What binds us together: Normativity and the second person
RIS ID
108697
Abstract
Even if it appears quite evident that we live within society and as a consequence are bound together by shared norms and institutions, the nature of this relationship is a source of philosophical perplexity. After discussing the conditions of adequacy a conception of shared norms must accommodate, I discuss communitarian and interpretationist accounts of shared norms. I claim that they are problematic insofar as they fail to provide an adequate conception of the shared and binding character of social norms. Finally, I argue that a different understanding of the shared character of norms follows from a correct understanding of the conditions of adequacy at stake.
COinS
Publication Details
Satne, G. (2014). What binds us together: Normativity and the second person. Philosophical Topics, 42 (1), 43-61.