AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW
Nos. 55-56
DOUBLE ISSUE
75¢*

What the Fox Report Really Said
U.S. Militarisation of the Indian Ocean
We have produced a special double number of ALR for the summer period. This enables us to print a number of articles which would otherwise have to be held over until next year, since technical schedules did not permit another issue this year.

This double number means eight issues for the year, two short of our aim of ten. We have found that pressures of work on the small number of people involved in the production of ALR, together with various production hitches, have made monthly production difficult. Nevertheless, we hope and feel that we have managed to live up to some of our other aims - set out on Page 2 of issue No. 49.

We publish a detailed analysis of the Fox Report which gives the lie to the interpretations put on the latter by the media. The paper was prepared by Dr. Joseph Camilleri, a leading member of the national Uranium Moratorium movement soon after the report was made public.

Owen Wilkes, a leading peace activist in New Zealand, documents the background to the scare campaign about the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Gil Boehringer, a lecturer in Law at Macquarie University in Sydney, examines capitalist legal policy and shows how it is structured and run to serve ruling class interests. We hope to publish future articles on legal topics.

We publish a paper given by Allan Ashbolt at the recent Non-Alignment Conference. His paper deals with the general questions of threats to democratic liberties posed by the Kerr-Fraser coup and other recent events.

Mavis Robertson looks at the question of a non-aligned foreign policy from the viewpoint of Australian socialists, arguing that this option is one that socialists must seriously consider in today’s conditions.

We are very pleased to be able to publish an article on experiences of job organisation by a rank-and-file worker. Dave Rimbault was one of the initiators of the site committee on the Bondi Plaza building job and sets out some of the committees experiences.

Comment is longer than usual and deals with the various ‘participation’ schemes being promoted to solve the economic and social problems of capitalism. Economic Notes looks at the problems of capitalism’s economic planners. A short discussion piece and two reviews complete this special issue.

AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW - Nos. 55 - 56.

December, 1976.

Comment ............................................................. 3
What the Fox Report Really Said ......................................................... 11
Dr. J. Camilleri
Threats to Democracy .................................. 19
Allan Ashbolt
Australian Involvement in US Militarisation of the Indian Ocean ..... 25
Owen Wilkes
Developing Job Organisation ................... 37
Dave Rimbault
The Option of Non-alignment ................... 41
Mavis Robertson
Economic Notes ... .............................. 47
The Dialectics of Capitalist Legal Policy ................................ 51
G.,H. Boehringer
Discussion ........................................................... 59
Book Reviews ................................................... 60

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As the first year of the Fraser government ended the signs were multiplying that a confrontation between government and unions could occur at any moment. The simmering tension between governments and business on one hand, and unions and workers on the other has come very close to open struggle on a number of fronts. Victorian government moves to limit union action on social and environmental issues such as Newport, Fairfax intransigence over printers’ demands and the use of scab labor (backed by plans to introduce sweeping technological changes to the printing process) and various threats to ‘get tough’ with unions are all indications that the conservative forces are itching to smash union militancy and shackle unions’ ability to act in either the narrow or wider interests of workers.

Whatever the outcome of the present confrontation it is clear that the next few months could well see an attempted decisive move by Fraser to ‘cut the unions down to size’, thus making it easier to solve the crisis in the interests of capital.

Yet while this big stick of conservative policy occupies attention at the moment, there has also been increasing prominence in recent months for another approach to solving the system’s problems. This has been labelled, in previous ‘Comments’, the carrot approach. This Comment examines that approach in more detail.

The more subtle, softline aspect of ruling class strategy is mainly bound up with various ‘participation’ schemes, but also has more general philosophical and political aspects. With the system in a crisis in many respects, after the long boom and successes of the post war years, there is a need to try to justify and shore up the system ideologically as well as to solve its objective problems in fact. And while no amount of ideology can substitute for solutions to objective problems, the battle of ideas in defence of the system and against the socialist alternative is very important - in politics, even crucial.
For, as Marx recognised long ago when he distinguished between a 'class in itself' and a 'class for itself', a class which is objectively exploited and oppressed does not necessarily see that its interests can best be served by overthrowing its exploiters and oppressors and reorganising society in its own interests. Social changes, especially revolutions, are above all political acts requiring a certain degree of consciousness, if only partial and not fully understood, about what is being done. Therefore, if socialist and progressive and militant consciousness is weak, the response of workers and others to a crisis situation may more easily be contained within the system.

The ruling class recognises this, and so wages an endless ideological campaign. In the present crisis this campaign has been stepped up, although it is also accompanied by real soul-searching by establishment thinkers as they seek to find new answers to replace the old certainties.

Of late, a large number of business leaders, Liberal politicians and capitalist ideologists have gone into print on a philosophical plane trying to explain the crisis by shifting the blame onto alleged national characteristics of laziness and softness (Jim Killen and Sir Paul Hasluck) and calling for various solutions such as worker participation schemes, share ownership by employees, etc. As Sir Robert Norman, chief general manager of the Bank of NSW, and a leading planner and advocate of capitalism put it recently, business must get out and sell its system. Business leaders, he said, can no longer afford to be political neuters. They never were, of course, but Sir Robert is really pleading for a more active intervention in politics by more business people, as his later comments show:

There can no longer be any room for any person being a neuter in the sociological and philosophical upheaval which reflects the gales of change battering our world today.

In other words, capitalism must develop its own ideology further, make it more appropriate to the real conditions of the time, and take the offensive. This ideological battle is cloaked in fine-sounding words but really has a 'crass' material aim: the self-interest of business. For, according to Sir Robert, industry makes no genuine effort to tell its employees how their organisations and industry really work. It does not make or emphasise the point that the workers' greatest enemy is not the organisation that makes a profit but the one that does not. Ours is not just a profit system, it is a profit and loss system, and on our entrepreneurial enthusiasm we either stand or fall. Profits, therefore, become the broad yardstick of our efficiency.

What worries Sir Robert is that it is precisely the profit (profit and loss, if you like, although he never poses the question: who profits and who loses?) system which is in question and doubt. After all, if, as many more are beginning to see, it is the profit system and its problems and contradictions which is the basic cause of the 'sociological and philosophical upheaval' then who can wonder at the questioning and doubt. To meet this questioning and doubt, the system's rulers and supporters are developing all sorts of theories, explanations and prescriptions, all with the aim of proving that the system is still the best of all possible worlds, that its problems are caused by the...
people who inhabit it and that if only they would change things would be OK once again. Some of the theories are just plain way out, like those of the philosopher Ayn Rand, who calls for a return to laissez-faire capitalism which even most other capitalist theorists realise is an impossibility.

But some of the theories are much cleverer and the solutions they propose are more realistic, capable of containing and confusing working class opposition unless carefully combated. Foremost among these are the various schemes for worker participation and share ownership.

These days it is not just reformist politicians who put these ideas forward; even extreme rightwingers like Willis and Fraser are looking carefully at the schemes as a possible solution to the general problems. Liberal Senator Peter Rae, writing in The Australian on April 15 under the revealing heading "The workers' role in saving capitalism" puts the pro-capital case very well:

World capitalism and its social, economic, political and environmental effects, is in the throes of a public examination for which it appears regrettably ill-prepared. There is an obvious reluctance on the part of unions, company directors and governments to face the reality of this public examination.

Worker participation, says Rae, has been discussed and resisted by 'vested interests' in such a way that the public has become 'confused':

Yet, it is, in my view, an inescapable matter for resolution if the capitalist system of private enterprise is to be preserved.

Nothing could be clearer. To make it even clearer that Rae's concept of participation is a thoroughly capitalist one, and not crypto-socialist or a sell-out to the workers, he goes on to oppose too much government intervention in business and the
development of big corporations which might stifle individual initiative. For:

*Individual activity remains, and in a free society must remain, the chief engine of development and improvement in both economic and social activity.*

Rae extolls the virtues of small business ('... still by far the largest provider of employment in Australia') and the individual entrepreneur. He wants to find a way whereby these capitalist virtues of individual initiative can be extended to involve workers and others who in reality suffer from the sort of individual initiative which Rae admires. To perform the difficult task of making people believe that they are or can be participants in private enterprise and 'individual initiative', it is necessary to provide sops which give people the feeling of a material stake in the system and some measure of control.

To preserve the opportunities for individuals we need to reform the nature of the relationship between the individual and the big corporation - particularly qua investor and qua employee. In other words we need to reform and make more efficient and attractive the avenue for participation of the capital and labor provided directly by individuals.

Economically, this is pitched more in the interests of small business and middle class people with a reasonable amount to invest than at workers, most of whom would find it very difficult to raise any significant amount to buy shares with. But politically, the main intention is to somehow find the ways to tie workers into the corporate system. Rae ends with a despairing question, aimed at the hardliners within the establishment and at those within the workers' movement willing to be conned:

*Is it too much to hope that an awareness of the problems of our economy will cause people to start looking beyond the symptoms of strikes, industrial unrest, investor apathy, declining growth rates etc. to the true nature of the disease - the failure to provide a system adequately involving a broad cross-section of individuals and sufficient to enthuse both their capital and labor participation?*

**'PARTICIPATORY' CAPITALISM**

This 'improved form of participatory capitalism' - to use Rae's somewhat grandiose term in a later article - is increasingly the concern of capitalist policy makers.

Mr. J.H. Valder, chairman of the Sydney Stock Exchange, recently called for 'worker participation in the ownership of companies' and clearly saw this as a way to tie workers into the system, to give them a stake in it so that they would defend it as theirs.

What we should be doing is making all employees and their families realise that their own welfare is dependent on the financial success of the companies for which they work.

From the establishment point of view there is not necessarily anything sinister about all this. They see their system as the only possible one so that the welfare of everyone, even those at the bottom of the heap, must depend on the health of the system. It follows logically that people must be made to see this, hence schemes like participation and share ownership.

Australian ruling class interest in these ideas was given a push by the recent visit of American advocate of the ideas, Louis O. Kelso. A corporate lawyer, he has developed the 'Kelso plan' which encourages employees to acquire shares in the company for which they work. The *Sydney Morning Herald* editor, with disarming honesty and a neat play on words, dubbed Kelso a 'corporate prophet'. That the pun was intended is clear from the discussion in the editorial:

*The obvious intention of such schemes is to break down the barrier between labor and capital and give workers a direct interest in their employers' profitability.*

And to underline the point, the editorial goes on:

*The former NSW Minister for Labor, Mr. Hewitt, believed that the plan could be the answer to industrial trouble.*

The *Herald* is, naturally, well aware of the major obstacle to the plan:
It is doubtful whether the response of the union leadership will be as favorable. Those leaders intent on heightening rather than lowering class conflict would see it as a threat to their position. They could portray it as an attempt to buy off their workers rather than allow them to participate in decision-making at board level.

The Herald is dead right about this last point. Of course they never pose the question, let alone answer it, whether the scheme is in fact an attempt to 'buy off'. Equally, it never asks whether conflict in fact should be heightened, not in the interests of trade union leaders but in the interests of that vast majority of Australians who make up the working class and who only ever get anything when they are prepared to show a little fight. And who can wonder at the suspicions of trade unionists when, as the Herald itself notes: "Mr. Fraser said .... that he found the proposal attractive "in philosophical terms' and had it under examination". A bit more ruling class philosophising! Of course, the proposal is 'philosophically attractive' because it is above all politically attractive - but then, even Mal the Knife likes to wax philosophical to tart up self-interested schemes. (The individualism involved in share ownership and the thought that even the workers can become 'little capitalists' with their own share in the system is a comforting hope in these times of 'philosophical upheaval').

LABOR PARTY POLICIES

Even more important for the working class movement is the approach and policy of the Labor Party on these questions. Various State Labor Party branches have adopted policies on worker participation although there is no sign of any precipitate rush to implement them and the politicians take great pains to dissociate themselves from any confusion with workers' control. During the May NSW election campaign, Liberal Premier Willis attacked the ALP for having a workers' participation scheme which threatened the rights of business. The Liberals sent a letter to employers asking for campaign donations on the basis that return of the Willis government was essential to preserve the free enterprise system in NSW. This exaggerated (and now, after six months of Labor government, demonstrably false) claim was backed up by reference to the worker participation policy of the NSW Labor Party. Wran very hastily denied that the worker participation policy meant workers' control and then went on to say that in any case the policy had been dropped for the time being. He explained that he had met with union leaders before giving his policy speech and they had agreed that 'industrial experiments' such as worker participation and the 35-hour week (!) would have to be put aside because of the state of the economy.

It is interesting that Wran felt he had to put aside his own party's policy so as not to scare business and that large sections of business are still wary of anything which might give workers a small say in management. For the fact is that far from threatening capitalist interests, worker participation schemes are designed to maintain them. In some countries of Western Europe these schemes have already proved their worth in containing workers and even in boosting profits. It is therefore only the conservatism and backwardness of Australian capitalists together perhaps with a fear that workers offered participation schemes might demand workers' control, which prevents them adopting the plan.
A close look at Labor Party participation policies shows clearly that they are not intended to threaten capitalism or to serve as a transition to socialism. Indeed, ALP leaders are even very careful as to the pace and degree of worker participation. In a letter to the Financial Review earlier this year, Don Dunstan stated that industrial democracy must 'develop slowly' (i.e. not too quickly!). This is from one of the foremost advocates of worker participation in the country.

The NSW Labor Party has developed a detailed worker participation policy (the one that Wran will not implement 'in the current economic climate'). The policy statement makes it quite clear that workers' participation is envisaged as operating within the system:

One of the difficulties that must face us in seeking to introduce systems of Workers' Participation in Australia is to find the appropriate form of participation having regard to our existing social and economic system and the laws and procedures already in operation for the regulation of relations between employers and employees.

In other words, in no way is the campaign for workers' participation seen as breaking out of, or even pointing away from, the existing system. From the very beginning, its proponents are careful to design it in accordance with the way things are at present. This method of introducing 'industrial democracy' is seen as the 'realistic alternative' to workers' control. It is conceded that Workers' Self-Management, as practised in Yugoslavia, is the 'ultimate in worker participation in management'. But:

The problem is that its application in Australia would be severely limited by the question of ownership.

In a socialistic state such as Yugoslavia, where the means of production, distribution and exchange are vested in society as a whole and where the workers act as managers, no problems arise.

In a mixed economy such as we have in Australia, the private ownership of capital, no matter how remote it may be (?!), presents the basic contradiction to a system of Worker Control.

This hits the nail on the head. But having come thus far, it is a pity that conclusions are not drawn as to the value for socialists in a capitalist society of promoting worker control ideas. Rather than the existing ownership of capital being the basic contradiction to a non-existent 'worker control system', the statement is far better turned around: Struggles for workers' control present a basic contradiction to the ownership of capital.

Not surprisingly, the policy's authors do not draw this conclusion, preferring instead to use the fact of private ownership as an excuse for developing participation schemes rather than struggles for control:

However, as a general rule given the fact that our society will continue well into the foreseeable future as a mixed economy with a substantial measure of private ownership (?!), then the most appropriate system to strive for is one which will work, and produce considerable tangible benefits for working people rather than one which, whilst the ultimate ideologically, would have limited practical application.

No socialist would deny that it would be much easier, in today's conditions, to
implement worker participation. But anyone claiming to be socialist should ask whether to do this will assist the socialist movement or the capitalist system. That it will more likely assist the latter can be seen from the statements of capitalist policy makers at the beginning of this Comment and from a study of the real experiences of participation schemes in other countries. An interesting light is shed on this by Per Ahlstrom, an editor of Metallarbetaren, the monthly magazine of the Swedish Metal Workers' Union, the largest in the country. (Reprinted in the AMWU monthly journal, October 1976). Since Sweden is the country where participation has been refined to a high level, and is regarded by reformists the world over as a social-democratic paradise, Ahlstrom’s views are significant. He says:

What has really happened in Sweden is that employers have realised that it is economically profitable to have good working environment. And that production often moves more smoothly if the workers, who have first-hand knowledge of the way things are done on the shop floor, are allowed to participate and give advice and tips about improvements.

Ahlstrom points out that companies in Sweden function in a different climate from that in other capitalist countries. The Social-Democrats promoted full employment and a levelling out of wages among workers. This resulted in shortages of labor during boom periods and difficulties in ‘buying’ workers by paying higher wages than competitors. Therefore, companies in Sweden hit on the working environment as a selling point to attract labor.

Companies with poor working environment and monotonous work have trouble retaining their employees. Turnover and absenteeism are high. That costs a lot of money.

Volvo was probably the first company to realise that. By backing improved environment and consultation with the workers Volvo tried to reduce personnel turnover and absenteeism. And it worked out well. An inside investigation that Volvo made is said to have indicated that investments in good working conditions produce a 20 per cent return. (My emphasis - B.A.)

It is this last fact which has helped to promote great interest in participation schemes in countries where the industrial climate does not force it. Big business is beginning to realise that participation may be more than just a way of staving off worker discontent - it may also produce dividends in the literal economic sense. Significant in this respect is the linking, in Sweden, of participation and ‘humane’ working conditions with piecework. Although in factories like Volvo’s the assembly line has been broken down and workers produce in small teams, the companies can still control work speed in their own interests. Ahlstrom notes:

There are many ways to control a worker’s working speed. The moving assembly line is just one of them. The most frequently used method is the wage system. With piecework, no moving assembly line is required. The worker is still forced and enticed to work hard in order to earn as much as possible.

The employers are reluctant to break this link between participation and piecework:

In more and more industries, unions are demanding fixed salaries. But the employers’ answer is almost always no. The Swedish employer’s desire to experiment does not go that far.

Ahlstrom concludes:

The experiments undertaken thus far by Swedish companies have not altered the relationship between employee and employer in any decisive way.

The NSW Labor Party document recognises, if only in a naive way, that business will not be very interested in participation and ‘job enrichment’ schemes unless it has something to gain:

Whilst much research material is now available on the question (of forms of worker participation) surprisingly (?) few companies have shown even the slightest interest in this area except when they are beset with high labor turnover in times of full employment.

But the question is never posed, by the authors of the document, of whether there can be any compatibility between the needs
and interests of bosses and workers. If employers are only interested in participation as a means of solving their own problems, how can it be anything more than a mechanism for propping up the system by tying workers into it more firmly?

Socialists, of course, are interested in improving the lot of workers even within the system - very often they are the most effective organisers and participants in struggles to do this. But socialists should never be part of helping to develop schemes which help the system overcome its problems. That is why the concept of workers' control, even as part of day to day struggles within the system (e.g. workers' control over safety matters) is the one which socialists should put forward in opposition to participation.

It is interesting to note that there is a theoretical underpinning for the concept of participation in the Labor policy document. This is the idea that there are no longer any big capitalists and that the real problem today is the 'professional managerial class'. The document says:

The controllers of capital in Europe have come to accept the rights of employees to share with them the responsibility for decision making at the highest level, the Board of Directors. This is as it should be as in most cases today there are no clearly distinguishable owners of capital. Rather there is the small shareholder, the bank depositor, the insurance policy holder and the mutual fund investor, people who are as powerless as are employees in dealing with the controllers of capital, the professional managerial class.

Professional Managers control the enterprises as they do the financial institutions, in most cases with no greater commitment than a desire to retain their influence, privilege and power indefinitely.

