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POLITICAL CRISIS is not too high a term to describe the unprecedented American situation. Johnson still wears the presidential mantle, posing as the “most powerful man in the world”, with even less pretensions to this than the unworthy successor to Cassius Clay’s world heavyweight title. Johnson is in limbo, a discredited time-server waiting to hand over to a shadowy successor who will have to recast American policy in a world where the most powerful imperialist nation can no longer dominate. This is the most agonising re-appraisal of all; it is the logical end to the grandiose policy formulated at the end of the Second World War. While there are certain parallels with disintegration of the British Empire, the differences are striking. Britain’s decline was more gradual, more apparently inevitable; 40 years ago Ludwell Denny was able to write a book called “America Conquers Britain”.

American dreams of world domination have been shattered far more dramatically, at the apparent height of its economic, political and military power. While the real causes of this collapse were working below the surface for the past two decades, they have come to a head in a complex of economic, political and military developments.

DEFEAT IN VIETNAM is the catalyst for all these. Never, in modern history at least, has a world power suffered such a defeat in war against a small nation, and never have the consequences been of such world significance. This is a turning point of the world, ranking with such decisive events of the last half-century as the Russian Revolution, the defeat of Nazi Germany and victory of the Chinese Revolution. The Vietnamese people have been able to inflict this defeat for several reasons — world-wide support, including weighty material aid from the socialist countries, the international people’s movement against the American war and strains imposed by over-extending U.S. power.

Important as these were, the greatest contribution was the political and military struggle of the Vietnamese people which has earned them the gratitude and admiration of all anti-imperialist and socialist forces throughout the world.

The Tet offensive struck a devastating blow at the American military and political position. American officialdom tried to present
this offensive as a last desperate throw, but no-one really believed it. The Australian Communist Party's National Committee, meeting during the offensive, estimated its significance thus:

... the Vietnamese liberation forces have shattered the whole political position of the American government ... (and) exposed the civil and military policy makers not only as aggressors but also as men who have deliberately misled their own people ... the military and political situation in Vietnam now reveals the complete collapse of their whole case and the bankruptcy of the whole policy. Tribune, Feb. 14)

This analysis was verified even sooner than expected. Johnson's March 31 speech was, above all, an admission of defeat, personal as well as national.

There were other components, too; deception ("we will go anywhere in the world" and intensified bombing); manoeuvre in an effort to regain military initiative (new offensives like "Operation Complete Victory"); propaganda, to regain some credibility for the role of "defender of freedom." But admission of defeat remained the main feature.

Political and military events since have confirmed this, and widened the credibility gap. "Operation Complete Victory" was a complete flop. Designed to "clear the Vietcong from around Saigon," its defeat preluded the new and still-continuing National Liberation Front offensive in the capital. That week brought the war's heaviest US — and Australian — casualties. The Saigon puppet regime is in acute crisis, over which hovers Diem's ghost. Surely the replacement of one Saigon "Prime Minister" by another must rank among the most ridiculous puppet play ever enacted.

THE PARIS TALKS are now getting under way, with the US negotiators trying their best to appear in some role other than face-savers trying to get out with whatever they can. Representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are negotiating from positions of strength, as much moral as military. The United States is faced with the demand for an unconditional ending of the bombing and other military attacks on the North. The American effort to bargain on this appears ridiculous, for the Vietnamese are not bombing the United States, nor can they sustain any claim for scaling down military operations while they build up their armed forces and launch futile "operations."

The Paris talks can lead to negotiations only if the Americans stop the bombing — as they will ultimately have to. The negotiations may then be long and difficult, because there are vital issues that are not negotiable to the Vietnamese. Negotiations must be directed at withdrawal of all foreign troops—that is, a return to the 1954 Geneva Agreement, breached by the Americans. The
National Liberation Front must be recognised as a principal party to the negotiations, since they have popular support, obviously lacking for the Saigon regime. Negotiations are possible on how and when these principles are operated, not on whether they must be accepted.

LIKE SAIGON, CANBERRA IS DISORIENTED, confused and most unhappy. The Gorton Government is dazed and bemused by the events of the last eight weeks. Gorton, who seemed set to be the most garrulous and publicly exposed Prime Minister ever, has scarcely been seen or even heard on any substantial issue; Hasluck is even quieter. Junior ministers are left to make the statements, and all they do is show that they have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. Perhaps Mr. Anthony, among the least intellectual of Mr. Gorton's Ministers, expressed it best in the defence debate:

We cannot, as some would seem to desire, be isolationist and neutral . . . oblivious to the ebb and flow of events . . . particularly in Asia where active Communist aggression has manifested itself more openly and directly than in any other part of the world . . . Australia is involved in Vietnam because there is the clearest evidence that freedom there is threatened by aggression, with our own security ultimately at stake . . . We need powerful and reliable friends . . . (Hansard, 2/5/68 pp.1097-8).

This brainless clinging to the ruins of a past policy bears out Newsweek's statement that the Thieu-Ky regime, upset by the Paris talks; has formed a:

co-ordinating committee . . . with the reluctant participation of Australia and New Zealand to present the US with a united front during the talks. (Newsweek, 6/5/68).

Whatever the truth of this, the need is obvious to campaign more vigorously for withdrawal of Australian troops. The Australians have already suffered heavy losses trying to preserve the United States military position that is already strategically lost, trying a political face-lifting operation on a visage sagged beyond repair. Mr. Gorton will soon go to Washington, with two aims that are really one: to find out what Washington's policy really is, and so find out what Australia's policy must be.

AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS IN RUINS. Built up so painstakingly since 1949, this foreign policy had only one pillar to sustain it — the so-called US alliance, complete reliance on a "great and powerful friend." Criticism of this policy, came from several sources, but the crucial one is that long advanced by the Communist Party, and expressed in 1964 in these words:

. . . the Menzies foreign policy binds our country to the declining and most unstable and destructive forces in the world. (Resolution of Twentieth Congress, Communist Party of Australia).
Foreign policy is, today, far more obviously linked with all other political issues than ever before. As the Communist Party was quick to point out, Menzies' fatal 1965 decision to intervene in Vietnam altered the whole political struggle in Australia; it can never be the same again. The Vietnam war has already created new conditions and a new urgency for a fundamental debate on Australian foreign policy. This must be a mainly *Asian* policy, for reasons of geography, history and politics. And an Asian policy must be above all an attitude to the national and social revolutions that have swept across this great continent since 1945.

Put in its simplest terms, Australian foreign policy since 1949 has been based on fear of and hostility to these national liberation revolutions. This led to complete and even subservient acceptance of US policies, including non-recognition of the People's Republic of China and the final disastrous Vietnam commitment. The lesson of Vietnam must surely be the need for a new attitude, at least the acceptance of the reality of national liberation, even if not that support for it advocated by the left. And the left must assert this support much more vigorously, not just for its own narrow political advantage but because it is a vital issue for Australia.

LIKE THE BOURBONS, the right has learnt nothing from the collapse of the Vietnam policy; it is equally unable to forget anything of its ideological conditioned reflexes. The present Government is unable to produce any new ideas, and so it sticks to the old, even when they have failed. They go on repeating like parrots: "Asia is a threat; we need great and powerful friends; we have to fight them over there so we don't have to fight them here." Perhaps the US will not be so prepared to send its troops into Asia so Australia should seek a new alliance, with "free" Asia — Association of South East Asian Nations, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan that can influence the United States to remain in Asia, or at least support this alliance? Or a program of re-armament that makes the present expenditure look like peanuts, building up military strength, including nuclear weapons (as advocated by Sir Philip Baxter, Atomic Energy Commission chairman) — and of course the acquisition of that miraculous new weapons system, the F111? Or, most likely, a mixture of the two? Even the way-out lunacy of a Kent-Hughes is not impossible — a grand alliance of Australia, Japan, Taiwan, South Africa and Rhodesia.

This portends a new reactionary offensive, prepared by a barrage of racist propaganda in the new guise of the "haves" defending themselves from the population-exploding "have-nots".
Certain political straws show how the wind blows. The truly iniquitous new amendments to the National Service Act, on the pretext of closing loopholes against a “small number” of draft-dodgers and draft-defiers, scarcely seems credible in the government’s public terms. It makes more sense if the government really had in mind a big expansion of conscription, the only way it can get a big army for its reactionary policy. The government has been served notice that this act will not succeed, nor will it be accepted. Rather, it widens the front of the struggle against conscription, the Vietnam war, government policy, by introducing new elements of democratic rights.

A planned reactionary political drive also explains the sustained effort to introduce a “wages policy”, still continuing despite the rebuff dealt out by the metal trades workers. It fits in with the broad hints, dropped by Gorton, Bury and McMahon among others, that “we” must make sacrifices for defence and development. Naturally, it is wage and salary earners who have to make the sacrifices—capital must be free to “develop”, while government must take more taxes to “defend”.

It also makes more understandable, if no more excusable, the McCarthyist attacks by Attorney-General Bowen on the Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament, trade unionists and secondary school students who lobbied parliamentarians. (If it is true, as suggested, that Bowen is one of the more liberal of the Liberals, it doesn’t say much for the rest). The panic fear at the visit of 120 high school students shows the government’s uneasy conscience, as public reaction also exposes the ever-decreasing utility of anti-communism.

The government is uncertain, bemused and afraid, and it will react predictably by moving still further to the right. This confronts the labor movement, and indeed all who are concerned with peace, living standards and democratic rights, with big tasks. These tasks are also great opportunities, opening real perspectives for ending the 20-year rule of political conservatism. Even more exciting possibilities arise, of challenging the social basis of this conservatism, the monopoly-capitalist domination of economic and social life and thinking.

The Labor Party struggle has to be seen in this context. Much comment on the latest instalment of the cliff-hanging serial “The Trials and Tribulations of Gough” has been superficial and therefore misleading. This is partly excusable, since it is an historical peculiarity of Australian Labor Party conflicts that they
are usually fought about surface issues. Then, of course, the manipulators of public opinion who own the mass media are interested in confusing the real issues. That explains the peculiar paradox of why the anti-Labor press proprietors seem so concerned about the ALP “image” and electoral prospects.

Beneath plot and counter-plot, charge and counter-charge, move and counter-move, lie real policy differences. Whitlam’s tactical errors and personality certainly affected Federal Executive and Caucus voting, but they reflected the big issues of foreign policy, class and political alignments, the whole character of the ALP and its inter-relations with the trade unions and other labor movement trends, including the Communist Party. One newspaper commentator got closer to the issue when he correctly compared Whitlam’s stand with British Labor politician Denis Healey’s statement at the 1959 Labor Party conference. Healey said:

If you take the view that it’s all right to stay in opposition as long as your socialist heart is pure . . . It’s the people we are trying to help . . . who suffer if we lose elections . . . We shall never be able to help them unless we get power. (Quoted in The Australian 2/5/68).

This was an apt, if perhaps unfortunate, analogy that raises a very important question for the ALP left particularly, but also for the whole working class movement. What will the Labor Party do when it gets into office? Wilson won a resounding electoral victory, by abandoning “socialist principles”. In so doing, he has inflicted the worst blow on the British Labor Party since McDonald and Snowden in 1929. The accelerated decline of British capitalism was the objective cause for Wilson’s rise and for his imminent fall. The subjective cause was abandonment, not only of what was “socialist” in British Labor’s program, but even of its ideology of reforms, its claim to represent the workers and their unions and its past attitudes on Vietnam and foreign policy.

Whitlam has suffered a setback, but the struggle will continue. The rightwing groupings behind the ill-fated offensive are still intent on usurping power, and they are working to a master-plan of which the meteoric rise of former Democratic Labor Party member, Harradine, to prominence in Tasmania and to Australian Council Trade Unions and ALP executives was a shining example.

There are many aspects to this struggle, but perhaps the most important is the need to take the issues outside the necessarily narrow framework within which it has so far been fought. The real issues—of foreign policy, militant action and challenge to the present rulers of Australia, unity—and struggle must be made issues of action, discussion and debate among the people, in fac-
tory, workshop, university, in suburb and country town. In this, the left in general and the Communist Party in particular need to become more active and influential in projecting its ideas and programs of action in every sphere.

THE WORLD CAPITALIST CRISIS is becoming more acute, spreading everywhere—Britain, USA, France, West Germany, with new forces coming into action in the most diverse forms. The French political crisis, spreading to the factories and bringing the militant working class into big struggles that lend a new and vitalising dimension to student action, is particularly important.

The great need of today is unity of all left and revolutionary forces. Not the out-of-date illusion of some centrally co-ordinated strategy, that only really exists in the monstrous invention of the bourgeoisie, "the international communist conspiracy", but a unifying general concept that inspires the diverse struggles of the people of all nations.

The new anti-capitalist, anti-authoritarian and potentially revolutionary mood growing among people everywhere makes still more vital the course of development in the socialist countries. The massive economic, technological and cultural achievements of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other socialist countries, their defence of peace and material and moral support for national liberation, have placed these countries in a special position in the minds of countless millions everywhere. Despite all the hostile propaganda, that has used real socialist mistakes and shortcomings as well as bourgeois ideological inventions, millions all over the world believe and feel that socialist revolution creates the necessary conditions for real democracy, effective people's control and the possibility of a new life that combines social advance with individual fulfilment.

What is not always so evident is the bold creative urge to develop and encourage the concrete forms of socialist democracy, social responsibility and control, and individual freedoms. Clinging to old ideas, rigidity or even uncertainty as to the results of boldly pressing forward in ways that will increase socialism's attraction, can sometimes spring from a wrong estimate of world forces. If imperialism is in fact on the defensive, even confused and in flux, a bold strategy of socialist development and appeal could well ultimately exert a decisive influence on world development. It is from this analysis that Australian Communists have greeted recent developments in Czechoslovakia, and expressed their hope and belief that these will succeed.
John Sendy

DEMOCRACY
AND SOCIALISM

A Vice-President of the Communist Party of Australia, who was Convenor of a Party Commission established to draw up a Charter of Democratic Rights, analyzes here the theoretical issues involved. Copies of the Draft Charter have been widely circulated and are available on application from the Communist Party, 168 Day St., Sydney (price 10c.)

THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S draft Charter of Democratic Rights is an attempt to analyse briefly the essence of contemporary Australian democracy, to expound Communist views on democratic freedoms in a future Socialist Australia and to outline proposals around which campaigns for retention and extension of democratic rights in present capitalist society might be undertaken. The earnestness of the Communist Party in putting forward this program is emphasised by the fact that we are initiating both Party and public discussion of the draft before its finalisation later in the year. The purpose of this article is to discuss some peripheral questions of concern to some marxists and socialists.

Recently a Communist waterfront worker put it to me with some feeling, "Democracy might be a class question. But when we talk of democracy that's what we've got to mean. If an author writes a book we don't like or people refuse to toe our political line, that's too bad. When we talk about bloody democracy that's what we've got to mean — democracy — it's as simple as that!" For most Australians it is as simple as that. The average person is little concerned with whether the democracy he desires is described as bourgeois or proletarian. He wants a fair go, with no one standing over him; to be able to speak up and say his piece; to pen a letter to the papers and have it published; to strike, if need be, without penalty; to write without being censored; to use his telephone without it being tapped; to be interviewed by the radio and television man and be able to criticise the government and the Prime Minister; to travel where his money and time allow him; to worship or not as his inclinations lead him. He remains quite unmoved (and even nonplussed) if told that there is no such thing as pure or absolute democracy. He wants what he calls "democracy" and worries little about the prefix.
All this is fair enough but unfortunately the whole problem of democracy in relation to its implementation is extremely complex.

The common or lexicographic meaning of "democracy" which it has had since the days of Athenian greatness is "government or rule by the people". It refers, that is, to a method of governing, and does so by specifying who rules, or makes the binding policy decisions in a state. Any contemporary attempt at a definition will cause less confusion if it keeps close to this original meaning of "democracy", given to it by long historical usage. (Henry B. Mayo An Introduction to Democratic Theory, New York Oxford University Press 1960, pp. 22-23)

Historically democracy has been associated with the concept of rule by the common people, against upper class privilege; a sort of levelling process and very much a class question. This was why it was feared for so long. For the idea of democracy carried with it the possibility of rule by the "unenlightened mob" with presumably dangers to the privilege, wealth and power of the educated and "enlightened" minority who comprised that section of the population best fitted to govern in the "interests" of the whole of society. Modern elitist theories which claim that a real mass-participating democratic system is virtually impossible in modern industrial society in fact adhere to similar views, though cloaking them in sophisticated language.

In ancient Greece and Rome democracy existed for the ruling class, was resisted in respect to the plebeians and unthought of regarding the slaves. In early capitalist days in England the franchise existed for the propertied. Almost every concession in the direction of extending it to adult suffrage had to be fought for by the mass of the people over long years. To this day in Australia property qualifications are required in many states in respect to State Upper House and local government elections, and gerrymandering is still a feature of our society. In a reference to early capitalist society C. B. Macpherson writes:

There was, necessarily, great inequality, for you cannot have a capitalist market society unless some people have got accumulated capital and a great many others have none, or have so little that they cannot work on their own but have to offer their labor to others. This involves inequality in freedom of choice: all are free but some are freer than others. (C. B. Macpherson The Real World of Democracy, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1966, pp. 1-2)

Capitalist democracy has its foundation in the revolutions in Britain and France in the 17th and 18th centuries. At that time the English and French commercial and industrial middle class were struggling for freedom from the oppressive restriction of feudal aristocratic rule — for the free movement of commerce and trade which required an end to the restrictions if they were to flourish. These revolutions were fought with popular support, for the purpose of ensuring the class rule of the rising bourgeois
class, in which the demands for political and religious freedoms played an important part. They were genuinely progressive movements forward in the march towards democracy. But ideas of democracy and freedom were essentially linked with those of property.

Marx dismissed the democracy of his day as "mere formal freedom". He was scarcely exaggerating. *Das Kapital* (the first volume) was published at Hamburg in 1867. This was the year of the Second Reform Bill which gave the vote to British householders who lived in their houses and paid the rates — adding about 1,353,000 voters to the electorates. Lord Cranbourne (later the great Lord Salisbury) called the Bill "a very dangerous experiment". He and two colleagues resigned from the Cabinet in protest. (Herbert Agar *The Perils of Democracy*, the Bodley Head. London 1965, p. 57)

The old argument that "the poorest he that is in England has a life to live as the richest he" hardly holds water when confronted with the realities of capitalist society. Irrespective of the franchise and of the tremendous importance of the franchise the wealthy are in the position of enormous privilege not only regarding material living but also in respect to their "say" in matters of government and power. Little thought is required to illustrate the advantages of the wealthy in present Australia in education, control of the mass media, political campaigning, influencing government decisions and generally in having a more direct hand on the power levers of society.

Our present Australian democracy while extended and refined by years of political struggle and usage is blighted by the monopoly capitalist system of private ownership and profit-making and carries with it the extreme danger of transforming the limited democracy we have won into a mirage as far as actual popular control is concerned and whittling away of even those democratic rights acquired over long decades. Current industrial penal legislation, the political amendments to the Crimes Act, telephone tapping, the concentration of more and more power at the executive levels of government and measures restrictive of free speech and assembly are evidence of these trends, while the unrest among teachers, pilots, postal workers and many professional workers frequently centres on overcoming the frustrations of having little influence in determining the policies and direction of their work or industry. Furthermore, the control over modern capitalist industry which has such influence and power in our community is certainly the reverse of democratic. Yet this aspect is the central issue for real extension of democracy.

In an article published in *Pravda* on January 3, 1919, Lenin advised the workers as follows:

You must take advantage of bourgeois democrácy, which, compared with feudalism, represents a great historical advance, but not for one minute must
you forget the bourgeois character of this “democracy”, its conditional and limited character, never share the “superstitious belief” in the “state” and never forget that the state even in the most democratic republic . . . is simply a machine for the oppression of one class by another.

Present-day capitalist society, no matter how democratic respecting elective processes, has little chance of becoming a form of society and government which is inspired with the feeling and consciousness of the dignity of man.

