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Thoughtful feeling and feelingful thinking - an evolutionary step

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THOUGHTFUL FEELING AND FEELINGFUL THINKING -
AN EVOLUTIONARY STEP

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

from

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by

NADIA CRITTENDEN, BACHELOR OF ARTS (HONS)

Department of Psychology
1991
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This thesis contains the following revisions, based on examiners’ reports, as requested by the Postgraduate Subcommittee, Graduate Faculty, University of Wollongong.

Revision 1. Provide a summary conclusion justifying the major aim of this thesis as stated on p.xviii.

(Appears at the end of Chapter One, pp.20-24. See also Conclusion at the end of Chapter Two, pp.51-55).

Revision 2. Define and discuss clearly what is meant by the "evolutionary step in the development of the emotional process".


Revision 3. Explore more of the contemporary literature on emotion and cognition (Averill, Lyons, Neu, Frijda).

(Appears in Chapters Two and Three, pp.46-55 and 70-76).

Revision 4. Place Chapters One, Two and Three with an epistemological position.

(Appears in the Introduction, pp.xiii-xviii).

Revision 5. Define some terms e.g. self, ego.


Revision 6. Support and reference the material dealing with the theories of emotion based on evolutionary theory in Chapter Three.

(Appears in Chapter Three, pp.63-66).

Revision 7. Extend Appendix I by applying the central argument of the thesis in one case. That is, by presenting an example of emotion analysis and showing its relationship to the process of construing.

(Appears in Appendix I).

Revision 8. Answer criticisms of the treatment of philosophers.


In addition, small adjustments have been made in the thesis generally, where appropriate, to incorporate the revisions.
The aim of this thesis is to establish that, in the history of human thought on emotion, a gradual development has been taking place that reflects the ways in which our emotional processes have been changing, and gives us an indication of the ways in which they may yet change. Within this general aim, the claim is made and substantiated that certain perspectives on emotion can be abstracted from the many theories put forward in the history of western thought. These perspectives are yielded by the different ways in which emotions have been conceptually related to cognitive processes, physiological processes, ethical concepts, motivation and creativity – that is, by the ways in which past thinkers have related the personal experience of feelings to physiological states, to ways of thinking, to the practice of morality, to our reasons for acting, and to the creative process in its many forms.

A further supported claim is made that psychological theories of emotion emerging in modern times were developed in a scientific and/or psychotherapeutic context. However, they too could be scrutinised within the framework of the perspectives that emerged from philosophical backgrounds. They can also be seen to establish new levels of awareness of the development of emotional processes, most particularly in the work of Sigmund Freud and George Kelly. The claims are also made and supported, that within Freud’s Theory of the Instincts there exists a more complex, cognitively based theory of emotions, and that within Kelly’s Theory of Personal Constructs there exists a theory of emotions that posits the closest relationship between thinking and feeling yet conceived. It is argued that a more satisfactory use can be made of Kelly’s process of construing if it is preceded by a personal analysis of emotions based on Freud’s theory. That is, I have argued that Kelly’s process of construing involves both feeling and thinking as a rational process, and that a personal awareness of the ways in which we feel and structure our feelings (such
awareness being assisted by the knowledge yielded by Freud's work) is important to the development of the construing process in each of us. A brief description of a technique of emotion analysis based on aspects of Freud's psychoanalytic technique is presented in the final chapter, with an account of how the emotional awareness gained thereby contributes more fully to the construing process. An illustration of this process is given in Appendix I.
INTRODUCTION

Why emotions are important

That emotions are important is clearly visible in the ways in which they affect individual lives and societies, civilisations and history. Their power and the problems they create have been acknowledged and pondered over by major thinkers dating back, in our culture, to early Greek philosophy. Yet very few philosophers before modern times produced complete theories of emotion as a major aim, or by intention - rather, such theories emerged as a by-product of inquiries into the nature of knowledge and people's "place in the universe". Although I have highlighted ideas on emotion in looking at the development of the concept, these ideas were a part of wider epistemological or ontological enquiries and were often prescriptive as well.

In looking at the way the concept developed (as opposed to simply reviewing philosophers) I have sought to bring out a particular trend, to show how thinking on emotion has gradually become more complex as the human race progressed towards modern times. Such a progressive development is not always visible when it occurs in the background of much more obvious developments such as the development of scientific concepts, and especially alongside the materialist philosophies as prevalent at this time. Further, the trend or development that I perceived in my inquiry was of a particular kind, evolutionary in its action and reflecting people’s changing experiences. This was identified not in a specifically cultural or historical way in terms of events, but in terms of the general effects of time and experience. A development occurring at that level can, I think, be very easily lost or made invisible by the particulars of history and cultures. And that may be at least a part of the explanation of why, even
though the importance of emotions has always been apparent, present day philosophers and psychologists are making statements such as:

"The importance of emotions both for the individual and society can scarcely be overestimated. For the individual emotions are both ends in themselves and means for the attainment of other ends. For society emotions are involved critically in social control, role performance and interpersonal interaction. Emotions are matters of profound concern to everyone." (Rosenberg, 1990)

and

"Emotion and knowledge are far more personal than the traditional emphasis on reason and understanding - as opposed to passions - would suggest ... For too long we have emphasised the impersonal demands of knowledge instead of the passion to know, and both knowledge and passion have suffered ... These [emotions] are not momentary intrusions into our lives, but their very core, and the source of our ideas ... " (Calhoun and Solomon, 1983, p.40)

And indeed, the serious problems of present-day culture seem more than ever to be connected with the way in which people feel about things. Policies about environment pollution, political systems, and quality of life, for example, may be made as a result of carefully thought out advantages and disadvantages, but the implementation and success of such policies seems to depend on how people feel about clean air, clean water, people in politics, the quality of their lives and, these days, the future of the human race. If this were not so, simply knowing of the advantages and disadvantages of certain things would be enough to bring about certain behaviour. But it has been recognised in a number of ways that people need to care, they have to feel, and be encouraged to feel, that certain things are important enough to take a stand.
The most recent and spectacular example of this was the action of the Russian people during the political events there this year. All their experience and knowledge of the Soviet System and the ways in which it dealt with political uprising would have told those people that taking a stand during the coup in Moscow would end in tragedy for them, as it did so terribly in Hungary and other places. On the basis of such knowledge and prediction any uprising would seem to be futile, and indeed the rest of the world waited for the tanks to roll. From the live transmission of events and from first-hand accounts it was clear worldwide that people’s feelings were the basis of their stand, their desire to see the end of a dictatorship. That such feelings may have been related to sound reasoning at some level (such as the knowledge of imminent economic collapse, a prospect that was evident to ordinary people there) does not detract from the fact that at the time of the coup emotion was the power of that resistance. It has also long been recognised that such powerful emotion can be evoked and used, both positively and negatively, by political authorities. Hence the emotive advertising on issues such as pollution, AIDS, health, nutrition, fitness, in politics, and in connection with disadvantaged people and countries.

But such emotive advertising would hardly be necessary, I think, if people knew more about their feelings, were more aware of their individual ways of feeling, and the feelings of others. Finely tuned, imaginative feelings would not need to be battered with painful over-stimulation and excessive example to bring about certain attitudes and action. Nor would they be as easily exploited for negative purposes. Maze (1983) draws a distinction between being conscious of something and being aware that one is conscious of something. He argues that these processes do not occur together automatically or necessarily. To be conscious of something is one mental act of awareness, and to become aware that one is conscious of something (an act of self-awareness) is a separate act of
awareness, which *may or may not* occur (Maze, 1983, p.90). This, I think, is very clearly the case with the conscious experience of feelings. People may well experience certain emotional states consciously, they may "live" their feelings, without the further mental act of awareness that they are doing so. To be more fully aware of oneself in this way does not seem to be automatic with emotions or knowledge. People often surprise themselves by becoming aware of things they know or feel but not *realise* they knew or felt, though the knowing and feeling must, in some real sense, have been conscious. Unconscious knowledge or feeling, in the sense of repressed knowledge or feeling, seems to fall into a different category. Given that in our society there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that people are not fully aware of their feelings, and that such awareness may be crucial to our attitudes to some very serious problems, I would argue that emotions have taken on an especially urgent importance.

Traditionally the pursuit of knowledge has been based on problem-solving. That emotions have such a direct bearing on our ability to solve problems must emphasise their importance. I have sought to show however, that the importance has not been a sudden manifestation, but that the qualitative development of our emotional processes can be traced back through writings on emotion to the earliest available in our culture.

**An epistemological context**

The epistemological context within which I speak of levels of emotional awareness allows for, and stresses, the importance of personal experience in the acquisition of knowledge. Throughout the thesis I am
speaking from a position that claims that knowledge has an essentially personal nature both in the knowledge of particulars and in more general ways. In this sense, knowledge is related to personal judgement, personal skills, meaning and understanding rather than any "objective" topographical, mechanical (or quantum-mechanical) idea of knowledge. This position has been expounded in great detail, and developed over a number of years by Polanyi who has argued that "a topographical atomic account of the Universe ... ignores all our normal experience and can answer no questions about it" (Polanyi, 1975, p.29). He posits a theory of personal knowledge that relies on "ordinary experience" to amass "a vast range of everyday knowledge, conveying delicate and complex conceptions, that serves as a guide to biology, medicine, psychology, and to the manifold disciplines that study man and society" (ibid., p.32). Such personal knowledge can be corrected and expounded by the sciences "which rely in their turn on the further personal knowledge of the experts" (ibid.).

Polanyi speaks of two different kinds of awareness - "subsidiary awareness" and "focal awareness" where the "subsidiaries" enable us to "focus" on something else, a "joint image" which is the integrated view of the subsidiaries and gives them a meaning (ibid., p.34). He calls this "tacit knowing" which can be taken as a typical pattern or structure of the process of coming to know something. This kind of knowing has three distinct aspects - the functional, the phenomenal and the semantic. Polanyi illustrates this by describing the structure of the act of reading a printed sentence. The sight of the printed word, he says, guides our immediate attention away from the type, to its meaning (the focus). The type functions as a guide to the meaning (the semantic aspect). The phenomenal aspect lies in the fact that the word looks different from the way it would look to someone with different experience, for example, to someone to whom it was completely foreign. The familiar use of a word
"which is our subsidiary awareness of it, renders it in a way bodiless, or as is sometimes said, transparent" (ibid., p.35).

Within this structure of coming to know, there are three "centres of tacit knowledge" - the subsidiary particulars, the focal target and the knower who links the first to the second. The link occurs by "the act of a person" who integrates one to another, the act being the "creative imagination" in action which, for Polanyi, is the way in which knowledge is extended and acquired (ibid., p.38). In other words, to follow Polanyi's illustration, the printed type on the page (the subsidiary) and the meaning of it (the focal target) are related only as the knower relates them. If the knower chooses to change or break the relation, for example by making the black marks on paper the focal target, then the other relation (the word and its meaning) is dissolved for that moment. In this way the knower needs only to focus on a subsidiary to change the relation between subsidiaries and focal targets. Polanyi claims that our awareness of subsidiaries can exist on any level of consciousness (including the unconscious) but focal awareness is always fully conscious (ibid., p.39). Subsidiaries are anything at all which we use to help us find meanings, and meaning itself becomes a subsidiary when we go one step further in the acquisition of knowledge and focus on understanding. Polanyi describes subsidiaries as "tools of observation" with which we identify while we use them. He calls this a process of "indwelling" by which we "pour ourselves into" the subsidiary. This may apply to physical tools (such as a hammer which becomes an extension of our arm and hand as the nail becomes the focal target), and to conceptual tools (such as a theory, through which and within which we examine other things). Such tools "amplify the powers of your body" (ibid., p.37).

Polanyi's epistemology which I have adopted as a framework, has been a particularly useful tool, to use his own image, for examining the
development of emotion in the way that I have wanted. Within this framework I have been able to use the relationship between subsidiaries and focal targets in ways that helped me move towards the understanding I was seeking. Beginning with the view that people’s knowledge of emotion and their articulation of thought about emotion comes from the pool of normal experience, I focussed firstly on the different ways in which people thought about emotion, as they were presented in the writings available. The subsidiaries were the thoughts of the philosophers, selected to show those ways most clearly. Hence the philosophical material is not meant to be a full coverage of any philosopher’s thought, or any justification of it (such a task would be a thesis in itself, as I found when I attempted it in the early stages of planning this thesis), but a selection of thoughts that illustrate the developmental trend for which I was searching. The first part of that trend was that people had different ways or perspectives for thinking about emotion, and those ways seemed to be related to the particular problems which the experience of emotions raised. I develop this point further at the end of Chapter One.

Secondly, I focussed on how psychologists approached the study of emotion from the point of view of the then new discipline of psychology which had its own needs in trying to establish itself as a discipline. In this case, I used as subsidiaries, the ways that emerged from early thought and attempted to relate them to psychological thought. Thirdly, I focussed on a particular psychologist (George Kelly) when I became aware, in a subsidiary way, that he appeared to have integrated the different ways of thinking about emotion to provide a new, creative relationship between thought and feeling. Fourthly, I focussed on another psychologist (Sigmund Freud) when I became aware, again in a subsidiary way, that he appeared to provide the means whereby the relationship between thought and feeling emerging from Kelly could be more effectively realised and used to acquire more understanding of emotion both in personal ways and
more broadly. Fifthly, I focussed on the new awareness of thought and feeling that seemed to be possible from the complementary relationship between the work of Freud and the work of Kelly.

Polanyi’s epistemological framework is compatible with Kelly’s philosophy of Constructive Alternativism (Neimeyer, 1980), and also allows for various other positions I have spoken from both directly and by implication. It allows for an inner/outer distinction in terms of people’s "inner environment" (that is, their world of awareness and self-awareness, and the unique and private character of the world of thought, so central to Polanyi’s idea of knowledge), as opposed to "external environment" which can be taken to be all that lies outside the world of thought. It also allows for a dualistic view of mind and body, which, while it is not central to this inquiry, is assumed by implication in a number of ways both theoretically and within the technique proposed later in the thesis, for analysing and furthering the understanding of emotional processes. It also allows for the assumption that our concepts of things are "loaded" with the meanings we attach to them through personal experience, as well as having a more general or commonly-held meaning (which may be loaded in another way, culturally, politically etc, but still allowing for an "unloaded" meaning which we recognise as its bare definition). For example, the concept of sadness has a general or unloaded meaning whereby we all know what we mean by "sadness". But for each individual, the concept also has a meaning derived from that person’s experiences of sadness. In the latter case, the subsidiaries are the experiences, bringing to bear on the focal target which is the meaning of sadness. This idea was very well illustrated recently in an edition of a primary school magazine where some children entered items that described feelings. Sadness was described as
"Sadness is dark blue
It tastes like a rotten apple
and smells like smoke rushing through your clothes
It looks like tears falling into a glass jar
and sounds like a baby crying.
Sadness feels like a wet sponge."

There are several other examples of feelings described in this way including joy, fear, friendliness, love etc, all of which give clear examples of the ways in which personal meanings are built into words and concepts from an early age. For Walsh, sadness is dark blue, for someone else happiness may be dark blue, depending on the association (it is certainly easy to imagine how a dark, velvety blue sky could be associated with happiness ...). In the next section of the Introduction I describe the aims of this thesis more formally.

The aim of this thesis

*The major aim of this thesis is to show that in the history of human thought about emotion, a gradual development has been taking place that reflects the ways in which our emotional processes have been changing, and gives us an indication of the ways in which they may yet change.*

In fulfilling this aim I have sought to establish firstly that the gradual development referred to has been the emergence from the history of ideas, of five distinct ways in which people have thought about emotions. Secondly, I have sought to show that these five ways reflect the changes in human emotional processes as these operate in increasingly complex patterns in the context of the relationship between thought, feeling and our interpretation of events. By "emotional processes" I refer to people’s ways of experiencing, understanding and articulating emotions. Finally, I have sought to show that the complex relationship between thoughts, feelings
and our interpretation of events, as it emerges eventually from the work of Freud and Kelly, indicates the ways in which these three mental events may be more fully integrated within the human personality.

That this whole pattern of development has an evolutionary character I posit in the light of Huxley’s exposition of the nature of evolutionary action. Huxley (1953) argues for the existence of two levels of evolutionary action. He speaks of the biological (genetic, reproductive) level of evolution and a secondary or "superimposed" level which shows the appearance of "new capacities" during the evolutionary process. These involve the appearance of special characteristics such as "the emergence of mental capacities" (ibid., p.viii). He refers to the world of language, meaning, individual experience and pooled experience as a "new kind of environment for life to inhabit ... the world of the mind" (ibid., p.122). This world, he claims, has its own evolutionary action which he calls the "psycho-social sector" of the "human phase of evolution" (ibid., p.8). He describes this action as a unique progressive line belonging only to humans, and unique also "in that it has enabled life to transcend itself, by making possible a second mechanism for continuity and change, in addition to the genetic outfit in chromosomes. This is man’s method of utilising cumulative experience ..." (ibid., p.ix). Huxley argues further for the primacy of the human personality in the evolutionary process claiming that "whichever objective standard we wish to take, properly developed human personalities are the highest products of evolution; they have greater capacities and have reached a higher level of organisation than any other parts of the world’s substance" (ibid., p.165). In addition, the fact that progressive evolution involves the realizations of new possibilities leads to a further thesis "that the nearest to an ultimate that we can discern in human life is not an absolute, but a trend - the trend toward greater realization of possibilities by means of the co-operation of integrated individual personalities" (ibid., p.165).
Support for the idea that there is an evolutionary character to the development of mental processes can also be found in some of the later writing of Popper (1984) who refers to the evolutionary character of the development of the products of the mind (these being knowledge, feelings, cultures) and most especially to the evolutionary character of theories which survive, he claims, by a process of natural selection, this being the survival of the fittest in terms of problem solving. Thus we are being provided with "better and better information about reality" (Popper, 1984, p.239). Hawking (1991) refers to the Darwinian principle of natural selection operating in connection with human reasoning where some individuals will be better able to draw useful conclusions about the world around them. They are then more likely to survive and so have their patterns of thought and behaviour emerge as dominant ones (Hawking, 1991, p.14). This idea again supports the notion that there is more than one level of evolutionary action. All three writers refer in different ways to the impossibility of ignoring the progressive developmental character of people's ways of thinking, feeling and experiencing the world. Huxley states that if, as he was aware, people objected to the wider use of the term 'evolution' then some other term will have to be invented to account for the comprehensive process of psycho-social development (Huxley, 1953, p.2).

It is within this context and understanding of the whole process of evolution and within the epistemological context of personal knowledge, that I speak of the complex development of the relationship between thought and feeling - that is the emotional processes and the thinking processes, and the ways in which they may interact to provide the kind of progress that contributes to the greater realization of possibilities and the greater development of the human personality. Within this context, I propose that it is appropriate to speak of "thoughtful feeling and feelingful thinking" as "an evolutionary step".
From the major aim of this thesis then, five secondary aims emerge which form the structure of the work. Each proposition is now presented and briefly discussed.

(1) That the history of human thought on emotion yields certain perspectives from which we may understand more about the complexity of feelings.

*In Chapters One and Two* I have traced the thinking on human emotion from presocratic times to modern theories, outlining the major traditions that have emerged. These have included the ways in which feeling has been related (and not related) to thinking, the relationships posited between emotion and ethical concepts, emotions and motivation, emotions and creativity and emotions and physiological processes. From the seventeenth century onwards, in particular, emotions were most clearly separated from many other concepts, notably ethical concepts. The major emphasis in philosophical thought moved closer to aspects of reasoning, carrying the separation of thinking and feeling into the modern age. Letwin (1987) claims that "Kant ... presents the Platonic disjunction between pure reason and irrational passion in an even more acute form. He sees reason as a unifying, harmonising force, leading all rational beings to the same true and morally correct conclusion. Passion he sees as utterly disjoined from and opposed to reason" (Letwin, 1987, p.3). Hobbes also took the stand that reason must oppose passion, whereas Hegel, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza and Hume all attempt, in different ways, to draw a closer relationship between "reason and the passions".

In each case I have attempted to describe the particular way in which each philosopher selected has tackled the problem of emotions and their place in the human psyche, as well as to show how their thinking is connected to the thinking already established. The aim has been to
present material that reflects as far as possible the particular trend I have sought to make visible. This has involved selecting those active and original ideas about emotion that reflect the growth in complexity of the concept. I have taken it as "given" within the epistemological framework of this thesis that such growth reflects the increasing complexity of human experience. This has been argued very capably by Polanyi, as I stated earlier.

The way in which the philosophers have been selectively treated requires, perhaps, some justification. In each case the aim has been to demonstrate something and to lead to a particular conclusion, rather than to justify or to argue for, or against, any particular idea. Almost all the philosophers I have dealt with have distinguished themselves more forcefully with other ideas, and those other ideas are, or can be, related to their ideas on emotion. Also their ideas on emotion are usually presented within a broader epistemological context of their own, but insofar as the ideas on emotion have been able to stand on their own, I have not found it necessary to present, each time, those complex and major frameworks. For example, in presenting my selection of ideas from Spinoza I have not entered into any discussion of his major concept of conatus because with this concept he is explaining and justifying his position as regards the origin of emotions. Conatus, or his idea that "Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being", is put forward with supporting propositions, as a justification for his saying, a little later, that emotions can be explained in terms of the mind passing from states of greater and lesser perfection (i.e., from pleasure to pain). And that, in turn, is used to give his position on what he considers to be the primary emotions (Spinoza, 1955, pp.136-8).

My interest in Spinoza however focusses on the way in which he has classified emotions (e.g. active/passive, pleasure/pain, memory/ideas, part
of a perfect natural plan, and able to be 'scientifically approached') rather than on his explanation or justification of that position. His actual position (rather than his justification of his position) reflects, I contend, the trend of increasing complexity, and the type of complexity that he specifically contributes. If I were discussing his theory of motivation as a central aim, I would discuss the concept of conatus as his actual position and, depending on whether or not I was attempting to describe his justification of that position, would introduce specific other propositions. Otherwise, I could simply describe what is meant by conatus, without attempting to assess his justification.

It is in this descriptive, and sometimes mildly discursive mode, that I have presented a philosophical context for the psychological points I aimed to make as the central aim of this thesis. With early philosophers the selections emerged more easily, as many ideas were being presented in their initial form, especially the powerful idea that there was a profound separation between feeling and thinking processes. With more modern thinkers the task became more complex as, in some cases the separation of thinking and feeling became greater and in others arguments against such a separation emerged strongly. In the latter case such arguments seemed to be based primarily on the creative and aesthetic aspect of emotion. Kant, for example (who formally saw emotions as irrational, as Letwin (1987) points out) presents a theory of emotions within an aesthetic context in his lesser known work, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. In Chapter Two I have presented a description of this theory as being the developmental step, rather than his formal position. I have not entered into a discussion of Kant's more prominent and encompassing theory of moral duty, though obviously this would have been necessary had I been attempting to present any sort of justification of Kant's position, and had I been looking for internal consistency as a major aim. I have also described Nietzsche's idea that emotions are the product
of a creative outpouring of the personality, and Sartre’s idea that emotions are people’s ways of "transforming the world". The creative aspect of emotions can be traced back to presocratic thought, but these philosophers refine and highlight it.

Of the present day philosophers, Heller (1979) argues, that "to feel means to be involved in something, feeling being essentially a relation to something, positive or negative, where "something" can be anything, even another involvement (Heller, 1979, p.60). Averill (1980) describes emotions in terms of rigidity and flexibility; Rorty (1980) explores the relationship between thinking, beliefs and feeling; and Solomon (1976) attempts to "sweep away the myths of emotion" by positing a creative harmony between thinking and feeling. Each of these philosophers has followed a developmental thread of one or other of the major perspectives on emotion, bringing it into modern day thinking. In each case the selection of material has been made to highlight another complexity or dimension being added to the concept of emotion. Although I have valued many excellent commentaries and analyses of various philosophers, I have attempted as far as possible to work from original sources since my aim has been to present ideas that form a certain pattern, rather than arguments or justifications, and then to give an interpretation of that pattern. Insofar as the concept of will concerns my inquiry, I have dealt with it only indirectly as a part of the motivation aspect of emotion. To raise the question of will as a separate issue is not an aim of this thesis, as it invariably seems to involve taking an argumentative stance, rather than a descriptive one, if anyone's position on will is to be made clear. Although such a task would be an interesting one, it would swing too wide, I believe, from the central task of this thesis.
A further proposition was that modern psychological theories, though emerging from different contexts, did not abandon these developing strands, and in fact contributed to them further.

In Chapter Three I have attempted to show that psychologists beginning from different vantage points, psychological, behavioural and psychotherapeutic, began reflecting a new phase in the development of emotions; and that psychology itself could be argued to be a part of the socio-evolutionary process in connection with emotion.

Three major world symposia on emotion have been held since 1927 (The Wittenberg Symposium, 1927, The Mooseheart Symposium, 1947, and The Loyola Symposium, 1968) and at each, speakers have commented strongly on the need to understand these "ancient, fundamental, and deeply hidden elements of our experience and behaviour" (Tulloss, 1973, Appendix I, p.1). Evolutionary theories of emotion began to emerge alongside physiological, cognitive and existential theories. The psychological theories could be categorised however within the perspectives of emotion outlined at the end of Chapter One. Within these perspectives I have discussed early physiological theories and the development of major theories from Freud onwards. Chapter Three concludes with an argument that Freud and Kelly, with the scope and direction of their theories add a new and major dimension to the understanding and development of emotional processes.

The next proposition to emerge was that Kelly, within his theory of Personal Constructs has presented a theory of emotions that posits the closest relationship between thinking and feeling yet presented.

In Chapter Four I have outlined Kelly's (1963) theory of personality and attempted to show how, despite no formal intention to do so, Kelly has
presented a substantial theory of emotions. I have attempted to establish that within his concept of construing there exists a close relationship between thinking and feeling, and that such a relationship is essential to his process of testing constructs by way of prediction and validation. I have claimed however, that in presenting such a close relationship between thinking and feeling, Kelly has not explained how we may structure our emotional processes to become more aware of the ways in which we use them in construing. I maintain that Kelly has, in fact, presupposed the existence of such personal emotional awareness.

(iv) The next proposition then, was that the means to the personal emotional awareness necessary for the full use of Kelly's method of construing as a way of making sense of the world, was to be found in the work of Freud.

I have sought to demonstrate that within Freud's Theory of Psychoanalysis there exists a theory of emotions that is more complex and cognitively based than his more formal Theory of the Instincts. I have argued that his most complex Theory of Emotions, positing three levels of emotional processes, makes it possible to engage in a system of emotional analysis based on the psychoanalytic technique of association.

*In Chapter Five* therefore I have outlined Freud's (1964) theory of the instincts and the place of reason and emotion within it. *In Chapters Six and Seven* I have attempted to show that Freud said much more about emotions than his Theory of the Instincts allows, and that his other references, when considered together, begin to form a pattern that adds new levels to the Theory of the Instincts. The aim of these chapters has been to present an emerging pattern of statements that form the basis for an elaboration of Freud's theory. From the Standard Edition of Freud's works therefore, I have attempted to find the mainstreams of his thinking
that appeared to run beneath his formal statements. To that extent, it was not primarily a chronologically developmental search, but a search for the "question marks" in his thinking, and indications that he was aware of such question marks.

Mackay (1986) has argued that psychoanalytic theory changes and develops over the course of Freud’s writings with some hypotheses added and others removed or changed. He argues however, that despite such changes there was an underlying unity of form, and the changes represented revisions of aspects of the theory rather than really different theories (Mackay, 1986). My argument is that, as well as an underlying unity of form concerning the instincts, there was an underlying concept of feeling that was never given the articulation given to the instincts. I have argued this on the basis of the many statements made by Freud that did not fit into his Instincts Theory and seemed, at times, to be at odds with it.

The Theory of Emotions from Freud that I have proposed in Chapter Eight does, I argue, resolve many of the apparent inconsistencies in Freud’s thinking. The path to such a theory has been necessarily complex, involving as it did, much of Freud's writings and the need to tackle his various attitudes to knowledge and feelings. It has not been my intention to present a negative view of Freud in these chapters. If I have referred to his arrogance it has been in the sense of creative philosophical presumption (as in, for example, his claims to truth) rather than in any personal sense. The theory I have posited as emerging from his writings is, I contend, the richest framework within which to explore feelings that has yet existed, and one that was increasingly at the edge of his thinking.

(v) The final proposition in this thesis was that, on the basis of Freud’s Theory of Emotions and his analytic technique, and Kelly’s Theory of
Personal Constructs, we have the direction to go forward to a new awareness of thinking and feeling.

I have put forward in Chapter Nine the idea that both Freud and Kelly have moved substantially forward in the understanding of mental processes, and that there are more complementary connections in their thinking than seems apparent. I have also presented the beginnings of a technique for personal analysis of emotions to demonstrate how this may be implemented and used to follow Kelly’s process of construing more effectively. The technique is necessarily in an abbreviated form, with suggestions of the kind of elaborations possible. It is not primarily a psychotherapeutic technique, nor one that is based on ethical or motivational assumptions, but it is meant to increase personal emotional awareness and knowledge of oneself and others. It is based on the assumption that we do have private "emotional worlds" with their own meaning and structure, and that it is possible to discover and articulate those worlds. These assumptions are related to Freud’s structure of mental processes and to the philosophical idea of "possible worlds". It remains to give a more detailed account of the technique and the ways in which it relates more fully to the psychoanalytic process during its implementation. However, in the present form its structure is visible and the relevance to the central aim of this thesis is, I hope, clear.

I have added two Appendices to the thesis. Appendix I is an illustration of how the technique of emotion analysis works in one particular case, and how the knowledge and awareness yielded by the analysis may be used to elaborate construing. This is intended as an illustration only and not as any sort of empirical test, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Appendix II describes how empirical possibilities might be approached in connection with the theory and some of the problems involved. There is also a brief discussion of how emotion analysis may possibly be used in connection with current research.

Finally, what I have attempted to do is to pose the question "What is an emotion?" indirectly, and to move closer to an answer by seeking a greater awareness of the many processes of definition involved. For this reason I regard this work as primarily psychological rather than philosophical, though perhaps any theory of emotions belongs somewhere between. Regarding the definition of the term "emotion" I have distinguished between "sensation" and "emotion", using the former in a physiological context and the latter as a process that incorporates both the physiological and cognitive experiences of feeling. The terms "feeling" and "emotion" I have used interchangeably, based on the latter definition also, except in Chapter Eight where, within Freud's multi-level theory I distinguish between "instinct", "sensation", "feeling", "emotion" and "emotional state". The term "reason" I have used both in the Humean sense as "that which judges a truth and falsehood" (Hume, 1969, p.465) and in the sense of the process of the conceptualisation and ordering of experiences.

The term "self" I have used to denote individual consciousness (including self-consciousness) in a generally applicable way, but the term "ego" refers to the self in the Freudian sense, that is, as that part of the psyche which stands in a certain relation to the Freudian concepts of the Unconscious and the Superego.

The term "emotion analysis" I have used to describe the process of analysing the emotions of any individual. This process is presented as a specific technique in Chapter Nine and in Appendix I. It was difficult to find
a suitable term to describe this process and while "emotion analysis" is not ideal, no other term seemed any more suitable. It is used simply to mean "analysis of emotion", just as "data analysis" is used to describe "analysis of data". The term "emotional processes" I have defined as "the ways in which people experience, understand and articulate emotions". Other terms in this thesis are defined, where appropriate, in the text as they occur.
Section I: Early concepts of emotion

The concept of emotion has been present in human deliberations as far back as the history of human thought has been recorded. Going back as far is the concept of reason, and also attempts to understand and posit a relationship between these two. The seventh century (BC) poet Hesiod wrote:

and Love, who is fairest among immortal gods, loosener of limbs by whom all gods and all men, find their thoughts and wise councils overcome in their breasts (Barnes, 1987, p.56).

Hesiod thus links emotion and thought very early in a way that foreshadowed one of the major traditions in the analysis of these concepts, the tradition that emotion, feelings or passions, control or overcome reason. The second tradition holds that reason can, and should, overcome, or at least regulate, the passions. Philosophically there are very early subscribers to both positions. The Presocratic philosopher Empedocles took the view that Love and Hatred ("Strife") dominated the very creation of the universe. In the cycle of creation the four elements were forever being brought together by Love and torn apart by Strife. In man,
She [Love] is thought to be innate also in the limbs of mortals, by whom they think thoughts of love and perform deeds of union, calling her Joy by name ... Her, you must regard with your mind ... (Barnes, 1987, p.166).

Here love is seen as the force of creative motivation and reason is given the function of understanding this. Love is regarded as the means whereby reason can be exercised as in "Intelligible things are made similar by Love, whereas perceptible things are overpowered by Strife and torn further apart ..." (ibid., p.169). This very early idea does not see emotion (at least not the basic emotions of Love and Hate) as confined to human experience, but sees human experience as one manifestation of these forces. In this context, Love and Hate are seen as primary forces of the universe that impart something of themselves into each created thing. The human experience of emotion becomes the experience of joy, harmony, unity, symbolising the bringing of things together, and the experience of misery, disharmony and destruction and decay, symbolising the tearing of things apart. As broad as this idea is, the beginnings can still be seen of the kind of theory that claims emotion or feelings dominate the psyche and that reason, at best, can only recognise, identify, learn about these things.

But Empedocles also suggests a close relation between thought and feeling, associated with Love and "Holy Mind" active in the cosmos (ibid., p.163), when he says, having outlined the way in which we recognise each thing by its like: "... all things are fitted together and constructed, and by these they think and feel pleasure and pain" (ibid., p.191). The suggestion here is that emotion (pleasure and pain) is both felt and thought, which is a dimension of emotion theory that has been picked up and developed in present day thinking (Solomon, 1976).

Democritus (about 470 BC), the most prolific and ultimately most influential of the presocratic philosophers (Barnes, 1987, p.244), had
something to say about the passions in connection with his thoughts on knowledge. Reason, which he called genuine knowledge, he saw as the "standard of truth", but he is reported as having had three ultimate such standards - for what is unclear or obscure in the realm of knowledge, the standard is the apparent (the "apparent" being the sight or understanding of what is unclear); for investigation in the realm of knowledge the standard is the concept (the "concept" being that which the investigation is about); and for knowledge of choice and avoidance, the standard is the passions (the "passions" being an indication of what we find pleasant and therefore to be chosen, and unpleasant and therefore to be avoided) (ibid., p.254). This posits quite an interesting relation between reason and the passions since reason here is used to know what to choose and what to avoid, and it must do this, apparently, by observing feelings that are pleasant and unpleasant. Presumably, if reason chooses to pursue those things which give pleasure and avoid those which give unpleasure, the more pleasure is gained overall, so it would seem that it is in the power of reason to bring about or not to bring about certain feelings.

Democritus claims however that passions can be overwhelming and that the soul (as distinct from the mind) is responsible "inasmuch as it had destroyed some parts of the body by negligence or dissipated them by drunkenness, and had ruined and ravaged other parts by its pursuit of pleasures" (ibid., p.264). But at the same time, "medicine", according to Democritus, "cures the diseases of the body, and wisdom clears the soul of passions", and "reason is a powerful persuader" (ibid., p.264). So, although passions may rule the body, it is up to reason, as the seat of knowledge and wisdom, to choose and regulate that it should be otherwise. The soul, which needs to be "cleared" by wisdom is the "dwelling place" of happiness, which Democritus calls contentment, well-being, harmony, orderliness, tranquillity. This is constituted by "distinguishing and discriminating among pleasures, and this is the noblest
and most advantageous thing for men" (ibid., p.265). So happiness, rather than pleasure, is the ultimate goal for men, since pleasures may be "good" or "bad", and reason must choose happiness (good pleasures) or misery (bad pleasures) (ibid., p.266). The mark of good pleasures is moderation "for men gain contentment from moderation in joy and a measured life: deficiencies and excesses tend to change and to produce large movements in the soul, and souls which move across large intervals are neither stable nor content" (ibid., p.269).

Democritus makes many more remarks on the value of "temperateness" (such as "Temperateness increases joys and makes pleasures greater" (ibid., p.271), which is curiously contradictory since temperateness would seem to be leading to intemperateness i.e. greater and greater pleasures), and the value of reason (such as "it is hard to fight against anger: to master it is the mark of the rational man" (ibid., p.274)) but the final picture that emerges does not simply put reason in the primary position. Clearly passions have the power to overwhelm and control and while it is implied that reason is stronger, reason itself (i.e., the attainment of wisdom and knowledge) is dependent on a good upbringing and education which is not in the control of the individual. Democritus stresses the importance of upbringing and education on many occasions and makes it clear that he regards learning as the major key to a happy life. Reason here is, of course, not only the reasoning faculty, the ability to learn, but also learning or knowledge itself, so ultimately Democritus is saying that when the reasoning faculty is successful in obtaining right knowledge, then it is possible to control or regulate emotions. Therefore, presumably, in the uneducated state, man is ruled by passions, perhaps feebly moved by reason at times.

Conceptually this leaves emotions in an interesting position because even if the moral element is removed (i.e. that some pleasures are "good"
and others "bad") we are still left with the idea that some pleasures produce more pleasure while others produce less or actual unpleasure. The great pleasure of stuffing oneself with a favourite food, for example, may be followed by the great unpleasure of illness or possibly self-disgust. Or, more conceptually, the great pleasure of thinking about revenge on one's enemies, may be followed by powerful feelings of remorse, etc. And, of course, the great pleasure of being able to assist a beloved person in some way may be followed by the still greater pleasure of knowing one has contributed to the further well-being of that person, and so on. It is easy to see why even the earliest philosophers found it necessary to bring in ideas of "good" and "bad" to sort out such complexity.

In Nature it was readily observed that "like begets like" yet here it was that pleasure could beget unpleasure, so a further category was needed, and it was the moral category that emerged and remained central to the concept of feelings and emotion for an extraordinary length of time. In one sense this is not surprising of course, since the human tendency to make value judgements is as strong as any other part of the human psyche, and no account of human nature has ignored this. What is surprising is that feelings conceptually seemed completely bound up with or swamped by the moral category. At the point where it became obvious that some pleasures led to further greater pleasure and other pleasures led to less or to the opposite of pleasure, the nature of pleasure itself (i.e. this curious feeling that could generate more of itself, or turn into its opposite) was somehow explained away by positing "good" and "bad" pleasures.

If emotions are viewed in the context of human actions rather than feelings only, then it is easier to see how the concept of emotions became so closely bound up with the concept of good and bad. In his book *Discovery of the Mind*, Snell (1982) spends a chapter tracing the origins of Greek thought on virtue and "the good". He points out there that the first
"call to virtue" in Greek literature is sounded in the opening book of the *Iliad* where Achilles, about to attack Agamemnon in anger, is restrained by the goddess Athena. She comes "to put an end to his passionate impulse" by stopping his action (Snell, 1982, p.155). She does not do this by offering a moral reason (though the murder of Agamemnon would have been considered morally wrong) but rather by offering inducements ("gifts") as a reward for self-control. This equation between the good and the advantageous marked early Greek thinking on ethics in many ways (ibid., pp.156-7). The advantageous of course brought pleasure in one form or another. So the notion existed even then that a good act brought reward (pleasure) and a bad act brought nothing or punishment (unpleasure). In practical terms then, good and bad became tied with feelings of pleasure and unpleasure. In political terms also, it followed that some actions were to be chosen and other avoided, not only to achieve something called happiness (a state of mind) but also to protect those things connected with good actions, i.e. rewards, prosperity, honours, etc.

**Section II: Themes from Plato and Aristotle**

It was not until the time of Socrates that the notion of happiness for its own sake appeared, (i.e. the assurance of having done no wrong), and then, it could be traced to the religious notion of permanent happiness in an afterlife as a reward for having lived a good life (ibid., p.164). The concept of happiness began to include the notion of a feeling, a phenomenon of the mind, as well as a complete state of prosperity or well-being tied to the notion of a morally good life. Plato in his writings did not speak directly in any detail of the nature of emotions, or present a formal theory, though the concept was introduced many times in
connection with his ideas on ethics, education, religion, and society and politics. In *The Republic*, a study of society that includes thoughts on these topics, Plato introduces the dialogue with a discussion of justice and what it could mean. One of the very early ideas introduced is the notion of feelings and good character as being connected. When Socrates speaks with Cephalus, an old man, on the subject of life, Cephalus points out that old age gives a certain freedom from intense desires. Referring to feelings of sexual desire, Cephalus agrees with Sophocles the poet (so he says) who saw such feelings as a "fierce and frenzied master" (Plato, trans. Lee, 1974, p.63) and says that "in old age you become quite free of feelings of this sort and they leave you in peace; and when your desires lose their intensity and relax, you get what Sophocles was talking about, a release from a lot of mad masters" (ibid., p.63). Unhappy old people, claims Cephalus, are unhappy not because of age but because of character, for "if men are sensible and good-tempered, old age is easy enough to bear; if not, youth as well as age is a burden" (ibid., p.63). The discussion then goes on to speak of "good and sensible men" and the ethical requirements of that state. What this dialogue shows in connection with emotions is that there was obviously a concept around then that linked feelings with desires and sensations, as well as with satisfactions of being morally on the right track. "Good and sensible men" were those who were not too torn apart by the "mad masters" of desire. Old age brought its own set of feelings however, that were different in quality from youthful feelings, so feelings were clearly more than intense desires, just as they were different from goodness and good sense.

Still pursuing the notions of justice, Plato carries the discussion on to the relation between happiness and the just and unjust man. The theme of happiness is explored at some length in *The Republic*, the notion being one rather different from the usual English understanding. The common Greek word for happy ("eudaimon") "implies less an immediate state of
mind or feeling than a more permanent disposition of character, something between prosperity and integration of personality, though of course feeling is involved too" (ibid., p.102). The "feeling" involved is presumably the immediate state of mind which accompanies the disposition of character and prosperous state of the person. But if happiness is not a clear "feeling" to pursue, the notions of pleasure and pain are. In Book Nine of *The Republic*, Plato addresses the actual nature of feelings of pleasure and pain, while still talking about the relation between happiness and character. This dialogue explores feeling as a kind of movement in the psyche which is in some way perceived by the mind. The dialogue begins by establishing that pleasure and pain are to be regarded as opposites, and then it is asked:

And is there not a state in which we feel neither pleasure nor pain? ... it will lie between the two, I suppose, giving the mind rest from both ... What is more, both pleasure and pain when they occur are processes of mental change, are they not? ... But didn't we see just now that to feel neither pleasure nor pain is to be in a state of rest between the two? ... Then can it be right to suppose that absence of pain is pleasure or absence of enjoyment pain? ... (ibid., pp.408-9).

The answer to the last question in the dialogue is "no" thus leaving the way open for Socrates (Plato) to discuss what he believes to be the "true character" of pleasure and pain, and the state in between. So far he has defined them as processes of mental change (with rest being cessation from change). He goes on to argue that there is a level of "pure pleasure" that is difficult to achieve except by learning and wisdom, most people being caught in the illusion that absence of pain is pleasure and absence of pleasure, pain. He draws a parallel with the natural world where there is a "top, a bottom and a middle" and claims that most people move from the bottom to the middle and down again believing this to be the real world. One ascension to the top however (brought about only by contact with the unchanging reality of wisdom and truth i.e., learning) is enough to make
one realise that all one had seen before was grey and black - not black and white (ibid., pp.410-11).

So the feeling or state of "pure pleasure" is conceived by Plato to be something that is bound to the unchanging and eternal realities whereas other feelings stemming from pain and absence of pain, belong to the changing and ordinary (or illusory) realities of the everyday world. This concept of feelings and emotional states relies on some quite unprovable presuppositions (such as the existence of different levels of reality, and a height of "pure reality", eternal unchanging) but the significance for emotion theory is that Plato clearly was not satisfied to define emotions only as degrees of pleasure and pain. There was a place in the human psyche where feelings were experienced in terms of a complete state of being, as far as he was concerned, and the levels of purity were connected with the quality of feeling, which may be contemplated outside an ethical context if one is simply looking at what a feeling might possibly be. However for Plato this is clearly something of an aside, since The Republic is concerned with an inquiry into the nature of justice and its political, social and ethical ramifications as they affect "the ideal state". Nonetheless, a concept of emotions emerges that is complex, developing on the one hand the idea that education and learning are essential to understanding feelings, and indeed to having feelings, and introducing also the idea of degrees of reality (or quality) to feelings.

Aristotle gives a direct discussion of emotions in the Rhetoric and refers to emotions in De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics. The notion of happiness is once again connected to the Greek meaning of the term and is used by Aristotle much more widely than in connection with feelings, but he does speak of pleasure and pain, of anger, pity, fear, love, etc. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines the emotions as "all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by
pain or pleasure" (Aristotle, trans. Ross, Vol.XI, p.1378). With this
definition, Aristotle does not define emotions in a way that throws light on
what a feeling might actually be in psychological terms, but he formally
establishes two important notions: firstly, that feelings affect judgements
(so there is a certain relation between feeling and thinking or emotions and
reason) and secondly that emotions are always accompanied by pleasure
or pain, which are in themselves regarded as feelings. In this early thinking
on emotions then, pleasure and pain are used as a way of categorising
emotions formally. Further, Aristotle makes it plain as he defines anger that
some emotions are accompanied by both pleasure and pain. "Anger," he
says, "may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a
conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification
towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends".
He adds, "it must always be attended by a certain pleasure that which
arises from the expectation of revenge ... It is also attended by a certain
pleasure because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance, and the
images then called up cause pleasure, like the images called up in dreams"
(ibid., p.1378).

This definition (though perhaps arguable on the grounds that feelings
of anger and feelings towards wanting revenge could be separated even if
they remain closely related) gives us another powerful component of the
concept of emotion, that of emotions being caused, or brought into being
by thought, or imagination, in the form of images. In this case feelings of
pleasure are being brought about by thoughts dwelling on the act of
revenge. The relationship here is an interesting one: anger which is
defined in terms of an impulse towards revenge, brings about (causes)
thoughts about the act of revenge which in turn causes feelings of pleasure
"of a certain kind". The anger in the first instance was caused by the act of
another. So embedded in the emotional process are the notions of
feelings, thoughts, and actions. And in fact, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*,

Aristotle claims that the virtuous man must not only act correctly, but also feel correctly, deliberation and practical reasoning being the means to this achievement (Aristotle, trans. Thomson, 1983, p.545).

