How all roads lead to anarchy: from Carr to Proudhon, via the postmodern 'interferences' with international relations

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How All Roads Lead to Anarchy: From Carr to Proudhon, Via the Postmodern 'Interferences' With International Relations.

For Susie
Most young men and women at the century's end
grow up in a sort of permanent present lacking any organic relation to the
public past of the times they live in.

Eric Hobsbawm.

Today our schools of rationality balk at having their history written,
which is no doubt significant.

Michel Foucault.

Struggle amounts to an awful thinking,
Its discoveries remain limited
only because its course is interrupted.

Roberto Mangaberia Unger.
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Preface

This thesis is an investigation into the dominant ways of coming to understand conflict in the new millennium. Further, this thesis penetrates deeper into social theory to question the dominant methodology and the common understanding of what constitutes reality and the methods whereby Realism and Neorealism have retained a monopoly of truth claims despite prolific criticism. This thesis seeks, by using recent postmodern literature in IR, to reframe both reality as conceptualised and the methods and questions that should be directed towards understanding and creating reality. In reframing and reconceptualising reality it becomes possible to have an alternative and equally realistic understanding of the causes of conflict.

Therefore, the point of this thesis is not so much to provide a whole ream of conclusive answers to contemporary issues, so much as to offer more productive avenues of research in the hope that the determinism and pessimism of mainstream theorising in IR might be eschewed indefinitely.

This thesis also seeks to understand why mainstream theorists have come to rely upon their own theory of reality for so long and how it became engrained as the only realistic theory of IR.

I argue that the first part of the answer resides in a modern preoccupation with shedding responsibility through objectivity, the second part concerns shedding history in the name of science, and thirdly of presupposing reality's intransigence to further an understanding of reality which has consequently served to entrench its imperfections. Each of these three elements can be seen in the implicit normative
concerns of Realism, Neorealism, Neoclassical Political Economy, Enlightenment philosophy and the practice that these ideologies have spawned. Their obviously glaring irregularities bloat in daily current affairs where people die as a result of the modern deterministic doctrines of power politics and/or economic rationalism, most obviously in the form of mass consumption producing mass waste and global warming; the first a cause of modern political economy, the second its effect. Moreover, concerted international efforts to remedy this pollution get bogged down in the discourse of state sovereignty, of economic (ir)rationalism, and a blind faith in science; the very (circular) logic that precipitated the initial catastrophes.

This thesis has finished up as a critique of the presumed sovereign impotence of the state. Moreover, it is a critique of the presumed intransigent but largely illusory aspect of the state, which comes under the heading of metaphysics, or so I shall argue. It is a critique of the scientific philosophy that elevates reality to the deterministic level of factuality; this thesis is also a critique of the broader modern discourse within which this image of reality fits. Finally, this thesis is an attempt to relocate people—for better or for worse—in the making and shaping of our social, cultural, economic, and political environment, to achieve a deeper understanding of the causes of our global calamities and of the source of a possible cure.

I would like to propose that nothing, not even change, is beyond concerted effort. This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the primary cause of apathy and disaster are human beings, but we are also the only remedy.
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr Steve Reglar for his constant supervision and advise. I would also like to thank him for giving me the space to develop my ideas without hindrance, and for pointing me in the many directions that this thesis took. I would also like to thank Dr Reglar for the advise of parsimony and clarity, and for the philosophical, analytical and terminological skills which I had to develop as a result of my eclectic reading.

I would also like to thank Associate Professor Andrew Wells for reading successive drafts of this thesis in such a short time, and for his help in ensuring that this thesis was completed and of a standard that I am proud of.

The basic structure of this final draft was recommended by Jim George, whose help was brief but invaluable, and for which I am very grateful. I would also like to thank Professor Rajani Kanth for early words of encouragement and for introducing me to radical and critical political economy; this is a path that I have only just begun to walk. For useful comments on various drafts and chapters I would also like to thank Peter King, Suzanne Evans and Dr Lloyd Pettiford.

For supplying the material used in the introduction of this thesis concerning the history of the Department of International Politics at The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, and for providing the historical work on E.H. Carr, I would like to thank Caroline Haste at the department of International Politics at Aberystwyth.
Finally, this thesis would have been impossible without the material support of Carmen Hill and Susan McCann, and it is to you that I am most grateful of all.
Introduction

My Dear Sir John,

The armistice has been signed and the statesmen of the nations will soon assemble to undertake the task of concluding the pact of Peace, which we all ardently hope will herald in a new world, freed from the menace of war. Out of their deliberations our supreme desire is to see established a League of Free Peoples for maintenance of international right and the enforcement of international duty. Beyond all material reparations and all territorial adjustments this foundation of a righteous peace among civilized states may prove to be the most permanent and most valuable result of the war. The plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference can lay the foundation of the League of Free Peoples but they cannot rear the Temple of Peace. This is the task of the coming generation, and for its achievement we shall need consecrated energy, goodwill, knowledge, and enlightened public opinion in all countries. Old problems must be confronted in a new spirit; insular and vested prejudices must be removed; understanding and tolerance need to be greatly developed. It is an immense task and a myriad agencies will be required to discharge it. Among these must be our Universities and our own University of Wales, whose sons have so freely laid down their lives in the morning of their days, and whose memory our little Nation will wish to cherish for all time.

It has occurred to my sisters and myself that the University of Wales and the Council of the College may be willing to allow us to found a chair of International Politics at Aberystwyth, in memory of the fallen students of our University, for the study of those related problems of law and politics, of ethics and economics, which are raised by the project of the League of Nations, and for the encouragement of a truer understanding of civilization other than our own. We are prepared to contribute for this object the sum of twenty thousand pounds, and we should be glad, if our proposal is accepted, that the Chair should be associated with the illustrious name of President Wilson.

With kind regards,
Believe me to be
Yours sincerely,
David Davies.

Lord Davies — like many of his Welsh contemporaries — sought to make sense of a senseless slaughter in establishing the first academic department devoted entirely to the study of international politics. The study of international relations (IR) was defined as political science in its application to international relations with special reference to the best means of promoting peace between nations and the League of Nations was pronounced to be the most fruitful area of study and research.

1 University of Wales Council minute dated 13 December 1918. The proposal was accepted.
3 The League of Nations was the focus Lord Davies's idealism. However Brian Porter notes, [to] [his] surprise and vexation, none of the professors appointed to the Woodrow Wilson Chair had shown much enthusiasm for [his somewhat elaborate] ideas. Porter tells the somewhat ironic history
Lord David Davies’s personal solution to war revolved around an all-powerful International Police force, using the latest in modern weaponry, and capable of crushing any aggressor with speed and determination. The sovereign centre of authority was to be the League of Nations, though the sovereign to whom Lord Davies had to appeal was the British parliament—in which he was a Liberal Member—and eventually to the House of Lords after being awarded a peerage in 1932. Needless to say the above, less academic proposals, never saw the light of day.

However, at the outset the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth did resemble the normative concerns of its founder. Ieuan John et al. have argued that the department aimed to strive for

the moral and political aim of improving the human condition, and the academic obligation to understand, explain and illuminate the complex phenomena of political relations between states. It might be conceded that the prescriptive element was predominant, that the moral obligations of the scholar and the central concerns of the holder of the [Woodrow Wilson] Chair, should be to exhort and teach the need for action, and suggest the policies by which an international organization, the League of Nations in this specific case, could be made effective and even gain the acceptance of nations.

Study at Aberystwyth centred on questions of International Law, the study of institutions, and how states acted in relation to these norms. As such it became a scientific pursuit in the study of the actions of states and institutions. Moreover, the overwhelming aim which dominated the pioneers of the new subject was to prevent war—regarded as the disease of the international body politic. Jim George

surrounding the inception of the department and the politics and turmoil that surrounded the appointment of Professors.

4 B. Porter E.H. Carr: The Aberystwyth Years. 1936-1947. (Forthcoming) p2. These ideas are fully worked out in Lord Davies’ The Problem of the Twentieth Century published in 1930, which received respectful reviews from both The Times Literary Supplement and International Affairs. Ibid.


6 Ibid, p. 91.

7 Ibid, p. 93.
has dubbed this initial approach to the discipline neo-Kantianism. Neo-
Kantianism involved a concern with normalising interstate relations along Enlightened
Liberal, Republican and institutionalist lines always with a concern for the ought of
International Relations as a discipline and a concern for the ought of the discourse's
object of study, namely, international relations.

With the appointment of E. H. Carr to the Wilson Chair of International
Politics in 1936 all this was to change. Though, I would argue, not due to any radical
break in scientific method or discovery, but due to the dichotomous political currents
of the day, the way in which Carr successfully disseminated his ideas throughout the
body politque, and how this body politque, in turn, attributed his ideas a sovereign
voice.9

Lord Davies opposed Carr's appointment to the Chair from the outset,
believing that someone who held beliefs more in common with his own would have
been more suited. His preferred candidate was W. Arnold-Forster—a painter by
profession, though he published widely in the field of International Relations.
Forster's views mirrored those of Lord Davies in that he was an ardent supporter of
the League and this obviously made him an excellent candidate for the Chair. Despite
his poor academic background Arnold-Forster was a more favoured candidate than
Herbert Butterfield of Peterhouse, Cambridge.10

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9 Stefano Guzzini calls this the Kissinger effect whereby the very real links between academia and the
policy elites of the host states merge to prove the validity of one theoretical orientation over
another. (Guzzini, Stefano. *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy:
The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*. 1998.)
In the event, however, E.H Carr was appointed to the chair. This was not without its acrimony, and in fact Carr's appointment prompted Lord Davies's immediate resignation of the Presidency of the University College of Wales.\(^{11}\) It is probable that Lord Davies was as yet unaware of how radically different their ideas were at this point. Lord Davies, it seems, simply had his own favoured candidate, and let his somewhat authoritarian personality get the better of him.

Lord Davies sympathies were indicative of both the thoughts of his contemporaries and his cultural heritage. For such a small nation, The Welsh were, and indeed still are, a very internationally oriented people. At that time the people and their more affluent and public-spirited upper classes alike, aimed to forge strong international ties with the world derived from what Porter argues was a world of naïve and enthusiastic idealism, made up partly of Nonconformist pacifism, and partly of Celtic knight-errantry.\(^{12}\) Porter's antipathy here reveals the lingering prejudice against idealism in the twenty first century which began in earnest with Carr's inaugural lecture at Aberystwyth that was to spark this first positivist dichotomy in IR, and the raging debate since.

Carr's realism argued that rather than resort to intellectual idealism, and instead of designing perfect schemes for the salvation of the world, [Utopianists] should, if they wished to have any influence over public opinion, keep in touch with it, with the political thinking of the man in the street British public opinion, he

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\(^{11}\) Ibid, p. 7.
\(^{12}\) Ibid, p. 9.
said, would never countenance collective security measures aimed to perpetuate Versailles. 13

Carr's prior tenure at the Foreign Office undoubtedly shaped his way of perceiving the realities of the world. It seems from the above that the *British* state is a homogenous sovereign entity, worthy of no analysis; it is only public opinion that need be influenced. However it was through his brief appointment at the Ministry of Information at the outbreak of the war, and his four year employment on the editorial team of *The Times*, (at that time regarded throughout the world as a semi-official mouthpiece of the British Government 14) where he wrote a total of over 350 leading articles [and] played an important part in influencing domestic and foreign opinion although the line he took as the War approached its end diverged increasingly from government views and policy 15 that he undoubtedly achieved the very goal he had set himself in his inaugural lecture, i.e. to influence public and academic opinion.

An indication of his success can be seen in the remarks of Thomas Jones, one of the most politically influential of all Welsh men and advisor to successive Prime Ministers, who argued in a letter to the Principle of the College after the war, when Carr's future there was in jeopardy, that Professor Carr on *The Times* is worth several generals in the field and the brilliant strategist who put him there should be promoted Field-Marshal of the Home Guard. Later in the year he made the point with brutal precision: Should D.D. [David Davies] attempt to dislodge Carr he will be fought to the death. 16

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13 Ibid, p. 12 (emphasis added).
14 Ibid, p. 15.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid, p. 19.
Carr's early conservatism is exemplified in his aspirations for the department. Again in his inaugural lecture, Carr argued for the promotion of a truer understanding of the nature of international relations, and thereby contribute to the creation of a balanced and well-informed public opinion on international problems. 17

Thus the normative element was abandoned explicitly from the discourse and students were forced to focus their attention on the world as it was considered to be rather than as it might be, and although this occasionally prompted accusations of cynicism, it seemed the only basis for an intellectual discipline concerned primarily with understanding rather than improving international relations. 18 Of course, as we have seen from both the Trust Deeds and the initial proposal letter, this conservatism betrays the dual aspirations of the founders, to understand and to end the disease of war, and the abandonment of the normative came to typify the poverty of the Realist paradigm.

The discipline was to take a decidedly conservative shape and evolve within very strict statist ontological boundaries derived from a positivist epistemology, and eventually a negation of the subjective and value-laden realities of life and/or the ability of the subject to alter his/her objective social environment or the inter-state system. With the appointment of Edward Hallett Carr to the Wilson Chair it soon became evident, much to Lord Davies's disappointment, that collaboration and cooperation were neither the stuff of departments nor of international politics. Indeed as the events of the following years showed, war and conflict between states and political ideologies were the norm, and it was to the relations between sovereign

17 Quoted in Ieuan John et al. op cit, p. 97.
18 Ibid, p. 98.
antagonistic states, reflected in the conflict between the disciplines founding protagonists, that academic, scholarly, and professional interest was to turn.

One of the main arguments in this thesis is the proposition that scientific Neo/Realism is seeking to sever its subjective and historical links to the past and present in an attempt to absolve itself from responsibility in the real world which Neo/Realism (this term signifies the only very superficial methodological difference between Realism and Neorealism and thus justifies their amalgamation, the terms Realist or Neorealist are used when referring to the conventional meanings which these terms encompass) has played a very constructive role in creating. Severance, I will argue, has occurred via reification, through reference to the timeless laws of nature or of the international system, via appeals to an objective science and primarily via reference to the ubiquitous and intransigent nature of the sovereign state. This thesis is an attempt to contextualise science, a theory of the state, and the philosophical chassis of Neo/Realism in such a way as to erode the sovereign voice that has been attributed to Neo/Realism over the last fifty years.

Moreover, by attempting to historicize the moments in which Neo/Realism has gone through a fundamental change in either methodology or subject (such as the one outlined above between Idealism and Realism), I would like to show that science does not evolve in a vacuum, that politics are never far behind appeals to objectivity, and that once this is recognised, the determinism which, I argue, underpins a vast amount of Neo/Realism, can be bypassed and in such a way as to dramatically widen — to paraphrase Jim George — the range of the possible in international relations and
also in the theoretical and normative aspect of International Relations (IR) as a discipline.

As the title deed suggest, the dual aspirations of the founders of the discipline were to understand the causes of conflict and to promote peace. This thesis challenges the traditional understandings of the causes of conflict, moreover it challenges the traditional methods of coming to understand the world around us and it also challenges the common conception (in IR) of what the world actually consists of. In so doing I would like to demonstrate the way in which responsibility and culpability should be reintroduced to collective and individual international relations.

Aims and structure of the thesis.

International theory of the modern era has always been inherently problem solving. This is evident in Hobbes's treatment of the English civil war, Machiavelli's proscriptions for the rise of a new system of autonomous political spheres; it is evident in the work of Pufendorf, of Kant, and almost any other western political theorist of the last two thousand years.

Only in the last century with the proliferation of positivism as the definitive method of social investigation has the study of society been given its consciously naturalistic and scientific status. Here it seems that the problem solving method and the empirical analysis of society was transformed to include grand theorising and the deduction of laws using the methods of the natural sciences without any recognition of societies history, its changing nature and the human role in this change.

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19 The paragraphs to follow serve only as an introduction to arguments that will be developed further in Chapters 4 and 5.
Positivism sought to sever the link between theory and practice via appeals to objectivity. Theories, gleaned from the empirical facts of our social existence, such as Realism and Neorealism (Neo/Realism) served the problem-solving ends of the social scientists though they were never recognised as doing so. These ends usually sought an end to the contingency of our social existence, the radical unpredictability and the anarchy of a society without the sovereign presence of an all-powerful God. This is arguably modernity's core project. In addition, Zygmunt Bauman has written,

> Modernity was, among other things, a gigantic exercise in abolishing individual responsibility other than that measured by the criteria of instrumental rationality and practical achievement. The authorship of moral rules and the responsibility for their promotion was shifted to a supra individual level.\(^20\)

The supra individual level, the higher ground as it were, was commandeered by the sovereignty of legislative reason. Bauman argues that this form of reasoning stemmed from Kant (Critique of Pure Reason) and the proposition that the philosopher, by virtue of his laborious reasoning, can legislate for the rest of humanity in the form of normative and universal propositions.\(^21\) This normative project thus operated in two ways; not only did it proscribe the ought for society it also sought to homogenise society, to establish norms, so as to facilitate the eradication of superstition (i.e. the power of the Church), the grounding of knowledge in certainty, and the evolution of modernity, the human spirit, and progress. Further Bauman argues,

> Modern rulers and modern philosophers were first and foremost legislators; they found chaos, and set out to tame it and replace it with order. The orders they wished to introduce were by definition artificial, and as such had to rest on designs appealing to the laws that claimed the sole endorsement of reason and by the same token de-legitimised all opposition to themselves.\(^22\)

\(^{20}\) Z, Bauman. Intimations of Postmodernity. Pg xvi.
\(^{21}\) Ibid, pp. 114 - 118.
\(^{22}\) Ibid, p. 119.
These were natural laws that had to be founded upon fact that was value and prejudice free. This was the positivist method and the legislators were almost unanimous in method, though not in interpretation of facts and indeed what constituted a fact. Nowhere is this more glaringly obvious than in the domain of High Politics, or the discourse of International Relations.

This theme of responsibility is one that we can only take up, however, once morality has been re-accorded a primary role in international politics. Considering the statist ontology of Neo/Realism, bearing in mind Neo/Realist admonitions to privilege power over morality, as we shall see in the first chapter, it is especially important to discuss how reality can involve morality. What must be demonstrated is that identifying the human nature of our social existence is of central importance so as to recognise morality and ethics for their constructive and destructive roles in society.

Realism in no way solves the problem of conflict. In fact, as John Vasquez has shown (using falsificationist methods) it actually exacerbates it. He found that power politics is an image of the world that encourages behaviour that helps bring about war and that when Realists are in power there is a greater chance that war will break out than when they are not.

However my intention is not to offer more empirical evidence in support of Vasquez’s claims. My intention is to deconstruct traditional and neo-realism and to demonstrate that the statist ontology, the method (i.e. positivist/empiricist) and the purpose (rational utilitarian) of Neo/Realism as dominant ways of understanding the world and conflicts place within it are fundamentally flawed, contradictory and

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inadequate. I also propose that Neo/Realism as a school of thought is no less utopian
than the Idealism which it sought to replace. This proposition rests upon the
observation that the world for Neo/Realists is a metaphysical construct with no
tangible base in reality. A state centric ontology, which is the characteristic of
Neo/Realism exists simply because we believe and act as though it does, as this thesis
aims to demonstrate. Moreover, I would like to link this psychological construction to
broader discourses of modernity in far more detail than above but with the same
intentions in hand, and to demonstrate how Neo/Realism at once attempts both to
absolve itself of culpability in world affairs yet, paradoxically, has more of a hand
than most in shaping them.

If I can demonstrate how Neo/Realism is but one way of viewing the world
and not of necessity the only real way of doing so, I should also be able to demonstrate
what the implications of living and thinking in terms of states and power are. In
essence, to think and live in terms of states and power restricts the ways in which
it is possible to live and act, to do so is therefore counterproductive and, as has been
argued by many postmodernists, violent and dangerous.

This thesis also seeks to reconfigure what we think the world consists of and
the way in which this reconfiguration displaces Neo/Realism, and offers space for a
new way of thinking and acting in the world freed from the ontological constraints of
state centrism. These lines of argument will be traced through six chapters.

The first chapter of this thesis seeks to discuss two things. First, I would like
to discuss how Neo/Realism comes to view the world in an amoral and ahistorical
way, how it is that the state has come to be reified via abstraction and hypothetical
deduction with no roots in the reality of our historical past and how viewing the world in the way in which Neo/Realists do is permissive of all manner of dangerous and violent acts in the name of the state, but always in a self-referential, justificatory manner. The main contention here is that Neo/Realism relies upon a metaphysical view of the state-as-actor. As such, Neo/Realism’s theories, which I will discuss in relation to this metaphysical construction (the state), will be elaborate and seemingly conclusive. The main problem is that metaphysics are renowned for being extremely inconclusive.

The second chapter of this thesis begins our decent into the theory of science. What I would like to demonstrate here is how positivism, with all its inherent contradictions, supports Neo/Realism’s commonsense view of the world by allocating states an objective and immutable nature, and then directing our studies away from the subjective nature of our constructed world and towards an enforcement of a metaphysical and largely psychological utopia. What will also be discussed is the way in which ontology and epistemology in Neo/Realist IR are mutually constitutive. The contradiction occurs when we recognise that positivism in IR supports a metaphysical ontology. Positivism as an epistemology was developed explicitly to move to a higher level of knowledge; Comte saw metaphysics as a second level of knowledge after theology. Why then is positivism so successful in maintaining metaphysics? This is a question that I will seek to answer in the second chapter.

The third chapter will begin the critical analysis of Neo/Realist statist ontology. Here, I would like to do three things. First I will demonstrate how Neo/Realism’s core assumptions are false, by using Vasquez Popperian
falsificationist methodology. To date *The Power Of Power Politics* (1998), is the only major study that actually seeks to verify the core Neo/Realist assumptions via an overview of the last fifty years of empirical research in IR. In so doing, Vasquez work confirms the theoretical anomalies discussed in chapters one and two: metaphysical abstractions cannot be either verified or falsified using an empirical epistemology no matter how pragmatic.

Second, by demonstrating how Neo/Realism is empirically fundamentally flawed, and by demonstrating the relative strengths of non realist propositions one can open up Neo/Realism to a scientifically proven charge of utopianism. Neo/Realism does not reflect reality; as such its grip on policy forums should be lessened because it is destructive and illogical to act on the basis of false information.

The third part of chapter three attempts to move further away from empiricism and positivism by asking how Neo/Realism is so resilient as a discourse. To explain Neo/Realism's power I have turned to the one philosopher who is qualified -in my view- to comment upon the power in knowledge and the resilience of discourse: Michel Foucault. This explanation of Neo/Realism's strength will act as a precursor to the proceeding two chapters and will seek to provide a context for the inclusion of linguistic philosophy within IR in general.

Chapter four begins the task of relocating International Relations within a broader modern context. Here I will demonstrate the position of the core Neo/Realist thinkers and their texts in relation to broader social theory using the landmark work of Jim George: *Discourses of global Politics: A Critical (re)Introduction to International*
Relations. The role of this work in any attempt to (re)write IR theory cannot be overstated.

The relocation of Carr, Morgenthau and Waltz within the broader discourse of modernity serves two purposes. First it becomes possible to level the well-honed critiques of broader social and political scientists at the fairly insular works of the major Neo/Realists, and, secondly, it becomes possible to begin anew our reconstruction of what constitutes reality on different premises. These premises are largely linguistic and critical. They stress the human authorship of our social reality, and its mutable and constructed nature.

In the fifth chapter, I would like to redraw the mental picture we have of IR. To do so I will draw upon the critical and radical voices of the postmodern theorists in IR. These theorists do not recognise the sovereignty of statist ontology. Indeed, it is exactly this that they question. Postmodern theory in IR both reframes our common conception of what constitutes the world, and our role within it. Moreover, the likes of Ashley, Sylvester and Walker, question the legitimacy of viewing the world in the way in which Neo/Realism has advocated for so long. Their work encourages us to look beneath the state to the human workings of society and to eschew a logocentric discourse that dictates otherwise.

The final chapter seeks to move beyond postmodernism. This very brief chapter, considering the amount of material that had to be excluded, seeks to link postmodernism to what I believe to be its anarchistic roots. Secondly, it seeks to retell the story of the rise of the states system without the first principle of self interest. Finally I would like to point the way towards working deterritorialised international
relations into a global historical and political sociology via the work of Roberto Unger. His methodology will also allow me to bring together some of the eclectic themes of the prior chapters. This re-telling of the story—in chapter six—allows us to circumvent the mirage of the sovereign state and rework IR theory into the broader fabric of international society. Unger’s work, Politics, allows us to take a step closer to the dual aspirations of the disciplines founders namely to have a deeper and more sociologically informed conception of the rise of the interstate system, the cause of war, and some understanding of how it might be avoided in the future, devoid of Neo/Realism’s naturalistic determinism.

This thesis is primarily an attempt to demonstrate that there is no single reality, sovereign and undisputed, which is our sole repository of meaning and data. This thesis seeks not so much to refocus the lens as to redirect its aim, to widen the angle of inclusion, to illuminate inconsistencies for the possibilities which they hold for the refashioning of the relationship between the subject and object, and this thesis is primarily an attempt to use the thinking space opened up by postmodern interferences in International Relations for constructive purposes.
Chapter 1

The Construction Of Utopia: A De-construction of Neo/Realist Statist Ontology.

Introduction.

[Power politics] wrote Martin Wight, suggests the relationship between independent powers, and we take such a state of affairs for granted. He argues that this phrase indicates not only the existence of sovereign political units but also the conduct of relations between them. This is an extremely powerful statement of Wight's statist ontology. This statist commitment is one that not only presupposes, but one that demands understanding on its own terms, for if you accept the existence of states, moreover, if states form the centrepiece of one's image of the world and are also an ontological commitment, then it could be argued, one must implicitly accept the entire Neo/Realist world view with all its nuances and sophistications, its developments and degenerations. If we accept that states exist as analytical constructs, we must ask why? and with the answers proffered come to the same conclusion as Wight — that to be realistic, we must take states for granted. What I am concerned with in this chapter is the how and why of this statement: how does Wight come to the conclusion that reality is states, and why.

It is not, however, an answer that can be found in Wight's work due to his historically positivistic methodology. For Wight, his epistemology presupposes his statist ontology, and the validity of what the world consists is taken for granted. I would also like to question this assumption. The question, therefore, is why does reality consist of states? And the answer can be found in the core Realist texts, those being, in chronological order, E.H. Carr's *The Twenty Years Crisis*, Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*, and Kenneth Waltz, *Man The State and War* and, also, *Theory of International Politics*. With qualification the same arguments can be traced through all statist IR, most IPE and regime theory alike.

I shall discuss what I regard as The Seven Stages of Neo/Realism. Essentially these stages represent a deconstruction of the Neo/Realist statist ontology, whereby these stages represent less a methodology aimed at coming to understand our reality, and more of a discursive praxis which reconstitutes meaning and reality via a myth of origins and claims to universality. Chapter two will discuss the more traditional concept of methodology in relation to the same seven stages, here, however, I would like to tell the story of how and why the world is what it is according to the Realist and Neorealist (henceforth Neo/Realist) schools of International Relations.

Underlying this argument is the assertion that even the most sophisticated Neorealist scientific theories concerning international relations rest upon unrelinquishable statist ontology. For example, I propose that it would be impossible

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25 This deconstruction of Neo/Realist statist ontology also represents the extent of state theory in mainstream IR. Variations in state conceptualisation in Neoliberalism or Neoliberal institutionalism whilst they add analytical depth to the broader concept of international relations, they do not venture
for Kenneth Waltz in his work *Man The State And War* to devise a third image of
international relations with which he can reject his first and second images without
previously *accepting* the first two in their entirety. For instance, the states system
(third image) rests upon an essentialist ontology of man (first image). Neither could he
devise the economic analogy in *Theory of International Politics* had not the
epistemology and ontology of Neoclassical political economy almost entirely
resembled that of Neo/Realism. By the end of this chapter, what I would like to have
made clear is that Realism, Neorealism and neoclassical political economy share the
same view of the world: it seems for Neo/Realists the world is complex and in need of
atomising, anarchic and in need of controlling, inefficient and in need of order, and that
the proscription which is applied to these issues, in essence, exacerbates that which it
seeks to pacify. In short, Neo/Realism creates that which it seeks to eradicate; namely
anarchy.

The Seven Stages of Neo/Realism 26 progress in this order: first we are
presented with an entirely unacceptable, *though hypothetical*, (1) state of nature
which *allows* the unhampered pursuit of the most evil vices (more modestly put as
self-interest or desires) -ever present within (2) human nature. In this state of
nature within which our human natures struggle in a war of all against all, it becomes
evident that self-preservation is paramount. The success of our will to *survive* in
conditions of scarcity is dependent upon our (3) power though by this stage power
and indeed human sovereignty has been divested to the (4) state in our best

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26 far from the core article of faith in IR, namely a state-as-actor theory. These variants will be discussed
in greater detail towards the end of the chapter.
interests mainly to resolve conflict amongst individuals. Further, the state becomes the embodiment of the human spirit; sanctioned by the social contract and vested in relinquished (5) sovereignty, this sovereign actor then steps out onto the international stage, one that by virtue of a multiplicity of like actors recognising no higher authority, is now (6) anarchic or structural depending upon modern day theoretical orientations. Ironically, the very act of attempting to subdue the initial state of nature has produced the very same (7) state of nature outside in international relations. Thus our modern concern with attempting to understand this state of nature.

Of central concern here is the way in which this world view, this myth of origins, this hypothetical and a priori base for universal theory, absolves all responsibility for action given the constraints that each hypothetical stage imposes upon actors. Morality is superfluous to Neo/Realist theory precisely because it has invented reality in such a way as to render it unrealistic. In this sense it is exactly as Bauman suggested (above), Neo/Realism, as a modern discourse, is the discourse of irresponsibility par excellence. Moreover, this hypothetical interpretation, this metaphysical construction, is the basis for all manner of misdemeanours in the name of the state.

1) A State of Nature.

Thomas Hobbes is the most often cited theorist of a State of Nature in traditional Realism. Citing Hobbes, H.J Morgenthau argues that were it not for the

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26 The first and second stage overlap considerably, indeed most stages contain a degree of overlap and do not necessarily follow each other quite so simply. They do however provide a stable framework
Leviathan domestic society would be reduced to a war of every man against every man\textsuperscript{27} and we are indebted to the state for the peace and order which we find in domestic society. As such the state of nature is a rampant gladiator pit not unlike the one to which Thomas Huxley and the social Darwinists alluded to at the end of the nineteenth century.

For Neo/Realists a theory of a State of Nature is derived from an atomistic view of pre-civil society, based upon the assumption that either (in the Hobbesian view) men pursuing their rational self interests in a society without a sovereign reduce society to a gladiator pit, or, (in Waltz’s interpretation of Rousseau) the early state of nature, men were sufficiently dispersed to make any pattern of cooperation unnecessary\textsuperscript{28} and thus a state of nature is inefficient. Waltz, argues that it was only upon collaboration that a state of nature arose due to the fact that there was no impartial or sovereign arbiter which could guarantee that human interaction would be equitable, efficient and productive. The infamous Stag Hunt analogy typifies this point of view. Men previously unable to satisfy their own needs in isolation collaborate to achieve collective ends, though without a sovereign there is no guarantee of successful collaboration. Either way, the state of nature thesis is hypothetical so as to provide a basis for ahistorical theorising. Waltz argues that Rousseau was concerned to show how it was society and human interaction that brought out malevolence and deceit, whereas for Hobbes (via Morgenthau) it resided in the inherent results of human (co)action. However, even a cursory reading of Thucydides will demonstrate that the state of nature is not only hypothetical but also far more

complicated. Why then do we presuppose a state of nature? The answer concerns human nature.

2) Human Nature.

Theories concerning human nature in Neo/Realist IR theory reside in either the rational-utilitarian camp, exemplified by Carr and Waltz, or within the traditional spiritual camp typified by Niebhur and Morgenthau. Underpinning both theories however, is the concept of self-interest-as-motivator epistemologically derived from the unpredictability of a rampant state of nature, for if society has no impartial arbiter, no sovereign, then what is to guarantee that society will be harmonious, and what will suppress our natural urges to satisfy material self interest?

