The international upsurge in the peace and disarmament movements has been strongly reflected in Australia. But, as the recent election showed — the Australian movement has not developed sufficient political clout to impose disarmament as an issue for our major political parties.

But the movement's experiences themselves suggest ways that can lead it towards becoming the irresistible force necessary to rid the world of the nuclear threat. Movements will always be pluralist by nature and cannot be confined to any one set of slogans. Between the slogans and their realisation there will be many partial measures if existing opportunities, even limited opportunities, are not taken up and acted upon, the movement will condemn itself to ritual. The greatest challenge lies in convincing people that they can take effective action against the threat of nuclear war as part of a movement to gain control over their own lives.

The nuclear disarmament movement is, by definition, less than 40 years old. We now know that there were scientists and politicians who queried the decision to use the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but most people did not know of the existence of the weapons or the debate on their use. Even those who did know could only guess at the possible effects.

Detail of this new weapon was shrouded in mystery even after it was used. Wilfred Burchett, then a war correspondent, was on Okinawa on August 6, 1945. The radio news spoke of a big new bomb, so Burchett travelled to Hiroshima to investigate. Thirty days later, the first report of that bombing was published in the London Daily Express. His story, *The Atomic Plague*, described how people, apparently uninjured, continued to die mysterious and horrible deaths. The sub-heading said "I write this as a warning to the world."

Burchett returned to Tokyo in time for a press conference given by high-ranking officers of General MacArthur's staff on the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Burchett's story of radiation sickness was specifically rejected, he had fallen victim to Japanese propaganda. 1 Atomic mis-information had begun.

At the time, many people believed, and some still do, that those two bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki saved lives. It is much more likely that United States strategic planners were giving a demonstration to the Soviet Union, and these were the first shots of the next war — till now avoided.

The Soviet Union was an ally — one which had made great sacrifices and earned much admiration. The early United States atomic policy was perceived by many as part of the "roll back communism" strategy which was done with all the lack of finesse that derives from unchallenged power.

President Truman and his associates promised vaudeville shows on the stage of the Bolshoi and fashion parades in the Kremlin while bullying a people who had suffered 20 million dead. And such offensive behaviour was often done in the name of God.

Truman wrote of atomic weapons in his diary: "It is an awful responsibility which has come to us. We thank God that it has come to us instead of our enemy. We pray that God may guide us to use it in his ways and for his purposes."

The early nuclear disarmament movement was anti-American and, to a degree, pro-Soviet. This was no "plot" but the action of real people with an historical experience. The United States of those times was overtly racist and not above electrocuting two New York Jews who were supposed to have told the Russians how to build their own bomb.

This early movement sought nuclear disarmament as the key step towards general and complete disarmament. It was very strong on community organising, particularly through petition campaigns. It informed people of direct-hit areas and helped people to understand that atomic war allows few hiding places.

The peace movement became more specific during the Korean War of the early 1950s during which the United States threatened to use atomic weapons. There have been at least nine other such US threats including Iraq, the Taiwan Straits, Laos, Berlin, Cuba and Viet Nam. The movement responded with its only weapon — public opinion.
The United States' nuclear monopoly had been broken in 1949. As the gap between Soviet and US nuclear potential diminished, so did the diplomacy called "atomic threat".

Those were the days when we spoke of atomic bombs; the hydrogen bomb came after 1949, as did the term nuclear. There was also a fascination with the possibilities of nuclear energy and the hope, now largely dispersed, that the peaceful atom would solve problems and bring the world to abundance. There is a difference between breaking a nuclear monopoly and an unimpeded arms race. A theory of mutual deterrence may have made some sense when each side could retaliate decisively. But it makes little sense to go on and on. A deterrence theory requires the ability to destroy the other side once (even twice) but not four or five, or fifteen times. The contending arms race greatly increases the possibility of nuclear war by accident or misunderstanding, and gives credence to the view that the real aim is to find a weapons system which can guarantee that the other side will be wiped out before it can retaliate.

When the United States monopoly was broken, its strategists knew of other ways to contain the Soviet Union. These included an enormous financial burden, the diversion of resources and technology, offer of special status. The special status factor has dominated world politics for several decades. It is an offer to the Soviet Union that, if it could not be number one, it could at least be one of the top two and that all fundamental questions would be decided by the two superpowers.