In *De Anima* Aristotle claims that "all the affections of soul involve a body - passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body" (Aristotle, trans. Ross, 1941, p.537). He argues further that since the body is involved as well as the soul, the definitions of "affections" (also referred to here as "feelings" and "emotions") ought to have a corresponding character, giving the example of anger being defined both as an "appetite for returning pain for pain" and "a boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart" (ibid., p.537). In these statements, Aristotle is attempting to define the soul ('psyche'/"anima") and to describe the relationship between body and soul; but while he presents the soul as the form of the body (and not a distinct thing attached to it), he also introduces the powerful notion that a feeling is something more than a physical or material manifestation. Aristotle describes the other dimension as the "form" or "formulable essence", and the idea of a "form" or "essence" in the case of affections involves cognitive processes as part of their reality. So to have an emotion, it would seem that we need both to experience or undergo the bodily change associated with a feeling and be able to abstract from that sensation to a level of recognising, categorising, and conceptualising what we are experiencing. In our own experience of emotions it would seem obvious that this is so, but it is very difficult to define adequately, and indeed many modern thoughts on emotions have persisted in attempting to reduce feelings to some form of physical process only.

Aristotle also categorises emotions in pairs of opposites, referring to growing calm being the opposite of growing angry - calmness being also gentleness, mildness, placability, patience, etc. (Aristotle, trans. Ross,
Vol. XI, p.1379). His account of growing calm is "a settling down or quieting of anger" (ibid., p.1379). The notion of emotion as being some sort of discharge of tension is also introduced "for men become calm when they have spent their anger on somebody else ..." (ibid., p.1380). Curiously, in his comments on anger versus hatred (ibid., p.1381), Aristotle speaks almost as though hatred is not a feeling in the terms of his definition (e.g., as being accompanied by pleasure or pain). He contrasts hatred with anger by claiming "anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not; the angry man feels pain but the hater does not" (ibid., p.1381). Hatred has some special status (possibly spiritual since it seems connected with evil) but Aristotle does not define this any further, and he then gives fear the same dual status or level - it is painful at one level but when it reaches certain proportions or takes on the quality of evil, then it is beyond pain (ibid., p.1382). This seems to be both a qualitative and quantitative distinction, and is not made in connection with other emotions. Aristotle discusses in the Rhetoric friendship (friendly feelings), shame, kindness, unkindness, pity, indignation, envy and emulation. However, Burnyeat (1980) discusses Aristotle's notion of "noble joy" and "noble hatred" (i.e., loving what is noble and hating what is base) thus giving again a qualitative dimension to Aristotle's position on emotion - the quality of a feeling being in turn dependent on a good education to a great degree. The child's sense of pleasure, "which to begin with and for a long while is his only motive, should be hooked up with just and noble things so that his unreasoned, evaluative responses may develop in connection with the right objects" (Burnyeat, 1980, p.80). Instinctive reactions such as fear need to be trained into the virtue of courage; feelings cannot be eliminated in a human being (and are in any case recognised as a basic part of being human), therefore they have to be trained (ibid., p.82).

Further, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle claims that actions and passions (but not all) have a "mean" i.e., the state which contains neither
excess or defect as appropriate to that passion and its context. This "doctrine of the mean" has been extensively analysed since Aristotle introduced it, though its central idea, that of appropriate moderation, was much spoken of by Democritus. The state of virtue is related to finding the mean appropriate to the circumstances, or in recognising that in some cases (e.g., spite) a mean does not apply (since spite is not an excess or defect of some possibly virtuous state but is in itself bad (Aristotle, trans. Ross, 1941, p.959). Although the idea of the mean is central to Aristotle's notion of virtue, it also tells us something important about Aristotle's concept of emotion in that, with or without reference to virtue, emotions admit of degrees both quantitatively and qualitatively. In many cases the mean feeling or state is a point between opposites. Aristotle gives the example of courage being the mean between feelings of fear and confidence (ibid., p.969). Further, when a mean is a state it is not defined as a feeling in itself, though feelings may be attached. For example, when we speak of someone as "a brave man" we are speaking of their character, not necessarily their feelings. They may or may not have feelings of bravery at any given time. One may be brave without necessarily feeling brave. It seems to be the case then that for every passion or feeling there seems to be, in Aristotle's system, a corresponding state which may (or may not) be said to be a disposition or character trait and which is not dependent on the presence of corresponding feelings at any given time. The state however, seems to predispose a person towards having certain kinds of feelings to a certain degree and of a certain quality (be it the mean, excess or defect).

While Aristotle does not give an account of what a feeling actually is in terms of its nature in the psyche, he comes very close to just such a point by the time he has outlined the relation of feelings to the soul, to reason, to virtue, to the body, and spoken of the kinds and degrees of feelings that
Section III: Themes from Epicurean and Stoic philosophy

Whereas the concept of emotion in Presocratic, Platonic and Aristotelian thought was developed in the context of a world that was committed to a close social life and social morality, both Epicureanism and Stoicism gave rise to concepts in the context of the large, impersonal kingdoms and empires of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds (Maclntyre, 1968, p.108). Epicurus developed the doctrine inherited from Democritus that morality is concerned with the pursuit of pleasure, virtue being the art of pleasure. But Epicurus does argue that many pleasures thoughtlessly pursued result in pain and that some pain is worth enduring for the later gain of pleasure. He also argues that freedom from intense desire is a condition of pleasure, the ultimate pleasure being tranquillity (ibid., p.108). Epicurus denounced religion as being a great source of fear (which was to be assiduously avoided) and sought a metaphysic that did not rely on any religious influence (Russell, 1980, p.254).

In this context, the concept of pleasure as something that could easily change to pain without proper regulation and choices is posited once again. The notion that it was possible to avoid some feelings (unpleasant ones) and to bring about others (pleasant ones) through some rational process of choice and discrimination is also present. The idea of a "state of rest" between the extremes of pleasure and pain (tranquillity) gives the keynote to the Epicurean concept of feelings. We gain nothing about the possible cognitive origins of feeling here except that while they are essentially physically based (even the soul was made up of physical
particles for Epicurus) the "pleasure of the mind" was the contemplation of physical pleasures (ibid., p.252). This separation of pleasure into physical and mental is the only indication of a notion of a cognitively based aspect of feelings but it does reinforce the earlier idea that the reflection on bodily sensations does form a part of emotional development, albeit a minor part in the Epicurean tradition.

Stoicism, led by the philosopher Zeno, saw human nature as a part of the cosmos both material and divine. The cosmology incorporated a law of the universe to which human beings automatically adhered along with all other matter in the universe. A part of the law is a universal rational principle (the Logos) which governs change and a part of it is goodness which is unquestionable (Maclntyre, 1968, p.105). Within this framework man, as a rational being becomes aware of the principle and virtue consists of assent to, and vice dissent from, the law through which human life proceeds eternally through our eternally predetermined cycle. The Stoics argue that evil is a kind of illusion brought about by the necessity of the existence of contraries (opposite poles). Assent to divine law and dissent from the law are also contraries (so dissent is needed to allow assent), but it is only through dissent that other evils are encountered. The divine law presents itself to humans as the law of nature and of reason, nature being the cosmic status of the moral law and reason being that which recognises and invites the practice of the four traditional virtues - prudence, courage, temperance, and justice (ibid., p.106). Pleasure, hope, fear, desire and pain were regarded as being against reason and nature and therefore to be avoided; the state to be cultivated was a "passionless absence of desire and disregard of pleasure and pain" (ibid., p.106). All emotion in this framework becomes a part of the "evil" or the contraries which makes them a part of the illusory nature of evil. To give way to feelings, to have them at all, was to be understood as dissent from the divine law and a fall from virtue. This concept of feelings, that they existed only as some sort of
distorted form of virtue, as virtue gone wrong, was later picked up and developed, though somewhat differently, by some Christian philosophy.

Section IV: Christianity and emotion

From the time of St Augustine to the Renaissance, Christian philosophy became the main force in European thinking. During these ten centuries some attempts were made to reconcile Christian thought with earlier traditions. As far as the concept of emotions goes, it remained essentially recognisable as an extension of early thought. For one thing, early Christians were dealing with a revealed religion (as revealed by Christ and the Apostles) and as such, they did not have a formal philosophy. Academically inclined Christians turned, naturally enough, to the traditions of the day which were made up of ideas from Platonism and NeoPlatonism, with some Stoicism. These seemed most compatible with, or able to provide a philosophical jumping off place for a Christian philosophy (Copleston, 1954, pp.14-15). Early ideas from St Gregory of Nyssa display some Platonism in regard to St Gregory's idea of the "ideal man" as opposed to the earthly man. He also propounded the idea of God's world created out of goodness and love, and freely, not from necessity. As the founder of a systematic mystical theology, St Gregory also brought out the themes of man's mind being "fitted to know sensible objects, and contemplating these objects the mind can come to know something of God ..." (ibid., p.36). However, ultimate reality is not accessible to man so the soul learns despair through being unable to reach the goal for which it yearns. Once again emotions are placed in the soul as their "dwelling place". But the soul in the Christian context is that part of man that yearns for God, that was created by Him in love. Full love or ecstasy is gained as
the soul moves further and further towards the knowledge and love of God. The opposite poles of emotion in Christian thought then are love and despair with love being degrees of closeness to God and despair being estrangement. The Stoic ideal of happiness being the possession of virtue for its own sake was developed by St Ambrose leading to an even greater happiness in God.

St Augustine described happiness as knowledge of the truth (which was knowledge of God), and knowledge of the truth as wisdom. Everything given to us (reason, feelings, sense, a body, etc) were all for St Augustine starting points or tools in man's ascent to God, so in some sense they were all forms of knowledge, all forms of truth by which to begin discovering deeper truth. The soul was created by God and was non-material though animating the body. The human will St Augustine saw as free to turn towards or away from God, a turning away running counter to the divine law. The virtuous life was attained by loving God and people. Love then is at the heart of the concept of emotion in Augustinian thinking. Since love of God is to be sought for and love of self to be avoided (ibid., p.85) then love emerges as some sort of force able to be turned (willed) into this direction or that. In the individual St Augustine saw a struggle between these two directions love could take "on the one hand the love of God and submission to his law, on the other hand love of self, of pleasure, of the world" (ibid., p.87). The struggle was won or lost by the will which, though free, could be influenced by reason and love, as well as despair.

St Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century was the first of the Christian philosophers to address emotions or passions directly. The first section of Part Two of his *Summa Theologiae* inquires into the nature and form of emotions. In trying to locate the seat of the emotions Aquinas argues that although the soul is non-material (and therefore incapable of suffering) it may still contain the passions since on the one hand "to suffer"
may mean "to receive", and on the other hand, suffering (as in emotion) may be experienced by the soul/body composite which gives it some place in the soul "consequentially" (Aquinas, trans. D'Arcy, 1963, pp.5-7). In this sense, thinking and understanding as involving reception could be seen as "in some sense passions" in the Aristotelian tradition, according to Aquinas.

The physiological aspect of emotion is seen as the "materia" of each emotion. Next Aquinas draws a distinction between "a passionate desire for the things of God" and other passions, claiming that the former involves no physiological modification so it may be located in the intellectual part of the soul. That sort of "passionate desire refers to acts of will which produce the same result as action prompted by emotion but which in fact are not accompanied by emotion.

In classifying the emotions, Aquinas distinguishes between "spirited" emotions, such as fear, hope, courage, etc, which "it is difficult to attain or avoid", and "affective" emotions which simply occur in the good/evil sense such as joy, sorrow, love, hatred, etc, (ibid., p.21). Emotions are not regarded as good or evil in themselves by Aquinas, except in so far as they are controlled or uncontrolled by reason. When uncontrolled they become blameworthy or evil; when controlled they become a part of the virtuous life (ibid., p.39). "Good" emotions are described as those "which create a favourable attitude towards something truly good or an unfavourable one towards something really evil" and "evil" emotions are described as those "which create an unfavourable attitude towards something truly good and a favourable one towards something truly evil" (ibid., p.43). Aquinas also sees emotions in terms of cause and effect with some emotions causing others, e.g. pleasure causing love. The four "principal emotions" are seen as joy and sadness, hope and fear - joy and sadness because in them all other emotions have their end and fulfilment; hope and fear because when the object of an emotion is some good, the movement of the soul begins with love, passes into desire and ends in hope. When the object of the
emotion is some evil, the movement of the soul begins with hatred, passes into aversion and ends in fear. Thus hope and fear become the final stages of movement in the soul.

Aquinas then deals with a number of emotions individually - love, hatred, desire, aversion, pleasure and sadness - giving each of them sensory and cognitive status, e.g., in the case of love, there is "natural love" (such as heavy body’s affinity with its natural place); then there is "sensory love" and "intellectual or rational love": which "apply to the attachment, sense of affinity with some good, the feeling of its attractiveness felt respectively by the sensory orexis, or the will" (ibid., p.65). As well, he relates emotion with knowledge in that something can only be the object of, for example, love in so far as it is to some extent known, but a thing could be loved better than it is known (ibid., p.79). With these kinds of statements on emotion, Aquinas is giving the concept of emotion a new dimension, though throughout his writings he refers back to the Aristotelian position. The difference is that whereas Aristotle inquired into and classified emotions in the context of morality and the virtuous life, Aquinas treats the moral life as, in a sense, subordinate to the idea of union with God. Aristotle regards the "good life" as worthy of being pursued for sound, practical reasons and as something good in itself, whereas with Aquinas one is always aware of the undercurrent that presupposes the existence of a loving God without whom all striving, all desire, all emotion would be meaningless, useless, and would turn to ashes. The effect on the concept of emotions is not so much to create a new concept as to create a new attitude to emotions. Whereas the traditional Greek attitude was based on practicalities, the attitude created by Aquinas’ inquiry calls for an approach based on a somewhat mystical sense of adventure, where emotions can be seen as standing not only in some relation to reason, or some part of the activity of the soul (or psyche), but also as having a natural and non-natural dimension. This suggests and implies a potential
way of being for which emotions are a mere forerunner, where the effects of emotion are separated form, and become more real than the emotions we are familiar with. In this sense "God and the Angels are without emotion" but nonetheless are steeped in joy. This stretching of the concept does not properly belong in philosophy, but it does become relevant to the psychology of emotion, as the work of G.J. Jung subsequently showed (see Chapter Three).

In the philosophical sense, Aquinas reinforces the notion that reason may control the passions, that passions contain a cognitive element, that the intellect classifies emotions and seeks to understand the relation between them (and that this is an essential part of understanding the meaning of emotion), and that knowledge and emotion are closely related.

Conclusion

In this Chapter I have sought to demonstrate that theories of emotion, as recorded in the Western tradition, have developed with progressive complexity over time, moving from very general ideas to increasingly detailed explorations of emotional processes. It may be observed that the earliest recorded philosophers perceived both thinking and feeling as forces in the body (as well as in the cosmos), with the possibility of either one or the other dominating at any given time. From this way of interpreting feelings and their meaning arose related ideas of feelings being of differing strengths and intensity, arising from different experiences and reactions according to the examples used by philosophers. This in turn led to the idea of feelings being of different kinds and attempts were made to categorise feelings. To do this, feelings needed to be adequately described and communicated, and the relationships between some feelings and others more clearly defined. This development can be traced
through earliest thought to Aristotle who presented the first systematic attempts to give an account of emotions, and their relation to reason.

When the poet Hesiod wrote of love overcoming wise councils in all men, he was addressing the experience of the strength of some emotions and of the mind's apparent inability to control them. The corresponding weakness in people is perceived in both physiological terms (love being a loosener of limbs) and in cognitive terms (wise councils being overcome). Empedocles addressed the strength of emotion by interpreting love and hatred as creative and destructive forces generally in the cosmos, people being agents of these powers and required to use their cognitive abilities to understand this, and so participate more actively. A simple categorisation of feelings as belonging either to love (joy, harmony, unity), or hatred (misery, disharmony, destruction) is constructed, and a sense in which pleasure and pain may be both felt and thought is suggested - possibly in the sense of being both experienced and understood, which is consistent with his idea of people needing to be both a part of creation and understand it. Democritus introduces a further complexity by speaking of emotions as the standard by which we choose some things (pleasant) and avoid others (unpleasant) - which in turn leads to the need to distinguish and discriminate among pleasures, these being categorised as good or bad. This very general moral idea underlies most early Greek thinking, reaching its greatest development in the works of Plato and Aristotle.

By the time of Aristotle five quite distinct ways of thinking about emotion have emerged, each reflecting the kinds of problems experienced by people in connection with emotions. The ways form certain perspectives on emotion that set a pattern for the development of theories to the present day. These are as follows:
(1) The way in which feeling and thinking are perceived as forces in the body, and experienced as physiological sensations, give a physiological perspective on emotion. All the early Greek thinkers refer to the physiological effects of emotion, and the theme is most strongly developed by Aristotle.

(ii) The way in which feelings are described, labelled and categorised, after having been experienced as differing in intensity, quality, kind and effect, gives a cognitive perspective on emotion. Early general categorisations by the presocratics become more formal in the work of Aristotle.

(iii) The way in which feelings are perceived to be related to behaviour, arising from the experience of feelings affecting behaviour, give a motivation perspective. This includes the issues of choice and avoidance and the idea of "right knowledge" leading to "right action", a theme touched on by Democritus and strongly developed by Aristotle.

(iv) The way in which feelings are perceived to be related to construction and destruction (with their related ideas of order and chaos, harmony and disharmony, beauty and ugliness), arising from the experience of feelings having an effect on creative capabilities, gives a creative perspective on emotion. The presocratics relate such experiences to cosmic events and all creation and Aristotle brings the creative concept back to individuals with his idea that people learn to create virtue in themselves and so create virtuous (harmonious, beautiful) things around them.

(v) The way in which feelings are perceived to be related to value judgements, to ideas of good and evil, and to ideas of personal responsibility, arising from the experience of injustice and guilt (or
justice and righteousness), gives a moral perspective on emotion. The sense of good and evil is evident in the writings of the presocratics, and is highly developed in the works of Plato and Aristotle.

In relation to the major aim of this thesis, I have sought to show that human emotional processes (that is, the ways in which people experience, understand and articulate emotions) progressively moved to the point where five distinct perspectives on emotion became visible, and that all thinking after that continued to elaborate on these in ways that reflected the increasing complexity of human experience. As Polanyi argues, the development of bodies of knowledge depends on "ordinary experience" and the complexity of such experience will be reflected in the elaborations in thought (Polanyi, 1975, p.32). I have also argued that the development of elaborations involves the perception and attempted solution of problems, a position that I draw from Popper's argument that the accumulation of all knowledge is brought about by the posing and solving of problems (Popper, 1984, p.239).

The sorts of problems that are reflected in the early philosophical writings up to Aristotle, are related to the five perspectives as described earlier. The physiological experience of emotion is related to the problem of how feelings affect the body and vice versa, and the problems of the origins of feelings; the cognitive experience of emotion is related to the problem of how to categorise, articulate and communicate emotional experience; the creative experience of emotion is related to the problem of the role feelings play in creative and destructive abilities and activities; the motivational experience of emotion is related to the problem of how feelings can appear to make (force) people to behave in certain ways, and how feelings can appear to be outside conscious control; and the moral experience of feelings is related to the problem of how and why we feel
some things to be "just" or "unjust", "right" or "wrong", "good" or "bad" in ways other than being merely useful to us, or not. These problems, I claim, form the basis for all subsequent inquiry into the emotions, and in addition, provide a context for being able to perceive, over time, an increasingly close and complex relationship between thought and feeling.

After Aristotle the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers developed the ideas of a pleasure/pain categorisation of the emotions, and of morality and virtue being the art of pleasure (Epicurean), and the idea of "passionlessness" being the greatest virtue (Stoic) the latter being connected to the idea that people should not "give way" to emotions. The Christian philosophers gave a love/despair categorisation within the context of a belief in a loving God and the idea of people's emotional motivation being the desire for union with God. The Christian philosophy developed a morality of emotion along Aristotelian lines, with some Stoic ideas developed as well, such as the idea of passionless leading to greater union with God. Aquinas developed a morality of emotion directly and forged links between Christianity and Aristotelianism, addressing the problems of control of the emotions (by reason) and the categorisation of emotions (in terms of "good" and "bad") which depended on their context. Aquinas also addressed the physiological/intellectual experience of emotion, claiming that the only emotion that did not involve physiological modifications was "the desire for the things of God". He reinforces the role of reason in control of emotion and in the understanding and categorisation of emotion.

In Chapter Two I look at the development of ideas by modern and recent theorists, and show how they go on reflecting and developing one or more of the five perspectives on emotion.
CHAPTER TWO

LATER PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS IN THEORIES OF EMOTION

Section I: The modern approach to emotion

With the increasing influence of science and the decreasing authority of the Church, post-medieval thinking underwent a number of changes. On the one hand, while the influence of the Church decreased, the influence of religion was carried on with concepts from Martin Luther which bring the individual (as opposed to States and societies) to the fore. On the other hand, the rise of science in the seventeenth century brought a new approach to knowledge, to the formation of theories, and to the direction of human thought. In itself the scientific approach was not new, existing certainly in Greek thought and formalised by Aristotle; but Aristotelian science, especially in astronomy and physics, was swept aside in favour of a mathematical and mechanistic conception of the universe; and more generally the approach, or attitude to knowledge and to humanity as a whole was new. The newness seemed to lie in the beginnings of a kind of objectivity about humans and their position in creation. No longer at the "centre of the universe", it seemed possible to see the human race in terms of objective fact and to a great degree this involved taking less notice of feelings or passions about things and more notice of observable, measurable qualities such as physical manifestations, actions, behaviour, the place of the person in science. Once again, this was foreshadowed by Aristotle, but it was not until the seventeenth century that evidence emerged that turned ancient ideas about the world upside down irrevocably, and gave way to a new way of looking for and defining
"truth". The implications for theories of emotion were far-reaching, involving more clearly than before a complete distinction (intentionally) between the concept of emotion and ethical concepts. It became no longer a necessary or desirable part of the "whole view" of man and the world to combine feelings with "the right way to live" or "the good", and indeed, the whole question of how we ought to do things became no longer so closely related to the question of how we do do things. This beginning of a shift in attitude was spectacularly demonstrated by Descartes in the seventeenth century when he came to the conclusion that knowledge must be sought for by first abandoning all the "prejudices and errors" that our minds contained through being exposed from birth to past traditions and ideas. Knowledge began only with those ideas that had been "squared with the norm of reason".

Theories from Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes

In Article 1 of Passions of the Soul Descartes abandons all previous notions of "the passions" claiming that the "ancients" had nowhere demonstrated the "defective nature of their sciences so clearly as well speaking of the passions. He claimed further that it should not have been so difficult a matter to inquire into the passions as "everyone has experience of the passions within himself, there is no necessity to borrow one's observations from elsewhere in order to discover their nature" (Descartes, trans. Haldane and Ross, 1931, Article 1, p.331). However, what Descartes termed "the passions" are not so easily observable by everyone as they obviously were by him. He presents a complicated theory in Passions of the Soul in which there is a relationship between the cognitive aspects of the passions and the physical manifestations of
emotion. "The Passions" Descartes defines as one of two sorts of thoughts. "Thoughts" he defines as the only things that we should attribute to the soul. The two "sorts" of thoughts are

(i) the actions of the soul, and

(ii) the passions.

He continues that "those which I call its actions are all our desires because we find by experience that they proceed directly from our soul and appear to depend on it alone: while on the other hand we may usually term one's passions all those kinds of perceptions or forms of knowledge which are found in us, because it is often not our soul which makes them what they are, and because it always receives them from the things which are represented by them" (ibid., Article XVII, p.340). In Articles XVIII and XIX Descartes speaks of desires which terminate in the soul itself (such as the desire to love God) and desires which terminate in the body (such as the desire to walk followed by the action of walking); perceptions which have the soul as a cause (i.e., perceptions of our desires) and perceptions which have the body as a cause (i.e., through the objects which strike our senses), and which consist of things like hunger, thirst, other natural appetites, and also pain, heat and so on. In Article XXV he describes "feelings of joy, anger and other sensations" as relating "solely to the soul" which are "sometimes excited in us by the objects which move our nerves and sometimes also by other causes". In Article XXVII the passions of the soul are defined as the "perceptions, feelings or emotions of the soul" and in Article XXVIII perceptions are explained as thoughts which are not actions of the soul, nor yet clear cognitions, but those perceptions rendered "obscure and confused" by the "close alliance between body and soul"; feelings are explained as being received into the soul in the same
way as objects of "our outside senses"; emotions are explained as those thoughts which most "powerfully agitate and disturb" the soul.

For Descartes, the soul had its "principal seat in the little gland [pineal gland] which exists in the middle of the brain, from whence it radiates forth through all the remainder of the body by means of the animal spirits, nerves and even the blood ..." (ibid., Article XXIV, p.347). The function of the passions was to "dispose the soul to desire those things which nature tells us are of use, and to persist in this desire", and also to motivate us to action (Article LII, p.3578). Six "primitive passions" are listed in Article LXIX - wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness, all other being composed of some of these and being "species" of them. When speaking of each of these, Descartes does not categorise them as being accompanied by pleasure or pain, but he does speak of them as being "agreeable" and "disagreeable", and of love as being a desire "to join willingly" with objects that appear to be agreeable' of hatred as the desire to be separated from objects that appear to be hurtful; of love as having many objects as well as being of many kinds (e.g., the love of a "drunkard for his wine" as well as the love of a father for his children) (Article LXXXII, p.367).

With the definitions of joy and sadness Descartes directly introduces the notions of good and evil, joy being the "enjoyment that the soul possesses in the good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as its own", and sadness being "the discomfort and unrest which the soul receives from evil" (Articles XCI and XCII, p.372). There does not seem to be any real point (unless concerned with morality) to connecting the notions of good and evil with the definition of emotion at this stage. Joy could just as easily and consistently be defined as the enjoyment of things perceived as agreeable, and sadness as the discomfort caused by the disagreeable. Descartes does not explain why he chooses to align emotion with good and evil - a notion that he supposedly abandoned with
the "sciences of the ancients". In Article LVI (ibid., p.359) where Descartes first introduces good and evil in an emotional context, he states that 'when a matter is presented as relatively to us good, ie., as agreeable to us, that causes us to have love for it, and when it is represented as evil or hurtful to us, that excites hatred in us" - but this seems to be something of an empty super-imposition of "evil" on to "disagreeable" and "good" on to "agreeable". There is no explanation of why Descartes equates goodness and agreeableness and evil with disagreeableness. That such an explanation would seem necessary can be indicated by the fact that it is very easy to imagine agreeable things that could very well be evil (e.g. the pleasure of revenge) and disagreeable things that could very well be good. Further, human beings are well-known for their capacity to love things that may be morally, or socially, or emotionally harmful to them and/or hate things that could be morally, or socially, or emotionally good for them - and this in fact is quite central to some powerful notions of morality, most particularly the religious moralities that perceived life as a struggle between much-loved "sins" and much-hated "virtues". The secular version perceives life as a struggle between much-loved "chaos" and much-hated "order", a theme which has many variations and contexts. When Descartes goes on to say that "from the same consideration of good and evil, all the other passions originate ..." (ibid., Article LVII, p.259), the equation between "good" and "agreeable" still appears to stand and his following statements are then based on what virtually amounts to a pleasure/non-pleasure categorisation of "the passions". In Article LXXIV he also aligns emotion with memory, claiming that the "utility" of the passions consists in their "fortifying and perpetuating in the soul thoughts which it is good it should preserve", the negative effect being fortifying and conserving those thoughts "more than necessary ... or on which it is not good to dwell".

On the relation between the will, reason, and the passions, Descartes describes the passions as not directly excited or removed by action of the
will, but indirectly controlled by "the representation of things which are usually united to the passions which we desire to have and which are contrary to those which we desire to set aside". So to incite courage and remove fear in ourselves for example, we need to "apply ourselves to consider the reasons, the objects or examples which persuade us that the peril is not great; that there is always more security in defence than in flight etc" (Article XLV, p.351). In addition, the reactions in the body, which powerful, render it more difficult to control the passions, the most being possible to control actions, "for example, if anger causes us to lift our hand to strike the will can usually hold it back" (Article XLVI, p.352). The strength or weakness of the soul is judged by the ability to control the passions (Article XLVIII, p.354).

Without really coming to terms with the precise relationship between cognition and feelings, emotions within the Cartesian framework present a picture, in the end, not unlike the Aristotelian theory minus the ethical centralisation. There is the idea of emotions having a physical and mental component (though the Cartesian "soul", unlike the Aristotelian "soul", is radically distinct from the body being linked with it primarily by way of the pineal gland); the idea of categorisation by use of pleasure and pain, interpreted as agreeable and disagreeable. This interpretation is understandable in the light of Descartes' regarding pain as related to a physical sensation, mental or psychological pain being a sensation of something disagreeable, the idea of feelings and actions being closely related, the idea of emotions being some form of agitation or disturbance with the psyche, the idea of emotions as the cause of some actions and vice versa, and the idea of a relationship between reason and emotions where some definite and effective role is assigned to reason. In addition, he attaches to the concept of emotion the dimension of a role in memory, and the idea that as well as feelings being variations of six major emotions, some feelings pertained to bodily appetites and others to "soul thoughts",...
distinguishing thereby between, for example, feelings of hunger for food and feelings of hunger for affection or recognition.

Spinoza (1955) wrote strongly against the Cartesian view of emotions, particularly in connection with the idea that it was possible ultimately to control emotions by the use of reason. Spinoza claimed that emotion was a part of a whole and perfect natural plan, and therefore neither to be "controlled" nor derided. In his *Ethics* he treats his analysis of emotions "geometrically", giving a series of definitions where emotions emerge as "the modifications of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications" (Spinoza, trans. Elwes, 1955, p.130). Spinoza notes that insofar as we are the cause of these modifications emotion is an activity; insofar as we are not the cause, an emotion is a passion (or state wherein the mind is passive) (ibid., p.130). In the form of geometrical proofs, he considers a series of propositions about emotions, which ultimately include the notions that love and hate are pleasure and pain respectively, each accompanied by the idea of an external cause; that love wishes to keep present the object of love and hatred wishes to destroy the object of hatred; that when any two emotions are experienced at the same time, the subsequent experience of one will prompt the experience of the other; that appetites and desires are the same except that desire is accompanied by consciousness of appetite; that all emotions stem from the three primary emotions of pleasure (stimulation or merriment), pain (suffering or melancholy) and desire (appetite with consciousness) (ibid., pp.138-40).

Spinoza argues that anything we conceive of pleasurably we will feel love towards and anything conceived of unpleasurably will be accompanied by hate (ibid., p.145); also what we desire, we conceive of as good (as opposed to what is good is what we desire) (ibid., p.137). With
his emphasis on the relation between emotions and our conceptions of things, Spinoza appears to be arguing firstly that emotions are dependent on our conceptual (cognitive) functions, and secondly, that to the extent that our conceptualising is flawed or incomplete, our emotions are misconceptions of the world and ourselves. Calhoun and Solomon (1984, p.72) also interpret Spinoza in this way in What is an Emotion? With this series of notions, however, Spinoza still attaches to the concept of emotion classifications based on pleasure and pain, a powerful cognitive factor, a causal factor, and also a development of the memory component in that variations of certain emotions and ambivalence or vacillation are related to the memory of certain ideas originally connected with certain feelings. Similar ideas later may be accompanied by different feelings and the connection between the new ideas and the ones in memory give rise to contrary emotions being experienced (Spinoza, 1955, p.142).

Spinoza's ideas on emotions are presented within a pantheistic framework where the entire universe consists of a single substance which is God (or Nature) and where everything that happens in the universe is determined by God and therefore necessary. To this extent, his theory of emotion is independent of the preceding Christian influence on thought (there being no notion of a personal God in Spinoza's idea) and it is consistent with attempts to present a view of human nature in scientific terms, in this case, using the structure of geometry.

With Thomas Hobbes too, the notion of a Christian God seems peripheral to his central theses about mankind. He reverts to the Aristotelian idea that, in the end, reason is the redeeming force in human nature. Hobbes argues in his essays On Man (De Homine) and The Citizen (De Cive) that the greatest of goods for each person is his own preservation, especially the avoidance of violent death, and that reason ultimately is the means to such preservation (Hobbes, trans. Wood,
Scott-Craig and Gert, 1978, pp.48, 55, 93). For Hobbes, emotions or "perturbations of the mind" are "species of appetite and aversion, their differences having been taken from the diversity of circumstances of the objects that we desire or shun" (ibid., p.55). Emotions also consist in "various motions of the blood and animal spirits as they variously expand and contract; the causes of these motions are phantasms concerning good and evil excited in the mind by objects" (ibid., p.55). Hobbes claims that emotions are "perturbations because they frequently obstruct right reasoning ... in this, that they militate against the real good in favour of the apparent and most immediate good, which turns out frequently to be evil when everything associated with it hath been considered" (ibid., p.55). "Judgement", he claims, "originates from appetite out of a union of mind and body (but) it must proceed from reason" (ibid., p.55). Joy, hatred, hope, fear all arise out of the presence or possible presence and enjoyment of "goods" or the presence and suffering of evil (ibid., p.56). In his description of various emotions, Hobbes relates them all to good (i.e., desired) objects and evil (i.e., shunned) objects (ibid., p.47). Good is pleasing, evil unpleasing. Good is "real or apparent", as is evil, in that some good things may belong to a "chain" of things that also carries evil things and the "real" good may only be ascertained by seeing things in terms of long-term consequences; similarly for evil (ibid., p.48).

Hobbes appears to be giving an account of pleasure and unpleasure (as related to good and evil, or desire and aversion) where appetites ("delights") are related to the senses, and feelings or emotions are related to the perception of the goods and evils of the world. Within this framework Hobbes sees the variety of emotions as "almost infinite" (ibid., p.62). In Leviathan he makes it clear that passions, without the moderating effect of reason, are essentially destructive to the survival of the state and the individual. In a "state of nature", uneducated, undeliberating, man is at his worst. But it is by virtue of certain passions (such as fear of death) and
reason (such as deliberation and thus knowledge of danger) that a state of "felicity" (continual prospering) may be sought (Hobbes, 1986, p.188).

Hume

Hume said, one hundred years after Hobbes, that "nothing is more usual in Philosophy and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates" (Hume, 1969, p.460). He goes on to claim that in fact "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will and ... it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will", despite modern and ancient claims to the contrary (ibid., p.461). And further, "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions ..." (ibid., p.462). However, what at first appears to be (and has been taken as) an assertion that emotions are the prime motivator, is in fact something quite different when Hume’s description of what constitutes a passion and what constitutes an emotion is taken into account.

A passion, says Hume "is an original existence ... and contains not any representative quality which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification" (ibid., p.462). Reason is of two different kinds: on the one hand, it regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects of which experience only gives us information; on the other hand, it seeks to establish the relation between objects and their capacity to cause us pleasure or pain, and, since it is our feelings or impulses that drive us to avoid pain and embrace pleasure, any action arising from our reasoning on cause and effect is motivated nonetheless by that original emotion or impulse. In addition, since passion is an original existence (and not an idea of an object) it is inappropriate to think of it as being contrary to reason.
since such contradiction is related to a disagreement of ideas. Only insofar as an emotion or passion is accompanied by a judgment, can a contradiction occur (ibid., p.463). And further, any passion can only be considered unreasonable when either it is founded on the supposition or the existence of objects which do not really exist, or when in exerting any passion in action, insufficient means for the desired ends are chosen.

With these kinds of explanations, Hume moves from a position that regards reason as the "slave of the passions" to a position where he merely considers it conceptually inappropriate to speak of conflict between reason and passion since they are different kinds of things and that in fact passions may be considered reasonable insofar as they are experienced in connection with existing objects and we choose (i.e., correctly judge) appropriate means to fulfil designed ends. This raises the possibility of a very close relationship between reason and the passions, a relationship that sees them as complementary motivators since it is only reason alone that cannot motivate in Hume's view (ibid., p.465). Further, it raises the possibility of a true blending of emotion and reason in the idea of "reasonable passions" or emotions, that is where the proper cause and effect relation is established by reason between an emotion and its object, and the subsequent actions prompted by passion and judged by reason are sufficient for desired ends.

However, in this account, Hume does appear to be treating a passion or emotion (he does not distinguish between them) as a primary sensation only. In denying that a sensation (a passion) is a representation of an object, he also seems to be denying, or not addressing, the possibility that an emotion could be the secondary, cognitive stage of a passion, that it does indeed become an idea in the mind. Such an idea is formed by the interpretation by the mind of a sensation, and the idea of the sensation is connected to the idea of the object which represented it. Thus, in Hume's
terms, a contradiction becomes possible as we are dealing with two ideas. The hint of such a possibility (i.e., the possibility of a difference between passion and emotion) within Hume's framework is suggested when he speaks of the certainty of "certain calm desires and tendencies which, tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind ..." and he speaks of these as being "confounded with reason by all those who judge of things from first view and appearance" (ibid., p.464). He contrasts these "calm passions" with "violent passions" which do produce "emotion in the mind". Hume does appear in this context to be distinguishing between passions (sensations) and "emotions in the mind". It seems worthwhile to consider therefore whether Hume's "calm passions" in the mind can really be regarded as separate from reason. Insofar as Hume regards reason as "that which judges of truth and falsehood" (ibid., p.465) then they must indeed seem to be separate; if however, reason is allowed the added function of being the means whereby passions are conceptualised and ordered in terms of categorisation, and thereby become that which we consciously think of as emotion (a secondary a process arising from the sensations or passions) then Hume's "calm passions" become directly connected with reason, and it makes sense to speak of a blending of emotion and reason.
Section II: Later philosophical ideas – Kant, Nietzsche, Sartre

Most of the essential ways in which emotions have been interpreted in the western tradition of thought are contained within the frameworks discussed so far. Later philosophers and psychologists developed and elaborated on some of these ideas, yielding a new perspective, but using the principles that had gone before. Some later philosophers, however, in addition to developing earlier ideas, did contribute a new dimension in a way that casts a significant light on established principles in connection with emotion theories. I will mention these briefly, not in an attempt to present their whole framework of thought in any detail, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, but in connection with the dimension I regard as significantly new in theory of emotion.

Kant (1970) added such a dimension within his completely new approach to theory of knowledge. Whereas previous philosophers had seen knowledge as essentially connected with real external objects perceived by the senses, Kant claimed that the "laws of knowledge" governed the transformation of sense perceptions to meaningful conceptual frameworks and that these laws were to be known and understood only by the activity of reason itself (Kant, 1970 trans. Liddell, p.11). Moral knowledge also was only to be gained by the discovery by reason of the fundamental principles of morality over and above experience which had been generally appealed to as providing the means for forming moral judgments. Support for and objections to Kant's theory (as put forward in his major works, The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment) are numerous, and the theory does not put forward a formal theory of emotions. In connection with moral theory Kant regarded feelings as subjective and therefore unsuitable as a standard for moral judgment (ibid., p.194).
However, Kant presented us with a new way of looking at emotion in a work written before the Critiques, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*. Using the same idea of "pure" rational activity, he organises feelings as falling within the concepts of the "sublime" and the "beautiful". In saying that feelings are subjective, he is also saying that "the various feelings of enjoyment or of displeasure rest not so much upon the nature of the external things that arouse them, as upon each person's own disposition to be moved by these to pleasure or pain" (Kant, 1960, p.45).

On the one hand, Kant is using one of the established categorisations of feelings with pleasure/pain, but he is also presenting what may be called an aesthetic theory of emotions that comes before *The Critique of Judgment*, his major work on aesthetics.

In the *Observations* Kant speaks of "finer, delicate" feelings that are qualitatively different from sensuous feeling and at the level of fineness and delicacy feelings may be "sublime" or "beautiful", where "the sublime moves, the beautiful charms" (Kant's emphasis) (ibid., p.47). The sublime is accompanied by earnest, rigid, astonished feelings, or even by dread or melancholy, or quiet wonder. The sublime may be "terrifying" or "noble" or "splendid". "Deep loneliness", Kant says, "is sublime but in a way that stirs terror" (ibid., p.48). And "the sublime must be always great; the beautiful can also be small. The sublime must be simple; the beautiful can be adorned and ornamented" (ibid., p.48). Many things are both sublime and beautiful but the elements of each are easily distinguishable from one another, as when a building may be sublime in its size and simplicity and beautiful in its detail and ornamentation (ibid., p.49). Both negative and positive emotions fit easily into this framework, which throws new light on the strength and complexity of human emotions, and also on the interplay of emotions. "Even depravities and moral failings often bear, for all that, some features of the sublime or the beautiful", Kant claims, referring to the terrifying or horrifying nature of such feelings (ibid., p.53). This framework
also sheds interesting light on our ability to experience apparently conflicting and sometimes disturbing emotions in connection with things we consider to be good and bad. As Kant points out, a deceitful scheme can arouse distaste, but also delight with its cleverness, delicacy and audacity (ibid., p.53).

In his *Observations* Kant works through a great range of feelings, giving each its place in relation to the human capacity to respond to a level of feeling he defines as "finer feeling" which he distinguishes from the "kind of feeling that can take place without any thought whatsoever" (ibid., p.46). The pleasure/pain categorisation is indirectly incorporated and the categorisation of good and evil is also visible. By using the positive and negative sides of the sublime, negative or painful feelings are given a context. That the full range of feelings we experience is taken into account is suggested by Kant when he says:

In human nature, praiseworthy qualities never are found without concurrent variations that must run through endless shadings to the utmost imperfection. The quality of the terrifying sublime [Kant's emphasis], if it is quite unnatural, is adventurous. Unnatural things, so far as the sublime is supposed in them, although little or none at all may actually be found, are grotesque (ibid., p.55).

Finer feeling (as opposed to thoughtless feeling or sensation) is dependent then on understanding and thinking (ibid., p.55) and the theory indeed posits a blending of thinking and feeling that may be called sublime in its scope and beautiful in its detail and implications (to describe it in Kantian terms). The incorporation of the sublime/beautiful into the categorisations of pleasure/pain, good/evil and degrees of imperfection leading to opposites, provides a powerful new dimension to explanations and descriptions of emotion and one that has scarcely been developed in the context of theory of emotion. To limit this approach to the field of
aesthetics is, arguably, to limit severely our understanding of feelings. There are related concepts that would need exploring (such as Kant's idea of "natural" and "unnatural") but the richness of his concepts of the sublime and the beautiful in connection with feelings is too obvious to be confined to aesthetics.

Nietzsche (1968) has provided another unusual dimension to our understanding of emotions with a series of strong statements about the expression of emotion. His theory of affects is strongly tied to his doctrine of perspectivism which claims essentially that any and every view of the world is only one among many, that any number of interpretations are possible, and none has any more claim to truth than others. The deeply complex nature of Nietzsche's work and thoughts cannot be properly discussed here, and any "short formulas" would of course be inadequate, but he makes some statements on the expression of emotion that are powerful and informative enough, I believe, to provide insights for us in this context as they stand.

In *The Will to Power* Nietzsche speaks of "the whole conception of an order of rank among the passions: as if the right and normal thing were for one to be guided by reason - with the passions as abnormal, dangerous, semi-animal, and, moreover, so far as their aim is concerned, nothing other than desires for pleasure ..." (Nietzsche, 1968, p.206, S387). He claims that this conception degrades passions "as if it were only in unseemly cases, and not necessarily and not always, the motive force" and also "in as much as it has for its object something of no great value, amusement". He claims that this is a "misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity and not rather a system of relations between various passions an desires; and as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason" (ibid.). Nietzsche contrasts this "misunderstanding" with the view that
It is richness in personality, abundance in oneself, over-flowing and bestowing, instinctive good health and affirmation of oneself, that produce great sacrifice and great love: it is strong and godlike selfhood from which these affects flow, just as surely as do the desire to become master, encroachment, the inner certainty of having a right to everything ... if one is not firm and brave within oneself, one has nothing to bestow and cannot stretch out one’s hand to protect and support ... (ibid., pp.208-9, S388).

There are a number of assumptions and ideas implicit in these statements that give a new perspective on emotions. My intention here is not to weigh these ideas within Nietzsche’s entire framework but rather to highlight an added dimension, a new way of looking at emotions. Firstly, Nietzsche implies that it is not necessarily "right and normal" that passions should be viewed as, in some sense, lower expressions of human nature to be guided by reason as, in some sense, higher. Secondly, he implies that every passion has an intimate relationship with reason. Thirdly, he implies that this relationship is one of relations between various passions and desires; then he claims that affects or passions are the product of, an outpouring of, a richness of personality, of a strength centred in a strong sense of self. The dimension that provides a new angle of thought here is the notion that emotions are an expression of personality, personality being in part an inner sense of self, or richness, of abundance, of ability to give to and support others. To the extent to which the personality is able to build or acquire such strength, the emotions find expression and are given their colour and their beauty.

The notion of the "will to power", so central to Nietzsche’s philosophy, is of course the vantage point from which he is viewing emotions, but the picture he presents is one that sheds light on that aspect of our experience of feelings where we give and receive feelings, where we feel exactly that sense of richness and power in connection with especially our ability to give and receive emotionally. Nietzsche directly and powerfully addresses
our experience of giving and receiving support through and because of our feelings. He implies that the quality of our feelings depends completely on all that is implied by being "firm and brave within ourselves". It has become one of the tasks of psychology to inquire into the giving and receiving of feelings between people, and Nietzsche provides the beginnings of one of the rare paths that may relate to the precise nature of this exchange, and the conditions under which it occurs both minimally and maximally.

Sartre (1985) also presents a picture of emotions that depends for meaning on his total framework or system and once again, I will use some of his key notions to highlight a dimension of his interpretation of feelings. One of Sartre's key concepts is that of freedom, specifically our freedom to choose how to be in the world and the immense responsibility for our lives that this freedom places upon us (Sartre, 1985, p.18). In this context, he claims that we choose our feelings no less than we (i.e., our consciousness) choose the ways in which we interpret the world. In The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, Sartre claims that emotion "is a transformation of the world" carried out when "the paths traced out become too difficult, or when we see no path, we can no longer live in so urgent and difficult a world" (Sartre, trans. Frechtman, 1939, p.58). The "new ways and new relationships" we construct to deal with the intractability of our circumstances are the manifestation of our emotional processes, and these involve, fundamentally, changing ourselves since we cannot change the world (Sartre, trans. Barnes, 1957, p.XV). Sartre rejects the idea that emotions "sweep" over people and determine actions in any way. Rather, emotion is one way consciousness chooses to live its relationship in the world (ibid., p.XIV). He claims "we must act" in the world and our transformations of the environment (i.e., our transformations of our attitudes to the environment) "is not a game; we are driven against a wall, and we throw ourselves into this new attitude with all the strength we can muster. Let it also be understood that this attempt is not conscious of
being such, for it would then be the object of a reflection. Before anything else, it is the seizure of new connections and new exigencies" (Sartre, trans. Frechtman, 1939, p.58).

