China's Ten Years

Professor May on Censorship

Conscription Then and Now

The AWU and the ACTU
AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW is a marxist journal of information, analysis and discussion on economics, politics, trade unionism, history, philosophy, science and art, for the promotion of socialist ideas.

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CONTENTS OCTOBER—NOVEMBER 1966

COMMENT
FREDERICK MAY — PROFILE
W. A. Wood
DISCUSSION
CHINA'S TEN YEARS
Laurie Aarons
FAMOUS ANTI-CONSCRIPTION CARTOONS, 1916-17
32-33
CONSCRIPTION THEN AND NOW
Eric Fry
THE AWU AND THE ACTU
Charlie Gifford
WHAT THEY'RE SAYING ABOUT US
45
INDONESIA A YEAR AFTER THE COUP
Rex Mortimer
YIDDISH CULTURE IN THE WEST
Judah Waten
BOOK REVIEWS

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NOT many statesmen become the enfant terrible of international politics at the age of seventy-five, as Charles de Gaulle has done, to the ill-concealed exasperation of Lyndon B. Johnson. De Gaulle's recent world tour was a diplomatic triumph, following close upon his visit to the Soviet Union, which opened up new perspectives for European and world politics.

In Cambodia, de Gaulle advanced a realistic solution to the problem which menaces world peace—that the United States must withdraw, or at least announce its willingness to withdraw, as the pre-condition to peace in Vietnam and neutralisation of Indo-China. But the Americans have neither the Gallic realism, nor diplomatic skill, to extricate themselves from an untenable situation. Instead, they blunder brutally into further escalation and drag the world along with them to the brink of disaster.

France, an imperialist power with imperialist aims, took some time to learn the lesson of history. First Indo-China, then Algeria, were needed to show there was another path than to make every national revolution a battleground in a new Hundred Years War between capitalism and socialism.

The contradiction in de Gaulle is well expressed in the anticlimax of the wasteful, and wasted, Muraroa explosion. De Gaulle is the mirror-image of Churchill. The latter achieved a lasting place in history for an historic denial of his whole political life before and after—the grand alliance with the Soviet Union in the war against nazi Germany. Churchill once said: "I did not become His Majesty's Prime Minister to preside at the dissolution of the Empire," yet he presided over just that.

De Gaulle returned to power to restore the glory and military might of France, to keep Algeria French, to forge an unnatural Franco-German unity. If he has restored French glory, it is only because he failed to achieve the rest. De Gaulle's great contribution lies in perception of the new elements in international relations — the relative decline of American economic and political power vis-a-vis both the socialist countries and the capitalist world; the reality and power of the national revolutions; the permanence of socialism as a system, and therefore the
necessity and possibility of co-existence; refusal to be blinded to
the real clash of French and U.S. interests by technicolored anti-
communism.

Thus, despite his many foibles, de Gaulle is a considerable figure
in world politics, destined for a place in history. This can
scarcely be said of his many detractors, least of all of Harold Holt,
who read him a fatuous lecture taken straight out of the Johnson
textbook, cramming of which constitutes almost the only schooling
for Australian foreign policy makers.

Mr. Holt seems likely to be in for even more disastrous excursions
into international affairs than Sir Robert. So it seemed in London,
where he was able to study another contrast to de Gaulle, the
almost-mystic, conservative military leader who can nevertheless
take a political stance independent of the United States, and com-
mand respect from friend and foe alike. We mean that smooth-
faced and tongued middle-class intellectual social democrat Harold
Wilson, erstwhile “left”, who is writing another shameful page in
British Labor Party history.

Gone are the high-sounding solemn promises of technological
and social revolution. Instead, the cold reality of wage freeze
and austerity for all but the richest, in deference to the City,
Wall Street and those international financiers known as the
“gnomes of Zurich”. Wilson told the British Trade Union Co-
gress: “Instead of government by peroration, we took action.”

The Tories had to rest on peroration, because they could never
have got away with the Wilson actions, swallowed by the TUC
bureaucratic majority, albeit with sour grumbles. Moved by a
baronet, seconded by a lord (whose Union had earlier rejected
the wage freeze), the majority forced through the endorsement
by a narrow majority.

The Wilson foreign policy bears not even a faint resemblance to a
socialist foreign policy. It is even a travesty of a British policy;
it is more humbly pro-American than that of Macmillan, Eden
or Churchill ever was.

No wonder the Australian Tory Holt was able to stand shoulder
to shoulder with “socialist” Wilson against the crude Afro-Asian
hordes who actually had the gall to expect that a Labor Prime
Minister would do what he had promised—put down a white-racist
rebellion against the Crown. How naive, to think that suppres-
sion of treason and racism, let alone socialist principles, could count more than City investments in and trade with Rhodesia and South Africa!

The debacle of official British unionism at Brighton focuses attention upon big issues before Australian unionism. Arbitration is in deep, chronic crisis. The 1966 basic wage judgment, reversing the 1965 “principles” which in turn reversed earlier “principles”, was quite unsatisfactory to trade unionists. Soon after, the Commission rejected without even giving reasons, a Clerks’ Union appeal against a determination of taxation officers’ pay. This produced an anguished protest from J. M. Riordan, Clerks’ secretary, that the unions would have to consider withdrawal from compulsory arbitration.

Then came the unkindest cut of all — flat rejection of the modest enough claim for a $6 rise for General Motors-Holden workers. The unions spent thousands of dollars on this case, even bringing an expert witness from the United Auto Workers’ Union of America. This rejection brought forth a plaintive wail from Mr. H. Souter, Australian Council of Trade Unions secretary, that “unions must now reassess their whole attitude towards compulsory arbitration. . .”

Workers everywhere are asking: What better arguments can be put up for wage rises than in the basic wage and GMH cases? And if such cases are not decided on their merits, how are they decided? The answer becomes clearer with every case. The arbitration system is loaded on the employers’ side. Logic, legal precedent, moral standards and economic facts are bent and twisted to find reasons for giving nothing, or as little as is believed practicable. A decision favorable to the workers is won by industrial strength, whether actually or only potentially exercised, and there is very good reason to believe that this conclusion is spreading through the union movement.

It is a two-edged sword for Messrs. Souter and Riordan to flourish the threat of withdrawal at Arbitration, in an effort to influence some small sop to justify the “leave-it-to-arbitration” inaction which passes for trade union leadership at ACTU level. Unionists might ask them to live up to their words. Would they then say, with Bottom in “A Midsummer Night’s Dream”: “. . . I will aggravate my voice so that I will roar you as gently as any sucking dove; I will roar you an ‘twere any nightingale?”
A widespread mood is developing in the union movement for an accounting of ACTU stewardship. A few more performances like the last Executive meeting of August 29-September 2 will certainly call forth probing questions. At that meeting (adjourned until September 26, after this is written), inaction, irresolution and procrastination in defence of vital workers' interests was matched only by planned efforts at erosion of previous ACTU policy on conscription, opposition to the Vietnam war, and other vital national issues. There is also more than a suspicion that the latter manoeuvres were destined to aid rightwing pressures to push Labor Party foreign policy nearer to one of bi-partisan agreement with the Liberal Government.

One of the least edifying aspects of that ACTU Executive meeting was the majority attitude to the strike of the Northern Territory aboriginal pastoral workers. These courageous aborigines walked off the job at Wave Hill, owned by the British meat combine Vesteys. Theirs was a simple demand—equal pay with white workers.

The Arbitration Commission had solemnly gone through the motions again. It heard a long case, replete with economic facts and moral issues, and then decided for equal pay—in three years. This was an iniquitous decision, rightly condemned by the ACTU. But to no avail; condemnation and moral argument cut no ice with court or cattle kings.

The aborigines went further than condemnation; they stood up for themselves, elected their own leaders, made their own decisions. Their strike will prove historic, not just industrially but in the developing struggle for aboriginal self-emancipation.

The Australian press, with very few exceptions, played down the dispute, in deference to the monopoly interests concerned. The majority on the ACTU Executive also played it down. They made no appeal for all-out union support, financial or otherwise. It was left to militant unions and public organisations for aboriginal advancement to raise money to help the aborigines, to the North Australian Workers' and the Meat Industry unions to pledge industrial support. The ACTU majority occupied itself instead with criticising "outside interference" in the dispute—apparently meaning the aborigines' own organisation. "ACTU rules and procedures" were the main pre-occupation, the winning of a vital dispute was nothing.
The irony of this whole performance lay in the fact that the aboriginal workers concerned—expected to conform to ACTU rules—were non-unionists. They could not join the NAWU because they are paid well below the basic wage. However, the aborigines understand the real principles of unionism. At the date of writing, they are standing firm and learning all the time. Their understanding of unionism is reinforced by their own ethos of tribal solidarity and an ever-growing consciousness of their identity as a people. Whatever its outcome, this dispute is a milestone in aboriginal advancement.

The Northern Territory Aboriginal Rights Council, whose leaders are all aborigines, has written to U Thant alleging, and documenting, extreme racial discrimination practised by the Australian government. This is unlikely to become a major issue in the forthcoming election campaign—itself a commentary on the morality of Australian politics. Yet it will not be entirely absent, one more of the many vital issues confronting Australians when they go to the polls on November 26.

The issues certain to be at the centre of the campaign are Vietnam, foreign policy and conscription. The Liberal-Country Party coalition is not quite as certain of their electoral impact as they make out. They want to exploit to the limit the potential anti-communism of these issues, colored by crude daubs of racism and anti-Asian chauvinism.

The more vigorously and squarely the Liberal Party case is confronted, not just in its effects but its causes, the more will support be won. Particularly is this true of a factual critique of the theory of the US alliance—the real foundation of the revealing slogan “All the way with LBJ”. Unfortunately, this cannot be expected from the Labor Party, even from Dr. Cairns, enmeshed as he is in the logical consequences of his acceptance of some special relation with the United States. Only the Communist Party will make a forthright and fundamental challenge to the government’s foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the electoral campaign will force a confrontation between Liberal and Labor foreign policies—and there are enough differences to mean that every Labor voter is expressing all-out rejection of the Holt-Hasluck line. The ever increasing brutality and immorality of the war, its character of outside invasion and aggressive war against a whole people, is becoming ever clearer.
Growing Australian casualties are causing deeper thoughts about why young lives are gambled and strengthens the opposition to conscription for Vietnam to around two-thirds of young voters.

The Vietnam issue has stirred public interest in foreign policy to an extent rarely seen in Australia before. Yet it may well be true that still only a minority, for or against, will be finally decided on how to vote by this issue. It is a good sign for Australia's political future that interest and passion have been stirred outside narrow limits, still better that the protest movement has been stronger, more articulate and convincing than those supporting the government, despite conformist pressures. Yet political polarisation may be on the committed left and the right, leaving most people still only superficially moved on the great issues of foreign policy.

However, military, political and economic facts of life have forced these issues into everyone's consciousness, even if in another form. Fate of the basic wage rise, affecting some eighty per cent of the people directly or indirectly, has become a public scandal. The responsibility for the wholesale raid upon incomes through price rises—by private and public institutions alike—has been placed upon McMahon's Budget, even by his political accomplices in the states.

Dishonestly devised to avoid electoral reaction, the Budget has pleased no one. No social service improvements, except an inadequate pension rise (swallowed up in price increases); a staggering extra burden in NSW and Victoria (with seventy per cent of the electors) hospital fees, fares and all sorts of charges; no solution to the education crisis. It is almost an open secret that a savage supplementary budget is likely if the Liberals get back.

The Australian economy is in a serious state of stagnation in most sectors. The flourishing sectors are those (mainly owned by foreign capital) gouging out Australian mineral wealth for export of raw materials—and foreign exchange to overseas shareholders. Those industries servicing this process, in construction and supplies, are also doing well. But the building, automobile and durable consumer industries are going backwards. Last year, production declined in seventeen of the thirty-five basic commodities reported on by the Bureau of Statistics.

Unemployment is rising, in a season when it usually falls. Lay-offs in the motor industry are only the most significant of
cutbacks in employment. South Australia has been particularly hard hit, while the politically touchy state of Queensland is also worse hit economically than the average. Memories of 1961 must be haunting Holt’s thoughts, which of course only presage an even dirtier campaign than usual. Yet 1961 proved that economic issues are decisive in deciding waverers, and can cut right across the violent anti-communism upon which Liberals and DLP rely to stampede enough voters.

Black storm clouds are rising over the world capitalist economy. Wilson may have been exaggerating to swing TUC votes when he said that another crisis like that of the 1930’s could come if sterling collapsed. However, there is no doubt that acute trade and financial problems are a constant threat. Problems posed by the rapid growth of productive forces are putting intolerable strains on the capitalist world with its restrictive relations of production, internally and between nations. These are more and more expressed in the sphere of finance and trade.

The development of sharp economic issues, coinciding with and demonstrably linked to great issues of war or peace, provide a wonderful opportunity to confront the complacent, supine and orthodox capitalist policies followed by Holt, Hasluck and McMahon.

It would be foolish to overlook the difficulties facing those forces wanting to end seventeen years of Liberal rule, not least the obvious defeatism and even active sabotage by the ALP and trade union right. However, predictions by press and Liberals and DLP of a smashing win, gaining ten more seats, are most unlikely to be achieved if anywhere near a decent campaign is waged by all genuine anti-Tory forces.

Certainly every Australian socialist, militant unionist and peace activist will throw everything into the campaign to defeat the government. Party and policy differences will be sunk in this common patriotic endeavor.

Equally certainly, whatever the outcome, the left will need to be thinking ahead, searching for new paths of advance to action for peace, to curbing monopoly power so living standards can be raised, and preparing the movement for the struggle for socialist transformation. The Communist Party will combine its independent election campaign with elaborating its views on the policies needed for 1967 and after.
FREDERICK MAY

"I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat."

—MILTON.

FEW professors have made such a strong impression on the public within so short a time of their arrival in Australia as Professor Frederick May. You can look through a Who's Who in Australia as recently as 1962 without seeing a mention of him. In fact he has only been here two and a half years. But already he is a familiar figure at peace rallies where his speeches have excited remark for their quiet fervor and their originality of thought and expression.

At the height of the Knopfelmacher controversy at Sydney University he was the man whose letters in the press and whose TV appearances caught the public eye and ear as perhaps the leading opponent in academic circles of Knopfelmacher's brand of ironclad prejudices.

In the book censorship controversy again he has taken a central place in the arena by the passionate hatred of restriction in any form which stands out in everything he says.

To see him jousting on TV with a bevy of Roman Catholics on this question—not a whit discommoded by the difficulty of saying that nothing at all should be suppressed at any time—was to recognise that here we have a born crusader, a man who, like Karl Marx, finds it his greatest joy in life to struggle for a worthy cause.

In Who's Who he lists opposing censorship as one of his "recreations"!

