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Aarons on the Chinese Revolution
Sendy on the Sino-Soviet Conflict
The Poor of Asia
Osmond on Workers’ Control
AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW is a marxist journal of information, analysis and discussion on economics, politics, trade unionism, history, philosophy, science and art, for the promotion of socialist ideas.

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Cover:
Red Guards and Soldiers brandish the Little Red Book of Mao quotations.
SINCE JUNE 1966 when *Australian Left Review* first appeared the range of contributors has broadened considerably.

The editorial board is now being expanded and further changes planned as a result of greater understanding of the issues facing the left.

Problems of socialist strategy and perspective have become the centre of attention, and *ALR* will devote much of its space to these.

It will do so in the belief that the left can best be served by advancing a definite point of view, and this should also help to raise the level of debate with other trends.

Major questions with which *ALR* will concern itself include:

- analysis of the economy, politics and sociology of present neocapitalist Australian society
- the nature of the socialist society which ought to replace it
- workers' control, student power, and all forms of self-management
- contemporary marxist thought
- the development of a socialist "counter-hegemony" to bourgeois society
- the development of consciousness, and the place and nature of education in society today
- struggles for national liberation and the advancement of socialism
- socialist activity and strategy in the trade unions
- mutual understanding and co-operation between workers, students, intellectuals and other sections of the people
- relations within the left.

Many of these questions are difficult of analysis and presentation, but these difficulties must be faced by all, whatever their social origin or experience.

However the editors will attempt to avoid unnecessary obscurities and jargon, and while not ignoring the past will not be tied to old slogans or standpoints hardly applicable today.

New features will be introduced, and a new format, starting with the first issue in 1970. The editors appeal to associates, subscribers, and all readers to continue and increase their interest in *ALR*. 
HO CHI MINH is dead! The world was stunned by the news, even though he had lived a long, arduous and adventurous life, had performed deeds of heroism and recorded achievements beyond most world figures of this crowded epoch. His life was one of passionate devotion to a cause from which he never deviated. He languished in British and Kuomintang jails, was under sentence of death by the French colonialists and was reported dead several times. A man of great stature, he so expressed his people's will and passion as to give his small country's liberation struggle a decisive significance in world history.

A true patriot, he was the greatest internationalist of his time. His patriotism led him to communism, and he never deviated from his devotion to the world revolution. His active political life spanned the 50 years of the modern communist movement. He was a revolutionary who worked in the Communist International, who always worked for its unity; his words transcend even death to call for this unity so sorely tried in recent years. A Vietnamese revolutionary, he was at various times an activist in the French and Chinese parties, and worked as a revolutionary in other Asian countries.

Ho Chi Minh, a man laden with years and a model communist, became a symbol of the revolt of radical youth. A truly great man, he was modest, simple and sincere, eschewing vanity and resisting all efforts at empty personal glorification. Marxist-leninist, materialist, he was poet and a man of culture. It can truly be said of him that he was a complete man, whose character and qualities were adequate to the heaviest burdens of revolutionary struggle, defeats and glorious victory. The measure of the man is that he faced up to three powerful and ferocious imperialisms — French, Japanese and American.

And his leadership helped his people defeat each. His memory will live for many generations, to be honoured by those who live after imperialism is only a bitter memory.

We publish his Testament, written on May 10th, 1969, as the most fitting tribute to his memory.

INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM, HAPPINESS: In the patriotic struggle against US aggression we shall indeed have to undergo more difficulties and sacrifices but we are sure to win total victory. This is an absolute certainty. It is my intention when that day comes
to make a tour of the North and South to congratulate our heroic compatriots, cadres and combatants, to pay a visit to our old people, our beloved youth and children. Then on behalf of our people I will go to the fraternal countries of the socialist camp and friendly countries in the whole world and thank them for their whole-hearted support and assistance to our people's patriotic struggle against US aggression.

Tu Fu, the well-known Chinese poet of the Tang period, wrote "in all times few are those who reach the age of 70". This year with my 79 years I am counted among those few people. Still my mind is lucid though my health has somewhat weakened in comparison with previous years. When one is on the wrong side of 70 health deteriorates with age. This is no wonder. But who can forecast for how long I can continue to serve revolution, fatherland and people? That is the reason why I leave these few lines in anticipation of the day when I go to join the venerable Karl Marx, Lenin and other revolutionary elders. In this way our compatriots in the whole country, the comrades in the Party and our friends in the world will not be taken by surprise.

FIRST I WILL SPEAK ABOUT THE PARTY: thanks to its close unity and total dedication to the working class, the people and fatherland, our Party has been able since its founding to unite, organise and lead our people in ardent struggle and conduct them from victory to victory. Unity is an extremely precious tradition of our Party and people. All comrades from the central committee down to the cell must preserve union and unity of mind in the Party as the apple of their eye. Within the Party to achieve broad democracy and to practise self-criticism and criticism regularly and seriously is the best way to consolidate and develop union and unity of mind in the Party. Genuine affection should prevail among all comrades.

Ours is a Party in power. Each Party member, each cadre must be deeply imbued with revolutionary morality and show industry, thrift, integrity, uprightness, total dedication to the public cause, exemplary selflessness. Our Party should preserve its entire purity, it should remain worthy of its role as leader and very loyal servant of the people. Working youth, union members and our young people as a whole are of excellent nature, burning to volunteer for vanguard tasks undeterred by difficulties, striving for progress. The Party must give much attention to their education in revolutionary morality and train them to be continuers of building socialism, both "red" and "expert". Training and educating the revolutionary generation to come is a highly important and necessary task.
Our laboring people both in the plains and mountain areas have for ages suffered hardships, feudal and colonial oppression and exploitation, furthermore they have experienced many years of war. Yet our people have shown great heroism, great courage, burning enthusiasm and are very hard working. They have always followed the Party since it came into being and they have always been loyal to it. The Party must work out a good plan for economic and cultural development with the view to ceaselessly raising the living standard of the people. Resistance in the war against US aggression may drag out. Our compatriots may have to undergo new sacrifices in terms of property and human lives. In any case we must be resolved to fight against the US aggressors until total victory.

*Our rivers, our mountains,*  
*Our men will always remain.*  
*The Yanks defeated, we will build*  
*Our country ten times more beautiful.*

No matter what difficulties and hardships may lie ahead our people are sure to win total victory. The US imperialists will have to pull out. Our fatherland will be re-united. Our compatriots in North and South will be re-united under the same roof. Our country will have the signal honor of being a small nation which through heroic struggle has defeated two big imperialisms — French and American — and made a worthy contribution to the national liberation movement.

**ABOUT THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT:** Having dedicated my whole life to the cause of revolution, the more I am proud to see the growth of the international communist and workers' movement, the more deeply I am grieved at dissensions that are dividing fraternal parties. I wish that our Party will do its best to contribute effectively to the restoration of unity among fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism in a way consonant with the requirements of heart and reason. I am sure that the fraternal parties and countries will unite again.

**ABOUT PERSONAL MATTERS:** In all my life I have wholeheartedly and with all my forces served the fatherland, and revolution and the people. Now if I should depart from this world there is nothing that I am sorry to have done. I regret only not to be able to serve longer and more. After my passing away great funerals should be avoided in order not to waste time and money of people. Finally to the whole people, the whole Party, the army, to my nephews, nieces, youths, children I leave behind my boundless affec-
tion. I also convey my fraternal greetings to the comrades, friends, youths and children of the world. My ultimate wish is that our whole Party and people closely united in the struggle to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic and prosperous Vietnam and make a worthy contribution to the world revolution.

The Trade Union Congress

THE WAY IS OPEN to a qualitatively new development of Australian trade unionism. Powerful forces are pushing the movement forward to change, although most union activists concerned may not have yet clarified the issues into conscious aims and methods of the new unionism whose necessity is becoming evident. The recent Congress of the Australian Council of Trade Unions expressed the growing demand for change, and a break with the past which only appeared to centre upon the election of a new President and executive.

The daily press (from the most sensational and reactionary to the serious and "progressive" components) represented the Congress as essentially an arena of a personal power struggle between Messrs. Souter and Hawke, with sinister implications of a leftwing conspiracy lurking somewhere in the background. But when it came to analysing and explaining the result, both in numbers and implication, the old labels somehow seemed inadequate.

Was it a "leftwing" victory? Is Hawke a "leftwinger?" If so, why did the leftwing win and what happened to the old-established rightwing majority? And how explain by old labels and formulae the sometimes peculiar line-ups and shifting alliances which elected Hawke by 49 votes (though the expert numbers men on both sides had predicted different results, ranging from Hawke by a hundred to Souter by 16)?

Hawke's election was first of all a defeat for the rightwing. In this sense it was of course a victory for the left. And the candidate supported by the left won only because he had the support of many centre unions and delegates, and even some right of centre. The real surprise was not Hawke's victory, but the relatively narrow margin of the win. Viewed objectively, Hawke was surely the better candidate on almost every count — intellectual ability, age, qualifications, spirit and temperament, capacity as a union advocate (which should appeal above all to the arbitrationist element, stronger in centre and right than in left — though by no means absent there). The solid and even surprising support for Souter was essentially an ideological and regimented rightwing vote, built
up quite a bit by padded affiliations from some rightwing unions whose administrations have successfully insulated themselves from rank and file opinion and control, or even the responsibility of conveying information to their members. One such union trebled its affiliation a few weeks before Congress and its hierarchy probably counted the members’ fees well spent even though Hawke won, since they swung the vote in one of the groups which elect half the executive.

By this win, and by dividing the two junior vice-presidents, the rightwing salved as much as possible from the wreck of its design to perpetuate cramping rightwing control of the ACTU machine that has been such a feature of the past decade and more.

Features of this control were not so much the adoption of rightwing policies and resolutions, but the obstruction and even castration of action needed to implement resolutions and policies adopted by ACTU Congresses and the demands thrown up by workers through the militant constituent unions. This skilful combination of ability to absorb militant demands within the framework of negotiation — compromise — arbitration was the hallmark of Albert Monk and the main skill he imparted to his apprentice Souter.

Why did the rightwing fail, despite its cohesion, its ideological conformity, the powerful pressures it exerted and the varied inducements it traded? The main reasons were perhaps its obvious lack of vision, its clear commitment to old ideas, methods and perspectives, its routinism and conservatism. Though the rightwing is developing some new thinkers, like J.P. Ducker, these few lack any scope for the ideas they develop. These are in fact only tactical plans to keep things essentially as they are, while pretending to modernise; talking about “unity” with the aim of using a unity on their terms as a prison to contain unwary militants who are willing to exchange the substance of militant action for the shadow of militant phrases and the illusion of uniting all sections behind a militant program.

The ideological-conformist rightwing showed a keen instinct in backing Souter, although some had flirted with the idea of backing Hawke, earlier even pledging their support. This can be said without any commitment to a judgment that Hawke stands firmly on the left, or that the present tiny majority on the ACTU Executive is a left bloc. Hawke’s statements on the future of unionism show he is far more open to the demands of change, modernisation and militancy than Souter ever was. His ideas about the scope of unionism, the perspective and range of its demands and the need for modernisation are a framework that has to be filled with content.
And the future dialogue and struggle in the union movement which will centre precisely on the character of this content.

The debate on future action against the penal clauses throws a light on the possible evolution of this debate, and the type of issues which will arise. The Congress divided 404-271 in rejecting an amendment going further than the Executive's recommendation. Allowing for accidental caucus decision, operating against both sides, the 271 represented a stand by the left on the issue itself and the tactics of the struggle. The 404 represented a coalition of what is sometimes called part of the left-centre, genuinely opposed to penal legislation but anxious that its methods be "realistic," with the rightwing whose attitude ranges from purely theoretical distaste for the legislation to an open acceptance of penal sanctions.

This leftwing vote surprised many, including some of the left who were concerned lest the vote would reveal a weakness in support of the militant stand on this issue. But it won the support of 40 per cent of delegates, including every militant union regularly restricted and penalised by the legislation and the Court of Pains and Penalties. The vote reflected the impact of the May strikes, the growing mass impatience of workers at the law's clear and obvious partisanship and denial of democracy.

This vote was a clear indication of the basic strength of militant unionism, that its positions more correctly reflect rank and file opinion than do all the manoeuvres, intrigues and passivity of the arbitrationists, despite the latter's support from official ideology and the mass media.

The coming contest in unionism has entered a new and healthier phase, in which the real and important differences on aims, demands, policies and methods can be fought out in the realistic context of modern problems posed by the scientific and technological revolution. This will remain a struggle between left and right, militant and conservative, socialist and reformist trends and ideas and personalities. It will retain elements of old arguments and the imprint of personalities, but it will, hopefully, move forward from the old, outdated and outworn framework, ideas and personalities that dominated even after the changed conditions called for a new impulse and direction.

The left movement, in all its breadth and sweep, has to participate actively and decisively in the ferment and struggle of ideas which is clearly developing in the unions. These concern the new horizons of union thinking — the much bolder and more radical economic, social and political demands which social change pose and make practical today; the total involvement of the trade unions in all issues and aspects of the social and political struggle, the new possi-
bilities of industrial unionism uniting whole industries and blue and white collar workers in powerful industrial unions that can most effectively challenge the supranational giants of capital that increasingly own and control Australia and manipulate Australians.

A key issue will remain that between the two differing concepts of unionism: either a democratic movement based upon active participation of its members in workshop or institution, its methods always based upon mass action, or a movement run from the top, committed to arbitration and legalism and thus absorbed into the system. The left still needs to develop its ideas and action program for unionism. It has a new opportunity following the ACTU Congress.

THE IMMINENT FEDERAL ELECTIONS also seem to foreshadow a new framework of political struggle. Whatever the outcome — the question seems to be only how many seats the government will lose — new strains and tensions must develop. And it should not be wishful thinking to predict that the post-election situation should favour the left, given it can reach more agreement upon its perspectives and methods of action. The pressure of great social and political issues has shaken up the whole political structure.

A certain disillusion with the established parliamentary parties, including the Labor Party, even with the whole bourgeois parliamentary system, has grown over recent times. The real sources of power are more and more seen or felt to be outside parliament — whether in big business boardrooms, the bureaucracy, or the opinion manipulators.

The disillusion develops while the political and social issues affect people more deeply and impel many towards action. This action tends to by-pass parliamentary and legal forms, whether the form be strikes, demonstrations, public protests, sit-ins, or other ways. Movements around particular issues intervene in the elections (defence of public education, anti-conscription, pensioners) expressing disillusion in the traditional parties and the system itself.

These are signs of a growing new force in political life, the first shoots of a mass movement which could change the direction of political struggle. Whatever the election result, the big issues of domestic and foreign policy will remain, and in general terms they will be operated as before, whichever government is returned. The most favourable result would of course be the defeat of the sitting government, for this would be a vote of censure upon the government which acts always for the wealthy monopolies, which committed Australia to United States imperialist aggression in
Vietnam, introduced conscription, pursues a colonialist policy in New Guinea and towards the aborigines and has failed to tackle urgent social issues such as health, social services and education.

Defeat for the sitting government could only mean election of Labor, whose policy is well within the limits set by the system. Yet return of a Labor Government would certainly mean new terms of political action, since it would subject to a new test the philosophy and practice of reformism — a test that is new both since it is 20 years since Labor was in office federally, and because new social conditions exist which make it harder for social reformism to satisfy those who want fundamental social change, or even radical reforms in society, as experiences of Labor in office in Britain have emphasised.

RECENT EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA continue to cause deep anguish in the left the world over. The terrible logic of the August 21st intervention has dictated a whole series of events. Changes in leadership are made to meet the demand for "normalisation," but each change is followed by new demands. The most published changes are made at the top and the process will go on there until the old guard who supported Novotny are back in undisputed control, perhaps behind a facade of a few other figures. Just as important are the less publicised changes in lower party, government and economic bodies, changes carried out from on top, by administrative means, without popular participation or election because there is no other way to push through the changes.

It is suggested by some that any criticism of these developments is an interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and its Communist Party. "Only the Czechoslovakian Party leadership can make a Marxist-Leninist assessment of developments there." All this might sound a little better if what is happening today were a new development, unconnected with previous events. It would sound a little more convincing if those who say it had said it in 1968, had been prepared to accept the Czechoslovakian Party's assessment, if "interference" then had been confined to comments, however critical.

Two indivisible considerations impel comment: the principle of socialist relations between nations, which is moral as well as political, practical as well as theoretical; the continuing effects of the occupation of Czechoslovakia upon the international revolutionary movement (including the consequences for the USSR and the other countries concerned).
One of the editors of ALR who lived in China during 1951-54 discusses some implications of the Chinese revolution in an article based on a report given to the National Executive of the Communist Party in August.

BY ANY STANDARD the Chinese Revolution, consummated on October 1 1949 and whose 20th Anniversary is now being celebrated, must be counted one of the greatest events in human history. It has been an epic of revolutionary devotion and creativeness, both in action and thought, releasing the energies of scores or hundreds of millions of people in China and throughout the world.

The Chinese Revolution has revealed even more sharply and richly the weight of the specifically national in revolutionary development, both because many of these features had tended to be elevated to the level of universality when there was only one “model” — a fairly natural tendency but taken to great extremes under Stalin — and also because, while every nation has its peculiarity, the Chinese nation is more “peculiarly national” than any other. This is to be seen in its great size, with a population exceeding that of North and South America and the Soviet Union combined; in the fact that China has had the longest continuous history as an at least partially unified state; that up till the last two or three hundred years it had the highest level of culture in the world; that its size, cultural level and basically self-sufficient nature as a whole and by regions meant that no other nation or combination of nations was able to successfully colonise more than a small part of it; and the specific way — years long armed struggle mainly in rural areas — in which the revolution developed and triumphed.

When to all this is added the now-being-realised complexity of the theoretical and practical problems involved in the revolutionary movement, the construction of socialism, and the development of proper relations between socialist countries, the difficulty of accurately assessing the position in China and its place in the world is given deserved emphasis, as is the need for patience and recognition that the problems involved are very long term.
The Issues in the Cultural Revolution

In the first year or so of the Cultural Revolution it was clear enough that there was an intense power struggle, and that there were issues involved regarded by the protagonists as vital, but it was not then very clear just what the issues were. The relation between policies and the struggle for power is complex. There are few major power struggles without policies being involved, and just as policies attract people, people attract policies, and the personal imprint of prominent leaders can be very great, as is obviously the case with Mao Tse-tung.

Stated briefly, the overall issue involved in the Cultural Revolution was how to build a modern socialist country out of a vast but poor agricultural country; where the specific conditions include active hostility from the United States, the break with the Soviet Union, the questioning of some aspects at least of the Soviet model of socialism, and the impact of the scientific and technological revolution which in a way compounds the problems of “simple” industrialisation. Put in another way, the over-all issue was the search for a Chinese way to solve these problems. This raises a number of more concrete issues which I will discuss here first of all from the point of view of seeking their positive and rational content, and then attempt a critique of them.

1 Moral versus material incentives.

Involved here are a number of other questions such as “economism” in factories and trade unions, the attitude to the economic reforms being adopted in other socialist countries, the rate of collectivisation and of commune-isation in the countryside, the role of private plots, of free markets, the attitude to “rich peasants”, and the emphasis, especially in the rural communes, on general distribution out of the common fund compared with payment for actual work units performed.

It is a truism to say that both moral and material incentives are necessary — in fact they exist in all socialist countries. The question is rather one of degree, of emphasis, which also may change from time to time. There seems to be no theoretically determinable optimum. But it is on the degree of material incentive compared with that of moral that the Soviet practice has come in for considerable criticism. No comprehensive analysis of incomes in the Soviet Union so far as I know exists, but from sources available it seems that from unskilled to highly skilled there might be a factor of three; for managers and experts, counting other privileges, the factor might be six; and for those in the top administration of party and state this might be doubled again. Such differences undoubtedly contain a tendency to become “castified” and give rise to certain “vested interests.”
In the early days of the revolution Lenin faced the problem, and wrote enthusiastically about "subbotniki" — voluntary unpaid work on Sundays:

Communism begins when the rank-and-file workers begin to display a self-sacrificing concern that is undaunted by arduous toil for increasing productivity of labor, for husbanding every pood of grain, coal, iron and other products, which do not accrue to the workers personally or to their "close" kith and kin, but to their "distant" kith and kin, i.e. to society as a whole, to tens and hundreds of millions of people united first in one socialist state, and then in a Union of Soviet Republics.¹

On the other hand, in the conditions of misery existing in Soviet Russia at the end of the civil war, in the controversy over the trade unions, Lenin had emphasised the need to give preference in consumption to aid the development of production.² At an earlier stage, in 1918 Lenin had confessed that the equalitarian principles of the Paris Commune could not be applied in the circumstances and that it was sensible to pay high salaries for the time being to experts.³ Later the Stakhanovites (shock workers) exercised a form of moral influence while also receiving comparatively high wages. These and other experiences indicate that there are no readily definable or absolute standards in this matter.