These naive and demonstrably false views, put forward long ago by the ideologists of 'people's capitalism', have been demolished, not only by Marxists, but also by 'reputable' sociologists such as C. Wright Mills. He showed that the so-called professional managerial class was well-integrated into the wealthy and powerful elite who really controlled things and that there was a strong identity of interests between them. To suggest that the small groups of big capitalists who own controlling shares in the big corporations are not in control of their own companies is as naive as the next statement in the Labor policy:

As the power of this group (the managerial class) is being checked in Europe for the good of the community ....

If one really believes this analysis then participation schemes can readily be justified as an advance for the working class. Indeed, the policy almost suggests that it is also an advance for the poor old shareholders, who are just 'as powerless as employees ....'

The test of the competing theories behind the strategies of workers' control and workers' participation lies in practice as well as analysis. If all the managers are interested in is maintaining influence, power and privilege then how does one explain the statements of capitalist representatives at the beginning of this article that workers must be convinced of the need for companies to show a profit? It can safely be predicted that, since profit is the main consideration of any capitalist enterprise, no participation scheme can ever go beyond the limits set by profit considerations. As noted above, this has been the experience in Sweden, where participation and job enrichment are most highly developed.

The real test of any participation scheme would take place if and when workers started to demand a say in the goals of production and what is produced. One can imagine the response of business if workers at, say, GMH, voted to produce public transport vehicles instead of the Golden Holden. The only way a participation scheme can work is if there is a large measure of ideological agreement between bosses, managers and workers about major questions like this - that is, if workers are firmly integrated structurally and ideologically within the system at both the workplace and the more general social level. This is to some extent unfortunately the case in places like Sweden and West Germany.

That is why socialists must firmly reject participation and similar schemes.

B.A.
20.11.76.
THE URANIUM DEBATE:
What the Fox Report Really Said

Dr. J. Camilleri

The First Report issued by the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry headed by Mr Justice R.W. Fox has given anything but the green light to the mining and export of uranium. Indeed, far from encouraging any "go-ahead", as mining interests and some of the less reputable media would have us believe, the Fox Report has properly concentrated on "the hazards, dangers and problems of and associated with the production of nuclear energy". While the Commission's recommendations lack the clarity and vigor that one would have desired, there is no disputing the fact that the Commission has accepted the main thrust of the evidence submitted to it by the opponents of nuclear power. The Commission thus concludes:

"Policy respecting Australian uranium exports, for the time being at least, should be based on a full recognition of the hazards, dangers and problems of and associated with the production of nuclear energy, and should therefore seek to limit or restrict expansion of that production." (p. 185.)

Having come to such a far-reaching conclusion about one of the most crucial questions of our time, it is perhaps disappointing that this otherwise valuable report should nevertheless contain a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies. This limitation, however, is acknowledged in the Report itself and attributed, at least by implication, to the "somewhat different views" held by each Commissioner (p.175). No doubt, it is this appreciation of the importance of value judgments which led the Commission as a whole to the conclusion that -

"Ultimately, when the matters of fact are resolved, many of the questions which arise are social and ethical ones" (p.6.)

From this premise it follows naturally that -

".... the final decisions should rest with the ordinary man and not be regarded as the preserve of any group of scientists or experts, however distinguished." (p.6.)

RISKS IN FUEL CYCLE OPERATIONS

Precisely because the Fox Report gives so little encouragement to mining and export of
uranium, the pro-nuclear lobby has been forced to rest its case almost entirely on points 1 and 2 of the summary of findings and recommendations (pp.185-6). However, on close scrutiny it is clear that these two conclusions, relating to the hazards of mining and milling uranium on the one hand and the operations of nuclear reactors on the other, do not constitute a recommendation in favor of the mining and export of uranium. The Commission has merely argued that these two risks do not, in its view, provide a compelling reason for banning the mining and export of uranium. Many would question the validity of this conclusion, but all that it entails is simply the notion that, if the Commissioners were satisfied on all other counts, they would not feel justified on these two grounds alone in recommending against uranium mining and exports. As it happens, the three Commissioners make it clear that they are far from satisfied that the many other risks, dangers and costs associated with nuclear power can be easily or effectively overcome. In any case, the Report insists on “close regulation and constant surveillance” (p.177) and admits that such controls are likely to be adequate only in relation to “the hazards involved in the ordinary operations of nuclear power reactors” (p. 185). Presumably an altogether different and unacceptable set of hazards could arise in the event of technical or human failure, war, an act of deliberate sabotage (p. 95), or earthquakes and other geological disturbances (p.97).

RADIOACTIVE WASTES

The Report readily admits that the disposal of low-level and intermediate-level wastes could pose a serious problem in the future “if supervision were relaxed, or if the operation became too widespread, or the bulk too great” (p.177). As for high-level wastes, the Commission concludes:

“There is at present no generally accepted means by which high-level waste can be permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods .... Permanent disposal of high-level solid wastes in stable geological formations is regarded as the most likely solution, but is yet to be demonstrated as feasible. It is not certain that such methods and disposal sites will entirely prevent radioactive releases following disturbances by natural processes or human activity.” (p.110.)

This assessment of likely risks leads the Commission to quote and endorse the findings of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution chaired by Sir Brian Flowers:

“There should be no commitment to a large program of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe containment of long-lived, highly radio-active waste for the indefinite future.” (p.187.)

The creation of large amounts of long-lived radioactivity is described as a problem of “first-rate international importance” which demands “careful watching” and “regular and frequent reassessment”. The Commission makes it clear that, unless satisfactory disposal methods are established in the very near future, it will not be possible to justify supplies of uranium by Australia. (p.178.)

NUCLEAR THEFT AND SABOTAGE

The Commission regards the possibility of theft and illicit use of nuclear materials and the sabotage of nuclear facilities as one of the most serious dangers surrounding the nuclear industry. It does not believe that nuclear installations can currently withstand determined assaults by terrorist organisations, or that it will be possible in the future “to provide sufficient defences to render every installation safe against attack by even small numbers of well-armed, trained men”. (p.152) In the light of evidence submitted to it, the Commission accepts the view that:

“.... a terrorist group could use reactor grade plutonium to make a bomb with good prospects of giving a yield of several hundred tonnes of TNT .... An explosive yield of a few hundred tonnes of TNT might be sufficient to destroy a very large skyscraper with severe loss of life. The ionising radiation released and the subsequent fall-out would also kill and injure many people.” (p.154.)

On the question of safeguards against such
risks, the Commission acknowledges:

"While provision of security adequate to
guarantee against terrorist intrusion is
theoretically possible .... there must be a
question whether adequate precautions
will in fact be taken." (p.178.)

The Fox Report also raises the serious
possibility that powdered plutonium might
be deliberately dispersed into the
atmosphere (p.155). Such a probability would
of course grow proportionately with the
projected increase in the amount of
plutonium circulating around the world.

The unique potential of plutonium for
threat and blackmail against society leads
the commission to the obvious but
frightening conclusion:

"There is a very real risk that the
opportunity and the motive for nuclear
blackmail will develop with time. Some
common characteristics of terrorist
groups suggest that they might attempt
to make and explode atomic bombs or
make other terrorist uses of nuclear
materials or facilities .... Major
difficulties could arise in attempting to
determine the reality of a threat by a
group to explode an atomic bomb, to
spread radiation from a reactor, or to
disperse plutonium. Either acceding to
or refusing the demands of such a group
could have very adverse consequences
for society." (p.159.)

PROLIFERATION

In the view of the Commission the most
serious danger is undoubtedly that of
proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this
regard, the inadequacy of the safeguards
provided by the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) are readily recognised. The
Commission argues, in fact, that both the
NPT and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) have contradictory
objectives in so far as they seek to promote
the peaceful uses of atomic energy while at
the same time attempting to restrict its war-
making potential. India’s detonation of a
nuclear explosive in May 1974 is cited as an
illustration of the many difficulties
surrounding any attempt to implement a
fully effective safeguards system. The
Commission concludes that “a commercial
nuclear program, particularly if it can be
designed to include enrichment or
reprocessing facilities, or both (on however
small a scale), does offer a satisfactory ‘half­
way house’ to a military objective.” (p.127.)
Hence the Commission’s blunt statement:

"The nuclear power industry is
unintentionally contributing to an
increased risk of nuclear war.” (p.185.)

The Fox Report leaves no doubt that, in its
view, the existing NPT safeguards system is
both weak and deficient. Not only has the
Treaty not received universal adherence
(p.125), but many of the non-signatories,
notably China, France, Argentina, Brazil,
India, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, South Africa,
are either nuclear or near-nuclear countries
(p.197). The powerful commercial incentives
which are encouraging the current spate of
agreements between the suppliers and the
consumers of nuclear technology are likely to
erode further the viability of the NPT system
(pp.125-6). Another obvious weakness
recognised by the Commission is the
possibility of unilateral withdrawal from
safeguards agreements:

“The wide nature of the discretion
available to each state that does wish to
withdraw is evident ... Thus, even if international safeguards were in themselves a totally adequate guarantee against diversion by governments, those safeguards are dependent upon treaty arrangements that can be terminated by unilateral act.” (p.128).

But, in actual fact, the existing safeguards are themselves far from adequate. Moreover, even if some of the difficulties could be overcome by revised drafting of the agreements, the Report raises serious doubts as to whether Australia “would be able to call upon sufficient personnel with the expertise to carry out” the functions required by back-up arrangements (p.129). Similar doubts are expressed in relation to the degree of pressure that Australia would realistically be able to exert on the importing state in order to ensure compliance with back-up safeguards requirements (p.130). Similarly at the international level, the Commission acknowledges the difficulties that are likely to arise from the growing financial burden of safeguards (p.135) as well as from the increasing demand for suitably trained personnel to carry out the necessary inspection duties (p.136).

Regarding the complex task of controlling the transfer of nuclear materials, the Commission explicitly states:

“The NPT does not prohibit the further transfer of materials by a receiving state to a third state, and is not entirely satisfactory in the provision it makes for safeguards on such transfers.” (p.130.)

This and other limitations have spurred the great powers, and particularly the United States, to seek stricter controls on the international transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear equipment. Thus far, these efforts have met with little success because they have been inevitably negated by narrowly conceived commercial and national interests.

Given the inescapable realities of national sovereignty and profit-oriented policies it is difficult to see how any improvements to existing safeguards arrangements can, in practice, mitigate, let alone eliminate, the fundamental weaknesses of the NPT system. In this regard it is worth quoting the comprehensive summary of these weaknesses provided by the Report itself, which include:

“... the failure of many states to become parties to the NPT; the inability of safeguards to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology from nuclear power production to the acquisition of nuclear weapons competence; the fact that many nuclear facilities are covered by no safeguards; the existence of a number of loopholes in safeguards agreements regarding their application to peaceful nuclear explosions, to materials intended for non-explosive military uses, and to the retransfer of materials to a third state; the absence, in practice, of safeguards for source materials; the practical problems of maintaining effective checks on nuclear inventories; the ease with which states can withdraw from the NPT and from most non-NPT safeguards agreements; deficiencies in accounting and warning procedures; and the absence of reliable sanctions to deter diversion of safeguarded material.” (p.147.)

Little wonder that the Commission is forced to the conclusion that “these defects, taken together, are so serious that existing safeguards may provide only an illusion of protection” (p.147). It is, therefore, somewhat surprising to find the Commission recommending that, in the event of Australia deciding to sell its uranium, such exports “should be subject to the fullest and most effective safeguards agreements, and be supported by fully adequate back-up agreements to the entire civil nuclear industry in the country supplied” (p.185). In so doing, the Report is merely advocating the very course of action on which it has itself cast the most serious doubts on the grounds of technical, political and economic impracticality. One can only assume that, in referring this critical question back to Parliament, the Commission’s intention is to leave it to the Australian people and to their elected representatives to determine whether or not Australia can effectively apply and enforce the stringent safeguards which are necessary but on which the international community has so far failed to agree.

WIDER SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR POWER

Although one of the most disappointing aspects of the Report is its treatment of the
social consequences of a plutonium economy, it is worth noting that the Commission was sufficiently concerned with the issue to regard it as an important reason for reducing the growth in energy consumption (p.35). Significantly, the Commission received no evidence contrary to that submitted by the critics of nuclear power who argued that increasing dependence on electricity distributed through a centralised grid "would require administration by a remote and bureaucratic technical elite, lead to a great concentration of political and economic power, and be vulnerable to large and expensive technical mistakes and failures" (p.35).

While no effort was made to assess the argument that "the large scale and complexity of nuclear power will reduce the opportunity for greater public control of decision-making and may threaten democratic procedures and civil liberties", the Commission agreed that many countries will be forced to take account of these considerations in their energy policies. Presumably the social and economic implications of nuclear power will need to be an integral part of the Australian uranium debate.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

If the pro-nuclear lobby was hoping that the weakness of its case on the wide range of safety questions would be partly offset by acceptance of the claims regarding the economic advantages of uranium mining and exports, then it must be terribly disconcerted by the findings of the Ranger Inquiry.

In the first place, the Commission has firmly rejected the argument that the industrialised Western world is currently facing or is likely to face in the foreseeable future a severe energy shortage. On the contrary, the Report explicitly states:

".... while the economies of countries heavily dependent on imported oil have been adversely affected by increase in world oil prices, it is incorrect to say that there is a presently existing world energy crisis which will create disastrous economic effects .... and it is clear that it is incorrect to suggest that there are energy impoverished nations which need Australian uranium for survival." (p.164.) [Italics added]

In this regard, the Report makes the pertinent point that "total world coal resources are so large that they will not be approaching depletion for many decades, even if the rate of energy use continues to increase exponentially as it has this century" (p.164).

The only major immediate world problem in the energy field identified by the Commission is the availability of liquid fuels. If this is an accurate assessment of current energy needs, then it is difficult to disagree with the Commission’s view that Australia’s uranium can do little to improve the situation (p.164). The Report indicates that, without the use of fast breeder reactors reserves of uranium would amount to only about 5 per cent of presently estimated fossil fuels (p.39). It is precisely for this reason that the three Commissioners have argued that the most valuable contribution that Australia could make would be to concentrate on such alternatives as the production of liquid fuels from coal and the provision of coal at economic prices as a replacement for oil. In the longer term, the Commission advocates the development of technology to utilise solar energy with a view both to low and intermediate grade heat applications as well as electricity generation.

In addition to its stress on the need for the rapid development of alternative energy resources other than nuclear power, the Commission repeatedly emphasises the value and the feasibility of energy conservation. It notes that "the major energy consuming nations have embarked on energy conservation programs of varying intensity, and that they are being given high priority" (p.34). Extrapolating from present trends, the Report predicts that energy conservation "will have a significant effect on total energy consumption by the end of the century" (p.35). Believing that "societies may come to value more highly in the future things not included in conventional measurements of economic activity" (p.33) and that zero economic growth may become a socially feasible and desirable goal, the Commission advocates the introduction of additional policy measures "to achieve desired reductions in the growth of energy consumption" (p.35) and makes one of its
principal recommendations a national program of energy conservation (p.186).

Another argument suitably squashed by the Report is the preposterous suggestion that nuclear energy is likely to solve the economic problems of underdeveloped countries. According to IAEA projections, which have had to be revised downwards, by the year 2000 the Third World would still account for only 10 per cent of world nuclear capacity (p.53). The obvious point to note about these countries is that large power generating units are not suited to their needs, and that the much smaller units required are generally uneconomic if based on nuclear power. Where nuclear energy grids exist they are more likely to supply electricity for the affluent minority in the cities than the rural masses. Accordingly, the Commission’s main recommendation in relation to underdeveloped countries is not for Australia to make available its uranium resources but rather to participate “in international efforts to develop those forms of solar energy technology most suited to the needs of developing countries” (p.56).

Advocates of nuclear power often advance the alternative argument that its widespread use in the developed countries will indirectly help the developing countries. The Commission has little confidence in the discredited theories of capitalist economic development from which this argument is derived: “Nor does it appear that the further development of nuclear power in economically advanced countries will make any significant difference to the ability or willingness of those countries to assist less affluent countries”. (p.56)

Regarding the future of the nuclear industry in the advanced industrial countries, the Report once again presents a much less optimistic picture than the pro-nuclear propaganda would suggest. Having noted the marked reduction in the number of new orders for nuclear power stations which occurred during 1974 and 1975, the Commission goes on to indicate the high probability of a reduced rate of commissioning of new stations during the next decade (p.45). Apart from the depressed demand for electricity since 1973, the Report explains this trend by reference to the large increases in the capital costs of building and commissioning nuclear stations in recent years (p.48). According to an OECD study, the total capital investment required for energy programs may thus be so high as to conflict with other economic objectives. In the view of the Commission -

“... electricity authorities generally may experience difficulties in raising finance
for heavy capital expenditures in the decade ahead .... since nuclear plants are more capital-intensive than coal-fired plants, it seems probable that the relative cost position of nuclear plants may be adversely affected by these financing difficulties.” (p.48.)

The Commission also questions the cost efficiency of large nuclear stations and concludes that “smaller-scale coal-fired generating plants may prove to be more economic than large coal-fired or nuclear generating units” (p.49).

Problems with other stages of the nuclear fuel cycle are also contributing to doubts about the economic competitiveness of nuclear generation of electricity. Present enrichment costs are heavily subsidised by governments (all enrichment plants at present in commercial operation were built for military purposes - p.27), and it is thought that the real cost of enrichment is at least twice what is charged at present (p.50). A number of governments in Western Europe are financing the construction of new enrichment plants (p.27), but efforts in the USA to induce private companies to put up the money have so far been unsuccessful (p.29) - hardly a vote of confidence in the nuclear industry by the huge transnational corporations involved. The status of reprocessing of spent fuel is even more uncertain. At present there are no plants in operation capable of reprocessing oxide fuel (the type used in the great majority of power reactors) and some severe technical problems have been encountered (p.29). If and when these problems are overcome, it appears that reprocessing will not be a profitable operation by itself, which means that the cost of nuclear electricity will be further increased (p.50).

As for the direct benefits that are likely to accrue to Australia for the sale of uranium, the report estimates that additions to national income generated by uranium exports would rise from less than 0.1 per cent of projected national income in 1980-81 to about 0.5 per cent in 1990-91, and would fall to about 0.4 per cent by the end of the century. In this context it is worth noting that the Commission rejects as too high the estimates of potential Australian uranium sales presented to it by the Australian Uranium Producers Forum, the Australian Atomic Energy Commission and Pancontinental Mining Ltd. (p.66). It should also be noted that these estimates of the contribution to national income and export revenue are based on an assumed production and sale of 30,000 tonnes of uranium per year, which is 10 times the proposed initial Ranger production; it could only be attained if all the presently known uranium deposits were mined at full capacity, plus another two or three new discoveries the size of Pancontinental’s Jabiluka. Thus it could be regarded as a rather optimistic projection. Even more sobering are the Inquiry’s findings in relation to the possible contribution to employment. It is calculated that at an initial production rate of 3,000 tonnes of U3O8 per year, the Ranger operations would employ about 600 during the construction period of two years. Thereafter, the operation would employ 250 people. Even if production were doubled, the impact on manpower requirements would be minimal, resulting in additional employment for 400 people in the first two years and 150 people thereafter (p.77). To the extent that the operation would draw largely on skilled or semi-skilled workers from the south, the mining of uranium cannot be expected to have anything but the most negligible effect on the national or even local level of unemployment.

