Organised labor’s most critical problem in the twentieth century has been how to bring economic and political democracy to workers. The extension of democracy for workers, however, cannot be separated from the problem of democracy and human rights for society as a whole. At various times, the needs of the general society have been far more important than just workers’ needs, especially when countries have been plunged into the terror of rightwing state-sanctioned violence.

The two main institutions of organised labor in modern times have been trade unions and political parties. Social movements, however, have always provided the impetus for major (as opposed to incremental) social and political changes that workers’ unions and parties may have helped initiate. In the first half of the twentieth century, virtually every union and political breakthrough for workers in industrialising countries involved leftwing leaders and organisations in some way, even if these initiatives at times were led by mainstream unions and labor-oriented parties with moderate policies and actions, and with leadership that did not include or only marginally included the left.

While considerable research has been done on the relationship between leftwing labor and rightwing violence for specific countries, beyond the European context this is a generally unexplored subject in broad comparative terms. Even comparative labor history takes us only so far, because all too often the comparison is with regimes and labor movements that are relatively similar. This scholarship generally separates the “labor world” into Asian and non-Asian spheres. Another focus, comparing national industrial relations systems or comparing national cultural differences, is not enough either, however useful these approaches have been up to the present.

Works in these particular areas, however, at least begin to connect Asian-based and European-based labor, even though they often emphasize institutional frameworks to the exclusion of labor movements and these movements’ interaction with political regimes.

We need to go beyond the usual “compare / contrast” framework of comparative labor history and work toward a new type of methodology, but one that does not necessarily exclude previous ones. As historians and social scientists, we cannot possibly find new approaches without building on and giving due recognition to earlier accomplishments. Certainly there are significant moves in the direction of new “comparative” approaches, perhaps most evident in scholarship that has been appearing in the journals International Labor and Working-Class History and International Review of Social History. Building a connection between comparative historical work and broader theoretical possibilities requires a methodology that extends much of the work that has been presented in these journals. Given the limitations of time and space here, what follows is an initial outline, with some hypotheses, of a work in progress.

I am proposing a new “global” framework for labor history that will reveal currently hidden patterns and dynamics of – and questions about – labor movements and labor institutions internationally, especially in relation to political regimes. My specific subject – to be researched in detail in the future – utilizes a global framework that focuses on specific strategic unions and industries in four countries located in four regions of the “Pacific hemisphere” – Argentina, Australia, Japan, and the United States – during the interwar period. One common linkage is that each country was the economic leader, in terms of GDP growth rates, in its particular region (Argentina – southeastern; Australia – southwestern; Japan – northwestern; United States – northeastern) in the years preceding this era.

Why specific unions and industries? We need to know how workers organised at the worksite, or in particular protest settings (strikes, rallies, community mobilisations, and so on). It is not enough to know the general outcomes or the summaries made by top leaders. For example, finding out the actual role of the left within a union or workplace all too often requires analysis of day to day actions at critical moments. The link between these union and industrial activities to larger political developments is the key to understanding common global patterns. Why strategic unions and industries? A strategic focus makes the research possible, narrowing the study to those unions and industries (1) most important to the particular country (examples would include, but not be limited to, mining for Australia, meatpacking for Argentina, automobiles for the United States, and shipbuilding for Japan); and (2) those most important in comparative terms (examples would include, but not be limited to, dock workers in Australia and Argentina, steelworkers in the United States and Japan, and textile workers in all four countries).

The problem of “rightwing violence” is crucial for labor history during this period for several reasons. First, political changes during the interwar period created the explosive environment that led to the first truly global war – World War II. Outside of Europe, how did changing political regimes and violence associated with them impact on the possibilities of labor movement expansion or contraction, and on democracy or repression for the larger society in these countries? What role did the labor movement play in countering the state’s negative role where this existed, or in influencing the state to act in positive (and nonviolent) ways? Second, how was violence, whether from employers, non-employer associations, and / or the state, used against the labor movement, and how did the labor movement respond? To what extent can this violence be characterised as “rightwing.” Was the violence directed against labor confined to workplace issues (such as widespread police and employer violence against C.I.O. union organising efforts in the United States during the 1930s; or the police shootings during the Townsville Meatworkers strike of 1918-1919 in Australia)? Or did the violence spread beyond the workplace to engulf the society at large (such as Argentina’s “La Semana Trágica” massacres in 1919, directed initially against workers but within days against immigrants and Jews as well; or the massive police repression against unions, intellectuals, and political oppositionists accompanying the rise of military influence in 1930s Japan)?