One example Sartre gives of such a transformation or change in attitude which leads to a change of our body and its relation in the world (directed by consciousness) is that of someone first wanting a bunch of grapes (seeing them as desirable), then being unable to reach them and, as a consequence, taking on the attitude that the grapes were too green anyway. The new attitude is taken on to break the tension caused by the frustration of a desire to obtain the grapes (ibid., p.59). We remove the quality of being suitable for picking to the quality of not being suitable for picking. Once again, it is not within the scope of this chapter to argue for or against Sartre's idea, but what the idea does in itself is highlight our direct experience of changing our feelings about something in order to make situations more to our liking or more bearable. It is obvious to us that on many occasions we can do this and that it take some sort of effort to do so. Sartre provides a way of looking at this process and an illumination on how this act of ours changes not only our perception of things, but also our acts, as a consequence, which in turn affects other events and people. The process of transformation must, in some way, be connected with our organisation of the world, our categorisation of objects and events, our connections between ideas and feelings, so that we may effect the transformation appropriately. But the process is also related to the process of choosing and the notion of freedom which, in Sartrean terms, suggests a kind of necessary activity.

This key notion, that we must act (and therefore have the freedom to act) implies that even non-action is a kind of chosen action that has its effect in the world. What we choose is a "way of being" and we must do this as long as we have being. That this responsibility is upon us is, when
perceived, a source of fundamental and inescapable anguish (Sartre, 1985, trans. Frechtman/Barnes, p.18). Anguish becomes then more than a feeling in the ordinary sense - it becomes a condition of being, an emotional state, an "anguish before myself" as opposed to fear which is related to "something in the world" (Sartre, 1957, trans. Barnes, p.628). The anguish before oneself is because "man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent that he fulfils himself; he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his acts" (Sartre, 1985, p.32). To act in ways that will transform or change himself or herself, a person must then begin by having certain attitudes or feelings towards himself/herself.

This seems a highly cognitive view of emotions on the one hand, but one that also gives emotions enormous power in the regulation of our lives. It is a curious and intensely close relation between reason (as an act of assessing and choosing) and emotion (as a way of perceiving the world). What it appears to illustrate is our direct experience of the necessity to change our feelings when we cannot change our circumstances. Interestingly, as Sartre so forcefully contends, our ability (or freedom, or responsibility) to change our feelings does in fact modify our circumstances in some way. In Sartre's "bunch of grapes" example a change of feeling towards the grapes results in the act of moving on and of leaving the grapes where they are, which will have some certain consequences for others in due course, as well as for oneself. The notion that feelings are a part of, and blended with the whole condition of being and acting in the world is not unlike Nietzsche's idea of feelings as an expression of the whole personality - each of these perspectives explain something about the way in which our feelings affect ourselves and others in a more direct and personal way, as opposed to the more objective formality of previous theories. The more subjective or personal approach to accounts of emotion became an important dimension of later psychological theories as will be illustrated in Chapter Three.
Section III: Recent philosophical ideas – Averill, Rorty, Lyons, Neu, Solomon

More recent ideas about emotion have continued to add to the complexity and detail of the five perspectives on emotion that form the pattern of development. In many cases the contributions have been very strong in the cognitive area though in some cases the cognitive explorations have led back to discussions of physiological, motivational, moral and creative perspectives.

Averill (1980) provides a theoretical framework for an interpretation of emotions that treats emotions as "social constructions ... that is, emotions are responses that have been institutionalised by society as a means of resolving conflicts which exist within the social system" (Averill, 1980, p.37). Averill casts interesting light on the ways in which emotional expressions are channelled in society that sets down certain "rules of behaviour", but the idea that I want to introduce here is his presentation of emotions as "cognitive systems" within the individual as well as within societies. He joins a person's emotional structures to other cognitive processes by positing levels of structuralisation which vary in the tightness or looseness of construction. Structures are very loose at the level of "transcendental emotional states (e.g., anxiety, mystical experience)" and at this level they shade into the cognitive structures of thinking with such states as reverie, dreaming, creative activity. At the next (higher) level of structuralisation, where thinking processes are concerned with everyday problem solving, where motivation is relatively high (in terms of self-preservation, ordinary living and working), the standard emotional reactions of anger, fear, envy, hope, etc, blend in. At still higher levels of structuralisation these emotional reactions shade into what Averill terms "hysterical states" meaning the exaggerated or unusual form of standard emotions. He says "their common characteristic is that they involve a rather severe dissociation of
consciousness and tend to be highly rigid and stereotyped" (ibid., p.42). At even higher levels of structuralisation "hysterical reactions tend to become fractionated and the affective component drops out, leaving only a part response which may symbolise the underlying conflict. Obsessive-compulsive reactions perhaps best exemplify this stage ..." (ibid., p.43).

Presenting emotions in terms of flexibility and rigidity provides us with a way of inquiring into our direct experience of feeling degrees of any particular emotion and emotional states. We may feel irritation, annoyance, anger or fury and we recognise that these, while having their own particular flavour, are also degrees of one kind of emotion. To see this in terms of tension gives us a view of some primary affective force; to see it in terms of conflict (i.e., problem solving processes) is to give us a relation between thinking and feeling, where emotion is given cognitive status, and where an interesting (and necessary) parallel is shown with the two processes.

Rorty (1980) in her article "Explaining Emotions" focusses on our experience of having feelings that do not correspond appropriately with our thinking or rational processes. She claims however that by examining the causal history of such feelings (i.e. taking into account a person's changing system of beliefs and attitudes, the influence of societies and cultures, and the genetic component) an appropriate correspondence can be found between thinking, beliefs and feeling. Tracing such a causal history involves, in part, an inquiry into our capacity for self-deception, or the holding of false beliefs. The relationship between self-deception and feelings is central to the problem of the discrepancy between thinking, feeling and acting that we so often experience. Rorty's article very usefully illustrates the difference between unintentional false belief (such as hearing bad news and reacting emotionally to it, although the news turns out to be untrue) and intentional false belief which is a product of self-deception.
Although Rorty's main task is to explain how and why such situations occur, the dimension of emotion theory that comes into play is that as well as events and beliefs having the effect of manipulating our feelings, we ourselves may manipulate our feelings by using the causal relationship between thought, belief, and feeling, with and without self-deception. The implication for emotion theory, ultimately, is the need to examine emotions in terms of personal responsibility and in terms of their reality, i.e., the need to look at the difference between feelings which occur as a result of our manipulations (self-deceptive or not) and those which occur for other reasons - and whether or not there is a difference in their moral status and in their reality status.

Lyons (1980) presents a theory of emotions which he defines as "a causal-evaluative theory" where he explores emotions as an evaluation process which caused "unusual physiological changes in the subject of the evaluation" (Lyons, 1980, p.53). He specifies that his account is of occurrent emotional states, rather than emotions considered dispositionally, and gives an account of this distinction both in connection with his survey of classical theories of emotion (which he claims are generally theories of occurrent emotional states also, though the distinction had not been formally made in most cases) and in connection with his own theory. To make the distinction, Lyons uses the example of vanity, saying that we can refer to a person as vain, and mean either that the person is giving an actual display of vanity (occurrent), or that the person has a disposition to be vain, that is, a proneness to do vain things, such as boasting, whenever the opportunity occurs (ibid., p.54). In treating emotions as an evaluation process Lyons sees the process as one of an evaluation of a situation, which gives the person a set of beliefs about their situation, which in turn causes the wants or desires leading to behaviour. The evaluations and wants together cause abnormal physiological changes and the subjective registering, as feelings (ibid., p.57). The example Lyons
gives is of a person's evaluation of the sight of a ferocious dog, where the perception of threat leads to running away, the combination of which leads to increase in adrenaline output, increase in respiration rate, which are subjectively experienced as thumping heart, sweaty palms, constricted chest, dry mouth (ibid., p.57). In his discussion of this process, Lyons addresses more detailed aspects of the physiological perspective on emotion, the motivational perspective on emotion in terms of the kinds of relationship between emotion and behaviour, and the moral/ethical perspective of emotion with his discussion on emotions and blame. In the latter case he holds that a person can, to some extent, exercise control over emotions, and to that extent can be held responsible for them (ibid., p.196). He deals, as does Rorty, with the human capacity to manipulate emotions, in oneself and others, and he deals also with the idea of emotions being useful or useless and whether such a distinction is appropriate. This involves him in discussions of emotions as being useful in terms of self-preservation and social acceptability (ibid., p.178).

Neu (1977) directly addresses the relationship between thought and feeling in his discussion of the connection between the ideas of Hume and Spinoza and psychological theories of therapy. He claims that "thoughts are of greater importance than feelings (in the narrow sense of felt sensations) in the classification and discrimination of emotional states" (Neu, 1977, p.1). He stresses however, that the importance of thoughts lies in their usefulness in discriminating mental states, not in making feelings, and other elements constituting emotions, less important. Neu sees thoughts, in the form of beliefs, as "essential" in that without certain beliefs in connection with emotion, discrimination between emotions (as opposed to feelings/sensations) is not possible (ibid., pp.1-2). In supporting Spinoza's interpretation of thought and feeling, Neu is arguing for the philosophic sense of Freudian, and general, analytic therapies, thus providing one kind of direct bridge between philosophy and psychology.
His philosophic justification is based on Spinoza’s cognitive interpretation of emotion (that is on the necessary relation between thought, or belief, and emotion) and on Spinoza’s argument that emotions may be transformed by examining (reflectively) the context of the emotion and its reality status i.e. whether or not the emotion and the idea are related to a real situation. Neu elaborates on Spinoza’s distinction between active and passive emotions, on the relation between emotion and action, and supports an argument that emotions can be reasonable, in the sense of being attached to ideas of real situations (ibid., p.147). In this sense, Freudian analysis assists in the understanding of real and unreal situations and the thoughts and feelings that may be attached to them, and the adjustments in the understanding can result in the possibility of adjusting or transforming emotions (ibid., p.147).

In his book *The Passions* Solomon (1976) is essentially concerned with the elucidation of the reality of emotions in that he attempts to sweep away the "myths", the deception and the self-deception, and to posit a harmony between thinking and feeling that is "not mere coherence but coherence with an optimal set of reflective judgements, which see in each case, the emotional strategies that are most to our advantage, cutting through the veils and fabrications of self-imposed fantasies, breaking through the self-enclosed prisons of defensiveness to maximise, in every instance, the possibility of intersubjectivity and mutual self esteem. And once we have reflectively seen such strategies it can be but a matter of time and courage for us to carry them out through our emotions. They, too, desire nothing more than precisely this maximization of self esteem which reflection, often better than they, is capable of comprehending" (Solomon, 1976, pp.412-13; Solomon’s emphases). With a complex series of steps, Solomon traces and assesses traditional philosophical and psychological thought on emotion coming eventually to a Sartrean-like position as regards choice and judgement, a position of subjectivity as
regards free will and emotion (i.e., regardless of whether or not emotional responses are determined, the subjective feeling is that we must make choices in connection with events and feelings), and a position that also posits a concept of "rational passions" used as a "creative means of self-realisation, living our lives as 'works of art' ..." (ibid., p.429).

Conclusion

With The Passions Solomon also provides a bridge between philosophy and psychology - but an unusual one in that, as a philosopher, he presents psychological ways with which to begin understanding emotions while at the same time claiming that there are no real "guide books for exploration". The guide book that he gives, almost in the same breath, is that of learning to see our emotions as our "creative activities". Within that phrase, a wealth of traditional thinking finds a place in connection with the creative perspective on emotion. Presocratic thought contained the notion of a creative element to emotion in a way that was both personal and divine (in terms of love as a creative force in the universe); Aristotle hinted at the ways in which the interplay of reason and emotion created virtue or the virtuous man; Christian philosophy posited creative love as the most powerful emotion; Kant's aesthetic theory of emotion is closely tied to creativity; and Nietzsche and Sartre introduce the element of creativity in unique ways, the former as a means of powerful creative self-expression, the latter as a means of "transforming the world".

Each of these philosophers has added a layer of complexity to the creative perspective on emotion and has thereby provided new ways of perceiving and solving the problem of how feelings are related to the creative process. From the broad Presocratic idea of emotion being a creative force in the universe (an indication of the personal experience of the strength of emotion) the thinking gradually moved to such particulars
as how to control emotion to create virtue (Aristotle), how to love as a way to create virtue (the Christian philosophers), how to dwell creatively within the poles of beauty and ugliness (Kant), how to create new ways to express ourselves (Nietzsche), and how to give new meanings to our experiences and our worlds (Sartre).

Each of the remaining philosophers mentioned in this chapter also added a significant new layer of complexity to one or more of the perspectives on emotion, thus increasing its dimensions, and giving new ways of solving the problems related to emotion. Descartes' complex theory describing the relationship between the cognitive aspects of the passions and their physical manifestations gives new ways of understanding the different kinds of desires, ways of categorising, and of communicating. He also provided a clear formal distinction between the cognitive and moral/ethical perspectives on emotion, though he still relates good and evil to kinds of emotions. He relates emotion to memory, giving emotion the "use" of preserving good thoughts, and the relation he posits between emotion and will (an indirect one) opens new ways of perceiving motivation (why we do things, and how we can control thought, feeling and action).

Spinoza also gives new ways of categorising emotions (the cognitive perspective), which, while retaining the major pleasure/pain categorisation, include the idea of some kinds of emotions being forms of desire. His complex notion of desire (appetite with consciousness) is related to the way in which we perceive things, and an added cognitive complexity is his idea that, to the extent to which we perceive things incompletely or in a flawed way, our emotions can be misconceptions of the world and ourselves. His notion that certain emotions are attached to the memory of certain ideas, and that those emotions can be re-attached to other ideas throws light on the problem of the experience of contrary emotions and the
conflict that usually accompanies such experience. Finally, his notion that the entire universe consists of a single substance which is God (or Nature) and where everything that happens in the Universe is determined by God, and therefore necessary, allows us to contemplate our feelings as possibly not always within our control, or entirely our responsibility (though able to be transformed), a view that must be of use in dealing with the problem of helplessness in the face of overwhelming emotional experience. Both the motivational and moral/ethical perspectives are broadened by these ideas.

Hobbes reverts to the Aristotelian idea that reason is the redeeming force in human nature and that the passions, unmodified by reason, are essentially destructive. The layer of complexity that his ideas add however, consists of his idea that good things and evil things (to which he relates emotions) can be "real or apparent", that they may belong to a "chain" of both good and evil things, and that their "true good" or "true evil" may become apparent only over time. This, I think, adds a new dimension to the moral/ethical perspective on emotion in that it indicates that good and evil can be dependent on time and context, a notion that present thinkers are still attempting to clarify. That feelings are equally dependent on time and context (conditions and events of life), as Hobbes contends, yields a new way of perceiving the problem of correct judgement, immediate conflict, and frustration of desire.

With Hume the pleasure/pain categorisation is again apparent, and the motivational factor is that passions drive us to avoid pain and pursue pleasure. But a new layer is added when Hume claims that the passions are not in conflict with reason (which judges whether objects cause pleasure or pain) but that they are different kinds of things, with different jobs - reason being used for judgement and choice, and emotions being the indicators of pleasure and pain, thus positing a complementary relationship. Conflict is caused by opposing judgements or choices, not
opposing passions. A further blending of emotion and reason is suggested when Hume speaks of passions as being sensations (violent passions) and passions being conceptualisations of a certain kind (calm passions), a decidedly cognitive view.

In more recent thinking Averill adds a complex layer to the cognitive perspective on emotion with his idea that emotions can be flexible or rigid, tight or loose, that they are cognitive systems with various shadings. This idea allows a new kind of categorisation and a new way of relating direct personal experience to the understanding of emotions. His idea of emotions as social constructions is dealt with in Chapter Three, in a psychological context.

Rorty formally introduces the idea that our experience of emotions does not always appear to correspond with our conceptualisations of emotions, thus highlighting the human capacity for self-deception, which raises the problem of communication, and the problem of behaviour that is consistent with beliefs. That the origins of such self-deception are posited as being directly related to the perceptions of situations and experience of emotions holds implications for both the cognitive and moral/ethical perspectives on emotion, and, to some extent, for the motivational perspective.

Lyons' distinction between occurrent and dispositional emotions, as he discusses them, adds a more finely detailed way of distinguishing between similar emotions (such as anger and irascibility, hate and loathing), and giving some emotions first and second order status. His treatment of emotions as an evaluation process defines more clearly ideas on the relation between belief and emotion, and shows how the causal-evaluative approach can cover "the many facets and functions of

Neu, though not directly outlining a theory of emotions independently, elaborates on the Humean and Spinozist theories, giving a new relation between Spinoza's theories and analytic therapies in psychology. As well as providing a bridge between philosophy and psychology, he supports the cognitive perspective on emotion by emphasising a necessary relation between thought and emotion, by elaborating on the reality status of emotions, and by putting forward the possibility of greater control over emotions.

In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate the ways in which modern thinkers have continued to add complexity to the five perspectives on emotion that emerged at the end of Chapter One. In demonstrating this, I have sought to support my claim that new ways of thinking about emotion are, in each case, elaborating on a fundamental pattern established by the five perspectives noted. In this context I have not sought to compare the theories or ideas, or to justify them, but rather to show how enduring theories and ideas have contributed to a particular trend or pattern. The growth or elaboration of that pattern I perceive as being evolutionary in character, as explained in the Introduction. I perceive it as evolutionary on the grounds that it does move in an increasingly complex direction and that it does represent a development in understanding, in Huxley's sense of evolutionary action. The importance of recognising this trend lies in the way access to this pattern allows us to relate thinking and feeling, not only as any one theorist relates them, but in as many ways as it is possible to relate them by using the various perspectives and their complexities as subsidiaries (in Polanyi's sense) to focus on new meanings, and to create, and become aware of, new experiences. Knowing that the five perspectives do represent genuine
ways of experiencing emotions also gives them a practical, problem solving use. For example the cognitive and creative perspectives may be used to focus on the problem raised by the experience of being hindered in creative activity by certain emotions, or to understand (and therefore enhance) the ways in which other emotions support creative activity. Selection of the perspectives would depend on the kind of emotional experience being dealt with, and its effects.

In Chapter Three, I will look at the ways in which psychologists contributed further to these perspectives and I suggest that two psychologists, Sigmund Freud and George Kelly, contribute in ways that represent the beginnings of a new evolutionary step in the general development - that is, they provide the means for individuals to become more directly aware of the action of each of the perspectives of emotion within their own experience.
CHAPTER THREE

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF EMOTION

Section I: The origins of psychological approaches to emotion

With the establishment of psychology as a separate discipline towards the end of the 19th century, theories of emotion began to emerge in a way that appears to be disconnected from the philosophical developments. For someone attempting to trace the development thread of emotion theory through psychology there seemed to be a substantial gap between the ideas traced through philosophical traditions and the theories being put forward by psychologists. It became clear that psychological theories did not consciously begin with philosophical assumptions. Rather, they arose from physiological, behavioural and psychotherapeutic work in psychology, being approached from a different direction. And to complicate matters still further in the search for connections, major emotion theories were embedded within theories of personality which themselves emerged from psychological research rather than philosophical development.

The new direction however could not, ultimately, move too far away from the philosophical origins of these theories, though it became a complex matter to find the connections. Psychologists have mostly taken the attitude that the field of emotions and feelings begin, for them, from completely unexplored territory. At the first major world symposium on
Feelings and Emotions held at Wittenberg in 1927 Tulloss said in his opening address:

Of all phases of human behaviour the feelings and emotions have most persistently resisted the attacks of the experimentalists. We have, as it were, made minor skirmishes and done some effective scouting. But the field of feelings and emotions remains for the most part an unconquered and unexplored territory... who will venture to say that we have gone far into the understanding of the more ancient, fundamental and deeply hidden elements of our experience and behaviour which are involved in the feelings and emotions." (Tulloss, ed. Reymert, 1973, Appendix A, p.1)

Speaking at the same symposium, Reymert (1973) suggests that the intangibility of feelings that has puzzled thinkers from earliest times, and the slowness with which science has attempted to "dissipate the fog of emotional states" has been due partly to man's reluctance to study "his own real self", partly to a certain kind of self-preservation that seeks to prevent destructive emotions from surfacing too strongly, and partly because feelings do not lend themselves easily to measured observation or clear language (Reymert, ibid., Appendix b).

Bentley, in his paper "Is 'Emotion' More than a Chapter Heading", points out that, among psychologists, the term "emotion" has as many different meanings as there are approaches to the study of human behaviour (Bentley, 1973, pp.20-1). Brett in his paper "Historical development of the Theory of Emotions" says that "while some subjects in the field of psychology have been more or less adequately traced by historians, there seems to be no adequate survey of the theories of emotion... descriptions and classifications have been recorded from the earliest times and exist in bewildering confusion..." (ibid., p.388).

Twenty years later at the second world symposium on Feelings and Emotions (the Mooseheart Symposium), Reymert said he felt, still, that the
field of emotions "constitutes the very 'heart core' of man's problems in relation to himself and other men at every level of interaction from the strictly personal up to the international". He added that, since the last symposium, when contributions were largely from academic psychologists, psychiatry and psychoanalysis were all making their contributions (Reymert, ed. Arnold, 1970, p.viii). Arnold (1970) points out however, that in the twenty years following that symposium, emotion was once more eclipsed, largely by the wave of behaviour theory. By the early sixties however, emotion, in the form of research and theories, was again visible, and in 1968 at the third symposium (the Loyola Symposium) the contributions were divided into sections - biological theories, cognitive theories, psychological approaches, mood theories, and personality theories of emotion (Arnold, 1970).

These three symposia illustrate very well the way in which theories of emotion arose in the psychological context - a context that set them apart from the stream of emotion theory in philosophy though at each symposium speakers referred to the problem of finding connections between philosophical and psychological theories and the need to do so for a better understanding of emotions.

To some extent philosophy itself contributed to the division. As Brett (1967) points out, Kant's contention that science is characterised by mathematical as well as empirical descriptions had a profound effect on successive psychologists who "were very concerned about themselves and the status and terms of reference of their developing inquiries ... It introduced the craze for measurement in psychology and reinforced the yearning for scientific respectability among psychologists ... " (Brett, ed. Peters, 1967, p.533). The mechanistic approach to the understanding of living organisms which dominated thinking by the middle of the 19th century swept psychological inquiry further into the "scientific mode". The
argument as to whether psychology can truly be considered a science is a complex one and cannot be entered into here, but the effect of the scientific preoccupations of psychology on the study of emotions was considerable. It was responsible for the many attempts to explain emotions in physiological and biological terms which often meant that more cognitive approaches to emotion were kept in the background. For example, Herbart, in the late 19th century, developed the idea that true knowledge implies feeling, and feeling directly affects knowledge. He held that the ultimate object of education was to produce a union of knowing and feeling (ibid., p.553). Herbart also anticipated the modern distinction between sentiment and emotion, sentiment being the tendency towards emotions of a certain kind. But his quantification of his theories of apperception (that is, that the pattern of ideas in the conscious mind is the means by which new ideas are introduced) which anticipated modern mathematical model approaches, formed the more recognised part of his work (Wertheimer, 1969, p.55). In the same era Lotze developed an idea that feeling was reducible to relations between ideas, a highly cognitive view, that was left hanging until a century later (Brett, 1967, p.647).

Darwin (1977), though not a psychologist, contributed ideas during the time of the emergence of psychology, which had far-reaching effects, influencing later theories, such as James' theory that emotion is the perception or awareness of physiological disturbance. Although Darwin was speaking in connection with his biological evolutionary theory in the *Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals*, he implied, from the beginning of his inquiry that the emotion and the expression of it are different things. When he speaks of the difficulties of observing the expression of emotion he refers to the need to show how far particular movements of the features are really expressive of "certain states of mind", and that the most "serviceable" way to seek evidence was to observe infants and the insane since both these groups of people exhibited emotion with extraordinary
Evidence was not available so readily from other adults since they had control over their expression of emotion to some extent (Darwin, 1977, p.13). As Darwin continued with his inquiry he distinguished between sensations and emotions (ibid., p.27); he referred to the relation between the differing intensities of emotional states, and their expression (ibid., p.28); he distinguished between the "direct action of the nervous system", and the will (ibid., p.29); he referred to the different ways in which men and women could express the same kinds of emotion (ibid., p.35); he spoke of the differences between reflex action, habitually acquired action, inherited action and willed action, all of which he regarded as expressions of emotion, and sometimes of the same kind of emotion (ibid., p.42); and he speaks of a blush being unable to be caused, as can other emotions "by any physical means, - that is by any action on the body. It is the mind which must be affected", the causes being self-attention, shyness, shame, and modesty (ibid., p.309). With such references Darwin clearly establishes a mind/body relation that makes emotion something other than only its physical expression. Since however, he did not put forward a theory of emotion (as distinct from inquiring into the physical expression of emotion) these references have not been given the status of a theory to support a cognitive view of emotion.

While James later relied heavily on Darwin's work to formulate his theory of emotion (the James/Lange Theory), it is the behavioural emphasis he uses, not the underlying cognitive assumptions. James states (together with Lange in 1922, who developed the same theory independently during the same time) that "the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion" (James, 1984, p.128). James claimed that "without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the
The interesting thing about this theory, in the present context, is that if you reverse it, it is equally strong. That is, bodily states, without the cognitive perception, would be no more than the awareness of sensations of a beating heart, rushing of blood, heat in the body, water flowing from the eyes etc, destitute of meaning or reason. We could flee or strike as the case may be, but we could not know why, and could not be aware of the differences between at least some emotional states, or indeed of having anything other than a physical sensation. We need some sort of cognitive activity to tell us that the tears flowing from our eyes and our awareness of those tears are due, for example to perceiving a dead person we thought to be alive, or an alive person we thought to be dead (grief or joy), or indeed to tell us that someone in the kitchen is peeling strong onions. Awareness of bodily disturbance simply is not enough to constitute the having of an emotion - a point that has been argued by cognitivists since, as will be seen in later sections of this Chapter.

However, James does, to some extent, anticipate problems when he says at the outset of his writing on emotion, that he proposed to consider only those emotions that had "a distinct bodily expression" leaving others aside. The "others" consisted of examples of emotions, such as intellectual delight, which would not be sufficient in degree to cause perceptible bodily changes (ibid., p.128) - which position, admitting as it does of "other" emotions, and of degrees of emotion being related to bodily changes, does, if anything, strengthen the cognitive reverse face of his theory. Cannon, a physiologist working at the beginning of the 20th century set out specifically to test the James/Lange theory by examining the connection between the awareness of bodily changes and emotion, and found that, in normal conditions, bodily changes, though marked, do not provoke
emotion. Without the "psychical emotion proper", subjects could report on bodily changes "without the feeling" (Cannon, 1984, p.150).

Section II: The development of psychological theories of emotion

Although the cognitive perspective on emotion was in evidence as psychology became a discipline, physiologically-based theories continued to hold the centre of attention, not least because, as Brett pointed out, psychologists were pre-occupied with producing data, and physiological theories could be tested in laboratories in ways that cognitive theories could not. Early behaviourist theories of emotion had also emerged by the beginning of the 19th century and they also fitted in with a scientific approach, providing the possibility for laboratory work. An early behavioural theory from Dewey held that while a part of emotion would be the "feel" of it in James' sense, that physiological "feel" still needed to be "placed, with reference to the other phases of the concrete emotion - experience" (Dewey, 1984, p.164). Dewey argued that the "feel" or "quale" had to be connected with the way of behaving, with certain "practical" attitudes related to any given emotion. In addition, the "feel" and the attitude needed to be placed with their "object" or "intellectual content" since an emotion is always "about" or "toward", or "at" or "on account of" something, this prepositional reference being "an integral phase of the single pulse of emotion" (ibid., p.165). Although Dewey gives the most significance to the behavioural component of emotion, claiming that the "behaviour side of emotion was always uppermost in consciousness", it is clear that there is a strong cognitive approach to emotion in his theory and that, without its cognitive, or "intellectual" content, the theory would not account for all the phenomena we associate with the subjective experience of emotion.
The physiological perspective

Theories of emotion based on biological evolution theory (Darwin, 1977, Plutchik, 1980) are supported by a great deal of evidence, observational from Darwin and more stringently experimental by Plutchik. Related biological theories (from Stanley-Jones, 1970, Schachter and Singer, 1962, Tomkins, 1970) provide strong evidence for connecting physiological processes with the experience of emotions. The physiological approach can be connected back to the early Greek philosophers (notably Aristotle), but what the physiological approach alone does not give a satisfactory account of, is the subjective, cognitive element of emotional experience - an element that was also foreshadowed by Aristotle and other early thinkers, and has in modern thought, been increasingly developed. No physiological process alone can give an understanding of, for example, the difference between tears of joy, pain or rage (Solomon, 1980). Bettelheim (1976) explains the importance of helping disturbed children to understand their powerful and often conflicting emotions. To learn to cope in a complex world a child "must be helped to make some coherent sense out of the turmoil of his feelings" (Bettelheim, 1976, p.5). Physiological processes alone cannot provide that kind of sense, though an understanding of them would obviously help.

There is an aspect of the evolution-based approach however that creates an even stronger tie with previous thinking. This is the idea that feeling and thinking was, and is, in a process of evolution even now, that ways of feeling and ways of thinking change fundamentally according to the demands of the environment and survival (Plutchik, Ed., Arnold, 1968, p.9). This implies that early theories of emotion are themselves a way of adapting and surviving in the environment, that man's understanding of his own processes is necessary to survival, especially processes as powerful as the emotions. At that point, theoretically, evolution theory itself
becomes a way of surviving most effectively by making better sense of the world. Without evolution theory, for example, a number of other studies, in zoology, genetics, etc, might not have developed as rapidly, if at all. That the development and accumulation of knowledge is related to survival is not in dispute. Hawking (1991) states "that it has certainly been true in the past that what we call intelligence and scientific discovery has conveyed a survival advantage" (Hawking, 1991, p.14). As a physicist, he also holds the view that it is not at all clear that in the future however, scientific discoveries might not destroy everyone, but that the regular evolutionary action in the universe is one reason to suppose they might not (Hawking, 1991, p.14). In other words, human theories and discoveries are themselves a part of evolutionary action and are, ultimately, working towards survival and development. Huxley (1953) supports this view in his socio-evolutionary view of the world, and his idea that the theory of evolution should be broadened to include the evolution of ideas has been supported in recent years by Pollard (1984) who explores future directions for the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution. Popper (1984) has presented an evolutionary theory of knowledge that is based on an evolutionary development of theories. Within his theory he posits that "the human mind lives and grows in interaction with its products", greatly influenced by "feedback" from those products which include all human invention such as theories, cultural structures, art, books, music etc (Popper, 1984, p.252). Popper also posits a "world of the mind" which consists of conscious experiences, thoughts, feelings, aims and plans of action (ibid., p.252), and it is this world that grows, changes and develops, as well as the physical world.

This attitude of seeking better understanding and attempting consciously to modify oneself and one's environment is also a strong feature of early Greek thought and must indeed form the foundation of the steady accumulation of human knowledge. When considering emotion
theories it becomes evident that the inner environment of man (i.e., the inner mental processes), in both Popper's and Polanyi's sense, is as important to man's development and survival as the external environment. The power of human emotions - both constructive and destructive - has not been disputed through the ages and within that context it is reasonable to argue that it is as important to understand and adapt to the power of emotions as it is/was to understand and adapt to (or modify) the power of Nature. It may be even more important in the light of recent views that the survival of the planet will depend on our attitudes to the environment and to one another (Suzuki, 1987).

If the realisation of the survival and developmental value of the understanding of emotions can be viewed as a part of the evolutionary process then it would be reasonable to assume that a survival instinct was at work, both in the experience of emotions and within the intellectual activity of mankind's pursuit of emotional understanding. Frijda (1986) states that, in principle, "if emotions are, wholly or in part, biological phenomena, they must serve a purpose for survival" (Frijda, 1986, p.5). Such an instinct can be perceived in the patterns of early and later ideas. One strong indication is that early philosophical thinking did not seek to understand emotions only in biological and cognitive ways, but to suggest ways in which feelings participated in creative processes, and ways in which feelings could or should be mastered. As stated at the end of Chapter One, values were put upon feelings - some were "good", some "bad" and goodness or badness were related to constructiveness and destructiveness. The reason versus emotion relationship was conceived among other things, as a possible way to master emotions and channel them constructively.

Psychology as a discipline moved partly towards finding ways to understand emotional processes in the therapeutic context - a
development that could indicate, in the survival context, that the attempt to establish reason as stronger than emotion had not been successful practically, though theoretically it had made an attempt at understanding and providing a direction for action. In the evolutionary context, the development of psychology as a discipline can be seen as a movement from the general (philosophical) to the particular in order to solve a number of problems. Brett (1967) claimed that psychology took about 2,300 years to develop enough to differentiate itself from "a mass of very general speculations" to address itself to particular problems (Brett, 1967, p.26), and within Popper's theory, it is entirely appropriate to suppose that the problems of psychology and the related theories, would eventually evolve to some sort of independent status. Within psychology itself, theories of emotion could evolve in a similar way. Overall, this relates well to Polanyi's position that personal knowledge is central to the development of a body of knowledge. A new branch on the evolutionary theoretical tree in connection with emotion theory was provided, I propose, by Sigmund Freud with his articulation of the theory of psychoanalysis - a branch which, I will argue in later chapters, has yet to reach full stature. A different branch, though as strong, has been provided by psychologist George Kelly with his theory of personal constructs. As discussed in the Introduction, a part of the central and major claim in this thesis is that, taken together, these two psychologists represent the most recent significant step forward in the evolutionary process of feeling and thinking, both theoretically and in practical possibility. I propose that, in practical terms, the evolutionary process consists of a new awareness and use of a close, complementary relationship between thinking and feeling.

The cognitive perspective

As discussed earlier in this Chapter, the early physiological theories of emotion developed by experimental psychologists all seemed to have
underlying cognitive content. Beginning during the same era, and in a psychotherapeutic context, Freud and Jung were also working with concepts of emotion that carried strong cognitive content. The exploration of the cognitive element in Freud's theory is a long and complex procedure which I have undertaken in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight in order to establish that Freud did in fact provide a complex, multi-level theory of emotions as distinct from this theory of the instincts. Jung, in his *Psychological Theory of Types*, explores the different meanings given to the use of the term "feeling", and differentiates between feeling as sensation (i.e., perception through conscious sensory processes), feeling as intuition (perception by way of unconscious contents and connections), and feeling as the attaching of a proper value to something (an interpretative or evaluative process) (Jung, 1984, pp.104-5). He arrives at the idea that feeling in the latter sense is essentially rational, by positing two types of persons - thinking types and feeling types - and by arguing that although these two types are different they "have something in common which I cannot designate except by the word rationality" (Ibid., p.104). Jung counteracts some objections to the idea of emotions being rational by providing different definitions of feeling and by discussing the process of thinking. Thinking as consideration and reflection, he sees as clearly rational activity; feeling as evaluation or interpretation, he sees as different from thinking, but no less rational. He claims that if the distinction is made between sensation, intuition and feeling, then "it becomes quite clear that feeling values and feeling judgements - that is to say, our feelings - are not only reasonable, but are also as discriminating, logical and consistent as thinking" (ibid., p.105).

Jung holds the view that in a "thinking type", (i.e., a person in whom the thinking function predominates) the feeling function is always underdeveloped and is superseded by the functions of sensation and intuition which are "precisely the functions which are not rational, not
logical, and not evaluating" (ibid., p.105). This kind of close relationship between feeling and thinking can be traced back to the early philosophical connection between feelings and value judgements, and does in fact provide an explanation of why, perhaps, that early connection was so strong and obviously felt (in the Jungian sense) at the time to be so relevant.

Social psychological theories, as presented within the Adlerian framework, provide a cognitive component which is related to the idea that emotions are the outcome of human goals, that they have an aim which, within any individual, is a rational aim within that individual framework. The individual framework in turn is dependent upon the social framework within which the individual is contained. Adler (1973) posits a clear relationship between thinking and feeling when he discusses the way in which feelings appear in connection with certain goals. The feelings appear when a person has a desire to approach a certain goal. They appear because the person's "attention and concentration have a tendency to exclude contradictions and conflicting tasks and thus evoke the right feelings and functions" (Adler, Ed. Reymert, 1973, p.317). Adler speaks of feelings being "never independent expressions and never in themselves real arguments for action. They will, nevertheless, always be used in this way and influence our secondary decisions from time to time" (ibid., p.319). The ultimate goals in the Adlerian framework are the overcoming of the difficulties of life and the achievement of superiority. To achieve these goals the mind uses feelings, evoking them as a means of establishing actions that lead to the desired goals. Feelings therefore emerge as being rationally directed, even in the neurotic individual where goals may seem in themselves irrational (ibid., p.317).

Other supporters of a social psychological view of emotions, such as Fromm (1975), Horney (1945) and Sullivan (1978) rely heavily on the
concepts of anxiety and helplessness as the starting point for discussion of feelings. Fromm views all people as having to cope with the one overriding problem of "separateness", the experience of which arouses great anxiety, distress and the range of negative feelings (Fromm, 1975; Fromm, 1980). Negative emotions are closely tied to, if not identified with, the experience of separateness from others in its many forms, and positive emotions are seen as having a rational purpose.

Horney views the human as a sufferer of basic anxiety due to early loss of security after birth, connected with negative influences in the environment. Since no environment is perfect, some degree of basic anxiety is present in everyone. Anxiety and the desire for love combine to evoke a range of positive and negative feelings depending on how individuals resolve their anxiety (Horney, 1945). Horney sees individuals as developing strategies to deal with anxiety and the need for love. The relationship between thinking and feeling emerges as one where thinking provides solutions to the problems of feeling. She regards neurotic solutions as irrational, but the feelings themselves remain the logical outcome of a faulty environment (Hall and Lindzey, 1978, pp.178-9).

Sullivan also sees anxiety as being the most basic and powerful part of the human personality, beginning in infancy and being a part of the interpersonal relations which he considers in turn to be the complete and only framework of human personality (cited in Hall and Lindzey, 1978, p.188). The experience of anxiety is a product of threat, and, as such, is a rational response to a situation in which existence is threatened. The cognitive analysis of the anxiety may at times be irrational (e.g., seeing threat where there is none) but the feeling itself and the many associated feelings are, in themselves rational. They appear in response to a message from the mind that threat is imminent. Speaking of the emotional development of infants Spitz (1968) describes emotions as a "linkage"
which "takes place between a specific facial expression and a particular experience" for which conscious perception of an emotional experience is necessary - a view which demonstrates very well the necessity of a cognitive component in the formation of emotion (Spitz, 1968, p.43). Such a simple linkage by the infant is the obvious forerunner to the more complex linkages between events and feelings in later life.

The social constructionivist view of emotion has focussed on the necessity of obtaining an understanding of the language of emotions as it develops in the context of social practices. Harré (1986) argues that the tendency of philosophers and psychologists to "abstract an entity", call it an emotion and try to study it leads us away from the "concrete world of contexts and activities" and that we "reify and abstract from that concreteness at our peril" (Harré, 1986, p.4). Dealing with emotions within social practices, with an analysis of the differential uses of a vocabulary leads the social constructionists into a theoretical world which opens up the very complex nature of any emotion at both the individual and social level, which includes the complexity of emotions across different cultures. Within the social constructionist approach there may exist the five perspectives of emotion yielded by the philosophical enquiry in Chapters One and Two of this thesis - the physiological perspective, the cognitive, moral, motivation and creative perspectives are all made visible by studying the social context and language related to them. Harré speaks directly of the ways in which some emotions can only be understood when viewed in a moral context for instance - emotions like envy or jealousy requiring "careful attention to the details of local systems of rights and obligations ... attention to the local moral order" (Harré, 1986, p.6).

Averill (1982) also argues that a part of the problem of defining emotions is "that psychologists in their search for simplifying principles, have tended to ignore the very phenomena they wish to explain - anger,
fear, grief, jealousy, love, envy, hope, joy, and the myriad of (sic) other emotions experienced in everyday life" (Averill, 1982, p.3). He argues for "a middle ground between the intuitive, quasi-literary descriptions characteristic of the classic works on emotion, and over-simplified 'deductive or generative' principles", and posits a social constructivist view that emphasises the social origins and current functions of emotions (ibid., p.4).

Averill argues that emotions are not simple, but consist of "levels" and subsystems within the levels. For example there is the organisational level where physiological and expressive reactions, feelings, cognitions and instrumental responses are related. Then there is the level of analysis where the biological, psychological and sociocultural aspects are analysed (and a subsystem for each on that level). Within this idea of emotions being related to behavioural and cognitive systems, he defines emotions as "socially constituted syndromes (transitory social roles) which include an individual's appraisal of the situation and which are interpreted as passions, rather than as actions" (ibid., p.6). Averill argues that in the appraisal of the situation, the appraised object, or objects, is "probably the most consistent and surest guide to the identification of the emotional episode", stating that each kind of emotion had its own characteristic objects, reflecting a particular set of appraisals. For example, the object of anger typically involves some appraised wrong, the object of jealousy a potential loss to another, and the object of envy, the good-fortune of another. The same physiological reactions, overt behaviour and so on could occur for each of those emotions, so the distinguishing feature was the object (ibid., p.11). The emotion itself Averill regards as a passion rather than an action, in that emotions are not viewed as something a person does deliberately whereas an action is viewed as deliberate (ibid., p.13). To overcome the problem of how people can be said to "suffer" their own behaviour in this context, Averill posits the existence of a "phenomenal
self" which is divided into two main categories corresponding to "actions" and "passions" which refer to all deliberately motivated behaviours in the case of the former, and all other states in the case of the latter. Hence, looking is an action, seeing is a passion, aggression is an action, anger is a passion (ibid., p.14). The "phenomenal self" is able to "monitor its own operations" and can therefore consciously experience itself as being both active and passive in certain ways (ibid., p.14).

In defining an emotion as a "socially constituted syndrome" i.e., "a set or population of responses that covary in a systematic fashion" Averill is defining an emotion as a set of responses, thus classifying responses as passions (ibid., p.7). As primary grounds for interpreting responses as passions (in the sense of being non-deliberate) Averill cites biological imperatives, social imperatives (socially constituted response tendencies), psychological imperatives (early patterns of reinforcement etc), systemic conflict (conflicting impulses or conflict with reality) and cognitive disorganisation (the interruption of ordinary cognitive patterns of processing information). He uses these grounds for "interpreting (or experiencing) response as a passion" to posit three broad classes of emotional syndrome - the **impulsive** emotions (automatic desires and aversions); the **conflictive** emotions (social hysterias resulting from conflicting demands being placed on the individual by society); and **transcendental emotional states** (the products of cognitive disorganisation).

Averill explores his highly cognitive theory of emotions by focussing on a single emotion, anger, (and its related phenomenon, aggression), "to gain a better understanding of emotional processes in general" (ibid., p.3). His explorations include discussions of the biological perspectives on anger, cross cultural variations, historical teachings (going back to Plato), anger and the law, motivational aspects, and a series of empirical studies.
of anger as experienced in various social contexts. He concludes that anger is a "conflictive emotion, that, on the biological level is related to aggressive systems, and, even more important, to the capacities for co-operative social living, symbolization, and reflective self-awareness; that, on the psychological level, is aimed at the correction of some appraised wrong; and that on the sociocultural level, functions to uphold accepted standards of conduct" (ibid., p.317). In discussing this definition, Averill refers to the physiological, cognitive, specifically moral, and motivational perspectives on emotion, and claims also that anger has evolved and is maintained within the social system because it serves to uphold accepted standards of conduct.

The social psychological contribution to emotion theory demonstrates a certain kind of cognitive process that seems to be an essential part of human emotion. This is the process of the recognition of others and the accumulation of emotional processes that may exist only within the framework of that recognition (i.e., the analysis of similarities and differences) of others. Social psychologists also justify and support the early philosophical insistence that emotions are closely bound with the cognitive functions of language, which in turn needs the existence of a society, however small. The formal categorisation of feelings also relies on language and being able to make comparisons between feelings as experiences by more than one person, or within personal interaction. For example, the feeling of anxiety engendered by a natural disaster is categorised differently from a feeling of anxiety in connection with a personal quarrel with someone, or the anxiety of being caught in a mob, and different again within a fearful mob as opposed to an angry mob. In each case the sensation of anxiety may be the same, the physiological manifestations the same, the differences being perceived and indeed created, by the understanding of each situation.
In a recent inquiry into emotions, Frijda (1986) describes his approach to emotions as "cognitive (as opposed to behavioural)" but better designated as "affective or conative". He states that "what is interesting about emotion is the emotional. Feeling is not cognition, it is feeling - it is responding 'yes' or 'no'. Striving is not behaviour, it is tending - toward, trying to reach or avoid" (Frijda, 1986, p.5). Frijda develops a theory of emotions as he presents a survey of the literature on emotion from Darwin to the mid-eighties. He began his survey within the general framework of principles that emotions in humans have a biological basis, that they are related to norms, values, cognitive possibilities (i.e. reflective awareness and intentional activity), and human modes of interaction, and that they have a regulation or control component. Within this framework he discusses Darwin's description of emotional behaviour, pointing out that cognitive control of expressive behaviour was not entirely absent, and that such behaviour had a functional component as other theorists also emphasised (ibid., p.12). He argues that the interpretation of expressive movement as behaviour "with functional significance in the subject's interaction with his environment is of central importance for clarifying the relation between expression and emotion" and for clarifying what is meant by emotion itself. In this context "expression suggests that emotions are tendencies toward given modes of interaction", and expression then becomes "merely those tendencies' embodiment, the manner (or a manner) in which the tendencies are effectuated" (ibid., p.12).

