Burchett Speaks

After Vietnam — What?

On Self-Determination

Censorship and Socialism

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BOOKS
THE "COMPASSIONATE" BUDGET of 1968-69 brought down in August 1968, like its equally illegitimate brother the "Family Budget" of 1967 is mis-named. From its content it would be more correctly called the "Fifth of the Asian War Budgets". However, a treasurer who has the ability to prod the President of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission with the advice that he should not give wage increases and then base his Budget on an anticipated increase in prices of 3% and a wage increase of 5.5% would have great difficulty calling a spade a spade.

The Budget's main objective is to carry out the commitments of the Liberal Party to its "continuing Asian War" theory and to its overseas friends, whilst spreading sufficient hand-outs to ensure continued political support from important industrial and agricultural interests. It fends off the ever increasing number of critics who draw attention to the decline in living standards, in real wages, social services and other aspects of our life, by making token increases in social services, education and repatriation.

The truth of this decline is reflected in the large number of migrants who are "voting with their feet" by returning to Europe as fast as they can save the money. This shows that constant loud propaganda that Australians "never had it better" is becoming difficult to hear above the clamor for improvements in our standards of living.

There are six important features of the Budget.

1. It increases the war expenditure by some $102 million. This continues the annual 10%-11% increase which has taken place since the commencement of the Asian War Budgets in 1963-64.

2. The results of some years of campaigning in the spheres of social services, Aboriginal affairs and education have paid off to some small degree. If this does nothing else it proves the point that consistent campaigning is an essential feature of Australian political life.

3. The Government shows it is prepared to pay large amounts of money solely for the purpose of ensuring support from politically important areas. For example the wheat growers and agricultural
industry by subsidy and fertilizer bounty. Also the RSL which last year became so critical of the Government's failure to increase repatriation benefits and threatened to take an anti-Government stand. Hence the tendency to higher rates in Repatriation pensions to widows and children, etc., rather than in ordinary social service payments.

4 The declaration by the Government that its social welfare policy is aimed at helping the "needy" or in other words, extreme cases of hardship. This reveals complete reversal of the principle of social service established by the Labor Government in 1949 which lays down that a citizen has social services by right.

5 This is the first Budget since 1963-64 in which there has been a direct increase in taxation rates to meet increased war expenditure. There has been sufficient opposition to the inbuilt increase character of the income tax scale to force the Government to unload some of the burden onto the company profit tax. This will probably only have a temporary effect on those companies, and they will plan to recoup in the following year by price juggling.

6 Increased sales tax rates lift the proportion of indirect taxation to a higher level than the previous year and this is an attack on the consumer expenditure. For example a motor car battery worth $17 will take $2.80 in tax, an increase of approximately 40c. Taxes on toys, sporting equipment, commercial vehicles and parts will sooner or later be paid by the consumer. The assessed cost of the increase in sales and company tax to the consumer, both indirectly and directly, will be $200 million. This reduces consumer expenditure which has declined over the last five years.

There is no suggestion of a capital gains tax, although it can be shown from Company Reports that large capital gain has taken place. One example of twenty-six companies examined in a survey published in the Sydney Morning Herald shows they increased their share value by 157% in 18 months. The anticipated rise from income tax will be only 13% over last year. This arises from the anticipated increase in earnings which are gained mainly to compensate for price increases.

An interesting comment by Mr. J. Mitchell of the Melbourne Age, August 24, 1968, was that in 1960 if the tax payer allowed for concessional deductions for his dependents, his wife and say two children under 16 years of age, then he would pay the tax department at $3.25 weekly, yet in 1967-68 this same tax payer earned an estimated weekly income of $65 from which tax of $7.55 was paid. Thus since 1960 tax paid by the Australian average male wage earner has risen by more than 100%, whereas his income has increased by only 40%.
THE FIRST of the National Annual Reviews on wages is almost complete. The Australian Council of Trade Unions lodged claims aimed at restoring the basic wage and increasing it by $11.40, based on increased prices and productivity and if this claim is unsuccessful, for an increase in the Total Wage by $7.70. These claims are extremely conservative, being based only on compensation for price increases and a share of the national productivity in the case of the Basic Wage from 1953, and with the Total Wage since July 1967.

The Employers' argument is that the "cupboard is bare". This is impossible to believe in light of profit increases over the past six months; they also abandoned support for work value cases, having had a taste of the Metal Trades Decision in 1968. The Commonwealth Government supported the employers' view arguing that there should not be wage increases, or alternatively, if there are they should be "small". When challenged as to what was meant by "small" the Government's representative was unable to give a sensible answer.

At the time of writing the hearing has not finished, but the circumstances in which the National Wage Case takes place are worthy of note. One would have thought that there would have been no interest from those who received the highest increases in the Metal Trades Work Value Case. This does not appear to be so. The tradesman and higher skilled groups are continuing their interest in the National Wage Case.

Though the Basic Wage no longer exists, there is within the wage structure a minimum standard below which wages should not be allowed to fall, otherwise it will affect all basic living standards. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers are vitally concerned with the National Wage Case, after having already had their wages seriously devalued by the Metal Trades Work Value Decision. Their wage relativity to the tradesman's rate is now the lowest since the 1930's. They are faced with the possibility of long drawn out work value cases which can give them little or nothing, despite the extremely pains-taking and careful submissions made to the Commission on Work Value by all of the unions with members skilled or unskilled in all Awards. The Annual National Wage Case will become a more important issue for these workers as there is no other arbitration outlet for them to obtain wage increases. They will find the need to more vigorously struggle for increased over award payments to maintain wage levels.

The introduction of the Total Wage led trade unionists to believe that it meant removing the basic wage standards that always served as a rallying point in wage struggles; it now seems certain that with the Total Wage, the National Annual Review, particularly if the claims are based on a "family needs wage", will become the centre of much industrial campaigning and action.
Malcolm Salmon interviews Wilfred Burchett

Wilfred Burchett, Australia's most famous journalist, was in Paris covering the talks between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam when Malcolm Salmon was there for Tribune. In this interview Burchett assesses Australian foreign policy, the Paris talks and likely developments in Vietnam. He explains why the Australian government continues to refuse him his passport.

SALMON: Could you describe the beginnings and development of your stand of opposition to the policy line of Australian Governments towards Asia?

BURCHETT: The beginning goes back to the strike of the wharfies against loading pig-iron to Japan, in the late thirties, the attitude of the government of the day in giving moral and economic support to Japan in its war of aggression against China. It seemed to me that the wharfies displayed not only a higher spirit of morality in refusing to nourish the Japanese war machine so clearly engaged in a monstrous war of aggression, but also a higher political understanding in recognising the danger for Australia inherent in that aggression.

Later, when Prime Minister Menzies took the initiative at a British Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in demanding that the Burma Road—China's only lifeline still open to the Western world—should be closed, because the fact of its existence offended Japan, I was convinced that the then government was on a suicidal course as far as Australia itself was concerned. Appeasement of Japan I considered not only the height of immorality, but the height of political folly. It is worth remembering that this appeasement by the then Menzies Government continued virtually until the eve of Japan's entry into World War II.

It was not by accident that one of my first journalistic efforts was to visit New Caledonia early in 1941 to write some articles warning about Japanese activities there and the inherent dangers in this for Australia. Following this I went up the Burma Road—reopened despite Menzies' objections, because of American pressure—and was actually in Chungking, then the capital of the China of the Kuomintang, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. My first book (about New Caledonia) appeared a day or two before Pearl Harbor. New Caledonia was almost immediately occupied by American troops and the danger to Australia temporarily averted.
Australian policy in Asia, especially South-east Asia, is based on supporting the most reactionary Quisling-type government which represents in general nothing except United States interests. Australian policy is to jump into every war on the side of such reactionary forces to repress the resistance forces supported by the people. This was true in Korea and Malaysia. It was not Menzies' fault that Australia did not intervene on the side of the French in the latter's "dirty war" in Indochina. During the 1954 Geneva Conference, External Affairs Minister Casey offered six battalions of Australian troops as part of an international force of intervention against the Viet Minh. (The only other "power" to offer troops was US-occupied South Korea, and the plan had to be abandoned. But the intention was there, the offer made without the Australian people even being informed.) Today, in America's "dirty war" against the Vietnamese people, the Australian battalions are there, in defence of the Quisling regime, hated by the Vietnamese people, despised throughout the world, incapable, like the regime in South Korea, of holding power for 24 hours without an American army of occupation. The Australian Government still pretends that the Chiang Kai-shek clique on Taiwan represent the 700 million Chinese people. A radical change of Australian policy towards Asia is needed; a correct appreciation of the real, stable, forces of progress and stability. For a start Australia should make a clean break with US policy in Asia, pull her troops out of South Vietnam, establish diplomatic relations with China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and get ready to recognise a real government of national union which will eventually be formed in South Vietnam. Policies should be based on authentic national interests and not on those of the tiny, but influential group of Australian capitalists who are prepared to spend any quantity of Asian and Australian blood in defending their mines in Thailand, Malaysia and elsewhere.

S: How do you see a successful end to the Vietnamese people's struggle affecting a) the South-east Asian scene, and b) the world scene?

B: A successful end to the Vietnam people's struggle would transform the South-east Asian scene. It is already evident that the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation and its allies are going to win and a government of broad national union will be established pursuing a policy of neutrality in international affairs. Excellent good-neighborly relations will be established immediately with neutral Cambodia—in fact such relations already exist between Cambodia and the NFL. An end of the war in South Vietnam would immediately create the necessary conditions to stabilise the situation in Laos and make workable the three-way neutral coalition government envisaged under the 1962 agreements on Laos. These
agreements were never in fact implemented because of US intervention in South Vietnam and the waging of "special war" in Laos. (It must not be forgotten that the US Command was established in Saigon in February 1962 a few months before the Agreements on Laos were concluded and CIA planes were already dropping US-trained and armed commando groups into the Pathet Lao areas before the ink was dry on the 1962 Agreements.) South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would be stable, neutral states, linked by common foreign policies, by their Buddhism and even to a certain extent by the influence of French culture.

Relations between them and the DRVN and through the DRVN with the rest of the socialist world would be close and friendly. The existence of this bloc of Buddhist, neutralist countries would exercise great influence on Thailand where resentment against American occupation has already reached boiling point and where neutralist ideas have become extremely popular among intellectuals and even in certain circles within the administration.

The sample of what "liberation" and "defence of freedom" American style means as illustrated in South Vietnam will make any other South-east Asian country with anything resembling a national government, think not twice but two thousand times before getting involved in anything that could open the way to great-power intervention again.

Once the war in South Vietnam is settled, one could imagine a bloc of mutually friendly, neutral Buddhist states extending from South Vietnam through to Burma, developing mutually advantageous trade and economic relations. The existence of such a bloc would prove a powerful source of attraction to Malaysia also, turning that country's thoughts inward to Asia instead of outward to the West. The anti-US demonstrations in Malaysia, sparked by opposition to the war in Vietnam, show that nationalist, pro-Asian and progressive sentiments there are on the increase.

As for the world scene, the fact that 31 million Vietnamese have stood up to the Western world's mightiest economic and military power will give a fillip to independence movements throughout the rest of the Third World. It is possible also that the shattering lesson the USA has been given in Vietnam will make any future American administration for a generation hesitant to plunge into any more such neo-colonialist wars. The illusion that the USA can play the role of world super-gendarme has been shattered in the jungle and rice fields of South Vietnam. The lessons from all this will not be lost on the peoples of Latin America and Africa where there is a great thirst among nationalist and patriotic elements to learn from the Vietnamese experience.
S: Concerning the official conversations in Paris between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the USA, you are on record as saying (interview with Peter Smark, *The Australian*) that “the most important thing was that the two sides had agreed to sit down together.” Could you amplify this?

B: Had Washington been winning the war—had General Westmoreland driven the NFL forces into a corner and been just about to deal the “decisive blow”, there would obviously be no talks going on in Paris. If North Vietnam was at its last gasp, communications hopelessly disrupted, the economy in ruins, industry and agriculture at a standstill, it is obvious also that there would be no talks in Paris. The Pentagon would insist on pushing ahead to administer the “coup de grace”. But the fact is that in the South, the Americans have been pushed on to the defensive. Their forces have completely lost control of the countryside and are pinned down in their bases and cities. The North has more than held out. Communications work splendidly with thousands of miles of roads and hundreds of bridges more than when the war started. Decentralised industry is now producing in the mountains and jungles, agricultural production continues to go up because of remarkable increases in per-acre yields. Bombing attacks of a scale unprecedented in military history have been absorbed by North Vietnam, but people continue to live, to work and to fight with undiminished courage and determination. Morale is higher than I have ever known it just because the people know they have taken on the greatest imperialist power and beaten it.

It is because there are some glimmerings in Washington that this is the real situation, that there are talks in Paris. This is the main reason for my remark that “the most important thing is that the two sides had agreed to sit down together.” Added to this is my experience of the 1954 talks in Geneva and the 1951-52 talks in Kaesong-Panmunjom to arrange a Korean ceasefire, that once such talks have started, they usually go on to their logical conclusion—a settlement.

S: Could you describe the political complexion of the coalition government of South Vietnam likely to emerge from the present conflict (in the broadest terms of course)?

B: The NFL officially speak of a “coalition government of broad national union”, and this is just what they have in mind. NFL support for the new Alliance of Nationalist, Democratic and Peace Forces formed immediately after the Tet offensive early this year is in line with this concept. Members of the Alliance’s Central Committee thus far named are very well-known Saigon and Hue intellectuals, lawyers, doctors, journalists—some of them very well-to-do incidentally, but all people of prestige, known for their political
and moral integrity. One could imagine a coalition formed between
the NFL, the Alliance and other patriotic elements or individuals,
who may come forward later, or who have already come forward
but for security reasons still remain anonymous. Such a coalition
government, if one studies the NFL and the Alliance programs
would be comprised of the broadest possible spectrum. Within
the Central Committee of the NFL for instance, one finds revolu­
tionary elements, one finds Buddhists and Catholics, representa­
tives of the national minorities, members of the urban bourgeoisie as
well as the workers and peasants. It represents the greatest expres­
sion of national unity that has ever existed in South Vietnam. US
policy has been to set the Catholics and Buddhists at each other’s
throats—as the French did in their time. NFL policy has been to
bring them together. US policy was to set the Vietnamese in the
plains against the national minorities in the highlands. NFL
policy has been to unite them. US policy has been to set the
townpeople against the peasants. NFL policy has been to unite
them. NFL and DRVN support for the alliance shows also that
they both foster the maximum of national and political harmony.
The future coalition government will obviously reflect just this.

S: Do you see a lengthy period of separation of the two Vietnams
following an end to the war?

B: This is obviously something that only the Vietnamese people
can decide. For the foreseeable future, however, I think there
will be two Vietnams, each with its complete autonomy in internal
and external affairs. But there will probably be some sort of
Coordinating Committee comprised of an equal number of per­
sons nominated by each of the two governments, to arrange day-
to-day questions such as trade, post and telegraph communica­
tions, travel, cultural exchanges, etc.

S: There is speculation that a “second front” in Asia could
emerge in Korea. What is your view?

B: I think this is something that has to be watched extremely
carefully. Certainly, when the USA started its war of interven­
tion in South Vietnam, and even as late as 1965 when the bomb­
ings of North Vietnam started, the overall US plans called for
re-starting the Korean war. There is strong documentary evidence
of this. At that time the Pentagon was under the illusion that
US forces would speedily “clean up” the guerrillas in South Viet­
nam and would then push on to the North, at the same time
reopening a “second front” in Korea. These concepts have been
shattered by the heroic and eminently successful resistance of
the Vietnamese people in the South as in the North. But there
are other plans, of which I became aware when I was in Korea
last year, closely connected with a whole series of US-staged
provocations in and around the Military Demarcation Line, and along the North Korean coast — the sort of incidents that led to the Pueblo affair. These seemed aimed at the very minimum at opening up a "second front" as a pretext for putting into effect secret clauses of the Japan-South Korea treaty and bringing Japanese occupation troops into South Korea. Again at a "minimum" this would release more South Korean divisions for service in South Vietnam. At something more than a "minimum" a Japanese army would spearhead an invasion of North Korea. As "bait" for all this, Japanese bankers and industrialists have been given unprecedented facilities for investing in South Korea on the sort of scale that recalls the days when Korea was a Japanese colony. Events in Korea should be watched with utmost vigilance.

S: The public movement against Australia's participation in the Vietnam war is the number one new political fact in the country. Having observed the anti-Vietnam war movement in various countries, have you any comment on what you know of the Australian movement?

B: I know only what I read in the newspapers — and complaints that news about this movement is almost completely suppressed in the newspapers — what I receive in letters from friends, and the sort of appreciation given by my Vietnamese friends, similar to Mr. Nguyen Than Le's reply to your question on this point at a recent press conference here in Paris. The anti-war movement in Australia is highly esteemed by my Vietnamese friends in Hanoi and within the NFL. This is not only a source of moral satisfaction because of the support for Vietnam, but because it confirms the long-standing internationalist position of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement that a distinction must be made between the people of a country waging war in Vietnam and the reactionary governments in power which are responsible.

I would like to stress also that public action, especially in countries like Australia which have troops in South Vietnam, can play a vital role in making the Paris talks successful, perhaps shortening them and thus the war. Now, when the talks have started, public pressure is more valuable than ever, especially at this moment when the talks on substantive matters are held up because of the refusal of the USA to halt the bombings of North Vietnam.

S: Would you care to say something about the attitude of the Australian Government in denying your legal right to an Austra- lian passport?
B: By refusing me for over 13 years my Australian passport, the Australian Government is guilty of an act of political vindictiveness almost without precedent. I was born in Australia, my father was born in Australia, my grand-father (on my father's side) arrived in Australia at the age of eight. My eldest son was born in Australia. At the time of the births of my three other children, I have tried to have them registered as Australian citizens. This also has been refused. To the best of my knowledge the Australian Government has tried to bring pressure to bear on the British Government to add to my difficulties in obtaining a British passport.

The fundamental reasons for this have to do with my answer to the first of your questions. For the past quarter of a century I have opposed Australian policy in South-east Asia and if it does not change, I hope to continue opposing it for the next quarter of a century. In fact, by refusing me my passport, the Australian Government covers itself with ridicule in those many countries of the world where I am well enough known to travel on my visiting card.

For 13 years my professional activities have been gravely hampered by the lack of a proper passport. However, when I looked at one the other day and saw the list of countries to which I could not use an Australian passport to travel, I began to wonder whether my professional activities would not be hampered even more if I did have such a document which would prevent me travelling to North Korea, North Vietnam and other countries to which I need access as an acknowledged Asian specialist. My North Vietnamese laissez-passer, is simply inscribed "valid for all countries in Europe, Asia and Africa" and I can have an endorsement any time I want it "and all other countries in the world."
IN TALKING about South-East Asia, I am going to include the activities of a number of countries, which, while not geographical parts of the region, cannot realistically be disregarded. These are the United States, the Soviet Union, China and India.

We are speaking of Australia and the South-East Asia Region after the Vietnam War, that is, we are assuming that the war is virtually over. Well, so it is, in the sense that it is probably lost, but the agony and the shillyshallying may drag on for longer than many people thought when Johnson pulled out of the Presidential race, and put in his agent Humphrey.

Nevertheless, we can already discuss the lessons of the War and the philosophy underlying our presence there without waiting for the final curtain. Our presence in Vietnam is just the latest example of a long standing Australian theory, which has been summarised as 'better there than here' — i.e. better fight them there than here. This was one very important reason for our joining in the First two Great Wars: to keep the Germans from coming our way. And, of course, the Germans were established in the Pacific in 1914. This theory implies that we have always been, more or less, in danger from outside attack — German, Russian, Japanese, and now Indonesian and Chinese.

There is no doubt that China and Japan have been our favorite international homicides, and Dr. Noël McLachlan's recent lecture on the Yellow Peril points up the reason. As Alfred Deakin so charmingly put it in a letter on June 4, 1908, speaking of the visit of the American fleet (along with Jack Johnson and Tommy Burns):

The visit of the United States Fleet is universally popular here not so much because of our blood affection for the Americans though that is sincere
but because of our distrust of the Yellow race in the North Pacific and our recognition of the "entente cordiale" spreading among all white races who realize the Yellow Peril to Caucasian civilisations, creeds and politics.¹

Cook gave tongue to similar sentiments, and spoke with gloomy relish that it was "certain that we stand in the way of other nations and must some day — perhaps soon — clash."² Believing in the Yellow Peril from way back — for Australian newspapers such as the *Sydney Morning Herald* were talking of the dangers of the "Chinese invasion" in the 1880's, at a time when China was in utter disarray — believing in all this — Australians took one of two paths, or tried to combine them. (There was a third alternative which they never considered.) Australians either sought to snuggle up as close as possible to a Great White Power, or better still, a collection of them; a recurring Australian troilistic scenario, or else they cast around for ways of making Australia self-sufficient in defence. Sometimes they combined the two strategies. A third possibility, that of realising that Asians were far too busy with their own problems to worry about us, never gained acceptance. The thought that one's inferiors never think about you, let alone envy you, is really not to be borne. And as to trying to *help* these countries or be friendly to them, that would be left to missionaries, who no doubt had their own little crosses to grind.

