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Towards New Union Militancy

In what ways do you regard recent industrial activity by your union as a new development?

The strike was longer, involvement greater and direct confrontation sharper than in most recent disputes. The assaults on partially completed buildings where employers attempted to use building tradesmen or other scab labor to smash the strike was a particularly new ingredient. We stated that if, in this scattered and fragmented industry, an employer used scab labor he must bear the full consequences. Arising from this private property was smashed where arrogant employers ignored the democratic decisions of mass meetings. It was this destruction of private property which struck fear to the very hearts of the employing class. If a relatively small union could successfully mount such an attack, what could be achieved by the more powerful unions with more resources if they acted in a similar way!

Jack Mundey is NSW secretary of the Builders Laborers Federation, and a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party. He gave this interview to *ALR* in July.
You speak of “destruction” rather than “occupation” which many on the left consider to be the main thing.

That is specific to the industry — there seems little point in the occupation of empty shells and still less of continuing building activity during a strike. In production and services (the nurses for example) the situation will differ, while in administration (the university for example) it will differ again.

What was the degree of involvement in the strike?

For our industry it was quite high. It was possible to hold the attendances at meetings at a high level — 1200 in the fifth week in Sydney, and the best ever attendances in Newcastle and Wollongong; 250 or more were engaged in consistent activity, which moreover was of a high quality in the vigilante groups, the number of which increased as the strike went on. These numbers should be seen in the light of the turnover in our union — 50% of the membership changes every year, yet we were able to hold them in the strike.

Another feature of involvement was the street demonstrations in which our members held the streets against the attempts of the police to move them onto the footpaths. This was another blow for the view that the streets are for the use of people and not just for commercial activity and military parades and that kind of “law and order”.

What do you think was the inspiration for this heightened militancy? Did it come from overseas, or locally, or both?

I believe a combination of international developments and purely national and local issues influenced leaders and rank and file. Many workers have been impressed by the aggressive forms of strike and militant activities in overseas countries. The events in France and Italy, and in Japan, and in some of the initiatives of the Black Power movement in the United States have impressed. The activities of the students in many countries including Australia have also made an impact and been appreciated by advanced workers.

The post-O'Shea period and the release, to a certain degree, from the stultifying restrictions of the penal powers has been particularly
important. The harshness of the treatment of the lower paid worker in this first phase of the scientific and technological revolution, where he has fared much worse than any others, is a further reason for heightened militancy and a feeling that change can be achieved if we act.

You rate the penal powers struggle of May '69 very highly?

I regard it as decisive in cracking the sense of frustration which was becoming universal among workers. The way it worked was that when a group of workers was involved in a struggle (and I could give many examples), after a few days or a week an array of union officials ranging from extreme right to extreme left would turn up and urge them, in different ways, to do the same thing — return to work to avoid the penal powers being slapped on the whole union or body of unions involved. The "left" officials usually justified this as being "in the interests of the class as a whole" as against those of the few score or few hundred workers actually involved. This may have been true in some periods and instances, but it became a habit and an excuse. There was too much readiness to settle rather than set out to win disputes.

The other side of all this was that union activity became increasingly embroiled in arbitration, and no real perspective was held or put forward for knocking over the whole arbitration and penal powers treadmill. Another aspect was that struggles have been fragmented. For example, there has been no combined strike of workers in the building industry since 1957.

You spoke of the scientific and technological revolution. How does this affect building workers?

Naturally much less than in some industries. It is hard to envisage building being basically computerised or automated in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless technical change is extensive—use of glass, aluminium, preformed concrete, prefabricated sections, new methods of placing concrete on site (cranes, pumps, etc.) are being increasingly used on homes as well as in commercial and industrial building. Little wood is now used in the latter, and less is also being used in homes, so the number of versatile tradesmen employed in building, especially carpenters, is decreasing rapidly, most of those remaining being form workers (for concrete).
Certainly; it emphasises the need for it—for a real industrial unionism free from craft hangovers, and with the laborers being accepted as a real force in the industry, not just as assistants. There are now 11 unions in the building industry, with many classifications in each. (The BLF has five classifications, and we are out to reduce the number.) The aim is especially to ensure that the lower paid workers improve their position relatively. Our agreement for settlement in the recent dispute is that the lowest paid will get no less than 90% of the increase of the highest paid. I would say that in the future industrial union the difference in rates between the lowest and the highest should be no more than 20%.

What books, writings, discussions, etc., have particularly stimulated your thinking on all these matters?

That is very hard indeed to answer. As a struggle develops it is not a particular book or books that promotes thinking. In today’s shrinking world there are many cross-currents at work in the industrial and political movement, so it is a combination of writings from various viewpoints that influences thinking along with the experiences of the struggle itself. Speaking personally, the struggles in France in 1968 and the varied reports on them, and the CPA pre-Congress and Congress discussions and decisions certainly stimulated me and encouraged the style of offensive strike development in our struggle.

What problems have you encountered in striving to develop such militant activity (a) among militant-inclined workers themselves, (b) from other forces in the industrial movement, (c) from “the public” generally?

I should point out the general difficulty created by the very scattered nature of the building industry. In regard to (a) I have already referred to the problems created among militant workers by the arbitration-mindedness that developed. Most militant workers have been critical for years of the general passivity displayed in strikes, and the failure of communists and others on the left to really force the issues. As I have said the frustration arose particularly because of the bowing down to penal powers, or even the threat of penal powers. These workers found it difficult to differ-
entiate who was who, who was left, right, or centre when all urged return to work when it came to the prospect of a longer strike.

(b) The left in the industrial movement in the main supported our tactics, though there were forebodings that "occupation" and "destruction of private property" were "going a bit too far". Some conservative members of the CPA considered the action was "left adventurist". The rightwing made no secret of their distaste for the strike, and their attitude to alleged violence and the threatened use of the Crimes Act was almost identical with Askin's, the employers', the newspaper editors' and the police.

(c) Because of the publicity, there was a sharp and mixed reaction. Controversy raged and our experience was that opinions was pretty evenly divided. My own impression is that younger people tended to support our positive approach, while older people were more status quo-ish and against confrontation. There was a general sympathy however for the lower paid worker, the battler, and his difficulty, in raising a family.

Is there anything in the criticisms that have been raised — of adventurism; of waging a too-prolonged strike; of deliberate damage to property; of coercing others who didn't agree with the strike; of introducing foreign concepts like "workers' control"?

The accusation of adventurism was used by the Sydney Morning Herald in its editorial when it urged the membership to reject the leadership: "The State Secretary of the union, Mr. Mundey, a leading member of the Communist Party, seems to be out to make a name for himself and his party in an extreme and adventurist manner. His union followers should consider where he is leading them before it is too late." (May 29.) There are also older trade union leaders, including on the left, who expressed the same sentiment.

As I have said, I think tactics in strikes, particularly since 1949, have been so tailored as to give a high priority to the penal powers threat, and thus the need to "get them back to work" to avoid fines. The general idea among officials was to try to win strikes quickly, and failing that, to beat a retreat and make the best of it. With the removal of some of the teeth from the penal powers in May '69, longer strikes including general strikes are likely to become the order of the day. Real economic and political gains are achieved when industry is brought to a halt. Lightning strikes and guerrilla tactics at job level have their place, but when the crunch comes it is the ability of the union to "stop everything"
that can force a strike victory at a higher level. Our crunch came in the second week, when tradesmen were beginning to be stood down and there was a move for conferences and a "responsible" approach of settlement through negotiations. At this stage there was little preparedness by the Master Builders to concede anything substantial. But when the laborers disappointed their expectations for return based on previous experience and the above pressures within the union movement, they got a big shock. They got an even bigger one from the vigilante groups, and so they had to change their tune. I believe they would have succumbed earlier (many did, concluding individual agreements with us based on paying what we wanted) had it not been for pressure from governments and other groups of employers more powerful than the Master Builders.

Deliberate damage to property was the most controversial aspect of the strike. It was also the one that worried the employers most of all. We did not set out on a wanton destruction rampage, but attacked only buildings where employers were attempting to use scab labor to break the strike. This had a devastating effect on employers, government and police alike. In this dispute it took the class enemy by surprise. Future action of this type will be most successful if hundreds and thousands of strikers are involved, so making it difficult for full police and government defence of the employers' property. The scattered nature of the building industry was an advantage here, as the vigilante groups were very mobile and could strike quickly.

The accusation of coercing others who didn't agree with the strike is largely untrue. It surprised many experienced union leaders that in a casual industry such as ours we could maintain the involvement of so many in a five week strike. In fact the tendency was for attendances at mass meetings to increase. The vigilante groups had their main development in the fourth and fifth weeks of the dispute. The decisions of numerous mass meetings in Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong and Goulburn were either unanimous or overwhelmingly in favor of continued action. These demonstrations of determination obliged us to stop the small number of tradesmen and non-unionists from performing our work. There was little criticism from other unions of our right to stop scabbing, though some more faint-hearted union officials were critical of our forceful methods of backing up democratic decisions of our striking members.

Of workers' control, again there was some criticism from the more rigid on the left, particularly some members of the CPA, to the effect that the whole exercise was "left adventurist" as well
as there being "nothing new" in the conduct of the strike. It was even suggested that it was an "Aarons' plot" to demonstrate part implementation of the recent Congress decisions and "embarrass" the "opposition" in the CPA! The emphasis on offensive strikes as against the usual "go home and stay home" strike allows an element of workers' control to exist. For example occupation and continued production could give workers a practical demonstration of their potential capacity to run industry.

What was gained by the strike, economically and otherwise?

The margins element of the wage was increased and a new standard established. The widening gap between tradesmen and laborers was greatly reduced. This was a victory over the employers' policy, applied especially in the metal trades margins struggle of 1967-68, where the tradesmen got $7.40—quite a substantial increase—while the rest of the workers, the great majority, got very little. Our strike has helped the whole class to smash these plans to buy off a minority section while making more than compensating profits from the low wages of the majority.

It is sometimes said that there are really no economic gains for the workers in such strikes. For example in this case it might be said that even with 100% victory it will take the workers a year to get back the wages they lost in the five weeks.

This argument is fallacious. Everything in the capitalist system goes against the workers if left to itself. If we don't struggle inflation will reduce our wages each year anyway, and we would never get it back, while the employers would grow richer and more powerful. The losses of the employers were far greater than ours—$60 million is their conservative estimate—and they have therefore learned that they must look on the laborers, with their newly developed strike experience, as a force to be reckoned with. This will help us to win further gains in future. I have already referred to the general economic gains for the class as a whole which is likely to flow from our struggle.

Other gains include increased financial unionism, and the possibility of the building unions now exercising a greater say in the industry. More broadly still, the workers—especially those most involved—developed their self-action and the consciousness that militancy needs to be displayed in the political and moral fields as well as industrially and economically. This will especially assist our objective of getting a big involvement in the September Vietnam Moratorium.
Do you see any weaknesses in the strike?

At the conclusion of the strike we called the wives together. We should have done this in the beginning. Other organisational problems were the neglect of finance raising in the concentration on vigilante activity. Another weakness is that there hasn’t been a real analysis by all building unions in NSW of future industrial relations within the building industry. We propose to request other building unions to discuss our strike and future industrial relations as they see them as we enter the 70’s.

What do you see as needed for further development of militant activity and its closer connection with aspirations for revolutionary change in society?

A complete reorientation of the left in the movement towards direct confrontation on a wider scale and with wider horizons, and away from purely wages and conditions struggles. The failure in peace activity, in all anti-war struggles, is the immediate main problem the unions must tackle. Direct intervention in the control of industries, in social problems, price controls is a must if unions are to win younger people and reverse the drift away from unionism.
THE REASONS FOR DISSENSION among America's rulers are clear. The war has destroyed the precious consensus while threatening to undermine the economy. Besides the threat to the dollar particularly from European bankers, rising inflation, and a worsening balance of payments situation — all aggravated by an economy fired up by military expenditures — the very foundation of American international expansion, the superior productivity of the U.S. economy, has been eroded.

For more than a hundred years the United States has been a Pacific power. But since the end of World War II and the collapse of the British, French and Japanese empires, the United States has become the major Pacific power. While the industrial nations remain the the largest trading centre for the United States and U.S. investment is increasing in Europe twice as fast as in the Pacific, trade is increasing in the Pacific faster than in Europe.

U.S. imperialism in Asia has developed peculiar characteristics which will determine the direction of future strategies in the area. Beginning with World War II economic thrusts have been accompanied and protected by an aggressive military presence. This fact has affected both the nature of economic relations in the Pacific Basin and the industrial development of the western United States. The United States' peculiar form of international military Keynesianism has stoked up the economies of the lesser Asian powers as well as Japan, producing a fatal dependency on the maintenance of a massive military presence.

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Peter Wiley is a revolutionary activist and member of the San Francisco staff of Leviathan.
It is a matter of common knowledge that defence spending has provided much of the dynamism for the American economy since World War II. With much of this spending going to maintain an American presence in Asia, military imperialism in Asia has played a significant role in the rapid expansion and internationalisation of the American economy. And now since the United States committed itself to intervention in Vietnam, the very institutions which were generated by this expansion, particularly the multinational corporation, have begun to devise an imperial strategy consistent both with the traditions of U.S. imperialism in Asia and with the global scope of their search for markets and resources. Beginning on the mainland of Southeast Asia, the corporations in the vanguard of the movement for rationalisation and extension of the Pacific market are beginning to systematise and integrate the complex web of bilateral, multilateral and regional alliances which have been constructed in the Pacific since the war.

VIETNAM

The formulation of a Pacific Rim strategy contributed to a clarification and alteration of the role assigned to Vietnam. In 1966 the United States saw Vietnam as another Greece or Korea. Upon successful completion of pacification, U.S. capital would move in and reconstruct the country tying its economy to the international market system. Henry M. Sperry, Vice-President of First National City Bank, outlined this strategy:

We believe that we’re going to win this war. Afterwards you’ll have a major job of reconstruction on your hands. That will take financing and financing means banks... It would be illogical to permit the English and French to monopolise the banking business. Because South Vietnam’s economy is becoming more and more United States oriented.

American corporations as well as banks were already staking out their claims. Standard Oil, Caltex and Shell, for example, were working on a $19 million oil refinery. Vietnam was being considered as more than a market for U.S. investments and a place where American-owned subsidiaries would purchase goods from parent plants in the United States. By reconstructing agriculture, particularly rice cultivation, Vietnam could resume its special role in the economy of the region by supplying rice to countries with serious food shortages.

Although the Tet offensive of 1968 destroyed these plans by driving the United States out of the countryside and into a few cities and fortified bases, the United States has no intention of withdrawing. As long as the United States is militarily incapable of pacifying Vietnam, it must accept second best. Rather than a
politico-economic entity integrated into the Pacific economy, Vietnam is being developed as a military outpost, a key base in the defence perimeter which runs along the edge of the Asian continent and is anchored in South Korea and Vietnam. Former Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Graham Martin has described the United States as creating a "protective screen" in Southeast Asia. Bases like Cam Ranh Bay, recognised by all observers as a permanent facility, will anchor this screen.

THAILAND AND INDONESIA

Behind this screen the United States is rapidly expanding its influence in Southeast Asia, focussing its attention primarily on Thailand and Indonesia. Thailand is considered "the centre of political and economic stability in Southeast Asia". In a real sense the United States is fighting in Vietnam to protect its interests in Thailand from the forces of revolutionary nationalism represented by the recently formed (January, 1969) People's Liberation Army of Thailand. With Vietnam lost except as a military outpost, the United States is trying to bring Thailand into the Pacific economy before the struggle there reaches the proportions of Vietnam. Between 1961 and 1967 the United States bolstered the military dictatorship of General Thonom Kittikachorn with $640 million in aid, almost two-thirds of it military assistance. In return the Thai Government reversed a tendency toward state control of the economy and opened the country to American investment and to the investment of important U.S. allies like Japan. The government provided tax holidays and guarantees against nationalisation and against restrictions on entry of foreign capital, repatriation of profits, and transfer of capital. In 1965 the Department of Commerce listed 99 firms in which American companies or individuals have a substantial direct capital investment in the form of stock, as a sole owner, or as a partner. Present U.S. investment is estimated at $195 million, with much more to come. Among the important investors are Caltex, Chase Manhattan Bank, Esso, Firestone Rubber, IBM, ITT, Foremost Dairies, Bank of America and Kaiser Aluminium. The last three are important West Coast firms.

American firms are primarily interested in Thailand's raw materials. Thus Tenneco and Union Oil signed the first contract for exploration and future exploitation of the oil fields under the Gulf of Thailand, while Standard of Indiana has constructed a $35 million refinery. Union Carbide has invested $4.8 million to extract tin concentrate and Goodyear has built three tyre plants to tap Thailand's extensive rubber supplies. Meanwhile large U.S. banks—Manufacturer's Hanover Trust, First National City, Morgan Guaranty and Banker's Trust—are moving into Thai finance.
Two other forms of economic activity are significant. Many large Japanese and American corporations are taking advantage of their increased international character in order to locate labor intensive industries and parts plants in areas where labor is cheap. In this way consumer goods and light manufactures can be produced cheaply and exported to domestic assembly plants. Parts can also be assembled abroad for the local market. Another type of activity is the actual construction of the defence perimeter. Utah Mining and Construction, a large international firm located in San Francisco, is building military bases in Thailand which are being used to bomb Vietnam. Utah's involvement in the military aspects of U.S. expansion in the region is instructive. Marriner Eccles, chairman of the board, has been a vocal critic of the war in Vietnam, a fact that has not prevented Utah from contributing to its extension.