Lenin had also, in discussing the Subbotniki pointed to the role of the moral factor in breaking through the problem of low productivity and starvation:

We know that in practice such contradictions are solved by breaking the vicious circle, by bringing about a radical change in the mood of the masses by the heroic initiative of individual groups which, against the background of such a radical change, often plays a decisive role.⁴

There can be no doubt in the mind of anyone who has visited China at any time in the last 20 years of the impressiveness of the moral fervor and enthusiasm which has existed on a mass scale.

The level of material rewards particularly of the mass of peasants in a peasant country, is also related to the basic problem of the so-called "primitive socialist accumulation." In Russia repression on a big scale was practised not only in the struggle against the kulaks, but also to enforce a policy of keeping the countryside relatively backward technically and culturally so that funds would be available for industries and cities. A greater emphasis on moral factors combined with a greater development of industry and cul-

¹ "A Great Beginning", in the collection Marx-Engels-Marxism.
² See Vol. 9 Selected Works, p. 13.
⁴ "A Great Beginning".
ture, even at a yet primitive level, through the Communes in China, cannot therefore be discounted as a possible alternative.

2 The kind of expert and the kind of education.

Much Chinese material contains a general (though not absolute) tendency to decry experts as necessarily becoming separated from the masses, of an attitude of superiority to the masses being developed when mental labor is separated from manual and when there is a great gap in living standards (it should perhaps be pointed out that the gap between intellectuals and masses in China has been traditionally much greater than we are accustomed to). Consequently a tendency to shorten and change formal education, a renewed and greater emphasis on “going to the villages”, an emphasis on self-reliance and indigenous methods, and a general struggle to prevent cadres and experts consolidating into a “new class” of organisation men, have been stressed.

3 The “Little Red Book” of Mao quotations lends itself to being made fun of, but makes more sense if seen as a type of new moral code replacing the Confucian which permeated every pore of Chinese society for hundreds of years. Similarly the figure of Mao, together with the red book can be taken as a unifying and rallying point of a nation traditionally and (at the present stage of development) inevitably, displaying strong centrifugal tendencies.

4 The red book could be considered to be a cultural factor in the sense of a moral code as mentioned above, and there was a campaign against entrenched and old cultural forms, as well as foreign ones.

5 The Cultural Revolution, genuinely to a degree at least, did harness the spirit of enthusiasm, self-sacrifice and revolutionary energy of youth, and some have praised Mao as the first political figure to consciously set out to do this in today’s context.

6 All the above are in general related to methods such as reliance on mass movements and “big leaps”, and “ideological remoulding” rather than physical suppression (though this was also present), and theories, examined later, about class struggle under socialism.

7 Whatever rationality and practicality is contained in the above policies which were at issue, is given greater point if related to expectations of external attack, something that appears in a rather different light now, following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, than it did before, while imperialism has continued to threaten. Thus dispersal of much of industry in rural areas and communes, and emphasis on local self-sufficiency with smaller, less sophisticated and improvised industries, which may be less efficient on a purely economic basis than concentration on highly centralised large-scale
modern industry, makes more sense if a protracted war on Chinese territory is envisaged. Similarly the emphasis on self-reliance and simplicity of equipment in the army. Except for the Bomb. But then the stress on moral as opposed to material incentives could become a necessary contribution to the diversion of resources to production of the Bomb, whether as power symbol, or deterrent, or both.

*But Will It Work?*

These rational aspects exist and cannot be ignored, but many commentators sympathetic to China see merely these and turn a blind eye to other aspects and considerations, such as

1 The moral and the material are easy to see separately in simple forms of manual labor, but it is a very different matter in highly complex industries and an integrated economy. People in one section of a large factory, or in all sections, may think they are working well, but often cannot really assess the results of their work directly, and need recourse to economic categories which can sum up the whole, such as profitability. Joan Robinson correctly points out that there is a difference between profits as a criterion of efficiency and as an incentive, but goes on to say that the Chinese claim that the one inevitably leads to the other. But if such economic means are not employed the results of “moral fervor” may not be readily measured or effectively attained and so may become more difficult to maintain as time goes on.

Also, when the atmosphere is such and there is the social pressure to conform, it may be possible to maintain hard manual labor in a team for quite a long time. But without a material incentive as well, it well may prove more difficult to get people to put time and effort into the acquiring of new, unaccustomed skills. That is, there well could be, and in fact seems to have been, more difficulties in the factories.

And is the reliance on the moral factor actually as great as is made out? Differentiation of incomes is one thing, but the prospect of material gain made collectively is, at least from time to time, emphasised. For example Mao Tse-tung:

*We should do everything possible to enable the peasants in normal years to raise their personal incomes year by year on the basis of increased production.*

Furthermore, there are very big differences in incomes in different parts of the country. Colin Mackerras records annual commune

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6 *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,* Foreign Languages Press. Peking, 1957, p. 36.
incomes (apart from private plots etc., which still exist) ranging from $U.S.25 without additional grain to $U.S.200 plus grain.\(^7\)

Another observer gives the average annual wage of an industrial worker as over $U.S.300,\(^8\) and I should be surprised if people "higher up" do not get still higher incomes, on a graded scale, as they did when I was in China.

Why cannot moral incentive (working for the good of distant kith and kin) overcome these great discrepancies? True, it is more difficult the more distant the kith and kin are, but some better explanation is needed than Joan Robinson's comment that "political danger" and "economic efficiency" preclude this at present.\(^9\) This may be so, but it could then be that the same situation and economic considerations are operating in other socialist countries.

Another writer gives as one of the reasons for the emphasis on decentralisation and indigenous methods rather than concentration in modern industry, not only the problem of transport for materials and the products of feeder industries, but the difficulty of deciding between conflicting claims of jealous provinces.\(^10\) Why cannot moral incentive be brought to bear to solve this problem?

2 Modern industry — and especially in these days of the scientific and technological revolution — demands an increasing number of highly educated and creative people, and these can really only develop fully in conditions of freedom, both from pressing material worries and ideological strictures. And even if dispersed, smaller, and more improvised industries will suffice in many cases, it cannot do so in the nuclear field, in rockets, aircraft, electronics, oxygen-steel production etc. not to speak of more social spheres of activity involving the training of socialist economists, bankers, traders, and administrators for the whole country. And as pointed out earlier, skilled workers in modern factories may not prove so easy to come by. Yet the trade unions have been destroyed as hotbeds of "economics." Consequently the proclaimed principles will have to be modified considerably if the Chinese are to attain ends which they undoubtedly do want to attain. The rate of catching up with other countries, which depends to quite a degree on the above, may also become a political, moral factor which could generate at least some conditions for a "Counter Cultural Revolution" to bring it about.

\(^{9}\) *The Cultural Revolution in China*, p. 37.
\(^{10}\) Bruce McFarlane "Developments in the Cultural Revolution", *Outlook*, No. 3, 1968.
And while combatting the development of bureaucracy among cadres, administrators and experts is commendable, may not one set of bureaucrats have been replaced by another? There is the situation arising from the un-arguable demand for acceptance that "Mao is right" before any democratic discussion is allowed (outside of this, the new set-up may be less bureaucratic for a time.) But is it not also necessary to tackle this endemic problem in other ways as well? As Joan Robinson recognises:

"To develop a modern industrial state ... needs planning, coordination and unified command. A government hierarchy working through a bureaucratic apparatus cannot be dispensed with ... The Cultural Revolution has swung the balance violently against organisation towards popular spontaneity; how can it be kept from gradually creeping back?"  

3 The need for a national unifying figure such as Mao in the conditions of China may be accepted, but the question of degree is surely of importance. In my view there is completely unrestrained adulation and a reckless releasing of nationalism. Where will it lead and how can it be stopped? A moral code is good so far as it goes if its precepts are good, but as an unthinkingly accepted, absolute truth which is put beyond question it works against rationality, the development of free minds and democratic processes. There is strong evidence of a markedly less degree of reasoning out and willingness to discuss all sides and all points of view in Chinese material published over the last three years than there was over fifteen years ago when I was there, and this I believe is a bad sign.

4 Getting rid of backward elements of culture is good, but not if it is indiscriminately directed against the heritage of the past. I still believe Lenin was right, in his address to the youth in 1920 to point out that one could not become a communist without acquiring the sum of human knowledge, that this was how marxism arose, and that it was certainly not enough to learn communist (or little red book?) slogans. And it is hard indeed to accept that Beethoven should be considered as a bourgeois corruptor of the youth.

5 The above and other negative sides of the mobilisation of the youth in the Red Guard cannot be overlooked or accepted merely as an exigency in a bitter political struggle. If the youth have been released from one conformity, have they not been plunged still more deeply into another? There is also evidence of cynicism being generated, and of disorientation in application to study for example, which may not be so readily overcome.  

11 The Cultural Revolution in China, p. 43.
12 Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues", in Marx-Engels-Marxism.
13 See China Observed, Chapter 14.
6 Mass movements and big leaps certainly have a vital place in the development of socialist society, (the first five year plan in the Soviet Union was a big leap and a mass movement), but they are far from being a universally applicable method. If they are treated as such and continually repeated, may not they produce diminishing returns? Ideological remoulding can be a powerful and useful method, but carried to extremes it can be as painful as a gaol sentence for political non-conformists.

To sum up, the policies now in operation as the result of the victory of Mao in the Cultural Revolution have chances of some success, but contain many negative features which, if uncorrected, will hinder economic and social progress and may produce a political reaction. There is some evidence however that the policies may be modified more in practice than the absoluteness of the words used suggest. The external influences could well be decisive in determining the course of future developments.

The Power Struggle

This was a major part of the Cultural Revolution, and was waged with great intensity, even more than other power struggles in the Chinese Communist Party, which have a long history. It seems that there developed in the latter half of the thirties a long term alliance between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi which carried through to the 7th Congress of the Party in 1945 and after.

The period '49 to '57 is something of a mystery, in that although Mao's prestige nationally and internationally was at its height, in internal affairs at least he seemed, uncharacteristically, to take something of a back seat. Few speeches or writings are attributed to him in this period. Perhaps this is attributable to Mao's lack of familiarity, compared with others, with the new conditions of shifting head-quarters to the cities and concentration on problems of industrialisation, with a considerable degree of reliance on Soviet experience and Soviet assistance. Apart from the three-antis and five-antis ideological remoulding campaigns the one big domestic issue on which Mao seems to have exerted himself was over the rate of collectivisation (which Mao wanted speeded up in 1955). In 1954 there had been the struggle against Kao Kang,
an important figure in the North east and Jao Shu-shih. It seems generally accepted that Liu (and Chou En-lai) were the immediate targets of Kao, but it is also possible that Mao was the ultimate target, and that this helped to cement the Mao-Liu alliance for a further period.

Mao played a minor role in the 8th Congress in 1956, making a very humbly worded opening speech. Reference to the Thought of Mao was omitted from the new constitution adopted at this Congress. It is said that Mao chastised his comrades afterwards, saying that the decisions of the Congress appeared "left" but were in fact "right."

In 1958, probably associated with an extensive tour undertaken by Mao, came the mass development of the people's communes and the 'great leap forward", which for a time seemed to carry all before it. The sixth meeting of the Central Committee meeting in December was apparently still seized with this. This meeting repeated the extravagant claims about production in that year and targets for 1959 (steel was claimed to have increased from 5.35 million tons in 1957 to 11 million in 1958, and 18 million was projected for 1959; the figures for coal for these years were given as 130, 270 and 380 million tons; grain 185, 375, and 525 million tons; cotton 1.64, 3.35 and 5 million tons.) The time for transition to ownership by the whole people (as distinct from collective ownership) was given as 3 to 6 years, or a little longer, and "some years" after the transition to complete communism was envisaged.

Yet it was at this meeting that Mao announced his intention not to stand for Chairmanship of the State (he remained Chairman of the Party), saying that he would be able then "to set aside more time for marxist-leninist theoretical work."

Knowing something of how such decisions are arrived at, it seems certain that it was made at least some months before, at the height of the apparent success of the great leap. A possible explanation for this may be that Mao felt internal problems were well on the way to solution, and that he could concentrate on external problems, particularly the growing differences with the CPSU.

In August 1959, with revision of the exaggerations of the great leap still going on, defence minister Peng Teh-huai was dismissed apparently for having earlier in the year "launched a fierce onslaught on the Party's general line," and on the leadership of


Mao. He and others associated with him were declared to have been linked with Kao Kang, and there were implications that both were in league with the Soviet Union. Peng is said to have urged a modernly equipped army, with reliance on the Soviet Union in this respect. Peng was replaced by Lin Piao, and it appears certain that Mao set out on a long course to ensure that, with Lin's assistance, the army would be loyal to him (a sort of precursor of the Cultural Revolution was carried out in the army before it was launched in the nation as a whole) and to overcome the damage done to his prestige.

The insistence with which it has been claimed during the Cultural Revolution that any losses in the great leap were made good in the recent period, for example the current use of buildings erected in that period, and the venom with which detractors of the great leap are still denounced, indicates that many more than Peng were involved, but why they allowed him to be sacrificed, or could not prevent it, is not clear.

For some years after this, cautious, pragmatic, and more "incentive-oriented" policies were pursued to overcome the aftermath of the great leap, the natural calamities, and the withdrawal of Soviet technicians. On the external front, with which Mao seems to have been most closely associated, there seems to have been a remarkable degree of unity in the intense campaign launched against Soviet policies in general and "Khruschov revisionism" in particular, despite some minor dark hints during the Cultural Revolution that Liu and his associates were prepared to seek some accommodation with the Soviet Union.

However some sort of paralysis of the party apparatus set in during this period, probably reflecting the inability of either side to muster the forces to overcome the other. Mao had, despite the failure of the great leap still considerable prestige among the masses and had secured support of the army. Liu and Teng had the party and government apparatus. The stalemate is shown in the absence of Central Committee meetings, which were supposed, under the 1956 constitution, to be held at least twice a year, which was observed up to the meeting in August 1959 at which Peng Teh-huai was sacked. The next was held in 1961, and nothing was reported of it. There was another in September 1962 which made important

18 There are few statistics on the losses in the "great leap". One authority, Uchida, in Scientific American, Nov. '66, claims that 400,000 backyard furnaces for making iron were built, of which only 300 have remained and been developed. These are said to produce now about one third of China's iron and steel. Of course critics claim, on the face of it with some justice, that even if some such "great leap" products are now used, the return on outlay is much less than it would have been if used more rationally.
changes in the secretariat, and the next was not held till August 1966 where Mao was able to muster a small majority. The last was held in October 1968, a prelude to the calling of the 9th Congress in April 1969, which set the seal for the present on Mao's victory.

Four stages in the development of the Cultural Revolution have been set out in a speech attributed to Mao Tse-tung. The first was the publication in November 1965 of an attack on the writer Wu Han for his play The Dismissal of Hai Jui, which is said, probably with justification, to be a defence of Peng Teh-huai. The author of this attack was Yao Wen-Yuan, Mao's son-in-law. Preceding this (February '65) there was a great new spate of praise for Mao, whose works were reported to be hard to get in 1965, and a new emphasis on political subjects in the curricula of the schools.

But perhaps the decisive move was the issuing of the May 16, 1966 "Circular of the Central Committee" which launched the violent attack on Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking, beginning the struggle to get at Liu.

This circular may have arisen from a reported meeting in Shanghai of Mao, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai and others, which probably also organised the forces for the Central Committee meeting in August. In this period too (May 1966) the first "Big Character Poster" was put up in Peking University by a young woman Nieh Yuan-tzu (later elected a candidate member of the Central Committee at the 19th Congress), which was immediately praised by Mao, and signalled the beginning of the Red Guard movement, which was to last for more than two years and closed the schools and universities.

The second stage is put as being from the Central Committee meeting in August '66 to the "January storm" of 1967, which was focussed on the key city of Shanghai. The struggle there raged back and forth for most of that year. On January 9, 1967, the Shanghai Workers Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters and thirty-one other rebel organisations issued an "Urgent Notice" to all Shanghai people. It contained a ten-point proposal, expressing their common interest in dealing a heavy blow to the "bourgeois reactionary line." The notice nullified many acts previously issued by the Party and the Municipal Government of Shanghai.

From then began the third stage of "triple alliances" (of leaders

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20 Colin Mackerras, China Observed, Chapters 6 and 12.
of the new revolutionary organisations, representatives of the People's Liberation Army in the area, and an acceptable section of the leading cadres) and the so-called "seizure of power" from the old state and party apparatus. These triple alliances were often unable to be formed or split apart after being formed, but were reformed and gradually spread over the country.

The fourth stage was the all-out attack on Liu Shao-chi beginning in March-April 1968, while a fifth may be identified with the Central Committee meeting in October, and the 9th Congress in April this year.

A great deal could be said about the venom with which the struggle was waged, and the unprincipled nature of many of the charges made long after the events to which they referred. I will deal with the problem in general later, and here give just one, but quite typical example. In the article published on September 20, 1963, *Peking Review*, No. 30 "On the question of Stalin", one of many replies to a letter from the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, with all of which Mao must have been closely associated, we read:

In the late twenties, the thirties and the early and middle forties, the Chinese Marxist-Leninists represented by Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi resisted the influence of Stalin's mistakes; they gradually overcame the erroneous lines of "Left" and Right opportunism and finally led the Chinese revolution to victory.

They (the CPSU) have not made an overall historical and scientific analysis of his life and work but have completely negated him without any distinction between right and wrong. They have treated Stalin not as a comrade but as an enemy.

If one compares the remarks made by Khrushchov when Stalin was alive with those made after his death, one will not fail to see that Khrushchov has made a 180-degree turn in his evaluation of Stalin.

It is not necessary to belabor the point of the different evaluations of Liu as he appears in this quotation in 1963 and in writings about him in 1968, or the wholesale negation of the work of a man — on much less evidence, be it noted, than is available in the case of Stalin.

What is the overall result of four years of intense inner-party and "class" struggle? It is undoubtedly a victory for Mao, but despite the fact that the opposition has been overwhelmed, it does not seem to be an overwhelming victory. The constitution adopted at the

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23 Mao Tse-tung, "Talk on Strategic Dispositions", *NLR* No. 54, p. 34.
24 See also *Indictment without Trial, The Case of Liu Shao-chi*, by A. E. Kent, Working Paper No. 11, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1969.
9th Congress says "Comrade Lin Piao is Comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-in-arms and successor". Naming a successor in a constitution is unprecedented in a Communist Party and, so far as I know, in any republican type constitution. It certainly hardly speaks for a stable situation.

On the 21 member Political Bureau are Mao and his wife, Lin and his wife, Mao's son-in-law, Chu Teh who is over 80 and has played little role for many years, and a number of Mao's closest associates. It is no slighting of the women as such to say that Mao's wife was little heard of till recently, while even less achievements are known of concerning Lin's wife.

There are reports of problems in running the factories with the new leadership, and in general, moral incentives notwithstanding, the new policies will have to show that they can "deliver the goods". Mao's death, should it occur relatively soon, could cause considerable problems of succession (despite the constitution), and in continuity of policies. Nevertheless the present Mao team must be considered as pretty firmly in the saddle for quite some time to come. The biggest "unknown" is the course and consequences of an extension of the military conflict with the Soviet Union.

The Chinese View of World Revolutionary Strategy

Fused with the traditional Chinese view of the world mentioned at the beginning and of their views on socialism and socialist theory, is a view of the further course of the world socialist revolution. This is based on the conceptions of experiences of their own struggle elevated to a world level — armed struggle as the form of struggle, surrounding the city from the countryside, and the view that the Chinese form of socialism is the one universal form. Says Lin Piao:

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world", then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world".25

Quite consistent, then, with all this, is Mao's claim that "the Chinese road is the only one to liberation". He then goes on, having spoken of China's industrial and military developments: "China should not only be the political centre of the world revolution. It must also become the military and technical centre of the world revolution."26

In view of this, and in view of the long growing and now extremely intense conflict with the Soviet Union described elsewhere in this

26 NLR, No. 54.
issue, and the wounded and now strongly expressed nationalism in
China (nationalism is not confined to China, of course), the struggle
for hegemony of the world revolutionary movement against the
hegemony of the Soviet Union becomes more understandable, if
no more edifying, as do the clashes over the border, which are
manifestations of them, but which cannot be adequately explained
by any conflict of strictly national interests.

Another very important light on this is provided by the mounting
claim that Mao Tse-tung Thought is the marxism-leninism of the
present era. When I was in China we were asked: “What classics
of marxism-leninism have you read?” In answer to the question
“Were the works of Mao to be considered as classics?” it was said:
“Make up your own mind”, but I had a clear impression even
then that the Chinese believed the only reasonable answer was
“Yes”.

There were other, less definable indications that the Chinese
believed that Mao should be considered the world’s leading marxist
— even before Stalin’s death — and this developed further after
Stalin had gone.