That expressive behaviour could be suppressed or held in abeyance led Frijda to conclude that there existed tendencies toward expressive behaviour, present prior to, and independently of, the execution of expressive behaviour - such tendencies being called "action tendencies" (ibid., p.70). He went on to posit a theory where emotions were considered as "changes in action readiness" which, as well as including readiness to execute certain types of behaviour, included "readiness or
unreadiness to achieve a given kind of end result". An "action tendency" is thus defined by the end result aimed at or achieved, and is also a "readiness for different actions having the same intent". For example, "one action tendency is readiness for attacking, spitting, insulting, turning one's back, or slandering, whichever of these appears possible or appropriate at a given moment. Another action tendency is readiness to approach and embrace, fondle, look at avidly or say sweet things, again according to what the circumstances favour (ibid., p.71).

Frijda argued that such changes had a quantitative aspect (activation), and a qualitative aspect (action tendency) and that they were accompanied by autonomic changes. Emotions differed in terms of the mode of activation (i.e. the different urges activated by events), in the kind of action tendency, and in the autonomic response. Different emotions were evoked by different stimulus constellations" as appraised by the person, relevant variables being what the stimulus could do to the person, and what the person could do in the context of the event (ibid., p.73). "Stimulus constellations" could result in many different forms of action readiness, depending on the pattern of events or "story". The "story" with jealousy for example may be that "someone else enjoys something that I have a claim to enjoyment upon, and which event is felt to interfere with satisfaction of this claim", and this may evoke many different kinds of "action readiness to change" - upset, excitement, stupefaction, grief, anger etc (ibid., p.73).

An even more highly cognitive aspect of Frijda's theory is his assertion that action tendency can take the form of "mental actions" having similar intent to overt ones - turning to an object in thought, or away from it, activities such as worry, planning, being in love, forms of nostalgia, grief and other such emotions (ibid., p.76). He also presents a complex system of categorisations, a detailed physiology of emotion, a theory of emotional
experience (relying on cognitions as an "essential ingredient"), and a theory of "concerns" or desires, all of which elaborate on aspects of his theory. He addresses the moral nature of concerns, and their related emotions, in a section on values, and the creative nature of concerns and their related emotions, in a section on aesthetic emotions (ibid., pp.353-5). He also discusses motivation in connection with concerns (ibid., p.361), concluding that emotions were "heavily dependent on motivation" in being related to concerns (ibid., p.372). A neurophysiological review deals with the physiological aspects of emotional response, with evidence to support that component of his theory that deals with the biological base of emotions, and to relate the neurophysiological and psychological aspects of emotion (ibid., p.379). A discussion of the control and regulation of emotion (which he claims is an essential component of the emotional process) seen as both inhibitory in the Freudian sense, and as intentional, completes a thorough and internally consistent account of emotions which relates well to all the theories he surveyed (ibid., p.423). Frijda demonstrates very well the ways in which the five perspectives on emotion outlined in this thesis need to be addressed when dealing with emotions.

The moral perspective

The idea of emotions being "good" or "bad" in the moral sense is not a strongly developed feature of theories of emotion in psychology. But the version of a moral attitude adopted by psychology is the "positive/negative" scale of emotions. I retain the idea that this is a version of a moral attitude because once past the positive/negative categorisation, any attempt at explanation of these poles leads invariably to the notions of good and bad in some moral sense. For example, if one asks what is meant by "positive" the answer may be 'constructive", or "that which pertains to happiness", or
"with the least amount of tension or anxiety", or even "the opposite to negative". But there are complexities since anger may be positive or negative and indeed most emotions have a positive and negative dimension on reflection except perhaps malice for which no redeeming feature has been found. But whether the difference lies within the constructive/destructive concept or pleasure/unpleasure, or high tension/low tension, the question must then still arise as to why psychologists, as much as anyone else, proceed on the spoken (or unspoken) assumption that positive is to be preferred to negative in the experience of emotions. Whether this is for the sake of mental health or happiness, or development, the question then remains as to why any of the latter should be pursued. Even if it happens that positive emotions are more conducive to survival as an individual, and as a species, there seems to be, at the conscious experience level, some assumption that it is morally better to co-operate with the instinct for survival rather than the instinct for destruction. At the cognitive level it is not sufficient to argue that survival is simply preferable to destruction, given that survival does not entail happiness.

Recent cognitive theorists such as Averill and Frijda have addressed the moral component of emotion directly, though not as a central issue in their theories. Averill posits that anger is, among other things, aimed at the correction of some appraised wrong (connected with the feeling of injustice), and Frijda speaks of a moral connotation connected with emotions that are related to concerns that deal with "ought" and "ought not" (Frijda, 1986, p.353).

Psychotherapists proceed on the basis that there is a clear moral obligation in the course of their work not to encourage the establishment of destructive and self-destructive emotions in a patient or client. Less directly, Gestalt psychologists speak of feelings as having "an abundance
of qualitative nuances" (Kreuger, Ed. Arnold, 1968, p.98), and of emotions which maintain the fullness of life and regenerate it (ibid., p.103). They contrast the "merely sensational" from the "genuinely creative" emotions (ibid., p.105) and speak of the ways in which good and bad events, as well as positive and negative events, arouse corresponding emotions with our being attracted to the former and repelled by the latter. The attraction and repugnance themselves become evaluative feelings with moral content (ibid., pp.106, 120).

Freud, though presenting no ethical component formally, uses the language of a moral system frequently in connection with his work, the exploration of which is carried further in later Chapters of this thesis. Kelly also works with an underlying base of value judgements, as will be explained more fully in Chapter Four.

The motivation perspective

The motivation aspect of concepts of emotions has been explored in some depth by psychologists both at the experimental level and theoretically. The philosophical background for such exploration comes from discussions throughout the history of philosophy on the relationship between thinking, feeling and acting, and on discussions about freedom of the will. Peters in *The Education of the Emotions* gives a clear account of the rationale behind psychologists' interest in the connection between feelings and motives (Peters, Ed. Arnold, 1970) pointing out that, if we study a list of emotions we find that the terms on the list can mostly also be used as names of motives (Peters, ibid., p.190). He cites the "historic dispute" between Leeper and Young about the facilitating or disrupting effect of emotion on motivated behaviour, and suggests that if an emotion
is defined as an "appraisal" of a situation, then the overlap between emotion and motive becomes clearly visible. Peters says that:

In cases where we apply the term 'motive', this appraisal of the situation is regarded as providing the reason why we go on to do something. We talk about motives only in contexts where an explanation for an action is given or demanded. (ibid., p.190)

Thus certain emotions may be clearly seen as both a feeling and as a motive for action. Jealousy, fear, anger can be both passive (as when one is simply conscious of the feelings themselves), or active (as when one is motivated to act in connection with those feelings) (ibid., p.191). That both kinds of appraisal may occur simultaneously (and often do) makes it easy to understand why emotions and motives are so easily confused.

Peters' explanation of the relationship between emotions and motives assumes that emotional appraisals are, in turn, the explanation (or motives) for certain behaviour. In this he follows a philosophical thread which sees emotions as being the cause of certain actions but since Peters sees the experience of emotion as necessarily cognitive (ibid., p.188), cognition becomes equally causally linked to action. This link was (less distinctly) foreshadowed by Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, Christian thinkers, Descartes and Hume, as discussed in Chapters One and Two.

The idea that emotions are prime motivators can also be traced philosophically and depends greatly on the way in which emotions are defined. With the re-emergence of cognitive aspects of emotion, it has become difficult to establish emotions as prime motivators. However, a definition of emotions that goes back to the possible origins of emotion, that explores the notions of energy, instincts and "primary" emotions, can yield a different sort of motivational connection. Such an approach was made by Freud in the course of his work in psychoanalysis. The strength
of Freud’s observations and his subsequent theory of the instincts has made his approach one of the major influences on thinking about emotions. An added complication has been that Freud made many ambiguous statements about emotions, and although formally he equates them with the instincts, a primary force in the psyche, there is plenty of evidence in his writings to suggest that links with philosophical traditions are strong. These links yield a substantial theory of emotions where the idea of motivation becomes more complex than his formal position suggests, as discussed in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight.

The creative perspective

The creative aspect of emotions has been one of the strongest influences on theories of emotion both in philosophy and psychology. In presocratic times the experience of emotion led people to the idea that love and hate were the creative and destructive forces of the universe respectively, and from there theories evolved which viewed people as creators of themselves, in terms of worth and reality, by the proper expression of their emotions as discussed in Chapters One and Two.

The central notion in psychological theories of creation through emotions is the idea that people create themselves psychologically through the awareness, understanding and expression of their emotions. This idea takes several forms. Rogers (1977) says that when a person experiences any of the emotions that he/she is capable of in an "all-out fashion", that person is in the direct creative process of becoming what he or she is (Rogers, 1977, p.113). In this context, emotions become the raw substance of what a person actually is beneath the facades, masks and structures that a person lives behind much of the time (ibid., p.114). In
following this idea, and especially in following that aspect of it which relates to interaction between people, Rogers is following a thread provided by Nietzsche who speaks of emotions as being the expression of the inner self, the quality of emotion being dependent on strength and courage (see Chapter Two).

Another approach to the creativity of emotions was taken by Schloss (1976) in his exploration of psychopoetry as a therapeutic tool. Schloss says that in the course of his work he has been particularly struck by "the beauty, intensity and directness of emotional expression" in many of the poems written by people in therapy. The benefit of such therapy lay in allowing clients to experience and express feelings they had not been directly aware of previously (Schloss, 1976, p.xv). The writing of poetry has related to emotion in several ways, Schloss claimed. It was a means of emotional expression, firstly, but it was also a means of heightening, lowering or changing emotions. Schloss distinguishes between psychopoetry and the writing of poetry in any other context. Psychopoetry is specifically oriented towards the exploration of feelings and the term poetry is defined as "any piece of writing which expresses or communicates a strong emotion, regardless of its formal qualities" (ibid., p.4). The implications for emotion theory here are brought by one of the questions Schloss raises - "What psychological processes help poetry become a therapeutic tool?" (ibid., p.1). His answer to this question involves an exploration of the relationship between emotions and creativity, culminating in the idea that creativity is, essentially, the "articulation" of emotion, the articulation taking any of the creative art forms. Such articulation leads to new levels of self-awareness and the growth (creation?) of a wider and richer variety of feelings (ibid., p.127). The relationship that emerges then, is a two-way relationship, working creatively both ways.
The idea of creativity in a Gestalt approach to emotion is that emotions form the basis of all experience, that within emotions are created perceptions, memories, clear ideas, firm decisions, all organised experience (Kreuger, 1968, p.99). Kreuger defines emotion as the "material origin of all other types of experience" claiming that other, behavioural, approaches cannot be used to analyse emotion. He claims:

No constellation of stimuli can allow the prediction that any emotion, let alone a particular emotion, will actually be aroused. However, every change in our experience can become the occasion for any kind and any intensity of emotion. On the other hand, an actually experienced emotion will colour every simultaneous experience. (Kreuger, 1968, p.100).

The idea that with our emotions we "colour" our experiences comes from the Sartrean idea that our emotions actually create our worlds, that the very way in which we perceive life (our worlds) is governed by our feelings which we choose and have full responsibility for in the moral as well as the creative sense. Solomon utilises the same idea when he speaks of emotions being the key to "living our lives as works of art", that is, creating certain qualities and attitudes in our approach to living (Solomon, 1976, p.429).

The emergence of Freud and Kelly

Freud and Kelly have both been briefly mentioned in this Chapter in connection with some of the perspectives on emotion and I have claimed in particular that, taken together, they represent a significant "cutting edge" of present day thinking in emotions. One of the reasons I have made this claim is that both these psychologists incorporated all the dimensions of
emotion theory, as I have outlined them, in their Theory of Psychoanalysis and Theory of Personal Constructs respectively. The physiological, cognitive, motivational, moral and creative components of emotion theory are all present in both theories, though in different ways. This in itself suggests that each of these theorists was able somehow to synthesise previous thinking to produce a new level of thinking on human personality, and on emotions in particular.

In the case of Freud, the new level is provided by a theory of emotions that is distinguishable from his theory of the instincts. The former, with the aid of psychoanalytic techniques, makes it possible, I argue in Chapters to follow, to discover and articulate personal worlds of emotions and emotion language and images. The need to do this is justified by Freud himself in his approach to psychoanalysis. The need to do this in the more general (as opposed to psychotherapeutic) context becomes visible in Kelly's new approach to personality and the notion of construing.

The ways in which traditional thinking have been incorporated in the theories of Freud and Kelly are as follows:

(i) Both theorists refer to the physiological aspects of emotion, in the way that emotion may be expressed physically and in the physical effects of emotion. Both also discuss the ways in which physiological manifestations may (or may not) be used to identify emotions.

(ii) A strong cognitive component is present in each theory of emotions. I argue in later Chapters that Freud has a complex cognitive level of emotions embedded within his theory, which deal with the differences between "affect" and "feeling", and with the categorisation of feelings. In Chapter Four I argue that Kelly's cognitive dimension is also
complex and includes the redefinition of feelings into cognitive states of construing.

(iii) The motivation aspect is central to Freud's thinking on affects which he regards essentially as the prime motivator at the level of instincts. A motivational component also emerges at the cognitive emotion level. Kelly posits a relationship between feelings and motivation when he refers to a connection between people's need to predict and the states of happiness and misery. Motivation is also discussed in connection with the process of reconstruing in order to allow better prediction, but also to enhance or avoid certain emotional states.

(iv) The ethical aspect can be indirectly perceived in both Freud and Kelly. Freud refers in personal ways to his ideas on the goodness or badness of certain feelings, not only in terms of pleasure/unpleasure, but in morally evaluative ways. Formally Freud does not give ethical content to his theory of the instincts but in the construction of the more complex theory of emotions ethical components emerge. Kelly implies in his writings that a state of happiness or well-being is good in itself, and to be preferred to misery, in an approach that is not only utilitarian. He also indicates that feelings connected with wanting to help people in distress (as in the psychotherapeutic relationship) are worthwhile.

(v) The creative aspect of feeling is visible in both theorists. In the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Freud refers to the psychoanalytic process (with its manifestation of affective processes) as a creative transformation from "senseless muddle" to a "logical and intelligible mental process". Kelly sees construing as a creative cognitive process. In my account of Kelly's theory of emotions and the role of emotions in construing, I argue that, insofar as feelings play
a central role in construing, they are themselves a substantial part of the creative process.

With both Freud and Kelly, a theory of emotions had to be sought for within personality theories that attempted to present a whole view of human nature. In each case the theories emerged from the psychotherapeutic context, and each claimed to make a new and radical beginning to the understanding of human nature.

Conclusion

In this Chapter I have sought to show how psychological theories of emotion developed from within the discipline of psychology, and how the influence of the scientific movement in the 19th century affected that development. I have argued that the major effect was that there was an emphasis on the physiological and behavioural aspects of emotion, with attempts to quantify and test emotional responses in an experimental setting. Theories also emerged from psychotherapeutic work in psychology, and some theories of emotion were embedded within wider theories of personality arising from research rather than philosophical traditions. While this in itself was not a drawback, theories arising from research being obviously significant, it did make the continuity of emotion theories from earlier thought more difficult to find.

I have also argued that despite many theories being developed, psychologists have continued to regard the emotions as a difficult and obscure area of psychology and have argued that a connection between philosophical and psychological theories did need to be clearly established. I have looked at some of the reasons, arising in both philosophy and psychology, for the apparent break in connections and have sought to show that theorists from Darwin onwards did have a cognitive component
in their accounts of emotions, though this was not the focus of attention until more recently. I have also sought to show that each of the five perspectives on emotion outlined at the end of Chapter One were developed to some extent in psychological thought, and that, more recently, cognitive theorists such as Averill and Frijda have addressed some or all of these perspectives directly in their theories of emotion.

In addition I have sought to show that the psychological developments in theories of emotion have a biological and socio-evolutionary character within the broader evolutionary development of human thought processes. I have claimed that this development has not gone unremarked amongst psychologists, especially in connection with thinking about the functions of emotions, as related to the biological and social evolution of emotional behaviour.

Finally, I have argued that Freud and Kelly have related theories of emotion and that the ways in which they are related provide a new theoretical and practical approach to emotional development. I have argued this on the grounds that both Freud and Kelly address all the five perspectives on emotion within their theories, though both theories are embedded within their general personality theories. Although recent theorists such as Frijda also address the five perspectives, I claim that Freud initiated a new development both theoretically and practically in the human approach to emotions and that Kelly initiated a new development in our understanding of the ways in which people make sense of their worlds, and a practical approach to developing more flexible ways of seeking greater understanding. In the next Chapter I will seek to justify this claim by exploring Kelly’s Theory of Personal Constructs and the place of emotions within it, and in subsequent Chapters I will explore Freud’s Theory of Psychoanalysis and argue that a complex, multi-level theory of emotions is embedded within it. As I will be claiming that Freud provides a
"missing link" in the explanation of Kelly's process of construing, I will begin with an account of Kelly's theory and then explore how Freud adds meaning to it. With this order of exploration, I will be moving away from the historical progression of theories to pursue my claim that the means to the personal emotional awareness necessary for the full use of Kelly's process of construing, is to be found in the work of Freud.
As I argued in Chapter Three, personality theorists could hardly avoid addressing emotions directly or indirectly, and when they did, they inevitably gave emotions a cognitive dimension and posited some sort of relationship between reason and emotion. Kelly (1963) attempted to give a complex and detailed theory of how people made sense of the world or worlds they perceived. As with many personality theorists his account arose from clinical work initially but widened its scope to address human nature in general. He presented a "new way" of looking at things, claiming to leave behind many accepted notions and to begin a new conceptual journey. One of the things he claimed to leave behind was the concept of emotion, but in this chapter I will argue that, not only did he not leave that concept behind, but also he posited, indirectly, a theory of emotion within his personality theory, and one that incorporated prior philosophical ideas about emotion. McCoy (1977) has argued that within Kelly's definition of fear, threat, guilt and anxiety, emotions may be construed as signals of the otherwise difficult to observe construing process. Within the Personal Construct Theory framework she expanded the set of emotions given by
Kelly to allow such signals to be more visible, especially for use in connection with clinical work. McCoy also argued (1981) that within that theoretical framework, emotions could also be construed as positive and negative, positive emotions being "those which follow validation of construing" and negative emotions being "those which follow unsuccessful construing" (McCoy, 1981, p.97). I will argue in addition that Kelly adds a new dimension to our way of perceiving emotions, the dimension of perceiving many basic emotions as ways of thinking, thus bringing feeling and thinking into a new relationship.

Earlier attempts by philosophers to blend feeling and thinking were based on the general idea that the way we think can affect the way we feel and vice versa, providing a loose blend that still allowed for a distinction between thought and feeling. In Kelly's system, threat, however, is defined as "the awareness of an imminent comprehensive change in one's core structures". This, and other similar definitions of some basic emotions, implies that such emotions are a kind of realisation based on a conscious or unconscious reasoning process. Feeling thus becomes a dimension of thinking, one that precedes the kind of thinking that organises and reorganises perceptions. In saying this, I am saying that Kelly makes a powerful conceptual move from one kind of emotional awareness (the kind most of us have now which allows a sharp distinction between feeling and thinking) to another kind of emotional awareness that needs no such separation.

In the final chapter of this thesis I will argue that some sort of bridge is needed for making that move (a special technique) before full use can be made of Kelly's theory. The task of this chapter however, is to establish that Kelly does have a theory of emotions embedded in his personality
theory (though he denies addressing emotions at all) and that emotions so presented play an active part in Kelly's process of construing.

Kelly's personality theory

My aim in this section is not to present an exhaustive account or critique of Kelly's theory, but to provide a context for the discussion of emotions within Kelly's system. I will restrict my account therefore to Kelly's basic framework. He says that his theory of personality began with two simple notions - one, "that man might be better understood if he were viewed in the perspective of the centuries rather than in the flicker of passing moments"; and two, "that each man contemplates in his own personal way the stream of events upon which he finds himself so swiftly borne ..." (Kelly, 1963, p.3). He claims then that the long range view of man "leads us to turn our attention towards those factors appearing to account for his progress rather than those betraying his impulses" (ibid., p.4). As human progress has, by and large, been given the label of "science", Kelly chooses to begin from the vantage point of "man-the-scientist". He includes all people in this classification and attributes to people a basic aspiration, as natural scientists, to "predict and control" (ibid., p.5) Kelly bases this attribution on a long range view of man, a perspective which shows, he claims, "a massive drift" of progress in terms of a problem-solving scientific approach to life where man is "ever seeking to predict and control the course of events with which he is involved" (ibid., p.5). This created a common viewpoint for the historian, the philosopher, the scientist and the clinician.

In setting the scene for his theory, Kelly says he speaks from a philosophical base that assumes the existence of a real world, the
existence of people's thoughts as also real, and a continually changing relationship between what people think exists and what does actually exist (ibid., p.6). He also assumes that the universe is "integral", functioning as "a single unit with all its imaginable parts having an exact relationship to each other" (ibid., p.6). In a graphic example he claims that there is, ultimately, as exact a relationship between the motions of fingers, the action of typewriter keys and the price of yak-milk in Tibet as there is between the fingers and typewriter keys, the apparent closeness of the latter being a phenomenon of our time and our experience. The scope of this philosophical view is vast, implying as it does that there are no isolated instances of "accidents" in the universe; that, given enough time and change, as Kelly says, any events may be brought into close and/or causal conjunctions; and that, in a universe that is in a constant process of change (in time) it is logically only a matter of time before all connections may be truly perceived. It can be argued therefore that man-the-scientist is behaving rationally and practically in attempting, both individually and collectively, to seek and establish as many of these connections as possible both in single lifetimes and in the course of broad spans of time. Such endeavour, it may be concluded, leads towards a way of being in the world that, ultimately, puts man's perception in exactly the right relationship with ever-broadening reality.

From such a philosophical base, Kelly describes man as "living creature [one part of the universe] ... able to bring himself around to represent another part, his environment", which "emphasises the creative capacity of the living thing to represent the environment, not merely respond to it" (ibid., p.8). Kelly claims further that, because he can represent his environment, he can place alternative constructions upon it and, indeed, do something about it if it doesn't suit him" (ibid; p.8).
With exact connections and relationships (such as perceiving a real connection between fingers and typewriter keys) certain predictions can be made and certain control may be exercised at least for as long as time and change allow that connection to exist. With inexact connections (as created by man much of the time) less prediction and control are possible. Kelly calls these patterns of connections "constructs" and describes them as "ways of construing the world" (ibid., p.9).

People seek to improve their constructs by seeking wider connections and new relationships between things and events and then altering existing constructs in the light of the implications of the new findings. Progress is impeded often by man's dependence on or "personal investment" in his general system.

Given that man must obviously be construing himself in connection with other things living and non-living, the construction of each individual system would be closely tied to a sense of personal identity, hence the deep-seated nature of dependence on personal systems. The communication of personal systems is limited only by the availability of a language which may be easily available, or need to be developed to suit particular needs and concepts (ibid., p.9). Human knowledge may be divided into realms of internally consistent connections (or facts) which may overlap, merge or divide again. These provide us with bodies of knowledge, schools of thought, movements of various kinds, disciplines, subjects and topics of conversation or thought.

Bodies of personal knowledge may be divided in the same way or in any way imaginable. Individual events may be considered in the light of any or all of the realms or systems (ibid., pp.9-10). Kelly claims "no-one has yet proved himself wise enough to propound a universal system of constructs ... We can safely assume that it will be a long time before a
satisfactorily unified system will be proposed" (ibid. p.10). In fact, given the constantly changing nature of the universe, a completely unified system could only be perceived from an "eternal" viewpoint.

While ever people are in the changing universe, their perception of any system must be changing also, however imperceptibly or unconsciously. If man will not change, then change is forced upon him. Kelly describes the individual process of construing in detail, pointing out common errors of reasoning (construing being described as essentially a reasoning process), ways in which constructs are used to predict and the ways in which man uses constructs to contribute his changes to a changing universe. He describes how constructs are tested for validation, often using "test tube proportions" at first to assess hazards. Hazards may include the creation of an ambiguous or contradictory position that affects prediction and control of oneself or one's environment (ibid., pp.13-14).

However, Kelly posits that no situation is irredeemable, no-one need "paint himself into a corner"; this ability to revise and replace gives rise to a "philosophical position" he calls "constructive alternativism" (ibid., p.15).

The assumptive structure of Kelly's theory is presented in terms of a "fundamental postulate" and eleven "construction corollaries" which describe the ways in which people construe reality (ibid., pp.46-104). Within this structure, Kelly refers to some constructs that relate to "transition" such as threat, fear, anxiety, guilt, aggressiveness and hostility. Although these are terms commonly associated with emotion, Kelly uses them specifically to denote transition. They signify awareness of various degrees or kinds of change to control or "core" construct systems, or changes in perception or, in the case of hostility, the "continued effort to extort validational evidence in favour of a type of social prediction which has already been recognised as a failure" (Kelly, 1955, Vol.II, p.565).
Essentially, when people construe or make a construct, they are attempting to perceive the real relationship between the objects of reality being regarded. They do this by seeing at the same time the similarities and differences among or between the objects where a relationship is being sought. So each construct becomes dichotomous or bipolar. To perceive the causal relationship of the motion of the fingers and the action of the typewriter, to go back to Kelly's example, is to perceive simultaneously the relationship between no motion of fingers and no action of the typewriter; to perceive a similarity relationship between fingers and typewriter keys one may introduce the paper being typed upon to highlight similarities. The similarity in that instance would be highlighted by being able to perceive how fingers and keys are similar but different from the paper. A relationship that emerges is that, for example, both fingers and keys act or have an active dimension (fingers strike keys, keys strike paper) whereas the paper is wholly passive in that context being struck with letters but not itself striking.

Clearly the process is complex and yields in each attempt a possibly infinite number of variations. As long as new objects and events can be introduced the relationships to be perceived are endless. Further, as long as new ways of perceiving existing objects (both physical and mental objects) can be imagined, the relationship between the objects will, or may, be changed. For example, the passivity of paper may become activity if one construes activity in terms of functionality. The paper does its "striking" by containing and giving back the information on it when needed. The keys and fingers become passive (and ineffectual) if paper is not available to "take the message", or if a typewriter ribbon is not present, or if the keys are damaged and illegible, and so on.

In this account of Kelly's theory (by no means exhaustive) I have attempted to give a context where it may be perceived that emotion, as we
understand it, does indeed not appear to have a place, as Kelly says at the outset. However, within the broader hypothesis pursued in Chapter Two that, firstly, there is inevitably a theory of emotion embedded in any theory of personality, however well disguised or unintentional; and secondly, that there exists an essential relationship between emotion and reason in any such theory, I will attempt to demonstrate that Kelly both addresses the concept of emotions and posits a specific relationship between emotions and reason.

In the introduction to his theory of personality, Kelly claimed that in his "new way of thinking about Psychology, there is no learning, no motivation, no emotion, no cognition, no stimulus, no response, no ego, no unconscious, no need, no reinforcement, and no drive" (Kelly, 1963, p.xi). He is referring to his having dropped such terms from his account. Further, he claims that not only have these terms been abandoned, but that the very concepts themselves "evaporate". "If the reader starts murmuring such terms to himself" Kelly says, "he can be sure he has lost the scent" [of Kelly's "new way" of thinking] (ibid., p.xi).

Concepts and their meanings

While I endorse Kelly's view that such terms need to be abandoned within the context of a new inquiry, I think the idea that the concepts themselves evaporate needs further exploration and qualification. All that can and should "evaporate" is the restricted meaning given to these terms, the "loading" that they are given by various theorists. The terms are loaded with particular meanings which are relevant to the framework adopted by the theorist and which may be necessary to the explanation of the theory. However, these "loaded terms" are then very often accepted in a much
wider, more general sense, this restricted meaning becoming often the *only* accepted meaning. Naturally, anyone who wants to think or speak of the corresponding concepts in a new or different way finds it very difficult to shake the "loaded meaning" from the term and the concept. One way to deal with this problem, which is essentially a problem of communication, is to drop the terms altogether, which is the course adopted by Kelly.

However, the concepts to which such terms are attached are not so easily dismissed. Although the concepts are also vulnerable to loaded forms (i.e., they incorporate for many people the various meanings suggested by the loaded terms), they remain nonetheless real and present in their "unloaded" forms (i.e., the forms in which they are a mental representation of a merely observed, but not yet interpreted, phenomenon). A distinction here between what I think of as a "processed perception" and an "interpreted concept" (in the mind) will perhaps be useful. A processed perception gives rise to a concept of an observed phenomenon, the concept being, in this form, a *descriptive* concept containing within itself no answers or possible answers about the underlying nature of the phenomenon. An interpreted concept is one that is broadened beyond its processed form to include deliberate explanations or possible explanations of the phenomenon. Polanyi (1959) makes this distinction in his theory of personal knowledge when he speaks of "pre-verbal knowledge" as being the acceptance a-critically of the "unreasoned conclusions of our senses", and "articulate knowledge" which is "established under the control of critical reflection" (Polanyi, 1959, p.17). When such bodies of articulate knowledge are more generally accepted, they can eclipse the development of further personal knowledge by being themselves a-critically regarded. It is to the latter form of concept that I believe Kelly refers when he says "the concepts themselves evaporate" (Kelly, 1963, p.xi). The evaporation of preconceived notions and meanings, however, still leaves behind *uninterpreted* concepts (or the
original conclusions of our senses) which Kelly has by no means abandoned. This can be demonstrated I think by a consideration of the terms Kelly has dropped, and their corresponding concepts. When introducing his theory, Kelly states that:

It may be unreasonable merely on the basis of a few pages of academic prose to ask a reader to reconsider his notions of why man does what he does. (Kelly, 1963, p.xii)

This sentence introduces the concept of motivation quite exactly, though the concept need not carry any extra, rigid, or loaded meaning the way the term "motivation" obviously does. To talk about "why man does what he does" is to talk about motivation in its unloaded form. Motivation is all about why certain things are done, why certain actions are carried out; and this concept is central to Kelly's way of looking at and being in the world (Henry, 1983).

On the first page of Chapter One of A Theory of Personality, Kelly refers to man's ability to "contemplate in his own personal way the stream of events upon which he finds himself so swiftly borne ..." and "the ways in which individual man may restructure his life" (Kelly, 1963, p.3). Here, once again, he virtually defines the concept of learning, minus the theoretical loadings it usually carries in Psychology. The concept refers simply to the business of a person's ability to take in which is going on around him or her, and to apply the information so gained. Many psychologists have given their explanations of this process, often introducing and defining various terms in doing so. Sidestepping such explanations still leaves the essential or common) concept in place and must do so if this aspect of human personality is to be perceived differently.

When speaking of his venture to provide a theory that does away with the notion of mental energy, Kelly says that "one of the possibly distressing
outcomes of this venture will be the discarding of much of what has been accumulated under the aegis of learning theory, perhaps even the abandonment of the concept of learning, \textit{at least in its present form} (p.37; my emphasis). Here Kelly shows awareness of the difference between theoretically loaded and unloaded concepts, (i.e. the difference between concepts that are oriented towards a particular point of view, and concepts that are more neutral, as described on pp.96-97) though he does not elaborate the point. He also seems to recognise that the basic concept of learning (the concept, not the term) is not so easily dropped though it may be desirable or even necessary to drop its theoretically loaded forms.

\textit{Cognition} is another term with strong theoretical loadings within psychology. But it refers essentially to the concept of what is going on inside a person's head while he/she is exercising the ability to take in what is going on around them. The interpretations of this process have been extremely broad to date, and incorporate all sorts of notions about how the mind operates consciously and unconsciously, deliberately and automatically. Kelly quite understandably wants to drop that bundle with relief, but he is still \textit{very} much concerned with what is going on inside a person's head as he refers to the "currents and eddies of the streams of consciousness", the "underground springs which feed" such consciousness and, of course, he refers overall to man's ways of construing his world (ibid., p.4).

\textit{Stimulus} is a term that obviously makes Kelly, and many others, wince, but the uninterpreted concept of stimulus is neither rigid nor horrific. It refers simply to things in the world that have the power to act upon, to influence, other things in the world, including of course, human beings. Once again, at the heart of Kelly's writing is an "invitation" that is meant, quite explicitly, to stimulate the reader into a new way of thinking.
This of course leads directly to response, which refers to what people do when things in the world (including themselves and others) act upon them. Kelly invites men and women to respond to his invitation (ibid., p.xii). What exactly is he inviting us to do if he is not recognising and introducing immediately the unloaded concept of response?

_Ego_ is a term that will probably now never lose its association with psychoanalysis. But the concept that Freud was attempting to verbalise was the notion of a kind of conscious self, a state of self-awareness which is a concept without which it would be difficult to communicate in the way that we do. Without it, we can hardly talk about "I" and "we", which Kelly does frequently, as well as speaking of the individual and a person's "own personal way" of doing things. I doubt that there is a single page of Kelly's writing on personality theory that does not contain an explicit or implicit reference to "selves". And, indeed, how could there be?

The _unconscious_ is another term bound to psychoanalysis and its language. But again, the concept does not _need_ to be loaded. The term was an attempt to verbalise the idea that there is a part of oneself, or of one's mind, that is not accessible to self-scrutiny directly; that there are parts of one's mind that it is difficult to claim knowledge about; and that there are things that we, in some way, know and have perceived at some time, that are not present in our self-awareness, or, if present, are in a disguised or distorted form. Freud claims that the contents of the unconscious mind have "representatives" in the conscious mind. Kelly refers to this notion when he speaks of the perceptions of badly deluded patients (ibid., p.8). He says that the fictitious perception of a badly deluded patient will often turn out to be a grossly distorted construction of something which actually does exist. Somewhere along the line, such a patient must have had a genuine perception of some real thing of which he or she was no longer aware. His or her _interpretation_ of that original
simple perception is what constitutes the delusion (ibid., p.8). The original perception must, of course, be somewhere in the mind still, if it is being interpreted in any way at all.

*Need* is a concept which refers to our state of existing as dependent beings; and some concept of this state is absolutely necessary if we are to speak of real human beings in a real world. Whatever we are dependent on, we need. Dependence permeates our very physical existence and is inextricably bound up with our psychological existence. Kelly refers to this early in his writing (ibid., p.6) when he speaks of the universe functioning as a single unit with all its imaginable parts having an exact relationship to each other; a system where all things are, in some way, interlocked; and this is presented as a condition of their existence. Break this relationship and the existence of the parts will be threatened. This is certainly observable on all sorts of levels both scientifically and personally or subjectively. We are born into a situation where we stand in a certain dependent relation to our environment. Our survival, physically and psychologically, depends on this relationship not being tampered with in negative ways.

*Reinforcement* is a term associated in Psychology with the notions of repetition and strengthening of certain behaviours by reward or practice. Strip away the theoretical loading and we are left with a concept of which Kelly makes strong use. At the very heart of his theory lies the business of making, testing, and remaking constructs. This is of course necessarily a repetitious activity within Kelly's framework. He also ties it in closely with the idea of strengthening. As Kelly says, "man seeks to improve his constructs by increasing his repertory, by altering them to provide better fits ..." (ibid., p.9). Persistence (making, re-making, testing) is central to the whole process (ibid., p.15).
The place of the concept of emotions

Showing how these "evaporated concepts" have been re-introduced and used by Kelly is the preparation, of course, for the re-introduction of the concept of emotions with which I am particularly concerned. As a term (as well as concept) "emotion" is probably even more theoretically loaded than any of the others. Not only is it formally loaded with various theories of emotion, but it is especially subjectively loaded for each of us as we define it in the context of our own experience. But the simple unadorned, unloaded concept is still identifiable both by us and in Kelly's writing. What we are talking about is feelings, those personal reactions, with physical and mental characteristics, that we all recognise as having in common to some degree, and mostly to a very great degree. We recognise the common language we have to describe the experience of feeling though we may disagree about the "why" and the "how". On that basis Kelly re-introduces both terms and concepts dealing with emotions, with, I might add, reassuring regularity. He begins as early as his introduction (yet again) with his reference to "human distress" and to the "frightening invitation" to each of us to reconsider our notions about things. He goes on to speak of the "ever more hopeful ways in which individual man can restructure his life" (ibid., p.3); of "liking our formulation (of life)" (ibid., p.8); of someone reacting with "an angry rebuke" in response to another's experiment in construing (ibid., p.13); of someone's "eagerness" to know something and to "hopelessness" (ibid., p.13); of a person's "dreading" the outcome of his experiments (ibid., p.14); and of the idea of the universe that doubled back on itself as "highly amusing" (ibid., p.21). Distress, fear, hope, liking, anger, eagerness, hopelessness, dread, amusement, are all terms which belong to our emotional vocabulary so in these kinds of references Kelly has dropped neither the terms nor the concepts.
Kelly also raises the concepts of freedom and enslavement (ibid., p.21) which, though not referring directly to emotions, are emotionally loaded terms, and concepts. The notion of freedom is one of the major themes in Kelly's theory and is central to his aim of looking anew at "why man does what he does". However, although Kelly examines the concept of freedom in the Freedom versus Determinism context, he does not discuss show people are in the state of freedom in terms of their state of mind. He does say that "ultimately man sets the measure of his own freedom and his own bondage by the level at which he chooses to establish his convictions" (ibid., pp.21-22). He also says, about a certain kind of freedom, that it "implies that man, to the extent that he is able to construe his circumstances, can find for himself freedom from their domination" (ibid., p.21. Domination is, of course, another emotionally loaded term that implies certain, strong feelings.

Indirectly though, Kelly steps right into the heart of the concept of freedom and its emotional implications when he says, in relation to freedom in construing, that "each little prior conviction that is not open to review is a hostage he (the construer) gives to fortune; it determines whether the events of tomorrow will bring happiness or misery" (ibid., p.22). In other words, construing and flexibility in construing are worth pursuing consciously because they free a person, at least in part, from the shackles of his or her circumstances and preconceptions, which in turn brings the possibility of happiness.

Distress or unhappiness is addressed when Kelly speaks of the "possibly distressing outcomes" of abandoning some established ideas as one embarks on the venture of re-construing (ibid., p.37). Interestingly, he does not say "confusing" or "disorienting" outcomes (though these are both conditions that may accompany the giving up of established ideas) but uses a much more emotive term, one which indeed entails a feeling. Being
distressed *entails* feeling distressed whereas one may be confused without even being aware of it and without necessarily *feeling* anything about it. There is considerable evidence that Kelly has chosen his words very carefully in presenting his theory so it is difficult to view his use of emotive terms as accidental. In each case, he says something important, albeit indirectly, about the human condition. We do in fact feel distress on giving up familiar things, even, in some instances, when these familiar things are undesirable and clearly better given up, such as certain environments or situations. We all fear the unknown in one way or another.

At the centre of Kelly’s theory, then, we find the concept of fear embedded along with the concept of happiness. We are "victims of our circumstance" when we are constantly faced with the unknown by being unable to predict certain things in our lives. The whole business of construing is bound up with the desirability of being able to *predict* and so escape the misery of bondage to circumstances. The process of construing aims, apparently, to minimise a whole set of negative feelings such as fear, distress, misery, discomfort, hostility, etc., and to maximise the corresponding set of positive feelings such as happiness, well-being, freedom from fear, and the feeling of contentment that accompanies having some feeling of control over one’s circumstances.

**The possibility of a theory of emotions**

While I feel, then, that I may claim that the concept of the emotions is not only present in, but intimately connected with Kelly’s theory of personality, it is less clear that Kelly presents a theory of emotions within his broader work. In fact, with his claims of a new approach to psychology, it seems that he studiously avoided attempting to provide any
such thing, and gives nothing formally. The question then is, is it possible to glean, deduce, or if you prefer, construe a theory of emotions from the things he says. Some claims in this direction I think are possible. It can be gleaned that, within Kelly's framework:

(i) Emotions do exist and they are states of mind at least in part;

(ii) they play an important part in our way of being in the world;

(iii) they fall into positive and negative categories, the first being desirable and the second undesirable.

Further, from Kelly's discussion on individual differences within personal construct theory it can be deduced that he does not regard behaviour as necessarily a guide to someone's emotional state (ibid., p.39). When he speaks of the need to recognise the private and the public domains of man's existence, he refers to the presumption of construing someone's behaviour as "anxiety" just because it is agitated. Although Kelly is defending his notion of the individual person operating under a construct system here, his example provides information on his attitude to emotions as well.

Finally, Kelly provides some evidence that he believes that people can control their emotional states. When discussing his Organisation Corollary Kelly refers to the painful personal conflict that arises when people have different constructs leading to incompatible predictions (ibid., p.56). He says that the Organisation Corollary, which deals with the construct system each person evolves, is basic to our understanding "of that most common of all clinic commodities, anxiety" (ibid., p.58). He then adds that a person may choose to preserve or alter his or her construct system according to which choice will make his/her anticipation of events more effective (ibid.,
The implication is, of course, that such alterings of the construct system will also alter anxiety levels and presumably enhance the levels of positive feelings. This kind of control over our emotional states is clearly presented as a product of being aware of and actively working on our construct systems (ibid., p.22).

The role of reasoning

Once the place of emotions is visible in Kelly's theory, the connection with reasoning is not difficult to find. When looking at the relation of philosophical systems to his theory, Kelly describes the process of construing and re-construing in scientific terms with an emphasis on the principles of empiricism, and as a rational process (ibid., p.17). This emphasis on a personal "scientific method", which enables people to form hypotheses, to test them and then form alternate hypotheses for better predictability, is echoed throughout Kelly's references to construing which is inescapably presented as a reasoning process.

Reason and emotions

It is a short step to give the relationship between reason and the emotions in Kelly's theory, having established:

(i) that Kelly views control over emotional states as possible through the process of construing, and,

(ii) that construing is a reasoning process.
It is by virtue of the reasoning process, then, that we learn to control our emotional states, thus enabling us to seek actively and maximise the emotional states we want. For the purposes of my earlier broader hypothesis (that it is difficult, if not impossible to look at emotions in the context of human personality without positing some relationship between reason and the emotions), it is precisely this implied relationship in Kelly's theory that is so significant. I have claimed further that such a relationship will occur in complex theories of personality whether or not the theorist intends this. Kelly clearly did not intend to say anything about emotions in a formal way so the occurrence of this relationship supports that hypothesis.

Finally, although Kelly did not intend to take a position on reason and emotions, the position that emerges is not in fact incompatible with his overall view of motivation. That there are emotional states and that reason is the means of controlling them through the process of construing, does not necessarily make the seeking of desirable emotional states the prime motivator. The prime motivator may still be, as Kelly says, anticipation of events and validation of predictions (ibid., p.158). The control of one's emotional states could merely contribute to the general freedom of the individual to pursue prediction and validation with greater assiduity.

Section II: The role of emotions in construing

Given that Kelly does deal with emotions within his theory of personality, at least indirectly, what kind of role can emotions be perceived as playing in the process of construing? Although at one level, construing (reasoning) can be seen as a way of predicting and controlling emotional states, emotions or emotional states are still present in one form or another
during the process of construing. If, as Kelly claims, our mental processes have as much claim to reality as external things and events, then emotions must be given reality status and, as such, they must be an active part of the changing universe. If, as claimed earlier, emotions fall into positive and negative categories within Kelly's system, and if we are concerned in our construing to seek happiness and avoid misery (even at a secondary motivational level), then our feelings must play a role in the way in which we perceive certain events and subsequently construe those events.

Further, our feelings may be the objects (mental objects) being construed at any given time, just as our thoughts or existing construct systems are available for re-construing. Our feelings may be construed and reconstrued in the light of and in the presence of other feelings, while at the same time influencing that construing. In other words, while perceiving a relationship between certain feelings of our own, we may simultaneously be influenced by other feelings (or our own) and be having new feelings about the relationship being discovered. Taken slowly, this is not as complex as it seems. It merely gives feelings (i.e., our awareness and concepts of emotions and emotional states) the same status as our thoughts and as objects in the external world.

But the notion of influence does cause complexity. Kelly claims that what influences our construing most powerfully is whether or not our constructs are validated when we put them to the test. However, what influences whether or not, or how, we test constructs, is our awareness of the hazards of impending change, this awareness being defined as anxiety or fear. Although valid at a certain conceptual level of reality, this does not say much about the direct experience of anxiety or fear. Kelly concedes that even on his definition, anxiety is associated with painful conflict (the Organisation corollary), and painful conflict is directly, subjectively perceived as distress. Individual distress is coloured by personal images
associated with our existing concepts (or constructs) of distress. Distress can, both physiologically and psychologically, affect our perceptions of things, as can any other strong emotional experience. And our construing will certainly be influenced by such perceptual variations.

**Emotions as real mental objects**

If emotions can be given the same reality status as mental objects i.e., concepts or thoughts or constructs, then they become just another part of the changing universe in Kelly's framework. This is not incompatible with Kelly's essential philosophical position as outlined earlier since he gives reality status to mental processes. Further, if we look at Kelly's universe as being integral in the way he describes, then emotions too stand in some sort of exact relationship with everything else. There is a relationship between emotions and thought, between emotions and awareness, between emotions and construct systems, between emotions and all other objects in the real world, including people. Whatever these relationships are, they affect and change other relationships between other objects and as we perceive these changes, our constructs also change. Given that in Kelly’s system, it is a normal and desirable process to seek actively to elaborate one’s perceptual field (defined as "aggressiveness") then it would seem that our awareness of emotions as real mental objects, would be a rich source of elaboration of our perceptions. That is, we need only to focus our attention on our feelings to begin noticing (perceiving) the ways in which our feelings provide the scope for any number of variations or interpretations of the reality we are regarding.
Feeling as a way of thinking

To the extent that the process of construing may in part also be a way of modifying and developing emotional awareness, the two processes (i.e., construing and feeling) seem to be creatively locked together. The experience of emotion followed by the emotional awareness yielded by the cognitive element (i.e., the interpretation, articulation, and categorisation of emotion) suggests that emotional constructs have a dimension of their own - a dimension within which the use of an emotional construct becomes a way of thinking and feeling at the same time. To think about something sadly, for example, is both to experience an emotion and enter into a way of thinking. It is reasonable and appropriate to think of some things sadly, just as it is to think of some things mathematically or some things economically, or otherwise in any context.

