The maternal as hospitality

Fiona Utley  
*University of New England*

Jane M. Lymer  
*University Of Wollongong, jlymer@uow.edu.au*
The maternal as hospitality

Abstract
There is significant play between the trope of hospitality as providing a political ontology and arguments that the maternal as pregnant embodiment is the original hospitality and thus the grounds of ethical engagement. For example, Diprose's critique of a political ontology of hospitality identifies that political hospitality is only possible due to women giving their lived time as potential mothers towards establishing and maintaining domestic stability. The more conditional the hospitality the more existing inequities are exploited with women increasingly unlikely to garner recognition for their civil rights over embodiment and reproduction. Alternately Aristarkova argues that the Levinasian-Derridean conception of hospitality would benefit from acknowledging that the dematerialised idea of femininity as familiarity is a description of the maternal relation and it is the maternal body that grounds acts of hospitality. Such acknowledgement would open the possibility for welcoming the maternal into the discourse and provide a solution to Derrida's aporia of ownership. The structure of images, here primarily the trope of the maternal to guide the development of a concept of the ethical and political subject, must be examined more thoroughly. In this paper we undertake a parallel reading of the maternal and the concept of hospitality by drawing upon La Caze's work on specific forms of images used in philosophical thinking and Kristeva and Diprose's work on women's temporality.

Keywords
hospitality, maternal

Disciplines
Arts and Humanities | Law

Publication Details

This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/270
AUSTRALASIAN SOCIETY
for
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Annual Conference
10th to 12th December
2012
The University of Auckland
**Venue: Fale Pasifika**

Building 275 – 22 Wynyard Street

Opened in October 2004, the Fale Pasifika is a traditional Pacific Island meetinghouse. It is the second largest in the Southern Hemisphere, and stands 12 metres high. The timber framework is New Zealand Radiata Pine, some of which was laminated to produce the traditional roof. Both traditional and contemporary Pacific artworks feature in the interior.

---

**Venue: Arts I**

Building 206 – 25 Wynyard Street
Welcome to the ASCP Annual Conference for 2012! The Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, is delighted to be hosting the conference again this year. We trust that you will enjoy your time in Auckland and we hope that you will have a chance to enjoy the city and its beautiful surroundings. This booklet contains some basic information that may be of use during your visit. If you have any questions, don’t hesitate to ask any of the organisers and postgraduate students assisting with the conference.

Conference Committee

Matheson Russell
Campbell Jones
Glen Pettigrove
Sean Sturm
Todd May  (Clemson)

Title: Humanism and Solidarity

Abstract: Recent years have seen the rise of a new type of anti-humanism, what might be called an a-humanism of systems theory. Two important exponents of this view are John Protevi and Jane Bennett, both of whom root their thought in the work of Gilles Deleuze. In different but related ways, they see human beings as part of a wider system that can operate at both the sub- and supra-individual levels as well as the individual one. This raises the question of how to conceive a politics based on their perspectives. This paper argues that, although the horizontal character of their ontology is in keeping with an egalitarian politics, it is difficult if not impossible to ground a politics of solidarity in this approach. This is because the bonds necessary for political solidarity cannot be forged across all elements or aspects of the system.

Bio: Dr. May took his Ph.D. from Penn State University in 1989, and has been at Clemson (after a brief stint at Indiana University of Pennsylvania) since 1991. He specializes in Continental philosophy, especially recent French philosophy. He has authored ten philosophical books, focusing on the philosophical work of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Rancière. His book The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism has been influential in recent progressive political thought, and his work on Rancière is among the first in English. May’s writings also seek to bridge the gap between "Anglo-American" and "Continental" styles of philosophy that developed in the early twentieth century. His teaching interests are varied; he has found himself teaching classes as diverse as Anarchism, The Thought of Merleau-Ponty, Resistance and Alterity in Contemporary Culture, Secular Ethics in a Materialist Age, and Postmodernism and Art.
Claire Colebrook  (PennState / UNSW)

Title: Hypo-hyper-hapto-neuromysticism

Abstract: In his homage and memorial to Jean-Luc Nancy, Derrida refers to an intensified hyper-haptocentrism in twentieth-century thought. Since making that judgment a series of manoeuvres within philosophy and theory have intensified this insistence on the values of proximity and affective immediacy, suggesting that Cartesian reason and separation have been displaced as the normative model for thinking. One of the most significant figures for this new axiology of close range thinking is the embodied brain, now deemed to be the decentred, attuned, dynamic and pre-personal ground of all thought and life. Indeed in popular culture the brain now offers itself as a symbolic resolution to many of the most profound ethical dilemmas, including the ethics of touch. The brain is at once always multiply affected and attuned - hyper-tactile - and yet always operating at a distance, embodied without being actually tactile. Looking at Derrida’s work on touch, Deleuze’s work on sense and a series of texts on touch, including the Fox TV series Touch and Jerry Sandusky’s Touched I argue for a Cartesian ethics of separation.


Georgia Warnke  (UC Riverside)

Title: Deliberation and Interpretation

Abstract: Deliberative democratic theory takes up the question of how the citizens of diverse and pluralistic democracies, citizens who by definition possess different interests, values and conceptions of the good, can nonetheless reach decisions, enact laws, and determine policies that they can all find legitimate and binding. The answer the theory gives looks to non-coercive deliberations among free and equal citizens who justify their claims and proposals by appealing to public reasons or considerations – in other words, to reasons and considerations all those affected can accept. Yet it is not clear that in diverse and pluralistic democracies what stymies democratic justification is the failure to offer or accept public reasons or considerations. Can we not agree on public reasons while understanding them in different but equally compelling ways? Indeed, might it not be that what stymies justification is our failure to acknowledge that we can agree on public reasons and considerations while understanding them in different but equally compelling ways? The first part of this paper explores these questions as they relate both to the original formulations of deliberative theory and to certain revisions. The second part
of the paper investigates a hermeneutic alternative that not only acknowledges but also values differences in the ways we can plausibly understand our public reasons and considerations.

**Bio:** Professor Warnke's research interests include critical theory, hermeneutics, democratic theory and issues of race, sex and gender. Her latest book is *After Identity: Rethinking Race, Sex and Gender* (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Recently she has written articles on Jurgen Habermas, Richard Rorty and Clifford Geertz. Recent graduate courses have focused on Habermas, Hans-Georg Gadamer and issues of identity. Undergraduate courses include courses on political philosophy, feminism and Marxism.

---

**PLENARY PANELS**

---

**Paul Patton**

**Speakers**

Keith Ansell-Pearson (Warwick)
Mark Kelly (Middlesex)
Jessica Whyte (UWS)
Paul Patton (UNSW)

**Bio:** Paul Patton is Professor of philosophy in the School of History and Philosophy at the University of New South Wales, where he has been since 2002. Patton received a B.A. and M.A. from the University of Sydney, and, in 1979, received a Doctorat D'Universite from Paris VIII, (Vincennes). Before he took up his professorship at University of New South Wales, Patton lectured at the Australian National University and the University of Sydney. Patton is a member of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. Patton has published widely on aspects of 20th Century French philosophy, including focus on the works of Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault. He is the author of *Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics* (Stanford UP, 2010), *Deleuze and the Political* (Routledge, 2000). He edited *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory* (Routledge, 1993), *Deleuze: A Critical Reader* (Blackwell, 1991) and co-edited *Deleuze and the Postcolonial* with Simone Bignall (Edinburgh UP, 2010), *Poetics of In-Between Space* with Sang-Koo Kim (Pusan National University Press, 2005), *Between Deleuze and Derrida* with John Protevi (Continuum, 2003), *Jacques Derrida: Deconstruction Engaged – The Sydney Seminars* with Terry Smith (Power Publications, 2001) and *Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* with Duncan Ivison and Will Sanders (Cambridge UP, 2000).
Kevin Hart

Speakers
Claire Colebrook (Penn State / UNSW)
Chris Watkin (Monash)
Michael Parmenter (Auckland)
Kevin Hart (Virginia / ACU)

Bio: Kevin Hart is a British-Australian theologian, philosopher and poet. He is currently Edwin B. Kyle Professor of Christian Studies and Chair of the Religious Studies Department at the University of Virginia and is the Eric D’Arcy Professor of Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University. As a theologian and philosopher, Hart’s work epitomizes the "theological turn" in phenomenology, with a focus on figures like Maurice Blanchot, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion and Jacques Derrida. He has received multiple awards for his poetry, including the Christopher Brennan Award and the Grace Leven Prize for Poetry twice. He is the author of The Dark Gaze: Maurice Blanchot and the Sacred (Chicago UP, 2004), Postmodernism: A Beginner’s Guide (Oneworld, 2004), The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy (Cambridge UP, 1989). He is the editor of Clandestine Encounters: Philosophy in the Narratives of Maurice Blanchot (Notre Dame UP, 2010) and Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion (Notre Dame UP, 2007). He is co-editor of The Exorbitant: Emmanuel Levinas between Jews and Christians with Michael A. Signer (Fordham UP, 2010), The Experience of God with Barbara Wall (Fordham UP, 2005), The Power of Contestation: Perspectives on Maurice Blanchot with Geoffrey Hartman (Johns Hopkins UP, 2005) and Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments with Yvonne Sherwood (Routledge, 2004).
CONFERENCE ABSTRACTS

Mathew Abbott (University of Ballarat, mathewabbott@gmail.com)
Ordinary Happiness: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Agamben

Developing the concept of happiness at work in the early Wittgenstein, and showing how it clarifies the Heideggerian idea that modernity is the age in which the world is set up as something to be pictured by a subject, in this paper I set these concepts to work in a reading of Agamben’s political ontology. I argue that appreciating Agamben’s philosophy will require that we turn to the idea of the ordinary, and in particular to a notion of it as a potential political achievement. This can help explain what he means when he writes in The Time that Remains of the possibility of a people “situat[ing] itself as a remnant, as not all” (55): Agamben’s ontology of the remnant — of what remains after the “Aufhebung of the state of exception” — is an attempt at thinking what it would mean to live and think beyond the Weltbild, of the world conceived as a representable totality. This, in turn, will show the link between the possibility of ontological change and the concrete political struggle for common happiness. Agamben’s repeated invocations of Paul’s referring in 1 Corinthians 7:31 to “the passing of the figure of this world” will from here appear in a new light: the time that remains is not the time that remains before the end of the world, but the time that remains before the end of the world-picture, before the passing of the skhēma of the world.

Sabrina Achilles (University of Western Sydney, s.achilles@uws.edu.au)
Literary Know-How

This paper investigates the work of literature, in the sense of the job of literature, as that is to perform an ethics of the situation, or, in Francisco J. Varela’s terms, an ethics of “situatedness.” Varela refers to this ethics as a knowledge of know how, and not, know what — which he attributes to rational judgement (and which results in morals), Varela’s concept of an ethics of situatedness is a response to the idea that “proper units of knowledge are primarily concrete, embodied, incorporated, lived.” This contrasts to ethics and morality that are the result of abstraction and generalisations of prior lived events by rationalised judgement. Such knowledge overcodes flows and the event. Within the same paradigm as Varela’s ethics of situatedness is Deleuze and Guattari’s “meaning is use.” These are both instances of an ethics of immanence. Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis is a sizeable investment in an ethics of immanence. This paper, then, maps the two types of ethics stipulated by Varela upon Deleuze and Guattari’s molar aggregates and molecular/micro-multiplicities, that is, upon the socius and the BwO. It further considers how the literary may function as a schizoanalysis of the event, freeing into the world both the unconscious and an ethics of situatedness against a backdrop of moral judgment and striation. The object text in this paper is Hitchcock’s Vertigo.
This paper examines some of Nietzsche’s most essential thoughts on death and shows their Epicurean inspiration. For Nietzsche, Epicurus is a figure who was “true to the earth,” abandoning all hubristic conceptions of human significance, including exceptionalism, and who taught that one should die as if one had never lived. As Nietzsche astutely noted, never in the history of thought has such a voluptuous appreciation of existence been so modest. This paper will explore Nietzsche’s interpretation of Epicurus — whom he calls the inventor of “heroic-idyllic philosophizing” — and the nature of a Epicurean attachment to life.

In the traditionalist culturalist account, identity is often defined in terms of race, class and gender, and so on. And we have already produced numerous theoretical models to approach culture, politics and history, and their exercise in the formation of identity as effects of narrative seeing history “as a kind of production of various kinds of narratives.” But in this paper, I approach identity from another standpoint: the idea of “noncultural”/“nonnarrated” reality of affects from the position of Spinozist ethics of immanence. A Spinozan ethics of immanence defines ideas as the power of activity of the body. Here, I am trying to make a claim that the idea of our identity can be understood in terms of affectivity of the body rather than in terms of the conceptual abstractions of culture, history and politics. My sense of “noncultural” does not deny culture rather it expands culture’s horizon opening new fields for individuations and helps to analyze the content and expression of culture, which we often overlook. In so doing, I divide the paper into two sections: In the first section, I present the role of affects and bodies in identity formation; and in the second section, I present identity as an act of self-fashioning one’s own self as a self-relational interiority.

Deleuze and Guattari ask, “How can we unhook ourselves from the points of subjectification that secure us, nail us down to a dominant reality? Tearing the conscious away from the subject in order to make it a means of exploration.” This paper explores de-faciality as a cinematic image performing such an “unhooking.” From silent film to the present, images of violation in wax museums have engaged directly with an audience’s sensory perception of being. Through the multiple viewpoints synthesised by the cinema, affective realms of horror are created that do not correspond to the logic of familiar, organising systems of representation, particularly the melting face. When un-common “things” occur to the face in we are “shocked” away from a structure of order to an unrecognizable zone of fluid corporeal boundaries and shifting assemblages of the human. This effect of horror engages with Deleuze’s view that “if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facialisations, to become imperceptible.” The immediacy of affecting images, such as facial violation, act as a visceral response without particular reference to the armature of an individual viewer’s psychically structured world. It is in this sense that the act of dismantling the face — of de-identifying the human visage — gestures towards a body-without-organs, and consequently a viewer unsettled from their subjective viewpoint as the stance that frames the world.

This paper aims at studying the notions of “sexual difference” and “performativity” together, by elucidating their areas of congruence as well as divergence. Judith Butler, through her Theory of Performativity, alerts us towards an essentialist position that would conceive the materiality of the body preceding the symbolic order. Instead, she posits a conception of the body as “active materiality,” which in combination with discursive practices, works to constitute and reconstitute the body and thereby deontologize it from the naturalized notion of “sexual difference.” But, the most significant intellectual
conundrum of the hour is, is there a political imperative to start off with sexual difference? And, in that case, what would such a notion of sexual difference entail, when it is stripped of all its integrity and essence? The aim of this paper is to address this paradox, where the notion of sexual difference certainly would not mean a return to the phenomenological understanding of it based on “experience,” “speech” and hence logos, but rather the very move to start off with the notion of the “displaced” woman is one of an ethical compulsion, than that of epistemic certitude.

Here, sexual difference is conceived not in terms of a “metaphysics of presence,” but rather in terms of the dispersive, disseminatory and multiplicatory potential of Dasein or the khora, an unnameable womb-like “embodied” non-space (a kind of non-origin, resisting anthropomorphism) existing prior to the nameable form, hinting at the notion of “multiple singularities” that punctuate the notion of sexual difference, certainly resonating the notion of multiplicity. This move from parody or performativity to sexual difference as difference is extremely significant for feminist politics, a politics which grounds itself in the ever-lacking “present,” since mere mimesis or inverse performativity is certainly not enough to interrogate phallocentrism. Parody must be doubly removed in order to open up the debate of ethics, since there is a political imperative to adhere to the notion of “sexual difference” as opposed to both sexual opposition as well as a kind of performativity which either reverts back to the logic of the promiscuous fragment or a foundational notion of convention, a move which writes “politics” back to the notion of undecidability.

**Charles Barbour** (University of Western Sydney, c.barbour@uws.edu.au)

*The Bandit and the Ensign: Sovereignty and Secrecy in Agamben, Derrida, and Nancy*

This paper analyses Gerard David’s dyptic *The Judgment of Cambyses* and Shakespeare’s *Othello* as a way of exploring the relationship between sovereignty and secrecy in the early modern period, or at the dawn of modernity. I propose that the first provides a fairly clear illustration of what, following and augmenting Foucault, Agamben calls biopower and the sovereign ban. The second, however, represents an alternative to this model, or at least an aspect of modern social, political, and legal relations that Agamben’s work cannot quite capture or explain — specifically secrecy, and the manner in which social interaction is conditioned by a secrecy, and thus a faith or a trust, that eludes the logic of the sovereign ban. In order to provide this point (or conjecture) with some theoretical and philosophical heft, I conclude with a discussion of Derrida’s treatment of the oath, and compare it with Agamben’s recent consideration of the same topic in *The Sacrament of Language*.

**A. J. Bartlett** (University of Melbourne, ajbar@unimelb.edu.au)

*Education: The Four Discourses*

The question of education is central to philosophical inquiry, precisely because philosophy interrogates the status and conditions of knowledge and the terms and means of its transmission. This paper utilises Alain Badiou’s reconfiguration of the distinction between “truth” and “knowledge” to explicate the four discursive strands of education discourse — epistemology, pastoralism, politics, psychology — and juxtaposes to this knowledge a true conception articulated by recourse to Plato, Saint Paul, Marx and Lacan.

**Jai Bentley-Payne** (University of Auckland, jai.bentley-payne@auckland.ac.nz)

*The Subject of Decision*

With a world in perpetual crisis the situation calls for philosophy to think the problem of change. Moreover, it is important to look again at the so-called agent of change and consider the question of the subject. The politico-citizen subject, the transcendental, the ego and the interpellated subject can all be reduced to the individual against the world. Politics under these terms is presented through the banality of choice as a mere inventory of bodies. Through the work of Alain Badiou, I will argue conversely that radical politics be considered via the rubric of the event. The subject, says Badiou, is rare. However, this rareness does not preclude enumerable instances of possibility for subjectivation. The situation can always be exceeded, and therefore the conditions must be created for the possibility of genuine change. In this way, radical politics can be understood as a movement of subjectivation that cannot be reduced to the individual. A political ontology reveals a subject in process, an operation that is at once localised and universal. Of particular interest is the role of decision in subjectivation. At the boundary of a
possible-impossible apora, a political subject is wrought by decision, confronted in the absence of choice. Subjectivation is sequenced between the mediating idea and the undecidable border of a situation. Crafting a determinate affirmation for the undecidable is vital for the project of radical politics today.

