People at the polls: a geographical analysis of a local government election, Wollongong, 1974

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PEOPLE AT THE POLLS:

A Geographical Analysis of a Local Government Election,

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by

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Honours Degree in the Department of Geography University of Wollongong 1976
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the pattern of voting of the 1974 Wollongong City Council Local Government Election. The analysis is conducted at three levels; first, overall, in which the effect of socio-economic factors upon the party vote at each booth is considered; second, within the Wards, in which the local context of voting is reviewed; and thirdly, the issue level.

Multiple correlation and regression analysis was used in an attempt to understand the pattern of variation in the relative magnitude of the party related vote. Residuals from the analysis suggested the operation of ward based factors, thus in Chapter 4 the scale of the analysis was changed in an attempt to determine whether or not local effects noted in the literature of electoral geography could be discerned. Because of data and system problems, however, this analysis could not be conducted in a way that gave results capable of being added to those from the previous analysis. Instead, the local effect was sought at the intra party intra ward level and among the votes obtained by independents. At both levels local effects were found to exist, although there appeared to be other systematically operating factors within some wards that affected the voting response surface.

The thesis then turns to an examination of some well marked inter ward variations in the nature of local effects. One of the most important factors contributing departures from a regular local effect was found to be the 'common ticket' electoral strategy which results in a candidate gaining almost uniform support across the ward. Local factors influencing the flow of information could still be seen to affect these results and three case studies of this situation are included. Re-examination of the support for 'party' candidates in other wards indicated that two other
electoral strategies also influenced the pattern of support for candidates: the 'variable ticket' strategy used by the Labour Party, resulted in a 'step' like response surface, the modified 'variable ticket' strategy employed by the Liberal-Independents, resulted in a more gradual distance decay in candidate support.

The issues component was also examined. It would appear that the issue of environmental protection was influential in determining the pattern of voting in the ward.

The three components (the party vote, the local context vote and the issues vote) were found to be highly inter-related. Although it was not possible to integrate the findings from each level of analysis in such a way as to permit the conclusion that some given portion of the place to place variation in voting patterns could be accounted for by these components, it is argued that this thesis demonstrates clearly the range of factors that need to be considered in any electoral study, their often complex inter-relationships, and the necessity for more studies based upon detailed observation in the field.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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4.7 Respondents Recall of Candidates, Classified Into the Following Categories, Contesting the 1974 Wollongong Local Government Elections within Respondent's Ward

4.8 Relationships Between Personality Candidates' Homeplaces and the Increase in Support Over Time

Table 5.1 Local Effects and Residential Proximity of Other Candidates - True Independent Candidates

5.2 Pairing of Same 'Party' Candidates, Based on Residential Proximity

5.3 Vote Increase Possibly Due to Variable Ticket Strategy

Table 6.1 Zero Order Correlation Coefficients - Environmentalist Vote and Socio-Economic Variables
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The outcome of the electoral process always depends on the aggregate of individual voting decisions by electors, distributed between electoral areas, for example, precincts, wards or districts. An understanding of the outcome of any election therefore must be based upon not only a knowledge of the electoral system employed, but also (and most particularly) on a knowledge and understanding of the motivating forces that resulted in the elector casting his particular ballot in the way he did.

Why then does a voter act as he does when required to distinguish between candidates or to rank order his preferences for competing parties or candidates? To be sure, there is an element of electoral a-rationality involved, as evidenced by the presence of the "donkey vote" in Australian elections (though to the individual elector, the decision to vote straight down the ballot paper, from 1 to N, may in fact be rational under conditions of maximum uncertainty, high levels of ignorance or a low level of motivation, in which case this vote might perhaps best be described as the 'least effort' response).

For the most part, however, it would seem reasonable to view the individual's decision to vote in a particular manner as being, at least, intendedly rational (Pred, 1967, 26-28). If this is so, it would then seem reasonable to suggest that the voting decision is likely to have been influenced by a wide range of factors that are both areally and societally variable, each at a range of scales, as well as temporally.

A CONCEPTUAL DIAGRAM

Figure 1.1 attempts to indicate both (a) the nature and (b) probable structural inter-relationships of these groups of factors. Obviously
models much more complex than this could be devised, particularly if
detailed process stages are desired (see for example Cox, 1969b).
So long as the primary focus is upon the factors that may influence
the decision to vote, however, a model as simple as this has a number of
advantages to offer in the analysis of electoral behaviour.

FIGURE 1.1 THE INDIVIDUAL DECISION TO VOTE: A CONCEPTUAL DIAGRAM
A. Decision to Vote

The actual voting preference (a) for a party/bloc
(b) for a candidate
presenting a bloc (where appropriate).

B. Perception of Best Interest

The 'filter' or political stimuli processors.

C. Individual Attributes

i) Psychological; for example (a) orientation - self and others (b) personality - introvert/extrovert
ii) Intelligence
iii) Demographic; for example (a) sex (b) age

D. Formative Socio-economic Context

i) Family status; for example, occupation of 'bread winner'
ii) Family neighbourhood; for example, high status/low status
iii) Parental political views

E. 'Present' Socio-economic Context

i) Socio-economic status; for example, (a) education (b) occupation
ii) Ethnicity
iii) Religion

F. Politically Relevant Information

i) Group and association membership
ii) Friends and acquaintances
iii) Neighbours/the neighbourhood
iv) The media
v) Electioneering
G. The Election

i) Level; for example, Federal, State, Local

ii) Election system
   (a) First past the post
   (b) Quota
   (c) Preferential

iii) Elector voting obligations
   (a) compulsory
   (b) non-compulsory

iv) Issues

v) Parties

vi) Candidates

H. Previous Politically Relevant Information

i) Group and association membership (in past periods)

ii) Friends and acquaintances (in past periods)

iii) Neighbours/the neighbourhood (in past periods)

iv) The media (in past periods)

v) Electioneering; for example, through 'how to vote' cards.

I. Previous Perception of Best Interest

i) The 'filter' or processor of political stimuli, for a previous election.

J. Previous Decision to Vote

i) Voting preferences at previous elections.

Best Interests

It may be argued that to a very large degree the decision to vote in a particular way (hereafter 'the voting decision') is proximally affected by an individual's perception of his 'best interests' (Box B, Figure 1.1). The concept of 'best interests' need not necessarily be 'best' in that they relate selfishly to the individual, for example, by increasing his own possibilities for wage/salary gains, reduced taxation
levels, lowered municipal rates, better road maintenance in his residential locality, etc., but may be unselfishly or altruistically 'best' in that they may permit a more reasonable distribution of wealth throughout the society, at some loss to the individual. Moreover, the elector's perception of best interests reflects the complex interrelations between a number of factors, some 'unique' to the individual, being affected by his psychological/physiological attributes, for example, intelligence, personality, while others may be associated with group memberships.

Temporal Stability of Voter Preferences

Even before an individual is old enough to vote, he is usually developing views on the subject of which political party is most congruent with his own view of society, that is, which best represents his own best interests. Such views will themselves result from exposure to parental political views and attitudes, that is, from 'parental socialisation' (Butler and Stokes, 1971, 66; Foladare, 1968, 526), reinforced by a particular life style and socio-economic context. Foladare (1968, 526), for example, demonstrates clear intergenerational stability in voting behaviour, that is, parents and their offspring demonstrate a high correlation with regard to party identification.

For voters voting in an election other than their first, it would also seem reasonable to suggest that an element of habit is involved, that is, decisions made for previous elections of the same type are likely to become ingrained and reinforcing. Certainly there is some evidence for this, if only that the proportion of 'swinging voters' is small and comparatively stable from one election to the next. Party identification, in fact, has been identified as a stable aspect of attitude structure that only changes in response to traumatic factors.
such as war and depression (Kasperson, 1969, 409). This factor is expressed in Box J, Figure 1.1. This is not to say that prior behaviour inevitably determines future behaviour in the voting context, but rather to suggest that the psychological and social supportiveness of consistent behaviour, reinforced by the approval (or disapproval, depending on one's psychological make up) of the individual's social reference groups - including his familial group - cannot be ignored. Undoubtedly such factors may be negated by the relative strength of other factors, for example, a particular issue affecting the individual, but they form a necessary ingredient in any attempt to generalise and schematise the factors underlying the individual's voting decision.

Information Flows

As suggested in the structural diagram (Figure 1.1) the nature of the political information received by an individual is affected by the socio-economic context of the individual. It is well documented that individuals of similar socio-economic levels reside in close proximity to one another (Timms, 1971, 121; Thomlinson, 1969, 63). Moreover, individuals tend to interact over comparatively short distances, while individuals' opinions different from the majority view in an area are more likely to be converted to the majority view (Cox, 1969C) as the intensity of short distance interaction increases. Thus areas differentiated along social class lines tend to have common perceptions of best interest (that is, there are 'groups of common interest' (Prescott, 1972, 80)) resulting in common voting decisions (Box E, Figure 1.1), although there are deviations from this general pattern.

The flow of politically relevant information (Box F, Figure 1.1) may also operate differentially in stimulating the voter, however.
The nature of political information received by an individual is likely to be affected primarily by his present socio-economic context, but in addition by his 'reference groups' (whether primary, for example, friends/acquaintances, neighbours, or secondary, for example, trade unions, service clubs) which is consistent with the sociologists' view of a community influence on voting behaviour (Campbell, 1958; Putnam, 1966), mediated through both primary and secondary groups. Thus closely knit groups in the community, for example, ethnic groups, may have political views differing from those of the community as a whole because of their interest definitions and social interactional patterns.

The elector may also obtain political information from the mass media. The degree to which the media are influential in shaping electoral decisions is difficult (if not impossible) to determine, but it would seem likely that the effect will vary according to the individual's mental attributes, degree of exposure to this information, as well as the individual's socio-economic context. If some part or parts of the media are biased towards one political party, and if the individual is unable to recognise this bias, then this may affect his voting decision.

Also important is the distribution of information in the course of the electoral campaign, that is, via electioneering, although its influence on electors has not received as much attention as it deserves for a form of information flow that is so intensely 'politically relevant' as this. Cox (1972, 161) for example, attempted to outline the effect of electioneering - in this case differential canvassing - on voting patterns and suggested that political parties may concentrate their vote catching activities into certain areas. If electors react favourably towards this areaally concentrated form of electioneering, then the party or candidate concerned may poll a higher proportion of
the vote than that which may be expected or predicted.

**Governmental Level of Election**

Overriding all previously discussed factors, however, is the level or importance, of the election, that is, whether the election is for a Local Government body, for a State body or for a National Government. Such a distinction is most important to electoral studies because it would appear that voting in National elections is usually on a status or class basis, although the effect of the 'attractiveness' of party leaders is also an important factor. At lower levels (especially at the Local Government level) the 'attractiveness' of candidates as well as the effect of issues may result in an elector voting quite outside the party frame relevant to national elections (as suggested by his personal characteristics, for example, his occupation or income level), for, perhaps, a local candidate.

**FROM INDIVIDUALS TO AGGREGATES**

Intuitively it would seem possible for any individual to indicate the degree to which a particular voting decision had been influenced by the major types of 'determinants' included in the scheme in Figure 1.1. In actuality, however, such a situation is unlikely and when it is desired to comprehend the voting behaviour of large aggregates, the situation becomes ever more difficult, for then an analyst usually begins with aggregate data for individual polling booths, precincts, etc., in which the individual voting decision cannot be identified. Sample surveys may be used in an attempt to gain some insight into the situation, but this is not entirely satisfactory as before and after the fact surveys are unlikely to reproduce accurately the actual voting behaviour, though this is not to suggest that the survey approach is of little value, as important work has been conducted by political scientists
and political sociologists using this approach.

When the aggregate data is combined for all the booths in an electorate, the resultant 'voting response surface'\(^1\) becomes the phenomenon of concern to geographic analysts of electoral behaviour. In general, such analyses have tended to focus their attention on the consideration of only three of the factors influencing the form of this response surface:

i) the socio-economic context as reflected in the party vote

ii) the flow of political information as reflected in the local vote component of the total vote and

iii) the issues,

assuming, apparently, that these three, individually or collectively, subsume or reflect most of the other factors. Conceptually speaking, these three elements may in fact be thought of as the three dominant and possibly distinguishable components of the total response surface.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT/PARTY VOTE COMPONENT

Whatever the assumptions that have been made about the behavioural significance of present social context, it is clear that the majority of researchers in the field of electoral geography have, in one way or another, recognised the importance of this factor in influencing the outcome of the voting decision (Roberts & Rumage, 1965; Cox, 1969; Johnston, 1972, 1973, 1974; Forrest & Johnston, 1973; Prescott, 1972).

Analyses of this component are generally conducted at a large scale, for example, a city wide basis. As the relationship between party allegiance and socio-economic status is well known, many researchers, as the first step in their analysis, identify indicators of socio-economic

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1. By definition, 'a voting response surface is the continuous equivalent of a map depicting the areal distribution of voting proportions (for example; percent Conservative) by constituencies' (Reynolds, 1969b, 130).
status to be used as the independent variables in an attempt to 'explain' the areal variation in the voting response surface. Roberts and Rummage (1965) and McPhail (1970b), for example, identify a number of independent variables pertaining to measures of status, education and housing in an attempt to 'explain' a particular voting response surface, but perhaps the most precise indication of a socio-economic context/party vote component was demonstrated by Johnston (1972) in his study of the 1968 Christchurch City Council Elections. A 'party effect' accounting for 80% of the variation in the voting at each booth was extracted from data relating to 38 party candidates at each booth from which he was able to conclude that 'the distribution of party support clearly reflected the social topography (of the city)' (1972,56).

Although electoral geographers have always been interested in aggregate voting patterns, during the 1960's other effects were realised as being significant by a number of researchers. As a result the scale of the analysis was reduced in an attempt to discern other effects. Such a change was of course merely another manifestation of the more general acceptance of a behavioural viewpoint which demanded a move from aggregates to the individual level.

THE LOCAL CONTEXT COMPONENT

While there is no doubt that a voter's socio-economic context, and therefore the socio-economic complexion of voting areas are likely to emerge as being very important in the explanation of the place to place variations in voting patterns, it is equally clear that deviations from the expected pattern of support for a candidate/party are likely to arise as a result of variations in the degree to which individual voters are linked to an interpersonal communication system within an area, social class, an ethnic group, etc.
Party allegiances, perhaps class based, may, in the case of an individual voter, be offset by personal friendship ties, for example, and in the context of less 'important' elections, for example, Local Government elections, such 'cross overs' in candidate/party support may be significant. These friendship ties are likely to be more intense between people separated by short physical distances; therefore, the information flow over short distances is also likely to be relatively intense.

More recent studies in electoral geography have attempted to introduce space and distance as explanatory, independent of other variables. In their 'Inquiry into the Spatial Basis of Electoral Geography', Reynolds and Archer (1969) attempted to analyse the socio-economic context component of the 1967 Mayoral Election in Indianapolis. However, it was found that although areal variations in the selected variables accounted for areal variations in the percent Republican vote, the variables were unable fully to account for the clustering of the percent Republican vote. Reynolds and Archer then suggested that the flow of politically relevant information might be an important factor worthy of consideration. They also hypothesised that this flow appeared to become a more important influence on the form of the voting response surface as the scale of the analysis was decreased to the level of the census tract.

Cox (1969c) demonstrated that the suggested flow of information did exist as a causal variable, and further, that it had a spatial structuring. He was able to demonstrate that electors belonging to organisations based outside their local area were more likely to be exposed to political opinions different from those held by members of organisations based on their home area.
More recently, Cox (1972) has suggested a methodology for demonstrating the effect of the neighbourhood (local area) on the voting response surface. Although Cox saw differential party activity and residential selectively (whereby people match their views with the surrounding area) as being able to produce a 'neighbourhood effect' or 'local effect', he chose to examine this effect as being caused by distance biased interpersonal influence thereby ignoring the other two mentioned factors. Whether such an assumption is justifiable, however, apparently remains untested.

Cox has been concerned, generally, with the effects of the neighbourhood on voting behaviour through interpersonal interaction. However, Reynolds (1969a, b) examined this flow of political information within an area, with special reference to the spatial distribution of the voting support for a particular candidate who was contesting his initial election. As Reynolds wanted to examine the spatial aspects of the support base for the candidate, he chose an intra party primary election so that his analysis was not distorted by the effect of between-party competition. The analysis indicated that the candidate's support declined both as distance from his home increased and the number of people living in areas around his home increased. This indicated that the flow of politically relevant information was spatially concentrated and seemingly supported the idea that electors tend to vote for a local candidate.

Recent research into local context voting Johnston, (1972, 1973, 1974) and Forrest and Johnston (1973) seem to reinforce Reynolds' views, though other areas of peak candidate support, also related to a high level of local knowledge of the candidate, have been demonstrated to occur in relation to the candidate's workplace, while even a negative local knowledge vote has been indicated due to the candidate's apparent
unpopularity in his home area (Forrest & Johnston, 1973, 173).

**THE ISSUES COMPONENT**

The existence of an issue effect upon the overall pattern of voting is a factor that is specific to the particular election (Box G, Figure 1.1) but it can also be shown to result from particular biases in the flow of information, in this case, a spatial bias with respect to those locations most affected by the issue (where an issue may be demonstrated as generating spatial variations in support). To the writer's knowledge, however, the existence of this effect has not been as well analysed, nor even so well demonstrated, least of all in conjunction with the other two components simultaneously.

Where an issue is locationally specific, then its effect upon the overall voting response surface should be easily discerned. Cox (1971, 28) and Johnston (1972, 50), for example, have suggested that issues such as relocation may well generate such a situation, for electors would be expected to support a particular party or candidate displaying some sympathy for their view. Furthermore, Forrest and Johnston (1973, 166) suggest that support for an issue oriented candidate or party should decline with decreasing proximity from the affected area - but again it must be stressed that this has not seriously been tested for, in the context of an overall electoral response surface, simultaneously with the socio-economic context and local context components.

**AN OVERVIEW**

Although the existence of three major components has been suggested there is no necessity that they all must exist in every voting response surface, nor is there any necessity that the three must be distinguishable from one another. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, the components may be conceived of as operating at distinct scales.
The analysis of the socio-economic context component of a voting response surface must necessarily subsume the effect of the formative socio-economic context (Box D, Figure 1.1) of the individual, although the two are related (Foladare, 1968, 526). The 'habitual' nature of the voting decision (Box D, Figure 1.1) is also subsumed under the above head, although his too may be related to present socio-economic context. Thus the analysis of this component would appear to be insufficient and incomplete, although there is perhaps no way of avoiding this due to the nature of the abovementioned interrelationships. Only the studies by Johnston (1972, 1973) and Forrest and Johnston (1973) have been able to state with some degree of precision the portion of the response surface that is accounted for by this component. Undoubtedly though, different types of elections and electoral systems provide differing scope for analysis.

At a smaller scale, researchers have shown that there is an information flow that influences an individual's voting decision. However the form and intensity of this information is likely to vary between social groups, ethnic groups, etc., but such variations are necessarily subsumed under the local context component. As previously outlined, Cox (1972) suggested three factors capable of causing localised warpings in the response surface (self selection, differential canvassing, interpersonal communication). Although the effect of self selection is difficult to discern, the effect of differential canvassing - indeed electioneering in general - is much easier to identify. For example, if an 'unknown' candidate saturates one specific area with his electioneering material, it is difficult to believe that his voting support in that area will not be higher than that occurring in some other area. Although this situation may result in an apparent local
context vote, when in reality it is not, the problem will be complicated if the candidate does reside in the area he saturates with his election material.

Another candidate specific factor that may influence the magnitude of the variation of the local context component concerns the number of election attempts. Logically, based on studies that have demonstrated a local context component, a candidate's voting support should increase with the number of elections he contests, and the trend should be more marked for incumbents. However, this factor also has not been examined in the electoral geography literature, although it may be an important indicator of the flow of political information within a particular area.

The occurrence of a local information type vote is also influenced by the nature of the electorate. Presumably the existence of a significant local context component of a voting response surface is more likely to occur in a ward based election than in a city wide or larger scale electorate.

With reference to local issues, there has been little, if any, research conducted that demonstrates the existence of this component in addition to the previous two components, although three researchers have speculated as to its properties.

THE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED

It should be evident from the preceding discussion that the present state of electoral geography leaves a number of problems unresolved, or at best, only partially understood. This thesis, then, aims to provide new insight into a number of these areas by analysing the pattern of voting in the multi-ward, multi-candidate Wollongong City Council Local Government Election conducted on the 21st, September, 1974.
... particular, the thesis will focus upon the following questions:

i) What is the City wide patterning of voting support for the two major groups ('parties') who contested the election?

ii) To what extent can the form of the voting response surface be accounted for by the place to place differences in the City's socio-economic composition?

iii) Does the support for each candidate demonstrate the existence of a local context vote?

iv) Is there a flow of candidate specific politically relevant information?

v) Were there any location specific issues that may have given rise to some discernible local warping of the voting response surface?

To this end, then, the thesis takes the following form:

The most important factors thought most likely to affect the outcome of the election are examined in Chapter 2, including the social characteristics of each Ward, the electoral system employed, the major issues of the election, the polarisation of the candidates as well as the major electioneering methods employed. The major aim of the Chapter is to provide an adequate backdrop to the election for the reader.

Chapter 3 is concerned with the attempt to determine whether or not a socio-economic/party vote existed in the election. To this end, regression analysis and examination of residuals from regression are employed.

The overriding theme of Chapter 4 is that local information or local context voting may account for some of the variation in the response surface unexplained by the previous analysis. Such an analysis is reasonable in view of the division of the City into five Wards for the purpose of the election.
Chapter 5 examines disruptive factors that may operate to inhibit the occurrence of local context voting including the relative location of the candidates within a ward with respect to the location of other candidates and especially the choice of electoral strategies.

A further influence on the response surface, that of location specific issues, is examined in Chapter 6 in an attempt to discern the nature of the effect of an issue on the voting response surface.

The study is concluded in Chapter 7 with a summary of the significant findings with respect to recent developments within the field of electoral geography, as well as suggesting areas for further research.
CHAPTER TWO

THE ELECTION

INTRODUCTION

Within Australia local government elections are usually held triennially, and as such, are unique events in that for no two elections in the same place for the same office, will the factors influencing the electoral outcome be precisely the same. Any study of electoral behaviour must, therefore, be set firmly in context. Although 'context' is difficult to define precisely, it may be seen as comprising such factors as the electoral system being employed, the social fabric of the electorate going to the polls, the issues on which the election has been fought, the broader socio-political backdrop to the election, the parties and candidates contesting the election and finally the nature and emphasis of the campaign prior to the election.

