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Abstract
The origin of this essay lies in two commentary pieces I read in The Guardian newspaper. Hugo Young was a Guardian commentator to his fingertips: well-informed, judicious, capable of seeing all sides of the argument. Which meant that for most of the time, as far as I was concerned, he was frustratingly moderate in his opinions, an archetypal liberal, which made this particular piece very striking. Young knew he was dying of cancer and that his column on 16th September 2003 would be the last one he wrote. He chose to write about the relationship between Britain and the USA, and the final words of the column, the final words he would write — so the written equivalent of the deathbed quotation — asked what would become of our country now it was ‘in abject thrall to Bush and his gang.’ Then in August 2005, the historian Timothy Garton Ash offered this comparison:
PETER HULME

Remember the Mane: A Special Poetic Relationship, 1895–1904

The origin of this essay lies in two commentary pieces I read in The Guardian newspaper. Hugo Young was a Guardian commentator to his fingertips: well-informed, judicious, capable of seeing all sides of the argument. Which meant that for most of the time, as far as I was concerned, he was frustratingly moderate in his opinions, an archetypal liberal, which made this particular piece very striking. Young knew he was dying of cancer and that his column on 16th September 2003 would be the last one he wrote. He chose to write about the relationship between Britain and the USA, and the final words of the column, the final words he would write — so the written equivalent of the deathbed quotation — asked what would become of our country now it was ‘in abject thrall to Bush and his gang’. Then in August 2005, the historian Timothy Garton Ash offered this comparison:

If you want to know what London was like in 1905, come to Washington in 2005. Imperial gravitas and massive self-importance. That sense of being the centre of the world, and of needing to know what happens in every corner of the world because you might be called on — or at least feel called upon — to intervene there. Hyperpower. Top dog. And yet, gnawing away beneath the surface, the nagging fear that your global supremacy is not half so secure as you would wish. As Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary, put it in 1902: ‘The weary Titan staggers under the too vast orb of his fate’.

‘The weary Titan’ rang a bell, though I needed to look it up. ‘Abject thrall’ had stayed in my mind and took a little more tracking down, although I suspect that Young was only unconsciously aware, if at all, of the phrase’s appearance in Edmund Spenser’s ‘Hymne of Heavenly Love’ (‘Out of the bosome of eternall blisse / In which he reigned with his glorious syre, / He downe descended, like a demisse / And abject thrall, in fleshes fraile attyre’), appropriate as that quotation might have been, if satirically intended, given the very publicly manifested Christian faith of George W. Bush and Tony Blair. But when did the ‘abject thrall’ that Young was talking about begin and what might explain it? US-British relationships are obviously long and complicated, and this essay doesn’t offer a fully-informed historical answer, but it is certainly the case that the relationship shifted dramatically around the end of the nineteenth century, arguably assuming then the form it still takes more than a hundred years later. Interestingly, much of the discussion about that shift took place as public poetry.

* * * * *
WAR OVER THE VENEZUELAN BORDER

Given the history of the last century, it always takes an effort to remember that there was serious talk of war between the USA and Britain in 1895, improbably enough over the border between Venezuela and British Guiana. This had been a long-running dispute — indeed it still is a dispute between Venezuela and now independent Guyana. Eventually Venezuela sought US support. Although no US national interests were involved, Grover Cleveland’s administration invoked the Monroe Doctrine to suggest that arbitration was in order. It did so via a memorandum to the British government delivered in July 1895 by Richard Olney, which has perhaps never been given its full due as announcing — as much in tone as in substance — the US determination to change the global order:

The United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good-will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to other grounds, its infinite resources, combined with its isolated position, render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.

(Curtis 284)

Five years later, Theodore Roosevelt would famously define his foreign policy as ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick’. If you were going to speak as loudly as Olney, it was even more important that your stick was big enough to back up your words. It’s sometimes forgotten that it was Britain which first felt the threat of that stick. With good reason Cleveland referred to his Secretary of State’s words as ‘Olney’s twenty-inch gun’ (qtd in Dennis 23).

The British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, took two months to reply before pointedly refuting Olney’s arguments, but soon accepting arbitration. The USA was not interested in Venezuela’s territorial claims — in fact the arbitration committee largely accepted the British case. It was interested in asserting its own right to control the American continent, as Cleveland’s aggressive message to Congress in December 1895 made abundantly clear.