For Morgenthau and Niebhur, self-interest is irrational. Moreover it is the result of original sin, it is inherent in a society that has fallen from grace, and in seeking to be Gods the Christian traditionalists assume humanity to be beastly. This demands either a sovereign power to crush overzealous individuals and states or a religious pacifism and enlightened reasoning, respectively, to end a chaotic state of affairs. Greg Russell argues, Morgenthau elaborated on man's separation from God as the starting point for theoretical reflection on the desires and aspirations of man as a political

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29 Thucydides noted that the Athenians were the first to lay aside their arms, to change to more luxurious ways and that their more settled life was due to their desire for gain. They settled on the relatively poor soil slightly further back from the seashore than other coastal communities. Piracy forced many communities away from the shore and into the midst of the Athenian community. Alliances were drawn up between the Athenians and other communities for mutual support and when Athens became too populous, colonies were formed. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian Wars Book 1*. p 13.
animal. 30 Niebhur, on the other hand, argues that it is the stupidity of the average man which taints the human race, based upon his observation that [m]ost individuals lack the intellectual penetration to form independent judgements and therefore accept the moral opinions of their society. 31 This position prompts Niebhur to advocate a purely religious pacifism which makes no claims to be socially efficacious. It submits to any demands, however unjust, and yields to any claims, however inordinate, rather than assert itself against another. 32

Conversely, for Waltz and Carr, utilitarian self-interest is unavoidable, as it is the only rational means of self-preservation in a society without sovereign. Consequently, [m]orality for Carr, has no rational attraction for prospective losers 33

3) Power.

The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined as power 34 wrote Morgenthau. Thus, for Morgenthau, human nature is seen to be a malignant will to power, which leads to conflict. Carr defines power as an ability to achieve ends at the expense of others, in zero-sum terms, and by Waltz in Theory of International Politics as the capability, whether exercised or not, to influence policy and outcomes within the immutable structure of the international states system.

33 E.H. Carr. The Twenty Years Crisis. 1946, p. 49.
Power in International Relations is a taken-for-granted concept, which, by broader Political Science standards, is underdeveloped. Referred to interchangeably as capabilities and interests, and either relative or objectively quantifiable, giving rise to gains or more power, interests or capabilities in unending circularity; power knows no limits and is sought after by all. To have power, by the Neo/Realist definition, means to have the ability to coerce. It is also one of many underdeveloped concepts in IR.

4) The State.

Given the hypothetical nature of a state of nature, given the nature of man, given also the ubiquitous and ephemeral nature of power which pollutes the fabric of society, the state is rationalised as a sovereign centre which came about to adjudicate between the irrational warring parties in a the Gladiator pit defined by scarcity, and the rational-utilitarians amongst us who would lead society into chaos or chaos into society.

For Waltz the material satisfaction of wants and needs prompt men to arrange their social existence along lines of adjudication and enforcement set down by a sovereign authority. Either way the repression of the avarice and greed in men is the duty of the state and it does so in order to preserve civil society and, ultimately, peace.
5) Sovereignty.

The legitimacy of state rule is secured via the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty presupposes that within a given territory over which there presides a state, whose duty it is to secure the peace, and whose authority is unquestionable, the sovereign will is the expression of right. To presume a state to be sovereign is to presume that within its borders there is no higher authority, that a violation of sovereignty is a violation of domestic control, and sovereignty also demarcates the internal from the external, the bounded and homogenous from the anarchic and unpredictable. In essence, Sovereignty implies an order, which would otherwise be absent without its recognition, and it is tied intrinsically to the theory of the state and modern foundationalism.35

6) Anarchy/Structure.

Sovereignty assumes form and content that can be distinguished from other claims to sovereignty. By personifying the state, by cartographically demarcating the extent of the state’s sovereignty, an other than or an outside or simply another body other than the state itself is immediately created once we come to accept that while multiple in source, Westphalian claims to sovereignty are indivisible.36 Being as the globe is territorially bound within its own ecosphere it follows therefore that all other sources of sovereign authority be either constituted in binary or multilateral relationships, which cannot violate the homogeneity and totality

35 This will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter five.
36 S. Krasner Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy. Krasner notes that the Westphalian Ideal is largely a myth. This is however of great pertinence to this discussion because as we shall see a great deal of Neo/Realist theory is based upon myth.
of the state as actor that the concept of sovereignty implies. The United Nations exemplifies this idea of equal sovereign units as actors. Sovereignty, in essence, is the basis of a statist ontology. It by definition implies anarchy and/or structure depending upon the variations that can be applied to the previous five stages.

However, this production of multiple bodies of equally sovereign natures, presupposes that, given the irreducible and absolute nature of sovereignty, that these states will logically stand or position themselves in a posture of warre lacking any supra- sovereign entity. Hence the traditional Neo/Realist belief that conflict is unavoidable.

Traditionally, the international system has been considered anarchic, though on further reflection it became evident that the free for all was in fact constrained or ordered by varying degrees. Later Neo/Realists in fact viewed the international system as structural due to its timeless essence and the recurrence of balances between states despite concerted efforts by actors equally as sovereign -but without the mandate for legitimate force- such as firms, to affect certain balances of power.


Ironically the state of nature so loathed in domestic sovereign-less society between irrational self-interested and power seeking individuals, has now been swept outside and it is accepted that states now carry the burden of anarchy which this story has constructed for them. The only contrivance being the assumption -though hotly contested- that states are in fact rational actors. Anarchy is thus superseded by rational utilitarian methods that constitute the order which the sovereign could not
expect of domestic subjects - human nature being as it is and power being the ephemeral, amoral prerequisite of survival and so on

The point of discussing the seven stages is to illustrate their hypothetical, abstract, metaphysical, inter-related, and mythical nature.

Impending Crisis,
And,
Man, The State, Then War!

Here I would like to trace the stages which make up the Neo/Realist statist ontology through E.H Carr's *The Twenty Years Crisis*, Waltz's *Man The State And War* and Hans J. Morgenthau's paradigmatic text: *Politics Among Nations*. Leading from this expose of Neo/Realist ontological commitments and why they are held as such will be a discussion of a similar ontology evident in Neo-classical economic theory-as-discourse in its application by way of analogy in International Relations theory, principally in Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* and mainstream Neorealist discourse as it has subsequently evolved. The choice of these texts is due to their centrality and status to the discipline. However, a reading of most (if not all) Neo/Realist texts would demonstrate that this statist ontology, and its mythical nature, is rampant.

It is no coincidence that we should find the issues pertinent to this discussion in Carr's work under the heading of Morality. True to Carr's project of asserting the overwhelming power of power, various stages leading to the Realist statist ontological commitment are emphasised over others, such as Carr's dialectical treatment of power is privileged over the state of nature thesis. The ubiquity of power, indeed of the will
of the stronger, is the foundation of Carr's world view. Though he is primarily concerned with the relations between states (much to the detriment of future Neo/Realist theory as we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5) the internal constitution of states is commented upon only in a cursory fashion. However, it is still possible to trace the seven stages through his *The Twenty Years Crisis*.  

Carr begins by questioning the plausibility of the state of nature thesis, arguing instead that Man has always lived in groups. However, he argues that membership of society is voluntary and that expulsion is indeed possible. Nevertheless, the peculiarity of political society, which in the modern world takes the form of the state, is that membership is compulsory, compulsory due to the impossibility of existing outside of a state. The origin of this peculiarity is not discussed causally in the manner in which he himself argues is the primary theoretical distinction of Realist discourse except through inference to power relations within society, which make up the hierarchical system that we have inherited from history. For example, he argues that the United States was made through a combination of the wish dreams of Jefferson, and Hamilton's position on questions of strength, wealth and power and both power and the dream were necessary ingredients. Here it is a dialectical counterbalance between the ideal and the real, which is the basis of state formation. For a realist, this is a slightly metaphysical explanation of state formation!

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37 Carr's theoretical orientation changed dramatically after the Second World War. This is most evident in his work *What Is History?* (1987) and will be discussed briefly in chapter four. However, these later works do not feature prominently in IR debate and will therefore not be discussed here.


39 Ibid, emphasis added.


41 Ibid, p. 96.
The state, he argues, is the product of human nature, our natures being either
belligerent or altruistic in varying proportions. In his own dialectic manner he argues
that it is power that is the constitutive factor of all politics and political action
must be based on a co-ordination of morality and power. However, given political
reality, or the ubiquity of power, power is privileged over morality as a first cause in
his theory. Throughout this work we see how the power/morality and reality/utopia
dichotomies are the constitutive factors of international politics, and that the
hypotheses derived from these oppositions explain our present day reality.
Nonetheless, as chapter four will demonstrate, there is a clear operation of
logocentrism involved in Carr's methodology.

Carr does, however, come into some difficulties when he attempts to reconcile
the dichotomy of the individual and the state in his discussion of personification. Here
we see how his theory of the state is developed so as to vindicate his power thesis on
the international (i.e. metaphysical) stage. This is the fourth stage in the construction
and vindication of his statist ontology.

Personification, he argues, is the category of thought which expresses the
continuity of institutions; and of all institutions the state is the one whose continuity
it is most essential to express. Without this personification, regardless of whether
the argument is in favour or against, there would be no mainstream discipline of IR.
Thus, personification serves the dual object of constituting not only the object and
subject in relation to the discourse but legitimises claims to sovereignty by

42 Ibid, p. 97.
43 Logocentrism is a concept developed by Jacques Derrida to denote the arbitrary privileging of
dichotomous concepts in terms of the logos or the I of political discourse. In this sense, Carr
privileges power over morality through reference to his own world view, philosophy etc.
reproduction of this personification. Moreover, this personification serves to reify the state and thus absolve its historical past from critique. We are instructed to personify so as to forget the intricacies of the state and make it easier to think of the state as an actor in the international arena.

Sovereignty, or our fifth stage, is thus constituted by personification, in what has become a primarily statist ontology. Once the distinction is made between objects such as Great Britain and Italy, once it is assumed that there exists a space out there in which these entities can exist, there must be some rational basis for this ontology. Sovereignty, despite the fact that Carr derides its use as a term with any preordained meaning (see below), allows us to construct an atomistic imagery or metaphor that can explain how and why states act as they do. The final three stages of Neo/Realism become immediately evident in Carr's work. As he quite rightly points out,

> It is a curious and significant paradox that those utopian writers on international affairs who most vigorously denounce the personification of the state as absurd and sinister none the less persistently allocate moral praise and blame (generally the latter) to those imaginary entities, Great Britain, France and Italy, whose existence they deny.

Following from this, he argues:

> The obligation of the state cannot be identified with the obligation of any individual or individuals; and it is the obligations of states which are the subject of international morality.

Thus Carr, by personifying the state, by reifying its socially constructed nature, can also absolve the state of any moral criticism. State obligations in this sense, are predefined by the very same imagery which personification implies. Once we accept

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44 Ibid, pp. 149-150. Of course, the reason for this resides in the previous three stages.
45 In this sense it can be said that International Relations actually constitutes and supports political theory. Indeed this is the argument of R.B.J Walker in *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. 1993 that we shall discuss in chapter 4.
46 Op cit, p. 149-150.
the personified powerful state, we must also accept that other states also exist in the same personified way. It then becomes difficult to associate any moral culpability with the state as it is said to be the sole source of legitimate power that makes it quite irrelevant to question how it uses such power. The personified state and its sovereign neighbours exist and are powerful (i.e. they have a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence) and any questioning of such power is pointless: it simply is reality. The point, however, is that this is a question of imagery and metaphor not tangible reality. Carr’s realism is thus typically metaphysical; one must ask how it is possible to be quite so utilitarian as well.

This utilitarianism is developed through an evaluation of the sociological theories of Reinhold Niebuhr and it also acts as a further development of his state theory. He argues that men seek strength in numbers and subsequently relinquish individual responsibility and morality in the name of the group. He argues, Loyalty to the group comes to be regarded as a cardinal virtue of the individual, and may require him to condone behaviour by the group person which he would condemn himself. It becomes a moral duty to promote the welfare, and further the interests, of the group as a whole; and this duty tends to eclipse duty to a wider community.48

How or why this is accepted as a cardinal virtue is also explained by reference to the internal logic of Realism. If power is expansionary and knows no limits, utilitarian self-interest would dictate that the most prudential mode of behaviour is a protective one. The nature of any threat is also relative to the individual’s own power, and thus states will be threatened by other states and individuals by other individuals. In personifying the state or the group, in swearing allegiance to it and renouncing the right to criticism in the name of expediency, Carr advocates the right and the

legitimacy of sovereignty as a concept, Carr's personified state does not have multiple heads, the group unites under a leader and that leader is sovereign. Sovereignty is established as a core realist tenet by assuming allegiance to a higher authority within the state despite the fact that Carr rarely, if ever, uses the word.49

The anarchy of the international system is discussed implicitly in Part Four of *The Twenty Years Crisis*, in which Carr seeks to discern the nature of legality in international relations, and comes to the conclusion that a treaty, whatever its scope and content, lacks the essential quality of law: it is not automatically and unconditionally applicable to all members of the community whether they assent to it or not. 50 And thus the autonomous and power conscious states and non-state actors of the international system exist in a state of antimony ever conscious of the inevitability of war and conflict. And in the absence of an omnipotent power, it is in the nature of power itself that the stronger will seek to maintain its position while it is in the interests of weaker to disrupt, and therefore benefit from re-distributions of power. And all this from personification. This demonstrates the power of Realist imagery, the ability to elucidate and devise theories of causation from simple assumptions.

The same is true in the work of Waltz. In *Man The State and War*, 51 Waltz's ability to deduce an entire theory of causation from a simple first principle of the state of nature is more explicit here than in the work of Carr.

49 In one place where he does, Carr argues, One prediction may be made with some confidence. The concept of sovereignty is likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct than it is at present It was never more than a convenient label ibid p 230. See below, chapter five.
50 Ibid, p. 171.
Waltz, by process of elimination, attempts to locate the origin of conflict first in the nature of man, as his first image hypothesis, then in the nature of the state, his second image hypothesis. Waltz argues that if man is the cause of war then he is also the cause of peace and thus man’s nature has no explanatory power in questions of causation. His second image of the cause of conflict resides in state theory. First he argues that liberals (which he should have referred to as libertarians in order to avoid confusion) are misguided in their naive faith in humanity, therefore their assertions that if only the state would step out of society and laissez faire all would be well are as utopian as the aspirations of the Marxists who (whilst also being caricatured to the extreme) view the seizure of the state in the name of the international proletariat as the only way of alleviating oppression and thus negating or ending the eternal class war which is the cause of all conflict. Waltz argues that the normative Kantian aspirations of the neoliberals will also lead to conflict. This echoes Carr who argues that the interests of the strong will always prevail over the weak and that the liberal utopianists conflate this logical observation and avoid the brute reality of policies. Communists, on the other hand, overtly endorse war to end war—as Waltz sees it—thus also reducing life to a constant battle.

That two sides should entertain contradictory goals does not mean that either is unworthy. It may indicate that both are impractical. The projected crusades of the liberals, as of Dostoievsky and the Communists, must, if implemented, lead to unlimited war for unlimited ends. They may lead to perpetual war for perpetual peace.52

And so after opposing human nature as cause to human nature as benign, and liberalism to communism and finding both sets of dichotomies to be lacking in a

52 Kenneth Waltz, Man The State And War, 1959, p. 113.
typically logocentric manner, in which his foundation is his statist utilitarian ontology, the stage is set for Waltz's interpretation of the primary causes of conflict.

As with Carr, Waltz begins by discussing a hypothetical state of nature, surprisingly citing Rousseau's argument in a footnote that the state of nature no longer exists, perhaps never did exist, and probably never will exist; and of which it is, nevertheless, necessary to have true ideas. Indeed, Waltz's theories are derived mainly from Rousseau, in opposition to what he sees as the inadequate ideologues that he discusses and eliminates during the previous arguments.

For Rousseau primitive man lived in splendid isolation, or as Waltz puts it; men were sufficiently dispersed to make any pattern of cooperation unnecessary. But finally the combination of increased numbers and the usual natural hazards posed the proposition: cooperate or die invoking a stereotypical Malthusian scarcity thesis and the assumption that prior to society (if such a thing can exist) man had no concept of anything.

And thus our self-preservatory instincts, or our will to survive, or what, given the context, must be seen as an amoral nature, forces humans into a free for all fight for survival which is exacerbated by the fact that whilst cooperation would seem the logical method of survival, pursuing one's own self-interest, as the stag hunt analogy sought to demonstrate, will produce the most immediate individualistic and positive results. Moreover, the stag hunt analogy, it is the point of departure for the establishment of government and contains the basis for [Rousseau's] explanation of

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53 Ibid. p. 167. n. 18. emphasis added. The point here is to demonstrate not the contradictory nature of a hypothetical argument so much as to show that it is used as a justification for a state centric ontology and for states per se.  
54 Ibid.
conflict in international relations. 55 In short, Waltz argues that cooperative action is not synonymous with individual interest, but why Waltz needs hypothetical argument to substantiate a purely subjective interpretation of an imaginary history, is never explained.

Which brings us to the third stage of Neo/Realism in what is becoming more and more a hypothetical and metaphysical justification for a statist ontological commitment. Interests are deemed to be inherently conflictual and whilst power is not mentioned explicitly, we are led to believe that interest is its synonym. His position is inherently utilitarian, and again, one is forced to try and reconcile utilitarianism with metaphysics.

Waltz argues that as society cannot be guaranteed to function smoothly by the collaborative actions and good will of humanity (mainly because these conditions cannot exist, see above), it therefore becomes necessary for humans to

set up rules governing cooperative and competitive situations, and organise the means of enforcing them. Others are forced to follow the new pattern, for those outside the organised society, unable to cooperate efficiently, cannot stand up against the efficiency of a group united and enjoying the benefits of a social division of labour. 56

Thus the fourth stage (Power) in the construction of the Neo/Realist statist ontology argues for the state to be constituted as a rational entity and a blessing for all mankind. As Rousseau argues, man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obligation to a law which we proscribe to ourselves is liberty. 57 Moreover, the implication from Waltz’s reasoning is that state formation has less to do with consent

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid, p. 171(emphasis added).
57 Ibid. p. 172.
and politics than it does with coercion and force commonly understood as being traditional power.

Waltz, however, encourages the constitution of the state along patriotic lines, the embedding of the idea of an us/Them distinction incorporated within an inside/outside dichotomy. This inside/outside dichotomy is actually one of the most important constitutive principles of international politics and of state psychology, for the state, which is after all an abstraction and consequently inanimate cannot be viewed as an acting unit unless the people view it as a living homogenous organism distinct from other such units. Thus nationalism is intrinsic to the praxis of international relations. Indeed, Waltz argues that nationalism is constitutive of sovereignty, as nationalism resides in the (hypothetical) will of the people (the state) or the will of the sovereign.

Sovereignty, or the fifth stage of Neo/Realism, in Rousseau's view is the manifestation of the will of a homogenous -therefore good- state (bad by implication denoting heterogeneity). Sovereignty presupposes, therefore, that the actions of the state reflect the will of the people, and other like units will respond to the actions of sovereign states in kind. Therefore, in aiming to secure their peace and liberty in an international arena without a corresponding sovereign power to the one present in the domestic field, sovereign states produce what has become synonymous

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59 Waltz's trumpeting of nationalism and patriotism in these pages is entirely understandable given its publication in the midst of the Communist witch hunts which plagued America in the fifties, however, it is also integral to the state centric ontology of Neo/Realist discourse which is our main focus here.
60 It is surprising that Waltz does not reprimand Rousseau for arguments such as The will of the state, which in its perfection is general for each of the citizens, is only a particular when considered in relation to the rest of the world (p 181) considering it is this very (liberal) attitude which he denotes as being misguided in his discussion of the second image.
with Neorealist discourse and the defining characteristic of their ontology: the security dilemma or the sixth stage of Neo/Realism.

States acting in their own interests, by the sheer physical proximity of other states cannot but affect the interests of neighbouring states. Thus, there is a perpetual dichotomy between sovereignty and the rational benefits of collaborative action. In Waltz's appraisal of Rousseau's philosophy it becomes apparent that given the ontology adopted, and in predictably eschewing the utopianist call for world government, one can only conclude with Waltz that wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them. Therefore causes are relegated to being of secondary importance behind the permissive or underling nature of the international system.

Much in the same vein as Carr, Waltz concludes by arguing that the positive utopian side of his third image (the possibility of world government) as a goal, whilst we must also adopt this third image as a stark reminder of the unassailable character of the (hypothetical) international system.

Waltz argues that the theories of Hans J Morgenthau fit squarely within his first image classification. Indeed, Greg Russell has argued, Morgenthau elaborated on man's separation from God as the starting point for theoretical reflection on the desires and aspirations of man as a political animal. The constitution of his statist ontology nevertheless proceeds through the same seven stages with varying degrees of emphasis as with our previous two examples.

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62 Unassailable, one might add, in utilitarian terms, but what of the metaphysics of the international states system? Surely we could simply think another hypothesis into being and continue in like fashion until we get the desired result?
However, by the time we reach the relevant sections of Morgenthau's work (*Politics Among Nations*) which contain the material which we desire, his statist ontology has been profoundly stamped into the psychology of the reader by continuous historical citation of treaties and wars among Great Powers and lesser states, and also by his talk of the objective and unchanging nature of the international arena and the scientific laws which can be derived from it.

Morgenthau's primary focus of analysis is power. Indeed it is in Chapter Eight, under the heading The Essence of National Power, that we find the seven stages of Neo/Realism playing out their fateful tune to the full.

Morgenthau explains,

> We have learned from our discussion of the ideologies of foreign policies that in the mind of the individual the power aspirations of others bear the stigma of immorality. While this attitude has one of its roots in the desire of the prospective victim of the power of others to defend his freedom against this threat, the other root grows from the attempt of society as a whole to suppress and keep in bounds individual aspirations for power. Society has established a network of rules of conduct and institutional devices for controlling individual power drives into channels where they cannot endanger society, or else they weaken them or suppress them altogether. Law, ethics, and mores, innumerable social institutions and arrangements, such as competitive examinations, election contests, sports, social clubs and fraternal organizations — all serve that purpose.

Of course, the state also provides avenues for the pursuit and expression of individual aspirations for power as Carr pointed out in reference to the creation of the American federal state. Moreover, not all aspirations for power bear the stigma of immorality and still less do competitive pursuits guarantee that individual power urges can be controlled. In essence, Morgenthau is referring to the ordered nature of domestic society as opposed to the anarchic one which would triumph were it not for institutional devices of the type to which he alludes, which could suppress humanity's lust for power, as Russell argues, [b]ecause imperfect man aspires to the
good but is frequently betrayed by a propensity for sin, the best system of
government is one which harnesses his virtues to serve good purposes and limits his
vices through legal and institutional restraints. 65 Here, the state of nature, or our
first stage is caused by man's propensity for self-assertion, which is for Morgenthau
an essentialist conception of human nature, or our second stage.

In the third stage, the struggle for power is universal in time and place 66
Morgenthau argues; mankind has fallen from grace and thus institutions aim to limit
his vices. Morgenthau argues much in the same vein as Niebhor, that groups manifest
the malignant nature of man far more easily, Thus, to take examples only from the
sphere of power, most societies condemn killing as a means of attaining power within
society, but all societies encourage the killing of enemies in that struggle for power
which is called war. 67 Society by this definition is one giant exercise in the
suppression of power in the individual, except it seems, for the statesman. It is this
political exception which leads us to the directly to the fourth stage.

States take on their subject's power struggles, and sanctify this struggle by its
sovereignty, and in the protection of the national interest. The national interest is
thus individual human interest writ large and as all humans are the same, comprising of
the same base motivations, the national interest involves protection from other group
interests. To repeat Morgenthau, the individual power aspirations of others bear the
stigma of immorality (above), nevertheless for Morgenthau these power aspirations
do exist and they are malignant.

65 Ibid, p. 5.
66 Ibid, p. 31.
67 Ibid.
The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it.⁶⁸

All state action on the international scene is reduced to a struggle for power against prevailing forces manifested within power balances. This is the sixth stage of Neo/Realism. Further, the system is anarchic, it is recognised by Morgenthau that the lack of a single sovereign precludes order, thus any tipping of the scales constitutes a state of nature out there and the final stage in our seven stage synopsis.

**Ontological Economising**

**And,**

**Another Theory of International Politics?**

Two international moments of great significance in the early 1970s—the oil shocks and the end of the Bretton-Woods system—changed the classical view that international politics was solely the domain of diplomats and high politics. For the first time there was a mainstream recognition within IR that economic causes can have political effects and *vice versa.* This was manifested in IR theory with a wholesale embrace of Neoclassical political economy.

What I aim to demonstrate here is how similar the world view of Neoclassical political economy (economics) and traditional Realist theory are. Waltz’s ontology is based upon the same presuppositions as Neoclassical economics, namely that the state is a sovereign rational actor constrained by the mechanisms of the international system. Excluding sovereignty, the firm to which Waltz alludes also follows from this statist and structural functionalist ontology.

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⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 162.
What I would like to do now is trace the seven stages of Neo/Realism through the later work of Kenneth Waltz and then see if the same ontology is present in recent Neo/Realist and Neoliberal works.

Reasoning by analogy argues Waltz, is helpful where one can move from a domain for which theory is well developed to one where it is not. 69 This is Waltz's justification for incorporating microeconomic theory. Microeconomic theory describes how an order is spontaneously formed from the self interested acts and interactions of individual units, and while Waltz knows and understands how unrealistic it is to talk of economic men and utility maximisers, units and markets, he nevertheless maintains that it is useful for theory.70 Here we have the first stage epitomised once more, a hypothetical primal state is offered as the basis for further theory. From this anarchic first base, we are then told that the state's primary motive is survival (utilitarianism), and we see both of these points in Waltz's conceptualisation of the market.

For Waltz, a market arises out of the self-interested actions of like units as stated above, however, the market contains order (which Waltz defines as structure) and this order is constituted despite the anarchy of the autonomous parts. Indeed, Waltz argues, Adam Smith's great achievement was to show how self-interested greed-driven action may produce good social outcomes if only political and social conditions permit free competition. 71 The market is structural due to the fact that it

69 Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. 1979, p. 89.
70 Again, as in Man, The State and War Waltz encourages us to look away from the evidence which suggests that the hypothetical is an over simplification.
71 Ibid, p. 90. This is what can only be called an about face in his theoretical development. In Man The State and War. It is this blind faith which is the very thing he lambastes in his critique of liberalism argu ing that further self interest on the part of the units creates injustice and this is the very reason for which we have the state. (See page 87-89) Again we have a purely hypothetical
conditions [actors] calculations whatever their intentions. As with both states and economic units (firms) survival is the base motivator\textsuperscript{72} and in a predatory environment, now classified as structural, it is imperative to asses and develop ones capabilities in a rational and utilitarian manner.

Capabilities can be understood as synonymous with power thus bringing us to our third stage. As Waltz argues, [s]tates may vary widely in size, wealth, power and form [and] States are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their ability to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of function.\textsuperscript{73} Capabilities are quantifiable; this is their only distinction from such abstract concepts as power. Capability is dependent upon material and immaterial resources, such as arms or knowledge. These resources are the object of state and firm behaviour, and in a condition of scarcity their acquisition is imperative for survival. However, the threat of violence and the recurrent use of force are said to distinguish international from national affairs\textsuperscript{74} and it is the threat derived from the structural condition of self-help and the unpredictability and rampant state of nature which arises upon collusion, which creates a security dilemma that forces each actor to consider its capabilities relative to other actors\textsuperscript{75} and act accordingly. Otherwise actors run the risk of dissolution/bankruptcy, hostile takeovers/defeat in war and so on.

Much in the same way as Morgenthau, though with a decidedly different structural functionalist ontology (see chapter four), Waltz often argues that to say assumption, which underscores a scientific theory. This paradox will be discussed in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, pp. 91-92.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, p. 96. Later Neo/Realism seems to shy from such definitive classificatory terms as power or human nature and has replaced them with the value free terminology adopted by economics, though the meanings remain the same.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid p 102.
the structure selects means simply that those who conform to accepted and successful practices more often than not rise to the top and are likelier to stay there...
or Structures encourage certain behaviours and penalize those who do not respond to the encouragement. 76 Which shows conclusively just how prescriptive and analogous both theories are. What we now have to discover is whether the incorporation of the economic analogy and the acceptance of economic causes and effects in any significant way changes the statist ontology of contemporary Neo/Realism.

Neoliberal Institutionalism.77

The argument that Robert Keohane’s puts forward in his essay Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War 78 is that essentially we live in a state-centric world whose structure is dictated by economic and security concerns. Keohane’s advance upon older theories is to accept and explore the fact that sovereignty of units is an abstraction and that actors can and do act in a multiplicity of ways whilst still maintaining their hypothetical atomistic cohesion. However, even for neoliberal institutionalism, states are still the principal actors in world politics [and] are rational egoists. 79

75 Ibid, p. 106.
76 Ibid, p. 92 and 106.
77 The noticeable element of the two sections to follow is the distinct lack of state theory. While there is most definitely a statist ontology underlying the contributions of Keohane and regime theorists, the relative influence of the state is balanced with that of Non Governmental Organisations (NGO’s) and regimes. What is most pertinent to this discussion is the way in which regimes and institutions, governmental or otherwise, are formed and the theories that underpin their formation.
78 R. Keohane Institutional Theory and the Realist challenge after the Cold War in Baldwin D. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The contemporary debate. (1993) pp. 270-300. Indeed most of the essays in this collection in one way or another seem to combine the agendas of the competing schools, however, Keohane’s is the most explicit argument in favour.
79 Ibid p 273.
Keohane’s argument is structured around three points of divergence between the traditional approach taken by Joseph Gireco and the institutionalist approach championed by himself. First, Keohane argues that Gireco’s approach to relative gains is rendered problematic with the involvement of three or more actors. Secondly, that these complications can in fact negate any clear-cut gain (power aggrandisement) in any specific policy decision, and thirdly that this problematisation of relative gains renders the empirical evaluation of actors considerations of relative gains more problematic also. This essentially mirrors what Baldwin argues in the introduction to *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*. He argues that the principal difference between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as theoretical discourses are the degree to which either part views cooperation as possible under conditions of anarchy.

While the arguments are more specific and nuanced, the ontology remains the same. Regardless of the degree, or even the feasibility of cooperation anarchy prevails due to the sovereign nature of hierarchically constituted entities, namely states. The seven stages are reinforced by the very nature of the argument thus taking abstraction into even deeper analytical territory. As Helen Milner notes, the question then becomes not one of determining the degree of cooperation but the definition of the term anarchy. She argues, Anarchy has been accorded a central role in international politics, especially in recent theoretical writings. And despite her argument that anarchy is not the only defining characteristic of international politics,

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80 Relative gains are those that contribute to the capabilities of other actors.
81 David A. Baldwin. *Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics* in Baldwin (ed) 1993, pp. 3-29.
anarchy reigns.\textsuperscript{84} Despite the problematic nature of relative and/or absolute gains, and the paucity of accurate empirical evidence to support arguments either in favour or against established theoretical positions,\textsuperscript{85} the ubiquity of anarchy is never questioned due to the hypothetical and metaphysical theories of the Neo/Realist writers.

Neoliberal theory seeks to discover those forces that mitigate interstate anarchy. One of the primary mollifiers is a regime. Ernst Haas\textsuperscript{86} argues that regimes come about in order to manage the unintended effects of collaborative action in conditions of anarchy. Life, he argues, is turbulent and this turbulence is confounded by man\textsuperscript{87} who in competing for scarce resources must create regimes in order to mitigate the worst effects of a general Crisis of Mankind.

The crisis is seen as an overall disequilibrium of the world system, which, is the totality of interacting forces \textsuperscript{88} While nature exhibits instances of [dynamic/benign] equilibria, social evolution is almost always more chaotic. Imbalances disturb the world system's tendency towards dynamic equilibrium.

Regimes are in this sense principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given issue area\textsuperscript{89} and their aim is to mitigate the conflict inherent within this Crisis of Mankind. Oran

\textsuperscript{82} Helen Milner. The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A critique In ibid pp 143-170.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid p 144.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, p. 167.
\textsuperscript{85} Robert Keohane in op cit p 295. We need more evidence on [the] effects of institutions. I suggest that to gather such information, more research will have to be undertaken at the level of the state, rather than the international system as a whole.
\textsuperscript{86} Ernst B. Haas, Words can hurt you; or, who said what to whom about regimes. In Baldwin. D, Key Concepts in International Political Economy. Vol 1, pp. 393-429.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, pp. 219-220.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, pp. 220-221. While Haas is careful to point out that this is mainly the view of the world championed by eco-reformists, he notes on page 237 that I subscribe to the principle of order associated with the eco-reformist view.
\textsuperscript{89} Krasner 1983 quoted in Strange 1988, p. 199.
Young\textsuperscript{90} argues in much the same way as Hass but is slightly less sophisticated. He argues that regimes come about due to coordination \textit{problems} typified in the literature on prisoners dilemmas, collective action problems etc.\textsuperscript{91} Actors are conceptualised as autonomous self-interested actors who in seeking to satisfy their interests precipitate conflict. Regime analysis such as Young's is not state centric and thus (in this article) regimes cannot be said to precipitate further conflict.