Naturally such a man wouldn't wait two and a half years before taking up a challenge to his basic beliefs or joining in a
battle he found going on near him. He would hardly wait two minutes. Not that he is a Don Quixote who rushes blindly into the fray without finding out first what it is all about. He might have done that once, but has now had experience. The peace struggle in Australia is not the first he has taken up.

When I interviewed him at his rooms in the Italian Department at Sydney University (while Herbert McClintock drew him) my aim was to find out what, basically, he thought, and what in his past career had led him to that position.

My first question, as to whether he followed any general trend or school of thought or whether he considered himself a complete individualist, was the only one he seemed to have any trouble in answering. But he said that after a discussion with his wife they had both written themselves down in the recent census as humanists.

But they recognised that there was much still to attract them in Christianity. They have an attachment to certain forms of it and they retain a strong admiration for the Friends with whom Professor May did some of his wartime hospital service in England. He was a conscientious objector, as was also his wife when her call-up came.

It seemed that Professor May is still arguing with himself about what he really is, or should be. "I tend to be individualistic," he said. "I ask myself 'Is pacifism practical? How far is it selfish—self-indulgent?"" It should not be hard to reassure him on that point. The militant faith he professes has not led him to a life of ease but into more battles than most academics would care to take on in a lifetime.

His affection for his old church is likely to remain all his life because it was from the church, or churchmen, that he derived his basic views on peace. He was trained for confirmation by Archdeacon E. F. Carpenter, a "gentle radical", even a socialist, who was then curate of Holy Trinity church, St. Marylebone.

It was here, probably, that he reached the conviction that, as he says now, "a church founded on the Image of Christ cannot support war".

"I can die for a cause, but I cannot kill for it." That was his stand as a boy of 19 and that remains his position today. When he was 19 the year was 1940. A Londoner, such a decision taken at that time did not mean that he avoided war. He saw plenty of it. As an orderly at Middlesex Hospital
he had to deal with some of the worst casualties, military and civilian, particularly when the flying bombs came over. (The bombs were no respecters of persons. Soldiers and civilians, young and old, people of all views were among those whose broken bodies Orderly May helped to care for.)

His hatred of war did not date from that experience, but the experience certainly strengthened it. Perhaps, too, some of his anti-war convictions are derived from his father who was buried alive, but not quite killed, in the Somme battle of 50 years ago.

His father was a builder's laborer, a fact which goes far towards explaining Professor May's mental make-up today. For part of the hungry thirties his father was out of work and the whole family depended on the allowance young Frederick was drawing to help him through grammar school.

When outstanding school results showed that he must proceed to university it was natural that he should go to the famous Birkbeck College. (Dr. George Birkbeck, an English physician, was pioneer in the foundation of classes for working men in Glasgow and London. In 1823 he was the main founder of the London Mechanics' Institute of which he was president till his death in 1841. He bequeathed it £3,700. Later it was renamed Birkbeck College and recognised as a school of the
University of London for evening and part-time students, a model for similar colleges all over Britain.)

"It is a rule that students must study while maintaining themselves in a job while doing their course," Professor May said. He fulfilled this condition by working as a hospital orderly often from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. At the same time it is equally firm college tradition that its students do the same syllabus as the rest of the university. Professor May complied with this rule also, winning the highest honors.

Brought up with a family of Italian opera singers, he has been bi-lingual since he was three years old and this also, of course, helped determine his main interest at school and university. It was natural that after the war he should find himself in Italy as a representative of British students' organisations helping Italian students reorganise their democratic activity after the long night of fascism.

Mixing with students of all political views he deepened his acquaintance with leftist views already made during the student discussions of the thirties in London over the Spanish Civil War and the Left Book Club publications. Italy is a country, says Professor May, where one can move among and speak with communists as a matter of course. He is a great admirer of the early Italian marxist writer Antonio Gramsci and reads Marx himself in Italian, French and English (but not in the original German).

Of the older Italian writers Professor May has an obvious liking for Giordano Bruno on whom he lectured recently to the Rationalist Society in Sydney. "A remarkable man," he said.

He keeps in touch with Italian developments today. There was a file of a Rome daily paper and a local Italian language newspaper on his shelves. He has hopes of progressive developments in Italian politics—a further "opening to the left". "There can be no going back from the position established by John XXIII" said Professor May and went on to talk of the "rebellious priesthood" in the south and the work in Sicily of Danilo Dolci.

He follows developments in other countries including the U.S.S.R. where he is in touch with the main libraries in Moscow and Leningrad. He mentioned the upsurge in student thinking there and in Poland and Czechoslovakia as showing "flexibility and strength" in Russian society.
Professor May obviously admires modern youth; he also feels apologetic towards it: “We are responsible for the sort of world we’ve given them.” Speaking as parent of four sons as well as a teacher, Professor May said he thought today’s young people had an even stricter moral code than their elders and were “more honest about it.” Their independent, non-servile attitude to their elders is something Professor May not only praises but has practised in his time. “My father used to say that no man was worthy of being called ‘sir’ ” he said. And Professor May, without ever being rude, managed to get through school and university without once using the word except as a form of address to the presiding officer at a meeting.

What brought such a man to Australia, a scholar with a wide reputation who might have had the choice of appointments just as high in other parts of the world? Obviously it was the chance to tread new ground—to build up something new. “At Leeds I had got as far as I could. I wanted to develop practical drama. Despite my being supported by Professor G. Wilson Knight, Senate decided against the idea. I’m still a firm advocate of drama as a university subject.” (At Leeds he was Senior Lecturer and head of the Italian Department.)

The invitation to occupy the first Chair of Italian at Sydney had proved irresistible. Already, in only two years, results are showing in the form of bigger classes in Italian and more postgraduate students, three of whom are now studying in Italy.

“And what do you think of Australia?” This was his chance, if he’d felt like it, to say something polite, perhaps about the weather or the beaches or democracy. He didn’t say anything like that. Mental climates only are what interest him and Professor May’s outstanding impression was of Australia’s “childish censorship.” This, he said was not just attributable to “Canberra” but was based on a fundamental trend in the community, both Protestant and Catholic. He wouldn’t call it Puritanism because the essence of Puritanism was “a refusal to see injustice done.”

And so we came at last to the reality of what I believe Professor May is—a Puritan, a man whose ancestors, as he told us, were on the Parliamentary side in the civil war. He thrives on battle, despite his shyness. He won’t lightly enter a battle. But when he does, he will not lay aside the broadsword until King Charles’ head is well and truly off.
Although we have no monarchy here, we have quite a few royalists in various realms of academic and governmental life. We must hope Professor May stays here to help deal with them. We may hope he meets some of our own builders' laborers, warms to our Australian sun and makes an even closer acquaintance with the Australian character which, as he knows by now, is basically as hostile to restrictions on thought and expression as he himself is. We can be sure he will not be put off by Dr. Knopfelmacher and the pro-censorship churchmen. In Australia he is not on enemy territory. He is among friends.

After reading the foregoing, written for ALR by W. A. Wood, the Editors felt moved to make a specific request to Professor May to explain precisely why he opposed censorship under all and any conditions. He sent along the following:

1. Everyone should have access to the material
2. He should judge for himself
3. He cannot honestly abrogate this right/duty
4. If we accept censorship in universities (either as institutions or individuals) we distort the transmission of learning, techniques, and intellectual probity
5. Censorship promotes expediency in bringing up children (both in the home and at school)
6. A good home and school—where all material is freely discussed—rids us of the need of censorship
7. There is no proof that material banned leads to crime
8. Comment that it *does*, comes only from police and magistrates and professional fundamentalists
9. It requires an act of will to take part in "pornography"
10. Shouldn't we be free to join in or stay out?
11. There is no man I trust to make this kind of decision for me—hence no belief in censors
12. Certainly, no qualities in the censors—that—are would induce me to forego my present views
13. Censorship retards natural growth of literature
14. Literature tends to be ahead of public opinion: it needs to be
15. We (as a society) need the arguments of the runners-ahead
16. We need more discussion of "taboo" subjects, not less
17. Politicians make the final censorship decisions: What fits them for this? Nothing
18 They are, in fact, quite unfitted for the task—they read too little, too seldom
19 The higher the politician's rank, the less in touch he is
20 There is no subject we may not discuss—Why should there be?
21 Censorship is an aspect of the authoritarian personality
22 We cannot consent to yield to such power-gathering
23 Often the appeal is to some supernatural authority for such interference in our lives
24 This is as dangerous as the attitude of the soothing politician, who, trading on general apathy, offers his "subjects" expedient censorship
25 Censorship goes with a lack of tough education
26 It goes with making literature and drama dull by refusing to look at the adult elements in them
27 It goes with our prevailing lack of adult education
28 It goes with our corruptingly low-standard popular entertainment
29 It goes with the current persuasion (politically invaluable) that it's better to have more and more material things and less and less mental activity
30 It reinforces the absurd Australian lingering anti-intellectualism
31 (It's absurd because more and more working-class children are ready for university work, and must be given the chance to do it)
32 (It's absurd because more and more families have a relative already engaged in higher education)
33 I object to censorship because it diminishes the individual. When a man freely gives to another, he gains in stature. Censorship, the arbitrary mutilation of the possible enrichment of his mind, degrades him. Worse, for he has his dignity still, it degrades utterly the censor. Sick already, he becomes so ill as to be a social problem

Professor May added this postscript:

"It has just occurred to me (as a result of writing the notes on censorship) that one of my chief reasons in making translations (I've put over 50 Italian works into English) is my opposition to people's being deprived of what I see as belonging to everyone."
DISCUSSION:

ECONOMIC CRISIS

B. TAFT has made a valuable analysis of post-war capitalism. Marxists, however, also need to look more closely at Australia, and to look at other phenomena which suggest that the factors he raises may not continue to operate in future with the same force.

Rapid scientific and technical progress has undoubtedly increased the role played by the production of the means of production in the economic process.

But in the final analysis, means of production serve for the production of means of consumption. Or, as Marx said, "the production of constant capital never takes place for its own sake, but solely because more of it is needed in those spheres of production whose products pass into individual consumption." (Capital, Vol. 3, p. 359, Kerr edition.)

This is still true, even though the contradiction between the producing and consuming power of capitalist society has, for the time, been lessened in its sharpness and a general world crisis of overproduction averted.

Its truth is evidenced in the present situation in Australia, where the rapid forward surge in productive capacity has produced an underlying, long-term, and extreme instability.

I am not arguing that a general world crisis of over-production is imminent. Still less am I arguing in favor of a "wait for another depression" policy. "Wait for" was never good politics, anyhow.

But I do suggest that the possibility of a serious collapse, affecting Australia if not the world, should not be discounted; that good politics must take this into account and advance appropriate proposals to avert it. Further, the rapid, anarchistic economic growth has created pressures in our society that are antagonistic to the progressive forces in the undeveloped countries. These pressures are dominant in our foreign policy, and their results exacerbate the economic problems.

There is much evidence that production has already been growing beyond the capacity of the market to absorb it. The value of stocks, for instance, has shown a net increase of $2,176 million in the 10 years to June, 1966. About 28% of this ($625 million) took place in 1965.

Indeed, a pronounced over-capacity exists now (or will exist when planned projects operate), in a large number of industries. New industries like chemicals and aluminium, which have figured prominently in Australia's growth story, are in the list.

This situation, the result of rapid, unplanned growth and a policy of leaving private enterprise free to make its own investment decisions, has confronted the Australian economy with serious problems.

The inflow of foreign capital has been responsible for much of the anarchistic growth and its results are seen in the position of our international reserves. In 1964-65 we had a deficit of $770 million on current account (visibles plus invisibles), but
our international reserves, saved by a capital inflow of $474 million, fell by only $316 million, to a figure of $1,392 million.

For the six years ending June, 1965, the net deficit on current account was $2,869 million, but the apparent capital inflow was $3,333 million. Had this inflow been half what it was, our reserves would now be eroded to danger point. Capital inflow has become a drug. The more we get the more we need, and the more we are likely to catch the 'flu every time Wall Street sneezes.

The more, too, do we need to export on a sharply competitive world market to meet our foreign commitments. The Department of Trade has stated that exports must reach $5,000 million by the mid-1970s if we are to balance our international payments. That is nearly double the $2,586 million reached in 1965.

Export of the newly discovered minerals will, of course, contribute to this target, yet signs are not wanting that their potential as foreign currency earners has been over-glamorised.

B. Taft pointed to the beneficial effects of the market, especially for capital goods, created by the industrialisation of the United Arab Republic, as well as to the fact that progress in other under-developed countries is exceedingly slow, and the gap between them and the advanced, imperialist States is widening.

The point is that the U.A.R. has broken, firmly and decisively, out of the colonialist and neo-colonialist net, while almost all the other newly independent States still hold to a policy of indigenous capitalist growth and foreign capitalist investment. Their slow growth rate is the direct result of the policies of the dominant advanced countries.

Kenya, where the writer was able to observe this policy at first hand last year, is a good example. But take Malaya, which is closer to Australia and has been independent for several years.

Marked on U.N. maps as one of the hungry countries of the world, Malaya has a high birth rate, a fast growing labor force, as well as very considerable unemployment. Measured in percentages, its industrial growth is marked, but in absolute figures it is slight, and totally inadequate to provide jobs and rising living standards.

The slight industrial growth comes mainly from overseas investment and not from local capital accumulation, and is not in sectors of the economy that would compete with the exports of the advanced countries; the import of manufactured goods has been rising.

The minimum measures that Malaya must take include control over the outflow of dividends and other remittances, industrial development as public enterprise coupled with a high protective tariff and import controls, and foreign aid of a non-exploitative character (i.e., from the socialist countries).

These policies depend for their introduction on the victory of progressive political forces.

It follows that our growth, rapid, anarchistic, and largely foreign financed and foreign owned, has created a basic instability that is becoming increasingly acute and bears within itself the danger of serious crisis.

If this proposition is correct, and I believe it is, we must formulate a comprehensive policy to correct the instability and avert the crisis.

Alf Watt.
I read with pleasure Herbert McClintock's review of John Berger's *Success and Failure of Picasso*.

I would like to deal here only with one Berger opinion with which I disagree—that the French Communist Party failed Picasso in not guiding and leading him along the path to becoming the artist of the working class.

I agree that the French Party made mistakes, but think these consisted rather of doctrinaire conceptions of socialist realism as the only art of the working class, views at that time almost universally accepted in the communist movement, including by artists.

Leading French Party functionaries, with such exceptions as Laurent Casanova, a man of broad artistic culture, were bewildered by Picasso's art.

They realised the immense political value of the fame and prestige Picasso brought to the Party, but nevertheless felt his art itself was alien to the movement.

It seems to me that the biggest mistake they made was to ignore Picasso and to throw the weight of the Party behind lesser painters like Andre Fougeron in an effort to build up an orthodox socialist realist counter to the influence of Picasso.