Lauren Bliss (University of Melbourne, lauren.bliss@unimelb.edu.au)

*Pregnant Resistance: Masao Adachi’s A Gushing Prayer [Film Philosophy Panel]*

This paper examines the relatively unknown film *A Gushing Prayer* (1971), or prayer for ejaculation, by Japanese filmmaker and activist Masao Adachi. The film offers a cross-examination of the struggle against the American occupation of Japan in the mid-twentieth century to ask the question: how is it possible to escape the perceived totality of history and of capitalism? While Adachi’s philosophy of the cinema echoes the writings of the Situationist movement and their notion of détournement, *A Gushing Prayer* ultimately figures the cinema as that which produces “a repetition and a continuity” (Adachi 2003). In discussing the notion of the figural in relationship to the work of film theorist Nicole Brenez, who borrows Giorgio Agamben’s notion of the “coming community,” this paper will address the films figuration of both the pregnant body and the prostitute as a site of paradoxical resistance.

Geoff Boucher (Deakin University, geoff.boucher@deakin.edu.au)

*Futures of Marxism*

This paper proposes that Marxism, as a set of theoretical research programmes linked to emancipatory agendas arising from specifically capitalist forms of oppression, will remain a central part of twenty-first century radical thought. Of course, invocations of both the recent death of Marxism and the spectral persistence of Marx are an intellectual commonplace of the early twenty-first century. On the Right, Marx is supposed to be directly responsible for the atrocities of Stalin and Mao, so that the catastrophe of historical Communism demonstrates that Marxism has failed. On the Left, meanwhile, “Marx” as a signifier is a safe bet, defining radical intentions that can be linked to the most astonishing positions, while Marxism has become identified with political voluntarism. But Marx as an unsystematic genius betrayed by a series of ideologues is as flimsy as the idea of Lenin as a modernist Saint Paul. What, then, are the futures of Marx, and Marxism, outside of journalistic commentary, rhetorical posturing and intellectual dilettantism? This paper proposes that the collapse of historical Communism released intellectual energies around three major reconstructions of Marxism, and three continuations of regional agendas in Marxist research, whose full effects have not yet been felt. Here we see Marx/ism as something other than a current in social theory of only historical interest or an empty signifier in the culture wars. The normative dimension of Marxist theory, a political philosophy of post-capitalist society, new empirically-grounded descriptions of capitalist economics are among recent contributions, although the articulation between class and politics remains as difficult as before.

Sean Bowden (Deakin University, s.bowden@deakin.edu.au)

*Tragic Agency in Deleuze and Hegel*

The aim of this paper is to clarify the early Deleuze’s references to the tragedies of Oedipus and Hamlet in his thinking about agency and action. I will examine the points of convergence and divergence between these references and the way in which Hegel turns to tragedy in order to understand action and agency. I will show that, for both Deleuze and Hegel, tragedy brings into focus three aspects of action and agency: retrospectivity, theatricality and heroism. Retrospectivity means that we only understand what we are doing and intending after the fact. Theatreality refers to the way in which action takes place in public space, such that our understanding of what we do and intend is inseparable from how we appear to others. Finally, the heroic character of action and agency refers to an agent’s holding itself responsible, and being held responsible, for doings which outstrip what he or she intends and can know. The main point of divergence between Deleuze’s and Hegel’s tragic conceptions of agency will then be brought out with reference to way in which the difference between the agent’s perspective on her intentions-actions and the perspective of others on these intentions-actions (the difference constitutive of the heroic character of action and agency) is dealt with. In Hegel, this difference is understood to be overcome within a recognitive community structured by “forgiveness.” In Deleuze, by contrast, there is no necessary overcoming and reconciliation of perspectives.
Daniel Brennan (Bond University, dbrennan@bond.edu.au)

Heidegger on Husserl’s Concept of Truth

In this paper I investigate to what extent Martin Heidegger takes on Edmund Husserl’s concept of truth as presented in the Logical Investigations. Heidegger claims that Husserl presents the most important and rigorous theory of truth as correspondence in modernity. This theory provides the backdrop against which Heidegger develops his more primordial conception of truth as Being-uncovering (Entdeckensein) in Dasein’s disclosure (Erschlossenheit). In this paper, contrary to Ernst Tugendhat’s famous critique, I argue that Heidegger’s ontological considerations provide a deepening of — rather than radical disagreement with — Husserl’s theory of truth as evidence. The confusion in the literature regarding Heidegger’s...

Justin Clemens (University of Melbourne, jcalemens@unimelb.edu.au)

Vomit Apocalypse [Apocalypse Today Panel]

One of the most interesting features of the emergent philosophical genre of speculative realism is its apocalyptic rhetoric, which ranges from invocations of the total extinction of the universe to object-oriented interpretations of Lovecraftian horror. As Ray Brassier puts it in the conclusion to his Nihil Unbound: “the subject of philosophy must also recognize that he or she is already dead, and that philosophy is neither a medium of affirmation nor a source of justification, but rather the organon of extinction.” This magnificent statement is echoed, in a minor key, by thinkers such as Graham Harman and Quentin Meillassoux, who speak, for example, of “hyperchaos” and the irrevocable “weirdness” of the real. Another noteworthy hallmark of this genre is its constitutive anti-Kantianism, under such derogatory slogans as “correlationism.” This paper examines these two interlinked features of speculative realism — essentially, its apocalyptic anti-Kantianism — by returning to the untenable presuppositions with which speculative realism begins. These are, first and foremost, its scientism, its return to a single principle as the fundamental determination relative to the “world of sense,” and therefore under the conditions of possible experience. This runs counter to some prominent readings of Kant’s intentions in this section. I develop implications of Longuenesse’s reading for the Kant-Hegel relation, by subjecting the elements of transcendental logic underlying the principle to an Hegelian exposition. The result is revelation of what “God” could not mean for Hegel. I also recommend a positive interpretation of Hegel’s idea of God, by linking Hegel’s reflections on the concept of the “I,” in the Introduction to the Subjective Logic, with Kant’s conception of the “I think” in the B Deduction. This theme is clarified further by recalling Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness and recognition in “The Truth of Self-Certainty” from the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Byron Clugston (University of Sydney, byron.clugston@sydney.edu.au)

An Hegelian Dialectical Exposition of Kant’s Principle of Complete Determination

In this paper I discuss the “principle of complete determination” from “The Ideal of Pure Reason.” The employment of this principle is involved with the generation of, among other things, the idea of the ens realissimum (“most real being”), which has been referred to as the “philosophical kernel of the idea of God.” I engage with Beatrice Longuenesse’s exemplary account of the principle, and her claim that it is grounded in the idealist logical structures of infinite judgment, disjunctive judgment, and the synthetic unity of apperception. Longuenesse’s basic conclusion is that the ens realissimum should be understood as grounding determination relative to the “world of sense,” and therefore under the conditions of possible experience. This runs counter to some prominent readings of Kant’s intentions in this section. I develop implications of Longuenesse’s reading for the Kant-Hegel relation, by subjecting the elements of transcendental logic underlying the principle to an Hegelian exposition. The result is revelation of what “God” could not mean for Hegel. I also recommend a positive interpretation of Hegel’s idea of God, by linking Hegel’s reflections on the concept of the “I,” in the Introduction to the Subjective Logic, with Kant’s conception of the “I think” in the B Deduction. This theme is clarified further by recalling Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness and recognition in “The Truth of Self-Certainty” from the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Jordan Collins (University of Auckland, jordanelijahcollins@gmail.com)

Heidegger on Husserl’s Concept of Truth

In this paper I investigate to what extent Martin Heidegger takes on Edmund Husserl’s concept of truth as presented in the Logical Investigations. Heidegger claims that Husserl presents the most important and rigorous theory of truth as correspondence in modernity. This theory provides the backdrop against which Heidegger develops his more primordial conception of truth as Being-uncovering (Entdeckensein) in Dasein’s disclosure (Erschlossenheit). In this paper, contrary to Ernst Tugendhat’s famous critique, I argue that Heidegger’s ontological considerations provide a deepening of — rather than radical disagreement with — Husserl’s theory of truth as evidence. The confusion in the literature regarding Heidegger’s...

Jan Patocka’s Understanding of Sacrifice and Jiří Menzel’s Films

My paper will explore the notion of sacrifice in the films of Jiří Menzel, focusing on Closely Watched Trains and Larks on a String. It is my contention that Menzel’s films are an excellent counterpoint to exploring, and explaining the idea of sacrifice in the work of his compatriot philosopher, Jan Patocka. For Patocka, sacrifice is an essential feature of dissent, because the dissident recognises that a life not willing to sacrifice itself to what makes it meaningful is not living. It is in the dissident themes of Menzel’s films, produced under late socialist conditions, that the link can be made between the philosophy of Patocka on the one hand and the films of Menzel on the other.

The employment of this principle is involved with the generation of, among other things, the idea of the ens realissimum (“most real being”), which has been referred to as the “philosophical kernel of the idea of God.” I engage with Beatrice Longuenesse’s exemplary account of the principle, and her claim that it should be understood as grounding determination relative to the “world of sense,” and therefore under the conditions of possible experience. This runs counter to some prominent readings of Kant’s intentions in this section. I develop implications of Longuenesse’s reading for the Kant-Hegel relation, by subjecting the elements of transcendental logic underlying the principle to an Hegelian exposition. The result is revelation of what “God” could not mean for Hegel. I also recommend a positive interpretation of Hegel’s idea of God, by linking Hegel’s reflections on the concept of the “I,” in the Introduction to the Subjective Logic, with Kant’s conception of the “I think” in the B Deduction. This theme is clarified further by recalling Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness and recognition in “The Truth of Self-Certainty” from the Phenomenology of Spirit.

One of the most interesting features of the emergent philosophical genre of speculative realism is its apocalyptic rhetoric, which ranges from invocations of the total extinction of the universe to object-oriented interpretations of Lovecraftian horror. As Ray Brassier puts it in the conclusion to his Nihil Unbound: “the subject of philosophy must also recognize that he or she is already dead, and that philosophy is neither a medium of affirmation nor a source of justification, but rather the organon of extinction.” This magnificent statement is echoed, in a minor key, by thinkers such as Graham Harman and Quentin Meillassoux, who speak, for example, of “hyperchaos” and the irrevocable “weirdness” of the real. Another noteworthy hallmark of this genre is its constitutive anti-Kantianism, under such derogatory slogans as “correlationism.” This paper examines these two interlinked features of speculative realism — essentially, its apocalyptic anti-Kantianism — by returning to the untenable presuppositions with which speculative realism begins. These are, first and foremost, its scientism, its return to a single principle as the fundamental determination relative to the “world of sense,” and therefore under the conditions of possible experience. This runs counter to some prominent readings of Kant’s intentions in this section. I develop implications of Longuenesse’s reading for the Kant-Hegel relation, by subjecting the elements of transcendental logic underlying the principle to an Hegelian exposition. The result is revelation of what “God” could not mean for Hegel. I also recommend a positive interpretation of Hegel’s idea of God, by linking Hegel’s reflections on the concept of the “I,” in the Introduction to the Subjective Logic, with Kant’s conception of the “I think” in the B Deduction. This theme is clarified further by recalling Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness and recognition in “The Truth of Self-Certainty” from the Phenomenology of Spirit.
As an important institution in the production of truth this takes us to the role of the university and the maintained through a politics of description in which claims to truth seek to invalidate altern critical and yet still continue with the everyday routines that feed neoliberalism. Secondly, idiotism is Heidegger to show how idiotism exaggerates o condition as much as it is an epistemological one. The paper therefore uses the writings of Martin

The dominance of neoliberalism requires us to think about how this primarily economic ideology has come to flood the entire social field creating a pervasive (and all-consuming) culture that privileges the private, the individual and the market. In this paper, this condition is referred to as idiotism, taken from the Greek word idios, meaning private. With regards to the politics of knowledge the argument pursues two specific and related trajectories. The first argues that idiotism should not be thought of as a condition born of stupidity, nor is our condition a case of false consciousness. Idiotism is an ontological condition as much as it is an epistemological one. The paper therefore uses the writings of Martin Heidegger to show how idiotism exaggerates our absorption in the world, explaining why we might be critical and yet still continue with the everyday routines that feed neoliberalism. Secondly, idiotism is maintained through a politics of description in which claims to truth seek to invalidate alternative views. As an important institution in the production of truth this takes us to the role of the university and the

Jane Connell (University of Melbourne, jane.connell@alumni.unimelb.edu.au)

The Second Journey of Hegel’s Master and Slave: Morphing Down the Twentieth Century

The renown of Hegel’s master-slave dyad, intensified in the wake of Kojève’s reading, is not matched by curiosity about the way the trope per se functions within subsequent thought. Rarely subject to rigorous critique, it is frequently deployed as a tool for critique. If, a propos of Hegel’s master-slave narrative, we eschew enlightenment notions of scientific thinking and take it, with Derrida and Bataille, as myth or legend, then Hegel’s choice of such limited, belligerent, paranoid characters is significant, as are the resonances of the particular imaginary — à la Sartre rather than the more restricted Lacanian sense — that informs the story. As this maladroit couple wends its way down the last century, it makes a second journey independent of that of the subject of Phenomenology of Spirit. In this paper, which forms part of project to examine the imaginaries of critical theory, something of the path of this trope is traced. The refuguring of the master-slave dyad in influential, popular and even popularised texts of the twentieth century, including those of Sartre and de Beauvoir, is read to illustrate the resistances and contortions used to avoid destabilisation of this trope as the necessity to include the woman as a subject increases. The direct interpolation of the woman’s subjectivity, a propos the master-slave dyad, into the Lacanian schema via one of its central tenets, the mirror stage is read to expose the malignity of an unchallenged misogyny and homophobia.

Ian Cook (Murdoch University, i.cook@murdoch.edu.au)

Voyaging In Smooth Space: The Politics of Nomads in the Age of the Corporation

Using Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of nomadism requires understanding their philosophy of space and movement. Much contemporary work misunderstands Deleuze and Guattari’s work on space-time. This is dangerous, in that it fails to account for the ways the corporation (capitalism) uses and creates smooth space, which is the domain of the nomad. We do not intend that the notion of nomadism be abandoned, however, but that it be understood differently. The paper is in three parts. First, we outline Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophical notions of nomadism, States and war machines and the associated concepts of smooth and striated space. Then we discuss appropriations of nomadism to illustrate the romanticisation of nomads as contemporary figures of disruption and resistance. Third, we argue that this appropriation both misunderstands space in Deleuze and Guattari and serves no critical function when the rigid lines of the State have been overlaid by the “transmutable or transformable coded configurations” of the late-modern corporation (Deleuze 1995: 101). While much of the paper is a critical account of the misappropriation of nomadism, we explore both the ways that nomadism presents new machines and logics of capture and escape. Engaging with questions of utility reveals possibilities with respect to lines of flight and probe-heads, while acknowledging the risk of potential psychosis, prestigious death and/or reterritorialisation on reterritorialisation.

Neal Curtis (University of Auckland; n.curtis@auckland.ac.nz)

Idiotism and the Politics of Knowledge

The Second Journey of Hegel’s Master and Slave: Morphing Down the Twentieth Century

The dominance of neoliberalism requires us to think about how this primarily economic ideology has come to flood the entire social field creating a pervasive (and all-consuming) culture that privileges the private, the individual and the market. In this paper, this condition is referred to as idiotism, taken from the Greek word idios, meaning private. With regards to the politics of knowledge the argument pursues two specific and related trajectories. The first argues that idiotism should not be thought of as a condition born of stupidity, nor is our condition a case of false consciousness. Idiotism is an ontological condition as much as it is an epistemological one. The paper therefore uses the writings of Martin Heidegger to show how idiotism exaggerates our absorption in the world, explaining why we might be critical and yet still continue with the everyday routines that feed neoliberalism. Secondly, idiotism is maintained through a politics of description in which claims to truth seek to invalidate alternative views. As an important institution in the production of truth this takes us to the role of the university and the
ways in which idiosyncrasy seeks to enslave academics and scholars to the truths of market fundamentalism via customer service, impact statements, and internal competition. All of this is regulated and managed by the discourse of “realism” that claims market principles to be the only solution.

Brehgam Dalgliesh (University of Tokyo, dalgliesh@global.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp)

*Foucault’s Critical History of Thought*

This paper argues that, in heeding Kant’s call for a philosophical archeology of reason that is framed against Nietzsche’s ontological priority of power, it is possible to speak of a Foucauldian *eauv* called critical history. Based on this method, Foucault excavates the domains of thought through which we experience ourselves and which limit who we are. It implies the task of critique is to make the will to know that drives thought conscious of itself as a problem, with a focus on the apparatuses of power/knowledge via which we are constituted as subjects but within which domination is always possible. By revealing these apparatuses to be contingent rather than necessary, it is argued that Foucault’s Kantian derived and Nietzschean inspired critical history of thought fosters a transformative critique on behalf of the autonomy of the subject. Finally, it is shown that those critics who dismiss Foucault’s work insofar as it lacks coherence and suffers from internal contradictions are mistaken precisely because they fail to acknowledge the possibility of alternative forms of critique, especially that of critical history, as well as of a conception of the subject as a construction of the power/technoscience relations that define our ontological condition.

Hugh Davies (LaTrobe University/Monash University, hdavies@latrobe.edu.au)

*Monetising the Apocalypse* [*Apocalyptic Today Panel*]

According to an apocryphal tale from the 2011 Occupy Wall Street protests, executives peering down on from their offices high in Goldman Sachs were said to have speculated: How can we make money from this? True or otherwise, this story speaks of the unwavering determination to snatch opportunity from the teeth of adversity that has so defined contemporary capitalism. From the Left, the end of capitalism is repeatedly predicted, yet its invincibility is such that it has managed to survive even its own demise in the form of the Global Financial Crisis. Indeed, this crisis appears to have rendered it stronger. The same might be said of the series of disasters that have set an apocalyptic tone over the last decade have brought about institutionalisation of a new and lucrative investment sector, that of disaster capitalism. Across Iraq and Afghanistan, from post-tsunami Sri Lanka to post-Katrina New Orleans, disaster capitalism generates profits by feeding off other peoples’ misery, generated through wars, terror attacks, poverty, trade sanctions, market crashes and all kinds of economic, environmental, and political disasters. Within this catastrophic configuration, it seems evident that the capitalism dynamic won’t simply survive an apocalypse, it will profit from it. Considering writings from Slavoj Zizek’s *Living in the End Times* and Naomi Klein’s *The Shock Doctrine* this paper explores disaster capitalism’s ability to survive the End of Days.