Each context yields its own set of new experiences, new ways of looking at things. If construing is indeed, in the final analysis, the attempt to perceive the real relationship between things in the real world, at any given time, then choosing the appropriate context within which to seek new experiences and think about them is of obvious importance. Being able to establish (perceive) an appropriate emotional context (or world, or framework, or system) becomes as important as any other framework. Insofar as the emotional context is such a rich source of perceptual and cognitive variations, it is a context that may be applied more often than most others when we seek to modify our constructs or to test and re-test them.
Identifying emotional worlds

If emotions or emotional experience can be perceived and understood as a way of thinking when that experience moves beyond the level of sensation, then it becomes important to be able to identify one's own system of emotional constructs and one's own way of thinking within that context. This gives rise to a complex problem.

If emotions are given reality status as mental objects (i.e., ideas) then they are the mental objects of an internal reality - a part of the real world, but an inside part. If we regard people as real objects in the world and mental processes as the "inside" reality of people (just as there is an inside to a piece of fruit or an inside to a book, or any object) then emotions become a part of this inside reality with the structure, language and logic of mental processes. The difference between emotional mental objects and other mental objects, though, is that other mental objects represent some sort of external reality, whereas emotional mental objects represent an internal reality, something that goes on inside a person, and usually "in the dark". Identifying our emotional worlds and structures then becomes rather more difficult than identifying mental structures (constructs) that are connected to an external reality. One of the difficulties is that of distinguishing between our emotions and other mental processes, i.e., distinguishing between emotion as a way of thinking, and other ways of thinking (e.g., ordering). Another difficulty is that of recognising the difference between emotional sensation, and emotion as a way of thinking (i.e., levels of emotion). A third difficulty is recognising the relationship between emotion as a way of thinking, and objects in the real world. Emotion as a way of thinking begins with a perception and interpretation of objects in the real world that is different from other ways of perceiving and
thinking. This gives rise to a particular kind of perceived relationship or connection between objects in the world.

In the following chapters I will argue that the psychoanalytic approach to emotions could provide an effective way to sort out our emotional worlds by being able to experience and identify our emotions as real mental objects rather than feelings attached to mental objects. This would yield, in turn, the emotional framework needed to develop the emotional dimension of construing in the most useful way. I will argue that Freud provides firstly, a way of identifying our emotional worlds and throwing light on them, and secondly, a theory of emotions (much richer than has hitherto been formally recognised) that throws light on the complex problem of levels of emotion, and the relationship between the internal, real world of emotion and external reality. The identification of our emotional worlds and language will in turn provide a more visible and effective dimension to Kelly's process of construing.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE PLACE OF EMOTIONS AND REASON
IN FREUD'S DRIVES THEORY

Section I: Repression and the unconscious mind at the beginning of Freud's theory

As a neurologist, Freud was concerned with answering specific questions about mental disorders when he embarked upon his investigation of the mind from something other than a neuropathological point of view. His first major account of the mental phenomena was understood as resulting from the operation of certain material elements according to basic laws (MacIntyre, 1965, p.19). This contained the concept of the human personality as a system seeking equilibrium, a concept Freud was to retain. His change of emphasis from neurology to psychology began in earnest with the ending of the partnership between himself and Dr Joseph Breuer.

Breuer had been working with a theory that hysteria was the product of a psychical trauma which had been forgotten by the patient. Breuer's treatment consisted of inducing an hypnotic state to recall the forgotten trauma. Freud began working with Breuer but then branched away, changing both the procedure and the underlying theory. He replaced Breuer's use of hypnosis (the results of which Freud found unsatisfactory in the quality of therapeutic catharsis) with his own technique of "free association" (Freud, SE., Vol.XIX, p.195). Ultimately, this step led to the development of Freud's system of ideas which he called psychoanalysis (Strachey, in Freud, 1982, p.15).
Repression

The most immediate questions Freud was dealing with related to the cause of neurotic symptoms in people suffering from mental disorders. As his thinking changed from the mechanical/material model to a psychical model of the personality, the appearance of neurotic symptoms became the system's way of seeking equilibrium by the channelling of repressed ideas into some type of expression, thus "levelling out" the psyche or fulfilling the instinctual wish (MacIntyre, 1965, p.26). In his early work, *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, Freud claimed however that it was "impossible to form a satisfactory general view of neuro-psychotic disorders unless they can be linked to clear hypotheses upon normal psychical processes" (Freud, S.E., Vol.I, pp.283-4). In the *Project* he makes the first organised attempt to present such hypotheses, introducing such notions as "pathological defence" and "repression" although the work was primarily neurologically based, and, as Strachey points out, it is essentially a "pre-id - a 'defensive' - description of the mind" (Freud, S.E., Vol.I, p.292). However, even as a biological mechanistic, "scientific" account, the *Project* contains an account of the problem of consciousness and the difference between physiological processes and "conscious sensations". Freud saw the former as "quantitative" and the latter as "qualitative", but still spoke in terms of unconscious processes and conscious sensations, thus leaving a high cognitive level of explanation aside, that is, the level of awareness of consciousness (Maze, 1983, p.90).

Freud also introduces the notions of a pleasure/unpleasure quality to "conscious sensations", as well as pleasure/unpleasure being related to degrees of pressure in the neurone system (Freud, S.E., Vol.I, p.312). The idea of "affect" emerges as a "sudden release of tension" as a "residue" of the experience of pain (i.e., a rise in level of tension), which results in a "repulsion, a disinclination to keeping the hostile mnemic image cathected
... a primary defence" (Freud, S.E., Vol.I, p.322). "The primary defence" is also referred to as "repression", where Freud links up the idea of pain-causing images "flowing away from the memory" with a "biologically taught" psychological system (Freud, S.E., Vol.I, p.322).

However, he also establishes the beginning of a notion of personality as a psychical entity, with the cognitive idea of "wishing" as a central process, where the mnemonic image associated with degrees of tension is attractive, not hostile, and where the consciousness or "ego" engages the "memory" and "judgement" to re-form the image (Freud, S.E., Vol.I, pp.330-1). Although a neurological/biological account of these processes is the basis of his theorising here, Freud does give the beginnings of the concept of repression, and its importance, and also the concept of cognitive processes, in connection with personality. When he goes on to discuss repression in connection with pathological defence, repression is already a central force in the psyche, though pathologically it takes on a different character (Freud, S.E., Vol.I, p.351).

Central, then, to the development of the notion of personality as a psychical entity is Freud's idea of repression. The positing of an unconscious part of the mind was the answer to the question of where repressed ideas could be stored. For Freud, the psychical concept of repression led inevitably to the concept of the unconscious mind (S.E. Vol.XIV, pp.166-7). He claimed later that repression was a theoretical formulation of a phenomenon which it was possible to observe as often as one pleases if one undertakes an analysis of a neurotic without resorting to hypnosis. In such cases a resistance was encountered, which invariably coincided with an amnesia and such a coincidence led Freud to posit unconscious mental activity.
For Freud, the "essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.147). The thing that is turned away is an instinctual wish; it is turned away not because the gratification would not bring pleasure, but because the gratification of the wish conflicts with other claims on the psyche. Unable to deal with the frustration of the conflict, the conscious mind attempts to eliminate the cause of the conflict, namely the instinctual wish. The power of the primal instincts however, is such that this elimination is not possible. The repressed instinct "proliferates in the dark ... and takes on extreme forms of expression ..." (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.149). Thus Freud, with his formulation of the psychical concept of repression, begins to describe some contents of the unconscious mind. It is in part a collection of instinctual wishes that, for one reason or another, cannot be consciously gratified. Further, each one of the wishes is the centre of a network of associations, the outer limits of which reach into the conscious mind, providing pathways back to the original wish which can be pursued in the course of psychoanalysis (S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.149-50). Freud calls these associations "derivatives and connections" which are "put out" by the repressed wish (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.149). Only the derivatives that are far enough removed from the repressed wish to not be recognised directly are allowed access to the conscious mind.

Neurotic symptoms follow the same pattern according to Freud - they are those actions which are sufficiently unlike the actions required for the gratification of the original instinctual wish while constituting expressions of it. Thus the conscious mind admits them to the conscious range of actions (S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.149-51). The purpose of all this conscious and unconscious mental activity is still bound to Freud's model of the personality as a system seeking balance. Repressed ideas are continuously seeking expression in the conscious mind and the conscious mind is continuously exerting a counterpressure to prevent them (S.E.,
Vol.XIV, p.151). But with the elaboration of his theory, Freud puts greater emphasis on the psychical constructions that overlay the neurological processes

**The unconscious mind as a basis for a broader theory of personality**

In dealing with the concepts of repression and the unconscious, it becomes evidence that these two notions give rise to whole groups of derived theories. To further explain the process of repression, Freud develops a concept of a superego or conscience; the conscious mind is put forward as a complex notion of a "self" or an ego and the unconscious becomes the id (S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.19-39). These three aspects of human personality form a whole theory, broad in scope and giving even more scope to derived theories. Hence the unconscious mind, once posited, together with repression, as an explanation of neurotic behaviour, becomes an account of the very essence of human nature. The questions Freud is attempting to answer have now extended from questions such as "What is going on inside a person suffering from hysterical, or from obsessional neurosis, or schizophrenia, or sexual malfunctions, or anxiety ... etc?" to questions like "What is the pattern and motivation of human nature, what is the reality of the mind, of existence ... etc?" At this level, Freud's description of the unconscious mind begins to include more components than repressed ideas or instincts. "The repressed" he says, "does not cover everything that is unconscious" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.166). Knowledge of the further contents of the unconscious mind would be gained by overcoming resistances.

Freud describes his assumption of the unconscious mind as "necessary" and "legitimate" (S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.166-9), citing as proofs the
"gaps" in the data of consciousness, dreams, the symptoms of the sick, ideas "that come into our head we do not know from where", and "intellectual conclusions arrived at we do not know how ..." (S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.166-7). He describes the scope of the unconscious as including "latent acts" and "repressed acts", the former differing only from conscious acts as being unconscious, as contrasted with the latter which, "if they were to become conscious, would stand out in the crudest contrast with other conscious processes ..." (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.172).

Three distinct aspects of the mind are finally described - the unconscious, the pre-conscious, and the conscious. The preconscious contains those psychical acts which, having been latent in the unconscious, are "tested" by the conscious, passed and relegated to the pre-conscious to await further use, given the occurrence of favourable circumstances. If these occur, the act can become an object of consciousness without encountering any special resistance (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.173). At this stage Freud has shifted from trying to locate repressed ideas in the mind to trying to locate all ideas in the mind. This appears to be an "eternal" location; that is, he is attempting to account for past, present, and future ideas in any given individual. The position relates back to Freud’s earlier, physiological stance; that is, he appears to view the personality as existing whole from birth in the same way as the body, with its physical potential entire, exists whole from birth with nothing essentially to be added or lost. Each individual becomes a tiny universe acting out its internal laws in response to a wider universe or environment, fuelled by the libido or pleasure principle (S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.46-7).

Within this universe Freud finds a place for the many aspects of human nature with which we are familiar: emotions (affective impulses attached to conscious and unconscious ideas), ideas (instinctual wishes), humour (a special relation between the unconscious and the
preconscious), and the reasoning process (the means by which instinctual wishes are processed from the timeless, reality-less world of the unconscious to the gratifying world of the conscious). The distortions connected with each of the natural mental processes are included and form, partly, the world of mental illness. The unconscious, deriving from the perception of resistance and repression, is the foundation stone for this entire theoretical superstructure.

The superego as a regulator

The superego, partly conscious and partly unconscious, is that part of the mind which is responsible for the admittance or banishment of instinctual wishes in the conscious mind - "a special critical and prohibitive agency which we have named the superego" (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.28). The superego can detach itself from the conscious mind sufficiently to observe, judge, and punish the conscious mind. Freud describes the process as "... it [the ego] splits itself during a number of its functions - temporarily at least. Its parts can come together again afterwards" (S.E., Vol.XXII, Pp.58-9). In the case of the superego, the ego splits itself in order to observe, judge, and punish, so one function of the detached piece is that of a conscience - "... scarcely anything else in us that we so regularly separate from our ego and so easily set over against it ..." (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.59).

The superego is not simply a substitute phrase for a conscience however. Freud carefully stipulates that "it is more prudent to keep the agency as something independent and to suppose that conscience is one of its functions and that self-observation, which is an essential preliminary to the judging activity of conscience, is another of them" (S.E., Vol.XXII,
The superego is split sufficiently from the ego to "enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, follow its own intentions and is independent of the ego for its supply of energy ..." (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.60).

Freud uses the symptoms of melancholia to illustrate a superego which functions with cruelty and excessive severity towards the ego and uses the same illustration to give an explanation of morality. Freud claims: "The superego applies the strictest moral standards to the helpless ego which is at its mercy; in general it represents the claims of morality and we realise all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the tension between the ego and the superego" (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.61). In the melancholics, this "morality" functions as "a periodic phenomenon". Once the melancholia lifts, the ego reasserts itself and enjoys "all the rights of man" until the next attack (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.61). Further, in some forms of the disease, the ego reacts strongly against the pressures of the superego by embarking on a spree of self-gratifications (the manic phase of the disease) (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.61). Finally, the superego functions as an ideal for the ego, demanding even greater degrees of perfection from the ego which the ego strives to fulfil. Freud attributes this function to the early image of perfection the child has of the parents (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.36).

The development of the superego Freud connects with the child's experience of parental authority. Young children, he states, are amoral and possess no internal inhibitions against their impulses striving for pleasure. However, "parental influence governs the child by offering proofs of love and by threatening punishments which are signs to the child of loss of love and are bound to be feared on their own account. This realistic anxiety is the precursor of the later moral anxiety" (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.62). So long as the parental influence functions, therefore, no part of the ego splits away to form a separate section. As soon as the external restraint is "internalised" however, the separated part of the ego which results, takes over the
function of observation, direction and punishment (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.62). This account of the origins of the superego Freud recognises as dependent on the child's long dependence on the parents and on the existence of the Oedipus complex, the latter being one of Freud's observations of the process of repression.

The Oedipus Complex is a phase in the development of children which Freud describes as "standing in an attitude" to the parents (S.E. Vol.XIX, p.176). This is the attitude of desiring the parents as objects of sexual gratification, usually with an emphasis on one parent depending on their (the parents') behaviour. The accompanying feelings aroused by both positive and negative, so the complex is "doomed to early repression" (S.E., Vol.XI, p.47). In its simple form, which Freud observes as being the most uncommon, the complex is described as being dissolved (rather than repressed) S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.31-3). More often, due to the bisexual nature of children, a more "complete complex" is observed and so the complex creates the type of frustration that leads to repression. Then the complex remains significant, operating from the unconscious mind and, according to Freud, it forms the "nuclear complex" of every neurosis, working actively in many regions of mental life (S.E., Vol.XI, p.47).

For the child, the complex is central to the formation of the superego. In the case of a boy, a fear of castration (punishment by the father or identification with the mother who lacks the male sexual characteristics) will lead the child to give up the desire for the parents as love objects, most especially the mother. Identification with the father results in the absorbing of the authority of the father into the ego, thus forming the nucleus of the superego (S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.176-7). In the case of a girl, the first attachment is necessarily also to the mother as the provider of basic need satisfactions, but the father is the first love-object. The detachment of the girl from her mother occurs before the beginning of the Oedipal phase. It
occurs through feelings of hostility also excited by the castration complex, though indirectly (S.E., Vol.XXII, pp.121-2). The hostility occurs when the girl blames her mother for the lack of a penis (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.124). She turns to the father also, and this for her, is the entering into the Oedipal phase or attitude. The father or the love-object is retained for many years as the fear of castration is absent. According to Freud, the prolonged Oedipal phase in women adversely affects the formation of the superego. Though formed, it "cannot attain the strength and independence which give it its cultural significance" (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.129). Nevertheless it operates as observer and judges and punishes sufficiently to be a separate and distinct part of the ego.

The ego as a thinking self

The ego is that part of the mind in which there is a "coherent organisation of mental processes" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.17). Freud sees consciousness as a quality attached to this part of the mind but not necessarily attached to all of this part. Some of the ego may be unconscious, but nonetheless distinct from the repressed unconscious (S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.17-8). Freud discusses this complex distinction in the first part of his essay, The Ego and the Id (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.13), stating that although the notion of an unconscious part of the ego adds yet a third dimension to the unconscious mind (that is, the unconscious, the preconscious, and now the unconscious ego) bringing the danger of rendering the quality of consciousness insignificant (if not contradictory, one might think), it would be more dangerous to ignore this characteristic of the ego. According to Freud, its reality is far too obvious and can be clearly perceived in the appearance of a resistance mechanism that emanates from the ego when associations move too close to repressed
The resistance mechanism causes associations to break down, thus impeding the access to an original repressed impulse; it also causes unpleasurable feelings so it can be perceived indirectly by the conscious ego (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.17). In this way, the ego attempts to preserve its original protection from an undesirable instinctual impulse, and it does this without participation by the conscious ego.

The fundamental occupation of the conscious ego is to be "a representative of the external world or reality" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.36). Freud describes the consciousness as the "surface of the mental apparatus", the part accessible to the external world (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.19). Into the consciousness come sense perceptions from the external world and sensation or feelings which generate inside the psyche. Thoughts, though coming from inside a person, must be connected to the corresponding words (or visual images) before they can become conscious; these words or images have their origins in previous sense perceptions, so originally (or in part) thoughts also come from the external world or at least are given form by the external world. They are certainly perceived by the thinker "as if they came from without" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.23).

As that part of the psyche which is in direct contact with the world, the conscious ego is modified by the world and also seeks to modify the part of the psyche that is not in contact with the world. Specifically, the conscious ego attempts to reconcile the pleasure-rulled inner person with the real demands of the world by establishing a "reality principle", thus representing "what may be called reason and common sense in contrast with the id which contains the passions" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.25). Despite its being portrayed as the communication point between the world and the id, Freud stresses that the ego remains a part of the id, "only a specially modified part" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.40). The special modification is the effect of
Freud describes the ego as "first and foremost a bodily ego" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.26). The body itself yields both internal and external sense perceptions, "it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.26). With its relation to the perceptual system, it "gives mental processes an order in time and submits them to 'reality-testing'" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.55).

Freud sees the ego as placed between the external world and the id, the latter being viewed as a world in itself (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.55). Hence the ego acts in connection with both these worlds; it enriches itself with experiences from the external world and it attempts to bring the world of the id under its control (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.55). In this position, the ego is always potentially under threat from three sources - the libido of the id, the external world, and the severe superego (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.55). The libido resists the control and frustration of its instinctual wishes thus attacking reason; the external world may yield experiences that damage the ego; the superego may unleash too much aggression and authority on the ego.

Section II: Emotions as instinct

Given a structure of human personality where the basic driving force is the desire for pleasure (the pleasure principle), and pleasure is named as the aim of an instinct or instinctual drive, it is understandable that Freud did not find it necessary to differentiate between instincts and the emotions at this theoretical level. It seems clear enough in the first instance that, if the drive for pleasure is an instinct and the experience or feeling of pleasure is an instinctual experience, then the feeling of unpleasure must also be an instinctual experience and their derivatives (that is, all feelings of pleasure in
connection with the gratification of the instinctual wishes, and all feelings of unpleasure in connection with the frustration of ungratified instinctual wishes) must also fall into the category of instinctual experiences. This is in fact Freud's formal position with regard to emotions.

Theory of the instincts

In his formal explanation of his theory of the instincts (S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.117-40), Freud defines an instinct firstly as a stimulus which "does not arise from the external world but from within the organism itself" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.118), as something which "never separates as a force, giving momentary impact but always as a constant one" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.118) and "since it impinges not from without but from within the organism, no flight can avail against it" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.118). In this definition, Freud is differentiating between physiological stimuli operating on the mind and "instinctual stimuli", or instincts. He completes the definition by stating that "a better term for an instinctual stimulus is a 'need'" and "what does away with a need is 'satisfaction'" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.119). Although he refers to "the mind", it is not entirely clear what Freud means this term to describe. He states that an organism receives stimuli in its nervous substance and then refers to something he calls the "perceptual substance" which distinguishes between outside stimuli and inside stimuli (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.119). He then sets up a postulate that "the nervous system is an apparatus which has the function of getting rid of the stimuli that reach it, or of reducing them to the lowest possible level; or which, if it were feasible, would maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.120). If Freud means that "the mind" is the nervous system or "substance" of which the "perceptual substance" is a part (and this does appear to be the case), then it would seem that only a part of the mind has
the capacity to perceive things and distinguish between things. This part of
the mind corresponds to Freud's account of the ego insofar as both the
"perceptual substance" (of the mind) and the ego (of the personality)
receive and distinguish between stimuli received from inner and outer
sources. Both these components also deal with stimuli received; the
"perceptual substance attempts to reduce stimuli to the lowest possible
level and the ego attempts to use stimuli as a means of satisfaction and
enrichment. While these different approaches to stimuli are not
incompatible in one sense, they do suggest a difference in attitude. The
ego also has various intellectual functions which cannot be ascribed to the
"perceptual substance" and the ego is also referred to as "a specially
modified part of the id", the modification being the effect of the influence of
the sensory perception. So, although the relationship between the ego and
the perceptual substance is very close, they still appear to be
distinguishable - a relationship which was set up earlier in the Project and
not fully explained then or afterwards.

Further, if the instinctual stimuli act on the mind and if the home of
these instincts is Freud's notion of the unconscious mind then it would
seem that the mind both engages in the constant stimulation of itself and at
the same time attempts to reduce stimuli to a non-existent level, or
"maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition" (S.E., Vol.XIV,
p.120). In addition, "the instincts and not external stimuli are the true
motive forces behind the advances that have led the nervous system with
its unlimited capacities, to its present high level of development" (S.E.,
Vol.XIV, p.120). This seems a curiously internal view of human
development, given the difficulty of imagining any form of development that
is not, in some way, based on the effect of the external world and stimuli
provided by it. The perennial chicken and egg problem is present here. It
may be said that without the instincts as a motive force, the mind (nervous
system) would not react to external stimuli in the way that is conducive to
development (or indeed, would not react at all); but, without the external stimuli, the instincts could hardly become evident or be given any play. If, as Freud says, the instinctual stimulus is a need, then it must be a need for something. If the something is satisfaction, then the satisfaction must be gained by means of something external to the need itself. In fact Freud says "the object of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.122).

The place of emotions

Within this framework, Freud refers to "feelings" as something which "reflect the manner in which the [nervous system's] process of mastering stimuli takes place" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.120). Feelings are described as the degree of presence (or absence) of stimuli. Freud says, "the polarity of pleasure-unpleasure is attached to a scale of feelings ..." (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.134). Love becomes the ego's activity to incorporate pleasurable objects into itself, hate the ego's activity to fly from or destroy unpleasurable objects (S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.136-7). All feelings become degrees of love (absence of stimuli achieved by incorporation), or hate (presence of stimuli). The feeling of "indifference" falls into place as a "special case of hate or dislike, after first appearing as their forerunner" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.136).

In his metapsychological discussion at this point, Freud refers to love and hate as being themselves instincts (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.137). These appear to be identical with pleasure and unpleasure. The pleasure principle seeks satisfaction of instinctual impulses by the id. Love is apparently the way in which this satisfaction is sought, that is, the ego's activity to incorporate pleasurable objects into itself. This way of speaking
about love sets up a particularly complex notion. Love is an instinct and an activity; love obviously has some sort of primary status and seems to be equated with the pleasure principle; love is both motivator (the pleasure principle operating from the id) and regulator (operating from the ego). A further complexity is introduced when Freud says that the case of love and hate refuses to be fitted into the scheme of the instincts (that is, the instincts as having opposite poles) (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.133). The problem is that love has three opposites (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.133): loving/hating is one; loving/being loved is the second; loving or hating/unconcern or indifference is the third.

In this context love is defined as:

(a) absence of stimuli achieved by incorporation of pleasurable objects;

(b) an activity (or an active force in the mind);

(c) feeling (loving or hating) as opposed to not feeling anything.

Hate is not particularly affected by these multiple definitions since Freud sees hate as a separate sort of feeling, not arising "from any cleavage of an original common entity ... [having] its own development before the influence of the pleasure/unpleasure relation made them into opposites" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). Love derives from "the capacity of the ego to satisfy some of its instinctual impulses auto-erotically by obtaining organ-pleasure" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). Hate, older than love, derives from "the narcissistic ego's primordial repudiation of the external world with its outpouring of stimuli" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). Freud divides the whole of the instincts into two groups of "primal instincts", the ego or self-preservation instincts and the sexual instincts (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.124). The primary status of both love and hate is emphasised and consolidated when love is seen
as deriving from the sexual instincts and hate as deriving from the ego instincts.

However Freud defines and redefines emotions at this point, it is clear that he regards emotions as an integral part of, if not identical with, instinctual impulses. This is the way in which emotions fit into the general theory of psychoanalysis and the way in which they make the most sense within Freud's conceptual framework.

The place of reason

Freud refers to the ego as that part of the mind in which there is "a coherent organisation of mental processes" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.17), and describes the ego as representing "what may be called reason and common sense in contrast with the id, which contains the passions" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.25). Clearly Freud regarded the ego as the centre of reasoning or thought processes. The unconscious mind he describes as being irrational, full of incompatible impulses, "existing side by side without being influenced by one another, and [which] are exempt from mutual contradiction" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.186). The conscious mind seeks to eliminate incompatibilities by engaging in the activity of either reconciling incompatibilities or else removing the difficult ones from the conscious mind by the process of repression.

Freud takes the unconscious mental processes once again as his starting point in tracing the development of thought processes. These older, primary processes are now the residues of a phase of development in which they were the only kind of mental process, Freud claims. The processes then strived for pleasure and "whatever was thought of [wished
for] was simply presented in an hallucinatory manner, just as still happens today with our dream thoughts every night" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.219).

The non-occurrence of the expected satisfaction and the disappointment that followed led the psyche to "decide to form a conception of the real circumstances in the external world and to endeavour to make a real alteration in them" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.219). This step Freud calls the introduction of a "new principle of mental functioning ... the setting up of a reality principle" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.219).

He proposes that this development in some way affects the sense organs, turning them towards the external world. Consciousness, which is already attached to the sense organs (S.E., Vol.XII, p.220), is also affected and learns to "comprehend sensory qualities in addition to the qualities of pleasure and unpleasure which hitherto had alone been of interest to it" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.220). A new and special function arose, that of "periodically searching the external world in order that its data might be familiar already if an urgent internal need should arise" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.220). This was the function of attention which was joined by the functions of "notation" (a part of memory) and "impartial passing of judgment" which decided, by comparison with memory traces of reality, whether a given idea was true or false. Motor discharge was converted into action and control of action was provided "by means of the process of thinking" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.221). Freud describes thinking as "essentially an experimental kind of acting, accompanied by relatively small quantities of cathexis together with less expenditure (discharge) of them" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.221). The "acting" referred to is the act of the conscious mind in comparing ideas presented to it with memory traces of reality. This uses up far smaller amounts of energy than physical acting on the basis of ideas (S.E., Vol.XII, p.221). This process of thinking obviously saves the
organism a great deal of time and energy by ensuring that actual action is maximally effective.

The theory of thinking described by Freud is compatible with any general description of the reasoning process and its effects on human behaviour, notwithstanding differing terminologies. Assessing, comparing, judging (coming to conclusions), reconciling incompatibilities are all forms of rational activity or the reasoning process, carried out with a greater or lesser degree of proficiency in each individual. In Freudian terms the degree of proficiency is measured by the actions subsequently carried out by the thinker, actions that invariably aim to increase pleasure and decrease or eliminate unpleasure. Hence the pleasure principle remains the ultimate motivator even in connection with the rational processes of the conscious mind. Freud does refer to a process of "replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle ..." (S.E., Vol.XII, p.219) and describes education as "an incitement to the conquest of the pleasure principle, and to its replacement by the reality principle ..." (S.E., Vol.XII, p.224). This process, he claims, however, "implies no deposing of the pleasure principle but only a safeguarding of it" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.223). With the advent of the reality principle, unreal (uncertain, momentary) pleasures are given up or replaced by real (assured, definite, lasting) pleasures. Successful education, he claims, depends on the successful offer of love as a reward from the educators, so the development of reason by education is still seen as being motivated by the pleasure principle, both at the deeper level where the psyche is seeking assured pleasures and at the surface level where the person is seeking to gain love from those around him or her. The ultimate object remains the gaining of as much love as possible, which is the greatest degree of pleasure, which in turn is the least amount of stimuli, internal or external, for the psyche.
The successful conclusion of this process is generally frustrated by the sexual instincts however, as they are much slower to come under the influence of the reality principle than the ego or self-preservation instincts (Freud, 1984, pp.39-40). Freud states that the sexual instincts obtain early gratification auto-erotically so they are not faced with the frustration that the ego instincts are. The period of latency in the sexual instincts which follows early gratification means that the sexual instincts do not need to subject themselves to reality testing for a much longer time than the ego instincts. The result is that the sexual instincts remain under the dominance of the pleasure principle for a longer time, if not, in some cases, permanently (S.E., Vol.XII, p.222). Freud refers to the sexual instincts as being hard to 'educate' (S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.10), thus allowing the pleasure principle to overcome the reality principle in some cases "to the detriment of the organism as a whole (S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.10).

In making these claims about the development of reason in the human, Freud makes some key assumptions. These are:

(a) that the process of education is the learning to differentiate between internal, hallucinatory instinctual objects and external or 'real' instinctual objects;

(b) that reality itself is somehow exclusively connected with the 'external world' while at the same time conceding that the ego becomes a part of the external world in relation to the id. This gives a certain relativity to reality. However, when speaking about the sexual instincts being hard to 'educate' and delayed in becoming subject to the reality principle, Freud uses the reason that "the sexual instincts ... obtain their satisfaction in the subject's own body ... " (S.E., Vol.XII, p.222). This suggests that he does not regard the body as external to the psyche. In fact some sort of reality-testing needs to occur in order for
the psyche to obtain pleasure from some other part of the body. Autoeroticism may also be hallucinatory. In Freud's terms, seeing the body as external to the mind does not involve a mind/body split in the light of his being prepared to see the ego as external to the id.

(c) that the part of the mind (the ego) that has the capacity to test reality also has the capacity to order reality, to form conscious concepts, to communicate both with itself, with other parts of the mind and with the external world, including other minds; the reality principle is also apparently responsible for the ability to see time (that is, be conscious of a past, present, and future), to predict, to judge, to have intention, (or at least talk about having intention in a way that tests reality as well; that is, a person may express the intention of crossing the road and then do so, which tests reality both to him/herself and to any observers), and to make mistakes, that is, to perceive reality either incorrectly or in a number of incompatible ways. All these capabilities are developed presumably in the service of the pleasure principle, although the work is done at the prompting of the ego instincts in the first instance.

**Behind the formal framework**

These assumptions are relevant to the way in which Freud refers to the processes of the mind more informally in his works. Having given a formal account, Freud proceeds to discuss feeling and thinking in a number of complex ways that do not fit easily within his formal framework. A consideration of these discussions begins very quickly to lead the reader away from the formal framework and into a realm where a much more complicated theory of thinking and feeling becomes visible. In Chapters
Six, Seven and Eight, I will pursue and outline the way in which Freud provides an underlying theory that supplements, and therefore changes, his formal position.
CHAPTER SIX

INSTINCTS AND EMOTIONS AS SEPARATE CONCEPTS
IN FREUD'S WRITINGS

Section I: Some difficulties with the theory of the instincts

Having located emotions clearly within Freud's drives theory, it would seem a straightforward matter to demonstrate how emotions and reason work in psychoanalysis and how the relationship between reason and the emotions emerges as a strong and necessary feature of Freud's theory of personality. However, a problem that quickly emerges is Freud's own treatment of the concept of emotions as being distinct from his concept of instincts. This appears to set up an undercurrent of thought in his writings that applies to emotions in a way that is not defined within his formal position. While Freud formally defines the concept of emotions as, essentially, completely bound to, if not identical with, instinctual impulses (i.e., a manifestation of instinctual impulses), he appears to operate informally with a concept of emotions that is far more in line with more conventional thinking and language.

As noted in Chapter Four, people have a common language in connection with many major concepts that makes our communication and mutual understanding of them possible. Further, we have "loaded" and "unloaded" concepts. When outlining his theory of the instincts and the place of the emotions within it, Freud takes and uses some sort of common
concept of "feelings" and loads it with the meaning that is consistent with his theoretical framework. What he does not do is outline the common, if in his view, erroneous, concept (the one which we all use in order to understand what he is talking about in the first place), and explain how the common concept must be understood or changed. However, he makes it clear that he is dealing with more than one meaning when he says in his lecture on anxiety: "Do not suppose that the things I have said to you here about affects are the recognised stock-in-trade of normal (sic) psychology. They are on the contrary views that have grown upon the soil of psychoanalysis and are native only to it" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.396).

On several more occasions Freud refers strongly to his uncertain position in connection with emotions. He begins some remarks on anxiety, pain and mourning by saying: "So little is known about the psychology of the emotional processes that the tentative remarks I am about to make on the subject may claim a very lenient judgement" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XX, p.169). And again: "Anxiety, then, is in the first place something that is felt. We call it an affective state although we are also ignorant of what an affect is" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XX, p.132). And further: "Psychoanalysis has never claimed to provide a complete theory of human mentality in general, but only expected that what it offered should be applied to supplement and correct the knowledge acquired by other means" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.50). And: "Let us call what becomes conscious as pleasure and unpleasure a quantitative and qualitative 'something' [Freud's quotes] in the course of mental events; ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIX, p.22). Finally: "What you may gather about affects from psychology the James-Lange theory for example - is quite beyond understanding or discussion to us psycho-analysts. But we do not regard our knowledge about affects as very assured either; it is a first attempt at finding our bearings in this obscure region" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.396).
With these kinds of statements, Freud is giving quite overt information on his position regarding a clear understanding of emotions. Firstly, he recognises that the term has various meanings for various theorists, including himself, and more importantly, that he finds it impossible to connect his views in any way with the views of what he terms as "normal psychology". Secondly, he is making it abundantly clear that he is not ultimately satisfied with this state of affairs and does not offer his definitions as being in any way conclusive. However, he does not discuss the ways in which "normal psychology" explains emotions and does not attempt formally to outline anything that he regards as misconceptions in thinking on emotions up to his time. This leaves Freud in a curious position - on the one hand he makes some very strong claims concerning the nature of the emotions; on the other, he backs away from giving these claims full theoretical status by examining them in the light of different theoretical claims, as he does do with most of his other strong claims. For example, the cornerstone of his theory of personality, the notion of repression, is looked at in the historical context and he notes how the concept previously arose in work by Schopenhauer (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.15). Similarly, with his notion of the Unconscious, Freud engages in major discussion of his justification for such a concept, philosophically and psychologically (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.13-18, and Vol.XIV, pp.166-71).

To complicate things a little more, Freud frequently expresses his dissatisfaction with the notion of instincts as a whole, i.e., as distinct from affects which are classed as one manifestation of the instincts. In his paper on narcissism he claims that there is a "total absence of any theory of the instincts which would help us find our bearings" and that therefore "we may be permitted, or rather it is incumbent upon us, to start off by working out some hypothesis to its logical conclusion until it either breaks down or is confirmed (sic)" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.78). In the paper Instincts and their Vicissitudes, Freud begins to conduct such a "working Out" (Freud,
S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.117-40). This is an early paper and he begins by commenting on the essential indefiniteness of many basic ideas, abut Freud is still proceeding on the assumption that "there is a total absence of any theory of the instincts" and that he therefore feels obliged to produce one. This is a curious position in that he is ignoring any previous thinking on instincts (and therefore emotions), but it is consistent with Freud's self-avowed attitude to established traditions of thought insofar as they impinge on his own work. For example, in his discussion on the theory of repression he says:

The theory of repression quite certainly came to me independently of any other source; I know of no outside impression which might have suggested it to me, and for a long time I imagined it to be entirely original, until Otto Rank [1911a] showed us a passage in Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Idea* in which the philosopher seeks to give an explanation of insanity. What he says there about the struggle against accepting a distressing piece of reality coincides with my concept of repression so completely that once again I owe the chance of making a discovery to my not being well-read. Yet others have read the passage and passed it by without making this discovery and perhaps the same would have happened to me if in my young days I had had more taste for reading philosophical works. In my later years I have denied myself the very great pleasure of reading the works of Nietzsche, with the deliberate object of not being hampered (sic) in working out the impressions received in psychoanalysis by any sort of anticipatory ideas. I had therefore to be prepared - and I am so, gladly - to forgo (sic) all claims to priority in the many instances in which laborious psychoanalytic investigation can merely confirm the truths (sic) which the philosopher recognised by intuition. (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.15-16)

I have quoted this passage fully because it makes one of the most important statements about Freud's attitude to his theorising and explains a great deal about his difficulties with something as complex as his theory of the instincts. Some of the extraordinary assumptions he makes are:
(a) that psychoanalysis is, of itself, a source of "truths" and that sufficient investigation of it yields some sort of scientific confirmation of philosopher's "intuitions";

(b) that Schopenhauer intuitively sensed the "truth" of the theory of repression long before Freud began his investigations;

(c) that being aware of the previous traditions of thinking on human nature "hampers" Freud's discovery of the material that "confirms" the many "truths" previously put forward;

(d) that theories can "come" independently of "any other outside source";

(e) that previous thinking of philosophers contain truths rather than being different ways of looking at things.

The problem with these assumptions is that they give psychoanalysis itself some sort of truth status that presumes that it is the best and only way to investigate abnormal (and normal) human behaviour and personality. Further, Freud sees any information he finds that is consistent with or identical to the thoughts of other thinkers, as being a "confirmation of intuitively sensed truths". He obviously does not see his own ideas as simply contributing to evidence supporting certain ways of looking at things. Further, Freud assumes simply because of his own theory, that Schopenhauer sensed a "truth" and ignores the fact that he and Schopenhauer could be sharing a point of view which is not necessarily right or wrong, or at least cannot be proven to be such. Further, the idea that knowing something about the history of thought in a given area hampers new discovery is an odd position for a seeker after "truth". It well befits the artist or the creative endeavour generally in that in those cases a unique way of seeing or expressing something is being sought, but Freud
lays no claim to being a creator. Rather he sees himself as having discovered truths scientifically through the process of psychoanalysis. Why he then insists on trying to make psychoanalytic theory some kind of exclusive truth is not clear. He says that we regard truth as the scientific endeavour to arrive at a correspondence between what we think and "what exists outside us and independently of us" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.170). His claims that the thoughts of other philosophers contain intuitive truths is extremely odd. What can Freud possibly mean by an "intuitive truth" or a "truth arrived at intuitively"? He claims in fact that intuition cannot be a source of knowledge (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.170). The comparison he is making is that while a philosopher arrives at his truth "in his head", Freud himself arrives at his truth through the investigation of psychoanalysis. That a philosopher may arrive at his truths through an investigation of human concepts (based on past human thought as well as his own) Freud somehow sees as being qualitatively different from his arriving at his truths through an investigation of the thoughts of his patients. This ties in with (and is as curious as) Freud's notion that theories are arrived at from some single source - in his case psychoanalysis - and can therefore be thought of as in some way original.

While Freud humbly renounces his claim on originality of some theories because they were put forward "intuitively" earlier by someone else, his actual claim is far more ambitious. He does not say he was the first to have a certain idea, but he does claim to be the first to confirm such an idea, to give it the status of truth, through a process which he claims outright to be a truth in itself. This process, psychoanalysis, has not, apparently, been derived from anything else, no other "outside source". Yet its components - asking questions, seeking motives, making different connections between thoughts and feelings, setting up a special relationship between two people, trying to trace the patterns of thoughts and emotions, trying to ease painful thoughts and emotions, trying to
heighten self-awareness - are all an integral part of the history of human thought and interaction. Further, Freud's meaning and his own ordering of these components into an internally consistent theory must necessarily have been influenced by his own education which in turn was a process derived from the history and experience of human thought. He may not have intentionally read philosophy but whether he liked it or not he absorbed a great deal of it from his culture, education, home life, and human interactions.

It is to be expected that although Freud formally sought to establish a theory of the instincts, and therefore (in his terms) a theory of emotions, he brought with him a whole world of language and meaning related to emotions and that these components must become visible in his writings, albeit covertly and unintentionally. The next section demonstrates how Freud used the language and concepts of emotions in ways that are inconsistent with his formal position on the instincts and emotions.

Section II: Freud's use of the terms and concepts of emotions

In the first sentence of the first lecture of his Five Lectures on PsychoAnalysis (Freud, S.E., Vol.XI, p.9), Freud refers to himself as having "novel and bewildering feelings" about being in the "New World". Analysed in Freud's formal framework, this means that Freud is having some activity of the nervous system aimed at his survival or gratification. He does not say what these feelings are precisely, except that they are new (novel) and confusing (bewildering). At the same time he must also be experiencing the feelings of novelty and bewilderment in themselves. Thus Freud's nervous activity must be occurring on two levels at least with several different kinds of feelings - the unspecified ones (that are new and confusing) and the feelings of newness and confusion. According to Freud's categorisation, feelings of novelty and bewilderment must be
degrees of pleasure or unpleasure, but it is difficult to see how this claim is justified. Feelings of bewilderment, for example, may be pleasurable, i.e., accompanied by feelings of pleasure, such as in a situation where something unexpectedly pleasant occurs, or they may be unpleasurable, i.e., in a situation where something unexpectedly or inexplicably unpleasant occurs. But in each case the feelings of actual bewilderment must be the same. The accompanying feelings of surprise, happiness or fear, and anger, would be pleasant or unpleasant but even these would be subject to degrees of pleasure or unpleasure depending on the circumstances and context.

To categorise the actual feelings as degrees of pleasure or unpleasure is to miss the nature and uniqueness of each feeling. It would seem that it is not only indifference that is a special case (see Chapter Five, p.106), but the feelings of pleasure and unpleasure themselves. They are special in that they accompany other feelings in varying degrees, rather like a colour accompanies and gives a certain character to an object. A box, for example, will always be some colour and also a particular shade of that colour. It may be a deep red box or light red, but in any case it is a red box and it would be incorrect to say that the box is redness or that redness is a box. Similarly anger is a feeling, but it does not follow that if anger is accompanied by feelings of pleasure or unpleasure then it is nothing but a degree of pleasure or unpleasure. Equally if "feelings of novelty and bewilderment" are coloured by pleasure or unpleasure it does not follow that they are nothing but degrees of pleasure or unpleasure. And Freud in his opening sentence does not treat them as such. His statement that he has feelings of novelty and bewilderment says nothing about degrees of pleasure or unpleasure. These two feelings in particular carry no undertones in their concept alone to indicate whether they are likely to be pleasant or unpleasant. It is in this way that Freud begins to indicate, at least, that in his own usage and meaning he differentiates between his
concept of instinctual drives (of which pleasure and unpleasure are a part or a manifestation (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.178)) and his concept of feelings or emotions.

Freud continues to refer to emotions/feelings/affects in a way that clearly differentiates between instincts and emotions. He refers to "a child's sexual instinct" serving for "the acquisition of different kinds of pleasurable feeling" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XI, p.43). He does not say different degrees of pleasurable feeling but different kinds which indicates that the "kinds" are something in themselves which have the added quality of being pleasurable. Further, he says that the sexual instinct serves for the acquisition of feelings, not "is a reflection of or a manifestation of certain feelings". Two different things must be present for one to acquire the other; so if the sexual instinct is the means by which a child acquires pleasurable feelings, the feelings must be something other than the instinct and something other than a reflection of an instinct.

Defining a complex, Freud describes it as "a group of interdependent ideational elements charged with affect" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XI, p.31). "Affects", he says, "may be regarded as displaceable magnitudes of energy" (ibid., p.18). It seems unlikely that Freud means that ideational elements are charged with instincts or even their reflections.

He has already defined instinct as a stimulus arising within the organism (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.122). If an affect is a displaceable magnitude of energy it would seem to be something different from an internally-based stimulus.

That there is a recognised ambiguity in Freud's use of the term "instinct" is only of partial help in the matter of emotions. However it does
point to the difficulty of Freud's speaking about the derivatives of the instincts (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.111-13).

In the editor's note on Freud's paper *Instincts and their Vicissitudes* (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.111-16) attention is drawn to Freud's use of "instinct" as:

(a) 'a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic';

(b) 'a concept on the frontier between the somatic and the mental ..., the psychical representation of organic forces';

(c) the psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimulation ... a concept lying on the frontier between the mental and the physical'.

These three accounts indicate that Freud was drawing no distinction between an instinct and its psychical representative (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.112). However in later papers he seems to draw a sharp distinction between them. In *The Unconscious* (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.177), he claims: "an instinct can never become an object of consciousness - only the idea that represents an instinct can". Before 1907, when he published the paper on *Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices*, the aspects of human nature that he later came to refer to as the "instincts" were variously referred to as "excitations", "affective ideas", "wishful impulses", "endogenous stimuli" and so on (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.114).
Section III: Emotions and sexuality

In the *Three Essays on Sexuality* Freud says that "the existence of sexual needs in human beings and animals is expressed in biology by the assumption of a 'sexual instinct'" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.135) and from then on he both corrects "popular" assumptions about the sexual instinct and elaborates his concept of instinct. In describing the development of the sexual instinct in humans, Freud strongly emphasises the necessity of distinguishing the sexual instinctual impulses "from the rest" and criticises Jung's "watering down" the meaning of the concept of libido "by equating it with psychical instinctual force in general" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.218). By "libido" Freud refers to "a quantitative variable force which could serve as a measure of processes and transformations occurring in the field of sexual excitation. We distinguish this libido in respect of its special origin from the energy which must be supposed to underlie mental processes in general, and we thus also attribute a qualitative character to it" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.217). This libido is connected to an "idea of quantity" the mental representation of which Freud called the "ego libido". This could be observed in action when it became "object libido" cathecting (mental) sexual objects (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.217). Libido then emerges as a part of the sexual instincts which is attached to the ego for the purpose of seeking satisfaction for the sexual instincts as a whole. They then must be a part of the "unconscious ego" or else be present in the ego as ideas. It is also distinct from, though clearly related to, the "ego instincts" (or self-preservative instincts). This forms a very tight, complex relationship between the sexual instincts (tied fundamentally to the id), the ego instincts (operating from the conscious or unconscious part of the ego) and the ego-libido which emerges as a special sex-instincts-related part of the ego instincts. Within this close relationship, Freud makes it difficult to give place
and meaning to sexual emotions, i.e., what we commonly experience and speak of as sexual feelings.

