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The challenge of multiculturalism: global changes and Australian experiences

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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the experience of Australia with regard to immigration and migrant settlement since 1945, and to discuss the model of multiculturalism which has emerged as a way of shaping social policy and national identity in an increasingly diverse society. Australia is widely regarded as a 'classical country of immigration'. Indeed, apart from Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders who make up approximately 2 per cent of the population, the whole Australian people can trace their origins back to the immigrations which started with British colonization in 1788. Immigration has always been a central part of nation-building in Australia. Since 1945, there has been a planned program of mass immigration. Today, one in five Australians are immigrants or children of immigrants, and the country is one of the most ethnically diverse in the world.
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The Challenge of Multiculturalism: Global Changes and Australian Experiences

CASTLES
The Challenge of Multiculturalism
Global Changes and Australian Experiences

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CHAPTER 1

AUSTRALIAN MULTICULTURALISM

The aim of this paper is to examine the experience of Australia with regard to immigration and migrant settlement since 1945, and to discuss the model of multiculturalism which has emerged as a way of shaping social policy and national identity in an increasingly diverse society. Australia is widely regarded as a 'classical country of immigration'. Indeed, apart from Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders who make up approximately 2 per cent of the population, the whole Australian people can trace their origins back to the immigrations which started with British colonization in 1788. Immigration has always been a central part of nation-building in Australia. Since 1945, there has been a planned program of mass immigration. Today, one in five Australians are immigrants or children of immigrants, and the country is one of the most ethnically diverse in the world.

Migration to Australia

After 1788, the Australian colonies developed as a white settler society, closely linked to Britain, and integrated into the economic system of the Empire. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population was partially destroyed, dispossessed and socially marginalized. A new population, both of convict or free origin, was brought in with a high measure of state planning and control. Ever since 1788, governments (initially the British colonial administration, later the Australian federal and state governments) have recruited, subsidized or encouraged immigrants, have made efforts to select suitable entrants, and have provided various special services for settlers (DIEA, 1986). This tradition of state intervention makes immigration a central area of public policy.

Prior to the Second World War, the overwhelming majority of settlers came from Britain. European minority groups such as the Irish, Germans and Italians often encountered hostility and discrimination (de Lepervanche, 1975). But racism was strongest against non-European immigrants, particularly the Chinese, who came in
response to the Gold Rushes of the 1850s, and South Pacific Islanders, recruited as cheap labour by plantation owners in the late 19th century. There was a close link between racism and the emerging feeling of Australian nationhood (MacQueen, 1975). The ‘yellow peril’ of Asian invasion was a persistent image of Australian popular culture. One of the first laws passed by the new Federal Parliament in 1901 was the Immigration Restriction Act, designed to exclude non-Europeans, which was to remain in force until the 1970s.

After the Second World War the Australian Government set up a Department of Immigration. Policy-makers believed that Australia’s population of 7.5 million needed to be increased both for economic and strategic reasons. Immigration levels have been high throughout the post-war period, ranging from a minimum of about 50,000 settlers per year to a maximum of 185,000 settlers. Net migration has accounted for about 40 per cent of the growth in population to currently about 17 million (NPC, 1991: 21). About five million people from some 100 countries have come to Australia as settlers since 1945 (BIR, 1990: 32). In 1947, nearly 90 per cent of the population were Australian-born, and most of the rest were from the UK. By 1986, the Australian-born share had fallen to 79 per cent, while 21 per cent of the population were overseas-born. Just over half of these are of non-English speaking background (NESB), which is the usual official label for cultural distinctiveness. Moreover, 20 per cent of the Australian-born had at least one immigrant parent. Immigrants and their immediate descendants make up a higher proportion of the population than in any other developed country.

This shift from relative homogeneity to great diversity was not the intention of the post-war immigration program. When it started, Immigration Minister Calwell promised the Australian public that there would be ten British immigrants for every ‘foreigner’. It was widely believed that non-British immigration would threaten national identity and social cohesion (Borrie, 1947; Wilton and Bosworth, 1984). But once it had become clear that immigration from Britain would be insufficient to sustain demographic and economic growth, the Australian Government looked elsewhere. In the late 1940s the Department of Immigration recruited in Displaced Persons Camps in Europe, giving preference to refugees from Baltic and Slavonic countries, who were perceived as both ‘racially acceptable’ and anti-communist. Altogether 180,000 eastern Europeans migrated to Australia from 1947 and 1951, making up 37 per cent of migrants in those years (Collins, 1988: 24). There was also considerable immigration from Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia.
By the 1950s the Cold War virtually stopped eastern European migration, while economic revival in northern Europe gradually reduced movements from that region. There was great reluctance to admit southern Europeans, who were seen as culturally different and politically suspect, due to the strength of the communist parties of Italy and Greece. Some commentators saw northern but not southern Italians as assimilable (Vasta, 1990). But the pressing need for labour led to recruitment agreements with most southern European countries. In the 1950s and 1960s most migrants came from Italy, Greece and Malta.

A two-class system of immigration developed: British migrants, and many northern Europeans too, were given assisted passages, could bring their families at once and had full labour-market and civil rights upon arrival. Those from eastern and southern Europe were less likely to get an assisted passage, had no automatic right to family reunion, were frequently directed into undesirable jobs and were generally treated as inferior (Collins, 1988: 23-4). But there was a third, invisible, class: those who were not admitted at all. The White Australia Policy kept out all non-whites, and was applied so zealously that even the Asian wives of Australian soldiers who had served overseas were excluded.

Immigration remained high throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and was widely seen as a major cause of Australia’s prosperity. By the late 1960s it was becoming hard to attract southern European workers, and many were returning to their homelands. The result was a series of measures to attract and retain migrants: further liberalisation of family reunion, recruitment in Yugoslavia and Latin America, and some relaxation of the White Australia Policy.1 But when the world recession of the 1970s hit Australia, the first reaction of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Government was to reduce immigration (the average level was 56,000 per year from 1971 to 1976). It also finally abolished the White Australia Policy, introducing entry criteria which did not discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or national origin.2 The succeeding Liberal-Country Party Government increased immigration to around 100,000 per year in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At the

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1 The move away from racism in immigration policy was matched by trends towards improving the formal status of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, who were granted citizenship for the first time following a referendum in 1967. However, the economic and social situation of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders remains disastrous today, a theme which cannot be dealt with in this paper.

2 Entry rules which are formally non-discriminatory do not necessarily exclude informal discrimination in the administrative practices through which they are implemented. There is no space to examine this issue in the present paper.
same time, the Indo-Chinese crisis led to the arrival of refugee boats from Vietnam. To prevent spontaneous and potentially uncontrollable entries of boat-people, Prime Minister Fraser agreed to join the international relief effort. This led to the planned entry of large numbers of Vietnamese refugees, soon followed by refugees from the Civil War in Lebanon. By 1980, 22 per cent of new immigrants were Asians (Collins, 1988: 26). Australian openness to family reunion quickly led to enduring patterns of chain migration from these areas.

**Current Immigration Policy**

Recent immigration levels have fluctuated according to economic conditions and government policies. They were low (60,000-100,000) in the recession of the early 1980s and high in the period of economic growth in late 1980s (up to 140,000 per year). In the current recession, immigration has declined somewhat, and there are calls for considerable cuts to economic migration. This contrasts with recent decisions in the USA and Canada, where skilled migration is being sharply increased. The Australian debate is marked by a short-term perspective, and a lack of forward planning: if skilled entries are cut now, the delays in processing built into the selection system will mean that the actual cuts in entries will come just in time to create skilled labour bottlenecks as economic recovery begins.

