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Class, gender and state formation:
articulation in Mapuchemapu and Chile
1400-1900

René Orestes Leal Hurtado
University of Wollongong

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**CLASS, GENDER AND STATE FORMATION:
ARTICULATION IN *MAPUCHEMAPU* AND CHILE
1400 – 1900**

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**from
THE UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG**

**by
René Orestes Leal Hurtado B. A. Honours**

**SOCIOLOGY PROGRAM
1999**

Certificate of Originality

I hereby certify that this thesis is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma of a university or other institute of higher education except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of this thesis.

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Preface and Acknowledgments

This thesis is based mainly on library research, particularly of Spanish-language materials which make up over half of the 141 works cited. I translated all of these into English and simultaneously analysed them, a very difficult and time-consuming process. I have benefited greatly from the works of scholars such as Perry Anderson, Jorge Larraín, Maurice Zeitlin, Lorena Godoy, Elizabeth Hutchison, M. Soledad Zarate, Karin Roseblatt, José Bengoa, Alvaro Jara, Hernan Ramirez Necochea, Marcelo Carmagnani, Gabriel Zalasar, Fernando Ortiz (who disappeared from a secret prison during the military dictatorship in 1976) and Arnold Bauer, some of whom I met in 1997 when I returned to Chile for six months. I also talked with Edison Otero, Milka Castro, Luis Vitale, José Cademartori, Rolf Foerster, Oscar Azócar and Claudio Denegri, all of whom advised and helped me in my research. These conversations in particular reinforced my interest in showing how and why Chile became a capitalist society and the *Mapuche* were deprived of their land and sovereignty.

This interest began during the dark years of the dictatorship in Chile, in particular, during those 'estrane days' when the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in East Europe and the electoral defeat of *Sandinistas* in Nicaragua overlapped. The world did not become what some of us had wished for the winners were, once again, those who were and have been powerful. Social struggles did not produce the expected outcome - human emancipation. The picture of injustice, social inequality and impunity did not change. In order to deal with my own confusion, I began to think more about the contradictory nature of Chilean society. Although 'things' were more complicated and negative than we had originally thought, the desire and need for social change remained strong within me and many others.

Australia became, unthinkable for a Latin American like me, the place in which I had an opportunity reflect upon these issues and to study the conflictive history of the *Mapuche* and Chileans. I thought it was necessary to understand how and why Chile is characterised by a deep class contradiction, an hegemonic *machismo*, an influential Catholicism, an exacerbated racism against the *Mapuche* and other indigenous people, and a fascist mentality embedded in the army and in the conservative right wing sectors of the political spectrum. These class, gender and political

formations and de-formations had originated and were reproduced and maintained by individuals and institutions at different times. My concern was to study our history sociologically from a Marxist perspective. Marxism is a theory which, in the eyes of many people, has been damaged by its 'practice' in Eastern Europe. Paradoxically, this experience in turn validated Marx's thesis by highlighting the indivisible relationship between theory and practice. Through the study of our history, this thesis will contribute to the 're-integration' of revolutionary thought and practice in both the social sciences and in political struggle. I spent three years in Australia and six months in Chile researching and writing this topic.

Thus, this thesis was born and grew up in a particular historical conjunction at an international and national level. It travelled across the Pacific Ocean and integrated the lessons of people who had shown me the importance of principles, justice, freedom and also and significantly, of knowledge. They were my grandfather Abraham, my father Hugo, and those people with no name but who were sisters and brothers of the same cause: the *compañeras* and *compañeros* of the popular rebellion, the *Mapuche peñis* of *Lumaco*, *Dibulco* and *Ñancucheo* in *Mapuchemapu*, the student movement of the 1970s and 1980s, the workers, unemployed and students of the poor suburbs

of Santiago who every day fought fascism in any way they could and who helped me to 'become invisible' so many times during those cold, grey winter mornings in Santiago. My deep acknowledgment and admiration goes out to those who fought for the freedom of others and made it possible for me to write this. Unfortunately, they are no longer amongst us; many of them disappeared from Pinochet's secret prisons and many others were assassinated by the fascist repressive forces. "*Ni perdón ni olvido*" (nor forgiveness nor forgetting). Forever with us Cecilia Magni, Tatiana Fariña, Elizabeth Escobar, Patricia Quiroz, Victor Díaz, Juan Orellana, Lincoyan Berríos, Vicente Atencio, Julio Santibañez, Raul Pellegrín, the *hermanos* Vergara and so many, many other sisters and brothers of the struggle against fascism.

If I was lucky in Chile during the 1970s and 1980s, in the 1990s, on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, my fortune continued. In Australia I verified that to fight capitalism in the academy and in the streets makes a lot of sense, even, in the so called 'first world'. Thank you Doctor Mike Donaldson for being one of the "indispensables" of B. Brecht's brilliant poem. Your generosity, fraternity, wisdom, patience and help in this work will be forever appreciated by my family and I.

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My infinite gratitude and love for my *compañera* María Angélica and our three wonderful children Daniel, Milena and Fabian, whose patience, support and encouragement have made this study possible. My love also to my mother and father who have always supported me, materially and spiritually. Many thanks to my brother Hugo and my sister María Elena and their respective families; thanks too to Hernán and Mindy for their help. My appreciation goes out to my friends Julia Urquieta, Christine Hicks, Checho Durán, Rubén Vásquez, Eduardo Vega, David Escanilla, Ximena, Roberto and Patricio Villaseca, Rebeca and Osvaldo Alfaro, Sergio and Checho González, Scott Pointing, Lautaro Carmóna, Luis Salinas and Nelson

Espinosa, for being such good people and making life more interesting, fun and happier every day.

Para mi compañera María Angélica y mis queridos hijos

Danielito, Milenita y Fabito

Abstract

This thesis is about the articulation of a multiplicity of modes of production over five centuries and the intertwined processes of class, gender and state formation in Chile and *Mapuchemapu*. These included the seigniorial mode of production which resulted from the articulation of feudal and indigenous modes and was consolidated in the seventeenth century in the colonial social formation and manifest in the *encomienda* and the *hacienda*.

This articulation meant for the *Mapuche* a significant but not total transformation of their communal mode into a new social formation of patriarchal *cacicazgos* containing embryonic classes of non-producers and producers. It weakened *Mapuche* social solidarity and political unity and consolidated patriarchy such that polygamy became, as never before, exclusive to powerful men who in this way concentrated political power, accumulated wealth and secured control of the land, when industrial capitalism was entering its monopolistic and imperialist phase in the industrial centres in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Patriarchal capitalism emerged as the dominant mode of production in the Chilean social formation even though seigniorial relations continued in agriculture until the 1960s and despite the resistance of the *Mapuche* nation which still struggles to recover its expropriated land and suppressed traditions. The study aims also to demonstrate the salience of historical materialism as an efficient instrument of social analysis useful in the revolutionary transformation of capitalism. It contributes to the reconstruction of historical materialism by showing that history and social processes cannot be understood without the study of gender formation and that they are not even, teleological or pre-ordained.

Introduction

From Communalism to Capitalism

Situating the Study: Theory, Method and History

Exploring what is now Chile from the fifteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth century, the thesis examines four main levels of articulation, social, political, economic and gender included in the intertwined processes of class, gender and state formation before and during the articulation of the European feudal and indigenous *Mapuche* modes of production. In studying Chile in this way from a Marxist perspective, I hope to contribute to what has been called by Larraín (1986) A Reconstruction of Historical Materialism, by demonstrating that historical processes are uneven and not pre-ordered nor pre-determined, and that history thus cannot be conceived teleologically. The reconstruction also involves seeing gender relations as constitutive of the modes of production in articulation.

To exclude gender relations incapacitates historical materialist theory and practice for revolutionary social change in Chile. Thus, class formation in Chile is studied using historical materialism as the "theory of practice which provides the essential elements for the comprehension of history, society and the individual in their complex relationships"

(Larrain, 1986: 6) while seeing practice as crucially involving class struggle in and through which "major historical changes are brought about" (Cohen, 1986: 19). Class struggle is not a 'ghost in the machine of history which explains everything' but it is an influential but not unilinear or inevitable process towards the radical transformation of society.

In the process of the re-composition of historical materialism class analysis, to remain relevant and useful, must welcome, pertinent criticism, such as that raised by some feminists, Critical School thinkers and by post-modernists. A reconstituted historical materialism must be open to "the most devastating objection to the theory, [which] in the final analysis, is what it may itself lead to . . . It is a possible outcome of class analysis that socialism cannot be achieved by any foreseeable transformation of the existing order" (Connell and Irving, 1980: 26).

Historical materialism as a theoretical body and analytical instrument makes no separation between theory and history, for theory, as Zeitlin (1984: 18) says so well:

is contained within the detailed analysis itself . . . [t]he test of any theory of social change or historical development is its causal adequacy for the explanation of specific historical sequences and

cumulative processes. . . . People do much better theory when interpreting the historical sequences than they do when they set out to do “theory” . . . Social theory without attention to details is wind.

But details without a sense of social change, of time passing, are boring. In the following chapters I hope to construct a narrative which is sequential and cumulative for, as E. P. Thompson (cited in Zeitlin, 1984: 19) has argued, this is a “pre-requisite and premise of all historical knowledge, the ground of any objective (as distinct from theoretical) notion of causation”.

In studying the articulation of modes of production in *Mapuchemapu*¹ and Chile, I wish to contribute to the task of re-discovering historical materialism as a relevant theory of social change, both in the social sciences and in revolutionary politics. Historical materialism then, is both a means, in so far as it provides the central method which informs this work, and an end, for I wish to contribute to its development, as much as I can.

¹*Mapuchemapu* means *Mapuche* nation in *Mapudungu* (the *Mapuche* language) (Mariman, 1997: f.n. 46). It was called *Araucanía* by the Spanish invaders. In this work I use both terms depending on the context.

The Method of Analysis: The Articulation of Modes of Production

Capitalism began in and from a previous social formation and "since we ourselves are still living in the epoch of capitalism, an understanding of the origins and development of this epoch is consequential to our own sense of the possible - in terms of both continuity and change" (Kaye, 1984: 25). Consequently, as Connell and Irving (1980, x) argue, those people who face the task of changing a society, need an account of the way it came into being and the way it has worked up till now for

a basic difference between a revolutionary and a bourgeois understanding of class is precisely that the former is historical and the latter is not; which makes excellent sense given that Marxist thought is directed to understanding the conditions for a fundamental historical change in social relations. The concept of class itself is an historical one, referring to patterns of social polarisation and transformation that can only be understood as processes in time, that is, as the history of society as a whole, not just bit and pieces of it (Connell and Irving, 1980: xi).

Class formation is intertwined, entangled, with the processes of gender and state formation which are shaped by classes and which shape them

throughout history. Thus, in order to understand how *Mapuche* preserved their independence for more than three and a half centuries; how a feudal system was born in the colony and how capitalism became dominant in the Chilean social formation on the eve of the 20th century, the main research questions of this thesis, I thought it was pertinent to study the articulation of modes of production. As Dobb (1975: 7) suggested, a mode of production refers to “the ways in which means of production were owned and to the social relations between [people] which resulted from their connections with the process of production”.

The relationship between modes, their articulation, produces a social formation, “a concrete and historically determined society, which comprises a complex articulation of modes of production, one of which is dominant” (Larraín, 1989: 181). In Poulantzas’ and Laclau’s (cited in Wolpe, 1980: 9) terms, “a social formation is constituted by a specific overlapping of several ‘pure’ modes of production”, it is “never the place of only one mode of production, but the articulation of several modes of production” (Rey cited in Larraín, 1989: 181). The articulation of modes of production is thus not static or stable but comprises, amongst other processes, “confrontations and alliances essentially between the classes which these modes define” (Rey cited in Larraín, 1989: 182). The relations of the articulation of the modes are

themselves sometimes relations of struggle (Wolpe, 1980: 40) and may have the consequence of disintegrating, maintaining or replacing the articulating modes. Thus, the articulation of modes of production is an uneven, underdetermined, unpredictable process, a melding and a clash between at least two different ways of producing material and spiritual life.

So, considering that this is a very complex and multifaceted process in which some aspects are more decisive than others, the following chapters focus - as mentioned above - on four main levels of articulation, social, political, economic and gender, which are involved in the intertwined processes of class, state and gender formation during the pre-colonial, colonial and independence periods up to the early 20th century.

The Historical Scope and Limits of the Study

European colonialism inaugurated a specific process of transformation of the aboriginal social formation existing in what is now known as Chile in the 16th century and most histories of Chile commence here. However, the indigenous social formation has its own specific history and temporal trajectory and I consider the indigenous pre-capitalist modes of production before examining their articulation with the feudal mode of production introduced by European conquest. The result of

this articulation in the colony was the birth of a particular form of feudalism that I call “seigniorial”. However, while this seigniorial mode of production was consolidated during the 17th century, the *Mapuche* communal mode was not destroyed by it but remained in an unequal but dynamic relation with it through which *Mapuche* remained politically independent in *Mapuchemapu*. But out of the articulation between the *Mapuche*, seigniorial and capitalist modes during the colonial period and beyond, a capitalist mode of production eventually became dominant in the social formation by the second half of the 19th century.

The broad scope and historical depth of this thesis is such that prudent scholarship suggests that its focus should be narrowed for the validity of this research depends, to a great extent, on its specificity. Consequently in its consideration of aboriginality, the thesis concentrates, geographically and historically, on the “Araucanians” (Faron, 1968: 9), as the Spaniards called the three indigenous peoples who lived in and around the Central Valley of Chile. They were known as *Picunche* (*Picun*: North; *che*: people), *Huilliche* (*Huilli*: south) and *Mapuche* (*Mapu*: Land) (Faron, 1968: 11). Of these three peoples, the *Mapuche* were unique in preserving their political independence until the end of the 19th century, their resistance to the Spanish and Chilean invaders for three and a half centuries expressing the articulation of the *Mapuche*

mode with the feudal mode of production from which the Chilean capitalist social formation emerged.

Indigenous Modes of Production in America

A communal mode of production existed in the *Mapuche* social formation prior to the European invasion and it articulated with an introduced feudal mode as did other indigenous modes in America. Like Carmagnani (1976: 20), I identify two main types of indigenous modes in America in the 16th century, an “agricultural” mode characteristic of the *Mexica*² and *Inca* social formations, and a so-called “primitive”³ mode based on gathering, hunting and horticulture. In the latter, polygamous families known as *lofs* or *regues* in *Mapuchemapu* constituted the basis of a patriarchal community.

These two types differed in that the former produced an economic surplus larger than that required for survival while the latter produced sufficient to satisfy the needs of the producing community and its relations with similar communities. Although economic surplus is only

² I will refer – as Thomas (1994: xix) does – “to the people usually called Aztecs as the *Mexica* . . . the word by which they called themselves. Neither Cortés, nor Bernal Díaz, nor Fr. Bernardino de Sahagún used the word ‘Aztecs’ . . . [Aztecs] was made popular by the Jesuit scholar, Francisco Javier Clavijero, in the eighteenth century, and then by Prescott”.

³ This denomination is teleological, and I prefer the expression communal mode of production.

an indicator of the character of the mode of production, which is more complex than this alone indicates, surplus is a key to understanding the structure, constitution, and social relations of these social formations.

The development of the indigenous agricultural political economy (in *Mexica* and *Incas*) was shaped by and led to the formation of a central state, a civil and religious bureaucracy. This slowed but did not stop the development of private property but it could not brake the growing differentiation between a producer class and a non-producer class (Carmagnani, 1976: 21). Unlike this, the communal economy, whose surplus was directly exchanged within each group or with similar groups, did not have a central state and their economic activity included gathering, hunting and incipient agricultural activity (Carmagnani, 1976: 21). Such was *Mapuchemapu*. The absence of a state did not impede but may have contributed to their capacity to resist the European invaders initially, for it did not mean a lack of political unity. However, the two indigenous types had already both achieved a sharply patriarchal structure in which polygamy was almost exclusive to male authority.

Articulation in *Mapuchemapu*: Economy and Social Solidarity

When the Spaniards invaded America, the *Mapuche* mode of production was communal in that land and labour were controlled by the

community in a system of family production whose surplus was directly exchanged among the members of the community or with other communities whose economic activity included gathering, hunting and horticulture. Economic and social relations were developed and reproduced in the polygamous family group or *lof*. The collective nature of property, collective production and the patriarchal organisation of the economy characterised *Mapuche* society in the 16th century. Land was not a commodity nor existed the concentration of ownership of the land, nor a deep division of labour either.

As an effect and expression of the articulation with the feudal mode, cattle raising and agriculture were developed by *Mapuche*. Within this process, polygamy was the economic and political institution that operated to firstly, centralise and concentrate power within *cacicaзgos*⁴ and secondly, to form alliances between them. Polygamy tended to become an exclusive practice of the patriarchal *loncos*⁵ who saw in it a way to control land, labour and animals for more wives meant more labour which required more land and produced more products. Simultaneously, by marrying women from neighbouring *cacicaзgos*, *loncos* could politically to control more land and large *cacicaзgos*⁶

⁴ The traditional polygamous family unit known as *lof* transformed into *cacicaзgo*, a centralised and hierarchical structure of power consolidated by the end of the 18th century.

⁵ *Lonco* or *cacique* means leader, chief (Bengoa, 1996: f.n. 40).

⁶ In strict terms, the large *cacicaзgos* were 'groups of *cacicaзgos*' led by the *lonco* or *cacique* of the largest *cacicaзgo* of the alliance (Bengoa, 1996: 69). I will use the singular term '*cacicaзgo*' to call them though it comprised a plurality.

were established in *Mapuchemapu* by the end of the 18th century. This was the beginning of a process of change that was to end with the Chilean occupation of *Mapuchemapu* 100 years later.

Economically, polygamy empowered *loncos* who through it reinforced and increased their control over the land in which production relations had been modified leading to the initial formation of an embryonic non-producer class (*loncos*) and an embryonic producer class (*conas* and women) in the 19th century.

The patriarchal character of *Mapuche* society was maintained but the class divisions polygamy began to produce deepened the power relation patriarchy had historically established among *Mapuche*. Then, to the subordination of women by men, the domination of wealthy *loncos* over male producers was aggregated. Thus, an “agricultural” mode of production (similar in some ways to that of *Incas* and *Mexica*) was developing in *Mapuchemapu*, but this process of class formation was interrupted by the invasion of *Araucanía* by the Chilean army in 1883, irrevocably moving the trajectory of the articulation away from the emerging “agricultural” *Mapuche* mode decisively toward Chilean capitalism.

Articulation in *Mapuchemapu*: Politics, Warfare and the *Loncos*

In pre-invasion *Mapuchemapu*, autonomous communities or *lofs* were united by the need for defence, mainly against the *Incas*. *Mapuche* recognised itself as a people, were aware of their political independence but had no need of a state to materialise that conviction. On the southern side of *Bio-Bio* River, *Mapuche* impacted by the invasion and the existence of a hostile neighbour, began to modify their mode of production from the very moment of conquest. They introduced horse and cattle raising and built a more permanent polity to cope with the demands of permanent warfare. Catholic missionaries and *encomenderos* tried to change their agriculture, gender relations and religious beliefs. However, patriarchal monogamy, a basic principle of Catholicism, clashed with patriarchal polygamy, crucial to their mode of production and reproduction. But while polygamy remained the relation most resistant to the effects of the articulation with the seigniorial mode from the 16th until the first half of the 19th centuries in the *Mapuche* social formation, other forces were transforming *Mapuche* production relations and politics.

The articulation between indigenous, seigniorial and capitalist relations of production in *Mapuchemapu*, and in agriculture and mining in Chile coupled with the reactionary nationalism generated by the Chilean

ruling class through the wars of the 19th century, gravely impacted on the *Mapuche* social formation. These contributed to political antagonism and division within *Mapuchemapu*, the killing of *Mapuche* warriors by the Chilean army and the loss of *Mapuche* land. As a result of this process of articulation, communality remade itself into inherited *cacicazgos*, a hierarchical and centralised structure of power. *Cacicazgos* were based on polygamy and the political and economic power generated by it for *loncos* and reproduced by them in the extension of some *lofs* into the larger *cacicazgos*. The former sense of unity and community within diversity was weakened and the way the *Mapuche* conceived of their independence began to vary from one group to another.

Politically, polygamy contributed to the establishment of political alliances with neighbouring *cacicazgos*, but, *cacicazgos* were diverse in size, economic power and political influence. The different intensities of the mercantile, political and social relations which various *cacicazgos* had with colonists and later, with Chileans, differentiated them. Those who lived closer to the Chilean frontier, the *Abajinos*, were more strongly permeated by foreign influences and even sought to be part of the Chilean State. Other *cacicazgos*, especially the *Arribanos*, opposed this and decided to keep their political independence. As the *Arribanos* feared, once the Republic was established in the early 1800s, peace

agreements with the Spaniards were not recognised by the Chilean authorities who considered *Mapuchemapu* a part of the Chilean nation. The tension between seigniorial and capitalist relations in Chilean agriculture and mining, motivated territorial expansion towards *Mapuchemapu*, in a campaign of annihilation legitimated by a reactionary and chauvinist nationalism nourished in the *hacienda* and the army.

Two major *cacicazgos*, *Arribanos* and *Abajinos*, contested hegemony in *Mapuchemapu*. The *Arribanos* realised that the Chilean ruling class' conviction that the land lost by colonists to *Mapuche* must be part of Chilean, threatened the totality of the *Mapuche* nation. In addition, the erosion of polygamy as an economic and political institution by the actions of Catholic missionaries and the agents of the Chilean State, threatened the *Mapuche* political economy. The looming loss of land and erosion of polygamy left the *Arribanos* no choice but violent defence which finally, the *Abajinos* joined.

A significant part of the history of the conquest of *Mapuche* and the theft of their land was written in the new Republic. The campaign for the territorial expansion of the Chilean Republic, its nationalist and chauvinist content and its plan of annihilation against *Mapuche*, together with a weaker *Mapuche* political unity and the technical military

superiority of their enemies, led to their defeat and the expropriation of their land.

Articulation in *Mapuchemapu* : Sexualities, Masculinities and Femininities

Mapuche, in particular male *Mapuche*, were sexually freer than their new neighbours for their religion did not regulate *Mapuche* sexuality like Catholicism did. Virginity was not valued and *Mapuche* polygamous marriages were about economics, consequently, the European monogamous marriage did not tempt them at all. But this freedom of sexuality from religious constraints was partial and apparent and did not mean gender equity and real freedom. In *Mapuchemapu* the man who was not a warrior was not a man and a woman who was not a good reproducer and producer was not a woman but a deviant, like the healers who were regarded as homosexual in *Mapuchemapu*. A binary gender/sex system dominated gender relations and the patriarchy that *Mapuche* people reproduced through the centuries was marked by changes in production and politics such that by the 18th century polygamy had generated profound social inequalities and unjust relations of power between men and women and between *loncos* and the rest of their community. Power became the patrimony of polygamous *loncos*.

A singular masculinity dominated *Mapuchemapu* characterised by courage, toughness, strength and agility, embodied in men trained for war. This physical discipline led *Mapuche* men to conceive of themselves as superior to women. As well as polygamy, another mechanism of male power, the *malón*, reproduced warriors masculinity, stressing bravery, virility, aggression, drunkenness and riding skills, the very characteristics that defined the prototype of the Spanish soldier. The military and war preserved and reproduced hegemonic masculinity for the Spaniards and for the *Mapuche*, for, according to them, *Mapuchemapu* required male warriors to defend it and its women creating the image of men as protectors and women as protected by men. The patriarchal polygamous character of *Mapuche* was in this way reinforced.

In the emergence and consolidation of a new *Mapuche* social division of labour, polygamy strengthened the extended patriarchal and patrilineal family assisting the accumulation of wealth and centralisation of political power. The articulation of modes, specifically in the realm of gender, consolidated patriarchy and defined the feminine as subordinate to the masculine, in a servile relation confined to reproduction, domestic work and agricultural production.

This masculinity united the leaders and the lead. All *Mapuche* men gained from the subordination of women. Whether they were powerful or powerless, all men considered women as commodities but polygamy became almost exclusive of *loncos*. Polygamy was not legally restricted to some privileged men but it was undeniable that the more cattle a man possessed, the more women he had and vice versa. This in turn meant that the more women a man had the more land he controlled. In this sense polygamy was strongly tied to land, it was “the right” of *loncos* and their instrument of power. The polygamous family, part of a system of marriage alliances, facilitated the development of the great *cacicazgos*, the political forms that coexisted with and expressed and supported the new social and gender division of labour encouraging a centralised power structure.

A hegemonic masculinity and two sexually differentiated genders dominated the *Mapuche* gender spectrum. Female and male healers were respected for their religious and medical knowledge but they were seen as deviant. In this binary gender/sex system, the feminine was in a subordinate position to the masculine, the masculine was associated with men and the feminine with women. The gender configuration was strengthened by warfare and in particular by polygamy which deepened the gendered division of labour, differentiated men from each other and enhanced *loncos*’ political power of *loncos*.

Articulation in the Chilean Colony and the Republic: The *Encomienda* and the Seigniorial Mode of Production

The *Mapuche* communal mode articulated with the feudalism brought by the Spanish conquerors significantly through the actions of the Imperial State which appropriated its key productive factors, particularly, land and labour. This was inspired by the distribution of land and labour undertaken by the Spanish Monarchy in the territory reconquered from the Moors. In Spain, the distribution of land was called *repartimiento* and in America *mercedes de tierra*, and the utilisation of labour was called *encomienda* in both Spain and in its colonies.

The appropriation and utilisation of land and labour by the Spanish state was crucial in the articulation and formed the main social relation of production in the Chilean colony. It was established rapidly amongst those living to the north of *Mapuchemapu* for they had already been subjugated by the *Incas* state whose territories passed to the *conquistadors*. But in the case of *Mapuche* only a section of their land was expropriated, for they fixed the *Bio-Bio* River as their northern frontier with the colony and continued resisting invasion, remaining independent until the end of the 19th century. In the central region, however, the feudalisation realised by the Spanish State substantially disintegrated the indigenous mode and incorporated its remains into the

feudal mode of production dominant in the colonial social formation. The *encomienda* was the main production relation in this feudal mode of production.

Thus, the conquest of indigenous land was the basic premise of *latifundia*. The Royal grants of land to the conquerors (*mercedes de tierra*) were relatively small, no more than 100 hectares. The Crown aimed to avoid a repetition of the large *señoríos* of Aragon and the subsequent fragmentation of Monarchical political power. But contrary to the Monarchs' will, land was rapidly commodified in what is now central Chile. This was the beginning of property understood as private. The contradiction between private and communal property was resolved in favour of the former not because private property was the manifestation of a 'more developed' mode but because with imperial invasion, private property acquired a determinant political and economic weight.

The *encomienda* was the means of appropriating indigenous labour in the Chilean colony. Scholars such as Carmagnani (1976: 24) and Jara (1987: 22) argue that the *encomienda* in Latin America was the Royal cession of a specified indigenous community or group of communities to a Spanish conqueror, the *encomendero*, who must defend the Monarchs' new conquered land and Christianise their indigenous labour

force. The *encomendero* must demand a compulsory tax from indigenes who were from the moment of conquest, subjects of the Spanish Crown. The tax could be paid in money, goods or labour⁷, and labour was the main way in which indigenes of the central region paid tribute. The *encomienda* was a derivation of the Spanish feudal mode of production, reproducing in the colony patriarchal and servile relations. It was a form of serfdom similar to that in Castile and Aragon except that in the colony the landlord could become a landowner and land was rapidly commodified. This re-organisation of the productive factors under the colonial regime was rapidly realised and by the end of the 16th century substantial land and mines had been seized by the Spanish State and granted to those who seized it. They rapidly introduced European forms of social, economic and political organisation including *encomiendas*, transmuting the indigenous system of labour known as *mita* to extractive work in mines.

The *mita* consisted in the obligation of the indigenous community to provide labour for mining. The *mita* was the conquerors' adaptation of the pre-invasion compulsory provision of labour by indigenous communities – such as those subjects to the *Incas* – to their sovereigns

⁷ In the “agricultural economies” like the *Incas*, tax was paid in money and kind so, the Spaniards only re-oriented them. Labour and the social division of labour, were in some aspects modified and in others, including the name, adopted completely by the Spaniards as in the *mita*, as will be seen in Chapter One.

in work of social benefit like infrastructure, maintenance and development. Unfortunately for the Spaniards, they could not find in Chile the same abundance of silver and gold ores that they had found in *Mexica* and *Inca* territory, and agriculture, especially cattle raising, became the main economic activity in the colony, and *encomienda* and not *mita* its main economic institution.

Given the difference between serfdom in the Chilean colony and that in Spain, and the preponderance of the *encomienda* over *mita*, I call this mode “seigniorial”. It was characterised by the transference for the use of the *encomendero* (landowner) of the labour of the indigenous family group or groups of families which was surplus to that needed for their own subsistence and economic reproduction. Their unpaid labour was used on the *encomendero*’s land and thus the *encomienda* was a form of serfdom.

The *encomendero* as a political, patriarchal, religious and military authority conferred a seigniorial character on the mode of production in Latin America, in spite of the commodification of land. Spanish *encomenderos* and indigenous serfs constituted non-producer and producer classes respectively, the first classes produced by the articulation between the feudal and indigenous modes of production.

Articulation in the Chilean Colony and the Republic: The *Hacienda*, Gender, Race and Class Formation

While Spain was developing a new type of state, in America pre-Absolutist feudal forms of land ownership predominated. By the second half of the 17th century the *encomienda* changed – through intervening forms – into the *hacienda* which nominally now contained labour paid in kind, slightly modifying the seigniorial mode. While *inquilinos* became serfs, a part of the labour force was separated from the means of their reproduction, becoming seasonal *peones*. *Inquilinaje* and *peonaje* were the main social relations of the *hacienda* by the second half of the 17th century, involving not only indigenes but also *mestizos* and poor Spaniards. The harshly exploitative character of the *hacienda* motivated many workers, mainly *peones*, to leave it and turn to banditry which became a rural social movement of rejection of the seigniorial character of the system of *hacienda*. The centre of the activity in the colony until mid 19th century, the *hacienda*, was a social totality in which feudal class and gender relations were reproduced, minor capitalist elements introduced and importantly, a gender segmentation of labour began to form reproducing feudal patriarchy in the Chilean colony. Racism had been introduced by the conquerors and in the *hacienda* it was reproduced along class lines.

The centuries of war of reconquest in Spain against Moorish invaders and its religious expression as 'Christianity versus Islam', marked the Spanish people. The definition of 'the other' in what is now Chile, originated in these wars in Spain, transported by the conquerors, most of whom had been soldiers in that war or were soldiers' sons. Indigenes represented 'the other' in America, the pagan *indio*, who has not been Christianised and is still called "Moor" in the present day. Class formation was being informed by a racial practice brought from Castile and reproduced in America during colonisation. Racism actively participated in class formation mainly through religious beliefs, for the *encomienda* forced the acceptance of Catholicism by the conquered people. Those who rejected Catholicism were repressed and socially excluded, and their phenotypical features facilitated their identification. Thus, along with patriarchy, racism has been implicated in class formation in Chile and is a factor contributing to its specificity.

Racism was also overtly manifest when a chauvinist nationalism emerged that justified the ambition for territorial expansion of the Chilean ruling class and legitimated the invasion of *Mapuchemapu* at the end of the 19th century. The *Mapuche* was no longer the heroic warrior, symbolic of the struggle for Chilean independence from Spain, but became again the immoral and pagan savage that personified all

human imperfections. Racism then has been a continuing practice in Chile and has helped to mask exploitative production relations.

In the second half of the 19th century, agriculture underwent some changes that although not insignificant, did not alter the seigniorial character of the *hacienda*. A shift from cattle raising to wheat production occurred, during which large *haciendas* were subdivided into *fundos*, without affecting significantly the concentration of land ownership. *Patrones* found a strategy to insert it in the modernisation of the country impacted by capitalist industrialisation in England, without altering the social relations in the *hacienda*. The changes involved minimal technical innovation, especially in threshing; the subdivision of large areas of unproductive land and the multiplication of landholding among rich families and the higher circles; increasing productivity by intensifying labour and the introduction of wage relations in seasonal work by payment in tokens. *Inquilinos* remained but in fact were significantly deprived of their means of production becoming a kind of stable *peonaje* that, together with tied, free or seasonal *peonaje*, constituted the labour force in agriculture. However and in spite of the resistance of *patrones* to accept wage relations, the process of proletarianisation in agriculture, had begun.

But thrusting European capitalism impacted not only the countryside but importantly, activated the mining industry in Chile. Because of the rise of mining, many female and male *peones* emigrated from the countryside to the northern mines and to urban areas, escaping from the regime of the *hacienda*. However, the new company mining towns were not paradise on the earth. Exploitation, semi-incarceration, a total separation from the means of production and only nominal wages in which payment was in tokens, constituted virtual its relations.

However, if the *hacienda* had created servility, the company town generated resistance. Underlying this historical moment was the contradiction between a feudal-seigniorial mode of production and a capitalist mode of production both present within the Chilean social formation. So, the contradiction was not “between a ‘system of production for use’ and a ‘system of production for the market’, but that between feudal land-property – serfdom and, an industrial capital–wage-labour system” (Takahashy, 1982: 71). Therefore, the fundamental social processes here were the polarisation of the direct producers, the dissociation of the peasantry from the land, a change in the social form of labour from servile to free and a shift in the social mode of reproduction of labour power from the *hacienda* to the company towns and urban centres (Takahashy, 1982: 72). The ‘escape’ of rural workers from the countryside, the large concentration of

workers in company towns, the separation of them from the means of production and the apparently free character of their labour, all impelled workers to rebellion and to become a class of their own. Working class organisation and struggle emerged from the company towns and capitalist relations were established in mining in the first decades of the 20th century as a result of class struggle. In addition and as a consequence of the process of working class formation, the ruling class became more united and homogeneous at the end of the 19th century, but only after a period of sharp and violent division.

Articulation in the Chilean Colony and the Republic: From Absolutism to the Republican State

Just before the Spaniards invaded America, the Spanish Crown recovered the land occupied by the Moors and attempted to overcome the crisis of the feudal system by restructuring the state into what was called “the Absolutist State”. According to Anderson (1979: 18),

this was a *redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination*, designed to clamp the peasant masses back into their traditional social position . . . [t]he Absolutist State was never an arbiter between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, still less an instrument of the nascent bourgeoisie against the aristocracy: it was the new political carapace of a threatened nobility.

The Monarchs aimed to prevent the weakening of their sovereignty in the kingdoms of Castile and above all in Aragon. Quarrels within the feudal ruling class between the high nobility and feudal lords who were changing into a bourgeoisie, threatened the stability of the Crown which feared the loosening of its control over the emerging agrarian capitalists.

In Chile, the Spanish State conceded the task of placing the new land under Crown sovereignty to private armies called the *hueste indiana*⁸, financed almost totally by the Spanish minor nobility, hence the rewards in land and labour granted to them. Thus, the private interests of the conquerors were the real motor of Spanish expansion in the American continent. But in America, the arm of the redeployed and recharged state was not long enough to control the ambitious conquerors. The *mercedes de tierra* and *encomienda*, the political, economic and ideological means of securing simultaneously the feudal character of land and labour, political control of the colony and the evangelisation of its population with patriarchal and racist doctrines, soon became, precisely what Absolutism had tried to avoid in Aragon. *Encomenderos* and then *terratenientes* ruled in the colony and the colonial state reinforced their domination and not that of the Monarchs in Spain.

⁸ The *hueste Indiana* was the private army of an adventurer looking his fortune (Larraín, 1996: 131). Only in special cases was the enterprise totally financed by the Spanish State (Jara, 1987: 18).

They exercised local political, legal and military power from their *haciendas* and the key decisions for the life of the whole Chilean colony were made by them. Political change towards an independent Republic did not affect them, though they would have preferred colonialism to continue.

Chile, politically independent from Spain in 1818, experienced substantial changes but, the *hacienda* continued as the key institution and the landowners managed to control the new centre of power, the Republican State, and became absolutely hegemonic within it during the first half of the century. But in the second half of the century, their hegemony was contested by liberals who harshly criticised the *hacienda* system. Although capitalist merchants and mine owners invested in agriculture, they could not modify the structure of the *latifundia* for the landowners used the state to preserve the rural *status quo*, particularly the Constitution of 1833. Liberals, mainly from mining industry and commerce, inspired by the European enlightenment, challenged their rule in the countryside and control of the state in the 1850s.

The ruling class contained two main fractions, the dominant one constituted by the conservative landowners and the other by liberal merchants and the mining bourgeoisie. Growing domestic and

international mercantile activity and the predominance and expansion of the capitalist mode of production in Europe, especially in England, dynamised the process of articulation in both the Chilean Republic and the *Mapuchemapu*. As stated above, mining, a key sector for the development of industrial capitalism in Europe, was activated in Chile by the British industrial bourgeoisie in alliance with Chilean ruling class merchants.

During the 1850s, Liberals encouraged changes in the structure of the state and the introduction of capitalist relations in mining and agriculture. They won executive government but not the complete control of the state, which meant modernisation and secularisation of important aspects of life, but no change in the class and patriarchal nature of power. Towards the last decade of the century, intra-ruling class conflict became a struggle between two opposed projects of national development. One was represented by a minor mining segment of Liberals who aimed at national capitalist development led by the state which would focus on industrialisation, manufacturing and infrastructure works. The opposing fraction was comprised of the major mining fraction of the Liberals in the nitrate industry, allied with British investors. They attracted landowners to support their plans to liberalise the economy, minimise the role of the state and emphasise raw material exports. In this way, landowners kept the *status quo* in the

countryside. The alliance of Chilean nitrate and English capitalists and local landowners did not encourage the transformation of the *hacienda* system. Far from affecting the landowners, the resolution of the conflict in favour of the nitrate alliance had serious strategic implications for capitalism in Chile. Capitalism in Chile emerged extroverted, dependent and from the beginning, underdeveloped. I do not mean that if the defeated project had succeeded, development and independence would have been guaranteed. Dependent underdevelopment and independent development seem the only alternatives in peripheral capitalism. However, as Larraín (1989: 470-471) argues, dependent capitalist development could also have been an option if the losing fraction led by President Balmaceda had triumphed. Therefore, the dependent and underdeveloped character of the Chilean capitalism

cannot be explained by its original imposition from without but must be explained by the particular development of its structures of class domination, which in the nineteenth century were articulated with the interests of the European industrial bourgeoisie (Larraín, 1989: 203).

However, because of its bourgeois character, 'dependent capitalist development' would not have meant the resolution of class

contradictions in Chile. The progress of the productive forces would have been accompanied by class polarisation, poverty and diverse forms of social inequality, inherent in all process of capitalist development.

Articulation in the Chilean Colony and the Republic: Sexualities, Masculinities and Femininities

The specific articulation of the Spanish Catholic feudal patriarchy and the *Mapuche* patriarchal tradition left no choice but the reproduction of patriarchy, with its specificity, in *Mapuchemapu* and Chile. The influence of feudal patriarchy was decisive for the development of *machismo* in Chile. The dynastic marriage policy that characterised the political alliances of Spain when the conquest of America began, demonstrated the economic character of marriage in the Spanish aristocracy. The formation of political alliances through polygamous marriages in *Mapuchemapu* was also decisive. The Absolutist State and the Catholic Church were key agents in shaping, maintaining and reproducing patriarchy in Spain and its colonies.

Sexuality was strongly regulated by the Church. Women's virginity, as a strict precondition for marriage, seriously restricted sexualities to a single sexuality dictated by Catholic dogma. In this way, the sexual life of the colonists was full of prejudices and fears, threats and repression. Considering that the Chilean colony was militarised, urban areas were

small and dominated by military and religious activities and servile social relations dominated the countryside through the *hacienda*, feudal sexual patterns were accentuated, especially to the detriment of women. A colony dominated by the image of the male Catholic conqueror-warrior embodied by the *encomendero* and then, by the *terrateniente*, exacerbated sexism and discrimination against women and established a binary sex/gender system from which *machismo* was reproduced and in which women were subordinated to men and men were differentiated from each other in class terms.

These gender constructions were generated in a gender/sex system in which male and female heterosexuality in feudal Europe “were contrasted and asymmetrically valued as intellect/body, active/passive, rational/irrational, reason/emotion, self-control/lust, judgment/mercy and order/disorder” (Walker Bynum, 1991: 151). But the femininities and masculinities strongly influenced by Catholicism were suffered differently across the feudal class spectrum.

Aristocratic women served in the Court and were devote to the Church. They were reproducers but not producers like the women in the serf class who suffered not only discrimination but also exploitation. Importantly, some women in Spain became independent artisans, as did

in the Chilean colony, who forged new gendered identities and sexual relations within the nascent working class.

The dominant masculinity was represented by the figure of the Spanish landlord, the *machista* knight warrior. The *macho* in Chile, as in Spain, was personified by the landlord, the *patrón* of the *hacienda* and within it *machismo* was reproduced through servile relations and religion linking class and gender relations. *Machismo* validated only heterosexuality subordinating women to men and expressed homophobia, racism and servile relations. The heterosexual and monogamous nuclear family was the institution through which sexuality and gender constructions were watched and regulated by the Catholic Church and the state.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the *hacienda*, *inquilinaje*, *peonaje* and the family were the nexus through which patriarchy was developed. But the class and gender dynamics in Chile impacted by warfare and rural bondage produced their own redressers. Most women could not fit the heterosexual nuclear family model. Their husbands were dead or had left their families and the *haciendas*. Widows, single or abandoned women, like the independent artisans in feudal Spain, challenged the patriarchal state and Church and demonstrated that it was possible to experience gender differently than in the patriarchal form that served

the interests of the ruling class. From the beginning, the history of the proletariat was the history of women and their relations with their men. Consequently, the Chilean working class involved the indispensable participation and contribution of women to its formation, appearance and specificity. Thousands of women became independent workers in a variety of occupations creating a social space for themselves and for male *peonaje*. Around women's activities a grass-root culture grew, for the Chilean working class was forming. Women bravely confronted the state and the church and were able to produce their subsistence and to solidarise with male *peonaje*. They challenged the *machista* conception of masculinity and femininity imposed by the state and the Church and carried out by most ruling class men and women and by sections of the subordinated population such as the *inquilinaje* in the countryside and some domestic servants.

However, the changes brought about by the articulation in which capitalist relations began to be more influential in Chile by the mid 19th century, meant the insertion of women in new relations of production. This affected gender relations and the feudal-Catholic character of patriarchy to which capitalist elements were integrated. Patriarchy not only created, maintained and reproduced inequality between men and women, but among men and also among women for class relations were also involved in the creation and maintenance of masculinities and

femininities. Thus, gender constituted different social identities (such as those of the *patrón* and the *inquilina*) that were not accidental but were consistent with the class relations of the dominant mode of production in the social formation.

The contradiction between capital and labour by which gender relations are shaped is significantly shaped by gender relations. Historical materialism as a theory of practice shows how women's anti-patriarchal struggles in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, notably contributed to the formation of the working class, the labour movement and the recreation, reproduction and renovation of Chilean popular culture. Working class women became main actors in labour history and the history of the working class has been their history. The women's movement in Chile was not contrary to or separate from the labour movement but part of it. However, it was difficult for the women's movement to develop its own identity for as a consequence of the impact of the gender segmentation of labour on the labour movement, gender issues were dissociated from class issues and often working class women's concerns were ignored by male trade union leaders.

It is through the dynamic of a structurally changing and entangled processes of gender and class formation that culture and identities are

constantly shaped and re-shaped, formed and deformed by the uneven development of the social relations of production. My study of gender construction in the second half of the 19th and the early 20th centuries focuses on the formation of femininities and masculinities in the emerging bourgeoisie and proletariat. It shows that the development of the social relations of production were decisive in the formation of gender identities which vary according to the mutual interaction of gender and class just as gender contributes reciprocally to the specificity of class formation. The gender segmentation of labour, a process that historically began with feudalism in the colony and hence was transmitted, modified and in some aspects reproduced intact into capitalist relations, is an expression of the mutual interaction between gender and class. Consequently, the impact of this gender segmentation of labour on the labour movement meant the reproduction of patriarchy within it. By creating some industries and occupations as 'masculine' and others as 'feminine', a hegemonic masculinity characterised by rationality, hardness, strength, and emotional toughness was reproduced in the labour movement which genderised the exercise of power and action within the working class itself.

The Structure of the Study

The articulation of a multiplicity of modes of production across 500 years is a messy and unfinished business, the analysis of which is

complex, for the points of departure often seem arbitrary and even massive social changes appear contingent. It is easy to get lost, and to preclude this, the thesis is ordered in three main parts with their respective chapters following an historical sequence, each ending with a conclusion.

Part One seeks to understand the lives of the inhabitants and the process of class, gender and state formation in *Mapuchemapu*, during 1400s and subsequently, in the colony up to the 17th century. Chapter One focuses on the *Mapuche* mode of production and compares it mainly with other indigenous modes established in the *Mexica* and *Inca* Empires. Chapter Two examines Spanish Feudalism and Chapter Three, the Spanish conquest of America, focusing on the levels of articulation social, political, economic and gender implicated in the entangled processes of class, gender and state formation; Chapter Four discusses the articulation between the *Mapuche* and the introduced feudal modes of production, mainly examining the key mechanisms of the articulation, the appropriation of land and labour through the *mercedes de tierra* and the *encomienda*, salient in the formation of the seigniorial mode of production. The construction of the colonial state and the imbedding of feudal patriarchal structures in the colony are also reviewed.

Part Two focuses on the colonial period and the first decades of the Republic of Chile, and on the *Mapuchemapu* in the same period. Chapter Five deconstructs the *hacienda* and the social relations of *inquilinaje* and *peonaje*, the social phenomenon known as social banditry and *machismo*. Chapter Six examines the transformations at the levels of production, gender and politics in *Mapuchemapu* over almost two centuries of warfare and articulation with the seigniorial regime of the colony. Chapter Seven focuses on the point at which the colony became an independent Republic early in the 19th century with the new state creating fresh linkages with the *hacienda*. The challenge to patriarchy by independent women workers is highlighted.

Part Three is a close up of the second half of the 19th century during which the seigniorial mode of production was eclipsed by the capitalist mode in the social formation. For this reason, careful attention is paid to class, gender and state formation in Chile (Chapters Eight, Nine, Ten and Eleven) and in *Mapuchemapu* (Chapter Twelve).

PART I

Creating the “New World”: Patriarchal Communalism and the Patriarchal *Encomienda*:

1400 -1700

Chapter One

***Mapuche* and Other American Peoples Before 1492**

Chile⁹ is located in the extreme south of the American continent. The country is a thin strip 4,200 kms long from north to south, and about 150 kms wide on average. Its eastern boundary is the Andes Mountains and on its West is the Pacific Ocean. The northern region is desert while the centre, a fertile valley with a moderate climate and four clearly differentiated seasons, is the region in which most of the population is concentrated and is the principal place of first settlement. The southern region in contrast to the north, is cold and humid, with a great variety of vegetation, volcanoes, snow, rivers, lakes and rain forest.

The origin of the *Mapuche* is still a matter of debate among scholars. For Bengoa (1996: 13) and Galdames (1941: 3), these aborigines lived in what is now the central and south of Chile perhaps from the earliest time that it was possible for human beings to exist on the earth. For Latcham (cited in Bengoa, 1996: 12), they came from the centre of South America, specifically, from the *Tupi Guarani* territory, now

⁹Although at that time that region of America was not known as Chile but perhaps as *Chiri* (cold) or *Tchili* (snow), terms from the *Inca* language *Quichua* (Hancock, 1971: 26), I will use the Spanish term 'Chile'.

Paraguay. Retamar (1990: 26) and Neira (1990: 91) argue that *Mapuche* forebears would probably have come into the American continent from Asia. Although their origin is uncertain, it is plausible to affirm, from certain archeological evidence, that there was a people that can be called *Mapuche* who were living mainly along the central coast about 2,500 years ago (Bengoa, 1996: 15).

The central and southern regions of what is now Chile, were densely populated not only by *Mapuche* but also by *Picunche*¹⁰ and one million people lived in the central valleys and in *Araucanía* (Aylwin, 1997: 1; Bengoa, 1996: 16). These communities were not settled in a fixed and permanent place but these were nomadic tribes (Galdames, 1941: 2) permanently and cyclically moving from north to south and back, sometimes along one thousand kilometres of coastline. But this nomadic character was changing and by the 16th century, these peoples had restricted their mobility to the southern area known by the Spanish as *Araucanía* in which conditions for living were less demanding. So, the transitoriness of their settlements depended on their needs for food and shelter and also on climatic conditions and the timing and location of religious rituals. Thus, time and space were directly related to their material and spiritual life which constituted an indissoluble unity and in

¹⁰ Among the several indigenous peoples, *Picunche* was the other major indigenous group (Noggler, 1984: 1; Faron, 1968: 11). Others were the northern *Chinchas* and *Diaguitas*, and the southern *Huilliche* who did not live in the central region (Noggler, 1984: 1; Galdames, 1941).

this way they understood and experienced their lives and interacted with each other and with their environment.

The specific area which the *Mapuche* inhabited was demarcated by the *Maule* river in the north and by the *Cruces* river in the south. *Mapuche* lived in sheltered places, "frequently in ravines, on the banks of streams, or in the midst of forest" (Galdames, 1941: 9) in houses (*rucas*) built of straw and clay, in which they cooked, slept and protected themselves from the elements. *Mapuchemapu* an area of 5.4 million of hectares, was a region rich in resources which satisfied the needs of a hunting and gathering people numbering about half a million people averaging about 10.8 hectares each (Bengoa, 1996: 16).

The *Mapuche* communal mode was based fundamentally on hunting and gathering, although they had already began incipient agricultural activity by the 16th century, before the Spanish conquest. *Mapuche* political organisation required no state and was based on the *lof*, the polygamous family. The patriarchal character of *Mapuchemapu* whose reciprocal relationship with polygamy empowered the aged male authority within the *lof* who maintained his influence with the help of religion and warfare despite the incursions of other American indigenous people, the *Inca*.

The modes of production in America prior to the Spanish invasion were various but they can be grouped into two main types which articulated differentially with the feudal mode of production after 1492. One, called by Carmagnani (1976: 20) the “agricultural mode of production”, was able to generate a regular economic surplus¹¹ and was typified by the *Inca* and *Mexica*; and the other, exemplified by the *Mapuche* communal mode of production, generated sufficient to satisfy the needs of the producer community (Carmagnani, 1976: 20) and its relations with similar communities.

The resistance to the invasion by the *Mapuche*, one of the main forms of the articulation, was a direct consequence of the contradictory nature of the feudal and *Mapuche* modes of production, for, as Jara (1987: 41) pointed out, the fundamental problem for the Spaniards was that the *Mapuche* could not live in an alien regime of production in which they were forced to provide a surplus to the Spaniards beyond their own needs. The *Mapuche* communal mode did not produce surplus able to be appropriated by an inter-generational dominant class or cast. *Mapuchemapu* was not governed by a central state then, political divisions and power struggle were not as intense and acute as in *Inca* or *Mexica* social formations.

¹¹ Economic surplus is used here only as an indicator of the character of the mode of production, which is

The Freedom of Hunting and Gathering

Mapuchemapu has a rainy climate and is abundant in vegetation and in many species of fish, shellfish, animals and birds. Hunting, gathering and sheep raising were undertaken by a relatively independent polygamous family group known as *lof* or *rehue* whose diet was based on beans, potatoes, maize and the flour of the *piñon*, the fruit of the *Araucaria* tree. The group consumed what it produced and there was no surplus large or regular enough to support a group of non-producers. However, a marked gender and age division of labour existed with the younger men performing the more dangerous activities such as fishing at sea, for example, while the women worked in horticulture, textile and domestic production (Bengoa, 1996: 20). Productive activity, however, was not characterised by a sharp division between work and leisure and the testimonies of Spanish, Dutch and English sailors – the famous pirate Francis Drake among them - who visited *Mocha* Island between 1544 and 1600, are eloquent in describing the abundance in which *Mapuche* lived (Quiroz, 1997: 1). This was the mode in which *Mapuche* produced and reproduced their lives, a mode in harmony with the environment in which nature and religious rituals defined the cycles of gathering, hunting, sowing and harvesting. *Mapuche* were thus a people who lived and produced in freedom.

What defined, characterised and differentiated *Mapuche* society from others was the nature of property, production and social relations. There was no “individual” ownership but a kind of collective control of most productive resources. Land was not a commodity and its use was not concentrated in the hands of a few. This regime called by Riesco (1988: 280) “primitive communism”, and by Noggler (1984: 21) “social democracy”, was oriented to the satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the people (Riesco, 1988: 280). The whole family group controlled the land and the product of the collective agricultural work was, in general, directly consumed by the collectivity. While the direct producers were the consumers, surplus was traded with other communities through barter.

For Noggler (1984: 22), the tribal family system of *Mapuche* was a “social democracy” because all owned the soil in common, like the water and air and everyone had right to use the land she or he wanted, for there was enough for all. Much work was done together, such as building a house or sowing crops. According to Noggler (1984: 22) anyone who wanted to sow maize, invited the women, men and children of their community for a particular day and once the work was completed, provided abundant food and drink for the workers, a collective work known as *Mingaco*. *Mapuche* production and social relations generated by these property relations, facilitated the

development of a social solidarity among the community members which in turn impeded, by its own nature, class formation and hence, hierarchical class relations of power.

Simultaneously with collective production, the right to some individual property was secured (Noggler, 1984: 21), including the social right of women and children to possess their own goods and to use of them during their lifetime. The original combination of collective and private property in *Mapuche's* society was a kind of "moderated communism and a private property equally moderated . . . the real basis of the family, community and the whole *Mapuche* society" (Noggler, 1984: 21). When a female was born, her mother gave her an animal, and a boy received the same from his father. During childhood, their property grew for the offspring of their animals belonged to them as well. However, the usufruct was with the family. At marriage, women took their possessions to their husband's family that had the right of usufruct but not the right of ownership. In the case of a divorce, specifically if a woman left her husband and came back to her mother's family, her family had to return the bride-wealth paid to her husband's family. Besides, the husband lost the usufruct of the animals that his ex-wife had taken with her when she married him. This was considered to be to the woman's benefit and the man's loss. According to Noggler

(1984: 21), this meant a certain independence for women, but it did not hinder discrimination against them as it will be seen in the next section.

Community, Patriarchy and Political Power

The *lof* constituted by an originally totemic family was a territorially autonomous economic and political unit (Latham and Guevara cited in Jara, 1987: 49) within which some men were polygamous which empowered them politically and economically within the clan. The father of the oldest family was the patriarchal authority for he was seen as the wisest, the most valiant, the most respected by the members of the *lof*. He was known as *ulmen* or *lonco* (Galdames, 1941:9; Nogger, 1984: 22) and was the judicial authority who guaranteed the usufruct of the land. His authority depended on the size of his family, that is, by the number of wives and offspring and the quantity of animals he possessed (Jara, 1987: 49). However, his title was largely symbolic for his tasks, to guarantee the usufruct of the land and represent the *lof* in negotiation with other *lofs* when conflicts between them occurred, were sporadic. In daily life, the *ulmen* was a normal member of the clan (Bengoa, 1996: 27).

In the clan, the members of the *lof* dwelled in not more than fifty houses around the *ulmen's* (Jara, 1987: 49) and sometimes about one hundred people dwelled in one very large structure containing the

ulmen and all his offspring, his sons and their wives, daughters and grandchildren (Bengoa, 1996: 26). Although *rehues* were relatively independent and autonomous territorially, they met together for religious rituals and importantly, they became allied in order to make war against a common enemy.

The assembly in which *Mapuche* met and socialised was the *cahuin*. In times of war, *lofs* formed an alliance called *ayllarehue* (Jara, 1987: 49) which comprised no more than nine *rehues*. In the *ayllarehue* a *toqui* (warrior chief) was elected. For urgent military reasons, *ayllarehues* met in what was called *Huichan Mapu* (Land Alliance) which brought together representatives from all of *Mapuchemapu*. When the *ayllarehues* met in the *Huichan Mapu*, the great *toqui* of *Mapuchemapu* was elected and he led his people during the war (Noggler, 1984: 22). But the authority exercised by *toquis* was also temporary, exercised only during war time and even then, this authority was subjected to the views of other chiefs, expressed in a council which comprised only men.

Thus, apart from times of war, *Mapuche* never constituted a nation with a permanent state and a centralised bureaucracy. Although the relationships between communities were determined by exchange, religious rituals, natural disaster and war - all of which required

organisation beyond individual communities - there is no evidence of the existence of a *Mapuche* state as in the *Inca* and *Mexica* empires (Jara, 1987: 49). Each *lof* was within itself collectively organised for production, religion and education (Noggler, 1984:22) and this was the permanent political unit of the *Mapuche* people, united sanguineously by lineage (Jara, 1987: 49).

The political organisations of *Mapuche* concerned both the social welfare of the polygamous family and the well being of the whole *Mapuche* nation as a sovereign people. These ends were achieved by differentiating autonomy and unity, by preserving the independence of each community and simultaneously enhancing solidarity among them (Noggler, 1984: 22). Nevertheless, the decentralised character of *Mapuche* society was not static. *Mapuche* conceived their land as a most sacred treasure, a property of the whole nation to be collectively worked by it (Faron, 1968: 10; Riesco, 1988: 280). The defence of the land, the maintenance of their traditions and religious beliefs were their central concern.

Religion, Genders, Warriors and Hegemonic Masculinity

The work of social solidarity was crucially undertaken by religion within which women played a central role for, as well as performing most of the agricultural and domestic work (Faron, 1968: 15), some of

them were (and still are) community healers and priestesses (*Machis*), leading religious ceremonies and rituals along with *Dungues* (soothsayers), to influence the natural elements through communication with their gods to benefit the harvest (Galdames, 1941: 11). *Mapuche* believed in a pantheon of gods¹² that were subordinated to a Supreme Being, *Pillan*, according to Galdames (1941: 11), *Ngenechen* according to Montecino (1996: 1). This central divinity is a powerful god commanding clouds and winds, producing storms, earthquake and thunders. Apart from divinities there were some demiurges located between gods and humans. Some divinities caused illness, death and misery and others brought good harvests and abundance of game (Galdames, 1941: 10). The manichaeian characteristic Montecino (1996: 1) attributes to *Mapuche*, who would place everything in opposition, good and evil, right and left, women and men, would have been present in their divinities too. But Montecino (1996: 4) refers to two important aspects of the relation between the feminine and religious belief. Firstly, although women sometimes embodied goodness and were linked to the supernatural for the feminine was conceived as subjective and irrational, usually they were placed in the evil side of *Mapuche* symbolism. Secondly, gods manifest a third gender for divinities were simultaneously male and female. Similarly, when the *machi* was a man,

¹² There is no agreement among the specialists about the character of *Mapuche* divinities and their qualities. Montecino (1996: 2) comments that *Mapuche* people do not use the word “creator” nor “god” and that the word that other specialists translate as “god” in fact means “author”. For Montecino (1996:

he reflected both the masculine and the feminine. According to Santa Cruz (1978: 29) however, healers were most of time homosexuals and this third gender was related to the supernatural. Thus, women and men healers were regarded as deviant people and they were related to the supernatural, the divine, contrasted to the “real” women who worked for her husbands or “real” men characterised by the warrior, who as the truly masculine was hegemonic¹³.

Latcham (cited in Vitale, 1993: 136) argued that long before the European invasion, *Mapuche* were monogamous, matriarchal and matrilineal, husbands residing in their wife’s family clan, under the wife’s family totem. This matriarchal regime changed sometime before the invasion to a patrilineal system based on patriarchal polygamy. Influences from northern peoples and the *Inca*’s attempt to invade *Mapuche* territory impacted on their gender relations for evidence provided by conquerors and sailors who were in *Araucanía* by the middle of the 16th century, shows that *Mapuche* were patriarchal and polygamous. Pastene in 1544, Drake in 1578, Cavendish in 1587, Hawkins in 1594, de Cordes in 1599, van Noort in 1602 and Spilbergen

2), there was only one god for *Mapuche*, the god of water, sun, earth, etc. For other scholars such as Galdames (1941), *Mapuche* were polytheistic.

¹³ Hegemonic masculinity is “the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women” (Connell, 1995: 77).

in 1615, testified that *Mapuche* men had several wives and van Noort commented that the men had all the women they could (Quiroz, 1997: 1-2). In addition, the Spanish soldier Francisco Nuñez de Pineda y Bascuñan, who was a *Mapuche* prisoner and later lived in the *Araucanía* and adopted *Mapuche*'s customs and traditions, wrote in his tribute to *Mapuche* called *El Cautiverio Feliz y Razón de las Guerras Dilatadas de Chile* (1973) (*Pleasant Imprisonment and the Reason for the Protracted Wars of Chile*), that the life in a polygamous family was very hard, filled with disagreements, fights and jealousies for different personalities, sensitivities and tempers must share a crowded environment.

Effectively, the *Mapuche* patriarchal structure was the main cause of social inequality. Prestige was a male patrimony. The man who was not a warrior, was not a man. The prestige of the *toqui* depended on bravery, toughness and strength¹⁴, the characteristics of a warrior, but not all warrior were equal. Social organisation was based on a patriarchal and polygamous system with its own distinctive community life and productive system (Galdames, 1941:8). Patriarchs were the polygamous men who control resources, who lived with as many

¹⁴ See Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga's epic narrative *la Araucana* (1969), in particular the narration of the testing of young men's strength and power, such as the election of Caupolicán as *toqui*.

women as they could buy, paid for them with animals, liquor, fruit, utensils and ornaments of different kinds (Galdames, 1941: 8; Nogger, 1984: 13). To afford that, they needed many animals and much land which they had access to because their offspring was larger. Land was free and labour was scarce and a polygamous man could increase his labour through his offspring, his *mocetones* and *conas*, those directly related to him by sanguineous ties. All these empowered him. However, patriarchs' economic power was confined within their own community for polygamous relations were patrilocal by the 16th century in *Mapuchemapu*.

Life was different for women and men. Men were educated since childhood for war and did not perform a great deal of agricultural, let alone, domestic work (Galdames, 1941:14-15). They were permanently in military training or on campaigns. The social construction of gender began in childhood. During a boy's infancy, his father took no notice of him. Adult men taught boys over 8 years old to play games like *palin* (hockey) and handball, to train them for war and when a boy had learned how to shoot an arrow and brandish the lance and the club he was considered a man. In this way, *Mapuche* made warriors who embodied *Mapuche* masculinity whose main characteristics were strength, courage, toughness and agility typical of men trained for the war (Agostino, 1997: 3) and this physical discipline led *Mapuche* men

to conceive of themselves as superior women. The army and war were sites where hegemonic masculinity was reproduced and maintained (Agostino, 1997: 3). Women taught girls cultivation and the preparation of food and clothing and the manufacture of wool, cloth and utensils. Women followed their husbands when they went on a military campaign, carrying provisions for them. The defence of land required the formation of warriors, men were the protectors and women the protected and the patriarchal character of *Mapuche* society was in this way reinforced.

Other American Peoples

But when Columbus met indigenes in what are now the Caribbean Islands at the end of the 15th century, *Mapuche* were one among many diverse peoples in America (Lipschutz, 1967: 102). While *Mapuche* constituted the major indigenous group in the area, there were other peoples who during centuries exercised influence on their processes of social formation, peoples, who were also nomads and some of them, warrior peoples. But the character of American peoples at continental level was more diverse than even this suggests. Specifically, there were two very numerous peoples in what today is called Latin America, the great *imperios pre-Colombinos* (Pre-Columbus empires): the *Mexica* and the *Inca*. The former inhabited the Central American region now known as Mexico. *Tenochtitlán* (today called Mexico City) was in

1492, the biggest city in the world apart from Beijing (Retamar, 1990: 25). The *Inca* were living along the Andes Mountains, in what today is Ecuador, Perú and the north of Chile. Carmagnani (1976: 20) estimated that from a population in America that numbered not more than 100 million people prior to the Spanish invasion, about sixty to seventy percent was comprised within what he called the “agricultural economy” and about thirty to forty percent in the hunting, gathering and incipient agricultural economy¹⁵ like the *Mapuche*.

Inca and *Mexica* had achieved sustained material development (in the Western sense) and had developed knowledge in engineering, architecture, astronomy, mathematics and geometry, among other disciplines (Riesco, 1988: 279). They were in a process of imperial expansion when the Europeans arrived (Galeano, 1990:350) driven by a social structure which comprised clearly defined classes and a state headed by kings empowered by divine will who exercised power

¹⁵ While similar to *Mapuche* in the sense of their community production, social life, religion and political organisation, these peoples differed in other important aspects such as in their gender relations and military. *Iroques* and *Guaranies* for example, were not patriarchal (Galeano, 1990: 35). They were similar to *Mapuche* for they did not know private property so, ambition, individualism, egoism and mercantile competition were not generalised social and economic phenomena (Galeano, 1990: 34). Guatemala's indigenes, *Mayas*, called their land “mother” and when they chopped a tree, they begged “her” for mercy (Galeano, 1990:36). In addition, marriage was not indissoluble; virginity was not a value; homosexuality was open in communities living along the coasts of the Caribbean Sea mainly, in the *Yucatan* Peninsula. Sexually then, these Central American indigenes and others to the south were truly free (Galeano, 1989: 321). The *Iroques*, *Guaranies* and some others elected their leaders in assembly - as *Mapuche* did in times of war - and women participated in the decision-making process, the *Cacique Nicaragua*, naively, asking the Spanish invaders who had elected the King of Spain (Galeano, 1990:35). Therefore, *Mapuche* was similar to all these indigenous peoples at the level of religion, social and political organisation and relations of production. However, *Mapuche* differed from all of them at the military level and from *Iroques* and *Guaranies*, in terms of gender relations.

through a priesthood and military commanders over the direct producers under rigid customary codes (Galeano, 1990: 35). This type of social formation was not dramatically different to the feudal absolutist State existing in Spain at that time (as we shall see in the next chapter).

The centralised state of *Mexica* rested on relatively 'self-governing' political, economic and military units called *Calpulli*, an institution that "held land which its members did not own but used. [I]t was probably an association of linked extended families whose leader, the *Calpullec*, was probably elected but, by the fifteenth century, that office had become hereditary and lifelong" (Thomas, 1994: 8). Through the *Calpulli*, the farmer was controlled by the King who owned the land. One third of the product of the land granted to the farmers by the *Calpulli*, was given to the King (Thomas, 1994: 8). The other two thirds went to the *Calpullec* who as a member of the dominant group, used it for his own needs and then distributed the rest at his will among the members of his lineage, the *Calpulli*.