Comparing interwar regimes in these four countries reveals a paradox. In economic terms, Australia and Argentina followed similar paths of development. In the decades before World War I, both countries had very high growth rates, high rates of immigration from Europe, and had strong primary sector-based industries (meat and meatpacking for Argentina, wool and mining for Australia, for example). While both were industrialising, they were not doing so at the same pace as North America and Western Europe. Japan and the United States, on the other hand, were
industrialised nations during the interwar years, even though the U.S. was far ahead in many sectors. By the mid-1930s, however, they were equals in a few strategic industries such as shipbuilding. The U.S. had a strong primary sector, but its manufacturing capability became the most important strategic part of its economy by this time. Japan's weak primary sector forced it to concentrate on manufacturing capacity in order to successfully compete with Western powers.

Politically, however, the United States and Australia had far more in common with each other than they did with either Japan or Argentina. Both had elected systems of government, with complete civilian oversight of the military. In contrast, Japan had an unstable parliamentary system without sufficient control over the country's army and navy, who saw themselves as owing primary loyalty to the Japanese emperor. Argentina's military also did not view itself as subject solely to civilian elected authority. In 1930, the Argentine military overthrew the (liberal) Radical Party government of Yrigoyen, remaining in power for over a decade, even though nominal and corrupt elections of civilians were held until it assumed total control from 1943 to 1945.16 Japan experienced a more gradual military "coup", first evident in 1931 when the Kwangtung Army in China deposed Prime Minister Inukai by invading and occupying all of Manchuria, followed by numerous assassination attempts against leading elected officials in Japan. After Army officers finally assassinated Inukai in 1932, the military had virtual independence from and veto power over any civilian government.18

Violence against labor in Japan and Argentina during the 1930s must take full consideration of these political developments and the unique role of the military. In contrast, violence against labor in Australia and the United States was overwhelmingly the product of local police and locally elected or appointed officials, rather than the national or state governments. Australian workers in particular were least subjected to violence. On the other hand, workers in certain regions and industries in both the United States and Australia experienced a disproportionate level of violence. Trying to organise U.S. Southern workers during this entire period did not differ much from attempting to unionise Japanese workers generally, because of the complete disregard for law and human rights by Southern government authorities and employers.

Levels of violence, then, need to be categorised. Low levels involved temporary arrests and the application of standard (rather than extraordinary) legal prohibitions. This type of violence was often more psychological than physical. When Australian workers and unions were subjected to any form of violence during this period it rarely if ever went beyond this level, in large part because of the institutional and legal protections of the compulsory arbitration system and the political power of the Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.). American workers and unions often faced more severe forms of violence until the end of the 1930s when the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.) and positive court rulings backing up the Act began to have a moderating effect on many employers and local government officials. By the 1930s, the generally pro-labor administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and widespread labor influence in a revitalised Democratic Party at local, state, and national levels further assisted labor's advance. 17

Medium levels of violence involved police attacks, including beatings and nonlethal shootings; long-term arrests; severe legal restrictions on activities; outright bans on labor activity and organisation bans; surveillance and use of agents provocateurs; and mobilisation of rightwing mobs. Throughout most of the interwar period, this level of violence directed against labor was common in many parts of the United States. The consolidation of union power and legitimacy during World War II, with the full support of the Roosevelt administration, put an end to much of this violence directed at labor, except in the South, which was a region with laws and mores quite different from much of the rest of the United States. Violence against labor in the South, too, cannot be understood unless it is seen in relation to racial segregation and violence against African Americans, something endorsed by virtually every leading government official in that region until the advances won by the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. In the American South, the cause of a multiracial labor movement has always been directly tied to the fate of African Americans as a whole.18

In Japan, on the other hand, authorities relied heavily on police with wide discretionary powers to enforce a "medium" level of violence against workers, unions, and leftwing political parties. As enforcers of political orthodoxy, these Japanese authorities tended to focus mainly on leftwing union and political organisations, while not harassing more moderate (and eventually conservative) union formations, such as the Sodomei labor federation.19 Argentine authorities were not as extreme as their Japanese counterparts, especially in the 1920s after the 1919-22 strike wave and before military rule that commenced in 1930.20 Both the Japanese and Argentine cases, however, reveal another dynamic behind interwar labor movements: nationalist anti-left unions emerged by the late 1930s that supplanted the power of the leftwing organisations. In Japan this policy was ruthlessly pursued through state actions and dissolution of existing independent unions. In Argentina, on the other hand, a populist labor movement emerged that eventually became the base of Juan Perón, a former military officer who turned on the military authorities and later retained the presidency through legitimate elections.21

High levels of violence against labor have included killings, either as individual assassinations or mass killings; mass arrests without due process; widespread attacks on working class communities; total bans on any labor activities, punishable by arrest, physical abuse (torture), and killing; rightwing mobilisation of mobs to carrying out lethal attacks; use of the military in addition to the police; and the elimination of all legal rights. Japanese labor seems to have been most subjected to these extreme forms of violence, in contrast to Australian labor during this time which rarely if ever experienced this level of abuse. The problem for understanding violence against labor in Japan, however, is that we don't know in detail the exact extent of it. When some one thousand trade unionists and intellectuals were arrested en masse after passage of the Universal Manhood Suffrage Act in 1926 (but preceded by earlier police powers as well), what happened to them while incarcerated?22 How did this affect families, other organisations, and the labour organisations themselves? The same could be said for the late 1930s, when independent trade unions were disbanded by the state and the government-run Sanpo labor organisation replaced them. These type of questions are readily asked when we confront the contemporary realities of labor activists in China, South Korea, or Indonesia, but labor historians have not addressed these issues as directly when discussing the Japanese movement during the interwar period.23

Overall, patterns of violence against labor have been uneven, making it difficult to draw national generalisations for the whole period. For all four countries, levels of violence need to be considered in terms of (1) specific unions, especially those tied to the left; (2) specific political organisations and parties; (3) specific industrial sectors and workers within them; (4) specific regions or locales, especially those more likely to experience violence against labor; (5) years within the interwar period (the 1920s, for example, appear less violent in Japan under "Taisho Democracy" and Argentina under the elected Radical Party governments than the military-dominated decade of the 1930s); (6) general popular support for or opposition to labor repression / labor advancement.

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One peculiar part of the puzzle, when considering the labor movement in all four countries, is the failure of the labor movement politically in Argentina and in trade union terms in Argentina and Japan during the 1930s, in contrast to the labor movement’s spectacular union organising and political alliance-building successes in the United States during this decade. Part of the solution may be to compare union densities and activity in each country during this decade, because these highlight the centrality of political regimes in determining the relative strength or weakness of the labor movement.

All four countries suffered from the worldwide depression. At the national level, both Japan and the United States introduced major government spending programs, including substantial military-related projects. Japan preceded the U.S. in major military spending during the 1930s, but President Franklin D. Roosevelt soon brought the U.S. into a competitive position in this area, with naval shipbuilding initially leading the way, and later superseded by military aircraft production by the late 1930s. Japanese trade union membership climbed during the 1930s, but did so at a very slow pace and never approached the American figure. Economic conditions and Keynesian-type government spending therefore do not explain union expansion or contraction.

The evidence points to political rather than economic factors as the driving force behind labor strength. Japan’s union density was only 8 percent of the industrial workforce in its prewar peak (1936), with union membership in all sectors totalling 420,000. During World War II, union membership in unions not controlled by the dropped to zero. In 1946, one year after the end of World War II and authoritarian government, Japan’s union density reached 41 percent, with 4,926,000 union members, a dramatic statement about the role of political regimes in hindering or assistance the labor movement.

In contrast, U.S. union density in 1930, one of the lowest points for membership in the first half of the twentieth century, was just 11.6 percent of nonagricultural workers. President Herbert Hoover and a Republican-controlled Congress pushed through “balanced budgets,” refused to fund any government relief for the unemployed, and promoted the interests of big business at the expense of labor. Eight years later (1938), union membership had risen to 27.5 percent, and by 1945 had reached an all-time high of 35.5 percent. This growth occurred under President Roosevelt’s pro-labor Democratic administration, which carried out government spending policies that parallelled those of the Japanese governments of the same years.

Argentina’s historical level of union strength is more difficult to assess because much of the literature does not even address the question of union density. Strike activity, however, can be used as an alternative indicator. Argentina’s biggest strike wave before the 1940s occurred between 1919 and 1922. In Buenos Aires alone, which would have been the main, but not only, centre of labor activity, there were 367 strikes with 308,967 workers participating. By 1923, the labor movement had been contained, with only 4,737 workers joining in 114 strikes in the city. Nationally, Shipley calculates that 19,181 workers took part in 93 strikes (a figure at odds with the larger number of strikes in Buenos Aires, which is an indicator of the lack of accuracy in strike statistics for Argentina’s interwar period. By 1928, strikes rose to 135, with 73,918 strikers, and then fell to 127 strikes, with 38, 505 strikers, in 1930, the year of the military coup d’etat. During the 1930s, unions stagnated, with only 43 strikes and 4,622 strikers in 1931, and 105 strikes with 34,562 strikers in 1932. Labor had virtually no power politically and had been weakened in terms of trade union membership and impact. Its fortunes would not be reversed until the early 1940s, when meatpackers, workers from the nation’s leading industrial sector, united behind Juan Perón to forge a new labor populism that would overthrow military and conservative control of the government. Again, the political regime would make the difference. As Berquist notes, the predominance of a moderate and ineffective labor federation, the Confederación General de Trabajadores (C.G.T.) stifled a militant response to repressive government measures against labor.

This pattern also occurred in Japan, where the moderate and increasingly conservative and anticommunist Sodomei federation of unions tried to accommodate the rightwing governments of the 1930s. As in Argentina, communist-led unions were targeted and suppressed by the government. Large argues that Sodomei also was accepted by many Japanese workers, especially with the rise of ultranationalism in support of Japanese aggression against China. Ultranationalism, however, can spread more easily when police are actively used to repress and terrorise those who oppose it, especially in working class movements.

In the United States, the union movement shifted to the left during these years, but never became a socialist-oriented labor movement. The industrial unions that split away from the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) to form what eventually became the Congress of Industrial Organisations (C.I.O.) were led by John L. Lewis, head of the United Mine Workers (U.M.W.), a man who had become notorious in his own union for his authoritarianism and use of thugs to deliver discipline to his factional enemies. When Lewis assumed leadership of the C.I.O., however, he changed into a different person, hiring socialists and communists as advisers and organisers because he knew they would work the hardest and produce the best results. Leftwing socialists led C.I.O. unions in auto, shipbuilding, and men’s clothing, while communists came to lead C.I.O. unions in longshore (dock workers), electrical production, metal mining and smelting, and meatpacking. The most important organising breakthroughs of the decade – on the San Francisco docks in 1934 and the Flint GM sitdown of 1937 – were led by communists like Harry Bridges (who always denied his affiliation) and men like Wyndham Mortimer (who didn’t deny it). Only very late in the 1930s did the C.I.O. begin to accommodate the mainstream Democratic Party, and in the process move to the right. Attacks on communists, however, did not become a major feature of the union movement until the mid- to late-1940s, when the political barrage from anti-union Republicans in Congress grew. By the late 1940s, the Republicans controlled Congress, even though Democrat Harry S. Truman was president, and this change made it possible for a full-scale legislative and investigative assault on the labor movement, especially its leftwing. In response, the C.I.O. unions expelled those unions who had communists among their leadership, and moved more and more to the right. As this happened, mainstream unions lost the possibility of political independence and a genuine voice on behalf of the working class, and instead became little more than advocates for improved workplace conditions.

In Argentina and Japan during the interwar period, leftwing labor led by anarchists, syndicalists, and finally communists had been unable to make longterm headway, either in trade union or political terms, in large part because of the sharp rise of rightwing state-sponsored violence during the 1930s. In the United States, a pro-labor administration at the federal government level assisted the advancement of a new industrial union movement that included significant numbers of leftwing leaders and organisers. This administration and its Democratic majority in Congress also acted to restrict rightwing violence against labor, whether this violence came from local government officials and police or from employers, by instituting reform legislation and agencies that would provide alternatives to strikes and that would guarantee workers’ rights to organise.

Australia appears to be quite different than these other three countries. In Australia, union density was among the
highest in the world, reaching 53.3 percent by 1920. Membership rose to 56 percent by 1929, then fell to a low of 42.6 percent in 1934, still far above any of the other three countries for any time in their history. Ten years later, in 1944, membership had rebounded to 54.2 percent and remained in this general percentage for three and a half decades. The difference between Australia and these other countries, in terms of trade union security, has been the compulsory arbitration system and the requirement that unions are registered by the state (rather than chosen by workers and / or agreed to by employers) under this system. Australia's political regimes, until very recently, have accepted this system since it began in the early part of the twentieth century, thereby creating a protective wall (through the industrial courts and legal precedents) around trade unions.

Further supporting the advance of labor has been the Australian Labor Party, which has acted on behalf of trade union interests, but has also provided an integral political linked for unions. This labor strength, however, has not been leftwing in character, however progressive numerous reforms over the century have been. The A.L.P.'s laborism has been at the expense of leftwing labor and a socialist agenda. In times past it has also supported racism and imperialism at the expense of working class internationalism.

At the same time, leftwing activists have been at the core of Australian labor's advance. The conscience of Australian labor has more often come from its leftwing unions, such as the Waterside Workers Federation (opposing World War I conscription promoted by a Labor government) and the Miners' Federation (opposing postwar austerity under a Labor government). The ideals and direct action practices of the Australian branch of the I.W.W. (International Workers of the World) have also inspired rank-and-file activists in many conservative unions, including the powerful Australian Workers Union (A.W.U.). The Australian movement seemed to have every advantage in the interwar period, compared to the labor movements in Japan, Argentina, and even the United States. Union density was high, far higher than even the United States in the 1930s, labor had its own political party and had held power at both the state and federal levels, and rightwing violence against labor was at one of the lowest levels in the entire world.

Why, then, did the Australian labor movement fail to advance in union terms -- at least nationally -- during the Great Depression? Why did its political wing fail to retain national power under the Scullin Labor government, and why did Labor not return to national power again until World War II? When we look only at Australia, the answer to these questions may appear straightforward -- the power of the Bank of England over Australia's national loan repayments and implications for budget deficits; the initial split in the A.L.P.'s ranks, led by Lang; betrayal by Treasurer Joe Lyons and the creation of the United Party; Scullin's general lack of leadership; and so on. The solution is not so obvious, however, when viewed from a comparative -- and especially global -- perspective: why did Australian labor fail at such a critical moment when so much seemed to be in its favor?

Endnotes

1 Throughout this paper, the U.S. spelling for "labor" is used. When referring to specific organisations with "labor" in them, the proper capitalised name is used (e.g. "Australian Labor Party" or the British "Labour Party").


5 Examples of comparative history based on similar regimes and labor-focused (all of which are excellent scholarship) include: Australia and Canada (Labour History 71, Nov. 1996 / Labour/La Travail 1996 Special Joint Issue, "Australia and Canada: Labour Compared"); the United States and the United Kingdom (Jeffrey Haydu, Between Craft and Class: Skilled Workers and Factory Politics in the United States and Britain, 1890-1922, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988); Japan and China (Germaine A. Hoston, The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994); and Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela (Charles Berquist, Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1986). This list is only a small part of a huge and growing comparative literature.


7 David Brody made this criticism in response to labor history papers by David Palmer, Tom Sheridan, and Nancy Gabin when he chaired a panel on Australian and American labor history at the American Historical Association 1994 (January) annual meeting in San Francisco. The present analysis aims to address some of Brody's comments.

8 I find "Pacific hemisphere" more useful than "Pacific rim". The former term includes all countries on the "Pacific" half of the globe, even if they do not have ports on the Pacific Ocean. These include the American continents; East / Northeast (including Siberia) / Southeast Asia; Australia / New Zealand; and all Pacific islands.
The countries of South America are connected geographically, economically, and culturally, so considering Chile a "Pacific rim" country but not Argentina is a pointless distinction. The same could be said of the East Coast versus the West Coast of the United States, or internal provinces of China versus Kwangtung Province.


Hane, Modern Japan, p. 253.

Bernstein, Turbulent Years.