Immigration from Asia (particularly south-east Asia and the Indian sub-continent) is now the largest component of entry, making up 35-45 per cent of total intakes. However, entries from the UK and New Zealand also remain high. From 1988-91 a total of 388,000 settlers entered Australia. The top ten countries of origin were:

- UK and Ireland (75,000)
- New Zealand (42,000)
- Hong Kong (29,000)
- Malaysia (20,000)
- China (19,000)
- Vietnam (32,000)
- Philippines (22,000)
- India (11,000)
- Sri Lanka (6,000)
- South Africa (5,000).

In late 1991, an Asian country, Hong Kong, for the first time overtook the UK as the largest single source country for immigrants. Relatively few western Europeans (apart from the British) have come to Australia in recent years. However there was considerable Polish immigration in the early 1980s. More recently, the end of Soviet domination in eastern Europe has led to contradictory trends: on the one
hand, some eastern European settlers of the post-war period—or their
descendants—have opted to return; on the other hand, there has been an upsurge in
applications for migration to Australia at consulates in the Soviet Union and other
Eastern European countries. A new wave of eastern European migration seems
possible.

A detailed discussion of the complex legal, institutional and administrative
framework which regulates immigration and settlement is not possible here (see
CAAIP, 1988; Castles, 1989), however, some central features should be noted.
Immigration levels are decided upon annually by the Federal Government. Program
implementation is the responsibility of the Department of Immigration, Local
Government and Ethnic Affairs (DILGEA). Prospective immigrants apply to
Australian consulates abroad, where they may be interviewed by Immigration
Officers. Medical and occupational tests may also take place. Currently about one
million people apply each year, of whom about 100,000 are successful. There are
three main immigration categories:

— *Family Migration*, the largest category, since all permanent immigrants
  have rights to family reunion. The Immediate Family (spouse and
  children) are admitted automatically, while more distant relatives
  (siblings, parents, etc) are assessed according to a Points System. In 1989-
  90 the Program Target for Immediate Family was 41,000 and for Extended
  Family 30,000. The total in the Family category was 71,000.

— *Economic Migration*. This is sub-divided into various sub-categories, such
  as Business Migration (Program Target 1989-90, 10,000), Employer
  Nominations (11,000), Independents (i.e. individual applicants assessed
  on the Points System: 23,500) and the Occupational Shares System (i.e.
  occupations classified as in demand in Australia: 9,000). The total in the
  Economic category was 54,000.

— *Humanitarian Migration*. This comprises refugees selected in cooperation
  with the UNHCR in refugee camps (e.g. Vietnamese in Thailand) as
  well as some ‘in-country humanitarian applicants’ selected in their
  country of origin (e.g in El Salvador). There is also a relatively small but
  growing number of people who apply for refugee status when already in
  Australia on temporary entry permits. The Program Target for this
  category was 14,000 in 1989-90.
Economic migration makes up less than half the total intake. It is this component which is easiest to reduce in times of recession. Economic migration generates future chains of migration, due to the rights to family reunion. This also applies to the other categories: refugees can bring in their dependents just like other migrants, while people admitted through family reunion can then bring in further family members. The Points Test, used for several categories, is based on a model developed in Canada, and was first introduced in 1973. In the current version, points are awarded for work skills, age, language skills, and family relationships with residents or citizens of Australia. The Points System is complex and hard to apply fairly. It is not discriminatory on racial, ethnic, religious or political criteria, but it does discriminate in favour of young, economically productive people who have been able to receive a good education. It tends to select either people from highly-developed countries or an elite from less-developed countries, thus encouraging the ‘brain drain’.

The Australian immigration system has always been based on the primacy of permanent immigration of potential citizens. However, in recent years the number of temporary entrants has grown. These are made up of students and trainees, as well as temporary workers with special skills, often moving within the framework of transnational companies. There is a certain slippage from temporary into permanent immigration, through the possibility of applying for transfer to permanent status.

The Emergence of Multiculturalism

The post-war immigration program was designed to maintain the integrity of Anglo-Australia, but in fact achieved the opposite, bringing about great ethnic diversity. The initial solution to this dilemma was found in assimilationism: the doctrine that immigrants could be culturally and socially absorbed, and rapidly become indistinguishable from the existing Anglo-Australian population (Wilton and Bosworth, 1984). Government measures to encourage successful settlement included some special services: provision of initial accommodation and basic English courses, help in finding work, and support for voluntary efforts such as ‘Good Neighbour Councils’ (Jakubowicz, 1989). But the centrepiece of assimilationism was to treat most migrants as future citizens, who were to live and work with Anglo-Australians. Naturalisation could be obtained after five years, later reduced to three and then two years, and children born to immigrants
automatically became Australian citizens. Immigrants had the right to bring in family members, but there was no special educational provision for migrant children. (Martin, 1978; DIEA, 1986; Vasta, 1990). Cultural pluralism and the formation of 'ethnic ghettos' was to be avoided at all costs.

By the 1960s, it was obvious that assimilationism was not working. The situation of migrant workers was marked by labour market segmentation and social segregation. Migrants settled in the industrial suburbs and the inner-city areas close to their work, where housing was relatively cheap. Many migrants were living in isolation and relative poverty (Martin, 1978). Migrant children were failing at school, often due to lack of support in learning English. The result was a series of social policy measures including an Integration Branch within the Department of Immigration, immigrant welfare grants for community agencies, a Committee on Overseas Professional Qualifications, a special law providing for English courses for children and adults, English language courses on television and at the workplace, and the first steps towards a Telephone Interpreter Service (DIEA, 1986: 31).

From about 1970, immigrants began to be perceived as a political factor, since they made up a significant proportion of working class voters. The ALP set up Greek and Italian sections, advertised in the ethnic press and selected some migrants as candidates (Collins, 1988: 135-7). The victory of the ALP in the 1972 election, after 23 years of conservative government, seems to have been partly attributable to this policy. ALP Immigration Minister Grassby spoke of multiculturalism and explicitly rejected assimilation, seeing the increased diversity of society as a cultural and economic enrichment. However, the emphasis in ALP policies was not on cultural pluralism but on improving welfare and education systems (Castles et al., 1990: 59). Specific measures included the right to invalid and widows pensions, migrant housing and low-interest loans, family health insurance, and work-based child-care programs employing workers of appropriate ethnic backgrounds, (Jakubowicz et al., 1984: 60-1).

When the Liberal-Country Party Coalition was re-elected in 1975, Prime Minister Fraser went to considerable lengths to win the support of ethnic community leaders. The Fraser government set out to redefine multiculturalism by emphasising cultural pluralism and the role of ethnic organisations in provision of welfare services. Fraser stressed the value of multiculturalism as a way of achieving social cohesion in an ethnically diverse society. The bodies set up to produce and disseminate 'multicultural attitudes' (Foster and Stockley, 1988: 31) included the Australian
Institute of Multicultural Affairs (AIMA), and the Special Broadcasting Service, which was to provide multicultural television and radio services. The Adult Migration Education Program was expanded, and a Multicultural Education Program was developed for schools.