For example, they arranged in 1950 an exhibition in a fashionable Paris gallery of Fougeron's rather stiff, hard, naturalistic paintings of miners and publicised them to the sky in the Party press. They failed, nevertheless, to capture interest in any way comparable to Picasso's paintings.

We know now, from the written evidence of Picasso's former wife, Francoise Gilot, herself a painter, that Picasso was deeply hurt by this display of partisanship, but his loyalty to his newly-found party remained firm.

Picasso was recruited to the Party, at the age of 65, by Casanova, who influenced him strongly, as he did a number of other intellectuals, in discussions held when Casanova was hidden from the Nazis by close relatives of Picasso's dealer Kahnweiler.

Picasso deeply admired Casanova and communist intellectuals prominent in the resistance, like the poets Louis Aragon and Paul Eluard.

When he joined the Party the market value and sales of his work began to fall, especially in the United States, as Kahnweiler and Gilot have admitted.

For years afterwards his art came to be written down in influential art magazines and to this day false interviews and forged "testaments" are published throwing doubt on his artistic integrity.

He has consistently resisted all pressures on him to resign his Party membership, even when his work has been subjected to ridicule and to attack from sources within the Party leadership, and from the Soviet Union, such as when he drew and Aragon published in *Lettres Francaises*, a head of Stalin.

To all such attacks he has replied with dignity and restraint and from within a communist viewpoint.

Since the war, Picasso has not created anything with the power and authority of his epic mural of the Spanish war, "Guernica".

This can hardly be held against him. The mural was the result of a very special historical situation and exceptional emotional pressures to
which his Spanish origins contributed strongly.

He has, however, responded on an impressive scale to major world events with his *Massacre in Korea* of 1951, his later murals *Peace* and *War* at Villauris, as well as the 1949 *Dove* which, in all its simplicity, provided the world with its most acceptable symbol of peace.

The world communist movement has created a rich body of fine art and literature, some of the finest of the twentieth century.

It is only necessary to mention the work of Siqueiros, Rivera, Leger, Guttuso, Sholokov, Brecht, Eisenstein, Prokofiev and Shostakovitch to demonstrate that.

But the attitudes mentioned have adversely affected both the work of Party artists and the Party’s relationship with them.

These attitudes were expressed particularly in oversimplified interpretations of the slogans “art is a weapon” and “literature must be Party literature”.

It was held that art should be obviously militant and should intervene directly in political life with the immediacy of propaganda or organisational work.

Its form should be intelligible and acceptable to the worker, irrespective of his cultural level. The success of art was measured by its relation to one or other current campaign, the degree to which it illustrated the current Party line.

It resulted frequently in Party artists feeling themselves not quite free to follow the spontaneous dictates of their artistic impulses, those impulses without which no real worthwhile work of art is created.

In fact, life itself in all its infinite variety is the source of art. It all depends what we make of it, imaginatively and in the terms of art.

Our communist values will find expression in art which comes from the heart.

When Lenin said that literature must be Party literature he was not referring to artistic literature, but to political writing.

Artists with any sense of social responsibility, and obviously artists attracted to the Communist Party have this sense to a marked degree, cannot but be deeply concerned with the timeliness or relevance of their art to the crucial issues facing mankind; in present-day terms, the war in Vietnam and its possible escalation into world nuclear war, racialism, man’s self-alienation and others.

But the complex nature of the creative processes has to be considered if art is to arise above the ephemeral and strike deeper than the cartoon or the poster, valuable as they may be in their own right.

In our own Party in Australia there has been in recent times a most welcome advance in the attitudes of leading organs and of individual cadres to these problems, restricted or limited mainly by lack of familiarity with them.

Far greater trust is being placed in the ability of artist members to meet their own specialised problems and responsibilities in a communist spirit.

It is now possible to hold out to the serious-minded artists outside the Party a welcoming hand with the assurance that in our Party they would be free to express themselves as they genuinely feel.

To return to Picasso.
He comes in the declining years of a great cultural epoch; one of unprecedented technological advance, but also one which in art elevated above all else individualism and subjectivism and widened disastrously the gap between the artist and the general public, to the point of mutual mistrust and even hostility.

Picasso does not open an era. He closes one. His art, with all its restless inventiveness, its subversive intentions, its metaphors and ambiguities, its violent distortions of natural form and its strident emphasis on the expressive sign, winds up an epoch of visual and pictorial discovery.

Within Picasso's art the perceptive painter will find a well of suggestions for the further development of his own art, and encouragement.

NOEL COUNIHAN.

DEMOCRACY AND FACTIONS

ONE can agree with Rex Mortimer (A.L.R. No. 2) in discussing John Sendy's article "Democracy in the Communist Party" (No. 1) that we need discussion for and against specific proposals.

The former's main proposal is factions, in favour of which he advances these arguments:

1 Factions were not outlawed in the Russian Party till as late as 1921.
2 Lenin's extraordinary leniency towards factionalism, for example the Zinoviev-Kamenev betrayal of the Party's plans in 1917.
3 Outlawing factions, in a one-party state assisted the rise of Stalinism.
4 The welcome stimulation provided by the struggle against the Hill faction;
5 That the thing is not to proscribe factions but to define the limits within which they may function.

It is good that such a question should be discussed without the emotions it traditionally arouses, and I would like to put forward some 'Cons':

1 & 2 Factions were certainly recognised to exist in the Russian Party but what were the experiences of these and what were Lenin's views?

"Hitherto, all over the world parties have been formed of local organisations united by a single central institution. But in 1912, the Russian and Lettish liquidationists made a great discovery: henceforth it will be possible to create a Party consisting of centres, organisations and factions". (Lenin, Present Situation in the R.S.D.L.P., 1912, Selected Works, 12 Vol. edition, Vol. 4).

"... by this label of 'non-factionalism' the worst remnants of factionalism mislead the young generation of workers." (Violation of Unity under Cover of Cries for Unity, 1914. Vol.4)

The letter of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. of Nov., 1917 to Zinoviev, Kamenev and others, called upon them "either to give an immediate undertaking in writing to submit to the decisions of the C.C. and to carry out its policy in all your actions, or to retire from all public Party activity and, pending the meeting of the Party Congress, to resign all responsible posts in the working class movement." (Vol. 6).

"The guarantee that we will not break our neck on this question (conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace
with Germany—E.A.) lies in the fact that instead of applying the old method of issuing an enormous quantity of literature, of discussions and plenty of splits, instead of this old method, events have brought a new method of learning things. This method is testing everything with facts, with events, with the lessons of world history." (Report to 7th Congress of the R.C.P., March, 1918. Vol. 7).

"There is an objective logic in factional struggles which inevitably leads even the best of people . . . to a position which actually differs in no way from unprincipled demagogy. This is what the whole history of factional war teaches." (The Party Crisis, Jan., 1921, concerning the struggle with Trotsky over the Trade Unions. Vol. 9. Emphasis added).

". . . in my opinion this luxury (the discussion on the above question, E.A.) which took up so much of the Party's time . . . was absolutely impermissible." (Report to 10th Congress, March 1921. Vol. 9).

What Lenin wrote does not, of course, settle the matter for us. But appeal to his views and to the experiences of the Russian Party surely demand examination of it.

3 The question of a one-party state does not arise in considering the position of the C.P.A. Our aim is for a coalition of all left forces for the achievement and building of socialism. There should also be, I believe, the constitutional right of political opposition.

In such circumstances, anyone who disagrees enough with the prevailing party view or its underlying basic outlook to form a faction, has ample scope to join one of the other constituent parts of a coalition (whether before or after its actual formation) or form a new constituent.

4 The 'stimulation' of the Hill period did not depend on there being a faction but on the fact that fundamental differences gradually took shape and had to be thought through and argued out.

We could in my opinion have well done without the factional part of it and concentrated on the issues, observing majority rule and leaving time to provide additional evidence as to who was right—a course repeatedly and unsuccessfully offered to Hill.

Similarly (though with differences) in the international split. Taking the substance of these as unavoidable in the circumstances, surely we would be better off if there were concerted action, especially regarding Vietnam, while reasoned debate continued on the issues—a course precluded by the stand of the Chinese Party.

5 Of course, if people differ strongly enough they will voluntarily leave the party, or factionalise, whatever penalties there may be in the rules.

But if they do not differ so strongly, what do they need a faction for if their views have adequate opportunity to be advanced and discussed? A faction is a party within a party, a group having its own organisation and discipline, its own loyalties, through the "objective logic" of which it comes to put these things above loyalty to the party, its platform, its organisation and discipline.

And Rex Mortimer has not defined at what point the activities of factions would cease to be compatible with party membership, or who is to decide when that point has been reached.

Far better, it seems to me, would be to develop the present practice of giving expression to different points
of view in party publications, to include in this different points of view expressed in party committees, and seek to define under what conditions a right to a party-wide discussion of issues in dispute might be invoked.

This (mentioned in part by Mortimer) by no means exhausts the question, but opens a more fruitful approach than giving factions a constitutional standing under the rules, which would I believe—and unnecessarily—encourage and institutionalise disunity.

ERIC AARONS.

PSYCHOANALYSIS

Psychoanalysis (hereafter PA) is a technique, method or practice, but not, as “Heraclitus” wants, a science which demands a clearly-defined subject-matter and with it causality, synthesis, generalisation, standards of predictability and control. PA never measured up to that!

Many sciences reveal ever-increasing inter-relationships — almost “coalescence” in some spheres—such as biology and bio-chemistry. But each stands upon its own independent feet, distinctive and particular. Hence, an all-sided approach in psychiatry is needed and not, as with Freud, a “Literal and uncompromising psychic determinism.”

For PA practice and its results one must rely upon authorities competent to judge. Professor of Psychology, H. J. Eysenck, Director of the Institute of Psychiatry in London University, writes (1960): “Training in PA techniques became almost an essential requirement for the budding psychiatrist, and theories and jargon filtered through to nurses, social workers, teachers and the general public . . . The success of the Freudian revolution seemed complete. Only one thing went wrong: The patients did not get any better” (his emphasis).

There’s something gorgeously funny in that sentence when one thinks back over a half-century of thousands of PA textbooks, hundreds of schools, sub-schools, trends . . .

It was said of Freud that he rescued the sick mind from theology and put it back where it belonged, the clinic. All right. A persistent claim for him is that he sought the origin of mental disorders (and associated or resultant physical ailments, say paralysis) in the patient’s environmental conditions. That would, indeed, place PA on a scientific basis. But what is environment? Man’s consciousness (including fantasy, etc.) is a social product. Behavioural and characterological phenomena cannot be restricted, as with PA, to personal, or transient, or family and group connections, important as they are. The real environment, the basic determinants, are work, income, housing, education, peace, war.

The harassing actions by Sydney’s police against Aborigines (and Chicago’s police against Negroes) could be sanctioned by “proofs” from PA texts dealing with complexes, hidden drives, etc., among these coloured people. I prefer Paul Robeson’s aphorism: “There are no backward people, only people held in backward conditions.”

—L. HARRY GOULD.

TRADE UNIONS

I agree wholeheartedly with Pat Clancy that there is an urgent need for rethinking many of the complex
problems that confront the trade union movement in Australia at the present time. In his six-page article Pat goes into great detail to point out just what some of these problems are, and how progressive unionists should go about tackling them. In doing so, a long overdue service was rendered to the entire left movement.

While I accept many of the conclusions drawn, it is on the question of amalgamations between kindred unions that I feel deeper rethinking is required. It is not enough to repeat that amalgamations are the main way forward during this particular period of Australian development.

There are certain obvious disadvantages one is forced to accept that tend to weaken the left influences on important trade union bodies by this method, i.e., representation on Trades & Labor Councils, Dispute Committees and various Industry Federations, both State and Federal.

Also the subject should be analysed in light of local conditions, and the fact that in Australia the Arbitration Commission interferes to such a degree in the internal affairs of the unions. How often have we seen, that after years of bitter struggle, militant workers have built a strong large union that has been captured by right wing opportunists from within, or has had extreme right wing leadership imposed, either directly by the Court, or by way of Court controlled ballots.

Amalgamation at this stage of Australian development does not meet the challenge as far as medium or large unions are concerned. It is done better by way of State and Federal Industry Federations. Some experience in Victoria has shown the way forward by the wise and militant leadership that has been shown by such federations in the recent prices campaign.

The subject warrants much deeper study and calls for all-round discussion to establish just where the left is going before we trade the devil we know for the devil we don't know.

—J.O'N.

As Pat Clancy indicates (ALR No. 2), the increasing weight of white collar workers in the work force, and of young people in the community as a whole, poses new challenges to trade unionism. I see these challenges along the following lines:

The six and a half odd million Australians under 30 who have, as Clancy says, “no personal experience of the economic difficulties and many struggles of the 30’s” have, in my view, serious and indeed imperious needs. Lay aside for the moment the truly sad plight of the big pockets of underprivileged amongst us (the sick, the widowed, the old): consider the great majority of workers—unskilled, skilled, white-collar, blue-collar. Increasingly these will be young and highly-trained people. For a start (as Clancy says), their material needs are not being satisfied. These needs are largely influenced by society’s vastly increased production potential, and are far more ambitious than the needs of their fathers. But material standards are being undermined before their very eyes by the relentless pressures of inflation, all of which, incidentally, is roughly true for advanced capitalist nations in general, and not merely for Australia.

What about the personal, you might say the psychological, needs of these workers? Here the situation is fairly new, and I think potentially extremely encouraging for socialists. The under-thirties, in general, feel far greater self-respect and make far more im-
perious and ambitious demands upon life than did the generation who experienced the depression. They take for granted a fairly high material level—but would, in my view, fight even more tenaciously than their fathers did if confronted with a direct challenge to those standards (and that's saying a lot, when you recall, say, the depression-eve strikes and lockouts). But, in addition, they want a feeling of fulfilment which the scurry for material acquisitions does not assuage. They are actually experiencing a desire for creativity from work, and because this desire is largely frustrated, often manifest signs of anger, bewilderment and restlessness. Usually, of course, they do not know what makes them so restless. The younger the workers are, the more imperiously such desires assert themselves. But as producers, in their actual work situation, they are often mere ciphers, and they experience alienation in an especially bitter way because of their developing needs.

And as citizens, in their social and political life, their situation is deteriorating as neo-capitalist decision making is concentrating in the hands of an ever-dwindling, tiny few. On the cultural plane, neo-capitalist society, as it becomes more automated, will deepen the workers' feeling of alienation and make their cultural impoverishment ever more poignant. Thus it becomes an imperative human need that the worker, both as producer and as citizen, be offered the chance of education, both specialised and general. The younger and the more skilled the worker, the truer these things are of him.

