The author discusses the expansion of strategic studies in Australian universities, the cold war concepts on which the studies are based and the dangers inherent in these developments.

Our problem has been that we expect the voice of terror to be frenzied, and that of madness irrational. It is quite the contrary in a world where genial, middle-aged generals consult with precise social scientists about the parameters of the death equation, and the problem of its maximization.¹

IN AMERICA, the non-military advisers to the Defense Department, such as Herman Kahn, Thomas C. Schelling, Henry A. Kissinger and Albert Wohlstetter, have been aptly termed "crackpot realists" by C. Wright Mills and "The New Civilian Militarists" by Irving Louis Horowitz. Although not officially connected to any branch of the armed services, they have assumed the predominant influence in many areas of strategic policy. They have completely overwhelmed the military profession, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, in their contribution to the literature of strategic studies. They increasingly dominate the field of education and instruction in the subject. Indeed, with the exception of restricted fields of professional knowledge, the academic and quasi-academic centres of strategic studies have displaced the staff colleges and war colleges. Despite the grumbles of the generals, the civilian militarists have created a more flexible and more potent war machine than anything that could have been imagined by the old service-club approach of the career men in the armed services.

The new civilian militarists like to see themselves as presiding over the birth of a new academic science. In recent years, however, the validity of their methods, their utility to society and their integrity of purpose have all been called into question. Their morality needs scrutinising according to some critics, while others argue that it is the scientific adequacy of their claims. In The War Game (1963), Horowitz indicted those men trained in the strategy and tactics of military terrorism who, under the protection of university and government agencies claim and proclaim their 'neutrality'.

with respect to social and political values. They replace problems of principles with matters of strategy. They prefer thinking about the unthinkable at the costs of any examination of what is possible and preferable. They inhabit a world of nightmarish intellectual 'play' while ridiculing the 'ossification' of American military posture. They seem to prefer 'advisory' positions and leave to politicians the actual tasks of acting out their recommendations (how else can they claim to be 'value neutral' with respect to scientific canons). In brief, they are 'military' minds with 'civilian' status.

Others extend the terms of the indictment beyond either the complete absence of morality or moral obscurantism. Philip Green, whose writings constitute the most formidable critique of "the new intellectual imperialism" of the civilian militarists, argues that they are to be condemned for being pseudo-scientific in their methods. They rely on a method of "scientific" analysis and a logic of "rational" action that obscures discussion of basic issues, rather than confronting the primarily political and moral questions of the nuclear age. The specialist techniques they employ, such as game theory and systems analysis, are bogus when used to arrive at strategic decisions and merely give an air of expertise to positions arrived at in an arbitrary and subjective manner. These partisan strategic analysts confuse propagandist-salesmanship with science and their pseudo-science is a disservice to the scholarly community. In *Deadly Logic* (1966), Green argued that their work has nothing to do with 'science'. To use inappropriate techniques that permit analysis to consist wholly of the manipulation of one's own prejudices; to rest one's theorizing on an assumption that already contains in it the conclusions that one wishes to reach—this is exactly the opposite of what genuine scientists in any field actually do.

They assume, he went on, that questions of policy are beyond debate, thereby simply not discussing the crucial propositions that one makes about world conflict. In other words, they engage in "the vice of the depoliticalization of the political: the attempt to fit essentially political questions into the strait jacket of so-called scientific analysis."2

The institutionalized study of strategic problems in academic and quasi-academic centres outside the defence establishment is of course most developed in the United States. In Britain, the best-known research centre is The Institute for Strategic Studies, but the scale of its work cannot be compared with the semi-official American research organisations such as the RAND Corporation or the Institute of Defense Analyses. Academic interest in strategic problems is underdeveloped in Australia where until recently the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) stood virtually alone. Academics have always played a crucial role in the activities of the AIIA, although the organisation is not officially attached to any university. The present Federal President is Professor Norman Harper, an historian at Melbourne University and a former Chairman of the Research Committee, who was succeeded in the latter post by Professor B. D. Beddie, a political scientist at the Australian National University. The former Federal President was Professor Gordon Greenwood, an historian at the University of Queensland. Sir Alan Watt, the full-time Director of the AIIA, and a former Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, works from an office in the Department of International Relations at the ANU, whose head is Professor J. D. B. Miller, editor of *Australian Outlook* which is published quarterly by the AIIA.


