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In Defence of the Student Movement

THE STUDENT MOVEMENT TODAY is the one organised, significant segment of the intellectual community that has a real and active commitment to the kind of social change that our society desperately needs. Developments now taking place may lead to its destruction, in part through repression, in part through what I think are rather foolish tactics on the part of the student movement itself. I think this would be a great, perhaps irreparable, loss. And I think if it does take place the blame will largely fall on the liberal enlightened community that has permitted a situation to arise in which the most committed, sincere, and most socially active of young people are perhaps working themselves into a position at the end of a limb, from which they may be sawed off at great cost to all of us and to society as a whole.

One development that makes me feel that this matter is of crucial importance right now is the rise on the campuses of a growing movement that I think is quite ill-conceived and that may lead to repression of student activism and destruction of what I deem the few possibilities for significant social change. I have in mind a letter (which I did not receive, though a number of my colleagues did) from the Co-ordinating Centre for Democratic Opinion headed by Sidney Hook and a number of other people.
The organisation is now called University Centres for Rational Alternatives. The letter calls upon people to join this organisation, the goals of which "will be to defend academic freedom against extremism, to promote the activism of non-extremists in all aspects of civic affairs, to foster rational treatment of contemporary problems, and a combat attacks on the democratic process", particularly "terrorist attacks and multiple varieties of putschism" such as at San Francisco State, and also "many other extremist resorts to disruption, intimidation and violence", all of which amount to a "new McCarthyism of the left". The letter speaks of the dangers of appeasing this movement, pointing out that appeasement is both "morally intolerable and practically disastrous". And it says that "the main thrust" of the new organisation is to be "to protect and advance the freedom and democratic integrity of academic life", to struggle against the "extremist challenge", "to support the university as an open centre of free thought and speech — as a meeting house of many viewpoints — not as an enclave of enforced conformity or a totalitarian beachhead in a democratic society".

It would be very difficult to find anyone who would reject these goals. It would be difficult to find anyone who would be in favour of a university that would be an "enclave of enforced conformity" or who would oppose the view that the university should be "an open centre of free thought and speech". But in another and more serious sense it represents, I think, an extremely dangerous, even perhaps vicious development: no doubt inadvertently, but I think objectively. When I see things of this sort, what immediately comes to mind is some advice that A. J. Muste gave to pacifists about half a century ago. He said that their task is to denounce the violence on which the present system is based and all the evil, material and spiritual, this entails for the masses of men throughout the world. So long as we are not dealing honestly and adequately with this 90 per cent of our problem, there is something ludicrous — and perhaps hypocritical — about our concern over the ten per cent of violence employed by the rebels against oppression.

I think that's a sensible remark. And in fact, even if the criticism of "McCarthyism of the left" contained in this letter and similar statements were entirely accurate, still I think Muste's words would be quite appropriate. It would be surprising that that much attention should be given to this miniscule element in the problems of society and the problems of the university.

The Dominant Voice

There is another voice in the mainstream of American opinion that is becoming more dominant: the voice of people like Melvin
Laird, who has called for a “first strike” if the situation requires it. This makes us, as far as I know, the only country in the world where the Minister of War has come out in favour of “preventive war” if “our interests” demand it. And he is supported — I suppose again this makes us the only country in the world where this is true — by the leading military spokesman in the press, Hanson Baldwin, who has come out in favour of first use of nuclear weapons for what he refers to as “defensive purposes”; specifically, bolstering weak governments against subversion and aggression — where we decide, of course unilaterally, when this is taking place — as in Vietnam in 1964, when it appears a decision was made perhaps even prior to the 1964 election campaign to escalate the war and to attack North Vietnam. One recalls the rhetoric during the election campaign. This decision, whether it was actually made, was secret and private. It was a conspiracy, an illegal conspiracy to carry out acts of war that then were put in effect in February 1965. This conspiracy has not been challenged in the courts although it is one of very great significance, not only to the people of Vietnam but to ourselves, and although it violates domestic law insofar as international treaties are part of that law.

What are investigated in the courts are other sorts of “conspiracies”; for example, the “conspiracy” by Dr. Spock and others to challenge the illegal acts of the government. It is striking that the government made clear what it regards as the basis of the Spock conspiracy. It made this even more clear at the appeals level than it did during the trial by giving a list of “co-conspirators”, of whom I am one. The criterion that identifies this set of co-conspirators is precise; the people tried at the Spock trial and the co-conspirators happen to be exactly the group that appeared at a press conference, independently, to speak their minds, to say what they thought about the war and resistance. Many of them never met before or since. This was the only link between the people named as “conspirators” in the Spock trial.

I believe this indicates what is the real peril not only to academic freedom, but to the freedoms provided by the Bill of Rights. Even if one were to agree with everything said in criticism of the student movement, this criticism would, in proper perspective, be quite insignificant.

The dominant voice in American society, the mainstream opinion, is bracketed by people like Frank Darling, on the one side, and by people like Melvin Laird and Hanson Baldwin, on the other. This voice is one that was made explicit by Barrington Moore in
an article in the Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in early 1960:

You may protest in words as loud as you like. There is but one condition attached to the freedom we would like very much to encourage. Your protests may be as loud as possible so long as they remain ineffective. Though we regret your sufferings very much and would like very much to do something about them — indeed we have studied them very carefully and have already spoken to your rulers and immediate superiors about these matters — any attempt by you to remove your oppressors by force is a threat to civilised society and the democratic process. Such threats we cannot and shall not tolerate. As you resort to force we will, if need be, wipe you from the face of the earth by the measured response that rains down flame from the skies.

I think if you observe American society, you find that this is its predominant voice. It's a voice that expresses clearly the needs of the socio-economic elite; it expresses an ideology that is adopted and put forth with varying degrees of subtlety by most American intellectuals and that gains a substantial degree of adherence on the part of a majority of the population, which sees itself as entering or already having entered the affluent society.

This predominant voice is supported by a predominant attitude of almost total apathy that makes it possible for any atrocity to appear in the front pages as long as it is directed against alleged "communists" or landless peasants or something of the sort. And it arouses virtually no response, certainly no response commensurate with what is described. This attitude is developed from the very earliest years.

A look at the files of the New York Civil Liberties Union will explain very clearly what "law and order" means to the poor. What it means is permanent harassment by the forces of justice. You get a very clear picture of this in books by Algernon Black for example, or Paul Chevigny in Police Power, where he discusses no real atrocities but just the low-level, day-to-day harassment that defines the life of poor people in their relation to the forces of order. He does not mention events like the murder of students, events which lead to a great deal of sympathetic clucking of tongues, but do not lead to the formation of any national committees to defend the rights of students.

University freedom

I have up to now been discussing "the violence on which the present system is based", to use Muste's words. How about the other aspect, the 10 per cent, or more accurately, the 1 per cent or less of the violence? George Orwell once described political thought, especially on the left, as a kind of masturbation fantasy which the world of facts hardly matters. Unfortunately, there is
a good deal of truth to that characterisation. One of the Movement newspapers once carried an article by a very distinguished professor at Harvard, an old friend of mine who has become deeply involved in radical politics lately and who says that the "goal of university agitation should be to build anti-imperialist struggles in which the university administration is a clear enemy". Now this man knows American universities very well, and in particular he knows Harvard very well. It's very difficult for me to believe that he really thinks of Nathan Pusey as the representative of imperialism on the Harvard campus. In fact if that were true, things would be very easy. All you would have to do would be to sit in at the administration building and you would have struck a blow at imperialism. But it doesn't work like that. The problem is far deeper. This is almost pure fantasy.

The real problem is that those who call for freedom in the universities are calling for something that exists but that is very badly misused. The universities are relatively free, fairly decentralised institutions in which the serious decisions, those that actually relate to the interrelation between student and faculty, to the curriculum, to what a person does with his life, the kind of work he does — those decisions are very largely made by the faculty and very largely at the departmental level. At least this is true at the major universities I am familiar with.

Of course, the temptations are very strong to make certain decisions rather than others. For those who choose to put their talents to the service of the powerful institutions of the Society, there are many rewards — or what might be thought to be rewards. There's power, prestige and affluence — a share in the great project of designing an integrated world system dominated by American power, which many feel to be a reward. Those who make different choices can confidently expect a good deal of abuse and recrimination, perhaps the destruction of their professional careers. Hence, in one sense the choice is hardly free. In fact, the choice is approximately outlined by General Hershey in one of his most famous statements; namely, this is the American or indirect way to insure compliance.

But in a much more important sense the choice really is free. And the fact of the matter is, and I think one has to face this, that the politicisation of the universities and the subversion of science and scholarship, which is quite real, is the result of a relatively free choice by students and by faculty who have been unwilling to resist the temptations and to face the real difficulties of standing outside the mainstream and of rejecting the rewards, if such they are, that are offered by compliance.
Consider the problem of developing radical scholarship in the universities. This is a category I do not believe adequately exists. I personally believe that objective scholarship will very often lead to radical conclusions in the social sciences, as in every other field. One takes for granted in fields outside the social sciences that objective scholarship will often challenge the predominant framework of thinking. Only in the social sciences is this considered somehow the mark of an alienated intellectual who has to be dealt with by psychiatric means. But the fact of the matter is that the task of developing objective scholarship free from the constraints imposed by the American political consensus is quite a real one, and I personally believe that it will lead to radical conclusions.

The burden of proof is obviously on someone like me, who makes that assertion, who believes that objective research will support conclusions of a radical nature. And this is exactly the point that I want to stress. The failure to develop what might be misleadingly called radical scholarship, the failure to build it into the curriculum, this is by no means the result of decrees by college administrators or by trustees. Rather it results directly from the unwillingness of the students and the faculty to undertake the very hard and serious work that is required and to face calmly and firmly the kind of repression, or at least recriminations and abuse, that they are likely to meet if they carry out this work in a serious way. I would expect these to come not from the administration but rather more from the faculty, which may feel that its guild structure, the professional structure on which its security rests, is being threatened.

Particularly in the social and behavioural sciences, where theoretical content is virtually non-existent and intellectual substance is slight, the pretence of professional expertise is very often used as a defence against quite legitimate criticism and analysis. Here I think can be found one source of the abuse of academic freedom; namely, the restricting of those who try to develop objective academic scholarship that will challenge the prevailing framework of thinking in the professions and the conclusions that are often reached.

**Possible obstacles**

Suppose that these barriers are overcome — the barriers being, I think, the unwillingness of students to do the hard work required and the fear of the faculty that their guild structure will be threatened. Suppose that these barriers are overcome. Then it might be that the trustees and the administration would step in
to erect new barriers against the implementation of study and research and teaching that leads to radical conclusions and the action programs that ought to flow from honest serious research. However, this is only speculation. We do not know that the universities will not tolerate programs of this sort, both as teaching programs and programs of research and action as well, because the effort has barely been made. There are cases of administrative interference and they are deplorable, but it would be a great mistake to think that they constitute the heart of the problem. They do not.

I think it crucial that the effort be made. I think we very much need understanding of contemporary society, of its long-range tendencies, of the possibilities for alternative forms of social organisation and a reasoned, serious analysis, without fantasy, of how social change can come about. I have no doubt that objective scholarship can contribute to that understanding. But it is hard work and it has to be conducted in an open-minded and honest fashion. Furthermore, I think work of that sort has a political content almost at once and can strike directly at repressive institutions. To cite one example, there’s a group of graduate students and junior faculty in Asian studies at Harvard and other universities who have formed a Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars that is attempting to develop — I can only describe it in value-laden terms — a more objective and hence more humane and more sympathetic treatment of the problems of the developing Asian societies. If this attempt on their part succeeds — and I think it may, if it consists of solid and well-grounded work — it may seriously weaken one foundation stone of the national psychosis that plays a major role in promoting the garrison state with its enormous commitment of resources to destruction and waste, and its continual posing of the threat of nuclear war.

Scientists and military work

Let me mention perhaps a more important example, the problem of organising scientists to refuse military work. For example, consider the matter of the Anti-Ballistic Missile. Most scientists know that the ABM is a catastrophe, that it will not increase our security but in fact will probably endanger it by increasing international instability and tensions. But it is quite predictable that having given their lectures to the Senate committees, many of these very same scientists have gone to work to build it, knowing what they are doing. There is no law of nature that dictates that this must be the case. They can refuse individually; they can refuse collectively. They can organise to refuse. I think the real point is that lectures on the irrationality of the ABM, though
quite amusing, are basically beside the point if in fact the ABM is motivated not so much by the search for security as by the need to provide a subsidy for the electronics industry. And I think there's very good evidence that that's true. The fact of the matter is that — if I may quote from a paper given at the December 1967 meeting of the American Economics Association —

... the current proposal for an ABM system has been estimated to involve 28 private contractors with plants located in 42 states and 172 congressional districts. Given the political reality of such situations and the economic power of the constituencies involved, there is little hope that the interaction of special interest groups will somehow cancel each other out and that there will emerge some compromise that serves the public interest.

These interest groups are further specified as "the Armed Services, the contractors, the labor unions, the lobbyists who speak of free enterprise while they are getting a government subsidy, the legislatures who for reasons of perk or patriotism vote the funds", and so on.

These are the political realities; they have not got much to do with whether there might be an accidental nuclear explosion or the chances of shooting down one of those Chinese missiles that Melvin Laird is worried about. Incidentally, I might add that the electronics industry itself is quite aware of all this. For example, there is a study of the Electronics Industries Association that discusses prospects for the future. It states that "arms control agreements during the next decade are unlikely. The likelihood of limited war will increase and thus for the electronics firms the outlook is good in spite of the end of hostilities in Vietnam".

Scientists can organise to refuse co-operation with such projects, and they can also try to organise and to take part in the mass politics that provides the only hope in the long run for countering and ultimately dispelling the nightmare that they are creating. I think that if an organisation of scientists to refuse military work develops on any significant scale, then precisely because of the role that this work plays in maintaining the so-called "health" of the society, they may find themselves involved in very serious political action. I wouldn't be surprised if they find themselves involved in what is called an "illegal conspiracy", or a kind of resistance. In general, I think one can expect that effective politics — by that I mean politics that really strikes at entrenched interests, that really tries to bring about significant social change — is very likely to lead to repression, hence to confrontation.

**Confrontation**

There is a corollary to this observation: The search for confrontation clearly indicates intellectual bankruptcy. It indicates that
one has not developed an effective politics that by virtue of the way it relates to the social realities, calls forth an attempt to defend established interests and perhaps attempts at repression. One who takes his rhetoric at all seriously will work towards serious reforms, perhaps even reforms that have ultimately revolutionary content, and will try to delay confrontation as long as possible, at least until he has some chance of succeeding.

The search for confrontation is a suicidal policy. Now there is an argument for the search for confrontations, and I think one should face it frankly and openly. It's put forward clearly by people like — to quote a past-master in this — Daniel Cohn-Bendit. He denies being a leader, but was certainly one of the most articulate spokesmen for the French student actions. He has the following to say about "provocation", about confrontation politics.

Provocation is not a weapon of war except in special circumstances. It can only be used to arouse feelings that are already present, albeit submerged. In our case (the student case in France) we exploited student insecurity and disgust with life in an alienated world where human relations are so much merchandise to be used, bought and sold in the market place. All we did therefore was to provoke students to express their passive discontent, first by demonstrations for their own sake and then by political action, directly challenging modern society. The justification for this type of provocation is its ability to arouse people who have been crushed under the weight of repression.

This is not an unfamiliar argument and one cannot discount it. But when we talk about the student movement in the United States, we are really not in any serious sense talking about people who have been traditionally crushed under the weight of repression. That's rather hyperbolic. And I think in the actual concrete situation of the student movement the idea of confrontation tactics is often a confession of the inability to develop effective politics or the unwillingness to do the serious and hard work of social reconstruction that can easily be condemned as "reformist", but that any true revolutionary would understand immediately is the only kind of work that could lead to new social reforms, which might perhaps even pave the way for a revolutionary or far-reaching change in social organisation.

I think that confrontation tactics as they actually evolve are frequently rather manipulative and coercive and really the proper kinds of tactics only for a movement that, inadvertently or not, is aiming towards an elitist, authoritarian structure of a sort that we have had far too much of on the left in the last half-century and that in fact has destroyed what there was of a living, vital left in the Western world.

There is a confusion in all of this talk about tactics that ought to be faced more clearly in the student movement. I am referring
to the practice of counterposing “radical tactics” to “liberal tactics”. This is a senseless distinction. It makes no sense at all to try to place tactics in a spectrum of political judgment. Tactics are neither radical nor conservative, nor do they lie anywhere else on the political spectrum. They are successful or unsuccessful in achieving certain goals that may be discussed in terms of their political character. But to talk about the tactics as what is “radical” or “liberal” is to make a fundamental error. Part of the style of the student movement is to focus great attention on immediate concerns that are close at hand — what do you do tomorrow, how do you relate to the people near you, and so on. This is nice in some ways. It gives an attractive style to many of the student actions, but it can be politically quite destructive, I think, if it becomes the general framework within which the movement develops.

Any serious movement for social change will have to involve many different strata of the population, people who certainly see their needs and goals quite differently, including many groups that are in no position even to articulate their goals and needs, and certainly not to bring them to public attention or to develop political action based on them. I think that these may prove to be related and compatible goals — but of course that has to be shown.

The major task for intellectuals — including the student movement, which in large part has been the cutting edge of a growing movement for social change — is to try to understand and to articulate those goals, to try to assess and to understand the present state of society and how it might change, what alternative forms there are for the future, to try to persuade and to organise and ultimately to act collectively where they can, and individually if it comes to that. On the other hand, it is quite clear that if the adult community fails to act in some way to meet the real problems of the universities and society, if it contents itself with deploring the occasional absurdities of the student movement and various superficial manifestations of student protests, then I think we can expect with perfect confidence that student unrest will continue. Furthermore, it is right that it should continue. Those who deplore the forms that it takes, I think might do much better to ask what they can do to eliminate the evils that constitute the core of the problems we face, and then proceed to act in a serious and committed manner to confront these problems.
MARX SHOWED that there was a basic contradiction between social production and the private (capitalist) ownership of the means of production and of the product. As a result of this contradiction, in the long run the social relations between workers and capitalists become a barrier to the development of the productive forces. The 1929-39 economic crisis and depression was seen by many as establishing Marx’s basic proposition beyond any reasonable doubt.

In the last 30 years, however, there have been increases in the living standards of the majority of people in countries with developed economies. There have been rapid rates of growth in countries such as Japan and West Germany. Since Marx’s time, among the basic changes that have taken place have been a growth of monopoly, new forms of imperialism and a growth of the governmental sector and state controls in the economy. Keynes’ General Theory (1936) gave a theoretical base for the growth of the public sector and controls, seen by him as necessary for the continuance of capitalism. Do these developments mean that the Marxist analysis is dated? Can we expect a long period of growth under capitalism?

