The first wave of arguments for the extended mind focuses on questions of functional parity between internal and external processes and especially the functional role of causal coupling between internal vehicles and external vehicles. The arguments and examples of Clark and Chalmers (1998, reprinted in this volume) have come under pressure from internalist critics such as Adams and Aizawa (2001, this volume) and Rupert (2004, this volume), who have targeted the arguments from functional parity and causal coupling.
However, there is also a second wave of arguments for the extended mind, which focuses on questions of the complementarity of internal and external vehicles (Sutton this volume) and their consequent integration into a cognitive whole (Menary 2007, this chapter). This second wave of arguments also takes a more enactive approach to cognition, seeing it as constituted by our bodily activities in the world in conjunction with neural processes and vehicles (Rowlands 1999, this volume; Wilson 2004, this volume).
I will call the first-wave arguments extended-mind-style arguments. Allied to extended-mind-style arguments are those of distributed and embodied cognition (Hutchins 1995; Gallagher 200S), with their emphasis on social situation and embodiment. When we bring together the arguments and evidence in support of extended, distributed, and embodied cognition we form the view that cognizers are embodied and located in a situation which has both physical and social aspects, and that some bodily interactions with the environment constitute cognitive processing.