The new civilian militarists have been defended locally by Hedley Bull, Professor of International Relations at the ANU since 1966 and former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit in the British Foreign Office, in “Strategic Studies and Its Critics”, *World Politics* July 1968. For a critique of Bull’s position, see Max Teichmann, “Strategy, Science and Morals”, *Pacific*, Nov.-Dec. 1967.


In recent years there has been a substantial expansion of the activities of the AIIA. A grant of US $75,000 from the Ford Foundation in 1962, conditional on the appointment of a full-time Director, enabled a three-year research project on Australia’s relations with South-east Asia to be undertaken. To cover additional costs and make provision for the expansion of work after the Ford grant was exhausted, the AIIA launched a public appeal in 1964 for $200,000. The appeal was launched by the Minister for External Affairs and the Federal Government also helped by making contributions tax-deductible. A useful sum was collected, but the target figure was not achieved. As it turned out, the Ford Foundation again came to the rescue in March 1968 with a further grant of US $100,000 for a second third-year project on Australia’s relations with South-east Asia.5

Another grant from the Ford Foundation, the size of which was undisclosed, enabled the ANU to establish in 1963 the Defence Studies Project within the Department of Political Science. The grant came through the AIIA, and from 1963 to 1966 the Project was led by Professor A. L. Burns. In September 1964 it conducted a seminar of military personnel, public servants and academics who considered the conditions of dispersal of nuclear weapons about the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the conditions under which Australia might become an owner or a host. The authors of the three papers presented at the Conference openly declared their assumption that no matter what military or economic inadequacies were revealed in China at the time of writing, sooner or later she must become strong and therefore a threat to surrounding nations and to Australia.6

The gradual awakening of academic interest in strategic studies in Australia led one of its leading proponents, Dr. T. B. Millar of the Department of International Relations at the ANU, to look optimistically into the future when he addressed the annual conference of the Australian Regional Groups of the Royal Institute of Public Administration in November 1965 on the need for developing institutionalized study of strategic problems:

We have lived for so long in our political backwater that we came to believe that strategy was something that concerned our allies but not us. And our Government, which appeared to have discovered the secret of perpetual rule, aided by a bureaucracy which did not especially want its comfortable seclusion invaded, convinced us for a long time that defence was a subject which could safely be left to the experts inside the high stone walls along St. Kilda Road. Perhaps Russell Hill has caught the winds of change. Perhaps such few


6 A. L. Burns, Nina Heathcote and G. P. King, Nuclear Dispersal in Asia and the Indo-Pacific Region (Canberra: Australian Institute of International Affairs and The Australian National University, 1965.)
academics as are seriously interested in defence are believed to be a rather more potentially respectable bunch these days. Perhaps the Viet Cong and Dr. Sukarno have aroused us all to an awareness of the dangers around us and the need of an informed public opinion to help produce or accept the necessary measures to meet them. Whatever the reason, it does seem that a better relationship is developing between all those in the community who are concerned about defence matters.7

The gap between Russell Hill and Acton rapidly closed in the second half of 1966 with the establishment of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU,8 which incorporated the facilities of the Defence Studies Project. Its gestation period, however, did not proceed quite as smoothly as its initiators had anticipated. In the Australian Financial Review (3 Aug. 1966), Maximilian Walsh reported that there was a strong division of opinion at the ANU on the proposal to set up the Centre. A meeting of the heads of departments attached to the Research School of Pacific Studies discussed the scheme, but the opposition was so strong that its proponents avoided putting any recommendation to the vote. The chief objection recorded was the high content of classified information likely to be contained in papers emanating from projects sponsored by the Centre. The dependence of Centre personnel on access to classified material would result, it was felt, in an impingement on the academic independence of the Centre, since its staff would have to be cleared with both the Department of Defence and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. The critics also argued that the source of the Centre's funds could link its work too closely to the general aims of US foreign policy. Nevertheless, one of the leading proponents of the Centre, Sir John Crawford, the then Director of the Research School of Pacific Studies and subsequently Vice-Chancellor of the ANU, told Walsh that he intended to press ahead with the proposal. He also strongly denied the allegation that the Ford Foundation had offered to finance the Centre. Subsequently, Tribune (24 Aug. 1966) reported that two representatives from the Ford Foundation had arrived at the ANU just before the meeting of departmental heads in the Research School of Pacific Studies. A subsequent item in the Australian Financial Review (19 Aug. 1966) stated that some opposition to the Centre had been eliminated by the decision that its research projects would not be classified, but other critics feared that classification would probably be introduced at a later stage.

