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Yoko Harada
University of Wollongong

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*Floating Between the Orient and the Occident:
Japan, Australia and Their Inferiority Complex*

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

from

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

by

Yoko Harada

Bachelor of Arts

Master of Social Change and Development

Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies

School of History and Politics

2009

CERTIFICATION

I, Yoko Harada, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.

Yoko Harada

31 March 2009

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Figure 1: Cartoon “The Bridge on the River Euphrates” by Peter Nicholson
(23 February 2005, *The Australian*, p. 1)

AUTHOR'S NOTE

Following the custom in Japan, Japanese names are written in the following order; first surname and then given name throughout the thesis. Names of Korean and Chinese residing in Japan also follow this order.

Macrons to indicate long vowels in transliterated Japanese are not used in this thesis.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAP	Australian Associated Press
ABC	Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ACLALS	Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies
AGI	Asia Gateway Initiative
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
EAC	East Asia Community
EAS	East Asia Summit
EEC	European Economic Community
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
ICCNND	International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
ICR	The Institute of Cetacean Research
IHT	The International Herald Tribune
IWC	International Whaling Commission
JAS	The Journal of Asian Studies
JMOD	Japan Ministry of Defence
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
NIKKEI	<i>Nihon Keizai Shimbun</i>
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RSL	Returned and Services League of Australia

SDF	Self Defence Force (Japan)
SMH	The Sydney Morning Herald
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
UN	The United Nations

ABSTRACT

Japan and Australia are generally understood as very different countries in terms of culture, history and ethnicity. However, if we focus on their formation as modern nation states they are contemporaries and their similarities become visible. Under the influence of European and American imperial/colonial expansion, they both became modern nation states around the turn of the last century. As a result of being latecomers to the Western dominated international community they both developed an “inferiority complex” in relation to the West. This made them appear ambiguous within in the context of Asia where they geographically belong. Their ambiguous national identities are aptly represented in the reading of Edward W. Said by Japanese and Australian intellectuals. In a world which Said described being dichotomous and hierarchical, they float between the Orient and the Occident. Their ambiguous identities troubled by an inferiority complex are well reflected in their behaviour in the international arena. On the one hand, as frontrunners in the region in terms of modernity, they act in a superior manner towards neighbouring Asian countries. On the other hand, they tend to be connected to strong countries in the West. Japan and Australia’s closeness in recent years can be explained as an outcome of their similarly ambiguous position in the world. They are still captured by the rhetoric of colonialism and imperialism and in this sense they have not yet been fully “decolonised”.

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INTRODUCTION

Why do Japan and Australia appear similarly ambiguous within Asia? This thesis attempts to explain the situation by introducing the notion of an “inferiority complex” in relation to the West into the sphere of national identity.

Japan and Australia, which are geographically located on the periphery of Asia, are generally understood as very different countries. However, the moment in world history when the Japanese archipelago and the Australian continent transformed into nation states was almost the same. Japan and Australia gained the structure of a modern nation state at around the turn of the last century. Compared to other countries in the region, they were frontrunners as modern nation states. On the contrary, among the Western countries, which were dominating the international arena, they were latecomers. Both countries became obsessed with the idea of not being mature enough compared to the Western countries. Their process of creating their national identities was significantly affected by the idea. On the one hand, they suffered from an inferiority complex in relation to the West. On the other hand, to balance the unstable identity troubled by this complex, they acted in a superior manner in relation to neighbouring Asian countries. Their identities and behaviour floated ambiguously between the Orient and the Occident.

When comparing Japan and Australia, it is not difficult to point to stark differences. History and culture are simple examples and the environmental setting of the two countries is another aspect which makes them very different. Therefore, it is astounding to find a beautiful gum tree at the gate of a Commonwealth war cemetery not in Australia but in Japan. The Yokohama War Cemetery, for which the Commonwealth War Graves Commission has responsibility, was first settled by

the 38th Australian War Graves Unit in 1945 to concentrate the graves of Commonwealth prisoners of war which were scattered throughout Japan into one place (Yokohama War Cemetery Leaflet). The Cemetery consists of four main sections; United Kingdom, Australian, Indian and a combined New Zealand and Canadian (Yokohama War Cemetery Leaflet) and there are another two gum trees standing in the Australian section as if looking down on the Australian soldiers' graves. Fallen gum leaves cover the grave plaques.

As the name indicates, the Cemetery is located in Yokohama city. It is about an hour's trip by express train from Shinjuku station in central Tokyo to Hodogaya station in Yokohama, the nearest train station to the Cemetery. A further 20-minutes bus trip which goes through Hodogaya's commercial area and then a residential area is needed and a few minutes walk from a bus stop finally takes you to the entrance of the Cemetery. If it is in the midst of Japan's hot and very humid summer, people visiting the site will be fairly soaked with sweat by then and looking up at those gum trees which are usually associated with the dry climate of Australia in that very wet setting gives them quite an extraordinary experience. The strangeness of gum trees in the Japanese vegetation enhances the sentiment which was accumulated around those Australian soldiers who had lost their lives on foreign soil. The difference of environmental setting between the two countries increases the nostalgia of those who are familiar with the signature tree of Australia.

This sentiment exists similarly in Cowra, Australia, a town about three hundred kilometres west of Sydney. The town is well known as the site of the Prisoner of War camp and the breakout of Japanese from the camp in 1944 during the Pacific War. Nineteen years after the war, in 1964, a Japanese cemetery was established and the remains of Japanese POWs who died in Australia were all brought to this

site to rest. In 1979, the Japanese Garden was established and the town became known as a symbol of friendship between Australia and Japan (Kibbler 2006). In the late 80s, a project to plant sakura trees along a street connecting the former POW site, Japanese and Australian cemeteries and the Japanese Garden was launched (Kibbler 2006). The street is now called Sakura Avenue. *Sakura Matsuri* – Cherry Blossom Festival – is held annually in the town. The sight of a row of *sakura* trees – which is considered to be the symbol of “the distinctive Japanese cast of mind” (Watsuji 1961) by many Japanese people – within the climate of Australia, especially on the typical reddish Australian soil, was just as extraordinary as coming across gum trees in Japan.

The project to plant *sakura* trees started as a part of Australia’s Bicentennial celebration and the initial aim was to plant 1988 trees for the year 1988. The project is, however, taking more time to complete and still continues in 2009. One of the reasons for this delay is the climate in this dry Australian town (Kibbler 2006). It took time to implement a well established irrigation system which was crucial to providing enough water for *sakura* trees. In addition, the period suitable for planting *sakura* trees is quite short in dry weather conditions and the number of trees which could be planted within one year was limited. This episode simply and clearly tells of the difficulties in growing plants which are not native and symbolically demonstrates the difference between Australia and Japan in terms of the typical environment, and climate.

If what Watsuji Tetsuro, a Japanese philosopher and thinker on ethics, argued in his well known work *Fudo*, which was first published in 1935, is true, Japan and Australia, countries with such a stark difference in climate, could never be

compared. The Japanese term *fudo*, which is normally translated into English simply as “climate”, is explained by Watsuji as follows. He says:

I use our word Fu-do, which means literally, “Wind and Earth”, as a general term for the natural environment of a given land, its climate, its weather, the geological and productive nature of the soil, its topographic and scenic features. (Watsuji 1961, p. 1)

The purpose of Watsuji in writing the book was “to clarify the function of climate as a factor within the structure of human existence” (Watsuji 1961, p. v). He further explains:

Man’s way of life has its own distinctive historical and climatic structure, the individuality of which is shown with the greatest clarity by climatic patterns governed by the limitations within a climate. Climate, essentially, is historical; so climatic patterns are at the same time historical patterns. (Watsuji 1961, pp. 133-134)

In order to explore his argument, Watsuji introduces three types of climate – monsoon, desert and meadow – which indicate “man’s way of life” (Watsuji 1961, p. 134), according to zones defined in actual meteorological climate.

In this classification, Japan belongs to the monsoon type and to emphasise the particularity of Japan, he introduces the concept of “typhoon nature” (Watsuji 1961, p. 134). He states that Japan’s is a monsoonal climate but different from other monsoon climate countries, such as India, since the country, unlike others, is affected by very fickle seasonal winds which bring heavy rain – typhoons – and heavy snowfalls (Watsuji 1961, p. 134). This analysis leads him to connect this

characteristic of Japan's climate to the "Japanese cast of mind" and he defines the cast of mind as follows linking it to the *sakura* tree. He argues:

And it [notion of the Japanese which is abrupt as the representation of its typhoon nature] has further produced the distinctive Japanese cast of mind that exalts and sets great value on emotion and abhors all tenacity. It is of deep significance and highly appropriate that this mood of the Japanese should be symbolised by the cherry blossoms, for they flower abruptly, showily and almost in indecent haste; but the blooms have no tenacity – they fall as abruptly and disinterestedly as they flowered. (Watsuji 1961, p. 136)

Climate is, for Watsuji, a crucial element which has a significant influence on the very existence of human beings and on the creation of their character.

Unfortunately, Australia was not in the scope of Watsuji's thinking and is not mentioned in *Fudo* but it is not difficult to imagine that he, with no doubt, would have placed Australia in a different climate type from Japan's typhoon nature attached to the monsoon type and could have described the "Australian cast of mind" which is very different from the Japanese one based on his categorisation. People living in a land of *sakura* and a land of gum tree could never show a similar "cast of mind".

Nevertheless, on this onset of the twenty first century, not the two countries' differences but their similarities are attracting more attention. A book which came out in 2005, *Islands in the Stream: Australia and Japan Face Globalisation* is one of those examples which reflect a recent focus on Japan and Australia's similarities. An editor of the book Stephen Alomes starts his introduction by presenting "a contemporary cliché" saying "Australia and Japan are said to be the 'odd couple'"

but he points out that in fact they are “a comparable couple” (Alomes 2005, p. 1).

Explaining the purpose of the book he says:

This book explores the complex ways in which each society is facing the contemporary forces of globalisation, discovering that in several respects they are a comparable couple: two societies facing similar pressures on the economy, society and culture. (Alomes 2005, p. 1)

Japan and Australia are, according to Alomes, sharing the “experience of responding to global change” which derives from the patterns and pressures of globalisation on developed societies (Alomes 2005, p.1).

One crucial phenomenon which Alomes emphasises and identifies as one of the similarities the countries have is the rise of conservative politicians in both countries. Examples are the two Prime Ministers, Koizumi Junichiro and John Howard. Under the influence of globalisation, both countries have felt a sense of insecurity in economic, social, cultural and psychological terms. The wave of neo-liberalism that deregulated business structure and the workplace spread social anxiety among those who lost in the free competition race and they have sometimes fallen into psychological depression. In popular culture, Americanisation has made its way into both societies and they are in a position to feel a sense of cultural cringe – a sense of being inferior. Referring to the security issue, fear over terrorist threats is strong in both countries and they are strong allies of the United States in the “war on terror”. In spite of the situation where this supportive stance towards the United States makes them more likely to become targets of terrorist attacks, politics which pursue a hardline policy against “terrorism” is popular among the citizens both in Japan and Australia. These insecure circumstances legitimated the power

of politicians like Koizumi or Howard. They gained and held power as a result of populism.

While *Islands in the Stream* focused on issues mainly within the countries, a workshop held in Japan, also in 2005, focused on the disciplinary field of international relations. The workshop co-hosted by La Trobe University and Nanzan University of Japan titled “Searching for Equitability and Peace in the Post-9/11 World: Exploring alternatives for Australia and Japan” gathered 15 academics and researchers from both countries and also a couple from other Asian countries. The organisers’ focus was on both countries’ similarities. They clearly described this point in the concept and background section of the workshop’s website by saying “[t]here are remarkable similarities in the situations in which these two countries find themselves today, particularly in the context of the post-9/11 war on terrorism” (Joint Australia-Japan Workshop 2005). They especially recognised the similarities in both countries’ relationship with the United States where the two countries were closely tied in terms of their economies and, moreover, in terms of security (Joint Australia-Japan Workshop 2005). The organisers pointed to both countries quick and firm support for the United States in the war on terrorism and also recognised a similar “sense of vulnerability and threat” in both countries (Joint Australia – Japan Workshop 2005). Having these similarities as a premise, the workshop brought together and shared ideas from both countries and considered alternative directions which the countries could take (Joint Australia – Japan Workshop 2005).

One of the organisers of the workshop, Michael Seigel from the Institute for Social Ethics, Nanzan University, later reported three significant similarities between Japan and Australia which became apparent during the workshop. First, they both perceive Western civilisation as the supreme form of civilisation and try to

be a part of or try to be recognised as a part of this advanced civilisation by Western developed countries (Seigel 2006, p. 5). Secondly, their relationships with neighbouring Asia Pacific countries tend to be less close than would be expected and fear directed towards these countries has easily risen within both countries (Seigel 2006, p. 5). Finally, both Japan and Australia have a habit of considering bilateral alliances with stronger or the strongest power in the world as their most important international relationship in terms of security (Seigel 2006, p. 5).

What we are made to realise from these examples is that despite their differences in history, culture and geography, let alone climate, there are explicit and, at the same time, peculiar similarities between the two countries. A similar phenomenon exists among their nationals¹. It is the instability of their national identity which derives from their sense of immaturity and lack of confidence as a nation state. This is crucially affecting their behaviour in international relations and is expressed in their ambiguous attitude towards their neighbouring Asian countries. The similarities between Japan and Australia, thus, become more obvious in the context of Asia. In this thesis I argue that this situation can be explained as a symptom of their shared psychological problem – the possession of an inferiority complex in relation to the West.

In this thesis I will examine the problem – an inferiority complex – shared between Japan and Australia in three different dimensions: (1) how the inferiority complex was created in the historical context of their international relations, (2) how the inferiority complex is affecting their national identity with regard to their position in the world, and (3) how consequences of the inferiority complex are

¹ In this thesis, I will use the term “nationals” to refer to people who identify themselves with particular nation states (in most cases in this thesis Japan and Australia) and who are a part of the process of nation states to forge their national identities.

expressed in the international arena today. The first section of my thesis, Section A, presents a context for Japan and Australia's collective psychological instability regarding their national identity. Chapter One places the two countries in parallel position in world history in order to establish a basis for the argument of my thesis. Although Japan and Australia are generally seen as very different countries in terms of their history – Japan being seen as an old country and Australia as a new country – if we focus on their existence as nation states, it becomes clear that they are contemporaries in the modern era. They both emerged as new nation states and became visible in the international arena at around the turn of the last century.

The origin of present international relations is said to be found in 17th century Europe. The Westphalia Treaty which marked the end of the Thirty Year War (1618-48) established the basis of relationships between states – a polity which started to emerge in Europe in this period. One of the main concepts which had derived from the Treaty was the idea of sovereignty. The idea was to secure the independence of one state and repel others hoping to intervene. States were expected to have population, land, border, central government and bureaucracy, a set of laws including a constitution, and military and police to maintain their sovereignty.

Along with this structure of states, another key element that characterised the polity which is a modern creation was the notion of the nation. If elements of a “state” indicate a framework of a nation state, then a “nation” could be recognised as the spirit of the polity – a spirit which mobilises people as one unified polity. Whether the notion of nation is a modern idea or not is a controversial debate. Nevertheless, an ideology of nation – nationalism – is widely recognised as a modern creation. It was used by the leaders of states to generate an organic connection

among the population and unify them. Nation states developed into the main actors in the world and created modern international society.

The international order based on nation states which originated in the European continent started to expand outside Europe carried by imperialism and colonialism. Other parts of the world were gradually incorporated into the order. However, there are some counter arguments to this Eurocentric view. By following the flow of silver between 1600 and 1800, Andre Gunder Frank, for instance, presented China as the centre of the world at that time and tried to reconstruct the premise of present international relations. Nevertheless, the fact that international society is led mainly by Western powers today, makes it unrealistic to understate the significant influence of Europe or the West, plus the United States of America, on the present international order.

Japan and Australia which are geographically located in the Far East were created as modern nation states under the influence of the West's imperial and colonial expansion into Asia. In 1901, a new nation state, the Commonwealth of Australia, was born gathering together six colonies and obtaining permission from its mother country. It was clear evidence of the importance of British colonialism in the Asia Pacific. Only approximately a decade earlier, Japan had been transformed into a modern nation state by implementing its Western style constitution in 1889. Although domestic circumstances were already eroding its feudal system, stronger pressure for Japan to go through major social transformation came from overseas – mainly from the West. The gunboat diplomacy of the United States, followed by

other Western nations, pushed Japan to participate in international society. Thus, as modern nation states, Japan and Australia belong to the same generation².

Because of their different history and different influences from the West pushing them to become modern nation states, the incidents which took place in the Northern Hemisphere and in the Southern Hemisphere at around the turn of the last century may appear to be just coincidental. However, by focusing on the flow of world history and the two countries' positions in the flow, their contemporaneous aspects and their similar status in the newly constituted international society become apparent. They were latecomers to international society which was ruled by the rhetoric of the West, and simultaneously, they were frontrunners in their region, Asia, in being structured as nation states.

This ambiguous position of Japan and Australia being somewhere between the East and the West has affected their behaviour in international society. Having Japan and Australia in parallel, Chapter Two examines the similar ambiguity of the two countries by borrowing an idea from the area of psychology.

² Compared to Japan which had already started to behave as an independent imperial state by waging war against China and expanding its territory by colonising Ezo, Ryukyu, Taiwan and Korea by the end of the 19th century, Australia's ability to stand alone internationally at that time could be questioned. It was not until after World War Two that the country gained its independence from Britain with regard to foreign policy. From this perspective, there would be a challenge to my view that recognises the two countries as contemporaries. However, here I will make clear that in this thesis I am pointing to the contemporaneous aspect of the two countries by focusing on the timing of when they gained the constitutional structure of modern nation state. It is then that they were recognised as one unified polity in the international arena. More importantly, the two nation states both came into being somewhere between the rise of the Western imperial powers and the independence of colonised countries after World War Two. It is on this basis that I describe Japan and Australia as belonging to the same generation.

In addition, multicultural aspect of Australia may appear to contradict the idea of "nation state". Nevertheless, Australia is counted as one "nation state" by the United Nations, for example, in international sporting events, such as the Olympics. Therefore, in the context of this thesis, multicultural Australia is recognised as a single nation state.

Kawai Hayao, a Japanese psychologist, once interpreted the psychological state of one human being to understand the present world politics by specifically referring to the United States of America (Kawai 2001, pp. iv-v). Comparing the United States to an ego which is trying to keep control of the world order in their rhetoric, Kawai explains their reaction to the terrorist attacks in 2001, for example, as the symptom of a troubled ego. Incidents which significantly destabilise the identity of the States being a ruler of the world could be seen as a psychological complex.

Applying Kawai's idea to Japan and Australia, it is possible to see both countries as egos which are trying to maintain their own national identity. Since their establishment as modern nation states, they both have made an effort to forge their unique and proud national identities. However, their ambiguous state has negatively influenced their maintenance of the identity. Being latecomers to the international community, they unsuccessfully tried to catch up with and to become a part of the West. Therefore, they have been obsessed with the idea that they are not yet mature. This sense of immaturity turns into a psychological complex – in Japan's and Australia's cases an inferiority complex in relation to the West.

This inferiority complex disturbs the stable condition of their national identities and their behaviour as nation states occasionally betrays this aspect of their psychological situation. Being latecomers to the international arena ruled by the Western powers, Japan and Australia have always been attempting to catch up with the dominant power. They tend to see the world in a structure which has a hierarchy having the West at the summit and have believed that every nation state is developing and advancing in a linear way, from the East to the West.

Recognising themselves as being excluded from full membership of the Western club, they have been cautious about not falling into the category of "the East". This

idea leads them to differentiate consciously and also unconsciously and isolate themselves from those “inferior” Asian countries which are located in the East and are their neighbours. This behaviour by Japan and Australia is often seen. There are both past and present examples. This behaviour expresses their intention to show and reassure their superiority in relation to neighbouring countries and makes them feel closer to the West. Asia is used as a springboard for them to leap towards their maturity.

In Section B I depict the ambiguous identity of Japan and Australia by introducing orientalism as outlined by Edward W. Said. In his most prominent book *Orientalism*, Said explained that orientalism is “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said 2003, p. 3). He made apparent in the book that because of the practice of orientalism by the West, the present world is understood and perceived as a place divided into two parties: those who dominate, the Occident, and those who are dominated, the Orient. Referring to Said’s thoughts, my focus in this section is on the national identity of Japan and Australia in the dichotomous and hierarchical world structure.

For this purpose, in Chapter Three, we see how one of the most prominent and influential intellectuals of the twentieth century was introduced to Japan and Australia, how he and his ideas were received and understood in both societies and how he is remembered after his death in 2003. Said started to be widely recognised in Japan after a Japanese translation of *Orientalism* was published in 1986. Since the book was already generating a critical debate abroad, Japanese intellectual circles were quick to take it up and many book reviews followed, published in newspapers and academic journals. The most significant aspect of the book for Japanese intellectuals was that Said was criticising the discourse and rhetoric of the

West which are dominant in the present world. By placing Japan in the context of Said's argument, they recognised the hierarchical relationship between Japan, a country of the Orient, and the West. Moreover, some intellectuals became aware of Japan's character as "orientalist" in relation to neighbouring Asian countries.

Said's occasional but continuous appearance in the Japanese media was supported by a few Japanese intellectuals who tried to bring his ideas to the public, especially through newspapers. The only occasion for Said to visit Japan was also organised by an individual who wanted Said's perspective to be heard more widely by the Japanese public. A few Japanese publishers were constantly interested in bringing Said's writings to Japanese readers and, even after his death in 2003, several publications of Said's books and articles became available in Japanese.

Compared to the situation in Japan, Said's appearance and reception in Australia were rather low key and he himself was a more controversial figure. On the one hand, in the academic sphere, Said was introduced to the area of Asian studies around 1980 under the influence of academics in the United States. This was a result of response to Said's criticism of area studies which was defined by Said as being in the similar category to oriental studies – studies of Other. There was an explicit division between those who supported Said's argument and those who criticised him. Later his argument entered into postcolonial studies. Being a country with a colonial history, it was inevitable for intellectuals in Australia to sympathise with Said's perspectives from the periphery. On the other hand, within the public sphere, Said's origin as a Palestinian specifically came under the spot light. He was taken as an expert on the Middle Eastern conflicts and, moreover, was seen as a symbolic figure of the anti-Zionist movement and occasionally became the target of those who supported Israel.

Nevertheless, there are people in Australian society who try to maintain the thoughts of Said both in academia and the public sphere more generally. Although it is a rather silent flow, Said's legacy is alive in Australia as it is in Japan.

It is against this background of Said's reception in Japan and Australia that in Chapter Four I will examine how intellectuals in both countries read Said and how they have located themselves in the West/East divided world. In addition, how Japan and Australia were seen and categorised by Said will be presented. I will try to depict the state of national identity in both countries: countries which float between the Orient and the Occident.

From the writings of intellectuals in Japan, it is clear that there are three dimensions to locate Japan in Said's context. The most popular way to perceive Japan was to put the country in the category of the Orient. Generally, there is almost a consensus for seeing Japan geographically, ethnically, historically and culturally as an Oriental country. Nevertheless, *Orientalism* made intellectuals "re-realise" that Japan is not simply located in the Orient but it is represented by the West to belong to the Orient. Said's argument made clear that Japan is in a subordinate position in relation to the West. The criticism of Said of the West's orientalist behaviour eased the resentment of people on the archipelago who were always under the pressure from the West particularly since being forced to open up the country in 1853.

The second dimension, however, shows a different Japanese character. When it comes to the issues of the Middle East, Japan slightly shifts its position to the Occident. The way the Middle East is represented in Japan was not crucially different from the representation of the region in the West. The image of the Middle East in Japan is generally integrated into exoticism or terrorism since Japan is

mainly importing images of the Middle East from the United States. As a result, Japan's gaze towards the Middle East is similar to the gaze given by the Occident towards its subject, the Orient.

In the third dimension Japanese position becomes clearer and firmer. The focus is on the relationship between the country and the neighbouring Asian countries and it recognises Japan as an orientalist, being a coloniser and an imperial power in the region. Therefore, the third dimension is the most controversial for Japan regarding the reading of *Orientalism*. This practice is termed "Japanese orientalism" and it depicts not only Japan's expansionism in Asia before the Pacific War but also its attitude towards its "inner other" – mainly Koreans residing in Japan as a consequence of the imperialism of Japan in the past – after the war up until the present day.

As it is apparent from my brief outline of these three dimensions, Japan is a country which has both Oriental and Occidental characteristics. Japan appears to be rather ambiguous in the framework of the Orient/the Occident divided world described by Said. The status of Japan floats somewhere between the two categories.

Writing by Australian intellectuals referring to Said also could be divided into three different dimensions but in a slightly different form than that of Japan. The first and the most popular way to situate Australia in Said's context was to see the country as an orientalist in Asia. Being a nation state created by a Western imperial power in the non-Western part of the world, this was an inevitable aspect of the character of Australia. The country's link with the Occident regarding its origin led to Australia observing neighbouring Asian countries as the other and

alienated itself from the rest of Asia. Its mindset was with the Occident and its behaviour towards neighbours tends to resemble a Western rulers' attitude.

This first dimension refers to Australia's relationship with the others which exist outside the country, whereas the second dimension features the others within the country. This dimension is distinctive to Australia which is a multicultural country. Having an indigenous population and many immigrants not only from Britain or other parts of Europe but also from Asia, Australia has the Orient within itself. This was the reality of the Australian continent from the very day the British settlers landed in 1788. To describe the mainstream white population's attitude towards the "inner other", Australian intellectuals borrowed the idea from Said. The attitude was comparable to orientalist from the West.

The third dimension, however, shows a different character of Australia. By focusing on the fact that Australia was an outpost of the British Empire, there are Australian intellectuals who stress the country's subjection to Britain – the Occident. This makes Australia slip from the status of the Occident as it was seen in the first and the second dimensions. Its position moves slightly in the direction of the non-Occident, if not the Orient.

Thus, Australia's position in the Orient/Occident divided world is ambiguous. The background of this ambiguity is different but Australia shares this characteristic with Japan. Reading of Said by Australian intellectuals suggests that Australia's identity also floats between the Occident and the Orient.

In the third part of Chapter Four, I will focus on Said's perspective toward the two countries and examine how Japan and Australia were depicted in his writings. Throughout his career as an intellectual speaking to the world, Said's interest was always focused on the Middle East. The United States and European countries

were also within the scope of his interest as they were inseparable from the problems in the Middle East. On this basis, Japan or Australia was never a central issue for Said. In his main book *Orientalism*, Australia is not mentioned and Japan was referred to just a few times and in an insignificant way. However, in *Culture and Imperialism*, a book frequently seen as a sequel of *Orientalism*, Said deals not only with issues between the Middle East and the West but also more widely with other parts of the world and, in that context, Japan and Australia attract his attention. In Said's view, Australia was mainly perceived as a subject of the British Empire and it was not in the category of the Occident. On the other hand, Japan was in most cases categorised as being in the Orient by Said. However, on several occasions in *Culture and Imperialism*, Said refers to Australia and Japan's characters which could be interpreted as orientalist. Thus, even in Said's view, the location of Japan and Australia in the world floats between the Orient and the Occident.

Finally in the third section of my thesis, in Section C, I present symptoms of both countries which are the consequences of their inferiority complex. The complex which is created by their ambiguous position in the world and their ambiguous national identity, is expressed in the two countries' behaviour with regard to their international relations.

In Chapter Five I look at both countries' similarly ambiguous attitude towards Asia. Because the dynamism which Asia is demonstrating as the twenty first century begins, the region is gaining attention from all over the world mainly for economic reasons. Japan and Australia are also on board with respect to this interest. They seek to benefit from the region while understanding Asia is one of the top priorities for both societies. Asia or neighbouring Asian countries are

frequently taken up as an object of study by intellectuals and mentioned in everyday discourses including in media stories.

What becomes apparent from this phenomenon in both countries is the existence of a psychological border between Asia and themselves. Despite their geographical proximity to the region, they neither perceive themselves as belonging to Asia nor try to situate themselves within the region. A sense of otherness and remoteness is always lying beneath their references to Asia. Asia exists in their neighbourhood but in a slightly remote distance. This gives an impression that Asia is an object for them to handle and they seem to be having difficulties doing so.

Their awkwardness in relating to Asia is expressed in the international arena with regard to regional integration. Their relationship with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their behaviour in the movement to form the East Asia Community (EAC) are apparent examples. Their ambiguous behaviour could be described as “one foot in Asia, the other in the West”. They do not want to lose the benefits which will be created from economic ties with Asia and, simultaneously, they have confidence in their better knowledge of the region due to their geographic proximity.

Nevertheless, both Japan and Australia do not sit comfortably within Asia and they tend to turn to their allies in the West as if searching for their mentors. This phenomenon is a representation of their belief in hierarchy among nations and is a symptom of their inferiority complex.

In the last chapter of my thesis, Chapter Six, I offer an explanation of the closeness of the two countries in this twenty first century. It is another symptom of the complex. Recently, especially in the era of the Australian Prime Minister John Howard and the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and his successor Abe

Shinzo, both Australia and Japan frequently referred to each other as “natural partners”.

In spite of this intimacy between the two countries, in reality there are some tensions and disputes in their international relations. One example of tension is negotiation regarding their bilateral free trade agreement. Although their studies group on the agreement have been meeting continuously to work on the issue, it is not an easy task for them to formalise the signing of the agreement since Australian farmers are demanding free access to the Japanese market where farmers, especially rice farmers, are heavily protected by the government to secure its national self-sufficient rate.

Another area where Japan and Australia take up completely different positions is over the issue of whaling. Every year when an annual meeting of the International Whaling Committee approaches or when the Japanese whaling ships start to hunt whale in the Antarctic for scientific research, an outcry opposing the Japanese activity bursts out in Australia. Suddenly Japan is represented as a savage nation by the Australian media, far from an image of a “natural partner”.

Conflicting memories of the Pacific War is also an issue over which Australia and Japan do not and cannot share a historical sensibility. From Japan’s point of view, the memory of the war mainly integrate into an image of a war fought against the United States. On the contrary, Australia remembers this war in the Pacific as a war against Imperial Japan. With dark memories hosted by prisoners of war, Australian society still holds a strong resentment towards the Japanese.

Nevertheless, there is some sign that the present international climate is drawing them closer and overcoming those difficulties that lie between them. The most prominent example of this has been the deployment of additional Australian

soldiers to Iraq in 2005 to protect the engineers of the Japanese Self Defence Force. Imagining the strong resentment that exists in Australian society regarding the former war in the Pacific, this was seen as an epoch-making event for the relationship between Australia and Japan. However, under the present politics of the international arena, it was a natural initiative taken by both governments.

What is evident here is that both Japan and Australia have a very strong connection with the United State. Japan with the Japan – U.S. Security Treaty and Australia with the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty. Both countries are tied to the sole super power in the present world. And with the signing of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and Australia in 2007, it was said that it was the completion of the security triangle in the Asia Pacific. This tendency of both countries to move towards the West, in this case the United States, has resulted in them isolating themselves from their neighbouring Asian countries. Considering their mindset, thinking there is a hierarchy in the world order, this also is a symptom caused by their inferiority complex. This is the very reason why the two countries have been close to each other in this new century.

The age of colonialism and imperialism are believed to have become a thing of the past. Most of the nations which were objects of colonialism gained independence after World War Two. Referring to the membership of the United Nations, there are 192 members (United Nations 2006) and each state acts as one sovereign independent nation in the current international arena. Nevertheless, traces of colonialism and imperialism are still alive in the world today. The rhetoric which drives international politics today is particularly deeply affected by views drawn from the past.

Japan and Australia are also under the influence of this rhetoric from the previous era. An inferiority complex in relation to the West which the two countries share is a remnant of colonialism and imperialism. This complex is affecting their sense of national identity and has had a negative influence on their relationship with neighbouring Asian countries. The time is overdue for the two countries to overcome and to be free from the dichotomous and hierarchical world-view. Examination of the countries' inferiority complex is therefore a matter of great urgency.

SECTION A:

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA IN PARALLEL

INTRODUCTION

The remark that “Japan and Australia resemble each other” is quite provocative. Apart from the fact that they are both advanced industrialised democratic countries in the world today, their images are very different. A Japanese historian Fujikawa Takao begins his book on a history of Australia, *Oosutoraria Rekishi no Tabi* (Australia: A historical journey), saying “For a *new* country like Australia ...” (emphasis added: Fujikawa 1997, p. 4). A few lines later, he again emphasises “Australia is an extremely *new* country (emphasis added: 1997, p. 4).” Indeed, as expressed proudly in the national anthem, *Advance Australia Fair*, Australia is a “young” and “free” country. If you observe Australia’s history from the days when European settlement began in 1788 with the arrival of the First Fleet from England led by Captain Arthur Philip as well as the recognition of the continent as *terra nullius*, this becomes apparent. And, it is this image of Australia being young or fresh or new that is a major reason why the impressions of Australia and Japan, seem so different.

Japan, on the contrary, is generally recognised as having “an ancient culture”. Japan is normally associated with a long history and ancient traditions. According to Amino Yoshihiko, there is almost a consensus among present academics of ancient Japanese history that the name of the country *Nippon*³ appeared in the

³ *Nippon* is the name of the country in Japanese language. It could also be pronounced as *Nihon*.

history of the archipelago around the end of the seventh century, although the exact date or year is unclear (Amino 2000, p. 88). This 1,300 year long history of Japan could be extended for another 1,300 years for those who recognise that the country's origin coincides with the Emperor system. The basis of the belief is descriptions in two Japanese ancient history books: *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Things) which appeared in 712 and *Nihon Shoki* (Chronicle of Japan) in 720 which tell of the first Emperor Jinmu who succeeded to the throne in 660BC (Henshall 2004, p. 6, Totman 2005, p. 50). Though records were established by myths and legends and the existence of the first nine emperors, including Jinmu, had been widely rejected in present Japanese historiography (Amino 2000, p. 102)⁴, the continuity of the Imperial family is used by Japanese nationalists to emphasise the uniqueness of their country. Reflecting this view, the Japanese national anthem praises the Imperial reign and prays for longer prosperity of the Imperial family⁵. This is a significant contrast with the “young” and “new” and “fresh” country Australia, a creation of modern era.

This explicit contrast between Japan and Australia in terms of the length of the country's history, however, becomes blurred when we focus on the countries' character and role in the present international arena as nation states. Both Japan and Australia started to form one unified polity which became the basis of their present status in the world as sovereign nation states in the middle of nineteenth

⁴ Amino points out that it is not until the late 7th century the title “emperor”, *Tenno* in Japanese, itself appeared in an official record. He also stresses that we should be cautiously reminded that there was no history of “*Nippon*” before the end of the 7th century. Concept of “*Nippon-jin* (Japanese people)” neither existed. (Amino 2000)

⁵ Japanese anthem *Kimi ga Yo* (literary means His Majesty's reign) was composed in the late 19th century. Lyric was taken from Japanese ancient poetry but the tune was a modern creation. Although a debate arguing whether the original poetry meant His Majesty or not is still unsettled, it was composed to praise Emperor Meiji and it is now recognised by the majority of the Japanese population that the anthem is strongly connected to the reign of the Imperial family. (Matsumoto 2000, pp. 105-124)

century. They both implemented modernised constitutions as a vital component of the political structure of their states at around the turn of the last century and, by the end of World War One, they had established their presence in the international arena. Simultaneously, the means to bind the population under the same political system as unified group of people – nationalism – had been generated in the archipelago and on the continent. This historical event – the forming of modern nation states – locates the two countries in parallel and allows us to observe them as contemporaries. It suggests that Japan and Australia share an historical backdrop and experiences in the course of the development of international society in the modern context. At the same time, it indicates that there is no surprise that Japan and Australia have similar behavioural tendencies in the present international arena.

My primary purpose in this first section of the thesis is to establish the basis of my argument in my overall thesis – that is to place Japan and Australia in a parallel position. In Chapter 1, I establish and make clear my proposition that Japan and Australia are contemporaries in modern world history. They share same ground and similar characteristics as nation states. First, I use this chapter to review the history of the present international relations system which is believed to have originated in Europe. As I have noted, the development of international society from its Westphalian origins emerged in the seventeenth century. A sovereign unified polity – a nation state – which derived from the system became a unit to form international society. This significantly Eurocentric view about the origin of international relations is resisted by some scholars with an Asia-centric perspective.

By observing the fact that the international society today is significantly driven by the rhetoric led by the strong states of the West, I suggest the importance and inevitability of recognising the origin of present international relations are in Europe. At this point, two main characters of this thesis will be brought back into my discussion. Japan and Australia will be placed in a parallel position and their footsteps as they gradually transformed themselves into nation states from the mid-nineteenth century to early twentieth century and historical circumstances which had surrounded them will be followed. I also describe their behaviour in the international arena in those early days. Contemporaneous aspects of the two countries will become apparent. They belong to a similar generation of nation states in a history of international relations.

In my second Chapter, I establish the existence of an inferiority complex in relation to the West that lies within Japan's and Australia's national identity. As I demonstrate in the first Chapter, when Japan and Australia were establishing unified polities in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the world was already dominated by European and American powers. The newly formed nation states – Japan and Australia – entered into the international arena which had been controlled by those Western powers and, as latecomers, they had to accept the rhetoric which had already been widely accepted. Borrowing from J. V. D'Cruz and William Steele's words explaining the situation of Australia, both Australia and Japan were "Junior members" of the West club (D'Cruz & Steele 2003, p. 289). This circumstance apparently shows Japan's and Australia's subordinate position to the Western countries and their second class status in the international arena.

Although this was a circumstance which was created more than a hundred years ago, this hierarchy between the West and the two countries in the international

arena is not only an historical issue but also a contemporary problem. A notion of being in a subordinate position in relation to the West is deeply embedded in the collective mind of their nationals and expressed in both countries' everyday discourses. In both countries, for example, there is a tendency to conduct "needless comparison" (Phillips 1980, p. 113) with Western powers. On one hand, in Australia, a norm, termed a "cultural cringe" persists among Australian people. They tend to examine the question of whether they were good enough using comparison with the mother country and also with the United States nowadays. On the other hand, the Japanese are keen on meeting a "universal standard" or "global standard". For them "standard" is almost always a standard drawn from the Western world and, therefore, they are also comparing themselves to Western countries. This behaviour of the nationals of both countries is an expression of their lack of confidence as mature nation states. This sense of immaturity has its root in their origins as nation states.

What could be detected from this phenomenon is an inferiority complex in relation to the West within the two nations' collective psyche. This psychological state of both countries has affected their behaviour in the international arena like symptoms of a neurosis derived from an inferiority complex. This inferiority complex makes them feel less significant than Westerners and Western states and, as a result, the governments of Japan and Australia have followed along behind Western powers in the present international arena. Simultaneously, their behaviour towards their neighbouring Asian countries is affected by this complex. For Japan and Australia, countries where the collective national notion is obsessed with the idea of the world being a place with a West/East divide and hierarchy, creating an inferior Other was a way to balance their national identity. Their

neighbours have been an easy target for rehabilitation as both Japan and Australia were frontrunners in Asia in terms of modernisation. Being an outpost of Empire, the settler society on the Australian continent has from the very beginning positioned itself as superior to Asian countries which were the targets of the European and American domination. In Japan's case, by transforming itself into an imperial state in Asia, it alienated itself from the region and viewed Asian countries as inferior. It was possible for the two countries to feel a sense of superiority when placed in the context of Asia.

An inferiority complex in relation to the West is significantly affecting Japan's and Australia's behaviour in the present international society and this is making the two countries appear similarly ambiguous within and towards Asia. In this section I present Japan and Australia as contemporary nation states in the modern era and examine a shared problem – the inferiority complex – which disturbs their national identity.

CHAPTER 1: Contemporaries in the international arena

INTRODUCTION

Japan and Australia have more in common than is generally understood and believed. Their similarities start to emerge and become clear when we focus on their behaviour in the current international system of nation states. Nation states are constituent members of international society. In other words, nation states are units which are the players in the international arena today. They interact with each other and create the nature of the arena. The reason for the similarity between Japan and Australia as nation states is, I argue, that the archipelago and the continent share a period in world history when they formed as nation states and entered world politics. Along with this historical background, their common geographical location – situated in the non-Western part of the world and on the periphery of Asia – contributed to Japan and Australia fostering similar characteristics.

In this chapter I will review the origin of the present international society and attempt to locate the two countries in the flow of the history of the international system to demonstrate their contemporaneous aspect. First, I will examine the emergence and the development of the present international society by focusing on the formation of a nation state and I will survey the widely-shared understanding of international relations today. My examination will simultaneously confirm how international society has been significantly dominated by Western-centric rhetoric. Then, I will bring in the two main nation states studied in my thesis, Japan and Australia, in relation to the history of international relations. I will trace the nation

state building which proceeded on both sides of the Equator in a similar period in history and I will place them in a parallel and comparative position.

REVIEWING THE ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The present world operates with nation states as its key players. In this age of globalisation, it is true that there are many other non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations or multinational corporations which play their part in working to create one global society. Nevertheless, in order to review the emergence and the development of present international relations, it is necessary to recognise the significance of nation states as the main players in the international arena.

In their introduction to *The Globalization of World Politics* which they edited as an introductory textbook for students of international relations, Steve Smith and John Baylis ask “[w]hy does the main title of this book refer to world politics rather than international politics or international relations?” (Smith & Baylis 2001, p. 2). Calling “international politics” and “international relations” “the traditional names”, Smith and Baylis suggest that “world politics” is a better phrase for the book since, having a focus on the contemporary world, their “interest is in the politics and political patterns in the world, and not only those between nation-states (as the term international politics implies)” (2001, p. 2). The activities of “transnational actors” such as “multinational companies, terrorist groups or human rights non-governmental organizations” are within their scope (2001, p. 2). They also point out that the phrase “international relations” indicates that their focus is only on relationships between nation-states and so underestimates the influence of actors such as cities, other governmental organisations or international organisations (2001, p. 2). Baylis and Smith make the point by suggesting that these non-state

actors are becoming more influential in the world and the power of nation states is relatively declining.

Baylis and Smith's emphasis on the decline of the power of nation states paradoxically highlights how nation states had been significant players in politics in the world until the debate over globalisation and a borderless world became popular in the final years of the twentieth century. Moreover, even though we do recognise players in the international arena other than nation states, the power of nation states has not necessarily weakened. In some areas, for instance, restrictions on the migration of human beings or the boundary of nation states is becoming firmer. The most prominent international body today, the United Nations, which both Japan and Australia consider to be the central organisation in terms of diplomatic principles⁶, has states as its constituent members⁷ (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter II, Article 3). Therefore, in order to trace the development of international society, the focus should be on the nation state which is an essential unit for the construction of present-day international society.

To begin my review of present international relations from a historical perspective, it is necessary for me to go back to seventeenth century Europe. The Peace of Westphalia which marked the end of the Thirty Years War (1618-48) between Germany, France and Sweden is an event which is crucial for scholars and

⁶ In 1957, the then Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke released a Diplomatic Bluebook and referred to three principles which underlie the Japanese diplomacy (Kitaoka 2000, p. 311). The principles were: having the United Nation as its core, the cooperation with the free world and being a part of Asia. Although "free world" is now almost replaced by the United States, Japan still keeps these principles as the core of its foreign policy. On the other hand, the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's speech in 2008 refers to "the three pillars of the Government's foreign policy". The alliance with the United States, the commitment with the United Nations and the engagement with Asia are the three pillars (Rudd 2008b).

⁷ Articles in Chapter II which is referring to the UN's membership indicate that members of the body are "states". For instance, Article 3 says "[t]he original Members of the United Nations shall be the states ..." and Article 4, Clause 1 says "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states ...".

students of international relations or anybody who refers to the origin of international society today. Karen Mingst notes in her book on international relations:

The Thirty Years' War (1614-48) devastated Europe, with armies plundering the central Europe landscape, fighting battles and surviving by ravaging the civilian population. But the treaty that ended the conflict had a profound impact on the practice of international relations. (Mingst 1999, p. 28)

Robert H. Jackson argues that the event “was the first explicit expression of a European society of states which served as a precedent for all subsequent developments of international society” (Jackson 2001, p. 44). Jan Aart Scholte clearly states that before this age of globalisation, “world politics was chiefly organized on the basis of the so-called Westphalian system” which he explains as “a states-system” (Scholte 2001, p. 20). Thus, recognising Westphalia as the beginning of the present international society and international relations is a common understanding among people dealing with international affairs.

There are, of course, some views that contradict this premise. Jackson refers to two such views. Martin Wight, according to Jackson, argued in his book *Systems of States* that “... Westphalia is the coming age but not the coming into existence of European international society ...” and Wight saw “the Council of Constance (1415) which, in effect, transformed the papacy into a quasi-secular political power with its own territory” as the origin (Jackson 2001, p. 43). F. H. Hinsley chose a later date than the Westphalian view and recognised that the emergence of modern international society happened in the eighteenth century (Jackson 2001, p. 43). Nevertheless, Jackson concludes:

... however we choose to look at it, the multinational treaties of Westphalia, and those which came after, were conceived as the foundation of secular international law or what came to be known as the 'public law of Europe' (Hinsley 1967: 168). (2001, p. 43)

The Peace of Westphalia was a historic event for the formation of modern international society. This became the starting point of the current international society and a system derived from the event became the common understanding of international affairs.

As the Westphalia system was defined as "a states-system" (Scholte 2001, p. 20), the emergence of "states" coincided with the idea of sovereignty, the most significant outcome of the peace negotiation of Westphalia. Jackson notes that "[t]he treaties of Westphalia formally recognized the existence of separate sovereignties in one international society" (2001, p. 43). Mingst puts the development of "the notion of sovereignty" at the top of her list of "key developments after Westphalia" (1999, p. 28). She states that as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia, "virtually all the small states in central Europe attained sovereignty" (1999, p. 28). Each state gained "exclusive rights within a given territory" and "the notion of the territorial state was accepted" (1999, p. 28). A state which is independent and not dominated by other states emerged as a geographical unit from which different states conduct interactions. Mark A. Boyer and John T. Rourke's analysis of states' characteristics confirms this point. Six characteristics of states – sovereignty, territory, population, diplomatic recognition, internal organisation and domestic support – are presented and they assert that sovereignty is the most important one. (Boyer & Rourke 2004, p. 132). In connection with contemporary international relations, Jackson recognises that:

The seeds of state sovereignty and non-intervention that those seventeenth-century statespeople planted would eventually evolve into the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions, and other contemporary bodies of international law. (Jackson 2001, p. 43)

States, defined around the idea of sovereignty which has its origin in seventeenth century Europe, have developed into the main global players.

Thus, what was required for a polity which had a territory and a settled population to form a state were elements which assured the sovereignty of the polity. As I have noted, it is at least required to have a central government and bureaucracy, a set of laws including a constitution which binds the population together, the police to keep order within the polity and military force to protect the territory and its border which separates itself from the wider world. Namely, a state represents the structural aspect of a unified polity which is then an actor in international society. Apart from this framework of the polity, in order to make this structure stay unified and function as one entity, something organic to bind the people together is required. This is the point where the aspect of the “nation”, which coincides with the notion of nationalism, comes into my discussion. If the “state” is the body, then the “nation” could be recognised as the spirit of a nation state. As Eric Hobsbawm puts it “[t]he state was the framework of the citizens’ collective actions ...” (Hobsbawm 1994, p. 264) but, at the same time, people needed a unified will which made them take collective action.

According to international relations scholars, nationalism, a collective will which binds people as one nation, was a creation that came after the Westphalia Treaty. It is said that it emerged in the eighteenth century and developed into the nineteenth century (Halliday 2001, p. 443, Mingst 1999, p. 31). Mingst points to the American

Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789 which were encouraged by the Enlightenment as the main incubators for emerging nationalism (1999, p. 30).

Explaining nationalism, Mingst says:

Nationalism leads people to participate actively in the political process. For example, during the French Revolution, a patriotic appeal was made to the masses to defend the nation and its new ideals. This appeal forged an emotional link between the masses and the state. (1999, p. 31)

It was recognised as “the foundation for politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” (1999, p. 31). Boyer and Rourke also refer to the American and French revolutions, stating that democracy, which derived from the two revolutions, gave a push to nationalism and solidified and “promoted the creation of the national state” (Boyer & Rourke 2004, p. 137).

However, the view that the “nation” is a modern creation is not necessarily widely accepted. As Osawa Masachi, a Japanese sociologist, points out, whether nation and nationalism are the creations of the modern era or not is the most significant and controversial debating point for theoretical arguments regarding nation and nationalism (Osawa 2002, p. 296). Anthony D. Smith, in his well known work *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, reviews two main arguments referring to the origin of the concept of “nation”. Smith categorises scholars like Benedict Anderson, who is widely known for his book *Imagined Communities*, and Ernest Gellner, the author of *Nations and Nationalism*, as “modernists”, those who argue nations and nationalism are completely modern creations (Smith 1989, p. 10). An academic of international relations, Immanuel Wallerstein also investigates the “modernists” category (1989, p. 227). In contrast, scholars who opposes the view of ‘modernists’

and see the longer continuation of a collective notion of nations are categorised as “perennialists”, those who recognise nation as having a perennial existence (1989, p. 12). To the debate between these dichotomous views regarding nations and nationalism, Smith adds the concept of the *ethnie* to point out the shortcomings of both sides and to present his way of understanding the origin of nations. As the title of the first chapter of the book “Are nations modern?” indicates, he is more concerned about the “modernist” view and tries to see some kind of continuity between the nations in the modern sense and a collective notion of communities which existed in the pre-modern era. Smith recognises nations as having duality with the *ethnie* – the ethnic community – and, simultaneously, pointed out that the development from the *ethnie* to nations was encouraged by the transformations which occurred in the modern era (1989, pp. 13-16).

Paradoxically, what becomes apparent in Smith’s argument is the significance of modern factors in the formation of nations. Smith explicitly describes “nationalism” as “a wholly modern phenomenon ...” (1989, p. 18). Even though he is making an effort to present the continuity between the pre-modern *ethnie* and the modern nation, he is also admitting the modern aspect of nations which are based on an ideology and movement to form a nation – nationalism.

Considering the purpose of this thesis, examining the location and the behaviour of Japan and Australia in the present international arena, then, it is crucial to focus on this modern aspect of the nation. Reiterating, most international relations scholars recognise nations and nationalism as modern creations. It is a common understanding among them. Fred Halliday’s explanation indicates this. He says “[t]he invocation of history is very central to the whole nationalist view of the world: ideas of the ‘ancient’, the ‘primordial’, the ‘traditional’, the ‘age-old’ are commonly

invoked. But the doctrine itself is of more recent origin ...” (Halliday 2001, p. 443). He continues “... the contemporary usage of the word ‘nation’ and its associated doctrine ‘nationalism’ dates from the eighteenth century” (2001, p. 443). Thus, the understanding by international relations experts, a political entity “state” which emerged from the Treaties of Westphalia had evolved along with the notion of “nation” which was used as a tool to mobilise the population within the state from the eighteenth century and the interaction between those nation states created the standards and basis of modern international relations.

While Europe was experiencing this transformation, it was at the same time expanding its influence to the non-European part of the globe. As Hedley Bull and Adam Watson state:

This European international society, it should be noted, did not first evolve its own rules and institutions and then export them to the rest of the world. The evolution of the European system of interstate relations and the expansion of Europe across the globe were simultaneous processes, which influenced and affected each other. (Bull & Watson 1985, p. 6)

The system started to move out of Europe along with the expansion of European states in the form of colonialism and imperialism. Referring again to the outcome of the Treaty of Westphalia, Mingst acknowledges both the development of the “centralized control of institutions under military” and the emergence of a “capitalist economic” system besides the development of sovereignty as the key developments of the Treaty (1999, p. 28). Militarism and capitalism drove European states to move out of their area in the form of empires. By the end of the nineteenth century, Europe was totally divided into nation states and areas outside Europe had

gradually been integrated into those empires as colonies (Oguma 2002, p. 635). The idea of recognising the nation state as a modern creation and as the main player in international society spread out from Europe, as well. It took another half a century for the entire world to be covered by nation states, since it was not until after World War Two that most former colonies of the Empires gained independence and formed nation states of their own. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, the system of international relations which had evolved from the Westphalian system was already setting the rules and driving world politics. Thus, the basis of the present international relations system is significantly Eurocentric or, by adding the United States to those powers, Western-centric.