The *Inca* Empire was divided into four large areas or *suyu* (quarters), each of which was divided into smaller provinces. Within these, *Incas'* social organisation was strictly hierarchical with the householders-taxpayers at the bottom and the *Inca* royal family at the top, with the

Sapa Inca (Unique *Inca*) or emperor at the apex of the pyramid (Bankes, 1977: 109). The emperor was the representative of the Sun on Earth, with absolute power over all people; all men were his sons and all women his wives (Bankes, 1977: 110).

In relation to this class structure, nobility comprised two levels of privileged people: the first level was the royal family and the "*Inca* by privilege". In the second level were the *Curacas*, who ruled the alien conquered peoples for the empire. Those who constituted the exploited class were the Commoners who worked in Agriculture, the predominant productive activity. They had to pay their taxes in terms of work performed but importantly in goods: "[t]hey worked to provide the specified amounts of tribute in food and goods that each province was responsible for supplying for the Emperor's government storehouse" (Bankes, 1977: 111). The direct producers' surplus was the exclusive patrimony of the ruling class. "Law concerning private property forbade commoners to keep luxury goods, including anything in excess of a householder's and his family's needs, unless he had a special license from the *Inca* Emperor to possess them" (Bankes, 1977: 111)

In the *Inca* society, everyone worked for the monarchical state and lived subjugated to it. This relationship between state and people,

though it allowed the satisfaction of people's basic needs, not only curtailed peoples' freedom, but would have also meant a certain loss of 'personality' or identity (Noggler, 1984: 22), of identification between the people and the land, which did not happen in *Mapuche* society. Other subjugated peoples, under the control of *Curacas*, paid tribute to the emperor. *Inca* people were controlled and disciplined by an authoritarian state but as will be seen in Chapter Three, the existence of dominated peoples within the empire's confines, would make *Inca* vulnerable to invaders from outside the subcontinent.

What is clear now is that there was an intense, vibrant and diverse human existence long before colonisation in this sub-continent. In contrast, the dominant European ethnocentric understanding, the "official history", has been the version of history used to the benefit of the Latin American ruling classes, of European and later, United States interests. Meanwhile, the next chapter will explore the European world at that time, particularly, feudalism in Spain, its class relations, the Absolutist state and the influence of Catholicism on the monarchy, gender and race relations, crucial to understand the articulation of the modes of production in Latin America.

Chapter Two

Feudalism and the Advent of Spanish Absolutism

Feudalism in Castile and Aragon: Serfdom and *Repartimiento-Encomienda*

Feudalism was established in Christian Spain, France, Italy, and Germany in about the ninth century, after the dissolution of the Carolingian empire (Ogg, 1972: 203; Pryor, 1985: 82). European feudalism was a mode of production containing several classes and in it the institution of serfdom was the predominant mechanism of surplus extraction (Anderson, 1979: 19). However, as Anderson (1979: 62) and Hilton (1982: 14) comment, ambiguity and polemic have characterised the discussion of the nature of serfdom. Searching for an unambiguous and uncontentious definition of the term, containing the substance of the feudal mode of production, Takahashi (cited in Hilton, 1982: 14) suggests that

serfdom [was] the existence-form of labour in the feudal mode of production. Its essence was the transference to the use of the lord of the labour of the peasant family which was surplus to that needed for the family's subsistence and economic reproduction. The surplus labour could be used directly on the lord's demesne

(home farm of the manor), or its product could be transferred in the form of a rent in kind or in money, from the family holding. Given the effective possession of the subsistence-producing holding by the peasant family, the transfer of the surplus must be forced, since the peasant, as contrasted with the wage labourer, does not need to alienate his [or her] labour power in order to live.

Within feudalism, the nobility, and lesser warrior officialdom, accumulating wealth and enjoying social prestige, constituted the section of society in power, while the serf had replaced the slave on the subordinated side of the social spectrum. The central social classes, the ruling class and the subjected class had the 'feudal lord' and the 'serf' as their respective social subjects. This elemental division corresponded, in general, to Spanish social reality before and early in the fifteenth century, the century in which the *Américas* entered the history of Europe and Europe entered the history of the *Américas*. But Feudalism, like any mode of production, was not static or uniform, and in Spain, the dispersion of sovereignty in several states and the change in the form of surplus extraction from labour to rent in money, plunged feudal power relations into a deep crisis. As Anderson (1979: 19) comments, "the class power of the feudal lords was thus directly at stake with the gradual disappearance of serfdom". Out of this the monarchy

redefined sovereignty in a more centralised way, in the form of an Absolutist State based in Castile and Aragon which constituted the main feudal states in Spain at the advent of the sixteenth century (Anderson, 1979: 61). Thus, the Absolutist State was a “*displacement* of politico-legal coercion upwards towards a centralised, militarised summit, the Absolutist State. Diluted at village level, it became concentrated at ‘national’ level” (Anderson, 1979: 19).

Castile was the dominant state in the Spanish peninsula. With a population of between five and seven million and successful trade with northern Europe, it was a prosperous Kingdom. This contrasted sharply with the Kingdom of Aragon, whose main feature was the preservation of serfdom and the awesome independence of the feudal powers of the local aristocracy in the countryside (Anderson, 1979: 63-64). The existence of and differences between the two states is evidence of the devolution of sovereignty and the absence of a central state in Spain, a characteristic of the feudal state prior to Absolutism. Indeed, “[t]he asymmetry of institutional orders in Castile and Aragon was, in fact, to shape the whole career of the Spanish monarchy henceforward” (Anderson, 1979: 65). Spain was the earliest great power of modern Europe, and it was in a strict sense, “inordinate” among the other Western monarchies of the age (Anderson, 1979: 60).

During the time of Spanish feudalism, there were seven centuries of wars and invasions which affected the Iberian Peninsula. Two Middle-Eastern peoples, at that time called by the Spaniards 'Arabs' and 'Moors'¹⁶, invaded Spain over seven hundred years and notably transformed the Gothic and Latin cultures which had prevailed until their arrival in the seventh century (Galdames, 1941: 31).

The Absolutist State in Spain was born in the marriage of King Ferdinand II of Aragon and Queen Isabel I of Castile in 1469, symbolising the union of Aragon and Castile (Anderson, 1979: 62). Castile was a wool economy, the "Australia of the middle ages" (Anderson, 1979: 62), with a busy trade with the Flemish. Aragon, had long been a territorial and commercial power in the Mediterranean, controlling Sicily and Sardinia. Their combined military and political power was rapidly evident in several conquests: Granada was reconquered from Moorish invasion; Navarre was absorbed; Naples annexed; Milan, the Franché-Comte and the Netherlands added to the Empire; and above all, the *Américas* were discovered and subjugated. Spain was the premier power in Europe (Anderson, 1979: 62), and in the minds of the Spanish, in the world. The power of the Monarchs was now "absolute", even over the rest of the nobility. But as will be seen

¹⁶According to Galdames (1941: 31), Arabs entered Spain for the purpose of conquest in the eighth century, "following the conquest of all of North Africa. Only the northern region of Spain, included between the Cantabrians and the sea, escaped conquest at their hands. Later the Moors also established themselves in the Peninsula. They were Mohammedans like the Arabs, but natives of North Africa. Finally many Jews settled there . . .".

later in this chapter, Absolutism did not mean a radical change of the feudal mode of production, rather it was the form the Spanish state adopted in order to overcome Spain's economic and political crisis and so maintain ruling class domination.

This absolute power was represented by the Monarchs of Spain, who for their religious piety were called "the Catholic Monarchs" and obliged all their subjects, without exception, to profess the same faith¹⁷. They created the infamous Inquisition, which was to persecute all those charged with not practising Catholic doctrine faithfully (Galdames, 1941: 32). Christianity, as we shall see in the next Chapter, was the meaning, rationale and justification with which colonization in America would bless the genocide and the plunder which inaugurated for Europeans the history of that continent. In Castile, the very event of the invasion of America was seen as a Divine reward for the victory over the Moors and for the implacable persecution of heretics (Galdames, 1941: 33).

The Catholic Monarchs also responded with violent repression against a sector of the nobility who had accumulated enormous wealth and were ruling their fiefdoms as 'little kings' in a decentralised institutional

¹⁷Before Catholicism was instituted as the only acceptable religious doctrine by the Monarchs, "*Mudéjares* and Jews were permitted to practice their respective religions, and the latter were permitted to retain their own law" (Chamberlain, 1939: 44).

structure which enabled them to commit acts of disobedience against the Monarchy. Those who did not accept the Monarchs' authority "with good grace paid for their temerity with their lives" (Galdames, 1941: 33).

But while the religiosity of the Spaniards facilitated, to some extent, their consent to the Spanish Monarchs, it was not the main reason for monarchic omnipotence. The Spanish monarchy owed its power to dynastic marriage policy and to the colonial conquest of America (Anderson, 1979: 61). The Spanish Absolute State "drew strength both from the inheritances of feudal aggrandizement at home and the booty of extractive capital overseas" (Anderson, 1979: 61). But while this strength was projected by Castile's military power and its armies' campaigns in Europe and America, it was not a reflection of the consolidation of political legitimacy and economic growth at home. The expansion of the Spanish empire was chaotic, economically unplanned, weakening its already uneven state structure in the peninsula, especially the links between the two central Kingdoms. In addition, due to the territorial dimension of this expansion, it was even more difficult to consolidate a unique economic system based not on a steady development of productive resources but, as it was, on the plundering of treasures from the mineral-rich mountains and fertile valleys of America (Galeano, 1973: 23).

Popular upheavals had occurred prior to the Absolutist re-structuration of the state in 1469. Poor people rebelled against injustice in feudal villages and small towns. In *The Revolution in Spain*, Marx and Engels (1974) showed that feudal monarchies in the fourteenth century, were also shaken by social upheavals and revolutions. At the end of the fourteenth century, the aristocracy had rebelled against King Juan II. In the fifteenth century more serious insurrections occurred against King Enrique IV and the head of his government, Don Juan de Pacheco, Marqués de Villena. For Marx and Engels (1974: 7), "insurrections were as old in Spain as the governments of those monarchs against which rebellions have usually been addressed". Not consent and stability, but upheavals, social turmoil and political instability characterised the dynamic of Spanish feudalism before Absolutism. However, political restructuring did not bring calm to the Spanish Kingdom. Between 1640 and 1643, secessionists revolted in Portugal, Catalonia and Naples, driven by the unbalanced processes of political restructuring and the absence of a unified economic strategy in the Spanish Kingdom. Thus, Spanish Absolutism "had expanded too fast and too early, because of its overseas fortune, without ever having completed its metropolitan foundations" (Anderson, 1979: 81). In the big cities these revolts were led by members of the nobility and erupted in kingdoms in which sovereignty was still devolved.

Castile, the Reconquest and the Rise of the *Repartimiento-Encomienda*

Until the twelfth century, the Castilian state's main task was to settle the territories from which the Moors were removed by the Castilian army¹⁸ (Pérez De Tudela, 1956: 77). This basic task in the re-conquered land defined the most particular features of Castilian political economy, for out of it evolved a rigorous formula of occupation, whose principle feature directed by the Crown was the *repartimiento* (Pérez De Tudela, 1956: 76). The *repartimiento* consisted in land granted by the Sovereigns from the reconquered territory "to those who participated in the conquest in recompense of services and to provide for the peopling, government, and defence of such territory. This practice became fixed custom, and to a certain degree was obligatory on the part of the Sovereign, especially in view of the fact that the *conquistadores* served at their own *costa y mision* [risk]" (Chamberlain, 1939: 38). Grants in *repartimiento* were given by *juro de heredad* or *heredades* (right of ownership by heritage) and imposed military duty on those who received them. It was from the *repartimiento* that the great *latifundios* of the nobles in Andalusia developed (Chamberlain, 1939: 38).

The reconquered territory was divided among the nobility, the authorities of ecclesiastic foundations and the army. The war context in

¹⁸ Meanwhile the war continued in those territories still occupied by the Moors.

which grants were given, the non-citizen status of feudal women and the masculinity and femininity formed in that context and under the influence of the Catholic doctrine, did not allow women - except in specific circumstances¹⁹ - to hold *repartimientos* or *encomiendas* or any grant from the Crown. *Repartimientos* and *encomiendas* were by definition, patriarchal institutions. Women were forbidden to bear arms. The *encomienda*, was, in its original and generic terms,

the temporary grant by the sovereign, of territory, cities, towns, castles, and monasteries, with the powers of government and the right to receive the revenue, or a stipulated part thereof, and the services owed to the Crown by the people of the areas concerned under *fuero* and custom. The grant was given for the lifetime of the recipient, for that of the sovereign, or at the will of the latter. In its jurisdictional aspect the *encomienda* was a charge of government, the *comendador*, or *encomendero* (*comendero*), exercising the authority of the Crown in the areas involved . . . The *comendador*, or *encomendero*, possessed no power to change the status of the people of the lands assigned, nor to alter the established tributes and services (Chamberlain, 1939: 35; see also Simpson, 1950: 176, fn 25).

¹⁹Chamberlain (1939: 28) signals in this respect that in "an early *cédula* it was stipulated that women who possessed *encomiendas* should name and support *escuderos* to perform the military service of which they themselves were incapable". However the Crown at one time considered women should be

From this broad and generic definition, the *encomienda* became, in practice, the institution in which serfs were handed over to the care of a single landlord to whom the land was granted by the Monarchs alone who, ultimately, possessed it.

In Granada, restricted and qualified participation in the grant in *repartimiento* in class as well as in gender terms, benefited the men of the noble ruling class and an emerging bourgeoisie and excluded, by the middle of the fifteenth century, the peasantry and urban dwellers (Pérez de Tudela, 1956: 79).

After the reconquest of Toledo, this process led to the emergence of powerful *Concejos* (town councils) provided with enormous resources, comprised mainly of merchants under the control of *caballeros* (knights). Nevertheless, it was the King who granted the territories to the Councils and appointed those who divided up the Royal property. Not surprisingly, the King regarded the Councils as a most efficient and loyal instrument against external and internal enemies (Pérez De Tudela, 1956: 77).

But by the end of the fifteenth century, a serious political and economic crisis had emerged in the Peninsula. Spain's enormous territorial

excluded from the holding of *encomiendas* in so far as they were unable to hold and defend the lands reconquered.

power was grounded on an unstable basis, the two diverse political and economic realities, Castile and Aragon. Castile, as stated above, was the dominant Kingdom by its demography and economy. With a population calculated at between five and seven millions (Anderson, 1979: 63) and a buoyant economy based on trade with Northern Europe of cereals and wool, Castile looked very prosperous at that time. The wool boom in turn enlarged the urban areas and developed the textile industry (Anderson, 1979: 62). The concentration of wealth was extreme: "two to three per cent of the population controlled some 97 per cent of the soil. More than half of this, in turn, was owned by a few magnate families" (Anderson, 1979: 63).

Importantly, the *encomienda*, "the method of handing out men as well as land" (Thomas, 1994: 577), the relation of production that had emerged in Castile, had been established in *Andalucia*, *Extremadura* and *Murcia* during the war against the Moors. While the *encomienda* took various forms according to which institution or authority granted it, it tended to perpetuate itself in two main ways. Those granted at the will of the sovereign became lifelong and those granted for a lifetime, "tended to become hereditary, frequently being transmitted from father to son by special *merced* of the Crown" (Chamberlain, 1939: 36).

The Castilian *encomiendas* and *repartimiento* did not contribute to the autonomy of feudal lords nor to their relatively independent political sovereignty. To the contrary, these institutions tended to link territorial property with local power (in the Town Councils) controlled centrally by the Castilian state and so consolidated central political power. Therefore, the Castilian *repartimiento-encomienda* both economically and politically, as a relation of production and as a political-legal mechanism of the central State, was an important factor in the consolidation of the Absolutist State in Castile.

This Castilian version of serfdom was not a different feudal relation of production, and what specified the *encomienda* was its dependency on the central state and the political role the grant played in maintaining the Absolutist character of the Monarchy. In this way the Monarchy sought to overcome the crisis of the whole feudal system in Spain. Thus, the *encomienda's* political implications made it different to the *señoríos* of Aragon - as we shall see in the following section - in which serfdom, in its 'purest' form, was the predominant relation of production.

Aragon, the Kingdom of *Señorío*

In Aragon, there was still a large Muslim population during the reconquest, in the valleys of Ebro and Levante, for example (Pérez De

Tudela, 1956: 77), part of which remained in the Kingdom and was incorporated into serfdom, the main relation of production which characterised the feudal mode of production.

There was still an aristocracy with vast feudal powers in the barren *Aragonese* countryside in which "serfdom still survived and a captive *Morisco* [Moorish] peasantry toiled for its Christian landlords" (Anderson, 1979: 64). The inhabitants numbered less than one million and the three main provinces or principalities of this realm (Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon), constituted in fact, separate political, judicial and economic feudal structures, making the Kingdom of Aragon less centralised politically than Castile. Wealth was also differently accumulated, for in Aragon, the minor nobility of the regions and principalities accumulated wealth whereas they did not in Castile, where wealth was accumulated by a 'high nobility', an "aristocracy of enormous estates and powerful military orders" (Anderson, 1979: 62). This was due, to a great extent, to the dispersed form of serfdom still predominant in Aragon. In Castile, a new form of serfdom, the *encomienda*, had emerged, in which the land politically and, to a lesser extent, economically, was centrally administered. The autonomy of the feudal lords in Aragon, the poorer Kingdom, was in this way less constrained while their wealth was less concentrated.

Thus, while Castile was experiencing the structuring of an Absolutist State, Aragon remained decentralised. The differences in the reconquest processes corresponded, to a great extent, to the relationship between serfdom and the state in each Kingdom. Whereas the Castilian versions of serfdom, the military grants in *repartimiento* and *encomienda*, were - apart from their economic nature - a mechanism of state intervention within the Absolutist strategy predominant at that time in Castile, Aragonese serfdom was an element of and contributed to the maintenance of the fragmentation of that Kingdom in which there was no coherent state.

The Limits of Spanish Absolutism

This brief presentation of the economic, political and social characteristics of the realms of Castile and Aragon shows how different they were and the political and economic obstacles the latter presented to the construction of an Absolutist State. Moreover, Aragon also had "much less profitable prospects for economic fiscalisation. Castile had five or six times the population, and its greater wealth was not protected by any comparable constitutional barriers" (Anderson, 1979: 65) like those of Aragon. The essential differences between these two realms were unsolved problems for the prospects of a centralised Absolutist State in Spain. This uneven development had serious economic and political consequences. Only "the Castile State machine was rationalised

and modernised. But the new monarchy never opposed it to the aristocratic class as a whole. Top military and diplomatic positions were always reserved for magnates" (Anderson, 1979: 66).

In Aragon no political and economic strategy of that nature could be applied. "Aragon in effect, was thus left to its own devices" (Anderson, 1979: 67), because it was impossible for the Monarchs in Castile to restructure Aragon's political and economic institutions according to the centralisation of powers strategy of an Absolutist State. Aragon could not even be subordinated as an 'internal colony' because of the existing devolution of powers expressed in the economic, political and military authority of the feudal lords over their territories, in the cities, towns, villages and the countryside. Therefore, the Absolutist project was never completed, "far from creating a unified Kingdom, their Catholic Majesties failed even to establish a single currency, let alone a common tax or legal system within their realms . . . The Inquisition was the only 'unitary Spanish institution' in the peninsula" (Anderson, 1979: 67). This pattern was later accentuated with the accession of the Habsburg sovereign, Charles V, to the throne, during whose reign the *Américas* were juridically linked to the Kingdom of Castile, but not to Aragon, further exacerbating the tensions between the two realms, and cementing the connection between Castile and the colonies.

Because of the overseas expansion of Spanish imperial power, territorial councils were constituted as unifying institutions for the rule of the Spanish Habsburg Empire over which 'the sun never set'. The objective was to create a chain of command through which the Monarchs' rule was consolidated, even in the most remote territories, and the institution of the Viceroyalty was created for that reason. The Catholic Monarchs saw the Viceroyalties as the institutions to which to delegate duties and responsibilities in order to guarantee the observance of their will. However, due to the strict control exercised by Castile, these institutional bodies lacked even a minimal autonomy to decide and rule on behalf of their Majesties. They became a heavy bureaucratic burden on the Castile State machine, except for those formed in America, for which the 'tyranny of distance' provided a major autonomy. In the remainder, created within Spain and Europe, power was very restricted by the superior monarchical structure.

Nevertheless the major problem was that, in spite of these unifying attempts, there were still two Kingdoms and two economies and not one. The Atlantic and Mediterranean economies represented by the realm of Castile and Aragon respectively, never met within a single commercial system (Anderson, 1979: 69). The overseas possessions reinforced the lack of unity between the two main realms within Spain. As Anderson (1979: 69) says, "[t]he very sprawl of the Habsburg

Empire thus overextended its capacity for integration, and helped to arrest the process of administrative centralization within Spain itself". That is, the periphery exercised centripetal pressure within the centre itself.

War and Catholicisation were the main concerns of the Royalty. Thousands and thousands of soldiers were sent into the south and the north of Europe to different theatres of military operations. Charles V, the Spanish King who in fact was a German and did not speak a word of Spanish (Galeano, 1985), dominated Italy and drove France from the Iberian peninsula. But in the north, the Reformation remained unvanquished in Germany itself, and "the most advanced urban society in Europe henceforward became an elongated military platform for Spanish Absolutism" (Anderson, 1979: 71). These permanent conflicts however, brought about a financial crisis for the Habsburg Empire the consequences of which were so dramatic that after the abdication of Charles V, "a State bankruptcy had to be formally declared a year later by his heir" (Anderson, 1979: 70).

America emerged, then, as vital in reconstituting the coffers of the Spanish Monarchy. The New World both refurbished the Spanish treasury and prolonged Spain's internal disunity (Anderson, 1979: 70). The wealth in America was as unimaginable as the fact of finding a new

continent. Gold, silver, pearls, precious stones were found in enormous quantities by the conquerors. Between 1503 and 1660 alone, 185 tons of gold and 16,000 tons of silver arrived at the port of Sevilla (Galeano, 1985: 33 -34). The whole of Europe's reserves were one third of the silver transported to Spain in a century and a half. Among many different minerals discovered, silver exported from the Américas constituted 99 per cent of the total of the minerals extracted - mainly from *Inca* soil, specifically from *Potosí* - in the middle of the seventeenth century. The minerals plundered from the new colonial domains then contributed decisively to European economic development. As Galeano (1973: 12) argues, to a great extent this wealth made possible Europe's economic development and sealed America's fate, for "[o]ur defeat was always implicit in the victory of others; our wealth has always generated our poverty by nourishing the prosperity of others - the empires and their native overseers. In the colonial and neocolonial alchemy, gold changes into scrap metal and food into poison".

Although American treasures were abundant, they could not save the economy from the huge costs of the military campaigns and the absence of fiscal saving: "[A]t the height of the treasure-fleets, colonial bullion directly accounted for only 20-25 per cent of [Castilian] revenues" (Anderson, 1979: 71). This does not mean that America's contribution

was insignificant but that the squandering by the Monarchy and aristocracy was massively excessive, for the treasures of America "made Spain the premier power in Europe for the whole of the 16th century" (Anderson, 1979: 62). The permanent problem was not the lack of economic resources but the inefficient and disorganised political and economic strategy of an Absolutist kingdom only formally unified. "The productive potential of Castile [was] undermined by the same empire which was pumping resources into the military apparatus of the state for unprecedented adventures abroad" (Anderson, 1979: 73).

This vast wealth did not benefit the Spanish people nor was there relief for the economy of the Kingdom either. Spain itself was in fact notably modest and limited in its economic development. Doubtless, the reasons should be seen in the curious triangular relationship between the American and European territories of the Spanish Empire and the Iberian homelands (Anderson, 1979: 62), by which Spain in turn became the *Américas* of Europe, "a colonial dumping ground for foreign goods" (Anderson, 1979: 73). Due to the low level of economic development of Spain, most of the American treasures had only a transitory stop-over in the port of Sevilla. They went as payment to other European countries which produced commodities needed in Spain and in its overseas colonies. Far from saving and rationalising resources, the nobility continued squandering them and the Spanish

foreign debt increased following Columbus' journey. "Although the Spaniards had the cow, others drank the milk. The Crown was mortgaged" (Galeano, 1985: 34). American silver and gold went almost directly to German, Genovese, Flemish and Spanish bankers. Even a great percentage of the national income coming from taxes collected in Spain, was used to pay debts to the emergent bankers. "[T]he more commerce a State established with Spain, the more silver it got"(Colbert cited in Galeano, 1985: 35). There was an acute European struggle for the conquest of the Spanish market, which included American silver and gold. "America was a European business" (Galeano, 1985: 35). The Absolutist state was in fact a 'giant with clay feet'. In 1543, 65 per cent of the total of the *rentas reales* (royal rents) were assigned to the annual payment of the *titulos de deuda* (titles of debt). But American wealth not only served to pay debts (Galeano, 1985: 35), the silver for instance, was used to pay for the export of non-Spanish commodities to the 'New World'.

[t]hat rich empire had a poor metropolis . . . [t]he Crown kept opening up new war fronts, while on Spanish soil the aristocracy devoted itself to extravagance, and priests and warriors, nobles and beggars, multiplied as dizzily as living costs and interest

rates. Industry died with the birth of great sterile *latifundia*²⁰, and Spain's sick economy could not stand up to the impact of the rising demand for food and merchandise that was the inevitable result of the colonial expansion. The big rise in public expenditures and the choking pressure of the overseas possessions' consumer needs accelerated trade deficits and set off galloping inflation (Galeano, 1973: 34).

Did this crisis mean that Absolutism signaled a significant shift away from feudalism itself? Was the Absolutist State a state form of the feudal system? Or did it signal a change from feudal to capitalist relations of production? Studies within historical materialism such as those of Marx and Engels (1977), Hill (1982), Althusser (1972), Anderson (1978; 1979), among others, are at least, not coincident on the historical position and role of Absolutist State and its relations within the feudal mode of production. But clearly we need to understand what social system the post-Colombian European invaders were the bearers of when they 'discovered' the *Américas*.

Absolutism: a Form of the State in Feudal Society

The feudal mode of production is primarily defined by the specific relationship between the producer and the means of production: the serf

²⁰ *Latifundia* was a Castilian feudal agrarian production relation, 'heir' of the *repartimiento*. As Chamberlain (1939: 39) points out, from "the lands in *repartimiento* developed the great *latifundios* of

and the land respectively. This relationship, known as 'serfdom', formed the basic economic and juridical-legal structure of the feudal mode of production (Anderson, 1978: 147; 1979: 19). What characterised this mode of production was that neither labour nor the means of production were commodities. Serfs depended on a feudal lord, who usually rented a small piece of land to them for their subsistence. So, these feudal lords constituted a class of agrarian land 'owners' who "extracted a surplus from the [serfs] by political-legal relations of compulsion. This extra-economic coercion, [took] the form of labour services, rents in kind or customary dues owed to the individual lord by the [serf] . . . (Anderson, 1978: 147). Although the serf was under the legal jurisdiction of a feudal lord, the chain did not finish there. The lord was not omnipotent. A superior noble could demand military service from him in turn, the "liege lord would be vassal of a feudal superior" (Anderson, 1978: 148).

These links continued upwards to the highest position, the Monarch, of whom in the end, "all land could in the ultimate instance be in principle the eminent domain" (Anderson, 1978:148). Unlike the centralised states of the *Mexica* and *Incas*, this system produced a vertical devolution of state functions downwards. Despite Absolutism, there was not a unique central political sovereignty but in fact, "the parcellization of sovereignty was constitutive of the whole feudal mode of production"

(Anderson, 1978:148). Thus, 'parcellization' meant that in this social formation, there were several semi-sovereign states and not a unitary central state. From this social structure, three important social consequences emerged. Firstly, parcellization brought about an unintended consequence, the existence of the communal village and lands in which an important degree of peasant autonomy and cohesion remained (Engels, 1976: 170). These constituted an important factor of peasant resistance - the revolts mentioned above - with obvious negative consequences for the oppressor class. As Anderson (1978: 150) argues,

[t]he peasant class from which the surplus was extracted in this system thus inhabited a social world of overlapping claims and powers, the very plurality of whose 'instances' of exploitation created latent interstices and discrepancies impossible in a more unified juridical and economic system.

The feudal relation between countryside and town emerged as a second structural specificity of the process of social formation. Although the feudal mode of production was overwhelmingly agrarian (Anderson, 1979: 151) and the countryside economically dominated the town (Engels, 1976: 165), the feudal town was important and historically *sui generis*. There was a dynamic relation between a rural economy of 'natural exchange' in the country regulated by nobles and an increasing

commodity exchange in the town controlled by merchants. While the former was predominant, specially in Aragon, "the laws of motion were governed by the complex unity of its different regions, not by any simple predominance of the manor" (Anderson, 1979: 151). So, this interaction of countryside and town was in this way unique and a product of the specific feudal mode of production.

Furthermore, the parcellization of sovereignty revealed also that the summit of the feudal structure "was in certain important respects its weakest link" (Anderson, 1979: 151). The economic power of the Monarchs resided fundamentally on their land-owner condition but their dominance over serfdom -their jurisdiction- was essentially military in nature. They had no "direct political access to the population as a whole, for jurisdiction over it would be mediated through innumerable layers of subinfeudation" (Anderson, 1979: 151). This meant permanent political instability and constituted in fact, a contradiction in the system itself, for

a complete fragmentation of sovereignty was incompatible with the class unity of the nobility itself . . . there was thus an inbuilt contradiction within feudalism, between its own rigorous tendency to a decomposition of sovereignty and the absolute

exigencies of a final centre of authority in which a practical recomposition could occur (Anderson, 1979: 151-2).

Apart from the direct and at times uncertain control exercised by the nobility, religion was an important instrument of social control. Since religion impeded access to education for the majority of the population, ignorance was another consequence and support of the feudal class structure. "[N]othing distinguished Spaniards better from individuals of any other nationality than their extreme religiosity and hence, there was no quality more powerful than their ignorance" (Galdames, 1941: 34). Only members of the ruling class, in which the higher and lower nobility figured, were educated. The serfs, farmers and villagers "lacked the most elementary education" (Galdames, 1941: 34).

The parcellized structure of the state, facilitated even more the development of this separated ideological order. The Church, which in Late Antiquity was an integral part of the state imperial machinery, became "an autonomous institution within the feudal polity" (Anderson, 1979: 152), with its own territorial jurisdictions and armed forces. The fragmentation and dissemination of state organisation, bureaucracy and political power contrasted with the unifying institutions and ideology of the Catholic Church. Paradoxically, although the Church played an ideological role in Medieval times serving the interests of the feudal

dominant class and maintaining and reproducing patriarchy, its unifying and centralised nature provoked a legitimacy crisis for the feudal structure itself.

Feudalism, Patriarchy and Religion

"The expressed opinion of any age depends on the persons and the classes who happen to articulate it . . . [i]n the early Middle Ages what passed for contemporary opinion came from two sources - the Church and the aristocracy" (Power 1976: 9). Therefore, ideas about women were on the one hand, produced and reproduced by "the [ecclesiastic] order, usually celibate, and on the other hand by a narrow caste, who could afford to regard its women as an ornamental asset, while strictly subordinating them to the interests of its primary asset, the land" (Power, 1976: 9).

Effectively, the nature and sphere of women were defined by that class and ideological source "least familiar with the great mass of womankind" (Power, 1976: 9). Women's position in feudal Europe was rigid and extremely narrow, to a great extent fixed by Catholic doctrine established by the Church Fathers, like Jerome who wrote :

As long as woman is for birth and children, she is different from man as body is from soul. But when she wishes to serve Christ

more than the world, then she will cease to be a woman and will be called man (Daly 1985: 85).

Thomas Aquinas, in his philosophical treatise *Summa Theologicae*, had incorporated the metaphysical Aristotelian legacy in which women's place in the universe was already fixed by their supposed defective nature. Aquinas (cited in Daly, 1985: 91) in fact wrote that a woman was

a misbegotten male, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex. Her existence is due to some defect in the active force . . . as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation.

Thus, according to Aquinas, women have a unique reason for being, that is, they are needed in the work of generation, of the biological reproduction of human life (Daly, 1985: 91). What determined woman's position in society was thus not her condition of being human "but her sex, and by her sex she was inferior to man" (Power, 1976: 10). For Walker Bynum (1991: 179), this subordinated position of women was produced and reproduced by the binary gender system

construed by the Catholic doctrine that opposed women and men in terms of humanity-physicality-woman and divinity-rationality-man. The man incarnated the divinity of the "Son of God" and the woman his humanity, but humanity understood as physicality, as the flesh of the "[w]ord made flesh" (Walker Bynum, 1991: 179). Then, in the dominant theological tradition, "male and female were contrasted and asymmetrically valued as soul and body" (Walker Bynum, 1991: 177-178), and body was seen as inferior to soul, for, although women body was "the locus of fertility and of mystical encounter, it was also the locus of temptation and decomposition. Whereas soul was immortal, body arose again only after decay and as a result of the grace of Christ's resurrection" (Walker Bynum, 1991: 236). In the Middle Ages, women was inferior to men, even within the Catholic Church institution itself. In this respect, Walker Bynum (1991: 235) stresses that "[w]e must never forget the pain and frustration, the isolation and feelings of helplessness, that accompanied the quest of religious women . . . [their] voice was often silenced, even more frequently ignored".

This "characteristic medieval attitude could only have arisen in an age in which clerical and aristocratic groups were able to impose their point of view" (Power, 1976: 10). Religion concealed social contradictions and "justified those relations of domination which [were] open and visible" (Larraín, 1983: 38). The justification of women's position was

in the sacred order which was revealed by God and which consequently could not be altered by humans. The ruling class and the men leading that class were in this way 'only' the agents of a supreme and sacred will which came from a transcendent sphere,

beyond the contingency of material life . . . Personal dependence upon, and loyalty to, the landlord [was] spontaneously expressed in the ideological submission to God, from which all subordination [was] modeled . . . the Middle Ages knew no other form of ideology than precisely religion and theology" (Larraín, 1983: 38).

Although there were dissonant voices, especially from the "upper ranks of the urban middle classes" (Power, 1976: 10), they were not predominant like the ecclesiastical and knightly discourses. Less heard still were working people, who whose labour, "sustained both Church and aristocracy" (Power, 1976: 11) and who remained with the serfs an inarticulate majority. Women remained almost totally silenced. Most literature was written by religious and aristocratic men under the tuition and surveillance of a brutally anti-female Catholicism (Power, 1976: 11)²¹. The Spanish founder of the Jesuits²², Ignacio de Loyola

²¹At the end of the fourteenth century, Christine de Pisan challenged religious dogma and masculine hegemony. Her book *Le Roman de la Rose* is a famous attack against the feudal *status quo* and in defence of women (Power, 1976: 13).

²²This religious order played a crucial part in the American colonisation, especially in the Chilean colony, as will be seen in Chapter Five.

(1491-1556), saw a similarity between women and Satan: "[t]he enemy conducts himself as a woman. He is a weakling before a show of strength, and a tyrant if he has his will" (cited in Daly, 1985: 101).

Anti-women sentiments and practices were at the heart of the polity and of the Church and were reflected in the social life of medieval people. Within this pattern, femininity and masculinity were formed and reproduced differently, according to their class location. Masculinity and femininity in the ruling class were shaped by the Catholic conception of men's and women's duties and tasks. Women's obedience to men was a *sine qua non* of marriage, a "fidelity of dog to master" (Power, 1976: 16), a relationship based on men's orders, which must be obeyed. If that did not happen, physical force restored obedience and family order. Although in theory, feudal law held that noble women could be endowed with land, feudal marriage and the influence of religious dogma meant in practice, a "certain denigration of woman as a person. While the Church subordinated a woman to her husband, feudalism subordinated her to her fief. All feudal marriages of convenience were dictated by interests of land" (Power, 1976: 19). The subjection of women was in this way dictated by the Church and by the aristocracy, which meant the promulgation of the idea of a 'natural' inferiority of women to men.

But simultaneously, there was a counterpart, the image of women's superiority embodied by the Virgin Mary present through the ruling class woman's representation as a 'lady'. "The cult of the [V]irgin and the cult of chivalry grew together" (Power, 1976: 19). Ruling class femininity was built on this model. The cult of the 'mundane lady' was the romantic counterpart of the cult of the Virgin. At the darkest early times of the Middle Ages, ruling class hegemonic masculinity portrayed a tough, valiant, warrior and fanatically religious man who subjugated 'his' woman in an almost master-slave relationship. Since the twelfth century as part of the ideal of chivalry, a medieval gentry evolved in which "the knight" and "the lady" were central, and "the romantic worship of a woman [was] as necessary a quality of the perfect knight as the worship of God" (Power, 1976: 20). *L'amour courtois* enshrined the polite society's philosophy of life. The feudal courts of Champagne, Blois, Flanders, of Frederic Barbosa and Pedro II of Aragon, among others, were the main centres of the lyric poetry, troubadours and refined music consistent with courtly love (Power, 1976: 22).

The paradox was that courtly love had to be essentially free but marriage was determined by economic interests, so "fiefs married but men and women loved. True, the adored lady was always a wife but always someone else's wife. This was one of the rules of the game" (Power, 1976: 24) and the stories of Don Juan Tenorio, the great

Spanish lover of the Spanish Middle Ages, confirm it. But courtly love was as platonic as it was scholastic, of the head more than of the heart, artificial, schematic, rigidly ruled by uncountable norms and elaborate conventions, developing "a whole jurisprudence of its own [just] as scholastics debated in schools so poets and ladies debated in courts" (Power, 1976: 26). The image of superiority of the lady, half worldly and half divine was only that, an image, and it did not counteract the essential feudal doctrine of women's inferiority. The ideal lady was venerated in the small aristocracy, but outside this class, women and men had "no part in any refining influence of the courtly ideal" (Power, 1976: 27). Courtly love "was not professed by men of other classes, nor did it necessarily apply to women of other classes. The knight was a champion of God and the ladies, and the great majority of women who were not ladies remained unchampioned" (Power, 1976: 27).

The working woman in the town and the country experienced her gender in a very different way to that of the high aristocracy. Women were not a decoration in that set of social relations in this epoch. Although in general, women could not participate in public affairs, in politics, diplomacy or the military, they played "an equal part with men in the economic life of nations. Like men, they were driven to offer themselves for hire, or otherwise to work for their living" (Power, 1976: 53). Women in the Middle Ages did not devote themselves only

to marriage which was not the only career for them. Their work in the feudal countryside "was organized around the family household, itself a multifaceted sustainer and reproducer of human life" (Donaldson, 1996: 95). Many craftsmen's wives were their husbands' assistants in their trades, in times when factories were unknown and industries were carried out by craft workers (Power, 1976: 53). There was no rule stating that women were only unpaid domestic workers. In spite of guild regulations which expressly excluded women from participation in a trade, exceptions were created by wives and daughters and above all, by widows (Power, 1976: 55). Women worked as "butchers, chandlers, ironmongers, net-makers, shoe-makers, glovers, girdlers, haberdashers, purse-makers, cap-makers, skimmers, bookbinders, gilders, painters, silk-weavers and embroiderers, spicers, smiths and goldsmiths among many other trades" (Power, 1976: 60). Medieval women not only worked with or as heir to her husband's trade, but in fact, many "unmarried women supported themselves as shopkeepers and wage earners and many married women carried on occupations of their own perfectly distinct from those of their husbands" (Power, 1976: 57). The attitude of men towards the competition from or co-operation with female labour was, under a religious dogma and a generalised ignorance, negative. A key reason for this was "the same as that which animates hostility to female labour today. Women's wages were lower

even for the same work, and men were afraid of being undercut by cheap labour" (Power, 1976: 60).

In the countryside, serf women and men, dwellers on all manors, were expected, if they were married, to labour on their family holdings. "[T]o spin, to scour the flax, to comb the hemp, wash and wring clothes, dig up the beets . . . [and] were called to work with her husband in fields and pastures" (Power, 1976: 71). For these women and men neither courtly love, nor chivalry existed nor did participation in her husband's or her own trade.

Nevertheless, working women's lives in the countryside, subjected to their fathers, husbands, landlords and the regime of serfdom which attempted to subjugate all of them, also had their rude gaieties. Occupations were varied and flexible, not repetitive and rigid. As Christine de Pisan (cited in Power, 1976: 75) said,

[a]lbeit they be fed with coarse bread, milk, lard and pottage and drink water, and albeit they have care and labour, yet is their life surer, yea, they have greater sufficiency, than some that be of high estate"

As Power (1976: 75) suggests, "Christine could with some justice have added greater equality and perhaps even greater self-respect to the compensating advantages of the peasant woman's existence".

Chapter Three

Invasion and Conquest of Latin America

The history of Latin America began with migrants from the Asian mainland who crossed the Bering Strait between 40,000 and 27,000 BP and were almost completely dependent on hunting (Burkholder and Johnson, 1990: 1). These nomadic peoples had formed diverse societies in the subcontinent when Spaniards met them in 1492.

The Spanish conquerors carried out their invasion of the sub-continent from the Caribbean Islands of *Hispaniola (Dominicana)* and Cuba towards what today is Venezuela, Panamá, the Peninsula of *Yucatan* and Mexico, proceeding from *Darien* (Panamá) to the southern region of the sub-continent, with the exception of the lands invaded by Portugal in what is today Brazil. The islands from which the invasion began had been occupied for about two thousand years before the voyage of Columbus (Burkholder and Johnson, 1990: 1). When the Spaniards arrived in America, they believed they were in some island of Japan. Columbus' first fleet, did not come to conquer and colonise a new territory but to buy spices, as essential in Europe as salt to preserve meat (Galeano, 1985: 16). Columbus, predicting the earth was round, intended to reach *Las Indias* (The Indies) by sailing to the west, but he

did not know that America would come first. The 'new' land was inhabited, as Columbus wrote, by "*gente mansa*" (peaceful people) (Columbus cited in Galeano, 1985). This was a most fortunate and opportune finding for the declining Spanish economy.

The Spanish traders not only found spices but precious metals and an aboriginal population who, although regarding them first with curiosity, suspicion and distrust, later received them with hospitality thinking they were their gods. The indigenes saw the Spanish ships as floating fortresses, horse and armed rider as one being. They did not know their daily lives would become, from that moment, the most terrible nightmare.

Returning from his first journey, Columbus told the Queen in Castile what he had found in America. The apparent non-existence of previous European settlement in the 'New World' could open a wide horizon for a declining Spanish economy, weakened by the re-conquest of *Granada* (Galeano, 1985: 16). Precious metals were used in Europe in commercial exchange so the overseas territories could play a great role in sustaining the economy of Castile (see Chapter Two). America was annexed to Castile and entered the history of Europe. The task now was to prepare new fleets to conquer and colonise it and in this way to maintain and sustain the power of the Spanish Empire.

Logistically, the conquest of America had as its central bases of operations the port of Seville in Castile and the island called by the Spaniards *La Hispaniola* in the Caribbean Sea (Thomas, 1994: 67). The inhabitants of *La Hispaniola* and Cuba were the *Tainos*; in the lesser Antilles, the Caribs; in the Peninsula of *Yucatan*, the *Mayas*; and in what is now Mexico, the *Mexica* and peoples subjected to them, such as the *Totonacs* and *Tlaxcalans* (Thomas, 1994: 5, 197, 239).

The initial colonial institutions were led by Governors who, though appointed by the Indies Council on behalf of the King, enjoyed a fruitful autonomy. The Council itself was overwhelmingly a patrimony of the Kingdom of Castile, to which the Indies were subjected. For that reason the conquerors were well known Castilians and they were either relatives or friends of, or maintained business relationships with members of the Indies Council and the Holy Brotherhood, a clerical institution created in 1476 (Thomas, 1994: 63-69). Governors, Captains of Conquest, *Encomenderos*, scribes, notaries and priests were officially appointed by these two institutions. They became the first members of the newly dominant class in the American colonies.

Meanwhile in Castile, corruption had become institutionalised, particularly amongst the Monarchs' bureaucracy in charge of 'West Indies' affairs. The political, economic and military developments in

the *Américas*, in particular the high level of autonomy of the conquerors, can to a great extent be explained by the decisions of the Indies Council in which the Crown seemed uninterested, except where profit could be obtained to finance royal adventures in Italy. “King Ferdinand allowed his civil servants to approve Caribbean autocracies such as the sleepest Castilian town would not have tolerated for a moment . . . those domestic officials allowed the tropical autocrats a free rein” (Thomas, 1994: 69).

Between 1493 and 1518, Spanish settlement had concentrated in the Caribbean islands. In 1508 and 1509, the islands known today as Puerto Rico and Jamaica were seized by Juan Ponce de León and Juan de Esquivel respectively. In 1511, Cuba was invaded by Diego Velasquez and the survivors of the famed “company of gentlemen” who came to the Indies on Columbus' second voyage (Thomas, 1994: 67). The island of Florida was claimed by Ponce de León.

The Repartimiento-Encomienda Arrives in America

The conquest and colonisation of Latin America created feudal and slave institutions and did not introduce the capitalist mode of production, as Gunder Frank (1969; 1970) and Vitale (1993) argue. As I stated in the previous chapter, in Spain serfdom was still the main relation of production though some new relations of production, such as

the *encomienda*, had been created by the Absolute Monarchy. The *encomienda* though servile, had a political character in so far as it was created within the Absolutist strategy of political and military control of the kingdoms to sustain and facilitate the exercise of Royal sovereignty. As Larraín (1996: 164 n. 22) notes, the Spanish Monarchs were especially aware of avoiding the formation in Latin America of feudal lords like those of Aragon who could challenge Royal power. This was one of the main reasons why the *encomienda* did not formally include the concession of land to the *encomenderos* although land was in fact granted to conquerors through the *repartimiento* or *mercedes de tierra* (Jara, 1987: 21; Carmagnani, 1976: 23) and rapidly, in the case of the Chilean colony, *encomenderos* became landowners, as we shall see in the next Chapter.

According to Chamberlain (1939: 25), the *repartimiento-encomienda* since the invasion of Antilles involved

the partition in *repartimiento* of the *caciques* and their subjects, the latter in stipulated number, by governmental authorities under specific powers granted by the Crown and their assignment to Castilians in *encomienda* to give personal service. The *encomenderos* were obliged to provide for the spiritual and temporal welfare of the natives assigned to them . . . [The

indigenes were] required to give personal service and to pay tribute to their *encomenderos* . . . through the partition of natives on a territorial basis . . . the *repartimiento-encomienda*, extra-legally, temporarily assumed quasi-territorial aspects.

One of the first governors in America, Fr. Nicolás de Ovando, Governor of *La Hispaniola*, introduced the *encomienda* to America (Thomas, 1994: 66; Chamberlain, 1939: 50). He had been *Comendador de Lares* of the Religious Order of *Alcantara*, which had worked assiduously in the re-conquered *Extremadura* . He knew the benefits of the *encomienda* and sought to transfer what had been done in Spain to *La Hispaniola*. He thus founded the colonial version of the *encomienda* (Thomas, 1994: 66) including "the requirement that the recipients of grants of natives assume obligations with respect to furthering [their] welfare . . . and assuring their Christianisation" (Chamberlain, 1939: 50).

Besides the religious task, the Royal Ordinances required that the *encomendero* maintained "arms and a horse" (Chamberlain, 1939: 50) similarly to the *comendador* in Castile who was required to support a stipulated number of men-at-arms or to possess a horse and weapons (Chamberlain, 1939: 50). To the obligations of the *encomendero* of Christianising and rendering military service, was added a third

requirement, "the peopling and permanent holding of territory acquired by conquest" (Chamberlain, 1939: 46). These three requirements served the imperial purposes of the Spanish Absolutist State and their consequences were the violent imposition of alien forms of production and social relations, polity and ideology. The *repartimiento-encomienda* was crucial in the articulation of the modes of production that facilitated the process of Spanish colonisation in America.

The articulation at the level of production relations took two main forms according to the two main types of indigenous modes defined in Chapter One with which the feudal mode articulated. In the case of that mode characterised by gathering, hunting and horticulture and the absence of a central state, the conquest pursued the immediate dissolution of the indigenous mode of production and its substitution by the feudal mode of production (Carmagnani, 1976: 22). However, the indigenous mode of production was not substituted completely but in some places a distinctive new mode emerged as a product of the articulation of both. Thus, this new mode of production was not a replica of the Spanish mode, although feudal features were clearly manifest in the colonial social formation, as we shall shortly see.

In the Caribbean islands in which this type of indigenous mode existed, the articulation of the modes of production meant not only the

destruction of the indigenous productive system by the introduction of the *repartimiento*, but the total extermination of the population due to warfare, disease and forced labour (Larraín, 1996: 140; Carmagnani, 1976: 24). From 1493, when Columbus arrived back in the Caribbean, his mission was no longer only trade but conquest. An expedition of fifteen hundred men including two hundred volunteers some of whom "were 'gentlemen and craftsmen' including the twenty knights who conducted themselves with undisciplinable arrogance" (Thomas, 1994: 65) arrived at *La Hispaniola* (Santo Domingo Island) and initiated the invasion. Their objective was to build a trading factory there such as the Portuguese had created in West Africa (Thomas, 1994:65). It is easy to imagine what these men were able to do in order to achieve their ambitions, especially against people considered by them as being in a "state of nature" whose souls must be saved. Anything these conquerors could do, was ethically justified by their religion, and politically and legally supported by their Royal institutions immersed in a culture of military expansionism and Inquisition. Ambition and religious fanaticism commanded thus the minds of the conquerors of America.

During the first years of the process of conquest, the Spaniards' main concerns were to expropriate their lands, treasures and convert the

indigenes to Christianity²³. The military campaign that Columbus led against the people living in what are known today as the *Dominican Republic* and Haiti, was one of the first experiences by the indigenes of life after the Spanish invasion. People were brutally slaughtered and five hundred were sent to Spain as slaves and although later, in the Sixteenth century, slavery was abolished in Spain as a result of the influence of some theologians, in America hell had begun for its inhabitants (Galeano, 1985: 17).

Before invading a place, the 'Captains of Conquest' - in front a public scribe - had to read to those about to be invaded an extensive and rhetorical official *Requerimiento* (Requirement) in which the indigenes were told that their land was under Royal jurisdiction and were exhorted to convert to the Catholic faith (Galeano, 1985: 18). The listeners did not understand a word of what was told to them. The *Requerimiento* stipulated that those who dared to reject the new religion, were to be immediately subjected to the mandate of the Inquisition and the Monarchy, cruelly punished, their families sold as slaves and their possessions expropriated (Galeano, 1985:18). The fanatical mission against the pagans and the fever for treasure was thus an 'explosive fuel' which ignited the criminality of the conquerors practiced in wars of reconquest in Spain, encouraging the plunder of

²³ Hernán Cortés' close comrade in the conquest of *Tenochtitlan* wrote that he "came to America to serve

native wealth. The sheer size of the American continent, its contrasting climates, varied and colourful vegetation hid marvellous treasures.

As Carmagnani (1976: 24) commented, the conquerors expropriated land through the *repartimiento* in these Islands, "seduced women, enslaved men, imposed unjust punishments and insisted to be provided with gold. The *Tainos* chiefs protested. They were overthrown, transported or killed" (Thomas, 1994: 65). Consequent rebellions were followed by pacification. *Xaragua* in the *Hispaniola* and *Caonao* in Cuba are noted by scholars like Thomas (1994: 67) and Galeano (1985: 23) as among the worst massacres in the history of the conquest of America. The Caribbean islands' population decreased radically after the invasion. *La Hispaniola's* 100,000 in 1492, had fallen to 30,000 by 1516 (Thomas, 1994: 67). Some Spanish conquerors even fell from favour for having committed extreme abuses against the indigenous populations and for bad administration. This was the case of Columbus, his brothers and his son Diego who were removed by the Crown (Thomas, 1994: 67).

The people were 'uncivilized' according to the Spaniards, but the 'civilised' Spaniards destroyed those communities who produced enough crops, above all cassava and sweet potato, to feed themselves. Their

unforgivable sin was to believe in their own gods and to live in harmony with their environment. They were dragged to the mines as slaves and their horticulture was destroyed. In 1514, Velasquez proudly wrote to the King that the "handful of pigs which he had brought to [Cuba] four years earlier had already turned into 30,000" (Thomas, 1994: 68). Meanwhile the human population decreased. Humans "gave way to animals. Wild cattle, wild horses and even wild dogs did untold damage . . . [T]he Spanish Caribbean in 1518 thus seemed a ruined place. The [indigenes] washed for gold and died young, while the Spanish fed livestock, seduced the native women and read romances" (Thomas, 1994: 69). This destruction of the indigenous system of production meant the end of the communal relations there.

But this was not a new exercise for the Castilians. Castile itself had suffered a similar devastating effect by the substitution of pasture for sown field such that "the wealth of [this] kingdom depended as much on its five million sheep as its four million inhabitant . . . [i]n fact, both Hispaniola and Cuba went through a more radical version of a depopulation which had been happening in Castile . . . " (Thomas, 1994: 68). The Spaniards thus transported their productive conceptions to the new land imposing the production system dominant in Castile and destroying in this way the indigenous mode of production using the labour so released in shepherding and in mining.

The dramatic decline in the population soon affected the Spanish settlement of these lands. The Bishop Bartolomé de Las Casas wrote that between 1493 and 1518, more than three million were killed in *La Hispaniola*, almost its total population, and the native population of the Antilles disappeared entirely (de Las Casas cited in Thomas, 1994: 69). Thomas (1994: 69) says that "perhaps 200,000 people died in the four large Caribbean islands in a quarter of a century". The Spaniards were obliged to look for new sources of labour, food and wealth in what they still believed was part of the Asian continent. In this way, after two expeditions ordered by the Governor of Cuba, Diego Velasquez, people who were part of the disintegrating and once powerful *Mayas* empire, were encountered in what today is known as the *Peninsula de Yucatan*. In 1517 Juan de Grijalva, led the second expedition to the sub-continent (Thomas, 1994: 102-103), and met and fought the *Mayas*, learning more about their treasures and the mysterious empire called *Mexica* (Hyams and Ordish, 1963: 13). The campaigns of the conquest of America changed in nature and at the same time, the *Mexica* perceived how dangerous the threat was to them. They had heard about the atrocities committed by the Castilians in *Castilla del Oro* (Golden Castile, Panamá) and in the Caribbean islands (Thomas, 1994: 179). Moreover, due to the scarcity of Spanish women and the tradition of these both peoples of making political alliances by exchanging girls and

young women, a new and important subordinated social category emerged, the *mestiza* (Larraín, 1996; 140).

The second type of indigenous mode, the indigenous agricultural mode of production, was characterised by an economic surplus beyond the basic needs of the community; the existence of a ruling non-producer and a subordinated producer class; a great concentration of population and a central state, such were the *Mexica* and *Inca* empires. The conquest fundamentally meant the reorientation of the surplus from its appropriation by the indigenous state to the establishing Spanish colonial state and to the Spanish metropolis (Carmagnani, 1976: 22). The Spanish division of labour resembled, to a great extent, that of *Mexica* and the *Inca* at that time. *Mexica's* and *Inca's* technical expertise in agriculture and manufacture surprised the Spanish conquerors who thought these productive developments were solely European. They were amazed for example, when they went to the market of *Tenochtitlan*, according to the Castilians, "twice the size of the great square of Salamanca". Others in this party who "claimed to have been in Constantinople, and all over Italy including Rome, said that they had seen nothing like it" (Thomas, 1994: 296).

The population in Latin America numbered no more than 100 million and in *Mexica* and *Inca* empire between sixty to seventy percent lived

(Carmagnani, 1976: 20). This suggests that agriculture was technologically diverse and complex involving sophisticated irrigation systems²⁴ (Carmagnani, 1976: 21). These allowed for good harvests and increased productivity. The *Inca* state developed this infrastructure through the organisation of labour for collective projects, for the well being of the whole community (*mita*). In this way the state was legitimated as promoting public welfare and the dominant class became hegemonic while appropriating a considerable part of the surplus. Production outstripped population and a surplus for the powerful non-producer class was guaranteed (Carmagnani, 1976: 21).

The *encomienda* in Latin America developed differentially according to which indigenous mode articulated with the feudal mode of production. In the agricultural mode, the collection of tax in the form of payment in money, kind or goods prevailed over payment in labour because this mode of production could generate a strong surplus. Unlike this, in the communal modes, labour was the main form in which indigenes paid tribute. These two types of *encomienda* represented two different uses of labour during the conquest (Carmagnani, 1976: 25), but the development of mining made this difference less clear.

²⁴ See Hyams and Ordish's The Last of the Incas (1963). Also Burkholder and Johnson's Colonial Latin America (1990), pp. 12-15.

Having initiated the processes of colonisation in Mexico in 1521, in Central America in 1523 and in Perú in 1533, the Spaniards set thousands of indigenes to work as serfs and slaves in *haciendas* and in gold and silver mines. Mining, almost non-existent in the communal economies, consolidated and developed almost exclusively in the populated regions of the agricultural indigenous economies during the 1570s. Doubtless the mining of fabulous ores in *Mexica* and *Inca* empires, the primary *raison d'être* of the conquest, accelerated the transformations of social relations there. A large number of indigenous workers were transported from their original agrarian homes to the new mining regions of production (Carmagnani, 1976: 25). The transference of indigenous labour to the mining areas, in what is now Perú, was realised through the indigenous institution of *mita*, which the invaders adapted to their own purposes. When indigenous labour was insufficient due to the high rate of mortality produced by the inhuman working conditions, slaves were brought from Africa to America. Some of them went to replace the disappeared indigenous population in the Caribbean islands working mainly in cotton plantations. Others went directly to the mines. The experience in *Mexica* mining regions was similar.

Although feudal relations were predominant in the conquest and initial colonisation, forms of slavery also existed in America. About 10

million Africans were forced to come to America – one third to Portuguese Brasil - and were used as slave labour in cotton and sugar plantations (in the Cuban colony for instance), in mines in what is now Bolivia and Perú, and as servant or family slaves (predominant in the Chilean colony) (Larraín, 1996: 140). In the Chilean colony, African slaves were brought from Perú to toil in the Jesuits' fields and work in their workshops. For these slaves "there was no legal and human protection" (Galdames, 1941: 134). The offspring of the slaves and the indigenes were called '*Zambos*'. '*Mulatos*' were the descendants of Africans and Spaniards. They numbered less than twenty thousand, Africans, *Zambos* and *Mulatos* together (Galdames, 1941: 134).

Thus, the abolition of slavery in Spain did not restrict the violence against the indigenous population and nor did it impede the development of a new form of serfdom, the *encomienda*, and forms of slavery such as the *Mita*. Thus, two modes of production were introduced to Latin America during conquest and colonisation, slavery and feudalism (Larraín, 1996: 141) and the latter consolidated as the main mode of production in the 'Spanish - Latin America' (see Introduction and Chapter Four).

Slavery was compatible with the feudal system and this demonstrates that, as Carmagnani (1976: 12) argues, some production relations do

not necessarily coincide with the dominant mode of production in the social formation. Slavery, as a relation of production co-existed with the *encomienda* and was significant in Brasil and in those regions in which the indigenous people were exterminated, in the Caribbean islands, the Mexican, Colombian, Venezuelan and Peruvian coasts (Carmagnani, 1976: 26).

The *encomienda*, born in Spain and transplanted in America with the conquest, consolidated as the predominant relation production in the Spanish colonies during the economic stagnation between the last third of the 16th and the last third of the 17th century (Carmagnani, 1976: 18). Land had been commodified and private property began to exist within a servile regime of production. In other words, characteristic elements of capitalism began to emerge in a feudal mode of production configuring a mode that contained a capitalist aspect and that thus was not wholly feudal while its main relation of production, serfdom, or its Latin American version, the *encomienda* was feudal and determining overall (Carmagnani, 1976: 9). The *encomienda* generated a system of class relations between colonial lords and indigenous serfs (Larraín, 1996: 140). But a relevant and peculiar result of the articulation in Latin America was that this pre-capitalist system of classes operated according to racial and phenotypical differences: black slaves,

indigenous serfs and *mestizas/os*, and the Spanish lords owners of mines and land (Larraín, 1996: 141).

The Transformation of the State in the Latin American Empires

The historical circumstances of conquest in which the new colonial states were formed in Latin America, transformed the state apparatuses of the *Mexica* and *Inca*. Hernán Cortés invaded the *Mexica* Empire and became the model for other conquerors in subsequent campaigns in the south of America, including Francisco Pizarro, who led the conquest of the *Incas* (Hyams et al., 1963: 11). History is not the biography of leaders, but it is the process of human production and reproduction that shapes and is shaped by the lives of people. It is not surprising then, that some individuals become more influential than others in some historical circumstances. Cortés' entrepreneurial conquest of *Mexica* pursued objectives that would characterise Spanish conquest in the whole sub-continent. By overthrowing the emperor *Moctezuma*, he aimed to transform the *Mexica* state into a Spanish colonial state; abolish *Mexica's* polytheist religion and replace it by the Catholic religion; increase the production of the gold mines and agriculture through the *encomienda* and demonstrate his fidelity to the King even though "the King of Castile had no idea what Cortés was

doing, no knowledge indeed of who Cortés was, and had given him no mission" (Thomas, 1994: 274).

In achieving these ends, the making of political alliances with indigenous political fractions, the technical superiority of the Spanish army, *Mexica's* and *Inca's* conception of history as predetermined and fatal and, the social and religious background of the Spanish conquerors, contributed to the transformation of these indigenous states into colonial states.

The *conquistadores* were, most of them, ambitious Castilians: "[t]he Spaniards involved in all these voyages were mostly Andalusians, Castilians or *Extremeños* (from *Extremadura*). Conquerors were members of the minor nobility, *hidalgos*, who, though they probably had little money, were certainly 'not reared from behind the plough'" (Thomas, 1994: 58). While of the lower stratum of the feudal ruling class they were yet within it. So these conquerors shared a language, *Castellano*, had similar customs, the same religious beliefs, and were part of a military and rural cattle-raising tradition. This social cohesion was crucial to their success. In addition and importantly, most of these conquerors had family links with or were friends of members of bureaucratic Castilian institutions like the territorial councils, one of which, the 'Council of the Indies', controlled the 'West Indies' (Thomas,

1994: 58). The motivations of these men were mainly to become rich and famous "in the service of the King and of God" extending in this way the dominions of Christianity and Empire.

The bulk of the volunteers came to America as a result of poverty in the countryside. "'Hunger and disease are never wanting', Diego de Ordaz from León wrote in 1529 (Thomas, 1994: 58). The decline in the area devoted to horticulture due to the increase in sheep rearing and cattle farming in Castile and specially in *Extremadura*, was a main factor in the economic crisis in Spain between 1502 and 1508, further encouraging emigration which was not a new social phenomenon in Spain at the time of the conquest of America (Thomas, 1994: 58). The rank and file soldiers, most of them from the same region as their leaders, were poor peasants, serfs who expected to leave their life of misery in Spain.

Cortés, Curse of *Mexica*

During the first one hundred years of Spanish domination, the *Mexica* population was reduced from 25 million to one million (Larraín, 1996: 135). Hernán Cortés, the conqueror of *Mexica*, wrote to his King that "[t]he fashion of living in [*Mexica*] is almost the same as in Spain with just as much harmony and order" (Cortés cited in Thomas, 1994: 3).

At the time Cortés wrote this letter, he had already been two years among the *Mexica* and had finally defeated them.

Mexica were a profoundly polytheist people. They were ruled by a monarchy led by a King - *Moctezuma* at the time of the conquest in 1519 - empowered by gods to decide over the life or death of the people. *Mexica* society was - as seen in Chapter One- a marked class, patriarchal and patrilineal society. Other peoples had been subjected to *Mexica* imperial rule, especially the *Totonacs* and *Tlaxcalans*, who, as allies of Cortés, contributed greatly to the Spanish victory over the *Mexica*. However, they were not to be liberated by, but subjugated to that other mysterious imperial power from which such strange people had come.

Cortés was impressed with de Grijalva's discovery of a new land and although he had had some conflicts with the Governor Velasquez, he was allowed to prepare a fleet for the lands seen by Hernández de Cordoba and de Grijalva. Velasquez was ambiguous about the objective of this expedition but for Cortés there was no doubt. He had come to America for gold, not to be a peasant, he told his friend Ovando, the Governor of *La Hispaniola* (López de Gomára, 1964: 10) and he defined his adventure by saying "fortune favors the daring" (Cortés cited in Galeano, 1973: 24).

Cortés prepared a fleet, numbering between nine and twelve ships ((Thomas, (1994: 222, 223); López de Gomára (1964: 22-23); Díaz (1963:57)), with around 550 Spaniards, including 50 sailors (López de Gomára, 1964: 23). He had 16 horses, 32 crossbows, 10 bronze cannon, and a few arquebuses, muskets and pistols" (Galeano, 1973: 27). Like the *conquistadores* in *Extremadura*, and in keeping with the Castilian custom, Cortés invested his own money to finance this expedition mortgaging everything he owned to equip it (Galeano, 1973: 24) and Velasquez also contributed resources to that expedition. Except for those of Columbus, Pedrarias Davila and Magellan which were supported by the Crown, most of these expeditions were self-financed

Cortés was thirty four years old at the time of the expedition. He had some knowledge of law (which he had read for two years at the University of Salamanca) and understood the importance of legal matters not only for leading an expedition but also for settling a colony. Cortés valued the fidelity of personal allies, especially if they came from *Extremadura*, his place of birth. His most important officials such as Portocarrero, Sandoval and Alvarado were personal friends, all of them born in that region, "the wildest part of Castile" (Thomas, 1994: 117).

Cortés divided to rule, even within his own expedition (Neira, 1990: 83). Once in *Mexica* territory, he founded the first town, which he called *Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz* (Rich Town of the True Cross). This act of settlement was to define whether the expedition was for trading purposes only or for conquest. Cortés used his legal knowledge to 'institutionalise' the settlement. He wrote the official document of its foundation, organised the town 'election' and in it, was 'elected' *Justicia Mayor* and Captain General. His close friends filled the top positions defeating Velasquez and his friends. The expedition would be, definitely, an army of conquest. This manoeuvre has been described by scholars like Thomas (1994: 199) as a "*coup d'état*". To reinforce this, the *caudillo* (the leader) ordered nine of the twelve ships to be sailed onto the sands where they were not burned (as has been widely reported) but, were broken up to prevent retreat. The materials salvaged were used to build the town and to augment the military arsenal. In this way, Cortés "put an end to the plotting against him" (Thomas, 1994: 222).

Apart from the "initial shock of seeing such strange people and thinking of Spaniards as gods" (Posse, 1990: 43), rulers of empires such as *Mexica*, did not always conceive of the invaders as enemies. Thus, Hernán Cortés, the conquer of *Tenochtitlan* (a "great political genius, a Machiavelli" according to Neira (1990: 83)), was able to seek alliances

with some against others, for he understood that not all inhabitants of this place were the same. *Totonac* and *Tlaxcalan* leaders became his allies against *Moctezuma*.

