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Palmada—Industrial Perspectives
Salmon—France a Year After
Marek on the Stalin-Mythos
Playford on CB Warfare

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NO-ONE, not even the most wildly optimistic, expected that 800 people would spend all, or part, of Easter debating and considering strategies for the Left in Australia. The fact that they did suggests a new seriousness which could serve the Left well.

The Conference for Left Action was not without its problems. While there was some evidence of a yearning for a fresh start, for a real attempt to overcome the worst divisions, the first attempt to consider holding such a conference came from Laurie Aarons, secretary of the Communist Party. This raised immediate problems. For some, notably Newsweekly on the right, it was an attempt to bring under communist control all the new and varied radical forces. But there were those on the Left who had their suspicions too. Was this just another exercise in manipulation? Was it an example of further compromises with petit bourgeois forces? Why was the approach made by Aarons and not by the Communist Party organisation?

Such reservations express in various ways one disquiet of those on the Left who remain unconvinced that the Communists, given their past, their program, their organisation, their attitude, can now contribute meaningfully to socialist advance in Australia. The fact that it was Aarons could hardly be taken as hiding his identity, but it raised at least two important advantages. First, while one may discount anti-communist phobias if one likes, in reality it is easier to decide to join in the initiation of a project with a person than with an organisation. Second the nature of the Left today is that trends are more identifiable with people than with organisations. Even the Communist Party no longer appears, let alone is, a monolith. Other Left trends appear differently from State to State, within organisations or are represented in various “little” journals. Some trends do not even have a public face.

In any event 30 initiating sponsors representing significant but by no means all trends, consulted and decided on the form of the conference. Later more than 100 others endorsed their proposals, added to them, changed some. By the time conference assembled no significant trend was absent although some were more substantially represented than others.
Although the sponsors had sought to discuss two questions, a critique of Australian capitalism and its position vis à vis world imperialism and then to consider various strategies, it was really the latter which engaged attention. Many participants rejected the need to make a substantial critique, claiming that “we know the problems.” Unfortunately this is less than the truth. It is because so little is known by workers of the motivations of students, by students of the real conditions of workers, by professional and skilled workers of the difficulties facing the unskilled, by the majority of the real deprivation of the minority, and much more that many Left strategies are still so removed from reality. Who, for example, understood the participation of a twenty year old Maltese migrant, a man who works forty hours doing dull repetitive work for less than $40 and who spent his holiday weekend providing coffee for the ideologists? If the Left Conference showed anything, it showed that most of the homework remains to be done and must be done if an alternative to capitalist myth-making is to ever become the province of more than a few.

Yet there is already sufficient grasp of basics to ensure genuine attempts at socialist renewal. And this despite obvious inadequacies. There still are some communists who believe that they have fulfilled the requirements of militancy simply by prefacing whatever they say with “I am a communist”. It’s still disconcerting for some, to have to enter real debate and dialogue and something of a shock (not only to communists) that open differences are aired between communists. There are workers and students who substitute wish for reality and declare that worker-student cooperation is a going concern despite the intolerance which appeared even in that gathering. There were attempts to solve deep seated problems by advising students to wash more often and cut their hair as if this was the main barrier separating students from workers. Workers, on the other hand, were told to read more widely and to advance actions incomprehensible to some present, let alone those outside, not to speak of their suitability or otherwise.

Just as those who assumed that the Communist Party was a monolith were surprised so were those who lump together all under thirties as “students” or the “new left”. True, most young people present were students representing an important development of new radicalism, but if anything they were more divided than the rest. Far from offering Left alternatives that are new, one heard echoes of every old Left idea ever propagated — the praise of Stalin, a sectarian response to a radical catholic, unthinking hero worship of “the workers” — were some ideas expressed by individual students.
What was new was the coming together, the prevailing spirit that no one (one or two excepted) had all the answers, that the lessons of France had been taken in, if not fully admitted, and expressed in the conviction that the key to social change lies with the working class. By and large then all present were seeking common ground for the Left — students, academics, workers, union officials, professionals—to break capitalism's hold on the working people, if the means varied the end was the same.

For communists the criticisms offered of their position were, mainly, constructive, if in some cases more perceptive than those they now make of themselves. Notice was served on the Communist Party to continue the present changes, which are respected, to restructure its organisation, to accommodate more of the differing views on the Left, to get more to see that there is no alternative to the development of organisation which can become the centre of the revolutionary movement. For communists in the trade unions it was an unequivocal call for a revolutionary perspective, not just for militant actions but for the development of actions which serve revolutionary purposes.

Whatever the weaknesses and strengths the Left will not be the same again. Some suspicions have been dissipated and replaced by a new tolerance; ideas and programs were discussed on their merits, mostly free of prejudice; the concept of power and the upgrading of demands for control received a new emphasis and the development towards essential worker-student cooperation was enhanced, if only because those revolutionary workers and students present now estimate each other more positively.

For those who were not present, the stimulation is difficult to convey although the quality of the papers presented may be judged since these are for sale. For the future a realistic program was adopted. It dispensed with the "Long live this" and the "Down with that" in favor of a modest effort at research, a registrar of Left and radical organisations and a series of future conferences, the first scheduled for August on workers' control and self-management. All hold the possibility for further Left collaboration.

Where it will all lead to no one can say. In the immediate aftermath, trade unions in Sydney responded, as they haven't for a long time, to police intervention in a student anti-conscription demonstration. Perhaps this too is part of a new beginning. Someone suggested that no conference of the Left, with such diversity had been held since that which led to the foundation of the Communist Party in the 1920's. It may be that this conference represents first steps for the revolutionary coalition needed for the '70's.
THE SCOPE AND DEPTH of the opposition to the penal clauses of the compulsory Arbitration Acts revealed in the struggle against the gaoling of Clarrie O'Shea and continued after his release, has surprised the radical-minded as well as alarming the conservative. This poses a challenge to all, not excluding the communists, even though they have been paid the over-generous compliment by Government, DLP and employers of being held responsible for it all.

However different in form, this great struggle has intimate links with the student revolt, the negro rebellion and the French upheaval of a year ago, reviewed once again in this issue. There is a vast ground-swell springing in ways not yet adequately fathomed, from the very nature — repellent and alienating — of modern society in the throes of the scientific and technological revolution, with its monopoly domination in the economy, its bureaucracy and authoritarianism in enterprises, institutions and organisations, its increasing incapacity to satisfy human needs.

Compulsory Arbitration, enforced by all the repressive power of the State, is the very antithesis of the deepest aspirations of modern man who yearns for self-fulfilment and at the least a measure of independent control over his own activities. Since this authoritarian compulsion involves a far greater number of people to a more intimate degree than any other repressive laws, the fight against it is of correspondingly greater significance.

If hundreds of thousands of unionists cannot run their own organisations, control the disposal of their own persons even to the limited extent of withholding their labor when they think necessary, or pursue without repression even modest aims (as measured by the possibilities of today), how can larger aims such as workers' control, student power, autonomy for aborigines, meaningful civil rights and participating democracy in general be achieved? This is the question that should be posed again, again and again.

The usual and more obvious reformist attempts to divert the struggle with minor modifications of the penal clauses, or of the arbitration system itself will need to be guarded against, as will the specious pleas for "law and order" which can conceive nothing but compulsion (by and for the Establishment) and regard self-management in any form as a dream — or a nightmare.

No less, however, will it be necessary to combat traditional trade union narrowness, which is blind to the transforming possibilities of the struggle in the present political and social scene, in forging links between workers and students and others, and in impelling the unions into the path of bursting through capitalist containment and integration and becoming instruments of radical social change.
INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVES

A survey of the issues, trends and possibilities in the turbulent industrial scene in Australia 1969, made by a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party of Australia.

SPEAKING AT SHELLHARBOUR, N.S.W., on May 5, the Federal Treasurer Mr. McMahon stated that Australia’s gross national product at constant prices had been rising by 5½ per cent annually, 1 per cent higher than the growth rate of the ’fifties. “If the recent rate is maintained,” he said, “our gross national product would treble in 20 years . . . Australia, if it maintained its present immigration program would have a population around 20 million by 1980.” These are arresting figures even if not accepted at face value. Australia is a young country whose all round industrial development only really took place from the period of the second world war. It is a tremendously rich country with a potential of growth that exceeds the predictions of Mr. McMahon.

But this picture of expanding economic growth will mean different things to different people depending where they stand in relationship to the production process, the share of what is produced, how society recognises their individual and collective contribution to the expansion, and by what say the producers, whether by hand or brain, will have in determining what will happen in the production and distribution of their product.

The scientific and technological revolution, as yet only in its infancy in Australia, is having and will continue to have a radical effect not only on production but more importantly on the structure of the productive forces and the different strata of society. The very nature of human labor, its division, its material and human qualities, are being impacted from all sides by these revolutionary changes in the production processes. The study of these changes in the forces of production and the social, economic and political consequences that flow from them under conditions of present day monopoly capitalism are fundamental to arriving at a correct strategy for the revolutionary movement. It is from here that we start our analysis of the main forces, both actual and potential that can be drawn into the struggle for social change. It is
from this analysis also that we seek the issues, both old and new that are motivating diverse sections of society in the struggle against capitalism.

Lenin pointed out that without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary change. Development of theory on the way forward to socialism in Australian conditions and having it accepted by the mass of the Australian people is a decisive task. The relevance of the Communist Party as a viable political organisation exists only in its demonstrating the ability to analyse social reality and act as a leading force by the transformation of its theory into mass movements of all the exploited and alienated in society — particularly in the trade unions, where it has had its main influence. It is only relevant to the extent that it recognises changes and demonstrates capacity for leadership not by mere proclamations, but in practice. Furthermore, the Communist Party has no monopoly of ideas, solutions or truth. Not only must it win voluntary support for its ideas in open contest with others but it must recognise and be prepared to join in open alliance with other left forces committed to revolutionary change.

The scientific and technological revolution deepens and aggravates the problems associated with further extensions in the divisions of labor and in turn emphasises and accentuates the ever expanding social character of production. The further divisions are expressed in the decisive connection between research and development projects and industrial production — in the ever increasing proportion of public social resources which find their way into research and development and in the fact that research and development requires increasing specialisation with longer periods of training.

As distinct from industrial production, the product (commodity if you like) which flows from research and development is something different, original and new. The creative ideas of the scientist and technician working in the field of research and development in the service of production are as much commodities as those produced by the machine engaged in direct material production. More and more the disposal rights of his creative ideas belongs to the capitalist who employs him.

If alienation of the worker in general stems not only from the division of labor but even more from the conversion of labor's product into a commodity belonging to another, how much greater then is the alienation of the scientific worker whose production is not required to be some standardised product but something that is new, unique and creative, i.e., ideas?
This process of alienation that permeates not only the toiling section of society is causing a whole wave of questioning of the moral and ethical values of the capitalist system. Man's individual creativeness is fettered by the repetitive processes of the machine which is still dominant. Morals and ethics are cloaked in the hypocrisy of capitalist class society, democracy serves the ruling class and the bureaucracy, whilst a sham parliamentary system assumes more and more the character of autocratic, executive rule. In essence the whole question of human values, man's human purpose in life is thrown sharply into focus. It is clear now, if it wasn't before, that there is no real demarcation line between the economic, the political and the humanitarian.

With the development of the productive forces, the social strata in conflict with capitalism and capable of sweeping away the old and establishing the new has been considerably broadened. The concept of the most decisive force for change, the working class, must include today all those who, by hand or brain, contribute collectively, and actively participate in some part of the productive process.

If this social force represents the most important element in the challenge to the capitalist system, then the tactics, organisation and issues required to mobilise them are equally decisive. The ability of the ruling class to maintain some form of stability relies to a great extent on its capacity not only to actually hold firmly the reins of power by force, but also to maintain its ideological hegemony and contain opposition within a limited and fairly well defined framework of activity. It will tolerate such opposition so long as it does not seriously threaten the existing power structure. It is only when opposition breaks beyond these accepted avenues of opposition that the real nature of the class conflict is exposed.

Modern day capitalism has developed the most subtle and sophisticated methods by which to mould and control the mass consensus and forms of opposition. Take, for example, the trade unions. Violently and brutally suppressed in the formative years of industrial capitalism, they now seek to contain and accommodate them within the framework of the established capitalist order. In Australia, a somewhat unique system of State Arbitration, incorporating its own code of penalties, is the main medium by which monopoly pursues its policy of containment. By the processes of Arbitration the Establishment seeks to constantly restrict the autonomy of the trade unions and consciously uses it to impose its own incomes and other policies on the workers. Let us examine briefly how this has operated in recent periods.
The employers' total wage concept first put forward and rejected in 1964 was adopted by the Arbitration Commission in 1965 and put into effect in 1966-67. This concept provides for a periodical review of wages, based on economic grounds that conform to the interests of the employers. Allied to this there is now the policy of work-value assessments to determine classification rates of individual workers. The effects of this quite radical change in the process of wage fixation have been to:

1. Allow the employers to utilise to the full the most restrictive and exhaustive arbitration procedures.
2. Widen the gap, and consequently the divisions, between the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers with even greater exploitation of the unskilled workers.
3. Attempt to abolish the "flow-on" tradition that was associated with decisions determining the rates in the Metal Trades Award.
4. Attempt to achieve a greater measure of control over all aspects of wages including over-award payments.

The parallel between these changes implemented by the Arbitration Commission and proposals made in the Vernon Economic Enquiry shows clearly the role of the Arbitration system in imposing an incomes policy determined by the employers. The next step in this policy is the so-called Employers' Charter which seeks to extend this process a step further, thus once again placing the trade union movement on the defensive and carrying through the plans of the employers.

If we examine these developments only since 1964, a clear pattern emerges. The employers constantly hold the initiative, utilising to the full the processes of Arbitration and its penal provisions to contain the trade union movement, placing it in a perpetual state of defending the status quo. They are in fact, achieving in a much more subtle way what the Wilson Labor Government is seeking to do by legislation, i.e., foist a centralised incomes policy on the working class and trade union movement. Thus the Arbitration system is able to obscure the real intent of its decisions in legalities and farcical impartiality. The side effects of frustration, costly court hearings, fines and penalties, an almost unavoidable pre-occupation in legalities and economism are important fringe benefits that accrue to monopoly in pursuit of their aims.

A concerted challenge by the Left of the trade union movement against the Arbitration system and its penal powers is necessary,
even essential if the working class is to break out of the straight-jacket that has been tightly woven around it. In the last 20 years since the development of the Penal Powers, orders instituted against unions under them have grown from periods of one month to three months, to six months, to twelve months and in isolated instances bans have operated for two years.

It is true, of course, that opposition to the penal powers by the Left has always existed. There is some validity in the argument that circumstances in the past have not always been favorable for a confrontation on the use of the Penal Powers. The relative strength of the right wing and concern for the possible isolation of the Left were matters that had to be taken into account.

Tactical problems concerning unity will continue to arise but the present political situation, the developing general concern for restrictions of democratic rights conditioned by such campaigns as anti-conscription, opposition to the Vietnam war, the right to demonstrate, opposition to censorship and the hypocrisy of capitalist ethics has considerably altered the whole climate in which such a challenge can and must proceed today.

The jailing of C. O'Shea, Victorian Secretary of the Tramways Union which refused to pay some $8,000 in fines and costs, has been the catalyst embodying 20 years of bitter frustration of the working class. The nationwide strike action and demonstration of workers has been the biggest for 20 years. A significant feature of the action has been the involvement and new unity of students and workers in the demonstrations, emphasising the affinity of issues concerning them both.

Attempts will be made, in the face of the upsurge of opposition to the Penal Powers to modify what was referred to in past resolutions of the ACTU as the capricious use of the Penal Powers. Nothing less than the complete repeal of all repressive legislation in the Arbitration Act will be acceptable to the organised working class. In fact, in this important struggle the whole system of Arbitration is under challenge and the slogan of collective bargaining should be pushed to the fore.

The reasons for which the trade unions were formed, i.e., to defend labor "against the encroachments of capital" remain a basis task. They have demonstrated their willingness to engage in this struggle in the past and will do so in the future. However, to allow the sights of the working class to remain confined merely to questions affecting the price of their labor is to cast them in the role of defenders of the wages system. The trade unions, as organisations of the working class, need to be instilled with the consciousness necessary to respond to every form of social injustice
on whichever section of society it is inflicted. This requires that the trade unions acquire a political perspective, a counter-strategy to that of monoplies, which launches the working class on to the offensive. It requires that the Left in the trade unions examine the issues that flow as a result of technological change to see the counter, not in terms of past demands, but in more radical demands that meet the present requirements.

There is sometimes an underestimation as to the speed with which technological advance is proceeding in Australia. The main trend at the moment has been towards mechanisation and semi-automated processes but some idea of what is planned for the future is indicated by the fact that there are now some 5,000 computer programmers in Australia but the estimate is that by 1973 there will be 20,000.

There is also a tendency in the trade unions to approach the effects of this technological revolution only in terms of solutions that applied to problems of yesterday — to see its effects only in terms of redundancy, preservation of existing work areas and other more obvious social consequences, and moreover to meet these problems with the type of solution which gives the appearance at least of the unions solving the employment problems of the employers or, like the Luddites of old, opposing technological change. Time and again the trade unions are faced with a situation, brought about by the introduction of new methods of production and employer initiative, of being forced to negotiate a solution and then being put into the position of undertaking the responsibility of "selling" the result to the workers. As a result, the workers whose pattern of work has been radically changed and whose thinking necessarily lags behind developments, see not the employers as being responsible, but the unions.

But even more importantly, the issues that arise from these radical developments are in themselves entirely new. The more obvious questions, such as wages and conditions still remain and must still occupy a prime place in trade union activity, though these too need to be approached in a radically different way. But, in addition, the very nature of the changes being wrought in society, throw up many moral and social issues that vitally affect the worker and his family and must also become the concern of the trade unions. The state of housing, social services, taxation, pensions, urban developments and planning. In fact all those questions that go to make up what is often referred to as the "quality of life."

In fact the trade unions must challenge the right of those who at present own, control and plan the future for their own ends, to
exclude the workers from the making of decisions that affect not only them but the future of society as a whole. This raises the question of democratic control, of the right of the producers to challenge and intervene in all matters that affect their welfare, from those on the job itself to issues involving society as a whole.

One such example of a more radical approach and expressing in an embryonic form the type of demand that must be extended, is the industrial agreement operating on the modern container ships Manoora and Kanimbla. The Seamen's Union and other Maritime unions, in order to offset the reduction in the manning scale due to modernisation, has instituted swinger shifts (thirty-four weeks on and eighteen weeks off) at a minimum rate of pay for 52 weeks. On each ship there is a committee of representatives of all shipboard unions who meet regularly with the skipper to discuss issues arising from the agreement. Further examples, like the Teachers' Federation and their demand for representation on an Education Commission (still unsatisfied), the direct intervention by job committees on safety issues and so on must be extended to widen the influence and direct intervention of the workers and their trade unions into all aspects of production. These demands awaken the consciousness of the workers to their real role in society, that of the producers of the wealth of society.

Such demands are not necessarily confined to the job and factory level but extend to the broader social questions which today more than ever express the contradictions between the advantages of the scientific and technological revolution and state monopoly control. In a society where abundance for all is made possible by the great technological advance, can the working class ignore the plight of the pensioners and other large underprivileged minority groups? Can the organised working class continue to tolerate the blatant injustice and denial of land rights to the Aborigine minority? How many trade unions or even individual officials reacted in protest immediately to the renewed demand by the reactionary leaders of the RSL that a government White Paper be produced on Communists and the Communist Party?

The plight of the education system — probably expressing even more clearly than any other social issue the contradiction between social needs and the policy and priorities of an immoral, elitist-thinking bureaucracy, is responsible for increasing agitation and activity by teachers, students and organisations of parents and citizens.

This activity stems from a concern at the inadequacies of an outdated and outmoded education system that denies thousands
of children the greatest possible opportunities to acquire knowledge in an age when higher learning is essential. These children, in the main, are the sons and daughters of trade unionists yet, apart from a few resolutions, the trade union movement does not actively initiate or join with the Teachers’ Federation and other educational bodies in campaigns to assert the rights of all to a free education.

Migrant workers now comprise a large section of the work force, particularly in the unskilled section where, in many instances, they form a majority. Is this fact adequately reflected in the trade union organisation, structure and activity? To attract a more active participation of migrant workers in trade union affairs, the unions must vigorously combat the discrimination meted out to migrant workers, taking issue with such questions as the refusal of the Government to grant naturalisation to those migrants who have been known to take part in progressive causes.

These and many other issues not mentioned require greater vision and a more radical approach in finding solutions. To carry a forward-looking and militant policy through requires also a streamlining of trade union organisation, an expansion of trade union democracy at all levels. This applies particularly to developing virile trade union organisation at factory level and providing the facilities by which this grass-roots level of organisation can find expression at all levels. It requires a conscientious and sincere approach to the amalgamation of various unions in the one industry as an important step to strengthening the union movement economically and organisationally. Bureaucracy and authoritarianism exist pervasively in the trade union movement. Some union structures and methods of organisation, their type of propaganda and style of work belong to an era long since past. A modern, highly efficient organisation corresponding to the exacting demands required to facilitate the dissemination of information, ideas and a policy that reflects the needs of the working class in these days of rapid change is essential.