Welfare policies towards migrants were reshaped to fit into the neo-liberal agenda of cutting government expenditure and privatising welfare. The problems encountered by migrants were defined as individual deficiencies, resulting from poor English, lack of knowledge of Australian institutions, or failure to adapt to an industrial society. Migrant welfare was removed from the mainstream social system, and delegated to the ethnic group, through a system of grants to ethnic organisations.1 This provided welfare on the cheap, since pay, staffing levels and conditions could be lower than in government agencies (Jakubowicz et al., 1984: 81). Such funding gave government the opportunity of deciding which ethnic organisations to recognise, a useful form of political patronage, which tended to strengthen the role of traditionalist leaders.

The Hawke ALP Government, which was elected in 1983, initially continued the multicultural policies of the previous government. However, as Australia’s economic perspectives became more uncertain, people began to question the benefits of immigration and multiculturalism. The ‘Great Immigration Debate’ started in 1984, with public calls for restricting immigration, particularly from Asia, and press campaigns against alleged high expenditures on multicultural programs. The campaign quickly took on racist overtones, reminiscent of the ‘yellow peril’ slogan of the past (Blainey, 1984; Markus and Ricklefs, 1985; Castles et al., 1990: 116-38). The Government began to believe that there was diminishing support for multiculturalism, and in 1986 abolished the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs, and cut funding for English as a Second Language teaching and for the Multicultural Education Program. Plans were also made to merge the Special Broadcasting Service with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. However, these cuts led to an ethnic mobilisation which threatened the ALP hold on marginal seats in Sydney and Melbourne. In an amazingly rapid about-turn, many of the measures of 1986 were reversed in early 1987. New policies and institutions were introduced to strengthen and re-define multiculturalism.

1 The costs of these were more than defrayed by the 1978 decision to abolish tax rebates on remittances to migrants’ dependents overseas (Castles et al., 1990: 68).
Today the ALP Government emphasises the economic benefits of multiculturalism, arguing that a multicultural population is better placed to respond to the challenges of increased international trade and communication, and above all to provide the opening to Asia which is seen as crucial to Australia's future. The National Policy on Languages, which was adopted in 1987 (Lo Bianco, 1987), has the aim of encouraging bilingualism, including the learning of 'languages of economic and strategic significance' as well as maintaining the 'community languages' of migrant groups. In the social policy area, the government has argued the need to move away from services for specific ethnic groups. The slogan of 'mainstreaming', introduced in the mid 1980s by the New South Wales Government, has been generally adopted as a principle for restructuring government services. All Commonwealth Government departments are now required to produce annual 'Access and Equity statements' designed to ensure that their services are responsive to the needs of a diverse population.

The most significant statement of the new approach to multiculturalism is contained in the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia (OMA, 1989), launched by the Prime Minister in 1989. The National Agenda identifies 'three dimensions of multicultural policy':

- cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and religion;
- social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and opportunity, and the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender or place of birth; and
- economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilise effectively the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of background.

In the National Agenda (OMA, 1989), multiculturalism is essentially seen as a system of rights and freedoms, which, however, are limited by an overriding commitment to the nation, a duty to accept the Constitution and the rule of law, and the acceptance of basic principles such as tolerance and equality, English as the national language and equality of the sexes. Multiculturalism is not defined in terms of cultural pluralism or minority rights, but in terms of the cultural, social and economic rights of all citizens in a democratic state. The program contained in
the document is based on the recognition that some groups are disadvantaged by lack of language proficiency and education, together with discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, etc.

A variety of special institutions and arrangements have been established to implement multiculturalism. At the central government level, policies are coordinated by the Office of Multicultural Affairs in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. OMA has a wide-ranging brief, which includes monitoring bills and cabinet submissions, vetting departmental Access and Equity Statements, and publicly promoting multicultural policies and good community relations. The Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (DILGEA) is responsible for a range of settlement services, including the Adult Migrant Education Program (mainly responsible for English courses); the Grant-in-Aid system of support to migrant welfare organisations; and the Telephone Interpreter Service, which provides interpreters for all languages throughout Australia. DILGEA also funds a quasi-autonomous Bureau of Immigration Research.

Several other departments have special sections concerned with multicultural issues. For instance, the Department of Employment, Education and Training has a National Office for Overseas Skills Recognition, is involved in implementation of the National Languages Policy, and shares responsibility with the state education authorities for migrant and multicultural education. Finally, the Federal Government continues to finance the Special Broadcasting Service, which provides radio and television broadcasts in English and other languages to meet the needs of ethnic communities, and to promote wider cultural understanding.

Most states have ethnic affairs commissions (EACs) or offices, which have a role similar to that of OMA: they advise the state government, vet new laws, try to make state government services more accessible to members of all ethnic groups, coordinate language services, and generally promote good community relations. State education, health and community services departments generally have multicultural units to provide interpreting and translation services, and to plan service delivery. There are units to deal with specific problems affecting NESB people, such as recognition of overseas qualifications, aged care, occupational health, women’s issues, and drug and alcohol dependency.

Multiculturalism is a major focus for a number of non-governmental bodies, such as the Ethnic Communities Councils and their federal body, the Federation of Ethnic
Communities Councils of Australia (FECCA). There are multicultural or ethnic affairs units in bodies such as the Australian Council of Trade Unions. Special non-governmental agencies (generally subsidised from public funds) are concerned with provision of information and counselling, or improving services for particular groups, such as migrant women and youth. However, multiculturalism is above all a public policy issue, which has not played a major part in the private sector. The private bodies in the area function essentially as pressure groups, calling on government to improve resources and services.

Problems of the Australian Model

The preceding account can be summed up by pointing to the central features of the Australian model for immigration and ethnic relations:

— planning and strict control of entries by the government;
— entry policy marked by non-discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity and national origin, but selectivity according to economic and social criteria;
— rapid access to citizenship and other formal rights;
— active social policies and special agencies to deal with the educational, social and economic needs of immigrants;
— acceptance of cultural pluralism, within carefully defined limits.

Australian multiculturalism appears to be a necessary consequence of mass immigration and growing cultural diversity, which has forced the state to re-examine social policies, and to address the consequences of diversity for community relations and national identity. On the whole, the Australian model appears to be fairly successful. It has allowed the efficient management of a migratory movement of great magnitude (relative to the size of the receiving population). It has provided rapid access to citizenship to people of very varied origins. It has facilitated processes of dramatic demographic, social and cultural change with surprisingly little social tension. Multiculturalism accepts the legitimacy of linguistic and cultural maintenance, and of ethnic community organisations, helping to provide the first and second generation of immigrants with the security and self-esteem necessary for a high degree of social participation at both the individual and collective levels. Finally, multiculturalism has permitted a shift from an explicitly racist and isolationist notion of national identity to a much more open
society, more capable of facing up to the new realities of its position in the Asian-Pacific region.

However, the Australian model of immigration and multiculturalism has a number of problems and contradictions. Firstly, it should be noted that the essential factor which has made the tightly-controlled entry system possible is Australia's geography: the relative remoteness and the surrounding ocean have made entry regulations easy to enforce. The significance of this seems likely to decline in future: factors which increase the propensity to migrate to Australia, and make it harder to police movements include improvements in transportation, increasing mobility of capital and labour in the Pacific region, the growth in temporary movements, the establishment of migrant chains and the existence of ethnic communities within Australia. If strict entry control is the price which migrants to Australia have to pay for a generous system of rights once they get in, then both sides of the equation may soon look shaky.