Beyond Thailand is Indonesia, one of the richest regions and largest single markets in the world. American companies have literally swarmed into Indonesia since the coup against Sukarno although the chaotic state of the economy has proved a significant barrier to investment. President Eisenhower explained the relationship between the struggle in Vietnam and Indonesia as early as 1953 when he asked, "If we lost Vietnam and Malaya, how would we, the free world, hold the rich empire of Indonesia?"

Since large-scale U.S. intervention in Vietnam, Indonesia has been redeemed for the "free world". With the coup against Sukarno in 1966 the trend of growing hostility toward foreign capital was arrested and a more pliable government "came into existence". Within six months of its advent the new government returned expropriated property to its former owners and promulgated a new law on foreign investment. The law provides virtual exemption from taxation for new foreign investors and makes no provision for joint ventures, one method which is usually employed in an effort to retain some local control of foreign investors. President Suharto summed up the attitude of the new government toward foreign investors when he reassured Prime Minister Sato of Japan that Indonesia will "never interfere in the affairs of private business organisation in Indonesia."

Soon after the coup and the counter-revolutionary bloodbath which killed hundreds of thousands of Indonesians, the United States extended aid to the new regime. Aid is now being followed by the preliminary forays of American investors. American Freeport Sulphur is opening a $76.5 million copper mine while U.S. Steel, Bethlehem, Kaiser Aluminium (among others) are also interested. American oil companies are just beginning to investigate
Indonesia's rich deposits although they are still hampered by a residue of nationalism from the Sukarno regime; the government insists on receiving 65 per cent of the net returns. Fifteen American banks, including Bank of America, Chase Manhattan and First National City have received authorisation to open offices. They are participating in the formation of a national investment bank which will give them a large measure of control over Indonesian finances.

Raw materials bring most investors to Indonesia and the economy is well on its way to becoming an extractive industry-plantation type of neo-colony. Although the Dutch were able to explore only a tenth of Indonesian resources, and the Sukarno regime did not get much further, potential investors know that the islands abound with oil, tin, copper and many other important materials as well as timber and the most fertile lands in Asia. By the middle of 1968 the government approved foreign investment projects totalling $332.08 million, with a five year goal of $2.5 billion. More than three-quarters of these projects were concentrated in mining, plantations, forestry, and fishing. Projects totalling $57.8 million were approved for manufacturing. Of the total amount a little over a third were U.S. investments and the next two investors were listed as Canadian and South Korean, but the companies are in fact subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. Thus, almost two-thirds of the planned investment in Indonesia will be American-owned.

JAPAN

Although our attention is concentrated on Vietnam and Southeast Asia due to the prolonged military confrontation there, Japan is in fact the pivot of the United States' economic and military offensive in Asia. Japan, and island bases like Okinawa, have been the most important forward staging areas in two U.S. interventions, Korea and Vietnam. Japan is industrialised, seemingly stable politically, and often a willing partner in U.S. expansionist designs. Japan is the second largest market in the world after Canada for U.S. goods, the largest market for U.S. agricultural goods, and an important target for U.S. investors and exporters who so far have been prevented from penetrating the Japanese economy like they have the European.

But Japan presents a problem and the solution of the problem is perhaps one of the most important reasons for the United States' continuing presence in Southeast Asia. Japan is an island economy with a small resource base, a rapidly growing population, and a domestic market that is limited in relation to the rapidly expanding productive capacity of its modern economy. In order to keep up
its present rate of economic growth it must have larger and larger foreign markets and supplies of raw materials. Because of the importance of Japan to the United States in the Pacific, the United States, since the occupation, has assumed a great deal of responsibility for managing the expansion of the Japanese economy as well as its own. Eisenhower explained in 1954 that the loss of Indochina "would take away that region Japan must have as a trading area, or it would force Japan to turn toward China and Manchuria, or toward the Communist areas in order to live. The possible consequences of the loss of Japan to the free world are just incalculable".

The possibility of reorientation toward China and Russia is strong if not "natural". China and Russia are Japan's logical trading partners for reasons of transportation cost and economic specialisation. Prewar Japanese imperialism was based largely on the complementary nature of the Japanese and Chinese economies. China provided a market for Japanese textiles and industrial goods and at the same time supplied important raw materials like cotton, iron ore, and coal while helping to feed the Japanese population with rice and soya. Ideology and pressures from the United States have not prevented the Japanese from trying to re-establish this trade pattern since the Cold War. Trade grew rapidly in the fifties, was slowed down by Chinese political opposition in the late fifties, and began to pick up again until the Cultural Revolution. The future of Sino-Japanese relations is unsure at this point although Japanese businessmen feel that trade with China this year will pick up perhaps equalling the record level of 1966. In addition Japan in involved in several joint ventures with Russia in eastern Siberia designed to develop the resources of the area.

The United States is clearly wary lest Japan first reorient its trade policy and then follow this change with a more independent political stance in all of Asia. To prevent this reorientation the United States is encouraging Japan to re-establish its relationship with the Southeast Asian region of its former East Asian Coprosperity Sphere, while directing the rest of its overseas economic activities toward the West. Southeast Asia is already providing important raw materials for Japanese industry (bauxite from Thailand, oil from Indonesia) and will provide more in the future as long as the Southeast Asia countries are amenable to the exploitation of their resources by the new and old colonial masters. Until recently, however, the region did not live up to Japan's expectations as a market for goods and investment. Japan turned instead to the United States, Canada and Australia and began to develop new markets and sources of raw materials in Latin America. Japanese foreign investment in the "underdeveloped" countries is
presently shifting away from Latin America and toward Southeast Asia, particularly the United States' neo-colonial dependencies, Taiwan, Korea and Thailand. Despite this shift, 26 per cent of Japanese foreign investment in 1968 was in Latin America while only 14 per cent was in other Asian countries.

Significantly, the United States has provided a surrogate market for Japan in Asia which helps to keep Japan out of the Chinese or Soviet trade orbit. From 1945 to 1962 U.S. military expenditures in Japan contributed significantly to the GNP and paid for nearly 20 per cent of Japanese imports, a very important factor in a country which until the recent boom has had chronic balance of payments problems due to the necessity to import large quantities of goods. In addition, U.S. military involvement has provided the markets that Japan needs in the "underdeveloped" countries of Asia. The Japanese economy has thrived off the export of goods to Korea, Vietnam, Thailand and other American outposts. The impact of the escalation of U.S. military involvement on the Asian mainland can be illustrated both by the Korean war which initiated the Japanese economic "miracle" and by the way the economy began to accelerate with the escalation of the Vietnam conflict. In 1965-66 the GNP rose 2.7 per cent, in 1966-67, in comparison, it rose by 7.5 per cent, reaching a fantastic 10 per cent in 1968.

The relationship between the tempo of Japanese economic development and U.S. military involvement is more complicated than a simple accelerating effect from the U.S. military expenditures in Japan and Asia. Both the Korean and Vietnamese interventions caused rapid upswings in the U.S. domestic economy, the largest market for Japanese goods, which in turn stimulated the Japanese economy. In general, Japanese economic health is tied in large part to U.S. military adventures.

THE STRATEGY

The corporations in the forefront of Pacific economic expansion see the development of a Pacific Rim strategy as the key to orienting Southeast Asia and Japan toward the West and integrating them into a market system under U.S. hegemony. Operating through their research arm, the Stanford Research Institute, these corporations (Kaiser, Union Oil, Bechtel, Bank of America, Castle and Cook, Utah Construction and Mining, and Tenneco, to name a few) began to articulate a conscious strategy beginning in 1967 as an outgrowth of their expanded activities in the area.

At the core of the Pacific system, as they see it, are the advanced industrial nations, Japan and the United States, and the three industrialising nations, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The
greater part of the flow of trade and investment is between these countries and is based on a certain degree of specialisation. The United States trades with all the nations exporting a wide variety of goods, most important of which are raw materials, agricultural goods, consumer durables and capital goods. In addition the United States has invested and will continue to invest in all the Asian countries, with particular emphases on Australia and Japan, where direct U.S. investment is presently not welcome. Australia and to a lesser extent New Zealand export raw materials and agricultural goods largely to Japan. In Australia, raw materials in particular are being developed for sale in Japan with Japanese and American capital. Japan produces textiles and a great variety of consumer and capital goods for the same markets as the United States, while also investing wherever possible.

The United States and then Japan stand at the apex of the hierarchy of economic development. They draw resources from the next tier, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, while selling goods in these markets. These advanced countries, moreover, regard the integration of the neo-colonial countries around the Pacific Rim into their triangular and quadrilateral economic relations as essential to the future development of an international division of labor in the Pacific. First, because the neo-colonial countries are at a very low level of development, their growth could be spectacular and their potential as markets far greater than advanced countries. Second, the advanced countries view the raw materials of these countries as increasingly important to their economic well-being. SRI-International Vice-President Ed Robison explained, "The raw materials that enable the rich countries to grow richer must increasingly be bought from the poor. The industrialised nations are using these basic materials in geometrically increasing quantities. . . . We are . . . forced to scour the world to find out sources . . . " Finally, Southeast Asia and Latin America have a special significance, as we have described, for the United States' ally, Japan.

The need to "scour the world" for raw materials has provided the impetus for bringing western Latin America and western Canada into the Pacific pattern of trade, tying the eastern Pacific to the western Pacific. The United States has been exploiting the resources of both Canada and western Latin American countries like Chile and Peru for quite a while. Now elaborate international agreements are being made in conjunction with Japan to expand these operations in order to meet Japan's soaring needs for raw materials.

The activities of Utah Mining and Construction, a major Pacific Rim corporation and affiliate of SRI, are typical of the complex international relationships developing around the Pacific Rim be-
tween the United States and Japan. Utah owns a controlling share of Marcona Mining. Marcona invested in the exploitation of iron ore in Peru in 1956. Now the ore is exported to Japan in ships constructed for Marcona in Japanese shipyards. The ships then move on to Indonesia and the Persian Gulf, returning to the West Coast of the United States with oil. In 1967, Marcona began exporting alumina from western Canada with a fleet of Japanese-built ships. In Australia, Utah is embarking on a joint venture with Mitsubishi, one of Japan's corporate giants. Together they have paid $112 million (Utah put up 85 per cent of the capital) to explore 1333 square miles in Queensland for coal. The coal will be moved to the coast on a railroad built by the Government of Queensland and will then be shipped to Japan in Japanese-built ships. When Utah's construction of military bases in Thailand is taken into account we have a full picture of an expansive Pacific Rim corporation profiting from the extension of the military perimeter on the Asian mainland and from the exploitation of raw materials behind this perimeter.

Along with the formulation of a conscious strategy for the Pacific, the United States has initiated or participated in a great variety of arrangements and institutions designed largely to “internationalise” protection of existing investments and facilitate further investment mainly in the less developed areas. Some of these arrangements are international in character; others serve as a convenient cover for U.S. control. Foremost among the institutions is the Asian Development Bank (ADB) founded in 1966.

Another important aspect of the internationalisation involved in the Pacific Rim strategy is the beginnings of military involvement by the other advanced Pacific nations particularly in Southeast Asia. In January, 1969, the Japanese began to send destroyers from its so-called Maritime Self-Defence Force into the Malacca Straits between Malaysia and Indonesia. The next month Australia and New Zealand announced that they will maintain forces in Malaysia and Singapore in anticipation of British withdrawal east of Suez in 1971. The United States has put great emphasis on the internationalisation of the Vietnam intervention by forcing its more servile allies like South Korea to send troops. When revolutionary nationalism becomes generalised in Southeast Asia, which is only a matter of time, the United States will have its imperialist co-partners at beck and call.

**IMPERIALIST CUL-DE-SAC**

Despite the immense sophistication of the international corporation, and the overwhelming strength of the American military state,
the success of the Pacific Rim strategy is far from a foregone conclusion. Indeed it is subject to pressures from without and within, due largely to the growth of revolutionary nationalism on the one hand and competition in the international economy on the other.

The consequences of the continued colonisation of the third world are apparent: China, Algeria, Cuba and Vietnam are all responses to the continued expansion of Western capitalism. At the same time the Western powers are incapable of learning the lesson of repeated defeats at the hands of revolutionary nationalism. This is more true in Asia than anywhere else. Through vast geopolitical arrangements like the Pacific Rim strategy the international corporations are consciously generating the conditions that lead to revolution. SRI, for example, explains that "In the colonial era, the export of tropical products from Southeast Asia was a cornerstone of the world trading system. The demand for these products, and for minerals, is still increasing year by year. It is still true that a country gains by exporting the products in which it has the greatest comparative advantage".

The kind of insistence on repeating what has been proved to be self-destructive is responsible for the internationalisation of the anti-colonial revolt in Southeast Asia. At present guerrilla struggles are taking place in Laos, Thailand, Burma, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Some of these are just beginning (India and Burma), others were thought to have been terminated but are springing up again (Philippines and Malaysia), still others are emerging as major confrontations (Laos and Thailand).

Unable to deal with the conditions that breed revolutionary resistance, the corporations must opt for counterinsurgency, a disastrous course because once the struggle has sufficient roots counterinsurgency can only contribute to its growth. In Thailand where guerrillas are fighting in three separate areas, the struggle has reached the stage where the local militias have been consolidated into a People's Liberation Army. For several years the United States has been supplying the Thai "police" with a great variety of material including weapons, helicopters and patrol boats. Within the last two years American pilots have been "advising" Thai pilots on missions against the guerrillas. There are presently about 50,000 U.S. troops in Thailand. Virtually all the elements of another Vietnam!

Investors in Thailand like Union Oil, Union Carbide, Kaiser, Castle and Cook, Bank of America, and Utah Mining and Construction are working through SRI for Project AGILE, the Pentagon's world-
wide counterinsurgency research program so that the United States will be in a knowledgeable position should “large-scale intervention in Thailand be called for” (SRI).

Another factor is China. How long will she sit by and witness the extension of U.S. military power along her borders? Many of the leading corporations active in the Pacific are eager to trade with China. It galls them to have to watch the Japanese and West Germans reaping profits from the enemy. But trade with China is unlikely to come while China sees larger and larger deployments of troops and bases on the Asian mainland. Further, China will undoubtedly continue to support liberation struggles in adjacent countries.

Besides the pressures from outside, the development of the Pacific Rim strategy is threatened from within, particularly by the complex relations between the United States and Japan. While the United States has fought in Southeast Asia in part to secure the area for Japan, Japan still remains a serious competitor. In Thailand until recently, for example, Japan was the largest investor. Japan is pursuing new markets aggressively; the director of Pacific operations for one of the largest American firms in the area commented recently that “little by little Japan is taking over the Pacific”.

Japan’s most serious threat is in the U.S. domestic market in steel, autos, certain consumer goods and electronic components. The steel industry in particular is adamant about imposing measures, whether higher tariffs or quotas, which will cut down Japanese imports. Many corporations are caught in a dilemma. If the decline of the United States’ competitive position is a long-term trend due to factors like inflation which cannot be controlled, they will have no choice but to restrict imports.

U.S. corporations argue that they must restrict Japanese imports if Japan is not willing to reciprocate by opening the door to U.S. direct investments. Despite a recent token liberalisation policy, Japan prevents American corporations from gaining control of Japanese firms or from setting up subsidiaries by limiting U.S. investment to joint ventures controlled by Japanese capital and to stock market investment. The United States is eager to compete equally within (read dominate) the Japanese economy by setting up its own operations and purchasing Japanese firms. If the United States is allowed to Americanise the Japanese economy as it has the European, Japan, with its fantastic rate of growth, could become the major market for U.S. capital.

Faced by a variety of pressures from the United States, Japan might embark on a more independent course. She is already
arming herself with destroyers, subs and American jets at the urging of the United States. It is foreseeable that she might decide in the future that she can exist without living under the United States' nuclear umbrella, particularly if she has more amicable relations with countries like China who will remain hostile as long as Japan serves as an outpost for U.S. military adventures. The consequences of splitting with the United States cannot be taken lightly. Besides the benefits of imperialism without militarism, Japan would lose the annual "subsidy" from U.S. military expenditures in Japan and perhaps some of the benefits of military expenditure outside of Japan. Japan would have to be pushed quite a ways by a strong trend toward protectionism in the United States and more adamant attempts to open the door before any fundamental change would take place. The seeds of the conflict do exist, however, and they are growing.