Arthur Stein's conception of regimes is however \textit{decidedly} state centric and in his conception of the international system, conflict is rife.\textsuperscript{92} The conceptualisation of regimes developed here is rooted in the classic characterisation of international politics as relations between sovereign entities dedicated to their own self preservation, ultimately able to depend only on themselves, and prepared to resort to force. \textsuperscript{93}

Stein's ontology is rational utilitarian and his conception of regimes whilst not as metaphysical as his conception \textit{of the state} as a rational actor, however, contrary to Young's position that regimes are spontaneous results of self interest, Stein argues that regimes are the product of the very autonomy of states and their self-interests that lead them to create regimes when confronting dilemmas. \textsuperscript{94} In this sense it is argued that states are not as susceptible to the contingency of a non-state centric view of the world implies. One could deduce that states create regimes much in the same way as they create anarchy, primarily because it is in their interests to do so.

\textsuperscript{90} Oran R. Young Regime Dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes in Baldwin op cit, 86. pp. 430-450.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, p. 281.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, p. 452.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid, p. 324.
Conclusion.

This chapter has sought an exposition of Neo/Realist state centric theory. Neo/Realist ontology has here been defined as a theory of the essence of the international system. This essence consists primarily of states and the utilitarian logic that informs both their creation and their actions. What I have sought to demonstrate is that a statist commitment in IR is essentially a metaphysical one, constructed as it is around hypothesis, abstraction and arbitrary privileging of concepts in terms of the real predefined by the intrinsic logic of the seven stages of Neo/Realism. This circular and totalising logic is particularly restrictive in terms of the range of possible policy options open to statesmen, despite, as it will be seen, the fact that this view of history and of the world is held as an article of faith rather than due to scientific validation and support. Neo/Realism defines reality via its own criteria in order to maintain the illusion that reality is immutable and ahistorical. This pretence allows for the abrogation of morality in the name of pragmatism even though pragmatism is based upon metaphysical a priori assumptions with almost no relation to the reality which it seeks to reflect as we shall see in the proceeding chapters. In a sense, Neo/Realism is no less utopian than the idealism it sought to replace; the only factor which marks Neo/Realism out from its predecessor is its success in establishing its hegemony in the minds of students and the public alike.

In the following chapter I proceed from the uncontroversial proposition that Neo/Realism is paradigmatic to the study of international relations. It was necessary to understand the metaphysical aspect of this paradigm before we could come to
understand how this paradigm has shaped the scientific evolution of International Relations as a discourse and its research agendas.
Chapter 2
The Positive Constitution
Of A
Metaphysical Reality.

Introduction.

Stephano Guzzini argues that Realism is paradigmatic. In fact he argues that Realism is the only paradigm in International Relations for two reasons. First, Realism reflects a world view that has become dominant both inside and outside the discipline of IR. Secondly, the reflexive effect of this paradigm guiding policy proscription - and in turn shaping the world that it analyses - reinforces the paradigm's scientific validity (in terms of correspondence to reality) and Realism's resilience as a view of the world.

Guzzini also argues that Realism is the only paradigm in IR because no other theory of international relations has a world view and can guide policy in the same way as Realism. Further, the state centrism of Neo/Realist theory, whilst attacked from all sides, is left unscathed because while the centrism of the state is questioned, the state is not. This produces two immediate problems. The first is that the state, forming the centrepiece of most ontologies in IR, is not easily ignored. Secondly, Neo/Realism's claim to represent reality per se, and the failure of any theory to question this reality (moreover for all other theories to also presuppose the existence of states in all their multifarious forms), leads more to a battle of definition.

95 Stephano Guzzini. Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, 1988.
than of paradigm formation. In short, the state, whether central to international theory or not, is never ignored for fear of charges of utopianism.

However, international theory is surprisingly devoid of state theory. Complex and diversified Great Debates continue in IR without the state coming under any theoretical and critical scrutiny. This was Guzzini's first point, Realism as a view of the world has become hegemonic. We will discuss the implications of this hegemony in the following chapters. For now I would like to discuss a possible explanation for the hegemony of this view of the world.

Reason argued Carr, could demonstrate the absurdity of the international anarchy; and with increasing knowledge, enough people would be rationally convinced of its absurdity and put an end to it. In the mean time, it seems most mainstream IR scholarship has resigned itself to the international system's objective nature. International anarchy is a fact, it is a reality beyond human control and as such, it consists of laws and regularities that can bear fruitful theory. To return to Carr, he argued every political judgement helps to modify the facts on which it is passed. Political thought is itself a form of political action. Political science is the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be. Unfortunately, subsequent theoreticians and political scientists in the Neo/Realist camp have sought to ignore this line of debate within the mainstream, by appeals to objectivity through positive and naturalistic science.

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97 Ibid, p. 5. (Emphasis Added). This point will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter.
98 Carr's historicism is largely ignored in mainstream IR. It is his Machiavellian realism (or variations thereof) that is trumpeted - his methodology, as chapter four will show, is an anomaly for Realist science.
One of the glaring contradictions within IR theory, which I would like to demonstrate, is the contradiction between positivism and metaphysics. Moreover, I hope to make it apparent that within IR epistemology and ontology are mutually constitutive. In less technical terms, I will argue that positivism in IR entrenches metaphysics! The reason for the astonishment here, indeed the irony, is that Comte, in coining the phrase positivism, sought to move away from theology and metaphysics and ground epistemology in brute experience and thus constitute a third - higher - level of knowledge. 99

The purpose of this chapter therefore is to demonstrate that ontology and epistemology 100 in International Relations are mutually constitutive. The previous chapter aimed to show that mainstream state theory in IR rests upon a profoundly metaphysical conception of the state. What I would like to demonstrate here is how positivism as an epistemology reinforces the misconception that the state is a tangible and physical entity by treating it as a thing in itself. James Rosenau's statement epitomises the Neo/Realist (dis)position:

As a focus of study the nation-state is no different from the atom or a single cell organism. Its patterns of behaviour, idiosyncratic traits, and internal structure are as amenable to the process of formulating and testing hypotheses as are the characteristics of the electron or the molecule. 101

I would now like to discuss the common conception of positivism within the Neo/Realist camp and how it has changed and developed over the years. This will serve to show how Neo/Realism has sought both to absolve itself of all responsibility for the way the world is by virtue of a value free positivist social science, and

100 I understand Ontology to denote the essence of existence. Epistemology is a theory of knowledge by which we can come to know the essence of existence.
101 James Rosenau quoted in Jarvis, 2000, p. 43.
constitute its version of reality as the only possible international reality. Secondly, I would like to discuss some of the leading scientific theories in IR and how they reinforce not only mainstream ontology, but also the misguided perception that a value free science is possible at all.

**Positivism.**

Steve Smith argues quite succinctly, [d]efining common sense is the ultimate act of political power. ¹⁰² Science, more specifically, a positivist methodology and empiricist epistemology that forms the mainstream in IR results in a very restricted range of permissible ontological claims. ¹⁰³

Positivism’s main assumption is that it is possible to have a unified scientific methodology, namely that it is possible to apply the empirical methodology (i.e. observation) of the inanimate natural sciences to the sentient social sphere. Smith defines three variants of this methodology; the first being that championed by Comte who argued that all sciences would eventually be unified and thus able to discover all evolutionary causal laws; the second variant, which originated in the Vienna Circle, being logical positivism, maintains that that which cannot be directly experienced does not constitute knowledge. This approach not only maintains that moral, aesthetic or hypothetical deductions are not scientific, but that only the strictest empiricist methodologies constitute a science. Such a view Smith argues, would mean that it was simply not possible to speak of unobservables such as the

¹⁰³ Ibid, p 17.
structure of the international system or objective laws of human nature —or the state for that matter.

For most theoreticians, this would be incompatible with a scientific investigation of international relations, as most of the phenomena discussed cannot be observed; only the results of acting upon the basis of abstraction can be seen in international relations. Consequently it became necessary for IR scholars to adopt a less dogmatic philosophy of science, and one which uses less stark criteria for what counts as knowledge.

By eschewing these restrictions, mainstream IR theory has in fact positioned itself in something of a limbo as to what constitutes knowledge. The third variant of positivism in IR rests upon the idea that if a statement is logical, can be empirically verified, and is distinct from the facts about which the statement is made—the statement constitutes scientific knowledge this is a pragmatist position. Its purpose is to establish a Humean theory of causation with which invariable temporal relationships between observed events can be established. In Smiths view these three points are more than evident in IR theory though manifested differently, if not unconsciously: 1) Positivism in IR assumes a naturalistic methodology; 2) there are an objective set of facts out there which exist independent of our attitudes towards them; 3) there are laws of causation which exist in the social as well as the natural world which licences both the deductive-nomological [traditional Realism] and the inductive-statistical [Neorealism] forms of covering law explanation; 4) theory validification/falsification is based upon the previous three points; i.e. a theory is valid.

104 Ibid, p. 14
105 Ibid, p. 15.
if it conforms to the value free facts which manifest themselves independently of the subject, and theory is valid if it is useful and if it explains causation, and can -by implication- predict the future. In short, positivism is a methodological position reliant on an empiricist epistemology which grounds our knowledge of the world in justification by (ultimately brute) experience and thereby licensing methodology and ontology in so far as they are empirically warranted \(^{106}\) i.e. reconceptualise the round holes (world) only if the same old squares (states) don't fit.

Thus positivism works in two stages; first there is an assertion of what constitutes reality, and in the second stage positivism asserts the empirical method of analysing reality as dictated by the paradigm. Realist claims to be closer to reality than their utopianistic counterparts are thus intrinsic to establishing their ontology as the only real way of viewing the world. Therefore, ontology is assumed and epistemology is licensed in so far as it validates ontology.\(^{108}\)

What I will now show is how this conceptualisation of science fulfils the dual purpose of reconstituting Neo/Realism as a science, and its objects as objects and not as ideas. As a result, claims to realism reinforce the hegemony of statist ontologies in the minds of practitioners, observers and Carr's public alike (see introduction).

\(^{106}\)Christopher Lloyd, 1993, ibid.
\(^{107}\)Ibid, p 17.
\(^{108}\)Ibid.
The Beginnings Of A Science ¹⁰⁹

To begin an economic analogy of my own, I would like to quote Mark Lutz who argues:

In the decades after Adam Smith his followers aspired to be considered more as scientists than as mere social philosophers. They sought to logically deduce from a first principle of self-interested motivation meaningful implications and consequences applying to society. Such tendency was particularly apparent in the works of David Ricardo, Jean Baptiste Say, Nassau Senior, James Mill and in the earlier works of John Stuart Mill. Economists of that time wanted to explain prices or exchange value, as well as the production and distribution of social wealth, and to do so by some generalisable, law like behaviour, as in the physical sciences.¹⁰⁸

Under the heading Economics of an Invented World Lutz argues that economists fabricated their world in order to simplify reality. He also shows how on the basis of this fabrication it was possible for economic scientists to appeal to the policy elite of the (British) state in terms that would appeal to the interests of the social sector of which they were a part whilst also giving an air of scientific impartiality.¹¹¹ Rajani Kanth, in Against Economics, shows that this was particularly so with David Ricardo. Rather than being the paradigmatic Ricardo of distribution concerns, Ricardian theory was guided by the prior dictates of policy The so-called Ricardian model endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to tie general economic stagnation to straitened conditions in agricultural production, such that the Corn Laws and their landlord patrons could both be depicted as ruinous to the general interest.¹¹²

In International Relations, however, Guzzini argues that Realism is an attempt to revive and keep nineteenth century diplomatic practice alive. It could be argued that idealism would have paved the way for Realism's gradual dismissal, constituted as it

¹¹⁰ Mark Lutz. Humanistic Economics. 1988, p. 70.
¹¹¹ Ibid. pp. 70-71.
¹¹² Rajani Kanth Against Economics. 1998, p. 27.
was around theories of global community, collectivism, and (ruinously for it) appeasement.

Thus Idealism, or Utopianism, was set up as the first of many (positivist) is/ought dichotom[ies] 113 Jim George argues that this is the hallmark of Neo/Realist discourse, the construction of a science on the basis of the privileging of fact over value, is over ought, and object over subject 114 so as to produce a value free science which can provide disinterested guidelines for international conduct. Moreover, by distinguishing reality from utopia Neo/Realists have confused the meaning of the term utopia in IR. Utopia has come to signify not only no-place in mainstream discourse but also the intransigence of contemporary reality. In this sense, to refute utopians is to argue a deterministic conception of progress and history. This is of course imperative if scientists are to have a bank of objective date from which they can deduce timeless or ahistorical naturalistic laws. The very idea that reality can be anything other than it is now is not conducive to Neo/Realist positive theory construction.

Moreover, in IR, it must be noted that the Kissinger syndrome is not illusory. Both Kissinger and Morgenthau both believed that a balance of power thesis would be more advantageous to United States national interest during the Cold War, Carr argued that idealism would confound peaceful intent and let everybody know his views on prevailing wisdom, and Waltz, whilst accepting the Balance of Power thesis, developed a theory more in tune with the times to explain causation considering the influence of economic forces in IR and the prevailing structural determinants of the

113 Jim George. Discourses of Global Politics. 1994, p. 78
114 Ibid.
cold war. These ideas took a battering with the U.S. in Vietnam and from this event there was spawned international political economy and institutionalism, which changed the focus of study to match prevailing international conditions. For example, there is no talk of a balance of power in later institutional theory due to the theoretical hegemony of the US, neither is power discussed per se, instead, we see the rise of gain theory, and structural or institutional constraints acting to negate the negative effects of anarchy. State centrism is accepted whilst other more prominent actors are accorded roles in IR more in tune with institutional Neoliberal patronage.

In effect, events out there have influenced and been influenced by actors in here, and whilst the analytical content of Neo/Realism may have changed, its methodology has not. To argue that actors cannot influence reality in any distinctive way, as positivism must presuppose, is a highly problematic claim.

Of course, what interests us here is stasis and not change, and the object that symbolises this stasis most evidently is the state. State centrism assumes that whilst the international system may vary by degrees, the state remains an objective, though metaphysical and a largely a priori, fact of international relations.

The Six Principles.

States, Neo/Realists argue, have always been with us. Moreover, Neo/Realists argue, as we saw in Chapter one, that states constitute an international anarchy out there and it is this anarchy which Neo/Realism seeks both to understand and to mollify. Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* is exemplary of the ambition to understand the balance of power which he believes is present within the anarchic
system of states, and he begins his privileging of the reality of the international system in the first page of his monumental work. Arguing that the history of modern political thought is the story of a contest between two schools that differ fundamentally in their [world views] Morgenthau privileges Realism over neo-Kantianism—unconditionally—so as he is able to assert the reality of the international system as it is. Morgenthau directs us to analyse the way the international system is by denouncing the way the international system should be as superfluous to scientific investigation. His paradigmatic Six Principles of Political Realism are probably the most unequivocal statement in favour of a positivist methodology that can show us the way the world really is and better inform our problem solving enterprises implicit in his instrumental and technical rationality.

The second stage of positivism is to assert a sharp distinction between object and subject in the social sciences. The investigator (subject) must be objective, as the object (subject) exists impervious to our preferences. In fact, for Morgenthau, we risk (subjective definitions of) failure if we attempt to transgress these objective laws. Thus objective laws are subjectively determined and understood, though the actions of the majority are still the final determinant. If no one acted in a Neo/Realist way, then Neo/Realist laws could not exist.

Of course, Neo/Realists assume that people do act in specific predictable ways, and this first principle also assumes our second facet of positivism, that for realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through

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116 We will discuss the intricacies of his theoretical position in chapter four.
117 Op cit, p. 4.
reason. Thus, laws exist, they are verifiable or falsifiable by facts, which exist independently of our reason, and therefore our ability to influence them, and they are derived from a first principle of causation defined as self-interest—which is the second principle of political realism.

By understanding objective laws, and a first principle of causation, we can understand human action better than the subject itself. Thus our subjective reasoning about objective facts easily leads to empathy, which blurs this object/subject dichotomy. Morgenthau asserts that thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he [the statesman] does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he does himself.

True to legislative reason (see Bauman above) the object of this endeavour is to bring systematic order to the political sphere [and] it provides for rational discipline in action and creates an outstanding continuity in foreign policy, which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum, and by and large consistent with itself. This reliance upon a first Weberian principle of interest also serves the dual purpose of setting the criteria for validation of theories deduced from empirical findings, and of defining the utility of theories in terms of their convergence with the interests of the actors. The epistemological tension between interpretation and empiricism is further exacerbated in Morgenthau's fourth principle where he asserts that the tension between interest and morality (both subjectively interpreted unless one has clear ideas of, and abides

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118 Ibid.
119 Ibid. p. 5.
120 Ibid, emphasis added.
by, the laws of social existence) must be subverted in the name of rational political action given Neo/Realist ontology and the choice of empirical facts which inform it.

It soon becomes evident that realist science is built upon itself i.e. it must be understood on its own terms by reference to itself. The other (morality/idealism) is referred to only so as to exemplify the superiority of Neo/Realism and to reinforce its own concrete ontology. The very exclusion of the other, its marginalisation, is constitutive of Neo/Realism’s sovereignty.

These principles could be read as the scientific apology for a power politics approach to society, which entrenched cold war doctrine up to Morgenthau’s dismissal from the Pentagon in 1965 over his opposition to the Vietnam War.¹²²

By this time however, Waltz had already written his response to the human nature thesis in *Man The State And War*, and defined the international system as anarchic on the basis of self interest and the state, though he privileged the states system as the primary cause of conflict. As we saw above, it is impossible to theoretically isolate the structure as cause without first isolating its parts as constitutive. By the time Waltz wrote *Theory of International Politics*, this fact is entirely forgotten in his privileging of systemic over reductionist theories of IR.

Waltz’s objective in *Man, The State and War*, was to refute behaviouralist science that began with the premise that man was the root cause of all war, therefore to make man good was tantamount to solving the problem of war. In a sense, this too

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¹²¹ George argues that this debt to Weber for the concept of interest is rarely acknowledged in mainstream IR literature. See page 91.

is a neo-Kantian argument and one that Waltz associates (surprisingly) with Morgenthau and Niebhur, our arch-realists.\(^\text{123}\)

More surprisingly still is Waltz's rejection of the empirical methodology and psychological focus of the quantitative revolt of the behavioural sciences, which, by attempting to explain everything by psychology succeeded in explaining nothing.\(^\text{124}\)

Instead, Waltz argues that political analysis is preferable to psychologism and it is to the analysis of history, and of the facts of political life, which he is referring. More specifically, Waltz assumes a deductive-nomological model of analysis derived from Carl Hempel. He begins by proposing a general law such as war is a condition inherent in international anarchy. It is then argued that both the structure and content of states (i.e. people and their institutions) are its antecedent conditions, and that it is possible to deduce from international anarchy, structures and institutions -not to mention man- the cause of war.\(^\text{125}\) Of course this explains very little, it does however legitimate the status quo, and allows Waltz to reconceptualise the nature of scientific enquiry in IR. Instead of focusing on the acts of statesmen we must now focus on the acts of states, their power distributions/capabilities and least we forget, the alternatives to pursuing a balance-of-power policy is still a matter of choice, but the alternatives are those of probable suicide on the one hand and the active playing of the power-politics game on the other.\(^\text{126}\) Enter game theory and the security dilemma, for the cardinal rule of the game is often taken to be: do whatever you must in order to win it. If some states act on this rule, or are expected to

\(^{123}\) Kenneth Waltz. \textit{Man The State and War}, p. 34.  
\(^{124}\) Ibid, p. 81.  
\(^{125}\) Steve Smith, \textit{Positivism and Beyond} p. 15  
\(^{126}\) Kenneth Waltz, op cit. p. 205.
act on it, other states must adjust their strategies accordingly. 127 Game theory and the prisoner dilemma is predicated upon the state being considered as a coherent and rational totality in its self, which, as this thesis proposes, it most definitely is not.

For Smith, the fourth contributing factor to a positivist methodology is the assumption that theories must have utility and be empirically valid, and this is Waltz's hallmark. Game theory, the stag hunt analogy, etc, all serve the purpose of reinforcing the ontology to which he is committed and the policies which he asserts to be most practical under the ontological circumstances i.e. balance of power politics conducted by the two super-powers of the day, an eschewing of which would mean probable suicide.

By the time Waltz came round to writing his exemplar text of positivist Neo/Realism, Theory of International Politics, the world had seen two oil crises and the end of the Bretton Woods system. It was now also self-evident that military strength was not a guarantee that the national interest can be successfully achieved as the debacle in Vietnam proved. It was also at this time that multiple military coups managed to install capitalist/corporate/puppet states all over the developing world, for example in Chile Pinochet replaced Allende, and in Indonesia Suharto replaced Sukarno, more often than not with U.S. covert aid.

Power under these circumstances was not so easily conceptualised as simply military strength, nor could a balance of power be determined by the need to survive alone, as Waltz argues in Theory of International Politics, few states die 128, though their capabilities (a euphemism for power) can vary over time. These capabilities are

127 Ibid.
128 Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. p. 95
affected by the interests pursued and/or achieved and the relative gains derived therefrom. The structure remains the same and it is anarchically constituted by the interaction of like units constrained by only deep structural causes and the effects these structures have on different actors.

Waltz comes to these conclusions by drawing the most explicit parallels between Newtonian physics, economics, and systemic IR theory. As George argues, Waltz conflates the dichotomy between reductionist and systemic theories in this work, by forgetting the constitutive nature of the parts, and in creating a structuralist theory for International Relations characterized by the logic and rigour of deductivist [rather than traditional inductivist] theorising in the natural sciences he also managed to drop all the undesirables of traditional theorising. These included reductionist, fact-grubbing empiricism and a Popperian sleight of hand which reasserts the privileging of the subject over the object in certain instances such as Morgenthau's second principle in which we are directed to think for the subject. This, one is led to believe, is not conducive to positive science. Positivist empiricism, predicated as it is upon the complete separation between object and subject in order to substantiate claims to a value free science, lends itself to the reinforcement of ontology. Charles Jones argues that [for empiricists no truth about the world can be established other than on the basis of experience. Rationalists, on the other hand, take the view that we may have a priori knowledge of the world. This means, literally, knowledge before experience; but the sense of before is not temporal Whilst there is still some confusion over Waltz's position, it is widely believed that he

129 Ibid, p. 96-100.
occupies a middle ground between rationalism and pragmatism. Pragmatism in this sense holds that if a community accepts a statement then it holds as a temporary truth. Waltz's latent positivism in *Theory of International Politics* concerns his commitment to a naturalistic philosophy, and the vagueness of this position concerns his pragmatic licensing of empiricism if it conforms to what he perceives to be rationally warranted.

Empiricism in IR is not such a contested concept. Apart for the post-positivists, most theorists subscribe to the idea that a fact is a fact, is a fact. One of the most confusing facts of IR is the status of the state as a fact. It is undoubtedly a metaphysical concept and it is strange to see that IR theorists and non-theorists, most of who employ positivist methodologies in what was an attempt to transcend metaphysics, seem to be reinforcing the ubiquity of metaphysics via the very methods which sought to eradicate it.

Positivists within IR thus state their ontologies dogmatically; to challenge the dogma is to brand oneself utopian. Secondly, positivists in IR gather facts informed by the dominant ontology or paradigm (predominantly statist), which reinforces the ubiquity of metaphysics! Thus, Neo/Realists have come to see the structure of the international system as dictating the range of the possible in international relations by demanding our complete attention and subsequently constraining it. Though structural theory allows for change at the systemic level. The state centrism of Neo/Realism is reinforced by the concept that states do not die and that they therefore are still of primary importance, thus the constitutive elements of the structure are still to be our

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primary focus of analysis even though Waltz directs us not to reduce structure to its constitutive parts. State structures constitute the epitome of macro structures and thus the international anarchy and the balance of power thesis, which must result from this reality, is preordained. Thus Smith's third defining element of the positivist methodology is fulfilled; causation is restricted within the parameters of structural ontology.

The utility of this theory cannot be underestimated. It allows for the inclusion of other actors though it still relies upon a crude empiricism to validate its central tenets. This empiricism, tied as it is to a standard Neo/Realist ontology will always produce the same results, i.e. nothing of great value, as shall be discussed in the next chapter.

Carr's scientific structuring of Realism is far more sophisticated. Actually, it becomes rather hard to untie his constant admonitions to pay heed to the dialectic of thought and the mutual dependence of concepts upon their antithesis, though his position does shine through. While Waltz and Morgenthau are reticent to admit the limitations of their arguments, Carr actually celebrates these limitations as constitutive of progress in a truly Hegelian manner. He does not however, refrain from asserting that reality must be discovered before any is/ought, power/morality (etc.) dichotomy can be resolved.

Carr's historical self-consciousness is the defining factor that sets him aside from his American counterparts and the positivist epistemology, which was to become entrenched within North American IR.\textsuperscript{132} Statements such as Purpose is a

\textsuperscript{132} See Smith in op cit, pp. 31-33.
condition of thought and There can be no reality outside the historical process display the extent of this awareness. It thus becomes problematic to pigeon hole Carr's methodology as a Neo/Realist caricature. He is however, the master of the dichotomy and always privileges the is of international relations over the ought and in this way Carr shifts from

an original position, emphasising the complex dialectic of subject and object, to a power politics Realism that insisted on the factual independence of some inexorably linked aspects of existence over others. The point is that one does not need to reject Carr's critique of the neo-Kantians to recognise the paradoxical and inadequate nature of his own position, with its equally one-sided positivist determinism, which acknowledges a sphere of reality out there independent of the function of thinking, which the observing subject is powerless to influence or alter. Much more than enforce a particular methodology, indeed his methodology was largely ignored.

And Carr thus constitutes his policy proscription in terms of this is reality so do as you ought given this reality, which served to close down thinking space as George argues, and dissolve the idealistic aspirations of future students of IR. Neo/Realist ontology/reality was constituted by Carr, developed and tied to inductivist roots which proved its validity by Morgenthau, divorced from its historical roots and objectified by early Waltz, and then consecrated as a modernist liberal utopia by the neo-Realists of the post-Theory of International Politics era by virtue of removing all links to the real world via a naturalistic scientific procedure.

**Conclusion.**

Neo/Realism has many ontologies, which are mutually constituted via a positivist epistemology. Of primary importance for this chapter and the last, is the way in which positivism interacts with a statist ontological commitment to construct

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133 E.H Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis*, p. 3 and 67.
134 Carr's methodology will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four.
135 Jim George, op cit. pp. 78 - 79.
136 For an analysis of the depth of Carr's realism see Robert Cox *Approaches to World Order*, p. 27.
a closed teleology. What this means is that Neo/Realism has used a naturalistic conception of scientific endeavour to reinforce the ubiquity and intransigence of a state centric world view. Paradoxically, state centrism relies upon metaphysical assumptions concerning reality as we saw in the previous chapter, and positivism, an epistemology largely reliant upon experience and fact, demands concrete foundations derived from real life observational experience which metaphysics simply cannot provide. Ironically, this is exactly what Neo/Realism demands, that positivism prove a statist ontology to be foundational via observation, thus rendering Neo/Realism utopianistic in the sense that this is a contradiction in terms.

The Neo/Realist paradigm is therefore philosophically fundamentally flawed, (the myriad details of this proposition will be discussed further in chapters four and five) it has, however, dictated the direction of empirical research over the last fifty years since the publication of Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*. What the following chapter will demonstrate is that the anomalies, which have been discussed thus far, render it glaringly obvious that empirical research cannot either prove or disprove metaphysics. How then do we account for the tenacity of the Neo/Realist paradigm?
Chapter 3

A Critique of the Power of Power Politics.

Introduction.

John Vasquez's argument is that realism, specifically the work of Hans J. Morgenthau, has not been successful in passing [empirical] tests and concludes that this [empirical] evidence along with well-known conceptual flaws indicates that the realist paradigm is a fundamentally flawed and empirically inaccurate view of the world. The falsificationist epistemology which Vasquez uses to test the core Realist propositions is explicitly empirical, it is therefore extremely pertinent to this discussion. Moreover, by demonstrating the Realist paradigm to be flawed, Vasquez's argument may support my own, which is to say that the Neo/Realist conception of the state is largely metaphysical and that positivism and/or an empiricist epistemology would obviously find a metaphysical commitment very difficult to either prove or falsify. However, I aimed to demonstrate in the previous chapter that positivism aids in the establishment of the state as an objective fact by branding theories that do not take the Neo/Realist conception of the state and its logic into account as utopian.

What we will see in this chapter is that Vasquez does not see the metaphysical quality of the state and it thus allows him to hold a state-centric view of the world. What we will also see however is that Vasquez is subsequently unable to explain the

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tenacity of power politics in anything but empirical terms, which essentially explains nothing. Vasquez shows without a doubt, that Neo/Realist statist and largely metaphysical ontology and the scientific method ubiquitous to the discipline, are flawed in both what they aim to prove (the existence of international anarchy) and in the manner in which they do it (naturalistically). For it seems that this fundamentally flawed paradigm still commands the field of scholarly enquiry despite its conceptual, analytical, empirical and ontological problems. It is this anomaly that this chapter seeks to explain.

I will thus Vasquez work in two ways. First, I would like to demonstrate how metaphysical assumptions about the world couldn't provide a true picture and this is proven (secondly) by the very methods that realism employs to sustain this ontology. The postmodern critique will involve a discussion of how it has managed to sustain this obtuse paradox for so long. The central contention here is that the positivist/empiricist methodology severs the very real history of the present by uncritically reinforcing the present's ubiquity and intransigence via an uncritical objective scientific methodology. In short, reified metaphysics are not conducive to testing via falsificationist procedures.

Finally, I would like to discuss Vasquez conception of the postmodern agenda and how his view of both the methodology and the purpose of what he calls an attitude is itself fundamentally flawed. In effect he elucidates only the epistemological role of postmodernism in order to falsify it. I will also take a Foucauldian position in an attempt to explain the resilience of the Neo/Realist paradigm. What I would also like to demonstrate is that it is the construction and the
maintenance of technologies of power/knowledge embodied within the discourse of Neo/Realism, which is the power of power politics.

Texts.

Traditionally, it is argued, the positivist approach to international relations is no more problematic than to accept that in the common or garden, not the postmodern definition of text—texts consist of words. And this is the Achilles Heel of the empirical critique, for Vasquez analyses texts as unproblematic pages full of value free objective facts gleaned from the world out there and as such, for him, if these pages do not validate a theory, indeed if the realist thesis is falsified by the evidence provided by the empirical research agendas spawned by the realist paradigm itself, then the theories—not the facts—are false. Indeed, the assumption that there is no subjective link between facts and theories is the primary assumption of the scientific enterprise.

First, therefore I shall examine if indeed there is a correlation between the assumptions that Vasquez presents as paradigm defining, and the statist theory/ontology that I discussed in the first chapter. It is important to establish that both Vasquez and I are discussing the same reality. Secondly, once it has been shown that there is a correlation between the scientific and the deconstructive view of the world, and that Vasquez empiricism can be applied to the deconstruction offered

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139 It should be noted that Vasquez employs a largely Popperian falsificationist methodology which is not strictly speaking a positivist position. However, Poppers rationalism is still naturalistic and sought to deduce laws from an objective reality. That Vasquez should assume this objective reality should comprise of states qualifies Vasquez as a statist and a positivist. For a discussion of his position see Vasquez 1995.
in the first chapter- we must discover whether Vasquez critique, the points he makes, and the results he offers, will in any way end the proliferation of realist-inspired work and thus enable the development of another paradigm/ontology. The point here is to show how a flawed ontology is not going to produce facts that correspond to, or validate, an assumed and largely metaphysical reality.

The problem my analysis poses is whether the positivist pursuit is a good method of theory construction and evaluation. Alternatively, is it true that as theories create facts it is valid to assume that facts will always be found to support theories and that such a tautology is not conducive to science? 140

Vasquez uses Masterman's three-point definition of a paradigm and the questions that it seeks to answer.

A) What are the fundamental units of which the world is composed?

B) How do these units interact with each other?

C) What conception of the world should be employed to answer these questions?