Here it is interesting to note the Chinese analysis of Stalin made
in 1963. Stalin’s strong points are listed as: having fought Tsarism
and propagated marxism; having led the internal and external
fight of the Soviet Union after Lenin’s death; of having upheld
the line of industrialisation and collectivisation; of having defended
marxism against opportunism and developed it; of having led the
Soviet Union to victory in the war; as having a correct foreign
policy ‘on the whole” and (NB) of having stood in the forefront of
the tide of history, guiding the struggle.

His weaknesses are stated as: having sometimes fallen into meta­
physics and subjectivism, of having on occasions been divorced
from reality and the masses; of having confused different types of
contradictions in socialist society; of failing to understand class
struggle in socialist society correctly, and making mistakes in
handling counter-revolutionaries; of failing to uphold democratic
centralism; of having made mistakes in relations with other parties
and given some bad counsel in the international movement.27

With the possible exception of upholding democratic centralism
(and even this may be claimed now the party apparatus built by
Liu and Teng has been smashed and replaced by Mao’s), it will
be seen that Mao is claimed to have all Stalin’s good points, while
his specific further contribution has been in the fields where Stalin
was weak. On Practice and On Contradiction dispose of the meta­

physics and subjectivism, the mass line and mass movements dispose of the divorce from reality and the masses, and *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* disposes of the confusion of different types of contradictions, the incorrect handling of counter-revolutionaries and class struggle in socialist society. Especially when taken together with the Cultural Revolution which is claimed to be a universal third stage (after seizing power and establishing socialism) of revolution "carried out under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to consolidate it — the need for a seizure of power limited to certain spheres and certain regions, not in the whole of society".28

It is not necessary to write down the great achievements in thought and action of Mao Tse-tung, or to ignore the fact that he has been a towering figure on the world scene for over thirty five years, or to deny the great importance of prominent leaders, to find in the above claims and the adulation so sedulously fostered, a "cult of the individual" both ridiculous and menacing and for which offsetting factors are not even sought by Mao and his followers, still less found.

*An Criticism of the Chinese View of World Revolutionary Strategy*

Although it has aspects which should be taken into account, I believe that overall the Chinese picture of the world revolutionary process is faulty for the following main reasons:

1 It is a picture of the world so oversimplified as to be false. While correctly emphasising the tremendous importance of the national liberation movements, it is wrong in virtually writing off the revolutionary potential of the working class of the West, and the new contradictions arising in modern capitalism which can lead to a revolutionary resurgence are not recognised, still less understood. The insistence of one sole method of struggle — armed struggle — does not take account of or explain the varied forms of anti-imperialist advance.

2 Taking some concrete issues of world politics, the Chinese often seem to me to be wrong. For example, on Vietnam the evidence that they have hampered the delivery of supplies from the Soviet Union; in the Middle East their opposition to a political settlement between Arabs and Israelis, and their support for those extreme Arab nationalist calls for the destruction of Israel; their fanning of the India-Pakistan conflict, and their preparedness to deal with West Germany, the United States and other countries while denouncing others who do so.

More generally, the problem of "peaceful co-existence" is approached by China, as it is by the Soviet Union, from the point of

view of world strategic considerations as seen through their own national eyes, mistakes often being made on this account. For example the Vietnamese were hostile to the CPSU at the time when it suggested they should "in the interests of peace" give up the struggle against the US. On the other hand, the Chinese were opposed to the Vietnamese using political as well as military means in the struggle against the US, apparently urging the Vietnamese to "fight to the end" even if this meant national suicide.

On the question of the danger from and importance of avoiding nuclear war, the Chinese certainly err greatly, in my view, by underestimation and ridiculous "paper tiger" talk (the while putting the obtaining of the bomb as a number one objective). The Soviet Union correctly pointing to the untold calamity nuclear war would be, sometimes hints at the imminence of it (during the Czech invasion for example) to curtail opposition in the name of the primacy of the larger issue.

3 By their deep-seated urge for hegemony, and the insistence on 100% acceptance of their line, the Chinese have alienated and repelled many others. The Communist Party of Japan was very close to China for many years, including after the Japanese break with the CPSU, but it now denounces equally the "great nation chauvinism" of both.

Cuba was, in political orientation in the struggle in Latin America (as well as in a number of internal policies), closer to China than to the Soviet Union, but still had their internal affairs interfered in despite specific requests and demands. A deputation of Latin American communists from a number of countries, many of whom were favorably disposed to Chinese policies, visited China in late 1964. They were hectored and harangued by Mao Tse-tung because they would not accept Chinese leadership 100%.29 We had similar experiences in this country, as did many others.

Some Theoretical Questions Involved

In addition to the question of moral and material incentives in socialist society mentioned earlier, a number of general theoretical problems for socialists emerge from consideration of the course of the Chinese Revolution and the Sino-Soviet conflict.

1 As touched on earlier, the different backgrounds of nations and revolutions show enormous multiplicity and divergence, as do the ways to build socialism and the nature of what is in fact

29 There is some indication of a greater flexibility in present Chinese policy, with the emphasis on the ability of their adherents in other countries to exercise real political influence. See the Editorial in Communist, No. 5, reprinted in English in Soviet News April 29, 1969.
built. And this multiplicity and divergence even increases further as more socialist countries emerge, the existing ones evolve, and the character of various parts of the non-socialist world also changes. The development of previous social systems showed a similar great variety. Franz Fanon spoke of the third world countries not regarding themselves, in their revolutions, as becoming a part of the existing socialist world, but of using the fact that such a world existed vis-a-vis capitalism, to advance in their own, perhaps very distinctive ways. He spoke in particular of the need for the peasants to be brought to advance themselves, regarding the town working class and petty and national bourgeoisie as coming to stand in the way of this because of their relatively privileged position and attitudes.30

Without identifying Mao’s views with Fanon’s, I have already indicated that, unorthodox though they may be, the people’s communes may have some viability as a new way to tackle what was tackled in quite a different way in the Soviet Union. In another aspect, the German marxist-economist Kuczynski spoke of a new — the agricultural — way to industrialisation.31

Some people get agitated when such things are pointed out, saying there are fundamentals, common features, universals which must be upheld at all costs, lest everything go to pot. But if experience is taken seriously the harvest of such universals, at least in any usable form, is fairly confined — a change in political power, public ownership in place of private (both large scale and much of individual means of production), mass involvement on a great scale in the revolution itself and after (though in some cases not for so very long), and some form of revolutionary organisation. With the enormous variety in all of these within themselves, and the continual further complicating of the conditions in which revolutionary struggles proceed, repetition of such “well-known truths” tells us precious little about our own struggle.

Insistence by the leaders of CPC or the CPSU and by those who follow them on the one true path (theirs) and the one true interpretation of marxism or marxism-leninism (theirs), hampers rather than reveals and helps.32 We must attempt our own analysis on the basis of our study and understanding of marxist and other writings at the time, and on the basis of our practical experiences of the struggle. In particular we should elaborate the principles of the socialist society we stand for. We should do so still more boldly, still more thoroughly than we have done hitherto.
The role of the human will in society, in history: the relationship between the objective and the subjective. The question here is not 'can the subject exist without the object', or "which is primary", but of the inter-relations between the two and the degree to which the subjective element, the human will, can open up new possibilities in social development. I think this degree has traditionally been underestimated in marxist theory, and this has had, though not in all cases in practice (Lenin, Mao, Castro, Ho Chi Minh), deterministic and thus inhibiting and dogmatic influences. But what can be said more than this, if anything? At least we ought to ponder and study the problem. I think one difficulty (in elaborating a theory on the question, that is) is that the problem changes greatly from time to time, and requires a separate concrete analysis on each occasion. But there do seem to be "historic junctures" — revolutionary situations of course are foremost here, but are not the only ones — where the possibilities, the human options, multiply, and a great effort of will can produce startling changes. Stuart Schram, whose biography of Mao Tse-tung should be read by all, regards Mao's view that "the subjective creates the objective", as one of his chief characteristics.

It may be that Mao, although an opponent of the old Chinese culture in the main, is influenced to a degree by the mystical tradition of all Eastern philosophy — that is the search for truth "within", rather than "without". Certainly Mao's account of "contradiction" in places follows very closely the ancient Chinese view, and there is the failure to distinguish it from the Western, Hegelian and Marxist, view. This is not necessarily to condemn. Eastern philosophy has in the main been treated for too long in western society with ignorance or contempt.

Related to this question is that of the base and superstructure (the terms being used here because they are traditional, not necessarily definitive). The Chinese say that despite state ownership of the means of production, the degree of material incentive, the differences of income, the existence of markets, the caste or class power exercised, and the lack of ideological development mean that the Soviet Union has gone back to capitalism.

Soviet authorities increasingly say that despite state and collective ownership the People's Republic of China does not have as its main aim the well-being and all round development of the citizen, is subordinating the development of production to its own hegemonic aims, is using voluntarist leaps rather than planned development, is using levelling and compulsion instead of incentives, and there is no participation by the masses in the running of the economy, and

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thus that it is not now, or is ceasing to be a socialist country. It is said:

It will be recalled that Marx and Engels never reduced the concept of the economic system merely to the form of property. Drawing attention to the many-sided and diverse attributes and manifestations of production relations, they pointed out that state property contained only the “possibility of resolving” social contradictions in the economic sphere. (Marx and Engels, Works, Vol. 20, p. 290, Russian-Language edition) and that “nationalisation of property” in different social conditions might not produce the same results and might have different social consequences. The decisive role would be played by the social nature of the state, which exercised a tremendous influence on economic relations.34

It is interesting to compare this viewpoint with various Soviet statements about Yugoslavia at different times.35

While I discount the claims of both as being taken far too far, one wishes each would look at their own system as a whole in the light of the strictures they make on others, and the point is, in the theoretical sense, well taken. That is, while collective ownership is the necessary foundation the actual nature and all round assessment of the social system cannot at all be adequately embraced in this. That is, ‘socialism” is an abstraction which has to be clothed in flesh and blood. And many of us, unfortunately, do not like the flesh and blood in which it has hitherto been clothed in most cases — and neither do many others. Especially do questions of the form of state, self-management, the role of the party, intellectual and other freedoms — that is mainly questions of socialist democracy — arise as neither adequately treated theoretically nor developed practically. As far as the Soviet Union and China are concerned neither accords with what I would describe as “socialist democracy”; but I would also say that both could develop in that direction — that is, there is not one only possible starting point for this.

Probably the most important point connected with the question of the base and superstructure in China and the Soviet Union at the present time is that of war. Hitherto, almost all marxists and socialists have held that, given public ownership of the means of production as the basis, a contradictory phenomenon of the political superstructure, such as war was impossible. Clearly, this is no longer tenable, and one of the most disturbing features of all in the present situation is that, along the lines of the preceding argument, both China and the Soviet Union are preparing their people ideologically for war by giving prominence to views that the other is “non-socialist”, “aiding imperialism” etc. The populations of

35 e.g. Suslov, Report to the Central Committee CPSU, February 14, 1964.

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both countries have been brought up on the simple marxism which says that war between socialist countries is impossible. But wars between capitalist countries, or between capitalist and socialist countries (starting always with the capitalist countries) are acknowledged as common phenomena.

4 Related to these questions again, are those of class and class struggle in socialist society. In a previous article I attempted to examine this problem by pointing out that the identification of class in capitalist society by reference to relations of ownership alone was far too general, and that this might be extended to recognition of "necessary relations" understood in a wider sense, and that this would have some bearing on socialist society also. I think that the problem under socialism needs to be examined concretely, but sociological analysis has been lacking.

Under socialism, in every country, we have seen the development of big struggles after the victory of the revolution, when the unity engendered by the actual struggle to overthrow the old system, and the mass enthusiasm on which it is based, tends to disintegrate.

What needs to be done is to find different ways of conducting political life from that which has existed hitherto, where those who differ are labelled as "class enemies", and the old class passions and struggles are re-aroused in what are quite different circumstances. What is needed, speaking in general, is an orientation towards full development of socialist democracy and acceptance of some form of political pluralism. Few, if any, of those declared to be enemies, whether Bukharin, Liu Shao-chi or Dubcek, can seriously be considered as "capitalist agents", and it only discredits socialism to declare that they are.

_Tentative Conclusions_

1 The internal crisis in China has been basically resolved for some time to come, but big divisions still remain.

2 The line on internal questions now being put into operation has prospects of some success, but the extent of this is doubtful.

3 The line adopted by China on international questions is unlikely to have the degree of impact expected, though it will have some.

4 All these questions, in their concrete outcome, hinge to a great degree on the course of development of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Measures of invasion, or greater military action by one side or the other would have to be condemned, would have incalculable consequences and would face the socialist movement internationally and in every country with the need to rebuild from the ground up.

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DISCUSSION:

DEMOCRACY — ESSENCE OF SOCIALISM

THE ARTICLE by Franz Marek — “The Structure of the Stalin Mythos” appearing in the June-July issue of the ALR cannot be ignored by any Marxist. Its great value lies in the fact, that it provokes thought and re-appraisal of the main issue which divides Marxists today, internationally and within many countries including our own. Nor does it lose stature because of the fact that the writer includes himself in the army of Marxists who for some decades, accepted distortions for facts.

The need to defend the new Socialist Republic from attack, the rise of fascism, the titanic sacrifices and combat during the second World War, the revolutionary upsurge following it, all combined to divert the development of socialist theory and practice to the defence of one country, the USSR. Rigid censorship and the resulting lack of information strengthened the acceptance of the “Mythos”. The exposure of the Stalin Terror from within the Soviet Union, broke the spell and from then on Stalin’s interpretations of Marxism-Leninism have been questioned and challenged.

More questions, analysis, research and criticism will continue until Marxists everywhere return to the essence of socialist ideology — an ever-expanding democracy — the development of the individual, and respect for him as a member of society.

It is not sufficient today that these questions and criticisms be answered by some dogmatic statement about “bourgeois influence” or “the penetration of imperialist saboteurs”, and in many cases the concocted “enemy of the people”. Why is it that today, almost 52 years since the October Revolution, a rigid censorship (a fact which I consider to be well established) prevents the Soviet people from reading the opinions even of Marxists from other countries? Has this article of Franz Marek been published there?

Have I (for 56 years an industrial worker, with a brief interruption of 3 years unemployment, and now in receipt of our generous old age pension) now become an agent of the capitalists because I have read it? In seeking the answer to Soviet censorship I can only conclude that a small group of decision makers fear their own people and place what they consider to be the interests of the State above socialist principles.

We recall that Lenin described proletarian dictatorship as a thousand times more democratic than bourgeois dictatorship. Why? Because he was primarily concerned with developing democracy and because he had to negate suspicion and revolt against the very word “dictatorship”.

Following the October Revolution Russian Marxists were faced with the colossal task of feeding a starving, illiterate people, through periods of counter-revolution and war, and increasing production became the primary and essential task. But today in capitalist Australia few people would deny that we have solved the technical problem of production sufficient to
provide every citizen with a comfortable life.

The problem of equitable distribution remains, and this is closely linked with rising demands for democratic control, participation in management expressed in worker strike action, student demonstrations of a great variety, acts of defiance against bureaucratic authority, in the slogans for Worker Power, Student Power, Black Power. Surely this question of democracy is the starting point along the road to socialism — and the goal.

NEIL GOW.

STALIN'S HEIRS

"THERE IS intense suspicion and scepticism of the Soviet Union" — a key judgment in a comprehensive survey of students, Negroes, young radicals, the New Left in Communist Party USA's Political Affairs, March-April, 1969.

The central problem for all communists, the first principle and slogan, is international communist unity. International unity will remain an empty dream until the present CPSU leadership can win that great (though not well-based) confidence, the primary certitude communists and other progressives once reposed in the Stalin government.

Where is the confidence in Australia among the youth, academics, humanists? Among the million Aussie workers in the recent strikes and demonstrations? The overwhelming majority in the splendid Left Action Conference expressed, in effect, actual mistrust. Disappointed with Soviet leaders, vast numbers of activists have turned to the false gods of Mao, Trotsky, Debray, Marcuse.

Internationalism demands fundamental changes in several spheres of Soviet home and foreign policy, as follows:

Limited Sovereignty: Traditionally the theory and practice of imperialism, domination of big powers over the smaller; the latter acknowledge the authority of the former to determine policy on basic issues. Australia is becoming a good (or bad) example. Through economic penetration, bases, etc., our country is declining towards semi-colonial status, a "client state".

John Foster Dulles, denied the right of any non-socialist country to remain neutral, e.g. Nehru's neutralism was "immoral". Related to this question, but in a splendidly different way, the USSR Constitution (Article 17) grants the constituent Soviet Republics the right "freely to secede", i.e. to become independent of USSR.

Limited sovereignty doesn't belong to socialism; the concept is repugnant. The term is a misnomer, an undialectical contradiction; compare with "good fascism", "revolutionary reformism", "cacophonous melody".

Elitism: Refers to intellectuals who now subscribe in various ways to the earlier notion of "managerial revolution". CPSU's leaders become today's most prominent elite; they are anarchist-type "heroes" who lead the "herd". Their chief error is lack of trust in the creative power of fullest socialist democracy, and therefore the harsh censorship, paternalism and repression. Soviet citizens are tender-minded children who must be protected. This is dangerous nonsense.

The Soviet people have fought, within living memory, three great revolutions. If they are ignorant and gullible the fault is entirely that of Stalin and his successors who have blotted out Lenin's vision of enlightened socialist society "where every kitchen maid learns to run the government."

We laugh at Mao's miracle-working thoughts, but in certain aspects of foreign affairs and some ideological
problems Soviet citizens are just as misinformed as the Chinese. In this regard Brezhnev is a "hero" like Mao; Soviet and Chinese people know only what they are permitted to know.

Misinformed! Ask the Soviet troops what kind of welcome they were told to expect when entering Prague and the "welcome" they did receive from the hostile populace.

Misinformed! Take religion today. Even RC reactionaries, the traditionalists, acknowledge the mounting drift away from religious belief, not just because of the Pill or celibacy but fundamentally due to the advancing power of philosophical materialism plus social criticism and actual rebellion against the old order (see, e.g. editorial SMH, 8/4/69).

But the latest Soviet text, Fundamentals of Dialectical Materialism p8, proceeds serenely: "Clericalism is gaining influence steadily as Imperialism's political and ideological weapon" (!).

Human Face: The Czechs didn't for a moment deny the prodigious social advances in most of everyday Soviet life—guaranteed employment, culture, sport, dedication to peace, aid for Vietnam, etc. — humanism and democracy manifested in a thousand ways. Nothing like it in capitalism; what can be more human than expropriation of the capitalists? The reference was only to Stalinism, absence of the human face "at the top".

The 20th CPSU (1956) Congress made its shattering impact. How could such evils and crimes exist in the Party of Lenin? But in time the revelations came to be accepted, in increasing degree and in non-communist circles too, as an honest effort to undo the horrific past. Khruschev later (1958) claimed that there wasn't a single Soviet citizen in prison for political beliefs. But gloom is again descending.

The five Soviet writers best known in the West—Yevtushenko, Voznesensky, Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn and, now, even the "hard-liner" Sholokhov — are under ban or interdict of some kind.

The pattern of imperialist propaganda against marxism has decidedly changed in the past decade. From endlessly "refuting" Marx's Capital and Lenin's Imperialism the emphasis has shifted largely to ethics, meaning marxism is "naturally" anti-democratic and repressive.

The pet argument is that in his early writings (the 1844 Manuscripts) Marx projected a wonderful future for man, the winning of his true human essence, and so on; but he denied these in later theoretical and programmatic works...

The point: It is hard to counter these charges when imperialist publicists are so often provided with reports of inhuman Soviet gaol conditions, or a Brezhnev policeman laying down the law to Czech workers (see quotation from Rude Pravo in The Australian, 18/6/69), or the latest abomination of sentencing dissenters to detention in lunatic asylums. It was "easy" for communists in the Stalin period — the charges were summarily rejected as false, inventions. . . That won't work any more.

CPA, CPSU Democracy compared: On the Czech events the Communist Party of Australia has provided for free open discussion; it has been an enlightening and exhilarating experience. With the CPSU, censorship and gaoling. We expect, we have the right to expect, 52 years after October, ten times greater democracy and freedom than in capitalism.

Democratic forms (majority rule, etc.) are essentially the same in all social formations, from the slave-owning aristocracy of antiquity to the present — it makes for maximum efficiency
to advance the economic and political interests of the particular class.

But historically there is one constant. To acquire knowledge there is no possible substitute for exchange of opinions, the free play of conflicting ideas, for criticism, and not a gracious acceptance of criticism, but providing, arranging and organising it. Here the CPSU leaders have failed. They won't listen to other voices, only to the echoes of their own.

“Our (Soviet) ideology is stagnant”—thus Academician Peter Kapitsa, addressing the presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences (28/2/69. See ALR No. 4). Urging Soviet philosophers and others to enter directly into the ideological struggle in the West, in capitalism, he said:

“Our ideologists will lose the privilege they have in our country where the censor preserves them (—LHG) with care from contrary views (!!—LHG). In the impending struggle this will not be so. There all will be judged by open criteria.”