The isolationists concentrated on things like home defence forces, and pressure for an independent Australian Navy. The others ran around, concentrating mainly on the British connection, but also dreaming of Pacific alliance systems and putting out periodic feelers to the Americans. For example, Deakin wrote to the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Crewe, on 27 September 1909 suggesting "an agreement for an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to all the countries around the Pacific Ocean supported by the guarantees of the British Empire, Holland, France, and China added to that of the United States". China was OK at that time, being patently under Western domination if not occupation, and so could join the club, just as Nazi Germany allowed the Japanese in as honorary Aryans. The proposed Deakin gang-up was aimed at Japan and Germany. But, not for the last time, the British stalled.

Even before the First War, Australian Governments were doubtful of British abilities to hold the Pacific against a Naval Power like Japan. As Britain concentrated more and more upon Europe and Germany, she steadily denuded her Pacific Fleet. The con-

¹ *Deakin-Jobb Correspondence* 4/6/08 (Australian National Library. Cook was also having similar thoughts. See Cook’s *Notebook*: April 1908, 24-6.
² Cook’s diary, 27/5/09. *Cook Papers.*
sequence was pressure to get British permission for an independent naval squadron and a real voice in Empire strategy. The entry of Japan on our side in 1915 removed the dangers for a time, although there had been some anxious moments with the German warships during the first convoying of the A.I.F. overseas. But after the war the Australian anxieties persisted and culminated in the fiasco of 1941, when Britain could not help us, most of Australia's forces were overseas, and the Japanese unwisely attacked Pearl Harbour.

This dialogue between those who plump for alliances, while secretly doubting their foolproof character — as Cook said when introducing the Defence Bill on 21st September 1909, "no nation depends entirely for its security upon treaties" — and those urging the building up of strong home defences and keeping out of alliances, has been going on ever since.

Thus Australian attitudes to Asia up to the Japanese War were either fear, and when there was patently nothing to fear, indifference. The Japanese War set the Labor Government thinking of Pacific Pacts (such as Lyons had proposed, unsuccessfully, in 1937). The Anzac agreement of 1944 was the first result but we had to wait until 1951 for a firm American guarantee in the form of Anzus, and till 1954 for Seato.

Australian attitudes towards post-war decolonisation were either yes or no, or yes and no (that really covers all the permutations, doesn't it). The Labor Government and most Labor people supported decolonisation, especially in the heady atmosphere of the Four Freedoms and promises of a new world, which always follow major holocausts, and which can never be taken as accomplished facts or as statements of real intention. Essentially they are sops to the survivors. Conservatives greatly disliked seeing the French, the British and the Dutch eased out of their possessions and replaced by independent, hence unstable colored governments. In the same way they now fear the moving out of Americans from Asian countries — just as they dislike the possibility of White South Africans, Rhodesians and Portuguese losing their dominions in Africa.

After the onset of the Cold War and the Korean War, Australian Governments and their supporters have taken a generally jaundiced view of Asian independence movements and Asian governments who are not on our side. Those who are on nobody's side are also viewed with a degree of jaundice and their difficulties in maintaining their non-aligned status are anticipated with some pleasure. Given these long standing strains of fear of Asia, feelings of national weakness, and an acute consciousness
of the great disparity between our chances of a decent life and the chances of those around us, the foreign policies of postwar Conservative governments are easily explained.

Just to take our guilt about being so much richer than our neighbors and our determination not to help them in a really worthwhile way. Asians then take on the visage of “the mob” of 18th and 19th century England and France; the great unwashed as they used to be called. Such people are dangerous — so in Australian conservative minds the buried but still active fear of the Australian mob, potentially violent, thirsting for equality and the bosses’ daughters, is matched by an even more general fear of the teeming Asian mobs bent upon similar tasks. When Mr. Askin referred to anti-Vietnam demonstrators as the unwashed, he was simply reviving a fear still slumbering fitfully in bourgeois breasts, and revealed the kind of emotions which even impeccably peaceful demonstrations can arouse. And there is nothing one mightn’t do to all these various intruders into the Garden of Eden or, should I say, the Temple of Mammon — driving over them, or napalming them is OK, so long as we can preserve our Caucasian chalk circle.

To turn to relations with individual countries around us.

China

This country is now our fourth best customer, and our wheat exports are very nearly dependent upon future trade with the Mainland of China. Nevertheless, it is going to be a long time, apart from important sectional interests such as this, before China becomes a really important customer for this country — so we do not need to be nearly as circumspect with her as say, with the United States or Japan. We can certainly afford, economically speaking, to go on boycotting China in international politics. Of course, this is a policy which has patently failed. In so far as this boycott has produced results, these have been to confirm Chinese suspicions that the West is incorrigibly hostile, has never really accepted her decision to establish a Communist state, and still hankers after a restoration. If we don’t, why do we continue to deny China her rightful place in the society of nations? It is indeed hard to give an answer, other than to say that our policy of non-recognition and exclusion from the United Nations, is the only, way we can express our hostility to China short of force. There are those among us who favor this outlet.

Whether our policies towards China change after the Vietnam War depends much more upon what our Government and that
of the United States decide, than upon anything which China is likely to say or do. It is becoming more and more evident that Americans are going to be confronted with another no-choice, no-contest, election in a few months — the Convention numbers being stacked by the respective Party machines long before the selection process. The great mass of American people who have opposed the Vietnam war, opposed the policy of overseas intervention, interventions on what have been essentially, grounds of Real Politik, and who view the scenario of permanent Cold War and a Warfare State stretching until 1984 with dismay — are going to be disenfranchised, as they were in 1964. If the new American government and the new Australian government based upon a likely ALP electoral debacle even greater than that of 1966 — if these decide to continue their story of the Chinese thrust south and the necessity of defending free Asian countries from Communist subversion, then Chinese Australian relations will be the same old story as now. It is no use Mr. Chipp saying that the theory of the Chinese thrust south is untenable, any more than it was for Mr. Whitlam to say so in his Roy Milne Lecture in 1963. The fact is, as both acknowledge, election after election has been won on this theory and there is little doubt that this coming one will be as well. As Mr. Whitlam said in The House, this Government has won Khaki elections in 1951, 1954, 1958, 1963 and 1964. And it won one in 1966 and will do so this year if there is an election.

The only prospect for this grotesque stalemate between China and America being broken, is in the event of an entirely new Administration attitude towards Asia—an attitude questioning the right and the need to intervene, but, more especially, the actual as against the imagined relation between China and social revolutionary change in Asia. Not that there is much likelihood of radical change in South East Asia in the next decade. I personally don't get the impression that there are many explosive revolutionary situations in our part of the world. At any rate, we can discuss this by looking at a number of our neighbours.

Malaysia and Singapore

Many of you will remember the Four Corners programme of a few months ago when Abdul Razak and Mr. Lee were interviewed about their security problems, both internal and external. The Malaysian minister did not even speak of American help, nor was there a word of the Chinese thrust south. He mentioned insurgents, but expressed confidence in his country being able to handle them on their own. He expressed an interest in our troops staying on, though of course they would not be in the numbers likely to
make any real contribution in the event of any genuine military emergency, such as an overland or oversea invasion.

Malaysia's stability and military viability depend to a major extent upon the internal policies of her Government—and this boils down to a satisfactory accommodation between Chinese and Malay. If the Government discriminates against the local Chinese—governing by a policy of Malay supremacy, then the country is in for trouble. In a situation of quasi civil war, Communism, either local or Mainland, would flourish, or could flourish, and the result could be tragedy—civil war and intervention. We certainly would have no role in such a tragedy, except perhaps that of a bemused, imported, assistant chucker out. However, such developments take time, and the future is really up to the Malaysian Government. Stationing a few battalions of Australians in Kuala Lumpur, with orders to keep out of communal strife, would be a completely irrelevant gesture for us to make, but one which, like many irrelevant gestures, could land us in trouble. Trouble with the locals, trouble with the Philippines, trouble with the Indonesians. This because of the disputed Borneo territories. So long as this dispute lasts, it seems extremely unwise to commit ourselves to military arrangements with any of these three countries.

Singapore's troubles are different. They are economic, and those are producing political strains. Probably the bulk of Singapore's Chinese population look with benevolence, if not some pride, at the achievements of Mainland China, although they must be puzzled as most of us at what has been happening there over the last few years. But this does not make them Communists, or Singapore another Cuba. But it does mean that if all substantial political opposition to the present Government continues to be crushed by repressive measures, and Singapore's economic difficulties multiply, then many citizens of Singapore may look to other creeds and other countries for support. But of course, Singapore is a city state—guerilla war is out, a strong and loyal army and police force can certainly control city disturbances as they can in most places. Furthermore, Singapore is jammed in between two Muslim countries, both experienced in crushing subversion, both anti-Chinese and anti-Communist. The situation in Singapore would need to deteriorate a great deal before that country is a security risk. What Mr. Lee wants, and will probably get, is economic aid. His attachment to Western troops and the great base is primarily economic, as Malta's is. And of course, Western backing helps him in dealing with Malaysia and to a lesser extent, for there is no great animosity yet, with Indonesia. I don't really see why we would take sides in this internal struggle for power in this corner of the peninsula. Mr. Lee has said explicitly that he
doesn’t want American troops, because he hasn’t a security problem, and doesn’t want the kinds which Americans bring. Enough said.

**Indonesia**

Our relations with Indonesia are going to depend upon the kind of regime they have. Unless our governmental attitude changes a good deal the more rightwing the regime the better we will like them, the more dominated the country is by the military, and by rightwing religious obscurantists, the better we will like them. The appalling massacres over the last few years — involving deaths of perhaps more than half a million people — the worst since the Nazis quite possibly — have gone uncriticised — and, by most of the electorate — (life members of the sleeping sickness society) unnoticed. Our Press and mass media are not interested — as you know, mass murders of left wingers is not news. Nor is there any outcry in this country about the conditions revealed by Dr. Feith in his article in the *New Republic*. If a Government of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) did this, we would have nothing to do with them. Probably, we would judge them as threats to our security. The only thing we really worry about vis a vis Indonesia is whether they might acquire a Communist government, for we equate such an event with the appearance of a threat to our security. In the days of the close links between Indonesia, Russia and China, there were many people who feared that Indonesia would become a nuclear base directed at Australia, involved, as we then were, in confrontation with Indonesia. I remember writing at the time that there was very little chance of that occurring. That Great Powers do not give allies, let alone politically unstable allies, nuclear weapons — for fear of making them independent, for fear of the ally changing sides and becoming a nuclear enemy, for fear of outside intervention which a combination of distance from the scene and, quite possibly, the basic weakness of the Great Power concerned, would render the Great Power unable to deflect. And so it happened.

A Communist Indonesia would have the same internal problems and the same geopolitical limitations as Suharto’s regime. It could threaten us in New Guinea or by nuclear attack. It would only acquire its own nuclears if we had already done so, as part of the normal cycle of proliferation. It would be no more likely to become a Chinese tool than any other Asian Communist country — if anything, it would lean more on Russia, which, once it starts operating in the Indian Ocean, will be able to give it some support. But Russia would not arm it with nuclears — being, along with the United States, the Power most interested in preventing nuclear proliferation. Whether Russia
decided to establish bases in a Communist Indonesia would depend largely on American-Russian relations and Russo-Australian and Indonesian-Australian relations.

It is manifestly in our interest to get on well with Indonesia and the External Affairs Department's policy during confrontation of still trying to keep as many links going with Indonesia as possible, was a very far sighted and fruitful affair. It only shows what we could do with China, who is much farther away, who has never been in open conflict with us except for Korea. It only shows how a realistic non-ideological foreign policy can keep temperatures down while still defending one's vital interests.

There are only four circumstances in which we could tangle in the future with Indonesia. One is if we are lured into an alliance gang up against her; a second is if we became mixed up in possible future disputes with Indonesia on the one hand and Malaysia on the other, or even between Indonesia and the Philippines; a third would arise were we to intervene in an internal revolutionary situation such as might arise in 10 or 15 years time; a fourth could result from a dispute over New Guinea. Some of these potential conflict situations would be more likely in the event of a revival of the PKI — but others could occur without it.

In particular, involvement in the political fortunes of Malaysia and Singapore seems to be against our long term interests, because of the chance of clashing with Indonesia. (I have already spoken of the military redundance of our forward presence there vis a vis combating China or internal subversion).

As to New Guinea, this seems to me a political and military liability to Australia. It would be very difficult to defend in the event of large-scale Indonesian infiltration tactics, if these were to combine with a disaffected native population — And the way we are governing and regarding New Guinea is likely to produce this disaffection, which could be reflected in the attitudes of a post-independence New Guinea government. Even if such a government wanted to shelter under our wing, I'm not sure that we should guarantee it against Indonesia.

The military grounds for such a guarantee are not terribly firm. It is said that we must hold East New Guinea on strategic grounds — just as it used to be said that West New Guinea was a vital interest of ours. We seem to be bearing up quite well in the face of having lost that vital interest.

East New Guinea is supposed to protect our northern sea routes from Indonesian harassment, and our Northern and
Eastern coasts from raids. But, of course, Indonesian bombers and rockets could still hit us without Eastern New Guinea, Moresby and Milne Bay are useful but that is all. If we had command of the sea and air around the islands we could protect Australia and our northern sea routes, but if we didn’t have that command, we’d lose out anyway. Seeing that Eastern New Guinea is so difficult to defend by land, and seeing that it is one of the few things which we and Indonesia, Communist or otherwise might quarrel about, we should not attempt to give it a military guarantee. A joint guarantee with a number of other states would be preferable, a UNO one even better. This latter would be difficult to organise, and might not operate when the time came. From a military point of view, it would be better if we established a couple of bases on islands off New Guinea, e.g., Not that I rate the chances of an Indonesian attack very highly, but it’s something one should keep in mind.

Better There Than Here

Which brings me to a strategic theory which has been far too important and far too unquestioned in Australian military thinking. I refer to the doctrine “better fight them there”. Thus it is supposed to be better to fight the Indonesians in New Guinea, rather than catch them as they try goosestepping down the Birdum track or while they are around the beef roads near Carpentaria. I can’t see that it’s better, I really can’t. It’s supposed to be better to try fighting the dreaded Communists in a country where they know every inch of the country and have massive popular support. Well, I don’t think the Americans think it is better, i.e. easier, any more. Of course, it is better to mess up someone else’s country than your own — but the thing is to win, not lose. Is it better to fight a massive Chinese army, say, with short supply lines, and an enormous supporting hinterland, with one’s own back to the sea and with long sea communications, rather than fight a much smaller version at the end of a long and valuable sea route, protected only by a fraction of the air-power which a country can mobilise near its own borders? I would have thought not. This is why, after Korea, the US Chiefs of Staff ruled that further land wars on the Asian mainland were out. President Johnson’s decision to ignore this rule has only produced verification of the soundness of the Chiefs of Staffs dictum. Not that the chances of a Chinese land thrust are very high — while those of a Japanese style sea invasion is really to fight the last war. If nations want to threaten distant lands, it is going to be with missiles, not armadas of ships as yet unbuilt.

There are a number of Asian countries which produce or could produce changes in our regional environment. They in-
clude India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand, and I will discuss them in turn.

**India**

Our main interest in India has resided in her non-aligned foreign policy, in the enormous problems of starvation and misery which afflict her and which threaten a search for drastic political solutions, in her apparently endless dispute with Pakistan, and in her relations with China. We are also interested in India's apparent nuclear ambitions.

What are likely to be India's relations with China after the Vietnam War? Unless China's attitudes change, they will probably go on being bad. India is one of the many Asian nations who has been steadily critical of the Western role in Vietnam, but this has not changed Chinese distrust for India. Indian public opinion has been pretty much against China since 1962. Though not so strongly as it has been against Pakistan. India has never really recovered face, which she perhaps needlessly lost in 1962, nor has she forgiven the Chinese for pricking her military pretensions.

This is not to say that international affairs loom large in most Indians' calculations — they do not. Problems of how to keep alive and then if possible to live well, occupy most Indian minds. The struggle for education, for jobs, for some kind of breakthrough in agriculture and population control, is enough to keep most Indians busy. In voting at elections, a number of states are showing increasing preference for Communist candidates — Peking-oriented ones in particular. So the China problem has not entirely deflected Indians from the path of what may be political realism for them: Nor would we be distracted by the Yellow Peril if we were in half the social and economic troubles in which the Indians find themselves. Only our Government, with its neat schizophrenic split between trade and war, shows a degree of cynical realism.

The Indian-Pakistan rivalry is one of the most puzzling to outsiders, just as the original drive for partition of the sub-continent was. But both facts are rooted in deep historic antipathies which appear insoluble and which make Greeks and Turks seem like blood brothers. The Indo-Pakistani split, besides leading to two wars, so far, and a ruinous arms race, has made a joint plan for defence of the sub-continent against outsiders impossible. It has also started to let in the outsiders — all busily pushing their own barrows. China, Russia and America are in the van, and the only reason why Britain isn't cracking her whip is that she has lost the handle.
Pakistan is probably China's only friend in Asia — and one can see why. Pakistan figures that America, Britain and Russia are busily courting India, not only by sympathising with India's unjust retention of Moslem territory, but also arming India, ostensibly to combat China, but really, whether they like it or not, to fight Pakistan. Hence the close Sino-Pakistani embrace — of great military value to Pakistan. During the last war with India, Pakistan was able to concentrate all her forces in the West, leaving East Pakistan virtually undefended. She did this partly because it was practically indefensible, but also because Chinese troops poised in the North acted as a deterrent against Indian action in the East. India was also obliged to keep a powerful force immobilised watching the Chinese. Pakistan did not win, but she did not lose either. The Indian reaction to this problem of war or possible war on two fronts, is to prepare to make the Bomb. She is reasoning that in the end it will be less expensive and more of a deterrent than conventional forces. The initial outlay might be considerable, but the running costs will be moderate. Also, the peaceful uses of atomic power can revolutionise India's power and dam-building enterprises. Finally, Chinese nuclear blackmail will be checked.

Now of course these arguments are all right, so far as they go, although it is sad to see what is left of Ghandian non-violence. India is in a spot, no doubt. But how would making a Bomb help her? The first result would be a firm Sino-Pakistani alliance. The second would be a Pakistani bomb. Also as we know, nations who rest their security upon nuclears find that they cannot use them, and that they encounter other kinds of pressure, which they have to cope with by diversifying their weapons systems. This spells greater not less expenditure, and heightened rather than reduced tension. The Bomb would average out at 2.3 per cent of India's GNP — a sizable proportion of her education expenditure. India is the last country to be able to afford such nonsense.

Another sad thing about the Indian Bomb is that many Indians think that India's prestige will soar, and India's voice in world affairs will be listened to with a new respect. When one remembers with what respect, even if much of the respect was grudging, the voice of India was heard in the 1940's and 1950's, precisely because Nehru was not disposed to grind out the hateful Real Politiks which has so degraded Cold War politics, one can only marvel at India's new naivete.

What can Australia do about this situation? In the first place, she should steer clear of entanglements with either India or
Pakistan. Suggestions for a Pacific Confederation including India — a DLP proposal — could lead to quite undesirable consequences, and wouldn’t stop India’s nuclear march.

Secondly, we should have no part of the Indian lobbying against the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, and try to persuade her to sign it.

Thirdly, we should do nothing to legitimise her activities by refusing to sign the Treaty ourself, or by surreptitiously welshing on the Treaty by building nuclear power stations and accumulating plutonium.

Fourthly, we might view with some sympathy India’s (and Sweden’s for that matter) suggestion, that non nuclear countries, or some of them, who can make the Bomb, but do not at present, should be included in the Committee to supervise the Treaty. This suggestion is really an attempt to break the Great Power monopoly in the world. If the Great Powers really put world peace before trying to push their national and ideological interests, there would be some hope, for any increase in the influence of potential nuclear powers like Sweden, India, Canada and even Japan, and the decrease of Russian and American control, would be a positive gain to the international system, in my opinion. But watching America’s homicidal antics in Vietnam, and Russia’s bullying of Czechoslovakia, one can guess what their reaction would be. Still, the Indian proposal is one which we should support.