In its total commitment to maximum profit, neo-capitalism (in Australia as much as anywhere else) profoundly distorts the model of the sort of life appropriate to both the possibilities and the needs of our century.

This began as a discussion about trade unions, but it soon turned into one about politics. And it can go no further without facing up to problems of political power: every marxist knows why. Pat Clancy pointed to political problems only implicitly, and I felt he did so because he thinks of trade union politics chiefly in terms of the Communist Party. As it is, the Communist Party cannot directly confront problems of political power, but this is no reason for a marxist to avoid carrying analysis through to the political level if it is essential—and in this case, essential it certainly is.

To return to narrowly and obviously trade union problems: consider the worker merely as producer, and not as both producer and citizen. Increased control over that part of their lives they spend as producers would fulfil important needs of modern workers. With the spread of automation, as more of the work force becomes highly skilled, workers will need and, even if leadership on the matter is not forthcoming, will demand increased control over the part of their lives spent as producers. Even now there are signs of this for those who like to see.

Teachers, for example, have struck over the composition of the tribunal which determines their working conditions, and threaten to strike over the size of classes they teach. Both these demands are closely related to traditional bread and butter trade union demands, but at the same time they approximate and prefigure a qualitatively new type of union demand. They represent the beginnings of an invasion of the boss's area of control, and they assume and reflect an increase of self-respect in the worker, an expanded concept of his rights and his area of power. In my view, incidentally, waterside workers
began to encroach upon the boss’s area of control as early as 1920 in some Queensland ports in their struggle for the rotary system.

The demand for workers’ control must be taken up by cadres specialised in the ways of each particular industry; here such a demand can be spelt out only in the most general way.

The boss reacts extremely sharply to any demand for workers’ control which is something more than a mere worker-manager consultation device (this strengthens his position, not the worker’s). The boss can sense the menace inherent in such a demand. Thirty shillings a week he can concede if he must, and then make it up at the workers’ expense. But once workers taste self-management, it is very hard in need to make them forget that taste; one can imagine circumstances under which the experience could bring an irreversible increase in the workers’ self confidence.

—M.S.

LETTER

The Editor,
Australian Left Review.

We enclose a copy of our first report Vietnam: Negotiations, for review in Left Review. This report is shortly to be published in printed form.

We are also interested in gaining more members for the Group, and would appreciate it if you could print the following advertisement in the next issue of your magazine:

VIETNAM STUDY GROUP

Anyone interested in assisting in research on the Vietnam war and related problems, please contact:

The Secretary,
Vietnam Study Group,
230 Leicester Street,
Carlton, Victoria.

or ‘phone 309 1453.

Intending members should have done some background reading on Vietnam, and be prepared to do several hours’ research work a week. The Group is not affiliated to any political organisation. The main function of the Group is the preparation of reports providing detailed and integrated factual material on aspects of the Vietnam war. The first report — on Negotiations — is available from the secretary. Other assistance in the form of monetary donations or secretarial help (especially typing) is also welcome. The Group is also interested in having correspondence members, particularly in other States.

Unfortunately, we cannot afford to pay you for putting in such an advertisement—our only finance comes from donations.

Thanking you,

Yours sincerely,

JOHN LAYFIELD (SECRETARY).

(See review on page 64.)
October 1, 1956: Tien An Men Square is filled with a million citizens marching or watching in elation at the seventh anniversary of their Revolution. Mao Tse-tung and other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party stand alongside Communist leaders from over fifty countries. There is a spirit of great optimism and enthusiasm. The just concluded 8th Congress has decided on a program of carefully-planned socialist construction. China has scored a brilliant success at the Bandung Conference, which united almost all the Afro-Asian countries, many of whose leaders are also standing on Tien An Men. The unity of the world communist movement has never appeared so strong. Chairman Mao praised the Soviet Union and indicated Chinese willingness to learn from it and other socialist countries.

October 1, 1966 will be celebrated in very different conditions. Almost all the main decisions of the 8th Congress have been jettisoned — and that without convening another Congress or openly stating the reasons for the changes. The rational policy of socialist economic construction was replaced by the grandiose "great leap". Correct policies of gradually raising the quality of education according to possibilities and providing the conditions of tolerance and diversity in science and the arts have been replaced by the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution." This is not proletarian in ideological inspiration—it could perhaps be regarded as inspired by primitive suspicions of science and culture, a form of petty-bourgeois fanaticism. It is not cultural but obscurantist and anti-cultural, it is not a revolution but a degeneration of the revolution and encouragement of conformism miscalled "rebellion". Chinese foreign policy, changed beyond
recognition from the days of Bandung, has led to an international isolation unbelievable in 1956. The Chinese leaders have placed their Party in isolation in the communist movement, too. The exaggerated language, absurd polemics and subjective policies they advance have gradually alienated the support and even sympathy of Parties hitherto agreeing, in part at least, with their concepts and ideas.

The Chinese leaders have been the most important contribution to this themselves, by their stubborn and contemptuous rejection of all appeals for united action in support of Vietnam. This has shown up the stark fact that Chinese disruption of communist unity has helped only United States imperialism, otherwise in such dire straits in Asia and the world. Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union over Vietnam have been in sharp contrast to statements by Ho Chi Minh. They have attacked Cuba in violent terms, are at loggerheads with the Japanese communists over the peace movement, and have an exactly opposite estimate to the Koreans of the 12th Tokyo Conference against A and H Bombs. An interesting confirmation of this estimate comes from Vanguard (No. 32, September) in an article almost certainly by E. F. Hill. As sometimes before, he goes even further than the Chinese are prepared to go:

"It is said that the Chinese are 'isolated'. Yes, if you want to look at the superficial, count heads of countries even amongst those who have hitherto supported China, that is true. In the ranks of the Communist themselves an immense process of sorting out is going on." (The word Communist is in the singular, by mistake probably, yet symbolic. One is reminded of the old verse: The whole world's queer, 'cept thee and me, And even thee's a little queer.)

Changes in policy are accompanied by no less significant changes in other fields. Some main leaders elected by the 8th Congress have disappeared from the political arena, where and how often remaining a mystery. The Party Constitution is flouted—the Congress five years overdue; the Central Committee meeting less and less frequently—four years between the last two, although it should meet "at least twice a year." An increasingly rigid theory and practice is reflected in jargon and near-hysteria in speech and writing, quite opposite to earlier writings of Mao Tse-tung and to his admonitions against jargon (in Oppose the Party Eight-Legged Essay).

A full-blown "personality cult" has developed in China. If there has been no repetition of the worst excesses of the Stalin
period—as is fervently to be hoped—it is certain that adulation of Mao is already far more extreme—and absurd—even than that lavished upon Stalin. These and other dramatic changes in China call out for explanation and assessment.

**Historic event**

One great fact must be grasped: despite all the mistakes, excesses and policy shifts made by the Communist Party, the Chinese Revolution is one of the great events of our times; it has already achieved much in remaking China and will achieve still more. This revolution is an objective process which will in the long run assert the necessity for reversal and correction of policies. Conditions of its historical development have laid an impress upon the Chinese Revolution and upon the Communist Party which performed such prodigies of self-sacrifice, valor, persistence, won such victories and so creatively developed marxist-leninist theory.

Economic, social and political conditions of China in the 1920's—themselves a consequence of its long history—confronted the Chinese communists with complex problems. A big nation, with enormous latent power, it lay a prostrate and helpless victim of contending European powers and Japan. A people once among the world's most advanced in industry, technology and science, had dropped far behind. The foreign powers, coming for outright plunder, stopped to exploit through trade and industrialisation. Their oppression of the Chinese, and their savage rivalry, distorted social development beyond all bounds. The Chinese people suffered this intolerable burden, not patiently as in the Western myth, but with an ever growing bitter determination to change the whole society.

Those young intellectuals (inevitably mostly from the upper middle class) who perceived the plight of the nation and wanted to change society, could take only the revolutionary path. The death of Sun Yat-sen, the bloody victory of Chiang Kai-shek with the aid of the foreign powers, set the most determined of these upon the communist path. There was no other way open. Yet how could the communists win in China? Repeated efforts at proletarian uprisings in the cities, despite incredible heroism, were crushed. These uprisings were advised by the Communist International; Stalin played a large part in elaborating this advice. Efforts to impose views upon the Chinese Party, springing from failure to appreciate the specific conditions of China and perhaps from narrow concern for Russian national interests, may have laid the foundation for Maoist suspicion of views of other Communist
Parties.* If so, this was compounded by Stalin's policy on China during and after the Second World War. (This casts serious doubt on the sincerity of the Chinese defence of Stalin.)

Mao Tse-tung seriously tackled the great and complex problems of the Chinese Revolution. The strategic political and military concepts he elaborated in this herculean task are brilliant examples of creative marxism, the antithesis of doctrinaireism and rigidity (and examples of vivid writing even in translation). Perhaps the essence of his theory was that the peasantry under proletarian leadership had to be the main force of the Chinese Revolution for a variety of reasons—including the superiority of the weapons of Chiang’s armies and the foreign forces stationed in the cities. From this arose the concept of “encircling the cities from the countryside.”

The Chinese Revolution succeeded in the course of twenty years of civil war and the war against Japan. It was successful in the face of overwhelming odds, implacable opposition from the United States and Britain, at a bitter cost in lives and suffering. It was also successful in face of advice from foreign communists, although by no means without assistance, including the Aid for China movement in Australia and the struggle to stop export of iron to Japan.

US responsibility

The main single external contribution to what has happened has been the US policy of active hostility to China which has continued and developed until today it is the main threat to world peace. This bitter US hostility is a reaction expressing the rage of an expanding US monopoly capitalism, intoxicated with dreams of world supremacy and counting upon the huge stimulus of the exploitation of cheap labor, rich natural resources and massive market for the export of capital supplied by a country larger in area than the USA and a population one-fourth of humanity. The course of events since 1956 has been greatly influenced by the fateful US option for an active anti-China policy of isolation, aggression and attempted humiliation. This policy has already failed, and has rebounded upon the Americans, who have added to their other crimes the grave responsibility for contributing much to recent developments in Chinese policy. It

* Further light on this can be obtained in *Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party* (Vol. IV. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, p 171, Lawrence and Wishart.—Ed.). The Wang Ming criticised in this resolution was Chinese representative in the Comintern, who returned to China and influenced what Mao calls the “Third Left Line”.

28
is a little late for Johnson to speak in vague generalities about wanting a settlement with China.

The American anti-China policy is followed by Holt, acting for the decisive groups in the Australian ruling class. It is their main justification for “All the Way with LBJ”, for Vietnam and the decline in living standards, whether put in the refined accents of a Hasluck or the crude roar of the recruit instructor: “Get those slant-eyed yellow bastards before they get you.”

Those level-headed Australians who can see the national interest through the haze of racialist anti-communism will oppose this criminal policy, and seek to develop the already-significant trade relations to a national policy of friendship with China. Australian communists will be to the fore in this patriotic task, while making their position clear on those issues on which they differ from the Chinese leadership. This is not always easy, since statements from China sometimes lend superficial coloring to the otherwise absurd black-white caricatures of the hard-line gang now in control of Australian foreign policy.

Despite its own words, however, the Chinese leadership remains cautious in action, calculating and shrewd in analysis of power realities. It so far retains the communist standpoint that imperialism remains the source of war, and that world peace can be maintained only by opposing imperialism. The divergence occurs on estimation of the possibility of preventing world war—which in words at least the Chinese estimate at almost zero—and the methods of struggle for peace. There is no danger of China declaring war on, invading or bombing the United States; neither desire nor possibility are present. On the other hand, American planes have flown over and bombed China; the United States has the military potential to invade China (though no chance of winning the war this would inaugurate). Some important American military and political forces have openly advocated this course. The Chinese leadership, for its part, does not help the cause of world peace, or its friends, by exaggerated talk of “welcoming” an American invasion.

The fight against the threatened US aggression against China, for the reversal of China’s exclusion from the United Nations and the world community, is vital for world peace and especially relevant to the struggle for an independent Australian foreign policy. There is a special significance for all Communist Parties in waging this struggle, since it may well prove one of the paths towards restoration of the unity of the movement. Rightly or
wrongly—I believe wrongly although not completely without some subjective cause—the Chinese feel that their special position has not been always considered by other socialist countries, particularly the USSR.

Are they communists?

There is some discussion among Australian communists—and, it may be, elsewhere, too—about whether the Chinese Party leadership can still be regarded as communist, or at what point their departure from marxist-leninist positions and behaviour would call this into question. This writer believes that the answer can only be: Yes, they are communists, even though their political positions are wrong, damaging the cause of communism. They are communists whose communism is influenced strongly by Chinese tradition and national pride, the latter swollen by their great achievements, and not least by the almost mystic belief of Mao Tse-tung in his own “thought.”

Though the experiences of the Stalin era, among other examples, warn of the need to avoid crude over-simplification of the relationship between base and superstructure, China is a socialist country so long as the economic structure of China remains collectively owned, and its movement is towards construction of socialism. It is difficult to detect any evidence of, or probable trend towards, return to capitalist production relations. It is no more valid to wipe aside this fact because of deep ideological differences with the Chinese, than for the Chinese to claim to discern a return to capitalism in the USSR. Perhaps, in the long run, this basic fact provides the foundation for qualified optimism.

The internal and deep-lying social causes for the spasmodic character of Chinese policies, as distinct from their ideological and psychological reflections, are to be found in the complex problems of industrialisation of their huge country, with at least 500 million living in rural areas and depending upon peasant agricultural methods, even with a form of collectivisation. The 1958 “great leap” was an effort to jump over a whole historical stage. It called forth tremendous enthusiasm, setting as the goal a victorious entry into fully-fledged communist society before the Soviet Union, by the power of ideology and without the patient and even tedious work of creating a large-scale modern industry or needing to master science and technology.* Now, there is reason to expect some new variant of the “great leap”.

* This displays only hindsight, since I was convinced and enthused by the Great Leap which I saw in its genesis in 1958, backyard steel furnaces, incredible crop yields and all.
It may seem contradictory to foreshadow a possible new “great leap” following the “proletarian cultural revolution” and yet to speak of (even a long range) optimism for return to scientific marxism. Yet it is possible that, given the present political and ideological line, the only way to return to rationality lies in further experience of the futility of such subjective internal economic policies, particularly when this is added to the reverses in Chinese foreign relations on both state and Party levels.

Reports of widespread opposition within the Communist Party to the “Red Guard” excesses are significant, coming as they do from official Chinese sources. It would, however, be a mistake to swallow whole the press speculation that the “Red Guard” is replacing the Communist Party, or is being built up as an alternative; the Red Guard is firmly controlled by the dominant Party leadership under Lin Pia.