AN ALTERNATIVE WORLD VIEW

The view that present international relations has its roots entirely in the West circulates as a “common understanding” in the world today. However, there are some scholars from the Orient who contest this Western-centric “common understanding”. This idea of the West moving into other parts of the world, specifically into Asia, which is frequently cited in the context of colonialism or imperialism, blinds us from recognising the interaction between different polities within Asia and as a result people tend to be ignorant about the history of the region before its encounter with the West. When people see things only from a Western-centric perspective, whether they are Westerners or non-Westerners, it is easy to lose the other side of the story. Those scholars who are arguing against the Western-centric world view try to introduce alternative ways of seeing the world and its history.

A Japanese scholar Hamashita Takeshi, who presents an alternative view and challenges the Western-centric view, argues:

... the history of modern Asia needs to be clarified, not in terms of the 'stages of development' of the Western modernization model, but in terms of the complex of interrelationships within the region itself, in the light of Asian self-conceptions. (1994, p. 91)

He insists that although "[i]t has long been the practice to analyse modern Asia from the view point of nations and international relationships", it is necessary to analyse Asia by focusing on 'areas' or 'regions', "an intermediate category between the nation and the world generally" (1994, p. 91). Hamashita pays attention to the tribute system with China at the centre of the system. He examines the situation in East Asia and Southeast Asia in around the period of the 17th to 19th century and points out that trade had developed in the area in accordance with the tribute system. Trade conducted by Chinese junks was studied thoroughly to demonstrate the validity of his argument. Hamashita places Western countries, Holland and Portugal, on the outskirts of this tribute system. He points out that countries which were a part of this Sino-centric tribute system created their national identity in relation to China and goes on further to say "Nationalism was born in Asia from within the tribute system and through common ideals of tribute relationships" (1994, p. 94).

Hamashita is not alone in challenging the "common understanding" about Western-centric international relations and history. Sugihara Kaoru, another Japanese academic, challenges the conventional view recognising Asia as a stagnated place by focusing on an Asian trade bloc (Sugihara 2001, p. 132). His fundamental question is why do we simply believe that the Western system was superior to the other regions in every historical period and spread to the rest of the world? Is there not a difficulty with this view? The necessity to re-examine each

region's history with this question in mind is stressed by Sugihara (2001, p. 136). Sugihara specifically mentions a group of scholars called the California school which is trying to re-write world history and to re-grasp Europe's history using a history of East Asia. Kenneth Pomeranz, Jack Goldsmith and Bin Wong belong to this school (2001, pp. 135-136). Hamashita's point of view is shared by those who are researching economic history in Asia.

Andre Gunder Frank is another scholar who shares Hamashita's view. Although Frank is not a part of the California school, his prominent work *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age* can be seen to belong to this category of analysis. In the introduction, he says:

... the widespread failure to use a holistic global perspective not only confines us to parochial views, but that these also seriously distort all regional, sectoral, and indeed temporal findings because they fail to fit these findings into the global scheme of things. ... That has been the original sin of received Eurocentric historiography and social theory, which started in Europe and worked from there outward. (Frank 1998, p. 51)

Therefore, Frank began "by working our way around the globe, starting with trade, money, population, and production worldwide" (1999, p. 51). He has developed his argument by focusing on silver. When we follow the route of the distribution of silver between 1600 and 1800, it finally reaches China, providing evidence that China was then the centre of the world. According to Kawakatsu Heita, this argument was not unique to Frank (Kawakatsu 2001, p. 145). Sugihara points out that *ReOrient* uses the content of *The Great Divergence* by Pomeranz as its basis

(2001, p. 136). Thus, there are enough studies to give credibility to the argument which challenges the Western-centric view of world history.

However, ironically, if we insist too much on this Asian-centric view which counters the Western-centric one, then we start to lose sight of the Western influence on Asia in regard to the origins of international relations. Examining British merchants' political power specifically in China in the late nineteenth century, Motono Eiichi makes this point clear. He asserts:

They [Japanese historians who emphasise the Asian-centric view of history] have emphasized the importance of Asian trade and the strength of Chinese merchants so much that they in turn now underestimate the influence of Western mercantile enterprises. (Motono 1994, p. 108)

Watson and Bull expand this argument from economics to politics. They first admit:

Europeans, of course, have never had any monopoly of knowledge or experience of international relations. The rules and institutions of contemporary international society have been shaped by North and South Americans of European stock or assimilation and also by Asian, Africans, and Oceanians, as well as by the European powers in their period of dominance. (1985, p. 1)

However, they affirm:

But it was the expansion of Europe that first brought about the economic and technological unification of the globe, just as it was the European-dominated international society of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that first expressed its political unification. (1985, p. 2)

Moreover, when the focus is on politics and not on the economy, the dominance of Western rhetoric in the present international arena becomes apparent. As I argued above, the present world operates with nation states as its main players. They are defined around the idea of sovereignty. Therefore, while under the tribute system which Hamashita and other scholars had referred to with China as its core, there was a clear hierarchy between the core country and the subject countries. In the European system, theoretically each nation state was equal to the other. And this is the basic understanding of the present world. Simultaneously, Hamashita's comment that "nationalism was born in Asia from within the tribute system ..." (Hamashita 1994, p. 94) is also debatable. Nationalism as a notion in the context of the present international relations came from Europe. It was a notion which organically bound the population together to allow the state, also a modern European creation, to operate as one unified polity. Probably what Hamashita was arguing was closer to Smith's idea of *ethnie*. Thus, it is fair to state that by the turn of the last century, international society started to function following the rhetoric of the West which was backed by the idea of modernisation and industrialisation.

What is, however, important to point out here is that, in practice, international society also had a hierarchy. Although the Westphalian system was based on the idea of sovereignty, nation states were not necessarily equal in practice. In an arena created by the West and dominated by Western rhetoric, the West was always inevitably ahead of the rest and the powerful states in the West set the rules and standards of international society. Under this political climate, even forming a nation state, which appears to be gaining sovereignty and independence from other polities, simultaneously meant that the polity was required to join the existing international arena and to follow the standards set by the West (Nishikawa 2003, p.

133). In addition, the structure of the polity was also required to follow the standard of the European-born nation states. It needed a territory, population, a central government, constitution and other laws, the police, military and a will among the population that functions to keep them unified as one solid polity.

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA IN PARALLEL

It was this moment in world history when the Japanese archipelago and the Australian continent were formed into nation states following the standard of the West. As I have noted, the formation of nation states on the archipelago and the continent took place in almost the same time frame in world history – from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century. One of the most significant factors which made the two nation states come into being was the West's expansion to the non-Western part of the world.

In Australia's case, the way this happened is readily apparent. The continent of Australia was "discovered" by the Europeans and colonised by Britain. Recognising the continent as *terra nullius*, the coloniser Britain attempted to wipe out the indigenous population and implanted a European political system along with its own white population. Under these coercive conditions, there was little choice for people who were already living on the continent before the arrival of settlers. The continent gained the political structure of a self-governed nation state when it was federated in 1901. The 50,000 or more year-long histories of indigenous people were ignored and are barely recognised especially with regard to present international relations. The existence of Australia is itself a representation of Western imperial expansion.

On the other hand, it is difficult to recognise the influence of Western imperialism and colonialism in the creation of a nation state in the Japanese

archipelago. Japan has never been a colony of a Western imperial power. However, it was not free from the influence of that power. As Jackson states “[n]ot every non-Western country fell under the political control of a Western imperial state” (Jackson 2003, p. 45). Nevertheless, “those countries which escaped were still obliged to accept international law and follow the diplomatic practices of international society” (2003, p. 45) and Japan was one of those. Confronting the coercive approach from the United States and other European powers, Japan decided to play the game by the rules set out by the West. Komori Yoichi calls this process in Japan as “self-colonisation” (Komori 2003, p. 8). The introduction of a Western political system including the implementation of the written constitution in 1889 was the embodiment of that transformation. Japan’s move to become a nation state could not be explained without referring to the influence of the West.

In order to feature the contemporaneous aspect of Japan and Australia, I will trace the process of the two countries forming modern nation states by placing them in a parallel time frame of world history. At the same time, I will explore how the circumstances of international relations then functioned as a push factor for the archipelago and the continent to transform themselves.

Japan

The Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Meiji Constitution) was promulgated in 1889 and was enforced in November 1890 at the first assembly of the Imperial Diet. Sasaki Takashi describes this implementation of the Constitution as “an entrance pass to international society whose main axis was the Western powers” (Sasaki 2002, p. 28). According to Mikuriya Takashi, “it was an incident which symbolises the establishment of the Meiji State somehow or other dressed in a form of modern state” (Mikuriya 2001, p. 127). The arrival of a fleet of four black battle ships led by

Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States in 1853 was an epoch making event for Japan. It affected the move into the era of modernisation and Westernisation and pushed Japan into the international arena. Japan confronted the fleet which had 63 cannons with just a third of them protecting Edo Bay (present Tokyo Bay) (Matsumoto 1998, p.8). The gunboat diplomacy of the West which started with this Perry incident led Japan to renounce its isolationist policy and resulted in the conclusion of unequal treaties with the Western powers in 1858 (Komori 2003, p. 6). Amending this discriminatory situation by hastening its process of Westernisation became the mission of Japan. Implementing a Western style constitution was a part of the mission. Having a written constitution was one of the conditions which shaped a modern nation state.

When Commodore Perry and his fleet boldly sailed into Edo Bay, he was bearing a message from the President of the United States, Millard Fillmore, directed to the head of the Shogunate, Shogun Tokugawa. Although Japanese officers asked them to retreat to Nagasaki and then hand over the message since that was the only port where Japan had contact with foreign countries then under the isolation policy of Tokugawa Shogunate⁸, eventually, the Commodore managed to make the officers accept the President's message. The message demanded that Japan open up the country and trade with the United States. The message was clear. If Japan would not accept the demand, the US would wage war against Japan. After briefly leaving Edo for the Ryukyus, present day Okinawa, Perry returned and after a few negotiations, the United States obtained what it had demanded. Japan and the

⁸ Tokugawa Shogunate had been conducting this isolation policy since 1639. It restricted Japan's contact with foreign countries to Nagasaki, a city in the southern part of Japanese archipelago. The only countries which were allowed to trade in Nagasaki were China (Ch'ing) and Holland. The policy was first implemented to prohibit the spread of Christianity. Japanese people had also been banned from travelling abroad by this policy.

United States signed the General Convention of Peace and Amity in 1854. Totman describes:

The Convention opened the two ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to foreign vessels in need of provisions or safe haven. It assured safe treatment of shipwrecked sailors and granted the Americans a priori any concessions that other governments might obtain in future (“most-favored-nation” treatment). It also authorized the opening of a consular office at a later date, although disagreement subsequently arose on whether its opening required the consent of both parties or only one. (Totman 2005, p. 289)

This was clearly the end of Tokugawa’s isolation policy. Japan had begun its journey into international society. This ground-shaking event for Japan had two significant consequences. One was the agreement of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States which came four years after the Convention. Totman writes:

The Treaty called for appointment of diplomatic and consular agents in Edo and three additional trading ports, expanded the travel privileges of Americans in Japan, and permitted them to practice their religion. It gave them immunity from Japanese law (“extraterritoriality”) and guaranteed that tariff levels on the trade would be no higher than those any other government might subsequently negotiate. (2005, p. 289)

The other consequence was that Japan was obliged to make similar agreements with other Western powers. The Convention agreement with the United States was followed by agreements with Britain, Russia and Holland. In 1858, Holland, Russia, Britain and France also entered into the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. Five

Treaties, including the one with the United States, which had three clauses referring to tariff rate, consular jurisdiction and most favoured nation status were interpreted as “unfair treaties” by the Japanese. At the same time, as Matsumoto Kenichi points out, through signing treaties with foreign countries, Japan for the first time, realised that in the outer world there was an international society consisted of Western nation states and there existed international laws (1998, p.131).

At this point, dissatisfaction with Tokugawa Shogunate’s decision to conclude the treaties with foreign countries was mounting within the society of samurai warriors. This rise of negative sentiment towards the Shogunate coincided with earlier hostile feeling against foreign countries; there were already signs of decline in Tokugawa’s authority. One example which amplified the sentiment was the Shogunate’s incapacity to handle famines in the 1830s (Henshall 2004, p. 67). Being in power for more than 250 years, the Tokugawa Shogunate was exhausted in its capacity to rule the archipelago. Samurai warriors who advocated the restoration of the Emperor’s rule, as well as anti-foreigner elements, quickly formed a movement to topple the Tokugawas. In 1867, power was nominally transferred back to the Emperor from the last Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu. Although this event was followed by a year long civil war between those who supported the Shogunate and those who opposed it, preparations to establish a new government were simultaneously under way. The Emperor Mutsuhito, now known as Emperor Meiji, in 1868 relocated from Kyoto to Edo⁹, which was immediately re-named Tokyo, literally meaning eastern (*to*) capital (*kyo*). The new government was formed around the Emperor.

⁹ Since 794, the Emperors had resided in Kyoto.

By this time, even those who supported the restoration of the Emperor because of their anti-foreign sentiment had already realised that it was almost impossible and it was unrealistic to reject relationships with Western powers. First of all, the leaders of Japan knew the result of the Opium Wars (1840-1842 and 1856-1860) and how the Ch'ing Dynasty, which was a centre of Asian order, was shaken in its attempts to confront the West. Secondly, in 1863 and 1864, two domains (*han*) in the south western part of Japan recklessly challenged the Western powers by force and were defeated. Under these circumstances, the only way to preserve Japan's existence and to become a part of international politics as played by the West was to first overcome the unfair treaties and then be recognised as an equal member in the international society by Western powers.

The Japanese government was, therefore, quick to introduce the Western system and to operate like a modern nation state. In doing so, the government first sent out a mission to the United States and to Europe in 1871. The mission was led by Ambassador Iwakura Tomomi and among members there were people like Ito Hirobumi who later headed a group which worked to draft the new constitution and who subsequently became the first Prime Minister of Japan and Kaneko Kentato who supported Ito in the group. Although the mission's attempt to revise unequal treaties during this trip had not been accomplished, the need to reorganise Japan into a nation state which met the criteria of the West was strengthened. Another government effort which hastened its Westernisation was to hire foreigners to work in Japan as advisors. According to Mikiso Hane, "they were particularly prominent in the field of education" and at its peak, in 1874, a total of 524 were working in Japan (Hane 2001, p. 115). They were expected to bring Western knowledge to

Japan. German Harmann Roesler who was a contributor in drafting the Constitution was among those foreigners.

The task of drafting a new constitution had taken off in 1875 but it had begun to take full effect in 1881 (Suzuki 2002, pp. 296-306). It was decided that a parliament would be established in 1890 and that meant promulgation of the constitution should take place before that date. As mentioned before, Ito Hirobumi led the team. He again visited Europe for inquiries about constitutions and on his return, Inoue Kowashi, Ito Miyoji, Kaneko Kentarou and Roesler started to draft the new constitution. The final draft of the constitution was completed in 1888. On 11 February 1889, finally, the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was promulgated by the Emperor. This event took place at the newly built Imperial Palace and the people attending the ceremony, including the Emperor himself, were dressed in Western style. Of course, this was done in order to let the Western countries understand that Japan had been transformed into a Westernised constitutional polity (Suzuki 2002, p. 294).

While recognising the strong influence from the West in regard to social transformation in Japan in the late nineteenth century, it must be clearly noted that the arrival of the wave of Westernisation was never synonymous with either the disappearance of a long history of the archipelago which had been built before this period or a radical break with the past. Indeed, Commodore Perry's arrival to Edo Bay was an extraordinary incident for Japan. However, Perry's black ships were not the first Western ships to disturb the Japanese. In accordance with the increase in economic interest in Asia by the West, from Russia, Britain, and the United States, ships started to arrive near Japanese waters from the early eighteenth century (Suganami 1985, p. 188). Even whaling ships from Australia

sailed up to the Far North and had contact with the archipelago in the early nineteenth century (Slee 1979, p. 11).

These contacts which posed a physical threat to Japan and led to the introduction of Western ideas and technology were not unique events for the archipelago. As is well known that, guns, which could be interpreted as the outcome of the highly sophisticated technology of the West, were brought to Japan in 1543 by the Portuguese who were washed ashore on one of the islands in the south of Japan. This was followed by the introduction of Christianity in 1549 by the Spanish missionary Francisco de Xavier. Actually, Christianity spread quickly among Japanese elites and created fear within the Shogunate (Buruma 2003, p. 5). Along with the foreign influence on politics, the penetration of Christianity was seen as “a potentially destabilizing influence” by the Tokugawa Shogunate, which came into power to rule the archipelago in 1603. The Shogunate introduced a seclusion policy in 1639 (Morris-Suzuki 1990, p. 9). Since then, Japan had been officially out of contact with the outer world for about two hundred years. However, one small window remained open to foreign countries in Nagasaki, the island of Dejima where the Dutch and Chinese were allowed to trade, and brought knowledge from the outer world. As for Western knowledge, since the early eighteenth century, Dutch learning, specifically in the areas of anatomy, cartography, astronomy and mathematics, became popular among Japanese intellectuals (Morris-Suzuki 1990, p. 13). Therefore, when Perry arrived in Japan in the mid nineteenth century, “the Japanese elite knew more about America than Americans knew about Japan” and “the Japanese knew more about the West than most other Asians did, including the Chinese” (Buruma 2003, pp. 4-5). A person like Fukuzawa Yukichi, a strong

advocate of the Westernisation of Japan in the time of Meiji Restoration, was first educated as a Dutch scholar.

This continuity between the pre- and post-Perry incident could also be recognised in the newly implemented constitution which was intended to be a symbol of Westernisation and modernisation. While drafting the Constitution learning from the West, Ito Hirobumi noted that European constitutions had Christianity at their core. Since Japan did not have such an established religion, Ito thought that the Emperor system should be the core of the Constitution (Suzuki 2002, p. 293). This practically meant bringing Shinto to the centre of Japanese faith. Sasaki Takashi describes how the new constitution appeared to follow closely the structure of the Constitution of Prussia while in its practical operation it followed traditional Japanese unwritten law (2002, p. 34). Ian Buruma puts this situation as “[t]he appeal was to ancient tradition, but the model was European” (2003, p. 13). As a representation of this mixed situation, the ceremony for the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution at the Imperial Palace actually consisted of two separate functions. As noted before, one ceremony was held in a very Western setting. However, before that ceremony, another very traditional function took place in the Imperial Palace, but in a different room (Buruma 2003, p. 22, Suzuki 2002, p. 291-293). There the Emperor, in a traditional *kimono*, officially reported to his ancestors about the implementation of the new constitution (Buruma 2003, p. 22, Suzuki 2002, p. 291-293).

At first glance, the situation outlined above seems to demonstrate the complex mixture of the modern and therefore new impact from the West to Japan and the ancient history and tradition of the country before the arrival of the West. However, this complex mixture of new and old and East and West, should also be understood

as the representation of a nation state as a modern creation. The Emperor system which has a long history was built into the modern polity and functioned as a mechanism to unify the population. In reality, for most ordinary Japanese people, the Emperor had been an unfamiliar and remote figure before the Meiji Restoration. During the Tokugawa Shogunate, the common people were ruled by their local lord. Therefore, it was necessary for the new government to propagate the Emperor as the centre of the state to its people and it is said that the government struggled to do so (Matsumoto 1998, p. 329). This was exactly the process of Japan developing or inventing the notion of nationalism to unify the country. The implementation of the Constitution was one crucial and necessary element for Japan to gain the structure of a state. Simultaneously, making the Emperor the core of the constitution generated a notion of nationalism and worked to form a nation. Thus, from an international relations point of view, although it appears to be the continuation of a long Japanese tradition, the implementation of the Imperial Constitution was definitely a part of Japan's process of transforming itself into a nation state in the context of Westernisation and modernisation. It was a major step forward for Japan to enter the international community.

Australia

As for the continent of Australia, it was obvious from the very beginning that the newly federated Commonwealth of Australia was a nation state born out of the Western imperial and colonial system, and was thus a modern creation. In the year 1889, the year when Japan gained its constitution and parliamentary system, there was a significant step forward on the Southern continent for federation which had been slow and incoherent for some time. In 1889, a speech made at Tenterfield by Sir Henry Parkes, the then Premier of New South Wales colony, advocated the

advantages of federation (Parkes 1981). Despite a number of talks held among colonies viewing their future as one federal state with strong encouragement from their mother country, Britain, since the middle of the century, the process of the federation had not gone smoothly and one of the reasons for this was a rather negative or uncooperative response from New South Wales, the most populous and the most prosperous colony (Trainor 1994). Therefore, Parkes' positive views about federation in the speech were perceived as a sign for the federation movement to accelerate. Although the colonies struggled for another decade, finally in 1900, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act passed the British Parliament, and on 1 January 1901, a new nation state was born.

The history of Australia before it became a nation state was made up of many separate histories. There were stories passed on in the form of oral traditions belonging to the Aboriginal people who lived on the continent for thousands of years. In addition, from 1788, a collection of colonial histories appeared on the continent. On the occasion of the federation, six British colonies, New South Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria and Queensland, formed the Commonwealth of Australia. It was these colonial histories rather than any Aboriginal version of history that dominated the process of nation building.

Among the colonies, New South Wales was the first colony established on the continent to pursue British imperial ambitions. Other colonies were gradually established in the following decades. It was in mid-1840s when the federation of Australia first became an issue. In 1850, the Australian Colonies Government Act was passed in the British Parliament. This act enabled the colonies to set up responsible government in each colony. New South Wales was again the first to be granted responsible government in 1855. Three years later, South Australia,

Tasmania, and Victoria, which was officially separated from New South Wales in the 1850s, all introduced responsible government. Queensland followed them in 1860. For Western Australia, it was not until 1890 that it gained a responsible government. The implementation of a responsible government in each colony partly meant gaining limited independence from their mother country. Thus, the enactment of the Australian Colonies Government Act is understood as part of a movement to consider federation of colonies on the continent.

Motivation for this movement for federation was not singular. There were, generally speaking, three dimensions taking into account the circumstances of the mother country, Britain; the colonies' internal circumstances and the colonies' external circumstances. These dimensions intermingled in complex ways. Therefore, the path to federation was also complex and never smooth or quick. The initial suggestion for federation was made in Britain. In 1846, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Britain, Earl Grey, suggested a plan to form a general assembly in the colonies and discuss issues of "tariffs, postal services, intercolonial roads and railways, communication and customs duties (Irving 1999, p. 3, Foster et al.). A Privy Council in 1849 presented a more detailed plan based on Grey's proposal concerning the general assembly. It referred to, for instance, its members, the way the members are elected or its power to establish a 'Supreme Court' (Irving 1999, p. 3). However, this proposal was met with strong opposition from the colonies and was finally abandoned. It was said "[b]y the time of the Privy Council report, the Australians were disinclined to embrace any constitutional proposal which they themselves had not initiated, or at least upon which they had not first been consulted" (Irving 1999, p. 4). Along with the fact that each colony had been granted responsible government under the Australian Colonies Government Act in

1851, it seems that colonies started to gain greater independence from the mother country. Nevertheless, it was obvious that they were still fully subject to Britain. Even the Act which gave them slight independence was an act of the British Parliament. Throughout the process of federation, Britain maintained the right to give the final legal assent. Britain was, as seen in Earl Grey's initiative, in favour of federation from the very beginning. For Britain it was more efficient and convenient to deal with a single government than to deal with plural colonial governments respectively (Irving 1999, p. 7). It also would contribute to reducing the costs of maintaining the Empire. Britain's policy to allow colonies to gain more autonomy indicates that, by the mid-nineteenth century, the way empires managed their colonies had undergone a significant shift. The releasing of their direct control over the colonies by the empires meant the ground was laid for nation states to emerge.

The second dimension of the movement for the federation emerged from colonies' internal circumstances. As Earl Grey had rightly suggested in 1840s, there existed some common concerns among colonies and they seemed to be better solved by colonies dealing with them collectively. In accordance with the establishment of responsible governments in colonies, a body to discuss the common concerns, an intercolonial conference, started to meet in the mid-1850s. Issues concerning tariffs, light-houses, quarantine, postal services, the control of rivers, roads and railways, as well as communications in general were among those common concerns which had been discussed (Irving 1999, p. 3). An Intercolonial Postal Conference held in 1870 was a success and although it could not gain approval by the British, the idea of a 'Federal Council' was put forward by Sir Henry Parkes (Irving 1999, p. 5). However, at the same time, the colonies all had their own interests and they did not

necessarily consent to catering for the others' interests. For example, not every colony was comfortable with the idea of reducing or abolishing intercolonial tariffs since it was a crucial income for some colonies. They were aware of the merit of being bound together, but were also sceptical about advantages they could gain from consolidation.

The external circumstance of the Colonies were the third dimension for the movement for federation. In the late nineteenth century, the colonies started to observe conflicts among Western powers. As Takeda Isami points out, the colonies of the Australian continent for the first time saw themselves placed in an international arena. By then, German and French ships were in nearby waters and the colonies were also afraid of Russia which was advancing southward (Takeda 2000, p. 92-101). France had annexed New Caledonia in 1853 and was sending convicts to the nickel mines there (Takeda 2000, p. 98). Australian colonies' feared recidivists migrating from the island (Trainor 1994, p. 14). The most direct and significant impact they had experienced was an incident related to New Guinea. To prevent Germany from annexing New Guinea, Queensland decided to annex it in 1883. This action was not welcomed by London. London was also reluctant to accept the government of Victoria's plan to annex the New Hebrides which later came under French control. Prior to these incidents, British troops had already been withdrawn from the continent by 1870. The colonies, especially Queensland and Victoria, realised that in order to react to the continent's danger, they could not rely on their mother country but would have to rely on collaboration between the colonies.

While these internal and external circumstances gradually drove the colonies towards further integration on the continent, one important notion had started to

develop among the settler population – a notion of an Australian nation. Searching for their own independent identity, they began to decide who belonged to the continent and who did not. In the middle of the nineteenth century a large quantity of Chinese workers migrated to the Australian colonies. In the north, the entrance of indentured labourers from the Pacific Islands and Japan was also significant. Observing these phenomena, the settlers' community started to recognise a boundary dividing "them" from "us" and an identity built on a white, British "Australia" emerged. The move for the colonies towards the federation was given yet another push by this notion.

The so-called 'influx' of Chinese workers to the Australian continent began with the gold rush in the 1850s. Stuart Macintyre describes it as "the multinational diggings" (Macintyre 2004, p. 102), the goldfields were filled with American, French, Italian, German, Polish, Hungarian workers and needless to say the local population. But Chinese workers outnumbered the rest (Macintyre 2004, p. 87). They came and also were brought to the continent as cheap labour. They were involved in the shipping industry as seamen as well as diggers in the goldfields. This quickly became a concern for local "white" workers and became an issue in each colony. As early as in 1855, "[t]he Victorian Government imposed special entry taxes and appointed protectors to separate them on the goldfields, ... (Macintyre 2004, p. 102)". This was followed by other colonies which had also introduced similar regulations to curb the number of Chinese migrants. Ian McAllister *et al.* records:

In 1880 Sir Henry Parkes called an intercolonial conference to discuss the problem.

The outcome was agreement between all the colonies, except Western Australia, on a common policy to restrict Asian immigration; Western Australia fell into line

in 1886. The issue was kept alive by the intercolonial conferences of 1888 and 1896, and emphasised the necessity of co-operation between the colonies to halt Asian immigration. (1997, p. 2)

Although the colonies were experiencing many disagreements, as observed above, the problem of Asian immigration, specifically targeting Chinese workers, had been a common concern binding white colonists together. The appearance of Chinese workers on the continent made the white settlers conscious of who was inside and who was outside their community. This division was exercised beyond the border of colonies. The sense of nation had been generated among the mainstream white population.

Along with this alien immigration problem, there was another issue which made the settler population contemplate who belonged with them and who did not and fostered their sense of nationalism. Touched upon already, it was an external threat. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, conflicts between the Western powers over colonising various parts of the world were increasing and they were extending even to the South Pacific, next door to Australia. The colonies were feeling a threat that conflicts in Europe may be brought into their adjacent waters and then on to their land. As for threats from Germany and France, they were real in cases of New Guinea, New Caledonia and New Hebrides. As for Russia's threat, it was more about people's imagination. Fort Denison, built on a tiny island in Port Jackson, Sydney, was constructed to defend Sydney from Russian attack (Takeda 2000, pp. 96-97). An assumption that Russia might attack Sydney derived from an event that had occurred in Europe, the Crimean War (1853-1856). Late in the 1890s, there came a threat from Japan, in Macintyre's words, a country "which imitated Western economic and military techniques to defeat China and occupy Korea" (2004, p. 140).

Seeing the withdrawal of British soldiers from the Australian continent as mentioned above, Australia had to face those threats without relying on its mother country. Although the Royal Navy was still on a mission to defend the Australian sea, people on the continent felt it was not enough and dissatisfaction with the response of Britain had heightened (Macintyre 2004, p. 140). Feeling these external concerns tapping at its door and observing Britain's attitude, the notion of binding people together to defend the continent of Australia was strengthened. Macintyre wrote "[t]he new nation was shaped by external threat and internal anxiety, the two working together to make exclusive racial possession the essential condition of the nation-state" (2004, p. 139).

In addition to this formation of nationalism by exclusion, it is worth noting that the emergence of an Australian-born population also helped foster the sense of an integrated community on the continent. According to *The Australian People*, edited by James Jupp, the term "Australian" was first used to describe aboriginal people in 1814 (Inglis 1988, p. 54). Then "[f]rom the 1820s, and possibly before that, 'Australians' were also white people born in the colonies" (Inglis 1988, p. 54). This notion of "Australian" became firmer in the later years. Irving says "... the greatly enlarged population of 'native' children, born in the gold-rush decades of the 1850s and 1860s, had now come to adulthood. Their sense of place and their loyalties were Australian" (1999, p. 7). These people had their ties with Britain but most had "never set foot in the Mother Country" (1999, p. 7). It was not a difficult task for people with this background to identify themselves with the continent and with each other beyond the boundary of each colony.

Thus, the sense of nation was gradually formed in the mind of the colonies' population during the latter half of the nineteenth century. It was to this sentiment

that Henry Parkes appealed to with the Tenterfield Speech of 1889. He emphasised the necessity of forming a defence force within the colonies first and then referred to “his trademark theme of national greatness” (Irving 1999, p. 8). Parkes introduced advice from British General Sir James Edwards who had inspected the military forces on the continent saying “the forces of the several colonies should be federated for operation in concert in the event of war, so as to act as one great army” (Parkes 1981). Pointing to the existing Federal Council, Parkes said that the Council was not enough to achieve the unification and the colony needed “one central executive authority, which could bring all the forces of the different colonies into one national army” (Parkes 1981). He went on to suggest the necessity of establishing “a convention of leading men from all the colonies” and the convention “would have to devise the constitution which would be necessary for bringing into existence a federal government with a Federal Parliament for the conduct of national business” (Parkes 1981). Following the speech, the National Australasian Convention was held in 1891 (Macintyre 2004, p. 136). Despite disagreements from time – to – time, finally in 1898, they came up with a draft of the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth. After all colonies except Western Australia passed referendums of the Constitution Bill ¹⁰, the bill was sent to London in 1900 and there, with amendments, was passed by the British Parliament. On 1st of January 1901, the proclamation of the Commonwealth of Australia took place in the Centennial Park in Sydney and in May the first Federal Parliament opened at the Exhibition Building in Melbourne.

¹⁰ Western Australia got successful referendum result in July 1900, a few weeks after the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act passed the British Parliament.

Establishing this new nation state was not as dramatic as the forming of the United States of America which separated from Britain in 1776. There was no war fought and no declaration of independence delivered. Therefore, compared to the national identity of the United States, Australians' national identity did not start from a military conflict with Britain. The newly born nation state of Australia was still tied to Britain not only by various political or economic systems and decision making but also by psychological attitudes regarding nationhood. The Commonwealth of Australia gained authority and legitimacy as one nation state by subscribing to the history and tradition of its mother country. A century later, on 1 January 2001, looking back to the time of federation, *The Sydney Morning Herald* wrote:

The great themes of speeches and editorials on January 1, 1901, were Empire, the white race and the boundless wealth of a united Australia. These were modest ambitions for a new nation. Australia wasn't breaking free. We weren't reinventing democracy to suit our own temper. Our destiny was to be British, white and rich. (*SMH* 1 January 2001a, p. 1)

This identity of Australians could only be maintained by referring to British history and tradition and by maintaining the "Britishness", especially the Whiteness, of the nation.

The sense of national identity which had bound the population on the Australian continent was a complex mixture of new and old. Moreover, real military and diplomatic power remained with Britain till World War Two. Nevertheless, it gained a structure of one unified state and started to participate in the international arena at around the turn of the last century. What should be noted here is that the

birth of the nation state Australia in 1901 had happened just about a decade after the birth of the newly established nation state in the north, Japan. They were, as modern nation states, contemporaries in world history.

SHARING A POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Japan and Australia, countries which emerged as nation states at around the same time in world history, had experienced similar events in the early twentieth century. It was the time when international society was going through a transition and was establishing the basis of the present system of international relations. In 1919, the new academic discipline of International Relations was founded (Burchill 2001, p. 4, Smith & Baylis 2001, p. 3). “Scholars and thinkers have long devoted their thoughts to international politics” (Burchill 2001, p. 4) and they “have tried to make sense of world politics for centuries” (Baylis & Smith 2001, p. 3). However, International Relations became an academic discipline only when the University of Wales at Aberystwyth established a Chair of International Relations after World War One (Burchill 2001, p. 4). It was, according to Scott Burchill, the “intellectual reaction to the horrors of” the war (Burchill 2001, p. 4) and the purpose of the founder, David Davies, in establishing the discipline was to prevent future wars (Smith & Baylis 2001, p. 3). The international system which had developed since the days of the Treaties of Westphalia in the seventeenth century was exhausted as a system designed to avoid conflicts between states and the world had experienced a catastrophe. World War One could be recognised as the historic moment when international society was forced to revise and reconstruct itself. Japan and Australia were not disconnected from this trend. The involvement of both countries in this historic war itself, the Paris Peace Conference, the signing of the Versailles Treaties and the forming of the League of Nations which followed the war was no

mere coincidence. It indicates that these newly born nation states were surrounded by similar international circumstances which made or even forced them to participate in events.

In terms of presence in the international arena, it is true that Japan was more significant as an international figure than its counterpart. Right after the country gained the structure of a modern nation state by promulgating its constitution, it began an imperialist venture on the Chinese Continent¹¹ and fought the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). Although Japan was initially cautious about its involvement, responding to the request from Britain, Japan took part in the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 (Sasaki 2001, pp. 213-214). As a result, Japan formed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 (Sasaki 2002, pp. 240-242) and secured its position in the international society with the support of Britain. Two years later, by taking advantage of the momentum, Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). By the very beginning of the new century, Japan was already a major world naval power. Because of the confidence and ambition derived from becoming visible in the international arena and its interest in German possessions in the Far East, Japan positively got involved in World War One. Although its ally Britain was rather negative about Japan's full involvement in the war, Japan had aggressively appealed to Britain and to other allies to gain their support for Japan entering the war (Arima 1999, p. 108). As a result, after the war, Japan was able to participate in the Paris Peace Conference as one of the five powers.

¹¹ In regard to East Asian countries, the Archipelago (Japan), the Peninsula (Korea) and the Continent (China) are often used in Japanese texts especially when mentioning circumstances in the pre- and during World War Two period. As *Chugoku Tairiku* (the Chinese Continent) or *Tairiku* (the Continent) means a territory where the Chinese authority reaches on the Asian Continent in Japan, in this thesis I will use the term the "Chinese Continent" which is almost synonymous to the "Mainland China".

Compared to Japan, Australia's profile as an international player is rather less impressive in the early twentieth century. Indeed, the Great War is remembered as a historic moment for Australia. It is said that the country experienced independent nationhood especially in connection to the legend of Gallipoli. At the Paris Peace Conference, the then Prime Minister Billy Hughes made an outstanding appeal to defend the White Australia policy (Hughes 2004, pp. 58-62, Lowe 1995, pp. 131-132). He succeeded in preventing a clause referring to the racial equality which was an amendment put forward by the Japanese delegates from being inserted to the Covenant of the League of Nations (Hughes 2004, p. 61, Lowe 1995, pp. 134-137). Yet, Australia's presence in the international arena was not necessarily significant. Although Australia became one self-governing nation state in 1901, it was actually categorised as one dominion along with Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa and seen as one of "the self-governing units of the British Empire" (Dutton 2001, p. 27). And in regard to international relations, it was subject to the veto of the mother country (Dutton 2003, p. 27, Lowe 1995, p. 145). Even Hughes' vigorous performance, according to Australian writings, at the conference is not clearly remembered by Europeans and Americans (Lowe 1995, p. 131) and specifically by the Japanese (Arima 1999, pp. 180-181).

Thus, at a glance it seems that Japan and Australia had developed in different ways as nation states. Japan quickly became an imperial power whereas Australia remained a part of the British Empire, specifically in negotiating international relations. Nevertheless, their status as nation states in the international arena placed them in a similar category. Even though Japan was counted as one of the five powers at the Paris Peace Conference, the position of the country was not equal to Western powers. The country had always been under the supervision of Western

powers since its emergence as a Westernised and modernised nation state. As a result of the Shimonoseki Treaty which ended the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Japan was ceded Ryoto Peninsula on the Chinese Continent. However, Russia, France and Germany intervened and forced Japan to abandon the peninsula (Mikuriya 2001, pp. 305-308). Even though Japan was invited to the Paris Peace Conference as one of the five core nations along with the United States, Britain, France and Italy, while drafting the treaty, important elements were decided by those four countries and Japan remained a “silent partner” (Arima 1999, pp. 173-174). The then Prussian Chancellor Bismarck’s remark which was given to the Japanese delegation in 1873 was quite suggestive. The prior mission of the Iwakura Delegation was to amend unequal treaties between Japan and Western powers and it was hoping to achieve the mission based on international law. However, Bismarck taught them that politics among states appears as if it was managed by international law but, in reality, what really counted was power (Matsumoto 1998, pp. 350-353). The great powers abide by international law if it benefits their states, but if not, they discard the law by using military force and there is no chance for weaker states to defend their sovereignty by loyally subscribing to international law (Matsumoto 1998, p. 351).

This was the fate of nation states which came into being in the latter half of the former century. The influence of the European imperial powers and the United States covered almost the whole globe and interactions between states were already conducted by following the rhetoric set by the West. As Mikuriya Takashi and Oguma Eiji argue, Japan was a latecomer as an imperial power (Mikuriya 2001, p. 308, Oguma 2002, p. 628). This simultaneously and technically meant that Japan was a latecomer as a modern nation state to the international arena and so was

Australia since it was a creation of British colonialism. Simultaneously, and more importantly, it must be noted that most of their Asian neighbours who were under colonial control became independent nation states only after World War Two. This indicates that Japan and Australia were frontrunners as modern nation states in the Asian context. After World War One, the former German territories in the Pacific became mandated territories of the League of Nations. The islands north of equator came under Japanese supervision and those to the south under Australian supervision. This quasi-colonialist feature of Japan and Australia implies their similar status, which belongs somewhere between those who colonised and those who were colonised.

CONCLUSION

Japan and Australia, countries which are generally seen to be very different, emerged as nation states in the international arena in at a similar period of world history – in the latter half of the nineteenth century – as a result of the expansion of the Western empires into the non-Western parts of the world. This circumstance meant they shared similar characteristics and also their location in the present international arena as nation states.

The basis of present international relations is widely understood to have its origins in the Treaty of Westphalia which ended The Thirty Year's War in Europe in the seventeenth century. The system of world order after the Westphalia was called the Westphalia system and was said to be a “state system” which had nation states constructed and defined around the idea of sovereignty. In order to maintain sovereignty a polity needs to gain the structure of a state – having population, land, a recognised border, central government and a bureaucracy, a set of laws, a military and a police force. Along with this framework, it was necessary for the population to

have a sense of nation – a notion which makes the population feel an organic connection to one another. While the notion had been under debate concerning whether it is a modern creation or not, the way it was used as an ideology – nationalism – to form a nation state was widely recognised as a modern phenomena. Nation states as units of present international society were, thus, products of the social transformation which had happened in modern Europe and, therefore, the nature of the system of present international relations was and remains Western-centric.

The archipelago of Japan and the continent of Australia were located in a non-Western part of the world and on the periphery of Asia. These two countries developed into nation states in a period between mid-nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The main cause of the development – the significant influence of European and American powers which had expanded into Asia – is shared by the two countries. On one hand, Japan which had been a feudal society and had been adapting an isolationist policy was forced to open up the country by the United States and, along with its internal circumstances, transformed itself into a single nation state. One prominent and symbolic event which took place during the transformation of Japanese society was the framing of a new constitution which happened in 1889. The then leaders of Japan placed the Emperor system at the centre of the constitution and tried to create a sense of unification among their subjects and formed a nation.

On the other hand, the Commonwealth of Australia was an outcome of British colonialism. Six British colonies federated in 1901 to form one unified polity and gained their own constitution and parliamentary system. Although in many ways the newly born state was still tied to its mother country, the continent had gained

the structure of a modern state. Also on the continent, along with the implementation of the structure of a state, there was the encouragement of national sentiment within the population on the continent thus promoting a sense of nation. Apart from Britain's positive support for the federation, the move to form one unified state was encouraged by nationalism. Facing both internal and external threats and sharing racism as its core, in the latter half of the nineteenth century the mainstream white population on the continent forged a binding sense of nationhood among themselves.

Thus, by focusing on the aspect of Japan and Australia as nation states, their contemporaneous aspect in world history becomes visible. They both made their presence felt in the international arena which was already operating by the rhetoric of the European and American powers, at around the turn of the last century. The influence of the West's expansion into non-Western areas in the world was a major cause of the peoples of the archipelago and the continent transforming themselves into a nation. This history of Japan and Australia drove them into similar circumstances. It was obvious that the two countries were latecomers in the West-dominated international arena. However, when we put them in the context of Asia, where they geographically belong, they were frontrunners in the region in terms of making their way into international society. By placing them in parallel, it is possible to recognise that the newly born nation states were put in an ambiguous position in the international arena – somewhere between the West and the East.

CHAPTER 2: Sharing an inferiority complex

INTRODUCTION

Two countries, situated on the eastern edge of the East, Australia and Japan, are, as I argued in my last chapter, not as different as they were generally imagined to be in terms of being modern nation states. Both the archipelago and the continent were significantly touched by the influence of the West's expansion into the non-Western part of the world. As a result of this influence, Japan in 1889 and Australia in 1901, by adopting constitutions, gained the political structure of a state and formed modern nation states. In spite of their typical images – Japan being an old oriental country and Australia being a young occidental country – they are contemporaries as modern nation states experiencing similar circumstances at the time they became nation states.

This indicates that they made their entry into international society, which was already functioning under the rhetoric of Imperial European states and the United States of America, at the same period in world history. Consequently, their position in the world was similar. Both Japan and Australia were obviously latecomers to international society which was controlled by the West. At the same time, within their geographical region, Asia, they were the frontrunners in building Westernised modern states.

In this chapter I depict Japan and Australia's subordinated position in the international arena since their foundation as modern nation states and argue that because of their second-class status in the world, an inferiority complex in relation to the West has developed in their national psyches. This psychological state of both countries has affected their behaviours in the international arena. It is like the

symptoms of a neurosis derived from an inferiority complex. In order to balance their frustrated psyches, they tried to maintain their superior status and closeness to the West by creating inferior entities. The neighbouring Asian countries became the target of this exercise.

“JUNIOR MEMBERS” OF THE WEST CLUB

For Japan and Australia which made their debut into the international arena around the end of the nineteenth century, the expansion of the European imperial states and the United States of America into Asia was one of the main factors in transforming themselves into independent modern nation states. Because of the circumstances, both countries were latecomers to the arena which already had been controlled by the rhetoric of the West. This situation made them imagine themselves as backward countries compared to the Western nations. At the same time, they were newcomers to the arena. Although the term “newcomer” indicates a positive impression – such as newness or freshness – it is also associated with immaturity and this negative impression left Japan and Australia observing themselves as “forever infants”.

One famous and frequently cited passage by Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the most prominent intellectuals and an educator in Japan during the Meiji Restoration era, well displays the status of both countries at that time. Fukuzawa was a leading figure in promoting the modernisation and Westernisation of Japan in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In one of his books, *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku* (An outline of civilisation), he divided civilisation to three phases: civilised, half-civilised and savage (Fukuzawa 2004, p. 21). He placed European countries and the United States into the “civilised” and Japan into the “half-civilised” phase along with other

Asian nations such as Turkey and China (2004, p. 21). This explicitly shows the idea that was dominating the mind of Japanese leaders at that time.

What is more suggestive regarding this passage by Fukuzawa is that he categorised Australia into the “savage” phase along with Africa (Fukuzawa 2004, p. 21). It is not difficult to imagine that Fukuzawa’s regard for Australia was quite low. Although as a member of the Japanese delegation to the United States and European countries, Fukuzawa travelled overseas in 1860s three times, he never visited Australia (Frei 1986, p. 238). Henry Frei points out that Fukuzawa’s knowledge about Australia was mostly reliant on encyclopaedias which he bought overseas (1986, p. 238). Moreover, considering the fact that the book *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku* was published in 1875, Australia was not even federated then. Therefore, whether Fukuzawa was looking at Aboriginal Australian society or settler society is unclear and the reason why he labelled Australia as “savage” is not known. Nevertheless, the labelling is clearly indicative of the status of Australia as a colony and later as a nation state in relation to the civilised West as Fukuzawa’s view was a reflection of the European perception of Australia. It well depicts Australia’s status in the world. Australia, like Japan, was on its way to adulthood.

As I have noted, Australia became an independent nation state on the first of January 1901. However, the status of the continent within the context of international arena did not change much after federation compared to before the event. Describing the situation of the federation of Australia, David Dutton states “creating an independent state was never the aim” (Dutton 2001, p.26). He asserted that federation was an internal issue handled by the Colonial Office in London and “[t]he commonwealth remained within the structure of the British Empire” (2001, p. 26). He further mentioned “... the Commonwealth of Australia was hardly more

independent in 1901 than its constituent colonies had been before Federation” (2001, p. 27). As we have seen in my discussion in the last chapter, federation was a plan put forward by Britain in the mid-nineteenth century in the first place and the final permission for federation came from a decision of the British Parliament. Thus, it is clear that although Australia became one nation state in 1901 and became one of the players in the international arena, it remained in a subordinate position in relation to its parent country, Britain.

This subordinated image of Australia in relation to its mother country which derived from the situation regarding its birth as one polity has haunted the country. When describing Australia, terms which indicate the subordinate position of the country are frequently used. David Walker is straight forward in using the phrase, an “appendage of Empire” (Walker 2003, p. 337). He describes Australia as a country that has tried to present itself as being in danger from Asia in order to make itself an important entity and says “[t]here was not much to be said for or about Australia as a remote and unimportant appendage of Empire” (2003, p. 337).

“Outpost” is a word often used to point to the position of Australia being an “appendage of Empire”. Dutton’s words quoted in the former paragraph were from an essay titled “A British Outpost in the Pacific”. The essay appears in the publication *Facing North* which deals with Australia’s relationship with Asia and was compiled on the initiative of the Australian Foreign Ministry. Dutton is particularly looking into Australia’s diplomacy for the period from around the time of federation to the Great War (2001, pp. 21-60). Walker, Ien Ang and Jon Stratton have expanded what “Britain” means in relation to Australia as an outpost of “Europe” or “the West”. Walker, in his signature work *Anxious Nation*, refers to Australians’ self-image and says it is “an outpost of Europe facing Asia” (Walker

1999, p. 4). He points out “Australia came to nationhood at a time when the growing power of the East was arousing increasing concern” and “[t]his in turn came to influence how Australians saw themselves” (1999, p. 4). In their essay “Asianing Australia: Notes Towards A Critical Transnationalism In Cultural Studies”, Ien Ang and Jon Stratton state “... ‘Australia’ was constructed as a settled outpost of the ‘West’, an attempt to realize a society on the principles of European modernity in a space outside Europe” (Ang & Stratton 1996, p. 20).

Another term which we occasionally see describing Australia in relation to its mother country is “antipodes”. Peter Beilharz in his book *Imagining The Antipodes* which is a thorough study of an Australian art historian and anthropologist Bernard Smith’s works and thoughts describes “... the antipodes must be understood as a *relation*, not a place” (Beilharz 1997, p. xiv). Examining Smith’s book *The Antipodean Manifesto*, Beilharz explicitly explains the meaning of the term. He writes:

Being antipodean, within the British frame of reference, was like a punishment of some kind or another, to do with the place felons were sent, or idiotic cousins or reprobates. Yet Australians were also exiles, in some way or another, as well as invaders. The antipodes are invented by imperialism. (1997, p. 97)

He continues:

But they, or we, are not just ‘down there’, the dirty bits down below, the oddities of platypus and Aborigine, topsy-turvy. The antipodes are not nowhere, they are at the other pole, the other end, connected vitally to the centre because imagined and held by it. Our antipodes, our Australia is not just anywhere invisible ‘down there’,

they are specifically Europe's antipodes, unspeakable European embarrassments or else laughable local oddities. (1997, p. 97)

This explanation well depicts Australia's subordinated position in relation to its mother country and to Europe which is the centre of the world, and further, indicates the status of Australia in the international arena.

Ghassan Hage clearly explains Australia's position in the world as a nation state in his important publication *White Nation*. Hage, by pointing out that nations in the context of international relations are often associated with the image that they are growing up from childhood to adulthood, immaturity to maturity, refers to the ranking of nations. He says:

First, there are the imperialist nations themselves, imagined somewhat like gods (and like fathers and mothers in the child's imaginary), either as immediately and forever adult, or as born in a past somewhat discontinuous with the present where their adulthood is unquestionable. (Hage 1998, p. 143)

Then he goes on to say:

Secondly, there comes a host of nations imagined to be in various stages of development on the way to 'adulthood'. The national 'maturity' of all these nations was or is still seen as problematic, by themselves and by the rest of the world, especially by the imperialist power under whose wing they have grown into recognised nation-states. (1998, p. 143)

Without any debate, it is apparent that Australia "has always fallen into this second category" since it is "a nation born out of the imperialist system" (1998, p. 143). A

shadow of the second class image as a nation state in the international arena has constantly followed Australia.

This was also a perception coming from Asia in regards to Australia according to J. V. D'Cruz and William Steele. In *Australia's Ambivalence Towards Asia* they bluntly state that for Asians the image of Australia is "a junior member of the Western alliance of former colonial powers, a lower-ranked member of a white club, and an imposed cultural transplant ..." (D'Cruz & Steele 2003, p. 289). This indicates that Australia's status in the world has been somehow fixed at the point of federation and it is hard for Australia to be free from it. After all, Australia is "... despite the fact that it now firmly considers itself 'Western', the *outcome*, not the origin of the Westernization/modernization of the world" (Ang & Stratton 1996, p. 22) and it is difficult for the country to become a full member of the West club.