To which, Morgenthau, as the exemplar paradigmatic realist in Vasquez analysis, answers:

1) Nation-states or their decision makers are the most important actors for understanding international relations.

2) There is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics.

140 Vasquez The Power of Power Politics. 1998, p. 77. Here Vasquez argues that paradigms guide empirical analysis and that conceptualisation precedes paradigm formation. He also argues that facts presuppose a paradigm, does this mean that there is in fact no objective bank of facts? Or that conceptualisation is not rigid? I presume that Vasquez would opt for the latter though I would argue that both propositions are equally misleading.
3) International relations are the struggle for power and peace. Understanding how and why that struggle occurs and suggesting ways for regulating it is the normative purpose of the discipline. All research that is not at least indirectly related to this purpose is trivial. Further Morgenthau argues,

4) Politics consists of a struggle for power.

5) In [present day] international politics only nations wield significant power.

6) Therefore, in international politics, during the modern state system, only nations are actors.\textsuperscript{141} However, the realist agenda bloomed with the arrival of Waltz's \textit{Theory of International Politics}, which subsequently added three extra points to the realist paradigm. They were:

7) Anarchy is given a pre-eminent role in the realist paradigm given the unmoving structure of international relations,

8) The Balance of Power becomes a law of international relations that theory must explain,

9) The number of actors in the system is now a critical factor, importance also being attributed to non-state actors, though not equitably.\textsuperscript{142}

The way in which Vasquez short synopsis of realism reflects the analytical approach (seven stages) outlined in chapter one is most obviously represented in points number 1), 3), 4), 5) and 7), with the possible inclusion of an empirical statement concerning the origin of the quest for power (i.e. human nature) somewhere between points 4) and 5), or, 4) and 7)\textsuperscript{143} to account for the behavioural oriented science of the decades leading up to the war in Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{141} Vasquez \textit{Power Of Power Politics} p 37 & 48.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid, p. 191. Vasquez also critiques Waltz's structural functionalism. See below.
\textsuperscript{143} Vasquez does draw attention to the Behaviouralist revolt in pages 39 — 43, however, he argues that the search for cause in IR was one of a difference in methodology and does not touch upon the validity of the initial empirical material.
Thus my seven stages are represented by

1) Structure is anarchy (state of nature)

2) Human nature as cause, included by me though excluded by Vasquez, is not a philosophical issue but an empirical one concerning the cause of war\textsuperscript{144},

3) Power is the central focus of IR research, as cause, effect and object of analysis.

4) The sovereign state is the primary unit of analysis.

5) By implication, sovereignty or nation states as coherent unified and autonomous actors, constitute the international arena,

6) The above produces anarchy/structure, which is either

7) A state of nature, a society of states, etc. etc. though unequivocally a domain in which war can occur as because there is no body that can effectively \textit{prohibit} it.\textsuperscript{145}

\textit{First}, Vasquez bases the scientific method along broadly Popperian falsificationist lines and applies this to the concept of the paradigm that he develops from Kuhn.\textsuperscript{146} He argues that the paradigm to be falsified is mainly a realist paradigm as it dominates the intellectual field of IR both in its assertions and by the number of nonrealist writers that take issue with it. Thus realism is paradigmatic due to the fact that it asserts its dominance by claims to represent reality, its endurance, and in the way it acts as a sounding board for counter arguments.

\textsuperscript{144} See pages 203-212 for a description of how Neorealism fares no better than Realism in its hypotheses and in the search for empirical validation thereof.

\textsuperscript{145} Waltz cited in ibid. p. 203.

\textsuperscript{146} Of course both Kuhn and Popper rejected each other's positions.
He argues that in the field of IR there is a basic consensus concerning the method, objects and objectives of analysis and that despite the proliferation of various approaches and conceptual frameworks that have become popular in the field there remains only one paradigm due to the fact that prior to the Marxist paradigm in IR, none of the core realist assumptions (numbers 1), 2) and 3) above) were challenged.\footnote{Ibid, p. 71. Vasquez concludes from a review of the literature that the Marxist challenge was viewed to be outside of the main debate and thus not deemed central to the mainstream concerns outlined in points 4, 5 and 6 above.} Further, Vasquez argues that the Marxist paradigm was rejected not for its scientific input but for largely political reasons.\footnote{Vasquez, (1983), p. 128.} Further, Vasquez draws our attention to a quite disturbing finding in IR literature, he argues quite convincingly, that mainstream IR literature is based upon cumulative knowledge which, rather than being progressive in the sense that scholars abandon falsified assumptions prior to developing future arguments, is degenerative in the sense that [each] scholar just kept writing until people stopped reading, a change to approach was/is favourable to a challenge to the core assumptions. Often Vasquez argues, the policy relevance of an explanation seemed to be a more important criterion for its acceptance than its accuracy.\footnote{Vasquez, 1998, p. 72-73. Vasquez develops the argument that realism represents a degenerative research paradigm in Chapter 11 as part of the additional six chapters to the original text, which was published in 1983.} As such realism is prone to dogma and ideology, which Vasquez argues, was not even dispelled by the quantitative revolt of the behaviouralists during the sixties who aimed to move beyond conjecture.\footnote{\ } 

Vasquez research shows that of 7,827 hypotheses (of which an average 93.7\% of the tested hypotheses were oriented by realist assumptions), 93.1\% of realist hypotheses were falsified while only 83\% of the remaining nonrealist (7.1\% of
total hypotheses) hypotheses were falsified. The central Realist hypothesis, which for Vasquez is paradigm defining, is hypothesis 5a. which states that Realist hypotheses that relate national power or inter-nation alliances with inter-nation conflict-cooperation should fail to be falsified more frequently than all other hypotheses — noncentral realist or nonrealist.\textsuperscript{151}

Overall, however, nonrealist hypotheses faired dramatically better in failing to be falsified and were proven to be more accurate, more central to IR debate and indeed, were — in frequency — better able to predict behaviour in international relations thus making them more scientific and less trivial.\textsuperscript{152}

Vasquez concludes that the realist paradigm has not produced much knowledge and both the pursuit of knowledge and its paucity should be the central concern of any science. Furthermore, he asks, if the view of the world presented by the realist paradigm is correct or useful as a guide to understanding, why have so many hypotheses guided by this view been falsified? If the realist paradigm is correct, why have hypotheses that have rejected it been falsified proportionately less often? If the view of the realist paradigm is correct, why has the realist paradigm produced only 48 scientifically important findings out of 7,158 realist hypotheses that were tested from 1956 to 1970? \textsuperscript{153}

Primarily, the research conducted across the field indicates that the primary assumptions of realism (and by implication Neorealism) are false. The idea that

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{151} Vasquez, 1983, p. 185.
\textsuperscript{152} Vasquez, 1998, p. 142-149. This is the core of legislative reason as outlined in the introduction, to predict and control as outlined by Waltz second image.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid, p. 153.
states are rational and unitary actors is seriously questioned by the psychological revelation that,

individuals and groups generally do not make decisions in a rational manner, because they process information not on the basis of logical rules but on the basis of a set of psychological principles which do not necessarily correspond with logical reasoning (see Jervis 1976; Janis and Mann 1977) Especially during crisis situations, overreliance on images and analogies to what worked in the past plays an important role in decision-making.\textsuperscript{154}

Thus the idea that states can be rational actors independent of the personal wishes of individuals, and that these wishes are value free and rational is seriously questioned. If states cannot be deemed rational and unitary, indeed if it is people which comprise them that are not rational, why speak of states as undoubtedly problematic analytical entities at all?

Anomalies in the field of IR pose a problem in Vasquez view. He argues that to discover the cause of such anomalies would require further empirical testing of established realist assumptions, despite the fact that empiricism cannot produce theories which can challenge the dominance of the realist paradigm, as he argues at the beginning of chapter four, and, indeed, as both Waltz and Carr argue in their works. Thus it would be pertinent to ask whether it is practical to continue empirical testing of any theory while the same statist ontology is being utilised to construct an image of the world. For example, Vasquez argues,

any alternative paradigm will need at minimum a typology of wars that can adequately distinguish wars that result from misperception from those that do not, and a theory that can explain why each type is different and the conditions under which each is likely to occur Any successful competitor of the realist paradigm must fill that gap and develop a theory of war broader than the [realist] one on misperception.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, pp. 156-157.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid, p. 165.
Research also shows that balance of power politics in fact leads to war, alliances are the precursor to conflict and that the more powerful states are, the more involved they become in wars. 156 This poses serious anomalies for the realist paradigm as Vasquez repeatedly shows. Realists also argue that rational action whilst it causes security dilemmas can also produces balances. These are the hypotheses that the evidence falsifies.

Waltz and the neorealists do in some sense change this image or view of the world. They redefine its nature as structural and following central realist propositions claim that war occurs because there is nothing to prevent it. However, Vasquez shows that in times where major states have made a concerted effort to manage their rivalries war has not occurred between them. 157 Vasquez also seems to endorse the positions taken by the poststructuralists Alexander Wendt and Richard Ashley that structure, rather than being given, is actually socially (or historically) constructed. 158 Secondly, Vasquez argues that to focus upon anarchy and structure is to ignore more important structures of cooperation and interdependence, and the structure shaping qualities of the capitalist system. Neither are the analytical tools of the prisoners/security dilemma etc. empirically warranted in aiding policy formation as most states, in fact, have fewer than three interstate wars in the post-Napoleonic era 159 and further to this, the theory of predation central to the Hobbesian thesis of

156 Ibid, pp. 172-173.
157 Short of eternal peace alliances will always produce war eventually. It is the logical development of the resolution of such simplistic dichotomies as peace/war etc.
158 Op cit, p. 212.
159 Ibid, p. 209.
constant war between rational self interested actors seems to be prone only to major states and can be avoided, quite simply, by not playing the power politics game.  

The democratic peace theory also poses as an anomaly for the Neo/Realist science in that if democracies do not fight each other then they should be immune from the security dilemma of structural realism. Further, and this is also characteristic of a degenerating research programme, if structure does not exist and war is not a permanent threat then why do Neo/Realists insist upon maintaining the assumptions which underpin their entire world view?

As the evidence suggests, none of the core Neo/Realist assumptions are correct simply because one can be logically deduced from the other. Anarchy cannot be presupposed simply because of a core assumption concerning a first principle of self-interest etc. In fact international life is far more complicated and the evidence is inconclusive as to just how complicated it actually is. In conclusion, Vasquez argues that the paradigm's conception of the international system as anarchic has hidden two of the real fundamentals of the system that have profoundly shaped its order and nature; namely, that it has been an international capitalist system and that it has an international legal system constructed around the rule of state sovereignty. Focusing on the anarchy of the system has hidden these other structural characteristics that are probably more important. 

160 Ibid, p. 210. Power politics is an image of the world that encourages behaviour that helps bring about war [thus] the attempt to balance power is itself part of the very behaviour that leads to war [Consequently it] is now clear that alliances do not produce peace but lead to war. Vasquez 1983 quoted in George (1994) p 13. George was aiming to make a statement more concerned with praxis than our present discussion is. The confusion arises in our context when we try and conceptualise alliances between major powers. The only precondition for the erosion of an alliance is enmity that would logically precipitate conflict. This renders this quote tautological but descriptive non the less. It demonstrates how useless Neo/Realist ontology actually is.

161 Ibid, p. 212.
The Promise of Post-modernism.

One thing, which Vasquez does not explain fully, is why power politics is so powerful. Whilst an explanation of *The Power of Power Politics* is the central concern of the book there is no adequate theory as to why Neo/Realism is so resilient bar the degenerating research programme argument and how theorists tend to shift goal posts which was discussed very briefly above. While Vasquez does note that the realist paradigm does command a vast amount of financial resources directed at further research into the core realist tenets, and that alternative research strategies are proportionately less financed,\(^{162}\) this is only a partial -though insightful- explanation for the resilience of Neo/Realism.

However, his definition of paradigm allows some room for explanation, though not necessarily in the direction favoured by Vasquez. For Vasquez, the power of Neo/Realism will only ever be eroded once the anomalies discovered by and within the research agendas can be accounted for by an alternative paradigm. Thus, to explain power politics one need only discuss the grip a certain view of the world has upon practitioners, how it has become hegemonic and why.

The most constructive element of postmodern intrusions into IR (which Vasquez argues may be abandoned in favour of a more critically reasoned post-structuralism before it has gotten much of a foothold.\(^{163}\)) is the revelation, that if modernity is indeed arbitrary\(^{164}\) and what poses as the only truth is in fact one choice amongst many, then what exists must have been socially constructed by people who

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\(^{162}\) Vasquez, 1983, p. 227.

consciously or unconsciously chose to act in the way that they did. Indeed, Vasquez concedes, *All data are theory laden*. Any good social scientist would agree with this, but the word independent [facts] means different things to each side of the situation. For the post-*positivist* critic, it seems to mean that any data set will always be biased in favour of the theory that informed its collection. The implication here is that datasets will always produce confirmation rather than falsification of an explanation or theory. 165

Of course, it seems Vasquez misunderstands his own argument when he in fact points out that the more common scientific discovery in IR is the null finding. What must be pointed out is that theory is value laden also; therefore it conditions not only facts as discovered but also their gathering and interpretation. Would not a null theory produce null findings? Neo/Realism consistently validates itself by its own criteria with reference to its own metaphysical and statist ontology. The reason, it endures despite empirical inaccuracy has nothing to do with the facts as stated, but everything to do with the idea that *if reality is a social construction*, any theory which purports to represent this reality with the greatest following of believers is bound to become hegemonic regardless of empirical accuracy. This is the core idea behind the concept of the paradigm and it as the previous chapter shows, Waltz consistently directs student to pay heed to the most productive mode of theorising about the world as other methods are prone to penalising their adherents.166 Empirically Vasquez argues, we know enough about the world to conclude that not every

164 This is in itself a debateable position; Foucault’s study of the Panoptican seems to demonstrate that modernity is anything but arbitrary. Where Vasquez is correct however is to show how something else could equally well have occurred. Vasquez 1995, p. 216.
imaginative narrative can be imposed on the world The word reality refers to this resistance of the world to conform to every imaginable conception humans think up. 167 Vasquez's main point however is to show that the world does conform to conceptions and blatantly so with Neo/Realism. What is a paradigm if it is not an imaginative narrative as was discussed in the first chapter, indeed it seems this line of argument goes much deeper, as overreliance on images and analogies to what worked in the past plays an important role in decision making 168 as Vasquez shows, and rational unitary states are complicated by the irrationality of the individuals which constitute these very human constructions. Therefore, for Vasquez to argue the idea that if reality is socially constructed and, consequently, every theory is therefore socially constructed -including the theory that reality is a social construction- and because choice poses as truth (for postmodernists) neither statement can be true- whilst an attack on relativism, is nonetheless a meaningless play on words considering his own scientific concerns; namely the refutation of the realist paradigm.

Vasquez cannot accept the theory that would expose the value-laden nature of his own philosophical position, namely linguistic postmodernism. For example, Vasquez states that it is the differences between accuracy and error, reality and fiction, truth and falsity are in fact constructed by concepts 169, Vasquez cannot relate postmodernist philosophy to his own positivist position. In his attempt to falsify postmodernism he had to set it up in opposition to science and privilege (falsify) one over the other. What I would like to show how is how postmodernism deliberately

166 Waltz. 1979, p. 92 and 106.
169 Vasquez, 1995, p. 226
avoids such dichotomies by refusing to take a position *per se* and by maintaining that everything is questionable.170

**Foucault and Power.**

Vasquez isolates Foucault as the ephemeral constructivist 171 though it is more than evident that the subtleties and sophistications of Foucault's argument are lost on Vasquez. What I would like to attempt here is fill the holes in Vasquez argument by reference to the Foucauldian concept of power and how it relates to the concept of paradigm and reality, not to mention scientific objectivity. What I would also like to show is that there is more to postmodern philosophy than the question of relativism 172 in IR, though this will explained in chapter four and five. Essentially, I would like to explain the power of power politics in non-empirical terms.

Foucault argues, *we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth and this is done through the production, accumulation, circulation and the functioning of a discourse* 173 which is, in this case, International Relations and the dominant realist paradigm. Here, as Guzzini shows, Kuhn's description of the function of a paradigm seems to fit rather well the development of realism and of its discipline in that it began as an academic pursuit; *changed* by the material conditions of the post war periods, it became taken over by the Kissinger-syndrome with its mutual ties between university and the hegemonic power status of

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170 The role of relativism in postmodern theory is predominantly misunderstood. From my readings, I have been led to believe that relativism acts to erode the dogmatic sovereignty of the hegemonic discourse the nihilism which is commonly associated with relativism only assumes negative etymologies once it is compared with the illusory foundationalism of objectivism.

171 By constructivist Vasquez refers to those theorists who assume reality to be a social construction.


the United States. Realism functioned as a paradigm in setting the boundaries of legitimate research. 174

Notice here how Guzzini highlights the term legitimate. This is the core of the Foucaultian argument. How is it that realism has such a monopoly on truth? Its textual history and the link between theory and practice constitute the discipline, Neo/Realism's statist ontology and the disciplinary world view or paradigm itself.

Foucault terms the classical scientific endeavour the will to truth 175, it is essentially a naturalistic pursuit of ultimate enlightenment, whose source is the objective world, which is, paradoxically, never discussed but always assumed. 176 The established truth is manifested within the legislative right of the practitioners of a discourse to claim a sovereignty of right, or a monopoly of truth conferred upon them via an acceptance of their legislative reason. Here, right and truth cannot be separated. Both are functionaries of power, essentially there can be no discursive power without its monopoly of truth; this truth is in turn, latent power. Moreover, power is linguistic and not material.

However, as rights and right, in the West, are also legal concepts, truth being its determining factor and right having the power to confer death upon a subject, right becomes less a law, than the whole complex apparatuses, institutions and regularities responsible for their application. 177 Right and truth thus have traditional and violent power in society. In this sense, power is visually apparent to

175 This will to truth is taken directly from Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil, 1973, pp. 15.
176 See Smith Positivism and Beyond (p 33) where he argues that in IR the role of positivism is largely implicit and silent with the vast majority of scholars being unaware of their epistemological orientations.
177 Foucault Power/Knowledge, pp. 95.
the social scientist as a coercive effect. Therefore discourses are no longer passive intermediaries between theory and practice, they permeate life and knowledgeable practices.

Philip Barker\textsuperscript{178} isolates six points within Foucault's theorising, which establishes power not as a coercive force but as an idea.

First, for Foucault -Barker argues- there is no realm outside of power. It is not an object and it is impossible not to become subjected to it. In this sense, Individuals are the vehicles of power not its points of application.\textsuperscript{179} Essentially, there is nowhere within its intricate network where freedom exists nor, contrary to most modernist, emancipatory philosophy, is there some primal liberty to which we can aim.\textsuperscript{180} Power is a positive thing and as such, is the best distributed thing in the world.\textsuperscript{181}

Power, in this sense, pervades all our personal relationships. It is the knowledge we hold of ourselves, and our relations with one another. This, the second facet to power shows how the simplest social etiquette is a dictate of power; manners, politeness etc., because they vary in degree over time it is possible to see just how technologies of power have manifested themselves in society at any one time and the processes and procedures which demanded their existence. For example the communist witch hunts in 1950s America is reflective of the power of Marxist philosophy and the very real violent effects of this dichotomy between capitalism and

\textsuperscript{178}Philip Barker: Michel Foucault. Subversions of the Subject, pp. 77 — 84.
\textsuperscript{179}Ibid, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{180}Ibid, p. 77
\textsuperscript{181}Ibid, p. 98
communism were manifested and made intelligible by reference to the state, right and wrong, and other such logocentric dichotomies.

However, power relationships are not necessarily repressive or coercive, they can also be determined as productive and indeed multiple in their form. As it is resistance which produces moments of power, there can be no change without hegemony, thus power becomes free of its negative connotations, that are the bane of the realist discourse as now power no longer deals with coercion and force, neither does it have utility or a materially quantifiable element. Power/knowledge resides within discourses and paradigms; it is an accepted conditioning and directing of thought. As Foucault explains,

> power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the privilege of a dominant class, which exercises it actively upon a passive, dominated class. It is rather exercised through and by the dominated. Indeed, it is perhaps unhelpful to think in terms of classes in this way, for power is not unitary and its exercise binary. Power in that sense does not exist: what exists is an infinitely complex network of micro-powers, of power relations that permeate every aspect of social life. For that reason, power cannot be overthrown and acquired once and for all by the destruction of institutions and the seizure of the state apparatus. Because power is multiple and ubiquitous, the struggle against it must be localised. Equally, however, because it is a network and not a collection of isolated points, each localized struggle induces effects upon the entire network. 182

Because, with Foucault, there is no distinction between the dominator and the dominated, both are subject to forms and manifestations of the power relationship, power is, [i]n this sense local in its application but global in its effects. 183 The power strategy can thus be utilised, it becomes a relationship with implications, in the sense that, and depending upon the context, it establishes itself and precipitates imitation or habit, without conscious reflection. It is most evident in the Kissinger Syndrome.

But the final facet of power, which Barker distinguishes, is that there can be no power without resistance. Conciliatory acts or those of accession cannot produce power/knowledge. Consequently, this renders the traditional view of power as an ability by B to persuade A to do something he/she would not otherwise do, as secondary to the underlying knowledge structures. The psychological relation which Morgenthau discusses, is in fact the power relation. Once the individual decides to submit, there is no power. Coercion has ramifications or global effects, but essentially an ability to coerce does not constitute power. In fact Neo/Realism is a classic example of discursive power.

International Relations theory is derived from a very distinct set of classical texts. The role these texts played at the time they were written cannot be underestimated; excluding the ambiguous readings of classical writers such as Machiavelli and Thucydides, Carr wrote to re-establish the ubiquity of power politics in an era that demanded its input, equally so with Kissinger, Morgenthau and Keohane who wrote to legitimise the role of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and regimes of the modern day in our calculations of international politics.

None of these texts can be taken out of their historical context. As this thesis is attempting to demonstrate, universal theories are predominantly contextual. However, each one of the above texts has assumed a discursive legitimacy that cannot be divorced from the power relations that they served. Each work was an act of political rebellion against the established order/disorder of the times from which they arose. By assuming a scientific quest for truth, these texts allowed for the possibility
of a universal truth whilst denying it in practice. This is a clever act of rebellion against the established hegemony of a world view by whatever name.

The act of power with which Realism established what was to constitute truth in IR was first done through *commentary*. The commentary is formulated by building upon primary texts such as those of Waltz, Morgenthau and Carr, which then become the focus of discussion. By selecting the type and form of these texts within a discourse, there is a clear act of exclusion of the others that do not conform to the perceived scientific goal, or to the reality as dictated by theorists of that time. Subsequently, once these primary texts have been established, there is a proliferation of secondary commentary, which cannot be clearly distinguished from their precursors. As Sheridan notes, it is about homogeneity and agreement, mutual support within the field at the expense of valuable criticism that does not necessarily conform to the assumptions (truths) of the dominant paradigm, as we saw with Vasquez above.

For Guzzini and Vasquez to refer to Neo/Realist discourse as paradigmatic is completely legitimate, and to refer to the other theories in IR more as conceptual frameworks shows the power of power politics. The endless froth of commentary is worked up from within by the dream of masked repetition: on its horizon, there is nothing else, perhaps, but what was at its point of departure, mere recitation. This rather bizarre way of describing the evolution of Neo/Realism is

184 The following discussion was drawn from Sheridan 1980 pp. 124 — 134. It concerns only the control of discourses, not the concept of the discourse in its entirety.
pertinent due to the degenerating nature of the realist research programme as discussed by Vasquez above.

The second principle of exclusivity within a discipline derives from what Foucault calls the principle of the author. Not the individual, to whom the text can be attributed, but the unifying principle or the paradigm, which underpins the discourse. In this case I have tried to argue that it is the seven stages of Neo/Realism that constitute the underlying unifying principle. Of course, in IR, explicitly or not, the unifying principle is the sovereign state. By deriving its monopoly on reality from both its acceptance of and its bolstering of state institutions and theory, not to mention externality or other which is reinforced by the discipline of IR, Neo/Realism can claim a hegemony of truth. There can be no originality of authorship within as the discipline is closed to further interpretation; sovereignty also signifies the boundaries of the discourse.

As IR is such a young discipline in its present guise, the dominance of one theory or paradigm at the expense of all others is to be expected. The realist paradigm has set the parameters for researchable topics, for choosing between them and then simply excluding all others due to its internal logic or paradigmatic approach. The dominant discourse thus becomes self-perpetuating and, as outlined above, all powerful. But, [s]ince paradigms constitute the basic tool of research in normal science, normal science in turn cannot correct the paradigm. Hence, a new paradigm can only be born of a radical new world-view, that is, by the abandonment of the old paradigm.\footnote{Stefano Guzzini, 1998 p. 4.}
The second facet of the paradigm is its strong connections with historical context or, its relationship with the real world. As Kuhn noted, A paradigm governs, in the first instance, not a subject matter, but a group of practitioners. Any study of paradigm directed or paradigm shattering research must begin by locating the responsible group or groups \(^{188}\) which I attempted to do in the first chapter of this thesis.

For John Vasquez, the post-positivist debate (or post modernism) must be kept separate from the inter paradigm debate within IR, despite the fact that in his opinion only one paradigm exists, because it is very unclear how, if at all, the post positivist debate will favour or advantage one international relations paradigm over the other \(^{189}\) Of course, Vasquez has argued that there is only one paradigm in IR as the core concepts employed by researchers in IR remain the same. Postmodernism seeks not to add empirical evidence to one theory or another, but to demonstrate how and why one paradigm has become dominant over time and what deconstructive practices can reveal to us about our presumed reality as dictated by dominant paradigms. This is the line that I will adopt in chapter five and six.

**Conclusion.**

In deconstructing the statist ontology and world view of Neo/Realism and its scientific methodology in the first and second chapters I aimed to draw attention to its value laden nature to demonstrate its lack of scientific impartiality. I also tried to

\(^{188}\) Ibid. Emphasis added.
demonstrate how reality is not quite as simplistic as mainstream theorists would have us believe by reference to metaphysical constructions and arguments to justify a power politics paradigm. This chapter has sought to show how the empiricist epistemology has falsified the Neo/Realist world view and has shown that metaphysics cannot be true reflections of reality, as empirical data cannot support these assertions. Moreover, this would imply that if Neo/Realism were to remain as the paradigm in International Relations, it would have to adopt a different scientific methodology, possibly one more akin to theology.

The contradiction between positivism and metaphysics, which I discussed in chapter two, is thus seen to be a major anomaly in IR. Positivism is constitutive of an objective position towards the international states system and of the state itself by dogmatically asserting its metaphysical qualities to be objective and conducive to empirical analysis. However, empirical data cannot explain Neo/Realism's resilience though it does demonstrate that metaphysics cannot produce empirically accurate and non-falsifiable evidence.

To explain the resilience of power politics it was necessary to develop a theoretical critique. A discussion of Foucault's theories of power as applied to texts and discursive practices proposed an alternative, and I believe more plausible, explanation for Neo/Realism's monopoly of truth claims in IR. What this discussion shows is that repetition and praxis rather than truth underpin the resilience of Neo/Realism. We exist in a world of anarchic states because we believe and act as though we do, and for no other reason. The problem with a state centric theory,

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however implicit, is that it demands understanding on its own terms, it demands that we come to the same logical conclusions as power politicians because we are dealing with the same state centric realities, with the same range of plausible truth claims, all of which are dependent upon Neo/Realism's own internal and limiting logic. This logic is in turn tied to the project of modernity and its quest for emancipation and enlightenment, not to mention release from the bondage of ideology and superstition. The following chapter will develop these themes further by demonstrating the position of Neo/Realist discourse within the broader discourse of modernity.
Chapter 4.

Opening Up Some Thinking Space.

Introduction.

In chapters one and two I sought to provide a discussion of the world-view of the Neo/Realist school of international Relations. Metaphorically speaking, one could argue that this world-view might represent the body of a car. Chapter three sought to understand the way the engine powered the vehicle forward; in this chapter I would like to discuss the car's chassis. All three fit together in such a manner that dictates the range of possible shapes which the car can take. A London bus could not be built on a Ferrari chassis, nor could a Ferrari be identified apart from its constituent parts.

What this chapter seeks to demonstrate is the position of Neo/Realism within broader discourses of modernity, and in so doing to level criticism at Neo/Realism, which would have otherwise been impossible.

Neo/Realism is only self-explanatory; indeed its constituent units dictate a certain type of discourse, a predetermined range of the possible and reality per se, Neo/Realism also dictates the nature of the discipline of International Relations itself by its monopoly of truth claims derived from its positivist pretensions. International Relations presupposes states, sovereignty, relations between separate objects, objects and subjects, empiricism, positivism, and Modernity which are all the stuff of Neo/Realism. Therefore there is more at stake in a deconstruction of Neo/Realism than a certain world-view, ontology or epistemology, indeed, the disciplines raison d'être
is at stake; its sovereignty is in jeopardy, postmodernism has the Hobbesean *Leviathan* -and all which it represents- under siege.

During the course of this chapter I will contextualise the philosophy of Neo/Realism. While it is commonly accepted amongst less dogmatic theorists that there can be no value-free science of International Relations, postmodern deconstruction can show how Neo/Realism (a decidedly Neo-Liberal creed) can be placed squarely within the modernist tradition and has thus adopted its values and normative concerns regardless of whether these concerns and values are recognised or not. We can historicize Neo/Realism by discussing its philosophical and historical roots, by showing the concerns of its lineage and ancestors and how it developed. Specifically, I want to show how Neo/Realism has sought to objectify itself and therefore provide some form of Cartesian certainty though science. Neo/Realism’s claims to be the mirror of nature have been shown (Chapter three) to be dubious at least due to the anomalies this science has inadvertently discovered; what I would now like to discuss is how a Neo/Realism’s philosophical chassis is also dysfunctional.

What I will discuss is the *Verstehen* approach of Morgenthau and Carr and its abandonment by Waltz et al. What I wish to show is how this abandonment of a certain mode of coming to understand the world around us (*Verstehen*) confounded a more encompassing understanding than that which a more hermeneutically oriented approach may have achieved. As we shall see, Neo/Realist discourse encourages a certain way of thinking about the world, a certain way of framing questions and producing answers, which all support the ideology of science and the sovereignty of
its objective data bank. In short, what can be shown is that Neo/Realist methodology is simply one amongst many, and as such its adoption is a subjective choice, consequently the merits of this choice can be discussed further.

The limitations of the Neo/Realist approach to the scientific study of international society will be discussed in light of the critiques of this traditional approach advanced by the postmodern scholars whose lineage has been traced by Jim George and David Campbell from Wittgenstein to Foucault. This broad introduction to the diverse and diffuse corpus of postmodern scholarship in the social sciences will serve to contextualise the following chapter, in which I will discuss the specific arguments of a select few writers in the postmodern vein.

One could argue that the first and second chapters of this thesis sought to criticise the body-work of Neo/Realism and found that on its own terms it is fairly dilapidated, the third chapter sought to show how its engine, its scientific driving force, needs servicing, and this chapter would like to show how shot through with rust Neo/Realism's chassis has become.

The Verstehen debt of Morgenthau and Carr.

Jim George notes that the term Verstehen (process of understanding) refers to a range of approaches, associated (broadly) with a sociology-of-knowledge perspective which have in their diverse ways challenged the notion that there can be objective scientific knowledge of human society akin to that in the natural sciences. It signifies a general rejection of naturalistic investigation.

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190 George and Campbell, 1990.
The *Verstehen* approach began as a psychologically oriented position (derived from Dilthey) applied to a broadly hermeneutical methodology that sought to derive meaning from society not from objective data sets but from human speech and action. George argues that von Humboldt's position, in which meaning is a matter of active linguistic competence that arises from the human social process, the dialectical interaction of mind, and the social use of grammar is exemplary of this orientation and that it can also be traced though Weber and Mannheim; the men behind Morgenthau and Carr.