Finally there are the political liabilities of an alliance with the United States. Japan is aware that subordination to the United States means inability to break out of the cycle of involvement in U.S. military adventures, a distinct problem for an Asian nation with a large, militant left. The United States and the Mutual Security Treaty which allows the United States to have bases in Japan have been a target of the left for years. Militant action against the huge U.S. base on Okinawa has increased in the last year with the return of the island to Japan as a goal. The Japanese and the U.S. mission seem to be in agreement at this point that a return of the base to Japan might be a good way to "manage" the confrontation which is anticipated for next year when the treaty is scheduled to be renewed. If the left can exert greater pressure on the government in the impending crisis, it may force the government to take a more independent stand. The return of Okinawa and several small bases would not represent an American pull-out to a defence perimeter in the Philippines and Guam. Most estimates are that if the United States can afford to give up the base in Okinawa, it will be transferred to Cam Ranh Bay.

What alternatives does corporate imperialism have in Asia? Withdrawal or significant disengagement simply are not feasible given the nature of American expansion to the East. Since 1945 the United States has "invested" billions of dollars in aid and material and tens of thousands of lives in three wars (the Chinese civil war and the Korean and Vietnamese interventions) in order to maintain a presence on the Asian mainland. This fact alone should be indicative of U.S. intentions.

But now the corporations at the forefront of planning the Pacific Rim strategy are taking themselves further into a situation where
there is less and less room to manoeuvre. Having constructed the southern flank of a permanent defence perimeter with its major bases at Cam Ranh Bay and in northern Thailand, they have defined the area immediately behind this perimeter beginning in Thailand and including Indonesia and all of Southeast Asia as vital to the existence of their leading ally, Japan, and as integral and essential to the entire Pacific Basin. The Basin in turn has been defined as essential to the future development of international capitalism because of its raw materials and its vast potential.

The propensity of the system to penetrate and attempt to incorporate larger and larger areas has generated an epic struggle against imperialism, the beginnings of which we are just witnessing. When we examine the liberation struggles in other Asian countries, we ought to remember that the Chinese fought for more than two decades for their independence and that the Vietnamese have been fighting now for almost three. These struggles will smoulder, rekindle, and flare up according to their own rhythms but they have reached the stage where their expansion is inevitable.

The central role of armed counter-revolution in U.S. imperialism in Asia is probably the most important short term factor governing the United States' ability to extricate itself from Vietnam. The negotiations are influenced by the United States' intent to maintain a permanent military presence in Southeast Asia. The military cannot "liberate" Vietnam. It remains to be seen if they can hold on to the enclaves. But they will not accept anything short of this.

Finally the economic consequences of a significant reduction of the U.S. military presence would be severe, if not disastrous. The economies of the Asian countries oriented toward the West have grown in dependency on expenditures generated by American interventions. If Japan would suffer from a military cut-back, the impact on less developed countries like Korea, Taiwan or Singapore would undoubtedly be more severe. Once committed to the generation of significant economic development by means of military expenditures it has become close to impossible to take a peaceful course even if the various liberation fronts would allow it.

With the United States operating on the basis of the assumptions which have shaped the Pacific Rim strategy, the Paris talks do not indicate a dramatic reversal in U.S. foreign policy. Indeed they are simply a ploy to buy time to cool out dissent at home while continuing the disastrous policies of the postwar period in Asia.
Kevin Hartshorne

Czechoslovakia — Two Years After

TWO YEARS AFTER the Warsaw Pact Invasion. Two years after 1968 became yet another momentous historical date for the sophisticated Czechs and Slovaks. Dates such as 1415, 1620, 1848, 1918, 1938, 1945, 1948... Czechs know their history, and no-one who cannot appreciate the momentous significance of such dates as these to the people living in ‘the cockpit of Europe’ can appreciate their mood in 1970. For there are those of us whose emotional identification with certain concepts of government and certain ideological dogmas lead us to behave like leftwing Chamberlains: Czechoslovakia is a long way off, we know little about it, it’s a small country — and what’s all this prattle about sovereignty and nationalism anyway? We’re internationalists, aren’t we?

1415? The Prague preacher Jan Hus was burned because he condemned Church corruption and refused to recant in Rome. His death helped set off Protestant rebellions which caused radical changes in central European society. To many Czechs 1415 is yesterday. Hus’s statue in the capital carries an inscription in old Cyrillic proclaiming that while it stood Czechs would always feel free. No-one apparently translated this for the nazis for they left it standing. Hus has come to symbolise national identity, national independence and freedom from domination by larger powers.¹ And at that time the preacher stared down Paris Street from the historic old Town Square at an enormous and bombastic statue

¹ It amazes me that the same socialists who demand that Papuans, Aborigines or Fijians have all these things cannot want them for Czechs or Slovaks as well, or for Tartars etc.

Kevin Hartshorne is a High School Teacher in Victoria. He lived for many years in Czechoslovakia and is author of the book Czechoslovakia — From the New World.
1620? From 1620 to 1918 the Czechs (and Slovaks) were ruled by Austro-Hungary. 300 years of Catholicisation and Germanisation! The Czech language held out only in the country areas and it was such a catastrophic period that the Czechs remember it as the ‘Period of Darkness’ from the title of a book by Jirasek. Ferdinand of Vienna won a battle near Prague and:

He determined to extirpate the Protestant religion from Bohemia, and... (his success) has rarely been equalled in the history of persecution. By a system of widespread confiscation and ruthless repression the country was brought under the Austrian heel. A German ascendancy as intolerant as that of the English settlers in Ireland was imposed upon the Czechs, and not seriously shaken till the nineteenth century. German officials ruled... Jesuit priests controlled education... (and) the Bohemian peasantry was trodden down into servitude... (So there resulted) the manufacture of a servile state in Europe.2

1848? The Year of Revolutions in Europe. The Czechs revolted too, like many a people demanding more freedom, more possibility of national and cultural development. But the Austrians had other ideas:

On June 17, 1848, Prince Windischgratz turned his guns upon the city of Prague... (and) postponing for seventy years the realization of Czech liberties, crushed the Bohemian rebellion.3

1918? This year marked the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its rule over the Czechs and Slovaks. Masaryk and Beneš were revered as founders of the First Czechoslovak Republic. After 300 years Czechs and Slovaks could use their own languages freely, set up their own institutions and control their own destinies without any overlords!

1938? The story of Munich and the Western betrayal of Czechoslovakia to Hitler is well-known. Less well-known is that Czechoslovakia was already a well-fortified and modern state with a strong army and air force and that its people responded in 1938 in such overwhelming numbers, revealing that amazing ‘crisis unity’ which astounded the world in 1968, that Hitler would have had great trouble breaking through the forts had not the Munich Agreement simply handed him the country. There is evidence to support the theory that nazism could in fact have been defeated in 1938. But what a bitter experience, those six years of nazi domination to a

3 op. cit., p. 922.
people who only twenty years before had been freed from three centuries of Austrian domination!!

1945? Once again a Liberation, a Soviet Liberation. It is true that the Americans were in a position to liberate embattled Prague and the country before the Red Army and bowed out under an international agreement, yet moral and historical justice saw the Soviet forces eulogised as the true destroyer of fascism. Especially as treaty links dated from pre-war days, there was widespread and genuine affection for the liberators.

1948? The year of decisive socialist change, the year which demanded that people decide which way to face, after Western style elections in 1946 had shown the Communist Party to be the major one and to be constitutionally the legitimate governing party.

1968? The year of the fall of Novotny, the period of the ‘Czech renaissance’ and the subsequent Warsaw Pact Invasion. Why all this turmoil in 1968? The simple answer is that it had become obvious to all but a few citizens that the Novotny people were then holding society back and that despite life having some good features almost every sector in society was suffering grave stagnation.

Perhaps economic failure destroyed Novotny’s power above all. In 1959-61 I witnessed a steady and uninterrupted rise in living standards in Czechoslovakia, and even though industry was carrying agriculture this seemed to reflect a basically sound economy. But in Autumn 1962 there occurred a serious economic, political and moral crisis. The leaders were unable to cope, their authority weakened rapidly and there was evidence of widespread economic and social dislocation, caused by power failures, food shortages, a sudden rise in the incidence of bribery, a nation-wide management breakdown and a general slump in public morale. People’s frustration became so acute that even communists cursed and said that if this was socialism then it wasn’t much good to them. Yet despite an unusually severe winter the Czechs and Slovaks rallied and their national feeling was shown at its best in the crisis as production was maintained in weather more typical of Siberia than of Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{5} I felt at the time that authority was relatively powerless. It looked for a few days as though socialism would

\textsuperscript{1} The Slovaks were actually ruled by the Hungarians for 1,000 years.

\textsuperscript{5} I stress the perhaps unique importance of “national feeling” here because I do not know of a comparable example where certain individuals who were known to be bitterly opposed to the ruling ideology would nevertheless make such prodigious efforts during a national crisis: namely, some of those individuals whose property had been nationalised after 1948.
collapse from sheer inertia. I believe that had a significant number of people been in fact organising to destroy socialism then they certainly could never have chosen a moment when the system was more vulnerable.

However, sheer muscle and patriotism is no long-term substitute for necessary reforms, which was proved in 1963 when industrial production actually fell slightly—almost unheard of in a developed country in recent years. His regime weakened, Novotny responded by loosening the reins a little. He gave prominence to talk about the ideas of economic reform of people such as Ota Sik while attempting to rule in the old way. He also liberalised foreign travel and cultural freedoms generally, to placate the intellectuals above all, who were his main critics.² By Christmas 1964 the atmosphere in Prague was intoxicating because of the tremendous intellectual and cultural energies released, energies that had been held in an ideological strait-jacket since the 1950's purges frightened thinking people into silence. But Novotny fell because economic and political problems were left unsolved. From 1964-8 the economy just dragged miserably along; the crisis simply deepened.

The case of the Czech writer Vladimir Skutina does much to reveal aspects of the quality of life under Novotny and of some of Stalinist socialism’s worst features.⁷ On May 5, 1962, Skutina was arrested at his office in the capital. He was not charged, nor allowed to contact anyone, but taken immediately to a prison cell. He writes:

"Only when I returned home after having served my sentence did I find out that a second car was driven to our place and its crew behaved in precisely the same way that I had seen in war films about Gestapo raids on the homes of suspected anti-fascists." Skutina’s wife was feeding their baby girl. They told her this could wait and: "...as she watched they...seized all the writing they could find...opened every book to look for espionage material...and threw each book on the floor...This abuse and occupation of my flat took eight hours...They didn’t even tell her why I’d been arrested."

Skutina was charged with: ‘Lowering the dignity of the President of the Republic’. He writes: ‘I was supposed to have said Pre-

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² Skutina charges that Novotny ignored the Constitution, which decreed he submit to re-election for the Presidency in 1962. But even in 1964 he had been widely expected to fall, and his re-election can largely be attributed to his one really independent act since 1957: He criticised the methods used in the sacking of Krushchov, who returned from Czechoslovakia not long before his fall and was popular there as the de-Staliniser who had saved people such as Edouard Goldstucker from execution.

sident Novotny was an ass’. In fact in 1958 Skutina had been co-author of a scenario for a Czechoslovak-Yugoslav film. Novotny happened to be starting an ‘anti-revisionist campaign’ when it was released and he accused Skutina and co-author of ‘succumbing to the cosmopolitan tendencies of the Yugoslav revisionists’. The film was banned. Skutina said at several public meetings that Novotny shouldn’t pronounce judgement on matters he didn’t understand, whether he was President of the Republic or not. This was the real reason for his imprisonment.

After long delays he was eventually tried and sentenced, the state producing ‘two witnesses’ who had been in prison themselves at the time he was supposed to have ‘lowered the President’s dignity’. He served sixteen months. In prison Skutina was interrogated by the Procurator General — the same man who in 1968 tried to silence him after he had published his book. He threatened that if the writer did not apologise publicly for what he had written, he would have him imprisoned for ‘counter-revolutionary activity’. Skutina managed to obtain legal protection, the official was dismissed. And he writes: ‘And so I was able to prove to my own eyes that January had been no mere formality — thank God even for those eight months of the “process of renewal and revival”. We had sown the seeds’.

Very revealing is Skutina’s description of prison life under Novotny, as late as 1962:

Sometimes I fancied that the organizers of the prison . . . delighted in the most cynical absurdities . . . A former nazi S.S. officer who had been given the task of putting out the eyes of Czech children in Terezin8: had the job of choosing those prisoners in our section who were allowed to watch TV, and he was also responsible for the supervision of prisoners in the TV room. For a long time I couldn’t get used to eating food prepared by . . . (a man who) had murdered his own child . . . cooked it and eaten it.

Skutina writes that hardened criminals were treated much better than ‘politics’ and it was apparently policy to put them together to degrade and frighten the politics. He praises some humane guards, condemns those who were brutal.

We can compare Skutina’s inside report on prison life under Novotny with a statement by a Mr. B. Chnoupek, now Editor-in-Chief of Prague Radio:

The phrases such as ‘Prague Spring’, ‘new model socialism’ and ‘socialism with a human face’ were attractive but false phrases coined to confuse the people.9

8 Terezin was a nazi concentration camp. From memory, I believe 15,000 children were sent there and only about 100 ever returned.
While Skutina himself writes in the 1969 Afterword to the second edition of his book:

And then came January 1968. We were all full of what was going on and above all full of hope . . . We lived with an unbreakable faith in our socialism with the human face.

And I believe that Skutina’s courage and sincerity have been amply proved by his act of republishing his book in 1969 when many of the neo-Stalinists he had been attacking publicly already had their old jobs back. As he wrote:

I did not stop believing in socialism or the correctness of the course we had taken even afterwards when things had stopped being so simple . . .

As soon as Dubcek came to power in January 1968 and I read about his Action Programme and evidence came out about it in newspaper articles, citizens’ private letters, etc., about the new situation in the country my reaction was one of great relief and excitement. There seemed hope that a Western country like Czechoslovakia (which it is culturally and historically) could create a sophisticated and healthy, organic society which at long last might solve the main problems of the twentieth century. The Soviet Union had pointed the way, but on such questions as freedom of speech and self-determination had become conservative and inflexible. Although ‘The Soviet Union Our Model’ had been a key slogan in Czechoslovakia for twenty years, as a leading Czech cultural figure said to me in 1964 in Prague, ‘it long ago ceased to be true’. In other words, the Soviet Union could no longer serve as a political, cultural, economic or organisational model, except in a very general sense — unless by affronting national dignity and identity and by causing dangerous social distortions and stagnation.

Some form of ‘Dubcekism’ was demanded for the revival of the stagnating nation and the reform movement was not the product of its leaders’ minds primarily but it arose out of the needs of the situation. Economic reform was desperately needed. The so-called ‘command socialism’ directed almost entirely from one centre after the Soviet model had ceased to work. Not only was decentralisation crucial however, but the wider political, cultural and social freedoms necessary to allow it to function:

Without the participation of the public, without the initiative of the people generally — whatever their relation to Party membership — there would be no real progress towards new policies, there would be no renaissance in our political life.10

The effect of the political changes carried through under Dubcek can be seen in the example of a North Bohemian firm. In 1963

10 Dubcek’s speech to the Special Congress of the Czechoslovak Union of Journalists, held 21-23 June 1968, reported in Novinar nos. 7-8, p. 249.
its deputy director had complained to me about the unqualified and corrupt director he served under. The director was not an engineer, merely a political puppet who blackmailed employees with the help of secret dossiers on their past lives and activities, which was routine procedure. After January 1968 this firm's employees simply voted their director out of office and elected a specialist who had their confidence. This situation duplicated hundreds of times expressed the essential nature of the Dubcek regime. And it represented a process of the strengthening of socialism, not a weakening as some have said. A slogan in a magazine of the period: "Initiative from Below, Not Planned from Above" clearly implies the sort of changes that had been needed for a return to complete health of Czechoslovak society. Working in a Prague factory, I had proved to myself how workers' thinking was done for them on most issues; they were merely asked to approve decisions already taken, and that the only effective power in the country was wielded by the Central Committee of the C.P., which after twenty years of socialism was an insult to the integrity and maturity of the Czechoslovak people and a direct cause of inefficiency, bureaucracy and all sorts of social strains.

'Dubcekism' meant a return to creative and principled Marxism. The vulgarised Stalinist version in fact often pushed into public life those whose grasp of socialist and Marxist principles was weak. The best Marxists were destroyed or silenced in the 1950's. The Stalinist rulers evidently believed in the 'rulers and ruled' dichotomy of capitalism as an unchanging basis of government. But under Dubcek the 'little man' felt his words had weight at long last, that he was respected and trusted, and the Party and its leaders rapidly regained lost popularity and stature. Czechoslovakia has not had such a loved and accessible leader since Tomas Masaryk, Father of the First Republic. And for people to become active and involved in public life after those bleak years, certain freedoms were a must:

In the rapid development of political life in Czechoslovakia towards democracy a decisive role was played by the abolition of censorship . . .

It is interesting how Dr. Husak commented on the Novotny era press to an interviewer regarding the question of the autonomy of Slovakia, in the very same magazine:

It's true that for many years public opinion in the Czech lands has been not only underinformed, but even directly misinformed.

13 He means the lands of Bohemia and Moravia, as opposed to the territory of Slovakia.
Dr. Husak went on to discuss the problems of nationalism and internationalism in the post-1945 period when he and others had demanded autonomy:

The efforts to gain national equality were condemned as nationalism.14

And he characterised the feelings of mistrust sometimes occurring between Czechs and Slovaks thus:

These feelings had been deformed on both sides through the false glorification of Internationalism.