Before I transfer my discussion at this point from Australia to Japan, Australia's contemporary as a modern nation state, we shall consult a little more on D'Cruz and Steels' literature. In *Australia's Ambivalence Towards Asia*, the authors thoroughly examine the troubled relationship of Australia with neighbouring Asian countries and accuse Australia and more broadly the Western countries of judging others – the non-Western countries, in the book, specifically Asian countries – by their values and, also, for criticising the others while not recognising their own shortcomings. For the first point, they acutely assert:

In stunning unawareness, Western elites stalk the globe oblivious to the unexamined, and therefore fundamentalist, nature of the idiosyncratic and solipsistic construction of their particular 'sacred and inviolate' brands of 'democracy', 'freedom', or 'human rights'. This allows them to believe their politically correct and largely Anglo-ethnic-based values to be 'universal' and

superior, while really those values bear the markings of a peculiarly Western secular or religious democratic fundamentalism. (2003, p. 42)

On the second point which is the main issue of the book, they state:

... Australia (not unlike the USA) trumpets, at home and abroad, its egalitarianism and democracy as well as its stances on related issues such as human rights and corruption, judging non-Western countries in the region unfavourably by these criteria, while Australia's own record on important fronts is disgraceful. (2003, p. 19)

Here, by "important fronts" which is "disgraceful", they mean Australia's "... own failure on human rights issues ... towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people" (2003, p. 9). D'Cruz and Steele, throughout the volume, try to shed light on what the Orient side has to say which is normally invisible or ignored because of the exercise of Orientalism by the Western countries. And there, they draw several examples from cases regarding Japan which is seemingly, in their mind, totally an Oriental country.

Defending values on the Orient side, they argue that in Asia paternalism or family loyalty does not necessarily contradict liberal democracy (2003, p. 110). Paternalism or strong ties between individuals and the family are generally seen as less liberal and a less democratic system which specifically obscures individuals' freedom and independence of their will.

By taking up a Japanese female politician Obuchi Yuko's case, D'Cruz and Steele go against this perception. Obuchi became a member of the Japanese Parliament following the path of her father Obuchi Keizo who died while serving the country as the Prime Minister in 2000. At a first glance, it may seem that Obuchi Yuko was

somehow forced into her “family business” regardless of her own will. However, D’Cruz and Steel say that it was her spontaneous family loyalty which led her to the Parliament (2003, p. 110). Obuchi was not a victim of oppression, they point out. Later in the book they also mention that “the self in a Japanese context which is distinctively different from the unitary ‘I’ in Western discourse ...” (2003, p. 188) and that individualism in Japan has developed into a different form from the one in Western society (2003, pp. 192-193). They indicate the arrogance of the West simply judging Japan, the oriental country, with the Western view.

Another example which D’Cruz and Steele introduce to defend the Orient by referring to Japan is the Tokyo Trial case after World War Two. They brought in an episode about an Indian judge, Radhabind Pal, who shed light on the hypocrisy of the West, which was on the victor’s side and on the side trying Japan’s war crimes, at the Trial (2003, p. 186). Following the same line, they also point to atrocities caused by British colonialism and the air raids on Japan during the Pacific War by the United States and they say the Western countries are not in the position to accuse Japan over its misdeeds during the war (2003, p. 296). By showing how the West has exercised arrogance in relation to Japan, the authors have emphasised Japan’s character as an Oriental country.

Here, it is necessary to ask, was and is Japan simply an innocent victim of the orientalism by the West? Unfortunately, the answer is no. It is rather ironic but the episode of the Judge Pal at the Tokyo Trial is frequently used in recent Japan by right wing nationalistic people to legitimise Japan’s behaviour in the former war and to insist Japan was not guilty (Nakajima 2007, pp. 11-14). This way of thinking is making Japanese society blind and ignorant towards its imperial and colonial past which caused enormous tragedy in neighbouring Asian countries. Although

historically and geographically Japan belongs to the Orient, it has exercised its own version of orientalism towards Asia and acted like a country in “the West club”. However, Japan, as D’Cruz and Steele rightly point out, was simultaneously in a subordinated position in relation to the West. Therefore, borrowing Hage’s categorisation about nation states, Japan also falls into the second category nation which is on its way to “adulthood”. In D’Cruz and Steele’s expression regarding Australia, Japan is also “a junior member of the Western alliance of former colonial powers” (2003, p. 289).

Unlike Australia, Japan did not have a “blood relationship” with the West. However, it became related to the international society in a manner more like an “adopted child” where the legitimacy of the country’s existence in society was guaranteed only by admission or recognition by its “foster parents”, the Western nations. Therefore, from the very beginning, Japan was placed in a subordinated position in relation to the West. As I explored in my former chapter, in order to be accepted properly in the international community, Japan transferred itself into a modern nation state in terms of political structure by adopting a Western style constitution. As quoted above, Sasaki Takeshi describes this as an event which gave Japan “an entrance pass to international society whose main axis was the Western powers” (2002, p. 28). Simultaneously, Japan, then, was learning that “the new concept of the law of nations” was in practice among the outer community (Owada 2006, p. 7). Owada describes:

The outside world consisted of a number of nations like Japan, so it was said, but they were organized to form a ‘community of civilized nations’ where certain basic rules of conduct would apply. The community of nations could accept only those

nations which were civilized enough and prepared to practice this code of conduct in their mutual intercourse. (2006, p. 7)

This “code of conduct” was non-negotiable from Japan’s point of view and the standard was always determined by the Western powers. This clearly shows the existence of hierarchy between the West and Japan. Since the country was a latecomer, along with the fact that Japan was historically, culturally and ethnically aligned to the Orient, it was a “second class member” of the West club.

Oguma Eiji has introduced a concept “coloured imperialism” to explain this situation in his prominent book “*Nipponjin’no kyokai*” (The Boundaries of the Japanese). The focus of the book is on Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan and Korea, the former colonies or annexed territories of Imperial Japan which were located on the border region of Japan. Oguma reconsiders the concept of “Japanese” and “Japan” by examining Imperial Japan’s policies on those subject areas (2002, p. 3). Towards the end of the book, he points to the ambivalence of Japan being both the one to dominate and the one to be dominated. While considering Japan’s behaviour towards the boundary regions, the weaker party in relation to Japan, he suggests the necessity of recognising another party which is stronger and superior to Japan – the West (2002, p. 7, pp. 661-665). Here he presents the term “coloured imperialism” to describe the state of Japan (2002, p. 661). Indeed, Japan acted as an imperial power in the region. However, the modifier “coloured” indicates its inferior status in relation to the West and leaves Japan in a subordinate position.

A SENSE OF CRINGE IN EVERYDAY DISCOURSE

It is now more than a century since Japan and Australia were newly formed modern nation states and entered into the international arena and they must have gained

full membership by now. However, the reality does not look as it should. Their status as a “junior member” or as “second class” still lingers on. The subordinate position which Japan and Australia had reinforced in their early days as modern nation states has not fundamentally changed. This hierarchy between the West and themselves still has significant influence in both countries’ people’s way of thinking and acting and this is expressed consciously and, moreover, unconsciously, in their everyday discourses.

In Australia, “cultural cringe” is one phrase which represents the hierarchy between the country and the West, specifically its mother country Britain. According to Stephen Alomes “[t]he cultural critic, A. A. Phillips, coined the term ‘cultural cringe’ in the late 1940s and early 1950s to describe that ‘disease of the Australian mind’, the belief that Australian culture was inferior to that of the metropolis” (Alomes 1988, p. 219). Specifically in connection to the literary world in Australia, Phillips in his essay “The Cultural Cringe” says “[t]he Cringe mainly appears in a tendency to make needless comparisons” (Phillips 1980, p. 113). By pointing out “... in the back of the Australian mind, there sits a minatory Englishman”, Phillips remarks that the Englishman’s “ghost sits in on the tete-a-tete between Australian reader and writer ...” (1980, pp. 116-117). The Australian reader has not been free from “the problems of colonialism” and he/she always judges Australian writings by thinking “will this make sense to Englishman?” or “what would Englishman think about the literature?” (1980, p. 113). This norm exists not just in the literary circles but is more widely spread among “Australian social and intellectual elites ...” according to Alomes (1988, p. 219). They “have long associated themselves with the centre and not the periphery, the imperial centre not the colony” (1988, p. 219).

In 1966, when Phillips compiled the new edition of his work *The Australian Tradition: Studies in a Colonial Culture* which was first published in 1958 and contains the essay “The Cultural Cringe”, he wrote in the Preface “Today I believe – at least I hope – that younger readers of my essay may wonder what I am talking about” (1980, pp. xxiii-xxiv). Referring to the reason why he left the essay in the volume, he continued:

I have left the selection in this book, partly because it has some historical interest, partly because we are not yet safe from a recrudescence of the Cringe. There have recently been signs of its revival in forms less crude than the original, but not less dangerous. (1980, p. xxiv)

Twenty two years later, when he published *Nation At Last?: The Changing Character of Australian Nationalism 1880-1988*, referring to Phillips’ work, Alomes admits that the cringe is still alive way into the late twentieth century (1988, p. 220).

Since then another twenty years have passed and the norm is still lingering on in Australia. In the beginning of this new century, we occasionally come across the term “cultural cringe” itself in everyday discourse particularly in the media. It seems that the cringe exists not only in the cultural sector but almost everywhere in society from politics¹², the wine industry¹³, the service industry¹⁴, education¹⁵, tourism¹⁶ and so on. Some of the reports in the media are quite serious about this

¹² See, for instance, Michael Costello, “We need no lessons from Blair”, (*The Australian*, 31 March 2006); Phillip Adams, “Yes, yes, Mr President” (*The Australian*, 22 June 2002).

¹³ See, for instance, “A taste to make the angels smile”, *The Advertiser*, 28 February 2000.

¹⁴ See, for instance, “Flash mob comes the raw prawn”, *The West Australian*, 2 March 2002.

¹⁵ See, for instance, Emma Macdonald, “Artisan plan to help stem skills shortage” (*Canberra Times*, 15 March 2007).

¹⁶ See, for instance, Madonna Cameron, “US tourist bait bigger than shrimp on barbie”, (*The Courier-Mail*, 30 January 2002); Paula Kruger, “Tourism minister defends ‘where the bloody hell are you’ slogan: Where the bloody hell are you campaign draws criticism”,

cringe phenomenon which is still present in Australian society. “Senior academics claim a new cultural cringe is infesting our universities and encouraging the neglect of Australian literature” reports Rosemary Neill in *The Australian* (Neill 2006, p. 10). She takes up the argument of two academics in Australian literature who claim that Australian literature is undermined in the country’s tertiary education even though it is quite popular outside the country (2006, p. 10). According to the article, Sydney University is the only university which has Australian literature courses for undergraduates and research grants for literary projects are more often given to European projects than to Australian ones (2006, p. 10). Matthew Warren, also in *The Australian*, refers to cultural cringe in regard to the brain drain in Australia (Warren 2007, p. 6). Warren is introducing what Bernard Salt, a demographer and KPMG partner, stated in an address. Salt pointed out that “the brightest university graduates” from Generation Y who were free to see Australia “as being on the edge, not the centre of activity or opportunity” and believe that the centre is “in London or New York” (2007, p. 6). This belief is supported by “Generation Y’s baby-boomer parents” who encourage their children to go abroad to work and this accelerates the brain-drain from Australia (2007, p. 6).

Moreover, the cultural cringe has shown a new twist in this new century. Leonie Lamont says in *The Sydney Morning Herald* “[n]ow migrants adopt the cultural cringe” (Lamont 2005, p. 3). Lamont reports that a study by Peruvian-born Dr. Zuleyka Zevallos in Melbourne shows Turkish and Latin American background young women with high levels of education who were either “born or grew up in working-class migrant suburbs in Melbourne” thought “Australia was a cultural vacuum” (2005, p. 3). While praising and embracing Australia’s core values such as

freedom, egalitarianism or the laid-back personality, in term of “culture”, they just cannot recognise culture as residing in Australia. They see their countries of origin as having “the real culture” and they even thought that “their ethnic culture was moulding Australian culture” (2005, p. 3). Since they are also Australians, it could be argued that the cringe has been regenerated by the non-Anglo migrant population in this country.

Apart from these articles which analyse the present situation of Australian society, most of articles used the term “cultural cringe” in a kind of flashy catchphrase way. Some indicate that Australia was finally released from the cringe by saying “Goodbye, cultural cringe” (Dale & Irvine 2005, p. 1), it “has finally shrugged off its cultural cringe” (Retschlag 2000, p8) or suggest Australia is “getting over” the cringe (Colvin 2007). On the other hand, there are people who insist that the cringe is still out there. In *The Australian*, Michael Costello states “[i]t seems the cultural cringe still lurks in the subconscious of some Australians (Costello 2006, p. 14). It is echoed by comments like “Australians still trying to shake off the cultural cringe” (Kruger 2006) and “[c]ultural cringe and political correctness still thrive in Australia” (Cameron 2005, p. 61). Both John Shand and Sharon Verghis in *The Sydney Morning Herald* declares the cultural cringe is still “alive and well” in Australia (Verghis 2001, p. 17, Shand 2004, p. 20).

Some others talk about the return of the cringe. Megan Saunders and Daniel Hoare assert “[t]he trade agreement with the US threatened to send Australia back to the days of the “cultural cringe” (Saunders & Hoare 2004, p. 2). Julietta Jameson writes in *The Sun-Herald* “[r]eturn of cultural cringe as we kowtow to visiting US nobodies” (Jameson 2007, p. 15). And finally, the new cringe has arrived in Australia. In an article which I mentioned above, Neill pointed out “a new cultural

cringe is infesting our universities” (Neill 2006, p. 10) and talked about national identity in relation to the Cronulla Riot in December 2005. Christopher Bantick then said “[t]he stale symbols of patriotism dress our new cultural cringe” (Bantick 2006, p. 13).

Whether the cultural cringe is still here in Australia or has been gone or has returned, what we are able to see from these expressions is that Australians are more or less concerned about their “cringe”. In January 2008, *The Sydney Morning Herald* wrote “[f]orget the cultural cringe” (Kaufman 2008, p. 3). The article was referring to a report issued by the Phonographic Performance Company of Australia saying “Australians are now broadcasting more local acts than in recent years” (Kaufman 2008, p. 3). As a phenomenon, the reality that more Australian music is gaining attention in this country may be justifying the end of the “cultural cringe culture era”. However, ironically, the fact that the paper bothers to run this kind of article shows that they are undertaking “needless comparison” as Arthur Phillips called it. If you truly are free from the cringe, you would not have to even think of drawing a line between music by Australian artists and those from overseas.

The discourse containing the “cultural cringe” phrase gives an impression that “the level of self-flagellation” is astonishingly high among ordinary Australians. As British writer in Melbourne, Nigel Lopez-McBean, argues (Lopez-McBean 2006, p. 7), there is a kind of a premise in Australian mind that their country is slightly immature compared to those advanced Western countries out there in the Northern Hemisphere. The Australians understand their country to be “on its way to adulthood” as Hage pointed out and as a result the “coming of age” of Australian nationhood is frequently mentioned in the country.

The most favoured moment in Australian history which coincides with the phrase “coming of age” seems to be Gallipoli. Borrowing from Antimo Iannella’s report “Anzac Sprit” in *The Advertiser* 2008, Emeritus Professor of University of Adelaide Trevor Wilson has described Gallipoli as “... the first battle that was widely reported, with British newspapers mentioning the Australian contribution” and it “helped to build up our national consciousness” (Iannella 2008, p. 27). There are, however, those who oppose this view. Tony Stephens says that although Gallipoli is seen as Australia’s coming of age, “[i]t is difficult to argue that Australia became a nation at Gallipoli, or even came of age there, when Australians were responding to British imperial demands and to British orders on the battlefield” (Stephens 2002, p. 3). Indeed, even after Gallipoli, Australia faces “coming of age” situations one after another. “Australia, after all, has ‘come of age’ more often than most countries” (2002, p. 3). Some say World War Two was Australia’s coming of age (Saunders 2002, p. 17). Others say the Snowy Hydro scheme construction was a coming of age (Malone 2006, p. 3). In 2002, the then Employment and Workplace Relations Minister Tony Abbott was reported as saying “Australia’s involvement in East Timor’s push for independence was ‘a coming of age’ that showed the nation could handle major international issues without help from powerful allies” (Gray & Cauchi 2002, p.5). The Chief Executive of a non-governmental organisation World Vision Australia Tim Costello recognised the moment when the Australians raised enormous amounts of money for the relief of the Boxing Day Tsunami as Australia’s coming of age (Philips, M. 2005). And in 2006, when the nation’s population reached 21 million, the media reported it as nation’s coming of age (Dart 2007, p. 1). So, when will Australia reach adulthood? Will it ever grow up?

The notion of immaturity or “on our way to adulthood” is no stranger to people in Japan, a country which is highly industrialised and economically strong but a non-Western country. In Japan, there are quite a few episodes regarding General MacArthur. There is one very famous episode where he referred to Japan as “like a boy of twelve” (Dower 2000, pp. 550-551)¹⁷. According to John Dower, this was merely a five word passage out of around 174,000 word record of MacArthur’s testimony, but “this passage drew obsessive attention” from people in Japan (2000, p. 551). Regardless of the context, “Japan being a 12 years old infant from Americans’ point of view” was the impression which remained in Japanese people’s minds. Since the opening up of the country as a result of the gunboat diplomacy of the US and other European countries in 1868, Japan had had a “catch up with the West” policy as its top priority. Learning from the West, it had built a Westernised political system and implemented a constitution. While trying hard to amend the unequal treaties with Western countries, Japan had built up its military and had a historic victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. It took part in the Great War and was able to make an appearance at the Paris Peace Conference and was committed to the establishment of the League of Nations. It even imitated the West and became an imperial power in the region, held colonies and expanded into the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese Continent and South East Asia. Finally, Imperial Japan was bold enough to declare war against the Allies as if it had become equally big and strong enough to do so. This delusion of the Japanese was completely destroyed by its surrender in World War Two leaving vast areas in Asia and also its

¹⁷ This MacArthur’s testimony was made on 5 May 1951 at a joint committee of the Senate of the United States (Dower 2000, p. 550). He was trying to make his point that “the Japanese could be trusted more than the Germans” (Dower 2000, p. 550). He compared the Anglo-Saxon to a 45 year old man and argued that “the Germans were quite as mature” whereas he referred to the Japanese as “like a boy of twelve” (Dower 2000, p. 550).

own country in ruins. The Japanese population came to be aware that Japan never had been a rival of Western countries. MacArthur's remark reaffirmed this reality.

Sixty years on, although it has experienced an economic downturn in the 1990s, Japan is one of the biggest economies in the world. In 1988 the *per capita* GNP of Japan surpassed that of the United States (Tsutsumi & Sawa 1994, p. 12). Among countries with more than 10 million population, Japan became the richest country¹⁸ (Tsutsumi & Sawa 1994, p. 12). The country is one of the original members and the only Asian member of the Group of Eight (G8) powers. It must have grown up from a "12 years old child" and have truly passed the coming of age day by now. Nevertheless, in Japanese society, there exists a sense of cringe which always observes Western countries as being ahead.

Once again, consulting Arthur Phillips' remark on Australia, "[t]he Cringe mainly appears in a tendency to make needless comparisons" (1980, p. 113). The tendency is also quite apparent in Japanese society. In everyday discourse, the expression "*Obei de wa*", which literary means "in Europe and America", are frequently used when comparing events, situations and conditions with European countries and the United States and in order to judge or recognise the position or the situation of Japan. The expression can be seen in various aspects of the society, from economy to medical issues, legal issues to life style issues, as if standards are all and always resident in the West.

Some comments including "in Europe and America" are both overtly and covertly presenting the situation in the West as positive and advanced and the situation in Japan as negative and backward. Writing about "fair trade" in coffee, tea, sugar, clothes and other miscellaneous goods in *Mainichi Shimbun*, Nakamura Hideaki

¹⁸ In 1988, a country which recorded the highest *per capita* GNP was Switzerland with a population of 6.5 million (Tsutsumi & Sawa 1994, p. 12).

says “in Europe and America the awareness of fair trade among the public is high but in Japan the interest is quite low” (Nakamura 2008). Referring to British bank HSBC’s Future of Retirement report, London correspondence Fujiyoshi Yotaro states “in Europe and America” the majority of the interviewees were positive about retirement but in Japan 40% answered negatively (Fujiyoshi 2006). In spite of the fact that the survey of HSBC was covering people from 20 countries from around the world including non-Western countries like China or Singapore, there was no mention about those countries in the article. Numano Mitsuyoshi points to a unique habit of the publishing industry in Japan. In Japan, most magazines are published earlier than the actual dates. For example, the January edition of a monthly magazine will be in book stores in December. He says “As far as I know, this kind of thing never happens in Europe or in America” (Numano 2007, p. 9).

Some other comments are suggesting that Japan will follow the trend in Europe and the United States. In July 2006, *Sankei Shimbun* reported that the Ministry of Justice was considering the amendment of criminal punishment including the introduction of social services partially replacing imprisonment or monetary penalty (*Sankei Shimbun* 27 July 2006a, p. 3). It is explained that this was already common “in Europe and America” and if it was introduced it would be the first case in Japan (*Sankei Shimbun* 27 July 2006a, p. 3). *Sankei Shimbun* then turns to biofuels and writes “In Europe and America,” biofuels have already been introduced and the use of the fuels will also be promoted in Japan from now on (*Sankei Shimbun* 27 April 2007c, p. 8). Although the biggest car manufacturer in the world is the Japanese company Toyota, what cars should be equipped with seems to be decided by users in Europe and America. Whether that is a side air bag, breathalyser or automatic roof for convertible cars, they are all already familiar and wide-spread in European and

American society and they are now finally coming to Japan (*Mainichi Shimbun* 28 July 2007a, p. 1, *Mainichi Shimbun* 29 August 2007b, *Sankei Shimbun* 25 March 2007b, p. 5). This trend even comes into the field of men's beauty treatment. "In Europe and America, men's skin care is usual and it is gradually becoming common in Japan, too" states the most prominent Japanese cosmetic company Shiseido (*Nishi Nippon Shimbun* 10 February 2008).

As a matter of course, the comparison is not always "needless comparison" as Phillips pointed out. There are cases where comparisons are relevant. In order to not be overly self-centred and to place and see itself in wider context, it is important to consult with others or outside views. However, does the object of comparison always have to be a European country and the United States? Is it a fair view to put Japan in a context where there is a sense that the country is in most cases lagging behind the West – the standard? Moreover, should Western values also be evaluated?

The popular use of the phrase "*kokusai kankaku*" which means "international sensibility" in Japanese society well indicates this notion. *Kokusai kankaku* is one of the most essential, favoured and required qualities for a capable person in Japanese society. When the Liberal Democratic Party, Japan's ruling party, celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2005, the Party released its new platform. Regarding future education, the platform promised that the party would allocate sufficient resources and declared that it would aim at fostering national pride among Japanese nationals and those who were ambitious and those with *kokusai kankaku* (LDP 2005). A similar message is coming from the corporate sector. *Kokusai kankaku* is mentioned in the executives' message to their employees in, for instance, New Year statements or at entrance ceremonies for newly recruited

workers which are usually held in April in Japan. They say that they are in need of talent with regard to *kokusai kankaku*. The educational world is no stranger to this trend. It is again mentioned at university entrance ceremonies. Junior and senior high schools from all over the country are sending their students for overseas excursions in order to cultivate *kokusai kankaku*.

With no doubt, having an international sensibility is indeed a virtue for an individual. However, when *kokusai kankaku* is mentioned in the Japanese context, *kokusai* – international – seems mainly to refer to the United States and Europe. In April 2008, when the new governor of the Bank of Japan, Shirakawa Masaaki, was appointed, the president of *Nippon Keidanren* (Japan Business Foundation), the biggest and the most influential business association in Japan, Mitarai Fujio said that he was positive about the appointment since Mr. Shirakawa was a person with *kokusai kankaku* (*Mainichi Shimbun* 7 April 2008). Interestingly, when Mitarai became the president of the foundation in 2006, he was recognised as a person suitable for the position because he had rich *kokusai kankaku* (*Mainichi Shimbun* 15 October 2005, p. 1, *Tokyo Shimbun* 8 November 2005, p. 3). Mitarai and Shirakawa's common background was that they both had the experience to be appointed to work in the United States. In Mitarai's case, he spent 23 years in the States while working for his company Canon Incorporated. The judgment over whether a person has an international sensibility or not seems to be made regarding the experience of living overseas. But does living in the United States simply provide a person with international sensibility? On the contrary, is not there a danger for a person to develop a biased or too Americanised way of thinking? These two gentlemen, Mr. Mitarai and Mr. Shirakawa, who are two significant figures in the Japanese economic sector at the moment maybe individuals with true *kokusai*

kankaku and, here, I am not questioning their quality. However, the way international sensibility is judged and expressed in everyday discourse, which is mainly seen in the media representations, has to be questioned. Are they really talking about “international” sensibility? Are we not just talking about familiarity with Western society?

Simultaneously, international sensibility in Japan is in many cases wrongly connected to the ability to speak English – the dominant language in the world at the moment especially in the business world. In 2002, it was reported that electronics company Hitachi, Ltd. decided to introduce the score of English skill certificate test, Test of English International Communication (TOEIC), to evaluate the performance of their employees. The decision was made because on many occasions Hitachi had to cooperate with their overseas partners and in such an environment *kokusai kankaku* was required by their workers (*Jiji Press* 16 January 2001). The report said that Fujitsu Limited had a similar personnel evaluation system. Another example is from a local government. Gunma Prefecture, which is located in the northwest of Tokyo, published an email newsletter *Gunma in the box* in English (*Yomiuri Shimbun* 9 July 2002). The purpose of this plan was to let Gunma people to foster *kokusai kankaku*. Chemical Daily reported on an interesting survey conducted by a chemical textile company Kuraray Co., Ltd (Chemical Daily, 2008). The survey focused on *kokusai kankaku* of university students today. Although the company was supposed to be looking into the students’ understanding and their way of approaching international issues in the worldwide sense, the survey inserted a question asking whether the students are confident in using English. This is backed by a notion that *kokusai kankaku* and the ability to use English is inseparable (Kuraray 2008).

In the typical Japanese mind, which perceives the world in a hierarchical structure with the West at its summit, “international”, “the West” and “English” suggest an intriguing link. International society is seen as dominated by Western rhetoric. This rhetoric is recognised to be understood in English which is a language from Western countries and the dominant language in the world at present. There must be a lot of people who are, for instance, fluent in Chinese or Korean or Arabic and so on and are rich in international sensibility. Also, there must be many people in Japan who are not able to speak English or other foreign languages but have international sensibility. On the contrary, the fact that a person can operate using fluent English does not necessarily mean that that person has a rich international sensibility. Needless to say, knowledge only from the West does not help us to understand the range of issues existing in the international community.

Tsujii Takashi, in his book *Dento no sozoryoku* (Creativity of tradition) thoroughly examines the present stagnated or even decaying situation of Japanese literature and more broadly culture and acutely asserts that from the end of the nineteenth century until the country’s surrender at World War Two in 1945, *kokusai kankaku* meant to learn and understand mainly about advanced European countries (Tsujii 2001, p. 128). He argues that learning and understanding about Europe was nothing to do with *kokusai kankaku* in a real sense but was about an appetite for knowledge in the name of a success. Success in this context meant to be recognised in international society as an independent modern nation state, which was not necessarily a negative thing in those days (2001, p. 128). However, this Japanese habit has not changed even more than a hundred years. Actually, the disgraceful defeat at World War Two meant this long lasting Japanese disease deepened (2001, p. 128).

Thus, even today, both in Japan and Australia there is a notion that permeated society which places the countries and their nationals in a subordinated position in relation to the West. The nationals recognise that their countries have not yet reached maturity and they are still on their way to adulthood. Because of this hierarchical structure, they tend to compare themselves to Western countries when, in many cases, this is not needed or is irrelevant. This tendency is reflected in the nationals' everyday discourse particularly as it is represented in the media. Then, what is the mechanism which leads to this persistent hierarchy between the West and the two countries? Why has it haunted the two nations even though it was established more than a hundred years ago?

NATIONAL PSYCHE TROUBLED BY AN INFERIORITY COMPLEX

Although this thesis is not looking into the minds of individual Japanese or Australian nationals and explaining their views of the countries, the West or the world, it is worth consulting a psychological explanation in order to examine the mechanism behind the expression of their subordination to the West. The notion which permeates Japanese and Australian society could be considered to be a collective psyche of nationals within the framework of a national identity. Based on this premise, I will introduce an observation made by a Japanese psychologist.

Kawai Hayao, who was a well known Jungian and who was also the Commissioner of the Agency for Cultural Affairs in his final days, made an interesting observation regarding the relationship between the United States of America, the entire world and terrorism by referring to the psychological concepts, ego and complex. In an introduction to one of the volumes of his collected works which was written immediately after the terrorist attacks on American soil on

September eleventh 2001, and after witnessing the incident, he tried to provide an explanation for what was happening to the world from a psychological perspective.

The ego is understood as “the executive organ of the mind” and “[t]he management of conflict and its ability to work toward adaptation are the ego’s most characteristic operations ...” (Lasky 2002, p. 168). Namely, it operates to maintain the identity of an individual. Before Freud published *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1900, it was believed that the ego was firmly independent. However, with the publication of his groundbreaking book, Freud demonstrated that the ego was affected by unexpected unconsciousness and was not as firm as it was believed to be (Kawai 2001, pp. iii-iv). The ego tries to preserve the identity and the independence of an individual and tries to exclude elements which do not accommodate it (Kawai 2001, p. iv). Those elements which could not be accommodated into one’s identity form a complex. While the ego is in control it will oppress the complex and maintain its identity (Kawai 2001, p. iv). However, when the complex becomes more significant and the containment of the complex is endangered, it will become visible as symptoms of neurosis (Kawai 2001, p. iv).

Kawai adapts this psychological state of one human being to the world as one entity. He interprets the United States as an ego which is trying to manage the integrity of the whole world (2001, p. iv). Despite the United States’ will to be in control, organs which resist this domination are developed and they sometimes revolt against the United States in the form of terrorism which is like symptoms of human’s neurosis (2001, pp. iv-v). This situation makes the United States as one nation state feel depressed or frustrated and sometimes drives it to attack others (2001, p. v).

Kawai is careful in determining the effectiveness of this comparison between a human being's psychology and what is happening in the world today but maintains there are very significant similarities between them (2001, p. v). He goes on to predict that the 21st century would be a century for all human beings to contemplate integrity and identity as a whole by observing the incident that happened in the most powerful state in the world at the very beginning of a new century (2001, p. v).

This observation by Kawai is particularly interesting and suggestive in understanding the mechanism behind Japan and Australia's behaviour as independent nation states in the international arena today. Kawai interpreted the psychological state of one human being to understand present world politics imagining the world as one unified body and recognising the United States as its ego which tries to keep its integrity. Before leaping from a human being to the entire world, this model is, I would argue, applicable to a nation state. Japan and Australia respectively could be seen as one independent body and the collective will of their nationals to pursue their national identity as their ego.

As Kawai warned, we need to avoid impetuous determination when placing a human being and the world in the same psychological context in order to compare and analyse. Nevertheless, since the argument of this thesis is developing within the framework of national identity which in turn is closely related to the psyche of nationals in a collective sense, the comparison gives us at least a clue to understanding the situation in both Japanese and Australian societies. Hence, referring to the ego and the complex of the United States as a sole super power in the present world, the "cringe" phenomenon among Japanese and Australian societies can be interpreted as a symptom of their neurosis which is caused by their complex. This complex is obviously the one caused by their long lasting subordinate

status in relation to the West and their inferiority complex in relation to the West – the West complex.

In another work titled *Konpurekkusu* (complex) which was first published in 1971, Kawai briefly explains an inferiority complex. According to Kawai, an Austrian psychologist Alfred Adler who initially worked with Freud, emphasised the importance of an inferiority complex (Kawai 2006, p. 56). Adler later opposed Freud's libido theory and asserted that the most primordial desire of human beings was a desire for power. Every human being has some kind of inferiority complex and in order to compensate for the complex, a person aspires to attain power (2006, p. 57). Adler thought that when this attempt fails, the person starts to show symptoms of neurosis (2006, p. 57).

One important point which Kawai clarifies is that being an inferior entity and having an inferiority complex are different issues. Being in an inferior position, if you are well aware of the position and accept it, you do not develop an inferiority complex. That is because the fact that you are inferior in a certain circumstance is integrated into your ego and your identity is not disturbed. In this case, your pride will not be hurt by being in an inferior position. However, if you are not able to accept your own inferiority status then this becomes a problem. An inferiority complex develops in your psychology and starts to disturb your integrity of the identity (2006, pp. 57-61).

In the light of this psychological analysis, the mechanism behind the cringe phenomenon seen in Japan and Australia begins to be revealed. Both Japan and Australia are placed in a subordinated position in relation to the West because of the circumstances of their birth as modern nation states. This condition is unchangeable. If both countries were comfortable with this state, then there would

be no further trouble. They can just stay in the position and maybe create a “junior nation state club” together. The problem is, however, that they are not necessarily satisfied with the situation. The expression of their subordinate state in everyday discourse emerges spontaneously and unconsciously with a sense of cringe that indicates dissatisfaction regarding their nation’s position in the world.

Indeed, Japan and Australia are highly developed, industrialised and also politically stable countries based on democracy. They are two among thirty members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The origin of the OECD is based on the cross Atlantic connection between the United States and European countries (OECD History). Japan was the first country from the Pacific and specifically from the Asian end of the Pacific to join this firmly Western centred grouping in 1964, three years after the forming of the OECD (OECD Tokyo Centre). In 1971, Australia became the second country from the Pacific to enter the organisation. As symbolically shown in their participation in the OECD, they are a part of a force which is leading and shaping the world. There is no surprise for Japanese and Australian nationals when they recognise themselves standing side by side with Western powers in the present international arena.

In spite of their OECD participation, both countries still do not seem to have gained full membership of “the West club”. It is impossible for Japan to erase its ethnicity or historical connection with the Orient. As for Australia, contrary to its vast land mass, it is a small country in terms of population and its significance in world politics. It is not even a member of the G8 and it is so far away from the centre of the world – Down Under. This gap between their position in reality and the position they believe they are supposed to occupy eventually develops frustration among the nationals and the frustration is expressed in a form of a

cringe phenomenon within these societies. Referring to psychological analysis, this could be read as a symptom of their inferiority complex in relation to the West¹⁹.

What is more significant and more problematic about these two countries' psychological illness is that the consequence of the complex has not just been seen within the communities but it also spreads beyond their boundaries. As mentioned in the case of the United States and terrorism, the symptom of neurosis is sometimes expressed in a form of attacking somebody else (Kawai 2001, p. v). Likewise, Japan and Australia turn to Asia. As if they are keeping the balance of their psyche, Japan and Australia act as superiors in relation to neighbouring Asian countries.

Here, it is appropriate to bring back the famous passage by Fukuzawa Yukichi in his book *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku* again. Fukuzawa described the world divided into three phases according to the level of civilisation. The phases were "civilised", "half-civilised" and "savage". In this categorisation, Fukuzawa placed Japan in the "half-civilised" phase because he was well aware of Japan's backwardness in terms of civilisation compared to Western countries. However, Fukuzawa did not just

¹⁹ Pointing to the process of Japan's Westernisation after the Meiji Restoration and also to the post Pacific War period when Japanese society had quickly adopted the American way, it could be argued that still the country was resisting the West and trying to maintain its own Japanese values, therefore, an inferiority complex in relation to the West did not exist in the society. Also, Australia's diplomatic exercise after the war which tried to play the role of a "middle power" in the international arena may make Australia appear to be over its inferiority complex. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid recognising signs of an inferiority complex in both countries. Even as I am undertaking the final edit of my thesis this complex is on display. On 26 September 2009, it was reported that from now on the G20 meeting would be the core international body to govern global economic issues replacing the G8. Australia was overjoyed with the news saying "PM Kevin Rudd wins place at new G20 seat of power" (Shanahan 2009). This is a clear representation of Australia's inferiority complex. On the contrary, Japan was unhappy about the news. The Japanese media reported that it would lower Japan's position in the world (Fujita 2009). Japan was the only Asian (non-Western) member of the G8 summit and was proud of it. However, with the G20, China and India will also be there. Japan would no longer be the leader of Asia and this bothers the Japanese mind. This concern is derived from an inferiority complex.

leave Japan in the lower position in this categorisation. By having a “half-civilised” phase in the middle and putting these three phases in a relative position, he managed to place Japan in a superior position – a position closer to the West – than “less-civilised” countries within the “half-civilised” phase or countries belonging to the “savage” phase (Komori 2003, 17). Komori Yoichi argues that:

A “Half-civilised” country could be “half-civilised” only by reflecting itself in a **mirror of the other** called “civilised” and creating its self image by the criteria of the “civilised”. Simultaneously, in order not to fall from the “half-civilised” phase to the lower phase and to be enslaved by the West, it was necessary for the “half-civilised” to discover or manipulate “uncivilised” or “savage” entities which are a **mirror of the other** on the opposite side and also by reflecting itself in the mirror, it had to confirm that compared to those inferior others it was fitting into the “civilised” criteria. (bold original: Komori 2003, p. 18)

For the newly born modern nation state Japan in the late nineteenth century, “the inferior others” were neighbouring territories. Expansion of Japan into those territories was justified by this relative way of seeing the degree of civilisation. Under an imperial idea a “more civilised country was allowed to take the control of the less civilised territory and people to civilise them”. This was behind Japan’s behaviour (Komori 2003, pp. 17-19).

First, it was Ezochi²⁰ in the north and, secondly, Ryukyu²¹ in the south. Then in 1890, at the first Diet under the newly implemented imperial constitution, Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo delivered a significant speech referring to Japan’s external policy. He stated:

²⁰ The land of *Ainu* people which is now Hokkaido Prefecture.

²¹ Ryukyu is now Okinawa Prefecture.

Certainly, there are two aspects to a state's independence and self defence. First, there is a *shuken-sen*. Secondly, there is a *rieki-sen* which is an area closely related to the security of *shuken-sen*. There is no country which does not have *shuken-sen* or *rieki-sen*. In order to secure our independence among those [imperial] states, it is not enough just to defend our *shuken-sen*. (quoted in Marukawa 2003, p. 48)

Shuken-sen literally means sovereignty line – national border – and *rieki-sen* means interest line – a line which lies one step further from *shuken-sen*. What Yamagata directly meant in this speech was that in order to defend Japan's *shuken-sen*, it must defend the *rieki-sen* which lies in the country's adjacent area – Korea. Furthermore, when it gains control of the area, it should defend another *rieki-sen* lying one step further away. That area was Manchuria. This speech was made to get the approval from the Diet for spending the military budget on external operations, since before then, Japan was using the budget on more on internal issues (Marukawa 2003, p. 48). This remark is now recognised as a turning point for Japan signalling the move into the Korean Peninsula and the Chinese Continent and it was to end in the occupation of a vast area of Asia (Kang 2003a, pp. 90-91, Kang 2003b, pp. 98-99, Marukawa 2003, pp. 47-50, Yamamuro 2002, p. 40). Up until the 1880s, Japan was cautious about its expansion into the peninsula and the continent but this *shuken-sen/rieki-sen* rhetoric changed that approach (Marukawa 2003, p. 48).

Along with its fear of being colonised by the Western powers, Japan's aspiration to be a modern nation state acting like other Western countries is well expressed in this speech and also in later actions taken by the country toward neighbouring Asian countries. Japan's gaze followed the West which was positioned ahead of

Japan. However, by looking back Japan discovered and invented Asian countries which were less civilised and so backward in Japanese eyes. This recognition made them act in a superior fashion to their neighbours.

Recalling the biased way of the interpreting *kokusai kankaku* (international sensitivity), Tsujii Takashi points out the following. Where Tsujii, a poet and a novelist, expresses his concern about the lack of *kokusai kankaku* in the studies of Japanese tradition, he states:

Needless to say, *kokusai kankaku* starts from understanding different cultures which we frequently encounter on a daily basis and people with different life styles, religion and history. For Japan which is located in a region called Asia, understanding culture in a Siberian Maritime Province, the Korean Peninsular and the Chinese Continent should have been the starting point and the basis of *kokusai kankaku*. Instead, Japan in the past gave up a chance to foster *kokusai kankaku* by looking down on neighbouring countries and recognising the region merely as a place for its imperial expansion. (2001, pp. 127-128)

Tsujii's remarks clearly show the hierarchy between the West, Japan and Asia, within the consciousness of Japanese society. The psychological analysis regarding the inferiority complex, neurosis and its symptom clearly explains this structure. It could be said that psychological backwardness regarding the West which creates the inferiority complex is the cause of Japan's behaviour in the region. The national identity of Japan has the cringe feeling balanced by finding backwardness in other neighbouring Asian countries.

On the other hand, in Australia, a white settler colony on the edge of Asia, from the very beginning there was a division between the continent and its neighbour,

Asia. Australia was a symbol of the Western imperialism in the region. Ien Ang and Jon Stratton presented this situation as “Australia’ being constructed as a settled outpost of the ‘West’; an attempt to realize a society on the principles of European modernity in a space outside Europe” (1996, p. 20). Therefore, the relationship between them was in a fixed hierarchy, having Australia in a superior and Asia in an inferior position. Nonetheless, this fact did not mean that Australia was in a superior position or was equal to other Western powers. As I have discussed in this chapter, Australia has been a subordinate entity from a Westerncentric point of view. Reiterating Ghassan Hage’s remark, Australia always falls into the “second category” (1998, p. 143). Australia is “a nation born out of the imperialist system” and, therefore, it cannot go into the first category which is constructed by nation states whose “their adulthood is unquestionable” (1998, p. 143). Ang and Stratton state that Australia is “not the origin of Westernization/modernization of the world” but is “the outcome” (1996, p. 22). Here emerges the uneasy and frustrating notion among members of Australian society which seems to be permanently lagging behind the West and on the way to maturity.

The introduction of the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901 by the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia could be seen as one symptom which was caused by this inferiority complex. The Act, which became the basis of the White Australia policy which officially lasted for 57 years, passed the first parliament of Australia. The introduction of a dictation test as a means of border control was a main feature of this act. As James Jupp defines it, this test was “probably the most hypocritical invention in the long history of Australian immigration” (Jupp 2002, p. 8). He notes that:

It authorised an officer at the point of arrival to administer a dictation test of 500 words. It was understood, though nowhere stated, that this should be in a language not known to the immigrant. ... The threat of the test was, however, extremely effective. A message was sent out to the world that 'coloured' people could not settle in Australia. ... Australia had become one of the 'whitest' countries in the world outside northwestern Europe. (2002, p. 9)

This Act was said to be targeted at the entrance of Asian immigrants, mainly Chinese people, to Australia (Takeda 2000, p. 50). Since the middle of the nineteenth century, because a large quantity of Chinese workers entered the continent, numbers of acts restricting Chinese and "coloured" people's migration were established in each colony. On the occasion of federation, an overarching act was implemented. By excluding Asians as others using the policy, Australia as a nation was trying to construct a national identity aligned to the West. As it was in the case of Japan, inferior Asia was created and used as a springboard for Australia to psychologically view itself in a superior position to its Asian neighbours and be part of Western civilisation.

The following assertion made by D'Cruz and Steele shows Australia's intention to exclude itself from the region. They point out that:

..., at Federation, white Australians used the logic that the only way democracy could be ensured in Australia was through a policy that maintained racial homogeneity and purity of Anglo-Australian culture and a weird form of democracy by excluding peoples with 'wrong' skin colours and belief-systems and by building into the Constitution the values pre-eminent in the culture of Anglo-

Australia, such as a circumscribed notion of equality and, through it, individual rights and a democratic framework of government. (2003, p. 43)

By adopting liberal democracy, Australia intended to demonstrate that it was part of the West. However, because in reality the country was in a subordinated position in relation to the West, it had to locate inferiority in others by introducing the peculiar logic I have discussed above.

D'Cruz and Steele, quoting from Arthur Phillips' works, explaining that while Australia was feeling a "cultural cringe" towards white Europeans", it simultaneously behaved "towards coloured peoples" in a "superiority-of-being-us" manner (2003, p. 36). This behaviour can still be recognised today. As already seen in this chapter, D'Cruz and Steele are critical about the West's tendency to judge issues in the East by its own criteria. Occasionally, Australia had to act with a "superiority-of-being-us" attitude to make it appear more significant than it actually was. As one recent example of the "superiority-of-being-us" behaviour, the authors refer to Anthony Milner's remark "a national overconfidence" regarding Australia's intervention into East Timor in 1999 (2003, p. 36)²².

²² Here, it is interesting to recall Yamagata Aritomo's *shukensen/riekisen* (sovereignty line/interest line) argument which I recorded above. In Australia's defence white paper in 1994, *Defending Australia*, which followed the 1987 defence white paper, *the Defence of Australia*, the importance of "the defence of Australia and its interests" was particularly stressed (Brown 1995). This policy was overtly represented by John Howard who came into power in 1996. In his famous the "Howard Doctrine" interview with *The Bulletin* on the occasion of the East Timor intervention, Howard said that by the intervention "[w]e were defending the values we hold as Australians" (Brenchley 1999, p. 22). The similar logic and mentality could be found in Yamagata's and Howard's words – in order to defend their national interests, going beyond the *shukensen* and defend the *riekisen* by going into somebody else's territories could be justified. Also, like Yamagata, Howard indicated the necessity of an increase in defence spending in the interview (Brenchley 1999, p. 22). Indeed, from South Africa (the Boer War) to China (the Boxer Rebellion), Gallipoli to Villers Bretonneux, the Korean Peninsula to Vietnam, Iraq to Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands, Australia has repeatedly crossed its sovereignty line in order to defend its national interest.

Coming back to Kawai Hayao's observation, in human's psychology, elements which could not be accommodated into one's identity form a complex and when one's ego loses control of the complex, symptoms of neurosis start to appear (Kawai 2001, p. iv). Both Japan's and Australia's behaviour to act in a superior way towards their neighbouring Asian countries could be seen as a symptom of the neurosis bothering their national psyche. The complex which is disturbing each nation's integrity in terms of national identity is an inferior complex in relation to the West.

CONCLUSION

Japan and Australia have different origins. Australia is a country which is an outpost of the Occident. On the contrary, Japan is a country which long belonged to the Orient. Nevertheless, because they were formed as modern nation states at almost the same time in world history under the significant influence of European and United States' expansion into the non-Western part of the world, in terms of their relationship to the West, they have been in a similar position – a subordinate position. Therefore, the notion that they are lagging behind Western countries is shared by both countries. This notion is both intentionally and unintentionally expressed in everyday discourse frequently in the form of a “cringe”. This situation of Japan and Australia is very similar to a person who is suffering from neurosis. Seeing a collective notion among nationals of both countries seeking national identity as ego, the cringe phenomenon can be understood as a symptom of neurosis developed by a complex. The complex which is disturbing Japan and Australia's national identity is an inferiority complex in relation to the West. The countries reluctantly perceive themselves to permanently be in the seats reserved for “junior members” or “second class nation states” and they feel they are in an inferior

position. This notion of inferiority has been embedded in their national psyche and directs their behaviour in the international arena today.

The most significant symptom of the neurosis in the arena is their behaviour towards neighbouring Asian countries. The notion of superiority is held by two countries towards Asia. It is, indeed, significant and suggestive that the first steps taken by both Japan and Australia following their formation as modern nation states was to bluntly present their stance towards neighbouring Asian countries. Japan subscribed to the idea of sovereignty line/interest line and threw an aggressive gaze over Asia using imperialist eyes. On the other hand, Australia, by adapting the White Australia policy, alienated itself from the geographic region where the country belongs. This habit of Japan and Australia of looking down on their neighbouring Asian countries and behaving in a superior manner is still with them in this 21st century.

Because of their origin as latecomers to international society, they were and still are obsessed with the belief that a nation state develops in a linear way towards adulthood and from the East to the West and they believe there is a stark hierarchy between the two worlds. This obsession made led to an inferiority complex among Japanese and Australian nationals and has created a superior attitude towards Asia.

SECTION B:

AMBIGUOUS IDENTITY IN THE LIGHT OF EDWARD W. SAID

INTRODUCTION

Japan and Australia, two nation states which emerged in the international arena in a similar period of modern world history, share an inferiority complex in relation to the West. The historical backdrop to the two countries gaining state-hood has, as I argued in the last section of my thesis, made them suffer from this complex. This is reflected in their national identities. A sense of immaturity led to their identities floating somewhere between the West and the East. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate their ambiguous identities. In order to do so, I will consult with the expertise of Edward W. Said, one of the most significant and controversial intellectuals of our time.

The most fundamental cause of the ambiguous national identities of Japan and Australia is that both countries are obsessed by a perception which sees the world as a dichotomous and hierarchical place with the Western powers occupying the superior position. They believe a nation state will develop in a linear way, from the uncivilised/the East to the civilised/the West. Their sense of immaturity derives from this belief and they are struggling to be fully fledged members of the West. Said who is best known as an author of *Orientalism* was an intellectual who explicitly focused on how such a dichotomous and hierarchical world view was created. As one Japanese critic, I noted, in *Orientalism*, Said revealed the ambition of the West to justify the domination of the Orient (Miura 1986, p. 11). In the book, he defined “orientalism” as “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and

having authority over the Orient” (Said 2003, p. 3). He exposed the practice of orientalism by the Western powers by thoroughly examining a large number of texts on the Orient. By doing so, Said made apparent that this practice of the West, and in the form of imperialism and colonialism, had led to the present world being understood and perceived as a place divided into two parties: those who dominate and those who are dominated. Said continuously argued this point throughout his life and was particularly outspoken on the issue with regard to Palestine.

Because of his acute criticism of Western arrogance, Said was occasionally accused of exaggerating the dichotomy between the West and the East and was understood as being willing to emphasise the superiority of the East, in Said’s case particularly Islam. For instance, Ibn Warraq writes in his recent book, a critique of *Orientalism*, “Said and his followers can only cope with a Manichaeian worldview – the Evil West versus the Rest, perceived or presented as morally superior, or good” (Ibn 2007, p. 13). Nevertheless, from his writings, interviews and lectures, it is not hard to recognise that Said was not intending to stimulate the opposition between the West and the East nor was he insisting on Islam’s superiority over the West. In his criticism of Samuel Huntington’s well known essay “The clash of civilization?”, Said’s stance was clearly demonstrated.

Huntington’s essay “The clash of civilization?” first appeared in the *Foreign Affairs* journal in 1993. Three years later in 1996 it was, in Said’s words, “expanded” or “bloated” into a book *The Clash of Civilization and Remaking of the World Order* without a question mark (Said 2002). In observing the world after the Cold War, Huntington argued that in this new world conflicts will occur not based on ideology or over economic matters, but on culture. He said “Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global

politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations". He continued by arguing that "The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics" (Huntington 1993). In this provocative essay, Huntington defined eight civilizations – Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin America and African – as major civilizations in the present world (1993) and argued that these civilisations tended to clash because: (1) they were fundamentally different, (2) there was more interaction between people around the world, (3) the weakened local identities or identities attached to nation states had been replaced by religion, (4) the West's power was at its peak and making non-Western civilizations become antagonistic, (5) civilizations were un-compromising, (6) economic regionalism was on the rise (1993). Fundamentally, as one of the subtitles "The west versus the rest" indicates, he drew an explicit line between the West and the non-Western world. Huntington recognised the West as an absolute existence. He did not bother defining what "the West" really meant and did not hesitate to position the West as superior to "the rest". Said completely dismissed this way of observing the world.