The indictment is absolutely damning.

I., Harry Gould.

POLITICAL MYTH
—OR MIRTH?

THE LEFT ACTION Conference called upon the Australian masses to discuss workers’ control. Australian realities and objective conditions appear to have been glossed over with the spirit of romance, emotions most dangerous to all strata within the working class.

Adventurism leads to the serious mistake of underestimating the class enemy. This exploiter of the people will use all means he controls to smash organised challenge to his economic and political power.

Workers’ control therefore can only be established by the fundamental law of the class struggle, by winning socialism. The modern day conditions of the Australian working class and its relationship to the class struggle have not changed in fundamental principle from the so-called old methods of previous days.

On the contrary, the ruling class, not by new methods or tactics, but using the old tried and tested successful means of the State, its resources and apparatus, have been able to control and tighten the grip on the Australian people. In such circumstances the class struggle has sharpened.

The standard of living on one hand appears higher and the people accept the direct participation in the dirty Vietnam War. However there has been no advance in the standard of living, the sharpness of the class struggle has increased the exploitation of the Australian people by state monopoly capitalism.

Standards of living and exploitation can only be measured in correct marxist principle by comparison of the value of labor and maximum profits. It is true that luxury items such as cars, refrigerators, television, etc. are available. It is also true housing and land is available, but at what price in regards to labor?

The working wife, the two job husband. The increased labor hours in relation to the purchase of commodities. The decline of Social Services and Security. Increasing taxation, inflation, the record national hire purchase debt of $93 per head of the population. These are Australian conditions. These are the objective conditions of an advanced capitalist economy.

An economy which is controlled by a ruthless class of exploiters, of national and foreign capitalists, who have the full support of a reactionary gov-
erminement. Hardly a situation for such adventurism as Workers' Control.

Workers' control is a romantic catch call slogan; it will appeal to many. To the majority who have worked in various movements, REALITIES are the principle for the correct methods to advance the conditions of the Australian people.

An adventure in workers' control could very well follow this example. The crew of a ship, preferably a passenger liner, have taken over the vessel and declared this ship is now going to be run solely for the workers' benefit. This would include all those associated with the running and maintaining of the vessel. There is not enough time or space to list all the organisations necessary to successfully run a ship.

However the profits from the venture are to pay wages, build flats, give social security which society does not. In other words a small pocket of socialist workers, dreaming of UTOPIA.

But back to our venture—cargo, fuel, stores, tugs, etc., etc., all just happen to appear. Oh, yes! there's the example of the Government Transport Workers, of not collecting fares. To keep up with them, our vessel S.S. WORKERS' CONTROL will conduct world cruises, and not collect fares.

Where is the State apparatus while all this is going on? The Government condones it, the armed forces stand by, the police disappear, the ruling class do not even apply to their court, so no more penalties. Is there any need to go further?

Workers' control, in my opinion, is seriously being confused with a very old tactic of staying below in a mine or remaining in a factory during a strike. The French workers used this tactic in their recent struggles. The lesson from this experience is that many other factors must be established be-

fore there can be a political takeover of the establishment.

For principle in accordance with the marxist-leninist thesis, the working class can establish workers' control by eradicating the exploiters and their supporters, then establishing a socialist state. This can only be achieved by the working class under the leadership of a marxist-leninist party, implementing correct policies. Building the party, developing an organisation to win the support of all strata of the class, for the final victory over capitalism.

This challenge is the property of the vanguard, that being the Communist Party. The responsibility is the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dangers and setbacks for the victory to a socialist Australia are the responsibility of the vanguard to meet.

Conclusions on experience which one must draw are neither new nor old, nor are there new phenomena in this era. Of course we have entered the technological revolution, which will have subsequent effects on the social, economic, political life of the people.

Adventurism is always a danger to the working class, and is erroneous in the light of marxist-leninist principles. The responsibility to the Australian working class is to build the Communist Party, challenge the society and prepare for the final victory. This is the challenge of our era and it cannot be answered by MYTH or MIRTH.

TOM SUPPLE
Vice President Sydney Branch Waterside Workers Federation.

ONCE AGAIN ON CIVILIAN MILITARISTS

THE LETTER by "professorial fellow" T. B. Millar in ALR Aug.-Sept. 1969 criticising Dr. J. D. Playford's article
"Civilian Militarists" will not fool anyone who knows Millar's views from public lectures and seminars, nor anyone at the Australian National University who has followed the activities of the "Strategic Studies Institute".

Dr. Millar is an ex-Duntroon lecturer. That is his affair. Why attempt to cover it over? More important, Dr. Millar is a regular visitor to the Department of Defence. He has been seen there on a number of occasions taking notes from the very lips of high officials of that Department. Whether or not this information is "off the record" or "non-classified" is beside the point. The outlook and close liaison of Millar and defence department as shown in published work is justly described as "alliance parfait".

If Millar says his group have "no interest" in "counter-insurgency warfare" as he claims, he is misleading your readers. In fact a series of seminars were held on this topic and guerilla warfare at the ANU with the active support of his group. Vietnam in particular was discussed, with papers by leading "threat experts".

Millar claims that the opinions and publications of his Institute and its members are objective and academic. This is not so. His own work is always premised on the "threat" of China's millions and of the Soviet navy's "aggressive" presence in the Indian Ocean. His reaction to a recent scholarly paper on the Pine Gap base by an ANU academic bordered on the hysterical, with the usual claims of "left wing" bias, etc., etc. Meantime, in articles in the Canberra Times Millar attacks the Americans for "letting down" the Saigon regime, and always makes a point that special arrangements must be made for the personal protection of the war criminal, Ky.

The fact is that the setting up of the Strategic Studies Institute was strongly opposed by many ANU academics, notably by those who are members of Canberra's Quaker community. No democratic Faculty or Board decision was made. The Institute of Strategic Studies was imposed from the top, after private negotiations with the Ford Foundation.

Amongst its publications, only the work of Arthur Burns on games theory as applied to international relations could, in my view, be classified as "objective". That is not necessarily an end in itself. Clash of opinion and a non-objective case can also serve a useful purpose but Millar cannot hide in a thicket of "objectivity".

The idea that any academic can freely use the library and publications facilities of the Strategic Studies Institute is most doubtful. Already articles submitted for publication are being heavily "edited" and delayed on the grounds of "left-wing political bias".

Professor Boulding of the USA, visiting the ANU, suggested the setting up of an Institute of Peace Research. His advice was ignored in favour of a system based on Millar's "special relationships" with the Defence Department. We have nothing comparable with the Swedish Institute of Conflict Resolution and similar American bodies.

WHERE HAVE ALL THE WOMEN GONE?

AFTER READING Australian Left Review 3/1969 I am reminded of one of those objectionable quotations about Australia being a land of "scentless flowers and songless bird." We could add to that "and no women live", if we based our judgment on left-wing publications in general. The names of three women are mentioned briefly — Prime Minister Mrs. Meir (Israel), Marjorie Knight (Aberdeen University) and Dame Zara Holt, now Mrs. Bate.
At least one woman rated a mention, so perhaps we are improving.

In these days of a resurgence of publications about women, from our modest *Girl Fridays in Revolt* (Australia) to *The Better Half*, with subtitle *The Emancipation of the American Woman*, by Andrew Sinclair (published in England, year 1960), surely we could spare a paragraph to describe something of the way of life or attitude of mind of Australian women of the Left, past or present.

For those men who still quote smugly that woman's place is in the home, it might be of interest to point out that some modern American women took them at their word and returned to the home, with some very interesting results. On page 355 in the chapter headed "The New Victorians" (historical not geographical) we find the following: "Victorian traditions still rule the proper place of women in business and in the home. The exception points up the rule."

Yet women do own now two-thirds of the wealth in private hands in the country. They have not earned it; they have married it and have been left widows. In 1960, there were eight million widows compared to two million widowers. The new widows were as rich and independent and powerful as the only free women in colonial days, the first American widows. Their numbers were augmented by a horde of divorcees, whose alimony gave them all the freedom of the widow before the death of their husbands. Indeed, as the death-rate declined, divorce arose as the solution of an unhappy marriage.

For those who think that all that has no bearing upon conditions in Australia, it is worth pointing out that women in the home are dependent on the wage or salary earnings of the men, whether the wife has to slog, as she sometimes does, harder than the husband wage-earner or whether she lives the life of a pampered pet on the profits earned by her businessman husband. That is the pattern everywhere in capitalist countries.

The point of very special interest is the fact that husbands seem not to live too long under these conditions. One Australian Fulbright scholar, visiting and employed in USA found that in one school all the men teachers had at least two jobs. A few of them had three. In almost all cases the wives had decided that their place really was in the home and some of them were underemployed domestically or had "expanded their care of their children and their homes to take in the slack of the superfluous hours."

In the decade before 1960, the American population growth was four times that of Great Britain, three times that of Italy, one and a half times that of Japan and nearly that of India. For the upkeep of all that with appropriate status symbols, the American male had to work on a scale which would have given apoplexy to the mildest of our trade union leaders in Australia.

All this may appear less than intricately theoretical and not specially likely in Australia, but like Bernadette Devlin in the British House of Commons, it is a speech from the heart.

The plea behind it is a fiery one of solidarity among both sexes and for a deeper understanding of each other’s strivings and difficulties.

The enslavement of women can have its repercussions on the men. Talking of slavery, Marcus Aurelius once wrote: "One cannot touch pitch and remain undefiled. Slavery eventually engulfs the master as well as the slave." That may not be an exact quotation, but the urge for freedom, justice and the right to develop our faculties to their fullest extent is something common to
both men and women — even in Australia, where our Equal Pay campaign was a polite squeak.

MRS. E. B. WILSON

A REPLY TO CRITICS

JACK HUTSON and Ann Curthoys both contest certain views I hold — or rather that they believe I hold — in the last ALR (4-1969).

1. A leaflet was distributed advocating non-collection of fares as a strike form in a major Sydney bus depot during the strikes over Clarrie O'Shea and the penal clauses. It certainly was not laughed out of court as Jack would suggest.

2. The idea of "occupation" as a form of strike is being raised by militants in a number of struggles, especially in Brisbane.

3. I don't accept that there is some unique "Australian road to socialism" (what is it? a "peaceful" road?) and therefore can hardly be expected to accept a specifically "Australian" form of workers' control . . . I am however quite willing to hear what this "Australian" workers' control is and discuss it on its merits. It is Jack who is vague and unspecific on this point. If that it "dogmatism", I plead guilty.

4. I do not believe or "assume" that all trade union officials are bureaucrats. On the contrary, there is a very small but very significant minority who are not and who are grappling with the whole question — not sweeping it under the carpet . . . As for avoiding the union apparatuses like the plague — well, even the plague can be overcome and it is often necessary for the doctor to work at close quarters with the patient. But all precautions must be taken not to get the disease . . .

Finally, the Workers' Control Forum pointed to a number of quite distinct positions on workers' control and self-management. I think it is fair enough to say that a whole grouping, particularly among union officials said that workers' control was not an issue to be fought out now (they want to relegate it, like socialism itself, to holiday occasions) or, alternatively, that the unions have always been fighting for workers' control and so can continue in the same old way.

The point is, of course, that workers' control and self-management, both as a strategy and tactic, are very relevant issues today because they link up with the lack of power the workers have and begin a real struggle, outside the framework of accepted union demands and tactics against the dictatorship of the boss and bureaucrat and the State.

Ann Curthoys does my argument in International 7 an injustice when she simplifies to one of "advocating election of a Labor government" so that the workers who are going to support Labor will go through the experience of a Labor government and then turn to the Left. It is surprising to be accused of "sanctioning the parliamentary system" when I went to some lengths to stress the need to concentrate the main fire in elections on exposing the sham of parliamentarianism and at the same time, and more important, on developing a model of socialism which, based on self-management, would have more democracy than our present system.

How does she propose to answer the question of ALP workers who ask if we support election of a Labor Government? Is it sufficient to simply go ahead and denounce Labor reformism, to say that one is as bad as the other? That smacks of a disastrous "social-fascism" theory that can only alienate and not convince. Certainly, the task is to build the revolutionary socialist party with a mass audience.
Ann Curthoys does not really begin to tackle the question of how to do so, other than simply stating it. As for the lack of a coherent theory encompassing self-management, the technological revolution, etc., perhaps it's that she just doesn't understand it?

DENIS FRENLEY.

ANOTHER REPLY

ANN CURTHOYS in ALR No. 4 1969 seems to assume that Laurie Aarons' paper at the Left Action Conference is a program. Aarons, Laver, Freney, Gould, Heffernan, O'Neill, Carmichael and Clancy all spoke, relatively briefly, on the topic: Strategies for Social Change. It would be too much to expect a program from anyone in the circumstances and certainly unreasonable to expect it from one or two but not all. All offered programmatic points, some more than others, but none had the opportunity to offer more than trends and possibilities, though often they did so quite clearly.

It may be possible to assume that with co-operation and self-management as a basis for a new balance of central planning and local initiative there would be more central planning, but most people would surely find little difficulty in seeing that it means less.

The problem of making the changes that would lead to "relations in which the control of a person can never be taken from him" is not solved by simply stating what is considered to be inadequate in a paper by Laurie Aarons (unless one offers viable alternatives). Nor is it much use proclaiming as non-issues those issues that truly exercise the minds and actions of many people. If proportional representation were presented as a final solution to man's problems it would be ridiculous, but electoral reform is a real issue in South Australia and Northern Ireland and it would be a democratic advance to end gerrymanders.

The defeat of Gorton (which means the election of Whitlam — there is no other alternative) would not be a great advance either, yet until Gorton is rejected by the majority there is little hope for profound social advance unless one assumes that this can be done by a minority who would then, presumably, impose self-management. Saying that Whitlam is the only alternative to Gorton does not preclude the necessity to support left candidates (some in the ALP as well as outside), but neither should such support create the illusion that a left government is possible now. One may legitimately refuse to support any candidate for a whole number of reasons but as an alternative strategy it's about as useful as voting informal. The problem is to develop socialist consciousness. A labor victory can, though it may not, contribute. A Gorton victory, on the other hand, will certainly strengthen conservative consciousness.

As for the notion that only direct control has meaning one must ask how, in a complex society, this is to be achieved, and what happens on the way to that achievement? We cannot return to the village, and even modern versions of communes must face the problem of delegating powers, unless their participants refuse to benefit from any machinery or utility outside the capability of their control.

It might be more useful to strive to make the form and content of elections democratic, as part of the process towards self-management; but if one wants to abandon all forms of elections one must offer real alternatives.

JIM STEVENS
THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

The origins and meaning of the current disputes between China and the Soviet Union are discussed by a Vice-President of the Communist Party.

SUN YAT-SEN, in a statement published in Izvestia two days after his death in March 1925, expressed the hope that the day would soon come when the USSR would welcome a friend and ally in a mighty, free China, and that in the great struggle for the liberation of the oppressed people of the world both these allies would go forward to victory hand in hand.1

This dream of Sun Yat-sen's appeared to be consummated 24 years later with the truly world-shattering victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949. It was propagated by loud, and convincing, announcements of the "unbreakable solidarity" between the USSR and China and epitomised in the top of the hit parade song "Moscow-Peking" played and sung ad nauseam throughout China in the early 50's. Nikita Krushchov at a banquet in Peking on September 30, 1959 concluded his speech thus:

Comrades, our peoples have emerged on a wide and clear road and are full of boundless energy. There are no tasks that cannot be accomplished by a thousand million people who have shaken off the bonds of capitalist slavery. We are advancing to our cherished goal full of boundless confidence in the correctness of our just cause, and rallied closely together. This unity, lit by the inextinguishable light of Marxism-Leninism, is our great achievement which we shall preserve as the apple of our eye.2

A far cry indeed to today:

With burning hatred for the enemy, hundreds of millions of armymen and civilians in different parts of China have been holding rallies and demonstrations during the past few days . . . They indignantly denounced the Kremlin's new tsars for their heinous crimes . . . The Chinese people, armed with Mao Tsetung Thought and tempered in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution are determined and have the strength to defend the sacred territory of the great motherland and hand the aggressors the blows they deserve.3

On March 11 this year the Chinese People's Daily declared that "the Soviet revisionist renegade clique thus owes a debt in blood to the Chinese people". In May the Soviet journal Ogonyok referred to the Soviet "determination to defend every little shred of our native land" and to the Soviet peoples right to "holy vengeance for every drop of blood shed by the sons of the Motherland".

Such are but a tiny sample of the incredible statements emanating from both sides in what has developed over the years from a bitter verbal wrangle to armed border clashes. The world watches agog as war preparations are made and pre-emptive strikes are discussed. The world also puzzles as to how it all came about and as to what it is all about. It is simplistic nonsense to assert (as some do) that one side is right and the other wrong. It is almost irrelevant to speculate as to who "started it". It is fantastic to imagine the consequences for the world of such a war which would be unwinnable and "endless". It boggles the imagination to consider these events from the standpoint of socialist principles for there seems little of socialist principle involved.

The Background

The answers lie, undoubtedly, in the history of China and Russia, in the particular histories of the two revolutionary movements, their Communist Parties and their place in the world communist movement and in the relative dominance of the CPSU in world communist affairs over a long period. The idea that the conflict commenced in the period of 1958 has to be abandoned in the light of the facts.

Examination of the history of the Chinese revolution reveals that it largely was fought and won against the advice and instruction of foreign communists (Comintern and Stalin). It suffered reverses and frequently catastrophic defeats when it followed such foreign advice, and won victories when it worked out its own strategy and tactics. Soviet advice throughout the history of the relations seems actuated as much by desires to protect its far eastern borders and diplomatic necessities as by desire to further the Chinese revolution — perhaps understandable but hardly a proletarian internationalist approach. For those who argue that such Soviet interests should have been the primary consideration and that the Soviet attitude was thus justified, the proof of the pudding lay in the eating as almost invariably when the Chinese under Mao Tse-tung went against Soviet advice they won victory, weakened imperialism and seemed to strengthen the communist movement.

Soviet (and Comintern) policy in the 1920's saw Chinese revolution as essentially national in character and led by the nationalist Kuo Min-tang. The young Communist Party was to work within
the KMT as individuals to exert proletarian influence. Indeed such a policy seemed ideal, for Sun Yat-sen had warm relations with the Soviet Union, likewise his successor Chiang Kai-shek. Soviet advisers (e.g. Borodin) had considerable influence on the KMT. Chiang was appointed an honorary member of the presidium at the 6th Congress of the Communist International in 1926. In the same year he wrote:

Only after the overthrow of imperialism can China obtain freedom... In the present world revolution, there is the Third International, which can be called the general staff of the revolution... If we want our revolution to succeed, we must unite with Russia to overthrow imperialism... If Russia aids the Chinese revolution, does that mean she wants to oblige China to apply Communism? No, she wants us to carry out the national revolution. If the Communists join the Kuo Min-tang, does this mean that they want to apply Communism? No, they do not want to do that either...

Strong words and also revealing words. Who could blame the Russians for placing some considerable reliance on Chiang? Yet this was penned at a time when Chiang had already commenced arresting communists and removing them from leading positions in the KMT organisation.

China was not a unified country. In the early 20's there were three main influences, the KMT in the South, and the warlords Wu Pei-fu in Peking and Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria. The Soviet Union established warm relations with the KMT in the south yet pursued diplomatic interests with Peking and Manchuria. One of Sun Yat-sen's and Chiang Kai-shek's dearest wishes was for the revolution to be extended from the south by the undertaking of the Northern Expedition aiming to defeat the feudal militarists to the north. Yet this was not originally supported by the Soviet Union who strove to retain good relations with all the main Chinese influences on its eastern borders. The Chinese communists had to be pressurised periodically to maintain collaboration with the KMT and this remained Soviet policy for a time even after Chiang Kai-shek had massacred the workers' movement in Shanghai in April 1927.

Military and peasant uprisings followed in the wake of the failure of the policy of collaboration with the KMT. The CPC general-secretary Chen Tu-hsin was sacked and denounced as a right opportunist (he had largely carried out Moscow's instructions) and Chu Chiu-pai became party leader so commencing the first left line in the Chinese Party. In December 1927 the Canton uprising was brutally suppressed after being influenced by Stalin against the better judgement of men on the spot. Li Li-san became the guiding spirit in the Party and further uprisings and frontal attacks on big cities ended in disaster.

4 Cited in Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung, Penguin p.92.
In 1930 the Moscow-trained student Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming) returned to China and along with close colleagues was installed in influential positions in the Chinese Party. Wang Ming had spent five years in the Soviet Union, where he had gone at the age of eighteen, studying the revolutionary movement. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in Moscow two years later, and was 23 years of age on return to China. Thus began the second, equally disastrous, left line of adventurism and rigidity, of ill-conceived uprisings, military confrontations with the superior forces, the slogan “attack on all fronts” which led to the victory of Chiang Kai-shek’s campaign of encirclement and annihilation in respect to the main base areas of the revolution.5

Following these defeats came the victory of Mao Tse-tung in the councils of the Chinese Party. This occurred in 1935 at the famous Tsunyi meeting in Keichow Province at the commencement of the Long March. From that time the Chinese Party shook off the Soviet influence, it developed uninhibited its own peculiarly Chinese strategies and tactics and despite incredible hardship and obstacles proceeded from victory to victory culminating in the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949.