Cortés allied with *Totonacs* in *Cepoallan* (Thomas, 1994: 195) and then, betrayed them in favour of an alliance with the *Tlaxcalans* in *Tlaxcala* (Thomas, 1994: 237). He had christened Marina (*Malinali* or *Malintzin*), a woman given to him by the chief of *Potonchan*, a people in the region between *Yucatan* and Mexican territory. She became his lover and interpreter, indispensable in the conquest of *Mexica*, speaking *Chontal Mayas*, *Nahuatl Mexica* and Spanish, essential languages for Cortés' purposes (Hyams and Ordish, 1963: 12; Thomas, 1994: 171-172).

Totonacs and *Tlaxcalans* increased the size of his army (technically superior to *Mexica* army) enabling him to enter *Tenochtitlan*, the imperial city, in November 1519. *Moctezuma*, the Emperor, did not know how he should act in front of a man who sometimes appeared as a friend and later as an enemy, sometimes as the god *Quetzalcoatl* (Galeano, 1973: 27), later as a representative of an unknown and mysterious King. Finally he greeted him: "'*Malinche*', he said, making use of the title all *Mexica* used for Cortés, 'you are in your own house. So are your brothers. Rest'" (Thomas, 1994: 280). However,

Moctezuma was unsure and this uncertainty condemned him. The situation became so paradoxical that Cortés installed himself and his army in one of *Moctezuma's* palaces, as royal guests. Later, using his eloquence and claiming a supposed act of treason planned by the Emperor against him, Cortés arrested *Moctezuma* but allowed him to govern from prison. As well, he pressed *Mexica's* nobility to abandon their gods, abolish human sacrifice in their ceremonies and adopt the Catholic faith. *Mexica's* religious idols had to be replaced by Christ and the *Virgen María* and their shrines used for Catholic masses (Thomas, 1994: 301, 302). Cortés' idea was to rule without violence, but the indigenous nobility was divided and some of them wished to rebel and end this crisis of legitimacy of their imperial authority (Thomas, 1994: 321). The King's guests had set no date to leave by and *Moctezuma* himself had become a humiliated man, shameful to his own people (Thomas, 1994: 391).

A Spanish mistake was enough to unleash *Mexica* rebellion. While Cortés fought in *Cepoallan* against the recently arrived Pánfilo de Narváez (who hoped to replace Cortés' as leader), Alvarado, in charge of *Tenochtitlan*, committed a massacre during a religious festival. The people were angered by this aggression against their gods and the violation of their religion. One, indignant at the Spaniards actions had shouted to *Moctezuma* and the Castilians: "[W]hy does not the earth

swallow you up, you who steal the gods of others . . . ?" (Thomas, 1994: 391).

Once Cortés returned, *Mexica* withstood the siege of the whole Spanish army. *Moctezuma* died and the Spaniards were expelled from the city. A new *Mexica* leader, *Cuitláhuac*, replaced *Moctezuma* but, his rule was brief. When Cortés reconquered *Tenochtitlan* in 1521, there were no limits to his cruelty against who "had no shields left, no clubs, and nothing to eat" (The Florentine Codex cited in Galeano, 1973: 29). The American peoples, shaken by this chain of events, understood that their lives never would be the same as in the past. The curse of Cortés, '*La maldición de Malinche*' (the title of an old Mexican song), had fallen upon the *Américas*.

"Strange Thieves" are Coming to the *Incas*

Following the massacre in *Tenochtitlan* and once Cortés had consolidated his power over *Mexica*, one of his friends, Pedro de Alvarado, launched the conquest of Central America in 1523. The *Mayas* had disappeared as a centralised empire before the Spanish invasion (Giddens, 1993: 51) but various of their descendants still lived in that region of America when Alvarado and his army fell upon what today is Guatemala. The chief *Tecum*, was killed along with "so many that it made a river of blood which is called the *Olimtepeque*" (Galeano,

1973: 30). In order to end the slaughter of their people, the captains *Nehaib* and *Ixquin*, surrendered all gold, emeralds, diamonds and silver to the Spaniards (Galeano, 1973: 30). *Incas* in the south, would have a similar fate at the hands of Francisco Pizarro, who like most of the America's *conquistadores*, was born in *Extremadura*, in the town of *Trujillo*. The *Inca* empire, as shown in Chapter Two, ranged from what is today Ecuador to the *Maule* River in what is now Chile. As Burkholder and Johnson (1990: 11) comment, "[t]he *Incas* created the largest indigenous empire in the Américas and developed the most sophisticated political and administrative structure found among the native peoples there". Andagoya's exploration south of what today is Panamá, confirmed "Balboa's accounts of what might await an expedition really pushing its fortunes in that direction" (Hyams et Al., 1963: 13). Pizarro was interested thus in the southern lands. He took the conquest of *Mexica* as license to proceed in the land of the *Incas*, Cortés as his inspiration (Hyams et al., 1963: 13).

But unlike Cortés, Pizarro, "an illiterate pig-breeder"(Galeano, 1973: 27), did not finance his own adventure. He was "driving himself to emulate his kinsman of *Mexica*, but in a spirit of desperation rather than confidence . . . his fortune was at a low ebb" (Hyams and Ordish, 1963: 14). He associated with an older soldier Diego de Almagro and a priest, Hernando de Luque, who was the main financier of the journey.

Despite serious obstacles, particularly in recruitment, finally, eighty were signed on who were desperate characters, "the idlers and ne'er-do-wells and riff-raff who had come out from Spain to repair broken fortunes. They were ready for any undertaking which offered even a chance of profit" (Hyams et al., 1963: 15). Pizarro knew about a huge city, the capital of a great King whose country had been invaded by an even greater King, the Child of the Sun in person, the *Sapa Inca Huayna Capac*, who came from the great *Inca* city *El Cuzco* (Hyams et al., 1963: 17).

Pizarro was not discouraged by the failures of this first two expeditions for they taught him that the size of the *Inca* empire demanded better preparation, more men, equipment and food. The third expedition set off in 1531. The way to *El Cuzco* was long and throughout the journey, Pizarro was regarded with sympathy by *Incas* because he fought in *Puna* a people hostile to their emperor *Atahualpa*, who had become very curious about these white men who resembled *Incas'* bi-sexual god *Viracocha*. The references to gods coming from the east, present in the *Mexica*, *Maya* and *Inca* religions had "given rise to the hypothesis that the gods of the native religions were really Europeans who reached our shores long before Columbus" (Galeano, 1973: 27).

The European desperation to take the precious metals found in this land ended the peaceful relation between *Incas* and the Spaniards. *Incas* understood that their society was being threatened. However, the terror imposed by gunpowder, horses, steel, the use of the wheel and the way the *conquistadores* practised the arts of treachery and intrigue with refined expertise, allowed Pizarro and his army which had entered *Cajamarca* with 180 Spanish soldiers but more significantly, with thousands of *Yanaconas* and 37 horses, to defeat an army in Perú of 100,000 (Galeano, 1973: 27). The great empire of silver and gold, marvellous temples and mountains of minerals like *Potosí*; an empire with a centralised state led by a respected emperor; with an economy based on agricultural production which easily fed the whole population; and with an army gathered from what today is Ecuador to Perú, succumbed to intrigue and the use of new technology as an instrument of terror (Galeano, 1973: 27).

Before Pizarro "strangled and decapitated *Atahualpa*, he got from him a ransom of 'gold and silver worth more than 20,000 marks in fine silver and 1,326,000 *escudos* in the finest gold'" (Galeano, 1973: 30). Francisco Pizarro, "triumphantly entered *Cuzco* in 1533 and seized the heart of the *Inca* empire"(Galeano, 1973: 26).

Diego de Almagro's expedition to *Mapuche*' land in 1535 comprised 15,000 *Yanaconas*, most of whom were descendants of *Incas* (Hancock, 1971: 25). They defeated the northern and central indigenous communities, *Copiapins*, *Cuquimpuans*, *Quillotanes* and *Mapochinians*²⁵(Hancock, 1971: 27), but not *Mapuche*. In 1541, Pedro de Vadivia crossed the *Atacama* desert and founded Santiago in the region inhabited by *Picunche* (Galeano, 1973: 26).

The Spanish success in conquering America can not be explained without understanding firstly the political-military alliances, the coalitions between the leaders of the conquest and the indigenous ruling classes. These alliances exacerbated the already existing hatred between peoples and reinforced Spanish troops with thousands of indigenous soldiers. In other words, the Spaniards used the indigenous political and military structure to subjugate the indigenes. Secondly, technological superiority was another factor that contributed to the conquest. The Spanish army's equipment and armament destroyed lives and maimed bodies but it also impacted psychologically on the indigenous people. Thirdly, in the case of *Mexica* and their rapid defeat, their culture played a central role. Their own culture played an important part for it was dominated by a mythology that conceived their history as predetermined to a catastrophic end. The Spaniards

²⁵Noggler (1984), Faron (1968) and Galdames (1941), refer to these four peoples as one, *Picunche*.

were their gods who came to punish them and this assumption disarmed them. A fatalistic conception of history paralysed them and minimised their capacity for resistance to the invaders for, in the end, nothing could be changed. This mentality gave a great initial advantage to the Spaniards (Larraín, 1996: 133). Fourthly, the entrepreneurial character of most of the expeditions (Jara, 1987: 20) and the social and religious background of the conquerors assisted in their achievement of domination and was significant in the process of class formation from the conquest onwards. Most of the leaders came from the one class in the same region, *Extremadura*, in the Kingdom of Castile.

Machismo, Encomienda and Indigenous Masculinity

Gender relations were strongly linked to religiosity from the beginning of the conquest of Latin America. Religion and a shared regional culture united the Spaniards who came to America in spite of their different class origins. The most unifying element was their religious devotion and Catholicism not only provided the values which justified conquest but, it contributed to the unity of the army, reinforced discipline, supported the verticality of order and command and maintained patriarchy in Latin America.

The Spanish patriarchal tradition translated to Latin America was of a specific kind. It was feudal patriarchy as practiced by a militarised

section of Spanish society, by conquerors or men who participated in or were directly influenced by the re-conquest of Castilian land. Many of them, their fathers and grandfathers, had fought against Islam. The Andalusians and, to a lesser extent *Extremeños*, had lived on the frontiers of Christianity and Islam for centuries (Thomas, 1994: 58). The *conquistadores* had already experienced a 'Holy War' against the Moors and this overseas campaign would be for them another Crusade, this time, with a promised reward in gold and silver. The military tradition of Castile and militant Catholicism once again served the ends of the Spanish Monarchs, this time, by subjugating unknown peoples on the other side of the world. And this domination was particularly violent in terms of gender relations. As Connell (1995: 187) comments, apart from the Monarch Isabel, the imperial states "created to rule the new empires were entirely staffed by men, and developed a statecraft based on the force supplied by the organised bodies of men . . . the conquerors were perhaps the first group to become defined as a masculine cultural type in the modern sense".

For Spanish conquerors the indigenes were strange, savage or uncivilised (Galeano, 1985, 1990; Posse, 1990). But though inferior, the indigenes looked beautiful, feminine, homosexual for them (Fernandez-Alemany, 1996: 225; Trexler, 1995). Thus Columbus a devote Catholic thought the indigenes were peaceful, generous and

beautiful, but simultaneously considered them primitive, naked, cowards without culture (Larraín, 1996: 132).

Despite the feudal and Catholic background of patriarchy incarnated by conquerors and contained in the *encomienda* and, the patriarchal character too of indigenous peoples organised by polygamy, some theories argue that patriarchy in Latin America has symbolic origins that emerged from the history of the conquest of *Mexica* and were based on the relation between Hernán Cortés and Marina. The first of these theories argues that Marina symbolised the *mestizaje* and the adoption by Latin American women of the conquerors' values while rejecting the racial purity of either the Spanish or the indigenes (Caro, 1996: 176). Marina would have symbolised *Mestizaje* and the acceptance of patriarchal relations.

The second view, *Malinchismo*, is that Marina was a traitor to her people. This figure of the treacherous woman echoes of Eve in the Genesis story and like it ascribes the failing of men to the weaknesses of women. While *Marianismo*, as we shall see, locates women as virtuous and meek, *Malinchismo*, according to Montecino (1996: 43), portrays them as duplications and cunning. At the same time, the ambiguity of the status of her children, bastards born outside Christian marriage and the product of miscegenation (see Salazar, 1990: 55), makes them and

especially *mestiza*, unreliable and untrustworthy. *Malinchismo* then, serves the patriarchal purpose of feminising the racially inferior while racialising femininity itself.

At this point *Marianismo* enter the scene. According to Montecino (1996: 33), *Marianismo*²⁶ concentrates on the relationship between the virgin and her son, which is at once maternal and servile, for Mary is the servant of god, her son as well as being his mother. God the father, on the other hand, is absent while his son is not, but is present on earth in the violent figure of the warrior, the conqueror, the lord. Montecino sees the origins of *machismo*, then, lying in popular Catholic theology as presented in the images of the wrathful, potent, male god and the pious, weak, submissive female virgin. The father is replaced by the violent figure of the warrior, the conqueror explaining *machismo* as the opposition between conqueror (masculine) and conquered (feminine).

However, these theories though original and interesting, are partial and narrow explanations of *machismo* which is a patriarchal synthesis resulting from the articulation between the feudal and indigenous modes of production. As mentioned above, patriarchy did not begin with conquest. The diverse indigenous communities in Latin America were mainly and largely patriarchal (see Chapter One). The worst offence to

²⁶ See Caro (1996).

a man was to call him a woman, as when *Cuahtemoc* called *Moctezuma* “a woman of the Spaniards” (Todorov cited in Caro, 1996: 178). The virgin and Marina came from two different patriarchal societies whose men fought each other while expressing and mutually admiring their masculinities based on bloody violence, authoritarianism, hierarchialism and the service of a vengeful master. The clash between the two patriarchies reinforced their main characteristics. The warrior mentality, the hegemonic masculinity that conceived maleness in relation to strength, toughness, bravery existed in both Spanish feudalism and in *Mexica* for fundamentally, both were militarised empires. The resulting *Machismo* was servile, hypocritically monogamous²⁷, racist and homophobic. The first two are almost an exclusive patrimony of feudal patriarchy but homophobia was plainly shared by Spaniards and indigenous people, especially by *Mexica* (see Fernandez-Alemany, 1998: 226; Trexler, 1995; Caro, 1996: 177).

As Fernandez-Alemany (1998: 226) comments about Trexler’s (1995) work, indigenous warriors feminised and homosexualised the enemy, while within their own communities the *berdaches*, young men forced to dress in women’s clothes for special religious services involving their rape by priests and chiefs, were not a different gender for “[b]ehind the

²⁷ It is a common practice in Latin America for married Catholic men to have mistresses and many children outside marriage. This is a sign of maleness, of being a *macho*.

forced feminization of male youths into *berdaches*, it was older males desire of dominance over young males” (Fernandez-Aleman, 1998: 225).

Therefore, *machismo* characterised a gender/sex system that positioned masculinity and femininity as binary opposites that helped to establish European males as the dominant gender in Latin America, in which Spanish men were lords and indigenous women their serfs while indigenous men were regarded as simple, cunning, treacherous, emotional that is as female. Although Latin American gender identity has been seen as symbolised in the relations between the absent father and the presence of feminine as maternity over the illegitimate child, to the extent that this is accurate, it is not an exclusive to *mestiza* and Latin America. As Caro (1996: 178) argues, the exclusion of men from domesticity, has been a characteristic of capitalism since the 19th century. Beyond symbolism, *Machismo* is the hegemonic masculinity in Latin America, the “specific strategy for the subordination of women” (Donaldson, 1993: 645) produced by feudal and indigenous patriarchies and Catholicism, that is, a consequence of the articulation of the modes of production at level of gender relations. It has been sustained in a rigid division between two genders, by no means an exclusive patrimony of the Spanish invasion nor solely a creation of indigenous social formation (Caro, 1996: 178).

Chapter Four

The Resistance of *Mapuche* and the Establishment of the Patriarchal *Encomienda*

The core of this chapter is an analysis of the articulation of the *Mapuche* and the feudal modes of production, that is, a study of the conquest and the colonial settlement of what is now Chile. As anticipated in Chapter Three, this Chapter focuses on the transplantation to America of the Castilian *encomienda* which contained, as a relation of production, the essence of the feudal mode of production dominant in Castile, its social and economic relations and Absolutist secular and religious political powers. The *repartimiento-encomienda* was the cornerstone of conquest and colonial settlement. The military occupation, the formation of the colonial state, Christianisation and the installation of new gender relations, were processes that can not be understood without the consideration of the metamorphosis of the *encomienda* which was shaping the physiognomy of the new colonial settlement. Finally, the Chapter will discuss the development of the colonial social formation regarding *Mapuche* resistance, the scarcity of mineral resources and the conflict between monopolistic Absolutism and a rising mercantilism, resulting in the hostile co-existence for more than

three and a half centuries of two societies, the struggling colony of the invaders and the changing way of life of *Mapuche*.

A Never Ending War

In less than fifty years, the Spanish conquered the Caribbean Islands, Central America and South America, except Brazil. With the invasion of what is now Chile, they sought to complete their Divine task, the Christianisation of the peoples of this vast land mass and the transference of their wealth to Spain. However, the conquest of *Mapuche* had a more complicated course than the Spaniards - even with their accumulated experience in previous genocides - anticipated. Such was the tenacity and adaptability of *Mapuche* that conquest remained incomplete, splitting their territory into two, the larger part controlled by the Spaniards who initiated settlement there after 18 years of war. The *Mapuche* fought for almost 400 years in what the Spanish called *La Guerra de Arauco* and have been broadly recognised by historians for their warrior valiance in defence of their land (Hancock, 1971: 38). Their soil could not be touched. Even before the Spaniards, the *Incas* tried to invade *Mapuche* territory in 1485, but were defeated by them near the *Maule river*, which constituted the limit between these two peoples until the *Incas* were defeated by the Spaniards in what now is Perú (Noggler, 1984: 3).

The Spanish attempts of conquest of *Mapuche* began in 1535 with Diego de Almagro, Pizarro's comrade. He was expelled by the well organised *Mapuche* who, though impressed by his steel armour and horses, resisted and defeated the Spaniards in the battle of *Reinogüelén*. He returned to Perú to reinforce his army but was killed in a dispute with Pizarro in 1538 (Noggler, 1984: 55).

Pedro de Valdivia, who had fought in Flanders and Italy, entered what today is Chile with 156 Spanish soldiers and hundreds of *Yanacona* warriors. After 11 months hard travelling, his army achieved an important victory over *Picunche* in the *Mapocho*²⁸ valley in December 1540 which allowed him, two months later, to found the city of Santiago (Noggler, 1984: 55), on the 12th of February, 1541. The first governor of Chile, Pedro de Valdivia, called it, significantly, *Santiago de la Nueva Extremadura* (Santiago of the New Extremadura) (Hancock, 1971: 36). It remains the capital of Chile. The city was very soon under siege by Araucanians and only with the aid of reinforcements from Perú, could Valdivia save himself and his soldiers. Later, he marched more than four hundred kilometers southwards, to the fringes of the Bio-Bio river and for the first time *Mapuche* – who concentrated preferentially here - saw Europeans in their lands. The *Mapuche* army attacked and severely weakened the Spaniards and

²⁸The name of the main river in Santiago.

Valdivia was forced to return to Perú to re-organise his army (Noggler, 1984: 55).

In this battle, *Mapuche* became familiar with European weapons and their effectiveness. They mobilised all their people and began to plan how to combat these strange and powerful armaments (Noggler, 1984: 32). Meanwhile, with new forces, Valdivia arrived back in Chile in 1550 and in that year, decisively defeated the *Mapuche* army in the battle of *Penco*. From that moment, the division between free and occupied land was established, *Mapuche* led by their *toquis* and *caciques* retaining firmly their land from the *Bio-Bio* river to the south. From the Bio-Bio river to the north was settled by the Spanish conquerors and soldiers and by thousands of conquered non-*Mapuche* indigenes (Noggler, 1984: 56) setting the 'colonial constellation' as it would continue for more than two and half centuries, up to first declaration of independence of Chile in 1810. But the war still continued.

The absence of cities and the 'open' form of *Mapuche* *lofs* (for the land was communally worked, without fences around the arable soil), facilitated the advance of Valdivia's troops and in this way the city of Concepción was founded in 1550 on the fringes of *Mapuche* unconquered lands, constituting an overt provocation to them

(Hancock,1971:48). Other towns, *Imperial*, *Valdivia*, *Confines*, *Villarica* soon followed and garrisons were also established at *Arauco*, *Tucapel* and *Purén* (Noggler, 1984: 57).

In spite of the foundation of cities and garrisons the two armies frequently attacked each other and there was no peace south of the Bio-Bio. *Mapuche* persisted in their independence organised by outstanding leaders such as *Colo-Colo*, *Caupolican*, *Lautaro*, *Tucapel* and *Galvarino*. The very conqueror and first governor of the colony, Pedro de Valdivia, was killed in the battle of Tucapel by troops led by the *Mapuche toquis* *Caupolican* and *Lautaro*, in 1553. They occupied and burnt to the ground recently founded Spanish cities such as *Concepcion* and garrisons such as *Tucapel* and *Villarica*. In this situation of continuous warfare, arrived Spaniards, the majority poor and illiterate people, landless peasants who sought to escape misery in Spain, the members of the nobility only arriving later, as governors, magistrates, bishops and officers (Galdames, 1941: 34).

Mapuche had understood that if they hoped to defeat the invaders, it was wise not to neglect the superiority of their military technology. They adopted metal-making technology, invented new weapons and changed their military strategy and battlefield tactics. *Mapuche* created mounted infantry half a century before European armies, and from the

beginning of the seventeenth century, *Mapuche* cavalry was superior to the invaders' (Noggler, 1984: 33). In addition, the use of military intelligence, espionage and the practice of diversionary tactics lead to the defeat of the Spaniards on several occasions until Cornelio Saavedra, in 1871, introduced the repeating Winchester rifle, the European 'devil's invention' which 'pacified' the *Mapuche* people as it had the indigenous peoples of North America.

This brief description of the military aspects of *Mapuche* resistance shows their commitment to defend their land and to preserve their independence. However, European armament was decisive in the success of the invaders. The use of the wheel, steel and gunpowder were sufficient and efficient for the ends of conquest and colonisation. Military technology was a precious instrument of domination, a key instrument of this form of articulation.

In the process of conquest and articulation, military methods and the needs of the *encomienda* frequently coincided. *Mapuche* prisoners were transferred to the *encomenderos* to replace in their fields the *Yanaconas* who died from depredation and disease (Galdames, 1941: 88). By *desgobernar un indio* (disjointing an indian) a *Mapuche's* foot was cut a little above the toe joints in order to make flight impossible "but neither these outrageous cruelties, nor the executions *en masa* of

the chieftains . . . wrought the desired effect . . . The gallows or a holocaust incited them, on the contrary, to new and more implacable vengeance" (Galdames, 1941: 88).

A radically new method of pacification was accepted by the Crown in 1612 from the arguments of the Jesuit Luis de Valdivia. Through the strategy of 'Defensive War', Luis de Valdivia tried to stop "the cruelties of the war and the bad treatment which the *encomenderos* inflicted on the natives" (Galdames, 1941: 89). Thus, the Court agreed to suppress the provision of personal services by the indigenes to the *encomenderos* and to abolish the *encomiendas*. The Bio-Bio river would be the boundary of 'Spanish territory' (Galdames, 1941: 89). A peace was achieved, but a general insurrection broke out in 1626 and the cessation of this treaty was proclaimed in Santiago by Luis Fernández de Cordoba by order of the King Philip IV (Galdames, 1941: 89). This was good for military men who benefited from the prolongation of war not only through rewards granted by the Crown but, by imposing a regime of slavery which although not predominant, was their revenge against troublesome *Mapuche*. Army officers obtained a good profit from the sale of prisoners as slaves to the *encomenderos*. But the enslaved *Mapuche* rebelled and individual *encomiendas* became battle fields (Galdames, 1941: 89).

But 1598 was a decisive year. *Pelentaro* led a general insurrection that destroyed Spanish towns and cities in what was known as the *Mapuche* triumph of *Curalaba*. Consequently the war changed, the Spanish army was professionalised and financed by the Crown through the system known as *Real Situado* (Jara, 1987: 129; Aranguiz and León, 1996: 189). On the 21st of March of 1600, and as a result of the urgent petition of *encomenderos* for assistance to the Spanish army, a *Royal Cedula* ordered that the *Capitanía General de Chile* be helped by the Viceroyalty of Perú with sixty *ducados* each year for budget to maintain the troops sent from Spain (Jara, 1987: 129). Despite the Peace Treaty of *Quilín* in 1640 that established the *Bio-Bio* River as the frontier between the colony and *Araucanía* (Bengoa, 1996: 407) and, the partial success of a missionary system of pacification begun in 1692, the war continued intermittently.

In the eighteenth century, a relative calm arose but the territory remained divided and *Mapuche* kept defending and maintaining their independence. The Spanish troops were demoralised by the futility of their efforts and work in the countryside had, in some periods, been hardly affected, paralysed even, during two centuries of war. But paradoxically and as a consequence of the negative effects of the war, the colony also experienced a growth for the "large permanent army . . . maintained there stimulated the active exploitation of the soil"

(Galdames, 1941: 91) for the troops came directly from Spain and not too many workers were recruited for the *encomiendas*. But the social climate in the urban areas was unstable. The cities gave rise to protests against the imposition of extraordinary taxes or *derrama* to pay for the never ending armed conflict, in spite of the war budget mentioned above, the *Real Situado* (Galdames, 1941: 91).

The dilemma for the Spaniards was whether to continue seeking conquest and slow the growth of settlement or to concentrate on the colonisation of the territory north of the Bio-Bio which they occupied. They opted for the latter and despite Noggler's (1984: 56) assertion to the contrary, this allowed them to begin the processes of colonisation, and they increased their efforts to expropriate the land and labour of the *Mapuche*, *Picunche* and *Yanaconas*, to establish the institution of *encomienda*, to develop a civil administration in Santiago and to organise ecclesiastical life (Noggler, 1984: 56), all according to the pattern well established in the conquered territories of the *Mexica* and *Incas* based in turn on Castilian feudalism.

The articulation of the feudal-Spanish and indigenous modes of production was violent and had its military expression in a war in which the Spaniards, with the sword's hilt as the Sign of the Cross (Galeano, 1973: 21), expropriated land, abolished *Picunche's* and other northern

indigenous peoples' religion and dramatically, modified their social and production relations. However, the Spaniards did not meet a *Mapuche* nobility interested in conspiracy as happened with the *Mexica* and *Incas* for *Mapuche's* production and social relations did not lead them to constitute a state or a class society, let alone an empire. They did not subjugate other peoples as *Mexica* and *Incas* did²⁹, nor were they subjugated by other imperialising people either. In addition, and again unlike the *Mexica* and *Incas*, *Mapuche* did not believe in a fatal and predetermined history nor that their gods would return from the east to punish them. The Spaniards were seen as invaders who wanted to expropriate their land and they felt the need to defend it. They preferred to reaffirm their identity as a people seeing themselves as *Mapuche* (people of the land), and not as *Araucanos* (people from the region of *Arauco*), as Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga called them in his epic poem "*La Araucana*" published in Madrid in two parts, in 1569 and in 1589 (Noggler, 1984: 1). According to Wilhelm (cited in Noggler, 1984: 1), the self-designation "*Mapuche*" is the emphatic expression of a determination to be acknowledged and respected as the unique people of that land, as the exclusive owners of that soil. From such a conviction, *Mapuche* derived the strength to struggle for more than

²⁹According to Noggler (1984: 2), *Mapuche* would have settled in the south of the central region in the twelfth or thirteenth century, one or two centuries before the Spanish 'discovered' America in 1492. *Mapuche* would have displaced *Picunche* and *Huilliche* towards the north and the south respectively but, once settled, *Mapuche* did not subjugate other indigenous peoples.

three centuries against the European invaders and their allies (Noggler, 1984: 1).

Despite invasion, conquest and colonisation, a great part of *Mapuche* land remained free. Their society continued in important respects as it was prior to the Spanish invasion (see Chapter One), but it was certainly affected by the constraints of warfare which ceased only half century after Republican rule. The *repartimiento-encomienda*, that in the Chilean colony took the form of *mercedes de tierra* and *encomienda* (see chapter One and Two) as fundamental instruments of conquest and colonisation, attempted to replace indigenous production relations and mold new social and political identities. In particular, a process of class and gender formation and deformation was inaugurated with the establishment of the colonial state and Catholic religion in the usurped land. Therefore, simultaneously with and as a product of the military stalemate, Santiago became much more than a "military outpost of Perú" (Faron, 1968: 10). The appropriation of a great section of the central valley by the invaders meant that this would become a real colony.

The *Encomienda*, the Crucible of a New Society

As seen in Chapter Two, the grants in *repartimiento* and in *encomienda* arose in the context of the process of reconquest and re-peopling of

territory occupied by the Moors in Castile (Chamberlain, 1939: 46). Since the conquest and colonisation of America involved similar objectives for the Crown, it is not strange that the processes of war and settlement were shaped by Castilian experience, especially since the Castilian conquerors were themselves veterans or the heirs of veterans of these campaigns in Spain.

The *encomienda* experienced a metamorphosis through conquest and colonial development. Conceived as an economic and political mechanism within the Absolutist strategy to preserve the feudal regime and avoid the process of dispersion of sovereignty and decline of serfdom as in Aragon, the *encomienda* was not what the Crown expected. The *encomienda* became something else. Paradoxically for the Crown, the conquerors, who should have protected the Royal interests, were the most interested in changing the nature of the Castilian *repartimiento-encomienda*. The objectives of insuring permanent colonisation and providing internal and external defence were achieved, but those requirements on nature of land tenure and the obligation of protection for the indigenes through Christianity were to a great extent distorted. *Encomenderos* became too autonomous from the Crown and an inhuman exploitation characterised their relationship with indigenes on the *encomiendas*.

The indigenes carried out diverse work such as shepherding, mining, transporting, construction activities and household service (Chamberlain, 1939: 26). They paid tribute to the *encomenderos* in kind (vegetables, fruit, meat, food in general), in products of their industry (textiles, pottery, precious metals) and at times, in money if they were part of a former empire such as *Mexica* (Chamberlain, 1939: 26). But if they subsisted from the communal economy, they paid with their labour (Carmagnani, 1976: 23). Until the mid-sixteenth century, the *encomendero* "determined the form, extent, and periods of service and the types and amount of tribute at will and in accord with his personal desires and needs" (Chamberlain, 1939: 26).

The *Repartimiento-encomienda* in the Colony of Chile

Once new territories had been conquered and colonisation initiated in America in the 17th century, a reward was conceded to those who had served in the campaigns of conquest and to their male descendants for two or more generations³⁰, the *mercedes de tierra* (Carmagnani, 1976: 23; Chamberlain, 1939: 27). Thus, the *encomienda* was not only the basis from which production developed but also the transference of its property through the generations, meant that it generated new gender relations (see Chapter Three).

³⁰This is the origin of the colonial *Mayorazgos* (Galdames, 1941: 181), the name given in the Chilean colony to the process of miscegenation, which will be focused on later in this Chapter.

The conquerors, the first *encomenderos* in America, were rewarded with a real grant in property, in perpetuity. In the sixteenth century, forty percent of conquerors were granted *encomiendas* in the first distribution of land tenure by the colonial state in Chile and thirty percent in the second distribution (Salazar, 1985: 26). But although land had been granted and *cedulas de encomiendas* provided labour for it, the conquerors were not originally entitled to sell or buy *mercedes de tierra* and *cédulas de encomiendas*. However, from early on, most of the *encomenderos* arrogated truly jurisdictional powers over the indigenes assigned to them and they "tended to consider the towns they held and their districts as their property by Royal donation, appropriating lands within the districts of the towns granted to them and selling and transferring the titles of their *encomiendas* to others" (Chamberlain, 1939: 32). According to Carmagnani (1976: 23), the land granted was relatively small, not more than 100 hectares per man. But *mercedes de tierra* began to be commodified and several were regrouped to form a single large property. The process of commodification of land was unstoppable for, after all, who could stop it in such a remote land in which colonial political and judicial institutions were still being built? This was the origin of *latifundia*. Many *encomiendas* were established on these properties. An

encomienda of one thousand indigenes was not unusual and some contained ten thousand (Jara, 1987: 21).

Thus, in spite of the Absolutist desire to prevent the development in America of a hereditary and feudal landed aristocracy which would operate to the detriment of the Monarchy (Chamberlain, 1939: 31), the *encomenderos*, especially in Chile, transformed the *repartimiento-encomienda* into *señoríos* which, though circumstantially and tactically regarded by the Crown as a way of "advancing colonisation, furthering stability and insuring permanent dominion" (Chamberlain, 1939: 31), in fact contradicted Absolutism, as had already been demonstrated in Aragon. Not surprisingly then, a conflict arose between the Crown and the "independent-minded *conquistadores*" (Chamberlain, 1939: 32). While their economy and polity were in a formative stage, the conquerors sought to transform the *repartimiento-encomienda* into a seigniorial grant, with jurisdictional and territorial dominion and permanent land ownership and the Monarchical ban on the appropriation of land formally ended about a century after the Royal creation of the *encomiendas* for America in 1536, 88 years after the foundation of the colony of Chile.

The "tyranny of distance" greatly contributed to the transformation of the *encomienda*. The lack of efficient control allowed developments

towards seigniorialism which were to some extent permitted by the Monarchy in those aspects "not detrimental for its authority which had become fixed as a result of the policies and practices of the higher and lesser officials, of the indigenes and the *encomenderos* themselves" (Chamberlain, 1939: 32). Thus, the *encomienda* in America as "it existed in its final form was consequently . . . the result of the interworkings of royal policy and of the policies and actual practices [of officials and *encomenderos*]" (Chamberlain, 1939: 33). The land suitable for agriculture acquired a money value, was bought and sold, in spite of the Royal ban on land ownership. As the commercial value of its produce grew, the land which could only be acquired by *merced*, became after conquest and expropriation, illegally available through "a variety of outright fraudulent means", but not through *the encomiendas*, which granted rights of ownership only of labour and not of land (Gunder Frank, 1969: 23). From 1629, once the ban on land ownership had been abolished, the system expanded and land was sold along with the indigenes it contained (Galeano, 1985: 64).

Accordingly, an American institution of surplus extraction, a product of the violent articulation of the feudal and indigenous modes of production, which Glauser (cited in Larraín, 1989: 238) labels "the *encomienda* mode of production", emerged. Its feudal characteristics co-existed with incipient capitalist elements for "the Spaniards [in the

colony] appropriated the land . . . and big *haciendas* or *latifundios* were formed in the last third of the 17th century (Carmagnani, 1976: 18). In fact, servile relations of production that characterised the *hacienda* soon absorbed poor Spanish peasants too, who had started as free tenants" (Larraín, 1989: 238). But despite these changes, the Monarchy did not abolish the *encomienda* until 1789 in its Chilean colony, and while legally the land became privately owned, the main relation of production remained feudal. The *encomienda* was abolished, but the *encomenderos* remained, the controllers and beneficiaries of the new market in land and labour became the "*señores*" or landowners, now released from some of the more onerous forms of imperial control. A "seigniorial" mode of production had resulted from the articulation between the feudal and the indigenous mode of production in the colonial social formation.

So, conquest and settlement in Chile had their specificities and distinctiveness not only because of *Mapuche* resistance but also because the *encomenderos* themselves transformed the nature of the *encomienda* from the very beginning of conquest in the 16th century. While the war continued in the south, the Spanish colony began to arise in the central region, displacing and substantially modifying the economic, political and social relations of the indigenous peoples there, most of them *Picunche* (Noggler, 1984: 1). Simultaneously with the

development of the *encomienda*, the predominant production relation during conquest and colonisation, a system of trade and new colonial political and social institutions were created.

Against the Monarchs' wishes, this colonial growth did not mean the reinforcement of Spanish Imperial rule but the emergence of a Creole ruling class of *encomenderos* and merchants, who benefited from the control of the army by colonial authorities and began challenging monarchical authority and the Spanish economic monopoly of the *Américas*. Although the *encomendero* in the Chilean colony may have looked and acted like a European feudal lord, he can not be characterised as such. The *encomendero* was not initially interested in social position, titles, function or political prestige as was the Spanish aristocrat, but was "moved by desire for profit and pursuing the goal of wealth" (Miranda cited in Gunder Frank, 1969: 126). An important factor contributing to the development of this Creole ruling class was the Royal prohibition for *encomendero* to exercise "political or judicial authority . . . directly or indirectly, either himself or through his agents" (Chamberlain, 1939: 29).

The source of their wealth was a labour force constituted mainly by *Picunche* (Faron, 1968: 11) who worked in agriculture and mining within the *encomienda*. Although the mining labour system, the *mita*

(Galeano, 1985: 111) was predominant in several Latin American colonies, it was not the case in the Chilean colony for minerals, as we shall see later, were not apparently so abundant and the indigenes had not undertaken mining production like *Mexica* and *Incas*. Through the *encomienda*, indigenes in the Chilean colony became a labour force who had to pay with personal services for what they were forced to do and to believe in. Nonetheless, the Spaniards did not sweep away the social and cultural identity of the *Mapuche* who preserved it in spite of the loss of part of their land, although their mode of production was no longer predominant outside of it.

The organisation of the colony was particularly complicated by *Mapuche* resistance and by the geographical isolation increased by the Monarch's wishes "to prevent anyone not a Spaniard from establishing himself there" (Galdames, 1941: 62). However and unlike feudalism in Spain, the creation of a permanent army for the War of *Arauco* allowed "labour to go on normally in the assurance that it would not be interrupted for levies or enforced conscription" (Galdames, 1941: 102). This army, economically sustained by the Crown since 1600 through the *Real Situado*, although still receiving revenues from colonial taxation (*derramas*), allowed *encomenderos* to increase their fortunes. The resistance of *Mapuche* "caused the Spaniards great apprehension and cost the Crown a good deal of money for supplies and troops which had

to be sent to save Chile, its colony. Not only did the Spaniards fail to conquer the *Mapuche*, they had to devise an effective, and expensive, means of preventing their being overrun by them" (Faron, 1968: 11). The Spanish state's military spending was one of the specific forms in which it actively participated in the process of class formation in the colony. The war was not good business for the Spanish state but it benefited an emerging economically dominant class.

Nevertheless, everything was not perfect for *encomenderos*. The "constant warfare . . . made attention to agriculture difficult and caused excessive expenses; and on the other hand, the limited development of industries and the occasional paralysis of labour in the mines considerably reduced receipts" (Galdames, 1941: 68). Certainly with the discovery minerals, the economy developed and the Spanish rulers' wealth also increased but effectively, mining was not the main productive sector of the colony. Mineral production did not grow for gold and silver were scarce. Only copper was produced in a considerable amount and was used to manufacture cannons, bells and other articles in Perú and Spain. Compared to the mineral wealth of the *Mexica* and *Incas*, above all, in relation to gold and silver, the soil of the most southern territory of America was quite sterile (Galdames, 1941: 102).

For that reason, from its earliest days as a colony, Chile was fundamentally agricultural. Tallow, fruit, vegetables, wheat and livestock constituted the principal products, their producers, indigenous workers. Commercial activity was mainly centred in Santiago. The wealth of the *encomenderos* who constituted the core of the Creole aristocracy was created by indigenes and *mestizos*, whose "work constituted the source of wealth of this new society"(Riesco 1988: 280). Like Galeano (1973: 12), Riesco argues that this servile labour contributed to the expansion of capitalism and economic progress in Europe, with little compensation by the *encomenderos*. For example, amongst the gold washers of *Andacollo*, more than twenty thousand indigenes and *mestizos*, men, women and children, worked for their *encomenderos* not as serfs but as slaves (Riesco, 1988: 280). Although formally the relation of production was feudal, and this was the general condition of almost the total colonial process, the character of the exploitation and racism transformed it in practice, in particular times and places, to a relation of slavery.

Economically, colonists in Chile were in a worse situation than many of their counterparts in the sub-continent. Due to the commercial monopoly of Spain, no commercial fleets were allowed to come to the colony (Ramirez Necochea, 1959: 24). Merchants came only once a year from the Iberian Peninsula, to Havana for the Antilles; Vera Cruz

for Mexico; Cartagena for Venezuela and Colombia; and finally to Portobelo, situated in Panamá, for the rest of the South American colonies including far distant Chile. Illegal trade developed with the Peruvians (Galdames, 1941: 71) and later, with the colony in Argentina (Riesco, 1988: 281). In fact, Chile emerged as a cattle-raising country, just as Castile had been before it. Through the illegal importation of large herds from Argentina, "the regime of isolation to which the colony was subjected in matters of trade was in fact destroyed by contraband and, with the introduction of this new element into colonial life, commerce tended to free itself" (Galdames, 1941: 104). Eventually, the monarchy stopped opposing this tendency and a law to register ships to carry on the mercantile traffic was enacted (Galdames, 1941: 104).

The growth of the Spanish colonies in America followed a different course to that of feudalism in Spain. However, this was not so radically different that colonialism itself created new internal and external economic relations. Bagú (cited in Gunder Frank, 1969: 22) argued that despite the feudal relations of production in Spain, that "[c]olonial capitalism rather than feudalism, was the type of economic structure which appeared in America". But what arrived in America was a feudal relation of production. This consolidated at the end of the 17th century with the specific characteristics of the *encomienda* that was, fundamentally feudal. Although mercantile relations grew in Latin

America, in the specific case of the Chilean colony, this growth was slight because of its geographical location in the sub-continent but more importantly, because its economic surplus was not significant prior to the 18th century. This was a colony in formation, shaken by permanent warfare, with a very rudimentary infrastructure inadequate for international trade. In addition, as noted above, gold and silver ores were not abundant as in the Viceroyalty of Perú and commercial activity was restricted and oriented mainly there and to the small domestic market. Nevertheless, though the precarious development of production and trade is an important factor to consider, what centrally defined the mode of production was the character of the social relations of production and not external or exogenous factors. As Marx argued in *Capital* (1967), commerce in money or goods, did not by itself transform the feudal mode of production. The solidity of the mode of production depended on its internal coherence, which was given by the production relation that characterised and defined the mode, in this case, the feudal *encomienda*. In the incipient agrarian development of the Chilean colony, the class structure in formation included Spanish *encomenderos* and mainly indigenous serfs (though poor Spaniards had been integrated into the labour process), and servile relations were predominant. Thus, as Larraín (1989: 187), argues

even if it were right and possible to conceive of a 'colonial mode of production' which was violently imposed in order to break the resistance of the Indian modes of production, this situation cannot be understood as a way of introducing the capitalist mode of production, for it was a way of introducing servile institutions like the *encomienda* . . . If there was an articulation it was one between the traditional Indian modes of production and feudalism.

The colony of Chile, because of the tenacity of the *Mapuche*, its relatively isolated location and the monopoly exercised by the Crown over the *Américas* and the apparent absence of minerals, was almost still-born by mid seventeenth century. Its survival depended on feudal relations reproduced fundamentally in the *encomienda* and not on a capitalist mode of production in the colonial social formation, as Bagú (cited in Gunder frank (1969) and Vitale (1993) have argued. Even with this initial development of production, trade and infrastructure in the 18th century, the feudal character of the mode of production did not change in the colonial social formation for, although the *encomienda* became the *hacienda*, this production relation continued reproducing feudal social relations which from the beginning restricted the circulation of commodities (Carmagnani, 1976: 28), as we will see in the next chapter.

The Formation of the Colonial State

As was explained above, during the first part of the sixteenth century, the Spaniards conquered the *Américas* from what today is Mexico to *Mapuchemapu*. In the second half of that century, they built up their colonies such that Spanish America became the prized possession of the Spanish crown. The period of conquest in what is now Chile extended from 1535 to 1561 and the colonial period from 1561 to 1810 (Galdames, 1941: 86). In order to consolidate conquest, new institutions were created and as seen in Chapter Two, the *Concejo de Indias* (Indies Council) in Castile, was the institution through which the colonies were governed by Royal mandate. This council "proposed the names of the persons who should occupy public offices in America and took note about complaints and news that arrived in Spain. It proposed, furthermore, the laws which ought to be issued" there (Galdames, 1941: 62).

Santiago, the capital of the colony, relatively safe from the war mainly fought more than 400 kilometers to the south, was the place in which most of the colonial power was concentrated. The colony was subjected to the Viceroy of Perú and was ruled by a Governor appointed by the King on the advice and through the *Concejo de Indias*. The top royal representatives in America were the Governors, Viceroys and Captains General. The Governor was a salaried officer whose role was to

command the army; to appoint and remove the other public functionaries, except those who were appointed by the King; to administer civil and penal justice; to direct the administration of cities and nominate the members of the first *Cabildos* (City Councils); to exercise the right of ecclesiastical patronage for the King and, under the title of *Vice-Patrón* of the Church, to name the parish clergy; and to divide lands and people provisionally among the individuals whom he thought most deserving (Galdames, 1941: 62-63). The political authority of the Governor resided in his deputy, in the *corregidores* (governors of cities and subdivisions called *partidos* -today provinces -, in the *alguaciles mayores* (senior constables) and in the Royal officers, among them, *tesoreros* (treasurers) and *contadores* (accountants). All of these were appointed by the King (Galdames, 1941: 63). However, the Governor's power was not completely arbitrary. Whoever were injured by him, could seek redress from the Viceroy of Perú or from the King himself and the Governor could be subjected to a *juicio de residencia* (public hearing) (Galdames, 1941: 63).

Furthermore, *Audiencias*, judges, were established "to watch the governors, take care of each other, and give account to the King of what they observed in the colony. These judges were appointed by the King. The colonial justice system was known as the *Real Audiencia*" (Galdames, 1941: 62). Rivalry existed thus between the Governor, his

subordinate political authorities and the *Audiencias*, but, the administration of criminal justice itself was very strict and the punishments for offenders were public and extremely severe. Torture was the most frequent means of "drawing out confessions" from prisoners (Galdames, 1941: 65).

An important component of the structure and organisation of the cities was the institution known as *Cabildo*. The government of the towns was exclusively with officers of the Royal government and local indigenous officials. "In these *cabildos* and native officers of the Indian towns is to be found a parallel to the *concejos* of towns held by Castilian lords" in Spain (Chamberlain, 1939: 46). The *Cabildo* was comprised of "two *alcaldes* (mayors), six *regidores* (town councillors), a secretary, and a *procurador*, who represented it before the other authorities" (Galdames, 1941: 63). Although when a city was founded, these members were designated by the Governor, they could later be replaced by others named by the former members each year, although three of the *regidores* were initially irremovable (Galdames, 1941: 63). However, with the growth of the colony, "these [three *regidores*] offices were sold at public auction . . . the result was that the same persons occupied them for many years" (Galdames, 1941: 63). The duties of the *Cabildo* were various but among the most important were

the cleanliness of the city, public sanitation and health and the application of justice.

Apart from this state structure, and within the institutionality created in the colony and in fact beyond it, was the *Cabildo Abierto* (Open Assembly). Important public affairs or a danger threatening the city were deliberated by all residents in this public assembly. There, people determined the measures which should be applied. This was the most democratic political institution in the colony and it would play an important role in the struggles for independence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The *Cabildo Abierto* was an exercise in direct democracy which "frequently provoked difficulties for the leaders of the colony, especially when [they] imposed extraordinary contributions (*derramas*) on the neighbourhood, or committed some forceful act" (Galdames, 1941: 64).

From the early tributes fixed by the *encomenderos* and those imposed by *cédulas de encomienda*, a tax system evolved in the colony. In the Chilean colonial state there were two classes of taxes, one "taxed definite services in each community and . . . belonged to the *cabildos*" (Galdames, 1941: 68), the other "taxed the production and business of the country and belonged to the King" (Galdames, 1941: 69). The main sources of revenue for the Crown were: the royal fifth, 20 per cent of

the value of the production of the mining or washing of gold; the ecclesiastic tithe, the tenth part of the value of the agricultural and cattle production of each year; *Almojarifazgo* (the tariff), a customs duty of 5 per cent on imported or exported merchandise; the *Alcabala* (excise tax), an impost on the sale or transfer of goods at the rate of 2 to 6 per cent of the value of the goods; and the sale of Papal Bulls for eating meat on days prohibited by the Church (Galdames, 1941: 69). Towns were taxed according to the size of the population, their mineral and agricultural resources and, the industrial, commercial, fishing and agricultural activities of the indigenes (Chamberlain, 1939: 26). These taxes through which the colonised paid for their own colonisation, were a heavy burden on the colonists too who though living in a beautiful valley, did not find there the mythical *El Dorado*.

Catholicism, the *Encomienda* and Patriarchy

The Catholic Church hierarchy watched the political authorities and by virtue of the privileges that it enjoyed and because of the moral influence it exercised, it became superior to the political and legal institutions (Galdames, 1941: 64). Since ecclesiastical authorities constituted the firmest basis of the Monarchs' absolute power and had as their principal mission the defence of the Monarchy's divine origin, special prerogatives were bestowed upon them, such as civil jurisdiction (*jurisdiccion civil*) and ecclesiastical privilege (*fuero eclesiastico*)

(Galdames, 1941: 66). The Catholic Church became, in practice, another state power, an apparently untouchable institution, and the colony reflected this. Santiago, the 'urban centre' of the Chilean colony, resembled a poor, medieval small town with its churches and chapels and devotional regime embedded in the daily life of people, their calendar, traditions and customs.

Christianisation was the 'great mission' of conquest and colonisation. Professing the Catholic religion was one of most important signs of European civilisation and the means by which the Spaniards distinguished who was or was not a human being. All beliefs and religions alien to Catholicism were violently repressed and the Inquisition was created to eliminate the heretic, whether in the Iberian Peninsula or beyond it. The *encomienda* was the instrument through which indigenes' forced conversion to Catholicism was achieved and their welfare 'guaranteed'. The *encomendero* had to build a chapel or church in the town of his *encomienda*, to support a priest and "aid the Church and the orders in their task of indoctrination and ministration" (Chamberlain, 1939: 29).

Among the religious communities established in the colony in the sixteenth century such as Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, Augustinians and *Mercedarianos*, perhaps the most influential religious was the

Jesuits (Galdames, 1941: 65) who established a few colleges and the university in the eighteenth century. "[T]he zeal with which they practiced their pious duties" (Galdames, 1941: 121), made them decidedly influential in society and in government. But the importance of the Church and in particular, of the Jesuits, was not only educational, political and religious but, economic too. They were linked to the richest families in the colony and the Jesuits themselves possessed an enormous wealth, represented by their fifty *haciendas* in the eighteenth century. The support of the rich and governors' authorisation of donations to them, allowed them to accumulate land and wealth, establishing a "vast network of business which involved the whole colony" (Galdames, 1941: 122).

Nobody in the eighteenth century colony generated more profit than the Jesuits, whose labour force was constituted by African slaves brought by them from Perú. The Jesuits' power eventually lead the Crown to expel them from the colony in 1767 (Galdames, 1941: 121-122) for their growing influence was threatening the colonial state itself. Their expulsion re-ordered the colony's hierarchies and confined economic power to the secular ruling class. Religion was to remain a means, a political and ideological instrument, a way of exercising, reproducing and preserving the imperial power of the Monarchy.

Since 1536 and by Monarchical mandate, indigenes with their descendants were given to two generations of *encomenderos*, the father and his immediate male heir³¹. Property could thus be secured by inheritance, but for a son to be legitimate his mother had to be Spanish because Spaniards, and in particular the *encomenderos*, regarded indigenous women as racially inferior to Europeans. To rape them was not considered a crime by Spaniards. Other indigenous women became *encomenderos*' mistresses who, like raped women, also procreated illegitimate children. Generally then, *encomenderos* did not marry indigenous women, but through these 'informal' sexual relations, *mestizos* soon outnumbered the Spaniards (Galdames, 1941: 77).

The development of gender relations in the colony can be better explained by observing and interpreting Sergio Villalobos' research (cited in Santa Cruz, 1978: 47) population between 1536 and 1565. In a sample of 3,443 people, men outnumbered women five to one. In a sample of 683 Spaniards' wives, 533 were Spanish, seventeen were indigenes, ninety five *mestizas*, two Africans, eight *mulatas*, twenty one *Zambas* and seven were not specified (Santa Cruz, 1996: 47). Seventy eight percent of Spaniards' wives were Spanish.

³¹As Chamberlain (1939: 30) points out, although "*encomiendas* were normally granted for two lives . . . as the result of constant petition to the Crown, grants were extended by royal *cédulas* of general application to three and four lives . . . The eldest son succeeded to the *encomienda* and in the absence of male heirs, the eldest daughter. If there was no issue, the wife succeeded".

Most of the *encomenderos* married Spanish women in the colony, thus, making their heirs Creoles, Chilean by birth but Spanish by origin. These Creoles "acquired noble titles, buying them from the court, and had themselves called 'count' or 'marquis'" (Galdames, 1941: 131). They were educated in the Jesuit colleges, in the university in Lima and later, in the first state university, the University of San Felipe³², in which they were taught Canonical Law, philosophy, theology, medicine and mathematics, in Latin and according to Catholic doctrine (Galdames, 1941: 127).

By the eighteenth century, the population in the *Araucanía* and in the Spanish colony was as follows. The *Mapuche* population was estimated at not less than 100 thousand (Galdames, 1941: 100; Faron, 1968: 11). The population of the territory controlled by the Spaniards numbered half a million (Galdames, 1941: 97). One hundred and seventy thousand were of European descent (Galdames 1941:97) and of these, 20 thousand were born in the Iberian Peninsula and one hundred fifty thousand were born in Chile (Creoles). The remainder comprised three hundred thousand *mestizos* and more than thirty thousand indigenes (Galdames, 1941: 100). Posse (1990: 45) claims that the *encomenderos* thought they were repairing their imperial genocide by procreation.

³²It was founded in 1738 under the rule and in honour of Philip V (Galdames, 1941: 125) .

Warfare and Catholicism contributed to maintain Spanish inter-marriages in the Chilean colony. In a militarised and extremely Catholic society in which the indigenous population was larger than the Spanish population, but in which the latter subjugated the former, the Spaniards thought of Catholic monogamous marriage as a European institution. This conviction and practice was in contradiction to the aim of the Crown of evangelising indigenes and replacing polygamy by monogamy. The patriarchal binary gender/sex system was in this way racialised by Spaniards in the colony, and patriarchy in the colony can not be understood without reference to the Castilian feudal origin of *repartimiento* and *encomienda* through which grants in land and labour were conceded. The *repartimiento-encomienda* was a system in which women's subjugation was 'normal' in so far as they were not citizens, for women - apart from the Queen - could not possess property and generally could not hold any grant (except in extraordinary situations such as absence of men in a noble family), let alone in the context of warfare in which these grants were created, firstly in Castile and then, in America. Women were discriminated against by a hegemonic and military masculinity, known in Latin America as *machismo*, which valorised physical strength, bravery, masculine honour, courage, pride and daring. Certainly there was a class differentiation in gender discrimination. Ruling class women were more privileged than the serf women, at the bottom of the class hierarchy which was reinforced

vigorously by the Catholic Church whose doctrine relegated women to a servile place in feudal society, as Simone de Beauvoir (cited in Daly, 1985: 53) argues, " [c]hristian ideology has contributed no little to the oppression of women".

The *encomienda* reflected and reinforced the patriarchal character of Spanish feudalism and 'imprinted' it on Chilean colonial society. As the predominant Royal donations were grants to the military, women were excluded from holding them. The Crown "considered excluding women from the holding of *encomiendas* on the ground they did not possess the qualities necessary for holding and defending the lands colonized. The *encomendero* was a [man], a mounted soldier, and the *conquistador*, if not already an *hidalgo*, achieved that status through participation in the conquest" (Chamberlain, 1939: 28).

Women were systematically excluded of education. There were no schools for girls, let alone for poor *mestizas*. Some poor boys could - in exceptional cases - gain access to school but the very school room and teaching were class-biased, the teacher treating students differently according to their class origin (Galdames, 1941: 127). Wealth and masculinity were the pre-conditions of education. As Galdames (1941: 127) says, "the ideas of the governing social class continued to prevail. Its members believed that learning to read and write was dangerous or

of no advantage for the poor or for women, even rich women, because it might corrupt their religion and [morality]". Rich girls spent some years learning in convents and at home but "respectable priests denied absolution in confession to a girl guilty of learning French" (Galdames, 1941: 128). The gender and class discrimination in education was not only a consequence of a conservative Catholic Church but of the political orientation of the dominant class. In the colony in the eighteenth century, there were no secular books, not printing press, no secular colleges and no theatres or galleries (Galdames, 1941: 131). American indigenous cultures were far richer and more multiform than this colonial ignorance, uniformity and obscurantism.

CONCLUSION TO PART I

The Articulation of *Mapuche* and Feudal Modes of Production and the Emergence of the Patriarchal *Encomienda*

Spanish Feudalism, Absolutism and Colonisation

The attempts to overcome the crisis of feudalism in Spain by reorganising the state as a centralised, vertical and authoritarian structure of power, the Absolutist State, and the reconquest of Spanish territory from the Moors, were of fundamental importance in the colonisation of America, especially in the Chilean colony. Most of *conquistadores* and their *huestes* in what is now Chile came from Castile, precisely from the region of *Extremadura*, in which Christianity confronted Islam.

The feudal mode of production in Spain was as an organic unity of economy and polity dispersed in several fragmented sovereignties through the social formation within which it was constituted. Serfdom embodied economic exploitation and political-legal coercion at the level of the feudal village and it was the mechanism of surplus extraction in this mode of production. However, due to the dynamic relation between the rural economy and the development of an embryonic 'sphere of circulation', as a product of the growth of commodity

exchange and then the emergence of money rents, the institution of serfdom came into crisis and with it "the class power of the feudal lords" (Anderson, 1979: 19) based on it. The dominant class had to restructure the whole edifice, from the bottom up. In the course of the sixteenth century, a vertical, militarised and centralised political-legal structure was created by the Spanish Monarchy, the Absolutist state (Anderson, 1979: 19).

Some scholars including Marx, Engels and Poulantzas, among others, thought the bourgeoisie was born within this Absolutist State. Engels (1976: 172) argued in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State that

periods occur where the warring classes balance each other so nearly that state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of independence of both. Such was the absolute monarchy of the 17th and 18th centuries . . .

In the same way Marx (cited in Anderson, 1979: 16) asserted that "Absolutist States were a peculiarly bourgeois instrument. . . [u]nder the absolute monarchy . . . bureaucracy was the only means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie". But did a hypothetical end of serfdom mean the end of feudal relations in the countryside? This

would be difficult argue since aristocratic land ownership blocked the free market in land and labour mobility (Anderson, 1979:17). Although the method of surplus extraction changed from labour to rent in money, this did not mean that feudal relations changed substantially. "[A]s long as labour was not separated from the social conditions of its existence to become 'labour-power', rural relations of production remained feudal" (Anderson, 1979: 17). Therefore, serfdom continued to be the predominant relation of production defining the feudal mode of production dominant within the social formation.

But these changes in the feudal forms of exploitation were not insignificant. In fact, they brought about new forms of the state. That is, they were not essential structural changes of the feudal mode of production itself, but were a change in the form of the feudal state. Absolutism was manifest in a rigid, centralised feudal state apparatus. In Hill's (cited in Anderson, 1979: 18) words: "[t]he absolute monarchy was a different form of feudal monarchy from the feudal-estates monarchy which preceded it; but the ruling class remained the same".

Absolutism in Spain was the form adopted by the Spanish State in order to reaffirm the feudal lords' class domination. However, this did not mean a change in terms of the feudal relations or, the substitution of a feudal by a capitalist mode of production. Even the process of

centralisation was incomplete. Apart from Castile and the development of the *repartimiento* and *encomienda*, other Kingdoms remained unconnected and largely independent. They were mainly divided into *señoríos* which dated from the 12th and 13th centuries, and these jurisdictions were more important in economic than in political terms for the nobles who controlled them. As Anderson put it: "[t]hese combinations of 'sovereignty and property' were a telling survival of the principles of territorial lordship into the epoch of Absolutism. The ancient regime preserved its feudal roots in Spain to its dying day" (Anderson, 1979: 84).

Although still feudal, the *repartimiento* and the *encomienda* and other Castilian grants emerging in the period of the *reconquista*, were the manifestations of the onset of a generalised crisis of feudalism in which serfdom had become an anachronistic relation of production in the whole of Europe (Hilton, 1982: 46), as surely as they were attempts to resolve the crisis itself. In this framework, the Castilian grants, consistent with the change of the character of the state were a centralising variation of serfdom. In contrast to this, Aragon remained decentralised in *feudos* and was constituted by atomised political, legal and economically independent territories ruled by rich aristocratic feudal lords. Dynastic marriage and the wealth found in the *Américas* did not achieve the unification of the Spanish Kingdom and improve its

economy but instead dispersed sovereignty, stimulated wars and reinforced a chaotic and disorganised economy.

Spain in 1492 was a feudal society with a very asymmetrical state structure which had consolidated Absolutism only in Castile. This Kingdom and one of its regions, *Extremadura*, became very significant for America. The *repartimiento* and the *encomienda*, (synthesised in the single term *repartimiento-encomienda*), were important not only for Castile's armed conflicts against the Moors but also for the articulation between the feudal and indigenous modes of production in colonial America.

Articulation at the Social Level: Class and Race Formation

Two main modes of production existed in America prior to the Spanish invasion, the communal and the agricultural modes of production. Unlike the *Inca* and *Mexica*, the *Mapuche* communal mode was characterised by the collective control of the land and resources by the polygamous family group or *lof* which lived in a subsistence economy regulated by the ecological cycle of the region within which they moved, hunting, gathering and carrying out their horticulture and religious rituals. *Mapuche* did not live in a mode of production based on the private ownership of productive resources, with a ruling class exploiting labour and generating a surplus beyond that required by the

community to subsist. Clear and opposed classes and a permanent and centralised state were absent in *Mapuchemapu*, but servile and slave relations of production existed in the *Inca* and *Mexica* social formations. In the communities in the south of the sub-continent such as the *Mapuche*, "the regime of the community constituted its mode of production, the links between its members were strong, economic inequality less accentuated and the collective consciousness about the common interest more internalised" (Riesco, 1988: 280).

The official history of America, that history contained in text books and curricula for primary, secondary and tertiary education in Chile, reduces, to a great extent, the pre-Colombian reality to the *Inca* and *Mexica*. The study of *Mapuche* and the comparison of them with other American peoples are useful because it shows how diverse the American sub-continent was before Columbus. The differences between the main modes of production in *Mapuchemapu* and in the *Mexica* and *Inca* social formations were decisive in determining the manner and duration of their restructuring subjugation and destruction by their articulation with the feudal mode of production once the Spanish invasion began.

The articulation of the Castilian-feudal and *Mapuche* modes of production resulted in the division of what is now Chile into *Mapuchemapu* and a Spanish colony derived from but different to

Spanish feudalism. *Mapuche* remained politically independent despite the constraints of war and conserved crucial elements of their political economy, especially polygamy. The military aspects of the clash were decisive in the physiognomy of the colony. The major consequences of the expropriation of the largest part of *Picunche* and other land in central Chile were the liquidation of their mode of production, its replacement by the *repartimiento-encomienda* and the massive reorganisation of land and labour. The expropriation of land and the subjugation of indigenes as serfs (though slavery also existed), subordinated and rapidly destroyed the foundations of the diverse Central Chilean peoples, some of whom had been subjugated earlier by the *Inca* Empire.

In the colony, a new relation of production emerged, the *encomienda*, which experienced several changes from its Castilian origins shaped by the Crown's Absolutist strategy. Its new relations of production shaped the whole colonial settlement. Patriarchy was deepened and two central embryonic classes emerged from a society in which land had quickly become a commodity. As in Aragon, the Kingdom of *señorío*, a powerful and patriarchal landowning class of non-producers emerged in contrast to a class of indigenous serfs into which *mestizos* and poor Spaniards were incorporated during the 17th century. Classes were identified by a racism introduced by the Castilian conquerors which

reproduced in the colony the identification of 'the self' and 'the other' developed in the war against Islam. Indigenes, *mulatos*, *zambos* and blacks were the alien Moors for the Spanish colonists.

Articulation and Gender: Sexualities, Masculinities and Femininities

Mapuche were a patriarchal people in which a hegemonic masculinity represented by the figure of the warrior was accentuated by warfare. A binary gender/sex system operated in which masculinity was associated with warrior men and femininity with reproducing and producing women who performed domestic and public work, though men also participated in the latter. What is remarkable is the sharp similarity between this form of masculinity and that of the Spanish conquerors. Articulation did not corrode hegemonic masculinity but, as we shall see, deepened it into a hybrid *machista*. Polygamy was almost a privilege of *ulmenes* or *loncos*, elderly patriarchal authorities in whose family groups patrilineal and patrilocal relations predominated. At the moment of conquest, polygamy was already generating discrimination against, perhaps exploitation of, women and an incipient differentiation between polygamous and non-polygamous men, tendencies that were accentuated by articulation with the feudal mode introduced by Spaniards and with the new seigniorial mode of production.

The expropriation of the land and the appropriation of the labour of both women and men, impacted fundamentally on gender relations. Masculinity and femininity in Spain were informed by Catholic doctrine and experienced differently by the feudal classes. These Spanish class and gender relations were translated to America by the already developed and tested Castilian institution of conquest and colonisation, the *repartimiento– encomienda*. Some existing patriarchal and patrilineal relations of power were maintained and deepened while polygamy was severely punished and the European monogamous nuclear family imposed by the Colonial State and the Catholic Church.

The introduction of the Spanish-feudal gender configuration into America, consolidated a rigid patriarchalism in which *Machismo* emerged as the hegemonic masculinity in a very rigid and militarised gender/sex system dominated by the image of the warrior/conqueror as the masculine and the pure remote, aristocratic lady and the sensual, hardworking serf woman as economically differentiated femininities. Sexuality was dictated by Catholic doctrine and Catholic marriage was the necessary condition of human reproduction and the transmission of property. The *encomienda* connected the gender relations produced after the conquest with the production relations that became dominant after the 16th century. The appropriation of indigenous land and labour and the task of evangelising natives were a simultaneous and intertwined

process of class and gender formation. For this reason, *machismo*, as a hybrid resulting from the articulation, was consistent with patriarchalism, servility, homophobia and racism since the first day of conquest.