Secondly, Australian multiculturalism is based on notions of culture and ethnicity which have changed over time, and which are often not coherent and clear. The first approach to multiculturalism—that of the ALP Government of 1972-75—was essentially concerned with the economic and social rights of migrant workers. Eastern or southern European origin was conceptualized not in cultural terms, but as a marker of class position. This was consistent both with the political ideas of the ALP and with the fact that the majority of migrants at that time were people of peasant origin, who had become manual workers in industry. The Liberal-Country Party Government of 1975-82 based its approach to multiculturalism on a primordialist concept of culture, seen in static terms as the language, folklore, cuisine and customs brought in as 'cultural baggage' by immigrants. The ethnic group was regarded as a relatively homogeneous community with its own 'natural' leaders, whose mainly traditionalist representation of ethnic culture transcended class. Multiculturalism was thus concerned with cultural maintenance and pluralism, although within the framework of the 'overarching values' of Australian society (Zubrzycki, 1977; Smolicz, 1985), which were also seen in static and homogeneous terms. This model also fitted well with the privatisation ethos of neo-liberal social policy, since welfare provision could be delegated to ethnic community organisations.

The current approach, as summed up in the National Agenda (OMA, 1989) moves away from this static view of culture and ethnicity. Cultural identity and
diversity are now seen as legitimate attributes of all citizens and residents—part of the private sphere, which is not to be promoted, but certainly to be protected, by the state. Thus cultural rights are not seen as pluralism, let alone separatism, but as an aspect of citizenship, to be restricted only where they infringe other rights, such as the rule of law, tolerance of others, or equality of the sexes. The shift from a pluralist ethnic group model to an inclusionary multicultural one is in part a result of the development of the migratory process: away from a rural-urban movement, to a much more complex situation including upwardly mobile second and third generations, as well as new immigrants of more diverse ethnic, social and educational backgrounds (Jayasuriya, 1990). However, although the conceptual framework has shifted in response to such developments, it is neither coherent nor universally accepted. There is no clear notion of the relationship between ethnicity and other dimensions of inequality—above all class and gender. Nor is there any clarity about the long-term perspectives for cultural difference and ethnic identity within Australia. It is not surprising then, that actual policies and practices have a contradictory and transitional nature, containing elements of the previous approaches.

Thirdly, the multicultural definition of citizenship in The National Agenda appears to leave no role for specific social policies for ethnic minorities. But in practice there is still a wide range of specialised services and agencies, and ethnic organisations lobby for their continuation and improvement. There is a very real problem here: basing service delivery on ethnicity tends to segregate and marginalise migrants, but ignoring ethnicity and catering for migrants only within general services can mean neglecting special needs and perpetuating structural discrimination. In any case there is a big gap between the ideology of equity and the real persistence of inequality and social marginalization. People who belong to certain ethnic groups (particularly southern Europeans, Latin Americans, Lebanese, Turks and Indo-Chinese) tend to have lower occupational status, lower incomes, higher unemployment rates and a variety of special health and educational needs (DIEA, 1986; ABS, 1989). Ethnicity is therefore still a marker of class position for certain groups.

Fourthly, the ethnic group model which emerged in the late 1970s provided a recognised socio-political role for ethnic associations, which put a premium on the construction of culturally-based definitions of needs. Indeed it has been argued that pluralist models of welfare delivery actually helped to construct a special form of ethnicity, and the organisations and leaderships which went along with it
(Castles et al., 1990: chapter 4; Jakubowicz et al., 1984). Such leaderships have an interest in presenting a view of homogeneous and relatively permanent ethnic communities, with common needs. Although this concept of the ethnic community is becoming increasingly questionable, and does not match the current approach to multiculturalism, the government cannot ignore the political influence of ethnic organisations. Thus despite the emphasis on rights of 'all Australians' in the National Agenda, OMA, DILGEA and other government bodies continue to subsidise ethnic organisations in a variety of ways.

Fifthly, major Australian institutions in both the public and private sectors are still based on British, US and—to a lesser extent—western European models. Their structure and organisational culture tend to disadvantage people who show differences in appearance, speech, behaviour or values from positions of power. The political task of changing central institutions to truly reflect a multicultural society has yet to be undertaken.

Finally, immigration and multicultural policies remain controversial. There is considerable public debate about levels of immigration, forms of selection, expenditure on special services, the meaning of multiculturalism and the effects of cultural pluralism on social relations and national identity. Although the major political parties all support immigration and multiculturalism, they differ considerably on the detailed public policies this entails. The public debate frequently takes on racist overtones, evoking spectres of being 'swamped' by mass immigration from Asia. Although there are no riots (like in Britain) and little organised racist violence (as in Germany), there is considerable evidence of racism, taking the form of abuse, harassment and even physical violence, particularly against Asians¹ (HREOC, 1991). Multiculturalism still has a long way to go before it secures universal support.

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¹ Racist violence and discrimination is most severe against Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. The HREOC Report on Racist Violence (1991) found that such practices were widespread and institutionalized, and that the perpetrators were frequently police officers and other officials. This will not be discussed in the present paper.
Conclusion

Australia has become a society of great cultural and ethnic diversity in a very short period. The high level of government intervention in immigration policy has been carried over into the areas of settlement and ethnic relations. In this Australia is very similar to Canada, but unlike the USA, where the integration of immigrants has been largely left to market forces. Multiculturalism has emerged as a formula for managing both social policy and identity, and has played a central part in the successful model for immigrant settlement and community relations. Multiculturalism has changed considerably in recent years. In the late 1970s, its language was of 'enrichment' through diversity and 'dignity' through cultural maintenance. The focus on cultural pluralism matched both the social policy priorities of the conservative government, and the interests of mainly middle-class leaderships seeking to articulate the demands of first generation European immigrant workers. The experience which transcended class difference was the cultural isolation and social marginalization resulting from assimilationism; multiculturalism set out above all to redress this. Today, cultural pluralism has lost its central role as a minority demand, partly through changes in the economic and political context, partly through changes in the make-up of the NESB population, and partly because multiculturalism itself has demonstrated that formal acceptance of diversity does not in itself necessarily improve the position of minorities.

The first generation southern and eastern European cultural brokers are therefore losing their leadership role, although ethnic organisations remain significant, and governments continue to stress cultural rights. The new leaders are of Asian as well as European origin, and belong mainly to the second generation, i.e. they are of NESB migrant parentage. They have been educated in Australia, understand the system well, and are often employed within the bureaucracy. They articulate the needs of ethnic minorities not in cultural but in bureaucratic terms, as expressed in the catch-words of Access and Equity. These new leaderships still make use of cultural markers, in order to maintain links with their constituency. The concept of the ethnic community, as a social category which transcends both class and generation, is crucial to their position.

The location of this new NESB leadership group is contradictory: they belong both to the ethnic communities (which they construct and mobilise) and to the state (for which they work in one way or another). This contradiction reflects the tensions
within multiculturalism, which is both a public policy designed to manage diversity, and a way of articulating minority interests. Similarly, the current form of multiculturalism embodies the potential conflict between an inclusionary declaration of civil, political and social citizenship for all, and a pluralist model based on ethnic groups as interest groups. A further tension exists between the guarantee of the right of minorities to be culturally and linguistically different, and their exclusion from positions of real power if they exercise that right.

Multiculturalism is likely to be a central element of Australian public policy for the foreseeable future. But it has yet to reach a stable and coherent form. Further controversy and change are therefore likely. Considerable work is still needed before multiculturalism can provide a satisfactory framework for social policy and for national identity, in a period when Australia needs to both reshape its internal economic and social structures and to re-orient its international relations.
References


CHAPTER 2

THE AUSTRALIAN MODEL OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM IS IT APPLICABLE TO EUROPE?

