Does managerial pay disparity influence BHC default risk?
Publication Name
International Review of Economics and Finance
Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between managerial pay disparity (i.e., pay inequality of the CEO with other top executives and other employees) and default risk (measured using an innovative market-based credit default swap spread). The research relies on panel data for 1992 to 2018 from 198 U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). We find that managerial pay disparity is negatively related to BHC default risk, suggesting greater pay disparity does not necessarily contribute to excessive risk-taking and instability in the banking sector. However, additional analysis reveals that managerial pay disparity is associated with higher default risk among BHCs with assets of less than USD 50 billion. We also find that greater managerial pay disparity is detrimental to BHC stability in the presence of weaker board monitoring (in the form of less gender-diverse boards and higher board co-option). Overall, these findings suggest that BHC size and board monitoring mechanisms are important factors in understanding the influence of managerial pay disparity on BHC stability.
Open Access Status
This publication is not available as open access
Volume
92
First Page
1250
Last Page
1269
Funding Sponsor
Jyväskylän Yliopisto