Narrative practice and understanding reasons: reply to Gallagher



Publication Details

Hutto, D. (2006). Narrative practice and understanding reasons: reply to Gallagher. In R. A. Menary (Eds.), Radical Enactivism Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto (pp. 231-247). Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub. Co.

Additional Publication Information

ISBN: 9789027241511


Gallagher writes, "My limited aim, in agreement with Hutto, is to suggest that there is no need to appeal to overly mentalistic theory-of-mind explanations for how we understand others" and that "narrative competence suggests an alternative to TOM approaches" (Gallagher: this volume). Indeed, he goes further and adds that "Our primary way of understanding others is worked out not via 3rd-person observation or 1st-person simulation, but via real (2nd person) interaction in pragmatic and social contexts" (Gallagher: this volume). Those familiar with my previous writings on narrative and folk psychology will recognise that all of this is music to my ears (Hutto 1997, 2003b, 2004). Indeed, making an extended case for these sorts of claims is the primary focus of several of my new papers, edited volumes and my forthcoming book, Folk Psychological Narratives. In this reply I highlight some aspects of the approach that I have been developing in those works.

Please refer to publisher version or contact your library.