FUTURE ACTION

Given the magnitude of the dangers and costs of nuclear power and the extremely limited benefits that Australia or the international community are likely to derive from a policy of uranium exports, it is hardly surprising that the First Ranger Report should have shown so little enthusiasm for the proposal. Not only does the Commission give no clear go-ahead for the mining and sale of uranium, not only does it make any positive decision conditional on stringent controls and safeguards, but it goes to very considerable lengths to recommend specific courses of action which, if adopted, would obviously conflict both logically and practically with any policy designed to assist the expansion of nuclear production.
On the question of regulation, the Commission stresses the need for strong central government control over all activities relating to the nuclear power industry. Such controls should be such as to ensure that the government can, at any time, immediately terminate those activities, permanently, indefinitely or for a specified period (p.185). Moreover, the Commission stresses that such controls may have to be applied irrespective of the economic disadvantages for the mining interests. Should it be concluded that the government does not have the strength to resist these pressures, then the Commission believes that the only proper course would be to refrain from any mining development (p.183). Other controls must fulfil the following objectives (pp.182-3):

* careful selection of the countries to be supplied regardless of the international tensions that such discrimination might create
* maintenance of production and price stability
* pressures from the mining industry must not be allowed to determine the course to be followed in relation to the hazards of nuclear power.
* adherence to all treaty obligations
* resale by a purchaser of Australian yellowcake to take place with Australian approval

The government must be satisfied in advance that the conversion or enrichment of Australian uranium will not create serious hazards

* the entire policy is to be subject to frequent Parliamentary decisions and consideration.

Complementing these proposed conditions, the Commission has outlined a positive program of measures, the net effect of which would be to prevent or seriously mitigate against uranium mining and exports. These include (pp.183-6):

* the establishment of a Uranium Advisory Council to assist the government in relation to all the environmental aspects covered by the Report. The Council is to command public confidence, to report to Parliament, and the majority of its members are not to be involved in the nuclear industry or the promotion of nuclear power
* initiatives to ensure that the public is kept fully informed of relevant facts, for which purpose it is strongly recommended that frequent debates take place not only in the Federal Parliament but in State Parliaments and Territory legislative bodies.
* periodical review of policies by a body independent of government and with adequate access to the public
* the establishment of the machinery for the development of regular review of a national energy policy
* immediate steps to institute full and energetic programs of research and development into alternative energy sources
* a national program of energy conservation
* ample time for public consideration of the Report and debate upon it.

This last recommendation is, in fact, at the heart of the whole issue. For it emphasises the need to reach a decision that is in full accord with the democratic process. For this purpose, the ordinary people must be made aware of the relevant facts. But there is much more to it than that. To be in command of the facts is one thing, to arrive at a considered and responsible judgment in relation to the facts is quite another. It is highly significant that after one year of solid deliberation, the Commission, composed of three distinguished men and assisted by several experts and advisers, was not able to determine “whether it is preferable to delay coming to a decision about mining for a period of several years or alternatively to proceed with carefully planned development of the industry” (p.181). Given the gravity, the complexity and the unforeseeable consequences of the nuclear project, it is only prudence and common sense to insist that any decision should be preceded by the widest public and parliamentary debate. The responsibility is too large to be entrusted to interested parties in the nuclear industry, to the experts or to the government. What is at stake is not only the future of this generation but that of countless generations yet unborn.
Since we are supposed, in this session, to be discussing the consequences of November 11 last, let me suggest for a start that at least one of the consequences has been very beneficial indeed. For almost the first time in recent Australian history it has become possible, in ordinary discourse, to speak of the ruling class without being accused of polemical extravagance, cheap rhetorical trickery or vulgar marxism.

Kerr's action, so plainly linked to advice (or should it be urging?) from the Chief Justice, made it quite plain to many previously purblind people that the privileges, prerogatives and powers of the ruling class were from now on to be considered as written explicitly into the Constitution. There was no longer any discreet pretence that political behavior was ultimately controlled by convention or democratic practice. And I think we should beware of arguments, even now sponsored by some legalists on the left, that Kerr's action was in essence a betrayal of the intentions of the Founding Fathers. In my view, Kerr's action carried out those intentions with a clarity and ruthlessness of purpose that the so-called Founding Fathers (who were, for the most part, a ripe old bourgeois bunch of political scallywags, scoundrels, hypocrites, careerists, tainted idealists and bargain-basement visionaries) would have commended. Make no mistake: the Constitution was devised to protect the interests, property, business and commerce of the ruling class. Significantly, about the only freedom it guarantees is the freedom of interstate trade. I see no point, therefore, in waxing sentimental about our inglorious Founding Fathers or in ascribing to them motives and virtues which they never possessed.
Nor do I see any point in weighing the question of whether Kerr was correctly using his powers or whether those powers actually exist. What we should remember is that powers exist when they are effectively used and there is no doubt that the powers of the Governor-General's office have been, as it were, proven by Kerr's action - and I must add, by Whitlam's failure to take any immediate counter-measures. The time for Whitlam to have acted was when Kerr handed him the dismissal notice. What would have happened if Whitlam had refused to accept it - if, after looking at it, he had torn it up? Would Kerr, as commander-in-chief, have called out the defence forces? Or would he have retreated from any assertion of his supposedly constitutional powers? But the fact is that Kerr knew his man: he knew that Whitlam was a legalist; he knew that Whitlam believed in the sanctity of high office, in procedural propriety and in pieces of paper bearing the appropriate bureaucratic stamp: and above all he knew that Whitlam, by wilfully sacking or demoting nearly all his most senior ministers, had isolated himself within the government and now stood alone, unguarded and vulnerable, at the head of a squabbling, morale-shaken and disintegrating party. Kerr probably never would have risked withdrawing the Prime Minister's commission if Whitlam had come to him that morning as the leader of a solid and united party, accompanied by a ministerial group of, say, Cairns, Connor and Cameron. As it was, Whitlam had virtually set himself up to be knocked off.

"Maintain your rage", said Whitlam, who might have done better to exhibit some rage when confronted by the Governor-General. And if there is to be any continuing expression of rage, it needs to be directed not only against the Governor-General and the monarchical principle which he enshrines but against the ruling class conspiracy of which the Governor-General's coup was the culmination. The threat to democratic rights emanates, as always, from the ruling class, and one of our tasks in the immediate future should be to identify its elements, expose its contradictions and attack its weaknesses. The events of November 11 destroyed, once and for all I hope, the myth of Australia as some vast, amorphous middle class presided over by benevolent political, social, industrial arbitrators allotting us higher or lower incomes according to merit, luck and the size of the national cake. Yet when one tries to specify the source and nature of these threats to democratic rights, one succumbs to an awful sense of deja vu, as though Australia was back in the 'fifties, 'sixties and early 'seventies, as though the Labor government had never happened. And this is not precisely because the conservative coalition is dismantling Labor's reforms; it is rather because those reforms scarcely altered social and economic relations in any fundamental way. The changes have been mostly cultural and ideological - that is to say, superstructural. Of course these changes in consciousness, with consequent changes in values, have had some effect on relations in the workplaces and on social relations generally. For example, the granting of maternity leave to women in the Commonwealth Public Service, regardless of whether the woman can show a marriage certificate, represents a change in the status of women that is both economic and cultural, both structural and superstructural. But the broad proposition remains: that partly because of obstructive tactics by the Senate majority, partly because of the Labor government's own backsliding and temporising, and partly because of the lack of ideological drive in the Labor platform as a whole, there has been remarkably little progress towards socialist objectives. Socialism, indeed, was never really on Labor's agenda; its programs were essentially (and contradictorily) posited on the well-being and survival of liberal capitalism; it was preoccupied for most of its term with welfare, community improvement and quality-of-life schemes as if its sole aim was to bring stability to the existing system; and in its final year it even became, paradoxically and tragically, the party of unemployment. As a result, the conservative coalition is now in a position to turn back the clock, to cancel out the limited and temporary advances of 1972-75, to pursue with some vigor its policies of reaction and regression.

I am dwelling for so long on these aspects of Labor's period in office because there will presumably be Labor governments in the future - that is to say, governments representing a loose and uneasy coalition of anti-capitalist groupings, some only anti-capitalist within the system and intent merely on extracting a fair deal from
capitalism others more explicitly and militantly anti-capitalist, seeking the hegemony of the working class. We have to learn from the mistakes of 1972-75 if there is to be any hope of taking this nation towards independence in its external postures, and towards socialism in its internal arrangements. The point hardly needs to be emphasised that the thrust externally towards independence must correspond with the thrust internally towards socialism. And just as the Whitlam government was hedged about with ambiguity, tentativeness and pusillanimity in its attempts to reform the economy and control the bureaucracy, so it was in its attempts to adopt an independent stance in the world. After the Terrigal Conference of February 1975 (which I once inadvertently, through a slip of the tongue, christened the Terrible Conference) it was no longer possible to treat very seriously Whitlam's professed concern with non-alignment. I believe that he was sincerely anxious to move into a new set of foreign relations; but the truth is that the Terrigal Conference wiped out, so to speak, the Lima Conference of 1974. Terrigal marked, if I may put the matter pejoratively, a surrender to General Motors and the American Chamber of Commerce; it was a declaration of non-independence from the demands of capital, especially international capital.

From that moment, the intra-government, intra-party rot took hold; and there was brutal contradiction between the scattered protestations of independence in foreign affairs and the actuality of dependence, alignment, even alliance in domestic affairs. This contradiction was soon manifested in the conduct of foreign affairs, particularly in the attitude towards Timor and, in a lesser-publicised case, the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea). I cite the instance of the DPRK because it is a country I know fairly well and for which I have some affection and admiration. Also it is a country which has tried to make a social philosophy out of self-reliance and non-alignment; and nothing, not even the rationalisation that in its geographical situation as between the USSR and China it had no other option, not even its inability to send out news releases in decent comprehensible English, can take away from that remarkable achievement. Now Australia had recognised the DPRK and exchanged ambassadors owing largely I think, to the personal intervention of Dr
Cairns with the Prime Minister. I am open to correction on this assumption, but it was certainly Cairns who cornered Whitlam into meeting and talking with the DPRK’s first big political delegation to Australia. Not much has been said about the reasons for the sudden exodus of the DPRK embassy staff just a few days before Kerr’s constitutional coup. There were news stories about a smashed car and about one-upmanship by the South Koreans in Canberra, but hardly any mention of what was fundamentally disturbing the DPRK - Australia’s shrilly-shallying in the United Nations on the question of the withdrawal of US troops from the Korean peninsula. During 1975, coinciding with the deterioration in government control over the bureaucracy, there was a resurgence within the Foreign Affairs Department of pro-American thinking: the old diplomatic warriors of the Cold War and Vietnam once again smelt blood, the Labor Party’s blood, and the Australian Ambassador to the UN decided of his own volition to continue supporting the US presence in Korea. He was eventually instructed to abstain on the crucial division, but the damage had been done with the Koreans - and anyway, the interim Fraser government soon gave him the go-ahead to vote as he had originally planned. This is perhaps not the whole background, and probably the Koreans in Canberra were too quick to anger and impatience, too unaccustomed to the pious prevarications of Western diplomacy, but even so much as is known or can be deduced from those strange events hardly backs up any notion that the Labor government was deeply attached to concepts (let alone doctrines) of independence. The lesson is that, if you surrender to General Motors in the domestic economy, then you will inevitably surrender to the US State Department on issues affecting the Korean peninsula.

Instead of dealing with threats to democratic rights and social development, following on November 11 last, I seem to be travelling backwards from November 11 and talking, at least tangentially, about the Labor government’s failure to secure democratic rights and social development. But he who moves forward without knowing and remembering the condition of the soil from whence he has come will ultimately get caught in quicksand. And I simply do not believe that the world changed on November 11. I believe that Kerr is dangerously vain and, as I wrote at the time, if not clinically insane then mad nor-nor-west. I believe, as I have indicated, that there was a confluence or conjunction, even a conspiracy of extra-parliamentary forces on the right which manipulated the downfall of the Labor government. I take no credit for prophesying to a meeting of CICD in September 1974 that something of this sort was bound to happen, because the signs were already visible at that time and the campaign of denigration was gathering pace. I believe, too, that November 11 was a defeat for the left, though not a cataclysmic one, taking into account that experiments in social democracy usually end as a defeat for the left. We should have anticipated no other result - and if that sounds fatuous, there is at least one person here who will testify to my deep sense of gloom and foreboding on the night of the election victory in December 1972. So why am I expected to examine threats arising particularly from November 11? Probably because, although the threats may not have changed in character since the late ’sixties and early ’seventies, they have now acquired what might be called an imminence. November 11 changed not the threats; it changed our consciousness of those threats.

A list of threats tends to be a string of platitudes: unemployment is a threat because it robs people of the right to work; tightening of the national education budget is a threat because it restricts the right to knowledge; the virtual abolition of Medibank is a threat because it consolidates the perquisites of the bourgeoisie and denies these same advantages to the working class. And if I leaf through my last book, especially the speeches and articles from the 1960s, I can abstract from it an impressive catalogue of threats which still have relevance: high expenditure on military hardware, foreign military bases on the Australian mainland, a sellout of mineral resources to foreign countries, the grip of multinational combines either directly or through compradore companies, military alliances like the ANZUS treaty (a treaty which memorialises, so to speak, Australia’s response to the Korean war). The words “foreign” and “military” keep recurring, for these are key words in the political dictionary of a dependent nation. The threats from racism have not receded much since those days,
either, especially for the aborigines. Then there are threats which have already materialised into government attacks on basic rights or freedoms; the right to organise labor (i.e. the right to form and run trade unions); the right to withdraw labor (i.e. the right to strike); the right to receive information (i.e. the right to uncensored news and comment); the right to express opinion (i.e. the right to publish or demonstrate).

I must even confess to a grudging admiration for the way in which Fraser, with an ideological decisiveness that Whitlam never showed, has honed in on the national radio and television service. His avowed aim is the "depoliticisation of broadcasting, by which he means intensifying, solidifying and making irreversible its bourgeoisification. I would never pretend that the ABC is anything but a pillar of the Establishment, busy essentially with the propagation of bourgeois tastes, opinions and values. There is an important sense in which even the more radically oriented programs of, say, my own department serve this purpose either by drawing attention away from the generally conservative and sometimes downright reactionary bias impacted in most of the ABC’s news, information and comment, or by giving the ABC an opportunity, when attacked for intellectual rigidity and dead-handedness, to point to its own democratic tolerance, liberalism and fair-mindedness. Yet, whatever its failures, absurdities and pomosities, however much it embodies (or perhaps embalms) the cultural gentility, political timidity and moral hypocrisy of Australian life, the ABC has been gradually moving since about 1970 towards a more pluralistic program output, one which expresses a wider range than ever before of ideas and cultural fashions; towards a devolution of control, a breaking down of authoritarian and hierarchical control, in actual program production; and and towards a rejection of stylistic influences from the BBC and the US networks. It is these trends which Fraser finds offensive and which he is obviously determined to stifle, by appointing a chairman in his own ideological image, by encouraging ABC management to use the iron heel, and probably by introducing bureaucratic machinery to incorporate the national service more firmly in the commercial system.

In this scheme of things, the public sector would play only a supportive role to the private sector, looking after such minority concerns as religious broadcasts, rural broadcasts, schools broadcasts and high culture broadcasts, which the commercial stations avoid as unprofitable yet which appear to assist in maintaining bourgeois health and stability. Increasingly, too, the ABC would become an outlet for, say, Time-Life interpretations of the history of Europe (as in a recent television series, “The Mighty Continent”), for dramatised, romanticised, bowdlerised political and sociological sagas from the BBC, and for so-called international productions of cops and robbers stories with US film outfits. Thus would the ABC pursue its sanctified task of propping up the superstructure and contributing, in the expectation of the Fraser government, to capitalist longevity. Meanwhile, the commercial stations could stay full throttle on exploiting the vulgarity and hysteria of the commodity culture and on making the world safe for selling merchandise. And there is hardly need to add that, in this set of circumstances, RCA (just to take one example) would continue to flourish and expand as a rent-collector for television satellite relays and overseas voice circuits, as a supplier and purveyor of films and gramophone records, and as an investor in Australian manufacturing and media companies.

What I am trying to say is that for all the ABC's grotesqueries and inadequacies, it deserves to be recognised as the only media instrumentality to which the Australian people still have some right of access. I am not claiming that it is owned or controlled by the people in any politically meaningful sense; but its responsibilities to opposition parties and its susceptibilities to pressure groups have made it more diverse in its representation of interests, tastes and opinions than most other media institutions. And the degree of political consciousness among the staff just about reflects what is to be found in the populace at large. The ABC has become, indeed, a useful barometer of the political climate; and the battles now being fought in and around the ABC (like this week's blackout by the Women's Co-operative of a management-censored program) give some indication of the sort of conflicts that will probably occur in bigger
public arenas. Let it not be thought that I am prophesying a vanguard function for the ABC - but, partly in justification of this excursion into its complexities and permutations, I would remind you of one fundamental strategic mistake made by the French students and workers in May 1968. They took over the Odeon Theatre as a platform for their keynote speeches, primarily because it was the site of so much of the nation's cultural heritage and thus seemed historically appropriate. They would have been far wiser, of course, to have taken over national radio and television.

The reasons for discussing the ABC is not to make a diversion but to ask a question: which institutions or groupings in this present social formation can we expect to create a consciousness of the need for national independence? If we were to think only of media institutions, the picture is rather bleak. Beyond the ABC, with its limited horizons and capacities, the commercial monopoly of Fairfax, Murdoch, the Melbourne Herald and Packer is as entrenched as ever, and its connections with the electronics industry (in which there is a strong foreign component) has been if anything strengthened. Murdoch is practising a form of media imperialism which infuses his Australian papers, by processes of cultural feedback and merging, with political values borrowed from his British and American newspapers. Book publishing, except for a few (a declining few) Australian houses, has been steadily absorbed into empires headquartered in London and New York. And when, not many years ago, RCA bought Random House and CBS acquired McGraw-Hill in order to establish dominance in the text-book business, it signalled an ominous stage in the reach of the media monopolists towards global control of education - not just classroom or lecture-room teaching but the dissemination and inculcation of values through radio and television entertainment.

But we must not despair, because the main impetus for an awareness of the meaning and necessity of national independence will not come from the press and from broadcasting - which are, after all, only secondary agents of change. The primary agent of change is still the working class - and in effect this means at the moment the vanguard trade unions. Even to properly interpret what is happening in the media, one should not merely read the newspapers, listen to the radio or watch television, one must also assess the situation in the media unions or on the shop floor of media institutions. The ABC has to be judged, for example, not so much by its programs as by the attacks on authoritarianism, hierarchism, careerism and censorship coming from its employees. The press likewise has to be looked at in the context of worker unrest, particularly among printers faced with job obsolescence and unemployment, and in the context too of a widening assertion of journalistic dignity and integrity.