It is often argued that the task of regulating the economy is made easier by the creation of “consumer societies.” Acceptance of stability and growing affluence underlies the view held by some that the working class has been integrated into the capitalist system, and that for revolutionary change we must look to forces outside the normal employer-worker relations. The central question to be discussed here is: “Has the modern monopoly-imperialist State solved the economic problems of capitalism?”

GROWTH OF SURPLUS: PROPENSITY TO CONSUME

Modern marxists, such as Sweezy, base their analysis on the growth of surplus. As an extreme case of monopoly, the BHP illustrates why surplus grows with monopoly capitalism — as a monopoly BHP is a price maker. It has the resources to reduce costs. In these conditions the growth of surplus is inevitable. One

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way of regarding the question of the share of the working people in the product is to ask: "What are the trends in the propensity to consume?"* Because of its class character, a mature capitalist economy has two basic trends — surplus and productive capacity tend to expand rapidly, while on the other hand the long-term trend of the propensity to consume is for it to decline.

A. The Propensity to Consume

Keynes thought it probable that in wealthy countries the propensity to consume would fall as income rose. I believe that the tables below illustrate a law of development of the industrialised capitalist countries studied, which can be stated in these terms: in general, and in the long-run, as income grows the propensity to consume declines. Because of the importance of consumption this is one major reason for the long-term instability of a capitalist economy.

TABLE 1: Showing trends in the propensity to consume.

(a) USA¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gross National Product (GNP) $ Thousand millions</th>
<th>Consumption (C) Thousand millions</th>
<th>Propensity to Consume = C / GNP x 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>74.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>256.5</td>
<td>176.8</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>483.7</td>
<td>311.2</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>865.7</td>
<td>536.6</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>932.1</td>
<td>576.0</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This means that consumption absorbed 74.8% of USA's GNP in 1929; consumption absorbed 61.7% of GNP in 1969.

(b) England²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP £ Thousand millions</th>
<th>(C) £ Thousand millions</th>
<th>Propensity to consume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The propensity to consume is the proportion of income or product that goes to consumption. Keynes first used the term. Consumption is seen here as depending primarily on the level of income and the distribution of income.


### (c) Australia\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP $ Thousands of millions</th>
<th>(C) $ Thousands of millions</th>
<th>Propensity to consume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938-39</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (d) Japan\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP Thousands of millions of Yen</th>
<th>(C) Thousands of millions of Yen</th>
<th>Propensity to consume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>7,792</td>
<td>5,087</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>11,342</td>
<td>6,891</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>20,863</td>
<td>11,417</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>52,780</td>
<td>27,478</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One finds periods when income is rising but propensity to consume changes very little, e.g. Australia 1948-49 to 1958-59; USA 1951-1964. But the long-term trend — pre-1939 compared with the present time, is quite clear.

It follows that before 1939 in the first three countries studied, about three-quarters of the product went to the consumer. Today, the proportion is down to three-fifths and it is still falling. In Japan just over half of the product goes to the consumer. While there have been vast increases in the levels of consumption in the countries studied, the proportion of the product going to consumption has declined. In view of the key role of consumption we now have to examine how is it possible to have had:

- Increases in surplus and in productive capacity.
- A decline in the propensity to consume over the same period and much lower levels of unemployment compared with the 1930's.

### B. Factors off-setting the fall in the Propensity to Consume

The product must be sold. The question thus becomes: In which

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direction has spending increased since 1939 to compensate for the higher productive capacity and the fall in the propensity to consume? There must be an off-setting factor or the capitalist world would be plunged into mass unemployment. In the discussion that follows reasons for growth in countries such as Australia will be discussed. But the main emphasis will be on the US. The reason for this is that the US is a mature capitalism. Rapidly developing countries such as Australia are likely to meet some of the same economic problems when they reach the same level of development if they are based on a capitalist framework. Again the present monetary crisis illustrates how conditions in the United States affect the rest of the capitalist world.

Why have there been much higher levels of employment since the 1930's? Developing countries such as Australia are a special case. Here the off-setting factors are increased private investment and the growth of the government sector of the economy. Migration is a factor here. Overseas investment in Australia gives a short-term expansion e.g. in minerals, at the cost of longer-term disposal of assets to overseas interests. In a growing economy, growth encourages investment, and thus further growth. The re-equipping of the Japanese economy since 1950 has been a major factor in its growth.

A structural change from consumption to private investment is not possible in a developed economy such as that of the US. Thus gross private domestic investment was 15.7% of the GNP in 1929; 13.1% in 1940 and 14.8% in 1964 (Shapiro: *Macroeconomic Analysis* p. 123). In the US what has offset the growth of productive capacity in the last 30 years (associated as it has been with a decline in the propensity to consume), has been the growth of government spending.

Thus government purchases of goods and services increased from 8.2% of GNP in 1929 to 22.7% in 1969. The main single factor in this rise has been the increase in military spending from 0.7% of GNP (1929) to 8.8% of GNP (1969). Lipsey estimates that if the US reduced its defence spending “over-night” to 1940 levels, then unemployment might rise as high as 25% of the labor force.5 Joan Robinson develops the view expressed here when she says that “the effect of his (Keynes') argument is to explain why it is that modern capitalism flourishes when governments are making investments in armaments.” In doing so they are creating demand and employment. J. Robinson concludes: “The cure, most of us would agree, is even worse than the disease.”6

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5 Lipsey: *An Introduction to Positive Economics* p. 659.
It follows that in the US the increased propensity to save (implied in the reduced propensity to consume) has been offset mainly by government investment in armaments. It was not a change in thinking towards Keynesianism that ended the depressed years of the 1930’s. In the US the number of unemployed was still 19% of the workforce in 1938. In 1944, after three years of war, the figure was only 1.2%.7

**THE US ECONOMY 1960-70**

There were three quite distinct phases in the US economy in the 1960’s.

1. 1958-64

Military spending was very high in this period. For example it was $45,900,000,000 or 9.3% of the GNP in 1960, compared with 0.7% in 1929. Despite this the period saw a sharp rise in unemployment — the number of unemployed averaged 5.8% of the workforce, whereas in the preceding seven years the average number of unemployed was 3.6% of the workforce8. This indicated that the problem of selling the product was becoming more acute in the early 1960’s.

2. 1965-first half of 1969

The economic effects of US military spending in the period 1965-69 are shown in the following table:

**TABLE 2: The US economy, 1960-69, some relevant figures.9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total unemployed</td>
<td>3,852</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>2,857</td>
<td>2,975</td>
<td>2,817</td>
<td>2,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(thousands) (March)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage unemployed</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence expenditure</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ thousand millions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Budget Deficit</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
<td>-25.2</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ thousand millions10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Price Index</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>109.9</td>
<td>113.1</td>
<td>116.3</td>
<td>121.2</td>
<td>127.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(base 1957-59=100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Samuelson: *Economics* p. 191.
8 Ibid. p. 191.
10 Surplus indicated by + and deficit by —.
The cause of the accelerated rate of military spending from 1965 was, of course, the war in Vietnam, which in 1968-69 accounted for about one-third of US military spending. Between 1965 and 1969 the number of US unemployed declined by 614,000, despite an increase in the workforce. Corporate profits were $66,800,000,000 in 1964 and $92,200,000,000 in 1968. Each year of the Vietnam war has seen a budget deficit, as high as $25,200,000,000 in 1968.

The transfer of resources to war, financed in part by deficit budgeting, plus administered prices, explains the sharp increase in inflation from the first year of the extended Vietnam war to today. Thus, the Consumer Price Index rose from 109.9 to 127.7 in the four years 1965-69. Social problems mounted in this period. Thus 26,100,000 US citizens are described as living in poverty in 1967 (13.4% of the population), and an even larger number lived in near-poverty. Thus in 1967 one in four Americans lived in or near poverty.

3. Mid-1969 to present day

Signs of a recession appeared in the USA late in 1969. Central features are set out in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3. The US Economy 1967-71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1967</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total unemployed (thousands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence expenditure $ thousand millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Budget Deficit $ thousand millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Price Index (base 1957-59=100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1965-69 boom was caused by the sharp rise in military spending, financed in part by deficit budgets. By mid-1969 the period of expansion of the US economy on this base had come to an end. There were two reasons for this. The Vietnam war

---

had led to mounting inflation (see Table 3 above). There was a real fear that the US was heading towards a financial and economic crisis. This led to restrictions on the rate of increase in the money supply, credit restrictions and higher interest rates. More importantly, the nature of the war and military defeats caused widespread hostility to the level of military spending. In 1970 and 1971 there was some reduction in the level of military spending.

Table 3 shows that the economy soon moved into a recession with mounting levels of unemployment. In 1970 real GNP actually declined, and figures for May 1971 (the latest available) showed unemployment at 6.2% and inflation at an annual rate of 7.2%. In the Monthly Review (April 1971) Sweezy estimates that in December 1970, unemployed and those in defence-related employment came to a total of 22,300,000 — 25.1% of total labor force. Sweezy concludes that the figure of 25.1% is somewhat higher than the highest-ever officially recorded unemployment figure of 24.9% in 1933. Because of the areas in which spending has been reduced reports indicate that growing unemployment is no longer confined mainly to unskilled workers, Negroes and youth. The rate of increase of unemployment is much the same for black and white, skilled and unskilled workers.

The Australian Financial Review of April 14, 1971, writes that the Japanese economy is "in search of a boost" and further: "We (the Japanese—Ed.) are caught in a genuine depression." The possibility of this development was indicated in Table 1 (d) above which shows for Japan a steady fall in the propensity to consume. The Japanese growth rate of 7% is still high, but the recession has already led to a scaling down in demand for some Australian minerals and short time for some Japanese workers in growth industries such as electronics.

TRENDS IN MODERN CAPITALISM

In the most highly-developed capitalist State — the US — the tendency of a modern capitalist State towards stagnation is quite clear. Major reasons are the growth of surplus and productive capacity on the one hand and the long-term trend to a fall in the propensity to consume. The trend to stagnation can be delayed for long periods. The development of new resources and industries in Australia, expansion of old industries, capital inflow and high rates of migration have led to a growth of the economy. These factors could not operate in a mature economy such as that of the US, where military spending has been the main factor in masking (to a degree) the trend toward stagnation.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY - TRADE CRISIS

Since writing the above the monetary-trade crisis in the United States has forced the Nixon Government to announce a number of measures including a ten per cent surcharge on most imports and an end to the US undertaking to convert dollars into gold. Since 1945 there has been a vast expansion of trade between the capitalist countries, helped by the relative stability of the dollar which became the currency through which these countries have settled their debts. Attempts have been made to reduce tariffs.

Thus the decisions of the Nixon administration represent the end of an era. The economic crisis in the United States has forced measures reminiscent of the exchange depreciation-high tariff policies of the 1930's. The basic reason for the import surcharge is that the market cannot absorb the vast volume of goods produced by US, Japan, the EEC and other countries. Countries such as Japan and West Germany — with more rapid rates of development — are eating into the American market. The US monetary crisis is made more severe by the war in Vietnam and the attendant inflation plus the high levels of US investment overseas — another drain on dollar reserves.

Total US reserve assets — including gold — were $13.5 billion in June 1971. The US balance of payments deficit was $10 billion in 1970 and at an annual rate of $23 billion in the first half of this year. In these circumstances the monetary-trade measures were inevitable. In effect the US is pursuing the policy followed by the Japanese in the 1930's — exporting unemployment. The import quotas and forced revaluation of other currencies will give a short term advantage to the US at the expense of exports of countries such as Japan, West Germany and Australia. The monetary-trade crisis is thus a result of the deepening crisis of capitalism seen in the growing problem of finding markets, and Vietnam. Restrictions on trade reduce the volume of trade. They invite retaliation. For this reason the measures taken by the US will have the overall effect of deepening and widening the crisis of capitalism.

CONCLUSIONS

Since 1939 the economic contradictions of the US have been obscured primarily by military spending; the contradictions have not been solved. What is happening in the US is not a trade cycle of the 19th century type. There can be fluctuations within the general framework of stagnation. That the basic trend is to stagnation is shown by the growth of unemployment before 1965
and since 1969. The USA is entering a new era. The economy can no longer rely on continued increases in military spending which in any case is contributing to instability. If President Nixon’s proposed visit to China takes place, it will be difficult to maintain the present level of military spending.

It is often argued that military spending can be replaced by spending on education, health, slum clearance and anti-pollution measures. But to see this transfer as a simple process is to ignore the realities of the class nature of capitalist society. Military spending is promoted by the ruling US circles primarily to promote political ends. It is highly unlikely that these circles would have willingly consented to continued huge budget deficits and heavy taxation for ends such as slum clearance. Thinking in terms of their own narrow interests, the great monopolies see such things as education as a cost with no profit margin. Galbraith points out that the technology of industrial giants such as General Dynamics DuPont and General Electric is more suited to weaponry and space research than to building hospitals.

The real answer to the contradictions discussed is the complete overthrow of the capitalist system, followed by a socialist society in which there will be workers’ (people’s) control and maximum individual and group initiative. In capitalist countries we must have a policy now linking the present with the socialist future. The first thing is to get popular realisation of the possibilities for “the quality of life” when man controls modern technology for human ends.

The crisis of capitalism calls for bold policies now around questions such as education, environment, living standards, etc. It is in this context that the fight can be developed for workers’ control. Bold policies must lead to action aimed to achieve them. The objective is not a more humane and efficient capitalism. If the left forces link the movement suggested with the need for revolutionary change, then the growth of the movement — and the conflict with the predatory interests of capital — will play a vital role in developing socialist consciousness.
Sham desegregation in US schools

Two recent studies verify that the Nixon administration's "desegregation" policies in the South have resulted in mass firings and demotions of black teachers and principals, increased discrimination against black students within Southern schools systems and the closing of many black schools.

In a six-state survey by the civil rights branch of the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare in Atlanta, the RRIC reported it was found that in the last two years the total number of teachers rose by 615, while the number of black teachers fell by 923. At the same time 77 per cent of the total of teachers leaving their jobs were white and 14 per cent were black.

According to the study of the six organisations publishing the report on the "Status of School Desegregation in the South 1970", many black teachers are also being forced to teach classes for which they have no training. It cited examples of gym teachers being forced to teach biology and of English teachers being forced to teach gym. These teachers were often soon fired for "incompetency". The study also revealed that the first teachers to be fired have often been active in the civil rights struggle.


Yugoslav inflation

"The 12 per cent rise of the cost of living in January-September 1970 testifies to a serious inflationary trend and that it is therefore imperative to do away with all sources of inflation without delay..."

"The government programme of stabilisation measures immediately began preparing the Law on the Freezing of Personal Incomes as they considered that personal incomes are increasing faster than productivity, or in other words that a share of accumulation is being drained off into personal incomes.

"This view was opposed by the trade unions which argued that real personal incomes are closely following the growth of productivity... If anyone can be said to have acted incorrectly, then it is the (governments) who still have a very large say in the domain of budget and investment spending."

—Yugoslav Trade Unions No. 68, Jan-Feb. 1971.
No monolithic unity

“The world has changed also because of the tremendous development of the means of production, a consequence of the scientific-technical revolution, which changes definite social structures and throws up new problems inside the revolutionary movement of developed countries, which must aim to carry the revolution through to the end. . .

“There are no recipes, no magic formulae for solving these problems. The generalisations of the new experience, Marxist-Leninist theoretical research demand an open debate, free enquiry. But there can be no open debate, free enquiry, where the battle of ideas is annulled, where anathema are proclaimed, where every divergence is presented as heresy.

“Today there can be only one kind of unity, which recognises differentiation, which accepts principled criticism as part of this unity, a unity which gives every party the right to decide its own line without outside interference.”

—Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the CP of Spain, at a meeting in Rumania, Neuer Weg (Bucharest), 5/9/71.

Political Pluralism in Chile

“There can be a plurality of Parties, but not conciliation between classes, as there was and is in the Christian Democratic Party, for Socialism, in liberating society from the exploitation of man by man, creates the conditions for the separation of political and ideological pluralism from the plurality of classes; the different parties will no longer represent antagonistic classes, but the continuation of an historical tradition and the political transformation of classes and social strata which will continue to exist for the whole long period of construction of socialism in Chile. . . That is, if four parties and two movements yesterday gave birth to Popular Unity and today form the six parties of the People’s Government, tomorrow they will be the six parties of the Socialist Government of Chile; it could, moreover, be that their number will increase on the basis of broader support for the People’s Power, or it could be that some will merge on the basis of specific autonomous and internal agreements and decisions.”


Preparing for self-management

“If the worker does not start to control his trade unions now, he will never control industry. If he does not start to control his political leaders now, he will never control the state.”

Upholder of International law in theory

Commenting on the 25th Assembly of the UN, Professor Bernhard Graefrath, of the Humboldt University, writes:

"In close relationship with the ban on the use of force is the ban on intervention. In present-day international law this is a necessary result of the universal recognition of the principle of sovereign equality of states. The right to sovereignty in the universal system of present-day international law demands non-intervention, preventing of any interference in the sovereign area of another state. This ban on intervention . . . is not expressly formulated in the UN Charter, but that it is part of its fundamental principles was laid down expressly in resolution 1815 (XVI)".

—Deutsche Aussenpolitik (Berlin GDR), No. 3/1971.

On the death of Khrushchov

"His life was really not that of a bureaucrat and his work had an original stamp and a decisive weight at a moment important for his country and the whole labour movement, so that it has left a trace behind it, which has not been eradicated even today. . .

"Remembering Khrushchov does not mean forgetting his mistakes and limitations. He was human, he was a real man, not an ordinary comrade. . ."

—I'Unita (Rome) 12/9/71.

"For us, the name of Nikita Khrushchov is linked with the initiatives taken by the CPSU, particularly at the 20th Congress, to overcome the cult of Stalin’s personality and its consequences, which started a new stage for the international communist movement in the struggle for socialism and peace."

—I'Humanite (Paris), 13/9/71.

Portugal's heroic fighters

The British Communist Fortnightly Review, Comment (22/5/71) praises the heroic press of Portugal whose printers and distributors risk death to produce the clandestine press.

"The leading Portuguese anti-fascist clandestine newspaper is Avante (Forward). Avante has been regularly published clandestinely in Portugal for the last 40 years. It must be the longest regular publication ever known for a clandestinely printed political paper, probably in the whole world. . . . From time to time clandestine print works fall into the hands of the secret police, who then proclaim that Avante is finished! But the next issue of Avante always comes out."

