Strongly Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange

Authors

Rongmao Chen, National University of Defense Technology ChangshaFollow
Yi Mu, University of WollongongFollow
Guomin Yang, University of WollongongFollow
Willy Susilo, University of WollongongFollow
Fuchun Guo, University of WollongongFollow

RIS ID

119449

Publication Details

Chen, R., Mu, Y., Yang, G., Susilo, W. & Guo, F. (2016). Strongly Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange. In K. Sako (Ed.), Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2016 (pp. 19-36). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Abstract

Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols have been widely deployed in many real-world applications for securing communication channels. In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we revisit the security modelling of leakage-resilient AKE protocols, and show that the existing models either impose some unnatural restrictions or do not sufficiently capture leakage attacks in reality.We then introduce a new strong yet meaningful security model, named challenge-dependent leakage-resilient eCK (CLR-eCK) model, to capture challenge-dependent leakage attacks on both long-term secret key and ephemeral secret key (i.e., randomness). Second, we propose a general framework for constructing one-round CLR-eCK-secure AKE protocols based on smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs). Finally, we present a practical instantiation of the general framework based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption without random oracle. Our result shows that the instantiation is efficient in terms of the communication and computation overhead and captures more general leakage attacks.

Grant Number

ARC/DE150101116