Fifthly, we should have no part of suggestions that we help the Americans out in the Indian Ocean — the object of the exercise being to contain Russia in the Western Indian Ocean and also defend India against China. (This despite Indian protests about the setting up of US polaris bases to her South). This scenario, yet another from the DLP book of military fables, could succeed in embroiling us with Russia and China, and just possibly, with Pakistan. In the light of our other commitments proposed by the interventionists, just what we could send to the Indian Ocean area is hard to say. The YCW’s perhaps. Upon reflection, that mightn’t be such a bad idea. So long as there is no settlement of the Kashmir dispute, the probability of a Sino-Pakistan Alliance, and of India being forced into the American or Russian orbit will get stronger. Meanwhile India’s grave social problems will mount, almost unnoticed. We can only keep out.

Thailand and the Philippines are also countries which we should treat carefully. They are both corrupt and unjust societies.
The Philippines is also a violent one. Insofar as we line up with their present governments, we underwrite injustice, and we might have to pay out one of these days, in defence of rotten things.

Thailand was very unwise to forsake her pre-1954 neutrality. She is now on very bad terms with Vietnam, Cambodia and China — she has an insurgency problem stemming partly from outside help — her troops are in Vietnam, her American nuclear bomber bases qualify her as a nuclear target. After the War, she would be well advised to return to neutrality and ask the Americans to leave. Whether she does will depend partly upon the magnitude of the eventual American defeat, whether America retains her taste for forward mainland presences after the War, and whether the Thais are really her agents. We could be of no help here, other than to urge the Liberalisation of the Thai Government. But our Conservative Governments have had little enthusiasm for such work.

This brings me to the theory that we ought to try and influence events in Asia by aid, by preferential trade arrangements and by developmental programs of one kind or another. We should of course be doing all of these things — but not in the hope of containing Communism and keeping the existing governments in. Now, of course, if this aid, trade and development served to alter the chronic social injustices of some of these dictatorships and plutocracies — that would be a very good thing. But the results of aid, for example, of American aid, since the War, have been to reinforce existing governments, to multiply corruption, and, in Asia and Latin America, to drive Nationalist and Left Wing Forces together. For every society which has become more progressive as a result of US aid there must be half a dozen who have become more reactionary or who are unaltered.

The effect of aid in Europe was to bolster Conservatism everywhere — and Spain, Portugal and Greece particularly come to mind. The North European bourgeois governments, having been replaced firmly in the saddle, are now trying to kick the American ladder away, on the quite reasonable grounds that the Americans have done their job. The US resistance to this idea and their attempts to invoke the Russian threat is paralleled by Russian attempts to retain full control of her satellites. (One only has to think of the grave US threat to Czechoslovakia which Pravda has recently discovered — the Russians have actually spoken of the Americans and Germans planning to attack.) We tend to admire nationalism in Asia, but not in Eastern Europe.

But the US aid strategy has failed in Asia — whereas if it has failed in Europe, it is only because America wants permanent
political control of Western Europe so that she can take over their economies and markets. Otherwise, aid as a stabiliser and as a factor working against a radical social reconstruction of West European Society, has worked only too well. But in Asia and Latin America it has not — for the government host societies are mostly too archaic, too inflexible for America to be able to legitimise. Also a number of them have attitudes towards social organisation, education and the like, which work against economic progress, even as defined by capitalism. The other day Mr. Nixon deplored the fact that America had spent over $150,000 million in aid over the last 25 years — and deplored it in the context of America still not being able to get her way. The context was Vietnam.

Now if America can't, neither can we, with our quite puny surpluses for aid and overseas investment. An estimate of the amount of aid invested which the South-East Asian Region can economically absorb and use in a year, is $19,000 million. Our contribution to that kind of need would be a drop in the bucket. So let us not think we can affect sizable political events in Asia by aid and investment. As for trade, like most rich countries, the bulk of our trade is with other rich countries, and South-East Asian trade is not important to us, and is only likely to become so when Indonesia manages an economic take-off.

So if we wish to affect political events in Asia by direct methods, military means have a greater prima facie plausibility. But only prima facie — This article has been written in the wake of a historic fiasco procured by its own hands by an immensely powerful International nation.

The ethics of intervention have never been properly set out by those most in favor of it. This is partly because their motives are never as pure or as unmixed as they make out; partly because intervention patterns tend to be peculiar, to say the least. The US have intervened to overthrow Left Wing regimes in Cuba and Guatemala and San Domingo, and there is plenty of evidence of massive CIA activity in British Guiana before the destruction of Chédi Jagan's regime. They supported Jiminez, Batista and Trujillo to the last, and now underpin dictators like Shoessner, of Paraguay with his torture chambers and secret police organised by none less than the late Anton Pavelic. What right wing regime has been overthrown by the US on moral grounds? Not Spain, not Greece, nor Portugal — nor the barbaric sheikdoms.

The same double standard is used in Asia, as we all know, and as we now witness daily in agreements justifying the Western presence in Vietnam. Sometimes we are supposed to be punishing
aggression — that is, doing UNO's job for it, without asking it and in the face of continuous criticisms from the Secretary General of the United Nations, and most of the members of the United Nations.

Sometimes we are acting to save the Vietnamese from a fate worse than death, viz. Communism, by providing them with a better alternative, which is, of course, Death. This whole decision of ours to play God to millions of people, of deciding to will the deaths and maimings of thousands and thousands of them on such flimsy, shifting grounds — has probably not been paralleled since the Spaniards sacked the empires of South America and destroyed their peoples, on grounds of giving them the Christian Way of Life.

We are humbugs, most of us, who defend intervention on these kinds of grounds, because when pressed, we fall back on Reasons of State i.e. better there than here, or the best way to keep the Americans in the area is to agree with everything they say and do, whether or not we really believe that they are right, or even acting in their own best interests. And we call this hypocrisy being a good ally, whereas, of course, it is acting the false and selfish friend. These were the grounds argued by the Holt Government in 1966. You can tell an electorate who boozes by the government it chooses.

To return to the master interventionist in S.E. Asia — America. She has been described by Professor Wolfgang Friedman of Columbia Law School as a country torn between a moralising tradition and the demands and aspirations of an imperial power. Probably. At any rate, the normal end to that kind of conflict is ideology, and rationalisation. And so has it happened in South-East Asia. One way of getting out of this whole tension between morality and Reasons of State, is to simply plump for Power Politics. There are many powerful supporters of this kind of international approach, both in the United States and in Australia, as we know.

So long as these people retain their influence, which is partly a matter of general acceptability, they will impede efforts to give up the attempt to win victory in Vietnam and accept the verdict of Asian nationalism in full cry. They will, right up to the end, argue one last major throw to win, and failing that, a falling back to an endless war of attrition a la the Thirty Years War. If for example, Mr. Nixon wins, we may expect a long last attempt by the US to save face and produce at least the appearance of a victory. If Humphrey wins in December, we might similarly expect a long period of stalling well into the New Year,
during which time thousands more, including Australians, will die. In these circumstances, the protest movement in America, inflamed by the knowledge of having been denied any real choice in the election, will doubtless escalate its activities. It might meet repression aimed at keeping the streets clear, using negro violence as the pretext. But the political result in Vietnam is hardly in doubt.

The only way I think a post-Vietnam America can continue playing the kind of Imperialist role in South-East Asia and elsewhere which it has acted out over the last 20-odd years, is to bring to the fore a coalition of military men, scientists, technicians, politicians and “realist” intellectuals who would combine a virulent anti-Communist ideology with an unrestrained primacy of military and strategic needs. It would lead to the gradual suppression of dissent and move the United States closer toward the society of 1984. (Wolfgang Friedman)

What is more likely is a half-baked risotto of semi-withdrawal and searches for new and more efficacious ways of continuing to try and control the world system. Alternatively, a major spheres of influence deal, which if it were to work would have to include China. Otherwise East, South and South-East Asia could continue to be the scene of a three-way tug of war between the three Great Powers.

We have no role in any of these scenarios, except tagging along; saying “me too”. We have tried that and it hasn't worked. The alternative is to be a reliable, moral, law-abiding member of international society, and to start spending rather more time than we have hitherto, asking ourselves what kind of a country we want here, and how we can synthesise our interests in Europe, in America, in Australia, and in Asia, in ways which do not over-emphasise any of these interests. We have neglected Asia — we have neglected Australia — and over-emphasised the white communities overseas. Let us, after Vietnam, try to redress the balance.

Contribution of articles and comments from readers are welcome, and should be sent to Australian Left Review, Box A247, Sydney South Post Office 2000.

To meet printing schedules, articles are normally required one month before date of issue—the first day of every second month. Contribution for the discussion pages should not exceed 1000 words.
DISCUSSION:

STUDENT ACTIVISM

COMMENTING on the questions asked of student leaders (Student Activism ALR No. 4, 1968) I claim that the main causes are generally, the failure of modern industrial, bureaucratically organised societies to meet the individual human needs; particularly, for Australia, (1) the Vietnam horror; (2) desire of individuals and minority groups to participate meaningfully in government process, and feelings of frustration resulting from the capitalist establishment’s denial of their rights; (3) increasing evidence of the capitalist power elite’s suppression of humanistic values.

The movement receives its impetus from the contradictions which this present form of society cannot resolve; however the actual form of its action seems to draw on the examples of movements (not only student movements) overseas — e.g., SDS, Martin Luther King and non-violent civil disobedience.

I favor student power provided it is understood that there is nothing sacred about student action, which should be seen as part of the general radical and working class movement for a more progressive society. Student power could be achieved (here) by increasing the social consciousness of students, by constant attitude change campaigns, to the point at which a majority of the student body demanded the right to active participation in the administration of the University and the Students’ Union, as well as in the social issues of the day. The first effect of this achievement of power would probably be a radicalisation of campus administration, of quality of courses, and the more significant effect — probably a more powerful protest movement coherently demanding change to a more humanitarian social organisation.

I think that much could be gained by a close contact and co-operation of all progressive people and their organisations. I should like to see the student radicals learn more from the CPA in terms of ideology and philosophy, and establish even stronger contact with all leftwing sections of the trade union movement and ALP. I would like to see the CPA and all left forces grow in strength and form an effective working coalition in issues of social change — education, Aboriginal and other minority rights, socialism: — nationalisation of big industry and finance, better social services, etc. I would like to see diminution in rightwing anti-progressive elements in the ALP and such unions as the AWU.

As to the future — after any excesses of youthful enthusiasm are tempered, most of the young radicals of today should be good supporters of the left, and perhaps even leaders in tomorrow’s left forces. Perhaps a very few, with little contact with reality in terms of the present situation, may become disillusioned and opt out of the political struggle.

I believe that a democratic society is one where the economic and power organisations guarantee to all citizens to develop their own potentialities to the fullest along scientifically and humanistically progressive lines; where there is maximum freedom to participate in the positive development of all mankind; this pre-supposes a socialist economic organisation com-
bined with free communication of ideas, and the rights of all to participate in decisions of public administration. In my view, censorship of ideas and communications would be incompatible with this ideal, and the only suppression of human responses would be suppression of cruelty and all anti-progressive and anti-humanistic actions. Ideas should not be suppressed in a democratic society; any foolish or anti-progressive ideas should be capable of scientific disproof. This would necessitate a high level of social consciousness and willingness to participate in administration, on the part of most people. It would necessitate rationality combined with a love of people, and of progress.

I agree with socialism as a necessary step towards setting up a truly humanistic society, based on recognition of the dignity of man, of universal human rights, and international peace, and co-operation of all peoples in the common goals of social, economic, scientific and cultural progress, for the benefit of all human beings, in a world no longer divided by class distinction.

Bob Morrish

WHY CZECHOSLOVAKIA?

EACH ONE OF US may see the conflict of ideas and political, military and international relationships between the people of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Communist Parties in his own way and out of his own particular experiences and make different judgments.

Careful reading of the articles of Professors Hermach and Hodek and Doctors Richta and Levck, appearing in the journal, Czech. Trade Unions during the past three years, leads me to the view that there may be another area of conflict about which little appears to have been said in the Australian debate, but which, nevertheless, basic to the other considerations.

This is the conflict of developments and ideas within the economic base and the working relationships of people at the commencement of the scientific and technological revolution within Czechoslovakia and other socialist societies.

Perhaps in some of the Czech leaders' explanations of what they feel is the essential path for a socialist country entering the scientific and technological revolution, there are even more conflicts with their Russian, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian and East German comrades than have yet been revealed and many lessons for Australians too; more than in the debates of the philosophic, political and military issues! It may be the uniqueness of the Czech position which draws the fires of their comrades but holds out so much of value for Communist Parties like that of Australia.

The big problem in the economic base of Czechoslovakia increased during the past five years, as the need for intensive rather than extensive development became paramount. In this regard, perhaps the Czech economy has been in a quite different circumstance to the Russian, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian economies. Some of the consequences of this different economic circumstance of Czechoslovakia was explained in the Action Program.

It is, of course, quite impossible to summarise the whole of the articles on "Can the Future be Planned", "Twentieth Century Man", "The Self-Awareness of Socialism" and "Our Conception of Humanization" or Professor Hermach's large thesis in which he deals with the essentially "civilisational" process of socialism. These are
large ideas that take one even beyond the essentials of humanism.

In respect of economic planning: their views appear to be that five, seven or ten year plans can no longer satisfy the requirements of overall progress. "... the tasks which the planning of the national economy has been expected to fulfil were much more modest than what is meant by 'Planning the future'. Our plans were drawn up for relatively short periods not exceeding five years and did not entail the entire complexity of social life. Under the term 'planning the future' we do not only understand the future prospects of the economy, but also the long-term shaping of the entire substructure of civilisation of conditions for human life. In our research into the social and human conditions of contemporary civilisation we have arrived at the conclusion that we are on the threshold of a period of far-reaching changes in the fundamental processes of civilisation, changes which are no less significant than the industrial revolution of the past century, but which are, however, in many respects deeper and more profound than ever before. It can be seen that it is exactly this initial process of changes, which we call the scientific-technological revolution, that is becoming the source of all efforts in the world today for a purposive management of the civilisational processes and a long-term planning of the future".

What is particularly interesting in relation to that kind of view is the extent to which state monopoly capitalism's planners have embraced the same perspectives on a second industrial revolution and its requirements for capitalism. Does that mean that the Czech Marxists equipped with the tools of both scientific and humanistic disciplines have become the greatest revisionists? Or does it mean that they are advancing to grapple with all of the dynamics of society in the scientific-technological revolution? Professor Hermach gives some of his concepts of the latter in "The Self Awareness of Socialism":

"The optimism of socialism does not and cannot represent the irrefutable security of a precisely planned prediction. It cannot do so, not only because social motion, influenced by the human majesty of freedom, decision and creation, does not permit causality to transform into a mechanical force, such as the motion of an object, but particularly because of the fact, that contrary to the majority of historical phenomena, socialism can only materialise as a radical and creative act. That is why socialism is threatened by each attempt to force its motion into pre-arranged strict directives. Since thinking about socialism has for a certain period been subjected, by the absolutism of the plan, to pre-arranged necessities, and point-blank causality, the obvious result was the appearance of certain ailments in the life of socialism..."

"Since socialism cannot develop in any other way but as a continuous creative activity which keeps overcoming the stages of development it has already reached, every primitive comprehension of the laws governing the development of society and the necessities following from their application has a deformatory effect on its motion." 1

Hermach cited Karl Marx in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" to show the interruption and self-criticism of proletarian revolutions: "... proletarian revolutions, like those of the nineteenth century, criticise themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses
and paltriness of their first attempts..."

It may be that the Czechs, with a unique experience in pre-war bourgeois democracy, German occupation and a peaceful transition to socialism on a technological and human base rather different to that of all of its intervening socialist neighbours, may be enabled to judge "the inadequacies, weaknesses and (relative) paltriness of their first attempts" at preparing the optimistic picture of socialism in the last quarter of the Twentieth Century.

"COLANTI."

1 Drs. Levcik and Richta "Can the Future be Planned?" "Czech Trade Unions" No. 1, 1968, p.15.


MANUFACTURED MENACE

PINCHGUT, a tiny sandstone fortress on a tiny sandstone outcrop in the centre of Sydney's huge harbor, was built more than a century ago because someone in authority said the Russians were going to invade the Colony. In Victoria a fortress was erected on Mud Island in Port Phillip Bay.

If the responsible Czarist Minister had been aware of this development, he might well have pointed out that "invasion means warships and a fleet. We have a tiny fleet. Nearest port is Vladivostock in the Far East, a fishing village. Everything would have to come from St. Petersburg, twenty thousand kilometres away, go round Africa. England rules the seas. Having no Siberia it needs its Australian colonies for its surplus convicts The report is the babbling of an idiot."

Completely absurd as was the report of a Russian Invasion, the so-called menace of The Yellow Peril was just as absurd. Yet the old Bulletin paraded this spectre for years. Never any explanation of how the still feudal "Yellow" countries were to come the thousands of miles, with England still undisputed Mistress of the Seas and protectress of Australia, one of its most profitable colonies.

Nineteen-seventeen and the Socialist Revolution in Russia gave the world's politicians and newspapers a bogey they have paraded for half a century. Even after fifty years of Peaceful Coexistence they still deny its possibility. The Press throughout the world never 'lets up' in their anti-Soviet, anti-Communist propaganda. Most of it is incredibly childish, but the memory of the reading public is short and, knowing no history, they are not equipped to recognise falsification of history.

However the Australian military forces, lacking a really good, hair-raising spectre, progressed slowly. Then two World Wars created a machine that had a vested interest in Menaces and Perils, particularly and significantly as in that period much capital was invested in tin, rubber, oil, silver-lead and minor industry in South East Asian countries. This made it imperative that Australian Governments have some bogey to justify the expenditure of millions, rising to tens of millions, then to hundreds of millions, finally, in 1968, to $1,118,000,000 (Treasurer McMahon's figure). To protect the country from...

From what? This is a very awkward question and is rarely asked. Yet occasionally, the real reason, printed for all to see (not only in the Financial Pages) is the declaration that Australia has substantial investments in the area which must be protected.

So — a Menace there was. Indonesians were going to attack Australia. Again no explanation; only an incredible acceptance of Governmental and newspaper-backed publicity that this was so. How the Indonesians, with little shipping, no war in-
dustry of importance, lacking in fin­ance, impoverished, enormous domestic problems, were to launch a large scale invasion (let us forget the matters of navy, shipping, air protection, lines of communication) and land a million fully equipped and adequately armed soldiers, hospitals, food, munitions, armament on our shores was never dealt with, for the very good reason that it could not be dealt with, even in fantasy!

Melbourne journalist and writer on Vietnam, Denis Warner, stated on ABC News Commentary on Sept. 7 that the purchase of the F111 was because the Australian Government was afraid of Indonesia! Now that the communist risk had disappeared, he said, Australia must help the present “safe” forces there.

Gone the Russian Peril of last cen­tury. Gone the Yellow Peril. Gone the Indonesian Peril! Gone the Vietnam Peril! Yes, gone the Vietnam Peril, for there can be no end but victory for the Vietnamese national forces. The past repeated unequivocal statements by President Johnson that America intended to stay in Vietnam, no longer have value. The pronouncement by his representative, Averill Harriman, leader of the U.S. delegation, is an acceptance of irresistible facts. Harriman said (A. F. Press cable, The Australian 7/6/68) that America sought neither military bases nor any other favored positions in South Vietnam as an outcome of the war, and this also applied to Laos. He said the United States believed that countries in South East Asia should be free to determine their own internal affairs. “We look forward to the day when our troops can be withdrawn. Our objectives are strictly limited. In Vietnam we want no alliances. We have no desire to threaten or harm the people of North Vietnam or to invade your country”.

If one read that statement in the light of American conduct in the past — and even in the present — it would be to repress disgust at the hypocrisy. America, building its forces from hundreds to half a million and using all the known horrors of warfare, each year promised victory in the next year. But Harriman’s words have to be read in the light of events today, with the initiative in the hands of the national forces and world and domestic feeling against the aggression widening and mounting to decisive heights. In what faith Harriman’s words were given matters little — events will force their confirmation.

Actually, Vietnam never became an official endorsed Peril. This was because of confusion and disagreement as to what was behind it. And behind it, the seekers for Menaces declared, was China. How now was Australia men­aced? What applied to the Indonesian Menace applied with greater force to China: tiny shipping tonnage, enormous domestic problems, including the desperate task of lifting production to satisfy, not only the basic population but the annual twelve million population increase, apart from a number of other deficiencies and handicaps including a couple of thousand extra miles of communications with no adequate means of protecting them.

This is now being recognised. Thus J. A. C. Mackie and Milton Osborne (quoted by The Australian) stated: “The notion that China was threatening to sweep down through South East Asia in armed strength, or that there was a Peking-led Communist conspiracy to subvert one country in the region after another was barely credible.” Robert Duffield, The Australian’s Foreign Editor, wiped the idea in other words: “China”, he wrote, “has never sent conquering armies to ‘colonise’ outer areas of China; Mao Tse Tung has shown no more desire to do so than the Ming Dynasty did”.