23
Chile: A difficult Revolutionary Model

ONE YEAR AFTER THE VICTORY of the Left in the elections in Chile, and a little more than eight months after the establishment of a people's Government, it is useless to make an estimate however summary of the advances, achievements, and reverses registered by the complex Chilean revolutionary phenomenon. First of all, we should describe the economic, social and political background which made possible the rise to power of the Left coalition, Unidad Popular, and then analyse its exercise of power throughout this period of eight months, in order that we then may offer a few interpretative outlines of the possible paths that the Chilean revolutionary process could take in the near future.

Chilean Development until 1970: The Chilean economy has been characterised over recent decades by its strong tendency to stagnation together with a high rate of inflation. The most notable elements in this state of economic crisis embraced the agrarian sector, the industrial monopolies and the international consortia, especially US-based ones, which occupied the commanding heights of the Chilean economic order. In the agrarian sector, cattle and crop-raising, based on feudal relations of production, has been in constant decline. Thousands of toilers have thus been condemned to a life of semi-slavery. The latifundist system, as the centre of economic and political power, restricted domestic demand, placing outside the consumer market large sections of the toiling people. Chile up to 1970 was obliged to spend one million dollars annually on the import of foodstuffs, because of the inability of the agrarian-latifundist sector to satisfy domestic demand. The process of industrialisation, fostered by strong policies of government intervention, which was the product of the militant mobilisation of urban masses, underwent from 1955 onwards a marked deformation, due to the massive penetration of foreign capital. In fact, the principal sources of raw materials and even those required for

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the most petty manufacturing activity were under the control of foreign capital, which used its control as a function of its worldwide interests and not as something serving Chilean national industrialisation. This deformation was also based on monopolistic structure. Taking advantage of the small domestic market in Chile, and of their influence in the political structure, the big commercial capitalists turned themselves into industrialists, but in their new role still retained the parasitical stamp of their old. Subject to monopoly capital, the national industry saw its growth rate slacken until it was unable to absorb even the natural increase of the work force. Thus the industrial bourgeoisie enriched itself on the basis of growing and chronic unemployment, which depressed wages and ruined or absorbed small and medium industry. It is interesting to note that from 1960 the rate of unemployment rose from 6.7 per cent of the total active population to 10 per cent in the last months of the Frei Government (1964-1970). The other characteristic element of the Chilean economy was the presence of foreign capital. After the 1929 depression, US capital soon came to occupy first place among foreign investment in Chile. From 1940 to 1960, direct US investment increased by about 80 per cent, that is, by about the same percentage as the total Chilean national production. In this fashion, in 1970, foreign capital in all its forms attained in Chile the unprecedented level of 2800 million dollars, or a third of the total capital of the country.

To sum up, the big landowners, the industrial monopolists and foreign capital, especially Yankee capital, established the framework within which the social and political struggle unfolded, a struggle which placed before the different classes and social forces the alternative of either accepting the system, or, on the other hand, of seeking the means for the revolutionary transformation of Chilean society.

The Chilean Social Scene in 1970: Chile is a capitalist country and within it the two fundamental classes of every capitalist society—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—are active. But Chile is also an under-developed country, which means that pre-capitalist classes exercise a certain weight (landlords, peasants, artisans, small traders). We should also bear in mind that the activity of foreign capital gives rise to the existence of an imperialist bourgeoisie, which expresses itself primarily through the functionaries of foreign enterprise and agents in the employ of foreign capital.

Working masses, new middle social groupings, national bourgeoisie, the oligarchy and imperialism—these are the social categories most appropriate for use in analysis and understanding of the present and ongoing political life of Chile.
Working Masses: We mean by “working masses” a vast mixture of classes and social groupings which have in common the fact that in their majority they live at subsistence level and depend exclusively on their own work to do so. There are the working class, made up of wage workers who produce the agricultural and industrial wealth of the country, the white collar workers in the capitalist enterprises and the public servants. These are all wage workers. Also to be considered are the small producers in town and country, and the small traders. Together these elements represent more than 90 per cent of the active population. The following chart gives some idea of the relative importance of the different sectors in the Chilean social structure.

SOCIAL CATEGORIES AND THEIR EARNINGS, CHILE 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percentage of population</th>
<th>Earnings in millions of escudos</th>
<th>Percentage of earnings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>1,760,000</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar workers</td>
<td>412,000</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small traders and farmers</td>
<td>737,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>663</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,209,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is easy to deduce from this chart the unjust distribution of income existing in Chile in 1970, where 9.3 per cent of the population received 34.4 per cent of total earnings. We do not have space here to spell out the social conditions of exploitation and poverty in which the Chilean workers live.¹

The new social groupings: A minority of the working people which may be estimated as about one-fifth of the total active population live in conditions superior to those of the majority and this minority we call the new middle groupings. They are made up of university teachers, technicians and specialists employed by the government or by private enterprise. We also include under this head the students, who, as everywhere in Latin America, have strong revolutionary traditions. Contrary to the commonly held view, these groupings are not satisfied with their lot and do not have a conservative attitude towards the status quo. In general, the thinking and the intellectual development of these sectors in Chile have always led them to be at the barricades at the side of the workers, and, very often, to a position of leadership in the social struggle. The social situation of the “old” middle groupings

¹ See Chile: A New Way, by the same author, p. 15.
made up of small employers and industrialists is different. They have been gravely affected by inflation and the monopolistic character of credit control, and have been practically relegated to a proletarian position.

The national bourgeoisie: To our mind, it is difficult to situate precisely in a sociological sense the national bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries, where the foundation of this class is mixed and intertwined with the financial jungle of foreign capital. Perhaps it could be said that until 1955 there existed in Chile a national bourgeoisie with interests in contradiction to those of imperialism. But from that year onwards, the interpenetration of foreign capital-national bourgeoisie appears to have become the catalytic element in the growing process of disnationalisation of the Chilean national industry which had previously existed. In any case, the normal income of the Chilean bourgeoisie comes from share trading, real estate, foreign currency dealings, certain industrial activities which are strongly protected, and from speculation.

The Oligarchy: The oligarchy is made up of the landlords, bankers, the biggest shareholders in the biggest companies, and the directors and managers of these companies. Although the families of the oligarchy amount to only a tiny proportion of the population, their economic power is immense. In fact, one per cent of the shareholders have 46 per cent of the shares in the country’s private companies and 35 per cent of the banks and insurance companies. About 3000 haciendas owned by the big landlords account for 58 per cent of Chile’s agricultural production and 80 per cent of farm lands. The Big Creole capitalists based their riches on the monopolist or dominant positions they commanded in the Chilean economy. The oligarchy has business relations and interests with foreign capital, through shareholdings in foreign companies operating both inside and outside Chile. They consequently have no interest in national development separate and apart from foreign capital.

Foreign interests (imperialism): Through their subsidiary companies, the massively powerful North American clans participate directly in the distribution of the national income generated within Chile. The Morgan clan controls the Chilean electricity and telephone systems and the Sociedad Minera El Teniente. Rockefeller operates through Esso Standard Oil and the financial house, IBEC Chilena, which holds shares in all of the national oligarchy’s most important enterprises. The Mellon group exploits Chile’s iron ore deposits through the Bethlehem company, and is one of the most important shareholders, through the agency of Koppers, in the Compania de Acero del Pacifico. The National City Bank group owned the most important copper deposits through the Ana-
conda company and its subsidiaries and had intimate links with
the Grace family which permitted it to control many Chilean indus-
trial enterprises. Dupont has interests in Anglo-Lautaro, Sudamer-
cicana de Explosivos, and Industrias de Neumaticos, and the
Ford and Boston groups in several enterprises operating within
Chile. As is it to be expected, all these enterprises send home to
the USA large profits. One out of every two dollars entering
the Chilean economy is destined for the coffers of foreign monop­
ologies and banks. To sum up, Chile is an important element in the
general framework of the world system of imperialism, particularly
in view of its copper exports, an essential strategic raw material
for the world military plans of the United States government.

The Left Comes to Power: As can be seen, in the light of the
country’s economic and class antecedents which we have just briefly
analysed, the rise to power of the Unidad Popular coalition just
over a year ago might appear as something fortuitous, in the
nature of an “historical fluke”. However, the deep economic crisis
affecting the whole system, which was aggravated by the reforming
attempts of the Frei government, enormously facilitated the organi­
sation, the raising of consciousness and the mobilisation of the
broad masses of workers, in town and country alike.

The attractive social nucleus was the working class, with its
rich revolutionary traditions. Around it gathered other exploited
sectors and groupings. The political instrument and vanguard was
represented by the Socialist and Communist Parties, which over­
came their tactical differences, toughened their strategy for the
elections, which themselves offered a way forward deeply rooted
in the consciousness of the Chilean workers. The bourgeoisie and
imperialism put forward two candidates in the elections of September
1970. That is, they divided their forces, committing the huge
historical blunder of under-estimating the strength and development
of Allende as a candidate. Thus, it was possible to realise the
unlikely hypothesis that a marxist candidate, running on an anti­
imperialist program, could win, in a clean popular election, subject
to all the forms of bourgeois legality, the Presidency of the Republic
is the most sophisticated and stable Latin American democracy.

The Unidad Popular Government: The winning of the Presidency
by Salvador Allende was officially acknowledged on November 4,
1970, after fulfilment of all requirements of the Constitution, which
gives to the National Congress (Bi-cameral Parliament) the right
to endorse the winner in national elections. From November to
August of the present year, Chile, thus, for the first time in its

2 On the fiasco of the Frei government's attempt to "reform" the Chilean
system, see Chile: A New Way, by the same author.
political history, has been governed by a Left coalition at the head of which is the marxist leader, Salvador Allende.

In this short period, important initiatives have been taken in agrarian, banking and industrial matters, and copper has been nationalised. These measures I would like to call fundamental transformations within the concept of the bourgeois revolution, which open the way to socialism. From this point of view, a revolution in Chile is beginning. Summing up, it may be said that these measures tend to strike at one and at the same time at the latifundistas, the monopolies, and imperialism. Let us look briefly at the way in which these transformations were carried out.

a) Radicalisation of Agrarian Reform: Under the cover of the old Agrarian Reform Law drawn up by the Frei Administration, the Unidad Popular government has pressed forward with the massive expropriation of more than 1000 properties in the central zone of Chile, covering an area of more than half the total cultivable land in the country. The drawing-in, mobilisation and development of the masses in the Chilean countryside has no parallel, and represents one of the most important achievements in the overall process of change in the society. This agrarian reform measure was a heavy blow at the oligarchy, which has rallied politically to the National Party.

b) The Banking System: Through legal processes, 45 per cent of the national banking credits has been acquired on behalf of the government, and more than 15 banks have been nationalised. Bilateral agreements with three foreign banks have broadened the financial base of the Unidad Popular government. As was to be expected, this measure greatly affected the oligarchic sectors and part of the national bourgeoisie.

c) Nationalisation of Strategic and Monopolistic Industries: Steel, coal and iron have been nationalised, together with the main textile industries. The procedure utilised has been government intervention in view of irregularities in the conduct of capitalist owners, or unreconciled conflicts between capital and labor. The textile monopolies and other sectors, including North American interests (electronics, for instance), have been hit by these measures.

d) Nationalisation of Copper: The redemption of the copper deposits, until yesterday in the hands of Yankee investors, represents the most concrete achievement of the Unidad Popular government. After long legal procedures, in the course of which Parliament modified and changed the spirit of the nationalisation law, the Chilean State came to be the sole owner of the nation's copper. A time limit was established for the fixing of the sum of compensation and also a special court was set up to examine
the companies' claims in the event that the compensation figure was judged to be "too low or unjust". To complete the picture, mention must be made of a number of "conjunctural" measures, such as the reduction of the rate of inflation to 10 per cent within eight months, a raising of the workers' purchasing power by 30 per cent, the launching of big plans for the building of cheap housing, and the improvement of collective social services favoring especially the pensioners and deprived sectors of the rural population. Finally, in the field of international relations, Chile has shown great independence and an opening has been made towards the socialist camp, a system in cooperation with which the government has launched important plans for industrial, scientific and cultural development.

The Institutional Set-up and the Class Struggle: The peculiarity of the Chilean experiment is that all these measures, which form part of a coherent program of the government, have been realised within the old bourgeois institutional framework. Nobody could imagine that the ruling sectors (oligarchy, national bourgeoisie and imperialism), naively respecting the revolutionary process, would accept resignedly the loss of their privileges and power. Nothing of the kind is occurring in the Chile of today. We may witness how the class struggle, sometimes open and violent, and at other times silent and peaceful, is proceeding day by day in the Chilean revolution.

The institutional system rests upon three powers. There is the executive, represented by the President and his Ministers, which is an important centralising force, but is not decisive. There is the legislature, the bi-cameral Parliament, which at the present time does not represent the real balance of forces within the country. Here, the Unidad Popular is in a minority, and the bourgeoisie and imperialism have a majority. Finally, there is the judicial power, which is supposedly independent, but which is structurally obedient to a rigid class scheme. Here the bourgeoisie and imperialism have a majority. Completing this set-up is an institution very important to Chile, Le Contraloria, a sort of court, endowed with all-embracing powers, which was set up in 1927 at the instigation of North American investors, and whose purpose is to exercise rigorous control over State expenditures. It is this organisation which has the task of establishing the amount which must be paid to the Yankees by the Chilean government for copper. Here too the bourgeoisie and imperialism have a majority.

As can be seen, the Unidad Popular has very limited room for manoeuvre if it remains within the framework of bourgeois institutions. We shall observe some aspects of the way in which the
Class struggle has operated within this institutional framework. The draft law sent by the President to Parliament for the nationalisation of copper was totally denatured by the representatives of the bourgeoisie and imperialism, who left the way open for an interpretation and utilisation of the law favorable to the companies affected by the law. We should recall that the Christian Democratic Party and the National Party have a majority in the Parliament. The nationalisation of the textile industry, which is now in the hands of the workers, has been declared illegal by the Contraloria, thanks to some forms of legal interpretation. The Contraloria is controlled by the bourgeoisie and imperialism and works through certain learned persons who base themselves on "juridical wisdom".

In the matter of the agrarian reform also, bourgeois legality is protecting the latifundistas and operating against the working people.

That is, in all the measures taken by the Unidad Popular government, the bourgeoisie and imperialism have used all their still intact power in opposition, and are pushing the government to seek for illegal ways forward and thus to provide them with a moral pretext which may be used to halt the government and recover their privileges. The class struggle is the stuff of everyday life in Chile.

Analysis of the Present Political Position: The future of the Chilean revolution is being decided in the present months. The concrete fact is that political power, in this case, the Presidency of the Republic, is only a section of the real power in Chile. In September 1970, the bourgeoisie and imperialism were disunited in their fight against the working people. But now, when the mobilisation of the people is going ahead, they are showing themselves to be firmly united. That is, they are returning to the old scheme of preventing the advance of the people through the ruling Holy Alliance. The first five months of the Unidad Popular government revealed a high level of combativity on the part of the masses, both in town and countryside. But particularly from July, when there was a by-election in Valparaiso, which was won by the bourgeoisie united against the Unidad Popular government, this combativity has declined. The Rightwing and imperialism lifted up their heads again, following the psychological impact of Allende's win.

It must be clearly seen that on September 4, 1970, the people and the Leftwing of Chile won the government. They won a part of the power, a part of the access to the centres of decision-making. They did not win power. The working people of Chile still
do not have power in their hands. They have in their hands an effective instrument, the government, and if it is well used, if it is taken as an instrument of the workers, it can serve as an element to develop the work and the way towards the revolution.

As indicated above, after November 4 the government took a series of measures in copper, in banking, which had previously been the preserve of only a few, and struck at some industries, transforming them into the property of the whole people; some important landed properties were also passed into the hands of the peasants. But much more important than this, after September 4 the workers began mobilising in support of their own demands, the peasants and the Indian population for land, the citizens for their rights, and the students and small producers for theirs. This factor is the most important one in the whole Chilean process. It is the workers, trusting in themselves, and in their own organisations, selecting and striking at their enemies, who are carrying the Chilean process forward.

But since September also, the dominant sectors, the bourgeoisie and imperialism, have been opposing the government's every forward step, and the advance of the workers, along the path that the workers are taking in Chile. From September onwards, the bourgeoisie, fearful for their power and riches, have been fighting the government. If a peasant takes over a farm property, the latifundistas appeal to bourgeois legality. The workers and peasants are still advancing, but the dominant classes, from September 4 onwards, have run up their banners — the banners of legality, of private property, of law and order.

They have succeeded in preventing achievement of certain production targets, limiting production in their own enterprises, dismissing workers, organising subversion and promoting crime as last-ditch expedients. The owners of factories are not increasing production in an adequate manner; the latifundistas are sabotaging agrarian production, stopping sowing, etc. These attitudes are reflected concretely in a shortage of essential goods required by the population for their subsistence, the promotion of confusion among the masses of the people, especially the women, who, through powerful propaganda means, are being led to believe that the government and the revolution are responsible for the state of affairs.

Imperialism, which up to now has not yet raised its head in the midst of the confusion of the Chilean bourgeoisie, is now beginning to exert pressures to prevent the government from going forward with its plans and programs. The EXIM Bank has
announced that it is not going to lend to Chile previously promised funds until the exact amount is known of the compensation to be paid to Anaconda, etc., for the nationalisation of copper. That is, the domestic bourgeoisie, in close alliance with imperialism, has taken the offensive against the Chilean people with the clear perspective of stifling their struggle and disarming morally and materially the popular basis of support for the Unidad Popular government.

This situation is becoming steadily more critical and is making it more and more difficult to continue playing the Chilean institutional game. Bourgeois legality at present is operating in favor of the bourgeoisie and imperialism and consequently prejudicing the real advance of the revolutionary process. The class struggle is steadily assuming more dramatic forms, and although I cannot announce it as an ineluctable, axiomatic truth, a violent, armed confrontation daily comes close to the Chilean scene.

The Alternatives: A maintenance of the situation above described is good neither for the government nor for the working people. On the contrary, it is only good for the bourgeoisie and imperialism. The working masses in Chile are daily becoming more conscious, and are identifying more and more clearly just who their enemies are. However, in the middle groupings, there are emerging signs of a certain demoralisation, and sense of insecurity. Massive sackings, and the sudden closure of factories and companies, are giving rise to panic among the middle sectors. The bourgeoisie and imperialism, through their information channels, are projecting the most hair-raising images of the future of Chile. The workers and their parties are strengthening their positions, even though the path to be taken is not clear and defined.