Unity of the trade union movement is an essential element to carrying through the campaigns that confront the working class. There are forces within and outside the trade union movement which constantly seek to disrupt and divide it. If the Left of the trade union movement advances policies and gives leadership around issues that correspond to the interests of the workers and mobilises them in supporting action, these rightwing forces are made impotent. Since the last ACTU Congress the leadership of the ACTU has been strengthened from the Left. This has been an important development and could assist, between now and September, to create the circumstances for a further swing to the Left
at the ACTU Congress. The Congress itself is already being portrayed by the reactionary press as a power struggle between Souter and Hawke who are candidates for the vacant position of President. Of course, the outcome of this important vote holds considerable interest for the national trade union movement, but in essence the real issues will be those policy questions decided by Congress.

Will the Congress reflect the great needs of the Australian working class and people in today's conditions? Will the congress, if the issue is still undecided, take up the challenge thrown out by the Tramways Union and the other trade unions to Arbitration and the Penal Powers? Will the Congress reject the futile exercise of applying to the Court for wage increases on monopoly's terms or will it demand of this society that it provide a minimum family living wage for all? Will it declare in support of any young worker who refuses to register for national service to fight in the dirty war in Vietnam?

Decisions on these and other important issues hold considerable interest for the whole of the working class. The great class battles which started in 1968 over the Metal Trades Margins decision and attempts at absorption have been extended to 1969 with the confrontation of the Penal Powers. Already the Treasurer, Mr. McMahon, has declared that the Federal Government will oppose the unions' claim in the approaching national wage case. The workers have registered their feelings and will continue to make their views known. The trade unions, particularly the Left, must give them a positive, militant lead now for this is what they will be looking to the Congress for — re-structuring and the taking up of issues that can make the unions real instruments of social change.
FRANCE
A YEAR LATER

The author was an eye witness of some of the events in France in May-June 1968 (see for example the interview with ALR—No. 4 1968). Here he re-examines those events in the light of subsequent developments.

ONE YEAR AFTER France's crisis of May 1968, de Gaulle has at last gone. Some will say that his resignation over the defeat of his April 27 referendum on regional reform and abolition of the Senate came just a year too late, that it was well within the bounds of political possibility to achieve such a result a year earlier. But the connection between the two events is undoubted — his resignation would have been unthinkable without the tremendous erosion of his position wrought by the May crisis of 1968.

The meaning of this crisis still haunts not only those who come after de Gaulle in power in French politics, but the governments of the entire world of advanced capitalism. It is also a source of continuing inspiration and debate for revolutionaries everywhere. The forces unleashed in France's upheaval of 1968 were so characteristic of contemporary capitalism that the temptation to see them as a prefiguration of what may come to pass elsewhere, whether feared or desired, is irresistible.

The May 1968 events in France have already given rise to their own mythology. Two mythical presentations of them are most prevalent on the Left. One is that May 1968 represented a revolution betrayed, that power was there "waiting to be gathered up in the streets" (Jean-Pierre Vigier), but that due to the failure of the leaders of the Parti Communiste Francais (PCF), a clear and simple revolutionary option was passed up. The other is that the "great merit" of the PCF in the crisis was that it "rejected adventurism" (Waldeck Rochet), and thus averted an inevitable bloody defeat for the working class.

Argument about these propositions must necessarily remain fundamentally speculative. The PCF leadership did not move — the alleged "power vacuum" was not tested. Nor, it must be added, can it ever be either convincing demonstrated or denied, despite the flood of writings designed to achieve these two opposite aims. For while it absolutely convincingly demonstrated the new revolutionary potential of the working class and the intellectually-
trained in modern societies, the 1968 French drama never reached the final act — it did not test the capacity of the repressive machinery of modern bourgeois States to meet revolutionary insurrections. One can only say that the light-hearted dismissal of this capacity is just as inappropriate as the tendency to see the sophisticated contemporary repressive machinery as *ipso facto* ruling out the possibility of successful revolutionary insurrection. Answers to such questions must await future situations in which, wherever they arise, all parties to the conflict will certainly have done much homework on the French crisis of 1968.

What I feel needs to be said, with the benefit of 12 months hindsight on the French crisis, is that the PCF leaders' unbending refusal to give any credit at all to forces to their Left, their overriding concern with parliamentary strategies (building alliances to their Right), did tend to reduce the scope of the crisis during its course, and to minimise the scope of its eventual effects.

For example, it is my belief that at the peak of the crisis, with nine million wage-earners on strike during the fourth week of May, if the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT) had told the Gaullist authorities that it would not negotiate with them for a settlement in the Grenelle talks, but only with a new government formed for the purpose, the government could have been forced to resign and a new one formed in which democratic forces could well have made substantial advances. The agreement to negotiate with Pompidou at Grenelle, it seems to me, tended to legitimise the Gaullist power at a moment when the maximum political and social pressure was being exerted upon it, at the moment of its maximum weakness.

The French-domestic and the international considerations determining the PCF refusal to move against the Gaullist regime at this moment which seems to me to have been a decisive one, will certainly be studied for a long time to come. It should only be noted here in passing that there were very lively fears in the minds of PCF leaders at the time that the Gaullist regime would only in the prevailing circumstances be succeeded by another with a less anti-American foreign policy orientation. Certain reticences in the Soviet press coverage of the crisis at the time would seem to indicate that the Soviet Foreign Ministry had made a similar appraisal. (One responsible PCF official told me in a conversation in Paris in June 1968 that in his view "US imperialist and Zionist influences" had played a determining role in the orientation of the student Left during the crisis.)

In any case, it seems to me that it is here, in this kind of "middle ground" between the two "myths" referred to above, that the truth about possible alternative outcomes to the French crisis of
1968 is to be found. But one does not reduce by a jot the strength of a myth by calling it by its name — the fact is that the two main myths about the French crisis are believed by millions. They are material facts of the most potent kind in the life of the French Left today — facts of division, facts of bitter conflict even.

How do the main actors in last year's French drama stand today? What are the prospects for the healing of the breaches which today scar the body of the French Left? Dominating the French student movement, detonator of the May crisis, is a sharp struggle of influence between the far-Left groupings which were the chief protagonists of student revolt in '68 and the PCF-oriented UEC (l'Union des etudiants communistes). The most recent indications are that the latter forces have made considerable headway, especially in various elections to representative bodies in the university world.

In March, elections were held to the UER (Unites d'enseignement et de recherche) to be set up under the government's new education law. The new bodies, comprising representatives of students, teachers, research workers and administrative personnel, will have as their nominal task the defining of the orientation of the new universities envisaged by the law. The extreme Left, through the leadership of UNEF (l'Union national des etudiants francais) called for a boycott of the elections. But the UEC, acting through the newly-formed UNEF-Renouveau — a broad grouping of Left and moderate Left students — recommended a vote, raising the slogan "Don't leave the universities to the reactionaries." Result of this confrontation was that an estimated 52 p.c. of the student body took part in the vote, with rather wide differences in the level of participation for various disciplines: 42 p.c. in Letters, 43 p.c. in Sciences, 53 p.c. in Law, 68 p.c. in Medicine and Pharmacy and 77 p.c. in the university technological institutes.

Considering that in the only previous nation-wide elections held in the French student body — to designate representatives to handle social security questions — the level of participation has been of the order of 15 to 20 p.c., the vote in the UER poll expresses dramatically the new level of political awareness in the French student body. Voting in all cases of course is voluntary.

Another advance for PCF influence was marked by the March extraordinary Congress of the SNE(Sup) (Syndicat national de l'enseignement superieur), the university teachers' union, whose role in the May crisis was hardly less important than that of UNEF. Basing themselves on a program of socialist-oriented trade union action within the university, PCF activists and their supporters won control of the organisation from far-Left forces headed by former SNE(Sup) secretary Alain Geismar, who with Daniel Cohn-Bendit
and Jacques Sauvageot was the student movement leader most in the public eye last May. Geismar and his supporters favored a program of constant revolutionary contestation of the bourgeois university.

The Congress was almost evenly divided, with 2691 votes for the majority line and 2265 for the Geismar-Herszberg forces. The gravity of the division in SNE(Sup) is underlined by the fact that elected representatives of the minority position refused to accept seats on the leading bodies. At one point the Congress split physically in two, with the Geismar-Herszberg forces leaving the meeting hall singing the Internationale, and for a time holding their own meeting in a neighboring amphitheatre.

It should also be noted that PCF-influenced people are in highly influential positions in the secondary teachers' union (SNES), and in the national committee of the CAL (Comités d'action lyceens), or high school action committees, which organised millions of secondary school pupils in May 1968. The wave to what might be described as moderate-militant positions seems in fact quite general. It would be pleasant if one could react with unalloyed pleasure at these developments. But a sober examination of the French education world shows that the divisions within the Left, the struggles of tendency, are quite as bitter as they have ever been. There are few signs that the vital synthesis of the various Left forces in the world of education is under way, or that their ideological differences are being confronted in other than the spirit of factionalism.

The same is true for the Left as a whole, as the campaign for the presidential election following de Gaulle's resignation is at present (mid-May) so graphically demonstrating. The Federation of the Left, grouping the Socialist Party, the Radical Party and Francois Mitterand's Republican Clubs, which in the past has collaborated electorally with the PCF, has been virtually sprung by the impact of the May crisis. Reduced to its component parts — Mitterand's Clubs are now known as the CIR, or Convention des institutions républicaines — the various elements of the Federation are now demonstrating publicly the differences which set them at odds privately in the past.

As for the PCF itself, it is impossible to detect much movement in its disposition towards other Left forces in the year that has passed since May. True, the Manifesto of the Central Committee, adopted by the December 5-6 1968 session, makes a relatively more positive assessment of the student movement of May than that made at the time. The Manifesto says at one point:

we can record that as a result of the May-June struggle socialist ideas have reached new strata of manual and intellectual workers, even if it is true
that the ways of conceiving socialism vary from one section to another.

For example, as might have been expected, among white collar workers, intellectuals and students, petty-bourgeois conceptions of socialism have shown themselves to be lively. But the big fact is that the ideas of Marx and Lenin far from remaining cold and dogmatic scholastic formulae, are more and more becoming the property of the masses.

Old and false notions of class collaboration are shown to be powerless in the face of the rise of socialist ideas.

It must be said that this is a good distance from the tone of much PCF comment on the student movement made in the course of the May crisis, and from the frame of mind which inhibited the PCF from making any protest when eleven far-Left student and other bodies were banned by the Gaullist regime in June, 1968. But in the strategic sense, the PCF continues to distinguish itself in relation to other Left forces by describing them as "Left and Rightwing opportunists," and "Left and Rightwing revisionists" (see reports by Georges Marchais and Waldeck Rochet to a conference on communist work in the factories, Bagneux, February 23-24, 1969). With the best will in the world, it is impossible to recognise in these formulations very much of the reality of the ferment of ideas which characterises the French Left today.

It is the refusal to come to terms with this ferment, and in particular the refusal to recognise anyone standing to the Left of PCF positions as a valid interlocutor — as anything else indeed than an "opportunists" or "revisionists" — which is perhaps the most disturbing feature of PCF practice today. To say this is not to deny the existence of "opportunists" or "revisionists" currents within the French Left — the spectrum is so variegated that it embraces virtually everything. But one cannot but be concerned to see a Communist Party as important as the PCF contenting itself with the old practice of applying pejorative labels to all other Left trends.

Andre Gorz, a member of the Editorial Committee of Jean-Paul Sartre's Les Temps Modernes wrote recently (in the British New Left Review's special issue on France, Nov.-Dec. 1968) that the "hegemonic capacity" of a revolutionary party "will be measured precisely by its ability to enrich itself from movements born outside the party, to develop with them a common perspective while fully respecting their independence, and to become for them the centre of attraction, the pole of doctrinal reference, the main political outlet.

Such a comment seems particularly pertinent in the context of French political life today.

All this is not to say that the bitter divisions of the French Left, with their roots deep in history, would be resolved quickly and easily, merely as a result of a change in attitude on the part of the PCF leadership. But it is to suggest that the PCF, seed-tree as it is
of many of the Leftwing groupings and incontestably the strongest force on the Left as a whole, has a quite special responsibility in the historic task of striving for unity of the Left. Any move by the PCF to “dialogue” with the trends to the Left of it, such as has been done on the Italian scene by the Italian Communist Party, would have, it seems to me, an incalculable and liberating effect. Such a confrontation of ideas, with its implicit aband-

om of the exclusivist stance of the PCF, would among other things certainly serve to differentiate those who desire united Left action from those whose hostility to the PCF overrides all other con-
siderations.

In inner-party life, the PCF leadership is campaigning rather strongly at the present time in favor of democratic centralism. Singled out for criticism is Political Bureau member Roger Garau-
y, who in a recent book took to task what he claimed was the tendency of the PCF leadership to accent centralism more heavily than democracy in their practice of democratic centralism. Garaudy was named three times in this connection by fellow PB member Georges Marchais in his speech at the Bagneux meeting referred to above.

It is not without interest to recall here that Garaudy, at the height of the May events, wrote the most sympathetic article on the student movement yet to appear over the name of a leading PCF member. Printed in the June 1968 number of Democ.

ratie Nouvelle (which has since ceased publication), the article stressed “the deep internal connection of this (student) movement with that of the workers,” emphasised the relationship of both with the contem-

porary developments in science and technology and said: “We who are proud to belong to a revolutionary party, far from making ourselves history’s official mourners, welcome with joy this wonder-

ful human uprising.”

Garaudy said that this disposition had to be maintained despite the fact that “the student movement is troubled by adventurism, by attempts to buy it off for sundry purposes, by provocations that divide and weaken it and facilitate repression.”

My own brief personal experience of French communist politics last year was sufficient to persuade me that the PCF, like heaven, is a house with many mansions — that it embraces many tendencies. The assessments of Soviet policy, and of the position within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, made by different French communists, were particularly striking in their variety. It seems to me that a degree of political diversity in such a massive organisa-
tion as the PCF is inevitable and must sooner or later be acknow-
ledged by the PCF leadership on pain of an internal development of some dimensions. But for the moment at least the current seems to be running in exactly the opposite direction.
The past year has seen a consolidation of organisations to the Left of the PCF. In January, the intellectual-based Parti socialiste unifié (PSU), a nine-year-old breakaway from the Socialist Party which strove to outflank the PCF to the Left in the May-June crisis, published a program which aroused considerable public interest, especially in its treatment of problems of political and economic democracy under socialism. At the Sixth National Congress of the party in March, the PSU’s national secretary (and current presidential candidate), Michel Rocard, found himself voted down in his stand for a boycott of the April 27 referendum. The Congress voted by a substantial majority for a “No” vote — the position adopted by the PSF, and the Socialist Party. But despite this “unitary” groundswell, the Congress resolution said the party would address itself to the “masses influenced by the PCF,” rather than to that party itself.

On April 9 the formation was announced in Paris of an entirely new Left organisation, the Communist League, which immediately announced it would seek affiliation with the Fourth International (founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938). Inspiration for the new Ligue Communiste came directly from militants of the JCR (Jeunesse communiste révolutionnaire), perhaps the most interesting and important of the Left youth bodies which played leading roles in the May crisis. The JCR is the fruit of a split in the UEC in 1965, a split occasioned by the differences of many UEC militants with the PCF policy of support for Mitterand in the presidential election of that year, and by longer-standing differences connected with policy in the movement of opposition to the Algerian war.

Another body inspiring the new Ligue Communiste is the Party Communiste Internationaliste, which, like the JCR, was banned by the Gaullist regime in June, 1968. It is profoundly characteristic of the times in the French Left that the leaders of the new League plan to “work from the outside in” — explicitly, to work in the student world (which in May 1968 was the seat of the fire which eventually enveloped the working class), and, as far as the working class is concerned, in provincial centres and in sectors of industry where the PCF is least strong. Two-thirds of the membership of the Communist League, which sprang formally from groups around the newspaper Rouge, are aged between 19 and 25, 40 p.c. are students, 15 p.c. secondary school students, 15 p.c. teachers or postgraduate university workers, and 30 p.c. white and blue collar workers.

In general, one cannot avoid noting that the far-Left bodies, small as they no doubt are, are drawing their predominant support precisely from the social strata most closely identified with the new developments in the productive forces — in particular, the students and the intellectually trained. A similar phenomenon has been
remarked upon in the trade union world, where the PSU-influenced *Confédération française démocratique du travail* (CFDT), a rival body of the PCF-influenced CGT, is making its most rapid progress in the sectors where the newest productive forces are to be found.

Although the CFDT is only half the size of the CGT, and although the far-Left groupings are mere grouplets alongside the PCF, such trends cannot but be worrying to the PCF leaders. (Is not something of the same reality betrayed by the presentation of 72-year-old Jacques Duclos as candidate for the presidential election by the PCF, while the Ligue Communiste is putting up 28-year-old M. Alain Krivine, and the PSU 38-year-old M. Rocard?)

The strike of March showed that the French working class has lost none of the combativity which characterised it in May-June last year. The struggle to preserve and extend the gains won in the mighty strike movement of those days, and to expose the trickery of the proposed plan for "participation" in industry, dominates the agenda of French working-class action these days. Politically speaking, there is no doubt that socialist awareness is more widely disseminated in the French working class today than at any time in the past, and that young workers in particular have over the past year come to socialist positions in large numbers.

But the transformation of the tremendous potential of the French Left forces into enduring revolutionary achievement clearly awaits progress towards their unification. It is a truism that Communist Parties, if they are to advance, must constantly and ruthlessly examine their positions. Of particular relevance in contemporary circumstances is the re-examination of attitudes to other Left forces, especially those to the Left of the CPs.

Just how valid are traditional attitudes to these forces as they exist concretely in the various national environments, and how justified the traditional prejudices? In a certain sense what is required is a leap back in time to pre-Stalinist, pre-communist-exclusivist positions of the CPs, to an historical moment when it was not too hard to give credit to others for revolutionary sincerity and to examine their ideas on their merits, and when there was not too ready an assumption that the CPs by their nature had all the answers.

Such a "leap backward" in today's circumstances could well be a leap forward in the direction of a revivified and intellectually richer Left than has existed hitherto. It is within the power of the PCF, it seems to me, to make a quite historic contribution to political development by adopting some such attitude in the context of French political life today. Its size, its experience, its authority alike commend it as the initiator of a new atmosphere of dialogue in the French Left, which is at present so tragically divided.
DISCUSSION:

WORKERS, INTELLECTUALS AND MARXISM

MARXISM, in Marx's own words, is "not a dogma, but a guide to action". They are dogmatists, not Marxists, who rigorously apply everything Marx said to the world of today; yet, at the same time, changes since he wrote do not invalidate his teachings. It is not revisionism, but genuine marxism, to apply marxist methods of analysis to each new situation as it arises.

Anti-intellectualism in sections of the marxist movement stems partly from a mechanical, un-marxist interpretation of Marx's analysis of the roles of the proletariat and the intelligentsia, partly from failure to realise that the mid-twentieth century proletariat and intelligentsia cannot be absolutely identified with those of Marx's time.

Marx knew that socialist ideas very rarely develop spontaneously in the working class, but are usually introduced to it by progressive intellectuals, because the proletarians of his day lacked, not the intelligence, but the educational background and cultured leisure to elaborate sophisticated philosophies.

On the other hand, Marx realised that the intelligentsia of his day could not become an independent revolutionary force, because of its heterogeneity of interests and lack of the necessary numerical or economic strength to influence political events significantly without powerful allies, and that the proletariat was the only potentially revolutionary class, because its interests were diametrically and irreconcilably opposed to those of the ruling class, because its conditions of life forced upon it greater homogeneity than any other class in history, and because it was the most economically powerful class in nineteenth-century society, though not yet conscious of its strength.

To win over the proletariat to socialism, the workers must first be organised around simple economic demands in such a way that the spasmodic, diffuse class struggle of those days would be raised to a level that would bring the proletariat face to face with the problem of State power and who held it.

To these ends, paternalistic associations, in which intellectuals were the messianic leaders and workers the docile and obedient rank and file, were not enough. The proletariat must find socialist leaders from within its own ranks, and these must become the spearhead of the revolutionary movement.

But while the proletariat was the only class capable of becoming consistently revolutionary, it did not follow that every proletarian was a born revolutionary leader, wanting only an act of faith in marxism to develop all his hidden potentialities at once stroke. The intelligentsia could not become a revolutionary class, but it does not follow that no intellectual could be a revolutionary.

On the contrary, the very lack of education and leisure that made it nearly impossible for socialist ideas to originate in the working class also
made it extremely difficult for workers to attain a thorough understanding of marxism while they remained tied to their jobs. It was for this reason that Lenin insisted on strong cadres of professional revolutionaries as the core of a revolutionary party. Only in this way could workers be given the leisure and educational opportunities to master revolutionary strategy and tactics and understand marxist economics and philosophy.