A day after the A-bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, these two survivors have received rice balls from an emergency relief party but do not seem to have the energy to eat

The key factor was the idea that we of the West were basically democratic and had to be armed to protect our way of life while our enemy was basically totalitarian and peace was a catch-cry for slavery. By and large, that dichotomy between democracy or disarmament, as E P Thompson has pointed out, was a wave that rolled along very successfully for more than 20 years. Disarmament activists would often be greeted with a shout of "Go back to Russia". Many events fuelled such concepts, and while it is beyond dispute that the United States began and continues to lead the nuclear arms race, it is pointless to deny that all nuclear states bear some responsibility for the present situation.

This is not a question that can be relegated to the past. If the movement is perceived as pro-Soviet it will not be politically effective. This is a sensitive question. As more people become conscious of the role of United States installations in this country there is a logic in concentrating efforts on their removal, but a one-sided view of disarmament will not diminish the fears of the many people who believe that the peace movements want the West to be defenceless. One cannot overcome this problem by adding a few slogans about the Soviet SS20 weapons and calling for their removal from Europe.

Writing of this policy and action dilemma in the British CND, E P Thompson says:

As we enter the crisis year of 1983, the sense of duty to oppose Cruise at home is pushing all other questions out of people's minds — the question of a nuclear-free Europe, of the dissolution of the adversary blocs, of a dialogue between West and East.

I must argue that these questions must be resolutely kept before the public mind, and in the mind of the peace movement most of all. I could show a hundred political reasons why it would be wrong to forget them. But there is one plain reason which everyone must come to understand. If we forget the need for reciprocal pressure upon the Soviet military system, then it is possible that we — and all of Europe — will fail. For then our movements can be presented by our powerful opponents as being, in effect if not in intention, a pro-Soviet resistance movement only. They will paint us into that corner. It is ironical that the Cold War agencies of both sides are now anxious to put the Western peace movements into that corner — the Soviet ideologues because they suppose that a captive movement would be more useful to their own diplomacy, and also because they fear the unsettling effects of a trans-continental peace movement in the East; the NATO ideologues because they know that a pro-Soviet peace movement will be easy to isolate and defeat.

Events of the last 20 years ought to make it clear that atomic diplomacy has served the United States very well in its efforts to contain colonial revolution and to maintain neo-colonialist regimes in its sphere of influence. It has also served the Soviet Union in maintaining a certain level of cohesion in Eastern Europe. If, at the time of the British atomic tests at Maralinga, we in Australia knew little of
the dangers of atomic testing, the scene was changing rapidly in the 1960s. The Cuban missile crisis raised mass understanding of the fine line on which the world walks. In some cases it also brought an appreciation of how the Russians must feel, surrounded by NATO missile sites, when the Americans became so stroppy about a site geographically close to them. And everyone seemed to be testing — a lot of them in the Pacific. The British kept their nuclear capacity, to continue as a great power as much as anything else. As it became clear that British nuclear capacity was not fundamental, a new movement, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), was formed, and with it the concept of unilateralism.

The main thrust of the disarmament movement has always been for mutual, verified arms reduction. Unilateral measures are usually seen as a means of moving towards that goal. Unilateral measures are not an option for every country and are not popular with many people (never mind governments) whatever social system those people live under, because there is such a lack of confidence in the positives of the other side. It would not only be wrong but stupid to allow a Fraser, a Reagan, a Thatcher — all of whom favour increasing Western nuclear arms unilaterally — to claim that they are for multilateral disarmament while we in the peace movement are nothing but unilateralists. In the year when the Cruise and Pershing missiles are planned for Europe; when Reagan wants to trade those for the Soviet SS-20s; when the Soviet response has been to suggest that the missiles count must include the British and French arsenals; it makes sense to push for a non-nuclear Britain as part of an overall reduction of nuclear arms in Europe, but this does not mean that all proposals for unilateral measures have equal validity.

Nuclear testing held centre stage in the movement over many years because the Americans and the Russians were testing bigger and bigger bombs and because France and China joined Britain in the nuclear club. China, incidentally, immediately offered a "no first use" treaty, a proposal recently made by the Soviet Union.