Alarmed by the tone of US language, such dignitaries as the Prince of Wales, the Duke of York, and the Archbishop of London published a series of peace messages in British and US newspapers in January 1896. A poetic appeal was also published by William Watson in sonnet form:

O towering Daughter, Titan of the West,
Behind a thousand leagues of foam secure;
Thou toward whom our inmost heart is pure
Of ill intent: although thou threatenest
With most unfilial hand thy mother’s breast,
Not for one breathing-space may Earth endure
The thought of War’s intolerable cure
For such vague pains as vex to-day thy rest!
But if thou hast more strength than thou canst spend

(Curtis 284)
In tasks of Peace, and find’st her yoke too tame,
Help us to smite the cruel, to befriend
The succourless, and put the false to shame.
So shall the ages laud thee, and thy name
Be lovely among nations to the end.

The intertextual relationships here are quite complex. When Britain seemed at threat from France in 1852, Tennyson had addressed the ‘Gigantic daughter of the West’: ‘We know thee most, we love thee best, / For art thou not of British blood?’; though, when called on militarily, the British offspring become male: ‘Arise, our strong Atlantic sons, / When war against our freedom springs!’. Watson’s phrase ‘towering daughter’ to refer to the USA is in the same vein as Tennyson, but probably picks up the phrase from a poem by Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Anglophile New Englander, written on the dedication of the Shakespeare Fountain at Stratford-on-Avon in 1887, a poem which ends with a conventional elegy to the familial relationship between the two countries:

Land of our fathers, ocean makes us two,
But heart to heart is true!
Proud is your towering daughter in the West,
Yet in her burning life-blood reign confest
Her mother’s pulses beating in her breast.
This holy fount, whose rills from heaven descend,
   Its gracious drops shall lend,—
Both foreheads bathed in that baptismal dew,
And love make one the old home and the new!

‘Towerling daughter’ may sound slightly threatening; and the fact that the fountain had been paid for by George C. Childs, millionaire Philadelphian publisher, perhaps spoke to changing times in which the mother country’s national institutions needed financial support from wealthy daughters to survive. Nonetheless, maternal pieties are observed here, and Holmes celebrates the common fount which bathes both foreheads.

In Watson’s poem, the USA is still the daughter, still in that genealogically secondary position, able to be chided for her unfilial threat to the imperial mother. But at the same time she is also ‘Titan of the West’, another poetic reference, this time to Matthew Arnold’s world-weary characterisation of England in his 1867 poem, ‘Heine’s Grave’. Remembering Heine’s criticism of England, Arnold had written:

So thou arraign’st her, her foe;
So we arraign her, her sons.

    Yes, we arraign her! but she,
The weary Titan, with deaf
Ears, and labour-dimm’d eyes,
Regarding neither to right
Nor left, goes passively by,
Staggering on to her goal;
Bearing on shoulders immense,
Atlantean, the load,
Wellnigh not to be borne,
Of the too vast orb of her fate.

That Arnoldian reference to the ‘weary Titan’ would also be picked up by Joseph Chamberlain in a well-known exchange with Sir Wilfrid Laurier at the 1902 Colonial Conference. To Laurier’s challenge, ‘If you want our aid [the aid of the colonies], call us to your councils,’ Chamberlain would reply:

Gentlemen, we do want your aid. We do require your assistance in the administration of the vast Empire which is yours as well as ours. The weary Titan staggers under the too vast orb of its fate. We have borne the burden for many years. We think it time that our children should assist us to support it, and whenever you make the request to us, be very sure that we shall hasten gladly to call you to our councils. (Amery 421)

In this case, the familial metaphor can survive because Chamberlain is addressing the Empire and Britain can still see itself as the mother country — even though Chamberlain neutralises Britain’s gender in his quotation from Arnold: now the too vast orb of its fate, where Arnold had ‘her fate’. Chamberlain’s biographer notes that although the proceedings of the 1902 Colonial Conference were never published, he draws from a 197-page verbatim record for his version of the speech, so it’s telling that almost all references to it, including Timothy Garton Ash’s, write of ‘his fate’.