We as a movement can find our base, our constituency, only in the working class - and at present only in the unions specifically. Independence in foreign affairs is virtually unattainable unless workers themselves have achieved a substantial measure of social and economic independence, of control over their own industrial conditions and their own social relations. To call for an independent stance externally is, as I suggested earlier, meaningless without a corresponding campaign for the independence of the working class internally from the constrictions and humiliations of capital. This is not to rubbish the idea of national independence and non-alignment; it is to locate a source of strength for the achievement of national independence in a working class conscious of its own independence - a class both in itself and for itself. There are undoubtedly threats to democratic rights in this country, and it is not beyond possibility that Australia could sink into the human degradation, moral infamy and judicial violence of, say, Brazil - a country with which we are sometimes compared in terms of resources and where social development involves the jailing and torture of dissenters, the suppression of free speech and open demonstrations, the secret execution of leftwing academics and journalists, the persecution of communists and radical catholics alike. But the main threat is that we may not fully understand or sufficiently believe in our own potential for independence, class independence as well as independence in foreign relations. If, as a result of November 11, 1975, Australians can now talk about the power of the ruling class, they should also begin to talk about the power of the working class.
Australian Involvement in U.S. Militarisation of the Indian Ocean

Owen Wilkes

Over the last five years the countries bordering the Indian Ocean have been pressing for the establishment of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean which would block the escalation of great power military presence in the area. Australia and New Zealand voted for a UN General Assembly resolution in December 1972 which supported the general concept of such a Peace Zone. Over the same period modest escalation of both US and Soviet military activities has occurred in the area. The Soviet expansion has of course been continually emphasised and exaggerated in the West, while American expansion has gone largely unnoticed.

Then came the Middle East War and the Arab oil embargo, and the Indian Ocean suddenly became very important to the US. European allies had largely refused to help the US airlift to Israel, and it was obvious that in any future oil war US invasion forces would have to be routed through the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the US military was being forced out of South-east Asia. New bases, new allies and new weapons had to be found and built.

Over the same period, Australia and New Zealand have been subjected to increasing pressures to endorse this militarisation of the Indian Ocean and to become physically involved. Now, in 1976, with conservative governments, as pro-US as any in the past, we find ourselves committed to an Indian Ocean policy deplored by most Indian Ocean nations, and even by liberal elements in the US Congress. Moreover, we are likely to be dragged into another war - in the Middle East or in Africa - fighting for the US and against the people who should be our friends. The situation is disturbingly similar to that of ten or twelve years ago when America was soliciting our participation in the war against Vietnam.

This article examines the Soviet "threat" in the Indian Ocean, the US military "response" to that alleged threat, and America’s real objectives in the Indian Ocean.
THE SOVIET NAVAL BOGEY

In recent months our news media and governments have made frequent allegations about a massive Soviet military buildup in the Indian Ocean. However, documented facts and statistics do not substantiate the allegations.

The military situation in the Indian Ocean up until 1974 has been usefully summarised in a report commissioned by the UN Secretary-General and released in May 1974. (1) This report describes how the Soviet Navy first moved into the Indian Ocean in 1967 when a space tracking ship appeared. Since then, the Soviet presence has been fairly continuous, building up from 529 “ship days” in 1968 to 2487 in 1973 (fighting ships only). By 1973 the flotilla typically consisted of three to five small warships, two or three submarines, two minesweepers, two oilers, two to four supply ships, and maybe an oceanographic ship - about twelve ships in all. The flotilla has never been particularly active, apparently being constrained by lack of shore facilities and resupply problems, so that the ships spend much of their time moored to buoys in the central ocean.

There have been occasional bursts of activity, in particular during the Bangladesh war in 1971 and in the October 1973 Middle East war. For a while after the Bangladesh war there were up to ten Soviet minesweepers clearing Chittagong Harbor; their presence was used in the West to boost to twenty the alleged number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean.

Since the UN survey, Soviet ship numbers have begun to decline. According to retired Admiral Gene Laroque, the Soviet flotilla was reduced from twelve to five or seven vessels, of which the biggest is a destroyer. (2) More recently still, according to a US Defence Department spokesman, the Soviet presence has been reduced to only four combatant vessels. (3) It should be remembered that Soviet minesweepers “are technically classified as combatants”. (4) So at present the Soviet flotilla is the third biggest in the Indian Ocean. France, with eighteen vessels has the most, and the US, with eight, is second biggest. The US presence is the most powerful, however, because as described below, it includes larger ships with greater fighting capability.

The figure of four Soviet vessels has been accepted by diverse publications from Newsweek to the New China Newsagency. While reduced in numbers, the Soviet flotilla has been upgraded to some extent in that it
now includes a modern Krivac class guided missile destroyer.

Alarm has also been generated in the West by claims that the USSR has numerous military bases in the Indian Ocean and is acquiring more. At various times it has been alleged that the Soviet Union had bases at Berbera (Somalia), on Socotra, near the Chagos Archipelago, at Umn Qasra (Iraq), at Aden, at Chittagong, in Mauritius, Zanzibar, at Trincomalee (Ceylon), Vishakapatnam (India) and elsewhere. The Australian Liberal-Country Party once even claimed that Singapore had become a Russian base!

In fact, the most that has ever happened at any of these places with one exception is that Soviet naval ships have made port calls there. Soviet ships have occasionally put into Singapore for repairs on the same commercial basis as have ships of other nations. Near the Chagos and Seychelles Islands, the Soviet Navy has mid-ocean mooring buoys, but no shore facilities of any kind. There is no other factual information to support the other claims.

The one allegation of a "Soviet base" which is less easily dismissed concerns Berbera in Somalia. To bolster up its own case for enlarging its Diego Garcia base, the US has been saying a lot about Berbera. According to US Navy spokesmen and others, Berbera is a truly massive base with a fully equipped port for vessels up to 12,000 tons, facilities for the servicing and storage of sophisticated cruise missiles, a nearly completed airfield for Soviet aircraft, a long range high frequency communications centre, barracks for 1500 men, and a fuel tank farm. All this sounds very impressive, almost as impressive as what the use US is building at Diego Garcia. In fact, the reality is that at Berbera there is a Somalia port used by Soviet vessels (5); and an airfield which has once been used by Soviet marine reconnaissance planes. (6) The fuel tank farm has only one-quarter the storage capacity of that being built by the US on Diego Garcia. (7) The Berbera communications facility consists only of "two large rhomboid antennae". (8) A rhomboid is a medium power, unsophisticated antenna that can operate in only one direction for point-to-point communications. US Defence Department intelligence photos reprinted in Air Force Magazine show the facility to be absolutely insignificant compared with the hundreds of hectares of antennae the USN has at its Indian Ocean bases (described later). (9)

Both the Soviet Union and Somalia have denied that Berbera is a missile base, and Somalia invited some US legislators to look for themselves. The senators could find no "facilities for the servicing and storage of sophisticated cruise missiles". Senator Dewey Bartlett saw only some ancient (1959 vintage) Styx missiles of 48 kilometre range - and indeed the Pentagon had already admitted that this was all that was there. (10) Lots of navies besides the Soviet Navy have Styx missiles - including those of India, Iran and Egypt. There is no evidence that any of this constitutes a "Soviet Base" - it simply represents military equipment given or sold by the Soviet Union. It is not in dispute that Somalia has acquired USSR-made aircraft, and that there are about 1,000 Soviet military "advisers" in Somalia. (11)

Another Western technique for enhancing the scariness of the Soviet bogey is to claim that the opening of the Suez Canal will allow the Soviet Navy to reinforce its Indian Ocean flotilla with elements of its Black Sea fleet, and this will give it tremendous strategic advantage over the US. In fact, the opening of the Suez Canal has given the US even greater accessibility for its Mediterranean fleet which, moreover, is not subject to the constraints suffered by the Black Sea fleet having to pass through the Turkish Straits, where it is subject to NATO surveillance. The absurdity of this particular argument is obvious when one considers that it was the US Navy that did most of the work of reopening the canal and since its reopening it has been used by the French, US and British Navies, but not by that of the USSR. (12) William Colby, ex-CIA director, has been quoted as saying that opening Suez did not help the USSR, and that the USSR would not use it because of instability in the area. (13) It is also worth noting that the Soviet Pacific fleet's access to the Eastern Indian Ocean from Vladivostock is similarly constrained by the narrow straits controlled by Japan and South Korea. Also the distance the Soviet fleet has to transit from Vladivostok is much greater than that which the US Pacific fleet has to cover from its major bases in the Philippines and Guam.

No Western propaganda picture of the
Soviet Navy is complete without a mention of the Soviet trawlers which, to quote one propagandist “provide the most sophisticated intelligence to any nation afloat”. The USSR normally has about forty big trawlers in the Indian Ocean and no doubt some, or all of them indulge in any radio snooping that is possible. But sophisticated snooping is just not possible - shipborne antennae are too unstable, too small, and subject to too much radio interference from other onboard electronic gear. Sophisticated electronic spying is only possible with giant antennae like those of the US described later.

The magnitude of Soviet Naval activities in the Indian Ocean can best be summarised by quoting the former director of the CIA, William Colby, who in closed door testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, said that the Soviet presence was “relatively small and inactive”. He dismissed any threat from this force by pointing out that a number of constraints limited its effectiveness - in particular it lacked air cover and it lacked land bases. (14)

Having disposed of the Russian bogey it remains to consider why the USSR maintains the modest presence which it has in the Indian Ocean. All the evidence suggests that the main reason is simply to impress allies and potential allies. Soviet vessels “show the flag” in any port they are welcome at (no doubt intending that the flag will be plainly visible from Peking!) and indulge in a little bit of western-style gunboat diplomacy on such occasions as the Bangladesh war. There is certainly nothing commendable about this, but it is not particularly sinister either. At least the Soviet Navy has always been quite careful to keep out of real wars. The way for us to deal with the problem is to set up a zone of peace rather than start a naval arms race.

The USSR can of course justify its presence by pointing out that the US was there first (which it was). The USSR had no naval presence there until the construction of North West Cape Naval Communication Station was completed, which was taken to signify that Polaris/Poseidon submarines, with missiles targeted on the Soviet Union, were deployed in the Indian Ocean. (15) If the Soviet ships have any strategic function at all it would be to impose some check on this missile threat. However, it is generally accepted that even detecting, let alone destroying nuclear subs is not feasible. The Soviet ships show no specialisation and are not in sufficient numbers to be able to do this.

There are two other reasons why the USSR may feel an Indian Ocean presence is necessary. Firstly, the USSR has a considerable mercantile traffic through the Ocean, in particular carrying cargo from one end of the Soviet Union to the other. Secondly, about one-third of the USSR’s mid-ocean fish catch comes from the Indian Ocean, and they may feel the fishing fleet needs protection, perhaps from an Iceland-style “cod war”.

GROWTH OF U.S. PRESENCE

The US entered the Indian Ocean in 1950 with the stationing of “Mid East Force”, consisting of two destroyers and an amphibious ship, at Bahrein. This situation remained fairly static until about 1959 when contingency plans were filed for the Pacific Fleet to enter the Indian Ocean if necessary and negotiations were commenced for siting a naval communication station on Australia’s Indian Ocean shore. This base - North West Cape - was completed in 1967, integrating the Indian Ocean into the worldwide Defence Communications system, and in particular providing very-low-frequency communications receivable by totally submerged submarines.

The US sent a task force including the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise into the Indian Ocean in December 1971 while the Indo-Pakistan war was in progress. The next month, the Pentagon announced that the US would maintain a permanently increased presence in the region, and the jurisdiction of the Pacific Fleet was extended to include the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, the Navy was also taking steps to establish a more permanent presence ashore. Thailand already offered adequate facilities on the Indian Ocean periphery but it was decided that a more central location was also needed. Diego Garcia - an atoll with only a small human population - was ideal. Britain had purchased the atoll from Mauritius in 1965 for possible use as a joint US-UK base, a US-UK agreement was signed in 1966, and preparations for construction there were announced in 1970.
The thousand or so helpless inhabitants were removed and dumped in Mauritius where they remain to this day in abject poverty. The British Foreign Office has admitted that there was "some reluctance to move and the Mauritius government says 'it is basically true - these people are having a tough time.'" (16)

But no-one cared. The base was completed in 1973. It was described officially as an "austere" communication facility with "only" an 8,000 foot runway and about 250 men.

When the October 1973 Middle East war broke out Diego Garcia underwent rapid augmentation, with a TSC-54 communications satellite ground terminal being flown in from North West Cape. (17) The aircraft carrier Hancock was moved into the Indian Ocean and later was replaced by the Oriskany. It was announced that the US presence was to be further stepped up.

Sure enough, in January 1974, the Pentagon announced that Diego Garcia would be turned into a full-scale base with an airfield long enough to take fully loaded B52s and F111s, an anchorage for a permanent task force, a repair tender for ships and subs, marine reconnaissance aircraft, and about 600 men.

This upset just about everyone. It upset the US Senate and Congress, although both eventually approved. It upset the British who theoretically owned the island and it upset the Mauritians who had sold the island to the British on the understanding that it was to be used as a communications base only. Almost all the nations around the Indian Ocean, including Australia and New Zealand, expressed disapproval. Chester Bowles, a former US Ambassador to India said that it was "a new incursion by America into waters it does not need and cannot protect, a move whose cost benefit ratio is negligible, in an area where its armed forces have become even more unwelcome."

The size and complexity of Diego Garcia are far in excess of any needs created by the Soviet presence; even Time magazine noted that "the powerful new American air-naval base nearing completion on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia is far more sophisticated than any facilities that the Russians have yet developed along the African coast."

### US NAVAL SHIPPING IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

As already described, the US has had a continuous Indian Ocean presence since 1950 and this presence has continuously expanded. It has included a number of anti-submarine exercises, some held under SEATO auspices (remember SEATO?) with Australian and NZ participation. These anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises are presumably concerned with preventing any Soviet sub-attacks on the US missile subs there.

The US now has about eight ships in the Indian Ocean, often including an aircraft carrier and a guided missile cruiser. Until recently the number of American ships and ship-days was always less than that of the Soviet Union - probably because of the obvious propaganda advantages that accrued to the US.

The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff has provided figures for ship-days from 1965 to 1973 (18) while figures for 1974-75 are available from the USIS. (19) These figures may be summarised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Soviet</th>
<th>US</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-67</td>
<td>0 800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>529 800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>1138 800</td>
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<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>1670 872</td>
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<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>1480 858</td>
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<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>2397 990</td>
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<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>4610 1572</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>2940 1409</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* These figures are for fighting or combatant ships only - that is they do not include supply ships, tankers, etc. Soviet minesweepers are included - they are technically classified as combatant by the US. (20)

There are two points to be noted about the figures. Firstly, that the US started this admittedly minor arms race. Secondly, that
"ship-days" are an inadequate measure because they take no account of ship age, size, or sophistication.

Thus, the US figures include aircraft carriers which maybe have twenty times the firepower of a destroyer. The Soviet Navy has no aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean. Remember also that the Soviet ships are hindered by long supply lines and their lack of shore facilities.

This still leaves the problem of whether there are American missile subs in the Indian Ocean. It is generally assumed that North West Cape base was built to provide Command and Control communications to Polaris and Poseidon subs in the Indian Ocean. Admiral Laroque in March 1974 congressional testimony said there was little doubt that parts of the Indian Ocean have been used as patrol areas. If missile subs are present they would be from the Guam squadron. As the US loses its Mediterranean bases and as Soviet ASW improves, the Mediterranean may become too "hot" for American subs, leading to increased Indian Ocean deployment. The new high-speed Trident subs with much longer range missiles will have vastly better operating economics for Indian Ocean deployment.

**US BASE FACILITIES AND BASES AVAILABLE TO THE US**

The US has a comprehensive network of bases which facilitate its military activities everywhere in the Indian Ocean area. The principal base is, of course, Diego Garcia, already described.

**Naval bases:** Until recently, the main base supporting ship operations was that of Bahrein. But since the Bahrein regime pretended to order the US out of Bahrein in the aftermath of the 1973 Middle East war, the Pentagon has been disinclined to rely too heavily on this base.

Diego Garcia will soon be supplemented by base facilities at Cockburn Sound near
Strategic waters: A new superpower rivalry for naval dominance

Military map of the Indian Ocean according to American journal, *Newsweek.*

Perth. This is a big base with berthing and repair facilities under construction for large ships and submarines. There will also be a magazine for storing naval ammunition, torpedoes and missiles and a communication facility. Fremantle and Perth provide nearby heavy engineering backup. (21)

Construction of Cockburn Sound was begun in 1971 when Malcolm Fraser, then Defence Minister, made it clear that the US was an intended user. The USN had initial plans to homeport one destroyer there, (22) but these plans had to be shelved when the Whitlam government came to power and construction was ordered to virtually cease. With a tory government back in power, Admiral Holloway, US Chief of Naval Operations, claims that the US now has the all-clear to base nuclear powered vessels (i.e. submarines?) there, allegedly to defend sea lanes between the Middle East and Japan. Admiral Holloway says there are no plans to base strategic missile submarines there. (23).

At Char Bahar in Iran, another big $600 million naval-air base is being constructed under a shroud of secrecy by American contractors, ostensibly for Iran, but presumably it will be available to the US. (24)
There are currently 24,000 US advisers in Iran.

The US has access to port and airfield facilities in Oman. (25).

The US is also expanding military port facilities at Jubail on Saudi Arabia's east coast. The Pentagon last year awarded a $181.5 million contract to a South Korean construction company, hoping thus to avoid the ire of the US Jewish community. (26)

South Africa's Simonstown naval base was formerly used extensively for Indian Ocean operations by the US Navy, but this had to be discontinued because black crew members were subjected to South Africa's apartheid practices.

The US Army's Military Review has suggested that the US should establish a naval base in the bantustan or "homeland" of Transkei. (27)

Although Subic Bay in the Philippines and Guam are geographically outside the Indian Ocean, they are close enough to service Indian Ocean operations by the US Navy, but this had to be discontinued because black crew members were subjected to South Africa's apartheid practices.

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Although Subic Bay in the Philippines and Guam are geographically outside the Indian Ocean, they are close enough to service Indian Ocean operations - as indeed they did during earlier task force incursions during the Bangladesh war, etc. Singapore is also available to and used by US naval ships.

Air bases: Diego Garcia will soon be the principal US Indian Ocean air base. Other bases used or usable by the US include Learmonth (28) (near North West Cape), Cocos Island (29), an Australian possession, Gan (a British airbase in the Maldives), Mahe (in the Seychelles), Char Bahar (Iran), and, until recently, Utapao, in Thailand. USAF planes make frequent use of Singapore, where the Lockheed Corporation, with Pentagon financing, has taken over the former RAF repair facilities at Changi.

Clark Airbase, in the Philippines, although geographically outside the Indian Ocean, is close enough for transports, marine reconnaissance Orions, SR-71 spy planes, and bombers to operate over the Indian Ocean.

MARINE RECONNAISSANCE

One very important factor that has not been given much consideration in comparison of US/USSR strengths and intentions is America's complete coverage of the Indian Ocean by maritime reconnaissance aircraft - principally P3C Lockheed Orions. The Orion has an operational range of about 2300 miles. If one draws 2300 mile radius circles around the airbases from which US and allied Orions are known to operate - i.e. Learmonth, Cocos, Diego Garcia, and Char Bahar, - it is seen that the US has the practical capability of keeping the entire Indian Ocean under surveillance. According to ex-CIA Chief William Colby the Soviet Union has no equivalent capability.

America's allies perform a large proportion of the surveillance. Australia flies Orions out of Learmonth and Cocos while New Zealand patrols into the Indian Ocean from Singapore (according to Prime Minister Muldoon, who produced photos of Russian ships allegedly taken from NZ Orions over the Indian Ocean.) Iran has also been provided with Orions by the US. All this surveillance is directed and coordinated by the USN which assigns areas of responsibility, and 'targets' detected in one area are passed on to the ally in the next area whenever targets progress over a boundary. All data is forwarded to and processed by the USN. The same integrated operation extends over the Pacific, with the US, Japan, Australia, and NZ each having their own areas.