This chapter attempts to consider briefly such contextual material in order that the later, more detailed analysis can be more meaningfully presented and understood. In each section, the 'touchstone' of relevance has been the influence that the particular factor has on the electoral outcome and the pattern resulting from this outcome.

THE ELECTION

General Elections of Aldermen for the City of Wollongong, were last held on 21st September, 1974. This election was one of a number in New South Wales in 1974, at which the Australian Labour Party, which contests such elections, was at a disadvantage due to the decline in popularity of the Federal Labour Government. Although it is difficult to determine exactly how many, this unpopularity led to the fall of a number of
Fig 2.1
WOLLONGONG:
LOCATIONAL ASPECTS.
Labour controlled Councils in New South Wales, including even the Broken Hill City Council, which had been controlled by the Labour Party for approximately 40 years.

THE CITY OF WOLLONGONG

Location and Shape

The Wollongong Central Business District (C.B.D.) is located some 80 kilometres (kms) south of the Sydney General Post Office. In fact, however, the northern limits of the City of Wollongong reach to within only 15 kms of the southern margins of the Sydney urbanised area. From this point south stretches some 50 kms of near continuous urbanisation (Fig. 2.1), squeezed in between the 200-500 metre high Illawarra escarpment to the west, and the sea on the east.

As a result, the City is elongated and wedge shaped, occupying a restricted area of coastal plain and foothills that is never more than 20 kms wide, and diminishes to nothing at its northern most limits. The urbanised area of the Illawarra includes both the City of Wollongong and the Municipality of Shellharbour, each of which is administered by its own team of Aldermen, and presided over by a Mayor elected from, and by the Aldermen. This study is concerned only with the former.

Population and Economic Activities

At the 30th June, 1974, the population of the City of Wollongong numbered approximately 167,000, of which approximately 30% was overseas born (Table 2.1). Of this overseas born component, almost 31% had resided in Australia for less than 5 years, reflecting the rapid expansion the City has experienced in the post-war period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of Overseas Born</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.K. &amp; Irish</td>
<td>21,262</td>
<td>43.55</td>
<td>13.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>6,697</td>
<td>13.72</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>5,539</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>40,432</td>
<td>82.82</td>
<td>25.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1971 Commonwealth Census

As at 30th June, 1971.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing etc.</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>4,379</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>26,625</td>
<td>41.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, Gas &amp; Water</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4,787</td>
<td>7.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale &amp; Retail Trade</td>
<td>9,173</td>
<td>14.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Storage</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>4.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance &amp; Business Services etc.</td>
<td>3,050</td>
<td>4.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration, Defence</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Services</td>
<td>5,426</td>
<td>8.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment, Recreation</td>
<td>2,841</td>
<td>4.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, not stated</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>64,871</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1971 Commonwealth Census
As can be seen from Table 2.2, the local economy is dominated by coal mining and the steel industry. Indeed, at the Census of 1971, 47.79% of the employed population were involved in these activities. This, therefore, suggests a very large support base for the Labour Party in this area.

**Urban Structure**

The City in its present form is the outcome of a process of comparatively recent suburbanisation of previously semi-dependent towns or villages. To the north of the C.B.D., early settlement consisted of a number of mining villages, each of which has acted as a focus for suburban development. The C.B.D., still the major single focus of retailing in the City, was an early developed rural servicing centre but in recent years (Davidson, 1974) the area to the north of it has also become one of the more intensively developed areas of high density home units and flats.

Port Kembla, also once an autonomous municipality, remains the focus for the City's heavy industry and employs a major part of the workforce of the City. Under the pressure of rapid peripheral suburban development, the City has in recent years spread further to the south, around the western shores of Lake Illawarra to Unanderra and Dapto, where there have been building developments, both private and State Housing Commission, and this situation will continue due to the shortage of large amounts of housing area throughout the City. However, the City is also pushing into the foothills of the escarpment and these areas comprise high cost private developments.

As might be expected from a knowledge of the City's evolution, there are major local variations in demographic composition. The highest proportions of over sixty-fives, for example, occur in the old mining
WARD BOUNDARIES AND POLLING BOOTHS.

- Ward Boundaries
- Polling Booths
- Escarpment

Fig 2.2

- Dapto
- Escarpment
- Fairy Meadow
- Helensburgh
- Illawarra Lake
- Wollongong
- Wombarra
- Woonona
villages of the north; by contrast, the highest proportions of young adults and children occur in the new residential developments to the south. The migrant population tends to be quite heavily concentrated in localities relatively close to the steelworks, such as Cringila, while high status populations prefer the wooded vantage points of the elevated foothills immediately north and west of the City centre.

THE WARDS: DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

For local government electoral purposes, the City is divided into five wards (Fig. 2.2). Each ward has its own particular character and it is therefore necessary to indicate briefly their varying social and demographic characteristics since these are likely to be influential in determining the pattern of voting.

Ward 1

Ward 1 comprises a number of old mining communities and not unexpectedly mining is still a dominant occupation of the workforce in this ward. Although there has been some new residential development along the foothills in the southern half of the ward and some State Housing Commission development in the Bulli-Woonona area, the longer established residential areas are beginning to age quite markedly and a fairly high degree of dilapidation is not uncommon. Accompanying the large number of 'old' homes and residential areas is the highest proportion of old aged persons found in any of the five wards (Table 2.3).

According to Robinson (1974) the ward is generally 'WASP'ish in character, with very low proportions of overseas born, partly because the ward was fully settled before the post-war influx of migrants, but also because it is most distant from the steelworks and other major employers at Port Kembla, where the migrant workforce is primarily employed.
Although old, the area is characterised by a predominance of owner occupied dwellings, except in the Bulli-Woonona area. In this case, however, ownership is not associated with higher socio-economic status, as is usual, for in many cases the dwellings are small cottages rather than houses - old and dilapidated. Recently, however, the demand for elevated building allotments with a view of the ocean has resulted in relatively high concentrations of new and expensive home construction for more affluent residents along the foothills. Despite this development, however, the ward is essentially a lower status area.

Ward 2

Although Ward 2 also contains some old mining areas, much has been developed since 1960. As in Ward 1, the demand for a 'block with a view' has led to a number of quite recent expensive subdivisions at the base of, or on, the foothills. Indeed, part of Wollongong's most prestigious suburb, Mount Ousley, is located in this ward. By contrast, however, there are also five State Housing Commission estates in this ward (Figure 2.1), which contributes significantly to its high level of social heterogeneity.

A small but growing proportion of overseas born people resides in this ward, particularly in the south, for example at Fairy Meadow and Balgownie, where there are substantial concentrations of Italians. In such areas, between 35% and 45% of the population in each census Collector's District (C.D.) is overseas born (though these would appear to be more upwardly mobile members of the ethnic communities than those resident in, say, Port Kembla).

Occupationally there is also a high level of diversity within the ward. The presence of a number of mines, a coke works and a growing light industrial estate (in the Fernhill-Reidtown area) together with relatively easy access to the Port Kembla complex are responsible for
the high levels of employment in mining and manufacturing that occurs in some C.D.'s (up to 50%). In contrast, however, in the high status areas of Mount Ousley and Mount Pleasant up to 40% of the workforce is employed in professional/managerial capacities.

Ward 3

This ward contains the C.B.D. of the City, as well as the City's educational complex (University, College of Advanced Education, Technical College, two High Schools). It also contains the largest concentration of high status residents (those involved in professional and managerial occupations) including Mount Keira, Keiraville, Smith's Hill, parts of Mangerton and Mount Ousley. By contrast, however, it also contains the single largest concentration of multi-unit housing, including high rise apartments and home units as well as Housing Commission flats, most of which is rented accommodation. Predictably, while the residents of such areas vary greatly in age and occupation, there is a well marked tendency for young, economically active adults to cluster here.

Although older residential structures exist both north and south of the C.B.D., highest concentrations occur towards the pollution prone areas nearer the heavy industrial complex and it is in this area that most of the overseas born population resides. In some localities up to 45% of the population in each C.D. in this area is foreign born, coming in particular from the United Kingdom (U.K.), Yugoslavía and Italy.

From 20% and up to 60% of the workforce in this ward is employed in the manufacturing industry. The higher figures occur concurrent with the migrant areas, while the lower figures are again for areas along the foothills.

Ward 4

Ward 4 contains the huge Port Kembla steelworks complex and an
extensive number of other metallurgical and noxious industries such as fertiliser manufacturing and the refining and smelting of non-ferrous metals. Much of the population finds employment locally. In some areas close to the complex e.g. Cringila, and Warrawong, more than 70% of the workforce may be so employed. Large numbers of southern European immigrants are also characteristic (at least 25% in all C.D.'s, ranging to greater than 65%) in localities such as Lake Heights, Cringila, Primbee, Warrawong and Berkeley. The essentially non Australian nature of the population is manifested in many ways, for example, by the scattering of gaily coloured homes, ethnic commercial facilities, the appearance of national dress in the streets, and a remarkably high linguistic diversity. Some schools in the area, for example, Port Kembla Primary School, have over twenty nationalities represented in their school population.

There are many old houses in the Cringila, Port Kembla, Warrawong, Primbee and Kemblawarra areas. Most of the newer developments in the area belong to the State Housing Commission, which has estates at Berkeley, Cringila, Port Kembla and Warrawong. The Berkeley and Lake Heights areas contain large numbers of U.K. born immigrants.

Given this strong industrial orientation and its proximity to the steelworks it is not surprising that of all the Wards, this one rates least highly in terms of social status and residential desirability.

Ward 5

Because of the demand for housing blocks in the City and because there are no longer large amounts of land near to, or north of, Wollongong central, post-war population growth has forced the City to expand southwards, west of Lake Illawarra. Ward 5 therefore contains the southernmost and most rapidly growing localities of the City. Although it is difficult to estimate the precise magnitude of this expansion, some indication of
the growth rate during the period 1971 to 1974 can be obtained from the change in the number of electors in the ward, which rose from 20,016 to 25,522 - that is, by 27.51% in three years.

The greater part of this rapid expansion has been accommodated in single family dwellings, for the most part owner occupied, although there has been Housing Commission developments at Dapto (142 homes), Unanderra (789 homes) and especially Koonawarra (906 homes).

The highest concentrations of U.K. born immigrants in the City are found in this ward, especially in and around Housing Commission areas. Highest concentrations occur in Unanderra and Koonawarra where up to 50% of the C.D. population may be U.K. born.

Overall the prevailing social status level of the residential areas is not high. Nevertheless some development in more elevated positions such as Figtree Heights and Mount Brown, or west of the Lake at Kanahooka and Hayes Park, are more expensive and house people employed predominantly in white collar jobs. Throughout, the population comprises family groups, heavily concentrated in the actively family forming stage. As a result, a high and increasing proportion of the population is of school age and only a small proportion of residents is over 65 (Table 2.3).

Summary

Each ward then, is basically internally quite heterogeneous and this heterogeneity is also evident between the wards. The wards differ from one another with regard to factors such as age of residential development, enclaves of ethnic and status groups as well as the age and occupations of the people. Thus, well marked 'local' effects are likely to become apparent in the voting pattern at the intra-ward level, but in addition significant differences can also be expected between wards.
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The electoral system used in this election, as in every Local Government election in New South Wales since 1968, is the preferential or alternative vote system (Sawer, 1973, p.65). Under this system, the elector must place a number, without replication, from 1 to N (with N representing the number of candidates on the ballot paper) against each name on the ballot paper. This numbering of every name requires the elector to express his order of preference for each candidate - whether he has a preference for a particular candidate or not!

Under this system the candidate with an absolute majority (50% plus one vote) of first preference (or primary) votes is declared elected. However, if no candidate gains an absolute majority of the primary poll, then the candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated and his second preferences are distributed to the remaining candidates, each such vote having the same value as a primary vote. If still no candidate has an absolute majority then the candidate with the next lowest number of votes, whether first preference or second preference, is eliminated and his preferences are distributed to the remaining candidates. Candidates are continually eliminated on the minimum preference basis until one candidate gains an absolute majority of the total formal votes cast.

In this election, three Aldermen were to be elected from each of the 5 wards; thus, after one candidate has been elected, his second preferences are distributed to the remaining candidates (N-1) and the elimination process described above continues until a second candidate gains an absolute majority of the valid votes cast. The process is again repeated for the election of a third candidate. A more detailed discussion of this system can be found in Sawer (1973, p. 65-66) and Solomon (1974, p. 84-86).
As in all such elections in N.S.W., only persons eligible under the Commonwealth Electoral Act are entitled, but not obliged, to vote. Eligible voters are "Australian residents, of either sex", over the age of eighteen years "who are British subjects or nationals by birth or naturalisation". (Sawer, 1973, p.50). This definition of eligibility has immediate significance for the City of Wollongong and leads to a rather anomalous and iniquitous situation in which some ratepayers of long and good standing are not eligible to elect those officials charged with responsibility for administering the provision of services and the power to levy local rates to pay for such services, simply because they are not British subjects or nationals! In the City of Wollongong, therefore, with approximately 30% of its population born overseas, a significant section of the population is unrepresented and furthermore, there are substantial differences between wards in the effect of this factor on voting. In Ward 4, for example, about one in four of the adult population is disenfranchised on this ground - even though, it may be argued that this has not had a great deal of impact upon the actual outcome of the election, as the Labour Party, the party such people usually support when naturalised, is still elected. In other words, if allowed to vote, migrant ratepayers would not change the outcome in Wards 1, 3 and 5, although they may have some minor impact on the outcome in Ward 2 - the ward that usually decides the control of the Council. Some notion of the magnitude of this effect can be obtained from Table 2.4.
TABLE 2.3 - AGE COMPOSITION OF THE WARDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Population 0-14 yrs. (%)</th>
<th>Population 15-65 yrs. (%)</th>
<th>Population 65+ yrs. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>27.26</td>
<td>63.85</td>
<td>8.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>29.48</td>
<td>65.66</td>
<td>4.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>22.54</td>
<td>68.98</td>
<td>8.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>31.32</td>
<td>64.56</td>
<td>4.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>35.70</td>
<td>60.96</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>29.60</td>
<td>64.69</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1971 Commonwealth Census

TABLE 2.4 - NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward (a)</th>
<th>Eligible Voters (b)</th>
<th>Popn. 14+ in 1971 (%) (c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>18,465</td>
<td>99.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>19,510</td>
<td>90.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18,508</td>
<td>81.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>17,949</td>
<td>75.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>25,522</td>
<td>111.95¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>99,954</td>
<td>90.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (b) Wollongong City Council Electoral Roll, 1974
(c) 1971 Commonwealth Census

* Eligible voters as at 21st September, 1974, while population 14+ was at the 30th June, 1971

1. Figure of little use, due to the rapid population growth in this ward.
POLLING PROCEDURES

Voters were able to cast a ballot, by attending a polling booth located in their ward of residence between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. For those people who were unable to attend a polling booth on the day of the election, postal or absentee votes could be cast. Votes could also be cast at post offices outside their ward of residence prior to the election. Because these two forms of voting accounted for only 1.29% of the total votes cast throughout the City in this election, however, they will therefore be excluded from all subsequent analyses.

In addition, electors unable to vote within their ward on the day of the election were able to cast their ballot at selected booths in other wards on the day of the election. These booths were located in central positions, usually in the larger shopping areas. Again, because such votes accounted for only 0.95% of the total votes cast, they too have been removed from the study.

Overall then, 97.76% of the total votes cast in this election were cast at one of the 65 polling booths distributed throughout the 5 wards (see Figure 2.2). (The booth names are contained in Appendix A). Because voting is optional, the number of electors who actually voted was substantially less than those eligible to vote. Overall, in fact, only about one in three of eligible voters turned out to elect a new Council, and this proportion was fairly constant across the wards (Table 2.5).
### TABLE 2.5 - VOTER TURNOUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Votes Cast (a)</th>
<th>Formal Votes (b)</th>
<th>Eligible Voters (c)</th>
<th>Turnout (a/c) %</th>
<th>Formal Voter Turnout (b/c) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,948</td>
<td>6,790</td>
<td>18,465</td>
<td>37.63</td>
<td>36.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,023</td>
<td>6,770</td>
<td>19,510</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>34.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,294</td>
<td>6,080</td>
<td>18,508</td>
<td>34.01</td>
<td>32.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,402</td>
<td>5,075</td>
<td>17,949</td>
<td>30.10</td>
<td>28.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8,712</td>
<td>8,482</td>
<td>25,522</td>
<td>34.14</td>
<td>33.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>34,379</td>
<td>33,197</td>
<td>99,954</td>
<td>34.39</td>
<td>33.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (a) and (b) Wollongong City Council Returning Officer  
(c) Wollongong City Council, Electoral Rolls, 1974

As would be expected from a knowledge of the characteristics of the population residing within the wards, Ward 4 (a Labour stronghold) had the lowest level of voter turnout, while Wards 3 and 5 displayed, virtually, the City-wide average levels of turnout. The keen competition between candidates in the key ward, Ward 2, probably accounted for the well above average turnout figure (36.00%). The highest turnout of electors occurred in Ward 1 (37.63%) probably because of the major issues affecting this ward specifically. These issues will be discussed in the following section.

### THE ISSUES

Basically, this election did not differ significantly from most other Local Government elections. Most candidates stressed the parochial 'bread and butter' issues such as the need to provide curbs and guttering, to improve road surfacing and road maintenance, etc.

However, one ward did have an issue of note. In Ward 1, three
candidates campaigned as "Environmentalists" on a platform containing such 'planks' as the establishment of an Illawarra Regional Park, but most particularly in opposition to the proposal, by the owners of the Coalcliff Colliery, to establish a huge coal dump at Madden's Plains on the escarpment (Figure 2.1). At this time there was considerable adverse reaction to the proposal in the community, the Environmentalist candidates attempted to capitalise on this, and on the likelihood that residents in this ward would be more responsive than people in other wards to any threats to the environment in view of their close proximity to both forested scarplands and beaches.

More generally, City wide publicity was given to the sitting Labour dominated Council's supposed mismanagement of funds, an issue which reached the front page of the local newspaper on a number of occasions. Perhaps because of this issue, but more probably simply as the outcome of a growing discontent with the prevailing standard of financial management, a Ratepayer's Association had been formed (though with only a handful of supporters) to act as a 'watchdog' for ratepayers. This group received much publicity in the media and its viewpoints were, as may be expected, against the Labour administration.

Overriding these issues was the steadily growing dissatisfaction of the Australian community with the Federal Labour Government. Throughout 1974 inflation was on the increase and the number of strikes by unions was at a higher level than ever before in the history of Australia. While the Wollongong area is normally a blue ribbon Labour area (see Table 2.6 Column 1 for a ward breakdown of State and Federal preferences), any marked dissatisfaction with the Federal Labour Government among voters could easily create some difficulties for the Labour dominated Council, for at a ward level support for the party was far less uniformly high than that evidenced in State and Federal elections held in this area.
TABLE 2.6 - WARD VOTING PREFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>State &amp; Federal Preference (a)</th>
<th>Local Government Preference*(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Very safe Labour throughout</td>
<td>Safe Labour throughout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Safe Labour</td>
<td>Marginally Liberal Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Marginal to safe Labour</td>
<td>Very safe Liberal Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Very safe Labour</td>
<td>Very safe Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Marginal in the north, to safe Labour</td>
<td>Very safe Liberal Independent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: a) Electoral Returns, since 1968  
   b) Council Electoral Returns since 1968  
* Under the present electoral system (preferential)  

Traditionally the control of the Council is decided in Ward 2, thus even a comparatively small anti-Labour movement could present difficulties for the Labour incumbents in this Ward.

THE CANDIDATES

General

At stake in this triennial election were 15 positions as Alderman on the Wollongong City Council, three Aldermen to be elected in each of the 5 wards. Overall, 49 candidates contested the election, distributed by ward, as shown in Table 2.7. Of these, 14 were official Labour Party nominees, 16 were what might be described as 'true' independents, three were Environmentalists (in Ward 1) while a further 16 so-called 'independent' candidates took a distinctive anti-Labour approach to the election. These 16 will be termed the Liberal-Independents, both for ease of distinction between candidates and also because their 'independence' was doubtful. Support for this distinction can be
### TABLE 2.7 - NUMBER OF CANDIDATES IN EACH WARD, BY PARTY*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Liberal Independent</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>14 (8)</td>
<td>16 (7)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49 (15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labour Party Officials and Local Newspaper

* Figures in brackets represent the number of candidates on the previous Council.

Drawn from a number of sources, but it is particularly important to note that a supposedly educational 'school' for intending Aldermen was conducted for them without any Labour Party nominees invited, and from this 'school' came a document entitled the 'Non Party Policy for a Progressive Wollongong'. In other words, this 'school' was, in reality, a meeting at which the main item on the agenda was the formulation of a policy for the Liberal-Independents. This view received further support from a claim by one Alderman, formerly aligned with members of this group, that the Liberal-Independents had formed a 'party' (Illawarra Daily Mercury, 28/8/74). Additionally, two members of this group admitted membership of the Liberal Party.

1. One candidate, R. Law contested the 1973 N.S.W. State Government seat of Corrimal as a Liberal candidate. The other candidate, R.W.J.R. James, made no secret of his party affiliations, and even had Liberal Party members manning polling booths for him.
'Tickets'

As three candidates were to be elected from each ward, and because under the preferential system in such elections it is unusual for one candidate to gain an absolute majority of the primary poll, it has become customary for candidates sharing similar party allegiances or views, to organise themselves into 'tickets' of two, three, or even four candidates. In order to increase their chances of election these candidates exchange preferences with one another. This exchanging of preferences needs some explanation because, by exchanging preferences this may allow candidates to concentrate their efforts in a particular area of a ward and gain more votes in that area yet also gain the benefit from other candidates on the ticket doing the same elsewhere in the ward, as can be seen from the following example.