Jean-Philippe Deranty (Macquarie University, jp.deranty@mq.edu.au)

*Rancière’s Paradoxical Materialism* [*Rancière Panel*]

Rancière’s interpretation of aesthetic modernity relies upon an extension of the egalitarian axiom into the realms of expression and representation. This extension is made possible by the fact that the political axiom of radical equality, by suspending the links between political voice and social place, in fact unsettles the very ontology of the social order, and impacts in turn on the expressive practices that are rooted in it. Radical equality does not just undermine hierarchical principles that serve to rank social bodies, discursive genres and objects of representation alike, but also the very logic of necessary, or natural, assignation. The disruptive work of equality applies to the very separations between orders of reality, for instance between different expressive media, or indeed between the ideal and the material. This work of ontological disruption, however, ends up as little in political indecision as it does in an aesthetic of indefinite suspension. In fact, it grounds a paradoxical materialist perspective, one that looks at political action and artistic practice in terms of limited and fallible operations to restructure a field of experience, introduce a temporary grammar between words and things, some local form of sense. I study three examples of this practical, paradoxical materialism in Rancière’s writings: in the case of work; the reading of Rimbaud’s poetry, and the interpretation of Lang’s cinema.
Max Deutscher (Macquarie University/University of Queensland, maxwell.deutscher@mq.edu.au)

*Judgment: From Deeming to Sentencing*

Judgment should not be arbitrary and yet it is a work of arbitration. I consider whether all judgments are sentences, and whether all sentences are judgments. If one is to judge, one must be prepared to deem something to deserve a certain epithet — or that a concept may rightly be stretched to fit a case. The paper traverses domestic, political and legal judgments. Attention is paid to the Australian High Court’s “Mabo” case concerning native title. My thesis is that judgment, while subject to constraints of objectivity, essentially involves “being pleased at” some aspect of how things are, or should be.

Andrew Donnelly (University of Sydney, adon1462@uni.sydney.edu.au)

*Conscience as Ideal Moral Self-Conception*

There are two main ways of thinking about the conscience in ethics. The first way of thinking about conscience holds that the conscience just is the capacity to make moral judgments. This is the account defended by Moore and Butler, for example. The second way of thinking about conscience connects the conscience with authenticity to self or identity. This approach is exemplified in the accounts of Heidegger and Arendt. In this paper I articulate an account that mediates between these two ways of thinking about conscience. I name this account “ideal moral self-conception.” On this account a judgment of conscience is a judgment about whether some past or proposed action is consistent with an agent’s conception of the ideal moral self: that judgment as to the sort of person you judge that you morally ought to be. I offer two reasons as to why my account should be preferred to the other two: First, it best explains our common intuitions about conscience. Second, it gives the best justification for rights of conscientious objection.

Simone Drichel (University of Otago, simone.drichel@otago.ac.nz)

*Narcissus on the Postcolonial Couch: A Levinasian Analysis*

In an early essay, Levinas explicitly aligns Western philosophy’s preoccupation with autonomy — as that which “aims to ensure the freedom, or the identity, of beings” — with the solipsistic self-absorption of Narcissus. And yet, no sooner has Narcissus made his entrance than he disappears again: unlike fellow Grecian Odysseus, for example, who remains a permanent fixture in the Levinasian universe, Narcissus is instantly returned to oblivion. This paper begins from the premise that, Narcissus’s fleeting appearance notwithstanding, the Levinasian oeuvre may productively be read as an attempt to break free from the entrapment in self-absorption that is Narcissus’s pathological legacy. Understanding “the Western idea of freedom [as] a defense against narcissistic humiliation” (Alford 121), I propose that the liberation from such pathological narcissism in turn gives rise to a new understanding of freedom: a freedom that is not, as in the case of Narcissus, mortiferous, but rather generative of ethical life. Translating Levinas’s ethical treatment of pathological narcissism into a postcolonial context—the very context in which Narcissus’s “imperialism of the same” is arguably most overt and destructive—the paper frames the colonial encounter as an encounter between Narcissus and Echo. It suggests that the life-affirming dimension of what Gayatri Spivak calls their “deconstructive embrace” only becomes possible once Narcissus’s psychic wound is addressed via Levinasian analysis.

Grant Duncan (Massey University, L.G.Duncan@massey.ac.nz)

*“Be a good subject!” How Are the Sovereign and the Subject Mutually Constitutive?*

I begin with a hypothesis about subjectivity: that “to be is to be ruled.” As this implies that the subject would be the mere product of relations of power, the opening hypothesis is soon scuttled; but it serves to provoke reflection about subjectivities in and of the polis, or believable “identities” — and about that exceptional kind of subjectivity called “sovereign.” The aim is to consider the subject and the sovereign as mutually constitutive. For the subject to adopt the place of citizen with a recognisable “identity” — or to be denied it — a sovereign power is at work. But the sovereign requires a “people” — a collective of recognizable subjects — in order to instantiate its rule. And, if we can decentre the subject, we may decentre the sovereign too. Sovereignty and subjectivity depend upon one another, as one answers to the desire of the other. A psychoanalytical theory of transference can help here. The subject’s “Che vuoi?” (What do you want?) is distantly echoed in the Sovereign’s “Chi sei?” (Who are you?), forming a
powerful relation of identification. Being sovereign (ruling) and being a person (living) are mutually authorising and defining sets of actions. They are mutually constitutive ontologically (as we turn a blind eye to what’s missing), thus forming a politico-legal constitution.

Joanne Faulkner (University of New South Wales, j.faulkner@unsw.edu.au)
*Imaginary Childhoods and Fabricated Memories: The Politics of Identification in Wilkomirski’s Fragments*

In 1995, the publication of Binjamin Wilkomirski’s memoir, *Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood*, represented a first for holocaust literature. An autobiographical account of a young child’s internment and torture in concentration camps, the author’s survival was thought to be incredible, and the clarity of his depictions of fragmentary childhood memory impressive. Before long the best-selling book was uncovered as a fraud: Wilkomirski’s name was actually Bruno Grosjean, he had grown up in Switzerland, and was not even Jewish. The Jewish intellectual community’s response to this deception was divided: while many felt betrayed — that Jewish suffering had been hijacked and trivialized — others held that the account was still of literary value, and revealed something of the holocaust experience, despite its inaccuracies and fraudulent origin. This paper will use *Fragments* as a starting point for reflection on the seductiveness of representations of wounded childhood in literature, and the work that such representations perform in managing ambivalence about one’s own social privilege. Not only in accounts of the holocaust, but also for representations of the removal of Aboriginal children, identification with the child — as protagonist, observer, and victim — serves an important, yet ethically precarious role in negotiating our responsibilities to past injustice.

Fraisopi Fausto (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany; faustofraisopi@gmail.com)
*The Quasi-Ontology of “An Sich”: Bernard Bolzano’s Theory of Science between Leibnizian Ars Combinatoria and the Husserlian Idea of Mathesis Universals*

Starting from the critical position that Husserl assumes against Bolzano and his idea of *mathesis universals*, this paper focuses and emphasizes Bolzano’s project for a *mathesis* and the differences between this project and Leibniz’s. Putting into an historical perspective these three forms of *mathesis*, by Leibniz, Bolzano, and Husserl, we/I open in so doing a theoretical perspective concerning the non-ontological dimension of idealities they form and articulate *mathesis* as such. The an-ontological Combinatorics of propositions and of ideas in themselves, suggests, Bolzano maintains, the possibility of a treatment of combinatorics independently from these ontological and metaphysical presuppositions that formed and structured the Leibnitian *ars combinatoria*. In this sense, the philosophical position of a “semantic Platonism,” assumed by Bolzano, opens the perspective of a non-metaphysical but modular *mathesis* that we can articulate and widen beyond an ontological commitment.

Ian Fookes (University of Auckland/Université de Paris 8; ifoo001@aucklanduni.ac.nz)
*Víctor Segalen’s Exoticism in the Context of Phenomenology*

At the outset of the twentieth century, Víctor Segalen (1878-1919), a French naval doctor, novelist, archaeologist and poet reinvented the nineteenth century notion of exoticism. Returning to a “[d]efinition from the prefix Exo in its broadest possible generalization,” he rejected cliché notions of the exotic as essentially tropical and geographically distant from Europe. Exoticism “is not that kaleidoscope of the tourist and the mediocre spectator, but the lively and curious reaction to the shock of a strong individuality against an objectivity, of which it perceives and tastes the distance.” From this starting point, he developed his ideas into an “aesthetics of diversity” [*une esthétique du divers*], which has been alternatively read as paradoxical and dogged by its own relativism, or as a coherent theory of Being prefiguring that of Martin Heidegger. The paper introduces Segalen’s exoticism in terms of its philosophical influences (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Jules de Gaultier) and then discusses the above interpretations of his work in relation to the following question: Does reading Segalen’s exoticism in the context of an emergent phenomenology help us to reconcile competing interpretations of his poetics.

Veronique Foti (Pennsylvania State University, vmf3@psu.edu)
*Paintery and Phenomenological Interpretation in Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind”*

Abstract not available at time of printing.
**Richard Ganis** (Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan; richard.ganis@lums.edu.pk)  
*Eros and Its Discontents: On the Taming (and Un-taming) of Love in Habermas, Derrida, and Honneth*

In the tradition of Kant, the attitude of loving benevolence is kept at express conceptual and structural remove from the public use of reason and its cognate principles of tolerative reciprocity, such that the particularism of the former is barred from “infecting” the impartial universalism of the latter. Notwithstanding, neo-Kantian discourse ethicists such as Jürgen Habermas have made various attempts to nudge the asymmetrical orientation of affective concern for the welfare of the other within the normative orbit of universal justice. Their aim is to guard against the prospect of “banalization,” which we invite when we anchor moral discourse in an appeal to “dialogical reasonableness” alone. While sympathetic to this objective, the recognition theory of Axel Honneth breaks with Habermas and his collaborators: it seeds the orientation of caring recognition into the conceptual and genetic core of all intelligent problem-solving languages and their associated spheres of life. Here Honneth blurs the boundary between detached cognition and love for the irreducibly singular other, evincing a surprising affinity with the deconstructive care ethics of Jacques Derrida, which likewise invites the possibility of an all-pervasive phenomenology of recognitional experience. This paper offers a qualified defense of the epistemological convictions of Habermas’s discourse model, which draws the line between love and morality rather more sharply than Honneth and Derrida have done.

**Paul Giladi** (University of Sheffield, p.giladi@shef.ac.uk)  
*Moving from Transcendental Logic to Dialectical Logic*

Up until the 1980s, the general consensus in both Kant and Hegel scholarship was to emphasise the fundamental differences between the two philosophers. The differences were emphasised so much so that many were inclined to view Kant and Hegel as polar opposites. However, since that time, some philosophers began to read Kant and Hegel as sharing a lot in common. Though, the way in which the positive relationship between these two philosophers can be cashed out appears to be ambiguous: one way of viewing Hegel’s debt to Kant is made famous by Pippin (1989). This school of thought interprets Hegel as working entirely within Kant’s transcendental constraints. Hegel, according to Pippin et al., should be understood as offering his own idiosyncratic version of transcendental idealism, for he is only interested in uncovering the necessary a priori structures for possible experience and is not committed to any kind of metaphysical enquiry. The second way of viewing Hegel’s debt to Kant, unlike the Pippinian reading, aims to interpret Hegel as developing Kant’s transcendental insights into domains that Kant either restricted himself from entering or those domains that Kant did not address. This school of thought finds notable support in the work of Bristow (2007). Those who share Bristow’s broad view maintain that Hegel was supportive of Kant despite rejecting transcendental idealism. However, what is crucial here is that Hegel’s rejection of transcendental idealism does not obviously rule out the possibility of Hegel being bound to transcendental philosophy itself. My aim in this paper, therefore, is to suggest a way of regarding Hegel as a transcendental philosopher, one that stresses its Kantian influence without reducing it to Kantianism.

**Hal Ginges** (University of Western Sydney, gingeses@bigpond.net.au)  
*Rudolf Steiner and the Limits to Knowledge*

Rudolf Steiner is well known as the founder of Waldorf education and biodynamic agriculture, but not as a philosopher. In his early career, however, Steiner was a neo-Kantian who sought to demonstrate that we have access to knowledge of essences. Steiner extrapolated from Goethe’s *Urphomenen* to claim that we do possess an *intellectus archetypus* and Fichte’s intellectual intuition to argue for what he called “intuitive thinking.” This paper outlines Steiner’s arguments as a series of disjunctions from the epistemological propositions of the critical philosophy.

**Dominic Griffiths** (University of Auckland, dgr051@aucklanduni.ac.nz)  
*Early and Later Heidegger and the Question Concerning Authenticity*

There is a seemingly intractable difficulty in the core of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, which concerns the question of authenticity. Heidegger’s early work, particularly *Being and Time*, develops a fairly robust concept of authenticity that is centred round the individual’s experience of anxiety and
knowledge of his or her death. For the most part each of us lives in the mode of inauthenticity, absorbed in everyday living, oblivious or sometimes even deliberately fleeing in the face of our individual finitudes. Yet, through moments of illumination and bewilderment, “moments of vision,” the existential condition of human being is crystallized and an individual becomes authentic, attuned to the finite nature of his or her own individual existence. This experience is characterised initially by anxiety, but, for Heidegger, this emotion can give way to resoluteness, essentially a genuine appropriation of fate and the limited nature of existence. In Heidegger’s later work he abandons the language of Being and Time. No longer is the individual either held out to the nothing in “moments of vision” or levelled down to the general conformity that everyday existence demands. Instead our existence is mythologized and drawn into a richer relationship with other elements that surround and sustain us. Our mortality, instead of representing the void of beinglessness, becomes the way each person is enmeshed into a broader community that extends before and after his or her individual life has ended. Essentially mortality is a gift that binds the individual to a community of fellow dwellers. My question is whether we can, in some ways, appropriate the language of authenticity in the early Heidegger and find continuity with it in the later. For many interpreters of Heidegger this not possible, yet as a whole Heidegger’s philosophy, whether explicitly or implicitly, is always concerned with the meaning of an authentic life, and what the most genuine response is to the living of it. The aim of the paper will be to explore this question more fully.

Mike Grimshaw (University of Canterbury, michael.grimshaw@canterbury.ac.nz)
Vattimo: The Political Flaneur of Weak Thought

This paper rethinks the future of continental philosophy of religion through a central, annotative reading of Gianni Vattimo’s Not Being God (2010). The reading undertaken develops from Agamben on citation (2005) and Zizek on the short-circuit (2003) into a new reading strategy of annotation that is viewed as a development of weak thought. It argues for what is termed the flanerie of the weak thought of annotation, rethinking the future of continental philosophy of religion as para-thought. The future envisioned is a future that flaneurs, annotates and is para- to both the religious and laicity and their associated strong claims and metaphysics. For Vattimo weak thought helps us see that if we read Nietzsche as an announcement and not a claim, hermeneutics teaches us we cannot conceive ultimate objective truths. Therefore, after Heidegger, we reach the end of metaphysics and the age of weak thought, where we respond only to appeals and announcements. The paper that follows is developed from one delivered at Postmodernism, Culture and Religion: “The Future of Continental Philosophy of Religion,” Syracuse University April 7-9, 2011. Before I address the issue of “continental drift,” I engage with Vattimo’s The Responsibility of the Philosopher (2000) and his A Farewell to Truth (2011). It concludes, following the central section of “continental drift,” with a response to hermeneutic communism as Vattimo (with Zabala) himself flaneurs, against the crowds of neo-liberalism.

Simone Gustafsson (University of Melbourne, simoneleegustafsson@gmail.com)
The Ambiguity of Indistinction: Animal Being in Agamben and Merleau-Ponty

Giorgio Agamben’s concept of homo sacer or bare life is grounded in part by the distinction between bios, politically qualified life, and ζωή, the Greek term that “expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings” (Homo Sacer 1). This distinction as it functions in Agamben’s texts, however, remains ambiguous. The concept of ζωή itself, and that of the “natural” remains largely undetermined in Agamben’s analyses. At times the notion of ζωή appears proximate to a vitalist conception of an elemental essence, substance or spirit common to all living beings that grounds the very possibility of political existence. It is posited as a formless life or living matter from which something like the way of life or bios can emerge, in the sense that it functions as the presupposition for the latter. On the other hand, in order for ζωή to be at stake in modern biopolitics, it must in a sense already be given to bios; “natural” life as formulated in Agamben’s homo sacer must always already contain the possibility for politicization. It must already be exposed. This paper seeks to explore this conceptual ambiguity and the ramifications of this indistinction for an account of animal being or animality in Agamben’s work. It will argue that animal being is “doubly” excluded; animality cannot be subject to the “bari” and is in fact barred from the political. It will conclude with a discussion of animal being as conceptualized in the work of Merleau-Ponty, whose texts offer a more productive and open account of animal life.
Ben Hjorth (Monash University, ben.hjorth@gmail.com)
“Spirit When Acting Appears . . .”: Tracing the Performative in the Phenomenology of Spirit

This paper seeks to address what Judith Butler and Catherine Malabou have termed “the problem of the body” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, by attending to the echoes and implications of performance in the text. It first identifies the ambiguous, split status of both body and self in early Hegelian ontology and methodology. Many of Hegel’s embodied “models,” or shapes of Spirit, are characters drawn from theatre; most notably the much-debated, mourned and maligned body of Antigone. As such the paper argues that theatrical character, modelling a synthesis or sublation of form and content which proves crucial to the narrative of developing Spirit, holds a key to the Hegelian conception of body and self. In this framework, the dialectic (dialogue) of Lordship and Bondage is to be seen as precisely a staging of the emergence of character itself, and thus implicates a specifically performing body at this moment of Spirit’s self-consciousness. This leads, finally, to an outline of a conception of the performing body as one defined by fluid and paradoxical relationships between its own body and self/selves, and the bodies and selves of Others. This conception is situated in fruitful relation with recent readings of the Hegelian subject as “ecstatic” (Butler) and “plastic” (Malabou). Paradoxically, this paper suggests, performative models of the subject may indeed point to ways out, even a “letting-go” [Aufgeben], of the problem(s) of the body in Hegel.