The conditions of the proletariat and the intelligentsia have changed greatly since Marx's day. In the nineteenth and the earlier part of this century, these were almost hereditary castes. It was taken for granted that a worker's son would generally become a worker, more often than not in his father's trade.

Similarly, university students were almost invariably sons of such professional men as senior clergy, lawyers, doctors the upper echelons of the teaching profession and the public service, plus a few studious scions of established aristocratic and merchant families.

Socially and economically, between the two classes was a great gulf fixed. The proletariat lived in ceaseless toil and grinding poverty, and was not even entitled to the prefix "Mr." before his name. The intellectual was a "gentleman," accepted almost as an equal by the ruling class, and considered rash and improvident if he married before his income was at least four times that of the average working class family.

There are many obvious and profound differences between the proletariat of Marx's day and of our own, all of which must be carefully considered in assessing the present political role of the proletariat and the strategy of revolutionary socialism, but, for our present purpose, the most relevant is the vast improvement in the, educational opportunities of workers' children — due less to any great access of enlightenment and generosity on the part of the bourgeoisie than to its need for increasing numbers of technicians and technologists.

However, even today, the children of the poor do not have nearly the same educational opportunities as those of the rich. Moreover, the broader education and increased leisure of the workers has not done as much as might have been hoped to facilitate the development of socialist ideas among the workers, their education being tailored to increase not only their usefulness but also their conformity to capitalism, and the vastly expanded entertainment industry being more or less deliberately designed to discourage intelligent use of leisure.

Nevertheless, considerable and rapidly growing numbers of workers' children are able to proceed to tertiary education. This has been very advantageous to academically gifted children, but for the industrial proletariat as a whole it means the loss of some of its best potential leaders, who are being absorbed into the intelligentsia. This, it seems to me, is one of the reasons for the low ebb of proletarian class-consciousness common to most advanced capitalist countries, giving rise to the Maoist view that the proletariat in the capitalist countries is a spent force, and that the new spearhead of the revolution is the national liberation movement in the underdeveloped countries.

But this is only one side of the picture. Let us now look at the new intelligentsia. Not only are increasing numbers of intellectuals drawn from the working class, consciously or unconsciously taking working class attitudes with them into the universities and the professions, but their conditions of life approximate more and more to those of the proletariat. The
average graduate’s salary advantage over the average skilled manual worker hardly compensates him for his longer unpaid or under-paid apprenticeship; even the type of work performed by that large section of the new intelligentsia that works in laboratories resembles that of an artisan rather than that of the traditional “liberal professions.”

In most industrial concerns and many branches of the public service, all but the most senior professional employees even have to queue up with clerks and process workers to clock on and off.

Yet the modern professional employee is far more essential to the smooth running of modern capitalism than the old-style intellectual, and is increasingly aware of the economic power he can wield. At the same time, the very fact that he has received more education than the average industrial worker makes him more keenly aware of the kind of life that modern technology makes possible, once liberated from the restrictive practices of the capitalist establishment. This is the basis of the great upsurge of revolt in the universities and among other sections of the intelligentsia.

In short, the bulk of the intelligentsia is becoming proletarianised, and the intellectual New Left is not a new phenomenon, independent of the revolutionary working class movement, but an integral part of the continuing struggle. The new intelligentsia is more analogous to the skilled artisans of Marx’s day than to the nineteenth-century intellectuals, and, just as most of the best labor leaders of the past were drawn from among the skilled workers rather than the unskilled laborers, so more and more of those of the future will come from the ranks of the new intelligentsia.

If this is “elitism,” then elitism is necessary to every developed society.

No sane person objects, for instance, to an “elite” exclusively privileged to put up brass plates and practise medicine; why, then, to an “elite” of those best qualified to lead the labor movement, irrespective of the section of the working class from which it comes? The safeguard against bureaucratic elitism is proletarian democracy, drawing every individual into activity at the highest level of which he is capable, and making the leaders responsible to the class, and subject to recall when they cease to serve its interests.

The important point is that the distinction between “workers” and “intellectuals” is becoming more and more artificial, and the sooner both these sections of the new proletariat realise this, and recognise their community of interest in irreconcilable opposition to capitalism, the better will it be for the labor movement, and hence for the world at large.

ARTHUR W. RUDKIN

HENDERSON ANSWERED

THE DEBATE in recent issues of A.L.R. concerning the principle of self-determination and the extent of its relevance in the occupation of socialist Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of five brother socialist countries, has been a thought-provoking one.

Not only has it been an interesting challenge of differing viewpoints — it deals with theoretical issues of basic importance to any serious attempt to win mass support for socialism in Australia.

It was the theoretical justification of the occupation advanced by J. B. Henderson (ALR 6 of ’68) which I questioned in my discussion contribution (ALR 1 of ’69). It is disappointing that in his reply, JBH prefers not to pursue the attempted theoretical...
justification, merely stating he maintains his interpretation is right and mine is wrong. While he has every right to retain his viewpoint, a mere statement of belief without answering the points raised does not make for any greater clarity on the issue of the rights of nations to self-determination.

The whole emphasis in JBH's recent article shifted to justification on the grounds that events justified what happened. He relies on his statement that "The evasion of the case of the Five has been a marked and disturbing feature of those in Australia who disagree with the action of the Five."

Publications issued by the Five before, during and since the occupation, showed that their "case" varied almost from week to week. It covered the range of threatened West German armed intervention, CIA fostered internal counter revolution, rightwing revisionist elements within the leadership of the Communist Party and Government of Czechoslovakia, the birth of "quiet counter-revolution", and so on. However JBH defines the "case" to which he subscribes as "counter revolution aided by external forces would not be allowed to break socialist Czechoslovakia away from the socialist community."

It seems worthwhile, therefore, to repeat the following points which have been published in numerous articles, including in ALR.

Internal counter revolution which posed a serious threat to overthrow a socialist state of some twenty years' standing would certainly be prepared to engage in armed struggle. Yet the caches of arms which the occupying forces announced they had uncovered in Prague were publicly declared by the head of the workers' militia in Prague to be the property of the workers' militia units in factories, offices and institutions. He demanded their return. Surely these workers' militia units were not the forces of internal counter revolution.

The alleged voices of the counter-revolutionary forces — the clandestine radio stations operating during and following the invasion — were, in fact, the property of the armed forces of Czechoslovakia and were used by Party and Government leaders broadcasting to the people during those turbulent days.

One would be naive not to expect some CIA agents to be active in Czechoslovakia at any time (as they are undoubtedly in all socialist countries). The White Book 'On Events in Czechoslovakia' published by the Press Group of Soviet Journalists and supporting the case of the 5 says: "According to the State Department the number of US tourists in Czechoslovakia stayed around 1,500. By August 21, 1968, the number had grown to 3,000, most of whom as the US papers themselves reported, were employees of the Central Intelligence Agency." As J. R. Campbell of the Communist Party of Great Britain commented (Tribune, 30/10/68): "It would of course help immensely if the White Book could give the names of the US papers which reported that many of the US tourists who were entering Czechoslovakia were employees of the CIA. What US newspapers were kind enough to give the world this propaganda tidbit about the CIA?"

The White Book in the section titled "The Slogan of the Freedom of Speech in the Hands of Counter Revolution", writes: "This was what rang out from the pages of Mlada Fronta (the Czech youth paper GS): 'The law we shall enact must ban all communist activity in Czechoslovakia. We shall forbid the activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and disband it . . . We shall consign to the flames the books of the communist ideologists Marx, Engels and Lenin . . ."' The White Book
neglected to explain that the sentences were from a speech by Smrkovsky, published by *Mlada Fronta*, in which Smrkovsky quoted the words from a roneod leaflet to show that while the influence of rightist forces should not be exaggerated, it could not be ignored and should be combated.

Perhaps the most striking refutation of the charge of counter-revolutionary and CIA activity on the verge of overthrowing socialism in Czechoslovakia, lies in the fact that there has been not a single announcement of the arrest or trial of a counter-revolutionary or CIA agent since the occupation. Not one arrest has been announced arising from the weapons caches and clandestine radios. The only detentions known to have occurred were immediately following the invasion when leaders of the Czechoslovak Government and Communist Party were taken out of their own country and held for some days.

The claim of an imminent danger of West German invasion does not measure up to the fact that at no time during the period were the powerful Czechoslovakian military forces, who presumably would be willing to resist a German invasion, mobilised for action. It also seems strange that to repel a pending invasion the main forces of the five armies made not for the German border but for Prague, where they occupied the buildings of the Government and Communist Party.

Further doubt is cast upon the case of the five when some eight months since the invasion, the Czechoslovakian Government and Communist Party leaders who allegedly called upon the five for assistance, have still not come forward.

The foregoing are only a few of the points which have been widely published and, at the very least, show certain claims in the case of the five are incorrect. Yet those supporting the intervention in Czechoslovakia make no mention of these refutations. One may certainly choose to ignore facts and maintain one's position in spite of them, but it is not honest then to assert "The evasion of the case of the Five has been a marked and disturbing feature . . . ."

The recent Sino-Soviet armed clashes yet again give warning that it is essential that the socialist countries act only upon agreed principles based on mutual respect for the full sovereignty of each socialist state. It matters little whether JBH and I agree with the recent Soviet claim that China has ceased to be a socialist country; nor whether we believe China's estimation that the Soviet Union is an imperialist power. What does matter tremendously for the cause of socialism is how these two strongest nations of the socialist camp resolve their disputes — by further armed conflict, or by actions governed by the principle of the right of nations to self-determination.

G. SANDERSON

HUTSON'S VIEWS CONTESTED

THE FACT that the Left Action Conference decided to call a Conference on Workers' Control and Self-Management in August this year prompts me to reply to some of the points raised in Jack Hutson's comments on the symposium on workers' control in *ALR* (April-May 1969), especially as the main comments concerned my own contribution to the symposium.

Jack Hutson states that I "appear to be moving far too quickly" in advocating workers' control and self-management as slogans which can be raised immediately. As to my proposition that the Left should have advocated in the recent rail strike that the workers run the trains themselves instead of simply walking off the job,
he suggests I would have been “regarded as a bit of a nut”.

I first of all want to state that I do not conceive of workers’ control and self-management simply as slogans to be waved around. Rather they have to be concretised in particular struggles, around particular issues that directly concern the workers. While generalised revolutionary propaganda explaining the full implications of these slogans must continue at all times, there must be a conscious effort to see how such slogans can be applied to particular struggles.

Second, on the example of the railway workers. Let’s take another. The bus and tramway workers are threatening strikes if unionists are jailed for refusal to pay fines imposed under the penal clauses.

Is it really so ridiculous to advocate among the busses and trammmies that, instead of simply walking off the job, they run the buses and trams themselves but refuse to collect fares? Wouldn’t that also overcome the antagonism naturally aroused in the commuting work force when a walk-off strike takes place — besides its other implications? And even if only a small minority of workers were convinced in the first place, isn’t it obligatory to sometimes be in a minority, and go against the traditional accepted pattern? Anyhow, I don’t think one would be regarded as such a “nut” as Jack suggests.

On Jack Hutson’s second point of disagreement (that workers’ control has not arisen before now because of the “objective conditions”), I think we should clearly differentiate between the gap in discussion of workers’ control and self-management here compared with overseas (perhaps 4 or 5 years) or the gap on student power (perhaps 3 or 4 years, but rapidly catching up), and the fundamental reason why workers’ control and self-management haven’t featured in Left discussion for the past thirty years. The reason is not “objective”, but simply the domination of the Left in past decades by reformist and stalinist dogmas, all of which idealised centralisation and the State, and to which workers’ control and self-management were foreign. The change in the past year or so in Australia has been due to the retreat of stalinism and the development of new, revolutionary ideas.

On the third point — the relationship of the trade unions and workers’ control. Here, I agree with Jack, is a very important difference.

Workers’ control and self-management will be raised through union structures, as well as through directly political channels. But all bodies to implement or even fight for workers’ control and self-management as such must be independent of the union structures and hierarchy — left, right or centre. Otherwise, they run the danger of becoming just another sub-committee under the control of the union hierarchy and the real meaning of self-management and workers’ control — the direct management of a whole industry or enterprise or the direct control of a sphere of production etc. under the control of no boss, be he a union boss or otherwise — will be lost. Action committees set up in factories etc. to fight for workers’ control and self-management must be independent of the union — which does not mean necessarily hostile to a particular union leader or leadership. The fight has, of course, to be fought out inside the union, as well as on the shop floor. But to fight inside does not mean to submit to union control. Maybe such independent committees directly responsible to the workers on the floor — be they democratic shop committees, “action committees” or committees applying workers’ control or self-management in a given instance and period of time —
will be the best means of ensuring that real "workers' control" applies within the unions themselves... As for the "dangers" of such committees developing into an "unofficial" union leadership, rather than this being "dangerous nonsense" as Jack claims, it would, I believe, be the best thing that could happen to some unions, some of our corrupt union bureaucrats, and to some of our routinist and cautious "left" union leaders...

Final point: with all due respects to Brian Mowbray, I could also quote to Jack Hutson workers (including shop delegates) who would support my point of view. I don't think quoting "ordinary workers" proves much.

DENIS FRENEY

WORKERS' CONTROL AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY

I WOULD COMMENT as follows on the concept of "workers control" as outlined in ALR 2/1969:

WORKER PSYCHOLOGY — The Australian worker really believes in the "divine right" of capitalists to OWN and MANAGE their respective holdings. In the case of government owned industries, such as the railways, this "respect" is transferred to the bureaucratic administration.

Unfortunately, the workers doubt their competency to manage their own affairs, a feeling engendered by a society which alienates the worker from the product of his own creative effort, and which insists upon industrial discipline and subservience.

The worker has to understand not only the industrial processes, but also the concomitant social fabric arising therefrom. Shortcomings in respect can be directly attributed to the failure of unions to deal with the problem of worker education.

NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES AND WORKERS' CONTROL — In relation to the government owned industries, such as railways, the objective is a more immediate possibility. However, experience shows that the railway bureaucracy (and the government) is very jealous of its right to manage, or mismanage, as it thinks fit; and the unions are consulted as little as possible, despite the fact that prior consultation could obviate subsequent disputes, for which the bureaucracy is thus entirely responsible.

It is, I believe, necessary to distinguish between nationalised and socialistised industries. Quite clearly, nationalisation without EFFECTIVE worker participation, is not socialism, and it is on this point that the ALP must do a lot of hard thinking, otherwise it has not the right to claim leadership of, or affinity with, the workers, or the trade union movement.

TOWARDS A SOCIALIST CONSCIOUSNESS — Right-wing union leaders do not want to draw (for their members) political lessons from the industrial struggles; and their organisation at work, or the lack of it, testifies to this.

The organisational work, and campaign of explanation must be such that the workers will not only understand the struggle, but also care. This is not an issue to be dealt with by the Arbitration court, which has been constituted for the express purpose of preserving the "rights" of capitalists in a capitalist orientated society, rather will it be fought out in the open; a contest between the "divine right" of capitalists and bureaucrats, and the collective strength and determination of the workers. The Left ought not be deflected from the fundamental objective: the socialisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange. Workers' control must be seen, not as an end in itself, but as a stepping stone to that objective.
We can predict that unions will be increasing their more militant demands, and that workers, provided it is pointed out to them, will be able to see that industrial objectives DO have political consequences. And as these seemingly simple issues assume social, and therefore political, significance, the "coalition of the left" becomes more concrete, unified, and an effective threat to the establishment. At a time when this "coalition of the left" is assuming significance and importance; when unionists, students, peace workers and other dissidents, are beginning to perceive and react to the fundamental contradictions in contemporary capitalist society; when it is already apparent that this movement will assume massive proportions, that it will need to know where it wants to go, and how to get there — we must ask: Where will the Communist party be — at the lead, or submerged by the general morass of protest.

It seems to me imperative that the Communist party, because it has the policies and the philosophy; because it sees the problems of capitalist society in their totality must assume leadership of this quickening movement. And it must be a leadership earned, deserved; completely free of any suggestion of infiltration or behind-the-scenes manipulation.

Many communists, as individuals, are doing a fine job in the unions, and other organisations, but far too many work in the shadows, and whilst they gain respect as individuals, and possibly support for their views, it is not support for the communist party as such. Is it sufficient to acquire respect as an individual who HAPPENS to be in the Communist party?

If the party is to grow, and grow it must, if it is to be truly effective, then a more open stance is required, not only in unions or other organisations, but in the community at large, communists must develop a greater affinity with the people, and the people must be able to see this affinity.

This requires, not arrogant self-assertion, but the ability to set examples of honesty and political understanding.

H. Austin, State Councillor, Australian Railways Union.

LETTER TO THE EDITORS

My attention has been drawn to an article by John Playford, "Civilian Militarists", in the Australian Left Review, December 1968. This article makes references to alleged statements and assurances by me, and I defy Mr. Playford to produce any evidence whatever for their truthfulness. The article virtually implies that I have been a liar or at least a flagrant breaker of assurances given. Naturally, I reject such imputations.

At no time did I say that the Strategic Studies Centre in ANU would not be supported by a Ford Foundation grant. On the contrary, it has been. However, I did say — and repeat now — that this grant carried no strings whatever from the Foundation. The Centre has been allowed to develop in accordance with the normal and proper rules of academic development followed in any university. That is, the Centre which is governed by an academic committee has been able, within the limits of finance (ANU and Ford) available to it, to develop its methods and subject of enquiry as has seemed best to it. The Centre and its members have established a solid reputation for competence, relevance and objectivity.

Yours faithfully,

15/3/69

J. G. Crawford
Franz Marek

STRUCTURE OF THE STALIN-MYTHOS

A prominent ideologist of the Communist Party of Austria discusses how a generation or more of communists developed gravely distorted views concerning the theories of Marx and Lenin. This translation from Weg und Ziel No. 11, 1968 is by Henry Zimmerman.

ONE OF THE MOST OUTSTANDING phenomena of intellectual history: the judgments and prejudices, feelings and ideas of hundreds of thousands of people have been stamped for dozens of years by two books, which became a material force because they gripped the masses. What has been called “Marxism-Leninism” for dozens of years was in reality essentially embraced in two books which Stalin wrote — the first alone, the second in collaboration with others.

In 1924, immediately after the death of Lenin, Foundations of Leninism — the foundations of “marxism-leninism” — was published. In 1938 there appeared The Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, showing “marxism-leninism” in action. This was studied by all communist parties in all languages, and attained the highest circulation of any book since the “Foundations”. What was presented as “marxism-leninism” in these two books and in their combination was a peculiar mixture of marxist perceptions and pragmatic considerations dictated by the policies of the first socialist state, together with scientific considerations and authoritative proclamations. In a simplified, vulgarised and misinterpreted form this combination frequently reduced a complicated scientific theory to a catechism of truths, half truths and untruths, which, by a compelling logic, deduced from false premises logically correct but objectively false conclusions. Because they were simple, easily taught and learnt, these books blessed tens of thousands of idealistic fighters with the uplifting feeling that they understood all problems, that they could fathom the heart of all problems in a few theses; at the same time the simplicity and

A working definition of “mythos” might be: a model held in a society, which is a reasonable framework the members of that society are prepared to accept; which hides or explains away certain contradictions; and which is also flexible enough to allow a certain latitude for people who are loyal to the model to have disagreements on certain aspects of it.
clarity of the principles they set forth strengthened conviction of a speedy and inevitable final victory.

We dare to assert that even honest and serious attempts by communist publicists and politicians to free themselves from the pressure of the theses hammered in for dozens of years — and we do not exclude this article — bear the stamp of that period and often carry out the liberation from the Stalin-mythos with conceptions and ideas which entered their hearts and minds in that period, for example, the peculiar final slogan: "Long live Marxism-Leninism!", as if this wish for the well-being of a scientific theory had more meaning than the slogan: "Long live the quantum theory!"

Seen historically, this slogan made more sense of course. Strictly speaking the "marxism-leninism" of the Stalin period was the scientific trimming of the Stalin-mythos. Earlier, during Lenin’s lifetime, the term "leninism" was used to denote the perspectives of the Russian Labor movement as seen by Lenin and the Bolshevik fraction of the Russian Social-Democratic party. These interpretations, based on a high degree of deliberation and perception, were to become of general significance. They were concerned primarily with the perspectives of a socialist revolution in a mainly agrarian country, the role of the party and its organisational form in the revolutionary struggle. Lenin considered his conceptions as an application of marxism to Russia and defended them against those who — without regard to the particular conditions in Russia — stuck to the words of Marx and Engels and to Marx’s model of a revolution.

The general significance of Lenin's intellectual achievement emerged when Lenin, following upon the outbreak of world war, analysed monopoly capitalism, and characterised imperialism, the capitalism of the monopolies, as the highest phase of capitalism. The relevant studies and conclusions were undoubtedly the most significant and creative development of scientific socialism since Marx and Engels. They carried, in the truest sense of the word, a new world within them, not least because of the hypothesis of the possibility of a socialist revolution in one or more even backward countries — in contradistinction to Marx’s model of revolution, which counted on the simultaneous victory of the proletariat in the most developed capitalist countries. Furthermore, Lenin had recognised, with the prophetic vision of a genius, the revolutionary potential of the national anti-imperialist movements of the suppressed colonies and semi-colonial countries, as a part of the socialist world revolution.