Firstly, assume each candidate distributes election material with himself number 1 preference and his 'running mates' as numbers 2 and 3. Assume that the outcome of the election is as follows (Table 2.8) and that candidates A, B and C are aligned in the 1-2-3 fashion outlined above. The first candidate to be eliminated is A, and his second preferences go to B. If there is a preference flow on of 80% from A to B, then after this distribution B will have 57 votes, C will have 60 votes and D (if he gains the remainder of the votes of A) 84 votes. Candidate B now has the least number of votes and when he is eliminated 80% (or 46) of his votes go to C, while 20% (or 11) votes go to D. Thus C has 106 votes and D has 95 votes. Candidate C is elected and his second preferences go to A. The above process will start again and thus, eventually, B will be elected with 105 votes, and with his third preferences, along with the third preferences of C, A will be elected with 101 votes. Thus, three candidates will be elected with 60.20% of
the primary vote, virtually using the same votes three times! Such a system is unfair to the electors voting for the non-elected candidate, in this case, as they are left virtually unrepresented! (see Sawer, 1973, p. 65-67 for a more detailed discussion).

This example indicates a sound rationale for the ticketing of candidates. In this election therefore, the two major parties in each ward (Table 2.7) each offered a ticket to the electors. In Wards 1 and 5, three tickets were offered - Labour, Liberal-Independent, an Environmentalist ticket in Ward 1, and in Ward 5 a ticket of the self named 'Truly Independent' candidates.

Candidates

Local government politics may serve as a 'breeding ground' for potential professional politicians, especially in this area (former Federal Minister for Minerals and Energy, R.F.X. Connor, and N.S.W. State Speaker, L.B. Kelly, both contested Council elections before their entry into higher levels of government). Equally, it provides an opportunity for certain categories of individuals, some with clear vested interests in the community, to involve themselves for 'the good of the community'. However, to be successful an individual generally
needs to become well known to the electors and in this community (as in most other places), this is most readily achieved by active involvement in community groups, for example, through business contacts, membership of service and social clubs, and the like, or perhaps through repeated election attempts.

Of the candidates presenting themselves in this election approximately 24% (N = 12) were sitting Aldermen, a further 6% (3) had been candidates at a previous election (only one had previously been successful - Ford - who was Mayor (1968-1971)), while a further 6% (3) had been candidates for election at a higher level of government. A further 20% (10) were known within their wards due to ethnic, business and sporting links with the community. Thus just over 57% (28) of the candidates had achieved a greater than usual exposure to electors. Interestingly, however, this was much less common for Labour than for Liberal-Independent candidates (over half were Liberal-Independent candidates).

The Labour candidates were comparatively unknown because it appears to be against Labour policy in this City to let their candidates become 'personalities' in their own right and to campaign as such. Thus Labour candidates are strongly party-vote dependent. This situation is quite different for the Liberal Independents who attempt to make themselves well known, not specifically as a group but as individuals and 'personalities'. Such a situation would appear to have some interesting electoral implications. The Labour candidates appear to have a 'ceiling' to their vote because of their party identification, while the Liberal-Independent candidates (although influenced to a degree by their apparent party allegiance) have a much higher voting support ceiling because of their emphasis on 'personalities'. This apparent difference in the maximum vote the two major 'blocs' may achieve has important ramifications.
under the preferential system because a well known candidate may 'carry' other members of his ticket into office (even though the minor candidates may only have a handful of votes between them!).

**ELECTIONEERING**

Local Government election campaigns are usually run on restricted budgets, although there is, as yet, no legal limit to campaign expenditure. Candidates are expected to be largely responsible for their own fund raising and campaigning. Due to the overall low level of funds candidates have, and because of the Ward scale of the election, mass media are less likely to be used than the more localised, personal methods of voter-candidate communication such as doorknocking.

In this election, so far as can be ascertained, this seems to be the case - if information supplied through a questionnaire(Appendix B) by 14 of the candidates can be accepted as representative of all candidates. A check of newspapers at the time, and discussion with Radio and T.V. stations, however, does support this view (for the majority of candidates) i.e. capital intensive methods were not as important as the more personal communication methods.

The data summarised in Table 2.9 were derived from candidate responses to a check list of methods of publicising themselves ranked in decreasing order of importance.

From Column 1 it can be seen that only 15.39% of candidates saw mass media advertising as being important. A further 43.60% of responding candidates saw the face-to-face communication methods as being very important. Column 2 displays the total ranking of the candidates. The mass media electioneering methods are used by 24.19% of candidates. Face-to-face communication was used by 45.16% of all candidates and when this percentage is compared with Column 1 (43.58%) the earlier conclusion is again supported
### TABLE 2.9 - ELECTIONEERING METHODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>% of Candidates Using this Method (Any Ranking) (2)</th>
<th>% of Candidates Ranking methods 1, 2 or 3 (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio &amp; T.V.</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>16.13</td>
<td>10.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handouts/Letterboxing</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doorknocking</td>
<td>16.13</td>
<td>23.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Addresses</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Meetings</td>
<td>16.13</td>
<td>10.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work visits</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends Doorknocking</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasting from a Car</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Preferences</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data

i.e. this method is perhaps the most important, and the cheapest.

The local newspaper offered candidates free space, between 3½ and 5 weeks before the election, to outline their 10 top priorities, if they were elected. A number of candidates took advantage of this opportunity.

The local Labour Party runs and co-ordinates a City-wide party campaign and provides 'how-to-vote' cards to be distributed at booths for their candidates. Liberal-Independent candidates, on the other hand, all claim to use only their own financial resources for campaigning. Some doubt may be cast upon this generalisation, however, for the Liberal-Independents campaign in Wards 3, 4 and especially Ward 5, must have required comparatively large amounts of money. From the available
information, it would appear that at least $1,000 was spent in each of
Wards 3 and 4, while anything up to $1,500 may have been spent in Ward 5,
by the Liberal-Independent candidates. Leading Liberal-Independents in
these wards refused to answer the questionnaire, which is not surprising
when their probable campaign expenses are taken into account. Most of the
candidates who answered the questionnaire indicated that their campaign
expenses were between $150 and $400.

Wards 3, 4 and 5 had the greatest differentials in publicity between
the two major parties. In these wards, the Liberal-Independents may have
invested anything up to twice as much time and money in campaigning as
the Labour Party candidates.

Through their large amounts of advertising, the Liberal-Independents
publicised the slogan "Keep Party Politics out of Local Government",
particularly through the mass media. In addition to this emphasis of
the campaign, these candidates also publicised their 'personality'
candidates, while Labour publicised the Party.

In all, the Liberal-Independents' campaign was much more effectively
run than that of the Labour Party, due in large part to the differing
budgets for the campaigns. In addition, however, the Labour Party lost
its Campaign Director during the campaign and there was a significant
time lag before an efficient replacement was appointed and fully functional.

2. Working on the basis that these candidates provided at least two
pamphlets for every elector (without how-to-vote cards at booths)
within their wards then, from Table 2.4, pamphlets required in
Wards 3, 4 and 5 number 37,000; 36,000 and 51,000 respectively.
At the time, pamphlets cost at least $120 for 5,000. Thus the cost
for pamphlets alone came to $888, $864 and $1,224 - and these figures
do not include how-to-vote cards, posters, mass media advertising,
hired help or other miscellaneous items! Thus, these estimates are
conservative estimates!
THE RESULTS

Labour Party control of the Council was relinquished as a result of the election, for the Liberal-Independents gained 3 representatives in Ward 2, Ward 3 and Ward 5, while Labour had a clear sweep in Wards 1 and 4 (Table 2.10 gives some notion of this, by using first preference votes, although the outcome in all wards was decided by the distribution of preferences).

TABLE 2.10 - THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION, BY WARDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Liberal-Independent (%)</th>
<th>Labour (%)</th>
<th>Third Ticket (%)</th>
<th>Labour Swing\textsuperscript{a} (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>36.08</td>
<td>47.01</td>
<td>14.99</td>
<td>-19.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>52.10</td>
<td>45.47</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>58.73</td>
<td>20.33</td>
<td></td>
<td>-36.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>34.56</td>
<td>54.90</td>
<td></td>
<td>-14.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>57.13</td>
<td>27.32</td>
<td>12.76</td>
<td>-26.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>48.64</td>
<td>37.98</td>
<td></td>
<td>-17.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wollongong City Council Election Returning Officer

a. Labour swing is defined as:

\[
\text{Labour Swing} = \left( \frac{1974 \text{ Performance} - 1971 \text{ Performance}}{1971 \text{ Performance}} \right) \times 100
\]

As suggested earlier, and as freely tipped before the election, control of the Council was determined by the results in Ward 2. Because of the preferential system, one complete 'ticket' was elected from each ward. The largest swings against the Labour Party occurred in Wards 3 and 5, where the campaign expenditure differentials were greatest, and where Liberal-Independent 'personalities' were standing. The swing against Labour is, however, overstated in Ward 5 and even more so in Ward 1, for
in these wards the influence of the third ticket was an important determinant. The only real consolation for the Labour Party from this election was its increased share of votes in the all important Ward 2. This result suggests that the control of the Council, after the next election, may well be back to the Labour Party.

The surprise performance in the election belonged to the Environmentalists in Ward 1. This group polled 14.99% of formal votes cast in this ward, and was responsible for a sizeable swing against both 'parties' in this ward. This intervention of the third ticket resulted in this ward having the highest voter turnout in the City!

As for the defeat of the Labour Party and the swing against it there may have been a number of causal factors involved. Factors that may have influenced the outcome included the Federal dissatisfaction with the Labour Party, a more effective campaign by the Liberal-Independents, the influence of the third ticket, as well as the more appealing Liberal Independent candidates. It is difficult to isolate any factor as being the most important, as the factors appear to have operated together.

CONCLUSION

This brief, but important, survey has attempted to provide an adequate 'behind the scenes' view of the election, so that some sense can be made of the analyses of actual voting behaviour which follow. Of particular importance to the understanding of the remainder of the study would seem to be:

3. This situation could only occur under the preferential system, whereby the Labour Party (although increasing its proportion of the vote) lost its 2 Aldermen in Ward 2!
a. the internal variance within wards with respect to various social and demographic characteristics.

b. the effect of the preferential system resulting in candidates organising themselves into tickets, and thus being able to concentrate their efforts in certain areas within a ward.

c. the Labour Party's stress on party voting, and the Liberal-Independents' emphasis on 'Non Party Politics', as well as personality candidates.

d. the importance of the personality candidates, and the manner in which they may 'carry' other candidates.

e. the major methods of electioneering used i.e. primarily face-to-face communication.

With these points in mind it is now appropriate to initiate more probing and detailed analyses by searching for order in the overall pattern of votes cast for the major 'parties' in this election.
INTRODUCTION

It has been previously suggested (Figure 1.1) that an individual's voting decision is likely to be influenced by the variables summarily categorised as the 'socio-economic context' and the 'formative socio-economic context'. At the aggregate level it is probable, therefore, that there will be a fairly clear cut association between the social structure of a population and the level of support given to a particular political party or candidate. Because of the variety of factors previously identified as being related to the voting decision, however, it is not to be anticipated that the socio-economic variables alone will account for all (or even a large portion) of the place to place variation in voting patterns. Nevertheless, as a first step in the analysis of the voting response surface, it is important to determine the strength of such an association.

The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to describe and analyse the pattern of voting in the 1974 Wollongong City Council Election and in particular to examine the relationship between the pattern of socio-economic variation and the place to place variations in the voting support for parties. Initially this will entail the delineation of 'groups of common interest' that is, 'those groups of individuals that vote in accordance with what they perceive to be their best interests' (Prescott, 1972, p. 88). Variables indicative of such groups and the strength of their presence in areas will then be entered (as the independent variables) in a multiple correlation and regression analysis, along with measures of voting behaviour (the dependent variable). The amount and distribution of the unexplained portion of
Fig 3:1
THE STUDY AREA.
the response surface, as revealed by residuals from the regression, will then be reviewed.

In all analyses the dependent variable, the strength of 'party' preferences, will be derived from the total first preference vote cast for each 'party' at each booth included in the study area (see Appendix C, for these booths)\(^1\) (Figure 3.1).

**THE PATTERN OF FIRST PREFERENCE VOTING**

Figures 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrate the pattern of the intra city variation in the strength of the electoral support for each 'party', as indicated by the first preference votes. Broadly speaking, the patterns reflect the social pattern of the City. The highest Labour proportions are achieved in the Berkeley-Warrawong-Port Kembla areas immediately north of the Lake, and the East Corrimal-Bellambi-Woonona areas to the north. As might be expected the highest Liberal Independent proportions (as evidenced by the 70% isopleth, and the 60% isopleth in its northern reaches) coincide with areas of highest land values and social status rankings, in the elevated foothill areas of Mount Pleasant-Mount Ousley-Mount Keira and in West Wollongong-Mangerton and Figtree.

At the outset then, a well marked socio-economic context effect would appear to underlie the pattern of electoral preferences.

**BOOTH DATA VERSUS AREA DATA**

Before suggesting specific 'explanatory' variables, however, a significant methodological problem requires resolution, namely the reconciliation of voting data - for booths - with socio-economic data.

---

1. Only first preference votes will be employed in the analysis because it is the only vote with a spatial distribution. Other preference votes (from second to N) are not available at the booth level.
Fig 3.2
VOTING SUPPORT: LIBERAL-INDEPENDENTS(%)
Fig 3.3
VOTING SUPPORT: LABOUR (\%)

[Map showing voting support percentages in various locations, including Dapto, Bellambi, Figtree, Woonona, Illawarra Lake, Port Kembla, and other areas]
relating to areas. The essence of the problem can be more precisely stated as follows: given that voters are able to vote anywhere within the City, to what extent can the votes cast at any given booth be attributed to the population residing near that booth; that is, when voting, do sufficient electors cast their ballot at the polling place nearest their place of residence, for it to be analytically valid to attempt to relate voting behaviour at the booth, to the social composition of the population living in close proximity to the booth?

This problem is not new in electoral geography. Lewis (1965), for example, overcame a similar problem by superimposing maps of the differing distributions upon one another. However, Lewis was mainly interested in the coincidence between the variables and thus this method, while it does show areas of correspondence between variables, does not allow the exact correspondence of the phenomena to be statistically analysed. More recent studies (for example Johnston (1972, 1973), Forrest and Johnston (1973)) have attempted to surmount the problem simply by assuming that electors do in fact vote at the polling booth nearest their home, though in the absence of any clarification in these studies it is impossible to ascertain exactly how they operationalised the assumption - is 'nearest' in terms of airline distance, road distance, or the actual time taken for the 'journey to vote'? More importantly, though, there has been no empirical testing to determine the validity of the assumption that people vote at the booth nearest their place of residence.

Obviously such an assumption can be justified on an a priori basis on many grounds - in terms of 'mental maps', in that individuals are more aware of their local environment (Horton and Reynolds, 1969, p.38-39), on least effort principles, etc., the inference being then that physical distance between points is an important determinant of behaviour patterns.
Yet when, as was the case in this election, a vote can be cast anywhere within the City, it cannot safely be assumed that voters will behave in this way. There may in fact be a substantial leakage of voters to other booths, because voting is likely not to be a single purpose trip, but rather combined with shopping, recreational or even social activities (given the lengthy period during which the polls are open), for example, in association with Saturday morning shopping, afternoon sporting visits, or perhaps evening social visits (to the public bar, club, movies, or friends), few of which need be located in close proximity to the voter's place of residence.

For this reason, rather than proceeding on the assumption that booth responses can be related to the population residing in close proximity to them, it is necessary to attempt to test empirically its validity.

Ideally such a procedure might involve the examination of addresses of electors voting at each booth, in a particular election, as revealed by the check list electoral rolls compiled by booth officials on polling day. Unfortunately, these rolls were destroyed three months after the election. As a substitute, permission was granted for access to the rolls from a sample of polling booths used in the New South Wales State Parliamentary Elections of 1976, but delay in making these data available (at the time of writing, some months after agreement in principle to grant permission to view, the State Electoral Officer had still not determined how or where the rolls could be examined) made such an attempt impossible.

As a result, it was decided to survey residents in two areas of the City. Accordingly a questionnaire (Appendix D) was distributed to a random sample of 110 households around two polling booths. (Booth 10 in Ward 1, Woonona Public School and Booth 53, in Ward 5, Hayes Park
Public School). The results of the questionnaire are contained in Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Booth</th>
<th>Households Voting at this Booth (%)</th>
<th>Households Voting at next closest booth (%)</th>
<th>Households Voting Elsewhere (%)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>90.63</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>88.52</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>89.60</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data

These results lend some credence to the assumption that electors vote at the polling booth nearest their home, though they are far from being conclusive evidence of a City wide tendency to vote in the assumed way. In default of any more substantial local evidence or evidence from other electoral studies, however, it must suffice. In passing, however, it might be noted that this does appear to be a surprisingly important weakness in the literature on electoral behaviour, and one that deserves further attention.

As more extensive testing may be feasible using official data, it would seem reasonable to suggest that future studies attempting to relate voting behaviour to the ecological characteristics of an area should first attempt to demonstrate that the two data systems are directly compatible.

Accepting for the moment that booth results are generally attributable to the electoral behaviour of populations about them, it becomes necessary to allocate Census Collectors' Districts (C.D.'s) to polling booths. In this study the following procedure was employed. Firstly, the centre
of population for each C.D., or part thereof, was determined with the use of a Wollongong City Council map of building allotments in the City. Road distance between the centre of population and the polling booths in the area was measured. C.D.'s, or parts thereof, were then allocated to the booth separated from it by the shortest road distance. In this way each polling booth then became the 'centre' of a 'vote-shed' for which aggregate characteristics were defined by the aggregation of census data from the 1971 Census of Population and Housing (unpublished).

GROUPS OF COMMON INTEREST - THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

**Occupation**

It is well documented (Reynolds and Archer, 1969, p. 16) that occupation is the most objective correlate of the subjective idea of social class. Occupations most representative of a left-wing vote are concerned with heavy industry, particularly mining and manufacturing (Roberts and Rumage, 1965, p. 168). As mining and manufacturing account for almost 48% of the workforce in the City, it is reasonable to assume that this large component of the workforce will provide a significant support base for the Labour Party. It is logical then to hypothesise that the proportion of the first preference votes polled by Labour (Liberal-Independent) at any booth, will vary directly ( inversely) with the proportion of the workforce in the 'vote shed' involved in manufacturing and mining \( (X_1) \).

**Status**

Status is a multi-faceted variable reflecting not only occupation but also such attributes as education and income. To avoid the difficulties that would result from the separate use of each of these highly inter-correlated variables, factor scores for each C.D. on the dimension 'Low Socio-economic Status' were derived from a factorial
ecology of Wollongong (Robinson, 1974) and averaged over the 'feeder' area for each booth, to produce a second, more general measure of socio-economic status. It is hypothesised that the proportion of the total first preference vote polled at each booth by Labour (Liberal-Independent) will vary directly (inversely) with the magnitude of the factor scores, \( X_2 \).

**Age**

There is a great deal of support for the suggestion that the aggregate pattern of voting is influenced by the age and sex structure of a population (Roberts and Rumage (1965), Cox (1968), Reynolds and Archer (1969), Forward (1976)). Roberts and Rumage (1965), for example, demonstrated that the Labour vote was negatively related to the proportion of the population aged 65 years and over. Such a suggestion is based on evidence presented by a number of researchers (Lane (1965), Butler and Stokes (1971)) that with increasing age, people tend to become increasingly more inflexible in their attitudes and therefore are likely to favour a conservative party.

While this general relationship between age and voting is not in question in the Wollongong area, it seems more reasonable to argue that rather than voting conservative, old people are more likely to support the Labour Party. The aged, here, are more likely to have had a long period of involvement in the mining and manufacturing industries, especially during times when relations between the management and labour were worse than the present. Thus the tendency for increasing attitudinal inflexibility in the Wollongong area is likely to be manifested in the aged continuing their traditional pattern of political allegiance towards the Labour Party. It is therefore hypothesised that the Labour (Liberal-Independent) vote proportion will be related directly
(inversely) to the ratio of Australian born population aged 60+ years, to the Australian born population aged 15-59 years (as at 30th June, 1971) \(X_3\).

**Housing**

The use of housing related variables in analyses of party preferences has also been suggested by several researchers. Variables used have included persons living in non private households (Roberts and Rumage, 1965) as an indication of a left wing vote, the percentage of owner occupied dwellings as a measure of right wing voting strength (McPhail, 1970) and the percent of deteriorated dwelling units (McPhail, 1970). Obviously these variables are not unrelated to socio-economic status, but in an exploratory study of this kind, particularly one concerned with Local Government elections, where home ownership and ratepaying are likely to be more important in influencing voting behaviour than in a State or Federal election, it seems reasonable to include some indicator of this sort in the analysis.

In this study, therefore, it is hypothesised that in areas with a high percentage of the total private dwellings owner occupied \(X_4\) there will be a correspondingly high voting support for the Liberal-Independents, or a low level of support for the Labour Party.

Home ownership alone would not seem to exhaust the total contribution of the housing variables. In most cities, recently developed areas of private housing are often deficient in the provision of basic facilities and services, and such issues often loom large in Local Government elections. Given that the outgoing Council was Labour controlled, therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that such areas, regardless of their status, occupational, educational or age characteristics, would be particularly likely to vote against the Labour Party, possibly in favour of the Liberal-Independents. It is therefore hypothesised
that in those areas where a high percentage of the total dwelling stock was built during the period 1966-1971 \((X_5)\) there will be a correspondingly high level of voting support for the Liberal-Independents or a low level of support for the Labour Party.

**THE ECOLOGY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE**

Table 3.2 contains the zero order product moment correlation coefficients between booth levels of support for the two major 'parties' and the ecological variables previously hypothesised as having some potential 'explanatory' value. (The relevant data for these calculations are contained in Appendix E).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Y(_{Li})</th>
<th>X(_1)</th>
<th>X(_2)</th>
<th>X(_3)</th>
<th>X(_4)</th>
<th>X(_5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y(_{Li}) - The Lib-Ind. Vote</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-0.601</td>
<td>-0.515</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X(_1) Mfg/Min. Employ't</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>-0.193</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X(_2) Low S-E. Status</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X(_3) Age Ratio</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.502</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X(_4) Home Ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X(_5) New Dwellings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y(_L) The Labour Vote</td>
<td>-0.762</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>-0.251</td>
<td>-0.338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \(p \leq 0.10\)

** \(p \leq 0.05\)

*** \(p \leq 0.01\)
The most notable feature of the table is the significance of the occupation ($X_1$) and status ($X_2$) variables. Although it may have been argued that the two variables are very similar, the low and non-significant relationship between them ($r = .210$) does not support such an argument.