The very centrality of immigration to Australian society has been a reason why many European observers have seen no relevance in a comparison, arguing that their own countries are ‘not countries of immigration’, but merely places of sojourn for temporary labour migrants from the European periphery. Today, however, the myth of temporary migration is breaking down, and the reality of permanent settlement and the formation of new ethnic minorities can no longer be denied (Castles et al., 1984; Castles, 1986). Moreover, new types of ‘South-North’ and ‘East-West’\(^1\) migration are rapidly growing in significance. Immigration and growing cultural diversity now present major challenges to European societies. In this situation, the policies and practices of ‘classical countries of immigration’ may prove increasingly useful.

\textit{The Australian Model and Western Europe}

How relevant is the Australian experience to current problems in western Europe? It is impossible to present a comparative description of the migratory process in various European countries here. There have been two main types of immigration: migration from colonies or former colonies to the colonial power, and migration of workers from the European periphery to the industrial economies of North-West Europe, often within the framework of ‘guestworker’ systems. Although there were many differences between these types of migration, there have also been important similarities and convergences. A large proportion of both ‘colonial workers’ and

\footnote{It should be pointed out that these concepts are questionable from an Australian perspective. Australia belongs geographically to the South, but culturally, economically and politically to the North. Similarly, migrants from Eastern Europe move further East when they come to Australia. Clearly the concepts of South-North and East-West represent cultural, economic and political, rather than geographical locations.}
'guestworkers' became incorporated into the economy as unskilled workers. Both have tended to bear the brunt of economic restructuring and the urban crisis, experiencing unemployment, poor housing and social conditions, and suffering the racism of insecure sections of the local populations (Castles et al., 1984; Castles, 1986). Both 'colonial workers' and 'guestworkers' have been incorporated into society as new ethnic minorities, which experience various degrees of insecurity and exclusion (Hammar, 1985).

Improvements in the societal position of ethnic minorities, which were beginning to be made during the late 1970s and early 1980s, now seem jeopardized by protective reactions sparked off by the escalation of South-North migration in the late 1980s and the current development of East-West movements (Alund and Schierup, 1991). Clear distinctions between types of migration are breaking down, government policies are increasingly difficult to implement (SOPEMI, 1990), and fears of economic and social tensions are growing. Immigration and ethnic diversity are forcing Europeans to re-examine their social policies, political institutions, cultures and national identities. There is a marked tendency towards exclusionary policies, particularly towards non-Europeans, and this in turn increases hostility towards existing minorities.

Similarities between Western Europe and Australia include:

— large-scale immigration and settlement since 1945, with increasing numbers of non-European migrants in recent years;
— institutional and informal practices which initially concentrated certain groups of migrants in manual employment, leading to marked segmentation of the labour market according to ethnicity and gender;
— residential concentration in urban areas, affected by housing problems and poor infrastructure, where competition and conflict with local people develop;
— the growing significance of racist discourses, which use the presence of minorities as an explanation of economic and social problems, and advocate exclusion and discrimination.

The differences include:

— geographical factors which still permit a high degree of government control of migration to Australia compared with the increasing difficulty of controlling national borders in Europe;
— larger relative size of the immigrant population in Australia;
the role of immigration in nation-building in Australia, compared with the older established populations of European nations;

- an immigration policy based on permanent family settlement in Australia, compared with a policy still based on the myth of temporary residence in some western European countries;

- an inclusionary concept of the nation in Australia, where immigrants are encouraged to become citizens and quickly gain access to all formal rights, compared with exclusionary concepts of citizenship and nationhood based on ethnicity in some European countries.

There are clearly important parallels, as well as significant differences between Australia and western European countries. The question is: can some of the successful elements of the Australian model be usefully applied in Europe, and what changes are necessary to make them appropriate in the different context? To answer this, it is useful to re-examine the central features of the Australian model for immigration and ethnic relations, already mentioned in Chapter 1.

Planning and Strict Control of Entries by the Government

The price for a generous policy of rights for settlers in Australia, has been a high measure of control of entries. Immigration levels and categories are worked out as a balance between economic needs (e.g. labour demand, the need for specific skills), the needs of ethnic communities (for family reunion) and international responsibilities (e.g. burden sharing with regard to refugees). At present, there is a tendency towards loss of control of migratory movements. It seems to me that this is partly because some governments are trying to carry out policies which are unrealistic and in conflict with economic, social and political realities. For instance, in the German case, trying to maintain the fiction of not being 'a country of immigration' at a time of very rapid immigration condemns public policy to absurdity. An active immigration policy means setting out levels of immigration which are realistic in view of internal and external pressures; striking a balance between various types of migration (economic, family and refugee); and setting up selection mechanisms which are as fair as possible. Such a policy would have to be co-ordinated with policies on international relations, trade and development. Migrations will take place whether governments want them or not, as the current growth of illegal migration demonstrates. An active immigration policy will not
solve this problem quickly or completely, but it is the only chance of maintaining some measure of control of movements.

**Entry Policy Marked by Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity and National Origin, but Selectivity According to Economic and Social Criteria**

There is currently a tendency in western Europe to favour East-West over South-North migration. This is usually justified in economic terms (eastern Europeans are seen as better educated and more productive), and cultural terms (‘after all, we are all Europeans’). These arguments lead, in the final analysis to racial and ethnic discrimination. Moreover, they are likely to worsen the situation of existing non-European minorities by defining them as intrinsically inferior and undesirable. The Australian experience of moving from the racist selection criteria of the White Australia policy to the current non-discriminatory is instructive here. At the beginning of the post-war immigration program, the majority of Australians believed that non-white immigration would lead to social conflict and the breakdown of national identity. In fact the opening of Australia to non-white (i.e. particularly Asian) immigration has not led to a breakdown of the social fabric, but rather to considerable economic benefits and an enrichment of society. The lesson for Europe is the need to remove any forms of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity and national origin from immigration rules. This does not, however, mean that there should be no selectivity: criteria of education, training, work experience, age, etc. can be used in selecting entrants in the economic migration category, though not for refugees or immediate family members.

**Rapid Access to Citizenship and Other Formal Rights**

Perhaps the most important single lesson of the Australian experience is the key role of citizenship and of economic, social, political and cultural rights in bringing about good community relations. The overwhelming majority of immigrants in Australia have become citizens, while all children born in the country automatically have citizenship. This gives them access to the political system and the opportunity of participation in many social arenas. It also gives them a sense of belonging, and the security necessary to develop long-term perspectives. This security also makes immigrants less threatening to other social groups: since they
have full labour-market rights, they are not forced to undercut wages or work in clandestine situations. In western Europe, some employers (and even governments) are willing to take advantage of the cheap labour provided by clandestine migrants or refugees from less-developed countries, while denying them the right to secure residence status. Similarly, policies which exclude permanent immigrants from citizenship create a situation of marginalization which threatens good labour relations and social peace, and which contradicts the principles of representative democracy. In the long run there is no alternative to making citizenship available to all permanent residents—it should be done sooner rather than later. The argument often advanced against it—that many immigrants do not want to give up their existing citizenship—is in fact a reason for accepting dual citizenship, or for developing forms of latent citizenship, rather than denying it to permanent residents.