These fears were far from groundless. In the previous year, Millar had drawn attention to the use that the US Administration made of non-government defence and strategic experts from the universities and organizations such as the RAND Corporation,

before suggesting that the aid of academics should be enlisted in Australia.9 Reviewing the book, Malcolm Fraser, MHR, who became Minister for the Army shortly afterwards, pointed out that Millar had not mentioned that the academics who participated in the American research projects underwent a security classification which involved certain restraints and vows of silence on those involved.

Fraser then posed the question: "Would Australian academics and defence publicists be prepared to undergo similar restraints?". 10 Indeed, Millar himself had raised the problem during his address to the Royal Institute of Public Administration in November 1965:

There are certainly security problems in associating academics and research institutions in activities involving classified information, but they are not insoluble. Each individual must be security cleared, and proper precautions taken over documents or materials or processes. Only those initiates who do not wish to share the sanctum believe that it is impossible to do so without rending the veil.11

Despite the opposition of a number of senior ANU academics, the Centre was speedily established. Not unexpectedly, Millar was appointed to the position of Executive Officer, the "climax" — to quote the Australian Financial Review — of "a meteoric rise in the academic sphere" since he joined the ANU as a Research Fellow in International Relations in June 1962. In August 1964 he was appointed Fellow and promoted to the position of Senior Fellow in July 1966. In 1968 he moved up another rung in the academic ladder to the position of Professional Fellow. Graduating from the Royal Military College at Duntroon in 1944, Millar served as an infantry officer in the AIF at Morotai and later with BCOF in Japan. After the war he resigned from the Army and took his B.A. degree from the University of Western Australia. Moving to Melbourne as a teacher at Huntingtower School, conducted by the Christian Science Church, to which he belongs, Millar worked part time towards his M.A. at Melbourne University which he completed in 1958. The thesis topic was the "History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District and Colony of Victoria 1836-1900". He then proceeded to the University of London, where he gained his Ph.D. in 1960. Before transferring to the ANU in 1962, he lectured in military history at Duntroon.

Millar holds strong public political views, going well beyond those civilian militarists who merely call for increased defence

---

expenditure and the importance of maintaining the American alliance. At the first university “teach-in” on Vietnam at the ANU in 1965, he supported Australian intervention, along with Peter Samuel and Tom Hughes, Liberal MHR. A report of his speech in The Australian (24 July 1965) indicated that he believed the situation in South Vietnam was like the two Australian Communist Parties amalgamating under the leadership of the “Chinese” group and, with encouragement and assistance from the Communist governments of New Zealand and Indonesia, beginning in Queensland “a campaign of terror, or murder, coercion and persuasion aimed at taking over the nation by force.” Moreover, he pointed out, the insurrection broke out while “Sir James Cairns” was Prime Minister. Millar’s principal argument in favour of Australian intervention was that “we are committed to the defence of South Vietnam by the Seato treaty.” Unless we assist the United States in Vietnam, we cannot expect them to help us when we are in trouble. In any event, he concluded in a vain attempt to silence the critics, “The Government has access to far more information than we have.” It is interesting to note that Millar has not spoken at any subsequent “teach-ins” on Vietnam, and has refused an invitation to participate in one at Monash, but he still strongly supports Australian intervention.

Millar is especially critical of those Australians who are opposed to Australia’s intervention in South Vietnam. In Australian Neighbours (July-Aug. 1965), published by the AIIA, he made the following comment on Australian defence and foreign policy:

I feel many of the criticisms to be misguided, and feel that a large proportion of the critics would change their attitudes if they were obliged to forsake the luxury of opposition for the responsibilities of formulating and implementing government policy. Much of the criticism appears to be based on the theory that we should trust and cultivate (or bribe?) potential enemies while distrusting and refusing to assist or support acknowledged friends.