Except for the correlation between the Labour vote and the old age ratio, the directions of the correlations were as hypothesised, although the variables were significant at different levels. Interestingly enough, the old age variable displayed almost no relationship to the Labour vote, although its negative association with the Liberal-Independent vote was as expected. This would appear to suggest that as the number of older and retired people in an area increased there was a decreasing tendency to support the Liberal-Independents but no tendency to vote Labour. Conceivably these people may have voted for some other ticket, or candidates, but such a conclusion cannot be derived from this kind of analysis. However, such a result could indicate that as the number of younger adults in an area increases, so does the Liberal-Independent vote. This suggestion is given further weight when the negative correlation between age and new housing development ($r = -.502$) is taken into account, along with the positive correlation between the Liberal-Independent vote and the importance of new housing in an area.

Surprising also was the weak correlation between the Labour vote and home ownership. This is difficult to explain, although the home ownership ethos within Australia may be related here.

**MULTIPLE CORRELATION AND REGRESSION**

As with the study of many other phenomena of interest to geographers, the pattern of voting is unlikely to be adequately explained by a single factor—for example, socio-economic status—but rather can be expected to vary in response to the combined effects of a number of variables.
In an attempt to determine that combination of independent variables that best accounts for the variations in the dependent variables, the data matrix was subjected to stepwise multiple correlation and regression analysis.

The Liberal-Independent Vote

### Table 3.3 - Summary Table of Stepwise Regression Results: Liberal-Independent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>Increase in $R^2$</th>
<th>Standard Partial Regression Coefficients</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ (Employ't)</td>
<td>.3613</td>
<td>.3613</td>
<td>-.607</td>
<td>29.415***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_3$ (Age)</td>
<td>.5721</td>
<td>.2108</td>
<td>-.446</td>
<td>25.126***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ (Status)</td>
<td>.7105</td>
<td>.1384</td>
<td>-.381</td>
<td>23.901***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from Table 3.3, three variables relating respectively to mining and manufacturing employment, old age and low socio-economic status together were capable of accounting for some 71% of the variation in the votes cast for the Liberal-Independents while the entire equation was significant at the .01 level ($F = 40.903$). The standard partial regression coefficients reveal that in order of importance these variables were mining and manufacturing employment, the old age ratio and finally the measure of low socio-economic status.

When it is considered that the potential sources of error are substantial these results seem to be reasonably pleasing and not all that much worse than that achieved by Roberts & Rumage (1965) when the nature of the areal units being employed is taken into account.

---

2. The analysis was operationalised using the BMD.BMDO2R stepwise regression program on the University of Wollongong Univac 1106 computer.
Fig 3.4

RESIDUALS FROM REGRESSION:
LIBERAL INDEPENDENT.
Residuals from Regression

An examination of the pattern of residuals\(^3\), particularly those with values of greater than ±1.5 standard errors of estimate from the predicted values (Thomas, 1960), suggests, however, that there are other systematically operating factors at work, for it can be seen (Figure 3.4) that the Liberal-Independent vote is substantially over predicted at polling booths north of Wombarra (in the north of Ward 1) and in the Berkeley area (just north of the Lake), while the vote was significantly underpredicted at booths in the more central part of the urbanised area, in Corrimal and Tarrawanna (Ward 2).

Supplementary to these clusterings of the larger residuals, there are also clusterings of smaller negative residuals i.e. the vote is overpredicted, and smaller positive residuals i.e. the vote is underpredicted. For these smaller residuals, the booths north of Woonona (to the south of Ward 1) are all overpredicted, while those between Russell Vale (in the north of Ward 2) and Mount Ousley (on the southern boundary of Ward 2) are basically overpredicted. There is a heavy concentration of underpredicted booths in the central area of Wollongong; south of this, booths are overpredicted while in the Dapto area (in the south of Ward 5) most booths are underpredicted.

---

3. Residual, in this study, refers to standardised residuals where

\[
R_i = \frac{Y_i - Y_{ic}}{S_{yi}}
\]

and

\[R_i = \text{standardised residual}\]
\[Y_i = \text{i th observation on the dependent variable}\]
\[Y_{ic} = \text{Calculated value of the dependent variable for the observation}\]
\[S_{yi} = \text{standard error of the estimate}\]
Surprisingly, the pattern of residual variation shows substantial correspondence with the division of the City into Wards. Ward 1, for example, with 11 booths, has 82% of its values overpredicted; Ward 2, with 11 booths, has 64% of its values overpredicted; Ward 3, with 9 booths has 78% of its values underpredicted; Ward 4, with 14 booths has 57% of its values overpredicted; while Ward 5, with 14 booths, has 79% of its values underpredicted (see Table 3.4).

### TABLE 3.4 - VARIATIONS BETWEEN THE ACTUAL AND PREDICTED VOTE : LIBERAL-INDEPENDENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Values Overpredicted (%)</th>
<th>Values Underpredicted (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>81.82</td>
<td>18.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>63.64</td>
<td>36.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>77.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>57.14</td>
<td>42.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>21.43</td>
<td>78.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48.15</td>
<td>51.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This situation would seem to suggest that further reduction in the sums of squares may most readily be achieved by the inclusion of an additional ecological variable, or variables, known to vary by Ward. At least as, or possibly more likely, however, is the possibility that the pattern of unexplained variance reflects the operation of factors relating to the individual behavioural dimension of the election which have not as yet been considered in the analysis, for example, Key's (1949) 'friends and neighbours' effect. If a similar situation appears in the analysis of the Labour vote, as seems likely to be the case given the general similarity of the zero order correlations, this would seem to demonstrate a clear necessity to
Fig 3.5
RESIDUALS FROM REGRESSION:
LABOUR

- > 1.5 Se
- 1 to 1.5 Se
- 0.5 to 1 Se
- 0 to 0.5 Se
- 0 to -0.5 Se
- 0.5 to -1 Se
- 1 to -1.5 Se
- < 1.5 Se

Stanwell Park
Wombarra
Wollongong
Figtree
Cringila
Dapto
Wontona
Bega
Ballaclava
Bellambi
Balgownie
Escarpment
Wollongong Lagoon
Illawarra Lake

0 2 4
kms
change both the scale of the analysis - from City to Ward - and its orientation - from aggregate to individual or small group.

The Labour Vote

When Labour's proportion of the total first preference vote polled at each booth is substituted in the regression analysis, results substantially identical with those for the Liberal-Independent vote, though with directions of association reversed, appear (Table 3.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>Increase in $R^2$</th>
<th>Standard Partial Regression Coefficients</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ (Employ't)</td>
<td>.4961</td>
<td>.4961</td>
<td>.662</td>
<td>51.200***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_5$ (New Dwellings)</td>
<td>.6235</td>
<td>.1274</td>
<td>-.362</td>
<td>17.255***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ (Status)</td>
<td>.6816</td>
<td>.0581</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>9.131***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The entire equation is again significant at the .01 level ($F = 35.685$), but perhaps the most important distinction (between this analysis and that for the Liberal-Independent) lies in the fact that the new dwellings variable enters into the regression before the status variable, suggesting that new-home owners, being the most heavily affected by rate rises and the like were, regardless of their status, less likely to support the Labour candidates.

Residuals from Regression

Larger residuals (greater than ±1.5 standard errors of the estimate) from the regression of the Labour vote on the independent variables, are much more randomly distributed than those for the Liberal-Independent analysis/ Largest residuals occur at Bellambi (to the north of Ward 2), Balgownie (in the south of Ward 2) and Windang (near the mouth of the Lake)
booths, where the vote was underpredicted, while overprediction occurred in the central area of Wollongong, Cringila (near the centre of Ward 4), and in the Dapto area. As in the previous case, however, there is also an apparent Ward to Ward variation (Table 3.6) which strengthens the earlier mentioned suggestion that this may be indicative of the need to move the analysis down a scale (from City to Ward).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Booths Overpredicted (%)</th>
<th>Booths Underpredicted (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>72.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>72.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>88.88</td>
<td>11.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.57</td>
<td>71.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>78.57</td>
<td>21.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>48.15</td>
<td>51.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE THIRD TICKET

Thus far, separate analyses of the voting pattern for the two major 'blocs' have demonstrated merely that a moderately high proportion of the variation in party voting strengths can be accounted for by variables descriptive of employment in mining and manufacturing and low socio-economic status, and that there appears to be a Ward related effect of an as yet unspecified nature. As might be expected, the one analysis is, to a large extent, a mirror image of the other, although the Labour vote seems to be responsive to variations in the age of dwellings while the Liberal-Independent vote seems to be responsive to variations in the age of people, in addition to the two previously mentioned 'common' variables.

Before proceeding to an examination at the Ward level, the influence of the third ticket requires consideration. In particular it would seem
Fig 3.6
EFFECT OF THE ENVIRONMENTALIST TICKET

(A) Lib-Ind Residuals

(B) Labour Residuals
useful to ascertain whether the presence of a third 'party' ticket in Wards 1 and 5 is in any way related to the pattern of residuals from the preceding regressions.

In Ward 1 it might be expected that the effect of Environmentalist candidates (the third ticket) would be responsible for the at times heavy overprediction of the regression at the polling booths in the far north of the Ward. However, it is unlikely that this group caused the general Labour underprediction throughout the entire Ward as well as the general Liberal-Independent overprediction throughout the Ward.

To gain some notion of the effect of the third ticket in this Ward, the residuals from the regression analyses are plotted against the proportion of the total first preference vote obtained at each booth by the Environmentalists. (Figure 3.6).

At any booth where the Environmentalists received over 10% of the vote the Liberal-Independent vote, generally, fell further below the level predicted by the regression, i.e. there is a negative relationship between the two that would seem to indicate that the Environmentalists may have drawn votes away from the Liberal-Independent candidates (Fig. 3.6a).

For the Labour Party, however (see Figure 3.6b), where the Environmentalist vote was below 30% at a booth the Labour vote was also most always overpredicted. Again, then, there is a negative relationship between the residuals and the third ticket's vote, but in this case Labour residuals are still positive at almost all the booths. The difference in the base levels at which the effect of the Environmentalists was felt by the major parties (for the Liberal-Independents, the base level Environmentalist vote was 10%, while for Labour, 30%) suggests that the Liberal-Independent vote was more affected by the intervention of this third group, although it is difficult to determine why this should be so, since in Ward 1 the Environmentalist movement was most
Fig 3.7
EFFECT OF THE THIRD TICKET - WARD 5.

(A)

Labour Residuals

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5

Third ticket vote (%)

(B)

Lib-Ind Residuals

0 0.5 1 1.5

Third ticket vote (%)
heavily identified with the Labour Party, though at election time there was some doubt as to whether the Environmentalist candidates would distribute their preferences to the Labour Party or to the Liberal-Independents. This doubt (although the Environmentalists distributed their preferences to the Labour Party) may have resulted in a number of Liberal-Independent supporters voting for the Environmentalists. However, such an explanation is far from satisfactory.

In the Unanderra area of Ward 5 the third ticket was particularly strongly represented and as a result levels of support for the two major tickets were less than those predicted by the regression equations. Similarly the Labour vote was heavily overpredicted in the Dapto area, and on the surface of things this too may be attributed to the third ticket's performance. But it does not seem likely that vote splitting by the third ticket could, on its own, have been responsible for the Ward wide overprediction of the Labour vote or conversely for the general Ward wide tendency for underprediction of the Liberal-Independent candidates.

When residuals from the two regressions are separately plotted against the proportion of the total first preference vote polled at each booth by the 'Truly Independent Team' (the third ticket) (Figure 3.7), however, it appears that almost anywhere the third ticket polled more than 10% of first preferences the Labour vote was lower than expected (Figure 3.7a). Although a generally negative relationship is evident between the two, the relationship is not particularly close. By contrast the Liberal-Independent vote is almost always underpredicted - irrespective of the third ticket vote (Figure 3.7b), and further, there is a slight tendency for the degree of underprediction to increase with the strength of the third group's vote. In these circumstances, if a single glaringly exceptional booth (nearest a social club where one member of this group
is an important official) can be ignored for the moment, it would seem reasonable to conclude that voters who supported the third ticket were dissatisfied Labour supporters. Such an explanation is consistent with the fact that the majority of preferences from the third ticket went to the Labour Party.

From this brief consideration of the relationship between the voting support for the only significant and clearly identifiable third tickets and the performance of the two major contenders for political power, it seems clear that the appeal of the Environmentalists cut across party lines in the northern areas and drew votes from both parties, though more significantly from the Liberal-Independents, while in the south the third ticket's effect seems to have been mainly experienced by the Labour Party candidates.

In short, in each of Wards 1 and 5 it would seem reasonable to argue that the existence of substantial residuals from the regressions of Labour and Liberal-Independent voting support on variables descriptive of the socio-economic context reflects to a considerable degree the confounding effects of the presence of a third ticket - both the Environmentalists (Ward 1) and the 'Truly Independents' (Ward 5). Elsewhere though, no such single solution appears. The search for explanation must therefore be directed elsewhere.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have been able to demonstrate the existence of a clear socio-economic context influence on the pattern of voting in the 1974 Local Government Elections in the City of Wollongong. Given the difficulties of data aggregation the power of this explanation is satisfyingly high, though by no means outstandingly so. Roberts' and Rumage's (1965) bounded urban area analysis, for example, achieved
coefficients of multiple determination that were only slightly higher $(R^2 = .807)$, while Johnston's (1972) 'party vote' value 'explained' 80% of the voting response surface. In view of the presence of the only locally significant, and therefore disruptive third ticket vote in this area, it does not seem unreasonable to maintain that these results (with $R^2$ equal to approximately .700) are at least comparable in interest and value with those achieved elsewhere.

Overall though, approximately 30% of the variation in the pattern of voting preferences remains unaccounted for. While the effect of a third ticket in two Wards is undoubtedly responsible for some portion of this unexplained variation, however, much more would appear to be attributable to other, Ward-specific factors not capable of being included in a City wide macro scale regression analysis.

Such a situation directs our attention immediately back to the diagram of possibly influential factors upon the voting decision, and in particular to those influences included under the general headings

THE ELECTION

POLITICALLY RELEVANT INFORMATION,

both of which can be expected to be of importance at the level of the Ward which was, after all, the level at which the election actually took place. In short, having identified a general or City wide 'explanatory' element in the socio-economic context, we must home in on the Ward, and on such factors as the flow of politically relevant information, the impact of the individual candidate and on elements of the electoral system itself if we desire to understand finer grained variation in the voting response surface.
CHAPTER FOUR

LOCAL CONTEXT VOTING

INTRODUCTION

In the previous Chapter, the examination of voting preferences against a combination of variables reflecting the socio-economic composition of small areas suggested that a more complete understanding of voting behaviour would appear to require consideration of factors operating at the intra-ward level. At its simplest this could indicate the existence of significant inter-ward variations in socio-economic composition that were not adequately displayed by the variables included in the regression. However, the earlier examination of ward population characteristics has already indicated that there is a fairly high level of internal heterogeneity which would tend to negate such an argument. The search for further explanation must therefore be pursued in other directions.

It will be recalled that at the outset of this study it was hypothesised that the socio-economic context of the voting decision was likely to be only one of many complexly inter-related factors affecting the decision to vote and therefore, in sum, the particular form of the voting response surface. Thus far, though, no particular attention has been given to factors such as the flow of politically relevant information or the particular characteristics of the election itself, for example, its ward based nature. Taken together, in fact, these two points would appear to offer a potentially fruitful approach to the problem of further elucidating the pattern of first preference voting for they demand that attention be focussed upon each ward separately, i.e. upon the five separate and distinctive elections, each with the potential for involving unique
issues, dominant personalities, information sources and party apparatuses with differing levels of effectiveness, differing strategies, tactics and practices and, therefore, with differing possibilities for influencing the outcome of a voting decision.

For these reasons this Chapter will consider the elections as they took place at the ward level, focussing in particular upon a question that has achieved major significance in the recent literature on electoral geography, that is, on the degree to which a local context ('friends and neighbours'/local effect) vote can be identified in the overall pattern of voting.

THE LOCAL CONTEXT VOTE

In 1949 Key described a phenomenon he termed the 'friends and neighbours' vote. The basis for his identification was simply that candidates contesting state offices received very high levels of voting support from within their home county, as well as those counties immediately surrounding the candidate's home county. Other American researchers, for example, McCarty (1960) and Reynolds (1969a,b), have also suggested a home town or county bias in support for some candidates. A more recent study (Johnston, 1974) has introduced a change in nomenclature for the phenomenon, from the more specific and therefore 'process restrictive' 'friends and neighbours' title to the more general 'local effects'. (In this study, the term local context vote will be employed while the occurrence of a local context vote for a candidate will be termed a 'local effect').

Although some researchers have demonstrated a tendency by electors to support local candidates the basic premise of this research, that is, that electors do go to the polls with a local candidate preference, has not seriously been tested, although Stokes and Miller (1962) have
demonstrated that voters are more aware of candidates residing within their immediate local area than they are of those residing elsewhere. Although this information is valuable, awareness, of itself, does not demonstrate that electors will therefore vote for a local candidate even though, for a great variety of reasons ranging from familiarity with, personal knowledge of, or even sheer parochialism (particularly in a Local Government election), they might be expected to do so. The assertions of Johnston (1972, 1973, 1974), Forrest and Johnston (1973) and Reynolds (1969a, b) notwithstanding, however, we have very little detailed empirical support for this expectation. Any study of the so-called local context vote would therefore seem to need to demonstrate that the phenomenon was, in fact, a result of local knowledge.

As suggested by Key (1949), if local context voting exists for a candidate, his voting support should display a locational peaking, generally in areas close to the candidate's homeplace, though other peak support areas may also occur, for example, at booths nearest a candidate's place of work or near some social club or organisation in which the candidate may be well known.

Because of the probable attenuation of knowledge, contacts, etc., with increasing distance it is to be expected that there will also be an attenuation of voting support, that is, a 'distance decay'. Such a suggestion, of course, is in keeping with many studies of human behaviour and social interaction, for example, Boalt and Janson (1957) or the manifold studies of diffusion and migration (see for example, Olsson, 1965, Brown 1968). In Reynolds' (1969a, b) voting model distance was included specifically to represent the impediment to interaction, on the grounds that because communication becomes more difficult as the distance between the communicators increases, so too will the flow
of politically relevant information emanating from a candidate's home area be inhibited.

If these localised webs of communication do exist then, when a person presents himself as a candidate in an election he should expect to obtain a home, work or social place based peak of support, with support decreasing away from this peak due to the decline in the intensity of the communication web with distance.

Not all candidates are likely to generate equally powerful local effects, however, nor can we expect that the form of the distance decay will be identical. Reynolds (1969a,b) and Forrest & Johnston (1973) suggest that local context voting will be more important in the case of candidates seeking office for the first time and in the case of unknown candidates - clearly because such candidates are less likely to have a 'ready made' public image and widespread public appeal, and are thus more likely to be heavily dependent upon personal backing from friends and neighbours, workmates and the like. Where a 'first timer' or 'novice' candidate does have community wide support, however, then, of course, the importance of a strictly 'friends and neighbours' vote is likely to be lessened. It would not seem unreasonable, therefore, to suggest with some degree of confidence that the frequency of exposure and the relative strength of the friends and neighbours vote (within the candidate's response surface) may be inversely related (Reynolds, 1969b, 124).

Areas for Investigation

From this brief review of the literature relating to local context voting several questions emerge as being worthy of detailed examination in this study. If local context voting does exist in the election within each ward of the City of Wollongong, then we might expect to find
(a) peak support for candidates at booths in close proximity to home, work, or social involvement places

(b) a distance decay in voting support away from such peaks

(c) better known candidates and incumbents displaying a broadening in their support base with time

(d) electors displaying and being able to articulate a significant preference for candidates who reside in close proximity to them, rather than those who live elsewhere.

LOCALISATION OF CANDIDATE SUPPORT

The first, most obvious need is to determine whether candidates do in fact gain a local vote. A local effect for a candidate may be discernible at the inter and/or intra party level, that is, while competing against other candidates of different political leanings and also when competing with candidates of the same political party (this latter case being the more common, as previously suggested), or perhaps even at both these levels.

When the major aim is to improve the 'explanation' of the voting response surface (as suggested in the preceding chapter) then the study of the recurrence of local effects should be conducted at the inter party level. However, in a number of cases it is unlikely that a local effect can be discerned separately from the socio-economic context vote of the previous chapter, especially in those cases where the candidate resides in an area dominated by the political views of an opposing party. Another factor compounding this problem concerns the preferential voting system and the resultant 'ticketing' of candidates whereby candidates are able to concentrate their campaign efforts in a small area, yet gain the benefit of their 'running mates'' campaigning elsewhere (through the flow-on of preferences).
Therefore, due to the 'masking' effect of the socio-economic vote, as well as the operation of the preferential system, this study is unable to empiricise the effect of local context voting which would result in the 'explanation' of the voting response surface being increased by X%. This study will, for candidates of the major 'blocs', be conducted mainly at the intra party level. If a local context vote can be discerned either at the intra party (intra ward) level or for the true independent (non-party) candidates in the 'inter party' vote, however, then it would not seem unreasonable to suggest the possibility of the same phenomenon occurring at the inter party level, such that, given the availability of sufficiently sensitive techniques and/or sufficiently detailed data, it could be identified and used to supplement the broader party/socio-economic context vote. This section of the analysis will therefore begin with a consideration of the voting support given to independent and 'third ticket' candidates and proceed to a consideration of the locational aspects of the support given to candidates sharing positions on the same ticket - that is, at the intra 'party', intra ward level.

The True Independents

Because these candidates have no apparent party ties it may be argued that they are likely to obtain their support more or less uniformly throughout the ward. If there is a local effect then, regardless of its origin, it may be expected to be manifest as a significant departure from a uniform support base in the ward, as measured by some significant change in the proportion gained of all votes cast at a booth.