The movement against nuclear testing took on a mass aspect in Australia, eventually finding reflection in specific initiatives of the Whitlam Labor government against the continued, and continuing, French testing in the Pacific. France is not a signatory to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. This treaty, signed in 1963, is claimed as one victory for the world-wide movement against testing, as is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1967.
At the time, people thought that testing would stop when, in fact, it went underground; that there would be no further proliferation of nuclear weapons when, in fact, and partly thanks to the “peaceful” nuclear industry, including the Australian uranium industry, some thirty countries now have, or have the capacity to produce, nuclear weapons; some even thought that the Americans and Russians would reduce their stockpiles. By the late 1960s we had all become used to living with the bomb and we came to that period of virtual silence about nuclear weapons which Peter Watkins addresses in his film *War Games*. In the late 60s, the peace movement had a new concern — the Viet Nam war.

Many aspects of the disarmament movement mentioned here are not specifically Australian but it should be noted that in the first half of the 1960s the Australian labor movement, including an influential section of the parliamentary wing, reflected a growing disenchantment with the United States and Australia’s military arrangements. There was outspoken opposition to military treaties and to bases, to the US war in Viet Nam and with Australia’s involvement, then in its early stages. These matters became election issues — in a sense this was what the movement had always wanted.

Cailwell, then Labor leader, took a strong stand against conscription for the war. But the electorate was not convinced. In 1966 Labor polled its smallest vote in sixty years. This is not a claim that the sole reason for the poor showing at the polls was due to Labor’s policies on such matters, or that such questions should not become electoral issues, but to make a distinction between policies acceptable to the ALP and its members and to the electorate at large, to draw the conclusion that policies are only as good as their mass support and to indicate that the task is still in front of the movement to convince a significant majority of Australians, not least those who vote Labor, that the disarmament movement is not about to leave Australia defenceless, that we are not anti-American, that we do not desire to hand Australia to the Russians.

In the late ‘60s, the peace movement had its victories but, as always, nothing stands still. A new round of nuclear arms development got under way and it is that which drew the response in the last several years and found expression in Australia in the mass demonstrations of April 1982.

Given that part of the ideological armory of those in the West who demand more and more sophisticated arms is that the Soviet Union has superiority, it may be worthwhile to give the essence of the annual survey (1981) provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).°

First, the trade in conventional armaments is increasing. This is the one boom industry during the world recession. Until 1979, most arms were sold by the United States. By 1981, the Soviet Union had become the leading exporter of major weapons. The policy of restraint in arms sales initiated by President Carter in 1977 was revoked in mid-1981 by President Reagan. At this level both sides contribute to the arms race.
When it comes to nuclear arms, each side claims the other side is trying for some kind of first-strike capacity, while declaring its own objective to be solely defensive. SIPRI estimates that the Soviet Union has more launchers than the United States (2504 to 1919) and the total explosive power of Soviet missiles and bombers is 4.5 billion tons of TNT against 3.5 billion tons for the USA, but the United States has more nuclear warheads (9540 to 8802). SIPRI comments:

It is hard to make any sense out of statements that one side or the other is inferior or superior in strategic weaponry. The margin of overkill is so large that such statements have no meaning.

Nuclear weapons testing continues. SIPRI reports 49 nuclear explosions in 1981. Of these, the USSR conducted 21, the USA 16, the UK 1 and France 11. China did not test in that year. SIPRI notes that the rate of testing is increasing and that there has been no downward trend in any year since the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963.

The centre of attention in 1983 is theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. In this case, both the USSR and the USA put forward widely differing estimates of their respective strengths. SIPRI claims:

A reasoned judgment is that, whether the comparison is limited to missiles, or whether it includes aircraft as well (where the problem of deciding what to include is much more difficult) the Soviet Union appears to have a superiority in long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe of about 2:1.

The European disarmament movement, quite logically, believes that the way to a more sane situation is to seek reductions of existing weapons on the Soviet side and the exclusion of new missiles from the US, thus the campaign against the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles and for the dismantling of the SS-20s.

In March 1982, the Soviet Union announced a freeze on the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in the European USSR. More recently, the Soviet Union has offered to link withdrawal with a calculation which involves counting in the nuclear missiles of France and Britain. Significantly, SIPRI has made the following calculation:

By the end of 1981, the Soviet Union had some 175 SS-20 missile launchers within striking range of Europe. The number of warheads carried by 175 SS-20s is roughly the same as the number deployed on SS-4s and SS-5s before the SS-20s were introduced. The number of launchers — 175 — is also roughly the same as the number deployed by the UK and France combined. So the status quo ante and a rough matching of Soviet missile systems with those of the UK and France could be obtained by limiting the number of SS-20 launchers to their end-1981 number; however, this would have to be accompanied by the elimination of all SS-4s and SS-5s.
In the world-wide movement there are specific responses. Europe, West and East is restless about nuclear war. The new missiles developed in support of that theory lead to the assumption that the targets will be in Europe and not in either the USSR or the US. The "freeze" movement in the United States is a specific response to the upgrading of the arms race by President Reagan and the incredible cost it will involve in a time of severe recession. It appeals to a simple logic: since both sides have such a margin of overkill they could both cut back and still be "safe". The campaign for the "freeze" is not a campaign for disarmament, but an attempt to break the upward spiral of the arms race.