Non-Communist critics, he continued, “tend to equate communism with all that is natural, inevitable, progressive, wholesome and democratic.” The United States “stands in the way of the Chinese expansion.” The Indians “have become much more appreciative of the value of friends in the West since their experience of a Chinese invasion.”

On this last point, it would be interesting to hear Millar’s views on the writings of Dr. Alastair Lamb, not to mention a statement by General Maxwell Taylor in testimony before the US Congress in which he admitted that India started the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 by militarily “edging forward in the disputed area.” (UPI, 18 April 1963).

Another theme frequently stressed by Millar is that the “Viet Cong” are simply “terrorists”. In an ABC broadcast several years
ago which was later included in a booklet entitled *Ferment in Asia* (edited by Professor Norman Harper), Millar summed up the “Viet Cong” as a “powerful internal terrorist army”:

North Viet Nam seeks to extend its Communist system over the south and into Laos and perhaps Cambodia. Only the United States, massive and alien, stands in the way. The Americans seek to contain Chinese hegemony; to limit Hanoi’s control to North Viet Nam; to prove that the Communist model of subversion and revolutionary warfare is not inevitable and invariably successful, even with an adjoining Communist state; to maintain the right of small nations to exist.

United States’ measures to assist economic, social and political developments in South Vietnam, Millar wrote in *The Bulletin* (6 March 1965), “have largely failed for a single basic reason: the systematic campaign of murder and sabotage by the Vietcong designed to deny the aid to the South Vietnamese people.” Were the U.S. to withdraw from South Vietnam, he continued, “the whole of its carefully-fostered and genuinely deserved reputation in Asia as a bulwark against Communism and a support against poverty would be irreparably damaged.”

“Chinese expansionism” was the basic assumption of Millar’s paper on “Australia’s Defence Needs” which appeared in *Australia’s Defence and Foreign Policy* (1964), edited by John Wilkes:

That the Chinese People’s Republic, with its standing army of some three million men, has supported and will support subversion, revolution, and even overt invasion throughout South-East Asia in an attempt to ensure that the region is controlled by communist governments sympathetic or preferably subordinate to China; and that if China were to gain control of the mainland, Australia would be in a very difficult position. Thus in helping to defend South Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia, Australia contributes directly to its own defence.

Australia, he continued, was helping to defend South Vietnam from “externally-backed communist subversion, infiltration, terrorism and aggression.” Moreover, “We need to ensure that our servicemen are ideologically armed — not ‘indoctrinated’, but aware of the great benefits of the democratic way of life, and the Christian values which are the basis of our society.” In this paper, and in his other writings, he argued both that “we must prepare now to meet the future threat”, and that China is at present both unable and unwilling to invade Australia.

In fact, in his major work to date — *Australia’s Defence* (1965) — Millar is even more contradictory, as one of his persistent critics, Max Teichmann, pointed out in *Arena*, Summer 1966, and also in a paper on “Non-Alignment — A Policy for Australia” in *Aspects of Australia’s Defence* (1966). On the one hand, Millar referred to the “expanding imperialism of the Chinese People’s Republic” (p.31); on the other hand, we were told that not only does China not have the means to launch an invasion of Australia but that
“it would seem unlikely, at this stage, that the Chinese Government has any desire to do such a thing.” (p.59)

These quotations should be sufficient to make clear the intensity with which Millar holds Cold War assumptions, and also his tendency to denigrate opponents on the grounds of naivete or worse. Not surprisingly, then, we note an item in News-Weekly (12 Oct. 1966) announcing that forthcoming speakers before the Canberra Branch of the Defend Australia Committee, the leading pro-Vietnam lobby group in the country, would be Senator F. P. McManus of the DLP, Mr. Malcolm Fraser, the Minister for the Army, and Dr. T. B. Millar.