For the purpose of this thesis, two aspects of Weber's *Verstehen* approach can be isolated. First, Weber sought to move away from the positions of earlier scholars such as Wilhelm Dilthey who argued for the egocentric, sociopsychological approach to *Verstehen* which rejected the proposition that the natural and social sciences could work with the same methodology, and to apply explicitly the methodology of the natural (positivist) sciences to the social sciences in order to alleviate the obvious subjectivity in social investigation. In this way it became possible to deny pure objectivity in social reality (theory) whilst continuing a relentless search for Cartesian certainty (practice), which Weber perceived to lie in the regularities and constants of human interaction. In effect, Weber began a mode of social investigation that sought naturalistic laws within human thought and action, and believed that the discovery of laws lay not so much in observation but in interpretation and implicit subjectivity. Secondly, due to Weber's move away

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192 Ibid, p. 146.
193 George re-positions IR within broader social theory debates by giving Realism roots and eroding some of its ahistorical pretensions.
from the ego as the *primary* source of meaning, the search for objectivity necessitated recognition of the distinction between a

scientifically deduced is and a culturally deduced ought. Its impact has been a model of rational behaviour for International Relations in which, in an objectified realm, the motives of actors are given [as] the rational pursuit of culturally determined ends or interests and further analysis of them is considered logically unwarranted in any scientific judgement as to the nature of the system out there. 194

Morgenthau's interpretation of Weber's position is epitomised in his second principle of political realism, in which he argues that while interest can and should be defined as power and taken as an objective category [of reality] which is universally valid, nevertheless, one can best understand how this is so through hermeneutical analysis of dispatches conversations with other statesmen and anticipation of his [the statesman's] very thoughts. In this sense, Weber and Morgenthau combined two positions. The first was a hermeneutic position that reverses the argument of [later] epistemology and instead of a being interpreting a world sees a being formed by tacit know-how which is prior to the interpretation of facts. Individuals are caught up in a hermeneutic circle whereby we can only understand the world by our being caught up in a web of significance. 195

Morgenthau's epistemology aimed to come to an understanding of the psychology of the actor and was intrinsic to the problem solving enterprises of the early Cold War years and the demonization of the other in modern political thought, which was the communist Soviet threat to Liberal western democracies and the capitalist ideology that it was nurturing. Positivism adopted a dominant scientific status via the testing of rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their

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194 See George op cit. 193, p. 147 —148.
195 Smith, *Positivism and Beyond*, p. 26
consequences which signifies Weber's influence and also the philosophical anomaly inherent in the early Realist approach to science. The presupposition of value free and objective facts which exist independently of human concern, though cannot exist without a Verstehen interpretation of them is such an epistemological contradiction. In short, if power-defined-as-interest is a fact which can only be given meaning through interpretative practices, then in what sense is it an objective fact? It is a contradiction in terms. However, as George has argued,

The Russian/Soviets were, on this basis, a neurotic people, with an instinctive sense of insecurity that, in the postwar era, had become heightened by their interaction with the more competent, more powerful economically advanced west. Such a power could not be rationally dealt with because it was impervious to the logic of reason [and] seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality [emphasis added]. On this basis, all the Russian/Soviets understood was military force — this is, power politics. With this historical analysis established, the Cold War scenario had its (external) factual foundation. And from this foundation all other Cold War logic flowed. The Soviet desire to expand was, in this discursive context, both predictable and a source of great danger, to the west in general and the United States in particular. This was because the modern attempt to alleviate Russian neurosis was now combined with a Marxist ideology, which preached world domination and the destruction of capitalist democracy.197

Positivism could thus be seen as an attempt to mask the inherently ideological chassis of the Realist/Verstehen phase of International Relations scholarship.

George also argues that this modernist tension between interpretation and naturalistic positivism also forms the dialectical chassis of Carr's political realism, which is indebted to Mannheim. In The Twenty Years Crisis positivism and interpretation are not mutually constitutive (and productive) as are most if not all Carr's other dialectical oppositions.199 Instead, Carr resolves his dialectical tensions —

196 Morgenthau. 1979, pp. 4-5 see also George, 1994, p. 93.
198 Ibid, p. 77.
199 Carr's debt to Mannheim rather than to Weber may suggest a reason for the distinctive evolution of the British School of International Relations into a more critically oriented discipline rather than the quantitative behaviouralist revolt which was to sweep American IR in the wake of Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations. By the time What Is History? (1961) was written, Carr is at pains to discuss simple
in this case- logocentrically by privileging deductive empiricism over interpretation, egoism over sociability, power over morality, and the state over society.\textsuperscript{200}

Moreover, historical analysis assumes an unproblematic data set which comprises of facts [that] exist independently of what anyone thinks about them and which \[one\] is powerless to influence or alter \[a central characteristic of which is\] the irresistible character of existing tendencies\textsuperscript{201} a comment which shows Carr's early conservative tendencies which are later mirrored by Morgenthau who argues that objective laws exist and are impervious to our preferences . \textsuperscript{202}

The philosophical anomaly in Carr's earlier works are also the focus of his later works in which he resorts to seeing himself as an intellectual dissident\textsuperscript{203} and argues for a more hermeneutically oriented approach to the study of history and what is in David Boucher's words a search for the author\textsuperscript{204}. This development of thought contrasts with Carr's position in \textit{The Twenty Years Crisis} in which his \textit{Verstehen} position is set against the law-like nature of power, of the state and of his crude inductivist logic concerning history.

The anomaly, which was discussed in Morgenthau's conception of objectivity, was presented above; Carr's argument that the state is a personification, given meaning through human understanding and imagination, and whose nature it is most

\textsuperscript{200} George 1994, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{201} Quoted in George, 1994, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid, p. 93. Again it should not go unnoticed that the arguments presented in the introduction of this chapter support the observation that this philosophical anomaly has many practical uses, namely the masking of subjective ideological interpretation of an enemies interests in scientific terms for explicit reasons, namely the influence of public opinion.
\textsuperscript{204} David Boucher quoted in George 1994, p. 147.
essential to express 205 is a repeat of the same mistake. How can there exist an objective set of data impervious to our preferences, if it is our preferences that also constitute the primary unit of analysis? This paradox is never addressed and indeed it cannot be addressed, as Vasquez asked in the previous chapter, what can remain of positivist social science, however, if this point [reality being a social construction] is accepted in its entirety? the answer -quite simply- is nothing, though the question is never asked nor answered in anything but crude anti-relativist terms which skirt the issue entirely and avoid serious debate concerning the historical contingency of reality as we have seen.

Waltz Structural Integrity?

In 1961 Carr wrote in What is History? that sociology at present faces two opposite dangers- the danger of becoming ultra theoretical and the danger of becoming ultra empirical. The first is the danger of losing itself in abstract and meaningless generalisations about society in general. The other danger is that foreseen by Karl Mannheim of a sociology split into a series of discrete technical problems of social readjustment. 206 Neorealist structuralism has fallen victim to both.

The chassis of Neorealism developed and marketed by Waltz et al (1979-) is based upon a rejection of the Verstehen approach in an attempt to overcome the interpretative and inductive leanings (not to mention inconsistencies) of the traditional realist school of IR and to provide Cartesian certainty for a discourse embroiled in objectifying the Cold War.

205 Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, pp. 149-150.
Jim George's position is exemplary of postmodern attitudes towards the abandonment of a richer methodological approach to IR promised by the *Verstehen* approach when he argues that

*Theory of International Politics* and (to a lesser extent) *Man the State and War* stand as major indictments of an International Relations community that, closed to critical reflective capacity for so long, has accorded such high status to works of so little substance. They stand, in this regard, as a testament to the continuing legacy of a closed modernist discourse in the period of Realist dominance in International Relations.\(^{207}\)

It is, however, Richard Ashley's critique of Neorealism in his article *The Poverty of Neorealism* (which appeared in a collection of essays entitled *Neorealism and its Critics*)\(^{208}\) which is most pertinent to our discussion. The *Poverty of Neorealism* argues that not only is neorealism a degeneration of theory as George and Vasquez have pointed out, but it is also an orrery of errors. What Ashley's argument also demonstrates is that the constituent aspects of the structuralist argument as a whole are contradictory-in-themselves (see below)\(^{209}\)

What was edited out of Ashley's argument by Robert Keohane was his position on the abandonment of the *Verstehen* approach of traditional thought in IR and the direct result of which was to pose his argument in exactly the terms he was aiming to avoid, i.e. either you accept his argument and abandon Neorealist scholarship -because one is deprived of the capacity to think and speak in answer to most of what is important in world politics today [- or one] repudiate[s Ashley s] commitments, in which case one is free of the limitations on thought that the

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\(^{207}\) George, 1994, p. 119-120.


\(^{209}\) Richard Ashley and R.B.J Walker *Reading Dissidence/Writing the discipline: Crisis and the question of Sovereignty in International Relations* *International Studies Quarterly* #34 1990, p. 406.
neorealist enclosure would impose. 210 Thus by taking out of the argument that element which leant itself most heavily to a conversation or debate, Keohane actually silenced Neo/Realism's critics and deafened its adherents.

However, I would argue that neorealist enclosure is not simply due to methodology and the units of analysis as they exist-in-themselves, but the way in which the two interact to produce and facilitate an understanding of life and a worldview which restricts the range of the possible due (primarily) to International Relations state-centric commitments (theory) and the state-centric assumptions of international relations (practice).

By dominating mainstream truth claims, Neorealist theory constrains practice within its own ontology and worldview represented and articulated through its dogmatic and ideological theoretical base. Ashley argues wherever it has emerged, structuralist argument has taken form in reaction against phenomenological knowledge and speculative, evolutionary thought. In this sense it rejects subjectivity on all levels of analysis, it aims to go deeper than this subjectivity and discover the independently existing logic or structure whilst attempting to transcend a simplistic object/subject dualism by arguing a type of holistic approach to society governed by rules, laws and regularities which constrain and transcend (thus dictate) the range of possible outcomes of rational or irrational action. While structure is privileged over its constituent parts, only the parts can change whilst the structure will always remain the same. 211

210 Ibid.
211 Ashley, op cit, p. 264-266.
However, if neorealism is to bathe in the glow of structuralist accomplishments it must also be prepared to suffer criticisms as to structuralism’s limits. 

Ashley argues that if Neorealism was to progress beyond the limits of traditional Realism it had to first highlight its inadequacies, those were its penchant for subjectivity on questions which demanded more objective value free knowledge, namely power defined as interest and the nature of the states system, and its lack of learning from other fields of social theory such as economics and psychology. 

Moreover, Neorealism sought to locate economic variables within analysis of international affairs so as resuscitate what Neorealist scholars and the public alike saw as the declining power of the state over international affairs during the economic crises of the seventies and the eighties.

Ashley argues that the state centric concern of Neorealist IR theorists negates Neorealism’s structuralist pretensions, for in not problematising the nature of the constituent parts of a structure, by assuming the unproblematic, unitary, and sovereign nature of the state, the concept of a structure becomes less problematic. Waltz in this sense sought to construct an image of the international states system that corresponded to pre-established cartographic conceptions of the world and invest them with structure and a deterministic quality. The problem with this is that Neorealist state centrism is too problematic to constitute an effective structural functionalism.

The Neorealist utilitarian concern with economic rationale and the microeconomic analogy, or the assumption that social reality [is] made up of

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individual actors inhabiting a world characterized by scarcity also negates the concept of structure in that it presuppose[s] normative structures transcending and irreducible to individual wants and needs, [which] the utilitarian would hold to be scientifically indefensible metaphysical notions. Thus while Neorealism is utilitarian in orientation, it contradicts the idea of a structure. Indeed Ashley cites the position taken by Talcott Parsons who suggests that utilitarianism precludes even the most rudimentary regimes, let alone a supranational structure. Thus, if neorealism is to be utilitarian it cannot be structuralist as well.

Further, Neorealism's utilitarianism -derived from a selective reading of Weberian technical or instrumental rationality- presupposes the rational actor model of international relations, which also reduces structuralism to the positivist empiricism, and the subjective analysis (not to mention reductionism) of its forbearers. Not only that but by unconsciously advocating technical rationality, and herein lies the danger of the Neorealism for international practice, if Neorealism's structuralism/ conservatism masks the inherent responsibility of the actor, it also abrogates it. Moreover it is a metaphysical imagery that supports this abrogation of responsibility and it is also contradictory when applied to positivism as we saw in chapter two.

Ashley summarises the first three parts of his argument with the neorealist denial of the four p s. He argues that neorealism denies history as process by arguing its ephemeral and unchanging structure (explicitly in the law of a balance of power). It denies the historical significance of practice as constitutive of reality, the

\[214\] Ibid, pp. 172, 175.
power of power (traditionally conceived) to dictate the nature of society. And finally neorealist structuralism denies politics or more correctly, neorealism reduces politics to those aspects, which lend themselves to interpretation exclusively within a framework of economic action under structural constraints set by the state over its domestic subjects. Thus structure is restricted to the power relations amongst larger entities and it also serves to reinforce our commonsense views of the world and ourselves, and by reinforcing the anarchical nature of the structure it also reconfirms the necessity of the state as-unit-of-analysis convention among students of politics. 215 In sum it is the blinding light of the halo surrounding the state in neorealist thought 216 which for Ashley is the deciding element in neorealist confusion as to the nature of their scientific orientation. This state/science theme will be discussed in the next chapter, but for now it would serve to show how in presupposing the state as an unproblematic and given entity in IR scholarship, neorealism (more so than its predecessor) contradicts all its structuralist tenets, simply because the state is problematic not only ideologically, scientifically, theoretically and historically but also conceptually and it resides upon a plethora of complex discursive practices for its existence as an objective fact of reality as this thesis is attempting to demonstrate.

An Introduction to Postmodernity.

Ashley's argument in The Poverty of Neorealism borrows concepts from such diverse writers as Habermas, Bourdieu and Foucault whose positions whilst not

215 Ibid, p. 293.
incommensurable are not entirely compatible, neither are they accorded the exegesis which thinkers of this importance deserve, and this leaves Ashley’s argument open to conceptual flaws. These will be discussed towards the end of this chapter. Here I will discuss the intellectual ancestry of Ashley and George, informed as they are by broader social theory debates marginalized by the mainstream in IR scholarship, and attempt to place them within a sociohistorical context.

**Reality and Language.**

George and Campbell have traced the roots of postmodern philosophy back to the linguistic turn in analytical philosophy championed by Wittgenstein, Winch and Quine. What this turn achieved was the repudiation of the twin pillars of (post-Kantian) empiricist-based philosophy: [which were] (1) the notion of a fundamental distinction between analytic and synthetic statements [i.e. between logically true and humanly derived or fabricated statements] and (2) the nominalist principle, which reduces the conditions for real knowledge of the world to a universe of atomised contingent things.

Wittgenstein’s later contributions revolved around the principle that language was constitutive of reality in its articulation; that this articulation was subject in turn to socio-historical and cultural influence, and thus reality -if to be understood through

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218 This section cannot pretend to be conclusive or comprehensive in any way. It serves mainly to introduce arguments pertinent to the arguments which follow in the next chapter and to discuss the central concept that reality *per se* is not as simplistically deduced from our surroundings as Neo/Realists would have us believe. On the contrary, the very fact that Neo/Realists presume to have the strongest grasp of the true essence of reality and the correct method of coming to those conclusions is exactly what is under question. Thus this chapter serves to displace the self-assured nature of Neo/Realist discourse. The following chapter will highlight the logical inconsistencies of Neo/Realist discourse in light of recent critical social theory and discuss the effects of these inconsistencies upon our social existence.
219 Ibid, p. 142. See also George and Campbell Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference. The bulk of this section will be taken from these two seminal works in IR. The contributions of these works to a discipline so long estranged from the broader social sciences and philosophically impoverished as a result cannot be overstated. They allow for the first time a critical reassessment of the entire discipline and force philosophical self-consciousness upon its theoreticians which has been severely lacking since Waltz structuralism closed off any productive thinking space in IR.
220 Ibid.
language as was held by the logical positivists—constituted not of logically independent facts and objects which could be understood simply through their articulation in language, but of the linguistic and socio-historical practices which invest objects with meaning. Thus reality could not be understood apart from our subjective interpretation and articulation of it.

The theoretical arguments of Quine and Winch together challenged the positivist empiricist core of modern social theory in their assertions that, according to Quine, all statements are synthetic or man made, insinuating that direct experience and observation as such is a *boundary condition* of thought and understanding and that as such—there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single experience [as such] No particular experiences [can be] linked to any particular statements. 221 In this light, if all knowledge is synthetic and its articulation is determined by sociohistorical circumstance as Wittgenstein showed, then it becomes logical to accept Peter Winch's (1972) proposition that if what constitutes knowledge is subjectively determined and subjectively expressed as such, then that which constitutes the positivist other can only be constituted as such at the expense of myriad other others subjectively determined and expressed as other. 222 Thus there is an explicit process of exclusion and marginalisation intrinsic to the positivist quest for universal Cartesian foundational certainty based upon arbitrary subjective judgements.

This position is given added strength by the earlier work of Thomas Kuhn (1970), who argued that knowledge is constructed by social communities following

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221 Quine quoted in *ibid*, p. 143.
222 See George and Campbell *op cit.*
agreement upon norms, traditions, and rules of reading and interpretation, and not by an atheoretical process of testing theory-impregnated observations \(^{223}\) hence the concept of the paradigm which dictates research and the range of the possible within the natural sciences. Though Kuhn expressed some doubt as to whether his analysis would be applicable to the social sciences, its challenge to the positivist epistemology lies in its questioning of the objective and value free nature of the *natural sciences* and thus the legitimacy of its role as a model for social analysis.

Thus social theory becomes firmly grounded in the language games and social practices, and understanding thereof, which bring it to light. As a consequence it could be argued logically that it is in fact social necessity that draws forth knowledge. Indeed the critical hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer would suggest as much. He argued - as an extension of the *Verstehen* approach neglected by the positivists- that hermeneutics can be a universal approach to understanding derived from texts as they present themselves in their historical context and mainly through language. Understanding was then determined through interpretation and its influence upon practice in the social reality of a given time and place. Gadamer privileged a practical and ethical form of knowledge over the technical knowledge advocated by the scientific community epitomised in the false idolatry of the expert, an attitude mirrored in Feyerabend and John Ralston Saul.

Gadamer sought to bridge the gaps between objects and subjects through a process of understanding and action derived from the Aristotelian notion of *praxis*, which denotes the link between theory and practice. In so doing, he argued that the

\(^{223}\) Ibid.
individual is united by a specific bond with the other, he thinks with the other and undergoes the situation with him. 224 This lack of distinction between the object and subject of interpretation moves further than the simplistic search for the author (noted above) employed by the traditional *Verstehen* hermenuticists—and by Carr and Morgenthau—in that it denies the objectified author's autonomy in either text or history (which produced deductivism) and seeks instead to locate the human process of understanding—consciously—in all aspects of sociological understanding and rejects the search for objective foundations of knowledge, as well as the possibility of an impartial observer, as illusory. Further, the idea that one is powerless to influence or to alter the facts of history is thrown into confusion, indeed the complication of the idea that an ahistorical edifice of fact exists at all undermines the positivist quest for certainty. Bernstein has argued that this form of analysis also supersedes the simplistic objectivism/relativism dichotomy so prevalent as the retort to most critical theory, as it denies the autonomy of the constituent parts of the dualism and relocates the argument squarely within a personal, ethical and normative project of living harmoniously in the world.

Each time some philosopher comes up with what he or she takes to be a new argument or insight showing why one cannot assimilate or reduce all forms of knowledge to the canonical forms of the formal and natural sciences, there have always been an ample supply of tough-minded types who have countered with arguments that, at best, their opponents have noted some practical difficulties but certainly not any genuine theoretical obstacles to the essential unity of all science and the reduction of the several sciences to a single all encompassing universal science.225

This rejection of a unity of method resonates throughout the post-positivist debate, it does not, however, resonate throughout the various forms of critical social theory which has eroded modernist certainties. Indeed, neither has it eroded all faith in

224 H. Gadamer quoted in George 1994, pp. 149-150
the modernist project of emancipation and progress deemed so illusory by the postmodernists.

In an attempt to further or complete the emancipatory and progressive element of the project of modernity, Jurgen Habermas expounds further on the issue of praxis in an attempt to answer the question of how modern peoples might come to understand the deformed and ideological nature of the language, social rules, values and meanings associated with a dominant mode of understanding—scientific rationalism—which has successfully transformed philosophico-political problems into technical and strategic ones. He thus attempts to retrieve the critical aspect of the project of modernity (i.e. the quest for pure knowledge free from superstition, mythology, and ideology via rational thought) and direct it at all aspects of human interaction not simply the traditional dichotomy between the oppressed and oppressors within it—namely the proletarian and bourgeois class. Thus Habermas moves beyond traditional critical Marxism to try and discover the emancipatory possibilities of a Critical Theory informed though not constrained by the post-positivist debate. This approach employs dialectical methods, which are true to a universal emancipatory project derived from Kant, (and with qualification Hegel and Marx) though without the positivist blinkers inherent to each approach. Intrinsic to all is the adherence to a naturalistic and determinist epistemology—informed as it may be by hermeneutics and humanism—and a teleological and progressivist approach to history and the future. This is the point at which postmodern scholarship can enter the debate—opposed as it

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226 George and Campbell. 1990, p. 278.
is to some idea of rationality as distinct from irrationality—though it does not follow consecutively—but alongside—the Habermasian project.

Postmodern scholars reject simplistic dualism and dichotomies such as rational/irrational, subject/object, reality/utopia etc. Inherent to all postmodernism is the concern for heterogeneity and difference. This concern develops from the understanding that divisions and classifications of types and forms of human existence are arbitrary and subjectively determined which—while radically relativist in approach—seeks not a firm foundation from which one can determine the difference between one and the other extreme, but seeks to understand and ask Why? the methods and social practices by which these dualisms and dichotomies are constituted and enforced in modern society and to what ends.

Postmodernism takes the linguistic turn one step further; in that what constitutes our social reality and makes it meaningful are the complex forms and procedures of discursive practices.

A discourse generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained. More precisely, a discourse makes real that which it prescribes as meaningful. In so doing, a discourse of Realism, for example, establishes the sociolinguistic conditions under which realistic theory and practice can take place, and it establishes, simultaneously, that which, by discursive definition, does not correspond with reality.

With a linguistic and textual understanding of reality it becomes possible for those engaged in critical social theory to question the notion of a singular, stable, knowable reality which has been an integral part of a dominant post-Enlightenment

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227 George, 1994, p. 155.
story in which the ascent of Western rational man is located as integral to the gradual historicophilosophic unfolding of the world's real nature. 229

Already we can see how this approach differs from its predecessors. It breaks with Habermasian Critical Theory in its denial of the proposition that the sole repository of human emancipation lies in enlightened human rationality. Indeed it questions the possibility of emancipation at all (see below) and any truer form of understanding derived from grand narratives and either/or dualisms such as rationality/madness. Indeed, thinkers informed by a postmodern understanding of philosophy deny that understandings of philosophical issues of the post-Wittgenstein era simply clarify. It is argued instead that it has made us more conscious of our actual involvement in -and responsibility for- the world around us. In this sense, postmodern philosophy, while it is justifiably seen as an epistemological position, is actually more concerned with ontology. It seeks to erode the influence of dominant discourses and in such a way reveal that there is more to reality than is postulated by the realists. Epistemology is co-dependent upon to the project of ontological deconstruction. In short postmodernists are ontological anarchists.

Integral to all discourse is a reconceptualisation of power. 230 By redefining power as the forms and technologies of language and social practice at work within a discourse, by therefore recognising the role of and the constitutive nature of knowledge, of all forms, in the formation of a discourse, postmodernists do not recognise a distinction between knowledge and power. The two become synonymous in the constant reformulation of notions of truth and rationality, of madness and what

229 Ibid, p. 29.
230 This has been outlined above Chapter Three and will not be repeated here.
constitutes the other in all eras of history. In this sense the arbitrary nature of truth-claims and the disqualification of other in everyday life has very real effects upon the link between theory and practice. In fact George argues that for postmodernism there is in fact no distinction between theory and practice, theory becomes practice as soon as it informs our understanding of the world and the range of possible modes of living within it.

Conclusion.

This chapter sought, first of all, to demonstrate the limitations of Neo/Realist theory from a philosophical perspective. This was attempted by placing the objectified and universal theory of international relations adopted by Neo/Realists into context, something that Neo/Realists—indeed philosophical positivists in general—have sought to avoid since the dawn of the enlightenment. The absolutist and universalistic aspirations of modernists in general are illusory. On the basis of the arguments presented here, there can be no all-encompassing totalised whole within which all dissent is tamed, rationalised and conformed. The very concept of us necessitates a them, which suggests that there could be no us without a them. If this universalising project is an enigma, as this chapter sought to outline very briefly, then what was the purpose of objective theory and analysis in IR? It was suggested that actual physical circumstance brought about by Neo/Realist praxis\textsuperscript{231} dictated the role and purpose of structuralism-as-practice during the Cold War years of the last century. It gave scientific credence to state action, much in the same way as other

\textsuperscript{231} See also Vasquez above chapter 3.
pretences at objectivity (outlined in Chapters 1& 2) have done in the past. Couple this with the philosophical paradox illuminated in the first three chapters and one would be led to conclude that Neo/Realism is more of an ideological endeavour than a scientific one.

Secondly, it aimed to provide a context within which the following exposition of postmodern thought in IR can be placed. I sought to demonstrate that reality is not given, but made and remade by active linguistic procedures, which erode the deterministic implications of modern science. It also attempted to demonstrate how postmodernism seeks to avoid logocentric privileging and dichotomies in general, viewing them as problematic, polemic and limiting. Postmodernism leaves dichotomies well alone and as we shall see in the following chapter, seeks more to question than to provide any definitive answers, and to question not the reality as opposed to the un-reality of the world view of Neo/Realism but how, by what methods and for what purpose this reality has become the dominant way of understanding and acting in the world around us.
Chapter 5

What Constitutes Reality?

Introduction.

We have now arrived at a contextualisation of postmodern interferences in IR. As George quite succinctly put it, Reality is not what it used to be in International Relations and in this space we will now further problematise the taken for granted maxims and axioms of IR; here, in the relatively spacious area (de)constructed by a questioning and challenging philosophical position, we can approach our central tenets with values heretofore unacknowledged and question the sovereignty of an insular discipline and its objects, units, methods, assumptions and so forth. Not only this, it now becomes possible to redirect the rhetoric, and challenge the realism of those with a monopoly of truth claims in IR. As we saw in the previous chapter, there is far more that constitutes reality than simply meets the eye, and this chapter will introduce the linguistic questions as they have been directed at the taken-for-granted-truths in IR.

The argument I will forward at the end of this chapter is that international theory is more than in a simple state of disarray, it will become clearer that the postmodern interferences go far deeper than anyone in the mainstream of the discipline is willing to acknowledge, it is more than a question of method or of...
normative objectives or research programmes empirically defined, at stake here is the reality which we have come to accept and the plethora of discursive practices which support it. In short, one might say that postmodernism has exposed the foundationless irrelevance that is the Neo/Realist metaphysical conception of the sovereign nation-state, and a discipline (IR) dependent upon such constructs for its rhetorical force and its patronage.

This chapter will attempt to achieve two things. I intend to illustrate the nature of the arguments presented by the postmodern theorists in IR. What I intend to show is the broad discursive concerns which connect those who theorise in IR via a postmodern orientation and the implications such lines of reasoning have for the discipline as a whole.

It will also be necessary here to repeat some of the main arguments presented in the preceding chapter in order to contextualise the more specific and targeted arguments within the narrow discipline of IR and to juxtapose the sophisticated with the Realist. Realism, it will be seen is predicated upon philosophical unself-consciousness.

The second line of argument in this chapter will attempt to reframe the concerns of the first chapter of this thesis. In so doing I will scour the postmodern literature in IR to attempt an exegesis of what constitutes the state or what does not, I will attempt to uncover the postmodern concerns with rational man, sovereignty, anarchy, power and structure and show how these reconceptualisations, whilst leaving the material world (as opposed to metaphysical) intact, ruin our traditional

234 Kal J. Holsti quoted in Devetak The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory Millennium 24:1.
understandings of it and in so doing allow for an overhaul -or reformulation- of the ways in which we as individuals and the societies which we form, wish to and can live together. This section will operate as a broad introduction to the following chapter, in which I will attempt the construction of a state-less theory of international relations. It will become evident from the arguments presented in this chapter, that stereotypical anarchism resonates throughout postmodern IR.

**Stereotypes.**

Though it has become somewhat of a cliché to comment on the inherent eclecticism of postmodernism, it nevertheless is a very prominent aspect of this mode of inquiry. Stereotypical postmodernism could be seen as an anti-method, though in reality there is a broad consensus that the *deconstructive* strategy is the one to be employed almost unequivocally across the board.

It is the objects of deconstruction that vary, along with the manner in which the deconstruction is carried out. For example, Cynthia Enloe\textsuperscript{235} deconstructs common understandings of power, the nature of the state and the public/private divide in IR theory though from a feminist perspective. She does this by deconstructing our common understandings of domination and social hierarchy, by introducing the marginal -in this case women- and thereby revealing the inconsistencies with the assumption, in IR theory, of a sovereign unproblematic bounded and homogenous state-as-actor.

\textsuperscript{235} Cynthia Enloe. Margins Silences and Bottom Rungs: how to overcome the underestimation of power in the study of international relations. 1996.
Richard Ashley\textsuperscript{236}, on the other hand, introduces an interpretative double reading deconstructive strategy, which aims to silence the sovereign voice within IR literature (Statist Neo/Realism) and the heroic practices which are predicated upon the establishment of logocentric privileging. Ashley’s deconstructive strategy is textual, though the implications go further than the bindings of a text, in that by questioning the possibility of sovereignty in general, he questions whether it is possible for the state to be sovereign at all.

It is arguments such as these that we will discuss here in an attempt to deconstruct the nature of postmodern interferences in established IR theory and why they could be considered as such. Also central to postmodern concern is the unsettling of established and unquestioned assumptions in IR. Postmodern readings go to great lengths to illustrate the extent of philosophical and methodological unselfconsciousness in IR. And in so doing, postmodernists unsettle the sovereignty of the dominant discourse within IR which is the subordination of all ambiguity and diversity in the name of a sovereign centre and an appeal to legislative reason and rationality in the face of a fracturing postmodern era.

Richard Ashley and Cynthia Enloe both ask What is the state? and both come up with different responses though the deconstructive method may be very similar. Enloe deconstructs the semi-fictional work of Rosario Castellanos -The Nine Guardians- to try to uncover just how underestimated the amounts and varieties of power it takes to form and sustain any given set of relationships between states. \textsuperscript{237} Specifically, Enloe wants to show how the public/private relations within states mirror

\textsuperscript{236} Richard Ashley Untying the Sovereign State: a double reading of the anarchy Problematique. 1988.
and are constitutive of the inside/outside relations between states. In this sense, what Enloe is concerned to show is how the metaphysical nature of the state is based upon a patriarchal hierarchy.

Cesar and Ernesto went down the steps from the veranda to the farmyard. They mounted, and at a slow trot put the house behind them. The women, kneeling on the ground to pound the grain, stopped their tasks and sat quietly with arms rigid, as if rooted into the stone of their mortars, their slack breasts hanging loose in their blouses. They watched the two men pass. There are the Indian women to do your bidding, Ernesto. We’ll be looking out for one of these brats to turn up with your complexion. Beggars can't be choosers. I’m talking from experience [ ]

It was doing them a favour, really, because after that the Indian women were more sought after and could marry where they liked. The Indian always recognises this virtue in his woman, that the patron had found pleasure in her. And the children among those that hung about the big house and served there faithfully. (Castellanos, 1992, p 127)²³⁸

Patriarchy is discussed here in relation to the Zapatista uprising in Mexico, and how relations of domination actually sustain the concept of a bounded sovereign entity that is the state. Even from this quotation we can see five relations of domination and the technologies of power which support them. For instance, Enloe seeks to highlight the technologies of power between Cesar and the Chiapas women; between the women and the impoverished men of the Chiapas; between the children and the patron, and between the Chiapas men and their patron. It is fear and force and the relations of power which are transferred through the body as the object and subject of power, which perpetuate these modes of domination. The argument that humans are the vehicles of power (see chapter three) is one of Foucault's major insights concerning technologies of power. Postmodern feminists take this further and by problematising the traditional concept of power over in IR. Rather than power being simply exercised as an ability to force someone to do something they

²³⁷ Enloe, op cit. p. 186 (emphasis added).
²³⁸ Ibid, p. 194.
would not otherwise do, Enloe draws our attention to the institutionalised nature of
gender hierarchy, how it is a form of bio-power, how knowledge and coercion
combine to produce these localised technologies of power, which in turn support
global structures of power relations. 239

Enloe writes,

a male rancher's ability to bargain with the central state officials over land reform and tariff proposals depends in no small part on his confidence -and the credibility in the eyes of the state official- in his ability to control his ranch employees, his confidence that they won't be able to bargain with that same official behind his back, his confidence that they, or at least most of them, won't even imagine that bargaining independently with the state was in their own interests. 240

And she does so, so as to illustrate that

Mexico never negotiated with the United States [over the NAFTA agreement], anymore than Canada had negotiated with the United States. Particular officials of particular ruling regimes conducted these highly complex negotiations under the more or less credible pretence that the states they spoke for were functioning and durable. 241

In Mexico however, the Chiapas peasant rebellion which took place in the run up to the acceptance of Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, and Enloe notes how almost all political commentators writing on the successes of the Mexican economy were entirely unprepared when the Zapatista (the representative revolutionary party of the poor Chiapas Indians) shook Mexico, it was shown in bold relief the amount and nature of repressive practices which were necessary to portray the norm which the state system expects, of a sovereign bounded homogenous entity. Enloe shows how this revolutionary party had broad grass roots support with strong female representation which encouraged the margins to speak up for themselves and in so doing changed the nature of the state of Mexico.