As the conical trend surface analysis employed by Forrest & Johnston (1973) is inappropriate in a ward context the following method has been devised in an attempt to ascertain whether or not such an effect can be discerned. If we assume, ceteris paribus, that at each booth
Fig 4.1
HOME PLACE SUPPORT BIAS - INDEPENDENT

- WARD 3
- Mt Ousley
- Keiraville

% of total vote

0 km

\( A \) Home place (Hough)
in a ward independent candidates polled the same proportion of first preference votes that they gained across the whole ward, then the pattern of departures from this uniform base can be used to determine a $\chi^2$ (chi square) statistic. $\chi^2$ values equal to, or in excess of, the critical level for the appropriate number of degrees of freedom will indicate that the actual distribution of support differs significantly from the uniform. In such cases the pattern of relative departures from this uniform surface (expressed as a percentage deviation, either positive or negative, from the uniform surface) can then be examined in relation to home/work/social involvement locations and should indicate whether or not a local effect is evident.

Initially the analysis will only concentrate on those independents achieving something more than token support as opposed to those who appear not to be 'serious' candidates, for example, three University students standing in different wards, as well as a pensioner residing in a retirement village.

As can be seen in Table 4.1, five independent candidates achieved a significant degree of support (that is, in this case, greater than 5% of the total vote). If the candidates on the third tickets are excluded (as they may have a larger support base than the non ticketed independents), then two candidates remain for consideration, both standing in ward 3 (Hough and Brodie).

When the $\chi^2$ test is applied to Hough's voting support, a $\chi^2$ value of 150.03 is computed indicating a highly significant departure from uniformity. Furthermore, the largest relative deviation from uniformity occurs at the booth closest to the candidate's home place. The importance of this vote can be judged from the fact that this booth accounts for 22.20% of the total vote (see Figure 4.1). In the case of Brodie, the $\chi^2$ value was again significant ($\chi^2 = 26.55$), the largest deviation
TABLE 4.1 VOTING PERFORMANCE OF TRUE INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>% of Ward Votes</th>
<th>$\chi^2$ Value</th>
<th>Basis of Largest Deviation</th>
<th>% of Personal Votes Obtained at Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>C.E. Bruton</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>265.16***</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>20.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.B. Germyn</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>17.47*</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>36.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N. Tonkin</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>891.93***</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>40.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>H. L. White</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>117.96***</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>40.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>N.J. Smith</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>27.94***</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>17.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.L. Johnston</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>42.79***</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>28.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.P. Doyle</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>19.04**</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>26.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H.G. Achaoui</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>18.45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W.A. Hough</td>
<td>8.81</td>
<td>150.03***</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>22.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Brodie</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>26.55***</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>15.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>J.W. Bleeker</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>40.85***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.W.H. Jordan</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>26.11**</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.S. Kirkwood</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>36.97***</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>44.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P. Stratton</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>266.49***</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>64.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Zantiotis</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>678.13**</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>51.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Only those candidates with home/work/social involvement in the ward included.

b. Candidate on the third ticket in the Ward.

* $= p \leq 0.10$

** $= p \leq 0.05$

*** $= p \leq 0.01$
LOCALISED VOTING SUPPORT — Independents

(a) Germyn

(b) White
occurring at the booth nearest the candidate's homeplace, and the votes polled at this booth accounting for 15.56% of the candidate's total voting support in the ward.

Quite clearly a marked local effect in the candidate's voting support is evident. Of the three other candidates gaining a significant level of support (greater than 5%) (that were excluded earlier), all gained a marked local effect, two of which were home based while the third candidate displayed peak voting support at the booth nearest the site of his major social involvement. Overall then, a substantial local effect is evident for the five most significant independent candidates.

Of the 11 less significant independents, 10 had $\chi^2$ values that differed significantly from uniformity. Because of their low levels of voting support, the simplest indication of the significance of a local effect can best be obtained from a consideration of the distribution of actual votes (as compared to the proportion of the total vote obtained at a booth), particularly the percentage of the candidates' own vote obtained at each booth within the ward. (This type of analysis is most appropriate here because if supporters of this candidate are his 'friends and neighbours', as is suggested by the low levels of support, the number of votes received by the candidate will not vary as a proportion of a booth vote, but vary by the actual number of his 'friends and neighbours'). Again, if local effects are evident, and for these candidates it might be expected to find the almost classic friends and neighbours vote, a major portion of the candidate's own vote should be related to his home, work or major social place.

Figure 4.2 is clearly illustrative of the highly localised support base for many of these candidates. However, there are a number of
candidates whose support does not show this pattern. No really convincing argument to account for this situation can be developed. It may be possible however, that these lesser known candidates are not even particularly well known near their residence, or have more dispersed (rather than clustered) contact systems.

This brief examination of the pattern of voting support for the independent candidates who reside, work or socialise within the ward they contested demonstrates the common occurrence of local effects in voting support. Of the 16 candidates in this category, 13 displayed a home place bias in their voting support while only one candidate demonstrated a social place bias in his pattern of voting support. It would therefore seem reasonable to suggest on this basis (slight though it may be) that some further component of explanation for the form of the voting response surface might concern the variable distribution of local effects.

**Within-Party Local Effects**

To determine whether highly localised voting support was characteristic for candidates in terms of their share of the total number of votes polled by their 'party' the \( \chi^2 \) statistic was calculated for each Labour and Liberal Independent candidate, uniformity this time being defined in terms of the candidate's share of the 'party' vote for a ward; that is, if candidate A received, overall, 20% of his party's vote in a ward, then, *ceteris paribus*, it could be expected that he ought to have received 20% of his party's first preference votes at each booth in the ward. If local effects in voting support occur in this context they will be independent of the socio-economic context and should therefore highlight the occurrence of place specific or local effects resulting, for example, from elector 'knowledge' of the candidate. Again, if
Fig 4.3
LOCALISED VOTING SUPPORT—INTRA PARTY.

HOWARD (Ward 2) - Lib Ind

PARKER (Ward 1) - Labour

% of Labour vote

Distance from Residence (kms)
local effects do exist, the major positive deviation from uniformity will be expected to occur at the booth closest to the candidate's home, work or social place.

Table 4.2 indicates that 19 of 26 candidates displayed an intra party pattern of support that differed significantly from the assumed uniformity. Of these, 16 displayed a local effect (Table 4.3), in that highest support could quite definitely be associated with booths near the candidate's home, work or social place.

The pattern of voting support for two of these candidates, Howard (Liberal-Independent, Ward 2) and Parker (Labour, Ward 1), is illustrated in Figure 4.3 and characteristic of the support given other candidates in their respective 'parties'. As the diagram shows, peak support for Howard occurs at the polling booth nearest his workplace (Booth 21) (Howard was the Executive Director of the Illawarra Retirement Trust and his office was located within the Towradgi Park Retirement Village; thus his workplace bias in support can only be accounted for by residents of the Village, and the people of Towradgi generally, supporting him), while his second highest support occurs at the booth nearest his homeplace (Booth 17). Parker, a Labour candidate, received an overwhelming proportion of his party's vote at the four booths nearest his homeplace, while elsewhere he received very little support - a pattern that is replicated by all the Labour candidates in Wards 1, 2 and 5.

Three significant points emerge directly from these data.

(a) the uniformly extreme divergence values of the Labour Party candidates in Wards 1, 2 and 5.

(b) the consistently high divergence values for the Liberal-Independents in Ward 5 and to a lesser extent in Ward 1, and

(c) the heavy concentration of candidates whose distribution of
TABLE 4.2 VOTING SUPPORT FOR THE MAJOR 'PARTY' CANDIDATES\textsuperscript{a} (BY WARD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Ticket</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of own ticket's vote</th>
<th>$X^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cram</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>25.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>233.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>81.44</td>
<td>69.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parker</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>57.17</td>
<td>950.95***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Woodward</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>32.06</td>
<td>1,469.97***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>36.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>65.18</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graham</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>31.69</td>
<td>1,683.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>29.91</td>
<td>1,557.78***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>38.40</td>
<td>1,331.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hall</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>14.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanson</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>3,062</td>
<td>90.73</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tobin (E.W.)</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>13.87*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dezelin</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>90.71</td>
<td>6.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tobin L.J.</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td>13.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>85.63</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>12.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clarke</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>84.66</td>
<td>8.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ffrench</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>17.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wetherall</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>65.94***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Arkell</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>2,885</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>192.41***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairley</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>169.69***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schipp</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>25.77</td>
<td>601.86***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cunningham</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>30.57</td>
<td>1,182.80***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hendriksen</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>36.96</td>
<td>1,157.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sinclair</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>32.47</td>
<td>1,220.87***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} - Only includes those candidates with some basis of contact with the ward, for example, homeplace.

* $= p \leq 0.10$

** $= p \leq 0.05$

*** $= p \leq 0.01$
Fig 4.4
UNIFORMITY OF CANDIDATE PREFERENCE.

1. Hanson
2. Tobin
3. Hall
voting support either did not differ significantly from uniformity, or did differ from uniformity but with no relationship to their home, work or social place (Table 4.3), in Wards 3 and 4 (9 out of 10). This latter situation is exemplified in Figure 4.4 in which it is clear that the level of inter booth variations in voting support for the three Liberal Independent candidates is minimal.

Such marked inter ward variations in the significance of local effects in the intra party vote are clearly suggestive of the operation of ward-specific factors that in Wards 3 and 4 'dampen' the occurrence of apparent local effects and in the remainder, particularly for Labour Party candidates, enhance them. Before attempting to explain such markedly contrasting situations, however, attention must first be directed to that other element of the local effect, namely, the 'distance decay', for it may well be that while the level of departure from uniformity (for the major 'party' candidates in Wards 3 and 4) is not sufficient to achieve 'statistical significance', the overall pattern of support may still possess sufficient regularity in the form of a distance decay to provide further support for the initially hypothesised local effects. Such an analysis may also provide some additional insight into the processes underlying the apparently contrasting patterns of voting support at the local level.

**DISTANCE DECLINE IN VOTING SUPPORT**

If a true local 'information' vote exists then we might expect to find a fall off in support for each candidate with increasing distance between home, work or social place and each particular booth. Accordingly, the proportion of the total vote (for the true independents) and the proportion of the party vote (for candidates within the two major 'blocs') polled at each booth by each candidate was regressed against the road
### TABLE 4.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LARGEST RELATIVE DEVIATIONS FROM UNIFORMITY AND CANDIDATES' HOME, WORK OR SOCIAL PLACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Home Place</th>
<th>Work Place</th>
<th>Social Place</th>
<th>Uniform or no Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour L-I</td>
<td>Labour L-I</td>
<td>Labour L-I</td>
<td>Labour L-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a - only candidates with some contact within the ward included

b - Liberal-Independent
Fig 4.5
GRADIENT EFFECTS - INDEPENDENTS

a) Germyn (Ward 1)

\[
\text{Distance from residence (kms)}
\]

\[
\text{% of total vote}
\]

\[
Y = -72.04X
\]

\[
r = -0.759
\]

b) Zantiotis (Ward 5)

\[
\text{Distance from residence (kms)}
\]

\[
\text{% of total vote}
\]

\[
Y = -53.47X
\]

\[
r = -0.918
\]
distance of the booth from the candidate's home/work/social place.

The True Independents

The results of the analysis for the independent candidates (Table 4.4) indicate that there was a significant fall off in voting support with distance away from their home for eight candidates. In addition, one candidate's support declined away from his social place (where he was an important official). An example of the gradient effect is illustrated in Figure 4.5. A further seven candidates (44%), however, did not display a significant decline in voting support with distance; five of these candidates, however, are in Ward 3 (Table 4.4), that is, in that ward already shown to possess the strongest tendency towards cross-ward uniformity in voting patterns. Such a situation would seem most simply to be explained by the fact that all seven candidates were virtual 'unknowns' before the election. Their voting support may therefore be thought of as the outcome of an almost random voting process. One of these candidates was a pensioner (C.L. Johnston) who resided in a retirement home and received a large part of his support from postal votes (which have been excluded from the analysis); one candidate was an outspoken union official generally opposed to strikes and therefore unlikely to poll significantly in any direction, while the other three were 'concerned citizens' with no particular bases of support. Although no distance decay in the support for the candidates has emerged this may not necessarily indicate that the phenomenon did not occur. Obviously, for some of the least known candidates the scale of the analysis is quite likely to have been too coarse to pick-up a distance decline; that is to say, if it were possible to carry out an analysis at, for example, the city block or C.D. level, different conclusions may have been arrived at. As this 'finer' scale data is
TABLE 4.4 GRADIENT EFFECT REGRESSION ANALYSIS - TRUE INDEPENDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Basis of Decay</th>
<th>'b' coefficient</th>
<th>'r'</th>
<th>a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bruton</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-1.272***</td>
<td>-0.737***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germyn</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.060***</td>
<td>-0.759***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tonkin</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-1.503***</td>
<td>-0.774***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.457</td>
<td>-0.433</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td>-0.357</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johnston</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.280</td>
<td>-0.516</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doyle</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.311</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ackaoui</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.274</td>
<td>-0.287</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hough</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-2.022*</td>
<td>-0.657*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brodie</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bleeker</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>-0.361</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stratton</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.240**</td>
<td>-0.548**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kirkwood</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.132***</td>
<td>-0.724***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keys</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>-2.092***</td>
<td>-0.753***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zantiotis</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-1.449***</td>
<td>-0.918***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.024***</td>
<td>-0.693***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a - Candidates with some contact within the ward
b - For 't' values see appendix F.
* = p ≤ 0.10
** = p ≤ 0.05
*** = p ≤ 0.01
unavailable, it must be concluded, then, that for the true independent (and generally less important candidates) a definite local pole of support was not associated with a particularly well marked fall off in support with increasing distance. Such is likely to be the fate of 'unknowns' unsupported by any 'party machines' with some particular support base. This is supported by the fact that of the nine independents who did display a gradient effect, five were 'third ticket' candidates with a particular support base. (As suggested in Chapter 3 the support for the Ward 1 Environmentalists appeared to be Liberal-Independent type voters, while supports of the Ward 5 third ticket appeared to be dissatisfied Labour supporters).

Labour and Liberal-Independent Candidates

When the socio-economic context of the voting decision is removed (by focussing upon the proportion of a 'party' vote obtained by the major ticketed candidate) a local context vote accompanied by a gradient effect in the voting support may again be expected to occur for, ceteris paribus, the local candidate, that is the candidate living closest to the elector, should be most favoured. Thus when there are several candidates from the one 'party' residing within the ward a series of overlapping and alternating voting 'fields' covering the ward might be expected to occur. (From the point of view of electoral strategy too, it may be suggested that maximum use could be made of this effect by selecting candidates with homes, and probably therefore voting support, as widely separated as possible within the ward.)

When voting support for these candidates is regressed against distance from home/work/social place (Table 4.5), it becomes apparent that 14 candidates display a significant gradient effect in voting support, with all the significant decays occurring away from the candidate's homeplace. An unusual point, though, is the concentration
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Ticket</th>
<th>Basis of Decay</th>
<th>'b' Coefficient&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>'r' &lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cram</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.191</td>
<td>-0.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-1.852</td>
<td>-0.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-4.337***</td>
<td>-0.857***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parker</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-6.194***</td>
<td>-0.740***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Woodward</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-5.874*</td>
<td>-0.585*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Work</td>
<td>-0.203</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-5.340***</td>
<td>-0.824***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graham</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-16.442***</td>
<td>-0.788***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-13.826**</td>
<td>-0.661**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-12.26</td>
<td>-0.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hall</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanson</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>+0.159</td>
<td>+0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tobin (E.W.)</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>+0.459</td>
<td>+0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dezelin</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.477</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tobin (L.J.)</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>+0.500</td>
<td>+0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.846**</td>
<td>-0.604**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>-0.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clarke</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.680</td>
<td>-0.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ffrench</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-0.294</td>
<td>-0.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wetherall</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>-0.706</td>
<td>-0.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Arkell</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-3.420***</td>
<td>-0.926***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairley</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-1.406**</td>
<td>-0.637***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schipp</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-3.858***</td>
<td>-0.944***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cunningham</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-12.968***</td>
<td>-0.838***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hendriksen</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-10.284***</td>
<td>-0.900***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sinclair</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-7.232***</td>
<td>-0.800***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> - Candidates with some contact with the Ward

<sup>b</sup> - for 't' values see Appendix F

* = \( p \leq 0.10 \)

** = \( p \leq 0.05 \)

*** = \( p \leq 0.01 \)
Fig 4.6
INTRA PARTY GRADIENT EFFECTS

a) Ford (Lib-Ind)

\[ y = -0.857x + 100 \]

\[ r = 0.857 \]

b) Cunningham (Labour)

\[ y = -0.838x + 100 \]

\[ r = 0.838 \]
of the significant declines in Wards 1, 2 and 5, while candidates in Wards 3 and 4 display uniform levels of support across the Ward.

These results, then, are similar to those of previous analyses and merely serve to emphasise yet again that there would appear to be factors operating within Wards 3 and 4 that 'dampen' the occurrence of home/work/social place based local effects with declines in voting support away from these points.

When 'r' levels are high and 'b' values are statistically significant, as for example in the case of candidate Ford (Figure 4.6a), the commonly hypothesised process, that is, voting support declines with decreasing proximity to the candidate's homeplace, appears to be appropriate. Such a situation, though it can be considered illustrative and representative of the pattern of voting support for four Liberal-Independents displaying a gradient effect, contrasts with that characteristic of Labour candidates displaying 'step type' effects. As Figure 4.6b shows, such candidates display an unusual clustering of high support booths - always those nearest the candidate's home; elsewhere support levels are uniformly low. As a result, 'b' slope coefficients are much larger in Wards 1, 2 and 5 than those for the Liberal-Independent candidates in these same wards and their 'r' values appear to be marginally lower, indicative of the greater dispersion of values about the regression line. Such a fundamental difference between candidates of the two major 'blocs' in the manifestation of local effects clearly requires further probing.

For the majority of candidates in Wards 3 and 4 there is no suggestion of any systematic variation in the vote with distance. As Figure 4.7 demonstrates (by reference to two candidates: R.T. Hall (Independent Ward 3) and C. J. Clarke (Labour, Ward 4)) no particular pattern is evident and this is very much the case for the majority of 'party' candidates in the wards, although it is
UNIFORMITY OF VOTING SUPPORT—
INTRA PARTY.

a) HALL

\[ Y = 1.62 + 0.013X \]

\[ r = -0.022 \]

\[ b = -0.013 \]

b) CLARKE

\[ Y = 88.44 - 0.68X \]

\[ r = -0.372 \]

\[ b = -0.68 \]
difficult to determine why this should be so. Suffice to say, though, the factor causing this pattern appears to be common to both wards, between each 'party'.

THE LOCAL EFFECT REVIEWED

The initial analysis of peak support for the independent candidates indicated an apparent local effect component to their voting response surfaces, that is, there appeared to be a distance bias to the flow of information in the area nearest either the home/work/social place of the candidate that resulted in a higher proportion of electors in this area being willing to support the 'local boy' than was generally the case in more distant areas. Within 'parties' almost 62% (N=16) of candidates displayed an apparent local effect, further supporting the previous results, but it was particularly noticeable that there was a concentration of candidates in Wards 3 and 4, the majority of whom, for some as yet undefined reason, did not display any apparent local effects. The initial suggestion that a candidate's peak support will occur at the booth/booths nearest his home/work/social place would therefore seem to be generally true, at least in Wards 1, 2 and 5, but other factors would also seem to be involved.

When the distribution of support for the independents was examined, candidates in Wards 1 and 5 displayed gradient effects consistent with a distance related attenuation in the flow of information. Again, however, a number of the minor independents did not display a significant trend, perhaps due to their anonymity and thus they received votes at random in those areas away from their home.

Regression analyses confirmed the views (gained from the previous party analysis) that there was some 'dampener' to the occurrence of local effects in Wards 3 and 4 that resulted in a cross ward uniformity in
party support. In addition the higher 'b' coefficients for the Labour, as against Liberal-Independent candidates in Wards 1, 2 and 5, due to the 'step like' pattern of the Labour candidates support (whereby the candidates gain most of their votes at the booths nearest their home, and very little elsewhere) suggested another systematically operating process, for the Liberal-Independent candidates in these wards displayed a much more gentle decay in support.

In short, then, the results seem to lend some support to the findings of Reynolds (1969 a,b), Johnston (1972, 1973, 1974) and Forrest and Johnston (1973) but clearly the origins of three such contrasting patterns of voting support (uniform, 'step function' and gentle decay) require more detailed attention. Before passing to that task, however, it is necessary to demonstrate that the patterns identified as suggesting a preference for a local candidate can be shown to reflect such a preference. To this end, then, data gathered by a survey questionnaire distributed in two localities within the study area will briefly be examined.

If these data demonstrate the validity of the underlying assumption of the bulk of the preceding discussion, then it will be possible to proceed with the search for an elucidation of the patterns outlined in the discussion.

LOCAL CONTEXT VOTING - COINCIDENCE OR OVERT PREFERENCE?

Respondents to the survey questionnaire (distributed to 110 households around two booths used in the election - Booth 10 in Ward 1, Woonona Public School, and Booth 53 in Ward 5, Hayes Park Public School) were asked to rank their preferences for a number of candidates about whom they were given a variety of information - in other words it was a situation not unlike the voting decision they would have been faced with at election time.
Specifically, they were asked to distribute their preferences between seven candidates - three from the 'party' they supported (the number one candidate on this 'party's' ticket, one who resided in the same area as the respondent and a third 'unknown' but party supported candidate), three candidates, similarly identified, from the party not supported and a last, unknown independent candidate.

From the responses it was apparent that the expression of preferences in such an abstract form was more difficult for voters than in the 'real world' situation - either that, or in real life voters care little about preferences other than their first two, as these were the only reliable responses.

TABLE 4.6 VOTING PREFERENCES OF RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>1st Preference (%)</th>
<th>2nd Preference (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own 'Party's' No. 1 Candidate</td>
<td>Booth 10</td>
<td>Booth 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.75</td>
<td>65.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own 'Party's' Local Candidate</td>
<td>36.25</td>
<td>32.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 'Party's' Local Candidate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>95.06</td>
<td>97.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data

As Table 4.6 reveals, however, while a majority of electors at both booths not unexpectedly preferred to vote for their own 'party's' number one candidate, approximately one third of electors in both samples
indicated that they would prefer a local candidate from their own 'party' to their own 'party's' number one candidate. This suggests that local context voting is important in determining the overall pattern of intra party, if not inter party, voting. An examination of the distribution of second preferences also provides a degree of support for the view that some electors may even be prepared to cross party lines (as indicated by the magnitude of this vote in Table 4.6) in order to support a local candidate. At the larger scale, therefore, the possibility of a local candidate vote from electors not usually supportive of a particular party cannot be entirely discounted.