In our judgment, the immediate alternatives could be:

a) Dissolution of the Parliament through a consultation or plebiscite in order to replace it with a House or Assembly of the People, a step which should be taken quickly before there is serious loss of popularity for the Unidad Popular government.

b) Give more strength to the revolutionary power through convincing the armed forces, until now loyal to President Allende, to break with institutionality and support the popular masses.

c) Civil war provoked by the bourgeoisie and imperialism supported by militarist, pro-imperialist sectors.

d) Maintenance of the social stalemate by a process of softening of the government’s program, transforming the revolution into a series of social reforms, an alternative which does not exclude the possibility of a popular revolutionary uprising.
Conclusions: In the light of the developments which I have briefly summarised above, there exist two tendencies within the Unidad Popular government. There is one which is described as moderate, which seeks an alliance with sections of the Christian Democrats, in order to find a "peaceful path" out of the Status quo in which the Chilean process find itself at present. This tendency also seeks to avoid a confrontation now with imperialism, and to find a formula for payment of, and in the long run actual payment of, compensation to the nationalised Yankee companies. The other, stronger tendency, which has greater popular support, is to break with bourgeois legality, and to bring about a radical definition in the Chilean political scene. The formula of the Socialist Party provides for no payment of compensation to the Yankee companies, and for the provocation of conflict now with imperialism.

Personally, and writing from this distance, I believe that this last alternative is the most opportune. However, it carries some intrinsic risks. The demobilisation and decline in combativity which is to be observed among some sections of the people, wrongly accepting the legalist and paternalist mentality of the government, could weigh very heavily in the event of an armed confrontation. However, the process of the political negotiations is also prejudicing and demoralising the masses, for whom their political leaders are substituting themselves. Once again, revolutionary history brings us face to face with the dilemma of whether to trust the broad masses or to confide in the people's vanguard parties the power to decide the next steps which must inevitably be taken in the difficult Chilean revolutionary model. History is open, and future events will prove the rightness or wrongness of the reasoning we are discussing here.

In respect to the conduct of the bourgeoisie and imperialism, they are biding their time, conscious that they still have many cards to play. Their power has not yet been seriously attacked, and has only been hit hard at certain points. They are not at present seeking an armed confrontation, preferring to allow the passage of time in which the government may lose support among the masses, and, under the cover of bourgeois legality, to retrieve power at the next elections. This is the present line of thought of the Chilean Rightwing. As can be seen, the workers and their parties must choose the right moment to consolidate their forces, and to jump decisively over the steel wall represented by the maintenance of the institutional apparatus, which is preventing the radicalisation and the advance of the workers towards socialism.
NOTES ON THE ECONOMY

That Budget and the Domestic Economy

WHAT IS THERE LEFT TO SAY on the Budget? Not much. At the time of writing (mid-September) the first signs that the government had over-reacted were becoming evident. In a week of gobbledy-gook statements, Mr. McMahon attacked the prophets of gloom and denied that unemployment would rise above 100,000. He then announced that of course it would rise above 100,000 at the beginning of 1972, pointing out that it nearly got there last January (as if that made it OK). Careful questioning in Parliament and on TV has now revealed that the extra 50c for pensioners was not nearly as good as it looked (40% of pensioners don’t get a rise) and it looks as if the Wool Commission is well on its way towards implementing the final and logical step of various Australian government policies towards agriculture . . . protection all round (at least double the budgeted cost).

Don’t worry, 55% of the government contribution via price supports go to the richest 15% of wool producers. Even more importantly, the immediate beneficiaries will be the banks and the stock companies, whose loans to farmers will be paid off. And the present Rural Reconstruction Scheme with its emphasis on debt reconstruction and loans for viable farms is designed to help those who want to stay on the land, not to help people get off . . . farm size has to increase, so you wait around for your neighbour to go broke, so that the government can help you buy in for a song. (How nice and neighbourly on our family farms.) There’s not much help for that move to a new job. . . . None of this will help wool in the long run; no matter what the price of wool, recent changes in relative processing cost are now so high in comparison with synthetics that even free raw wool would not be sufficient to close the price gap between woollen and synthetic garments sufficiently to maintain high enough prices for Australian farmers. It has recently been found that synthetic processing machines can be speeded up considerably, but wool fibres are not strong enough for this to work in wool processing. Worse, new machines have recently been invented to make fine yarns out of coarse wool, so that the demand for high quality wool has fallen. As one expert suggested to me, you can’t do too much to a horse-drawn buggy to make it sell once the automobile is around.

As if the wool crisis, the dollar crisis, and a lousy budget were not enough, the High Court threw out much of that toothless
wonder, the Restrictive Practices Legislation. But all was not lost, for the way is now open for a stronger new law. How strong and effective will it be? Suppose it was as good as the American Anti-Trust law (usually held up at the best in the capitalist world) ... have you noticed much trust-busting there? Of course, there are other things which do cut into domestic monopolies. Although BHP may have taken out its monopoly profits in the form of complacent and comfortable existence for its executives, they must be trembling at the thought that GMH has threatened to start buying cheaper Japanese steel. And tariffs, which protect many jobs (especially in textiles) also protect plenty of profits for Australian companies. Notice how jumpy Ampol became with the cheaper petrol imports, only to be followed by the automatic protective mechanisms to stop so-called petrol dumping ... as if a "free market" price existed anywhere to be under-cut by dumping ... but then that's another story, since Australia could get very cheap petrol if she exported some of the light Bass Strait crudes in exchange for heavier crudes. This would lower refining costs, even if it meant upsetting the cosy little agreement between Mr. Gorton, BHP and Esso.

Since when has Sir Cecil Looker become interested in paying taxes? Well, he is advocating a capital gains tax, which at first sight should hurt the share traders. Puzzlement? Not really, since the present arrangement is a little uncertain. The wording of the tax law is a bit sloppy and sometimes you can get away with no capital gains tax, and at other times you get hit for the full amount for personal income tax ... a mere 66.7% for most who operate on the stock exchange. The trouble is that, with the new computerized tax man, it's getting harder to pose as a 'genuine investor' so that you can evade capital gains taxes. While all income, no matter from what source, should be taxed at the same rate, the game is getting a little tough ... imagine a capital gains tax of 25% (the American rate) ... better to be hit for 25% than 66.7% ... 

The International Money Crisis

WILL AUGUST 15 GO DOWN IN HISTORY as the beginning of the 1970's trade war? The latest moves by the United States to try to blunt the challenges to its economic supremacy from the vanquished countries of the Second World War (Japan and West Germany) clearly mark the beginning of a new phase of inter-capitalist rivalries. It may be said that the seeds of the present crisis lie in the internal contradictions of capitalism. However, the more immediate causes lie in the particular arrangements made towards the end of the Second World War at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire, USA, for the international monetary
arrangements for postwar capitalism. The experience of the 1930’s had already shown that the old Gold Standard system was no longer workable. This fact, coupled with doubts as to the sufficiency of future increases in the supply of gold to provide internationally acceptable money, ruled out a return to the old system.

However, once accidents of history and immutable economic laws ceased to govern the supply of international money, the crucial issue to be resolved at Bretton Woods was the control of the printing press for international paper money. The economist and negotiator for Britain, Lord Keynes, argued for an International Monetary Fund with some powers to (in effect) print money. He even suggested that the new currency be called ‘bancor’. It was impossible to reach agreement on such an international institution due largely to the issue of the control of future increases in international money. The system accepted was a modified Gold Standard under which the US dollar was directly related to gold, and all other currencies related to the dollar. Under this arrangement, both the US dollar and a shored-up pound sterling were to become the pivot currencies to be held by other capitalist countries alongside the ever (relatively) diminishing supplies of gold. The system has worked in a crooked sort of way, although prone to exaggerated speculative movements of ‘hot money’. In effect, currency speculators can make a one-way bet on a weak currency. For example, whenever sterling is weak, it’s silly to leave money in a London bank when it can be switched to Switzerland; you can’t lose on sterling becoming more valuable, but you have a good chance of gaining from sterling becoming cheaper. This is especially so since the speculative act further weakens the currency under attack and increases the chance of gain.

In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, dollars were very scarce and most capitalist countries used the dollars they earned either to buy goods only obtainable from America (the only major economy to survive the war unscathed) or to accumulate reserves. And, after the initial scarcity of goods (and particularly American goods) was relieved by the economic recovery of war-devastated Europe and Japan, the ability of the United States to effectively control the printing press for international money (i.e. the dollar) came into its own. Thus, a period of 20 or so years ensued during which the richest country in the world, for the price of a small interest charge paid on foreign holdings of the dollar, has been able to buy more goods and services from the rest of the world than she sells. There should be no need to mention here some of the services bought — military bases, key sectors of foreign capitalist countries — all made a little easier when you are in effect the banker for the capitalist world.
The crises in international money during the early part of the 1960's revolved around the strains imposed as sterling bowed-out as the major buffer for the dollar; when the costs imposed on the domestic economy of the UK became too great. It became ridiculous to continue in this role when it became necessary to resort to recommending cold showers for workers and capitalists alike to smarten themselves and sterling up. Not only were the working classes unwilling to have wage and employment policy governed by the interests of the City of London and the international role of sterling, but export profits for manufacturing capital were being kept down too. The crises of the latter part of the 1960's were related to the Japanese and West German challenges to American economic supremacy in both commodity and money markets, and also French efforts in the money markets. That De Gaulle failed in 1968 to bust the dollar and force a return to gold is history. Now the Japanese and the West Germans, who for a long time have been accumulating dollars, are becoming increasingly reluctant to play the old game and re-value whenever the dollar is threatened. It was a great deal easier for the Americans to put on political pressure to force either additional accumulation of dollars or a currency revaluation during the Cold War years. (For an excellent analysis of these trends, see Mandel's *America versus Europe: Contradictions of Imperialism*, reviewed in *ALR* 32.)

The immediate cause of the present crisis lies in the overvaluation (once again) of the dollar in relation to the yen and the deutschmark. Weakened by the strains of the Indo-China war, the dollar has not been able to withstand the recent competitive onslaught of many Japanese and West German goods. Worse, key American industries such as electronics, steel and autos have begun to feel the effects of competition for the first time in years — that is, competition which eats into monopoly profits. Earlier in the 1960's, it was mainly textiles . . . as if that was not bad enough.

The man behind the latest American moves in Treasury Secretary Connolly, the conservative Democrat and former Texas governor. In an early August warm-up, he announced a ‘get tough’ policy with Latin American countries that expropriate American holdings. As Connolly put it, ‘We don’t have any friends there anyway’. It’s rumoured that US copper interests have been doing some homework! Then the Nixon package for the ‘New Prosperity’ on August 15. He faced the problem of protecting the dollar, of protecting American industry from Japanese and European competition, of protecting the American position as banker for the world, and of protecting his rear by stopping further rises in unemployment.
(you need to keep-em on their toes, but not too much as to encourage them to start a revolution). Given that the West Europeans and the Japanese were proving none too cooperative in revaluing their currencies, he had to act dramatically. (It's a little tough when the bargaining has to be done on a more equal basis.) The main weapons used by Nixon were the 10% import surcharge and a stop on gold exchanges for dollars. The fact that the (GATT) rules were broken by the former policy did not deter Nixon and predictably everyone else has been calling 'foul' ever since.

Not surprisingly, Australia was left in the lurch. With a balance of trade deficit over-compensated by capital inflows, a case could be made for Australia to revalue her currency with the yen. But underneath the veneer of confidence, the Treasury men are scared about the trade deficit (what would happen if foreign investors stopped liking us and we had to pay 'em back?). Grasping for straws, we clung to good old sterling!

Will the policies do what Nixon wanted them to? With such a long list of requirements, he obviously won't get everything he wanted. And his success at solving what was for him the most immediate economic problem — the dollar — depends crucially on the reactions of the Europeans and the Japanese. Already the threats of a trade war in retaliation have been made, but it's a little early to predict the outcome. In business, if you think that you alone can survive ruthless competition, you wait around till the others go broke. However, when competition gets tough enough to threaten mutual destruction, you join in an explicit or tacit monopoly-type arrangement. But nations are more complex than countries, and the contradictions between competitive drives and the threats which these may bring to the survival of the capitalist system as a whole are not so easily controlled. The forces of nationalism and various domestic economic and political pressures are pushing the governments of Western Europe and Japan to more serious challenges of US economic and political domination of the capitalist world. Yet in spite of all this, one should not underestimate the capacity of capitalism to rebuild its weakest institutions. After all, capitalism survived the ruptures of a massive depression and a global war not so long ago. Socialists cannot afford to wait around for the system to collapse, but should increase their resolve to bring about radical change and use current crises and rifts in the capitalist world to help achieve that end.

DAVID EVANS
EARLY IN THE 1840s Karl Marx used to frequent Hippel's Winecellar in Berlin and engage in long stein-in-hand conversations with the Bauer brothers, and other members of the Hegelian Left. Engels has left us a pencil sketch of one evening meeting, when the high priest of the Left Hegelians, Arnold Ruge, was treated to the disrespect which characterised the noisy group of "Freemen". Sitting slightly apart, in the nonchalant pose of one who is **au-dessus de la melee,** was a teacher from Madame Gropius' academy for young ladies, Johann Caspar Schmidt, who wrote under the pen-name of Max Stirner. Stirner's essay on education was published by Marx in *Rheinische Zeitung,* after Marx became editor of that paper in 1842. In time, Marx tired of the public bufooneries and larrikinism of the Freemen and finally broke with them in 1842. Among the sort of activities which he found particularly irritating was the clowning of Bruno Bauer at Stirner's wedding to Marie Dahnhardt. Though today it seems trivial, Bauer shocked the bourgeoisie by making mock of the wedding by substituting copper rings from his purse for the wedding ring.

Stirner, who appears to have lived a double life, partly the teacher of genteel ladies, and partly the wild young free man, finally rebelled against the complications of the bourgeois side of his life by publishing in 1844, his only significant book, *The Ego and its Own,* which professed to tell proletarians how they could liberate themselves. It so outraged bourgeois opinion that he was dismissed from his post and entered a decline, which was to

* Standing apart from the battle.

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see him separated from his wife, penniless, jailed for debt and forgotten. It was easy to see how the good burghers of Berlin were horrified by Stirner's mammoth work. It rejected completely every value, every social goal, every obligation, every concept. It was a tirade against and rejection of what was socially imposed in favour of an extreme individualism. Stirner started from a particular idea of man's development.

From the moment when he catches sight of the light of the world man seeks to find out himself and get hold of himself out of its confusion, in which he with everything else, is tossed about in motley mixture.

But everything that comes in contact with the child defends itself in turn against his attacks, and asserts its own persistence.

Accordingly, because each thing cares for itself and at the same time comes into constant collision with other things, the combat of self assertion is unavoidable.

... The victor becomes the lord, the vanquished one the subject: the former exercises supremacy and the "rights of supremacy", the latter fulfils in awe and deference the "duties of a subject".

... they watch for each others' weaknesses — children for those of their parents and parents for those of their children...

Back of the rod mightier than it stands our obduracy, our obdurate courage...

And what is our trickery, shrewdness, courage, obduracy? What else but mind (geist).

Mind, Stirner goes on, is the individual's youthful first self discovery, the discovery of the spooks, or powers above. This discovery leaves the world of rules discredited, something which the youth sees from a "heavenly standpoint" from the standpoint of his own conscience: For inculcated rules he substitutes the rules of conscience. But now he is fettered by his own conscience and the struggle between the ego and the general interest begins again.

We "run after our thoughts" now, and follow their commands just as we followed parental human ones. Our course of action is determined by our thoughts (ideas, conception, faith) as it is in childhood by the commands of our parents.

But is Stirner's solution to find the most appropriate system of balance between social and the individual, to maximise the combined interest? No, it is to reject all the guides.

Do truth, freedom, humanity, justice, desire anything else than that you grow enthusiastic and serve them... God and mankind have concerned themselves for nothing, for nothing but themselves... Away then with every concern that is not altogether my concern! You think at least that the "good cause" must be my concern? What's good, what's bad?... My concern is neither the divine nor the human, not the true, good, just, free, etc., but solely what is mine, and it is not a general one, but is — unique as I am unique.

He preached that nothing sacred existed. Men who disagreed had wheels in their heads, were haunted, the victims of a fixed
"idea, "an idea that has subjected man to itself" Pour épater le bourgeois* he gives this example:

Take notice how a "moral man" behaves, who today often thinks he is through with God and throws off Christianity as a bygone thing. If you ask him whether he ever doubted that the copulation of brother and sister is incest, that monogamy is the truth of marriage, that filial piety is a sacred duty, then a moral shudder will come over him at the thought of being allowed to touch his sister as wife also. And whence this shudder? Because he believes in those commandments.

As far as Stirner was concerned the criminal and the honest man were both on the same level, theoretically speaking, as both were the victims of ideas. The major task he posed himself was to rid people of all commitments to any principle because through such commitments they became slaves, even to notions like freedom. A man is free from what he is rid of, owner of what he controls or has in his power. Egoism is what is correct — but not the old egoism of bourgeois self aggrandisement — rather a new transcendent egoism.

From this premise flowed Stirner’s more practical proposals. He rejected the notion of social laws, and called all States despotisms, claiming that it was meaningless to distinguish between how authority was exercised — by the collectivity or limited numbers of individuals. All States were orders of dependence whose purpose was to tame and subordinate the individuals. Parties were of the same order as they too wanted a state.

On the other hand, property was in accord with egoism and acceptable, for it “was nothing but what is in my power” and man was entitled to whatever property he could “empower” himself of. All attempts to enact rational laws about property had “put out from the bay of love into a desolate sea of regulations”. Even Socialism and Communism could not be excepted from this and revolution could never be more than “a working forth of me out of the establishment”.

Karl Marx was in Paris when this book was published and he had already broken with and started to evolve his own thoughts, partly in critiques of the ideas of his erstwhile boon companions, the Freemen (in the Holy Family and earlier writings). If we are to accept his own account of his intellectual development, as expounded in the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy written in 1859, he had reached the second stage in the development of his thought when he turned to an examination of Stirner’s new book. He wrote:

when in the spring of 1845 (Engels) also settled in Brussels, we resolved to work out in common the opposition of our view to the ideological view

* To outrage the bourgeoisie.
of German philosophy, in fact, to settle accounts with our erstwhile philo­sophical conscience.

The resolve was carried out in the form of a criticism of post-Hegelian philosophy through which work they achieved self­clarification. The first of the volumes included an enormously profound and lengthy attack of Saint Max (Stirner)’s new book.

There is little doubt that this *German Ideology* is a key work in the development of marxist thought and that the section on the Leipzig Council dealing with Bauer and Stirner is the most important part of it although it is often left out of contemporary editions of the *German Ideology*, despite Marx’s indication that it was dedicated to criticising Feuerbach, Bauer and Stirner. Naturally the attack was in the terms of the positions which Marx and Engels had already evolved, and whose broad lines were laid down in the first section of the book which dealt with Feuerbach. How we should understand the first part of the book is to a considerable extent indicated in the second. We are not, therefore, overstating when we affirm that marxism was partly worked out in a critique of Stirner.