Neither the ideological veil of pluralist democracy nor the material veil of extravagant productivity alter the fact that in the realm of advanced capitalism the fate of man is determined by the aggressive and expansive apparatus of exploitation and the politics interwoven with it. The civic rights that are permitted and administered in this system of domination do not diminish the violence of an oppression which has made the world a hell. At the moment hell is concentrated on the battlefields of Vietnam and the other sacrificial lands of neo-colonialism.” (Herbert Marcuse “The Question of Revolution”, New Left Review No. 45, pp. 3-4)

The Argument About Peaceful Transition

Discussion of the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism, and the proposition that political opposition or political party opposition should be envisaged under socialism, usually arouses controversy among Communists and marxists. It also evokes the charge of insincerity of the part of many opponents of socialism. The “doubting Thomases” on the Left usually present the following arguments. Peaceful transition is impossible because the ruling class will never relinquish wealth, power and privilege without resorting to violence. There has never been a peaceful transition to socialism in the past therefore why should it be deemed possible in the future? Look at the actions of the reactionary forces in Greece and Indonesia as well as in other countries in recent years. While democratic institutions in Australia may be more traditional the capitalist monopolies are more deeply entrenched than in most countries. The idea of peaceful transition goes against all the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

In discussing these assertions it should be clearly stated that socialism in Australia is undoubtedly a long way off and it would be a very foolish person indeed who would attempt to predict the exact way in which a socialist transformation will be consummated. (Perhaps even the main problem today is the doubt in so many minds as to whether such a prospect is real at all in Australian conditions. Certainly some of the left wing of Australian politics hold that pessimistic view.) Here, however, the discussion must centre not only on the desires of the Communists, but also on the possibilities that exist.

Firstly, the concept of a peaceful transition to socialism is not contrary to the teachings of the great theorists of marxism.
Such a possibility is referred to in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin in many well known passages. Nonetheless it is true that the main bulk of comment by these writers dealt with the other possibility. But surely one must evaluate the context in which such emphasis was laid.

Secondly, it is true that all socialist revolutions which have occurred have been marked by wars and violence either in the period just prior to, during or after the actual establishment of a socialist government. Such cases as San Marino and Kerala are left aside because the former is such a microscopic country and the latter only a part, a state, of a country. (The case of Kerala is extremely interesting in this context because whilst the socialist government elected in 1957 was removed by the central Nehru administration in 1959, a socialist government was overwhelmingly elected again in 1967. This is a point which could well be pondered by those who argue that "it can't happen"). It should be remembered, however, that in most of the countries where socialist revolutions have occurred the despotic character of the previous regimes invariably blocked the path to peaceful change. Furthermore, if one leaves aside the peculiarities of the case of East Germany, there has never been a socialist transformation in any advanced industrial capitalist state except Czechoslovakia, a fact necessitating the closest study by marxists.

The argument that the experience of the military coups in Indonesia and Greece demonstrate the impossibility of the peaceful road in countries such as ours is hard to sustain. Indonesia is a country emerging from feudal-colonialist domination; certainly in no way an advanced democratic industrial country. Furthermore, the September events in Indonesia, whatever the real truth of them, did involve armed action which was crushed by the rightwing generals. Greece has a history of reactionary militarist and fascist regimes and a history of invasion, civil war and violent political struggle. Furthermore, social revolution was not being attempted in either country at the time the militarists imposed their rule in order to thwart the progressive tendencies in the countries. However, the recent trend of events in both Greece and Indonesia make it difficult to foresee radical social change developing in a peaceful way in these countries. Additionally the phenomenon of defeat of attempted revolutions is not new. One need only recall the socialist revolution in France 1871 and in Hungary, Germany and Austria in 1918 and 1919. These were certainly armed uprisings, but they were still brutally crushed. Hence one can surely advance the view that armed and violent approaches to socialism are not guarantees of success any more than peaceful attempts.
Thirdly, some people on the left baulk at the suggestion that opposition be allowed freedom to propagate ideas and to organise under socialism. They fear opposition ideas and underestimate both the ability of a people freed from exploitation and the power of socialist ideas in such a situation. They fear the prospect of the mass media being open to varied ideas forgetting that any political, philosophical or economic theories will stagnate unless confronted with contention, opposition and debate. Communists, it is my contention, should be opposed to monopoly of ideas, to an "official" state ideology, under socialism, and to the outlawing of contrary opinion. The "hothouse" conditions of no opposition ideas being allowed is almost impossible to achieve in the first place and in the second if such is attempted marxism would eventually cease to be marxism or else be grotesquely distorted as happened under Stalin's regime in the USSR. In a socialist society power would lie with the people who in huge majority supported socialist views in general terms at least.

Fourthly, any socialist transition automatically involves breaking the power of the capitalist class. The freedom of the owners and controllers of industry must inevitably be infringed in order to establish a socialist society because private ownership of the main means of production has to be replaced by public ownership. The enterprises of the capitalists have to be taken from them irrespective of whether the revolution is peaceful or violent. The social system is thus changed. This does not necessitate the chopping off of the capitalists' heads or depriving them of voting or political rights. It means depriving them of their economic and political power and transferring that power to the people. Such a fundamental change in advanced democratic countries, such as Australia, may well occur over a prolonged period of intense mass political struggle and not necessarily in an abrupt "overnight" fashion as was the case in Russia. This would obviously depend upon the actual situation at the time, the balance of forces nationally and internationally, the depth and intensity of the mass movement for social change, the degree of isolation of the ruling circles and so on. And it must be recognised today that the capitalist and imperialist systems are minority systems in the world. The anti-colonial and socialist revolutions have substantially changed the face of the world in the past fifty years. While the strength of imperialism remains awesome in the fields of industry, wealth and weaponry, its strength of influence has suffered a tremendous decline. This applies also in its ability to dictate to progressive political regimes in smaller countries. The Vietnam conflict perhaps demonstrates this most clearly. While the Americans inflict frightful devastation on that
country, they are suffering colossal defeat as well as political isolation on a grand scale.

Lenin made some profound comments on such matters in the period following the 1917 revolution — comments which are frequently misconstrued or not fully understood.

If the exploiters are defeated in one country only — and this, of course is typical, since a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries is a rare exception, they still remain stronger than the exploited, for the international connections of the exploiters are enormous. (V. I. Lenin The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1950. pp. 49-50.)

It must be noted that Lenin uses the words *If the exploiters are defeated in one country only.* The implication is that his conclusion may well have been different if many countries were involved and presumably would have been different in this current world situation fifty years later.

No doubt in most socialist countries in the period since Lenin wrote, internal and external efforts at “restoration” have occurred. To take some specific examples. Internal efforts in China have been made but have been pathetically feeble. Likewise the external efforts, while still ominous, have so far proved abortive.

The 1956 Hungarian events are often quoted to prove the sustained power of counter-revolution. However despite the undoubted manipulations from external counter-revolutionary circles and the assertive actions of those inside the country, the facts seem to point to a firm basis of unrest and dissatisfaction with maladministration, government bureaucracy and dogmatic, undemocratic and harsh actions of the Communist authorities which assumed large proportions. Attempts to overthrow the Cuban socialist government have been undertaken by emigre Cuban forces in collusion with the United States. These have so far failed dismally. Cuba exists some 90 miles from the shores of the mightiest and most anti-Communist imperialist power which would dearly love to witness its demise, but such has not happened in the world of today. Of course if a socialist government, e.g., in China, Cuba or Vietnam idly stood by, unprepared and unarmed and without powerful allies, the results of such counter-revolutionary efforts both internal and external would well have been quite different; But such has not been the case nor is it conceivable in the future.

Lenin, in the statements above, is revealed at his brilliant best for while his estimation of the 1918 situation in respect to Russia was correct he also heralded the possibilities of circumstances where his criteria for Russia in 1918 would cease to apply. Yet even the most liberal bourgeois democracies, when hard pressed, frequently
resort to naked violence and terrorist methods in order to protect the capitalist system. This has been graphically demonstrated in recent times, for example in the USA in connection with the civil rights struggle and in West Germany in relation to student activities. No attempt is made here to predict whether a socialist transition will be peaceful or violent; only history will determine that. But whether it be peaceful or not, a tremendous mass struggle will be required.

Problems for Consideration

Many marxists have all too frequently ignored the differences between tsarist Russia and semi-colonial China where the most influential socialist revolutions have occurred, and such countries as Australia. The circumstances in these countries differed greatly from those existing in a highly advanced capitalist democracy like Australia. This problem has occupied marxists in all too little theoretical analysis. Such analysis is not the purpose here but some comments on the particular aspect of democracy seem appropriate.

The main works of Marx and Engels were written when capitalism was only in its earliest period of development in most countries. In continental Europe industrialisation occurred mainly in the last quarter of the century. Feudal regimes were still being toppled. Monopoly was in its infancy. The great bulk of populations in the “advanced” countries did not enjoy the democracy they do today. Notwithstanding the French revolution of 1789 ushering in the era of “liberty, equality and fraternity”, up until 1848 only 200,000 French people had the right to vote out of a population of 30 million. Many historians indicate that Britain could hardly be called a democracy until 1918. Yet women received the franchise as late as 1928. Thus the works of Marx would hardly be expected to deal with many of the problems we face today. Nonetheless numerous observations which he and Engels made are worthy of note. In an article “The Chartists” published in the New York Daily Tribune, August 25, 1852 Marx wrote:

We now come to the Chartists, the politically active portion of the British working class. The six points of the Charter which they contend for contain nothing but the demand of Universal Suffrage, and of the conditions without which Universal Suffrage would be illusory for the working class; such as the ballot, payment of members, annual general elections. But Universal Suffrage is the equivalent of political power for the working class of England, where the proletariat forms the large majority of the population, where, in a long, though underground civil war, it has gained a clear consciousness of its positions as a class, and where even the rural districts know no longer any peasants, but only landlords, industrial capitalists (farmers) and hired laborers. The carrying of Universal Suffrage in England would, therefore, be a far more socialistic measure than anything which has been honored with that name on the Continent. Its inevitable result, here, is the political supremacy of the working class.
Marx was, of course, more than a little optimistic in relation to the rapidity of change. It also took long years before universal suffrage was enacted and it hasn’t as yet had the result of “the political supremacy of the working class.” However here was an indication of the trend of Marx’s thinking about the problem where political democracy was a possibility. In his introduction (written in 1895) to Marx’s *The Class Struggles in France 1848 to 1850*, Engels refers to the program of the French Workers’ Party. This program was drawn up by Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue under the direct supervision of Marx in 1881. Engels indicates that the program referred to the franchise as having been “transformed from a means of deception, which it was heretofore, into an instrument of emancipation.”

It may be argued that Lenin in much of his theoretical work and in his practice saw the problem differently. But then Lenin was dealing in particular with a situation in which democracy was greatly limited, where there was no universal suffrage, and where representative institutions were not developed. Engels in the article referred to above outlines the way in which the German Social Democratic Party utilised the franchise and won considerable strength in the German parliaments towards the close of the last century.

With this successful utilisation of universal suffrage an entirely new mode of proletarian struggle came into operation, and this mode quickly developed further. *It was found that the state institutions, in which the rule of the bourgeoisie is organised, offer the working class still further opportunities to fight these very state institutions.* (Emphasis mine. J.S.)

It must be pointed out that the German Social Democratic Party later compromised its socialist and revolutionary position. Nevertheless this observation by Engels deserves serious consideration in the light of the developments in advanced democracies. It relates very closely to the attitude of, and problems posed by, Palmiro Togliatti on the eve of his death in 1964.

... there must be deeper reflection on the theme of the possibility of a peaceful road of access to socialism. This leads us to make clear what we understand by democracy in a bourgeois state, how one can extend the limits of liberty and of democratic institutions, and what are the most effective forms of participation for the working masses and the workers in economic and political life. Thus arises the question of the possibilities of the conquest of positions of power by the working class within a State that has not changed its character as a bourgeois State, and therefore, whether the struggle for a progressive transformation of this nature, from within, is possible. In countries where the Communist movement is becoming strong, such as in our country (and in France) this is the basic question that today arises in the political struggle. This leads, naturally, to a sharpening of this struggle and on it depend the future perspectives.” (Togliatti’s Memorandum, cited in the *Foreign Bulletin* of the Italian Communist Party, August-September 1964, page 75.)
The President of the Communist Party in Victoria stresses the influence of world conditions and development of mass struggle on the perspectives of socialism without civil war and the flowering of democracy.

IN THEIR DRAFT CHARTER of Democratic Rights the Communists set forth their aim of a socialist Australia with full freedom of political activity for all sections of people. This freedom would operate on the basis of public ownership and control of the means of production; a democratised army, police and public service; a democratised press, radio and television; and active involvement of working people in the administration of the government and the economy. In other words, the special dominant power of private monopoly capital would have been wiped out, making real freedom possible for the mass of the people. Freedom would be subject only, says the draft Charter, to "the constitution and laws," to the curbing of "attempts by undemocratic minorities to impose their will by force," and to the banning of "advocacy of war, violence and race hatred." "Freedom of speech, assembly, religion, press, travel, artistic expression and respect for the rights of minorities" would be guaranteed in the constitution.

To declare such an aim is important. It is also vitally important to create the conditions under which the aim can be realised in practice. If socialism in Australia were to be born out of conditions of war and repression, as in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, then we, like the people of those countries, would need to restrict the liberties of the overthrown forces for a long period. The hope of attaining our program without such a long intervening period depends above all on the carrying out of the transition to socialism without civil war or large-scale violence. Even a peaceful transition will not ensure, of course, against all "attempts by undemocratic minorities to impose their will by force," but it should limit the seriousness of these attempts and the support they could secure.

The hope of a peaceful transition depends on many factors, chiefly: 1 preservation and widening of our democratic liberties;
2 a favorable world balance of forces; and 3 powerful united struggle against the forces of monopoly capitalism within our country. Recent world developments have made a peaceful transition far more possible. The desire of Communists has always been that the people should find a peaceful road forward but ruling minorities have resorted to violence.

We have named as the first condition of a peaceful transition the preservation and widening of our democratic liberties. The draft Charter refers rightly to "our firm democratic traditions." By and large, the Australian people have always had strong democratic sentiments. Twice they have astounded the world with an unexpected referendum result (defeat of conscription for overseas service in face of the tremendous win-the-war propaganda of 1916 and 1917, and defeat of Menzies' "anti-Communist" referendum proposals at the height of McCarthyism in the USA). The same democratic spirit has recently animated large bodies of workers in many remarkable industrial struggles despite massive penalties under the arbitration laws. The repressive policies of Australian ruling circles have been met by many successful struggles against censorship, passport bans, speaking bans and the like.

To defend and develop our traditional liberties — to reaffirm the right to strike, to abolish the penal laws against strikers, to stop the imprisonment of conscientious objectors to the war in Vietnam, to stop inquisitorial laws and repressive police actions, to win proportional representation in parliamentary elections, to win a real say for trade unions in the carrying through of technological changes and in the running of factories, and above all to expose the propaganda of "anti-communism" on which nearly all attacks on democratic liberty are based — this is the first necessity for a peaceful transition to socialism in Australia. Failure in this could mean fascism, the blocking of the peaceful road forward, and the necessity to overthrow the ruling minority by force and to keep it down by force afterwards. The greatest menace to our democratic liberties is war, particularly aggressive war fought in foreign countries like Vietnam. War of this kind becomes increasingly unpopular as it proceeds and leads inevitably to attempts by the government to stifle its opponents. We see the onset of such attempts now. For this reason our success or failure in the struggle for peace — in particular, at this moment, the struggle against conscription and the coming call-ups and the imprisonment of youths refusing service — helps to determine our whole path to socialism and the whole character of Australian socialist society in its early stages.
More is needed, however, than preserving the liberty to struggle. What is needed above all is the struggle itself, the most powerful struggle by wide sections of the people against the power of monopoly capital in all its manifestations — not only its war-mongering and its attacks on liberties but its wage-cutting, its industrial autocracy, its arbitration machinery, its control over the State. The struggle will have to develop a breadth and a power sufficient in a time of crisis to paralyse the wealthy class from waging a violent resistance. It would be unreal to think of a peaceful transition except through an overwhelming gathering of strength by the people and the crippling of the power of action by the wealthy minority. The religion of this minority is greed and it will never voluntarily give up its vast possessions.

Can a wealthy class in fact be paralysed from taking action? Professor Salvemini, historian of Italian fascism, in his book, *The Fascist Dictatorship*, speaking of the situation in September 1920, when the workers had occupied the main factories of Northern Italy; when the Socialist Party had won a third of the seats in parliament a year before and had been increasing its support since; when the government could no longer count on the troops and when the fascist bands had not yet developed in strength, says: "Had the leaders of the General Confederation of Labor and of the Socialist Party wished to strike a decisive blow, here was the opportunity... The bankers and the big industrialists and big landlords waited for the socialist revolution as sheep wait to be led to the slaughter." It was the workers' own rightwing leadership (or the dominant right-wing element within it) which threw away the chance of an almost bloodless victory. (No Communist Party existed in Italy at that time). A coalition of left-wing forces including a powerful Communist Party and combining parliamentary and extra-parliamentary struggle could use such a situation very differently.

A further condition for peaceful transition is even more basic. It is the turning of the world balance in favor of socialism and against capitalism. This is already occurring on a grand scale. The socialist countries have consistently averaged a faster growth of industrial production than the countries of capitalism. With their new economic reforms they are overcoming the decline in rate of growth which was mainly evident about 1962-63 and have shot ahead to new and faster rates (the Soviet Union and East European countries averaging about 10 per cent in 1967). Economic power is the basis of political influence, and the faster rate of increase of Soviet production has opened the way, not only to important improvements in living standards, but to really massive economic or military assistance to other countries.
— Vietnam, Cuba, India, the Arab countries for example. The socialist world, accounting now for over 40 per cent of the world's production, has already made imperialist intervention in other countries harder.

Combined with the rise of the socialist world has come another heavy blow to the imperialists — the mass uprising of the oppressed colonial peoples, the majority of which have now won their political independence while others are battling for their freedom arms in hand like the Vietnamese and the people of Southern Africa. This, too, has tipped the world scales heavily against imperialism. The coming victory of the Vietnamese people will tip them further still — and the many years of attempts by the imperialists to reverse the forward movement by destroying the anti-imperialist governments of the vital Middle East oil region have so far ended in failure. The successes of the rightwing military coups in Indonesia, Ghana and Greece are contrary to the general historical movement which is a forward one. Workers' and students' actions inside the imperialist countries are also helping the whole anti-imperialist advance on a world scale.

Earlier the transition to a socialist Australia could hardly have been accomplished without full-scale Anglo-American military intervention. (Don't we remember the swift British military intervention in British Guiana and the classic statement of the British Colonial Secretary of the day that "His Majesty's Government will never permit the establishment of a Communist Government in any part of the British Empire"?) But now, with American forces suffering major defeat in Asia and the British forces being withdrawn from "east of Suez," this armed intervention may be avoidable. This is thanks to the long struggles and sacrifices of the people of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and of the oppressed colonies and former colonies to all of whom we owe an eternal debt of gratitude.

In all work it is important to recognise fully the power of monopoly capital and its virtual dictatorship over our so-called "democratic" society. That is why I would regard the first part of the draft Charter as of crucial importance. The people's struggle for larger democratic liberties is carried out in a society which is a democracy "only for the minority, only for the possessing classes, only for the rich" (Lenin). The people's struggle can sometimes be powerful enough to affect State policy. But in general the monopolies not only rule the economy, they rule the State. To serve the people's needs, a radically new State machinery will have to be constructed.
We know of all the big business lobbying in Canberra; corruption in direct and less direct forms; and the growing personal union between monopoly and governments (the same wealthy families appear in the Cabinet room and in the board meetings of the main companies). Big business wields a mighty power through its ownership of press, radio and television, and also through direct blackmail, exercised particularly by the great banks which are the very heart and centre of the whole monopoly structure.

Can we forget that in 1931 the Commonwealth Bank Board, then composed of representatives of Big Business and private banking, forced the Federal and all State Governments into a drastic cut of pensions, social services and public servants’ wages by threatening to withdraw necessary credits and plunge the governments into bankruptcy? And that in 1947 the National Bank, through its then vice-chairman Sir Frank Clarke, helped to kill the Bank Nationalisation Bill by using the Liberal majority in an undemocratic Victorian Legislative Council (led by Sir Frank Clarke) to throw out the Cain Labor Government?

Only if we fully recognise this virtual monopoly dictatorship will we be able to rally the necessary forces to end it and prevent its resurgence. And only by recognising it will we be able to take a balanced view of restrictions placed on the dispossessed forces of the old order in existing socialist societies. These societies arose from conditions of war and fascism, terror and torture. To attain to a full socialist democracy embracing the whole people they have had to pioneer a long and difficult course never charted previously. At each step mistakes could arise, either from a premature lowering of guard against internal and external conspiracies, or from delays in democratisation, limiting the benefits of socialism and giving needless opportunities to the enemy.

Big advances in democratisation have been made in the last decade. They would have been more rapid but for imperialist threats, the danger of the nazi revival, CIA activities, etc. They would also have been more rapid but for the distortions of the later Stalin period which involved repressions that were excessive, arbitrary and often aimed at very fine revolutionaries who merely held different opinions. Carry-over of the effects of these distortions is the main reason justifying measured criticism by Communists in other countries when restrictive actions appear unjustifiable. In voicing this criticism we should always recognise — and show that we recognise — the great difficulties faced by the pioneers of socialism in the lands where it has so far been built and the incalculable debt we owe to these pioneers for the job they have done and are now doing.
SO OFTEN in our society one hears people, whether they be trade unionists or students, talk about their rights. The worker insists on his right to strike, the student of his basic right to dissent. However to believe that such rights exist independent of a latent or real power to protect them is a dangerous illusion. Throughout Queensland history trade unionists have struggled to achieve a power position which would establish their right to form associations to fight for a more efficient planning and equal distribution of wealth. This socialist conception has been met with the combined economic and therefore political power of the people who have owned or managed the wealth of the land.