Husak of 1968 and Husak of 1970 are practically strangers to one another. We can compare this statement with another made in May 1970 during Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin’s visit to Prague to sign a treaty spelling out the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ which allows the Soviet Union the right to interfere in the affairs of other socialist countries. Dr. Husak thanked the Russians for crushing the ‘reactionary forces that wanted to take Czechoslovakia out of the socialist camp’. The treaty gave as its main sanction ‘the common internationalist duty of socialist countries’. Does Dr. Husak still hold his original views on nationalism, or is he a man with as many faces as the lately-humbled ‘pragmatist’ Harold Wilson?

During the past two years not one expression of optimism out of Czechoslovakia has come to my notice, unless through the mouths of a Husak, a Chnoupek, a Bilak or a W. J. Brown. More typical is my Slovak engineer friend who writes from a Czech industrial city on July 7, 1969:

Now no one can easily change my opinion that politics is a dirty business even under socialism, that it’s a struggle for power and for the benefit for private interests. Just imagine that all of the Novotny people are once again back in their jobs. Only Novotny and Sejna15 are lacking. Under present circumstances I’m willing to demand Novotny’s rehabilitation.

This young man had been known to me as an ardent Soviet supporter. He was very bitter about his father being one of only three in their Slovak village of several hundred people who approved the invasion. He himself resigned from the CP, as did his brother, who was so shattered with everything he fled to Canada. His letter of 16.9.1966 reveals the depths of his new-found bitterness and cynicism:

Only the old mad people are with them. The young people hate them . . . For five months they have been trying to prove to us that there was a counter-

14 We recall that Husak himself was imprisoned 1950-60 as a ‘bourgeois nationalist’.
15 Sejna was the General who defected to the West.
revolution here . . . The majority of people have lost interest in politics because they now definitely know it is a dirty and disgusting matter. The worst is that we can see no way out, they are not able to draw an at least slightly attractive picture of the future of our two nations. We are great pessimists.

This is how the invasion has changed a young Slovak I knew as an idealistic and faithful Party member, and we are asked to believe by some people that that invasion was a good thing!

So dear to them is their sovereignty, so precious their national identity, that to the Czechs August 1968 was 1620 all over again. Another Period of Darkness had begun. It may well be that there will be no terror, certainly no similar repression of language as by the Austrians — for it will be impossible to reproduce the same atmosphere of hysteria, fear and mistrust of the early 1950’s — but foreign troops will remain on Czechoslovak soil indefinitely, the state of the economy and living standards decline steadily, and gradually also the buoyancy and controversy is fading from creative culture. We heard the Czech Minister of Culture say recently: “It is the right of the state to decide what culture should reach the public”.16

Strong national feeling expressed on a socialist basis was the main cultural, political and economic motor of Czechoslovak society in the recent period. They wanted to develop socialism in their own way in their own country. The invasion switched off this motor and that is the main reason that life is stagnating. Young people, most of whom became interested in and involved in political life for the very first time under Dubcek, have averted their eyes from the faceless and characterless men who are busy purging everyone who has been the least bit liberal and independent-minded, and who are settling down to an updated version of the pre-1968 corrupt, bureaucratic and monolithic style of rule. They are the new Jesuits, the new Prophets of anti-Thought, the new oppressors, the modern Inquisitors. And now these young people, like almost everyone else, have turned inward. They are prepared to wait even another 300 years, passing on a torch of hatred, of love for a man with a human face, and of fiercely smouldering national pride. Meanwhile they live for the present and seek comfort in cultural innuendo and Schweik-style political jibes.

But whatever the individual does, history will bide her time. She will wait for a new ‘Prague Spring’ and a new Dubcek. And as Skutina wrote: ‘We have sown the seeds’.

16 Newsweek, 6.4.1970, p.16.
Interview with Ernst Fischer

Spiegel: Mr. Fischer, last year we asked you about the hopes of a human socialism, about the danger that in Czechoslovakia the experiment of a reconciliation between democracy and communism could be ended by violence. You told us: The traces of what occurred till now will never disappear. On the next day, foreign troops invaded Czechoslovakia.

Fischer: I am still firmly convinced. The traces will not disappear. Something extraordinary occurred at that time, which goes well beyond everyday politics: for the first time in history a people was happy for eight months. Whomever I spoke to in Czechoslovakia — whether worker or intellectual — there was simply the light of happiness which rose from the whole people. At last, what we thought, at last, what we dreamt!

It was a short intoxication, perhaps like in Russia after the February revolution of 1917 until the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly and of the supporters of the Soviets in Kronstadt by the Bolsheviks.

I believe that Czechoslovakia, in the few months before August 21, was the freest country that ever existed. But the memories of this happiness cannot disappear. Some will despair, many will resign themselves. A few have become scoundrels. But the memory of the days of the Prague spring remains a powder keg, with which the authorities cannot cope. This powder keg will blow up one day.

Ernst Fischer was born in 1899. He joined the Communist Party of Austria in 1934, and in 1945 became minister for Education in the Provisional Government. He was expelled from the Communist Party after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He is author of The Necessity of Art: a Marxist Approach and other books. This interview appeared in Der Spiegel in November 1969. Translation by Henry Zimmermann.
It appears that this powder keg has barely touched other communists, not even the communist parties in the West.

The very mighty offensive of the Moscow power apparatus, and of all the power apparatuses loyal and subservient to it, has increased. For progressive communists, for those who are democratic-revolutionaries, the situation has become more difficult. But in the Italian party for example, something similar occurred as in Austria. A group has issued a journal: *Il Manifesto* — outside the party, against the line of the party, against the strategic line of the party.

The rebels have not yet been expelled from the Party, as you were from the CP of Austria?*

At a broad discussion in the Italian Central Committee it was stated that such things could not be tolerated, but there was no sanction, no administrative measure, the result was: "We have to continue to discuss". And at this meeting my friend Lucio Lombardo-Radice warned: "Beware of the Austrian methods. When one starts to expel an Ernst Fischer, and to silence a Franz Marek, then the whole party is endangered". I recount this one event to show that there is much explosive material in the parties.

But aren't all the supporters of the Prague model being eliminated step by step from the Communist Parties of the West?

We Communists who are not prepared to submit, who are not prepared to recognise a sanction, who have our own brains and do not think with the brains of others — we have suffered a defeat. But it is one of those defeats about which Rosa Luxembourg once said that they could be more important for the future than some temporary victories. The temporary victors are the tanks, the Soviet power apparatus, which has no interest in the existence of living communist parties, but only the deepest contempt for them.

The party apparatus then represents anti-Communism?

Nothing is feared more today by the Moscow power apparatus than an autonomous revolutionary-democratic movement. This started already under Stalin: the great power policy, this great

* They have been since — trans.
Russian chauvinism, of which Lenin once said, it was "a scoundrel and a despot". They talk a lot about our break with Moscow. In reality it is the other way around. The present Moscow power apparatus has broken with the idea of socialism. Brezhnev—that is the break with Marx and Lenin.

**You are a marxist . . . and the Russians they are not marxists?**

We are watching with concern how the terrible heritage of Tsarism is gradually stifling the legacy of the October Revolution in the Soviet Union. The decisive impulses in the near future will not come from the Soviet Union, not from the Eastern bloc, but most probably from the West.

**From the communist parties of the West?**

Perhaps also from individual social democratic parties, also from formations which are only just arising and which we cannot yet clearly recognise and define. In my party, the Communist Party of Austria, the intellectuals, the majority of the shop stewards, particularly the younger shop stewards, stand on the side of the progressive communists.

**The communist parties of the West have to participate in elections. Then the official line of the party counts. The course taken against the traces of the Prague spring will express itself in the political arena in defeat for the communist parties.**

The comrades in Sweden have lost an election, here in Austria we have lost an election. But that is not decisive. I am not thinking of today's voter. I am thinking of the voter, the people of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. The decisive thing is that a new spirit of revolutionary democracy is beginning to break through—gradually, in a contradictory way, within the communist parties and far beyond the communist parties.

**If the communists as a party cannot win an election, which road to power do you wish to take if no Soviet tanks can help you?**

What interests me is the response to the events in this tiny Austrian party in the left Catholic circles, among social democrats,
among intellectuals and young workers in the factories. For the first time, the whole of the youth organisation does not stand behind the party! Here we see what I consider the possibility of tomorrow, that is, a community of struggle which is no longer a party of the old style, but a new community reaching right across all the archaic fronts.

That means: party communism is dead.

Most of the communist parties — as in general all political parties — have remained far behind developments. The decisive contradiction of modern society is, in my opinion, between the possibilities and the requirements of our epoch on the one hand and a completely archaic social structure on the other hand: archaic institutions, archaic parties, archaic thinking — between the unused possibilities which modern science and technology offer us and the factual situation in the world. Immense sums are being wasted for armaments, the earth is left in a miserable condition, a condition of ignorance, of wastefulness, of contradictions — and one flies to the moon. I believe that this contradiction of the waste of productive forces, of the squandering, of the misuse of all that modern science, technique and labor creates, will increasingly become a social force. And this is where I see the decisive contradiction, not just in proletariat and bourgeoisie.

The proletariat has until now been seen as the social force which alone is interested in solving the contradiction described by you. Who will do this now according to your conception?

This contradiction, or rather the possibility of revolt is expressed particularly in the youth. The student movement — which has had its successes but also failures — is a revealing symptom of this epoch. This is not simply as before young against old, but this is a revolt of the growing generation against the whole archaic environment, the outlived institutions and courts which surround them.

The communist parties have not been able to establish a genuine relationship to the revolution of the youth.

Nor to the second revolutionary force: the alliance of science and the labor movement, which is slowly emerging. It is exciting to observe how very many of the leading scientists are beginning to
realise that science is not above moral values but embraces responsibility. And thirdly: the working class of today is no longer the proletariat of yesterday as Marx knew it. Today it is a class in which gradually the border-lines between the skilled worker, the technician, the engineer are beginning to become blurred. The number of white collar workers is growing. Soon in the highly developed countries we shall see more white collar workers than blue collar workers.

**Will the white collar workers change society then?**

Knowledge is outraged more strongly by the social environment than lack of knowledge. The highly skilled worker is decisive. I believe that intelligence is one of the deciding factors of every revolutionary movement, one of the deciding forces of production, as fantasy for instance is another productive force.

These theses mean that you are no longer a dogmatic marxist, Mr. Fischer. What should the organisation of the revolutionary forces be like? Do you believe that some kind of new party will arise?

We are fed up with the old existing parties. I expect that completely different social formations will gradually emerge—full of contradictions, without recipes, at first bespecked with many errors. They can’t be constructed in your head. They arise from practice, which must be continually thought through, always be tested and transformed into theoretical conclusions.

Can you already state some examples or is that at present just a hope?

There are already new international contacts between progressive people and groups of very different trends.

**What kind of people are they?**

My friends and I for instance find it much easier to talk to a progressive young Jesuit or Dominican than with a dogmatic communist. Old barriers to an understanding have largely been lowered, the old vocabulary is gradually beginning to disappear.
Mr. Fischer, are you still a Leninist?

I am a marxist. I believe Lenin was the greatest revolutionary of our epoch. But I have the greatest horror for the term marxist-leninist, this theological concept which is in reality only a transliteration for Stalinism.

Your hope that the intellectuals might be the decisive revolutionary force recalls the old elite theory of Lenin, and this lies even today at the base of the dogma of party communism.

It is not very likely that a social perception and new methods of social change will come from any of the existing parties. I can imagine it in Italy — the Communist Party of Italy has really basically understood the new contradictions of modern society and recognised that new methods are needed; that new perceptions are demanded, that new alliances must be forged.

So you are still prepared to gamble on that party?

Also on the Spanish Party and many others.

But what do you expect of the masses?

I see for instance at high schools and universities the growing consciousness of the students, the victims I would say of these outdated institutions. These victims say: This can’t go on! For different reasons, scientists will say: This can’t go on! And again for totally different reasons even larger numbers of workers will say: This can’t go on! I mean the growing feeling of malaise, of uneasiness, of the feeling that we have affluence, but behind this there lies a terrible inner distress, and this distress cries out from the schools, and cries out from art, from publications and from many manifestos. The growing feeling of distress will increasingly penetrate, grow through and finally burst through the feeling of affluence. We are living in the midst of the world revolution — completely different to the way Marx and Lenin thought of it. The only reasonable and necessary goal is socialism.

There are more signs of this disquiet in Western countries than for instance in the Soviet Union or the GDR. One could conclude from this that the West is closer to the socialism, as you imagine it,
than the totally stagnant (even in the development of productive forces) socialist world, long overshadowed by the West.

The growing disquiet actually proves the opposite.

But only if the conflicts in the socialist countries have been resolved.

The precondition for the Prague spring at any rate was socialised industry. A powerful enemy was missing — capital which is interested in the maintenance of its profits. Thus it was easier in Czechoslovakia than in a capitalist country to carry out a peaceful democratic revolution. In a capitalist country this would have been impossible.

What do you mean by “socialised industry”? Who has the power of decision over the means of production in this “socialised industry”? Surely not society — the working people, the population?

One of the opponents of revolutionary reforms, of a new structure of society is the search for profits by the capitalists — which I am not now posing as an individual devilish characteristic, but the capitalist must be hungry for profits, he really has no alternative; either he goes broke or he must continually increase production, the rate of profit. This enemy is missing however in a country with a socialised industry. In the socialist, let us say in the so-called socialist countries, enough enemies remain: the shocking bureaucracy.

But these enemies are much more powerful than private industrialists. In a state owned industry, the state is also the employer — a master who owns the whole state apparatus directly.

I don’t believe that the state as employer is more dangerous than the individual capitalist or the capitalist monopoly.

You can strike against individual capitalists, you can’t strike against the state.

In Czechoslovakia, the nationalisation of enterprises has in no way hindered the workers from striking and organising their struggle. On the contrary at a certain turning point it made the struggle easier. But I am not asserting that the present condition of nation-
alised industry in the East creates better conditions for the workers than the capitalist industry in the West.

Surely even worse, for the workers in the capitalist countries possess more political and social rights.

Take the GDR. The conditions of the workers are no worse than in the West, in some respects better than in the West. The workers have an extensive voice in questions of hiring of employees, of the conditions on the job, etc., and are in my experience not at all dissatisfied. It is a fact that the GDR is a highly developed industrial country. Economically things are improving in the GDR.

But surely that is no argument proving social progress.

No, that’s true. If we understand the competition between socialism and capitalism in the way the Soviet leaders for instance interpret it: who has a greater social product? where is the productivity of labor greater? where is more being produced?—then capitalism has won the competition. The competition must be fought out as it was attempted to be fought in Czechoslovakia; the struggle of human happiness against human unhappiness, the competition: where is there more freedom? where a greater unfolding of all personal abilities? — the contest between the principle of achievement which only thinks in terms of increased production, or at least to think that man, not the product, decides. In this sphere socialism would potentially be the victor. There are however no historical examples yet.

So you now develop the force of production, fantasy, which you postulated, in the direction of a model which does not yet exist.

Yes. I am convinced that such a model would have arisen in Czechoslovakia — associated with great difficulties, therefore not an ideal example.

Are the traces of this Czechoslovak experiment also visible in the communist parties of the socialist countries?

Not in the party apparatuses of the Eastern bloc. But traces of these Czechoslovak events have entered deeply into all these countries and have released something there. I could name from Continued on page 43
Australian Lecture Tour

PROFESSOR ROGER GARAUDY
Marxist Philosopher, Revolutionary Activist

September, 1970

Sponsored by the Editorial Board of Australian Left Review
ROGER GARAUDY, born in Marseilles in 1913, is one of the most gifted of contemporary Marxist philosophers. Garaudy has perhaps done more than any other one man to foster exchange and dialogue between the Marxist trend and other significant trends in modern thought, such as Christianity, existentialism and structuralism.

Already well known in this country for his contribution to Christian-Marxist dialogue, he has maintained a constant stream of publications on a far wider range of philosophical and political questions over the past 30 years. His written works, more than 20 in number, appear in many languages. Three of his books are currently available in English, From Anathema to Dialogue, Karl Marx: The Evolution of His Thought and Twentieth Century Marxism.

The measure of the breadth of his interests and their connection with political activism may be gauged from the fact that his work on Arab philosophy was published in Arabic in Cairo by a group of supporters of the, then, Colonel Nasser and by the revolutionary Ben Bella in Algeria soon after that country had won liberation.

Within France his writings as a revolutionary pamphleteer, expressing the case against French colonialism in Algeria and Vietnam, are as well known as his philosophical works.

The most fruitful and innovatory part of Garaudy's work has come since the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. The terrible revelations of the reality of the Stalin era made by Khrushchov at this Congress gave rise in Garaudy to an intellectual crisis which led him to rethink all the former verities, not as a sceptic, but in order to give them a firmer foundation.

Unlike those communists who sought to react to these revelations by quickly turning the page, Garaudy plunged into a systematic study of the philosophical foundations of revolutionary politics.

His exceptionally rich and varied life led from a Catholic worker's home through a brief period as a protestant convert to the French Communist Party at the age of twenty.