Millar’s Cold War assumptions are not shared by all non-Communist specialists. Thus we find two young Australian social scientists writing as follows:

The fact that China has given aid and comfort to her allies in neighbouring countries, that she has taken strong measures to subjugate an area juridically regarded as part of China, and that she has made a brief foray into India (over a border dispute as genuine as such disputes can ever be, and probably under provocation) should not deceive us into thinking that Communist China has performed any acts comparable to the international aggressions of the 1930’s and 1940’s. 

Even more interesting are two evaluations of China in 1966 by Alastair Buchan, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and by Roderick MacFarquhar, editor of The China Quarterly, published by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Buchan described China’s objectives as follows:

It is very easy to put together the stream of abusive editorials in the Peking Daily with the facts of China’s population, her nuclear weapons programme—and her agricultural poverty, to create a nightmare prospect of an over-populated and vindictive great nation expanding in every direction, and provoking the first nuclear war in the process. It seems to me there is little justification, certainly in Mao’s statements, for this view... Certainly China would like to recover her influence over areas like Vietnam and Laos, as to some extent she has done over Cambodia, and this leads her to be an active supporter of indigenous revolutionary movements. But she has never promoted any internal ‘wars of liberation’, only encouraged them where they develop naturally. I can see no evidence that she wishes for a satellite empire in Asia, while there are clear signs that she is becoming increasingly absorbed in her own domestic and political problems.

---

12 Anthony Clunies Ross and Peter King, Australia and Nuclear Weapons (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1966), pp.56-57. Millar’s most recent work, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus & Robertson 1968), continues to argue that China is a military threat to Australia although not an immediate one, and that the threat must be met mainly by military measures. “In fifty years time (Australia) could be a Great Power — or a granary tributary of an Asian empire.” For a critical review of the book by a fellow firm believer in the desirability of continuing Australian-American alliance, see Milton Osborne in The Age, 14 Sept. 1968.
There were "no signs that she is losing her innate caution, or that she wishes to rule Asia by force." Consequently:

If this view of Chinese policy is correct, there is no case for creating an integrated military coalition of her powerful neighbours and the external powers to 'contain' her physically as the Soviet Union had to be 'contained' in Western and South-eastern Europe in the 1950's.

Successive US Secretaries of State from Dean Acheson to Dean Rusk, he concluded, have wrongly described China as an aggressive power which must be physically confined by direct military confrontation.13

MacFarquhar noted that "there is little evidence to suggest that the Chinese are interested in actively trying to initiate or mastermind subversion abroad." Moreover, "Mao does not think in terms of the aggressive use of force, even in the absence of countervailing American power, except in the case of the 'restoration area', and not necessarily even there." Fear of Chinese expansionism, MacFarquhar concluded, is "mistaken."14

Let us now examine some of the activities of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, whose Advisory Committee comprises Professors Sir John Crawford, H. W. Arndt, B. D. Beddie, Hedley Bull, A. L. Burns J. D. B. Miller, P. H. Partridge and W. E. H. Stanner of the ANU, the ubiquitous Sir Alan Watt and of course Dr. T. B. Millar. In September 1967, the Centre held its first major conference, a seminar on Britain's withdrawal from Asia, whose proceedings were edited by Millar and published under the title Britain's Withdrawal from Asia: Its Implications for Australia. The Conference was private and attended by academics, public servants, parliamentarians, diplomats, and a selected group from the Press. Papers were presented by Millar himself, Professors J. D. B. Miller, A. L. Burns and W. E. H. Stanner, Mr. Geoffrey Fairbairn of the ANU, Dr. D. E. Kennedy of the University of Melbourne, Dr. H. G. Gelber of Monash University, and three journalists, Mr. Denis Warner (The Herald), Mr. Creighton Burns (The Age), and Mr. Peter Robinson (The Australian Financial Review). The published proceedings of the conference came out just before Britain definitely announced that it would be withdrawing east of Suez in the near future. Peter Samuel's review in The Bulletin (13 Jan. 1968) was headed "Non-Policies from a Roomful of Tories". The book, he began, was "an account of how our foreign affairs establishment protects itself against ideas." Some of the papers were "outstandingly frivolous", and he specifically cited H. G. Gelber's suggesting that the British are not really disengaging, J. D. B. Miller's gentilities on the need to consider foreign policies other than All-the-

way-with-LBJ (concluding with ‘They may not comfort us, but they do make us think’) and D. E. Kennedy’s parade of well-worn points about SEATO which evoked, in discussion, the priceless conclusion that an alliance ‘less specifically opposed to Communism might appear desirable, but against whom would it be directed?’

