Continuity skepticism in doubt: a radically enactive take
RIS ID
108763
Link to publisher version (URL)
Abstract
This chapter responds to several accusations that a REC-inspired program for explaining the natural origins of content—the NOC program, for short—is doomed to fail. Section 1 responds to a preliminary general concern that the NOC program is internally incoherent when seen in light of the Hard Problem of Content—a problem identified by RECers themselves. Section 2 considers a different, more softly pitched complaint against the NOC program—namely, that in drawing a sharp distinction between basic, contentless, and content- involving kinds of cognition, REC gives succor to continuity skepticism, the specific complaint being that REC is at odds with evolutionary continuity. Section 3 casts doubt on the idea that REC motivates this kind of continuity skepticism by offering a sketch of how the natural origins of content could be explained in a gapless, REC-friendly way that does not violate evolutionary continuity. Finally, Section 4 considers how REC fares against a different, philosophically motivated variety of continuity skepticism.
Publication Details
Hutto, D. D. & Satne, G. (2017). Continuity skepticism in doubt: a radically enactive take. In C. Durt, T. Fuchs & C. Tewes (Eds.), Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture: Investigating the Constitution of the Shared World (pp. 107-127). Cambridge, United States: The MIT Press. https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/embodiment-enaction-and-culture