In Australia there are also specifics, among them:

**The movement against uranium mining** which began primarily with ecological considerations but soon made the link between uranium and nuclear weapons proliferation. This finds reflection in twice-yearly national meetings of key sections of the anti-uranium movement organised in the Coalition for a Nuclear Free Australia (CNFA) and the Australian Coalition for Disarmament and Peace (ACDP). The CNFA has done much to raise consciousness about the dangers inherent in so-called peaceful nuclear energy, nuclear accidents and accidental war.

**The movement for nuclear free zones** which has involved local community organisations and has found expression through decisions by municipal authorities to declare their region nuclear-free. This form of organisation has since been taken up, with considerable effect in the UK and elsewhere in Europe.

The concept of nuclear free zones has given impetus to the movement for an independent and nuclear-free Pacific. This is a vital movement because, in this one region, are all the elements of a nuclear society — uranium mining, nuclear-waste dumping, nuclear-weapons testing, testing of delivery systems, deployment of new nuclear weapons. All the nuclear weapons states are involved at one level or another. Here, the fight to be nuclear free also poses the question of colonialism, the right to independence, the right of indigenous peoples to land rights.

The proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace has not had the same attention as the movement in the Pacific but is of particular relevance to Western Australians. An outline policy by the Labor Opposition for a nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere, although short on detail, suggests that the question of nuclear-free zones will continue to be an important element in the Australian disarmament movement.

- The US military bases and installations: an extensive education campaign and the publication of *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate* and the commissioning by the Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament (AICD) of the film *Home on the Range* have helped develop a growing sense that while United States bases remain in Australia this country will be a high nuclear target. Some also realise that these bases are a real threat to others.

- There is also a growing awareness that the enemy is not easily identified. For many years the enemy was China according to various Australian governments. Indeed, for some twenty years we were told that Red China would be coming to get us but when alliances changed that threat dissolved overnight. Given the geographic position, the Russian threat is harder to justify.

- The influence of non-alignment: This is hard to quantify but the existence of the non-aligned nations arose, in part, as a response to nuclear strategies and the existence of the bloc division of the world. It was the non-aligned nations who were responsible for the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament which helped to give impetus to the campaign. In 1980 one million people demonstrated for disarmament in New York four years later at the second Special Session.

During the Whitlam years real efforts were made by the government to forge links with the non-aligned movement. Australia sent official observers to meetings of the non-aligned nations. The conditions for a non-aligned movement are that you oppose the bloc division of the world, do not belong to a military alliance involving either super power and do not allow foreign bases on your territory.

It should be said here that the peace and disarmament movement in Australia is, by and large, non-aligned, not just in terms of seeking greater independence for Australia or in understanding that the bloc division of the world limits the rights of all small and medium powers, but in being non-aligned politically both within an Australian and a world context.

The earliest post-war peace movements did start from the beginnings of the World Peace Council (WPC) but, as events unfolded, became A informal and for most of the movement today there would be no agreement with that body's stance on some key questions. The Australian Peace Committee (APC) was formed in 1975 as the Australian affiliate of the WPC.

For the non-aligned peace movement there is no way that Soviet ties became "safe". In 1961, the US fired on Poland on the pretext of the military presence in Afghanistan can be justified, even if it is understood, any more than the US pressure on Nicaragua or presence in El Salvador can be condoned. In this context, the Australian movement actively opposed Soviet nuclear testing when, in 1961, the Soviet Union broke an informal moratorium on testing. This was done even by people who were, by and large, sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