Active Social Policies and Special Agencies to Deal with the Educational, Social and Economic Needs of Immigrants

The Australian state provides support services for the settlement process, such as reception centres for new arrivals, help in finding employment, language courses, special educational support for immigrant children and translating and interpreting services. Such services are seen as a central aspect of multiculturalism, in accordance with the principle that all government agencies should make their services appropriate and accessible to people of different ethnic backgrounds. They are complemented by equal-opportunities and anti-discrimination laws, and special agencies to implement these. Clearly, special services of various kinds have also been introduced in all western European countries to help deal with problems of immigration and settlement. The Australian experience is that it is important to move away from piecemeal and ad hoc social policies in this area. Multicultural social policy should be regarded as a long-term necessity, and not simply a transitory part of the settlement process. Moreover, such measures should be understood as citizenship rights, crucial to securing the full participation of people of diverse ethnic backgrounds in a pluralist society.
Acceptance of Cultural Pluralism, within Carefully Defined Limits

Australia's post-war immigration program and the policy of assimilation were designed to maintain cultural homogeneity. The emergence of multiculturalism was a reaction to an unplanned development, but it has proved highly successful as a way of maintaining good community relations in an ethnically diverse society. Multiculturalism sets out to define the relationship between the cultural rights of individuals and groups, and the rule of law in a secular society. In the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (OMA, 1989), multiculturalism is set out not in terms of minority rights, but as system of rights for all citizens in a democratic state. In this understanding, multiculturalism is not a way of protecting possibly repressive and separatist cultures, but a new statement of the division between the public and the private in civil society. In Europe today, many people cling to the idea of ethnic homogeneity, and want to turn the clock back to an imagined monocultural community. They feel threatened by the idea of difference, and above all by the possibility of loss of modernity and secularity, which seems to be embodied in the perceived cultures of certain immigrant groups. Multicultural policies based on the Australian model could provide a way of safeguarding the cultural rights and specific interests of minority groups, while allaying the fears of some members of the ethnic majorities.

In fact European societies have always been marked by migrations and cultural interaction. Contemporary mass migrations, together with trends towards globalization of economy and culture, are certain to bring about increased cultural pluralism and ethnic diversity. Current tendencies towards exclusionism—the 'fortress Europe' mentality—and romantic and often violent attempts to return to an illusory ethnic purity can do a great deal of harm, but they cannot permanently stop the process of cultural change. In Australia, the very volume and diversity of immigration, together with the changing position of the country in international economic and political relations, have forced people to come to terms with such realities, and to work out a blueprint for a multicultural society. The Australian model is far from perfect: it contains unresolved contradictions and problems, and is constantly changing. Nonetheless, my conclusion is that the Australia experience can provide useful impulses—if not easy answers—for Europeans.
References


CHAPTER 3

MIGRATIONS AND MINORITIES IN EUROPE
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1990S:
TWELVE HYPOTHESES

This paper will not examine current migrations and the situation of ethnic minorities in particular western European countries. Rather my aim is to look at global patterns of migration and ethnic minority formation, and to relate these to general tendencies in world political economy and cultural development. Then I will examine the possible meaning of these trends for migrations and minorities in western Europe, in particular with regard to government policies, racism, citizenship and national identity. Finally, I will discuss some consequences: on the one hand for the theoretical approaches and research methodology of social scientists; on the other hand for the political demands and aims of the anti-racist movement. In view of the very general and provisional nature of my considerations, I will put them in the form of twelve hypotheses, which I will try to explain and justify.

1. The world is entering a new phase of mass population movements, in which migration to Europe and the situation of ethnic minorities in Europe can only be fully understood in a global context.

At the beginning of the 1980s, there was a widespread belief that mass migrations to Western Europe had, for the time being, ended, allowing a phase of stabilisation of immigrant populations. The stopping of labour migration to most countries following the 'oil shock' of 1973-4, and the gradual completion of processes of family re-union (despite attempts by some governments to prevent them), seemed to provide conditions under which the 'new ethnic minorities' could settle and establish community structures. This stabilisation facilitated gradual improvement in the socio-economic situation and the civil and political rights of
immigrants. This was the context for debates on pluralism, multicultural policies and measures against discrimination and racism.

The situation changed dramatically in the late 1980s. There was a rapid increase in volume of migrations to North America\(^1\), Australia and Western Europe. There was also growth in migrations concerning the countries of the South (SOPEMI, 1990), including rural-urban movements within less-developed countries (LDCs), between various LDCs, from LDCs to newly-industrialising countries (NICs) and between LDCs and oil countries. The ‘new migrations’ were new in areas of origin and destination, with more and more countries and regions being drawn into migratory relationships: for instance, the Southern European countries which had experienced mass emigration until the early 1970s now became areas of immigration from Africa and Asia. The migrations were new with regard to the characteristics of migrants: for instance the increasing participation of women workers, and an emerging polarisation of skills with both unskilled and very highly qualified personnel participating. They were also new with regard to forms of migration: former ‘guestworker’ countries now became the destinations of family migration and refugee movements, while new ‘guestworker systems’ developed in the oil countries. The overwhelming trend, however was towards spontaneous movements—uncontrolled though not necessarily unwanted—by governments and employers, and often taking the form of illegal or refugee movements.

At present there are estimated to be 80 million migrants (that is, people living permanently or for long periods outside their countries of origin)—the equivalent of 1.7 per cent of world population. Thirty million of these are said to be in ‘irregular situations’ and 15 million are refugees or asylum seekers (IOM, 1990). The new trends are generally summed up in the catch-words South-North migration and, most recently, East-West migration.\(^2\)

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1 In the case of the USA, the growth got under way following the new Immigration Act of 1965, which repealed the restrictive and racist measures which virtually stopped mass immigration from the early 1920s.

2 It should be pointed out that these are Eurocentric terms. There are countries of the Southern hemisphere (like Australia) which belong politically, economically and culturally to the North and West, and which receive increasing numbers of migrants both from Asia and Eastern Europe. Similarly, some countries of Europe (like Yugoslavia and even Britain) are taking on some of the characteristics of LDCs, with regard to the way they participate in the international division of labour.
In the case of Western Europe the number of asylum-seekers increased throughout the 1980s, and then jumped at the end of the decade, mainly due to increased movements from Eastern Europe. However, entries of workers and of family members of previous migrants also rose sharply in the late 1980s (SOPEMI, 1990).

2. Previous distinctions between types of migrations are becoming increasingly meaningless. This is undermining state migration policies.

Migration policies (where they existed at all!) have been premised on the belief that fairly neat distinctions could be drawn between types of migration, such as:

Economic migration, which in turn is sub-divided into
- unskilled
- skilled
- entrepreneurs, etc.
- family re-union
- refugees

Another distinction regarded as highly significant has been between temporary migrants (usually workers) and permanent settlers.

Such distinctions have been central to a variety of official systems, including the Australian immigration categories, the US Preference System, the German ‘guestworker’ program and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) framework.

Today, such distinctions are collapsing. Migratory chains, once established, continue, even when the original policies on which they were based are changed or reversed. For example, when the German Federal Government decided in 1973 to stop labour migration and to encourage return migration, the main migratory chain—that from Turkey—continued to develop, initially in the form of family re-union, then through refugee entries (Blaschke, 1990). Similarly, what appears as entrepreneurial migration, may in fact be essentially a form of permanent family movement, as in the case of some South-East Asian migration to Australia, Canada and the USA.
The classic case for the erosion of neat categories is that of refugees and asylum seekers. The overwhelming majority of these do not fall under the criteria of individual persecution of the UN Convention definition, even though they are forced to leave their countries by war, famine, economic pressure, ethnic persecution or ecological catastrophe (Ministry of Labour, Sweden, 1990). For the year 1990, the UNHCR estimated the re-settlement needs for refugees at just 150,000, and called on governments to be less generous to asylum-seekers who did not meet UNHCR criteria, because giving them support might divert efforts from ‘real’ refugees (UNHCR, 1989: 2). The huge gap between the UNHCR figure, and the world’s 15 million refugees and asylum-seekers casts doubt on the viability of the Convention definition, and points to the pressing need for new international policies on refugees and asylum-seekers.