Although the results are based upon a small sample of respondents and are therefore far from conclusive, they gain added credence from the fact that the proportions of respondents favouring local candidates are very similar in each sample, representing two quite separate electorates.

As a final test of the importance of 'local information', respondents were also asked if they could recall any of the candidates who contested the 1974 elections, on the grounds that if there was some 'flow of information' pertaining to candidates residing relatively close to the elector, then it should be displayed in their recall of candidates names.

As Table 4.7 indicates, of the respondents that were able to correctly identify a candidate, nearly all were able to recall the name of the successful 'party's' local candidate. (For example, in the case of Booth 10, 53.75% of respondents were able to recall a candidate's name and 51.25% were able to recall the successful 'party's' local candidate).¹

¹. In a study mentioned by Johnston (1975, p.344, footnote 3) a sample of electors was asked before the 1974 Christchurch City Council ward based election if they could recall any candidates' names; only 13% could name two or more of the candidates. In this survey (conducted some 20 months after the election), an average, 32% of respondents could name two or more of the candidates in the election. The two figures are probably comparable but because the surveys were taken at different times with respect to the date of the election, the figures appear very different. In both the Christchurch and Wollongong samples, the local candidate was the candidate most recalled by respondents.
TABLE 4.7 Respondents' Recall of Candidates\textsuperscript{a}, Classified Into the Following Categories, Contesting the 1974 Wollongong Local Government Elections Within Their Ward (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Candidate Recalled</th>
<th>Booth 10</th>
<th>Booth 53</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The elected 'party's' locally residing candidate</td>
<td>51.25</td>
<td>54.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected 'party's' other candidates</td>
<td>27.50</td>
<td>50.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non elected 'party's' locally residing candidate</td>
<td>33.75</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non elected 'party's' other candidates</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Local Candidates</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrect or no answer</td>
<td>46.25</td>
<td>40.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data

\textsuperscript{a.} Some respondents were able to recall a number of candidates.

By itself this result is not especially significant for, obviously, responses may simply reflect the publicity these candidates have received since the election (almost two years). The significant fact is, however, that the successful 'party's' locally residing candidate was recalled more often than the other two candidates from that same 'party' combined. This is especially significant in the case of the candidate most recalled at Booth 53 (H. Schipp), as one of the other candidates on his ticket is the present Mayor of Wollongong, F.N. Arkell, a far more newsworthy personage both at the time of the election and since!

If local candidates really are better known, then this should also be the case for the local candidates put up by the unsuccessful 'party'. As Table 4.7 demonstrates, this was certainly the case at Woonona (Booth 10) but the responses from the Hayes Park sample (Booth 53) failed to replicate this situation. In this case, however, local events would
seem to be involved, for in this locality the unsuccessful local candidate was a Labour Party candidate who was largely unknown outside the local Party Branch and failed to present herself as a viable candidate to the electorate.

**VOTE INCREASE WITH TIME - CANDIDATE EXPOSURE**

If the apparent local effect is due to variations in the amount of information concerning a candidate due to friends, neighbours and acquaintances, then, the level of elector knowledge of candidates should increase over time, for Reynolds (1969a,b) argues that candidates broaden their support base over time; that is, their support base changes from one with a relatively restricted home/work/social place base, to a level at which the importance of this peak area is not as pronounced due to the voting support at locations away from the peak support pole increasing (relative to the high support pole). If such a situation can be discerned here then it will be both a test of Reynold's hypothesis (for the first time) and further confirmation of the role of local knowledge as a factor in determining the pattern of electoral support.

There were 15 candidates in this election who had previously contested Wollongong City Council Elections. Only seven candidates displayed an increase in their voting support over time; one of these was due to the candidate being 'promoted' to a higher position on his party's ticket, whilst two more reflected simple increases in the intensity of campaigning. Overall then, four candidates demonstrated an increased voting support over time that could be claimed to be largely independent of any real increase in the level of campaigning and certainly independent of any change in their position on their 'party' ticket. The significant feature about these four candidates, however, is that they are the Liberal-Independent
Fig 4.8
PERSONALITY VOTE INCREASE

FORD (Ward 1)

% of Total Vote

100
80
60
40
20
0

1965 1968 1971 1974 Year

Non Labor Vote
Ford's Vote

WARD (Ward 2)

% of Total Vote

100
80
60
40
20
0

1968 1971 1974 Year

Non Labour
Ward

HANSON (Ward 3)

% of Total Vote

100
80
60
40
20
0

1968 1971 1974 Year

Non Labour
Hanson

ARKELL (Ward 5)

% of Total Vote

100
80
60
40
20
0

1965 1968 1971 1974 Year

Non Labour
Arkell
'personality' candidates in Wards 1, 2, 3 and 5 - each of whom topped the primary poll within their respective Wards, and thus the increase in their vote through the flow of candidate-specific information is important to the outcome in each Ward.

Two of these candidates, Ward (Ward 2) and Hanson (Ward 3), were contesting their third election while the other two, Ford (Ward 1) and Arkell (Ward 5), were contesting their fourth. All increased their proportion of the first preference vote at successive elections (Figure 4.8) relative to the total non Labour vote (decreasing in Wards 1 and 2, stable in Ward 5, increasing Ward 3), though Hanson in Ward 3 probably displays the effect of his ticket's increased share of the primary poll, due mainly to the token opposition of the Labour Party (although Hanson's vote still increased at a slightly higher rate than the non Labour vote).

Having demonstrated that the vote for these personality candidates has increased over time (in a manner consistent with expectations) it is necessary to explain why the vote for only these four candidates increased, independent of the more 'structural' factors stated above. This is difficult to achieve in any detail, but it must be stated that these candidates on their initial election attempts all polled well above the level of normal 'first timers', suggesting that the candidates were well known within their wards before contesting Council elections. (In fact, this is the case).

The next step in analysing the upwardly mobile voting support for these candidates is to examine the spatial patterning of the increase and in particular to determine whether Reynold's (1969b) suggestion that the peak support area becomes blurred with time is correct. Table 4.8 does not support Reynold's view to any great extent, nor does it allow any easy generalisations, for no common pattern of variations is apparent.
CHANGING SUPPORT BASE - WARD

WARD 2

1968

1971

1974

O home   △ work   • booth
Fig 4.10

CHANGING SUPPORT BASE—ARKELL

1965

% of Primary poll

\[ y = 34.87 - 1.22x \]

Distance from residence (kms)

1968

% of Primary poll

\[ y = 38.22 - 0.81x \]

Distance from residence (kms)

1971

% of Primary poll

\[ y = 49.84 - 2.04x \]

Distance from residence (kms)

1974

% of Primary poll

\[ y = 56.92 - 2.82x \]

Distance from residence (kms)
### TABLE 4.8 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONALITY CANDIDATES' HOMEPLACES AND THE INCREASE IN SUPPORT OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>'b' and 'r' values</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>-1.297**</td>
<td>-1.532**</td>
<td>-1.866***</td>
<td>-2.181***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r</td>
<td>- .711</td>
<td>- .640</td>
<td>- .759</td>
<td>- .854 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>-3.81**</td>
<td>-2.934**</td>
<td>-1.782</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r</td>
<td>- .733</td>
<td>- .676 *</td>
<td>- .242</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanson</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>1.158</td>
<td>- .800</td>
<td>-1.602</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r</td>
<td>.372</td>
<td>- .234</td>
<td>- .268</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkell</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>-1.227*</td>
<td>- .807</td>
<td>-2.038***</td>
<td>-2.823***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r</td>
<td>- .612 *</td>
<td>- .404</td>
<td>- .851</td>
<td>- .808 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

('t' values for 'b' and 'r' contained in Appendix F )

For Arkell and Ford, homeplace peak voting support appears to increase in importance (as indicated by the trends in the 'b' coefficients) which is contrary to Reynold's suggestion; there is no real trend in the distribution of Hanson's vote over time; while Ward does appear to display a broadening in his support base with time. The pattern of voting support for Ward over the period 1968 to 1974 is illustrated in Figure 4.9 and does lend some credence, albeit small, to the notion. This situation contrasts with that for Arkell, illustrated in Figure 4.10, where the pattern of support is increasingly displaying a home area bias, the support levels near his homeplace increasing more rapidly than elsewhere - such a situation, though, supposedly represents a 'first time' candidate who gains much higher levels of support around his homeplace than elsewhere in the ward.
CONCLUSION

The notion that local effects may account for some of the initially unexplained variation in the voting response surface was tentatively supported by the prevalence of local peaking and gradient effects, although in Wards 3 and 4 their occurrence was less common than elsewhere. A survey questionnaire conducted around two booths in the City suggested that approximately one third of electors preferred local candidates, and that over 50% of the respondents were able to recall the name of the successful 'party's' candidate that resided closest to them.

It was suggested that if local context voting was important, it should be manifested in an increased level of support for candidates over time. Some support, though not a high level, was obtained for this suggestion from the pattern of changing electoral support received by the four Liberal-Independent personality candidates, each of whom topped the primary poll in their respective wards. For a variety of reasons (ranging from the increased intensity of campaigning to a candidate being 'promoted' within his own ticket) no such trend could be discerned for the remaining candidates.

As much of the evidence seems now to point to the existence of local context voting as an important factor at the ward scale, it is now necessary to examine those situations which seem to deviate from the classically regular local peak-distance decay and to search for the causes of such disruptions, with particular reference to Wards 3 and 4.
CHAPTER FIVE
DISRUPTIVE FACTORS

INTRODUCTION

Because there is such a strongly marked dichotomy between the areal pattern of electoral support for Labour and Liberal-Independent candidates in some, but not all, of the wards, it would appear that in certain of the wards some systematically operating disruptive factors are at work, affecting the emergence of local effects. Some clue to the nature of these influences can be found in existing writings. Writers have already suggested, for example, that the development of a local context vote at the inter party level can be affected by such factors as

(a) whether the candidate lives in an opposition dominated area (Johnston, 1974) - because electors in that area are more likely to vote along party lines for the primary or first preference vote; although there may be a tendency for a leakage of votes across party lines to a local candidate (as suggested by the survey analysis in the previous chapter) for lower order preferences, these will not be detected in an analysis of this type.

(b) whether an opponent resides close by (Reynolds, 1969a,b; Tatalovich, 1975) - this effect being intensified by increasing residential proximity.

(c) whether a member of the same party, particularly a more popular candidate, resides in the same area as the candidate (Johnston, 1974). In this instance the candidates may 'share' the local effect with neither benefitting to any great degree, though the more popular candidate is probably least affected.

(d) whether there are particular election strategies that operate against local context voting. (Cox (1972), for example, has suggested that
differential canvassing, whereby parties concentrate their vote catching activities in certain areas, may result in areally biased information fields leading to some modification of the pattern of voting support.

Because of the need to focus upon the intra party situation, it is not possible in this study to undertake any penetrating analysis of the effect of the first two of these possible disrupting influences as they apply to Labour and Liberal-Independent candidates. However, some indication of their possible relevance may be obtained from a consideration of the pattern of electoral support given to the true independents within each ward. (Under these circumstances, though, the first suggested disruption concerning an opposition party dominated area is not applicable).

NEIGHBOURHOOD COMPETITION

When a candidate standing as an independent resides close to some other candidates, especially those with 'party' affiliations, the effect of these other candidates is difficult to discern and when it can be detected, seems to vary by ward (Table 5.1).

It would appear from this tabulation, therefore, that the simple hypothesis stated earlier is somewhat less than fully applicable. In the most extended wards (1 and 5) proximity of other candidates does not appear to hamper the development of local effects, as demonstrated by the existence of high local concentrations and distance decays in support. In the most compact wards, however (for example, Ward 3), while the majority of independent candidates obtain peak support at a booth near their home, there is little significant difference in support levels with increasing distance, from which it would seem reasonable to conclude, perhaps prematurely, that the 'density' of candidates in a ward would appear to be more important to the emergence of an attenuation
of voting support with distance than the simple presence or absence of a proximate competitor.

### TABLE 5.1 LOCAL EFFECTS AND RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY OF OTHER CANDIDATES - TRUE INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES⁠

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Number of Independent Candidates</th>
<th>Occurrence of Localised - Candidate Relevant Support Peak</th>
<th>Number of Candidates Displaying Gradient Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁠a. Includes only candidates residing, working or socialising within the study area, with some contact within their ward of candidature.

### PROXIMITY OF POPULAR CANDIDATE - INTRA PARTY

When two candidates on the same ticket reside nearby and if one candidate is decidedly more popular or well known than the other, then it is probable that the lesser known candidate will not display a local effect in his voting support.

In this election there were five cases of candidates on the same ticket residing nearby one another in which one candidate was considerably better known than the other.

The specific effect of proximity remains difficult to determine; however, in Wards 1 and 2 the more popular candidate displayed a home based local effect, while neither of the minor candidates displayed such an effect, though Howard (Ward 2) did display a significant work-place
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>'Party'</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>% of 'Party' First Pref. Vote in Ward</th>
<th>'b'</th>
<th>'r'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>81.44</td>
<td>-4.337***</td>
<td>-0.857***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Cram</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>-0.191</td>
<td>-0.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>65.18</td>
<td>-5.340***</td>
<td>-0.824***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Hanson</td>
<td>90.73</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Tobin,E.W.</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Dezelin</td>
<td>90.71</td>
<td>-0.477</td>
<td>-0.234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Tobin,L.J.</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>85.63</td>
<td>-0.846***</td>
<td>-0.604***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib-Indp</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>-0.374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Best known candidate listed first for every pairing

* p < 0.10
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01

centred peak. In Wards 3 and 4 no 'trend' is evident (repeating yet again their dominant motif). Overall, then, the effect of residential proximity of more popular candidates on the voting support given to less well known candidates is hard to identify. All that can be said is that this factor may have been responsible for the absence of a home-place based support pattern and gradients in relation to two candidates in Wards 1 and 2 - hardly substantial support for the continuing utility of an hypothesis.
ELECTORAL STRATEGIES

Preceding sections have contributed but little to the development of a deeper understanding of the voting pattern in the 1974 Wollongong City Council Elections. As a result we are left, on the one hand, with some substantial departures from what might be expected on the basis of a local information/knowledge effect; and on the other hand, with only one as yet untapped area of potentially fruitful hypotheses - that relating to the injection of deliberate bias into the flow of politically relevant information due to electoral strategy. This section will explore the manner in which electoral strategies, devised to influence the outcome of the election, may also influence the areal pattern of intra-ward voting. In particular, attention will be devoted to

(a) the effect of the common ticket across a ward
(b) the effect of the variable ticket across a ward

Common Ticket Voting

So far, it has been assumed that electors, after deciding on a 'party' preference, then choose for themselves which of the several candidates offered by that 'party' (for their particular ward) will receive the benefit of their first preference vote. While this is undoubtedly a possible manner of proceeding, it is common for 'parties' to attempt to guide voters in the distribution of preferences, in order to maximise their possibility of success, by the distribution of how to vote cards and other electioneering material containing specific suggestions as to the way the elector should vote. In a well regimented electorate such suggestions receive a high level of support.

One common strategy publicises a constant ordering of candidates right across the ward, that is, the same candidates retain the same position on all electoral aids distributed in all sections of the ward.
by a particular 'party'. The usual feature of such a strategy is that candidates lower down on the 'party' ticket are, in fact, not advising electors to vote for them specifically, but rather to follow the card.

Such a strategy was used by both major 'parties' in the more compact wards - by Liberal-Independents and Labour in Wards 3 and 4, and by the former 'party' alone in Ward 2. It would seem that such a strategy is most useful in wards in which there is no clear 'neighbourhood' identification; that is, in which residents do not perceive strongly marked locality differences. For example, residents throughout Ward 3 consider that they live in 'Wollongong', while Ward 4 residents live 'near the Steelworks'. Within societally cohesive wards sharing a broadly similar locational image or perception, it is easier (and perhaps more effective) to publicise one candidate, in an attempt to maximise the chances of that candidate being elected on first preferences or within the first few candidate eliminations, so that there will be no serious leakage of votes through the distribution of preferences.

Under these conditions, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapter (see for example Fig. 4.4), local effects are unlikely to emerge, or, if they do, are likely to be comparatively minor and heavily localised, perhaps confined to the closest booth to home, work or play place, because the chosen strategy purposely attempts to achieve a high level of uniformity in voter response by supplying all areas within the ward with uniform information and also a standard preferred response. However, no matter how conscientious 'party' workers and candidates may be in attempting to provide this uniformity in the flow of politically relevant information, it is still possible for some factors to disrupt the expected near-uniformity of the voting response surface. Three examples of this can be seen in the study, one in each of Wards 2, 3 and 4.
WARD 2
From Rixons Pass to Cabbage Tree Lane

HOW TO VOTE
FOR YOUR INDEPENDENT TEAM

To Vote No. [1] for ALDERMAN TOM WARD
Vote Thus.

[6] LONG, S. G.
[2] HOWARD, N. A.
[5] GARRETY, R. D.
[4] WHITE, H. L.
[3] JAMES, R. W. J. R.
[8] SMITH, J. E.

[1] WARD, T. B. G.

To Vote No. [1] for DR. RONALD JAMES
Vote Thus.

[6] LONG, S. G.
[3] HOWARD, N. A.
[5] GARRETY, R. D.
[4] WHITE, H. L.

[1] JAMES, R. W. J. R.
[8] SMITH, J. E.
[2] WARD, T. B. G.
[7] GRAHAM, M. S.

Authorised by - A. KAHLER.

Fenner Printing, 68 Elliott's Road, Early Meadow
i) The Case of Unilateral Reconsideration

Within Ward 2 (the ward in which the electoral outcome decides the control of the Council) the three Liberal Independents began campaigning with a constant ticket headed by their personality candidate, T.B.G. Ward, with N. Howard in second position and R.W.J.R. James placed third on the ticket. However, late in the election campaign, James (who lived outside the ward) decided that his position was somewhat 'shaky'. In an attempt to improve his chance of election, then, James 'broke' from the ticket and distributed his own how to vote card (Figure 5.1), confronting electors who should choose to vote for the Liberal-Independents, not with a simple decision to follow the 'party' ticket, but as well to choose between himself and Ward. As might be expected, electors residing in areas close to Ward's home place (which was near his work place) tended to give their support to Ward, but with increasing distance there was a significant decline in this support because the probability of choosing one candidate or the other became less markedly skewed in Ward's favour (Figure 5.2). Furthermore, in areas to the south of Ward's home, support for James increased more rapidly because of the elector's knowledge of him in that particular area. The outcome of James' decision to depart from the agreed upon strategy was a well marked deviation from the expected areal pattern of support (which, under the common ticket strategy, should have approximated uniformity) and a serious reduction in Ward's proportion of the first preference votes, which was only 65% of the total, whereas in other wards employing the common ticket strategy the number one candidate gained a minimum of 85% of his ticket's votes.

ii) The Case of the Slighted 'Favourite Son'

Another striking departure from the expected near uniform voting response surface which reflected the operation of area specific variations
Fig 5.2
POLARISATION OF VOTING SUPPORT - T.B.G. WARD.
in the quantity and quality of candidate-specific information can be seen in the pattern of votes cast for R. Wetherall, a Labour candidate and incumbent Alderman in Ward 4. Wetherall had held the number one position on Labour's ticket for at least the three elections previous to 1974. In this election, though, for reasons not officially announced, he was 'demoted' to the number two position on the ticket which was offered uniformly across the ward. Whereas in previous elections his position had assured him of something in excess of 85% of Labour's vote (and approximately 50% of the total vote in the ward) spread fairly consistently across the ward, the second position in this election led to a dramatic, and again generally uniform, reduction in his support to slightly over 12% of Labour's vote. However, because he was particularly well known and respected in one area of the ward (Port Kembla), an area in which it would not be too great an exaggeration to label him a 'favourite son', reflecting his heavy involvement in local activities, e.g. as President of an important social club, and also because his 'demotion' was not particularly well regarded by a considerable number of electors, his support in this area remained much higher - at almost 22.5% of his party's first preferences at the booth nearest this area (whilst elsewhere polling at a level commensurate with his ticket ordering).

Briefly, then, in politics, although the machine may determine the strategy and to a large degree influence the outcome, in the end, voters, being individuals, given sufficient motivation and information, may well act in ways contrary to expectations and thus alter the outcome. As Wetherall's voting support over time displayed a general increase (very similar to the personality candidates in other wards), there is some foundation for thinking that although he holds second spot on the Labour ticket, his vote may well increase and thus detract support
Fig 5.3
CANDIDATE CONFUSION - A RESULTANT SUPPORT PATTERN

- Homeplace
- L.J. Tobin's %
of labour vote

[Map showing candidate confusion pattern with Homeplace, Wollongong, and other locations]
from the Labour Party number one candidate in future elections.

iii) The Case of the Confusing Candidates

It is not an unknown tactic to present the electorate with a candidate having the same, or similar, name as a better known opposition candidate in the hope of dettracting from the vote of the more popular candidate, or from his preferences for his running mates. In Ward 3 such an event did occur with both major groups running a Tobin, although only the Liberal-Independent Tobin (E.W.), an incumbent Alderman, was relatively well known by the electorate.

Although E.W. Tobin did not display a candidate-specific peak in support, nor did his support display a gradient effect, it can be argued that his support would have displayed a peak area, except for the influence of L.J. Tobin, the Labour candidate. The Labour candidate held the third position on the ballot paper while the Liberal-Independent candidate was listed at number five on the ballot paper. From this situation, and because electors on E.W. Tobin's home area were prepared to vote for a Tobin that they had some knowledge of (although the knowledge was not particularly specific as these electors did not know his initials) these electors voted for the Tobin nearest the top of the ballot paper out of confusion - a situation that resulted in L.J. Tobin receiving his highest proportions of the Labour vote at the booths nearest E.W. Tobin's home (Figure 5.3)! The suggestion that electors were confused is given further support by the distribution of L.J. Tobin's preferences during the process of electing the third Alderman - over 48% of his preferences went to Hanson's and E. W. Tobin's running mate, Hall, while only 34% of his preferences went to Labour's number one candidate!