Nevertheless, Stalin’s definition of leninism as “the marxism of the period of imperialism and proletarian revolution” was a neo-
logism and a simplification. Zinoviev tried to save the old approach in the famous inner-Party discussion of the Bolsheviks — less so in his speech to the 5th World Congress of the Communist International — by describing leninism as marxism under the specific conditions of a backward country, where the peasantry comprised a majority of the population. This limiting definition did not do justice to the real genius of Lenin and to the significance of his perceptions. But the ready-made formula of Stalin facilitated a canonisation, which far too often dissolved marxism in "marxism-leninism", in the sense that marxism certainly remained perceptible, touchable, but amputated in certain important spheres, which had less significance for Russian conditions and were not developed by Lenin. The whole wealth of thought of the young Marx for instance, with the significant concept of alienation, disappeared, remained unknown and not allowed for, withheld for dozens of years from the revolutionary labor movement, not least because Lenin, who had died before the publication of important writings of the young Marx, had not dealt with them. Systematising, schematising Marx and Lenin, "marxism-leninism" led again and again to unreal, voluntaristic generalisations, which arose from the Russian situation, from Soviet considerations of state (that is, whatever the Soviet leadership considered desirable) and from the proclaimed theses of Stalin. It sinned against marxism and against the thoughts of Lenin by simplification, vulgarisation and falsification, and from it one took whatever was needed. Thus in philosophical questions Materialism and Empirio-Criticism was preferred to the later, more mature Philosophical Notebooks.

The liberation from the Stalin-mythos occurred first of all by a return to the sources, to Marx and Lenin. Many of those who returned to or studied the sources frequently felt like the community in the self-critical Jewish joke, which decided to lay down asphalt in a street and after the necessary cleaning of the street discovered that the street had already been asphalted.

**On the Theory of Revolution**

Let us take for example the problem of the socialist revolution. Lenin had adapted Marx’s model of the revolution to the transition of a bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution in a backward country with feudal remnants. Lenin’s references to the possibility of revolution in one or in a few countries play an important role in the "Foundations" and the "Short Course", in the "marxism-leninism" of the Stalin period generally. And yet there are literally only a few sentences of Lenin’s in two articles of the years 1915 and 1917, which are not very clear, not developed, not commented upon. Stalin needed these words of Lenin for his polemic with Trotsky, for the orientation of socialist
construction of socialism in one country; but they became a credo, without even an attempt being made to work out a really scientific theory of revolution, despite the fact that the theses of Lenin, which had been corroborated by the October Revolution in Russia, had been shown to be somewhat incomplete by the revolutions of Asia, Africa and Cuba. Hand in hand with this amputation went a vulgarisation of the marxist law of motion, which the classics had derived from West European history, and which was generalised as a linear succession of social formations; in this connection the "Asiatic mode of production" was deleted for the sake of simplicity.

Connected with this: for the marxist theory of revolution it was critical that the development of the productive forces of capitalism resulted in material maturity for the transition to socialism, that the social character of the productive forces make itself felt already within the framework of capitalism, in joint-stock companies, cartels, trusts, and in the growing role of the state in production. Lenin developed this important thought further. He studied the new, state monopoly capitalism and wrote that socialism already knocks at the door. So that the main thing now depended on moving forward to revolutionary democracy, so as to help the material maturity of socialism to break through politically as well. In the "Foundations" and in the "Short Course", this problem disappears. As it was mainly a question of justifying the construction of socialism in one country, to present the Russian October Revolution as a model for all socialist revolutions, this serious amputation occurred. As a result, the Communist movement found it more difficult to analyse in time the problems of modern capitalism, to analyse scientifically the role of the state in modern capitalism. This amputation played a part in the fateful delay in the orientation of the revolutionary movement of the developed capitalist countries towards new roads to socialism.

The fact that statements and thoughts of Marx and Engels about the possibilities of a peaceful road to socialism had been neglected and historical facts concealed, undoubtedly contributed to the simplification and vulgarisation of the theory of revolution. In the "Short Course", it was decided once and for all that in July 1917, on the road to October, the possibility of a peaceful revolution in Russia was lost — in accordance with a statement of Stalin at the 6th Congress of the Bolsheviks: an alteration to the facts which undoubtedly facilitated the teaching that the October Revolution was the compulsory model of all socialist revolutions. Only after the death of Stalin was it recalled that Lenin, shortly after the defeat of the Kornilov rising, in August 1917, had again raised the possibility of a peaceful revolution, which could have counted on the support of the majority of the left forces, and that he had
still written of this possibility in September 1917. The marxist concept of the many roads to socialism, ever underlined by Lenin, faded during the Stalin period.

Lenin had written that marxism is all-powerful, because it is true. Simplifying, one could say that "marxism-leninism" of the Stalin period was true, because Stalin was all-powerful.

Revisions as Dogmas

If it is said of that period that dogmatism dominated, this is not to be understood to mean that the interpretations of Marx, Engels and Lenin were treated as dogmas, holy and untouchable. Stalin repeatedly spoke of creative marxism, which was the enemy of every kind of dogmatism, about the need to develop theory, etc. If one starts from the basic propositions of the classics, one would have to describe Stalin as one of the greatest revisionists in the history of marxism. The "marxism-leninism" of that period stood under the sign of the revision of important basic propositions of scientific socialism. But as Valentino Gerratana¹ correctly states, this "creative marxism" was first of all a pragmatic instrument which, in the name of the struggle against dogmatism and with appeals to the need to develop theory, justified considerations of state and arbitrary acts of the party leadership, and which, instead of an independent development of marxist theory, led to a development often independent of marxism which was revised as required. If, for instance, to justify the trials of 1936 and 1937, the theory was proclaimed that with the advance of socialist construction, the class struggle became ever sharper, then already by 1939 it was asserted that the class struggle had been overcome in socialist society and that only saboteurs and spics harmed socialist construction. The revision of Marx's principles often went so far that in the name of the development of theory, there resulted a complete rejection and ignoring of important principle, with scorn and derision for those who upheld them. Thus Stalin's proposition that even communism could be built in one state, in one country, narrowed the conception and the presentation of the development of socialist society to production and productive forces, (as distinguished from the basic propositions of the classics) took the soul out of the concept of communism, and changed completely the notions bound up with this concept. The scorn which was heaped on the potential and unnamed opponents during the proclamation of this theory at the 18th Congress of the CPSU was really a mockery of marxism. Opponents were often treated like Aesop, who was thrown from the cliff, not because he disregarded Apollo, but because he mistrusted the Delphic priests.

¹ Valentino Gerratana, Introduction to Lenin's "Stato e rivoluzione" (Editori Riuniti 1966) pp. 9 ff.
The fully developed mythos allowed only scorn and violence towards doubters. It was a period of "blood and iron" as Togliatti once wrote, a period of gigantic difficulties for the first socialist state, which explains many anomalies, but which are irrelevant for the arguments with which we are primarily concerned here. Here we are concerned with the structure of a mythos, whose momentary theses were declared as eternal dogmas. And in this sense and only in this sense can we speak of the dogmatism of that time. All problems seemed clear and resolved; they could be summed up in two, three, four maxims; they could be contained in two, three, four conclusions. Anyone who did not understand this was at best an idiot — "if not something worse" to use a phase popular in the 'thirties. Marx and Lenin did not treat their opponents with indulgence, but during the Stalin period, the history of the labor movement was a chain of triumphs over idiots, rogues and spies.

Thus the "Short Course" is a short history of how the Bolsheviks overcame fools and criminals — not to speak of the caricature of various philosophical trends in the fourth chapter of the book. We take the most remote, most harmless example: the "economists" with whom Lenin polemised in *What is to be Done?* (1902). From opportunists, who represented the point of view that the Russian workers could only be moved by means of social questions, they became fools who rejected all political perspectives. One only has to read Lenin's *What is to be Done?* to note how the argumentation of this standard work has been vulgarised.

*Voluntarism and Laws of Development.*

The canonisation of all theses, which left no room for doubt and discussion, but only the task of interpretation and commentary, reached its peak in a fantastic bowdlerisation of the basic problem of the marxist conception of history, the relationship of individual will to the general regularity of social development. The momentary decision of will was glorified as an expression of the general laws of development and thereby transfigured as infallible and irresistible. The momentary decision of will was so closely identified with the general laws of development of historical progress, that every doubter and critic was aware in advance of the ridiculous role of trying to act counter to the iron "must" of history. He thus became a lawbreaker in two senses of the word, one ridiculous, and the other criminal. While the possibility of mistakes (in the past) was basically admitted by Lenin's formula for the need for self-criticism, this possibility was excluded for the present and for the future — all the more, as what were rightly or wrongly considered reasons of state, were identified with "marxism-leninism". No wonder there were ideological disputes later, when there were
many socialist states, led by pupils of Stalin, with differing state interests.

When state interests could be identified with the laws of development, this had to lead to different laws of development in view of the differing positions of socialist states. On the 8th December, 1961, the then Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Ilyichev, declared: "The unity of the International Communist Movement is a law of development of Marxist-Leninist Parties". On the 4th February, 1964, the Leadership of the Communist Party of China declared that the splitting of the communist movement was an objective law of development.

The mythos resembled a cloud cuckoo land in which everything became always more beautiful, better and bigger. Lenin had warned not to regard the road of the revolutionary labour movement as a straight and smooth Nevsky Prospect, and his essay on art, on climbing high mountains, belongs to the most beautiful pages of marxist ideology. But as, according to the mythos, everything that was willed had to appear right and inexorable, reality had to demonstrate the wisdom of the decisions and the triumph of the general laws of development. There were no doubts, no problems, no mistakes; a world was constructed whose inner logic could not be gainsaid, whose compelling logic convinced revolutionary minds. Only this world was not the real world. This compelling logic often

2 The "marxism-leninism" of the Stalin-mythos was a pragmatism, which proclaimed the momentary interests of state, whether reasonable or not, as an eternal truth and principle of "marxism-leninism". Richard Wagner was honoured after the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. Hegel was exposed as a reactionary after the attack on the Soviet Union. The necessary solidarity of the revolutionary labor movement with the first socialist state was the basis of the monolithism which belonged to the essence of the Stalin-mythos which appeared the more inexorable the closer the bearer of it stood to doubt and hesitation. The glorification of the Russian working class and the Russian people, who after all had carried out the first socialist revolution, first attempted the building of socialism, and carried the main burden of the struggle against fascism, was the basis and pre-condition of the mythos, although it was connected with historical simplifications, as for instance, the statement that the Russian Party was the only party which had carried out a decided struggle against the first imperialist world war. Occasionally the Bulgarian "Tesnyaks" were mentioned. But in no textbook was there any mention of the great and self-sacrificing struggle conducted by the Italian labor movement.

The Stalin-mythos had its decisive roots in the warm link of the revolutionary labor movement with the first socialist state, the first proletarian revolution, the first socialist experiment. Gramsci, the most significant marxist theoretician between the two world wars, expressly formulated in his theses for the Lyons Congress of the Italian Communists, that history justified the predominating and leading function of the Russian Party in the formation of the Communist International or the basis of the position of the Russian state — "the first and only real conquest of the working classes in the struggle for power." This very internationalist duty of solidarity later led to the position that every doubt in the mythos could be said to endanger this solidarity.

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yielded doubtful arguments, because the conclusions were deduced very logically from a premise which was inexorable, even if not correct. Thus the discussion took on the form of a scholastic interpretation of inexorable quotations. Stalin had described leninism as the marxism of the period of imperialism and of proletarian revolution. There would certainly have been no dearth of propagandists who would have been ready to describe marxism as the leninism of the period of rising capitalism and the formation of the labor movement.

The Stalin-mythos at times took on real liturgical forms. These had their origin in certain significant speeches and documents of Stalin, in which perhaps the influence of the seminary attended by the young Stalin made itself felt. This is particularly traceable in the writings of his youth, but even later the simplifying conclusions and solemn repetitions act like the amens in prayer. Read for instance the last work of Stalin, his impressive speech at 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the position of communists on democracy and national independence (1952). All propositions end with similar phrases, with the repetition of the same themes, and take on a compelling and logical character just because of this solemn repetition — except that the starting point is at the least a gigantic over-simplification.

In the very liturgical presentation of scientific socialism in the Stalin-mythos, certain basic ideas of the classics were lost. The works of the young Marx, which were intolerable philosophically to the mythos; many political thoughts of the older Engels, which were not sufferable tactically to the mythos; important allusions of Lenin before his death, with their democratism, their fighting position against bureaucratism, their rejection of any personality cult, would have been fatal to the mythos. As regards the history of thought before marxism and the history of the labor movement before the formation of the communist parties, marks were allotted and visible breaks introduced. The greatest minds of “before” were given a place, roughly equivalent to the place given in hell by Dante in the Divine Comedy to the greatest heathens who were not Christians and could not be Christians, as they were born before Christ.

"Where faith dwelt for thousands of years, doubt now dwells", it is said in Brecht’s Galileo. It also dwells where the mythos has ruled for dozens of years. How could it rule for dozens of years?

The Mythos and the Labor Movement

In the Stalin-mythos there was mingled theory and institutionally conditioned propaganda, marxist concepts and argumentation often determined by reasons of state, together with scientific soc-
ialism. Even marxists, experts in scientific socialism, succumbed to the mythos, as one succumbs to any mythos which, as Levy-Strauss showed, demands general acceptance, but at the same time allows a certain range of doubt and unbelief. Even in the sense of the modern study of mythology, the term “Stalin-mythos”, which Togliatti used, is preferrable to the concept of “personality cult”, which only complicates the comprehension of how this phenomenon could arise and become effective. The mythos, writes Levy-Strauss, gives man a reference system which tries to overcome, to veil, the contradiction between the concepts and reality by a logical model. The Stalin-mythos overcame and veiled the contradictions which arose in the construction of socialism in an immensely backward country; the contradictions between the ideas of scientific socialism and the methods used in the first socialist experiment; between the illusions of the revolutionary labor movement and the difficulties which it confronts after its first conquest of power, the conflicts arising therefrom. It is thus understandable that even significant marxists and socialist idealists succumbed to the mythos, because they had faith in the first socialist state and had no alternative to this faith.

One thing must not be over-looked: the appeal to marxism and the study of the classics left wide room for correct analysis, for reasonable conclusions, and particularly for splendid struggle, in which the whole readiness to struggle and sacrifice of the communists could be proven. All the more so as the development of the mythos did not proceed evenly. In certain periods — for instance, during the spring of the anti-fascist struggle and of the ideology of the 7th World Congress of the Communist International in 1953 — the interests of the first socialist state coincided so closely with the interests of the revolutionary labor movement that the mythos did not hamper the development of the struggle and even united them in such a figure as Dimitrov. The existence of the first socialist experiment was after all — as Otto Bauer often stressed — identical with the basic interests and perspectives of the labor movement; so every decision for governmental reasons by this state, whether right or wrong, was felt as an obligation. The Communist Parties were born as children of the October revolution, they grew up in solidarity with it; in the development of this solidarity, they then, step by step and often imperceptibly, slid into acceptance of the mythos.

Here also lies the explanation, why tens of thousands of the most noble people, and hundreds of the greatest artists and scientists, succumbed to the mythos. Enzensberger has tried in an essay on Pablo Neruda to explain a poem about Stalin by the great poet

by reference to the shocking conditions in Latin America. What
Bloch? Guttoso? And, at a certain period, Pasternak? Herbert Mar-
cuse proclaims solemnly and correctly: "There are forms of violence
and suppression which no revolutionary situation can justify, be-
cause they negate the very end for which the revolution is
a means." But were the Communists suddenly confronted with
this alternative?

They had first accepted a conception, which they thought cor-
rect and still hold as correct today, that in the twenties, there
was no other road but the course of building socialism in back-
ward Russia. In the inner-Party discussion of the Bolsheviks, in the
inner-Party discussions of the communist movement, Stalin, bor-
rowing heavily from Bukharin, personified this point of view.
Stalin became the personification of that trend, which meant so-
cialism to the communists, not just socialism in one country, but
socialism as such, as against the betrayal of socialist hopes which
they had experienced in the practice of the Social-Democratic Part-
ies. To be for socialism at that time, when Stalin represented the
trend for socialist construction in Russia, meant to be for Stalin.

And this applied even more, when the pathos of the first
Five-Year Plan gripped the land of the October Revolution, in the
midst of a severe economic crisis which was seen as the proof of
the instability of capitalism, at the beginning of the fascist wave,
which was seen as proof of the fragility of bourgeois democracy.
The worst anti-communists and enemies of socialism spoke at that
time of the Stalin Five-Year Plans, of the Stalin experiment, thus
helping to weave the mythos which slowly and almost impercept-
ibly was spun around the movement. The communists saw all
their hopes made concrete in the grandiose construction. And
Charles Peguy had already written that only those who touch
nothing have clean hands. Then came the victory of Hitler fascism,
then came Spain — and admittedly there also came at the same
time the Moscow trials. Much seemed unbelievable in these trials,
but the communists wanted to believe, had to believe if they
were not to abandon every alternative. Should they orientate them-
selves on those Social-Democratic Parties, which capitulated to fas-
cism, which delivered Spain to Franco and the fascist Axis Powers?
After all, no one today who wishes to help Vietnam orientates
himself on Wilson. The bloody war waged by the Secret Services,
to which King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the French Foreign
Minister Barthou fell victims, appeared to explain many things,
as did the fact that former communist leaders, like Doriot and

4 Hans Magnus Enzensberger Einzelheiten (Suhrkamp 1962) p. 316.
5 Kultur und Gesellschaft II (Suhrkamp 1965) p. 138.
others, in an unbelievably short time found their way from "opposi-
tional communism" into the fascist bog. Did not also the heroes of the first period of the Great French Revolution commit treason because of their rejection of later developments?

One looked for arguments, and because one looked, one found them. Thus one succumbed to the mythos, which left room for a certain range of doubt when there was asquiescence in general. And during the struggle, which for hundreds of thousands of communists was a life and death struggle, there was little time for thought — and soon there was the Second World War, in which the Soviet Union bore the main burden. Her victory was linked with the name which previously personified the policy of socialist construction. Step by step, in the midst of struggle one had slipped into the mythos without any other alternative.

Read Brecht's *Book of Changes* and follow chronologically how from general and unconditional acceptance, the assent remained even after the trials, with all his reservations. Even after his rec-ognition that there were many people whom Lenin convinced, that there were only a few whom Stalin commanded, he has no doubt in the correctness of the policy — until the 20th Congress. And in the period of "blood and iron", hundreds of thousands of wonderful idealists, ready to make the last sacrifice, were also pre-
pared to believe Stalin that they were men of a special mould that there were no fortresses which they could not take. About them Brecht said in his *Joan*

"Not one of them
Cared only for himself.
But for the bread of strangers
They toiled without rest."

Similar thoughts are to be found in Steinbeck’s first novel *In Dub-
ious Battle*. And if the survivors, sore and humbled, knowing that they are not unconditionally trustworthy, think over that time, in honest searchings of their conscience — they find no other alter-
native which they could have chosen.

Of course, where the mythos once reigned, there now stands doubt.
IN THIS PAPER I propose to make a critical examination of the American alliance from an Australian perspective. In that context I shall be only peripherally concerned with that maze of social, economic and diplomatic developments which we term the Asian Revolution. But I would like to make two general observations on that subject which seem relevant to the present discussion.

First, there has grown in Australia a school of thought which holds that revolutions a la Vietnam can be expected in a large number of Asian, (and other underdeveloped) countries in the immediate future. I don’t subscribe to this point of view. Revolutions are extremely difficult things to start and to prosecute; successful revolutions as opposed to palace coups, are exceedingly rare. Most Asian states are rapidly modernising and the power of the modern state to deal with embryonic insurgencies is considerable. In this sense, despite the claims of Peking, time is most likely on the side of the big battalions. The Vietnam insurgency has developed under favourable circumstances and yet has taken nearly three decades and a heavy toll on Vietnamese lives to reach its present stage of considerable strength. The uniqueness of the situation in Vietnam needs to be emphasised both to the romantic armchair revolutionaries, understandably elated by Tet and its aftermath, and to Government supporters, hopefully chastened by recent developments, both of whom have, from different standpoints, espoused the domino theory.

Secondly, I’m not sure that one should expect, or demand policy makers in Canberra to determine Australian policy towards a revolution by asking, ‘Is it in the interests of the peasant masses of
state X?' One would expect them to enquire 'Is it in Australia's interests?' On both these criteria I believe it to have been unwise for Australia to have participated in the Vietnam War. But in fact neither criterion provided the original impetus for involvement, for our masters in Canberra asked 'Can we resist American pressure to despatch a contingent of troops to fight alongside those of our ally and protector?' The location of the conflict was all but immaterial. The American alliance has been the cornerstone of Australian policy in Vietnam and much of Asia: that alliance requires a more rigorous evaluation than either the Government or most of the official spokesmen for the Opposition have been prepared to give it.