Relations between the Chinese and Soviet communists in the years 1935-1949 appear to have been sparse, desultory and remote. The problems of relations with the Soviet Union . . . involved alongside rivalry a genuine feeling of solidarity between the Communists of the two countries. At the same time Stalin had two distinct but related goals, both of which were totally unacceptable to Mao Tse-tung. The first was to avoid pushing the revolution in China too hard if this was likely to endanger Moscow’s diplomatic position. The second was to make sure that the Communist movement in China remained under Soviet guidance and control. Although the form in which these issues presented themselves varied substantially over the years, the two basic tensions persisted during the entire period from 1935 to 1949.6

Stalin was not keen about Mao’s prosecution of the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek following the defeat of Japan. It is undoubtedly this attitude to which the Chinese refer when referring to Stalin’s mistakes in the middle 40’s. Yugoslav sources maintain that Stalin told Kardelj how he had advised the Chinese communists

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5 Incidentally Wang Ming has recently emerged from obscurity by writing a pamphlet “China, Cultural Revolution or Counter Revolutionary Coup?”, a particularly vitriolic and subjective attack on Mao Tse-tung which has been circulated widely throughout the world by the Novosti Press Agency. Wang Ming sums up his “analysis” by stating that Mao “has become not only an enemy of the Communist Party of China but also the common enemy of the international communist movement. He has become not only the enemy of the Chinese people, but the common enemy of the entire progressive and peace-loving humanity”. Presumably “anything goes” in the struggle against such a man!

to join the Chiang government and dissolve their army. (See Schram p. 238). Such attitudes on Stalin's part, it is alleged, reflected concern to placate, and not upset, the United States and so avoid jeopardising Soviet security in the Far East so soon after the war.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed in February 1950 after prolonged negotiations conducted by Mao Tse-tung in Moscow. Mao's three months absence from China leaves the impression of some hard bargaining. Certainly Soviet credits to China of 60 million U.S. dollars annually for five years to be repaid by 1963 could not be considered immense aid. Soviet presence in Darien and Port Arthur was to continue until 1952 — yet in fact lasted until after Stalin's death — possibly due to the physical proximity of the Korean war. It was not until after Stalin died that assistance and relations blossomed.

The starting-point in the disintegration of these new close ties between Moscow and Peking was unquestionably Krushchov's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress denouncing Stalin's crimes. This does not mean that the Chinese objected as violently to Krushchov's action as they have recently claimed. On the contrary, the Chinese press at the time indicated strong approval of certain aspects of "destalinization". Nevertheless, the Twentieth Party Congress marked the beginning of an evolution in Soviet policy, the ultimate consequences of which were to prove unacceptable to Mao, even if he did not clearly foresee them at the time.

In 1953 following Stalin's death some rank and file Chinese communists asked the question: "Now that Stalin is dead will Mao Tse-tung have to go and work in Moscow?" This was laughingly and patiently rejected by ideological cadres. Yet after witnessing the policies of the 20th Congress and noting what they considered to be the "adventurist" and "revisionist" proclivities of Krushchov and the Soviet leadership, it is not inconceivable and indeed is almost certain that Mao Tse-tung decided that the new revolutionary HQ should be transferred from Moscow to Peking and that the mantle of Stalin should fall upon himself. Hence began the battle for hegemony in the Communist and revolutionary movement (and indeed for world hegemony) which has developed to the stage it has reached today.

More Recent Controversies

Naturally national interest and hegemonistic aims have remained obscured on both sides. For over ten years the row has developed fiercely on a wide range of issues involving almost every sphere of policy and interest: the assessment of Stalin; a formidable range of ideological questions involving peaceful co-existence and the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism in some countries; attitudes to the United States; questions relating to China's internal

7 Schram, p.285.
policies such as the communes and the Great Leap Forward; the withdrawal of Soviet experts from China; the Sino-Indian border clash; nuclear weapons; Taiwan; Czechoslovakia; the Vietnam war and many other important matters. The general course of the dispute and the arguments is well known and it is not the purpose here to examine them in detail. Yet some comments on a few are necessary.

It is interesting that assessments of Stalin are closer today than at any time since 1956. There is little doubt that official Soviet views today approximate the Chinese while they are less forthrightly expressed. The rehabilitation of Stalin proceeds in the Soviet Union, hesitantly and in muted tones.

The withdrawal of the Soviet experts with their blueprints provides one of the Soviet moves which greatly exacerbated the conflict and makes reconciliation a most long range affair. The writer, in Moscow in 1964, was shown voluminous documents which proved only the weakness of the Soviet case and pointed up the whole exercise as being designed to teach the Chinese a lesson.

Possibly the dispute over nuclear weapons provides a more basic revelation of the real issues in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This dispute did not receive any public airing until some four years after its occurrence.

As far back as June 20, 1959, when there was not yet the slightest sign of a treaty on stopping nuclear tests, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defence, concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. This was done as a presentation gift at the time the Soviet leader went to the United States for talks with Eisenhower in September...

This accusation has not been refuted by the Soviet Union and the way in which the Soviet Government replied to it clearly indicates the correctness of the main charges while the reasons for the change of policy are, perhaps, another question. In September 1963 a Soviet statement stressed that the Chinese economic situation would have to be strained to the utmost to produce even "a few atom bombs". It complained that the Chinese had made public "classified documents and information relating to the defences of the countries of the socialist community" and had presented the facts in "a distorted light". The statement went on to stress the necessity of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the interests of peace and in the interests of China and argued that it would be wrong to fight against the arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons and against their spreading in the "West"...
generally while at the same time supplying China with them. It claimed that China would be better off devoting its efforts to developing the national economy and the well-being of the Chinese people than exhausting itself to produce the bomb. A further Soviet Statement emphasised that China had no need of the bomb because the Soviet Union had nuclear power enough “to wipe from the face of the earth any state . . . that might encroach on the revolutionary gains of the socialist countries.”

However sympathetic one might be towards the Soviet argument, and there is logic in it, one must easily recognise the paternalistic, interfering nature of the reply on which aspects the Chinese were quick to seize. A nationalistic government with hegemonistic ambitions would hardly take kindly to being told “We’ll look after you”! Viewed in such a context the Soviet argument in reality seeks to place all socialist countries under Soviet patronage and influence — in one sense a realistic approach in the politico-military sphere yet hardly conducive of relations of equality or equal rights, more particularly when the history of the Soviet Union itself has been tarnished rather badly by national interest and hegemony.

The problem of Taiwan has assumed greater importance as the dispute has unfolded. The Chinese have in fact claimed (in their Government Statement of September 1, 1963) that Krushchov came to Peking after his Camp David talks with Eisenhower in 1959 in a bid to persuade them (the Chinese) to accept a “Two Chinas” situation on the ground that “Taiwan was an incendiary factor in the international situation”. If Krushchov did make such an attempt, then it seems likely he was inspired to do so by his talks with Eisenhower. The Chinese could be excused for assuming that Taiwan was a bargaining counter in the Soviet/U.S. detente. The Soviets, in their statement of September 21, 1963, claimed Krushchov simply spoke of “peaceful ways” to solve the Taiwan issue. They added, however, that: “No doubt remains now that one of the reasons for the attack by the Chinese leaders on the policy of the world communist movement was the lessening of international tension which took place in 1959 when there was a definite relaxation in the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States, especially after Comrade Krushchov’s visit to the U.S.A.”

Indeed if such was not Soviet policy in 1959 it seems likely that it is now. There is increasing evidence of Soviet negotiations with Taiwan in the context of the growing Sino-Soviet conflict. A clear statement of Soviet attitudes to and relations with Taiwan is called for.

Why?

How can it come about that the two main socialist countries appear to be on the verge of war? The accusations hurled by each

one at the other have great similarity — new tsars, Maoist clique, return to capitalism, military-bureaucratic dictatorship, collusion with U.S. imperialism, aggressor, social imperialist, etc., etc. — heaps of wildness, exaggeration, spite and self-righteousness with elements of truth, yet with little of real marxist analysis apparent. In fact the whole sorry picture makes a mockery of socialist principles as they are practised in the two countries and seriously calls into question the protagonists degree of adherence to revolutionary socialism. It highlights the immense pressure of nationalism and self-interest which determines, in particular, external policy.

The true cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict has become increasingly clear; it is the struggle for leadership — for leadership in the “socialist camp”, in the Communist world movement, and in the world as a whole.11

Mehnert’s observation, made five years ago, is undoubtedly the crux of the matter. The Soviet Union fears China as a rival. Since the thirties Chinese Communists have never been pliant in their relations with the Soviet Union and have become increasingly less so. They owed little to the Soviet Union in the first place, in any direct sense, in the winning of their revolution except for the very presence of that country in the world scene. They grew up to very definite independence in attitude, a feature never favoured by Soviet leaderships since Lenin. For in this connection there is no Communist Party leadership anywhere pursuing independent policies who are viewed kindly by the Soviet leadership.

With the advent of China on the world scene after 1949 and their claim of China representing the model of socialist revolution for a vast part of the world the hegemony of the Soviet Union came under direct challenge.

If China had provided the model on which future revolutions among the peoples of Asia (and perhaps later of Africa) should be based, this was also a claim that China should lead and guide these revolutions towards their goal: the claim that Mao had added new truths to Marxism, meaning the experience and practice of the Chinese revolution, was also a claim that China could provide that interpretation of the orthodox doctrines of Communism most applicable in her region. These arguments amounted to a restatement in modern terms of two of the fundamental postulates of the old Chinese view of the world: that China was the centre of civilisation, the model which less advanced states and peoples should copy if they were to be accepted within the pale, and that the ruler of China was the expounder of orthodox doctrine; that after all and always, Chinese interpretations were the right ones; truth and right thinking must come from China and conform with Chinese teaching.12

FitzGerald’s interesting and penetrating assessment is given much more weight with the more recent Chinese claims that Mao Tse-tung’s Thought is Marxism-Leninism in the contemporary world.

and that the Chinese model and methods are applicable in all countries. Small wonder that the Soviet leadership, whose socialist outlook is contaminated with a national interest reflected in a hegemonistic position and aims, should be concerned. Thus the collision course developed.

The popular feeling in China against the Soviet Union is well known, whipped up by the leadership's frenzied campaign against the Soviet "revisionists" and "social imperialists". It is a nationalistic fervour seldom witnessed hitherto. For China the Soviet Union has become the Number One enemy and danger. What of the position in the Soviet Union?

After visiting the Soviet Union in 1967 Alexander Werth wrote:

In theory, the United States is Russia's Enemy Number One. But only in theory. The nuclear "balance of terror", if nothing else, makes a Soviet-American war very unlikely; moreover there has never been a war between Russia and America, and there is no area in the world today where American and Russian interests clash in any violent way. If the Americans felt that it was their duty to the "Free World" to "destroy communism", they would — and should — have started long ago on destroying Russia (rather than little Vietnam); but as De Gaulle said, there were at least a dozen different "communisms", and the Russian variety has become one of the most innocuous, with the concept of the "nation state" strongly predominating over that of "revolutionary mission" in the world.

No, the United States is not Enemy Number One. Enemy Number One — at least in Russian popular imagination is China . . .

Werth goes on to relate his observation of popular Russian fears . . . the real quarrel with China is not over ideology that it is in reality a quarrel between two nation-states; that the Chinese, already 700 or 800 million strong, will soon have a billion people, and that their population cauldron may well explode some day, and that there is something particularly sinister in the frequent incidents on the Chinese-Soviet border, and in the territorial claims made on various Russian territories in Central Asia and the Far East, allegedly stolen from China by the Russian Tsars. (p. 269).

That such widespread fears exist has been noted by Australian Communists visiting the Soviet Union. (Such fears have a disturbing similarity to the "yellow hordes to the north" idea which has been skilfully used by the Australian ruling class over long years in order to foist a policy on the Australian nation of "it's better to fight them over there before they come here".) This is further illustrated, for example, by an article printed in Pravda on August 16, following the clash on the Sinkiang frontier. The writers, discussing the rocky outcrop of the Jungarian Gates, state that through these very gates three centuries ago came foreign invaders in an avalanche onto the Kazakh stepp. The peoples' memory has retained the pain and wrath, the hatred and courage of those far-off years. The present rulers of China are sending their soldiers along the same path as the bloody campaigns of the Jungarian conquerors.

What possibilities are presented for the imperialists to choose priorities in dealing with its two major enemies is easily imagined. This conflict plays right into the hands of such governments as those of the U.S. and Australia. A conflict of such magnitude, complexity and fierceness between the Soviet Union and China relieves much of the pressure upon imperialism and weakens the revolutionary struggle around the world. The Soviet handling of the complex situation with China tends to back up the imperialist arguments of China's aggressiveness and casts doubt on the collective security proposals for South East Asia.

Is China aggressive? That dubious and even ridiculous territorial claims have been advanced in various ways is obvious. That border clashes have been provoked by China is probable. That bellicose-sounding statements have emanated from China is all too true. Yet has modern China a record of aggression? This cannot, in fairness, be said. In 1965 Sir Robert Scott the former British Commissioner General in SE Asia and former permanent secretary to the British Defence Ministry, in delivering the Dyason Memorial lecture in Sydney, pointed out that historically the Chinese had never been given to striking the first blow and that the Chinese under communism would respond only when they felt their security threatened. Numerous commentators and students of China strongly share this view as does this writer. However the Chinese Communists do take the view of keeping the pressure on their enemies, of "twisting the tiger's tail"; a tactic used against Chiang forces and the United States and obviously now against the Soviet Union. Such "pressure", presumably, will be kept up at points of disputed territory. Yet this is quite a different thing to invasion or even pre-emptive strikes. The Chinese communists' military record definitely has not been one of adventurism and ill-conceived blows against superior enemies.

Socialists cannot support military measures by either side to decide this issue. What has to be introduced into this debacle is patience, negotiations and socialist principles. Australians, of course, will be able to influence the course of events hardly at all. So that for Australian socialists the emphasis inevitably becomes the struggle to re-introduce real socialist and marxist approaches and analysis without fear or favour, scattering the myths and illusions built up over years and looking the problems squarely in the face.

Shortly before his death Lenin strongly warned of the dangers of great nation chauvinism and its effects upon the peoples and revolutions of the East and these are the problems which have emerged so clearly today. That they could emerge so strongly necessitates examination of the state of socialism in the world.
FOR BULK ALONE this one-million word study, is a daunting proposition. But its size — whose impact is minimised to some extent by the masterly printing and production — is really the least of the difficulties it poses.

Much greater is the difficulty of the task it sets itself, which is nothing less than an examination in all its connections of the social, political and economic condition of the region which Professor Myrdal calls South Asia. Under this head he studies the vast, complex and ancient society of India, where he worked for a number of years and which is really the pivotal point of the study, and also Pakistan and Ceylon. The South-east Asian countries also receive some attention, but only in a relatively marginal way.

Myrdal consciously approaches the study in the tradition of the classics of political economy — the echo in the title of Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations is far from accidental. Indeed, he says in his preface: "It is not altogether a pretentious metaphor when I describe my endeavor to apply an institutional approach in this study as an attempt to analyse the development problems of South Asia in the manner that Adam Smith studied England’s development problems two hundred years ago. Smith, of course, never dealt with problems as purely 'economic', and the same can be said in general of the whole classical school . . ." (p. x).

Myrdal develops his "institutional approach" in a sustained polemic with prevailing "purely economic" approaches to the problem of development in South Asia, especially as practised by Western economists, but also by many specialists in the South Asian countries themselves.

His attack on "Western bias" in the study of South Asia is pressed with relentless vigor. At one level, he attacks the political, diplomatic and strategic influences which bear upon these attitudes — the whole complex of cold war phenomena, as they have influenced economic studies. At another and deeper level, he attacks the tendency to carry over into the study of South Asia social and motivational assumptions arising from a Western environment.
His discussion of the concepts of "unemployment" and "under-employment" as used by Western economists in relation to South Asia is particularly interesting in this connection. He finds these conceptions inappropriate to the historically evolved South Asian reality, preferring instead the concept of "under-utilisation" of labor.

However, Professor Myrdal explicitly disclaims any "pure economic" approach for himself — he is in fact at great pains to point out that all economic judgments are valuational judgments. Perhaps the core statement of his argument is the following:

Conditions in the rich Western countries today are such that, broadly speaking, the social matrix is permissive of economic development or when not, becomes readily adjusted so as not to place much in the way of obstacles in its path. This is why an analysis in 'economic' terms, abstracting from that social matrix, can produce valid and useful results.

But that judgment cannot be accurately applied to South Asian conditions. Not only is the social and institutional structure different from the one that has evolved in Western countries, but, more important, the problem of development in South Asia is one calling for induced changes in that social and institutional structure, as it hinders economic development and as it does not change spontaneously, or, to any very large extent, in response to policies restricted to the 'economic' sphere. (p. 26).

The depth of the differences between the developed Western countries and the world of South Asia is a leitmotif of the work. In an extended comparison of the initial conditions for economic growth as between the present-day rich Western countries and the countries of South Asia today, Myrdal finds on almost every count that the comparison is unfavorable to the South Asian countries. In particular, he emphasises the slowness of the development of the growth potential in the pre-industrial West, and compares it with the imperative need of the contemporary South Asian countries for accelerated rates of development. Myrdal concludes this discussion with these words:

In a sense, the most fundamental difference in initial conditions between the South Asian countries today and the Western countries in any period of their pre-industrial phase is the difference in the pace of history. A telescoping of change has become the only alternative not only to continued stagnation but to regression. In the final analysis, this situation is a result of the high levels of economic development now achieved by the developed countries and the accelerating speed with which they continue to develop . . .

It is as if the "coefficient of changeability," starting at a low point in the Middle Ages, rose and then continued to rise at an ever faster rate. And so the ideas of change, adaptability, and mobility were gradually accepted as a way of life, until Westerners became accustomed to the kind of "permanent industrial revolution" in which they live today. (pp. 700-701).

In the South Asian countries, on the other hand, the long stagnation . . . has solidified institutions and attitudes, and hardened resistance to change in all strata of the population.
Myrdal defines the "institutional approach", as follows:

We conceive of the situation in each South Asian country — as in any other country — as a social system. The system consists of a great number of conditions that are causally interrelated, in that a change in one will cause changes in the others. We classify the conditions in six broad categories 1) output and incomes 2) conditions of production 3) levels of living 4) attitudes towards life and work 5) institutions 6) policies.

This structure of categories represents the conditions in a country viewed from the 'economic' angle, which corresponds to the focus of the present study. The conditions in the first three categories represent broadly what is usually referred to as the "economic factors;" while categories 4 and 5 represent the non-economic ones; category 6 is a mixture and is usually considered to belong to the "economic factors" when policies aim at inducing changes in conditions 1-3, but not otherwise. (pp. 1859-1860).

The main thrust of the "institutional approach" is in fact a plea for a much greater appreciation of conditions 4 and 5, as they exist concretely in each South Asian country, in confronting the problems of underdevelopment, development and planning for development. Each of the "conditions" listed above is the subject of a book-length essay in Asian Drama. Here we can only comment on his summation of conditions 4 and 5. Of condition 4 (attitudes towards life and work) he notes particularly as obstacles low levels of work discipline, punctuality and orderliness; superstitious beliefs and irrational outlook; lack of alertness, adaptability, ambition, and general readiness for change and experiment; contempt for manual work; submission to authority and exploitation; low aptitude for cooperation; low standards of personal hygiene and so on. To these attitudes should be added unreadiness for deliberate and sustained birth control . . .

As to condition 5 (institutions), he notes a land tenure system detrimental to agricultural advance; undeveloped institutions for enterprise, employment, trade and credit; deficiencies of national consolidation; imperfections in the authority of government agencies; instability and low effectiveness in national politics; low standards of efficiency and integrity in public administration; ineffective organs for provincial and local self-government; and a weak infrastructure of voluntary organisations — the institutional conditions which constitute these national communities as "soft States" in our terminology. At the root of all these institutional debilities is a low degree of popular participation and a rigid, inegalitarian social stratification. (pp. 1862-1863).

The core recommendation made by Myrdal for emergence from this social miasma is what he describes as "radical State policies" designed to bring into life the "modernisation criteria", which he takes to underlie all efforts at development in South Asia. These criteria he describes as a rationalist (rather than a sentimental) approach to economic problems, the development of the economy on a planned basis; a rise in labor productivity and the level of living; social and economic equality; an improvement in social institutions and standards; national consolidation and national independence; democracy in political life and in the sphere of public relations; social discipline combined with democratic planning. (p. 57, et seq.)
It is necessary to apologise for the length of the quotations presented above. But they still present nothing but the barest of skeletons of the argument of this massive theoretical enterprise in the methodology of economic studies, upon which Professor Myrdal expended a full 10 years of his life. Myrdal's "institutional approach" takes him, as can be seen, right to the threshold of a marxist, revolutionary socialist approach. But it is a threshold he does not cross.