He has experienced the reality of the 20th century in the Nazi prisons and concentration camps of World War II, in the leader-
ship of miners' strikes, as a Communist Deputy in the French Parliament and in his travels which have taken him all over the world and given him experience of virtually all regimes of East and West.

A Professor of Philosophy at the University of Poitiers, Roger Garaudy has several times been guest lecturer in major universities in various countries, including the United States, and will make a further tour of that country after his visit to Australia.

An activist in the events in May, 1968, in France, this experience and the events in Czechoslovakia in the same year led him to the writing of his latest controversial book: The Great Turning Point of Socialism, in which he discusses frankly his views on the main theoretical problems for Marxists today, the problems of the plurality of 'models' of socialism and socialist strategy.

It is this book, and events that followed, which led to his expulsion from the Communist Party of France earlier this year.

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my experience and from the circle of my friends many people of different origins and positions who were deeply influenced by Prague. They have drawn hope from it that a real socialism is possible. They have drawn courage to offer resistance under difficult conditions, to organise a kind of illegal activity. True, they are only small groups, for instance in Poland.

**But these small groups are confronted by big ones, which retire into complete apathy.**

The immediate reaction is great resignation, despair, cynicism, "what's the use of it all?" Naturally that is the immediate reaction. But in the whole historical development small minorities have always been decisive in the long run, and anticipated the future.

That's where Lenin appears again.

You could equally say: "That's where Christ appears again". He started with twelve disciples and then it became a world movement.

**But among the twelve there was already a traitor.**

Among the twelves who are getting together here and there in the countries of the Eastern bloc there is surely a traitor. But the one Judas has not prevented Christianity from becoming a world movement. And the many Judases, the many scoundrels in the countries of the Eastern bloc, will not be able to prevent it either in the long run.

**Christianity hardly changed the social relations in this world but rather stabilised them. Today it appears that communism too is unable to change the social relations in this world.**

First I would like to defend Christianity. It is true it brought forth no social revolutions, but nevertheless it carried some great new ideas into a rather brutal egotistical world — ideas which have not become socially dominant, but yet built among a not too small section of mankind new moral barriers, an ethical code, which did not exist previously. You see, communism, which has had far less time so far, and which has had the misfortune to win first
in a backward country, this communism has nevertheless changed some things. It has forced the capitalist world to grant more reforms than it would otherwise have done. The beneficiaries of the Russian Revolution are not so much the Russians, but rather the whole Western working people and the peoples of the "third world".

But communism has also, because of its terrorist appearance in Russia, robbed socialism of many possibilities in Western Europe.

Since the Prague spring we know that it can be different, such a regime can be smashed. A socialism with a human face is possible. I repeat, these are the traces which will never disappear in the consciousness of millions of people. I do not expect that new impulses will come from countries of the East. This is now rather the responsibility, the moral and historical duty not only of the communists of the West, but of all those in the West who feel and think as socialists in the broadest sense of that word. The people in the Eastern bloc are waiting for us. I am a very unimportant man from a small party in a small country. Yet I hope that our voice will be heard.

The Soviet Union today is no longer an under-developed country, but an industrial state with the largest proletariat in Europe. Is it imaginable that this proletariat — using the productive force, fantasy — will one day arise and realise a new world?—That the events of Czechoslovakia will be repeated in the Soviet Union?

It was no accident that this thing started in Czechoslovakia because it is the industrially most developed country in the Eastern bloc, and also because the Czechs have a great democratic tradition. The history and tradition of a people play a decisive role also on the road to socialism. This is often underestimated by the vulgar marxists. In Russia today beneath the new social relations of production, the old tsarist Russia continues to live — this horrible tradition of a country which knew no renaissance, which had no city bourgeoisie, but 300 years of Tartar rule instead. We in the West have the advantage of a tradition of personal freedom, of the awareness of individuality, of the dignity of man and of the rights of man, which had been little developed in Russia. This whole tradition is becoming virulent and may in the West — we see it today for instance in the churches — become a revolutionary
force. On the other hand I do not exclude the possibility that in the East the idea of socialism, which has degenerated into a phrase, may have a definite influence in the education of youth and lead—and has led in Czechoslovakia—to people saying: "Yes, that's what we are taught in school, but in our country things are not like that".

**You mean that the phrase forces people to confront reality? It still acts as a measuring rod?**

I see not only in the communist parties of the West very strong potential forces of renewal, but I see these forces also in all the countries of the East. But it will be a more difficult, slower, contradictory process, for there other opposition forces also exist, there is a growing nationalism, movements of religious sects, which are becoming increasingly significant, so that it is impossible to predict when and how these difficult contradictions, these different movements, which oppose the rigidity of the system, will break through.

**Do you believe a revolutionary upheaval is possible, or do you believe that as in the West there is a probability of reform also in the East?**

In general I would not counterpose reforms and revolution so absolutely. I believe that world revolution is a chain of greater and lesser reforms which are achieved sometimes by violent means, but sometimes also by non-violent means. Soviet technologists and people in the economy are forced to ask more and more frequently: "Why do we remain behind?" They already feel this today. America has overtaken them, they will fall further and further behind. The question then arises: perhaps a little more democracy is needed after all and perhaps we need newspapers which really inform, real discussions to give real incentives for productivity, for collective work, for collective thinking, for collective action. It is also possible that against the Great-Russian nationalism there will be an alliance of another many-sided nationalism with certain technocratic circles. It is also possible that certain sections of the working class will join this alliance and that some time the fall of a dictator, of a politbureau will have greater consequences than hitherto. All this is possible. But all this I would not like to prophesy in detail.
As against this vision there is the small opposition which communists offered to the Prague intervention, the slight protest against the only States in Europe to cross borders by force of arms since the second world war — the five Warsaw Pact States.

This has been partially due to the great influence of the respect felt for the Soviet Union as the first communist state of the world, the country of Lenin and the October Revolution. I know from personal experience how difficult it is to overcome such a deep, such a strong feeling of attachment, which we had for the Soviet Union. This attachment to the Soviet people, which defeated German fascism, I retain as before. But it is not easy to recognise and correct deep, great, decisive errors, because this is not just an intellectual process, but it is also linked very much with feelings. I have complete understanding for old workers, for old communists, who are simply unable to learn anew. That was their life, that was the content, the meaning of their life.

Surely one could expect from people who claimed to aim to liberate the world, to recognise, however painful it might be, that they have served a criminal cause.

I would never make any reproach to these honest, if dogmatic and inflexible, communists. My reproach is directed at the cynical apparatus, which tells lies, which is never moved by emotions, but only wishes to hold on to its position. I hope that with the whole of the younger generation these emotional feelings will no longer play any part. It is no accident that the youth stand united against this dogmatic line, for to them the Soviet Union does not in any way mean what she meant to us — and I admit still means to us in the deeper recesses of our hearts.

But the apparatus had already lied, been cynical and terroristic in the past.

That is not correct.

Don't you have the feeling that for half of your life you have been linked with the wrong people?

No, I don't have that feeling. You see the great difference between the present situation and the time of the trials and purges
of the thirties is this: We — I include myself — really believed that it was like that, that there was really a conspiracy against Stalin, that the confessions were genuine. We believed that and millions believed that.

And today it's different?

If Brezhnev says anything, nobody believes a word of it and those who repeat it consciously lie, and those who listen to it know it's a lie. That is the great difference of the repetition — the first time it is effective, one is prepared and able to co-operate faithfully in the most horrible things. The second time it doesn't work.

Do you really believe that this faith existed throughout the 'thirties, when everyone in the Soviet Union lived among people, who suddenly disappeared the next day, when everyone knew perfectly well that they were honest, convinced communists?

I lived in Moscow at that time. I only had one thought. Hitler must be beaten, and only the Soviet Union can beat Hitler. Everything else was secondary. If I knew then what I know now, I would have conducted the struggle against Hitler in the same way or perhaps committed suicide. There was no other alternative.

Even at the time of Stalin's break with Tito you saw no alternative.

I shall never forgive myself the position I took then against Tito. But I — like many others — thought: We are confronting a third world war. There can be nothing between the fronts.

But today you stand between the fronts — or to which camp do you belong?

I am no returning prodigal son. I left my father's house and I am moving even further away. I am returning neither to social democracy, nor to the world of my father, but I go on as a communist into the unknown.

Mr. Fischer, we thank you for this conversation.
Indonesia's Political Prisoners

THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 100,000 political prisoners in Indonesia today. For those who believe (as at least one Victorian academic does) that this total is insignificant when compared to the total Indonesian population, the proportional equivalent in Australia would be approximately 10,000. Many of the prisoners have already been held for several years without trial, and new arrests are being made daily.

So far as the military authorities are concerned communism is a troublesome spectre. In the months following the "abortive coup" of October, 1965, they slaughtered, or presided over the slaughter, of between 300,000 and 1.5 million "communists" in an attempt to eradicate it.1 While in most places the killing spree seems finally to have run its course, there are still occasional reports of massacres. For example, early last year H. J. C. Princen, Deputy Head of the Human Rights Institute, claimed that since November, 1968, about 1,000 people had been massacred in the Purwodadi region of Central Java by two Army divisions. The government denied the allegations but refused to implement Princen's suggestion that an independent tribunal be appointed to investigate his claims.2

1 There is still no conclusive evidence as to the exact number killed. The numbers given in the text are the lowest and highest estimates I have heard. The Economist, Aug. 20, 1966, pp. 727-8, reported that, according to a team of 150 university graduates from Indonesia, the number killed was likely to have been about one million.

2 See M. Bondan (ed.), Indonesian Current Affairs Translation Service (hereafter called ICATS), Djakarta, March, 1969, pp. 140-150, in which reports are quoted from Pedoman, Angkatan Bersendjata, Harian Kami, Indonesia Raya, Simar Harapan, Nusantara, Kompas and other newspapers.
The armed forces newspaper claimed that the allegations were nothing more than fabrications by an international political guerrilla movement, to which most of the notable Western social scientists concerned with Indonesia were alleged to belong (e.g. one of them, Dr. Benedict Anderson, "is a blood brother of Perry Anderson, editor of the New Left Review"). Generally, however, the mass slaughter seems to have been replaced by a means of suppression more in keeping with the rest of the 20th century: political detention camps.

Indonesian statistics are not noted for reliability, and the political sensitivity of this issue makes a clear picture even harder to obtain. Nevertheless, the evidence given, even by the government's own spokesmen, is considerable. For example, in March, 1969, Major-General H. Achmat Tahir, Special Deputy of the Indonesian Department of Defence and Security, stated that there were then about 80,000 political detainees in Indonesia. The Head of Public Relations of the Prosecutor-General's office, M. Simatupang, stated in February, 1969, that the total number of political prisoners was about 100,000. In October last year General Panggabean, then Deputy Commander of the Command to Restore Security and Order, stated that the number of those whose cases had not yet been settled — i.e., who had not been brought to trial — was 71,905 persons. Finally, in April last year, an intelligence officer of the Department of Defence and Security said that there were more than 150,000 political prisoners in Java alone.

Details on the location and number of detention camps are, as one might expect, not so readily available. In the populous area of Central Java, where a "state of war" was officially in force until January this year, the Minister for Information, Budiardjo, has admitted that there are 16 internment camps with about 400 persons in each. In an interview last year the Chief-of-Staff of the Sumatra Co-ordinating Command, Major-General Muskita, was asked the number of political detainees in Sumatra; he refused to give a figure, but when the number "20,000" was mentioned he replied: "There are that many". (It is not uncommon, incidentally.

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6 Nusantara, 21/2/69, p. 1. (ICATS, Feb. 1969, p. 82.)
7 Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, Jan.-June 1969, Sydney University, p. 100. The statement originally appeared in the Jakarta Times, 19/4/69.
9 Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, op. cit., p. 102.
for regional statistics to contradict those given by the central government.)

**Classification of prisoners**

Political detainees are divided into three categories. Those who are officially alleged to have had some knowledge of the “abortive coup” plans are classified as Group A. When Tahir gave the total number of detainees as 80,000 he stated that 4,452 of them were Group A.11 The government has stated that it intends to bring all Group A prisoners to trial.

Another 14,458 prisoners (again, using Tahir’s breakdown) are classified as Group B:12 that is, the government admits that it has no direct evidence that they were involved in the coup attempt, so it intends to imprison them indefinitely without trial.

Early last year the government began looking for a suitable island on which it could confine Group B prisoners, and after a few months the island of Buru, in the Moluccas, was chosen.13 In August last year 2,500 prisoners were taken there, among them one of Indonesia’s foremost writers — Pramudya Ananta Tur. In the first quarter of 1970 it was planned to send a further 5,000 prisoners there, as well as an unspecified number of detainees from Gerwani — the former Communist Women’s Organization.14

Although Buru was originally given the euphemistic label of “resettlement project”, and the prisoners theoretically allotted land of their own, in practice they are still detained under constant guard in barbed-wire-protected compounds, and while conditions probably are a little better than in the camps in Java, even the influential daily *Harian Kami* stated that it was pointless pretending that the Buru camps were anything other than concentration camps. (*Harian Kami* went on to add that the government had no alternative but to send detainees there, since it could no longer afford the cost of keeping them in Java, nor could it run the risk of releasing them.)15

A further 24,059 prisoners are classified at Group C: they are not accused of complicity in the coup attempt, but simply of having been associated with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Official government policy is to release all Group C prisoners, and

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12 Ibid., p. 134.
some have already been set free. Their freedom, however, is far from unconditional. Every released Group C prisoner is given a guide book containing an oath of loyalty which he must take with him wherever he goes. He is not allowed to change his address for at least six months, and he must report regularly to the authorities.\textsuperscript{16} Any infringement of these conditions results in his being imprisoned again — as a Group A or B prisoner. A recent visitor to one village in Java reports that former Group C prisoners, of whom there are many in the village, are chronically unemployed because anybody who gives them work — or any sort of assistance — is automatically regarded as politically suspect by the all-powerful local army commander.

Finally, of the 80,000 detainees mentioned by Tahir, the biggest group, comprising about 33,000 persons, had not yet been classified\textsuperscript{17}: that is, they had not even been formally accused, let alone tried. (Other accounts show this group as containing even more detainees.)

\textbf{Conditions & effects}

Since most Indonesians are desperately poor, it would be ludicrous to expect to find good conditions in the country's prisons. Yet the evidence available suggests that conditions in the political prisons are unnecessarily barbaric. One account states that the amount allocated for feeding political detainees works out at 7.7 rupiahs per detainee per day — enough for one cupful of rice.\textsuperscript{18} Allegations of torture have also been made: for example, H. J. C. Princen claimed last year that the army leaders behind the mass-murders in Purwodadi used torture by electricity to obtain confessions.\textsuperscript{19}

But it is not only the detainees themselves who are suffering. Thousands of families — many of them poor to start with — have been deprived of breadwinners. Hundreds of women have been forced into prostitution; in one town in Eastern Indonesia, according to an informant from that town, army officers are systematically forcing wives of detainees into prostitution under threat of further harm to the detainees themselves. Often the wives of prisoners never learn why their husbands have been arrested, under what classification they have been grouped, or even where they are being detained. Moreover, in many cases the relatives of detainees are automatically regarded as being politically suspect.

\begin{enumerate*}
\item\textsuperscript{16} Suluh Marhaen, 16/1/70, p. 2. (\textit{ICATS}, Jan. 1970, p. 55.)
\item\textsuperscript{17} \textit{ICATS}, March 1969, p. 134.
\item\textsuperscript{18} Barbro Karabuła, Letter from Indonesia, \textit{Eastern Horizon}, 7 (5), 1969, p. 43.
\item\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Pedoman}, 1/3/69, p. 2. (\textit{ICATS}, March 1969, p. 140-1.)
\end{enumerate*}
There are other, bizarre manifestations of the processes at work. An owner of a Djarkarta art-curio shop specialising in Balinese carvings almost went out of business because most of the artists who supplied him were either killed or imprisoned. The shortage of teachers in Java has become more acute as a result of the disproportionate number of teachers detained there. Many masters of Java’s oldest and most famous art form, the puppet theatre or “wajang”, have been imprisoned, and those still performing are carefully censored. Use of the PKI “complicity smear” has become notorious. Once somebody is accused of being a communist he has no recourse to anything — unless he happens to be friendly with a higher officer. There have been numerous cases of people successfully avoiding having to repay their debts by accusing their creditors of being “PKI”.

It is impossible at this stage to predict the political consequences of the present policy of political suppression. In any case, this issue cannot be separated from others which affect the mass of people, such as the bloodbath following the “abortive coup” and the pro-Western economic policy of the Soeharto government. One thing appears to be certain, since it is noted as often by supporters as by critics of the government: there is today widespread dissatisfaction in many rural areas — dissatisfaction arising out of the suffering and social dislocation which followed the fall of Soekarno, with an apparent decline in educational opportunities, with (in some parts of Java) economic schemes that benefit mainly rich overseas corporations, and with the failure of the Soeharto government to even begin putting an end to the corruption which attained such spectacular proportions under Soekarno. But the dissatisfaction is inchoate; it is shared by politically powerless, leaderless, dispersed and relatively uneducated people, who are likely to remain that way for some time to come, since the government response to any clear expression of dissatisfaction would almost certainly be an intensification of suppression.