Within the Chilean colony a gender system emerged in which women outnumbered men but were economically, socially, legally and politically subordinate to them, especially to the patriarchal landowners. It reproduced the patriarchal indigenous tradition but was deeply penetrated by Catholicism with its patriarchal and racial dogma, exacerbated by the bellicose climate imposed by a never ending war. The Catholic Church hoped to replace indigenes' beliefs, spirituality and customs by new morals, principles and ethics crucially aimed at women, but neither the Church nor the army succeeded against *Mapuche* polygamy which was central to their political economy.

Articulation at the Political Level: Colonial State Formation

Although *Mapuche* did not constitute an imperial state subjugating its own and other peoples like *Mexica* and *Inca* empires, the absence of a state did not mean a lack of solidarity and unity when they were threatened by an alien people. They were very aware of their independence and understood the importance of a co-ordinated military strategy. Spain resembled the *Mexica* and *Inca* social formations at that

time, and their polities were familiar to the private conquerors and their *huestes*. Cortés exploited the similarities in his conquest of the Mexica Empire, but the conquerors were unable to do likewise with the *Mapuche*. The creation of colonial political, judicial, military and ecclesiastical institutions consolidated Spanish rule in only part of what is now Chile while hindering the development of mercantilism and entrepreneurialism and consolidating the *encomienda*.

The articulation between *Mapuche* and feudal modes led to the predominance of a derivation of the latter, the seigniorial mode of production, in the larger section of the central region, and simultaneously and significantly, to the autonomy of *Mapuche* south of the *Bio-Bio* river where they preserved their political independence and social organisations. With the growth of the colony, *Mapuche* continued to be besieged even though they were recognised as an independent “nation” by the Spanish crown in 1640.

North of the *Bio-Bio* river, the *encomienda* destroyed indigenous communal production and inaugurated new social relations of class unknown in this region of America. Although, early in the colony, the *repartimiento-encomienda* resembled Castilian serfdom, it soon became very similar to Aragonese serfdom, although land became a commodity. This colonial development produced two central social classes. A

Creole bourgeoisie derived of the Spanish minor nobility began to accumulate growing economic power and would become decisive in challenging Spanish rule in the Chilean colony. Its counterpart, a subordinate class, the precursors of the *inquilinos* and *peones* was also conceived in this articulation. Central Chile's indigenes, *Yanaconas* (who had come from the north with the Spaniards), and the *Mapuche* captured by the Spanish army became servile rural workers. Others were the first manifestation of a seasonal workforce in an agriculture dominated by a derivation of the *encomienda*, the *hacienda*. The next section will explore the processes of class, state, and gender formation implicated in the *hacienda*, the centre of colonial life.

PART II

Patriarchy, the *Hacienda* and the *Cacicazgos* in the Republic of Chile 1700 - 1850

Chapter Five

The Colony after the *Encomienda* :

Gender, Class and Race in the Emergence of the *Hacienda*

From the *Encomienda* to the *Hacienda* : the Reproduction of Servility in the Colony

The Spanish campaigns of conquest and settlement in America depended for their success on American indigenes, forced into feudal and slave production relations to produce for *encomenderos* and the Spanish metropolis. Though feudal relations predominated, slavery, as Marx argued in *Capital* (1967), was a basis of capitalist primitive accumulation too, and it and feudal relations co-existed in the colony in an uneven and varied relationship.

Since the seventeenth century, the *encomenderos* increased through purchases, auctions, appointments and the usurpation of the indigenes' lands their original landholdings granted by the Monarchs. As seen in Chapter Four, soon after its arrival at America, the *encomienda* began to experience changes as a result of its articulation with the *Mapuche* mode of production. A feudal relation of production initially, it was characterised by agricultural exploitation for the direct consumption of the landlord and his serfs and the payment of tribute to the Monarchs to

whom land belonged (Jara, 1987: 326). But these lands became the *encomenderos*' property and were traded by them, losing their feudal character and constituting a new form of property called variously *hacienda*, *estancia*, *fundo* or *ingenio*.³³ A market in land emerged marking the passage from the original Spanish feudalism to a Latin American version, the *hacienda*, which while still feudal, contained weak characteristics of a capitalist mode in the commodification of land and incipient wage relations.

Agricultural production itself was soon for commercial exchange, for the national or international market. In this way, the production of commodities slowly began to replace the creation of use values (Segall, 1953: 91). However, central feudal characteristics remained in the form of the expropriation of labour such as servile and unpaid work in many *haciendas* or work paid in kind. While this developed towards labour paid by a miserable amount of money, socially, the patriarchal and servile nature of the interaction between the *inquilinas/os* and the landlord continued. Thus, the articulation of modes is never completed but is always a process of dissolution and retention of social relations, in which arcane forms can be passed by and yet revived. From its origin in the feudal *encomienda*, "the *señorial* seal of property" (Jara, 1987: 323) was recreated, translated and maintained in a new institution, the

³³I will use the term *hacienda* here to avoid confusion.

hacienda, in which past traditions, practices and experiences were embedded.

With the development of these characteristics the *latifundia* was constituted linking territorial possession with political power. The *tierras realengas* (Royal lands) were sold or auctioned to increase the public income of the colonial regime (Godoy, 1971: 66), in other words, the feudal state concentrated land in the hands of the *terratenientes*, expanding and developing the *latifundio* in contrast to the *minifundio*, the small lots of land directly expropriated from *Mapuche* and *Picunche* granted to the soldiers on the frontier.

Unlike the rest of the continent, rural life continued to be predominant in Chile because of the *Mapuches'* destruction of seven southern cities in the most prosperous and populated colonial region during the Araucanian war and because of natural disasters which halted the original impetus for urbanisation which had seen sixteen cities founded between 1541 and 1580. According to Jorge Hardoy (cited in Godoy, 1971: 65), the urban population in Spanish-America between 1580 and 1630 grew from 30,000 to 77,000. In the Viceroyalty of Perú the growth was particularly dramatic, from 11,600 to 41,200, whereas in Chile the urban population fell from 1,500 to 960. In addition to urban decline, two factors contributed to the expansion of the agrarian

population and production: the opening of Perú to exports which promoted cereal production and the constitution of the *hacienda* (Godoy, 1971: 65). In this context of de-urbanization in the Chilean colony, the *hacienda* emerged as the main form of property, the institution which gradually replaced the *encomienda* through a process of intervening forms of land tenure (such as *préstamos*, *poblaciones*, *cercos* and *arrendamientos*) (see Gongora, 1971: 92). Importantly, within the *hacienda*, the *inquilinaje*³⁴ and *peonaje* arose as the main forms of life and labour. Thus, agrarian expansion and de-urbanisation contributed to and were a result of the centrality of the *hacienda*, in which important political, military, economic and social relations developed and would be continued through and by several generations.

The *Hacienda*

Examining the emergence of the *hacienda* when the Spanish monarchical state and its colonial possessions were declining, Medina Echavarría (1971: 103) emphasises that it became a self-sufficient political, social and economic unit based on cattle and agricultural production containing installations such as water dams, mills, workshops, stables, cowsheds, wine cellars and coal bunkers. The *hacienda* constituted a 'social world', the centre of the rural life, and included institutions such as chapels and jails (Godoy, 1971: 67).

³⁴ Etymologically, *inquilinaje* means inhabitant (Góngora, 1971: 97).

However, the huge dimensions of the *haciendas* did not mean they were well populated. Some *haciendas* had around 100 families living within their borders (Salazar, 1985: 46), but the average was less than 25 in those *haciendas* linked to commerce and the export of products to Perú (Salazar, 1985: 47).

The *hacienda*, as a social, economic and political unit which extended its scope beyond the agrarian landscape, expanded also its social texture to dependents and workers who lived within it, forming in this way a social totality with specific functions, duties and obligations that expressed a complete and complex dynamic within the emerging social formation.

One of these crucial functions was the exercise of political authority (Medina Echavarría, 1971: 103). The *hacienda* established political and social order in the conquered lands and, during the final crisis of the colonial state in Chile, it provided social and political stability in the transition to political independence (Medina Echavarría, 1971: 104; Godoy, 1971: 67). As Medina Echavarría (1971: 104) suggests, when the state bureaucratic apparatus collapsed, the *hacienda* contributed to the maintenance of social cohesion, and provided the beginnings of the classes which constituted the core of the dynamic structural process of Chilean social formation.

Through its institutions, the *hacienda* was a unit in which the new classes, *terratenientes* (landowners) on the one hand, and *inquilinas/os* and *peones* on the other, were fundamentally generated and reproduced. The *terratenientes* were an agrarian aristocracy who accumulated wealth, power and prestige on a vast scale, even reaching to the cities, for the *terrateniente* who did not wish to stay on his property could live in the nearest city and in this way his kinship and social network expanded beyond the countryside, allowing him political participation in the urban context as well. Family formation and class formation are intimately connected and, the *haciendas* were the nuclei of a extended family network through which the *terrateniente* formed alliances with other landlords constituting 'family federations' which controlled entire regions (Medina Echavarría, 1971: 104). Between them and the *peones* of the *hacienda* were stewards, white and *mestizos inquilinos*.

Although the *inquilinas/os* did not constitute the largest section of the subordinate classes, they were the most oppressed and concentrated group under patronal authority until 1860 (Salazar, 1985: 45). Certainly, the *hacienda* had a greater capacity to absorb labour (including that of vagabonds) than other minor forms of property or tenancy, which were indeed marginal and subsistent.

The Origin of *Inquilinaje* and *Peonaje*

As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the subjection of indigenous labour in mines and the countryside through the institutions of *mita* and *encomienda* was the basis of the colonial society in Latin America until the seventeenth century³⁵. The compulsory payment of tribute by the indigenes, a feature of the *encomienda*, was abolished between the end of the seventeenth century and beginning of the eighteenth century. The servile *inquilinaje*, unfree by customary and legal contract with the landowner and 'free labour' or seasonal *peonaje*, were the main ways in which labour was organised in the *hacienda*. Thus, the *hacienda* contained *inquilinaje* and *peonaje* as its main social relations with the latter representing the emergence of formally waged labour in the eighteenth century, forming the material basis of colonial life.

The transition from the *encomienda* to the *hacienda*, involved forms of land rent called in general *arrendamientos*. These differed from 'free' tenancy (*préstamo*) in which occupants paid no rent for worthless land (Góngora, 1971: 92). For security from attack, this form of tenure was

³⁵Although in the Chilean colony the *encomienda* was officially abolished in 1789 by the governor Ambrosio O'Higgins, this institution had, in fact, radically declined as an institution in the seventeenth century. At the time the *encomienda* was abolished, there were only three *encomenderos* in the Chilean colony (Encina and Castedo, 1982: 389). It is interesting to note also that most of these eighteenth century's few remaining *encomenderos* and other emerging *terratenientes*, were not descendant of sixteenth century's first conquerors. The merchants *Vascos* (Basques), who did not participate in the conquest, came in the seventeenth century and displaced the old aristocracy first, from the commerce and later, from the land. A survey carried out by the Jesuit Olivares in the middle of the eighteenth century, showed that among the 250 noble families of Santiago (who were also the land owners), eleven were descendant of the sixteenth century's conquerors. Thus, many *Vascos* were *encomenderos* but not conquerors during the seventeenth century (Encina and Castedo, 1982: 376-377).

mainly located at the limits of the *haciendas*. In the *arrendamientos*, the dwellers became tenants of the landlord paying first in kind but later in money. In this way a rental market was constituted (Góngora, 1971: 93) which led to an increase in the settlement of rural workers who became, in the eighteenth century, the *inquilinaje* comprising of impoverished *mestizos* and Spaniards (Godoy, 1971: 67)³⁶. But although land had become commodified, labour remained predominantly unfree in the *haciendas* during the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Apart from practices of slavery, relations of production were predominantly feudal in the countryside and this was the main characteristic of *inquilinaje* during the colonial period.

The *hacienda* cannot be understood apart from *inquilinaje* and *peonaje* which literally construct it and they cannot be explained apart from the forms of ownership of land which existed through the period of conquest and colonial settlement. *Peones* were landless male workers in temporary employment, indigenes who were brutally exploited, badly paid in kind and seldom in money. As Marx (1967) argued, *peonaje* was a payment in advance for the future *peon's* work which in fact constituted one of the most cruel and efficient ways to obtain a great margin of surplus value from workers.

³⁶Also led to the formation of other rural tenancies and minor properties which were not less important

However, indigenes were not the only ones who were subjugated. With the advent of the seventeenth century, the constraints caused by the Spanish monopoly over its colonies, the costs of the war and the shortage of indigenous labour impoverished a large number, mostly *mestizos*, though some Spaniards were in the same condition (Góngora, 1971: 99). These poor *mestizos* and Spaniards were descendants of the servants of conquerors and *encomenderos*; immigrants who had been poor in Spain and arrived late in the conquest period; ex-soldiers who had slowly incorporated themselves into rural life. Poor Spaniards and *mestizos* occupied some indigenous land as smallholders, but mainly dwelt within the *haciendas* (Góngora, 1971: 99) or became *peones* travelling through the countryside to get work in the *haciendas*. Others who were poor relatives, *bastardos* (bastards) of the *terratenientes*, resided in borrowed land, the '*préstamos*' (Salazar, 1985: 41).

Those who had rented pieces of lands within the *haciendas* together with the employees and servants of the estate, became *inquilinos/as* with the onset of an expansive economic phase based on wheat production at the end of the seventeenth century (Salazar, 1985: 41). The *haciendas'* production of wheat eclipsed peasant production and rapidly resulted in their subordination as *inquilinos/as*. From 1760 onwards, the big merchant-*terratenientes* increased their pressure on the *arrendatarios*.

The rise in the price of land caused rents to rise while at the same time as merchants, they paid lower prices for wheat independently produced; and as moneylenders, they tripled the interest rates while continuing as the states tax collectors. If the tenants ended in bankruptcy, they demanded payment with compulsory *peonal* labour (Salazar, 1985: 42). According to Salazar (1985: 42), the apparently horizontal relationship between the *terratenientes* and *inquilinos* became a tense, repressive and vertical relationship. The partner had become a *patrón*, whose lack of trust in the *inquilinos* (Salazar, 1985: 42) was evident in their dispersal within the *haciendas* far from the *patronal* house. By 1860, as will see in Chapter Eight, the expulsion of *inquilinos* from the *haciendas* was institutionalised with *patrones* burning down their poor homes (Salazar, 1985: 42).

With *inquilinaje*, seigniorial relations of production had emerged in which feudal and incipient capitalist characteristics can be observed. This is a good example of how uneven the articulation process is, with elements coming from feudalism in Spain, subject at that time to deep changes, and other elements from an emerging private ownership in America. Unlike Spain and its Absolutist State, the change in social relations was more dynamic in the periphery, actively assisted by the colonial state which took a leading part in the process of class

formation, initially by granting land to individual owners and later by commodifying it.

Subsequently, an agrarian aristocracy began to rule the countryside and the cities. The term 'tenant' lost its meaning as a person renting a small piece of land and the institution of *inquilinaje* became the predominant social relation for those who did not own land. The development of the *inquilinaje* out of the *arrendamientos* resulted from the new commodification of the land and older feudal forms of labour combining to create the *hacienda* in which aristocratic landowners ruled over poor Spaniards and *mestizos* rendered vulnerable by their landlessness. Thus, the formation of the great properties known as *haciendas* was crucial and a result of the articulation of the *encomienda* with the indigenous modes in Latin America from the 16th to the first half of the 17th centuries when feudalism settled in the Chilean colony (Carmagnani, 1976: 18). Henceforth, the *hacienda* was the matrix of class formation in the agrarian economy and the social and political life of the whole territory.

Inchoate Class Action and Social Banditry

From the first days of the conquest not all conquerors were *encomenderos* and still less were all migrants landowners. In 1575, in the Bishopric of Santiago, 14 percent of colonists were *encomenderos*

(84 out of 515 colonists) and in *Nueva Imperial*, in the south, 21 percent were *encomenderos* (275 out of 1,040 Spanish settlers) (Salazar, 1985: 26). Early in the seventeenth century, twenty five percent of the *patrones* of Santiago were *encomenderos*. The phenomenon could be also seen from the angle of indigenes labour (*encomendados*). In the first quarter of the seventeenth century in Santiago, 37 percent of indigenes were *encomendados* (2,014 *encomendados* out of 5,514 indigenes) who constituted twenty percent of the total labour force in the colony, but there were about 3,000 African slaves and an unknown number of *mestizos* and poor Spaniards working for the colonists as well. (Salazar, 1985: 26).

Producing a rural work force proved problematic for the Spanish colonists. Disease, warfare and *Mapuche* resistance diminished the supply of indigenous labour. However, the *encomenderos* were tied to the use of the indigenous labour which accompanied their grant of land. Poor colonists and *mestizaje*, were growing outside the colonial labour system, as an increasing colonial reserve of workers at that time called *vagamundos* and later, *vagabundos* (vagabonds) (Salazar, 1985: 26). They were discriminated against by colonial authorities, were excluded from becoming public servants, police officers, or from living in indigenous villages without especial Royal permission. Poor Spaniards and *mestizos* were destined to be workers in urban workshops, poor

peasant farmers renting land, miserable wage earners in the *haciendas* or to become vagabonds (Salazar, 1985: 27).

But the working conditions in the *haciendas* were inhuman. Many indigenes, poor Spaniards and *mestizos* escaped from them and from the frontier towards the Andes Mountains and the land of the *Mapuche*, whose territory reached what is now Argentina. As for soldiers' desertions the discipline and rigour of the frontier army recruited from the Chilean and Peruvian *mestizo* population (Gongora, 1971: 75), led the soldiers to envy the free life of the *Mapuche* people. Later in the seventeenth century, only Spaniards were recruited in an attempt to avoid more desertions. *Castas*³⁷ were absolutely excluded from the army (Salazar, 1985: 27). Poor people were defined as potential delinquents and thus in 1663, no one of low social condition was allowed to own weapons (Salazar, 1985: 27). According to the Spanish-born and later Creole rural aristocracy and colonial authorities, their lack of social honour identified them as *vagos* [loafers] (Góngora, 1971: 75). They were socially excluded, deprived of the possibility of social mobility or promotion. In fact, even to be part of the *bajo pueblo* (low people) constituted an offence. A growing mass of poor, unskilled and unemployed people spread through out the rural areas and cities of the territory. Santiago's poor colonists and *castas* numbered 17,000 in

³⁷ *Mestizos, mulatos and zambos.*

1570, three times the number of Spaniards and Creoles to whom citizenship was granted. In 1620, the former outnumbered the latter five times (Salazar, 1985: 28).

One of the most recurrent and common excuses for the segregation and social exclusion of poor Spaniards and *mestizos* was laziness (Góngora, 1971: 73). But what in fact motivated this social behaviour were the colonial social constraints. *Vagabundaje* was attractive to *Mestizos*, *mulatos* and *zambos*, the *castas*, because of the status already given to them by Spaniards and Creoles and because of the working conditions in the rural properties, particularly, in the *haciendas*. The rural labour market did not improve for them with economic growth for *patrones* did not wish to employ vagabonds and when skilled labour was needed for the growing export of manufactured products to the Vice Kingdom of Perú - *terratenientes* preferred to train indigenes and Africans, seen by them as more easily exploitable (Salazar, 1985: 29-30).

The *vagabundos* turned to horse and cattle theft, raiding the *haciendas* and trading the animals they stole, seeking refuge in the dangerous parts of the mountains. This illegal activity as well as a means of subsistence, was an expression of rebellion against the colonial order and a challenge to the *encomenderos*' - and later the *terratenientes*' - authority, and a recognition of the opposite interests of the landlords, a 'class instinct',

though not perhaps a class consciousness. The vagabonds lost their families or never had them. Many were illegitimate sons, abandoned by their parents who were called *huachos* (Salazar, 1990: 67). Late into the colonial period, the *peones* the impoverished workers of the *haciendas* who later would be called *roto*, the generic term for all poor people in Chile were also seen as vagabonds. If their behaviour drove them against the social order, it also reflected an inchoate class hatred expressed with passion and bravery. The Chilean *vagabundo* was first of all a rider, for without a horse he saw himself, and was seen as a beggar. Despite the existence of several laws banning indigenes and *mestizos* from riding horses, *vagabundaje* continued to be a major problem for landowners and a significant component of the process of class formation in Chile. Late into the eighteenth century, when migration to Santiago and the mines in the north was very common, vagabondage remained, continuing until the end of the nineteenth century.

Patriarchy, Religion and Racism

Rooted as it was in the extended family, the authority exercised by the *terrateniente* had a marked patriarchal character. Authority and fidelity, protection and charity, mixed with arbitrary violence were characteristic of this authoritarian patriarchy which extended from his oldest son to the least of his *peones* (Medina Echavarría, 1971: 104).

The *señorial* character of the *encomendero* was transmitted to the *hacienda*, his power further entrenched, expanded and formalised when he was made a judge by the colonial government, now able to arrest and sentence *vagabundos* who threatened his authority and the peace of the countryside. It is mistaken to consider the system of *hacienda* as totally feudal but it in fact was, to a great extent, feudal, its character defined by the predominance of its main servile social relation, *inquilinaje*. Also its *señorial* character became undeniable from the point of view of the type of authority that dominated in the *hacienda*. Elements of past monarchical authority were present in the landlord, 'El señor' (the lord) of the *hacienda*. Renowned for his religiosity, *machismo* and authoritarianism he was a copy of the Spanish *señor feudal* (Medina Echavarría, 1971: 106) and was known as *patrón*³⁸.

A ruling conception of masculinity (*machista*) was to a great extent constructed and reproduced in the *hacienda*. The institution of *mayorazgos* represented the principle of authority in which the male, especially the oldest male, enjoyed all the privileges, fortune and the main inheritance of his father. Gender discrimination was institutionalized in the colony and one of its expressions was the *Real Pragmática* of 1776, enacted by the King Carlos III of Spain. This was a Royal mandate on marriage by which people younger than 25 years

³⁸The title remains popular to this day still used by *inquilinos* and *peones* to address their landlord.

old were forbidden to get married without the consent of their father or only in his absence, of their mother (Vial Correa, 1971: 82).

The subordination of aristocratic women tied to their mansions and subjugated by their lord, reproduced the medieval practices of Spain outlined in Chapter Three. As well, the *señor* used to sexually abuse *inquilinas* and illegitimate sons were a frequent reality in the *haciendas* (Salazar, 1990: 56) as some landlords' wills evidence (Godoy, 1971: 68). Despite being militantly Catholic in public, the landlord's adulterous practices were not considered a sin by him, and his wife had to accept this behaviour (Santa Cruz, 1978: 65).

Aristocratic women spent part of their time in their town houses, in which they carried out an intense social life, mainly in *tertulias* (gathering of friends) and in church activities, devotion to which did not prevent them from displaying expensive jewels and clothes (Santa Cruz, 1978: 66). Although these women had access to Catholic education in their childhood, it was of a very limited sort and marriage was their real vocation and almost only destiny, many marrying at eight years old (Santa Cruz, 1978: 63). Their one hope was that their choice might coincide with their parents' preference for a rich and Spanish-born man, recently arrived from the Metropolis (Santa Cruz, 1978: 63),

otherwise, they had to subordinate their feelings lifelong to their parents choice, a contract between fathers.

Impoverishment would sometimes be the price of independence. Santa Cruz (1978: 65) comments that in urban areas, white craftswomen, baked bread and cakes for sale. These women were more independent than aristocratic women and they managed their own commercial activities as did craftswomen in feudal Spain (as seen in Chapter Two).

Inquilinas suffered discrimination as well as exploitation. Most of them were very closely linked to the *Patronal* house in providing personal services, attending their *patronas* in their social activities and in performing domestic work. Some became the confidantes of their *patronas* as did some *inquilinos* to their *patrones*, but hard work and long hours in the *hacienda* in diverse tasks such as cooking, gardening, milking, cheese, butter and tallow making sheepshearing, wool spinning and mothering, characterised the duties of the *inquilinas* (Santa Cruz, 1978: 66). Experiencing this double exploitation and discrimination, they suffered most when they were pregnant to the *patrón* or to a *peon*. Extremely poor, sexually abused, abandoned by the landlord or by their

partners who were usually seasonal workers, these women, most of the time, also abandoned their own children³⁹.

The deeply gendered and patriarchal division of labour in the *hacienda* based on the ownership of the land and the control of the lives of those who lived on it, was reaffirmed and blessed by the Catholic Church. The *patrón*, the Christian '*pater* ', the patriarch, protector and punisher, was in overall control, fusing authority, power and sexual dominance in his own identity, insisting on obedience, respect, true dependency and subordination from the women, especially from the *inquilinas*.

Patriarchalism was consistent with and was maintained, reinforced and projected on to the whole colonial by the Catholic Church. Catholicism exercised an enormous influence on peoples' lives in the *hacienda* which consolidated the 'spiritual hegemony' of Catholicism in Chile. The *hacienda* was thus a fundamental instrument for the socialisation of Catholicism, a 'natural' place of evangelization in which religion and patriarchy reproduced and supported each other. According to Cousiño (cited in Larraín, 1996: 188), the *hacienda* - along with the army - was one of the key 'social sites' in which religion became a central agent for the formation of Chilean identity (see Chapter Twelve). Indigenes,

³⁹ Some mothers left them on the door step of a noble household; others took them to an orphanage, or gave them away or sold them. A few killed them (Salazar, 1990: 64).

mestizos, poor Spaniards were either blessed, punished or protected by the Virgin Mary, whose female sacred image replaced an indigenous religious syncretism with multiple male Gods (of northern and central indigenous people), named according to the local popular traditions and rituals (Montecino, 1996: 59). For the Catholic Church, aristocratic ladies must represent their Immaculate Virgin on earth, whereas women workers dirtied her name. The virgin was the carer of motherless *peones*, *inquilinos* and vagabonds. God in the *hacienda* was incarnated in the *patrón*, called lord by his workers, reproducing in this way the Middle Ages' dominant asymmetrical dichotomies male/female, soul/body in which lords were like God, (Walker Bynum, 1991: 177-178). The *patrón* had the power of life and death over the men working for him and the *hacienda* was not unlike a military institution (Feder, 1975: 85) and in fact, the Chilean army would later be formed mainly from the *haciendas* (Ramirez Necochea, 1984: 11).

The *hacienda* also reproduced the class basis of ethnicity. By the end of the 18th century, a radical class division was noticeable. Social mobility did not exist and from their inception, classes were as hermetic compartment, sealed from one another by what Vial Correa (1971: 82) calls "social prejudices", a euphemism for racism. Although racist practice is commonly regarded as a modern phenomenon, its roots came from the Spanish feudal society. The centuries of war of reconquest in

Spain against the Moorish invaders profoundly marked the Spanish. This was seen as a war between Christianity and Islam, the pagan 'other' was for the invaders, most of whom had been soldiers in the Islamic War or were their sons, Africans and indigenes, the savage and uncivilised *indio*, represented the 'other' in America. The class formation process reproduced the racist practices brought from Spain in America during colonisation. So, mainly through religion, racism actively participated in class formation, Spanish rule in America led to the institutionalisation of racism by discriminating against all those who did not profess Catholicism or rejected evangelisation. Phenotypical features facilitated the identification of those who must be socially excluded for their religious beliefs, locating their position in this class society in formation. Thus, together with patriarchy, racism has been part of the class formation process in Chile contributing particularly to its specificity, ferocity and tenacity.

Chapter Six

Transformations in the *Mapuche* Mode of Production

The reduction of *Mapuche* population, especially the killing of its men, and the diverse forms of social, economic and political contact with the Spaniards, deeply transformed *Mapuchemapu*. A new social division of labour in the *Mapuche*'s production of material and spiritual life, very different to the existing form of communality, emerged over 200 years. In its concentration of the control of land and in the accumulation of wealth, the new social relation of production resembled elements of the *Señorial* system dominant in the colony. The sharp patriarchal character of *Mapuchemapu*, facilitated by the practice of polygamy, was accentuated by colonisation. Although patriarchy characterised both societies in the 17th and 18th centuries, polygamy distinguished one from the other and it was central to this new production relation and the reproduction of patriarchy itself in *Araucanía*. These changes in production and gender relations contributed to the transformation of the political structure of *Mapuchemapu* which became, by the end of the 18th century, centralised into hereditary leaderships. But unlike the indigenes controlled by the colonial state, *Mapuchemapu* still retained its political independence and the people maintained their ancient

religious traditions in spite of attempts by the colonial state and missionaries to capture their souls.

Accumulating Wealth: Warfare, *Parlamentos* and the Shift to Cattle Raising

Although *Mapuchemapu* remained politically independent (as seen in Chapter Four), the invasion changed its production and social relations in several aspects. One of the key effects of colonisation and constant warfare was the transformation of the hunting and gathering mode, that characterised the pre-conquest *Mapuche* social formation, to an agricultural-cattle raising one with a new division of labour, growing mercantile relations and new relations of power and subordination. *Mapuche loncos* on the one hand, and *mocetones* or *conas* on the other, represented social classes in formation in the 18th century, the latter subordinating the former (Bengoa, 1996: 59). The last fifty years of the eighteenth century in particular saw the acceleration of these transformations.

The peace treaty in 1641 known as '*Parlamento de Quilin*' had established the Bio-Bio river between the Chilean colony and *Mapuche* territory as the official frontier between the 'two nations', formally acknowledging *Mapuche* independence after ninety one years of warfare. Subsequent *Parlamentos* were based on this agreement but the

war continued. Until 1641, the War of *Arauco* had been a conventional war of conquest between two armies, the invaders and the *Mapuche*. The horse was one of the *Mapuche*'s most useful acquisitions from the European invaders (Jara, 1987: 52), for military as well as economic purposes. *Mapuche* victory led by the great warrior *Pelantaro* at the battle of *Curalaba*⁴⁰ in 1598 (Vial, 1996: 102), demonstrated that they had mastered the use of horses and marked an important change in the campaign of conquest, in the way the war was carried out and was a great step in the process of legitimisation of *Mapuche* political independence. Simultaneously and as a consequence of the result of this battle, *Encomenderos*, threatened by *Mapuche* military superiority, sought help from Spain for many of Spaniards who had come to America during the first century of conquest and colonisation were not professional soldiers. The conquerors and their troops were a hybrid between private entrepreneurs-conquerors that became *encomenderos*, and the rest were soldiers and poor Spaniards looking for fortune (Todorov cited in Larraín, 1996: 131). After *Curalaba* and the *encomenderos*' petition, the Spanish army in the Chilean colony became professionalised and financed by the Royal Authorities. So, by *Cédula Real* dated 21 March of 1600, the Monarch agreed to assist the *Capitanía General de Chile* with financial resources from the Viceroyalty of Perú (Jara, 1987: 129).

⁴⁰ This battle was part of a general *Mapuche* insurrection that finished with the destruction of *Osorno* by

But in the late 17th and especially in the 18th centuries, the war became a *guerrilla*, a “*malón*” (León Solís, 1990: 18) which Spaniards found very difficult to win. For military and importantly, for economic reasons, they decided that a new peace agreement was necessary. In 1793 in the *Parlamento de Negrete*, *Mapuche* political independence was consolidated and definitively acknowledged by the Spanish Crown (Bengoa, 1996: 34-35). The frontier became the scene of active commercial exchange, bringing a more fluid contact between these two modes of production resulting in multiple and reciprocal influences between *Mapuche* and the colonists.

Meanwhile, *Mapuche* who had consolidated their supremacy in the south, turned to horse, cattle and sheep raising such that they came to have more horses than the Spanish army (Bengoa, 1996: 45). Raising cattle for the market constituted the *Mapuche's* main economic activity though subsistence production continued along with it such that at the advent of the nineteenth century, “the hunter and gatherer was replaced by the cowboy”(Bengoa, 1996: 41). The successful defence of *Mapuchemapu* meant peace and *Mapuche* transformed aspects of their customs and consolidated - through growing cattle raising and mercantile activities - a great territory crossing the Andes Mountains,

the *Mapuche* army in 1604 (Vial, 1996: 102).

from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean, reaching what is now Buenos Aires, in Argentina.

The search for pasture and cattle for commercial ends, led *Mapuche* and *Pehuenche*, a highlands indigenous people, to fuse (Bengoa, 1996: 45), made possible not only by the political alliances established between them through marriage, but by a migratory flux from the *Araucanía* to the *pampas* caused by the permanent threat of invasion from the colony during the 16th century (León Solís, 1990: 21). By the end of the eighteenth century, other indigenous peoples on both sides of the Andes had joined the *Mapuche*, who territorially constituted one of the largest ever political entities in Latin America (Bengoa, 1996: 45).

However, victories in the war, successful *Parlamentos* and territorial expansion did not mean *Mapuche* could remain as they were before the invasion. By the 18th century, warfare and disease had wiped out eighty percent of the pre-invasion population of one million on the Chilean side of the Andes. The lesser population density aided settlement and to political consolidation. Some *loncos* began to extend their power in the lof through polygamy and the exchange of the new wealth in cattle for women. As a result of the cattle raising activity and exogamous marriage, commerce grew while the *Mapuche* settled in *Araucanía*

where *loncos* controlled greater areas of land because of their patriarchal authority over familial labour.

Settlement required a different type of military defence and *Mapuche* continued to represent a challenge to the Imperial power. Together with the changes in the way they produced and reproduced their material life, their independence as a people allowed them preserve their freedom. The inhabitants of the *Mapuchemapu* did not pay tribute to the Crown, nor did they serve in *encomiendas* or *mitas* and nor were they subjected to any form of legal coercion. They maintained in the 18th century their pre-invasion political structure though *loncos* began to tighten their control over *lofs* and over larger acreages. They continued too their cultural and religious patterns maintaining polygamy and paganism while indigenous and Spanish fugitives, merchants and criminals from across the Bio-Bio River, began to penetrate *Araucanía* (León Solis, 1990: 19).

Warfare, Commerce, Religion and *Mapuche* Political Power

Commercial activity was the main consequence of the cattle raising and vice-versa. Sheep farming, characteristic of the previous subsistence economy, was rapidly replaced by effusive cattle farming, generating an intense frontier commerce with the Creole merchants of *Concepción*, *Valdivia*, *Mendoza* and *Buenos Aires* (Bengoa, 1996: 47; León Solis,

1990: 20). *Mapuche* mainly exchanged their animals for European-style products including alcohol, gunpowder, iron, silver, clothing and sugar. But the relations were not restricted to commerce but involved labour and political and military alliances too. This complex system of frontier relationships substantially re-oriented the indigenous mode of production with the formation of units of production oriented to the Spanish market and to the supply of products for periodic fairs or *conchavos* (León Solis, 1990: 20).

So extensive was this commercial relationship, that *Mapuche* leaders and the colonial state attempted to regulate it (Aranguiz and León, 1996: 194). At the *Parlamento de Negrete* of the 14 March 1793, the Governor Ambrosio O'Higgins and *Caciques* signed a treaty that "commerce between the two nations" would be subject to tariffs, except for gold and horses. This treaty was ratified in February 1797 by the King of Spain, thus reaffirming *Mapuche* independence and sovereignty already acknowledged in the previous *Parlamento de Quilin* in 1641 (Bengoa, 1996: 48). This recognition as an independent nation together with the regulation of trade which it allowed, permitted indigenous control over those Spaniards who came into *Mapuche* territory. Before the treaty, many swindlers frequently deceived and stole from the *Mapuche* people, causing anger and distrust (Bengoa, 1996: 48). However, in strictly commercial terms, the trade between the two

nations, benefited the Spaniards more than the indigenes. Spanish colonists got good horses, cattle, salt and woollen clothing while the *Mapuche* were developing their taste for wine and other varieties of alcohol.

The pre-invasion hunting and gathering mode changed to the cultivation of wheat, which was introduced during the first century of invasion, as well as tools such as the plough which, together with the digging stick, became the main tools of wheat agriculture (Bengoa, 1996: 57). From the end of the eighteenth century and especially during the nineteenth century, the growth of agriculture led to an increasing social differentiation of labour (Bengoa, 1996: 57). The work done before and soon after the Spanish invasion, was not marked by a division between producers and non-producers. But by the end of the eighteenth century, the practice of others preparing the soil, sowing the land and harvesting the produce of the *lonco* had begun. Apart from *loncos'* wives who served him, men and women *conas* or *moctones* worked for *loncos* who rewarded them with produce while the *lonco* rarely participated in physical work, generally assuming a managerial role (Faron, 1968: 48). Once the soil was prepared or the harvest had concluded, the workers returned to their own lands. With cattle raising, this asymmetrical relationships between *loncos* and *conas* deepened in the 19th century (Bengoa, 1996: 62).

One of the most important consequences of the battles with the Spanish army and trade relations with neighbouring colonists was the change in the political organisation of *Mapuche*. The pre-invasion *Mapuche lofs* or *rehues* constituted by independent polygamous family units, could not easily resist the Castilian military. From the sporadic *ayllarehues*, meetings of nine *rehues* that characterised military organisation before the invasion (Aylwin, 1997: f.n. 6), *Mapuche* came to have regular assemblies with permanent war commanders (*Toquis*) and new skills in politics and diplomacy were learnt (Bengoa, 1996: 63). Thus *Mapuche* society became more centralised, with a stable and complex leadership.

The permanent war situation eventually led to the creation of a central organisation called "*La Asamblea de Mil Quinientos*" (The Assembly of Fifteen Hundred *Loncos*) (Bengoa, 1996: 63) representing the same number of *lofs*. Members of the assembly had equal rights and rank and each represented about five hundred people. However, because of the size of this assembly, effective and regular decision making was problematic, so a smaller assembly emerged in which the *loncos* delegated again their responsibilities to the *Ayllarehues* which, by this mandate, became even more powerful than they were before (Bengoa, 1996: 63). By the middle of the 18th century, the regional organisations of *loncos* (*Butalmapus*) were an established political reality, especially in relationship to the Spaniards (Bengoa, 1996: 63). These assemblies

became formal political institutions and those repeatedly re-elected *loncos* became *ñidol-loncos*, key leaders among the rest of the *loncos* (Aylwin, 1997; f.n. 6; Bengoa, 1996: 63). This process of an increasing concentration of political power was linked to the process of accumulation of wealth. The *ñidol-loncos*, were the richest and the most powerful of the *Mapuche* controlling land and the labour of *conas* and possessing, as a personal right, women and cattle (Bengoa, 1996: 64).

But there were also new elements marking the productive process. The political control of the land, strongly consolidated through polygamy, had created a social hierarchy which was rapidly dividing *Mapuche*. Controlling land was possible by controlling labour. This in turn meant control of the products of the land such as crops and cattle which lead in turn to increased mercantile relations within *Araucanía* and beyond. Control of the land and its surplus had to be political (as it was, indeed, in Feudal Europe) since there was no landlessness and no-one was forced to work for anyone else by economic necessity. Politics was the key to class formation in *Mapuchemapu*. In this, as will be discussed further, polygamy had much to do. Through it, large territories were linked and controlled, together with the labour of men and women. Fundamentally, the political utilisation of traditional family ties and military alliances contributed to the supply of labour. However, a more

marked differentiation within *Araucanía* occurred in the nineteenth century, which created almost independent family federations⁴¹.

This process of centralization of power became clearer in the second half of the 1700s when there emerged about 100 distinguishable communities each with a *lonco* and among whom, fifteen or twenty *Ñido loncos* exercised decisive influence (Bengoa, 1996: 64). This process of centralisation tended towards *cacicazgo hereditario*⁴² (hereditary or inherited leadership), for what were democratically elected military authorities in the *cahuin* before the nineteenth century, became the formal confirmation of their male heirs during it (Bengoa, 1996: 65).

As has been seen so far, various simultaneous processes were occurring in *Mapuchemapu*. The impact of the invasion, centuries of warfare and the settlement of the Spanish colony close to their land, affected the production of material and spiritual life. A growing mercantile relationship between *Mapuche* and Spaniards, *Mapuche* and other peoples across the Andes Mountains and between *Mapuche* families

⁴¹The *Malón* or *Maloca*, appropriation or robbery of another community's animals (Bengoa, 1996: 61), is an example of these divisions. These robberies were a frequent practice and one of the 'side effects' of the transformations in *Mapuche's* economic, social and political life.

⁴² As will be seen in Chapter Twelve, these regional groups consolidated in the 19th century and two of them, *Arribanos* and *Abajinos*, were the dominant inherited *cacicazgos* in *Araucanía*.

themselves, constituted the first process. The second was the development of a more centralised political organisation because of the war. Together these led to the centralisation of productive resources and a deepening division of labour transforming community life. Despite the shortage of labour due to the war and disease, production had to satisfy not only consumption needs but also exchange relations. This crucial change in *Mapuche* production relations was even more evident in the nineteenth century (a subject of the Chapter Twelve), for money was not yet the key medium of exchange and the social relations of production were not totally capitalist. A combination of elements shaped the production relations, some from the ancient fraternal and community production system manifested in a sort of 'relation of assistance', a solidary relationship between *loncos* and *conas* in which *loncos* 'asked *conas* to participate in work'. However and in spite of family links to *loncos* and their active participation in the decision making processes in the *cahüines*, *conas* were, by the second half of the 1700s, subordinate to *loncos*, allowed to live in the territory politically controlled by *loncos* in return for labour performed. *Conas* were *caporales* (cowboys) looking after *lonco's* cattle, as well as farming, for women no longer worked the soil as in the past, though they did it if this was necessary. *Conas* became warriors when their *loncos* called them to war (Bengoa, 1996: 61). They were thus, the *loncos'* labour force and his accomplished soldiers as well.

Conas, then, were a subordinated class-in-formation in that they paid with labour and military service for the right to subsist on a piece of land within *loncos'* territory. In these ways *conas* were a kind of indigenous serf. However, they were not serfs in so far as at least were citizens of their nation and they participated in these productive relations voluntarily. That is, they were born free and could leave the land if they wished and they could oppose the *lonco's* leadership. Nor was there a religious mandate condemning them to serve their *loncos* for a lifetime, condemning them to be unfree from birth, as happened to serfs in Catholic Europe.

There were, then, clear tendencies of firstly, increasing concentration and control of the land and labour within more dominant mercantile relations and secondly, a major division between *Mapuche* communities and embryonic class divisions within communities themselves, as a result of the exercise of political power during the class formation process in *Araucanía*. Although there was not still a clear distinction between owners and non-owners of territorial resources (Bengoa, 1996: 61), *Mapuche* were experiencing, from the second half of the eighteenth and through the nineteenth century, an incipient agrarian social division of labour. The growing political control of land and labour exercised by *loncos* meant they controlled the means of

production, objects of labour such as land and trees and, means of labour, such as tools and animals. Also, *loncos* controlled and used the social surplus, especially cattle and horses and they organised the labour time of the social unit to produce regular surpluses. However, *loncos* were not the “owners” of productive resources in the capitalist sense of private property, in so far as the land was not a commodity and there was no “hidden” extraction of surplus value as happens in capitalist relations of production. Private property over land did not exist, and anyone could settle in a *lonco's* terrain if he allowed it, as usually happened. According to Bengoa (1996: 60), there was a more precise sense of property in cattle for they implied exchange and wealth and even more so in women, the main symbol of wealth among indigenes and the key element in the labour of social reproduction.

Mapuche were causing an accelerating transition from communality to the consolidation of private property based on cattle raising, leading to an increasing concentration of private wealth. Thus, *loncos* constituted a class-in-forma-tion in that they had, by the land and labour they controlled, a political and economic base through which they accumulated wealth and power, in cattle, women and land respectively. They were not direct producers but they controlled labour, production, administered resources and were the owners of the products they exchanged. *Loncos* extracted from *conas'* labour a visible surplus as in

feudalism and they were at the same time military leaders in time of war. In these features *loncos* resembled the Spanish feudal lords. However, *loncos* were not a class of feudal landlords in that they were not subjected to a superior political and monarchical power and labour in their lands was not unfree. The relations of production developed in this period of *Mapuche* history, did not match all the characteristics of serfdom, the predominant relation of production of the feudal mode of production. In addition, *loncos* were not a capitalist ruling class for there were not capitalist relations of production in their society although growing mercantile relations were becoming dominant and there was a tendency to consolidate land ownership and formalise a regular labour system. But definitely, a *lonco* and a feudal landlord looked more like each other than either resembled a capitalist landowner.

The developing hereditary leadership adapted the education of their sons to include new political aspects along with the older warrior tradition known as the *huerquén* ⁴³, a preferential system for the transmission of warrior power (*cacicazgo*) which developed a high level of rhetorical skill and a deep knowledge of their own family's and their allies families' histories (Bengoa, 1996: 65).

⁴³This system of training consisted in the exercise of the memory, meticulous attention to detail, precision in describing the features of objects and situations. Thus, the heir was trained as a messenger (the meaning of *huerquén*) to transmit messages without hesitation and accurately. In this way, the

This intense preparation of selected boys was seen by the colonists, especially by the Jesuits and other missionaries, as an opportunity to influence *Mapuche* leaders and diplomats, above all, after the failure of the *encomiendas* and missions in the task of evangelisation. The more vertical and central political structure was a new opportunity for the conquest of indigenous pagan souls, for if the leaders were converted to Catholicism, their people would follow. Jesuits, Franciscans⁴⁴ and other missionaries offered leading fathers a Christian education for their sons. Those *loncos* who accepted the offer, were honoured by the colonists and were given priority in their commercial activities. Through this education, *loncos'* sons learnt the Spanish language and the customs of “the enemy”, including the *señorial* social, political and economic values with their strong centralist and patriarchal content redolent of the monarchy and the Church (Bengoa, 1996: 64). However, this method of conversion was also unsuccessful in Christianising *Mapuche*. The educated sons, on returning to their lands, recovered their customs, embraced polygamy and forgot the Catholic religion.

Polygamy, Patriarchy and Power

The democratic character of the pre-invasion *Mapuche* society was disappearing, replaced by a centralised structure based on the

future *lonco* was prepared as a chief of peace, a 'diplomatic' leader who needed to be a good speaker, know people and to know the secrets of alliances (Bengoa, 1996: 66).

⁴⁴Franciscans founded the *Colegio de Chillan* (The College of *Chillan*) where they educated *loncos'* sons (Bengoa, 1996: 64).

accumulation of wealth by hereditary and patriarchal *loncos*. Women were the possession of men, particularly, of wealthy men and were crucial in the production and reproduction of indigenous life which long before the conquest, according to Latcham (cited in Vitale, 1993: 136) had a matriarchal orientation. A husband "resided in the bosom of the woman's clan" (Vitale, 1993: 136) and children adopted the filiation and totem of their mother, that is, descent had a matrilineal character for each woman who married, acquired a new element (the new husband) for the support and protection of her family group (Latcham cited in Vitale, 1993: 136).

But as shown in Chapter One, prior to the conquest, *Mapuchemapu* had become patriarchal. The effects of a permanent warfare and the male centralisation of power and the changes in the mode *Mapuche* produced, were factors that contributed to accentuate gender relations of *Mapuche*. Men took their wives to the villages of their fathers. In this way men, especially wealthy men from a rich lineage or heritage, became owners of the cultivated property, of the house in which they lived and the animals they could feed (Latcham cited in Vitale, 1993: 136; Santa Cruz, 1978: 21).

Women during their youth, depended on their fathers or, if he passed away, on their brothers or other male relatives. When they were

married, they depended on their husbands and were not entitled to inherit property; and if they became widows, they were dependent on their eldest son. *Mapuche* women became almost slaves to their men who utilised them as an exchangeable commodity in the time of the development of the cattle raising economy.

The *Admapu*, *Mapuche* code of ethics, conceived marriage as an economic contract that allowed men to have as many women as they are able to buy and maintain. The groom must pay the bride's father with cattle, sheep, horses, *chicha* (cider), food and clothes. Sometimes 12 to 13 year old girl were sold. Also, *Mapuche* men used to sell their daughters at the *bebederos* (fairs). So, according to Mariño de Lobera (cited in Santa Cruz, 1978: 21), the more daughters a man had, the richer he was. Some *Mapuche* men possessed between four and six, but the important *loncos* had between ten and twenty women, which increased their prestige and honour. *Mapuche* married women who were not directly related⁴⁵. By marrying women from other lineages, they extended their control of land and their political power by forming family alliances. The favourite form of polygamy was the sororal polygamy in which a man married several sisters. The poorer men must be happy with only one or two women for the bride wealth he had

⁴⁵ Wedding lasted three or four days and *Mapuche* drunk, ate and dance. The food was provided by the groom and his relatives and friends. The bride's family provided the cider. The parties were great opportunities for sex for single women and men (Santa Cruz, 1978: 31).

to pay was too high for him (Santa Cruz, 1978: 21). Celibacy was considered a tragedy.

But not all wives were valued equally by the polygamous men. There was a preferred wife, the first wife (*huindomu*). She was considered the 'real' wife of their husband by the secondary wives (*inamdomo*). The *huindomu* managed the domestic tasks and importantly, organised food production. Wives worked in agricultural production and in home duties, for powerful men were not producers (Santa Cruz, 1978: 22). Due to its character of economic contract, the marriage can easily be dissolved. The woman could abandon her husband and return to her parents' place. Her father had to return the dowry to the ex-husband's family. Nevertheless, the economic nature of marriage did not mean that there was no affection between *Mapuche* people. Men did not use to talk negatively of their wives and women were very attached to their husbands (Suarez de Figueroa cited in Santa Cruz, 1978: 27). The offspring took the name of the father as is the tradition in patriarchal and patrilineal lineage and wives were inherited by the husband's oldest son who however, could not inherit his own mother (Santa Cruz, 1978: 26).

As seen in Chapter One, Nuñez de Pineda y Bascuñan wrote that the life in a polygamous family was conflictive in the 17th century. Others think

that polygamy was practiced in harmony, one noting that the *lonco* decided at dinner time which wife would go with him to bed. The rest of wives slept in the same room as him but were not allowed to make love to him that night (Santa Cruz, 1978: 22).

Nevertheless if there was something positive for women it was the way they experienced their sexuality. Single women were entirely free in sexual matters. Virginity was not important and it was not required for marriage, nor was losing virginity reason to get married. All *Mapuche* polygamous practices and conceptions of sexuality were condemned by the Catholic Church during the colonial epoch, as did the Jesuit Olivares who criticised *Mapuche* parents for “they did not care about their daughters’ sexual virtue or virginity” (Olivares cited in Santa Cruz, 1978: 31).

But in spite of this aspect related to sexuality, patriarchy became a sharper power relation through a polygamous practice that was increasingly a patrimony of politically powerful and wealthy men. Patriarchy was clearly manifest in the processes of accumulation of wealth and centralisation of power in which women were relegated to inferior position, becoming a *loncos’* possession, a commodity. They were forced to work, without rights of possession or influence in the political decision-making processes, subordinated even to their own sons

(Latcham cited in Vitale, 1993: 137). Thus, women were totally excluded from property ownership though they worked in agriculture and at home:

loncos were the owners of everything and they did nothing; they did not provide anything for their family and were served with all they wanted in the house. When they woke up everything was in order and in this way they could enjoy life and think about war” for, as Gomez de Vidaurre commented (cited in Santa Cruz, 1978: 33), “they believed that since they were born warriors, they must be served as lords”.

Polygamy, in the context of the emergence and consolidation of a new *Mapuche* social division of labour, strengthened family links in the direction of patriarchy integral to the process of accumulation of wealth and the centralisation of power. During the colonial period, the processes of change from the articulation of modes, specifically, in the realm of gender, consolidated patriarchy by tying women to labour such as sowing and harvesting - but excluding them from cattle raising - and to domestic work, to duties such as spinning, weaving, cooking, washing, childcare and the preparation of liquor (see Latcham cited in Vitale, 1993: 137).

Thus a masculinity based on the crude exploitation of women was constructed which united the leaders and the lead. All *Mapuche* men shared the subordination of women through the ideal of polygamy whether they were educated leaders or workers, but only the wealthier practiced it. Both *loncos* and *conas* regarded women as objects, possessions in the rapid process of change in the social division of labour. However, polygamy could not be practiced by all men, at least, with the same intensity. Polygamy was not legally restricted to some privileged men but it was undeniable that the more cattle a man possessed, the more women he had. And inversely, the more daughters a man had, the richer he was. This in turn meant that the more women a man had the more land he controlled. Therefore, polygamy became a key institution in the process of accumulation of the wealth of the male leadership, allowing the control of large areas of land. In this sense polygamy was strongly attached to land, it was almost "the right" of *loncos* and it empowered them. The "new" and powerful polygamous family, part of a system of marriage alliances, facilitated the development of the great regions, the new political forms which accompanied the new social division of labour and the new hereditary and centralised power structure. This process of class and gender formation in *Mapuche* society, led to the formation of differentiated groups in *Araucanía* united only by war, in time, against the army of the new Republic of Chile.

Chapter Seven

The *Hacienda*, the Republican State and the Challenge to Patriarchy in the First half of the Nineteenth Century

By the first half of the 19th century, the *hacienda* was firmly established as the predominant form of property, and *inquilinaje* and *peonaje* as the key social relations within it. These distinctive relations were a result of a long process of articulation between the feudal and indigenous modes of production from which non-feudal relations such as *peonaje* developed out of the interaction of the colonised and colonisers. While Dobb (1975: 11) suggests that "systems are never in reality to be found in their pure form", nonetheless "each historical period is molded under the preponderating influence of a single, more or less homogeneous, economic form, and is to be characterised according to the nature of this predominant type of socio-economic condition". In Chile the *hacienda* and its social relations provided this "preponderating influence" but a simple insistence that the social formation was feudal or capitalist is misleading⁴⁶. If the social formation was neither or both, it is crucial to show how and understand why feudal relations co-existed with incipient capitalist social relations

⁴⁶Within this debate, A. Jara (1973; 1987) and Carmagnani (1976) argue that the social formation was fundamentally feudal with Carmagnani claiming that feudalism declined as the main relation of production in Chile only in the second decade of the twentieth century. Against them, Segall (1953), Jobet (1955), Vitale (1993) and Gunder Frank (1969; 1979) assert that capitalism arrived in America with

of production for such a long time. If a label is needed to characterise the period from late colonialism until the first half of the nineteenth century, the predominant social relations and values, make the word 'seigniorial' as "useful as any" (Bauer, 1975: 12). Nevertheless, during this time, deep changes occurred in the mode of production, a new form of relations between classes grew over three centuries "to proportions which enable it to place its imprint upon the whole of society and to exert a major influence in moulding the trend of development" (Dobb, 1975: 11). Because of the persistence of the old structure of the *hacienda* in agriculture from which the continued dominance of the old *señorial* class was possible, both the chronology of capitalist development and an analysis of its earliest characteristics are needed to understand this complex and fluid situation (Hilton, 1982: 153-154).

The predominant relations of production, the state of the productive forces and the process of class formation were deeply implicated in the consolidation of the institution of the *hacienda*, and the social relations of *inquilinaje*, *peonaje* and social banditry. Although serfdom, rent, surplus, surplus-value, capital and wage labour are central 'economic' aspects of this story, political processes were by no means less important, especially in setting the *tempo* (Hilton, 1982: 157) of the articulation of the seigniorial, indigenous and capitalist mode of

the Spanish conquest. Gunder Frank and Vitale did so in order to justify dependency theory which is their explanation of the development of capitalism in Latin America, in particular in Chile.

production and in framing the inter-relationships of the economic, gender and social moments in the changing social formation (Hilton, 1982: 53).

Ownership of the Land: the *Hacienda*, the Predominant Relation of Production

The consolidation of the *hacienda* as a mercantile and productive institution was a result of the concentration of the ownership of land and the predominance of servile relations and emerging capitalist labour relations within it. Characteristically this predominant production relation in the *hacienda*, contained two co-existing labour relations, the *inquilinaje* and *peonaje*.

Early in the nineteenth century, Chile was not as large territory as it is today but comprised in reality from *Copiapo* in the north to *Maule* in the South. There were some enclaves beyond the *Mapuchemapu*, such as *Concepción* and *Vadivia*, but they were almost totally isolated from the rest of the country. In fact, the population was concentrated only in what today are the *Norte Chico* and the *Zona Central*, close to Santiago, including the large rural properties on which the *hacienda* was consolidated (Bengoa, 1988: 100). Access to the south was, to some extent, impeded by the absence of roads, bridges and railways which, had to traverse chains of mountains and valleys split by rivers running east to west from the Andes Mountains to the sea. However, the most

serious obstacle were the bandits in *Maule* and *Chillan*, beyond whom was hostile and independent *Araucania*.

The ownership of agricultural land was highly concentrated by the last decade of the 18th century. In the district of Santiago, landholdings comprising 870,000 hectares with thirty five thousand inhabitants, belonged to only 172 individuals. In *Melipilla*, 776,000 hectares and more than nine thousands inhabitants belonged to 24 landowners. In other places of the central region, the ownership of land was even more concentrated, as in what today is called the Sixth Region. As the Jesuits had been expelled from the colony, Mateo Toro-Zambrano, 'Count of Conquest', a rich merchant who became president of the First National Junta Government in 1810, bought their *hacienda* "*La Compañía*" whose fifty square leagues⁴⁷ comprised almost the whole of that region (Haenke cited in Bengoa, 1988: 77). In 1854, this *hacienda's* yield was the largest in Chile. Early the nineteenth century, according to Bauer (1975: 18), "there were in the region between Aconcagua and Concepción some five hundred properties of over 1,000 hectares each, perhaps 125 of which contained well over 5,000 hectares each". Bernardo O'Higgins'⁴⁸ *hacienda* "*La Cantera* ", covered 36 thousand

⁴⁷ A league is equivalent to 5572 metres.

⁴⁸The hero of the Independence of Chile, commonly called "the father of the nation".

hectares and the former Jesuits' *hacienda* in *Longavi*, 80 thousand (Gay cited in Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 47). Three *terratenientes* Prado, Aguirre and Balmaceda owned all the land between Santiago and Valparaiso, a distance of more than 130 kilometres. To the Prado family alone, belonged half of that territory (Graham, 1968: 146). The historian Hernan Ramirez Necochea (1986: 47) estimated that by 1869, around seventy percent of all the cultivated land was owned by around 2,300 landowners. The remaining thirty percent was possessed by around 27,000 small and middle peasants⁴⁹.

But only some *haciendas* "yield[ed] a good income and others, outside the Santiago or export market areas, were virtually worthless regardless of their size" (Bauer, 1975: 19). Great areas of land were not used for production and, as will be seen, the development of the productive forces was precarious. The *hacienda* was ruled by an irresponsible, stubborn, patriarchal and classist *terrateniente*, full of anachronistic aristocratic prejudices, including an intense interest in exercising señorío over vast areas and extracting without significant costs and risks, most of the output of his *inquilinos*. The more extensive his properties and larger the number of people subjugated to his will, the bigger was his influence and the more powerful became his class (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 49).

⁴⁹Bauer (1975: 14) estimates that the total population of Chile was some 500,000 by the early nineteenth century. By 1861, it had grown to 1,500,000 (Atropos cited in Bengoa, 1988: 123).

Inquilinaje and Peonaje in the Republic of Chile

The concentration of land ownership, the virtual monopoly of agricultural land and production that *latifundia* meant, prevented the permanent settlement of peasants in and around the *haciendas* (Bengoa, 1988: 119). The monopoly of land ownership was also the cause of permanent migration, banditry and of a growing *peonaje*, for relations within the *hacienda* were not mere relations of 'presence', as argued by Morandé (1987) and Cousiño and Valenzuela (1994), but were relations of domination and submission.

Morandé (1987: 182) claims that while the *hacienda* in its outward orientation produced for exchange, converting its products into money, internally it did not purchase labour for wages. The *inquilinos*, he claims, worked on the land to have the right to live on it and their real payment was the *fiesta* (celebration), a ritual manifestation, the sum of their lives' meaning. For Morandé (1987: 183), labour was not a commodity, but a tribute retaining a sacrificial element derived from the indigenous economies⁵⁰.

In the same vein, Cousiño and Valenzuela (1994: 62) argue that the *hacienda* was not a structure of political domination, for in the "co-presence" of the landowner and the serf, the *patrón* was as scared of

⁵⁰ See also Cousiño 1990, Segunda Parte, Capítulo 1, pp. 136 - 137.

death and as tied to the land as the *inquilino*, while the *inquilino* was not bound to the *hacienda* through fear but by personal loyalty and fidelity in the *señorío* as a co-presence. In the *hacienda*, Cousiño et al. (1994: 65) add, festive consumption was part of a structure of sociability and was not a strategy of display and domination. For festive pleasure, the result of the wealth created in the *hacienda*, was not exclusive to the landowner whose generosity signified the real *señorío* (Cousiño et al., 1994: 65). Hence, the *hacienda* was not an expression of a dialectic of domination. Cousiño et al. (1994: 65) argue, finally, that it was the absence of the landowner from the *hacienda* which destroyed it. Without the co-presence of *patrón* and *inquilino*, the *hacienda* perished at the end of the century for the *terratenientes* move to the city broke the personal bonds of the *hacienda*.

Reality, however, was somewhat different. Big *haciendas* needed to maintain their labour force against a shortage of labour created by the Wars of Independence in the second decade of the last century. Landowners thus began to recruit again a permanent, settled and trustworthy labour force (Bengoa, 1988: 118)⁵¹. But the very concentration of the ownership of land produced an ‘uprooting’ of the

⁵¹Parallel to this process of settlement was the development of peasantisation, which had also taken place. However, this process would yield to the power of the *hacienda* (Bengoa, 1988: 111), as will be seen further in this chapter.

diverse groups of poor peasants, depriving the landowners of what they sought.

At the same time, the very dynamic of the *hacienda's* production rhythm required a reduced number of settled and permanent workers, *inquilinos*, for longer periods; and a larger number of temporary wage-labourers, *peones*, for shorter periods. The intermittence of labour was one of the defining features of the *hacienda*, and a 'good' *hacienda* possessed a stable number of *inquilinos* and a small population of peasants surrounding the *hacienda* who were engaged, as seasonal workers (Bengoa, 1988:119). The quality and security of their granted and rented plots were as precarious as the living conditions and rights of *inquilinos* within the *hacienda*. If *patrones* required a larger number of seasonal workers, *peones* were engaged although they did not trust strangers on their land.

Early in the nineteenth century, an average of twenty *inquilinos* families settled in a *hacienda*, while *peones* made up two or three times their number and were employed as seasonal labourers in periods of intense work (Bengoa, 1988: 81; Salazar, 1985: 47). By 1860, *inquilinos* numbered 15,000, and while they were not the majority of rural workers, they were highly concentrated and oppressed by the

predominant *patronal* authority, the *terratenientes* of the *hacienda* (Salazar, 1985: 45-47).

In the course of the eighteenth century, despite the progressive abolition of legal coercion, informal pressure on *inquilinos* by *terratenientes* continued. *Inquilinaje* thus, remained as a permanent and servile labour relation and the *inquilinos* were faced with expulsion or the intensification of their labour as agriculture shifted its focus from cattle to wheat (Bauer, 1975: 15). In 1838, some *inquilinos* subsisted on three pieces of bread, a pound of jerked beef, a few cents and cigarette papers per day, good conditions compared to some other *haciendas* (Gay cited in Bengoa, 1988: 122). But in most *haciendas*, *inquilinos* were not paid in money but in kind, and *inquilinaje* as such, continued to be a feudal feature persisting with emerging capitalist elements⁵².

The *señorial* character of the *terrateniente-inquilino* relationship decisively marked agriculture, even later than last century. In "the mid-twentieth century, attempts were still being made to require landowners to pay at least half of the service tenant's salary in money" (Bauer, 1975: 11). The relation between landowner and *inquilino* was one of the power and subordination, based on fear, obedience, respect

⁵²Salazar (1985: 45) sees *inquilinaje* as 'dysfunctional' to capitalist development in what seems to be a too functional explanation.

and submission derived from the contradiction between ownership and non-ownership. This was a relationship of dependency insofar as *inquilinos* depended absolutely on the *patrones'* will, not one of co-presence or shared spiritual bonding with the land.

Dangerous *Peonaje*

Peones, as shown in the previous chapter, were the temporary, seasonal wage workers in the *haciendas* and were seen by the landowners as non-trustworthy bludgers and dangerous thieves. Positive attributes such as strength, daring and the ability to be smart, completed the characterisation of the *peon* who came to be the prototype of the working class man, the *roto* (Bengoa, 1988: 142).

During the first half of the nineteenth century, there were two types of *peones*, the tied *peon* and the free *peon*. The tied *peones* were poor peasants, smallholders who rented or possessed a small piece of land in the areas surrounding the *hacienda* and worked in it during the busy seasons (Salazar, 1985: 41). Essentially *peones*, for they were not settled in the *hacienda* like *inquilinos* and were apparently paid in money, they were very dependent on the *hacienda* and were subject, together with their families, to the economic and political power of the *patrón* who, as explained in Chapter Five, exercised his power and influence beyond the limits of his *hacienda*.

Free *peones* or *gañanes*, wage labourers who travelled the country from the *haciendas* to the northern mines, were not attached to any particular *hacienda*, minor rural property or to any specific region, like the tied *peones*. Compared by Gay (cited in Bengoa, 1988: 24) with the Gypsies in Spain, free *peones* preferred a life of intermittent labour in which periods of intense work were interspersed with periods of leisure and celebration. They refused to be attached to a specific place and subordinated to a *patrón* for very long, and worked to get what they needed to continue their nomadic life. These workers were multiskilled and their occupations were various at least until technological change restricted the utility of their abilities.

Although tied and free *peones* should have - theoretically - been paid in money, this did not happen frequently. They were paid in kind, in food and clothing, rarely in coin (Bauer, 1975: 11). The increase in *peonaje* was caused by the productive development of the *haciendas*. Although the main activity of the majority of the *haciendas* was cattle raising (Bengoa, 1988: 78), grain production grew from the eighteenth century⁵³, and required more workers. However, landowners did not want more tenants so, *peonaje*, especially tied *peonaje* which the *terrateniente* preferred, tended to increase, but not the extremely low

⁵³Grain exports rose from 180,000 qqm. to 400,000 qqm., an increase of 222%, from the early to mid 1800s ("qqm" means metric quintal and one qqm is equivalent to 100 kilograms) (Bauer, 1975: 14).

wages paid (Bauer, 1975: 15). The usurious landowner cut costs still further and found labour in the *hacienda's* internal population, from *inquilinos'* families. Effectively,

as the market for agricultural produce - particularly wheat - grew, the land became more valuable and more hands were needed for cultivation. The landowners stepped up the amount of service required from the families that were allowed to settle on [their] land. Instead of occasional labour during roundup or slaughter, each 'renter' was required to supply an able bodied man to the [*hacienda*] all year round to help with plowing, planting or irrigation (Bauer, 1975: 15).