The Americans threw in the Domino Theory to strengthen the propaganda about the Chinese Menace. Of this,
Duffield wrote when the President of Thailand expressed his disbelief: “Now, if Thanom Kittikachorn no longer believes in the “Domino Theory”, what right have those defence hawks on the (Australian) Liberal back benches to believe in it?”

History shows that Australia faced no Peril from feudal Czarist Russia more than a century ago. It faced no Yellow Peril from feudal, semi-colonial China half a century later. It faced no Indonesian Peril. It faced no Perils in the Yesterdays. It faces none today that economic assistance, understanding, acceptance of peaceful co-existence and recognition of national sovereign rights would not neutralise. With those principles as a foundation for Australian foreign policy, South East Asia could and would become an area in which the awakening peoples seeking national sovereignty could steadily work out policies which, with our assistance, could be mutually fruitful.

Norman Freehill

METAL TRADES UNIONS

RECENTLY the Metal Trades Federation celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary. This central organisation, uniting the metal unions, was inaugurated at a conference held in Melbourne, June 14-16, 1943. The Metal Trades Federation, with a Federal Council consisting of two representatives of the Federal Executives of each of the affiliated unions, and organisations in various States, consisting of representatives of State branches of the affiliated unions, has functioned continuously and has played an outstanding role in the general struggles of the trade union movement.

One of the aims of the Federation was to foster amalgamation. At the time of its formation, the Federated Ironworkers’ Association was in process of amalgamation with the Munition Workers’ Union. The Sheet Metal Workers’ Union and the Agricultural Implement and Stovemakers’ Union were negotiating on the question of an amalgamation which was completed in 1945. Recently the amalgamation of the Boilermakers’ and Blacksmiths’ Societies has given a further stimulus towards the Federation’s goal of one union in the metal industry.

A history of the Metal Trades Federation, covering the struggles of the period of the Second World War, the problems and struggles of the early post war years, and the increasingly important role of the metal unions in the national trade union movement over recent years, would be of value to the working class movement. During the existence of the Federation, the metal industry has expanded and the metal unions now have a combined membership of more than 300,000. New problems of the wages struggle, technological changes, and the increasing need for trade union activity on social problems generally, call for still closer organisation of the metal unions.

The ACTU Executive is to convene a conference of the metal unions to discuss proposals for a joint metal trades department within the framework of the ACTU. Metal unions have welcomed this objective, conditional on a sufficient measure of control by the metal unions on policy and administration, to maintain the level established by the Metal Trades Federation, and to enable further advancement.

T. Wright

FOR AMALGAMATION

ALTHOUGH THE ACTU has indulged in severe condemnation of the Arbitration Commission’s decision abolishing the basic wage in favor of a total wage, it is possible that unions
will eventually benefit by developing greater unity, and in many cases complete amalgamation.

Amalgamation has occurred in some cases and although some large craft unions are proud of their independence, they will die a slow death, unless they are prepared to join larger organisations.

On the one hand many employers spurred by the profit motive and the struggle for survival in a highly competitive market are constantly reforming themselves by mergers and takeovers.

They also have strong employers' federations staffed by experts with seemingly unlimited funds to resist union demands.

As well as being organised on a national basis some employers are governed by international agreements.

Unions when facing such opposition often unite but petty differences are often resurrected when amalgamation is mentioned.

In the present economic situation we have seen a close association between the Australian Railways' Union and the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen and a joint presentation for just wage increases being made to the Arbitration Commission by these unions.

Because of this close association in wage struggles of the past, these unions have not felt the need for amalgamation; but with automation making severe inroads on the economical and numerical strength of these unions some consideration will have to be given to amalgamation in the near future.

Looking at the picture in a broader sense we find over 90 unions affiliated with the ACTU broadly divided into industry groups, but although many agree to the principle of amalgamation few have done so.

Some union officials say that by amalgamation thousands of dollars could be diverted into more useful channels, such as improvements in trade union research, enlargement of strike funds, better welfare benefits for members, etc.

In view of the fact that all future claims for wage increases will have to be on a work-value basis, some unions have employed research officers, with a university degree on a substantial salary.

The money necessary for such an expansion is often beyond the scope of a small union.

Automation is slowly eroding traditional craft concepts, making skills and whole occupations obsolete.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the railways, where many signalmen have been displaced in favor of automatic track signalling requiring the attention of merely one or two operators.

Even the grade of train driver has been threatened in England by the introduction of an automated train not requiring the services of an operator.

Although employers have saved thousands of dollars by a denial of "flow on", by order of the Arbitration Commission, unions have found it necessary to unite industrially to achieve just wage increases.

A feature of the present railway work value case has been the great unity between the ARU and the AFULE on an Australia-wide front.

Such unity has eventuated in European countries, and Australians must realise that the existence of a large number of trade unions, many of them small and insignificant goes against the future progress of the union movement as a whole.

L. E. Speers
EDUCATION IN NEW GUINEA

THE ADMINISTRATION is indulging in a spate of self praise for the advance of education over the last fifteen years. Compared with the previous sixty years of colonial rule it is certainly a success story but the failures of the past are no basis for comparison.

In 1963 two separate surveys were taken, one by the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, usually known as the World Bank, and the other by the Commission on Higher Education in Papua and New Guinea, referred to here as the Currie Commission after Sir George Currie, the Chairman of that Commission. The divergences in the figures are not a reflection on the surveyors but arise from the lack of accurate data in the Territory.

The World Bank survey shows that 1958 was the first year in which the pupils attending schools with a recognisable standard were separated from the sub-standard schools. The primary school attendance was then 43,000 in both administration and mission schools. In 1963 the World Bank survey showed that 149,552 pupils were attending primary schools. The Currie Report's figures were 147,112. The World Bank survey stated that the number of children of school age was 492,000. Those attending school were 30.3 per cent of the total.

Both surveys projected their figures to 1968. The World Bank survey expected 247,957 pupils in primary schools and the Currie Commission 252,140. Both these surveys were made when Mr. Hasluck was Minister for Territories and were based on the tempo of advancement at that time. The schools in existence at that time could accommodate more children than were attending.

Answering a question in the House of Representatives last year, the present Minister, Mr. Barnes, gave the number of children in primary schools as 200,260 out of a potential of 549,000 —36.4 per cent at school. (Hansard 18/10/67.)

The present Minister assumed office in December 1963, and as the projections indicate immediately began to cut back the education program, stating that further emphasis would be on economic development.

There is evidence of considerable economic expansion over the last four years but its impact on the two million New Guineans is negligible, because an illiterate people are unable to take advantage of the changes. Irrespective of the amount of outside capital investment New Guinea will remain a backward and primitive country if the mass of the people continue to be illiterate. At the present time it is doubtful if more than 15 per cent can read and write.

Mr. J. K. McCarthy, who was with the Administration for 40 years, is seriously concerned with the lack of education. "There is a desperate need for educated Papuans and New Guineans and we are paying dearly for the lack of schools during the early years. My job made me constantly aware of this and I wish that the process could be hastened." Instead of hastening, we have the deplorable position that the ratio of school attenders to the numbers eligible has advanced less than 7 per cent instead of the 25 per cent envisaged in the projections of 1963.

An added deterrent to the expansion of education is that since last year a charge has been imposed. Parents now have to pay $1 per year for each child attending primary school and $3 for those attending secondary schools. This is no way to encourage people with no educational background to seek an education for their children.
It is contrary to the Education Acts in Australia and denies the provisions of the United Nations Human Rights Charter which states Article 26 (1) "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages."

The Barnes Administration claims that the emphasis has been transferred from primary to secondary education, but the number of students in secondary schools is also well below the projections made in the World Bank survey and the Currie Commission Report.

In answer to a question in the House of Representatives (Hansard 18/10/67) Mr. Barnes stated that there were 11,396 students enrolled in Administration and Mission secondary schools. The projections given for 1967 in the World Bank Survey were 15,373 students and the Currie Commission Report 15,543. Technical students exceeded the projections by over 154 per cent 3,177 as against 1,251 projected.

The opposition of Mr. Barnes and the then Minister for Education, Senator Gorton, to the establishment of a university in the Territory apparently had the support of Federal Cabinet. This opposition was only defeated by the breadth of the protest from both Australia and New Guinea, but it has the effect of delaying its establishment by two valuable years. As no special provisions are made in the Budgets for the necessary buildings, these are only becoming available this year. The university authorities state that their plans for development are being frustrated by the lack of funds and also by the fact that allocations are made on an annual basis although each intake of students is for three or four years. Thus the university did not know what funds were available for 1968-69 until the Budget was brought down in August, although the Currie Commission had recommended that at least until 1970, the university's funds should come direct from the Commonwealth as a special grant.

As a result of such circumstances, Professor Inglis, Acting Vice-Chancellor, said in February that the university would have to refuse admittance to 35 eligible students this year, at a time when there were only four indigenous graduates in the whole country. Present enrolments are (Sydney Morning Herald 23/2/68): 71 students taking second year courses, 160 taking first year courses and just over 100 taking the preliminary year.

To achieve the objective of economic advance, so often portrayed by Mr. Barnes, needs a changed attitude to expenditure on education. As stressed in the Currie Commission Report "education is a producer good." In order to get production under way it is necessary to make considerable capital outlay.

In order to gain the greatest advantage from such expenditure it will be necessary to make a frontal attack on adult illiteracy, because the adult population have the immediate task of developing the productive capacity of the Territory. The elimination of illiteracy is being undertaken in a number of countries, including Cuba, which claims to have eradicated illiteracy in a year and is now implementing a program to raise these former illiterates to primary school standard. If this success can be achieved by a nation with a poor and backward economy how much easier must it be for a highly industrialised and wealthy economy like Australia?

Any proposals for the eradication of illiteracy in New Guinea will meet with fierce opposition from the monopolies which batten on New Guinea and thus have a vested interest in its backwardness. But they are only a small
group whose power arises from their connections of wealth and association within the Establishment. If sufficient New Guineans and Australians, by their united effort, show that they wish to see an advanced and prosperous New Guinea, these people can be thrust aside.

JIM COOPER

THE LIBERTY TO CONTROL

THE DRAFT CHARTER of democratic rights issued by the Communist Party of Australia says that “the democratic participation of the people in making decisions which basically affect their lives has to be the foremost demand of movements for extension of democracy”. This struggle is to be engaged now not after socialism.

Ralph Gibson in Australian Left Review Number Three 1968, lays a heavy emphasis on “liberties:” the right to strike, penal laws, conscientious objectors, police repression. “More is needed however,” he says, “than preserving the liberty to struggle. What is needed above all is the struggle itself, the most powerful struggle by wide sections of the people against the power of monopoly capital.” Failure, he warns, means fascism.

This is surely correct. Correct too the historical truth of Lenin’s observation that democracy was “only for the minority, only for the possessing classes, only for the rich.” Preservation of rights against the repressive measures of monopoly, made possible by its dominant control of the State machine is undoubtedly political lesson Number one for any communist.

The draft however seems to me to introduce a connected but separate issue namely, democratic control. Australian communists in the past have not advanced this concept with any degree of confidence or consistency, fluctuating, as they were, between ideas of a left united parliamentary front, and entering Parliament only to expose it.

Now mass strikes, demonstrations and other forms of protest are a necessary instrument of the working people in the effort to obtain “participatory democracy”, but they do not constitute, in themselves, “control.” If we are to use the term “liberty,” then it would be necessary to coin a phrase "liberty to control." However the very real complexities and natural personal limitations in participatory control of industry and affairs by the working people, mark off this democratic right as something qualitatively different to the traditional liberties of speech, publication, procession, worship and assembly.

These “liberties to struggle” will have to occur decisively at flash points in the long struggle to establish “liberty to control.”

The draft does not suggest that democratic control will be a walk-over, but a “struggle,” that is, another front of struggle against the monopolies. The draft does not expect, of course full control for this would be socialism. It contemplates a “measure” of control. It says

“The struggle to achieve measures of democratic control in deciding conditions of work, development, planning...”

“. . . popular control in relation to national development, the economy, the distribution of the national income and the problem of coping with technological change.” Such words seem mild, but carried out, they would challenge the “command-posts” of the Establishment, both in industry and the State.

Incidentally, the behind-the-scenes monopoly dictatorship about which
Ralph Gibson rightly warns, may be understood by the left-wing, but the ordinary citizen does not understand it. In the process of a protracted struggle for a reasonable measure of democracy, along with other struggles, the masses can learn from experience who lies behind “the Establishment.” They can learn too that in some institutions, there are false “talking shop” aspects which must be discarded to be of use.

But . . . by what precise means is the “participation in control” to be exercised? The draft gives no clues.

The purpose of this contribution is not to answer the question but to comment on the nature of “control.”

The concept of control varies according to a person’s concept of society. For example, at one extreme there are anarchist ideas which regard society as a collection of disconnected individuals, an “atomised” society. Organisations of individuals of any character are regarded as an infringement of individual liberty. Therefore not only is “bureaucracy” wrong, but any form of State apparatus, political parties, or even unions. Consequently there is opposition to planning and consistent policies, both of which assume organisation. Control is seen as an individually-exercised operation, with each individual having an identical right of control to any other.

At the other extreme are ideas of right-wing socialists who regard the exercise of the ballot-box for Parliamentary candidates as the ultimate extent to which the citizen need participate. Such people, in Australia, are not given to theorising, but the underlying assumption could only be an elitist one: “Leave it to me: all you have to do is to vote for me.”

Neither of these concepts corresponds to modern life. Today’s giant industrial complexes, where the division of labor has proceeded a hundredfold over the days when Marx wrote, together with the world-wide co-ordination of production and exchange are wonders of organisation. Without such organisation, the leisure, education and culture of the working people of the privileged Western world, and with it a high level of democratic control, would be impossible.

Wherever man turns in modern capitalist society, he finds himself as part of a production team. And this holds irrespective of the pace of technological change about which the late Dave Morris and “Colanti” have some differences. This is so because we use the word “production” in the sense that Marx did, meaning the production of surplus value, so that the so-called tertiary “services” industries and their white-collar employees are included.

Each production team then, in its turn is intermeshed with other production teams in every direction, the whole held together in the political structure of the State.

The trouble is not, as the anarchists would have it, that there are teams and a political structure, but that the whole lot are controlled by capitalists forced by the very system of production to ignore the increasingly knowledgeable opinions of their workers, and their increasing needs for more creative work, each at his own level of skill, experience and capacity.

Moreover, the position can only be reversed by the workers building powerful job organisations, industrial organisations and political organisations, advancing better policies than the capitalists and culminating in complete public ownership.

Democratic control in this context therefore can, at its fullest, be expressed decisively by individuals only as part of a collective.
The ballot-box parliamentary socialist, and the hundreds of thousands of street demonstrators will play an irreplaceable part in the political struggle, but neither can substitute for participatory worker-control. Only an organised struggle for this, systematically uncovering the real source of authority and opposition to the workers' cause can serve to correct those with trends towards anarchism or towards parliamentarism, and unite them with the mass of working people.

M. Crow

UNLUCKY AUSTRALIANS

I FIRST became aware that Frank Hardy was involved in the Newcastle Waters/Wave Hill struggle of the Aborigines from a cutting from The Australian I received in the German Democratic Republic. My first reaction was to ask myself, "How the devil did Frank get up there and what's he doing with the Aborigines?"

The Unlucky Australians is an answer to the questions I asked myself. It describes what brought him to the "top end" of the Northern Territory, how he became involved in the strike of the Aboriginal pastoral workers, in their struggle for land rights and in their historic action in "squatting" on Wattie Creek.

The value of the book is twofold, first because it exposes at first hand before familiarity had dulled the author's perception, the humiliating conditions under which the Aborigines employed in the pastoral industry of the north live, and secondly because it has caught almost photographically a particular phase in the Aborigines' struggle for emancipation.

Inevitably comparisons must be made with other works on the Aborigines — Herbert's Capricornia and Stuart's Yandy as examples. Both, in this writer's opinion, are far better literature, but neither had the impact which one can anticipate for The Unlucky Australians.

Hardy's impressionism coupled with reportage has one serious weakness. He has been unable to fit what he described into its historical perspective. The 1946 Pilbara strike of Aboriginal stockmen "intrigued" (p.19) him but little more. He cited Dexter Daniels on the influence of the Gurindji on the thinking of the Roper River Aborigines (p.242) but its importance for the future course of the Aborigines' struggle seems to have been missed.

He has written about an important phase of an historical process without fully realising it. Egon Kisch, the master of reportage, before undertaking an assignment immersed himself in the literature and the history of the subject about which he was to write. Hardy could well have done the same, or insofar as he was tipped fortuitously into the Aborigines' struggle he should have done his reading before recording his experiences.

He notes almost incidentally the help the Trade Unions gave in bringing Dexter Daniels and Captain Major south to speak and collect strike funds but the historic role of the working class in the Aborigines' struggle is obscured. Is it adequate to comment in parentheses "(the better the day, the better the deed)" that the strike at Newcastle Waters commenced on 1st May? Was it mere coincidence that the Pilbara strike also commenced on 1st May? Or is there some genetic connection?

Before the war the only white people the Aborigines of the north came in contact with were those interested in their exploitation in one form or another — the pastoralists, the missions and the government bureaucracy. But this changed with Pearl Harbour in 1941, when thousands of troops — Hardy amongst them at Mataranka — and
the Civil Construction Corps, operated in the north. These were largely work­ers in or out of uniform and some part at least of the ideology of the working class was taken over by the Aborigines and adapted to their pur­poses.

In 1938 fifty per cent of the Abori­gines in the Northern Territory were described as “nomads”: today there are none. They have broken their tribal bonds and are becoming in­creasingly conscious of themselves as one people on an Australia-wide basis. The yeast is in the dough and what Hardy writes about is part of the fer­mentation.

Because it is one man’s account of his experiences it is natural that Frank Hardy himself is part of the story but is his obtrusion excessive? Why does he appear in ten of the twenty two photo­graphs illustrating the book, mostly in the centre of the picture? In con­trast Dexter Daniels and Captain Major, two of the main Aboriginal participants in the struggle, score three appearances each.

By personalising the account it re­mains unclear — at least in this re­viewer’s mind — the extent to which other white people influenced or were engaged in the Gurindji struggle.

One technique that Hardy has em­ployed to advantage is his use of tape recording transcriptions. About a fifth of the book is made up of such trans­criptions. They help in no small measure to bring his account to life and give it depth. These transcriptions incidentally have considerable anthrop­ological value.

To summarise: The Unlucky Aus­tralians is a timely and important book. Its weaknesses are of a subjective na­ture and are outweighed by the book’s merits particularly its educational value for that portion of public opinion which has no experience of the plight of the Aborigines in the north. It is, moreover, an example of the way one communist responded to injustice, im­mersed himself in a struggle and de­veloped initiatives which took the de­mand of Aborigines for land rights out of the Northern Territory and into the conscience of the nation. By implica­tion the book can fulfil a certain role in determining tactics in the struggle around Aboriginal land rights and against the overseas companies, monopo­lisising the best pastoral land of the north. One thing is quite certain, the disgraceful “residential area, horse paddock and orchard” decided on by the Federal Government will not satisfy, but will further incense the Gurindji who had petitioned for restoration of 500 square miles of their tribal land.

The front will broaden to take in an increasing number of Aborigines, and at the same time involve wider sections of the non-Aboriginal pop­ulation.

**Frederick Rose**
Ted Bacon ON SELF-DETERMINATION

In the light of the events in Czechoslovakia the author considers the meaning of the right to self-determination.

No one can discredit revolutionary Social-Democracy as long as it does not discredit itself.


Self-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny; no one has the right forcibly to interfere in the life of the nation.

Stalin: Marxism and the National Question, 1913.

IN COMPARISON with the many current events highlighting the brutality, lawlessness and violent usurpation of the rights of nations and defenceless peoples characteristic of modern capitalism, the almost bloodless Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia could appear insignificant. Yet it may ultimately prove to be of as great concern to socialists as any other contemporary event, for it marked a clear departure from long-established marxist principles concerning the relations between nations and especially between socialist countries.

No justification of the occupation of socialist Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of the USSR and four other socialist states has yet been attempted in terms acceptable to marxists. The right of all nations to self-determination has been an established marxist principle for many years. True, as with other principles, a particular combination of circumstances may arise when greater principles, such as the fate of the world socialist movement for a while take precedence over it. But the situation must be demonstrably very grave indeed for this to be permissible. The early Soviet governments, for example, did not intervene to enforce socialism in such former parts of the Russian Empire as Finland or Poland.

Nowhere yet has any substantial evidence been produced that the situation in Czechoslovakia did in fact threaten the very survival of the socialist community of nations so as to warrant intervention by armed force to impose policies on the Czechoslovak Government and Party running counter to the socialist policies adopted by them.
Such evidence would have to be very weighty indeed to convince the generations of Communists in all countries taught to believe in the complete independence and equality of all socialist states and the impossibility of war between them.