I believe only one prediction is in order: however successful the present economists and technocrats may be in curbing inflation and restoring “order” to the economy, and however firmly the army’s firepower may enable it to rule (so long as it remains united), the suffering generated by the killings and the detention policy — and this is not being quietly forgotten — together with the continuing hardship of life in the villages at a time when more and more people throughout the Third World are refusing to accept their poverty as just, suggest that the seeds today are being sown for massive future conflict. To try and predict the form and consequences of this conflict would, in my opinion, be foolhardy.
IT IS THE LEAST of this book's merits that it brings together a broader and more intelligently conceived range of texts treating the interaction between Marxism and revolution in Asia than has ever before been assembled within one volume. Beginning with Marx's scattered writings on India, China and the characteristics of the peasantry, it traces with well-judged selectivity the evolution of Marxist thinking about revolution in the East through debates inside the Second International, the works of Lenin, resolutions of the Communist International, right down to contemporary Soviet views on national democracy. In the period after 1917 these documents are balanced by others taken from the contributions to Marxism by Chinese Marxists and communists, and particularly, of course, Mao Tse-tung.

The result is a fascinating and complex chronicle, in which we can follow at first hand the genesis and development of many of the disputes and conflicts which have bedevilled and agitated Marxists right down to the present day (incidentally reminding us that, in the realm of ideology, at any rate, there is nothing new under the sun). Many of the texts are well-known and have attained the status of hallowed authorities; others again are obscure, but significant passages from such forgotten figures as the Tatar communist Sultan Galiev or Mao's early teacher and friend, Li Ta-chao.


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There are so many issues raised in this material that those who delight in unravelling the maze of tactical, organisational and strategic questions which occupy so much of the time of revolutionary socialists will find endless food for speculation and controversy. The great contribution of the authors, however, is to provide a long introductory essay which separates the wood from the trees and brilliantly uncovers the basic processes at work beneath the perennial argumentation of the ideologues. The central theme of this challenging overview is of such importance and contemporary relevance as to demand brief outline and discussion.

D'Encausse and Schram regard the development and transformation of Marxism as indissolubly bound up with the ‘dis-Europeanisation’ of the world, which is one of the fundamental features of our time. Marx was, as they emphasise, a thoroughgoing Europeanist culturally, notwithstanding his immense world vision, and his concept of world revolution was set within the context of the spread of the dynamic qualities of modern European civilisation, whose attainments he celebrated as he pilloried the social relationships which fettered its further progress. Socialism to him represented the crowning culmination of Western development; its pre-condition was capitalist industrialisation, which for the first time in history created the prospect of abundance and hence the possibility of transcending the class exploitation, the stunting division of labour and the alienation which scarcity economics made inescapable. Industrialisation also furnished the gravediggers of capitalism, those who had nothing to lose but their chains, the workers who in the act of freeing themselves would lay the foundations for universal freedom.

In his sparse writings on the underdeveloped world Marx manifested his belief in the transforming role of productive technique, the decisive revolutionary mission of the European proletariat and the static character of the “Oriental mode of production” in Asia. While his later work showed a tendency to recognise some potential for socialism in “archaic” systems and classes (as, for example, in his discussion of the Russian commune, and his remarks on the peasants generally), he remained convinced that only revolutionary changes in Europe and North America could precipitate socialist transformations on a world scale.

It is no secret any longer that it was Lenin who mediated the adaptation of Marxism to Asia. The very nature of Russia, situated geographically and culturally midway between Europe and Asia, contributed in no small measure to the determination of Lenin’s ideas. He compensated for the weakness of the proletariat by elevating the role of party organisation and the professional revo-
olutionary, and proposing a class alliance with the peasantry, and so fashioned an instrument for revolution in underdeveloped countries. He also recognised, as Marx had not, the importance of the national question in revolutionary strategy. His analysis of imperialism, which gave rise to the theory of the "weakest link in the chain", and his adoption of Trotsky's thesis of uninterrupted revolution (by which the capitalist stage could be bypassed) provided the justification for jettisoning the deterministic aspects of Marxism and enabling communists in underdeveloped countries to seize power in the name of the proletariat and socialism.

It was small wonder that it was to Lenin rather than Marx that Asian radical intellectuals looked for answers to the problems that agitated them in the age of national awakening in the East. His works were read wherever revolutionary nationalists discussed the nature of imperialist oppression, the struggle for emancipation, the formation of national states, the ways of overcoming the legacies of economic backwardness and cultural submission.

But Lenin himself remained sufficient of a Europeanist to believe that revolution in the advanced West would be needed to make a socialist revolution in Russia viable, and to discount the possibility of revolutions in Asia succeeding without the help of the European proletariat. But the impatience for change which had led him to hurdle the obstacles to immediate revolution in Russia soon affected Asian revolutionaries also. The first manifestation of this in the communist movement was the dispute between Lenin and the Indian communist M. N. Roy at the second congress of the Communist International. Where Lenin was cautious about revolutionary prospects in the East, and advised the communists there to accept the hegemony of the national bourgeoisie in the colonial emancipation struggle, Roy's burning nationalism expressed itself in giving Asia a central place in the world revolution and conceiving the ability of the oppressed colonial proletariat to lead the national liberation movement directly to socialism. The dispute between Lenin and Roy, and the later interventions of Sultan Galiev, prefigured, in spirit if not in letter, the later conflicts that were to develop between the Soviet and Asian communist movements.

Mao Tse-tung took up where Lenin and Roy left off. His wedding of nationalism and Marxism inspired by Li Ta-chao, Mao by 1925 (in his report on the peasant movement in Hunan province) had already arrived at the conviction which was to dominate his life's work, that the poor peasantry of China constituted an irresistible and inexhaustible tide of revolutionary spirit which could be harnessed to the transformation of his country. In the aftermath of the debacle of the Comintern's policy of uniting with the "national
bourgeoisie" in the Kuomintang, Mao proceeded to put his belief to the test, with results that are now history. In the process he further transformed Marxism by eliminating the revolutionary role of the industrial proletariat (except in ritualistic terms) and obliterating the relationship between socialism and advanced technology.

D'Encausse and Schram rightly see in this evolution more than the revision of a doctrine to fit revolutionary exigencies. It represented an historic meeting between Marxism and the national reassertion of Asians, which profoundly affected both. In China, with its millenia of distinctive development and its rich culture and political traditions, the problem affecting all colonial peoples, that of "modernising while remaining themselves," was felt most acutely and could not be resolved by accepting a tutelary status to Europeans and European thought. Marxism had to be Sinified, and China had to assert the relevance of her revolutionary model for the rest of Asia.

The more the Soviet Union under Stalin and his successors came to identify the interests of world revolution with the interests of the USSR as a state (a tendency which, as the authors point out, had already begun under Lenin), the more the seeds of the great schisms of our time were sown. Many elements enter into the Sino-Soviet conflict, but underlying it and intensifying its manifestations is the antagonism between Soviet paternalism and Asian national pride. Russian disregard for the interests of Asian communists is nowhere more clearly revealed than in the contemporary theory of "national democracy" which, stripped of its ideological trimmings, assesses the social character of third world regimes solely by reference to their susceptibility to Soviet influence. In recent times, as this book documents, Soviet theorists have even come to view the military in these countries as "objectively" a force for transformation in the direction of socialism. That this has not remained merely a theoretical exercise is illustrated by the case of Indonesia, where in 1964-65 Soviet representatives shifted their support away from the pro-Chinese Indonesian Communist Party and undertook negotiations with anti-communist military leaders through representatives of the small but influential Murba Party.

In their contest with the Soviet the Chinese have elaborated their own strategic world view. Ironically, they have taken up a Comintern formulation referring to the underdeveloped countries as "the villages of the world", and converted it from a term of disparagement to one of pride. To the Chinese, the Western countries constitute a "burnt-out revolutionary hearth", and the revolutionary future lies with the third world. Implicitly, they believe that contradictions
between classes are less fundamental than contradictions between the developed and underdeveloped regions. In this, they arrive at conclusions similar to those of some Western scholars, who see a developing "convergence" between industrial countries irrespective of political coloration.

While the Chinese are undoubtedly more influenced by ideological factors than are the Russians, there is also a greater element of state interest in the basic Chinese concept than is often realised. For a country which aspires to challenge the great powers, but is deficient in conventional power resources, it makes sense to encourage liberation struggles in their hinterlands as a means of weakening them, tying down their forces, and ultimately extracting concessions from them.

In the course of its Eastern migration, as we have seen, virtually the whole of Marx's scheme of social revolution was discarded in favour of an ever more pronounced voluntarism. Lenin initiated the trend towards elevating politics above economics; Mao carried the process still further; and it reaches its final (?) culmination in the theories of Regis Debray and some Cuban leaders, who completely eliminate the masses, class factors and the economic base from consideration and conceive revolution in terms of the willed actions of small groups of conscious elites.

The issue between determinism and voluntarism is usually argued in philosophical or ideological terms. But it seems obvious from the history of the past fifty years that the attempt to draw a "correct" line between the two in revolutionary strategy is fundamentally misconceived. The vulnerability of political systems to revolutionary action varies according to a number of factors, one of which is the depth of social penetration (political, ideological, control) which the system in question achieves. If this penetration is shallow, then a system which appears relatively stable on the surface may be overthrown by a small cadre force of revolutionaries (as was the case in Cuba). Where, on the contrary, the political power drives deep into society, it may withstand quite deepgoing economic and social crises without succumbing to much larger revolutionary movements, as the history of Western Europe confirms. An accent on voluntarism or determinism in the revolutionary movement may in large measure reflect these circumstances, so that the line between "adventurism" and "economism" will be drawn at different points under different environmental conditions.

In a sense, the revenge Marx has taken upon his voluntarist revisers has been to deny them the possibility, once they have jumped over his historical stages, of creating anything more than
a caricature of his original socialist vision. This is no more than another way of saying that Marxism in the underdeveloped world has been transformed from a theory of post-capitalist society into a vehicle for industrialisation and modernisation more acceptable in some contexts than the capitalist alternative.

While eastern Marxism developed a new voluntarist dynamic, orthodox Marxism in the West stagnated and degenerated. This leads d'Encausse and Schram to pose their concluding paradox: "When one considers both the various theories which call themselves Marxist, and the realities of the world today, it would seem that the only alternative lies in a choice between a scholastic Marxism which has nothing to do with revolution and a revolution that has nothing to do with Marxism." It is true, as they point out, that the traffic between Marxism and Asia no longer flows along a one-way street, and the radical student movement in particular has adopted many of the voluntaristic aspects of Asian Marxism. But, while the new radicals have punctured the sterile determinism of the older leftwing political structures, they appear now to be running into a cul-de-sac of their own. Meanwhile, classical Western Marxism is being revitalised in the West and applied to the still embryonic trends in post-industrial society. Out of the new technological revolution and the parallel analysis of it in Marxist terms may come a fresh dynamism, fusing the deterministic and voluntarist strains in Marx in ways more appropriate to this setting than either of the alternatives suggested by these authors.
The Permissive Politicians

COMPARING THE PROBITY of members of the political executive in Australia and Britain, Professor Sol Encel has remarked of the Australian experience:

The long list of ministers who have been charged with corruption, and the repeated refusal of governments to lay down rules about the private interests of their members, reflect a basic difference of outlook about the standards appropriate to public life . . . 1

However, before discussing the Australian experience in detail it is necessary to examine briefly the norms of behavior adhered to in Britain.

In an attempt to remove or at least minimise the possibility of a clash between the public duties and private interests of Ministers of the Crown, the British Parliament has over the years evolved a comprehensive ruling on their business interests. Back in 1906 the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, ruled that all directorships held by Ministers must be resigned, except for directorships of philanthropic undertakings and directorships in private companies. This ruling remained definitive for over three decades, although there was increasing dissatisfaction with his narrow definition of private companies since under changing com-


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pany arrangements a private company was frequently a very large company. Furthermore, there had been a large extension of private companies acting as holding companies for public companies.

The whole question of private and public companies came to a head in 1939 with the revelation that Lord Runciman, the Lord President of the Council, was the director of a number of large private companies. The Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, recognised that if Campbell-Bannerman’s ruling were to be interpreted in the modern statutory sense it would go far beyond the intentions of its framer. Accordingly, he ruled that the term “private companies” was to apply only to concerns dealing wholly or mainly with family affairs or interests, and which were not primarily concerned in trading.

While Campbell-Bannerman had delivered a reasonably comprehensive ruling on the question of directorships held by Ministers, the situation with regard to shareholdings, speculative investments and interests in Government contracts, remained in doubt. During the Marconi Inquiry debate of June 1913, Prime Minister Asquith laid down a rule of conduct for the guidance of Ministers in financial matters. He remarked on the “perfect absurdity” of the doctrine that a Minister ought not to hold shares in any company with which the Government has or may have a contract. There was only one rule to be observed, he continued, and that was that any interest held by a Minister in a Government contract coming before him must be disclosed to his parliamentary head, and the Minister himself should stand aside while the transaction was going through. Moreover, Asquith declared that there were certain commonsense principles, which he classified as “rules of positive obligation”. Ministers should not enter into transactions where private interests may conflict with public duty; they must not use official information for private profit; they should not use their influence in support of a contract in which they have an undisclosed private interest; they must not accept favors from persons contracting or seeking contracts with the state; and they must avoid speculative investments in which their position gave them an advantage over other investors. Beyond these “rules of obligation” there were “rules of prudence” which he found difficult to formulate in precise terms. However, one of the obvious “rules of prudence” would be that Ministers should avoid all transactions which might lead to a belief that they were doing anything forbidden by the “rules of obligation”.

The last important ruling on the private interests of Ministers was laid down by Sir Winston Churchill in 1952. It is largely a compound of previous rulings. Ministers are urged so to order
their affairs that no conflict arises or appears to arise between their private interests and their public duties. They must not engage in any activities which may distract their attention from their public duties, and they must, in cases of the retention of private interests, declare those interests if affected by public business, while detaching themselves from the consideration of that business. Ministers must resign all directorships, public or private, paid or unpaid, with the exception of private companies established for the maintenance of private family estates, or directorships and offices held in connection with philanthropic undertakings. And even these directorships should be resigned if any risk of conflict with public duties ever arises. Ministers must divest themselves of a controlling interest in any company, and of shares, whether controlling or not, in concerns closely connected with a Minister's own Department. Finally, they should scrupulously avoid speculative investments in securities about which they have, or may be thought to have, early or confidential information. Churchill's ruling has been upheld by subsequent Conservative and Labor Governments, one example being Basil de Ferranti's resignation in 1962 from the position of a Junior Minister in the Macmillan Government. 2

II

By contrast, we find in Australia the prevalence of easy-going standards regarding the possibility of conflict between a Minister's official position and his private interests. 3 In the 1880s successive Governments in Queensland were so closely linked with the Queensland National Bank, the principal financial institution of the Colony, that Opposition critics described the Morehead Ministry (1888-90) as a branch of the bank. The Premier himself was a director; the Treasurer, Sir Thomas McIlwraith, was a former director and one of the largest shareholders; A. H. Palmer, President of the Legislative Council and a former Premier, was also a director. McIlwraith's successor as Treasurer, W. Pattison, was the largest shareholder in the bank as well as chairman of the Mount Morgan


3 For a survey of the situation up to the late 1950s. see Encel, op. cit., pp. 293-299.
Mining Co., one of the largest industrial concerns linked with the bank. In 1904, George Swinburne, Victorian Minister of Water Supply, was attacked in the Victorian Parliament because he was a director of the large engineering firm of Johns and Waygood, which tendered for Government contracts. Swinburne resigned from the board in 1905, although he rejoined when he went out of office. In 1924 a Federal Minister resigned from the Hughes-Page Ministry after he was indirectly implicated in the operations of Canberra Freeholds Ltd., whose London office in Australia House was selling blocks of land in Canberra under false pretences.

One of the most notable cases was that of Senator A. J. McLachlan, Federal Postmaster-General in 1934-38. M. Blackburn, Labor MHR, asked Prime Minister Lyons whether any Ministers were company directors. His question was prompted by the fact that McLachlan was a director of several important companies, including the Hume Pipe Co. Australia Ltd., the largest manufacturer of concrete pipes in Australia, which did considerable business with the Post Office. Lyons replied that “No reason can be seen why information of this personal character should be supplied to the honourable member”. Subsequently, pointed questions were raised in Parliament about the letting of Post Office tenders to the Hume Pipe Co., of which McLachlan was chairman of directors. Reluctantly, Lyons was pushed into making a statement of principle regarding directorships held by Ministers in public companies:

It does not seem to me to be practicable or desirable to lay down a general rule that no Cabinet Minister shall be a director of any company. It would be plainly anomalous if one Minister could retain the whole of the proprietorship of some business or enterprise, while another Minister was debarred from being one of several directors conducting an exactly similar business or enterprise . . . If a contract which the Government makes with such a company is one which results from the exercise of individual judgment or selection, as in the case of the supply of goods of some special kind, it seems clear that a directorship of the company concerned would be inconsistent with the discharge of ministerial duty. But some arrangements which are technically contracts are made on a non-selective or non-discriminating basis . . . if there is the slightest element of judgment or choice involved in the placing of government business, no Minister should be a director of a company which is the recipient of that business.