240 Ibid.
The way by which Enloe comes to understand the world is via affinity. She transcends the us and them dichotomy by approaching international relations via a feminist perspective that argues, the personal is the political and the international. Thus there is no distinction between women and more importantly, their experiences. Enloe's transnational approach is global in this sense, and eschews the male dominated and constructed international regimes that can be seen to be constructed upon localised technologies of power. In this sense, her analysis goes deeper than a positivist empiricist methodology could recognise.

Enloe contrasts this epistemology with the typical Joe Friday's Just the facts, M'am approach to international politics championed by the positivists which fails to recognise the complexity of the primary unit of analysis, namely the state. Taking this line further, asking the same questions of IR theorists as does Enloe would force a complication of what NAFTA actually means, from where is its meaning derived and what is its constitutive principle if the state is a problematic entity? Further, is the domestic sphere (society) legitimately excluded from mainstream IR theoretical analysis at all?

Ashley goes a long way towards answering and problematising these questions. He attempts to do this whilst eschewing simplistic yes/no answers and logocentric privileging, thus his method is clearly far more deconstructive for he deliberately provides no foundational basis for reconstruction. What Ashley is

244 For the purpose of this chapter I have taken those articles by Ashley that are most pertinent to the discussion at hand, namely Poststructuralism and postmodernism within IR. The previous chapter featured The poverty of Neorealism thus it will not be featured here. I have also restricted myself to
concerned to do is ask how it is that these questions came to be framed in the first place and what it means for modern theoretical discourse. His point of departure is his interpretation of logocentrism in IR, which he calls the heroic practice. This heavily gendered term ties in with the arguments of many postmodern feminist critiques and it is possible -despite obvious differences- to link Ashley's work with the arguments put forward by Enloe above.

The heroic practice, turns on a simple hierarchical opposition: a dichotomy of sovereign versus anarchy, where the former term is privileged as a higher reality, a regulative ideal, and the latter term is understood as something which endangers this ideal. This privileging assumes the state to be the fountainhead of rationality, it assumes also that the state is an unproblematic entity in its foreign dealings and it assumes that the state is also the only form of salvation in an anarchical and contingent, not to mention violent and harsh global (external) arena. It is this very same arena that the state seeks to pacify.

Ashley argues that in the face of pre-modern contingency, ambiguity, and superstition, the heroic practice arose as a form of inquiry that sought to tame our natural and social environments. It sought by way of subordination and privileging to make foundational claims upon which all other claims could be made and this logocentric procedure was centred upon the sovereignty of the state against the anarchy of our social environment. True to the logocentric procedure -or the heroic practice- anarchy must be tamed so that

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sovereignty [can] betoken a rational identity: a homogenous and continuous presence that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique centre of decision presiding over a coherent self, and that is demarcated from, and in opposition to, an external domain of difference and change that resists assimilation to its identical being.  

This practice is seen as heroic precisely because it assumes such a gallant and chivalrous enterprise. And it is logocentric precisely because, when adhered to unquestioningly, it demands understanding on its own terms and rejects dissidence and protest in terms of a quest to destroy the heroic practice itself. To talk in terms of the heroic practice in such a way demands that all options be posited in terms of an either/or dichotomy. Either you are inside or outside the heroic camp. In international politics this is a dangerous pursuit. Understanding the heroic practice in this way and the reality of multiple sovereign states out there, we can see how the anarchy, which it presupposes in tandem with the order of each individual separate state, precipitates conflict. Moreover, Ashley ties this to modern discourse as a whole and does not locate it exclusively within the realm of International Relations.

Ashley problematises this understanding of the modern constitution of sovereignty, by distinguishing between two ways of approaching the sovereignty question. Considered logocentrically, Ashley concedes that the heroic practice tends towards sovereignty though universal sovereignty can never be achieved. Indeed this is so because sovereignty can only be recognised in the face of contingency or anarchy that is personified by the other. Ashley contrasts monological reading of the anarchy problematique (the heroic practice) with a dialogical reading, which introduces

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247 Ibid.
248 Ashley terms this the monological reading as opposed to the dialogical reading. The monologue is the manner of understanding which posits the fountain of all understanding and being in man and rejects any questioning or protest as anti-heroic and thus something to be assimilated or cast out. The dialogical reading of sovereignty, or dialogue, presupposes multiple voices.
multiple sovereign voices. These voices do not necessarily stand in opposition to the heroic practice, but must be understood in their constitutive role of that very same practice, their role as the other, the untamed or anarchic necessary for the logocentric privileging of the tame and ordered.

However, it is this accommodation of the other which erodes the primacy of the hero, the process of inclusion and acceptance breaks through the blackmail of the heroic practice which stipulates that you are either with us or against us, by refusing the either/or dichotomy and instead enters into a process of dialogue. In this sense it is also possible to resist simplistic idealism/realism dichotomies and construct new and meaningful ways of understanding the world around us.

In terms of International Relations, Ashley alludes to the neorealist inclusion of the non-state actor in its theoretical constructions. Ashley points out that the heroic practice is effectively nullified once the sovereignty of the state is questioned by the inclusion of multiple sources of rational autonomy, such as multinational companies or international organisations, be they governmental or not. In effect, neorealism renders itself problematic if it maintains both a statist and a pluralist outlook at once. Sovereignty is impossible as a method of delineation and exclusion, as a way of delimiting exactly what constitutes the inside or the outside. As Ashley argues, once

the theorist confronts this metaphysical conceit and concludes that he has utterly no rational basis for deciding [what] can be counted as sovereign sources of valid interpretations and which cannot, then he cannot disregard the independent forces of the [non state actors] and he must take the predicament seriously as a political problem.
Of course to recognise Neorealism's value laden nature is to ruin its scientific pretensions and allow more than the heroic practice can accommodate.

This issue of accommodation is tackled directly in a later article\textsuperscript{250}, where Ashley responds to the gendered nature of traditional theorising in IR again, and portrays International Relations to be the Inniterate Condottiere - a subject in estrangement. Ashley argues here that Poststructuralism has opened up debate in IR; it has also transcended the relativist retorts of its critics and shows relativism to be superfluous to the discussion. Poststructuralism has shown those who wish to see IR as a discipline and its dominant positivist epistemology have serious limitations, postmodernism can make us conscious of the sources of contingency in international relations and their constitutive role in identity-formation. In this sense, poststructuralism has encouraged theorists to question their primary units of analysis (i.e. the state) prior to anything else. Thus the very nature of the discipline is thrown open to interpretation encouraging the possibility of far more productive dialogue—if only theorists caught in the mainstream would engage in conversation with the other.\textsuperscript{251}

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid, p. 250. Recent work by Darryl Jarvis (2000) has sought to counter this politicisation of IR via a rejection of postmodernism. However, Jarvis's work becomes increasingly difficult to decipher the more he attempts to depoliticise the discipline.

\textsuperscript{250} Ashley. The Achievements of Poststructuralism in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Steve Smith ed, pp. 240-253. This article, one of the more recent articles by Ashley, is complex. It reads like no other article in the mainstream of International Politics (regardless of its marginality). This article demands critical reading, its meaning is not immediately apparent, it speaks as a problematic text, it demands the deconstructive readings common to literary analysis, and as such a coherent interpretation is not predetermined. Its obvious emphasis is on the question of sovereignty though it is tightly knitted into the fabric of International Relations as a discourse. The text itself aims (in my interpretation) to encourage critical reading; in attempting to discuss the achievements of post-structuralism this article eschews closure and encourages dialogue, this is the main achievement of post-structuralism and though it is only implicit in the text it is a position which can only be arrived at by utilising the anti-method which Ashley and the post-modernists encourage.

\textsuperscript{251} Lapid's (1989) characterisation of the post-positive turn in IR as the Third Debate is quite misleading in this sense. There has been a wholehearted rejection of Postmodernism in IR by the mainstream on the grounds that postmodernists cannot stake out a clearly definable research agenda against which their work can be evaluated. (See Jarvis 2000 p 91.)
For Ashley, the place of poststructuralist argument in IR is on the borderlines between domestic and international political theory. In this sense, Ashley seeks to locate inquiry between those traditional societal manifestations of international consciousness derived from their recognition of a world out there and the transnational recognition of a localised world, and in this sense he again reflects the concerns of Enloe above.

Feminist writers, to accentuate the inconsistencies of traditional theorising in IR often use Ashley’s line of reasoning to complement their own. Jaqui True aptly summarises the arguments presented above when she notes that,

[Men’s] understanding of human agency [in IR] is imposed by taking the standpoint of men-masculinity as generic. Rational man as metaphor for human nature is presented as self-interested and autonomous with the capacity for instrumental reason. Moreover he is abstracted from situatedness in the concrete world, from a place in time and space, from particular prejudices, interests and needs. The workings of the inter-state system are explained by reference to the egoistic behaviour of this Hobbesian or Waltzian man in the state of nature. The naturalisation of gender hierarchy is inextricably tied to the assumption that the state of nature is competitive, egoistic, rapacious and violent and therefore anarchy is not what states make of it, but is essentially power and conflict ridden. Feminist theorists are suspicious of such theoretical models which deny the centrality of human relatedness, and repress the way affective relations constitute distinctive subjectivities.

Thus we see how both subjectivity and femininity are diametrically opposed to the heroic practice of taming anarchy via a strong and ordered centre.

Jean Elshtain questions why and on what grounds the realist narrative can construct caricatured accounts of Hobbes and Machiavelli in an attempt to prove that the male, like Machiavelli’s virtuous Prince [must be] the bearer of order who must tame capricious female forces [fortuna], domestically and externally. This imposed

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254 Jean Elshtain quoted in ibid. p 231.
and chosen policy of domestic regimentation is seen as a paternalistic imposition, and as such is questionable for both male and female critical theorists alike.

Needless to say the use of Machiavelli is caricatured throughout the Neo/Realist literature in IR. R.B.J Walker has gone to great lengths to show how this is so and to show, from a postmodern standpoint how it is not only constitutive of Neo/Realism but of a specific modern discourse as he sees it.255

As we can see from the arguments proposed by True, Machiavelli and Hobbes are conjured from the annals of history to prove the static nature of the international system, specifically the timeless nature of power and self-interest and the inclinations of man-as-human-nature. Walker rejects this crude interpretation of the great Realist texts arguing that Machiavelli and Hobbes are far more complex.

Walker’s readings of Hobbes and Machiavelli are undertaken via a questioning of the realist axiom that while [c]ivil society may be the site of progress and the pursuit of justice international politics simply is the realm of contingency and conflict.256 This axiom is repeated time and again by Neo/Realists who point to Machiavelli and Hobbes as having to cope with exactly the same problems and lest we repeat previous mistakes we should heed their teachings of prudence, unscrupulousness, and virtu in the face of contingency and anarchy which make up the timeless nature of the international system.257 However a contextualisation of

255 Walker is concerned mainly with arbitrary distinctions between inside and outside in IR theory. Here, however, I would like to concentrate on his concepts of temporality in IR theory and the questions of stasis and reification. This will lead to a discussion of reification in the work of Alexander Wendt and the limitations of Wendt’s approach in comparison to Walker’s.


257 Walker is also quick to point out that Hobbes was not a theorist of international relations, but that his atomistic view of domestic society and the motivational forces therein proved to be remarkably compatible with the view of the international as it came to be assumed. See Walker History and Structure In the Theory of International Relations.
Machiavelli reveals that he existed within a new historically specific time and place. Specifically, Walker notes how Machiavelli sought to speak about the emergence of the new city state in terms unfamiliar to those steeped in the Christian universalism of the time. In this sense, contrary to realist appeals to his timeless nature, Machiavelli spoke more of humanism, republicanism, or civic virtue than of ends-means rationale, or interest defined as power. Further, Machiavelli sought to confront the contingency of *Fortuna* head on and as such he counselled for preparedness for the unpredictable, which is in stark contrast to realist counselling for the timeless and predictable.

Walker highlights Machiavelli’s counselling concerning the use of fortresses in this respect. Walker shows how Machiavelli is aware of the contingency of time and place and that what is useful today may not be tomorrow. This he deciphers from Machiavelli’s counselling that fortresses are either useful or not but that only fools trust in fortresses [and] consider the hatred of the people to be of little importance. Thus it can be seen that Machiavelli is [committed] to a politics that responds to the temporal contingency of life in this world, Machiavelli is prepared to face up to the consequences that, according to what we have come to learn from both the classical and Christian inheritance, must be drawn once one abandons the possibility of transcending the contingencies of time through an appeal to being or eternity.

Moreover, Walker later draws our attention to the role of spatiality in the constitution of modern political discourse and this is also typified in Machiavelli’s admonitions, that the fortress wall cannot guarantee internal peace any more than it

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259 Ibid, p. 35.
can external. They are simply walls, thought they constitute political space which is the foundation of international politics both now and in Machiavelli’s day. This is the beginning of the very real human construction of political space that became reified over time.

Further, Walker argues that the concept of the other, central to modern logocentric political discourse could not be constituted without spatial demarcation of what constitutes the outside of political discourse. The material outside of the fortress also came to signify an area of contingency and anarchy not protected under the auspice of the city-state. Indeed, Walker argues that as sovereignty is never simply there what was never simply there can never simply disappear. 262

Identity.

William Connolly263 argues that the construction of the other in political discourse was undertaken, so as to compensate for the death of God in modern western society, and the passing away of the Ultimate Arbiter, He who is the impartial voice of truth between contesting dichotomies. There are, indeed, parallels between the history of Christian definitions and treatment of otherness and the range of contemporary orientations to academic otherness among secular social scientists. 264

Connolly’s main concern is identity formation. Identity in the modern sense is by definition set against its antithesis. Identity in the modern sense of the term can only be constructed via an unproblematic totalisation of what it means to be totally

262 Ibid, p. 332.
formed as a discernable object as opposed to the indiscernible fragmented other. Further, to assume an identity - in the modern sense of the term - is to assume a hierarchy of identities in which God or the universal truth, or the ego/rational self reigns supreme and those who exist in closest proximity to this ideal are at the top of the hierarchy.

Identity, for Connolly, is subjectively determined. It is not however determined in a vacuum without external influence. Modern senses of one's identity are constructed via a process of differentiation closely akin to the logocentric procedure outlined previously. Connolly shows how Christianity was so constructed as a universal identity in opposition to its antithesis — paganism. Thus to be Christian meant to assume the superiority of one's faith to that of the other and to convert or excommunicate non-Christians. Christianity itself could not be questioned from within without eroding the faith upon which this identity stood.

The discovery of the New World was both productive and destructive in this sense. It allowed for a strengthening of faith in the face of a history of paganism but discovery of the other en mass also proved to be a force which predisposed Christians to cross the line between the questioning of the other in relation to the self to a questioning of the self in relation to the other. This second line of questioning is problematic. If one is to retain the totality of the self as an identity that is externally given and predetermined as either Christian or England, it must be done so unquestioningly. To question is to accept that it is at least possible for one's identity to be in a state of flux. Individuals by this token are not reducible to rational actors,

264 Ibid, p. 325.
nor are a plethora of social activities which go in to constituting what is traditionally known as the state, necessarily reducible by the same token to a state which can assume a timeless and unproblematic identity.

Alternatively, Connolly argues that a postmodern identity assumes an ironic stance toward what it is even while affirming itself in its identity. As such it presupposes flux, change, and a lack of foundations whilst accepting immediate perceptions of the truth as foundational and static. Here we can see how it may be problematic to assume, as does Waltz, that the only true objective of the state is survival and we may be inclined to agree more with Morgenthau when he argues that the notion of interest is not fixed in time and place (second principle). The contradiction occurs when we assume that interest/power is separate from identity/state, that interests whilst they may change will leave the state intact. This is the basis of a structuralist or regime theory as per Waltz. In short, if our conceptions of what a state is, of what constitutes the state and its interests, of how these interests constitute its identity, can vary, there is no rational basis for believing that the international states system is a timeless and ahistorical manifestation of the collective interests of man defined contractually via either a Hobbes or a Rousseau. The theme of identity thus shakes the foundations of caricatured interpretation of the classical realists, of the state and the nature of international anarchy.

Alexander Wendt elaborates upon a theory of identity to attempt the construction of a theory of interests in his article Anarchy is what States Make Of It Though this article is not without its inconsistencies and contradictions. First

265 Ibid, p. 331.
however it may serve to illustrate the main points of Wendt’s argument as there are some fairly strong connections between his thesis and Connolly’s. Wendt argues that

[i]dentities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a portfolio of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations. Sometimes situations are unprecedented in our experience, and in these cases we have construct their meaning, and thus our interests, by analogy or invent them *de novo*. More often they have routine qualities in which we assign meanings on the basis of institutionally defined roles.\(^{266}\)

Thus he argues that institutions create fairly stable sets of identities, alternatively, fairly stable sets of identities create institutions. Institutions and identities are mutually constitutive.\(^ {267}\) Thus anarchy is constituted by identity and interests that *can* change. We could therefore assume that anarchy can be transformed into any other form of social (dis)organisation depending upon the identities and interests of actors and the social context within which they exist. For example, once the USSR effectively abrogated its communist totalitarian identity (in the eyes of the west), the Cold War was effectively over. As Wendt states, our assumption is too much if we argue that, in virtue of anarchy, states in the state of nature necessarily face a stag hunt or security dilemma.\(^ {268}\) In short, it is too simplistic to assume that actors pursuing rational interests, either autonomously of or in conjunction with other actors will necessarily produce anarchy. This is simply an oversimplification of very complex issues that have been omitted from Neo/Realist discourse.

Neo/Realists qualify their positions by *reification*. Reification disguises the fact that actors play a major role in shaping an objective world, and in this sense it is similar to the deterministic attitudes of Christian theology.

\(^ {266}\) Wendt, 1995, p. 136.

\(^ {267}\) Ibid, p. 137.

\(^ {268}\) Ibid, p. 139.
Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his product is lost to consciousness. The reified world is experienced by man as a strange facticity, an *opus alienum* over which he has no control rather than as the *opus proprium* of his own productive activity.  

What Wendt aims to demonstrate is that, not unlike Vasquez' argument (see chapter 3), Realism is prone to self-fulfilling prophesies as it fails to recognise its own agency in the process of identity and interest formation. Essentially, a state of nature is what states have made of themselves. This was the point which I tried to make in the first chapter of this thesis, though I came to it via a different process of investigation. Essentially, the arguments presented are that Realists and diplomats have read themselves into a corner and have accepted the normal way of coming to understand the world. This would not pose as too much of a problem were it not for the fact that realism, states, sovereignty and traditional modes of understanding the world precipitate violence and death on unimaginably orchestrated scales. In short Neo/Realism is able to sanction murder, though Neo/Realism’s just cause, or the timeless nature of the international system seems to be a problematic justification.

However, the problems in Wendt’s argument are glaring. In concluding, *Anarchy is what states make of it* Wendt accepts reification in terms of structure and anarchy, though not in terms of the state. As such, it becomes possible for Wendt to ask what kind of foundation offers the most fruitful set of questions and research strategies for explaining revolutionary changes? and answer in terms a simplistic either/or dichotomy in which one methodology can reign supreme in the quest for

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269 Luckmann and Berger quoted in Alexander Wendt. 1995, p. 147
271 Ibid.
272 Ibid, p. 132.
truth in IR. Wendt is also predisposed towards empiricism, though there is no evidence of it anywhere in his article. He argues that the answer to the methodology question is ultimately an empirical one which betrays his positivist bias and contradicts his prior argument. Wendt seems to accept the role of interest and identity in the social construction of power politics but not of the material world.

Wendt notes, [t]he state-centrism of this agenda may strike some, particularly postmodernists, as depressingly familiar. Though I would have to argue that it is not state-centrism's familiarity that is depressing, but the way in which it contradicts his entire argument.

The first and second chapter of this thesis attempted to show how concepts and the most often used units of analysis in IR (namely the state of nature and the state) discipline the range of the possible in international relations, and thus dictate our possible conclusions not so much be their physical essence but by their ideological appeal. This is also the argument that Wendt proposes, but it may serve to note that he in fact disqualifies his conclusion throughout his argument.

Wendt, can question all the constitutive elements of the international state system but leave the entire edifice intact by presupposing the state to be an unproblematic entity-in-itself. Conceding to the argument that language is constitutive of our social reality, and by arguing that if society forgets what a university is, the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist he should also presume that same for the state, it being as metaphysical as the anarchy which it

273 Ibid, p. 161
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid, p. 163.
constitutes. In fact Wendt does not, which renders his argument problematic. For if agency and language is constitutive of anarchy, it is also constitutive of the state and empirical analysis will not be the impartial arbiter it is hoped it will be. There is still no way of deciding between the relative strengths and weaknesses of either a structural or constructivist theory. Empiricism presupposes that objects exist in themselves and independent of the subject's volition. However, Wendt's argument is predicated upon the opposite assumption; that objects and subjects interact in a manner which imposes identity upon each other. It is this contradiction that allows Wendt to talk of collective security and anarchy in the same paragraph. By Neo/Realist definitions, how can there be collective anything under anarchy? 277

So far we have seen that Neo/Realism has effectively reified its primary units of analysis, those being the state, sovereignty, and anarchy. For Rob Walker, it is the mythical history of the discipline that has been reified. In History and Structure in International Relations 278 Walker discusses the evolution of Realism as a text. Here he repeats the prototypical stories, which have decomposed the historical links between Neo/Realism and our historical past. Walker shows how the stories proffered by Neo/Realists tie very closely to modern stories of emancipation and progress, and reification proceeds by showing us that the world is as it is and not very dissimilar to how it was. The massive and erudite literature which has advanced our understanding of [premodern] phases of human experience 279 is systematically omitted in favour of the grand modern narratives of emancipation, freedom and justice.

277 Ibid, p. 155. This proposition obviously ignores Bull's contribution to the debate. My main problem with the idea of an anarchical society is that it is a metaphysical idea. Ontologically and epistemologically, there is still very little progress in the move from anarchy to societal anarchy. 278 Walker, 1995.
This privileging of myth over reality\textsuperscript{280} severs our very real historical links to the past and begins the process of reification. It is also the foundation stone of a social science devoted to the positivist building block approach to social investigation whereby objects must be constituted independently of the subject to afford empirical analysis. Unfortunately, there are fundamental flaws in its foundations, which speak volumes about the intended results of scientific investigation in IR. In short, the simple story of life before international relations has become quite implausible\textsuperscript{281} though some of the selected empirical/historical reasons for this will become clearer in the next chapter.

Walker terms the history of international relations a myth of origins which while it commands considerable authority conceals its own mythical nature by constant repetition and obligatory footnoting. Once however, these myths of origins are displaced, the plethora of alternative interpretations of history and progress erode the hegemony of Neo/Realist theory and it becomes visible as only one interpretation amongst many and a faulty one at that. As Walker points out, some of the most familiar and enduring analysis of world politics has been facilitated by a certain forgetting of history.\textsuperscript{282}

Such forgetting is integral to positivist IR. More specifically, it is integral to a Waltzian interpretation of positivist/empiricist science and structuralist IR. Further, it is integral to the constitutive and dichotomous nature of structure and anarchy in the praxis of international relations. However, of central importance here, reification is

\textsuperscript{279} Ibid, p. 318.
\textsuperscript{280} See: Buffet and Hauser, 1998.
\textsuperscript{281} Walker, 1995, p. 319.
\textsuperscript{282} Ibid, p. 323.
integral to our understanding of what constitutes the state as an entity worthy of theoretical and empirical study.

This leads me to a rather difficult question for postmodern theorists of international relations: what exactly constitutes an object and an event for postmodernists both in international relations and its study?

**Synthetic Reality.**

Roland Bleiker\(^{283}\) goes some way to answering these questions. Drawing upon linguistic interpretations of meaning and language's constitutive role therein, Bleiker argues that the linguistic turn transcends and precedes classical epistemology. As such, events are actualisations of reality in language\(^{284}\) and reality has no meaning aside from its articulation. Reality's identity is thus constituted through interaction of thought, language and purpose. As such meaning is accentuated by intervention and participation and not pre-constituted simply by being.

This relocation of meaning and identity-construction squarely in the social process of understanding and interaction encourages us to look not at universal categories and constructions, but to the localised areas of meaning construction and their linguistic representation. Bleiker's example is the fall of the Berlin Wall and what constituted this as an event worthy of interpretation. Here, he argues, the event was constituted and given meaning through the plethora of images and interpretations which erupted onto the world via the media and political commentary all of which

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\(^{283}\) Roland Bleiker. 1998.

\(^{284}\) Ibid, p. 480. Nowhere in the literature, which I have surveyed, have I found arguments that further problematise traditional modes of understanding by referring to the plethora of different languages and the cultures from which modes of understanding arise. Surely a study of how different languages use
were informed by subjective interpretations but were translated and transmitted by individuals who wished to objectify that which they thought constituted the event in itself. Thus a plethora of societal practices were reduced to one or two five-second sound bites. 285

The political impact and in many ways the reality of the actual protest was determined less by what actually happened in the streets of East Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden than by how these events were represented in the world media and absorbed by its viewers. The dynamic of the mass movement, the influence it exerted on the outside world, and the pressures that the outside world exerted back on the domestic situation in East Germany was shaped by a long and maybe untraceable chain of interfering interpretations. 286

Bleiker also shows how events of these magnitudes cannot be understood in area specific terms. He argues instead that world politics is transversal in that it recognises no arbitrary borders or delineations, no centres and peripheries clearly demarcated and all encompassing. Changing modes of understanding of what actually constitutes the world supports this deterritorialisation of world politics. Thus, while events are constantly in a process of reinterpretation, things are also in a process of reinterpretation and therefore change. As Walker notes,

Some people may kick tables to reaffirm the material solidity of the real world, but the demonstration is unlikely to be convincing to anyone familiar with the categories of contemporary physics. 287

Essentially, to examine events is to scrutinise how one particular interpretation of them has been objectified to the level of factuality. 288 It is too ask which processes elevate the interactions of people and their material surroundings to the status of events. It is to locate power within the process of constituting both

different meanings for similar though not necessarily identical objects and events would be very fruitful in understanding just how meaning is constituted universally.

286 Ibid.
288 Bleiker. op cit, p. 483.
meaningful events and objects within the process of articulation, and this is integral to understanding the what and why of any plethora of circumstances. Further, language regimes, traditional ways of posing questions and framing answers are located within the available modes of expression through language and the manner in which these utterances are to be received. Thus, as with identity, human agency cannot be distinguished from our social environment. Both are mutually constitutive.

The two-way process of communication is fuelled by expectation and intentions. This, as Bleiker shows, is dangerous when we talk in terms of war and statecraft and should be recognised as such. For example, war is traditionally viewed as a question of pragmatism, strategy and universalistic objectives for explicitly subjective ends. It is however, somewhat of an impasse in terms of change because the traditional modes of explaining and doing war are intrinsic to the process itself. Thus to end war one must first reinvent the language and methods by which war is given meaning. Postmodern interferences go at least some way towards accomplishing this goal by disrupting the concept of the other which is the object of hostilities.289 If the object cannot be clearly delineated apart from the subject/self/state, then what is a war and whom are wars fought against and for? More importantly, postmodern investigations allow a far broader understanding of the why of war not restricted to objective arguments concerning the national interest and state security. In a nutshell, for Bleiker, the power and the positive potential of postmodern critique does not lie in engaging orthodox international theory, but in forgetting it. 290

289 Ibid, pp. 486-487.
290 Ibid, p. 491.
Morality.

Finally, I would like to introduce a concept which has had no place in traditional theorising of international relations due to both the nature of Neo/Realist assumptions and the way in which they have been deconstructed. Contrary to the admonitions of various traditionalists that postmodernism would reduce IR to nihilism and relativism\(^{291}\) with no possibility of determining right from wrong, I would now like to show how *morality* can again be taken seriously in IR. First it may serve to clarify the realist position and demonstrate how similar it is to many of the arguments presented thus far.

By now it should be plain to all but the most dogmatic of mainstream theorists, that to accuse postmodernism of both nihilism and relativism is to assume that the mainstream is both squarely rooted in an unproblematic universal heroic practice and of high moral calibre. This chapter has been dedicated to problematising the first proposition that postmodern IR theory necessarily leads to relativism by demonstrating the way in which deconstructive and genealogical epistemologies help in the reformulation of alternative world views. Realism, tied as it is to a rationalist/hermeneutic epistemology and a metaphysical/utilitarian ontology, is diametrically opposed to morality. In fact morality does *not feature* in Realist discourse precisely because of its positivist (fact/value, interest/morality) logocentric privileging. Morality is instead restricted to the domestic concerns of subjects constituted in a dichotomous public and private sphere; the relations *between* states

\(^{291}\) Nihilism is here seen as a decent into an anti-morality abyss where the motto is *anything goes*. It is commonly deduced from a reading of Nietzsche. Nihilism, however, grew as a pre-communist form of philanthropy common to disenchanted gentry in pre-revolutionary Russia. Nihilism in this sense means to accept social obligation.
are beyond the influence of morality precisely because Neo/Realists construct to be as such.

These are the issues which Jim George raises in his article Realist Ethics, International Relations, and Post-modernism: Thinking Beyond the Egoism-Anarchy Thematic.\textsuperscript{292} Morality is generally deemed to be superfluous to the pragmatism required by the statesman who must deal with the harsh realities of the world with an ends justifies the means logic and whereby a rationalism and utilitarianism precludes morality in a world defined by scarcity and/or structural constraints and/or states and/or anarchy and/or security dilemmas, stag hunts, etc.

For George, Levinas provides an excellent way of entering the ethical debate in IR. George argues that by relocating the ethics debate prior to the Platonic framing of all discourse in terms of logic, and physics.\textsuperscript{293} In this sense it again means to transcend the object/subject distinction and the framing of ethical concerns in terms of self as other or empathy on the self's terms, but to recognise that we are all Others somewhere to someone and that one cannot detach oneself from a concern with ethics for [t]here is no choice it is always and inescapably my concern. \textsuperscript{294}

Realists may dismiss this manner of framing ethics in terms of impotence, and conservatism by reference to a state of nature thesis and the seven stages which follow; however, the arguments presented above show how this conservatism is unfounded. It has been argued that our social reality is constructed despite the fact that in the mainstream Neo/Realist literature it has become reified. Thus ethics are our collective concern simply because if we were their constructive agents, then we also

\textsuperscript{292} Millennium, 24: 2. 1995, pp. 195-225.
have the capacity to deconstruct and eliminate those factors which we deem to be unethical.

A postmodern discourse also eschews universalism; it denies that there can be one ethical standard against which all moral judgments can be judged, therefore, for a postmodernist it becomes necessary to locate ethics within the politico-normative terms of everyday life. As George argues,

> Ethical behaviour in this context is dependent not upon textual doctrine, regulatory moral codes, or rules and norms of right conduct, but directly upon the way in which humaneness and the self/other relationship is understood and formulated. It is, consequently, an ethical theory as practice which transforms the ethical realm from one in which the acting subject stands independent of the ethical object (as Other), to one in which subjects and subjects-as-objects are never autonomous of each other, but are intrinsically bound together in an ethic of responsibility, without ontological detachment clauses.

Responsibility has been the one factor that has been altogether eschewed in the modern narratives offered in the first and second chapters of this thesis - to paraphrase Bauman, modernity has been one giant exercise in the abolition of responsibility. Evidence of this can be seen in neo/realist structuralism, utilitarianism, rationalism, and realism *per se* and in the plethora of other consciously constructed dichotomies and oppositions throughout modern discourse of emancipation and freedom. George argues that we should instead aim towards an ethic of contextualised heteronomous responsibility in contrast to autonomous freedom.