These concepts derive directly from the Communist principle of self-determination for all nations, the essentials of which were argued out theoretically in the Russian Social Democratic Party, under Lenin’s leadership, before the Russian Revolution and applied in the building of the multi-national USSR and in the defining of its relations with and attitudes to all other nations and peoples. Far from diminishing in importance, as the “leftists” who argued with Lenin predicted it would, the “national question” has become much more complicated and serious in the years since the 1917 Revolution first opened the way to its solution.

In the period between the two world wars, when the nations formerly contained within the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian Empires began to work out their own destinies, the main English colonies, of predominantly European descent achieved a measure of independence, and the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America developed powerful movements for national independence, a host of new aspects of the general problem arose. After the Second World War, the emergence of a number of new socialist countries and the achievement of political independence of dozens of former colonies complicated the question immeasurably. In “Western” countries such as Britain and the USA, where Lenin had thought the national question settled, the growth of the Welsh, Scottish, Negro and other movements has introduced new features.

Marxist thinking did not keep pace with this vast, changing reality. There was no lack of practical responses to particular situations (e.g., by the Communist International and its main component, the USSR, in the ’20’s and ’30’s). But all too frequently—as recent, somewhat sketchy analyses have shown—these responses were conditioned by the subordination of marxist theory and principle to the apparent tactical needs of the moment, which increasingly characterised Soviet marxism in the years of Stalin’s ascendancy and power, when the Short History of the CPSU (B) which gives scant attention to this problem, was the main source of marxist studies in most Soviet schools. Most of the recognised marxists outside the Soviet Union followed the Soviet pattern or else lost their influence, and often lost heart as well.

Stalin’s positive contributions to the solution of the national question were, from the very beginning, vitiated by his obsession with “getting things done” in a hurry and justifying impermissible behaviour under the pretext that the solution of major problems
of building the USSR required the over-riding of secondary ques-
tions, among which he included the rights of nationalities. Lenin
called attention to this basic defect in Stalin in his famous "Testa-
ment" — the notes dictated for his "Letter to the Congress" at the
end of 1922 which was, unfortunately, only read out to the delega-
tions to the 18th Congress in May 1924 and not published until
1956. (It is contained in Vol. 36 of Lenin's Collected Works,
pp.593-611.)

In this Letter, after expressing doubts as to whether Stalin would
always be capable of using his authority with caution, and sug-
gest ing his replacement as Secretary General, Lenin voiced "the
greatest apprehensions" about the treatment of the Caucasian
nationalities by Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Orjonikidze. Querying
whether enough care had been taken "to provide the non-Russians
with a real safeguard against the truly Russian bully", he said:
I think that Stalin's haste and his infatuation with pure administration, together
with his spite against the notorious "nationalist socialism" played a fatal role
here. In politics, spite generally plays the basest of roles.

He went on to elaborate his views on how internationalism should
be understood, distinguishing between the nationalism of an
oppressor nation and that of an oppressed nation, the nationalism
of a big nation and that of a small nation:

Internationalism on the part of oppressors or 'great' nations as they are called
(though they are great only in their violence, only great as bullies) must consist
not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations but even in an
inequality of the oppressor nation, the great nation, that must make up for
the inequality which obtains in actual practice... . .

In one way or another, by one's attitude or by concessions, it is necessary
to compensate the non-Russians for the lack of trust, for the suspicion and the
insults to which the government of the "dominant" nation subjected them in
the past.

He stressed the need to maintain and strengthen the union of
socialist republics, but warned that any harm that could result
to the USSR from a lack of unification between the national appar-
tuses and the Russian apparatus
is infinitely less than that which will be done, not only to us, but to the whole
International... by the slightest crudity or injustice towards our own
non-Russian nationalities.

He was continuing here, in the most difficult actuality of the
building of socialism in the multi-national USSR, the fundamental
approach to the national question which had been hammered
out by the Russian Social Democrats throughout their history, and
especially in 1903, 1913 and 1916. All this argument is worth
restudying.

In these discussions, especially in "A Caricature of Marxism"
(written in 1916 but not published until 1924) Lenin had main-
tained consistently (in argument with "leftists" who scorned the immediate struggle for democratic rights and cried "down with the frontiers" in the simplistic belief that "the socialist revolution would solve everything") that the road to socialism lay through the struggle for democracy under capitalism and that "democracy in the national question means the self-determination of nations."

Attacking the "left" theory that "self-determination is impossible under capitalism and superfluous under socialism", he said:

From the theoretical standpoint, that view is nonsensical, from the practical political standpoint it is chauvinistic. It fails to appreciate the significance of democracy. For socialism is impossible without democracy because (1) the proletariat cannot perform the socialist revolution unless it prepares for it by the struggle for democracy; (2) victorious socialism cannot consolidate its victory and bring humanity to the withering away of the state without implementing full democracy. To claim that self-determination is superfluous under socialism is therefore just as nonsensical and just as hopelessly confusing as to claim that democracy is superfluous under socialism. ("A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism". Collected Works, Vol. 23, pp.74-5.)

Today, fifty-one years after the Russian Revolution, Soviet democracy, both internally and in its relations with others is still defective. No unbiased observer can doubt that a great and viable socialist system has been built in the USSR or that open manifestations of chauvinism, so common in capitalist countries, have largely been eliminated. But neither can any socialist fail to be perturbed at the fact that, despite the enormous strength of the Soviet system, there are still severe limitations on freedom of expression, restricted and carefully edited information in the mass media and paternalist attitudes among some officials to foreign countries and experiences — including those of other socialist countries and Communist Parties. These basic faults in Soviet democracy cannot be excused merely by reference to the difficulties of the historical development of the USSR, enormous though these have been. To adopt a form of expression popular with Soviet publicists these days: the defects of Soviet democracy are not just the internal affair of the Soviet Union. They are the affair of all communists, for they affect the whole present and future of the world socialist movement.

Though the Soviet Union is rightly regarded as a model of a multi-national state, it is still not a perfect model. "Crude violations of the basic leninist principles of the nationality policy" within the Soviet Union were reported to the 20th Congress of the CPSU by Khrushchov in 1956 and he revealed that the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had been "artificially blown up". "The Yugoslav affair", he said, "contained no problems which could not have been solved through Party discussions among comrades".

Measures were adopted to prevent the recurrence of violations
of the rights of constituent parts of the USSR and between it and other socialist countries. In October 1956, the Central Committee of the CPSU declared that the foundation of the foreign relations of the USSR always had been and remained the policy of peaceful coexistence, friendship and cooperation between all States.

"This policy," it said, "finds its most profound and consistent expression in the relations between the socialist countries" which, it asserted, "can build up their relations only on principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty and non-intervention in each other’s internal affairs."

This concept was repeated in the 1957 Budapest declaration and the 1960 Statement of 81 Parties, in 1961 at the 22nd and in 1966 at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia has not only cast a shadow on the sincerity of all these declarations of principle — it has also demonstrated the necessity for re-examining the past. Denigration of Stalin, Beria, Molotov or Khrushchov were never satisfactory “explanations” for marxists, but most believed or hoped that the mistakes of the past would never recur, that their causes had been or were being eliminated. Now a continuity of error is revealed and its basic sources must be investigated and properly analysed.

Such an analysis by marxists is prompted not by “anti-Soviet” sentiments, nor does it result from being “misled by imperialist propaganda” as a Pravda commentator asserted recently. On the contrary, the interests of the Soviet Union itself demand it, and it is essential for the further progress of the world communist movement, of which the USSR remains the strongest component. The need for such an analysis, in this spirit, was expressed by Palmiro Togliatti in his last “memorandum”, published in Pravda in September 1964 after it had been printed in Italy:

Generally speaking, it is believed that the problem of the origin of the Stalin personality cult has not been solved up till now and that no explanation has been furnished as to how it became possible at all.

The problem attracting the greatest attention—this refers to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries—is, however, the problem of overcoming the regime of restricting and suppressing democratic and personal freedoms which was introduced by Stalin...

The general impression is that of a slowness and resistance in returning to the leninist norms that ensured within the Party and outside of it a wide liberty of expression and debate in culture, art and also in politics. This slowness and this resistance are difficult for us to explain, above all in the present conditions when there is no longer capitalist encirclement and economic reconstruction has had tremendous successes.

Unfortunately, the “slowness and resistance” which troubled Togliatti have not been overcome in the USSR and it is pretty clear that the main crime of the Czechoslovak Party has, in the eyes of Soviet leaders, been their determination to take the bold
step of abolishing the restrictions on democracy which had caused an alarming slowdown of progress and widespread discontent among the Czech and Slovak peoples and in their Party.

Soviet explanations of the reasons which prompted the armed violation of oft-declared principles and in particular of the 19-days-old Bratislava Agreement are voluminous, various, contradictory and, above all, unconvincing. Imminent danger of imperialist intervention or internal counter-revolution can be discounted. The highly competent Czechoslovak armed forces were never asked to act and, in any event, the occupation proved that assistance could have been obtained in a matter of hours, if needed.

The alleged weakness of the Czechoslovak Party and Government were denied, in practice, by the amazing, disciplined attitude of passive resistance adopted by the nation at the call of its leaders. The alleged call for assistance by Czechoslovak Party and Government leaders has been discredited by the facts that not a single name has yet been mentioned and that the legitimate leaders of the Party and Government are obviously not the seekers but the victims of this “assistance”.

Among the Soviet articles, one by I. Sidelnikov in Pravda (August 29) perhaps gives the clearest clue as to their real fears.

“The facts show,” he says (what facts?) “that in Czechoslovakia reactionary, anti-socialist forces, under the cover of slogans of ‘democratisation’ and ‘liberalisation’, gradually, step by step, led the matter up to the undermining of the guiding role of the working class and its Communist Party. They rocked the foundations of the political system.”

Even if this were true, would it justify unheralded incursion? But it is not true. Since the beginning of this year, and especially since the wide circulation of the Czechoslovak Party’s Action Program in April, new life and vigor had been apparent in Czechoslovakia, new confidence in the working class and Communist Party, new faith in socialism and in the position of Czechoslovakia as part of the socialist world. Democracy, which Lenin considered essential to socialism and which is clearly the burning question for the socialist movement everywhere, especially in the developed countries of the modern world, was the mainspring of the new spirit of confidence characterising socialist Czechoslovakia before the occupation.

It is surely not possible that significant elements, at least, of the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact leaderships are still unaware of, or indifferent to, the enormous and lasting negative effects of this action. At one stroke it damaged the image of these nations as leading forces in the world socialist movement and as architects of the policy of peaceful coexistence. In dealing a heavy blow to
the generations-old Czechoslovak friendship for and confidence in the Soviet Union, it not only shocked communists and other progressives throughout the world. It also gave an unexpected bonus to extreme right, militarist elements throughout the capitalist world, especially in West Germany and the USA, breathing new life into the moribund NATO and other warlike imperialist institutions and treaties. It constituted a major setback to the developing process of trust and common action between the communists and other forces of the left in country after country, and revived dying fears that the communists were "not to be trusted". The Swedish elections were the first dramatic proof of this. Above all, by striking right at the heart of a major principle of socialism—the right of all nations to self-determination—it increased the mistrust between peoples on which imperialism thrives.

Analysis of the root causes cannot be avoided. The purpose of such analysis should by no means be to gleefully drag into the open every error made in the building of Soviet Socialism, let alone to provide more fuel for the enemies of socialism. It should, I think, be undertaken in the spirit of the Czechoslovak Party's *Action Program*, towards the end of which its authors say:

We are not taking the measures outlined to make any concessions to our ideals—let alone to our opponents. On the contrary, we are convinced that they will help us to get rid of the burden which for years provided many advantages for the opponent by restricting, reducing and paralysing the efficiency of the socialist idea, the attractiveness of the socialist example.
CENSORSHIP AND
SOCIALISM

Censorship shall not impede any serious and restrained pursuit of truth

(Prussian Censorship Edict, 1843).

If an investigation must constantly attend to this third factor, an irritation supported by law, will such pursuit not lose sight of the truth?

*With inquiry, restraint is the prescribed fear of finding the result,*
a means of keeping one from the truth.

(Karl Marx, commenting on this Edict).

IN THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA the issue of censorship has occupied a key place. On the one hand its abolition enabled the Communist Party to regain a great deal of the mass support it had lost under Novotny. On the other, things said or written in the new conditions so alarmed the leadership in the Soviet Union and elsewhere that they declare they saw in them more than enough reason for military intervention.

Censorship is being both justified on practical grounds, and advocated *in principle*, with opposition to it being denounced as a departure from essential theoretical standpoints of marxism-leninism. A similar view is adopted by a number of critics of the Communist Party's Draft Charter of Democratic Rights. (See *Discussion*, Nos. 1, 2 and 3, 1968). These circumstances make necessary some examination of the theoretical issues involved and the practice of censorship in the Soviet Union as the oldest and most developed of the socialist countries.

In discussing the question one problem is that it is usually posed in terms of absolutes—either censorship or absolutely none, which I consider obscures rather than clarifies. For one thing it does not distinguish the different requirements of peace time from times of war or civil war. Neither can I envisage in any foreseeable future *absolute* abolition of censorship becoming possible in the field of state secrets, or even (though to a much lesser degree) in the field of so-called morality or 'pornography'. Nor is it possible absolutely to prevent censorship by means of selection of what is reported, or reasonable to require editors, producers, etc., to refrain from pursuing some policy under the guidance of which they assemble their materials, accepting some and rejecting others.

The question of how dividing lines are to be drawn, between protecting state secrets and wilful censorship, between licence for
the depraved and freedom for artistic expression, between freedom for editors and workers in the mass media and the rights of those who establish these media and the subscribers to or viewers of them deserves much study in its own right and is related to our present discussion. But it cannot be effectively tackled until some questions of principle are canvassed.

I hold that the aim of socialists, their point of departure and orientation should be against censorship. And since I have already rejected absolutes, I hold that the dividing lines drawn in the Soviet Union are so far in the direction of censorship as to be quite wrong in principle.

The main argument for censorship is simple. It is that the field of ideas is a vital arena of the class struggle, of the struggle between socialism and capitalism, and that it is not only permissible, but even a revolutionary duty to prevent views hostile to socialism being expressed.

But if ideas do not have to be combated because they are not allowed to be expressed, the art of combating them will atrophy, as will the active development of one's own ideas necessary for the purpose. The same applies in the case of what amounts to a sham ideological struggle through arbitrary selection of phrases or interpretations of meaning. The straw man is easily knocked down, but the boxer who trains that way is unlikely to win any real fights.

For example, one Pravda criticism of the much talked of “2000 words” statement was “the authors of this anti-socialist platform threatened to use armed force in support of their positions.” The only reference to armed force in the 2000 words is:

“We can assure the Government that we will give it our backing, if necessary even with weapons, as long as the Government does what we gave it the mandate to do: and we can assure our allies that we will observe our treaties of friendship, alliance, and trade. (London Guardian, July 16, 1968).

I am not here arguing about the subjective intentions of the authors of the 2000 words, but I am saying that Pravda is using a wrong and ineffective method, based on censoring the actual remarks of the real or supposed adversary. Legions of such examples could be quoted, for the conception and method is one in general use.

The reverse side of this is the continual repetition of so-called “well-known truths” and the saying by rote of what is expected about the glorious this or the unshakable that, which in the end becomes at best a boring formalism, but as often as not actual self-deception. Sometimes this is justified on the grounds that we must not speak of not-so-pleasant realities as they may lead to
a drop in morale. Probably Lenin himself is the best answer to such an outlook. Reading his speeches or articles at whatever period of the revolutionary struggle shows conclusively that he scorned this sort of nonsense, and spoke frankly and directly to the people, however tough the situation. For example, at the Second Congress of Political Education Departments (October, 1921) he said concerning the New Economic Policy:

We could not have started anything without this general discussion because for decades the people had been prohibited from discussing anything, and the revolution could not develop without a period in which people everywhere held meetings to argue about all questions. This has created much confusion. This is what happened—this was inevitable, but it must be said that it was not dangerous. (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p.70.)

Then in his letter to A. L. Sheinman, Chief of the State Bank, who had written that the bank was now (1921) “a powerful apparatus”:

At present the State Bank = a bureaucratic paper game. There is the truth for you, if you want to hear not the sweet communist-official lies (with which everyone feeds you as a high mandarin), but the truth.

And if you don’t want to look at this truth with open eyes, through all the communist lying, you are a man who has perished in the prime of life in a swamp of official lying. Now that is an unpleasant truth, but it is the truth. (C.W., Vol. 36, p.567).

These words of Lenin’s come to mind on re-reading much communist literature over the years from most countries including our own, and when listening to speeches at some conferences, anniversaries, etc., where the history of socialism can be spoken of mentioning barely, if at all, Stalin, Trotsky, Khrushchov and others, and various key questions of socialist development.

The flabbier the ideological atmosphere engendered in such conditions, the less is effective ideological activity carried on, and the more it tends in snowball fashion to become necessary to restrict expression. But in the end this becomes self-defeating, for no press or other medium of communication can be so managed or controlled as to change realities which people experience in life. Although there is no measure for the effectiveness of the mass media, and powerful and all as they must be reckoned to be, there are limits to what they can do for good or for ill.

One example in practice was the widespread mass dissatisfaction in Czechoslovakia, which 100% freedom from “bourgeois ideas” in the mass media could not allay. On the contrary, it is clear that the censorship was an additional and powerful cause of cynicism and discontent—the very soil for anti-socialist ideas which the censorship is claimed to combat.

On the other hand, if the monopoly press, etc., were so powerful, how is it that the revolutionary forces are able to triumph
at all not only against their influence, but against that influence backed by the power of the state? And if the mass media are under the control of people's organisations instead of private capital and the state power is socialist, how can a few hostile ideas be regarded as the beginning of the end?

_Pravda_ (22/8/68) says of what they call anti-socialist statements in Czechoslovakia “One could cite dozens if not hundreds of similar utterances”. Dozens, even hundreds seems rather small, in a country of 14 million people, yet _Pravda_ adds “Day by day the working people were swept by this wave of hysterical abuse openly directed against communism and socialism. . .” (emphasis added).

The view that ideas alone can cause a counter-revolution is in contradiction with the marxist concept of the relation between life and ideas. True, ideas have some life of their own and can play to a degree an autonomous role but this is very far from absolute. If there are not sufficient causes in real life (e.g. bureaucracy, concentration of power, reliance on positions of authority, mismanagement, lack of freedom), the ideas of capitalism will not succeed in undermining a socialist society after 20, still less after 50 years. Recognition of this will direct attention to real causes away from measures such as censorship which I claim are ultimately self-defeating.

But censorship and the conception of ideological struggle that goes with it has another very important side. It arrogates to those already in power, and in charge of the censorship the “right” to decide what ideas are to be denounced as counter-revolutionary, revisionist, etc., and therefore beyond the pale. This in turn has the effect of branding the holders of such ideas as “counter-revolutionaries” or “aides of counter-revolutionaries” and therefore open to punishment without much possibility of redress. This has, over the years, led to such terrible results that it is deeply disturbing to see it still pursued. Either the communist parties must discuss together the interpretation and development of the principles of marxism-leninism, in a spirit of free exchange of ideas and respect for those who adopt a different view while continuing the debate, or one party or a majority must be given the ultimate authority. This has proved impossible in practice, and was specifically rejected (with the support of the Australian party) at the 81 parties’ meeting. More important, it is wrong in theory, and could only result in conversion of marxism into a dogma and/or a religion, in which certain “scriptures” (in whose custody?) are beyond question or investigation. This contradicts the essential spirit of marxism as a
scientific enterprise and can only lead to its ossification or even destruction.

But to return to the practice of branding people or ideas without stating what these ideas actually are or arguing them out. Speaking of a speech of C. Cisar, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, *Pravda* says (22/8/68):

It amounts to apostasy of Leninism, repudiation of its international significance and denial of the idea that Leninism remains a guide to action in present day conditions.

Perhaps it does, but it is nowhere argued, or combated ideologically, and *Pravda* readers have little chance of knowing what Cisar actually said.

Speaking of criticism by Vice-Premier O. Sik, of Czechoslovakia’s economic development and relations, *Pravda* says:

> While criticism is, of course, a necessary thing, it must at the same time meet the two criteria of being scientific and objective and of according with the interests of the working masses of people and of socialism.

Perhaps Sik’s criticisms do not meet these criteria, but do *Pravda’s?* Readers could not know, because they have no means of knowing what was actually said.

*Pravda* says of the elected leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia:

> . . . a minority of presidium members, headed by Alexander Dubcek, came out openly (at Cierna Nad Tisou) on right-wing opportunistic positions . . . While professing as a camouflage their desire to defend socialism these people were, in fact, trying to gain time while conniving with counter-revolution.