Joanna Hodge (Manchester Metropolitan University, j.hodge@mmu.ac.uk)
From Experience to Excription; J.L. Nancy and the Experience of Freedom

The motto: “liberty, equality, fraternity” seems to us somewhat ridiculous and difficult to introduce into philosophical discourse, because in France it remains official (a lie of the State) and because it is said to summarise an obsolete Rousseauism. The Experience of Freedom is a text published by Jean-Luc Nancy in 1988. It consists in thirteen sections, with an additional section fourteen, under the non-thematic title, “Fragments,” in which Nancy addresses various questions posed to its author, presumably in the course of its examination for the Doctorat d’Etat. Between section thirteen and section fourteen there is a marked shift of register, an exploration of which will be begun in this contribution. The shift is from the neutral all-seeing “we” of authoritative discourse, to the immediate authorial “I,” which seeks to respond to questions posed, presumably by the examiners. The differences between authorial “I,” the all-seeing “we” and the “being in common” of the liberty in dispute are the distinct registers which impose the fragment form of the fourteenth section. This contribution will begin to open out the implications of these shifts of register, in order the better to locate the implications for the task of philosophy of these transitions. In the concluding paragraph the activity of transcription is invoked and this contribution will offer an account of the emergence by contrast of the notion of excription.

Kevin Houser (Indiana University, klhouser@indiana.edu)
Suffering + Separation = Solidarity: How Levinasian Alterity Becomes Ethical Proximity

Present Levinas scholarship says much about what the face does; unfortunately, it says almost nothing about how the face does it. Likewise, there is no shortage of talk about alterity as ethically central; but there is almost nothing on how alterity “becomes [ethical] proximity.” I offer a concrete way to answer this “how” question and close this explanatory gap, without recourse to traditional Levinasian catechisms. Taking cues from Kant’s 2nd Critique explanation of how the law elicits respect, I offer a two-part “normative mechanism,” the first part of which consists of Cavell and Levinas’ claims about the normative structure of suffering: that it strikes the sufferer as an unrelentingly individual imperative (“YOU handle/undergo this!”) — an imperative issued to/imposed upon the sufferer alone. The second “part” of the mechanism is Kant’s claim about the requirement for something to count as a justified imperative: namely, that it ought be, in some degree inter-subjective/impartial. This sets up a structural conflict which strikes deeper than the level of particular rules/reasons: the criterion for something to count as a legitimate reason is necessarily violated by the isolating — even individuating — perfectly partial imperative of suffering. This renders, from separation in suffering, a strangely tragic solidarity — a shared a priori sense of suffering as not merely as an event but an offense — and explains how the face can constitute both plea and command.
Christopher Howard and Wendelin Küpers (Massey University, W.Kupers@massey.ac.nz)
Travelling as Embodied and Inter-Placed “Be(com)ing”

Based on approaches and insights from phenomenology and hermeneutics, this paper aims to contribute to a processual understanding of travelling as inter-relational event of be(com)ing. Specifically, adopting an advanced phenomenological perspective, following Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1995, 2003), travelling is argued to be an embodied and situated nexus of inter-related active and passive as well as individual and collective dimensions situated in spaces and times of in-betweens. When travel practices are approached as relational processes, rather than stable entities, psychic and agentic processes of traveller and affected stakeholder are seen to exist and are in turn limited and shaped through their inter-dependencies to socio-cultural and system dimensions and vice versa. Despite being in liminal, anti-structural positions “out there,” traveller’s experiences and happenings do not unfold in isolation from broader narrative identities and their impact on shaping of reality.

Mark Howard (Monash University, mahowl@student.monash.edu)
Social Movements as Aesthetic Interventions

Violence typified the Italian social movements of the 60s and 70s, ending in the brutality of the “years of lead.” This movement sector has particular significance in the sociological discipline of social movement theory (SMT), raising questions of how high risk activism was justified and defended by its agents. This paper considers the adequacy of the conceptual vocabulary of SMT, arguing its particular use of concepts from aesthetic theory to address lacunae in structuralist and identitarian models of radicalisation diminishes the account of social movements. Specifically, the instrumentalist understanding and use of aesthetic vocabulary in SMT obscures important dynamics of group emergence in radical politics. In response to this deficiency, I discuss work by Jacques Rancière that puts forward a way of understanding the formation of radical communities through the process of subjectivisation — the challenging of dominant frames and their classification and identification of subjects. Rancière questions the presupposition that social movements are the expression of a social group. Alternatively, social movements are a movement of subjects, of people trying to find or apprehend an identity as fighters through the very dismissal of their sociological identity. I will discuss how this concept reinflates the role of aesthetics in emancipatory politics, grounded in the idea of “aesthetic intervention.”

Apple Igrek (Oklahoma State University, zefelius.igrek@okstate.edu)
Deconstruction’s Myth of Resistance

Mutually reinforcing tendencies within cultural theory and deconstruction point to an all-pervasive problem in post-modern society, a problem that is diagnosed with varying theoretical terminology: acceleration, totalization, discipline, hegemony, the simulacrum, emotional synchronization, instrumental rationality, and suchlike. The responses to this problem are diverse, but often appeal to something in common. From primary texts to secondary literature, from Derrida and Baudrillard to J. Hillis Miller and Leonard Lawlor, there is a critical attempt to rethink infinite singularity in hopes of combatting the politics and phenomenology of presence. In each case an appeal is made to something irreducible to finite parameters (whether subjective, linguistic, pragmatic, or otherwise). In bringing us closer to infinite otherness, this strategy paradoxically sets up a new dichotomy between the inside and the outside; it is argued that we ought to be hospitable to the future, to what is incalculable and foreign, and that in any case it is impossible, by definition, to exclude what is limitless. That is to say, we ought to affirm precisely that which cannot be denied or rejected. This influential logic only works insofar as we presume a distinction between those who turn away from excess phenomena, i.e., those who are blinded by globalized consumerism and social media, and others who have learned to deconstruct their own bio-political subject positions. In this paper, I will argue that we need to give up such distinctions and that doing so will highlight new discourses and new possibilities.

Andrew Inkpin (University of Melbourne, ainkpin@unimelb.edu.au)
How Can a Hammer Be “In-Itself”?

In several passages in Being and Time Heidegger describes readiness-to-hand as the in-itselfness (Ansichsein) of environing entities. Thus a distinction usually attributed to natural entities is provocatively
reassigned to tools (such as hammers) and instrumental relations, despite a simultaneous recognition that the purposive nexus of significance, which the latter exploit, is shaped by human agents’ generation of ends. Beyond this, Heidegger’s claims that presentness-at-hand is “founded” in readiness-to-hand and that access to nature is mediated by instrumental relations appear to suggest that nature depends ontologically on the existence of Dasein — as indeed does the very notion of “in-itselfness” (SZ 212). Having first identified some of the issues raised by these claims, this paper attempts to make sense of Heidegger’s thought that in-itselfness attaches to the ready-to-hand. Guided by the discussion of the “reality problem” in §43, it is argued that a correct understanding of the scope and the aim of Heidegger’s foundational claim on behalf of readiness-to-hand allows this to be done while avoiding implausible anthropocentric constraints on an ontological conception of nature. Overall the aim will be to show how a hammer can be “in-itself” without forcing us to be unrealistic about trees.

**Anita Jaboor** (Deakin University, ajabo@deakin.edu.au)

*Deleuze and Literature: The Representation of Rhizomatic Space*

This paper will examine the assemblage of spatial metaphors in literary texts through a Deleuzian perspective. In this paper, I will be exploring how the rhizome concept is manifested in Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (1899) and Cormac McCarthy’s *Blood Meridian* (1985). These texts are purveyors of philosophical complexity, which make possible paradigm shifts that expose the unstable nature of Western thought. The pseudo-geographical metaphors of smooth, striated and rhizomatic space, conceptualised by Deleuze and Guattari, will provide a theoretical framework for surveying the treatment of space in Conrad's and McCarthy's novels. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari develop the rhizome concept that, as a model for theory and culture, allows the production of perceptions and reterritorialisation in the creation of new theoretical maps. In challenging tap-root systems of thinking, Deleuze and Guattari propose that within a rhizome thought, culture and desire are in a constant state of becoming, which essentially implies that they are always able to grow, develop and multiply. Through the characters’ infernal journeys into the Congo and the Western frontier, the novels literally move away from civilization, thus enabling a deterritorialization of one territory to recreate another. In essence, the treatment of space within the texts can be read as a metaphor, which enables a paradigm shift that reveals the fundamental meaninglessness and chaos underlying civilization.

**Mark Jackson** (Auckland University of Technology; mark.jackson@aut.ac.nz)

*Security, Preservation, Enhancement*

In an interview, “The Return of Morality,” Michel Foucault candidly suggests the extraordinary influence of Nietzsche and Heidegger on his thinking. Moreover, it is precisely reading them together that was genuinely at stake for him: “Nietzsche and Heidegger: that was a philosophical shock!” It is curious, despite this most overt statement on a fundamental orientation to thinking that so few commentators on Foucault have engaged explicitly with this genealogy. Given Foucault’s (again) stated reluctance to cite Heidegger at all and reference Nietzsche seldom, we need to conceive of a genealogical exploration implicitly rather than through overt reference. This paper aims at approaching Foucault’s 1978-79 Collège de France lecture course, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, in relation to a close reading of Heidegger’s 1943 lecture, “The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead.” In this lecture, Heidegger engages the question of life in Nietzsche’s discussion of will to power, as well as broaching a fundamental understanding of the essence of “subjectness” in secularity, in the sense of insuring oneself (Sicherheit, Versicherung). Our aim it to engage in a correlative reading of the Foucault text in terms of the emergence, for Foucault, of biopower, and the coincident emergence of “apparatuses of security.”

**Helen Johnson** (Monash University, helen.johnson@monash.edu)

*Ungrounded Subjecthood, Covert Objecthood: On Form and Commodity [Apocalypse Today Panel]*

Since “The Dematerialization of the Art Object” was first printed in *Art International* in 1968, dematerialization has developed along some perhaps unexpected trajectories. The shift towards temporality that once offered art an escape route from economic materiality now offers an increase in circulation, in the service of the post-Fordist commodity market. This shift will be examined in reference to the recent push towards a postanthropocentric conception of the art object, posited in opposition to art as a space for critique, and attendantly to aesthetic experience. Post-anthropocentrism
in art will be considered as a force in opposition to the formation of the sensus communis in its relation to aesthetic experience, as formulated by Immanuel Kant. Rereading John Chandler and Lucy Lippard’s “The Dematerialization of the Art Object” through the lens of semicapitalism, this paper draws on Michael Sanchez’s Contemporary Art, Daily, Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude and Jacob Taubes’s Occidental Eschatology to discuss shifting conceptions of temporality in relation to contemporary art.

**Campbell Jones** (University of Auckland, campbell.jones@auckland.ac.nz)
*The World of Finance*

Beyond the political alarm bells being rung by its rapaciousness, finance has become one of the key philosophical questions of our age. Finance is reworking our world in the name of another world, and the question must be – which world? This paper advances a formalization of the logic of the world of finance and possible exits from this world through recourse to Heidegger and Spivak’s accounts of worlding and Badiou’s account of the logics of worlds. The world of finance is a world of profound ontological presuppositions, and the task of any historical ontology of the present will require accounting for these presuppositions. In short, it can be said: (1) finance presents a logic of the number which is the logic of arbitrage, a logic of the perpetual inequality of bodies across space and time; (2) finance distributes a world of separated bodies, promising a had infinity of possible worlds and forms of life; (3) finance radically empties the world of content, which as Marx identified results from the representation in finance of the capital relation in its “most superficial and fetishized form,” that is, as “money that produces more money” (Capital, vol. 3: 515). Failure to take this grave logic of the world of finance seriously runs the risk of the institution of a world from which there will be no exit and of which there will be no end.

**Elaine Kelly** (University of Technology Sydney, Elaine.Kelly@uts.edu.au)
*Dwelling in the Future*

Engaging with the works of Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas and Timothy Morton, this paper will speculate on futuristic dynamics of dwelling and mobility by looking into the deep past. This paper pivots around the questions: How can an “ecological thought” accommodate the issue of migration and dwelling? How can continental philosophy engage with emerging issues associated with climate change? In an effort to elaborate these questions, this paper outlines some historical junctures of climate and human migration in order to think through the political and ethical issues of dwelling and mobility today. Migration studies have tended to remain strongly within the nation-state structure when analysing movement across and within borders. In this paper I draw on some preliminary research I have undertaken in a variety of scientific perspectives on the climate-migration nexus. In 2009, scientists Carto et al. wrote a paper titled “Out of Africa and into an Ice Age” in which they hypothesised that migration out of Africa over 100,000 years ago may have been climate-driven. From here, I will unpack its findings and assumptions in an effort to think through the relationship between borders, migration and belonging. What sorts of political, ethical and cultural insights can we draw out of this?

**Marguerite La Caze** (University of Queensland, m.lacaze@uq.edu.au)
*The Politics of Guilt and Shame*

This paper focuses on the ways that perceptions and experiences of shame and guilt are shaped by political conceptions of who belongs to the more shameful and guilty parties. While shame tends to be thought of as a more social response than guilt, I will argue that guilt is also, often, a social phenomenon reflecting the views and expectations of others. Guilt is ambiguous between the fact of having done something wrong, and guilt as a felt experience. I examine guilt and shame and the expectation and need to take it on when one is not directly implicated. This is the converse of the refusal to accept guilt when one is actually culpable; a danger with the concept of collective guilt. I use the debate between Jaspers and Arendt over guilt and responsibility, as well as Sartre’s work on shame, to develop an account of the political aspects of perceived and felt guilt and shame in oppressed groups. I argue that while both experiences have a social element, and social relationships are essential to ethics, the view that oppressed groups should experience the guilt and shame expected of them by dominant groups should be challenged. I will begin by articulating the nature of guilt and shame; then discuss how some philosophers (e.g. Calhoun, 2004) have argued that
the oppressed should accept the expected burdens of guilt and shame; and then show how that view can be questioned while still accepting the social nature of the experience of guilt and shame.

Michael Leininger-Ogawa (Australian National University, michaelhlo@hotmail.com)
*Naming Beings: Ian Hacking’s “Historical Ontology”*

There has been relatively little commentary upon the connection between the work of Ian Hacking and continental philosophy. Amongst the various possibilities available, such a connection can be most clearly established with the work of Michel Foucault. Not only has Hacking written several pieces of commentary on Foucault, more importantly, Hacking has utilised aspects of Foucault’s work within his own historical investigations. Indeed, Hacking describes his own approach with a term borrowed from Foucault, “historical ontology.” This term is placed beside the commensurate terms “dynamic nominalism” and “dialectical realism,” by Hacking, to outline his notion of the relationship of correspondence between what comes into being and our conception of it; a particular balance between nominalism and realism that allows scope for both. This paper will seek to determine the structure necessary for this mutual accommodation in Hacking’s “historical ontology.” Consideration of this correspondence will be undertaken with an eye towards both the tensions that arise when such a fit is attempted and the solutions for these made available within Hacking’s work itself. Furthermore, the nominalism present in Foucault’s “archaeological” works, in particular The Order of Things, and interpretations of his nominalism by those such as Etienne Balibar, Paul Veyne, Slavoj Žižek, and Gilles Deleuze will provide a backdrop for our assessment of Hacking’s “historical ontology.”

Alex Ling (University of Western Sydney, a.ling@uws.edu.au)
*Between Saturation and Exhaustion: Lars von Trier and the Melancholy End of Cinema [Film Philosophy Panel]*

Lars von Trier’s recent film *Melancholia* (2011) has provoked no end of debate: simultaneously hailed as a “masterpiece” and “tiresome,” von Trier himself half-dismissed the work as “too polished” and “a woman’s film” at its premiere at Cannes (where he was infamously declared “persona non grata” after noting that he had come to “understand Hitler”). Drawing upon the contemporary philosophy of Alain Badiou, this paper argues that von Trier’s recent film — as well as his cinema more broadly — in fact offers a profound meditation on the current state of cinema as both “saturated” and “exhausted” (concepts which are central to — yet arguably underdeveloped in — Badiou’s philosophy). Taking as given cinema’s imminent demise (or “subjective finition”), von Trier’s work insistently asks the question: did cinema live up to its potential? The paper thus uses von Trier’s cinema to both exemplify and clarify aspects of Badiou’s philosophy (in particular, his twin concepts of “saturation” and “exhaustion”), as well as examine the broader significance of cinema as an artistic condition of philosophy.

Tracy Ann Llanera (Macquarie University, tracy.llanera@students.mq.edu.au)
*Morality by Words*

For Murdoch, Nussbaum, and Rorty, the moral pulses along the blurred margins of a person’s inner and outer life. When seeking answers to moral questions, an individual tarries between two realms: on the one hand, her responses bear significance within a private universe where beliefs and desires dwell; on the other, they also figure within her environment where others thrive and connect with her reality. Now it is interesting to explore why they also argue reading literature best exercises the moral engagement between personal ends and public good. On the private level, literature invokes and modulates deep features of human life: for Murdoch, the form of the good; Nussbaum, the contingency of life; for Rorty, the irony of vocabulary. In the public sphere, literature counts as a tool for moral expansion: Murdoch believes it cultivates “unselfing”; Nussbaum claims it helps form images of unique lives; Rorty argues it enables us to recognize suffering. Thus the more literature we consume, the better our chances of becoming fulfilled persons with a bountiful sense of empathy. However, we can cast doubt upon this claim. A person nurtured by beautiful words cannot be guaranteed to grow into a moral one. Perhaps the most literature can do is teach us to comprehend situations, and recognize the good when it shines. This paper articulates the relation between literature and private and public ends. It culminates by provoking the question of literature’s limits.
**Martyn Lloyd** (University of Queensland, m.lloyd@uq.edu.au)

_Ethical Self-Fashioning and the Problem of Libertine Sociability in Sade’s Histoire de Juliette_

Sade’s most sophisticated and mature work is his 1801 _Histoire de Juliette, ou les Prospérités du vice_. The text has two striking aspects. First, Juliette develops across the course of the novel, gradually growing from being a homeless, if precocious, orphan to being a master libertine. Her growth involves developments in both her own person — the novel is a story of her ethical self-fashioning, the training and care of her embodied sensibility — and in her management of her relationships with other libertines. In this aspect there is a striking contrast with the story of Juliette’s sister Justine who, notwithstanding the increasingly brutal adventures to which she is subjected in the story, remains as incomprehensibly naïve in the last pages of the novel as she is in the first. In terms of literary genres, the move between the 1799 _La Nouvelle Justine, ou les Malheurs de la vertu_ and the _Histoire de Juliette_ may be understood as a move from the picarasque novel to the _roman d’apprentissage_ or _bildungsroman_. Second, the text presents Sade’s philosophical ideas at their most sophisticated and the development of Juliette as a character is intimately related to the novel’s philosophical project. It is this interaction that makes the text a philosophical novel in the proper sense; tracing the interaction between the novelistic and the philosophical aspects of the novel will be the goal of this paper.