The overall effect of this situation is a general break-down in regulation of migration and settlement by governments or supra-national bodies. As the OECD has pointed out, policies to contain migratory flows are becoming ‘difficult to implement’ and there is a growth in illegal movements to Europe as well as to other regions (SOPEMI, 1990). Certainly there are no comprehensive joint European policies on migration and refugees. However, where there are moves towards such policies—such as through the Shengen and Trevi agreements—the emphasis is on restriction and exclusion rather than on rational and humane immigration policies, or on providing more effective support to refugees.

3. The growing disparities between economic, social and demographic conditions in South and North (and East and West) provide the context for future mass migrations.

In the 1990s, 90-100 million people will be added to world population every year. By 2025, world population is expected to almost double to 8.5 billion people. While the industrialised regions are projected to grow relatively little from 1.2 billion people in 1990 to 1.35 billion in 2025, the LDCs will increase from 4 billion to 7.15 billion (IOM, 1990). This will lead to a vast increase in demand for jobs: the total labour force of the LDCs is projected to grow by 733 million between 1990 and 2010. For comparison, this is more than the total current labour force of the industrialised countries—586 million in 1990. The LDCs need to create 36 million new jobs each year in the 1990s—a target which seems quite unattainable in the light of the performance of the last few decades (Golini et al., 1990).
Population growth in LDCs is linked with rural-urban migration and rapid urbanisation. In 1970, there were only 20 cities in the world with more than 5 million inhabitants. By 2000, there are expected to be 44—and most of them will be in LDCs. The largest cities in the world are expected to be Mexico City and Sao Paulo with 24 million people each. Other huge cities in LDCs will include Calcutta (16 million), Bombay (15 million), Teheran (14 million) and Jakarta (13 million). Poor housing, lack of social infrastructure and high unemployment are likely to make these cities unattractive places in which to live.

It seems obvious that these demographic and social factors will create enormous pressures for South-North migration (Zolberg, 1989). In terms of the simple push-pull models which were used to explain migrations in the 1960s, one could argue the pull factors were the main explanatory factor during the mass labour migrations to Western Europe from 1945 to about 1973: migrant workers came either because they were recruited or because they had a justified expectation that they would find a job (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 25-28). During recessions, labour migration declined. In the 1980s, this changed: the push factors became dominant and people came mainly because the conditions of life were completely intolerable in the area of origin. Even unemployment and a marginal existence in the North became preferable to staying in the South. In other words, such movements will continue whatever the labour market situation and the policies of governments in the North.

However, push-pull theories—generally based on simplistic human capital theories—have only a very limited explanatory value. It is necessary to look beyond individual movements and their immediate causes, if we wish to understand the fundamental processes.
4. Economic, social and demographic disparities alone do not cause migration. Rather, the movements are an expression of the interdependence between sending and receiving areas within the political economy of the world market. Moreover once movements start, they often lead to chains of migration, which continue even when the initial causes or government policies have changed.

It has long been obvious that it is usually not people from the very poorest countries, nor the most impoverished people within a given area who are most likely to migrate. Migration requires resources, both financial and of cultural capital. People do not simply decide as individuals to move to another country to maximise their life chances. Most migration is based on existing economic and social links, connected with colonialism, international trade and investment, or previous migratory movements. For example the US Bracero Program of the 1940s started a long-term migratory movement from Mexico to the USA, just as the German ‘guestworker’ program led to a permanent chain of Turkish migration. Research by Sassen (1988) has shown the strong links between investment, trade and migration; increasing mobility of capital in the contemporary world economy is a principal determinant of labour mobility. International migration is thus a collective phenomenon which arises as part of a social relationship between the less-developed and more-developed parts of a single global economic system (Portes and Böröcz, 1989).

Realisation of these links have an important consequence. Many people believe that economic development of the countries of the South will reduce emigration. The left has long called for ‘development aid instead of migration’, while the neoliberal slogan has been ‘trade in place of migration’. Today we must understand that economic development, at least in the short and medium term will lead to increased emigration from the poorer countries (see Tapinos, 1990). This is because the development process—i.e. bringing less-developed areas into the world economy—leads to such severe disruption of existing societal structures that previous ways of living become unviable, and migration appears as the only solution. In very general terms, the process has the following stages:

- interaction with developed countries through colonialism, trade, aid and foreign investment;
- rural development (the ‘Green Revolution’);
- rural-urban migration;
— emergence of large cities with poor social conditions and lack of
  employment opportunities;
— improved education but insufficient jobs for graduates, leading to the
  'brain drain';
— cultural influence of the rich countries through mass media, tourism,
  commodification of cultural products;
— better transport and communications;
— temporary labour migrations;
— permanent movements to richer countries;
— establishment of links between migrant communities in rich countries and
  areas of origin, strengthening the cultural influence of rich countries, and
  sustaining migratory chains.

A good example for the way this process has worked for a successful NIC is Korea,
where the rapid industrialisation which has made the country one of Asia's 'four
tigers' has been accompanied by large-scale migration, mainly to the USA (Sassen,
1988: Chapter 4). However, this relationship between industrialisation and
emigration should hardly surprise us, when we remember that Britain's industrial
revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries was marked by mass overseas emigration
of proletarianised farmers and artisans.

Thus the current upsurge in South-North migration is essentially a reflection of the
economic, social and cultural crisis in many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America, caused by the post-colonial mode of incorporation into the world
capitalist economy. The end of the Cold War adds a new political dimension: as
long as there was a Second World which provided an alternative development
model, the concept of the Third World had a political significance as a possible
non-capitalist way to modernisation. The rise of OPEC and the NICs had already
eroded the economic usefulness of the concept of the Third World. Now the
political value has been lost too: there is no other way but the capitalist one. Since
millions of people have already experienced the dislocation, destitution and
injustice brought about by capitalist development, they are left with no hope of
realisation of human dignity and rights in their own countries. Migration to the
North now appears as the only way out.

At the same time—and this is stating the obvious—the end of the Soviet Empire
means an enormous additional potential for migration to the rich countries of
Western Europe and North America. Just as with the South, the economic and
cultural incorporation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into the capitalist world order is likely to give rise to large-scale migratory chains. In both economic and cultural terms, East-West migration is likely to compete with South-North movements, making the situation even more complex.

5. The new types of migration correspond with the restructuring of the economies and labour markets of the developed countries in the last twenty years.

The ending of organised recruitment of manual workers by industrialised countries in the early 1970s was not a mere conjunctural phenomenon, but rather a reaction to a fundamental re-structuring of the labour process. The last two decades have been marked by:

- the ‘new international division of labour’, i.e. increased capital export from developed countries and establishment of manufacturing industries in the South;
- the micro-electronic revolution;
- erosion of traditional skilled manual occupations;
- growth in the services sector, with demand for both highly-skilled and low-skilled workers;
- emergence of informal sectors in developed countries;
- casualisation of employment, growth in part-time work, increasingly insecure conditions of employment;
- increased differentiation of labour forces on the basis of gender, age and ethnicity (i.e. mechanisms which pushed many women, young people and members of minorities into casual or informal-sector work);
- a high degree of international mobility of highly-skilled workers.