Considering the conditions in which *inquilinos* and *peones* worked in the *haciendas*, it is not strange that labour productivity was not high (Bauer, 1975: 160). *Inquilinos* were settled in the least productive parts of the property and were unsure about their permanency in the *hacienda*. They could not feel confident in a *patrón* who, for very unjustifiable reasons, could expel them and their families from his property on which they had served for decades, many generations in some cases. Expulsion could be caused by an *inquilino's* horse eating the landowner's alfalfa; or by the failure of an *inquilino* to capture some thieves; or for housing a vagabond without permission; or for

refusing to sell to his *patrón* his small harvest for lower than market prices (Dominguez cited in Bengoa, 1988: 131).

Thus, exploitative relations, uncertain tenure, extreme poverty and personal humiliation created a sense of alienation and rootlessness in many *inquilinos* and independent poor peasants, a feeling which was already present in the free *peones*, “the dissident contingent of the *hacienda* system”, who were never subjugated to the *terratenientes* like the *inquilinos* and most of the tied *peones* (Bengoa, 1988: 119).

As was shown in the previous chapter, the development of the *hacienda* led to the appropriation by the *terratenientes* of peasants’ farms, transforming some of them into *inquilinos* and increasing *inquilinaje*. Many other peasants became *peones* but both *inquilinaje* and *peonaje* were social relations which peasants did not choose to enter. *Inquilinos* lived and worked within the *hacienda* under a *señorial* regime, while *peones* had to sell their labour power for a miserable wage – most of time paid in kind - in a labour market dominated by the *hacienda* system. Thus, through *peonaje* nominal wage relations entered in the *hacienda* system in what, according to Kay (1980: 63), could be called “the process of internal proletarianisation”.

The proletarianisation of the peasantry in the first half of last century was transformative for a fundamentally rural society. As 'free wage labourers', *peones* expressed their rejection of oppression and exploitation, and their subsequent search for freedom, by emigration from the countryside; by social banditry; and by rural seasonal work unattached to a particular *hacienda*. If *peonaje* lacked established structures of communication and integration with the dominant world, as Salazar (1985: 120) asserts, it was precisely because *peones*, through their practices and attitudes, evidenced a new class in formation, a class whose interests contradicted the interests of the ruling class and the *hacienda* system as a whole. The very practices of the *peones* signalled the rise of a proletariat which in turn meant that capitalist relations were becoming ascendants within the *hacienda*, in an historical conjuncture marked by growing mercantile activity. However, this does not mean that the *hacienda* had become a capitalist institution but that *peonaje* was, despite the reluctance of the *terratenientes*, a form of wage relations and was eloquent evidence of a proletariat in formation.

Subsequently and as a consequence of the virtual monopoly of land ownership and the power exercised in and from the *haciendas*, *peones* became not only agrarian workers but miners and later industrial workers creating in this way, the urban and mining *peonaje*. Migration

itself was, simultaneously, cause and effect of a market based on and creating new labour relations and a new division of labour in contradiction to the predominant and servile *inquilinaje*. The way these different groups of rural workers, *inquilinos*, tied *peones* and free *peones* produced their means of subsistence, defined how they lived. The subordinated, oppressed and restricted lives of *inquilinos* (and to some extent, of tied *peones*), contrasted to the freer, more sensual, rebellious, nomadic and daring life of the free *peones*, but they were subordinate nonetheless for relationship between landowners and rural workers rested finally on the concentration of the ownership of land, the *señorial* character of the *hacienda*, a structural characteristic of Chilean rural society and a heritage of the personal relations between conqueror and conquered (Bauer, 1975: 11). There is no neutral 'presence' here. By the mid 19th century, the solidity and internal unity of the seigniorial mode of production, ensured its predominance over capitalist features that had already appeared in the agriculture, such as the commodification of land and the extraction of surplus-value.

The Rise and Fall of Social Banditry

In the *hacienda* the *inquilino* and *inquilina* developed their limited sociability, along with several other families living there, some with a long past in that property. After a hard days work, they would, after dinner, to tell stories by the fire about previous generations of

inquilinos and *patrones* and especially, about ghosts and the heroic deeds of the bandits. Some *inquilinos* admired, envied and desired the dangerous but free life of the bandits in the mountains. Few condemned them, for as Hobsbawm (1974: 15) argues, "[a] man becomes a bandit because he does something which is not regarded as criminal by his local conventions, but is so regarded by the state or the local rulers".

Almost all was denied to the people called *castas* and later, to poor Spaniards as well. They were excluded from citizenship, independent or private commerce, political participation and access to the social activities of the Spaniards and the white Creoles. All were seen as potentially criminal by the authorities. It would have been unlikely for social banditry not to have grown in the 19th century, and it centred in the south of the central region though there were also bandits in the district of *Melipilla*. From *Vichuquén*, *Curicó* and *Tenó*, the northern limit of *corregimiento del Maule*, to the *Bio-Bio* River, the southern limits of Chile with the *Araucanía*, bandits lived and even controlled great areas (Bengoa, 1988: 105). This was cattle country with access to the other side of the Andes mountains where *Chiquillanes*, *Pehuenches* and *Huilliches* lived (Bengoa, 1988: 105). A potentially powerful and independent movement of insurrection was encouraged by the *terratenientes*' arrogance, fruit of their territorial power.

The movement for political independence from Spain and then, the War of Independence, stirred all social sectors in the colony. In September 1810, a National *Junta* Government was formed, conceived as a demonstration of sovereignty by those who were against the Crown, the Independentists, triggering a violent confrontation between the Realists – the Spanish authorities in the colony - and Independentists. Poor people were excluded from civil society so, the battle for political independence was mainly amongst the ruling class with Spaniards and conservative Creole *terratenientes*, in power at that time, on one side, and *terratenientes* and the more liberal emergent bourgeois mine-owners and merchants, on the side of the Independentists. The dispossessed were not politically represented in this power struggle until civil war required the formation of an army (Ramirez Necochea, 1984: 12). Many joined, according to the tendency of their *terrateniente*, either the Realist Army or its opponent, *El Ejercito Libertador*, comprising both Chileans and Argentineans. That the rich needed the poor was now open and obvious.

Bandits, too, seized opportunities for booty and adventure acting as irregular forces or *guerrilla* for either side. The Pincheira gang, fought for the Realists, and the Neira gang fought for the Independentists. The Pincheira gang was large and dominated the mountains of the southern region. These bandits did not only attack *haciendas* but seized towns

and cities such as *Mendoza*, on the other side of the Andes, which was part of Chile (Bengoa, 1988: 108). José Miguel Neira and his gang supported the clandestine activities of Manuel Rodríguez, a popular Chilean hero and organiser of the *guerrilla* in support of the Libertador Army. Rodríguez took *Melipilla* and *San Fernando* with Neira's support, would not have succeed (Millas, n.d.: 36). In Hobsbawm's (1974: 13) terms, Neira was the "peasants' champion".

Once the independent Republic triumphed, in some zones in the south bandits continued to almost control entire regions but social banditry generally changed its character and from about 1835, demands for land increased, beginning a short period of the process known as *campesinización* which however, did not succeed in breaking the *terratenientes'* monopoly of the land⁵⁴. Although social banditry was a part of winning independence, its political character was not clear cut. Certainly the victims of bandits were the quintessential enemies of the poor (Hobsbawm, 1974: 22); but bandits were a rural not urban phenomenon and more importantly, were a product of rural property and production. There were rich and poor, powerful and weak, rulers and ruled, but Chile remained profoundly and tenaciously traditional, and predominantly pre-capitalist in its rural structure. Although bandits were the peasants' champions, who took from the rich to give to

⁵⁴On peasantisation, see Salazar 1985, *Capítulo 1*, pp.37 - 74.

the poor, they were unable to protect them against the authoritarian *patrón*. Bandits liberated themselves from the repressive world of the *hacienda* but they did not liberate their brothers and sisters. Although social banditry was a protest, it was a modest and unrevolutionary protest (Hobsbawm, 1974: 24) not against the fact that *inquilinos* and *peones* were poor and oppressed, but against the fact that they were excessively poor and oppressed. “Bandit-heroes did not think to make a world of equity. They could only right wrongs and prove that sometimes oppression can be turned upside down” (Hobsbawm, 1974: 24). Bandits recruited peasants to their bands to live free in the mountains but they never planned to subvert the general established order. They assaulted *haciendas* and interdicted the rural roads but they did not attempt to destroy the system of *hacienda* in order to give the land to those who worked on it, nor did they attack the centres of political power. During the Independence struggles, they acted under the influence of other politically aligned sectors. Towards mid-century, once grain production became more important than cattle raising and, in part as a result of it, a growing development of industrial and mercantile activities began and the social conditions for social banditry began to disappear.

Class and Patriarchy in the New Republic

Just before independence, around two hundred landholding families constituted a strong network, an alliance of aristocratic Creole families (Bauer, 1975: 18), faced the changes brought by growing the resistance to the Spanish Crown's monopoly by developing commerce and trade under the influence of the bourgeois revolutionary process in France and in the United States, these landowners, who had had a strong influence in the colonial regime, accepted political change enthusiastically, spurred on by some of the more liberal members of their class like Bernardo O'Higgins. In this way, they could maintain and enhance both their economic interests and their strong presence in the state for, as Marx and Engels pointed out only a few years later (1977: 168), "each class which is struggling for mastery . . . must first conquer for itself political power in order to represent its interest in turn as the general interest, which immediately it is forced to do"⁵⁵.

As Bauer (1975: 18) explains:

[A]s Spanish power disintegrated in the first decades of the nineteenth century, the cohesive and class-conscious Creole elite

⁵⁵Segall (1953: 16) suggests that independence had its roots in the mining sector (even that the whole of Chilean history can be seen as mining history). Chapter Nine will deal with the development of mining, but suffice it to say, the small smelter-mining sector of *Norte Chico*, was not an homogeneous force able to express itself politically. Neither mining nor industry could offer a stable basis for political organisation and the mines were in isolated areas, far from the capital (Bengoa, 1988: 85). In addition, with major *terratenientes* invested in the mining sector, mine owners and *terratenientes* were members of the same ruling class.

moved smoothly, compared with other former Spanish colonies, to control the machinery of republican government. The early-nineteenth-century elite shared a compact geographic region and common economic interest. There were squabbles within the elite, most notably between the Larraín and Carrera clans, but in Chile, more so than in the rest of Spanish America, there is strong social continuity that runs right through the Independence period.

The *hacienda* became well established in the 18th century, and in the 19th century, the *terratenientes* consolidated their mercantile interests and concentrated the ownership of land, the Creole *Mayorazgos* still maintaining an iron grip over the land (Bengoa, 1988: 84). The rural-urban characteristic of the *terrateniente*, his absenteeism from the *hacienda* (Feder, 1975: 88) and presence in the capital was accentuated in Chile. The landowner extended his influence to Santiago for there political power was physically situated. Apart from the *terratenientes*, the state was urban, for the *terratenientes* were the state in the countryside. The landowner was the military commander-*terrateniente*, the judge-*terrateniente* and the district's sub-delegate-*terrateniente* ⁵⁶ (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 52). This alternation

⁵⁶A good example of *terratenientes*' participation in independence and the concentration of powers is the case of the "maestre de Campo" Pedro José Maturana Guzmán who was the chief of *Colchagua's* Independentists, commissary of the militia, major, judge of lands and importantly, owner of the *hacienda* 'La Teja' (Bengoa, 1988: 86).

between the *hacienda* and the city allowed landowners to exercise economic and political power over the whole population and socially, the ties between the city and the countryside were often consolidated by marriage.

The patriarchal and class relationship between *patrones* and *inquilinos* was decisive for the formation of the Republic for it was the *hacienda* which linked the state, the ruling class and the 'popular classes' (Bengoa, 1988: 85) and provided an apparent social consensus which was the origin of Chilean nationalism. This ideological expression of class domination was materially based on the stability of the *hacienda* and its institutions that in turn maintained the stability of the state (Bengoa, 1988: 85). So, when Independentists fought for a stable Republican State, they both presupposed and augmented the stability of the *hacienda*, that is, the stability of the state was based on the preservation of the concentration of ownership of the land. In this way, the new Chilean State derived its authority from the *terratenientes* and reciprocally, it legitimated politically *terratenientes'* control of the land with the landowner exercising political, military and juridical functions at the local level (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 51; Heize González, 1973: 547) empowering him at the expense of the *inquilinos*, poor peasants, *peones* and especially of poor women.

The urban activities of landowners increased during the first two decades of the 19th century, marked by the struggles for political independence from Spain. While absenteeism was an obstacle to technological progress and improved farming (Feder, 1975: 87) because customary methods of farming were maintained insofar as managers were not allowed to introduce changes in the productive system, landlords' absence from their *haciendas* was, by no means always detrimental to their political and economic interests. The *haciendas* continued using pre-feudal ploughs, the irrigation systems were precarious and non-existent in many *haciendas*, except on some ex-Jesuit properties. Thus there was an 'intentional incapacity' according to Feder (1975: 88) to increase production and the non-utilisation of large extensions of land in *haciendas*. Ironically, this contributed to the transformation of the patriarchal *patrón* into an entrepreneur and a politician. Landowners were aware of their political role and learned to accommodate the perspectives of commerce and mining. The process of capital accumulation, initiated in the *hacienda*, extended to mining and commerce (see Chapter Nine). So, the earnings of the *haciendas* were invested in new forms of accumulation (Bengoa, 1988: 90). Landowners maintained their less than fully productive '*señorial* kingdoms' and simultaneously increased their participation in the state and in other economic sectors from which they realistically expected greater returns. In turn, landowners had little economic incentive to

improve farm management or their relations with the rural community when they derived substantial incomes by owning many *haciendas* and/or from non-agricultural sources (Feder, 1975: 89).

There were also merchants and mine owners who were not *terratenientes* and were strongly linked to the British capital⁵⁷, but as the century went on, these growing non-rural capitalist sectors formed a class alliance with the influential *terratenientes* who controlled the country (Bengoa 1988: 91). This unity of the ruling class was developed by and expressed in organisation. Effectively, the influence of agriculture in the state increased with the creation, in 1838, of the National Society of Agriculture (NSA), which gathered together key landowners and other powerful men. The Society had played the role of a Ministry of Agriculture in the last century, and as a kind of adviser organisation of government was financed by the state (Bengoa, 1988: 94). NSA's declared concerns according to its foundation document, were the backwardness of agriculture, the increasing depopulation of the countryside and the protection of the rural property from bandit attacks (Bengoa, 1988: 93).

Between 1838 and 1849, its membership numbered 398, only 37 percent of whom were active rural producers. The rest were members

⁵⁷"The fortunes of the Edwards, Lyon and Délano families, for example, all grew out of the Valparaíso trade" (Bauer, 1975: 87).

of their families, some retired from the countryside and directly involved in business, some were politicians and others were related to the embryonic banking system (Bengoa, 1988: 94), thus were the rural and urban sections of the ruling class strongly linked. A social division of labour emerged within *terratenientes'* families. Besides the *terrateniente* as such, other family members were politicians, lawyers, priests and officers of the army (Bengoa, 1988: 96). If the *hacienda* belonged to several brothers (*haciendas* were always owned by men), the one with the agricultural vocation ran the *hacienda*, the lawyer defended it in the city, the politician represent it in the state and the priest scared the peasants with the hell and encouraged the subjugation of women with visions of a post-mortem happiness, as they had been doing from the Middle Ages. But overall, the formal public organisation which played a pivotal role in articulating their collective interests was the NSA.

The NSA defined itself as apolitical, declaring that politics was incompatible with agriculture and that in the Society there was no place for political or religious discussion (Bengoa, 1988: 93). However, as Bengoa (1988), Bauer (1975) and Heise González (1973) show, this was rhetoric divorced from reality. The Presidents of the NSA were the more serious candidates for President of Chile. In fact after 1838 and until 1920, the Presidents of Chile were both *terratenientes* and

members of this Society. Bulnes was a landowner in the region of *La Frontera*, Montt in *Petorca*, Pérez in *Polpaico*, Balmaceda and German Riesco in *Melipilla*, Errazuriz in *Colchagua*, Barros Luco in *Linares* and Sanfuentes in *Camarico* (Heize González, 1973: 96).

The Constitution of the Republic of Chile, enacted in 1833 expressed Diego Portales' authoritarian conception of the state and excluded women and the illiterate people, eighty percent of population from the vote (Larraín, 1997: 4). This institutionalisation of class and gender inequalities, together with the concentration of ownership of the land, reinforced and expanded into the state itself the class and gender dynamics characteristic of the *hacienda*. The few rural workers who had the right of vote, had to vote for their *patrón* or for those he decided to support. The *hacienda La Compañía*, which covered almost the whole province of *Rancagua*, is a good example. Its owner, Juan de Dios Correa, was elected senator between 1846 and 1876, following in the footsteps of his brother. The votes from their properties ensured the election of the *terratenientes* and the control of this 'captive clientele' was sufficient to deliver control of Parliament. In the tenth session of Parliament (1852-1855), 14 out of 29 senators and 20 out of 54 deputies, that is, 48 percent and 37 percent of each houses were *terratenientes* (Bauer, 1975: 45). By 1850, Bauer adds, "the Correa, Errázuriz, Subercaseaux, Ossa, Larraín, Lazcano families together with

the 'sword of Penco' (i.e. the military families from Concepción), were firmly in control". According to Izquierdo (cited in Bengoa, 1988: 95), the membership of NSA for the periods from 1838 to 1900 numbered 1131, 20 percent of whom were members of parliament in which they were "the single most important group" (Bauer 1975: 45).

Apart from sacralising the power of the state in the marriage of interlocking families, from the chapels on the *haciendas* to the Cathedral in Santiago, the Church reinforced the continuity of the ruling class. As Bauer (1975: 28) points out "although the '*huaso* on his daring steed . . . the man of business and the modest *donzella* alike acknowledge the power of the priest', the Church, from the metropolitan cathedral to the rural *hacienda* was most closely identified with the upper class". In performing its tasks of education and health, the Church continued to reproduce class and gender inequalities and ignorance among poor people, while it subjugated and repressed women.

Landowners' class interests led them "unhesitatingly into an alliance with the commercial emissaries and investors of the new foreign metropolis [England] in order to increase their economic power" (Bauer, 1975:45). The Chilean ruling class which the *terratenientes* hegemonised was already a class in itself and for itself for it was a

"cohesive and class-conscious group whose vital centre was the large landholders . . . [it] stood ready to move into the new positions of Republican government" (Bauer, 1975: 45). In the process of class formation, this class plainly participated in and contributed to the formation of the Chilean State, marking it with its own characteristics inherited from the *hacienda*. The Chilean State became in this way a particular instrument of the dominant class, a patriarchal and authoritarian state which maintained a restricted conception of citizenship in spite of the influence of the democratic French tradition on some of its liberal members. The state facilitated the introduction of new forms of accumulation of capital and the unity of the ruling class.

Women Workers Challenge Patriarchy

The ownership of land, the *hacienda* and the Catholic heterosexual family bound class and gender formation. In the 19th century, the *hacienda*, *inquilinaje*, *peonaje* and the family manifested and sustained patriarchy, and yet working class women challenged the patriarchal state and Church and showed that it was possible to experience gender differently than in the form which served the interests of the ruling class. From its inception, the history of the working in Chile has been the history of women and men, and of their relations with each other. Consequently, the process of Chilean working class formation crucially involved women working in a variety of independent activities such as

textiles, crafts, sewing, dressmaking, washing, catering, boarding houses and prostitution in its formation, physiognomy and specificity.

Independent poor women - widows, single women or deserted wives created a social space for themselves and for male *peonaje*. Around women's productive activity in which were able to produce their means of subsistence, a grass-root popular culture, in the Gramscian (1971) sense, developed, which created social bonds with male *peonaje* and challenged the masculinity and femininity imposed and supported by the state and the Church, by most ruling class men and women and by sections of the subordinated popular classes such as the *inquilinaje* in the countryside and women domestic servants.

Mapuche insurrections in the second half of the 18th century and importantly, the Wars of Independence in the second decade of the nineteenth century, dramatically altered the sex ratio of the surviving population (Salazar, 1985: 257). In extreme contrast to the early days of colonisation (see Chapter Four), by 1813 in Valparaiso, women outnumbered men 2:1 in a population of 1,714 aged between 16 and 30 years old; 1.6:1 in Concepción in 1822, in a population of 6,543; 3.7:1 in a population of 70,000 people in 1823 in Santiago (Salazar, 1985: 270).

While more women survived the civil wars, kidnapping and rape were common. Such was the patriarchal temper of the times that Creole and Spanish men used to kidnap from the *Araucanía* women whom they called pejoratively '*Chinas*' (Chinese). By 1819 the situation of single women had deteriorated so badly that the authorities rhetorically condemned it, with no help for the women. In fact the enactment of the *Reglamento* of 1778 which established free trade between Spain and the *Américas* allowing the import of manufactures, negatively affected embryonic national industries and artisanal production (Ramirez Necochea, 1959: 40). Textile production had become one of the chief occupations of women smallholders and *inquilinas* in the countryside. In the cities and on the *haciendas*, women's crafts enjoyed great prestige, especially the work of dressmakers who "measured, cut and sewed clothes on clients without touching their bodies" (Lambert cited in Salazar, 1985: 261). But the imports of textiles undermined this incipient Chilean industry and artisan women were particularly affected by the non-payment of tax. Taxation officers would auction their holdings although they knew the women were alone, poor and desperate and the women travelled the rural roads with their children and their few belongings looking for a place to live and work, affected by misery and hunger, for food was not abundant for all social classes, as Teresa Pereira (1978: 82) suggests.

Smallholders' wives and widows demanded respect and a place to live and those women who did not possess a small piece of land like other independent women, demanded it from the state⁵⁸. In this way, many *ranchos* appeared on the edge of the rural roads and on the fringes of cities. These poor homes usually had a small vegetable garden and in this humble but independent household, they worked hard for their subsistence. They baked bread and prepared meals for *peones* and once they were established, sold alcoholic drinks to travellers, *peones* and to some small merchants.

Many of these independent women continued their crafts of spinning, weaving, sewing and took in washing for others in order to survive. Some became adept at commerce and their establishments became a meeting place for men and women workers. These began to develop as social spaces free from the prejudices of the clerical state and, for the first time since the Spanish conquest, a section of the Creole *mestizo* population experienced sexual freedom in relationships, marked not by subordination and servility but by equality, solidarity and love, independent of the Church (Salazar, 1985: 276). Women and men freely ate, drank and smoked together, something forbidden at that time. Even, the *machismo* that captivated rural male workers was neutralised in the social space created by these independent women. As

⁵⁸See Salazar (1985: 262) for examples of these women's demands, such as those of Ignacia Román, María Igoñes and Catalina Jerez.

Salazar (1985: 280) comments, female *peones* did not need to know too much about the guest *peones* who were their customers to trust them, house them or do business with them. The mutual acknowledgment of their class interests was sufficient to allow the friendly sharing of their lives and experiences. The folk or popular tradition of Chile, its grass-roots culture including Chilean food, music and crafts, was firmly founded on and based in egalitarian social spaces created by these independent women last century. The typical Chilean *ramada*, a kind of pergola under which Chileans celebrate their Independence each year, was invented by them (Salazar, 1985: 275).

The women were accused of prostitution, called *apostentadoras* (hostess) of bandits by the ruling class, prosecuted by the state and persecuted by the Church. "The ecclesiastical and local council authorities found that women's work and female subsistence commerce were morally reproachable, and were authorised to initiate against these women a taxation crackdown and a moral, juridical and police offensive" (Salazar, 1985: 281). Independent women were violently repressed, arrested, imprisoned and deported. More *huachos* (orphan children) went motherless and fatherless deprived of the so-called 'nucleus of society'. The cohesion of the working class family, fragile at best, was further undermined. The Catholic conception of the

primacy of the integrity of family unit was in fact, reserved for the family of only one class, the ruling class.

As shown above, many *peones* and poor peasants became bandits, or were recruited by the army during the Independence Wars, the civil wars and the wars against *Mapuche* or were arrested or killed in a world ruled by the *terratenientes*. Consequently, many women had to leave the *haciendas* and many of their children became *huachos* and *huachas peones* spread out throughout the country (Salazar, 1990). *Inquilinos* and *inquilinas* serving in *haciendas* and urban mansions, completed the picture of a socially excluded, repressed, hated working class in formation. The intense and happy moments women and men *peones* and poor peasants enjoyed in the social spaces created by independent women were not acceptable to a ruling class who denied everything to the poor. From 1820, women were deported for adultery and in 1836, the President of the Republic, the ex-*terrateniente* Joaquin Prieto, banned entertainment in *ramadas* on any day of the year (Salazar, 1985: 282).

As a result of the restriction of women's commercial activities and their prosecution for moral offences such as adultery, their independent activity declined and they were, by the middle of the 19th century, absorbed as workers, especially in domestic serfdom; or they subverted

it by taking up illegal prostitution; or they became unpaid workers serving their husbands according to the rules of the Church and the state. In 1823, it was decreed that women out doors after curfew must show a ticket from her mistress. This decree was further specified by the Intendant of *Concepción* who ordered that any woman without verifiable means of support would be deported to *Colcura* if she could not prove of that she served in an honourable house (Salazar, 1985: 286). Thus dependent female *peonaje* rapidly increased in the second half of last century (Salazar, 1985: 285), as will be seen in Chapter Ten.

Thus, the ideas of property and authority, so strongly rooted in the *terratenientes'* mentality, were translated into the state which together with its, by no means less authoritarian ally, the clergy, imposed through violent gender and class repression, the manner in which poor men and women must live, love, work and feel. Their rules carried the servile relation of *inquilinaje* into the urban domestic sphere in which poor women served their cosmopolitan and aristocratic ladies who were the sexual and decorative objects of their husbands, the owner of the *hacienda*, the military commander, the senator, the secret father of the servant's child.

It must have been quite a scene to see the structure of this patriarchal and classist world revealed at lunch with the *terrateniente's* family, as

Blest Gana had done. The scene would show a sunny Sunday after Mass, at lunch time in the garden, the servant girl bringing from the house a bottle of red wine from the *hacienda*, produced by the labour of her *inquilinos* father and brothers. The *patrón*, at the head the table, makes a toast, glad to have the whole family gathered together: his brother priest on the right, his brother lawyer on the left, his brother official on the other side of the table next to his merchant cousin visiting from Valparaiso. Set apart from them, are 'their' women, reclining under the sunshade, listening to a minuet played on the piano by the *terratenientes'* daughter, who recently returned from her holiday in France.

However, this idyll was soon disrupted by a new class dynamic emerging at the middle of the century in which the ruling class split and violent fractional confrontations occurred, a class conflict which would be more directly expressed towards the end of the century, period in which working women and men organised and conscious of their class emerged on the social scene.

CONCLUSION TO PART II

The *Hacienda* and the Landowning Class: Polygamy, Concentration and Centralisation in *Mapuchemapu*

Articulation at the Social Level, Class and Race Formation in the Chilean Colony

The private nature of the conquest deflected Absolutism's original intentions in the new colony. Imperial grants of stolen land and conquered people created the *encomienda*, which initially were confirmed by juridical processes and later by legal ownership. The commodification of land "denaturalised" the *encomienda* and led to the creation of the *latifundia* in Chile plainly consolidated by 1700 and represented by the *hacienda*, a social totality that was the centre of colonial life.

Although feudal and slave relations of production still existed in the Chilean *hacienda*, land had become commodified and wage relations were nominally introduced, for free seasonal *peones* were paid in kind, seldom in money. *Inquilinaje* was the servile social relation that characterised the *hacienda*. Born as a form of tenancy, *inquilinaje*, provided the permanent workers for the *hacienda* who with their labour in agricultural production and as servants of the patronal house,

paid rent for a plot of land from which they produced their subsistence. Rarely did their products reach the market, the absorbing and monopolistic *hacienda* system impeded the development of tenancies and smallholdings outside of the *terratenientes'* *feudos*. The concentration of the ownership of the land in the hands of the *terratenientes* destroyed any hope of *inquilinas/os* and smallholders becoming independent entrepreneurs and producers for the market. They were absorbed by the *latifundia* though they continued to exist subordinate to the *hacienda*. Many *peones*, smallholders and in fewer numbers *inquilinos*, left their rural occupations and homes to express through social banditry their rejection of the *hacienda* regime. These “primitive rebels” (Hobsbawm, 1974; 1969), were not aware of their class condition and of the need for class solidarity with their brothers and sisters in the estates.

Inquilinos, *peones*, rural bandits and independent women workers constituted the fragmented and early appearance of the Chilean working class and were the expression of the transformation of agriculture and social life in the colony. Thus, between the 18th and the 19th centuries landowners on the one hand and poor Spaniards and *mestizos* on the other, were shaping and shaped by the forming classes.

Articulation at the Political Level: The Formation of the Chilean State

While the concentration of land ownership was decisive in Chilean agriculture and the basis of the landowners' economic power until independence, the *latifundia* was also the foundation of political power that the *patrones* sought to maintain when Chile became independent of the Spanish Monarchy. The landowning class was organised and united and the power of the *hacienda* was extrapolated into the new state in formation through the creation of the National Society of Agriculture that provided the *terratenientes* a unified political and economic strategy. Although the mining fraction of the ruling class inspired by the European enlightenment was part of the independentists' leadership that began to challenge *terratenientes* and the *latifundia*, the landowners' power remained intact. *Terratenientes* enacted an authoritarian and conservative constitution in 1833, controlled the economy and the state until the 1850s, and governed the country until 1860.

Articulation and Gender Formation in the *Hacienda*

Spanish patriarchal heritage was, to a great extent, reproduced in the *hacienda*. Women were overtly discriminated against, according to their class position. A hegemonic masculinity tied to land ownership and racism, blessed by the Catholic Church, limited the lives of rich

women but above all, of poor women and men and legitimated *machismo* in the figure of the *patrón*.

Warfare, work and living conditions in the *haciendas*, the nomadic character of *peonaje* and the sexual harassment women experienced in the *hacienda*, made the nuclear family model propagated by the state and the Catholic Church inoperable. Instead I threw hundreds of women onto the roads, many of whom died struggling for survival. But the women who survived were able, in extremely negative conditions, to produce for themselves and their children. They created a rural grass-roots culture on the roads and the fringes of urban areas in which their small businesses constituted social spaces in which sexualities were more freely expressed and the working class began to recognise itself in its traditions, conflicts, suffering and happiness.

Through their experiences of life, of their class and their gender, independent women workers were “making” their class and became a threat to the establishment and its fossilised religious ethics. Independent working women were a “social problem” for the state which regard them as marginal but dangerous, “deviant” people beyond the scope of the closed and rigid gender/sex and class system. Independent women demonstrated, not premeditatedly but out of the living conditions imposed upon them by the *señorío*, that patriarchy is a

relation of domination that fundamentally serves the interests of the ruling class in each epoch, and that Catholicism makes these class and gender relations appear normal, just as the sacrifices on earth necessary to win a place in heaven. In this way ruling class' interests appears as the people's interests.

Articulation, Class Formation and Gender Relations in *Mapuchemapu*

The articulation of *Mapuche* and Spanish modes of production throughout the colonial period, changed deeply the *Mapuche* and colonial social formations. As a consequence of permanent warfare, the subsequent reduction of the male population and the diverse forms of social, economic and political contact with the invaders, *Mapuchemapu* was transformed. A new social division of labour, different to the existing form of communality, emerged. Women and *conas* remained direct producers and *loncos* became non-producers. Women experienced harsh discrimination and exploitation and the social and economic differentiation between polygamous and non-polygamous men was more marked despite the warrior ideal and ties of kinship that still produced solidarity among them. However, this fraternity was used by *loncos* to create servility, a relation of subordination based on the appropriation of productive resources such as land and animals which now only nominally were the usufruct of all, as tradition had

prescribed. The collective control of land and its products began to be modified in the 18th century by the tendency to the concentration of power and the accumulation of wealth by *loncos* caused by polygamy.

These new production relations and warfare changed *Mapuche* politics. The expansion of some *cacicazgos* began to create centralisation of political power which became permanent in hereditary male leaderships that tended to combine, through marriage alliances, other groups or *lofs*. *Mapuche* leadership understood that co-existence with their neighbours not only required military but also political preparation for the exercise of political power was now a permanent task. *Mapuche* groups bordering on the Chilean colony developed intense commercial and political relations with the colonists, an experience that allowed the *loncos* to prepare their sons for leadership by using the education offered by the missionaries for this end.

But despite these changes in important economic and political aspects of the life in *Araucanía*, *Mapuche* still maintained their ancient religion rejecting missionaries' attempts to capture their souls. Although under attack by the Church and state, polygamy became economically and politically central to *Mapuche* social reproduction by the end of the 18th century, especially for *loncos*. It reinforced family links in the direction of patriarchal and patrilineal relations – although patrilocality

was no longer an immutable principle – linking these to the process of accumulation of wealth, social and gender division of labour and the centralisation of power. During the colonial period, the articulation of modes, consolidated patriarchy in which women were the principle reproducer and producers. They worked in agriculture and domestic tasks and sometimes in cattle raising but their most important task was to bear as many children as they could.

Women were sexually free prior to marriage and there was no religious constraint on sex for single women. Although marriage was an economic contract, married women were expected to be faithful and obedient to their husbands whose masculinity was based on the warrior image. Both *loncos* and *conas* regarded women as commodities, but polygamy could not be practiced by all men even though was not legally restricted. Economic power defined who could be polygamous. The more economic power a man had, the more women he had. This in turn meant that the more women a man had the more land he controlled. Polygamy was directly linked to land, it was almost the privilege of *loncos* and it empowered them. The “new” larger polygamous family expanded through exogamous marriage alliances, facilitated the formation of large groups, the new political forms which rose with the new social division of labour and the new hereditary and centralised power structure. These class and gender developments in

the *Mapuche* social formation, led to the creation of large and competing political units in *Araucanía* in the 19th century, which had serious consequences for the unity and military capacity of *Mapuche*.

PART III

***Señorío* and Capitalism**

The Struggle for Hegemony and the Destruction of

Mapuchemapu: 1850 - 1900

Chapter Eight

Class Formation in Agriculture⁵⁹: 1850 - 1920

The traditional *hacienda* of the first half of the nineteenth century was almost self-sufficient, it practically consumed what it produced and its marketable surplus was very small (Kay, 1980: 66). The Peruvian demand for wheat had also diminished as a consequence of the War of Independence. The large concentration of the ownership of the land and the absence of demand thus explain the stagnation of the rural economy until the 1840s. The *haciendas* were mainly dedicated to cattle raising which did not require a large labour force. With the participation of the *inquilinos*, a few tied *peones* who received a miserable part of the production for their consumption and a reduced number of seasonal wage labourers who were shamelessly underpaid, the large estate resembled the Spanish *señorío* of the Middle Ages.

After the 1850s, the international market brought some changes to the *hacienda* system, which however, did not alter its seignorial character despite a growing market for labour, land and products. Two factors influenced the renovation of the agrarian structure, the crisis of Chilean

⁵⁹ As Carmagnani (1976: 9-10) points out, agriculture and cattle raising on the one hand and mining on the other, are two dimensions of an integrated productive complex. Production relations cannot be understood in isolation from the total set of relations, which they comprise. So, while these processes are

cattle raising and migration from the rural areas. These were contemporaneous with a shift to wheat production, which consolidated the *latifundia* without changing its structure and the subdivision of the large *haciendas*, which consolidated seigniorial rural property and the landowning class. Servile social relations were maintained in the estates by transforming *inquilinaje* into settled and tied *peonaje* but within a seigniorial regime and by restricting wage relations only to seasonal *peonaje*. These processes were simultaneous and uneven as the following discussion illustrates.

The Crisis in Cattle Raising and Rural – Urban Migration

Climatic conditions and a powerful cattle raising neighbour, Argentina, favoured a change in the production of the *haciendas*. Certainly, to pasture on the western side of the Andes Mountains was more difficult than on the eastern side in which great prairies under more and less stable humid conditions, allowed Argentineans to breed their cattle easily⁶⁰. In the central region of Chile in contrast, rain is abundant only in winter when grass grows in the lowlands. During summer, the thawing of the mountain snow allows pasturing in the higher altitudes

intertwined, for analytical reasons, the changes in agriculture are here studied first followed by mining in the next chapter.

⁶⁰According to Bengoa (1988: 187), the origin of Argentinean cattle raising could be dated to the first settlement by Spaniards in the sixteenth century, when the indigenes attacked and destroyed Buenos Aires and released the stock which multiplied in the next hundred and fifty years in the fertile prairies whose grass is irrigated with abundant rain.

when the central valleys are dry and hot⁶¹. This means that climate and topography made the cost of production of cattle in Chile more expensive than in Argentina. In addition, the smuggling of cattle practiced by the *Picunche* in the south, and by muleteers and cowboys in the central region, made competition with Argentinean production almost impossible. Cattle imports grew, cattle legally imported from Argentina rising from 15,000 head in the 1870s to 100,000 head by the 1890s (Bengoa, 1988: 188).

With traditional cattle raising diminishing in favour of agriculture, dairy farming began to produce exports through Valparaiso⁶², and also to the main internal market, Santiago (Bengoa, 1988: 194). The production of beef was also changing. The creation of the first public slaughterhouse in Santiago in 1849 meant that the meat business, previously rural and competitive, became urban, industrialised and monopolistic (Salazar, 1985: 119) under the control of the great *haciendas*. Consequently small producers tended to disappear, at least, from the most lucrative phase of the process, slaughtering and retail selling. The slaughterhouse was a new source of employment with capitalist characteristics. A change in the social division of labour was

⁶¹Differentiation in pasturing according to the year's seasons were and still are practiced by the *Mapuche* community of the mountains, known as *Pehuenche* (from interviews with *Mapuche* leaders of *Admapu* in *Lumaco*, 1982).

⁶²The main warehouse of the port of Valparaiso, belonged to the *terratenientes* or, as Salazar (1985: 98) calls them, the merchant-*terratenientes*. After 1860, they associated with English entrepreneurs forming commercial companies in Valparaiso.

happening and, importantly also, a more urban cosmopolitan culture was born with the early development of this industry⁶³ (Salazar, 1985: 119-124).

Nonetheless, because Chile was unable to compete with Argentinean cattle production and wheat was in high demand in United States and Australian markets, a shift to wheat occurred. But this productive process required a larger labour force and the War of Independence and the growth of urban-based production had stimulated rural-urban migration. While the central reason for escaping from the countryside continued to be the monopoly ownership of land and the preservation of servile relations in the *haciendas*, landowners did not attempt to change the character of rural property even though they subdivided it. *Terratenientes* aimed to maintain and expand servility within the *haciendas* by transforming *inquilinaje* into a tied and settled *peonaje*, by increasing the number of badly paid seasonal *peonaje* and by absorbing small producers into this process. About 76 percent of Chile's population of 1.3 million still lived in rural areas in 1865 (Bauer, 1975: 159). The rural population ranged between 952,000 and

⁶³However, a price rise due to a tax on imported Argentinean beef became a serious problem and the cause of one of the first great social conflicts in Chile, manifest in strikes and social protests in the streets in 1905 (Salazar, 1985: 149).

990,000 between 1865 and 1895. Migration did not seriously affect estate production and *peonaje* even grew because the natural increase of the rural population was greater than out-migration.

However, many new vagabonds', *peones*', small-holders' and *inquilinos*' wives, sons and daughters were not attached to the land but were on the roads seeking their fortune. Many rural workers left their families - if they had one - to work on railway construction, in the northern mines (Salazar, 1985: 149) while women who left the estates became urban workers obtaining a living in combinations of formal and informal, paid and unpaid work (see Chapter Ten).

Migration is not only a question of individual choice as the 'push and pull' theory of migration argues, but is also a massive historical social process (Castles and Miller, 1993: 23). The historical-structural causes of migration from the Chilean countryside were the concentration of land ownership which 'pushed' people to leave the countryside and the increasing demand for labour from mining and the infrastructure development, mainly railways and ports, which 'pulled' or attracted many men and women, not only *peones* as in the past but also small-holders and *inquilinos*. Migration from the *haciendas* worried but did not constitute a serious problem for *terratenientes* when cattle production was being replaced by wheat growing.

There were three main waves of migration. During the first half of the 19th century, especially since the War of Independence, escape was often to rural vagabondage. The second wave was characterised by migration to paid labour in national infrastructure and mining and also, emigration overseas, mainly to Perú, Argentina and California⁶⁴. A third wave of emigration – mainly to the nitrate mines in the north and the coal mines in the south - occurred during the Pacific War, the invasion of *Mapuchemapu* and the peak of nitrate exploitation in the north of the country (Bengoa, 1988: 193)⁶⁵. A new *peonaje* emerged mainly as a result of the second and third waves of emigration. Women and men who were formerly independent peasants, free rural *peones*, tied *peones* and *inquilinos* formed a new *peonaje*, different in its origin and fate to the 18th century *peonaje*. They constituted the basis of the Chilean proletariat through which capitalism began to develop (Salazar, 1985: 149).

By the mid 19th century wheat production which required a larger settled work force than that provided by *inquilinaje*, was only slightly affected by labour shortages. Although not only were *peones* leaving the *haciendas* but smallholders and some *inquilinas* families as well, the

⁶⁴Because of the advances in navigation, migrants also arrived in Polynesia, Australia and Japan in this period (Bengoa, 1988: 155). The nomadic or mobile character of Chilean labour was popularly expressed by the term '*Pati-Perro*' (Dog's-Foot).

⁶⁵A fourth migration period (mainly to Santiago) - beyond the scope of this work - was coincident with the First World War (Bengoa, 1988: 152).

rural population remained stable. However, the destination of migrants was not the mountains and banditry but to paid work outside of agriculture, in mining and urban areas. Banditry, a characteristic of pre-capitalist social formations (Hobsbawm, 1969: 23), was disappearing as a social phenomenon.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that seigniorial relations disappeared in the *haciendas*. In spite of the consequences of migration, *terratenientes* resisted change and maintained servile relations in the countryside, although Chile was moving beyond the narrow constraints of the “rural life world” of the *hacienda* which had subjugated peasant women and men for more than six generations. The rural workers’ emigration thus revealed the tension, interaction and contradiction between a seigniorial system of relations of production and a new system which even expanded, to some extent, its influence into the *haciendas*. Migration and the presence of active foreign entrepreneurs, most of them British (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 32), according to Salazar (1985: 146), were the decisive factors in the creation of a proletariat in the mines and ports and in road, bridge and railway construction, and even in a few *haciendas*.

Migration then, created an urban “industrial army”. In 1865, there were twenty cities with a population larger than five thousand but by

1885 there were thirty three while Santiago and Valparaiso had more than one hundred thousand inhabitants⁶⁶ (Vitale, 1993: 60). Santiago and Valparaiso and the northern mining districts grew at an annual rate of 1.9 percent between 1860 and 1890, from 469,000 to 828,000 inhabitants (Bauer, 1975: 152). Hurtado (cited in Bauer, 1975: 158) estimates that 481,000 left the rural areas between 1865 and 1907 alone. However the rural population did not decrease but slightly increased by five percent, from 952,000 in 1865 to 1 million in 1930.

As well as migration to the cities, there was also emigration overseas, especially to neighbouring countries and to the gold rush in California. During the peak of the 'wheat cycle' in 1870, 2,000 emigrated to Argentina. In addition, the *Gringo* Enrique Meiggs⁶⁷ engaged 15,000 more Chilean workers, for the construction of Lima-Arequipa Railway in Perú.

The *Terratenientes* and the Modernisers

In spite of the crucial political change, which replaced the Colonial State with a politically independent Republic, the *hacienda*, as in the colonial

⁶⁶Santiago's population numbered 129, 000 in 1854 and grew to 237,000 in 1885 while Valparaiso's grew from 53,000 to 115,000. According to the census, the population of Chile was three million in 1885 (Vitale, 1993: 60).

⁶⁷Meiggs was a famous North-American engineer who was in charge of railway construction in Chile. He appreciated and admired the value and capacity for sacrifice of Chilean workers who came from the countryside to work for him (These workers were called the *rotos carrilanos*). Meiggs sharply criticised the way *terratenientes* treated their workers. In a speech at the opening of the Santiago-Quillota Railway (Valparaiso route) he said that, "workers must be treated as human beings and not as dogs for they are good, the question is to know how to instruct them. Here, workers are not appreciated, they are badly treated" (Meiggs cited in Bengoa, 1988: 143).

period, continued to be the dominant institution in Chile in the first half of the nineteenth century. But the formation of the Republic, the development of the country's infrastructure, the opening of new markets and the emergence of other productive sectors such as mining, led landowners to make changes in agriculture.

By the second half of the 19th century, the country had grown in diversity. Major interaction between the countryside and the towns was reflected in a flourishing urban life but importantly, new social relations developed in the new non-agrarian productive centres. For the first time in Chilean history, there was a legal alternative for rural people in the growing labour market in mining and in infrastructure works. The resulting migration from the countryside, although massive, did not cause the alarming levels of labour shortage that some *terratenientes* exaggeratedly claimed. In this conjuncture in which the demand for increased production and incipient labour shortage overlapped, landowners searched for ways to retain labour on their estates. Nevertheless, they insisted on maintaining the same social relations, the same power they exercised for centuries in their *haciendas*, while introducing some changes to adjust the seigniorial agrarian structure to the 'new times'.

The problem for *terratenientes* was on the one hand how to maintain their concentrated ownership of the land and servile labour relations

while, simultaneously on the other, increasing production to satisfy the growing demands of the internal and external markets. Their solution contained three main components: firstly, the utilisation of the country's infrastructure to link *haciendas* to the markets and to introduce innovations in the productive process, mainly in wheat threshing; secondly, the subdivision of the *haciendas* but the consolidation of rural property; thirdly, the expansion of estates' labour by transforming *inquilinaje* into servile, settled and tied *peonaje* and increasing seasonal *peonaje*, retaining in this way the seigniorial character of large rural property. These three components will be now analysed.

Minimal Innovation: Maximising Human Labour in the *Haciendas*

The efforts of capitalist merchants in investing money and technology in the *haciendas*; the supply of labour for mining and infrastructure works from the seigniorial estates and the trade between Chileans and *Mapuche* on the *Araucanía* border, expressed the intense interaction between the three modes of production articulating within the changing Chilean social formation. From the 1850s, "the rise of a wider market and with it the better roads, rail, steam that permitted produce from land deep in the country to reach the growing cities was a powerful stimulus to agriculture" (Bauer, 1975: 117).

However and in spite of this dynamic, transformations in the methods of agricultural production by the powerful *terratenientes* were only partial. Though *terratenientes* were aware of the need for new technology in wheat production, they did not attempt to train their workers to use it. Engineers, machine operators and mechanics were imported in what is called the *Desarrollista* Cycle, between 1835 and 1878 (Salazar, 1985: 150). *Terratenientes'* resistance to changes in their *haciendas* did not impede however their involvement in activities beyond the rural world. Their economic and political power allowed them to invest in other sectors of the economy and to leave their own almost intact. Nonetheless, a minority of landowners challenged the conservative seigniorial character of traditional *terratenientes* assisted by some entrepreneurs from the mining and financial sectors who saw in agriculture a means of capital accumulation. They were joined by some progressive intellectuals influenced by the European project of modernity and their alliance had its first manifestation in the Agricultural Fair in 1869 and in the *Congreso Libre de Agricultores* (The Free Congress of Farmers) in 1875 known also as *Congreso de la Elite Modernizadora* (The Congress of the Modernising Elite) (Bengoa, 1988: 226).

The aim of this Congress was to modernise agricultural production through the introduction of new seeds and fertilisers and fundamentally

through new agricultural technology. The *haciendas*, according to the modernisers, had to be rationalised, wage relations introduced and rural workers trained to operate the new machinery and apply the new science of agriculture. This in turn required the creation of agricultural schools and the improvement of living conditions, diet and housing within the *haciendas* (Bengoa, 1988: 236). Permanent waged work would displace *inquilinaje* and temporary *peonaje* in the *haciendas*. In short, capitalist relations would replace existing social relations through the development of the productive forces which made their introduction necessary.

But only merchants and mining capitalists who had invested in flour mills introduced these changes in the rural economy. Granaries and flour mills employed wage workers and foreign technicians and mechanics which meant that the Chilean mills were technologically equal to any mills in the world at the time. However large *haciendas* retained traditional methods and it is not possible to equate their workers with, for example, the stable and permanent rural labour force of Germany and France at that time (Zeitlin, 1984: 29; Bauer, 1975: 66).

To the majority of *terratenientes*, whose economic and political interests were represented by the National Society of Agriculture and

the state, even after the two defeated bourgeois insurrections of 1851 and 1859, these changes were unacceptable (Zeitlin, 1984: 3). Liberals were demanding too much, according to this conservative mentality (Bengoa, 1988: 228), and the modernisation model was overwhelmingly rejected by most *terratenientes* and taken up only by a small number. The rest of the landowners introduced only minimal technical changes to increase production⁶⁸ (Bengoa, 1988: 211). For them, the key to increased production was the labour force. Although *terratenientes* lamented a shortage of labour, this existed more because of the urgent need to produce for an expanding market rather because of the non-existence of potential labour in the rural areas. The question was how to recruit the floating mass of *peones* in the countryside. Once they had found ways of recruiting them, the introduction of machinery was seen as something complementary. In other words, despite extensive out-migration, labour shortages were not a spur to more capital intensive production.

While the central valley was re-organised around wheat by the 1870s, the production process remained very rudimentary. A great part of the

⁶⁸ *Terratenientes* used different mechanisms to stop the changes in their *haciendas*. Among these were the credit system created to develop agriculture but whose end was distorted by landowners. Effectively, the *Caja de Credito Hipotecario* (CCH) (The Mortgage Credit Fund), created to promote agriculture, became a brake on it, for the loan mortgages were not used to modernise but to satisfy the luxurious life of rich *terratenientes* like the Errazuriz, Echeverría, Larraín, Ruiz – Tagle, García Huidobro, Ossa and Correa families who constructed big mansions and parks in the *haciendas* and in Santiago, Concepción and Talca (Bengoa, 1988: 228). The other brake on agricultural development was the preservation of extremely low taxation on *haciendas*. Although low tax could have encouraged them to invest more,

process, mowing, was done manually. During sowing seasons, the plough continued to be pulled by horses or oxen (Bengoa, 1988: 198-199). In addition, the complex topography of the country increased the problems of communication. Until Balmaceda's government (1886-1891), roads and railways almost did not exist. Carts pulled by mules and oxen transported the wheat production. Producers and the market were thus, very poorly connected. Aware of this while the Liberals were in government after the 1860s, *terrateniente* Members of the Congress did not oppose policies to develop the country's infrastructure for this directly benefited them.

But the still inefficient wheat farming techniques cost the *terratenientes*. The Pacific markets became Argentinean. The United States and Australian producers were soon outstripping them. By the 1870s, they were heavily dependent on European (and particularly English) markets, which required only unprocessed bulk wheat. Spurred on by international competition, the introduction of some new technology saw wheat production in 1865 triple and in 1874 quadruple the 38,000 tons produced in 1855 (Sepulveda cited in Bengoa, 1988: 196; Kay, 1980: 69).

they preferred to continue with their expensive aristocratic style of life in the *hacienda*, Santiago and Europe. In 1874, landowners impeded the re-evaluation of their own properties.

The introduction of machinery in use in Europe in the 1850s into Chile in the 1870s was more a consequence of international competition than a modernising aim of the *terratenientes*, though some of them claimed credit for improving the *haciendas*' output. The main innovation for wheat production was the threshing machine. In 1867 there were 137 threshing machines and the number grew to 500 in four years (Bengoa, 1988: 203). Although threshing machines became common in the *haciendas*, reaping machines did not and in 1871, there were still only 170 (Bengoa, 1988: 203). Thus there was only partial mechanisation of wheat production. The availability of workers in the countryside despite migration and the seigniorial and patriarchal character of the *terratenientes*, impeded modernisation within the *haciendas*. If ratios of population to land area between Central Chile, Victoria in Australia and the San Joaquin Valley in California are compared, it is possible to explain why in Australia and the new lands of the American West, farmers were quick to use new machines: there were 300 people per square kilometre in Chile, 32 in Australia and 23 in California. Chile, "in contrast to all of these countries, had the possibility of a great many inexpensive labourers" (Bauer, 1975: 150-151). In addition and importantly, the existence of a long Spanish feudal heritage in Chile contributed to resistance to new technology as well.

The Multiplication of Landholdings and the Consolidation of Rural Property

The ascendance of wheat production did bring changes to the *haciendas* for although *terratenientes* resisted changes to the character of production relations, they understood that the boundaries of the *haciendas* had to be modified and be more clearly established (Bengoa, 1988: 209). The sub-division of the *haciendas* made the properties more manageable but also meant that landowners did not lose but preserved, through their families and their aristocratic circle, their ownership of most of the land. They, after all, were the key buyers, sellers, and speculators in land and they benefited from the price rises caused by its subdivision (Bengoa, 1988: 214). The re-organisation of rural property was not in favour of the small-holders, who were pushed to *peonaje* but for the convenience of the *terrateniente* aristocracy and meant the consolidation of the commodification of land. Landowners reduced the size of properties but maintained their monopolistic control of the land. Landholding multiplied, landownership did not. Changes in tenure patterns did not affect considerably the agrarian structure, but “the older *haciendas* gradually gave way to more manageable *fundos* and greater production yielded more income for a more numerous landowning class” (Bauer, 1975: 117).

The ability of the *hacienda* to resist and adjust to the “winds of change” brought about by the expansion and diversification of the country’s activities, was possible because the landowners were hegemonic within the Republican State. Their command positions in the government, military and legislature allowed them to effect some changes in agriculture without undermining their own economic and political power. Effectively, the changes in land tenure patterns were initiated by landowners from within the State. As Bauer (1975: 118) points out, these modifications in tenure pattern “took place within a context of fortuitous circumstance and governmental benevolence”. Regardless of the form the subdivision of the estates took, the number of *terratenientes* did not decrease but increased. A subdivided *hacienda* yielded more profit per acre not to one landowner but to more *patrones*, sons, male relatives and friends of the former owner. In this way, the patriarchal structure was reinforced as well. More men now had a direct material interest in the maintenance of servile social relations. Increased profit was a result of a better and more diversified utilisation of the soil through better management. Subdividing a large *hacienda* into smaller units meant an “internal expansion: land within the boundaries of the estate that was previously unused was now cleared, plowed and irrigated . . . [as well as wheat,] vines, dairies or creameries were installed” (Bauer, 1975: 130). Good management did

not require the introduction of new technology. In this way, servile social relations remained intact.

The introduction of new policies was necessary to 'guide' the changes in land tenure in order to ensure that landowners' interests were not negatively affected. The institution of *mayorazgos* had been the legal mechanism imposed by the colonial state in order to consolidate rural property among the *terratenientes*' families. Through the *mayorazgo* land could only be transferred to the oldest male heir banning its division among all heirs. The first *mayorazgo* was created at the end of the 17th century and it proliferated during the 18th century. At the end of the colony there were still twenty-five *mayorazgos* (Aránguiz and León, 1996: 170). O'Higgins abolished the titles of nobility but he could not abolish *mayorazgos* (Aránguiz and León, 1996: 226). After the 1850s, the remaining impediments to a free market in land were removed and the government facilitated the sale, rental and the mortgaging of property (Bauer, 1975: 118).

The taxes that the Catholic Church had imposed on *haciendas*, the ecclesiastical tithe and *catastro*, were abolished in 1854 and replaced by a state tax on estate income. The tithe had collected a tenth of agricultural produce. The new tax was not on property as such but on agricultural income. Idle land was not penalised but nor did the tax

increase in proportion to increased production. Instead the government aimed to raise a certain amount and taxed only up to that point (Bauer, 1975: 118). Thus in the years 1861 to 1874, the amount collected annually was always about 650,000 *pesos*. Between 1875 and 1890, the annual tax collected was constant at around one million *pesos*. Since prices for agricultural produce rose steadily during the last third of the century and output increased as well, the *terratenientes* enjoyed an ever-decreasing tax burden (Bauer, 1975: 118). In fact, “the government acted as intermediary in a vast operation to relieve landowners of their debts” (Bauer, 1975: 120).

The state re-organised the agrarian economy and enhanced seigniorial power and the wealth of landowners. In this way *terratenientes* could face and manage the expansion in agricultural production that demands from the international market required. If Argentina monopolised beef production, Chile commanded wheat production. Wheat and the re-organisation brought about by the sub-division of land to meet the demand for it dominated the rural economy of the second half of the 19th century, as cattle raising had in the first half (Bengoa, 1988: 197).

The shift from cattle raising to wheat production required an increase in arable land and to do this, the enormous *haciendas* with huge tracts of potential arable land had to be divided. Land had to be redistributed

or rented out to improve management and meet the demands for wheat from the international market. So, a slow but inexorable change in land distribution and management occurred (Bauer, 1975: 117). But in spite of the redistribution, the landowning class preserved its rural properties. Landholdings and landowners increased in number but the allocation of land occurred within the restricted circle of aristocratic landowning families. The *terratenientes*' relatives and friends purchased or rented the subdivided land. Non-landowners were prevented from entering the market in land by the high prices caused by the subdivision itself.

According to LeFeuvre (cited in Bengoa, 1988: 232) the subdivision of the *haciendas*, created three types of properties, large, medium and small. The largest properties, *haciendas* (over 11,000 hectares) and the medium sized properties, *fundos* (over 201 hectares), constituted the great rural properties which, since then, are popularly known as the *latifundia* (Bauer, 1975: 136). The *minifundia* consisted of properties smaller than 150 hectares which progressively became more fragmented with their peasant owners providing seasonal labour to the *latifundia*.

While the permanently irrigated soil in the foothills of the Andes Mountains was valued the most, many of the largest *haciendas* of the central valley also contained dry land usually considered unusable by

the landowners. These unarable dry lands were sometimes used in combination for grain and cattle production or were rented out, or sold, most of the time, within the family circle (Bauer, 1975: 121). The twelve largest landowners in 1874 were - in order of size - the Ossa, Larraín, Correa, Ovalle, Valdés, Balmaceda, Errazuriz, Vicuña, Echeverría, Subercaseaux, Ruiz-Tagle, and Garcia Huidobro families. In 1875 they owned 105 large estates producing, according to tax records, 1.1 million *pesos* in income (Bauer, 1975: 177).

In the period of the subdivision and re-organisation of Chilean agriculture between 1854 and 1917, the concentration of land ownership varied unevenly within the central region and in general it decreased compared to the 1840s (see Chapter Seven) although, as the distribution of land in *La Ligua* shows, the subdivision did not affect the *latifundia*. In 1854, 99 percent of the land (about 150 thousand hectares) was owned by 8.6 percent (14) of the total number of landowners (Bauer, 1975: 25). Each *latifundia* averaged about 10,000 hectares. In 1917, 99.7 percent of the land (about 201 thousand hectares) was owned by 30 percent (21) of the total number of landowners (Bauer, 1975: 25). While the number of *latifundia* had increased, their size averaged about 9,500 hectares, compared to the *minifundia* average thirteen hectares.

In *San Felipe* in 1854, one percent of the total number of landowners (seven landowners) owned 46 percent of the land (about 4,800 hectares), in holdings averaging 680 hectares. By 1917 this average had grown to about 1,000 hectares. In Caupolican in 1854, 5.6 percent of landowners (sixty two landowners) owned about ninety percent of the land (150,000 hectares). But by 1917, three percent of landowners (117 *terratenientes*) owned eighty seven percent of the land (211,000 hectares). The *latifundia* averaged 2,400 hectares in 1854 and 1,800 hectares in 1917 (Bauer, 1975: 126 - 128).

Now, considering the central region as a whole, six percent of the total number of landowners (3,078 *terratenientes* or *latifundistas*) owned 86.4 percent of the total land in central Chile (5.4 million hectares) by 1917. Their properties averaged about 1,750 hectares. Overall, the concentration of the ownership of land diminished compared to the pre-subdivision period in which an *hacienda's* size averaged over 11,000 hectares. However, some large holdings remained until the 20th century, such as the vast livestock *hacienda Río Colorado* of some 160,000 hectares, and *Las Condes*, *Putando* and *La Ligua*. But overall, while landholdings increased in number, rural properties continued to be owned by the same social class of landowners who maintained servile social relations in their *fundos*. This was a reallocation of land within

the ruling class, not a redistribution of it to the smallholders or landless *peones*.

The 'new' *fundos* supplied the wheat and flour demanded by the international market. Between 1860 and 1880, wheat production increased by 5.3% per year in the central region, the land devoted to wheat production increasing by 208 percent from 130,000 hectares to 400,000 hectares (Kay (1980: 71). The subdivision of land was accompanied by an internal re-organisation of the productive process. Effectively, a "greater and more diversified agricultural output created the need for an ever-increasing staff to assist in estate management" (Bauer, 1975: 136). A more complex hierarchy and division of labour developed in the *hacienda* in which the absent patrón was replaced by an administrator. Estate administration comprised *mayordomos*, *capataces* (foremen), *potrerizos* (field bosses), *llaveros* (warehousemen) and clerks (Bauer, 1975: 137-138). These employees who had annual contracts and were paid in money, had to supervise a number of *inquilinos/as*, settled, tied and seasonal *peones* who were paid in kind, rarely in money.

By 1890, a fall in the international price of wheat generated a crisis in agriculture. The land of the central region again devoted to cattle raising, displacing wheat production and pushing part of the rural

labour force to the south, towards the region of *La Frontera*, the land expropriated from the *Mapuche*. These lands, called 'colonised regions', became the grain zone of Chile. Between 1880 and 1908, the annual rate of increase in wheat production was -1 percent in the central region and 7.9 in the *Frontera* (Kay, 1980: 69). European migrants, especially from Germany and Switzerland, and 'new' landowners who came from the mining and financial sector, became the *terratenientes* of the *Mapuche* land. As Bauer (1975: 174) points out,

if the motor of Chilean economy was the northern desert, the national government and social leadership were firmly in the hands of a traditional elite for whom landownership was one of the principal values . . . the *nouveaux riches* created by the mining industry invested in rural estates⁶⁹.

There was an increase of productivity within the subdivided large *haciendas* and an extension of the 'latifundism' towards the south through the expropriation of *Mapuchemapu*. As noted above, subdivision in the central region meant a better use of the land, more efficient management and an improvement in the use of resources (increased productivity). *Haciendas* and *fundos* increased in value. A

⁶⁹One of the new rich was José Bunster, a renowned merchant supporter of the expropriation of *Mapuchemapu* who became one of the richest *latifundistas* of the zone. However, the supply of capital for agriculture did not mean that he ignored his businesses and original sources of wealth in the

“small” productive *fundo* maintained a landowning family in an appropriate upper class style, whereas before a huge and largely unexploited *hacienda* provided for only one owner (Bauer, 1975: 175). The *hacienda La Compañía*, noted in the previous chapter, was owned by Juan de Dios Correa until 1850. After he died, it was divided into eleven large *fundos* (Bauer, 1975: 131). Each one of these provided substantial wealth for his sons and daughters, preserving the aristocratic power and patriarchal character of the Correa family.

Like Correa family’s *hacienda*, the largest estates (over 10,000 hectares) were subdivided. By the first decades of the 20th century, most of the great *haciendas* of the 1850s were subdivided into two or three still large *fundos* ⁷⁰ (Bauer, 1975: 130). Nationally, “by 1854, there were 145 *fundos* with an income of 1,545,000 *pesos* and twenty years later, 338 that produced 3,880,000 *pesos*” ⁷¹ (Bauer, 1975: 175). While the average of the size of *latifundia* diminished (properties over 10,000 hectares), landholdings multiplied within the ruling class maintaining in this way the rural property. Thus, in spite of the subdivision of large estates and the existence of a growing peasantry

speculative financial sector emerging in Valparaíso at that time. He was known as the “industrialist of the *Araucanía*” and the “King of wheat” (Bengoa, 1988: 154).

⁷⁰As a result of the subdivision, the number of properties over 5,000 hectares diminished and simultaneously, the number of properties between 201 and 5,000 hectares increased: 2,800 by 1917 and nearly 4,100 by 1935 (Bauer, 1975: 131). The same process occurred among the small properties. After 60 years of land subdivision, the number of properties between 21 and 50 hectares increased (small properties became smaller), from 6,300 in 1917 to 9,800 in 1935 (Bauer, 1975: 131).

⁷¹These are total incomes. According to Salazar (1985: 35), by 1861, the average annual income of a large estate was about 7,500 *pesos*.

owning small lots of land, concentration of land ownership (though slightly reduced), was maintained within the *terratenientes*' families.

This pattern within central Chile favoured, once again, the landowning class and made the life of the peasantry more difficult for "[w]hile the tenure pattern of larger estates only gradually changed, the really small plots were rapidly fragmented" (Bauer, 1975: 131) into smaller and smaller pieces until almost this disappeared, the peasant families integrated as labour into the *fundos* only formally proletarianised within the estates (Kay, 1980: 62). Most of these peasants were absorbed as tied *peones*, as is discussed further below.

The Diversification of Rural Labour: Tied, Settled and Seasonal *Peonaje*

The agrarian structure strongly based on the concentration of the ownership of the land was not substantially altered by the subdivision of *haciendas* but increased the number of landholdings and landowners and boosted rural production. Even though wage relations, especially for seasonal labourers, were introduced in the *latifundia*, the *hacienda*'s social relations were formally but not essentially altered. The shift from cattle raising to grain production did not alter landowners' attachment to seigniorial relations, but these diversified within the estates. Most of *inquilinos* became *estables* (settled) *peones*

and, as stated in Chapter Seven, brought other labourers to the estate, the tied *peones*. Although prior to 1850 the increased labour requirements of the *latifundia* were met by the *inquilino*'s family, this supply was soon exhausted. *Inquilinos* then had to provide workers from outside of the *hacienda*, who were smallholders or free *peones*.

The new settled and tied *peones* were rarely paid in money and became the permanent workers or paradoxically in the case of the former, "*inquilinos* or tenants" who with their labour and by supplying other workers to the *latifundia*, paid their debts to their *patrón* in the form of 'rent' for an non-existent plot of land, as will be explained further below. These settled *peones* became a peculiar type of serfs who were progressively separated from the means of production but remained attached to the *fundo* by their 'compromises' with their *patrón*. The other form of rural labour were the seasonal *peonaje* paid very low piece rates (*tarea*) during wheat harvests, most of time in tokens. The persistence of seigniorial practices was not a mere whim, an irrational attachment to tradition, for servile relations constituted the cheapest form of labour and importantly, this particularly acute form of patriarchy continued almost unaltered.

As explained in Chapter Five, the *inquilino* had a double function: he worked - as a independent producer - on a plot of land within the *fundo*

for which he paid rent and he worked as an agricultural labourer for the *patrón* (Kay, 1980: 68). But usually, his rent was not paid nor his wages received in money but in kind. Seldom did the *inquilino*'s own production generate sufficient surplus to allow him to contract another to perform his task in the *fundo*. He had to work as a peasant for his subsistence, and as a rural labourer for his *patrón*.