Before proceeding to the substance of Marx’s critique, it is important to note his approach, as the technique of reading (what the critique is looking for) is closely connected with the substance of his position and itself throws light on the specific difference of his position. Marx makes a Hegelian reading of Stirner, that is, he looks for the inner essential unity of the author’s approach to discover what the implicit position of the work is. He does not accept explicit position. In contemporary jargon: he acts (reads) as if the theory of the writer is in his practice and has to be produced by the reader. So, on one level Marx makes a philosophical reading of Stirner: he comes at his subject in the manner one would expect of a disciple of Hegel.

But, he also goes beyond the conventional style of looking beyond the appearances to the essence and this explains why the whole of the *German Ideology* is a critique of German philosophers (Stirner’s book itself is markedly Hegelian in its understanding of History). Where Hegelians, and philosophers generally, tend to think of understanding as something in the head, a function of the mind, and tend therefore to vex themselves with solving problems which are not real problems, Marx had already decided, as his practice reveals, that even understanding is socially based and that the locus and stature of particular facts (ideas or not) can only be determined by reference to the real world (i.e. by stepping outside the world of philosophy into that of history) (this is one dimension of the “empiricism” in the *Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts, which he had written about a year before.)

Briefly his position was that the more you knew, the more you could understand. In the previous years he had sometimes worked three days and nights without end, building up a huge and catholic knowledge of facts. It was this catholicity which distinguished his intellectual methods and reading technique from these men he was criticizing. He used his much vaster knowledge in all fields to show the inadequacy of Stirner, whom he dubbed a philistine, whose ideas were, as he vulgarly and eruditely put, entre ambas posaderas (between the buttocks). We may note as an aside that this indicated that Marx already detested the klugscheisse (clever shits) of the world, who believed that "correctness" was shown through cleverer argumentation. What we must note here is that while seeking for the essence of Stirner's position to discover its inconsistencies, Marx did not make an immanent critique, a critique of Stirner in Stirner's terms: he also changed the language or terms of disproof, shifting them out of the conventions of philosophical discourse as practised then and now, onto a new level. Just what this new level was I leave aside for the moment. In sum, in the technique of reading and criticism we can already see Marx's theory at work, and even the abuse is germane to it.

The second section of the German Ideology is an almost page by page refutation of Stirner and cannot be understood unless The Ego and its Own is read with it. The critique takes place on many levels, but its central point is this: Stirner never made his point about how men could liberate themselves because he never got beyond an ideological view of history and men, that is, his presuppositions were without adequate empirical foundation. He therefore constructed an account of history and man which never existed, and from which it was easy for his egoist to escape, because he was escaping from nothing.

Marx points out that from the beginning Stirner's description assumes that the child seeks after the essence of things, becomes a "metaphysician", who works out his destiny by the adaption of his attitudes to life. "He takes the world as his conception of the world" and it is related in its entirety to him, by him. Thus Stirner regards the various stages of life only as the "self-discoveries" of the individual, and these "self-discoveries" are always reduced to a definite relation of consciousness. "Thus the variousness of consciousness is here the life of the individual". So in Stirner the speculative idea is made the driving force of history, and the thinker creates himself out of nothing material.
To this idea Marx counters that in the "development of a property something is created out of something". Far from it being true that "out of nothing" I make myself, for example, a "speaker", the nothing which forms the basis here is a very manifold something — the real individual, his speech organs, a definite stage of historical development, an existing language and dialects, ears capable of hearing and a human environment from which it is possible to hear something, etc., etc. If Stirner had looked at the history of the Middle Ages he would have observed that far from Christianity having a history of its own, which changed itself, "wholly empirical causes in no way dependent on any influence of the religious spirit" brought about changes in its "history". So it is with all his categories — Stirner does not look outside them to discover their genesis: they are self generating.

In fact this adds up to the dominance of the speculative philosophers in history — since history takes place in the head — their superior awareness makes history:

Saint Max's adoption of Hegel's world domination of the philosophers and his transformation of it into a hierarchy are due to an uncritical credulity of the saint and to a "holy" or unholy ignorance which is content with "seeing through" history . . . without troubling to "know" many "things" about it.

It is therefore because his approach is a-historical, or ideological, that he arrives at his understanding — in which philosophers rule the world and all history is merely a transcendence of earlier philosophy.

How had he got to this position where men were merely the victims of their ideas, and self-liberation was merely awareness of this fact and its discard? It was, writes Marx, because of German historical development, which had a completely petty-bourgeois character. In Germany, because the French revolution had never been real (but merely an ideal) the bourgeoisie had never noticed the connection between ideas and values (ideology) and real interests and therefore never looked beyond the slogans to the reality. The German context explained why Stirner misunderstood communism, which he can only identify with utopianism: the search for the Holy or Right society (a fetter) rather than the correcting of a malfunctioning machine by men for themselves.

If Stirner had not taken as his starting point Man (philosopher's concept) but the study of 'men" (as materialists do) he would have descended from the realm of speculation into the realm of reality from what people imagine they are to what they actually are, from what they imagine about themselves to how they act and are bound to act in definite circumstances. He should have realised that individuals have always started out from themselves, and could not do otherwise, and that therefore
both the aspects he noted are aspects of the personal development of individuals; both are equally engendered by the empirical conditions of life, both are only expressions of one and the same personal development of people and are therefore only in seeming contradiction to each other.

... (liberation is a question of the materially determined destruction of the preceding materially determined mode of life of individuals.

What price then, Saint Max’s notion of the fetters of fixed ideas and how men can liberate themselves through rejecting them? Stirner clearly regards man’s self-liberation as the process of recognition by men of the successive “heavens” which have emprisoned them, from whose mortality they can now liberate themselves.

Marx replies that the egoists of Stirner only free themselves from their past as philosophers and not in reality. Fixed ideas survive as long as reality, material circumstances allow them to, and this goes for fixed ideas of German philosophers. In sum, as Marx points out, the examples of which teem in Stirner’s book are rooted in the inmost method of exposition in which everything is a phenomenon of the essence and the essence is Man as unique, not real men making their history.

As Saint Sancho earlier made the thoughts of individuals into something existing independently, so here he separates the ideal reflection of real conflicts from these conflicts themselves and gives them independent existence. The real contradictions in which the individual finds himself are transformed into contradictions of the individual with his idea or, as Saint Sancho also expresses it more simply, into contradictions with the idea as such, with the Holy. Thus he manages to transform the real conflict, the original source of its ideal reflection into the consequence of this ideological appearance. Thus he arrives at the result that it is not a question of the practical abolition of the practical conflict, but only of renouncing of the idea of this conflict, a renunciation which he as a good moralist, insistently urges people to carry out.

It is clear that Marx not only disagreed with the views of Stirner, but that he also opposed them and regarded this opposition as crucial in his own intellectual development. The opposition was on philosophical grounds and was concerned with prime motor forces in history. Thus it concerned not what was peripheral to Marx’s new theory of philosophy, but the central core. This is not to say that Marx had already worked out fully his own new theory of philosophy in the German Ideology, but that he was so much in disagreement with Stirner on fundamental issues that he was being forced by default to find his own alternative. Stirner and The Ego and its Own are, as Krimerman and Perry point out, among the patron saints and the Bibles (used advisedly) of the anarchist movement and so this disagreement shows an early disagreement between Marx and men who were later known as anarchists, discrediting the idea that the dispute between marxists
and anarchists is merely over practical matters like centralised control (authoritarianism), and the corresponding idea, sometimes bruited (e.g. by Guerin) that anarchism is merely marxist socialism without the central control. Marxism is an anti-anarchism, though Marx did not always assert that this or that thinker he was opposing was an anarchist.

What then, are the specific fundamental differences between marxism and anarchism at this stage of Marx's development? We can only answer in limited terms, since Marx had not fully elaborated his own point of view, but we can establish with considerable precision what he did not like about Stirner and the implications of the Stirnerian position. The last concern was again one of Marx's forte; he was capable of indicating where people would end by the logic of their position.

As Engels indicated in a letter to Marx, both Stirner and Marx and Engels started from an apparently similar presupposition: that antecedent to anything else there stood human beings. How they defined or understood the first factor (prime mover) in their philosophy was however, very different. For Stirner it was the abstracted concept "Man" and for Marx and Engels it was men as social-beings (that is not abstracted). Where Stirner thus started from a concept of human nature (the abstracted notion of man) as the centre of the world, Marx and Engels started from real empirical history.

The fundamental distinction between the early anarchist and Marx is thus not whether man makes the world (an absolute immanentism, inherited by both from Feuerbach), but just how we should understand this notion. Marx had already started to work out his position by 1845 but had not concluded it in any satisfactory fashion. But, starting from the view that all our "heavens" were produced on earth by men (being is the subject—thought the predicate, in Feuerbach's terms) he had looked to the real world of men "the empirical basis" as the starting point of any understanding. Since men were in society the starting point had always to be men as social beings — never capable of abstraction from one another or the social complexity, without losing meaning. But to think and pass judgements it was necessary to abstract (all Marx's works are abstractions — real life transformed into notions of the real life) and thus Marx had already suggested in the part of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts on Estranged Labour that man was conscious life activity, or conscious productive life who in the process of making his social life (producing) estranged himself from himself and from his product and from his fellows — seeing other men as alien entities, against
him. He had lost sight of his quality as a social being through having subordinated his essential being to his means of existence. (The whole notion rests on the claim that men produce to fulfil their needs, and that there are ever-increasing artificial needs that they have to satisfy — though this claim is only spelt out in the German Ideology. In turn, the reduction of production to the fulfilment of needs is a product of the division of labour and the property system.)

Taken in the large, without too much over marxologising, we can say that Karl Marx could not accept a notion of man except as a social being, whose fulfilment (re-entry into his essential being from his alienated state) could only come socially, with other men. In other words, men would liberate themselves with each other by making their happiness together. Responsible socialists (and I do not doubt that Marx moralised despite his affirmation to the contrary in the German Ideology) faced up to reality and tried to fix the “machine”, they did not try to stop the world and get out egotistically (drop out). Not only was this a sanguine proposal, it was also impossible.

What he objected to in Stirner is thus clear. Stirner, through his refusal to look beyond his concepts to the real world beyond, like his fellows* avoided the fact that Man was social man engaged in praxis, producing everything, even his concepts of himself in an everchanging fashion. Stirner refused to face up to the real world and its problems. This refusal was emotional and unconscious and to be explained by the German way in which he came at the problem of men’s liberation — a philosopher’s way. What should we understand by the philosopher’s way (as German Ideologist)? To answer this we must to some extent make an inferential reading of Marx in terms of the whole corpus of his work, which raises great methodological problems, which need to be defended at length but which are merely asserted here. By asserting as the prime mover a fixed concept of Man’s nature

* “Edgar Bauer had been brought before the Prussian courts for denouncing the Prussian State. After sentence had been pronounced, he was asked if he had anything else to say. He calmly replied that the decision was logically null and void. The existence of the State implied the existence of subjects. The state had no jurisdiction on any but its own subjects. But he, Edgar Bauer refused to recognise the State. It had no validity for him. The dialectic was perfect, but what it did not prove was that the State had no power over him. The iron bars and stone walls of his cell were proof of that power. It was rumoured, however, that Bauer convinced himself on the basis of his solipsism that this was a mistake, and that the prison-cells, bars and all — had been posited by his deeper self-consciousness.”
to real history as the changing of the nature of men, Stirner was turning reality upside down, was abstracted. He was separating the idea from the reality and making it something over and against that object, and thus lapsing into a dualism which was no different from, and a lot worse than, Christianity.

The philosopher's way was that the way in which he established the adequacy of his own judgement about what Man was. As a philosopher he believed that his judgement could be tested in the then accepted terms of philosophical discourse, by other concepts, and thus its truth could be established without any real activity of men whose liberation it sought. This meant that he was making a judgement and then verifying it himself in the terms he chose.

The dangers of this were enormous. If Man's true nature was such and such, and the true path was such and such, and they could be established in advance finally in a book (the test of any proposition is theoretical, i.e. abstract, rather than in theory and practice, two united praxes) then the test of good or bad (beneficial/non-beneficial action) was in the book. If men did not subscribe to the "Book", then, of course, they were, as Stirner referred to them, "the stupid populace". Inevitably, men who think in Stirner's fashion are anti-democratic and elitist, believing that they have an intellectual key (a sum of knowledge) which is self-verifying. Marx was, of course, by this time proceeding rapidly to the implications of subject-object unity (his starting point) via real life, to the notion that judgements are not discovered to be true but are made true in revolutionary praxis by the people whose predicament they seek to describe, and they will only catch hold if they correspond with social reality. Liberation is not an intellectual act but a remaking of thought and historical matter. So the passionate "anti-intellectualism" which Woodcock says is characteristic of Stirner in fact cloaks an elitist position in which human beings are subordinated to doctrines — exactly the position which Stirner decried and which anarchists wish to avoid.

To conclude: already in 1845 Marx had decided that the basic philosophical position of anarchism, its absolute notion of Man as an egoist and an individual who was oppressed by social fetters (by rule and self rule), would lead it to an anti-democratic tyranny. A priori assertions to which reality must conform had no place in marxism. As Marx himself never stopped writing: we must not accept the self-conceptions of people which cloaks their reality: anarchists of Stirner's sort were in no sense democrats or socialists.
THE APPEARANCE OF JACK BLAKE’S BOOK, which was written on a grant from the Socialist Research Fund, is very welcome. It is an important event because (regrettably) so few Australian marxists have written books. It is an important book because it deals with fundamentals of the problems of revolution in Australia as a particular case of a modern industrialised capitalist country. In doing so, it also puts on the plate difficult questions of theory and action that are, to me, not always clearly posed in the book, and discussion of them can considerably assist their resolution.

Blake’s central thesis is that the old model of revolution accepted was one applicable to countries in which the ruling class and its organs of power had become isolated from the people (Feudal France, Tsarist Russia, Chiang Kai-shek’s China, Batista’s Cuba, etc.) and where dire material poverty affected the majority and assisted the formation of a desperate revolutionary mass which overthrew the old society. Such circumstances, Blake points out, neither gave the time nor focussed attention on the need for development of a cultural hegemony of the revolution in opposition to that of the old society and its rulers. One consequence of such a failing was that the socialist societies which came into existence in such a way failed to make the needed revolution in human relations, concentrating on industrialisation and developing varying degrees of stalinism.

In modern capitalist society, not only is power less clearly seen (the “ruling class” cannot be precisely determined because ownership and power are not so direct, but mediated through managers and bureaucrats), but it is also less depended on to maintain the system than cultural hegemony — the values of society, hallowed by tradition. Thus the central position of values in the modern revolutionary process, and the need to consciously reject the former overly political and organisational orientation of revolutionary movements with their drive to centralisation and fascination by political power, neglect and even deriding of values, and general anti-intellectualism. One prominent agitator on the goldfields in Victoria in the latter half of last century is reported to have habitually concluded his speeches with the epigram

*Revolution From Within* — a contemporary theory of social change, by J. D. Blake. Foreword by Dr. R. A. Gollan. Published by Outlook. 164 pp., cloth $6.00, paper $3.50.
Moral persuasion is all humbug,
There's nothing convinces like a lick i' the lug
and large numbers of Australian workers and revolutionaries have
certainly been of that opinion.

Today, there is growing evidence of the rejection of the values
of capitalist society in many circles, and in the growing number of
movements of the people such as those concerned with the
environment and pollution for example, as well as in more traditional
fields. This both points a direction and gives hope that the
great power (especially of containment) held by the existing system
can be and will be undermined "from within" — thus the title
of the book.

Why has this new characteristic and this new possibility
appeared? Mainly because of the scientific and technological
revolution and the changes in capitalism accompanying it which
have emphasised the emptiness and inhumanity of present human
relations, has increased the number and awareness of the intel­
lectuals, and is restructuring the work force in a way which can
overcome the old separation of mental and manual labor, and the
mutual antipathy of workers and intellectuals. It has also given,
for the first time, the possibility of a new revolution with a new,
far deeper, human content. Allowing for greatly different condi­
tions, a similar type of transformation is possible and necessary in
the existing socialist countries.

The central thrust of action under the guidance of the newly
developing values is self-management in all spheres from factory
to local to university. This is essential to prevent a recrudescence
of stalinism, rule from the top, authoritarianism. It can prevent
the still needed organisation and central planning from over­
shadowing self-management because the base will be strong in
spirit and in actual control. It is possible because the newly
structured work force — better educated itself, and with closer
links with the general culture through the intellectually trained
members now in it — can run things without owners, professional
controllers and bureaucrats. The central point of activity of
revolutionaries should therefore be in the work place.

This general line of reasoning, which is of course argued in
the book itself at much greater length (and given necessary
qualifications) is coming to be more widely held, and I for one
support it, particularly the emphasis on the central place occupied
by values. In fact, I would have liked to have seen a development
of the question in its philosophical and other implications, but of
course the book had purposes which probably precluded that.
Jack Blake deserves congratulations on his efforts, and the best form of this would be a wide study and discussion of the book. To Outlook, now unfortunately ceased publication, should also go congratulations for what must have been a costly exercise in publishing. Again, buying and reading the book would be the best practical form such support could take.

One hopes that the wish to stimulate criticism and questioning was a major part of the intention. I emphasise questioning because, although there are qualifications and recognition of other considerations which may meet what I have to raise, the impression remains that there could be important differences in understanding various statements.

One general criticism is that in a book which, correctly to my mind, stresses the need to re-examine and challenge old traditions, the tradition is continued of claiming, as a support for a point of view, that it is based on the one true interpretation of marxism. It may be, but who is to decide which is the true interpretation when there are many — and not only the “official” ones which hardly merit the title — but ones held by numbers of respected theoreticians and activists? It would also be desirable, where criticisms of crucial points in Marx are made, as they are in a few places, that the implications of the criticism for marxism as a whole might be pursued.

There is also an impression of determinism which still persists despite qualifications — in fact, direct rejection of this standpoint. In the penetrating criticism of stalinism and in other parts there seems to be an implication that the rise of stalinism was inevitable, since its basic cause lay in the nature of the working class of those times, as determined by lack of education, anti-intellectualism, and the consequent lack of any strength or outlook except that of collectivism. It might be said “it happened, and therefore it was determined”, but this would be begging the question of determinism, particularly since similar questions arise at any time, including today.

And was this the cause of stalinism, or was it rather one of a complex of interacting influences which worked out differently in different countries, and could have worked out still more differently given a different state of consciousness by a number of people? Or even a different series of “accidents” with individuals — e.g. a longer life for Lenin, and a different succession after his death?