But there is enough hard evidence to show that there has been long-standing opposition to recent Maoist policies on all fronts—economic, military, political, cultural. Its persistence reveals a firm social basis for this opposition, which cannot easily be dismissed or regarded as “remnants of the bourgeoisie.” It is far more likely that this basis is to be found in the important and growing industrial working class, and the scientists, technicians and academics directly or indirectly associated with large-scale production.

But there is enough hard evidence to show that there has been long-standing opposition to recent Maoist policies on all fronts—economic, military, political, cultural. Its persistence reveals a firm social basis for this opposition, which cannot easily be dismissed or regarded as “remnants of the bourgeoisie.” It is far more likely that this basis is to be found in the important and growing industrial working class, and the scientists, technicians and academics directly or indirectly associated with large-scale production.

It would be a gross over-simplification and determinism, as well as political naiveté, to believe these economic conditions will result in smooth rectification of incorrect policies. Undoubtedly, ideological and political changes are decisive in the assertion of these social forces. This is possible only within Chinese society—and within its Communist Party.

Communists of other countries can only do their best to assist this inevitable process by acting to their utmost power upon the external conditions which influence China’s development—that is, the struggle against imperialist hostility and US encirclement, and by continuing patient efforts for unity within the movement, including with the Chinese Party. This latter requires patience, ability to resist provocations and endure insult, while making reasoned criticisms of what they regard as the most important differences with the Chinese stand.

Australian communists will try to make their modest contribution.
Mars: "Just give it the first tap. I'll do the rest."

"Why is your face so white, Mother? Why do you choke for breath?"
"O! I have dreamt in the night, my son That I doomed a man to death."

"Why do you hide your hand, Mother And crouch above it in dread?"
"It beareth a dreadful brand, my son With the dead man's blood 'tis."  

"I hear his widow cry in the night I hear his children weep, And always within my sight, O God! The dead man's blood doth leap."

"They put the dagger into my grasp. It seemed but a pencil then, I did not know it was a fiend for the priceless blood of men."

"They gave me the ballot paper, The grim death-warrant of doom And I smugly sentenced the man In that dreadful little room"

"I put it inside the Box of Blood Nor thought of the man I'd slay Till at midnight came like a wild flood God's word — and the Brand of Conscript"

THE THIN EDGE

Some of the most famous cartoons in the campaign against conscription 1916-17
little son! O my little son!
Pray God for your Mother's soul,
that the scarlet stain may be white again
in God's great Judgment Roll

of Massuet, St Andrews Place Sydney

Of Course we'll All be in the Same Boat
Today's anti-conscription fight compared with the conscription struggles of 1916-17.

FIFTY years ago, in October 1916, Australians voted against sending conscripts to the battlefields of the First World War. A year later, in December 1917, they again refused to permit this despite all the pressures on them to agree.

The No vote on conscription has been treasured in the collective memory of the Australian labor movement as a great victory. It has been disparaged by conservatives as a temporary lapse from patriotism. For two years at a critical period of war and turbulence the question of conscription dominated Australian life, far beyond the ordinary interest in politics. The rejection of conscription was of great significance, despite being a negative victory, of saying "No". Many motives, often unclear, were brought together in one inescapable act of decision: the question, what kind of a country Australia was and should be? So the defeat of conscription became part of the national framework in which the same issue is being debated today.

Compulsory military service, at home or abroad, is not a good or a bad thing in itself. It can only be judged by its circumstances, purposes and effects. In 1916-17 conscription meant, as it means today, the forcible sending of Australians abroad to fight in the wars of imperialism.

In primitive society every man was a warrior. The duty of bearing arms carried with it equality of rights. In the absence of a ruling class and separate state power the community itself was police and army. The citizen of the Greek or Roman city state still exercised some of this effectual democracy, although
now he excluded the slaves from it. When the ancient empires which grew from the city states made war a business, the citizen soldier became a professional. Under feudalism warfare was the essential occupation of each lord, on which his position depended. Lords fought for profit, soldiers were hired and serfs conscripted. The devastation of warring feudalism was a powerful reason why the populace turned to a central monarchy to curb feudalism and create a national state.

England, the first capitalist country, could now remove fighting from ordinary life. The predatory wars which England waged from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century were largely fought by a volunteer navy and army. In the nineteenth century, when Britain was the world's workshop and banking house, war was relegated to colonial outposts. The dirty business at the other side of the globe needed only a handful of soldiers attracted by glory or pay. Hence nineteenth century Britain was non-militarist. This was one side of the liberal tradition of civilian rule, citizen rights, laissez faire and business freedom.

Australia inherited these attitudes and took them further. Convicts were not alone in hating callous jailers and upstart officers. Settlers and convicts both, and their children, implanted in the Australian character a dislike of being ordered around. The freedom of the gold rushes re-inforced this, the expansive years before the depression of the 1890's confirmed it; and then in the struggles which surrounded the formation of the Labor Party solidarity against hostile employers and governments was embedded in the labor movement. Australians, happily isolated from the world, needed no armies. Armies were undemocratic, strongholds of caste division and unthinking obedience. This was one firm basis on which Australians rejected conscription in 1916-17 and doubt it today.

Meanwhile, the peaceful period of capitalism was coming to an end. Other countries had caught up with Britain industrially. From the 1880's the epoch of imperialism brought greater rivalries between empires and the military race which culminated in the First World War. European countries which had fought for national unity now prepared for wider battles. War, like industry, was transformed by technology. Warfare now required mass armies, which only compulsory military service could provide. Britain still avoided this.

So did Australia, but already the influences for conscription
were growing. The White Australia policy, the strongest expression of nationalism, has a racial basis of Anglo-Saxon superiority as well as its economic basis of prohibiting cheap labor. Boys from the bush and suburbs joined the militia in each scare as a foreign warship appeared in the Pacific. A contingent was sent, unasked, to the Soudan Campaign fiasco in 1885. Volunteers abounded for the Boer War at the end of the century. Only a tiny minority opposed this blatant grab of the Boer Republics; most gloried in Australian participation. Australians were not immune to the currents of imperialism. Many, with a curious off-stage jingoism, half hoped for a blood letting which would be the mark of nationhood. They got it in the First World War.

Within the labor movement the debate over compulsory military service became open. Hughes and Holman, the young radicals of the 1890's, favored it. So did most of the leaders of the Labor Party. Their favorite example was Switzerland, scarcely typical even of Europe, their argument was that universal training ensured equality of sacrifice and a democratic army. They confused the power of a people in arms with the helplessness of forced soldiers. Armed peoples have indeed made and defended revolutions, in modern times from the levée en masse of the French Revolution onwards. But the armies which governments conscripted in the early twentieth century were to do as they were told in the service of imperialism. Australian leaders, including those in the Labor Party, wanted Australian control of the armed forces, which they would then willingly place at the disposal of Britain.

Compulsory military training commenced in Australia in 1911, endorsed by both the Liberal and Labor Parties. Boys of twelve had to register, their cadet training began at fourteen years and continued from age eighteen in the citizen forces.

In the two and a half years before the outbreak of war in 1914, over 27,000 prosecutions were launched against parents of youths for failure to register. The usual penalty was a fine, but 5,732 youths were sentenced to imprisonment in military or civil jails.* Compulsion had been met by spontaneous and determined opposition. Amongst those prominent in it were

convinced socialists such as Harry Holland. This mass civil disobedience was threatening the continuation of compulsory military service before the war began.

Australia was swept into the First World War on a tide of patriotism and imperial fervor in which Liberal and Labor Parties alike promised their utmost support to Britain. Labor, winning the election of September 1914, formed the government. W. M. Hughes, who succeeded Fisher as Labor Prime Minister towards the end of 1915, believed that the needs of the war over-rode all else. Only the militant and international socialists of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) and some women pacifists stood out in opposition to the war itself.

There was no lack of volunteers for the forces. Yet questionnaires and war census cards soon hinted at compulsion, military and civil. In January 1916, conscription became law in Britain and was being discussed in Australia. Hughes, visiting Britain, was avid to increase Australia's part in the war. On his return he announced in August 1916 that a referendum would be held on conscription for overseas service. The movement against it had already started in a small way, now the battle was joined.

The forces were very unequal. In favor of conscription were the Prime Minister, his cabinet, the Federal Opposition, eleven out of the twelve State Premiers and Opposition leaders, employers' federations, chambers of commerce, every conservative politician and public figure, nearly all church leaders, the newspapers. Censorship, intimidation and prosecutions under the War Precautions Act were used against the opponents of conscription. They were branded as shirkers, pro-Germans and traitors in a fury of hysterical "patriotism". Every power was used to crush opposition. Even the question was loaded. In 1916 the electors were asked to vote:

Are you in favour of the Government having, in this grave emergency, the same compulsory powers over citizens in regard to requiring their military service, for the term of this war, outside the Commonwealth, as it now has in regard to military service within the Commonwealth?

In 1917, more simply:

Are you in favor of the proposal of the Commonwealth Government for reinforcing the A.I.F. overseas?
When conscription was rejected by a narrow majority in 1916 and 1917 it was a triumph for a mass movement which fought its way from the ground against overwhelming odds. This movement was spearheaded by a handful of class conscious militants. It won the support of most of the labor movement, against their leaders. In the vanguard too were pacifists and liberals of great courage who proclaimed a message of humanity. Some Catholic leaders made a public stand. The brunt of the campaign was carried by young, unknown men and women who overcame every obstacle with vigor and originality. When it came to the test they had won to their side the silent majority.

In 1916 and again in 1917 only a few Australians wholly opposed the war and the imperialism which caused it. Many others, however, opposed conscription for a variety of reasons. They resisted it as tyrannical, a weapon in the hands of a dictatorial government to undermine Australian liberties. They feared it as a permanent step towards the militarisation of Australia. They baulked at the inequality of sacrifice which would send ordinary young men to die whilst profiteering flourished. They dreaded the endless slaughter of Australian youth. Some, like Archbishop Mannix, supported Irishmen fighting against British rule. Others yearned for Australia's lost isolation, or simply wanted to keep out of the army. The vote for "No" summed up many motives.

So conscription brought to the surface underlying conflicts. The defeat of the referenda was a defeat for reaction in every way. It ensured that Australia would continue in the liberal democratic tradition, that militarism would be restricted, that an independent national decision would be made on overseas wars. The Labor Party had been split, but split by purging it of its right wing.

Disillusionment with the war grew after it had ended. Although no foreign threat to Australia was apparent, compulsory military training remained until the Scullin government discontinued it in 1929. It was re-introduced by the Menzies government after the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. Conscription for overseas service, however, could never have been acceptable in Australia during the period of the phoney war.

The situation was completely different in 1942, so conscrip-
tion for overseas service was different in substance from what it had been. Australia was fighting for national survival against Japanese aggression, as part of the world front against the fascist powers. A total war effort was mounted under the leadership of the Labor Party and with the full support of the labor movement. The authority to send soldiers to defined areas of the Western Pacific was given to the Curtin government without difficulty, for the government was trusted in the defence of the country. This particular act was a minor part of everything else which was being done, when sacrifices were made willingly because they were necessary. In this war against imperialism Australians put aside their isolation to play a full part. The victory was historic, and the world would never be the same again.

History moves slowly most of the time, despite the flurry on the surface. Large changes mature for many years before their growth forces them into the open. Then a cross-roads is reached from which a path into the future must be chosen. Today Australia's borrowed time is running out and decisions have to be faced. Again they centre on conscription.

Today conscription means conscription for the American war of intervention in Vietnam. Hence it becomes the touchstone for the great questions of the time. Australia's national independence, its relations with Asia, its future development, come to a point here. This is the broadest issue on which criticism of our government's policy centres. Many strands are brought together to be resolved by a verdict on conscription, as they were fifty years ago. A strong and deep-seated Australian tradition opposes it.

The vote against conscription in 1916 and 1917 did not stop the war, nor Australia's participation in it, nor secure a just and lasting peace. Hughes won an election in 1917 and again in 1919 despite conscription. This may well happen again. But the struggle against conscription made its contribution to the ending of the war, to the revitalisation of the Labor Party and the trade union movement, to the A.L.P. socialisation objective of 1921, to the formation of the Communist Party in 1920. Above all, it shaped to some extent the future of Australia, for in this struggle the forces of reaction and the forces of progress contended at a time of decision. The path of reaction was blocked, the path of progress was opened.
THE late Clarrie Fallon, seventeen years head-serang of the Australian Workers’ Union, once quietly said, “I will never join a body I can’t control.” Fallon wasn’t boasting. He was simply spelling out the decades-old credo — official but unwritten — of the AWU hierarchy. Fallon’s words are a sinister backdrop to the July decision of the AWU executive council to recommend to its 1967 annual convention that the union affiliate with the Australian Council of Trade Unions. The AWU hierarchical power structure, first shaped by E. G. Theodore and W. McCormack back in the days of the amalgamation of the AWU and the Amalgamated Mining Association, is much the same today despite a nagging erosion of its base.

Power is still the biggest word in AWU top circles. And power percolates through an ugly heap of undemocratic rules, low-wage awards, “red-baiting”, strike breaking, suspect ballots and collusion with employers and governments. Ted Theodore, with a mixture of shame and pride, once described the set-up as “government by officials for officials.”

The AWU power edifice is laced together by a unique web of rules which are observed or broken according to where you sit on the heap. Ballots are farcical; upwards of eighty per cent of AWU members do not vote in ballots, and until recently AWU ballots did not conform to the secrecy provisions of the Arbitration Act. Two-thirds of the membership are always ineligible for office because of the five years continuous membership rule. Even the eligible members can have their nominations thrown out unless passed by the officials as “fit and proper persons” to contest office.
Wide open to corruption, AWU ballots are notoriously suspect. The present General Secretary Tom Dougherty was first elected to that office in circumstances which, according to an affidavit by Clyde Cameron in the Industrial Court a few years ago, "The late Justice O'Mara found that the Queensland branch ballot . . . was characterised by corruption and breach of rules."

With nearly 80,000 members and nineteen of the forty delegates to Federal convention, Queensland is the biggest AWU branch and the real seat of power. Until recent years the Queensland secretary was the traditional king maker of the Australian Labor Party machine, inheriting without question the presidency of the Party's State Executive and enjoying such privileges as facsimile voting in ALP plebiscites. (This was the use of a facsimile of the ballot paper published in The Worker, to which the voting coupon from the AWU ticket was to be attached.)

But the heyday came to an end early in 1959 when the then AWU secretary Joe Bukowski was suspended from all official positions in the ALP and the AWU disaffiliated in retaliation. The immediate issue of dispute was the misuse of facsimile ballot papers in an ALP plebiscite, but Bukowski's suspension was really the culmination of a new stage in the struggle against "Industrial Group" influence in the Queensland branch of the ALP. At a Labor-in-Politics convention a few weeks later facsimile voting was abolished, and Tom Dougherty, in a burst of standard AWU rhetoric from his Sydney office, accused the ALP in Queensland of being dominated by "Communists and fellow travellers."