Terratenientes' permanent labour force was traditionally constituted by *inquilinaje*. Although *inquilinaje* continued in its traditional form in some *latifundios*, in most others they became or were replaced by settled *peonaje*, permanent workers or landless *inquilinos*, who were more closely supervised and better exploited in their productive tasks due to the subdivision of the land and the new division of labour. As explained in Chapter Seven, in the first half of the 19th century, the *inquilino*'s family supplied extra labour and this process continued and expanded in the second half of the century aided by the recruitment by *inquilinos* of part of the nomadic mass of rural *peones* and poor peasants as tied labourers on the *latifundia*.

In supplying in addition to his own and his family's labour, at least one tied *peon* to the *patrón* and *patrona*, the *inquilino* now was 'appreciated' by the *patrón* not only for his work and loyalty but for the amount of extra labour he could provide for the *fundo* (Kay, 1980: 68).

The expansion of labour rested then upon the already settled *inquilinos* who after 1850, were “asked to provide two and even three full time workers” (Bauer, 1975: 159). In the *hacienda* of *Pichidegua* for instance, “[of] the twenty-one *inquilino* households, twelve had to supply two *peones* each. By 1870, this process had become commonplace” (Bauer, 1975: 160).

Although the tradition of *inquilinaje* persisted, a settled *peonaje* became the dominant form of permanent labour within the *latifundia*. Since *terratenientes* were reluctant to pay money, they required the workers to be remunerated by the *inquilinos*, but payment was in kind for the *inquilinos* were unable to transform themselves into a kind of ‘employers’. Thus, in the case of the *hacienda El Peumo*, the *inquilino* had to furnish two tied *peones* for whom the estate only provided a daily food ration. The cost of each worker was 20 cents a day and “since the *peon* was often a member of the *inquilino*’s household, the ‘wage’ was probably most often paid in kind. Even if the *inquilino* had to go outside his own kin for the *peon*, he must rarely have paid in cash” (Bauer, 1975: 161). The *inquilinas* families began to use their precarious huts, averaging between 40 and 50 per estate in 1860, for housing the tied *peones* and themselves but now as settled *peones* (Salazar, 1985: 165).

The settlement of tied *peones* within the estate was not in the form of tenancy which in the eighteenth century had characterised *inquilinaje*. Since there was not a plot of land with which to produce independently, tied *peonaje* was worse than *inquilinaje* for the tied *peones* were allowed only a small piece of land not exceeding 35 square meters (the *cerco*) on which to raise hens and grow vegetables when there was water (Salazar, 1985: 166; Bauer, 1975: 161). In this way, tied *peones* were separated from the means of production. However and simultaneously, they became unfree by their attachment to the *latifundia*. The 'wage' *terratenientes* paid them was in the form of housing. There was no clear alternative for them apart from emigration from the countryside, a hard decision for a family, but not so for young people who left as many of their predecessors had done. The *inquilino* father had become the *patrón* of his own wife and children (Salazar, 1985: 165) reinforcing patriarchal relations amongst the poor and many of these children sought a freer life beyond the seigniorial regime.

The new settled *peonaje* was constituted by those *inquilinos* who had dreamt of obtaining a piece of land to develop their own agrarian enterprises. However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, they had already realised the sad reality of their own proletarianisation. Thus, a symbiosis developed between the servile *inquilinaje* and

peonaje. Paradoxically, the expansion of labour within the *latifundia* brought about both an extension and modification of *inquilinaje* (Bauer, 1975: 161) and the semi-proletarianisation of *inquilinos* and tied *peones* (Salazar, 1985: 156).

By 1870, *inquilinos* could not pay rent to the *terrateniente* let alone pay wages to *peones*. They were deprived of their plot of land and relegated to the *cercos* (Zeitlin, 1980: 365) because they fell into debt with the *patrón* (Salazar, 1985: 166) whom they must keep paying. The 18th century *inquilinos*' tenancy which included a plot of land and use of pasture from which they could produce a surplus for the market no longer existed as such. However, as Salazar (1985: 166) points out, the tenancy contract was not altered or abolished, meaning that *inquilinos* had to pay for land which did not exist. This means that if they could not pay with money or with their production, they had to provide labourers who were not paid and themselves became *peones*. Thus the *inquilino* became a *peon* within a tenancy regime in which the landowner did not pay for his work but required in addition extra labour from the *inquilino* in exchange for the use of land which in fact did not exist. Even those *inquilinos* who by 1860, still retained a piece of rented land within the estate and paid rent in cash or with work or products, could not avoid the impact of the inflation of land prices on his rent which grew faster than the price of land. Salazar (1985: 164)

estimates that between 1820 and 1860, landowners doubled and tripled the value of the land each ten years. Since the landowners also charged interest on rent owed of 100 percent in the first year and 200 to 300 percent in the second year, the rent could not possibly be paid by the tenants. These *inquilinos* were thus pushed into a settled *peonaje* like others were before them.

The settled *peonaje* multiplied everywhere and in some *haciendas* like the *hacienda Viluco* and in many *fundos*, the *inquilinaje* was almost totally replaced by the settled *peonaje* (Salazar, 1985: 166). Even the payrolls of seasonal *peonaje* decreased. This change within the *haciendas* led some *patrones* - the liberal minority - to criticise *inquilinaje* in the *Primer Congreso Libre de Agricultores* (First Free Congress of Farmers) and propose its abolition and the introduction of wage relations. However, other landowners took the opportunity to only formally change *inquilinaje* by transforming *inquilinos* into settled *peones* still under an *inquilino* tenancy, and by introducing a system of contract work, *trabajo a tarea*, and by increasing the seasonal *peonaje* (Salazar, 1985: 167). Thus, *inquilinaje*, settled *peonaje*, tied *peonaje* and free or seasonal *peonaje* continued co-existing. The seasonal *peonaje*, in the form of *trabajo a tarea*, was the largest numerically and the clearest form of waged work for money (see Bauer, 1975: 153-156). From the total rural population in Chile (excluding *Araucanía*) in

1865 of 952,000 people, 30,000 were *inquilinos*; 5,000 were household employees; 125,000 were day labourers working *a tarea*; and 35,000 were unemployed⁷² (Censo of 1865 cited in Bauer, 1975: 159). The great majority (757,000) were a “loose, unattached mass of people who squatted on marginal land along the coast or on the edge of cities, lived in rude huts on interstitial plots in the valley, or simply moved along the length of central Chile in search of sustenance” (Bauer, 1975: 146). Although the semi-legal life of *peones* was freer than the *inquilinos*, their living conditions were very precarious. Frequently they were attracted to seasonal work such as harvesting in a form of labour called *Mingaco* (“fiesta work”) - adapted by *terratenedientes* from one of *Mapuche* traditional forms of labour (see Chapter One) - in the *latifundios* for which payment was quantities of local wine and *Chicha*, and a gluttonous meal (*comilona*) (Bauer, 1975: 146).

The growth of grain cultivation from 120,000 to 450,000 hectares between 1850 and 1875, was, to a great extent, a result of the *trabajo a tarea* rather than the introduction of machinery for about 40,000 additional workers were required for the wheat harvest alone (Bauer, 1975: 150). Rural workers followed the harvest from north to south, from *Aconcagua* in early December to *Maule* late in January and the

⁷² These are figures from agriculture in Chile reason why they did not include *Mapuche*, who at that time were still politically independent.

maximum output per worker was 1 *tarea* a day, a *peon* cutting between thirty to fifty *tareas* a season (Bauer, 1975: 150); importantly, he was paid in money. However, the annual wages fluctuated between 40 and 80 pesos a year (Salazar, 1985: 171), but this was a nominal figure for *peones a tarea* worked only seasonally and received about half of this. Considering that the daily ration of food was either counted as part of, or deducted from the wage, the total amount paid by the landowners was almost the same as the miserable 32 *pesos* per year spent by the state in maintaining a *peon* in prison at that time (Salazar, 1985:171).

For the traditional *patrón* - the majority of landowners in the countryside - the annual payrolls showed that seasonal *peonaje* working *a tarea* (supposedly the most convenient form of labour for landowners), became excessively expensive. The cost of seasonal *peonaje* was forty percent of the *latifundia* annual taxable income (Salazar, 1985: 168). *Terratenientes* sought new ways to reduce this “waste” of money by cutting the wage and later by paying with tokens for the *fundo's pulpería* (shop). The free *peonaje* working *a tarea* were in this way trapped by the token system.

Thus, the “proletarianisation” of *inquilinaje*, tied, settled and free *peonaje* was more formal than real (Salazar, 1985: 168) for these

processes were still contained within the web of archaic pre-capitalist seignorial relations under which smallholders' and *inquilinos*' farming projects were an unrealisable dream; tied *peonaje* constituted a hopeless alienation; settled *peonaje* was a poorer servile version of *inquilinaje*; and the seasonal *peon* was as poor as a prisoner in the state jail and paid frequently in tokens. Since these rural workers were under no legal compulsion to remain nor did they enjoy the usufruct of *latifundia* lands except at the sufferance of the landowners themselves, the only solution for many young workers was to leave the *latifundia*. What the *inquilinos* surrendered of their actual product of labour in "rent" was not coercively extorted from them as independent petty producers, for they had neither the land nor other means of production to produce and reproduce their own subsistence; they depended on the *latifundia* for both. The production relations in agriculture are correctly described as 'seignorial' and are not plainly feudal nor capitalist because of the labour service obligations placed on the *inquilinos* and the diverse kinds of *peonaje* in which they were trapped (Zeitlin, 1984: 28).

Chapter Nine

Mining, Capitalist Expansion and the Rise of the Labour Movement

The rhythms of class formation in this period responded primarily to the contrasting and linked dynamic between agriculture and mining and to the development of the country's early infrastructure and the creation of financial and political institutions. All of these occurred simultaneously in a context of growing global and local markets and in times in which industrial capitalism had already reached maturity in England, a nation which was a crucial participant in the Chilean process of capitalist development.

Although scholars such as Segall (1953), Carmagnani⁷³ (1976), Larraín (1989), Zeitlin (1988; 1984; 1980), Salazar (1985; 1984), Ramirez Necochea (1986) and Vitale (1993), among others, place the origin of capitalism in Chile at different times, they all agree on the significance of the mining industry for its development. In studying the origin and growth of mining, the nature of the social relation known as free *pirquinaje* must be understood and so must its transformation under the

⁷³ Although Carmagnani (1976: 202) maintains that feudalism declined only in the first decades of the twentieth century, he considers mining as the key in the emergence of capitalism. He did not appreciate that land commodification, the growth of cities, production for markets and a tendency for labour to become a commodity, were a strong tendency for the expansion of capitalist relations in the second half of the 19th century.

system of *habilitación*, and the subsequent establishment by the British of company mining towns which provided the cradle of the labour movement.

The industrial revolution required raw materials and English capitalists went overseas for them. The abundance and diversity of ores in Chile (iron, coal, copper, gold and importantly, nitrate), attracted English capital to Chile. The English industrial bourgeoisie developed and came to monopolise in alliance with incipient Chilean financial and mining capitalists, the banking system and the industrial exploitation of minerals. An external economic dependency was thus generated and internally, this capitalist alliance, having subordinated the free *pirquinaje* through the system of *habilitación*, practically eliminated it by the imposition of company towns with the cooperation of the Chilean State. The *pirquineros*, independent miners prior to the intervention in mining of Chilean capitalist merchants and British investors, became servile and a semi-waged workers, who, like the free *peones* in the seignorial *fundo*, were most of the time paid in tokens and forced to live, alone or with a family, within the carceral company town. The English industrial bourgeoisie, who already ran mines in their own country through the “company town”, introduced it to Chile and in it the articulation of indigenous, seignorial and capitalist relations produced a mutation of social relations of production.

Unlike the *hacienda*, the company town did not generate servility, for while the *hacienda* contained, reproduced and retained - even after its subdivision - elements of serfdom, the company town contained a hybrid social relation of production, contained more capitalist than feudal as signified by the rebellions it induced.

The *hacienda* was a “complete social world” dominated by the political, judicial and military figure of the landowner. It was a social, political and economic institution in which the direct producers were not totally separated from the means of production since they could, at least, most of the time produce their own subsistence. Although the direct producers were not under legal compulsion for service, they were in practice tied to the *demesne*. In particular *inquilinos*, like serfs, thought of themselves as ordained by birth to that social condition, a view encouraged by the *patrón* and by the Catholic Church for centuries. They were in practice socially unfree. In this way, the Catholic religion stimulated and reinforced the servility of the direct producers and legitimated the patriarchal figure of the landowner to whom the *inquilinos* felt they belonged. Paternalism and submission and not open class conflict thus was generated and reproduced in the *haciendas*.

Unlike the *hacienda*, the company towns expressed class contradictions and generated rebellion. The rationalisation and the physical concentration of large numbers of workers characterised the *campamento minero*. By 1890 nitrate workers numbered 4,534; this figure grew to 22,485 by 1895, to 40,825 by 1908 and 56,981 by 1918 (Ortiz, 1985: 70). Direct producers were absolutely separated from the means of production and labour became a commodity. The only possession of workers was their ability to work which they sold for a wage. But they were peculiar wage-workers since their wages (like those of the seasonal peones in the *hacienda*) were usually paid in tokens and not in money. The replacement of money by tokens, valid only in the confines of the company town restricted the social world of workers, but did not void the extraction of surplus value by means of the production of commodities. This contradictory content led owners and non-owners of the means of production into a relation of opposition, a conflictive class relation. Incipient working class consciousness and class struggle, manifestations of the contradiction, were evident when workers demanded and fought for payment in real money, thus further impelling capitalist relations and their own formation as a wage earning proletariat.

The Free *Pirquinaje*

As seen in Chapter Three, once the Spaniards knew about the mineral wealth of America, the exploitation of mines became their key concern. The conquerors' mission was to fill the Spanish Kingdom's coffers and to build their personal fortunes as well. Almagro, in the first expedition to what is now Chile, expected to find the quantity of gold and silver found earlier in the *Mexica* and *Incas* empires. But although this was not the case, both Almagro's and later Valdivia's expeditions verified the existence of copper, iron, silver and gold ores (Segall, 1953: 15). Northern indigenous tribes subjugated by the *Incas* had discovered and mined some of the ores. Others were discovered by Spaniards (See Alvaro Jara, 1965: 1-8) and later, by Chilean mine workers known as *pirquineros*. The expropriation and discovery of the ore, its exploitation and export were a colonial state concern for the State owned the mines through conquest (Jara, 1965: 1) and through the institution known as the *mita* (see Chapter One) indigenes were forced to work in them (Segall, 1953: 13-15).

During colonial period, the Royal Ordinances had stated that although mines were the colonial state's property, their use was open to any individual regardless of their social background, excepting indigenes and slaves (Salazar, 1985: 174; Jara, 1965: 175). Later in the Republic, this ordinance was renewed through legislation such as the *Codigo de*

Minería de 1874 and the *Reglamento Salitrero de 1878* (Ortiz, 1985: 16). Anyone could work a mine, as long as someone petitioned the authorities, declared possession, registered the land and commenced mining. A *peon* could run his own mine and the risks of many kinds that mining involved dissuaded the aristocracy from mining, hence, the popular character of mining in this epoch of free *pirquinaje*.

Pirquineros, played an important part in colonial and Republican mining exports for one and a half centuries (1720-1872). These former *peones* found and developed the majority of the mines which they worked as "quasi independent commodity producer[s]" (Zeitlin, 1984: 46). *Pirquineros* of the 19th century were independent in that they had their own equipment, worked on their own or with others sharing the product or hired workers for wages. But many *pirquineros* became dependent on merchants or incipient bankers (*habilitadores*) like Agustin Edwards⁷⁴ and Carlos Lambert, in what was known as the system of *habilitación* (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 33-34; Zeitlin, 1984: 46). *Habilitadores* supplied food and equipment through draconian lines of credit and they usually purchased *pirquineros'* output demanding low prices as the *trapicheros* had done in the past⁷⁵. Often

⁷⁴Agustin Edwards became a magnate banker and owner of the most influential national newspaper, *The Mercurio*, until recently, the voice of the Chilean bourgeoisie.

⁷⁵The merchant-*trapicheros* charged about two third of the metals cost of production to the *pirquineros* for improving the metal's purity (Salazar, 1985: 178).

these miners became, "in the course of such transactions, transformed into wage workers in all but name" (Zeitlin, 1984: 46). Since they owed money to the *habilitadores* and sold their ore to them, they effectively worked for them. Landowners-merchants were not content to simply sell to and buy from *pirquineros*, they also invested in ore smelting furnace. Thus, mining capital was initially mercantile capital oriented to the mining activities of the rural *peonaje* working as free *pirquinaje* (Salazar, 1985: 173). Late in the eighteenth century, prior to Chilean independence, the annual production of gold and silver was on average, worth 1.7 million *pesos* (Segall, 1953: 15).

The Formation of the Banking System

Merchant-landowners became the mining bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century. While most of the biggest *terratenientes* tried only to reinforce and consolidate seignorial relations of domination and intensify exploitation of their agrarian tenants (Zeitlin, 1984: 30) in response to the ascendancy of capitalist relations of production elsewhere in the country, other *terratenientes* invested in commerce, mining and infrastructure. Thus, "mine owner and banker, railroad magnate and manufacturer, shipper and trader, landowner and miller were most frequently not only close associates, or drawn from the same family, but were the very same individuals: Ossa, Edwards, Vicuña

Mackenna, Matta, Goyenechea, Cousiño, Urmeneta, Gallo, Subercaseaux " (Zeitlin, 1984: 30).

The growth of Chilean mining, in particular of copper production, was linked to the development of industrial capitalism in Europe, especially in England (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 27). The new industrial capitalism demanded large volumes of raw materials especially copper and iron ores for the fabrication of machinery for production and transport. English capitalists who knew about the minerals of Spain's colonies, investigated the possibilities and reports on the Chilean social, economic and political situation were, according to Ramirez Necochea (1986: 29), enthusiastic. Some English entrepreneurs became permanent residents in Chile and most became citizens. From 1817, Sewell, Walker, Waddington, Cameron, Miller, Bunster and Campbell settled their companies in the provinces of *Atacama*, *Coquimbo* and *Valparaiso*. The Chilean Mining Association, the Anglo-Chilean Mining Association and the Chilean and Peruvian Mining Association connected the financial and mining sectors from the 1820s (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 28). According to Hernandez (cited in Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 28) in 1827, there were more than 3,000 foreigners in *Valparaiso* alone, most of them English. One of the consequences of the English settlement was that social as well as commercial relations linked the Chilean merchant-capitalists with the English entrepreneurs,

marriage consolidating an economic and social alliance between the Chilean capitalist class and the English investors. These foreign capitalists, brought technicians and machinery with them to exploit the Chilean mines, encouraging the merchant-landowners to increase their investment in mining (see Salazar, 1985: 213).

These English capitalists and Chilean merchants who initially invested in copper mining and export - and to a lesser extent in cereal exporting - provided the capital for the first banks. In Valparaíso, the main financial centre of the Republic and one of the most important financial centres and ports of the Pacific west coast, important banks were established including the Edwards' Bank (1846)⁷⁶, the Ossa Bank and the Valparaíso Bank (between 1850 and 1860) (Ramírez Necochea, 1986: 39; Zeitlin, 1984: 25). The Edwards' Bank had branches throughout the country and in South America, the U.S.A. and Europe and was one of the earliest banks established in Latin America⁷⁷. The first stock exchange was opened in 1840 in Valparaíso and the formation of joint stock companies was made legally possible in 1854, signalling the beginning "of the ascent of the corporation as a decisive

⁷⁶The Edwards family initially generated its fortune from mining and banking, as *habilitadores*. Through monopsony, Edwards, Vicuña, Cordovez, Haviland and Lambert and others, accumulated capital and became part of an informal financial network based in the North and in Valparaíso. Their economic interests triggered the war between Chile and the Peruvian-Bolivian alliance in which countries Edwards also had investments. Nitrate, silver and copper attracted these magnates whose unlimited ambition saw, in the annexation of these territories, a perfect way of multiplying their fortunes (Ramírez Necochea, 1986: 39).

⁷⁷Edwards also owned ships and an exclusive dock at Birkenhead in England. Ships of the 'House of Edwards' carried silver and copper to China and India as well as to France and England (Zeitlin, 1984: 25).

organisational form of capital accumulation, in particular in banking, insurance, mining, and especially railroad construction" (Zeitlin, 1984: 25).

Copper Ore and Nitrate Mining

In a global context of industrial capitalist expansion in the second half of the 19th century, the subsequent development of a capital market and of new technology, dynamised the mining sector. Capitalist relations of production became predominant through the progressive transformation of mining production from the free *pirquinaje* to the establishment of company towns (*campamentos mineros*) (Salazar, 1985: 173).

Discoveries of minerals and the introduction of modern machinery and technicians contributed decisively to mining growth after the 1830s. "[T]he discovery and exploitation of rich silver and copper veins in the 1830s and 1840s was followed quickly by a mid-century breakthrough in coal production and copper smelting" (Zeitlin, 1984: 23). The increased activity attracted people to *Atacama's* capital, *Copiapó*, transforming this mining village of the *Norte Chico* into a "cosmopolitan town . . . where [people] from England, France, Chile, Germany, Italy and all the neighbouring republics converged" (Vives cited in Zeitlin, 1984: 45).

Mining continued growing, above all, with the production of copper, copper ore, nitrate in the northern region, and coal in the south. In 1860, Chile's total mining export income was \$ 18.8 million *pesos* which increased to \$ 60.9 million *pesos* by 1890 (Vitale, 1993: 67). This rapid growth was caused by the development of capitalist relations and the injection of British capital. In this way England established control over the world's largest extractive industry. Sixty three percent of the copper ore consumed by English industry in 1860 was Chilean (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 29). In the 1860s, Chile became the world's leading producer of copper ore (Herrmann cited in Vitale, 1993: 69). The copper smelting industry developed rapidly with the creation of furnaces in *Guayacán*, *Tongoy*, *Los Vilos*, *Carrizal* and *Lirquén*. *Guayacán*, owned by Urmeneta, a land and mine owner, had thirty five furnaces employing 400 in 1872 (Vitale, 1993: 69).

Atacama in 1875 was the most important mining region with a work force of over 6,000, ninety eight percent of whom were skilled workers, up from sixty five percent in 1830. Fifty nine percent (3,624) were concentrated in copper, but even so, more than fifty percent of the mines were run according to the old system of free *pirquinaje* and one third by *pirquineros* under the system of *habilitación* (Salazar, 1985: 216).

The rapid growth of copper ore production until the 1890s was a cause and consequence of the development of other industries. Effectively, mines, smelters and foundries contributed to other industrial activities such as brass foundries, brick and tile works, cement works, glass and bottle factories, machine shops, boiler works and workshops for copper utensils and equipment as well as infrastructure works such as railroads in the central valley for wheat production and export, and for the northern mining region (Zeitlin, 1984: 24-25). As well, "there were growing carriage and cart-making works, sugar refineries, paper mills, breweries and mechanised factories producing woollen textiles, rope and twine, boots and shoes, soap and candles, tackle and ship's rigging and cordage" (Zeitlin, 1984: 25). Many of these industries also exported their products and in 1857, "ocean going steamships, some fired by Chilean coal, joined Chile's 200-vessel merchant fleet, which had consisted until then of sailing ships" (Zeitlin, 1984: 25). The crucial factor in the development of these other industries was the advance in mining production, made possible by the introduction of English capital and technology which came together specifically in the company town.

But the growth of more capital intensive mining in the U.S.A. was the main cause of a crisis in Chilean copper in the 1880s. Despite the high quality of Chilean copper ore, production fell from 700,000 tons in the

1870s, to 360,000 in the 1880s, to 236,000 tons in the 1890s (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 36). The decline of copper ore in the 1880s seriously affected the *Norte Chico* and the economy as a whole (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 36). But the War of the Pacific (1879 -1883) against Bolivia and Perú contributed to a further expansion of the capital of the mining bourgeoisie and bankers for victory allowed Chile to annex the provinces of *Tarapacá* and *Antofagasta* from Perú and Bolivia (the *Norte Grande*)⁷⁸, an area abundant in highly marketable nitrate. The English capital controlled thirteen percent of the total nitrate production before the war (1879), to thirty four percent after it, in 1884 (Ortiz, 1985: 15). The small mining companies which had controlled the nitrate before were gradually legally displaced by a new *Codigo de Minería* in 1888, which replaced the *Codigo de Minería* of 1874 and the *Reglamento Salitrero* of 1878. In 1906, a new law delivered the totality of Chilean nitrate to the ruling political oligarchy, allied with English and also U.S. capitalists (Ortiz, 1985: 15-16). However, despite the prosperity, victory brought for the new nitrate owners, the rural *peones*, *inquilinos*, poor peasants and mine *peones*, who bravely fought in this war, continued living in misery and sacrifice.

⁷⁸ This region is also abundant in copper and silver but they were not crucial as nitrate at that time. Chilean territorial expansion meant also the appropriation of silver mines such as *Huantajaya*, *Santa Rosa* and *Challacollo*, and foundries such as *Caracoles* and *Peñablanca*, in the Peruvian and Bolivian provinces of *Tarapacá* and *Antofagasta*. In 1885, the annual production of silver reached 155 tons. In 1890 in the most important foundry, *Peñablanca*, there were forty-five furnaces, five steam engines and a labour force of five hundred (Vitale,

By the 1880s nitrate had become the main Chilean export and by 1890, fifty percent of Chile's total export income came from nitrate (Vitale, 1993: 68). Although seventy percent of the population of close to one million still lived in the countryside in 1885, rural migration to urban areas continued, the migrants attracted by industrial development derived fundamentally from the nitrate industry which allowed the development of infrastructure such as railroads, bridges, roads, telegraph, running water and the growth of manufacturing. Once the war ended, the National Manufacturers Association (*SOFOFA*), was created to organise national industrial development. Industrial growth between 1870 and 1895 was striking: in 1870, there were 241 factories, but by 1895, they numbered 2,449 (*Censo Industrial de 1891* cited in Bernedo, 1996: 343).

Company Towns and the Rise of the Labour Movement

The financial and mining faction of the ruling class invested in mining. Allied with British capital it controlled and owned the mining industry and its production, employing a growing number of wage workers. By 1850, company towns like the company towns in England, were established in the south of Chile, on land expropriated by the Chilean State from the *Mapuche*. According to the census of 1885, there was a strong proletarian enclave in the new coal zone in the *Arauco* Gulf

1993: 68-69). Mechanised work and wage relations had become predominant in mining though the system of *habilitación* still persisted.

where more than 5,000 miners⁷⁹ lived with their families and worked in the 21 *piques* (galleries) in the undersea mines of *Lota* and *Coronel*. They worked 11 hours a day in inhuman conditions, for an average of 1 *peso* per day⁸⁰. The major investors were Matías and Luis Cousiño and Federico Schwager whose coal competed with imported British coal which was needed for copper smelting and steel making. Matías Cousiño, "the embodiment par excellence of the development of Chilean capitalism at mid-century" (Zeitlin, 1984: 24), owned a high technology copper smelter which successfully competed with British foundries⁸¹. The coal mines in the *Arauco* Gulf had a more homogeneous mechanisation of the productive structure than copper mines (Salazar, 1985: 214). According to the *Censo* of 1885 (cited in Vitale, 1993: 69), the coal companies possessed fifty- eight steam engines and twelve locomotives of 473 horse power. But not only in the south were company towns formed but also in the annexed northern territory, where British and Chilean capitalists mined nitrate⁸² (saltpetre deposits).

The company town was an hermetic structure of domination under the control of managers. In the *oficinas salitreras* (nitrate mines) the company towns were groups of buildings of about one hundred metres

⁷⁹ My great-grandfather was one of them.

⁸⁰ A seasonal *peon* in a *hacienda* in 1875 earned 32 *pesos* a year.

⁸¹ Between 1858 and 1860, the ports of Valparaíso, Coquimbo, Huasco and Colcura received 112,000 tons of English and 129,000 tons of Chilean coal (Zeitlin, 1984: 24). Cousiño also possessed "major copper mines in the barren wastes of *Atacama* and rich silver mines in the hills of *Chañarcillo*" (Zeitlin, 1984: 24).

⁸² Indigenes began to mine nitrate in the northern territory in the 18th century (Ortiz, 1985: 12).

by fifteen metres separated by parallel streets ten to twelve metres wide. These buildings were divided into dwellings for single miners and for married miners. The fifteen square meter unmarried miners' room was shared by two miners and had no windows or yard. A miner's family comprising between four and seven people shared two rooms, one of which was the wife's workshop and shop. The other was the bedroom the family shared. A little backyard covered with a simple roof became simultaneously the kitchen and laundry, shared by hens and goats (Salazar, 1985: 221-222). According to a Parliamentary investigation in 1904 (cited in Salazar, 1985: 223), the homes were over crowded and poverty stricken and company towns were an uninhabitable place.

Despite the relatively capital intensive nature of mining, in 1840 labour comprised eighty percent of the costs of production (Salazar, 1985: 216). When wages rose by eighty percent between 1820 and 1840, the mining companies were able to defray these costs by devaluing the tokens in which the miners were paid. As their wages rose, so too did the prices of the goods workers purchased in the *pulperías* (stores) owned by the companies which paid the wages (Salazar, 1985: 217).

Rival retailers wishing to gain competitive advantage from the outrageous prices in the *pulperías* by setting up business close to the company towns, paid high contributions to the mine owners (Salazar,

1985: 223). However, some state land was rented at lower prices to entrepreneurs 'with influence'⁸³ in government who installed brothels and bars around the small nitrate company towns in the northern *pampa* region making on average one bar for every ten and a brothel for every fifty workers (Salazar, 1985: 223).

But other goods such as groceries, medicines, clothing and food were an exclusive commercial monopoly of the mine owners (Salazar, 1985: 223). Even though each worker had to pay one *peso* for health cover, they still had to buy medicines in the *pulpería* and to pay for hospital care. This commercial monopoly provided a good profit for companies. In the company town of *Tarapacá*, for example, a model compared to others for its labour relations, the *pulpería* produced a profit of \$15,000 (*oro*) per year, 15 percent of the capital invested in the maintenance of the company store (Salazar, 1985: 224).

The wages paid in tokens in the 167 company towns in the nitrate mines were almost totally recovered by the companies through the system of company stores and health insurance. Apart from housing, workers' rights almost did not exist. Accidents at work, illness, suicides and dismissal caused a continuous replacement of the labour force. During

⁸³Salazar (1985: 223) gives the example of the city of *Tocopilla* in the north in which capitalists carried out intense commercial activity related to alcohol and prostitution. For a population of 4,000 people, there were three large distilleries, more than 200 brothels with canteens and eight 'decent' brothels.

the early 1900s, apart from those sacked whose number is undetermined, between 5,000 and 7,000 workers were replaced annually, between 12 and 14 percent of the 48,500 workers employed in the 167 company towns. Of these, about 8 percent were killed or injured, about 5 percent were ill and 0.5 percent suicided. This situation of easy replacement did not encourage employers to improve working conditions but, to promote illegal immigration from Perú and Bolivia especially to their former territories (Salazar, 1985: 225).

The State, Property and Proletarianisation

The company town was a key instrument in the transformation of peasants into proletarians and it exemplified the social order the capitalists wished to impose on the whole country. The carceral system of control and discipline governing wages, work, leisure, living conditions, housing and consumption converted the seasonal *peonaje* into the proletarians upon whom capitalist relations of production depended.

[T]he frontiers between judicial punishment and the other institutions of social life, such as school, the family, the workshop . . . came increasingly to be blurred by the development of similar disciplinary techniques in all of them, and the frequent transfers which take place from one institution to another . . . a

kind of carceral continuum which covers the whole social body (Garland, 1993: 151).

In turn, the formation of company towns with the cooperation of the state was an important "step in the process of consolidation and accumulation of mining capital" (Salazar, 1985: 220). Police stations were placed within the company towns to prevent any disturbance to order caused by alcohol and to repress any social protest. In addition, in 1841 the mine owners asked President Joaquin Prieto to impose a nine p.m. curfew in all mines in order to prevent theft⁸⁴. The lights of the company town were turned off at nine and those who dared to go outside were punished with at least eight days work without pay (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 129). The company towns did not emerge only in isolated places in Chile, beyond the reach of the state. Many of them emerged in the heart of the *hacienda* country, through which the seasonal *peonaje* had strolled⁸⁵.

Thus, the company towns were not formed in Chile due to the absence of the state (Salazar, 1985: 220) nor did they replace it. The ideas of the liberal social contract had penetrated only the liberal section of the Chilean ruling class and while the state protected the rights of private

⁸⁴"*La Cangalla*", the illegal appropriation of silver by miners was a 'form of participation in production' according to them, but was robbery according to mine owners (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 128-129).

⁸⁵Porteous (cited in Salazar, 1985: 219) suggests, erroneously, that the state was replaced by the company town.

property, it did not protect the rights of propertyless citizens. As John Locke (1963) stated in Two Treatises of Government, citizens would provide consent to be ruled by the state only if the state protected their property. Those who possessed land and capital in Chile at the end of the 19th century were rich men, and the non-possessors, especially women and illiterate people, did not have the civil rights of citizens. The company towns were not foreign to this character of the state but were an expression of it for elements of the bourgeoisie played a leading part in the state, as has been discussed in Chapter Seven and will be seen further in Chapter Eleven. The State in which the mining bourgeoisie had a strong influence, protected company property and reinforced its inviolability.

Company towns were formed on indigenous land expropriated by the Spanish conquerors and later by the Chilean State. They were a product of the articulation of indigenous, seignorial and capitalist modes of production, and announced the dominance of capitalist relations of production in the new social formation. "[p]roduction relations in [some] mines and foundries were based not only on wage workers but also on a variety of mixed forms of production involving (as it still did in England during the same period) intermediary contracting and subcontracting relations between capital and labour" (Zeitlin, 1984: 46). Capital investment in new technology, the increasing separation of

workers from the means of production and importantly, the development of the capital and labour contradiction which manifested itself initially in the struggle for payment in money (see next section), meant that capitalist relations of production were becoming dominant, “based, in the first place, on mining” (Zeitlin, 1984: 23) and British investments in it.

Between 1820 and 1860, England received sixty percent of Chilean exports, mainly raw materials. In turn, fifty percent of Chilean imports came from England principally as manufactures (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 32). Nevertheless and simultaneous to the fact of dependency⁸⁶, British companies opened new markets, especially, for the mining industry and the financial sector, accelerating the process of capitalist class formation, the growth of the Chilean bourgeoisie and introduced new objects and means of labour, new forms of work while simultaneously, encouraging the growth and cohesion of the proletariat. In short, British capitalism significantly contributed to the development of Chilean capitalist relations of production and their inherently conflicting class dynamic⁸⁷.

⁸⁶I am only stating the fact of dependency here. The relationship between dependency and underdevelopment is discussed in Chapter Eleven.

⁸⁷ Due to this initial development, copper and coal, silver ore and nitrate production became more mechanised, but not to the extent of reducing the labour force. Various forms of labour persisted, such as free *pirquinaje* in minor establishments in which less than a dozen workers were employed (Zeitlin, 1984: 46). As in the UK, there were labour relations in which “the immediate employer of many miners was often another miner, who was at once boss, technician, and fellow worker, and in turn employee of the mine owner” (Zeitlin, 1984: 46; Segall, 1953: 25).

A rapid process of class cohesiveness, identity and consciousness took place in the working class throughout these years. The concentration of miners in the company towns and the work and living conditions there, contributed importantly to workers unity, solidarity and organisation (Salazar, 1985: 219). But wage relations did not bring payment in money but in tokens whose precarious value within a very limited sphere of circulation, the company store, meant in fact that the transformation of labour into a commodity was more virtual than real. However, the total separation of miners from the means of production was absolutely real, as was the absence of a religious and paternal relationship with their *patrones* as in the *hacienda*. The company town retained the token system of the *hacienda* but displaced seigniorial with bureaucratic and corporate relations.

The company towns were a mechanism of capital accumulation for Chilean mercantile capital allied with the English industrial bourgeoisie on which mining development depended (Salazar, 1985: 221). This process of capital accumulation impelled the new workers toward rebellion and not servility, their radicalism expressed in continuous upheavals. The company towns became the sites of a serious social crisis which was detonated by the massacre of miners by the Chilean army in the *Santa María* School in *Iquique* in 1907, during the miners' strike for payment in money.

As will be seen below, the 'social normalisation' of the company towns through the introduction of full wage relations (especially payment in money), was not the result of the companies calling for state intervention (Salazar, 1985: 221). The state primarily intervened, firstly with violence against workers and then by encouraging real wage relations, because the workers' campaigns for social change were very militant. Thus, ironically, the workers and their families in seeking improvement in their lives, finally proletarianised themselves by smashing the token system. Working class enclaves emerged around mining production through which the Chilean working class recognised itself as such and, from which (though not exclusively), the Chilean labour movement grew and developed. The company towns were the incubators of the labour movement.

The Formation of the Labour Movement

Production relations understood as relations of power, "[which] people enjoy or lack over labour power and the means of production" (Cohen, 1986: 13), had a clear, visible and obvious class expression in the extractive industries. This was manifest, on the one hand, in an accelerated accumulation of wealth by the Chilean bourgeoisie linked with the British industrial bourgeoisie (Larraín, 1991: 26) and in poverty increasingly rejected by the emerging Chilean working class on the other.

Although often short-lived, rebellions against the regime of company towns in the second half of the 19th century were important in the building of workers' sense of themselves and their power. Between 1849 and 1878, about one third – the greatest single number – of the twenty workers protests recorded, involved miners (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 133-134). This does not mean there was an organised, coordinated and strategic national or even industry-wide movement but in these early struggles the organisation and consciousness of an emerging proletariat was significantly forged. These struggles served to identify common interests and a common enemy forging a sense of unity and of the need for organisation in many workers.

The obviousness of the class abyss had already encouraged some Chilean intellectuals to write about the new class system which so negatively affected the lives of the majority. Radical liberals such as Francisco Bilbao and Santiago Arcos were inspired by the European project of modernity, especially by the French 'Encyclopaedists' (Witker, 1983: 41-43), and other Chilean intellectuals, such as Martín Palma and Ramón Picarte, by Blanqui, Owen, Fourier, Proudhon and Saint Simon, the Utopian Socialists. They challenged the conservative ideas promoted by Edwards' Newspaper, '*El Mercurio*' (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 137) and by the new capitalists such as Daniel Feliú, Carlos

Walker Martinez and Eduardo Matte, among many others (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 193).

Although “class struggle on the terrain of ideas” (Larraín, 1983: 161)⁸⁸, was a factor in the organisation of the labour movement, it was unable by itself to effectively overcome obstacles such as workers' illiteracy and their obvious lack of economic power and political representation. In fact, the utopian ideas mentioned above had a bourgeois-democratic character and were part of the movement which arose at the beginning of the 1850s and that nonetheless also contributed to the process of development of the working class organisation.

The first labour organisations were the *mutuales de obreros* (workers' mutual associations) organised to minimise the impact of unemployment, hunger, illness, disability and death⁸⁹. ‘Liberty, fraternity and equality’ was the slogan of the mutuals (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 167-169) but nonetheless, they were seen as a potential threat to the *status quo* by the dominant class and thus were rejected by

⁸⁸I adopt Larraín's expression instead of 'ideological struggle' because its meaning is more consistent with Marx's definition of ideology. For Marx ideology distorts reality for some ideas conceal contradictions. Thus, ideology cannot be a concept which names progressive ideas which are attempting to reveal these concealed contradictions. So, there is no 'ideology' of the working class, which in turn means that there is not struggle between 'ideologies'. Ideas, which are ideological, serve the interests of the ruling class, though sometimes these ideas did not come from the ruling class and are not ideological all the time.

⁸⁹Fermin Vivaceta was one of the most important founders of these labour organisations (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 168).

it⁹⁰. Workers at least realised that this form of organisation meant unity and solidarity and was potentially a social site in which, independently of the Church and their employers, they could share their problems and develop their interests as a class.

In 1879, there were sixty mutual societies in the country, forty of them legally established when the Chilean work force numbered 100,000 (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 167; Ortiz, 1985: 69). By 1890, mutual societies numbered 150 within a work force of 150,000 (Ortiz, 1985: 69), about half were legal and the first women's mutual societies were created in *Valparaiso*. By 1900, there were more than three hundred mutuels, about one organisation per 800 workers (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 191-266).

However, due to its cooperative character, this type of working class' organisation was unable to respond to the effects the capital-labour contradiction was producing in the proletariat. People worked fourteen to sixteen hours seven days a week. In the nitrate enterprises, the wage was irregularly paid, sometimes each two or six months or so, and miners were forced to ask for payment in advance and for credits in the company stores. Thousands of children worked as miners, an average

⁹⁰The Catholic Church in opposition to the mutuels, created workers' organisations whose mission was to instruct, moralise and unite Catholic workers. Rafael Angel Jara, Abdon Cifuentes and Domingo Fernandez Concha were some of the organisers of these organisations (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 171).

of one hundred children in each company town. Living conditions were characterised by malnourishment, poor clothing and substandard housing and the company towns looked more like concentration camps or prisons than villages and workplaces (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 276-280).

Thus did women and men experience their class. In this context, mutual assistance organisations were limited in their effectiveness. Although this had shown them they could organise in limited ways. The idea of resignation was not in the heads of hundred of thousands of women and men workers, but they did not yet have an organisation in which "they [could] live their own history" (Thompson, 1968: 11). New organisations were thus created out of the mutual societies and important leaders emerged who had been trained in and by the mutual movement. The "Unity is Strength" Society in the nitrate mines of *Negreiros*⁹¹, "The Great Maritime Union" of *Valparaiso* and *Iquique*; the Bricklayers' Union, the Shoemenders' Union, the Hatters' Union, the Painters' Union and the Tillers' Union were the first among many others (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 263).

But prior experience in mutual associations was not enough. The question of how to overcome conditions of exploitation and misery had

⁹¹ This workers' society led the great strike of 1890 (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 256).

to be worked out by the emerging proletariat. In this the comprehension of the relation between class domination and the control of political power was crucial in the formation of unions which saw the need for obtaining political power as a means of winning social justice. The leaders were influenced by communist and socialist ideas, which impacted strongly on them and contributed to the formation of unions and women's organisations within the labour movement in formation, with a clear working class political character. Such were Carmela Jeria, lithographer and journalist; Micaela Cáceres, the first president of the Women Labourer Society; Juana Roldán, member of the Democratic Party; Esther Valdés, journalist and founder of the Dressmakers' Association; Carlos Jorquera and Luis Emilio Recabarren⁹², the latter, a founder of the *Federación Obrera de Chile* – FOCH – (Workers Federation of Chile) and the *Partido Comunista de Chile*. Jorquera was a militant of the Democratic Party and early in the 1890s, he travelled to Europe and was strongly influenced by the *Communist Manifesto*. He helped to organise the Maritime Union of *Valparaiso* (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 263; Hutchison, 1995: 270; Vitale, 1993: 143; Salinas and Pollarolo, 1989: 72). Anarchists also formed clearly radical societies and unions but many of these were still characterised by mutual cooperation rather than by syndicalism.

⁹²For a more detailed account of the period in which Recabarren became the leader of the Chilean labour movement and the Communist Party, see Luis Emilio Recabarren (1976), and Fernando Ortiz (1985).

But class polarisation, the work of union leaders influenced by Marx and Engels' revolutionary theories, the development of the women's movement, the representation of workers in the political system through the Democratic Party and later through the Communist Party, encouraged workers to fight for their rights and transform their organisations into unions. Workers understood that struggle creates organisation and vice versa and the large number of diverse workers' organisations and social protests between 1884 and 1890, especially the great strike of July 1890, were proof of this.

There were at least sixty significant industrial conflicts and disputes in the country from 1884 to 1890 from the most diverse sectors of industrial production, almost two conflicts each month. The biggest conflicts were in the north (*Tarapacá*), Santiago, *Valparaiso* and the *Arauco* Gulf. Twenty four of them were in the northern company towns and docks; fourteen in Santiago; six in *Valparaiso* and the rest in other cities, especially in the southern coal zone (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 282-285). Another significant characteristic of these conflicts was that most of them were strikes with claims which included wage rises, an end to the system of payment in tokens and the freedom to buy (the end of *pulperias*) and the improvement of working conditions.

In July of 1890, huge strikes that began in *Iquique* in the north, spread to *Valparaiso*, *Santiago*, *Lota*, *Coronel*, *Concepción* and other smaller productive centres (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 296). The actions had a violent character for miners not only paralysed production but also attacked the hated *pulperias*. Ten to fifteen workers were killed in *Iquique*. In *Valparaiso*, women rioters lead men and children into the streets, attacking grocery shops and bakeries. More than fifty were killed (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 293-303).

The spread of workers' protests and growing levels of organisation brought an aggressive reaction from the conservative bourgeoisie which, through civil war, had already overthrown Balmaceda's liberal government in 1891⁹³. In fact, the conservatives blamed the liberals for the workers' upheavals identifying the secularism proclaimed by the liberals as their main cause. This in turn provoked workers to withdraw from the Catholic Church (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 291). In 1892, a law sent to the National Congress to legitimise the repression of strikes, encouraged workers to think that the labour movement could become stronger if it was united and organised nationally.

The *Congreso Social Obrero* (Workers' Social Congress) was formed in

⁹³About the Civil War of 1891, see Ramirez Necochea's *Balmaceda y la Contra Revolucion de 1891*, (1969) and *Antecedentes Económicos de la Guerra Civil de 1891*, (1951); also Zeitlin's *The Civil Wars in Chile*, (1984).

1902 bringing together 20,000 workers in 168 organisations. However, this organisation was divided over the limited and conciliatory views of some of its leaders, members of the Democratic Party and it dissolved in 1908. The *Mancomunal*, a national organisation formed in 1900, was an alternative for workers (Ortiz, 1985: 189) which had emerged as the forerunner of a unified national union. The *Mancomunal* attempted to harmonise the mutuals' tradition with the immediate needs of the proletariat, especially for wage justice. Between 1900 and 1907, during the "bloody years" the working class groped its way towards national unity which it finally reached in 1909 with the establishment of the *Federación Obrera de Chile* (Ortiz, 1985: 176). Although its class character was still not absolutely clear, in its action programme, the FOCH called in 1917 for the unity of the working class without gender, racial or religious discrimination. The formation of the *Partido Obrero Socialista* in 1912 contributed to the radicalisation of the proletariat and influenced the FOCH to become a revolutionary instrument of the working class. Communist workers from the nitrate, coal and petroleum industries led by Recabarren, sharpened the class focus of the FOCH which in December 1919, declared the abolition of the capitalist system as its strategic goal (Ortiz, 1985: 220).

The social relations of production changed in mining, in particular, in the company towns out of which capitalist relations emerged dominant

from the articulation of the indigenous, seigniorial and capitalist modes of production. During the 19th century, English capital in alliance with Chilean merchant-capitalists contributed to this transformation, of free *pirquinaje* into mine workers totally separated from the means of production. The new workers became a devaluated commodity and in reality, remained unfree, due to the payment in tokens which forced them to depend on the company stores and obliged them to live within the company towns. They became proletarian by fighting the oppressive and exploitative working and living conditions in the company towns and smashing the carceral system they epitomised and embodied which was protected by the Chilean State. The capital and labour contradiction exploded in the company towns and in these, the first workers' organisations were formed. In only seventy years, from the formation of the first mutual societies to the FOCH's programme of action, working class became a class for itself.

Chapter Ten

The Development of Patriarchal Capitalism:

Feminine and Masculine in the Bourgeoisie and Proletariat

In Chile during the second half of the nineteenth century, gender relations were decidedly patriarchal and this patriarchy was shaped by the processes of class formation which themselves were also significantly created by gender relations. Patriarchy not only creates and maintains gender inequality and the oppression of women by men, but it also differentiates men from one another in a variety of ways, including in the apportioning of the 'patriarchal dividend' which is not paid equally to all men. At the same time, class relations, which at times may seem anti-patriarchal in some aspects, are also implicated in the creation and maintenance of masculinities and femininities which have a decided class character. A *terrateniente* and an *inquilino* were indeed different men, and their different social identities were not accidental, haphazard or random but were fundamental to the class relations of the mode of production they inhabited and created.

In assuming women's oppression by men is 'natural' and that it should be accepted as such, patriarchal practice and beliefs are ideological presenting "a distorted consciousness [which] has a particular negative

connotation whose two specific and connected features are, firstly, that it conceals social contradictions and, secondly, that it does it in the interest of the ruling class" (Larraín, 1983: 28-29; 1979: 58; Callinicos, 1989: 139)⁹⁴. Conceiving patriarchy as the main contradiction in capitalism is ideological for it obscures the contradiction between capital and labour by which gender relations are shaped. In particular, it masks the sharply conflicting relations between seigniorial and bourgeois women on the one hand, and *inquilinas* and working class women on the other.

In contrast, historical materialism as a theory of practice, shows how women's anti-patriarchal struggles in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in ways which were not always straight forward or obvious, were fundamental in the formation of the working class and the labour movement and to the recreation, reproduction and renovation of Chilean popular culture in which the class and movement inhered. Proletarian women became the key actors in labour history and the history of the working class is the story of the struggles of impoverished women against patriarchy. They built the women's movement in Chile not in opposition to or separate from the labour movement but as part of it. This created its own dilemmas for at times significant matters developed and promoted by the women's movement were overshadowed by issues raised by male-dominated unions.

⁹⁴ See Chapter Nine, footnote 88.

A materialist understanding of class and gender formation reveals that as far as collective action is concerned, women are the active subjects of the women's movements as well as being, with men, constitutive of the labour movement and its actions. It is through this dynamic of structurally changing and intertwined processes of gender and class formation that culture and identities are constantly shaped and re-shaped, formed and deformed by the uneven development of the social relations of production and reproduction.

This position is in sharp contrast to Montecino's (1996) conception of gender, culture and identity (see also Chapter Three). According to Montecino (1996: 30), the cult of the Virgin Mary (*Marianismo*), acquires a specific cultural meaning in Latin America in the formation of the *mestizo* ethos. *Marianism* in its imagery of 'the mother and the son' reveals, she says, an historical tension which tends to be resolved by filling the empty symbolic place of 'the father' by *machismo*, a reproduction of the foundational opposition between the conqueror (masculine) and the conquered (feminine) (see Chapter Three). The *macho*, a violently masculine figure, is identified with the conqueror (Montecino, 1996: 30-33; see also Connell, 1995: 187), the *caudillo*, the general, the *guerrillero* (Caro, 1996: 2). The universal *Mariano* symbol

particularised by the *mestizo* ethos, Montecino (1996: 30-32) claims, is the matrix of all Latin American femininities and masculinities.

This perspective denies an historical conception of gender relations, for Montecino thinks that it is the role of symbols and not the history of social relations in which women have been immersed, which constitutes the social construction of gender. But gender constructions have by no means, been pre-determined and uniquely defined by a religious and racial fusion fixed in the past. Certainly *mestizaje* and religion were and are constituent aspects of Chilean gender identities, but they are not unique to them, let alone do they constitute the substratum of what Chile was, is and will be, for in fact, *mestizaje* and syncretism are consequences of the articulation of the indigenous and feudal modes of production, which had their counterparts through out Latin America.

In contrast to Montecino's approach, the following study of gender construction in the second half of the 19th and the early 20th centuries will focus on the formation of femininities and masculinities in the emerging bourgeoisie and proletariat. It will show that the development of the social relations of production were crucial in the formation of gender identities according to the dynamic structural relation between gender and class and their mutual formation. Thus, in gender formation in this period, class is decisive variable in so far as it

contributes to the specificity of the process of gender formation just as gender contributes reciprocally to the specificity of the Chilean class process.

Chapter Seven examined aspects of the different forms of patriarchy affected by and affecting the process of class formation in the first half of the 19th century. In the second half of that century, the development of the capitalist mode of production in the social formation established and promoted specific feminine and masculine identities. The 'feminine' and the 'masculine' were differently expressed and experienced by women and men according to their social class. Thus, while discrimination against women was ubiquitous, poor women were more discriminated against and more exploited than ruling class women, while the emerging capitalist system, like both the feudal and indigenous worlds from which it grew, was manifestly (and sometimes even singularly) beneficial to men of wealth and power.

At that time, the religious basis of feudal patriarchy was preserved and reproduced through the main social and political institutions, particularly through the ruling class family and the State. However, the expansion of capitalism impacted on patriarchy, especially on its Catholic foundation. While the *hacienda* reproduced and transmitted to the *encomienda* the Christian justification of male supremacy and the

principles of property and authority embodied by the *terratenientes mayorazgos*, these feudal relations were embroiled with a strengthening capitalism by the second half of the nineteenth century. The shift from agriculture to mining and from rural to urban living modified important views of life and society inherited from the colonial past. In particular, the Christian values on which personal and collective life were based and that had strongly informed gender construction, were challenged by the dynamic of capitalist relations, specifically, by capitalist modernity.

The Catholic Church was threatened by the bourgeois and liberal project of a secular state, by an educational system at whose centre was no longer God but “man” and “his” rational capacity to understand the material world. This rationalism re-defined, to some extent, the concept of patriarchy although Catholicism continued to influence public and private life more or less intensely. In many aristocratic, even liberal, families this influence was preserved, while for members of the dominated class the case was different. Their rejection of the system of *haciendas*, their emigration from rural to urban areas and the decimation of their men in the Independence and Pacific Wars shattered their families. Those who maintained the nuclear family in the traditional way, such as the *inquilinas*, kept the patriarchal Catholic faith, reinforced by and reinforcing their ignorance and domination by

landowners. But not so the seasonal *peones*, women and men who lived independently of the *hacienda*, for they could not constitute a nuclear family as the Catholic Church and the state required (Zarate, 1995: 153). Their sexual and familial relations, to an extent, lost their religious basis and justification and were in practice freer, less constrained by legislation and religion.

Santiago: City of the Rich

Constituent of the emerging capitalist mode was a new demarcation between private and public spheres but this was not as clear within the proletariat as within the ruling class. The capitalist class preserved male power in all spheres, by consolidating simultaneously, discrimination against and the exploitation of, women workers in paid work at the workplace or in the household and in unpaid work as well. Discrimination existed against wealthy women, but not class exploitation, for they exploited working class' women and men.

The urban landscape in which the ruling class lived was a physical expression of gender and class relations. The centre of Santiago, which contained the main institutions of the Republic, the Presidential palace, State offices, law courts and the Cathedral which had been built in the colonial times, formed the physical area of power in a city that still retained its colonial appearance (Bauer, 1975: 27). Surrounding this, a

ring of modern aristocratic suburbs was built which partially transformed the colonial city while preserving the squares, characteristic of Spanish colonial architecture. Paved streets, public lighting, new systems of water supply, new means of transport and European-style parks all constituted an urban expression of the new bourgeois prosperity (Brito, 1995: 30), consequent on, mainly, the development of mining, especially on the exploitation of nitrate after the 1880s. In the main urban centres of Santiago, *Valparaiso* and *Concepción* lived rich Chilean families in their European-style mansions. They dressed in the finest French fashions and the saloons of *Cousiño's* Palace for instance, were hung with marvellous Lyons curtains and the ball room was specially decorated in the finest Louis XVI style (Pereira, 1978: 95). These mansions were inhabited mainly by the wives and daughters of the rich and their retinues. Their relations with the Church and with the world of society – its balls, parties and picnics – provided their only access to the public world.

As well as preserving luxury and aristocratic traditions at home, the wives of rich men spent their time organising their servants, doing charity work and attending Mass and they continued their feudal task of moral surveillance on behalf of the Church (Pereira, 1978: 102-103). Servants did the domestic work and cared for their children until they were old enough to attend boarding schools (Pereira, 1978: 103).

However, this low intensity of familial relations did not undermine patriarchal authority. Family wealth and property were still controlled by the father, and the father, in particular, authorised his children's marriages, specially his daughters'. Rich men were concerned with financial matters, the state of their properties and businesses, political activities. With abundant time for leisure, they lead a busy social life filled with cock fights, horse racing and *rodeos* (Pereira, 1978: 102), spending little time at home.

In terms of citizenship, franchise was restricted to literate men which meant that only about twenty percent of the population could vote in the second half of the nineteenth century (Larraín, 1997: 2). Women still could not vote and under the Republic, they continued to be men's property, their primary function to procreate, as mandated by the still powerful Catholic Church (Vitale, 1993: 138). In this sense, neither the democratic aims of the liberals, nor the rationalism of modern times liberated ruling class women from their subordination.

Problems of the Public-Private Dichotomy

The subordination of rich women was sharply different to that suffered by poor women at the hands of the state, bourgeois women and men, and men of their own class as well. Thus, although patriarchal power relations extended across social classes, its expression and content

varied, as well as its intensity, accentuated by a triple condition of producer, reproducer and raiser of children which poor women alone, not men or rich women, bore in their entirety. As discussed in Chapter Seven, independent women from the countryside settled in urban areas, mostly alone with their children. They were incorporated into the paid workforce both 'formally' and 'informally', as a consequence of the predominance of capitalist relations. As Brito (1995: 27) argues, the public-private dichotomy, so strong and clear in the world of the rich, was not very evident to poor Chilean women. Instead 'the public' (paid work in the employer's workplace), 'the private' (unpaid work in the family house-hold) and importantly, paid work in the family house-hold were complexly integrated significantly eroding the public/private dichotomy sharply maintained in the world of wealth (Brito, 1995: 27). This flexible integration constituted the 'world' of poor women. Under this logic, employing women in industry did not mean detaching them from their families and thus undermining social reproduction in the family (Salazar cited in Godoy, 1995: 105). Working at home was not only about women's productivity but had to do with gender prescriptions which assigned different and hierarchically ordered social activities to men and women. However, this very dynamic led many women to question their dual workload and demand justice and equality. They fought against this double exploitation and against the gender subordination expressed in a *machismo* exacerbated and encouraged by

the state, in the army during the Pacific War, in the gender inscribed work place, and in the training schools for workers. They became active in the urban reshaping of grass-roots popular culture, in the construction of their own organisations and in the formation of the labour movement. They demanded equal pay and the elimination of labour discrimination (Salinas and Pollarolo, 1989: 74). With the birth of their own organisations, they increased their demands and fought the dictates of the patriarchal bourgeoisie.

Emigration to the cities meant either integration into or exclusion from capitalist production and the modernisation process. Some women entered the formal sector of production and others remained on its margins. A lot moved in and out of it at various times depending on the state of the money economy, their position in their life courses, the ages of their children and whether or not they were the sole income earners in their family house-hold. Many women had to raise their children and produce their own means of subsistence and that of others by washing, cooking, sewing, weaving and serving in aristocratic homes. In addition, many of them had to sell their products and sometimes their bodies in the streets. As Brito (1995: 37) says, women's homes were simultaneously their work places, the site of their material, social and spiritual production. Despite the expansion of capitalist industry in the

second half of the 19th century, women remained in street commerce, in washing and sewing, in domestic service and in prostitution.

By 1865, twenty percent of all women in Santiago were washers. Fifty eight percent of them were illiterate, the majority were widowed or married and their average age was 41 (Brito, 1995: 46). They washed in the tenement houses, using water running in ditches which created sanitation problems for their fellow tenants. However, their work did not lift them out of poverty. The cost of a dozen garments, washed and ironed, was 1.50 *pesos* at the end of the century, and the materials used cost 0.50 *pesos*. According to Brito (1995: 47), this income was absolutely insufficient in relation to the cost of living at that time. Many women gave their clients' clothes to the money lender in order to survive and then could not recover them and were prosecuted. Washers' reputation deteriorated. This stigma and the assumed compatibility between family tasks and sewing were important reasons why some women preferred to learn the dressmaking profession and by 1895 there were 53,389 washers and 117,086 dress makers (Salazar, 1985: 154). Between 1879 and 1883, 48,435 sewing machines were imported costing seven *pesos* on average and women had their own means of production (Salazar, 1985: 311). Their situation improved a bit but their humble home-workshops were soon displaced by textile factories in which they were systematically underpaid.

The other main occupation for women was in domestic service or *servidumbre*. Thirty four percent of all women working in Santiago between 1850 and 1920 were servants and their number increased from 16,820 in 1854 to 60,434 in 1920 (Salazar, 1985: 285). Most of them were illiterate, single girls who came directly from rural areas. Although figures for prostitution are unclear, prostitutes were mostly recently arrived migrants between 20 and 30 years old and most were illiterate (Brito, 1995: 57).

In 1854 women workers made up 45 percent of the total work force, rising to 55 percent in 1895. Only in 1920, once the war was over and more men returned to work, did women decrease to 40 percent of the total number of workers (Salazar, 1985: 155). Thus, the percentage of women workers was very significant, especially in periods of crisis, as during and after the Pacific War, periods in which women's paid labour was more significant than men's.

Tenements to Prisons

In 1813, only ten percent of the population lived in urban areas but by 1920, the proportion had risen to 43 percent (Salazar, 1985: 228). As the emigration to urban areas led by women grew, authorities responded by relocating the poor saying that the proliferation of *ranchos* (poor homes) would create sanitation problems in the cities.

But by 1895 there were still 5,272 *ranchos* in *Santiago* (Brito, 1995: 33). The aristocracy and the Church were dismayed by the social life of the poor and sought to force the women to live and work in *conventillos* (tenements), sets of rooms of twelve to fourteen square feet off a narrow corridor, sharing a common yard in which women carried out most of their productive activities and domestic work.

Tenements were miserable, dirty and violent places. Alcoholism, prostitution, overcrowding, lack of privacy, went hand in hand with verbal and physical violence, often murder (Brito, 1995: 38). Those living in *conventillos* were seen as criminals, servants or prostitutes by the Chilean aristocracy (Salazar, 1985: 299) and were treated with contempt and violence by the police.

In 1864, 2,380 individuals were processed by the justice system, including 150 women, one for each fifteen men. By 1873 this number had risen 57 percent overall, while the number of women jumped more than 260 percent (Zarate, 1995: 154) with the ratio now one woman for each seven men. Of each ten women imprisoned, four were dressmakers, two domestic servants, one a cook, one a washerwoman and two were women without a known occupation. Unemployed women involved in prostitution and gambling were punished with severe prison sentences. Independent women, the *vivanderas*, whose main income-

generating activity was selling food and drinks, and providing entertainment and accommodation for men in their miserable *ranchos*, were deported to the south of Chile (Zarate, 1995: 154).

The last census of the century which covered 1885-1895, recorded that the population grew eleven percent, while the unemployed grew 471 percent (Zarate, 1995: 155). In 1890, in this context of crisis and poverty under a supposedly progressive Liberal government - President Balmaceda's government - women were imprisoned in the same proportion as men and by 1898, women in jail outnumbered men two to one (Zarate, 1995: 155), their most common offences robbery and slander. Washerwomen and domestic servants were frequently accused of these offences and all women's offences were related to their lack of virtue which their punishment sought to restore by hard work, for the Sisters of the Good Shepherd (the *Congregación del Buen Pastor*) would teach those who loved crime to now love work in their *Casa Correccional de Mujeres* (Women's House of Correction).

Around three quarters of all women worked for money (Brito, 1995: 40), both within and outside of the formal sector. In fact, the formal sector reflected the contents of masculinity and femininity provided by patriarchy which defined male and female occupations. In this way, "tough" and "heavy" work, such as mining, building, cattle farming

were for working class men. Occupations for women, such as cooking, dressmaking and washing, among others were related to the domestic sphere which, according to the patriarchal state and the Church, could not be abandoned by women, even if they were working in the formal sector.

Poor women worked in both paid and unpaid work but many women did paid work outside of workplaces, in the tenements in which simultaneously, unpaid domestic work must be done. Overall, two thirds of the female working population did their paid work outside of workplaces such as factories or workshops during the second half of the 19th century. Between 1865 and 1920, an average of thirty six percent of workers were women (Brito, 1995: 41).

But the liberal ideas of *laissez-faire* capitalism did not easily corrode the colonial legacy of patriarchy which the conservative segment of the ruling class accommodated to the new labour relations brought about by capitalism. Although the new market in services provided by women's work benefited capitalists and merchants, the social life generated by it were disapproved of by the Catholic Church even while the services of women were enjoyed by the elite to which its leadership belonged (Brito, 1995: 46).

Education and the Gender Division of Labour

Illiteracy constituted a significant barrier to women's opportunities for paid work and a better life. It was more a consequence of the class structure rather than of patriarchal conditioning, for illiteracy equally affected working class men, though patriarchy was coherent with the class dynamic. However, at the end of the 19th century, some industrial schools for women and men workers were created by the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril* (SOFOFA, Manufacturing Employer's Association), which needed skilled labour for its manufacturing strategy. SOFOFA was an institution created in 1883 by the liberal section of the bourgeoisie - supported by the state - whose objective was to organise the growth of the manufacturing sector (Ramirez Necochea, 1986: 187; Godoy, 1995: 76).

Women's schools were more successful than men's and women's enrolment was larger than men's. For instance, in 1905, women students numbered 684 and men enrolled in male schools numbered 271 (Godoy, 1995: 87). The first of the girls' schools, known as *Escuela Profesional de Niñas* (Professional School for Girls) (Godoy, 1995: 71) was created in 1888 in Santiago and by 1906, there were twenty five. Between 1888 and 1898, an annual average of 143 diplomas were granted. Diplomas on linen manufacture, dress making and commerce were the most common. The aim of education was twofold: to

capacitate women workers as part of SOFOFA's manufacturing strategy, while retaining them as outworkers for they were taught that some work was 'more appropriate' for women than men, that women's occupations must be compatible with home duties and consequently deserved lower wages (Godoy, 1995: 74). According to the *Estadística Industrial* (cited in Godoy, 1995: 93), in the clothing industry in 1909, men received 4.51 *pesos* and women 2.10 *pesos* per hour.

Education was also characterised by an emphasis on discipline and morality for female and male *peones* had to be transformed into industrial workers. The rootless, rebellious, informal and daring character of *peones* must be changed. In addition, these schools had a marked patriarchal character, which was expressed in support for the bread-winner ideal in which a man is responsible for the material well being of his family, of which he must be the *patrón*. In times of peace, marriage and establishing and maintaining a family was the goal for single women and their formal occupations must be consistent with it. Washing, ironing, sewing and cooking were seen as accomplishing these two ends. The industrial and the domestic gender divisions of labour in the public and private spheres were mutually determining and supporting (Godoy, 1995: 102).