South Africa flies Shackleton marine reconnaissance planes which also contribute to the overall surveillance. South Africa wanted to buy Orions but the US refused on the grounds that they might be used against insurgencies. There are still congressional pressures "to sell them the P3C aircraft to gain the intelligence that would be produced therefrom" (30)

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE

The US has a world wide network of electronic listening posts engaged in eavesdropping on other nation's radio traffic and pinpointing the location of transmitters. These listening posts rely in particular on gigantic Wullenweber antennas of up to 35 acres extent, and about 30 metres high. Being so big, they are hard to hide, and are easily identified. Wullenweber antennas suitably placed for monitoring the Indian Ocean are located at San Miguel (in the Philippines, and recently reactivated to
substitute for one closed down in Thailand), at Abu Musa (Iran), and at Asmara (Ethiopia).

The Wullenwebers are operated by “naval security groups” or USAF Security Service personnel for the National Security Agency. A Naval security group also operates at North West Cape, apparently with less sophisticated antennas. Its existence was inadvertently revealed in congressional military construction hearings. (31)

American electronic intelligence capability is currently being augmented by Iran which has hired the Rockwell International Corporation to build an additional airborne and ground based radio intercept staffed with ex CIA and National Security Agency staff. The CIA is supposed to be a beneficiary of this augmented capability. (32)

The South Africans operate a big electronic snooping base at Silvermine Mountain, near Simonstown. According to a Wall Street Journal reporter “on Silvermine video screens the Ocean areas from the East coast of South America to Bangladesh and from the bulge of South Africa to the Antarctic can be represented in their entirety or in sections. At the touch of a computer console, a watch officer can summon, for example, a geographic display of all merchant ships in any selected area, or all east-bound merchant ships, or all naval vessels.

“Having spotted a vessel on the video display, the operator can query the computer for any combination of the ship’s characteristics including type, size, course, speed, flag, cargo ... A touch of the keyboard also evokes similar data on all aircraft in the area.” Classified data from this system is fed through the US naval communication station at Londonderry, Northern Ireland, to the US itself. (33)

The US wanted to augment the Silvermine facility with its own radar gear to be installed under Nato auspices, but this was blocked last year by the other Nato countries.

One example of how this network is used was given by a defector from the US National Security Agency writing in Ramparts, August 1972. He described how the US used off-shore ships to “D.F.” (direction find) a radio transmitter of the Mozambique liberation forces, “then they’d correlate with our installation in Ethiopia which also had intercepted it, and pin point the source.”

The Soviet Union appears to have no equivalent electronic intelligence system, apart from those ubiquitous trawlers.

The existence of such a network around the Indian Ocean allows any radio transmitter aboard ship, submarine, or aircraft to be instantly determined by triangulation. Cryptanalytic computers allow near instantaneous decoding of radio messages.

SATellite SURveillance

The US has “Big Bird” and other spy satellites in high inclination and Polar orbits, principally for photographing military facilities within communist countries and for supplying intelligence in war areas such as the Middle East. These satellites are controlled and interrogated by a world-wide network called the USAF Satellite Control System (SCS). Indian Ocean bases for SCS are located at Mahe in the Seychelles and at Nurrungar, Australia. Until mid-1975, the US also had a Nasa satellite tracking station on Madagascar with classified military functions which probably included monitoring spy satellites. When the US was forced to leave classified documents were burned, computers smashed, and secret telemetry records, master tapes, etc. were destroyed. (34)

The advantage of having ground stations in the Indian Ocean is that satellites can be commanded to focus on particular targets, and the resulting data can be received all more or less instantaneously. The Soviet Union has similar satellites but no ground stations in the Indian Ocean area, and thus would have to wait until the satellites were over the Soviet Union to command or interrogate, so that any particular snooping operation might take several orbits, and therefore several hours, to complete.

The US has missile early warning satellites in geostationary orbits over the eastern end of the Indian Ocean, and according to some reports, over the western end as well. They are monitored by a ground station at Pine Gap in Australia. Their principal function is to detect missile launches, including test missiles, within the
Soviet Union, but they could also monitor submarine launched missiles in the Indian Ocean. Other sensors aboard these satellites are designed to detect nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and in space.

The Soviet Union is only beginning to deploy an equivalent system.

COMMUNICATION NETWORK

The US Navy has large communication bases at North West Cape, Diego Garcia, and Asmara. North West Cape has a two megawatt VLF transmitter, the other two have smaller VLF transmitters, all for communicating with totally submerged submarines. Other equipment at these bases, and at Mahe, Bahrein, Madagascar, and elsewhere provide ship to shore and aircraft to ground communications and also point to point communications as part of the general purpose world-wide Defence Communications System. America’s arsenal of nuclear weapons is controlled through this latter system.

The Soviet Union has no equivalent facilities in the Indian Ocean, although it does have a small communication base at Berbera.

MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT

The USAF Military Airlift Command operates C5A Galaxies and C-141 Starlifters over a network of routes in the Indian Ocean. North West Cape, for example, is supplied by Starlifters from Hickam AFB (Hawaii) through Christchurch (NZ), Richmond, and Alice. Diego Garcia is supplied from Hickam through Yokota (Japan) and Cocos, and also from Clark AFB. Other routes exist but are not known in detail. MAC maintains hangars, repair equipment, spare parts, and storage at various airfields including Dhahran in the Persian Gulf and Pearce in Western Australia.

These routes, airfields and depots are significant not only because they help maintain bases in operational readiness, but because they also provide a continual rehearsal of the massive airlift of troops and equipment from the Pacific to the Middle East that will be needed if the US decides to go to war in the Middle East in the event of another oil embargo. The Soviet Union flies transports to various African countries but has no ocean-wide network like that of the US.

US OBJECTIVES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Western propaganda includes a lot of rubbish about filling the “vacuum” left by British withdrawal. “Vacuum” as used here is a meaningless term and any military deficiency felt by Indian Ocean nations can easily be put right by Indian Ocean nations themselves, singly or in combination. The Indian Ocean nations do not sense any “vacuum” that must be filled, as though in response to some inexorable physical law, by the US against the expressed wishes of the local people.

Guaranteeing “freedom of navigation” is similarly meaningless. If the phrase had any meaning then every powerful nation would be justified in patrolling every ocean. In fact, piracy on the high seas just hardly ever happens.

A franker explanation of America’s motives in the Indian Ocean can be got from the testimony of Admiral Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, to the Senate Defence Appropriations Subcommittee in May 1974.

Zumwalt said that world-wide Navy mission requirements were in order of priority:

1. Assured second strike capability
2. Sea control capability
3. Ability to project power ashore

Assured second strike refers to the missile submarine’s assured capability of launching a retaliatory (i.e. second) strike in response to a first strike by the enemy. In the Indian Ocean this requirement is either not present or is satisfied by submarines patrolling from Guam, together with the communication bases which will send the firing order, and Omega navigation transmitters.

Sea control means the ability to deny the oceans to other nations in time of war. The near omniscient and omnipresent surveillance systems described above, in conjunction with maritime patrol bombers
(i.e. the Orions) and the Indian Ocean task force based at Diego Garcia will meet this requirement.

"Projection of power ashore" is the current euphemism for gunboat diplomacy - the use of aircraft carriers to threaten small nations, the ability to send the marines anywhere to interfere in other people's affairs and so on. The Indian Ocean task force, as currently configured, together with the Military Airlift Command, meet this requirement.

"Maintenance of overseas presence" means just that - defending and supplying the world-wide network of bases that serve the previous three "mission requirements". Ultimately, of course, even these objectives are not the real concern. Basically, the Navy wants more money so it can become bigger, and the best way at the moment to get more money is to pretend that it is needed in the Indian Ocean. As the Wall Street Journal (April 10, 1974) puts it "more bases and increased naval deployments will provide the rationale for an Indian Ocean Fleet and bigger ship building budgets. The Navy has been panting on the edges of the opportunity represented by the Indian Ocean."

It is worth noting that it is virtually impossible to find any statement from US government sources which justifies the Indian Ocean build-up in terms of documented Soviet threat. Indeed, Admiral Zumwalt has even gone so far as to say that "While Soviet activity adds to the rationale of Diego Garcia, that rationale would exist independently of anything the Soviets are doing". (35)

US short-term objectives in the Indian Ocean may also be expressed, much more succinctly, as preparations for war in the Middle East and in Africa.

Ever since the 1973 oil embargo and as recently as July 29, 1976, the US has been threatening and preparing for a war "to safeguard US access to Middle East oil supplies". The battle plans for such a war were leaked to Time magazine in 1975. (36) In the last Middle East war the US had to rely on fascist Portugal for staging points on the resupply route across the Atlantic and up the Mediterranean to Israel. Now even that ally in Europe is lost. The next Middle East war will have to be fought from the Indian Ocean end with massive airlifts from Pacific bases to the US airfield at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. Now that Thai bases are unavailable the Australian alliance may be invaluable for logistic support.

The other possibility is race war in Africa, which the US may want to be involved in to gain access to mineral resources. America has already warned the USSR that she will not tolerate "another Angola" which, translated, means that Soviet or Cuban assistance in another liberation war may be used as a pretext for US military involvement.

The conclusions to be drawn from this analysis of the Indian Ocean situation are simple:

a. Although the Soviet presence is inexcusable it in no way constitutes a threat.

b. We should demand that the Soviet Union totally remove its naval forces from the Indian Ocean if for no other reason than to give the US no excuse for escalating its naval presence.

c. Australia and New Zealand should re-align themselves with the other countries of the Indian Ocean area in demanding an end to the US military presence.

d. The best way of doing all this is to endorse the concept of, and work towards the achievement of, an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace.

e. As a first step Australia must refuse to provide facilities to the US which violate the Peace Zone concept. That means Cockburn Sound, North West Cape, Nurrungar, and Pine Gap.

FOOTNOTES


5. The port is said to have been constructed by the Soviet Union in 1969 and since 1972 a barracks ship and a repair tender have been tied up there. The one intelligence photo released by the US shows no other warships in port. If Soviet ships use the port regularly it seems strange that US Intelligence is unable to produce a photo demonstrating this. The photo is reproduced in (US) Air Force Magazine, August 1975.

6. During the May 1975 “Okean” Exercise, Soviet ASW aircraft overflew Iran and landed at Berbera.

7. Berbera base accommodates 170,000 barrels. The Diego Garcia base will take 320,000 barrels of ship fuel and 380,000 barrels of aviation fuel, according to Air Force Magazine, August 1975.


9. Captioned in the photo are ‘fence’, ‘antenna area’ (9120 metres long), ‘electronic support vans’ (two of them) and a ‘storage support area’.


15. This argument is implicitly accepted by the UN report (see ref. 1) and is well developed in “The pattern of Soviet Naval deployment in the Indian Ocean 1968-1971”, Michael McGwire in “Soviet naval developments: Capability and context”, ed. M McGwire, Praeger sponsored studies in international affairs.


20. 20. See ref. 4.


28. USAF transports resupply North West Cape via Learmonth.


DEVELOPING JOB ORGANISATION
Experiences on Bondi Plaza

Dave Rimbault

Amidst the turmoil in the building industry in NSW over the last two years the rank-and-file Site Committee - its formation and work - on one of Sydney’s largest building jobs holds some lessons in organisation and unity of workers at rank-and-file level.

In many respects, this job organisation is a model of rank-and-file democracy and control, resisting the divisive attacks of the bosses at a time when the developers and the Federal leaders of the Builders Labourers’ Union had split the union in NSW and dismissed its elected officers. The workers on this job developed their own organisation and unity of all building workers as they initiated their own campaigns whilst resisting the attacks of the boss.

One of the initiators of this rank-and-file organisation, Dave Rimbault, sets out his experience.

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Two delegates, Jim Denness and myself, initiated the concept of the Site Committee. It arose directly from the experiences of the job (over 500 workers) where sectional disputes of workers covered by various unions tended to involve the whole of the site in interminable disputes. The site covered metal workers, plumbers, carpenters, bricklayers, painters, tilers, builders’ labourers, and electricians, all covered by their respective unions. The aim of the Site Committee, representing all unions, was to unite the job and make the workers’ organisation more effective by isolating the disputes as they arose.

The idea flowed also from the events of November 11, 1975 when the Whitlam Labor government was dismissed from office. The workers were angry and their political awareness was heightened. This was reflected in the reaction and response of workers to the job conditions. Almost anything relating to conditions and safety would send them off.

A safety issue provided the opportunity to bring the workers together in mass and it was at this meeting that we raised our concept of the Site Committee and its democratic functioning. Nine men from all trades were elected from this mass meeting on the basis that they would be responsible to the mass meetings with the main purpose of raising consciousness and mass involvement in decision making.

The first issue, which was thoroughly discussed, involved the major contractor, Concrete Constructions, on the general issue of safety, particularly lighting and cleaning up of floors. The Committee was charged with the responsibility of taking it up with Concrete Constructions. The company’s first reaction was to ignore the other delegates and just deal with Jim Denness and myself. There was no response from the boss so a report-back meeting decided to stop all work in the unsafe areas until they were brought up to scratch. One day’s production was lost and the workers returned to work to see 1,200 new light fittings installed and eight truck loads of rubbish removed from the unsafe areas.

OUR FIRST VICTORY

A demand for the payment of lost time to the workers affected was made to David Jones, the owners of the areas affected and they were all paid. From this small victory consolidation of the Site Committee was assured and the mass meeting decided that there should be weekly site mass meetings, to discuss job problems including the wider political and social issues. The weekly mass meetings have been a feature of the organisation ever since. They are held every Wednesday at lunch time with a regular chairman and the secretary takes minutes.
Encouraging the workers to express their views brought to light the particular problems affecting groups of workers and made them the property of the whole site. Thus each worker identified more easily with one another rather than seeing only the artificial barriers of union or craft.

For instance, like many other construction sites, the job employed many sub-contractors who in turn employed a number of workers. The rates being paid by these sub-contractors varied greatly. It was decided to check all awards and rates, including special allowances such as dirt and multi-storey, etc. money, with the aim of bringing them into uniformity, thus eliminating another source of division. This examination apart from revealing discrepancies in the legal sense, enabled us, in the brief period of a fortnight, to bring all rates and conditions into uniformity.

At one of the mass meetings, outside workers who were in dispute and on strike requested support. After discussion it was decided to strike a $2 levy. Out of the 500-odd workers, fourteen form workers decided not to pay. A further meeting decided that if the levy was not paid by the fourteen they would have to go. The BWIU, to which the fourteen belonged, called a full meeting of their 85 members to support the fourteen non-payers. However the other 71 BWIU members took their stand with the decision of the mass meeting and insisted that the fourteen abide by the democratic decision of the mass meeting to pay the levy.

**RAISING FINANCE**

Very early in the piece the need for regular finance to assist in our activities, such as helping other workers in struggle was recognised. We decided to run a job raffle each week. Five hundred tickets are sold each week and handled by the delegates of all trades. The raffle is drawn in different eating sheds each week by the men themselves. This has realised a permanent bank account of over $500 out of which monies are paid to striking workers. We find this better now than striking levies each time some workers come to us for support, although this does not rule out special levies when thought necessary. A balance sheet of the Site Committee's funds is hand printed and posted up in every shed for all to peruse and checks can be made by anyone at any time.

Recently the Site Committee recommended to the mass meeting that it purchase, out of the funds, two motorised wheelchairs to be presented to the Spastic Centre and this has been done.

**CONDUCTING OWN DISPUTES**

The Site Committee conducts all disputes on the job with control in the hands of the mass meeting. Union officials are invited to participate and are welcome, although many of them appear afraid of job organisation which involves their members. In our experience there is nothing to fear from workers' rank-and-file organisation if union officials express and show confidence in the workers' abilities to conduct and lead their own struggles. Then their advice and support becomes a welcome adjunct to the workers' activities.

The Site Committee has conducted its disputes even up to the stage where we have been taken to the Arbitration Court by the Employers' Federation and two sub-contractors. On that occasion the Judge was brought to the site for an inspection and the Site Committee presented its argument on the uniformity of multi-storey rates. The solid unity of the whole site (even though only a few were affected) resulted in a victory, again without loss of paid time.

As expected the boss used his own methods to weaken the leadership of the Site Committee. Militant workers were offered "leading hands" jobs and it is a measure of the integrity instilled in the organisation that each worker approached asked the Site Committee for advice on whether to take it or not. With this sort of approach the Site Committee invariably took the view that it was better to have a militant in that position and that it was up to the worker himself to decide. We have not had one disappointment so the bosses intentions have failed.

**POLITICAL DISCUSSION**

Before November 11 and the formation of the Site Committee political discussions were a non-event on the job. There were only two communists on the job (a third, the author, was recruited following a Communist Party election meeting - Ed.) and only a few Tribunes were being sold each week. There was a deal of misguided anti-communism on
the job. A lot of this was broken down, first on the Site Committee by a discussion as to why Jim and I were in the Communist Party and, secondly, by our approach to democracy and organisation. By discussing our ideas openly and frankly we have helped to develop a greater understanding of the Party and its concept of socialism. We now sell 40 Tribunes a week on the job and have developed a regular weekly political discussion with a Communist Party functionary. The average attendance at these discussions was twelve and considerable interest was shown in the topics discussed which they selected themselves.

PROBLEM OF RACISM

Reflecting the building industry generally the job carried workers from many lands. Some 60% of the workers are foreign-born migrants. Also reflecting Australian society generally were the expressions of racism by many of the Anglo-saxon workers. The use of derogatory terms such as "wogs", "chocolate frogs", etc. are commonplace. The migrants get blamed for smelly lockers, garbage around the job. The so-called "wogs" are always the "weakies" who will cop anything. My experience is that the opposite is the case and that racism is the most insidious and divisive form of activity ever to serve the boss.

This particular incident occurred one day when we were "rained off." We left the site at about 11 am but this meant we had to come back for our pay. Many of the lads spent their waiting time in the pub which meant that by the time the wages arrived some were the worse for wear. A few of the lads, fortified by "John Barleycorn" started having a go at some of the migrants with such statements as "why don't you get your own shed?" and demanding that they speak English at all times. These remarks reflect the ignorance and elitism of ruling-class ideas which lay just under the surface in our white, anglo-saxon, "superior" society. The grog had brought it out in its most vicious form.

Jim Denness, Dick Whitehead and myself were just leaving the job when we met John Hortas, a Greek labourer, nearly in tears and quite distressed. He told us what happened and we went back to take it up with the few drunken heroes. They readily admitted having used the words complained of and expressed surprise that we anglo-saxon workers should take the side of the "wogs". When we persisted with our criticism they demanded a meeting in the morning to take it before the workers.

The following morning the meeting was called and I addressed the meeting with some emotion and feeling, condemning racism and its divisive intention. I pointed to my own experience with migrant workers who had gone out on the grass for three weeks to support me when Mainlines had tried to give me the push. When I had finished I demanded that the three individuals concerned apologise to the workers or leave the site. This was endorsed overwhelmingly by the meeting. Two of the workers apologised and the third left the job the following day after refusing to apologise. To this day the one remaining worker guilty of the outright racism has mixed very well with the migrants, and one never hears him mention "wogs" or "dagos". This worker was a militant fighter for whom I have a high personal regard and no doubt he has learnt a considerable lesson from this incident.

The problem of racism is deep-seated among many British and Australian workers. It stems from the ignorance of other cultures, the fear of something different or change in the class society in which we belong. The influx of migrants with different cultures and from many lands has done a lot to improve the understanding that ours is not the only culture, nor even the best. We can learn much from these working-class people without whose confidence and solidarity the Australian working-class can never hope to win.