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294 Ibid.
295 Ibid, p. 207.
298 George. 1998, p. 211.
Unfortunately, I have my own reservations as to George’s application of these ideas to international relations. George cannot transcend the state in his application of the ethic of responsibility. What becomes apparent is that by applying the ethic of responsibility to the state we presuppose or invite an entire world-view and it becomes very difficult to combat the effects of non-responsibility via the very same apparatus and ideological constructions that create and sustain the non-responsibility ethic in the first place. State or Neo/Realist agnosticism concerning issues of ethical and moral culpability, are easily justified via reference to a state of nature that would render any moral acts superfluous to the imperative of survival given the very same state of nature, interpreted in either micro (domestic) or macro (international anarchy) terms.

While a postmodern ethic can transcend the given-ness of any specific situation, I do not agree that politicians informed by postmodernism can transcend their own interests given that the means available to implement these changes do not exist and to invent them would destroy the legitimacy and protective role of the state. This is a discussion which will be taken up in the following chapter, but for now it may serve to conclude this chapter by tying together some of its broad themes and their implications for the theory as practice of International Relations.

Conclusion.

In the first chapter of this work I deconstructed Neo/Realism in terms of seven stages which -I argue- make up a world-view which we operate within today. To conclude this chapter I would like to show what the postmodern theorists in IR do to
these stages by reframing the nature of the discourse and its constitutive objects and to show what a possible alternative world-view informed by these theories may look like.

First, the hypothetical state of nature thesis, which is a common apology for the status quo within mainstream circles, could be enlarged to encompass present day social configurations. We live in a forever-changing state of nature, which could be called our social and natural environment. This environment is continually being shaped and reshaped by interests, identities, necessity, discourse, theory as practice, perceptions, understanding, and interpretation. These ideas can be seen resonating through the work of Wendt (with qualification) Connolly, and Walker. These writers challenge the assumption that there is a fixed and immutable foundation in IR, be it the state, structure, anarchy or power defined by our interests. What the concept of reification allows us to acknowledge is that our social environment has a history, which is not essentially hypothetical, and which, if reinterpreted given the massive and erudite literature which Walker alluded to could look somewhat different than it does to mainstream theorists in IR.

Secondly, it is simply dogmatic to talk of a permanent human nature as per Morgenthau or Niebhur, so too are interests far more problematic than a simple reduction to a quest for material power as per Waltz and the structural functionalists. Wendt and Connolly both show that our interests shape our identities and vice-versa and that a dichotomous distinction of the self and other and a presumed binary relationship between that is exogenously given by material factors is illogical.
What we have seen is that social hierarchies and value-laden interpretations of them have propagated a reified state that does not exist aside from our conception of it. Thus postmodernism has shown that (quasi) universal complicity in this norm has produced an international system of states. This, as mentioned above, would not be of any significance to rational discussion were it not possible to moralise on the implications such an ideological construct has on the range of the possible in our global existence.

George's interpretation of morality via Levinas is also reflective of this point. By reducing all identities to a binary relationship between self and other we reduce a complex process of identification to a simple opposition. It could be argued that the complex interaction between humanity and our natural and social environment constantly reshapes both elements. Thus whilst our ethical and urgent need for responsibility for human actions are self-evident to all but the most dogmatic in IR, it is now possible to reconstruct the world in such a way as to facilitate the coordination of measures such as global inequality, environmental degradation and so forth.

Third, we dealt with the concept of power as discourse in the previous two chapters. Following from this we can see from the discussion presented thus far that the traditional concept of power is entirely inadequate to deal with the complexity of the postmodern interferences in International Relations. The erosion of the object/subject dichotomy forces us to realise an ethic of responsibility when dealing with others and our environment and to think beyond binary power relationships. Therefore the idea that power somehow has an amoral nature can be rendered preposterous. Power, traditionally defined as coercive, does not grasp the
complexities of social interaction. Life is not dictated by a might makes right theory, but is predicated upon the interaction between identities and interests and the role of the discourse in shaping both. Postmodern philosophy encourages us to look deeper into the fabric of our social environment, to locate those areas in which modes of domination are restricting change defined locally and subjectively, and not via some universal conception or assumption of the truth. It also allows us to erode the ethic of non-responsibility that has become enshrined in modern discourse as power.

Fourth, and of central concern for the following chapter, is the way in which postmodernism problematises the nature of - and the idea of - the state. Further, and I believe this to be postmodernism's major contribution to International Relations, postmodernism dares to ask unlike any other theory of International Relations: what is a state? and informed by dramatically different methods, categories and concepts, replies: an idea! Granted that Enloe discusses the social formation of the state, and that Ashley must presuppose a thing called a state before it can be rendered problematic, however it is the vast gap between questioning and taking for granted which not only renders Neo/Realism problematic, but also any uncritical state centrism throughout the discipline.

Thus to assume the prior existence of the state before any theorisation of IR can commence renders all resulting theory problematic as we saw with Wendt and with George. Wendt was statist before he was a constructivist and while he agrees that the state can construct its identity and interests it would be illogical for him to assume the same for individuals as this would allow them to deny the state and any
such questioning would erode the applicability of Wendt's theory to the inter-state realm out there which is also somehow separate to our identities and interests.

George's lapse is somewhat less easy to define. However, it is again possible to question why a state should adopt his categories of responsibility at all. A state bound as it is by its own sovereignty need choose nothing that is not in its interests. Responsibility being one ethic which would destroy the state internally, I fail to see why the state would accept it as a binding clause for its existence. To apply George's ethic of responsibility, I believe it is necessary to circumvent the state, its institutions and appendages. Moreover, I must agree with Bleiker that the only way we can possibly hope for a different future and way of applying George's ethics would be to forget orthodox theory entirely.

This as Ashley has shown is well under way. To assume IR to be in a state of estrangement from social theory in general, unable to accommodate the theories that have proliferated since Wittgenstein, and to be questioning its own raison d'être, is to assume that things will never be the same again. The Inniterate Condottiere has been cast loose of its foundation, its sovereignty and the source of all meaning for modern discourse.

Sovereignty, more than any other idea has revealed the inadequacy of IR to accommodate change. Sovereignty underpins -albeit implicitly- the whole of IR. Sanctioned in the UN charter, it symbolises all that is wrong with traditional international politics. This enshrinement of a principle, and its translation into a brute fact predetermines the entire range of possible outcomes for world peace or the saviour of the world from environmental or nuclear annihilation. And yet sovereignty
is a fundamentally flawed concept. It presupposes and assumes too much. It presupposes most subjects to have been resolved when in fact they have only just come into contention. For example, sovereignty assumes a positivist epistemology, logocentrism, and rationalism. It assumes our global existence to be immutable and divided into sovereign entities; it assumes sovereignty to be the source of all meaning internationally when it so evidently is not.

Sovereignty allows us, in turn, to presuppose a state of nature, or anarchy out there as opposed to order within, it presupposes multiple competitive centres each vying to be the ultimate source of rationality, and it also allows us to presuppose conflict to be eternal. Moreover, to discuss the nature of society in a postmodern language allows us to see the metaphysical nature of the sovereign state, and in so doing frees up conceptual thinking space in which we can envisage alternatives to deterministic Neo/Realist discourse.
Chapter 6

Beyond Postmodernism?

Introduction.

This thesis has attempted to displace the dominance of Neo/Realism in IR. I have argued that Neo/Realism holds a dogmatic statist commitment that is largely untheorised. Moreover, the state in IR is a metaphysical construct, which as Ashley has argued is a commitment prior to science and exempted from scientific criticism. The second chapter of this thesis maintained that this was in fact integral to a naturalistic conception of science in IR. Furthermore, an empiricist epistemology as applied to state centric international relations demanded that the state be conceived as a thing in itself so that it could become the object of dispassionate scientific analysis. Chapter three attempted to demonstrate that despite the mutually constitutive nature of a statist ontology and positivist/empiricist epistemology, the Neo/Realist research agendas failed to validate the legitimacy of its largely statist ontological commitments.

Chapters four and five sought to locate human agency in the social construction of knowledge and to illuminate the various discursive hegemonies that statist ontological commitments precipitate. They also sought to erode a deterministic conception of life and to demonstrate that as society is fashioned by sentient actors, these actors should therefore be held responsible for their actions. How then can
international theory transcend a largely metaphysical conception of the state and still produce constructive and realistic theory?

This chapter explores the space opened up by the displacement of Neo/Realism and the inclusion of post positivism. This chapter will be presented in three sections. The first section will contextualise the postmodern within anarchist theoretical discourse; of central is a theory of the state. This chapter shows how similar Ashley's critique of sovereignty (outlined in the previous chapter) is to Michael Bakunin's short (fragmented) work God and the State. It will be possible here to advance many anarchist themes whilst still remaining true to a post-positivist position. I will outline here the core connection between the idea of a God and the Neo/Realist conception of the state; namely metaphysics. I will subsequently discuss the foundational institution of the modern liberal state system, namely the institution of private property. Drawing on the work of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, I propose that not only is the state a metaphysical construct, but that so too is its core institution, private property. What I would like to demonstrate here is that economics and politics are intrinsically tied together, historically and theoretically, albeit metaphysically.³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ R, Ashley quoted in Jarvis, 2000, p. 104.
³⁰⁰ Michael Bakunin God And The State. Date N/A. See preface by Carlo Cafiero and Elisee Reclus, pp. 5-8. Many of Kropotkins works remained unfinished and many were also edited fragments of writings assembled posthumously.
³⁰¹ For an example of extensive preliminary research see Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict (1998). The research suggests that private property is an exogenous cause of conflict.
In the second part of this chapter I will turn my attention to *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* by Peter Kropotkin. At first glance it would seem that *Mutual Aid* is somewhat of an anomaly for this thesis. It is staunchly empiricist and tentatively naturalistic in its historical methodology. Nevertheless, Kropotkin does not present his ideas as the definitive alternative to tradition but as the basis of his social philosophy. Kropotkin sought to dispel the dogmatic belief in the first principle of self interest and show by zoological analysis that contrary to the core tenets of social Darwinism, epitomised by Thomas Huxley, a state of nature in which man fought for the means of existence in an anarchic free for all never existed. What Kropotkin wished to show was that sociologists confused the metaphor of a struggle for existence with the reality of the necessity of mutual aid.

By discussing the implausibility of both an ahistorical and universal first principle of self interest, I aim to demonstrate that mainstream International Relations and can no longer rely on a hypothetical and abstract analogy to provide the basis and justification for its state centric theory.

The third and final section of this chapter, seeks to offer a redefinition of the state and its role in society, a reconceptualisation which makes use of the vast literature demonstrating the states less than passive intermediary role in the formation of civil society. For this task I will discuss the work of Charles Tilly and Roberto Unger. Tilly's redefinition of the state as an organised racketeering enterprise is supported by Kropotkin's empirical analysis. This reconceptualisation also serves as an excellent introduction to the work of Roberto Unger.

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Unger's political sociology supports a deterritorialisation of international politics by stressing the interdependence of communities, merchants, and the international relations of overlords and their armies. His methodology is also groundbreaking in that he seeks to avoid the pitfalls of both a positivist and a deep-structure analysis of social change, thus his post positivist position can discern the underlying logic of social plasticity whilst also providing narratives to support his theory. Many of the themes that have been raised in the previous chapters can also be seen in Unger's work, it provides a framework within which IR theory can be reconceptualised. At base, this chapter proposes an alternative theoretical foundation for the theory of international relations, and avenues for future research, without finality.

The Origin of Deconstructive Theory.

Anarchism is a marginal discourse. Commonly perceived as the discourse of chaos it has not been accorded a respectable position within traditional political science debates. However, the works of Bakunin and Proudhon, and to a lesser extent Kropotkin, are related to the theoretical evolution of postmodernism. Bakunin's work *God and The State* anticipated the deconstructive methodology aimed directly at what has come to be known as logocentrism and sovereignty; two peas in a modern pod.

304 Kropotkin's analysis of the prison system in Siberia, written as a young officer in the Russian military, have an uncanny resemblance to the equivalent work by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*. Undoubtedly, the French *Gauche* (Left Wing) would have been well versed in most if not all anarchist literature due to its marked popularity in continental political science both at their time of publication and today. Kropotkin's work is however of a more empirical nature and as such it features less in the more philosophical arguments to follow.
Bakunin’s point of departure is obviously his antipathy towards the blind faith of a monotheistic religion and the sovereignty of God. Indeed he extends his critique of sovereignty to the state, arguing that the state also occupies an equal position to the idea of a God in modern minds. Bakunin uses an early example of what Ashley has termed the monological reading technique[^305] which centres on the acceptance of the sovereignty of a religious and statist discourse. Bakunin’s analysis also recognises the absolutism of such a discourse, and in his critique of monotheistic religion and the state, parallels can be drawn between postmodern deconstruction and anarchist theory. Both Ashley and Bakunin question the possibility of a sovereign be it an embodiment (i.e. the state) or a deity. Both also question the logocentrism, which underpins the idea of sovereignty, and the link between a philosophy of science and the state.

Throughout Bakunin’s *God And The State* the distinction between the state and God is treated as highly ambiguous. In short God and the State are treated as analogous. Both, according to Bakunin, are socially constructed and metaphysical entities used for the suppression of liberty. Bakunin also critiques the logocentric opposition between a materialist and an idealist philosophy of which the idealists are the neo-Kantians and the clergy, and the materialists the Machiavellians and the positive scientific community.[^306] In essence however, Bakunin rightly shows that the opposition between the two seemingly irreconcilable positions are illusory. In fact, he

[^305]: Richard Ashley *Untying the Sovereign State: A double reading of the anarchy problematique* see above.

[^306]: It may serve to note that Bakunin also derives his definition of materialism from Proudhon. The objection is not to materialism or realism per se, but materialism or realism founded upon the unquestioned authority of minority groups like scientific savants, the church, or the state. The reason for this will become clearer, but the central reason concerns Proudhon’s preoccupation with liberty and authoritarian materialism’s opposition to it.
argues, both are mutually constitutive; one cannot exist without the other due to their totalising tendencies. We see throughout this work a tendency to question the absolutist foundations upon which a logocentric position can be held. In effect, Bakunin operates both a monological and a dialogical reading of the question of the Church and the State.

This critical technique is symbolic of both Proudhon and Bakunin; indeed it may also be the reason for its radical and marginal nature. It is confusing and polemic unless we can make some sense of the vitriol's underlying thesis.

Human indifference stems from the objectivity intrinsic to ignorance, or so Bakunin argues. For Bakunin, ignorance is the founding principle of objectivism and reification.\textsuperscript{307} Ignorance of man's authorship of our social existence is predicated upon a contrived determinism with roots in deism (the worship of objective or external Gods) and the dictates of authoritative institutions. Bakunin argues that it is in fact the two institutions of God and the State that have stifled human liberty and furnished those who propagate the ideas of God and State with the means of enslavement of the ignorant.\textsuperscript{308}

This enslavement as Bakunin puts it, is predicated upon there being no absolute separation between God and the state. In fact Bakunin argues that Rousseau and Robespierre took Voltaire at his word and created the Supreme Being: the state.\textsuperscript{309}

\textsuperscript{307} Bakunin, \textit{God and The State}, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{308} See pages 40 — 42 above for examples of Niebuhr and Morgenthau's religious convictions and proscriptions.
\textsuperscript{309} Ibid, p. 79. Voltaire said, If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him (p 17). Realising that God did not exist, Bakunin implies that Rousseau did indeed invent him and embodied the sovereignty of God in the state.
Bakunin argues that the pastoral imagery\textsuperscript{310} was easily transposed from theology to statist theory and the rule of God was transferred to the rule of the learned man of science. The ignorance of the individual man was exploited by reference to the objective laws of reality and the doctrine of modernisation was founded to give man something to aspire to, which was not of this time. Look forward and not around became the central creed. Moreover, man was encouraged to come to know God or to recognise the state and to privilege both over Socrates dictate \textit{know thyself}\textsuperscript{311}. Bakunin's critique of God, the State, and positive science can thus be read as a critique of objectivism in general.

Bakunin's contribution to IR theory can be most explicitly stated by reference to the timeless dichotomy between idealism and realism. Bakunin refers to this as the opposition between idealism and materialism. He argues that to oppose one to the other masks certain inherent attributes, which lead both down the same path to totalitarianism. Idealism by its very definition aims in the materialisation of its ideal society and a realist or materialist \[s\]tarting from the totality of the real world, or from what is abstractly called matter, it logically arrives at the real idealization- that is, at the humanisation, at the full and complete emancipation —of society.\textsuperscript{312} The problem arises when we consider the unity of method: i.e. the sovereignty of objective scientific authority and which -either way- materialist or idealist, results in inequality.

\textsuperscript{310} For a postmodern interpretation of this imagery see Foucault's \textit{Pastoral Power} in \textit{Politics Philosophy Culture}, 1988. See especially p. 39.
\textsuperscript{311} Ibid, pp. 72-73
\textsuperscript{312} Ibid, p. 48.
and totalitarianism (defined as total homogeneity controlled by legislative reason) or materialist state centris as per the Machiavellian Realists. 313

The Idealist pursuit of norms leads to a homogenisation of society (see Introduction above), which by definition is impossible, nevertheless relies upon the authority of the scientific community. The materialist pursuit of the emancipation of mankind through a complete understanding of our material reality, also relies upon legislative reason to dictate what counts as legitimate and real. This also stifles individuality and coupled with the institutions of the state, defiles liberty and equality.

Proudhon comes to his conclusions via a different method. Whilst his conclusions are not dissimilar to those of Bakunin i.e. that man is not free due to the authoritarian constraints imposed by those persons who act under the auspices of a reified, amoral and metaphysical sovereignty; for Proudhon, the role of private property in the social construction of states is the primary cause of this authoritarian inequality. Proudhon’s method is largely deconstructive and in this sense the links between Anarchism and postmodernism are quite similar again. Proudhon does not term his methodology deconstructive, neither does he refer to political economy as a discourse, nevertheless, his genealogical deconstruction of the concept of private property, and his textual analysis thereof is strikingly postmodern.

313 Ironically, Proudhon—widely viewed as an utopian anarchist—also spoke out against the idealism of his contemporaries. Alan Ritter writes: Proudhon’s realism is inspired by dissatisfaction with his utopian predecessors. Like Marx, who admired and followed him here, Proudhon subscribes to the utopians radical ideas but condemns their disregard of repugnant facts. The utopians wanted to reconstruct the world: in this they were perfectly right. Their error was to perpetuate the religious dream by rushing off into a fantastic future instead of grasping the reality that crushes it. The Political Thought of Pierre Joseph Proudhon. 1969, p. 26.
Proudhon's is a textual analysis of the possibility of private property. He states that as researchers and writers on the topic are not in unison on the principle of property rights, the error lies in themselves; and since every error has a reality for its object, it is in their books that we must look for the truth which they have unknowingly deposited there. Proudhon's analysis therefore looks for the inherent contradictions within the works of Cousin, Ricardo, Saint-Simon, and de Tocqueville to name but a few, and in the way in which they come to the conclusion that the right to private property is a universal right of man.

Property laws are not dissimilar to the right to sovereignty, the right of sovereignty, and sovereign rights. Both sovereignty and private property are predicated upon an equality of right to both sovereignty and private property, and the universal recognition of this equality is its foundational principle. The problem, as Proudhon sees it, is that equality (a just and natural right) destroys private property, and private property (a legal dictate of jurisprudence) destroys an equality of conditions. It is this anomaly that Proudhon seeks to explain.

Equality, as Proudhon goes to great lengths to demonstrate, is a rather obscure legal term. In essence, legal equality means equal rights before the law. Thus we are all equal before the law; the law, however, is sovereign. Sovereignty is the expression of the will of the sovereign and whilst it assumes objectivity/impartiality, not only are these concepts illusory, we can now also come to understand how sovereignty may qualify as despotism.

315 Ibid, p. 29.
Jurisprudence sanctifies the institution of private property; it cannot also sanction the concept of equality (for reasons which will become clearer). For Proudhon, material equality was our original condition. In essentialist terms, Proudhon also argues that society seeks this equality once more and instinctively. What Proudhon argues is that in the aftermath of the French Revolution the Third Estate sought to vest themselves in the material splendour of the Monarchy. Proudhon argues that the French Revolution was thus a quest for equality. However, Proudhon argues that the Revolution was simply progress, not a revolution, as the underlying principles of society remained the same, i.e. unequal.

To demonstrate that equality is the foundational principle of society, Proudhon elaborates a theory of society. Society for Proudhon is largely contractual. It is theorised from his division of labour thesis derived from Rousseau, and its role is to show how each individual supports every other reciprocally via their task or emploi. Proudhon uses an analogy to illustrate this fact. He argues that if we begin by conceptualising a colony of one thousand individuals who are denied foreign trade, these one thousand people in order to survive must support each other in their individual capacities. Multiplied mathematically, he argues, his analogy might represent the human race that are truly isolated. 316

The individual man can supply but a very small portion of his needs; all his power lies in association and in the intelligent combination of universal effort. The division and cooperation of labour multiply the quantity and the variety of products, and specialization improves their quality. There is not a man then that does not live off the products of several thousand other industries; nor a labourer who does not receive from society at large the things which he consumes and, with these, the means of reproducing.

Now, this incontestable and uncontested fact of the general participation in every kind of product makes all individual productions common, so that every product made by the producer is mortgaged in advance by society. The producer himself has the right only to that portion of the product which is expressed by a fraction whose denominator is equal to the number of individuals of which

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316 Ibid, p. 130.
society is composed this reciprocity of mortgages destroys even possession
But, it will be answered, even if that is the case, even if the product does not belong to the producer, since society gives each labourer an equivalent for his product, it is this equivalent, this salary, reward or compensation, which becomes his property.
Let us not be blinded by a false justice: what is given the labourer in exchange for his product is given him as a basis for an advance on future labour. We consume before we produce.
To conclude: the labourer, in relation to society, is a debtor who of necessity dies insolvent. 317

The point, which Proudhon is at pains to stress, is that the state is an arbitrary interference in the natural workings of society. By sanctioning the right to private property the institution of the state is the source of inequality and thus is diametrically opposed to society. Moreover in stepping out of the production process, the representatives of the state place unnatural burdens upon the workers. For Proudhon, sovereignty is a cloak covering the inequality enshrined in state theory.

Proudhon elaborates a monological reading of the concept of private property. The first part of the book is dedicated to understanding the constitution of private property. Private property as an institution is intrinsically tied to the philosophical separation of subject and object and the domain of the former over the latter. However,

the law, in establishing property, has not been the expression of a psychological fact, the development of a natural law, or the application of a moral principle; it has in every sense of the word created a right outside of its own province. It has realised an abstraction, a metaphor, a fiction, and has done so without deigning to look at the consequences, without considering the disadvantages, without asking whether it is right or wrong. It has sanctioned egoism. 318

318 Ibid, p. 61
Thus, the law, according to Proudhon, has delved into the realm of metaphysics in an attempt to establish a physical fact. 319 That one can have sovereign jurisdiction over one's possessions is as metaphysical an argument as sovereignty itself, as we discussed in previous chapters.

Proudhon's central thesis is that property is theft. 320 However, he notes that [p]roprietor and thief have always been as contradictory as the being to which they refer are antagonistic, and all languages have preserved this opposition. 321 Later, after lengthy discussions of concerning how the very concept of private property is logically impossible and materially unproductive, he turns his attention to the very nature of the verb to steal, and his discussion is quite remarkable. Here he begins by a translation and a linguistic approach to meaning formation and he deconstructs meaning from language. Beginning with a translation of the Latin which resembles our own understanding of the verb to steal Proudhon then turns his attention to the Greek word for to cover or conceal which, he argues, has similar etymologies to the verb to steal (derived from the same consonants kleptes from klepto (I steal)). Further, Proudhon's translation of the Hebrew gannab or thief is similar to the verb to put away, or conceal expressed by the word ganab. Thus Proudhon's famous re-translation of the Eight Commandment to you shall not put away anything for yourself 322 which in Hebrew reads lo thi-gnob.

This deconstruction is typical of Proudhon's sociological approach to meaning formation. He does not take meaning to be eternally valid or objective, but filtered

319 One of the reasons why Proudhon's thesis was rejected on submission (due according to its sponsors' to its complicated nature) may be due to these philosophical debates. It may be that Proudhon had not the vocabulary to express his true meaning and hence his rather confusing style.

down through historical praxis. Thus he is able to argue that that which is socially constructed can also be socially dismantled. The prior explanation of the psychological separation between object and subject (dictated by law) and the right of the latter to the former being equal to the rights inherent in property (despite the contradiction) is thus given added weight. He argues that the separation between object and subject is arbitrary and due to socio-cultural convention, and that the meaning of this separation cannot be given an objective context, i.e. it is inherent in our expression of fact within linguistically given contexts.

Given the socio-linguistic nature of the concept of property, Proudhon is thus able to demonstrate that the right to profit from or to increase ones capital is sanctified only by legal dictate and makes no logical sense. In essence, by arguing that a monological reading of the concept of property does not also include the right to profit from private property -that profit is in fact cultural practice, not logical fact- Proudhon is able to show how the praxis of private property is self destructive, and that the metaphysical theorising of private property shows that at base, private property is theft. Two examples may illustrate this observation.

Proudhon's eighth and ninth propositions 323 that 8) \textit{Property is impossible because its power of accumulation is infinite, while it is exercised only over finite quantities} and 9) \textit{Property is impossible because it is powerless against property} demonstrate the impracticality and therefore unjust nature of property laws (specifically interest), and the theoretically zero sum nature of unhindered economic practice. The latter proposition is also unjust for Proudhon due to both its

\begin{itemize}
\item 322 Ibid, p. 198.
\end{itemize}
destructive nature towards property (rendering the true nature of property impossible) and towards society (resulting in monopolisation and despotism).

The first proposition deals with the concept of compound interest and its impracticality considered in an ideal economy. Deducing correctly that the right to profit from a thing is impractical in reality, as the rights inherent to private property would soon swallow up all property, hence Proudhon's observation that the State is an unnatural complication of the market. The government is (was) however a national proprietor, thus both property and government act against their best interests.

Had Proudhon been versed in the arguments about contemporary ecological crisis, his thesis need not have been so metaphysical. Over consumption leading to mass waste is eroding the earth's fragile ecosphere through the boring of holes in the ozone layer and the consequent global warming. To voluntarily minimise profit in the interests of ecology does not make economic sense unless the right to profit without legal limit is abandoned.

The ninth proposition is further illustrative of the logical impossibility and impracticability of the right to profit from private property. Profit is the right to take a reward from the luxury of capital. As such profit must be made out of a transaction with another person and this profit and loss chain is passed throughout the economic process. As such,

producer A makes a profit out of producer B, according to the principles of economics, B must be reimbursed by C, C by D, and so on down to Z. But by whom will Z be reimbursed for the loss caused him by the profit charged by A in the beginning? By the consumer, replies Say. What a contemptible hypocrite! Is this consumer any other then, than A, B, C, D etc., or Z? By whom will Z be reimbursed? If he is reimbursed by A, no one makes a profit, and consequently there is no property. If on the contrary Z bears the burden himself, he ceases to be a member of society, since it refuses him the right of property and profit which it grants to the other associates.

Since the nation then, like universal humanity, is a vast industrial association which cannot act outside of itself, it is clear that no man can enrich himself without impoverishing another. For in order that the right of property, the right of increase, may be respected in the case of A, it must be denied to Z, and so we see how the equality of rights, separated from the equality of conditions may be a truth. The iniquity of political economy in this respect is flagrant. 324

One would assume from his reasoning that for Proudhon the institution of private property propagates inequality on the one hand while it demands equality on the other. Equality in property rights but not in property; this sort of reasoning would also lead one to assume that inequality is a prerequisite for prosperity and that the First world is/was supported and enriched at the expense of the Third world. 325

The rapacious and intrinsic self-interest to which Neo/realists and Neo Classical economists refer is deemed to be the inherent cause of our maladies. As we saw in Chapter one, the contrived social Darwinism to which this line of reasoning lends itself is apologetic of our very real human role in creating our social environment. Typical of a logocentric position of course, the self-interest thesis is opposed and privileged over altruism. There cannot be a compromise if causation is to be explained. Of course, the story of human altruism is never told. Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution by the anarchist Peter Kropotkin goes at least some way towards accomplishing this task, though Kropotkin's methodology is at least as questionable as those of whom he seeks to refute.

325 See Frank, Andre Gunder, 1978 and 1975. See also 1998. The thesis proposed in Frank's earlier works match this line of reasoning very closely. Proudhon notes, without force, property is powerless against property (p. 167) and the historical commentaries given by Frank demonstrate this to be very much the case in Latin America and, indeed, Africa and the Indian sub-continent. Without inequality of capacities, and without force, profit could not be charged on goods.
Evidence.

As we saw in the first chapter, to establish the hypothetical state of nature thesis is intrinsic to a statist ontology. From the state of nature thesis it becomes possible to argue the benefits of civil and statist society. The assumption of rational self-interest as Man's primary motivator, or a malignant human nature for the traditionalists, also helps to stress the benefits of the state as an objective adjudicator and provider of the peace and tranquility which would otherwise be absent from society.

What must be stressed, however, is that the state of nature hypothesis is purely hypothetical and ahistorical and its role as such is to provide a universal theory upon which an explanation of the nature of society and its mechanisms can be placed. Of course, it is purely hypothetical; moreover the state of nature thesis is used to construct an amoral, ahistorical and naturalistic framework within which it becomes increasingly difficult to apportion blame and culpability, and increasingly easier to justify malevolence and deceit. As Morgenthau argues, The ethics and mores of politics are generally considered to permit greater leeway than the ethics and mores of society in general in certain actions such as campaign oratory and promises in general. 326 It is hypothetical and inaccurate universal statements that allow him to say this.

There is no evidence, as Wight and Waltz rightly pointed out, that a state of nature ever existed. And so one must ask the question, why, if there never was a state of nature, and there is a massive and erudite body of literature which describes

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326 Morgenthau, 1979, p. 228.
human society throughout the ages, drawn from historical, anthropological and archaeological evidence, why does state theory and more specifically mainstream International Relations theory, not take this evidence into account? What would the inclusion of positive historical analysis do for IR theory? If one is to include historical evidence in state theory, is a logocentric statist ontology a legitimate commitment? The answer would have to be no as I hope to point out. As Unger argues below, contrary to common conceptions, narratives (not universal statements) can be drawn from historical analysis.

Kropotkin deliberately excludes all evidence which does not support his central thesis, arguing that as his excluded evidence has been privileged throughout historical, anthropological, and zoological analysis it does not deserve added attention. Moreover, attempting to demonstrate the prevalence of mutual aid within species of necessity omits an analysis of factors which work against this principle. Kropotkin's primary concern is therefore to demonstrate the role of mutual aid in the creation of society and in the continuing evolution of living species. Where Kropotkin does discuss struggle and war amongst individuals of the same species, he does so to illustrate its destructive and regressive effects upon the process of material and psychological evolution.

What is interesting from a postmodern point of view is Kropotkin's insistence that zoologists, anthropologists and sociologists do not confuse further what he sees as the metaphorical struggle for existence -to which Darwin alluded- and the actual struggle for life experienced by species living in harsh and uncompromising natural Conditions.

Kropotkin. Mutual Aid p 23 see also page 84.
environments. Further, Kropotkin also aims to demonstrate that within species, competition for the means of survival is the exception rather than the rule, and if there is competition or a struggle it is between species.

Already we can see the implications of such a radical turn-around in social analysis. If there is no natural struggle between humans for the means of sustenance and that the natural inclinations for living species is to assist and aid their own kind rather than the exception to the rule which is to profit from each others loss, then of what purpose is the state? Before answering these questions, a few examples may assist in reconceptualising a more historically accurate picture of the evolution of society.

To begin with, science has established beyond any doubt that mankind did not begin its life in the shape of small isolated families, in fact it has been demonstrated that the clan or the tribe was the initial and universal mode of social organisation within which mutual aid and support was practiced out of necessity due largely to the harsh natural conditions which primitive peoples had to endure. Indeed, early life was remarkably free of warfare and it was largely a specialised enterprise not common to all. Further, the idea that primitive peoples were dispersed and unattached (thereby constituting a state of nature) in pre civil or state society, is dismissed by the evidence concerning marriage practices. Clans and tribes were extended families and therefore marriage was disallowed within the tribe. As with the Kamilroi speaking Australians, husbands and wives had to be taken from neighbouring tribes and clans, and this ensured not only the vitality of the tribe but

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328 Ibid, p. 87.
also their interdependence and mutual support.\footnote{Ibid.} Family links also made it decidedly less likely that communities would fight over disagreements. Indeed, feuds and grievances usually ended in the grieved parties taking the transgressor into their own family group.