**Matthew Lorenzon** (Australian National University, matthew.lorenzon@gmail.com)

_The “Order and Ornament” of Antagonisme I by Xavier Darasse and Alain Badiou_

For almost fifty years the philosopher Alain Badiou has collaborated with musicians on operas and chamber works that reflect and contradict his parallel philosophical oeuvre. While Badiou has recently begun to speak about Wagner and his collaborations with the composers Georges Aperghis and François Nicolas, we know almost nothing about his work with the organist, improviser, and composer Xavier Darasse on _Antagonisme I_ for violin, vibraphone, marimba, piano, and voice. Composed for the 1965 concours de composition at the Conservatoire de Paris, the work stands in close historical and conceptual proximity to Badiou’s first published writings. Through the analysis of letters, sketches, manuscript and performance scores, this paper argues that the music of _Antagonisme I_ is an answer to Badiou’s paradoxical conception of music, presented in the text to the piece as well as in the 1964 novel _Almagestes_, where “Order and Ornament can no longer be distinguished.” The paper then considers the work in relation to Badiou’s contrasting theorisation of music as “completely intelligible” in the 1965 article “The Autonomy of the Aesthetic Process.”

**Christopher Lucibella** (University of Memphis, cjlcblla@memphis.edu)

_Deveiations from the Norm: The Danger of Classifying Intersex Conditions as Disorders_

The medical conditions that have been classified in recent times under the heading “intersex” (and, in previous decades, “hermaphroditism” and “pseudohermaphroditism”) are diverse in their respective etiology and effect on body morphology, but have in common the fact that they may cause atypical genital configurations in infants, such that a neonate may not be immediately identifiable as “male” or “female.” In this paper, I follow theorists that have criticized contemporary medical protocols, which call for the treatment of intersex conditions through early surgical correction. Specifically, I address a recent change in the clinical management of intersex conditions, which comes in the form of a proposed shift in nomenclature from “intersex” to “disorder of sex development (DSD).” In considering the debate over this diagnostic label, I look to work by Ellen Feder, who argues in favor of “DSD.” Against Feder, I contend that “DSD” should be rejected as an umbrella classification for conditions that result in atypical genital configurations. Drawing from the thought of French philosopher Georges Canguilhem, I investigate the relationship between pathology and normality, and conclude that labeling a condition as pathological comes with a mandate to correct it. In the context of intersex management, “DSD” labels a particular set of features as disordered, and therefore condones the continued surgical correction of cosmetic variations in the sexual anatomy of infants.
Craig Lundy (University of Wollongong, craighundy@gmail.com)

Why wasn’t Capitalism Born in China? Deleuze and the Philosophy of Non-Events

Why wasn’t capitalism born in China? Why did capitalism emerge in the West, rather than China of the third or even eighth century? Deleuze and Guattari consider this question on numerous occasions throughout their writings. The answer that they provide is, in a word, the State. Through its principle of capture and control, the State apparatus restricts the intensification, propagation and abstract conjugation of decoded flows, thus inhibiting the facilitation of a field of immanence upon which capitalism depends. This response, apart from some terminological intricacies, is rather straightforward. However, what is it that lies behind this relatively simple response? And more importantly, what is it that motivates the question and Deleuze and Guattari’s frequent return to it? If one glances at the various instances that the question of capitalism’s emergence is invoked, it will become clear that Deleuze and Guattari are not always so interested in the answer. Instead, the question is often raised in order to illustrate the significance of a particular kind of question — namely, the kind of question that calls into consideration the contingency of history and the history of contingency. After discussing Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to the question of capitalism’s non-emergence in China, the second part of this paper will thus explore the manner in which this question might suggest to us a Deleuzian philosophy of not events, but non-events.

Ruaridh MacLeod (Columbia University, rjm2132@columbia.edu)

Heidegger and Neuropsychology: The Structure of Mood Considered in the Light of Current Emotion Theory

Following Matthew Ratcliffe’s work, I link Heidegger’s conception of mood with recent neuropsychological study into the nature/function of emotions, taking care to emphasize the derivative nature of reasoning and scientific study when considered in relation to the irreducible and discursive operation of moods within Dasein’s primordial state-of-mind, particularly as it is realized in “care.” Though Ratcliffe does much to convince that current emotion theory is complementary to Heidegger’s conception of mood, his approach has several shortcomings, which I seek to address. (1) The insufficient detailing of the exact relation between Heidegger’s concept of mood, and the general concept of emotion Ratcliffe holds representative of current thinking on this feature of Dasein’s existential-ontological being. Accordingly, I provide a more comprehensive sense of the relation between Heidegger’s rather loose characterization of “mood” (Sections 29–31), and the specific mode of attunement termed “fear.” (2) Ratcliffe’s claim that emotion “punctuates” the coherence of a given mood, or else arises from the disruption of expectation, distorts the actual nature of emotion per se, and its success is overly reliant on use of “negative” emotion. I attempt a more comprehensive outline of the role emotions play in relation to intentionality; and provide a portrayal of emotion, which is demonstrably more adequate to structure of mood within Being and Time.

Daniel Mcloughlin (University of Adelaide, daniel.mcloughlin@adelaide.edu.au)

The Politics of Human Rights and the End of History

This paper considers the relationship between human rights and radical politics in the present political conjuncture. I identify two streams of thinking about human rights amongst contemporary continental philosophers. The first, which includes figures such as Alain Badiou and Giorgio Agamben, critique the role that human rights play in justifying contemporary state violence and argue that they should be abandoned by radical politics. The second camp, which includes Jacques Rancière and Michel Foucault, acknowledge such critiques, while arguing that human rights still offer an important tool for political struggle. I analyse these positions in light of Samuel Moyn’s historical analysis of the emergence of the institutions and discourse of human rights. Moyn argues that human rights became the dominant language of political resistance in the wake of the collapse of Marxism and national liberation as theoretical and political projects. While human rights have indeed provided an important political tool at the “end of history,” Moyn’s analysis suggests that there may be some limits in their utility for a politics that breaks with the current liberal political imaginary.
Andrew Macklin (University of New South Wales, andrewm@fbe.unsw.edu.au)

Animate Architecture

In this era of ecological crisis how do we think about the “materiality” or “objecthood” of architecture? Is it lifeless, organized matter — shelter or a machine — designed and activated by humans to service human functions, even if it does so sustainably? Or is it “alive,” moulding our consciousness of the life-world, beckoning the body to behaviours that seed ecological consciousness AND working cooperatively and symbiotically with nature to heal and sustain not just our world but hers? Jane Bennett’s recent idea of “vital materiality” allows this shift in consciousness, for me, to an animate architecture. Vital materialism recognizes that humans have used ideological stereotypes (matter, things) to objectify the non-human world in order to own, dominate, use and abuse. More importantly, we have forgotten how living beings and inorganic things are “vital” — alive and autonomous with their own being and history that is omnipresent in human culture, which they powerfully shape. Dovetailing vital materialism with ecology in the context of architecture, it is no longer seen as a compilation of “things” which we design and through which we control the world but as an “agent” — an omnipresent living entity which animates our consciousness of the life-world opening us to engagement, mutuality and interconnectedness with the earth. This talk will be rumination on the ethical possibilities of architecture through the ecological looking glass of vital (and Marxist) materialism.

Oren Magid (Georgetown University, omm6@georgetown.edu)

The Authentic Conception of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time

Being and Time’s epigraph reads as follows: “For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression being. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed” (1; Plato, Sophist 244a). The two versions published in English do, at least. Yet neither translation accounts for Heidegger’s use of “eigentlich,” which modifies “meint” in the phrase, “was ihr eigentlich meint, wenn ihr den Ausdruck seidend gebraucht.” Thus, one of Heidegger’s most important and influential technical terms goes unnoticed in the very first sentence of Being and Time. This is the only such omission I have found in either translation, and it goes against Macquarrie and Robinson’s explicitly stated strategy. Macquarrie and Robinson claim to identify an “informal” use and a “much stronger,” technical use of “eigentlich”: “In the contexts which seem relatively informal we shall write ‘really’; in the more technical passages we shall write ‘authentically’ “ (5, fn. 3). The translators’ oversight is telling; it is hard to see how either use makes sense in this passage. In this paper, I will show that: (1) There are no such “informal” uses of “eigentlich” in Being and Time, and (2) the standard interpretation of the “technical” use of “eigentlich” — as an “existentialist” concept — is not sufficiently broad to show its relation to the central ontological question of Being and Time: the question of the meaning of being.

Nick Malpas (University of Sydney, nick.malpas@gmail.com)

Normativity, Politics, World

This paper explores how normativity is connected to the inter-human world and particularly to politics. I begin by looking at Christine Korsgaard’s account of normativity, which I build upon and revise. Korsgaard claims that the source of normativity is the reflection of individuals, although she acknowledges that normativity is related to human sociality since reflection requires language and the reasons for our actions must be public. On this view, language and sociality are conditions for normativity only insofar as they are conditions for reflection. While reflection certainly is necessary for normativity, I draw on Hannah Arendt’s work to argue that it is the intersubjectivity of human existence, rather than reflection, that is the source of normativity. Normativity, as well as particular norms, should be understood as part of “the world” which lies between people. Normativity in general is grounded in our answerability to others, while the specific norms that bind an individual arise out of the interactions and relationships they have with others. As intersubjective and worldly, normativity must then be understood as dependent on politics, that is, activities of collective self-constitution and self-determination. One’s normative outlook is constituted by one’s particular political situation, and, thus, is open to contestation in an essentially political sense.
Monica Marchetto (University of Palermo, Italy; monica.marchetto@libero.it)
Schelling’s Theory of Matter

The problem of matter is one of the central issues in Schelling’s philosophical thought. In the years 1797-1800 Schelling takes Kant as his point of departure not only for his transcendental philosophy, but also in the construction of matter. Already for Kant the concept of matter constituted a systematic problem, since it was neither an entirely empirical nor an a priori concept. Schelling takes up and develops the issue within the context of his own philosophy. In his attempt at speculative comprehension of matter, he turns his attention to the contemporary scientific debates (in particular to the theories of chemistry, electricity, biology), integrating their results into his own system. In 1801 Schelling unites transcendental philosophy with the philosophy of nature, thus establishing a philosophy of absolute Identity, which leads to the transformation in the concept of matter. The present paper intends to investigate Schelling’s theory of matter from the following two points of view: (1) conceptual inquiry and (2) historical analysis of Schelling’s thought in the context of the natural science of his day.

Reyvi Marinas (Monash University, reyvi.marinas@monash.edu.au)
The Overseas Filipino as Conscious Pariah: Theorising Filipino Identity Through the Lens of Hannah Arendt

The paper theorises the identity formation of overseas Filipinos through the lens of Hannah Arendt. In particular, I argue that Arendt’s notion of the “conscious pariah” provides a theoretical framework in the formation of a distinctive Filipino identity. I examine the development of her thought on the conscious pariah and how this framework fits within her understanding of politics. I then explore the historical formation of Filipino identity and demonstrate how Arendt’s framework is understood by drawing on early Filipino exiles, not only to draw parallels with Arendt’s “exemplary” pariah figures, but also to highlight the resuscitation of the pariah’s “hidden tradition” (to use Arendt’s words) as an ongoing “political project” of the Filipino struggle at home and abroad.

Jodie McNeilly (University of Sydney, jodie.mcneilly@gmail.com)
Bodily-Schemata and Sartre’s I and Me: Reflection and Awareness in Movement

Philosophers have faced the problem of self or inner awareness since the self, itself, became something to be known and/or understood. Once dancers “let go of the mirror” (Claid 2006) they too began to face the problem and limits to bodily awareness, developing specific reflective practices to obtain access to their inner bodily selves. But for the phenomenologist, reflection requires an active process of perception, which problematises our grasping of the so-called hidden, organizing structures of movement that are unable to be perceived (bodily-schemata). For the dancer, then, how is it possible to access and have a deeper understanding of these nonconscious bodily structures? What are the limits to inner bodily awareness? In this paper, I draw upon Sartre’s challenge to Husserl’s pure ego with his notion of object transcendence in his essay of 1937 “Transcendence of The Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness.” I do this as a possible means for understanding bodily-schemata and its expression through interactive dance technologies. Using several examples from dance performances, I suggest how bodily-schemata can be accounted for if our attention is not directed towards an inner-sensing of the body, but towards a site of interaction where objects or materials extend or “supraextend” our bodies in the form of clothing, costume and digital representations.

Thomas Mical (University of South Australia, dr.mical@gmail.com)
Cold Surfaces

The images and senses of coldness and cruelty permeate the ambient spaces of our designed neomodernity, operating in the world as a repetition compulsion tending towards reductivism by emptying. The increasingly hyper-minimal and super-flat surfaces of the word are the result of a para-ethical of efficiency driven by the technological imperatives and the movement towards surface-affects. These infrathin surfaces are nominally varied in their appearances, but increasingly unified in their symptomatic demonstrations, and are perfect analytical tools for understanding the process of surfacing (or “skinning”) the world within late modernity. This essay examines the concept, percept, and affect of these minimal surfaces as complex reconceptualizations/reterritorializations of the subjectivities and desires they are engineered to contain and control. The past heroic period of emergent 20th-century
architectural modernity labelled “The International Style,” with its apparent turn to ascetic white surfaces and planes (in art and architecture), will be re-examined as the source of this contemporary world of coldness and cruelty, of disciplining surface-affects. This recalled white wall and glass wall fashion was developed from a hydrostatic pressure model of spatial deviations — architecture designed as soap bubbles, and will be rethought in light of processes of condensation. This essay will attempt a Deleuzian schizoanalysis of the modern architectural skin (Venus in steel?) — in terms of the affective, hygienic, and political criteria used to justify their appearance by select designers. The abstracted surfaces persist and become more cold and cruel as an ethic of disciplined imagination, though the forces (desiring-machines) driving that formation are now nearly inverted from high modernity in the contemporary condition. In fact, a subtle set of conceptual and perceptual reversals have occurred at the surface between modern and pre-modern. In examining the design sense of the minimized surface today, we will examine the unintentional effects of these surfaces, especially for the minimalist surface’s frequent perception and affect of coldness and cruelty and the reorganization of sense it forecasts, following Deleuze’s work on Sacher-Masoch and implicitly following his writings of *The Logic of Sense*. In its entirety, this essay theorizes an intentional affective coldness and cruelty of the contemporary surfaces of sense (and non-sense).

**James Muldoon** (Monash University, james.muldoon@monash.edu)

*Arendt and the Occupy Movement*

The Occupy Movement has been one of the most significant political phenomena of recent years. In this paper the theoretical perspective of Hannah Arendt will be deployed in order to conceptualise the Occupy Movement in terms of her notions of political freedom, constituent institutions and the public realm. From this standpoint, the Occupy Movement can be viewed as an attempted Arendtian revolution: a radical critique of representative democracy and an endeavour to institute a more participatory and direct form of democracy through citizens’ councils. The central principle of the Occupy Movement is an Arendtian understanding of freedom as self-governance in which citizens are actual participants in government. The basic structure of the Occupy Movement is that of decentralised, autonomous citizens’ assemblies. In *On Revolution*, Arendt argues that for a revolution to lead to genuine processes of democratisation it must preserve a space in which citizens can participate in government. For Arendt, both the French and American revolutions failed to incorporate a space for citizens to participate in government and thus failed to preserve the revolutionary spirit. The Occupy Movement can be considered revolutionary in Arendt’s sense of the term because it seeks to rejuvenate the idea of citizens deliberating over the common good in public assemblies. For Arendt, it is only through a preservation of this distinctly public and political space that genuine freedom can be maintained.

**Joshua Mullan** (RMIT University, joshua.mullan@rmit.edu.au)

*Did Derrida Foreclose the Possibilities Offered by Community? Responding to Esposito’s Critique of Derrida*

While it is well known that Derrida was quite suspicious of the notion of community and tended to avoid using it, should this reticence be read as a rejection of it? In a recent interview, Roberto Esposito has claimed that Derrida forecloses the possibilities offered by this term. In this paper I respond to Esposito’s critique and demonstrate how a closer reading of Derrida’s later work highlights his longstanding engagement with the question of community. However consideration of their respective approaches also demonstrates that there is a need to clarify the significant differences between them. I highlight these by responding to two claims that Esposito levels against Derrida, namely that he rejects community for a weaker notion of friendship, and that his conception of community as self-destructively auto-immunitary fails to consider the dialectical character of immunity. In responding to these claims I clarify some important aspects of the ways Derrida approaches rethinking community and illustrate how Esposito and Derrida can be fruitfully read together to further our understanding of it.

**Maria O’Connor** (AUT University, maria.oconnor@aut.ac.nz)

*Night Moves*

My aim is to journey slowly into darkness, into movements of night conditioned by ambitious thought via Gilles Deleuze and Maurice Blanchot on an ethics of the image. Both, in their singularities, bring to
the image thought as an active force that affirmatively (or ethically) frees the work from a fixed point of view. More radically they offer re-encounter of the work of art in terms of intensive flows of existence expanding perception. Rather than open new thought as a position of adding to an excess of new experiences for including more in our lives, their (night) moves aim to re-problematise models of fixity that secure moralism (and not an ethics). The conception of night in my title is attributed to Blanchot’s other night or désoeuvrement as unworkability, essential to the work of art in its refrain from certainty or finality. Night Moves as an extended title is attributed to Deleuze’s conceptual offerings (immanence; difference and repetition of time; impersonal affects and percepts; non-narrative formal intensities; imperceptibility) that ethically perform dynamic interlacings, affirming the mobility of thought. His night moves unbind Blanchot’s madness of day — our frustrated attempts in pinning down existence once and for all. Night Moves concludes on Tom Ford’s A Single Man (2009) as a cinematic example of existence as ungraspable in its everyday recession, offering encounters for discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life.