JOB COMMITTEES A BASIC UNIT OF TRADE UNION ORGANISATION

Site or Shop Committees are a necessary and essential part of the workers organisation and an important medium for the expression of rank-and-file participation and say in the unions' affairs. As stated earlier they provide the capacity for uniting all workers, breaking down the artificial barriers of union and craft. They relate better to the needs of the workers reflecting their needs.

Our experience, which is probably not new, has been an interesting and exciting one from which many lessons were learnt.
The publication of the White Paper on Defence dispenses with the Soviet “threat” which dominated government foreign policy statements, or statements pertaining to foreign policy, made in the first months of the Fraser government. The projection of a threat, no matter how unreal, was used to condition public opinion and to assist the United States to upgrade its presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans in the aftermath of the Vietnam defeat. The recent and regular visits of a variety of ships from the US Navy, including nuclear ships, are part of the conditioning, designed to win acceptance of a strategy which includes a permanent US nuclear presence in this region. One further result is the continuing upgrading of the defence budget which adds to the distortions in the economy and further limits finance allocations for social welfare.

The White Paper tends to the view, expounded by the former Labor government, that no real threat to Australia can be perceived. Given that the Labor government suffered considerable criticism for this position, it was not unexpected that the shadow minister for defence, Hayden, pointed this out with a certain vindictive pleasure. However, it would be wrong and tragic if the labor movement now accepted that a bi-partisan policy on foreign affairs exists.

There is little doubt that Fraser speaks from the heart when he rants about the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that he is in sympathy with the US hawks, even though he may accept that the only guarantor in the much-vaunted US Alliance is that the US will probably come to the aid of Australia in the event of total war. It hardly needs pointing out that, in such circumstances, aid will, most likely, be immaterial.

Of far greater importance is the fact that the Fraser foreign policy and defence posture accepts the US regional strategy to contain national liberation movements and to restore, maintain, or extend, imperialist hegemony. It would be a sorry day indeed if the labor movement gave de facto recognition to a policy which rejects the growing influence of the movement of Non-aligned Nations while giving priority to maintaining the status quo in the ASEAN countries, particularly Indonesia.

It may be far-fetched to think of Indonesia as a potential military threat to Australia although it is a clear military threat in the...
Underlining the Fraser policy is the concept that nothing must be allowed to threaten capitalist interests in the region. Indonesia's aggression against East Timor is therefore condoned. In the future, attempts to gain control of the vast natural resources in Papua-New Guinea for the benefit of its peoples could be met with destabilisation efforts from Australia and Indonesia, separately or together. Social upheavals against the corrupt rulers of Indonesia or against tyrannical regimes in other parts of Asia could lead to interventions by Australia, with or without the United States. Another ally against the march of history could be Japan. This is not to say that the Labor Party would automatically refuse such involvement, as its ambivalence towards East Timor shows, but the Labor Party, or significant sections of it are a long way from endorsing the realities of the Fraser policy.

Those who seek an alternative foreign policy need to recognise that Australia has always been aligned and seldom independent. When Labor's wartime Prime Minister sought an alliance with the United States he showed some independence from the traditional ties with England, and considerable realism in recognising that the actual threat then came from this region. Much later, when John Gorton was Prime Minister, he toyed with a policy of "Fortress Australia", a form of armed neutrality then popular in Sweden, but in general, Australia has been in the US orbit, with less and less independence since World War II.

The Vietnam war, Australia's involvement as part of the price of alignment and the sheer determination of the Vietnamese to win, despite the odds, led to some rethinking. The great popular movement against the war contributed to Labor's victory in 1972. The Labor government distanced itself from the US hawks and projected a policy not far removed from the liberal wing of the US democrats. The distance covered wasn't very far but seemed so when compared with the "cold war" stance of past and present Liberal governments. It did contribute to breaking down total acceptance of US hegemony but even the mild suggestion that Australia should share some control over the US bases in this country was met with sustained hysteria and was a factor in the dismissal of the Whitlam government. A more important aspect of the Whitlam years was the normalisation of relations with many countries, an acceptance of the need to contribute to relaxation of tension (detente) and contact with the Non-aligned Nations. Willesee, then foreign minister, was an observer at the Non-aligned Nations Foreign Ministers' Conference in Peru. At the level of government, and in the mass movement for peace, more voices were raised in favor of nuclear-free zones and in opposition to US military bases in Australia.

These tentative steps were retraced after December 1975. The present government is unreservedly for bigger and better US bases and considers nuclear free zones "unrealistic". Its vocal support for the US base at Diego Garcia precluded any invitation being issued to Australia to participate in the Conference of Heads of Government of the Non-aligned Nations held in Colombo last year. This isolation from, and hostility to, the movement of non-alignment came at the very time when several countries involved in military-political alliances had sought and been given a basis for formal co-operation in the movement. Unlike the present Australian Government, these countries are aware that the future lies in a world without blocs. The movement of non-alignment now involves a majority of countries with various social systems and levels of development but all respond to the need to overcome the bloc division of the world.

After World War II the United States became the military and political leader of the so-called "free world". Beginning with the Truman Doctrine of 1947, United States policy has always been confrontation, rather than co-operation, between the great powers. As the cold war advanced, military pacts formalised all other relationships, NATO was followed by the Warsaw Pact and there seemed to be no middle ground. Most countries appeared to have little choice but to be on one side or the other. In time it seemed that there were only two voices powerful enough to take decisions on all crucial issues of international politics.

The balance of terror created by the military blocs has long been considered an important factor in preventing a third world
war fought with atomic weapons. In Europe the balance is such that the limits of power have been recognised in the Helsinki Final Document which has sanctioned such a state of balance. In other regions of the world, however, this is not the case and a general problem today is that the arms race continues although each side, long ago, achieved sufficient firepower for massive overkill.

This is due in part to the fact that all the big powers have a global strategy. Successful national liberation movements in various regions of the world upset the previously existing structure of international relations. The present concentration on the Asian-Pacific region follows the victories in Indo-China and raises particularly serious problems since all the great powers, and Japan, are present. There are other factors in the arms race, notably the proliferation of suppliers. France and China have stood outside some of the control arrangements entered into by the USA and the USSR. This followed the break between China and the USSR and the effort of France to distance herself from the USA. In the present situation there are many reasons to sell arms for profit, political influence, or both.

It has not been easy for small countries to break with the blocs. In general a huge price is extracted. Among the most influential non-aligned countries are Yugoslavia, Cuba and Vietnam, each of which, in quite different circumstances, had to pay heavily for their independence. In a very real sense the roots of non-alignment can be traced to the Soviet Union's break with Yugoslavia, although the actual movement developed and gained strength only when many countries, former colonies, won a measure of independence. Put simply, many of these countries did not want to face an 'either-or' situation. It was less than a choice if, in winning independence from imperialism, they had to exchange participation in one bloc for another. While no country can have total independence, many can, and do, refuse to ally themselves with one or other great power since the price of the alliance is usually a further limitation on independence.

There has been constant debate in the movement on what attitude to take to the great powers. In general terms there is recognition that a constructive dialogue is needed. It is accepted that the bloc division of the world is an historic phenomenon which won't be overcome by wishing it away. The blocs, and specifically the military pacts, will have to be dismantled together, but despite the growth of the movement's influence and the expressed desire by the Soviet Union to end the arms race, the blocs are as strong as ever. This is due in no small part to the fact that the United States continues to regard NATO as the best way to contain the USSR while the USSR assumes that many of her best interests are served by a form of detente where major negotiations are confined to the great powers.

A present danger is that one bloc can gain an advantage and upset the existing balance. The foolish and dangerous encouragement of the United States to upgrade its presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly at Diego Garcia, makes the Fraser government culpable in a new round of the arms race in this region.

Recognising such realities, the non-aligned nations always stress the need to overcome the bloc division of the world systematically. Despite obvious disagreements and levels of understanding between these nations they show considerable unity on this matter and their consistency is reflected in their views on how to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament. They campaign for a special session of the United Nations in 1977 which could consider precise disarmament measures. This is seen as the most appropriate way to hold a world disarmament conference and to ensure that disarmament negotiations become the property of all. This form also takes account of the fact that under other circumstances the presence of France and China might be in doubt.

Until now, disarmament negotiations have tended to be confined to the USA and the USSR. When they reach agreements these usually establish new and higher levels of arms, not disarmament. The United States has a strong economic, as well as political motive for this situation. The disarmament proposal of the Soviet Union for a ten per cent arms reduction across the board is not favored by all small nations which feel they have a right to a certain level of arms
protection for their hard-won independence. They claim, and rightly, that the major problem is contained in the arsenals of the great powers. In the event of war the potential targets involve everyone but, until now, control is confined to the big powers.

The fact that the non-aligned nations give a renewed emphasis to the United Nations and its role is a measure of how that organisation has changed and suggests that further changes will be made. Until recently, the UN was virtually controlled by the United States. The Soviet Union was consistently portrayed as "the dog in the manger", using its veto to say "no" to all proposals. While the United States sought to project the rejected proposals as "reasonable" it is clear that the power of veto was a protection offered not only to the Soviet Union but to many other countries seeking to break free from imperialism. In the changing circumstances there is now a potential majority which can itself protect the interests of small nations and contribute to the establishment of a new system of international political and economic relations. In this sense, non-alignment is not a tactic or a loose alliance of nations which seek to be a third bloc. It is a response to deeply felt needs for independence which no bloc, even if there were an altruistic one, could guarantee. It prefigures a new stage of international relations when all countries will be non-aligned and independent.

Such a time is far distant but the point to see is the historic process which is under way. This may be more difficult for Australians than for many others if only because our sense of independence has been so often distorted into jingoism and because 200 years is not long in which to develop an identity. The left has certainly not come to terms with the powerful force of the idea that is involved in national identity.

There are tendencies which reject non-alignment by concentrating on its deficiencies. It is not difficult to score points. One can point to Indonesia's role in East Timor, Syria's role in Lebanon, or the various unseemly grabs for the former Spanish Sahara and the reactionary nature of not a few of the regimes of those involved, and dismiss the whole thing, but without trying to hide the differences existing within the movement, or its difficulties, it should be possible to see that this movement is a major
factor in a general strengthening of independence at the expense of imperialism and a rising struggle to end the arms race and overcome underdevelopment.

A crucial part of the movement is its demand for development, summed up in the term "New World Economic Order". The right to development and control over one's own natural resources is a call to reason in a world of great contrasts between rich and poor. In a situation where the United States faces an increasing scarcity of raw materials, a major factor in its military strategy, trade policies and the dominance of the multi-nationals, this demand takes on real political force. The oil crisis showed that not all the muscles are on the side of imperialism even though its strength is very great. It is worth noting, too, that Australia, as a major trader in raw materials and primary production has an objective interest in the fate of the New World Economic Order and that this is a basis for developing cooperation with the non-aligned movement.

Australia does not yet meet the criteria for membership in the non-aligned movement which are: (a) an independent policy in conformity with the principles of active and peaceful co-existence; (b) support for national liberation movements; (c) non-involvement in military pacts with great powers; and (d) no foreign military bases on its territory.

The present policy is for Australia to remain a part of the US bloc, trading the right to political and economic independence for some vaguely promised military security while helping in the development of mini-imperialist ambitions. The logic of this position is to encourage the hawks within the United States and at home. A variant of this is an anti-Soviet alliance involving such strange bedfellows for a reactionary government as China. This risky gamble, which Fraser has obviously considered, implies that security can be based on the continuing enmity between China and the Soviet Union. Australia could opt for armed neutrality although this is barely feasible in both a military and geographic sense.

There is no point in considering that Australia would exchange its present bloc loyalty for alignment with the Soviet Union. Even those who support Soviet foreign policy and see it as always acting for peace do not suggest this. It is also possible that Australia will join an ASEAN style regional pact. The present ASEAN Pact acts as a back-stop for US imperialism in Asia although it also represents a certain limited trend away from total US patronage. For some of its members it is a slight advance on former positions but it would not represent anything new in Australia's relations and would be, correctly, judged as one more effort to prevent countries in the region from altering the status quo.

There could be development towards an Asian Security Treaty, a concept promoted by the Soviet Union in much the same sense as it promoted European security. There is no doubt that advances have been made in European security. This is due, in part, to the equal relations between the USSR and the US in Europe as well as to the independent initiatives of many European states. The same conditions do not apply in Asia. There is a vast inequality of power and little respect by the United States for the independence of Asian nations, large or small. In Europe, the post-war borders can be accepted but in Asia there is the continuing question of Taiwan, the US domination of South Korea and the unresolved territorial dispute between the USSR and Japan, to take a few examples. Additionally, security in Asia without the active participation of China is a myth yet China is most unlikely to participate in any long-term agreements while the dispute between her and the Soviet Union remains. For all these reasons, no matter how desirable it may appear, an Asian Security Pact is not a genuine option at this time.

Given that these are the present options, the development of an alternative foreign policy for Australia most involve a movement towards non-alignment. This requires at least some serious study of the nature of the movement, avoiding simplicity. It should be noted that many nations in the movement are very close to either the Soviet Union or China, some try to be friends with both, some are very close to France and some can barely be distinguished from members of the US bloc. Within the movement some seek

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*While it is outside the scope of this article the development being sought is, in some cases, not an attempt to copy the existing industrial societies. This factor may be an influence in tackling the problem of over-development.*
to change this situation, to make the notion of non-alignment explicitly anti-imperialist. Some seek to confine its role to a few principled questions such as overcoming the bloc division of the world; others want it to speak out on all burning disputes of the moment. Something of each concept exists. At the Colombo Conference there was no attempt to confine the movement, perhaps because it is difficult to categorise some countries, but primarily because it is recognised that the period of overcoming colonialism is drawing to an end, that there will be few more newly liberated states to ensure the growth of the movement, and that its future lies in expanding the commitment to non-alignment beyond the "third world".

The non-aligned movement is not free from interventions, indeed there are numerous attempts to destabilise it and create tensions between its members. There are efforts to down-grade those of its policies which are assumed to be unfavorable to one or another great power or to unjustly equate non-alignment with neutrality. It has been accused of acting for the Soviet Union and, conversely, of not being sufficiently partisan or "class" oriented. In fact it is against all forms of domination and specifically against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism.

A tendency towards non-alignment in Australia can, and will, pass through various stages including continued and growing support for anti-imperialist struggles, acceptance of responsibility to help overcome the results of colonialism and, more specifically, the devastation created by the war in Vietnam: partial measures for disarmament, including nuclear free zones, measures to protect the environment including development of a rational resources policy and the maintenance of the moratorium on uranium mining, actions against multinationals in the economy, dismantling US bases, developing trade, scientific and cultural exchanges with all countries. Some of these elements are already present in the policies of the Labor Party and ought to be strengthened.

Socialists recognise that foreign policy is never separate from internal policy. In the past, and perhaps in the future, "cold war" attitudes abroad go hand in hand with restrictions at home. The converse is also true. A self-managed, democratic socialist state would need a foreign policy based on independence, mutual respect, opposition to imperialism, support for movements of national liberation and non-alignment.

At this time, the challenge for socialists and other democratic forces in the peace movement and the labor movement is to strengthen the trends towards non-alignment by fighting concretely against imperialism and for genuine peaceful coexistence, for actual disarmament measures and in solidarity with liberation movements. Primarily this will require a concentration on this region although, naturally, there are causes which require support all over the globe, as is the case with solidarity for the Chilean resistance, and in those situations, such as the Middle East, where a major conflict could erupt. In such cases the Australian movement seeks to play its part but this does not prevent critics of "regionalism" from expressing the demand that the movement should take up with equal vigor the injustices in all parts of the world. A closer examination of the priorities of those expressing such concerns reveal a remarkable similarity with the foreign policy of particular great powers. Such criticism takes little account of the resources available to the movement or that it is natural that Angola should be particularly concerned with what is happening in Africa, that Cuba should give special attention to the struggle for independence in Puerto Rico and that Australians have a major obligation to the liberation forces in East Timor.

Moreover, the trend towards non-alignment will not reach its potential in Australia if those who seek an alternative foreign policy confine themselves to being solidarity supporters of others, or content themselves with generalised appeals for disarmament. The real struggle involves the foreign bases on our soil, the rape of our own resources and the mischief done in our name in what passes for Australian foreign policy. This should not mean indifference to others, or a distorted nationalism, but recognition that until large numbers of Australians feel deeply the injustices done to themselves by imperialism they will rarely act against the injustices done to others, or develop the necessary confidence and combativity to win a new direction in Australian foreign policy.
Millions more will join the 14 million unemployed in advanced capitalist countries as the world economy staggers into 1977, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD has abandoned its earlier prediction of a slight recovery next year and now forecasts deepening of the world recession - including higher unemployment.

The OECD's most recent overview of the world economy, published as its Economic Outlook 19 in July stressed how long the recovery would take:

"The strategy of restoring full employment and normal levels of capacity utilisation progressively over several years reflects the conviction that an attempt to make progress more quickly would be interrupted by a new boom and bust well before the objective had been achieved" (emphasis added).

Even this cautious program has been abandoned, however. The next Economic Outlook, due to be published on December 20, predicts progress will not even begin next year.

The OECD has leaked these predictions to persuade the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries not to raise the price of oil in the near future. OPEC meets in Qatar on December 15. Some petroleum producers, including Iran, have called for a large price increase of up to 25 per cent. Another oil price rise would further delay economic recovery, the OECD believes.

The OECD also wants the new Carter administration to abandon Ford's restrictive economic policies and stimulate the American economy. This leak comes just when Carter and his advisers are getting down to planning their policies for next year.

In July the OECD predicted that the Gross National Product of member countries would increase by 4⅔ per cent during 1976. This represented some slowdown from the growth rate achieved in the first six months of this year, when GNP rose at an annual rate of 6½ per cent.

The OECD then thought that recovery would begin again, with output growing at an annual rate of 5⅔ per cent in the first half of 1977 and 5 per cent in the second half.

These growth figures have now been revised downwards. Growth of only 4.3 per cent is expected in the first half of next year; in the second half this should drop to 3.5 per cent.

Since world productive capacity will grow at between 4 and 5 per cent this means next...
year there will be considerably more unemployment of capital - and of people.

The OECD believed that if growth could be maintained at between 4½ and 5 per cent into the middle of 1977 unemployment would start to fall. But even with this optimistic prediction the fall would be slight. Thirteen million would still be unemployed at the middle of next year, down one million from the present figure.

At the depth of the recession, in October last year, unemployment in the OECD area was 15½ million.

Now it looks like unemployment will instead climb above this figure.

The US and Japan

The key to any recovery, the OECD believes, lies with the United States and Japan. In July the OECD thought that "conditions for continued expansion are particularly favourable in the United States. With confidence of both consumers and investors greatly improved and signs of recovery in business fixed investment, real GNP could rise faster than the OECD average." They went on to say "the recovery seems also well established in Japan."

But barely a month later this optimism about the American economy was being tempered by new evidence. Things were slowing down before they had really got started.

The Financial Review thought the slowdown in the US recovery had implications for Australia, and summed up its fears in an editorial on September 2.

Reports suggest a "pause" in the American recovery, the paper concludes. "But it is not just an exclusively American worry. For the strength of recovery in the world economy, and in particular the prospects for an export-led recovery in the Australian economy, will depend upon what happens in the US."