Apart from the peculiar circumstances that a person described in these terms still has to be accepted as the leader of the CPCz, there is no adequate presentation of the respective arguments or of how such a far-reaching condemnation is arrived at.

*Pravda* is particularly critical of “the repeated calls made by leading officials of the CPCz, ‘to end the communist power monopoly,’” and it is strongly inferred that this contradicts fundamental and immutable principles of marxism-leninism, and is virtually counter-revolutionary.

The reasons why the CPCz believes that the Communist monopoly of power should be ended are set out in the *Action Program* (see, for example, my previous article in *ALR* No. 4). They are not examined by *Pravda*, and I know of no principle of marxism-leninism which says that the communists must monopolise power. The Communist Party of Australia, along with many other communist parties in fact reject this as a principle, let alone as an immutable one. But in any case no party or parties has the
right to enforce by arms a certain (dubious) interpretation of marxism-leninism on another.

Censorship is wrong and bureaucratic also because what information or ideas are let through to the people is decided from on top, and without any possibility of control or restriction from below. It also increases the size of the unproductive administrative apparatus, and breeds within it an, at best, paternalistic outlook—that is, it reinforces the bureaucratic incubus on society.

Lenin, on contrasting the state under capitalism and socialism laid great emphasis on the socialist state being “no longer a state in the proper sense of the word” because of mass participation in various forms. These forms included the ready flow of information and ideas from which the workers were previously in the main excluded, both by the monopolisation of the means of information by the rich and their deliberate efforts to deceive and to foster ignorance, and also because of the cultural backwardness of the people, their oppression by want, deprivation and over-work.

Today, with the shortening of hours of work, greater affluence and the higher level of education and culture (all with many reservations it is true), the withholding of information becomes all the more irksome and frustrating under capitalism, being one of the prime sources of the feeling of alienation and powerlessness. Unless people are well-informed about facts and their interpretation—including possible alternate interpretations—they are neither in a position to participate in decision making nor likely to be encouraged to aspire in that direction.

“Information” means more than just a collection of facts. Most company reports contain many facts, but facts such as tend to obscure the real position as far as possible. Many parliamentary speeches, answers to questions, white papers, etc., are of the same kind. In fact, one of the main forms and reinforcements of bureaucracy today is the monopoly not only of the ownership of the means of production but monopoly of information, which is kept internally within the management, administration, etc. This same monopoly is also one of the main ways that a bureaucracy uses to protect itself. Socialism, requiring the participation of people as a basic means of changing society and eliminating bureaucracy, should have a ready flow of information, both as to facts and ideas, but the practice under socialism so far leaves a great deal to be desired in this regard.

Implicit in much of the justification given for censorship is the idea that as socialism develops the population will become more
and more homogeneous in composition and in thought. But all modern industrial societies are very complex—and I would say of growing complexity—in the field of occupations at least, and this finds its reflection in different approaches to questions, different aspects of reality having different impacts and being differently assessed by various strata. There needs to be both confrontation and harmonisation of these different sides and approaches, and this cannot take place without freedom in the field of ideas.

The development of a common dialectical materialist world outlook (which in any case cannot be expected to be complete) by no means precludes differences in ideas in other fields. And dialectical materialism itself requires freedom in the field of ideas in order to develop itself further in the light of scientific discovery and new social experience.

In today's conditions, with the general rise in cultural and educational standards, and especially the great growth in the numbers of those intellectually trained at tertiary level and their increasing participation in all fields of production, service, administration, teaching and research, this applies particularly to the circulation of ideas between intellectuals and workers, but involves all strata.

Another feature of modern industrial society is the increasing dissidence at certain features of it, usually described in the general term the "mass society". This is meant to convey such ideas as the "lostness" of the individual in what appears as a vast machine, with insufficient sense of community among its members and with most feeling powerless to make any impact on it.

Such problems are much compounded in modern capitalist society because of the alienation due to dispossession and exploitation, and the commercialisation and general tawdriness of prevailing values. But they are by no means completely absent under socialism, and this is expressed theoretically and politically by describing socialism as only the lower stage of communist society. Before the higher stage is realised some not-so-savory features of modern industrial society can give rise to nihilistic or anarchistic ideas, as well as other forms of dissidence.

Produced to one degree or another by sociological factors in a socialist society, it is a great mistake to simply label them as "bourgeois ideology". And a mistake tactically as well as in theory, because not every dissident in socialist society is an actual or even potential supporter of capitalism. But they may be made so by wrong treatment and the problems they are expressing in a roundabout way may be wrongly ignored. It seems to me this is part of the error in the persecution of writers and others in the Soviet Union.
Some "dissidents" also have, in history, proved to be the harbingers of the future, and there is no infallible means of distinguishing these from other more negative dissidents. The communists themselves are an example of a minority which became a majority.

During this year the CPSU has developed the view that a great ideological offensive by reaction is under way, and is a prime cause of difficulty in the socialist countries and the world movement.

All Party organisations must carry on an offensive against bourgeois ideology and take vigorous action against attempts to smuggle in, through various literary productions, works of art and other works, views alien to the socialist ideology of Soviet society. (Resolution of the Central Committee, CPSU, April 10, 1968.)

Besides finding application in increased pressure and repression within the Soviet Union, this same idea seems to be contained also in the much publicised view that the new tactics of the enemy are "peaceful counter-revolution". This is claimed to have been the main factor in Czechoslovakia.

Just as a revolution cannot be accomplished without smashing the reactionary state machine and replacing it by a new one, so counter-revolution has set itself a similar aim — that of smashing the socialist state apparatus and replacing it by its own apparatus. In the beginning this is attempted by peaceful means, replacing cadres loyal to socialism by advocates of so-called "liberalisation".

Such thinking, incidentally, makes it clear why the intervention was undertaken on the eve of the Czechoslovak Party Congress. The fact that Dubcek and other main leaders are still in power with the united support of the people shows also how erroneous and contrived are such theories as the above supporting the intervention.

All this seems wrong to me in the light of what is discussed above. Two main objections may be formulated as follows:

1 If "peaceful counter-revolution" and "ideological subversion" is in fact the order of the day, the thing is to develop a real ideological struggle.

2 I do not think capitalism is on the ideological offensive, but rather on the defensive. In these circumstances bold development of the ideas of marxism is called for to push it back further.

On both grounds censorship, restriction on ideas, hampers the struggle. And I believe it cannot be for too long maintained, for more enlightened and forward looking forces must continue to expand as socialism develops.
GRAMSCI'S VIEW of the role of the socialist party in preparing for the revolution was quite novel. This was to be expected given his novel view of marxism and of the tasks of socialists in advanced capitalist countries. This point has had to be made at the outset because other writers from both the communist party and outside have maintained that Gramsci, on party questions, was in the Leninist tradition. They have had both ideological and scholarly reasons for asserting this. The P.C.I. has still, to the best of my knowledge, not given up democratic centralism, although factional activity is quite open to its ranks, and therefore has emphasised the continuity in Gramsci's writings between the *Ordine Nuovo* period and the *Prison Notebooks* period. The second period has been seen in the light of the former. Thus it is maintained that what Gramsci wrote while in prison constituted only a revision of earlier ideas which were strongly democratic centralist and inspired by Leninism. The same interpretation has been made for scholarly reasons by non-communist writers who view Gramsci's theories on the party in 1919-20 and 1927-37 together and extract a synthesis. Presumably, though this is not stated by the writers, they are not prepared to risk assertions that this or that part of Gramsci constitutes the essence of his work. In refusing to do so they are avoiding a cardinal point of Gramscian methodology which was brought out in the third article in this series; always to seek for the essence of the writings of a man and to disregard obiter dicta and writings not really the product of his own thought but borrowed from somewhere else. Since Gramsci himself emphasised the need to do this they are being unjust to him by ignoring his own directions on how to interpret philosophy.

This article assumes that there is a major disjunction between the thought on the party which he held before he went to jail and that which he evolved while in prison which corresponds with the disjunction between his understanding of marxism before he went to prison and after. Essentially what Gramsci had said in
his prison treatment of marxism was that in advanced capitalist systems with a long tradition of bourgeois rule, control of the proletariat and its allies did not rest on the naked repressive force of the state and there was little class consciousness. Rather it rested on the bourgeois hegemony of political consciousness, that is, on the fact that in hundreds of different ways it had secured the adoption of its own world view by the whole populace. This had not been obtained without concessions by the bourgeoisie and rested to some extent on the absence of causes for resentment among the populace. In other words, in contradistinction to the Leninist proposition advanced in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, that capitalism in advanced capitalist countries could "bribe" (a term of opprobrium meaning convert) the top level of the local proletariat, Gramsci maintained that capitalists could do so for nearly the whole populace. The conversion rested not so much on conceding economic conditions of a high level but rather on the incapacity of the mass to formulate an alternative world view for themselves. They were, after all, faced with an absence of intellectuals of their own and a sophisticated set of values offered to them by the bourgeoisie. Not that this was a conscious activity on the part of the bourgeoisie on all occasions. Rather it was the inevitable result of the nature of society. In sum, in capitalist societies with long established cultural and political structures, the bourgeoisie had maintained a monopoly of moral values and in the last analysis socialism is concerned with inculcating new moral values (i.e., the creation of a new man).

Hence flowed Gramsci's view of the task of a socialist party in such an environment. He drew an analogy with Machiavellian theory, understanding that in his *Prince*, Machiavelli "intended to educate politically 'those who don't know', an education which is not negative, to hate tyrants . . . but positive, to recognise certain determined means, even tyrannical, because you want certain ends". Gramsci did not accept the view that what Machiavelli was preaching was some sort of political amorality, but rather addressing an exhortation to the man who must educate the whole people to the need for a new society. What was needed politically in the era of capitalism of an advanced sort was a "modern prince". But the "modern prince" could not be a concrete individual it had to be an organism . . . the political party. This was so because of the complexity of modern society. Great king philosophers were no longer possible. However, the party had a role essentially the same as that of Machiavelli's educator prince. He wrote:

"The process of formation of a determined collective will, for a determined political end, is conducted not through pedantic elaboration and classification of principles and criteria for a method of action, but as a quality, characteristic
traits, duties, the necessity for a concrete person, what makes the artistic fantasy of he who you wish to convince work, and gives a more concrete form to the political passions.\(^5\)

While there are apparent similarities to the role of the revolutionary party as described in Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?*, centreing on the primary role of the party as an elite educator of those "who do not know", it is the dissimilarities which must be noted. Apart from the period and depth of education, which will be discussed later, the important distinction lies in the greater emphasis in Gramsci on the role of the party as a moral force. It, unlike the Leninist party, concentrates not on what to do and how to do it but what ought to be done; not on imparting theory and tactical directions through its newspapers but on imparting moral and ethical values. The possibility of success of Gramsci's suggestions and emphasis is borne out much more by contemporary knowledge of political science than Lenin's, which assumed the possibility of transmitting complicated theory (albeit diluted) to the masses and having them make use of it effectively. Apart from the fact that men cannot be reached through ideas alone, the history of the Russian revolution showed that the theory had to be watered down to virtual meaninglessness (by Stalin) and eventually contributed to the substitution of a religion of the Leader rather than a religion of the doctrine. We know that men are attracted by the religion of marxism rather than the rationality, that they follow opinion leaders rather than choose more plausible ideas when presented with advice between two arguments. Thus Gramsci in choosing to make the party the church of the new religion\(^6\) was actually being much more realistic and historically oriented than those marxists who either believed in the appeals of rational argument or believed in the ability of the proletariat to learn marxism and conduct its own revolution. This did not mean that marxism would not eventually be lifted above the level of a religion but in the first stages the task of the party was to establish itself by whatever means, elitist or otherwise, as a moral leader.

The second distinction between Gramsci's party and Lenin's was that the educatory role of Gramsci's party was expected to last a much longer time than that of Lenin. This was so precisely because (1) Lenin needed only to teach the Russian worker how to conduct a revolution which they already wanted, whereas Gramsci had to convince them that they needed a revolution, and (2) Lenin envisaged the making of the new man after the revolution and for Gramsci it was essentially a case of making him before the revolution. This flowed naturally from the insistence on building up a counterhegemony of socialist ideas within the capitalist framework.
Of course the distinction between "those who know" and "those who don't know" sounds rather platonic and is elitist, with intellectuals as the elite, as we shall see in the last article in this series. It is not likely to appeal to the populist dominated members of the Australian labour movement both because of the implied hierarchy of value and because of the damaging egalitarianism (levelling down; disrespect for achievement of any sort) present in the whole of Australian society. It is going to be difficult for the worker who believes or has had it dinned into his head that he is as good as everybody else and that the labour movement is his movement, to swallow views which so depreciate him and his potential for leadership. Only in the countries where the prevailing notion is not merely that there is a division of social functions but also a hierarchy of social functions, like Italy, is such a notion not outrageous to democratic sentiment.

Another distinction between Lenin's party and that of Gramsci concerned size, organisation and discipline as distinct from purpose. While recognising the changing qualities of the bolshevik party from that proposed in 1902 to that at present in existence in the USSR, the fact remains that this party was tightly organised and disciplined and composed of a small section of the population. Gramsci had a quite different view of the party. The party he talked about was the "organic" party, understanding party more in 18th century sense as a grouping of those with similar interests and a similar world view.

"One can observe that in the modern world, in many countries, the organic and fundamental parties, for the necessity of struggle or for other reasons have broken in factions, each of which assumes the name of "party" and even of independent party. Often for that reason, the intellectual headquarters of the organic party belongs to no fraction and operates as if it were a directive force of its own, above the parties and sometimes even believed to be some by the public. One can study this function with greater precision if one starts from the view that a paper (or a group of papers) a journal (or group of journals) are also "parties" or "fractions of a party" or "functions as a determined party". Think of the function of The Times in England...

Quite clearly this party would not function as a monolith and would not be subject to tight discipline (there are some moves to create something like it being conducted by Amendola in Italy today). Such a party would have three levels of organisation. (1) A diffuse element of "average" men whose participation is through discipline and loyalty and not through creative and organising functions; (2) A principal cohesive group, "the captains",

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who are most important since they can form an army whereas an army cannot run without them; (3) A "middle element that articulates the first element with the second, putting them not only into physical but moral and intellectual contact." While this appears a variation of the leaders, cadres, rank and file system of bolshevik parties, it has significant differences. First, there is no pseudo-democratic assertion that it is the first group which is most important. The captains are the most important for "without them any discussion is empty". It is not really clear to me what role the communist party proper would play in it. It appears that any sectarianism would be abhorred and that it would be expected to work with other members of a splintered labour movement (the organic party?). Which fraction would play the leading role would depend where the leading theorists were. In the case of Italy, Gramsci clearly believed that the PCI would provide the leadership, something even more logical today than when he was writing.

Another major distinction was that Gramsci's party would consider national interests of primary importance in motivating its activity. He wrote, "Certainly the development is towards internationalism but the point of beginning is "national" and it is from the point of beginning that one must start".9 This was so because hegemony expressed itself nationally (in specific national forms) and because national proletariats thought within national frameworks. Internationalism of the Comintern's sort was evidently wrong.10 It had led to passivism and then to "napoleonism". World revolution was a variety of mechanistic marxism for which Gramsci had no time.

The party had to make a detailed investigation of the national character of the people it was dealing with in order to discover how to reach them.11 This did not mean that the party should become populist in its orientation. On the other hand Gramsci denied that the theory of the party could ever be in contradiction with the desires of the populace, at least at a level which was qualitative. Australians faced with the fact that the Australian worker is the worst enemy of socialism, in many if not most cases, may find this a trifle optimistic. But it must be remembered that Gramsci regarded all that existed as rational, that is, having or having had its purpose and this included the scintilla of "common sense" which could be developed on. It was merely a matter of working slowly on little things and not looking to the finishing post with the blindness of the man who does not see the hurdles.

To conclude, Gramsci's party had the following task: to propagate and popularise a new world view. But, the populace
“change concepts with great difficulty, and never by accepting concepts in their "pure" form, so to speak, but always in some eclectic combination. Rationality, logical coherence, completeness of argumentation, all these are important but far from decisive in dealing with people. Of course, it can be decisive at a secondary level, if the person involved is already in a state of intellectual crisis, has lost faith in the old, and is wavering between the old and the new” [this would not be so in advanced capitalism].

So philosophy can only be lived as a faith by the masses. “The important element is without doubt irrational, faith”. The change to a new world view can only come for social and political reasons [not economic]. Hence certain tasks can be deduced (1) never to tire in repeating your own arguments (varying the literal form); repetition is the pedagogic method most appropriate for acting on the minds of the populace; (2) To work incessantly to raise the intellectual level of ever greater strata of the population. This entails developing groups of intellectuals of a new type, who rise directly from the people and yet remain in contact with them forming as it were, the ribs crossing the mass. This second necessity, if fulfilled, is what really modifies the “ideological panorama” of an epoch. Nor, furthermore can these elites be constituted without a hierarchicization of authority and intellectual competence taking place in their midst, which may culminate in a great individual philosopher, if this person is capable of living in a concrete way the demands of the massive ideological community, of understanding that it cannot have the narrowness of a movement of his own individual mind and who thus succeeds in elaborating the formal collective doctrine in the way which is closest and most appropriate to the modes of thought of a collective thinker [the party].


2 Ordine Nuovo, p.228 ff, 353 ff. See also the first two articles in this series. ALR, Feb.-March, April-May 1968.

3 See for example Tarrow, op.cit.

4 Mach., p.100.

5 Ibid., p.3.

6 Materialismo storico, pp.15-16.

7 See e.g. V. I. Lenin, “What Is to be Done”, (F. L. P. H. Moscow), p.204.

8 Mach., p.21.

9 Mach., p.114.

10 Ibid., p.115.

11 Passato e Presente, p.56.

12 Materialismo storico, p.17.
This paper was originally given to a National Student Congress on Revolution in Southern Africa at Oxford last March. The author is a leader of the movement for liberation in South Africa.

THE WHOLE of that part of Southern Africa which is controlled by racial minorities is experiencing either consistent and regular guerilla activity or is faced with advanced preparation for its commencement.

Angola\(^1\) was followed by Mozambique\(^2\) and they by South West Africa\(^3\). For Portugal (already extended by the brilliantly successful operation PAIGC in its West African colony of Guinea Bissao) the problem of guerilla operations in its territories is beginning to assume the proportions of a major crisis. Early this year Salazar, speaking of Angola and Mozambique, conceded that "if the troubles there continue very much longer, they will diminish and destroy our ability to carry on."\(^4\)

And now the guerilla front against foreign and minority rule has been extended to Rhodesia where since August 13, 1967, guerilla units of South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) and Rhodesia's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) have been involved in armed clashes with South African and Rhodesian military forces\(^5\). The official admission of government losses of 8 dead and 14 wounded in these early engagements is disputed by the ANC and ZAPU, and appears to be an underestimation in the light of the reported number of casualties which filled Rhodesian hospitals. Despite early attempts to denigrate the calibre of the guerilla forces, the scale of the fighting, the tenacity of the guerillas in hand-to-hand combat, and the effectiveness and sophisticated quality of some of the ambushes even at this early stage, were a pointer to future possibilities\(^6\).
ANC-ZAPU ALLIANCE

According to press announcements, the collaboration between ANC and ZAPU guerilla forces was not coincidental but was part of joint planned action in the sense that "the fighting that is presently going on in the Wankie area is indeed being carried out by a combined force of ZAPU and ANC which marched into the country as comrades-in-arms on a common route, each bound to its destination. It is the determination of these combined forces to fight the common settler enemy to the finish, at any point of encounter as they make their way to their respective fighting zones." This alliance has its historical roots in a situation which, in many fundamental respects, is common to both peoples. Rhodesia under Smith is more and more embracing the South African type political framework. Its survival in the face of a moderate amount of international pressure is almost undoubtedly due to the considerable bolstering up of its economy by South Africa. This same role of saviour of "white civilisation" in Rhodesia is being played by South Africa in the military field.

It is reasonable to inter that if the Smith group could have avoided calling in South African troops to cope with the first batch of guerillas it would have preferred to do so. As it is, it lays itself open to the charge that its capacity to muster sufficient internal support to deal with this type of situation is suspect. And indeed it is inconceivable that, in the long run, this micro-community of 200,000 whites could muster either sufficient resources or morale to cope with a growing guerilla movement which would in varying degrees gain the allegiance of the politically deprived 4 million Africans.

The presence of the S.A. regime's armed forces on Rhodesian soil is an indication (if another is really needed) that the minority regimes in the whole of Southern Africa have come to regard the survival of white rule as indivisible. In this sense, South Africa's strategic borders are more and more conceived as extending to the northernmost parts of Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. In this sense too there must be an extremely important strategic connection between the efforts of the guerilla forces in every part of occupied Southern Africa; and we can therefore expect increasing collaboration between all the organisations in the area which stand at the head of people's armed units.