Not surprisingly, McLachlan tendered his resignation as Postmaster-General.

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1 Ibid., p. 293.

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The most notorious case of all was that of Sir Arthur Warner, a Victorian State Minister and a leading industrialist, who was the central figure in a long succession of incidents where he had clearly used his political position to advance his business interests. While Minister for Housing, Materials and State Development in 1947-50, he had retained directorships in many companies having dealings with his various Departments. These flagrant abuses of the norms of behaviour to be found in Britain led to a full-scale debate in the Victorian Legislative Assembly during September 1949, but Warner’s record was passionately defended by Premier Hollway. For six months before the 1950 State election he was also Minister of Electrical Undertakings and, at the same time, head of Victoria’s greatest electrical manufacturing business.

As Minister for Transport 1955-62, Warner was involved in even more notorious examples of a clear conflict of interests between his public duty and his private interests. Electronic Industries Ltd., of which he was managing director, supplied electrical equipment to the Railways Department, of which he was Ministerial head. The disclosure that automatic soft-drink machines manufactured by one of his companies were being installed in Victorian railway stations, and that the old water fountains were being removed, led to yet another debate in the Legislative Assembly on November 19, 1958. Premier Bolte typically refused to take the Labor Opposition’s charges seriously. He claimed that Warner was not a director of Vending Machines Pty. Ltd. However, when a Labor member pointed out that Warner was managing director of the company owning Vending Machines, Bolte merely replied that “Dr. Evatt is your managing director”.

By this time it was obvious that literally anything could take place in the permissive atmosphere of Victorian State politics. In October 1967 the Chief Secretary and Deputy Premier, Sir Arthur Rylah, was appointed to the board of the clothing and footwear firm of Easywear Ltd. A stormy debate on the subject ensued in the Legislative Assembly on October 25, 1967. However, with the firm backing of the Attorney-General, Rylah emerged unscathed. In June 1968 he accepted his second directorship. The firm involved, Avis Rent-a-Car Systems Pty. Ltd., engaged in tenders for State and Federal Government contracts. While Acting Premier, Rylah visited New Zealand in August 1968 to negotiate with

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NZ Ministers, unsuccessfully as it turned out, a licence for Avis in New Zealand. The Victorian State Opposition Leader, Clyde Holding, demanded an immediate session of Parliament to debate the issue, but Bolte arrogantly refused the request, terming the episode a "trivial matter". When Parliament eventually resumed, a full-scale debate on the issue took place on September 17, but again the Liberal Ministry confirmed the status quo. Towards the end of January 1969, Rylah announced publicly — and with intense bitterness — that he had resigned his Avis directorship back in October 1968. Yet he also disclosed that he would be continuing his association with the company. Early in 1970 Rylah resigned his Easywear directorship after the company was taken over by another firm.

It is interesting to note that Bolte, in defending the Victorian practice, has claimed that Ministers holding company directorships are on exactly the same plane as lawyers, farmers and accountants, etc. Other Liberal politicians have attempted to score juvenile debating points by pointing to Clyde Holding's share in a Melbourne legal firm. But as Platt has noted: "A clear distinction must necessarily be observed between the problems of a rule of behavior applicable to legislators as a whole and a rule applied solely to members of the Government." Defenders of the Victorian system have failed to understand the meaning of the dictum that "The wife of Caesar must be above suspicion". Opposition spokesmen have been careful not to accuse Rylah of corruption; rather they demonstrated that he had placed himself in a position where his Ministerial activities could be interpreted as subordinate to his business interests.

In the same period, three of Rylah's fellow Victorian Ministers have also been company directors. While on the board of Toppa Holdings Ltd., manufacturers of ice-cream and milk processors, V. O. Dickie was appointed Minister for Health in 1965. He did not resign from the board until 1968 when the company was taken over by British Tobacco. R. J. Hamer, Minister for Local Government since 1964, accumulated a number of directorships — Nylex Corporation Ltd., Moulded Products (Australasia) Ltd., Yorkshire Dyeware and Chemical Co. (Australasia) Pty. Ltd., the Gas Supply Co. Ltd., and General Foods Corporation Holdings Ltd. He resigned from the board of the Gas Supply Co. Ltd. in February 1966, when involved in discussions on the future of natural gas.

9 The Herald, 13 August 1968.
10 The Age, 29 January 1969.
11 Platt, op. cit., p. 269.
in Victoria. In March, 1970, he also resigned his Nylex directorship on the grounds that he had been appointed Acting Minister for Public Works. Finally, the Minister for Education, Lindsay Thompson, is a director of the Deakin Housing Society. Yet, significantly, another director of this company, Peter Howson, MHR, has revealed that he resigned his directorship during his term as Federal Minister for Air and rejoined the board only after being dropped from the Ministry.\(^\text{12}\)

The practice of successive Bolte Ministries in permitting Ministers to retain or accept directorships has been sharply criticised on many occasions in editorials in the Melbourne daily press, where it has been suggested that Victoria should follow the British and Australian Federal practices.\(^\text{13}\) Bolte says that he is merely observing a "local rule". He believes that his authority is sufficient to safeguard the "public interest". Referring to Ministers who have occupied directorships, Bolte told the Legislative Assembly on September 17, 1968: "I have accepted sole responsibility for the conduct, the propriety and the honesty of all these Ministers". Ironically, Victorian Ministers control the activities of State public servants and local government councillors in an attempt to prevent their private interests conflicting with their public duties. Obviously, they have more faith in their own integrity than they have in either the public service or their fellow politicians at the local level.

Menzies was largely responsible for bringing Federal practice into line with that of Britain, although neither he nor his successors have explicitly laid down any rulings on the British pattern.\(^\text{14}\) In the interwar period Menzies was a director of the following companies:

**Australian Foundation Investment Co. Ltd. (1929-38).**
**National Reliance Investment Co. Ltd. (1929-38).**
**County of Bourke Permanent Building & Investment Society (1933-39).**

**Commercial Union Assurance Co. of Australia Ltd., Melbourne Board (1935-38).**

**Equity Trustees Executors and Agency Co. Ltd. (1936-39).**
**Capel Court Investment Co. (Aust.) Ltd. (1936-38).**

\(^{12}\) *The Australian*, 5 March 1970.

\(^{13}\) See e.g., *The Age*, 17 September 1968; *The Herald*, 18 September 1968; *The Age*, 10 March 1970.

It can be seen that he had resigned all his directorships before becoming Prime Minister in 1939, but he had held Ministerial posts during the thirties, both as Victorian State Attorney-General 1932-34 and Federal Attorney-General after 1934. Nevertheless, during all the periods in which he was Prime Minister, Menzies strictly adhered to the British practice. Sir Phillip McBride, on being appointed a Minister in 1949, was obliged by Menzies to resign no fewer than 33 directorships. Moreover, when Sir William Spooner was given the portfolio of National Development in 1951, he had to resign 16 directorships.

The best example of Menzies' firmness on the question occurred in 1958, when Sir Percy Spender, a former Minister in the Menzies Government (1949-51) and former Australian Ambassador to the United States (1951-58) who had just been appointed a Justice of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, was virtually forced to resign from the board of the Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Co. (Aust.) Ltd. His resignation was tendered after he received a tersely-worded letter from Menzies following allegations by E. J. Ward in the House of Representatives on August 26, 1958. Strange as it may seem, Menzies appears to have been genuinely ignorant of the fact that Spender had been a director of the company since 1944. After L. H. E. Bury was dismissed as Minister for Air in 1962, he joined the boards of Duncan Holdings Ltd., Lend Lease Corporation Ltd., and the General Assurance Society Ltd., but resigned these directorships upon being appointed Minister for Housing in 1963. In March 1962, Sir Allen Fairhall, then Minister for Supply, was obliged to resign from the board of R. & N. Statham Ltd. However, he retained the managing directorship of Wilken and Jones Pty. Ltd., successful manufacturers of dummy models for shop-window displays of women's clothing.

Both Holt and Gorton maintained Menzies' general adherence to British norms of behavior regarding company directorships.

17 Aldridge, op. cit.
18 Following his retirement from the International Court of Justice in 1967, Spender joined the boards of Bushells Investments Ltd., Bushells Pty. Ltd., and The Reader's Digest Association Pty. Ltd. He also became chairman of Agen Holdings Ltd. and Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd.

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Gorton informed the House of Representatives on May 29, 1969 that no Ministers were on the boards of public companies, although some held directorships in private pastoral companies or small businesses, but none of these companies had any dealings with any Government Department or public instrumentality. Of course, many former Liberal and Country Party Ministers assume (or less frequently resume) directorships, e.g. at the Federal level: Sir Arthur Fadden, Sir Charles Davidson, Sir Neil O'Sullivan, Sir William Spooner, Sir Phillip McBride, Sir Allen Fairhall and Sir Howard Beale.

At the State political level, a general, if rather uneven, trend towards the standards observed in Federal politics may be discerned. No Minister in the various Playford administrations in South Australia — apart from the late Sir Cecil Hincks, Minister for Lands 1946-53 — was allowed to retain a company directorship. On joining the Askin Ministry in 1965 as N.S.W. Minister for Child Welfare, Minister for Social Welfare, Advisory Minister for Transport, and Vice-President of the Executive Council, A. D. Bridges gave up 65 directorships worth about $60,000 a year. Bridges died in 1968, and his successor as Minister for Child Welfare, F. M. Hewitt, had to resign 14 directorships. When Nicklin became Premier of Queensland in 1957, he instructed all Ministers to surrender their directorships. His ruling, however, did not apply to share holdings in companies that are intimately connected with a Minister's Department. These problems received widespread publicity during the Evans scandal of 1962 and the more recent Bjelke-Petersen case.

During October and November 1961, E. Evans, Queensland Minister for Mines and Development, bought 2000 Australian Oil and Gas shares when the average market price was $2.20. By March the market price of AOG shares had risen dramatically and his original investment of about $2200 was worth about $20,000. It is clear that Evans had used his Ministerial position to advance his material interest, but his actions were upheld by the Cabinet. Even the staunchly pro-Government Courier-Mail declared editorially:

That a Minister for Mines should speculate for his personal profit in any mining enterprise that has to deal with him as a Minister will still appear

21 In 1966, J. M. Fraser, Minister for the Army, formed a family pastoral company — Fraser Properties Pty. Ltd. — with an authorised capital of $700,000 (The Age, 26 August 1966).
22 The Management Digest (Canberra), 20 February 1968.
23 The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 1968.
24 Ibid., 3 September 1968, 18 September 1968.
improper to many people, though the Premier has found it possible to excuse Mr. Evans 'flutter'. . . 25

During the Queensland State election campaign in 1969, the leader of the Opposition accused Premier Bjelke-Petersen of using deceit to acquire "fabulous wealth" from oil share transactions. It was also disclosed about the same time that he held half a million Exoil NL shares. 26 Late last year a new mining company, Bjelke-Peterson Pty. Ltd., was established; it was "believed to be associated with the Premier of Queensland". 27 During a recent appearance on the ABC television program "Four Corners" (March 21, 1970) Bjelke-Petersen was brutally frank in expressing the view that he saw no conflict between the public office he held and his extensive interests in the oil and mining industries.

A controversy involving the South Australian Minister for Local Government, Roads and Transport, Murray Hill, who is also a leading local estate agent, arose in 1969. The Leader of the Opposition, Don Dunstan, claimed that pamphlets bearing the name Murray Hill Pty. Ltd. were inviting householders to sell their properties through the company. They were being distributed to people living in an area affected by plans under the Metropolitan Adelaide Transportation Study (MATS). Hill was defended by Premier Hall in the House of Assembly on August 7, 1969, on the ground that he was no longer a director of his company and "therefore completely exonerated". However, as Dunstan was quick to point out, Hill's financial interest in the company was retained and his actions were so open to dubious inference as to constitute a grave impropriety. It is also relevant to note here that Hill is a director of two public companies — The Century Insurance Co. Ltd., and Friends Provident and Century Life Office.

At the Federal level, there has not been a comprehensive ruling on the question of Ministers' shareholdings. Gorton told the House of Representatives on March 4, 1969, that Federal Ministers were not prohibited from holding shares in mining companies which might apply to the Government for leases. He went on to observe, with obvious satisfaction, that the Minister for National Development, David Fairbairn, who dealt with mining leases, had sold all such shares before taking office. In October 1969, it was revealed that Senator M. F. Scott, Minister for Customs and Excise, and the Rev. Dr. Malcolm Mackay, Liberal MHR for Evans, had been

26 Nation, 22 March 1969.
involved in a $2 million deal over a manganese mine in north-west Australia. Mackay is chairman of Longreach Metals NL, and Scott was a major shareholder in Mount Sydney Manganese Pty Ltd. which sold out to Longreach. Scott is also the principal vendor in a string of West Australian mining leases. It is interesting to note here that Scott was recently elected chairman of the Government Members Mining Committee, after being dropped from the Gorton Ministry. His predecessor was none other than Mackay, whom Whitlam once described as having "given up the divine for the divining rod".

Unquestionably, many politicians — including Ministers — make much more money than would appear possible if they were dependent solely on their parliamentary salaries. One journalist recently asked:

Was there any truth . . . in the whispered allegations that a National Development Minister played the stock market because he knew a lot about mineral and oil exploration because of his position?

It will be many years before crude bushranger ethics cease to dominate important areas of Australian political life.

III

Despite the uneven trend in Australia towards upholding the norms of behavior required of British Ministers, editorial writers and Labor politicians delude themselves when they claim that the adoption of a comprehensive ruling along the lines of the one in existence in Britain would remove the possibility of a conflict of interests. Even if Ministers were to divest themselves of all directorships and shareholdings, business and propertied interests would still be able to count on their positive and active goodwill. Furthermore, the existence of Labor Ministers has not destroyed the validity of such an analysis. A handful of them, of course, may have believed that they were not serving capitalist ends but their instrumental function in the system has determined otherwise.

28 Sunday Observer, 19 October, 1969, 26 October 1969.
29 The Age, 18 March 1970.
It is not so much a question of Ministers being consciously influenced in their contact with business by the possibility of securing directorships at some later date. Their personal ties with the world of corporate capitalism are not as important as their worldview. Beyond all their political, cultural and religious differences, Ministers accept as beyond question the capitalist context which is of fundamental importance in shaping their attitudes, policies and actions to specific issues and problems. They are fundamentally committed to capitalist enterprise which is seen as a necessary, desirable and "natural" element of Australian society. The various ends pursued by the members of Governments are conditioned by, and pass through the prism of, their acceptance of and commitment to the existing economic system.

POSTSCRIPT

This article was completed just before the eruption of the Comalco shares scandal in May-June, which began when the giant international mining company offered share allotments in its new issue to leading politicians, public servants and financial journalists. Prime Minister Gorton personally rejected the preferential offer and suggested that other Federal Ministers should follow suit, since acceptance of the shares could give the impression that they were being singled out for special treatment — and that would be undesirable in the light of Comalco's dealings with the Government. He laid stress on the fact that subscribers to the flotation would almost certainly make a quick-scale profit. As it turned out, the shares were issued on June 11 at $2.75, yet within minutes they had rocketed to $5.80 on the Melbourne Stock Exchange.

Gorton's advice, however, was not listened to by key members of the political executives in several States. In Queensland, for example, six Ministers — including the Treasurer, the Minister for Industrial Development, and the Minister for Works — received thousands of shares as "customers" of Comalco. Other Ministers may have taken up the offer through nominee companies or relatives. Nevertheless, the Ministers named in the press passionately defended their actions, the common refrain being that it was their own private business and that they could make money how and as they wished. The Bulletin (June 20) referred to the "thinness" of this type of argument: "Politicians with an interest in a company can push contracts worth millions to favored ones."

The Comalco scandal is a reflection, in the crudest form, of how the political executive — and other elements in the State system — serve the interests of the owners and controllers of concentrated economic wealth.
ANTONIO GRAMSCI first gave the notion of hegemony its correct place in marxist theories of the exercise of political control. According to Gramsci, societal power did not rest solely on coercion but on manipulation and consensual agreement between the rulers and the ruled. The exact proportion in which coercion and consensus coexisted depended on which society was examined at which stage of history. He thought that in advanced capitalist societies and transitional societies, like the Italy he examined in the early thirties, the emphasis was more and more on obtaining consensus through manipulation, rather than ruling through coercion. So at least one of his central concerns in his research was to establish and describe just how the rulers of a society manipulated the populace to obtain their agreement in the way society was run. Obviously the indoctrination of the young was very important. Through the type of schooling which existed the rulers could inculcate the values and beliefs necessary for the maintenance of their type of social system. Thus Gramsci was always very interested in the “Questione scolastica” and wrote a number of significant notes on schools and their organisation and their role in the instillation of hegemonic values in his prison notes. Only since 1958 has really significant work on Gramsci’s pedagogical theory been done in Italy and practically nothing has been done outside his name. What follows is a translation of one of his two most important essays on the schooling system.

Alastair Davidson
IN GENERAL, WE CAN SEE that all practical activities have become so complex, and sciences so intertwined with life in modern society, that every practical activity tends to set up its own school for its own specialists and directing groups and thus to create a group of specialist intellectuals of a higher grade who can teach in these schools. Thus, beside the sort of school which we can call “humanistic”, which is the oldest and most traditional school, and which was designed to give every human individual a general and even unspecialised education—the fundamental ability to think and get along in life—there has been created an entire system of specialist schools of various grades, for whole branches of the professions or for already specialised occupations which are precisely marked out. We could even say that the crisis in education which now besets us is tied to the fact that this process of differentiation and specialisation has come about chaotically, without clear or precise principles, and without well studied and consciously fixed planning: the crisis of educational programming and organisation, that is, the crisis of the general orientation of policy for the formation of modern intellectual groups, is in great part an aspect and a complication of the more all-enveloping and general crisis.

The basic division of schooling into classical and vocational was a rational scheme: the vocational school for the instrumental classes and the classical school for the ruling classes and the intellectuals. The development of an industrial base in both the city and the country made increasingly necessary a new type of urban intellectual: beside the classical school developed the technical school (vocational but not manual). This called into discussion the very principle of the concrete orientation of general education, of the humanistic orientation of general education based on the greco-roman tradition. This orientation, once under discussion, was finished, since its formative effectiveness was in great part based on the general prestige, which was traditionally not questioned, of a particular type of civilisation.

The tendency is today to abolish every type of “disinterested” (or not directly tendentious) and “formative” schooling or to leave only a reduced sample for a small elite of gentlemen and women who do not have to worry about preparing for a professional future and to spread the specialised vocational school in which the fate
of the pupil and his future activity are predetermined more and more. The crisis will find a solution which, according to reason, should follow these lines: a single primary school for general humanistic, formative education, which correctly adjusts the development of the capacity to work manually (technically/industrially) and the development of capacity to work intellectually. From this type of school for all, via repetitious experience of vocational orientation, pupils will proceed to one of the specialist schools or into productive work.

We must bear in mind the growing tendency by which every practical activity tends to create a specialised school, just as every intellectual activity tends to create its own educational club or circle, which assumes the function of a post-school institution which specialises in organising the conditions which allow men to keep up to date with the progress taking place in their own branch of knowledge.

We can see that the decision-making organs are tending more and more to divide their activity into "organic" aspects: the deliberative which is essentially theirs and the technical-educative whose problems they have to resolve which are first examined by experts and analysed scientifically. This has already created a bureaucratic body structured in a new way, since beside the specialised offices of those competent to prepare the technical material for the decision-making bodies is created a second type of functionary, more or less "volunteers" and disinterested, chosen from time to time from industry, the banks and financial world. This is one of the mechanisms through which the career bureaucracy has ended up controlling democratic and parliamentary regimes; now the mechanism is extending itself systematically and is absorbing within its ambit the great specialists in private practice, who thus control both bureaucracy and regime. Since it is a necessary systematic development which tends to integrate persons skilled in political techniques with persons skilled in the concrete questions of administration of practical activity essential to great and complex modern national societies, all efforts to exorcise this tendency from the outside have no result but moralistic preaching and rhetorical lament.

The question arises of modifying the preparation of technico-political personnel, integrating their education with the new necessities and elaborating new types of specialist functionaries who collectively can relate the decision-making activity with it. The traditional type of political "leader", who is prepared solely for formal, law-making functions becomes anachronistic and represents a danger to the life of the state: the leader must have a minimum of general technical education which permits him, if not to "make"
the correct solution by himself, to be able to judge the solutions offered him by the experts and thus to choose the correct one from the "synthetic" point of view of political technique.

A type of decision-making body which seeks to incorporate the necessary technical competence to operate realistically has been described in another place [in another essay he wrote] where I spoke of what happens in editorial boards on certain journals, boards which function both as boards and cultural clubs. The club criticises collegially and so contributes to the elaboration of the work of single editors, whose work is organised according to a plan and a division of labor which is rationally apportioned. Through the discussion and the collegial criticism (made up of suggestions, advice, methodological direction, and criticism which is constructive and directed towards mutual education) in which each man acts as a specialist in his field to integrate with the collective competence, we succeed in reality in raising the average level of individual editors, and reaching the height and capacity of the most prepared, ensuring not only an ever more close and unified collaboration on the review, but creating the conditions for the emergence of a homogeneous group of intellectuals who are ready to produce regular and methodical bookish publications (not only of occasional publications and unconnected essays, but of whole works together).

Undoubtedly, in this type of collective activity, all work produces new capability and possibilities for work, since it creates more and more fundamental conditions for work: indexes, bibliographical notes, collections of fundamental specialist works, etc. This calls for a strict struggle against habits of amateurism, improvisation, and declamatory and oratorical solutions. The work must be done in writing especially, just as the criticisms in succinct and concise notes must be in writing. This can be achieved through distributing the material in time, etc.; the writing of notes and criticism is a didactic principle rendered necessary by the need to combat the habits of prolixity, declamation and fallacies created by oratory. This type of intellectual work is necessary to make the self-taught acquire the discipline for study which a regular school career creates, to taylorise intellectual work. The principle of the "old men of Santa Zita" of which de Sanctis talks in his memoirs of the Neapolitan school of Basilio Puoti is useful: that is, it is useful to have a certain "stratification" according to capability and attitude, and the formation of work groups under the guide of the more expert and advanced, so that the more backward and rough can have their preparation speeded up.

An important point in studying the practical organisation of the single primary [q.v. supra] school is that regarding schooling in the
various grades which correspond with the age and the intellectual and moral development of the students and the ends which the school itself desires to attain. The single or humanistic (understanding this term humanistic in the wide and not traditional sense) or general education school must intend to usher young people into social activity after having taken them up to a certain level of maturity and capacity, up to intellectual and practical creativity and autonomy in attitudes and initiative. Fixing the compulsory school age depends on general economic conditions since these can force demands that youth and young men contribute immediately to production. The single school demands that the State is able to assume the expenses which are today a charge upon each family for the maintenance of the pupils, that is, that it transforms the education department from top to bottom, extending it and complicating it in an unheard of way: the entire process of education and formation of the younger generation becomes public after having been private since only in that way can education involve all generations without distinction of groups or castes. But this transformation of schooling demands an unheard of enlargement of the practical organisation of schools, that is, of buildings, scientific material, the teaching body, etc. The teaching body in particular must be increased because the fewer the number of pupils to teach the greater and more intense efficiency of the school, which raises other problems which will not be solved rapidly and easily. Even the question of buildings is not simple because this type of school must be a college with dormitories, refectories, special libraries, rooms suitable for seminar work, etc. Thus, at first the new school should not be and will not be for other than limited groups, students chosen by competition and placed according to the responsibility of appropriate institutions.

The single primary school should cover the same years as that covered today by the elementary and middle schools which have been reorganised not only for content and method of teaching, but for the distribution of the various grades during schooling. The first grade of elementary school should not last for more than three or four years, and beside inculcating the first “instrumental” notions of learning—reading, writing, arithmetic, geography and history—should propound that part of “rights and duties” which is neglected today, that is, first notions of the State and Society, as primordial elements in a new conception of the world which opposes the conceptions given by various traditional social ambients, that is, concepts that we can call folkloric. The problem of teaching we have to resolve is that of making fruitful and moderating the dogmatic tendency which must exist in these early years. The rest of the course should not last more than six years, so that at fifteen
to sixteen years all the years of the single primary school should be complete.

It could be objected that a course like that is too tiring because of its rapidity, if we wish to attain effectively the results which the present organisation of the classical school proposes to attain but does not. We can say, however, that the complex of the new organisation will have to include the general elements through which, for some pupils at least, the course is too slow today. What are these elements? In certain families, especially in the intellectual classes, children find in family life a preparation for, a prolongation of, and an integration with school life. They absorb, as the saying goes, from the "atmosphere", a great quantity of attitudes and beliefs which facilitate schooling properly speaking: they already know and develop knowledge of literary language, that is, the means of expression and knowledge which are technically superior to the means possessed by the average pupil in the school population between six and twelve years. Likewise, the pupils of the city, because they live in the city, have already absorbed before the age of six a number of concepts and attitudes which make schooling more easy, profitable and rapid. In the internal organisation of the single primary school at least the principal of these conditions must be created besides the fact which is presupposed, that alongside the single primary school there is developed a network of kindergarten and other institutions in which, even before school age, children become accustomed to a certain collective discipline and acquire preschool notions and attitudes. In fact, the single school should be organised as a college, with a collective life day and night which is free from the present hypocritical and mechanical present-day forms of discipline. Study must be done together, with the help of the masters and better pupils, even during the hours of so-called individual study, etc.

The fundamental problem of this phase is raised by the present schooling represented by the high school (liceo) which is no way different from preceding years of schooling as a type of teaching except for the abstract supposition that there is a higher intellectual and moral maturity in the pupil which is in conformity to the greater age and the experience which has already been accumulated.

In fact there is a jump between high-school and university, that is, between what is a school truly speaking and what is life. . . From teaching what is purely dogmatic, in which the memory plays a large part, one passes to a phase of creative or autonomous and independent work; from school where study is imposed and controlled in an authoritative fashion, one passes to a phase of study or professional work in which intellectual self-discipline and moral autonomy
is theoretically unlimited. And it comes straight after puberty, when the surge of instinctive and elementary passions has not yet finished grappling with the brakes of character and moral consciousness which are being formed. In Italy, where in the university the principle of tutorial work is still not widespread, the transition is even more brusque and mechanical.

This is why the final period in the single school must be conceived of, and organised as, a final phase in which we tend to create the fundamental values of “humanism”, intellectual self-discipline and moral autonomy necessary for further specialisation either of a scientific character (university studies) or of a more immediate practical and productive nature (industry, bureaucracy, organisation of exchange, etc.). The study and learning of creative methods in science and life must begin in this last phase of school and no longer be a monopoly of the university or be left to chance in real life: this phase of school must contribute to develop the element of autonomous responsibility in the individual, to be a creative school. It is necessary to make a distinction between the active and creative schooling, as in the Dalton method. The single school is active schooling throughout, even though it may be necessary to place limits on libertarian theories in this field and emphasise with some energy the duty of adult generations, that is, the duty of the State, to make younger generations “conform”. We are still in the romantic phase with active schooling in which the elements of the struggle against mechanical and jesuitical learning have become unhealthily inflated by contrast and in polemic: we must go into the “classical” rational phase and find in the ends to be reached the natural springs for the elaboration of methods and forms.

Creative schooling crowns active schooling: in the first phase we tend to discipline and thus to level in order to obtain a certain sort of “conformity” which we can dub “dynamic”; in the creative phase, on the basis of “collectivisation” of a social sort, we tend to expand the personality, which has become autonomous and responsible, but with a solid and homogeneous moral and social conscience. Thus creative schooling does not mean an “inventing and discovering” school; it indicates a phase and method of research and knowledge, and not a “programme” in which is predetermined an obligation to be original and to innovate at all costs. It indicates that learning comes especially through a spontaneous and independent effort of the learner, in which the master has only the function of a friendly guide like that which exists or should exist in Universities. To discover a truth by oneself, without suggestions or outside help, is to create even if the truth is an old one. It also shows methodological ability; it shows that in every way the pupil
has entered the phase of intellectual maturity in which new truths can be discovered. Therefore fundamental school activity in this phase takes place in seminars, libraries and experimental laboratories; in it the fundamental preparation for professional occupations take place.

The advent of the single school signifies the beginning of new relations between intellectual work and industrial work not only in the school but in all social life. The principle of unity will be reflected for that reason in all cultural organs, transforming them and giving them new content.

**The problem of the new function which universities and Academies can have.**

Today these two institutions are independent of one another and the Academies are the symbol, frequently derisory, of the lack of connection between high culture and life, between the intellectuals and the populace (thus the fortune which the futurists had in their first period of anti-academic and anti-traditional Sturm und Drang, etc.).

In a new situation of relations between life and learning, between intellectual and industrial work, the Academies should become the cultural (systematising, expanding and creating intellectually) organisations of those people who, after their single schooling, pass into work in the professions and a field of contact between them and university teachers. Social elements employed in the professions must not fall into intellectual passivity, but must have at their disposition (through collective initiative and not through individuals, as a fundamental social function recognised as of public necessity and usefulness) specialised institutes in all branches of research and scientific work, in which they can collaborate and in which they can find all the subsidies necessary for every form of cultural activity which they intend to undertake.

Academic organisations will have to be reorganised and revivified from top to bottom. Territorially they will have a centralisation of specialisations and competencies: national centres will be composed of the existing great institutions, regional and provincial sections of local, urban and rural clubs. They will be divided up according to cultural and scientific competency, and will all be represented in the higher centres but only partially in the local clubs. Unify the various types of existing cultural organisations Academies, Cultural Institutes, philological circles, etc., integrating them with traditional academic work which consists mainly of systemising past knowledge and seeking to fix the norm in national thought as a
guide for intellectual activity, with activity tied to collective life, to the world of production and work. Industrial conferences, scientific organisation of work, and experimental factory cabinets will be controlled, etc. A mechanism will be constructed to select and advance the individual capacity of the popular masses, which are sacrificed today and lost through mistakes and dead-end efforts. Every local club should be obliged to have a moral and scientific section, and gradually should organise other special sections to discuss the technical aspects of labor, in the factory, office and field, etc. Periodic congresses at various levels will make the most able people known.

It would be useful to have a complete list of all the Academies and other cultural organisations which exist today and arguments which they deal with most in their work and which are published in their "Reports": in a great part it is a question of cemeteries of learning, but even these have a role in the psychology of the ruling class.

The collaboration between these organs and the universities should be close, like that of all higher specialist schools of every sort (military, naval, etc.). The aim is to obtain a centralisation and an impulse to the national learning superior to that of the Catholic Church.*

* This scheme of organisation of cultural work according to the general principles of the single primary school should be developed accurately in all its parts and serve as a guide in the constitution of even the most elementary and primitive centre of learning, which should be conceived of as an embryo and molecule of the whole massive structure. Even initiatives which are transitory and experimental should be conceived of as being capable of absorption into the general scheme and at the same time as vital elements which tend to create the whole scheme. The organisation and development of the Rotary clubs is to be studied.

THE VIETNAM MORATORIUM invites the famous American author, Mr. Norman Mailer, to attend the September demonstration. Would he mind sharing the platform with Jane Fonda and dear old Dr. Spock, hero of the Woman's Day set, toilet-trainer extraordinaire? How about a dash of Dr. Cairns to top it off? And will Norm write a book about it — about the demonstrators, and his role in the whole deal, and how the Daily Telegraph misrepresented him, and the relationship between shit and Dr. Spock, and some insights into the psychology of Jane Fonda, Time pin up girl? And what will he say about poor old Jim...

We could find out, one day, perhaps. In the meantime however we have The Armies of the Night, Mailer's account of the Washington anti-Vietnam demonstration of October 1967. It's more than an account of a political demonstration, it's a deep and tortured look at a sick society: "America, once a beauty of magnificence unparalleled, now a beauty with a leprous skin."

Mailer is a complex man. He's been to the further shores of Hell, and back, stabbing one of his wives, consuming drugs and alcohol, burning holes in his brain until, in his words, his head had taken on "the texture of a fine Swiss cheese". Yet he has retained a hold on life and not slipped off the razor's edge. This he achieved via writing — novels, journalism, essays, poetry — putting into words his own concept of life and the truths that have been revealed to him.

An egotist to be sure. Mailer is the hero of this work. But he deals with himself in the same tough-minded sharp way that he deals with others. He catalogues his hang-ups. He likes his sex to be guilt-ridden; he is a neo-Victorian. And if he's cruel to others then he's cruel to himself as well. It's a kind of existential therapy. Just write it like it is.

He blasts his way through the American Peace Movement, past the liberal academic opponents of the war whose only quarrel with the Great Society is that they think it temporarily deranged, jabs a couple of Oscar Wilde rights to left personalities like Paul Goodman, Dwight Macdonald, frames the American Communist Party in a brief few lines, the spiritual deadness of its dull old manipulating calculations, and dashes on commenting left and right, the New Left, sex, Black Power, morality, tactics, revolution, violence, television, history, American life, values, cops, Vietnam...

"The death of America rides in on the smog". This is also what Mailer writes about; the death of America, the death of the society that set out to be the new Jerusalem, "the land where a new kind of man was born from the idea that God was present in every man not only as compassion but as power..." And it's dying in a schizophrenic frenzy where hate and power come together, where war and sex meet, becoming interchangeable; and the Vietnam war becomes the huge production of Christianity gone wrong and its aberrations (the twisted napalmed kids, the frightened young men shooting at the shadows of dark trees in the darker jungles) are the manifestations of sex gone sour in a society that's shot holes in the minds of its children, stifling them, crippling them, showing them reality in the TV commercial. This is what Mailer's about.

And the real hero of it all is not Mailer but the dissenting people of America of which Mailer is part.

R. J. CAHILL
Our next issue . . .

No. 27, October-November, 1970 . . .

will be devoted mainly to articles on the history of the Communist Party of Australia, which was founded on October 30, 1920.

Contributors will include . . .


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