Millar’s mistake, Samuel concluded, was in not inviting along to his seminar people “who might have shaken his conservatives a little in their rut. A Santamaria, a Knopflmacher, a Cooksey, a Colin Clark, or a Teichmann or two were desperately needed.” For the record, it should be made public that Max Teichmann was not invited, despite the fact that he had argued that Britain’s withdrawal from Southeast Asia was inevitable in a paper at the 1965 conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association and in an article entitled “Protecting Ourselves” in the Spring 1966 issue of Dissent.

Seminars are also held regularly at the Centre and speakers from outside the ANU have included Douglas Pike, author of Viet Cong, G. Jockel of the Department of External Affairs, Air Marshal E. Reyno of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Group Captain D. B. Nichols, Director of Legal Services in the RAAF, and Professor Lincoln P. Bloomfield, a former senior State Department official now at the Centre for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which was financed until recently by the C.I.A.

One revealing aspect of the Centre’s work is their current interest in the techniques of counterinsurgency warfare. They have already held one seminar on the subject and there will be another in the near future. There are no indications to date that they intend to emulate such large-scale exercises in “counter-insurgent prophylaxis” as Project Camelot, sponsored a few years ago by the US Army under the aegis of the American University and eventually cancelled by former Defence Secretary Robert McNamara following widespread criticism in Latin America. The old formula for counterinsurgency used to be ten soldiers for every guerrilla. Now the formula appears to be ten social scientists for every guerrilla. Counterinsurgency projects implicitly identify revolution and radical social change with social pathology, and order and stability with social health. Their general purpose is to reduce the likeli-


hood of social disturbances or revolutions in the Third World. The possibility that all or some revolutions may be justified or desirable is not considered, nor is any interest shown in how to assist Left insurgency movements in dealing with dictatorial governments of the Right. Implicit in the concept of “counter-insurgency” is an assumption that revolutionary movements are dangerous to the interests of “the free world” and that the US and its close allies must be prepared to assist counterrevolutionary measures to repress these movements. Professor Edgar S. Furniss, Director of the Mershon Social Science Program in National Security at Ohio State University, has warned that counterinsurgency theorizing, like deterrence theorizing, is “equally poisonous for social science study and research.” And Conor Cruise O’Brien has argued convincingly that many social and political scientists accept, although they do not proclaim, the principle of “counterrevolutionary subordination.” One can assume the continued promotion by the United States and its satellites of counterrevolution in the underdeveloped countries, and in this kind of situation the real danger to academic integrity comes from “counterrevolutionary subordination.”

It is undeniable that some scholarly research is being undertaken at the Centre, but the world’s problems are defined in terms extremely close to what the Left feels to be the perception of world problems held by the Australian Government.

Relations between the Centre and the defence departments are cordial. Although no formal links exist, the Centre has effective access to government and they certainly hope to influence government policy. A peace institution on the other hand, not only would be denied these informal links but it would be neither as influential nor as well-financed. Some of the projects already undertaken at the Centre are sober and serious pieces of research, but they are wholly within the framework of the Cold War perspective. The American counterparts of the Centre and the quasi-academic institutes like the RAND Corporation are unquestionably oriented towards the general perspectives, if not always the concrete policies, of the American foreign policy elite. They hold the same important assumptions as the official United States position, and these basic assumptions are not put to any kind of test. In the case of RAND, although its research workers have been intellectually independent to the extent of strenuously questioning their employer’s policies, they have not been “independent” to the extent of questioning

---

16 Introduction to Green, Deadly Logic, p.ix.
17 Conor Cruise O’Brien, “Politics and the Morality of Scholarship”, in Max Black (ed.), The Morality of Scholarship (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p.71. It is believed that the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU has recently begun a substantive study of nuclear weapons for Australia.
either the nature of the jobs they are performing or their basic values. As Max Teichmann wrote in the Spring 1967 issue of *Dissent* when discussing social science institutes or projects in receipt of CIA or US military finance:

Such an institute need not produce loaded or contaminated research—but it will be influenced by a distorted order of research priorities. Some avenues of research and some hypotheses would almost certainly be excluded, for fear of producing unpalatable conclusions or unacceptable prescriptions. Thus how many US foundations would go on financing a Military Institute which started producing studies showing the desirability of unilateral nuclear disarmament, or armed neutrality, or the dangers of stationing US bases on its soils, or historical analysis showing that America was mainly responsible for maintaining the Cold War, or demonstrations that the US was conducting subversion of other countries by the use of the CIA and its innumerable fronts? Yet research bodies in these fields which dodge such enquiries . . . are, intellectually speaking not worth a cracker.

Where does the Centre obtain its funds? When it was being established Sir John Crawford had adamantly denied rumours of financial assistance from the Ford Foundation, but today the ANU publicly acknowledges that the funds are coming from this source. The Ford Foundation in fact has been the most active foundation in the broad field of international relations, including grants to establish and maintain the Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Professor Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago has commented on the enormous positive and negative influence which foundations exert upon the objects, results, and methods of research. They reward certain types of research by supporting them and stimulate more research of the same type by promising to support it. On the other hand, they thwart or make impossible other types of research by not supporting them. The political scientist who wants to share in these rewards and, by doing so, gain prestige and power within the profession cannot help being influenced by these positive and negative expectations in his concept of the social truth of the methods by which to seek it, and of the relevant results to be expected from it.]

The assumptions of the Cold War are accepted by the Ford Foundation. Thus it favours projects in which all questions are submerged to the national interest. Writing in *The Village Voice* (6 July 1967), two young New Left social scientists, Todd Gitlin and Bob Ross, noted that the consequences of a grant from the CIA, the State Department or the Ford Foundation, were identical — “to expedite America’s foreign penetrations, and to render them legitimate; to decorate the gendarmerie of the world with ribbons of rationality and liberalism.” Looking at the claim that the Congress for Cultural Freedom’s newly-found ties with the Ford Foundation

---

indicated that it was no longer a Cold War instrument, I. F. Stone's Weekly (3 April 1967) commented:

Frankly, we don't think the shift from CIA to Ford makes much difference. The Ford Foundation, with McGeorge Bundy at its head, like the Rockefeller Foundation, which Dean Rusk long ran, are part of the same pompous American establishment... These stuffed shirt institutions are no more likely to finance independent and critical writing on American policy in Vietnam or Latin America than would the CIA.

And Conor Cruise O'Brien has maintained that the way in which international political studies are today supported and organized in America involves manipulation:

Many of these studies, both respectable and other, are financed either by some branch of the United States government or by some foundation whose policies are the same as those of the United States government, from which it may even acquire its highest personnel. When we find that many of these studies also distort reality, in a sense favorable to US policy and reassuring to US opinion, it is apparent that here the morality of scholarship has been exposed to temptation and in some cases has succumbed with enthusiasm.19

The role of civilian militarists in Australia will certainly become more important in the next few years. Already The Australian (8 May 1968) has editorialised on the urgent need for a "think tank", along the lines of the RAND Corporation, to modernise Australian military organisation and strategic thinking. It was immediately joined by Professor Hedley Bull who told a defence forum at the University of Melbourne that the rigid division between public servants and armed forces personnel on the one hand and academics, parliamentarians and journalists on the other, impoverished thinking about defence matters on both sides. He added that the Australian defence machine needed to be subjected to the sort of "intellectually rigorous political, strategic and economic analysis" that transformed the American war machine under former Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara — a transformation in which the key role was performed by the RAND Corporation, (The Australian, 8 May 1968).

There has been a clear connection between the "disinterested" scientist and America's arsenal of exotic weaponry, between the "dispassionate" anthropologist and the domination of primitive peoples, between the "objective" sociologist and the manipulation of power elites in under-developed countries, and between the academic centre of strategic studies and counterinsurgency warfare. As Irving Louis Horowitz noted when he entered a plea for moving beyond the findings of the civilian militarists, such a step would be to move into "a clearer and cleaner use of social and political science."20

19 O'Brien, op.cit., p.70.
20 Horowitz, The War Game, p.28.