Not only is the idea of the revolutionary overthrow of all existing structures as a possible denouement to the South Asian drama absent from the work, but the mass of the population are seen throughout as an object of government, which may be either good or bad, rather than as a possible force for social progress in their own right. The perspective of a change of the entire class structure therefore scarcely arises, however keenly aware Professor Myrdal is of the mammoth difficulties posed by this structure for progressive social development.

It is a matter for the greatest regret that a work of such importance barely examines at all the experience of the Asian communist-led regimes of China, North Korea and North Vietnam. True, they are geographically peripheral to the scope of the work. True, there are substantial differences in the historically evolved national communities of East Asia and South Asia, which, in the case of China, North Korea and North Vietnam, undoubtedly favored the growth of revolutionary socialist movements out of the movements for national independence. But even the most superficial study of the pre-revolutionary situations in these three regions points not only to differences, but to similarities, and great similarities.

With all its shortcomings in practice in the different national environments, socialist co-operation in agriculture must surely be said to offer at least as promising a perspective in South Asia as the planned development of capitalism in agriculture recommended by Professor Myrdal. Likewise, the experience of China, North Korea and North Vietnam is rich in experiments in the planned development alongside modern industry, of the traditional craft industries — a course which figures very high on the list of recommendations with which Professor Myrdal concludes his study of the problem of industrialisation. Above all, their success — which remains unique in the history of Asia — stimulating that "popular participation" in the social process, whose lack Professor Myrdal sees as the "root" of the institutional problem in the South Asian region, surely deserved comment.

Professor Myrdal's identification with progressive, non-communist
elements of the South Asian elites is passionate and complete. He says at one point:

Despite the increased interest in South Asian problems in other parts of the world, the leading figures in this drama are the people of South Asia, especially their educated class . . . (p. 34).

This is not to suggest that he does not feel the most genuine sympathy for the suffering of the masses of a country such as India. He does — the entire work is lambent with such sympathy. But the idea of a politically decisive section of the educated class moving over to revolutionary socialist positions and securing massive popular support (as happened in the present-day socialist East Asian countries) he scarcely entertains.

Perhaps the political optic of the work is most surely indicated by the fact that its author index contains at least eight column inches of references to the writings and statements of Jawaharlal Nehru, and no reference at all to Mao Tse-tung. But is there such a "Chinese wall" (if one may be forgiven the expression) between the societies of South and East Asia? Is it really a fact that the development problems of the two regions, due to historically evolved factors, are different in kind? Is it really not possible that what we are witnessing today is merely a lag in time.

The reverses so far suffered in 1969 by the forces of reaction in India — representatives par excellence of those "institutional impediments" to change whose negative influence is so thoroughly exposed by Professor Myrdal — do at least give slender grounds for hope that a "global" socialist change is not forever ruled out for this vast country, whatever the difficulties such a change may face. The very forms of political democracy on which Professor Myrdal pins considerable hope could conceivably help to ensure a less painful socialist transition, in the conditions of India, than has occurred elsewhere in Asia where such forms were less developed, or did not exist at all.

Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama* towers over previous attempts at its subject. It is a massive contribution to scholarship, and a strong antidote to glib, Western-biased approaches of either the Left or the Right to the problems of social development in the long-stagnant societies of Asia. It is noteworthy that it has been received rather coolly in the West, but with considerable enthusiasm in the region to which it is devoted.

Gunnar Myrdal writes at one point that the outcome of the Asian drama is "not necessarily tragedy". Whether one shares its basic political viewpoint completely or not, there can be no doubt that his work, through the light it throws on the reality of the problems of development in the region, will work powerfully in favor of averting a tragic outcome.
IN THIS ARTICLE I want to compare the analogy which is widely drawn between student power and workers' control, and suggest that the analogy is frequently exaggerated, particularly by students. Secondly, I wish to defend the concept of workers' control as something which is not necessarily reformist, as part of a revolutionary socialist strategy, and as something which provides a new framework for political and industrial agitation.

At bottom, the two slogans, student power and workers' control, have the same criticisms of modern society (capitalism, if you like). This set of criticisms is associated more with the New Left, here and overseas, rather than with the orthodox communist movement this century, in the advanced societies of the West. The criticism says that men are isolated from real control over the issues and decisions which affect their daily lives, the “quality of life” as experienced under capitalism; they even lack any sense of confidence in their ability and competence to discuss matters outside their jobs, families, and leisure-time activity. Decision-making, in this view, is centralised and concentrated in the hands of irresponsible elites, which are unaccountable to those “under” them, who are vitally affected by the very large scope of the decisions made. In short, the critique underlying both student power and workers' control says that society today is undemocratic; that it is either largely out of control, or that control is vested in the hands of men of privilege, and not exercised in the interests of the mass of the people.

In Australia, the major difference between student power and workers' control, in practice, is that (since the early 60's) students have been able to develop a viable, though inherently unstable, political movement led primarily by revolutionary students, which had adopted a student power program; this movement has begun to work profound changes in the nature and structure of education in this country. Workers' control, on the other hand, is not an
integral part or basis of a real political or industrial movement of Australian workers — it is at this stage only a theoretical concept. (This does not mean that many workers' struggles cannot be embodied within the concept of workers' control, just that no unionists have openly placed their struggles, so far, in this light.)

This difference has an important danger within it: that the success of the student power movement will be unreasonably expected of any workers' control movement that might develop. I use the words "unreasonably expected" because some very real factors necessarily limit workers' control, at the same time as making student power necessarily a more practical proposal. That is, the application of the slogan, or strategy, of workers' control, its use as a guide for struggle, will always be more complicated and easily confused than the concept of student power. There are three reasons, I suggest, for this being true.

First, the type of criticism of society, mentioned above, meets a better response amongst students, teachers and educators, than amongst any other grouping or class in society. Radical students have been able to get much support from more "moderate" staff and students because of this, whereas they have not been able, often, to obtain the same agreement on issues like imperialism and the Vietnam war. This is because it is in the education system that basic beliefs about society (such as the notion that society is democratic or otherwise) are taught, learned, subjected to criticism, etc. This is to say, it is in the education system, most thoroughly and openly, that the "culture" (attitudes, values, information) of society is passed from generation to generation.

A second reason for student power getting off the ground is that the ideals of liberal and humanistic education are in themselves democratic and radical, especially in Australia. When people say that the aims of education are to produce critical, thinking, independent citizens, they are saying something which is a basic democratic assumption, and in conflict with the actual reality of Australian condition, thus giving rise to dissatisfaction and a basis for political action.

Thirdly, the ideas which we associate with "student power" — self-government, grass roots democracy, communities, participatory democracy — are intrinsically easier to apply to educational institutions, than to ordinary work-places in our society. Not only do students, teachers (or some of them) think it a better idea for students to have a say in their own education, but it is much easier in practice to apply this than to apply it to a work-situation.
A classroom contrasts with a wharf, an oil rig, a transport depot, a public service office, an assembly line, to take various examples, in that these jobs entail functions and processes that are much less independent and self-contained. This is just a reflection of the fact — now a cliche — that modern society is very complex. Most jobs, that is, are specialised, and merely segments, portions, of much larger operations, and processes, and industries. This generalisation does not apply so much to any classroom, or school, or university or college.

Another factor breaks down the analogy — or the simple analogy — between student power and workers' control, and that is the "scientific and technological revolution" underway. The most visible agent (and symbol) of this "revolution" is the computer. Already many jobs within banks, and clerical positions in the public and private bureaucracies, have been greatly reduced or even done away with by computerisation. Which jobs we will be left with in, say, twenty years time, and how much working-time will be needed for them, cannot yet be predicted.

It is true, then, that two very important factors break down the easy transfer of the success of student power to the realm of working experience in our society: the complexity of society, and the rapidly changing structure of the work-force. It is also true to say that these factors are powerful influences on many of the people who would like to accept the idea of workers' control, but sense that it just isn't practical.

What does this type of difficulty mean for practical political and industrial struggle around issues? It means that whereas students have been clearly able to present a set of demands (or a program) based on the idea of student power, and which has served as a radicalising program for many students in universities, (it has served to enlarge the Left); workers, and their leaders, on the other hand, will always be in a certain amount of deep water trying to get a comprehensive and unambiguous set of demands from the idea of workers' control. In the case of students, they have been demanding things like control of courses studied, methods of learning and teaching, methods of testing and assessment, control of student and university governing bodies, control of discipline, and so on.

With workers' control, though, the problem is more complex and not so clear-cut. This fact is acknowledged in a number of frequent criticisms of the idea of workers' control, considered as something new, as a new way of orienting and giving direction to industrial activity, rather than as something which is a new name for the old pattern of trade union activity.
1 That even if you could achieve “workers’ control” on the job, over things like union organisation rights, rights of entry, safety, hours of work, etc., you would still not be affecting workers (and their families) in basic areas of their lives. Their lives could still be struggles for survival under very difficult conditions.

2 That workers’ control demands would ignore the traditional issues of the Left in the unions — living standards, wages, conditions, the penal powers, etc.

3 That demands for workers’ control can be “bought off” by the bosses and by parliamentarians, with things like “co-management” (of a trivial kind), profit sharing schemes, no-strike agreements, and the like.

The conclusion of all these arguments could be that workers’ control, if it is anything new at all, is a new deception for the workers’ movement, and that it is a reformist and not a revolutionary demand. The arguments of this article, however, and the argument of those who genuinely believe the trade union movement is in a crisis and needs new strategies, new forms of action, is that workers’ control can be a framework for activity which breaks out of the existing defensiveness of the trade union movement, and its preoccupation with wages and conditions (“economism”), and that the new direction can be (though need not necessarily be) a socialist and revolutionary one.

To make this clearer it is necessary to break down “workers’ control” as a vague idea into three things: 1. A criticism of society (as outlined earlier); 2. A carefully prepared set of demands; 3. A set of organisational principles.

The third, the organisational principles, links workers’ control with the ideas of participatory democracy of the student movement’s rhetoric, and also with the tradition in Australian unionism of shop-committees. It also involves considerations of tactics like the validity of the strike weapon, and so on.

What distinguishes a reformist approach to politics, and a revolutionary one, ultimately, is that the radical or revolutionary considers problems like injustice and poverty as part of society as a whole, and says that the whole basis, or structure of society needs changing, because the society is organised in such a way that poverty, injustice, etc., are necessary and logical outcomes of the system, and not just accidental features. Reformism, by contrast, says that injustice, and so on, can be removed from the existing system without fundamental change. It follows from this that a revolutionary, in practical politics, putting forward proposals for reform of society (because it would be foolish to put forward the demand for socialism and revolution when no-one wants or understands it), can only distinguish himself by virtue of the
reasons he gives (publicly) for advocating one particular reform, or demand. Frequently he will be placed in a position of agreement with, or close agreement with, people with a quite different view of what's wrong with society. In this situation, then, you can only maintain any demands, whether they are workers' control demands or traditionally phrased demands, by giving different reasons for supporting them, a different critique of society.

In addition, for clarity, a critical separation must be made between two sets of workers' control demands — those which are limited to the job situation itself and those which more widely affect the worker's life and family. The first type of demand was mentioned earlier, and includes many of the demands which would figure in any log of claims prepared by a more militant union, including election of foremen, and so on. The second type of demand includes wider social and political issues, which must be raised by the workers' organisations, otherwise the real decisions affecting people in society — to do with health, education, housing, and how much work and what type of work you have to do, will remain untouched. Ultimately, this means the abolishing of the usual trade union distinction between industrial and political activity, which has served to prevent workers' organisations tackling the major areas of vested power and privilege in society.

To give a more concrete example — in an industry like the vehicle building industry, workers are vitally involved in making (or rather supporting the making) of monopoly decisions about the types of cars being produced in Australia, how safe they are, how "built-in obsolescence" is maintained, how many brands are being produced of cars that are essentially the same, and so on. As well as countless workers' control demands for control of conditions and time spent on the job, and wages, etc., a revolutionary workers' control program would have to concurrently raise the demand that workers no longer comply in the making of unsafe, built-in obsolescent, overpriced vehicles, and that they use their industrial power to bring about "reform" of this type. Ultimately, however, reforms made with this perspective, and combining with principles and clear statements about one's reasons for making these proposals, will become a mass movement aiming at the abolition of monopoly, and the control of society for the interests of a few, and against the interests of the majority of the people. A socialist movement aimed at the overthrow of capitalism, that is. The people must control the basic decision making processes in Australia, and the top public servants, monopolists and politicians who maintain power by manipulation and control of people, must be removed from power.
Stella Nord

NEW CONDITIONS
NEW DEMANDS

Some of the material in this article was presented to the Sydney Workers' Control Conference but here the author, who has worked in industry and is currently an office worker, specifies the changing position of women as a permanent section of the work force and poses some questions for trade unions and others of the left.

THERE WAS A TIME, not so long ago, when most communists and socialists believed that a high rate of employment of women could only happen under a socialist system, and that equality had been achieved through equal pay, guaranteed employment for those who want to work, opportunities to learn a trade or higher education, and through the provision of pre-school and after-school child care, paid maternity leave and a certain level of community services.

Now, however, the position has changed in many capitalist countries where there has been a dramatic increase in the number of women workers and particularly in the number of married women workers. This change in the work force applies particularly to Australia.

Women now represent more than one-third of the total work force. In May 1966, according to the Commonwealth Census, almost 40% of all women 15 years and over were working. If allowance is made for full time students, more than 50% of Australian women aged 15-59 years are working or training for work. Of this work force, nearly a half (48%) are married. This is the most dramatic change. The Melbourne Institute of Public Affairs states that in the twenty years 1947-1967, the number of married women working has risen from 100,000 to over 700,000.

Postwar industrialisation and the development of highly mechanised and automatic production processes has greatly expanded the range of jobs for women, particularly in the manufacturing sections of industry. At the same time technological change demands that young people, formerly the ready supply of unskilled and semiskilled low paid workers, stay longer at school. To fulfil labor requirements industry has promoted a migration program, but as this has probably reached a peak, the only possible avenue left is to encourage increasing sections of married women to join the work force.
What is the significance of all this for the forces seeking radical change and socialism? Does this influx of women into the work force weaken the trade union movement, or can it be a source of strength for the unions and all the forces working for social change?

The circumstances of working class women, when Lenin spoke of them as the greatest reserve of the working class, were those of drudgery, few had the right to vote, and those actually in the work force were small in number. In the present industrial society sheer physical strength is less important although "women's work" is quite often menial, repetitive and unskilled. Women are not, however, called on to be drudges. Labor saving devices have cut down on heavy household chores, the vote has long been universal so that women's votes have considerable influence in determining the results of parliamentary elections. As a third of the work force employed in most spheres of industry and commerce, in government and private enterprise service industries, and in professional occupations, they are an essential component of Australia's economy and can no more be done without than the rest of the work force.

It is possible for women to respond to the needs of the labor market not only because modern techniques of home care and marketing are available to them, but because of the trends of earlier marriage, smaller families (again in part due to scientific developments), and earlier completion of child bearing. While some problems have been solved, more will have to be faced and solved if a greater proportion of women are to be maintained in the work force. Women with large families find it very difficult to carry the burden of two jobs. Many others with young children, where they are not forced by economic factors into working to provide housing and other necessities, remain at home because of the shortage of proper pre-school facilities, and the lack of part-time working opportunities to enable them to combine satisfactorily, the roles of worker, mother, wife.

Until recently the age group over 45 years seemed too old for employers to consider, but now there is growing realisation that such women will often work for a considerable number of years and the fact that they will not have their work interrupted by pregnancies or sick children, is seen as an advantage. But these women have to be encouraged out of their homes. Often their homes were bought before land prices were inflated; they have their furniture and their children are off their hands. Their tradition was to work only until marriage. If they worked at all, after marriage, it was on a temporary basis as during World War II. It is on women in this section that many school committees, women's organisations and charities depend for fund raising and other activities. These organisations are now being seriously affected as few replacements appear to take the place of a generation of women who will...
be the last of their kind — those who made home duties their life's work.

A growing number of mainly younger women now see their employment as a permanent condition, perhaps a necessity, often a burden but permanent nevertheless. Unlike the first wave of post-war women workers who sought employment, temporarily, to provide for a particular family need, they realise that two incomes are necessary to provide a home, a standard of living, and savings for those periods when they have babies. Child-bearing is a temporary interruption and work is resumed if and when suitable arrangements are made for the care of the children.

It is accepted then that most women go to work because they need the money, as men do. Rents or home repayments are seldom less than half the State basic wages or the Federal minimum wage (all under $40). Refrigerators, washing machines, T.V. and the motor car are now considered essentials in many families. It is less than an answer to appeal to women in 1970 to make do with one wage, an ice chest, a wash board, a crystal radio and a push bike. And just as those innovations of another period did not bourgeoisify the working class neither do today's essentials make the working class, magically, middle class. The car, an enormous drain on family income, is a very real need where public transport is inadequate and where inflated land prices have forced workers to live far away from their work-place. And presumably, the only way to get the benefit of the super-market specials is to have a car to carry the stuff home.

Widespread higher education for children and young adults are new expenses which are required to be met in the technological age. In one sense the wage of the working mother replaces the wage contributions of children who, not so long ago, were expected to contribute to earnings once they reached 14 years of age. Just as the earnings of fathers and children did not mean affluence, so in today's conditions, even the two income family tends to just get by.

As one third of the decisive force for radical change and socialism, and with the same potential for industrial and political action against monopoly capitalism as have other workers, women workers are now much more than reserves of the working class. However the realization of this potential will depend on all forces of the left, and particularly the left in the trade unions with its militant industrial and political experience. Only 4 of every 10 women workers belong to trade unions so the first important stage for their working class education is to plan attractive and convincing "join your union" campaigns.
Becoming a wage earner does not automatically make a woman convinced of the need to join a trade union, or even to become aware of her exploitation by the monopoly owners of production. This awareness has to be engendered by the political and class conscious forces in the trade unions. The involvement of women workers in actions for their needs is the best environment for their class conscious development. Education through struggle is far more convincing than all the best written propaganda and speeches. Many women workers do not even know what a union is for, where to go to join, their award rights, how a union functions, and so on. Some women believe that basic wage increases every year are granted by the courts and the government, and the unions carry out the orders of the courts. Other women conclude that if unions are not doing anything about their particular problems, there's no point in paying union fees. Other women who are members of trade unions whose leaderships are ideologically opposed to militant action, or are indifferent to their needs, see these trade unions as part of the Establishment and some are afraid of joining a union in case the boss finds out and victimisation follows. Many women, unorganised and left alone to fight their own battles against the boss, have accepted the anti-union propaganda of the monopolies and the daily press.

The question is who is going to win the support of working women? The employers who blame high prices on wage increases and equal pay, and who say that communists and other militants in the unions are there to stir up trouble and provoke useless strikes, or the left which can only win the support of working women for progressive policies if they vigorously campaign for their needs, and assist them assert their rights in industry, trade unions and society? In this regard, the politically advanced women in all sections of the left (workers and students) can give valuable assistance to working women by convincing the organisations they belong to (trade union, women and student organisations) to take up these issues of concern to working women.

Where some unions with militant leaderships have encouraged women to take action to get some demand, experiences show that women will respond — enthusiastically. There is the example of members of the Liquor Trades Union who in 1967 went on strike for equal pay. The strong support of many men workers gave the women much encouragement. In some cases the militancy of many women encouraged some less-militant male workers to support the strike. This action won equal pay long before any arbitration court hearings.

This year when the same Union held a stop work meeting to protest against the actions of some big retailers who had employed
non-union labor to do the work of men and women restaurant workers on strike against the penal powers, over 500 (mostly women) packed the Sydney lower Town Hall. Their action brought quick agreement by the retailers to the union's demands.

Other good examples may be found in the work of the Teachers' Federation with its original and up-to-date democratic organisational forms and publicity which has encouraged so many teachers (especially women) to join in a successful campaign for equal pay and now for better working conditions and higher educational standards. The Sheet Metal Workers' Union and others have also set out to encourage their women members to take militant action for equal pay and better working conditions.

Most militant actions involving women workers have taken place during working hours, on and off the work-places. Experiences show that women workers do not readily respond to meetings called after work. Family responsibilities after work prohibit many women from going out again, besides the physical strain of working all day and doing household duties after work leaves little time or energy for meetings. It should be obvious then that the involvement of working women in union campaigns has to be planned at job level, and for job level action.

The demands around which women workers can be organised arise out of the conditions in which they find themselves. Many working mothers with pre-school and school age children find it almost impossible to arrange suitable pre-school and after-school care for their children. Where suitable places are available, they are often too expensive for working class families, and especially if there is more than one child to be cared for. This problem has been almost ignored by governments and employers, except for periodical mention at employers' conferences. It is a matter of concern that as yet very few trade unions regard this problem of the working mother seriously either.

