Military adaptation and organisational convergence in war: Insurgents and international forces in Afghanistan
Publication Name
Journal of Strategic Studies
Abstract
Existing studies focus on explaining how militaries adapt in different ways to the challenges of war. However, organisation theory suggests that competition and normative pressure will lead overtime to convergence within particular business and policy sectors, as optimal ways of organizing and operating are learned and emulated. I examine this dynamic in the context of the conflict between the Afghan Taliban and the British Army. That there should be convergence in modes of operation or organizational form between these two very different opponents seems most improbable. Yet, as this article shows, convergence did occur as the conflict wore on.
Open Access Status
This publication is not available as open access
Volume
45
Issue
5
First Page
718
Last Page
742
Funding Number
ES/L008041/1
Funding Sponsor
Economic and Social Research Council