These days, hardly anyone would argue that there are "good" nuclear weapons and "bad" nuclear weapons, although at least one Trotskyist group, the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), opposes the slogan "No nuclear weapons, East or West", claiming that this suggests that both sides are to blame when, in their view, the US is to blame. In most movements in Europe, Japan, the United States and Australia these are all the countries where there are mass-based disarmament movements. People oppose and seek to rid the world of all nuclear weapons. This does not mean that the blame for the nuclear arms race is seen as being the equal responsibility of the nuclear weapons states, but there are very few people in Australia who would agree with the estimate that of the non-aligned peace movements will hold conferences in the European spring, the former in Prague in June, the latter in Berlin in May. The Australian Peace Committee is organising Australian representation to Prague while the Australian Coalition for Disarmament and Peace (ACDP) is organising representation to Berlin. It may be that both will be places for dialogue between peoples with a variety of perceptions and solutions. Of particular interest to Australia will be the conference for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) to be held in June in Vanuatu. Australian representation, which will include a significant Aboriginal presence, is being organised by the NFIP committees in Australia through ACDP and CNFA.

Undoubtedly, all these international gatherings will confirm that the nuclear disarmament movement is perceived differently in different countries and within countries. There is one legislative body, at least, which is at a national level. Disarmament is seen by some as political, by others as a moral issue and by many as simple survival.

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There is a view within the Australian movement that the way to disarmament is simple. All we need to do is stop uranium mining, get rid of the US bases and get out of ANZUS. I see these as long-range aims but they are by no means simply achieved. Undoubtedly one could avoid the effects of the present recession if one won the lottery, backed all the winners at the races and picked the correct numbers in Lotto, but the chances are rather remote.

The point is that one should not confuse moral positions or ultimate aims with policies. Even those who agree that the danger of nuclear war is real will always want to know how nuclear disarmament can be achieved. And people do choose to work in different ways. There is no one “correct” way to work for disarmament. There are appropriate organisations to join if one wants to put major emphasis on stopping uranium mining or give priority to the campaign against the United States bases, and there is always room for more organisation, especially at the level of local communities, if public opinion is to be mobilised against the arms race.

Those who believe that an essential element for a successful movement is a change in policy of political parties should work in the party of their choice, and while no one would deny that political parties respond to what is going on outside in the community, those in political parties should not demand that the disarmament movement should give its main attention to changing particular party policies. In the case of the Labor Party, this matter is expressed in contradictory ways; first, that the movement ought to be in advance of the Labor Party with the aim of showing that party that it ought to take a higher profile and second, that nothing should be done to separate the movement from the Labor Party. There are, of course, many graduations within these two views. In a very real sense, people expressing these ideas are not talking about the Labor Party as an organisation, but how to change public opinion and achieve a reflection of that changed opinion in political parties. In my view, there will always be “advanced” views and actions and movements which place priority on breadth. Both have a role in changing and mobilising public opinion.

Those who have come to understand the dangers of nuclear war sometimes conclude that all those people who do not come to marches or demonstrations or special church services are indifferent, or worse, blind to the realities. I think that most people do know the basic facts about nuclear war. What they do not know is what, if anything, they can do. Many are wary that if we take disarmament initiatives, the other side will not, that is, that we will be in greater danger without, say, the US bases than with them.
There is a need to produce well-researched, factual material on the arms race as, for example, is done by the Victorian Association for Peace Studies. Technical data is a good basis from which to argue against further escalation of the arms race, in support of the United States freeze campaign or for a cut-back in nuclear arms by half, but such data does not impress everyone and can increase the feeling of powerlessness in the community. When people are told that there are enough nuclear weapons in the world to kill everyone four times over (or fourteen times, or seventeen times) their common sense tells them that you can only be killed once.

Many people are burdened with the everyday problems of living. It says little to a single parent on a pension, to an unemployed person, to a process worker engaged in fairly mindless work for rotten pay, to people who can’t pay their mortgage, or their electricity bill, that the greatest problem facing them is nuclear war.

Unless the disarmament movement speaks to such people about their problems and connects that to the arms race, the movement will grind to a halt. The arms race is the biggest factor in distorting the economies of many countries and the world cost of the arms race is mind-blowing. But this should not be so translated in Australia as to assume that what is spent in this country on defence can be used to solve many local problems; indeed, it is likely that if Australia came out from under the United States defence umbrella more would need to be spent on conventional defence.

In any case, we ought to be sensitive to the employees of the defence industry and the uranium mining industry. And since we are the people who want change, it is our responsibility to develop workable ideas for alternative employment and we also need to take account of people’s fears — even if we think they are irrational.