In an article "'Getting With' the Working Women" (Tribune, August 13, 1969), Alice Hughes (State Secretary Union of Australian Women) points out that many countries in Europe, North America and Latin America are far more advanced in their provision of child care facilities than is Australia, and one would think that we were living in a backward part of the world instead of a country, that by world standards, is one of the most affluent. She also states that in 1966, of all children in Australia between the age of 3-5 years, only one in twelve (a total less than 60,000) attended pre-school centres, and even the majority of these are short-hour centres and of very little assistance to working mothers. The monthly bulletin of a local Communist Party Branch stated that thirteen
thousand under-fives in the North Sydney area have to compete for 200 kindergarten places. The lack of child-care facilities is not the only issue. Paid maternity leave, compassionate leave to look after their sick children, shopping time, are rare exceptions in awards and agreements covering the employment of working mothers.

When it comes to wages women workers make up the biggest section of the lower paid workers. Most are paid only 75% of the male wage, and large numbers of them are employed in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. Even if they did get equal pay, women in these jobs would still come within the category of low paid workers. Many women workers are barred from skilled occupations and, therefore, higher pay mainly because opportunities for education and training have been limited and because of outdated social and economic prejudices and fears, many trade unions have not taken steps to assist women to assert their right to apprenticeship training.

Migrant women are among those who work in the lowest of all low paid jobs, and often under conditions that would not be tolerated by most Australian workers. A high proportion of these women do not understand English, and trade union leaflets and publicity do not help them. Few unions have migrant organisers, and very few unions have material translated into other languages. For the migrant woman worker, especially with a large family, working full time, travelling long distances to work and back, and with language difficulties, life can be very burdensome. Ways must be found to assist these inexperienced and unorganised women.

The recent equal pay judgment and its very limited application of equal pay to so few women shows the need for widespread and consistent militant action if women are ever going to achieve equal pay. Shorter working hours, a living wage, pre-school and after school needs, paid maternity leave, re-training programs, tax allowances for household assistance, apprenticeships, suitable employment for women graduates, equal pay and equal opportunity in employment — all these are urgent issues for women workers, and are the ones that the unions should be taking up on their behalf. During the course of organising women in support of these, the ideas of workers' control should be advanced.

It is on these questions that the left, especially in the trade unions, should come forward in defence of the rights of working women. Any organisation, whether trade union, women's or political, which claims to function in the interests of the working class, unless it orientates its work to include activities in support of the needs of working women — especially young women — will become divorced from the great social and economic problems of our times.
There are several significant political causes dealt with by Carr: the Bolshevik monopoly of power, the unity of party and state, state and party centralisation, the curtailment of free inner-Party debate, the problem of state and party bureaucracy and the use of force in solving the national problems of the Russian Empire. It is only possible to deal with each of these briefly. The Bolshevik monopoly of power did not happen automatically. At the time of the October coup against the provisional government several Bolshevik commissars and the powerful railways union insisted on the formation of a coalition government. But this collapsed in March 1918 when the left social-revolutionary group in the government opposed the Brest-Litovsk treaty. The non-Bolshevik parties were never suppressed as such, but after 1921 their activities were invariably declared counter-revolutionary and they were unable to operate openly. As a result all meaningful political debate tended to be increasingly confined to the Bolshevik party; and when political tensions rose as in 1921 and 1923 the party came to the verge of a split.24

The character of the revolutionary regime with a Bolshevik monopoly of political power led to an increasingly great overlap between party and state. It became more and more difficult to distinguish between party and state: to all intents and purposes they became one.

In this set-up the party came to dominate the state and in any dispute the party was the final arbiter. Disputes in and between state bodies were carried over into the party and became the possible basis of factional struggles in the party. In Carr's words, "It was becoming more and more difficult to distinguish between disloyalty to the party and treason to the state."25 In both spheres — party and state — greater centralisation became the main feature. The Bolsheviks had always had a tradition of secrecy and discipline and the special position of the party, and, perhaps, the political experience of the Russian workers, hardened the process after 1917. The centre of the party shifted from the central committee to the politburo. At the tenth congress in 1921 the central committee acquired the power to expel members of the central committee by a

25 Ibid., p. 212.
two-thirds majority. After the congress the central committee met less often; the three incumbent secretaries were all replaced. At the eleventh congress in March 1922 a new secretariat was elected, this time with a general secretary — Stalin.26 The centralisation in the party was matched by a similar process in the state. Here the concentration occurred earlier than in the party. Sovnarkom and the executive committee of the Congress of Soviets governed by virtue of an authority derived from the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, but very rapidly Sovnarkom assumed the sovereign position in the state. At the same time a concentration of authority at the centre at the expense of local soviets and congresses of soviets occurred. The net effect of this centralisation was more and more to restrict power struggles to a few people, mainly the politburo, and made it difficult to appeal to a wider audience if the small circle decided against it.

Associated with these features of the political system there was a growing tendency to circumscribe real debate and proscribe political opposition from any quarter. This did not occur at once. Initially, in the immediate post-revolutionary period, there was a period of unfettered discussion and controversy. The rise of strong opposition, particularly the left communists, and the civil war crisis, produced demands for the strictest centralism and the severest discipline, but in 1920 and 1921 further opposition came from the "decembrists" and the "workers' opposition". The result was the decision on unity at the tenth congress which banned factions and groupings. Dissemination of the ideas of the "workers' opposition" was declared to be incompatible with the membership of the Russian Communist Party. Henceforth the criticism of individuals or even of groups would be tolerated, but the opposition must not organise. In 1921 and 1922 disciplinary action became more common.

In August 1921 Lenin just failed to have Shlyapnikov expelled from the party for his oppositional activities. Shlyapnikov was a long-time Bolshevik, a worker by origin, first commissar of labor in the Soviet government and a leader of the "workers' opposition". Early in January 1922 a discussion club formed in Moscow was dissolved on the initiative of the central control commission which had been set up in September 1920, originally as a sort of ombudsman, only to turn into a body to enforce the authority of the party. A mass purge of the membership was undertaken. Most striking of all, perhaps, was the connection which was quickly established between the control commission of the party and the GPU (the political police). Carr notes that the party had established a monopoly of power in the state; now the state had begun to control the party.27 At the twelfth party congress in 1923 these develop-

26 Ibid., pp. 185-213. 27 Ibid.
ments came under attack; several speakers criticised the growing bureaucratism, particularly the account and distribution section of the central committee, which kept account of the party's manpower and supervised its distribution.

The problem of bureaucratism in the party and the state came to centre around Rabkrin — the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection — whose commissar was Stalin. This department in 1920 had superseded an earlier one of state control. In Lenin's view it was to lead the fight against bureaucratism and corruption in Soviet institutions through workers and peasants elected for short periods by the same constituents who elected the delegates to Soviets. It was to serve as a form of direct democracy. Lenin continued to defend Rabkrin against growing accusation of interfering, inefficiency, incompetence and bureaucratism, until the last few months of his active working life. Among his last articles, however, were two which called for a drastic reform of Rabkrin to overcome its glaring inadequacies.28

Finally, another political cause of the differences which led to the struggle at the end of 1923 was the use of force to deal with the national question. Again this was an issue on which Lenin had backed Stalin, as the responsible man, only to become alarmed and, while he lay sick, to call for Stalin's removal from office. Subsequently to the revolution and the civil war Georgia had been a British-sponsored republic under a Menshevik government; early in 1921 the Red Army had invaded Georgia and a Soviet Government had been established. Lenin had been prepared to consider a coalition government, but the chief Mensheviks had fled to Paris. Because of the extremely variegated ethnic character of the whole of Transcaucasia, the Bolsheviks sought to establish a single federal republic on the Russian model. This policy was resisted by the Georgian Bolshevik leaders, but they were overruled by Orjonihidze; the Georgian party leaders were removed and ordered to Moscow. Eventually at the end of 1922 the invalid-Lenin dictated a memorandum on the issue which censured Orjonihidze, Dzerzhinsky (who had investigated only to exonerate the central leadership from any misdeeds) and Stalin. Lenin urged Trotsky to speak up on the question at the twelfth Congress.29 The fact that Trotsky did not respond to Lenin's urging but left Bukharin to take up the cudgels for the Georgians emphasises the importance of the personal element in the causal sequence leading to the factional struggle.

Lenin realised the importance of this element of personal conflict. In his "Letter to the Congress" — a memorandum in which

28 Ibid., pp. 225-228.
he expressed from his sickbed his fears about a personal clash among the leaders in his absence — he clearly delineated Stalin and Trotsky as the main protagonists. As part of his proposals to prevent a split he called for Stalin's demotion from the office of general secretary and added that although it may be a trifle, from the point of view of the relations of Stalin and Trotsky it was not a trifle, "or it is such a trifle as may acquire a decisive significance."

In the event Lenin's advice was not followed. At one point in his discussion of the characters of the principal figures Carr sums up his views on the role of personality in Soviet history in the nineteen-twenties; they form "a minor part of the story . . . The struggle between policies and the struggle for power between individual leaders were both real. But they proceeded independently and on different planes." The crucial aspect was Trotsky's personal isolation in the politburo. He had only become a Bolshevik in July 1917 and he owed his position to his own abilities and to Lenin's recognition of his unique capacities as a revolutionary and thinker of brilliance. With Lenin withdrawn from active participation in the leadership, Trotsky was thrown back on his own resources. Many "old Bolsheviks" regarded him with suspicion because of his non-Bolshevik past; some feared his emergence as a Bonaparte; of all the Bolshevik leaders he seemed the most likely to fill this role. There were long-standing differences between Trotsky and Zinoviev, apparently the most likely candidate for the succession. In these circumstances a triumvirate of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin formed inside the politburo, Trotsky at first accepted the situation, and he did nothing at the twelfth congress to force the issues which had worried Lenin. But to a considerable extent Trotsky's freedom of action was circumscribed by the resilience of the triumvirate in following Lenin's injunctions. Stalin's great political skill in meeting Lenin's criticisms played the major part in avoiding an open breach. However, given Trotsky's personality, the breach had to come. The immediate cause was the worsening of the scissors crisis. On October 8 1923, Trotsky addressed a letter to the central committee in which he indicted the politburo policy on two counts: a) the radically incorrect and unhealthy regime within the party; and b) the dissatisfaction of the workers and peasants with the grievous economic situation, which had been brought about as the result not only of objective difficulties but because of flagrant errors of economic policy. This, and the platform of the 46, which followed a week later, put the fat in the fire. From October 1923 until January 1924 an intense debate took place; it ended with the defeat of the opposition, although the majority had made considerable concessions in the process.

Two major points remain; both raise the issue of "accident" or "chance" in history. The first is the effect of Lenin's illness in 1922 and his growing incapacity until in March 1923 he became moribund (he finally died in January 1924); the second, Trotsky's illness in late October 1923 which kept him from a very active part in the struggle. The first is relevant to the causes of the split; the second has more to do with the outcome. Lenin's illness is indeed a major point. Referring to the contrary trends in the party, Carr says: "So long as Lenin firmly held the reins, the two forces could be reconciled and run in double harness." To a remarkable degree Lenin expressed in equal measure the opposing tendencies; "western" and "eastern", intellectual and practical, democratic and centralising. He was equally at home in the party and the state. He had an outstanding political capacity for keeping faith with principle while adapting to necessities. Through all this he maintained the confidence and goodwill of the Bolsheviks of all tendencies. His importance can perhaps best be gauged by the influence he had on Trotsky's fortunes. Lenin and Trotsky together were irresistible; Trotsky on his own, while often right, could not establish his leadership. Analogous situations give us no help in predicting a different outcome if Lenin had not been incapacitated. All we can say is that this "accident" certainly had a causal effect on the split.

It is necessary, finally, to make some estimate of Carr's success in writing history along the lines of his ideas on historical causation. At one point Carr says, "given the composition of the party and the turbulent conditions into which it was plunged within a few months of its revolutionary triumph, its evolution was inevitable. In the struggle latent in the term "democratic centralism" — the struggle between the flow of authority from the periphery to the centre and the imposition of discipline by the centre on the periphery, between democracy and efficiency — the second was bound to emerge as the predominant factor." Elsewhere Carr excuses himself for the use of the "naughty" word but he does seem here to be arguing that the course of events was inevitable: they were bound to happen, predetermined by the existence of certain conditions. Generally he seems to argue that certain causes were so overwhelming in Soviet history between 1917 and 1924 that a split was inevitable and the voluntary aspects were of less significance than he suggests in *What is History*? As has already been stated Carr's endeavours to set out causes are not as neatly executed as would perhaps be expected from the emphasis he puts on the importance of the historian uncovering causes in history. His use of explana-

35 See pp. 2-3.
tion hypothesis is rarely evident; one case is the use of Robert Michels' ideas on the role of oligarchy in explaining the centralisation of power: "All organised political parties — and particularly parties representing the masses, where the rank and file is widely separated from the leaders by the intellectual and technical qualifications required for leadership — have tended, however democratic the principles on which they rest, to develop in the direction of a closed oligarchy of leaders." But such attempts at explicit hypotheses are rare.

It is made explicit at one point that Carr does not rate personality, in the context of the relation of interpretation of causes, of much significance. He acknowledges it plays a part, albeit minor, but it is in tune with his interpretation which is that historical, social and economic causes are the main ones. This is his cognitive and causal orientation to reality. While it is not strongly explicit, it is pretty plain from the marshalling of facts and the framework into which they are placed. In the hierarchy of causes Carr attaches greatest significance to the historical, the social and the economic. The rationality operating behind this is that Carr sees the Bolshevik revolution as part of a world revolution and he is interested in these causes because of their possible general significance.

How far is he successful in relating the causes to each other and ranking the causes, in order of importance and hitting on an "ultimate cause"? Carr certainly suggests a multiplicity of causes but it is not made very clear how he assesses them. The stress is on the historical, social and economic but it is rather difficult to judge which of them is regarded as most important. The essay the "Legacy of History" suggests that he might think the historical causes are of greatest importance: the historic backwardness of Russia, the western-eastern division, the large historic-cultural gulf in society, but one cannot be absolutely sure. He does make a specific reference to the "scissors crisis" — an economic cause — as the immediate cause, but the immediate cause is not the "ultimate" cause.

Carr certainly sticks to his injunction not to indulge in the might-have-beens of history. He does keep pretty closely to what happened and he rarely attempts what Collingwood insists is the essence of history — trying to get at the thought lying behind the events; at least he avoids any imaginative speculations in contrast to Isaac Deutscher, who in his biographies of Stalin and Trotsky (more especially the latter) resorts to this method successfully.

“Accidents” are not treated as of high importance. Carr doesn’t try to make much of Lenin’s illness, which had its causes; nor does he attach much significance to its causal sequence and how it affected the sequence which he considers of primary concern. This is in line with his ideas on accident. Carr is reasonably successful in writing history in the way he advocates but his failures emphasise the difficulties of method in history. It is somewhat more difficult in practice to write history according to a model than might be expected from an initial statement of the model.

In fact, the historian writes history as it presents itself to him. If the causes are clearly discernible they are usually made fairly explicit; otherwise the causes may lie hidden within the history itself until, perhaps, a better historian is able to clarify what has hitherto remained obscure. In this respect history is not much different from any other branch of knowledge, although the problems of historical causation have their own individual nature.

PREPARATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY PROGRAM

Strategies for socialism are up for discussion. To one degree or another everyone on the left is concerned to develop a strategy for social change, to find the answers to the complex problems of revolution in modern society.

In this respect a very important issue for the next Congress of the Communist Party, scheduled for June 1970, is the drafting of a new program. The National Committee will present a draft for discussion from its meeting in December.

An outline of theses which serve as a basis for drawing up such a program was produced in May, and views of readers of ALR on all the issues involved, will be welcome.

The outline was published in Tribune of September 24, and copies are available on application to the CPA.

All ideas will be carefully considered in preparing the draft of the program, which will then be open for party and public discussion and debate up till and during the Congress.

Views should be submitted in writing to Laurie Aarons, National Secretary, Communist Party of Australia, 168 Day St., Sydney 2000.
Books


ALTHOUGH THIS is by no means a cheap book it joins the growing collection of invaluable publications in the field of Australian literature produced by Oxford University Press. Two earlier volumes, Australian Literary Criticism edited by Grahame Johnston and Twentieth Century Australian Literary Criticism edited by Clement Semmler began what is undoubtedly one of the most important publishing ventures at present under way in Australia. These books, together with the monograph series “Australian Writers and their Work”, also published by OUP, bring together much of the best that has been thought and said about Australian literature since its very beginnings.

As the title of this particular anthology implies, Mr. Barnes’ main concern was to bring together various essays all of which have some bearing or comment on the role of the writer who finds himself in a peculiarly Australian environment. Frederick Sinnett, writing in 1856 was in the uniquely fortunate position of being able to comment on Australian literature almost before there was any such literature to comment upon. And yet this Fiction Fields of Australia, the first piece in this anthology, made many points which were to be reiterated throughout the ensuing century. The spirit of Sinnett’s belief, for instance, that “most Australian stories are too Australian” is almost directly answered in the extract from Vincent Buckley’s Essays in Poetry, Mainly Australian published in 1957, where Buckley sees Christopher Brennan as “the first genuinely unself-conscious” Australian writer.

Other essays included are of more specific application and interest. A. G. Stephens’ book, Chris: Brennan, originally published in 1933 is here at last restored to print. It was the first book on Brennan to be published and has been followed by three others together with innumerable articles, and yet still retains that vigorous and fresh outlook which typified almost all of Stephens’ writing. He obviously did not much like Brennan’s verse, though he is rather cagey about saying so. He interestingly places him as a writer “in the rank of cosmopolitan commentators such as Gosse, Saintsbury, Symons”, and perhaps even more interestingly (even if yet wider of the mark) declares that Brennan’s major fault was that he “wrote by eye more than by ear, and (for reasons too many to explain here) the best poetry in all languages is written by ear for an ear.” Only A. G. Stephens among Australian writers would be audacious enough to try and get away with an argument like that and Mr. Barnes pays homage to this audaciousness (and to the astute intelligence which lay behind it) by making Stephens the key figure in this anthology; and by including not just the Brennan book, but a series of essays on Lawson, the Introduction to The Bulletin Story Book, some of the Furphy-Stephens correspondence and even Victor Daley’s merry satire on AGS and his disciples, “Narcissus and Some Tadpoles.” The main point about Stephens is that not only does he write about major writers but that he is a major writer himself. Would it be too much to hope that an offering such as Mr. Barnes gives us will spur some enterprising publisher on to give us a collected AGS? Such a book must be the most needed volume in the whole field of Australian literature.
yet another virtue of this anthology is that the editor has not restricted his choice to the obvious classics of Australian literary discussion and debate. Even in the section covering the earliest years of our literature he has been able to uncover the unexpected. An essay such as Thomas Heney's review of an anthology of Australian verse edited by Douglas Sladen in 1888 surprises by the force of its argument against literary nationalism and by its constant insistence that Australian literature must be seen in the context of literature as a whole, and not just as a peculiarly Australian phenomenon having peculiarly Australian standards. Heney wrote:

"There is beginning to grow up amongst certain circles of critics and writers a sort of implied and tacit agreement that much ought to be forgiven a man or woman who writes upon Australian subjects from Australian standpoints on the ground of their local appeal. Rubbish is to be consecrated, provided it be precious, i.e., Australian; and slipshod workmanship, threadbare subjects, rhythmical or unrhythmical verbosity, in a word, every disfigurement of style and every absurdity of conception will be not pardoned only, but cherished, provided it bear the sacrosanct impression of localism." Bearing in mind the sort of misplaced adulation which has been the fate of so many Australian writers since Heney wrote, his words have an almost prophetic ring.

Of course in many ways the task of an anthologist is a thankless one, even if he is as conscientious as Mr. Barnes has undoubtedly tried to be, even writing commentaries and introductions to link the various pieces he has chosen to print. Certainly it does seem to me to be a major flaw in this collection that it neglects entirely the Norman Lindsay inspired "vitalist" school of writers which flowered in the 1920's, and whose literary achievements even if now rather critically unfashionable, were nonetheless a major contribution to the development of our literature.

Barnes in his introduction to the third section of the book seems in fact to be in two minds about the Lindsay school, which reached perhaps its height of influence through the magazine Vision (1923-4). He admits that "there can be no doubt that it was a stimulus to creativity at a barren time", but almost hedges his bet by also insisting that "far from being avant-garde the magazine was a reflection of the English nineties". Surely the only answer one can make to this is: so what? Henry Handel Richardson was also an old-fashioned writer but nobody neglects her achievement or denies the importance of her position in the development of Australian writing. If Mr. Barnes' anthology had included at least Norman Lindsay's Creative Effort and some of the exuberance from Vision it would have done more justice to this era of our history.