Theoretically there does seem to be some sort of consistency between the notion of ego-libido (which, when it becomes object-libido "we can then perceive it concentrating on objects, becoming fixed upon them or abandoning them, moving from one object to another and, from these situations, directing the subject's sexual activity ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.217)) and affects (which are "displaceable magnitudes of energy"). Affects also become attached to mental objects (and Freud is referring here to mental objects, Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.217, see footnote), allegedly giving them their "colour" of pleasure or unpleasure. On the one hand this seems to blur the distinction between an affect and a quantity of ego-libido (when it becomes object-libido).

In his essay on *Infantile Sexuality* Freud claims that: "it is clear that the behaviour of a child who indulges in thumb-sucking is determined by a search for some pleasure which has already been experienced and is now remembered" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.181). In Freud's terms, the child's libido (or quantity thereof) attaches itself to a mental object, namely the memory of a previously experienced pleasure, thus "directing" the child to seek that pleasure again. If however, the memory (or idea) of previous sucking already has an affect attached to it, i.e., a degree of pleasure, then the quantity of libido that attaches itself to that same memory would seem to be something quite different from the affect, which is already in place when the libido comes searching for the memory. The affect could not even be the manifestation of the sexual instincts or the libido (ego-instinct related specifically to the sexual instincts). At most it could be regarded as a pleasurable sensation attached to the original thumb-sucking experience and then the memory of that experience.
At the infantile stage, it does not seem appropriate to regard that sensation as a feeling in the terms in which feelings were discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, where it was claimed that a certain degree of self-awareness, language and rational activity were necessary for the development of feelings (as opposed to simply having sensations). Freud also refers to "sexual excitation" throughout his essays on sexuality in a way that distinguishes such excitation (sensation?) from "affective processes" (also sensations?).

In *Infantile Sexuality* Freud claims that "comparatively intense affective processes, including even terrifying ones" are sources of sexual excitation (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.203). He claims that: "the sexually exciting effect of many emotions which are in themselves unpleasurable, such as feelings of apprehension, fright or horror, persists in a great number of people throughout their adult life" (Freud, S.E., Vol. VII, p.203). Here it seems clear that Freud is distinguishing firmly between sexual excitement (as the manifestation of the sexual instinct) and emotions which either accompany such excitement or actually provoke it.

Further, he appears to distinguish between feelings of unpleasure and other feelings such as apprehension, fright or horror. To say that fright or horror are "in themselves" unpleasurable implies that they actually are something in themselves to which is attached the quality or further feeling of unpleasure. In the same essay Freud makes another observation that requires some unravelling in connection with the notions of excitation and emotion. He claims that: "it is an unmistakeable fact that concentration of the attention upon an intellectual task and intellectual strain in general produce a concomitant sexual excitation in many young people as well as adults" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.204). To say that such attention "produces" sexual excitation is to say something other than that sexual feelings are produced. Excitement (tension) and affect in the form of sensations of
pleasure or unpleasure) still seem conceptually and qualitatively different from sexual feelings which require the use of a different vocabulary and metaphor (see Chapter One).

Still in the same essay, Freud speaks of it being "more or less" certain that the "fullest provisions are made for setting in motion the process of sexual excitation (in infancy) - a process the nature of which has ... become highly obscure ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.201). He claims that "first and foremost" the process is set in motion by the "excitations of sensory surfaces" (skin and sense organs) but "apart from these sources there are present in the organism contrivances which bring it about that in the case of a great number of internal processes sexual excitation arises as a concomitant effect (sic) as soon as the intensity of those processes passes beyond certain quantitative limits". And further "that the whole nature of sexual excitation is completely unknown to us ... (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, pp.204-5). Once again, "sexual excitation" seems to emerge as something quite different from either sexual instincts or emotions/feelings, and indeed is regarded by Freud as being highly obscure in nature. He clearly then does not equate sexual excitation with the sexual instincts (which seem to be connected with the "internal processes" referred to) or with affect, or feelings.

In his essay *Transformations of Puberty* Freud once again addresses "the problem of sexual excitation" referring there to "the nature of sexual tension which arises simultaneously with the pleasure" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.212). In this essay he treats "sexual excitation" and "sexual tension" as equivalent thus making an even stronger distinction between excitation (tension) and affect or feelings.
Section IV: Hysteria, neurosis, and emotions

In the Preliminary Communication of Studies on Hysteria Freud and Breuer refer to the operative cause of the illness of traumatic neurosis as being the "affect of fright - the psychical trauma". The claim is that "any experience which calls up distressing affects such as those of fright, anxiety, shame or physical pain - may operate as a trauma of this kind ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.6). The "affect" is being presented as an emotion attached to an event. An "event" is being presented as something that has the power to "call up" distressing (or other) affects. So it seems that events in our lives are things that provoke or "call up" emotions (presumably from somewhere) If affects are viewed as "displaceable magnitudes of energy" that are some sort of manifestation of an instinctual drive, that attach themselves to ideas, then it is difficult to see how they can be "called up" by events unless we are speaking solely of internal, mental events.

Freud and Breuer clearly are not referring to mental events only, but to experiences that provoke the emotions of fear, shame, anxiety etc. Further, the only way to rid the neurotic patient of symptoms is to bring back into consciousness the memory of the experience and to evoke the same powerful emotion (affect) in connection with that memory. The arousal of the distressing memory together with the full quota of its distress (or affect) results in a complete dispersal (or discharge) of the emotion and the disappearance of the neurotic symptoms involved (Freud, S.E., Vol.II, p.6). The process of recalling the event to the consciousness does constitute the formation of an idea to which the affect can then be attached and thus discharged - but this does not solve the problem of how the event itself "calls up" an affect in the first instance. In Freud's terms, the event should become an idea in the mind and the idea then calls up an affect or affects. If the event is so shocking that the consciousness immediately rejects it, then presumably, the unpleasurable affect remains "floating" and
seeks to attach itself to some other idea in the mind, seeking "discharge" of the excitation so caused.

In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* Freud states that he relates pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is present in the mind and relates them in such a way that that "unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution". But he adds immediately that this is not a simple relation and does not solve the problem of what the meaning of feelings of pleasure and unpleasure really are (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, pp.7-8). Freud states unequivocally: "...we would readily express our gratitude to any philosophical or psychological theory which was able to inform us of the meaning of the feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which act so imperatively upon us" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.7). In statements such as these Freud seems to be distinguishing quite clearly between feelings and instincts. The instinct towards seeking pleasure he speaks of as a "strong tendency" in the mind that is related to the "tendency towards stability" (attributed to Fechner) (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.9). The instincts opposing this tendency (or instinct) are the ego's instincts of self-preservation which apparently perceive the instinct towards pleasure in its primary form as "inefficient and even highly dangerous" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.10). The self-preservation instincts form the basis of the *Reality Principle* (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.10) which emerges as a strong tendency to achieve pleasure but with the reservations of being able to tolerate postponement and temporary unpleasure in the interests of survival (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, pp.10-11). With these explanations, Freud is not, clearly, referring to those "feelings" which he had just classed as being indefiniteable and obscure.

He quite correctly senses at this point that "strong tendencies" towards this or that state do not explain the complexity, variety, and aesthetic status of the almost infinite array of those things we all call
feelings. Nor does an account of the tension between pleasure and unpleasure suffice to explain the shades, combinations, and patterns of feeling that play across our consciousness throughout our lives. The neurotic may indeed be "traumatised" by an event and may indeed be psychologically crippled by the effect of a particular and powerful feeling. That however, does not explain the delicate and complex network of feelings, as quite distinct from ideas and instincts, that exists in the neurotic's make-up. Such a network is present in everyone quite irrespective of any trauma, except perhaps the "shock" of being born and becoming aware of a world that is itself full of imbalances and mysteries. Nor does any account of the mechanism of neurosis and hysteria give an account of the power of feelings in other than the self-destructive sense - the constructive sense being power that feelings have to influence other feelings whether they be one's own or those of another person, not in struggle but in enrichment.

Freud begins to touch on this complexity (and indeed to distinguish between kinds of feeling) when he distinguishes between anxiety, fear, and fright. Referring to traumatic neurosis in Part II of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud describes "anxiety" as "a particular state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown one"; "fear" as "requiring a definite object of which to be afraid"; and "fright" as "the state a person gets into when he as run into danger without being prepared for it; it emphasises the factor of surprise" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.12). But even here, Freud does not go far enough into the complexity.

He speaks of fear, anxiety, and fright as "states" and quite rightly, since it is of the most common of experiences to be in a state of fright or fear or anxiety and not be aware or fully aware of the feelings of fright, fear, or anxiety. The state of extreme fear or fright can in fact paralyse the immediate awareness of feelings (as well as actions) completely. If action
is taken to dispel the fear or fright then very often, the feelings are experienced well after the actual event. In a state of fear a person may appear to act fearlessly and without feeling. The feelings of fear afterwards may actually cause further terror, confusion or collapse. A state of fear may well be an instinctual reaction to an event or even the idea in the mind of that event, but the release of feelings of fear require that state to be broken by action of some kind.

This in fact is consistent with Freud’s claim that the recalling of a traumatic event and its affect is necessary to dispel hysterical symptoms. But the event which "calls up" the state (affect?) of fear is repressed by the conscious mind before any action can be taken to break the state and release the feelings; so the patient is "caught" in the state of paralysis induced by the unbroken state of fear. By recalling the event to the consciousness, the patient is acting to break the state of paralysis which in turn breaks the state of fear, which then releases or allows the feelings to emerge. That is, it allows the person to attend to his or her feelings and thereby experience them, thus feeling a sense of release from what were virtually unknown pressures. That Freud believes a state of anxiety cannot produce a traumatic neurosis (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.12) is also consistent with this distinction between states and feelings. The "state of expecting danger or preparing for it" (Freud defining anxiety, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.12) allows action and indeed demands it. It also gives time to attend to feelings that arise in connection with the expected danger, so emotional paralysis does not occur.

Freud touches directly on this process when he states in Studies on Hysteria that: "The fading of a memory or the losing of its affect depends on various factors. The most important of these is whether there has been an energetic reaction to the event that provokes an affect. By 'reaction' we here understand the whole class of voluntary and involuntary reflexes -
from tears to acts of revenge - in which, as experience shows us, the affects are discharged. If this reaction takes place to a sufficient amount a large part of the affect disappears as a result" (Freud, S.E., Vol.II, p.8).

Once again, Freud seems to be talking about two different things when he speaks of the affect provoked by an event and the display of feelings or affects that occur when a person reacts to the event. To say simply that the original affect is "discharged" does not explain the feelings that accompany that process of discharge, i.e., that accompany the tears, act or revenge, or whatever. What appears to happen, in fact, is this - a traumatic event "provokes" an affective state. Then there occurs a "reaction", or rather an action, to break that state and only then is that state dispersed by an outflow of feelings and more actions in some cases. If no action is taken in the first affective state, i.e., if the person is paralysed and helpless in the face of an event that cannot be dealt with effectively, then the second stage, the outflow of feelings cannot occur and they remain pathologically inside the psyche.

In the quoted passage two more points of complexity arise. Firstly, when Freud speaks of a 'reaction' being the whole class of voluntary and involuntary reflexes from tears to acts of revenge, he is not distinguishing sufficiently between physical and emotional reactions. Tears, for example, do not tell us much about feelings - we may cry with sorrow, joy, terror, hatred, frustration and love, or cry without knowing why, or feeling anything specific. We may perform an act of revenge or atonement with different or mixed feelings. The act itself, while it may indicate a discharge of feelings or affects, cannot tell us with any real accuracy, what those feelings are, even with regard to ourselves let alone others. When Freud says: "If there is no such reaction (to an event) whether in deeds or words, or in the mildest cases in tears, any recollection of the event retains its affective tone to begin with" (Freud, S.E., Vol.II, p.8), he does not say anything about
feelings, neither the feelings that accompany the reactive deed, nor the feelings that make up the "affective tone": attached to the original event.

This brings us to the second point of complexity - when Freud says a large part of the affect "disappears" as a result of a "sufficient" reaction he is once again telling us only about a kind of emotional tension that is attached to an event. It is again the most common of our experiences to feel a surge of emotion or emotional tension in reaction to an event without, quite often, being able to define precisely what our feelings are. That tension may be dissipated by an action to "counter" the event and we are conscious of release from the tension, but we may still have many differing feelings about the entire incident.

Freud appears to allow this when he says: "an injury that has been repaid, even if only in words, is recollected quite differently from one that has had to be accepted" (Freud, S.E., Vol.II, p.8). Freud cannot be saying that the "repaid" incident is recalled without any feelings or affect. What he seems to be saying rather is that such incidents are recalled with different feelings or affects. In fact we may observe that such incidents are recalled with feelings devoid of acute tension. This indicates that there are feelings "charged with affect" or "affective energy" which gives the degree of passion attached to any given feeling. This does not seem to be incompatible with Freud's general position except that he has not gone so far as to distinguish between feelings in this way. What he sensed of this problem he covers by speaking of the degree of pleasure or unpleasure attached to an affect, relating pleasure and unpleasure to the "degree of excitation that is present in the mind but is not in any way 'bound'" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.8). A high degree of excitation (or tension, which Freud himself equates with excitation) relates to unpleasure, a low degree to pleasure.
That Freud was so essentially dissatisfied with this account as a complete explanation of "the meaning of feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which act so imperatively upon us" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.7) is consistent with the diverse ways in which he speaks of "affective states", "affects", "emotions", and "feelings". That he decided to use pleasure and unpleasure as descriptions or measures of the effect of excitation or tension in the psyche raises another set of questions.

Firstly, to say that pleasure corresponds to a low degree of excitation does not really tell us anything about feelings of pleasure. We all commonly experience states of emotional tension and release of that tension where the state of tension can in fact be pleasurable for any number of reasons - anticipation, readiness for desired action, or simply the simple pleasure of "feeling alive and vital". Equally, a low degree of excitation can be unsatisfactory or unpleasurable in a situation that requires tension and action. It is not enough to claim that when we have feelings of tension and excitement that are pleasurable, we are in some way "really" in a state of low excitation, or that when we have unhappy feelings of a lack of tension that we are "really" in a state of high excitation. This simply does not explain our feelings as we directly experience them, though it does, in an important way, say something of the mix-up of feelings that occurs in the cases of hysteria and neurosis. That Freud constantly takes psychoanalysis, and therefore abnormal states of mind, as his starting point, makes his own position understandable, but at the same time it makes his perspective on feelings correspondingly unacceptable (even to himself).

Secondly, to take pleasure and unpleasure as primary states of some sort or degrees of states is difficult to justify. Certainly it can readily be observed that a range of feelings have commonly attached to them the notion of being pleasurable or unpleasurable. Anger, fear, hatred, pain,
etc, are for example, regarded as states of unpleasure. But, it can also be readily observed that there are situations in which anger "feels good". To say that it feels good or pleasurable because there is some sort of discharge of excitation going on does not explain our direct feeling and experience of pleasure while in the state of anger and certainly does not explain our direct feeling of, for example, sadness or emptiness when such an incident is over.

With the "discharge of the affect" one should, in Freud's terms, be conscious of pleasurable feelings as the product or manifestation of a low degree of excitation. Freud would argue perhaps that the discharge was not "sufficient", but it is not satisfactory to say "sufficiency" is to be measured by the very presence (or absence) of pleasurable feelings. The most violent discharges of emotion are frequently followed by feelings of low grade pain, sorrow and tiredness.

Further, why must pleasure or unpleasure be the primary states or measures? Why not take "anger" and "non-anger" or "fear" and "non-fear"? It would seem just as valid to say that anger is the measure of excitation in the psyche, that we operate fundamentally on a "Peace Principle" but that self preservation demands a state of protective anger from time to time. However to propagate the species and fulfil our human nature by expressions of mutual attachment, we need a state of peace (pleasurable activities, especially sexual ones, certainly distract us from any possible dangers and leave us vulnerable) so we strive instinctively for peace. The raising and discharge of anger protects our peace in appropriate circumstances. Where the peace is violated (i.e., where the anger is insufficient to protect it or ineffective because faced with greater anger) then such violation constitutes trauma and the raised anger begins to operate unappropriately in the psyche.
From here on, Freud's psychoanalytic technique operates just as effectively as it does on the pleasure/unpleasure scale. Fear and non-fear can be rolled out in exactly the same way. It is not sufficient to argue that we can say that fear, anger, etc, are unpleasurable because we can equally say that pleasure is angerless or angerful (to degrees thereof) or pleasure is fearless or fearful and soon. To define pleasure in terms of degree of excitation as Freud does is essentially to rob it of its own quality and uniqueness of feeling which is what we directly experience when we speak of "feeling pleasure".

Thirdly, the whole notion of primary states in connection with feelings is indeed most obscure, as Freud says. To speak of primary states in connection with tension and lack of tension seems useful in terms of the successful operation of many things, including the human psyche, but even then there is the problem of extremes and how to deal with them. Each can be constructive or destructive depending on the context; and at the extremes of each, definition becomes blurred as does the very distinction. Freud demonstrates this very well in his discussion on love and hatred, which he cannot class as opposites in any simple way, and which, Freud claims, refuse to be fitted into the scheme of the instincts, i.e., the instincts as having opposite poles (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.133).

So far in this chapter I have sought to demonstrate that Freud's use of emotional terms and concepts does not fit easily into his formal theoretical explanation of the instincts, emotions and feelings. I have sought to establish that Freud refers to instincts, emotions, feelings, affects and states in ways that indicate a real difference between them either directly by his usage, or indirectly by the inconsistency or problems that arise when the attempt is made to relate his explanations to his usage. I have also sought to demonstrate that there is a real conceptual problem with Freud's use of polarity in connection with emotions. In the following
chapter I shall discuss Freud's concepts of love and hatred and his concept of anxiety to demonstrate further that his thinking has an undercurrent of emotional concepts that seem to form a separate theory of emotions - one that does cause problems with some of his theoretical structure, but which, nonetheless, adds another useful dimension to psychoanalysis.
CHAPTER SEVEN

INSTINCTS AND EMOTIONS AS SEPARATE CONCEPTS
IN FREUD'S WRITINGS (continued)

Section I: Love as instinct

In his discussion of love Freud makes it very clear that while he recognises the many ways in which language uses the word "love" and indeed that such uses do describe different forms of love, those forms were nonetheless all originally fully sensual (genital) love and remain so in man's unconscious (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, pp.102-3). Freud says in Civilization and its Discontents that the "careless way in which the language uses the word 'love' has its genetic justification". He claims that people give the name "love" to the relation between a man and a woman "whose genital needs have led them to found a family" and also give the name to the positive feelings between parents and children, and siblings, the positive feelings between strangers, and so on (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, pp.102-3). These other loves, he claims, must be described as "aim-inhibited love" or "affection". What man came to call "love" was, originally, the sexual desire of a man for a woman and the desire to keep the sexual object near, thus providing the foundation for the formation of families. For the woman, love was also originaly sexual desire and the need to remain close to children and protection (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.99).
With the claim that all love is fundamentally "fully sensual love" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.103), Freud is classing love as one of the most powerful instincts, powerful enough to form one of the "two-fold foundations of human beings - the compulsion to work, which was created by external necessity, and the power of love which made the man unwilling to be deprived of his sexual object" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.101). On this basis, Freud is seeing love as an internal force in man (a sexual instinct) and an external force in civilisation, shaping the ways in which people relate to one another and mature (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.98). As an internal, sexual instinct, love emerges as the sexual energy of the libido and is recognisable in Freud's formal theory of the instincts.

Freud also speaks of love as "positive feelings" for the sexual object and other people (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI). He also states in Civilization and its Discontents that "one of the forms in which love manifests itself - sexual love - has given us our most intense experience of an overwhelming sensation of pleasure and has thus furnished us with a pattern for our search for happiness" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.82). In connection with this experience he claims that: "We are never so defenceless against suffering as when we love, never so hopelessly unhappy as when we have lost our loved object or its love" (Freud, S.E., Vol. XXI, p.82). To counteract this helplessness and suffering, while attempting to retain the happiness brought by love, "a small minority" of people protect themselves by directing their love to all men alike and "they avoid the uncertainties and disappointments of genital love by turning away from its sexual aims and transforming the instinct into an impulse with an inhibited aim. What they bring about in themselves in this way is a state of evenly suspended, steadfast affection feeling which has little external resemblance any more to the stormy agitations of genital love" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.102). For Freud, this constituted one of the "techniques" for fulfilling the pleasure principle.
With these kinds of claims, Freud is attempting to establish love as an instinct. But he is doing this in a curious way. It is as though he is saying "all love is essentially genital love" in the same way as he could claim "all beverages are essentially water". In other words, genital love is elemental in the same way as water is elemental. While this may be a claim that can be broadly justified, it does not in the end tell us very much about the nature of different feelings (or beverages) and, in particular, feelings of love.

Section II: Love as feeling

Within the history of human thought on love, sexual desire and love have not been considered identical even within sexual relationships between men and women. To put it even more finely, sexual desire and sexual love have not been understood as identical. It is a common experience in the lives of most people to feel a desire for sex which may possibly be satisfied by any one of several agreeable partners ("sex objects"), and to feel a desire for sex with a particular person where no other partner can possibly satisfy. Our vocabulary, mirroring our human experiences, distinguishes between all possible alternatives and combinations here. There is:

(a) sexual desire with sexual love where the object of desire is exclusive and particular;

(b) sexual desire without sexual love where the object(s) of desire is not exclusive or particular but conforms only to general criteria of appeal (i.e., preferences for particular types or characteristics);
(c) sexual desire with sexual love and "love entire" where the first two are joined by feelings of love for the whole person as an object of love, where that person's desires, feelings, needs, and personality are taken into account and dealt with lovingly;

(d) sexual desire and sexual love without "love entire" where the exclusive and particular object is needed, wanted and even "owned", whether they like it or not;

(e) there is also "love entire" without sexual desire or sexual love, where the well-being of the love-object(s) is important; and

(f) "love entire" with an exclusive and particular love object where the well-being of a particular love object is important, and sexual love and desire are not present. There is also the relationship with self-love to be considered in each of these variations.

Freud's claim that we must view these variations under the general heading first and foremost of genital love and then with sub-headings of sexual love and aim-inhibited love (with its "steadfast feelings of affection") tells us nothing of the multiplicity of personal feelings of love, for which we have a most elaborate and complicated vocabulary, that are evoked in the various circumstances described above. As argued in Chapters One and Three, a sensation of pleasure and a feeling of happiness are two different experiences (though they may be had concurrently) which are different by virtue of their cognitive status. Similarly, sexual desire (sensation, excitation) and sexual love are cognitively different, and they may be operative separately or together.

Further, Freud's division of love in this way does not explain why those who use "aim-inhibited love" as a "technique" for fulfilling the pleasure
principle are not in fact as immune from suffering as they ought to be on his definition. Pursuing genital love outright is too dangerous and causes the most acute suffering, Freud claims. Aim-inhibited love is the protection against this, especially in the form of directing love to all men alike (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.102). These "affectionate feelings" bear little resemblance to the "stormy agitations" of genital love.

It is difficult in fact to find examples of the kind of love that Freud has set up here. He evokes pictures of benign parsons or religious people smiling serenely at the world and professing love for all, but the reality, even of these kinds of people is very different. For Freud to argue, as he does, that the "love thy neighbor as thyself" injunction is a way civilisation has of protecting itself against man's natural aggression by asking man to go against his natural instincts, hardly bears up when the consequences of such love are considered in the real world (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.112). Such love may indeed go against natural instincts (though this is arguable if one examines the complexity of the term "natural") but it leaves the lover in a most vulnerable and dangerous position personally, thus making this love extremely difficult to practise on two counts.

There is of course the well-known pseudo-love practised by many "lovers of mankind" which is a kind of benevolent detachment, a generalised air of good-will which hardly recognises individuals at all, but the hollowness of this sort of love with its well-meaning platitudes has long been obvious. We recognise from our language and our experience that love assumes a certain character - it is involvement (not non-involvement), it reaches out, it is offering something (not merely taking), it is generous, it has strength, and so on. It also carries pain as well as joy in any of the forms we personally recognise and practise. It increases vulnerability as well as strength. It is a way of being as well as a way of feeling.
When compared with what we see of love, Freud's notion of "aim-inhibited love" is a difficult one. To say that it is a love that is "far removed from the stormy agitations of genital love" may describe some sort of ideal gentle love but it bears little resemblance to actual friendships in the real world, or other non-sexual love relationships. Most friendships are just as vulnerable to misunderstandings and stormy agitations (though of a different kind to sexual love). What is implied in Freud's claim of the transformation of genital love from a powerful instinct to "an impulse with an inhibited aim" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.82) is that the love becomes in some way less powerful, less stormy, less passionate. But is the infidelity or carelessness of the sexual lover any more painful than the carelessness and disloyalty, or treachery, of a friend? Many would argue most emphatically not.

Once again our language mirrors our experiences. Betrayal in family and friendships is treated no less passionately in our literature than betrayals by sexual lovers. The loss of a friend breaks hearts no less than the loss of a lover. The very removal of friendship from the uncertainties of the sexual sphere has made it more precious (and therefore more dangerous) than sexual relationships in many cultures throughout the ages. As Cicero wrote in 44 BC, "All I can do is urge you to put friendship ahead of all other human concerns", and "What could be finer than to have someone to whom you may speak as freely as to yourself? How could you derive true joy from good fortune if you did not have someone who would rejoice in your happiness as much as you yourself? And it would be very hard to bear misfortune in the absence of anyone who would take your sufferings even harder than you", and finally, "friendship is so concentrated and restricted a thing that all the true affection in the world is shared by no more than a handful of individuals (Cicero, trans. Copley, 1971, pp.53, 55).
The language used in Cicero's essay *On Friendship* and the ideas expressed are familiar and comprehensible. We have experienced the pain of loss in connection with friendships, we know their value and their power. We distinguish between powerful feelings of friendship and powerful feelings of sexual love and the different kinds of power they have over us. Of course they may co-exist in any one relationship, but that does not make them identical, or one "safer" than the other. Freud may argue at some meta-level that the passion of friendship and other aim-inhibited loves is a proof of love's essential genital nature (something of a circular argument!) but this is not our conscious experience. It is not our conscious way of being and understanding as it is reflected in human history, and our understanding of our experiences cannot completely be dismissed by Freud or anyone else in favour of a meta-level explanation. At least, the meta-explanation would need to be able to co-exist with our conscious understanding, not as individuals only, but as nations, cultures, ages, eras and civilizations, that is on very wide empirical grounds based on different types of human relations, not only neurotic ones.

Freud concedes this indirectly with his oft-stated uneasiness about emotions, his multiple ways of referring to them and the very language he uses, even within his psychoanalytic language system, to describe himself and others. As he says in part II of *Civilization and its Discontents*, love clings to and seeks an emotional relationship with objects in the external world and "we are never so defenceless against suffering as when we love" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.82). To have an emotional relationship implies the sort of cognitive involvement discussed in Chapters One and Three. When speaking of the sources of suffering Freud mentions the suffering of the body in time (ageing), the suffering caused by the "external world which may rage against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction" and the suffering "from our relations to other men ... the suffering which comes from this course is perhaps more painful than any
other ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.77). Here he does not specify the primary, sexual relations but speaks as though "relations to other men" is to be taken in the broad historical sense (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.778).

Freud complicates his notion of love in a particularly difficult way when he speaks of the difficulty of fitting love (and hate) into his scheme of the instincts (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.133). In his paper, *Instincts and their Vicissitudes*, he speaks of there being "no doubt that there is the most intimate relation between these two opposite feelings (love and hate) and sexual life, but we are naturally unwilling to think of love as being some kind of special component instinct of sexuality ... we should prefer to regard loving as the expression of the whole sexual current of feeling ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.Xlv, p.133). Looked at in the context of emotions, Freud is clearly attempting to distinguish between the components of the instinct of sexuality (such components being discussed by him as opposites such as sadism and masochism, scopophilia and exhibitionism) and the feelings of love and hate, though he is also attempting to define love and hate in some special way as related to sexual instincts. It is here that the distinction between instincts and feelings seems crucial. It is indeed difficult to see love as the manifestation of an instinct in the way that sadism, for example, can be seen as the manifestation of an instinct. But it is certainly comprehensible to see love as a feeling closely related to the sexual instincts and appearing alongside the instincts, coloured perhaps by the nature of the instincts (and thus being perceived sometimes as its opposite, hate). Hate though is not the only opposite to love, Freud claims. There is also *being loved* (as the opposite to loving) and *indifference* (as the opposite to loving/hating).

Freud's classification here is an example of the complexity that lies right at the heart of his thinking on emotions. He is classifying together three qualitatively different things and each reflects a level of his dealing
with emotions. When speaking of love/hate he is speaking of emotional states; when speaking of loving/being loved he is speaking of emotional feelings and the giving and receiving elements; when speaking of indifference/loving, hating he is speaking of non-feeling as opposed to feeling, i.e., degrees of excitation. Looked at in the context of his other ways of referring to instincts, affects, feelings, emotions, we see the real beginning of a threefold theory of emotions that is consistent with all the references but that gives emotions a new position within the theory of psychoanalysis - and which, incidentally, makes sense of the apparent contradictions in Freud's ways of speaking. This theory will be outlined further in Chapter Eight, but to underline this development I will look at Freud's notion of hate, and then of anxiety.

Section III: Hate

Whereas in the use of the word "love", an intimate connection with sexual pleasure and function is discernible, the use of the term "hate" yields no such connection, Freud claims (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). In Instincts and their Vicissitudes Freud traces the origins of hate stating that "the relation of unpleasure seems to be the sole decisive one" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). Hate emerges as the instinct of the ego to abhor and pursue, with intent to destroy, all objects which are a source of unpleasurable feeling and "it may be asserted that the true prototypes of the relation of hate are derived not from sexual life, but from the ego's struggle to pursue and maintain itself" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). Love and hate become opposites only in the context of the pleasure/unpleasure relation (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). The difficulty with regard to hate is that Freud gives no explanation of what it is for the ego to "hate and abhor" other objects which are a source of unpleasurable feelings, as distinct from
"pursuing with intent to destroy" such objects. It is comprehensible enough to claim that the self-preservative instincts of the ego pursue and attempt to destroy objects which cause unpleasurable feelings, but what is the dimension added by reference to hating and abhorring such objects? If it is the case that the hate instinct triggers the instinct to destroy, then it would seem that the activation of the one instinct is dependent on another instinct which is dependent on some further instinct. In this instance, destruction is triggered by hate which is triggered by unpleasure which is triggered by an object in the world or an internal mental object of some kind. So far, so good - but what can such an explanation possibly tell us about our conscious experience of hate? Firstly, we may experience hate in many different ways and contexts. Sometimes we recognise that we want to destroy the hated object, but more often the urge to destroy is not part of our conscious feeling. We may turn away from the hated object, remove ourselves from its sphere of influence, do battle with the object in order to transform the hated feature of it; but whichever of these actions we take to alleviate our distress, we still have our feelings of hate to contend with and understand. Here we have to sort out hate from fear, from distress, from anger, from frustration, from rivalry, from injustice, and from many other feelings (sometimes including love), all of which we recognise as being different from one another though often co-existing.

Any one of the emotions just mentioned could trigger the instinct to destroy in certain circumstances, could be the result of feelings of unpleasure caused by some external (or internal) object, and indeed any one of these emotions is easier to define than hate itself. Though our language and culture allows the term "pure hatred" and seems to have some concept of it (especially in relation to evil), it is exceedingly difficult to describe such a feeling. We feel that it would be implacable and terrible, and we know of deeds, in history certainly, that appear to have been inspired by such a feeling. We may explain the deeds by positing the "hate
as an instinct" theory, but this is once more at a level removed from the actual experiencing of emotion. When looking at the explosion caused by an atomic bomb one may be told of the physics of the process, but that bears little relation to what one is looking at, i.e., to one's experiencing the sight and sound of the explosion. The physics of the matter and the experiencing of it are two different though equally valid and necessary kinds of explanation. Similarly, while psychological explanations or theories may explain what is "really" going on when we experience emotions, it is not enough to explain what they are, to give them meaning that is related to and consistent with our vital experiencing - without which no theories would be possible. Again, Freud concedes these things indirectly with his reservations about the nature of feelings, with references to their complexity and obscurity.

In connection with hate, Freud says in An Outline of Psychoanalysis that he eventually decided (at the age of 82) to assume the existence of only two basic instincts - Eros and the destructive instinct (the final aim of which made it also a death instinct). As he defines hate in terms of the instinct to destroy (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138) and refers finally to Eros as "Eros (or the love instinct ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXIII, p.149), we come to the basic instincts that appear to be love and hate where love encompasses the notion of unity and the urge to bind together and establish even greater unities, and hate encompasses the coming apart, the undoing of connections, destruction as opposed to construction (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXIII, p.148). In this context it is easy to see why Freud sees love and hate as instincts, forces that move us and shape our lives as individuals and as species. It is also clear however that these "instincts" are not his final explanation and understanding of our conscious feelings - a point I will elaborate at the conclusion of this chapter.
Section IV: Anxiety

It is perhaps within his treatment of the concept of anxiety that Freud’s multi-level approach to emotions is illustrated most dramatically. In his lecture Anxiety Freud refers to the problem of anxiety as being "a riddle whose solution would be bound to throw a flood of light on our whole mental existence" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.393). He says that up until a certain point he studied anxiety as a neurosis of the vagus nerve and then found that nothing interested him less in understanding anxiety than a knowledge of "the path of the nerves along which its excitations pass" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.393).

He claims that neurotics describe anxiety as their "worst suffering" and that "everyone of us has experienced that sensation, or, to speak more correctly, that affective state at one time or another on our own account" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, pp.392-3). He goes on to describe "realistic anxiety" as contrasted with "neurotic anxiety" when he sees the former as being "something very rational and intelligible" on the one hand (i.e., in so far as it gives warning of danger) but not so rational on the other hand (in so far as it, or an excess of it, can paralyse action). Then he states that "by 'anxiety' we usually understand the subjective state into which we are put by perceiving the 'generation of anxiety' and we call this an affect". At this stage anxiety is a sensation, a state, something rational (possibly), an affect, a warning (i.e., a manifestation of the self-preserving instinct) and something that we can perceive in ourselves (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, pp.394-5).

That Freud sees anxiety primarily as an affect suggests that it is closer to an emotion than to an instinct. Freud continues this analysis by stating that an affect "includes in the first place particular motor innervations or discharges and secondly certain feelings; the latter are of two kinds -
perceptions of the motor actions which have occurred and the direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which, as we say, gives the affect its keynote" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.395). As Freud says here, an affect is something "highly composite" and, (significantly for my inquiry), it is made up of motor innervations or discharges and certain feelings, thus distinguishing between affect, discharges of energy and feelings. Freud then goes further and claims that this still does not give the essence of an affect, and that the repetition of some particular significant experience is the "core which holds the combination we have described together" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.396). In this way an "affective state" is constructed and Freud likens it to the construction of an hysterical attack, the hysterical attack itself being a freshly constructed affective state and the "normal" affective state being the expression of a general hysteria which has become a heritage, i.e., "a very early impression of a general nature placed in the prehistory not of the individual but of the species" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, pp.395-6).

By likening the construction of an affective state to an hysterical attack Freud adds yet another dimension to his treatment of emotions. At this stage, Freud's intention to distinguish between "displaceable magnitudes of energy" (tensions), affects, instincts and feelings is very clear. But if emotions are to be seen as certain states then this is conceptually different again. According to Freud, an hysterical attack (as opposed to chronic hysterical symptoms) is constructed when a person, who had previously enjoyed good mental health, undergoes an occurrence of "incompatibility in their ideational life" where the ego was faced with "an experience, an idea or a feeling which aroused such a distressing affect that the subject decided to forget about it because he had no confidence in his power to resolve the contradiction between that incompatible idea and his ego by means of thought activity" (Freud, S.E., Vol.III, p.47). However this task, a defensive one by the ego, cannot be carried out, the memory
trace and the affect which is attached to the idea "are there once and for all and cannot be eradicated". The ego can, however, rob the idea of its affect and this sum of excitation is then attached to some "mnemic symbol" in the conscious mind (Freud, S.E., Vol.III, pp.48-9). Hysterical attacks continue each time a "fresh impression of the same sort succeeds in breaking through the barrier erected by the will" whereby a fresh affect is supplied to the original weakened idea and the original affect finds its way back to the idea. The hysterical attack lasts until a further conversion takes place, i.e., the affect is once more transferred to a mnemonic symbol (Freud, S.E., Vol.III, p.50).

To follow Freud's parallel between an hysterical attack and an affective state we can assume that an affective state (such as "normal" anxiety) is constructed by some original event that gave rise to excitation and that each time a fresh impression of the same kind takes place the original excitation is added to and strengthened becoming identifiable by the ego as a particular kind of excitation such as a state of pleasure, distress, etc - what, in short, we all call emotional states. The original event that began the construction of an emotional state ascribes to genetic makeup, thus we are all born with a predisposition to feel certain things in connection with certain events (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, pp.395-6).

Freud's use of the term "state" here suggests something rather stronger and more encompassing than any single "feeling" or emotion. An hysterical attack (to follow the parallel) is something that briefly dominates the organism and an "emotional state" suggests that same domination - unlike the more usual human condition of feeling a mixture of emotions at any given time and not being dominated by any one of them. A strong or significant event certainly alters this balance from time to time but we commonly refer to someone being in an "emotional state" when some dominant feelings are strongly present. Once again the presence of
feelings suggests some cognitive relation, a certain degree of self-awareness. An "affective state" in Freud's terms, however, does not necessarily suggest personal awareness of any particular feelings. To be in an affective state one needs only to be in a state dominated by a high degree of excitation and, as argued in Chapter Six, one may be in such a state without being able to identify one's feelings correctly at all.

This distinction between emotional and affective states continues to be present as Freud interprets and analyses anxiety. As an affective state, anxiety begins with the original impression in the mind of the act of birth (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.396) which has become the prototype of the affects of mortal danger with its "combination of unpleasurable feelings, impulses of discharge of excitation and bodily sensations". This may recur as an affective state whenever events stimulate a person back to that original, overpowering condition of complete anxiety - or it may recur as an emotional state when a person experiences an inflow of anxious feelings. The difference may be further illustrated by the way in which we commonly refer to people as being in certain emotional states and in "highly emotional states", which seems closer to Freud's description of an affective state, as opposed to an idea in the mind being charged with affect to a greater or lesser degree. A "state" implies the entire psyche being involved, as is the case in an hysterical attack, which Freud uses as the parallel. In an affective state the entire psyche is charged with excitation (tension), whereas in an emotional state the entire psyche seems rather to be "coloured" with specific, identifiable, self-conscious feelings.

This distinction in connection with anxiety can perhaps be best perceived when comparing Freud's descriptions of "free floating anxiety" and "phobia" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.398). Free floating anxiety may be perceived as a general affective state where a high degree of general excitation is present and is ready to attach itself to "any idea which is in any
way suitable ... and lies in wait for any opportunity that will allow it to justify itself" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.398). Characteristically the sufferer is unable to identify specific feelings or specific objects of fear but is "tormented" by foreseeing "the most frightful of all possibilities, interprets every chance event as a premonition of evil and exploits every uncertainty in a bad sense" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.398).

By contrast a phobia is described as a form of anxiety "which is attached to particular objects or situations" and although the anxiety is intense in connection with the particular object, it does not pervade other areas of living for the sufferer (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.400). Further, this anxiety is always readily identified by the sufferer as being a particular feeling (e.g., fear, disgust, horror, etc) rather than a general uneasiness that is overwhelming. Freud says that these two forms of anxiety are independent of one another and only appear simultaneously by accident, neither being a natural progression or stage of the other (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.400). In the case of free floating anxiety, the psyche is generally charged with excitation (tension), with specific feelings very difficult to identify; in the case of phobia, the psyche is "coloured" for a short time (or for short intervals) by specific emotions.

A further exploration of the concept of anxiety leads Freud to claim that anxiety has the further quality of invariably appearing, in cases of psychoneurosis, as a replacement of some other affect after a repression has occurred (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.403). Freud claims that the normal course of psychical events in the unconscious, i.e., where no repression has occurred, is always accompanied by a particular affect. In the course of his inquiries, he found that this affect was replaced by anxiety after repression had occurred, "no matter what its own quality may be". He goes on, "thus, when we have a hysterical-anxiety state before us, its unconscious correlate may be an impulse of a similar character - anxiety,
shame, embarrassment, or, just as easily, a positive libidinal excitation or a hostile aggressive one such as rage or anger" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.403). He concludes: "anxiety is therefore the universally current coinage for which any affective impulse is or can be exchanged if the ideational content attached to it is subjected to repression" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.404).

With this claim, Freud not only establishes anxiety as something different from other emotions, feelings or affects (in so far as it is some sort of "universal coinage"), he also refers quite clearly to the notion that affects can be repressed along with events, that emotions can become unconscious. Earlier, in his essay *The Unconscious* Freud had argued against the notion of unconscious emotions or affects stating that so-called unconscious affects can be misconstrued affects, or affects that are prevented from developing at all by repression, or are transformed during the process of repression to anxiety. He concludes his argument in that instance by saying that despite the linguistic usage (e.g. unconscious anger, etc), there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas - but there are unconscious affective structures which can become conscious. He claims, finally, that: "the whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes - basically of memory traces, whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.178). He adds that "in the present state of our knowledge of affects and emotions, we cannot express this difference more clearly". Freud's later use of the concept of unconscious emotions does not however sound like mere "linguistic usage", especially when he describes the way in which "unconscious emotions" operate in the case of the construction of hysterical attacks. There the original affect, as well as the fresh affect, find their way back to the unconscious idea. The unconscious affect manifests itself under hypnosis (the discharge of intense emotion under hypnosis
being in no way conscious activity and in no way perceived as feeling by the patient at the time).

The use of the notion of "unconscious affective structures", which appear to harbour the "potential beginning" of affects (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.178) helps to resolve this apparent contradiction, but in doing so, it adds yet another level to the way in which Freud presents emotions. What can these affective structures or potential beginnings be, if they are not affects themselves, i.e., the excitation or tension or energy that we are beginning to recognise as the primary level of Freud's thinking on emotions? And what kind of "universal coinage" can anxiety be, if it is not also some sort of primary excitation, in the same way that pleasure and unpleasure seem to be the "universal keynotes" of other emotions? At the same time, this primary status seems to be different in each case. Pleasure and unpleasure seem to be almost a property of other emotions or a quality attached to them as well as a way of ordering emotions into at least two kinds. Anxiety however seems to be the "basic material" or "basic energy" that any emotion reverts to when its development or manifestation is impeded.

And indeed, the basic excitation or tension that an affect appears to be and that is unpleasurable, according to Freud, when present to a high degree, seems to bear some resemblance to anxiety also. At the same time Freud still speaks of anxiety as the conscious feeling we all recognise - the feeling of apprehensiveness, panic, worry, pessimism, fear, and their variously potent mixtures - which is clearly on a different level or in a different mode to the primary energies of emotion.

On yet another meta-level, Freud describes the generation of "realistic anxiety" as the ego's reaction to danger and the signal for taking flight, and claims that it might then be "plausible to suppose that in neurotic anxiety
the ego is making a similar attempt at flight from the demands by its libido" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.405).

The link between the generation of anxiety and the libido is pursued by Freud in a number of related ways. He states unequivocally that libido is a term "properly reserved for the instinctual forces of sexual life" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.413). To some extent, then, libido is likened to the primary energy of affects, the excitation or tension that exists in the psyche, ready to manifest itself given the proper stimulus. Yet affect does not, in itself, strive for pleasure as the libido has been described as doing. Libido, however, which has been repressed, is transformed into anxiety (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.410).

Affect that has been repressed (or prevented from developing) is also transformed into anxiety. We know that Freud did not intend libido and affect to be seen as identical in any sense, yet he has tied them to anxiety here in a way that makes it difficult to disentangle them, especially after he had introduced the term "unconscious affective structures". When describing the generation of neurotic anxiety Freud claims that it is closely dependent on unconsummated "libidinal excitation" (i.e., specifically inadequate discharge of "violent sexual excitation" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.401) which he terms as "libido put to an abnormal employment" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.404). Affect that is transformed to anxiety is described as "prevented from developing" or as "strangulated" rather than abnormally employed. And overall, Freud most certainly allows libido existence in the unconscious while he repeatedly maintains that affect cannot be unconscious despite appearances and linguistic usage to the contrary.

In order to elucidate the relationship between "realistic anxiety" and neurotic anxiety, Freud needs to relate the abnormally employed libido (of the latter) to the ego's instinctual flight from danger (of the former). To do
this he traces the genesis of anxiety in children and comes to the conclusion that such anxiety is generated by disappointment and longing for the beloved mother following the first, and subsequent, separations from her, thus bringing anxiety back to unemployed libido (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, pp.405-8). Hence neurotic anxiety stems, in the end, from infantile anxiety. In the case of healthy adults, momentary longing and disappointment are not transformed into anxiety because they have learned to employ such libido in other ways or to hold it in suspense. Where, however, "the libido belongs to a psychical impulse which has been subject to repression, then circumstances are re-established similar to those in the case of a child in whom there is still no distinction between conscious and unconscious ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.409). The emphasis is mine, to draw attention to the fact that, while he considers that there is a time during which the distinction between conscious and unconscious does not apply to children, he nevertheless attributes any number of emotions as well as libido to them. Once again, the multi-level or multi-faceted way in which Freud deals with emotions is thrown into relief.

In his later writings on anxiety, Freud clarifies his position further and highlights the levels at which anxiety operates - namely the "automatic" or "involuntary" level whenever there arose a situation analogous to the danger of birth, and the ego-level where the ego subjects itself to anxiety as soon as a similar situation "merely threatened to occur in order to call for its avoidance" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XX, p.162). The "involuntary" level of course suggests an anxiety that originates in the unconscious while the ego-level suggests a conscious anxiety with cognitive significance. Freud in fact refers to "instinctual anxiety" as opposed to "realistic anxiety" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XX, p.168), which of course immediately raises the question whether other affects (or emotions or feelings) can have an "instinctual" as well as a "realistic" level. This question is pursued in Chapter Eight in
connection with what I present as Freud's secondary or underlying theory of emotions.