The enormity of the task facing ANC guerillas within South Africa itself gave rise previously to suggestions that the liberation of Southern Africa should be approached as a project to be achieved in geographic stages — first Mozambique, then Angola and in the end South Africa. This strategy appears never to have
found favour in the ANC or in any of the other liberatory movements: and for good reason. There can be little doubt that when Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique reaches a crisis point, Salazar's friends in South Africa (looking to their own future) will intervene on a massive scale. Their capacity to do so, and their capacity to meet mounting military pressures in Rhodesia, will in part be dependent upon events within their own country and in particular, on the extent to which the South African guerilla probes take root and menace internal stability. Similarly, every victory in Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa and Rhodesia, brings with it untold psychological and material advantages for armed units operating within the Republic of S.A.

SOUTH AFRICAN GUERILLAS

The ANC has not attempted to hide the fact that its guerillas are in the process of making their way to their own fighting zone. An underground leaflet — "We Are At War" — distributed recently by the ANC's illegal apparatus within South Africa, talks of the Rhodesian battles and states: "Soon there will be battles in South Africa. We will fight until we have won, however long it takes and however much it will cost."

Is this idle talk? The inherent weakness of the Smith group and the Portuguese and their vulnerability to organised military insurrection is patent. Can the same be said of South Africa at this stage? Is it not being too sanguine to expect a successful outcome to armed confrontation between the very considerable resources and weapons of the white-controlled South African state and the inexperienced lightly-armed guerillas? Where are the sanctuary-providing and logistically important friendly borders? Where are the Sierra Maestras, the jungles, the swamps, the paddy fields?

These questions have reference to the sort of model which has been built up over the years in people's minds of the ideal and classical type set of conditions which make guerilla operations a feasible proposition and they undoubtedly have an important place in any serious assessment of its prospects. But we must not overdo historical analogy. There is in fact no classical type model of physical conditions to which successful guerilla struggle conforms. Different geographical factors call for different methods and forms of guerilla struggle. I shall return to this.

POLITICAL PREREQUISITES

The only universal prerequisites are to be sought in the general political situation rather than in physical or geographic factors. Given a colonial-type situation, armed struggle becomes feasible if and only if the following political conditions are present:
Firstly, a disillusionment on the part of the majority of the people with the prospect of achieving its liberation by traditional and non-violent processes.

Secondly, a readiness on the part of the people to respond in varying degrees and ways to the call for armed confrontation — from actually joining the guerillas, to making their path easy and that of the enemy hard.\(^\text{10}\)

Thirdly, the existence of a political leadership capable not only of gaining the organised allegiance of the people for armed struggle, but having also the ability to carry out the painstaking process of planning, preparation and overall direction of the conduct of operations.

A final judgment on the extent to which the present South African situation conforms to these requisites needs a little more than formal statistical and analytical equipment. It requires assessments by indigenous political activists who know and understand not only the demonstrable facts but who, in addition, have a “feel” for their people, a sensitivity to their mood and the sort of revolutionary instinct which enables them at every given stage to differentiate between the possible and the fanciful.

These qualities are nurtured by years of intimate political nexus between a leader, a people and a situation. We must approach with extreme caution the attempts of outsiders (however well-motivated) whether it be in Africa or Latin America, to legislate for others in this respect. In South Africa, as in all other countries, a true assessment of these factors is primarily the function of the liberatory organisations and their leaders.

**OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS**

Of course, favourable conditions for armed struggle ripen historically. But the historical process must not be approached as if it were a mystical thing outside of man which in a crude deterministic sort of way sets him tasks to which he responds. In this sense to sit back and wait for the evolvement of objective conditions which constitute a “revolutionary situation” amounts in some cases to a dereliction of leadership duties. What people expressing themselves in organised activity, do or abstain from doing, hastens or retards the historical process and helps or hinders the creation of favourable conditions for armed struggle. Indeed in one sense the process of creating favorable conditions for military struggle does not end until the day of victory. Given commencement and sustaining of guerilla activity operates as an extremely important factor in creating more favourable conditions for eventual victory. But it is not the sole factor.\(^\text{11}\) Other forms
of mass activity, including those inspired by the successes of the guerilla units, also play a vital role.

Of course, no political struggle (and this is what guerilla struggle essentially is) can be taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable chances. It does not however follow that licence must be given for every act of adventurism, irresponsibility and 'trying your luck.'

There is not a single serious segment of the organised liberatory movement which does not believe that, in a general sense, political conditions in South Africa are favourable for the commencement and development of armed struggle. This does not necessarily imply a belief that there exists at the moment a classical type revolutionary situation, with an all-round revolutionary insurrection as an immediate possibility.

MILITANCY IN THE TOWNS

Is there evidence that the course upon which the ANC has embarked has a political basis in the existing South African situation? There is, I believe, abundant evidence that it has.

The Africans of South Africa have a history which is rich in resistance to alien rule not only in the initial period of colonisation, but also in the last few decades when it reached new heights. The people have over and over again demonstrated their capacity to act at a most sophisticated political level.

The 50s and the early 60s witnessed four impressive nationwide general strikes all called by the ANC and its allies. The significance of these strikes should not be underestimated. On each occasion, hundreds of thousands of urban workers risked their jobs and their consequent right to remain in an urban area, in quest not of reforms, not for better working conditions, but in response to a purely political call to demonstrate a demand for votes, opposition to racial laws, and so on. In the face of repression Trade Union organisation was minimal — and the above responses were important pointers to the high level of political consciousness which a half-century of urbanisation combined with vigorous political leadership had inculcated into the townspeople. There are many more examples to be found in the 50s and 60s which illustrate the capacity of those in the urban areas to react impressively to calls for action involving both tenacity and sacrifice: the Defiance Campaign of 1952-53, the bus boycotts of the late 50s, women's resistance against the extension of pass laws to women, the pre-Sharpeville anti-pass campaigns.

And what of the people in the countryside, which is the focal point of guerilla activity in the initial stages? Here too there
is convincing evidence of a peasantry which despite centuries of intensive repression, lacks submissiveness. In the very recent past and in many important areas it has demonstrated a capacity for action to the point of armed resistance. In Sekhukhuniland (Transvaal) in the late 50s the peasantry, partly armed, doggedly resisted the attempts by the authorities to replace the traditional leaders of the people with government-appointed servants, so-called Bantu Authorities. In Zululand similar resistance was encountered. The most intense point of peasant resistance and upsurge was amongst the Pondo in the Transkei. By March, 1960 a vast popular movement had arisen, unofficial administrative units were set up including people's courts. From the chosen spots in the mountains where thousands of peasants assembled illegally came the name of the movement — 'INTABA' — The Mountain. Although this revolt had its origin in local grievances, the aim of the resistance soon became the attainment of basic political ends and it came to adopt the full programme of the ANC.\textsuperscript{13}

What is also significant about many of these actions in the countryside is that despite the traditionally strict legal sanction against the possession by non-whites of any arms or ammunition, they always manage on appropriate occasions to emerge with an assortment of prohibited weapons in their hands.

These then are pointers to the validity of the claim by the ANC that the African majority of the country can be expected to respond in growing numbers to a lead which holds out real prospects of destroying white supremacy, albeit in a long and protracted war. The conviction held by all African political groupings (except those sponsored by the government) that the white state can be shifted by nothing short of violence, reflects what is today both an incontrovertible objective fact and a belief held by a majority of ordinary people both in town and countryside.

**OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES**

If then all these subjective elements in the situation tend to argue in favour of the ANC decision, what about some of the formidable objective difficulties? On the face of it the enemy of the guerilla is in stable command of a rich and varied economy which, even at the stage when it is not required to extend itself, can afford a military budget of £186 million. He has a relatively well-trained and efficient army and police force. He can draw on considerable manpower resources because he has the support of the 3½ million privileged whites who can be expected to fight with great ferocity and conviction (albeit one that is born of economic aggrandisement).
In addition, South Africa has very influential and powerful friends. In a situation of crisis these friends may well lose their existing public inhibitions to openly associate with and bolster up the racist regime.

If there is one lesson that the history of guerilla struggles has taught, it is that the material strength and resources of the enemy is by no means a decisive factor.

Witness the resources at the disposal of the French in Algeria; at the height of the fighting 600,000 troops were supplied and serviced by a leading industrial nation whose economy was quite outside the reach of military operations. In terms of pure material strength and almost limitless resources, can anyone surpass the USA in Vietnam? And no amount of modern industrial backing, technical know-how or fire power appears to sway the balance in favour of the invaders. What about the spectacle of Grivas and his Cyprus group challenging the British Army with 47 rifles, 27 automatic weapons and 7 revolvers? (“It was with these arms and these alone, that I kept the fight going for almost a year without any appreciable reinforcements”) 14

The answer lies in this. Guerilla warfare, almost by definition, posits a situation in which there is a vast imbalance of material and military resources between the opposing sides. It is designed to cope with a situation in which the enemy is infinitely superior in relation to every conventional factor of warfare. It is par excellence the weapon of the materially weak against the materially strong.

GUERRILLA TACTICS

Given its popular character and given a populace which increasingly sides with and shields the guerilla whilst at the same time opposing and exposing the enemy, the survival and growth of a people’s army is assured by a skilful exercise of tactics. Surprise, mobility and tactical retreat make it difficult for the enemy to bring into play its superior fire-power in any decisive battles. No individual battle is fought under circumstances unfavourable to the guerilla. Superior forces can be harassed, weakened and, in the end, destroyed.

“There is a saying: ‘the guerilla is the maverick of war’. He practises deception, treachery, surprise and night operations. Thus, circumstances and the will to win often oblige him to forget romantic and sportsmanlike concepts. . . . Some disparaging people call this ‘hit and run’. That is exactly what it is! Hit and run, wait, stalk the enemy, hit him again and run
... perhaps this smacks of not facing up to the enemy. Nevertheless, it serves the goal of guerilla warfare: to conquer and destroy the enemy.”

The absence of an orthodox front, of fighting lines; the need of the enemy to attenuate his resources and lines of communication over vast areas; his need to protect the widely scattered installations on which his economy is dependent (because the guerilla pops up now here now there): These are amongst the factors which serve in the long run to compensate in favour of the guerilla for the disparity in the starting strength of the adversaries. I stress the words ‘in the long run,’ because it would be idle to dispute the considerable military advantages to the enemy of his high level of industrialisation, his ready-to-hand reserves of white manpower and his excellent roads, railways and air transport which facilitates swift manoeuvres and speedy concentration of personnel.

But we must also not overlook the fact that over a period of time many of these very same unfavourable factors will begin to operate in favour of the liberation force:—

(a) The ready-to-hand resources including food production depend overwhelmingly upon non-white labour which, with the growing intensity of the struggle, will not remain docile and co-operative.

(b) The white manpower resources may seem adequate initially but must become dangerously stretched as guerilla warfare develops. Already extremely short of skilled labour — the monopoly of the whites — the mobilisation of a large force for a protracted struggle would place a further burden on the workings of the economy.

(c) In contrast to many other major guerilla struggles (Cuba is one of the exceptions) the enemy's economic and manpower resources are all situated within the theatre of war and there is no secure external pool (other than direct intervention by a foreign state) safe from sabotage, mass action and guerilla action on which the enemy can draw.

(d) The very sophisticated character of the economy with its well-developed system of communication makes it a much more vulnerable target. In an underdeveloped country the interruption of supplies to any given region may be no more than a local setback. In a highly sensitive modern economic structure of the South African type, the successful harassment of transport to any major industrial complex would inevitably inflict immense damage to the economy as a whole and to the morale of the enemy. (The South African forces would have the task of keeping
intact about 30,000 miles of railway line spread over an area of over 400,000 square miles!)

TERRAIN AND FRIENDLY BORDERS

One of the more popular misconceptions concerning guerilla warfare is that a physical environment which conforms to a special pattern is indispensable — thick jungle, inaccessible mountain ranges, swamps, a friendly border and so forth. The availability of this sort of terrain is, of course, of tremendous advantage to the guerillas especially in the early non-operational phase when training and other preparatory steps are undertaken and no external bases are available for this purpose. When the operations commence, the guerilla cannot survive, let alone flourish, unless he moves to areas where people live and work and where the enemy can be engaged in combat. If he is fortunate enough to have behind him a friendly border or area of difficult access which can provide temporary refuge, it is of course advantageous, although it sometimes brings with it its own set of problems connected mainly with supplies. But guerilla warfare can, and has been, waged in every conceivable type of terrain, in deserts, in swamps, in farm fields, in built-up areas, in plains, in the bush and in countries without friendly borders.

The sole question is one of adjusting survival tactics to the sort of terrain in which operations have to be carried out.

In any case in the vast expanse that is South Africa, a people's force will find a multitude of variations in topography; deserts, mountain forests, veld, and swamps. There might not appear to be a single impregnable Sierra Maestra or impenetrable jungle, but the country abounds in terrain which in general is certainly no less favourable for guerilla operations than some of the terrain in which the Algerians or the resistance movements in occupied Europe operated. Tito, when told that a certain area was "as level as the palm of your hand and with very little forests," retorted: "What a first-class example it is of the relative unimportance of geographical factors in the development of a rising."

In particular South Africa's tremendous size will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the white regime to keep the whole of it under armed surveillance in strength and in depth. Hence, an early development of a relatively safe (though shifting) rear is not beyond the realm of possibility. The undetected existence of the SWAPO training camp for over a year and, more especially, the survival for years in the mountains and hills in the Transkei of the leaders of 'Intaba' during the military occupation of the area after the 1960 Pondo Revolt, are both of importance in this context.
First outbreaks of organized violence occurred in March 1961. Various factors including division in the guerilla ranks, and events in the Congo (which accommodated considerable guerilla reserves) enabled the Portuguese temporarily to render ineffective a movement which at its height had thousands of guerillas in the field and had gained control of considerable territory in the North. In the last few years a re-grouping has taken place and once again there is evidence of guerilla activity on a number of fronts.

The armed struggle in Mozambique was launched in September 1964, by Fre­limo, an amalgamation of several earlier movements. Dr. Eduardo Mandlanc, the President of Frelimo, claims to control a fifth of the country (Northern districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado). There are reported to be 50,000 Portuguese troops in Mozambique.

According to evidence which emerged in the recent trial in Pretoria, South West African guerillas under the control of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) established a training camp in the territory in 1965 which operated undetected for close on a year.

Quoted in an editorial in the Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail, 6 January 1966.

According to press reports the main areas of operations appear to have been at Wankie, Zambesi River Valley, Northern Matabeleland, and the District of Bulawayo, West of the Livingstone Bulawayo railway, Urungwe district and the Siplilo district. The biggest clash lasting 48 hours appears to have been at Tjolotje. The usual ploy of describing the joint efforts of the Vorster-Smith armed forces as a 'police action' is open to question when regard is had to facts like the use of Hunter jets, armed helicopters etc.


Statement issued on 19 August 1967 by Oliver Tambo, Deputy President of the ANC, and J. R. D. Chikerema, Vice-President of ZAPU.

FRELIMO has for long claimed that South Africa has been helping to arm and train the Portuguese; also that whites from South Africa have been fighting in the Portuguese units. In October 1967 the South African Foreign Minister spoke of 'mutual security arrangements' between South Africa and the other states in Southern Africa.

Che Guevara, Guerilla Warfare, Chapter 1.

Debray, Revolution in the Revolution, tends to proceed from the proposition that "the most important form of propaganda is military action," to a conclusion that in most of Latin America the creation of military skilled guerilla foci is sufficient to bring about favourable conditions for an eventual people's military victory. Thus he underrates the vital connection between the guerilla struggle (which in its early stages must of necessity be of a limited magnitude) and other forms of militant mass activity. He sees the FOCI (which in terms of his approach must assume overall political as well as military leadership) as having (certainly in the initial phases) to cut itself off from the local population. There are many indications, including the increasing devotion of resources to mass illegal propaganda throughout the country, that the ANC's approach on this important question is different.

"World history would indeed be very easy to make if the struggle were taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable chances" — Karl Marx in a letter to L. Kugelman, 17 April 1871.

A detailed description of these events and their significance is contained in South Africa: The Peasants' Revolt by Govan Mbeki; Penguin African Library.


Introduction to Guerilla Warfare, Mao Tse Tung.

Che Guevara, Guerilla Warfare, pp.120-125.
THE INSIDE LEAF of the dustjacket states, among other things, that . . . "he (John Hughes) has been careful to share with the reader the sifting of fact and rumor . . ."

It is a puzzling admission to make. Did the author retain the "rumor" and create "fact" from it? How much of his book is actual fact, not political bias?

Today, some three years since the start of a political action that unleashed one of the most sickening massacres in modern history, most people still do not know — how did it start? — why the butchery? — what's the aftermath? So many governments, including the Australian, have calmly ignored the whole process by claiming only Communists were killed and that's O.K.

*Indonesian Upheaval* continues that kind of ideological and political outlook. The author does three things. He condemns wholesale the Sukarno regime, doesn't eulogise but certainly justifies the massacre of at least one million men, women and children, and presents the Suharto clique like Caesar's wife, that is, above suspicion of anything but the highest political, moral and national ideals.

To what extent this outlook gets through depends upon the reader's outlook and knowledge of Indonesian affairs.

The author quite smoothly proclaims as fact some of the most vital questions about the whole events of 1965.

"Privately, the Communists began to spread the word that a 'Council of Generals' was plotting against the President. Aidit (Communist Party Gen. Sec.) reported this to Sukarno. Sukarno challenged army commander Yani. But Yani explained calmly that it was a group concerned only with promotions of colonels to the ranks of generals" (p.15).

It was, you see, only a Communist rumor about a generals' plot which was disposed of when one general denied it. But subsequent events surely indicate that the top military brass were not only contemplating a power seizure, but have done so fairly efficiently, testifying to careful and long preparation.

"There is no question, of course", Mr. Hughes blandly says, "that the Indonesian Communist Party was up to its neck in the coup attempt" (p.114).

Was the PKI "up to its neck" or did some Communist leaders react (yes even wrongly or unwisely) to a certain situation? This is, indeed, a big question with growing evidence pointing to the fact that the Indonesian Communists as a whole, as a Party, did not know of or become involved in the events — except ultimately, as victims.

Chapter 22, entitled, perhaps hopefully, "Return to Respectability", is the one more directly linked to present day happenings. This deals with the prospects for the Suharto military regime, and thus can be judged already on known performance.

Beginning on March 11, 1966, the already "sifted" Suharto opponents, People's Congress, banned the PKI, installed Suharto as acting (and actual) President, gave him sweeping emergency powers (far greater than
Sukarno ever had) and set the date for elections for July 5, 1968. July has come and gone and the election date is now set for three years hence.

Ex-President Sukarno’s “guided democracy” is heavily criticised and, truth to say, it wasn’t so good, but what should be said of Suharto’s “new” parliamentary democracy? In preparation for the 1968 Congress meeting Suharto appointed (Feb. 1968) 104 new MP's, bringing his direct appointments to an estimated minimum of 65% of all deputies. Even so, when Congress met in March, some 30 battalions provided “security” so that in Major General Machmud’s words the Congress should be “protected from any pressure and intimidation”. (Sydney Morning Herald 20/3/68.)

John Hughes speaks with feeling of the huge cost of Malaysian confrontation to Indonesian living standards. One must agree with this. But in two years or so since the ending of confrontation, the army has not been reduced, but on the contrary is now established as the key personnel in the civil service. Suharto has stated the aim of trebling the armed forces by the end of the present decade.

John Hughes blames present weaknesses on the legacy of the Sukarno regime and on the Communists as the real villains in that period. In doing so he ignores achievements of the period. Since 1945, under extremely difficult circumstances, including continual imperialist intrigue and subversion, plus sabotage from home grown feudal and budding capitalist elements, a home and overseas shipping line was created (Australians please note), a civilian airline established, a successful crash program was undertaken to overcome illiteracy, an elementary country-wide medical service was developed, new industries were created, foreign enterprises were nationalised and there was some development of democracy, formerly unknown. True the economy was not strong, and over militarisation took its toll.

But now what is the situation in the “New Order of the '65 Generation?” Stronger? Be your own judge. Education has broken down, parents now pay teachers bribes to get their children accepted into schools, illiteracy is on the increase; foreign loans and investments are seen as the solvent of the country’s economic problems; medical services have all but ground to a halt; graft and corruption have become a way of life in the face of declining wages due to galloping inflation. (In the last year prices have increased on normally used goods 10-20 times.) Discontent is mounting while continual military forays against “Communists” (i.e. Suharto opponents) are increasing. Foreign investors are given practically unlimited concessions.