It would be unjust though to close on a carping note for, as I have already suggested, this book is of immense value and interest. The Foundations of Culture in Australia, and cri de coeur of that extraordinary man "Inky" Stephensen is here, as is Rex Ingamell's Conditional Culture, both long since in need of reprinting. The final section of the book, dealing with writing of the fifties and sixties is perhaps the section where most people will feel that something else should have been included, and something more left out; and if Mr. Barnes' selection here is a more obviously subjective one than elsewhere in the book it is also a selection which reveals an acute awareness of the sort of critical revaluation which Australian literature is now undergoing.

Leon Cantrell
POVERTY IN AUSTRALIA,
G. G. Masterman.
Angus and Robertson, 171 pp., $2.25.

ADDRESSING the Summer School of the Australian Institute of Political Science in 1962, Bob Hawke of the ACTU described it as "a polite gathering of polite and comfortably-situated people applauding platitudes, uncritical when confronted with nonsense and sublimely unaware of the economic and political realities which face this country." This sort of reaction is not altogether absent after reading Poverty in Australia, a collection of the papers presented at the Institute’s Summer School in January 1969.

The opening address was given by W. C. Wentworth, the Federal Minister for Social Services, and it complacently concluded on the note that Australia probably has less poverty than any other country: "It is the combination of our social system and our social services, operating upon our tremendous natural resources and comparative freedom from the shackles of the past, which had produced for us this fortunate state of affairs." Wentworth’s war on poverty is to be based on a policy of purely fiscal or social security payments; concepts like "participation" and "community" have not yet reached Canberra. As Jim Spigelman pointed out at the conference: "The Minister’s paper could easily have been written at the turn of the century. The types of issues he discussed and the programmes he suggested were those that existed in 1900."

The best contribution came from a visiting London School of Economics Fabian, Professor Donald Dennison, who reminded the delegates that industrial progress does not eliminate poverty and may exacerbate it, that the conventional social services work to the advantage of the “haves”, and that “we institutionalise and perpetuate inequality and make it respectable.” Other papers, all of which had some interesting things to say, were read by Professor Ronald Henderson of the University of Melbourne, Miss Janet Paterson of the Brotherhood of St. Lawrence, and Professor R. G. Brown of Flinders University.

Not one of the speakers however, looked at the causes of poverty. It was left to a couple of young radical students to raise points of fundamental importance. In particular, Garrie Henderson, a second-year Melbourne University activist, berated the conference for ignoring cultural poverty and he went on to argue that poverty should not be seen as a paradox in advanced capitalist societies. Implicit in most of the papers was the assumption that poverty was some kind of aberration which could be abolished without any fundamental socio-economic structural changes. Yet as Henderson pointed out, poverty in all its dimensions is built into the capitalist system and it will not be eliminated until power in Australia is massively redistributed. That his remarks were completely ignored is not surprising for none of the papers had looked at the distribution of wealth and income. (Henderson later wrote an excellent article entitled “An Introduction to an Analysis of Poverty and Social Change” in National U, 12 May 1969.)

Any satisfactory analysis of the nature of poverty must recognise capitalism as the basic source and socialism as the ultimate solution. Of course, meliorative measures within the capitalist framework are possible, but the system will never be able to eliminate poverty, as Hyman Lumer has shown in Poverty: Its Roots and its Future (New York: International Publishers, 1965).

In his conclusion to Wealth and Power in America (New York: Praeger,
1962), Gabriel Kolko stated that "poverty will continue to be a basic aspect of the American social and class structure so long as no fundamental changes are made in the distribution of wealth and the autonomous control of the corporate machinery." This remark obviously holds also for capitalist countries other than the United States.

JOHN PLAYFORD.


ALEXANDER WERTH has been writing books for a long time. A lot of them have been about Russia, as he was born in Czarist Russia in 1901, but he emigrated to England and became a British subject.

He spent the years of the Second World War in the Soviet Union and reported the heroic exploits of the Russian people and the Red Army. In 1964 he wrote Russia at War, a world best seller now published in 18 languages. In 1965 he was again in Moscow as official guest of the Soviet Government for the 20th anniversary victory celebrations and Marshal Sokolovsky presented him with a war medal. He visited the Soviet Union again in 1967 for material for a new book which he was writing as a sequel to Russia at War. It was to be called Russia at Peace.

No one could accuse Alexander Werth of being "anti-Soviet". But as he says, "This book had been completed before the invasion of Czechoslovakia and was already at the printer when that tragedy occurred."

He decided to change the name of his book. "Technically, even after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Russia was still 'at peace'. No war had been declared on Czechoslovakia. But the very fact that, in August 1968, Russian and Czech blood (however little) was flowing in the streets of Prague made the title 'Russia at Peace' singularly incongruous, if not downright offensive." So it was changed to Russia: Hopes and Fears.

He used as a theme an excerpt from a letter received from a young Russian in September 1968. "Since Prague, our last year's timid hopes of liberalisation in Russia have dwindled for the present while our fears of a return to Stalinism (or worse) have increased immeasurably."

This is a book about Soviet achievements and about Soviet bureaucracy. It is absorbingly interesting in the light of the problems at present besetting the Communist movement as a guide to greater understanding of them. It is not the analysis of a detached academic but one by a skilled and knowledgeable observer, a reporter who spends most of his time in the Soviet Union talking, and listening, to people — to scientists, economists, writers, workers, young people and old.

The first chapter forming a background against which the whole book is written consists of a penetrating review of the CPSU Central Committee's "Survey" of the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution, published in 1967. This survey or thesis is available in Australia.

He refers to it as a sort of Brezhnev-Kosygin "History" of the last 50 years and a perspective for the future. Significant in this he sees a "calm and level headed" historical analysis of Trotskyism without departing from the basic stand against it as propounded by Stalin; admission of the extreme difficulties of collectivisation of agriculture but still justification for its brutalities and the sacrifices for industrialisation; the near destruction of the Soviet Union in the war and
admission of serious miscalculations in preparation for the Nazi attack; the people’s heroic struggle and continued sacrifices for post-war reconstruction.

He sees a more sober estimation of the difficulties of transition to communism. Despite evidence of spectacular industrial growth, productivity and wages are comparatively low compared with the U.S. and difficulties remain in agriculture and in the distribution field.

The “Survey” quotes figures of improvement in the material welfare of the Soviet people and the extension of democracy. On this latter point Werth says, “In reality this passage significantly exaggerates the role of the Soviets as something ‘independent’ of the Party machinery. This ‘democratisation’ of the Soviet Union is somewhat overdone.”

The section on the nationalities does not hint at the anomalies in Soviet society with most responsible posts occupied by Russians and a continuation of the “Jewish problem”, though in a less acute form than under Stalin and Khrushchev.

Of the “Survey’s” attitude to art and literature he says “All these verbal concessions to the ‘new spirit’ are hard to take seriously, and it seems obvious that in the government and Party hierarchy there is still a terrifying hangover from the Stalin days in matters of art and literature.”

He sees, on the face of it, “the Russians final and entirely unambiguous acceptance of polycentrism. Each Communist Party must in other words consider its own national interests first. This is a complete departure from Stalinism.” Then he goes on, “Only is it quite sincere? For if so why the great alarm caused in the Kremlin by the liberalisation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968.”

Nevertheless the “Survey” which may be regarded as the official Soviet line (and so the voice of Brezhnev and Kosygin), has, as we have seen, its weaknesses; but most Western readers will still find much of it very fundamental and convincing, above all in the anti-war stand taken by the socialist camp . . .”

Werth examines in detail the religious problems and the Soviet citizens’ attitude to sex and the achievements of the Soviet Welfare state in health, housing, education and culture. He discusses the economic reforms, the problems of Comecon and Soviet aid to developing countries.

He deals with the disputes among historians, economists, politicians and in the fields of literature, between the “Liberals” and the “Stalinists.”

The views of the Soviet people are lively and illuminating. A Professor of biology from the Novosibirsk Science Centre on Lysenko:

“You people in the West make a terrible song and dance about Pasternak and all that; but for God’s sake, literature is one thing, and one can have a hundred different opinions about any book; but science — oh, those unspeakable cretins nearly ruined Soviet science between 1948 and Pappask (Stalin’s) death. Yes people in the streets wept when he died; to us scientists it was the happiest day of our life.”

Soviet science has continued to extend its independence and is referred to as a “state within the State.”

A history teacher who spent 15 years in a labour camp asked if he had read Solzhenitsyn: “Yes and I also recently read Evgenia Ginsburg’s book and Chukovsky’s ‘Deserted House.’ Well let me tell you; the Solzhenitsyn story is the most accurate account I know of life in a camp. That’s precisely what my camps were like.”
A professor of philosophy: “Since Stalin’s death, there have been definite improvements. The powers of the NKVD have been drastically curtailed. Police inquisition, though it still exists, is more discreet than it used to be. A man like Khrushchev though a fool in many ways was more ‘democratically minded’ than Stalin; and Kosygin is better still. But there has been no proper return to Leninist ‘Democratic Centralism’. Secrecy still applies to many fields of activity. It is strongest of all in the field of ideology.”

After an interview with 18 year old Sasha, a reporter on the Moscow evening paper, who was too young to remember Stalin, Werth says, “My general impression was that he was not widely interested in ideology, but was very proud of living relatively prosperously in a well-run country that took such good care of all its citizens.”

The book deals in some detail with the Soviet Union’s relations with other countries and in particular with China. Werth says there are “at least a dozen different ‘Communisms’ and the Russian variety has become one of the most innocuous, with the concept of the ‘nation state’ strongly predominating over that of ‘revolutionary mission’ in the world.”

“There is good reason to suppose that (whatever ‘provocations’ there may have been from the Chinese side) the Russians were glad to have an excuse to stop extensive and intensive economic aid to China in 1960. In other words, it became important for Russia not to turn China, in a very short time, into a vast industrial power.”

Russia: Hopes and Fears is the answer, or a large part of the answer to many of the world’s most ticklish problems. Werth is a writer who is easy to read. He is at present writing a book on the Soviet Czechoslovak conflict.

Jim Moss


FRANK MOORHOUSE has collected twenty-four of his short stories into what he calls a “discontinuous narrative”, which term adequately describes the cohesion stopping short of unity the book as a whole achieves. Even for those who have been previously acquainted with Moorhouse’s stories this ordering of his book will undoubtedly emphasise his dry, rather spare style’s strengths and special appropriateness to his subject matter. These subjects are from Sydney’s non-conformist, young and alienated society — more particularly, the Sydney “Push” — and the Andersonian “Libertarian Society” — but, through a combination of such groups’ structures and Moorhouse’s skills, the stories transcend the self-congratulatory knowingness that makes coterie writing so often of this type of work.

In a surprisingly relevant introductory note Moorhouse says the characters in his “interlinked stories” form a “tribe — a modern urban tribe — which does not fully recognise itself as a tribe”. It is just this last aspect of the book’s environment that Moorhouse’s narrative captures so very ably. All stories are in either a direct or implied first person that denies chances for authorial comment of a narrative or moralistic nature while the presentation of their allegedly unstructured milieu does allow the reader to see “the tribe” where individual characters may not.

Added to those, still largely structural and organisational skills, there is a preoccupation with analysis and knowingness sometimes bordering on a frank self-awareness in almost all the characters — the thirty-year-old homosexual whose trip to his parents and
their country town shows him his true home is now the city, or the recently deserted husband who cannot feel fully for others' troubles but who knows it with a strange understanding.

Perhaps one of the most successful of these stories, one that shows their analytical nature's artistic as well as sociological strength, is the first in the book, "The Knife". In this story the narrator, with a large degree of knowingness, plays with ideas of masculinity through his buying a knife to hang from his belt while living in a shack out of Sydney with his young mistress. The story's first line, spoken by the girl when the knife is missing — "The knife was in the duffle-coat — with the Methedrine and Herzog" — cleverly includes emblems of nonconformity, and the masculinity symbols, while its context gives it a wry, satirical humour that the story maintains.

But if "The Knife", often wittily, embodies the uneasiness inherent in looking for identity while rejecting bourgeois, conformist standards (no cliche, this), other stories merely enumerate the special forms of scrutiny this may involve or, as in "Walking Out", suggest, against the tenor of the story I feel, the narrator "drops out" for vague and lazy reasons — exactly those reasons his parents want to believe.

But even the weaker, and they are usually the shorter, stories indicate Moorhouse's, and his character's, fascination with motives and with what I think could be called the intellectual or theoretical issues underlying the conscious adoption of nonconformist attitudes.

However the most successful stories are those that, as well as analysing or portraying motives, shift them into uneasy or tense situations, test situations, and, consequently, out of the field of merely fictional attitudinising.

It is in these that Futility and Other Animals becomes a truly accomplished, rather than promising, work and Moorhouse's understanding of the complex nature of difficult or trying situations is conveyed through the ease of good writing — an ease that most often rests in the generally binding quality of the dialogue or the spare objectivity of descriptions rather than any quotable passages.

Reviewers and readers alike are bound to say much about language and attitudes in this collection but the book is in fact distinguished by its very lack of any preoccupations with the sensationally contemporary — abortion, the pill, drugs. In their stead Moorhouse gives an urbane, well ordered and frequently dry humorous view of his "tribe" and what makes it tick in a not particularly experimental language and in situations that other countries' literatures have coped with for up to fifty years now.

CARL HARRISON-FORD.

THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN POLAND, by Paul Novick. Morning Freiheit (US), 36pp. 40 cents (Aust.)

HOW could there be a "Jewish problem" in Poland? Less than 30,000 Jews now live in the country compared with the three and a half million before the war. Poland has had more than 20 years of socialism, with racist propaganda outlawed. And the secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Wladyslaw Gomulka has a Jewish wife.

Until a few years ago, this would have been the attitude of most socialists in the West to a booklet of this kind. Recently, however, it has been sadly and reluctantly conceded that the raising of the question of anti-semitism in socialist countries
is not merely a ploy of the imperialist bourgeoisie to slander the communist movement.

Paul Novick, the author, is the most prominent Communist active in Jewish affairs in the United States, and until the last convention was a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA. He has visited Poland for lengthy periods on a number of occasions and has written about the country in booklets and in the progressive New York Yiddish language daily Morgen Freiheit.

Early in the booklet Novick adds to the list of facts of a positive nature on the position of Polish Jews. He points to a number of examples of "a regime which showed real solicitude for its Jewish communal and cultural institutions". He shows how real concern for the Jewish people disarmed many enemies of People's Poland and won honor for socialism.

He cites the many cultural institutions which the Polish government helped the post-war Jewish community to set up. He describes the effect of cultural exchanges between Polish and American Jews, and the way in which Jews everywhere were touched by the homage paid by Polish Communists to such events as the Warsaw Ghetto uprising against the nazis.

Then in March 1968, the old scar on which so much skilled and devoted surgery had been performed, and which had been pronounced by many as healed, opened up. That this happened, and the reasons for it form the main subject matter of Novick's book.

During the long periods in which right-wing forces ruled Poland, vicious use was made of anti-semitism. The combination of factors making for anti-semitism on a mass scale in Poland could scarcely have been more potent if it had been arranged deliberately. There was ignorance and poverty, national oppression. The worst traditions of Catholic anti-semitism had full scope.

The Poles have long felt a sense of national frustration, a sense of having been a pawn in the international big power game. Then came the appalling suffering of the Second World War, and a number of aspects of their socialist history which tended to aggravate the strong nationalist feelings.

The Communists and progressive forces of Poland faced such a task in building the new society that many have felt, and still feel, that criticism of shortcomings or directing attention to problems is unjust. Novick refers, for example, to an anti-Jewish pogrom, in Kielce carried out by reactionary forces as recently as 1946, in which 42 people died.

But what emerges from the booklet are facts which put the question of anti-semitism in Poland on quite a different level from shortcomings and omissions in the struggle against the past. The real point here is the use of anti-semitism for political purposes by leaders and factions in the Polish government and Polish United Workers' Party.

March 1968 was a time of sharpening difficulties in Poland, which manifested themselves in several spheres, including the universities, the economy, and in the Party. It was evidently felt by more than one faction that with ammunition running low, a shot or two of anti-semitism could still be effective.

Novick demonstrates that what developed was a considerable campaign against 'Zionism', particularly after the Arab-Israel conflict of June 1967. There were pointed press references to disloyal elements, the percentage of Jews in the Party, and a singling out of Jewish Communists who had been
associated with crimes of the Stalinist past.

Examples are given of distortions of the history of the Jews in Poland, such as the playing down of the heroic Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943—a struggle which inspired all anti-fascist fighters. Anniversary celebrations of the event began to receive cool treatment by Polish leaders.

The main responsibility for the upsurge of anti-Semitism according to Novick, is due to a Party faction led by former Interior Minister General Mieczyslaw Moczar. Most of the examples are from this grouping. But it also becomes clear that the supporters of Gomulka were not guiltless.

General Moczar, for example is quoted from the Warsaw press as having said in a speech: "... The Israeli aggression against the Arab countries goes hand in hand with the anti-Polish campaign which international Zionism conducts throughout the world. This campaign is promoted through the modern means of communication such as the press, the film, television and literature, all of which are overwhelmingly controlled by the Zionists. On our part this campaign will meet with protest and condemnation. International Zionism attempts to whitewash the Germans of the crimes they committed against the Jews and in a perfidious manner it seeks to make the Poles equally guilty...

Statements like these deserve some pondering. While they do not approach the viciousness of some of the utterances of Moczar, some statements by Gomulka himself, and particularly by one of his prominent supporters, Andrzej Werblen, must be deeply disturbing to all socialists. They are quoted at some length, and the anti-Semitic character of the statements in the context of Polish politics are analysed.

It is said that opposition to Zionism, even denunciation of Zionism, is not anti-Semitism. This statement in itself is true. But the term 'Zionist' can be used in a context in which it assumes a definite anti-Semitic meaning. Novick puts it as follows.

"The anti-Zionist line which permeates so much of the Polish press appears to be an odd blend of Marxist-sounding phraseology and of the 'traditional' anti-Semitic notions which are easily recognisable to anyone who was exposed to the anti-Semitism of the pre-war Poland. The old hobgoblin of the wily and powerful International Jew always taking advantage of the decent and well-meaning non-Jews is slightly altered: instead of 'Jew' we now have 'Zionist'; instead of the 'world Jewish conspiracy' we now have the 'international Zionist conspiracy'".

A curious twist to the tragedy is provided by the fact that the super-vigorous "anti-Zionist" campaign tends to feed political Zionism. With the din of the campaign continually in their cars, it is natural for some Jews to conclude that perhaps the only solution is to pack their bags for Israel. Even the assimilated Jew who rejects Zionism has his latent soft spot for Israel sensitised. He takes more interest in the fortunes of the Israeli or Zionist leaders, and even identifies himself with them while having no thoughts of going to Israel.

Novick in no way comes out as an anti-Polish crusader. He banks on the traditions of the true patriots and humanists of this country about which he obviously feels so deeply, and especially does he bank on "the tradition of the Communist Party of Poland which was fighting anti-Semitism during the regime of Pilsudski and the colonels".

DAVE DAVIES
Books Received

SCIENCE IN HISTORY
by J. D. Bernal.
Penguin.
4 Vols., 1329 pp., plus index. $3.45.

GUERRILLA WARFARE
by Che Guevara.
Penguin,
143 pp., 70c.

REMINISCENCES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR
by Che Guevara.
Penguin.
272 pp., 1.00.

POLITICAL IDEAS
David Thomson Ed.
Penguin,
206 pp., 85c.

ABUSE OF POWER — US FOREIGN POLICY FROM CUBA TO VIETNAM
by Theodore Draper.
Penguin,
238 pp., 1.00.

OBsolete COMMUNISM — THE LEFT-WING ALTERNATIVE
by Gabriel & Daniel Cohn-Bendit.
Penguin.
256 pp., 85c.

AMERICA — THE MIXED CURSE
by Andrew Kopkind.
Penguin.
300 pp., 1.30.

RIGHTS AND WRONGS — SOME ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Edited by Christopher R. Hill for Amnesty International.
Penguin. 188 pp., 85c.

THE BIAFRA STORY
by Frederick Forsyth.
Penguin,
237 pp., 1.00.

EXERCISES IN DIPLOMACY
by Sir Percy Spender.
Sydney University Press.
393 pp., 7.00.

THE PREHISTORY OF AUSTRALIA
by D. J. Mulvaney.
Thames & Hudson.
276 pp.

A HUMANIST VIEW
Ian Edwards, Ed.
A. & R.
200 pp., 4.95.

IT'S PEOPLE THAT REALLY MATTER — EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
Donald McLean, Ed.
A. & R.
352 pp., 6.95.

AUTOMATION — THREAT OR PROMISE
G. W. Ford Ed.
Anzaas.
$5.25 bound. $3.75 paper.

SOCIETY, SCHOOLS & PROGRESS IN AUSTRALIA
by P. H. Partridge.
Pergamon Press.
246 pp., 3.50.

FROM ODESSA TO ODESSA
by Judah Waten.
Cheshire, 198 pp., 4.75.
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