Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content
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Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena-perceiving, imagining, remembering-can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others-the most elementary ones-do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones.
Hutto, D. D. & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, United States: The MIT Press. https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/evolving-enactivism