These three cases identify some of the different forms of 'knowledge' that electors have pertaining to candidates. The case of the unilateral reconsideration indicated that people around Ward's home were more aware
of him than of James. The case of the slighted 'favourite son' demonstrated again that electors do possess some specific 'knowledge' concerning candidates that is usually localised. The third case indicated that preference for the 'Local boy' may be quite parochial, for although some electors were aware of a local candidate, their level of 'knowledge' concerning the candidate was indeed low. Taken together, these cases demonstrate that electors do possess a greater degree of awareness of the 'local boy' than for any candidate living away from the elector's home area, but that this awareness and knowledge may differ between candidates and between electors. Also it may be 'masked' by the particular election strategy employed in the election.

The Variable Ticket

The variable ticket strategy involves a party/group in offering more than one officially endorsed ordering of candidates for a ward, each candidate having the number one spot in a particular section of the ward. This strategy, developed by a local Labour official, is used in Wards where a number of clearly distinct 'neighbourhoods' or localities can be discerned, for example, in Ward 5 where there are three distinct and separate areas: Figtree-West Wollongong, Unanderra and Dapto (Figure 2.1). By running the local candidate as the number one man in each of the three sections of the ward, the 'party' is able to maximise support since electors are most likely to be able to 'identify' with the 'local boy' (especially at this level of government). The strategy was used by the Labour Party in the extended Wards, 1 and 5, as well as in the more compact Ward 2, while the Liberal-Independents used it only in Wards 1 and 5. No reference has been found to the use of such a system elsewhere - certainly not in New South Wales - yet it would seem
RESULT OF VARIABLE TICKET STRATEGY—LABOUR, WARD 5

% of Labour vote gained by the local candidate

- Booth
- Homeplace

Fig 5.4

Ward 5

3

Figtree

89% 87%
81%
93%
93% 91%
95%

Unanderra

91% 93%

Ward Boundary

Illawarra

Lake

Cunningham

Hendriksen

Dapto

94%
92%
90%
94%
90%
92%

to have much to recommend it in Local Government elections of this type.

The Labour Vote

When the Labour Party candidates use this strategy each number one candidate obtains a high and near uniform proportion of the party vote at those booths nearest his home and hardly any support at all elsewhere (see Figure 4.3b). The voting response surface therefore assumes a step form rather than a distance decay. This strategy accounts for the enormous chi-square values for the Labour candidates, as shown in Table 4.2, as well as the very high 'b' coefficients for the Labour candidates (Table 4.5).

In effect, therefore, the candidate-specific local effect that has been so common in this study is magnified by instructions to Labour Party voters conveyed in the 'how to vote' cards and other campaign literature, making it virtually impossibly to determine the strength of the genuine local context vote that they could be expected to generate under other voting strategies. An example of this magnification is presented in Figure 5.4.

This approach is particularly beneficial to the Labour Party because, in general, their candidates do not have the same public appeal as those from the Liberal-Independent group and also because their candidates have a smaller and comparatively more homogeneous area in which to make themselves 'known' during the election period - a much simpler task for all concerned than attempting to present one comparatively unknown candidate to the whole ward, a situation almost certain to generate less votes. Therefore, although this strategy (which results in each candidate gaining approximately one third of his ticket's total vote across the ward) presents a number of opportunities for electors to vary their order of preferences from that suggested, the number of extra votes
obtained by the tactic more than counteract the possible leakage of
preferences and, provided the leakage is not too serious, if one candidate
gets elected so, too, should his running mates, for each candidate is number
two one in one area, number/in another and number three in the remaining
area of the ward.

The Liberal Independent Pattern

The variable ticket strategy was also adopted by the Liberal-Independents
in Wards 1 and 5 - with a slight modification. The modification concerned
the role of the personality candidates (Ford and Arkell) within these wards.
In general the less well known candidates campaigned most in those areas
closest to their homes (that is, within the ward sub-area, in just the
same way as the Labour Party candidates), but the personality candidates
presented themselves as the number one candidates to electors across the
whole ward - not just to electors in their home area; that is to say, in
the personality candidate's home area electors had one number one
candidate while in other sections of the ward electors had two number
one candidates to choose between - their local candidate and the personality
candidate. This situation was similar to the case in Ward 2, whereby
Liberal-Independent voters also were presented with the choice between two
number one candidates. Because the minor candidates had closer ties
with sections of the community (through membership of a number of service
and social organisations), these candidates were able to present themselves
as 'mini' personalities and obtain fair support in a section of the ward,
which, when preferences were distributed from the major candidate (in
addition to their other running mate's vote), enhanced their chances of
election.

MANIPULATING THE VOTE - AN APPRAISAL

The variable ticket strategy can be successful, but particularly for
Labour candidates because as a group, and individually, they are generally
less well known than their Liberal-Independent colleagues. For the
Labour Party, some measure of its effect can be gauged from the decline
in the non Labour vote in the three wards where Labour introduced the
strategy in 1971 (Figure 4.8). In Ward 1, the non Labour vote has
fallen to levels below those for elections at higher levels of government
conducted at booths within the ward! This decline is not due to the
socio-economic complexion of the ward - because the new residential
areas are higher status type areas - nor is it due to a change in the
popularity of the Labour candidates - in fact, in this election, the
Liberal-Independent personality candidate performed better than ever
before, and even topped the primary poll. However, in the case of Ward 5,
although the non Labour vote is generally declining, it is doing so only
marginally; perhaps because of the Labour Party's inability to find
suitably appealing candidates in the ward and perhaps because of the
rapid change in the population, which appears to be of an increasing
status level.

To determine the importance of the strategy with respect to gaining
extra votes for one party or the other is difficult. Perhaps some
indication can be gained from a careful examination of the pattern of
voting at two booths within Ward 2. At the previous election under the
variable ticket strategy, the ward was only covered by two Labour Party
candidates. For this election, however, a third candidate who resided in
the East Corrimal area (Figure 2.1) was introduced. At the two booths
(booth number 14, Bellambi Church of England Hall and booth number 16,
Corrimal High School) this candidate covered, the 1974 Labour performance
improved over 33% on the 1971 results (Table 5.3) against a backdrop of
a City wide swing of 17% against Labour and a Ward 2 swing of 4% to
Labour! At one other booth within the ward the Labour vote increased,
TABLE 5.3 VOTE INCREASE POSSIBLY DUE TO VARIABLE TICKET STRATEGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 Bellambi Church Hall</td>
<td>31.83</td>
<td>37.41</td>
<td>46.06</td>
<td>66.76</td>
<td>+44.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Corrimal High School</td>
<td>25.20</td>
<td>34.73</td>
<td>44.25</td>
<td>58.99</td>
<td>+33.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

while the majority of other booths in the ward displayed only a minor swing against Labour. In the absence of any other known factors likely to effect such a transformation, one can only assume from such data that the massive increase is the outcome of the variable ticket strategy.

The Liberal-Independent candidate's version of the variable ticket strategy is undoubtedly more fruitful than that of the Labour Party, for on one hand they have personality candidates who are able to attract votes on a ward-wide basis, whilst on the other they run minor candidates able to attract votes in their home area because of their ties within the area, and also because they are able to campaign more intensely in a small area.

So long as the preferential system remains, therefore, it would seem suicidal for the Labour Party to change away from this strategy, unless they, too, are able to present some well known/personality type candidates to the electorate. For the Liberal-Independents, due to their higher level of funds, vote catching and the chances of higher success will be increased by 'extending' the flow of knowledge relevant to a candidate into areas adjacent to his home sub-section of the ward, e.g. through increasing the level of candidate involvement (for example, through organisational membership) in areas beyond his home 'patch'.

Summary and Conclusion

The non emergence of local effects in some wards was examined with
respect to candidate proximity (for the independents); the proximity of a more popular candidate (for the 'party' candidates); as well as the electoral strategies used in the election.

The first suggestion that candidates may not develop local effects because of the close proximity of another candidate was partially supported, and the relative 'density' of candidates within a ward was seen as important in its effect on a gradient effect in support for the candidates. The second suggested disruption appeared to have some minor basis of support in Wards 1 and 2, but again Wards 3 and 4 displayed no particular trend, supportive of the view that more systematic factors were operating. The final analysis, that of electoral strategies, was found to be the single most important factor affecting the degree to which local effects were apparent, for to it could be attributed the three major systematic forms of the voting response surface, that is, the uniform, the 'step' and the gentler, more gradual gradient effect. The uniform surface was caused by electors being issued with election material advising them to support a ticket of three candidates arranged in a particular order, unchanged across the ward. Under such a system, it would normally be difficult to demonstrate an elector knowledge of the candidate, but on three unusual occasions the strategy was somewhat upset, such that variations in elector preference of local candidate could be demonstrated.

The two other response surface forms were caused by the variable ticket strategy - perhaps unique to Wollongong - under which some wards are divided into 'neighbourhood' type subareas and a local candidate distributes his election material only in the subarea nearest his home (resulting in the 'step' form for Labour candidates). Liberal-Independent candidates, especially in Ward 5, were able to use this system to fullest advantage because they also had a personality candidate who campaigned across the entire ward, as well as the comparatively lesser known candidate's
localised and distance affected appeal.

Overall, the examination of electoral strategies demonstrated how the introduction of a deliberate areal bias in the flow of politically relevant information could be employed to maximise voting support for the candidates. To the writer's knowledge this is a factor that has not been considered by previous electoral geographers working in this area, few of whom seem to have examined, or discussed, the specific form, intensity and distribution of electioneering material by candidates. While it may be reasonable for readers in some areas to assume that the candidates are not involved in electioneering, this would seem to be an unusual situation and it is suggested that greater attention should be paid to this point in later studies at this level.

Another factor arising from this examination is the obvious necessity to redefine and more precisely specify the concept of candidate 'knowledge' on the part of the elector and also the flow of candidate-specific information, for there is some evidence to suggest that electors have very little real knowledge of candidates. To be sure they may have 'heard about' candidates, and may vote for the candidate out of sheer parochialism, but this can hardly be described as real 'knowledge' of the candidate (as indicated by the Tobin name confusion example)!
CHAPTER SIX

THE EXISTENCE OF AN ISSUE VOTE

INTRODUCTION

Previous writers have suggested that there are three major components to a voting response surface. The first component is that of a socio-economic context - party type vote, which has been examined in Chapter 3; the second, a local context vote, has been considered in Chapter 4 (while disruptions to this vote have been considered in Chapter 5); the third, it is asserted, pertains to an issue. In this chapter, the effect of the only location specific issue that arose in the course of the 1974 Local Government Elections in the City of Wollongong on the spatial patterning of the voting response surface, is analysed. Almost every election has certain issues that candidates emphasise in their campaigns. However, some issues are raised so often that the electorate becomes fairly insensitive to them and tends to disregard them as a factor in reaching a voting decision. Where there is no particularly important issue it would seem likely that electors will tend to vote more strictly along party or local acquaintance lines, (particularly the former). Occasionally though, there are issues that do attract the attention of all, or part, of an electorate. When this happens we may expect to find that such issues warp the voting response surface.

The effect of an issue is most likely to become apparent when a particular issue affects one part of an electorate but not another, for example, relocating a road or rezoning residential land. However, the involvement of political parties, even at this level of government, often results in a situation in which even issues of this sort become lost in the socio-economic context ballot. When a candidate separate from the major 'blocs' contesting the election identifies himself with an issue,
Fig 6.1
ENVIRONMENTALIST VOTING SUPPORT

\[ r = -0.37 \]
indeed, even presents himself for election solely or largely upon this basis in the affected area, he may then receive a great deal of voting support from affected citizens, regardless of their usual political affiliations.

Such a situation occurred in the election under consideration. As earlier outlined (Chapter 2) three candidates stood as "Environmentalists" (conservationists), hoping to obtain support from the widespread public reaction against the establishment of a coal dump on Maddens' Plains by the owners of Coalcliff Colliery, and against construction of an offshore coal loader near Coalcliff, by the Clutha Corporation. The first proposal, if implemented, would have resulted in the destruction of a large area of local scrubland on the escarpment as well as an increase in coal dust fallout in the area, particularly during the westerly winds of winter months. The second proposal was thought likely to cause noise pollution (through the movement of coal trucks) and threaten aquatic life in the area. The area most affected by the establishment of both the coal dump and the offshore loader was the Coalcliff area in Ward 1 (Figure 2.1). The effects of this location specific issue in the pattern of voting behaviour is considered in this chapter. In particular, suggestions by Johnston (1972, 1973) and Forrest and Johnston (1973) that support for a candidate (standing on the basis of a local issue) will be most pronounced in the affected area and will decline away from that area are reviewed here. Attention will also be devoted to estimation of the section of the voting population which supported the Environmentalists' cause.

The Distribution of the Environmental Vote

The highest areas of support for the Environmentalists were the Stanwell Park, Coalcliff, Scarborough and Coledale areas (Figure 6.1). The booth nearest the affected area (Coalcliff) had the second highest level
of support for the ticket (50.98% of the total first preference vote) while Stanwell Park (2.7 kms to the north) displayed the highest support for the group (54.41%). An unusual aspect of the pattern of support is the Environmentalists' poor performance at Clifton (9.30%), 2 kms to the south of Coalcliff. However this result was not particularly surprising because the population around the booth contained the highest proportion of the workforce involved in the mining industry in this northern area, and thus these people saw the opposition to the coal companies' proposals in terms of their continuing employment and therefore did not support the Environmentalists. Overall, there was a tendency for support for these candidates to decline with increasing distance from the issue area (Figure 5.2). However, the correlation between distance and voting support, although negative, did not achieve statistical significance ($r = -0.437$), perhaps due to the wide scatter of the voting proportions given this ticket, because of the effect of the people at booths 3, 4 and 5 viewing the ticket as being against their best interests.

The results are fairly much in keeping with expectations concerning this type of vote. Nevertheless, if the conventional levels of statistical significance are employed, we must reject the hypothesis that there is a simple decline in support with increasing distance from the affected area. As the basis of this situation would appear to lie in the voting behaviour of electors choosing to cast their ballots at booths 3, 4 and 5, further attention to that area would seem to be particularly necessary.

**Disruptions to the Distance Decline**

Two major factors are considered likely to disrupt the decline in voting support with increasing distance from the affected area. In the first instance it is possible the straight issue vote may be contaminated by the social context vote, that is, people most likely to vote for the
Environmentalists out of a genuine concern for the environment may be the middle-class, 'socially aware' Liberal-Independent type electors, and perhaps committed unionists of the Mundey 'Green Ban' type. This suggestion was supported by a discussion with a prominent environmentalist who was one of the candidates on the Environmental ticket. However, this cannot effectively be distinguished from a second possibility—that electors supporting an Environmental candidate may have been doing so because he was a 'local' candidate, that is, the Environmental vote may simply be a disguised local context vote.

The Socio-Economic Context of Issue Voting

It is difficult to ascertain whether there was a socio-economic context to the voting support for the Environmentalists although there are two major sources from which an indication of its effect may be gained.

The first is that the Liberal-Independent vote was affected by the intervention of the Environmentalist ticket (see Figure 3.5) thereby suggesting that there was a socio-economic context to the Environmentalist vote.

Secondly, the correlation of the Environmentalist vote (the dependent variable) with the variables in the previous regression analyses can be used to indicate possible bases of support. If Environmental supporters were Liberal-Independent type electors, then we might expect that the relationships between variables would be of a similar magnitude and in the same direction as in the case of the Liberal-Independents. The relevant zero order correlation coefficients are contained in Table 6.1.

Only three correlations are significant. As expected, the Environmentalist vote is negatively correlated with both mining and manufacturing employment and low socio-economic status. These results indicate that
TABLE 6.1  ZERO ORDER CORRELATIONS COEFFICIENTS - ENVIRONMENTALIST VOTE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Environmentalist Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ (Min. &amp; Mfg. Employ't)</td>
<td>-0.556*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ (Low Status)</td>
<td>-0.766***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_3$ (Old Age Ratio)</td>
<td>0.705**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_4$ (Home Ownership)</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_5$ (New Dwellings)</td>
<td>-0.235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = $p \leq 0.10$
** = $p \leq 0.05$
*** = $p \leq 0.01$

some of the characteristics usually ascribed to Liberal-Independent voters are also related to the Environmentalist vote. The age ratio, on the other hand, is significantly and positively (rather than negatively) related to the Environmental vote. This lends support to an earlier suggestion, when no association was discerned between the age ratio and the Labour vote, that the variable might in fact be positively related to the third ticket or to other candidates. No precise explanation can be given for this particular result; however, it is worthwhile to note that the older people are concentrated in the central and northern areas of Ward 1, where the Environmentalist vote was highest. A discussion with the prominent Environmentalist indicated that there was no reason to think that older people would support the environmental movement, thus one can only conclude that there was no (or little) causal relationships between the two, and therefore the occurrence of a high Environmentalist vote and large proportions of old people was perhaps coincidental.

The significant negative correlations (with mining and manufacturing
Fig 6.2
VOTING SUPPORT FOR THE ENVIRONMENTALIST CANDIDATES.

**BRUTON**

![Graph showing voting support for environmentalist candidates in Bruton, with the correlation coefficient $r = -0.737$.](image1)

**TONKIN**

![Graph showing voting support for environmentalist candidates in Tonkin, with the correlation coefficient $r = -0.774$.](image2)
employment, as well as low socio-economic status) need further exploring here. These negative correlations 'account' for the comparatively low Environmentalist vote at booths 3, 4 and 5, because these areas had the highest proportions of the workforce involved in mining in the whole of Ward 1. Thus the earlier suggestion that these people viewed the opposition to the coal loader and coal dump as a threat to their employment is supported here. However, this gives rise to another point - the area around booth 2 also had as high a proportion of the workforce in mining as booths 3, 4 and 5, but the voters at this booth gave overwhelming support to the Environmentalists.

Booth 2 was at Coalcliff, the area most affected by the issue - the area where the people who would be expected to be the most aesthetically minded, with respect to this issue, reside. An issue of this kind would be expected to be judged on an aesthetic basis - something that residents of Coalcliff did - but not those at booths 3, 4 and 5 who judged the issue on another basis.

This section of the analysis has demonstrated a socio-economic context to the vote, and as suggested the supporters of the Environmentalists appear to be Liberal-Independent type voters, but there is little indication of a Labour elector type support, because the issue was judged on other than an aesthetic basis.

The Extent of Local Effects

Because two of the three Environmentalist candidates (Bruton and Tonkin) resided with Ward 1 while the third (Goodman) resided in Ward 3, it is not surprising that the two resident candidates achieve a homeplace bias in their voting support (Figure 6.2). Variations in the pattern of support for these two candidates give rise to variations in the ticket's vote (Figure 6.2), for example, in the far north of the ward, Tonkin's
vote is high, thus the ticket's vote is high, contrasting with the southern section of the ward, where both Tonkin's and Bruton's support is low and thus the ticket's vote is low. This pattern is partially accounted for by the fact that these candidates adopted the variable ticket electoral strategy whereby Tonkin campaigned in the areas from Coalcliff northwards; Bruton campaigned from Coalcliff to Thirroul; and Goodman campaigned from Thirroul southwards in this ward (thus there was some overlap in assigned campaigning areas).

The northern ward bias in the voting for this ticket, therefore, is partly due to the two candidates residing in that area, and also to the greater immediacy of the issue in that section of the ward. These two factors are so intertwined, however, that it is difficult to distinguish between them, and even more difficult to determine which, if any, was the more important determinant of the strongly location specific support given to these candidates, though it is important to note that both candidates displayed a definite homeplace related peaking in their voting support (Figure 6.2).

Voter Turnout

The highest voter turnout in the City, for this election, occurred in Ward 1 (Table 2.5). There are good grounds for arguing that higher than average turnout can be associated with greater than usual interest in the election issues. Thus if the higher turnout was caused by the existence of the Environmentalist ticket, then the highest turnout should be in those areas most affected by the issue, or areas where residents have a heightened perception of the issue, as might be expected, for example, in areas with relatively higher status residents.
Fig 6:3
RELATIVE VOTER TURNOUT—WARD 1.

Relative voter turnout (%) vs. Distance from Booth 1 (kms).

Stanwell Park
Coalcliff
Colesdale
Bulli

$r$ (from Coalcliff) = -0.518
Relative voter turnout\(^1\) was highest in the northern section of the Ward (Figure 6.3) and declined with increasing distance from Coalcliff (the most affected area) \((r = -0.518^*)\) although two other peaks of relatively high turnout occurred at Coledale and Bulli. At booths in the areas with the highest social rank (Stanwell Park, the northernmost booth, and Austinmer, some 11.9 kms to the south), however, turnout at Stanwell Park was approximately 69%, while at Austinmer, turnout was approximately only 44% — a difference of 25% in turnout between the two. Thus by comparison, the turnout at Coalcliff (approximately 66%) and Clifton (56.5%) was high, in relation to the social rank of the areas (which is low). This would suggest that turnout in the most affected areas was comparatively high, due to the effect of the location specific issue in increasing voter interest.

Conclusion

The difficulty encountered in attempting to separate an issue component from the voting response surface has been demonstrated, although the research has been necessarily exploratory. The hypothesised distance decline in voting support for the Environmentalist ticket did not occur.

The factor thought most likely to be causing this was that some electors appeared to have voted other than on an aesthetic basis, as could be expected from an issue of this type. In addition supporters of the

\(^1\) There is no breakdown available which shows the number of electors that may vote at a particular booth. The only breakdown available is for Wards. As an alternative measure then, the number of electors who voted at these booths in the 1974 Federal Election will be used as an indication of the number of electors who would be expected to vote at this booth. Although the measure is not completely satisfactory, it does give some basis for the calculation of relative voter turnout.
Environmentalist ticket appeared to exhibit almost the same characteristics as those ascribed to Liberal-Independent electors.

In addition to this socio-economic context related disruption to the gradient effect for the Environmentalists were the local effects displayed by the two Environmentalist candidates who resided within the ward.

Although the effect of the issue on the voting response surface was unable to be demonstrated conclusively, due to the above interrelationships, voter turnout was demonstrated to be apparently increased by the heightened level of awareness and interest on the part of the elector generated by the issue.