Said expressed his condemnation of Huntington's observation in a speech he delivered when he made his first visit, which eventually became his only visit, to Japan. The title of Said's keynote speech to a conference was "Clash of Culture or Clash of Definitions?". It was obviously a counter argument to Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations?". Said's main point was clear. He remarked that "... the weakest part and the part that we have to rid ourselves of in the idea of the clash of civilizations is the notion that there is a rigid separation which exists for all time between them" (Said 1995, p. 40). In giving a reason for this view, he refers to the reality of the present world. He states "... the overwhelming evidence is that today's world is in fact a world of mixtures, of migrations, of crossings" (1995, p. 40). He

also questions “[w]hat culture today, Japanese, Arab, European, Korean, Chinese or Indian has not had long intimate and rich contacts with other cultures?” (1995, p. 39). “... if you pay too much attention to the clash of cultures, you miss the great and often silent exchange and dialogue between them”, he asserts (1995, p. 39). Said’s criticism of the “Clash of Civilization?” thesis was directed at Huntington’s basic belief which is that there exists “an unceasing clash” in the world (1995, p. 35).

What was particularly problematic about this belief for Said was underlying notion which recognises the West as an absolute entity. This notion divides the West from the rest of the world and leads to the conclusion that the West necessarily confronts the non-West. It simultaneously enhances the notion of the West’s supremacy. This whole rhetoric fits well into discussions about the new world order after the end of the Cold War. He asserts:

The core of Huntington’s vision is the idea of an unceasing clash, a concept of conflict which slides somewhat effortlessly into the political space vacated by the Cold War. I do not therefore think it is wrong to suggest that what Huntington provides in this essay ... is a recycled version of the Cold War thesis, that conflicts in today’s and tomorrow’s world will remain not economic or social in essence, but ideological; and if that is so then one ideology, that of the West, is the still point or locus around which for Huntington all the other cultures turn. (1995, p. 35)

Although Huntington “makes it seem as if everybody knows what the West is” (Said 1995, p. 38), the definition of the West or Western civilisation is rather opaque. Said refers to American society which is seen as a society with homogenised Western culture. He points out “in addition to the official or mainstream culture there are always alternative or dissenting unorthodox cultures that contain many

anti-authoritarian strains in competition with the official culture” (1995, p. 39). He calls those alternative cultures “the counter-culture” (1995, p. 39). The West is never a monolith and when the firm boundary of one civilisation starts to become porous, the theory of an “unceasing clash” between civilisations comes into question.

Nevertheless, those who aspire to maintain the supremacy of the West need to create a collision between them and the other. Said thoroughly explained a structure which creates the rhetoric of different civilisations continuously clashes each other. When asserting that there is already “the kind of globalism” which is benign and positive he concluded that:

It would seem to me therefore that efforts to return the community of civilizations to a primitive stage of narcissistic struggle needs to be understood not as descriptions about how in fact cultures and civilizations behave but rather as incitements to wasteful conflict and unedifying chauvinism. And that seems to be exactly what we do not need. (1995, p. 40)

This speech by Said specifically targeted Huntington’s article and his way of perceiving the world. However, in the broader picture, Said was more generally criticising the rhetoric in the West which defends and manipulates the West’s supremacy. He persistently exposed the West’s ambition in this speech as he did in *Orientalism* and in other writings and speeches which followed the book.

Japan and Australia are countries obsessed with the world view which Said had criticised. That obsession was reproducing an inferiority complex. In this section of my thesis I will consult with Said’s expertise to depict both states’ ambiguous national identities. First, before going into Japan’s and Australia’s national identity problem, I will discuss how Said was introduced to the countries’ intellectual circles

and also how he was accepted and understood in both societies. Said was a controversial intellectual in both countries, but in different ways. On one hand, Said was less controversial in Japan because he was accepted as an intellectual from the West. Nevertheless, his argument, which made the Japanese intellectuals reinterpret Japan's imperial past, was significant. On the other hand, in Australia, Said was referred to in Asian studies and postcolonial studies but, in the public sphere, he was represented as an anti-Zionist and his work provoked heated debates. Whether the evaluation of Said is negative or positive, he remains an influential intellectual in Japan and Australia even after his death in 2003.

The second chapter in this section, in Chapter 4, I will focus on how this well known intellectual was read and understood by intellectuals in Japan and Australia and how they located their countries in a world view which Said had described as dichotomous – the West vs. the East – and hierarchical – having the West as superior. In addition, I will discuss how Said himself categorised Japan and Australia. I will do this by going through his descriptions of the two countries in his book *Culture and Imperialism*. In the mind of Japanese and Australian intellectuals and also in the mind of Said, the location of Japan and Australia is rather ambiguous. Writings by intellectuals in Japan show the country belonging to the Occident as well as to the Orient. Although Japan was a country which originally belonged to the Orient, modern Japan tried to be closer to the Occident and to be in a superior position in relation to neighbouring Asian countries. Said's perspective encouraged the Japanese to recognise their orientalist approach. In Australia's case, it was an outpost of the Occident and, therefore, the majority of Australian intellectuals saw the country as being located in the West. However, considering its subjectivity to the West, Australia could be seen as a country

belonging to the Orient, or at least, to the non-Western world. Said's recognition of the two countries was also ambiguous. In most cases, Said categorised Japan as an Oriental country. At the same time, Said saw Australia as a country which was subject to the West and therefore located in the non-Occidental world. Nevertheless, Said recognised Japan's and Australia's Western features. For intellectuals in Japan and Australia and for Said, the two countries' national identities were difficult to fit into a dichotomous world view. Their identities float between the Orient and the Occident.

CHAPTER 3: Said in Japan and Australia

INTRODUCTION

Edward W. Said died at the age of 67 in New York on 25 September 2003. He lost his struggle with leukaemia which he had suffered from since 1991. The news of the death of one of the most influential contemporary intellectuals quickly swept across the world. Both Japan and Australia reported the news.

In Japan, three major daily newspapers, *Asahi*, *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi* reported the passing of this prominent international scholar in their obituaries column the following day (Igarashi 2003, p. 39, Kono 2003, p. 31, *Yomiuri* 2003, p. 39). While *Yomiuri* had just published a short article referring to his death, Palestinian origins and his most prominent book *Orientalism*, *Asahi* and *Mainichi* gave him greater coverage and included a portrait photograph. Said was a person who had plural faces, a scholar of comparative literature, a critic in the post-colonial context, an advocate of the Palestinian cause (Usuki 2004, pp. 153-154) et cetera. Nonetheless, what was emphasised in those obituaries was the third aspect. The obituaries both mentioned Said's background as a Palestinian born in Jerusalem and by referring to *Orientalism* they depicted him as an expert on the Palestinian problem. He was also described as an opponent of the United States' unilateral behaviour (Kono 2003, p. 31) and a critic of its attack on Afghanistan and Iraq (Igarashi 2003, p. 39). They depicted him as the defender of the Arab world and an opponent of the West.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the equator, the death of Said had also been reported. In Australia, on 26 September, a presenter of the ABC radio program *AM* Linda Mottram started her program by interviewing Dr. Mustafa Barghouti, a Palestinian medical and human rights activist, saying "Palestinians have lost one of

their most vociferous and intellectually weighty advocates, with the death in New York overnight of the Palestinian-American academic, Edward Said” (Mottram 2003). On the same day ABC News Online reported “Palestinian advocate Edward Said dies” (*News Online* 2003) and on the following day *The Australian* said “Palestinians mourn death of intellectual warrior” (*The Australian* 27 September 2003a), whereas *The Age* used the headline, “Voice of the Arab world dies” (O’Loughlin 2003). As it was in Japan, Said’s image was inseparable from the issues of the Middle East, specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict.

However, the influence of Said in both countries was more significant, deeper and broader. Many articles written in memory of Said and a number of events which followed his passing and which are still occurring, indicated that the legacy of Said was not just confined to Middle Eastern issues. In the following section, I will examine the reception of Said in both Japan and Australia in order to understand Said’s influence. I will review how Said was originally introduced to Japan and Australia, how his writings and thoughts were introduced before and after his passing and how he was received in both societies.

JAPAN AND SAID

Said’s arrival in Japan

A Japanese translation of *Orientalism* appeared in book stores in Japan in October 1986. This does not mean, however, that Japanese scholars had been ignorant of this significant book before this publication. Since the appearance of the original book in 1978, Said’s argument had influenced intellectual circles in Japan (Sugita 1986, p. 358). In fact, the translation itself was an outcome of studies of the book at one university in Tokyo. Iatagaki Taizo, who is an expert on Middle Eastern studies and is one of the two editorial supervisors of the translation, used *Orientalism* as a

textbook in his seminar at the Tokyo University in 1981 (Imazawa 1986, p. 376). There were fourteen students in the seminar and each student prepared his/her own Japanese translation of one section of the book which was separately given to each of them. They brought those translated drafts to the seminar for discussion (Imazawa 1986, p. 376). Imazawa Noriko who is a translator of the book and Sugita Hideaki who is another editorial supervisor of the translation were among those fourteen students. Those translated drafts became a basis of the published translation (1986, p. 376). This is one example of Said's arrival in Japan before the publication of the book-length translation.

The recognition of the significance of this controversial book prior to publication explains the reason why four major Japanese nationwide daily newspapers picked up the translation in their book review section in November 1986, right after its publication. This resulted in the term "orientalism" and the name of Said spreading beyond the boundaries of academic disciplines and academia itself in Japan. It is fair to state that the recognition of Said and "orientalism" in Japan widened after the publication of the translation and the succession of newspaper reviews. Further reviews appeared in journals and periodicals in the following years.

In order to examine how *Orientalism* and Said were initially received and understood in Japan, it is necessary to first mention the translated volume itself. "Lost in translation" is the image which is often attached to translated books. It gives the books a rather "second-rate" impression compared to original publications. Needless to say, it is better to go through the original text but in the case of *Orientalism*, readers of the Japanese translation were not necessarily at a disadvantage. An eight-year time lag between the publication of the original texts and the translation allowed editors to include some additional texts in the book; one

was a translation of Said's essay "Orientalism Reconsidered", others were an essay by Sugita Hideaki, an editorial supervisor of the book and an afterword by Imazawa Noriko, a translator of the whole text.

Among these three texts, Sugita's essay titled "*Orientalizumu to watashitachi*" (*Orientalism* and us) gives the readers a thorough understanding and deep insight into Said's argument and also an overall picture of the significant international impact this book has had since its publication in 1978 (Sugita 1986, pp. 358-372). Sugita first explains the meaning of "orientalism" in Said's sense, Said's method in developing his points, and also clarifies the main argument which Said was putting forward suggesting that the significance of this book was to re-conceptualise the term "orientalism" itself and also Said's critical stance on this matter (1986, p. 358). Then he turns to some critical points about Said's argument by presenting critiques which appeared in previously written book reviews of the original literature. Finally, Sugita focuses on *Orientalism* and us – the Japanese. The relationship between Japan and the Middle East and Japan and Asia are pointed out. Also he mentions that studies on "Japaneseness" should be reconsidered in light of "orientalism" (1986, pp. 368-369).

Along with this Sugita's essay, a thorough review of *Orientalism*, Imazawa's afterword adds another book review to this literature. She starts her afterword by describing Said's background as a Jerusalem born Palestinian who was displaced as a result of Jewish settlement (1986, p. 373). By doing so, Imazawa made the readers recognise Said not only as an English literature academic but also as an intellectual who speaks from a Palestinian perspective. She also briefly goes through Said's argument and discussed how the book was received and understood in Europe and the United States, as well as including some critiques. Referring to

“orientalism” in relation to Japan, she points out that Japan was in a peculiar position (1986, pp. 375-376). On the one hand, Japan was an entity represented by the West as its subject. However, on the other hand, in relation to the Orient, Japan came to be in a position to treat the Orient as its object.

Another text inserted into the Japanese version of *Orientalism*, Said’s essay “Orientalism Reconsidered”, was first published in *Race and Culture*. It was intended to address various critiques the original book had received since its publication. With this text accompanying with the main thesis, readers in Japan were able to have a clearer view of Said’s argument in his book. Two reviews by Sugita and Iamzawa played an important role in providing background information for Said’s essay to the readers since they have contained major critiques of *Orientalism* and Said’s responses.

In addition to the fact that the Japanese version of *Orientalism* contained more than Said’s original text, it is worth noting another significant element in relation to the publication. That is the publishing of another Japanese translation of a book by Said, *Covering Islam*, just two months after the publication of the translated *Orientalism*. Originally, *Covering Islam* was published in 1981, five years after the original publication of *Orientalism*. However, Japanese readers were able to get two of the most prominent books by Said – two of three books which he later termed a trilogy²³ (Usuki 2004, p. 156) – at almost the same time. This book which more specifically mentions Islam than the Orient in a broader sense, along with his background as an Arab, made the readers understand Said’s “personal dimension”²⁴.

²³ *Orientalism*, *Covering Islam* and *The Question of Palestine* are called trilogy.

²⁴ This phrase was used by Antonio Gramsci and was quoted by Said in *Orientalism* (2003, p. 25). Kang Sang-jung also referred to the phrase by recalling Gramsci in his book review on *Orientalism* (Kang 1987, p. 57).

This also enabled Said to be seen as not only a literary critic but also as a committed intellectual who had a political perspective in his argument about the Middle East.

Initial reviews of *Orientalism*

As mentioned above, on the occasion of the publication of this Japanese version of *Orientalism*, several book reviews appeared in journals, periodicals and daily newspapers in Japan. These reviews were the earliest ones to introduce the book to the Japanese public. A month after the publication, four major daily newspapers²⁵ took up the book in their book review sections. They first referred to the significance of the literature in a general sense specifically discussing Said's interpretation of the term "orientalism" and then explored the meaning of these issues in the context of Japan.

As Nakano Makiko later in 2003 pointed out "the significant achievement of Said was to introduce the keyword 'imperialism' into the area of literary critic" (Nakano 2003, p. 46). In 1986, this point was clearly recognised in the four book reviews. *Yomiuri Shimbun* writes "What becomes clear through Said's writing is the dynamic process of the image of the Orient created by romanticism absorbed into the theory of imperialism" (*Yomiuri Shimbun* 17 November 1986, p. 7). Explaining "orientalism" as one ideology which Europeans have conceived, *Mainichi Shimbun* says "orientalism is one ideological system which Europe has imagined unrelated to the life of people actually living in the Orient and the interests of imperialism and colonialism are embedded completely in the idea" (*Mainichi Shimbun* 24 November 1986, p. 9). Each book review explains that the references to imperialism and

²⁵ There are five major daily news papers distributed nationwide in Japan: *Asahi Shimbun*, *Mainichi Shimbun*, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, *Sankei Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun*.

colonialism, which are part of the rhetoric of domination of the Orient by the West, can be recognised in the practice of “orientalism”.

It is worth noticing that two of the four newspapers use a verb “*abaku*” which means “expose” in their review titles. A review by Miura Masashi in *Asahi Shimbun* is titled “*Seiyo no yokubo abakidasu*” (Exposing the West’s ambition) (Miura 1986, p. 11), whereas Isoda Koichi’s review in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* is headed “*Seiyo chushin no ishiki wo abaku*” (Exposing the Western-centric consciousness) (Isoda 1986, p. 12). Miura points out that Said has exposed “something Orient which had been stated and studied as merely an illusion created to justify the domination of the Orient by the West” (1986, p. 11). On the other hand, Isoda recognises that Said has exposed “causes which are constraining Europeans as a pattern of thinking when they observe the Orient” (1986, p. 12). Both reviews noted that the target of Said’s argument is “the West”. Along with the information that Said was a person born in Palestine (Miura 1986, p. 11), Said’s stance – to be on the opposite side of the West – is clearly recognised and depicted.

While describing the basic argument in *Orientalism*, three out of four reviews have discussions referring to what this literature means to Japan and to people living on the Japanese archipelago. They try to place Japan in the context of Said’s argument which depicts the situation in the world in a dualistic structure – one party being a ruler and the other a subject.

The review in *Yomiuri Shimbun* referred to two points. It is argued that Said’s method of structurally analysing discourses regarding the Orient, following Foucault, was effective in re-considering the discourse on Japan (1986, p. 7). This statement derives from a point of view which is recognising Japan as a subject of “orientalism”. How the Occident describes, understands and represents Japan as a

country in the Orient effects the way people in Japan recognise themselves. *Yomiuri* suggests that Said's method may contribute to the task of Japanese people releasing themselves from a fixed belief about "*Japonism*". At the same time, *Yomiuri* points to Japan having an orientalist view in its relation to the Arab world. Although both Japan and the Arab world belong to the same grouping, the Orient, the non-Western side of the world, Japan's understanding of the Arab world is inadequate as it is in the West. In many cases, images of the Arab are imported to Japan from the West. A thorough description of images imposed on the Arab world by the West in *Orientalism* allows Japanese readers to recognise how little they actually know about the history or culture of the Arab world.

Miura and Isoda also point to the role of Japan as an orientalist – the ruler – in relation to neighbouring Asian countries. In their context, the Orient referred not to the Arab world but to Japan's neighbours, Asian countries. At the outset of his review, Miura refers to an episode where he was once surprised by recognising the perspective of colonialists in Watsuji Tetsuro's prominent work *Fudo* (literally means climate) especially in his description of China (1986, p. 11). He continues by saying that what Said described in *Orientalism* was what he had felt in Watsuji's writing. Isoda, in his review, is more straightforward on this issue. He recognises that the problem of "orientalism" was not foreign to Japan. He states that Japan's unjust discrimination against China and Korea in the past could be a representation of "orientalism" in Said's sense (1986, p. 12). Both Isoda and Miura recognise Japan as belonging to the side of those who imposed imperial and colonial rule over others.

In these early reviews of Said's *Orientalism*, four short newspaper book reviews clearly describe the diversity of Edward Said's contribution. He was indeed an advocate of Middle Eastern issues from the Palestinian point of view but,

simultaneously, his thoughts can be read and adapted to a range of issues in the contemporary world.

Said's appearance in Japan

Since the introduction of *Orientalism* in Japanese in 1986, Said has become an influential and popular figure in the Japanese academic community and also in terms of the wider public who are interested in intellectual issues. As Nishihara Daisuke points out “various translations of Said’s work successively emerged one after the other” after *Orientalism* and also “there are numerous translations published in a variety of Japanese magazines and proceedings ...” (Nishihara 2005, p. 241). Most of this significant collection of Said’s works in Japanese were initially written or spoken of in the context of wider world. However, there were a few occasions when Said’s voice was brought directly to Japan in the sense that Said knew he was speaking and writing for Japanese listeners and readers. In each case, there was a non-academic person who was touched by Said’s thoughts and who played the role of mediator between Said and the Japanese public.

It was in 1995 that Said set foot on Japanese soil for the first time and the visit eventually became the only occasion on which Said visited the country. Said was one of the keynote speakers at the International Mecenat Conference '95. The conference was to mark the fifth anniversary of Kigyo Mecenat Kyogikai (Association for Corporate Support of the Arts) which was established by Japanese private corporations to support the arts and was aimed at discussing issues of culture and the interaction between different cultures in the turbulent circumstances of the contemporary world (Nemoto 1995, p. 2). According to Nemoto Chobei, the then Executive Director of the Association, it was a time when Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations?” essay was promoting his collision between

different cultures argument over other theses focusing on social and national cooperation and Nemoto wanted to hold the conference in order to arrest the “Clash of Civilizations” trend. Therefore, the organisers tried to include the voices of non-Western intellectuals. They wanted to depart from a Euro-centric view.

According to Nemoto’s memoir (Nemoto was a former editor of *Asahi Shimbun*), Said was the last key speaker to be invited in order to fill in a spot vacated by the Mexican poet and Nobel Laureate Octavio Paz who had declined his invitation (1995, p. 2), but there would have been a no more suitable person than Said to take part in a conference with this specific purpose. After receiving a refusal notice from Paz, Nemoto thought of inviting Said. He had been deeply impressed by *Orientalism* and had believed that Said was a major intellectual (1995, p. 2). Nemoto got in contact with Said via Professor Ishiguro Hide who was Nemoto’s classmate during his university days and once a former colleague of Said at Columbia University. He soon got a positive response from the intellectual. With regard to Said’s poor health at the time, Nemoto was ready for Said’s sudden cancellation and, therefore, he was overwhelmed and relieved and became confident of the success of the conference when he saw Said chatting with Ishiguro in the lobby of a hotel in Tokyo just two days before the conference (1995, p. 2). Said’s speech was titled “Clash of Culture, or Clash of Definitions?” and was a direct critique of Huntington’s thesis. Although his health had deteriorated and he had to leave without participating in the panel discussion after his speech, on the day he delivered a strong message directly to the Japanese audience.

The way this first appearance of Said in Japan was received was outlined by Nishihara Daisuke who noted that - “[o]n this occasion, Said’s thought and career were highlighted by the Japanese media. Great attention was paid to his early life

in the Middle East and his involvement with the problem of Palestine” (2005, pp. 243-244). Nishihara adds “[a]s always the case with noted ‘Western’ scholars’ short-term visits to Japan, Said was soon surrounded by Japanese worshippers and sympathizers, including Nobel Laureate Kenzaburo Oe (1935-)” (2005, p. 244).

However, Oe was not just simply one of Said’s “worshippers” or “sympathizers”. Said and Oe were long time friends. Oe’s closeness to Said contributed to attracting Said to Japan. On the occasion of Said’s visit to Japan, one of the most prominent monthly opinion journals in Japan, *Sekai*, took advantage of this rare opportunity and arranged a discussion between the two intellectuals, Said and Oe; it appeared in the August 1995 edition of the journal under the title - “The late style: Literature, society and era” (Oe & Said 1995, pp. 22-41).

Later, in 2002, Said appeared in *Asahi Shimbun* having Oe as a mediator. This time Said’s voice was presented as a part of a series of Oe’s correspondence with overseas intellectuals. The series had occasionally appeared in the newspaper since 1995 having, for example, Gunter Grass, Amartya Sen, Zehng Yi and Noam Chomsky as Oe’s counterparts.

The first letter was forwarded from Oe to Said (Oe 2002, p. 11). Prompted by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom – which occurred just a few months before-hand -, Oe refers to Said’s *Culture and Imperialism*. Oe says that the decade-old book was talking exactly about the situation of Japan in the beginning of the twenty first century. In Oe’s eyes, Japan appeared as willing to be dominated by cultural imperialism imposed by the United States. He placed his hope on people of the younger generation who were trying to create a grass-roots network to oppose such imperialism. Replying to this message, Said depicted American cultural imperialism from his point of view as an Arab living in the

United States (Said 2002b, p. 11). He refers to his sense of being an outsider and how Islam or Muslims are represented and treated in the United States. He again accuses Huntington's "Class of Civilizations" argument of being shallow and simplistic and an argument that blinds people in a manner that prevents them from understanding more complex and dynamic interaction between different cultures.

Another figure who enabled Said to appear in the Japanese media was an editor of *Asahi Shimbun* Shimizu Katsuo. Shimizu had the opportunity to interview Said three times. Said made his appearance in *Asahi* a year after the publication of *Orientalism*. Early in 1987, Shimizu interviewed Said in his office at Columbia University (Said & Shimizu 1987, p. 7). Said has appeared in the tenth article of a column called *Bunka no Henyo* (The transfiguration of culture) which *Asahi* was then running as a series. The series was following various cultural phenomena which were seen in several cities in Europe and in the United States in an era which was facing the collapse of utopia and the stagnation and crisis of modern civilisation (1987, p. 7). Recognising Said as a critic of Western knowledge, Shimizu interviewed him in order to raise a number of points which had emerged from the series. Under the circumstances, Said said, there was a tendency for Western society to try to return to traditional culture which may well undermine women, ethnic minorities and others, and the majority of intellectuals were becoming reluctant to argue for alternatives (1987, p. 7). This tendency enhances the exclusion of those who do not share dominant values or interests. Said pointed to the necessity to create a new knowledge which does not work to dominate the other.

Eight years later, in 1994, Shimizu once again visited Said in New York. This time *Asahi* was running a series called *Seikimatsu Tushin* (Messages from the end of the century). Recalling his first interview in 1987, at the beginning of this second

interview Shimizu referred to Said's former comment that a notion to exclude something different from "us" is growing (Said & Shimizu 1994, p. 7). Said indicated that although there was a trend to unify the world specifically in the field of economics, people were becoming more and more closed and exclusive, making the world increasingly fragmented. A notion to exclude the others, to defend their identity – domination by identity – has been practised he argued. He also pointed out that the rhetoric of those who were asserting the threat of other civilisations was playing a part in this trend. Shimizu then asked about the role of intellectuals referring to Said in Reith Lecture series broadcast on the BBC a year earlier. Said asserted the importance of constantly being critical. Asked at the end of the interview whether it was possible to have a bright future, he answered that he had hope and emphasised the importance of trying to change the present situation by questioning the old system.

Shimizu's third interview with Said covered the end of 1999. The interview appeared on the front page of *Asahi* on 3 January 2000 (Said 2000, pp. 1-2). This was again part of a series called "*Shin-seiki wo kataru*" (Speaking about the new century). As is easy to guess from the title of the series, Said talked about how he saw the world in the dawn of the new century and gave his predictions for the future. He pointed out that while globalisation had transcended the boundary of one state and the migration of people had accelerated, unequal circumstances had spread in the world. He also referred to the rise of nationalism in many parts of the world and warned that nationalism which was too self-centred would be a threat. Although he had admitted that it was not an easy task for people with different cultures to live side by side, he believed that we must not give up the fight to create a diverse cultural coexistence. He added that he had a dream of creating a bank which

collects the memories of minor ethnic groups in order to recognise the real diversity of world history.

Apart from Said's appearances in Japan in printed form, Said also appeared on Japanese television. A TV director Kamakura Hideya from NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) had long been hoping to interview Said (Kamakura 2003, pp. 84-85). The chance came in the early 2003. Said had accepted Kamakura's offer as long as the interview was in the form of a dialogue between Said and Raji K. Sourani, a Palestinian lawyer, the Director of Palestinian Centre for Human Rights and Said's close friend (Kamakura 2003, p. 84). The dialogue was first supposed to take place in the United States. However, the US did not grant a visa to Sourani to enter the country, they had to meet in Egypt, where Said was visiting in order to lecture at the American University in Cairo. On 19 March, just a day before the invasion of Iraq by the US and their allied forces, Kamakura filmed the dialogue between the two intellectuals. Kamakura also recorded Said's lecture at the University. On his return to Japan, Kamakura produced a television programme - "Said talks about Iraq War – On the eve of the outbreak". It was broadcast on 26 April (Kamakura 2003, p. 85-86). Later in the year, when Sourani visited Japan, Kamakura set up an interview with Sourani by a writer Suh Kyungsik, a second generation Korean residing in Japan, and with his former record of Said's interview, Kamakura created another programme. On the 6 September, about 20 days before his death, the programme went to air. Thus in 2003, Said's voice and image were twice brought to Japanese television viewers.

Said's legacy in Japan

On 24 September 2003, Kamakura Hideya wrote a letter to Said (Kamakura 2003, p. 95). Kamakura had produced two television programmes from Said's interview and

other images of Said which he had filmed back in March in Cairo and both had been duly broadcast in Japan and he felt that that was the right time to write to Said and say he would send him a video of those programmes (2003, p. 95). However, the letter never got to the receiver. The next day, Kamakura received news of Said's death. In the evening of the day, Kamakura and other television crews who went to Cairo gathered in Tokyo and had dinner to commemorate Said (2003, p. 95). There they questioned what should be done from then on and talked about how they could reflect on what they had learned from Said. The task of passing on Said's legacy had started at the very point of his death.

In the following months, several articles remembering Said appeared in Japanese journals. *Mirai*, *Chiiki Kenkyu*, *Gekkan Hyakka*, *Shin-Nihon Bungaku* were some of those journals but the special edition of *Gendai Shiso*²⁶ which was published in November 2003 was the most prominent publication commenting on the passing of Said. It is the best means of grasping the overall view of how Said was remembered by Japanese intellectuals. The edition, which devoted itself entirely to commemorating Said, included a translation of Said's writing "Right of Return", Said's interview with Gil Anidjar, Said's colleague at Columbia University, a dialogue between Kang Sang-jung and Ukai Satoshi, and fourteen other articles which simply commemorated Said and his work. The articles were divided into four themes, Palestine, Intellectuals, Post-colonialism and Theory. They recognised Said's multiple profiles. Moreover, the participation of intellectuals in Japan from diverse disciplines indicates how widely Said's arguments had influenced contemporary Japanese thought. Scholars majoring in politics, the history of thought, French literature, contemporary Arab literature, Palestinian studies, Latin

²⁶ *Gendai Shiso* literary means "contemporary thoughts". It has a French subtitle which says "revue de la pensee d'aujourd'hui" (review of thinking of today).

American studies, the history of motion pictures, and so on were among the contributors. A photographer, novelists and the formerly mentioned Kamakura Hideya, the TV director were also a part of the edition.

In May 2006, a documentary film called *Edward W. Said: Out of Place* was screened in Tokyo. The film was produced by the Japanese film director Sato Makoto who visited places and people in the Middle East guided by Said's well known autobiography *Out of Place: A Memoir* (Siglo 2006). Sato starts his journey from a cemetery in Broummana, Lebanon, where Said is resting. His camera catches scenery from both Palestine and Israel and people from both sides. Ordinary people living in the area appear as interviewees as well as Said's wife Mariam, his daughter Najla and son Wadie, and people like Noam Chomsky, Said's colleagues and friends. Sato's focus is on people and their lives in the most controversial area in the Middle East. People living on the border are what Sato screened. Said was one of these border people. Coinciding with the release of the film, a book with pictures containing many interviews which could not be included in the film because of the restrictions of length and Sato's record of filming was also published (Siglo 2006).

Despite being a relatively minor production compared to entertainment movies, it was promoted in a well-planned way and gained considerable attention from the Japanese media and the public. The first screening of the film in Tokyo was attended by Said's wife Mariam and Oe Kenzaburo (Siglo 2006, Yuri 2006b, p. 24). Oe gave a special lecture after the screening. Japanese media followed the event closely and reports of this event as well as notices and reviews of the film appeared in several Japanese daily newspapers²⁷. The director Sato also took part in several

²⁷ See for instance, articles by Hamada Motoko, Ikeda Tomotaka, Katsuta Tomomi,

symposiums and talk shows which coincided with the screening of the film. A symposium held at a theatre in Kyoto, Kyoto Geijutsu Gekijyo, was attended by Mariam Said (Siglo 2006). Other scholars and intellectuals who had a strong connection with Said and his works expressed their views on Said and on the film and attracted a Japanese audience who were attached to Said and his thoughts. A series of events which were held on the occasion of the releasing of *Edward W. Said: Out of Place* demonstrates that Said was and remains a significant figure in Japan.

At the launch of the film, Mariam Said commented “Although Edward does not appear in the film, he exists in every aspect of it” (Siglo 2006, Yuri 2006a, p. 30). This is also true in a wider sense. Even after his death, his writings continue to be translated into Japanese and made available to the Japanese public. *From Oslo to Iraq, Reflections on Exile: And other literary and cultural essays, Power, Politics and Culture* and *Humanism and Democratic Criticism* are books included among those newly translated editions²⁸. Although Said is gone, his thoughts are still in demand and still alive for those who had sought guidance from him in order to live their lives and to understand the world they live in. Each person has drawn Said to his/her side and absorbed Said in their own “personal dimension”. Said and his arguments remain influential for intellectuals and members of the public in Japan.

AUSTRALIA AND SAID

Said’s arrival in Australia

Compared to the situation in Japan regarding the introduction of Said into the country, Australia was in a better position to understand Said since there was no

Matsumoto Ryoichi, Myochin Miki, Takao Yoshinari and a culture column in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (15 May 2006).

²⁸ For this information, I relied on the catalogue of the National Diet Library (Japan). URL for the Library is <http://www.ndl.go.jp/>.

language barrier and readers did not have to wait for translations to be produced. Nonetheless, the arrival of Said on the continent of Australia occurred, according to Professor Peter B. Mayer's memory, in a "rather low key" manner²⁹ (Mayer 2006). The debate on *Orientalism* in Australia first started in the field of Asian studies in the early 1980s. This was the result of the strong influence of Said's work on United States' academics.

On 22 March 1980, the Association For Asian Studies (AAS) in the United States held its annual meeting in Washington D.C (Schwartz 1980, p. 15). There, Benjamin I. Schwartz, the then president of the Association, gave a presidential address referring to Said and *Orientalism*. What Said questioned in *Orientalism* challenged the very nature of area studies. As Said pointed out in *Orientalism* area studies was "the ugly neologism" for "orientalism" (2003, p. 53). His criticism of "orientalism" was also directed at area studies. Meanwhile, area studies were also experiencing attacks from other sources, for instance, global theorists like Immanuel Wallerstein famous for his "world system analysis" (Schwarz 1980, p. 24). The relevance of area studies was questioned from the perspective that the world had already been transformed to "one interdependent 'system'" (Schwartz 1980, p. 24).

Under this circumstance, in his Presidential Address titled "Area Studies as a Critical Discipline", Schwartz tried to defend area studies from these criticisms but most of his speech referred to Said and *Orientalism*. Although Schwartz was sympathetic to Said's argument pointing out "... the 'Orient' is often used simply to provide a counter-image of the 'Occident'" (1980, p. 16) or orientalist dehumanise

²⁹ I am deeply grateful to Professor Mayer for providing me with this very crucial information. He even spent time to search his garage for correspondence between him and Robert Kapp back in 1979 which will be quoted below.

non-Western societies (1980, p. 23), he counter-argued that nowadays scholars engaged in area studies were not necessarily conducting research in a narrow field which leads them to apply particularity to their research fields and also stated that the notion of “Western superiority” no longer existed in area studies. Nonetheless, he concluded his address by warning area studies scholars not to fall into “complacency or self-congratulation” and by insisting on the importance of having “a complex and deep understanding” of the object of their research (1980, p. 25). This event simply shows the significant impact which Said and *Orientalism* was having on the field of area studies.

The annual meeting of the AAS which opened with this Schwartz address was followed by a review symposium in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, a publication of the Association. The review symposium “Edward Said’s *Orientalism*” in the May 1980 edition of the journal presented three essays on *Orientalism* by scholars from different Asian fields, Michael Dalby (China), David Kopf (South Asia) and Richard H. Minear (Japan) (Editor’s Note 1980, p. 463). In advance of those critical essays, Robert A. Kapp, an editor of the journal, contributed an introduction and remarked:

Orientalism is important because it addresses issues which are (or ought to be) central to the self-conception of scholars who are professionally socialized in and work in one culture but who devote themselves to the study of another culture (e.g., Asianists professionally rooted in Western societies). (Kapp 1980, p. 481)

Kapp’s recognition of the importance of area studies’ literature had contributed to Said’s reception in Australia. A year later, in 1981, another Australian scholar’s article appeared in *The Journal of Asian Studies (JAS)*. The article “Tombs and Dark Houses: Ideology, Intellectuals, and Proletarians in the Study of

Contemporary Indian Islam” written by Peter B. Mayer briefly touches on Said and *Orientalism*. In a footnote thanking Robert Kapp, Mayer suggests Kapp was the key person in drawing Said to his attention (Mayer 1981, p. 484). According to Mayer’s record, he first submitted the paper to JAS in June 1979. Then in October, he got a reply from Kapp. Kapp gave advice to Mayer saying “... I would urge you to have a look at Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, on which we are soon running a little review symposium, and which speaks in some ways to the persistence of erroneous or stereotypical characterizations” (Mayer 2006). It was not until July 1980 that Mayer was able to get a copy of the book. He read it and revised his paper and submitted it to JAS. Mayer’s paper was published in the May 1981 issue of *JAS*. This one small but prominent example shows how gradually the debate on Said and his book reached Australian shores.

A couple of years later, Said’s influence touched the Asian Studies’ academia in Australia. The *Review*, a journal of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA), published a series of articles on Edward Said’s *Orientalism between 1983 and 1984*. The aim of the series was not to add reviews of *Orientalism* but “to examine how the book has influenced, or might influence, approaches to the study of various parts of Asia” (Said’s *Orientalism* 1983, p. 1). They asked:

Has Said’s work, or have reviews of Said, led to a questioning of the dominant discourses in our particular fields? If this has not occurred, is it useful for specialists on other Asian regions to examine Said’s book and the debate which followed its publication? And how should this best be done? (Said’s *Orientalism* 1983, p. 1)

The first contributor to the journal was Ranajit Guha, a prominent figure in Subaltern Studies, who was then at the Australian National University. In a short article titled “Orientalist Strains in Indian Historiography”, Guha began by stating that “[t]he historiography of colonial India provides us with a clear instance of that knowledge [orientalism]” (Guha 1983, p. 2) recognised the traces of “orientalism” exercised by the Raj in India. Using the term “misconceptions” a few times, Guha explains how Indian society was under the influence of British orientalist perspectives. The creation of a “so-called Indian ‘national character’” and the generalisation of society were apparent in every field, even in the study of the economy (1983, p. 3). In concluding, Guha pointed to the ignorance of “the subaltern elements in society”, Guha asserts “[f]or the historian of India today the most unhelpful aspect of Orientalism is its function as an ideological arm of elitism” (1983, p. 4).

On the contrary, another contributor to the issue, Ian Mabbett, in his article “Orientalism: Enough Said”, completely rejected the effectiveness of Said’s concept of “orientalism” in Asian studies, specifically in South-East Asia. He stated:

My view is that neither the thesis of *Orientalism* nor any improved version of it can be so applied, because the work by its nature is not a contribution to the branch of scholarship hitherto known as orientalism. It is partly literary criticism and partly ‘psychoculture’. (Mabbett 1983, p. 4)

Mabbett argues that what Said was talking about in *Orientalism* was “all about the social psychology of attitudes to the orient” (1983, p. 8). Every orientalist cannot escape from “the psychology of bias” which is based on a person’s Western cultural background and tends to give an incomplete picture of the Orient. However,

according to Mabbett, orientalists' more significant risk is to be "prisoners of their sources" (1983, p. 8). What orientalists rely on in the course of their study are sources which are somewhat limited to certain areas and this is one of the causes of misrepresentation of the Orient. This problem is about "method", not psychology, which Said is not actually talking about. Therefore, *Orientalism* does not present a prescription for the risk of misrepresentation, Mabbett argued.

Following these two articles by historians, another nine articles on Said and *Orientalism* appeared in later issues of the *Review*³⁰. The evaluation of Said and his argument was mixed. Some sought the effectiveness of "orientalism" in their areas like China, Japan or India and some tried to make the concept work in their disciplinary fields. A. H. Johns dismissed the work saying "Orientalism is a tirade!" (Johns 1984, p. 21) whereas Dennis Grafflin defended the work from an attack launched by the prominent American Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis (Grafflin 1984, pp. 29-30). Michael Birch's article "Not Enough Said" was a response to the first two articles in the series. Birch first critiques Mabbett by pointing out that "Mabbett is implicitly maintaining the objective status of 'sources' and 'technique' and this kind of unstated assumption is exactly what Said is attacking" (Birch 1983, p. 11). On Guha, Birch indicates that Guha understood *Orientalism* in a narrow way. "Both of them reduce an extremely complex thesis ... to terms they already understand" (1983, p. 12). He goes on stating "*Orientalism* is a more dangerous work than Mabbett and Guha suggest" (1983, p. 12). As Birch asserts in his conclusion "[h]is work is a large warning to all scholars attempting to interpret

³⁰ The other contributors were Michael Birch, Dennis Grafflin, A. H. Johns, Peter Mayer, Ross E. Mouer, Richard Robison, Pierre Ryckmans, Brian Showsmith and John D. Young.

other cultures, or their own" (1983, p. 13), *Orientalism* caused significant controversy in Asian area studies in Australia.

It is interesting to note, on the other hand, that Said's positive reception in post-colonial studies in literature came after he had made an impact on Asian studies. Said is now recognised as one of the key founders of post-colonial studies³¹. Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, in their work titled *Edward Said*, argue that Said's "importance as a cultural theorist has been established in two areas" and one is "his foundational place in the growing school of post-colonial studies, particularly through his book *Orientalism*" (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia 2001, p. 1). Despite his growing reputation, Said's appearance in academic writings on literature did not happen till the late 1980s.

1989 is the year to remember regarding studies in post-colonial literature in general. This was the year when the book *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-colonial Literatures* written by three Australian scholars, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, was published. At the same time, Said was invited to the twenty-fifth anniversary conference of the Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies (ACLALS) at the University of Kent as a keynote speaker (Walder 1998, p. 70). The coincidence of recognition of Said's importance in the field promoted by the book and by the appearance of Said at the conference sponsored by a key organisation which had been an incubator for post-colonial studies, increased the force of Said's views. A point worth noting about the book was that it tried to reverse the power relation between former coloniser and the colonised within the studies of literature written in English. Even during

³¹ For instance, three books by Kang Sang Jung (2001), Komori Yoichi (2003) and Motohashi Tetuya (2005) which contain basic knowledge about post colonialism and post colonial studies, all mention Said as the key figure.

the twenty five-year history of ACLALS³² focusing on literature from former colonies, the initiative for these studies was always from the centre – from the British. The Australian’s attempted to reverse this power relation. Walder explains that the book with “[t]ensions between the former imperial centre or the ‘metropolis’, and the former colonies or ‘periphery’, became the central metaphor for the first book claiming to offer post-colonial literary theory as such” (1998, p. 66). It can be said that the time had gradually matured for Said and his concept to enter post-colonial studies.

In the latter half of 1980s, at around the time when this epoch-making work, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures*, was published, Said and his works gradually started to be quoted in Australian academic writings focusing on literature. In *Meanjin*, the first article which referred to Said appeared in 1987. In his article “Mourning after criticism” Simon During discussed the introduction of Said’s book *The Text, the World, the Critic* presenting it as a prominent work defending criticism (During, 1987, p. 305). Even though During is critical of Said’s stance, his article demonstrates that Said’s argument had started to be given serious attention in Australian literary circles.

This was followed by an article in *SPAN*, a journal of the South Pacific Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies, with one chapter of the ACLALS written by Jane O’Halloran in 1988. In her article “‘At the Far Edge of Their Firelight’: Primitivism and Progress in the Colonial Fiction of W. Somerset Maugham”, citations from *Orientalism* occur frequently. The article thoroughly depicts Maugham’s orientalist perspectives in his writings. Pointing out that in

³² The first Commonwealth Literature Conference was held at the University of Leeds in 1964 coinciding with the foundation of the first school of Commonwealth Literature at the university. (Walder 1998, p. 62)

Maugham's colonial fictions there was always a notion of primitivism, "a nostalgia for a lost world of peace and companionship, health of body and mind" (O'Halloran 1988, p. 70), she says "[p]rimitivism is part of what Edward Said has termed 'Orientalism'" (1988, p. 70). She argues that in contrast to describing the West as a "civilised" society, the Orient was always linked to irrational, feminine, sexual and sensual images in fictions of Maugham. This was supported by Said's argument.

As for the *New Literature Review* where Bill Ashcroft had been the key figure in the editorial team since its first publication in 1975, Fiona Giles' essay "Finding a Shiftingness: Situating the Nineteenth-Century Anglo-Australian Female Subject" was the first one to refer to Said. It appeared in 1989, the year *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures* was published. Giles focuses on how in the nineteenth century female migrants from England coming to the continent of Australia were depicted in literature. Giles pointed out that the female subject was "doubly othered". They were not only a secondary figure as women but also as those who were separated from their English culture. She argued that their features cannot simply be described as the "other" in the context of a binary relationship. She cites Said's essay "Reflections of Exile" when describing this complex feature of the female subject in the literature.

Said, his writings and thoughts, thus reached Australia. In some cases they were accepted enthusiastically and in other cases they were totally rejected as we have seen in the Asian Studies case. First in the field of Asian Studies, and then in the field of post-colonial studies, what Said had revealed in *Orientalism* and also in many other writings provoked critical discussions in Australia.

Said's reception in Australia

Edward Said was a person with multiple faces. His “intellectual output ... traversed the fields of literature, music, political analysis and activism, media studies, autobiography, and intellectual history” (Curthoys & Ganguly 2006b). Nevertheless, Said's cornerstone was his identity as a Palestinian. Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia state:

For whether he is talking about English literature, about the complexities of texts and how they are formed, about the ways in which the West exerted power over the Oriental world, about the functions of intellectuals in society, or even about music, his own place as an exiled Palestinian intellectual is constantly inflected in his work. (2001, p. 1)

So was the image of Said in Australia. And because of this image, Said was a highly controversial figure on the Australian continent.

On March 2003, the television program Four Corners by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) interviewed Said in New York and it was broadcast in Australia on 17 March (*Seven Ways To See A War* 2003). It was just three days before the war on Iraq was launched. The interview was part of a program titled *Seven Ways To See A War* and it interviewed seven “insiders around the world” to ask the question “what do they really think about impending war” (2003). Said was among the seven³³. Here, Said was described as an expert on Middle Eastern issues and he was introduced in the program as “America's most important Arab

³³ The other participants were General Sir Michael Ross (Former Director UK Special Services), General Buster Glosson (the US Air Force Commander of the air campaign in the last Gulf War), Dr. Laurence Meyer (former US Reserve governor and a scholar at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies), Shimon Peres (former Israeli Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), Dr. Mohamed Al Jabiri (a leading Iraqi exile in Australia) and Brigadier Jim Wallace (former Head of the SAS Regiment, Australian Defence Force).

intellectual” (2003). Chris Masters, reporter of the program, introduces Said mentioning “[f]or 14 years Said served on the Palestinian National Council. He does not see the United States as a champion for freedom. His opposition to the war reflects much Arab thought, from midtown Manhattan to Morocco” (2003). This was how Said was represented and how he was widely remembered.

This aspect of Said made his image inseparable from the issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and this linkage drew critical comment. Rather unusually for articles mourning a highly regarded international figure, when Said died in September 2003, obituaries appeared in the Australian media included ones making negative comments. For example, an article in *The Australian* stated from the outset “Edward Said, the foremost Arab intellectual in the US and an advocate for the Palestinian cause with a devotion *that apparently led him to exaggerate his past*, has died in New York” (Italic added: *The Australian* 27 September 2003b, p. 14). The article was referring to an incident reported by the British *Daily Telegraph* back in 1999. It was claimed that “he had exaggerated details of his childhood to strengthen his identification with Palestinian refugees”. A caption for Said’s photo in the obituary said “‘Exaggerated’ childhood: Said” (2008b, p. 14). It also referred to an event in Lebanon in 2000 when Said threw “a rock towards an Israeli guardhouse on the Lebanese border”. Although the article acknowledged Said’s significance as an intellectual and especially as a voice for the Arab world and also noted that Columbia University, where Said worked, did not accuse Said of the rock throwing incident, by noting these episodes the paper was promoting a controversial image of this intellectual.

Said’s firm stance in exposing the nature of imperialism and colonialism promoted by the West from a non-Western point of view disturbed some of the

champions of Western supremacy. On the occasion of an exhibition “Orientalism: Delacroix to Klee” at the Art Gallery of New South Wales in 1997, Keith Windschuttle attacked Said in an article titled “Edward Said’s Orientalism Revisited” which first appeared in the *New Criterion* in 1999 and a revised version in *Quadrant* in 2000. Throughout the essay, a sense of hatred of the author was expressed. Windschuttle reviews *Orientalism* and determines Said’s claims were “flawed” and his “whole attempt to identify Oriental Studies as a cause of imperialism does not deserve to be taken seriously” (Windschuttle 1999). As Ahluwalia and Ashcroft pointed out “[w]hat clearly bothered this author [Windschuttle] was the impact Said, the literary critic, had on the curators and patrons” of the art gallery (Ahluwalia & Ashcroft 2001, p. 138). “That Said’s work had penetrated the very inner sanctum of the West’s cultural institutions was, for Windschuttle, ‘unacceptable’” (2001, p. 139).

This tone is shared and emphasised by Greg Sheridan. In Sheridan’s case, the Palestine-Israeli conflict aspect was more in focus. In 2000, when The Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) broadcast a UK made television documentary *In Search of Palestine: Edward Said*, he wrote an article in *The Australian*, “Enough Said” (Sheridan 2000, Media p. 20). Writing in *the Sydney Morning Herald’s* TV guide page, Tony Davis admits that the quality of the documentary was not necessarily first rate (Davis 2000, p. 19). Davis, however, still sees this documentary (which shows Said returning to his home in Palestine after 50 years absence) as providing significant information about the Middle East. Sheridan obviously does not agree with Davis. Sheridan says “[d]on’t know why SBS keeps running documentaries like this. It is little more really than a tendentious, ludicrously one-sided rant against Israel, of the kind that most mainstream stations don’t do anymore (2000,

Media p. 20). He additionally insists “[i]t is also very offensive, in my view very nearly anti-Semitic” (2000, Media p.20). On conclusion, Sheridan again asserts:

It is impossible that anyone could believe that his program actually adds to the audience’s sum of knowledge about the West Bank or Gaza, or Israel, for that matter. But if you know just a tiny little bit about it, and if your broad prejudice is anti-Israeli, then that prejudice will be confirmed and strengthened by this program. (2000, Media p. 20)

Sheridan’s criticism on this documentary was directed at Said who in Sheridan’s eyes looked “anti-Semitic”³⁴.

When Said, for the first time, was about to set foot in Australia, his background as a Palestinian, a controversial issue in this country, caused some trouble. John Masanauskas reported on 10 May 2001 in the *Herald Sun* “Pratt linked to Palestine activist visit” (Masanauskas 2001, p. 10). Here, “Palestine activist” is Said. In May 2001, “to commemorate the first sitting of federal parliament”, the Alfred Deakin Lectures took place as a part of the Melbourne International Arts Festival. Fifty-three domestic and international people were invited to give lectures and Said was among them (*Building the Nation* 2005). The trouble reported by Masanauskas was the fact the Pratt Foundation was one of the sponsors of the lecture series. The Pratt Foundation was established by a Jewish businessman Richard Pratt and the fact that the foundation was supporting lectures including a “Palestinian activist” had upset some Jewish people in Melbourne (Masanauskas 2001, p. 10). Masanauskas reported:

³⁴ Kim Newman pointed out in her say to this Sheridan’s article “Sheridan also appears to not know the meaning of anti-Semitic. Semitic refers to both Arabs and Jews. For Said to be anti-Semitic, he must also hate Arabs” (Newman 2000, Media p. 5). On 24 February 2000, four letters from the readers appeared in *The Australian* criticising Sheridan’s view on the documentary and Newman’s comment was one of them.

Australia's only federal Jewish MP, Michael Danby, has protested to festival organisers, saying Professor Said was "a curious invitee ... to a tolerant and pluralistic Melbourne." A political lobby group the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council also criticised the invitation. (2001, p. 10)

The foundation stood firm on its role as a funder and rejected the call to "tell organisers who they should invite" and Jonathan Mills, the artistic director of the festival, who said "I don't walk away from the controversy that Edward Said represents" stuck firm to the decision and did not "edit" Said (2001, p. 10). Unfortunately, due to his illness, Said was not able to visit Australia on that occasion and Australians lost the chance to have him in the country forever. However, his lecture went on at the Melbourne Town Hall on 17 May delivered to a packed audience via satellite³⁵.

Despite his multiple interests, Edward Said tended to be seen solely as an advocate of the Palestinian issues who had an "anti-Zionism" view in Australia. Said was understood as a very controversial figure in this country because of this particular representation.