There is the same impression given by the discussion of the Australian ethos, mateship, etc. The debunking of previous idealisation is necessary and beneficial, but despite the present
fashion it is hard to accept the view that a system of beliefs and values such as this could develop in one, and only one, way. Nationalism, for example, can have different effects and different development depending on conditions and the activity and consciousness of actors in the situation. (Compare, for example, the different significance of nationalism in Vietnam, China, and Australia today.) It seems to me that the Australian ethos of the past had elements which could have been developed in a socialist direction if more participants had been more conscious. If we then say their lack of consciousness was itself determined, what we are left with is determinism, even if of a somewhat different form from the old.

Even if my assessment of the possibilities in the old Australian ethos is rejected as wrong or now unprovable, the consideration does not disappear, for the problem of the line of development of existing consciousness — that of intellectuals and intellectually trained, for example — still remains. To say that the values held by these strata are, unequivocally and inevitably, liberating, would be to adopt a kind of sociological or structural determinism. Blake does, in fact, correctly point out that many intellectuals tend to think of their position as one of personal emancipation, their natural point of attachment as being to the capitalist establishment, and that technocratic and elitist conceptions exist among them.

The intellectual culture is certainly absolutely essential for human development, and contains vital elements of humanity, rationality, democracy and so on. But it would be a mistake to think these can lead in only one direction. No “facts” are completely value-free, nor is “rationality” in looking at them a fool-proof “formula” which can give rise to only one — the truly human — way of interpreting them. For example, Blake points to the importance of teachers as an example of the intellectually trained in the present situation and struggles, and they certainly have much to their credit. But anyone acquainted with Australian teachers will recognise also that they have shortcomings including, according to one survey, being the most authoritarian in the world. And the famous German physicist Max Planck, who first formulated the quantum theory, once said: “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”

To point such things out is in no sense to detract from the great achievements of the students in particular in injecting new values and action onto the scene, which has done so much to begin stimulating a revival in the revolutionary movement as a whole.
It is only to point out that the intellectuals and intellectually trained should not be idealised as "the workers" were previously. The presentation in the book drives me to the conclusion that elitism and paternalism by intellectuals towards workers has crept in, despite qualifications and condemnation of such attitudes, and the stated ideal of a creative interaction. Nowhere is there any real indication of what workers might contribute to this interaction, but we are told that "... a people is as revolutionary as its intellectuals and intellectually trained." (p. 118) and that present society leads to irrational functioning and the misuse of natural resources, which "come into conflict with rationality and the more developed critical human awareness of the intellectually trained strata" (p. 121). But are not others conscious of this too, and showing so in action?

Values were developed in society before even literacy existed, and while the great importance of the connection with intellectuals stressed by Blake is welcome, the establishment of this connection is not likely to be assisted by implications that the experiences, and feelings, and thoughts of other strata can only be inert and uncreative. Take for instance the strike of the Water Board workers in Sydney recently. This was an assertion of the right to human dignity in employment (two migrant workers were sacked for refusing to put up with a foreman's abuse). Still more of this sort of mateship and solidarity, over something that most intellectuals would have little experience of, will help to bring human values into actual life.

I agree with the emphasis on criticism of past elevation of organisation, and in particular deification of (communist) parties, but feel that Blake has taken, from Lenin's view for example, only one side — the greater "material" strength obtained through the organised collective. In fact, another, no less important aspect of Lenin's thought was that of "protection" and development of a particular view of the revolution and its issues which otherwise could be swamped in the diversity of opinion and great mass action then proceeding. Perhaps this is elitism; if so, then so is every book or article written to criticise people's "false consciousness" and tell them the true one. Anyone who gets out a magazine with a definite viewpoint or strives in factory, institution or organisation to influence his or her fellows evidently feels that they have the truth and others do not. If they also feel the necessity to combine together with those of like views to get out a newspaper, exchange experiences and provide a focus (not a substitute) for activity, they will be forming an organisation or even a party. And Blake himself points out various "erroneous
views" which need to be criticised and combated. These will not cease “organising” for their views just because others do.

In other words, it seems to me that equally important with criticism of past organisation and parties is to actually refashion them to prevent the recrudescence of authoritarianism and to meet the needs of today. This is admittedly perplexing and difficult, but is no less important than recognising and participating in the new autonomous movements. In this connection one wonders at Blake’s view of the Communist Party, to which, as far as I know, he still belongs. In 1956 Jack Blake saw far more clearly than anyone else the purport of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and for this he deserves great credit. Probably he is justifiably resentful (as are many others from various periods) at the treatment he received. But objectivity seems to be lacking in the statement that the reason for the change in the party’s direction was merely a desire to “refurbish its image” (p. 117). The documents of the party’s last Congress published in 1969 and other analyses, and efforts at action to match, all bearing on issues raised by Blake, have a good deal more substance than that.

There can be no complaint if people do not want to belong to an organisation or think a particular party is not relevant, and uncommitted people are not (as they once were thought to be) second class revolutionary citizens. But the predicted forms of future revolutionary organisation seem to be an unjustifiably big jump from the theoretical and factual data given. This is related also to the time scale of the analysis. A tendency to restructuring of the work force certainly exists and is to be welcomed. But it will be many decades indeed before it will be of a kind which will overcome the division between mental and manual labor, nor does Blake speak of the reduction of “human” work content which is also taking place. More importantly, even if the theoretical analysis were fully correct, it may well be that in the next couple of decades, with population, resources, environment and other issues injected among the old ones, battles crucially affecting the future course of humanity will be fought out. The passion, will, fantasy and organisation that will go into this may be more distorted than it would be a few decades further on, but maybe recognition of the urgency and pace of things would constitute a more real basis for preparation by revolutionaries.

All in all, a stimulating and important book. One hopes that the discussion of it from supporters, opponents, and those like myself who think it has much merit, will be conducted as a real dialogue, and not as contention in which one side thinks the truth is already established and known.
The Importance of Raymond Williams

THIS ARTICLE selects Williams’ theoretical preceptions from The Long Revolution and his main theme of culture and social criticism from Culture and Society. It is not implied that these aspects are Williams’ only or most important views; but that in the following ways they are of importance. Williams develops a method of treating social man that does not run the risks involved in quantification when quantification becomes an end in itself. He stresses the importance of communications, in particular, along with politics, and economics. He considers the relation between “high” culture and social criticism in the works of a wide range of writers from 1780 to 1950. His analysis of the role of the artist in the Romantic period is viewed as an example of his interdisciplinary interests which challenge the highly specialized and educationally crippling nature of most of Australian academic life, particularly its English Departments. Williams’ own interests extend far beyond English Departments but are, nevertheless, based in them.

Raymond Williams said in the Introduction to The Long Revolution (1961) that his study went beyond academic prudence because there was, at that time, no academic subject in Britain
where he could follow through the questions that interested him. It is not surprising, then, that in his work the reader finds an acute awareness of changes in society over time and a developed consciousness of the different kinds of society in existence at any one time. These views are based on a wide reading in Philosophy, Literature, Literary Criticism and especially in the twentieth century sciences of Psychology, Anthropology and Sociology. If Williams has a primary aim it is to understand in what way the development of these new areas of study can assist any attempt to discover the meaning of "culture" in British society since the start of the ongoing Industrial, Democratic and Educative revolutions.

Before trying to understand what "culture" means to Williams, it should prove profitable to look at what he includes in his first chapter of **The Long Revolution**. Firstly, he surveys different theories about art and reality in Western philosophy and literary criticism held over the last two thousand years. Secondly, he introduces the biological fact that the brain of each one of us literally creates its own world. Thirdly, in terms of the area he has been surveying, Williams translates this biological evidence into the following comparison of world views or ways of being in the world:

| Platonist: | Man . . . natural seeing . . . Appearances |
| Artist . . . exceptional seeing . . . Reality |
| Romantic: | Man . . . natural seeing . . . Reality |
| Artist . . . exceptional seeing . . . Superior Reality |
| Modern: | Man . . . natural seeing . . . Reality |
| Artist . . . exceptional seeing . . . Art |

Fourthly, it follows, in Williams' view, from this sort of comparison, that unless the reader or viewer shares with the artist many of the complex details of a learned communications system, he cannot, in fact, see the artist's work. It follows, then, that there is a necessary social basis for any art because without communication there is no art. (As a parenthesis Williams mentions that aesthetic theory excludes communication as a social fact.) Fifthly, while it is true that all art is a process of communication according to Williams, he remains aware, nevertheless, that the function of art is often different: in some societies its function is to embody common shared meaning; in others, in rapidly changing societies, art's aim is to explore the frontiers of knowledge. What Williams has done in his first chapter, then, is provide a preview of his interdisciplinary methodology: his capacity to apply the implications of one area of knowledge to others.
He addresses this methodology to “culture” which can be any of the following: an ideal, a state of human perfection; a documentary body of intellectual and imaginative work; or the description of a particular way of life — an anthropological use of the term. This latter must include family structure and communication forms as well as political, economic and other social aspects. (Williams was to stress communications as a part of society rather than as a “reflection” of society even more strongly in the first pages of *Communications.* With careful application these three usages of “culture” are valuable, particularly in relation to each other. It is important, however, not to scale off art against a particular society for the whole reality of that society cannot be understood until the art — a part of it — is also understood. It is an inadequate educational procedure to focus on a particular discipline and then claim to be filling in the “background”. It is clear, then, that Williams regards the study of the relationships among elements in the whole as the most comprehensive study of “culture”.

It is here that he uses anthropologist Ruth Benedict’s book *Patterns of Culture.* For her a “pattern of culture” is a selection and configuration of interests and activities and a particular valuation of them that produces a distinct social organization, a “way of life”. Williams sees this notion as means to arrive at “. . . the actual experience through which these (pattern and characteristics) were lived”. He calls this “structure of feeling”. It is structure because institutions give it structure; it is feeling because it is not a perception of how the society operates but a perception of what it feels like to be in that society and for the structures of that society to be in each person. Moreover, Williams says that we are most aware of this in the arts of the period.

As an example of “structure of feeling” Williams claims, after analysing both “high” and “popular” literature of the 1840s in Britain, that the following characteristics emerge: value placed on hard work; success based on individual effort; class stratification based on status rather than on birth; poor people seen as victims of their own failings with the accompanying notion that the best will struggle and achieve socio-economic upward mobility; suffering as noble because it teaches humility, courage and dedication to duty; the family reverenced as the central institution of society; adultery and fornication as unpardonable sins, etc. Unlike Levi-Strauss (*Totemism*), Karl Mannheim (*Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*) or R. D. Laing (*The Divided Self*), Williams does not want the reader to feel these as the people of the period did; rather
he wants to reader to understand their feelings. Williams claims that while there were other works embodying other “structures of feeling”, this structure was the predominant one, that of the prominent productive group — the morality of the industrial and commercial middle class. Williams’ position is not one of predictive sociological determinism: expecting to discover a certain “structure of feeling” because the social structure or economic conditions determine it. Williams reads the “high” and “popular” literature and finds it there.

Williams extends his inquiry to the following:

We are seeking to define and consider one central principle: that of the essential relation, the true interaction, between patterns learned and created in the mind and patterns communicated and made active in relationships, conventions and institutions. (The Long Revolution, p. 89).

Undoubtedly influenced by Ruth Benedict, Williams finds “individual and society” a sterile way of coping with the above problem for Benedict writes:

One of the most misleading misconceptions due to this nineteenth century dualism was the idea that what was subtracted from society was added to the individual and what was subtracted from the individual was added to society. Philosophies of freedom, political creeds of laissez-faire, revolutions that have unseated dynasties, have built on this dualism. (Patterns of Culture, p. 181).

She further claims that modern Western society tends to identify society with restrictions that law imposes on us.

Williams analyses the term “individual” in historical contexts. In the Medieval period it meant “inseparable”; contemporary Western usage looks on “individual” as a kind of absolute without immediate reference to the group or groups of which one is a member. The change in meaning of the word occurred in the late sixteenth century or early seventeenth. Whereas Medieval “individual” destiny was connected with the total order of all aspects of life, Protestant “individualism” related only to God. As Erich Fromm points out, in Medieval society a person was identical with his role in the society; he was not an individual first who also happened to have a certain occupation. The growth of Capitalism encouraged men to see the individual as a source of economic activity. Williams claims that “the major tradition” of English social thinkers from Hobbes to the Utilitarians saw man as a bare human being whereas Hegel and Rousseau had seen the value of communities and forms of association mediating between the individual and society.* It was true that Locke saw the

* Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith’s sociological writing, John Millar and Robert Owen are not in “the major tradition”; they are not mentioned at all.
rational and co-operative elements of men as natural but he also postulated separate individuals who created the overall contract for mutual protection. The Liberal tradition argues for minimum government to protect the rights of the individual. And Freud too, while introducing the mediation of the family, assumed a conflict between individual and society. Recognition of groups within a society, then, was a major criticism of Existentialism's identification of the social self as the inauthentic self and the philosophy's neglect for social man.

It was necessary historically, therefore, according to Williams, in order to eliminate human identification with functions of institutions, to postulate the bare human being. People found and find meaning in themselves because they are a manageable area when compared with say, political and economic institutions. In turning away from society, however, they turned and turn away from other people so that each is just a mass in the other's eyes. Williams understands the process that he considers to be a deluded way of viewing the world. He seeks, however, to change this delusion. He proposes the terms "organism" and "organization", the former being the person and the latter being the social structure that becomes internalized. Each organism is an embodiment of relationships, the lived and living history of responses to and from other organizations. The concept "organism" and "organization" advances on both Benedict and Fromm in the sense that Williams argues that, despite a common "culture pattern" or "social character", each person's social history, his actual network of relationships is unique. This is caused by influence from varying systems or groups within a society. Thus Williams maintains that the new terms are not a new way of stating the old notion of individual and society but a way of describing a continuous process within which both are contained. And if the above is true, then participatory democracy is the best form of government.

By Chapter Four of Part One of The Long Revolution it is clear that Williams conceives of himself as a Socialist for his definition of society is related to a series of points about what he thinks is wrong with British Socialism. He defines society as "... a human organization for common needs. ..." The main fault of Socialism has been to propose a political and economic order rather than a human order. Another fault (mentioned briefly out of a Socialist context) is stress on these political and economic aspects of society to the exclusion of family and communications

** Williams is apparently unaware of Adam Ferguson's stress on the family.
areas of societal interaction. In Williams’ ideal society there would be that strong sense of community that was lacking in British thought from the late sixteenth century to Freud. Life and work should be integrated and the main claim to relevance of art should be a concern for our general humanity or to nothing. Williams combines the full impact of the meaning of his methodology and of his Socialism in the passage:

The long revolution, which is now at the centre of our history, is not for democracy as a political system alone, nor for the equitable distribution of more products, nor for general access to the means of communication. Such changes, difficult enough in themselves, derive meaning and direction, finally, from new conceptions of man and society which many have worked to describe and interpret. (p. 141).

Malcolm Bradbury finds a conflict between the kind of argument outlined above which he regards as passive, predictive sociological determinism and the argument in *Culture and Society* (1958) which emphasizes the value of culture as an active force in society, standing against the narrowness of materialism and the injustices and poverty of vision of Industrial Capitalism. Several replies may be made to Bradbury’s claim. Firstly, there is nothing in *The Long Revolution* that smacks of crude predictive determinism, as should be already clear. Secondly, the study of art in the way outlined by Williams is far from a “passive” activity, even if the art were viewed as “passive” under the weight of determinism. Thirdly, Williams’ analysis of the culture versus society conflict where it occurred in British literature and thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries fits his second category of “culture” In the light of *The Long Revolution* it is clear that this kind of “culture” can be studied by explication mainly and that degree of sociological study that Williams finds valuable for purposes of illumination, this latter method occurring particularly in Chapter Two. It would be quite possible to study the intellectual history in *Culture and Society* sociologically, or at least more sociologically than Williams does, to see how far the writers he chose are representative of society generally. Williams’ very point, however, is that they are unrepresentative and that is what makes them valuable because so much about their society can be gleaned from their social criticism.

Williams says that with the Industrial Revolution the meanings of five important words changed: *industry* no longer just meant a human attribute associated with hard work but a collective word for manufacturing and productive institutions; *democracy* ceased to be just a literary term and with the French Revolution became a part of political terminology in practice; *class* ceased to be a division or group in schools and colleges and referred to broad social
divisions; art ceased to mean skill and became the imaginative and creative arts; culture changed in the following way:

Before this period, it had meant, primarily the "tending of natural growth," and then, by analogy, a process of human training. But this latter use, which had usually been a culture of something, was changed, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, to culture as such, a thing in itself. It came to mean, first, "a general state or habit of the mind," having close relations with the idea of human perfection. Second, it came to mean "the general state of intellectual development, in a society as a whole." Third, it came to mean "the general body of the arts." Fourth, later in the century, it came to mean "a whole way of life, material, intellectual, and spiritual." (Culture and Society, pp. 13-18).

Williams' aim is to show the emergence of "culture" as an abstraction and an absolute. Firstly, there was the recognition of the practical separation of certain moral and intellectual activities from the driven impetus of the new kind of society; secondly, emphasis on the activities, as a court of human appeal, to be set over the process of practical social judgment and yet to offer itself as a mitigating and rallying alternative. Williams goes on to say that the idea of "culture" would be simpler if it were a response to industrialism alone but it is also a response to democracy.

The contents of Culture and Society reveal the wide range of political philosophers, journalists, poets, philosophers, men of letters, novelists, politicians, theologians, art historians, literary critics, essayists and historians whom Williams explicates. And there is implicit, and sometimes explicit, evaluation in his explications. Although the writers vary and would often disagree with each other, certain similar trends emerge; they all criticize their society and all regard art or "culture" as a repository of humane values. They condemn industrialization, Capitalism, urbanization, laissez-faire economics, materialism, ugliness, pollution and division of labor. They advocate many solutions such as Hero-worship, God, the State, nature, handicrafts, Medievalism, Socialism, Communism, urban planning, beauty, Fascist authoritarianism, sex, doing nothing, English Departments but above all, they advocate art — the writing, the reading, the reverencing and the study of art. For art is seen as the opposite of all those complex and often interlocking features that characterized and characterize in large part a society they hated or hate.

Because it traces a particular tradition the book is repetitive but, since it refers to 170 years, this repetition serves only to demonstrate its significance. Some reservations, however, must be entertained in the name of perspective. Culture and Society has at least the following faults. It uses extremely small aspects of the total output of a particular writer often without mentioning
his other concerns in such a way that a reader coming to the writer only in terms of Williams' view of him may take a part of his output as his major concern. This applies particularly to J. S. Mill. So long as it is realized that that Williams is selecting only the writer's view on "culture" and society, this delimited area of selection is not a problem. Williams' selectivity becomes dishonest, however, when he ignores those passages of Carlyle where the latter condemns art and "culture" as a waste of time.* Williams selects only those passages where Carlyle considers "culture" as the repository of human values. Finally, Williams virtually omits Oscar Wilde who both wrote and enacted the most extreme dichotomy between "culture" and society, between art and life, of any writer in Britain in the nineteenth century. Williams failed to see, then, that the sociological basis of the art for art's sake theory was a violent, if hilarious, attack on British society.