Michael Parmenter
(University of Auckland/Université de Paris 1 Panthéon/Sorbonne, dancer@paradise.net.nz)

Gestures of Incarnation: Two Contending Phenomenologies

With at least three recent English translations and as many new books devoted to his philosophy, the work of the late French phenomenological thinker Michel Henry is receiving belated recognition in the Anglo philosophical world. From the beginning Henry’s phenomenology of life found its fulcrum point in his radical critique of phenomenology itself and in his late works received further characterization by participating in what has been labeled the “theological turn.” Henry’s phenomenology of life, according to the title of one of his last books, presents itself as a philosophy of Incarnation. Henry’s phenomenology, however, stands in sharp contrast to a contending phenomenology of life, that of contemporary thinker Renaud Barbaras. Where Henry places himself in opposition to the world-embracing philosophies of Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Barbaras, as one of the leading authorities on the work of Merleau-Ponty, and more recently the a-subjective phenomenology of Jan Patocka, characterizes the phenomenon of life in terms of the living beings participation in a world of otherness. I will briefly introduce Henry’s phenomenology of life, examine Barbaras’ critique of Henry and sketch Barbaras’ alternative phenomenology of life. I suggest that though there are no explicit theological references in Barbaras, his philosophy, more than that of Henry, lends itself to an incarnational vision of the world.

Paul Patton
(University of New South Wales, prp@unsw.edu.au)


Foucault’s lectures in 1976 open with the statement of an intellectual crisis. They proceed to a series of questions about the nature of power and the ways that he has conceived of it up to this point: what is power? How is it exercised? Is it ultimately a relation of force? Only some of these questions are answered in the course of these lectures. His answer to the overriding question, ‘what is power?’ is not forthcoming until after the discovery of governmentality in his 1978 lectures. It is not fully developed until after his lectures on liberal and neoliberal governmentality in 1979. This talk aims to retrace his answers to the questions in the light of the published lectures and to examine the consequences of these answers for his analysis of neoliberal governmentality.

Knox Peden
(University of Queensland, k.peden@uq.edu.au)

The “Strange Spinozism” of Gilles Deleuze

Prior to Gilles Deleuze, most French thinkers considered Heidegger and Spinoza to be authors of incommensurable philosophies. When Deleuze began to develop his own metaphysics in the 1960s, however, he sought to move beyond the impasses of French phenomenology by working with concepts and themes that had their firmest roots in a particularly French rationalist reading of Spinoza. The result of Deleuze’s effort was a philosophical monstrosity — which was not a term of abuse in his vernacular — that married these two heterogeneous strands of twentieth-century French philosophy and shifted the sense of both inherited traditions.
**Mairéad Phillips** (University of Melbourne, maireadphillips@gmail.com)  
*Between Relation and Impulse: Hitchcock’s Body Count*

In *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, Deleuze says that Hitchcock will “borrow a particularly striking action of the type ‘killing’, ‘stealing’ from the detective or the spy film.” In the analysis that follows, Deleuze sees Hitchcock’s dead bodies as falling in line with his relational reading of Hitchcock’s films: “all is interpretation from beginning to end,” even murder, it seems. Deleuze borrows heavily from Rohmer and Chabrol’s concept of ‘exchange’, “which we find everywhere in his work.” One does not ‘commit’ a crime in a Hitchcock film; one ‘delivers’ it up ‘for’ another. But is something missing in this analysis, especially when we consider the sheer volume of dead bodies Hitchcock’s films produce? There is, however, another species of image that deals more explicitly with death, namely the impulse-image. The impulse-image is saturated with death, indeed, as Deleuze argues, death is its constitutive element: “it brings everything together in a single identical death impulse.” Hitchcock’s dead bodies then are fragments torn from the originary world, “the set which unites everything, not in an organization, but making all the parts converge.” Is there a contradiction then, between death as relation and death as impulse-image? This paper shows how the image of the dead body in fact reveals in most striking fashion how relation and impulse are united in Hitchcock’s films, how his cinema is in fact a combination of the two images rather than exclusively one or the other.

**Francis Plagne** (University of Melbourne, f.plagne@student.unimelb.edu.au)  
*Blumenberg’s Philosophical Anthropology and the Gnosticism Debates*

Beginning with the publication of the first volume of Hans Jonas’ *Gnosis and the Spirit of Late Antiquity* in 1934, the interpretation of the Gnostic religions of late antiquity became a matter of interest not only to historians and theologians, but also to philosophers. As Jacob Taubes noted, these debates can be read not only as contributions to the historical understanding of religious phenomena but also as “indicators of the present intellectual climate.” I argue that the relevance of Gnosticism for 20th century German intellectuals was primarily in terms of philosophical anthropology, specifically with regards to the anthropological possibility and significance of radical negation (sometimes understood in historically specific terms, bound up with the interpretation of modernity, as Taubes argues, but at other times understood trans-historically). Against this background I reconstruct the anthropological system of one of the most important voices in these debates, Hans Blumenberg. It is only against the background of multiple theorizations of the liberating power of what Adolf von Harnack called the “gloriously foreign” in Marcion’s Gnosticism (often formulated as a response to a perceived exhaustion of the project of modernity) that Blumenberg’s dismissal of the interrelated concepts of imagination, utopia and negation can become comprehensible, along with his unified critique of figures as seemingly diverse as Adorno, Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann and Heidegger.

**Pierre-Jean Renaudie** (University Paris 4-Sorbonne, pjrenaudie@gmail.com)  
*Why Can’t I Be Transparent to Myself? The Paradox of Self-Consciousness in Derrida and Husserl*

It became quite common to criticize lucidity and self-transparency as an illusion generated by Descartes’ position of the ego. Such a critical analysis rejects the Cartesian claim of having direct access to my own ego, and considers that inner perception is a delusive metaphysical presupposition. Husserl’s phenomenology has often been associated with this erroneous conception of self-knowledge. In his interpretation of Husserl (in *Voice and Phenomenon*), Derrida argues against this conception of the immediacy of self-consciousness. He posits that reflection creates an irreducible distance, between me and my own states-of-mind, preventing me from being transparent to myself. In this paper I will show that these two opposing positions are not as contradictory as one might think, but rather that they share the same presuppositions about the relation between subjectivity and interiority. I argue against Derrida that Husserl’s theory of expression can be understood as an attempt to give an account of the self without needing to presuppose any kind of inner perception, and I show that, in fact, Husserl provides stronger reasons that make the concept of self-transparency irrelevant.
**Jack Reynolds** (La Trobe University, jack.reynolds@latrobe.edu.au)

*Transcendental Pragmatics? Deleuze, Pragmatism and Metaphilosophy*

Extending work I have previously done on the significant metaphilosophical role that transcendental reasoning and common sense have played in differentiating much work done in so-called analytic and continental philosophy, in this paper I take up the challenge of pragmatism. Pragmatism is a tradition that predates any such “divide” and has a prima facie claim, even today, to being irreducible to any such “divide.” Indeed, in recent times Sami Pihlstrom’s *Naturalising the Transcendental* incorporates some forms of American pragmatist thought within the post-Kantian transcendental tradition, by relating the work of “postanalytic” philosophers like Wittgenstein, Putnam, McDowell, Rorty, Brandom, and others to this trajectory. This paper will consider the prospects for such a transcendental pragmatism, largely by considering the extent to which any such rapprochement is predicated on criticisms of what McDowell calls bald naturalism. It will also be suggested, drawing on Deleuze’s critique of good and common sense in *Difference and Repetition*, that a bracketing of the metaphilosophical value of common sense is also required. The conjunction of these two features — critique of bald naturalism and critique of common sense — are central to any transcendental philosophy worthy of the name.

**Louise Richardson-Self** (University of Sydney, lric8416@uni.sydney.edu.au)

*Thinking Difference: Irigarayan Insights on the Problem of Same-Sex Marriage*

According to Luce Irigaray, difference is “still conceived of and lived hierarchically.” This statement holds much weight, particularly for same-sex couples who remain without the right to marry in many countries. But there is dissent among the queer community as to whether marriage equality is an appropriate goal. Some view the goal of marriage as contrary to the goal of attaining respect for queers regardless of their (real or perceived) differences to a heterosexual standard of normality. The problem, according to this perspective, is that seeking marriage equality sends the message that queers simply want to be “like” normal heterosexuals, as popularly imagined. But attaining rights due to “likeness” is assimilative, and does not challenge hierarchical standards by which difference is conceived and perceived. However, Luce Irigaray’s politics of sexual difference may be useful for respectfully realising and recognising difference. I contend that Irigaray’s suggestion of rethinking difference in such a way as to promote “diversity-between” individuals, rather than “difference-from” individuals, could assist the formal legalisation of rights for same-sex couples for the right reasons. This will include the promotion of a conception of equivalent rights following from Drucilla Cornell, who has already begun to adapt Irigaray’s conception of equivalence between the two sexes to relationships between heterosexual and queer people.

**Malcolm Riddoch** (Edith Cowan University, m.riddoch@ecu.edu.au)

*Body Waves: Estatic Embodiment in the Art of the Earthquake*

As a phenomenological analysis of a sonic art performance, *Body Waves* explores emergent ec-static embodiment in this author’s performative experience of New Zealand sound artist Jo Burzynska’s (aka Stanier Black-Five) Christchurch earthquake soundscape. As an immersive sonic work of art, *Body Waves* has an immediate aesthetic impact on the auditory and somatic senses. Aesthetics, or the flux of straightforward sensory perceptions, is drawn into the on-going moment of the sounds themselves as they simultaneously rise and fall, subverting rational reflection and teleological expectations. Such is the ec-static temporalizing effect of indeterminate, experimental music performance. Beyond this immediate psycho-physiological immersion however, as a re-presentation of a dreadful natural disaster, *Body Waves* instigates a rupture between one’s world understanding and the earth that supports and nurtures it. Within this rupture, *natura or physis* is uncovered in this sonic work of art as the emergent way of being in constant becoming where ec-stasis is no longer merely a subjective experience of the bodily forth of ecstatic temporality but rather an ecstatic disclosure of the fragility of world. As a sonic work of art, *Body Waves* becomes a disclosure of one’s own world in a celebration of life as constant renewal in the face of the on-going, overwhelming emergence and dissolution of *physis*.
Laura Roberts (University of Queensland, laurajaneroberts@gmail.com)
Who Still Has Ears to Perceive Something of the Real? - Cultivating Difference in Luce Irigaray's Between East and West

Irigaray believes that the crises of our times stem from the fact that our Western culture is disconnected from nature, and consequently from the recognition of the fact that life is sexed. For Irigaray, when we “rediscover” this relationship between nature and culture, we begin to see human nature as two, as sexed. Culture becomes an extension of — and at the same time a return to — this dynamic sexed nature. She argues that if we acknowledge this relationship between nature and culture we will acknowledge that nature is made up of two sexuate subjects. And, importantly, each sexed subject must recognise its own relationship with nature (the sexed body) and with culture. The disasters that we face are the result of not properly understanding the nature/culture relationship in relation to ourselves, our being (two), in relations with others and with the planet. It is for this reason Irigaray suggests we may learn some lessons on how to reconnect with the body and re-establish the link between nature and culture from yoga. In Between East and West Irigaray writes about her own personal experiences of yoga and eastern philosophy as a woman situated within “western” culture/s. This work also opens up space for discussion on the relationship between sexual difference and other differences of culture, religion or race. In this paper I use recent work by Elizabeth Grosz to unravel this core element within this challenging philosophy.

Jon Roffe (University of Melbourne, jonathan.roffe@unimelb.edu.au)
The Pricing Surface and the Body Without Organs: Contribution to the Philosophy of the Market

This paper proposes to deal with one of three essential questions regarding the nature of the market, namely “What is the ground of market activity?” I will draw upon two resources to answer this question: the analysis of capitalism prosecuted by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, and the ontography of the market found in the work of Elie Ayache’s Blank Swan. From the former, I will draw, on the one hand, on the theory of the distinction between wage and finance capital, and on the other, on the notion of the full body of organs of the capitalist social formation. From the latter, I will make use of the notion of the market as a pricing surface, on which are inscribed entirely value-free pricing chains. On the basis of these two bodies of work, I will advance a definition of the market as the a priori global surface of inscription that underpins contemporary social reality while withdrawing from any attempt to instrumentalise its function by any given regime of regulation. When supplemented with a theory of market dynamism and an account of the market’s realization-regulation, I contend that this analysis provides a sufficient philosophical answer to the ontological question of the market and consequently, due to the absolute position of the market in the contemporary situation, an essential element in the construction of an ontology of the present.

Alison Ross (Monash University, Alison.Ross@monash.edu)
The Meaning of the Prosaic: Jacques Rancière as a Reader of Walter Benjamin [Rancière Panel]

Rancière treats Benjamin as a thinker working within the scenario set out in Hegel’s conception of the modern emancipation of meaning. The key historical thesis of Hegel’s conception of the prosaic condition of the material world is that encrypted meaning belongs to the past, the modern emancipation of meaning has redeemed it. Consequently, figurative language that remains in the face of this emancipation is “pure non-sense.” Benjamin follows Marx in disputing the consequences Hegel would be some form of emancipation of encrypted meaning. The crucial question Rancière asks is what the thesis of the modern emancipation of meaning means for Benjamin. His answer can be schematized as follows: For Benjamin, the idea that there are encrypted meanings is crucial for maintaining the prospect of emancipation, however, he does not see these meanings as able to be decrypted. Benjamin subscribes to a conception of persistent encrypted meaning, which preserves the purity of the revolution. This paper will 1) critically examine Rancière’s assumption that Benjamin loads prosaic things, such as the arcade and the commodity, with encrypted meaning and 2) counterbalance his reading with a comparative account of the two thinkers respective identification of language as a vehicle of emancipation.
Philipa Rothfield (La Trobe University, p.rothfield@latrobe.edu.au)

*Playing the Subject Card: Strategies of the Subjective*

Postmodern choreographer, Russell Dumas, is reluctant to leave his dancers to rehearse on their own. Why? Because they will only practise their ‘bad habits’. How could they do otherwise? If we are our habits, as Dumas often claims, then there is very little we can do to overcome them. *Or is there?* Alexander technique represents one such attempt to overcome habit. Predicated upon its own diagnosis of what is bad about habit, Alexander technique offers a strategic response, one which aims to inhibit habit so as to make way for something else: the possibility of moving otherwise. Alexander spoke of ‘non-doing’ in relation to his technique. Although non-doing suggests an absence of subjective agency, the technique itself calls for a very particular kind of engagement on the part of the subject.

The aim of this paper is to elucidate that which is implicit within Alexander technique; its acknowledgement of the force of subjectivity, but also its practical way of dealing with that force so as to enhance what a body can do. I will argue that there are a variety of ways to ‘play’ subjectivity in practices of this kind, that subjectivity is itself liable to strategic deployment. I enlist Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of the lived body as a means to investigate the so-called strategic deployment of subjectivity in these modes of practice. The common feature of these strategies is their element of *undoing* which I understand in terms of overcoming. Nietzsche’s Overman is the one who has broken the bonds of the human all-too-human. If Merleau-Ponty is able to discern the loosening of these bonds at the level of the lived body, it’s Nietzsche who continues the story with the concept of the Overman. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra loves the one who “wills his own downfall,” not for the sake of mere destruction (nihilism) but because the destruction of subjectivity makes space for something new. Deleuze coins a term, *active destruction*, according to which the human gives way to a new way of thinking, “other than the human type.” From the point of view of the subject, active destruction is the prospect of annihilation, but from the point of view of the body, of the dance of becoming, it’s not so bad. This paper will explore the sense in which subjectivity can be ‘played’ within these practices, towards what Deleuze calls the moment of *transmutation*, according to which the constraints of subjectivity give way to an affirmative manner of creation.

Matheson Russell (University of Auckland, m.russell@auckland.ac.nz)

*The Pragmatics of Political Disagreement: On Rancière’s Critique of Habermas [Rancière Panel]*

Rancière presents Habermas as a figure emblematic of the new politics of “consensus” to which he is opposed. Superficially it is understandable why he should choose Habermas to be the foil for his positive project of creating conceptual space for the properly “political” activity of “dissensus.” But anyone familiar with Habermas’s work will not recognize him as an apologist for an oligarchic, managerial, technocratic, economistic “post-democratic politics.” Far from it. The position that Rancière describes as “consensus democracy” is one Habermas has been explicitly critical of for decades. What’s more, Habermas is far closer to Rancière’s position than this caricature would suggest. Not only is he a theorist of democratic politics but also, like Rancière, he grounds his model of democratic politics in the equality of humans as speaking beings. At what point exactly, then, does Rancière actually part ways with Habermas? And does his critique hit the mark, or could Habermas’s sophisticated theoretical framework accommodate Rancière’s worries? These are some of the questions we aim to explore in this paper. (This paper presents work that is being co-authored with Andrew Montin.)*

Kriszta Sajber (University of Heidelberg, kriszta.sajber@gmail.com)

*Open Intersubjectivity: A Comparative Approach to Schizophrenia and Autism (TESIS)*

In recent theoretical advances in the philosophy of intersubjectivity, phenomenologists and cognitive scientists alike have drawn fondly on Husserl’s scarce remarks on “open intersubjectivity.” A crucial term, it has inspired novel interpretations of key texts of classical phenomenology and anchored fresh methodological approaches to the problems of empathy and understanding other minds. Yet some of the most potent theoretical implications of Husserl’s remarks remain understudied while the term “open intersubjectivity” is examined separate from the overall context of the Husserlian project. In my paper, I purport to remedy this state of affairs, even as my treatment of the problems surrounding the concept also draws on evidence from the realm of psychopathology. Upon discussing the most important principles and motivations behind a Husserlian theory of intersubjective constitution, I will...
turn to discussing two pathological variants in which the “openness” of intersubjectivity becomes subject to obstruction in two antithetical ways. One of these is characteristic of schizophrenic patients while the other is typically found in autism. I show that these two examples bring to the fore questions through which one may interrogate the tenets of Husserl’s philosophy of intersubjectivity in freshly productive, new ways.

Max Schaefer (K.U. Leuven, m.schaefer1@nuigalway.ie)

*Forgetting and the Ascension of Thought*

... as that which gives, as Derrida notes, has an intrinsic relation with an “absolute forgetting” (Derrida, *Given Time*). In asking about this relation, this paper seeks to show that implied therein is a no less basic relation between thought and hope wherein both ascend beyond the capacities of their commonplace determinations. Heidegger first questions the limit of the giving-transcendence of *being* beyond the immanence of thinking in the form of assertion and its “lived experience” in consciousness, preparing the way for its more originary, in-apparent unfolding as the abyssal unity and undulation (i.e., event) of time-space (Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*). Where Heidegger lays out the plight intrinsic to this abyssal event of spatial-temporalization as an abandonment that takes place as a “remembering and expecting” that is “raised up and is directed out only toward the decision” (Heidegger, 303), and thus toward thinking as thanking and recompose, I maintain that this falls short of the transcendence (i.e., nothingness) of *being* as giving, and thus of a true encounter with the plight of this abyssal event. More basic, and thus proper, to this most intimate and in-apparent nothingness of time-space, I argue, is an “absolute forgetting” beyond any manner of “recollection” (Derrida, *Given Time*), where thought’s place is, accordingly, anterior to all personal capacity, in first hoping from its affection by the ‘impossible’.