What is an alliance? An answer to this readily leads to confusion between what is and what ought to be. Palmerston, that unsentimental strategist of mid-nineteenth-century British foreign policy, is reputed to have declared that 'Britain has no eternal friends, only eternal interests'. On this hard-headed view states should ally to pursue interests which they have in common: an alliance is a means to an end. To a great extent the American alliance has become an all-pervasive end of Australian foreign policy to which an alarming number of other objectives have been subordinated, if not sacrificed. This is not necessarily undesirable. Since Palmerston's day politics has become popularised and it has become necessary for Western Governments to create moral justifications for their external behaviour to make it palatable to those they represent. Alliances have ceased to be temporary, transitional arrangements for the pursuit of limited interests; they have become, to use the jargon, communities of peaceloving peoples dedicated to the pursuit of liberty. Most governments formulate these high-minded phrases with some cynicism: after all Greece is in NATO, that bastion of democracy, and the Philippines in SEATO, an organisation dedicated to the preservation of an ostensibly satisfactory status quo. Does Canberra operate with such cynicism? One feels not. It seems unlikely that on important matters of policy the Government regularly asks those vital political questions. 'What are Australia's interests?' 'How may they be secured most cheaply most effectively, and most certainly?'. To examine these issues it is necessary to cut through the ubiquitous, moralistic verbiage which the Government gives every indication of believing. Of course it wants peace in South East Asia, but it wants other things more and is prepared to fight for them; of course it wants stability, although it will tacitly applaud the occasional elimination of half a million Indonesians because some of them are communists; of course it wants regional security, whatever that may be. Too often the meaningless propaganda has become the substance of policy and provides a panacea, a simple
answer to difficult questions. That is the function of the American alliance.

The American alliance has been a major objective of mid twentieth century Australian governments. Mooted before 1939 it became reality under the external pressures of the Pacific War. For the benefit of those inclined to think in terms of political obligations and debts it should be recalled that the U.S. fought because of Pearl Harbour, not to defend Australia. Following the defeat of Japan all the major political parties favoured an alliance with the US, which was formed by the Liberal Government in 1951 because the Americans, concerned at Mao’s victory and the Korean War, were then prepared to form such an alliance. It was not then the particular preserve of the Liberals for the ALP welcomed the ANZUS Treaty and supports it today. ANZUS committed the US to come to Australia’s assistance if she were attacked. In 1954 that fraudulent version of collective security, SEATO, was deemed to commit America to what Canberra euphemistically termed, ‘Australia’s forward defence perimeter’. At the time these seemed astute political moves: they cost Australia little and gave her a written guarantee, for what that was worth, of American protection. Since that time the price of that guarantee has progressively risen while its utility and the possibility of Australia’s invoking it have progressively declined.

The generation of Australian Liberal politicians that created the US alliance and during the 1950s formulated its working characteristics shared a number of basic assumptions about the world and Australia’s place in it. Menzies, Holt and Hasluck were the products of the age of Munich and the Japanese conquest of East Asia. From Munich they were inclined to draw the lesson that accommodation had no place in foreign policy planning; a few, precious few, delighted in their wise perception of Chamberlain’s supposed blunder; many more were determined not to be wrong again. Like Sir Anthony Eden and Menzies at Suez, they saw a Red Hitler under every Afro-Asian bed and, ignoring the relative strengths which destroyed the analogy, prepared to meet force with overwhelming force. Dissident tribesmen in Northeast Thailand became the Sudetenland Germans; North Vietnam becomes China’s puppet; Sukarno was the ‘petty Hitler of the Pacific’, or at least played Mao’s Mussolini.

From the Japanese thrust south other lessons were learned. It presented the prototype for Asian threats to Australia, a piece-meal conquest of Southeast Asia, a genuine toppling of dominoes. The lesson: to check the yellow hordes as far north as possible. That there were fewer Japanese than Commonwealth troops in
Malaya at the time of Singapore's surrender provided no answer to the 'How many human hordes make a flood?'

In the 1950s and 1960s Peking and the communist movements in Southeast Asia were accommodated to this perception. It was asserted that communism formed a monolithic, militant, atheist, aggressive and, worse, racially alien force, presided over by Stalinist Moscow and Asian Peking, intent on repeating Japan's thrust to Australia, Canberra appeared to be unaware that communism lost its vestiges of universalism in 1914 when the German Social-Democrats supported the Kaiser's War. For the following 50 years the press would assert communism's mythical unity. Mao came to power in China, and Ho in Vietnam, without, and to a great extent in spite of, Moscow's 'assistance'; Tito found Stalin's iron hand unbearable; the PKI's independence was beyond dispute. Except for those satellites established and maintained with some difficulty in Eastern Europe by the Red Army, the success of communist parties has been in inverse proportion to their degree of external control; they support a function of their self-sufficiency and adaption to local conditions. The Chinese communists are aware of this, for it was they, not the NLF, who provided the prototype for a war of national liberation. No more than Ho Chi Minh are they anybody's puppets. The edifice of the communist monolith of the 1950s would have collapsed under the briefest of analyses. But it was too useful domestically for the Liberal Government to contemplate such action. It became the all-embracing image of the Near North. Aggression equalled communism and vice versa.

This threat obsession, compounded by a nationalism prone to elevate Australia's significance out of all proportion — one thinks of Dame Zara Holt's (now Mrs. Bate) assertion that the world looked to Australia for a lead — and manifested occasionally in a manner alarmingly similar to Afrikaner notions of an embattled culture, produced the mythology of the US alliance. The Americans with suitable Australian encouragement, as in SEATO and the Vietnam War, would provide a defence in depth against 'the southward thrust of militant Asian communism'. The situation worsened in the 1960s for Peking came to direct the more militant half of the former monolith. Lin Piao's¹ statement in 1955 that Peking supports, indeed encourages, wars of national liberation was liberally misquoted, not least of all by Professor Scalapino on his periodic visits to keep America's junior partner properly informed, as evidence of Peking's aggressive intent. In fact what Mao's chief lieutenant stressed was that those revolutionary movements must be indigenous and that they should not depend on

external assistance. When the Chinese support war, they mean internal war against what they believe to be oppressive governments, not inter-state war. This is a far cry from the Japanese analogy and yet all but impossible to establish in the face of the neatly simplistic maps depicting red arrows coming from China. Not only do these appear in electioneering propaganda with the suggestion of a satisfactory formula, 'Where would you draw the Line?' but such maps are to be found in secondary school text books with the suggested topic for students' essays, 'Why does China present a threat to Australia?' Perhaps the answer is that the Country Party fears Chinese encouragement of a putative movement demanding land redistribution in the Riverina.

Canberra has also consistently claimed that the US alliance gave it a voice in US policy making. Surprisingly, this claim was for long believed. Kennedy's disavowal of Australian policy on West Irian and America's changed Vietnam policy over the last year should have disabused even the most credulous Australians.

Successive Liberal Governments have propounded this image of the world with varying intensity as it suited the state of domestic politics. To quote no less an expert than Herman Goering, "the people can always be brought to do the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is to tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism".

Menzies utilised this mythology with characteristic skill: the Communist Party dissolution bill; the Petrov affair, the purchase of the wonder plane, the F111 to support Liberal fortunes in the 1963 election. But if Menzies used the mythology he kept its price low. Until the end of his reign Australia spent almost the smallest proportion of her wealth on defence in the Western world. Under his successor, Mr. Holt, the enthusiasm with which Canberra stepped up the propaganda and increased the defence vote to counter the communist threat was alarming.

The latest encumbent of the Prime Minister's seat is said to represent a "new nationalism" and to be rethinking Australian foreign policy. Whatever the image makers intend by this nonsense he is clearly a man of the US alliance despite his equivocal kite-flying about a continental defence policy. North West Cape Polaris communications station and the ill-disguised Pine Gap installation make this an inescapable fact.

Against this background one may draw up a political balance sheet for Australia's relationship with the US. First, the benefits of the US alliance for Australia. It seems to be beyond question that an American commitment to defend Australia is worth having.
This was obtained in 1951. The questions which it raises are not so easily resolved: How useful is that commitment? What price should be paid to ensure that it is maintained? Of more question-able value to Australia is America’s military presence in South-east Asia involving as it does not only increasingly ineffectual support for pro-Western governments, but also the exacerbation of local conflicts, the intensification of anti-Western feeling and the widening of indigenous disputes to the degree where they involve the risk of wider wars. Does the fear of opposition to Bangkok in Northeast Thailand really justify the presence of enormous numbers of US servicemen and, ultimately, the risk of war with China and the worsening of US-Soviet relations? On any reasonable scale of values one would think not. Even if this US presence were deemed to be in Australia’s interests, would the Americans stay there anyway? Does the presence of 10,000 Australian policemen in Southeast Asia affect American policy? If the Americans would stay there anyway why spend 5 per cent of the GNP encouraging them to do so?

Another alleged benefit of the US alliance is that the Americans provide technological know-how, skills and capital important for Australian development. No doubt, but would they provide it without the alliance? The American government has considerable difficulty controlling private enterprise. Despite the wreckage he has made of Franco-American relations De Gaulle has found it impossible to keep American capital out of France.

A stronger motive, if not benefit, is psychological. On the one hand the alliance provides a means for thrusting Australia into the mainstream of world politics, and of avoiding the neutrality which is regarded by many Australians as immoral, as Mr. Whitlam had made clear in his pamphlet, Beyond Vietnam: Australia’s Regional Responsibilities. On the other hand the guarantee of American assistance, however modified and bought at whatever cost, provides some comfort to offset the lurking fear that the yellow hordes may, after all, sweep south.

Finally, for the government the alliance provides a convenient and heavy stick with which to beat the ALP. At a time when the Labor Party has exercised itself of all other demons radicalism, socialism and proletarianism, there remain only two points on which it is vulnerable: that Arthur Calwell and the Victorian executive remain in its ranks; and that it does not unequivocally support ‘All the Way with LBJ’, or ‘We’ll go a-waltzing Matilda with you’.

If the US alliance does provide benefits one is then forced to ask what price Australia should pay for those benefits and, further,
what extra cost is worth paying in order to maintain the same benefits. In the 1950s Australia was receiving the same security guarantee without Vietnam, without large defence expenditure, without mass sycophantic behaviour; an occasional verbal declaration of support for Washington sufficed. Has the new level of sacrifice been justified? To judge by Bury’s assertion that the F111 is a good plane at any price one might justifiably conclude that the government does not use cost benefit analysis. One needs to enquire whether the benefits of the US alliance could be obtained at a lower cost and whether Australian participation in the Vietnam debacle was not only unwise but also, even within the Government’s frame of reference, unnecessary. What are then the costs of the US alliance? These may be considered in three areas, political, diplomatic and strategic.

Politically, the alliance facilitates US intervention in Australian domestic politics. Such intervention is part and parcel of the diplomatic behaviour of great powers. That even a Labor government would not seriously threaten US interests keeps her intervention at a minimal level. But when it has been possible, for a small effort, to increase the likelihood of the Liberals’ maintaining power, America has utilised the opportunity. Two manoeuvres spring to mind. During the campaigns before the 1963 federal election, which was expected to be a close run affair, defence matters, and particularly the deficiencies in Australia’s air strike force, received considerable publicity. Then Menzies Government bought the F111 on an open ended contract which eventually led to a 300 per cent increase in cost and a delay of 3 years in the promised delivery date. The government made the most extravagant and ill-founded claims for the new plane which were generally accepted in large measure due to the Americans’ silence on the matter. Further, the USAF flew to every capital city in Australia a number of B-47s, which the Government said Australia would be loaned at no cost until the F111 became available.

That was the last Australia saw of the B-47s. The effect of these manoeuvres on the 1963 election is impossible to determine; their purpose clear enough. The 1966 election led to a similar strategy: the visit to L.B.J., Holt’s sycophantic reception, the poetry, the speeches, were all designed to ensure that the US alliance could be more easily used to beat the less fawning Labor Party.

These developments can perhaps be overestimated. Australia is in large measure a democracy and external manipulation of its political structure is difficult. But the US alliance, carefully cultivated as the ultimate guarantee of Australian security, coupled with the relatively even distribution of support between govern-
ment and opposition, does facilitate US involvement at crucial moments and increase the efficacy of that involvement when it does occur.

In the diplomatic sphere the US alliance appears to be a less beneficial arrangement than the government would have us believe. First, while the US government has often been able to utilise Australian "loyalty" to avoid unilateral American action in Southeast Asia — Laos and Vietnam provide the best examples — Canberra has found that on crucial issues the support of the Americans has not been forthcoming. In the case of West Irian Australia's unwise objective of maintaining the Dutch in the territory was torpedoed by US support for Indonesia; during confrontation Canberra found her ability to push the US towards a firmer policy on Sukarno was extremely limited, if not non-existent. Secondly, the claim that Canberra has a voice in US policy making has become patently fraudulent. Within days of Menzies' publicly stated opposition to negotiations with Hanoi, Johnson offered to negotiate at any time, at any place. Johnson's decision of 31 March 1968 to open serious negotiations clearly took Canberra by surprise.

Thirdly, the US alliance has led Australian politicians into the mistake of regarding Southeast Asia as a region essentially bipolar in its power configuration and thus analogous to divided Europe. The Philippines policy towards Sabah has tended to provide a corrective to this erroneous perception. The tangled skein of Southeast Asian politics does not represent a simplistic division between two competing power blocs.

Fourthly, the alliance enables Washington to provide Canberra with much of the information on which the latter bases its policy. Clearly, with its limited resources, Canberra is not in a position to make an independent analysis of every political development. The shortage, indeed, lack of Vietnamese linguists led Australia to rely on American assessments of the situation in Vietnam. This information could be tailored to suit American policy requirements; even if it were not, the inadequacies of Washington's own information is today only too apparent.

Finally the US alliance has led to policies not apparently in Australian interests. The Vietnam commitment is justified ultimately by the needs of the US alliance. But what cost is Canberra prepared to pay for that alliance? Almost any policy can

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2 An examination of published material should have made this clear long since. The deficiencies in America's information gathering process are depicted in David Halberstam's: *Making of a Quagmire*, written in 1964. Arthur Schlesinger later publicised the US Cabinet's ignorance in *The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy*. 
be justified by reference to the improvement of the US guarantee. Does "me too-ism" really significantly increase the likelihood of US support for Australia in the event of an attack? And, even worse, does the US alliance increase the likelihood of such an attack materialising?

Which brings me to the third category of cost, strategic. I find it so beyond doubt that no Southeast Asian power, indeed no power, except America, is capable of invading Australia within the forseeable future that the subject hardly seems worth raising.3

The technological developments necessary, the amount of resources required, are beyond any conceivable adversary's capabilities and even then the reward, an enormous army of occupation at enormous cost, would not nearly warrant the effort. A more serious, and less widely considered possibility has been thrown up by the imperatives of the US alliance. In 1963 the Australian Government reluctantly revealed that a communications centre was to be built by the Americans at North West Cape on the West Australian coast. As this base, now operational, is for communicating with American nuclear armed submarines targetted on Soviet central Asia, it placed Australia firmly in the central 'balance of terror' and, probably for the first time, exposed her to Russia's nuclear strategy. Australia, at least the base, became an important nuclear target. Over the last year or so it has become clear that the installation at Pine Gap, not far from Alice Springs, is for the purpose of tracking and possibly guiding, American missiles taking the southerly route to China in order to avoid overflying Soviet territory.4

Australia has thus become integrally, and unnecessarily, involved in the Sino-US confrontation. The Government, apparently having learned the lesson of the furore which the 1963 revelations produced, has revealed next to nothing about the matter, and information on Pine Gap has, like that on the F111 and the Vietnam war been gleaned from less secretive American official sources. It became public knowledge in Australia only after Australian manufacturers leaked the story, having been awarded only $3 million in contracts of the total $200 million cost. The rest was fully imported.

The significance of these developments is threefold. First, they illustrate the fashion in which the government is prepared to escalate the cost of the US alliance with gay abandon, even to

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3 See M. Teichmann: Aspects of Australia's Defence, for a useful examination of this matter.
the extent of making Australia a primary nuclear target. Second, they have been justified, when they have been admitted, by reference to the mythology of the US alliance rather than by rigorous analysis of the costs involved and the benefits accruing. Third, they cast, like the F111 affair, like the whole Vietnam policy-like the V.I.P. aircraft, serious doubt on the credibility and veracity of the government’s assertions.

I am neither necessarily hostile to the Australian-American alliance nor absolutely opposed to Australian interventionist policies in Southeast Asia. I do not even expect our masters to adopt a 'moral' foreign policy, for not only would it be the only state to ever make such an effort but politics, particularly international politics, does not readily lend itself to such a posture. What one is entitled to expect is a more rigorous definition and analysis of Australian interests; a more credible public explanation of those interests and how they are made operational; an abandonment of secrecy in strategic matters, at least to the extent that the Americans have been prepared to go and the acceptance on the part of both government and community that politics does not stop at the coast, that foreign policy is a political issue and that to criticise it is not to be "disloyal"5.

5 Interestingly Sir Alan Watt, generally a supporter of the Government's foreign policy, makes similar proposals, from a different standpoint, in his Vietnam: An Australian Analysis.
Bill Gollan

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

A member of the National Executive of the Communist Party of Australia examines some of the basic issues of Australian foreign policy.

THE REALITIES of Australian foreign policy are expressed not in fatuous statements of intent by Prime Minister Gorton about Australian leadership in Asia, but in the actual situation in which Australia finds itself as a result of 19 years of Liberal Party government.

Australia's subordinate and satellite position in the United States' aggressive and provocative policy in Asia, has, of course, been accepted by successive conservative governments, a United States presence in Asia being envisaged by them as wholly desirable irrespective of the tragic suffering and devastation inflicted on the Asian peoples, and especially the people of Vietnam.

A majority of the Australian people has been won to support this policy by the repeated assertion that Australia, in this way, is being protected from "aggression from the north", "communist aggression", "a row of falling dominoes" and the like. The rising likelihood of US change of tactics following the Vietnam debacle, has been underlined by the statements of Mr. Laird that the US is prepared to accept communists in the government of Vietnam.

The new Australian slogan in the changing situation is "Leadership in Asia." However, the projected new course, though it may tickle the palate of Australian commercial and financial interests, needs to be seen in perspective against the hard economic and political facts. It is true that Australian monopoly interests are already operating an expansionist "forward", economic policy in Asia and the Pacific. Existing assets (tin and rubber in Malaya, Carpenters, Burn Philp etc. in the Pacific islands) are being supplemented by fresh penetrations of Australian capital. Australian Consolidated Industries is developing holdings in Singapore and Malaysia with projected further penetration into New Guinea; whilst Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia is expanding into the Solomon Islands.

The Prime Minister, J. G. Gorton, addressing the seminar entitled "Australia 1980", held in Sydney in February 1969, and including 350 representatives of Australia's leading financial and
industrial institutions, gave a clarion call for further expansion in Asia. There is no doubt of the direction of the thinking of Australian monopoly and of the government which speaks for it.

These concepts are an expression of the national paranoiac and profit-seeking drives of Australian imperialism. They fail, however, to take account of other factors; the growing domination and takeover of the Australian economy itself by the mammoth US combines (12-15 per cent of all manufacturing, concentrated in the key areas, metals, oil, etc.) and also the rapidly expanding economic and political power of Japan in S. E. Asia and Australia.

The growing erosion of Australian economic independence has evoked some demagogic utterances from Prime Minister Gorton and calls for greater Australian equity in foreign investment; but in practice Australia, unlike Canada, India and other recipients of foreign investment capital, has established neither policy nor public authority to regulate or control it.

The Vernon Report which recommended such controls was rejected out of hand by the Menzies Government. As a result "overseas investment in Australian companies between 1950 and 1967 exceeded $5,000 million, and our indebtedness has increased by $4,600 million. This does not take account of the value of real estate sold to overseas investors, nor of the increase in the value of assets owned by overseas companies" (New Directions In Australian Foreign Policy Ed. Max Teichmann — Australian Pelican edition p. 206).

As to the economic effectiveness of unrestricted foreign investment in promoting economic growth the position in Australia could well be contrasted with that of Japan, where foreign investment is largely in the form of fixed term loans, without the surrender of national assets. In the respective countries the growth in national production per head per annum for the period 1955-65 was: Australia 1.8 per cent; Japan 8.1 per cent.

The Australian economy is very small compared with that of Japan, now the third industrial power in the world after the USA, and the USSR, with a population of 100 million people, a gross national product six times as great as Australia's and growing at a much faster rate.

Recent statements by the US State Department calling for regional pacts (Japan-India-Australia) have made it clear that the direction of the "new" United States thinking about Asia, is that Japan should be the fulcrum of its anti-China policies and should develop its markets and spheres of influence in S. E. Asia and Australia.
Development of Aspac and other machinery of economic coordination, together with the penetration of the Australian economy by Japanese interests are the first fruits of this trend.