Said's legacy in Australia

When *Power, Politics and Culture*, a book which contains twenty nine interviews with Said conducted in the period 1976 to 2000 (Said 2002, p. ix) was published in Australia in May 2004, eight months after his death, *The Canberra Times* gave the book a negative review. It said "I suspect that this large volume of interviews with Edward Said, published in America in 2001, might never have seen the light of day

³⁵ I thank Professor Vera Mackie of University of Melbourne, who was at the Town Hall on the evening, for letting me know that the Said's lecture was done via satellite and that Said had missed the chance to come to Australia.

in Britain and hence in Australia had he not died last year” (*The Canberra Times* 11 September 2004, p. 21). A writer of *The Canberra Times* review did not find the book thrilling. Said’s idea in those interviews were already expressed in his books and, moreover, the Palestine issues in particular were outdated (2004, p. 21). Gideon Haigh followed this tone in his review in *The Bulletin*. Haigh referred to the lack of “a more contemporary feel” in the book (Haigh 2004, p. 69). Nonetheless, the fact that the book was published afresh in Australia and that the event took place after the author’s death indicates the significance of the influence of this figure, Edward W. Said, in Australia.

Gauri Viswanathan, an editor of *Power, Politics, and Culture*, mentions in the book’s Introduction that “the first thing to note” about the volume was that those interviews were conducted in “a number of locations ... spanning Asia and the Middle East as well as Europe and the United States” (Viswanathan 2002, p. xi). This simply shows how Said’s thought quickly spread throughout the world. Viswanathan says:

They confirm his presence on the international stage as one of the most forceful public intellectuals of our time, a man who evokes interest in the general public for his passionate humanism, his cultivation and erudition, his provocative views, and his unswerving commitment to the cause of Palestinian self-determination. (2002, p. xii)

Along with the fact that Said’s books were translated into various languages, the significance of his influence is apparent and even in Australia, a country located on the edge of the Orient, is not excluded from this influence. James Ley’s review of the book proves this. In *The Age*, giving a positive assessment of the book, he states

“one of the virtues of this collection is its mainly reflective tone” (Ley 2004, p. 4). Referring to Said and his work as highly controversial, he suggests that this book helps to gather Said’s thoughts in more serene way because “[t]he conversational framework reveals Said to be less single-minded than some of his writings might suggest and keen to moderate, qualify and expand his ideas” (2004, p. 4). This suggests the benefit of Said being read and his thoughts revisited long after his death.

The establishment of an Edward Said Memorial Lecture is one such occasion. In October 2005, two years after Edward Said’s death, the University of Adelaide held an inaugural Memorial Lecture (Dally 2005). The Memorial Lecture was sponsored by the Australian Friends of Palestine. Dr. Robert Fisk, a prominent journalist from *The Independent* has written on Middle Eastern issues for decades, was the first speaker. Pal Ahluwalia, a Professor of the University and the chair of the event, introduced Fisk saying “[i]n that true Said-ian spirit he is best known for his ability to speak truth to power” (Ahluwalia 2005, p. 6). With this spirit, Fisk delivered a powerful speech regarding the current Middle Eastern situation, specifically on the conflict between the Palestinian people and the Israelis, while introducing some recollections of his conversations with the late Said. This Memorial Lecture has become an annual event in Adelaide during early spring. Professor Tanya Reinhart (2006), Dr. Ghada Karmi from University of Exeter, the UK (2007) and Dr. Sara Roy from Harvard University (2008) followed Fisk (Edward Said Memorial Lecture 2009). The “Said-ian spirit” has been handed down from speaker to speaker, and from the speakers to the audience.

Meanwhile, in March 2006, another event regarding Edward Said took place in academia. A two-day symposium titled “Edward Said: Debating the Legacy of a

Public Intellectual” was held at the Humanities Research Centre of the Australian National University. The stated aim of the symposium was “to illuminate the oeuvre of Said from several perspectives”. It was attended by scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds (Curthoys & Ganguly 2006a). Bill Ashcroft was there to give one of the four keynote speeches. Ghassan Hage was another keynote speaker. Discussion at the symposium considered “ways in which the Humanities in the twenty first century can engage with his legacy” (Curthoys & Ganguly 2006a). The symposium resulted in a book *Edward Said: The legacy of a public intellectual* a year later in 2007. The book with most of its chapters derived from papers which had been presented at the symposium showcased how widely and deeply Said had influenced Australian academics. The editors, Ned Curthoys and Debjani Ganguly, state in their Introduction “[i]n preparing this volume we have been constantly surprised and delighted by the ways in which Said engages our contributors, who mostly write from a country, Australia, that Said himself never visited” (2007, pp. 2-3).

Said’s legacy was also seen in a field where it is closer to the public. On 29 September 2003, a radio programme made by the ABC Late Night Live producers and hosted by renowned journalist Phillip Adams, played an interview with Edward Said. It was a replay of an interview which was originally broadcast in 1997. Adams played the interview again as a tribute to Said who died four days earlier on 25 September (Edward Said IV 2004). In this long interview lasting nearly an hour, Said talked about his childhood in Jerusalem and Cairo and how he got to the United States. He also enthusiastically talked about the situation of Palestine at the end of the 20th century and he severely criticised the then Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat.

Alternative Radio (Aust), a community radio station, is another media outlet which brought Said's voice to the Australian public. The founder of American Alternative Radio (US) David Barsamian was a close friend of Said (Alternative Radio September 2006) and Said's interview appeared on the radio several times and Alternative Radio (Aust) which is an affiliated company of Alternative Radio (US) also broadcast it. This was done even after Said's death and in September 2006, the radio featured Said (Alternative Radio in September 2006)³⁶. Every Monday, the radio replayed Said's former interviews; "Origins of Terrorism", "A Palestine Perspective on the Conflict with Israel", "Culture and Imperialism" and "Out of Place". Considering the nature of community radio, the number of listeners of the programmes may have not been all that significant. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that there still are people who try to promote Said's arguments in the public arena.

The occasional but continuous appearances of Said's work in Australian society even after his death, whether in the academic or non-academic field, indicates that the legacy of Said is still alive. Ashcroft and Ahluwalia point out that "Said's paradox of identity is indicative of the complex identities of diasporic and post-colonial peoples throughout the world today" (2001, p. 2). This is particularly true of Australia, a country which came into being as a result of imperialism and colonialism. And it is in this context that the thoughts of Said need to live on in Australia.

³⁶ My sincere thanks goes to Associate Professor Paul Sharrad who happened to hear the programme while he was driving back from Melbourne in September 2006 and kindly told me about it on his return to Wollongong.

CONCLUSION

Edward W. Said who was born in Jerusalem in 1935 became one of the most influential international intellectuals of our time. While Said's "personal dimension" was always the Palestinian issue which derived from the land of his birth, his thoughts were read broadly outside this context. Even after his passing in 2003, his legacy remains in both countries.

The publishing of a Japanese translation of *Orientalism* in 1986 was the trigger for Japanese society's absorption of Said's thoughts. Besides the intensive work required in order to publish the works of Said in Japanese, there were intellectuals who tried to introduce his voice to a Japanese public. Through newspapers and journals, Said appeared in front of Japanese readers. Fortunately for Said's followers in Japan, he also had a chance to visit Japan to deliver his speech to a Japanese audience. There is still enthusiasm for translating his works which are not yet in Japanese and those who were touched by Said try to reflect his thoughts in their own activities.

In Australia, Said reached an intellectual circle starting with a rather "low key" reception in the early 1980s. It began in the field of Asian studies and then gradually developed a significant impact on post-colonial studies. Beyond academia, the controversy which his arguments have caused was significant. His identity as a Palestinian and his stance as a critic of the present state of Israel made him a very controversial figure in this country. He was occasionally depicted in the media as a trouble-maker and activist. However, at the same time, he was received as an intellectual who has deep insights and his voice was heard and considered within the society.

Both Japan and Australia were not exceptions to those countries which were challenged by the thoughts of Edward Said. Although it is not always easily visible, Said's intellectual legacy can be found in various fields. This is also true in the sphere of considering national identities. In my next chapter, I will discuss how Said was read and used by intellectuals from Japan and Australia when locating their countries in the contemporary world.

CHAPTER 4: The location of Japan and Australia in the context of Said

INTRODUCTION

Edward W. Said was, as Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia acknowledged in their book *Edward Said*, “one of the most widely known, and controversial, intellectuals in the world today (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia 2001, p. 1). This was true of Japan and Australia, both geographically located on the edge of the Orient. Recognition of Said was high in Japan and Australia and his arguments influenced intellectuals in both countries. Although he died in 2003, he continues to be an influential and controversial figure. Now, the question is – Why and how did intellectuals from the archipelago and the continent interpret Said?

My focus in this chapter is on the question: Where do Japan and Australia, as nation states, belong in the present international arena? In *Orientalism*, Said argued that the modern world is widely perceived and understood to be divided into the Occident and the Orient. Moreover, the world is divided not just into two sections, but each division has a hierarchy – those who dominate and those who are dominated. By focusing on this key point, I will attempt to demonstrate the ambiguous identity of both nations. They refuse to fit neatly into either side and float between the Orient and the Occident within a dichotomous and hierarchical world order.

I will first address the question of how intellectuals in Japan read Said and I will locate their country in the Occident/Orient divide. Next, I will discuss Australian intellectuals’ recognition of their country in the context of Said’s work. Then, I will introduce the perspective of a third party – that is Said’s perspective on Japan and

Australia. I will extend and widen this discussion with regard to the ambiguous identity of both Japan and Australia³⁷.

JAPAN'S LOCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF SAID

When *Orientalism* was translated into Japanese and was published in Japan in October 1986, four major Japanese newspapers ran book reviews during the following month. As I note above, by adapting Said's argument to Japan's the circumstances, the reviews located Japan in three different phases. First, as a consequence of its historical and cultural features, Japan was perceived as a country belonging to the Orient. Second, in relation to the Middle East, Japan's behaviour was strongly associated with the West. Third, considering Japan's past as an imperial power in the region, it was defined as a country with an Occidental world-view. These three phases which were pointed out by the newspapers' book reviews at the very beginning of the process of introducing Said's work to Japan have been expanded by intellectuals in the course of their reading and relating Said to the Japanese context.

Japan as an object of "orientalism"

Among the three ways which *Orientalism* could be read and adapted in Japan, seeing Japan as a subject of "orientalism" proved the least controversial way to absorb Said's ideas. *Orientalism* which has "exposed the ambition of the Western powers" has touched a cord among Japanese people. Japan has been under the

³⁷ I understand that, fundamentally, national identity is a continuously contested concept and there is no solid one identity for one nation state – therefore, it is ambiguous. However, the situation I am pointing to in this thesis is the ambiguous nature of identity specifically in terms of Japan and Australia – countries floating between the West and the East. Following Edward Said's in-depth analysis of the present world, in this chapter, I will examine the question of which world – the West or the East – intellectuals in Japan and Australia imagine and place their countries.

spell of “orientalism” imposed by Europeans since the day it first appeared in their consciousness, when an Italian merchant and traveller Marco Polo named the archipelago “Zipangu”, a place located to the east of China which was imagined to be rich with gold. This tendency was enhanced after the opening up of the country to the world in the middle of the nineteenth century. As a part of their imperial and colonial expansionism, the influence of the Western powers washed over the shores of Japan. The country was under pressure from Western powers in the international political scene whereas its culture was represented and admired as unique and Oriental by the West. The argument in *Orientalism* encouraged intellectuals in Japan to recognise the existence of a systematic coercion exercised by Western nations over Japan as part of a strategy to dominate the non-Western world. Japan’s subjectivity in relation to the West and the structure which placed Japan in this position became clear when related to Said’s argument.

At the beginning of his book review of *Orientalism*, Seki Hirono pointed out that the book could be misread by Japanese readers as being specifically concerned with the Middle Eastern issues and unrelated to Japan (Seki 1987, p. 146). “An ethnic obsession” was the phrase Seki used to draw Japanese readers’ consciousness to the context of Said’s argument. The phrase defined the norm which had existed among the Japanese population regarding a “dichotomy between the West and the East” (Seki 1987, p. 146). Said’s argument provided an explanation for this dichotomous structure of the world and by introducing the phrase “an ethnic obsession” he bridges the gap between the argument and Japanese readers’ consciousness.

On the other hand, Sekii Mitsuo, in his review of *Orientalism* titled “The power of the West as unconsciousness”, was more direct in putting Japan into the context of *Orientalism*. Explaining the “unconscious structure” of “a Western style for

dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” as Said argued (Said 2003, p. 3), Sekii quotes from a British engineer, Richard H. Brunton who was hired by the Japanese government to build lighthouses in Japan in the late nineteenth century when the country was going through the process of modernisation and Westernisation (Sekii 1987, p. 288). The notion of superiority over Japan was expressed clearly in Brunton’s writing. By adding that there was no shortage of Brunton-like statements by foreigners who visited Japan in those days, Sekii directed Japanese readers to the position of their country in the context of Said’s argument in *Orientalism*.

A dialogue between Karatani Kojin and Paul Anderer on *Orientalism* which appeared in a journal *Waseda Bungaku* in May 1987 further explores the influence of “orientalism” on Japan and how *Orientalism* should be read. Karatani and Anderer, both scholars of Japanese Studies in literature, started their conversation by describing Said, his works and thoughts, and then covered a wide range of topics regarding Said and *Orientalism*. Before going into the topic of Japan and “orientalism”, they discussed the view of US academia of Japanese literature. Karatani commented that he was surprised to hear almost all the people who were studying Japanese literature in the United States around 1980 were mentioning Said’s *Orientalism*. Anderer expressed his concern over the phenomenon (Anderer & Karatani 1987, p. 10). An American who was majoring in Japanese literature, Anderer cautioned that people had to be more careful in adapting Said’s argument to Japan. Although whether we could expand the argument beyond the Middle East, to South East Asia, China and Japan, or not is the most stimulating aspect of *Orientalism*, no one has pursued this task yet, says Anderer (1987, pp. 10-11). Anderer was not against the idea of adapting Said’s argument to Japan *per se* but

he was suggesting the necessity of a more thorough review of Japanese studies and its origin by American scholars, as Said did for the Middle East. He advised that first, it is necessary to recognise the existence of the framework of “orientalism” in Said’s sense and then to construct arguments based on Japanese Studies.

Referring further to American scholars of Japanese Studies, Anderer pointed to the lack of Japanese points of view in Americans’ literary critiques of Japanese literature (1987, p. 15). This point was echoed by Karatani who spoke from the side of Japanese literature as a Japanese literary critic. Karatani introduces an episode from his experience of teaching Japanese literature at Yale University and says there is a tendency among American students to uncritically adopt the Western philosophy or criticism to Japanese literature and to ignore the history of literary criticism in Japan (1987, p. 16).

With this situation existing in the American academia, what was more problematic for Karatani and Anderer was that Japanese academia had been compromised by this trend. The most significant remark made by Karatani in the dialogue was “Japanese modern literature was written completely from the Westerners’ point of view” (1987, p. 11). He affirms that the perspective of “orientalism” had penetrated into the Orient itself, as Said had argued (1987, p. 11).

This point is echoed by Sekii in the book review on *Orientalism* I have already mentioned. Sekii indicates that the most significant aspect about “orientalism” is that it is still alive and reproduced in the West even today and penetrating into the East (1987, p. 288). What Sekii considers the most problematic aspect of this phenomenon is that the subject of “orientalism”, in this case Japan, was indifferently adapting and absorbing Western rhetoric (1987, p. 289). Sekii says

that the style of Western hegemony was not only reproduced within the West but also supported by what he called “reverse orientalism” in the East (1987, p. 289).

Thus, *Orientalism* instructs Japanese intellectuals as to the framework of “orientalism” which is permeating Japanese intellectual society. *Orientalism* is not just simply an anaesthetic to ease “ethnic obsession”, but a diagnostic explanation required in order to recognise what kind of situation Japan was in in relation to the West. When we consider this hegemonic relationship between the West and Japan, Japan is located in the Orient as Seki, Sekii, Karatani and also Anderer have claimed.

The Middle East as the Orient

In the context of observing the world divided into two categories, the Occident and the Orient, it is, as we have seen in the former section, given a country’s historical and cultural aspects, natural for Japanese intellectuals to locate Japan in the latter category. However, when the term “the Orient” is specifically attached to the Middle East, Japan’s location becomes uncertain. Although Said’s argument in *Orientalism* is effective in considering the broader power structure of the entire world, his central interest is on issues concerning the Middle East and he is mainly drawing examples from the relationship between the West and the Middle Eastern world. In this context, Japan’s shares a gaze directed towards the Middle East with that of the West.

As Seki Hirono bluntly points out, Japanese people could not imagine things other than oil, war, the Koran and *Arabian Nights* coming from the Middle East (Seki 1987, p. 146). Sugita Hideaki explained this situation further. Sugita noted that images of the Middle East among Japanese people were very biased and they were, for instance, always linked to exotic images or terrorism (Sugita 1986, p. 367).

According to Sugita, this situation was the result of the direct import of “orientalism” (which is popular among the American public into Japanese society) (1986, p. 367). Unfortunately, this tendency is also recognisable in the field of area studies on the Middle East in Japan, according to Sugita (1986, p. 367-368). Another academic Uhara Takashi also refers to this point. He says that through the channel of theories, the distorted image of Arab issues or Islam in Western societies had been cast over Japan as well (Uhara 1988, p. 69). Japan is observing the Middle East through Western eyes. As a result, knowledge about the Arab world is lacking in Japan much like in Western countries and alternative stories from the region have not been recognised.

Comments from Itagaki Yuzo in his dialogue with Kang Sang-jung on Said made in 1995, give a more detailed explanation of this point. Itagaki, a prominent Japanese scholar in Middle Eastern studies, explains the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union by inserting a perspective which includes the Islam element in this scope (Itagaki & Kang 1995, p. 345). He sees the collapse of Socialism in the twentieth century as originating in the Six-Day War in 1967 because the war shook the ground of Socialism in the Arab world (1995, pp. 345-346). According to Itagaki, the direct starting point of the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the Iranian Revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. This argument is rarely made in Japan as well as in Western countries. The absence of Itagaki’s argument in the discussion of “the end of Socialism” in Japan or in the international arena should be seen as an illustration of the lack of alternative views in any thorough examination of the cause of the demise of socialism. Since Japan is in a different position from Western countries, it has an opportunity and also a responsibility to introduce alternative perspectives which differ from the

Western ones and could include the Arab world in international debates. However, it has failed to do so.

Nishikawa Nagao says he was listening carefully to experts on the Middle Eastern problem and military affairs in the media to hear if they mentioned Said's *Orientalism* during the Gulf War in 1991 (Nishikawa 2003, p. 69). However, few recalled the name of Said or *Orientalism*. Considering the popularity of the term "orientalism" in Japan, it was ironic that the term had not been used on the occasion when it was most appropriate in Nishikawa's opinion. As Nishikawa rightly indicated, the Gulf War proved what Said had presented in *Orientalism* and was still an ongoing problem (2003, p. 69). Now, in this new century, we are observing another war in the Middle East. The practice of "orientalism" – the domination over the Orient by the West – is still continuing. Japan as a member of the Western alliance took part in the Gulf War as a palliative measure; contributing financially (Nishikawa 2003, p. 69). In 2003, Japan made a greater commitment to the US led invasion of Iraq. The country deployed its Self Defence Force troops for a "humanitarian" task located in a relatively "safe" area. With this policy in mind, it is as Nishikawa insists, necessary for Japanese intellectuals to reconsider their country's relationship to the region by consulting the argument of Said as it is made in *Orientalism*.

At a glance, *Orientalism* could be considered by Japanese readers as a literature on issues between the Middle Eastern and the West and "orientalism" as a problem residing in Western societies (Sugita 1986, p. 367). However, says Sugita, "orientalism" is also a problem which clearly comes up when examining the relationship between Japan and the Middle East (1986, p. 367). Thinking about the location of Japan within the framework of the Japan – Middle East relationship,

Japan slips into the category of the Occident which dominates and represents the Middle East as the other.

Japan as an “orientalist”

In relation to Japan’s location in the Occident/Orient divided world, it is natural to perceive the country as a part of the Orient and as subject to the power of the Occident. However, when it comes to Japan’s relationship with the Middle East, influenced by the Western, and predominately American perception of the Arab world, Japan starts to adopt the gaze of those who dominate – an orientalist’s gaze. This perspective places Japan as a part of the West and may seem to be a comfortable view for Japanese people to accept. However, defining Japan as orientalist in relation to its neighbouring Asian countries provokes controversy. This is deeply related to its dark past as a coloniser.

Again referring to Sugita’s writing on *Orientalism*, he has pointed out that Said’s argument on “orientalism” would become relevant to Japan when thinking about its relationship with the Middle East and also to Asia was considered (Sugita 1986, p. 367). Sugita says that the issue of “Japanese orientalism” became apparent when we consider the historical relationship between Japan and East Asia (especially China and Korea) (1986, p. 368). He emphasises the importance of Japanese people accepting Said’s argument as a relevant issue for themselves (1986, p. 368).

Sugita was not alone in this argument and as I have observed in my previous chapter, Miura Masashi and Isoda Koichi were clear with this point in their newspaper reviews of *Orientalism* (Miura 1986, p. 11, Isoda 1986, p. 12). Unami Akira, in his article which considers the meaning of Said’s *Orientalism* and *Covering Islam*, points out that *Orientalism* can be understood as including criticism of Japan’s behaviour towards Asian people (Unami 1987, p. 26). Imazawa

Noriko, a translator of *Orientalism*, was also aware of this point. After mentioning how the theme advanced by Said was received in Western countries, she indicated that Japan was in a unique position in regard to “orientalism” (Imazawa 1986, p. 375). Geographically and culturally, Japan was an entity which was observed as an object by Western nations. Nevertheless, Japan as a modern nation state chose to become an imperial power and in order to pursue its colonial experiment, Japan had learned Western theories of imperial and colonial domination. By doing so, Japan shifted its position from those who were dominated to those who dominate in relation to Asian countries. Therefore Japan is not free from Said’s criticism of “orientalism” (Imazawa 1986, p. 375).

Although there were quite a few Japanese scholars who were originally aware of the relevance of *Orientalism* in considering Japan’s behaviour towards its neighbouring countries, Kang Sang-jung, a second generation Korean residing in Japan, was the academic figure who has been most persistent in raising this point about Japanese society. Back in 1988, in the very last line of his review of *Orientalism* Kang asked “When will another Said appear in this stronghold of orientalism in the Far East?” (Kang 1987, p. 59). Needless to say, the “stronghold of orientalism in the Far East” applies to Japan. Since then, he has from time to time referred to this problem and written many articles on the issue in 1996. Some of those articles were compiled into a book called *Orientalisumu no Kanata e* (Beyond Orientalism). Following Said, Kang called the cultural hegemony exercised by Japan over Asia, a “Japanese orientalism” (1988, p. 134). Japan drew a border which cannot be crossed, between itself and Asia and by dividing “us” from “them” Japan had managed to assure its distinct identity. This cultural hegemony was practised in accordance with its social, economical and political systems (1988, p.

134) in the course of Japan's expansion into Asia from the end of the nineteenth century until the end of World War Two, and continued into the Korean Peninsula. Fifteen years later, on the occasion of Said's passing, in a dialogue with Ukai Satoshi in memory of Said, Kang once again refers to Japan's role as an orientalist power. He explains that there is a notion of superiority in Japan in relation to their neighbours and refers to the importance of re-visiting Said's argument for Japan to seriously undertake real reconciliation with Asia (Kang and Ukai 2003, pp. 18-20).

On the occasion of the publication of *Orientalizumu no Kanata e* in 1996, Kang wrote an article referring to the purpose of the book. In the article he explained that he had been inspired by the work of a Japanese American academic Stephan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Kang 1996, p. 135). In this book Tanaka examined the work of Shiratori Kurakichi, whom Tanaka calls "the principal architect of *toyoshi*³⁸" (Tanaka 1995, p. 11). Shiratori was an academic, active in the early twentieth century, who pursued a project to define Asia, "to establish Japan as an authority on Asia, and thereby to engage in a dialogue with the West" (Tanaka 1995, p. 28). This book encouraged Kang to examine the development of Oriental studies in Japan in order to unravel Japanese orientalism (Kang 1996, p. 135).

Following this trend, some Japanese scholars discussed the practice of Japanese orientalism in relation to individual Japanese intellectuals who shaped Japan's understanding of Asia from the middle of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century when Japan was going through a wave of Westernisation and modernisation. Those intellectuals ranged from policy makers, educators, philosophers, ethicists, and others, and were the people who shaped Japanese

³⁸ *Toyoshi* literary means "Oriental history".

thoughts about Asia, the world and their own country. Fukuzawa Yukichi, a thinker and an educator, is a favourite target for those who accuse Japan of an imperialist and colonialist stance toward Asia. By referring to Said's criticism of Marx's view as orientalist, Nishikawa Nagao argues that it was possible to recognise the same element in Fukuzawa's thinking which urges Japan to separate itself from Asia (2003, pp. 97-112, pp. 247-249). Komori Yoichi also defines Fukuzawa as an orientalist. Fukuzawa's vision of imposing otherness on the neighbouring countries and give justification for Japan's colonial expansion and was a characteristic of imperial states as pointed out by Said (Komori 2003, pp. 39-47). With regard to the colonial policy of Japan, Tanaka Kazuo refers to Yanaihara Tadao, a Christian and an economist who was one of Japan's colonial policy makers. Although Yanaihara was sympathetic to the local population in Japanese colonies and was dismissed from Tokyo University in 1937 because of his "idealistic pacifist view", Tanaka Kazuo says, by giving a positive view of Japan's implantation of economic development and education in its colonies, Yanaihara had acceded to the overall colonial policy of Imperial Japan (Tanaka 1991, p. 291-293). The image of orientalist overlaps with that depicted by Yanaihara.

Shifting attention from the political aspect, Karatani Kojin focused on the world of art. Pointing out that "the most typical subversion of colonialism is its aestheticcentrist way of appreciating and respecting the other" (Karatani 1997, pp. 48-49)³⁹, and adding that he believes "this is what Said meant by the term *Orientalism*" (1997, pp. 48-49). He then features two aesthetic scholars, Okakura Tenshin and Yanagi Soetsu. Okakura "discovered" craft in Japan as art under the

³⁹ This text of Karatani was published in both Japanese and English. Although I mainly relied on the Japanese text in *Hihyokukan*, for exact quotes in quotation marks are taken from English version translated by Sabu Kohso in *Boundary 2*. This quotation and the next one appeared on p. 153.

direction of American Ernest Fenollosa and he expanded this practice to the whole of Asia and also advocated the independence of Asians (1997, p.50). Nevertheless, he was ignorant about Korea and he thought Japan's domination over Korea was a matter of course (1997, p. 52). On the other hand, Yanagi contributed to the "discovery" of craft in Korea (1997, p. 52). He loved the people of Korea and was against Japan's policy of assimilation (1997, p. 52-54). This derived from his aesthetic point of view and was motivated by his compassion for Korea, which was a perspective of those who dominate according to Karatani.

Coming back to Kang, he did not stop at just accusing Japan about its past. His concern was that even after the war, the practice of "Japanese orientalism" continued and this was apparent in Japan's attitude towards their "inner others" – Koreans residing in Japan as a result of Japan's former colonial activities (Kang 1988, pp. 134, p. 137-138). Those Koreans are still invisible in contemporary Japanese society (Kang 1988, p. 139). Suh Kyungsik, another second generation Korean in Japan, explains his feeling of being "out of place" by associating himself with Said. Expressing how the absence of Said is significant to him in an obituary for Said, Suh overlaps Said's plural identities with his own situation. Said himself chose his identity as a Palestinian and Suh chose to be Korean, in other words to belong to minority groups, both in societies, the United States and Japan, which were "imperialistic" (Suh 2003, p. 82).

Locating Japan on the side of the Occident in Said's context is a controversial way to define Japan because it sheds light on Japan's negative past as an imperial state. This explains why people like Kang or Suh, who belong to a minority group in Japanese society, or Stephen Tanaka who is observing Japan from outside, are more likely to become aware of Japanese orientalism and thus be able to criticise it from

Said's perspective. And, they are apt to be seen as enemies who display an "anti-Japan sentiment" (Nishihara 2005, p. 250). However, whether the view is "anti-Japan" or not, Japan is unavoidably orientalist. It is apparent in light of Said's argument as it was read by intellectuals in Japan.

AUSTRALIA'S LOCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF SAID

When using Said's insights we can see that Japan has an ambiguous identity as it floats between the Orient and the Occident, on the other side of equator, Australia has also been maintaining its uniquely ambiguous character. As David Walker argues "[o]ne of the remarkable features of Australian history is the periodic rediscovery of our proximity to Asia" (Walker 1999, p. 1). This "remarkable feature" is strongly connected to Australia's own identity construction problem. "The construction of identity", according to Said, "... involves establishing opposites and 'others' whose actuality is always subject to continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from 'us'" (Said 2003, p. 332). Fazal Rizvi's essay in 1993, which takes the argument of Said on "orientalism" at its basis, points out strong linkages between "[t]he talk of nation-building and Australian national identity" and Australians' perception towards Asia (Rizvi 1993, p. 23). By perceiving Asian countries as "others", Australia always puts itself on the opposite side of the Orient. However, this does not necessarily completely place Australia in the category of the Occident.

As Rizvi says:

On the one hand, White Australia is a nation whose very foundation involved an unjust act of imperial power, and as a number of historians have pointed out, Australians have always been conscious of their status as a British colony,

subjected to similar forms of control and cultural oppression as other colonies. Yet, Australia was a settler colony which defined itself very much as an outpost of Britain. It has thus been complicit with the colonialist enterprise with respect to its relations with Asian countries. (1993, p. 24)

This characteristic of Australia promotes ambiguity in a world which is widely believed to be divided between “the Orient” and “the Occident” as Said asserted. Then the question is – How do people of Australia placed their country within this structure of the world having rulers/colonisers on one hand and ruled/colonised on the other?

In this section of my argument I will discuss Australia’s orientalist attitude in relation to the neighbouring Asian countries. Next, I will discuss Australia’s multiculturalism in the context of Said. Finally, in the context of Said’s views, I will describe Australia’s character. It is a character which does not easily fit into the category of “the West”.

Australia and the Orient outside

For Australia, which is located on the edge of Asia, its immediate Orient is the neighbouring countries to its north – countries in South East, East and South Asia. Being an outpost of the British Empire, a country belonging to the Occident, since European settlement started in 1788, the mainstream White population on the Australian continent had felt that they had been located in a place where they did not really belong. Bringing the historical and cultural legacy of the Occident to Australia has meant the country and its people have perceived their neighbours as the “other”. In the light of Said’s argument, scholars in Australia have identified their country as orientalist.

Fazal Rizvi's essay "Asia and the Search for an Australian Identity" quoted above depicts Australia's orientalist character by relying on Said's argument. His essay was written when Australia was accelerating an understanding that its future was in Asia under the Keating Government. This movement was a challenge for the dominant Australian population which had long linked its identity to its European heritage and had isolated Asia as the "other". Pointing out that the discourse on Asia in Australia was mainly informed by Europeans, Rizvi states that this discourse could be best understood by adopting Said's argument in *Orientalism* (Rizvi 1993, p. 23). "While Australia was not itself a major colonial power," says Rizvi, "Orientalism has been the dominant discourse in terms of which it has searched for its identity" (1993, p. 24). Rizvi traces the history of Australia being an orientalist in relation to Asia from the nineteenth century and states that even though Australia has now got closer to Asia for economic reasons its "representation of Asia ... is clearly ambivalent, ambiguous and contradictory" (1993, p. 25).

Walker traces Australia's "ambivalent, ambiguous and contradictory" representation of Asia in his book *Anxious Nation*. The book follows the relationship between Australia and Asian countries, India, China and particularly Japan, focusing on how Australia perceived those countries and, more generally Asia, between 1850 and 1939. He depicts, as the title of the book suggests, the anxiousness which loomed over the Australian society regarding its Asian neighbours. Walker recognises that at the base of this anxiousness which derives from perceiving Asia as the "other", lies the notion of "orientalism". Although direct mention of Said was made only in the book's Introduction and Conclusion, Walker's exploration of the structure of the Australia-Asia relationship and representation of Asia by Australia has echoes of Said's argument. Walker stated that:

In Said's argument, 'Orientalism' was the reason or permission Europe gave itself for being in the Orient. Prominent among those reasons was the 'lassitude' and 'backwardness' attributed to the East. This was the East as a hot, primitive, largely inert world, available for European colonisation. This Orient was one acted upon, rather than acting. (1999, p. 227)

He has read the notion within Australian society regarding Asia – anxiousness – in this context.

In a similar approach, *Australia's ambivalence towards Asia* by J. V. D'Cruz and William Steele, examines the orientalist character of Australia more thoroughly in the present context. In the book, which was praised by Walker as "a spirited and thought-provoking publication" (Walker 2003, p. 335), D'Cruz and Steele clearly state that they relied heavily on Said's and also on Ashis Nandy's works⁴⁰. They say:

The present work stands on the shoulders of work by Ashis Nandy, such as *The intimate enemy*, and by Edward Said, in particular *Orientalism*. We will be using the term 'Orientalist' in Said's sense, with 'Orientalist' being that which is characteristic of, or one who practises in, the field of Orientalism. (D'Cruz & Steele 2003, p. 39)

The book deals with "Australia's incessant problems with imagining Asia and Asians and of constructively relating to them" (D'Cruz & Steele 2003, p. 7). D'Cruz

⁴⁰ D'Cruz and Steele record that they were specifically influenced by Nandy's *The intimate enemy: Loss and recovery of self under colonialism* (1983) and *Savage Ereud and other essays on possible and retrievable selves* (1995) (D'Cruz & Steele 2003, p. 9). Ashis Nandy is an Indian sociologist and clinical psychologist who is now Senior Honorary Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi (CSDS 2009). <http://www.csds.in/index.php?inc=aboutCSDS>
http://www.csds.in/faculty_ashis_nandy.htm

and Steele carefully trace Australia's racist behaviour in relation to Asia specifically as it appeared in public culture as well as the question of the legitimacy of Western values. They have particularly focused on *Turtle Beach*, a novel written by Blanche d'Alpuget and subsequently made into a film of the same name, which examined the orientalist discourse which existed in Australian society. *Turtle Beach* has provoked controversy between Australia and Malaysia at a political level because of Australia's biased orientalist representation of this Asian country.

Simon Philipott refers to Australia's nearest Oriental country, Indonesia, in his essay "Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian National Imagination" and introduces Said into his argument. Philipott focuses on the "politics of fear" regarding an imagined perception of foreign countries and he sees this politics in practice specifically in the Australia-Indonesia relationship. Australia has always had feelings of fear and anxiety towards this neighbour (Philipott 2001, pp. 371-372). Explaining the politics of fear in a general sense, Philipott says "[f]ear is also prevalent in the essentialist images commonplace in the realist foreign policy discourses of academics, politicians and bureaucrats ..." and he refers to the use of "Orientalist categories" by "American Middle East experts" quoting from Said (2001, p. 374). According to Philipott, Australia has always acted in a superior manner towards Indonesia and judged the country by Australia's values (2001, p. 372, pp. 382-386). Philipott describes this Australian attitude as an orientalist exercise.

Thus, in the Australian case, Australian readers of Said, recognise orientalist aspects of their society and country and locate Australia on the opposite side of the Orient. This orientalist gaze towards neighbouring Asian countries, however, was not just directed towards the countries or people who are physically outside

Australia. The “others” who were residing inside Australia have also been examined in the context of Said’s argument.

Australia and the Orient inside

When Sugita Hideaki reviewed the Japanese translated *Orientalism* and indicated a few weak points in the literature, he referred to the lack of discussion about the “internal Orient” in Said’s argument (Sugita 1986, pp. 365-366). Because Said emphasised the way the West externalised the Orient and tried to put the other outside the border, says Sugita, his focus was not adequate in relation to the issue of the “Orient inside” the West itself. Discrimination against Jewish people, “Gypsies” and Freemasons in European society was created during the process of orientalising those people and it was inevitable that the problem of “orientalism” would include this issue (Sugita 1986, pp. 366-367). Despite the limitation of Said’s concept of “orientalism” with regard to the “internal Orient”, in the context of Australia, the concept is frequently applied to understanding the country’s domestic multicultural situation. Even though Said did not fully cover the issue, his argument is applicable when attempting to understand Australia’s internal problems.

The orientalist’s perception of “inner others” was, of course, not unrelated to Australia’s attitude towards its neighbouring Asian countries and the texts mentioned in the former section “Australia and the Orient Outside” which dealt with the latter issue simultaneously pointed to Australia’s internal problems. Philpott who has demonstrated the Australian “politics of fear” in relation to Indonesia points out that the cause of the fear was embedded within Australian society. He says that “Domestic anxiety about the policies of multiculturalism and immigration” is inflaming Australia’s orientalist attitude towards Indonesia (2001, p. 372). Rizvi also had Australia’s “inner other” problem in his scope along with its

“outer other” problem. He stated that Australia’s “relations both with its indigenous population and its Asian neighbours have been Orientalist” and it affected the construction of the country’s identity (Rizvi 1993, p. 24).

D’Cruz and Steele have discussed Australia’s attitudes both outside the country and within, but they have placed greater focus on “the dominant group of white Anglo-Australians” (D’Cruz & Steele 2003, p. 8). They assert that:

Contextualised then in historical and contemporary settings, this book deals with how race serves power relations between, on the one hand, the dominant group of white Anglo-Australians and their alter-being, the Australian state, and, on the other hand, people-of-colour, both (indigenous) First Australian, that is Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and people-of-colour of Asian, African, Pacific or other origin both within and beyond Australia. (2003, p. 8)

They say that when Australia accuses neighbouring Asian countries of human right violations, they need to think first about their behaviour towards indigenous people on their soil (2003, p. 9). Their accusation of “white Anglo-Australians” is harsh and they are not just criticising right-wing people like Pauline Hanson or John Howard but also pointing, for instance, to Alison Broinowski who is generally known as a critic of Australia’s arrogance towards Asia. They think Broinowski’s use of “our” excludes non-Anglo-Australians (2003, p. 14).

Being a settler colony, from the British colonisers’ point of view, the continent of Australia, since the day colonisation began, has embraced the other – indigenous people – inside itself. Later, the continent populated itself by relying on a succession of immigrants not only from Britain or Europe but also from Asia (Jupp 2002, p. 5-19). Therefore, it was inevitable that the rulers of the continent – the

dominant white population – would carry a non-Western population inside the country and would seek to control those others. Ivan Krisjansen, by focusing on the late nineteenth century when the very foundation of the Commonwealth of Australia was formed, introduces the concept of “Australian Orientalism” to explain race relations in Australian colonies from a post colonial perspective (Krisjansen 2001, p. 173). He introduces Said by stating:

As liberal governmentality was problematised by fierce debates, a succession of limits was imposed on race relations by the deployment of a vast array of powers, among which included: unions, pastoralists, the State, farmers, miners and capital. This will to power was subsumed by what Said has termed Orientalism, an analytic of limits which when examined allows for the possibility of diagnosing the organising trends of life, production and labour in relation to racialisation. (2001, p. 173)

He depicts how Asian labour, specifically Chinese labour, was increasingly restricted from workplaces in South Australia and the Northern Territory. Those restrictions resulted from Australia implementing the Immigration Restriction Act, which is generally known as the White Australia policy in 1901 following federation. Krisjansen recognises this process as “the scientific constitution of the Other” which treats non-Western people “as almost a different species or a genus” (2001, p. 188). The White Anglo population of Australia was constructing their identity as Westerners by creating the “others” and adopting science to legitimatise this idea.

In a more contemporary setting, Kevin M. Dunn introduced Said and “orientalism” to refer to the representation of two cultural minority groups in Sydney – Indo-Chinese and Muslim groups (Dunn 2003, pp. 153-165). From a

cultural geographer's point of view, Dunn shows how representations of those people are politicised in Australian society and points out the inevitability of them becoming part of "representation battles". With regard to media reports, including one murder case in 1994, in the Sydney suburb of Cabramatta, a place highly populated by Indo-Chinese-Australians, "orientalism" was mentioned in order to explain how the place and the people were portrayed in the media (2003, p. 159). Quoting from *Orientalism*, he says "[t]hese constructions of place provide powerful expression to long-held Western stereotypes about 'Orientals' as less civilized, depraved, alien and inscrutable" (2003, p. 159).

Jen Webb's focus, on the other hand, is on indigenous Australians in the field of art. Asking "what makes something art" and "who can be identified as an artist?" (Webb 2002, p. 137), Webb examines the position of Australian Aboriginal art in relation to mainstream art. In Webb's article, *Orientalism* is referred to in order to depict the "otherness" of Aboriginal arts. Having practical and also political elements as well as an artistic element (2002, p. 141), Aboriginal art is recognised as difficult to handle by "white art scholars and professionals" and has been categorised as "Outsider art" (2002, p. 142).

The policy of multiculturalism in Australia, which is supposed to integrate indigenous and Asian migrant Australians, was reviewed by Ruth Arber from the perspective of education. Looking back at nearly twenty year history of multicultural policy in this country and admitting there were positive effects, she argues that the policy had, however, not yet achieved what it had promised. In order to consider the way multicultural education might better work in Australia, Arber tries to borrow ideas from "identity, cultural studies and post-colonialism" literatures (Arber 1999, p. 311). Here, she refers to Said's *Orientalism* along with

Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*. She pays attention to Said's assertion that the Orient was made the Orient by the West and insists on the necessity of introducing these new ways of understanding present Australian society (1999, pp. 314-315).

Although official multicultural policy was implemented in Australia in the 1970s, the continent has since the beginning of British settlement, been a multicultural place. In this fundamentally multicultural country, Said and *Orientalism* are read in order to understand its inner Orient as well as to understand its relationship with neighbouring Asian countries. In the context of Said's argument, there is a silent consensus among Australian intellectuals that Australia is located on the side of the Occident.

Australia as the "Orient"

This "silent consensus", however, loosens occasionally in Australian academic writing. As I have already noted, Razvi refers to the ambiguous status of Australia in the context of colonialism (1993, p. 24). On one hand, Australia was subject to British colonialism. On the other hand, in the context of Asia, Australia itself was seen as "the colonialist enterprise" (1993, p. 24). Therefore, "social theorists writing about Australia-Asia relations remain divided on the applicability of Said's general thesis to Australian representations of Asia" (1993, p. 24). Nevertheless, as I have already shown in this thesis, Said and *Orientalism* have been quoted by Australian scholars from various backgrounds in order to better understand the state of Australia. And although the number of scholars recognising Australia as a subject of the Occident is small, there are a few significant writers subscribing to this view.

In his essay "When Does a Settler Become a Native? Citizenship and Identity in a Settler Society", Pal Ahluwalia focuses on Australia's role as a settler colony and

depicts the ambiguous state of settlers who were supposed to have power to rule the continent and to be of superior status. Ahluwalia quotes the following phrase from Alan Lawson; the “settler subject-position is both postimperial and postcolonial; it has colonized and has been colonized: it must speak of and against both its own oppressiveness and its own oppression” (Lawson 1995). He explains “[i]t is through an engagement of these two modes – the colonising and the colonised – that we begin to understand the interstitial cultural space in which settler subjects are located” (Ahluwalia 2001, p. 70). Here, the importance of the insertion of post-colonial theory when recognising “the interstitial cultural space” is emphasised. Ahluwalia’s essay refers to the contribution of Said with regard to “the reconceptualisation of space and identity” (2001, p. 70) and also in dismantling “binary oppositions” which encourage “other narratives” to become visible and to be “recovered” (2001, p. 71). It is in this context that Australia’s ambiguous position in the world which is believed to be divided into the Orient/Occident becomes apparent. Although the settler population has a strong connection to the imperial centre, its subjectivity in relation to Britain casts Australia beyond the Occident.

Although D’Cruz and Steele have continued criticising the orientalist aspect of Australia’s character throughout their writings, they also recognise Australia’s status as a quasi-Western nation. They assert that:

The assumption of an unquestioned, natural right for Australia to be a ‘full’ member of the region [Asia] sits uneasily among Asians whose image of Australia is of a junior member of the Western alliance of former colonial powers, a lower-ranked member of a white club, and an imposed cultural transplant, one whose motives and loyalty to the aspirations of the majority members of the region are questionable or have not been established. (2003, p. 189)

The purpose of this passage is to depict Australia's orientalist character in relation to neighbouring Asian countries. However, this passage also demonstrates Australia's position as a nation that does not fully belong to the Occident. By recognising that Australia as "a junior member of the Western alliance of former colonial powers" and "a lower-ranked member of a white club", D'Cruz and Steele are pointing to Australia's element of "other" or "the Orient" when viewed from a Western perspective.

While this literature is suggesting that Australia is slipping away from being in the category of the West, an article by Adrian Vickers "Racism and Colonialism in Early Australian Novels about Southeast Asia" written in 1988 is a rare example of is directly depicting Australia's status as part of the Orient. Vickers takes up novels written by Australian authors between the end of the nineteenth century and the 1960s set in Southeast Asia (Vickers 1988, p. 7). How Southeast Asia was represented by those authors was displayed and Said's *Orientalism* was brought in to explain those representations. "The 'degenerate' or 'corrupt' view of the East is a standard feature of Orientalist discourse, being part of the colonial ideology that, whatever their past achievements, sees natives as inferior to present European civilisation and therefore fit to be ruled" (1998, p. 8). Vickers tries to set Australia itself within the framework of the Orient as well as highlighting Orientalist descriptions offered by Australian writers. Referring to the exoticism of Southeast Asia, he states:

The transitory nature of visits to the region is partly a comment on its exoticism.

This exoticism does show that there was some familiarity with cultural and geographical details, however, so the Australians were not writing from a position

of complete ignorance. Furthermore, Australia itself, particularly the outback, shared some of these qualities of exoticism. (1988, p. 7)

In the last part of his article, Vickers indicates that “[d]espite the persistence of racist undertones in many Australian novels about Southeast Asia, the works ... do show that some Australians naturally located themselves in the region” (1988, p. 11-12). He concludes that:

Australia was itself an exotic country geographically located amongst other exotic countries, and its position as a European outpost was always a question. Hence the early predominance of Asian invasion novels, which speak of the insecurity of Australia’s Englishness in the face of the fact of Asia. The post-war years seem to mark a turning away from Asia, virtually a reactionary last-ditch attempt to make Australia seem more English or European than it ever had been. (1988, p. 12)

Vickers makes clear that Australia was not just subordinate but did exist outside the category of the Occident. He situates Australia in the Orient. Moreover, this indication is particularly significant since this is referring to Australia’s superior behaviour in relation to the rest of the Orient. This occurs as a result of a lack of certainty in Australia about being a genuine Occidental country.

Being an outpost of the British Empire, Australia’s location in the Orient/Occident divided world in light of Said’s argument, is usually recognised to be in the Occident. Specifically, in the context of Asia, to which it geographically belongs, Australia’s behaviour towards neighbouring Asian countries and also towards its indigenous and Asian migrant population within the country is identified with imperial and colonial power. However, considering Australia’s subjectivity to its imperial mother country, the country’s location slips away from

the category of the Occident. Even its orientalist attitude appears to belong to the non-Oriental side but not necessarily to the Occidental side.

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA IN SAID'S SCOPE

For Edward Said, neither Japan nor Australia was ever in the centre of his consciousness. Although his texts were widely read across the border, his arguments were always firmly based on his identity as a Palestinian and, therefore, Said's primary concern was with issues between the Middle East and the West (Ahluwalia & Ashcroft 2002, pp. 3-5). In *Orientalism*, Australia was hardly mentioned and Japan appeared just a few times in a fragmented way and in a general context.

Japan comes up in the first page of *Orientalism*. Said is explaining the difference in recognition of the "Orient" by the Americans and that of Europeans. He says "Americans will not feel quite the same about the Orient, which for them is much more likely to be associated very differently with the Far East (China and Japan, mainly)" (2003, p. 1). Later in the book he names Japan again with some other countries regarding cultures of the Orient. He says:

A wide variety of hybrid representations of the Orient now roam the culture. Japan, Indochina, China, India, Pakistan: their representations have had, and continue to have, wide repercussions, and they have been discussed in many places for obvious reasons. (2003, p. 285)

As in this quote, in *Orientalism*, Japan was referred to as one example of the countries in the Orient. Said's attention was not specifically on aspects which were particular to Japan. Along with Australia, which was totally absent in the literature, Japan was almost invisible in *Orientalism*.

However, *Culture and Imperialism* which was published fifteen years after *Orientalism* shows slightly different approaches. *Culture and Imperialism* is not merely a sequel of Said's former publication (Said 1994, p. xii) but it did follow the track of Said's argument in *Orientalism*. He continued to examine the form of the West's domination made of the East and he persisted in clarifying the structure of the present world which is widely perceived to be dichotomous and hierarchical. In the book, Australia and Japan are brought into Said's vision.

Said states in *Orientalism* that he has "limited that already limited (but still inordinately large) set of questions about the Anglo-French-American experience of the Arabs and Islam, which for almost a thousand years stood for the Orient" (2003, pp. 16-17). And by doing so, he admits, that it was inevitable that he eliminated "a large part of Orient" which includes "India, Japan, China, and other sections of the Far East" (2003, p. 17). As Said is clearly aware of, the limitation of his discussion in terms of the areas he draws materials on to support his argument in the book is apparent.

However, in *Culture and Imperialism*, Said draws on a wider map of the world. At the beginning of the newer book, Said notes that :

A substantial amount of scholarship in anthropology, history, and area studies has developed arguments I put forward in *Orientalism*, which was limited to the Middle East. So I, too, have tried here to expand the arguments of the earlier book to describe a more general pattern of relationships between the modern metropolitan West and its overseas territories. (1994, p. xi)

In this broaden context, Japan and Australia became visible in Said's arguments. Unlike in *Orientalism*, Said's reference to Japan in *Culture and Imperialism* is not

just in a general sense but includes aspects which are specific to the country. Australia which appears in the text more often than Japan is also put into an Australian oriented dimension.

In the following sections I will ask - Where were Australia and Japan located in Said's argument? I will examine Said's references to both countries in *Culture and Imperialism*. Said's reference to Japan and Australia was not intending to categorise them in relation to their position in the Orient or the Occident. Nevertheless, in Said's writing, the two countries' ambiguous state which does not sit comfortably in the dichotomous world structure is clear.

Australia in Said's scope

In *Culture and Imperialism*, it is Australia that appears at the beginning of the book. Stating that he will "try to expand the arguments of his earlier book" in the introduction to *Culture and Imperialism* (1994, p. xi), Said writes:

What are some of the non-Middle Eastern materials drawn on here? European writing on Africa, India, parts of the Far East, Australia, and the Caribbean; these Africanist and Indianist discourses, as some of them have been called, I see as part of the general European effort to rule distant lands and peoples and, therefore, as related to Orientalist descriptions of the Islamic world, as well as to Europe's special ways of representing the Caribbean islands, Ireland, and the Far East. (1994, p. xi)

As it is clear in this description, and throughout the literature, Australia is recognised as a place where European imperial exploration occurred. Having this basis, if we focus on what Said actually meant by "Australia" or "Australians" in each part where he mentioned Australia, the location of Australia starts to float.

Being a literary critic, Said's knowledge of Australia was accumulated mainly through the reading of literary works. *Great Expectations* and *David Copperfield* by Charles Dickens were two sources which interested him and he refers to them frequently. Relying on works by Robert Hughes, *The Fatal Shore*, and Paul Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay*, Said focuses on Australia's experience as "a 'white' colony" (Said 1994, p. xv). Australia's "a penal colony" background is stressed.

Australia was established as a penal colony in the late eighteenth century mainly so that England could transport an irredeemable, unwanted excess population of felons to a place, originally charted by Captain Cook, that would also function as a colony replacing those lost in America. (1994, p. xv)

The relationship between imperial Britain and colonial Australia was a perfect example for Said of how imperialism works towards its subject. Said draws an example from *Great Expectations* and by stating that Australia is "a penal colony designed for the rehabilitation but not the repatriation of transported English criminals" (Said 1994, pp. xiv-xv) and also by stressing that one of the characters in the novel was a "convict transported to Australia" (Said 1994, p. 63), he made apparent the lesser status of Australia in relation to its mother country. He uses "Australia" to present the behaviour and also Britain's attitude towards its subject. Being a subordinated entity, "Australia" appears without strong features of its own in his writing. "Australia" appears in *Culture and Imperialism* as a vast amount of land – a continent – which is placed remote from the authorities. Although vast, it is just another piece of land which Britain, the centre of the Empire, was controlling. In this context, Australia hardly becomes a part of the Occident.