If what has been noted above shows Williams as intellectual historian, Chapter Two, "The Romantic Artist", reveals penetrating insights into one aspect of Romanticism — that part of it that was a reaction against late eighteenth and early nineteenth century British society. This reveals a sociological, inter-disciplinary methodology; it demonstrates the theory of The Long Revolution.

The milieu of the Romantic artist contained several important changes. Firstly, while the rise of the middle class brought a bigger reading public, this mass audience was a "market" for the writer, his relationship with it being impersonal compared with individual patronage that had existed previously. (Williams does not claim that the artist's relationship with his audience is worse; only that, in important ways, it is different.) Several of the Romantics spoke disparagingly of their "Public". Secondly, there was a new notion in the air that art was the production of a specialist which followed the institution of commercial publishing. Art became a commodity like bottles, produced by the artist who might be viewed, or view himself like a bottle manufacturer. (This view differs not at all from Marcuse's in One Dimensional Man.) Thirdly, at the same time as these changes there developed also a system of thinking about the arts of which the most important elements were emphasis on the special nature of the art-activity as a means to "imaginative" truth and a stress on the artist as a special and superior sensibility. Williams said that it was tempting to view these latter two points as direct response to the actual change in relations between artist and society. This would be to

simplify, however, for these latter two developments were part of the embodiment in art of humane values which the changes of society to Industrial Capitalism and towards democracy were felt to threaten or to destroy. The consequences of this for the English Romantics were that art became a symbolic abstraction because a general social activity was forced into the status of a department or aspect and the works of art were nothing but self-pleading, self-pitying ideology:

The last pages of Shelley’s *Defence of Poetry* are painful to read. The bearers of a high imaginative skill became suddenly the “legislators”, at the very moment when they were being forced into practical exile . . . (Culture and Society, p. 63).

Williams’ achievements in the books and chapters stressed in this article are as follows. He has developed a sophisticated way of coping with dehumanized quantification in the social sciences with his notion “structure of feeling”. He has explained the socio-historic genesis of the false dichotomy “individual versus society”, thus facilitating an alternative way of viewing men in society — his organism and organization. He has highlighted the lack of attention given to the communications area of social existence, assisting the development of the study of mass media and “popular” culture. Conversely, he has charted the “high” culture versus society argument from late eighteenth century to mid-twentieth century Britain. He looked at and analysed the way in which the role of the artist in the Romantic period could be profitably viewed as interacting with broad social changes. All these notions he views as important for universities, general education and Socialism. He is a living challenge to timid academics caught in their specialties, terrified to respond to questions about the meaning of comprehensive education. And he has proved that inter-disciplinary methodology need not be superficial. There are writers in several fields of the Social Sciences and Humanities who have moved to interdisciplinary perspectives from different starting points. Williams has done this better than anyone else in Britain who has started with the basis of Literary Criticism.
Anti-Psychiatry:

A Critique of the Normal

AT FIRST GLANCE it might seem that Anti-psychiatry, described in the two articles following, has nothing to do with the concerns of the "ordinary" person and very little to do with revolutionaries. Such a superficial glance would, however, be completely wrong. For in fact, the theories and conclusions of the anti-psychiatry school (Laing, Cooper and Esterson are its main proponents) are crucial to an understanding of society and its sicknesses. For the layman, anti-psychiatry exposes some hitherto hidden features of his everyday life and his interaction with others, particularly in his family.

For revolutionaries, there is the revelation of features of our society which they had not previously suspected: detailed mechanisms of how people do psychological violence to one another, and how "normal" people, who are often themselves "sick" — expressing a sick society — bind up innocent (and, the anti-psychiatrists say, highly sensitive) people in impossible social situations, then sacrifice them as "sick" people to a brutal god — the conventional psychiatric system — in order to maintain the illusion that their own lives are normal and healthy: to reaffirm their own belief in themselves.

In much the same way, society reaffirms its own values when it sentences a criminal. One can learn a lot about a society by looking at those whom it defines as criminals and puts in prison. In our society, a big chemical company which pollutes the atmosphere, thus affecting millions, is fined $130, while a 20-year old who refuses to kill innocent peasants gets two years' goal.

Anti-psychiatry can be seen on a number of levels. On one, it is an examination of the interaction between a person defined as mentally ill and his social context showing how the actions of such a person, although "mad" when viewed in isolation, become quite intelligible when seen in their social setting. The anti-psychiatrists do not necessarily say that the mentally ill are not really ill at all. They concede that they may very well be "sick", but that this sickness may simply be triggered off by their social environment, rather than being an individual disease.

On another level, it can be seen as a social psychology — a theory about certain aspects of people's behaviour towards one another, and how this behaviour, regarded as "normal", influences and deforms others. This has far-reaching consequences, beyond the analysis of the "mentally ill". In fact, the anti-psychiatrists see an urgent need for an analysis of the state of "normal" society, where they see many of the real problems existing. Laing calls for a "pathology of the normal" (a call which Freud also made some thirty-five years ago).

On a third level, anti-psychiatry is a critique of existing society and also of conventional social science, especially institutional psychiatry. To make this critique, the anti-psychiatrists have had to get right outside the conventional
framework for looking at the mentally ill — a framework in which the abnormal, different, peculiar person, who acts "mad", must be insane, while the normal people around him must be sane. They constructed their own framework, in which they assume only that the person is different and try to examine in a reasonably objective way the actions of both the person and others in his social environment. They maintain, and have amassed certain evidence to show, that when we approach the situation in such an open-minded way, it immediately becomes apparent that the "sickness" of the person may be actually a reasonable reaction to the behaviour of those around him. Indeed, one might even go so far as to say that his environment is "sick" and needs a "cure", not him.

Thus, we can deduce the necessity for a "pathology of the normal" — an examination of social illness inherent in the very structure and relations of social groups — not just a study of individual mental disorder.

Now if the implications of anti-psychiatry were confined to the field of mental illness and the treatment of the insane, then society would owe much to it. However, anti-psychiatry has much wider implications, for it calls into question many conventional analyses of society. Such analyses tend to look at social situations and events from the point of view of the observer, who very often regards himself as "objective", but who, just as often, tends to adopt the point of view of the majority or the powerful. Anti-psychiatry shows us that it can be very helpful to look at these situations and events from the point of view of all participants in them. This is a position which other schools notably the existentialists, have previously adopted, but the anti-psychiatrists, while using the existentialists' philosophical basis, have taken the theory further by their practical use of it. Two examples of current interest might illustrate:

1. Revolutionaries have always said that part of their struggle for the liberation of the working class was to struggle for the emancipation of women and of oppressed races, which were seen also as class issues. Now, although they partly are class questions, there is more to it than that. Today, we have flourishing anti-racist, black liberation and women's liberation movements which exist somewhat independently of the class struggle.

   Now the interesting point is that it was only when women and blacks started speaking for themselves and analysing the situation as they saw it, that these movements really came into their own. Only the consciousness of their own oppression, and the verbalisation of this by a number of writers, who themselves experienced this oppression from the point of view of the oppressed, enabled these movements to have a concept of their own identity and the need to struggle for their own emancipation. A beautiful analysis of the importance of the point of view of the oppressed is given by Angela Davis in her Lectures on Liberation.

   Those who like to say "it's all a class question" have failed to see the situation from the point of view of women and blacks. Even a well-meaning male/white revolutionary cannot fully understand the problems faced; the analysis of their own situation was the pre-condition for the growth of the movements.

2. One of the important components of anti-psychiatry theory is the notion of the scapegoat. This says that in many social situations, a social group selects out (not consciously, but rather as part of its own process of development) one of its member to be a scapegoat — to be punished by the group in order to
take the blame for the group's own inadequacies: the majority avoids analysing its own faults and focusses them instead in a single member or a minority. Anti-psychiatrists see schizophrenics as "scapegoats" for their families, but the idea can be extended outside the psychiatric sphere.

Although the analysis and understanding of such situations still has a long way to go, the anti-psychiatrists have provided us with valuable insight into their dynamics. The consequences for a revolutionary critique of society are obvious.  

*BRIAN AARONS*

Beth Freeman

R. D. LAING, BRITISH PSYCHIATRIST, has developed a theory about being and going mad — about being and going schizophrenic. His theory grows out of Searle's and Bateson's mammoth efforts at explaining schizophrenia in terms of "being driven" crazy by crazy interpersonal situations (usually within the family). The philosophical heritage of the theory is existential-phenomenological, hence terms like "existence" and "experience" are used to refer to the totality of a person's "being in the world", man as a unitary whole.

"Experience' is a central concept. Laing sees it as the outcome not only of the given (the "real" physical world) but also of phantasy and personal thinking systems (assumptions about the world). An important consequence of this is that observation is never "neutral", "objective", "uninterpreted". It is always "X as Y perceives it". Assumptions about the world (cultural influences, family habits, theoretical foundations) affect the experiences of it. This strikes a blow at the prevailing myth that scientists, professional helpers and the like are objective observers.

The framework of clinical medicine (in which psychiatry is still commonly placed) entails a commitment to this idea of objectivity. Also, the psychiatric "illness" idea (parallel to physical disease) involves the notion that "the heart of the illness resides outside the agency of the person. That is, the illness is taken to be a process that the person is subject to, or undergoes".¹

¹ *The Divided Self.*

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Laing rejects both the medical model of conceiving of so-called "mental illness" and the medical model way of "assessing" and treating the diseased individual. Laing's alternative is to view the psychiatric patient's behavior as expressive of his "being-in-the-world", his existence; as symbolically integrative and meaningful.

For Laing the genesis of schizophrenia lies in the disconfirmation (or invalidation) of a person's perceptions, feelings and memory (his experience). This results in confusion about what is important or significant to the person, real or imagined, memory or phantasy. Chronic invalidation leads to a feeling of "ontological insecurity", the opposite of which Laing describes:

A man may have a sense of his presence in the world as real, alive, whole, and in a temporal sense, a continuous person.

The individual may then experience his own being as... whole; as differentiated from the rest of the world in ordinary circumstances so clearly that his identity and autonomy are never in question.

However, this may not be the case:

The individual in the ordinary circumstances of living may feel more unreal than real... precariously differentiated from the rest of the world so that his identity and autonomy are always in question.

Intense anxiety is generated by these feelings, and takes three forms. The first is the fear of engulfment:

In this the individual dreads relatedness as such with anyone or anything... because the uncertainty about the stability of his autonomy lays him open to the dread lest in any relationship he will lose his autonomy and identity.

The main manoeuvre to preserve identity under pressure from dread of engulfment is isolation.

Implosion is the second form of anxiety:

The impingement of reality... the full terror of the experience of the world as liable at any moment to crash in and obliterate all identity, as a gas will rush in and obliterate a vacuum.

Bizarre behavior which successfully keeps the world at bay is probably the manoeuvre here, though Laing is not explicit.

Fear of petrification, being turned into stone, and the dread of this happening is Laing's third type of anxiety. The manoeuvre to deal with this is depersonalisation, i.e., the magical act whereby one attempts to turn someone else to stone (and by extension regards him as a thing, negates his autonomy).

Psychosis develops as ontological insecurity and the associated anxiety becomes more intense. A "false self", embodying all

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2 Sanity, Madness and the Family, pp. 35, 41-2.  
3 The Divided Self, p. 39.  
4 The Divided Self, p. 42.  
5 The Divided Self, p. 42.  
6 The Divided Self, p. 44.  
7 The Divided Self, p. 45.
those tricks and manoeuvres above, becomes more extensive. The real self
in order to be safe from persistent threat and danger from the world, has cut
itself off from direct relatedness with others, and has endeavored to become
its own object: to become in fact directly related only to itself.
The individual in this position may appear relatively normal, but he is main-
taining his outward semblance of normality by progressively more and more
abnormal and desperate means . . . the defences against the world fail even in
their primary functions: to prevent impingements and to keep the self alive
by avoiding being grasped and manipulated as a thing by another. Anxiety
creeps back more intensively than ever.
Gradually psychosis develops.
Laing has little to say about treatment: there is a suggestion
that once the patient finds someone who “loves” him, the process
can continue on to resolution. In later works he speaks of the
necessity of converting confusions (about memory, perception, imagination) into conflicts which can then be dealt with. There is
even a suggestion that the schizophrenic episode is a “journey”
(something like a “trip”) from which the traveller returns sane,
not normal. The appeal in this account of the genesis and treat-
ment of schizophrenia is to approach the patient from the point
of view of his phenomenological-existential “reality”, to let his
behavior be seen as expressive of his being-in-the-world, his
existence. This allows of the possibility that the schizophrenic’s
behavior is meaningful and understandable, as opposed to the
traditional “medical model” approach, which sees the “disease”
as something the person is subject to, or undergoes.
So far the treatment of the topic has been concerned with
the individual. In The Politics of Experience, a series of papers
published in 1967, he sets his notions about schizophrenia in a
socially relevant context. Three of Laing’s more contentious
claims about schizophrenia are:
1 that the procedures of traditional psychiatry are “violent”;
2 that schizophrenics are more aware of the “truths” about society
than normal people; and
3 that schizophrenia is a kind of healing process (not a disease
to be interrupted and stopped).
To accept the first claim it is necessary to believe that almost
all of us are incredibly alienated — that the whole of our society
is alienated. In one of many senses, Laing uses this to refer to
the kind of state which allows us to accept as truths those claims
of our culture which are patently false, for example, that we are a
peaceful egalitarian society. This involves confirmation of false

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8 The Divided Self, p. 137. 9 The Divided Self, p. 138.
notions and the refutation of “true” ones in much the same way as the schizophrenic experiences it (but for him it is his perceptions, memory and so on which are refuted and these are more vital).

When a psychiatrist treats a schizophrenic he proceeds to invalidate the experience of his patient in exactly the same kind of way as that person’s family and close friends have—not seeing his behavior as symbolically expressive of his existence, but as “mad”—and in the same kind of way that our society acts on us to make us alienated. Hence, this alienated psychiatrist—alienated as we all are—is simply perpetuating and perpetrating the violent destruction of the self of the schizophrenic. He is of course unaware of the existential “murder” he is committing since he, like everyone else lacks the sociological imagination, the ability to perceive the relevance of intra and interpersonal events for the wide social context and, importantly, vice versa. He is, therefore, no more or less violent than everyone else and no more or less culpable.

However, Laing heaps invectives and accusations on psychiatrists because they are important agents of social control; the growing trend is to define deviance as “illness” and thus to bring more and more into the domain of the psychiatrist (e.g. crime, child rearing problems). He wants to shock them into knowing better, believing that if they would accept his view of schizophrenia they could carry their “treatment” through and resolve things. As it is they are simply putting up barriers—tranquillisers and electro compulsive therapy — which stop the flow onward, and Laing asserts that this is a violent process. Laing’s second, seemingly outrageous claim that the schizophrenic is the super-perceiver, not out of touch, but more in touch with reality, who is more aware of alienation than the rest of us, follows from this. If alienation in the sociological sense is simply another example of the invalidation of “true” and validation of “false” notions, then we could expect that persons who are subject to invalidation on another more personal level and who acknowledge it by eventually going “crazy”, will be better able to generalise this personal experience and insight into the larger sociological field.

In this light Laing’s third contentious proposition that schizophrenia is not a biologically dysfunctional process but some kind of natural healing process can be understood more clearly. If you accept any interactional concept of schizophrenia then this becomes a real possibility. Laing says, however, that we are so busy “treating” the patient that we never give the hypothesis a chance to be confirmed or refuted. The implication is that if a schizophrenic undertakes the “journey” and comes through, he will
be closer to sanity than our alienated existence which we call normality.

Laing is not explicit about therapy; he speaks almost mystically about providing "guides" who have "been there and back" and surroundings suitable for the "journey". The impression is that it has something to do with the dismantling of the false self systems in a thoroughly trustworthy atmosphere and with thoroughly trustworthy people. It seems that the schizophrenics stopped "trusting" others and themselves a long time ago and have to go back a long way to really grow again.

The most vigorous criticism of Laing is that he is impressionistic, not rigorous, but I think that appeals to him to refine and clarify his ideas will fall on deaf ears. Like McLuhan he is just not that sort of person, and I think, too, that he would regard all that "hair splitting" and "academic nonsense" as just so much bourgeois clap-trap, and as the sort of approach which has so far doomed psychology to irrelevance as far as the human condition is concerned.

Harry Freeman

ANTI-PSYCHIATRY AROSE as a reaction to two important problems in psychiatry. The first is the undeniable failure of psychiatry to do much with schizophrenics, still one of the biggest groups of the "mentally ill". The second, a problem common to all contemporary sciences, is that of social significance—whether it is an insidious agent of social control. In exploring both these problems I wish to show how they have been crystallised into a theory of schizophrenia by R. D. Laing and others. His theory involves the complete negation of the medical model in psychiatry and rejects the notion that a psychiatric patient is a diseased individual among normal sane others. It espouses the idea that "schizophrenic" behavior is meaningful and integrative if seen from the perspective of processes in a field of relationships which are in disharmony.

Laing's description of some schizophrenics as the most eloquent and perceptive critics of society and his assertion that they are one of the most grotesque results of society's inherent alienating nature have brought him a huge multi-disciplinary following. He has become a guru though many of the anti-psychiatry cult have no real idea of what they are against.

Harry Freeman is a Medical Officer with the State Psychiatric Service in N.S.W.
The medical model, where deviant behavior is regarded as the symptom of diseased thinking, harbors the possibility that the wide social context of a piece of behavior can be missed. Inherent in it too is the idea that a doctor can be an objective observer of a patient's world. This idea can lead to methodological inhibitions.

The inappropriateness of the model is well shown in the situation of the terrified patient who feels that all roads lead to the Gap.* Psychiatry says all roads do not lead to the Gap so the patient must be "deluded". Delusions are present in many situations, one of which is schizophrenia. We must exclude all the other causes and then show the schizophrenic that the feeling is invalid—not related to "reality". The possibility that in some entirely valid experiential way all roads do lead to the Gap for that person, while occasionally being acknowledged (as a symbolic presentation of suicidal tendencies), is really missed by the medical model since such a phenomenon can only be the symptom of a diseased mind. To feel that the experience was valid some sort of existential phenomenology would be helpful (since this really means being simple and descriptive), but not, I think, necessary, and it would require a flexible world view to see it as at all appropriate.