The pending withdrawal of Britain from S. E. Asia has intensified the process; Lee Kuan Yew having bluntly stated the intention of his government to transform Singapore into a "Japanese factory" as a substitute for the special economic advantages derived from Singapore's position as a British base.

Even a role for Australia of junior-partner to Japanese imperialism is evidently not regarded seriously in Japan, where the US proposed regional pact concept met with a cool reception. Japan is well enough satisfied with the present arrangement by which Japanese industry is fed by Australian metals and other raw materials. More than 20 per cent of all Australian exports now go to Japan.

Australia's satellite status further complicates its position in another direction. The incredible F111 agreement with the USA and the integration of Australian with US armaments resulting in heavy foreign procurement payments and consequent balance of payment difficulties have already created serious problems for the Australian economy; and angry and anguished demands (fruitless in the main) for greater access to the US market to correct the economic imbalance. At the same time the economic consequences of the American Alliance have been to restrict the expansion of mutual trade between Australia and the greatest potential market in the world — the People's Republic of China.

"Forward Defence"

Against this background the policy of "forward defence", has involved Australia in the futile and mischievous intervention in Vietnam, and to an undertaking to station a token-force in Malaysia-Singapore after British withdrawal in 1971. This is not merely an absurd pretension to the exercise of a non-existent power — a power too onerous for Britain to maintain: it is an irresponsible and dangerous piece of diplomatic showmanship, intended to placate the Malaysian government and satisfy US demands for action by its allies in conformity with the general lines of US policy: the maintenance of the status quo in Asia, which of course involve "counter insurgency" actions, the containment of China, and the promotion of the economic interests of the "western world". In fact. Australia's military presence in S. E. Asia despite disclaimers by the government can have meaning only if Australian forces are intended for use in "counter insurgency" action, to repress movements against the corrupt, reactionary, often semi-feudal regimes
of military dictatorships that have the support of the US government in S. E. Asia.

However, in addition to the basic question of the great democratic national liberation movement which is sweeping across Asia like a flood, there are special problems in SE Asia in which Australia becomes inevitably involved by its military presence in that area. There is the relationship of Indonesia to Malaysia that has already led to military conflict between the two nations; the sharp tension between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah; the internal economic and political problems in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. In Malaysia the communal problem of Malays (49% of the population) Chinese (37%) and Indians (11%) is endemic. The privileged political position of the Malays and the Chinese dissatisfaction and resentment, must, inescapably lead to a sharpening of the conflict and to internal dissension and civil strife. [This was written before the recent upheaval—Ed.]

The thinking of the Australian Government expressed by the new External Affairs Minister Freeth in his first public statement, that Australia's was a "police" role in S. E. Asia, is both absurd and criminally dangerous. That Australia, a minor, ethnically European nation in an Asian environment with extremely limited military resources, should, in the name of "defence", place itself in such a position reveals the bankruptcy of the government in its approach to a valid foreign policy that serves Australia's national interests.

Paranoia and Xenophobia

A visiting observer has described Australia's image abroad as that of a "fascist racist and militarist" community. Open and covert support for the racist policies of South Africa and Rhodesia by the Australian Government, the fact that Australia is the one "western" nation assisting in the atrocity against the Vietnamese people, the discriminatory "white Australia" migration policy and the record of Australians in their relations with Aborigines and New Guineans certainly lend color to such a description.

A racist, white-supremacist attitude towards Asia has been a deep rooted national prejudice over a great part of Australia's history. The deliberate use of the prejudice further to debauch and deprave the Australian consciousness has been part of the political stock-in-trade of all Liberal governments since 1949.

In the contemporary world a pre-condition of an aggressive foreign policy is the creation of an aggressive or at least permissive public opinion and the curbing of democracy. Hence the promotion of an atmosphere of an arrogant white supremacy or at best paternalism, blended with anxiety and fear — fear of communism,
fear of China, or even fear of undefined perils from Asia, amount-
ing to a national phobia. It has been relatively easy in this atm-
osphere to mount an attack on democracy that both curbs resistance
to government policy abroad and intensifies anti-Asian hysteria at
home. Regulations and restrictions directed at these ends have
been erected into a system: restrictions on and penalties against
the trade unions through the penal powers; the use of the Crimes
Act against dissenters; the conscription of Australian youth and im-
prisonment of those objecting to the bestiality of Vietnam; the
use of telephone-tapping and of ASIO — the formal apparatus of
a police state.

The success of the corruption of opinion is best measured in the
widespread acceptance of the immoral concept of "fighting them
there, rather than here", expressed most clearly in a speech by
Menzies on April 1, 1955.

It would be a sorry day for the security of Australia if we were driven to defend
ourselves on our own soil.

The arrogant, chauvinist assumption of the right of white Aust-
ralians to determine what action they should take on the soil of
Asian peoples, was made more explicit in a statement both on
economic and political terms by Sir Garfield Barwick, then Minis-
ter for External Affairs: (Sydney Morning Herald, February 4,
1967):

While it is handsome to talk about Asia having its future determined by
Asians, it must be remembered that we have an interest as well as other Western
countries in this area.

These prescriptions for continuing intervention and war in
Asia have nothing to do with Australian security. As Mr. Gordon
Barton, founder of the Australian Reform Movement stated (S.M.H.
Nov., 16 1966):

There is no Asian country, including China, which has or is likely to have
in the next 20 years a logistic capacity capable of transporting and maintaining
armies of the magnitude required to make a successful attack on Australia,
assuming a defence structure within this country of comparable strength to
that of say, Sweden or Switzerland.

The deception and corruption of Australian opinion is necessary
to mask the true aims of Australian reactionary policy.

The Asian Revolution and Australian Policy

The policy of the Australian Government vis-a-vis Asia is based
on support for the political assumptions that also determine United
States policy; in a word on opposition to any serious change in
the status quo.

Consequently it stands opposed to the burning issues of Asian
politics; in particular, land reform in the context of freedom from
foreign domination.
The feudal or semi-feudal structure of land tenure in most South-East Asian countries results in the economic and political domination of the numerically small landlord class, the grinding poverty of the peasant, the presence of millions of landless peasants who have no place in the economic structure. Talk of modernisation of the South-East Asian economies without the necessary first step of land reform is an exercise in self-deception and futility.

To support as the Australian Government does, the existing regimes in S. E. Asia is to support 16th century social systems. Economic aid from the developed countries, as is clear from the experience of the United States in Vietnam and Laos does not reach those in need, or promote economic progress. The greater part is diverted to swell the assets of those holding economic and political power. "Aid" in these circumstances becomes patronage and promotes corruption, parasitism and dependency without raising living standards or leading to any modernisation of the economy. In fact, it has a contrary effect, in strengthening the economic and political power of the ruling juntas and reducing the possibility of reforms that are centuries overdue.

In the words of one of America's allies, Ohina Mosayoshi, chairman of the Policy Research Committee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, in a warning to the USA on its Vietnam policy:

As a result of the China incident we gained an unpleasant understanding of the limits within which military action can be successful, when a foreign army allies itself with the elements opposed to land reform in the villages of a backward country. The French achieved a particularly keen understanding of this same point in Indo-China and Algeria. (From the paper by Gregory Clark at a Sydney Peace Conference Oct. 11-13, 1968, included in The Asian Revolution and Australia).

The Asian Revolution becomes a communist led revolution to the extent that other national forces fail to undertake the fundamental changes needed; in particular land reform and the securing of national independence.

When non-communist political trends pledged to basic reform combine with communists in a united movement a National Liberation Front arises representing the interests and ideologies of the overwhelming majority of the population.

The National Liberation Fronts are what they say they are; political and national coalitions to win basic political and human rights for their people.

1 It is worthy of note that despite its enormous electoral advantages the Thieu-Ky Government gained the votes of only 17% of the adult population in South Vietnam; and to maintain itself even with half a million US troops in support, felt obliged immediately to imprison or sentence to death many of its leading electoral opponents.
The Australian Labor Party once held to this view. In 1951 before both the Liberal and Labor Parties became addicts of the American Alliance, the then leader, J. B. Chifley, stated:

I hope that statesmanship in the years ahead will ensure that Australia shall not attempt to refuse or be a party to refusing to the peoples of Asia and the East the right of self-government. No doubt we shall be told that under such conditions these countries could be dominated by communist influences . . . The point I wish to make is that it is quite foolish for people to go around the country expressing the belief that all the trouble that is taking place in Asia and the East is due to communism.

The real driving force behind the movement in the East today is the desire of Eastern peoples for self-determination and self-government.

A painful contrast to Chifley's realistic and progressive assessment is provided by Gough Whitlam's — "clear and hold' policy in Vietnam — a policy objectively of opposition to the self-determination of the Vietnamese people, a policy of collaboration with United States imperialism and the government of landlords and militarists in Saigon.

The corruption of the policy of the Labor Party flows basically from its acceptance of the subordinate role of Australia in the U.S. alliance, its support for Anzus and Seato, and its substitution for the relatively independent foreign policy of the Chifley-Evatt period of one approaching bi-partisanship with the Liberal Party.

There is no evidence in statements by Mr. Whitlam that he understands the significance of the movements ranging from the continuing struggle of the Hukbalahaps in the Philippines to the popular movement in Laos, Thailand, Burma — in fact in every S.E. Asian country.

Nor has there been from either the Liberal or Labor Parties any recognition of the role of Indonesia. The Holt Government gave the impression that it welcomed one of the most terrible pogroms in history — the extermination of from 500,000 to one million people by Indonesian reaction in 1965-66. The ascendancy of an extreme right-wing militarist clique has been presented in defiance of the facts as ensuring greater security for Australia.

The future relations of Indonesia and Australia are too serious a matter to be determined by anti-communist prejudice or by ignorant opposition to the progressive forces of the Asian Revolution.

Foreign Policy and Australian Independence

Australia is both undergoing an economic takeover by United States and Japanese interests and also pursuing its traditional role as part of the predatory, aggressive interventionist imperialist world, which has earned for itself the hatred and distrust of the
Asian peoples. That this was neither necessary nor inevitable was shown by the Labor Government when H. V. Evatt was Minister for External Affairs. Much was done to disperse the atmosphere of fear and mistrust and lay the foundations of mutual confidence with S.E. Asia. Evatt’s policy was one of championing the right of the Asian people to independence. Australia’s sponsorship of Indonesia in the United Nations which provoked Menzies’ hysterical outburst (“the ecstasy of suicide”) gained respect for and a large measure of confidence in Australian goodwill in Asia. At the same time whilst remaining within the British-American system, Evatt adopted a distinctly independent Australian position on a number of issues even to the point of rejecting United States demands for a U.S. base on Manus Island.

Australian policy towards China is perhaps the most notable example of the sacrifice of Australian national interests to the political expediency of the American Alliance. In 1950-51 both the Labor and Liberal Parties had adopted the policy of recognition of China, and the Menzies Government had actually commissioned the search for an Embassy headquarters in Peking before policy was reversed under pressure from Washington.

The hard facts of economic life have compelled a de facto relationship with China but the absurdity of non-recognition and exclusion of China from the United Nations continues.

United States aggressive policy towards China, economic embargo, naval blockade and attempted encirclement through Korea and Vietnam, has been the basic factor in the continuing instability in China and Eastern Asia generally. The refusal to recognise China’s place and its normal and legitimate right as a great nation to a position of influence in Asia and the world has been a massive provocation against China and against world peace.

Australia has added its quota to the provocation by the establishment of an Embassy in Taiwan whilst continuing, in its own despite, non recognition of the People’s Republic of China, which is now fourth in the list of Australia’s export-trade partners. Any rational policy based on Australia’s real interests and on peace and stability in Asia demands a reversal of the current policy.

Continuation of present policy can result not only in further militarisation but to increasing influence of the nuclear-armament lobby which already includes the D.L.P., powerful forces in the Liberal Party and scientists such as Professor Titterton and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Sir Phillip Baxter.

The United States base at North West Cape for the direction of nuclear missiles against the U.S.S.R.; and the Pine Gap installation
for a similar purpose against China and the highly secret Woomera spy installation have already made Australia a high priority target in the event of general war.

Nuclear armaments in addition to imposing a crushing burden on the economy would initiate a nuclear arms race in this area, without in any real sense adding to Australian security. The small nuclear armament that Australia could afford would have little if any “deterrent” value, and would gravely increase insecurity. The further erosion of Australian independence involved in the circumstances of the Woomera deal has even resulted in protests from the normally servile Australian press. Australia is moving rapidly into the position of a military satellite of the U.S.A. with all the risks involved in that situation, but with negligible voice or influence in policy.

For Co-operation and Peace

A foreign policy meeting the needs of Australia, based on co-operation and peaceful relations with Asia has to begin with a recognition that the Asian revolution is already changing and will continue to change the face of Asia, and that at least neutrality, and better still support, is in the long term interest of this country. The defeat of the United States in Vietnam is only the most recent example of the failure of a policy based on resistance to the great social and political transformation occurring in Asia. This has already been recognised by millions of people in the U.S.A. whose efforts have forced the Nixon Government to accept the fact of the U.S. defeat, and the failure of its policy.

The Australian Government, whose whole position was built upon continuing United States intervention in Asia, has demonstrated its bankruptcy by failing to give support to moves for peace in Vietnam, and even appearing to the best of its ability to oppose them.

The Communist Party of Australia, which has consistently supported the Asian Revolution and condemned the American alliance has also recognised the bond between Australia and the forces in the U.S.A. opposed to imperialist aggression by their country.

In a declaration at the 1967 Congress, the C.P.A. declared:

Australian insistence on respect for the principles of non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of other peoples and the preservation of peace can only assist the strong emerging democratic forces in the USA who support these concepts and oppose Washington’s present policies. Given a radical change in US policies, good relations with the great and creative American people can benefit the Australian people.

The abandonment of an imperialist, interventionist role requires the scrapping of the aggressive Anzus and Seato treaties,
which, in any event are meaningless for Australian security. It requires a different relationship from the semi-satellite and infantile dependency upon “great and powerful friends”; and an assertion of a position based on national maturity and self-respect. Such a change presupposes the growth of a public opinion which rejects the anti-Asian phobias and racist arrogance of the past. It necessitates an acceptance of Australia’s place in the Asian world: and not merely as a projection of European imperialist power in that area.

The political struggle to bring about the necessary transformation of opinion is the cardinal issue of Australian life today to which all questions are secondary. This is recognised by the radical right with their emphasis on a militarist-fascist state, suppression of internal opposition and a policy of nuclear armaments and anti-communist, anti-national liberation intervention abroad.

However, with effective leadership by the combined forces of the Left the already considerable movement for a basic change of policy within the unions, churches, amongst intellectuals and students, and within the A.L.P. itself, could lead to rapid developments. It was foreign policy as much as domestic issues that took President Johnson within four years from the position of winning an all-time record majority for the Presidency to one where he was unable to attend his own Party’s presidential convention. Of no little importance in this respect is the growth of opposition and resistance to the National Service Act; in essence a criticism and rejection of the government’s foreign policy.

There is also a growing opposition to the blatant racism of the white Australia policy; and serious disquiet at the slow and niggardly promotion of self-government, and the postponement to the distant future of independence for New Guinea. The beginnings of a racial and national independence struggle on Australia’s very doorstep could well be the catalyst of policies incubated in white chauvinism and racial superiority. A policy of co-operation, really substantial economic aid without political strings and the rapid development of political independence for New Guinea could be the starting point for a new relationship with Asia.

Given the present relationship of political forces and the state of public opinion, the achievement of such a policy is no small task. But it is the principal political task in Australia today and one which the Left must tackle with intelligence, resolution and perserverance.

2 At United States’ insistence the mutual guarantee against “aggression” in the Seato treaty was limited to “communist aggression”. Hence it provides no guarantees against, for example, action by Japan or Indonesia.
The author, lecturer in politics at Monash University, surveys facts and attitudes concerning preparations for chemical and biological warfare. The article was researched up to February of this year.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (CBW) is the intentional use of chemical agents or living organisms to cause death, disability or damage in man, animals or plants. During the past few years there have been protests in many countries against CBW, inspired particularly by the massive use of chemical defoliants by the Americans in Vietnam. In America, Fort Detrick is the Army's CBW research and manufacturing centre. The main British establishment, run by the Ministry of Defence, is at Porton Down. But how involved is Australia in CBW research?

Australian participation was disclosed publicly for the first time in a feature article in The Sydney Morning Herald (9/3/67) by Noel Lindblom, the paper's science correspondent. He stated that CBW research was conducted by a small group of scientists at the Department of Supply's Defence Standards Laboratories (DSL) situated in the Melbourne suburb of Maribyrnong. Australia was said to have a three-year quadripartite agreement with Britain, the USA, and Canada on the exchange of the most recent developments in the field. Lindblom reported that Mr. W. G. Jowett, Chairman of the Australian quadripartite working group and acting Head Superintendent of the DSL's Protective Chemistry Division, was not free to discuss the nature of his duties or whether they were confined to the Maribyrnong laboratories. However, the article did disclose that Jowett visited Britain and the USA from time to time, including a visit to Porton Down in 1966. In the same year he lectured on modern developments in CBW to various Australian defence establishments, including HMAS Cerberus at Westernport in Victoria, the Army Staff College at Queenscliff in Victoria, and the Navy and Air Staffs in Canberra. Only a small proportion of the research efforts of Jowett's team were said to be ever published; the proportion being probably less than the 15 per cent of the Fort Detrick researchers' findings
published in conventional scientific outlets. Lindblom concluded that although Porton Down had been recently opened up to inspection on a limited basis to the British Press and at least some of the aims and intentions of American CBW scientists had been made public, there was "almost total secrecy" about research and development in Australia.

The article prompted Mr. Whitlam, the Leader of the Opposition, to address a question to the then Prime Minister, Mr. Holt, in Federal Parliament on March 15, 1967. Asked about the extent of CBW research in Australia, Holt replied:

I am informed that a small nucleus of Australian scientists is charged with the responsibility for keeping up to date our technology of defence against chemical warfare, and this involves some research work as well as keeping in touch with allied activity in this field. No work on bacteriological agents is being undertaken in Australia. The activities that I have mentioned are not in contravention of the 1925 protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisoning or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare.

The subject of CBW research did not come up again in Federal Parliament for almost a year and a half. However, anti-Vietnam groups were not inactive in this period: the Queensland Peace Committee for International Cooperation and Disarmament published Chemical and Biological Warfare in Vietnam which reproduced material from a number of overseas sources; the Sydney Vietnam Action Campaign's Vietnam Action (July 1967) carried a three-page article on CBW in Vietnam; the Vietnam Day Committee in Melbourne organised a demonstration outside the DSL on October 22, 1967.

Around the same time the Bulletin of the Vietnam Day Committee, Viet Protest News (Vol. 2, No. 3, 1967), brought out a full issue on CBW research, compiled by Humphrey McQueen and Ian Morgan. They devoted an excellent case study to Dr. R. G. Gillis, Principal Research Scientist at the DSL, based on the Annual Reports issued by the establishment. It was found that since 1958 Gillis had published five papers on nerve gases and related compounds. He had also published two papers on stonefish venom and one on a north Queensland stinging-tree called Laportea. Research into stonefish and the stinging-tree is important because by examining natural poisons it is possible to develop new weapons and to improve existing ones. Gillis' research into nerve gases was found to be more immediately alarming since all nerve gases are lethal.

Two general articles on CBW appeared in the Press in December (The Australian, 13/12/67; The Sydney Morning Herald, 30/12/67). Unfortunately, both articles neglected Australia's involvement in CBW, but one of them led to correspondence from
a number of scientists, including Professor L. C. Birch, Challis Professor of Biology and Head of the School of Biological Sciences at the University of Sydney, who spoke out strongly against the misuse of scientific knowledge by CBW researchers. *(The Australian, 26/12/67).* At the same time, a statement expressing concern over the use of herbicides in Vietnam and endorsed by 677 Australian scientists appeared in *The Australian* *(13/12/67)*.

Further evidence of Australia’s part in CBW research and development came to light in two of the papers presented at the London conference on CBW in February 1968, and subsequently published in Steven Rose (ed.), *CBW: Chemical and Biological Warfare* (London: Harrap, 1968). The joint authors of the contribution on CBW research in Britain, Robin Clarke, editor of *Science Journal* and author of *We All Fall Down: The Prospect of Biological and Chemical Warfare* (London: Allen Lane, 1968), and J. P. Robinson, of the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm, referred to one specific area involvement: the development of protective clothing impervious to radioactive dust and chemical and biological weapons. “Various other types of protective overclothing have been developed in Britain”, they wrote, “sometimes as a result of close collaboration with the American, Canadian, and Australian establishments.”

Dr. J. H. Humphrey, an immunologist, provided more evidence of Australian participation when he discussed his reservations about the work being conducted at Porton Down:

> The study of defensive measures may not be so innocent as it might appear if studies of offensive measures and discoveries relating to these are left to our American allies on a reciprocal basis. In the absence of other information it may be wiser to assume that the collaboration which began during World War II has not ended. The existence of an agreement between Britain, Canada, Australia and the US and of shared proving grounds for CBW research at Suffield, Alberta and Innisfail, Queensland, are examples. It is important to know what are the general terms and duration of this quadripartite agreement.