For years the AWU has been renowned in union circles for its low-wage awards. This led the president of the Queensland Trades & Labor Council, Mr. J. Egerton, to say in 1957, "We are sick and tired of having to fall into line with sub-standard working conditions accepted by the AWU." More recently, because of rising rank and file discontent with low-wage rates, AWU officials have adopted the practice of coming in on the grouter on wage cases and awards.

The AWU hierarchy has always opposed state and national trade union unity except on its own terms. In the "One Big Union" movement during and after the first world war the AWU, in the words of labor historian V. Gordon Childe "... was the rock on which One Big Union went to shipwreck".

Their hostility was dictated by their own design to make the AWU the one big union, and part of the capitalist establishment, and because they objected violently to the radical policies voiced by the OBU advocates. Speaking of the plans of the AWU hier-
archy Childe wrote, "They desire to extend the membership of their union in order to swell their own importance, but they aim at keeping the unions that they devour in the most complete subjection possible." When the ACTU was formed in 1927 the AWU stood aloof and hostile. Down the years branches of the AWU have affiliated with state Trades and Labor Councils only when it suited their purposes.

This "dominate, or disaffiliate and destroy" line of the AWU chiefs is also evident in their many bumptious withdrawals from ALP affiliation federally and in the states. In February 1965 the AWU annual convention decided to withdraw all support from the Labor Party federally because two federal labor politicians, Dr. J. F. Cairns and Mr. C. Cameron, supported AWU members who had been shamelessly betrayed by the hierarchy in their struggle at Mt. Isa.

In 1958-59 the right wing was still in disarray following the Labor Party split. Dougherty, quick to seize a chance but never good at tactics, launched an attack on the ACTU which finally led the right wing into a strategic straitjacket. Encouraged by the US-sponsored International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and on the eve of an ACTU interstate executive meeting, Dougherty, with his usual savoir faire, accused the ACTU of having no basic loyalties to Australia. In an angry and unanimous reply the ACTU executive said, "... Mr. Dougherty, in another of his typical irrational outbursts against the ACTU, has endeavored to question the loyalty and besmirch the character and bona fides of the ACTU... Mr. Dougherty's reference to basic loyalties could be very well tested in his own behavior in the labor movement. He loses no opportunity to be a disruptor."

Several months later the 1959 AWU annual convention, on Dougherty's initiative, decided to sponsor a rightwing confederation of unions to rival the ACTU. This move came immediately in the wake of a visit to Australia by Mr. David John McDonald, conservative president of the American United Steelworkers' union.

ACTU president Albert Monk, commenting at the time on the AWU plan, said, "The role of the present AWU leadership has been confined for years to union splitting. The constant attacks at AWU conventions on the ACTU and its officials has been simply a means of endeavoring to cloak the ineptitude of the AWU leadership to perform positive industrial work and formulate effective industrial, economic and social programs."
The extreme right flirted for a time with Dougherty's breakaway plan but, failing to rally significant support, shifted their attack to the issue of reciprocal visits to socialist countries. Throwing grist to their mill the journal of the ICFTU publicly and insultingly rebuked the ACTU by using the epithet "blackleg" (the American equivalent of "scab") for unionists who visited socialist countries. Albert Monk had visited the Soviet Union and China in 1957. The reciprocal visits dispute resulted in the rout of the extreme rightwing at the 1959 ACTU Congress, and then their further isolation through their non-attendance at the 1961 Congress. The rightwing had reached an impasse, and painful reappraisal of their positions was the big order of the day.

Meanwhile Australia was assuming key importance to United States strategic planning in Asia and the western Pacific. Because of this and the increasing inflow of US capital investment the US started to take a keener interest in Australian political and industrial institutions. The Australian Labor Party and the trade union movement were singled out for special attention.

The importance of this decision was later underscored by the decision of the Australian Government to allow the US Navy to establish a nuclear submarine radio control base in Western Australia, and the stepping up of US military activities in Vietnam.

Thereupon the US labor attache and his staff became the busiest team of men in Canberra, and by mid-1962 the extreme right had acquired a new ACTU strategy — stay in and turn it on a new, rightwing, course. The first major victory for this plan was the surprise appointment of Clerks' union federal secretary, J. Riordan, to a vacancy on the ACTU interstate executive in May 1963 following his rejoining the Labor Party. Riordan had previous long associations with NCC-DLP policies, and less than two years earlier had led the small group of unions that boycotted the 1961 ACTU congress through their refusal to pay a levy to finance reciprocal visits. The old-guard rightwingers on the ACTU executive were deeply implicated in Riordan's appointment and in events since then to keep Riordan on and alter the composition of the executive.

Stage two of the new rightwing strategy was to get the powerful but obstreperous AWU into the ACTU and so consolidate the putsch. It wasn't easy to get an AWU change of mind because the hierarchy was still obsessed by the notion of getting separate ICFTU affiliation as a "pure" trade union centre "free of communist influence." But heavy pressures and enticing terms had
started to bear fruit by the time of the 1966 AWU convention when several members of the hierarchy spoke of possible ACTU affiliation on the right terms.

The chief source of pressures for an AWU-ACTU rapport was revealed obliquely by Charlie Oliver when speaking of his 1965 visit to the US. Oliver told convention of the growing chagrin of American AFL-CIO leaders, who have long-standing associations with US State Department planners on international trade union matters, at the continued fragmentation of the rightwing forces in the Australian national trade union framework.

More recently the labor movement has been hot with rumors of US interference in union and political affairs, and on July 10 the Mirror newspaper Brisbane Sunday Truth carried an editorial headed “The CIA and our unions”. (CIA being the US Central Intelligence Agency.)

The Truth editorial referred to high-up labor circles crediting the CIA “with having had a hand in encouraging the powerful AWU to link up with the ACTU”, and went on “... there are vital reasons why the CIA ... should be vitally interested in Australian political and union trends. More and more we are becoming enmeshed in American affairs. More and more United States capital is being poured into Australian development. We are one of the few stable nations left and the United States naturally would like to see us stay that way ... both as an outlet for American investment and a bulwark against communist aggression in the South Pacific.”

This assault on the Australian trade union movement is paralleled by a similar offensive, in which the NCC-DLP plays a prominent part, against the Australian Labor Party. The motives in both spheres are rightwing control and domination at the top to thwart the rank and file striving for better living standards and national independence.

The nature of the affiliation terms offered the AWU are still the property of a very small group. For its part the ACTU will gain $16,000 annually in affiliation fees. But the AWU hierarchy, and those behind them, traditionally extort a terrible price for their favors. Dougherty gave a clue in his words of July 6, “When we join the ACTU we will be closer to one big union movement in Australia than at any other period of our history.” “One Big Union” AWU style is perhaps the price he is asking; with nawab Dougherty proposing and disposing.
"... the Left Review is a fully opportunistic, revisionist journal, Khrushchovian in every sense, and, therefore, despoils the facts, suppresses the truth..."

*The Australian Communist*, No. 21.

"... I look forward to receiving the ALR in future and I join with others in hoping that it doesn’t become too highbrow."

(Extract from a letter received by ALR from a correspondent wanting to join the Communist Party).

"... we were at first somewhat doubtful about changing the name to Australian Left Review. However, we have already accustomed ourselves to the change and consider it will have a wider appeal and be the means of attracting a wider circle of readers than was possible with the old C. R."

Mr. and Mrs. M., Queensland.

"It is indeed pleasing to note from your editorial that ALR No. 1 has its bulk circulation among trade unionists. I am of the opinion that it should include practical articles on just how socialism would be of benefit to Australians right now."

G. B., Victoria.

"I was very pleased with copy No. 2 and thought that the article by Pat Clancy on Trade Unions was excellent and most relevant to the current situation in Australia."

—T.Y., N.S.W.
IT seemed so simple to many observers late last year. The Indonesian generals had taken over, destroyed the Communist Party in a frenzy of blood-letting, broken President Sukarno's grip on national politics and established a tight control of administration throughout the country. It was only a matter of time before they consolidated their rule, rounded out contours of a rightwing military regime, and with Western aid began to put the ramshackle economy in order.

The actuality today is far removed from this complacent prospect indulged in by Australian foreign affairs spokesmen and editorial writers. Beneath the fascination with the public acrimony and intrigue emanating from Djakarta there can be discerned a profound unease with the continuing instability and division exhibited by the Indonesian elite, and the growing signs of deepening tensions throughout the archipelago.

The terse fact is that the elimination for the time being of the Communist Party (PKI) as a coherent political force has only served to unleash all the conflicts that exist in Indonesian society, and not least within its ruling circles. All those who saw in the rise of communism the most palpable threat to their power positions and their wealth, or who jumped on the army bandwagon when it began to roll on its bloody course, drank deep of the heady wine of victory in those early months, only to awake to the realisation that the struggle for survival and supremacy was still on in dead earnest.

It is next to impossible to sort out the multifarious streams
of antagonism that are funnelled into the capital and there released again through the statements, the actions and the conspiracies of military commanders, politicians, bureaucrats, religious functionaries, speculators and student action commands. Certainly they can be reduced to no straight-forward set of political and ideological discords. The self interest of ambitious military officers and corrupt state officials intertwines with religious affiliations, regional and local loyalties, professional jealousies, departmental rivalries, ethnic attachments and personal cliquism to present a bewildering patchwork of motivation to the observer.

However, some of the more potent centres of political conflict can be isolated to an extent. Three main groupings can be found in the army leadership (alongside many lesser alliances founded on regional interests and the power of local commanders). Furthest to the right is the grouping around General Haris Nasution, the former army strongman and only survivor of the Untung movement's kidnappings last October 1. In the light of the army's disunity, Nasution has sought to revive the fortunes of the Moslem party Masjumi, which was outlawed as a result of its complicity in the regional rebellions of the late fifties. The main agitational arm of Nasution's thrust has been the extremist student body KAMI, which in the early part of this year rampaged through the capital on its anti-communist, anti-Sukarno missions. This grouping seems to have lost ground throughout the year, with the KAMI kept within certain bounds, Nasution manoeuvred out of the Cabinet, and Masjumi leader Hatta left standing in the wings offering his services to a wary establishment.

The second, and major, army grouping adheres to the Cabinet head, General Suharto, perhaps in large measure because he has emerged at the top. His ideological makeup is more complex. A strong anti-communist and advocate of the army's mission to hold the balance of power in the political arena, he is nevertheless drawn by his Javanese aristocratic background and his mysticism (he brought his soothsayer from the central Javanese city of Semarang to help guide his decision-making) towards a modified form of the Sukarno brand of nationalism. Despite his determination to cut Sukarno down to size, he shares the President's fear of a complete breakdown in national unity, and so finds himself trying to maintain a precarious balance among the competing political factions. He is under heavy
pressure from the Moslem Scholars' Party and the Nationalists to keep Nasution and the KAMI students on a leash, and appears to have made some concessions to their demands. He has stated his wish to confine the political process to two major parties representing rightwing Nationalists and a united Moslem party, with the army holding the ring and no doubt calling the tune. There is no sign at present that he can impose the necessary restraints on the factions to achieve his goal.

A third armed forces grouping, still strong in Central and East Java, and within the marines and the air force, maintains allegiance to Sukarno's aura, his strident nationalism and his vague ideology of social reform.

With the army thus splintered and incapable of asserting its naked will effectively, the door is left open to all the other elements in politics and the administration to lobby, scheme, bargain, obstruct and sabotage. The result is governmental paralysis, compromise, failure. The triumvirate of Suharto, Malik and the Sultan of Djogjakarta proclaimed a three-fold objective in March—to establish effective government, end the confrontation of Malaysia, and restore the economy. We have already seen how little progress has been made towards the first objective. The second—ending confrontation—seemed to be faring better under the assertive control of the pro-Western, cynical, opportunist, corrupt Foreign Minister, Malik. Then it too bogged down in division and compromise. Confrontation has formally ended, it is true, but it had ceased to be effective even prior to the coup, owing to Indonesia's inability to pursue it either economically or militarily. More significant is the fact of serious governmental dispute as to the meaning of the agreement and the future relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. The consummate political skill of Sukarno is operating here, as in other fields, in an endeavor to widen the breach between the opponents and re-assert his grandiose concepts of an Indonesia leading the world in its opposition to all forms of imperialism and neo-colonialism.

Too much has already been written on the continuing crisis in Indonesia's economy to require much elaboration here. It is sufficient to say that nothing the new rulers have done so far has arrested the catastrophic decline in the country's production, exports, financial reserves or communications. Prices are reported to have risen by more than ten times so far this year, manufac-
turing plants are operating at twenty per cent of capacity, and breakdown is endemic in every sphere of the economy other than staple food production. In view of the practical domination of economic affairs by the bureaucratic capitalists (the military and civilian officials who run the state enterprises and control directly or indirectly all other key productive activities), their close links with the political rulers, and the massive scale of their corruption, it is difficult to imagine any government formed from the elite bringing order out of this chaos.

Formerly, optimistic predictions were made about the availability of Western funds to put the rightwing government on its feet. But, despite a meeting in Tokyo, the imperialists seem less than anxious to throw good money after bad, in view of the enormous scale of the aid that would be required and the political uncertainty that obtains in Djakarta. In any case, without a reliable administration, foreign funds may be expected to disappear the way they have done for a decade or more in Indonesia.

So far we have concentrated on the view from the top. What of the Indonesian masses? Here information is even more difficult to come by, impossible to check, and easy to misinterpret. However, many reports speak of growing discontent, restlessness and rebelliousness in Central and East Java. It is important to remember that Indonesian politics has been predominantly Javanese politics, that these regions of Java contain almost half the country's population, and that they have been strongholds of Sukarnoism and the Communist Party. For months, disoriented by the demise of their political leaders, fear-struck by the army and Moslem slaughters, and confused by official accounts of the coup and counter-coup, the active groups among Java's workers and peasants suffered the tide of reaction to surge over them. A number of factors have combined to revitalise their political and social protest—economic distress, distrust of the army and the Moslem right, Sukarno's ebullient refusal to admit defeat, and the emergence of underground communist, union and other radical organisations.

Surreptitiously but persistently, the Government allegations that the Communists tried to take power in the Untung coup are being questioned and rejected. The manifest and incongruous contradictions in the official press accounts and "confessions", which have led many outside Indonesian specialists
to dismiss the whole "Communist conspiracy" story as a fake contrived to entrench in power the victors in an intra-army feud, are circulating through the word-of-mouth channels of disaffection spreading in Indonesia's crucial provinces. Slowly, painfully but perceptibly, a mass movement is being reformed to challenge the power of the ruling centre.