On the other hand, a different picture emerges when it comes to his reference to “Australians”. Said’s writing starts to indicate Australia’s ambiguity. In the introduction, he says:

One of imperialism’s achievements was to bring the world closer together, and although in the process the separation between Europeans and natives was an insidious and fundamentally unjust one, most of us should now regard the historical experience of empire as a common one. The task then is to describe it as pertaining to Indians *and* Britishers, Algerians *and* French, Westerners *and* Africans, Asians, Latin Americans, and Australians despite the horrors, the bloodshed, and the vengeful bitterness. (1994, p. xxii)

The term “Australians”, people who are grouped with Africans, Asians and Latin Americans, obviously refers to the native population of the continent. For Said, “Australians” means, in this context, people who had inhabited the land before Western imperialism reached its shore.

The question of who comes into Said’s consciousness regarding people living on the Australian continent, however, shifts again in a different context. In a section where Said refers to Rudyard Kipling’s novel *Kim*, he writes:

Kipling assumes a basically uncontested empire. On one side of the colonial divide was a white Christian Europe whose various countries, principally Britain and France, but also Holland, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Russia, Portugal, and Spain, controlled most of the earth’s surface. On the other side of the divide, there were an immense variety of territories and races, all of them considered lesser, inferior, dependent, subject. “White” colonies like Ireland and Australia too were

considered made up of inferior humans; a famous Daumier drawing, for instance, explicitly connects Irish whites and Jamaican Blacks. (1994, p. 134)

Here, the Said's focus is on the white population – settlers – on conquered lands and they are described as inferiors. This is particularly suggestive in considering the character of Australia.

It is worth focusing on another section where Said touches on Australia to reconfirm this subjectivity of “Australians” in relation to their mother country. He writes “Australians remained an inferior race well into the twentieth century”. This sentence at a first glimpse sounds as if he is referring to indigenous Australian. However, the context which this sentence appears is where Said talks about tautological rhetoric used by the Empire to justifying its imposition of power on Ireland, America and Australia in order “to confirm European power” (1994, p. 106). He says:

One sees this tautology holding with a particular tenacity in British views of Ireland and the Irish as early as the sixteenth century; it will operate during the eighteenth century with opinions about white colonists in Australia and the Americas (Australians remained an inferior race well into the twentieth century); it gradually extends its sway to include practically the whole world beyond British shores. (1994, p. 106)

What made Said think this way is another interesting point which is unfortunately not expressed in the literature, but this is obviously an explicit description of the status of the White population on the Australian continent.

The dominant white population on the Australian continent was sent from the mother country to “settle” the colony and includes their descendants. “Racially”

people living in the mother country and those who are inhabitants of the colony belong to the same clan. Nevertheless, the power relationship between the mother country and the colony simply creates a hierarchy within the “Whites”. The remoteness of the Australian continent from Britain was a perfect setting to impose an image of the antipodes and provide superiority to those who are in the decision-making centre of the Empire. A feature of Australia being a “penal colony” also links people on the continent with negative image of convicts and implies a lesser image of white “Australians”.

Therefore, Australia, in the context of its relationship with Britain, had an aspect of the Orient in terms of its subjectivity to an imperial mother country. However, shining light on the issues within the Australian continent, there existed a different hierarchical relationship, that is a relationship between the settlers and the indigenous population and later non-Western migrants. In this setting, Australians who were settlers and thus ruling the continent had the character of orientalists. Although Said does not directly mention the relationship between the settlers and the indigenous people in Australia in literature, by attaching “Australians” to both groups, he indicated the ambiguous character of Australia.

Japan in Said's scope

Compared to the appearance of Australia in *Culture and Imperialism*, Said's reference to Japan is less significant. Nonetheless, some interesting and important points relating to Japan's position in the world are suggested in the literature where Said develops his argument in a framework contrasting those who colonised on the one hand and those who were colonised on the other. While in Australia's case Said's focus was on the country's past as a settler colony, in the case of Japan, Said's interest was more on contemporary issues, specifically economic ones.

As it was in *Orientalism*, in *Culture and Imperialism*, Japan was first identified as a part of the Orient. On one hand, he demonstrates how Japan was traditionally put under the gaze of European “orientalism” along with other non-Western countries. This was apparent in the field of culture and exoticism as it was imposed on the country. He specifically mentions the period from the late eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century when the Europeans “discovered” and took the Oriental cultures into their own. His expression “... when the cultural riches of India, China, Japan, Persia, and India were firmly deposited at the heart of European culture ...” (Said 1994, pp. 194-195) indicates Japan’s location in the world which is said to be divided into the West and the Orient.

Said simultaneously points to an intellectually inferior position which Japan and other Oriental countries occupied under the practice of “orientalism”. He specifically mentions missions sent to the West by Oriental countries to learn Western knowledge. The Japanese missions to the United States and European countries in the last half of the nineteenth century are included in a section of his work where he argued the point. He states:

During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Muhammad Ali sent missions to Europe, three decades before Japanese missions came to the United States and Europe, for the same purpose. Within the French colonial orbit, gifted students were brought to France to be educated until as late as the 1920s and 1930s, ... (1994, p. 262)

The purpose of these missions was “to learn the ways of the advanced white man, translate his works, pick up his habits” (1994, p. 262) and this attitude of Japan well explains the status of the country as the “backward Oriental”.

As a reaction to this hierarchical structure of the world, which has the Occident in a superior position, there was, of course, resistance from the Orient. Depicting the Orientals' resistance to coercive Western imperialism, Said states:

Whether it was the Philippines, or any number of African territories, or the Indian subcontinent, the Arab world, or the Caribbean and much of Latin America, China or Japan, natives banded together in independence and nationalist groupings that were based on a sense of identity which was ethnic, religious, or communal, and was opposed to further Western encroachment. (1994, p. 218)

Japan naturally sits in the Orient in Said's mind while talking about the unequal power relationship between the Orient and the Occident. On the other hand, Said's view of Japan in a more contemporary context is also expressed in *Culture and Imperialism*. Here Said's focus is on Japan's rise in the world as an economic power during the 1980s and he takes up the issue of "Japan-bashers" in the context of the notion of superiority which exists among Westerners towards the non-Western countries. He describes "Japan-bashers" as those who claim "the essential inferiority (and threat) of the non-Westerner" and puts them into the categories - "conservative philosophers", "ideological Orientalists" and "critics of 'native' regression in Africa and Asia" (1994, p. 17). Once again, Japan's location as an Oriental country is clear in his argument. However, in Said's wider view of the West and non-West, those who colonised and those who were colonised, in *Culture and Imperialism*, casts a light on another aspect of Japan – aspects of being an imperial power. In the introduction, while describing America's present imperialistic mindset or rhetoric as "... we are number one, we are bound to lead, we

stand for freedom and order, and so on” (1994, p. xvii), Said points out that this rhetoric is not new.

Yet it is a rhetoric whose most damning characteristic is that it has been used before, not just once (by Spain and Portugal) but with deafeningly repetitive frequency in the modern period, by the British, the French, the Belgians, the Japanese, the Russians, and now the Americans. (1994, p. xvii)

Japan’s past as an imperialistic state is firmly captured in Said’s vision. Here, the status of Japan transfers from the Orient to the Occident – those who dominate. Japan’s “non-Oriental” feature is expressed in a clearer way in the later part of his work in the contemporary context. Said goes into recent American imperialism which takes the form of economic expansionism. Where he points out that while this American expansionism is in the field of economy it has a cultural aspect, Japan’s ambiguous situation is presented. First he describes:

The relationship between America and its Pacific or Far Eastern interlocutors – China, Japan, Korea, Indochina – is informed by racial prejudice, sudden and relatively unprepared rushed of attention followed by enormous pressure applied thousands of miles away, geographically and intellectually distant from the lives of most Americans. (1994, p. 290)

In this quote Japan is on the other side of the imperialists and placed on the side which is pressured by American economic expansionism. However, this position of Japan is reversed in Said’s following sentence. He puts Japan in a different category from other “Pacific or Far Eastern interlocutors”. He says “... with the complicated exception of Japan, they did not actually penetrate the American continent” (1994, p. 290). Here, Said is suggesting Japan’s economic success

threatened America and created Japan-bashing norms in the country. The expression “the complicated exception of Japan” underlines Japan’s position as an ambiguous country. Giving further insight about this point, Japan is not only an economic exception as explained by Said. If we recall the attack of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 by Japan, it is apparent that Japan has physically penetrated American territory. This feature of Japan shows its exceptional position in the world. It is divided between the West and the rest.

In Said’s view, Japan is placed in an ambiguous position similar to Australia. Although the reason for the ambiguity are different, Japan also floats somewhere between the Orient and the Occident just like Australia. Japan is depicted as a subject of the Occident historically and also currently. However, Japan is also described as a country on the side of power which dominates others both during its imperial past and also from its current position as an economic giant in the present world. Even Said’s view shifts when categorising Japan in the West versus the East world view.

CONCLUSION

Throughout *Orientalism*, Edward Said tirelessly pursued and revealed the style of domination exercised by the West over the Orient and gave specific meaning to the term “orientalism”. Ever since the West’s expansion reached the non-Western part of the world, the world has been divided into two parties – those who dominate and those who are dominated. Even though this was not the primordial setting of the world, the idea was to conceive the world as a dichotomous and hierarchical place. It is a view which has permeated contemporary thinking. However, for Japan and Australia, countries both sitting on the geographical edge of Asia, this structure is problematic when seeking to locate them in the world.

In both countries, there were strong followers of Edward Said and some of them read him and tried to understand the circumstances in which their countries had been placed, but the location of both countries in the Orient/Occident divided world has continued to be ambiguous. In the case of Japan, the country would initially be put into the category of the Orient as was clear from its history and culture. However, Japan's location shifts to the Occident when it comes to its perception of the Middle East. Moreover, following a controversial view we can observe that the history of modern Japan makes people realise the orientalist character of the country. On the contrary, in Australia, as a white Anglo dominated society, initially the country was categorised as the orientalist in relation to both its Asian neighbours and its inner others – the indigenous population and non-Western migrants. However, Australia also has an uncertainty about this categorisation. Being a subject of the British Empire as a colony, Australia was not fully a part of the Occident.

This ambiguous character of both countries was also captured by Said's commentary. Although issues regarding Japan and Australia were not at the centre of Said's thinking, references to both countries in *Culture and Imperialism* correctly suggest their character. Australia was, firstly, a continent which was conquered by imperialism in Said's conception and it did not belong to the Occident. At the same time, Said's scope catches two different groups on the continent: white Anglo settlers and indigenous people. This indicates the orientalist aspect of the character of the dominant white Anglo population of the country. Japan, on the other hand, was mainly seen as on the side of the Orient. How Japan, along with other Oriental countries, was and is under the orientalist gaze from the West is pointed out in a range of literature. However, Japan's imperial past and also its economical

presence in the world today, and described in the literature, points to the Occidental character of the country.

Thus, both Japan and Australia are countries which cannot be easily categorised as either of the Orient or of the Occident. Japan is the Orient but, at the same time, the Occident. Australia has an Occidental character within the nation but in relation to its mother country it drifts closer to the Orient. Thus, within the framework of Said's argument on "orientalism", their character floats between the Orient and the Occident.

SECTION C:

BEHAVIOUR IN THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL ARENA

INTRODUCTION

Japan and Australia, two nation states sitting on the periphery of the East, suffer from an inferiority complex in relation to the West. This complex affects them significantly in terms of their view of themselves in the wider world. Their national identities ambiguously float between the West and the East. Their lack of confidence with regard to their relationship with European countries and the United States lies behind this complex and, at the same time, generates a notion of superiority towards their neighbouring Asian countries. This notion of superiority is recognised both within their societies and also in their behaviour in the international arena, particularly in relation to Asia. In this section I will discuss how Japan and Australia are acting and how they are positioning themselves in world politics.

It is interesting to notice that in both countries there is a trend to locate themselves closer to the West than to other Asian countries and also to see themselves as a bridge between the West and Asia. In October 2006, right after Abe Shinzo came into office as the 90th Prime Minister of Japan, he established a council called the “Council for Asian Gateway Initiative” headed by Nemoto Takumi, a Special Advisor to the Prime Minister (Tanigawa 2006). The Council consisted of business leaders, academics, bureaucrats and artists. The Council formulated a written plan in May 2007 (Asian Gateway Initiative 2007). At the beginning of the document, it was declared that “[t]he 21st century is the century of Asia” (AGI 2007,

p. 2). The Council was clearly aware that Japan was no longer the only giant in the region and the relationship between Japan and Asia which used to be vertical became horizontal (AGI 2007, p. 2). The Council's concern was that if Japan remained a closed country, it may be left out of Asian economic growth and it proposed several plans to make the country more actively integrated into the region.

However, the Council's basic view was a long way from seeing the relationship between Japan and Asia as horizontal. It had stated that "Japan will be able to share in the prosperity of other Asian countries by demonstrating its vision of becoming a gateway connecting Asia and the world ..." (AGI 2007, p. 2) and in the conclusion of the same document Nemoto stated "[t]his initiative aims to make Japan a bridge between Asia and the rest of the world through which people, goods, money, culture and information are exchanged ..." (AGI 2007, p. 52). In spite of the Council's recognition that Japan had already lost its position as a dominant regional player or leader, it was still assuming and taking it as given that Japan was in an advanced position in the structure of the world. These words sound as if other Asian countries were closed countries and had not enough experience to sail out into the world. This is an "unconscious" and "innocent" arrogant Japanese characteristic. Simultaneously, the document refers to Asia as one bound entity and positions it as the "other". A firm dividing line exists between itself and the other, Asia. Japan's superior notion in relation to Asia continues to be expressed in the context of this new century.

This Japanese "unconscious and innocent arrogance" towards Asia is shared by its counterpart Australia. When Kevin Rudd, who became the Prime Minister of Australia in November 2007, released, out of the blue, his ambitious plan to form an "Asia Pacific Community", the arrogance was apparent in his words. In an address

to the Asia Society AustralAsia Centre in June 2008, Rudd acknowledged that this was “the Asia Pacific century” and insisted on the necessity of Australia being actively committed to the region and not lagging behind. Having admitted there were already significant regional groups such as APEC or ASEAN, he stated that Australia had a long-term vision of the region’s architecture which would lead to the region forming an Asia Pacific Community (Rudd 2008b). Without doubt, Australia engaging with the region is an important and positive matter. However, the main participants in the plan, Asia and Asian countries were missing from Rudd’s context.

The Opposition was probably right in criticising the plan as “presumptuous” (ABC News 5 June 2008a). Rudd was particularly wrong in two respects: (1) to deliver the plan without consulting Australia’s neighbours and (2) in undermining the history and role of ASEAN in the region. It was reported that ASEAN had reminded Rudd of the existence of the Association as a body encouraging the integrity and unity of the region and Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed negative comment over the plan (*The Strait Times* 16 June 2008). Prime Minister Rudd was asked to explain the plan to his Asian neighbours (*The Strait Times* 16 June 2008). *The Nation* of Thailand wrote that Rudd had an old fashioned view of Asia and ASEAN and some forums which ASEAN formed were considered by him to be “insufficient” for maintaining the prosperity of Asia (Chongkittavorn 2008). The paper went on to warn “... he [Rudd] must quickly dispel any inkling in Asean that his perception is Euro-centric and condensing [sic] before it becomes an established fact” (2008). Singapore’s former ambassador Barry Desker was reported to have pointed out that Rudd’s plan “came out of the blue without any consultation with Asia” and he said “... it could have been better received if there was prior notice and some consultation with the region” (*Radio Australia* 3 July

2008). Rudd was talking about Asia without looking at Asia. Also, his understanding that Australia was in a position to lead Asia and connect Asia to the world was an error of judgement.

At the beginning of 2009, both Australia's "the Asia Pacific Community" plan and Japan's "the Asian Gateway Initiative" were rarely discussed in the media. As for the former plan, Dick Woolcott, Rudd's envoy to the Community, is on a mission to promote the plan to other Asian countries and countries in the Pacific, including the United States, and we await his report (Grattan 2009). As for the latter plan, after Prime Minister Abe's sudden resignation from his post in September 2007, the initiative from the government regarding the plan was weakened. Thus, both plans lack clear visibility at the moment. These are explicit examples of Japan's and Australia's expressions of an inferiority complex. They recognise other Asian countries as less capable in dealing with a world, mainly run by the West, and believe that they are in a position to take the initiative in pushing Asia onto the global stage.

In Chapter Five I will examine Japan's and Australia's ambiguous behaviour in relation to Asia which is a neighbourhood that is difficult to manage. First, I examine the discourse in both countries presented in newspaper articles or academic writings. I do this in order to outline how "Asia" is an issue for the two countries. Both Japan and Australia are willing to engage with Asia particularly in view of the region's economic growth but at the same time they are not positioning themselves within Asia due to their superior attitude towards their neighbouring countries. Asia is always the "other" to them and appears as a difficult object to handle. Then, I will examine the relationship between both countries and ASEAN, the most prominent and long lasting regional institutions in Asia, in order to

demonstrate their ambiguous behaviour towards Asia in the current international arena. Japan and Australia are two of the earliest countries to gain official negotiating positions with ASEAN. Nevertheless, within both countries there always has been a notion of judging ASEAN countries to be advanced. Forty years after its establishment, ASEAN has grown in terms of the number of participant states and, moreover, its overall role in international politics. It has become a crucial regional institution in the present world. In spite of this, both countries' attitude towards the Association and its member countries still implies a superior attitude towards them.

In Chapter Six I focus on the relationship between the two main characters in my thesis, Japan and Australia. In recent years, and despite a general understanding of them being different countries, Japan and Australia have started to see each other as "natural partners". The two countries became as close as they ever have been during the Koizumi – Howard era, specifically around 2005 to 2007. Even during this period, there were some differences and disputes between the two countries. Nonetheless, they overcame those differences and disputes and supported each other in the international arena. It was more visible in the context of Asia. At the same time, there was another aspect to their closeness. Behind the architecture of "natural partners", there was another participant in the game – the United States. Especially in the field of security, Japan's and Australia's approach to each other could not only be explained by their common characteristics. It is also their strong alliance with the United States. Once again, their tendency to identify with the West, and particularly with the United States in the present world, is a symptom of an inferiority complex that is played out in the international arena.

CHAPTER 5: One foot in Asia, the other in the West

INTRODUCTION

The former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, who used to be one of the most outspoken figures in Asia, once said “Australia must decide whether it is Europe or America or is it Asia” (BBC 8 October 2003). He continued “[i]f it is Asia, there’s no problem, but we see Australia as some sort of a transplant from another region with the same thinking of the transplanted entity”. This was not the only time that Mahathir criticised Australia’s ambiguous identity, floating between the East and the West. When Australia tried to strengthen its commitment to Asia in the 1990s under Prime Minister Paul Keating, using the channel of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), there was strong resistance from Mahathir. The most problematic aspect of Australia’s behaviour, at least for Mahathir, was that it acted as if it was superior to Asian nations. To Mahathir it looked like a non-Asian country dictating to countries in the region. He saw it as another form of colonialism. This tension between Australia and Mahathir extended to Prime Minister Howard’s era when Australia was trying to pursue a deeper involvement with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mahathir declared his concern at the outset.

On the other hand, in his book *A New Deal For Asia* published in 1999 where he referred to Japan Mahathir said:

Japan still seems undecided as to whether it is really a part of Asia or not. Some businesspeople and average citizens may regard themselves as very much Asian, but the government seems to feel that they are or should be more aligned with the West. (Mahathir 1999, p. 93)

Mahathir was then commenting on reform in the troubled Japanese economy. To him, it seemed that Japan was seeking to fix its economy by giving up its own way of doing business, which had been forged within Japanese society with its own values and virtues and yet was moving blindly towards more Western or American practices. Having recognised the Japanese economy as a model which other Asian countries should emulate, Mahathir advocated a “Look East” policy⁴¹ in the early 1980s. Still insisting on its validity, Mahathir believed that the regeneration of the Japanese economy could be achieved by re-visiting the values of Japan which had made the country one of the strongest and largest economies in the world. This view did not change even after his resignation as Malaysian Prime Minister in 2003. He expressed his anxiety about Japanese young people following Europeans and Americans and leaving their own values, such as diligence, behind (Mahathir 2004, p. 5).

These comments made by Mahathir on very different occasions aptly describes the situation shared by Australia and Japan – one foot in Asia, the other in the West – which is a symptom of an inferiority complex, a troubled psychology, experienced by both countries. In Mahathir’s mind, Japan always belonged to Asia and Australia was without doubt a Western country and he himself did not mention the two countries in the same context despite recognising their similarities. Nevertheless, his separate comments just naturally bring Japan and Australia into

⁴¹ When Mahathir took up the post of Prime Minister in 1981, Malaysia was going through development under the New Economic Policy (Mahathir 1999, p. 83). Believing the country needed an additional element to further the pursuit of development, Mahathir looked for a model in the international community. Rather than taking it from the West, he looked to Japan’s and South Korea’s success. Specifically, he focused on work ethic of Japanese companies and tried to introduce this to his country. This policy was called the Look East Policy (Mahathir 1999, pp. 81-95).

one category and their similar ambiguity in the region becomes apparent. Because of their geographical proximity to Asia and the significance of Asia in terms of their economies, it is a necessity for Japan and Australia to have commitments with Asia. Especially in Japan's case, historically and culturally, there are inevitable ties with the region. However, their mind is occupied by a paradigm in which the world is a place divided between West and East, with the West at the peak of a global hierarchy. This idea which is almost an obsession makes them feel uncomfortable relating to Asian countries – countries seen to be lower nations in the global hierarchy – as equal partners.

In this chapter, I will present the similarly ambiguous and rather awkward behaviour of Japan and Australia towards Asia. I will start by introducing newspaper articles and publications which could be interpreted as the representation of two countries' ambiguous behaviour. Then, I will expand my argument by specifically focusing on Japan's and Australia's relationships with ASEAN – the key organisation promoting cooperation and economic integration among Asian countries.

ASIA AS AN “ISSUE”

On the very first day of the twenty first century, the 1st of January 2001, *Asahi Shimbun* ran a column titled “*Nippon no yokan*” – a prediction about Japan. The column has a subtitle - “Integrating into Asia by getting over the wall”. The main purpose of the article was to point to the influence of globalisation. It was an influence that Japan had to face in the new century. It talks about a ‘border’ between the nation state Japan and the rest of the world. This border is starting to dissolve because of globalisation and it indicates problems Japan may face as a part

of that trend. However, the content of the article as the subtitle suggests is dominated by issues regarding Japan's encounter with Asia.

Borders between people, goods and culture have been collapsing, it was argued (Fukuda *et al.* 2001, p. 1). For example, to keep his business running, a Japanese *kimono* manufacturer had to move his factory to Vietnam in order to reduce the cost of production. To maintain a Japanese tradition he had to leave Japan. On the other hand, information about Japan is now flooding into China. A former study abroad student from China to Japan had created a Chinese homepage on the Internet which posted information about Japan. Young Chinese staff who have learnt Japanese at university are translating the information behind the scenes. And, there may be a chance that the yen will disappear and a new Asian currency, like the Euro, will be introduced in the future.

In relation to Japan's domestic issues, *Asahi's* article discusses the issue of people who migrate from other Asian countries to Japan to chase their "Japanese Dream" (Fukuda *et al.* 2001, p. 3). It also refers to Japanese Indonesians who are recruited by Japanese small and medium sized enterprises to work in Japan (Fukuda *et al.* 2001, p. 3). The population of Japan is going to decline in the near future and importing a foreign labour force will be inevitable. *Asahi's* article is filled with the notion that under the current phase of globalisation, Japan has to accept and also must integrate into Asia because of its close geographic proximity and because borders have been melting away. It also asks whether Japanese society and people themselves are ready for this transformation.

The appearance of this kind of article on the front page of a newspaper on the first day of the new century is itself suggestive. It indicates that Asia is an "issue" for the Japanese people. Japan appears to be in an ambiguous position and its

citizens appear worried when facing the weakening of borders between their country and Asia.

For Australia, on the other hand, the first of January 2001 was significant not just because it was the first day of a brand new century. It was the centenary anniversary of the country's federation, and the centenary of a successful nation. On the same day, Australian newspapers were filled with articles celebrating the centenary. *The Sydney Morning Herald* was among them. Inevitably, articles in the paper were focused on Australia itself and were not intending to focus on relationships with neighbouring Asian countries. Yet, the ambiguous identity of the country regarding the West and Asia was clearly present in those articles.

Referring back to the January 1, 1901, an article titled "Our Higher Ambitions" on the front page of a daily paper says that in 1901 "[o]ur destiny was to be British, white and rich" (*SMH* 1 January 2001a). The author of the article goes on to point out that the present situation is that "... Australia is still the country celebrated in the rhetoric of January 1, 1901". "... [I]t is impossible to make sense of this country today without recognising its Britishness". The writer asserts that "[t]he transplant is flourishing". By describing this aspect of Australia in 2001, the article, along with other articles in the paper, was advocating that the country should become a republic.

Another item in this issue of the paper titled "Our Challenge" is more specific in terms of the relationship between Australia and Britain. Its author points to problems with Australia's link to the British monarchy (*SMH* 1 January 2001b). The writer says that having "a monarch at the heart of our Constitution" itself is problematic because that leaves "the powers of our head of state" undefined. Moreover, given that the British monarchy is under the control of the British

Parliament, that is a foreign country's parliament, Australian/British link poses a question about Australia's independence. According to the article "[t]he truth is that time has not yet come for the republic. We want to be rid of the Crown, but it's not yet an overwhelming verdict of Australians" (*SMH* 1 January 2001b).

This historical link of Australia to Britain, or more widely to Europe, has been an issue for the country in its relationship with its Asian neighbours and this makes its position in the region ambiguous. Here, it is worth recalling the reaction from neighbouring countries when Australia decided to continue as a constitutional monarchy in 1999. It was said that the reason for the rejection of the referendum held in Australia in November 1999 over the issue of becoming a republic was because Australians were against the form of government, mainly the election of a president, which would be established after becoming a republic. However, gazes from Asia were cynical and headlines like "Australians vote to retain monarchy" (*The Hindu*) (Suryanarayana 1999), "We still want the Queen, say Aussies" (*The Strait Times*) (Walsh 1999) or "Aussies sing 'God Save The Queen'" (*The Nation* 7 November 1999) appeared in the Asia-based media. By once again confirming its "Britishness", the paper underlines Australia's difficulty in relating to Asia.

Returning to the column of *Asahi Shimbun* in Japan which discussed the country's difficulties in moving closer to Asia, it actually refers to Australia. In the second part of the column, which subtitled "A ghost of White Australia Policy", the challenges which multicultural Australia was facing were discussed (Fukuda et al 2001, p. 2). Although Australia had abolished its infamous White Australia policy three decades ago, xenophobic sentiment was on the rise in the 1990s. The mainstream White population, many of whom failed to benefit from globalisation, blamed migrants, mainly Asian, for their misfortune. The column depicted the rise

of Pauline Hanson in 1996 as the event symbolic of this phenomenon. A writer of the column saw the future of Japanese society in present Australia. Pauline Hanson's words answering a Japanese reporter's interview "You are going to remember me when Japan becomes a multi-ethnic country some decades later" are introduced as an ominous prediction for Japan (Fukuda et al 2001, p. 2). A problem experienced by both Australian and Japanese societies appears to overlap at this point.

The newspaper reports on the first day of the twenty first century from both Australia and Japanese commentators aptly display the countries' ambiguous status in the region. *The Sydney Morning Herald* writes "... since the collapse of the Empire we have had to find our own place in the world. We're still searching" (*SMH* 1 January 2001a, p. 1). This situation is almost the same for Japan. Japan has departed from Asia, where it used to belong. And it is "still searching" for its position in the world. For both countries, because of their proximity to Asia, it is inevitable that they have commitments in Asia and this remains a controversial issue.

AMBIGUITY VISIBLE IN PUBLICATIONS

Japan and Australia's ambiguous status in the region and their ambiguous feelings and ways of approaching Asia are represented in various media. Between November 2002 and July 2003, one of the most prominent publishers in Japan *Iwanami Shoten* published an eight volume book series titled *Asia's New Century*. To explain the purpose of publishing this series, an editor stated:

For Asia, the 20th century was an era of oppression and liberation symbolised by war and revolution. We decided to establish this series, *Asia's New Century*,

meaning century of new Asia, to recognise the crucial power which is forming new Asia beyond the former century and elements which it consists of and also to examine what kind of image of Asia will be developed from now on (Aoki et al. 2002, p. 2).

The series has eight topics: space, history, identity, happiness, market, power and concept. Each volume has one of the topics as its title and explores new Asia in each topic. Academics, writers, journalists and researchers from China, South Korea, and India as well as many Japanese contributors and even a couple from Australia give their views on the past, present and the future of Asia.

A premise which is at the basis of the series is that in this age of globalisation Asia is moving beyond its past profile. On the cover of the first volume, it says “[g]lobalization has broken down the geo-political and geo-cultural duality of ‘Asia’ and the ‘West’, melting down even the substance of Asia” (Aoki et al. 2002). In a preface co-written by eight editors of the series⁴², it is pointed out that although historically a concept of “Asia” was forged by the West, it is now not merely a counter concept (Aoki et al. 2002, p. v). Asia is transcending its boundary and in the 21st century “Asia” will be distributed and will be visible around the globe, the preface says (Aoki et al. 2002, pp. v-vi).

Paradoxically, however, this premise did not mean that the boundary around “Asia” had disappeared and it did not stop those editing the series taking Asia as their object. To be prepared for the “globalisation” of Asia, knowing what “Asia” was about was crucial and re-examination of the Asian world view and values was important and an immediate necessity (Aoki et al. 2002, p. vi). In this rhetoric,

⁴² Eight editors were: Aoki Tamotsu, Kang Sang-jung, Kosugi Yasushi, Mo Banfu, Sakamoto Hiroko, Yamamuro Shinichi, Yomota Inuhiko and Yoshimi Shunya.

Japan remains outside Asia. This emphasises on the existence of a gap between Japan and the region leads to Japan studying Asia as the other.

In the last volume – *Concept: for Asia's new century* – four of the editors and two of the contributors discuss what Asian studies in the 21st century might consist of. In the discussion, Mori Kazuko suggests the necessity of placing studies of Japan in one of the areas of Asian studies in order to put it in a relative position (Aoki et al. 2003, p. 17). She continues to admit, however, that this is quite difficult for those who undertake Japanese studies in Japan. That is because within Asia, Japan is Asia and Japan is not Asia simultaneously (Aoki et al. 2003, p. 17). Asia is the “other” for Japan but at the same time Asia is Japan itself. This Japanese ambiguity with regard to Asia can be found throughout this eight volume series. The representation of this ambiguity is in a number of essays which directly deal with Japan. There are only three out of one hundred and twenty essays. The other essays focus on issues in other Asian countries in the region itself. It appears that Japan exists outside the region. This situation leads to a question posed by Kosugi Yasushi in the very last essay of the series (Kosugi 2003, p. 252) “Are the Japanese people Asians?” Japan remains outside Asia and this means that, for Japan, Asia as an “issue” continues to linger.

Asia's New Century is, at the same time, presenting an interesting fact regarding Australia. Among those 120 essays, there is only one essay talking about Australia. An essay titled “*Ajiaka shita neshon?*” (Asianised Nation?) by Australian academic Ien Ang is included in the third volume – Identity: Deconstruction and Reconstruction. The appearance of just one essay on Australia in this series indicates two things. One is that, in spite of its proximity to Asia and its willingness to get involved in Asia, Australia is not considered a significant player in the region

at least not from Japan's point of view. The other is, however, that Australia is clinging to the edge of Asia. Australia was definitely on the periphery in the mind of the editors in Japan, but was not however completely excluded. This clearly shows Australia's ambiguous position in the region. And this leads us to an almost identical question to Kosugi's "Are Japanese people Asians?", "Is Australia an Asian country?" which is the title of a well known book published in 1997 by academic and former diplomat Stephen FitzGerald.

In 2001, the first volume of two volume series *Facing North* organised by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was published in Australia. The series was a record of the engagement of Australia, as a nation state, with Asia. In the introduction to the first volume, David Goldsworthy writes that Australia's engagement with the region has become rather complex in "the later decades of the century" and this has made for a lively "Asia debate" in Australia (Goldsworthy 2001, p. 11). He then listed up to a dozen publications regarding Asia⁴³ as illustrations of "the lively 'Asia debate'" (2001, p. 11). FitzGerald's *Is Australia an Asian Country?* which was one of the books included in Goldsworthy's list recognises that the establishment of APEC in 1989⁴⁴ forced Australia to

⁴³ The line-up of Goldsworthy's list was: the University of New South Wales symposium *Australia in Asia: The Next 200 Years* (1988), Ross Garnaut, *Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy* (1989), M. T. Daly and M. I. Logan, *The Brittle Rim: Finance, Business and the Pacific Region* (1989), Garry Woodard, *Australia and Asia – A Regional Role?* (1992), Helen Hughes and others, *Australia's Asian Challenge* (1994), Greg Sheridan (Ed.), *Living with Dragons: Australia Confronts its Asian Destiny* (1995), Richard Robison (Ed.), *Pathways to Asia: The Politics of Engagement* (1996), Anthony Milner and Mary Quilty (Eds), *Comparing Cultures* (1996), Stephen FitzGerald, *Is Australia an Asian Country?* (1997), James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Eds.), *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs, 1991-95* (1997), Paul Keating, *Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia Pacific* (2000) and Greame Dobell, *Australia Finds Home: The Choices and Chances of an Asia Pacific Journey* (2000).

⁴⁴ However, FitzGerald does not see this as Australia's true commitment to Asia. Australia was able to be enthusiastic about APEC because it had the United States of America, Canada and New Zealand as members, the "white men's club" (FitzGerald 1997, pp. 13-14).

contemplate Asia as “our future” and to seek further commitment in the 1990s (1997, p. 13).

Another publication on the list represents Australia’s intense interest in Asia at the broad academic level. Two volumes from a three volume series *Australia in Asia* edited by Anthony Milner and Mary Quilty was published by Oxford University Press Australia in 1996. The titles of the volumes were *Community of Thoughts* and *Comparing Cultures*. The third volume *Episodes* came out two years later in 1998. This publication was an outcome of research by the Australian – Asian Perceptions Project. The project was funded by the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia.

Thus, the last part of the 20th century was indeed a moment when the “Asia debate” became prominent. However, as already referred above, this was not necessarily a unique moment in Australian history, according to David Walker. He points out that Australia occasionally, as in a cycle, came to be aware of its “proximity to Asia” (Walker 1999, p. 1). Asia became an issue for Australia at the end of the nineteenth century because “[b]y the 1880s it was a commonplace to depict Asia as a world of huge populations ‘teeming’ with terrible energy. Asia was a force about to engulf the world’s underpopulated zones” (Walker 1999, p. 7). From Walker’s point of view, Asia has been an issue in Australia since it was strongly linked to the issue of Australia’s identity. He says “[t]his book argues that Australia came to nationhood at a time when the growing power of the East was arousing increasing concern. This in turn came to influence how Australians saw themselves as an outpost of Europe facing Asia” (1999, p. 4). He also states “... [this] powerful masculinising and racialising impulse in Australian nationalism would have been a

good deal less intense, had it not been for the geo-political threat attributed to awakening Asia from the 1880s” (1999, p. 5).

The *Australia in Asia* series also recognises this point. Milner, referring to the purpose of the project in forming the volume, Community of Thoughts, says:

Awareness of the practical consequences of cultural difference, and of the previous neglect of this dimension of Australian – Asian relations, led to the writing of the books in the Australia in Asia series. Together these books seek to investigate differences in values and perspectives that might be of immediate importance to Australia. But the Academy of the Social Sciences ... was well aware that such an investigation would throw light on a larger issue: that of the identity of Australia in regional terms. (Milner 1996, p. 8)

What becomes apparent from this remark is the “otherness” of Asia from the Australian perspective. To clarify an identity of its own, Australia needs to have an “other” and to examine it. This notion – Asia is different from us – is also discussed by FitzGerald. He asserts that Australians have been mentally lazy in not changing their minds in order to understand their neighbours better and create better relationships with them (1997, p. 10). His purpose was to point to Australia’s own problems but this comment clearly indicating that in Australians’ mind, Australia and Asia exist on different sides of a border.

This stress on the differences or otherness of Asia is very similar to that we have seen in Japan’s case. While learning more about Asia, they are both excluding themselves from the Asian context. In the next section of this chapter I will look into the attitude of Japan and Australia by focusing on their relationship with ASEAN, which is the most prominent grouping formed using the initiative of Asian

countries. I will do this in order to examine both countries' ambiguous regional credentials.

RELATIONSHIP WITH ASEAN IN THE EARLY DAYS

ASEAN came into being on 8 August 1967. Five Foreign Ministers from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand gathered in Bangkok and signed the ASEAN Declaration which is known as the Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN 2003). It had been 22 years since the end of World War Two which was the beginning of the decolonisation of the region. Each nation gained independence and was undertaking nation building but their economies were still weak and their political systems were experiencing instability. By that time, with the start of the Vietnam War, once again a conflict created by the Western powers (first France and then the United States of America), the region was in turmoil. Concern over the Chinese Communist Party coming to power was also shared by the South-east Asian nations. In Europe, the European Economic Community (EEC) had been formed in 1958 and the idea of regional integration was gaining more attention in international society.

Under these circumstances, the five nations from South East Asia decided to come together. As is clearly stated at the beginning of the Bangkok Declaration, they were “mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among the countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation” (ASEAN 1967). They were “to promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership” and to “contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region” (ASEAN 1967). The Declaration also referred to the prevention of interference from external forces for the purpose of maintaining each nation's

national identity and deciding the status of foreign bases in the region (ASEAN 1967).

This epoch making event in Asia was reported in *The Sydney Morning Herald* in an article titled “New Asian power grouping” on 7 August 1967. The report came from Bang Saen, Thailand, where the five Foreign Ministers were having discussion about forming the association before signing the Declaration on the 8th. The article simply described the grouping as “a new economic grouping” and noted its potential to form “a limited South-East Asian Common Market” in the future which was expressed by Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister (*SMH* 7 August 1967a, p. 3). An article appeared the following day, which introduced the name of the grouping “the Association of South-East Asian Nations” for the first time in a similar tone. The grouping was seen simply as an economic cooperation body and the article suggested it might consider regional free trade by referring to comment by the Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman (*SMH* 8 August 1967a, p. 3).

However, after the release of the Declaration, the newspaper’s focus shifted dramatically. That was because the Declaration had mentioned foreign bases. It said:

... all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development; ... (ASEAN 1967)

These assertive words from the Asian countries seemed to surprise or even shocked Australia. An article following a press conference by the five Foreign Ministers in Bangkok regarding the formation of ASEAN had this foreign base issue as its focus

and the title reflected this: "Declaration on bases" (*SMH* 9 August 1967c, p. 3). An article on 10 August "Asian nations to resist 'interference'" picked up comments from the Foreign Ministers which were filled with confidence about self-determination. Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia said "[t]he vacuum left by the colonialists who are gone must be filled by collective endeavours" (*SMH* 10 August 1967d, p. 3). Singapore's S. Rajaratnam said "the small nations of Asia were not going to be 'Balkanized' or manipulated by outside powers ..." (*SMH* 10 August 1967d, p. 3). "... Indonesia had always wanted South-East Asian nations to develop and stand on their own feet against negative forces from outside the region" (*SMH* 10 August 1967d, p. 3). In the article there is a sense that Australia for the first time had encountered independent and assertive Asian nations.

These two articles which recognised Asia's independence were followed by an editorial titled "Warning voices" calling for reconsideration of defence policy following "Britain's plans to withdraw from Asia" (*SMH* 11 August 1967e, p. 2). The Bangkok Declaration had suggested to Australia that there would be "no Australian forces in Malaysia or Singapore after Britain's withdrawal" and "no defence undertakings to these States except on the basis of properly negotiated treaties of mutual defence" (*SMH* 11 August 1967e, p. 2). It sounded like Australia was intending to fill the vacuum which would emerge from Britain's Asian withdrawal but that possibility was being challenged by leaders of the Asian nations. According to them, from then on, "foreign forces were in South-East Asia on sufferance only" (*SMH* 11 August 1967e, p. 2). The initiative regarding security in the region had shifted. Observing the formation of ASEAN, the sense that Australia's military role in the region might decline, was reflected in the editorial.

Compared with Australia, the media reports regarding the forming of ASEAN in Japan offered wider and more detailed opinion. Following the process of the meeting between the five Asian Foreign Ministers prior to the signing of the Bangkok Declaration, a correspondent with *Mainichi Shimbun* in Jakarta wrote:

Although it is not known whether a new organisation for Asian regional cooperation would come into being right after this meeting, it is worth paying attention as a new wave of South East Asian countries trying to overcome their economical weakness by collaborating. (Fujiwara 1967, p. 3)

This article which appeared on 1 August 1967 had also pointed out that the new organisation was said to have an economic purpose and did not involve political issues. However, feeling a common threat from the activities of local Chinese merchants in their countries which were perceived as aiding the spread of Communism, economic and political issues were inseparable. The organisation inevitably became political (Fujiwara 1967, p. 3). On 5 August, the paper focused on Malik's plan to bring South Asian countries together was said to be the basis of the formation of ASEAN (Nagamoto 1967, p. 2). With some other groupings already existing in the region⁴⁵, the Malik plan had encountered difficulties in gaining consensus among Asian nations (Nagamoto 1967, p. 2). Nevertheless, a grouping of five Asian nations was about to be established because they all shared pride in maintaining their nation's independence which they had struggled to attain after World War Two (Nagamoto 1967, p. 2). The day after the founding of ASEAN, the paper ran an article with a picture of the five Foreign Ministers signing the

⁴⁵ The article referred to Association of South East Asia (ASA), The Asia Development Bank (ADB), the *Maphilindo* plan and Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). It also recorded the Colombo Plan and South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which were established by the initiative of the Western nations (Nagamoto 1967, p. 2).

Declaration saying ASEAN was established with peace as its basis and aimed at mutual support (Kitajima 1967, p. 3). It pointed to the significance of the establishment of this new grouping. It mentioned that the Declaration referred to foreign bases but said it was only in this respect that political issues were discussed during the formation of ASEAN. *Mainichi Shimbun*, in its overall view, presented the event as the economic integration of Asian nations.

Yomiuri Shimbun gave a more political emphasis to the event. An article “The Association of South East Asian Nations launched” appeared on the front page of the paper on 9 August and specifically mentioned the insertion of issues regarding foreign bases into the Declaration (Yamamoto 1967a, p. 1). In addition, an article entitled “Five South East Asian nations united against China” explains that one of the reasons for the nations coming together was to establish a defence shield against the threat of China which was a common international and domestic problem (Yamamoto 1967b, p. 3). However, unlike the articles of *The Sydney Morning Herald*, this political aspect of the formation of ASEAN was seen as a move towards creating stability and peace in the region in *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Yomiuri 1967, p. 2).

Generally, at least from these two Japanese newspapers’ perspectives, the establishment of ASEAN was viewed favourably in Japan. In both newspapers there is a notion that Japan welcomed the initiative taken by Asian nations and their effort to create regional stability. On the other hand, it is necessary to recognise Japan’s categorisation of the region as underdeveloped. Expressions like “this is a grouping excluding developed countries” (Nagamoto 1967, p. 2) or “generally, the standard of living or the cultural level of the people in South East Asian countries are still low” (*Mainichi* 11 August 1967, p. 5) indicates the position that those countries were seen to occupy in the international hierarchy. The paper

is not necessarily expressing Japan's superiority with regard to the region and in the late 1960s the weakness of South Asian countries was a reality but it is worth noting that in the global hierarchy, Japan naturally positioned itself in a superior position to those Asian countries.

JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND ASEAN IN ACTION

The direct commitment of Australia and Japan to ASEAN, however, did not happen until the 1970s. ASEAN's activity was slow in the early years. After the establishment of the grouping, Foreign Ministers' meeting were held annually except in 1970, and the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration was signed in Kuala Lumpur in 1971. It was said, however, that ASEAN was lacking practical action (Kanda 1973, p. 59). The then Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew recognised during the opening address of the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1972 that "... over the last five years intra-ASEAN trade had declined due to similarity of exports" (ASEAN 1972). In view of the initial purpose behind the grouping, that is for five South East Asian nations to cooperate in order to enhance their economies this outcome was disappointing. Lee pointed out that the principal achievement of ASEAN for the past five years was "the understanding and goodwill created" among the nations (ASEAN 1972). It was reported that Lee asserted "Action, please!" by pointing to the necessity of ASEAN to not just hold meetings or to release recommendations but to act (Kanda 1973, p. 59). When a special meeting of Foreign Ministers was called in 1973 "to assess the recently concluded Agreement of Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and to consider its implications for Southeast Asia" (ASEAN 1973), a Japanese journal *Sekai shuho* reported "Where is ASEAN heading for?", since the body could not show any practical and visible achievement (Kanda 1973, p. 59).

However, in the mid-1970s, ASEAN started to take up new initiatives. First, besides its annual Foreign Ministerial meeting, the ASEAN nations decided to hold a summit meeting that gathered Prime Ministers and Presidents. The first ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting took place in Bali in February 1976. One of the outcomes of the meeting was to establish the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN 1976) which pointed to ASEAN's desire to facilitate regular activities. Secondly, the organisation started to talk with countries or organisations outside the region. ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences, which follow the annual Ministerial Meeting, began in 1978 and now ASEAN has ten dialogue partners – Japan, the United States of America, the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, India, China and Russia (MOFA 2007, p. 7). Following this move, both Japan and Australia's attention was directed towards ASEAN. It was more intense and serious than when the association was first established.

According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's website regarding ASEAN, it proudly states "Australia became ASEAN's first Dialogue Partner in 1974" (DFAT 2008a). This was proved by ASEAN's explanation saying "[t]he ASEAN-Australia relationship has evolved and matured considerably since Australia became ASEAN's very first Dialogue Partner more than two decades ago in 1974" (ASEAN 2008). However, Japan was slightly ahead of Australia in having direct talks with ASEAN. Quoting from ASEAN's Joint Communique 1977, the Foreign Ministry of Japan notes that the relationship between this country and ASEAN started when the two parties met in 1973 to talk about synthetic rubber (MOFA 2007, p. 30). ASEAN admits this by stating that "ASEAN and Japan first established informal relations in 1973" (ASEAN 2004a). What is important to note here is, of course, not which nation actually was the first one to relate to ASEAN,

but that ASEAN, as a single negotiating body, was engaging the wider world. 1977, the tenth anniversary of ASEAN, was a significant year in ASEAN's history. ASEAN nations invited leaders of Japan, Australia and New Zealand to individual meetings with ASEAN leaders. The meetings were held immediately after the second ASEAN Summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

In Japan, it was reported that this event had been named by the then Prime Minister of Japan Fukuda Takeo as "the beginning of Asia's new era" (*Yomiuri* 5 August 1977a, p. 1). Observing the outcome of the second ASEAN Summit Meeting, an editorial in *Yomiuri Shimbun* recognised that ASEAN leaders had gained significant confidence in the organisation's future (*Yomiuri* 7 August 1977c, p. 5). The confidence was backed by the tighter integrity of ASEAN which was based on an awareness among member nations of a shared destiny (*Yomiuri* 7 August 1977c, p. 5). The rise of the Association's visibility in the international arena as a stabilising force was another element which supported their confidence (*Yomiuri* 7 August 1977c, p. 5). It was also mentioned that the stabilisation of Vietnam made the countries positive and confident about the peaceful future of South East Asia (*Yomiuri* 7 August 1977, p. 5).

At the same time, this was a significant moment for Japan in relation to the region. Regarding the tragic traces which Japan had left in South Asian countries during the Second World War, its relationship with the region had remained sensitive and this was the first occasion that Japanese and Asian leaders had assembled for discussion since the war (*Yomiuri* 8 August 1977d, p. 3). Although memories of the direct impact of Japanese imperialism may have become distant by the 1970s, the intrusion of Japanese businesses into the region had created new and rising concern and suspicion within Asian countries. In many cases, those

businesses were linked to war reparations and along with Japanese corporations' behaviour in the region, there was criticism of the Japanese "economic animal" by those countries (Oi 1977, p. 1). When the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited five ASEAN nations in 1974, he was greeted by angry protesters at each destination (*Yomiuri* 13 January 1974, p. 2). An additional negative memory for Japan was that in 1976 it had expected to be invited to the first ASEAN Summit in Bali and the invitation was withheld at the final stage⁴⁶ (Toba 1976, p. 2). For Japan, a country with a fragile resource background, it is necessary to build a good relationship with resource-rich Asian countries. It was quite desperate to draw closer to the region. Therefore, its participation in the ASEAN Meeting of 1977 was a monumental initiative for the country (Toba 1977, p. 1).

Prime Minister Fukuda's trip to South East Asia was not only to visit Malaysia to participate in a Meeting with ASEAN leaders. He also visited four other ASEAN nations and Burma. At the final stop, the Philippines, he gave a speech which was called the Manila Declaration which was subsequently called the Fukuda Doctrine. In the Declaration, Fukuda emphasised that Japan will (1) contribute to peace in the region and will not become a military power, (2) create a relationship of sincere mutual trust with ASEAN nations as a true friend and (3) contribute to ASEAN's peace and prosperity as an "equal partner" (Takeishi & Oi 1977, p. 1). This was seen as an occasion for Japan to open a new page in its history of diplomacy towards Asia (Oi 1977, p. 1). Reflecting the significance of Japan's presence at the second ASEAN Summit Meeting, media reports gave significant commentary on this incident. The presence of Australia and New Zealand was mentioned but in minor form and they said there was no doubt that Japan was the central figure at this

⁴⁶ Australia and New Zealand were also on ASEAN's invitation list but along with Japan they were not able to attend the meeting (Toba 1976, p. 2).

historic meeting (Kaneyuki & Toba 1977, p. 3, *Yomiuri Shimbun* 7 August 1977b, p. 4).

At the meeting it was clear that Japan and the Asian countries were entering into a new phase, that is a more equal relationship. The main proposal put to ASEAN by Japan was to contribute one billion US dollars to five ASEAN industrial projects (ASEAN 1977, Kaneyuki & Toba 1977, p. 3). This offer by Japan may have looked like more aid to poor Asia from rich Japan. However, recognising a shift in ASEAN's rhetoric, articles in *Yomiuri Shimbun* repeatedly reported that the Japan – ASEAN relationship is in transition from aid to trade and now Japan had to see the ASEAN nations as “equal” partners. An editorial of 7 August says “ASEAN nations are now expecting assistance in the form of mutual cooperation with a ‘proud manner’, not in a form of ‘begging’ as a group of developing countries” (*Yomiuri* 7 August 1977c, p. 5).

Recognition of this transition in the relationship between Japan and Asia led the paper to suggest that Japanese society needed “to be free from its “traditional” behaviour of following the United States and from a diplomacy which has always looking to the West” (Toba 7 August 1977, p. 4). “The most important thing for us to do” says an editorial on 19 August “is altering our prejudice which neglect to neglect Asia, a prejudice which had been forged by an education worshipping Europe and the United States since the Meiji era” (*Yomiuri* 19 August 1977e, p. 5). *Yomiuri* on the 20 August warned that Japan needed to refrain from a policy on South East Asia which had recognised giving foreign aid was enough. The policy was backed by a long lasting rhetoric of the strong relating to the weak in Japan (Oi 1977, p. 1). A reporter Oi also went on to point out that although many Japanese had been visiting South East Asia to see tourist sites, they had never tried to integrate with

local people in the way Westerners did (1977, p. 1). The location of resources, markets and sightseeing were becoming new images of South East Asia for the majority of Japanese people (1977, p. 1). He urged Japan to have an exchange with the region which is not one way and to start a new era in the diplomacy in Asia (1977, p. 1).