The employers have used many weapons to deny workers their industrial rights to economic justice. At times when the unions were weak they have not hesitated to use the full power of the State apparatus, i.e., violence, on which this power rests. Thus in Barcaldine in the 1890's the army, militia and police were used and the strike leaders jailed at Rockhampton. In 1912 in the Brisbane strike when unions were still fighting for recognition of their right to exist, unionists were met in Albert Street with fixed bayonets. In 1918 at Cairns in the famous Red Flag Riots, the police opened fire on demonstrators wounding 16.

Since then of course the employers have, on the promise of its dual interest nature, set up the Conciliation and Arbitration system as a legal front and a buffer to emasculate trade unions, so that they do not have to show the real nature of their power position, which rests on control of the state apparatus and of the mass media. In the early days of trade unionism, workers were aware that the suppression of industrial rights involved in almost all cases a suppression of civil rights. The right to earn a living is certainly a civil right. At times when workers have been strug-
gling for their right to exist or for social justice their leaders have been jailed, intimidated, victimized.

Today however, and especially in the 1967 Civil Liberties struggle, I think it would be true to say that not many unionists saw the connection between industrial and civil liberty. This seems strange only two years after Mt. Isa when union leaders under Nicklin's emergency laws were denied almost all civil liberties. A paper I gave at the 1967 Trades and Labor Council Congress on the theme "Industrial and Civil liberty are Inseparable" was received well by the leadership; however, many rank and file, still reading the Courier-Mail, assume that they are living in the most sophisticated democracy in the world.

The need to dissent usually arises when an issue portrays the gap between the premises of one's society and the contradictions of these premises in action. Such an issue is the Vietnam war.

Students in Queensland had not played much of a role in the political development in that State. In 1965 when the Country-Liberal Coalition was denying basic civil liberties to unionists at Mt. Isa, some students were just beginning to be actively concerned with Aborigines. Very few, even today would have had much knowledge of the industrial and political history of Queensland. Few would know of the famous 1948 Railway strike, the bashing of Fred Paterson, the threats of machine-gunning, and the jailing of strike leaders. However, this is not unusual in an institution made up of children from middle class families. Their interest in social justice in the community was, and probably still is, negligible. In the 1940's the students had rallied in the parliamentary galleries to rubbish the government then trying to change the University Act to allow the State more control over tertiary development. The Cold War forced them into the classification of the children of light.

Algeria was of no concern to them; Cuba saw them supporting Kennedy's dogmatism; Sharpeville outraged a minority, and Vietnam has managed to shake only a few. In Queensland Vietnam has been the motivating issue, to some, mostly middle class, students who have progressively developed from a belief that it was one aberration of the system, to an understanding that the capitalist system is in fact suppressing human needs. The extension of the critical analysis came when they were refused the right to dissent over Australia's policy of supporting counter-revolution in Asia. They mumbled about their rights as they repeatedly went off to the watch-house, were intimidated and sometimes bashed. Some then realized how powerless they really were, that in Queensland people had relinquished their right to dissent, and that the
struggle for the small power of demonstrating and placarding had to begin.

With a massive education campaign about Queensland's Bill of Rights—the Traffic Acts—students were moved on this value issue. The hypocrisy of the Nicklin Government was clearly established and students from all political and religious philosophies supported the struggle. Nearly all university clubs except the D.L.P. actively supported it, the issue causing as well a split in the Liberal club, dividing into the real small "1" liberals and the Conservatives, who since Menzies' time have used the term Liberal.

I believe so many students became interested in the issue because it was a value issue. Students as yet are not interested in issues of material necessity and material justice, they are interested in issues of freedom.

The militant section of the Students' Society for Democratic Action stressed the importance of building student power. The need to develop their media, their communication with other potential powerful groups, teachers, technical training students, trade unionists. Their belief that only through a display of strength would aims be achieved was rewarded, surprisingly to some, by the removal of the permit fee. Not much but surprisingly quickly for many militants who thought it would take longer than the one march.

This year the militants won through again when, on Friday, 26th March, over 100 marched from the university to the U.S. Consulate, in an anti-Vietnam march putting into practice the union submission by not applying for a permit for a footpath procession or demonstration. They got through mainly because they believe the Government feared further large demonstrations on civil liberties.

The militants realize that the right to dissent effectively in Queensland is being protected by student power, still badly organised, and that such rights will only survive if some organised section of the community rises against abuses in the system. I think the depressing thing about the students' and even the trade unionists' position, is that they see no connection between the suppression of civil liberties and the intervention against the N.L.F. in Vietnam. Most students of Liberal, Country even Labor Party beliefs, felt it was only one aberration of an otherwise fulfilling system. That is not the analysis of the Society for Democratic Action. Civil liberties are suppressed by governments con-
cerned over too effective debate on issues which they know are damaging to their power position.

If the facts on Vietnam could be effectively put to the people of Australia, their position as aggressors against genuine social revolution would be clearly outlined. The S.D.A. students have come out of the struggle with more political sophistication. Their aim is now to attempt to analyse the dichotomies of their society in the fields of social justice, education, civil liberties, foreign policy and to show students and trade unionists that the present economic and political power arrangements of our society are geared to the suppression of the genuine needs both material and spiritual of the people of Australia.

SCIENCE TODAY

... using any reasonable definition of a scientist, we can say that 80 to 90 percent of all the scientists that have ever lived are alive now.

... the crude size of science in manpower or in publications tends to double within a period of 10 to 15 years

One of the things I think is happening is the maturing of a certain responsible attitude among scientists analogous to that which, in almost prehistoric times, moved physicians toward the concept of the Hippocratic Oath. Contrary to popular belief, this happened not because doctors were unusually dedicated or public-spirited people but because they were all too easily held personally responsible by their customers for poison, malpractice, and so on. The scientist has had a much harder time in arriving at this, for his customer has usually been the state rather than an individual. His guilt has been in the eyes of the world rather than those of an individual.

In Great Britain and the United States very few of the senators, congressmen, members of Parliament, and active politicians—less than 3 percent, in fact—have had any training in science or technology. Among deputies in the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., the figure now exceeds 25 percent, and though their machinery of government is very different from ours, I take this as an indication of the way our own future may lie.

Scientists have hardly yet begun to realise that they hold in their hands a great deal of power that they have hardly used. The ranks of senior scientists and key administrators of science have now swelled to the point where I think it will not be long before some of the good ones begun to enter politics rather more forcibly. We need such men, on the national scene and on the international scene. We need them for the internal reconstruction of the entire social fabric of science and for the external problems of science in the service of man.

DISCUSSION:

TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION — MORE MYTHS

YOUR ENGINEER contributor, Mr. David Morris, challenges the views of Richta published in the February-March issue of the A.L.R. and poses the question: “Just what is the scientific and technological revolution”?

Without really challenging the basic standpoint of Richta, in his final paragraph he declares:

“In sum, the scientific revolution is certainly not another industrial revolution like that caused by steam and the factory system. Of its many widely different aspects only a few have significant effects on the economy…”

It is not being too derivative or doctrinaire, to look to method in debate. And so, I would point to a current debate between Russian and Chinese writers on the Changing Structure of Capitalism (New Times No. 37, 1967, No. 9 of 1968 and Peking People’s Daily, Jan. 3rd, 1968). The Russian writer, S. Dalin made the point (N.T. 9, p. 14):

“Marx in his great work (Capital) gave us a picture not only of the statics of capitalism, but also of its dynamics. He revealed the tendencies of capitalist development, which in his lifetime were still at an embryonic stage. In our time these tendencies have manifested themselves full force, and hence reading Capital today one can only be amazed by Marx’s foresight. Proceeding from the trends of capitalist development revealed by Marx, Lenin continued his work and made a profound analysis of the new stage of capitalism. Much has changed in the half century since then, but for all that we still find in Marx and Lenin the answers to the most pressing problems of present day capitalist reality.”

The “amazing foresight” pointed to by S. Dalin includes not only the developments in capitalism, but also in the technologies of capitalist and socialist countries too. Seen by another writer in New Times No. 8 of 1968 (V. Shamberg)

“The present technological revolution radically differs from previous industrial revolutions, which hinged on isolated discoveries, such as the steam engine, the weaving loom, and the electric motor. Today it is a matter of an entire avalanche of discoveries, inventions, and modernizations. Ours is the age of the electronic computer, nuclear power, automation, programmed machine tools, supersonic jets, transistor radios, tape recorders, television and synthetic fabrics. The list could be continued ad infinitum and would include not only new products, but also new methods of production and new types of services.”

And the same writer points to: “The concentration of enormous capital in the hands of huge corporations … in 1966 the number of corporations with a turnover in excess of $1,000 million was 80 in the U.S.A., 12 in West Germany, 8 in Britain, 4 in Italy, and 3 each in France and Japan”. The scientific and technological revolution in capitalism with the further development of monopoly!
Some may over-simplify the process of change and development in accepting the present definition — a scientific and technological revolution. They may have been better served by sticking to the earlier definition — the Second Industrial Revolution. But in our lives, occupied, as they are, largely with many other needs and thoughts, that acceptance may be excusable and not so very important to our consequential social actions, for social action around the problems of the scientific and technological revolution appears to be the matter of increasing importance. In the same issue of New Times (No. 9 of 1968) the report of a joint French-Russian Symposium on “Automation and Man” had this to say on the point:

“The indisputable success of the symposium — and the French press was unanimous on this — must be credited to the ... scientific and technical committees of the two societies who avoided treating the problem of automation from a narrow technical angle and gave the symposium a sociological slant. This fully accorded with the interests of the French scientists and technicians whose basic problems of automation are of a sociological nature. It should be said that there is increasing interest in the sociological aspects of automation in the Soviet Union too.”

Dr. V. Pevzner writing in New Times No. 52 for 1967, is not satisfied with the viewpoint of those making up a general consensus some ten years ago that the Second Industrial Revolution opened or began to unfold a few years after the end of World War II, perhaps in 1950. His concept criticised the acceptance of isolated data of the unconnected kind cited by Dave Morris without trying to give it some kind of historical logic:

“... the sum total of data relating to the foundations of economic life ... of the whole world ... reveals the past half century has witnessed two stages of the scientific and technological revolution. The first up to the second world war, marked the completion of the mechanization of production processes and the conveyor. The second, post-war stage marked the beginning of automation in the full sense of the term, transition not only to automated machines and production lines, but to new production techniques when the worker’s role became more and more that of the designer, builder and supervisor of the machines and less and less that of direct producer.”

His perspectives on twentieth century history are not dissimilar to those advanced by British marxist, Dr. Sam Lilley in the book Men, Machines And History. And what Lilley, Pevzner, Richta and Hermach of Czechoslovakia and many writers like them in the United States and Britain are trying to pose is simply: As well as social revolutions proceeding in four continents there is, also, a general scientific and technological revolution developing in the capitalist, socialist and “third” world systems. These concepts pose problems of understanding as difficult as when Marx pointed to the “abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself” as well as its abolition with the capitalist mode of production itself: a concept over which Russian and Chinese marxists are now in some disagreement. And what is extremely important to our understanding of current realities, however, is that the problems being posed by many writers are those within social frameworks that grow less and less dissimilar. The two stages of Marshall McLuhan and Peter Drucker — typographical man and oral man or Drucker’s capitalist owner and a manager for capitalists — appear to have no basic quarrels with the realities presented by
the Russian and Czech marxists. For were we not, according to Marx and Lenin, to see such things in the transitions to Monopoly Capitalism and State Monopoly Capitalism?

Professor Hermach takes up the challenge of those seeing only trees in today's forest of change. In a longer theoretical work, not available in Australia, unfortunately, he points to some dangers in such views:

"The model of communism and the conception of marxism, ignoring the scientific and technological revolution as their essential component and further reducing the revolutionary process to problems of power, changes in proprietary forms and changes in ideology (i.e., considering the sphere of changes in production forces, work, etc., to be only an external condition of revolution) perpetuate, in fact, the social forms taken over from the industrial revolution and class struggles, and are incapable of directing society under new conditions. Everything indicates the fact that the beginnings of the theory of the scientific and technological revolution, along the lines of the 20th Congress, and especially of the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, represent a most essential creative discovery and a positive development of the Marxist theory since Lenin's time."

But even Australians are not unreceptive to such concepts, for a lecturer in the University of New England recently quoted a definition of the Industrial Revolution in order to draw comparisons with developments in today's Second Industrial Revolution. He quoted from an American sociologist:

"The term is generally applied to the changes which occurred in England roughly between the middle of the 18th century and the first 40 years of the 19th century... characterised by the urbanisation of population, mechanisation of agricultural processes and the development of the factory system... based on the steam engine and other labor saving machinery."

In the light of that definition, the lecturer, who clearly saw the use of steam and the development of the factory system as only parts of the First Industrial Revolution, went on to pose what he thought would be the main social features of the Second Industrial Revolution across whose thresholds, he thought, we had now begun to pass in all forms of society. These main social features were:

1. a further extension of urbanisation;
2. an elimination of differences between city and country;
3. oligopolies;
4. a world population explosion;
5. vast displacements of human labor in favor of machines;
6. great changes in the shape of leisure and the working day, working week, working year and working lifetime;
7. wages and salaries giving way to incomes;
8. much greater upward mobility of labor;
9. a vast shift, in countries like the U.S. and Australia, of ownership, control and direction of life from owners and non-owners to managers, officials and a bureaucratic power-elite much greater than we have seen before; and,
10. three distinct and widely debated sets of social relationships across world society.

As the lecture was about Industrial Conflict and Automation, the lecturer
pointed out that these changes will be the source of deeper industrial conflicts than we have today, but that they will proceed against a background of even deeper conflicts such as those now maturing over:

1. The Negro and Puerto-Rican ghettos in the U.S.
2. Technological unemployment and unemployability for many youth and the "under-educated".
3. Urban poverty, particularly of the aged and invalided, increasing.
4. Resources employed in ventures like the Vietnam War instead of "Great Society" projects.

In trying to reach an understanding of modern social realities room must be found increasingly for the views of the Richtas and Hermachs and more heed needs to be taken of the warning by Dr. Pevzner, previously quoted about the dangers of accepting isolated data in making an appraisal of historical events.

**BUILDERS’ LABORERS AND MARGINS**

The Builders’ Laborers margin struggle is further evidence of the aim of the employing class, governments and courts to split asunder the unity of skilled and semi-skilled workers in industry.

The general public would possibly believe that the struggle of metal workers early in 1968 was centred mainly around the absorption of hard won over-award payments in well-established work-shops. The publicity of the daily press certainly led readers to believe so.

There is, however, another deep-seated and still unresolved problem confronting metal workers. This is the fact that the overwhelming number of semi-skilled workers received less than $1.00 increase, yet in this section exist some of the most exploited in the whole industry. The increasing skills, responsibilities and profitability to employers of this large number of metal workers are ignored.

With the advent of more rapid technological change, it is clear that the employers are preparing to downgrade workers generally, with the recognition of the smallest possible elite.

Semi-skilled metal-workers dissatisfied with the metal-trades award, are looking for leadership and militant activity. This is not forthcoming, mainly because the leadership of most of the unions covering this category is firmly entrenched in right wing hands. However, of late there appears a growing realisation by sections of these leaderships that there is an urgency to get together with centre and left wing unions, if any real gain is to be hammered out of the employers in this fast-changing Australian industrial climate.

The anger of the metal-workers, shown by the almost spontaneous strike action, surprised the ruling circles and made it more difficult for them to contain the workers, to confine money increases to metal-workers, and compel unions in other industries to carry out protracted "work-value" cases.

Early in February the Building Trades Group of unions in N.S.W. commenced a vigorous campaign to win an interim margins payment of $5.20 for tradesmen with a proportionate amount for Builders’ Laborers. Of the twelve unions in the building industry in N.S.W., only the Builders’ Laborers is a non-tradesmen union.

The Master Builders’ Association, the biggest employer of building work-
ers in N.S.W., were divided on whether the $5 should flow to building tradesmen. The conservative element of the M.B.A. favoured a work-value case.

The more liberal element saw the danger of state wide strike action in the building industry and were all for having a negotiation with the Building Workers' Industrial Union, the largest and acknowledged leader of the building unions in N.S.W.

A militant history, sound leadership of the B.W.I.U., unity of building unions in N.S.W. and their preparedness to struggle won the day and finally the B.W.I.U. received an interim margin increase of $5.00 per week. This opened the door for other tradesmen’s unions in this state and now all have won at least $5.00 per week, and await developments in August.

Since 1962, when a new standard was set in the Builders' Laborers, with the first real review since the conclusion of World War II, the N.S.W. leadership has fought for a relativity of margins and builders' laborers' margins. Commissioner Webb by the introduction and upgrading of new classifications in the Builders' Laborers award, emphasised the key connection between the carpenter and builders' laborers in modern building technique.

After much industrial activity the general working conditions and rates were brought into uniformity in N.S.W. However, there is an attempt by the employers to move away from treating the Builders' Laborers as an integral part of the building industry with a close relationship with tradesmen in this industry. Instead the employers wish to equate the Builders' Laborers with somewhat similar non-tradesmen in the metal awards.

Though most States of the Builders Laborers' Federation are covered by the Federal Award, there are differing agreements in some States, so it is difficult to campaign in a national way. Therefore Builders' Laborers in N.S.W. have engaged in widespread job activity to maintain the relativity of margins and similar conditions to building tradesmen.

Besides the avoidance of industrial turmoil, one would think it would be preferable for job costing etc. if the employers agreed to see the industry as a whole. Also because the laborers in the building industry are a minority, the cost would not be great. This, however, is not the case and the builders are pushing ahead with schemes to deny builders' laborers their due deserts.

Right throughout Australia and in N.S.W. particularly, feeling is high and more strikes have taken place than for many a year. Conferences with the Master Builders in N.S.W. in late May, and with national employers in Melbourne early June will decide the immediate future, for if they fail, the building industry will be a turbulent one in the months ahead.

J MUNDEY

NEW GUINEA DEVELOPMENT

IN DEALING with the advancement of New Guinea most writers emphasise the importance of developing her export markets and say little or nothing about the need for balanced development, and industrialisation.

All the nations with high living standards, the wealthy nations, are industrialised and this is an inescapable connection with consumer demand and the industries to satisfy it can only come from people with money in their hands. Essentially this requires a home market, more particularly in the formative stages.
If concentration on exports was the way to riches, India, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America would be the richest nations in the world.

But the richest nations are in Europe, North America and Australasia. They lead the world in living standards and the consequent industrialisation.

New Guinea's concentration on exports arises from her colonial position and her domination by the big Australian planter monopolies, the most important of which are Burns Philp and W. R. Carpenters, although there are others whose rapid expansion could well challenge the positions long held by the older firms.

These people own or control a very large number of plantations and their production dominates New Guinea's exports. Having large shipping interests they are able to exert control over indigenous production which in some fields is quite considerable. They also dominate the import of manufactured goods.

The control exercised by overseas monopolies has meant and continues to mean that the greater part of the wealth produced is channelled out of the country. This leaves the local economy impoverished and little capital finds its way into the hands of the local people. This hampers the promotion of essential industries and limits the market for the goods they would produce. The activities of the Administration, too, seem to inhibit funds accumulating in New Guinean hands.

In forestry and mining the Administration takes action which prevents New Guineans from receiving the value of the assets on their soil. At no time has the Administration endeavoured to foster a large-scale agricultural project by New Guineans whether by co-operative or company development.

The lack of capital can be seen on every side; primitive agriculture, housing, water supply, sanitation and drainage all indicate that little of the tremendous wealth created (G.N.P. $330 millions) remains in the Territory.

The domination by these monopolies means that New Guinea is forced to give up its natural riches at the lowest possible prices, but has to pay correspondingly higher prices for the goods it imports.

This inequality in price relationships between the underdeveloped nations and the imperialist nations, has been the subject of several surveys by the United Nations. A special U.N. study in 1949 showed that between 1897 and 1938 the average prices of primary products fell by approximately a third in relation to those of manufactured goods. A further U.N. study (Economic Problems No. 600, 20.6.59) points out that the increase in prices of industrial goods and the decline in prices of raw materials represented a loss of import capacity for underdeveloped countries of approximately "the equivalent of six years of loans to underdeveloped countries by the World Bank on the basis of 1956-57 prices".