Gender and *Machismo* in the Labour Movement

As well as “men’s mutuals”, the first women's mutuals emerged and in Valparaíso in 1887, the “Women Labourers Society No 1” was created. Micaela Cáceres was the first president and its membership numbered 150 women. In 1888, the Women’s Emancipation Society was formed in *Santiago* (Vitale, 1993: 143), and in 1890 women actively participated in the strikes that shook Chile in July, and in the streets fighting that broke out in *Valparaíso* (Ortiz, 1985: 131). In 1894, the South American Women Workers' Society was founded in *Iquique* and in 1907, more than eight thousand miners marched with their wives and children towards the *Santa María* School where the Chilean army killed more than one thousand miners for demanding payment in money instead of tokens in the company towns (see Chapter Nine) (Ortiz, 1985: 176).

Two years after this bloody massacre, the *Federación Obrera de Chile* was founded. It called twenty nine strikes involving more than 200,000 workers. Between 1905 and 1907, a fortnightly socialist-feminist paper, *La Alborada* (The Sunrise), was established and read mainly in Santiago and Valparaíso. In 1913, women’s action lead to “The Legislation for Chairs” which obliged employers to provide chairs for women factory workers who had to work standing (Vitale, 1980: 98-104).

However, despite women actively participating in the formation and development of the Chilean labour movement which aimed for radical social change including women's emancipation, the movement nonetheless reproduced hegemonic male and female practices (Hutchison, 1995: 259). The prevailing gender segmentation of labour was reflected in the labour movement itself. This included the persistent identification of women with sexual virtue and the domestic sphere and of men with full time and paid work despite the obviously different circumstances in which Chilean women and men workers actually lived. Heavy work was only for men too, even though it was also done by women and from these erroneous beliefs about production and gender can be traced the sexist development of the Chilean labour movement, in which unions representing workers in male-dominated industries became powerful at the national level. The unions representing "male" industries such as mining, stevedoring and building became more powerful within the labour movement than unions representing women workers in occupations such as washing, sewing and *servidumbre*.

Even male leaders who fought for equal pay for women were seduced by patriarchal ideas. Thus Luis Emilio Recabarren called on unionists to demand equal pay for men and women and to restrict the number of children working in factories and workshops (Recabarren, 1976: 205).

He saw as did most male workers, women as a dangerous competition in the labour market. Women were paid lower wages than men by their *patrones* and were preferred to men. Equal pay would make men and women equally competitive in the labour market and remove women's advantage over men. But Recabarren's comprehension of the problem of the integration of women into the workforce was limited by the patriarchy he shared with his rulers. He thought that in the long term, a larger workforce would result in cheaper labour so women should remain in unpaid work and should become wage earners only in cases of extreme material need. Recabarren (1976: 209) even thought that it was a condition in the new freer society he was seeking to build that "daring male intelligence" required the "tender and sublime female intelligence" as its complement. Although as a Communist he believed that a socialist society must be classless, he thought that patriarchy and paternalism had a place in the new world.

Chapter Eleven

Underdeveloped and Dependent Capitalism, and the Struggle for Hegemony within the Ruling Class

As was seen in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, the *terratenientes'* resistance to change in the *hacienda* contrasted with the rapid development of capitalist mining promoted by British capital in alliance with the merchant-capitalist section of the Chilean ruling class under pressure from workers' organisations. This tension between production relations in agriculture and mining can be understood as an expression of the articulation between the capitalist mode of production itself, and the semi-feudal or seigniorial institutions preserved in the system of the *hacienda* (Larraín, 1989: 187). This articulation was expressed in class relations, gender relations and also in terms of state formation, the subject of this chapter.

The struggle for hegemony between different factions of the ruling class was decisive for the way capitalism developed in Chile and for the type of capitalism which emerged there. Firstly, there was a struggle between landowners and an alliance of bourgeois miners and bankers during the 1850s. Secondly, the Civil War of 1891 opposed a minor fraction formed by the copper, silver and coal mine owners on the one

hand, against a broader alliance comprising nitrate miners, merchants, bankers, English capitalists and landowners on the other. The victory of the broader alliance contributed to the underdeveloped and dependent character of capitalism in Chile.

However, Larraín (1989: 471; 1989: 160) suggests that a third alternative of development may have resulted from the conflict between the ruling class' fractions. Echoing Cardoso's and Faletto's (1979) theory of 'associated dependent development', Larraín (1989: 470-471) argues that the chances of achieving 'dependent capitalist development' rather than an 'independent capitalist development' (which failed) or a 'dependent capitalist underdevelopment' (which prevailed) would have been enhanced if the defeated mining fraction would have succeeded.

Although this option was more plausible than an 'independent capitalist development'⁹⁵ - due to the undeniable impact on the world of the industrial revolution in England - Larraín's proposition of a 'dependent capitalist development', as well as the other two options, would not have meant the end of social contradictions in Chile because of its bourgeois character. This form of development would have certainly meant growth of the productive forces and it would have increased the wealth of the ruling class but, inevitably, it would have been accompanied by

⁹⁵ Which the President Balmaceda only formulated but it seems to be that he did not know how to implement this, or even, if its implementation was possible (Zeitlin, 1984).

exploitation, poverty and sharp social inequalities. Although Cardoso, Faletto and Larraín argue that dependency and development are not always antagonistic processes⁹⁶, this does not mean that this alternative contains the resolution of contradictions and social inequalities inherent in the capitalist mode of production, which constitutes the main obstacle for human emancipation. Larraín's (1989: 161) definition of this road of development is consistent with this. 'Associated or dependent capitalist development' is for Larraín

a form of development sustained by foreign investment (especially by multinational corporations) in association with internal capital through the import of technology . . . which cyclically produces, as in any other process of capitalist development, increased wealth and the progress of productive forces but also increased proletarianisation, marginalisation and poverty.

Beyond speculations, it should be said that it was the process of class

⁹⁶ The aim of Cardoso and Faletto (1979) was to study dependency in specific historical circumstances because capitalist development and dependency are not equal or uniform processes everywhere. This view became a strong critique of the 'group' of theorists of dependency such as Amin (1977), Emmanuel (1972) Gunder Frank (1969) and Wallerstein (1979; 1974), whose common argument was that dependency and development are irreconcilable. For them, capitalism, as a world system, is mainly characterised by the dichotomy between centre-periphery in which dependent societies are seen as general objects of study, abstract and a-historical (Larraín, 1991: 3). They thought that the centre-periphery dichotomy was a result of the transference of resources through the unequal exchange mechanisms within the international market (Larraín, 1991: 3). Within these studies of dependency, Gunder Frank's (1969; 1970) theory of 'development of underdevelopment' is well known. Similarly, Emmanuel's (1972: 263) 'unequal exchange' theory argues that unforeseen centripetal forces are drawing all wealth towards certain poles of growth - the industrialised nations - which causes the impoverishing of the periphery.

formation, tensed by the development of capitalism in Europe, which defined the specific circumstances through which capitalism became dependent and underdeveloped in Chile. As Larraín (1989: 160) points out,

[d]ependency is not an 'external' factor which causes necessary internal effects but a general condition which can only express itself through internal class conflict.

The change in the configuration of the alliances within the ruling class from 1850 to 1891, showed the ruling class becoming more homogeneous supporting the alternative that succeeded. Only a minority faction remained in dispute with the broader faction formed against the Balmaceda government in 1891. This is consistent with the pace of working class and labour movement formation. Thus, while the ruling class was frequently disunited, it is feasible to argue that indeed it only finds coherence in its opposition to the working class. When the working class is weak or unformed, fractional struggle is unhindered and may be more intense. In fact, as shown in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, before the 1890s, the working class was less formed and weaker than it was after these years and this historical fact is politically and chronologically coincident with the degree of ruling class disunity before the 1890s. The development of unity and cohesiveness within

the ruling class towards the end of the century came at a time in which the labour movement was developing and the class struggle between the ruling class and the working class was evident. Thus do classes not only form themselves, but form each other.

Fractional Struggle in the 1850s: Landowners Versus Merchant and Mining Capitalists

The seigniorial agricultural system was frequently criticised by foreign and national capitalists during the second half of the nineteenth century. The bourgeoisie fiercely condemned its inequalities and injustices, the social relations of *inquilinaje* and *peonaje* and their derivations and especially the lack of productivity caused by the *hacienda* system. However, in spite of these views, the introduction of some machinery and a purely formal redistribution which kept most rural property in the same hands, the *hacienda* remained largely unchanged and the landowners continued using the state to maintain the *status quo*⁹⁷.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the *terratenientes* were the dominant ruling class fraction within the state, even though European enlightenment notions of political democracy and liberalism

⁹⁷ Although conservative *terratenientes* dominated in agriculture, modern capital investment still penetrated there. The central region's flour-milling developers were mining magnates themselves or were linked by trade to the mine owners (Bengoa, 1988). However, landowners appropriated a sizeable percentage of the mining bourgeoisie's surplus through taxation and fiscal policies that they themselves promulgated (Zeitlin, 1984: 37-38).

were ascendant at the moment of the independent Chilean Republic. Conservative landowners adapted well to the changes necessary to remain part of colonial ruling class and later made the transition to become rulers in the republican state. After the instability⁹⁸ which preceded the consecutive conservative governments between 1831 and 1861 (Vitale, 1993: 57), the 1833 Constitution⁹⁹ institutionalised the hegemony of this oligarchy. The very composition of the parliaments until 1850 – as seen in Chapter Seven - showed how distant from political power the liberals were, though they were in control of the emerging mining industry. The struggle between *Pipiolos* (liberals) and *Pelucones* (conservatives) in the 1850s, revolved around the political conflict between democracy and authoritarianism, an expression of the fractional struggle of mining and merchant capitalists against the agrarian *señorío*.

The issue of hegemony had focused the landowners' minds on their control of political power which they asserted and defended using the state political and military apparatus to protect their properties. The state led by aristocratic landowners resembled more the Lockean property-based model than Rousseau's conception of democracy. The Lockean liberal social contract between the state and citizen was

⁹⁸ The seven years between the end of O'Higgins' government in 1823 until 1830, were known as "the years of anarchy" or the "political learning process" in the new Republic (Bernedo, 1996: 249).

⁹⁹ The merchant Diego Portales, the ideologist of the conservative sector of the Chilean ruling class was the creator of this constitution, which inaugurated three authoritarian governments. Authoritarianism was in this way institutionalised and legitimised.

understood as the defence by the state of the lives, liberties, and estates of citizens who in turn provided consent to be ruled by the state (Locke, 1963: 395). The Chilean State under landowners' control reflected, as stated above, this contract between the landowning class and the state, for citizenship was based on private property and patriarchy. Hence only wealthy men exercised economic and political power. Thus, the Chilean State was in 1850 a centralised and authoritarian body, a faithful reflection of the landowners' authoritarianism (Ramirez Necochea, 1984: 22), the *hacienda* regime translated into the polity. In Zeitlin's (1984: 33) words, the Chilean State was

a highly centralised, unitary, and hierarchical political apparatus, yet it was also a State in which were inscribed the legal and juridical principles of the inviolability of private property and equality before the law, of freedom of movement and travel (i.e. of a free labour market), of freedom of contract and trade, and freedom of press and assembly . . . the 1833 Constitution even stated rhetorically that not only was equality before the law assured but also . . . in Chile there is no privileged class.

The bourgeois liberals sought to change this form of state, that is, changing Portales' authoritarian model of the state into a republican state (Larraín, 1997: 2), for they were inspired by the French

democratic project which rested on the social contract based on the principle of people's general will (Rousseau, 1988: 74; Held, 1991: 75). Bilbao, Arcos¹⁰⁰ and Vicuña Mackenna were three of the most radical representatives of this fraction of the ruling class. Some scholars such as Witker (1983: 41) and Donoso (1940: 178) see them as radical democrats rather than liberals for they expressed their desire for social change vehemently, as Francisco Bilbao (cited in Zeitlin, 1984: 36) did when he said

so long *inquilinaje* endures in the *haciendas* . . . so long as the omnipotent influence of the *patrón* over subaltern officials persists . . . no [political] reform will be solidly established”.

In the same vein, in 1856 Vicuña Mackenna (cited in Zeitlin, 1984: 36, f.n. 34), from exile in England after the unsuccessful insurrection of 1851, called for the “break up of the triple form of oppression of the *inquilinos*: the concentration of landownership and civil and military authority in the same hand”. Moreover, the liberals thought that the influence of the Catholic Church in social, economic and political life had to be minimised for they thought that the Catholic religion caused backwardness, irrationality and ignorance which they challenged by encouraging secular education.

¹⁰⁰Arcos was a banker's son and with Bilbao, organised the Society of Equality (Witker, 1983: 43).

However, the liberal critique and its project of change were rejected by the state authorities. Landowners in commanding political positions developed a strategy to preferentially stimulate and economically support infrastructure works in the central valley such as the construction of railways, roads, bridges and irrigation canals so that overwhelmingly their own estates concretely benefited (Zeitlin, 1984: 40-41). In contrast, the first railway line in the country built in the *Norte Chico*, from the mines near *Copiapó* to the smelters and port of *Caldera*, had to be entirely financed by the liberal mine owners themselves in the absence of state support. Montt's government provided direct financial support only to the central valley railway lines, the lines useful for landowners (Zeitlin, 1984: 40). In addition and unlike the northern mining railways, the vast majority of the *Santiago-Valparaíso* Railway's stockholders were Central Valley landowners in top positions within the state; eighty four percent owned land within the railways catchment area (Oppenheimer cited in Zeitlin, 1984: 41).

Regarding landowners' economic and political power, the emerging bourgeoisie preferred, tactically, to demand the reform of the state through legal means. The liberal activists, who had been very influenced by French Republican ideas, wanted "a federalist, decentralised, and parliamentary democratic state" (Zeitlin, 1984: 35).

They demanded the limitation of executive powers; the enlargement of manhood suffrage; direct popular election of the Senate as well as of the Chambers of Deputies; provincial and local autonomy; and popular elections of intendants, prefects, governors and judges (Zeitlin, 1984: 35). However, these reforms meant the abolition of the 1833 Constitution. This reform was not acceptable to the *terratenientes* who impeded any reform of the system. When these objectives could not be achieved within the existing institutional framework, in 1851 the liberals called for the formation of a Constituent Assembly of the People from which a new constitution could be enacted to replace the 1833 Constitution. This required, according to Zeitlin (1984: 35), the abdication of the President and his Council of State, the dissolution of Congress, of the tribunals and of the state's regional officialdom.

insulated from the fluctuation and insecurities of the market . . .
the countryside, under the domination of the large estate,
spawned no independent or self-governing peasant villages . . .
local civil and military officials and landlords were all but
identical (Zeitlin, 1984: 44).

The conservatives would (and perhaps could) not move. Consequently, those who owned large estates and were hegemonic in the state, the

conservative and aristocratic landowners, were politically and militarily challenged by the mining and agrarian capitalists in 1851 and 1859.

As Zeitlin (1984) advises, an examination of the 1851 and 1859 insurrections¹⁰¹, their geographical location and class composition, origins and activity of the insurrectionists and their opponents, not only provides valuable information about the character of these conflicts but helps explain why the struggle for hegemony was so crucial in the development of the state and even more importantly, in setting the basis for capitalist development.

The aristocratic *terratenientes* owned most of the land of the central region of Chile (see Chapters Seven and Eight). Capitalist mill owners lived in the south of the central region and mine owners were located in the northern mining region, mainly in the *Norte Chico*. In these latter two regions, the insurrections occurred, notable battles taking place in the areas between *Talca* and *Concepción*, below *Curicó*; in *San Felipe* in the valley of *Putaendo* on the northern end of the central zone and in the mining district of the *Norte Chico* (Zeitlin, 1984: 42).

Of the 145 largest estates in the country in 1854 . . . only four

¹⁰¹ For a detailed account of the 1851 and 1859 insurrections and the Civil War of 1891, see Zeitlin's (1984) work of "great historical penetration" (Larraín, 1989: 470), The Civil Wars in Chile or the Bourgeois Revolutions that Never Were.

were located below *Curicó* . . . *San Felipe* [was also] known as an obstinate center of liberal agitation . . . dairy products, fruits and vegetables, and wine were produced for *Santiago's* and *Valparaiso's* markets, not by a labour service tenantry on the large estate but . . . by independent yeoman farmers among whom there was a relatively 'equitable distribution of land' . . . [but the] epicenter of the revolutionary movement in 1859, however, was in the northern mining provinces of *Atacama* and *Coquimbo* . . . where the class relations unique to early capitalism were decisive in the entire production process (Zeitlin, 1984: 42-45).

A large number of mine owners were active in their opposition to the old order and "two out of three of the leading insurrectionaries of the 1850s belonged to the mining bourgeoisie" (Zeitlin, 1984: 49). Moreover, of the eleven leading revolutionary intellectuals, eight were from mine-owning families (Zeitlin, 1984: 53) who were themselves or were linked to merchants' and bankers' families including Vicuña Mackenna, Arcos and Bilbao. In addition, among the leaders there were some landowners. Among the 1850's rebel leaders, one in four were landowners, but they were not aristocratic landowners fighting against their own state for they were, at the same time, commercial mill and mine owners. Therefore, "[i]f the leading insurrectionaries who

were from the mining bourgeoisie, or who were south central flour-mill owners, are sorted out, these seemingly “revolutionary aristocrats” all but disappear: it turns out that, in fact, four of the seven rebel landowners were also mine owners” (Zeitlin, 1984: 53).

As Zeitlin (1984: 53) affirms, "if the mine owners, grain-mill owners, and industrialists are understood as the personification of "productive capital" at this historic moment, then 71 percent of the leading insurrectionaries were drawn from the specific capitalist segment of the dominant class”, that is, these insurrections had a clear bourgeois character. They were “abortive bourgeois revolution[s] led and participated in directly by the bourgeoisie itself” (Zeitlin, 1984: 280). However, the rebel forces could not defeat the army and they continued the conflict through political means through parties representing their own interests and those of new fractions formed within the ruling class between 1860 and 1891.

The Political Representation of the Ruling Class Fractions

The political parties in the Chilean Parliament represented different fractional interests and it is possible in them to observe the development of a new configuration of fractions and alliances within the ruling class which erupted in a third armed conflict in the second half of the 19th century, the Civil War of 1891.

In the social turmoil created by the uprisings of the 1850s, the contending fractions, the seigniorial landowners and the bourgeois capitalists, were politically represented by the *Partido Conservador* (Conservative Party) and the *Partido Liberal* (Liberal Party), respectively. The Conservative Party was mainly comprised of landowners and merchants of the central region. Its main electoral base was those families who lived on their *haciendas*, particularly between *Aconcagua* and *Talca* (Vitale, 1993: 155). Concern over land ownership and support for Catholicism set the foundations of the Party Program. The Liberal Party was consolidated in the 1850s. This party was mainly made up of the mining and financial bourgeoisie and also by some landowners of the southern zone of the central region, the flour milling area.

A secular tendency formed within the Conservative Party which was drastically rejected by the party conservative Catholic mainstream. In this way another conservative ruling class party, the *Partido Nacional* (National Party), was created in 1856 (Vitale, 1993: 156). A process similar to the split in the Conservative Party occurred among the Liberals. Because of the defeat of the 1850s insurrections and the subsequent pact between the Liberals and Conservatives, a tendency of the former left the Party and created in 1863 the *Partido Radical* (Radical Party), a secular party linked to the Masons and strongly anti-

clerical. It was the main voice of the artisans and independent small merchants, representing the interests of the petite-bourgeoisie though many commentators found it difficult to distinguish from the Liberals¹⁰² (Vitale, 1993: 159).

The *Partido Democrático* (Democratic Party) was founded in 1887. This was the first party to campaign for social change and reforms in favour of the majority of workers although its class character was not clearly defined. The most important leaders of this party included Malaquias Concha, Abelino Contardo and Agustín Cornejo who came from the Radical Party and soon after its foundation they were joined by leaders of the Mutual Societies (Vitale, 1993: 167). The party's programme included the protection and development of national industry; constitutional change; an elected judiciary; increased taxation on big capital; the right of *Mapuche* to independence and land; the end of the expropriation of *Mapuche* land by the Chilean State and capitalists; and the enactment of women's rights. Although progressive, the programme contained no reference to agrarian reform to challenge the main obstacle to industrialisation and internal market development, the power of the landowners (Vitale, 1993: 170). The Democratic

¹⁰² In 1875, another section of the Liberal Party formed a new party called the *Partido Liberal Democrático* (Democratic Liberal Party), founded to support the presidential campaign of an anti-oligarchic candidate, Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, one of the most important agitators in the 1851 insurrection. This was the first populist party in Chile. Because of an electoral pact with the Conservatives, it lost support and disappeared (Vitale, 1993: 166).

Party declined as a result of differences over tactics and strategy and its marked populist and electoralist accent (Castañeda cited in Recabarren, 1976: 11). Workers' leaders Carlos Jorquera and Luis Emilio Recabarren led a tendency representing within it working class interests and in 1912 Recabarren formed the *Partido Obrero Socialista* (Socialist Workers' Party) which renamed itself in 1922 the *Partido Comunista de Chile* (Communist Party of Chile) (Vitale, 1993: 171). The Conservative, National, Liberal, Radical, and Democratic parties were the most important parties which represented class and fractional interests and were also expressions of the process of change in Chilean society, especially, of the process of class and state formation processes in the second half of the 19th century.

The Constitutional Crisis of 1891 and the Road to an Underdeveloped and Dependent Capitalism

As seen above, the 1850s revolutions and the formation of new political parties were part of the dispute for state control, a political struggle that became more acute at the end of the 1880s. The insurrections of the 1850s were considerably different to the 1891 Civil War in which Manuel Balmaceda, the Liberal President, was dismissed. The 1850's rebellions expressed the rejection by the bourgeoisie of the *señorío* in agriculture and the landowners' hegemony in the state. Both the infrastructure work in central Chile and the tax policies of the

Conservative governments in favour of landowners and to the detriment of the mining bourgeoisie, were clear examples of the latter (Vitale, 1993: 62).

The Civil War of 1891 was not a simple confrontation between Conservatives and Liberals. Balmaceda himself was a Liberal whose family were Castilian-Basque Spaniards and landowners. Politically, the Conservatives did not grow like the Liberals who despite the military defeat in the rebellion of 1859, later won executive government, controlling the vertical and authoritarian structure designed by the 1833 Constitution which they had criticised earlier. Although militarily the Conservatives were not defeated, they conceded – under duress – politically to the Liberals to keep intact their economic interests. The political framework changed and deals were done between the Conservative Party led by *terratenientes*, and the Liberal Party representing the secular liberals. The Liberals governed from 1861 to 1891 through the successive governments of José Joaquín Pérez (1861-71), Federico Errázuriz (1871-76), Anibal Pinto (1876-81), Domingo Santa María (1881-86) and José Manuel Balmaceda (1886-91) (Vitale, 1993: 57) but the *latifundia* was untouchable.

In these thirty years, the state encouraged manufacturing and capital investment and modernised the infrastructure, education and labour

relations, the latter only nominally, especially in agriculture (see Chapters Eight and Nine). The influence of the Catholic Church on the state declined, but this did not mean that the Church ceased to be influential in Chileans' lives. By 1875, the Liberal governments had established secular education, freedom of religion, secular cemeteries and civil marriage (Vitale, 1993: 159). Thus, the Liberals changed aspects of the political physiognomy of the country, but even so, the *terratenientes* preserved their dominion in the countryside and continued to be privileged remaining, for example, exempt from the wheat export tax (Vitale, 1993: 63).

However, by 1891 the situation had changed yet again. Two external military campaigns not only changed the geographical shape of Chile but also its economy and politics. Firstly, the victory in the War of the Pacific (1879) against Bolivia and Perú secured an area abundant in copper, silver and importantly at that time, in the highly marketable nitrate. Secondly, the genocide against the *Mapuche* in 1883 and the expropriation of their remaining land, changed the economic epicentre of the country, encouraged migration from the *haciendas* to the main cities, to the south and to the nitrate region of *Tarapacá*.

However nitrate did not only bring prosperity and its exploitation generated conflict between two new fractions of the ruling class which

split over the position of the state in relation to English and Chilean investments in the nitrate industry. One side wished the state to use the revenues from nitrate production to assist industrialisation of the country. This position was supported by copper, silver and coal mine owners lead by the President of Chile, José Manuel Balmaceda.

The other fraction was wider and economically more powerful and comprised Chilean capitalists who were owners of the nitrate companies and members of the Congress, English investors in nitrate and *terratenientes*. These men desired a liberalised economy without state intervention in which unfettered private enterprise, foreign capital investment and the export of raw materials would be the main elements of capitalist development in Chile. This conflict found its expression in a political struggle between the Executive and the Congress over the reform of the political system and the replacement of Presidential rule by a parliamentary system.

Balmaceda's Project of National Development

The nitrate boom of the 1880s and 1890s attracted English capital which began to monopolise the nitrate industry. By 1879, "on the eve of the war [of the Pacific], British nitrate controlled about thirteen percent of the total private investment in nitrate. By 1884, its share rose to an estimated thirty four percent . . . " (Zeitlin, 1984: 80). In 1890,

seventy percent of the total Chilean exports went to England and forty percent of the total Chilean imports came from there (Gazmuri, 1996: 373). Balmaceda's main concern became how to protect national capital from the increasing presence of foreign investors in the nitrate industry. His class allies in copper, coal and silver mining were disadvantaged by the high demand for nitrate from the international market, and sought state assistance. Balmaceda, using the executive power of government in opposition to his Congress, developed a plan for national development, to be financed, to a great extent by nitrate revenues.

Balmaceda's plan aimed to encourage and protect increased national capital investment in the mining industry and in industrial development and to stimulate industrial growth by removing any restrictions on it such as John North's railway monopoly, opposed even by Chilean nitrate capitalists. To achieve this he sought to utilise the state's vast nitrate tax revenues (Zeitlin, 1984: 103) to encourage industrialisation which had seen 1,872 factories created between 1880 and 1895¹⁰³, a growth of more than three hundred percent on the number of factories in 1879 (Bernedo, 1996: 343).

¹⁰³ Although Balmaceda died in 1891, his government was in the centre of this period of industrial growth.

Balmaceda projected a state investment of 200 million *pesos* over ten years in industry, transport, communications and public education (Zeitlin, 1984: 82). Steam locomotives and 1,200 kilometres of public railroads were constructed, importantly, the railroad from what is now Mendoza in Argentina to central Chile and from Santiago towards *Araucanía*. Three hundred bridges were built, ninety of steel, including the great *Mallleco* Viaduct, still admired as an engineering achievement. Several public buildings such as the School of Medicine, the *Escuela de Artes y Oficios* (Technical College) and the Ministry of Public Works were built (Bernedo, 1996: 334) and running water and gas lighting improved urban living conditions and landscape. Telegraph lines were also extended and the number of telegraph offices grew. Wharves and new ports were constructed as well (Zeitlin, 1984: 83). Primary schools were built and 35,000 children were enrolled during the Presidency of Balmaceda . In 1888 the Catholic University was inaugurated as a private university, the professional School for Girls was created and in 1889, the Pedagogic Institute began to train secondary school teachers. In the new *Escuela de Artes y Oficios* (now the University of Santiago), a laboratory to explore the potential of electricity was established (Bernedo, 1996: 334). But entry to the University of Chile and the Catholic University was restricted to wealthy young men.

These achievements were made possible by “the abundant revenues available to the state from export taxes on the burgeoning nitrate industry in Chile’s recently annexed great northern desert “ (Zeitlin, 1984: 82). The strategy of reinvesting the surplus of state revenues in physical and social infrastructure and industrialisation was crucial for Balmaceda who was conscious of the weaknesses of an economy dependent only on raw material exports, above all, on nitrate, the most marketable product at that time. He was especially aware - against expert opinion - of the possible replacement of nitrate by a new artificial product as happened after World War I (Encina cited in Zeitlin, 1984: 83).

The question was, could the state, as the *Balmacedistas*’ wished, lead industrial capitalist development in Chile directly by becoming the main owner of and investor in the nitrate industry and through the nitrate revenues boost the country’s manufacturing industry and infrastructure works for national development? How to achieve this strategy was not clear to Balmaceda and his supporters and the plan worried not only foreign capitalists but members of the Chilean nitrate oligarchy as well, regardless of whether they were liberals or conservatives.

The emerging Left was also critical for although modernisation brought slight material and social progress, its capitalist character limited social

development and equity in Chile. Balmaceda's strategy did not include a just distribution of wealth or improved social justice. Unemployment, exploitation, payment in tokens, the expropriation of *Mapuche* land and the miserable working and living conditions of poor women (Zarate, 1995: 155; see also Chapter Ten), characterised the 1880s and 1890s. Poor people were marginal to the modernisation and development. Initiated by Liberals in the 1860s, Balmaceda's project of the 1880s was not different.

This meant that the replacement of Conservatives by Liberals in Executive Government did not bring prosperity for most. Political democracy was class biased for political participation and the decision making process were exclusive to the male ruling class. After the 1850s, a conservative oligarchy was replaced by a liberal oligarchy in the Executive, but this did not change the class character of the power relations within the Chilean State. Similarly, the later struggle between Balmaceda's fraction and the nitrate bourgeoisie was within the same class framework. National development was marked by the structural determinants of class and gender expressed as state power. Consequently, the fractions sought to protect their economic interests by controlling the state for, though some bourgeois - perhaps Balmaceda himself - honestly believed in national development to benefit all people, others saw the state only as the protector of their own interests

rather than as the leading institution for a capitalist development that would benefit all Chileans (Zeitlin, 1984: 75; Vitale, 1993) (as we will see further below). Thus, the fraction of Chilean and British nitrate capitalists protected their particular interests when they opposed the interventionist state that would regulate foreign investment including their own. They wished to control the state to keep it out of their business and in this way to increase their fortunes.

In addition, although the Balmaceda government talked about national development and sovereignty it was not anti-imperialist. Balmaceda did not enact any law against foreign investments and although the President attacked the 'Nitrate King' John Thomas North's monopoly of the transport of nitrate, he did nothing to control British investment in mining (Zeitlin, 1984: 99) which grew under his government. Even the government's policies towards North were aimed mainly at his nitrate transport monopoly in *Tarapacá* rather than at his investments in twenty enterprises elsewhere in Chile (Zeitlin, 1984: 100). Balmaceda's anti-imperialism was more rhetoric than action. He aimed to nationalise the nitrate industry but at the same time allowed the British to continue investing in Chile. During his government,

twenty-one British nitrate enterprises were organised in Chile from 1886 through 1890, and this 'boom' in British nitrate

reached its peak in 1888-1889. No less than 18 enterprises were founded in these two years - 7 in 1888 and 11 in 1889. No restrictions on their activities were imposed . . . In fact, most of these 21 British nitrate firms were founded by North or his close associates; 11 of all 21 (and 9 of the 18) were North enterprises (Zeitlin, 1984: 100).

All these are important considerations to bear in mind when capitalist development in Chile is discussed in the context of the Civil War of 1891.

The Isolation of Balmaceda within the Ruling Class

As noted above, the economic and political opposition to Balmaceda was primarily represented by four opposition groups the *Liberales* 'Suelto' ('Loose' Liberals), *Nacionales* (Nationals), Liberals and Radicals who formed an alliance known as *Cuadrilatero* (the Quadrilateral Alliance) which operated in the National Congress until 1890 (Bernedo, 1996: 338).

But this was not the only opposition that Balmaceda faced from the ruling circles. Bankers who were major leaders to national and foreign nitrate capital and to a lesser extent, to landowners, became his enemies as well. The collapse of copper caused by the shift of capital investment

towards nitrate and by competition with U.S. copper in the international market, precipitated a crisis in the copper industry which led Balmaceda to suggest putting the “public fortune on the side of the copper industry” (Zeitlin, 1984: 154) owned by some of his allies. Balmaceda was also very inclined to the idea of starting a State bank. It is not strange thus that “several of Chile’s principal bankers, among them Agustín Edwards Ross and Augusto Matte Pérez, were leaders of the anti-Balmaceda insurrection” (Zeitlin, 1984: 118), or that North and other Chilean and British nitrate capitalists contributed to Balmaceda’s defeat by supplying soldiers from the northern mines and by giving financial support for the war (Bernedo, 1996: 332).

Chilean nitrate mining capitalists were the allies of British capital and the latter, as Carmagnani (1976: 203) argues, were the link between the mining and the agrarian sector still dominated by seigniorial class relations. In this way an interdependency between these two sectors was established whose main link was the financial and commercial sector. By this link but above all, by the pivotal role of English capital, landowners were incorporated into the “nitrate alliance”. Although *terratenientes*’ interests were not touched by Balmaceda’s plan, there was an important aspect of state intervention which landowners did not like, the “colonisation” of *Mapuche* land by new European settlers organised by the Chilean State. The landowners did not defend

Mapuche land rights but they wanted to extend the system of *haciendas* towards and into *Araucanía* and emphatically rejected the state-organised immigration of settlers.

Nevertheless, it seemed to be that the colonisation of *Araucanía* did not affect their properties and their interests, at least in the short term and they benefited from the growth of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, railways and ports (see Chapter Eight). In contrast to the “deadly threat of Balmaceda’s policies to the bankers and nitrate capitalists . . . none of these policies appears to have posed the same sort of imminent danger to the great landed families” (Zeitlin, 1984: 133). Apart from the influence of the “nitrate alliance”, why specifically did *terratenientes* oppose state intervention in the South? They saw in state organised settlement a threat to seigniorial production relations in agriculture and they realised that in the long term, growing urbanisation and proletarianisation in the factories and workshops and in the mining industry and, the proliferation of secular schools even in the countryside, negatively affected their interests because they brought the possibility of change to the inhabitants of the *hacienda* (Zeitlin, 1984: 132). Moreover, the nitrate boom could seriously affect the supply of labour to *haciendas* for mining had already stimulated thousands of rural workers to migrate from the countryside to the north.

Paradoxically the nitrate alliance, especially English capital, used the threat of modernisation encouraged by the state to attract landowners to their alliance. The introduction of foreign capital does not automatically and immediately destroy the 'prior' mode of production, in this case, the seigniorial mode of production (Carmagnani, 1976: 203). Indeed, the alliance between English capital and the seigniorial landowners linked by the financial sector was an important factor in the maintenance of seigniorial relations in agriculture and in the reproduction of important aspects of these relations in the company towns (such as the nominal 'freeing' of labour). Payment in tokens common in the *fundos* lasted until the first decade of the 20th century in mining (Carmagnani, 1976: 203; see also Chapter Nine), when workers through their struggles - and not the mining bourgeoisie - forced real wage relations into mining.

Thus, once landowners became part of the alliance, the *Cuadrilatero* and the Conservatives in the National Congress sought to reduce Presidential power in order to stop the national development strategy and to achieve their own industrial and commercial agendas. Several times the President was forced by the Congress to sack Ministers and change Government policies until at the end of 1890, he refused to do so again. Congress rejected the budget and Balmaceda responded by

imposing it. Congress declared this illegal and dismissed him. Civil war began.

On the 7th of January 1891, the Navy rebelled against the government. Ramón Barros Luco, the President of the Lower House and Waldo Silva, the Vice-President of the Senate, aboard a naval vessel commanded by Captain Jorge Montt from a prominent ruling class family at *Iquique*, the nitrate city, formed a provisional junta led by Montt. They launched an insurrection which lasted until September of that year in which 10,000 people were killed, among them, Balmaceda, who committed suicide in the Argentinean Embassy after his forces were defeated (Bernedo, 1996: 338). The Chilean nitrate capitalists who supported and actively participated in the nine months' civil war against Balmaceda, were precisely those he sought to represent and whose interests he identified with the nation's fate. They turned out to be the main base of the insurrection against him, especially those in the Congress whose private investments would be at risk if public capital lead to independent Chilean economic development (Zeitlin, 1984: 102).

Thus through violent means, the mining and rural oligarchy re-organised the state and the political system into a new predominantly although not manifestly parliamentary system which undermined Presidential power (Bernedo, 1996: 340), even though, according to

some scholars, the process of real decision-making occurred neither in the Executive nor in the legislature but in social clubs like *El Club de la Union* (Bernedo, 1996: 356). The real power conflict was not between the ruling class and an autonomous state, as Blackemore (cited in Zeitlin, 1984: 72) argues, nor between national development and British imperialism - as dependency theorists like Gunder Frank (1969) and Vitale (1993: 64) claim, nor yet between a centralised state apparatus and the parliamentary system (Vives, cited in Zeitlin, 1984: 72). Contrary to Encina (cited in Zeitlin, 1984: 72), this was a struggle within the oligarchy, as Castedo's (1984: 17) argues, an intra-class conflict.

Driven by the fear that state enterprises would compete with foreign capital and make them dependent on state decisions, members of the same class, even ex-comrades and friends, entered into a fratricidal struggle. At stake was the surplus from the nitrate industry which would be taken by the state to develop the nation and so restrict the expansion of new private capital. Balmaceda wished in fact for an interventionist state but he did not realise or measure how it would affect his own class and the reaction of it against him. Nor did the Chilean capitalists realise that Balmaceda's own policies (towards North for example, as noted above) were inconsistent with his strategy and that the President and his advisers had "no coherent program for

capitalist development; nor were they consistent anti-imperialists . . . [i]t was only as the *Balmacedistas* groped toward such a program in practice that they found themselves, almost unawares, engaged in an attempt to subvert their class in order to save it" (Zeitlin, 1984: 102).

The class structural dynamic in Chile, led the majority of the Chilean oligarchy to oppose the proclaimed but poorly conceived project of national development. "[T]hese specific capitalist elements of the dominant class became Balmaceda's most desperate enemies" (Zeitlin, 1984: 133) and the unifying nationalism they had encouraged during and after the War of the Pacific, the national identity and patriotism forged in a context of nationalist hatred and the death of thousands and thousands of *peones* and peasants was ignored. Their private interests were the nation's. As stated above, it is not that Balmaceda's dismissal was a result of political conflict between elements of the state, between executive and legislative prerogatives, or the product of an imperialist conspiracy. The Congress was used by the Chilean capitalists to reverse Balmaceda's increasing independence of Congress. When political means proved insufficient to protect their interests, insurrection was the answer. British capitalists contributed financially to the rebellion but this does not mean that the main contradiction was between the centre and periphery. The armed political conflict was an expression of the struggle between fractions of the ruling class whose economic interests

clashed. The paradox is that it was a successful capitalist insurrection that “put an end to Balmaceda’s own unwitting capitalist revolution from above”(Zeitlin, 1984: 133).

The dispute for state hegemony by fractions of the ruling class was not the only conflict affecting the country in the 1880s and 1890s. Chapter Nine outlined the spread of workers’ protests and the proliferation of their organisations during the second half of the nineteenth century, above all, in the 1880s and 1890s. The corollary of the rapid and intertwined processes of organisation and struggle was the huge 1890’s strikes. While Balmaceda fought his own class, 10,000 nitrate strikers marched in *Iquique* and in July, the main cities of the country were shaken by a new force, “the socialist movement is no mere spectre in Chile; it is a growing menace and a very grave problem” (*Diario La Union de Valparaiso* cited in Zeitlin, 1984: 139). The nitrate capitalists demanded the state immediately repress the strikers (Zeitlin, 1984: 140) and the Congress demanded energetic action. Balmaceda in the end, betrayed those nitrate workers who had been his electoral supporters. Not surprisingly then, they ignored him when he called on them in the midst of the Civil War to fight the exploitative oligarchy in league with foreign capital (Zeitlin, 1984: 141).

The ruling class, frequently disunited before 1890, became more cohesive after the events of 1890 and 1891, when it found coherence in its opposition to Balmaceda's plan of national development and confronted a working class which had experienced growth in unity, organisation and capacity for collective action. Prior to the 1890s, fractional struggle in the ruling class was unhindered and intense for the working class was weak and newly formed.

Chapter Twelve

Polygamy, Capital Expansion, the Invasion of *Mapuchemapu* and Chilean Nationalism

The tension between communal, seigniorial and capitalist relations of production in *Mapuchemapu*, in agriculture and mining in Chile and the reactionary nationalism generated by the Chilean ruling class during the wars of the 19th century, severely impacted on the *Mapuche*. These processes contributed to political conflict and division within *Mapuchemapu*, the annihilation of *Mapuche* by the Chilean army and the loss of their land. They were the main forms that articulation between *Mapuche*, seigniorial and capitalist modes took in the 19th century at the economic, social and political level, specifically in the processes of class, gender and political formation.

Until this time, a kind of seigniorial system combined with elements of *Mapuche* tradition existed, a product of the processes of articulation between the feudal and indigenous modes of production through which communality was transformed into inherited *cacicazgos*. Before the Spanish invasion, *Mapuchemapu* was not centralised and hierarchical, a sense of unity and solidarity among its people always present when its sovereignty was threatened. *Mapuchemapu* was formed of autonomous

family groups or clans known as *lofs* or *regues* (see Chapter One), the bases of pre-conquest *Mapuche* communal organisation. These autonomous communities were united only in defence of their territories. The *Mapuche* recognised themselves as a people and were aware of their political independence and but did not need a state to materialise that conviction. However, after three centuries of articulation with the feudal mode, a hierarchical and centralised structure of power known as *cacicazgos* developed weakening the sense of unity and community within diversity such that commitment to independent nationhood varied from one group to other. Importantly, these changes also meant that *loncos* or *caciques* used the patriarchal structure of polygamy to build their economic and political power. Marriages between members of different *lofs* resulted in political-military alliances that formed large lineages (Mariman, 1997: 2) during the 18th century which became known as *cacicazgos* in the 19th century. However, not all *cacicazgos* were the same. Articulation is not a uniform process and the intensities of the mercantile, political and social contacts *cacicazgos* had with colonists and later, with Chileans, differentiated the *Mapuche*. During the independence wars, some became allies of the colonists and others of the Chileans. Those who lived closer to the frontier with Chilean territory, the *Abajinos*, were permeated by foreign influences and sought integration with the Chilean State. The other *cacicazgos*, especially the *Arribanos*, opposed this and

preferred to preserve their political independence but feared, once the Republic was established, that invasion was only a question of time. The tension between seigniorial and capitalist relations in Chilean agriculture and mining caused an expansion of Chilean territory towards *Mapuchemapu*, in a campaign of annihilation encouraged by a reactionary and chauvinist nationalism.

Two main processes resulted. Firstly, *Mapuche* communal system of production based on hunting and gathering that, as a result of the articulation of the modes, transformed into a kinship-based system of cattle raising and agriculture. This involved a fundamental change in production from the labour reciprocity that characterised communality, to a social and gendered division of labour in which polygamy was a key mechanism in the concentration and centralisation of power in large *cacicazgos*.

Secondly and simultaneously, polygamy operated politically to form alliances between these different *cacicazgos*. Although the division of labour is an internal group process and alliances were external to the group, these were mutually dependent processes and were regulated by polygamy insofar as broader alliances implied more polygamous marriages which resulted in more land, more cattle and a greater amount of labour to control. In this respect, polygamy also played a key

part for it was exclusive to *loncos* and contributed to expand their *cacicazgos* and in this way increased the number of female and male workers at their disposal. Economically then, polygamy empowered the *loncos* by reinforcing and increasing their control over the land through alliances and through the generation of a class and gender division of labour. Polygamy economically differentiated men into monogamous producers and polygamous non-producers while women were used as commodities, producers and reproducers by patriarchal men. Polygamy operated within groups producing class and gender differentiation and empowering *loncos*, and externally it enhanced the political power of *loncos* by expanding their control of land.

Thus, polygamy and the changes in production (from gathering, hunting and horticulture to cattle raising and agriculture) led to the formation of an embryonic non-producer class (*loncos*) and of a producer class (women and men *conas*) in the nineteenth century. Politically, polygamy contributed to the concentration and centralisation of power within *cacicazgos* especially in the two main *cacicazgos*, *Arribanos* and *Abajinos*, the territorially largest groups in *Araucanía*. However, the different courses of articulation in each group, generated a deep political disparity between them in relation to the Chilean State. This led other communities to follow one or other of these two major groups. *Arribanos* who succeeded in attracting other *cacicazgos* to

form the largest alliance in *Mapuchemapu* led the struggle against Chile. The *Mapuche* realised that the landowners' conviction that the land regained from the colonists by the *Mapuche* must be part of the Chilean nation, threatened the very existence of the *Mapuche* nation. In addition, the loss of polygamy as an economic and political institution through the actions of Catholic missionaries and the Chilean State, fundamentally undermined the *Mapuche* political economy. The *Arribanos* and later the *Abajinos*, considered that the threatened loss of land and the destruction of polygamy left them no choice but violent defence.

Polygamy, Economic Power and the Division of Labour

Until 1883, *Araucanía* was an independent nation of about 100,000 (Bernedo, 1996: 322; Faron, 1968: 11) comprising *Abajinos* (or *Nagpuleche*); *Arribanos* (or *Huenteche*); the *Pehuenche*; the *Pampas* (or *Puelche*); and The *Ultra Cautin's* Small Groups of *Mapuche*. As stated in Chapter Six, after 200 years of articulation with the seigniorial mode of production, the *Mapuche* communal mode underwent deep changes in the way it produced and reproduced its social life. In these changes in the 19th century, the modification in the control and distribution of productive factors, fundamentally land and labour, led to a social division of labour different to that prior to the conquest, in which a relation of subordination and dependency of producers to non-

producers occurred in the dynamic interaction between polygamy and production.

The *Mapuche* economy was based on cattle raising and agriculture in the 19th century, although some groups such as the *Pehuenche* remained in subsistence economy. This new mode of production overlapped in significant aspects the seigniorial mode developed in the colony (see Introduction). However the seigniorial mode and the *Mapuche* mode in the 19th century differed for land in *Araucanía* was not commodified and kinship relations meant that labour was neither paid nor free, like in the *hacienda*. Thus, the *Mapuche* mode of production in the 19th century was a complex patriarchal kinship-based system of production characterised by the transference for the use of the *lonco* (or *cacique*) of the labour of *conas* surplus to that needed for the family's subsistence and economic reproduction. The surplus labour was used directly on the *lonco*'s land and for his own benefit.

In *Arribanos* and *Abajinos cacicazgos*¹⁰⁴ an extra economic surplus larger than that required to satisfy the need of the community was generated, which in turn developed commerce within and outside of *Mapuchemapu* and contributed to the concentration and centralisation

¹⁰⁴ Although in minor scale, the *Mapuche* groups of *Valdivia* and *Toltén* developed agriculture too (Bengoa, 1996: 59).

of political power. As a result of this, *Mapuche* unity was undermined. The minor *cacicazgos* such as *Pehuenche*, languished economically (Bengoa, 1996: 59).

The growth of cattle raising and commerce in *Mapuchemapu* in times of peaceful co-existence with the Spanish colony and the Chilean State, deepened the social division of labour in *Mapuche* communities. The internal structure of communities became more steeply vertical and hierarchical and these transformations reinforced the patriarchal character of *Mapuche* gender relations, grounded in *loncos*' practice of polygamy which in turn served to firm *loncos*' control of land and wealth.

Traditionally *cacicazgos*' land was communally owned and was not the personal property of *loncos* (Guevara cited in Vitale, 1993: 214-215). In practice, *loncos* allocated the land to their followers. If in the 18th century *loncos* were still involved directly in some way in the productive process, they were not in the following century. The *loncos* *Cañoepán* and *Painemal*, for instance, were no longer direct producers but became great lords commanding the *conas*, tied to them by kinship to perform agricultural tasks. Seasonal work was performed by their wives and the main burden of production rested heavily on the labour of male and female *conas* (Bengoa, 1996: 79, 58).

The *conas* possessed a few domestic animals and satisfied their own needs by working on a piece of land allocated by a related *lonco*. Simultaneously, they worked for the *lonco* as servants, warriors, cowboys and farmers (Bengoa, 1996: 60). The *lonco Colipí* had seven wives and a great house in *Purén* that looked like a *terratenientes'* house. The *conas* lived in one wing to serve him and protect him from robberies and assaults. They received no payment for their labour (Bengoa, 1996: 60).

The traditional forms of labour known as *mingaco*¹⁰⁵ (Bengoa, 1996: 58; Faron, 1968: 19) and *vuelta de mano* (Faron, 1968: 19-20) lost their communal character in the *lofs* replaced by a new and marked division of labour. For instance, the familial and festive character of the harvest was maintained, but not the reciprocity of the original *mingaco*, for surplus had become an exclusive patrimony of the *loncos*, especially in cattle raising for the stock was now the property of the *lonco* and cattle meant wealth. The shift from subsistence communality to agriculture and cattle caused bride price inflation and bride price sometimes reached corrals of animals (Bengoa, 1996: 60).

The other co-operative form of labour *vuelta de mano* (exchange of hands) involved reciprocity between two men over many years, even

¹⁰⁵ *Mingaco* was also introduced into the system of the *haciendas* in the colony (see Chapter Eight).

over generations (Faron, 1968: 20). This continued to exist but rarely was there a reciprocal relation between *loncos* and *conas* of the large *cacicazgos* but only in minor lineages. The practice continued mainly between producer families during harvesting, threshing, and winnowing.

Women and the Division of Labour

Women's work in the nineteenth century did not differ much from that of the colonial period (see Chapter Six). *Mapuche* women frequently worked in agriculture and always did the domestic work. While unmarried, they performed domestic and farm chores under the supervision of their parents. Once married, they served their husbands under the supervision of their husbands' parents, especially their mothers-in-law (Faron, 1968: 32-35). Gomez de Vidaurre (cited in Santa Cruz, 1978: 33) narrated that *Mapuche* wives very often plowed the soil, sowed grain, harvested, threshed, looked after the horses and sheep, sheared wool, milked cows, collected firewood, cooked, did the cleaning and made all the clothing. Faron (1968: 15) and Lenz (cited in Bengoa, 1996: 59) affirm that women continued performing these tasks during the 19th century.

Lonco's wives were direct producers too, at least in seasonal agricultural work and having many wives was directly beneficial for the *loncos*. The *lonco* was the complete owner of their wives and their property and none of them, not even his favourite, was ever allowed to sell, lend or give anything away (Santa Cruz, 1978; 33).

Polygamy, Marriages and the Inequitable Wealth of Men

Mapuche married distant relatives almost without exception but not in a haphazard fashion.

[M]en from lineage x married women from lineage y but give their daughters in marriage to men of lineage z, never to men from lineage y, which would constitute incest . . . In terms of genealogical categories, the ideal form of marriage in the *Mapuche* scheme is “mother’s brother’s daughter” marriage” (Faron, 1968: 43-44).

Marriage was an economic contract under the rules of *Admapu* (see Chapter Six) and had three parts: elopement (which included the bride’s capture by the groom), negotiation and formal ceremony. After the elopement or in its absence, the principal members of the two families met and tried to reach a preliminary agreement about bride price and dowry and discussed the wedding ceremony itself. A *lonco* gaining land

through his marriage included as payment his finest horses, cattle and sheep, and he and his family provided for the wedding. The wedding party lasted several days after which the wife went to live on his land now possibly augmented by the use of the land of his wife's lineage (Faron, 1968: 44-45). If the groom was a *lonco's* son, he was given land by his father which was considered as the main item in the bride price (Faron, 1968: 46).

Although divorce did not exist, second marriages were common especially amongst *Mapuche* men. Women who returned to their parents' land lost their lineage rights for a woman was valued by being married and by living with her husband's lineage, and a men who left his lineage to live in his parents wife's land lost his too, for a men must remain with his father's group to validate his lineage-based right to land (Faron, 1968: 48). In general, separations affected women and their children more negatively than men for "separation worked to the disadvantage of those offspring who leave with their mother. They have no lineage-based rights on their mother's reservation" (Faron, 1968: 48).

Once married, reproduction was women's main task. *Loncos* "want[ed] many children and place[d] great value on women who produce[d] many children who survive[d] infancy" (Faron, 1968: 34). A *lonco* with ten

wives could have fifty children, a large number of *conas* directly linked to his *cacicazgo* who were his labour force and warriors. Having many children was a source of pride for a married woman living in her husband's lineage (Faron, 1968: 34) and infertility was a cause of separation and disgrace, although infertile women were not always divorced if they were physically attractive and were good workers (Faron, 1968: 35).

For *conas*, the married life was quite different for, as stated in Chapter Six, poor men without land, political power or cattle, could hardly afford one wife, seldom two. Polygamy became exclusive to *loncos* because the possession of wives necessarily involved the accumulation of cattle and vice versa. Moreover, the economic differentiation between polygamous and monogamous men increased by the higher and higher 'prices' wealthy men could pay for women. As Donaldson and Good (1988: 23) said, "only a very wealthy man had more than two wives, and [leaders] were both wealthy and polygamous . . . [polygamy inevitably] "became both a cause and a consequence of leadership . . .". Cattle raising, farming, trade and the organisation of warfare were all in the hands of the powerful polygamous *loncos* who exercised ultimate control in agricultural production, social reproduction and political organisation (Donaldson and Good, 1988: 24).

Lineages were more or less extended depending on *loncos*' economic capacity to form alliances and accumulate wealth. To expand their territorial possessions and political power, *loncos* cemented their alliances with other families throughout *Araucanía* by polygamous marriages. In this way, some *loncos* became more powerful and wealthy than others, controlling entire regions and representing their communities or *cacicazgos* to the Chilean State authorities (however, they did not represent the state to their people).

Loncos' economic power allowed them to use polygamy to gather or 'collect' wives which made them stronger and more powerful within the *cacicazgo* generating a sharp division of labour in the productive process. Giving animals in exchange to the *lonco* of brides' lineage, by establishing bigger families in their territories by marrying women from other communities, and from this exchange, to be able to use more land in and around their community, *loncos*' economic and political power was enhanced.

Simultaneously, the generalised exchange of women increased the control of the land by sealing political and military alliances between *Mapuche cacicazgos* through marriage (Bengoa, 1996: 127). Economically power was a *sine qua non* of polygamous alliances with other groups as the possibilities of them depended of *loncos*' wealth,

that is, on the amount of land he controlled, the cattle and horses he possessed and thus, the number of wives he could buy. Numerous wives, large amounts of land, abundant cattle and more labour, and their success at *malón*¹⁰⁶ enhanced their military capacity through which some of the surplus of other groups was acquired. In these ways, some *loncos* enhanced their ascendancy over other *cacicazgos* and the smaller and weaker *cacicazgos* were almost forced to ally to larger groups (Bengoa, 1996: 127).

The social organisation of *Mapuche* was crucially based on polygamy and land and their relationship. For instance, the most powerful *lonco* among the *Abajinos*, *Lorenzo Colipi*, had twenty four wives. One of his sons, *Luis Marileo*, had seven (Bengoa, 1996: 72-73). The close connection, through bride price, of wealth to polygamy allowed *loncos*, specially the *loncos* from the main groups, to pass on their sons the power they had inherited from their own fathers and thus to dominate entire regions over time (Bengoa, 1996: 69).

The Main Alliances in *Mapuchemapu*

Polygamy tended to centralise *Mapuche* political power which was increasingly exercised by the most important *loncos*. Families were

¹⁰⁶ The practice of *maloqueo* or *malón*, regulated the wealth of the *cacicazgos* through violence and the theft of cattle.

linked over more than 200 kms., from *Loncoche* to *Malleco*. The *Aburtos* of *Loncoche* joined by marriage the *Paillalef* of *Pitrufquén*, and the latter joined the *Manquilef* of *Quepe*, the *Vilu* of *Maquehua* and the *Neculmán* of *Boroa* (Bengoa, 1996: 126). By the mid-19th century, political and military power was exercised by about sixty *loncos*, the most important decisions made by no more than ten to twenty of them (Bengoa, 1996: 126).

The largest, economically and politically most powerful groups, *Abajinos* and *Arribanos*, were the two centres of political alliances for *Mapuchemapu*. The differential intensity and frequency with which they interacted with Chileans produced opposed views and attitudes towards Chile with whom their political relations were sharply different. During the struggles for independence the *Abajinos* were allies of the Chilean Republicans and the *Arribanos* of the colonists. The *Arribanos* remained enemies of the Chilean Republic and only when invasion was imminent, did the *Abajinos* fight with them against the Chileans.

The largest alliance in *Araucanía* comprised the *Arribanos*, *Pehuenche* and *Pampas* who together controlled about 6 million of nearly eight million hectares (Aylwin, 1997: 3) of cattle rich land. The *Arribanos* were the largest and pivotal *cacicazgo* in this alliance and they inhabited

the large zone of the *pre-cordillera*, between *Malleco* and *Cautín*. Their lands were well suited to cattle raising and they traded animals, silver products, herbs, alcohol, *ponchos* and *mantas* with *Puelche*, from the other side of the *Andes* Mountains.

The *Pehuenche* were not originally *Mapuche* but were integrated with them from the 18th century. They were the southern *Andes* mountains' indigenes who moved between northern *Chillan's* snowy mountains and *Lonquimay* and *Alto Bio-Bio* in the south. They were not an agricultural people like the *Arribanos*. Their location, the climatic conditions and their nomadic character as a mountain people, impeded a settled cattle raising and agricultural life. They traded horses, sheep and salt and *Araucaria* fruit ¹⁰⁷. Within their territory was located the famous *Pehuenche* Path or *Antuco* Pass, the main commercial route to *Puelche* on the Argentinean side¹⁰⁸ of the *Andes*. Annually in spring and summer, three or four merchant caravans containing more than one hundred loaded mules crossed the mountains through this pass. Their keen sense of commerce and their strategic position, made *Pehuenche* attractive allies for the *Arribanos*. Marriages and trade united them.

¹⁰⁷The *Araucaria* is a spice tree, unique to the *Mapuchemapu*. *Pehuenche* ate horse meat but their preferred food was the *Araucaria's* fruit (*piñon* or *pehuen*) (Bengoa, 1996: 92-93). From this fruit, *Pehuenche* made flour and prepared bread. An individual can live a year from the fruits of eighteen *Araucarias*.

¹⁰⁸ These people lived in what is now south-west Argentina, *Salinas Grandes*. They had intense contact with *Pehuenche* and the rest of the *Mapuchemapu* in commercial and military terms. A journey to *Puelche* territory was an excellent form of military training for the *Mapuche* (Bengoa, 1996: 94). *Puelche's* most important products for exchange were salt and jerked beef and cattle raising was their

Like the *Arribanos*, the *Abajinos*, the largest group in *Mapuchemapu*, had thousands of animals and a highly productive agriculture in which wheat and beans had already been incorporated as main elements of their diet. Their region comprised the land from the *Cordillera de Nahuelbuta* to the central valley, where the cities of *Traiguen*, *Lumaco*, *Los Sauces* and *Purén* now are (Bengoa, 1996: 71). They consolidated as a regional group at the end of the 18th century, their productive activity was dominated by cattle raising and the growing commerce within *Araucanía*, towards Argentina, the *Pampas*' region and with Chilean merchants along the *Bio-Bio* border.

Frontier life was marked by commercial activity between Chilean merchants and *conchabadores* (indigenous merchants) (Bernedo, 1996: 322) in which missionaries, *capitanes de amigos* and *lenguarases*¹⁰⁹ also featured. According to Ruiz Aldea (cited in Vitale, 1993: 215), estimations of *Mapuche* trade with Chilean merchants indicate that 25,000 *fanegas*¹¹⁰ of wheat, 500,000 pounds of wool and 15,000 animals were exchanged for shirts, silver objects, jackets and handkerchiefs in 1850. Chilean merchants could buy a two year old cow for 5 ounces of washing powder costing 0.75 *pesos* and sell it for

main productive activity. Their most famous *lonco* was *Calfucura* who had come from *Pitrufquén* in *Araucanía*.

¹⁰⁹ The term '*Capitanes de Amigos*' was a colonial name for a kind of foreign officer or diplomat.

Lenguarases were representatives, speakers for a neighbouring nation.

¹¹⁰ A *fanega* varies between 22.5 and 55.5 litres.

3.75 pesos (Treutler cited in Vitale, 1993: 215) and in the final years of the invasion of *Araucanía* by the Chilean army, *Mapuche* were regularly selling cattle for money (Guevara cited in Vitale, 1993: 215).

Cacicazgos were unevenly affected by the tension between Chilean landowners and the merchant and mining bourgeoisie. The latter invested in agriculture and introduced capitalist relations and became the nearest neighbours of the *Mapuche*, specially of the *Abajinos* from whom they began to purchase land in the 1860s. Their mercantile activity contributed to develop a market in land on the *Bio-Bio* frontier, particularly in the land of *Abajinos*¹¹¹.

In summary, the control of the land and labour was the basis of the *loncos*' political and economic power. Polygamy maintained this control inside the community through a sharp division of labour and externally through the formation of political alliances. Exogamous marriages of children of *loncos* from the largest *cacicazgos* with women from potentially allied smaller communities became common in the 19th century. Polygamy became the cause and effect of the accumulation of wealth, a sole right of the *loncos*. Marriages were

¹¹¹ The mercantile activity of Chilean merchants in the *Araucanía* is well exemplified by the dramatic case of Carmen Marilúan, Francisco Marilúan's daughter, one of the leaders of the *Arauco* in the 'war to death' and in the 1851 revolution. She was working as a domestic servant for an aristocratic family when she was forced to sell her family's 20,000 blocks of land to Domingo de la Maza for only 150 pesos (Bengoa, 1988: 152).

patrilocal and patrilineal¹¹² for wives were settled on their husbands' land and children belonged to their father (Montecino, 1996: 3). Many wives meant greater labour and a greater social surplus in products and animals. Polygamy was thus crucial for the concentration and centralisation of power within the *cacicazgo* and also, for the formation of political alliances between groups. Consequently, *Mapuche* opposition to Catholic monogamy remained a strategic element of *Mapuche* resistance to the invaders.

More than 250 years of articulation had deeply transformed *Mapuche* production relations and political organisation. A hunting and gathering social formation with polygamous family organisation was changing into a cattle raising - agricultural polygamous society with a sharp and developing class and gender division of labour and an increasing concentration and centralisation of power and mercantile relations. In sum, *Mapuchemapu* was developing a more hierarchical system of production and clear relations of subordination in which the patriarchal figure of the *lonco* was dominant and *conas*, especially women, the direct producers, became like serfs who although legally free, were placed in an unfree relation by their kinship to the *lonco*.

¹¹² Montecino (1996: 4) comments that this type of marriage was some times 'subverted' by marriages which transgressed patrilocality and patrilineal traditions as when a young man was kidnapped by a woman or went to live with his wife's family. But these were exceptions.

The story of *Mapuchemapu* in the 19th century then concerned the formation of embryonic classes and the consolidation of the *cacicazgo* upon its patriarchal polygamous basis. The change in polygamy from pre-colonial times, was mainly a consequence of the articulation with seigniorial modes of production manifested in the introduction of cattle raising, commerce, religion and the influence of *señorial* relations of production during almost three centuries of Spanish colonialism.

Gender Relations in the Nineteenth Century

Wives worked for their husbands, serving them and undertaking seasonal agricultural work, their fundamental tasks in the 19th century. Women were objects of exchange, the providers of labour and the reproducers of the polygamous family. However, some women became *machis* (healers) restoring the community's spiritual and material health, in a practice in which religion and medicine were united. Even though male *machis* were replaced by women (Jaña, 1997: 2; Montecino, 1996: 1) and shamanism became almost exclusively feminine in the 19th century, this did not mean a lessening of patriarchal power. Men who practised healing were regarded as both feminine and masculine, as being a third gender, resembling the gods who were also simultaneously feminine and masculine (Montecino, 1996: 1). While male and female healers were respected for their religious and medical qualities, they were seen as deviant. In the binary gender/sex system,

the feminine was placed in a subordinate position to the masculine and the masculine attached to men and the feminine to women. Thus, having women as healers did not imply equity in *Mapuche* gender and power relations for the power of polygamy maintained women, regardless of their religious tasks, in a subordinate position in *Mapuchemapu*. When the healers became almost exclusively women and exclusively could express the feminine, they were regarded as homosexual, but “female homosexuality [was] confined almost entirely to shamans and their novices” (Faron, 1968: 34). Since women were procreators in the patriarchal mentality of the *loncos*, healers could not be considered as ‘real’ women.

While the system of power was fundamentally grounded in polygamy, another mechanism of power was the *malón* principally involving the stealing of cattle and women, an activity that reproduced *Mapuche* warrior masculinity. *Malón* was a military competition between *Mapuche* communities for some of the surpluses they produced (Bengoa, 1996: 127). In *Mapuchemapu* there were no other social, juridical or political mechanisms to regulate the accumulation of wealth. The *malón* was a male activity which valorised bravery, toughness, virility, aggression, drunkenness and riding skills, the same qualities which defined the ideal Spanish soldiers (Encina and Castedo, 1982: 730). Since exogamous polygamy meant that women in raided

communities might well have come from the raiders' communities, the men only kidnapped women alien to *Mapuchemapu*. *Mestizaje* was thus accepted and the existence of captured Chilean girls and 'gringas' was very common in some southern communities of the *Araucanía*, as can be seen in the meeting of the *cacique Paillalef* described by Treutler (cited in Vitale, 1993: 215) in which *mestizas* women participated as members of the *Mapuche* community. The mechanism which existed to redistribute wealth, was not permitted to destroy *Mapuche* social organisation based as it was on an intertwined net of marriages in which everyone was related to everyone else in one or other way (Bengoa, 1996: 119).

The Struggle for Political Power in *Mapuchemapu*

The 19th century began with *Mapuchemapu* consolidated as an independent territory and the transformation of the Spanish colony into a Republican state called Chile. Despite the Spanish invasion, the *Mapuche* had managed to maintain their political independence, the official recognition of their sovereignty by the Spanish Crown, a great victory for the *Mapuche*. However, after almost three and a half centuries of war and resistance, the *Mapuche* were no longer able to preserve their political independence and their territory which the Chilean State expropriated to satisfy the voracity of the landowners and capitalists for territorial expansion.

Geographically, *Abajinos* were closer to the Spanish colony and later, to the Chilean Republic. Contact with their neighbours was very intense. Trade, political relations and social influences permeated both sides of the frontier. Because of this, *Abajinos* were more impacted than other groups - such as the *Arribanos*, for instance – by the foreign social, political and economic processes in the uneven process of the articulation of the respective modes of production.

Three generations of *loncos* embodied the attitude and action of *Abajinos* in the major political events of the 19th century for the colony and *Mapuchemapu*. These events included the advent of the Republic of Chile, the Chilean military incursions against *Mapuche* in the 1860s and 1870s and the final invasion of *Mapuchemapu*. Throughout the 19th century, the *loncos* *Colipí*, *Pinoleví*, *Cañoepán* and *Painemal* who led the *cacicazgo*, always maintained good relations with the Chilean Republic and were the group most loyal to the Chilean Government. One of *Lorenzo Colipí*'s sons for instance, was recruited by the Chilean army in the Pacific War and became famous in the Battle of *Yungay* (Bengoa, 1996: 73). The *loncos* sought integration with the Chilean Republic while maintaining their own position and power. They did not reject the *mestizaje* and encouraged their people to learn *Castellano* and maintain good relations with the Chilean army. Those who cooperated with the Chileans, like the *Cañoepán* family, obtained the

best land after the occupation of *Araucanía* (Bengoa, 1996; 74-80). Only the need to defend their territory after the 1860s, led the *Abajinos* to fight the Chileans in alliance with groups hostile to the Chilean State (Mariman Queménado, n.d.: 3).