Thomas Huxley's thesis that primitive man lived in a type of gladiator free-for-all,\footnote{Ibid, p. 84.} in an attempt to survive the harsh conditions of a material existence, could not be further from the historical and indeed present day evidence. The Aleoute Eskimo population of far North America provide us with the best evidence of why a rampant state of nature is impractical if life really is such a struggle.

Kropotkin's study reveals that within a population of 60,000 people scattered across arctic conditions there was but one murder in one hundred years, no common law offence for over forty years among a community of one thousand eight hundred people. Despite what we modern people would consider to be the complete and utter hardships of arctic life, tempers do not flare in Aleoute communities.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 99-101.} Quite understandably, arctic survival necessitates a certain degree of tolerance and endurability which would otherwise be quite extraneous in modern society. In Aleoute society it is quite shameful to die without killing one's enemy, it is considered proper to practice infanticide, euthanasia and parricide however it is remarked that as soon as the communities level of subsistence rises these practices are abandoned. Moreover, to have enemies is detrimental to the vitality of the clan when the day to day difficulties of maintaining a level of sustenance always takes precedent.
Kropotkin is equally careful to note that neither is primitive man the idealization which Rousseau makes of him and which Waltz later elaborates. The brutality as well as the community, which is evident in early tribal customs, is borne out of necessity and always executed in the name of the tribe and not by appeal to higher laws dictated by a sovereign authority. In essence the tribe was all. And, 

At no period in man's life were wars the normal state of existence. While warriors exterminated each other, and the priests celebrated their massacres, the masses continued to live their daily life. 

Further, the historian unconsciously draws a distorted picture of the times he endeavours to depict because nearly all historical documents deal with breaches of the peace and not the peace itself. Neither is it possible for us to consider history as a continual linear progression, argues Kropotkin. History is discontinuous for Kropotkin and as civilizations rise and fall, most often without any concept of their counterparts elsewhere, the tenacity of the clan, later the village, then the town, then the city, remained. Underlying these social organisations were communities of peoples supporting each other, not unconsciously as Proudhon suggests by a complex division of labour, but through day to day acts of support and care for their neighbours well being and hence the vitality of the community.

For Kropotkin, this vitality reached its peak in the Eurasian towns and cities of the later medieval period and in the early years of the Renaissance. It was here too that the seeds for its downfall were sown. [T]he very peacefulness of man being the

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333 Ibid, pp. 109-110
334 Ibid, p. 112.
335 See page 115. Whilst Kropotkin does not use the term discontinuity it is more than evident that this is his meaning. For in fact, the evolution of mankind has not been one of unbroken series he says. Without attempting to produce a grand narrative of evolution, the constant and prolific footnoting and referencing throughout Mutual Aid clearly show how prevalent mutual aid was throughout human history.
cause of the specialisation of the warriors trade\footnote{Ibid, p. 129. Emphasis added.} unfortunately this specialization also needed to maintain itself. Bands of unruly men roamed the countryside offering their services as protectors often under the control of a chieftain or overlord, and the village communities only too anxious to be left in peace\footnote{Ibid, p. 142.} enlisted their services. Charles Tilly has termed this War Making and State making as Organised Crime\footnote{Charles Tilly. War Making and State Making As Organised Crime in Evans et al. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge. 1985. As Tilly's work is better known than the equivalent by Kropotkin, I will focus here upon Tilly's work and refer to Kropotkin where relevant.}.\footnote{Ibid, p. 169.}

Tilly's work seeks to reframe the dominant myth of origins in state theory and rather than subscribe to the social contract, or open market theories and analogies, which serve as foundational universal statements upon which theories of international anarchy can be based, Tilly stresses the importance of seeing state formation for what it really was, and for him, state formation resembled organised crime or protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy\footnote{Ibid.}. This work is remarkably similar to the second half of Kropotkins Mutual Aid and even more similar to The State: Its Historic Role also written by Kropotkin. The dominant parallels concern the violent and paradoxical nature of state formation. Essentially, the bands of mercenaries and their overlord Kings sought to offer protection for rural communities and were at once the source of the greatest danger to the very same communities. As such, Tilly argues that state formation resembled racketeering, overlords were military entrepreneurs, and the rural populations\footnote{Ibid.} at least for the western European experience\footnote{Ibid.} were the hapless
victims of their own making. As Tilly rightly points out, and as we have seen from the discussions so far,

Apologists for particular governments and for government in general [read Neo/Realists] commonly argue, precisely, that they offer protection from local and external violence. They claim that the prices they charge barely cover the costs of protection. They call people who complain about the price of protection anarchists or subversives, or both at once. But consider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. Governments' provision of protection, by this standard, often qualifies as racketeering [to the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are the consequence of its own activities 341

Of course the key issue at stake here is the legitimacy to which Tilly referred above. How is racketeering legitimate? Tilly concurs with Stinchcombe, who argues that legitimacy, in terms of states, means or corresponds less with a higher right or value than it does with a simple might makes right thesis. Couple this with competition for the right to be mighty, or the story of the competition for sovereignty in Western Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and one can understand how racketeers, once control of a certain portion of the population had been achieved, then had to maintain this control in the face of competing claims to it. Kropotkin argues that all (or most) historians note how

populations, once free, and simply agreeing to feed a certain portion of their military defenders, gradually became the serfs of these protectors; how commendation to the Church or to a Lord, became a hard necessity for the freeman; how each Lord's and Bishop's castle became a robbers nest — how feudalism was imposed, in a word — and how the crusades, by freeing the serfs who wore the cross, gave the first impulse to popular emancipation.342

Tilly continues that, over time, certain lords and overlords became dominant in a certain area and whilst enjoying the economic tributes which came with military domination, were also able to extend their spheres of coercion and monopolise the use of force and the exaction of tribute on the other in a circular and strengthening manner.

341 Ibid, p. 171.
The procedure of becoming and preventing a threat at once was even more evident in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when great maritime states such as British
and the Dutch Empires extended their racketeering all over the known world. Tilly’s thesis is also concurrent with Frank’s work *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, in which he argues that monopolistic access to the silver and gold of the newly discovered Americas and superior European military techniques (principally with the former financing the latter—though the latter facilitated the former) explains contemporary European and American hegemony in the global economy more than neoclassical and/or modernisation theories.\(^{343}\)

However, Kropotkin contests the military theory of the origin of authority despite his aversion to state authority.\(^{344}\) Kropotkin’s analysis of a symbiotic relationship between the peasantry and their overlords is more akin to the work by Roberto Unger: *Plasticity into Power*. Both writers stress the very real economic factors that obliged both the peasantry and their overlords to consider external economic factors in their day-to-day lives. If we were to integrate the theory of private property of Proudhon with the sociological analysis of Kropotkin, we would be a step closer to understanding Unger’s anti-reversion theory of social progress.

Kropotkin, throughout *Mutual Aid*, is careful to account for the rise in the institution of private property. In essence of course, he claims it to be detrimental to the progressive evolution of humanity due to its divisive and individualistic side effects. Proudhon, on the other hand, shows how private property is impossible and

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\(^{342}\) Kropotkin. *Mutual Aid*, p. 146.

\(^{343}\) See Frank *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*. Also *The Development of Underdevelopment* and *On Capitalist Underdevelopment* for further empirical arguments, some of the most illustrative of which—for this argument—are drawn from Adam Smith’s *The Wealth Of Nations*. 

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that institutions which preserve it (namely the state) will be in constant competition with its logical side effects: namely the creation of an underclass, and hence state measures to remedy the negative effects of capital.

Unger's work *Politics is his magnum opus*. Moreover, comprising of three books it is difficult to synthesise in this chapter, not only because of its length but also its depth and scope. What follows is a short introduction to Unger's aims, method and illuminations, and a possible way in which, with the arguments of the previous chapter in mind, Unger's methodological and conceptual political sociology could be integrated into the study of IR. 345

Unger's aim is to integrate an anti-necessitarian social theory into practice. His *proto-theory* in *False Necessity* is thus a framework around which alternative theories can be built; it also acts as an introduction to his aims, which are more explicit than the ideas presented in *Social Theory*, the first book of the trilogy. Here, Unger asks the reader to distinguish between the deterministic aspect of contexts, structure, and framework (used interchangeably) 346 and their contingent and malleable nature. In so doing, Unger argues that post-structuralist and post-positivist social and critical theory has demonstrated the pliability of our social existence and *contra* deep-structure or positivist necessitarianism, human life oscillates between the the institutional and imaginative which suggests that whilst routine can have an intransigent quality, it is not determined as such indefinitely. 347

344 See Kropotkin, 1972, p. 145.
345 Many of the themes presented here can be seen in Robert Cox's integration of Gramsci into IR in *Approaches To World Order*, 1996.
347 Unger 1987, *False Necessity*, p. 33. As Carr noted fifty years prior, *The ideal, once it has been embodied in an institution, ceases to be an ideal and becomes the expression of a selfish interest, which must be destroyed in the name of a new ideal this is the stuff of politics* The Twenty Years
Plasticity is the key word here. Plasticity arises from the recognition of the contingent nature of history and the indeterminate nature of the stories that can be derived therein. Plasticity also implies a malleability of identities and interests that conform mainly to the contexts out of which they arise and into which they are to be applied. Interests can thus be seen as context transforming or strengthening depending upon specific interests. As such, there is no sovereign voice or teleological finality to which reason is but a slave. For Unger, conflict and the empowerment, which his radical views suggest, make, reshapes, and entrenches our social contexts. As such, the proto-theorist recognises that we can always act in ways that violate the rules and assumptions of our established settings [and] no statable list of structures or of underlying laws and constraints can fully govern our structure-revising and structure transcending activities.  

Unger's method seeks to reject the determinism of deep structure logic and to distance his position from the prestigious explanatory methods of the natural sciences without claiming an unjustified exemption from the responsibilities of causal analysis. Underlying Unger's maintenance of causal explanation is his arguments that whilst historical facts and theories may be contingent, the contexts and formative structures out of which they evolved do lend themselves to causal analysis. His main effort in de-naturalising necessitarian social theory is to demonstrate the intrinsic political nature of theory and social practice. It is within the politics of formative and stable contexts that one can determine causation behind context

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Crisis, 1946, p. 94. This could also be read as an introduction to Unger's work and signifies the depth of Carr's thought.

349 Unger 1987, Social Theory, p. 170.
transformational conflict. His method therefore recognises the inherently political, as opposed to the neutrality, of historical fact and narrative.\footnote{Unger is quite right to note that defining the terms he uses in a context free manner necessarily erodes their utility; he argues that in so doing he encourages the radical nature of the transformative enterprise in such a way as to avoid false necessity. \textit{Social Theory}, p. 173-4.}

Unger's object of study is the recurrent reform and retrenchment that underpins political and social life. More specifically, Unger seeks to understand the contextual logic and causation beneath the periodic reversion to natural economy in agrarian-bureaucratic societies.

Unger's anti reversion thesis demonstrates how the evolution of a cash economy, concurrent with the rise of enclosures and state appropriation of communal property, propagated reversion to natural economy by stripping the peasantry of its means of production and thus, by weakening the states main force (i.e. its manpower and means of subsistence) the pursuit of a cash economy also reduced a centralised form of government's ability to wage war and consolidate its legitimacy. Unger argues,

The effective expropriation of a large part of the Italian smallholders had enduring effects. These consequences ranged from the immediate crisis in military manpower that served as the background of the Gracchan conflicts to the consequence that the buildup of fiscal and military demands in later imperial history left the magnates in many areas of the [Roman] empire as the only class with the power to resist the exactions of central government and to benefit from its failure.\footnote{Roberto Unger. 1987, \textit{Plasticity into Power}. P. 19. This condensed review of Unger's complex and insightful econo-political analysis of the nature of state power of necessity omits much of great value to this thesis. Nevertheless, a brief review illustrates in which direction future research can (indeed should?) take.}

For Unger, it was imperative that there was a degree of give-and-take in the roles which certain of the segments of society assigned themselves. Unger's principle thesis is that the relationship between the peasantry and the state had to be one of plasticity if reversion was to be avoided. Thus clearly defined roles for both the rulers and the ruled were impractical.
Rural disarming, and the centralisation and monopolisation of violence (to which Tilly also refers (see pg 180)), which was a central characteristic of state formation, and the measures which were necessary to implement such overarching control, demanded a vast amount of material support—in the form of taxes and tribute—from the peasantry at large in the form of labour and property, and usually resulted in reversion. When it did not, it was usually due to the relative independence of the rural community from central control. Unger's analysis of the Japanese avoidance of reversion is illustrative of this point. Close knit communities who were able to support each other in times of dire economic hardship due to a lack of central interference, actually aided in the formation of cash economies and states. The sovereignty of the state was therefore never more than a concept when in practice, sovereignty of the state would have meant its decline. Thus Unger's thesis could be put as a general validation of the mutual aid principle. Moreover, the mutual material interdependence of society to which Proudhon alluded, is also given added credence due to the above empirical evidence that supports his theoretical argument. And finally, Unger's post-positivist position validates the preceding critique of statist ontological commitments and all which those commitments presuppose.

How then, might we come to integrate Unger's methodology and objectives into International Relations? One might begin by asking, without the trappings of a positivist or deep structure logic, can we determine the cause of

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352 This was entirely Proudhon's point in stating Property is impossible because it demands something for nothing. See What is Property? 1994, p. 122. If one person decides to step out of society and cease to produce, for whatever reason, the rest of society is forced to support him/her. If whole armies, hell bent on destruction step out of society as well, then the social costs are huge. State surplus extraction caused reversion in many areas, and where it did not, it was due in large part to living in dire straits and mutual aid.

periodic breakdowns into war in the international system? The answer at first glance would be a resounding yes. A few preliminary comments may suffice. Without the trappings of a state-centric ontology, without the false necessity of understanding facts as context free totalities and by deterritorialising international politics, one might come to a fuller understanding of the integrative nature of international society. By attempting to come to a deeper understanding of the institutional and imaginative contexts that combine to create different societies, and how the interests of elected or despotic rulers are shaped (without recourse to appeals to the eternal imperative for state survival), facts can be better understood in context and the contextual motivations of particular societies can be accorded their own specificity without the determinism of such trite equations as interest = power and so forth. Moreover, the eschewal of universalistic grand narratives also allows us to relocate history within IR, not the history of metaphor and analogy, but the history as presented to us through evidence, no matter how politically laden.

By relocating the historical context of facts and narratives, we can come to a fuller understanding of the technologies of power that underlie particular social events and cherish the heterogeneity of life for both its transformative and its institutional qualities. This, as Unger argues, does not prevent generalisations and theories, but it does preclude the definitive necessity and deep structure logic of Neo/Realism. In short we must come to see society for what it is, devoid of reification, anthropomorphism, personification, and analogy masquerading as fact.

Conclusion.

Anarchist theory serves three primary purposes for the theory of IR. First of all, anarchist theory helps to dislocate the primacy of the state. It does so textually. If one adopts a postmodern reading stance, there is no finality, which is of necessity intrinsic to the theories of Bakunin, Proudhon and Kropotkin; they are simply arguments. Second, anarchist theory serves as a passionately political introduction to the history of the state devoid of its metaphysical, universal and sovereign cloak. And finally, via a deconstruction of the institution of private property and its historical evolution, which is provided by Proudhon and Kropotkin, we can see how historically and conceptually linked politics, economics and international relations may be.

Historical and political sociology has many valued contributions to IR theory. Beginning with Tilly’s reconceptualisation of the historical role of the state, and demonstrating its human attributes and failings, and integrating this with Unger’s analysis of the symbiosis between government and society, we could stop viewing the state as sole a source of protection and stability and put it to work for humanity.

Using Kropotkin’s zoological account of the role of mutual aid as a factor of evolution, and the obsolescence of a primal state of nature, it immediately becomes possible to eschew the deterministic and pessimistic conception of societies intricate workings and open up the possibilities for human interaction ad infinitum. Proudhon’s analysis of the institution of private property, the nature of the state and sovereignty, ties economics and politics together at the root. Both share their metaphysical aspect and were both originally used as weapons of exploitation.
From this contextualised platform we might employ the methodological tools of Roberto Unger and by reconciling his aims with those of those of the discipline of IR (thereby rejecting his programme but not the spirit) we might be able to understand localised and contextualised breakdowns in peace and the oft-concurrent -though by no means pre-determined- escalations into war.

By shedding the metaphysical and sovereign aspect of state theory we might come to a fuller understanding of the possibilities available to people freed from illusory ideological constraints. Given that the presumed constraints imposed by reified abstractions such as the law, or private property are impossible (as the previous three chapters have sought to demonstrate) and should the abstract be replaced by concrete individual human choice and (re)action, we could relate the motivations for such choices to the social contexts from which they evolved. Moreover, by understanding the aspirations of actors and the ways in which aspirations clash —though without reducing society to a gladiator pit —humanity could work together in fashioning qualified ideals and future idealistic possibilities.

What has been shown is that humanity has an interest in altruism. This mutual aid precludes universal conflict and renders Neo/Realist state theory obsolete. Further, self-interest and conflict were prone to those who propagated those very same doctrines; exploitation from above could only be justified through recourse to universal self-interest and conflict. This chapter could therefore be read as an introduction to a broader thesis. This project would, however, be beyond the scope of this thesis and of its author's capability; it is not, however, impossible.
Conclusion.

This thesis has been, primarily, a critique of the presumed global reality as taught to students of International Relations through the canons of Neo/Realism. It has also been a critique of the hegemonic methodology used by Neo/Realists in an attempt to reify the state and the international system. Moreover, this positivist/empiricist methodology, it has been argued, has also dictated the way in which we can come to understand the world and whether or not reality can be changed or interpreted differently. Since the abandonment of the Verstehen element to traditional Realism, the deterministic element of positivism has been reinforced and with it the intransigence of the Neo/Realist conception of reality.

By taking a linguistic turn in philosophical discourse, it became possible to relocate human agency in international relations and, ultimately, to change our conception of what constitutes reality and whether or not this reconceptualisation of reality was in fact, mutable. By building upon less deterministic foundations, and by shedding the metaphysical aspect of political and economic discourse, I have argued that it becomes possible to come to a fuller understanding of the cause of war and the possibilities of peace, though what this understanding may encompass is again open to interpretation and debate.

Underlying the basic structure of this thesis, between the lines so to speak, there exist six distinctive threads of argument. First, I was concerned from the outset
with the role of propaganda upon the minds and ambitions of those who wish to come
to a fuller understanding of international relations so as to transcend the deterministic
aspect of mainstream theory. This began in the introduction with a short account of
the first dichotomy in the study of IR; namely the idealism/realism debate. Here I
argued a major aspect of my thesis: that the power of mainstream ideas-cum-
metaphysics which Neo/Realists embody through their assertion that reality is not
essentially about collaboration but about conflict and discord is pervasive.
Accordingly, any problem solving enterprise must first recognise the inherent ubiquity
of conflict in international relations. But such is at best only half the story, if not
entirely illusory. The Neo/Realist position relies upon a modernist preoccupation
with determining laws that permeate our social existence. Neo/Realists argued that
these laws are evident to the positivist scientist and are an enigma for the utopian who
fails to take such laws into account.

This hegemonic idea, it was argued, holds sway due to the power of a
paradigm and/or discourse. As I argued in chapter four, according to George a
discourse generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood
and explained. More precisely, a discourse makes real that which it prescribes as
meaningful. 355 A modern preoccupation with foundationalism as the only worthy
preoccupation, elevated Neo/Realism to the level of factuality primarily due to its
consistent logocentrism and its utility to the policy sector of the dominant western
policy institutions. Moreover, from my discussion of Foucault in the third chapter, it
became possible to offer an explanation for the resilience of power politics in

355 George. 1994, p. 30
theoretical terms, an explanation that corresponds to the Kuhnian concept of paradigms.

I have argued that Neo/Realism's resilience is due primarily to repetition and community homogeneity concerning the presumed correct method and objects of study. Therefore, Neo/Realism is real not because it occupies a sovereign ground or embodies some eternal truth but because it has successfully disseminated ideas about the nature of the international system throughout the body politique and academia alike.

The second half of this thesis was therefore an attempt to displace this hegemony via linguistic philosophy. Ironically, by explaining the power of language in terms of meaning formation and in the constitution of a conception of reality, the exposition of language as propaganda writ large becomes a viable argument. The point of departure however is to note that within linguistic philosophy there is no preordained foundation upon which the ultimate ideal can be built and through which it can be determined, and unlike positivism, there is no denial of the irony of the philosophical position. Linguistic philosophy, whilst it may lend itself to relativism, allows us to make and reshape our realities at will; though without the pretence of objectivity and appeals to higher laws which have historically been the rallying call of all manner of despots.

The second argument, which resonated throughout this thesis, was the reintroduction of the concept of responsibility in international relations. The concept of responsibility could only be reintroduced once it had been established that there is no higher purpose beneath which, or in the name of which, actions taken are absolved
from culpability. Thus it was necessary to demonstrate that the concept of the state employed by Neo/Realists, whilst it was/is generally considered to permit greater leeway in matters of ethics and mores\textsuperscript{356}, was entirely metaphysical. Furthermore the Machiavellian politics which Neo/Realism deduced (wrongly) from the timeless nature of the international system were in fact a cloak for a power politics which had no rational basis in historical fact, as I demonstrated in chapter six. In fact, Neo/Realists have confused the role of the state of nature thesis with history. A possible explanation for this confusion has two aspects to it.

First as Kropotkin argues above, historians in drawing from historical records, which invariably retell the history of breaches of the peace instead of the peace itself, confused an eternal state of nature and a first principle of self-interest with the reality of a prolific incidence of mutual aid. And therein lies the second aspect; in using a scientific methodology, which, George argues, is fact grubbing empiricism, Neo/Realists would not allow themselves, in the name of objectivity, to reinterpret the facts as they appeared to historians. The abandonment of the interpretative element of traditional Realism reinforced this impasse. Moreover, it reified an interpretation of our historical past to the position of factuality and through the subsequent redirection of scientific analysis towards deep structuralist logic as per Waltz and the Neorealists. History was abandoned as a source of information. Instead, students were directed to live in a type of permanent present\textsuperscript{357}, digest and regurgitate neorealist admonitions to pay heed to the present's ubiquitous nature and its deterministic logic while eschewing morality in the name of pragmatism. And thus the rich source of the

\textsuperscript{356} See Morgenthau above.

\textsuperscript{357} Eric Hobsbawm. \textit{The Age Of Extremes}.1995, p. 3.
present in all its multifarious forms was subsumed under an ahistorical and amoral logic, which simply validated a first principle of self-interest and a power politics doctrine, pertinent only to metaphysical conceptions of reality.

To reintroduce morality and ethics, indeed, to allocate responsibility in the international sphere, it is necessary not only to bypass the Neo/Realist conception of the state and its anarchic playground, but also to discover whether technical rationality and pragmatism can be avoided and conscious consideration of the other be relocated in the conduct of international relations. This path would entail rejecting the determinism of Neo/Realist power politics. Thus, I argued, the most constructive means of reintroducing morality to the international sphere is via recognition of human authorship of social reality and the unscripted nature of the future. This is where linguistic philosophy as an epistemology came into its own, and the arguments in chapter four and five are hopefully conclusive.

The third thread of my argument was to demonstrate the extreme complexity of human interaction. In the final two chapters, I first sought to identify the symbiotic relationship between all humans through the social construction of meaning and via Proudhon's mutuality, which is evident in his conception of a global division of labour predicated upon mutual aid in the satisfaction of material needs and services. Secondly, I sought to demonstrate the interdependence of the state (as a group of individuals who control a vast amount of material recourses and violence) and the people confined to the territory over which it has control. Enloe's work demonstrated the self-destructive nature of the types and forms of power it took to maintain the modernist conception of the state and the ways in which bio-power and
hierarchy subvert the societal bonds between people. This subversion, as Unger argued, is counterproductive. Indeed, if society is to avoid retrenchment and regression there cannot be clear definitions of roles and identities, the societal must take precedence, as events in Mexico's Zapatista uprising demonstrated.

Complex interdependence between individuals is illustrated not only in the social formation of knowledge, nor does it lie exclusively within the confines of territory. As Bleiker and Ashley argue, the erosion of the concept of sovereignty (and its attendant assumption of inside vs. outside) and the concomitant rise of a deterritorialisation of politics means the idea of the other erodes. As I argued, ecological issues far outweigh the petty nature of state sovereignty, and our interdependence, indeed our survival as a human race depends upon the concerted effort of governmental institutions to recognise this as a basic fact of life. This issue is intrinsically tied to the two previous lines of argument above. How for example can Neo/Realism cope with issues that are intrinsically tied to the discourse of state sovereignty but do not feature as real problems of international politics, because the logic of transnational problems such as the environment cannot be translated into power politics and self interest. Therefore, it is necessary, first of all, as Bleiker argues, to forget Neo/Realism and then reconstruct reality.

In what sense, therefore, do all roads lead to anarchy as the title suggests? The answer to this question is also the fourth line of argument, which my thesis follows and can be seen in each chapter without much difficulty.

In the first chapter, I sought to demonstrate that given Neo/Realist preconceptions of the state, its personification or anthropomorphic qualities,
metaphysical and abstract argument has concocted a myth of anarchy in the international arena. This anarchy is simply conceptual but relies upon a deep-seated pessimistic and utilitarian ontology. I argued that in an attempt to subdue anarchy and contingency, Neo/Realism simply moved it out there. Moreover, the dominant epistemology of Neo/Realism revelled in this metaphysical anarchy and deduced complex laws and games to enable political scientists to understand and attempt to subdue anarchy. But it was to no avail. The legislative reasoning that stipulated the sovereignty of Neo/Realism got it wrong, as chapter three argued. Instead of Neo/Realism coming up with all the answers and proving its discursive hegemony through results, quite the opposite has occurred; we still imagine anarchy out there and there is no way of knowing which is the best theory to explain it. Theories now compete for supremacy with no sovereign in sight.

Chapter four demonstrated how linguistic philosophy celebrates anarchy in the form of relativism. However, whilst it was argued that there could be no definitive meaning attached to any particular statement, that all meaning was synthetic, only critics, those obsessed with foundationalism lambasted the linguistic turn for the nihilism it was presumed to provoke.

And chapter five sealed this anarchic obsession. In chapter five, I argued that as there is no rational and objective source of meaning and order outside of -as it were- the social construction of meaning, (a realm which cannot logically exist) and by virtue of the argument that we are all other to somebody somewhere, we should scrap the modern preoccupation with state sovereignty and move IR as a discourse either to the borderlines between domestic and international politics, or simply
forget it and move on. This really was an undercurrent, but for the most defensive of Neo/Realists, this would have been the chapters underlying logic.

Ironically, the chapter that should have proven to be the most nihilistic, I hoped to be the most constructive. However, the source of the irony is in a common misconception of the definition of anarchy. As Proudhon argues, anarchy derived from the Greek, does not mean chaos or disorder but means the absence of a sovereign.\textsuperscript{358} This is exactly where this thesis attempts to direct the reader, to at least consider the possibility and the possibilities that arise from an erosion of the legislative reason enshrined in the concept of sovereignty.

Chapter six sought to illustrate the reasons for a radical political project derived from Unger, and the possibilities that this project holds. Essentially, this project seeks to determine the underlying motivations and particular contexts for change and retrenchment. These concepts express no finality, neither do they aspire to universalism, instead, there begins a recognition of the underlying order in anarchy; to repeat Proudhon, As Man seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in anarchy.\textsuperscript{359} Could we be seeing a way in which this idea, though at first glance paradoxical, may be true?

The idea of order in anarchy can be traced as the fifth line of argument throughout this thesis. It is the argument against the determinism that is evident in Neo/Realism and modernity. This determinism not only involves concepts of historical stasis and the homogenisation of society via universal legislative reason, but

\textsuperscript{358} Proudhon, \textit{What Is Property?} p. 209.
\textsuperscript{359} Ibid.
also Neo/Realist conceptions of reality as the only real reality there ever was and indeed, can be.

In questioning the Neo/Realist version of reality and in opening up conceptual accounts to criticism, I attempted to illuminate the metaphysics of Neo/Realism so as to demonstrate that any alternative account of reality is as plausible by Neo/Realism's own scientific standards. By showing how abstract concepts such as the state and anarchy are metaphysical and by relocating human agency in IR, it became possible to develop postmodern arguments into an elucidation of Unger's work *Politics* and his conception of the various sovereign-less orders that have come to the fore in international society. For Unger, there is an underlying order; it is not however, universal in any sense. Orders are anarchic in that they do not follow any deep structure logic nor are they reducible to the law like determinism of positivistic science. Instead, contexts, frameworks and structures are made and remade through the interaction of the imaginative and the institutional, in such a way as to preclude an overarching order but in such a way as to demonstrate the localised regularities of social transformation. Much in the same way as anarchist thought seeks the liberation of man through practical acts of social transformation; Unger's thesis also seeks the radical project, but without the attendant iconoclasm common to anarchist thought.

Of course, Neo/Realists will brand such radical idealism utopian. It will be branded utopian in two senses, not only as an imaginative spontaneous ideal which given current social contexts could not logically arise given Neo/Realist preconditions and *a priori*, but also because the ideas presented appeal to change and transformation. This realism/idealism dichotomy runs deeper than Neo/Realist
conceptions of determinism and it is also the sixth line of argument that this thesis has proposed.

The dichotomy between realism and idealism has been the hallmark of International Relations as a discourse since its inception. This thesis has sought to confuse the traditional concepts of what constitutes the real and the ideal, first by demonstrating Neo/Realism's metaphysical nature and therefore its less than real nature, and it also sought to demonstrate how a linguistic turn could ground idealistic aspirations in the social constitution of knowledge. I hope that this relocation of agency can point to the potential for social reconstruction once it is recognised as Gandhi once said, that means are ends in the making. In this sense, to recognise how humans created that which we call reality in all its multifarious forms, to recognise how this was done, both materially, and idealistically, and to show why change is so imperative, is the first step towards the accomplishment of the ideal, even if it is nothing like what it was planned to be at the outset. At least in this case, humans could only have recourse to themselves.

An analogy may serve to illustrate my point a little clearer. Michelangelo could see his masterpiece in an un-worked slab of coarse marble. The beauty which was painstakingly chipped out of the marble has stood the test of time and is still of immense aesthetic value. For Michelangelo, it could be argued that the ideal was the foundation of the real. It could be argued that Neo/Realism, metaphorically speaking of course, approached the marble not with hammer and chisel, but with spray paint and set about the marble concealing its possibilities. For Neo/Realists marble is marble, for them there could never be a statue of David.
Finally, to present the seventh argument of this thesis I would like to tie together the six previous themes and conclude.

The deconstructive aspect of this thesis concerned the displacement of Neo/Realism as the discourse with a monopoly of truth claims in IR. In so doing I attempted to demonstrate that within Neo/Realism there were contradictions, and ironies, which rendered it problematic to talk of Neo/Realism as the real discourse. Moreover, I have argued that sovereign legislative reason, coupled with common (mis)conceptions of the ubiquity of the positivistic scientific project have elevated a metaphysical interpretation of reality to the position of the only possible reality. The determinism that underpins the Neo/Realist conception of reality was shown to be predicated not only upon its ontology but also its epistemology; both however support a largely illusory concept of reality.

In demonstrating that given a different way of coming to understand reality and life within it, things need not be so determined, I also hoped to demonstrate that culpability could be reintroduced to the actions of societal representatives (governments) the world over. My position is based on the argument that social life is made and remade through human speech and action and that it is interpreted from history in a subjective and passionate way; that objectivism is illusory and the idea that we are not in control of our lives is reminiscent of a theological dogma.

In short, this thesis, from Lord Davies proposal onwards argues for a post positivist and post-modern international political sociology as a more encompassing theoretical beginning for International Relations. This thesis has also sought to demonstrate that reality is not necessarily as simple as Neo/Realists say it is, neither
did it necessarily evolve in the way they say it did, neither need there be one single way of studying it, nor does the future have to be or consist of what Neo/Realists say it will. If one thing is certain, it is this.
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\[\text{--------} \quad \text{Positivism and Beyond.} \quad \text{In International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Smith, Booth & Zalewski (eds). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1996.}\]