It would take a bold man to predict Indonesia's likely course from here on. In the absence of a stable elite or a cohesive mass opposition, the present uneasy, crumbling political facade could hold together indefinitely. But tensions are bound to increase bringing in their wake mounting disorders. No extreme, from secessionist revolts in the outer islands to civil war, can be entirely ruled out. Imperialist interference and manipulation will assuredly extend, and produce more ruptures and convulsions. The army is still the force to watch: the younger officer resentment at their leaders' corruption, high living and lack of patriotism, which was a salient factor in the Untung movement, is still at work, and may well produce a purging revolt along the lines of Nasser's coup in Egypt.

Only one thing can be said with certainty, and that is that if the country is to be lifted out of its torment, it will only be by a strong, disciplined and puritanical party or group, determined to deal ruthlessly with the decadent elites, purify the administration, put the state enterprises on their feet and begin the long-delayed social reform awaited by Indonesia's million-fold poor.

It was the failure of the PKI to develop class-conscious policies and a disciplined party with an independent standpoint that contributed heavily to its debacle last year. Decisively influenced by the Chinese Communist Party line of subordinating struggles to solve internal problems to "first eliminating imperialism from the world", it allowed Sukarno and his nationalist entourage to divert the Indonesian social revolution into sterile paths of anti-imperialist posturing, strident nationalism and prestige-building symbols, while the economy collapsed, the army and the bureaucrat capitalists built up their power, and social discontent became frustrated and disillusioned. The PKI followed in Sukarno's wake, hoping that the President would make it unnecessary to wage a stern class struggle for basic social changes. As a consequence, the party lost its grassroots
vigour, its independent ideology and its disciplined toughness. As the time came when it desperately needed these attributes, it fell too easily into the army's trap.

But Indonesian communism has shown extraordinary resilience; in 1948 too the army fell upon the PKI at Madiun and all but exterminated it, yet within ten years it had re-emerged as the strongest political force in the country. This time its way will be harder still, despite the great mass following it built up in the halcyon decade 1955-65. It will have to rebuild underground, attach itself firmly to the demands of the workers and poor peasantry, and forsake the former dreams of an easy passage to socialism under the protective wing of an aristocratic elite.

Australia's establishment members and ideologues, who viewed the military takeover with such complacent satisfaction, are already finding their rejoicing tempered by misgiving. It is not the fact that the death toll in the army's savage reprisals are now estimated at one million that disturbs them, but the indications that the new rulers are loose in the saddle. Foreign Minister Hasluck finds consolation in the thought that relations between Australia and Indonesia show signs of improvement and indeed it would be surprising if anti-communist reactionaries in Djakarta and Canberra did not find something in common. It is less understandable that Labor's Whitlam and Cairns, after recent visits to Indonesia, should find discussions with Foreign Minister Malik reassuring and indicative of better things in store between the two countries. Events in Indonesia can be welcomed only if one considers that the bloody repression of a people's aspirations for social progress is firm ground on which to build a peaceful and friendly Asia. This is not the policy put forward by the A.L.P., nor is it realistic.

The violence that has occurred in Indonesia has made further counter-violence inescapable. When the bitter cups flow over, as they must, it will not be a pretty sight. Let our anti-communist zealots remember the genesis of violence, and how they applauded it.

Indonesian and international reactionaries have not stopped social change in Indonesia; they have only forced it into more elemental channels.
OFTEN when anti-Soviet propagandists assert that today Yiddish culture is in a serious plight in the Soviet Union and that soon the Soviet Jews will be without a literature and language, they appear to try to leave the impression that conversely in the West, the Yiddish language and literature are flourishing. Actually the reverse is true; Yiddish literature is at a very low ebb in the U.S.A. and is virtually extinct in Britain, but in the Soviet Union there is still considerable creative activity in the Yiddish language. As Dr. Nahum Goldmann said at the recent meeting of the World Jewish Congress, the Soviet Jewish community is “culturally one of the most creative” (Melbourne Herald, August 1, 1966).

Yiddish, a younger language than Hebrew which goes back to antiquity, was derived from Middle High German between the 10th and 12th centuries, and after the Jewish migration eastward to Poland and Russia was mostly spoken in Eastern Europe where it was enriched by new words and word formations.

Modern Yiddish literature was born in the mid-19th century in Czarist Russia in which lived nearly 50 per cent of the total Jewish population of the world at that time. Yiddish cultural expression grew up in the Pale of Settlement, the vast ghetto set up in 1835 by Nicholas I, in parts of white Russia and the Ukraine in which most of the Jews were compelled to live. The majority of Jews engaged in petty commercial pursuits, lived in indescribable poverty, and were denied entry into Russian schools and universities.

The first important Yiddish writer, Mendele Mocher Sforim (Mendele the bookseller) began to write in Yiddish in 1863,
after he had visited many communities in the Pale. He depicted the horrors and miseries of ghetto life and championed the ordinary people as did the other two celebrated Yiddish writers who appeared soon after him, I. L. Peretz and Sholem Aleichem. These three writers constitute the classical trio of Yiddish prose. Perhaps the greatest of all Yiddish writers and certainly the most widely translated and best known is Sholem Aleichem (1850-1916), a rare humorist with a matchless style. His work represents an almost complete repertory of all the sufferings and humiliations, the economic hardships and the religious and political intolerance which, without respite, the Jews had to endure in the Czarist Empire between the years 1880 and 1915.

Outside the Czarist Empire in Europe where the bourgeois revolutions, first in 17th century England and later in France in 1789, gradually brought the Jews civil and political emancipation, Yiddish died out, particularly after the French revolutionary armies battered down the old Ghetto walls in Germany.

The Russian Jews did not acquire full civic, political and educational equality until the establishment of the Soviet Union, although the Pale had been abolished by the March revolution in 1917. Prior to that time, from the 80's, with the incessant pogroms which cost thousands of Jewish lives, went a tightening of the Pale, a further limiting of education in the Russian schools to which an increasing number of Jews aspired despite their love of Yiddish.

Between 1881-1914 no fewer than 2,000,000 Jews from Czarist Russia left their homes, the largest number going to the U.S.A. By 1915 over 1,500,000 Jews in Russia were living on charity parcels sent by Jewish philanthropic organisations in the U.S.A. and Britain.

During that whole period more and more Jews began to participate in the Russian socialist and labour movements as distinct from the separate Jewish labor organisations. This was partly the result of the spreading of marxist ideas in the ghettos of the cities of the Pale and in Poland, by Jewish intellectuals fortunate enough to receive education in Russian schools and universities. There was also a growing understanding that emancipation could not come about by the efforts of the Jews alone, but only in co-operation with the Russian democratic, labour and socialist movements. The words of the famous German-Jewish writer Ludwig Boerne, the contemporary of Marx and Heine, were widely quoted:

53
“He who wants to work on behalf of the Jews must fuse their cause with the demands of universal freedom.”

From the 80's Jewish socialists began to make an outstanding contribution to the Russian Socialist movement and they were among the founders of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. The attempt to separate off Jewish socialists and the Jewish working class movement in a separate compartment from the general socialist movement was the policy of the Jewish Bund, against which Lenin waged battle.

This conflict, as indeed the whole question of integration or assimilation which as a rule was accepted and encouraged by the European socialist movement, was increasingly discussed in the Yiddish press that arose in Odessa and Warsaw. Even then Russian culture was beginning to exercise a profound influence on Jewish intellectuals and workers, largely because of the universal character of the ideas that animated it, the ideas of writers like Tolstoy, and Plekhanov and Lenin. At the turn of the 20th century significant numbers of Jews were turning to the Russian language and Jews began to enter Russian literature and culture.

However, Yiddish remained the language of the Jewish masses, and in all the towns and villages of the Pale and in Poland there was some Yiddish cultural activity, theatres, readings and publications, often bound up with the Jewish Labor movement.

**Britain and the U.S.A.**

In the 80's and 90's in Britain the Russian-Polish immigration initiated new trends within the Jewish community which led to the formation of the working class movement among the Jews. In 1884, a year before William Morris launched his Socialist paper, “The Commweal”, the migrant Morris Winchevsky began to publish in London the first Yiddish socialist paper in the world, which was also the first Yiddish paper in England.

In less than 25 years the Yiddish labor and general press declined as Jewish labor gradually became part of the general labor movement, for it was largely the migrants that had supported the Yiddish press. The need for separate organisations diminished with the drying-up of immigration and the growing up of an English-born generation going through the Council schools and many of them battling their way to higher education.

As though symbolising the rapid change, Morris Winchevsky emigrated to America, where he became the bard of the Jewish workers in the New York sweat shops. Living to a great old
age, he took part in the foundation of the Communist Party of the United States, and in 1927 visited the Soviet Union where he was received by President Kalinin and honored in the same way as Eugene Pottier, the author of the "International".

Nothing of the Yiddish press which continued in an enfeebled form until the end of the second world war remains today. Nor did Britain produce one Yiddish writer of note, probably not one British-born Yiddish writer, although many Russian Yiddish writers including Sholem Aleichem wrote about the Jews in Britain. Except as a private family language, generally imperfectly spoken, Yiddish has disappeared from the Anglo-Jewish world. The London Jewish Quarterly in its summer issue 1964, commenting on the visit to London of the Polish State Jewish Theatre, asked:

"How many of those who were clamouring for the revival of Yiddish in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries went to see the Polish State Jewish Theatre on its recent visit to London for a four weeks' season of Yiddish plays? Judging by the attendance figures, not very many. Was it, perhaps, because they were not really concerned?"

And in truth they are not except for a handful of devotees, and even anti-Soviet propagandists who are allegedly disturbed by the fate of Yiddish literature in the Soviet Union would never dream of writing their own books in Yiddish even if they could. Jewish life in England has gradually found expression in an expanding Anglo-Jewish literature precisely because English has become the only language of the English Jews.

In the first thirty years of this century there were two distinguished Anglo-Jewish writers, Israel Zangwill and Louis Golding. Since 1945 there has been a veritable wave of Anglo-Jewish writers. Some of the best known are Arnold Wesker, Alexander Baron, Gerda Charles, Frederic Raphael, Wolf Mankovitz and Harold Pinter, all of whom have been understood and accepted by the non-Jewish public as well as the Jews, a significant fact which underlines the break-up of Jewish separatism in England.

An even greater outburst of Jewish literary creativity in English has taken place in the U.S.A. in the last 40-odd years. There were first the New York East End novelists and in the 30's Clifford Odets, Nathaniel West, Myer Levin and Michael Gold, famous for his "Jews Without Money".

Since the second world war their numbers have increased. These include Irwin Shaw, Arthur Miller, Saul Bellow, Norman Mailer,
Joseph Heller, Bernard Malamud and J. D. Salinger, who have all drawn from Jewish life as well as from the general American scene.

But during the same time the American Jewish community which has been the world's largest since 1918, has not produced a Yiddish writer of stature although many Yiddish writers like Sholem Aleichem emigrated to New York. American propagandists however do not hesitate to lay claim to the famous Yiddish writers I. J. Singer, J. Opatoshu, Sholem Asch and Z. Schnoeur because they lived in the U.S.A., although all of them were born in Poland or Russia and were mature writers when they emigrated to the U.S.A.

Yiddish literature and culture have catastrophically declined in the U.S.A. in the face of the integration of the American-born Jews and powerful Americanisation campaigns. "Time", in an article on December 28, 1962, dealing with the anti-communist Jewish daily "Forward", one of the few Yiddish dailies remaining in the U.S.A., said:

"The children of Forward readers do not read the paper, because they cannot. As the second generation sons and daughters of Jewish immigrants, they have forgotten the mother tongue, that backward running curious cross of Hebrew and medieval German. Like Yiddish itself, the Forward is an anachronism, born in a departed past to meet a need that no longer exists".

The well-known Yiddish authority David Flakser, writing about Yiddish in the U.S.A. on the occasion of the second World Congress for Yiddish culture, held in New York, which has the largest concentration of Jews in the world, said:

"During the 10 years between the Congresses the number of Yiddish-speaking and Yiddish-reading Jews has decreased greatly... Hardest hit has been the Yiddish book. The number of readers has declined steadily. Yiddish books are now read by Yiddish writers and the narrowing strata of the Yiddish intelligentsia. Talented Yiddish poets and novelists and essayists are forced to publish and distribute their books at their own expense."

The Yiddish theatre in the U.S.A. is even more moribund than Yiddish literature. There is not one permanent Yiddish theatre in New York. In the London "Jewish Chronicle" on July 14, 1961, the American-Jewish actress Stella Adler, the daughter of the late Jacob Adler, one of the greatest figures in the history of the Yiddish theatre, said:
The Yiddish theatre is dead. Part of it died with my parents. Maurice Schwartz tried to keep something of it alive, but it could not be done. The pressures of American life, the commercialism, the things people search for. It isn't a world in which arts can thrive.

The Future

Is there a future for Yiddish and Yiddish literature? As far as the English speaking countries are concerned the outlook is indeed bleak. For the majority of the Jews in these countries English is their native tongue. Literature can finally only be made out of the speech of a people.

The State of Israel offers no hope to Yiddish. In their introduction to *A Treasury of Yiddish Stories*, Irving Howe and Eliezer Greenberg say:

“For the State of Israel, through a variety of semi-official devices, has discouraged the use of Yiddish among its citizens. The language is looked down upon for the very reason that Yiddish writers cling to it so fiercely and with so desperate an affection: because it is the language of the Jewish dispersion, stained by exile, defeat and martyrdom.”

It is not quite so true of Israel now as when those words were written back in the fifties. Nevertheless, Yiddish is not encouraged, only Hebrew, which is the official language. It is repeatedly stated by Israel's leaders that Israel's cultural consciousness is Hebrew.

It would seem that in the Soviet Union, Yiddish literature might have a better chance of survival than anywhere else. This is not only because it has deeper roots in the Soviet Union, but also because Soviet Yiddish literature has adapted itself to the new life and does not draw on a Ghetto sensibility, which is still the case with Yiddish writers elsewhere.

And not least the republications in very large editions of Yiddish poetry and Yiddish novels into Russian, Ukrainian and other languages of the Soviet Union is a tremendous encouragement to Yiddish writers to continue writing in Yiddish.

Nevertheless, it cannot be precluded that Yiddish may eventually die out in the Soviet Union, as the younger generations, as in Australia, England, etc., cease to speak the Yiddish language. This will not be because of repression and the lack of official support but because of historical development. The large and increasing number of Russian writers of Jewish origin in Soviet literature is a pointer in that direction.
Books


THIRTEEN years ago, on June 19, 1953, Julius Rosenberg, 35, a New York electrical engineer, and his wife, Ethel, 37, parents of two young boys, were executed in the electric chair at Sing Sing penitentiary.

They had been found guilty with two others—David Greenglass a machinist (Ethel Rosenberg’s brother) and Morton Sobell—of conspiracy to transmit American atomic bomb secrets to the Soviet Union.