As expressed in articles in *Yomiuri Shimbun* regarding the epoch-making ASEAN Summit Meeting in 1977, Japan's relationship with Asian countries in the 1970s was very sensitive and its attitude towards Asia was still awkward. What is interesting to note is that despite all the warnings in the articles regarding Japan's biased perception towards Asia based on its "tradition" of worshipping the West, a troubled view towards Asia could still be seen in comment in the same paper. An article appeared on 8 August 1977 reporting on a round-table discussion by four *Yomiuri* journalists who reported from Kuala Lumpur. The discussion was mostly filled with a notion that Japan, by departing from "goods and money diplomacy", had entered into a new era in its relationship with Asian countries and, although it was not easy, Japan would be able to free itself from the position of "an orphan in the World" (*Yomiuri* 8 August 1977d, p. 3). However, at the very end of the discussion one participant bluntly mentioned that Japan was practically placed in a position where it could lead ASEAN and, therefore, Japan needed to be as patient as a grownup and foster ASEAN to maturity and make the Association Japan's true friend in the long run (*Yomiuri* 8 August 1977d, p. 3). It is not as arrogant as this comment suggests but a column written by an international economics expert, which basically sent warnings over Japan's attitude towards and in Asia, also contains a perception that Asia was less mature than itself. It was noted that the West anyway exists at a considerable distance from the ASEAN nation's point of

view (Fukami 1977, p. 3), whereas Japan was just one of them not so long ago. It is therefore inevitable that Asian countries would be jealous over only Japan becoming a developed country ahead of them (Fukami 1977, p. 3).

These articles reflected a perception deeply embedded in the Japanese mind which recognised Asian countries as infants and put itself in a superior position. Seeing the rise of ASEAN in the mid 1970s, it realised the necessity of approaching Asia as an equal partner. However, due to persistent perceptions, Japan was puzzled over how to deal with the new ASEAN initiative in the region.

Australia, another country in the region which was invited to the Second ASEAN Summit Meeting, was well aware of the difficulties experienced by Japan. *The Sydney Morning Herald* wrote on 5 August 1977 that Mr. Fukuda must be more nervous than Mr. Fraser about how he and Japan would be received at the ASEAN Summit Meeting (Slee 1977, p. 6). In an article titled “Testing Japan’s image”, from Tokyo, John Slee pointed to the anti-Japanese riots in 1974 when Tanaka visited South East Asia and to the decline of Miki’s participation in the ASEAN Summit Meeting in 1976, a year before, and suggested that Fukuda’s visit to Kuala Lumpur would be “an important test of how well Japan has managed to improve its image” (1977, p. 6). He said that Japan had prepared “several packages”, including the one billion dollars contribution to five industrial projects, which could be “seen as a goodwill gesture pure and simple” to attract the ASEAN countries and to promote a better impression of the country (1977, p. 6). However, as Slee asserted the packages’ wrappings were attractive but what actually mattered was the content (1977, p. 6). Along with the ASEAN nations’ anxiety over Japan’s intention to create closer links with Vietnam, Slee predicted the Japan’s future with ASEAN was not necessarily positive.

Indeed, the article was a sensible analysis of Japan's position when facing Asian countries, but this did not mean that Australia was free from problems or worries in relating to Asia through involvement in the Summit. Australia had its own business to worry about.

The biggest obstacle which existed was Australia's trade barrier. Australia had a tough tariff quota system and the ASEAN nations had been experiencing difficulties in getting into Australian markets, especially in the manufacturing sector (Hooper 1977a, p. 7). Ken Hooper reported in *The Australian* that Australia was "battling to justify its growing trade imbalance" (1977a, p. 7) and Michael Richardson pointed out in *The Sydney Morning Herald* "ASEAN should begin blocking Australian imports in retaliation against Canberra's protectionist policies" (Richardson 1977, p. 7). The problem was rooted in Australia's relatively weak industries such as textiles and clothing. Although the liberalisation of the Australian economy was considered by Asian countries to be insufficient, as a developed country Australia was a donor to South East Asia. Therefore, when those Asian countries started to demand an equal relationship especially with regard to trade, Australia was paralysed. The title of Hooper's article "MORE TRADE – LESS AID' ... NOW CANBERRA HAS TO DECIDE" (1977a, p. 7) draws attention to the problem.

This situation put Australia into a dilemma. As noted in *The Sydney Morning Herald*, "[i]ts (ASEAN's) region, after all, is a part – a very close part – of our wider Asian-Pacific region. Its stability and security and its prosperity ..., are inseparable from Australia's long-term interests in peace" (*SMH* 5 August 1977, p. 6). Moreover, the region was a market with a population of 230 million which was larger than the European market (*The Australian* 1977, p. 6). In addition, Australia recognised the trade expectations promoted by ASEAN. "But unlike the more developed Asian

countries, who have mainly looked to Europe and North America for trade openings, the South-East Asian states are looking to Australia” commented Alan Mitchell in *The Sydney Morning Herald* (Mitchell 1977, p. 15). Nevertheless, because of its own internal economic problems, Australia was not ready to lift its trade barriers and this ambiguous situation led Australia to think about “where do we belong and where do we fit in?” (Richardson 1977a, p. 7).

This dilemma made Australia look towards Japan, another Asian country from Australia’s perspective, in a somewhat jealous manner. Articles reporting the ASEAN Summit Meeting, especially in *The Australian*, kept referring to what Japan was doing or how Japan was received by the ASEAN nations. An editorial on 5 August saw the very foundation of ASEAN as “a new economic giant on our doorstep” supported by Japan’s money (*The Australian* 5 August 1977, p. 6). On the same day *The Australian* ran an article titled “Fukuda woos Asean with cash” and an article by Ken Hooper titled “Tokyo’s new \$1,000 million Asian invasion” said “They [the Japanese] think they can buy their way in” and “they probably can just like they did in Australia” (1977b, p.7). By accusing Japan’s of bad behaviour, they were, at the same time, busy comparing themselves to Japan. An article on 8 August reported Australia had proposed 90 million dollars aid to ASEAN but had “refused to reduce tariff barriers” and mentioned that “Japan will consider removal of tariffs”. The article’s author also expressed concern over the possibility that Australia may lag behind Japan (Hooper 1977c, p. 1).

A consistent continuous notion underlying these reports was a fear of exclusion in regional integration. The editorial on 5 August recognised that Australia is “in clear danger of being left on the outside” (*The Australian* 5 August 1977, p. 6). What is interesting about this editorial is that it compares ASEAN to EEC and

compares itself to its mother country Britain. Whether Australia had ever been an influential figure in Asia as Britain was in Europe is doubtful. It shows Australia's superior feeling towards neighbouring Asian countries including Japan and indicates a slight unease when faced with subordinate status in the region.

From these expressions in newspapers, it is very clear that both Japan and Australia had trouble relating to Asia and, therefore, invitations from ASEAN to join them at their Second Summit Meeting provoked a significant insight into both countries' attitude and way of thinking towards Asia.

JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND ASEAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY

In 2007, thirty years after Japan and Australia's first participation in a meeting with the five ASEAN leaders in 1977, under the theme of "One ASEAN at the Heart of Dynamic Asia", ASEAN celebrated its 40th anniversary (ASEAN 2007a). The association which started with five member countries now had ten members. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984. Vietnam became a member in 1995 followed by Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. These 10 member countries, on the occasion of the ASEAN Summit Meeting in November 2007, signed the historic ASEAN Charter as recognised in the Singapore Declaration (ASEAN 2007b).

From the day ASEAN was established in 1967, the implementation of its Charter was viewed with considerable scepticism by the wider world, particularly by countries in the West. Critics pointed out that since Asia is a very diverse place, it will be very difficult to integrate its members or to implement a unified agreement that binds them together. Having Myanmar as a member, a country which has a notorious reputation for abusing human rights among the Western countries was seen as being particularly difficult. It was said that it would be impossible for ASEAN to draw strength and power from acting as a single entity.

Nevertheless, ASEAN has developed over the past 40 years. It “has grown into a noteworthy alliance” (Aoki et al 2002, p. 2). At the same time, each ASEAN nation has gained strength and power (Aoki et al 2002, p. 10). Yamamuro Shinichi points out that ASEAN has created a kind of “anti-empire” type of system (Aoki et al 2002, pp. 10-11). No specific country is the leader of the Association and none of them has hegemony and now ASEAN members have invited China, South Korea and Japan as ASEAN+3. This is a system based on discussion and it is one that is working to prevent China becoming the sole regional super power – an empire – in the region (Aoki et al 2002, pp. 10-11). ASEAN has increased its prominence as a unit in the international arena. Expanding dialogue with others outside the association proves this point. ASEAN+3 as a grouping had its first meeting in 1997, but long before that time ASEAN had fostered bilateral talks with other nations. It now has ten formal dialogue partners⁴⁷ and has regular meetings. The association also took the initiative over forming the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Forum gathered ASEAN nations and nine other nations and one organisation⁴⁸. ASEAN has been functioning as a prominent and influential negotiating body which is creating a sense of the collective interests of the region and so, while ASEAN has been slowly but gradually developing, the question is - How have Japan and Australia improved or enhanced their relationship with ASEAN?

⁴⁷ The ten formal dialogue partners are: Japan, the United States, EU, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, India, China, Russia (*Tonan Ajia Ahokoku Rengo no kiso chishiki* 2007, p. 7).

⁴⁸ The first ARF meeting was held in 1994. Members were Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Russia, the EU and Papua New Guinea. Cambodia, Myanmar, India, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have joined the forum in later years (*Tonan Ajia Ahokoku Rengo no kiso chishiki* 2007, pp. 27-28).

The ASEAN Summit Meeting which took place in 2007 in Singapore was followed by the Third East Asia Summit (EAS)⁴⁹ on 21 November in which both Japan and Australia were participants. However, in Australia, media representation of the Summit meeting was very restrained. Considering the fact that in Australia the Federal Election on 24 November was approaching, this minimal coverage of the EAS and also the ASEAN Summit meeting itself was understandable. The Australian Government had sent Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to the meeting instead of the Prime Minister John Howard himself flying to Singapore (Dodd 2007, p. 11). Even so, when we recall all the fuss which occurred in Australia in relation to ASEAN from 2004 to 2005, it seemed strange to see only low key media interest coming from Singapore on this occasion.

On 14 December 2005, the inaugural EAS was held in Kuala Lumpur. Under the initiative of ASEAN, 10 ASEAN nations, China, Japan, South Korea, India, New Zealand and Australia gathered for the meeting. For Australia, the road to Kuala Lumpur had been long and tough. Since the 1990s, especially after former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating called Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia “recalcitrant” due to Mahathir’s absence at the first APEC leaders’ meeting in Seattle in 1993, the relationship between Australia and Malaysia had been difficult. Malaysia being an original and prominent member of ASEAN, Australia’s will to be integrated into the region especially in an economic sense was constantly questioned even by Keating’s successor John Howard. Therefore, when

⁴⁹ EAS was a meeting which evolved from the ASEAN+3 discussions. They were aiming at the forming of East Asia community in the future and establishment of EAS was seen as one process to form the community (General Information on East Asia Summit 2005). ASEAN decided that a member country “should (1) be a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) member or have the will to become a member, (2) be a complete ASEAN Dialogue Partner, and (3) have substantive relations with ASEAN” (General Information on East Asia Summit 2005). The first EAS was held in December 2005 and member countries are 10 ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.

Mahathir resigned from his position in October 2003, a somewhat relieved and optimistic mood developed in Australia. Australian media reports suggested that finally the obstacle which was preventing Australia from being a part of the region was gone and Australia would now be welcome to take up business opportunities in Asia.

Positive signs from ASEAN came quickly. In April 2004, when the economic ministers of ASEAN nations met in Singapore, it was agreed that ASEAN would invite Australia and New Zealand leaders to attend the ASEAN Summit meeting later that year. *The Australian* reported this as “ASEAN opens trade door for PM” (Lyall & Wallace 2004, p. 2) and *The Sydney Morning Herald* said “Howard receives ASEAN invitation” (Allard 2004, p. 1). They both pointed to Mahathir as the cause of Australia being absent from ASEAN Summit meetings in recent years. *The Australian* noted that “... an attempt by Australia in 2000 to initiate FTA discussions with ASEAN” was “vetoed by Dr Mahathir, who had had acrimonious relationships with the four Australian prime ministers who served during his 22-year rule” (Lyall & Wallace 2004, p. 2). *The Sydney Morning Herald* recorded that “Mr Howard has never been invited to an ASEAN leaders’ summit” (Allard 2004, p.1) and also saw Mahathir as the person who had blocked Australia’s presence at the Summit. Its editorial said “[n]ow the combative Dr Mahathir has retired, Mr Howard has been given an opportunity to strike back at critics who say he can’t enhance relations in Asia because of his close ties to the United States” (Allard 2004, p.1). Both newspapers were quite clear with their point that Mahathir was to be blamed for the derailment of Australia in relation to ASEAN.

Later in 2004, having accepting an invitation, Howard was in Vientiane, Laos, to participate in the ASEAN Summit. The most significant positive outcome of the

meeting between ASEAN leaders and Australia was Howard being able to negotiate a “historic trade pact” which “will give Australian businesses access to a market of more than 500million people with a combined annual economy of \$720billion” (Lewis & Lyall 2004b, p. 3). An article in *The Sydney Morning Herald* said “Australia joins ASEAN club” and pointed out that Howard had “put to bed the myth his government cannot deal with Asia” (*SMH* 1 December 2004). It was indeed a significant achievement for the Australian Government not to be left out of “the world’s most dynamic and fastest growing region” (*SMH* 1 December 2004). In spite of this, however, the media’s attention was also on Australia’s refusal to sign the basic ASEAN treaty, the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation known as TAC. The Howard Government was reluctant to sign it because the treaty “binds all members to a policy of non-interference and non-aggression towards its neighbours” (Wilkinson 2005) may restrict Howard’s doctrine of pre-emptive strike and also make it difficult to intervene in human rights violations in Myanmar⁵⁰. Several articles worrying about Australia “side-stepping the TAC issue” (Lewis & Lyall 2004b, p. 3) appeared both in *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* along with reports on the positive outcome of the meeting regarding FTA. *The Sydney Morning Herald* pointed out that “China, Japan, India, South Korea and Russia have all signed and the New Zealand Prime Minister, Helen Clark, is expected to say today that she is disposed towards it” (Allard & Levett 2004, p. 1). *The Australian* had quoted the then opposition foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd criticising Howard by saying “Mr Howard’s refusal to sign was an obstacle to the development of Australia’s broader political, economic and security relationship with ASEAN”. Rudd also pointed out that other nations, including Japan which has

⁵⁰ See, for instance, ABC Asia Pacific, Asia Pacific Focus, ‘Australia invited to the ASEAN party at last: Interview with Australia’s Foreign Minister’, 27 November 2004.

strong ties with the United States, had signed the treaty⁵¹ (*The Australian* 26 November 2004). In those articles there was a sense of fear of being left alone, yet again, in the region. However, Howard took the view that “it’s just not a big issue” (Lewis & Lyall 2004b, p. 3) and before leaving for Vientiane, he bluntly told reporters “[i]t’s how much you sell and how much you buy and how many people you educate in each other’s countries that really matters, rather than documents” (Lewis & Lyall 2004a, p. 4).

It, indeed, seemed to be “not a big issue” until it was raised again by ASEAN in the following year. When the new Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi made a diplomatic visit to Australia in April 2005, he urged Howard to sign the TAC (Banham 2005a). As agreed at a meeting of ASEAN+3 in November 2004, the first EAS was going to be held in 2005 (ASEAN 2004b). However, participating countries had not finalised this by the beginning of 2005. There was a consensus that ASEAN+3 nations were going to be the basis of the EAS but whether to invite three other countries in the region – India, New Zealand and Australia – which were showing an interest in being involved, was yet to be decided. In spite of Badawi’s view that the signing of TAC is crucial is Australia is to be included in the EAS, Howard had declined his advice (Banham 2005a). Howard was bold enough to state “[w]e would be very happy to participate [in EAS] but we are not knocking on doors begging admission, we don’t need to do that” (*SMH* 8 April 2005b). However, within less than two months, now realising that ASEAN as a whole was very serious regarding the TAC, the Howard Government was forced to change course and seek a way of signing the treaty (Banham 2005b). On 26 July, Foreign Minister Downer

⁵¹ The Howard Government was insisting that one of the reasons why it was rejecting the signing of TAC was “its incompatibility with the ANZUS alliance” (Lewis & Lyall 2004a, p. 4).

issued a press release saying that Australia had received an invitation to an inaugural meeting of EAS and it was followed by Australia's decision to sign the treaty (Downer 2005b). Finally on 13 December, a day before the EAS, Prime Minister Howard signed the treaty in Kuala Lumpur (ASEAN 2005a).

Throughout this fuss regarding the TAC from December 2004 to December 2005, articles referring to ASEAN in *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* were filled with anxiety over Australia being left behind in the Asian region. Recalling concern over Australia not being able to benefit from its Asian location, it seems that Australia's psychological distance from Asia has not been significantly shortened.

Inclusion of Australia in the EAS was supposed to be a significantly positive sign for the country. Unfortunately, however, it did not turn out to be a tranquilliser. A day after the inaugural EAS meeting in Kuala Lumpur, *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* sent out contrasting messages to the Australian public. The former wrote "Malaysia welcomes Australia with open arms" (Walters 2004a, p. 1) and the latter said "Malaysia delivers a short, important face slap" (Levett 2004, p. 2). As explained in *The Australian*, considering all the struggles which Australia went through to get a seat on the EAS, the country being "there from the beginning" (Walters 2004b, p. 2) should be seen as a positive sign. However, the negative tone of *The Sydney Morning Herald* may have reflected Australia's future position in relation to ASEAN and more broadly East Asia. ASEAN and +3 countries had been talking about creating an alliance which brings East Asian countries closer creating a significant body in the international arena. It was expected that EAS would become the basis of this new grouping which was called the East Asia Community (EAC). However, in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur it became apparent that the

ASEAN+3 grouping was likely to become the basis for EAC not EAS⁵². That means, despite all the effort to get to Kuala Lumpur, Australia was omitted from further regional integration plan. EAC's future itself was not clear at that moment but it was a major blow to the country then and Australia was thrown into an ambiguous and uncertain position in the region once again.

Coming back to November 2007, as I explain above, the low key representation at the ASEAN Summit meeting was partly due to Australia's domestic political circumstances. However, this exclusion from the EAC plan could be read as another reason for indifference towards the ASEAN meeting in Australia in 2007. Moreover, an incident occurred in Myanmar⁵³, one of the ASEAN members, shortly before the ASEAN meetings in Singapore ensured that Australia was remote from ASEAN matters.

According to the representation in articles, two major Australian newspapers' interest in ASEAN meetings that year was focused solely on how ASEAN would deal with the Myanmar issue. Mark Dodd wrote in *The Australian* "[h]opes for a regional human rights body with powers to punish violators such as Burma faded yesterday after Southeast Asian nations adopted a charter that promotes democratic ideals but provides no teeth to enforce them" (Dodd 2007, p. 11). *The Sydney Morning Herald* ran an article entitled "A grand day for the junta" and severely criticised ASEAN by saying "... it demonstrated its impotence" (*SMH* 22 November

⁵² Actually, the outcome of ASEAN meetings in December 2005 was quite ambiguous. Whereas, the East Asia Summit meeting declared that "the East Asia Summit could play a significant role" in creating the community (ASEAN 2005c), the ASEAN+3 Summit meeting's declaration said "the ASEAN Plus Three process will continue to be the main vehicle" to build the community (ASEAN 2005b).

⁵³ In September 2007, Myanmar monks took to the streets in Yangon in protest against high petrol prices. Actually, the outcome of ASEAN meetings in December 2005 was quite ambiguous. This was suppressed by force by a military government in Myanmar and this provoked a storm of protest domestically and also internationally. The necessity of democratisation of the country including freeing opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi was again put into light in the international arena.

2007c). It went on saying “[e]ven more depressingly, the ASEAN charter reaffirmed the two principles that guarantee the grouping’s ineffectiveness: non-interference in members’ internal affairs and decision-making by consensus” (*SMH* 22 November 2007c). Their view of ASEAN was very sceptical and was still dominated by the idea that the association was immature. The excitement two years earlier, when Australia was finally invited to EAS seemed to have dissipated and Australia remained in an ambiguous relationship with ASEAN – Asia.

While Australia was accusing ASEAN of mishandling the Myanmar issue and questioning Myanmar’s eligibility for ASEAN membership, Japan was fully involved in ASEAN events in Singapore in 2007. The Myanmar factor was, of course, also reported in Japan. Right before the ASEAN Summit, *Yomiuri* wrote that the Myanmar controversy would cast a shadow over ASEAN meetings (Hanada & Makinoda 2007, p. 4). It pointed out that by strongly supporting the United Nations’ commitment to the issue, ASEAN was trying to avoid criticism from Western countries (Hanada & Makinoda 2007, p. 4). The article also referred to China, which was viewed as a patron of Myanmar, increasing its influence on ASEAN and the point that China was reluctant to take up the issue in the meetings (Hanada & Makinoda 2007, p. 4). Observing the result of the ASEAN Summit, *Mainichi Shimbun* reported on 21 November that from the result of the ASEAN Summit it became apparent that Myanmar was a burden on the cooperation of the grouping (Fujita 2007a). However, for Japan, there were more important issues to report from Singapore.

First, one reason for the Japanese media focusing on ASEAN meetings was that Japan had concluded its talks with ASEAN regarding an economic partners agreement (EPA) which had FTA as a core and both sides had agreed to sign the

agreement in the coming new year, 2008 (Jitsumori 2007, p.2). This was the first EPA Japan had agreed to sign with a regional association (Osawa 2007) and it was not surprising that Japanese newspapers paid close attention to this matter.

Secondly, an element which made ASEAN meetings in November 2007 special for Japan was that that was the first occasion that the new Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo, who took up the prime ministership in September 2007, had made a diplomatic visit to Asia. The media was paying attention to what kind of message Fukuda would deliver and what kind of prospect Japan could see in its future relationship with Asia. One historical incident which made this Fukuda's Asian tour even more special was a declaration which was made in Manila thirty years previously by the then Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, father of Fukuda Yasuo – a declaration known as the Fukuda Doctrine. It seems that the media had rushed to search the archives regarding the Doctrine and tried to report Fukuda's debut in Asia by connecting his father's positive legacy to the region. The Fukuda Doctrine was explained as a guideline for the Japan – Asia relationship which included three principles: Japan (1) will not become military power and will contribute to the peace and prosperity of South East Asia, (2) will create a heart-to-heart relationship and (3) will cooperate in enhancing solidarity and the reinforcement of ASEAN (Tsuda 2007, p. 3). *Mainichi Shimbun* referred to a strong anti-Japanese atmosphere in South East Asia back in the 1970s with regard to its economic dominance of the region (*Mainichi* 26 November 2007c). The article argued that the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine changed Asian countries' impressions of Japan in a positive way and suggested that now Fukuda Junior needs to deliver a new doctrine in order to demonstrate Japan's stance towards ASEAN in the twenty first century (Fujita 2007b).

Reading this slightly nostalgic tone in the article we are reminded of the continuously sensitive and complex relationship between Japan and Asia and this is not too far away from the reality of the situation at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Another factor which had drawn the media's attention to Singapore was that Fukuda had a chance to meet both Wen Jiabao, the Prime Minister of China, and Roh Moo Hyun, the President of South Korea. The relationship between Japan and these two East Asian countries had been in turmoil for five years when Koizumi Junichiro was Japanese Prime Minister. Koizumi's visit to a controversial shrine, Yasukuni, outraged both countries and the diplomatic exchange between leaders of the countries had been frozen during that period. Moreover, Koizumi was particularly cautious about the rise of China's influence in the region and continuously confronted his giant neighbour (Fujita 2007b). Koizumi's attitude was seen as an obstacle to an atmosphere of enhanced cooperation in East Asia among ASEAN countries and was negatively affecting Japan's diplomacy in the region (Fujita 2007b). In Singapore, apart from the ASEAN+3 Summit, there were three additional chances for Fukuda to meet the two leaders – bilateral meetings with both leaders and a meeting among three countries – and it was a good occasion for Japan to fill in the lost five years in East Asia diplomacy. The expectation of a positive outcome of the meetings was high not only in Japan but also on ASEAN's side and this demonstrated Japan's unstable relationship with the Asian countries.

With regard to the China issue in relation to ASEAN, it is worth looking back to November 2005 in Kuala Lumpur when Australia narrowly escaped being absent from the EAS but was left in a vulnerable and unclear position in the discussion of forming the EAC. Japan was constantly interested in including Australia and New Zealand in the EAC plan. It was in January 2002 that Koizumi made a speech in

Singapore on Japan's policy towards ASEAN and referred to a plan to create a community in East Asia which brings closer and tighter relationships among East Asian countries. The purpose was to make the region stronger in terms of its economy, security and culture⁵⁴ (Suzuki 2002, p. 1). Koizumi's community plan was to make the Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership grouping as a basis of the community and expand it by involving China, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia (Koizumi 2002). Koizumi also stressed the importance of the United States' commitment to the region (Koizumi 2002). This Japanese plan was read as a counter movement to prevent China's rising prominence in the region (Nakatsu & Suzuki 2002, p. 3). By forming the community, leaving a door open for the United States' commitment and involving Australia and New Zealand which were strong allies of the United States, it was thought that it was possible to balance power in East Asia.

As stated in my argument above, however, according to the outcome of the ASEAN meetings in late 2005, the basis of the future EAC was likely to be ASEAN+3. Although the possibility for Australia, New Zealand and also India of joining the community had not disappeared and what Japan was expecting to occur did not transpire. Not surprisingly, the focus of the Japanese media regarding the ASEAN meetings was on the Japan vs. China struggle. In contrast to Japan's expectation, it was reported that China was pushing the idea to make the ASEAN+3 grouping the basis of the EAC in order to expand its influence in the region (*Mainichi* 11 December 2005b, p. 5, Otani & Yamashita 2005, p. 3). *Yomiuri* wrote "sparks flew between Japan and China over the structure of the community"

⁵⁴ According to Yamakage Susumu, Kim Dae Jung, the then President of South Korea, was the first person to advocate the necessity of establishing some kind of East Asia community in 1998 (Yamakage 2006, p. 15).

(*Yomiuri* 10 December 2005, p. 13). He saw the result was a “draw” (Suetsugi & Yoshiyama 2005, p. 2). *Mainichi* reported a “tug of war between Japan and China over forming the EAC” (Otani & Yamashita 2005, p. 3). The editorial judged the outcome as slightly in China’s favour and said that the rivalry between the two countries over the construction of the EAC would continue (Yamashita 13 December 2005, p. 1). Through its attitude in committing to ASEAN and also in facing its other giant Asian neighbour, China, it became apparent that Japan was still having a problem in creating an equal relationship with countries in its geographic region.

What is even more interesting and prominent and worth recognising is the influence of the United States on Japan regarding the forming of the EAC. *Mainichi Shimbun* has reported from Washington that behind the scene the United States was influencing the discussion on forming of the EAC at the ASEAN meetings (Oikawa 2005, p. 3). Although it did not openly oppose the EAC plan which excluded the United States, had encouraged Australia and India to show an interest in joining the EAS in 2005 and thereby reduce the influence of China (Oikawa 2005, p. 3). That meant that United States’ influence in the region would be maintained (Oikawa 2005, p. 3). On the surface, it was a struggle between Japan and China but in reality it was a battle between the United States and China. Japan acted as like a “deputy” of the United States in Asia, so to speak. It is necessary here to record that in 2007 Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo actually visited the United States right before his trip to Singapore to join the Asian leaders. Fukuda was known to be a person with a good knowledge of Asia and was reported to be going to emphasise Japan’s relationship with Asia (Igarashi 2007, p. 3). Nevertheless, what was on the top of the new Prime Minister’s agenda was the confirmation of the country’s close alliance with the United States. It was reported that his diplomacy motto was

“synergy between Japan-US and Asia” (Igarashi 2007, p. 3). It looks like Japan is closer to the United States than to its neighbouring Asian countries.

CONCLUSION

In Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, right after the EAC meeting, former Australian Prime Minister Howard told the media “APEC should remain the Asia-Pacific’s premier forum ahead of the emerging EAS” (Walters 2005, p. 2). Being left in an unclear position regarding the forming of EAC, it was understandable for Howard to suddenly mention APEC where Australia is not only an official member state but also a country which took the initiative in the formation of the organisation. Moreover, APEC contains Asia’s closest and strongest ally – the United States of America. Howard was quoted as asserting “Self-evidently APEC is the premier body and its great advantage is that it brings the United States to this region ...” (Walters 2005, p. 2). While the Australian Prime Minister was giving a slightly ‘out of context’ comment to the Australian media, the Japanese former Prime Minister Koizumi was talking at a press conference and stating that Japan’s foreign policy is based on Japan – US relations (Koizumi 2005). Although he was careful to reassure people that this policy did not undermine Japan’s relationships with other countries, it was obvious that the Japan – US relation was always pre-eminent. It is interesting and rather ironic to recognise that even when the leaders of the two countries were talking about their relationships with Asia, they were consciously and also unconsciously looking to the West. Considering the geographical location of the two countries and that of the United States, this must be their version of the “Look East” policy.

An advocate of the original Look East policy, the former Malaysian Prime Minister, was very unhappy with the United States bias in the policy of the two

countries. Just before the inaugural EAS, Mahathir was in Tokyo and told *Yomiuri Shimbun* about his negative predictions in relation to the outcome of the meeting (Yoshigata 2005). The main reason was that Japan was trying to invite non-East Asian countries, even the United States, to the EAS, and he bluntly stated “we need Japan but that is a Japan which does not speak on behalf of the US” (Yoshigata 2005). A few days later, back in Kuala Lumpur, Mahathir criticised Australia and New Zealand which are non-Asian countries in his view, for being a part of the EAS (*Tokyo Shimbun* 8 December 2005, p. 6). Referring specifically to Australia which is so obviously close to the United States, he said that summit was going to look like the ‘East Asia plus Australia Summit’ (*Tokyo Shimbun* 8 December 2005, p. 6).

The retired Malaysian Prime Minister’s comments may not reflect every ASEAN leader’s views or, moreover, the views of the people of Asia on Japan and Australia. Nevertheless, they accurately depict the behaviour of Japan and Australia within the region. They do not want to be excluded from the region but at the same time they need a strong Western state to support them even while they are relating to Asia. Asia was and is a continuing issue for both countries.

CHAPTER 6: Natural partners

INTRODUCTION

While an inferiority complex in relation to the West governs both Japan's and Australia's behaviour towards neighbouring Asian countries, the consequence of the complex can also be recognised in another sphere of international relations – the Japan-Australia bilateral relationship.

“Australia and Japan are indeed an odd couple”, writes Neville Meaney in his book *Towards a New Vision: Australia & Japan Through 100 Years* (Meaney 1999, p. 140). After referring to their cultural differences, geographical distance and difference in economical power in the latter half of the twentieth century, Meaney states that nevertheless “a peculiar set of historical circumstances has drawn the two nations together and created this unlikely and unequal partnership” (1999, p. 140). Indeed, in the dawn of the twenty first century, these two countries see each other as “natural partners”, specifically as articulated in their political sphere.

It is difficult to establish the exact starting point for the Australia-Japan relationship. In the present diplomatic discourse, the time-line of the Australia-Japan relationship usually begins in the post-World War Two period. For instance, the homepage of Australia's Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) just has a “Short history of the post-war relationship” section to explain the relationship between the two countries. It begins by mentioning the Agreement on Commerce which was signed in 1957 (DFAT 2008b). However, it is no secret that Japanese indentured labourers were already in the northern part of the continent as pearl divers and as sugar plantation workers in the late nineteenth century. Japanese

businessmen were also already active, for example, in Sydney, mainly in wool. On the other hand, it is less recognised that people from the Australian continent were, in turn, present in Japan engaged in business, as missionaries and as tourists. They have been in Japan from the latter half of the nineteenth century.

If we refer to a non-diplomatic but recorded contact between the Australian continent and the archipelago of Japan, we need to go back another half a century. As it was reported as late as in 1979 in *The Sydney Morning Herald* under the title “How Australians ‘invaded’ Japan in 1831” a Sydney-based whaling ship encountered an indigenous community in the northern part of the Japanese archipelago in 1831. This area is now a part of the island of Hokkaido (Slee 1979, p. 11). Moreover, quoting from Habara Yukichi, a Japanese historian, Amino Yoshihiko has referred to the possibility of Japanese fishermen from western Japan, *Kishu* (the present Wakayama prefecture), reaching the coast of the Australian continent for pearling during the Tokugawa Shogunate era⁵⁵. The Australian continent and the Japanese archipelago have a longer history of communication than it is usually recognised.

Having included all these events in the history of the Australia-Japan relationship, it is not an exaggeration to say that it was in Prime Minister John Howard’s era (1996-2007) that we saw the highest point in the Australia-Japan relationship, particularly in terms of a strategic relationship in the international arena. According to the DFAT homepage, between 1957 and 2008 there have been 22 occasions when Australian Prime Ministers have visited Japan (DFAT 2008b). Among these visits, seven were made by Howard (MOFA 2008d). This number is relatively large and therefore worthy of special attention. On Japan’s side, although

⁵⁵ The Tokugawa Shogunate lasted from 1603 to 1867.

there were not as many visits by Japanese Prime Ministers to Australia, the media's attention to Australia rose during the Prime Ministership of Koizumi Junichiro – 2001-2006. It was also between 2005 and 2007 that significant bilateral agreements were concluded. Thus, without doubt, the Australia-Japan relationship became more visible and the closeness of the two countries became increasingly apparent in the context of international politics in Asia Pacific region.

In this chapter I will examine Japan's and Australia's bilateral relationship and point out that the closeness of the two countries in recent years can be explained as another consequence of their inferiority complex in relation to the West⁵⁶. First, I will examine the Japanese-Australia relationship during the Howard era, particularly from 2005 to 2007. Then, I will outline a number of disagreements and disputes that took place during that period. These disputes could have undermined the bilateral relationship. I will then detail the short but eventful relationship between Japan and Australia under Australia's new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd. Despite his less than enthusiastic approach to Japan at the beginning of his Prime Ministership, Rudd eventually came back on track. Finally, I will discuss the rise of Japan's interest in Australia, particularly in the security sphere. I point to a factor which draws the two countries to each other and makes them "natural partners". It is their close relationship with the United States – a country that has been the most powerful Western state in the contemporary world.

⁵⁶ Of course, there could be other reasons for Japan and Australia's closeness in this new century. For example, from international relations realists' point of view, the rise of China is obviously one of those factors. However, if you then question why China is a threat for the two countries at the first place, it is hard to avoid the idea that is the basis of their behaviour. I argue that the idea that Japan and Australia view the world as a dichotomous and hierarchical place and that this view underlies their inferiority complex in relation to the West. I have approached the Japan-Australia bilateral relationship from this perspective.

CLOSE AS EVER RELATIONSHIP: 2005 – 2007

2005 to 2007 was a busy period for the Australia-Japan relationship (MOFA 2008d, DFAT 2008b). On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Commerce Agreement between the two countries, there was the signing of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007. A year earlier, there was the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation and a number of events were held in both countries under the title of 2006 Australia-Japan Year of Exchange. Moreover, in 2005, the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, an epoch-making collaboration between Australia and Japan was conducted in Iraq with Australian soldiers protecting Japanese Self Defence Force (SDF) engineers who were helping the Iraqis rebuild their war-torn country. During this period, both sides described each other in highly flattering terms.

“The Government has decided this morning to send a new Australian Task Force to Iraq to help in the process of rebuilding and consolidation and reinforcement ...” said the then Australian Prime Minister John Howard on 22 February 2005 at a press conference in Canberra (Howard 2005a). This Task Force was charged with providing “a secure environment for the Japanese engineering and support forces which are making a valuable humanitarian contribution to the rebuilding process [of Iraq]” (Howard 2005a). The Australian government’s decision was not welcomed by the Australian public. The war in Iraq had been unpopular in Australia and Howard had stated that there would be no major increase in the number of soldiers in Iraq during his general election campaign of 2004. The decision to send the Task Force was therefore criticised. It was seen as a “backflip” (*SMH* 23 February 2005a).

For Howard, a way of justifying his “backflip” was to stress the importance of Japan to Australia. He argued:

Very importantly, this deployment involves working alongside a close regional partner in Japan. Japan’s presence as part of the Coalition is very important. It is not only making a big contribution in practical terms, but Japan’s presence is also very important symbolically – a significant Asia power, a major economic power of course around the world, and, importantly, in our own region. And working alongside and in partnership with a close regional ally and partner such as Japan is very important from Australia’s point of view. Very important indeed. (2005a)

Later in the conference he was asked by one journalist “[w]as it the Japanese approaching Australia, was it the Japanese idea that we play this role or was it your idea?” (2005a). Howard offered a straightforward answer:

Well the initial request came from the British but the Japanese factor weighed crucially in my mind. I mean I am not indifferent to a request, an approach from the British or the Americans or indeed other close friends and allies but the Japanese element of this is quite crucial because Japan is a major regional partner of Australia, the Japanese presence in Iraq as part of the Coalition operation, albeit of a humanitarian kind, is a very important one and if it were to have disappeared then I think that would both in substance and in symbolism be a very bad thing. (2005a)

About a month later, Howard again drew attention to the closeness between Australia and Japan. In an address titled “Australia in the World” delivered to the

Lowy Institute for International Policy, he asserted that “Australia has no greater friend than Japan in Asia ...” (Howard 2005b).

This expression was welcomed and appreciated by Ueda Hideaki, the former Ambassador of Japan to Australia. He echoed Howard’s view by quoting the Prime Minister’s exact phrase in his speeches. One example is Ueda’s remarks to the Australia Japan Society in Brisbane and to members of the Brisbane Chamber of Commerce on 28 April 2006. Referring to the significant bilateral relationship between Japan and Australia, he stated “Prime Minister Howard affirmed in his speech last year that ‘Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan’” and explained that having “very strong economic ties” and also having “increasingly common grounds on political and security issues” were making this a “successful relationship” (Ueda 2005a). Another occasion was in Perth on 4 October 2006. At the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Ueda introduced Howard’s phrase by saying “[i]n acknowledgment of these growing ties, Prime Minister Howard, on a number of occasions has stated that ‘Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan’” (Ueda 2006b).

Along with this “no greater friend in Asia” discourse, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has been keen on using the term “Natural Partners”. In 2005, on the occasion of the Aichi Expo in Japan, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer sent out a message using the Official Expo Business Publication. He titled the message “Natural Partners – Australia and Japan” (Downer 2005a). In the message, Downer described both countries as “partners” in four categories: politics, trade, investment and security. He stated:

Since the 1980s, Australia and Japan have developed as natural partners in the region. A ‘Joint Declaration of the Australia – Japan partnership’ in May 1995

described our relationship as of “**unprecedented quality**”. Japan welcomed Australia as an “indispensable partner in regional affairs”. (Emphasis original: Downer 2005a)

Downer emphasised the political closeness of the two countries by referring to the 1997 establishment of annual Prime Ministerial meetings, the ‘Australia Japan Conference for the 21st Century’ in 2001 and its follow-up conferences in 2002 and 2005.

This approach is reflected in the Japan Country Brief page of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s website. At the beginning of the bilateral relations overview, the Brief confirms that “Australia and Japan enjoy excellent relations” (DFAT 2006). It then continues “Japan is of fundamental importance to Australia for political, strategic, and economic reasons” and once again, in the section of The Political Partnership, it says “Since the 1980s, Australia and Japan have developed as natural partners in the region” (DFAT 2006).

On the other hand, the language used in The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan’s website referring to the bilateral relationships is somewhat milder. Nevertheless, it is enough to draw attention to the closeness of the two countries. It uses the term “trusted partners” and says:

The rapid development of Japan’s relation with Australia in the post-war era was based on mutually complementary trade links. Since then, the relationship has expanded to economic activities, politics, culture and various other fields. As trusted partners in the Asia Pacific region, Japan and Australia share a common interest in regional stability and prosperity. (Japan – Australia Relations 2007)

However, a speech made by Shiozaki Yasuhisa, the then Japanese Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on 23 June 2006 to welcome Tony Abbott, the then Australian Minister for Health and Ageing, and Hugh Morgan, Chairman of the Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee to Tokyo for the Fourth Japan-Australia Conference, was studded with the terms “partnership” and “partners”. The title of the speech was “30 Years of Japan-Australia Relation: From Trading Partners to Partners of Democracy” (Shiozaki 2006). In a section called “An Evolving Partnership”, Shiozaki, like Ueda, recalled Howard’s views. He stated that if I may respond to what Prime Minister Howard has said of late, Japan has no closer partner or friend in the region than Australia”. He went on to say that “... tightly bound by shared values, Japan and Australia together make ‘Partners in Democracy along the 135 degrees east longitude’” (2006).

Then in March 2007, there was a historic moment for the Japan-Australia relationship. In the afternoon of 13 March, the Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in Tokyo. Recalling the fact that both governments’ recognition about the bilateral relationships tend to be focused on the post World War Two period, especially on Australia’s side, it is apparent that the two countries signing a declaration regarding security was an epoch-making event. The meaning of this event was slightly different between the two countries. For Australia, signing a security declaration with the former enemy which its nationals loathed so much was a significant turning point. For Japan, a country which theoretically does not have a military force and lacks the right to the use of force when settling international disputes as a consequence of the war, anything to do with a security alliance with foreign countries is controversial and,

therefore, the signing was an remarkable event. Nevertheless, it was similarly significant for both of the countries.

Before flying into Tokyo to sign the declaration, Howard re-iterated his point that Australia and Japan are “natural partners”. He noted that:

This year is the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Commerce Agreement Between Australia and Japan and that Commerce Agreement laid the foundations of the modern relationship between Australia and Japan and it has been an essential element of this very close partnership between our two countries. Australia has no closer partner or friend in the Asia-Pacific area than Japan and we value the friendship, we value the custom and we place very great store indeed on the bilateral relationship. (Howard 2007)

Words exchanged between Japan and Australia at the political level during the period 2005 to 2007 were flattering and sometimes overwhelming. Nevertheless, the politicians and also the diplomats from both countries confidently described their counter-parts as “closest friend” or “natural partner”.

DISPUTES, DIFFERENCES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS: 2005 – 2007

In spite of the political discourses which came out from both Japan and Australia, suggesting their relationship was at its height during the period between 2005 and 2007, some tensions did exist in reality. These disputes, differences and misunderstandings were evident even as the two countries’ leaders and diplomats were embracing each other. There were several instances which questioned whether the two countries were standing on the same ground and sharing the same values. Whaling, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA)/Economical Partnership

Agreement (EPA), and memories of the Pacific War, were the principal points of tension.

As I have noted, during the Howard government's tenure the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Japan Country Brief page available on the internet praised the bilateral relationship stating "Australia and Japan enjoy excellent relations" (DFAT 2006). While the brief was filled with issues which demonstrated the closeness of the two countries, the department slipped in one sentence which they said that "[w]e don't, of course, agree on all issues, such as Japan's whaling policy". Although it is just a short sentence with no further comment provided, what it contains is highly controversial and complex regarding the two countries' relationship.

Every year around June, tension rises between the two countries, specifically from Australia's side. The Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) is held around this time of the year and in what is now a predictable routine, the tone of the Australian media towards Japan suddenly becomes negative, unfriendly and even hostile. Even in early 2005 when Australia made a domestically difficult decision to send more troops to Iraq to protect Japanese Self Defence Force engineers and both countries were enjoying a close as ever relationship, the annual whale routine appeared on schedule in media reports. In May, when the IWC annual meeting was approaching, a number of reports attacking Japanese policy started to appear in the Australian media. Terms and expressions used by the media when referring to Japanese whaling activity (which the Japanese may call "catching whale"), were very strong and hostile. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation's television program *Asia Pacific Focus* called the activity a "whale kill" and kept using the term "kill" when interviewing

Morishita Joji, the Director for International Negotiations at Japan's Fisheries Agency (*Asia Pacific Focus* 2005). "Kill" is a very common term used by the Australian media when referring to Japan's much contested "scientific research" in the Australian media. *The Sun-Herald's* wording was even stronger and said "[o]utrage over Japan's plan to slaughter humpbacks" (Walsh 2005). Kerry O'Brian from ABC's *The 7.30 Report* called the pro-whaling nations' policy as "hard-headed diplomacy led by Japan" (7.30 Report 2005b). Those reports were often accompanied by disturbing images, for example, of harpooning whale or of bloody slaughtering scenes.

This tendency was also clear in 2007 when Japan and Australia signed the epoch-making Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. In that year, the attention to the whaling issue came earlier than usual. First, in February, Japan had called for a meeting in Tokyo prior to the Annual IWC meeting in May to discuss the normalisation of the IWC which, according to Japan, had fallen into a dysfunctional state (*Yomiuri* 9 February 2007a, p. 11). The meeting was boycotted by anti-whaling nations including Australia (7.30 Report 2007). On this occasion, *The 7.30 Report* ran a program on 13 February, where their Tokyo correspondent Shane McLeod reported from Japan. The topic was how the Japanese government was encouraging Japanese young people, who had rarely eaten whale meat, to eat the meat, to get used to it and learn the tradition related to whaling (7.30 Report 2007). Although the language used in the program was not hostile, the report gave the impression that the Japanese government was manipulating, or maybe even inventing, a Japanese whale consuming culture to make it look like a tradition. Meanwhile, the Japanese whalers who were already in the Antarctic Ocean and conducting their scientific research had experienced trouble when a fire broke out on

one of their ships. The fire claimed one crew member's life and the whalers left the area earlier than planned, cutting short their research. This incident was reported by the Australian media in great detail.

Later that year, the Annual meeting of IWC was held. On 1 June 2007, *The Australian* reported:

Japan today failed in its bid to lift a moratorium on commercial whaling at the end of a stormy annual meeting of the 75-nation International Whaling Commission (IWC) and warned it could pull out of the organisation. (*The Australian* 1 June 2007)

In fact the Annual meeting dealt with wider issues than just Japan's whaling interest, but reports in the Australian media had focused on Japan's bid to resume commercial whaling. What Japan wanted from this Annual meeting was to set a quota of minke whale for Japan's small coastal industry (*The Australian* 1 June 2007). However, Japan withdrew the proposal before the vote considering the anti-whaling nations' opinion (MOFA 2007b). The meeting's agenda was long and it included establishing a whale sanctuary in the South Atlantic, which was rejected, the aboriginal subsistence whaling issue, whalewatching and even the "Future of the IWC" (2007 Meeting 2007). Nonetheless, when the outcome of decisions taken by the IWC are boiled down to a single statement – Japan failed to realise its agenda. When Japan indicated its possible withdrawal from the IWC because it was not satisfied with the outcome of the IWC Annual Meeting, the then Australian Environment Minister Malcolm Turnbull was bold enough to call this behaviour "a dummy-spit" (*SMH* 3 June 2007b) or "a toddler's tantrum" (*IHT* 3 June 2007). The

Minister's words were a far cry from those directed towards your so-called "natural partner".

The picture viewed from the Northern Hemisphere was different. News related to the whaling issue also appeared in the Japanese media during 2007 but the content and the tone of the discussion was very low key. In February, *Asahi Shimbun* reported that Greenpeace Japan had started to broadcast a program which looked into the relationship between Japan and whaling. Greenpeace Japan used its internet television to look at the relationship and had even shown a character in the program trying some whale meat (*Asahi* 9 February 2007a). Closer to the Annual meeting, a report from Wakayama prefecture reported that one fishery cooperative in Taiji, a town known as one of Japan's whaling bases, had gone into self-bankruptcy as a result of the oil shock and the banning of a commercial whaling (*Kii Minpo* 2 May 2007). However, the article did not mention the Annual meeting of the IWC. It was just another local news story. A month later, the result of the Annual meeting came out and harsh criticism of Japan's desire to resume commercial whaling was reported (*Jiji* 29 May 2007). However, the tone was not as overheated as it had been in Australia. Moreover, what is very interesting is that even in reports of the IWC annual meeting, specific reference to Australia was minimal. Australia was almost invisible and Australia's direct attack on Japanese whaling was not taken up by the Japanese media. It appears that Japan was not being soft on Australia. This gives an impression that a natural partner Australia was invisible to the Japanese media. Australia was not sounding like a special country in the eyes of Japan.

Apart from the whaling issue which could be explained as a dispute based on different social attitudes, Australia and Japan have also experienced difficulties

over trade issues. In April 2005, when Prime Minister Howard visited Japan on the occasion of the Expo 2005, the main purpose of his visit was to have further discussion over the possibility of a FTA between the two countries with Prime Minister Koizumi. A positive sign was then sent by Japan, when the then Australian Foreign Minister Downer visited the country a month before Howard'. After Downer's visit the Australian government believed that "[t]he stage is now set for the Prime Minister and Mr. Koizumi Junichiro to announce a feasibility study next month during John Howard's visit to Tokyo" (Cameron 2005). However, the outcome of the summit meeting was ambiguous. At the joint press conference after the meeting, Howard welcomed "the fact that both countries, through our talks today, have agreed to further elevate or enhance the economic relationship, including the study of the feasibility of a Free Trade Agreement". Koizumi said only "[w]e agreed to look into this (FTA) and study this and continue to discuss that" (Howard & Koizumi 2005). Howard sounded very positive about the FTA, while Koizumi was rather low-key in his comments.

Koizumi's ambiguous tone was reproduced in Japanese media reports. On the day of the joint conference, 20 April, *Mainichi Shimbun* first reported the outcome of the summit meeting electronically. It reported the outcome as a flash news titled "'Nichi-Go FTA' Kosho miokuri kettei (Decision made to put off the Japan-Australia FTA talk)" (Kojima & Mochizuki 2005). However, the next day, a shorter but similar version of the article appeared in the newspaper as saying "*Nichi-Go FTA: Kenkyu kaishi wa goi – shuno kaidan* (Japan-Australia FTA: The summit meeting agreed to commence studies)" (Kojima 2005). Both articles were referring to the commencement of a "study", but the Japanese Prime Minister's comment could be taken in a either positive or negative way. Later this ambiguity was pointed out to

Howard by an Australian journalist at a doorstep interview at the Aichi Expo 2005. The journalist noted that Japan “seem(s) to be reluctant to even call it a feasibility study”, Howard answered “[w]ell different countries have different nuances ...” (Howard 2005c). The answer was clear enough to admit the slight difference in the countries’ positions towards the negotiation of a FTA.

It was at the end of 2006 when this issue again came to media attention. On 13 December, it was reported in Australia that after talking over the phone with his counterpart, Prime Minister Abe, Howard had announced the start of the 2007 free trade negotiations with Japan (Veness 2006). The title of an article in *The Australian* was “Talks to begin on Japan FTA” (Marris 2006). This news, however, was reported differently in the Japanese media. *Mainichi Shimbun*, *Tokyo Shimbun* and *Hokkaido Shimbun* said that the Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia had agreed on the phone that they would start negotiation of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). *Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Sankei Shimbun* noted that the countries would launch EPA negotiations which would have a FTA as its core.