Watson’s reference is rather different. The USA may still be a daughter, but she is also herself a Titan. Once the unfilial threat has been contained by the remark that the Earth itself would not endure the thought of war, the poem can proceed to find tasks for the surplus energies of this new Titan: smiting the cruel and putting the false to shame. In the same month Watson’s poem appeared, British politicians were hastening to recalibrate the familial relationship in the face of US sword-rattling. Arthur Balfour stressed that the very idea of war with the United States carried with it some of the unnatural horror of a civil war (Dugdale vol. I 226); Joseph Chamberlain said such war would be an absurdity as well as a crime, indeed a fratricidal strife (Neale xvii). None of this language was particularly reassuring given that the potential antagonist had in the not too distant past launched itself into fratricidal slaughter on an unprecedented scale. However, conflict was never really likely because, despite the terms of Salisbury’s response to Olney, British strategy was ‘solidly one of concession to the United States’ (Campbell 1960 26). By February 1896 the Queen, the government, and the opposition were falling over each other to accept the Monroe Doctrine and the right of the USA to appoint a boundary commission. This was not the response of a benevolent mother towards a petulant daughter, or of a brother to an estranged brother, nor even of one Titan towards a sister Titan. This was already abject thrall, even if it was an abjection thought bearable because the new world power was in some sense ‘ours’ — and I’ll come back to the significance of that possessive pronoun.
As if to underline the ritual nature of this transition, Britain had to undergo two further humiliations at the hands of the USA during this decade. The second — and most significant — concerned the replacement of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which tied US hands when it came to building and fortifying the isthmian canal, soon to be cut across Central America. Again, after several years of negotiation, Britain simply accepted US terms. The new factor here, driving US interests, was Theodore Roosevelt, first as Governor of New York, then as Vice President and President. Building on Olney’s example, Roosevelt perfected the art of diplomacy based on taking a stance of moral righteousness and not shifting from it. The third bone of contention was the Canadian border with Alaska, an issue of some moment after the gold rush of 1897–99. In the end, a rigged commission was established to give the USA the result it wanted and Britain a relatively dignified retreat. Canada was not pleased.

**AMERICANISM**

The ideology of Americanism had originally been concerned to defend the continent from the condescension of the self-defined Old World, as represented by thinkers such as Buffon and Hegel. Thomas Jefferson himself had played an important role here, as had South American figures such as Andrés Bello and Simón Bolívar, and the hugely influential European scientist, Alexander von Humboldt. However, as the nineteenth century progressed, US Americanism increasingly became an ideology based on the supposed moral and political superiority of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, distanced equally from the dying cultures of old Europe and the turbulent world of Latin America. The first watchword of this ideology was ‘manifest destiny’, a term originally dating from the 1840s, but repopularised through the writings of one of the most prolific and widely-read nineteenth-century US historians, John Fiske, whose lecture of that title was the centrepiece of a series he delivered at London’s Royal Institution in 1880: ‘In the deepest and widest sense, our American history … descends in unbroken continuity from the days when stout Arminius in the forests of northern Germany successfully defied the might of imperial Rome’. This was the destiny of a people variously called English, Teuton, Anglo-Saxon, or Aryan (Fiske 7, 151). As another popular writer, Josiah Strong, put it in 1891:

> It seems to me that God, with infinite wisdom and skill, is training the Anglo-Saxon race for an hour sure to come in the world’s future… If I read not amiss, this powerful race will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and beyond. And can anyone doubt that the result of this competition of races will be the ‘survival of the fittest’? (213–14).

The strategist for these US global ambitions was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a naval historian who became a close associate of Roosevelt’s, and a writer whose theories of cultural conflict still find their neo-conservative echoes today. His key text is *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, published in 1897, which collected essays published during the 1890s. Decrepit
as it was by 1898, the attraction of the remnants of Spanish Empire to the USA lay in Spain’s original circumnavigatory ambitions, which had led to the acquisition of territories on a tropical belt around the world. That Central American canal would soon complete the process initiated by Suez, and the USA would be able to establish for itself a world-wide commercial network supported by coaling stations across the Pacific—Hawaii, Midway, Wake, Guam, Manila. The coaling stations Mahan argued for have become refuelling stations for B52s, but that circumnavigatory belt is still crucial, with additional links provided by client states such as Britain, as with the removal of the inhabitants of the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean now a military island base crucial for the bombing of both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mahan had always judged the Caribbean to be essential for the development of US sea power, and Cuba to be the most desirable of the ‘island fortresses’, as he called them. In a memorandum he wrote on behalf of the Naval War Board in August 1898, Mahan mentioned Guantánamo Bay, along with a couple of other Cuban bays, saying ‘When Cuba becomes independent, the United States should acquire, as a naval measure, one of these ports, with a portion of adjacent territory’ (1975, II, 588). In fact, just before Mahan wrote those words, Guantánamo Bay had become the very first place in Cuba to see a US attack when Marines landed there in June 1898 to prepare the way for the full-scale US assault on Santiago which followed later that summer and which more or less ended the USA’s short war with Spain.