The motive for the crime was said to be ideological—communism.

The conviction of the Rosenbergs and their execution two years later after judicial appeals and two appeals to the White House for clemency had failed, aroused world-wide protests.

From the time of the conviction to the execution there were repeated demonstrations of protest and demands for withdrawal of the death sentences in cities throughout the world.

The French philosopher and writer, Jean Paul Sartre accused the U.S. Government of “criminal folly” and likened it to a mad dog.

Now, beginning ten years after the execution, an American couple, Walter and Miriam Schneir (unfortun-
The French Nobel Prize-winning author, Francois Mauriac raised the same question in a note of protest in the conservative Parisian newspaper "Figaro" the day after the execution.

"Have the Rosenbergs committed the crime for which they were executed?" he wrote, "That is the question. But another question obsesses and worries me: Was it of any use, and if so to whom?"

The Schneirs have assembled their material most skilfully. They begin with a brief but brilliant account of the development of the atomic bomb up to its use on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, to the first Soviet atomic explosion on September 24, 1948 (five years before U.S. experts had estimated they could possibly develop it) that ended the U.S. atomic monopoly and triggered off in America the wave of spy mania that engulfed the Rosenbergs.

The U.S. had to prove to the world that the Soviet could not have developed the bomb without treasonable aid from someone in America—and the Rosenbergs, with some tenuous but never proven association with the Communist movement, became the victims.

The Schneirs go painstakingly through the trial evidence up to the conviction, give the complete letters that passed between the Rosenbergs themselves, their children and their defence counsel, in which they resolutely maintained their innocence.

Then, in perhaps the most telling part of the work, they examine the chief prosecution witnesses against the Rosenbergs—David Greenglass, the simple machinist who was supposed to have stolen top atomic secrets from the Manhattan Project, and who had every reason for lying and implicating the Rosenbergs; Elizabeth Bentley, the professional anti-communist pimp; Harry Gold, the obscure chemist who rocketed to fame on his confession (and only his) that he was the American contact for Klaus Fuchs, the British atomic scientist who confessed to passing atomic secrets to Russia; the same Harry Gold who admitted under cross-examination to "16 years of lying" and who said it was a wonder "smoke didn't come out of my ears" because of the lies he had told.

The Schneirs leave this sorry array of witnesses in tatters.

Right up to the moment they stepped into the death chamber, the Rosenbergs could have saved themselves by confessing. A phone line was kept open to the White House from Sing Sing so that they could do so, but they refused, maintaining to the end that they had nothing to confess.

The Schneirs say in an epilogue: "The Rosenbergs and Sobell, pressured by a vast state apparatus to tell a story they knew to be untrue, stood firm.

"In a period of expediency and cynicism, they refused to co-operate, refused to save themselves at the expense of others.

"Faced with a profound moral choice, involving for them the question of life or death, they unhesitatingly chose.

"In this, the final triumph was theirs."

Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, one of the Supreme Court justices who thought that the Rosenbergs should be allowed another appeal, published his reasons the day after the execution, and added: "To be writing an opinion in a case affecting two lives after the curtain has been rung down upon them has the appearance of pathetic
futility. But history also has its
claims."

In "Invitation To An Inquest", most readers will feel that history has given its verdict.

TOM LARDNER.


SYME's name is generally associated with Victoria's protection policy in the second half of the 19th century. The legend that he was the Great Man of Protection and other important Victorian political matters, was possibly started by himself. It was certainly given wide credence by his first biographer, Ambrose Pratt, who not only styled Syme as the Father of Protection but set out to prove that Syme and The Age were the saintly and implacable Victorian parents of protection, popular opinion, liberalism, Deakin, governments and governmental policy.

A more formidable evaluator of Syme is Professor La Nauze who made a study of his role in the political economy of Australia with an analysis of his writings outside The Age. La Nauze severely criticised Pratt's book and more recently Sayers on Syme, expressing the opinion that an adequate biography is yet to be written.

In the main, Sayers' study of Syme has been damned with faint praise. But it should be said at the outset that he has done much to prune any idea that Syme invented the protection policy. He sees The Age as the mouthpiece of the popular movements of the time in the period that David Syme owned and controlled the newspaper, that is, 1860-1908. That the popular movements existed independently of The Age is indicated quite clearly by the writer in his section on Protection. From the late 1850's protection for native industries was gaining strength as a platform nostrum. Syme was still counselling caution in 1864 when protection became an election issue, though from 1860 his paper had been publishing favourable editorials and encouraging the formation of Tariff Reform Leagues. Sayers explains that Syme, wanting land for the people and full rights of self-government, saw a practical difficulty in the way of the too-early fostering of native industry. The squatters held the public estate; they controlled, too, the Legislative Council. The power of the squatters had therefore to be broken before other reforms could take place.

The association of the protection policy in Victoria with liberalism should not lead to wide generalisations either about Syme's role as the formulator, or about protection and liberalism being twin sisters. New South Wales liberalism had Parkes as its political leader and Parkes was a Free Trader. In New South Wales the labor movement was sharply divided on the fiscal issue both before and after the formation of the Labor Party. Free trade, of course, was the orthodox Empire economic doctrine and it was held tenaciously by squatters and importing manufacturers in the Australian colonies. The opposite view, the promotion of native industry, appealed to the wealthy in the towns but not necessarily to all workers, urban or rural. The free trade doctrine was spent in Victoria much earlier than in N.S.W., where it persisted, of course, after Federation.

That the doctrine of protection gained favor so early in Victoria has
been explained variously. Most views hold that it had something to do with the squatters—either because the wealthy pastoralist was from the beginning the big man in N.S.W. (the older colony) or because revenue from land sales in Victoria declined earlier and there was greater urgency for alternative sources of income. The cry to open the land had the support of the liberal movement in both States, but neither in N.S.W. nor in Victoria did the potential small farmer benefit from the liberal-promoted and worker-supported Land Acts of the 60's to the 80's.

In what position then can Syme and The Age be placed? It cannot be denied that he and his paper were influential media in a period when newspaper editors wielded greater influence than they do today. Syme helped, indubitably, to make the protection doctrine a practicable political question. Whether he made and unmade governments is another matter. He was a shrewd man (usually), with a flair for knowing which political horse should be backed; nor did he fail when necessary to give the right tips from the newspaper stable.

Sayers has written a biography of Syme, a much more objective one than Pratt's was. One inevitably expects too much from a biography; details of personal life and private attitudes, a full knowledge of the economic and political background in which the subject moved. Syme lived in a period which is full of events, confusing because so many things were happening in a large new country where capitalism was developing on the basis of convictism, the pastoral industry and the discovery of gold. Sayers as an Age journalist has thrown more light on an important figure of this developmental stage in Australia's history.—M.W.

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On July 7 this year the Minister for Territories stated that the people of Papua and New Guinea were free to choose any form of government: "This is their prerogative and a matter entirely for their own decision." Unfortunately, the Australian Government has made no effort to provide ideas on the many types of government that could produce the stability and development necessary. Many Europeans are now confident that New Guinea and Australia will be joined for many years to come. The Highlands Bulletin (July 9, 1966) has stated that the "way has been cleared for a special relationship to be established between Australia and New Guinea when self-determination is attained." Few people have remarked that it is foolish to give a person a choice between the Australian system and any other system unless the person in question knows the good and bad points of both systems.

The author of The Challenge of New Guinea is to be praised for producing a pamphlet that does clearly outline an alternative, and also points out weaknesses in the Australian system. New Guineans who have managed to attain literacy, a very small percentage, will find this pamphlet both easy to read and relevant to their situation at the present time. It will also provide useful information for Australians who want a survey of existing conditions in the Territory.

Apart from some information about current industrial unrest, I found a chapter on "Forms of Revolt" disappointing. The author sees the millenarian movements as a progressive
movement “representing the emergence of new forms of rudimentary political organisation to cope with the new situation.” (p. 25.) However, most of the Cargo movements have been reactionary rather than progressive and have attempted to use the traditional forms of magic and religion rather than new beliefs. On page 25 Yali, a cult leader of the late ’40’s and early ’50’s is described as being “dropped by the Administration.” This I believe to have been the natural result of Yali’s bitterness at broken promises and lies told to the people by the Army and Administration at the end of the war. The Administration could not very well continue to employ a person who did have such a feeling of injustice and hatred for the system.

Most of the pamphlet has a degree of competence that reflects the author’s familiarity with the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. The quoting of sources of information is an important advance and adds to the value of this publication. Writers of pamphlets often seem loathe to acknowledge sources and this detracts from their work.

Cost was, no doubt, a great consideration in the production of photographs and some are rather poorly reproduced. There would have been advantages in editing out some of the photographs and leaving more space for those remaining.

The value of this pamphlet is in its low cost, making it within the reach of people on a weekly wage of 30/-.

—Tokua Lapun.


Professor Albinski, Associate Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, utilising a Visiting Fellowship in International Relations at the Australian National University, has made a well documented study of Australian policies vis-a-vis China since the end of the Second World War.

The writer relies for his basic material not only on printed sources, but also on interviews with a wide range of personalities significant in Australian public life ranging from Mr. B. A. Santamaria to Dr. Cairns and including prominent Liberal Party members and academics.

The Menzies government’s opportunism and expediency, its “hypocrisy if not downright prevarication” (p. 301) on China trade are effectively presented.

Professor Albinski shows convincingly the enormous benefit accruing to the Australian economy from the sale to China of wheat totalling seven million tons to the value of $500,000,000 to 1964, equivalent, as the author dryly remarks, to the total defence budget for the latter year. As a result of the China trade “bonanza” the acreage sown to wheat doubled between 1957-8 and 1964-5. Simultaneously, wool sales totalled $22,000,000 per annum with the expectation of sales five times as great by 1970.

These benefits did not deter the Menzies government from following the United States hard line in the United Nations on the seating of
China. The U.S. government was far from pleased with the show of independence by its satellite represented by the sale of wheat to China and protested vigorously, especially as part of the purchase was shipped directly to Cuba, which, of course, was under a complete U.S. trade embargo. However, as the author shows, the influence of the Country Party was decisive.

Professor Albinski analyses in some detail the economic trends impelling the Australian economy towards Asian trade: the decline in exports to Great Britain from $718,000,000 in 1952-3 to $418,000,000 in 1962-3, and the trade deficits in 1962-3 of $214,000,000 with Great Britain and $210,000,000 with North America.

These, taken in conjunction with United States reductions of Australian lead and zinc quotas, and discriminatory tariffs against Australian meat, wool and cheese, and with Britain's moves towards the European Common Market underlined the urgent need for Australia to find alternative trading partners. And, of those offering, China was beyond all comparison the most important.

Professor Albinski's analysis of the position of the A.L.P. on foreign policy is particularly interesting. As he shows, the Labor Party accepted the basic postulates of the Liberal Party; its anti-communist position, the United States alliance, its identification with "the west". As a result, the attempt to give a more democratic orientation to basically identical policies served to throw Labor into disarray and to open the way to dishonest and misleading attempts by the Liberal Party to make it appear that the Labor Party was "soft on communism" and would leave Australia defenceless against "communist aggression". As Professor Albinski comments, "This was rather dirty pool, but it probably had its effect" (p. 209). Elections were won by the Liberals in which this "dirty pool" played a prominent part.

There is an interesting account by former Senator Arnold of an attempt by an official of the U.S. embassy to bribe him into changing his mind about visiting China with an A.L.P. delegation in 1957.

"Arnold was approached by a U.S. embassy official and ... urged not to go to China. If he changed his mind, a round-the-world trip and an expenses paid holiday in America would be provided for him. If he persisted in going, he would not, in future be welcome in the United States. The story comes from Senator Arnold himself who spoke for the record." (p. 380.)

A very valuable section of the book deals with the brutality and corruption of the Chiang Kai Shek regime. It is salutary to recall as the author does that most of the millions of pounds of economic aid provided by United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency in the post-war period went into the pockets of the Kuomintang officials, that relief food was sold on the black market in the streets of Chinese cities and that an Australian UNRRA official, Mr. H. R. Heath, "charged with embezzling UNRRA property, was detained for months without trial and locked in chains under intolerable sanitary conditions ... (as) a scapegoat to shield implicated Chinese officials." (p. 7.)

There is no evidence that the ethical standards of the Chiang Kai Shek regime have changed for the better.

Professor Albinski writes with objectivity from a liberal political position,
The political cynicism of the Menzies government emerges clearly. However, whilst its opportunist subservience to the policies of the United States are underlined, the material of the book brings out sharply contradictions between the interests of sections of the Australian bourgeoisie and some aspects of United States global strategic plans.

It seems likely that the further step taken by Mr. Holt (since the book was published), towards subordination of Australian to United States interests in his “All the way”, will sharpen these contradictions.

—Bill Gollan.

VIETNAM STUDY GROUP

A USEFUL piece of work in assembling documents from all sources on the much-debated issue of negotiations to end the Vietnam war has been done by the Vietnam Study Group in Melbourne. It surveys the “negotiating positions” of the U.S., the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the South Vietnam Government, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the U.S.S.R., Britain, Australia and other interested parties.

Highly illuminating is the Study Group's analysis of the D.R.V. attitude, because this is a position most frequently distorted and misrepresented in the Australian and American press. It shows that, as the Group says, “North Vietnam does not insist on prior unilateral withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam before negotiations, but does insist on a prior cessation of American bombing of North Vietnam”.

The D.R.V. is not saying that the South Vietnam National Liberation Front must run South Vietnam; it is saying it must be run in accordance with the Program of the N.L.F.

This provides for a democratic, elected government representing all sections of the people, whether N.L.F. or not. It is hard to see how the Americans could object to this, and in fact, the Group shows that what they really object to is any negotiations at all with the N.L.F., their main opponent in the war.

The Group's report says:

“While America has expressed a willingness for ‘unconditional negotiations’ she has, up to date, imposed several conditions that would be unacceptable to the North Vietnamese and N.L.F.; no negotiations with the N.L.F.; negotiations to be carried out publicly . . . under threat of bombing or further escalation”.

This is also the position of the Ky government in South Vietnam, and the Study Group quotes from the daily press report of April 23 (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives):

“At a press conference on February 8, General Nguyen Van Thieu and Air Vice-Marsham Ky declared that they would not negotiate with or recognise the N.L.F”. (This stand was re-affirmed by Ky on July 25, 1966.)

So it is clear that when the Americans and Ky say they want “negotiations” it is not negotiations for peace that they are talking about. There were negotiations for peace in 1954, which resulted in the Geneva agreements. These were deliberately violated by the U.S. Government and its South Vietnam puppets. The negotiations they want now are negotiations which would legitimise their violation of the previous negotiations.

As the documents here presented show, this is also the position of the Holt Government of Australia.

W. A. Wood.
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