"A strong recovery in the US economy could prove to be the only factor which would save the Fraser-Lynch economic strategy in last month's Budget."

But pessimists in the US are talking of a relapse back into recession, without a boom ever having been experienced, or even sighted, the Review reports.

Industrial production is barely rising, retail sales in July were actually lower than three months earlier and inflation is again on the increase.

Capital spending fell in August for the second consecutive month. Half of the 2.2 per cent decline was due to a big fall in orders for primary metals. When the volatile defence sector is removed, durable goods orders fell by 11.7 per cent during the month.

In Japan too, there are problems.

While Japan is benefiting from big sales of consumer goods to the US, the recovery there is not yet general, according to The New York Times' Andrew Malcolm in a report reprinted in The Australian Financial Review on August 10.

Prime Minister Takeo Miki's top economic advisers recently predicted an annual growth rate of 5.9 or 6 per cent. While this is better than many other capitalist countries, it is way down on the 10 per cent a year growth Japan experienced during the heady 1960s and early 1970s.

Unemployment, virtually unheard of during the boom, has not declined much. Officially, more than 2 per cent remain unemployed, but economists agree these figures should be doubled or tripled for a more realistic comparison with the jobless situation in other countries.

Significant , private capital investment has not picked up. In the first quarter of this year - after two years of decline - investment increased a meager 0.5 per cent, the first advance in nine quarters.

And with one survey of 178 major corporations showing they were operating at only 81 per cent capacity, future investment prospects look dim.

Australia

In Australia growth is well below even the pessimistic predictions for the rest of the OECD area. Gross domestic production in the June quarter of this year is barely 1 per cent more than for the same period last year. This actually represents a drop in the recovery rate, since production in the three months to March this year was 1.8 per cent up on last year. The September figures are not yet available as we go to press.
If this evidence is not enough to show that the Fraser government has no strategy for economic recovery, recent events in Canberra demonstrate how chaotic government economic policy formulation is.

On November 18 the Fraser government hit out at its critics in the Treasury by splitting the department. But the move comes as much from Fraser's anger at Treasury leaks to the press as from any long term plan to limit the department's power.

That day the government announced its second new department in a week - which is not a bad record for people forever railing against big government. The new Finance Department will oversee spending by government departments while Treasury retains its other functions.

The split is a slap in the face for Sir Frederick Wheeler, long time Treasury head - and one of the most powerful men in Australia.

Much of Treasury's power comes from being able to control other departments under the guise of checking on expenditure. It will still be the main source of government economic policy but without this policing function it will be less of a force in the Canberra power game.

While there have been many attempts to split Treasury or limit its power - especially under Labor - this move dates only from a cabinet meeting on November 5.

There Treasurer Lynch explained a number of options open to the government: a squeeze on credit, tax cuts, spending increases, and devaluation. He argued strongly in favor of a credit squeeze and against devaluation. In the end he got his way.

Meeting Leaked

The full story however came out in The Age five days later. Economics editor Kenneth Davidson gave a detailed description of the meeting in which Lynch, helped by Senator Cotton, fought against a cabinet majority - including Fraser - that wanted devaluation.

According to Davidson the options were dressed up to make the money squeeze the most attractive and devaluation the least attractive.

"Essentially the line was put to cabinet that tax cuts, expenditure increases and
devaluation would require offsetting monetary action which would be far worse than the squeeze package if inflation was to be contained”, Davidson reports.

He goes on to quote “inside reports” that Fraser and the rest of cabinet “were drawn to the subject (of devaluation) like moths to the light”.

“If the cabinet discussion is any guide”, Davidson concludes, “Mr Fraser is attracted to the idea of devaluation because he believes in the justice of redistributing income to farmers and miners and increasing industrial protection.

“This position rests on the argument that if income is shifted to the 'productive' sectors of the economy, economic growth will be enhanced.

“Initially neither Mr Lynch nor Senator Cotton was able to persuade the rest of cabinet that the inflationary consequences of such a move may upset the whole government ‘beat inflation first’ strategy.

‘Political Rabbit’

But Lynch was then able to “pull a political rabbit out of the hat”. Motioning to Reserve Bank governor, Mr Harry Knight, who had just put a strong anti-devaluation submission to the government, Lynch reminded the others of a section of the Reserve Bank Act that deals with differences of opinion between the government and the Bank.

While the government can direct the Bank to carry out the policy it chooses, the Bank can insist its views are put before parliament. The Bank has never done this before. “Mr Lynch did not have to spell out to cabinet the catastrophic political consequences of such a public disagreement between the government and the Reserve Bank,” Davidson said.

And there was “sufficient steel in the eye of Mr Knight” to show this might not be a bluff.

Fraser gave in, and adopted Lynch’s Treasury line, even though Sir Frederick Wheeler and Mr John Stone, deputy secretary of the Treasury in charge of economic policy, who were both present, kept unusually quiet.

While Fraser was obviously smarting under this reverse, he reached breaking point when he read the whole story in The Age. He came to the right conclusion: someone - one of his ministers or one of the Treasury officials present - told Davidson about the meeting, right down to repeating the Prime Minister’s attempts at humor.

Reading between sympathetic lines in Davidson’s article like “naturally enough senior Treasury officials are not popular with the government at present”, Fraser thought he knew where to lay the blame.

Eight days later he had his revenge.

Labor’s Plan

Labor also wanted to clip Sir Frederick Wheeler’s wings, but their plans came unstuck. They wanted to divide Treasury into a department of economic planning and an accounting department. Wheeler, Stone and the other Treasury troglodytes were to be shunted off into accounts, where they could do less harm.

Labor wanted to bring in an outside economist with a strong commitment to government intervention and planning to head the new department.

This plan was worked out when Jim Cairns was Treasurer, but it foundered when Wheeler convinced Cairns that a better solution was to have a planning unit within Treasury. Wheeler wanted a bigger, not a smaller, department to play with.

Wheeler may manoeuvre out of this one too. The real lesson lies in how the Fraser government is blundering from one decision about the economy to another. Both the cabinet meeting itself, and Fraser’s reaction to its being leaked, will inspire little confidence in the government’s big business backers.

After the meeting ended Fraser tried to inject some humor into the sombre occasion by saying he thought he would go to church on Sunday and pray.

However he was not amused when one of the advisers at the meeting quipped “and I suppose you will be praying for us?” This new religious approach certainly couldn’t do any more harm than the government’s other economic policies.

But then at least Fraser is doing something about unemployment - by creating jobs for government ministers.

T.O’S., November 21, 1976
The New South Wales Labor government's Attorney-General, Frank Walker, recently instituted a well-publicised campaign against what he flamboyantly described as "corporate crooks". (1) And to prove his mettle he has been taking on some of the "big fish" he promised us: Sir Paul Strasser being among those summoned to appear in court. (2) That Walker's campaign follows by a year-and-a-half moves in the same direction by the Federal Attorney-General in the Whitlam government suggests the possibility that the legal policies, including criminal policy, of capitalist governments can be analysed within the marxist problematic in the same manner as any other governmental policies.

Before discussing the nature and functions of capitalist legal policy it is necessary to analyse the role of the state in the capitalist social formation, for it is through the agency of the state that law is given effect both instrumentally and symbolically. In the succinct words of Lenin, "The state is a product and manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled". (3) And again, "The state is a machine for maintaining the rule of one class over another ... for holding in obedience to one class other, subordinated classes". (4) In addition to this primary domination function of the state emphasised by Lenin, Marx and Engels underline the broader management function in the following, "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie", while also noting the tremendous impact that the class has had, "The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part". (5)

And, of course, a major implement in the hands of the bourgeoisie has been the law, for it has been used to carry out the economic, political and ideological functions of the state in order to guarantee the reproduction of the economic system. Included within this guarantee are the means of production, an acquiescent and disciplined labor force, an effective capitalist class, and the social, political and ideological conditions in which the relationship between capital and labor can be maintained. The manner in which the capitalist state acts to fulfill its task is,
according to Lenin, various: "The forms of
domination of the state may vary: capital
manifests its power in one way where one
form exists, and in another way where
another form exists". (6) Now to begin to
develop these ideas in the contemporary
Australian situation: given the general
function of the state to protect the overall
interests of the ruling class, what special
function does a particular government's
crime policy serve in helping to provide that
protection?

In a recent and excellent book, Frank
Pearce goes some distance toward
explaining the function of criminal policy in
capitalist society. (7) While focusing almost
entirely on the United States, Pearce's
analysis is certainly applicable to capitalist
countries generally; of course, the specific
relationships which Pearce details between
the State and organised crime and between
the latter and criminal elements in the trade
union movement would not be found to have
developed to the same degree or in the same
pattern in other countries. Nevertheless,
such relationships have not been absent
from the Australian scene. (8)

Just as the concept of the interventionist
state has been important to an
understanding of contemporary capitalist
economic and social policy, Pearce applies it
to what we might call capitalist crime policy.
Thus, he notes that "The operation of the
state's repressive apparatus is not simply
determined by considerations of legality and
illegality. Not all criminals need concern
themselves overmuch with the law (e.g. some
white-collar criminals); at the same time
certain law-abiding citizens are subject to the
attentions of this repressive apparatus. The
criterion for state intervention is the extent
to which activities undermine the social
order .... the only way to understand the
actual workings of social control
mechanisms within capitalism is to
recognise that they are directed against
those activities which threaten its effective
reproduction, as it really is, in all its naked
barbarity". (9)

Pearce's work is an outstanding example
of the power but also the subtlety provided by
a marxist analysis of the functions of law in
a class society. (10) This becomes apparent
when we compare his analysis of corporate
crime with that employed by traditional
THE DIALECTICS OF CAPITALIST LEGAL POLICY

53

The latter have been aware for some thirty years, since the publication of Sutherland's pioneering work, (11) that a large amount of crime is committed by business people and corporations in the ordinary course of business. Following the conventional mode of bourgeois analysis, criminologists have primarily been concerned to discover the general "cause" of such criminal behavior. This has resulted in micro-level analysis, following Sutherland's lead for the most part, of the socialisation process by which, it is claimed, corporate criminals in general learn to act in an illegal manner. Of course, this analysis is never related to the specific material conditions of the capitalist mode of production, out of which arise compelling pressures to act illegally. (12) Nor do bourgeois criminologists ask fundamental questions even when suggested by their own findings. Thus Sutherland and his associates have shown that special methods of law enforcement and sanctioning have been developed which, by and large, provide far more favorable treatment for people committing corporate crimes than for those predominantly working class offenders committing what might be called urban property offences. However, by failing to consider the differential response by the state within their monolithic category of corporate crime, traditional criminologists have been unable to grasp the politicality of crime - and therefore of crime policy in a class society.

As opposed to bourgeois criminologists, Pearce does not place corporate crime into a generalised, monolithic theoretical category; thus he is able to confront the basic issue: how can we explain capitalist crime policy? He argues:

"Not all white-collar crimes are equally immune to prosecution. If for example embezzlement was left unprosecuted and there was a large increase in such activity, capitalism might well collapse; for the financial transactions essential to this kind of economy inevitably involve trust but cannot take place in a manner which gives fool-proof protection from violations of it. It is necessary to investigate the social effects of these crimes. Thus, in the Second World War it was imperative that the state should succeed in stopping those black market offences that undermined the American war effort, since American capitalism depended on military success, in order to gain control of crucial Asian markets. Immediate easy profit was in this case opposed to long-term interests. On the other hand, violations of the anti-trust laws (involving monopolistic control of certain markets) do not pose a threat to the social structure of American capitalism and can, therefore, be tolerated. The crucial question then that must be asked of white-collar or any other offences is - what effects do these
crimes, and public awareness of them, have on the social order." (13)

And as with any other capitalist policy, so too with capitalist crime policy:

"The answer to this question can only be given by examining a specific example of criminal activity in its own particular socio-historical context."

Again, Pearce stands bourgeois criminology on its head by nothing that:

"The focus should no longer be on the strategies used to avoid prosecution but rather on the effects of different kinds of crime. It is then possible to explain why the state wishes to prosecute certain offences and not others."

In his second chapter "Corporate Crime and American Society" Pearce makes it clear, through an analysis of the evolving American economy, that what determines the choice of behavior to criminalise and to prosecute is the need to provide the appropriate political and economic conditions for the maintenance of the capitalist system. Thus the state will, in general, allow capitalists "open slather" (14); Pearce notes that US Senator Warren Magnuson "named deceptive selling as today's most serious form of theft, accounting for more dollars lost each year then robbery, larceny, auto thefts, embezzlement, and forgery combined". (15)

Again, violations of laws supposed to control American corporations are seldom prosecuted but:

"The occasional prosecution under these Acts lays bare a volume of illegal excess profits that is staggering .... Such 'business activity' is typical .... of large corporations in America generally. The corporations provide the most efficient and largest examples of organised crime in America."

And in his third chapter, "Organised Crime in Historical Context", Pearce shows convincingly the inter-relationship between the state, big corporations, right-wing labor racketeers and organised crime operating in concert to maintain the capitalist system.

Yet the general public sees a far different picture most of the time, and the role of the law in shaping that picture, what Pearce refers to as the "imaginary social order", is crucial. Thus, occasionally the time arises when things start to get a bit out of hand and the legitimacy of the capitalist state and the system it protects is threatened. Then, as Gordon has written -

"The state may be pressured either nominally or effectively to prosecute the wealthy if their criminal practices become so egregiously offensive that their victims may move to overthrow the system itself. In those cases, the state may punish individual members of the class in order to protect the interests of the entire class. Latent opposition to the practices of the corporations may be forestalled .... by token public efforts to
enact and enforce anti-trust, truth-in-lending, anti-pollution, industrial safety and auto safety legislation.”

It sounds almost like a description of recent Australian government (Federal and State) reform programs!

Pearce also deals with the effectiveness of the criminal law in maintaining an appropriately docile working class. As a number of writers recently have stressed, crime control can be more usefully understood as being, fundamentally, class control. Pearce quite rightly argues that by concentrating on lower-class criminality, the state “strengthens the dominant individualistic ideology. If the criminals are also the social failures (those at the bottom of an open, competitive, hierarchical class system, where any man can succeed), then their criminality is caused by their inadequacies (lack of determination, moral weakness, etc.) and the major social institutions are not exposed to critical assessment. Secondly, by defining such individuals as non-citizens with no rights to employment, education, etc. the system’s failure to provide these for them (independently of their criminality) is obscured. Finally, by criminalising them and treating them as asocial and amoral, their potential for developing an ideologically sophisticated understanding of their situation is neutralised, and by incarcerating them it is made difficult for them to organise their ideas”. And, of course, if then they do begin to tear away the ideological veil and organise, for example, at Attica and San Quentin, they are mercilessly shot down. As George Jackson wrote - “We attempted to transform the black criminal mentality into a black revolutionary mentality. As a result, each of us has been subjected to years of the most vicious reactionary violence by the state.”

It needs no repeating that there are no prosecutions for killing or brutalising prison militants, particularly when Mr Big Business - Rockefeller himself - orders it to be done. And let us not hold our breath until it occurs in New South Wales.

Pearce’s book joins a now substantial and rapidly growing collection of work by marxists (and radicals) who have focused on capitalist state legal - mainly criminal - policy. To some extent this can be explained simply because of the nature of the marxist critique - comprehensive and systematic - and the nature of the class struggle in capitalist society. An analysis of the exercise of state power through law is of primary importance in such circumstances, especially perhaps in Australia where, due to specific historical factors the struggle is - or appears to be - encased in a legal thicket of considerable density and complexity. Thus the events of November 11, 1975 by tending to bring into disrepute the legal system have been seen by some by no means radical critics to have been injurious to the larger system.

Another reason for the burgeoning marxist critique of “loranorder” is, as in other fields, the inability of bourgeois social science to provide a satisfactory alternative. Thus many years ago even bourgeois social scientists turned away from the traditional concern with crime, as defined by the state, and its causes. A leading sociologist, Lemert, explained that rather than crime leading to social control, “I have come to believe the reverse idea, i.e. social control leads to deviance”. Yet this view, often referred to as “labelling theory”, is also extremely limited. Not only does it tend to focus criticism solely upon the administrators of the law, thereby failing to challenge the State standing behind them, it also tends toward an idealist and romantic view of criminal behavior. Thus the criminal is seen essentially as a hero, consciously choosing deviant behavior in his individualistic struggle to come to grips with the world. The labelling school, not accidentally, has therefore tended to deal with phenomena such as mental illness, homosexuality, prostitution, and drug use rather than facing the fact that crimes: “Arise out of a structure which has as its fundamental benchmark the ultimate value of property. Indeed, most crime is directly or indirectly related to that value whether it is the unlawful taking (theft or related offences) the failure to possess (vagrancy and related offences), behavior which results from not having or rebelling against the need or pressures to have it (drug use of various kinds), behavior which results from obsession with it (various forms of gambling and
speculation), behavior which results from an inability to separate the concept from social relationships (rape) and so on.” (26)

Indeed, according to Mr. McGeechan, New South Wales Commissioner for Corrective Services:

“The majority of offenders..., are serving sentences for property offences.” (27)

Additional support for the view that the nexus between property and crime is fundamental comes from recent research carried out in Papua New Guinea. It is stated that:

“About 90 per cent of all housebreaking offences so far examined involve the selective theft of food, drink and small household items.... All the evidence so far indicates that housebreaking gangs are supplying an obvious community need - the redistribution of items of basic necessity from the haves to the have-nots.” (28)

A third and more fundamental reason for the development of the marxist critique of capitalist legal policy is the demystifying effect of the contemporary crisis in capitalism. More than a decade of political and economic struggles against the capitalist system in the ghettos, in the prisons, in the factories, in the education system, and throughout the Third World, has brought capitalism under great pressure. A major weapon in the arsenal of the ruling class is, of course, the state legal system, particularly the criminal law. But the extensive use of the criminal law creates further problems, primarily because of the fundamental tension between short-term repression and the maintenance of long-term legitimacy. This is what Balbus has termed “the dialectics of legal repression”, (29) brilliantly illustrated in the recent film, Special Section, which showed the tensions inherent in any law and order program, there the implementation of Emergency laws in Vichy France. (30) “Anxious capitalism” is much less able than usual to cover its tracks, the more repression is required, the further is the ideological veil pierced with a strong likelihood that the anti-state forces, and ideology, will become stronger.

Perhaps the only weaknesses in the general marxist critique of capitalist legal policy has been the tendency to concentrate almost exclusively on the criminal law to the neglect of the civil law, and a failure to analyse the articulation of both kinds of legal policy with other policies of the interventionist state. (31) It isn’t here possible to provide the complex analysis required to remedy these weaknesses. Nevertheless, some idea can be given of the work that needs to be done if we look briefly at recent developments in Australia, at Federal and State (NSW) levels.

In the present prolonged crisis, Australian governments have still had as a primary task the protection of the common interests of the ruling class. Linked to that task is the necessity to retain the support of the rest of the population but especially that of the working class. In some cases, the two tasks are easy to reconcile; but where it is not, the state is sometimes able to make some form of trade-off in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system in the consciousness of the working class. (32) It is often the use of the criminal law, or its threat, which is basic to such a trade-off. To take the example we began this article with, campaigns against “corporate crooks” can be in the interests of both ruling class and governments supported by the working class. (33) Such a policy plays a part in the dynamic political process whereby the capitalist system is reproduced: Walker has indicated that it was his purpose in the campaign to combat the form of criminal behavior which is economically the most important in New South Wales and which had been neglected for years by the previous governments. Another important purpose of the campaign is symbolic - re-legitimation in the eyes not only of the domestic ruling class, but of foreign investors who might consider investing in the Australian economy but who are dubious about doing so in the light of the messy aftermath of the 1960s investment circus.