The wealth of Indonesia is about to be plundered by Belgian, British, Japanese, German, Australian and US monopolies.

John Hughes goes to great lengths to indicate that the hands of the USA Administration remained pure and unsullied throughout the critical 1965-66 period. No serious student of international politics could be so naive as to accept this for three good reasons:

1 The record of US policy in relation to the liberation movement, particularly in Asia.
2 The continual exposure of CIA (USA Central Intelligence Agency) activity throughout the world in Guatemala, Cuba, the US Labor movement right through to Australian literary fields.
3 The particular record of the CIA in Indonesia, financing rightwing groups, revolts, etc.
If my review appears too critical it is because the "New Order", much vaunted by the author as a welcome break from the past, has some 100,000 people rotting in concentration camps, untried, unfed and largely uncared for. Military courts plus heavily censored news media, "try" patriotic leaders. Running out of sufficient "reds" at times, fresh "enemies" are created. The Chinese have become "foreign subversives". Now the minority Christian Churches are uneasy over deteriorating relationships with fanatical "holy war" Moslem groups, protected by the "New Order".

Against this background Australian businessmen and conservative politicians scurry to Djakarta, while "New Order" apologists come to Canberra, cap in hand, proclaiming unconditional fidelity to private investment.

I see Indonesian Upheaval as part of the promotion for the acceptance of this Indonesia, but not for an Indonesia of enlightened development based on wide democracy and economic independence.

M. Burnham

SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

BY ANY STANDARDS this is a major work which many critics consider may indeed be a great one. Certainly Barrington Moore has set himself a huge canvas — that of studying the changes, and their causes, from feudal-agrarian society to modern industrial society in most of the major countries of the world and the connection of all this with democracy.

He attempts the task of outlining "the role of the landed upper classes and the peasants in the bourgeois revolutions leading to capitalist democracy, the abortive bourgeois revolutions leading to fascism, and the peasant revolutions leading to communism". His work may well become an important part of future study on these vital problems.

Barrington Moore's theory seems to propound the view that where bourgeois revolutions occurred as in England, France, etc., peaceful democratisation and modernisation followed in those countries; that where bourgeois revolutions failed or were only partially enacted as in Germany, Japan, China and Russia the future resulted in either fascist dictatorship or in Communist-led "peasant revolutions". His contents are "proved" in long, and often original chapters which all students of revolutionary change should study. His material is vivid and instructive. It is also extremely dubious in many areas and in many of its implications.

Perhaps the main area of doubt arises from the classification of the socialist revolutions as "peasant revolutions" and the idea that in countries where huge peasant masses exist the road to modernisation is blocked by the reactionary and conservative nature of the peasantry who lend themselves to fascist or communist manipulation from "above".

Historically the conservatism of the peasantry, economically and culturally, is undoubted. However the political developments in the modern world see masses of peasants participating in tremendous social movements for progress, independence from imperialism, and for the ending of despotic social formations and for modernisation.

It would be hard in the political sense at least, to define the role of the Vietnamese peasants as being conservative and reactionary. The world's radicals, including most of the foremost minds of modern society, have bestir-
red themselves in support of the Vietnamese cause. In many countries, movements involving huge masses of peasants are in existence under the guidance of socialist and marxist theories and have the goal of establishing newer and higher forms of society. Since the Russian Revolution most reactionary movements involving huge masses of peasants have had this influence and this aim.

Barrington Moore states that "by themselves the peasants have never been able to accomplish a revolution", that "the peasants have to have leaders from other classes" and that "for them to succeed requires a somewhat unusual combination of circumstances that has occurred only in modern times". Almost all peasant revolts nowadays are linked with marxism and the working class and socialist movements and in that sense surely cannot be simply classified as "peasant revolutions" notwithstanding their superiority as to numbers of participants.

Of course Barrington Moore considers socialist countries as being totalitarian. He describes the peasants as being "the principal victims of modernisation put through by Communist governments". However despite the frequent mistakes of socialist regimes, past and present, it boggles the imagination to think of Chinese, North Korean or North Vietnamese peasants as being "victims" of their present governments; for they no longer starve (except via the terroristic actions of the Americans), they have land, education, social services, vastly increased democracy (however imperfect by modern standards) and seemingly a future of modern development opening up before them.

The lessons of contemporary history seem to show that only on the basis of marxist ideology and organisation can social movements achieve lasting successes against modern imperialism and in the struggle for the development of a newer and more democratic society.

The question of violence receives much attention by the author. In an interesting chapter on the English “enclosures” which brought about the destruction of the English peasants “the massive violence exercised by the upper classes against the lower” is vividly revealed. The violence perpetrated in other countries is similarly examined, and the conclusions reached as follows:

“For a Western scholar to say a good word on behalf of revolutionary radicalism is not easy because it runs counter to deeply grooved mental reflexes. The assumption that gradual and piecemeal reform has demonstrated its superiority over violent revolution as a way to advance human freedom is so pervasive that even to question such an assumption seems strange. In closing this book I should like to draw attention for the last time to what the evidence from the comparative history of modernisation may tell us about this issue. As I have reluctantly come to read this evidence, the costs of modernisation have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a great deal more”.

“As long as powerful vested interests oppose changes that lead toward a less oppressive world, no commitment to a free society can dispense with some conception of revolutionary coercion. That, however, is an ultimate necessity, a last resort in political action, whose rational justification in time and place varies too much for any attempt at consideration here. Whether the ancient Western dream of a free and rational society will always remain a chimera, no one can know for sure. But if the men of the future are ever to break the chains of the present, they will have to understand the forces that forged them.”

John Sendy
LENIN, KRUPSKAIA AND LIBRARIES. Edit. S. Simsova, F/a F. W. Cheshire, 73 pp, $2.75.

LENIN'S WRITINGS on libraries and librarianship, and the legislation which he introduced after the Revolution, possess a classic status in the history of Soviet bibliography. His articles, letters, reviews and decrees on the subject in the period 1905-1923 were first edited by his wife, Nadezhda Krupskaia (herself an educationist of standing), and published in 1929 under the title What Lenin Wrote and Said About Libraries; enlarged editions appeared in 1932, 1934, 1939 and 1955. The volume under review contains the first English translation of the main items in What Lenin Wrote and Said About Libraries, together with Krupskaia's Foreword to the first edition and a condensed version of a speech which she made to a conference on library science and bibliography in 1936; the third section offers some 'Reminiscences about Krupskaia and Lenin' by, among others, the noted Soviet bibliographer, Nicholas Rubakin, and Lenin's chief executive in library matters, Lunacharskii.

Lenin, Krupskaia and Libraries is the first volume in a series, World Classics of Librarianship, a project for the publication of international studies in comparative librarianship, designed 'to provide historical source material for student librarians, as well as interesting glimpses for practising librarians of the origins of their profession in other countries and ages'. Unfortunately the book loses some of its value as a source book because of its incompleteness. A list of thirty-six untranslated items from Krupskaia's edition is given, and of course it is impossible to know whether they are all as 'minor' as is claimed in the Bibliographical Guide at the end of the book. The format could also have been much clearer; the incorporation of some of the more important information in the Bibliographical Guide into a general preface explaining the book's procedure would have facilitated reading.

Inevitably the main interest of the book is centred round Lenin himself, and inevitably also one's reactions to the articles and decrees are coloured and confused by subsequent history: the extraordinary growth of an efficient network of public and specialist libraries as part of an educational process which overcame the pre-revolutionary heritage of ignorance and illiteracy; and, on the other hand, in the Stalinist era, the use of the centralised library administration as a means of exercising effective censorship and political control of library procedures. In many libraries, for example, the public 'systematic' catalogue based on subject-matter (i.e. 'to reflect in the organisation of published materials the concept of dialectical materialism') was separated from the 'official' alphabetical author catalogue which was not available to the general public, and extensive use was made of the 'spetsfond', the special collections of 'undesirable' books not available for general reading: 'obsolete' books, pornography, foreign works inimical to the Soviet Union, and the works of 'enemies of the people'. And in Lenin's writing the same ambiguity persists: 'genuine insights into the ideological and market pressures on writers in capitalist countries ('It is impossible to live in society and be free from society') and insistence on the need to define and confront the governing ideologies of 'a deceptively free literature'—in an article which also speaks of the desirability of literature becoming 'the gear wheel and screw of the great social democratic mechanism'. What emerges, apart from the recognition that library organisation is, at base, the expression of ideology, is the enormous enthusiasm and practicality...
of Lenin’s approach, born, no doubt, of his own experience in the British Museum, the Bibliotheque Nationale and the library of the Societe de Lecture in Geneva; the procedures which he instituted produced not only the specialist libraries but a vast network of village libraries serving the whole community.

J. L. Sturm

THE WOBBLIES, by Patrick Renshaw. Eyre and Spottiswoode, 312 pp, $6.65.

PATRICK RENSHAW has written an exceedingly interesting book on the Industrial Workers of the World. This movement, affectionately known as the “Wobblies” had an effective life span of less than twenty years after its formation in 1905; yet its influence was immense. The author confines his study to a detailed analysis of the United States movement. However, the international aspects of “Wobbly” activity are mentioned, usually with a concise appraisal of the main ideological thread behind each national organisation. It is interesting to contrast the Australian I.W.W. with its American counterpart. Mr. Renshaw suggests that in 1905 both the Australian and the American working class were faced with the reality of the wage system. This era saw the end of the frontier days.

In the United States, in the early years of this century, conditions for the unskilled workers (and especially the large force of itinerant unskilled workers) were intolerable. Lumber workers, for example, were forced to sleep on bunks without mattresses, were given appalling food and paid subsistence wages. Only five per cent of the working class were unionised and embraced by the American Federation of Labour; and the vast majority of these trade unionists were semi-skilled workers and craftsmen. Some attempts were made to organise workers in a few industries on an industrial basis, but, by 1905 95 per cent of the American working class were without organised protection.

It was within this context that the Industrial Workers of the World were formed. Their aim, as set out in their Preamble, was revolution; to be achieved by organising workers on an industrial as opposed to a craft basis. Under this system “an injury to one becomes an injury to all”. The I.W.W. vetoed the “conservative” motto a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work and replaced it with a call for “abolition of the wage system”. With these aims, they set out to encompass all the working class, but especially those without previous experience of trade union organisation. Many of the unskilled were immigrants, whose language difficulties and ignorance of local conditions enabled employers to use them as strike-breakers, or at least to pay them at sweated-labour rates.

Apart from Union activity, the I.W.W. became involved in free speech fights reminiscent of today’s civil rights demonstrations. The “free speech” fights centred around the right of the Wobblies to recruit members at open-air street meetings. At Fresno in 1910, when the police began to arrest I.W.W. members and charge them with vagrancy, Wobblies came from hundreds of miles to pack the jails to over-flowing. The city officials were forced to repeal their legislation forbidding street meetings.

A fascinating aspect of the I.W.W. campaigns was their use of songs. Ralph Chaplin, Joe Hill and many others composed lyrics to well known tunes. “Solidarity for Ever” and “Halleluyah, I’m a Bum” are just two examples of the many which comprised the “Little Red Song Book”. The I.W.W. used their songs to spread the message of their movement across
the countryside. Known as the movement "with a sense of humour" the Wobblies made many friends among workers, but roused intense hatred among their class enemies. The initials I.W.W. were variously interpreted by their opponents as "I Won't Work", "I Want Whiskey", and, during the first world war as "Imperial Wilhelm's Warriors".

Many legendary characters appear in this book. Margaret Sanger, Helen Keller and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, each supported the Wobblies in their own way. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn was the most active within the I.W.W., but then the others were not sitting at home in the sink. Daniel DeLeon, a Marxist founder of the I.W.W., was highly praised by Lenin. DeLeon was known as the Pope, because he thought he was infallible in interpreting socialist writings. Wesley Everest, a war veteran and a leading member of the I.W.W. was lynched in his army uniform by a mob on Armistice Day, 1919. Finally, Big Bill Haywood, the miners' leader, who spoke for three days during the trial of 165 I.W.W. members in 1917. Among Haywood's statements to the court were these somewhat familiar words, "I have a dream, that there will be a new society sometime in which there will be no battle between capitalist and wage earner, but every man will have free access to the land and its resources". Bill Haywood's dream in 1917 was shared by Martin Luther King in 1963, but the Reverend King's dream envisaged the end of the battle between black and white.

Patrick Renshaw has made a notable contribution to the literature on the Industrial Workers of the World. Internal dissension wracked the movement from its inception, but this is an occupational hazard of any organisation aiming and working for change. The factions involved, despite their rather confusing mixtures, are carefully sifted and clarified by the author.

The main Australian heritage of the I.W.W. has been the organisation of the Australian Council of Trade Unions with its aim of industrial unionism.

_The Wobblies_ enables readers of some forty years later to understand how the I.W.W. came about; and why it died.

SHIRLEY WAKEMAN

POWER WITHOUT GLORY, by Frank Hardy. Sphere Books, 672 pp, $1.90.

FROM THE TIME it hit the headlines when its author was prosecuted for criminal libel, Frank Hardy's famous novel, _Power Without Glory_, has continued to maintain its extraordinary popularity. It is still, in fact, in the best-seller class, and it is not surprising that a new paperback edition has been issued, with an excellent introduction by Jack Lindsay.

The story of how the book came to be written and of the legal process which followed its publication, is an epic in itself. Frank Hardy comes from a working class background and was well acquainted with the illegal gambling and sporting rackets which are so typical of the Australian scene long before he conceived the idea of the novel. He was also well aware of the connection between the men who controlled these gambling organisations and the Australian Labor Party, men who ruthlessly and unashamedly exploited the average working man's natural desire to get a bit more from his wages than they are normally worth by making a few small bets.

The central character of _Power Without Glory_ was a Melbourne man, John West, a notoriously wealthy and powerful entrepreneur in the twin fields of sport and gambling, a man who had been governed all his life by an insati-
able lust for power. Later Hardy was prosecuted for libel, it being alleged that John West was in fact a certain John Wren.

To obtain material for his novel, the author carried out an extensive programme of research, much of it involving the detailed questioning of living persons. On more than one occasion his investigations exposed him to the risk of violence and even of sudden death. Even when he had completed his manuscript, he was faced with the problem of getting it printed and published, normally difficult enough, but in this case complicated by the highly libellous subject matter of the book. But Hardy was almost fanatically determined to bring his great opus to the birth, and with the help of loyal friends and supporters he succeeded in doing so in August, 1950.

Sales were fairly slow at first, mainly because, unless a commodity is extensively advertised, it takes time for its value to become known. However, the novel received nationwide, and, in fact, world-wide advertisement when its author was arrested for criminal libel. Sales figures mushroomed almost overnight.

The author could have been prosecuted for ordinary civil libel and would almost certainly have lost the case. Hardy was in fact prosecuted for alleged criminal libel of John Wren's wife. John West's wife in the novel was driven to adultery by a loveless marriage, and it was alleged that this libelled Mrs. Wren.

Conviction for criminal libel, a rare action at any time, carries with it the possibility of a severe prison sentence, and obviously this was what Wren and his supporters hoped for. In the event, the savagery of this aim worked against Wren and for Hardy. It served to rally to the author's support all the progressive forces in the nation, based on a solid core of workers, trade unions and intellectuals. Frank Hardy was acquitted after a dramatic trial.

Power Without Glory has undoubtedly made a greater impact and been more successful than any other Australian novel, both in the country of its origin and abroad. Why is this so? It is certainly not because the book is a highly polished work of art. Although it is powerful, dramatic and exciting, it is in some respects a little crude and naive. But, as in the case of many another great novel, faults of style are only minor flaws in a work of otherwise outstanding quality.

The fact is that Power Without Glory is a novel of exposure, revealing to the shocked and horrified eyes of its readers certain scandalous aspects of Australian social and political life. It is not that the average citizen did not know about these things, even if he was only vaguely conscious of them — corruption and gangsterism in sport and gambling, bribery and corruption of police, courts and officials; the fact that the Labor Party could be supported by donations from the tycoons of gambling and vice and that politicians could be no more than the tools of such men. What the book did was to recreate these things in a fictional form which presented them in a new light and for the first time made the Australian public conscious of their significance.

If it had done no more than this, it would have been no mean achievement. But the novel rises far above the level of the local and national. In sum and essence it typifies the power structure and corruption of a whole society, the social order of capitalism, and it is this above all which has made the book as interest-
ing to readers all over the world as it is to Australians.

Although many of its characters and situations are drawn direct from life, it is a highly imaginative novel and no mere documentary. As Jack Lindsay says in his introduction: "... Hardy succeeds in powerfully expressing the processes of social development, not as abstract things, not as a mere background of the story, but as forces imbedded deep in the spirit of West, his protagonist. This is what gives greatness to the novel..."

"The novel itself and the circumstances surrounding its conception, birth and publication, make up a singular unity, and even the reader whose political convictions are far from those of Hardy can hardly fail to be moved by such a tale of dedication and its results, both in the world of action and that of literature."

RAY WILLIAMS

SEX AND POLITICS IN AUSTRALIA by Morris Revelman. Publicity Press, $1.35.

THIS BOOK would be embraced to the bosom of Rene Descartes and his school of anti-empirical rationalists. The author is a seasoned exponent of the armchair-method of political science. One settles into a comfortable armchair, before a cosy stove, and gently muses about "If I were an average housewife, how would I vote?" What is incredible is not so much that one should try to study the world in such a way, but that there is a genuine, living, 20th century exponent! Perhaps that's it, perhaps it's not genuine, perhaps it's a colossally clumsy send up which I have inanely missed? Throughout my interpretation of the book as serious, I was plagued by the nagging suspicion that it must be satire, the author couldn't be serious; but what could it possibly be sending up?

The entire book is a perpetration of an elementary methodological blunder — probably a result of the above non-empirical attitude — the Verification Blunder.

The Verification Blunder consists of proposing a hypothesis, and then looking for instances which verify the hypothesis. Thus in the twenties someone proposed the hypothesis that sunspots cause economic fluctuations; a search revealed several instances of economic crises being preceded by sunspots, and thus the hypothesis is verified. The fruitfulness of this method was recognised by Karl Popper and others, who urged the search for falsifying instances. And the sun-spots theory was abandoned shamefacedly as the list of economic crises which were not associated with sun-spots grew and grew!

This book is about the domination of Australian society by Feminists. Females in Australia have voted themselves a set of laws which set them apart as a favored group, viz., divorce and maintenance laws. They were able to gain this favored position by voting as a group for the party which offered advantages to females. Upon this sub-thesis rests the entire book; if the sub-thesis falls the main thesis falls.

"The laws became the way they are, in the first place, because the politicians sold your rights and liberties for the female votes, and the judges, who are the products of the political and social system, have assiduously interpreted the laws to favor the females."

The argument to prove this sub-thesis is, like the whole book, pathetically weak. There is of course no survey to see how women do in fact vote, instead there is an armchair sur-
mise. The author divides the electorate into six groups:

(a) Workers who are irrevocably committed labor voters;
(b) Workers who are not irrevocably committed labor voters;
(c) Managers, etc., who consider themselves non-workers and vote anti-labor;
(d) Dependents of group (a);
(e) Pensioners;
(f) Owners of capital.

How does the (f) group gain a political majority, when the numbers of owners is obviously tiny compared to (a)?

The capitalists obviously don’t get support from (a).

Group (b) is very small, and mainly female, who pass into (d) without having much opportunity to assist (f).

Group (c) supports (f) but (e) is obviously numerically small.

Group (e) is mainly of elderly people who are already in (a) or (d); (e) is also numerically small anyway.

Group (d) is numerically large, female and not directly employed. It must be from this group that the capitalists derive their majority.

Thus, the divorce and maintenance laws which grossly favor women, were brought about by an unholy alliance of wives and owners, for their mutual advantage.

Let us divide the electorate into six groups:

(a) Women who drink;
(b) Women who drink only on very festive occasions;
(c) Members of Temperance Leagues;
(d) Husbands/lovers of group (a);
(e) Pensioners;
(f) Owners of capital.

How does the (f) group gain a political majority, when the numbers of owners is obviously tiny compared to (a)? The capitalists obviously don’t get support from (a).

Group (b) is not irrevocably committed, but is a small group.

Group (c) will support the Capitalists and vote for the Licensing Act.

Group (e) is mainly of elderly people who are already in (a) or (d); (e) is also numerically small anyway.

Group (d) is numerically large, male and not immediately affected. It must be from this group that the Capitalists derive their majority.

So the conclusion follows that women are voted out of bars by an unholy alliance of men and Capitalists.

However this is of course false, as the number of men or women who voted for the party which did or did not offer drinking in bars for women as a platform plank is zero or tiny. And parallel things are wrong with the argument under review.

The book is utterly misguided and worthless; I cannot recommend it to anyone, instead one is inclined to talk about wasting time on books which are remarkable only for being published at all.

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