Chilean governments were anxious to expropriate *Mapuche* land and considered, as a part of their strategy, the infiltration of Franciscan missionaries into *Araucanía* (Noggler, 1984: 96). The Franciscans tried hard to Christianise the *Mapuche*, to 'civilise' them and incorporate them into the Catholic Church and the Chilean nation. But, polygamy was very difficult to abolish because for the *Mapuche*, this institution was strongly attached to the control of the land. Besides, the parlous of the Colonial economy impeded financial support for Catholic missions. Priests no longer came from Spain and many of those who had went home after the advent of the Republic (Noggler, 1984: 96).

Although, economic, social and political influences from outside significantly changed *Mapuchemapu*, the Catholic religion, as a complete doctrine was never accepted by the *Mapuche*. Although *Abajinos loncos* used to send their sons to study in Catholic schools and maintained close relations with Catholic missionaries, polygamy was preserved. *Mapuche* could never accept the Catholic conception of monogamous marriage and family. *Mapuche loncos* used polygamy as

a key element in the centralisation and concentration of power and the rejection of the replacement of polygamy by monogamy hindered the attempts at evangelisation for the *Abajinos* and *Arribanos loncos* possessed many wives and cattle and much land. For that reason the incursion of missionaries and later, of the Chilean army, meant for *Mapuche*, above all for *Arribanos*, the destruction of them as a people.

However, to the Chilean authorities *Mapuche* land belonged to Chile for the Colonists had 'lost' *Mapuchemapu*. While the 'recovery' of that land by the Chilean State threatened the politics of the *Mapuche* nation, the loss of polygamy as an economic and political institution, whether by the action of missionaries or by the Chilean judiciary and the army or by both, threatened the *Mapuche* political economy. As will be seen further in this Chapter, this left the *Mapuche* no choice but violent defence.

Unlike the *Abajinos*, the *Arribanos* had less contact with the alien people, in particular in trade and religion. In their agreement with the Spanish Crown (see Chapter Six), they reaffirmed their political independence which they then saw threatened by political change in Chile. Their agreements with the Spanish Kingdom, ratified by previous *Parlamentos*, were threatened by the new Republic (Mariman Quemenado, n.d.: 3), from the beginning of which they fought for a

Mapuchemapu united against Chile and for federalism. Among the most notable *Arribanos loncos* were *Quilapán* and *Mangin* who was considered one of the wisest and politically most intelligent *loncos* of the entire *Araucanía* (Bengoa, 1996: 137).

The struggle for political independence in Chile impacted on the whole colony and *Mapuchemapu*, but this was not an insurrection from below but a struggle of Creole bourgeois miners, merchants and some landowners and artisans against the Spaniards and Creole Realist landowners of the central zone. *Peones, inquilinos*, women and slaves were recruited by the independentist forces led by their *patrones* (Bengoa, 1996: 137).

Mapuche, especially *Arribanos*, wanted no part of something geographically and politically beyond of their borders. Although the Creole aristocracy had nominally defined Chile's limits at *Magallanes* in the South and O'Higgins regarded *Mapuche* as Chileans (Aylwin, 1997: 2; Mariman Quemenado, n.d.: 3; Bengoa, 1996: 138), previous *Parlamentos* - which were still officially recognised in the 1810s - established the southern limit of the colony at the *Bio-Bio* river. The *Arribanos* thought that these should be transferred to the new Republic for the Republicans fought against Spain for control of the Colony, not for *Mapuchemapu*. This political issue was central in the negotiations

between *Mapuche* and Chileans (Bengoa, 1996: 80-86). However, the *Abajinos loncos Colipí* and *Cañoepán* supported *Mapuchemapu* integration into the Republic and this became a major point of dispute between these two major regional groups in the *Mapuchemapu* and a reason for uncountable *malones* which deepened the political divisions between them.

The *Arribano lonco Mangin* realised that the treaties with the Spaniards would not necessarily be respected by the Chilean authorities. Despite this, *Arribanos* leaders thought that it was tactically useful to insist on the validity and importance of the past agreements and to transfer them into the new framework of political relations. On February 3 1814 an agreement was signed in which the Chilean State promised to respect the past agreements between *Mapuche* and the Spanish Crown (Bengoa, 1996: 144), yet the *Arribanos* had little confidence in this and the *loncos Calfucura* and *Zuñiga* remarked, "[e]l rei es mejor; tiene muchas tierras. Los Chilenos son pobres; te robarán las tuyas"¹¹³ (cited in Bengoa, 1996: 141).

With this conviction, the *Arribanos* participated in what Vicuña Mackenna (cited in Bengoa, 1996: 142) called the 'War to Death'

¹¹³"[t]he King is better; he has a lot of land. The Chileans are poor; they will steal yours". Spain had stabilised its expansion for several centuries. Chile was in a process of expansion.

against Chile early in the 1820s allied with re-grouped Spanish troops in the south, led by the Realist Vicente Benavides although independence from Spain had already been achieved. This was a *guerrilla* war in which the *Arribanos* organised a non-conventional army of 800 *conas* (infantrymen) and 900 ex-Spanish soldiers. *Arribanos*, *Pehuenche*, bandits and Spaniards united by the objective of recovering the colonial *status quo*, but for different particular interests (Encina and Castedo, 1982: 728). Early in the 1820s, Benavides' forces controlled most of the south from *Chillan* to *Concepcion*. Pincheira's bandits attacked *San Carlos* and *Chillan* and Benavides took *Concepción*. His army grew to 1,751 regular troops and 2,400 militia. Stimulated by their lack of confidence in the new regime in the ex-colony, *Arribanos* and *Pehuenche* became very active in this insurgent movement. After each battle, Benavides and *Mapuche* warriors organised and re-organised their forces in the *Mapuchemapu*, south of the *Bio-Bio* river (Encina y Castedo, 1982: 731). The military power of the *Mapuche*, Realist and bandit alliance in the south meant that *Los Angeles*, *Nacimiento*, *Purén*, *Santa Bárbara* and *Tucapel Nuevo* disappeared, consumed by flames leaving an area which looked like it had never been inhabited (Encina and Castedo, 1982: 731). Benavides organised a regular army of more than 4,000 soldiers and a provisional colonial government in the south with official authorities.

Meanwhile, *Abajinos* fought with the Chilean army (Mariman Quemenado, n.d.: 3) and frequently *Arribanos* fought *Abajinos*. Finally, with *Abajinos* support, Bulnes and Prieto's army defeated Benavides in March 1822 and he was publicly executed in Santiago (Encina y Castedo, 1982: 736).

But even this did not mean the end of *Mapuche* resistance. The *Pehuenche* led an insurrection in which they destroyed all the cities beyond the *Bio-Bio* river in 1859 when a revolution was encouraged in Chile by the bourgeoisie (see Chapter Twelve; Zeitlin, 1984: 3; Bengoa, 1996: 166) and actively participated in the resistance war of the 1860s. In 1862 once defeat was evident, they signed a tactical peace treaty under their main *lonco* *Purrán* with Chilean officials in the Andes Mountains (Bengoa, 1996: 93) and with the advance of Chilean troops towards the *Malleco* river, were isolated in the mountains. By 1881 once *Mapuche* were defeated in the central valley, the Chilean army surrounded them and built forts in their region (Bengoa, 1996: 93).

The differential effects of articulation weakened *Mapuche* unity and the possibility of a united opposition to the Chilean State which was crucial in the final assault against *Mapuchemapu*. The profound changes in

Mapuchemapu especially in its political organisation, had already damaged its internal cohesion.

International Factors in the Usurpation of *Mapuche* Land

After the 1850s, the *Mapuche* were no longer portrayed by Chilean rulers as brave and heroic people who inspired the anti-colonial struggle at the beginning of the century but became barbarian *indios* who needed to be civilised, savages who had stolen colonial land, Chilean land. This new image reflected the social, political and economic changes that had occurred over fifty years.

During the first half of the 19th century, the battles for independence had, to an extent, ruined the central valley and the production and export of tallow, leather, jerked beef, wheat, wine was affected by the conflict. In the 1840s, wheat was in demand by the international market, and agriculture underwent some changes in the central region. The immediate cause of the shift from cattle raising to wheat production was the subdivision of the *haciendas* and as a consequence, the price of land rose in the central region from eighty *pesos* in 1820 to one hundred *pesos* per hectare in 1840 (see Chapter Eight; also see Bengoa, 1996: 156). Merchant capitalists who began to invest in land sought it in the south for the landowners in the central region subdivided the

largest *haciendas* only amongst their relatives and within aristocratic circles.

Land expropriation was initiated by speculative capitalists in the 1840s in the northern region of *Araucanía*, between the *Bio-Bio* and *Malleco* rivers and a kind of spontaneous colonisation occurred in which old *loncos*, frequently under the influence of alcohol, sold their land (Vitale, 1993: 217; Bengoa, 1988: 161). The *Mapuche Trango* sold a large territory in *Tucapel* to Cornelio Saavedra for 400 *pesos*; Tomas Rebolledo bought 600 blocks of land for 150 *pesos* in Nacimiento; Joaquin Fuentealba got 2,000 hectares for 500 *pesos*. It was common to buy 500 blocks for 250 *pesos* (Guevara cited in Vitale, 1993: 217).

Two crucial developments fundamental for Chilean capitalists' strategy of expansion impacted on Chile and the *Araucanía*: the industrial revolution that shook the American continent and the seizure and settlement of "the West" of the United States (Bengoa, 1996: 171).

Industrial development in Europe, specifically in England, provoked migrations from the countryside to the cities and European agricultural production was insufficient to feed the whole population. "The new factory towns quickly absorbed labour surpluses from the countryside. But atrocious working and living conditions led to poor health, high

infant mortality and short life expectancy in industrial areas. Low wage levels often forced both women and children to work, with disastrous results for the family” (Castles and Miller, 1993: 55). A massive emigration from Europe occurred caused by capital expansion and the social contradictions derived of it. This migratory movement provided another element in the process of articulation of capitalism in the periphery. The Chilean government planned emigration of Europeans to the south to change the system of *hacienda* requiring a process of expropriation of indigenous land similar to that occurring elsewhere, in the U.S.A., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Southern Africa, Argentina and Algeria. In sum, the western capitalist world rapidly advanced its agrarian frontiers under the pressure of the industrial revolution and delivered its people to the new world (Vitale, 1993: 213; Bengoa, 1996: 172).

Between 1853 and 1866 the Chilean State declared *Mapuche* land the property of the Chilean State (Bengoa, 1996: 158-162). The accessibility of Europe's market to Chilean agricultural products with the introduction of steam ships in 1869, also meant more land for wheat production (Bengoa, 1996: 156). After the 1880s, when the demand for wheat dropped, the *haciendas* and *fundos* of the central region returned to cattle raising and new southern land was needed to produce the cereal required by the domestic and international markets. *Mapuche* land was

the solution and beyond the southern limit of *Araucanía*, *Concepción*, *Valdivia*, *Puerto Montt*, *Chiloé* and *Magallanes* were integrated into the Chilean nation, leaving *Mapuchemapu* surrounded (Bengoa, 1996: 249). Lots of lands were sold by auction under the pretense of avoiding the concentration of ownership of land, as happened with *haciendas* of the central region. The land in fact was bought by a few like the 'king of wheat', José Bunster (Bengoa, 1988: 154). The modernisation of agriculture on former *Mapuche* land, a reduction in the size of rural property and the abolition of the *hacienda* system once again failed. As an immediate effect of this, *Mapuche* coastal families were expelled by the expansion of the *latifundia* and mining development in the *Arauco* gulf in the second half of the 19th century.

Simultaneously, taking advantage of the European labour surplus, the Creole oligarchies in the periphery expanded the internal frontiers of capitalism. The army was followed by the settlement of *colonos*, the key elements of a plan of annihilation of *Mapuche*, a lesson learnt from the United States, which served as the new model of genocide to apply against the *Mapuche*. Between 1880 and 1890, about 6,000 French, Swiss, German and Italian *colonos* settled in *Ercilla*, *Contulmo*, *Galvarino*, *Lautaro*, *Temuco*, *Traiguén* and *Victoria* (Bernedo, 1996: 324). In very favourable economic conditions, they received *Mapuche* land from the Chilean State and were supposed to bring civilisation and

progress to these lands and to the whole country¹¹⁴. In the process, most of these migrants became rich landowners, *Mapuche* were killed and impoverished and most of their land was expropriated. Feudal and capitalist relations, *inquilinaje*, settled *peonaje*, private property and the wage relation co-existed here until the 1960s.

Wars, Nationalism, Racism and the Ideology of *Chilenidad*

The Pacific War enhanced nationalist sentiment and racial hatred among the Chilean people. The heightened nationalism resulting from military victory in the 1879 – 1883 war, facilitated the accomplishment of the next task for the Chilean army, the invasion of *Araucanía*. Chilean capitalists triumphed in their incursion into Perú with an army formed from *mestizos peones*, *inquilinos* and *Mapuche* warriors. Colonel Cornelio Saavedra occupied Lima in 1881 (Bengoa, 1996: 409) and his victorious northern army was sent directly to *Araucanía* to finish the task of integrating this region into the Chilean nation.

Some scholars like Cousiño (cited in Larraín, 1996: 182), Morandé (1987) and Montecino (1996), locate the origin of the Chilean national identity in popular syncretic religiosity. For Cousiño in particular, national identity was significantly forged within two institutions: the *hacienda* and the army. According to him, the *hacienda*, as a social

¹¹⁴ See Vicente Pérez Rosales, (1976).

totality, prevented *inquilinos* from obtaining citizenship and participating in the nation except through the mediation of their landowners. As the wars of the 19th century promoted a general mobilisation that separated *inquilinos* from the *hacienda*, a national identity was forged when the religious values of the *hacienda* were introduced into the army, especially the *Mariana* religious symbolism¹¹⁵ that was represented in the army by the *Virgin del Carmen*, the *mestiza* *Virgin María*. This identity was not a product of rational and secular modernity but of the popular religiosity manifested in the army especially during the War of the Pacific. There, in the army, popular religiosity became the foundation of *Chilenidad*, Chilean national identity.

Cousiño's interpretation of national identity is a defence of the religious values that the seigniorial relations reproduced in the *haciendas*, extrapolated to the whole nation by the army. Certainly, a strong sense of nationalism did grow through 19th century militarism, especially, from wars of territorial expansion. Nonetheless, this form of nationalism was the affirmation of "us", the Catholic *señorío*, against "the other", secular modernity, a manifestation of the articulation between the seigniorial and capitalist relations in the terrain of ideas.

¹¹⁵See Sonia Montecino, (1996), p. 27. She argues for the centrality of Marianism and *mestizaje* in the formation of a cultural but more specifically, of a gender identity in Latin America from these two main elements. A critique of this view is in Chapter Ten and also in Caro (1997).

The definition of the 'self' against 'the other' is not an exclusive Chilean phenomenon at all. Wars create a sense of identity in which enemies and prisoners became the slaves and serfs of the winning side¹¹⁶ and thus inferior to the victors (Lipschutz, 1967: 48) as were the Muslims following the re-conquest of Spanish territories. This nurtured in the American conquerors and the Creole dominant classes in the Spanish colonies and Republics a strong racist sentiment based on the *jus gentium*¹¹⁷. Thus, this extreme way of identifying the "self" against "the other" in the Pacific War had an obvious racial content which was exacerbated by the invasion of *Mapuchemapu* and which marked Chilean class formation with a racial character.

The consolidation of the army as an instrument of the state, as an instrument of defence and repression, was consistent with the authoritarian way in which the Chilean State was being formed, after the institutional chaos of the 1820s. Since the enactment of the 1833 Political Constitution, state formation proceeded on very authoritarian lines. As Ramirez Necochea (1984: 11) noted, the state and the army were no longer characterised by *caudillismo* (charismatic leadership) but were grounded on the institutionality provided by the Constitution. This meant that the army could not longer be a mere *militia* led by

¹¹⁶See Lipschutz, 1967, First Part, E.

¹¹⁷Right of conquest. Through war, slavery or serfdom became just and practical. *Jus gentium* was the moral justification for the exploitation of and racial discrimination against people made alien.

caudillos. Almost fifty years after the enactment of the Chilean Constitution, the first war against Perú and Bolivia meant the definite professionalisation of the Chilean army (Ramirez Necochea, 1984: 43). In this regard, the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 and in particular, the Prussian army's organisation and racist ideology, were particularly influential. The Chilean army became a hierarchical, disciplined, classist, rationalised and racialised military organisation, the instrument that the state required for accomplishing territorial expansion and the repression of the proletariat. Thus, the Chilean army was in fact a rational, modern instrument that could not function without instrumental reason, as Cousiño himself argues in *Razón y Ofrenda* (1990: 193) contradicting his earlier anti-modern characterisation of the army as containing and expressing traditional religious values which became the basis of *Chilenidad*.

It was in this modern army that nationalism grew as a powerful ideology and it is this ideology that Cousiño interprets as Chilean national identity. But identities are not an eternal, fixed immutable essence which can be perpetuated through the army or any other institution, unchanged from the 19th century to the present as Cousiño asserts. Nor was national identity constructed from a 16th century

“Baroque Matrix”¹¹⁸ (Morandé, 1987: 149-166), nor is it determined by the *mestizo* character of Latin America on which the impact of the Christianity has produced a unique expression of popular religiosity (Montecino, 1996; see Chapter Eleven). What is common to all these views is that they regard popular religiosity as the essential substratum from which the national identity of Chile was generated. But by arguing this, these approaches became essentialist and ideological freezing time and space in the founding moment of the constitution of the identity they wish to explain.

In contrast, Larraín (1996: 219) argues that cultural identities have a 'history' and they transform themselves. They are in permanent construction and reconstruction, not in a random way, but from certain available relations and practices, symbols and ideas. However, the fact that symbols exist, does not imply that their meanings have always been the same, nor that these symbols have not changed in the context of new practices. Morandé's and Montecino's versions of identity and in particular, Cousiño's view that identity emerged from the institution of *hacienda* and the *army* and materialised in the 19th century's expansionist wars from which nationalism emerged, repeat and reinforce a “substantialist traditionalism” which represents the ideology typical of the oligarchic sectors of Latin America even today. These

¹¹⁸This is the religious version of the origin of modernity argued by Morandé (1987) to challenge the project of secular modernity based on instrumental reason.

forms of essentialism project an ahistorical view of the nation which legitimises power relations and seeks to neutralise social contradictions, forming a basis for the authoritarian cultural policies of dictatorships in Latin America (Garcia Canclani cited in Larraín, 1996: 217).

In the second half of the 19th century, a national identity born in the deaths of thousands of people, helped to mask and blur the deep social divisions between *patrones* and workers, officers and soldiers, men and women, Creoles and *mestizos*. Workers were proud to defend Chilean national capitalist interests, while previously they were *peones gañanes*, *rotos* with dangerous instincts. Internally there were *Mapuche* savages to punish and civilise, a mission accomplished by *rotos* and *inquilinos* as they transformed themselves into the soldiers of the new nation. Chilean national unity was forged in blood.

Chilenidad, the ideology which constructs what Chileans are and tells them how unified they are and undivided by any sort of difference they are, was profusely propagated by the state through the army, and it rose from the *hacienda*, the predominant social relation of production in the agriculture, encouraged by the Catholic religion. The Church blessed this apparent unity and harmony between *patrones*, *peones* and *inquilinos*, in an apparently non-oppressive and non-dominant relation of presence (Cousiño and Valenzuela, 1994: 65; see Chapter Seven). To

fight against *terrateníentes* was nonsense. The real struggle was against the *barbarie* in *Araucanía*. Patriotism was all, poverty was a temporary sacrifice on the earth to achieve heavenly bliss. Win heaven, defend the *patrón* and kill the pagan savage was the formula. Ruling class interests once again appeared as the people's interests and the late 1870s and early 1880s witnessed the violent invasion of *Mapuche* land by the Chilean army in the name of the nation and God. Nationalist ideas justified territorial expansion and hid class, race and gender divisions. The military complement of the political and legal initiatives of the Chilean State was the occupation of *Araucanía* under the control of the 'progressive' Liberal fraction of the ruling class who finally defeated *Mapuche* resistance with their army of national unity.

The Invasion and *Mapuche* Resistance: Unity to Recover the Sovereignty

The process of occupation was directed by the state, personified on the frontier by Colonel Cornelio Saavedra, whose army was the instrument of 'pacification'. As noted above, the political - military strategy, as in the U.S.A., consisted in the advance of the army followed by the colonists and the construction of the railroads. In the case of *Araucanía*, Colonel Saavedra ordered the army to advance from the north and the south towards the centre of *Mapuchemapu*. The northern border became the *Malleco* river and the southern border the *Toltén*

river. Although there was some support for *Mapuche* sovereignty in Chile, especially from the Franciscan missionaries, the invasion was overwhelmingly backed by the most influential political, economic, religious and social sectors of Chile, whose views were expressed by Agustín Edwards' *Mercurio* newspaper.

The *Mapuche*, fragmented in *cacicazgos*, confronted the invaders. One quarter of them led by the *Abajinos*, had been allies of the Chileans throughout the 19th century and they sought peace with the Chilean authorities and sold them land. For the *Arribanos* however, the situation was different, for shifting the frontier inwards to the *Malleco* river, threatened their territory and they insisted on Chileans respecting the agreements signed with the Spaniards in the past *Parlamentos*. When the Chileans did not recognise them, *Quilapan*, the *Arribanos* leader, realised that war was inevitable and saw unity of *Mapuche* people as fundamental to success. From 1869 *Quilapan* worked to forge the necessary alliances. An alliance between the *Arribanos* and the *Abajinos* was an important first step in this process and when both groups gathered a military force of nearly 6,000 warriors, the rest of the *Mapuche* groups joined as well¹¹⁹.

¹¹⁹ *Costinos* and some small *Mapuche* groups from the south of the *Araucanía* declared themselves neutral. Finally they joined the alliance.

The *Mapuche* were alone in their final resistance to the Chilean invaders (Bengoa, 1996: 176), although the *Arribanos* had accepted an offer from the French Aurelie Antoine to unify *Mapuchemapu* by proclaiming himself the King of *Araucanía* (Vitale, 1993: 223). They saw in this adventurer, the possibility of foreign support and unity in their struggle against the Chileans, who had already crossed the northern frontier. However, he was expelled from *Araucanía* by the Chilean government (Bengoa, 1996: 186).

In 1869, the Chilean army under the command of José Manuel Pinto, initiated the invasion of *Mapuchemapu*. 211 *Mapuche* were killed, 200 were seriously injured, 100 were captured, including women and children, 11,277 animals were stolen, and thirty five Chilean soldiers were killed by *Mapuche* warriors (Bengoa, 1996: 221). The number of cattle kept by soldiers and *capitanes de amigos* was presumably bigger (Bengoa, 1996: 213). Paradoxically, after these criminal incursions of the army, a peace treaty was signed with the *Arribanos* and in October Congress ratified it. Following this example of good intentions, the Chilean government ordered new incursions into *Mapuchemapu* in 1870 and the *Mapuche* led by *Quilapán* responded with an attack in *Collipulli* (Bengoa, 1996: 408).

As in the United States, the railway and *colonos* followed the army, soon reaching the city of *San Rosendo*. *Araucanía* was now only twenty four hours by train from the centre of Chile. The telegraph connected the city of *Los Angeles* in the *Araucanía* to the rest of the nation and the mining bourgeoisie began the exploitation of the coal mines in *Coronel* and *Arauco* (Bengoa, 1996: 409). Although several *Parlamentos* between Chileans and *Mapuche* took place in the *Mapuchemapu*, none of these negotiations were successful.

On the other side of the Andes Mountains in 1872, the *Pampas lonco Calfucura* attacked Buenos Aires. In 1878, Colonel Saavedra advanced to the *Traiguen* river and although several confrontations occurred with the *Mapuche*, the Chileans were distracted by the Pacific War. However, *Mapuche* were unable to capitalise on this situation. Centuries of conflict had reduced their military capacity (Villalobos cited in Bengoa, 1996: 205, f.n. 2) as did the death of *Quilapan* who had led the resistance against the invaders.

In 1879, the Argentinean army occupied the *pampas* at the end of the 'Desert Campaign'. A year later in *Araucanía*, *Mapuche* forces attacked *Traiguen* and in 1881, they attacked the fortified *Malleco* line and *Traiguen* was again assaulted. Meanwhile, 55,000 hectares of *Mapuchemapu* were auctioned by the Chilean government and the

Minister Recabarren established the frontier at *Cautín*. Saavedra was appointed as Minister of War after his successful campaign in Perú. However on 4th November 1881, a general insurrection of *Mapuche* occurred (Bengoa, 1996: 410) against the evident purpose of a general occupation of *Araucanía* (Bengoa, 1996: 250). *Mapuche* attacked Chilean troops in *Lumaco*, *Temuco* and *Nueva Imperial* and in other places (Bengoa, 1996: 410). By March 1882, more than 100 Chilean soldiers and 100 indigenous members of the Chilean army were killed. However, from the summer of 1871, the Chilean army replaced the Minié carbine with the Spencer repeating rifle. With this weapon *Araucanía* was 'pacified'.

At the end of March 1882, eighteen *loncos* went to Santiago to negotiate peace with the Chilean President *Domingo Santa María*. After five delegations had attempted to stop the war and avoid more deaths, and after the total occupation of *Araucanía* and the creation of the “Commission to Deliver Indigenous Land”, peace was declared on the January 1883 (Bengoa, 1996: 410). Ninety percent of *Mapuchemapu* was expropriated and the remaining 10 percent, the worst land, became reservations. Five million hectares between *Malleco* and *Valdivia* were auctioned and the *Mapuche* were gathered into less than 500,000 (Bengoa, 1996: 326).

Between 1884 and 1927, the *Mapuche* were confined in about 3,000 reservations. Forty years later, the indigenous reservations numbered 2,000. A century after the Chilean invasion of *Araucanía*, they numbered less than 600. The usurpation of *Mapuche* land by landowners and the transformation of indigenous land into private property, were the two main causes of the progressive disappearance of indigenous communities (Calbucura, 1994: 1).

CONCLUSION TO PART III

The Articulation of the Seigniorial, Capitalist and *Mapuche* Modes of Production: the Predominance of Capitalism and the Subordination of the *Mapuche* Nation

Articulation at Social Level: Class Formation in the *Hacienda* and Mining

The growth of mining production at the turn of the 19th century, brought about by and was an effect of a rapid development of the productive forces, the expansion of the labour market and changes in the division of labour in which wage relations became increasingly dominant in the social formation. In the countryside however, the *señorío* resisted the expansion of capitalist social relations encouraged by mining and financial capitalists and in spite of some renovation in technique and productive systems, and although wage relations were partially introduced and began to co-exist with servility, the latter continued to be dominant. Large rural property was, once again, the main obstacle to capital-intensive agricultural development. The *hacienda* or its new manifestation, the *fundo*, was persistently seigniorial manifesting symptoms of economic stagnation and backwardness compared to the buoyant growth of capitalist development in mining.

These processes in the *haciendas* and mines were, fundamentally, the expression of two different but related 'histories' of the major historical processes of articulation of the *Mapuche*, seigniorial and capitalist modes of production. Capitalist development proceeded at different speeds and intensities even for different regions in the same country.

Thus, the process of capitalist development was not homogeneous in its effects and equally evident in all places in the development of the social formation in Chile. Consequently, the class which made itself the dominant class still contained a strong fraction reluctant to accelerate change towards exclusively capitalist relations. Nonetheless, the ruling class was united against the *Mapuche* using the Chilean State as their instrument of expropriation and annihilation.

Seigniorial estates supplied labour to the mining industry in which capitalist relations became dominant. In mining, capitalist relations emerged dominant from the articulation of the indigenous, seigniorial and capitalist modes of production at the end of the 19th century. English capital in alliance with Chilean merchant-capitalists contributed decisively to capitalist development in mining during the nineteenth century transforming free *pirquinaje* through the regime of company towns in which they were totally separated from the means of production. Their labour became a commodity and in reality, remained

unfree, due to payment in tokens which forced them to depend on the company store and obliged them to live within the company towns. They became proletarian by fighting oppressive and exploitative working and living conditions in the company towns and in this way, the miners unleashed capitalist relations as well. The Chilean State contributed to the consolidation of this process. The capital and labour contradiction surfaced openly in the company towns and in these, the first workers' organisations were formed. In only seventy years – beginning with the establishment of the mutual societies - the labour movement developed and the working class became a class for itself.

But Chilean capital also penetrated the seignorial estates though they were not substantially modified by it. Although *inquilinaje* remained as a social relation in agriculture, *peonaje* apparently expanded, diversifying into free, tied and settled *peonaje*. But despite this, wage relations were not common. *Peonaje* was a servile relation more than a wage relation. The *hacienda* remained seigniorial with its patriarchal and servile character intact. Although the concentration of the ownership of the land diminished, it continued to predominate in agriculture, in spite of the subdivision of the large *haciendas*, amongst the wealthy.

The economic significance of agricultural production was overtaken by mining which became the major industry in the second half of the 19th century. Industrial growth in Europe required large volumes of imported minerals which were abundant in Chile. The investment of British and Chilean capital in mining led to the development of the productive forces and the growth of formally free labour which provided high levels of mining production and burgeoning mineral exports.

Gender Formation in the Republic After 1850s

The classes forming in the second half of the 19th century, defined differential gender constructions. Importantly, the pre-existing feudal patriarchy reproduced a gender segmentation of labour in the emerging working class which shaped the labour movement. Although patriarchy continued to be the main characteristic of gender relations, it had different specificities determining different constructions. The public-private dichotomy applied more clearly to gender relations in the ruling class rather than in the working class. Ruling class women were 'hidden' in their large properties where they supervised armies of servants and gave to the deserving poor. In contrast, the 'public' to some extent, was contained within the 'domestic' sphere of poor women, who carried out income-earning and unpaid work at home. They were workers, wives and mothers simultaneously. In the

confluence of production and reproduction, women undertook formal and informal, paid and unpaid work. Women's incorporation into the formal labour force was slower and less complete than men's incorporation into capitalist production in mines, factories and workshops which, assisted by feudal patriarchal ideas of appropriate masculine work, rendered these places masculine and exclusive of women. This, in turn, had a marked effect on the gender dynamics of the Mutuels which were workplace- based, and on the trade unions which emerged from them.

Thus, the content of patriarchy varied from one class to another and the dynamic of capitalist production which brought about new economic, political and social influences redefined it on a less religious basis, especially in paid production and in the working class' domestic lives. Certainly, the social space women opened up in urban areas with their work and social activities, allowed them to create a social life less penetrated by religion, though most were still nominally Catholic. This led to state repression and the application of gendered disciplinary measures in women's prisons and girls' schools which instilled a religious conception of sexual virtue on which all women's values and principles were supposed to be based.

By educating for the social order, hegemonic and complementary conceptions of femininity and masculinity were renovated and maintained by the ruling class and by the state. However, working class women and men, challenged this order and the women's and labour movements were born simultaneously in the struggle of class against class. Although the labour movement was not immune to patriarchy, ruling ideas were inconsistent with proletarian reality, and the ruling class' interests could not easily be expressed as the people's general interest, for the people were developing ideas of their own.

Historical materialism facilitates the comprehension of the construction of class and gender and their mutual interaction, especially, the specificity of the action of women within the counter-hegemonic movement and its contribution to the process of gender and class formation and the dynamic of the class struggle in Chile last century. The history of the female proletariat is not the whole of proletarian history just as the history of the male proletarian is not the whole of working class history. However, the female proletariat constituted the link vital for the constitution of both the women's and working class' movements and their collective actions. In other words, the organisation of feminist action was necessary as well as in the labour movement in which they have been subordinated by the patriarchal characterisation of male and female work. The labour movement's

revolutionary organisations contained a *machismo* which restricted the working class principle of solidarity and unity to its male membership, reproducing a paternal and patriarchal attitude by men in respect to their class' sisters, all of which has undermined the strength of the labour and women's movements and has empowered the ruling class.

State Formation: War within the Ruling Class

The process of state formation that to a great extent crystallised the articulation at the level of politics, was crucial in the way capitalism developed in Chile. The national unity celebrated after the Pacific War was destroyed by intra-class and inter-class upheavals. Political power was seized by an oligarchy of nitrate capitalists and bankers and this fraction of the bourgeoisie became hegemonic within the ruling class although the landowners preserved their position and retained some political influence but no longer controlled the state as they had done up to the 1850s. The Liberals had briefly become politically hegemonic, but their conflicting views about the way capitalism should develop substantially modified the content of their project and divided them between those who supported a strategy of state-lead capitalist national development and those who opted for economic liberalisation and an alliance with foreign capital. The first form of capitalist expansion appeared dangerous to the majority of the bourgeoisie and the landowners responded similarly.

Thus incipient industrial development was stalled by the action of that segment of the ruling class. The civil war winners established a political regime with a new clear predominance of the parliament. Although it was not a rigorously parliamentary system, the Executive was subjected to the rule of the majority in Congress, which in turn meant a check on government plans for commerce and industry.

Larraín (1991: 26-27) contends that the dependent nature of Latin-American capitalism cannot be explained by its original imposition from outside, but only by the particular development of its structures of class domination which in the nineteenth century corresponded to the interests of the European industrial bourgeoisie. In general, the capitalist periphery was formed as a consequence of the expansion of European capitalism which through colonisation and through international class alliances and commerce, re-organised the economic structures of third world countries and integrated or re-integrated them in the world market into a subordinated position.

The defeat of the *Balmacedistas* in the Civil War was decisive for the future of Chilean capitalism. Whether or not Balmaceda's strategy was consistent with his beliefs, its declared aim was to protect and develop national industry. The result of the Civil War in favour of the Chilean nitrate bourgeoisie allied with British capital, facilitated the growth of

an open economy, based on raw material export to foreign industrialised economies and on their investment in the extractives industries. The *Balmacedistas* represented an especially powerful fraction of the capitalist class consisting of the owners of the copper, silver and coal mines. Beset by economic crisis, they looked to the state for their salvation, but the *Balmacedistas* were finally overwhelmingly rejected in their own class and “[t]heir defeat, the failure of this small section of the mining bourgeoisie to secure political hegemony in their class and power in the state, was thus decisive in shaping Chile’s historically specific path of capitalist development” (Zeitlin, 1984: 75). This did not mean either that “capitalist development would have been enhanced, had [Balmaceda’s fraction] imposed its interests on the rest of the ruling class . . . [nor that] Chile would have entirely and necessarily escaped from dependency” (Larraín, 1989: 471). Perhaps the Balmaceda’s fraction victory could have opened the road towards an alternative different to both independent capitalist development and dependent capitalist underdevelopment, this is, toward a dependent capitalist development. However, the class contradiction embedded in the capitalist mode of production would not have been resolved by this alternative either. Revolutionary change was characterised and limited to a democratic-bourgeois reform which did not change the structure of class domination though it did not preclude it in the future.

Articulation in the *Mapuchemapu*: Inchoate Classes and the Loss of Sovereignty

Finally, the articulation of seigniorial, capitalist and *Mapuche* modes of production during the 19th century meant the end of *Mapuche* political independence. During the nineteenth century, polygamy consolidated as the economic and political institution which operated to firstly, centralise and concentrate power and to generate a social division of labour within political groups known as *cacicazgos* and secondly, to form alliances between them. Economically, polygamy empowered *loncos* who through it reinforced and increased their control over the land in which production relations had been modified. The formation of an embryonic non-producer class (*loncos*) and a producer class (*conas* and women) as a result of polygamy and the changes in production, was evident in the nineteenth century. The patriarchal structure of *Mapuche* society was maintained but the class character of polygamy accentuated the power imbalances patriarchy had historically established among *Mapuche* adding the domination of wealthy *loncos* over male producers to the subordination of women by men.

Politically, polygamy established political alliances through exogamous marriages expanding territorial control. Two major inherited *cacicazgos*, *Arribanos* and *Abajinos*, disputed hegemony in the *Mapuchemapu*. *Mapuche* realised that the Chilean ruling class'

conviction that *Araucanía* must be part of the Chilean nation, imperiled the sovereignty of *Mapuchemapu*. In addition, the erosion of polygamy as an economic and political institution by the action of the Catholic Church and the state agents, threatened *Mapuche* political economy. Loss of land and the end of polygamy left *Mapuche* no alternative but violent defence.

A significant part of the expropriation of *Mapuche* land was planned in the new Republic. Class and state formation processes in the Republic of Chile impacted on *Mapuchemapu*. The territorial expansion of the Chilean nation, its nationalist and chauvinist character and the final plan of annihilation against *Mapuche*, together with a weaker *Mapuche* political unity and the technical military superiority of their enemies, led to the expropriation of their land and the loss of their political independence.

CONCLUSION

THE END OF *MAPUCHE* POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE ORIGINS OF DEPENDENT AND UNDERDEVELOPED CAPITALISM IN CHILE

Articulation in *Mapuchemapu* : Class Formation

The *Mapuche* mode of production was based on communal relations of production, a system of family labour whose surplus was directly exchanged among the members of the community or with similar communities and whose economic activities included gathering, hunting and horticulture. Economic and social relations were developed and reproduced in the polygamous family group or *lof*. In general in America, there were two main types of modes of production, the communal, like the *Mapuche*, and the “agricultural” mode, characteristic of the *Mexica* and *Inca* social formations. The “agricultural” mode differed from the communal mode in that it produced an economic surplus beyond that necessary for the population to subsist. Private ownership of productive resources and a progressive differentiation between a producer class and a non-producer class developed together with a central state on which a civil and religious bureaucracy depended. What defined, characterised and differentiated

Mapuche society from this was thus the collective nature of productive property, communal production but it shared the patriarchal organisation of the economy. There was no 'individual' ownership but a collective control of most productive resources. Land was not a commodity and its control was not concentrated. By the 16th century polygamy tended to be exclusive to the patriarchal *loncos* due mainly to changes in production developed by the articulation such as cattle raising and agriculture. Economic, political and gender relations of subordination deepened in *Mapuchemapu*, and this process of change ended with the Chilean occupation of *Mapuchemapu* at the end of the 19th century.

More than 350 years of articulation deeply transformed *Mapuche* production relations and political organisation. A hunting and gathering society with a polygamous family organisation changed into an agricultural society with embryonic classes, a sharp gender division of labour, the concentration and centralisation of power in large *cacicazgos* and increasing mercantile relations. In this development, the control of the land and labour was the basis of economic and political power. Polygamy, an exclusive right of the *loncos*, became cause and effect of the accumulation of wealth. Many wives meant greater labour and a greater surplus of products and animals. The more products one controlled, the more wives one could acquire. Since land was abundant,

its control was through usage. The more land one could use, the more one controlled. Thus, polygamy meant power within the group and was the basis of the class formation process within it.

Neither missionaries nor *encomenderos* could successfully proselytise the *Mapuche*, abolish polygamy and impose monogamy, a basic principle of Catholicism. But the articulation with the seigniorial mode from the 16th century was slowly transforming *Mapuche* production relations and politics, while polygamy remained the relation most resistant to its effects.

In sum, a more complex and hierarchical system of production and clear relations of subordination developed in *Mapuchemapu*. This was primarily the result of the articulation of the communal *Mapuche* mode with the seigniorial mode of production which produced an agricultural-menial mode in articulation with the developing capitalism of the 19th century. The patriarchal figure of the *lonco* was dominant and most women, and all *conas*, the direct producers, became like serfs. Though legally free, they were bound by kinship to the *lonco* and by the economic and political power he exercised over them. Two embryonic classes were forming, a non-producer class of economically and politically powerful patriarchal *loncos*, and a subordinated and servile embryonic producer class of powerless women and men *conas*. A

servile and kinship-based mode of production was developing in the *Mapuche* social formation, a class formation process interrupted by the Chilean invasion at the end of the 19th century.

Articulation and *Mapuche* Political Centralisation and Concentration

The *Mapuche* social formation was more a set of scattered polygamous families than a single state centrally administered. The autonomous communities or *lofs* were united only by the need of defence and the *Mapuche* did not create a nobility to conspire with their Spanish equivalents as happened with the *Mexica* and *Incas*. Unlike the *Mexica* and *Incas*, *Mapuche* did not believe in a predetermined history ending in divine retribution but saw the Spaniards as invaders who wanted to expropriate their land and felt the need to defend it. Their autocephalous polity did not impede but contributed to their capacity to resist. In other words, *Mapuche* recognised themselves as a people, were aware of their political independence and did not need a state to manifest that certainty.

However, those *Mapuche* who had been impacted by the invasion and the existence of a hostile colonising neighbour, began to change their mode of production. They introduced horse and cattle raising and a more permanent political organisation to cope with the demands of a

permanent warfare. There was a progressive consolidation of an “agricultural” economy and the concentration and centralisation of political power, and in these changes, polygamy played a key part.

Changes in production and political organisation were a cause and a consequence of the alteration in the character of polygamy which, from the patriarchal form of family organisation of pre-invasion times, became an economic and political instrument to enrich and politically empower *loncos* by reinforcing and expanding their control over the land, beyond that which they immediately used. This was achieved in the 18th and above all, in the 19th centuries when the forming of political alliances through exogamous marriages with women from potentially allied communities became common.

The “new” and powerful polygamous family, part of a system of marriage alliances, facilitated the development of the great regions, the new political forms which accompanied the new social division of labour and the new hereditary and centralised power structure.

This expansion and concentration of power meant that the *lofs* or *rehues*, became inherited *cacicazgos*, a hierarchical and centralised structure of power. The sense of unity and community within diversity was weakened in a society that was experiencing a division into embryonic classes of powerful polygamous men and powerless women

and men producers. Moreover, the way different *cacicazgos* conceived their independence varied from one group to other. The different intensities of the mercantile, political and social connections *cacicazgos* had with colonists and later, with Chileans, differentiated them, and, in the 19th century, struggle for hegemony within *Mapuchemapu* ensued. Those who lived closer to the frontier, the *Abajinos*, were thoroughly permeated by foreign influences and even sought integration with the Chilean State. In contrast, *Arribanos* continued to defend *Mapuche* political independence. However, class divisions and rivalry between these major *cacicazgos* damaged *Mapuche* social solidarity and subsequently, their national political and social unity and capacity for defence.

The threat of invasion from Chile once again brought unity in *Mapuchemapu*, but *Mapuche* realised too late that the Chilean landowners' conviction that the land regained from the colonists by the *Mapuche* belonged to Chile threatened the existence of their nation. In addition, the erosion of polygamy by Catholic missionaries and agents of the Chilean State, threatened *Mapuche* political economy. Expropriation of land and abolition of polygamy led *Mapuche* to reorganise their army and defend their land as they did it against the Spanish Kingdom for two and a half centuries. *Mapuche* finally were defeated by modern artillery, the gattling gun and the repeating rifle,

organised and used with precision by the newly created professional army of the Chilean Republic.

The Articulation at the Gender Instance in *Mapuchemapu* (Sexualities, Masculinities and Femininities)

Because of the centrality of polygamy for *Mapuche*, monogamous Catholic marriage did not seduce them at all. Marriages were economic contracts without *vinculum* with religion that could condition *Mapuche* sexuality. Divorce was not a drama nor was virginity sacred, to be kept until marriage.

But this freedom of sexuality from religious constraints did not imply gender equity and real emancipation for women. In *Mapuchemapu* the man must be a warrior and the woman a good reproducer and producer. All those out of this pattern of gender relations were considered as deviant, homosexuals, as healers were regarded in *Mapuchemapu*. A binary gender/sex system dominated gender relations, and the patriarchal character of the *Mapuche* maintained throughout centuries, was accentuated by the changes in warfare, production and politics. Polygamy generated deep economic differentiation and political relations of power and subordination. To the subjugation of women by men, was added male differentiation

generated by the domination of wealthy polygamous *loncos* over male monogamous producers.

Masculinity was associated with aggression, virility, bravery, toughness and strength, typified by men trained for war. Their physical discipline led *Mapuche* men to conceive of themselves as superior to women. But while the system of power was fundamentally grounded in polygamy, the *malón*, a male activity which valorised military capacities and attitudes, drunkenness and riding skills, actively reproduced *Mapuche* masculinity. Thus, hegemonic masculinity in which men were the protectors and women the protected – despite women always supported male warriors in war time - was encouraged and maintained for the defence of *Mapuchemapu*. The patriarchal polygamous character of the *Mapuche* social formation was in this way reinforced, defining the feminine as subordinate to the dominant the warrior, in a servile relation in which men fought and worked.

This masculinity united men, the leaders and the lead. All *Mapuche* men aspired to polygamy, but only the wealthier practiced it and both *loncos* and *conas* regarded women as objects, commodities and possessions. For *Mapuche* thus, there was a hegemonic masculinity reinforced by warfare and in particular by polygamy and only two sexually differentiated genders each with a specified range of exclusive

tasks and occupations. Healing was undertaken by both sexes and while healers were respected they were also regarded as sexually deviant for they had stepped outside the gendered division of labour and were thus not real men and women.

The Articulation in the Colony and in Chile: Class and Race Relations

The *Mapuche* communal mode articulated with the feudal mode introduced by the Spanish conquerors with the feudal-Spanish mode becoming dominant in the central region of what is now Chile. The *Mapuche* mode continued to exist south of the *Bio-Bio* river strongly impacted by the feudal mode and in the territory controlled by the colonists, the indigenous mode of production practically disintegrated.

The Spanish Monarchy developed mechanisms called *Encomienda* and *Repartimiento* to redistribute land and labour in territory reconquered from the Moors. The expropriation of indigenous land and exploitation of labour was crucial in the articulation of feudalism with the *Mapuche* mode and was immediately successful north of the *Bio-Bio* river where people had already been subjected to or influenced by the *Inca* State. In the central region, the core of the Spanish colony, the feudal reorganisation of the productive factors realised by the Spanish State substantially modified indigenous life disintegrating their mode and

imposing feudal relations of production. The *encomienda* became the main social relation of production in the Chilean colony.

This trans-pacific feudal mode of production soon differed from its Castilian origins. The Spaniards freely assigned small lots of land to themselves in a process known as *mercedes de tierra*. This was the starting point of the commodification of the land and from it, the contradiction between private property and indigenous collective property rose, with private property predominating because with conquest, private property acquired a determinant political importance. The appropriation of indigenous land was the basic premise of an American *latifundia* that differed from that in Spain in that land rapidly became a commodity. For although the distribution of land and labour was conceived within a feudal order and a political orientation consistent to the authoritarian and centralised character of the Castilian Absolutist State, created to keep serfdom as the main relation production, to avoid political fragmentation and the dissemination of sovereignty and so preserve the whole feudal regime, the progressive privatisation of land led to the development of a market in land.

Notwithstanding this, the *encomienda* preserved the internal coherence of the feudal mode of production for it continued to be a servile production relation in which a specified indigenous community or

group of communities were ceded to an *encomendero* who could demand from them a compulsory tax which they paid with their labour. So, the *encomienda* as a form of serfdom, as in Castile, was the existence-form of labour in the feudal mode of production. It differed of the Spanish feudal regime only in that land became a commodity, and for this reason, I have called this mode of production "seigniorial". By the 17th century, against the Absolutism which had created it and like the landlords in Aragon, the *encomenderos* became the patriarchal political, military, religious and judicial authorities in the Colony. Spanish *encomenderos* and indigenous serfs constituted non-producer and producer classes respectively, the first classes in the Chilean colony produced by the articulation of the feudal and indigenous modes of production.

By the second half of the 17th century, feudalism, in its seigniorial derivation had consolidated as the predominant mode of production in the Chilean colony. Its main relation of production, the *encomienda*, transformed itself – through intervening forms - into *hacienda*, modifying slightly the seigniorial mode which now contained seasonal labour paid in kind, the *peonaje*. While *inquilinos* became serfs, part of the labour force was separated from the means of their reproduction, becoming seasonal *peones*. *Inquilinaje* and *peonaje* were the main social relations of the *hacienda* by the last third of the 17th century

involving not only indigenes but also *mestizos* and poor Spaniards. The severely exploitative character of the *hacienda* motivated many workers to leave it and turn to banditry.

The *hacienda* was the centre of life in the colony and the Republic until the mid 19th century, a social totality in which feudal class and patriarchal gender relations were reproduced and minor capitalist elements introduced. The *hacienda* also reproduced racism along class lines. The centuries of religious wars of reconquest in Spain against the Moorish invaders racialised the Spanish people. The definition of 'the other' in the Chilean colony had its origin in this episode of Spanish history and it was translated by the conquerors, most of whom, had been soldiers or were soldiers' sons in that war. So, African slaves, indigenes, the savage *indio* and importantly, the pagan, represented 'the other' in America. Class formation was formed by a racial practice brought from Castile supported by religious beliefs. The imposition of the *encomienda* meant the forced acceptance of Catholicism by the conquered people. Rejection of evangelisation brought repression and social exclusion, and phenotypical features facilitated the identification of those who must be socially excluded for their religious beliefs and position in this class society in formation. Together with patriarchy, racism has been part of the class formation process in Chile and it has also been a factor contributing to its specificity.

Racism emerged again with renovated strength in a chauvinist nationalism following the Pacific War, masking the voracity of the Chilean ruling class and justifying the invasion of *Mapuchemapu*. *Mapuche* were no longer the heroic warriors, example of bravery that inspired Independentists, but they became again the immoral and pagan savages, the uncivilised *indios* in 'state of nature'. Racism has been active in the history of the colony and the Chilean Republic and has both exacerbated and concealed the exploitative and classist social relations of production.

Although the *hacienda* preserved its seigniorial character in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was strongly influenced by exogenous and endogenous forces that led landowners to implement some changes within it. The industrial revolution in England and its impact on the world meant changes in the productive, commercial and political dynamics of the Chilean nation. The country grew in diversity because urban life and mining constituted alternatives for rural workers. Many of them left the countryside though migration did not cause a grave shortage of labour in the *haciendas* for the majority of the population still lived in rural areas.

In this context in which the demand for increased production and incipient labour shortage coincided, *terratenientes* searched for ways

to retain labour on their estates but maintain the same social relations. Thus, they introduced some changes to adjust the seigniorial agrarian structure to the new economic and political circumstances. The solution comprised the utilisation of the country's infrastructure to connect *haciendas* to the markets and to introduce technical innovations in the productive process, mainly in wheat threshing. Also, a subdivision of the large *haciendas* was planned which would not alter the character of rural property. Although the concentration of the land ownership was to some extent reduced, *latifundia* were maintained by increasing the landholdings among the landowners' family circles. *Fundos* became more productive for they became relatively "smaller", unused land was brought into production, and arable soil was better used by a more efficient management controlling a more diversified but still servile labour force.

Labour was diversified by transforming *inquilinaje* into servile settled *peonaje* and expanded by increasing tied and seasonal *peonaje*. Of these, only seasonal *peonaje* was nominally a wage relation (though frequently paid in kind, like the settled and tied *peonaje*). In these ways, *patrones* retained the seigniorial character of rural property resisting the impact of capitalist relations from outside and inside the country and slowing, but not impeding, the process of proletarianisation

in the countryside that had its first manifestations in these partial changes in the *hacienda*.

Simultaneous with and connected to these partial changes within the *hacienda*, was the development of mining encouraged by the English industrial bourgeoisie to whom merchant-landowners and an incipient mining bourgeoisie were socially and economically allied. Monopsony, the system of *habilitación* and foreign capital investments reduced free *pirquinaje*, the independent discovery, extraction and exploitation of ores and controlled mining production by introducing company towns. While the living and working conditions were no less exploitative than the *hacienda*'s, the company towns generated rebellion and not servility.

In the *hacienda* the direct producers were not totally separated from the means of production since they could, at least, produce their own subsistence and while they were legally compelled to service, they were in practice tied to the landowner's domain. *Inquilinas/os* believed that there was no other life apart from serving the *patrón*, that they were born unfree, a belief encouraged for centuries by the *terrateniente* and the Catholic Church. They were in practice socially unfree. Catholicism stimulated and reinforced servility and legitimated the patriarchal figure of the *patrón* to whom they believed they belonged.

Paternalism and submission and not class contradiction and conflict were generated and reproduced in the *haciendas*.

In contrast, rationalisation, the increased concentration of workers and class polarisation characterised the company town. Direct producers were absolutely separated from the means of production, and labour apparently became a commodity. Workers had only their own labour to sell, but they were not paid in money but in tokens. Payment by tokens, valid only in the company store, restricted the social world of workers, but did not void the process of extraction of surplus value by means of the production of commodities. Payment by and the redemption of tokens made exploitation starkly visible and the absence of alternative subsistence drove the workers into struggle. Working class consciousness and class struggle emerged. The workers struggled for payment in real money, thus further deepening capitalist relations and their own formation as a wage earning proletariat.

Thus the introduction of foreign capital was not a *sine qua non* for the destruction of the seigniorial mode of production and the predominance of the capitalist mode. Mine workers also fought to 'free' capitalist relations. But British capital and its local supporters ensured the persistence of the *señorío* linked as they were by financial institutions to the conservative landowners.

The Articulation at the Political Level: Colonial and Post Colonial State Formation

Spain in the sixteenth century was a feudal social formation with a very asymmetrical state structure that consolidated Absolutism in only one of its Kingdoms, Castile. In this Kingdom and one of its regions, *Extremadura*, the *repartimiento* and the *encomienda* were conceived by the Monarchy as tools to organise the political and economic life of reconquered Moorish territory. While still feudal, the *repartimiento* and the *encomienda* were the manifestations of the beginning of a generalised crisis of feudalism in which serfdom became an anachronistic relation of production. These institutions became significant not only in Castile's internal armed conflicts but also for the articulation of the feudal and indigenous modes of production in America. The Castilian grants were the institutions through which the Absolutist State formed the new colonies.

However articulation took different forms according to the characteristics of the specific indigenous mode in articulation with feudalism. A communal and an "agricultural mode" resulted at the political level of the articulation in different forms of conquest and different ways of organising the new colonies. The Spaniards found in the *Mexica* and *Incas* Empires, as big as their own, central states and large bureaucracies. The formation of political alliances between

indigenous leaders and the Spaniards, the social and religious background of conquerors, the predetermined and fatal conception of history of the indigenes and the military technical superiority of Spaniards, were factors that contributed to the transformation of the huge indigenous states into colonies.

In contrast, the absence of a central state and struggles for political power in *Mapuchemapu*, caused the Spaniards to confront a socially united warrior people over two and a half centuries and the articulation had as its initial effect the division of the what is now Chile into two politically independent and separate territories. Only in the territory controlled by the colonists was it possible to impose the *encomienda* and even there, it did not become what the Spanish Monarchs had hoped for.

The tyranny of distance, the private entrepreneurial character of most of the conquests and the ambition of the conquerors led to the formation in large *haciendas* of *señoríos* with local political, military and judicial powers. Real political power resided in these *señoríos* rather than in the official bureaucrats of the Absolutist State in the *Capitanía General de Chile*. The Colonial State was so dependent on the *terratenientes* that in practice they exercised political power in the fundamentally rural colony. The *encomenderos* developed a market in land regardless of its prohibition by the Crown. Similarly, the *Real Situado* was

imposed by the Crown to finance the army in Chile in 1600 due to the urgent petition of *encomenderos* who sought to protect their properties from *Mapuche* attack. The landowners in their *haciendas* were like feudal nobles in *Aragon* exercising political power directly in the colony and sometimes indirectly through the Colonial State bureaucracy that was their instrument of domination.

The formation of the state and the persistence of seigniorialism were mutually dependent processes that resulted in a new social formation different to but formed from the Spanish and the *Mapuche* modes in Chile. Not that the state determined the colonial economy completely nor that the colonial economy absolutely determined the state, rather, each was formed through an original and intertwined development of economic and social relations and political practice that constituted the social formation in Chile, a product of feudal and indigenous modes in articulation. The advent of the Republican State did not break the power of the landowners but consolidated it in a different way. Political power still came from the estates and the landowners became the hegemonic fraction of the ruling class in the Republic. Regardless of the modern rhetoric of a fraction of this class inspired by the European enlightenment that challenged the landowners, political power continued to be authoritarian, seigniorial, patriarchal and racist until the 1850s. The centrality and authoritarianism expected by the Absolutist

Monarchy of the Chilean Colonial State three centuries earlier, was paradoxically realised by the Republican State.

This omnipotence was only seriously challenged in the 1850s, when a fraction representing growing capitalist interests, criticised the authoritarianism of the government and condemned the servile relations dominant in the estates. State formation was crucial to the way capitalism developed in Chile, but while the challenge modified some of the authoritarian aspects of government it did not alter its classist character.

In the dynamic of class formation in which seigniorial relations were dominant in the estates and capitalist relations predominated in the mining industry, the state was the tool and the terrain of a struggle for hegemony between two main fractions of the ruling class, the landowners and the mining bourgeoisie. The state that had served landowners' economic interests, became the principal objective in the armed struggle between these two class fractions in 1851 and 1859. There was a virtual draw in these conflicts for while the landowners could not be militarily defeated, their conservative ideas were no longer dominant because the country had grown in diversity and the international context was dominated by modern capitalist ideas and practices. In a pact in which the *terratenientes* continued controlling

agriculture and retained a strong influence in the judiciary, the army and in the legislature, the Liberals won Executive government. The Republican State nominally bourgeois, governed a social formation that still was not completely dominated by the capitalist mode of production because the dominion of large landed property continued. Landowners saw the state as the way to preserve their interests and still proclaim them as the people's general interests.

The trajectory and character of capitalism in Chile was significantly shaped by the struggle for hegemony between the diverse ruling class fractions in the 1850s and in 1891, between the political confrontation of capital and the seigniorial *latifundia*. However, these sides changed in the Civil War of 1891 and the character and trajectory of capitalism in Chile was now disputed by two new fractions. One of these was a capitalist fraction which supported state-led capitalist national development and the other was an alliance of British capitalists, Chilean nitrate mine owners and landowners that opposed this idea for it threatened their economic interests in the nitrate industry and servility in the countryside. The former fraction was isolated within the ruling class which became more homogeneous as a result and significantly, in the face of a more fully formed and active working class.

The triumph of the nitrate's alliance in the Civil War of 1891 decisively marked the nature and direction of the Chilean capitalism which became underdeveloped, dependent and subordinated in the world capitalist system. Even if the other fraction had succeeded, there was still no guarantee either of independence or of development. Although the participation of foreign capital in the victorious fraction in Chile was important in determining the subordinate position that Chilean capitalism has since then had in the capitalist world system, what happened in 1891 was only an expression of the long process of class, state and gender formation in which the decisive elements were the Chilean internal class and political dynamics rather than the intervention of the British capital. The social basis necessary to sustain of Balmaceda's strategy of national development, did not exist; a revolution from above had limited possibilities to success.

No alternative considered a revolution from the grass root. The probability not only of succeeding but of implementing a strategy of 'independent capitalist development' for Chile was limited considering the development of the formation of classes, in particular, of the proletariat, and the growth of industrial capitalism in Europe. In contrast, the alternative that succeeded and characterised the Chilean capitalism as dependent and underdeveloped, expressed the balance of forces within the ruling class, the influence of British capitalists in the

Chilean economy and politics and the degree of formation and unity of the working class. A third alternative, called by Larraín (1989) 'dependent capitalist development', was more realistic than the first option. But this strategy that considered the participation of foreign capital regulated by the state in order to develop the productive forces and industrialise the country, would not have broken the exploitative dynamic of the class structure and benefited the great majority in the country because of its bourgeois character.

Gendered Articulation: Sexualities, Masculinities and Femininities

Articulation at the level of gender relations in the colony, *Mapuchemapu* and the Republic, integrated the feudal Catholic legacy of patriarchy brought from Spain in the *encomienda*, with the patriarchal - polygamous legacy of *Mapuche*. It was almost impossible that the gender relations in *Araucanía* and Chile in the 19th century would have not been patriarchal insofar as both *Mapuche* and the Spaniards, in different ways, were patriarchal, though they conceived sexuality differently.

The influence of feudal patriarchy was decisive for the development of *machismo* in Latin America and in Chile. The dynastic marriage-policy that characterised the political alliances of Spain in Europe when the

conquest of America began, exemplified the economic character of marriage in the Spanish aristocracy. The Absolutist State and the Catholic Church were salient in shaping, maintaining and reproducing patriarchy in Spain and its colonies.

Femininities and masculinities were informed by Catholic doctrine and experienced differently in the feudal classes. These gender constructions were formed in a gender/sex system in which only heterosexuality was socially accepted. Femininity in feudalism was associated with servility, weakness, and submission to men, like serfs to lords. Women, rich ladies in the ruling class or poor serfs in the subordinated class, were not citizens. Aristocratic women emulated the Virgin Mary on earth as ladies of the Court and devotees of the Church. They procreated but did not produce like the women in the serf class who performed both tasks. Importantly, some became independent artisans, an activity which journeyed to the Chilean colony and became very relevant for the development of gender relations in the working class. The dominant masculinity was represented by the figure of the landlord, the knight warrior, devote to Catholicism, exploiter, authoritarian and *machista*.

These patriarchal gender relations were transported to America by the Castilian institution of conquest and colonisation, the *repartimiento* -

encomienda. The construction of masculinity and femininity in the Chilean colony was strongly marked by warfare, Catholicism and the servile social relations of the *hacienda*. *Machismo* was nourished in the *encomienda*, constructed from the conception of masculinity dominant in the feudal binary gender/sex system. Homophobia, racism and domination were reflected in *machismo* and the heterosexual monogamous nuclear family was the institution through which sexuality and gender constructions were monitored and regulated by the Catholic Church. The personification of the *machista* was the *patrón* of the *hacienda* and within it, *machismo* was sustained, exercised and transmitted.

The ownership of land, the *hacienda* and the Catholic heterosexual family, linked class and gender formation. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the *hacienda*, *inquilinaje*, *peonaje* and the family were the nexus through which patriarchy was manifest. And yet, like independent artisans in feudal Spain, working class women challenged the patriarchal state and Church and showed that it was possible to experience gender differently than in the form that served the interests of the ruling class. From its onset, the history of the working class was the history of women and men and of their relations.

Consequently, the formation, physiognomy and specificity of the Chilean working class involved the indispensable contribution of women. These were the hard days in which thousands of widows, single or abandoned women became independent workers in a variety of independent occupations such as spinning, weaving, dressmaking, washing, catering, boarding and prostitution. They created a social space for themselves and for male *peonaje*. Around women's productive activity, a grass-roots culture developed. The Chilean proletariat was formed by women bravely facing the state and the Church, able to produce their own subsistence, to solidarise with male *peonaje* and challenge the *machista* conception of masculinity and femininity. This conception was backed by the authority of the Church and the state, recreated by most of ruling class men and women and by sections of the people such as the *inquilinaje* in the countryside and some women domestic servants in the towns.

However, the changes brought about by the articulation in which capitalist relations began to be more influential in Chile by the mid 19th century, meant that urban settlement implied the insertion of women into new relations of production. This impacted on gender relations and patriarchy into whose feudal-Catholic content capitalist elements were integrated marking the passage towards patriarchal capitalism.

During the second half of the 19th century gender relations were patriarchal and this patriarchy was shaped by class formation which was also significantly forged by gender relations. Patriarchy not only created and maintained inequality and oppression between men and women, but also produced differences among men and also among women. Simultaneously, masculinities and femininities had a categorical class character. Thus, gender constituted different social identities that were not accidental but consistent with the social relations of the dominant mode of production in the social formation.

Moreover, patriarchy was ideological insofar as it masked social contradictions in the interest of the ruling class. *Machismo* provided a common unity across class and race. But, understanding patriarchy as the only contradiction in capitalism as Montecino (1996) does, has also been ideological for it conceals the capital and labour contradiction by which gender relations are significantly formed. It is through the dynamic of the structurally changing and intertwined processes of gender and class formation that identities are constantly shaped and re-shaped, formed and deformed. Independent women workers in the 19th and early 20th centuries were an eloquent demonstration of this, their anti-patriarchal struggles significantly contributed to the formation of the working class, the labour movement and the recreation, reproduction and renovation of the Chilean popular culture. The

women's movement in Chile was not against or disassociated from the labour movement but part of it. However, the women's movement faced obstacles in the development of their own identity for historically the gendering of industries and occupations produced 'male unions' which became hegemonic within the labour movement. This led the labour movement mistakenly to regard working class issues as independent or isolated from gender issues. Thus, the penetration of the gendered division of labour in the labour movement also reproduced patriarchal practice within it.

The Reconstruction of Historical Materialism

My intention has been to contribute to the reconstruction of historical materialism on two specific accounts, to challenge deterministic conceptions of Marxism that in turn have lead to a teleological interpretation of history and secondly, to integrate gender relations into the study of the articulation of the modes of production.

The state was crucial in the generation of new social relations in the colony and these classes intervened in the formation of the state itself. The economy is political, and historical materialism is not helped by unidirectional and deterministic view that the 'economic base' determines the 'political and ideological superstructure'. The specific process of articulation in Chile reveals the connected and intertwined

processes of class, state and gender formation which are uneven and mutually dependent and not binary and pre-ordained. In Chile the state, as much as anything else, created the relations which supported it. Structures exist, but their direction and effects are not predetermined.

The history of the articulation of modes of production in *Mapuchemapu* and Chile in which people produce and reproduce their lives, denies the deterministic view of base determining superstructure in a linear and pre-ordered way. This study of articulation of a large part of the history of what is now Chile, has demonstrated how uneven, open and non-teleological historical processes are. Although there are certain dynamic structures that condition the practice of people throughout history, we have seen that it is human practice itself that provides the meaning of history and makes social change possible, though there is no guarantee of the success of such changes.

In relation to the second point of reconstruction, the connection between gender and class formation, the study has demonstrated that the exclusion of gender formation falsifies the historical facts and damages sociological analysis. The neglect of this aspect of articulation destroys the relation of theory and practice upon which historical materialism rests. Historical materialism, as the theory of practice, cannot exclude one of the most significant components of human activity, gender

relations and their connection to class and political processes. Analysing the past is not simply an exercise to validate historical materialism as a method within the social sciences. The recuperation of the memory of a people is intimately connected to the possibility of comprehending the present and creating the future.

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Maps

Area Studied

P A C I F I C O C E A N


Valparaiso

Santiago

Concepcion

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
Valdivia



Feudal Spain in the 16th Century



Latin America in the 16th Century



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