Another U.N. Report in 1961 reveals that between 1953-55 and 1957-59 the loss through the worsening in terms of trade for underdeveloped countries was nearly twice the total amount of public aid funds these countries received.

All this indicates that continued reliance on exports will not and cannot result in a balanced and viable economy in New Guinea. It also indicates the urgent necessity to plan for industrial development, for the production of equipment and materials to make New Guinea independent of imports to the greatest extent possible.

What is meant by industrialisation? The colonialists point to the giant pro-
ject which is being planned by Con-
zinc Riotinto in Bougainville to pro-
cess the copper ore won from its con-
cession at Panguna, and to serve which
the first railway in the Territory will
be built. But this massive complex will
only serve the interests of the exploi-
ters and do little to advance the inter-
ests of the people. This is not indus-
trialisation.

What is meant by industrialisation is
manufacturing the requirements of the
people, from the common shovel to
machines to make machines, as well
as textiles, foodstuffs and other com-
modities. No nation can consider that
its economy is sound if it is not indus-
trialised, and the standards of living
can not be safeguarded if the country
has to rely on other countries for its
manufactured goods.

The government recently elected will
exercise a measure of responsibility. It
is essential that its activities be dir-
ected towards an economy which will
be able to stand on its own feet.

It will need to see that capital ex-
penditure in the Territory is directed
in a way that will advance the pro-
ductive capacity of the people rather
than facilitate the exploitation of New
Guinea by overseas interests.

JIM COOPER

STATE AID AND EQUALITY
OF OPPORTUNITY

STATED in its most general form, the
demand for state aid to non-state
schools is a cry for equality of oppor-
tunity in education, especially for the
most under-privileged pupils, those in
the Roman Catholic parish schools.

How could such equality be achiev-
ed taking into account the backward
position of education in Australia gen-
ernally? (4.3 per cent of the Gross
National Product spent annually on
education compared with 6.4 per cent
in the United Kingdom, 6.5 per cent
in the United States of America, 7.3
per cent in Sweden and the USSR).

Is it enough merely to state a prin-
cipled objection to the whole policy
of state aid? Such a position tends to
sharpen sectarian division and conflict
amongst individuals and organisations
working for educational reform, whilst
leaving the problem of inequality un-
touched.

It is felt by some that the dual sys-
tem should be accepted as a fact of
life temporarily at least, and its class
biased methods of implementation be
opposed by insisting that financial
grants to non-state schools be confined
to those in need, the Roman Catholic
parish schools, whilst the schools of
privilege and wealth should be ex-
cluded.

Such a policy would undoubtedly
bring some relief to the poorer schools,
but it would be misleading to suggest
that giving special assistance to Roman
Catholic schools whilst excluding others
in a predominantly non-Catholic com-
unity is politically feasible; or, if it
were, that the present level of state-aid
would do more than provide a tem-
porary palliative.

Another suggestion that has been
made is the provision of an educational
endowment for all school children by
an expansion of the family endowment.
This would have at least the merit of
reducing the burden of maintaining
children at school in the case of the
lower income groups, and would not
raise sectarian disunity. It would not,
of course, solve the financial problems
of the parish schools.

Some Roman Catholics believe that
the Church should vacate the field of
primary or secondary education alto-
gether. In Scotland, where such a view
has prevailed, church and state have
agreed upon the taking over by the state of all Catholic schools, which then became an integral part of the state system, but staffed exclusively by Catholic teachers. In all other respects, staffing, administration, curricula, inspection by departmental officers, no distinction is made between Catholic and non-Catholic schools. Such a compromise solution would undoubtedly meet the wishes of many Catholic teachers and parents, but in view of the rigid attitude of the Australian Catholic hierarchy it seems to have little immediate relevance.

Continued state aid in its present form, whilst providing marginal benefits to some of the poorer schools, is also, in fact, a dishonest manoeuvre to provide handouts to the schools of privilege under the spurious slogan of equality of benefit.

The gross bias shown towards the schools of privilege is expressed in *Education*, the journal of the NSW Teachers' Federation, of April 17, in regard to grants for science laboratories:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Percentage of all pupils</th>
<th>% of State grant</th>
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<tr>
<td>State Schools</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-State Schools</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42.5</td>
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The grants already made include $70,000 to Newington College and $16,000 to Trinity Grammar School, both well-equipped private schools. The position is even more glaring in Victoria where grants have been made to the already lavishly equipped Geelong Grammar.

State aid in its present form does not substantially ameliorate conditions in the Catholic parish school; the marginal benefits provided leaving their pupils in a state of serious educational inequality, even when compared with the inadequately provided state schools.

At the same time the financial burdens of Catholic parents continue to increase (a rise in school fees this year despite state aid). The strengthening of the non-state sector also strengthens the social and sectarian divisions in the community and generates sectarian bitterness and social disunity.

Meanwhile, conditions in state schools continue to deteriorate; teacher shortages are becoming critical (hundreds accepting overseas positions, untrained teachers being introduced into Queensland schools), classes grow larger, essential equipment is not provided, and overall, even in the state system Australia is falling far behind the requirements of an age of science and technological change.

Clearly whilst inadequate funds are available to meet basic educational requirements division and conflict over the distribution of public finance will continue.

The teachers' unions and parents' organisations have enunciated the two basic needs for educational advance in general: a national enquiry into education promoted by the Federal Government; and immediate large-scale grants by the Federal Government to meet the most pressing demands. Any substantial improvement in the conditions of the under-privileged schools will remain a chimera until these conditions are met.

State aid is being used as a red-herring, a diversionary move, to delay meeting them. The important issue must continue to be the broad struggle, with the maximum degree of Catholic participation that can be achieved for an enquiry and massive emergency Federal grants of finance.

Until this fight is won the internecine struggle for the inadequate available funds is certain to become sharper and to be used by reactionary politicians to keep education reformers
divided. The basic question is to put first things first, not to allow secondary issues such as state aid to divert those working for educational reform from seeking unity in action to defeat the divisive plans of the Government and to secure real educational progress.

W. E. GOLLAN

DISSENT ON CUBAN WRITING

IN APRIL-MAY ALR, in concluding “Writers in the New Cuba”, J. J. quotes J. M. Cohen as noting a retrograde tendency towards the discouragement of the liberal trend in culture by “the rigid party men” and joins in Mr. Cohen’s hope that “this tendency will soon be reversed”.

Mr. Cohen writes of a positive attitude until 1967 and J. J. writes, presumably, in March 1968.

But does a search of the prolific Cuban articles (easily available in English) by “top” (rigid?) party men support the report of retrogression and the hope of an early reversal, which arises on the assumption that the report is true?

In 1967, for example, President Dorticos made it clear that the party had evolved no set views on art and literature, regarding these questions as being too complex and important to be “dealt with.” Meanwhile, full freedom of expression, including abstract and “unorthodox” schools, continues as, say, in Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia — but not in some other socialist countries.

It appeared that this view was voiced also at the international conference of intellectuals in Havana, in January 1968, and that there was complete agreement on questions of artistic freedom in a spectrum extending from Cuban “party men” to such people as Graham Greene, Bertrand Russell and J. P. Sartre — no friends of party-imposed criteria — also made it clear at the time that this was also their view of the state of freedom in Cuba in 1967, whereas they are still very concerned about the fate of the creative writers etc. in other socialist countries.

Lastly, in 1967, an English translation appeared of “Socialism and Man in Cuba” — a remarkable article dealing almost exclusively with the subtle problem of overcoming alienation and its practical consequences and the demands it makes of a marxist party and socialist society. This article by Che Guevara discusses freedom of expression in literature in the same spirit as Dorticos in the same year.

This may come as a surprise to those who dismiss Guevara and the Cuban leaders as Mao-tinged, as may his suggestion that 20th century “decadent” art is closer to reality than the prettied-up versions of 19th century realism which passed for some time as socialist realism.

S. COOPER

REALIST PROTEST

IN THE ALR No. 2 of 1968, there is an article, “Read any Stories Lately?”, by Leon Cantrell, which refers to “literary quarterlies such as Meanjin, Overland and Southerly”. I find it extraordinary that the article makes no mention of the Realist, and I can only assume that the author has neither seen nor heard of it. In fact, the omission becomes even more extraordinary when it is realised that the Realist is the only literary magazine of the left in Australia.

The fact is that the Realist consistently publishes more short stories than either Meanjin, Overland or Southerly, or, indeed, than any other literary magazine in the country. The latest issue
of the Realist (No. 28 — Autumn), for instance, contains seven short stories, compared with two each in the latest issues of Meanjin and Southerly and one in Overland.

Perhaps Mr. Cantrell justifies his silence on the subject of the Realist on the ground of quality, insofar as a significant proportion of its stories are not written by established and well-known writers. That he has a leaning towards the established writer is evident from several remarks in his article. In fact he even makes specific and favourable mention of Patrick White, whose short stories most people seem to find unreadable.

While the Realist does publish stories by established writers, including some of those mentioned by Mr. Cantrell, it does not do so exclusively. One of its aims is to assist and encourage promising new writers by publication, and there is little doubt that few, if any publications in Australia do more to help new writers than the Realist.

The Realist has always been ignored by the Literary Establishment, probably because of its partisan support of progressive causes, but it is a sad thing to see a similar conspiracy of silence developing in the left.

I might mention that the three literary quarterlies mentioned above are subsidised, in two cases very substantially, whereas the Realist is entirely dependent on voluntary donations from readers and supporters.

RAY WILLIAMS
Editor, The Realist

MORE ON CIA

AS A FOOTNOTE to my article on "Political Scientists and the CIA" (ALR April-May, 1968), it may interest readers to know that Dr. Max Kampelman, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association and probably Hubert Humphrey's closest political adviser, has been recently featured in items in both Newsweek (19/2/68) and Time (1/3/68). Representing Napco Industries Inc., he signed a $2,300,000 loan agreement with AID (Agency for International Development) in 1962 to send auto-parts plant equipment to India. Napco failed to deliver and the Justice Department has now filed suit to collect the $2,300,000. Congressman Gross (Iowa) has claimed that AID were eventually "hoodwinked" out of almost $4 million in the deal that "reeks of incompetence, fraud or both." For once, Humphrey is reported to be maintaining complete silence.

JOHN PLAYFORD
Max Praed

AN AMERICAN DILEMMA

A University Extension lecturer who recently visited the United States makes some pungent comments on economics and morals involved in capitalist "aid to the hungry."

Let's spread the word
Our surplus food
Can stop this guy from going Red.
The word comes back
Alas alack
The guy's already dead.

—New Left Jingle.

AMERICAN SOCIETY, like our own, is in the main monumentally indifferent to the proliferation of starving bellies in the world. Certainly you see a few articles in the better newspapers where a warning is sounded by a scholar, a government agency or UNESCO. But you also find things like the full-page advertisement inserted by Forbes (a business and investment magazine published in New York) in the New York Times of May 5, 1966, which depicts a reclining Asian with glassy eyes and his ribs sticking out. Under the picture it says, in large type: "Hey mister. Want to buy a shiny new car with white walls, air-conditioning, full power and stereo?" In smaller type the caption continues:

"Are you one of those people who thinks foreign countries should get off the dole and pay for what we send them? India did that. We are now holding the equivalent of two-thirds of the entire currency of India. They have paid it to us for food. And they are still starving. As a matter of fact, two billion of the world's people are near starvation. They are a very poor market for the things American business would like to sell them. Cars, for instance.

“Our government is up nights dealing with the world hunger problem. As Forbes says, 'In so doing, it will also create tremendous opportunities for businesses that have the know how, the foresight and the capital to help end hunger.' How? Don't we end hunger by sending food? Yes. When necessary. But remember India. We want these countries to grow their own. Besides, sending them a million dollars in food aid will feed only 70,000 people for a year. But sending a million dollars
Hey mister.
Want to buy a shiny new car with white walls, air-conditioning, full power and stereo?
worth of fertilizer from American industry would help feed 200,000 people for a year. That’s the big idea.

“Making good markets out of starving nations is such a huge opportunity for American business, Forbes recently did a special report called “Feeding the world’s hungry millions: How it will mean billions for U.S. Business! And a few out of the 425,000 Forbes subscribers have probably already figured out how they can do well by doing good. That’s what Forbes is for.

This report is “generally optimistic” but it is prefaced by “the views of an extremely well-informed businessman who thinks the prospects for feeding the world over the next few decades are dim.” He is Thomas M. Ware, chairman of International Minerals & Chemical, who, when he is not aggressively expanding his fertilizer interests, altruistically devotes himself to being the chairman of the Freedom From Hunger Foundation. This “engaged and aroused citizen” does not base his pessimism on a shortage of fertilizer, of implements, of seeds or even of land. The trouble is even more basic: it lies in the human mind. “Intelligence,” he says, “is capital. We’ve spent billions on education in this country to get the amount of intelligence we have today. The underdeveloped countries haven’t, and they aren’t going to be able to catch up overnight.” Nobody could legitimately accuse the humanitarian Tom Ware of being a racist. He believes that hunger itself breeds ignorance. “If half the people in the world are starving,” he says, “then half the world’s minds are permanently maimed. They just don’t have the voltage between the cars to get any work done. How can a mental dwarf who has no energy grow more food?” The proper use of fertilizer takes intelligence and education. “An American farmer knows just what he needs, and has the capital to pay for it. But a man who can’t read . . .” Ware is concerned that effective American action may be too long delayed. “When you double the population, you’re going to double the number of Sukarnos, Cubas, Vietnams, library burnings, and the like. More accurately, you’re going to get eight times as much trouble.”

Ware hopes his gloomy view is wrong. Forbes hopes so, too. In fact, American capitalism sees clearly the desirability of keeping alive those two thousand million starving people (increasing to four thousand million, it is predicted, by the end of the century), in the hope that they will become intelligent enough to appreciate the advantages of owning a Chevy and thrifty enough to save up their pennies for the down payment.

U.S. foreign aid in 1965 totalled an all-time record of more than $5.5 billion. A small proportion of this — as can be said about
all such programs — was genuinely altruistic in that it was sent to hospitals and other deserving institutions and actually spent in the recipient countries. However, most of the foreign aid funds allocated by the U.S. — and many other countries — are used on the home market to buy supplies which are shipped to the recipients. Such programs may therefore be described more accurately as foreign and domestic aid. While the actual amount that America spends in this way is most impressive, we should be wary of the apparent inference that American generosity also merits description in superlative terms. The fact is that in 1965 four Western nations — France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom — spent in public and private assistance to the “have not” capitalist countries a higher percentage of their national incomes than did the U.S.

As Forbes points out, for American business to do well by doing good the underdeveloped nations must learn to produce more food. The U.S. Government is therefore putting a great deal of pressure on the “have not” countries to make it attractive for U.S. companies to build fertilizer plants abroad. For a long time, India insisted that it handle all the distribution of fertilizers produced in that country by U.S. companies and that it also set the price. “Standard of Indiana understandably refused to accept these conditions,” says the Forbes report. What happened? The U.S. Government Agency for International Development put food shipments to India on a month-to-month basis until the Indian Government let Standard of Indiana market the fertilizer itself at its own price.

If I interpret capitalist economics correctly, the present state of the American economy provides solid underpinning for pessimism regarding the immediate future. Big war appears to be the only available market large enough to absorb the produce of America’s huge automated productive capacity. Despite increasing large-scale governmental manipulation, the U.S. economy needs something more than that to maintain recent growth rates — to say nothing of increasing the rate. The Vietnam war on its present scale is just not big enough. Somehow the war budget must generate into an expenditure of $125 billion rising to $140 billion — much more than the present operation — to provide the expansion needed to build the Great Society.

Three important factors in the overall slump are automation, consumer saturation of goods and services and the fact that the average American family’s total debt in 1965 was a staggering 60 per cent of its annual after-taxes income. If we add to these the paucity of massive, new, solvent markets and the depletion of certain strategic mineral resources we have signs of stormy econo-
mic weather ahead. For example, in August 1966 there were 1.5 million shiny new 1966 cars languishing in dealers' showrooms. Never before in the history of the American automobile industry had so many current models been in stock when the manufacture of the new season's cars had already begun. (Admittedly Ralph Nader's research and courageous car safety campaign must have influenced many people to postpone their new car purchases, but this accounts only in small part for the stagnant market.) Where were the customers?

Where, too, were the avenues for reinvestment? With human toil and hand tools, primitive societies for thousands of years produced increments so small that the rate of reinvestment in the new techniques was restricted to the order of about once in a hundred years. Today the tomato-picking machine in the Central Valley of California can pay for itself in seven working days, or a capital reinvestment rate of 4,332 times in a century!

All this means that U.S. industry, having outfitted itself with automated, mass-production equipment, now has to put on the brakes. Many industries are finding themselves operating their equipment at far less than capacity load because to do otherwise would flood the market with surplus goods, i.e., goods which some people already possess and others cannot afford. Other industries operate at near capacity only because of the growing demand for war materials — not a markedly increased domestic demand. The only potentially large market remaining in the U.S. today are the poor. The poor are not saturated by goods and services like the middle and upper classes — but they do not have the money or "prospects" to indebted themselves deeply for cars, services, houses and appliances. Automation complicates the picture further because it makes income more uncertain for the unskilled and semi-skilled classes. In order even to continue purchasing the bare necessities for survival — to say nothing of any rise in purchasing power — growing numbers of underprivileged people will have to be subsidised by welfare or some form of guaranteed annual income.

According to various estimates there are between 30 and 50 million underprivileged people in America. Of these, about eight million Negroes and four million others (mostly Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, etc.) are comparable in plight with the two thousand million undernourished, illiterate people in the underdeveloped countries. In Asia and Latin America in the past five years the population has risen by 12% and 17%, respectively, while the production of food has risen by only 10%. Having failed to prosecute the "war on poverty" at home, by what magic will American capitalism wage it successfully abroad? How will
two-thirds of the human race, now facing famine, be transformed into an expanding, solvent market for American goods and services?

The Forbes report says that the “war against hunger” will be fought on two fronts. The first will be a crash program to supply the underdeveloped countries with food. “Foreign aid,” formerly geared primarily to industrial development, will be directed more toward agricultural development. Food production will be expanded by the big American farmers who will get bigger although fewer in number — from over three million today to an estimated “immensely prosperous” 500,000 by 1976. The farmers of Canada and Australia are expected to share this boom. Food shipments are “designed to cope with such emergencies as the recent drought in India, which already has led to Communist-organised riots in the state of Kerala.” In the long run, the second front is expected to be decisive. Every nation receiving U.S. aid will have to build up its own agriculture as swiftly as possible. It will receive fertilizer and farm equipment free at first but later will be expected to buy them from U.S.-owned factories within its borders. Farmers will be taught how to make the most of the land and governments will be induced “to re-rig archaic policies in the field of price incentives, farm credit and land reform.” Underdeveloped countries will have to ignore the “Soviet experiment” and put agriculture first or they will not get aid.

So we have the blueprint. U.S. agricultural aid will be followed by U.S.-owned fertilizer and farm implement factories, then by other U.S.-owned industries which will employ the natives who will save their pennies until they can afford more food than they produce. The model is Western Europe, which used to receive agricultural aid from the U.S., but is now its biggest market for feed grains and poultry, or Japan which formerly received massive agricultural aid but now buys huge quantities of U.S. farm products annually on a straight cash basis. The American prospect for the starving Asian in the Forbes advertisement is therefore that he, or his surviving children, will ring up their pennies on Uncle Sam’s cash register whenever they want to buy anything from a chicken to a Cadillac.

Unfortunately for the American dream, as the poor increase in numbers they are likely to fulfil, in superdeveloped America as in underdeveloped countries, the gloomy predictions made about the starving “other half” by the dedicated fertilizer-spreader Thomas H. Ware. That is, along with the burgeoning Sukarnos, Cubas and Vietnams there is likely to be a multiplication of Stokely Carmichaels, Malcolm X’s, Wattses and Detros.
Alastair Davidson
GRAMSCI’S MARXISM

The author, lecturer in politics at Monash University, continues his series on the great Italian Communist leader, Antonio Gramsci. The article probes the particular features of Gramsci’s approach to marxism, pointing to conclusions important to consider in elaborating revolutionary strategies for advanced capitalist countries today.

GRAMSCI’S APPROACH to marxism was so novel that he has been called a neo-marxist. The novelty starts with his extremely rigorous methodological approach to the content of marxism, and not with the conclusions he reaches. Obviously, one of the greatest dangers in drawing inspiration or creed from a collection of writings is eclecticism. Marx’ writings, as with those of the Bible, provide ammunition for God and the devil or, at least, have done so for a myriad of mutually contradictory schools of marxism, each claiming to find authority for its propositions in the work of the master. Such a situation immediately raises the question: What is marxism anyway? Gramsci’s method of deciding this question must be the starting point in any examination of his marxism. Without understanding his methodological approach to marxism we cannot understand fully some of his conclusions about what marxism is. Furthermore, if we do not agree with his methodology then we cannot of course, agree with his conclusions. He wrote:

In science in general the most important thing is method: in certain sciences, furthermore, which must necessarily base themselves on a restricted source of positive facts, restricted and not homogeneous, questions of method are even more important, if they are not everything.

He maintained that if a person wished to study a Weltanschauung (world outlook) which “was never systematically exposed by its creator (and whose essential coherence is to be sought not in a single writing or series of writings but in the entire development of his varied intellectual work) in which the elements of the conception are implicit, then it was necessary to make as a preliminary a minute philological study, conducted with the utmost care for precision, with scientific honesty and intellectual loyalty, and the absence of every preconception or apriori reasoning or party position. It is necessary first of all, to reconstruct the process of intellectual development of the given thinker, to identify the elements which have become stable and ‘permanent’ that is which have become his own thought, different and superior to the ‘material’ he previously studied and which served as a stimulus; only these elements are essential parts of the process of development.”
further maintained that while the whole work of the philosopher had to be studied in the context of his life history in order to discover what he really said, even the most neglected and apparently irrelevant work, the main object was to search for the leitomotiv (main theme) of the work and not to worry about obiterdicta (incidentals) 4.

Gramsci ranked Marx' writings for value as sources in this order: 1 works published under the direct authority of the author, among these were considered not only those given to the press, but those circulated in whatever manner by the author, like letters and circulars (typical examples were, he suggested, the Glosse al programma di Gotha and the letters); 2 the works not published under the authority of the author but posthumously by others. In this case it was preferable to work from the original source. Both sets of material should be studied chronologically. Preparatory work, first drafts and so on were not legitimate sources for the author's thought. Letters should be treated with more care than texts as they were written in a different fashion and often not so carefully written. Marx' ideas should, where possible, be separated from those of Engels as they were not always in agreement. All works other than the two sets listed above were definitely of secondary value. Gramsci indicated at least once that he considered Capital the most important source for a reconstruction of marxism.5 Apart from ranking Marx's writings, Gramsci also considered what was permissible eclectically and, more importantly, whether it was possible and permissible to revise Marx' writings themselves on certain grounds. His starting point in reaching conclusions on these points was a consideration of the methodology of previous marxists and why their methodologies had been used. Gramsci maintained that there were two main schools of marxists. The first was typified by Plekhanov whose method was that of vulgar materialism due to Plekhanov's own positivism. To understand what Marx meant Plekhanov examined only Marx' intellectual origins.6 The other school was typified by Otto Bauer and maintained that marxism could be related to other philosophies which were not materialist such as those of Kant. Both methodologies were inadequate. The lone man on the correct road in understanding Marx had been Antonio Labriola who had enjoyed little fame. The explanation for the methodology and success of the two previous schools lay in the need of the time they were coined, which was to combat the prevalent popular ideology which was essentially religious transcendentalism. They therefore offered the most crude and banal materialist version of Marx which appealed to the superstition in popular culture in the same way transcendental religions did.7

This wedding of marxism or interpretation of Marx in terms
of the ruling vogue of materialism and positivist philosophy was explicable on the grounds that marxism had the tasks of combating religion with whatever weapons it could find as well as providing a new world view. German marxism did the first. Gramsci proposed to do the second: provide a marxism which was a Weltauschnauung (world outlook) and not merely an ideological weapon.

Due to their objects the two schools had overemphasised two aspects of marxism. The first had emphasised the mechanical determinist aspects and materialist aspects. The second had assumed that Marx should be interpreted in the light of other philosophy rather than on the face of his writings. Gramsci would do neither in his examination of Marx.

Turning to Marx himself Gramsci considered how Marx could be revised to eliminate the polemical from the objective material, assuming, of course, that the two earlier schools had found their authority in the dross of Marx, in his polemical writings. He considered that this was an essential preliminary exercise. He assumed that Marx used a development of Hegelian method for a tool of research and never quite freed himself of some of Hegel's concepts (e.g. that according to which history proceeded in eras of progress according to the stage of development of man's spirit). He also implied that Marx overstressed certain aspects of his theory for political purposes on occasion. For example, he maintained that the theory of the inevitable impoverishment of the proletariat was exalted far beyond its original importance, when it was intended as a polemical weapon.

So, Gramsci had a very elaborate methodology in which he first ranked Marx' works in order of value as sources of Marx' thought, and then was even prepared to revise them in the light of errors of emphasis which Marx would have made himself. This may seem a dangerous exercise, but at least Gramsci was very rigorous and honest about his methodology and his method is quite reasonable on the face of it.

To recapitulate, the two major errors of the past in the interpretation of Marx seemed to Gramsci to be that of the German school, which had made marxism a theory of mechanical determinism in which the wills of men were subordinate and that of Stalinism which had turned it into a religious dogma in which the solutions to all problems were to be found by looking at the appropriate page of Karl Marx, a man long dead and dealing with long dead problems.

For Gramsci marxism was not a sociology, that is, not a theory of "vulgar evolutionism", as the Germans had tended to suppose, and it saw history not as functioning according to the notions of
the pure laws of science in which one made predictions on the basis of some writing or other and sat back fatalistically to see the predictions come true.

Marxism was a “creative” and not a “receptive” or “ordering” philosophy. By the last two terms Gramsci understood philosophies which assumed the existence of an immutable external order of world. He said to avoid

solipsism . . . and the same time mechanistic conceptions which are implicit in the conception of thought as a receptive or ordering activity, it is necessary to examine the question “what is philosophy?” “historically” and at the same time pose as the basis of philosophy the “will” . . . but a rational and not an arbitrary will, which is realised inasmuch as it corresponds with objective historical necessities, that is, inasmuch as it is universal history itself at the moment of its progressive development (attuazione—fulfilment); if this will is represented initially by a single person, its rationality is documented by the fact that it is accepted by a great number of people, and permanently accepted, that it becomes a culture, a matter of “good sense”, a conception of the world, with ethics which conform to its structure.10

By “creative” then, he meant thought which modified the modes of understanding of the great mass and thus of that reality itself which cannot be conceived of without this great majority.

Naturally, given this notion of marxism, Gramsci attributed a much greater importance to the action of men in determining social change, than did the marxists of the German tradition. He announced that it was necessary to counteract the notion of marxism as a theory in which men were but passive factors in social change and the notion that all changes in the mode of social life should be explained by changes in the economic base of society.11 Of course, such a position was not new in marxism, both Lenin and Trotsky had emphasised the importance of the conscious activity of men in determining their own destinies, but usually there has been a residue of fatalism in their creeds, (e.g. the concept of world revolution). Gramsci completely rejected the notion of fatalism, maintaining that nothing would ever happen through developments in the economic system itself, without the conscious activity of men themselves. He wrote:

We should, I think, prepare a funeral elegy on the concept of fatalism, praising its usefulness in a certain historical period but burying it once and for all—with full honors.12

In turn his emphasis on history as something of which men and their wills are part, led him to regard the developments in the superstructure of society as more important than those in the base in determining the course of history. He maintained that explaining every fluctuation of ideology and politics as an immediate reflection of some change in the economic base of society was “primitive infantilism”. “In practice we can fight this idea with the authentic testimony of Marx, whose political and historical works are always
concrete." According to Gramsci developments of the economic base could only be studied after the economic development was finished and that:

We don't pay enough attention to the fact that many political actions are due to internal organisational necessities, the need to maintain the coherence of a party, a group, a society. The history of the Catholic Church is full of examples. If every ideological struggle within the Church had to be explained by a change in the base of society, the student would go crazy. (I must say many political-economic "dime-novels" have been written this way). Most of the ideological arguments were related to organisational needs. For example, take the struggle between Rome and Byzantium on the derivation of the Holy Ghost. It would be ridiculous to seek in the economic base of Eastern Europe the reason for the assertion that the Holy Ghost derives only from the Father, and likewise in Western Europe for the assertion that the Holy Ghost derives from the Father and the Son. The existence and conflicts of the two Churches do depend on their economic base and on their historical developments, but the specific positions of the Holy Ghost were set forth as an area of differentiation by the two Churches to strengthen their internal cohesion. They could have changed positions and it would not have mattered so long as the conflict was maintained. This is the real problem to be analysed and not the casuistry on each side. 13

There was no one relationship between even major developments in the base and political changes. Either economic well-being or economic hardship could cause such changes depending on the concrete circumstances.14 He repeated again and again that Marx had said that men become aware of their social position and thus of their tasks on the level of ideology: that marxism itself was of the superstructure.15 There was a vital connection between the structure and the superstructure of society. He drew this analogy:

You can certainly not say of the human body that the skin (and the type of physical beauty prevailing at that time of history) is mere illusion and that the skeleton and the anatomy are the sole reality; however for a long time something similar has been maintained (for marxism).16

Consequent on his assumption that the causes of historical change were to be sought in the superstructure of society rather than in the base, which was so much the ultima ratio (long term reason) as to be almost indistinguishable for political purposes, Gramsci's main concern became why men were committed to certain beliefs and to a certain system and what was needed to make them accept a new system of values. Here he lighted on the notion of hegemony, which he maintained was implicit in the ideas of Lenin.

There were two great levels of the superstructure, that of "civil society", that is, the totality of organisms vulgarly called "private", and that of the "political society or State". To the first level corresponded the notion of hegemony which a dominant class exercised through society and to the second the direct dominion which was expressed through government by law. Hegemony was what was secured through the "spontaneous consensus" which the mass of the populace gave to the mode of life impressed on society by the dominant group, a consensus given because of the prestige
and trust the dominant group enjoyed due to its position. It was sometimes a more important method of rule than that of the State which functioned to secure the obedience of the groups who did not consent to the method of rule. The State became more important in moments of crisis of command when spontaneous agreement became less important. Gramsci indicated that a typical period in Italy when the State was more important than any consensus or hegemony was after the war of 1914-18. He also indicated that for various cultural reasons there were countries (e.g. Russia in 1917) where there was really no hegemonical basis of rule, solely one of coercion. Of course the relative strength of the ingredients depended on which country, or, more precisely, culture, was being examined. More will be said of the nature of Gramsci’s national communism anon; suffice to say here that he was certainly no internationalist in the sense that Trotsky was, nor was he clearly a national communist. The dominant hegemony might be universal only for a short period and then give way to conflict. It would be characterised at all times by compromise for hegemony.

What Gramsci is saying here differs mainly in emphasis from what Marxists had traditionally admitted, at least before Stalin. What he is saying is that the bulk of the populace at certain stages of history support the values of the dominant class, that is, crudely, aspire to be capitalists because there appears to be something in it for them. Nor is it entirely fiction that there is something in it for some of them, the concessions capitalists make ensure this. The mass may gradually lose this faith in the ruling values, but this loss of faith will not necessarily depend on conditions in the economic base. Certainly at no time is a Marxist justified in believing that the bulk of the “oppressed classes” is with him or that history is working for him in the long run. Such conditions are the result of a long process of reorientation in the superstructure and cultural, social and religious as well as economic factors may play a part in determining how the bulk of the populace may feel. Certainly, there was no justification for assuming, as Stalin did in 1928, that a great depression would turn people away from capitalism and to socialism. The hegemony or moral sway of capitalist values would have to be broken first and this, in some cases where the hegemony had a very strong hold, necessitated very long and meticulous labour. For hegemony was achieved in a long process of socialisation which started in the cradle and went on through infancy, through schooling, contact with other social groups, and all the gamut of influences which sociologists and psychologists
tell us operate to make what we are. He wrote "... changes in the mode of thinking, in beliefs in opinions, do not come about through rapid 'explosions' which are simultaneous and general, they come about almost always through 'successive combinations' according to the most disparate and uncontrollable formulae of 'authority'."20

How then did Gramsci expect changes to come about in the values of the non dominant classes in a capitalist society where they had been so long under a capitalist hegemony? It should be noted here that Gramsci is talking above all about Italy which fell, at the time he was writing, into the category of semi-industrialised country rather than advanced capitalist. However, for a multiplicity of reasons the nature of the Italian superstructure, though often having peculiar local characteristics, was similar to that of advanced capitalist countries with a long cultural heritage (i.e. he had modifications to his techniques for countries like the USA, and implicitly, Australia).

He drew analogies from military strategy, distinguishing between trench and assault warfare. Several items will be quoted verbatim here to make his point clearer.

The same reduction must be made in art and political science, at least insofar as advanced states are concerned, where "civil society" has become a very complex structure which is resistant to catastrophic "eruptions" of an immediate economic sort (crises, depressions etc.): the superstructures of civil society are like the system of trenches in modern warfare. As in this case when it happens that a furious attack of artillery seems to have destroyed the whole of the adversary's system of defence, but instead only destroys the external superficialities, and at the moment of the attack and advance the attackers find themselves facing a still efficient defensive line, so it happens in politics during great economic crises, that neither do the attacking troops, because of the crisis, organise themselves like lightning spatially and temporarily, nor do they acquire an aggressive spirit ...

Therefore it is necessary to study in "depth" what elements of civil society correspond to the system of defences in a war of position.

It seems to me that Ilich (Lenin) had understood that a change should take place from a war of manoeuvre, applied victoriously in the East in '17, to a war of position which was the only thing possible in the West where, as Krasnov observed, in brief space of time the armies could acquire endless quantities of munitions, where the social cadres were themselves capable of becoming well supplied trenches.

Only Ilich did not have time to examine his formula more profoundly, taking into account the fact that he could only do this theoretically, while his fundamental task was national, that is demanded a recognition of the ground and an establishment of the elements of trench and fortress which were made up by the civil society, etc. In the East the State was everything, civil society was primordial and unformed; in the West, between the State and the civil society there was a fair relationship and through the shimmering of the State could be seen the robust structure of a "civil society". The State was only a forward trench, behind which there was a strong chain of fortresses and casemates; more or less from State to State, it is understood but this called for an accurate recognition of national character.21
While more will be said in successive articles about how a socialist counter hegemony can be built up in the working class through the activities of the socialist party and intellectuals, here it is necessary to say that the long trench warfare designed to break down the dominant hegemony and establish a socialist counter-hegemony, could not be conducted by the populace itself. That is to say, there was no spontaneous development of a counter-hegemony, or a set of values conflicting with the ruling ones, something which the German marxists had always believed implicitly.

Gramsci believed that all men were philosophers, that is all men had a world view. 22 Usually this world view was dubbed "common sense". It did not exist at the level of conscious criticism but was inarticulate. Thus while a social class usually had a common world view it was sporadic in its manifestation and because of social and intellectual subordination the class borrowed the world view of the dominant class although it was frequently in conflict with its own inarticulate world view. The frequency of conflict diminished in "normal times", when the subordinate class could live more or less in accordance with the world view of the dominant class. The conflict between what we may call unconscious and conscious values, could and did often end in moral and political passivity of the great mass. Critical understanding of oneself took place only through struggle for moral leadership of the particular social group and this in turn necessitated the emergence of a "leading group" of intellectuals. "The mass of people cannot become independent and autonomous without organising itself, and organisation is impossible without organisers and directors, without intellectuals", he wrote. While he maintained that officers could quickly form an army but that an army was useless without officers, he was not propounding a crude theory of voluntarism. On the contrary, he maintained that the propagation of new concepts took place for political and ultimately social reasons and logic, authority and organisation were very important only as soon as a general reorientation has taken place in the individual or the group. He always maintained as a general principle that 1 no society poses itself with tasks for whose solution there do not exist already the necessary and sufficient conditions or at least in which there are not already appearing and developing such conditions; 2 that no society dissolves itself or can be replaced if it has not first elaborated (svolto) all the forms of life that are implicit in its relationships. On the other hand it could hang on for ever if no attempts were made to organise an opposition to its hegemony. The whole problem of making a revolution became a struggle for minds.

We deduce certain musts for any cultural movement which seeks to supplant old world views:

1 To repeat unceasingly and tirelessly one's own arguments, though, of
course, varying the literary form. Repetition is the most efficient didactic method of working on the popular mind.

2 To work incessantly to raise the intellectual level of ever greater strata of the population. This entails developing groups of intellectuals of a new type, who rise directly from the people yet remain in contact with them forming as it were the “ribs” crossing the mass.

As might be expected, this work would be less onerous at a particular time in history when the hegemony of a ruling group was shaken by its own inability to cope with a disastrous social situation. The work would still have to be done, where the values of capitalism had been firmly instilled for centuries.

Of course, there were enormous problems facing any Gramscian marxist. Since Gramsci saw the relevant part of marxism, for political purposes anyway, in the theories of the superstructure, he automatically made it a much more sophisticated tool of analysis and also much more difficult to use, given the enormous complexity involved when dealing with moral values, implicit in the complex social life of the superstructure. Apart from the two major propositions and conditions for social change which have already been advanced, there were several other canons of historical methodology he said had to be followed by those wishing to use marxism as a guide to action. First the need to distinguish between “organic” and “circumstantial” movements in history. “The ‘circumstantial’ phenomena are certainly also dependent on the organic movements, but their influence is not long-range historically; they give place to a trifling everyday political criticism.” There were a number of pitfalls in this exercise because of the difficulty in finding the correct relationship between the organic and the circumstantial or occasional; you could either regard as immediately operating causes what were only operating mediatly or affirm that the immediate operating causes were the sole efficient causes leading in the first case to an excess of economism and in the second to excess of voluntarism. It also meant that there was no possibility of “objective” augury (prevision)

He who forecasts something in reality has a program which is to triumph and the forecast is itself an element in that triumph. That does not mean that a forecast must always be arbitrary and free and tendentious. You could even say that only insofar as the objective aspect of the forecast is connected with a programme does it acquire objectivity 1 because only passion sharpens the intellect and cooperates to render the intuition more clear; 2 because, as reality is the result of an application of human will to the society of things (the machinist to the machine), to leave out of consideration every voluntarist element or to calculate for the intervention of other wills only as an objective element of the general game is to distort reality itself. 23

It becomes obvious that in Gramscian marxism, great use must be made of subordinate disciplines to discover just what is going on in the superstructure. He himself showed his enormous erudition in the references in his Prison Notebooks. Furthermore because
of the complexity of the superstructure of society, it would be no simple matter discovering just what was going on in society. Gramsci suggested that if marxism were to have any value, even within his limited terms, as a mode of forecasting events, whole teams of experts would have to go to work to discover and analyse the developments taking place. He, working in prison, admitted that he did not have the sources to conduct any survey in depth of the nature of social developments. At best he claimed that his ideas and particularly the way hegemony worked were a preliminary canter. On the other hand, while he was often making informed guesses, his notion of how a democracy functions is very close to our own knowledge derived from advanced studies in political science, and his theory incorporates, or allows for the incorporation of many ideas difficult to reconcile with traditional marxism, such as elite leadership in the working class, the absence of class hatred or obvious antagonisms in many societies and the notion of the essentiality of mass apathy to the functioning of democracy.

However, if we agree that the real causes of social change are what he says they are, then it becomes obvious that he has something very important to say about the activities of a socialist party faced with the hegemony which exists in a country of the advanced capitalist sort. He also has major revisions to make about which section of the community is most important in attaining these social changes. These questions will be discussed in the next two articles in this series.

1 See e.g. Il Ponte, 28 February 1967, pp.201ff. It has also been maintained that he was in no sense a revisionist, N. McInnes, “Antonio Gramsci”, Survey, No.53, October 1964, pp.3-16.
2 A. Gramsci, Gli Intellettuali e l’Organizzazione della Cultura, p.183 (Henceforth Intellettuali).
3 A. Gramsci, Il Materialismo Storico e la Filosofia di Benedetto Croce, p.76. (Henceforth M.S.)
5 Ibid, p.155.
6 His understanding of Plekhanov’s position was drawn from The Fundamental Questions of Marxism.
7 Gramsci, Materialismo Storico, p.80.
8 MS, p.103.
10 MS, p.22-23.
11 MS, p.96-97, Marzani, op. cit. p.43-44.
12 Marzani, p.42.
13 MS, p.97. Marzani, p.44.
14 Note sul Machiavelli, Sulla Politica e Sullo Stato Moderno, p.49. (Henceforth Mach)
15 MS, p.238.
16 Ibid.
17 Ordine Nuovo, p.24, Mach p.68.
18 Mach, p.31.
19 e.g. M.S. p.14.
20 Intellettuali, p.142.
21 Mach, pp.66-68.
22 This aspect of his thought is excellently dealt with in Marzani, op. cit.
23 Mach, p.38.
IT IS PROBABLY 27 years since an Australian government has been in as deep trouble over foreign policy as the Gorton Government is at the present time. In October, 1941, the pre-war Menzies Government was thrown out of office because of the manifest bankruptcy of its political disposition in the face of the aggression of the Axis powers. This opened the way for the Curtin Government and a period of independent foreign policy activity such as no Australian government has matched before or since.

It is unlikely that the Gorton Government will suffer just now the same fate as its Menzies-led predecessor did in 1941. But it certainly deserves to. The turn of events in Vietnam, where the valor and effectiveness of the Vietnamese liberation armies have combined with mighty political and financial factors at home to produce at last a US willingness to talk on a settlement of the war, has left the Gorton Government literally gasping for breath.

One could sense the astonishment and anguish of the Government through the words of the former Navy Minister, Mr. Don Chipp, speaking in the supposed secrecy of a government party meeting, but reported by a pressman as saying, directly to Gorton: "Would I be exaggerating, Prime Minister, if I said that five months ago in this party room there was a unanimous view that victory was on the way in Vietnam? Now, does anyone believe that Vietnam will resolve as satisfactorily as Malaya, Korea or Berlin?"

It is hard to imagine a government so outflanked by events, so unprepared for a dramatic turn in a situation of prime concern to it. But being outflanked and unprepared is one thing. The quality of the response to such a situation is another. With his statement of March 31 announcing a limitation of the bombing
of North Vietnam and his decision not to seek another term of office, President Johnson exercised the unconscionable right of the leader of any great power to do precisely what the interests of that power require in precisely the way he thinks fit. He did not in the least find it necessary to consult his Vietnam ally, Australia, about what he intended to do.

One is reminded of a 1940 discussion between President Roosevelt and the Australian Minister to Washington, R. G. Casey, in which Roosevelt told of a US Cabinet discussion held a short time before on what the USA should do in three contingencies — an attack on Canada, an attack on a Latin American republic, or an attack on Australia and New Zealand. Gist of the decision was that of course if Canada was attacked, the US would be involved; if the Latin American republic was attacked, the US would be involved provided the republic was not too far from the territory of the USA; as for Australia and New Zealand, well, the implication was, the element of distance was so great it was altogether too bad! Reported in Sir Alan Watt's *Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965*.

The Gorton Government's pique at being thus ignored is understandable, considering the picture of a "special" Australian-US relationship which its spokesmen are so fond of projecting. But governments, like men, must sometimes know how to swallow feelings of hurt pride. If, swallowing its feelings, the Gorton Government had been able to come back smiling, to welcome the turn of events in Vietnam, and to wish success to the talks, it might have been saved some credit for itself.

What has happened, however, is that it has not succeeded in hiding its feelings of sullen resentment at the beginning of the Paris talks, and has even, according to the US magazine *Newsweek*, permitted itself to get drawn into a so-called "co-ordinating committee" along with the Saigon puppets, the Thais, South Koreans and Filipinos with the purpose of all pulling together at the coat-tails of the US the moment it looks as if the US is ready to move towards a meaningful settlement in Vietnam. This committee of the internationally tenth-rate is the kind of company Australia is consorting with in the 19th year of Liberal control of Australia's foreign policy destinies.

What this action of the Gorton Government reveals in all its nakedness is just how the Liberals understand the American Alliance of which they talk so much. Their understanding of this Alliance amounts to a craven, immoral and maybe-to-be-disappointed hope of keeping the USA involved in killing Asians, of keeping American power involved in Asia as a means of guaranteeing that the US "protect" Australia in some unspecified future.
contingency. Crass and base are the only words to apply to this kind of stance in international politics.

It is surely a measure of the disservice done to the Labor Party by the leadership of Mr. Whitlam that at the moment of the most open display of the political and moral bankruptcy of the government, his party should have been more concerned with an internal crisis precipitated by himself than with pointing out to the electorate the pass to which the Liberals had brought the country, and Labor’s prescription for the way out. Indeed, far from getting after the Government over the fiasco of its Vietnam policy, one of the points the prideful Mr. Whitlam was holding against the Victorian executive of the Labor Party was that it had presumed on its own account to make statements in line with ALP federal conference policy denouncing the Vietnam war.

Not for a long time had the dream-world quality of Australian political life as it is lived at present by the country’s major parties been so clearly displayed. Of all political parties, only the Communist Party was not taken by surprise by the turn of events. As early as the first week in February, the report delivered to a meeting of its National Committee by National Secretary Mr. Laurie Aarons had laid out the inner meaning of the Tet offensive — the assumption of an offensive strategy by the Vietnamese, and basic military defeat for the Americans — and foreshadowed the events which have now come to pass. (The report was embodied in a resolution published in Tribune under the headline, “Time To Rethink On Vietnam,” on February 14).

The Labor Party’s predicament on this occasion has particular significance. It showed quite clearly that for all Mr. Whitlam’s facile presentation of an “image,” his persistent failure to seize the nettle on questions of foreign policy constantly vitiates his leadership. And this failure arises directly from his political position, his whole outlook on politics. It sends one’s mind back to the crucial episode in modern Labor Party history, the split of the middle ’fifties. This split, which led to the formation of the Democratic Labor Party with its ultra-Right foreign policy, occurred as a result of the party’s efforts, at its 1954 Hobart conference, to re-orient its foreign policy in line with the modern needs of Australia. The issues on which the split occurred — the question of the recognition of China, withdrawal of troops from Malaya, and the banning of nuclear weapons — are substantially the great modern Australian issues, upon whose resolution the country’s future depends.

Acceptance by the Labor Party of the bi-partisan foreign policy with the Liberals which was essentially advocated by its far Right would have condemned it to abject political sterility.
The history of the ALP since that time can be seen as a history of struggle between those who wish to take advantage of the party's opportunity to present a bold alternative foreign policy, and those who see electoral advantage in minimising the foreign policy differences with the Liberals, in playing down foreign policy. The main representative of the latter trend, Mr. Whitlam, has spared no effort to bend, for example, the firm decision of the opposition to the Vietnam war adopted by the 1966 federal Labor Party conference to what he sees as the prevailing mood of the electorate.

Mr. Whitlam's efforts to mute his party's foreign policy differences with the Government are paralleled in domestic matters by his constant hankering for some sort of accommodation with the DLP forces. On both counts, he is profoundly mistaken about the nature of modern Australian politics. By adopting the position it has, the DLP has ruled itself out as a significant opposition force in Australian life. It simply agrees with the government on all the main questions of foreign policy.

These questions are up for resolution. They would have been so anyway, but the 19-year record of Liberal governments, and the present state of Liberal foreign policy, make their resolution more urgent than ever. To the extent that the Labor Party seeks to evade these questions and to accommodate itself to Government-DLP positions, to that extent it fails to do its duty to the nation, and also passes up the most serious opportunities it has to regain office. In the months ahead, as the foreign policy debate mounts in intensity, and pressures grow from the Right for still more reactionary foreign policy positions for Australia, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Labor Party may well face a moment of truth as significant in its own way as that confronting the Liberals at the present time.

It is impossible to sort out from the babel of voices arising from Government ranks at the present time any clear or dominant line of policy. But all leading Liberals who have expressed themselves adhere in one form or another to the concept of military force as the decisive element in our relations with Asia. There are "big pact" men (who want a new South-east Asian military grouping including Indonesia), there are "little pact" men (who want arrangements limited, perhaps, to Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore), and there are some who look to Japan.

The reservations expressed by the Government over accession to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty has publicly displayed the strength of those in the Government party who want to keep
Australia's hands free to seize the nuclear weapon, should occasion arise. Prime Minister Gorton himself, a politician noted for his close personal connections with senior members of the armed forces, appears to be developing ideas which break with the "forward defence" thinking which has dominated Government policy for years. But in its stead Gorton appears to be advocating some kind of "fortress Australia" strategy.

The drift of the Prime Minister's thinking was indicated by Sydney Morning Herald reporter, Ian Fitchett, when he wrote on May 21: "In the Government party room, Mr. Gorton is reported to have said that Australia would have to give far more attention to the example of defence efforts by countries like Israel." It is well-known that there is a strong school of thought among senior army officers, whose ideas could be assumed to be well-known to Mr. Gorton, that far too little attention has been paid to such military arms as the Citizen Military Forces, the kind of force so strongly developed in Israel, a state which is bellicose and beleaguered all at once.

Given the state of flux in Liberal thinking, there must be increasing pressure for the Labor Party to take some strong initiative on foreign policy questions, to move into the "vacuum" which is so painfully evident on the government side. It is impossible to ignore the signs of a significant shift of forces within the Labor Party, under the impact of recent international developments. The emergence of Dr. J. F. Cairns as indisputably Mr. Whitlam's strongest rival for leadership of the party in the April caucus ballot is perhaps the most impressive of these. The fact that Dr. Cairns ran Mr. Whitlam to a 38-32 result cannot be dissociated from foreign policy matters, given Dr. Cairns' unequivocal identification with Leftwing Labor Party positions on questions of international relations.

Whatever the immediate outcome of the struggle in the Labor Party, it is certain that the great imperative of our national life — the finding of a viable, morally-based set of policies by which Australia can accommodate its own legitimate national interests with the legitimate national interests of our neighbors — require a much more active attack on the foreign policies of the Liberal Establishment than is evident at present. Such an offensive, advocating positive alternative policies designed to safeguard peace in the region, would find a ready response in the developing mass movement of protest and dissent over Liberal lines of foreign policy. Contemporary experience in other countries is clearly demonstrating the power of the unity of diverse social forces to quickly transform apparently immutable situations.
Bernie Taft

ONE YEAR AFTER

The author, who was a member of the delegation of the Communist Party of Australia to the International Consultative meeting of Communist Parties held in Budapest in February, visited Israel on his way home. Here he discusses the situation in that country and in the Middle East a year after the June war.

THE JUNE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST has not solved Israel's problems, it has made them more serious. Israel's security is not greater than before June 5th. Peace is not nearer. The border incidents continue, with heavier clashes and loss of life. In Israel right-wing forces are more firmly entrenched. The atmosphere in the country is one of reliance on force, of "teaching the Arabs a lesson". The appetite for foreign conquest is growing. There is something of a cult of Dayan. The whole country is moving to the right. Voices are heard, and increasingly listened to, which talk of the "right to hold the land which we conquered by our arms".

The Israeli government acts in defiance of world opinion—the military parade through the occupied areas of Jerusalem in May was an example. Israel is losing some of the support and good will that it had earlier. Some sections of the left in the West which had tended to sympathise with Israel when Arab voices were heard calling for Israel's destruction, are revising their attitude, repelled by the intransigent attitude of the Israeli government. For despite all the talk about its desire for a peace settlement, the government is putting forward demands which it knows to be unrealistic and which no Arab leader could possibly accept. It deliberately refuses to clearly state its territorial settlement terms. At the same time responsible government leaders, such as the Minister of Defence (Ha'aretz, January 19, 1968) talk of "the Jordan river as a border of security of Israel".

The thinking behind this was revealed by the Prime Minister Levy Ashkol when he said on the eve of his visit to Washington (28th December 1967)—"Who knows if we will not have to remain another 20 years, maybe more, inside the border of the cease-fire lines, which are much more natural, stronger and more bold and
give us much more outlook into the future and much more hope". Such statements belie the professed desire for a just peace. For those on the left, the post-June developments in Israel must be extremely disturbing. Like the June war itself these developments are connected with the policies pursued by the Israeli establishment for the last 15 years.

What is happening today has to be seen in its setting. It has a history and it, like the June war itself, cannot be understood outside of its development. The establishment of the Jewish state of Israel in 1947 by decision of the United Nations was the direct result of the terrible tragedy that had befallen the Jewish people in Europe during the Nazi occupation. Six million Jews were killed systematically and in cold blood in what was the most monstrous operation of its kind in all human history. Europe was repaying a debt to the survivors of this tragedy. But the establishment of a Jewish state in a country populated by another people, the Palestinian Arabs, was bound to create problems.

After all, as Arab spokesmen have often said since, the Arabs were not the ones responsible for the crimes committed by Europeans against the Jewish people. In fact, Jews had lived for centuries in Arab lands in complete peace and harmony among the Arab population. It seemed to them that Europe was paying its debt to the Jewish people at the expense of the Arabs. If an historical claim 2000 years old has meaning to Jews, having lived in the country for generations has also meaning for the Arab population in Israel.

So difficulties were bound to arise: the question was how they were to be met. If a Jewish state was to flourish in the midst of this Arab world, which in the meantime was awakening and demanding its national independence, it had to find a way to live with it. Those circumstances demanded of the leaders of Israel a sincere attempt to find an accommodation with the awakening Arab movement. There were very real difficulties of course. Reactionary Arab feudal rulers, working in league with foreign imperialist powers denounced the state of Israel. Often the more subservient they were to the Western powers, particularly to the oil interests, which dominated the area economically, the louder were their attacks on Israel. It became a means of diverting the attention of their own people to a foreign enemy. Arab reactionaries acting in behalf of imperialist interests had in fact attempted to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel by force in 1948. But with the development of Egyptian revolution in 1952 a real possibility arose to find an accommodation with Egypt, the most important Arab country.
When a group of young Egyptian officers overthrew King Farouk in July 1952, they were motivated by a desire to rid the country of British colonial rule and to free it of the general corruption which had grown up around that rule. They were not preoccupied with the Palestine question. King Farouk had started the 1948 war and left the Army fire blank bullets, the cash difference went into his pocket. To get rid of British colonial rule, which was still in control of the country and the Suez Canal, was their aim—not an attack on Israel.

Nasser became the leader in 1954. He pursued a neutralist foreign policy, attempted to free the country of British domination and to gain control of the Suez Canal. Nasser actively attempted to find an accommodation with Israel. The war of 1948 had left a heritage of over one million Arab refugees, which Israel had steadfastly refused to do anything about. But with the retirement of the hard line Prime Minister Ben Gurion in December 1953 and his replacement by Moshe Shareff, who was a moderate who was looking for a political settlement with the Arab countries, a real possibility existed of finding a solution to the Israel-Arab conflicts. As contacts were established between Nasser and Shareff, the hard line forces in Israel led by Lavon, the Minister for Defence, and Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff, did all they could to prevent the attempts at rapprochement.

The Israeli Security Service was instructed to send Israeli agents into Egypt to carry out acts of sabotage against Western property which would be blamed on the Egyptians. This is how this episode is now openly described in a recently published best seller in Israel Eli Cohen, Our Man in Damascus, by E. Ben Hanan, pp. 24-25:

It had happened at the end of the summer of 1954. Information arriving from London caused Israeli leaders a considerable amount of worry. It seemed that the elderly Churchill under Egyptian pressure—accompanied by frequent acts of terrorism—had decided to withdraw the British forces from their bases in the Suez Canal area. For the ruling junta in Egypt this was a considerable accomplishment, but as far as Israel was concerned a British presence in the canal area was vital.

. . . The best solution seemed to be a series of sabotage attempts and open provocations, to be carried out by hired terrorists, secretly trained in sabotage and espionage since 1951 by Israeli agents. Some of the terrorists had even received "scholarships" for advanced training in Israel, which they had reached via France . . . they were divided into two groups, Cairo and Alexandria.

. . . In the months of May-June 1954, Israel decided to activate the group decisively. Instructions were received at the Headquarters calling for sabotage in public buildings, cinemas, post offices and railroad stations. The main target was to be British institutions such as libraries, cultural centres, houses owned by British citizens, and the British legation in Egypt. The aim—to bring Britain to the conclusion that it was still early to pull out of Egypt and that all guarantees offered by the Egyptian government in exchange for evacuation of the bases, were ineffective in the light of the continuing wave of terrorism.
It led to the arrest and execution of two Israeli agents in Egypt. Other efforts, not all yet revealed by any means, were made to aggravate the tension between Israel and Egypt.

The Israel Security Service which played a major role in these operations, is regarded as a most efficient organisation. This is how it has been described by General Von Horn, the Chief of U.N. Observers Staff in the Middle East:

The Israeli Secret Service has no equal in the Middle East in collecting information and special operations. It recognises no sovereignty other than its own, and lacks all inhibitions in its activity. Aided by an almost complete security blackout in its own country, it also knows that it is supported by practically every citizen of Israel, from the Prime Minister on down to the man in the street. And it enjoys the fruit of its penetration into practically every secret service in the world.

The Western oil interests then as now did not want a settlement of the conflicts between the peoples in the area. In fact Britain and France planned to get rid of Nasser who was adopting an increasingly independent attitude. An alliance with the hard line forces in Israel was carefully constructed. The next vital step in this tragic chain of events took place on February 28, 1955—11 days after Ben Gurion returned from retirement to the office of Israel's Defence Minister. It was the Israeli attack on an Egyptian garrison near the armistice border in the Gaza Strip, three miles into Egyptian territory, in which 43 people were killed. As Jean Lacoutièere describes it in his book, *Egypt in Transition*, "The Israeli attack on February 28 cannot be compared with the previous acts committed on both sides, and it opens a new phase—that of a sizeable military operation in a zone which has long been living in a state of insecurity*.

Certainly Egypt saw this as the victory of the "hard" line in Israel. Nasser is on record as seeing it in this way. It led to his fateful decision to form the commandos, the fadayeen which were recruited among the refugees in Gaza, and trained in sabotage. This seriously aggravated the situation between Egypt and Israel. But even after that Nasser made another attempt to reach a settlement with Israel. Through Dom Mintoff, who was then Prime Minister of Malta, contacts were established in January 1966 and a secret meeting between Nasser and Israeli representatives was planned for April in Malta.

As soon as the British got wind of this they did their best to prevent peace. The plans for the Suez campaign had been made. The dominant hard line leadership in the Israeli government acted in the same way. Israel's collusion in the Suez aggression against Egypt established her in the eyes of the Arabs as a Western agency in the Middle East. It made the task of finding a lasting peace in the area more difficult.
It is not difficult to understand why Western oil interests, with their enormous profits from the exploitation of the Middle East should do everything possible to destroy the movement for national independence or to keep up tensions between Jews and Arabs in the area. But what of the people of Israel? Have they not suffered enough? Do they not want to live in peace and security in their own land? This is certainly the popular sentiment, but the people who run the country have different aims.

The Israeli ruling class has long-range and well prepared plans. They involve conquering territory and "clearing" it of its inhabitants. They are based on an alliance with the Western interests in the Middle East. To carry them out requires skilful efforts to deceive its own people, to aggravate tension with its Arab neighbors and to bring up the youth in a spirit of hostility towards the Arabs. The ruling class made good use of the chauvinistic elements in the Arab movement, to create an atmosphere in Israel of a people surrounded by enemies bent on its destruction. They were helped by Arab extremists.

The Israeli ruling class is very skilful—it has learned well from the experiences of the ruling classes of other countries. One of the most surprising impressions one gets in Israel is the manipulated public opinion about the Arab national liberation movement. The public is shown only its muddy streams, its chauvinistic and demagogic elements. Nasser is presented as simply another Hitler. But the creation of this picture is important for the fulfilment of the aims of the Establishment.

Last year a lecturer at the Tel Aviv University, Dr. George Tamarin, conducted a survey of students in 7th and 8th grades of the Tel Aviv Primary School (13 to 14-year-olds) about the attitude to the Arabs. He asked them about some passages in the book of Joshua (which is compulsory study) according to which the invading armies at the "command of God" destroyed whole towns and villages and killed all inhabitants, including women and children. One of the questions to these 13-14-year-olds was: "If today the Israeli Army conquers an Arab village or an Arab town, do you consider it correct that it should act according to the behest of Joshua and kill all the inhabitants"? The horrifying results showed that 66% of the students answered the question in the affirmative. Typical replies were: The Arabs are our arch-enemies, it is necessary to kill them, because they can't be trusted and will otherwise kill Jews, etc. Eight per cent were partly in agreement, but had reservations and 26% opposed on humanitarian grounds, or because it would damage Israel's reputation in the eyes of the world. The academic who had criticised the chauvinistic education and its
results was dismissed from his post. This happened only a few months before the June war.

The Israeli public, for all its sophistication, its high level of education, its interest in politics, is astonishingly ill-informed on matters pertaining to Israel and its Arab neighbors. There is no doubt the overwhelming majority of the population of Israel supported the June war. They believed that the country was fighting for its existence and the people for their survival. The threats by Arab extremists to destroy Israel played the main part in this conviction. The experience of the destruction of the six million Jews in Europe during the Second World War has left a deep scar on Jewish consciousness. Some of the remnants of this holocaust are in Israel. Many of them lost members of their family during the war. Such people are naturally very sensitive to the threat of destruction, no matter how empty such threats may have been.

The Israel ruling class managed to use the traumatic experiences of the Jewish people for their own purposes. It served them as a means to unite the country and lead it into the June war. It made full use of the irresponsible and disgraceful statements of Arab chauvinists and demagogues which called for the destruction of Israel and made threats against the people of Israel. It deepened the feeling among the Jewish population of being surrounded by enemies bent on their destruction. But whatever the ordinary people believed, and were made to believe, the military and political leaders of the country knew perfectly well that there was no threat to Israel. They knew the state of the Egyptian Army, they knew that Nasser tried to avoid a conflict, that he was not in a position to fight, that he was bluffing. They knew of the secret efforts by Nasser to find a peaceful way out of the crisis. They knew of the concessions he offered to reach a peaceful settlement.

But they hid all this from their people. They fed them on biased and one-sided information. They highlighted all the aggressive statements and suppressed the conciliatory ones. They planned and prepared for this war well ahead. The blunders and miscalculations of Nasser as well as the boastful threats of other Arab leaders provided them with the opportunity to put these plans into effect. They exploited them with great skill.

Because of the way in which our information media handled the crisis the picture has been distorted and many of the facts have been hidden. It is certainly not common knowledge that Egypt’s attitude right through was one of moderation towards Israel, that it made frequent attempts to settle the differences, to find an accommodation with Israel. Nasser was constantly under pressure from demagogic Arab rulers for being soft on Israel. Despite Suez,
Nasser's policies since 1956 made United States imperialism the main target, while opposition to Israel was based on its connection with the United States and its support for US policies. This became more acute after the Greek military coup on April 21, 1967. Nasser, who was under growing pressure from the United States, became convinced that this was a new stage in the American plans to remove the anti-imperialist governments in the Middle East.

In the confidential Information Bulletin of the Central organisation of the Egyptian Socialist League, which is distributed to about 100 top Egyptian functionaries only, it was stated:

After the regime in Athens, the Cypriot Government of Archbishop Makarios will probably be next. The Americans will try to establish a subservient government there, in order to strengthen their position in the eastern Mediterranean. After that they will attack Syria, which because of its isolated position is the weak link in the progressive Arab world. The Baath regime in Damascus has not understood how to secure its position among the population. The ultimate aim of the Americans is the Nasser regime in Egypt.

A week after the Greek coup Nasser in his speech on May 1 made a violent attack on the United States, accusing it of being the head of a world-wide counter-revolution.

A week later on May 8, two Syrian representatives arrived in Cairo to inform Nasser that Israel was preparing a large-scale military operation to topple the regime in Damascus. They asked for Nasser's help. Nasser, who was suspicious of the Syrians and who feared that they wanted to push him into a conflict with Israel, replied that he would not promise anything until he had checked their information himself. The two Syrians told him that their information came from two sources; the Lebanese who were regarded as cautious and sober, and from their own information service, which had sent some officers into Israel.

Nasser decided to get his own information service to investigate the matter and also to task the Soviet Union if it believed that the Israelis at the behest of the United States were preparing for an offensive against the Syrian Government. The Soviet authorities confirmed that Israel was planning an attack on Syria and on May 12 responsible Israelis themselves declared that they intended to topple the Syrian Government in order to put an end to the raids of Palestinian units. This was also stated publicly by the Israeli Chief of Staff, M. Rabin.

Nasser decided that the threat was serious and required him to act to save the Syrian Government from destruction. His own information service confirmed Israel's intentions. He decided to take steps that he believed would frighten Israel and prevent it from proceeding with its plans to attack Syria. What did he do?
Did he send this troops secretly to the border in order to prepare for a surprise attack on Israel? No, he marched his troops openly with bands in broad daylight through Cairo, past the American Embassy. The whole thing had a theatrical touch about it. The Americans understood that this was meant to tell them Egypt was prepared to defend Syria, and that warned them to restrain Israel from destroying the Syrian regime.

The Egyptian troops reach the border. Nasser takes the next step (of a purely local character) by asking, not U Thant, but the Commander of the UN forces, General Rikhye to withdraw his troops temporarily from the border, until the crisis is over. There is no suggestion that the UN forces should leave Egypt or that Egyptian troops should replace UN forces at Sham El-shekh. But what happens is that General Rikhye says he has not the authority to do this, “only President Nasser can put such a demand to U Thant”. Nasser is compelled to ask U Thant to withdraw the troops from the border. Even then he does not even mention Sham El-shekh. But U Thant’s reaction is surprising. He says to Nasser that “if he wants the UN troops to leave the border he has to ask that all international troops be removed from Egypt.” Nasser is caught. He has to ask for the withdrawal. Even then U Thant acts with a strange rapidity. Nobody, least of all Nasser himself, expected this.

Why did U Thant act in this unusual way? Two theories have been advanced. One is that he wanted to create difficulties for the Americans in order to force them to scale down the war in Vietnam. The other is that the Americans had in fact encouraged him to act in this speedy fashion to call Nasser’s bluff, and to damage his reputation. In any case Nasser was now caught in a vise. For eleven years he has been under constant pressure to remove this remnant of the Suez aggression of 1956. Now in the crisis he gives in to the pressure. He proves he is not an “accomplice of the Zionists” as his enemies have accused him.

Even then he tries to prevent the crisis from growing. He accepts a request for a meeting with U Thant on May 22 in Cairo. They reach a secret agreement to ease the tension. Nasser agrees to let non-strategic material through the Gulf of Aqaba. U Thant undertakes to ask the maritime nations to send strategic materials through Haifa (as before 1956) pending the settlement of the issue. The Egyptians take still another step to avoid war. They offer “If the Israelis will publicly undertake not to attack Syria we are prepared to withdraw our troops from the frontier”.

A week later President Johnson sends Charles Yost as his personal representative to Cairo. The visit is secret. He has a discussion with
the Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad. They reach an agreement that (1) diplomatic efforts will continue to solve the problems in a peaceful way, (2) Egypt will raise no objections to the dispute being placed before the International Court in the Hague, (3) Zakaria Muhieddin, the first vice-president of the Republic, will go to Washington to work out an acceptable compromise. Charles Yost leaves Cairo on Saturday, June 3, two days before the start of the war. He leaves Nasser with the calming reassurance that Israel will not attack whilst negotiations continue.

Was the war necessary for Israel’s survival? Certainly Israel’s leaders knew how weak and unprepared the Arabs were, how much all the threats amounted to. How else is it to be explained that Ben Gurion, the old warrior, was opposed to the war? Would he have done so, if Israel was in mortal danger? Of course, Ben Gurion knew what the real position was. The war and its outcome has changed many things in the area. It has exposed the irresponsibility and downright treachery of Arab chauvinism. It has shown it as an instrument of those forces who want to subvert or destroy the Arab liberation movement. The war has also shown up the big weaknesses in the socio-economic structure of the Arab countries—the limited nature of the social changes, the existence of a privileged caste in the army, the reliance on nationalist demagogy as a substitute for the serious job of social reconstruction. There are some hopeful signs that some of these lessons are beginning to be learned.

The tragedy is that at the very time when the Arabs after bitter lessons are beginning to think with their heads instead of their hearts, all too many people in Israel are thinking with their hearts instead of their heads. Yet the real friends of Israel are those who advise her to seek, even at this late hour, and despite all the difficulties, the only road that leads to a secure future—the road of conciliation and compromise, the road that seeks a settlement based on the rights of both Jews and Arabs. Any other way can only lead to ultimate disaster.
An Interview With Lukacs

Members of the editorial staff of Nepszabadsag, the daily paper of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, recently interviewed the eminent Hungarian literary critic and philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs, now in his 83rd year. The text of the interview is re-published here in abbreviated form.

QUESTION: What is your opinion about the introduction of the new economic mechanism, what do you expect from the new economic mechanism?

ANSWER: This, in my opinion, has been an extremely important positive step, a continuation of the course started by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. From what did the difficulties arise, from which a way out had to be sought? At the time of the Revolution and Counter-Revolution in the Soviet Union—in 1917—the introduction of the so-called Commissar System in both industry and the army had been absolutely necessary because most of the military, economic and other specialists of the old system were totally unreliable; what is more they supported the Counter-Revolution.

Under Stalin this system was further developed rather than reduced. Suspicion ruled and bureaucratic centralisation, the meticulous supervision of every trivial detail, was typical of the time.

Yet socialist development, which had been launched by Lenin, had a far-reaching educational effect and produced an extremely wide layer of technical intelligentsia and qualified workers, so much so that even America is envious today of this development in the Soviet Union. A stratum of this kind, made up of Soviet men, could not be governed in this way. Signs of this had been evident a very long time ago. This too was recognised by the 20th Congress.

The Hungarian Party also deserves credit for having recognised the need for definite action in this field, and the new mechanism is an important attempt at realising socialist production freed from distortions. This in my opinion is a very positive feature of the new mechanism. It is a step which renders a renascence of marxism possible and necessary; on the other hand again it opens the way for a return to what we used to call proletarian democracy in the early times under Lenin. Now the question that remains is this: to what extent has the break with the old ways been achieved, and in so far as it has not yet been achieved what problems do
arise? In my view certain things have been eliminated. There is no doubt that for instance, in Hungary unlawful actions and everything they imply, have been consistently liquidated; but—and this is my opinion—the necessary and radical elimination of methods earlier used extensively has not yet been accomplished in every respect.

I should like to illustrate this point with an example, with the relation between tactics and theory. One often hears criticism of the wrong thesis that class-war grows more embittered all the time. We have refuted this thesis, but we have not examined it from a marxist point of view. Is it the truth that Stalin believed in the incessant intensification of class-war and this was the reason why the trials in the thirties took place? Or—and I believe this is the truth—did Stalin need the trials for tactical reasons and so he stated that class-war had been intensified all the time. In other words, instead of using the real method of marxism, i.e., the development of strategy and tactics from an analysis of the events, the tactical decisions—be they correct or incorrect—were decisive and theory was built upon them.

Q.: Comrade Lukacs, will you permit an incidental question here? You said it was wrong to criticise without an analysis and by dogmatic methods, the Stalinist thesis of the incessant intensification of class-war. Situations may arise when class-war actually does grow more intensive. So implicitly you condemn also the setting of the thesis of the incessant relaxation of class-war against that of its incessant intensification?

A.: Definitely. Whether class war is growing more intensive or not, is always a definite question which marxists have to clarify in the light of facts and then choose their tactics accordingly. Reverting to the original question, there is a certain reticence both in this country and elsewhere, to speak plainly about the decisive nature of decisive changes. We rather make the matter appear as if there had been a certain development, essentially correct, which would not be improved and what was right would be superseded by something even better instead of saying that a bad thing is being replaced by a satisfactory one. Allow me to refer at this point to Lenin, the great man of theory and tactics. When the Russian Civil War came to an end in 1921, he evolved—as is well-known—the new economic policy. Lenin did not then say that as a matter of fact war-communism had been a good policy, which he would replace by something even better, but stated with absolute frankness that as far as principles were concerned war-communism was an untenable policy which, however, had been forced upon us by circumstances. Since the pressure of circum-
stances ceased, a change would be brought about, a new economic policy be introduced. Lenin never claimed that the new economic policy was a continuation, a development or improvement of war-communism, on the contrary he told that the new economic policy was the opposite of war-communism. My objection is that we do not sufficiently emphasise the contrast between the old and the new economic mechanism, whereas the lessons to be drawn from the “Leninist transition” confirm that often it is the very “shock” that has the effect of awakening the masses and of orientating them toward new objectives.

Q.: You said that the 20th Congress brought a decisive change. Is now a change needed also relative to the 20th Congress?

A.: Its extension is necessary. Seen dialectically, a decisive change does not necessarily take place overnight. It may be the change of a period. The decisive change for instance, in human history, when Man developed and began to work is well known; this change had taken ten thousand or a hundred thousand years. It is certain that work had been the making of Man and it is equally certain that it took ten thousand or a hundred thousand years for work to become universal.

Q.: In recent years a reform of economic direction took place in a number of socialist countries and now the new mechanism is to be introduced also in this country. Does this not prove that the change, as a process, is progressing?

A.: Certain steps forward have been taken, there is no doubt about it. The change is under way, but we cannot claim to have completed it. I consider it necessary to make people conscious of the change in methods, as opposed to attempts at blurring the issue which one still encounters quite often.

Q.: One also encounters the phenomenon of people saying: “What we have now is quite good.” Not good, but “quite good”. And they are afraid that their position will get more difficult in one way or the other, i.e., they are concerned about results achieved so far. So we have to argue that what is now good will eventually be better.

A.: No one doubts that a certain improvement of the economy has taken place. I do not dispute this point, I take it for granted. But I maintain that, if people are still afraid of the new mechanism, it means they have not yet understood what the mechanism will actually mean for them, and we are to be blamed if they have failed to understand it.
Q.: You have been fighting and organising for the social responsibility of literature and art for decades. What is in your opinion, the essence of this responsibility today?

A.: The real significance of literature is that in a given age it reveals the greatness and depth of the human problems arising and the artistic expression of these human problems again has a certain indirect reaction on the progress of history itself. I do not think it was by mere chance that Marx reread the Greek tragedies from year to year, that he knew Shakespeare by heart. This was not merely dabbling at aestheticism on his part, and I am sure that he learned a great deal from them too. He learned about conflicts and to see historical transitions not just as the sum total of manoeuvres but in their larger context.

It was with an awareness of this significance of literature that Soviet literature started: the great works of Gorky, the Klim Samgin, Fadeyev's Nineteen, Sholokhov's Silent Don and Makarenko's pedagogic novels all offered descriptions of the great human problems that had arisen before, and during, 1917, and in the wake of 1917. In works of this kind the historical grandeur of the 1917 Revolution has been truly reflected.

I published an article about Solzhenitsin, in which I raised the problem that it was impossible in any socialist country to write a real novel about people of today unless it contained the resolve to deal with the period of Stalinism. For apart from the young now twenty years old, all of us have lived through these times, and the way one lives, speaks and feels today depends to a great extent on how one reacted, and is reacting, to those times. We ought to encourage the emergence and development of a literature of this kind. I see a very important example of this kind of literature in the two latest volumes by Laszlo Benjamin which reflect very clearly the personality of the professed revolutionary who had seen and experienced all wrongs and despite everything has remained a champion of socialism. This is one of the types of our days. It should be the function of literature to depict an ever broader typical stratum. I am an optimist as regards further development, yet I would consider it necessary to put this part of it in the centre of literature rather than the part emphasising particularities. Think of what Brecht stands for all over the world. Brecht has enjoyed a world-wide success, both in the socialist and the non-socialist countries, but his reputation had been established in the first place by Mother Courage, A Good Man is Wanted and so forth, i.e., by plays in which he presented the historical position of contemporary Man. These important human problems should be unearthed by literature, and if they succeed in doing this there
will again come a new period of vigor in literature comparable to that achieved by Soviet literature in the twenties.

Q.: As to how far it was the responsibility of literature to elaborate the complex labelled the personality cult you said in one of your articles that you considered it was the central task. If it is the central task to grapple with the heritage of that age, it means that essentially we have not yet accomplished it.

A.: It is my opinion that this is one of the central tasks of great importance of our era. It would be a great achievement, if a writer in this country were to be found who for instance, would be able to write the story of Jozsef Revai’s life, a life which I consider fraught with tragic conflicts. I know many comrades who in the early twenties had been excellent, devoted revolutionaries, who belonged to the type of men represented later by Imre Sallai, and who subsequently found themselves in opposition with what they had fought for. I know also some who have become dogmatic bureaucrats. “Central question” is a rather unsatisfactory phrase because the interrelation between the individual and the community is so complex that it must allow more than one central question to exist. One can speak of a whole complex of central questions. The complex I call the Revai tragedy is certainly one of the most important and most central problems in understanding today’s Man.

Q.: Comrade Lukacs, you have emphasised only the negative aspects of the period in question. After all, the people who won the biggest battles of World War 2, and who defeated fascism, had been brought up in Stalin’s time. And the generation which grew up in this country after Liberation carried out the socialist revolution.

A.: May I perhaps put my answer in this wording: I believe that even the worst of socialism is better than the best of capitalism. This is my deep conviction and it was with this conviction that I lived through those times. Since the building of socialism was going on also in those times, they too had their positive aspects. In the Soviet Union an up-to-date industry had been established that made resistance against Hitler possible. So I do not deny this positive aspect, but now for instance we are talking about literature and here we cannot evade the question that a number of people, even if in good faith, were involved in the most complicated situations distorting their human character and talent. Unless these distortions are shown, today’s reality cannot be presented as a reality. Human development is extremely complex, and of all things it is literature that must never gloss over its negative aspects, because it
is literature that can show us what powers of resistance, and what reserves still to be tapped, are to be found in man’s psyche and morality: it also shows the pitfalls which may influence the course of even the best of men.

Q.: Just one last question, Comrade Lukacs. What is your opinion of the present situation of marxism in the world?

A.: In most recent times a situation most favorable for us has developed. Namely, at the time when danger of war was—to some extent—removed, and a certain stage of detente was reached in the cold war, the ideologies that had emerged in the leading capitalist countries in the wake of victory in 1945 were all in a state of crisis. This is most obvious in the case of the United States where the post-1945 dreams of “American political and ideological hegemony”, the illusion in connexion with the American way of life, have collapsed. Most particularly the war in Vietnam and the immense difficulties besetting the efforts to integrate the negroes, have shown that the American ideology evolved in 1945 has all but completely failed.

On our side again the situation we discussed in connexion with the first question has arisen. One of the most important consequences ensuing from this is a steady growth of interest in and a positive approach to marxism in the West. In 1945 marxism was treated as an obsolete ideology of the 20th century, while in these days it has gained ground in a remarkable way. Compare the position taken by Sartre in 1945 and his position today, twenty years later. Consider how in the 'twenties Freudians took as their point of departure the need to bolster up Marx with Freudian psychology, and how today it is their aspiration to rehabilitate Freudism with the help of marxism. In a word, there is a very great interest in marxism now emerging, and that provides for us great vistas. In the 'twenties the then still starving and destroyed Russia exercised a vast influence on western intelligentsia. Now we have come to a point where it is up to us to increase our influence upon the West. We are in a favorable situation and we have to be equal to it. We do not realise how profoundly we could influence development in the capitalist world from philosophy to literature and music, if our standards were adequate. Let me quote here Bartok's example whose impact is constantly increasing, in contrast with that of extreme modernists who tried to disparage him by negative criticism. There is no reason why our literature, our film art and our philosophy should not have a similar influence, provided that we firmly break with dogmatism.

A universal approach with real appeal to people is needed. All its elements are inherent in marxism, all we have to do is to unearth them and turn them to good account.
EMPLOYERS are noted for their ingenuity in devising new methods of attacking wages to meet the circumstances at a particular time. A new method evolved in the period after the Second World War is called incomes policy, and it is to this subject that this book is devoted.

It is a full report of a symposium convened in 1966 by the International Institute of Labour Studies, (set up by the International Labour Office), to examine attempts to apply an incomes policy to the problems of the labour market and inflation.

The basic premise of the Symposium was that the generally accepted policy of full employment in the postwar period had created a permanent labour shortage which led employers to bid in the open market to obtain the scarce labour. The result was an upward wages drift which caused price instability and inflation.

The shortcomings of the usual market and planning mechanisms made them unable to deal with this problem. For relying on the market mechanism produced stop-go policies which produced recessions which resulted in unwelcome economic losses and had a detrimental effect on expansion. Relying on the planning mechanism would entail stringent plans to cover both production and consumption, but this, as one participant delicately put it, ... runs counter to our Western ethic”.

The incomes policy concept was formulated as a means of dealing with the problem of wage drift, but it was recognised that the establishment of price stability would require other economic measures, including price control.

The Symposium concluded that incomes policy was rather a woolly concept insofar as there is no generally accepted definition of it. But in practice it means that wage increases would be kept within certain official guidelines fixed around the increase in national productivity. Wage drift also turned out to be woolly because statistical shortcomings in all countries made it difficult to assess accurately its trend or specific areas of existence.

According to one participant an incomes policy could only be successfully introduced by a left-wing government, while another pointed out that in the six European countries where an incomes policy had been introduced it had in fact been done initially by a “labour” or “socialist” government.

Of interest in relation to Australia was a comment that an incomes policy was doomed to failure in a small export-dependent country.

Trade union participants held that if there was to be any restraint on wages, it should also apply to other incomes; that the worst aspect of incomes policy was the assumption that wages were the major cause of inflation; that acceptance of the policy meant that the trade unions agreed with the prevailing distribution of incomes; that it was not difficult to detect in such theories a predilection for a distribution of income unfavourable to wage earners.
One trade union participant contended that in a balanced economy there was no need for an incomes policy, whilst in an unbalanced one it could not be achieved. The general consensus of opinion appeared to support the latter conclusion, as it was apparent in actual practice that no country in the Western world had succeeded in achieving a fully fledged incomes policy and price stability. In fact, countries which had attempted to implement an incomes policy were no more successful than others in avoiding inflation.

The attempts failed for two reasons. One reason was, "... whilst wage drift was suppressed to some extent by law, the pressures causing wage drift (a desire to undertake competitive bidding, etc.) prevailed". The other reason was that tensions were generated inside the trade unions because, "... union officials were prevented by law from claiming increases which employers were prepared to concede". (That is, the economic forces operating in the labour market were too powerful to be restrained indefinitely.)

The immediate question which arises from this pessimistic conclusion is why were the attempts then made to introduce an incomes policy? Although this was not answered directly by the Symposium the answer appeared indirectly in some comments.

One was by an American trade union participant who said that when President Johnson set down guideposts on wage increases of 3.2% maximum, this "had a major restraining influence on wage settlements because it was a useful bargaining weapon for employers. The overall result was a sizeable lag of real wages behind productivity in a period when unemployment was declining". It is obvious therefore, that even when an incomes policy eventually failed, it can effectively restrain wages over a period.

In Australia, an incomes policy is not such a foreign concept as might appear on the surface. The President of the Arbitration Commission has been expressing concern for some time about the wage drift in Australia as expressed in over-award payments. The majority decision in the Metal Trades Award Work Value Inquiry even made an abortive attempt to deal with it by encouraging the employers to absorb the increases granted in existing over-award payments.

It seems likely that the employers would have had the incomes policy concept put through their "think factory" to see what use it could be to them. They have not however, adopted it but have formulated a wages policy more suited to Australian conditions. It is still however, designed to achieve the same objective as an incomes policy of restraining award wage increases, although only at a national level. Even then it would result in big savings for them. The employers have five factors operating to their advantage. The first is the highly centralised wage fixation provided by the arbitration system. The second is the constitutional limitation on the introduction of price control at a national level. The third is that their policy could be implemented irrespective of what Government was in office. The fourth is that it does not require the co-operation of the trade unions. The fifth is that such a wages policy could be a long-term one as it would not be exposed to anything like the same degree to the economic forces which experience has shown can undermine an incomes policy.

The moral is that the employers have obviously been doing some hard thinking on wage theory, so it behoves the trade union movement to do the same.

J. Hutson

IN FEBRUARY 1966 Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, two Soviet writers, were sentenced to seven and five years imprisonment respectively, the terms to be served “in a corrective labour colony with severe regime.” The crime of which the two men were found guilty was of publishing abroad, under the pseudonyms of Tertz and Arzhak, slanderous anti-Soviet propaganda, which was “passed off by hostile propaganda as truthful accounts of life in the Soviet Union.”

At the time, the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel created a tremendous interest in the West, an interest no doubt increased by the secrecy with which the Soviet authorities attempted to shroud the proceedings. As a result of this interest, and especially as a result of many letters and petitions begging clemency for the two men, Pravda of February 22, 1966 said:

“Some honest people have been misled by the campaign mounted in the West in defence of these two subversive writers. Lacking the necessary information, and accepting the statements of the bourgeois press, which shamelessly puts Sinyavsky and Daniel on a par with Gogol and Dostoyevsky and claims that literary issues and the freedom of the press were at stake, some honest and progressive people have felt disturbed.”

The importance of this book, On Trial, is that this “necessary information” is now available, so that “honest and progressive people”, or anyone else for that matter, who may have felt “disturbed” by what happened to Sinyavsky and Daniel, can now judge the issues for themselves.

The book includes a complete transcript of the trial (which has never been published in the Soviet Union), as well as a large number of comments and appreciations, from both within the Soviet Union and from the West. There are many relevant quotations from Soviet journals and newspapers, in addition to many previously unpublished protests and letters from prominent Soviet writers, as well as numerous petitions from Western writers and intellectuals. The long introduction to the book gives the backgrounds and reputations of the two convicted men, together with such pieces as Sholekov’s speech to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (April 1966) in which he denounced them, declaring their sentences to be too lenient. In addition, the book reproduces the key passages from the writings of Sinyavsky and Daniel, those passages which were most frequently cited during the trial and for which the writers primarily were convicted.

In all, I think it’s fair to say that, whilst two years ago Pravda may have had a point, anyone now armed with this most important book is in a good position to form a reasonable and accurate impression of the trial: of the nature of the charges against the two men, their basis in fact, and of the fairness of the proceedings and the final judgement.

And having read through On Trial, as well as through most of the writings for which the two men were convicted, it seems clear to me that there was a gross mis-carriage of justice. The charge of deliberately purveying anti-Soviet propaganda was in no way substantiated by any evidence presented, and the whole judicial process in which the two men were obliged to participate seems to have been arranged (as several prominent left-wing intellectuals in the West suggested at the time) for the sole purpose of setting some sort of example to other writers.
as to the sort of writing the Soviet establishment would not tolerate.

Such a charge, in fact, seems to be substantiated when we note the tone of the various pre-trial accounts of Sinyavsky and Daniel which appeared in the Moscow press. For instance, Izvestia, the "official" government paper, published on January 13, 1966 an article called "The Turncoats", in which the two writers were depicted as agents of Western propaganda, displaying "hatred for our system, vile mockery of everything dear to our Motherland and people".

Essentially then the trial was a public display of strength, though just how public it eventually became was no doubt the cause of some embarrassment to those who organised it. It was also one of the most unfortunate chapters from the as yet unwritten history of the literary infighting and repression which has bedevilled the Soviet system almost from its inception.

But what was there in the work of Sinyavsky and Daniel which singled them out as the victims of this bureaucratic stupidity? The fact that much of this work was published pseudonymously abroad, however tactless this may have been in the light of later events, was certainly not part of the official charge against them; for there is no Soviet law forbidding such publication, even though it does seem to be frowned upon. Instead, the prosecution claimed that the actual writings of the two men (almost all of which was fiction) betrayed anti-Soviet attitudes, and were written to achieve this effect. There were no "positive heroes" in their work — though what a "positive hero" is, or why a writer should have one, the prosecution never suggested.

In view of the nature of the charges the prosecution centred its case on out-of-context extracts from the works of both men. For instance, Daniel's story This is Moscow Speaking (written in 1960-61) concerns itself with the implications of the government's introducing a Public Murder Day. By a decree of the Supreme Soviet anyone can kill anyone else on this day except that:

"Murder of the following categories is prohibited: (a) children under sixteen; (b) persons dressed in the uniform of the Armed Services or the Militia, and (c) transport workers engaged in the execution of their duties. Paragraph two. Murders committed prior to or subsequent to the above-mentioned period and murders committed for purposes of gain or resulting from sexual assault will be regarded as a criminal offence and punished in accordance with the existing law. Moscow. The Kremlin. Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme..." Then the radio said: "We will now broadcast a concert of light music..."

The dead-pan satire here, reminiscent of the best of Swift, was seized upon by the prosecution as if Daniel had in reality gone around inciting murder, and as if he had actually accused the government of condoning and encouraging such a day. For Daniel to insist that "This is Moscow Speaking" was merely fiction, that it was impossible to equate an author with views or attitudes expressed in his stories, and that anyway this story was not really about murder but about people's reaction to an extreme situation, was to insist unheard. The prosecutor and the judge were equally adamant in their insistence that the imaginary situation was one slanderous to the Soviet regime, and to the Soviet people, and so criminally culpable.

Whilst it was certainly unfortunate that Western propagandists construed the writings of Sinyavsky and Daniel for anti-Soviet purposes, the prosecution seems to have deliberately ignored the point that this is in no way to indict the writers themselves. And even
if one were to grant the state's right to prosecute writers for the "political" content of fiction, the point around which this trial hinged, and which the prosecution completely failed to prove, was whether Sinyavsky and Daniel were deliberately purveying anti-Soviet material, not whether others were unfortunately using their writings for anti-Soviet purposes.

On Trial also indicates that one of the most alarming aspects of the case was the fact that, in the West at least, the trial and punishment of the two writers was responsible for the creation of far more anti-Soviet feeling than their writings could ever have created. The refusal of the Soviet government to publish an account of the proceedings has certainly not helped matters either. Not that this book will in any way help to redress this state of affairs, for though I take its transcript of the trial to be unquestionably genuine and fair to all concerned, the tone of the editors' comments reveals little sympathy to the Soviet government generally. A similar bias is indicated in the rather selective list contained in the book of the various petitions and protests asking the Soviet government to intervene on the writers' behalf. For instance, no mention is made of the protests sent by Australian left-wing organisations (eg. the Communist Party); in fact, the only Australian petition mentioned is that organised by the Cultural Freedom-Quadrant group.

But even in pointing out the way in which anti-Soviet curry has been made from the Sinyavsky-Daniel affair, one still wants to insist that the undeniable conclusion which emerges from On Trial is that the two men were made the scape-goats of ideological conformity in a manner which must indeed cause "honest and progressive people" everywhere to feel "disturbed".

Leo Cantrell

CONTAINMENT AND REVOLUTION.
Western Policy Towards Social Revolution: 1917 to Vietnam.
David Horowitz Ed.

SO we were not always wrong! Just occasionally, by some sort of miracle, what has been said by the marxists has turned out to be not a grievous error but the truth. What is more, it was the most important truth that had to be told to the world at that particular time. Such are the feelings which, try as we may, rise to the surface in the mind of many a left supporter who studies the histories of the recent past—the second world war and the cold war.

One such history is Containment and Revolution, a survey of Western policy towards social revolution — 1917 to Vietnam — by a number of different writers, edited by David Horowitz.

An article by one of the writers, John Baguley,* brings back memories of a bitter campaign waged by the western nations' socialists and communists to "open the second front" in Europe. Nobody who took part in that campaign will forget the attacks waged on it by the ultra-right, the official and semi-official claims that the western desert offensive of 1942 was as good as a second front in Europe.

Mr. Bagguley uses documentary evidence from both sides, allied and nazi, to show that each and every one of these contentions was untrue. What was being said at the time by governments, who had full knowledge of the facts, was false and often deliberately false. What was being said from Hyde Park, Domain and Yarra Bank stumps by leftwing orators who had comparatively few facts to go on, but an understanding of marxism, was the truth.

Who will forget the obloquy descending on the Communists of the western
world when they claimed, in August 1939, that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was not a betrayal of democracy by USSR but was forced on it by the appeasing western Governments? But now even such a conservative historian as A. J. P. Taylor, after a full study of the documents agrees that the USSR could have done no other, as the book under review notes. What the Communists yesterday were claiming, the archives today are confirming.

Was the Left never wrong? Of course we were, often, and seriously. But were we ever as badly and seriously wrong as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain when, returning from Munich in 1938 he said: “It means peace in our time”? Or as the American Secretary for War when on June 22, 1941, he told the American President as recorded in this book that “Germany will be thoroughly occupied in beating Russia for a minimum of one month and possible maximum of three months”? Not to mention his successor of 20 years later who gaily announced that the US would be able to bring its victorious troops home from Vietnam by the end of 1965!

That the left was so often right in the past does not mean that it is right today. But it may compel some people to take into account the possibility that this may be so. The contributors to this book show with sound evidence and a good deal of strong writing that the cold war need never have been; that it was launched quite deliberately by the American side and the threat of “Communist aggression”, on which it was sought to be based, was a myth.

A good example of this sort of debunking is John Gittings' chapter on the origins of China's foreign policy. Mr. Gittings has no trouble in showing that the hard-line anti-Americanism of the Chinese Communists today is of only recent origin and in fact was only adopted after every effort by the Mao leadership to reach an agreement with the Americans failed. These efforts began in 1942 when US military men were invited to Yenan. They went two years later and plans for far-going collaboration were laid, Mao saying that the US was “the only country fully able to participate” in China's post-war economic development.

At the same time the Chinese Communist Party had serious differences with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the adherence of the Chinese People's Republic to the Soviet “camp” in 1950 was not automatic. It opens up the hope that a return by the US to the former policies of Roosevelt could make possible a return by China to the former co-existence policies (or at least practices) of Mao.

In his preface Bertrand Russell says that the series of volumes begun by this book aims to clarify the issues and prepare the ground for “more effective opposition to those who would exploit or destroy us all.” What some of the contributors to this volume seem to forget, however, is that the only effective opposition is united opposition, and it must include all those who are interested in opposing the exploiters and would-be destroyers.

It is hard to believe that the USSR could be excluded from consideration when such forces come under review. Yet the treatment given Soviet policy by some of these writers suggests precisely such an exclusion. The USSR appears as a coldly-cynical great power which does not hesitate to betray its friends and supporters in foreign countries, even foreign communists, if its own narrow national interests require that.

Thus the USSR is accused by one contributor of having abandoned the Greek Left, and, by another, of having deserted the Italian Left during the
war or soon afterwards. Another sums up the pre-war seizure of Austria by Germany by saying that "Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Czecho-slovakia had all stood by while Austria was annexed" — a verdict which equates Neville Chamberlain with M. M. Litvinov in moral and political responsibility.

But none go quite as far as Isaac Deutscher in asserting that, long before the Truman doctrine appeared "Stalin had very effectively saved western Europe for capitalism, had saved western Europe from Communism". This, Deutscher says, was part of a sinister bargain struck by "Stalin" with the western powers under which "Stalin" was to have eastern Europe in return for this betrayal of western Communism.

This sort of one-sided attack on the USSR diminishes the value of Mr. Deutscher's contribution and, indeed, of the whole book. His claim, consistent with his attack on the USSR, that "the social struggles of our time have degenerated into the unscrupulous contests of the oligarchies", with "ruthless and half witted oligarchies" — capitalist and bureaucratic — "on both sides of the great divide" — deprives the struggle against American imperialism of its essential theoretical basis.

If the workers' socialist states are just as bad, "ruthless" and "oligarchic" as their imperialist adversaries, the future is much grimmer than most socialists would admit it to be. However all Mr. Deutscher is doing, in essence, is to repeat the criticisms aimed at Lenin and the Bolsheviks 50 years ago when they insisted in signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, thereby, in Leftist eyes, "saving" the Ukraine and other territories for capitalism and "abandoning" the communists living there.

The reply of todays' Bolsheviks to Mr. Deutscher would be on parallel lines to that of Lenin's and, oddly enough, it is contained essentially in this very volume. Why was the USSR in no position, even if it had wished to, to march across Europe and save France from US occupation? Replies one of these writers — "Russia lost in the war over 20 million people in dead alone. When, after the war, the first population census was carried out in the Soviet Union, it turned out that, in the age groups that were older than 18 years at the end of the war (that is, in the whole adult population of the Soviet Union), there were only 31 million men compared with 53 million women.

"For many many years only old men, cripples, children and women tilled the fields . . . Old women had to clear, with bare hands, the immense mass of rubble from their destroyed cities and towns . . . and only think how many of the 31 million men that were left alive were the cripples and invalids and wounded of the world war and how many were the old aged . . .

And who precisely is this writer who, by stating a few simple facts so starkly, knocks into a cocked hat Mr. Isaac Deutscher's thesis of the cold-blooded Russians who so callously deserted their western allies? Why, none other than Mr. Isaac Deutscher. The front part of his article, so far from supporting the conclusion of the back part, completely refutes it.

The writers in this book are severe on US policy, but not unfair. Their most severe strictures are scrupulously documented. By contrast, their innuendos and outright criticisms of the USSR are not supported by any evidence and, in fact, are refuted by such evidence as is available, including the evidence offered in this book. Those who seriously want to support world unity against imperialism must surely learn to be as fair to their prospective allies as they are to their declared opponents.

W. A. Wood
THE TOWER OF BABEL,
by Morris West.
Heinemann, 340pp, $4.25.

MORRIS WEST is a truly professional writer. Among Australian authors there are many far better craftsmen, but none with West's sure sense of timing. And none who makes as much money from writing, if that means anything. West has judged, rightly it seems, that there is no profit writing about the Australian scene, and has based his novel on larger, world events. It works, as Hollywood's interest in his books has shown.

This time, again obviously with his eye on Hollywood, he has set his new novel, The Tower of Babel, on the Arab-Jewish conflict in the Middle East, with stop press timing. The situation there is as hot now as when he sat down to write about it. Its main fault is that it does not, or even attempt to, answer the questions most lay readers would want to know about the Middle East situation. What are the issues? Who is the aggressor? Just what is the conflict all about? West could have, but most painstakingly does not, tackle the question on Lenin's formula for assessing the aggressor in a conflict: "Who is doing what to whom, and why?" The result is that what is admittedly a confusing situation is just as confusing at the end of Tower of Babel.

West, by avoiding the central issues, has reduced his novel to a parade of personalities. And while he has done it most capably, giving his characters complete credibility, his novel must, in the context of the events he is dealing with, be assessed as rather trivial. Again, in his care to avoid taking sides, he has presented all his people, on both sides, as rather likeable. Or, as the dustjacket puts it, "in the age of the anti-hero he (West) has written a novel in which every character can be termed a hero."

Thus Brigadier-General Jakov Baratz, Director of Military Intelligence, Israel, while plotting what turns out to be a most bloody raid on an Arab village, has a sorely troubled conscience about the affair. The reader is warmed to him by his kindliness, and by the tragic madness of his wife, a victim of the Nazis, and his hopeless love for the Israeli spy, Selim Fathalla. And Fathalla, himself, a conscienceless rogue, playing a dangerous espionage game in Damascus, and courting disaster by openly flaunting a mistress, still emerges as a perky, likeable man.

So West would have you love them all, his whole band of merry terrorists, swindling financiers, torturing security chiefs. But where does this leave the reader? He'll meet some very interesting characters, have the excitement of the border raids and murder of peasants, a peep into the torture chambers of Damascus, and the titillation of some mild sex. But what else? If he is seeking some key to what is a tragic and involved affair, one to trouble the conscience of any man, he won't find it in The Tower of Babel.

T. Moody

OF PROFESSORS AND 'PACIFICATION',
by Alex Carey.
8pp, 10c.
Available from the author,
163 Garnet Rd, Kirrawee, NSW, 2232.

AT THE END of last year professors at the three Sydney universities launched a public appeal to raise $30,000 for Civil Aid for South Vietnam.

In a circular letter the secretary, Mr. D. C. Stove, said that this sum would be spent through the Australian Civil Affairs Unit in Vietnam to build schools and colleges in Phuoc Tuy province.
The result would be to "transform the educational structure of a province of 140,000 people," permitting the people themselves to solve various serious problems.

Most people would say there is nothing wrong with that even if they feel inclined to ask what Australian armed forces are doing in Phuoc Tuy anyway, if the aim is to let the people themselves solve their problems.

But some important queries are raised by Mr. Alex Carey, a lecturer in the University of New South Wales, in a small pamphlet he has issued entitled Of Professors and Pacification.

Mr. Stove's circular, says Mr. Carey, fails to indicate that the Civil Affairs Unit is a unit of the Australian Army, staffed by some 50 regular army personnel.

It follows that money sent to it will be used by the army for purposes which are basically military.

Mr. Carey quotes the Financial Review of December 8 as having said that, as compared with other aid funds, the moneys raised by Mr. Stove's fund "go into a trust fund controlled by the Army. The disbursement of funds will be made exclusively by the Army in the field".

Earlier, last June, an Australian senior Government official told The Australian about the formation of what he called "a 46-man army civic affairs unit — the first of its kind — which is being sent to Vietnam this week under Colonel J. McDonagh."

Mr. Carey quotes reports from Australian daily press correspondents in the field which leave little doubt about Colonel McDonagh's role. The "aid" he dispenses is mainly aid to the Australian army in its attempt to suppress the National Liberation Front.

For example if the Army decides to uproot a village which is "irredeemable" — that is, convinced in favour of the NLF — and transfer it to a place under Australian military control, it is Colonel McDonagh's "civil" aid unit which builds the new camp.

Its purpose is quite openly to influence (some might say to bribe) the population into collaboration with the foreign occupying forces. So far it does not seem to have had very much success.

Evidence cited by Mr. Carey may well leave the potential donor to the fund in some doubt as to whether Colonel McDonagh and his team are quite the people to give disinterested aid to the cause of higher education in Phuoc Tuy.

But he leaves little room for doubt that support of Colonel McDonagh's unit means support of the war — and those approached by Mr. Stove, whatever their view, have a right to know this before deciding on their response.

[Since the above was contributed Mr. Carey has written a well-documented illustrated booklet, Australian Atrocities in Vietnam; 20pp., 25 cents. Available from Vietnam Action Campaign, 35 Goulburn St., Sydney.—Ed.]

BEFORE KINGS CROSS, by Freda MacDonnell. Nelson, 118 pp., $4.75.

THIS BOOK was reviewed together with Garryowen's Melbourne in our last issue. Inadvertently the title and other details were omitted from the heading. The error is regretted.—Ed.
Limited supplies of earlier issues of ALR are available. Articles appearing include:

**DEMOCRACY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY**

John Sendy  
(No. 1, 1966)

**CHINA’S TEN YEARS**

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**SOCIALISM: ONLY ONE PARTY?**

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