This brief examination of the effect of the issue on the voting response surface can only be regarded as an exploratory study. Further research needs to be conducted under less complicated electoral systems, preferably with a single candidate who does not reside in or near the most affected area, standing on an issue basis, and who does not use any complicated electioneering methods. Although there was some suggestion of a gradient effect evident in support for the Environmentalists, it was only significant at the 0.10 level and thus further research needs to be conducted under the above conditions, to enable evidence of some locationally specific issue related information flow to be presented.
CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY

The aim of this thesis was to attempt to understand why voting patterns occurred in the manner that they did, both at an overall level, as well as at the intra ward level.

As the City wide pattern of voting for both major 'parties' broadly mirrored the social topography of the City of Wollongong, multiple correlation and regression analysis was used in an attempt to 'explain' this pattern in terms of a number of socio-economic type variables. The most useful variables were found to be concerned with the workforce involved in mining and manufacturing in addition to low socio-economic status, while two other variables used (one in both the Labour and Liberal-Independent analyses) included an old age ratio and a new dwellings variable. Moreover, the use of these variables was able to account for some 70% of the variation in the voting response surface for both major 'parties'. Due to the nature of the study area, the amount of 'explanation' offered by the regressions was viewed as comparable to those recorded in other studies of this sort (Roberts and Rumage, 1965; Johnston, 1972), though there was still a good deal of 'unexplained' variation. At the outset, then, a socio-economic context/party vote component of the voting response surface was evident.

The pattern of residuals from the regressions displayed a marked clustering of residuals of the same direction (that is, positive or negative) which was interpreted as indicating that some portion of the unexplained variation might be due to factors operating at the intra ward level. Such clusterings of residuals were not particularly surprising in the light of the fact that the election was ward based, that, in effect,
there were five separate elections taking place and that electors were able not only to vote for a 'party' but a candidate, and in some cases the individual candidate may have been sufficiently attractive to win votes - regardless of his 'party' affiliation. This latter factor is especially important at this level of government because electors do not view Local Government elections in the same light as higher level elections.

The next step in the analysis was to demonstrate that local context voting could help to account for some of the unexplained 30% of the variation in the voting pattern. Unfortunately, because of the small scale of the wards and the preferential voting system the amount of the variation in the response surface attributable to this phenomenon could not be quantified. But, because the analyses were able to demonstrate a local effect in the voting response surfaces for both the independent candidates, as well as for the several candidates sharing a ticket, it seems reasonable to assume that such an effect is likely also to have occurred in the inter party vote, if only sufficiently sensitive methods of detection could have been devised.

In support of the immediately aforementioned statement, a survey questionnaire that was distributed to households around two booths in the City indicated that approximately one third of electors preferred to vote for the local candidate within their 'party's' ticket, thus the earlier indications of the occurrence of local effects were supported. Furthermore, over 50% of respondents were able to recall the name of the successful 'party's' local candidate for this election, which can be read as at least suggestive of some reasonable degree of knowledge of candidates on the part of electors.

Not all wards revealed the local effect to the same or even a similar extent. In Wards 3 and 4 particularly, there was little evidence to their
presence. Several factors seem to have been responsible for the failure of the well known local peak and gradient effect voting pattern to emerge. In the first place it seems that relative candidate location was of some importance here. For the true independent candidates, the analysis indicated that the 'density' of candidates within a ward may prevent the emergence of gradient affects, while not hampering the occurrence of a support peak. For the 'party' candidates, the location of a well known, and less well known, candidate relative to one another tended to disrupt the occurrence of home based peaks and gradient effects for the less known candidate.

More important than these factors, however, seem to have been the electoral strategies employed by the 'parties' in these Wards (3 and 4). Three major strategies were discerned. The first, that of the common ticket, resulted in the uniform, or near uniform, response surfaces that were so prevalent in Wards 3 and 4. Even this system was open to further modification, as was demonstrated by an examination of three situations in which it might be argued the flow of politically relevant information was distorted away from the norm by particular local, candidate specific events.

The second strategy, that of the variable ticket (perhaps unique to this area), attempts to maximise the identification between voters in a specific portion of a ward and a particular candidate. Because such a system is especially useful where candidates are relatively unknown, it was used by the Labour Party in Wards 1, 2 and 5 to ensure that their candidates had a good chance of becoming well known in at least a small part of the ward. A 'stepped' pattern in voting support for Labour candidates in these wards was the direct outcome of this strategy.

The third strategy, that of a modified variable ticket was used
by the Liberal-Independents in Wards 1 and 5. This strategy which resulted in a gentler, more gradual gradient effect for some candidates, combined a personality candidate with local lesser known candidates. The personality candidate, therefore, campaigned across the whole ward while his running mates concentrated their electioneering mainly in their home areas. This modified strategy seems likely to be more productive of voting support because it combines the vote 'drawing' power of the personality candidate across the whole ward with the local support of the other two candidates.

Because in one ward the environmental issue was also involved in the election, voting support for candidates known to have campaigned under its banner was examined to determine whether they had any particular effect upon the overall voting response surface (that is, to determine if there is an issues component to the response surface). The hypothesised gradient effect in voting support for the Environmentalists away from the area most affected by the issue, was not found to be statistically significant because a number of booths near the affected area displayed unusually low levels of support for this ticket. It was suggested that because people voting at these low support booths were involved with the mining industry, successful opposition to the construction scheme may well have threatened their employment prospects; consequently, they voted against the Environmentalists. This contrasted with the situation in the most affected area, Coalcliff, where the mining dominated population voted on an aesthetic basis - because it was their particular part of the environment that was going to be harmed.

DISCUSSION

This study raises a number of issues of importance to electoral geography. Firstly, the basis on which a local effect is judged to occur (the candidate specific peak support area and a gradient effect) needs
reviewing. In this study, the effects of other factors (especially electioneering) overstated the occurrence of local effects, as well as dampening them in other areas. The need here is to properly understand other possible effects on a candidate's response surface, instead of examining only his home/work/social place and its effect upon his response surface.

It has frequently been claimed that the flow of political information about a candidate contributes to the formation of a local peak and a distance decay in voting support. This study suggests, however, that there is an urgent need to consider what exactly is meant by the term and, perhaps even more importantly to examine in detail the effect of electioneering—the manipulation of the flow of politically relevant information. Previous writers have only ever mentioned the effect of electioneering in passing, without any analysis or search for its effect in influencing the pattern of support for candidates—but clearly it must have some influence, and may even have a major influence. Although the Wollongong case may be considered extreme, it undoubtedly demonstrates the importance of electioneering and the choice of electoral strategies in influencing the support pattern for candidates. It would not seem too unreasonable to suggest that the intensity of a candidate's campaigning may be highest in that candidate's home or work area and thus his vote may be highest in these areas as a result. Thus the nature and intensity of electioneering must be considered in future studies.

This is not to say that person to person communication concerning matters pertaining to politics and elections is not important, but rather to suggest that there is much more that needs to be considered. Also requiring attention would seem to be the concept of elector 'knowledge' of the candidate. At what point does 'knowledge' of a candidate begin to influence voting behaviour? Do electors vote for a candidate because they 'know' him or because they communicate with anyone who actually does know the candidate - or do they support the candidate because his name
sounds familiar (particularly at this level of government)? The classic example of this concerns the 'Case of the Confusing Candidates' - if the electors had any real knowledge of the candidate there would have been no confusion! This factor concerning the familiarity of a candidate's name is likely to loom large in determining the next Mayor of Wollongong as the election will be conducted on an 'at large' (City wide) basis. The most likely contenders will be the personality candidates from each ward in addition to one or two lesser known Labour candidates. However, if familiarity with a name is important (and especially in the local Government context) then clearly the present dynamic and enthusiastic Mayor of the City has a definite advantage in the forthcoming election. Moreover then, it can be seen that there are different levels of knowledge, only some of which are likely to affect the flow of information or messages relevant to voting.

Reynolds' (1969a,b) suggestion that the increased exposure of a candidate, and thus increased elector knowledge (familiarity) concerning the candidate results in the candidate's support base broadening from the initial home dominated support was not verified in the present context. In fact, perhaps the best known candidate within the City displayed a support base that appears to be increasingly home dominated! However, the trend that is evident is that a candidate's support level increases over time - if he is not tied to a particular party whose changing fortunes at some higher level of government may affect his performance. Thus Reynolds' suggestion needs re-examining, not in terms of broadening the support base, but increasing the level of support.

The suggestion by Forrest and Johnston (1973) that the support given to an issue oriented candidate declined away from the affected area was not supported here. The suggestion by the above writers leaves
much to be desired as it barely scratches the surface of the nature of an issues vote. Depending upon the type of the election and the nature of the issue, an issue vote may be related to socio-economic characteristics of electors, as well as being related to the candidate that is standing, and whether or not his home/work/social place occurs near the affected area, that is, he may gain a local context vote in addition to the issue vote. Another point connected with an issues vote is that issues may be polarising as well as unifying. When they are divisive, then a gradient effect in the support for the candidate is not to be expected, as demonstrated in the present case.

CONCLUSION

Recent trends in electoral geography have been heavily behavioural, highly quantitative and strongly oriented towards model building. Unfortunately, too often the quantification takes place before enough observation has been carried out. In this study the three components of the voting response surface are so complexly interrelated that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate them for independent scrutiny and equally difficult to consider them jointly. Almost any analysis that is able to 'evaluate' how much of a response surface is due to any particular component in a quantitative fashion, will more often than not have some faults - simply because it will not have taken into account the multitude of interrelated factors present in any one response surface.

If the aim of electoral geographers is to model or theorise, then they will undoubtedly experience great difficulty. At best, because of the difficulty of coming to grips with the factors that affect a voting response surface, they are forced to include in analyses variables or influences whose precise relationship with electoral behaviour are as often of speculative as the proven variety. To continue to stress model
building and theorising, without detailed observation first, is of little use, in fact. 'My own experience in talking to individuals about the way they voted in particular elections, is that many do not know exactly why they voted as they did' (Prescott, 1972, 87).
APPENDIX A

POLLING PLACES FOR THE ELECTION
## APPENDIX A

### POLLING PLACES FOR THE ELECTION

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Fairy Meadow Public School
Towradgi Public School
Mount Ousley Public School
Wollongong Senior Citizen's Centre
Keiraville Public School
Smiths Hill Girls' High School
Town Hall Theatre
Gladstone Avenue Technical College
Coniston Public School
Mount St. Thomas Public School
Berkeley Public School
West Berkeley Public School
South Berkeley Public School
Port Kembla Scouts Hall
Port Kembla Public School
Kemblawarra Public School
Primbee Public School
Windang Public School
Cringila Scouts Hall
Lake Heights Public School
Warrawong Community Hall
Warrawong Public School
Mount Keira Hall
Lindsay Park Public School
Figtree Hall
Unanderra Council Chambers
Unanderra Scouts Hall
Farmborough Road Public School
Mount Kembla Public School
Kembla Heights Hall
Dapto Community Hall
Brownesville Church of England Hall
Lakelands Public School
Koonawarra Public School
Hayes Park Public School
Mount Brown Public School
Wongawilli Hall
Avondale Weighbridge Office
Marshall Mount Progress Association Hall
APPENDIX B

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE - CANDIDATES
My name is Robert Hermann and I am an Honours student in Geography at the University of Wollongong. My thesis is concerned with the geographical aspects of the Wollongong City Council Elections of 1974. The data I am using concerns the voting performances of particular candidates at particular booths within each ward. In order to be able to interpret this data, I need information on candidates' backgrounds and how they conducted their campaigns. This questionnaire is thus designed to fulfil this need. Your help, in answering this questionnaire, will be gratefully accepted.

1. Have you previously contested Wollongong Council Elections? 
   If yes, on how many occasions? 
   Have you been successful? 
   If you are a sitting member how long have you been so? 

2. What was the basis for selection of candidates on your ticket? e.g. residential location 

3. Was the position for each particular candidate on your ticket changed in different parts of the ward? If so, how was the decision on the ticket order arrived at? 

4. How did you publicise yourself before the election? Please rank, in order of importance, those methods you used by placing an appropriate number in the box.
   Radio and T.V.
Newspaper
Handouts
Doorknocking
Public Addresses
Informal meetings with groups e.g. Rotary, Unions
Work visits
Friends knocking on doors for you
Broadcasting from a car
Others, please specify ........................................

5. Public meetings:
Where abouts in the ward did you hold formal campaign meetings?....
On how many occasions did you meet in this way?.....................
To what groups did you speak as a candidate for election?...........

6. a)Could you estimate how many pamphlets were distributed for yourself
and your running mates?..............................
b)Over what area were the pamphlets distributed?..................
c)Who determined the areas where pamphlets were to be distributed?...
d)Were you particularly assigned areas in which pamphlets were to be
distributed?............................................

7. What do you think were the major issues both for the city and for
your ward?................................................................

8. a)Before the election, how long had you resided at your address?.....
b)If you resided outside the ward, had you ever lived or worked in
the ward?.................................................
If so for how long?..............................................
c)Why did you stand in that particular ward?........................

9. At the time of the election what was your occupation, where were you
employed, and how long had you been employed there?..............
10. a) Have you any organisational affiliations? e.g. Rotary, Apex, Union sporting bodies, Social Clubs.................................
   b) If so please list and state how long you had been a member of these group/groups before the election..........................

11. What groups of people within your ward do you feel you drew your major support from? Please rank from 1 (most important) to 5 (least important).
   a. friends
   b. relatives
   c. people who reside closest to you
   d. people you work with
   e. others, please specify ..............................

12. Did you make any special effort to attract their votes?..............
   If so, what were they? .............................................................

13. Were any aspects of the actual voting behaviour in your electorate surprising to you? e.g. higher/lower levels of support at particular booths, interest in particular issues..........................

14. What sections of the community do you think were responsible for the election of the independent candidates in wards 2, 3, 5?........
   Do you have any explanation for this?.............................

15. Could you estimate how much it would have cost to mount an effective campaign in 1974?..............................
   How much did it cost you?.............................................

16. Do you have samples of your campaign literature I could obtain copies of?.............................................
APPENDIX C

POLLING PLACES WITHIN THE STUDY AREA
## APPENDIX C

**POLLING PLACES WITHIN THE STUDY AREA**

<table>
<thead>
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Unanderra Scouts' Hall
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Dapto Community Hall
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Lakelands Public School
Koonawarra Public School
Hayes Park Public School

Mount Brown Public School
APPENDIX D

ELECTOR SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
APPENDIX D

ELECTOR SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

CONFIDENTIAL

My name is Robert Hermann and I am a final year Honours student in Geography at the University of Wollongong. I am writing a thesis about the ways in which information relevant to a voting decision is transmitted, with particular reference to the 1974 Local Government Elections.

To do this I need information from a wide variety of people living in the Wollongong area. I am calling on you because your house was randomly selected from a list of Wollongong homes, and not because I know anything about you, or any member of your family. I have no connections with any political party. Please do not indicate your name or address anywhere on the form, as the questionnaire is confidential.

If your husband or wife also agrees to complete a questionnaire, I would like you to fill out the forms without consulting one another. If you agree to assist, I will be around to collect the completed questionnaire within the next few days.

A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Could you please indicate the relevant answer with a tick (√).
   a) Age Group
      i) 18-25 years
      ii) 26-35 years
      iii) 36-45 years
      iv) 45+ years
   b) Sex
      i) Male
      ii) Female
   c) How long have you been living at this address?
      i) Less than 2 years
      ii) 2-5 years
iii) 6-10 years

iv) More than 10 years

e) What is your occupation? (e.g. Teacher)..................

If you are not currently working, or you have retired, then please indicate your previous occupation in the above space.

f) When voting in Federal, State and Local Government elections, which polling booth do you usually vote at? (e.g. Berkeley Public School)?..............................................................

B. NEIGHBOURHOOD VOTING BEHAVIOUR

The next four questions are concerned with neighbourhood voting behaviour. By neighbourhood, I mean not only the area within one or two doors of your home, but that area regarded by you as being your home area e.g. one block from your home, 3 blocks from your home. Please tick (✓) the most appropriate answer for each question.

1. How would you think the majority of people in your neighbourhood usually vote in Federal and State elections?

   a) Mainly Labour
   b) Mainly Liberal
   c) Equally for both Labour and Liberal
   d) Swinging voters
   e) Don't know.

2. Which of these categories would you place yourself in when voting in Federal and State elections?

   a) b) c) d) e)

3. In Wollongong City Council elections, how do you think the majority of people in your neighbourhood usually vote?

   a) Mainly Independent
   b) Mainly Labour
c) For candidates who reside within your local area regardless of their politics.

d) Swinging voters

e) They are not very interested in Local Government and probably wouldn't bother to vote.

4. In Wollongong City Council Elections, which of the above categories would you place yourself in?

a)  

b)  

c)  

d)  

e)  

C. ALLOCATING BALLOT PREFERENCES

1. I would now like you to imagine that you are going to the polls to elect a team of three Aldermen to represent your ward. If you had the following candidates to choose from, how would you allocate your preferences from 1 (the candidate you most favoured) to 7 (the candidate you least favoured)? Please write the preference number in the box alongside each description.

A well known candidate who lives near you, but who stands for the 'party' you do not support, and who is not his own party's Number One candidate.

A well known candidate who lives near you, who stands for the 'party' you support, but is not that party's Number One candidate.

A well known candidate who does not live near you, who does not stand for the 'party' you support, and who is that party's Number One candidate.

A well known candidate who does not live near you, who stands for the 'party' you support, and who is that party's Number One candidate.
A little known candidate who does not live near you, who stands for the 'party' you do not support, and is not that party's Number One candidate.

A little known candidate who does not live nearby, who does stand for the 'party' you support, and is not that party's Number One candidate.

A candidate you known nothing about.

D. SOURCES OF POLITICAL INFORMATION

I'd like you now to think about the residential location of your five closest friends or closest acquaintances in the Wollongong area.

1. Please indicate the number who fall into each of the following categories, by placing the appropriate number in the box.
   (Distance referred to is road distance).
   Within your neighbourhood
   Within a mile of your home
   Between 1 and 2 miles of your home
   More than 2 miles from your home

2. I'd like you now to think about the political views of these friends/acquaintances. Even though you may not be completely sure, what candidates do you think they would support in a City Council Election? (Please tick (✓) the most appropriate answer).
   a) Mainly Independent candidates
   b) Mainly Labour candidates
   c) Evenly divided between Independent and Labour candidates
   d) Candidates fighting for a particular issue e.g. Conservationists.
   e) Mainly 'swinging' voters who would vote on issues raised at that time.
3. Please tick (✓) the most appropriate answer
   Do you feel that people in your neighbourhood are
   a) Well off, well above the Wollongong average
   b) Above the Wollongong average
   c) Average for Wollongong
   d) Below the Wollongong average
   e) Well below the Wollongong average

4. In which of the above categories would you place yourself
   (Please tick (✓) the most appropriate answer).
   a)   b)   c)   d)   e)

5. How many associations, of which you are a member, are centred
   on your local area? e.g. P. & C., Church group, local service
   group. (Please tick (✓) the most appropriate answer).
   0   1   2   3   3+

6. In how many of these groups is politics commonly discussed?
   0   1   2   3   3+

7. How many associations, of which you are a member, are not
   specifically centred on your local area? e.g. labour unions,
   pensioner associations, other social groups or clubs, political
   groups. (Please tick (✓) the most appropriate answer).
   0   1   2   3   3+

8. In how many of these groups is politics commonly discussed?
   0   1   2   3   3+

9. With which of the following groups do you think you would be
   most likely to discuss politics (whether Federal, State or Local).
   (Please rank all the alternatives from 1 (most likely to discuss
   with) to 6 (least likely to discuss with).
   Close friends
   Neighbours, who are not particularly close friends
People you work with (if you are a housewife disregard this alternative).

Within those associations centred on the local area, of which you are a member.

Within those associations not centred on the local area, of which you are a member.

Anybody, whether I know them well or not.

E. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

The next 4 questions concern the role of the local mass media in the diffusion of local political information. (Please tick (✓) the most appropriate answer).

1. If the Mercury carried an article in opposition to some Alderman or Aldermen would you
   a) Ignore it
   b) Read the article but not discuss it with friends/acquaintances
   c) Read the article and discuss it with friends/acquaintances

2. If the local T.V. News headlined the same story, would you
   a) Ignore it
   b) Take an interest in it, but not discuss it with friends/acquaintances.
   c) Take an interest in it and discuss it with friends/acquaintances.

3. If the local Radio News headlines the same story, would you
   a) Ignore it
   b) Listen with interest, but not discuss it with friends/acquaintances.
   c) Listen with interest and discuss it with friends/acquaintances.
4. If one or more of your local Aldermen were involved in this headline story, would this affect your vote for them at the next Council Election? (Please tick (✔) the most appropriate answer).
   a) I would give them a higher preference
   b) I would give them a lower preference
   c) I would not change my preference for them
   d) I don't know who my ward Aldermen are.

F. THE MEANING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The next two questions are general questions about local government.

1. In which ward of the City of Greater Wollongong do you reside? (please tick the most appropriate answer).
   a) Ward 1
   b) Ward 2
   c) Ward 3
   d) Ward 4
   e) Ward 5
   f) Don't know.

2. Could you indicate the location of the nearest ward boundary? If you can, write it down in the space provided.

3. Can you name any of the candidates who presented themselves for election, to represent your ward, in the last (1974) Wollongong City Council Election? If you can remember the 'party' he represented, please write this down in brackets after his name.

4. Can you name one or more of the sitting Aldermen representing your ward? Could you also tell me which 'party' each Alderman for your ward represents?

Thanks for your co-operation.
APPENDIX E

BOOTH VALUES FOR VARIABLES IN THE REGRESSION
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APPENDIX F

't' VALUES FOR r and b CONVERSIONS
**APPENDIX F**

**'t' VALUES FOR r AND b CONVERSIONS**

\[ t = \frac{r - n-2}{(1-r^2)} \]

for \( r \)

\[ t = \frac{b_1}{se(b_1)} \]

for \( b \)

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Cox, K.R. 1969b, "The Voting Decision in a Spatial Context", Progress in Geography, Number 1, 81-117.


ADDENDUM


Olsson, G. 1965, *Distance and Human Interaction*, Regional Science Research Institute, Philadelphia.