In his *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Freud makes it clear that he does regard anxiety primarily as an "affective state" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.81), where he also distinguishes between an "attack" and a "more persistent state" (thus reinforcing the idea that a "state" is different from a "feeling"), and where he also repeats the connection between anxiety and "the libidinal economies of sexual life" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.82). He also states clearly that he sees the connecting link between neurotic anxiety (unemployed libido) and "realistic anxiety" (ego flight from danger) as fear, i.e., in each case the sufferer is deeply afraid of something, namely either an external danger or the internal libidinal demands and the actions they imply (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.84). In each case the specific fear is that of a "traumatic moment" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.94).

In his latest summing up, Freud does place anxiety as a function of the ego alone where "the ego alone can produce and feel anxiety", though anxiety itself is divided into three "species" (realistic, neurotic, and moral) related to the ego's three dependent relations (the external world, the id, and the Super-ego) (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.85). While the "instinctual anxiety" may then be placed as an anxiety of the ego instincts of self-preservation (rather than transformation of libido), this still does not solve the problem of how the affect of anxiety "finds its way back to the original source of fear" which must necessarily be unconscious. The "unconscious affective structure" must still play some sort of role here; and indeed Freud nowhere repudiates his notion of unconscious affective structures.

Although he does repudiate the idea that the libido is transformed into anxiety (stating instead that the ego constructs anxiety in response to the
magnitude of the sum of excitation generated by an event), this does not really solve the problem of the relation between libido and affect since both are still described as "sums of excitation or tension" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.945). The abandonment of his "old theory" may clarify the generation of anxiety but it does not clarify its final position or "place" when it is regarded as an affect, as a "universal coinage" and an instinct.

Section V: Emotions as psychical states

To the extent that Freud refers to the psychical life as the "mental life" and includes everything from the physical brain to "acts of consciousness" in the "psychical apparatus", emotions may be anything from excitations of the nervous system to experiences related to consciousness with a definite cognitive content (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXIII, pp.147, 157). It is precisely this range of possibilities that Freud attempts to cover in fact with his many references to affect, emotion, feelings, states, etc. It can be argued, however, that there is a further, special significance to Freud's statements on psychical qualities in connection with feelings.

In his later paper *Psychical Qualities* (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXIII, p.157), Freud begins his discussion by stating that the fact of consciousness "defies all explanation or description" but that firstly, we all know what we mean by it, and secondly, it is a view held by many that consciousness alone is psychical, with the psychical phenomena being perceptions, feelings, thought processes, and volitions. He points out then that this gives an incomplete view of the very processes being perceived in this way and that the broken sequences of these processes posit physical or somatic processes that are concomitant with the psychical ones.
Psychoanalysis treats this problem of broken sequences by asserting that there are unconscious psychical processes as well as conscious ones, and that the study of these processes involves the positing of basic concepts and principles such as instinct, nervous energy, etc., just as the older sciences talk about force, mass, attraction, etc. The claim, in effect, is that Psychoanalysis postulates unconscious (invisible) events to fill the gaps uncovered in conscious (visible) events on exactly the same principle as theoretical entities are postulated in the physical sciences.

The significance of this for emotions is that Freud is admitting here that his statements on emotions (in all their forms) are in the nature of "plausible inferences and translations into conscious material", made using the same perceptual and theoretical apparatus as the physical sciences. A sequence of conscious events complementary to the unconscious psychical processes is thus constructed. This kind of exploration of emotions then yields knowledge of emotions only in so far as how they appear when brought into consciousness. To say that emotions have no complementary processes in the unconscious is to say that the broken, fragmentated knowledge yielded by consciousness is the only knowledge there is, to which view Freud most emphatically does not subscribe. Indeed, he pursued his theory of psychoanalysis precisely to establish that there were complementary "invisible" processes that gave a complete picture of "visible" or conscious processes, in connection with emotions.

This then is Freud's scientific justification for talking about something like "unconscious affective structures" and feeling permanently uneasy about his position on "affects". When one considers closely this scientific position that Freud holds, that a complete picture of the psyche is only possible by examining both the conscious manifestation of psychical processes (by observation) and the unconscious or invisible psychical processes (by inference and then prediction), then it seems reasonable to
assume that feelings (which we experience and observe) are underlaid by some more primary energy (which we infer and use as a basis for prediction), and that the admitting of these levels of emotional processes throws some light on the problem of how to relate what happens to us emotionally (in the passive sense) with what we experience consciously emotionally (in the active sense).

This passive and active sense of the way in which we relate to emotions reflects the traditions of thought that Freud brought with him to psychoanalysis and of which he shows awareness indirectly in his many statements on emotions. In the following chapter I will attempt to clarify this further and present what I perceive as a multi-level theory of emotion within Freud's writing.
CHAPTER EIGHT

A MULTI-LEVEL THEORY OF EMOTIONS FROM FREUD

Section I: The case for an alternative theory

In Chapters Five and Six I have argued that Freud was aware that his position on emotions or "affects" was not definitive, and that he was also aware that a meta-explanation of emotions, in terms of "displaceable magnitudes of energy" was not enough to give a clear understanding of emotions as we experience and speak of them. Although Freud uses the term "affects" to cover all types and ranges of emotion (including emotional states, moods and emotional aspects of desires and impulses) (Sachs, 1974), it seems clear that when discussing each of these aspects of emotion, he distinguishes between them in a way that requires a more complex or differently oriented theory of emotions.

One of the clearest indications of the unfinished nature of Freud's thinking on emotions is the seemingly contradictory way in which he refers to the place and function of emotions in the human psyche. Emotions are relegated to the conscious mind but also given some sort of existence in the unconscious; emotions are all affects but affects, feelings and states are given separate status. On a meta-level, emotions are some sort of process for the discharge of excess tension in the nervous system but they are also our experience of that release of tension, and our experience takes a much more complicated form. Emotions are our experience of degrees of pleasure and unpleasure, but Freud's reference to different kinds of emotions (as well as degrees of pleasure and unpleasure)
suggests a difference between degrees of pleasure and unpleasure and other feelings.

Another indication of Freud's perplexity about emotions is his preoccupation with and qualifications on his use of language concerning emotions. While maintaining that the term "affects" is how he chooses to refer to emotions, he freely and meaningfully uses other terms as well such as "feelings", "emotions", "states", "passions", and distinguishes between them. It is clear that this is not just a word variation. Freud reflects historically early attitudes to emotions by his use of language. As Averill (1980) points out in a paper on emotion and anxiety, the term "emotion", derived from the latin e + movere, originally meant to migrate or transfer from one place to another. But it was also used to refer to states of agitation or perturbation, both physical (as in the weather) and psychological (Averill, 1980, p.37). Freud's thinking reflects this early usage almost exactly in both senses when he speaks of "displaceable magnitudes of energy" and degrees of tension in the psyche.

Even earlier than the Latin-derived term "emotion", is the term "passions" which was used to refer to emotions by the ancient Greeks. Derived from the Latin "pati" (to suffer), it is related to the Greek "pathos", and terms such as "passive" and "patient" are related. Averill states that:

At the root of these concepts is the idea that an individual (or physical object) is undergoing or suffering some change, as opposed to doing or initiating change. Thus, in ordinary discourse, we speak of being "gripped", "seized" and "torn" by emotion. Stated more formally, emotions are something that happens to us (passions) not something we deliberately do (actions). (ibid., p.38)

Once again, these early traditions reflected in the language are noticeable in Freud's way of dealing with the very obscure idea (as he puts
it) of emotions. While he strongly denies any reliance on past traditions (as mentioned in Chapter Six), it is inevitable that he absorbed and utilised, albeit unconsciously, both the thinking and language on emotions as it was represented in his culture.

Hence it is not surprising that, while using such traditions on the one hand as his basic material, and at the same time venturing into a completely new way of understanding human nature through psychoanalytic theory, there should arise a tension between the old learning and the new perception. Again and again this is apparent in Freud's dealings with the terms and concepts of emotions as demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven. He was faced here with a powerful dilemma - namely that of seeking to abandon traditional thinking in the light of his new theory while at the same time being bound, as we all are, by our heritage and language and human thought. It is quite clear that, as far as emotions are concerned, he could not abandon that heritage even though he actively struggled to do so, and when he spoke and wrote as though he had done so, he himself was not satisfied with the results.

To step back from the detail of Freud's though at this point is to have a perception of this struggle between established and original thought, as Freud attempts to work out his unique position. What emerges is a theory that does incorporate established and original patterns of thinking and also provides a synthesis between emotional and cognitive functions. In the remainder of this chapter I will attempt to outline this broader theoretical undercurrent in Freud's work on emotions.
Section II: A multi-level theory

What I have perceived as emerging from Freud's many references to emotions is a theory that has essentially three levels or stages of emotional processes in the psyche. Each level is characterised by the presence of certain qualities, and related to them in a certain way, the qualities (of emotions) themselves providing a fourth dimension to the theory. To clarify this notion of qualities, which I introduce only as a way of ordering the components of this theory, I will begin by naming them as:

- the pleasure/unpleasure quality
- the sexual quality
- the anxiety quality
- the cognitive quality.

It is obvious of course, that this classification corresponds directly with Freud's aspects of emotion, and it is worth noting at this point that the theory I am speaking of is his theory, and it differs from what he has said directly only in perspective and organisation, not in actual content. My case is that this "new" theory provides an organisational framework within which the differences of the way in which Freud refers to emotions are resolved.

Positing three levels of emotional processes is a way of organising the different meanings Freud appears to give to the terms he uses - terms such as instincts, affects, feelings, passions, states; and positing qualities is a way of describing the relation between what Freud sees as major instincts, affects and feelings. As much as possible I will keep to Freud's own terms.
Level One - Emotions as instinct or affect

This is the level that is most consistent with Freud's formal position on emotions as outlined in Chapter Five. At this level "magnitudes of displaceable energy" are at work in the psyche, degrees of excitation are operating and tensions generate and dissipate. If this is viewed as a kind of primary level then it clarifies Freud's preoccupation formally with emotions as instincts. If it is viewed also as a kind of meta-level it can be seen as Freud's attempt to outline the broad principles of what is going on in the psyche, a kind of abstraction of our direct experiencing of feelings. By speaking of "affect" and "instincts" and "energy" and "tensions" Freud is creating an impression of forces at work that are essentially beyond individual control, in their most primitive forms, which uses the traditional philosophical notion of passivity in connection with "the passions". He is also creating an impression of forces that we know of by inference from our observation of ourselves and others. We cannot directly see an instinct or an affect or the energy, but we know that they exist by the way we observe them manifesting themselves in various ways in ourselves and others - just as, for example, we cannot see electricity but we observe its manifestations in light, in heat, and in the power of electrical goods. This notion uses the traditional scientific approach to inquiring into emotions.

At this level Freud speaks easily about affects being instinctual experiences and instincts being stimuli arising from within the psyche or "organism", exerting a constant force of motivation (see Chapter Five). All these notions fall consistently within the general idea of forces at work in the psyche". Major or primary instincts, such as the desire for pleasure, the avoidance of pain, and the instinct for self preservation all fit in comfortably.
Relation of Level One to the qualities of emotion

(i) At this level, the pleasure/unpleasure quality stands in an "instinctual drive" relation to the theory as a whole. It is a motivational force and it is also Freud's way of classifying affects as degrees of pleasure or unpleasure, which is a part of what we actually experience, and speak of in connection with emotions.

(ii) The sexual quality also stands in the instinctual drive relation, being a motivating force, a preservation force, and being in a co-operative relation to the pleasure/unpleasure quality. At this level, one can see the sexual instinct of mankind as well as that of individuals, acting on lives, societies, eras, and civilisations.

(ii) The anxiety quality stands in a "degree of excitation" relation to the theory at this level. Here anxiety becomes "displaceable magnitudes of energy" in certain circumstances, the way in which tensions are generated. "Sums of excitation" can attach themselves to inappropriate objects, or be transferred to mnemonic symbols in the conscious mind, can, at any given point, dominate the psyche. (See Chapter Seven, section on Anxiety). Anxiety is related to the pleasure/unpleasure quality in that it has degrees of unpleasure present and it is related to the sexual quality in that there is almost inevitably a sexual aspect to any manifestation of anxiety (or so Freud claims).

(iv) The cognitive quality of emotions is not so visible on this level although it is foreshadowed as an aspect of emotional processes when Freud speaks of the ego's activities in connection with the fulfilment of instinctual wishes, the generation of anxiety, and the manifestation of the self-preservative instincts.
However, in his statements about reason Freud claims that although it is in the ego that there is a coherent organisation of mental processes, representing "reason and commonsense", the original decision to form conceptions of the external world came from the unconscious mental processes (see Chapter Five, section on *Reason*). This decision was made, Freud claims, from a disappointed psyche which had failed to gain expected pleasures from hallucinatory objects of desire. The result was the setting up of a 'reality principle", a new principle of mental functioning that enabled the psyche to obtain real and lasting pleasure from real objects. At Level One therefore, when Freud is talking about instincts and energy, he is also talking about some part of the psyche that could work out that it was necessary to have some sort of communication with the external world to gain more or better pleasure. If this was supposed to be an instinct in itself, it must still have been in instinct with some kind of cognitive function, a function that enabled the selection of a means (even if it was by trial and error only) to improve its gratifications. The complexity of the process makes it very unlikely that it could have been a "happy accident" that the instinctual impulses (the only original mental processes) happened to cotton on to precisely the best way to solve its problems.

**Relation of Level One to the unconscious**

It is tempting at this stage to align Level One of the emotional processes with Freud's postulated unconscious mind, but the parallel does not work in a simple way. Firstly, Freud himself was ambiguous about the status of affects in relation to the unconscious. He claimed on the one hand that affects could not be unconscious but then he refers to "unconscious affective structures". If the term "affects" is used to cover all aspects of emotion, then indeed, feeling something requires consciousness, but there is enough evidence to suggest that Freud did have in mind some kind of emotional activity in the unconscious and that
this "unconscious affective structures" referred to emotion at the level of energy, excitation, and tensions in the psyche, all of which could be conscious or unconscious.

**Level Two - Emotions as feelings**

It is when we look at emotions in terms of feelings, those things which we experience in a particularly subjective way, though we have common concepts and language for them, that we see how incomplete any meta-explanation of emotions must be. As noted in Chapters Six and Seven, Freud remarked several times that there was great difficulty in providing an adequate description of "affects", under which label he attempted to include both the primary processes (affective energies) and what I see as the secondary processes (the development of the concepts and language of feelings). As argued in Chapters One and Three, the cognitive processes play a vital part in the development of feelings, as opposed to instincts and sensations. What we experience as feelings is very different in every way from what we believe to be primary energies, tensions, and excitations, though they are closely related. On this conceptual level, what we are observing and attempting to understand is the extraordinarily complex network of the ways in which the primary emotional processes present themselves to our experience and consciousness.

Freud did not concern himself formally with this aspect of emotions, though the tension generated in his writings between his formal position and the many ways in which he spoke of feelings is an indication that, in some way, he was aware of the grappling with these differences in ways of looking at emotions. As a psychoanalyst dealing with disturbed patients, he was facing this level of emotions every day. As an individual, he was dealing with his own feelings every day and in neither case did he think
always in terms of energy and excitation, as his language shows. He felt "novel and bewildering feelings" and we all know what he meant when he used this phrase, without knowing anything about the degree of excitation in his psyche or the degree of pleasure or unpleasure that accompanied these feelings.

So what is this world of feelings and how can it be organised as a level of emotions or an aspect of emotions? Freud actually provides the major components of such organisation himself, partly with those aspects of emotion I have termed elements, partly with the recognition of the role of language and partly with the division of the psyche into the id, the ego and the superego. I will look at each of these three ways of organising emotions, beginning with the way in which this second level of emotional processes stands in relation to the four qualities of emotion.

Relation of Level Two to the qualities of emotion

(i) The pleasure/unpleasure quality is a major way of categorising feelings, as well as the terms themselves describing a particular kind of feeling, arising from a particular kind of affect or sensation or level of tension. As Freud describes, feelings of pleasure and unpleasure appear to accompany other kinds of feelings providing a "keynote", and a major way in which emotions may be analysed. As I argued in Chapter six however, this does not make each feeling identical with the degree of pleasure and unpleasure accompanying it as Freud suggests in his formal argument. It is easy to see how he would settle for this when he describes all feelings as degrees of pleasure and unpleasure (see Chapter Four), but it is also easy to see that this is not sufficient in the light of his subsequent references. For as long as pleasure or unpleasure provides a "keynote" to a feeling, for example, the feeling and its "keynote" remain distinct. A feeling of nostalgia may be
accompanied by varying degrees of pleasure and unpleasure, depending on the context, but we do not describe nostalgia primarily in terms of pleasure and unpleasure. We think of it in terms of the past and the effects that the past exerts upon us. Our personal concept of nostalgia is closely related to feelings of pleasure or unpleasure only because it is based on these effects. The way in which pleasure/unpleasure acts as a category of feeling puts this quality in the role of a superordinate feeling and other feelings are related to it by being partly described by it, just as an object is partly described by colour or shape or function. When Freud says that what becomes conscious as pleasure and unpleasure is a quantitative and qualitative 'something' in the course of mental events (see Chapter Six), he indicates that quantity (degrees of affect) and quality (kind of affect) are distinct and, indeed, not easily defined as shown by his use of 'something' (Freud’s quotes).

The way in which the terms pleasure/unpleasure describe a particular kind of feeling (as well as being used as a category) gives this quality yet another dimension. As a category it has superordinate status - that it is used to describe all other kinds of feelings. As a feeling in itself, it must be described or defined in terms other than itself to give meaning to the definition. It is pointless to say, for example, that "pleasure is a high degree of pleasure". Formally, Freud says that pleasure is a low degree of excitation but if pleasure is identical with particular degrees of excitation then this definition is as circular as the "pleasure is pleasure" version.

In addition, it tells us nothing at all about what we experience as pleasure. To describe it in fact, we commonly resort to other feelings and sensations in the attempt to define something we all know to be related, but different from, other kinds of feeling, and related to, but
conceptually different from, energy or degrees of excitation. It is when pleasure is viewed on both Levels One and Two, in terms of energy/affect/sensation and conceptually or cognitively, that the term pleasure begins to take on a more rounded meaning.

(ii) The sexual quality is another major way of categorising a large number of feelings (if not all) in Freud's system. As with pleasure/unpleasure, it takes on a superordinate status when used as a category and must also be understood as a feeling (or feelings) in itself. As with pleasure/unpleasure, its conceptual status is extremely complex. Other emotional terms and emotive language and metaphor are used to describe it despite its being recognised as an instinct, a force, a powerful form of energy. In Freud's system, pleasure is tied to sexuality in the closest possible way, but when, for example, Freud refers to a child's sexuality or sexual instinct serving for the acquisition of different kinds of pleasurable feelings (see Chapter Six), then he is clearly distinguishing between kinds of pleasurable feelings. Once again it is when this relationship (between sexuality and pleasure/unpleasure) is viewed on both Levels One and Two of emotions, that they take on full meaning - that is, they make more sense to us, both on a meta-level in terms of "forces", and on a conceptual level in terms of description and meaning.

In defence of my notion that Freud intended sexuality to have superordinate status but remain distinct from other instincts (and emotions), I draw attention again to his conflict with Jung (see Chapter Six) and his (Freud's) emphasis on the necessity of separating the sexual instincts from the instinctual force generally. Indeed, he distinguishes sexuality both quantitatively and qualitatively from the other instincts, thus giving it the difference of kind as well as of degree. On Level One he talks about degree or the force or status of the
sexual instincts in relation to the instinctual force as a whole. But then he begins another kind of conceptual journey by distinguishing that part of the sexual instincts that ebbs and flows in the context of desires (the libido), which he sees as the "measure of sexual excitation" (see Chapter Six). The mental representation of the libido becomes the "ego-libido" which in turn becomes the "object libido" observable when it begins cathecting (mental) sexual objects.

The move from libido (in the unconscious) to "ego-libido" in the conscious mind represents the move from Level One (sexual instincts, energy or affects) to Level Two theoretically where the instinct is perceived or experienced directly as sexual desires and feelings. The "ego-libido" and the "object-libido" are experienced directly partly as a series of physical sensations and partly as a series of related feelings that may variously include, or be "coloured" by, pleasure, unpleasure, joy, sorrow, anger, fear, anticipation, love, hate and a great many more depending on the experiences and attitudes we bring to our consciousness of sexuality. In addition, at this level we are able to distinguish between different kinds of sexual feeling (those experienced at different levels of development as well as the differences evoked by different objects, and other feelings; for example, kindness, cruelty, gentleness, fierceness, etc, all play a part in the range of sexual feelings), and also the differences between feelings of sexual tension and feelings of sexual pleasure, as well as the differences between sexual feelings and feelings about sexual feelings. Though these may be mixed together, they need not be, and may be experienced separately.

This is the framework within which Freud can meaningfully say "the sexually exciting effect of many emotions which are in themselves unpleasurable, such as the feelings of apprehension, fright or horror,
persists in a great number of people throughout their adult life" (see Chapter Six). To make these kinds of claims, Freud needs both the meta-level of energy and instincts and this second directly experiential, conceptual level to his theory of emotions, which in relation to sexuality, resolves the different ways in which he refers to sexual excitation, sexual pleasure, sexual feelings and the sexual instincts as a primary force (see Chapter Six).

(iii) In connection with the anxiety quality, Freud says directly that anxiety is something that is experienced personally and with intensity. He again defines an affect in the context of anxiety and in this definition he speaks quite clearly of there being different parts to an affect - that it consists of "particular motor innervations" and "certain feelings". These feelings themselves are of two different kinds, the first being the perception of motor actions and the second being the direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure (see Chapter Seven). At no other point in his references to emotions does Freud state as straightforwardly his acceptance and acknowledgement of emotions as being as much a part of our personal experience and interpretation as a form of energy or excitation that seems to operate of its own accord in connection with the unconscious instincts. To say that an affect consists of motor innervations and certain feelings draws a sharp distinction between the energy of emotion and the personal perception that also makes an emotion what it is. To say that the feelings themselves have two parts, being both a perception of the motor innervations and direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure, is to make the distinction even finer, and presents a very clear case for attempting the kind of organisation of Freud's thinking on emotions that I have undertaken here.

It is significant that these indications of a more complex theory of emotions occur in connection with Freud's inquiry into the nature of
anxiety when it is noted that Freud regarded anxiety as the "riddle whose solution would be bound to throw a flood of light on our whole mental existence" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.393). He variously refers to anxiety as an affective state, a sensation, as being something rational (and irrational), as a warning (a manifestation of the self-preservative instincts) and as "something" we perceive ourselves experiencing (see Chapter Seven). As I claimed earlier, it is in connection with anxiety that one becomes really aware of the existence of different levels to Freud's thinking on emotions. A sensation is certainly a feeling, but what we call a feeling is more than that. It has a rational component, and it has a function or purpose. Anxiety does demonstrate these things very well and very obviously. To define it adequately in terms of degrees of excitation or pleasure/unpleasure is simply not possible, even for Freud, though of course it may be clearly perceived that excitation and sensations of unpleasure are central to anxiety.

These components have their context at Level One of this theory, but it is at Level Two that the complexities of the notions of direct experience and perception of anxiety find their context. At Level Two the element of anxiety can also be used as a way of categorising feelings related to but different from the first two elements. Anxiety itself also remains a distinct feeling described in the context of other feelings and needing such description to be understood. At Level Two, Freud's link between anxiety and the libido can be more clearly followed where anxiety is described in the context of direct conscious experience and libido described as an instinctual force but in its rational form of ego and object libido. Here we may speak of being, for example, fearful and unsettled (anxious) in a situation where our sexual instincts are not finding adequate expression (the ego-libido is being thwarted in its plans for the fulfilment of the aims of the sexual instincts). The link between anxiety and repression can also be described in meaningful
emotional terms. We may speak of being fearful, panicky, confused in a situation where we know we do not have understanding of our true feelings or when we have inconsistent feelings that seriously impair our lives. We may say that whenever this happens that the feelings we are confused about make us unpredictable to ourselves, so those feelings are perceived only under a cloak of fear, tension and apprehension (anxiety). We may say that we cannot find the right reasons or explanations (ideas) for these feelings so the fear and apprehension is attached to any ideas that are related that we can find. In this way unknown or confused (repressed) feelings are perceived as (transformed into) anxiety until the right reasons or explanations (ideas) are found.

Further, Freud speaks of at least two levels at which anxiety operates - the involuntary level and the ego level, the former being the instinctual anxiety generated at birth and to which we are all pre-conditioned, and the latter being generated by the ego in response to situations indicating similar threat (see Chapter Six). These levels posited by Freud represent Levels One and Two of this theory respectively as do Freud's references to anxiety as "instinctual" as opposed to "realistic". This idea that affects may have an instinctual as well as a "realistic" level indicates that Freud was surely leaning towards a theory of emotions that allowed for directly cognitive as well as instinctual levels of reality.

(iv) At Level Two the cognitive quality of emotions is the quality that gives feelings their comprehensible form - that is, the quality that allows the categorisation and description (or the perception and ordering in a pre-language sense) of emotions. I argued earlier that a cognitive aspect of emotions could be sought for at Level One, but at Level Two it is a necessary condition for the formation of feelings, as defended in
Chapter One. It is also a necessary element to allow us to have feelings about things, to connect feelings and their objects, thus giving us a better understanding of feelings when viewed in the context of their objects. In Chapter Five, I quoted Freud as viewing the ego as that part of the mind in which there is a coherent organization of mental processes and which represents reason and common sense "in contrast with the id which contains the passions". This is of course consistent with Freud's formal position (i.e., that the instincts and the passions or emotions are identical) but it is a curious reference in the light of Freud's subsequent discussions of emotions, once he acknowledges the conscious experiential level of defining emotions.

The conscious part of the ego we know, from experience, can be filled with our perceptions of feelings that are inconsistent, confusing, irrational (or seemingly so) and incompatible). It may be one function of reason to reconcile these incompatibilities, but it is also a function of reason in the first instance to recognise, categorise, describe and, in a very real sense, bring into being conceptually, feelings, as opposed to sensations, impulses, tensions and levels of excitation. As argued in Chapter One, the nature of a feeling is irrevocably bound up with our cognitive experience of it. Our world of sensations could exist without cognition - our world of feelings could not. Freud acknowledges this indirectly with his use of the technique of psychoanalysis, where his theorising about the nature of the human psyche is dependent on the cognitive, conceptual, articulated world of feelings from which he draws his primary data.

**Relation of Level Two to the unconscious**

Freud has viewed feelings in one way as being the "final manifestations" of the instincts (see Chapter Five). In that sense, Level
Two of this theory can be seen as the mind's translation of the instinctual forces into a comprehensible pattern of experiences in the conscious mind - a level where the experience of feeling is ordered and then articulated with the use of language. Freud sees reason as having been developed by the psyche as a means of finding satisfactory of "better" means of meeting the instinctual demands of the id. In this context, reason creates a level of emotions that enables it to understand and therefore serve the id more fully - so emotions at Level Two become the ego's expression of feelings (and if the ego represents the "reality principle" in the psyche, then its interpretation or presentation of feelings would appear to have more objective reality status than the id's completely subjective instincts). Sufficient for this theory of emotions however, is that there is a direct and consistent link between Level Two and the unconscious which also provides the necessary consistency between Levels One and Two generally.

The role of language

Having attributed to Freud some sort of indirect leaning towards a more complex theory of emotions and having posited his use of language as part of the evidence for this, it is easy enough to locate the role of language on Level Two of the subsequent theory. As mentioned in the previous section, language becomes the means of articulation of feelings that have been recognised and organised by the conscious mind. It is a way of further organising and categorising feelings as well as providing a means of communicating and comparing such organisation by other minds, thus providing a further dimension of meaning to our feelings. That Freud consistently made use of the established language of feelings (which would make no sense if the world of instincts only was given reality status) must be seen as his acknowledgement of the reality of the meaning of feelings as conveyed by that language. All that is really necessary though
for the existence of feelings in the Level Two sense is the capacity of the conscious mind to recognise and experience certain internal phenomena that are able to be organised into some sort of comprehensible conceptual picture. Language adds creatively to that meaning, but does not necessarily of itself create it; it reflects the original phenomena without necessarily being a part of it.

There is a sense however in which language does become a part of the phenomenon of feelings. Words can and do become the objects or ideas to which affects can become attached in the Freudian sense. To this extent, language takes on the same relation to feeling as does any other object of feelings. The relationship between feeling and its object, though not directly examined in the context of this thesis, is one that must be connected with the meaning of emotion, so that language in that sense would appear to play a role in the development of feelings. It can be readily observed for instance, that words have the power to evoke feelings, and it is arguable that this is only because the word evokes the idea to which feeling is attached. There are words, for example, that sound sinister (and evoke feelings of fear) even when the idea they represent is not. There are also situations in which the words used to describe some feeling can be seen as responsible for the creation of other, different feelings arising from the description. As mentioned in Chapter One, the role of language in this and many other contexts, has yet to be fully explored.

The role of the id, the ego, and the superego

To some extent, the role of the id, the ego and the superego as organising components of a theory of emotions is already obvious - but specifically at Level Two, this division of the psyche allows an extra dimension of organisation for feelings. If we take the conscious experience
of feelings as the central indication of the nature of emotions, then Freud’s division of the psyche adds meaning by providing a starting point for emotions (with the instincts in the id), a flowering or maturing of the emotions (with the understanding organising and measuring provided by the ego), and a regulator of the emotions (with the powers of the superego).

This organisational or developmental dimension is consistent with Freud’s use of the id, ego and superego to explain how emotions may fail to develop properly, may fail to mature or flower and may fail to be regulated or be over-regulated - which was after all, the beginning of Freud’s inquiry, prompted by the riddle of repression.

**Level Three - emotions as a state**

I have taken the notion of an emotional state as the basis for a third level of Freud’s theory of emotions because his references to emotional states indicated something different from either an instinct or a feeling in ways previously put forward. If we see instincts as primary energy or affect, and feelings as the development of that energy into organised cognitive as well as sensual forms in the consciousness, then states, in Freud’s terms, can be seen as related to both these levels in a quantitative way. In an affective state, the entire psyche is charged with a high degree of excitation; in an emotional state the psyche is rather "coloured" by some temporarily dominating feeling or feelings (see Chapter Seven). I am treating states as a level of emotions, rather than simply presenting them in their relation to Levels One and Two, because of Freud’s use of states as some sort of primary level of emotional development as well as an intermittent manifestation of a certain kind of affect and a certain way of experiencing emotions.
An "affective state" is constructed of motor innervations, feelings, and with the repetition of some particular, significant experience which is the "core" holding the combination together (see Chapter Seven). Ordinary or "normal" affective states occur with genetic pre-conditioning so there is a predisposition to feel certain things in connection with certain events. Neurotic affective states occur when the "displaceable magnitudes of energy", or affect, are moved around by the Ego (i.e., are attached to ideas other than the original ones) to counteract the distress caused by ideational incompatibilities. So "affective" states, normal or neurotic, become that level of emotions where energy and feeling are seen in relation to ideas and events. This level provides both a different perspective on emotions and also a way of relating affect (or primary energy) to direct feeling, which incorporates the cognitive aspect including the function of analysis and organisation, which would in turn deal with ideas of, and in relation to, emotion.

The relation is not a necessary one however as Freud distinguishes between "affective states" and "emotional states". An affective state occurs whenever events are sufficiently powerful to stimulate the psyche back into the original state of complete dominance by a particular affect, whereas an "emotional state" occurs when a person experiences an inflow of feelings prompted by events which carry only a suggestion or reflection of original events, so the "emotional state" does not carry the full force of the primary affect.

**A resolution of some problems**

The organisation of Freud's references to the emotions into a more complex theory of those phenomena does solve some of the problems raised by seeming incompatibilities in his writings.
(i) It allows for Freud's distinction between affects and feelings, instincts, sensations and states without affecting his formal position on emotions. He can still speak quite consistently about the instincts and of feelings as being their final, conscious manifestations. Freud's use of terms has been adjusted so that "affect" refers to the instinctual force or energy where an emotion is generated, feeling refers to the conscious level of emotions, and state refers to a quantitative relation between emotions and idea. The term "emotion" covers both affect and feeling. Terms like "instincts", "affects", "sensations", "tensions", "excitation" belong to the first level of exposition of emotions; terms like "feeling", "experience" and the analysis of the complex language and vocabulary of emotions belong to Level Two or the second mode of exposition of emotions.

(ii) The alternative theory allows for the way in which emotion, in some form, has unconscious and conscious status. Saying emotions must be conscious is compatible with Level Two as a way of explaining or analysing emotions where the very concept is dependent on the cognitive functions, and where the conscious experience of drives, needs and desires depends on cognition for identification and classification. "Unconscious affective structures" fit in at Level One where these structures represent the genetic pre-conditioning, the pre-disposition to feel certain things in connection with certain events. In this way a fairly complex unconscious emotional structure may be posited, and gives a context for "feelings" of which we are not fully conscious, or do not allow ourselves to admit to having. At the unconscious level a relationship can be posited between instincts and affects, the latter, according to Freud, being one manifestation of the former. At this level it may be posited that instincts generate needs and the frustration of those needs generate affect which is the basic energy of emotion.
When consciousness and cognition are joined to affect, feelings are generated. Affect plus feeling together constitute emotion. Emotional state is a quantitative relation between emotion and idea, i.e., a state depends on the amount of emotion that is attached to a given idea or set of ideas at a particular time. The idea is generated by instinctual and cognitive processes or experiences; the emotion is generated by affective and cognitive processes or experiences. In this way there is a difference between instinct and affect that still allows for Freud's close connection between them. Cognition applied to instinctual experiences equals ideas; cognition applied to affective experiences equals feelings. In this context it is also possible to throw some new light on Freud's claim that affects "attach" themselves to ideas, by looking at the relation between cognition, ideas and affect. If cognition acts on affect to produce feelings, then feelings must be made up of conscious experience of feelings and ideas of feelings. In this light we may meaningfully talk about "affective ideas" and "instinctual ideas" (i.e., the latter being the ideas produced by cognition acting on instinctual experiences).

An affective idea, originally generated by the frustration of an instinctual drive will naturally (in the normal course of psychical events) attach itself to the instinctual idea, originally generated by the instinctual drive in question. For example, sexual desire and love are generated. In the meantime cognition also acts on the sex instinct (without frustration being present) and produces an idea and memory of sex experience(s). The feelings of desire and love are present in the mind as affective ideas, which join with the idea in the mind of sex experience(s). In this way the mind acquires a whole, balanced concept. This concept is immensely varied, depending on the sex experiences subsequently added that involve the outside world, the amounts of frustration and thus affect generated, which in turn give rise to more instinctual ideas and more affective ideas, so the concept grows wider and wider. An emotional state can be said to
occur on the one hand when the degree of frustration and affect (and thus the number of affective ideas) outweighs the number of ideas gained by sex experiences, so affective ideas smother and swamp the instinctual ideas, creating an imbalanced psyche. At this stage the problem could be solved either by seeking to increase the sex experiences (not very satisfactory for a number of reasons) or seeking to reduce the generation of frustration, and therefore affect, by gaining more knowledge of the instinct and the way in which it motivates the psyche. The latter method of course was adopted by Freud using, ultimately, his technique of psychoanalysis.

I have used the sex instinct in the example, but any of the instinctual drives could be substituted. States of depression, anger, obsession (i.e., unpleasurable states) are produced by the imbalances described above. States of joy, happiness, satisfaction, elation, etc (i.e., pleasurable states) are produced when the affective ideas and instinctual ideas are appropriately attached and in balance. In this way reason and emotion are in harmony. To the extent that reason has some control over action, it may seek experiences to maintain the balance between affect and idea. To the extent that instinct is subject to frustration, affect will push the psyche towards seeking the experiences needed.

The role of reason

Freud does attribute to reason (the cognitive function) the function of seeking to satisfy the instincts using the principle "whereby it may, to some extent, regulate affective energy to gain real and lasting pleasure" (see Chapter Five). This, he claims, was the way in which the psyche dealt with the problem of instinctual drives and frustration. With Level Two of this theory of emotion however, reason plays an even wider role. Firstly, if it is seen partly as a problem-solving capacity, then, in some form it existed
before taking conscious form in the ego. It existed enough to organise the development of the ego in the first place, which is a perfect example of very efficient problem solving. Secondly, if reason is seen partly as an ordering function, then it also is responsible for the organisation and classification of concepts in response to experiences at all levels of the psyche. That an instinct in the unconscious seeks satisfaction is a rational process. That the psyche has instincts that are capable of being satisfied is a rational thing.

At the conscious level reason not only has the function of conceptualising, but also of developing a whole and complicated conceptual world (or worlds), the reality of which is strong enough to have an effect on our behaviour in a number of ways. Reason also recognises and conceptualises relations and connections between things and events, and is capable of certain conceptual manipulations which may manifest themselves (verbally or in actions) in physical manipulations of the environment (the environment here including people as well as objects, minds as well as bodies). Positing a second level in the theory of emotions in Freud then, also opens the way to a much wider concept of reason and a more complicated relationship between reason and emotion, a relationship that is also illustrated by Freud’s own activities as a thinker, and is aligned more consistently with the traditions of thought that Freud brought to (and used in) his theory.

This theory provides the means whereby an analysis of personal emotional worlds becomes feasible. Any such analysis must be able to yield a conceptualisation and articulation of the conscious experience of emotion, as opposed to an explanation of emotion only. Such a personal conceptualisation depends on our awareness of the levels upon which our emotional processes occur. With the multi-level theory posited here, Freud has provided a framework for our being able to perceive our emotional
processes at work at the physiological level, the cognitive level and at the level of a general disposition, or "emotional trait". His technique of psychoanalysis provides the method for exploring these levels of awareness, and allowing us to conceptualise and articulate our experiences at all three levels. In Chapter Nine I will elaborate on how I conceive the psychoanalytic method as a means to our private emotional worlds, and discuss the importance of such worlds to our ways of perceiving the world in general. It is my contention that while we have been aware of our emotions, we have not been aware of our personal emotional worlds and their structures. Because they provide a context for our ways of perceiving external reality (ie, the world around us), I argue that our awareness of such worlds is essential to a perception that is least confused by conflicting emotions and self-deception.
CHAPTER NINE

FREUD AND KELLY - AN EVOLUTIONARY STEP FOR EMOTIONS

Section I: A new direction in theory and practice

I have attempted to demonstrate in Chapters Four to Six that Freud and Kelly have both said a great deal more about emotions than either of their formal positions would suggest, and that each has implied various levels of awareness in connection with emotional processes. I have argued that these levels of awareness represent an evolutionary step in the development of emotional processes as they become, and are seen to become, more fully integrated with our cognitive processes. It is through such integration that the personality may become more developed, more whole (the central aim of Freud's work, as especially well pointed out by Bettelheim (1985) in *Freud and Man's Soul*), and our perception of the world and its realities may become more accurate (the central aim of Kelly's work). As I said in the Introduction to this thesis, many of the world's most serious problems both past and present, have been closely related to the ways in which we are aware and not aware of our emotional processes, the complexity of our feelings about things. In Chapter Three I explored some evolutionary approaches to emotion theory and posited a level of development where new levels of emotional awareness became a part of the survival adaptations. As I also stated in the Introduction, the central aim of this thesis has been to trace the development of emotional
awareness within our Western Culture and to show that each age and generation of thinkers have in some way articulated stages in this development, thus making it visible or self-conscious. I have tried to show that the development in our own age has been initially and fundamentally articulated by Freud, and then by Kelly, and that, by relating these two perceptions a further developmental path becomes visible - one where feeling and thinking become a synthesised process of interpreting our worlds.

Freud's contribution - access to emotional worlds

Within the broad scope of his theory of psychoanalysis, Freud has touched upon all the aspects of emotion yielded by previous thinkers. The physiological, motivational, cognitive, ethical and creative aspects of emotion are all visible in Freud's references to emotion, and within the context of a multi-level theory of emotions, each aspect has its place. Freud has also demonstrated the great power of emotions, very dramatically within the pathological context, and with subtlety and complexity in a more ordinary context.

On the practical side he has provided a structure for emotional processes that enables us to explore kinds of emotion, and a technique of analysis that allows a conscious journey into our personal emotional worlds, a journey which Freud regarded as vital to human progress (Bettelheim, 1985, pp.32-3). The depth and complexity of meaning that Freud gave to his concepts of repression and the unconscious mind has had a powerful effect on the ways in which we perceived ourselves. The unconscious was put forward as a whole world with its own laws, a world
which was ours personally, and yet needed to be discovered and explored if the human personality was to move towards wholeness. Notably, this attempt to articulate the reality of inner worlds stemmed from Freud's perception and contact with his patients' emotional worlds. These emotional worlds however, appeared to Freud in their most distorted, disturbed forms, becoming visible only because they were causing acute distress and illness. To explore them and their implications for the structure of the human personality was more than enough work for many lifetimes, but Freud repeatedly referred to emotions in a more ordinary context and implied many times, as I have tried to show, that there was much to articulate still. He provided the means for such articulation directly with the techniques of psychoanalysis, and indirectly by saying enough about emotions to enable us to form a consistent structure, which I have attempted to do in Chapter Eight. This structure enables us to begin to see relationships between "blind drives" (or instincts), and our conscious experience of feelings, between how we feel, and how we interpret and organise how we feel. It also enables us to begin to see possible relationships between thinking and feeling that help us to make more sense of our perception of ourselves and others. The technique of psychoanalysis can be adapted to explore personal emotional worlds (as I will attempt to demonstrate later in this Chapter) and to see how these worlds condition and colour our perceptions of events.

**Kelly's contribution - construing**

Within the scope of his Theory of Personality, also arising from psychotherapy, Kelly speaks of emotions less directly but with many dimensions of emotion still visible. As I sought to show in Chapter Four,
Kelly takes a conceptual leap that lands emotions right in the heart of the cognitive processes. Feelings emerge as ways of thinking. He sees the rational process of construing as the way in which people perceive and make sense of the world; the emotional processes become a strong component of the overall process, falling within the rational framework. At one level, Kelly sees emotions and emotional states as being subject to control by reason, but at another level, feelings are present in, and a part of the actual construing process, forming a significant part of the way in which we perceive the world. At a further level still, some feelings become a part of the changing universe when we perceive and construe them, while other feelings remain a part of that very construing. Finally, our construing takes part within various systems or frameworks of knowledge, of which our framework of emotional knowledge is one, as outlined in Chapter Four.

With this sort of role given to emotions, it becomes obvious that our emotional worlds (i.e., our systems of knowledge of emotions) need to be perceived and understood at a personal level before our construing can become more elaborate and more self-aware. By leaving the actual process of construing as something of a mystery, Kelly also leaves blank the emotional worlds that form part of that process. It is in this sense, I believe, that Kelly "presupposes" the development and use of Freud's work. A multi-level theory of emotions from Freud together with his psychoanalytic technique for exploring emotional worlds, provides a means whereby Kelly's assumption of the close association between feeling and thinking can be justified. To put it another way, Kelly may more validly assume a blend of feeling and thinking to characterise the construing process, provided that the means for such a development in human awareness (and the articulation of it) is available. A multi-level theory of emotions from Freud and his technique of psychoanalysis based on associations, provides such a means. It becomes a pre-requisite or
adjunct to the use of Kelly's method of approaching and understanding our on-going experience of the world.

**Some connecting links**

There are some other associations also that can be made between Freud and Kelly that support my claim that together they present a new way forward in cognitive/emotional development. These associations form the kinds of connecting links which indicate that Freud and Kelly were essentially concerned with the same kinds of issues in connection with human development and survival. Further, they indicate that there are similarities between the ways in which (both) Freud and Kelly perceived people as making sense of their worlds.

Both Freud and Kelly refer to the importance of accurate prediction in connection with what they each see as the aims of human life. For Kelly, accurate prediction means the difference between "happiness and misery". It means having some control over events as opposed to feelings of helplessness and being trapped by circumstances. It also means moving, each time, a step closer to reality, to perceiving the way things really are in the world, as opposed to living in the unpredictable, more senseless, world of "illusions". For Kelly, an illusory world would be one where the system of constructs does not reflect to any degree the correct or real relationships between things perceived at any given time. Freud also sees the outcome of accurate prediction (which he calls "assessment") in terms of happiness, particularly the happiness or well-being connected to a feeling of security. This feeling reflects the absence of neurotic anxiety, as opposed to realistic anxiety experiences in the face of real external dangers (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII,p.82).
Freud and Kelly each refer to the need to construe or assess both the past and the present with some degree of soundness in order to make a prediction of the future world secure. In his essay, *The Future of an Illusion*, Freud speaks of people needing to put themselves at a distance from the present (that is, to allow it to become the past) before it can yield "vantage points" from which to judge the future. "The less a man knows about the past and the present" claims Freud, "the more insecure must prove to be his judgement of the future" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.5). Kelly implies the same when he says that people abstract replicated properties of events already experienced (the past), and events being experienced (the present) to make it possible for them to chart events to come, in terms of these same properties (Kelly, 1963, pp.120-1).

Both theorists see prediction as being closely linked with the idea of control. Although Freud speaks from a deterministic viewpoint which suggests that a person is essentially controlled by his or her instinctual drives, he also refers to the need for *people* to control their instincts. In his lecture *Explanations and Applications*, he says: "Let us make ourselves clear as to what the first task of education is. The child must learn to control his instincts" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.149). Without such proper control, Freud argues, both the children and, in due course, societies would suffer grave damage. However, the educator needed to be able to predict the effects of such control to ensure that it resulted in gain and not further damage. Ultimately, to be able to predict and control the flow of instincts was the key to the survival of civilisation (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, pp.95-6).

Kelly does not proceed from a deterministic position when stressing the importance of control, though in the end he is putting forward a similar conclusion - that survival ultimately depends on man's ability to predict and control the flow of his personal experience and so restructure his life in
positive ways (Kelly, 1963, p.9). Kelly claims that to the extent that man may construe his circumstances, he may gain freedom from their domination. To construe and reconstrue one's perceptions and experiences emerges as a creative and renewing process, and within that context, represents a powerful form of control in both a personal and social sense.