Robin May Schott (Danish Institute for International Studies, rms@diis.dk)

*“Not Just Victims . . . But”*

Here I examine the concept of victim in two fields of debate, contemporary Anglo-American feminist discourses and contemporary security discourses. I argue that the dominant view of the victim as depoliticized, reified, and pathetic cannot be derived from phenomenological analyses of victims’ experiences or testimonies. Instead, these assumptions reflect the political agendas which frame debates about victims. In feminist discourse, a genealogical approach illustrates that the concept of victim is embedded in a contestation over whether feminist politics should be framed in terms of sexual difference or in terms of democratic collective political interventions. In security discourses, a genealogical approach indicates that the concept of victim is embedded in 1990’s interventionist paradigm. In the post-interventionist paradigm after 2000, the concept of victim has been replaced by the resilient subject who is empowered. Such an approach to empowerment overlooks the ways in which power operates through institutions and norms. The possibilities for articulating victim perspectives disappears with these contemporary modes of time (as future-oriented in an unending flow of uncertain possibilities), change (as inherent crisis) and self (as resilient and not marked by harm). In both feminist and security debates, the dismissal of the concept of victim reflects an ambivalence to concepts such as receptivity, passivity, and the capacity to suffer which earlier philosophers have considered to be central to human qualities. Dectrcenting the victim vs. empowerment opposition opens up the significance of vulnerability as a fundamental human condition, without making normative claims as in recent ethical turns to vulnerability.

Ricky Sebold (La Trobe University, rsebold@students.latrobe.edu.au)

*Realism and Nietzsche’s Perspectivism*

Any attempt to understand Nietzsche’s philosophy must come to terms with his well known, some might say infamous, doctrine of perspectivism. What can be so off-putting about it is the way in which it appears to undermine or at least put into question the notions of a mind-independently existing world that is the same for all observers and objective truth. What perspectivism seems to so conclusively rule out is something like a God’s Eye point of view or view from nowhere, which is often thought to be a necessary condition for making sense of metaphysical realism and objective knowledge. In this paper, I will first specify the ostensible inconsistency between perspectivism and metaphysical realism before going on to argue that the types of perspectivism that would genuinely posed a threat to metaphysical
realism suffer from intrinsic philosophical difficulties and the ones more acceptable no longer form an impediment to realism. More specifically, what I call “strong truth perspectivism” faces three problems: (1) metaphysical, (2) self referential, and (3) trivial. I then go on to develop an alternative account of perspectivism, what I call “value perspectivism,” which is consistent with the commitments of metaphysical realism. Finally, I assess whether value perspectivism threatens the possibility of objective knowledge, ultimately determining that it does not.

Josephine Seguna (Griffith University, J.Seguna@griffith.edu.au)

Dasein’s Precarious Performativity in Law

The social limits of disability; the vested interests and tenacious hold (Campbell, 2005:112) of ableism’s complex institutional, political structures and legal “mythologies,” are the source of the precarious state of the disabled identity. Indeed its “invisibility” is the consequence of separation from mainstream conventional facilities attributed to the physical and social barriers of “impairment” rather than the inadequacies and inequalities of sociality. This paper in consulting specific case law (Purvis v New South Wales Department of Education [1999] HREOCA 21 (3 August 1999) & Sutton v United Airlines Inc 527 US 471, 1999) will expose the fabricated “fixity” of disability in law and the reality of leaky identities by engaging in a theoretical discussion into the possibility of redefining justice. The philosophical investigation using the writings of Martin Heidegger and Judith Butler will allow for the actual removal of “the body” as the basis of legal determination. Embracing the conceptualization of Dasein as the process of seeking individual authenticity, the search for justice circumvents the need for ableist hierarchies of “acceptability” or scales of deserving and tragic otherness for “performativity” will re-characterize the nature of individual behaviour, autonomy and social interaction.

Colin Singleton (Swinburne University of Technology, cshingleton@optusnet.com.au)

Understanding the A Priori: The Post-Metaphysical Implications of Systematising Analytic Philosophy

In this talk I am going to address some of the issues raised by The Emmy Noether Research Group of analytic philosophers whose paper “Understanding the A Priori” seeks to re-think analytic philosophy. My goal is to show how this elucidation of analytic philosophy has post-metaphysical implications which allow speculations about the theory of understanding and the re-thinking of metaphysics and philosophy as autonomous fields of inquiry and point toward new approaches to explaining explanation which go well beyond centred radically objective metaphysical assumptions which configure analytic thought. The main conclusion of my speculative response to the Emmy Noether paper is that whatever explanation we accept of our investigatory authority, it is always configured by the metaphysical assumptions operating and that they are dependent on cultural, historical, semantic, intentional and metaphysical commitments like ontological and ontic preferences, and value, aesthetic choice and ethics. Without calculating the effect of these variables on argument, explanation has the characteristics of cultural and personal opinion based on an expression of the dogmatic understanding of how explanation works. (Short version of “Understanding the A Priori” at: http://fromthearmchair.net/project).

Simon Skempton (National Research University, Moscow; simon-skempton@gmail.com)

Badiou, Priest, and the Hegelian Infinite

Hegel’s distinction between the bad and true infinities has provoked contrasting reactions in the works of Badiou and Graham Priest. Badiou claims that Hegel illegitimately attempts to impose a distinction that is only relevant to the qualitative realm onto the quantitative realm. He suggests that Cantor’s mathematical account of infinite multiplicities that are determinate and actual remains an endlessly proliferating bad infinite when placed within Hegel’s faulty schema. In contrast, Priest affirms the Hegelian true infinite, claiming that Cantor’s transcfinite and his “diagonalization” mechanism of boundary transcendence are implicit in Hegel’s dialectic. Diagonalization can be seen as leading to either an endlessly proliferating bad infinite or the simultaneous transcendence and totalization of the infinity of self-relation, the true infinite. While arguing that a clear dividing line can be drawn here between two interpretations of the relationship between Hegel and Cantor, this paper also mounts a defense of the Hegelian true infinite, firstly by developing Priest’s suggestion that Cantorian diagonalizing functions are prefigured by Hegel’s dialectical overcoming of limits, and secondly by arguing that Badiou’s claim that the quantitative eludes the interiorizing tentacles of the dialectic
depends on a misreading of Hegel's philosophy as a “metaphysics of presence” that Badiou shares with a number of his contemporaries and compatriots.

Nicholas Smith (Macquarie University, nicholas.smith@mq.edu.au)

What is Productive Action?

The idea that productive action is a distinct action type, different in kind from moral action, is deeply ingrained in much Continental Philosophy. It is embraced by Arendt, Gadamer, and Habermas, amongst others, who owe their understanding of this idea to Aristotle’s famous distinction between poiesis (production) and praxis (action). For some time now, philosophers have been aware of the instability of Aristotle’s distinction, and the weaknesses of the social and political theories that are underpinned by it. But while the Aristotelian notion of praxis, and the associated concept of phronesis (practical wisdom), understood independently of the concept of poiesis, continues to attract the attention of philosophers, the concept of productive action itself has all but fallen from the philosophical radar. The question I raise in this paper is: what remains of the concept of productive action once it is abstracted from the discredited distinction between poiesis and praxis? If, for reasons that have been convincingly presented by Gyorgy Markus, James B. Murphy and others, productive action should not be contrasted with moral action in the way Aristotle and his Continental progenitors have supposed, how should it be conceived?

Rhonda Siu (University of New South Wales, rhonda.siu@gmail.com)

Music’s Life-Affirming Power in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy

This paper reconsiders the role that music is assumed to play in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (BT). It offers an alternative reading of this text through an examination of the nexus of his early linguistic, aesthetic and metaphysical views in BT, in conjunction with two, rarely mentioned unpublished essays, “The Dionysian Worldview” (1870) and “On Music and Words” (1871). My alternative reading coheres with the usual interpretation of BT insofar as it recognises that Dionysian music needs to coexist with the Apollonian plastic arts in order for the overall effect of tragedy to remain life affirming. Yet it also differs from this usual interpretation by questioning the idea that these two key aesthetic elements contribute equally to producing tragedy’s life-affirming power. It claims instead that this usual interpretation underestimates Dionysian music’s creative, transformative force to generate tragedy’s life-affirming potential through its potent expression of the metaphysical, corporeal, affective and intersubjective dimensions of human existence. As an expression of both pleasure and pain, of both creation and destruction, the musical element of tragedy provides a nuanced response to the ireradicable human suffering that Silenus’s wisdom expresses. In this context, then, the Apollonian element of tragedy only supports Dionysian music by facilitating the latter’s invaluable life-affirming contribution.

Sean Sturm and Stephen Turner (University of Auckland; s.sturm@auckland.ac.nz, sf.turner@auckland.ac.nz)

A Seismotics of the University

Here we consider the design-drive of the university 2.0. In line with Deleuze and Guattari’s “pedagogy of the concept” (1997: 12), we investigate the construction of the university itself as a — perhaps the — preeminent site of knowledge transmission of late capitalist technoculture. By pedagogy, Deleuze means the “construction” of concepts, rather than the teaching of them (see Toscano 2004: 120–21); a construction of the concept of the university, we contend, must also include its architectonics, that is to say, how it grounds itself by building. Such a construction Deleuze calls “groundwork,” or “working on the ground” (Deleuze 1992: 159). We view the architectonics of the university through the lens of Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s optics, wherein “common notions (concepts)” are revealed by a “light that traverses bodies and makes them transparent,” such that they “refer to geometrical structures or figures that . . . are transformable and deformable in a projective space” (1997: 148).

If our university is defined in its strategic plans and communications from the point of view of the visible, concretized in its building plans and those of Auckland’s “learning quarter,” our constructive method traces the visible and invisible lines of “force” and “flight” in the university (Deleuze 1992: 160–61). From the point of view of the invisible university, “critical thinking” and “creativity,” to take just
two of the bedrock givens of our university, need reworking: here, they are entrepreneurial, rather than emergent properties of “knowledge work.” What is required is a seismotic rupture of the apparatus of the university 2.0 to divulge such lines of flight as lie athwart its “force-field.” The designed space of the university must be seen as something teachers and learners construct, or “diagram” (Deleuze 1988: 34), in practice, rather than something they simply experience as a pre-constructed environment. Classrooms, corridors, cafés, etc. are places where critical and creative thinking and talk — “upbuilding discourses,” to use Kierkegaard’s term (2009) — can, in fact, do take place. When such places work, they show that the university can be otherwise; they are places of “becoming-other,” of transformation and deformation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 112).

Michelle Styles-Dargie (University of Queensland, mstylesdargie@gmail.com)

*Mimesis, Embodiment and Writing*

This paper argues that writing is an embodied mimetic practice and expands on Elizabeth Grosz’s notion of calligraphic writing.

Kiri Sullivan (University of Melbourne, k.sullivan3@student.unimelb.edu.au)

*The Cruelty of Time in Hitchcock’s Vertigo*

In *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* Deleuze describes *Vertigo* as one of “perhaps three films which show how we inhabit time, how we move in it, in this form which carries us away, picks us up and enlarges us” (1989, 82). Deleuze borrows from Bergson and Proust when he observes that “time is not internal to us, but...we are internal to time, which divides itself in two, which loses itself and discovers itself in itself, which makes the present past and the past be preserved” (80). This paper explores temporality in *Vertigo* through analysis of instances of repetition and its embodiment in the Hitchcockian motif of the double. I suggest that it is the multiplicity of time and repetitions that produce, divide, and double bodies that serve to exemplify characters’ perspectives on and experiences of time. We can discern a specific relationship between time-images and the double by focusing on the Deleuzian notion of repetition containing difference. Deleuze’s theorization of the three syntheses of time in *Difference and Repetition* encourages a commitment to time as composed of multiple productive processes that create beings and bodies. Through the figure of the double, *Vertigo* shatters boundaries between past/present/future, reminding us that it is never the same — but only difference — that returns eternally through the enactment of violence and cruelty on the body of the double, and on those who try to repeat the past.

Terrilyn Sweep (University of Queensland, t.sweep@uq.edu.au)

*Agent-Regret, Risk, Control Points and the Expression of Being*

In this paper, I explore Bernard Williams’ analysis of agent-regret, but flavour it with Heidegger’s ontological treatment of Being. It seems to me that there is an urge to take risks in order to experience something new and different. It is this urge that interests me, particularly when the action is a high risk one. Williams’ account of moral luck claims that how we think of ourselves in relation to actions we take is affected by intrinsic and extrinsic luck. When things go badly (and even if things go well) what we do or omit doing can result in agent regret. I want to propose that the need to create (new experiences), but seen from a Heideggerian viewpoint of the revealing of Being rather than subjective volition, should also be considered as a factor of intrinsic luck. It is a fact of our individual beings that we respond to the possibilities of creation and this sits in tension with the overt ontic results of one’s actions. In addition, I want to propose that there are control points in the revealing of Being. On the “safe” side of the revelation we are in control of what is revealed, but this is never a “free” expression of Being since Being will be expressed along pre-set parameters of our being-in-the-world. When we risk everything and allow Being to emerge, this is when agent-regret can arise. In some pursuits the free expression of Being is sanctioned and “safe,” such as in producing great art. The artist brings forth new expressions and does not (necessarily) suffer any consequences. This is one way of rendering new Being, however, if we play with new ways of being within ourselves, then there is a higher risk of losing control of the expression of Being. On the one hand this becomes authentic creation, on the other there is the risk of losing who we were. As beings-in-the-world we must survive within a pre-existing network with other beings. Rescripting our own being affects that of others. The need to discover Being within ourselves and the need to be-in-the-world are precarious companions.
Kim Tae-Kyung (University of York, tk612@york.ac.uk)

Does Colour Physicalism Prove the Ontological Property of Colours?

Objects have colours. We are able to perceive the colours and distinguish the difference between certain colours of the objects. Colour itself is a property of an object and has the phenomenological character that they appear to perceivers as they are. In explaining such characters of colours, some neuro-physiological analysis of visual organs and scientific analysis of light seem to give persuasive explanations, which support the colour physicalism. According to the physicalism, it is a physical property of colour, the surface spectral reflectance (SSR), which concretely defines the colour of objects. This physicalism has a strong idea as it can explain the colour constancy phenomenon and the mechanism of visual perception. This account might prompt two claims: firstly, colours are mind-independent properties of material objects; secondly, that our content of perceptual experience is dependent on the physical property of colours and our visual organs. If these claims were right, then it could support the non-conceptualists’ claim that the contents of colour experience are sometimes non-conceptual. However, there are some phenomena that the physicalists have to consider, for example, the idea that perceivers have different content of experience of colours even though they are under the same given conditions. This is called “colour variation.” In addition, we can perceive constant colours and apparent colours of hologram pictures without SSR. This implies that the perception of colours is not only dependent on the physical properties of objects. If this is right, then the physicalists may have to reconsider their belief that “colours = SSR.” Through the above issues, I will claim two things. First, that the contents of colour experience are not the responses of visual neurons to the stimulus; rather, they are applying concepts to the stimuli and the object. Second, that it has to be explained on a categorical level, not the physical level.

Adam Tate (Macquarie University, r.tate.adam@gmail.com)

The Incompleteness of Being and Time and the Incompleteness of Being and Time’s Concept of World

Near the beginning of Being and Time Heidegger presents an analysis of the concept of world that has remained the key measure for virtually all commentary on Heidegger’s late 20s understanding of world. Accordingly, commentary on the problem of world in Heidegger tends to understand world in an intrinsic connection with practical comportments or the “network” of the work-world’s significance (Bedeutsamkeit) and so on. And yet, in Being and Time, Heidegger tells us that the unpublished third division would provide “a positive understanding of the problematic of the world . . . for the first time” (§2 100). That is, the analysis of the surrounding world is so far from providing an answer to the problem of world, that it doesn’t even fully formulate the question of world. This paper will discuss Heidegger’s abortive plans for the fundamental ontological problem of world. Through this it will be possible to show that the problem of world in Being and Time intrinsically points to what Heidegger calls the problem of “transcendence.” It will be possible to show how this concept of “transcendence” has nothing to do with overcoming barriers; with linking together a collection of world-bits; with pragmatic systems or anything of this kind. Instead, it will be possible to show that and how this concept of transcendence is concerned solely and intrinsically with the worldliness of the world.

Trevor Thwaites (University of Auckland, t.thwaites@auckland.ac.nz)

A Leap into the Abyss: Heidegger on Thinking

Heidegger delivered three lecture courses in Freiburg during the 1950s: What is Called Thinking? (1951-52), The Principle of Reason (1955-56), and Basic Principles of Thinking (1957). In these lectures Heidegger follows his earlier trajectory of relating back to Greek thinking and, in this case, to the Greek conception of the opening or clearing. Heidegger also questions the notion of dialectical thought embedded in German Idealism suggesting that this clouds the essence of thinking. He promotes meditative thinking, thinking that begins with an awareness of the field and is open to its content and open to what is given (1951-52). Heidegger also claims that, in contemporary thought, logic has become more logical and has been modified into “logistics” so that “logic procures its ultimate and planetary form of dominance” empowered as “the soliloquy of language” (1957). He proposes a “leap into the abyss” which might be understood in Heidegger’s primordial ruminations as “saying” — whose basic characteristic is the letting appear or bringing forth. Heidegger stresses that “saying” is not limited to words and is the interconnection of being, language, and thinking. My discussion considers
the three lecture courses in the light of the politics of thinking in the contemporary world of the early twenty-first century.

**Daniel Tigard** (Tulane University, dtigard@tulane.edu)

*Culture and Punishment: A Nietzschean Analysis of Justice*

Naive genealogists of morals have misunderstood the purpose of punishment. Supposing merely reactive and weak characterizations to be the origin of punishment is to overlook a greater, more powerful role possessed by the act itself and by the individual who carries it out. It requires an “active, aggressive, arrogant man,” a man whom, as Nietzsche claims, is “a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive man.” What is it about the activity of the punisher that allows him to be seen in such a positive light? How exactly does punishment contribute to justice? With his diagnosis of sick cultures, Nietzsche prescribes the closing of one’s horizons. Closed horizons work to the advantage of individuals that are able and willing to overcome the passivity and institutionalization of fear that plagues the last man. The society of the last man — as encountered by Zarathustra — is wrought with inactivity. Institutions are erected, poisons concocted, customs and laws established all with the negative purpose of avoiding pain and discomfort. In order for a culture to survive, its members must take positive action and, in doing so, take risks. “All acting requires forgetting,” Nietzsche explains. In this essay, I show how the ability to forget enables action, how administration of punishment is an active participation in justice. Such participatory justice, I argue, is virtuous in supporting a confirmation of meaningful existence and a positive organization of culture.