In the British House of Commons on March 11, 1968, Mr. Tom Dalyell, Labor MP and member of the House Select Committee on Science and Technology, asked the Secretary of State for Defence with which countries there were shared facilities for testing equipment and weapons developed at the CBW establishment at Porton Down, and where these facilities were located. The Minister replied:

> In the United States, at Dugway proving ground, Utah; in Canada, at Suffield, Alberta; and in Australia, at Innisfail, in Queensland. The term ‘weapon’ in this context refers solely to riot control apparatus.

A front-page article in the London *Observer* *(26/5/68)* repeated the charge that Britain was not merely exchanging information
on CBW with the other three powers in the quadripartite agree-
ment, but had joined in the sharing of the use of proving grounds
at Dugway, Suffield, and Innisfall. The Observer article continued
that CS gas, the "riot control apparatus" developed at Porton
Down and used by the US army in Vietnam and against the
French students in the May 1968 revolt, was supplied to "certain
foreign and Commonwealth countries." Thus it is quite possible
that Australia is importing the agent.

A radio programme on CBW appeared on July 27, 1968 in the
ABC series "The World Tomorrow." A team of experts was
assembled including two CBW enthusiasts — Dr. Gordon Smith,
Director of the Biological Warfare Research Group at the Micro-
biology Research Establishment at Porton Down, and Brig.Gen.
J. H. Rothschild, former Commanding General of the US Army
Chemical Corps Research and Development Command and author
of the bible of CBW fans Tomorrow's Weapons (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill, 1964) — along with two opponents in Seymour M.
Hersh, former Pentagon correspondent for Associated Press and
author of Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden
Arsenal (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968), and Robin Clarke.
Clarke refuted British and Australian claims that work was being
conducted only on the defensive aspects of CBW:

I think anyone who tries to do this is really pulling the wool a little bit. One
of the things is that to do the defence you must in fact manufacture the
agent you're going to try and defend yourself against; otherwise, you can't
test it.

The producer of the programme, Dr. Peter Pockley, charged that
CBW research was being conducted in Australia at the DSL, but
the Department of Supply declined an invitation to participate
in the report. Another ABC reporter, Michael Daley, noted that
the DSL Annual Report for 1966-67 referred to research on tracing
the movement of chemical and biological aerosols through foliage,
the theoretical prediction of low concentrations of physiologically
active vapours in air, and the mode of action of drugs on the
nervous control of muscle, while on the germ front there had been
work on the reactions of bacterial endotoxins in the blood of
rabbits. These disclosures by Daley are of critical significance for
all the projects he listed have direct application to biological
warfare: aerosols are important as efficient means of disseminating
pathogenic bacteria such as some of the rickettsia (Q fever, etc.),
and microbial toxins and toxins taken from plants all have poten-
tial use as weapons for poisoning water, food and so forth. In the
previous Annual Report research had been shown on poisonous
plants, involving the isolation of active substances from the Giant
Stinging Tree and the Blister Bush from WA. Professor L. C.
Birch concluded the programme with a challenge to the Depart-
ment of Supply to comment on the allegations that Australia was preparing for CBW:

So the whole thing, the devastating effect of these chemicals and diseases, the extent to which they spread and we don't know how they will spread, and the fact that so much of the work has to be done in secrecy—all of this just burns into, I think, the scientific conscience of all of us. Why should any of it be going on in Australia? And if it is going on, shouldn't the Department of Supply let us all know now? Why and what are the details?

An article with a London dateline appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* (8/8/68) claiming that the Joint Tropical Research Unit at Innisfail was being used as a testing ground for germ warfare. The Minister for Supply, Senator Anderson, immediately issued a Press release:

The simple facts are that the JRTU was not established for the purpose of making chemical or biological warfare tests, and has not been so used; nor am I aware of any plans to use it for such tests in the future.

Parliament came to life again in the same month. During the previous 17 months in which not one parliamentarian had raised the subject of CBW, even "leftwing" members of the Opposition approached by members of the Vietnam Day Committee declined to bring it up either in question time or in general debate. However, on August 13 Whitlam reminded the Minister for Defence, Mr. Fairhall, that one of the parties to the quadrupartite agreement on CBW research—the USA—was not a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. He asked for an assurance that the Department of Supply had not at Maribyrnong or elsewhere received information or materials from that country in breach of the protocol. Fairhall replied:

It must be understood that other countries which may at some time be opposed to Australia's interests have available to them a considerable amount of knowledge of such forms of warfare. It would be folly of the worst kind if Australia were not to keep abreast of what is available in terms of knowledge so that if the time should come for us to defend our own troops in action we would know how to do it...we have never been involved in the testing of chemical or biological agents in the field of Australia, nor have we used the test areas of any other nation.

At the end of the Senate debate relating to the appropriations for the Department of Supply (17/9/68), Senators Georges and Keefe (both ALP) asked the Minister for Repatriation, Senator McKellar, whether any of the increase in the coming year's expenditure would be spent on the development of biological warfare, but on both occasions McKellar was adamant that nothing was being spent on this form of warfare. Georges returned to the subject on September 26 with a question to Senator Anderson, asking for an assurance that some experiments described in the current DSL Report were in no way connected with biological warfare. Anderson stated again that no experiments in biological warfare were being conducted in Australia, but he added: "We
must be in possession of certain information and we must ensure that our scientists study what is happening in other countries in all manner of matters which lie within the responsibility of my portfolio."

Anderson made a further statement in the Senate on October 8, which he prefaced by noting that "a small number of Australian scientists are charged with the responsibility of keeping up to date our technology of defence against biological and chemical materials. This involves some research work as well as keeping in touch with allied activity in these fields." He concluded his remarks: "No work on offensive biological or chemical warfare agents is undertaken in any establishment of my Department. Investigational work in the fields covered in the report is essential to defence against these types of agent." This heavy emphasis on "defensive" policy calls to mind a passage from Rothschild’s book, Tomorrow’s Weapons, where the author noted that "until I retired . . . I was not able to speak of a chemical or biological weapon without prefacing my remarks with the statement that the enemy might use it. I was never able to speak of the offensive, only of the defensive."

In the meantime, Professor S. D. Rubbo, Professor of Microbiology at the University of Melbourne, had been active writing a series of articles against CBW (Nation, 28/9/68; Pacific, Sept.-Oct., 1968; The Australian Quarterly, Dec. 1968) and also speaking on the subject at various public meetings. A speech at one meeting which was reported in The Australian (19/8/68) so infuriated "John C. Calhoun", the columnist for News-Weekly (25/9/68), that he wrote: "To the persistent propaganda about the horrors of nuclear war . . . is now being added some very imaginative stuff about bacteriological warfare — basically a revival of Wilfred Burchett’s germ warfare canard of the Korean War." (Rubbo effectively answered the psuedonymous columnist in News-Weekly, 16/10/68). Perhaps, one could ask, Australia’s possession of the embryo of a biochemical weapons establishment will provide the DLP with a cheaper and more effective “deterrent” than nuclear weapons? In another of his speeches Rubbo stated that Australia, as a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, should have no part in the use of chemical warfare in Vietnam and he called on the Federal Government to make a statement on the dangers of CBW (The Australian, 14/10/68).

On October 15 Senator Cohen (ALP) asked the Government to make a statement as suggested by Rubbo and on November 19 he received the following reply from the Prime Minister, Mr. Gorton: "There is no reason why the use of the types of chemicals employed in Vietnam for defoliation should lead to the use of
substances which would contravene the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or the general humanitarian principles which inspired it." Shortly afterwards, a letter appeared in The Australian (31/10/68) stating that Rubbo should have challenged the government to do a lot more than make a general statement on the dangers of germ warfare. The correspondent, Dr. A. B. Lloyd, Lecturer in Microbiology in the Department of Agricultural Biology at the University of New England, reminded readers that scientists at the DSL were actively engaged in research on biological warfare:

The Prime Minister has stated that this research is of a defensive nature. If he is sincere, then why not transfer the control of research from the Department of Supply to the Department of Health which is already responsible for natural epidemics and the development of vaccines, for such diseases as influenza, etc.? For if the biological warfare centre at Maribyrnong is engaged only in defensive work, then it too should be making vaccines and devising methods for protecting this country against man-made epidemics.

Lloyd then went on to question the secrecy surrounding the work of the DSL:

The great danger of conducting research in secret is that the public is unaware of the nature of the work and the dangers from any discoveries.

At present most biological scientists in this country know more about the biological warfare centres in Porton, England, or Fort Detrick, USA, then they do about the Defence Standards Laboratories, Maribyrnong, Victoria.

We as citizens have a right to know what is happening and to insist that this work is entirely defensive.

Senator Wilkinson (ALP) asked Senator Anderson on November 6 whether he would consider transferring the DSL from Supply to the Health Department, thereby establishing that the research being conducted at Maribyrnong was entirely defensive and not related to CBW. Once again, Anderson replied that "no part of my Department has in the past engaged in, is now engaged in or has any plans for future research work involving the handling of disease-producing biological agents, nor is there any facility in the Department that is set up to handle, or could be immediately converted to handle, such work." The defensive aspects of Supply's activities, he continued

are those with chemical and physical rather than biological aspects of this field... They include work on respirators and protective clothing and on studies of the rates of diffusion or dissemination of agents in the atmosphere.

On November 27 Senator Cohen asked the Minister for Supply to make a statement covering the terms of the quadripartite agreement for the sharing of CBW research findings and the shared use of testing grounds. Replying on the following day, Anderson stated that in July 1965 Australia had joined TTCP (The Technical Co-operation Programme) which related to co-operation in the whole of non-atomic military research and development. One field in which Australia exchanged information with the other
parties was called “Chemical and biological defence.” The Minister continued:

I and other members of the Government have on previous occasions stated that it is Australia’s policy to be well informed on defensive measures in this subject, but in accordance with Geneva protocol, not to have an offensive capability. In relation to the joint tropical research unit at Innisfail, I stated that it was not a testing ground for chemical and biological warfare, and at that time and on other occasions I have stated that Australia has no other testing ground which is used for this purpose. Although TTCP makes provision for the joint use of facilities, it will be clear from what I have just said that this provision cannot apply to the shared use of a chemical and biological warfare testing ground which Australia does not have, nor, as will be clear from my previous explanations of the nature of the work that we are doing, is it necessary for Australia to make use of, or participate in the use of, the testing ground operated by any other member of TTCP.

Meanwhile, public interest in CBW had been maintained by the screening on ABC T.V. of an excellent BBC documentary entitled “A Plague on Your Children” and by the publication of two lengthy reports on CBW by Christopher Forsyth in The Australian (2 and 4/11/68). Towards the end of December, Mr. Barnard, Deputy Leader of the Federal Opposition, stated in a radio broadcast that the fact that CBW research was carried on in laboratories attached to the Department of Supply implied that it was “more than merely defensive.” If the research was genuinely preventive and defensive, he went on, it should be transferred to the Department of Health. (The Australian, 30/12/68).

CBW came back into the headlines in February 1969. A BBC feature on the subject was screened on ABC television on February 16; it included an allegation by Mr. Tom Dalyell, British Labor MP and member of the House Select Committee on Science and Technology until he was sacked at the end of 1968 for his part in the agitation against the secrecy surrounding Porton Down, that the Joint Tropical Research Unit at Innisfail was being used as a testing ground for chemical weapons “and perhaps biological weapons, too.” A senior British scientist engaged in research at Porton Down also claimed that field tests were carried out at Innisfail. Immediately, Senator Anderson and an Army spokesman denied that the JTRU was being used for “germ warfare” experiments. The Army spokesman added: “Even if testing for germ warfare was being carried out here, I would not be in a position to disclose it.” (The Australian, 18/2/69).

An item in The Herald (18/2/69) reported that the JTRU was established in 1961 as a joint venture between Australia and Britain. Britain had provided the cost of running the unit, although Australia contributed $25,000 last year. Most of the scientists working at Innisfail are British, and most of the research is initiated from Britain. The report went on to state that after
the London Observer had claimed in May 1968 that work on CBW was taking place at Innisfail, Whitlam arranged for two members of his staff to visit the unit. They reported back that all they saw at Innisfail was the examination of the effects of tropical weather and conditions on army uniforms and equipment. An article in The Age (21/2/69) stated that there was a second establishment at Innisfail, jointly operated by the Department of Supply and the British Ministry of Technology.

It was unfortunate that the Press consistently referred to Dalyell’s charges under banner headlines reading “Germ Warfare.” The Federal Member for Leichhardt, Mr. Fulton (ALP) and two journalists visited the JTRU establishment to see whether “germ warfare work” was being conducted there. Fulton said that he had been at Innisfail 18 months previously but he was certain there had been no germ work going on at the time. “I would be very much against that type of thing” in the electorate of Leichhardt, he said. If trials associated with germ warfare were necessary, he continued, they should be conducted in a very remote place, “like a desert”, or a confined area. (The Age, 19/2/69). Following his visit to Innisfail, Fulton dismissed claims of germ warfare: “I went there with an open mind and came away satisfied with what I saw, and with the assurance from the unit commander that its function was to test military equipment.” (The Sun, Melbourne, 20/2/69). One of the journalists who accompanied Fulton headed his report “White Ants, Not Germs at Innisfail.” (The Age, 21/2/69).

Dalyell, however, did not claim that germ warfare research was being conducted at Innisfail. He said that Innisfail was the “hot-and-wet” proving ground, whereas Suffield provided “cold-and-wet” conditions, and Dugway was a “hot-and-dry” establishment. He went on to say that he believed testing at Innisfail was probably connected with herbicides (e.g., rice fungus) and with riot control agents such as CS gas, and it was also possible that toxic nerve gases were being tried out:

We do the work at Porton, and you Australians provide the proving ground. Innisfail could obviously simulate jungle conditions for trying out gases of the type used in Vietnam. (The Age, 22/2/69.)

It is most unlikely that germ warfare research is being carried out in Australia. We simply have not the facilities available to undertake the type of research for which Porton Down is infamous. On the other hand, chemical warfare research into nerve gases is almost certainly going on at the DSL. For the moment, a question mark must be placed against Innisfail, although it is possible that nerve gases have been tested there on protective clothing.

The public record on CBW research in Australia has enormous gaps. Little more information can be expected from the Govern-
ment, apart from what Ian Moffitt described in *The Australian* (17/8/68) as “bland denials” and “Canberra semantics”. It is known, however, that the Government set up a committee which investigated problems of defence for Australia in case of an attack by an enemy employing CBW weapons. The committee discussed such aspects as a hypothetical case where Australia was attacked from the North (Asia?) by an enemy using biological warfare weapons which caused an epidemic of Q fever. Not surprisingly, the Government has refused to acknowledge the existence of the committee.

Many US and British universities are heavily involved in CBW research. Are Australian universities participating in similar programmes for either the Australian Government or the US Defence Department? Some people are suspicious about the University of New South Wales — which is still believed to conduct security checks on new appointments to its staff — on the grounds that this institution now has a Faculty of Military Studies, based at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. Recently the Faculty of Military Studies advertised the position of Professor of Chemistry, whose department's interests inter alia were claimed to be nitrogen and organo-phosphorus chemistry and structure. Opponents of CBW research would be well advised to keep acquainted with activities at Duntroon. The Department of Zoology at the University of Queensland has for some time been actively working with potent toxins, especially some of the gastropod toxins which will paralyse vertebrae. The leader of the research group involved, Dr. R. Endean, denies that its work is in any way concerned with biological warfare and he states that neither he nor any of his group have been contacted by outside people with an interest in biological warfare research. Nevertheless, his published work is undoubtedly read with interest at Maribyrnong.

CBW research in Australia is insignificant compared to the work being conducted overseas. By refusing to acknowledge the extent of Australian participation in CBW research and development, however, the Government is preventing public debate on yet another aspect of the close links they have developed with the USA, a country which has never signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and which is patently violating the Protocol in its imperialist war against the Vietnamese people. It is to be hoped that an unrelenting campaign to end the secrecy which surrounds CBW research will be waged by the Federal Opposition in Canberra as well as the extra-parliamentary opposition and members of the scientific community who have refused to turn themselves into academic Eichmanns.
Books


THIS BOOK makes fascinating reading despite its brevity (215 pages). On Zionism, Israel, Arab nationalism and the characters of people such as Moshe Dayan, it gives a wealth of facts not generally known. It realistically examines the standpoints of both sides, refreshingly putting main responsibility on the author's own side to get some movement towards peace.

Insofar as it deals with the faults of the Arabs, the main point made is that it is a great mistake to regard Israel as merely a stooge for Western imperialism, although the author recognises reasons for the existence of such a view.

The main thesis of the book is the recognition that two great national movements, perhaps inevitably in view of historical circumstances, have come into collision in the Middle East, and that the only possible way out short of ultimate catastrophe is to break what has become a vicious circle.

Uri Avnery was born in 1924 in Germany and left for Palestine with his family shortly after Hitler came to power. He joined Irgun the National Military ("terrorist") Organisation which fought the Arabs and also the British, whom they thought were secretly supporting the Arabs, though Avnery records that later he realised the Arab fight was at bottom a great national rebellion which was destined to grow.

Avnery fought in the war of 1948, and in 1950 became editor of Ha'olam Hazeh ("This World") which is now regarded as Israel's leading weekly news magazine. Attempts to mute the voice of this journal in 1965 impelled him into the political arena, and he was elected to the Knesset (with 1.2% of the votes under proportional representation) as the sole parliamentary spokesman of a new political grouping.

The origins of the clash of nationalisms he places in the founding of Zionism by Theodor Herzl in 1896 with his book Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State). Avnery describes Zionism as a direct product of the spirit of nationalism in nineteenth century Europe, in the wake of the infamous Dreyfus affair.

Zionism, Avnery says, envisaged even greater changes than those introduced by other national revolutions, in that it involved as well the transfer of people from one country to another, and often from one class to another (usually lower).

The "achilles heel" of this fervent nationalism was its ignorance and blindness in regard to the Arabs. Avnery quotes an almost unbelievable incident recounted in one of the books of the famous Jewish philosopher Martin Buber. Nordau, another top leader of Zionism "hearing for the first time that there were Arabs living in Palestine ran to Herzl deeply shocked exclaiming, 'I didn't know that! We are committing an injustice'" (p.50).

Avnery dryly records that Nordau did not take long to recover completely from his shock and sense of injustice. So much so that at the Seventh Zionist Congress in 1905 he advocated an alliance with the Turks (then ruling Palestine) against the Arabs — "It meant, practically speaking", says Avnery, a declaration of war on the emerging Arab nationalist movement" (p.51).

This was followed by other moves, by the Arab side as well as the Zionist, and, says Avnery.
"Thus began the cycle in which Zionist-Arab relations have moved incessantly ever since: (1) The Zionists increase their efforts at immigration and settlement; (2) the Arabs react violently to what they consider a mortal threat to their national existence; (3) to contain the threat and gain political and military assistance, the Zionists look for an ally, an ally that can only be a foreign power whose interests are being adversely affected by the rising Arab nationalism: [Turks, British, French, Americans]; (4) the pact between Zionism and the foreign power whets Arab hatred and bitterness, sharpening their attack upon the Jewish national home; (5) this increases for the Zionists the need for even bigger allies.

It is a complete cycle, a truly vicious circle, this not-so-merry-go-round where each rider sits on his horse as it goes up and down, imagining that it is he who decides his course, tragically condemned — by the inner logic of his earlier acts and the ideology nourished by them — to follow a predestined course" (p.59).

Opportunities presented by positive Arab attitudes at various times were never responded to because of the basic Zionist attitude which remained dominant. For example Ben Gurion, regarded as the architect of the State of Israel "never wavered in his belief that Israel must remain a homogeneous Jewish state, that it must align itself with the West, and that peace with the Arabs is impossible" (p.97).

Opportunities missed because of this include relations with Nasser, of whom Avnery says that he had no anti-Israel sentiments or policy to start with.

Also the events in 1954, when General Riad announced that the Arabs were prepared to accept international control over the waters of the Jordan River which would have meant some actual collaboration between the Arabs and the State of Israel, and various other moves which may have opened some doors. Zionist attitudes and policies however made certain that these remained shut.

Other facts related by Avnery include those concerning the notorious spy story of 1954 where a group of Jewish Egyptians were directed to plant bombs in American and British offices throughout Egypt to worsen relations with these countries to the "benefit" of Israel.

Within Israel, Zionist policy worked in the same direction. The fundamental tenets of Zionism are described by Avnery as follows:

"(a) all the Jews in the world are one nation; (b) Israel is a Jewish state, created by the Jews and for the Jews all over the world; (c) the Jewish dispersal is a temporary situation, and sooner or later all Jews will have to come to Israel, driven, if by nothing else, by inevitable anti-Semitic persecution; (d) the ingathering of these exiles is the raison d'etre of Israel, the primary purpose to which all other aims have to be subservient" (pp.157-8).

Thus, in Israel, there is no separation between Church and State. Every Jew has the automatic right to settle in Israel, immediately acquiring Israeli citizenship (though his spouse, if a Christian would not become such except through normal processes of naturalisation).

But what is a Jew, who is a Jew? No clear-cut legal definition exists. There can be, and is, no definition except a religious one, and the courts of Israel have even decided that a person ceases to be a Jew if he adopts another religion. There is no civil marriage or divorce in Israel and a Jew cannot marry a Christian or a Moslem — nor can a Jew named Cohen marry a divorced woman, because Co-
hens, regarded historically as belonging to the priesthood, must marry virgins. (A Cohen cannot change his name to get out of it either!)

Perhaps more important, the idea of a homogeneous state being inherent in Zionism, any non-Jew is really a foreign element to the Israeli regime, and this has particularly grave consequences in respect to the Arabs. For example, it raises almost insuperable barriers to the settlement of the Arab refugee problem, because Zionist outlook regards it as essential to keep the Arab minority as small as possible.

Perhaps the most striking fact of all is that, after three generations of conflict and 20 years of an actual state of war, there is no Israeli Government department for Arab affairs. These matters are handled by the Middle East section of the Foreign Ministry, which employs only 30 officials out of a total of 900, and some of these deal with questions involving non-Arab Middle Eastern countries such as Iran! Less than 0.05% of the Israeli budget, and less than 3% of that of the Foreign office is devoted to Middle Eastern affairs. The Zionist ideology is overwhelmingly oriented towards the West.

Before outlining the author's approach to the breaking of the vicious circle, some facts concerning the Israeli Establishment need to be given.

Although many aspects of Israeli life are very democratic, the Establishment is deeply — and undemocratically — entrenched. Says Avnery "the Zionist parties... have power structures almost independent of their members, controlled by professional leaders and financed by outside sources". (p. 68).

This arose for quite understandable historical reasons, it is true, but this makes it no less a blight on today's political scene. Briefly, most Zionist party leaders originally lived abroad; they controlled a growing financial apparatus operating in Palestine but based abroad. The parties established their institutions. The kibbutzim (co-operatives) belong to parties, and thus breaking with the party meant abandoning a home. The Histadruth (trade union organisation) attached to left-wing Zionist parties, operated the labor exchange and an excellent sick fund — but this gave the leaders of parties great power over dissident members.

Considerable financial contributions to the various Zionist parties came from abroad via the Jewish Agency, whose governing bodies are not elected by any normal democratic process:

"It is a Federation of party secretariats... a system for the division of the spoils. Several million dollars are parcelled out directly among the Zionist parties, ostensibly as compensation for relinquishing their rights to organise their own fund-raising in the United States." (p.175) But the main activity of the Jewish Agency is (with complete agreement of the State) the organisation of immigration, including settlement and absorption of migrants.

"Thus", says Avnery, "parties controlling the Zionist organisation can manipulate vast amounts of money independent of ordinary democratic processes and controls. Small wonder indeed that to all these parties Zionism is sacred. The Establishment could not possibly exist without it. The idea of a non-Zionist Israel is to them heresy, mortal sin: "". (p.176).

And this is the radical proposal for a new course advanced by Avnery and his colleagues — a non-Zionist Israel.

They consider themselves to be representative of a new generation of Israelis who reject the Zionist shibboleths and attitudes. They regard themselves as Israeli (or Hebrew) nat-
ionalists, and not just another part of world Jewry that happens to live in Palestine.

Thus they do not look to a great new influx of Jews from abroad to develop Israel (nor do they believe it will come); they are not motivated by a need to acquire new territory for the settlement of such a flood of migrants; they are not oriented towards the West but to the Middle East, and therefore towards the Arabs, and a merging rather than a clashing of the two nationalisms; they are for a secular state and the overthrow of the existing Zionist establishment.

This new, non-Zionist nationalism is regarded by Avnery as similar to the new nationalism involving a sense of political destiny which developed in Australia for example. A nation, for him, is defined simply and pragmatically as "a group of people who believe they are a nation, who want to live as a nation, have a common political destiny, identify themselves with a political state, pay its taxes, serve in its army, work for its future, share its fate — and, if necessary, die for it". (p.155).

It is from this approach that Avnery draws his main proposal for peace. The Arabs are not one nation, but several. The only Arabs who are not identified with one or other of these nations are the Palestinian Arabs. They satisfy his definition of a nation — they want to live as a nation, and are prepared, if necessary to die for it.

This "would mean that the Government of Israel would offer the Palestinian Arabs assistance in setting up a national republic of their own, this offer being conditional upon a federal agreement between such a Palestine and Israel. The Palestine Republic would comprise the west bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip. Transjordan could join if its inhabitants were able and willing so to decide. Jerusalem as a unified city would become the federal capital, as well as the capital of both states... The Federal agreement should be preceded by an economic, political and military pact" (p.187-7).

Avnery answers some of the many objections that spring to mind, though he recognises the long term nature of such a solution, even if it is realisable at all. But what is the alternative? The parallel is drawn by many with the Crusader State in Palestine which lasted for about two centuries, but finally and inevitably succumbed. If this ultimate disaster faces a Zionist Israel, does it offer much comfort to Arab nationalism to have to wait this long for the internal progress to which they look, and which can hardly come while the state of war remains? Can it offer much comfort to the rest of the world which could be drawn into any one of the many future conflicts which will inevitably flare up in the absence of a settlement.

The questions once posed answer themselves, and must increase efforts towards a political settlement somewhere in the direction indicated by Avnery.

Whatever may be the case on the other side — and one can as yet only hope for an equally realistic and forward looking attitude gaining ascendancy among the Arabs and some of their supporters — the rulers of Israel, dominated by their Zionist outlook and pro-Western orientation, at present offer no encouragement whatever.

They appear to be "reasonable" (as they wish to appear) by offering direct negotiations with the Arabs. But as Avnery points out, far from being reasonable, this is a sure sign of bankruptcy of their policy in regard to peace. For all the present rulers of Israel want is recognition by the Arabs, which they immediately achieve once direct negotiations are entered into. This gives them "victory" in advance
of any proposals on their part to satisfy legitimate Arab demands. In fact they have no proposals and cannot agree among themselves on any proposals, as Prime Minister Mrs. Meir has recently clearly revealed.

One feels, from reading this book, that Avnery does indeed express the aspirations of the as yet very small number of “new generation” Israelis, and this gives some hope for peace in the future. What one does not know is whether this small number will increase quickly enough to avoid a new disaster.

E.A.


IN THE 19th CENTURY, with the discovery of the theory of evolution by Darwin and the general advance of science, the creation of the world as it appears in the Bible was discredited in the eyes of many and a movement developed called Rationalism.

Present-day Humanists are the “intellectual heirs” of such free thinkers. In 1968, British philosopher A. J. Ayer invited 20 members of the Advisory Council of the British Humanist Association to explain, with topics of their own choosing, what Humanism means to-day.

Humanists adopt a scientific method in their approach to analysing the world around them. They affirm the principle that human beings should not be expected to accept as dogma what is not known to be true, e.g. the existence of a deity.

However, the anti-Godism which dominated the outlook of earlier humanists has been replaced with a more all-sided attitude, dealing more with the role of man, dependent as he is, upon natural and social resources. As the N.S.W. Humanist Society puts it, “Humanists hold that human moral and social conduct are best founded on reason and on the value and dignity of man.”

In his introduction to The Humanist Outlook, A. J. Ayer points out that while there is no logical connection between religion and morals this does not entail that there is no causal connection, that is, the highest moral actions may come from those who adopt a religious faith and because of it. Therefore it would be a mistake for the Humanist movement to expend its main energies on an anti-clerical crusade.

Moral conduct receives a great deal of attention in this book — as it relates to war, nuclear weapons, inequitable distribution of wealth, birth control, the right to commit suicide for rational motives such as increasing senility, and the responsibility of each individual for his own actions.

A. J. Ayer points out that if there is no logical connection between religion and any code of morality, neither can science supply us with our values. We can appeal to facts to support moral attitudes but such support is not justification.

If so how do moral values arise? Who is to say which values are right or wrong? Are there any universal moral values? How do we learn to make moral decisions? These are some of the questions discussed.

Morris Ginsberg (Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics) opposes the view of the anthropologist Boas that there is no evolution in moral ideas (derived from Boas’ studies of primitive societies). Ginsberg believes moral codes differ but at the same time this does not rule out that behind diversity there are gen-
eral principles, which become increasingly accepted and universally binding.

Group morality survives in racial discrimination; in war; in chauvinistic nationalism; yet universalism has grown, that is, "the recognition that there are certain things to which men are entitled whether we love them or not."

Marjorie Knight (Psychologist of Aberdeen University) supports this view when she points out that in the study of the evolution of communities one finds a high degree of mutual cooperation, at the same time as there exists an attitude of mutual aggression against the outsider. Constantly, the in-group has widened. Morals then, are derived from the interaction of groups within the community and the discovery of what most effectively advances their mutual interests. She sees the widening of "in-groups" as leading towards a total inclusion of all mankind.

Kingsley Martin (Editor of the New Statesman and Nation) states it more firmly. He wonders what happened to the scientists who once resolutely opposed the idea of making nuclear weapons. Did they — when they became establishment — "forget they were servants of the world?" He concludes, "Humanism must bring society back to the idea of a world society."

In agreeing with this a marxist might add that the idea of a world society cannot be founded in ideas of what is good or right or what ought to be, but only by estimating the needs and desires of the majority of the people and then collectively taking action to achieve these. However, people acting collectively are acting morally only insofar as they are conscious of their goals as truly human.

Nor can the individual evade the necessity of making moral choices. They are constantly before us. As Kingsley Martin states in his contribution, "Even those who surrender their independence of judgment or those who merely go by current fashion are tacitly making a fundamental moral choice."

Individuals who join organisations, parties, form alliances and so on in order to further their moral aims still need to make such decisions. Loyalty to any group must depend on what this group does. Insofar as individuals identify themselves with a group then they share in the group's action.

So moral choices face us always. James Hemming (PhD, Educational psychologist) believes that the moral education of children is a process of guided personal development so that the child learns to be responsible for himself and his own actions.

At the same time, Humanists, in the opinion of Antony Flew (Professor of Philosophy) are opposed to indoctrination of the child. A proposition is a doctrine when thoughts, not known to be true or even known to be false, "are implanted with some sort of special authority," and he instances "ideas concerning God and man's relation to God." A child indoctrinated is deprived of developing the ability to make his or her own judgment on matters which will concern its whole life.

Raymond Firth from an anthropologist's standpoint, deals with Gods in primitive societies and the Christian God and how advanced theologians are exploring ways of adapting the tenets of the Church to social change. The trend which interests him is the emphasis on the human aspect of religion, its relevance to man's every-day concerns and its role in promoting social-justice, and gives as an example the worker priests and the attempts by Catholics and marxists to find common grounds on such subjects as work.
ers' control of industry or Marx's concept of alienation

Sir Karl Popper's essay, the only one not written specifically for this book, was translated from a script to a broadcast originally addressed to a German audience. He denies there are laws of history, be they mechanistic, dialectical or organic. "Emancipation through Knowledge" is his theme. His ideal of our self-emancipation through knowledge rests on discovering our own errors and the errors of others. This is not the same as the ideal of mastery over nature, which Marxists adopt. Self-criticism and self-emancipation are only possible in a pluralist or open society, according to Popper.

However, Marxists do not reject the idea that progress in knowledge is made by recognition of error as well as recognition of success. Marx's view that our opinions are determined by class interests does not negate this view. Marx investigated society and found that in class societies, class is a constant factor in forming opinions. His view was scientific. Classless society, the true open society cannot be achieved by universal tolerance of each other's differences if this means reconciliation of class interests.

The principles of Humanism, that is scientific method in approaching nature and society; reliance on man to make his own history; universalism in morality and so on, are encompassed by people of many diverse views.

In a recent survey by the Australian Humanist which drew 256 replies, Humanists in Australia were found to comprise: 11.4% Radical (including 1.5% Marxist, .8% Communist); 55.8% Reformist; 55% Moderate; and 24% Miscellaneous.

Among all these, there would be a more or less general agreement about the aims of Humanism as presented in

The Humanist Outlook. Where the differences lie would be in the way we are to proceed to achieve a world which is "founded on reason and the belief in the value and dignity of man."

Barbara Curthoys

PRAGUE SPRING,
by Z. A. B. Zeman.
Penguin, 169 pp., 70c.

THE AUTHOR of this slim book about the events in Czechoslovakia during last year is a Czech migrant who re-visited Prague after 20 years of absence. This absence is probably the reason for the major draw-back of his book concerning the democratic reforms in Czechoslovakia.

The analysis is based on very good general knowledge of Czech historical background and on much factual material given mainly by the Czech press. The author uses quotations from Czech dailies and weeklies in the right context and it is obvious that he has studied Czech reality for many years.

But his observations are limited by his long absence from the country. He places the beginning of the Prague Spring in the year 1967. Living in Czechoslovakia he would probably have realised that the great intellectual movement of the Czech and Slovak nations started 3-5 years earlier. Czech literature, film, theatre and art generally broke the barriers of Stalinism in the years of 1962-1964.

Zeman sees Prague Spring purely as intellectual reform. He gives a good picture of the journalists and writers' world. His analysis of the student movement is rather vague in facts and atmosphere. Z. A. B. Zeman doesn't write about the workers and the farmers who had their own specific reasons and motivations for challenging Novotny's regime.
We could recommend *Prague Spring* for reading mainly as an informative book with plenty of what in Australia are unknown facts, details, data and figures. The readers certainly will appreciate the short chronology of Czechoslovak events given at the end of this useful book.

**Ales Benda**

(Mr. Benda, a journalist on the Czech paper "Youth Front" visited Australia as a guest of the Young Socialist League in May this year.—Ed.)

**ON ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS, by Herman Kahn. Penguin, 300 pp., $1.65.**

HERMANKAHN, a mathematician rumoured to have an IQ of over 200, once referred to himself as an "amateur strategist". But since the conditional acceptance of his style of strategy by the US administration he has moved into the lucrative and powerfield of prediction and pontificating — his Hudson Institute team is now "investigating" the twenty-first century. However, in greater measure even than similar general theories of the Buckminster Fuller/Marshall McLuhan type, Kahn trades in errors of fact and in generalisation so loose it can be shown to be untrue (see the discussion of his first two books in *Dissent*, X, i, 1963).

*On Escalation* is a work so crowded with characteristic Kahn shortsightedness and general lack of political awareness it becomes difficult to know where to begin discussing them. As in his earlier works these faults stem primarily from the type of anti-sentimental stand he adopts, for by facing the fact that we must think of what would be involved in nuclear war he forgets individuals or societies completely and assumes, in their stead, a potential public tolerance of widespread disaster. Thus

"Today our strategic forces are so hardened and dispersed that many analysts believe the US could give the Soviets days to try to destroy these forces and they would not be able to do so. Therefore, there need be no rush for the President to retaliate. He could wait until the attack was finished and then decide on the nature of the retaliation. For example, he could communicate with the Soviets to find out if the attack was accidental or deliberate before striking back. (p. 65)."

As though to underline the naivete of expecting the necessary tolerance of such a situation, Kahn, at other points in the same book, lists both Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the *Lusitania* as "intense" (i.e. likely to start a war) "crises".

But it seems Kahn's style to be so rash. For instance four pages previously he is similarly naive before the US Government "Line" on the Tonkin Gulf Incident. After quoting a single article from *The Washington Post* of 10/7/64, headed "US Reprisal Raids on North Vietnam Kept as Last Resort," Kahn writes:

"Since the above was obviously 'leaked', it was likely to be understood by Hanoi and Peking as semi-official, if not official. It would be difficult to give a more detailed, specific and expository threat and account of the theory. However, the extent to which such stories may have influenced the behaviour of Hanoi and Peking is an open issue. It clearly did not prevent the later attack on US destroyers in Tonkin Bay."

To have leaped from any one report to this conclusion would have been absurd, even had the report been dated as late as July 31. In fact the 23 days between the report and the Tonkin Gulf Incident included separate appeals for a reconvened Geneva Conference from the Soviet Union, U
Thant and De Gaulle as well as NLF interest. But on 26/7/64 Saigon denounced such proposals (only a day after Johnson had stated "We do not believe in conferences called to ratify terror, so our policy is unchanged"); on 29/7/65 General Khanh of South Vietnam called for a "march to the North" and the same period included at least two North Vietnamese reports of US interference in the Tonkin Gulf area. On the strength of completely ignored contemporary actions and statements Kahn’s belief in The Washington Post as some form of lay hotline must be discounted even should the reader accept the attack as unprompted or the alliance between Hanoi and Peking both obvious and strong. (In his discussion of the "Phony War" of September ’39 — May ’40 Kahn again uses only one source: an article by Quester that ignores many important economic considerations.)

But this is the characteristic style of Herman Kahn. He has prepared a "ladder of escalation," labelled the "rungs," and then speculated with respect to either largely unsubstantiated claims about the past or to "metaphors and scenarios" which, since they are of his own making, he can hardly be congratulated on studying in depth. To make a book from his theories he must then push the world and its leaders into frames of his making, discounting at every "rung" the possibility that his scenario may not be plausible in its entirety. (Accidental war leading to the formation of a world government is "not . . . wildly implausible" to Kahn though he doesn’t say why not; nor does he say why Pearl Harbor and the act of violating Belgian neutrality in 1914 were similar in their "savage" break of "the conventions of war.")

In fact so much of Kahn’s book is unacceptable one cannot really get to terms with his general conclusion — that any nuclear war will be intentional rather than accidental and that he has the key to the forms any ordered escalation may take. His previous work was called Thinking about the Unthinkable (and included the confession he would not like to defend America’s justifiable loss in World War III being 60,000,000, his figure, “in the give and take of public debate”) but Kahn is not even a skilful thinker. His theory is all from the top of his head, because we haven’t had a holocaust yet, yet lack of such experience surely doesn’t necessitate ignoring precedent to such a degree that previous wars and crises are instructive only to the extent that they show us how different, and how much more orderly nuclear war will be: use of nuclear weapons, for instance, is seen as a quantitative not qualitative alteration to the nature of a conventional war or "agreed battle" — one can only assume, in this case, that a pushbutton war will simply not move the public as other wars might and that they shall accept all that their leaders do and say. In fact the simultaneous publication in Penguin of a savagely abridged Clausewitz On War demonstrates, and clearly, how strategy has not been forced away from precedent by the development of nuclear weapons. And one has only to look at the article Talenski, the Russian theorist, has written on “The Character of Modern War” (International Affairs, Moscow, 1960) to see just how unnecessary and callous Kahn’s hard truths really are.

As to the edition: the implications that the revisions to the 1965 text, the consequence of a trip to Vietnam, make the revised edition more up to date are quite misleading and the indexing is, if not arbitrary, irritatingly selective.

Carl Harrison-Ford
Books Received

DAYS OF FIRE
by Samuel Katz.
W. H. Allen, $6.15.
Distributed in Australia by
Tudor Distributors.

CHE'S DIARIES
with a foreword by Fidel Castro
London Bulletin of the
Bertrand Russell Peace
Foundation, No. 7. 228 pp.,
8/- stg.

RELIGION IN A SECULAR
SOCIETY
by Bryan Wilson.
Pelican, 286 pp., $1.00.

THREE NEGRO PLAYS
Penguin, 207 pp., $1.00.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN
AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Max Teichmann Ed.
Pelican, 212 pp., $1.00.

ULYSSES
by James Joyce.
Penguin, 719 pp., $1.70.

THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER
by J. P. Mackintosh.
Penguin, 207 pp., $1.00.

COUP D'ETAT: A PRACTICAL
HANDBOOK
Allen Lane.
The Penguin Press, 189 pp.,
$4.50.

WORK 2, 20 PERSONAL
ACCOUNTS
Ronald Fraser Ed.
Pelican, 265 pp., $1.30.

SUMMERHILL
by A. S. Neill.
Pelican, 336 pp., $1.20.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
IN EUROPE
Eric Moonman Ed.
Penguin, 175 pp., $1.00.

THE WRITER IN AUSTRALIA
John Barnes Ed.
Oxford University Press, 336 pp.,
Paperback $5.00, Hardboard $9.50.

RISINGHILL: DEATH OF A
COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL
by Leila Berg
Pelican, 287 pp., $1.00.

ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE POVERTY OF
NATIONS
by Gunnar Myrdal.
Pelican. 3 Vols., 2284 pp.

STUDENT POWER— PROBLEMS,
DIAGNOSIS, ACTION
Cockburn and Blackburn Eds.
Penguin, 378 pp., $1.20.

THE JEWS OF SILENCE
by Elie Wiesel

THE LETTERS OF RACHEL
HENNING
David Adams Ed.
Penguin, 292 pp., $1.50.

NOTES ON THE NEW LEFT
IN AUSTRALIA
by Rowan Cahill.
Australian Marxist Research
Foundation, 50 pp., 40c.
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