Kelly and Freud were both concerned with order within their ideas of human survival and development. For Kelly, man's construing is his way of ordering his perceptions, in order to make sense of the realities he perceives. Man creates "patterns or templates" which he then attempts to "fit" to reality with varying degrees of success (Kelly, 1963, pp.8-9). Man must also order his system of constructs to allow systems within systems, and to allow events to be construed within various systems representing different contexts and different bodies of knowledge (Kelly, 1963, p.10). One of these systems represents man's emotional context and here too, there emerge systems within systems, or levels of emotional perceptions. For Freud too, ordering of events takes on personal significance and is a crucial aspect of any individual psychoanalytic experience. The ordering of personal experience to find the right associations or relationships is central to the process of psychoanalysis. Freud also refers to order in the social sense as being in a "special position among the requirements of civilization", along with beauty and cleanliness (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.93).

The articulation and communication of a personal and social sense of order was of equal concern. For Freud, a part of a successful psychoanalytic experience was precisely the effective articulation and communication between analyst and patient, where articulation brings to light the hidden connections between psychical events, and communication brings understanding of the nature of and reasons for such connections. The complex nature of this process at times is suggested by
Freud's reference to "the secret language which so easily grows up between two people who see a lot of each other" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.49).

Kelly speaks of the need, especially in the therapeutic context, to find creative ways of articulating and communicating various construct systems. Construct systems may be unverbalised and require the creation of a language or some other means of communication. In the most general sense, people's ability to articulate and communicate their construct systems is one of the very many ways to broaden their construct systems and to make a whole new range of experiences easily available (Kelly, 1963, p.95).

The development of the ideas of prediction and control, and their dependence on ordering, articulation and communication have reached a very complex and sophisticated level in the work of Freud and Kelly. The idea that such development represents an evolutionary step forward for emotional processes is supported in the following way:

(i) The primary objects of prediction, control, ordering, articulation and communication in Freud's work have been the instincts - of which, I have argued, the emotions are a large part.

(ii) For Kelly human circumstances and events have been the primary objects of prediction and control.

(iii) The emphasis on these concepts emerge from these theorists precisely at a time in human history when the survival of mankind and this planet depends to a great extent on man's accurate control and prediction of his instincts, feelings and circumstances or events. Control and prediction depends on the adequate ordering, articulation and
communication of the ways in which such control is achievable. As I indicated in the Introduction to this thesis, the kinds of self-generated, self-destructive problems with which the world is now faced are closely related to the way people feel about their environment and their personal relationships. It is fair to argue, I think, that in the course of human history the present age holds the most power for mass self-destruction in a number of ways - and possibly also the most power to prevent this.

(iv) As well as providing complementary theoretical frameworks within which these concepts were developed, Freud and Kelly provide complementary processes or methods for the realisation of the concepts.

Section II: Ways for exploring emotional worlds, and applying them to the process of construing

A direction for exploring personal emotional worlds comes from Freud's basic psychoanalytic technique, though for emotions it could be described as an "in-width" analysis rather than an "in-depth" analysis (as described by Freud). The analysis described here is based on the multi-level theory of emotions from Freud described in Chapter Eight. In this theory emotions are perceived to operate on three major levels - firstly at the level of instinct or affect where the energies, excitations and tensions of emotion manifest themselves; secondly at the level of personal, conscious experience where feelings take on their cognitive nature and become a part of our knowledge; and thirdly at the level where emotional energies and conscious feelings combine to create a state in the psyche which has a particular emotional character for the duration of its domination of the psyche. This domination may be "acute" (as when
particular events cause high degrees of excitation and a particularly concentrated experience of feeling), or it may be "chronic" (as when a large quantity of excitation and a particular feeling are present as a part of the whole personality).

The exploration of the second and third levels of emotional processes in any person yields knowledge of personal emotional worlds or perspectives. As noted, the second level gives the cognitive nature to feelings (transforming affect to feeling), and for each individual this level of emotional understanding is very subjective, based as it is on personal interpretation of experience and personal use and understanding of language. It has something of a less subjective dimension based on the shared use of emotional language and the observation of apparently similar emotional experiences in others. However, the experience and understanding of feelings remains essentially intensely personal even when external events are fully shared. This phenomenon has been particularly explored as the philosophical problem of "other minds" which deals with whether or not we may know the contents of other minds, or even whether we may know that other minds truly exist. For the personal analysis I propose here the problem of the existence of other minds is not at issue, though the problem of other minds elucidates very well the personal, private nature of experience, and the language we use to articulate and communicate experience (Ayer, 1967, Malcolm, 1967, and Strawson, 1967). I raise this problem only in order to emphasise that the analysis of emotional worlds is necessarily a personal task, as is our construing of experience, and cannot, at any time, be accomplished by the adoption of models from other people's emotional worlds only, though shared communication of personal emotional words can add to the understanding of our own worlds. The exploration of our personal emotional worlds gives us the context within which we do much of our construing, that context being itself a part of the construing process, a point to which I will return a
little later when discussing the relationship between emotional worlds and construing.

**Some differences between psychoanalysis and emotion analysis**

Although Freud's basic technique of association is used in the emotional analysis I propose, the analysis differs structurally from standard Freudian analysis in the following ways.

(i) The aim of emotional analysis is to become aware of, and articulate the structure of our emotional worlds at the conscious level, to learn the order and organisation of our feelings at the present time, rather than to delve into the origins of our feelings. In other words, it is not meant to be used as a therapeutic analysis, but as a preparation for learning to use our emotional worlds to construe our experiences more fully, and to open up possibilities for construing in a greater variety of ways.

(ii) Whereas Freud's psychoanalysis attempts to reach the unconscious level of mental processes by following a chain of associations "down" or "into" the psyche, emotional analysis follows associations "across" the psyche, seeking connections between feelings and preferences, feelings and choices, feelings and the chosen use of language, to create an image or concept of a specific and personal world or "way of feeling".

(iii) Emotional analysis is not based on any presupposed psychological or moral laws or beliefs about the psyche, in the sense that any personal emotional worlds emerging from the analysis would be seen as subscribing to, or breaking any rules. In other words, what is found,
what is brought into the awareness is what will be used subsequently in construing until this changes naturally within the ongoing process of construing. As Kelly says, we live in a constantly changing universe and must be prepared to enter into change constantly. So emotional analysis will not aim to produce what we "ought" to feel at any time, but what we actually feel, and that may be used to reconstrue. The distinction is an important one because too often we construe on the basis of what we think we ought to feel, which can have confusing and distressing consequences for prediction and validation. Awareness of our emotional worlds (as opposed to a clutter of feelings) should enable us to distinguish between what we feel and that which we think (or feel) we ought to feel in any given experience. I mention this attitude as a difference from Freud's psychoanalysis in that Freud does presuppose a system of "good" and "bad" adjustments at the various stages of the development of the psyche. I don't dispute this at all, but point out that emotional analysis is not concerned with this in the context I propose.

(iv) Finally, emotion analysis is not meant to be the long process of psychoanalysis necessarily becomes. It is meant to disclose to us our emotional worlds, and may stop at one such world if desired, or uncover other such worlds at any stage of our lives. Also, although it is probably more useful, at least in the beginning, to share such explorations with an "emotional analyst", it is possible, within the scope of the analysis proposed here, to explore alone. This, of course, does not constitute a difference from Freud's methods entirely, since he did explore the full implications of psychoanalysis using self-analysis.
A basic technique for emotion analysis

An analysis or exploration of emotions begins with the technique of association. But whereas Freud used the technique of association as a way to interpretation of the psyche (through dreams, for example), in the present context, association is used to articulate and make visible the structure of personal emotional worlds, as illustrated in Appendix I.

In many ways, the opening up of an emotional world is not unlike the opening up of a "dream world". Freud speaks of the necessity to focus on "the separate portions" of a dream's content and to report in succession everything that occurs in relation to these portions, the associations that present themselves (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.11). In connection with an emotional world the place to begin is also with some "separate portions", those being in this case, particular feelings present in the consciousness at that time. And as with "dream portions", free associations are first called into play.

It will be noticed fairly soon that the flow of associations will fall into a number of categories. For example, let us say that the "portion" being focussed on is "a feeling of well-being".

The first category of associations will be the language associated with a feeling of well-being, such as "comfortable, relaxed, happy, energetic, satisfied, healthy, etc", or, "busy, successful, rich, clever, powerful, etc". I specify language as a category here because the first free flow of associations is usually aimed at giving meaning to the central concept being focussed upon (in this case "well-being") rather than aimed at introducing new concepts immediately. The words are used to elaborate on a first meaning initially. The three examples of clusters of words that I have given add three different kinds of meaning to the concept of
"well-being" very clearly, but it is more likely that a greater mixture of words will be produced in most cases. However, the balance will usually fall to one \textit{kind} of meaning more than to another, giving the subject of the analysis the beginning of one of his or her emotional worlds. If several meanings emerge quickly, then several emotional worlds are emerging.

Within that first category of language, the content is again divided into "portions", yielding further categories. I emphasise here that the initial free association, using one of the feelings present in the consciousness, needs to yield good supply of associations before continuing, enough to yield at least one (and possibly two or three) dominant meaning(s). The further categories are related to the perspectives on emotion which emerged at the end of Chapter One, and these in turn are related to the three levels of emotional processes yielded by Freud, as described in Chapter Eight.

\textbf{The categories of associations}

Having outlined five perspectives on emotion earlier, these may be used to provide categories of meaning to show us the different ways in which we experience and interpret our feelings, thus creating our emotional worlds. To demonstrate this, I'll continue with the examples related to "well-being". The three general meanings were indicated by

(i) comfortable, relaxed, happy, energetic, satisfied, etc

(ii) busy, successful, rich, clever, powerful, etc

(iii) free, flying, running, jumping, shouting, singing, etc.
In the case of group (i), the meaning is related to an easy-going contented emotional state; in the case of group (ii) the meaning is related to tense, excited, driving emotional state; in the case of group (iii) the meaning is related to a moving, flowing, also excited emotional state. Let us assume, for the sake of the example, that these three meanings were extracted from the first flow of associations from a single individual. We may now look at each of the "portions" contained in these meanings and categorise them further, in terms of the five perspectives on emotion.

Within the **physiological category** we could include "relaxed, energetic, satisfied, flying, running, jumping, shouting, singing".

Within the **cognitive category** we could include "powerful, clever, successful, free".

Within the **ethical or evaluative category** we could include "powerful, free".

Within the **motivational category** we could include "busy, energetic, satisfied, successful".

Within the **creative category** we could include "free, singing, powerful".

So far, "happy" and "rich" have been left out and may need more associations before they would fall into any category, though "happy" could slip into "cognitive" perhaps.

In this particular example, the physiological category emerges as the one with the most content, so we could assume that at least one of the
personal emotional worlds of the subject of the example is based on strong physiological interpretations of the experience of feeling.

At this stage the analysis could stop if desired, and the subject could use his or her awareness of a strongly physiological world of personal feeling to construe and reconstrue the events in his or her life. I'll return to this example at this point, a little later.

If however, the content of other emotional worlds is to be explored, the "portions" of each category need to be broadened with further associations, which may serve to strengthen existing worlds or open up new ones. For example, if we were to focus on the creative category, associations would be explored for the kinds of metaphor used to articulate emotion, images of feeling, the way in which feeling was used in connection with physically creative activity etc. This in turn, could lead to stronger connections with any of the other categories. Similarly with the ethical category, the associations would need to be explored for evaluative content, for feelings connected with ideas of "right" and "wrong", and then connections sought with other categories. Such connections may not always be found. Some emotional worlds within any individual may overlap, or they may be "self-contained".

**Emotional worlds and construing**

Even with the use of terms such as "associations", "connections" and "categories", all of which suggest some sort of system, the notion of emotional worlds is difficult to communicate in precise terms. Firstly emotional worlds, the emotional frameworks within which we experience and interpret events, remain essentially private. We may share our feelings
at any given time, but it is difficult to share the complex structure of emotional associations and meanings each of us carries around inside our minds. An awareness that there is such a structure is also a personal experience. Such an awareness may be prompted by the theories of others. In the case of Freud's references to emotion, if a multi-level theory is perceived, we may think about the levels of emotional processes and become aware of the physiological, sensational world of feeling, then the cognitive world of feeling (encompassing the creative, ethical and motivational dimensions of feeling), and then the states of feeling where the emotional world is coloured by a quantity of a particular feeling or associated groups of feelings. But these, though conceptually necessary, are very general, structural worlds of feeling and may only be used as a springboard to personal emotional worlds.

Kelly has claimed that people are naturally "construing beings", that, viewed over the centuries, people emerge as scientists, interpreting events, then testing those interpretations by making predictions based on them, and seeing whether those predictions are validated by subsequent events. In seeing a need to articulate this theory however, Kelly is suggesting that people are not really, or fully, aware of themselves as construing beings. He says in fact, that he is giving us a completely new way of seeing ourselves. In articulating our construing nature, Kelly makes it available to us as a context within which to construe ourselves. He gives us awareness of ourselves within a socio-evolutionary, scientific context.

The basic analysis of our cognitive emotional worlds using the technique described above may uncover whole "sets" of feelings which influence the ways in which we interpret (construe) events and the actions we take. The awareness and articulation of these emotional perspectives makes them also available to us to use as contexts for construing, as illustrated in Appendix I.
To return to the example where analysis stopped with the awareness of just one emotional world, a physiological emotional context, there are many possible ways such a world may be used to construe and reconstrue events. The recognition of a strong personal world within which emotions are perceived and experienced as primarily physiological processes will in itself influence the construing of the self. A person, in recognising that the physiological aspect of emotion is important to him or her, will obviously begin to notice the degree to which events are construed with this emotional tone. Constructs about one's own emotional responses and the emotional responses of others may be tested using predictions based on the physiological framework. If the predictions are validated, that emotional perspective will be strengthened and will, presumably, yield greater validation of predictions. If the predictions are not validated often enough, there remains the possibility of exploring other emotional worlds and testing constructs based on their structure. The existence of a strong physiological world of emotion would influence the choice of alternative emotional worlds - possibly ones that come nearest to a physiological model but containing wider concepts, such as a motivational world of emotion.

Following an analysis of emotions where many emotional worlds were discovered, or one world that encompassed many aspects of emotion, Kelly's process of construing may be utilised more fully, and greatly enriched. Any given experience may be consciously construed in as many emotional contexts as available, rather than unconsciously construed in one "set" emotional context. Further, it would become obvious in time that events were most appropriately construed in particular emotional contexts relevant to their type. For example, many events are best construed within an emotional context (or climate) of tolerance, and other events in an emotional context of intolerance, where feelings of tolerance/intolerance form the basis of an emotional world. If a bipolar categorisation of feelings
is pursued, each feeling and its opposite forms an emotional context within which certain kinds of events are most appropriately construed. The bipolar categorisation of feelings may be a substructure of a larger emotional world based on the ethical or creative category of feelings.

There are many other possibilities, made available by returning to emotion analysis whenever predictions are not being validated. To change one’s construing means to seek new ways of perceiving, to seek new relationships between things, based on the way two things are alike and different from a third. The way we feel about ourselves and the world greatly influences our choice of the way we will seek a "similarity and difference" relationship. Therefore, until we become aware of our emotional dispositions and the contexts we have established on the basis of them, our construing is limited by an ill-perceived relationship between feeling and thinking. Our prediction and control is limited in turn. As I sought to demonstrate within an exploration of a theory of emotions from Freud, our emotional processes and dispositions are infinitely complex, and always ready to yield new information about ourselves.

Conclusion

As the title of this thesis, "Thoughtful Feeling and Feelingful Thinking", suggests, my exploration of emotional processes began with the simple idea that feeling and thinking were really two sides of the one coin, and that both were needed in a complementary relationship for a more accurate and satisfying perception of the world. That "simple" idea swept me on three long journeys - one being an historical journey to find when and
where people in our Western traditions of thinking articulated concepts of emotion. Another journey was a conceptual one, to explore how concepts of emotion relate to one another, and have changed in time. A third journey was a psychological one, to explore personal emotional worlds and to seek ways in which such worlds could be communicated. From these journeys, this thesis emerged, a blending of the "loot" gathered into an argument for an evolutionary nature to the development of both feeling and thinking, where they can be seen to become as closely related as my "simple" idea suggested. This study has been limited to the developments in the Western Cultural environment and as such presents only half (or less) of the picture. Three more journeys into Eastern and other cultures could yield concepts and frameworks different enough to change the nature (if not the direction) of the development of the thinking/feeling processes. However, the Western tradition has seemed to be the strongest exponent in the past of the idea that thinking and feeling should be in some way separated, perceived as in opposition to one another, one being "rational", the other "irrational". It seemed therefore appropriate to consider the strength of these attempts at separation, and to consider also the strength of the attempts to overcome such separation. The historical, philosophical journey yielded evidence of both strengths - and also evidence of the many perspectives on emotion, each having strong conceptual roots. The psychological journey yielded the concept of personal emotional worlds and the ways in which these seemed to be an essential part of how we perceived and interpreted the world around us. The direction for further evidence and exploration would seem to lie, at this point, towards the empirical possibilities of the concept of emotional worlds and their usefulness to our thinking, and interpretation of events (see Appendix II).

As stated in the Introduction, the main aim of this thesis has been to find and present the developmental picture of thinking on emotions within
Western tradition and to show how that picture represents a coherent and on-going development of our emotional processes. The five major perspectives on emotion outlined at the end of Chapter One have provided the general framework within which to provide such a picture. As a framework it represents, both historically and now, the ways in which we think about emotional processes. The five perspectives - physiological, cognitive, moral, motivational and creative - are all major contexts for thought on emotion. A limitation of this framework may be that it is too general, and that each context presented is, in itself, too complex and too closely entwined with the others to be truly separated. Many writers on emotion mentioned in this thesis have commented on the difficulty of separating the perspectives given here. I think the separation is justifiable, but I have been very much aware of the difficulties of presenting contexts that clearly "stand on their own". Obviously "physical", "cognitive", "moral", "motivational", "creative" could each be defined in terms of the others, and equally, could each be explored further to give them more distance from one another. Philosophically however, thinkers have consistently separated the contexts within which they presented their thoughts on emotion and the outline of such contexts has, I think, been useful.

In connection with the secondary aims arising from the major aim, I would like to mention each aim again and comment on them:

(a) to establish that modern psychological theories, though appearing to start again, did not abandon the strands developed by philosophers, and indeed contributed to them further.

Once again, the limitations of this work, as presented in Chapter Three, may be that there are simply too many approaches to emotion in Psychology to be tied in to earlier thinking as I have attempted to do. To claim that each one has arisen fundamentally from some previous tradition
could be rather like claiming that there have been no truly new ideas since Plato and Aristotle. And, in any event, why must there be connecting links through the generations? Why not begin afresh from our experiences in each generation? Both Descartes and Freud argued strongly that traditions merely inhibited and distorted their perception of reality. This would be a fair approach I think if the work yielded by each generation did answer the questions about emotional processes, but as Solomon (1976), Reymert (1973) and Rosenberg (1990), have pointed out, the mystery of emotions has gone on deepening, rather than being clarified, so it would seem reasonable to seek the links between the "mysteries", and especially the links between the past approaches and the new direction of psychology.

(b) To claim that Kelly within his Theory of Personal Constructs has presented a theory of emotions that posits the closest relationship between thinking and feeling yet presented.

As Kelly did not formally present a theory of emotions, the task has been to find evidence for such a theory and to show how it relates to thinking processes. There are always dangers in abstracting theories from a writer where he/she did not intend to present them, but Kelly himself justifies the attempt by claiming that we are free to reconstrue events (in this case, his writings), especially in the search for validation. Construing a theory of emotions from Kelly did in fact yield such validation (for this writer) in terms of the subsequent awareness of the importance of emotional worlds to construing.

(c) To establish that the emotional awareness necessary for the full use of Kelly’s method of construing as a way of making sense of the world, was to be found in the work of Freud.
To go through the writings of Freud seeking new dimensions to his theory of the instructs carries its own particular problems. As many writers on Freud have commented, not least his official translator, Strachey (1964), there are many inconsistencies to deal with, and the complexity of his work will always yield new dimensions for those seeking them. In addition, Freud’s most recent biographer, Gay (1988), points out that Freud openly set out to make things as difficult as possible for his future biographers by throwing away much of his work and leaving behind much that was difficult to organise. There is a problem then, with putting forward a theory of emotions and claiming that the evidence for it is at all conclusive. I offer the Freudian Chapters therefore as an attempt to find the means for providing a structure and some doorways to our personal emotional worlds.

(d) To establish that, on the basis of Freud’s theory of emotions, and his analytic technique, and Kelly’s Theory of Personal Constructs, we have the direction to go forward to a new awareness of thinking and feeling.

This of course, is a substantial claim, but one that seemed to "make itself" as this thesis progressed. To have "established" such a claim is too hopeful an attitude in a thesis that only begins to touch on the "new direction" suggested in the final Chapter. I needed in fact to turn to the empirical implications of the theory to begin to explore ways to establish this last claim. That there have already been empirical investigations that may be related to work in this thesis, is a hopeful sign at least, that the sort of empirical possibilities mentioned in Appendix II, could begin to provide further evidence for the claims I have been pursuing. However, if the claim may be viewed in its component parts - that is (i) as a claim that the theories of Freud and Kelly, as I have related them, provide a new
direction, and (ii) that the direction actually will lead to a new awareness of thinking and feeling - then I think it would be appropriate to propose that the first part of the claim has been reasonably met. The second part of the claim, I suggest, would be a suitable topic for empirical investigation.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX I

An illustration of Emotion Analysis and the way in which it is related to Construing

I would like to comment briefly on some problems associated with the presentation of this illustration. Firstly, the methodology used is specifically constructed to illustrate the relationship between the process of emotion analysis and the construing process. To do this as clearly as possible, the subject of the analysis was asked to choose and present in writing, a problem (event, situation, attitude) which was fairly long-standing and had been clearly construed in some way, without being resolved. The subject was then asked to choose an emotion or feeling (any feeling) and to give a stream of free association words in connection with that feeling. The stream was analysed in the way shown below and the problem was construed, or reconstrued, in the ways illustrated. By "any feeling" I mean any feeling that the subject felt was easily accessible at the time, a feeling that was currently being experienced. This was because I am hoping to show that emotional worlds or contexts can be explored beginning with any feeling at all, not one necessarily related to the problem stated. The subject was asked to state the problem first only in order to be able later, to compare the construing of it before and after emotion analysis. This order of events will, I hope, become clearer in the description of the procedure which appears a little later. The problematic aspect is that a methodology in connection with any given theory usually takes years of empirical investigation to be developed. Certainly in the case of the theory proposed in this thesis, such years would be essential to the proper development of the process described here. Therefore, I would like to emphasise that this illustration is only a demonstration and not offered or intended as any sort of empirical "evidence" to support the theory at this time.
Secondly, it was a possibility that an illustration be attempted from some work of literature, either poetry or fiction. While I believe that a version of the analysis is possible in connection with literary works, that too is still in the process of development, and would not illustrate the procedure in the way that is required for reasons which will I hope become clearer. Briefly, the analysis depends on the free-association technique and is not intended primarily as an analysis of language only, still less the considered and deliberate language of writers, (with perhaps one or two exceptions such as, for example, James Joyce or Virginia Woolf). Though, having said that, a variation of the process could be used to detect possible emotional worlds within a writer's works. However, that would not illustrate the relationship between emotion analysis and construing directly.

The Illustration

The following material is an illustration of how I perceive the relationship between emotion analysis and the process of construing to work. It is based on the description in Chapter Nine, and presented in the format of a report (loosely) for clarity, though as stated earlier, it is not intended as any sort of empirical evidence at this time.

Aim of the illustration

The aim of this illustration is to show how personal emotional worlds, or contexts, may be elicited from a subject, and then used to reconstrue a problem. The procedure is meant to demonstrate how the use of personal emotional worlds may enhance and elaborate construing, thus showing a close, complementary relationship between emotion (feeling) and construing (thinking) as discussed in this thesis.

The subject was a male in early middle age. He was married, with one young male child.
Procedure

It was decided after some discussion that the procedure would take place in the subject's home where he felt most comfortable and most able to allow his feelings to emerge freely. We began by sitting at a table (the subject and myself), both equipped with pen and paper.

1. The subject was asked by me to write down some problem that he could think of, that was a long-standing source of some concern, and about which he had done some thinking, without being able to come to any resolution. When the subject had done this, he was asked to list some of the main issues that were connected with the problem for him, and then to identify what he perceived to be the main obstacles to a solution. The purpose of this was to establish the subject's way of construing a problem before emotion analysis (a problem about which he had already done a lot of thinking) so that this could be compared with his construing of the problem within the context of his personal emotional worlds.

2. The subject was then asked to put the problem aside and then his mind to the task of choosing a feeling which was currently active for him in his life and that he had no difficulty in "bringing to the surface". The purpose of this was to begin the access to the subject's personal emotional worlds, a process which can be commenced with any current feeling being experienced. When he identified such a feeling, the subject was asked to allow images to form around that feeling. For this task the subject was asked to make himself as comfortable as he could (e.g. walking, sitting, lying down, eyes closed etc, as desired).

3. The subject was then asked to give me a flow of words that expressed for him the feeling he was experiencing. The subject chose to write the words down himself in a flow that lasted for a few minutes. I then asked
the subject to rest for a short time and allow the feeling to ebb away. To facilitate this process we made a cup of coffee and chatted lightly about some things of mutual interest such as vegetable gardening, favourite fruits etc.

4. When the subject felt refreshed and suitably "neutral" (after about 15-20 minutes) he was asked to list the words that he had given under the categories of "physical/physiological", "cognitive", "moral", "creative", "motivational", and "uncategorised", listing any words twice if so wished. These categorisations were to be based on the subject's personal meaning and interpretation of the words that he had originally given. He was asked to remember his experience of the feeling and to consider why he had used those particular words, i.e., what the meanings of those words were to him in terms of his experience. The purpose of this was to begin to uncover the ways in which the subject interpreted his emotional experience and the personal contexts that experience raised for him.

5. The subject was then asked to choose the category he wished to explore further in relation to the problem stated at the beginning of the process. When he chose the category he thought most suitable he was asked to provide the "opposite pole" as he understood it, for each word in the category chosen. The purpose of this was to provide a series of bi-polar units or concepts that formed an initial emotional world or context within which to reconstrue the original problem.

6. Finally the subject was asked to reconstrue the problem within each bi-polar unit in the chosen category, thus giving a number of elaborations on the problem related to the context he had chosen to explore. To do this he was asked to give his personal meaning of the bi-polar unit and then the way in which he related this to the problem.
Outcome

1. The problem presented by the subject was:

   The unwarranted value and encouragement given to appearances as against substances (in society in general).

   This problem was presented as being the cause of long-standing disturbance and perplexity. It was construed as being related to "deceit in public behaviour, short-term thinking and lack of planning, concealing of inadequacies, profit-driven exploitation and environmental damage". The blocks to solutions were construed as (i) "the perception that individuals can't (or don't desire to) influence or change substantially the external environment", and (ii) "the problem of whether a personal resolution is self-deceptive if the external environment hasn't really changed". The central problem as presented above, was the one related to the emotional contexts outlined below.

2. The feeling chosen by the subject for analysis was panic. It was defined by the subject as a feeling of panic and not a state of panic since it was not pervasive or overwhelming, but was within reach, or accessible, to him at the present time, due to his being involved with study, assignment deadlines, duties at work, and family responsibilities.

3. The initial stream of associations was as follows: assignment, time, result, good, people's estimation, hard, boring, do well, tired, sleep, holiday, relax, time off, family, Abram, break, fulfilment, future, investment, motivation, long-term, price, balance, temporary, dream, idea, expectations, happiness, purpose, life, meaning, value, worthwhile, hope, recognized, unrecognized, self-knowledge, knowledge of others, skills, utilized, wasting time, pretending, earning living, stupid, non-priority,
unavoidable, avoidable, hope, expectation, economic pressure, non-acceptance, realistic, shouldn't be.

4. The words were categorised by the subject in the following ways:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical/Physiological</th>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Cognitive</th>
<th>Motivational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>assignment</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>do well</td>
<td>hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>result</td>
<td>people's estimation</td>
<td>break</td>
<td>boring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hard</td>
<td>price</td>
<td>price</td>
<td>motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tired</td>
<td>value</td>
<td>temporary</td>
<td>happiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sleep</td>
<td>worthwhile</td>
<td>idea</td>
<td>purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>holiday</td>
<td>hope</td>
<td>unrecognized</td>
<td>life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relax</td>
<td>stupid</td>
<td>recognized</td>
<td>wasting time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time off</td>
<td>non-acceptance</td>
<td>self-knowledge</td>
<td>pretending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family</td>
<td>life</td>
<td>knowledge of others</td>
<td>earning living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abram</td>
<td></td>
<td>realistic</td>
<td>unavoidable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>break</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>avoidable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>hope</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creative</th>
<th>Uncategorised</th>
<th>Categorised twice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fulfilment</td>
<td>time</td>
<td>hard (physical and motivational)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment</td>
<td>future</td>
<td>break (physical and cognitive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balance</td>
<td>dream</td>
<td>price (cognitive and moral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hope</td>
<td>expectations</td>
<td>life (motivational and moral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skills</td>
<td>meaning</td>
<td>hope (creative and moral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utilized</td>
<td>non-priority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expectation</td>
<td>shouldn't be</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When categorising each word, the "subject" gave the meaning the word held for him in the context of the emotion being analysed to explain why he categorised it thus. Most of the categorisations seem clear but some not. For example, "life" was categorised as having a meaning within a moral framework, the meaning being "life is good and to be respected", which forms a part of the "subject's" moral world of feeling. It is also categorised as having a meaning within a motivational framework, that is, "life is something that pushes and pulls on you ..." which feeling forms a part of the motivational world of feeling. In each case, the "subject" is speaking of the "feeling-meaning" attached to the word - that is, "I feel that
life pushes you along ." or "I feel pushed and pulled by life ...", so these are not statements of fact or general meaning, but personal association, personal meaning. Similarly, in the physical/physiological category, the subject stated that these were the words he associated with physical sensations and actions. For example, "holiday" for him meant being more in a physical or "body" mode rather than in a mental mode, being more aware of physical experiences than thinking experiences. The word "Abram" (his son's name) was also, for him, strongly associated with the physical experiences of body contact with his child etc. In each case the words in this category had some specific physical meaning. In the case of uncategorised words, a personal meaning was unable to be defined so further associations were planned at some later time.

5. The subject chose to use the moral category to begin to explore the world it indicated and to reconstrue the problem originally stated. The bi-polar structure of this category was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Category</th>
<th>Bi-polar Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>good</td>
<td>destructive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people's estimation</td>
<td>bad opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>price</td>
<td>enrichment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>life</td>
<td>deadness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>value</td>
<td>facade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>worthwhile</td>
<td>futile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hope</td>
<td>despair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stupid</td>
<td>wise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-acceptance</td>
<td>acceptance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. The subject reconstrued the original problem in the following ways:

1. good V destructive

Personal meaning: This means being yourself as opposed to pretending
Relation to problem: The value given to appearances encourages people to develop their steel-lined hollow insides and to become incapable of entering into life-giving relationships.

5. value V facade

Personal meaning: This means substance as opposed to emptiness.
Relation to problem: Appearances are empty in the long run.

6. worthwhile V futile

Personal meaning: This means naturalness and harmony as opposed to temporary monuments.
Relation to problem: We are building a society of temporary monuments physically and mentally, which is slowly destroying all naturalness and harmony.

7. hope V despair

Personal meaning: This means proper self-love as opposed to lack of self-love, or self-hatred.
Relation to problem: The social pressure to "keep up appearances" can lead to self-hatred, instead of developing proper self-love which leads to fulfilment as a person.

8. stupid V wise

Personal meaning: This means forms of idolatry as opposed to forms of communion.
Relation to problem: Worlds built of appearances make idolatry the only form of interaction between people and between people and the environment. Reality and substance
are needed for creative communion.

9. non-acceptance V acceptance

Personal meaning: This has two levels of meaning - one being the state of being unconscious of things and therefore non-accepting of them, as opposed to conscious and also accepting. The other meaning is having a lack of respect for others (non-acceptance) as opposed to respecting others (acceptance), and also being respected oneself, or not being respected.

Relation to problem: With value given to appearances, being respected may involve contributing to appearances rather than substance. Also, in the first meaning, if people are conscious of nothing but appearances then they will also be accepting of them. Equally, if people are unconscious of one another, in terms of substance and reality (what lies beneath the appearances) they will be essentially non-accepting of one another.

Commentary

From these personal meanings and the way they are related to the problem as originally stated and construed, it may be seen that the first analysis of the stream of moral associations used as the basis for an initial, simple bi-polar moral "world" yields quite a rich amount of reconstruing of the problem to increase the subject's own understanding of what, for him, constitutes some of the moral underpinnings of the problem for which he is concerned to find resolutions. Some distinct moral principles emerge which form the basis of this subject's conscious (and possibly unconscious) system of morality. Looked at from this moral "world" the
problem originally stated takes on new shapes and perspectives which will shape possible avenues of resolution.

As described in Chapter Nine of this thesis, the procedure involves seeking words associated freely with the experience of any current emotion, categorising or "clustering" the words which are associated in meaning by the subject and seeing how the words fit into the five categories first described at the end of Chapter One. The categories are bi-polarised and used to reconstrue problems (or events). The emotional words, or contexts, disclosed by the categories may be used to elaborate construing of oneself also. The procedure fits within the epistemological framework of personal knowledge as used in the thesis. In Polanyi's terms, the two poles of each bi-polar unit in any category can be used as the subsidiaries to focus on a new meaning or interpretation of any given problem, or event.

In connection with the moral world, or context, disclosed in this illustration, it is interesting to note also that no internal contradictions or inconsistencies were present in this initial stage of the analysis. Further associations, with each bi-polar unit for example, could possibly yield contradictions in the categories where contradictions would play a significant role in behaviour (e.g. moral and motivational contexts especially). Contradictions could also come to light possibly if the process was focussed on the exploration of the emotion itself, rather than on the wider context of using the "worlds" elicited for the reconstruing of a problem. The exploration of the emotion itself (in this case panic) was not the focus of this illustration, but if it had been, the methodological path would have been slightly different. The subject would have been asked to elaborate on the reasons for his initial categorisations, and the personal meanings attached to the bi-polar units would have been explored further. One or two such examples were in fact explored a little further when I
asked the subject why he had included "Abram" (his 18-month old son) in the initial stream of associations connected with the feeling of panic. The reason given was that Abram was at the stage of climbing all the time and had more than once seemed in danger. Another example was "holiday", the reason given there being that the subject associated holidays with "letting go" of mental activities. At the time of the analysis he was under pressure to get some work finished after which he anticipated a holiday. However, the thought of "letting go" before the work was finished induced a sense of panic. Connections with panic were also accessible through the bi-polar units. For example, in the moral context the personal meaning given to the first bi-polar unit was:

   good v destructive – "This means being yourself as opposed to pretending".

For this subject, the idea of pretending one's way through life, and being unable to do much about it because so much of social life was constructed on various forms of pretence, was associated with a feeling of panic.

In asking the subject to choose the feeling to be used initially, I was attempting to show that an analysis could begin with any feeling and still yield fruitful contexts for reconstruing problems. Had the subject chosen a feeling more directly related to the problem (e.g. possibly anger) the meanings given to the initial stream of associations would have opened up a different kind of perspective on, for example, his moral world, which could then have been compared with the moral context arising from the feeling of panic. It is within such comparisons that contradictions, significant to behaviour, may begin to occur. At this stage however, I would propose that it is better to explore an emotion that the subject is currently experiencing and to use that as a beginning.
Presenting an illustration of an analysis and its relation to construing in written form does not give anything, unfortunately, of the actual emotional experience involved in this procedure. The sessions, for example, are tiring concentrating as they do on evoking emotions. More than one feeling per session could not be explored without detriment to the whole procedure. The process of evoking the emotion concerned needs care also. Firstly the subject chooses the feeling most accessible at the time. Secondly the person doing the analysis (in this case myself) needs to co-operate in drawing the feeling out and allowing it to heighten as much as possible with a set of responses tuned to the feeling concerned. This requires careful empathic interaction, and is difficult to describe on paper though easily enough demonstrated in a "live" setting.

With these kinds of problems evident even at the preliminary level upon which this illustration takes place, it may be seen that, as suggested earlier, the empirical research in connection with this thesis would require considerable exploration, as would the contexts within which such research would be best carried out. The aim of the illustration was to apply, as clearly as possible at this stage, the claim that ideas from Freud and Kelly may be combined to provide new and richer ways of understanding thinking and feeling, and their relationship to one another. Without the support of full empirical studies, the example provided was necessarily a partial and modest attempt to fulfil this aim. I hope however, that the possibility of establishing a formal context for research is at least visible.
Some closing remarks

The technique I have proposed in this Appendix for the exploration of personal emotional worlds is based partly on my own exploration of personal emotional worlds, and some exploration of the emotional worlds of other people. What I have attempted to give was an indication of the possibilities arising out of the central purpose of this thesis, which was to establish, through an inquiry into thinking on emotion, that the development of our emotional processes is an actively on-going event, helped or hindered by ourselves, and greatly influencing our lives at a personal and global level of interaction. I also sought to establish that thinking and feeling were both rational, creative activities, two sides of the same coin, two forms of the same activity, of making sense of the world.

Within my personal explorations I have discovered, gradually that emotional worlds may take many forms. One such world of mine manifests itself as an "inner geographic terrain", or country, with emotional topography, climate, activities. This "world" emerged from an exploration of the physiological/physical category of associations, by following associations through several levels of development. "Emotional storms", "the winds of change", "upheavals", "floods", all take on new meaning within the context of this world. Many events may be construed, reconstrued and richly understood within an "emotional geography". Another such world manifests itself within the realm of colour. Emotions are subject to the same "shadings" (degrees) as colours and a perception of events in such a context of degrees of feeling, where the differences are construed in "colourful terms" provides an understanding not yielded by other images of degrees of feeling, for me. This "world" emerged from an exploration of the creative category of associations. For others, words symbolising degrees of feeling may be very different. What I have found is that the process of emotional analysis uncovers a structure that already existed,
created by my use of words and images, the ways in which I feel and interpret those feelings. The analysis does not of itself create emotional worlds, nor should this be its purpose. A proper attention to language and the meaning we attach to words, through our experiences, will show us our emotional worlds. The awareness and articulation of them, the understanding of them through the signposts provided by Freud and Kelly, gives us the kind of attitudes to our experience that Kelly believes is the closest thing we can achieve to the reality of ourselves.
APPENDIX II

Some empirical possibilities

In Appendix I I described a possible context for research in connection with the theoretical claims of this thesis. In this Appendix II I hope to indicate some of the areas in current research where the exploration of feelings as proposed could be useful. Not all studies in emotion are of the kind that would make use of this conceptual aspect of emotion. For example, in the British journal *Cognition and Emotion* the studies concentrate on "the emotional reactions in clinical disorders of mood, or emotion, responses to naturally occurring stressful events and responses to experimental procedures (inside front cover, *Cognition and Emotion*, all volumes). In this, and in the journal *Motivation and Emotion*, the studies focus primarily on highly-structured response situations, or relationships between certain emotions and actions, and these, while obviously very valuable, did not seem to me, at this stage, to be directly related to the idea of emotion analysis.

The following studies are selected on the grounds that they could possibly be elaborated by the use of emotional worlds as described in this thesis. The areas of research that seemed most relevant at this stage were those related to self-deception, to a lack of awareness of complicated emotions and their effect on behaviour, to the area of manipulation of the feelings of oneself and others, and to the area of personal relationships.

That we have quite strong emotional processes that we may be unaware of, or at least not fully aware of, is suggested by studies carried
out in connection with emotions and self-deception. Whisner (1989) speaks of the ways in which we "engage in self-deception" in order to maintain certain emotional states, to escape from other emotional states, or to hold on to emotions one feels morally obliged to have. He claims that self-deception makes one unaware of one’s emotional states, and also that, in some cases one can move from self-deception to the actual emotional state. A study by Flett, Blankstein, Pliner and Bator (1988) which looked at whether self-reports of emotional experience contained components of "impression-management" and self-deception, suggested further that people have some sort of cognitive control over their emotional states, and over the ways in which they articulate emotional experiences. Although Flett et al focussed on the role of self-presentation in the expression of emotion, they stated that it was clear on the basis of their findings that the relation between self-deception and the expression of emotion was worthy of further consideration. They found that subjects with higher self-deception scores, compared with subjects with lower self-deception scores, tended to rate their anger experiences, for example, as less frequent, less intense and shorter in duration. Such a general pattern was evidence in connection with negative emotions, and self-deception was also associated with a tendency to report the increased presence of positive emotions. Flett et al also suggest that the self-deception could be motivated by a general need to protect self-esteem. According to Whisner, self-deception "can pose a serious threat to reflective growth", can encourage people to have false beliefs about their emotional states (and act on them), and can lead people to being generally misinformed about themselves, others, and the world (Whisner, 1989, pp.392-98). It would seem then that a knowledge and awareness of personal emotional worlds could possibly be of use in counteracting the effects of self-deception in connection with emotion. It would be interesting to know, for example, whether the subjects with a high self-deception rating in the study by Flett et al would have a lower rating.
after undergoing emotion analysis and consequently, a more accurate report of the duration, intensity and frequency of anger experiences, and a difference in *attitude* to impression management. In connection with the need to protect self-esteem, the concept of emotional worlds has the advantage of being essentially a non-moral concept. That is, in personal emotional worlds, negative emotions would be a part of a whole structure having their justifiable "place", and balanced by the positive emotions. Becoming aware of strong negative emotions in a balanced context, and within an "emotion metaphor" could be less threatening, or not threatening at all, to self-esteem. For example, in a "geographic" emotional world, such as the one I described in Appendix I, negative emotions become part of a system of nature where my anger experiences may well be perceived as a "flood" or "volcano" or any other "natural disaster" which will have its consequences and, will need to be counteracted by other "natural forces" if the "world" is to survive. Such an emotional metaphor may well be more acceptable in terms of self-esteem than the idea that one is "an angry person who easily flies off the handle" etc. Having access to one or more personal emotional worlds could perhaps minimise the need for self-deception in connection with emotions - or at least significantly affect it. This in turn, may be useful in a number of research areas that require self-report on emotional states.

In connection with deception and manipulation (as distinct from self-deception), a study by Draper and Belsky (1990) found that people high in self-monitoring skills were particularly responsive to social interpersonal cues, and skilled at hiding their own preferences and feelings. People with low self-monitoring skills had more difficulty in masking their underlying attitudes and were less facile in social situations requiring deceit and manipulation. With this study a number of questions could be raised by introducing the notion of personal emotional worlds. Firstly, would the subjects with low self-monitoring skills have a high self-monitoring rating
after undergoing emotion analysis? Secondly, would knowledge of their own and others' personal emotional worlds facilitate social interaction and provide skills other than deception and manipulation in complex situations? The second question would relate to subjects with both high and low self-monitoring skills.

In the area of personal relationships, Felmtree, Sprecher and Bassin (1990) explored the relationship between emotional self-disclosure and the maintenance of personal relationships over time. They found that there was a significant relationship between self-disclosure and intimate relationships remaining intact. They also argued that "the ease of being oneself" in relationships was conducive to stable relationships, and that such ease implied direct knowledge of oneself. The problems connected with obtaining "direct knowledge of oneself" are considerable, and few methods have been developed. Brown (1990) argues that it is now evident that self-enhancement, self-assessment and self-verification motives all influence the search for self-knowledge, and that these need to be taken into account. As well as yielding self-knowledge directly, the exploration of personal emotional worlds need not be negatively affected by these motives. Enhancement, accuracy and consistency may be dealt with constructively by being accepted as a part of an emotional world, or being able to be resolved within a world. For example, a personal emotional world constructed within an aesthetic framework could satisfy the drive for self-enhancement while still yielding accurate knowledge of a range of feelings. The drive for consistency could actively contribute to the formation of many worlds (further metaphors) in attempts to resolve or "live with" contradictions.

Working within a social constructionist framework, Kippax, Crawford, Benton, Gault and Noesjinwan (1988) argue that emotions are constructed in reflections, that through reflections we "make sense of our experience of
the world and negotiate the meanings that we and others attach to them. Their study explores the ways in which emotions are "constructed" by incorporating the meanings of past experiences (obtained through a "memory work" methodology) and present experiences (appraisal). The complex study itself forms a part of the appraisal process. Conceptually it relies on meanings derived from experiences in the social world, making a distinction between feelings and emotions (the latter being socially derived), and regarding them as possibly overlapping, but not coextensive. Using that distinction, it is possibly the world of feelings with which the notion of personal emotional worlds is most concerned, but equally, it could be explored whether the "social world" is not in itself an "emotional world" that yields a certain understanding of emotions. Such an "emotional world" may possibly be socially constructed by those personal meanings people have most in common, thus providing a "social core" around which other feelings develop at the personal level. To explore this idea, emotion analysis could be conducted to compare the various personal emotional worlds of subjects and to relate widespread similarities to the social patterns in present society.

Although I have said elsewhere that emotion analysis is not being put forward as a therapeutic technique at this stage, the advantages or possibilities for therapy are visible to some extent, especially in connection with guided imagery therapies (Feinberg-Moss and Oatley, 1990) and in connection with the prevention of mental illness and self-diagnosis techniques (Ericson, 1990). As mentioned in Appendix I, emotion analysis seems to be a way also that may yield more knowledge of disturbed emotional associations related to clinically disturbed people.

As with presenting the illustration in Appendix I, there are difficulties with discussing the empirical possibilities of the theory presented without the development of the research necessary to discover the wider uses of
emotion analysis. Such uses, if they existed, could only become apparent as a proper methodology was developed, or a number of methodologies, for use in different research areas. As with any area of research, there is no shortage of problems to address, and the problems related to work with emotions are still as much conceptual as practical, as discussed in Chapter Three of the thesis. The theoretical framework described in this thesis and the practical technique proposed address, I hope, some of the difficulties of defining and understanding emotions, and some of the difficulties of eliciting data on emotions.
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This is to certify that I, NADIA CRITTENDEN, being a candidate for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, am fully aware of the policy of the University relating to the retention and use of higher degree theses, namely that the University retains the copies of any thesis submitted for examination and that the University holds that no thesis submitted for a higher degree should be retained in the Library for record purposes only, but within copyright privileges of the author, should be public property and accessible for consultation at the discretion of the Librarian.

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23/12/91