But most of all, since the disarmament movement is actually addressing itself to the need for effective arms control we should keep the concept of control firmly in our minds. If people feel incapable of controlling everyday aspects of their lives they will certainly feel helpless in the face of the nuclear weapons industry and the threat of nuclear war.

So it is crucial to pose actions which do not seem unreal and which may bring results. People won’t accept that they can change the world but they may agree to help change the mind of their member of parliament or convince their local councillor to take a decision in favor of a nuclear-free zone. Yet many people do not even know the name of their MP, and this lack of knowledge is not confined to the politically inactive. It is certain that changes in party policies will not take place until representatives at all levels are made more aware of public concerns including our concern that the risk of nuclear war is growing.
Until now there has been no comparable activity in Australia to the referenda on the arms race held in a number of states of the United States in 1982.

Australian constitutional provisions do not allow for questions of public interest to be placed on the ballot paper during a state or national election, but the Tasmanian Wilderness Society has offered a form of this when it developed the "no dams" write-in with considerable success. It should not be beyond the bounds of possibility to plan local opinion polls, especially in those areas where this question is hotly debated.

It would also be of value if a Labor government was encouraged to offer referenda on several vital topics, for example on a policy to deny access to ships or planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons unless the particular foreign power publicly committed itself not to bring nuclear weapons into Australia even temporarily. It is not easy to carry a referendum in Australia, but such an approach would bring the issues of nuclear war directly to the public, awareness would be heightened and, if carried, the usual conservative disruption of a new policy would be circumvented.

Similarly, the question of foreign military bases ought to be tackled consistently at a number of levels. Few people who oppose the existence of the bases have become conversant with the information presently available about them, including the dates when they are up for review, or the conditions under which they can be terminated. 1975 might have ended differently if the question of the renewal of the Pine Gap Treaty had been up for public discussion and debate.

This is not intended as a request to those who oppose any foreign base to light that battle, but to suggest that many ways must be sought to take the movement beyond its present state. The value of public debates lies in the possibility to inform and convince large numbers of people. It is those who stand for the status quo who like silence and promote secrecy.

As in all public debates, not everyone will come to the same conclusions. One of the difficulties of the disarmament movement and, perhaps, all movements for change, is the fear of activists that they are “selling out” if they make proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal. Yet all the proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal. Yet all the proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal. Yet all the proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal. Yet all the proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal. Yet all the proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal. Yet all the proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal. Yet all the proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal. Yet all the proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal. Yet all the proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal. Yet all the proposals which fall short of their ultimate goal.

In that context it may be that a future Australian government could be persuaded to negotiate unilaterally with those countries, especially the Soviet Union, to whom the US bases in Australia are directed. This might lead to some interesting proposals for a trade-off. It might start the process leading to the eventual removal of bases.

Although President Reagan still tries to picture the disarmament movement as a Kremlin plot, there are many signs that the movement is being taken seriously. Disarmament negotiations are under way again and a variety of proposals are being made by both the United States and the Soviet Union. As is to be expected, both sides usually make an initial response that the proposals of the other are “propaganda” but while they are talking there is hope. Our hope lies in mobilising public opinion. This is no easy task since those lobbyists for a continuing arms race include many scientists, technicians, military planners, military hardware manufacturers and government bureaucrats, all of whom, for reasons of power, profit or prestige want to continue the upward spiral.

But it is easier now than in the past to make an impact on public opinion because it is clear enough that the 40-year search for nuclear superiority does not increase security. Everyone who thinks about it, including some military planners, understands that if the United States develops new weapons systems then the Soviet Union will shortly follow suit. This has been the history of the nuclear arms race from the beginning so that, today, we are all less secure than in 1945. The immediate aim is to call a halt.

As George Kennan writes: "The effort to control and abate the nuclear weapons race is not, after all, a favor we are doing the Russians any more than it is a favor to ourselves. It is a dictate of the security and survival of all Western civilisation. Let us first meet that dictate. The next can come afterward."

Perhaps a priority ought also to be given to a comprehensive test ban treaty since that would make it almost impossible for the nuclear weapon states, or the would-be nuclear weapon states, to develop new and more deadly weapons as they could not be certain of their performance.

There are plenty of initiatives which can be taken and if they are taken the movement may become the irresistible force which finds the way to move the seemingly immovable object — the nuclear arsenals around the world.