At this conjuncture, with the difficulties in the economy continuing and obdurate, government policies are similarly pointing in different directions. Thus while unemployment is kept at high levels and the media is attacking “dole bludgers” in order to weaken the morale of sections of the working class and to “divide and rule” the working class, the Australian governments
pledge wage and tax indexation, to go all out against "corporate crooks", to promote pollution control, factory safety, consumer protection and prices control. Furthermore, at a time when tens of thousands of young people look like remaining unemployed, the New South Wales government has pledged to introduce a program of decriminalisation (drugs, vagrancy, offensive behavior, etc.), the probable extension of drinking hours, and even the possibility of legal abortions. Of course, the contradictions in the situation must be recognised. This array of policies and programs suggests several things: first, that the governments are trying to develop more subtle, non-criminal methods of social control over a potentially dangerous segment of the working class in order to reduce the potential for losing control through having to impose a comprehensive policy of penal repression; (34) and second, that in response to problems in the economy, social policy, including legal, is being developed which will provide more consumption. (35) This in turn is to be channelled into more profitable, more efficient sectors of the economy, partly through constraints imposed by law. (36)

Of course, while some of the measures indicated appear to be aimed at restricting ruling class power and delegitimating ruling class values, there are measures and policies pointing in the opposite direction, i.e. clearly supporting the interests of the ruling class. (37) Thus wage indexation is knocked on the head, unemployment is maintained at a high level, Medibank is sabotaged, and much of the program which appeared intended to restrict the autonomy of capital is emasculated, e.g. with regard to trade practices, consumer protection, prices justification, pollution (more than likely factory safety will go the same way) and even the campaign against "corporate crooks" has quietened down. Further, there are threats in the direction of restricting "political" strikes, the continuing media barrage of propaganda against "dole bludgers", the Federal government's campaign against the ABC. Also, the extent of decriminalisation in New South Wales has been put into the problematic category by the government's delay, followed by the punitive police raid on the commune at Tuntable Falls, and the continuing use of summary offences charges against demonstrators.

How these opposing tendencies will be reconciled will be determined not by any simple decisions based on what is "right", nor certainly by any consideration of what the "Rule of Law" will permit, but according to ruling class calculations based on the need for short-term "Order" (repression), long-term "Law" (legitimacy) and the relationship of these to developments in the economic sector.

**FOOTNOTES**

1. See e.g. "30 face charges in NSW company blitz", *The Australian*, 13.8.76; "NSW Out to Land Big Fish", *Australian Financial Review*, 13.8.76.

2. See the report, under a picture of a bath-robed Sir Paul "in the living-room of his $250,000 home", *The Australian*, 9.9.76.


8. See the recent articles based on interviews with lawyers concerning police abuse of power and corruption, especially with regard to organised crime, and failure to prosecute successfully in the area of corporate crime, in *The National Times*, 1.11.76 and 8.11.76.


10. In the Australian context see the two articles by Andrew Fraser, "Marxism, Legal Theory and the Radical Lawyer", *Arena* No. 44 (forthcoming); "Sackville, Poverty and the Law", *Arena* No. 42, 3-10, and see Hopkins, op. cit.


12. An illegal response to such pressures is often considered justified, e.g. the admitted "malpractices" of Qantas, *The Australian*, 24.9.76. The editorial in the same issue ignored
the issue of criminality, except to encourage the airline to compete harder.

13. This and the following two quotations are from Pearce, op. cit., pp. 81-2.


15. This and the following quotation are from Pearce, op. cit., p. 78.


17. See e.g. my paper “Third World Criminology: Crime Control or Class Control?” presented to Young Nations Conference, Sydney, 1976.


21. Yet the results of the on-going cover-up of the atrocious New South Wales prison system became counter-productive to the ruling class: a militant Prisoners Action Group, a radical Alternative Criminology Journal (banned from but widely read in the prisons) and a continuing series of embarrassing articles in The National Times.


23. The importance of such concepts as ‘legality’, the ‘rule of law’, “constitutionality” to the maintenance of ruling class hegemony is recognised by bourgeois politicians, academics and the capitalist press, etc. See, e.g. D. Horne, “The Rage on the Right”, Nation Review, 29.10.76.


27. Quoted in Tribune, 4.8.76.


31. I have attempted this kind of project in “Imperialism, Development and the Underdevelopment of Criminology”, Melanesian Law Journal (forthcoming).

32. The role of the trade union leadership in this process should not be overlooked, nor underestimated, see M. Tubbs, “Hawke The Manager of Discontent”, unpublished ms. 1976.

33. However, Walker’s campaign drew a shot across its bow from the capitalist press as soon as it appeared that he was going to go after corporate crooks sufficiently seriously to use Parliamentary privilege to denounce them and intended to reform the legal procedures which protected them; see the editorial, “Company Crime”, Sydney Morning Herald, 22.9.76.

34. See generally D. Brown, “Reform as Adaptation: An Examination of Decriminalisation”, D. Chappell and P.R. Wilson, Australian Criminal Justice System, 2nd ed. (forthcoming).

35. The Federal government has continued to exhort Australians to spend. And the New South Wales economy is sufficiently poor to evoke threats of internal protectionism, see “Call to Favor NSW goods angers States”, The Australian, 12.8.76. This is a possible explanation for decriminalisation of some recreational, “victimless” crimes, although the relationship is a complicated one.

36. Here the Trade Practices Act is a main battleground, see e.g. “Trade Laws Under Fire”, The Australian, 8.6.76. The Prices Justification Tribunal has of course been maintained by the Fraser government.

37. A particularly good example is the reform of the ground rules for the Prices Justification Tribunal which cuts down substantially the number of big companies under its jurisdiction, see two articles in The Australian, 17.9.76. And see critical comments on the ineffectiveness of the Trade Practices Commission by one of the commissioners, “Trade Watchdog Slated”, 10.9.76.
DISCUSSION

The contribution of Lloyd Edmonds on George Orwell and the Spanish Civil War to ALR No. 54 deserves a reply.

In his second paragraph, Lloyd Edmonds begins his slighting reference to Orwell: he had an "excursion" to the Aragon hills, "fired a few shots" and returned to London. A few sentences later, we learn that Orwell was shot in the throat for his troubles. The whole way Orwell's role is cast is that of a dilettante: at first reading it sounds almost as if Orwell was bored with the war, but being shot in the throat seems a good enough reason to me to leave Spain after only four months!

Edmonds portrays the struggle of the two cities, Barcelona and Madrid, in a curious way. Barcelona, it seems, didn't have the honor of being bombarded constantly and cut off from supplies. Barcelona was where Orwell drew much of his material for Homage to Catalonia. Therefore......?

Edmonds accuses Orwell of portraying the Armageddon that was Spain as a futile guerrilla skirmish. Yet my recollection of Homage to Catalonia is one of an inspiring book - a book that fuelled my socialist convictions as no doubt it has many other students who now study it.

The material Orwell did gather was inspiring. The atmosphere of a "workers' city", with flourishing (for a time) workers' control, reveals the truly political reason for the preparedness to die of the Spanish workers and peasants.

Yet the very central criticism which Orwell raises of the Spanish CP was that it saw the winning of the military war as a separate question, taking chronological precedence over extending the revolutionary gains in the workplace in the neighborhoods and elsewhere.

Franco and his generals had the support of 100,000 Moorish soldiers. Correct me if I am wrong, but wasn't another criticism of those to the left of the CP that the Republican government, heavily influenced by the CP, made little progress in liberating the Spanish colony of Morocco? Perhaps if the dynamic of the revolution was begun there, the numbers and morale of these Moroccan soldiers would have been altogether different.

The policy of the Spanish communists was never in doubt, we are told. It was 'to win the war'. But there are many ways to win (or lose) a war. And in a civil war one of the crucial elements is the morale of the fighters. They must have something to fight for. This is what gave the workers and peasants of Trotsky's Red Army the endurance and will to win in the Soviet Civil War. But the CP's policy, as outlined by Orwell (first win the war, then proceed with the revolution) is not really tackled by Edmonds.

Perhaps the demand for a "trade union government", rejected by the CP, was in the right direction, perhaps not......but this is not seriously discussed.

Is it Orwell's fault that he was promoted during the Cold War? (Actually, I think the bourgeoisie had far more effective opponents of collectivism, as he had then become, than Orwell). What happened of course was that Orwell's vision of socialism soured, as did many when they learnt or were convinced of the parody of socialism in the Soviet Union. Orwell's pessimistic Animal Farm and his nightmarish 1984 have become cliches for the popular notion of "communism". But we cannot eradicate such notions by justification of the policies of the parties which followed the international policy of the USSR.

Dave McKnight.
BOOK REVIEWS


H.J. Eysenck has long been the self-proclaimed voice of pragmatic 'commonsense' in British psychology. His targets have been any viewpoint which is not consistent with his own "scientific", empirically-based, opinions, whether the issue happens to be hypnosis, psychoanalysis, race differences (?) in intelligence, or the attempt to analyse psychological or medical problems at the social or political levels. In The Future of Psychiatry Eysenck continues his attack on those who would dare to criticise the institutional and professional structure and practice of psychiatry on any grounds other than his own. The result is an oddly defensive and dogmatic series of assertions which bear very little logical relation to the general recommendations he wishes to make concerning how psychiatric training and practice might be re-directed.

Eysenck is a "populariser" - an academic who is not afraid to write 'down' to the layman. But this all too frequently entails the simplification of one's opponent's arguments, as well as a reluctance to propose detailed theoretically-motivated arguments one's self. Instead of allowing these constraints to instil caution, Eysenck turns them into excuses for bald assertion, argument ad hominem and crude travesties of any opposing viewpoint. These tactics so weaken his discussion of contemporary psychiatry as to make this brief monograph of little value to anyone seriously interested in how psychiatry might be changed.

Eysenck is concerned to justify and perpetuate current trends by institutionalising what he accepts as a fundamental dichotomy in psychiatric diagnosis; he recommends that the behavior (psychological - environmentally induced) problems of the neuroses be distinguished from the organic diseases of some (he argues all) the psychoses and CNS disorders.

(Central Nervous System - ed.) The latter may remain the province of medical psychiatry, the former should be dealt with by psychologists - specifically, by behavioristically-trained personnel who would employ procedures such as operant conditioning and systematic desensitisation which rely on no assumptions of organic impairment.

To support this separation of functions, Eysenck reprints the evidence which he has cited in other publications (from Rachman and others) to show that behavior therapy is demonstrably efficient in alleviating "various types of anxieties and phobias", while other therapies are no better than none.

In a limited sense, these points might find support among many psychologists, if not psychiatrists - behavioral "disorders" which lack any organic pathology are becoming widely
accepted as non-medical problems.

But Eysenck's conclusion and recommendations for the future of psychiatry beg a number of important questions which have occasioned a debate of such radical significance as to belie his glib dismissal of their implications. In effectively ignoring these questions Eysenck limits his discussion of the future of psychiatry to a prediction and an expression of hope for one aspect of its practice. He never even questions whether psychiatry as he knows it could be radically altered, let alone eliminated as a discipline within medicine. A few examples should suffice to make this point:

First, the monograph assumes that all the "varieties of schizophrenia" will be shown to have an organic basis, whatever the contribution of psychological stress. The so-called "functional" psychoses ".... may not be 'functional' (i.e. due to environmental causes) in any real sense". As might have been guessed, this is due to the strong genetic basis for schizophrenia (hence R.D. Laing and Thomas Szasz can be dismissed) and because this type of disorder ".... responds well and specifically to certain drugs .... Anti-psychotic drugs and physical treatments like electroshock certainly do truncate certain types of attacks, and make recurrence less likely". But the partial efficacy of "physical" treatment does not imply any specific etiology of the disorders in question (what do drugs and ECT have in common?)! Moreover, Eysenck admits that neuroses also involve "strong genetic factors", but he suggests that these disorders are polygenetically based, whereas the number of genes involved in the psychoses "may be quite small" (may be!). Hence, the schizophrenias and manic-depressive illnesses are regarded as organic, although most authors would distinguish these two classes of "illness", expressing more confidence in the organic bases of the latter than the former.

On the basis of these very tentative arguments which assume the veracity and value of medical diagnosis anyway, Eysenck leaves the psychotics with the medical profession and marches the neurotics off to consult the behavior therapists.

Some years ago, Eysenck proposed a general theory of personality which purported to isolate three independent dimensions of character by "scientific" means (i.e. questionnaires and factor analysis). These dimensions were called "Introversion-Extraversion", "Neuroticism" and "Psychoticism". He has now discovered, in psychiatric diagnosis, support for these independent dimensions that his theory posited. And this will be the factual basis for splitting the practice of psychiatry in two: The future of psychiatry is beginning to look very much like the past.

The weaknesses of Eysenck's dismissal of all sociological or non-individualistic analyses of psychiatric assumptions and practice are nowhere more patent than in the naive references to terms like "politics", "manipulation" and "culture". For example, comparing Soviet psychiatry with that practised in the West, he states "political extremism is not even considered by psychiatrists (in the West) in making diagnoses". (Note the equation of "political" with "political extremism" as defined by the professional group itself!) Denying that psychiatry as a profession is likely to manipulate patients, he suggests that the only safeguard necessary is that the patient be allowed to refuse or demand treatment. After all ".... practically all (psychiatrists are) good, conscientious, kindly people, whose major concern is the well-being of their patients". That, of course, is not the issue. Eysenck tells us that "culture" does not cause neuroses, "interpersonal exchanges" do! The assumed independence of the latter from the former, is typical of the assumptions of the whole monograph. Even psychoanalysts whom Eysenck regards as unscientific could see that a cultural value-system stressing sexual repression was closely related to certain forms of neurotic disorders. Eysenck seems to think that "interpersonal exchanges" take place in a social vacuum.

In sort, the very concepts which might have allowed a discussion of the possible futures of psychiatry are used in such a narrow, conventional way by Eysenck that his paper merely predicts the continuation of a current trend that he personally favors.

- Philip Bell.

THE ARABS IN ISRAEL, Sabri Jiryis (foreword by Noam Chomsky), Monthly Review Press, 314 pp., $15.80 (hard cover).

In 1975 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism. This brought howls of outrage, not only from supporters of Israel, but from thousands of others. After all, how could a group who had been decimated by hundreds of years of oppression and anti-semitism be guilty of racism? Jiryis' book goes a good deal of the way towards answering this question.

As with most forms of racial oppression, the position of Arabs in Israel is closely tied to the economic needs of the colonialist zionist settlers. In 1948 most of the Arabs in Palestine were peasants, grazing or tilling land they "rented" from absentee landlords. Others, particularly the Bedouin, were nomadic. It was land that was the key to their economic survival and their way of life.

It has been the struggle over land that has determined the relationship between the Arabs and the zionist settlers since immigration began in
the 1890s. So far, the Arabs have lost, with “over 90 per cent of the land now owned by the state or the Jewish National Fund (JNF)”.

Jiryis recognises the importance of the land question, and devotes nearly half his book to describing and documenting the seizure of Arab lands since 1948. The Zionists have used a barrage of laws to dispossess the Palestinian Arabs. The “Absentee Property Law”, the “Defence (Emergency) Regulations”, the “Emergency (Security Zones) Legislation”, the “Cultivation of Waste Lands Ordinance”, and the “Law of Requisitioning of Property in Times of Emergency is a formidable arsenal of legislation to face. These laws were backed up by the massacre of Arabs who were reluctant to leave their land. Deir Yasin, the most infamous case of zionist terrorism, resulted in the slaughtering of 250 Arab villagers by the Irgun in 1948.

The spirit of the Irgun and Haganah has not died! In 1956, fortynine Arab villagers from Kfar Kassim were massacred by the Israeli army. Some of those responsible were brought to trial and found guilty, but after a strong campaign by the Israeli right wing, more of the culprits were released after serving less than three years. Gabriel Dahan, convicted of killing 43 Arabs in one hour, is now an “Officer of Arab Affairs” in the municipality of Romle!

More recently, hundreds of Arabs have been killed or wounded by Israeli troops during demonstrations in Jerusalem, the West Bank and other Arab districts. However, the Israelis have generally found that “legal” repression is just as effective, and less troublesome.

Since 1948 most Arab areas have come under the Emergency Regulations, a hangover of the British occupation. These regulations placed all power in the hands of the local military governor. He could declare any area “closed”, which meant entry and exit were allowed by permits signed by the governor. In this fashion a de-facto “pass system” was established allowing the authorities to instigate the forced migration of Arabs. Also, by “closing” certain areas, such as fields belonging to a village, and then refusing entry permits to that area, the Arabs were excluded from their land. These lands were then expropriated under one of the “legal” measures mentioned earlier.

By these methods, Jiryis estimates that about 65 per cent of Arab-owned land has now become the property of the JMF or the Israeli state. The bulk of this land has been resettled by Jewish kibbutzim or other Jewish enterprises.

This estimate of expropriated land doesn’t include that which was legally bought from absentee landlords, even though the peasants expelled from this land may have been working it for years. Nor does it include the “waqf” (Islamic communal property such as mosques and cemeteries) or the land left by the Palestinians who fled the 1948 war.

According to Jiryis “out of 807 Arab villages and towns in Palestine in 1945, 433 were still left standing in 1967”.

Hand in hand with this massive expulsion of Arabs from their land went a whole barrage of other oppressive and racist measures. “Judaisation” was carried out at all levels.

Arabs were barred from joining the Histadrut (the Israeli trade union organisation) and attempts to organise their own trade union bodies were crushed. In fact, most Arab organisations were banned, especially if they expressed any nationalist sentiments. Even many sporting clubs were outlawed. The Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) is the only predominantly Arab political organisation that has been allowed to exist, and it is continually harassed by the army and police.

“Judaisation” also meant the exclusion of Arabs from most jobs. A dairy refused to employ an Arab recommended for a job because ‘in times of war milk is a strategic item and a disloyal Arab could do much damage’. The thousands of Arabs driven from their land have entered four main areas of the labor market: the construction industry; hotel employees and servants; teachers in Arab schools; or the unemployed. Top administrative and public service jobs are held almost exclusively by Jewish settlers.

Despite the exhaustive documentation of his case (there are twenty pages of statistics and tables in the Appendix) Jiryis overlooks several crucial areas in his analysis. The book is an “update” of a text written in 1966. Thus the major developments inside Israel since the ’67 war are not included. The riots in Jerusalem, the West Bank and other Arab areas, as well as the recent election successes of Arab nationalists, are significant events which are not discussed.

In his attempt to explain the economic and legal underpinning of Israeli treatment of Arabs, the “less concrete” forms of racism practised against the Palestinian Arabs are overlooked. Religious persecution, the ID Card system, the prevention of inter-marriage, the jailing and mistreatment of political dissidents, and the rabbinate’s influence on the state are all key areas of Arab oppression. Jiryis leaves these gory details for the political propagandists, but his book suffers as a result.

It remains, however, an important and damning indictment of a state that still attempts to present itself as a haven of western enlightenment surrounded by hostile reactionaries. Israel’s generous aid to Rhodesia and South Africa becomes understandable after you have read Jiryis’ account. These governments have a lot in common!

- Greg Giles.
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