The USA invaded Cuba to prevent Cuban independence, but the *causus belli* — the 1898 equivalent of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction — was the explosion on board the US ship, the *Maine*, in Havana harbour on the evening of 18th February, which killed 266 out of the 355 crew on board. The newspapers were in no doubt that Spain was to blame: ‘Remember the Maine, to Hell with Spain’ became the popular slogan. Roosevelt needed no inquiry to determine the cause of the explosion: ‘The *Maine* was sunk by an act of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards I believe’ (1951 775).

The vision shared by Roosevelt and Mahan of how the USA could benefit from the dismemberment of what remained of the Spanish Empire had three significant outcomes: the buildings of the isthmian canal, which Roosevelt ensured by giving military support to Panama; the establishment of a US naval base at Guantánamo Bay, which had been a non-negotiable element in the Platt Amendment by which Roosevelt gave Cuba its ‘independence’; and Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet, sent round the world in 1907. Spain and Britain had announced their global ambitions through the circumnavigations of Magellan and Drake. Roosevelt would do the same for the USA, paying courtesy visits so that potential enemies could get a good view of US sea power. The Great White Fleet: the ships were indeed white, a poetical echo can also be heard in its name. Published in February 1899, Rudyard Kipling’s poem, ‘The White Man’s Burden’, had appeared at a critical moment
just two days before the US Senate ratified the Treaty of Paris that officially ended the Spanish-American War, ceded Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States, and placed Cuba under US control.

**THE NARRATIVE OF CONSOLATION**

Once the new power relationship between the USA and Britain had been established, a new narrative could be allowed to paper over the cracks, to provide at least a fig leaf to cover the new British thrall. The first opportunity for such a narrative had come with the destruction of the *Maine*: the incident awoke British sympathy and support, whereas newspapers in Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy viewed the coming war as one between the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon races and refused to support the USA. The USA found to its surprise that in Britain, of all places, its cries of moral indignation were endorsed (Campbell 1960 154–55; Seed). From the British point of view the Spanish-American war could only do good by revealing the ‘real’ sentiments of continental Europe towards the United States. In the past, the argument ran, when the USA and Britain had come into conflict, France, Germany, and Russia had been able to display a spurious friendship to the United States which was really no more than hostility to Britain. Now continental hostility to the USA would show itself, and Britain’s real friendship shine the brighter by contrast. This is exactly what happened. There was US recognition that the countries were — as a cartoon in the *Minneapolis Journal* had it (‘Bart’) — ‘better friends than they used to be’. And when there was talk of a Latin military alliance against the USA, the same newspaper was confident enough of British military support to risk the headline which gives this essay its title: Remember the Mane (24 May 1898) (fig. 1).

The great poetic expression of Atlantic rapprochement was ‘A Voice from the West’, written by the new British poet laureate, Alfred Austin, who was thought more politically reliable than his rival William Watson. The poem was published simultaneously in the London *Times* and the *New York Herald* at the end of March 1898:

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What is the voice I hear
On the wind of the Western Sea?
Sentinel, listen, from out Cape Clear
And say what the voice may be.
"’Tis a proud free people calling loud to a people
proud and free.

‘And it says to them: ‘Kinsmen, hail!
We severed have been too long.
Now let us have done with a worn-out tale —
The tale of an ancient Wrong;
And our friendship last long as Love doth last,
and be stronger than Death is strong.’
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Peter Hulme

"While the French Are Talking of an Alliance With Spain, It May Be Well for Them to Remember the Mane.—May 24.

Answer them, 'Sons of the selfsame race,
   And blood of the selfsame clan,
Let us speak with each other face to face
   And answer as man to man;
And loyally love and trust each other as none but
   free men can.

'So fling them out to the breeze,
   Shamrock, Thistle, and Rose!
And the Star-Spangled Banner unfurl with these,
   A message to friends and foes,
Wherever the sails of peace are seen and wherever
   the war-wind blows.