**Claire Timperley** (University of Virginia, timperley@virginia.edu)

*Constellations of Indigeneity: The Promise of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics*

Despite international recognition of the importance of indigenous rights, indigenous communities continue to face obstacles to acknowledgement of and restitution for their grievances. Among these obstacles is a concern about the nature of indigeneity itself: what makes a person or a group indigenous? And why might indigeneity uniquely confer particular rights? While there has been sustained scholarly attention to the rights that should be granted to indigenous groups, the concept of indigeneity is rarely explored. However, without an understanding of what indigeneity entails, the grounds for restitution are shaky. In *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno calls for recognition of the nonidentical — those characteristics that cannot be subsumed under the universal. For him, the nonidentical is negative — it points to the place where understanding encounters limits. Adorno’s nonidentical offers fruitful territory from which to approach the power and limits of conceptions of indigeneity. It allows us to engage critically with a constellation of concepts that — through negative space — attends to the unique experience and history of indigeneity. Focusing on the negative allows us to re-imagine the possibilities of indigeneity by avoiding assertions that seek to bolster claims of one group over another. Instead, commitment to the nonidentical opens the possibility for nuanced assessments about the nature of indigeneity and the opportunity to question essentialised identities and knowledge.

**Søren Tinning** (University of Turin, Italy; sorentinning2@gmail.com)

*The Active-Passive Architecture of the Critique of Pure Reason*

This article will outline two logics of activity-passivity in relation to the auto-limitation of reason in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. One will articulate the possibility of transcendental knowledge through a linear dynamic where activity-passivity is sharply distinct by the concept of limit (*Schranke*). The other will articulate a circular logic demarcated by the concept of boundary (*Grenze*), which constitutes the structure of pure reason itself. It is in this fully independent circular structure that pure reason secures itself as a necessary foundation of transcendental knowledge. The outline will show how the limit is primary as the constitutive demarcation of the possibility of necessary knowledge but also entails an inherent infinite regress. This problem is solved through the boundary’s concession of a (negative) transcendence of the closed character of the limit, allowing reason to positively demarcating its own founding limitation; i.e., making its own pure auto-limitation possible. Concluding, it will be discussed how the architecture of the CPR at central points appears ambivalent because the boundary challenges the constitutive priority of the limit; i.e., the openness of the boundary jeopardizes the closedness of the limit and thus potentially the necessity of transcendental knowledge. This final interpretation of the
CPR will lead to some remarks on how this ambivalence has been answered by Kant himself, by Fichte, and by Heidegger.

**Tyler Tritten** (Armstrong Atlantic State University, tyler.tritten@armstrong.edu)

*Necessity from Contingency: Otherwise than the Ens Necessarium and the Principle of Sufficient Reason*

In this presentation I propose that God is contingent. By this I am not espousing a form of process theology, whereby God’s consequent nature would be contingent upon the given datum of the world such that God is mutable and, more extremely, may even need to undergo an accouchement process in order first to come into being at all, nor am I proposing a process theology in which God would emerge as a novel quality, a supervenience upon a more original substratum. The god(s) of process philosophy, despite their mutability, always emerge according to a necessary manner of becoming. My assertion that God is fundamentally contingent — while not excluding that a subsequent necessity follows from God’s contingency — does not shy away from the fact that God is precisely that, a fact, and therefore something that could have not been, i.e. something contingent. My position stems from readings of Quentin Meillassoux, with his notion of supercontingency or Hyper-Chaos, and F.W.J. Schelling, with his notion of facticity of the unprethinkable. I will show how necessity is itself nothing but an accident of contingency. God’s existence is not grounded upon any sort of sufficient reason whatsoever, yet without precluded that his essence, i.e. his manner of being, is necessary. Necessity itself is a contingent fact.

**Chiu Yui Plato Tse** (Chinese University of Hong Kong, tsechiuyui@hotmail.com)

*Reinhold’s Principle of Consciousness Revisited*

An understanding of Reinhold is indispensable if one is to understand the motivation and the context of development of post-Kantian idealism. Reinhold’s principle of consciousness is proposed as the universally valid and universally accepted first principle of philosophy and it was supposed to be capturing the fundamental structure of all instances of cognitive consciousness, including self-consciousness. The theory is basically a representational theory of cognition. The purpose of this essay is to critically assess Reinhold’s principle of consciousness. The task is two-fold. Firstly, I will try to do some more justice to Reinhold in pointing out what is actually right about the principle, clearing out one false charge — which can be called the “regress-argument.” This argument against the principle takes issue with the structure of consciousness proposed by the principle and aims at rejecting the principle by appealing to self-consciousness as an instance that cannot be accommodated by the proposed structure of consciousness. I will suggest that this argument cannot effectively invalidate the principle, as there is at least one way to rescue it by further specifying the structure. Secondly, I will also point out what is really wrong with the principle, putting one real charge to the foreground. The real issue concerns the reality of the circularity inherent in the structure of consciousness, which is required by Reinhold’s affirmation of the principle as universally valid.

**Philippa Tunney** (University of Tasmania, philippatunney@gmail.com)

*Husserl’s Failed Annihilation of the World*

In this paper, I offer an interpretation of the famous thought experiment in §49 of *Ideas I* where Husserl annihilates the world to leave only pure and absolute consciousness. I will argue, in contrast to the literature, that Husserl fails in his attempt to annihilate the world. My analysis of §49 rests on asking which of his own four definitions of world Husserl is trying to annihilate. In §1-48 Husserl has defined the world as first: the overarching-collective horizon, second: the horizon for specific types of objects, third: as the surrounding world, and fourth: as the physical/natural world. By looking at each understanding of world in relation to the thought experiment, I conclude that Husserl fails to annihilate three, but does successfully annihilate the physical world. I further argue that if Husserl is unable to destroy the first three understandings of world without also destroying consciousness, then there is an interdependent relationship between consciousness and world, where neither can be without the other.
Fiona Utley and Jane Lymer (University of New England and University of Wollongong; futley2@unc.edu.au, jmb42@uow.edu.au)
The Maternal as Hospitality

There is significant play between the trope of hospitality as providing a political ontology and arguments that the maternal as pregnant embodiment is the original hospitality and thus the grounds of ethical engagement. For example, Diprose’s critique of a political ontology of hospitality identifies that political hospitality is only possible due to women giving their lived time as potential mothers towards establishing and maintaining domestic stability. The more conditional the hospitality the more existing inequities are exploited with women increasingly unlikely to garner recognition for their civil rights over embodiment and reproduction. Alternately Aristarkova argues that the Levinasian-Derridean conception of hospitality would benefit from acknowledging that the dematerialised idea of femininity as familiarity is a description of the maternal relation and it is the maternal body that grounds acts of hospitality. Such acknowledgement would open the possibility for welcoming the maternal into the discourse and provide a solution to Derrida’s aporia of ownership. The structure of images, here primarily the trope of the maternal to guide the development of a concept of the ethical and political subject, must be examined more thoroughly. In this paper we undertake a parallel reading of the maternal and the concept of hospitality by drawing upon La Caze’s work on specific forms of images used in philosophical thinking and Kristeva and Diprose’s work on women’s temporality.

Dimitris Vardoulakis (University of Western Sydney, d.vardoulakis@uws.edu.au)
Sovereignty and Foucault’s Biopolitics

I argue that Foucault conceives biopolitics not as separate, but only as distinct from other forms of sovereign power. I highlight some aspects of the way that different “regimes of power” can be connected if sovereignty is taken to signify different forms of justification of violence. I also draw some implications for a more general theory of sovereignty.

Daniela Voss (Free University of Berlin, Germany; voossdani@gmail.com)
Pity the Meat! Deleuze and Francis Bacon

According to Deleuze, both philosophy and works of art have the important task of resistance to what is intolerable in the present. To resist means to liberate us from the rule of actual facts and to create a movement of becoming beyond the actual toward the virtual, that is, the realm of virtual Ideas or pure events. For Deleuze, this movement of becoming — or process of “counter-actualisation” as he also calls it — has a clear utopian aim, namely that of calling forth a new earth, a new people. Francis Bacon’s paintings with their monstrous figures suffering from contortions and convulsive pain precisely pursue this utopian aim: the advent of a universal people in which the specific differences between man and animal are wiped out. The common zone between man and animal is the universal meat, which Francis Bacon captures in splendid colours. Deleuze detects in Bacon’s paintings an intense pity for the meat and a declaration of faith in life. What Bacon renders visible, we will argue, is the virtual Idea of vitality. This paper will connect Deleuze’s ethics of virtual becoming with the pictorial art of Francis Bacon and elaborate the metaphysical notion of universal meat (viande) as a challenge to the phenomenological notion of flesh (chair).

Saige Walton (University of South Australia, saige.walton@unisa.edu.au)
The Beauty of the Act: The Cinematic Gestures of Holy Motors [Film Philosophy Panel]

In his only essay devoted to the cinema, “The Film and the New Psychology,” Maurice Merleau-Ponty was to approach film as a perceptual, aesthetic and gestural gestalt that recalls our own being-in-the-world. Attending to a film’s temporal structure, as well as to its rhythm, movement, and sound, Merleau-Ponty argues that cinema incarnates ways of being — ways of being that are inter-subjectively apprehended through the perceptions and expressions of the lived-body. Shifting away from an internalized and hermetic account of the emotions, the philosopher maintains that “[a]nger, shame, hate, and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness: they are types of behaviour or styles of conduct which are visible from the outset. They exist on this face or in those gestures” (52). As with the communication of feeling to others through bodily gesture and attitude, Merleau-Ponty goes so far as to insist that what is “inside is also outside” at the cinema, whereby an
“interior landscape” is made manifest upon the surface of both body and film through particular styles of behaviour (58-59). While Merleau-Ponty productively captures the elicitation of feeling through a film’s surface expressions, the power of the cinematic gesture is delimited to the pre-reflective. To quote Merleau-Ponty: it is “perception [that] permits us to understand the meaning of the cinema” because a “movie is not thought; it is perceived” (58). What, then, are we to make of those films that deliberately and reflectively gesture towards their own cinematic being? How might our embodied intelligence be solicited by such self-reflexive gestures? This paper mobilizes Leo Carax’s recent Holy Motors (2012) — a film that gestures towards film history and Carax’s own work, while also attempting to figure the condition and possibility of the medium itself — to erode distinctions between cinema’s sensuous presentations and its reflective representations at the level of the lived-body.

**Chris Watkin** (Monash University, chris.watkin@monash.edu)  
*For the Love of Equality: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Adoration*

Philosophical discourse on the subject of political egalitarianism customarily privileges the demand for justice over any appeal to love, and for seemingly good reason: love is thought to be apolitical, impotent in the face of oppression and no revolutionary threat to those in power. In L’Adoration (2010, English translation to be published December 2012), Jean-Luc Nancy offers his most direct engagement to date with the theme of equality, and also one of his most sustained meditations on (agapic, erotic and filial) love. In so doing, he makes a compelling case for putting love at the centre of our thinking about equality. This paper first lays out the way in which Nancy relates love and equality in L’Adoration, setting it in the context of Being Singular Plural, Je t’aime . . . and “Shattered Love.” It then uses L’Adoration as a provocation to rethink the place of love in contemporary discussions of political equality by first showing how thinking equality without love for Nancy is structurally identical to the bad ‘general equivalence’ of capitalism, and then arguing that just as, for Nancy, communism is the truth of democracy, so also love is the truth of equality. The consequences of this re-inscription of love at the heart of equality are far-reaching: to seek equality without love is not only unloving but also rigorously and demonstrably un-egalitarian. This poses an important and uncomfortable challenge to the way we think about and engage in emancipatory politics.

**Bradley Warfield** (University of South Florida, bradley.warfield@gmail.com)  
*Charles Taylor and the Dialogical Moral Self*

In his most explicit treatment of Mikhail Bakhtin’s conception of the dialogical self, Charles Taylor suggests the endorsement of the latter’s view. On Bakhtin’s view, the dialogical self is composed of multiple, co-existing “voices,” “perspectives,” or “I positions” which remain on equal epistemic footing—and are in continuous dialogue—with one another (i.e., the “thick” version). Contra Taylor’s own claims, I argue that he must be committed to rejecting the Bakhtinian view, and must endorse, instead, a “thin” version of the dialogical self, in which the multiplicity of voices is subsumable, at any time, under a dominant voice. This is because this “thin” version alone is consistent with Taylor’s insistence, in his moral ontology, that for the health of the moral self a single “I position” must dominate the other “I positions,” thereby giving coherence to the relation between one’s moral deliberations and one’s “strong evaluative” moral self.

**Daniel Wilson** (University of Auckland, dwil237@aucklanduni.ac.nz)  
*The key to the Critique of taste: Interpreting §9 of Kant’s Critique of Judgment*

In this talk I’m going to provide an interpretation of §9 of Kant’s Critique of Judgment where he describes how judgments of taste are performed. Interpreters are divided over the correct way to interpret what Kant means in the following sentence: “Hence it is the universal capacity for being communicated incident to the mental state in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgement of taste, must be fundamental, with the pleasure in the object as its consequent.” The question is: How can Kant claim that an aesthetic judgment of the beautiful can be made (a judgment of pleasure or displeasure) while insisting that the pleasure is a consequence of the judging? I suggest and defend an answer to this problem that allows for a consistent reading of Kant’s text.
Andrew Wiltshire (University of Queensland, a.wiltshire@uq.edu.au)

Reason and Undecidability in Derrida and Habermas

Despite the burgeoning literature on the relation between Derrida and Habermas, there is a lack of analysis relating Habermas’ communicative reason to Derrida’s understanding of reason. This follows from a general lack of discussion concerning how Derrida’s philosophy, with its focus on structural undecidability and the constitutive outside, can positively transform our conception of reason. Although progress has been made over the relativistic interpretations, such as the one provided by Habermas, that took him to be participating in the outright rejection of reason, deconstruction still tends to be taken as standing in a purely negative relation to reason. Even those who highlight the ethical motivation behind deconstruction still tend to see the value of Derrida’s thought in its ability to demonstrate when reason negatively encroaches on the other, rather than in its possible contribution to a positive account. In this paper, by working within a Habermasian framework that acknowledges that reason must be situated within everyday communicative practices, I discuss how Derrida’s thought contributes to a positive transformation of our understanding of reason.

Katherine Withy (Georgetown University, kaw84@georgetown.edu)

Heidegger’s Antigone

Sophocles’ Antigone is the only person whom Heidegger names as authentic. But in trying to make sense of Antigone’s authenticity, we encounter two problems. First, Heidegger’s Antigone seems quite unlike any Antigone we have seen before in Continental philosophy (e.g. in Hegel, Lacan, Butler). Heidegger thus forces us to think Antigone anew. Second, Heidegger’s Antigone seems to escape the usual interpretations of Heideggerian authenticity (as being-towards-death, as taking responsibility for norms, as world-historical creation, and as Aristotelian phronēsis). Antigone thus forces us to think Heidegger anew. The source of these two problems is the fact that, as Heidegger sees her, Antigone is authentically uncanny. What Heidegger means by “uncanniness” is (as is to be expected) quite unlike what Freud or Derrida mean by the term. Uncanniness is a feature of being — its presencing through absencing. Antigone is authentically uncanny insofar as she relates appropriately to being’s presencing by being responsive and appropriately to being’s absencing by being reticent. Heidegger’s Antigone is thus a surprisingly passive heroine, and not the radical and autonomous figure she is often taken to be. Correspondingly, the vision of authenticity that we find in Heidegger’s reading of the play signals Heidegger’s own shift away from his earlier Aristotelianism and later Nietzscheanism, towards an ethics of Gelassenheit.
BOOK LAUNCH

Monday, 10th December
8.00 – 9.00 PM

THE GUS FISHER GALLERY

www.gusfishergallery.auckland.ac.nz/

74 Shortland St, Auckland Central
All conference participants welcome
Call for Papers

Parrhesia

Special Issue

The journal will publish a special issue in 2013 featuring a selection of papers from the conference.

We invite submissions of papers by 10th January 2013. Submissions should be in short form as presented at the conference. A selection will be made from these submissions by the guest editors and authors will be invited to prepare a longer version for publication. However, the guest editors reserve the right not to publish longer version papers if they do not meet the scholarly standards of the journal.

Submissions should be sent by email to Matheson Russell (m.russell@auckland.ac.nz).

Postgraduate Prize

A $500 prize will be awarded for the best postgraduate paper presented at the conference.

We invite submissions or nominations by 10th January 2013. Please include a copy of the paper as presented at the conference. A committee will decide the prize shortly thereafter and the winner will be announced on the ASCP news list. The winning paper will also be considered for inclusion in the Parrhesia ASCP Special Issue.

Submissions and nominations should be sent by email to Matheson Russell (m.russell@auckland.ac.nz).
Internet Access

Conference participants are welcome to access the Internet via the computers on campus or via the wireless network using personal computers or other devices. Both campus computers and the wireless network can be accessed using any one of the following login and password combinations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Login</th>
<th>Password</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>conf9031</td>
<td>nulenkic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conf9032</td>
<td>mehilyni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conf9033</td>
<td>ke9a5ash</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Select network: UoA-WiFi

Transport for
Auckland Airport

We recommend travelling to and from Auckland Airport using the Airbus Express (www.airbus.co.nz) or Super Shuttle (www.supershuttle.co.nz). These are cheaper options than taxis.

Allow an hour to and from the airport

Places to Eat
(vegetarian)

&

Supermarkets in the City

Raw Power Café — Floor 1, 10 Vulcan Lane
Revive Vegetarian Café — 33 Lorne St
Countdown Metro Supermarket — 17-25 Victoria St West
CONFERENCE DINNER

Tuesday, 11th December
6.30–9.30pm

Mecca Restaurant, Chancery
http://www.meccacafe.com/

Chancery, Auckland Central
for those registered for the conference dinner

ASCP
Annual General Meeting

The Annual General Meeting of the ASCP is scheduled for Wednesday afternoon of the conference, 12th December. If you have registered for the conference, then you are also a registered member of the ASCP (for the next 12 months), and you are entitled to participate in the AGM.
Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy