Social constraints on the direct perception of emotions and intentions

Authors

Shaun Gallagher, University of Memphis
Somogy Varga, University Of Memphis

RIS ID

89046

Publication Details

Gallagher, S. and Varga, S. 2014, 'Social constraints on the direct perception of emotions and intentions', Topoi: an International Review of Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 185-199.

Abstract

In this paper, we first review recent arguments about the direct perception of the intentions and emotions of others, emphasizing the role of embodied interaction. We then consider a possible objection to the direct perception hypothesis from social psychology, related to phenomena like ‘dehumanization’ and ‘implicit racial bias’, which manifest themselves on a basic bodily level. On the background of such data, one might object that social perception cannot be direct since it depends on and can in fact be interrupted by a set of cultural beliefs. We argue, however, that far from threatening the idea of direct perception, these findings clearly contradict the idea of hardwired theory of mind modules. More generally, we suggest that in order to further the understanding of social cognition we must take seriously insights about in-group and out-group distinctions and related phenomena, all of which are currently neglected in the mainstream social cognition literature.