In Canberra, while waiting for the first negotiation meeting to take place on 23 and 24 April 2007, both countries signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. They signed the Declaration in March. Along with their strategic partnership in security, their further cooperation in economic matters was mentioned in Abe’s and Howard’s joint press conference. In the comment made at the beginning of the conference, Abe revealed that an EPA was on the agenda of the summit meeting prior to the conference and he described how it would strengthen Japan’s and Australia’s strategic relationship (Abe & Howard 2007). However, Howard used the term FTA and he used this term even when he was answering a question from a Japanese reporter who asked about the merit of this future

economic agreement using the term EPA (Abe & Howard 2007). Not surprisingly, the Japanese media reported this economic agreement which was to be signed by the two countries as an EPA, whereas the Australian media referred to it as a FTA⁵⁷.

According to a leaflet distributed by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs the FTA would aim to reduce or eliminate tariffs on goods and also aim to delete obstacles related to service trades (EPA to FTA 2007). On the other hand, an EPA is explained as a wider framework that includes issues relating to investment rules and protection of intellectual property. Therefore, as *Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Sankei Shimbun* reported in December 2006, a FTA is a core part of an EPA and not necessarily related to totally different issues. According to the then Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro, a FTA is an agreement that assumes the importance of national borders, whereas an EPA deals with issues assuming there are no economic borders created by national borders. He goes on to argue that this means that a FTA “is a reminiscent of the 20th-century” while an EPA a more advanced concept (Aso 2006). An Australian description of the difference between a FTA and an EPA can be found on the Australian Embassy in Japan’s webpage. It is particularly interesting. Although the Embassy is a representative of the Australian government and so is required to use the term FTA, it also has to consider its Japanese readers and so has used the term EPA. This is the term familiar to the readers of its webpage. The Embassy used the expression “EPA/FTA” in Japanese pages and then explained that in Australia FTA includes goods and services trades, investment and other areas and is similar to an EPA as understood in Japan (An

⁵⁷ See, for instance, articles in *Nikkei Shimbun* or *Yomiuri Shimbun* for Japanese examples and *Australian Financial Review* (by Tim Harcourt) or *AAP* (by Maria Hawthorne) for Australian examples. They are all from 14 March 2007.

EPA/FTA with Australia). This sounds as if the Embassy was making excuses for the difference in the wording used on its Japanese webpage, rather than experiencing a case of “lost in translation”.

The ambiguous rhetoric coming from both governments and the media became an obstacle to the two countries pursuit of closer trade relationship, particularly in the case of agriculture. At the time of the commencement of the first round of negotiations on EPA/FTA on 23 and 24 April 2007, Okada Kanji asked “Should we eliminate agriculture from Japan?” (Okada 2007, p. 18). He warned “if Japan signs the EPA with agricultural giant Australia and if the tariffs on key items, for example, beef and wheat, are abolished, agriculture in Japan would be subject to devastating damage” (2007, p. 18). Reports on Japan and Australia’s negotiation on EPA/FTA appeared frequently in newspapers like *Nippon Nogyo Shimbum* (The Japan Agricultural News) and *Hokkaido Shimbum*, which is Hokkaido’s local newspaper. Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan, is primarily an agricultural producer. This situation was, of course, recognised by the both governments and this point was addressed by Abe and Howard at a joint press conference in Tokyo in March 2007. They referred to Japan’s agriculture as a very sensitive issue in both speeches and at a question-and-answer session and said agriculture would require significant consideration (Abe & Howard 2007).

It should also be noted that the agricultural sector is not only a powerful economic and political sector in Japan. The agricultural sector in Australia is also powerful and Australian farmers pressured their government to push for their interests in the course of FTA negotiations. They recognised that Japanese agriculture is a sensitive issue, but also recognised that the sector continues to be heavily subsidised. They argued that FTA negotiations should not include

exceptions (*The Advertiser* 14 December 2006, Shanahan & Kerr 2006, p. 2). This pressure made it difficult for the Australian government to compromise with its Japanese counterpart and the negotiations became tougher.


In case of the FTA/EPA, the governments of Japan and Australia began from a shared view of the benefits to be gained from enhancing their trading relationship. However, pressures on both governments from their own agricultural sectors made FTA/EPA negotiations difficult and complex.

Issues surrounding whaling and the FTA/EPA negotiations between Japan and Australia were sufficient to harm both countries' "natural partners" relationship. And, there was an even more deep-rooted difference between the two countries. This related to the two countries' perceptions and consciousness of issues related to the Pacific War. For Australia, it was a war to defend the country from an invasion by an expansionist Imperial Japan. The Australian people's memory of the war coincides with the resentment regarding the inhumane acts by the Japanese military on battle lines in South East Asia and in Japanese POW camps. On the other hand, among the Japanese, the same war is remembered as a war between Japan and the United States of America. John Dower points out that the overwhelming presence and initiative of the United States in Japan during the occupation period that followed Japan's surrender made Asian people who had suffered under Imperial Japan's occupation "invisible" (Dower 2000, p. 27). Even the name of the war was changed by the United States. It was changed from the Great East Asia War, which indicates the existence of the battlefields of Asia, to the Pacific War (Dower 2000, p. 419). In this process the "vaporization", as Dower calls it, of Asia took place and Australia also became invisible to the minds of the Japanese people. Australia was over-shadowed by the United States. This

difference between Japan and Australia in how they remember the Pacific War has emerged when issues regarding security and military operation occurred in their bilateral relationship.

The February 2005 decision of the Howard Government to send more troops to Iraq in order to protect Japanese Self Defence Force's engineers was, as I have already noted, a controversial decision. It was recognised by the Australian people as a backflip in government policy, and it was also controversial from another political perspective. Considering Australians' resentment towards Japan in relation to the war in the Pacific, the image of Australian troops protecting Japanese soldiers, despised enemies of the past, did not sit well. Although there was no significant overt protest in the streets by Australians, reflection on the past was evident in media reports. *The Courier-Mail* wrote "... the irony of Australian troops being used to protect Japanese soldiers was not lost on the RSL, which warned that many World War II veterans would not approve of the deployment" (Osedo & Williams 2005). In an article titled "RSL fears mission will reopen old wounds" in *The Advertiser*, it was reported that the "National president (of RSL) Bill Crews said while he welcomed the 'spirit of co-operation' between Australia and Japan, not all RSL members were willing to forget" (McIlveen 2005). This ironic element of the decision drew the attention of some satirists. Cartoonist Peter Nicholson recalled the construction of the Thai-Burma Railway during the war where Australian POWs were used as labourers.

'Please see print copy for
image'



**Figure 1: Peter Nicholson, “The Bridge on the River Euphrates”,
The Australian 23 Feb 2005**

In the ABC’s *7.30 Report*, an actor John Clarke playing John Howard’s role and Brian Dawe played the role of interviewer. They presented the following satirical conversation.

Dawe as Interviewer: Well, it’s not bad – “We’re going over to help the Japanese and replace the Dutch.”

Clarke as John Howard: Replace the Dutch, yes. I mean, the Japanese are going in there to reconstruct Iraq and we’re going to help them.

Interviewer: Will they be building any bridges?

John Howard: The Japanese?

Interviewer: Yes.

John Howard: I’ve got no idea, Bryan. Why do you ask?

Interviewer: Well, Australian troops have helped the Japanese in the past building bridges, and I just wondered – you know, it’s something we can do.

John Howard: It’s a very, very good angle, Bryan.

(*7.30 Report* 2005a)

When the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was signed two years after the collaboration between Australian and Japanese troops in Iraq, recollection of the memory of the Pacific War was again evident. Voices opposing the signing were clearly heard. In Australia, news of Australia signing a historic declaration was reported in the media before the actual signing. The first media reports coincided with Howard's departure for Tokyo. Although the most crucial concern about this declaration was how China would take this close security tie between Japan and Australia⁵⁸, many articles could not avoid mentioning a war that had ended in 1945. Patrick Walters commented "... through the bitter years of conflict in World War II followed by a slow and painful return after 1945 to more normal relations" (Walters 2007) and then he referred to the signing of the declaration as an argument that "dramatically symbolises the vastly changed bilateral relationship between the two countries" (Walters 2007). *The Sydney Morning Herald* reported "[i]t's been more than 60 years since Japanese troops attempted to invade Australia, ..." (*SMH* 11 March 2007a). While the RSL's view on this issue was sought and reported, Howard was repeatedly asked questions by journalists, including at a question session at a joint press conference with Abe, regarding the two countries' past. At the conference, Howard stressed that we must remember the past but, at the same time, it is important to look to the future and try to move forward (Abe & Howard 2007). This explanation was frequently quoted in media reports in Australia.

At the same time as security issues were being discussed with the Australian government, the Japanese government was in a serious trouble. It was obliged to cope with criticism which originated from the United States regarding the comfort

⁵⁸ See, for instance, Dennis Shanahan and Patrick Walters' report in *The Australian*, "Our military ties with Japan worry China", 10 March 2007, *ABC Online* report, "Japanese security pact no threat to China: Howard", 12 March 2007.

women' during the war. The ambiguous explanations coming from the Japanese government once again provoked protests from other countries. It was said that Japan still had not faced up to the atrocity and had not properly apologised. This stirred up resentment towards Japan in Australia and some bitter comments came from the public. Responding to Paul Kelly's comment on the issue in *The Australian*, a person called "flake" posted a comment in the paper's blog saying "I don't trust a people who cannot face their war time history of atrocities" and "I personally don't like the Japanese because I don't and can't forget, but my generation is dying off, so we'll be out of the way, so we can be ignored" (Paul Kelly Blog 2007). A person called "ralph of sydney" said "Japan is a nation of dishonest people" in the "Your Say" page of *The Australian* the person continued "We should have no dealings with Japan until they pay their WW2 debts including to the women they used as slaves". This person called Howard "a traitor to his country in having any dealings with the japs" (Your Say Blog)

However, this resentment towards Japan is hardly recognised or understood or maybe even cared about in Japan. In contrast to the concern of Australians with regard to the past war, few in the Japanese media referred to the sensitivity of Australians with respect to military cooperation with Japan. *Asahi Shimbun's* report on Howard's decision to increase the number of troops in Iraq to protect Japanese SDF personnel touches on the sensitivity (Inada & Ogura 2005). It said that memories of Japan's direct attack on the continent and of prisoners of war remain in Australian society and, therefore, the decision by Howard had symbolical meaning for the Japan-Australia relationship (Inada & Ogura 2005). *Sankei Shimbun's* editorial mentioned that some Australians still harboured discomfort towards Japan (*Sankei Shimbun* 23 February 2005, p. 2). But there was just a few

line comment and Japan's commitment or responsibility to Australian sensitivities was vague. What Japan was more concerned about was its own pacifist Constitution which was blocking the SDF from entering combat zones like Iraq without foreign troop protection and also the legality of the SDF being in Iraq in the first place.

In March 2007, a day after the announcement of the signing of the Joint Declaration, the incident was reported in Japanese newspapers bigger than the usual news related to Australia but there was only one newspaper, *Yomiuri Shimbun* mentioned the sensitive part of the deal with Australia (Kuromi & Nii 2007, p. 2). What was obviously much more important for Japan was the point that the Iraq commitment may lead the country to taking a significant step forward in relation to security after the Pacific War. Japan has never been in this kind of close security relationship with foreign countries except with the United States. As Taoka Shunji told ABC's radio program *PM* in 2005, "Most, 99.9 per cent of Japanese do not know what happened to Australian troops in the Second World War" (Percy 2005). This is partly to do with the ignorance of Japanese people about their own country's past. However it has more to do with the invisibility of Australia in both the Pacific War and in general.

In spite of everything, the tensions between them did not stop Australia and Japan from becoming politically closer at the beginning of this new century. When Howard made the controversial decision to send more troops to Iraq to protect Japanese SDF officers, along with criticisms of the decision, positive comments emerged as well. Greg Sheridan, a supporter of the decision, said it "sits squarely in the traditions of Australian strategic policy" (Sheridan 2005, p. 4). He went on to say:

The extraordinary Australia-Japan relationship has come full circle when Aussie soldiers are watching over Japanese build roads and bridges. Once long ago, it was the Japanese watching over Australians performing that task, in an environment of cruelty and persecution. (2005, p. 4)

Sheridan even turned the critical memory regarding the construction of the Thai-Burma Railway into a brighter picture of the present and the future. According to Sheridan "... now old enemies are the best of friends".

Two years later when the two countries signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, Patrick Walters of *The Australian* looked into earlier cooperation between Australia and Japan and also interpreted the signing as a "full circle" event. He referred to an event which happened ninety two years ago on the occasion of The Great War – a war frequently mentioned as the origin of Australian nationhood. During the war the battle cruiser Ibuki of the Imperial Japanese Navy had protected Australian ships carrying Australian soldiers sailing to the Western Front from German naval attack in the Indian Ocean (Walters 2007, p. 2). Walters determined that "[n]ow, the strategic wheel has turned full circle – through the bitter years of conflict in World War II followed by a slow and painful return after 1945 to more normal relations" (2007, p. 2). This closer than ever relationship between Australia and Japan was described as a "natural" situation. Reference to the bilateral relationship before the Pacific War is rare in Australia and this simply demonstrates that even the most aggressive resentment towards Japan could be overcome if required. Howard was quoted as saying "[i]t's important to the future that Japan assumes a greater security role in the region". He continued "[y]ou don't forget the past and you learn lessons from the past. But if we are to have a future

together in this region, then we must work together and recognise the need to do so” (*SMH* March 11 2007a).

John Howard’s seventh visit to Japan in March 2007, which turned out to be his last as Prime Minister, became a showcase for his policy regarding Japan in the Asia-Pacific. In Tokyo, prior to the meeting with his counterpart Abe Shinzo, he met Taro Aso, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kyuma Fumio, Minister of Defence, and Amari Akira, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. He met each Minister individually and held talks⁵⁹. In addition, he greeted officers of Japan’s SDF who had served in Iraq under the Australian Defence Force’s protection. He was shown appreciation for Australia’s commitment in that particular task in Iraq (JMOD 2007). The visit again depicted the closeness of the two countries. There is no doubt that the initiative of the Howard Government meant that Australia and Japan had become and that their relationship was the strongest ever.

A RELATIONSHIP WHICH “TRANSCENDS POLITICAL DIVIDES”

Kevin Rudd, who became the 26th Prime Minister of Australia on 3 December 2007, inherited a very close partnership relation with Japan. However, he stumbled at the very beginning of his Prime Ministership. The new government had tried to place emphasis on differences between its policies and those of the former government. Signing the Kyoto Protocol, making clear that there would be a withdrawal from Iraq, and delivering the Sorry speech regarding the Stolen Generation were a few of the new policies which were favourably received by Australian society. The move to drive the country in a different direction was seen as Australia taking a better and more just road and was recognised as moving away

⁵⁹ See, for instance, *Mainichi Shimbun* 13 March 2007 (by Hitoshi Omae) and *Sankei Shimbun* 14 March 2007, p. 8.

from the previous “dark age”. However, in relation to the Australia-Japan relationship, the new government had quickly fallen into a complex and controversial situation. There were two major issues – “skipping Japan” and whaling.

On 4 March 2008, Rudd announced his overseas trip to the United States and Europe and on his way back, to China (Rudd 2008a). Then, more than ten days later, on the 16th, it was reported that the then Opposition leader Brendan Nelson had accused Rudd of skipping Japan in his first major overseas trip (*AAP* 16 March 2008). Nelson was quoted as saying “... it was difficult to understand why the prime minister was not visiting Japan, Australia’s largest trading partner ...”. Nelson noted that “Mr Rudd speaks Mandarin”. He then said “He [Rudd] needs to brush up on his Japanese and visit the Japanese prime minister” (*AAP* 16 March 2008). After this the media was full of Rudd-bashing regarding his “Japan skipping” which was read in the context of the Sino-centric character of Rudd.

The omission of Japan from the trip was described by Andrew Robb, the Opposition Foreign Affairs spokesman, as “bad diplomacy” (*ABC* 16 March 2008b) and two scholars, Tom Conley and Michael Heazle, wrote it is “[b]ad policy to leave Tokyo out in the cold” in *The Australian* (Conley & Heazle 2008, p. 14). Other headlines read “Rudd cops flak for ignoring Japan” (Coorey 2008a), “Japan fury over Rudd snub” (Koutsoukis 2008) or “Japan-Rudd relations a ‘major problem’” (Hall 2008). Later in May, it was said in *The Weekend Australian Financial Review* “Australia has been a farm and mine for Japan for 40 years, yet in only six months Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has managed to shake Tokyo’s confidence that Canberra can deliver for another 40 years”. The writer of the article drew on comment from Alan Dupont saying that “The Japanese do feel Kevin Rudd is

overfocused on China and has not so far paid sufficient deference to Tokyo” (Kerin 2008, p. 26). These articles tended to see the Japan-China relationship only as one of rivalry and within that context, even Rudd’s expertise as a China expert was represented as a weak point or a negative characteristic of the Prime Minister. Terms and phrases like “China obsession” (Sheridan 2008a, p. 3), “China fever” (Conley & Heazle 2008, p. 14), “The China syndrome” (*The Australian* 3 May 2008), “China bias” (O’Malley 2008b) were attached to the Rudd government. Rudd was called a “Sinophile” (O’Malley 2008a) or even described as a “panda hugger”⁶⁰.

Apart from this “skipping Japan” incident, there was another issue, probably a more serious one, dividing the two countries – whaling. As I have noted above, whaling has been a sticking point for Australia and Japan since the Howard era. However, the confrontation between the two countries became starker under the new government. In May 2007, six months before the Australian Labor Party became the ruling party, Kevin Rudd, the leader of the then Opposition, and Peter Garrett, the then Shadow Minister for Climate Change, Environment, Heritage and Arts, jointly released a media statement titled “Federal Labor’s Plan To Counter International Whaling”. They suggested the possibility of taking “Japan to international courts such as the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to end the slaughter of whales” and to “monitor whaling vessels operating in Australian waters, and intercept vessels operating illegally” (ALP 19 May 2007). Then in the middle of November, just before the Federal Election, Robert McClelland, the then Opposition foreign affairs spokesman,

⁶⁰ Greg Sheridan wrote on the 7th of June that among East Asianists there were two types in broad sense. One is “the Chrysanthemum Club”, which indicates the Japanese studies scholars, and the other is “the Panda Huggers”, which points to the China studies scholars, and suggested Rudd to be a panda hugger. (Sheridan 7 June 2008b, p. 22)

reinstated the need for monitoring and suggested the possibility of using military resources for this purpose (O'Malley 2007). This hard line policy towards Japanese whaling worked well as one of the contrasts which the ALP focused on in order to emphasise the difference between the Labor policies and those of the Howard Government. Since the Australian public was not satisfied with Howard's approach towards the Japanese with regard to this issue, the Labor Opposition's hard line policy gained positive support. Reaffirming his policy during the election campaign, Rudd, just 10 days into his Prime Ministership, said that the new government will seek legal action against Japanese whaling. Although Rudd himself did not directly mention the possibility of using military vessels on the day, the media reported that "The Rudd Government is preparing to send the navy and air force to monitor Japanese whalers about to enter Australian waters" (Farr 2007). Reflecting the expectation and also the sentiment of Australian society, the media reports in Australia used provocative words and expressions.

In reality, what the Rudd Government had done was to send the Australian Customs ship the *Oceanic Viking*, not a Navy ship, to Antarctica to monitor and survey the Japanese whaling and to investigate the possibility of making a case under the international legal system (Smith 2008). For those Australians who expected a Naval ship to be dispatched⁶¹ for tougher action, the "monitoring and surveillance" activity of *Oceanic Viking* appeared rather indecisive and less exciting. However, a release of photos and video footage by the Australian Customs of Japanese whaling activities at the beginning of February and the following push from the media (Williams 2008) was enough to raise tension between the "natural

⁶¹ An opinion poll conducted by The Age shows, 91% saying "Yes" to a question "Should the Government send the navy to monitor Japanese whaling ships?". (*The Age* 21 December 2007, p. 10)

partners". One of the photos, a controversial "mother and calf" picture which fanned Australian sentiment, became critical. In the same day, for the first time during this event, strong criticism of Australia emerged in Japan. According to a media release from The Institute of Cetacean Research, they were not a mother and a calf but two female whales which had no sign of lactation (ICR 2008). The Director General of the Institution described Australian media's way of reporting as "dangerous emotional propaganda" (ICR 2008). The Japanese government was apparently not happy, actually it was angry, with the Australian government which allowed the Australian Customs to release those photos (Bergin 2008, p. 17, Coorey 2008b, p. 8,). The Australian government's policy and an overreaction from the Australian media and public had ironically, raised the Japanese people's interest in Australia. Australia was, once again, depicted as a 'racist' country with a record of a White Australia policy and the anti-whaling movement was presented as yet another case of cultural imperialism by "the West".

However, the Rudd government policy which appeared to be hard line did not last very long and by the time Rudd made his first trip to Japan as the Prime Minister in May, everything started to appear to be back to "normal". Nevertheless, when he announced his trip to Japan, the "skipping Japan" issue was once again brought up in the media. The trip was described as being "brought forward ... following a flurry of speculation he had offended one of Australia's closest allies and biggest trading partners by not visiting Tokyo" (2008a, p. 8). The then Deputy Opposition Leader Julie Bishop accused the Prime Minister saying "[h]is conduct toward Japan over the last six months has been unforgivable" and he has a "serious repair job to do" (2008b, p. 2). Therefore, his trip to Japan appeared to be a

relationship make-up journey. Nevertheless, Rudd was duly welcomed to the country and did as much as he could in just four days.

Arriving in Hiroshima in the afternoon of June 8, he visited the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and the Museum; paused in front of Kinkakuji Temple in Kyoto; gave a lecture to students of Kyoto University signed a 35 million dollar deal with Toyota; laid a wreath at the Commonwealth War Cemetery; promoted “Aussie” beef at one of the national supermarkets; took a tour for the National Art Gallery where Australian Aboriginal artist Emily Kame Kngwarreye’s paintings were exhibited; paid a visit to a local primary school; had an audience with the Emperor and the Empress at the Imperial Palace; and finally met his counterpart, the then Japanese Prime Minister, Fukuda Yasuo.

During his trip Rudd described Japan using flattering phrases like “Japan is a fantastic country” (Hawthorne 2008b) or “the culture of Japan is great and ancient” (McLeod 2008). As for the relationship between the two countries, he said it is “a fantastic relationship” (Rudd 2008d). He also stated “our relationship and our future together is not just based on common interests, it is also based on common values and an enduring friendship” (Hawthorne 2008b). Overall, as he asserted on the day of his departure to Japan, the two countries’ relationship looked in “first class working order” (Coorey 2008c, p. 2).

The reality of Australia-Japan relationship and also the fundamental approach of the Rudd Government towards Japan were reflected in Rudd’s press conference speech after the summit meeting. Rudd said:

I believe the Australia-Japan relationship is so strong, so broad and so deep it’s embedded in the political cultures of both of our countries. Labor and Liberal in Australia and LDP and I believe Democratic Party here in Japan as well. ...

The great thing about the Australia-Japan relationship is I believe that it actually transcends political divides. It is so strong, it is so positive, it's so important economically, politically and of course strategically. (Rudd 2008f)

This view demonstrates that the basic Australian policy concerning Japan under the Rudd Government follows and maintains the legacy of the Howard era.

At this moment, looking back at Rudd's way of handling the Australia-Japan relationship in his first six months in the office, it is rather doubtful if he was changing Australia's approach to Japan. The government had a tougher policy against whaling and did leave Japan out of Rudd's first major overseas trip. However, the tension between the two countries was overstated by the Australian media, the Liberal Opposition and was particularly overstated with regard to whaling because of the sentiment of Australian public. As early as January 2008, Simon Crean, the Minister for Trade, was sent to Australia's biggest trading partner (MOFA 2008a). Stephen Smith, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, followed Crean about a week later and he even paid a courtesy visit on the then Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda (MOFA 2008b). Later in 2008, the fifth Australia-Japan Conference was held in Tokyo. The Conference, which is described as a significant event in the bilateral relationship, was established in 1999, during the Howard era (DFAT 2008b). Also, the second '2+2' Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations, which was the outcome of Howard-Koizumi cooperation on security issues, was held (DFAT 2008b). As I note above, the "first class working order of the relationship" seems to be intact from the early stage of the Rudd Government and could not be changed dramatically because of the change of political climate in Australia, or in Japan.

When it comes to whaling, the termination of Japanese scientific research in the Southern Ocean at the end of March eventually made the issue less visible in everyday media coverage. This issue continues to be the biggest disagreement between the two countries. However, it is now described as a “disagreement among friends” (Hawthorne 2008a). According to DFAT’s Country Brief on Japan, the disagreement “should be viewed in the context of strong, extensive and mature cooperation between Australia and Japan” (DFAT 2008b).

THE REASON JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA ARE DRAWN TOGETHER

The Japan-Australia relationship which transcends not just political divides but also other differences and disputes such as whaling indicates that there is definitely a shared interest in maintaining their close relationship. Their closeness, particularly in this new century, is once again derived from their shared inferiority complex in relation to the West. Their ambiguous identities influenced by the complex that draws them to each other.

During his twelve year Prime Ministership, John Howard faced six different Japanese Prime Ministers. Koizumi Junichiro, who came to power in April 2001, was no doubt, Howard’s closest counterpart. On his visit to Australia in 2002, Koizumi issued a joint statement with Howard titled “Australia-Japan Creative Partnership” (MOFA 2003). Since then, in this beginning of the new century, Japan has made a significant step forward towards the Southern Hemisphere. The joint statement was followed in 2003 by the Australia-Japan Joint Statement on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, a joint Australia-Japan statement in 2006, Building a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Foreign Ministers, and in 2007 Koizumi’s successor Abe Shinzo and Howard signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (DFAT 2008b).

The political closeness of these two countries has made Australia, which had always been an insignificant country for Japan and had been only remembered for kangaroos, koalas, the Great Barrier Reef, Uluru, the Southern Cross and other unique flora and fauna, come to the attention of at least the Japanese media. One symbolic incident was the report in relation to the Australian Federal Election in November 2007. Right after the election, all five major Japanese nationwide-distributed newspapers took up the election in their editorials. This was an unprecedented situation. The Howard Government's attention to Japan had definitely contributed to the growing recognition of Australia and Australian affairs and issues in Japan.

The focus of the Japanese editorials was not on Kevin Rudd's victory but mainly on the defeat of John Howard who was in turn described as a strong supporter of George W. Bush. Depicting Howard as a firm pro-US figure in policies on Iraq and global warming, *Asahi Shimbun* wrote that Australia would be "departing from being a US follower" (*Asahi* 27 November 2007b). *Asahi*, *Sankei Shimbun* and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* pointed out that the world leaders who supported the United States at the beginning of the Iraq invasion in March 2003, including the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and its own Koizumi, had all exited from mainstream politics (*Asahi* 27 November 2007b, p. 3, *Sankei* 27 November 2007d, *Nikkei* 26 November 2007b, p. 2). In turn, Kevin Rudd was introduced as a person who, although keeping the US as the main strategic partner, would introduce slightly altered foreign policy from Howard's. What becomes apparent from these editorials is that Japan's interest in Australia had increased because of Australia's closeness to the United States which became clearly visible to Japan under the Howard Government and the result of the election in Australia was read and analysed in the context of

the international politics which has had the United States as its core. This situation reflects the Japanese tendency to see the world in US-centric terms, or more broadly, in a Western-centric way. And, this is exactly an aspect of Japan which Australia is most comfortable about.

Australia and Japan's recent closeness had been promoted by the Australian and Japanese governments on the basis of their country's shared values. Democracy is on the top of the list, freedom of expression, basic human rights, the rule of law, and a market economy, are values which are considered to be shared by advanced Western countries. These common values were clearly enshrined in the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. At the very beginning of the Joint Declaration, it says:

The Prime Ministers of Australian and Japan,

Affirming that the strategic partnership between Australia and Japan is based on democratic values, a commitment to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship; ...
(MOFA 2007a)

On the occasion of the signing of the Joint Declaration, there was concern raised by the media regarding the sensitivity of the declaration to other countries, specifically in relation to China. When asked by reporters about this concern, Howard admitted that China is also a very good and close friend of Australia. However, Howard also referred to Japan's credentials as a democratic country, and used this credential as justification for his decision to become strategically closer to Japan (Howard 2007). In turn, Abe Shinzo echoed Howard. Answering a question from the Australian media, Abe affirmed that his diplomatic policy is to enhance cooperation with

countries which share basic values such as democracy and freedom (Alford 2007, p. 1, *The Australian* 13 March). He stressed that Australia is one such country specifically in the Asia-Pacific region (Alford 2007, p. 1).

While reassuring their peoples that the two countries have fundamental social values in common, another “shared value”, which is the most crucial one, was emphasised by both sides – being firm US allies. Since 1951, Japan has been aligned to the United States through the Japan-US Security Treaty. As for Australia, it has the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) which also came into force in 1951. Recently, their firm support of the Iraq war – America’s war – which was interpreted as a part of the so-called “war on terror”, made their pro-US stance even clearer. Greg Sheridan wrote in March 2007 “John Howard, George W. Bush and Japan’s recently retired prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, became ideological and personal soulmates” and “[t]his was reflected in Iraq” (Sheridan 2007, p. 2).

The much-contested decision by the Australian Government to send troops to southern Iraq was much welcomed by the Japanese Government. Its unpopular and much contested deployment of the Self Defence Force to the conflict zone was on the edge of withdrawal. Japan could have been forced to withdraw if Australia had not decided to replace Dutch forces which were protecting the Japanese forces until that time. The Dutch had decided to end their mission. Australia had rescued the Japanese Government. Japan was able to keep its presence in the war in Iraq – the American war – until it finally withdrew from Iraq after completing its intended tour in July 2006 (*Nikkei* 25 July 2006). As for Australia, although it was a difficult decision, it helped Australia’s visibility as a firm US ally in the international arena. As is apparent in this case, Australia and Japan are set to cooperate and to develop

closer ties because of their political decisions taken under the present international climate. They are making more and more similar decisions and justifying their positions in the world as pro-US and thus pro-Western nations.

In Sydney in March 2006, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Aso Taro, the Foreign Minister of Australia, Alexander Downer, and the Secretary of State of the United States, Condoleezza Rice, gathered to establish a high level Trilateral Security Dialogue on strategic security issues (MOFA 2006). The establishment of this ground-breaking trilateral dialogue was once again described as an alliance between countries which share values. Again, “democracy” was mentioned and Howard affirmed “... we are, the three of us, great Pacific democracies and we therefore have an enormous amount in common” (Howard 2007). Since then, the Dialogue has been held three times between 2006 and 2008 and, in September 2007, a summit meeting among the three countries was held in Sydney on the occasion of the APEC meeting. Having this trilateral alliance as a background, the signing of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Australia and Japan in March 2007 can be recognised as the completion of a triangle which connects the United States, Australia and Japan.

Terashima Jitsuro once wrote that Japan’s diplomacy in the twentieth century could be summarised as a keyword the “Anglo-Saxon Alliance” (Terashima 2003, p. 133). Japan secured its position in the world using the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with Britain at the beginning of the century and after World War Two the United States was its custodian based on the US-Japan Security Treaty (Terashima 2003, p. 133). This was also true for Australia. Being a colony of Britain, Australia’s link to the Anglo-Saxon state is obvious. After the decline of Britain’s power in the world after World War Two, Australia approached the United States which was closer and

stronger than its mother country. Both Japan and Australia have relied on powerful Western states, which happen to be predominantly of British heritage, to promote their positions in the international arena. They have done this since they became modern nation states.

In the structure, as I outline in this thesis, both Japan and Australia are in a subordinated position in relation to the West. At the same time, as I argue in Chapter Five, both countries have isolated themselves from their geographical neighbours. They have located themselves in a superior position relative to neighbouring Asian countries. As a result, two countries that similarly float between the West and Asia have become closer in the present international arena. From Japan's point of view, although Australia is a country without great power in the world, it is definitely a Western country with a mainstream White population. This aspect of Australia satisfies the Japanese mind which looks towards the West. From Australia's point of view, although Japan appeared to be an Oriental country, its society and moreover its mind, was Westernised enough for Australia to feel comfortable with pursuing a deeper engagement. Two countries on the edge of Asia which are troubled by an inferiority complex in relation to the West have naturally drawn closer to each other in this new century.

CONCLUSION

Bilateral relations between the Japanese archipelago and the Australian continent have a more than hundred year history. However, because of the traumatic memory of World War Two, particularly in Australia, their bilateral relationship waited until 1957, when the two countries signed an Agreement on Commerce.

If the war period was the lowest point in the Japan-Australia relationship, then the high point of the relationship was during Howard's Prime Ministership.

Cooperating with his counterpart Koizumi, Howard made Australia the second-closest ally of Japan after the United States. Their closeness was particularly evident in the area of security and their intimacy became apparent in the international arena. Although Howard's successor, Rudd, initially appeared to be taking a different approach to Japan, it is now obvious that the basis of the bilateral relationship is firm and has not fundamentally changed. On the Japanese side it also made several significant steps forward to the Southern Hemisphere. During the Howard era, the attention paid to Australia by the Japanese media increased.

What becomes apparent from both countries' behaviour with regard to their bilateral relationship is that their common close relationship with the United States, a Western state that has been the most powerful state in the world, is making their relationship closer than ever. Both Japan and Australia try to locate themselves in the international arena in a pro-US and pro-West position. To do so, it is necessary for them to be linked to a powerful Western state and to obtain a guarantee for their position in the world.

Under the circumstances, it is natural for the two countries to feel comfortable with each other. They share an ambiguous identity which floats between the West and the East. An inferiority complex in relation to the West which is embedded deeply in their national psyche makes them believe that they are indeed "natural partners".

CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have attempted to find the reason why Japan and Australia, which are generally believed to be very different countries, appear similarly ambiguous in the context of Asia. As I have argued throughout my thesis, a shared inferiority complex in relation to the West is the main reason for their similarity. Although their historical, cultural and ethnic backgrounds differ, as modern nation states, they are contemporaries in world history. They both went through a social transformation that formed them into nation states from the mid nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century. In addition, for both of them, Western colonial and imperial expansionism has been a crucial cause of their social transformation.

Because of their similar historical backdrop, these two countries share a position in the current international arena. When the archipelago and the continent made their debut as modern nation states, Western imperial powers were already present in almost every corner of the world and international relations was conducted in accord with the rules the West had established. Japan and Australia were latecomers to this framework and, therefore, a sense of their own immaturity developed within both societies in the process of creating their national identities as modern nation states. This sense of not being a full member of the West penetrated their national psyche taking the form of an inferiority complex in relation to the West. It has governed the two countries' collective identity and has informed their behaviour in the international arena.

Symptoms of the complex were and are still recognisable in Japanese and Australian societies in the form of, for example, making an “unnecessary

comparison” with the West and checking whether they are meeting the standards of the West. Externally, this complex has been expressed in the countries’ need to connect themselves to the Western nations. In the present world context this has meant connecting to the United States. In turn, this tendency has led to an awkward relationship with neighbouring Asian countries. To fill in the notion of their shortcomings as full members of the Western nations, Japan and Australia have considered themselves to be superior to neighbouring Asian countries. They have needed “inferior others”. This has eased their disturbed psyche. In both countries, “Asia” has always been an issue which is difficult to handle and even in this twenty first century. Japan and Australia continue to struggle to maintain an equal relationship with nations in the region.

Contemplating this feature of Japan and Australia, at the very end of this thesis, I would argue that the problems all return to the issue of colonialism and imperialism. The last century has often been described as the century of war and revolution. However, it was also a century of liberation particularly for nations which had suffered as objects of colonialism and imperialism. After the last World War, most of these “objects”, including the people and countries of Asia, finally gained independence from their former colonial masters. They went through the process of decolonisation.

In spite of this significant social transformation, the consequences of colonialism are still very much alive in those countries and the traces of former colonisers are still visible. Moreover, the current international politics is still dominated by colonial rhetoric. The world is widely perceived as a place divided into the West and the East with an apparent hierarchy – the former always being ahead of the latter, Edward Said had recognised this situation in *Orientalism* and had consistently

promoted this thesis throughout his life. Said noted that the West has had the power to set the rules and to dominate the rest. Non-Western countries have been forced or spontaneously follow to follow.

Two countries on the periphery of Asia, Japan and Australia, are no exception. They are also still caught within the framework of colonialism. Their behaviour as modern nation states in the current international arena rests on a dichotomous and hierarchical world view. A belief which recognises nation states as developing in a linear manner – from the less-developed and less-sophisticated, from the East to the advanced West – has penetrated their societies and is having a crucial affect on it is crucially affecting the reproduction of their national identities. From a psychological point of view the countries have remained in a colonial context. They need to undertake a process of psychological “decolonisation” – change in rhetoric.

For Japan and Australia, countries where the national identity floats between the Orient and the Occident, it is difficult to position themselves in the context of “decolonisation”. In Australia traces of colonialism are still apparent. The “modern nation state Australia” which came into being on 1 January 1901 was obviously the outcome of British colonialism. At a glance, the separation from its imperial parent country can be understood as a process of decolonisation. However, being a settler colony, the mainstream White population did not retreat from the continent at the point of federation and the hierarchical relationship between the coloniser and colonised remained an essential part of the fabric of the nation. As a result, the colonial way of thinking has persisted. It has not been replaced.

The case of Japan is also complex. Japan is one of two countries in Asia which was not physically colonised by the West. It experienced a period of occupation after World War Two, but it remained independent as a nation state. However, the

subjectivity of Japan in relation to Western countries was apparent and the Japanese were well aware of the reality of Japan not being a full member of the West Club". However, the issue that did not receive much attention was that of "self-colonisation". During the transition period in Japan from the Shogunate feudal country to a modern nation state, Japan spontaneously Westernised the country's political and administrative systems and the life style of the society and, more importantly, Westernised people's way of thinking (Komori 2003, pp. 7-8). The trace of "self-colonisation" is still visible in Japanese society in this new century and a sign of change is hard to see.

Japan and Australia are both caught in an ambiguous situation. They have not been freed from colonial beliefs and rhetoric. This situation is reflected in the international arena, particularly in relation to their behaviour towards Asia. They are yet to perceive Asian countries as their equal partners and they are continually having trouble creating relationships that are free of friction. This friction is a product of Japan's and Australia's arrogance toward countries in the region. In order to create an equal and serene relationship with neighbouring Asian countries, it is necessary for the two countries to "decolonise" themselves and search for a new rhetoric in understanding the world.

Although the chances of change are not great, hope is not absent. In June 2008, when Kevin Rudd made his first trip to Japan as Prime Minister, he chose Hiroshima as his first destination. On 9 June, Rudd and his wife Therese Rein visited Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, laid a wreath and had a tour of the Museum. The local newspaper, *Chugoku Shimbun*, reported that the Prime Minister himself had chosen Hiroshima as his first stop in Japan and had said that international society must make every effort to abolish nuclear weapons and make

the twenty first century “the century of peace” (*Chugoku Shimbun* 9 June 2008). In Australia, *The Age* reported that “Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s visit to Hiroshima has quietly taken Australia’s relationship with Japan into a new era, six decades after the end of World War II” (Nicholson 12 June 2008, p. 4). The article also indicated that the visit had been carefully planned. It reported that the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet had been in contact with the RSL to ask its members’ opinion (Nicholson 2008, p.4). It was that sensitive an event in regard to the Australia-Japan relationship after the war.

However, the significance of Rudd’s visit to Hiroshima went beyond the Japanese-Australian bilateral relationship. Rudd was not only the first serving Australian Prime Minister to visit Ground Zero, but also the first Western serving leader to do so (Rudd 12 June 2008e). That was a historic event which had taken the conventional rhetoric regarding the event happened in Hiroshima in 1945 to a new dimension.

The legitimacy of the United States’ action in dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and also on Nagasaki has always been controversial. There is a view that these incidents are two of the world’s worst crimes. Whereas, the most used explanation, particularly by the United States and members of the former Allied Forces, is that they were acts which “hastened the war’s end and saved thousands of lives” (BBC News 16 December 2003). This rhetoric which is a victor’s rhetoric is at the same time, the rhetoric of colonial and imperial powers.

The Pacific theatre of World War Two was a conflict between imperial powers – between Japan and the United States. However, given that Japan was a latecomer to the international arena dominated by the Western imperial powers, Japan was also a country which was resisting the domination of an imperialistic American

power (Oguma 2002, p. 8). Of course, Japan took resistance in a terribly negative direction – enacting atrocities in Asia – and there is no excuse for that. However, we cannot ignore that the relationship between Japan and the Western powers was never an equal one. Japan was the object of Western imperialism. Therefore, the rhetoric with regard to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which is the victor's rhetoric, could be seen as a reflection of the colonialism and imperialism derived from the West. Rudd's visit to Hiroshima as the leader of a country which was on the side of the imperial powers at the point of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki incidents was, therefore, an epoch making event. He was transcending the rhetoric of the West's domination over the non-Western world.

Unfortunately, this historic event was almost completely ignored internationally. Even in Japan, the event was reported in a low-key manner due to domestic circumstances⁶². However, the event did not remain just as another performance by a politician. Rudd's proposal to establish an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) and to co-chair the Commission with Japan gave the event a practical basis. A former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans was appointed as a chairperson. The aim of the Commission was “to establish a high-level dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament to advance the critical international debate” and to “pave the way for the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] Review Conference” (Rudd 9 June 2008c). The NPT is expecting to hold the Review Conference in 2010. There are some states which are

⁶² The week Rudd visited Japan, the Japanese media were busy following the situation of a fragile Fukuda Administration and also a mass murder case which happened in Akihabara, Tokyo, on 8 June 2008. Also, the peace movement in Japan relating to Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been controversial and complex. Because of the overwhelming influence of the United States on Japanese society after the Pacific War, even voices from Ground Zeros are difficult to be heard (Harada 2008, pp. 231-232). News about nuclear weapons is not the top priority in Japanese society. In addition, because of Japan's staunch Western-centric view, the visit of the Australian Prime Minister to the country itself was not a particularly significant event.

not part of the Treaty and are obtaining nuclear weapons or are not abiding to the rules of the Treaty. The Treaty is losing the effectiveness and the Review Conference is in danger of becoming non-functional (Alexander 2008). To avoid a situation where we “simply stand idly by and allow another Review Conference to achieve no progress – or worse to begin to disintegrate” (Rudd 2008c), Rudd proposed specific action.

Japan reacted positively and swiftly to its counterpart’s proposal. When Rudd returned to Japan a month later on the occasion of the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Outreach Meeting, it was officially announced by the then Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo that Kawaguchi Yoriko, the former Foreign Minister of Japan, would be the co-chairperson for the Commission (MOFA 2008c). The first meeting gathered twelve commissioners including Evans and Kawaguchi from twelve different countries. It was held in Sydney in late October 2008 ⁶³. The commissioners confirmed that the aim of the Commission was to write a report with workable and practical recommendations before the NPT Review Meeting in 2010 (Evans & Kawaguchi 2008). In late 2008, the Commission had a meeting in Tokyo with NGOs and listened to what they had to say about nuclear non-proliferation (MOFA 2008e).

The second meeting of ICNND was held in mid-February 2009 in Washington D.C., the heart of a country which is the most significant nuclear power. On that occasion, three “*hibakusha*” (nuclear bomb survivors) gave their testimonies to the meeting. Having former US Secretary of Defence William Perry present (he is one

⁶³ As of February 2009, The Commissioners of ICNND are: Turki Al Faisal (Saudi Arabia), Alexei Arbatov (Russia), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Frene Noshir Ginwala (South Africa), Francois Heisbourg (France), Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan), Brajesh Mishra (India), Klaus Naumann (Germany), William Perry (US), Wang Yingfan (China), Shirley Williams (UK), Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (Indonesia) and Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico). (ICNND 2008).

of the Commissioners), made it an even more significant event (Takeda & Kawabata 2009). The Commission was able to have talks with members of the new US administration including Vice President Joe Biden (Deshimaru 2009). It is planning to hold similar meetings in Moscow in June and in Hiroshima in October and is aiming to complete its report by the end of this year (Umehara 2009). Australia and Japan's initiative to free the world from the nuclear threat is enjoying progress.

This is just one event which is in progress and we should not be over-optimistic over the outcome of this particular Commission with regard to transcending existing colonial views and rhetoric. The Western-centric view of the world persists in both societies and also in the wider world. It was while promoting the ICNND that Rudd announced his plan to form an Asia-Pacific Community. However, he had failed to consult his Asian neighbours. Japan's Western-centric mindset is staunch and even Australia, a junior member of the West club, often drops from Japanese view. One of the key reasons why Rudd's historic visit to Hiroshima received less than enthusiastic attention from the Japanese public was the invisibility of Australia in the mind of Japanese people.

Nevertheless, the two countries' effort to appeal to the world and to achieve a successful outcome from the ICNND indicates a way for Japan and Australia to break from their dichotomous and hierarchical world view. In the context of 1945, it is difficult to assess the legitimacy of using nuclear bombs. However, judging the incident in the current context, there is no excuse. It was a challenge to the very existence of humanity beyond the context of the Pacific War. The abolition of nuclear weapons is a highly important universal concern. It is said that the distinctive feature of Hiroshima and Nagasaki's peace movement has been not having a focus on retaliation but on the elimination of nuclear weapons (Chikushi

2004, p. 8). The spirit of the movement was motivated by a universal value – humanism. And this is the value which Japan and Australia share in their initiative and commitment to the ICNND. It could be extended to other areas.

Japan and Australia, which float between the Orient and the Occident, are probably in an advantaged position when it comes to establishing an alternative rhetoric that departs from the Western-centric view. Their ambiguous identities have been problematic in the context of a dichotomous and hierarchical world views. However, there is no need to worry about whether they fully belong to the “West club” or not or whether they should be a part of Asia or not. If they could establish a world view free from colonial rhetoric, they would not have to choose between the West and the East. Because they do not clearly belong to either side, it is possibly easier for Japan and Australia to move into a new phase.

What is necessary for the two countries is to depart from the conventional rhetoric. They need to “decolonise” themselves. They need to face up to their ambiguous national identities and recognise the existence of their inferiority complex in relation to the West. An inferiority complex persists as a complex because you are not fully conscious of it (Kawai 2006, p. p. 58). If you could comfortably accept your inferior status, then it would no longer be a complex. It would become a part of your identity (Kawai 2006, p. 59). Thus, if Japan and Australia could recognise their inferiority complex and could comfortably accept their positions in the present international arena, then it is no longer a complex and they would be in a position to move on to a new stage. Although, moving on will not be an easy task, there is no time to waste in their understanding and using their advantaged positions.

AFTERWORD

My voyage in writing this thesis, I suppose, began in December 1976. I am the daughter of a Japanese expat businessman who was living in Sydney and I was enjoying every aspect of my life in Australia. Everything looked perfect for a teenager. However, all of a sudden, my father's appointment to a new position back in Japan had ended my "perfect" days. I was cut off from all the "goodies" of my life in Australia; my friends and teachers at the Sydney Japanese School in Terrey Hills, our home in Middle Cove with a swimming pool, beautiful Northern beaches like Manly and Dee Why, a blue-tongued lizard (or maybe lizards) living in our backyard, sausage rolls from a tuck shop, ice creams from an ice cream van, rugby league games, a TV programme called Countdown, *et cetera*. The list was quite long.

I still clearly remember the moment when I crossed the Sydney Harbour Bridge for the last time in my father's white Ford Falcon in December 1976. I was pretty angry. I looked back at the bridge from the rear window and swore "I shall return", like Douglas McArthur did in Melbourne in 1944. I did not know whom I was directly angry at but I was just angry. And I think that anger led me accomplishing my dream of coming back to this country finally in 2003.

Nevertheless, leaving my anger aside, I lived my life between 1976 and 2003 in Osaka and Tokyo, most of the time feeling happy and fortunate. And now I believe that those 27 years in Japan played a very significant part in completing my thesis. Although I had never imagined myself writing a PhD thesis then, the education I received at Toyonaka Senior High School and Kobe College was essential for this

voyage. Professor Catherine Vreeland and Professor Shigeru Hiroshi are particularly remembered.

Even my hectic days working for the Saison Group, which used to be one of the biggest retailing conglomerates in Japan, as an “OL” (a term stands for an “office lady” which refers to a “working woman in a corporation”), contributed to this thesis. It was a great honour to work as a secretary for the founder and the then Chairman of the Group, Mr. Tsutsumi Seiji (who is also a well known poet and novelist by his pen name Tsujii Takashi). I became familiar with intellectuals, their thoughts and theories which I relied on in the course of my research through his writings. I also think that my research and editing skill was honed while I was working in that profession.

Some people I met as Mr. Tsutsumi/Tsujii’s secretary have provided me with significant support during my postgraduate student days here in Wollongong. I was particularly lucky to have an opportunity to meet Mr. Hori Takeaki and Professor Ochi Michio who were the pioneers of Australian studies in Japan through Mr. Tsujii’s commitment to the Japanese Centre of International P.E.N. Both Mr. Hori and Professor Ochi were kind enough to give me helpful advice regarding studying in Australia even after my departure from the Saison Group. Mr. Akiyama Teruo who is the president of his own publishing company and is an external advisor to Mr. Tsujii always took time to meet me and to even read my papers.

In February 2003, I returned to Australia as a Masters degree coursework student at CAPSTRANS. Since then many people have supported me during my time in Wollongong as an international student. They continue to communicate with me by emails, blogs, letters and sometimes telephone. Some of them supplied me with Japanese food or books and article clippings which were crucial to my study.

Some who are in Wollongong spent time with me having relaxing conversation over tea/coffee, and sometimes dinner. They are the people who consistently have reminded me that there is a wider world outside academia and reminded me not to lose a sense of “real life”, which Edward Said might call “worldliness”.

With my deepest and sincere gratitude, I would like to identify these people. They are: my family and relatives in Japan, friends and colleagues at Campus East – the University accommodation, former classmates at the Sydney Japanese School, Mori Seiko, Ohyama Mayumi, Kitao Tomomichi, Arakawa Jiro, Kiyoyoshi Atsuko, Imatsu Naoko, Shimizu Ichiyo, Mogi Noriko, Yoda Yuko, Masada Naoko, Katase Mayumi, Watanabe Masako, Sato Yuko, Fujiwara Sakiko, Nakano Yukiko, Saito Ritsuko, Yuko Ramsan, Anu Bissoonauth-Bedford, Naiki Sayaka, Dion Oxley, Joakim Eidenfalk, Adam Lockyer, Wendy Kay, Daryl Braithwaite and Keith & Mary Murray. In addition, I would like to extend my special thank you to Mrs. Misaki Shigeko who was the teacher in charge of our class at the Sydney Japanese School in 1972, and has been an inspiration to me for the past 37 years.

Finally, when I started my research five years ago, I was worried about my father who was living in Osaka by himself after my mother’s sudden death in March 1996. Although he was quite healthy and doing fine, he was over 70 and I thought that if something had happened to him, I would have to put aside my study and return to Japan. However, the one who encountered a health threat was me, not him. I still feel sorry and even guilty for making him so worried about me but a medical team at the Japan Red Cross Medical Center headed by Dr. Tanaka Isao made the anxiety of going through a medical ordeal minimal and the interruption to my research and normal daily life as short as possible. They had a quick and very professional response to my illness. I would particularly like to thank nurse Soda

Nana who provided me with a clear and positive vision and courage to overcome my ill-health at the very first stage.

Now, I'm about to log off and get away from my computer. (I assume that this would make, Dr. Aron Downie, a chiropractor, who has been looking after my body by fixing my stiff arms and shoulder which are typical symptoms among PhD students, very happy.) A thought which comes to my mind at this point is that I have been grappling with Japan's and Australia's national identity issues for the past five years. Indeed, I was. However, at the same time, I have been dealing with my own identity – an identity which floats, with no regret, between Japan and Australia. I am able to feel nationalistic sentiment towards both *sakura* and gum trees and I am happy, grateful and somehow proud to be able to be in that position.

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