'A message to bond and thrall to wake:
    For wherever we come, we twain,
The throne of the tyrant shall rock and quake,
And this menace be void and vain;
For you are lords of a strong, young land, and
we are lords of the main.'

Yes, this is the voice on the bluff March gale:
‘We severed have been too long;
But now we have done with a worn-out tale,
The tale of an ancient Wrong;
And our friendship shall last long as Love doth last,
and be stronger than Death is strong!'

The most striking aspect of Austin’s poem is that rather than speaking for Britain and addressing the USA, the poet feels the need to ventriloquise the voice from the west, from across the Atlantic, addressing the British as kinsmen and affirming a friendship stronger than death: a sentiment which once had been articulated, if not in quite such strong terms, by Oliver Wendell Holmes, but which now needs to be imagined precisely because those terms are no longer being heard. To that imagined voice, the poet responds in kind as an equal: ‘For you are lords of a strong land and we are lords of the main’. Nothing now about mothers and daughters — just the affirmation of a desired equality which the previous three years had proved totally illusory. Austin was, understandably, a much parodied poet, and in May 1898 the British Review of Reviews published a full-length parody, of which this is one stanza:

For wherever we come, we twain
The machine gun shall bellow of Jesus,
And the Bible preach gin and gain,
For our greed and gospel’s the same.
And if we’ve made an end of the Redskin,
so have you of his Maori kin. (qtd in Reuter 76–77)

Throughout the summer months of 1898, there were insistent British calls for Anglo-American unity. In May, during a famous speech in Birmingham, reported on the front page of the New York Times (14 May 1898), Joseph Chamberlain called for ‘permanent amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic’ and went so far as to say that war would be cheaply purchased if it allowed the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack ‘to wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance’. Articles from The Spectator in the same month capture the tone of British press coverage of the war: ‘We rejoice in the efficiency of the American representative of our race [Dewey at Manila], because we believe that, failing the Anglo-Saxon, the wronged of the world will find no defender…’. This is not a tactical alliance: Britain has bought into the US idea of foreign policy as a moral crusade. It is ‘our’ victory too, because the USA is the representative of the race, even if British military activity in this case was precisely zero:

We think America will keep the Philippines, and we heartily hope it. She will govern them well enough, much better than any Power except ourselves, and we have more
of the world’s surface than we can well manage… The envy we excite is already too great… It would be a relief if another English-speaking Power would take up a portion of our task, and in taking it, perform the duty of repaying something to the world which yields her such advantages. The ‘weary Titan’, in fact, needs an ally while traversing ‘the too vast orb of his fate’ [changed again to ‘his’], and the only ally whose aspirations, ideas, and language are like his own is the great American people. (qtd in Campbell 1960 152)

The ‘weary Titan’ appears again; but none of the users of Arnold’s lines actually echoed his deep pessimism about what England had become. Instead, we are offered different versions of how the load might be shared. Chamberlain looked to the children of the Empire; like William Watson earlier, The Spectator looks here to the USA, the eldest child, now so thoroughly grown up that it had to be talked of as a ‘cousin’, a carefully calculated degree of relationship, vaguely equal but with enough distance for some negotiation to be necessary. But whereas for Chamberlain the burden was to be shared, and for The Spectator the USA would be an ally on a journey across the orb, it would take Kipling’s poem to echo Arnold’s sense of a burden which Britain would lay down in order for another ‘white race’ to take it up. Here, finally, was Britain recognising that the USA would finally have to outgrow its position as ‘daughter’ or ‘son’ or assume its ‘manhood’ in order to deal with ‘Your new caught sullen peoples / Half-devil and half-child’.

One of the reasons for Anglo-Saxonism’s power as an ideology was that it covered several possibilities. At its widest it was identical with a Teutonism which included the spread of Germanic-speaking peoples over northern Europe and then North America. But that idea had little appeal in either Britain or the USA when Germany itself became a potentially hostile state. In the second half of the nineteenth century racial ideas had usually emphasised either blood or culture. However, what became particularly important at the turn of the century was language (Martellone). Of the three great British imperial ideologists from the second half of the nineteenth century — James Anthony Froude, John Robert Seeley, and Charles Dilke — it was Dilke who came closest to embracing the replacement of an imperial vision with an English-speaking vision. Indeed, he seems to have been responsible for the growing popularity of the term ‘English-speaking’. But, predictably, even Dilke could not envisage the changing nature of the relationship between English-speaking people. As he put it in 1868:

America is becoming, not English merely, but world-embracing in the variety of its type; and, as the English element has given language and history to that land, America offers the English race the moral directorship of the globe, by ruling mankind through Saxon institutions and the English tongue. Through America, England is speaking to the world. (224)

Britain might fancy itself as a ventriloquist but Roosevelt was nobody’s dummy, though he himself actively promoted Dilke’s title-phrase: the first volume of his historical epic, The Winning of the West, is called ‘The Spread of the English-
Speaking Peoples’, a phrase later adopted and enshrined in Winston Churchill’s four-volume *History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, which celebrated the race in precisely Rooseveltian terms after the Second World War. There had been a move to use linguistic commonality as the basis of a political federation (Kennedy), but the USA has never shown any inclination in this direction, however much a certain strain of conservative British political thought continues to dwell on the importance of language (Roberts).

**THE SUMMER OF LOVE**

During that summer of Anglo-Saxon love in 1898, US newspapers reported unprecedented displays of the Stars and Stripes in London on 4th July 1898, just after the fall of Santiago (*New York Times*, 5 July 1898). The Annual Dinner of the American Society was especially well attended by eminent Englishmen. The chairman toasted the Queen in a speech which had as its keynote, the *New York Times* reported, Whittier’s line, ‘We bow the heart if not the knee,’ which was widely seen — as in that same newspaper report — as expressing this renewed sense of US appreciation for the mother country. Given that the sentiment was tumultuously applauded in London, the English guests might not have recalled that John Greenleaf Whittier’s 1862 poem, from which the chairman’s line is adapted, is actually a savage indictment of British support for the South during the US civil war:

We bowed the heart, if not the knee,
To England’s Queen, God bless her
We praised you when your slaves went free
We seek to unchain ours. Will ye
Join hands with the oppressor?

More in sorrow than in anger, Whittier recalls the common race: ‘O Englishmen! — in hope and creed, // In blood and tongue our brothers!

‘Thicker than water,’ in one rill
Through centuries of story
Our Saxon blood has flowed, and still
We share with you its good and ill,
The shadow and the glory.

On the British side of the Atlantic, however, commentators were much more inclined to remember the phrase that Whittier had probably been the first to put into a poem. ‘Thicker than water’ sounds like an old saying, although the *OED’s* first reference to it is from an 1815 Walter Scott novel. But the phrase had become particularly popular just before Whittier wrote his poem because of an incident in China when a US naval captain had ignored his orders to maintain strict neutrality by coming to the aid of a British warship in danger of being sunk by Chinese guns. When questioned as to why he had disobeyed his orders, his only response was: ‘Blood is thicker than water’ (Hitchens 98). And from then on, that became the catchphrase of proponents of Anglo-Saxon unity, rising to a crescendo at the
end of the century. It was referred to by the New York editor, Whitelaw Reid, in a toast to Queen Victoria at her 1897 Diamond Jubilee in London (Kramer 1327–28) and by Justin McCarthy in an essay on British responses to the Spanish-American War. When Joseph Chamberlain had to defend his Birmingham speech in favour of Anglo-American unity in the House of Commons, he raised the possibility ‘that Anglo-Saxon liberty and Anglo-Saxon interests may hereafter be menaced by a great combination of other Powers.’ If they were, ‘whether it be America or whether it be England that is menaced, I hope that blood will be found to be thicker than water’ (Garvin 303). And when Jennie Jerome launched her luxurious journal, *The Anglo-Saxon Review*, in 1895, her son Winston Churchill scrawled a draft advert for it featuring the phrase (Gilbert 34).

**THE AMERICAN CENTURY**

As the new century dawned, the only half-way realistic assessment of the new Anglo-American relationship was produced by W.T. Stead in his *The Americanisation of the World, or The Trend of the Twentieth Century*. With a picture of Theodore Roosevelt as frontispiece, the book argued for the merging of the British Empire into the English-speaking United States of the World. Stead was prepared to make the best of what was evidently a bad job. He spoke against the ‘insular patriotism of our nation’, and in favour of ‘the broader patriotism of the race’ (5). After all, he argued, ‘Whatever they [the Americans] do, all goes to the credit of the family’ (7). However — in a telling analogy, which would not have gone down well with a largely anti-semitic British ruling class — ‘the American may stand to the Briton as Christianity stands to Judaism’ (7).

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