Anti-psychiatry, with its sociological perspective and an existential phenomenology seems well equipped then to re-examine the problem of schizophrenia. When this "disease" was first described it was classified into various types which have changed over the years, but the central theme has always been that schizophrenics have crazy ideas which they do not recognise as crazy. It begins in their early adult years and generally results in a gradual decline of social performance; hence the original conception of dementia praecox of Kraeplin. This decline has usually resulted in commitment to an institution for the sake of the individual and society, and the relentless nature of the process, regardless of psychiatric intervention "proved" that it was a "disease" for which there was no available cure. Various "treatments" have changed the course of the "disease" and it is being diagnosed more frequently, especially in the USA. Today about half the schizophrenics spend only episodes in institutions; a quarter gradually deteriorate and about a quarter have "it" only once. Half of all people hospitalised in the USA are psychiatric patients and of these two-thirds are schizophrenics so it is easy to see why this "disease"

* The cliff at the South Head of Sydney harbor, which has been the scene of many actual and attempted suicides—Ed.
has baffled and challenged psychiatrists and also why it is central to anti-psychiatry.

In the current era of electicism most people acknowledge both constitutional predisposition and environmental influences as aetiological (causative) phenomena in schizophrenia. The existential and Gestalt schools refer to a schizophrenic field of societal and interpersonal processes with a focal individual whose behavior is labelled “schizophrenic”. This view does not preclude biochemical concomitants and even predisposition of the process.

In contrast, Cooper stresses the essentially integrative nature of “schizophrenic” behavior in the field of operation. Schizophrenia to him is the phenomenon observed when an individual perceives continued normal behavior on his part as being potentially annihilating for the field (“if I don’t act mad there’s going to be a breakdown in this group somewhere”). This perception need not be conscious (and may of course be a misperception) but is available to consciousness if the social and interpersonal processes in the field are elucidated.

Laing feels that seeing oneself as a potential annihilator is just the other side of the coin to seeing oneself as potentially annihilated or annihilatable, and that this feeling is existential anxiety which is ontological insecurity, (i.e., fear about being). Sartre’s enormous contribution to this view is recognisable here. Laing postulates that the experience of the schizophrenic is related to his doubts about his existence and its meaning and that these doubts exist because of his socialization which involved repeated disconfirmation of certain fundamental feelings of his being in the world. The schizophrenic is therefore highly tuned to perceive contradictions in his field at an interpersonal and also at a much wider level.

While I realise that the word violent may outrage people who see their actions as being motivated by concern and compassion, its use can be justified in relation to conventional psychiatry when we examine the suffering of all the people in the field during the genesis of a schizophrenic and in the psychiatric solution—that is the cleavage of the field into a sick member whose experience is invalidated, and a family still containing a number of individuals in considerable psychic pain. If there is anything magnificent and unique in the human condition there is little evidence of it anywhere in that field! Laing suggests that this is a second-rate solution to the problem of a schizophrenic field but that it is inevitable when psychiatry is part of some nebulous piece of institutionalized thinking like clinical medicine, and when psychiatrists are just other alienated humans.
Nobody denies that the institution of war is violent but somehow most people feel it is being waged by “the others”—that there is an inevitability about it which ritually absolves them of individual responsibility. This is alienated human experience — the same phenomenon exhibited by the psychiatrist who regards certain consequences of treatment as inevitable, even desirable, and to whom the totality of violent processes is actually invisible. That contemporary society must contain such families is not his concern since he is adjustment orientated. He must adjust the deviant to society, a society where he believes there is mutuality between society and its institutions and the fullest possible expression of human potentialities. Marcuse would call this one dimensional thinking. Erikson’s personality theories are excellent examples of it.

It can be seen now that Laing, seeing that the treatment of schizophrenics involved the systematic invalidation of their experience, noted the similarity between medical treatment and the process whereby contemporary society socializes and existentially murders its individuals—develops a false consciousness by repeated disconfirmation of experience. Psychiatrists perpetuate the essential alienating process of our society and, of course, at this point of the exposition, having been cast into the role of villains, they understandably become defensive and angry. This is unfortunate since anti-psychiatry is appealing to society and psychiatrists.

Anti-psychiatry is a plea for unalienated human consciousness. It does not lay blame but elucidates processes. It is a cry for some sort of personal liberation and it says some sort of here-and-now phenomenological way of regarding the world is the way to achieve it. It simply says open your eyes and look at the obvious. If we do this we can see that to be concerned about what might replace psychiatry is really beside the point. The problem itself suggests that we need the institutions but we may not if we look at the world in a different way. This does not imply that some institutional thinking is not essential to societal existence, but the suggestion is that personal liberation will bring with it the recognition that such thinking about psychiatry or science, for example, carries a propensity to create alienated humans.

Schizophrenics will probably not disappear just because psychiatrists look at them differently, and people who seem “schizophrenic” will no doubt be thrown up in varying numbers by most cultures, so the problem of what to do about their pain remains with us. Laing has little to say about treatment except to show
that major tranquillizers and shock treatment do something that should hardly be graced by the word "cure". The numerous cases that Laing and others document indicate that they feel the validation of these people's experience decreases the anxiety they feel but there are so many other people concerned in the existence of a schizophrenic who disconfirm their experiences that this process would be very difficult to achieve. It seems then that tranquillizers will remain an integral part of the management of schizophrenic fields for some time and the question as to whether or not Laing's theoretical exposition is essential for a successful therapeutic encounter still remains.

In the light of most recent research into psychotherapy I believe that regardless of the psychiatrist's theoretical position, the ingredients for a successful outcome in psychotherapy are related to the relationship between him and his "patient". If the relationship is characterised by warmth, empathy and genuineness and they both expect it to help, there is likely to be a good result; if it is not then the patient's condition will stand as even chance of remaining unchanged or of becoming worse.

I am convinced that Laing's approach would lead inevitably to a relationship characterised by those important ingredients and equally convinced that most conventional approaches which operate within the medical model would not. Such approaches could, therefore, both harm the patient and, as I have shown earlier, obscure certain phenomena, the recognition of which is imperative in view of the critically alienated state of human conditions.

Why Laing and Cooper call themselves anti-psychiatrists is obvious (to use Laing's favorite word). If they were existential psychiatrists they could be dismissed as "just existentionists". But they have recognised the legitimising role that psychiatry plays in the horribly violent game we call societal existence. Although they are not the only ones to have noticed this, they have a sense of urgency about the situation which they feel can only be adequately expressed in the convulsive act of calling themselves anti-psychiatrists. I hear Eldridge Cleaver's words: "If you're not part of the solution, then you're part of the problem" ringing in my ears. For psychiatrists are a group of people who think they are part of the solution, but who are at the same time so obviously part of the problem.

Suggested reading: The Divided Self, The Self and Others, and The Politics of Experience, by R. D. Laing (all in Pelican). Reason and Violence, by R. D. Laing and D. G. Cooper; Sanity, Madness and the Family, by R. D. Laing and A. Esterson; and The Leaves of Spring, by A. Esterson (all published by Tavistock).
IN THE SECOND PART of the record of Alastair Davidson's interview with Guido Baracchi, The Making of a Communist, (ALR No. 32), there is a question asked about a statement made by J. G. Latham, Attorney-General in the Bruce-Page Government, in the House of Representatives in 1925 about a person named Montefiore. Latham alleged that Montefiore was a representative of the Communist Party at the Communist International. In the following answer and comment there is no light thrown on the matter except that Baracchi denies knowledge of this person in the period 1924-5. Furthermore, the assumption is made that Montefiore is male.

Dora Montefiore was a woman of her time like Emmeline Pankhurst and her remarkable daughters — Christabel, Sylvia and Adela. She was a suffragette in New South Wales long before women's suffrage became a mass question in Britain, a convert to socialism, becoming a prominent member of the British Social Democratic Federation (later the British Socialist Party), for a period during Harry Holland's serious illness in 1911, editor of the International Socialist in Sydney, a leader of the struggle against Hyndman's chauvinist pro-war line in Britain, seconder of a motion of support for the Russian revolution moved by Ramsay MacDonald at the Leeds Soviet Convention in June 1917, a foundation member of the Central Committee of the British Communist Party and a delegate representing the Communist Party of Australia at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International in Moscow in June 1924.1

It seems remarkable that her life should have taken this course because she was born into a family of English landed gentry, her father being very representative of that peculiar combination of land and money, which left its stamp on mid-Victorian England (he was what has been commonly called a public-spirited man, being the biggest financial guarantor of the Great Exhibition of 1915). In addition, she married into the remarkable Anglo-Italian Jewish Montefiore family which prospered in the 18th and 19th centuries through investment in the expansion of British colonisation.

Dora Montefiore (nee Fuller) met her husband, George Barrow Montefiore, when she went to Sydney in the 1870's to live with the family of her eldest brother. Subsequently, after her husband's death in 1889, she discovered something about the inequalities faced by women — even wealthy women. She records her anger when one of the lawyers, discussing her husband's will, said to her: "As your late husband's will said nothing about the guardianship of the children they will remain under your care."2 Children, by law, had only one parent, the father.

Soon after, Sir George Grey, in Sydney to speak in support of the federation of the Australian colonies, urged Mrs. Montefiore, with whom he was friendly, to take up the cause of the enfranchisement of women, arguing that New Zealand

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2 Montefiore, p. 30.
and Australia would lead the way to reform in Britain. In 1891, with Rose Scott and others, Dora Montefiore helped form the Womanhood Suffrage League of New South Wales.

When her father died, Dora Montefiore returned to live with her mother in England and took an active part in the suffrage movement. Eventually, she became involved in the early stages of the more militant movement of which the Women’s Social and Political Union formed the centre. Mrs. Montefiore was with Annie Kenney at the Queen’s Hall meeting at the time of the 1906 general election when Annie Kenney shouted at Asquith, “What are you going to do for women?” and, before she was carried out, “Votes for Women!”

Although Dora Montefiore remained in the suffragette movement (she objected to the term suffragette, preferring suffragist), activity in the socialist women’s movement became her main concern. She had become a member of the Social Democratic Federation because of a realisation that reforming the political system to provide for the vote for women was not enough to deal with the acute social problems which increasingly became her concern. She had come into contact with the dedicated women of the Russian revolutionary movement, too. In 1907, she was a SDF delegate to the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International.

In 1911, Dora Montefiore renewed her association with Australia. After a successful lecture tour of the United States, at the end of 1910, she sailed for Australia where her son had settled. In Sydney, she met the International Socialists who impressed her much more than the “flabby Labor Party of Holman”. In Harry Holland she saw one of the finest fighters whom it was her good fortune to meet in a long life. When Harry’s health broke down under the strain of newspaper work, public speaking and organising the movement, Dora Montefiore agreed to edit the paper until Holland was able to resume the editor’s work.

After her return to England in 1912, she became an executive member of the BSP and was one of the BSP executive members who were elected to the first Central Committee of the British Communist Party of which she remained a member until 1922. She was now past seventy years of age and ill-health and a desire to see her son’s widow and her grand-children took her once more to Australia (her son had died in 1921 from the after-effects of gassing in the war).

At first the Australian government refused her a visa because Communists were not allowed into the country, but when a guarantee was given that Dora Montefiore would not engage in any communist propaganda she was allowed to enter Australia. During her stay, she saw something of the various organisations of the Communist Party and renewed acquaintance with some of the socialists whom she had known in 1911. After her return to England at the end of 1923, Dora Montefiore received credentials from the Communist Party of Australia to be its delegate to the Fifth Comintern Congress.

Whether the executive actually dealt with the matter is a moot point; Baracchi says not. It is possible that the arrangement of her credentials was made in some other way. There seems no doubt, however, that she did represent the Australian communists at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern.

Roger Coates
THE OUTCASTS OF FOOLGARAH, by Frank Hardy. Allara Publishing. 245 pp. $2.50.

OPINIONS OF THE OUTCASTS OF FOOLGARAH diverge considerably from those who regard it as an outrageously comic novel to those who see it simply as the dirty wanderings of Hardy’s mind. At least, this is the opinion we get from reading some newspaper reviews (the newspapers seem reluctant to review it) and from talking generally.

There is, however, more to it than that. On the one hand, it is an example of what Bernard Shaw observed of the art of Mark Twain who, he said, put things in such a way as to make people who would have otherwise hung him believe he was joking. On the other, it is the record of what has happened to one communist, who also happens to be a writer, since 1956 when this novel first began to see the light of day.

Theoretically, The Outcasts of Foolgarah deals with the Marcusian thesis that the revolutionary force for changing society lies in the hands of those who are no longer captives of its repressive tolerance, that is the outcasts, the human refuse, those who stand outside society having been rejected by it, minorities of all kinds — pensioners, inmates of mental institutions and prisons, coloured peoples, sections of the working class, the permanently unemployed, student elements, etc. And Hardy prefaces his work with a quote from Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man and acknowledges his debt to this philosopher in his Author’s Note. So in one sense it is Marcuse with feathers, simplified and presented for popular consumption in the form of a novel, the thesis providing a theoretical support on which to hang the tale.

The tale itself is simple, tracing what happens to two garbage carters, Chilla and Tich, after having been sacked for sorting bottles in the boss’s time. From a simple strike which results from this exercise of arbitrary power, it proceeds to the stage where martial law is declared. Hardy probably creates literary and social history when he has the garbos and fellow outcasts (a student, an Italian, assorted garbage and sanitary workers, TPI pensioners) shoot it out with Australian troops fresh from Vietnam on Anzac Day.

Before this climax is reached, blasphemous in the eyes of the “canon law” of Australian myth makers, traditional organs of social change, like trade unions and the Communist Party, are shown to be part of the establishment, not sufficiently apart from it to either influence or change it, the outcasts being the only ones sufficiently removed to be able to fundamentally (i.e. radically) reassess what has passed for reality.

Many of the inhabitants of Foolgarah, a microcosm of Australia itself, are easily identified — like Sir William Bigears, Sir Jasper Storeman, and Crazy Darcy Meanswell. However, Hardy has learnt from his Power Without Glory days and in creating a single character he’s often gathered together a mean bunch of politicos, thrown them all into a melting pot and created a single monstrosity.

Foolgarah itself is a terrifying society, our society, riddled with corruption at all levels of public life, where decision-making is concentrated in the hands of a few, with the masses kept in their place with palliatives of all kinds —
accepted ways of doing things, right channels, rules, laws, hire purchase, the mass media — which constitute an acceptance of roles assigned to them by society, roles beyond which they will not step for to do so puts them beyond the pale and into the land of the outcasts. Even the outcasts do not initially want to be outcasts for in creating them Foolgarah has failed and will seek to destroy them, they being the evidence of its failure.

One could read *The Outcasts of Foolgarah* simply for laughs. In places it is hysterically funny. Stylistically, it’s an extended bawdy joke, what with cans of human excreta being upturned everywhere, over local councillors, politicians, even the Royal Her and Him. In fact, it would appear that Hardy has recognised the anal idiom of Australian life and simply written a novel exploiting it. If people are revolted or put off by this, then in the long run, they are only being revolted by themselves.

However, it’s not all laughs. The homosexual rape of student revolutionary Albert McKakie in Penbay Prison is powerful and shocking, coming as it does in the midst of comedy. In fact, this is the way Hardy works in this novel; he has the reader laughing and at the height of this laughter sticks him in the guts with a knife. At that point you realise it’s more than an extended piece of humorous writing.

Indeed, the whole novel constitutes a powerful work, leaving us with a scramble of emotions — like anger, hate, and what are we doing against this society Hardy has described. In turn, this means that Hardy has created, in the midst of all the bawdiness, human characters with which one can identify and not the cardboard cut-outs one critic has referred to.

Whether or not Hardy believes in the Marcusian thesis does not really concern us here. That is a matter for the author; and perhaps as he describes himself in the ruthless self-portrait (F. J. Borky) this is just a straw grabbed by a man disillusioned by the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the reappraisal of Stalin and stalinism. To that extent it is a statement of his current ideological position which is not necessarily his permanent one.

Given his history as a writer, one must admit that Hardy is unpredictable, save to the extent that his one consistency is his tenacious, combative, struggling spirit. This is probably the final value of the book — not that it says what many of us already know, admittedly in a powerful and entertaining way, but that the spirit of struggle against oppression of all kinds and the affirmation of human dignity are the values asserted in an age which seeks to subvert the former and deny the latter.

PAM AND ROWAN CAHILL

**MARX IN HIS OWN WORDS, by Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek. Allen Lane The Penguin Press, $4.50.**

THE SPATE OF REASSESSMENT of Marx’s work over the last two decades was a necessary and useful exercise, both to save Marx from the clutches of the dogmatists and to reinterpret him in the light of present social reality and events since his death. However, if this process continues to the detriment of our own analysis and understanding of modern capitalism, the left will run the risk of merely creating for itself another reified image of Marx, somewhat more sophisticated than the last one, but no better in its overall result.
Marx has provided us with a wealth of profound and creative insights into the workings of class societies, and this heritage has yet to be exploited to the full, particularly since much of his important work has lain unknown or forgotten until recently. But this is no reason to build ourselves a new set of scriptures. Rather, we should utilise Marx’s insights and framework in our own work, for which latter Marx’s work can be no substitute.

Whenever a new book on Marx appears, one gets the uneasy feeling that here is a new attempt to rewrite or reinterpret the scriptures for the author’s own (often quite legitimate and reasonable) purposes. Fischer’s book hopefully was not intended in this way, and indeed Fischer’s own original works on art suggest that he is not a “scripture quoter”.

In any case, this book is a useful introduction to, and view of, Marx’s (and Engels’) ideas. The authors give an exposition of these ideas in their own words, with plentiful quotations of Marx’s words. The book is divided into a number of sections (e.g. Division of Labor and Alienation/Profit and Capital/Theory of Revolution) which provide a useful structure for anyone new to Marxist theory. As an introduction, it has much to recommend it, and it is therefore a pity that the publishers have chosen to print it in hardcover form at about four times the price it would sell for as a paperback.

As a collection of excerpts from Marx, the book is probably not as good as that edited by Bottomore and Rubel (in Pelican paperback) while, as a commentary on Marx it is not as interesting, nor valuable, as some others.

However, its value as an introduction certainly justifies its existence in the somewhat overcrowded “Marx market”. It is to be hoped that it will soon appear in paperback, at a price more likely to guarantee large sales.

BRIAN AARONS

AUTHOR’S LETTER

To All Members of the Editorial Board,
Australian Left Review.

This is a complaint. I write in connection with the review of my book A New Britannia which appeared in Australian Left Review number 30 by Mr. Max Teichmann. In ALR 31 I asked for certain matters to be cleared up by number 32 which has appeared without further mention of this matter. I am sure you will be aware of the seriousness of the allegations made by Mr. Teichmann and why I am anxious that a retraction be obtained from him. Nor have I heard from your editor on this matter although I sent my letter by registered mail some months ago. In conclusion let me restate that Mr. Teichmann’s charges of plagiarism are totally untrue.

HUMPHREY McQUEEN

We assure Mr. McQueen and our readers that communication has passed and is passing between ourselves and Mr. Teichmann.—Ed.