Taking these tendencies together, we can speak of a new polarisation of the labour forces of highly developed countries: the old blue-collar skilled working class has shrunk, while both the highly-skilled workforce and the unskilled, casualised workforce have grown. Social inequality and insecurity has been exacerbated by the simultaneous decline of the welfare state. The labour movement has lost much of its power and its innovative capacity, in line with the erosion of its former social basis.
Existing ethnic minorities and new migrants have played varying parts in these developments. An exhaustive analysis is not possible, but here are a few examples. Labour market policies which give preference to nationals have contributed to very high unemployment rates for former ‘guestworkers’ and helped cushion the effects of re-structuring for local workers. The highly-exploited work of migrant women in the clothing industry has partly counteracted the trend to export of this type of workplace to LDCs (Phizacklea, 1990). The emergence of ethnic small business as a strategy for coping with racism and unemployment has played an important part in urban renewal and in economic change (Waldinger et al., 1990; Tait et al., 1992; Light and Bonacich, 1988; Blaschke, 1990). Temporary (and often illegal) foreign workers from Poland play a significant role in the German building industry, while undocumented African workers pick the fruit and vegetables of most Southern European countries. In the NICs, the labour of women rural-urban migrants is central to the development of the electronics industry, while attempts at industrialisation in OPEC countries have been largely based on migrant labour, both highly-skilled and manual. Clearly a new and highly complex political economy of migrant and ethnic minority labour is emerging.

6. Current developments in migration increase the interdependence between immigration policies and policies concerning the rights of established immigrant populations.

From 1945 until the early 1970s, the various types of migration to Western Europe appeared as successive historical phases. However, by the 1980s this succession was breaking down due to the overlap of these phases with various stages of the migratory process. This increased the difficulty of formulating and implementing coherent policies on immigration and ethnic minorities. This point sounds somewhat obscure and technical, but once elucidated its significance becomes clear.

I have argued elsewhere (Castles et al., 1984: Chapter 2; Castles, 1986) that the principle post-1945 movements to Western Europe were characterised by a three-stage migratory process:

— first, migration of workers;
— secondly, family re-union;
— thirdly, permanent settlement and the formation of ethnic minorities.
The historical phases were:
a) the immediate post-war migrations: movements of refugees and displaced persons, overseas emigration of Europeans;
b) either at the same time or somewhat later, movements connected with decolonisation, i.e. the return migration of white settlers to Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands;
c) the labour migrations of the boom period (about 1950-73), whether of workers from former colonies or of ‘guestworkers’ from the European periphery, which affected most Western European countries1;
d) the period of economic restructuring from about 1973 to the mid-1980s, marked by relative absence of labour migration, some return migration and the virtual completion of family re-union for certain ethnic groups;
e) The period which started in the mid-1980s, in which there are new migrations of a variety of types simultaneously, as already described.

For the purposes of the present discussion we can ignore phases a) and b) because they did not lead to the formation of ethnic minorities in Western Europe. It is evident that there was a high degree of correspondence between phases c) and d) and the three stages of the migratory process. In policy terms this meant that the significant discourse in phase c) concerned the recruitment and/or the control of migrant labour. Phase d) was the period of consolidation of immigrant communities. In this period, policies tended to become split into two areas: migration policy, which was concerned with keeping out or repatriating workers and with regulating and limiting family re-union, and policy towards established immigrants, which was concerned with social and educational measures, and—increasingly as time went on—with community relations and civil, social and political rights (see Hammar, 1985). The lull in immigration and the relative stabilisation of immigrant populations (albeit under conditions of inequality and social disadvantage) seemed to offer the perspective of improvement. No new immigrations would be permitted, but a gradual integration would be offered to existing minorities.

Now, this general interpretation of the situation has its problems: certainly there were national variations and countervailing tendencies. State responses were inconsistent and changed according to the ideology of the party in power. Moreover,

1 The timing varies somewhat for different countries. The difference is greatest for Britain where most labour migration was stopped in 1962 and family re-union took place mainly up to the early 1970s. A detailed discussion is not possible here.
both informal and institutionalised racism were ever-present while racist movements grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, it seems to me that there was a perspective for a gradual amelioration of the situation of ethnic minorities, and even for the emergence of multicultural and anti-racist policies in some countries. The escalation and diversification of migratory movements of the late 1980s and early 1990s has helped reverse such trends. The simultaneous existence of the various forms of migration and the different stages of the migratory process has thrown state policies into confusion. The division between migration policy and policy towards established immigrant groups simply does not work any more, and hampers effective measures, leading to a threatening political vacuum.

7. State policies towards migrants and minorities have tended to become increasingly complex and contradictory, as governments have sought to address a variety of seemingly irreconcilable goals; such as:

— provision of labour supplies
— differentiation and control of migrant workers
— immigration control and repatriation
— management of urban problems
— reduction of welfare expenditure
— maintenance of public order
— integration of minorities into social and political institutions
— construction of national identity and maintenance of the nation state.

As the migratory process has matured and new migrations have developed, policies have had to address an increasing number of areas, and to deal with ever-more complex situations. State responses have almost invariably been piecemeal and ad hoc, without any long-term, coherent strategies. This applies particularly where governments, for political reasons, have been unwilling to admit the reality of long-term settlement and continued immigration (e.g. in Germany, which according to the main political parties is still 'not a country of immigration'). To some extent the above list of goals is chronological: the emphasis was on labour supply and control of migrant workers in the 1950s and 1960s; on migration control and repatriation in the 1970s; on management of the urban crisis and on cutting welfare in the 1970s and early 1980s; and on public order, the long-term position of minorities and—again—on immigration control in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The overlap of these policy goals obviously leads to major contradictions, here are a few examples:

- exclusionary policies which deny rights and citizenship prevent integration into political institutions and exacerbate public order problems;
- immigration control and repatriation threaten the situation of existing ethnic minorities by criminalising later segments of migratory chains;
- policies which lead to employment of undocumented workers provide cheap labour for certain economic sectors, but also undermine general labour market polices, split the labour force and help cause racism;¹
- crisis management strategies based on blaming the 'enemy within' contribute to racist violence and threaten public order;
- attempts to stabilise national identity through the strengthening and naturalisation of ethnic boundaries lead to increased racism and push minorities into separatism and even fundamentalism.

To make the situation even more complicated, it became increasingly difficult to specify what the state is in European countries, both because of the unclear division of responsibilities in the migration area between national and supranational authorities, and because of still contested and unfinished re-ordering of the division between public and private in social policies. What state is responsible for migration policies: the individual states of European countries, the European Community as an embryonic all-European state, or even the superstate of the North, responsible for imposing the 'new world order' on the South? Balibar (1991: 17) concludes that there is no 'law-governed state' in Europe and that this leads to a 'collective sense of identity panic'. This contributes to the psychological insecurity which helps to cause informal racism, as well as providing the political space for populist racist movements.

¹ Or, as Balibar puts it, 'The modern state ...opens the door to 'clandestine' circulation of the foreign labour force, and at the same time represses it' (Balibar, 1991: 16).
8. Racism in European societies has two sets of causes. The first concerns ideologies and practices going back to colonialism and the construction of nation states in Europe. The second set of causes derives from current processes of social, economic and political change. The increased salience of racism and the shift in its targets over the last twenty years reflects the rapid pace of change in living and working conditions, the dissolution of the cultural forms and organisational structures of the working class, and the weakness and ambivalence of the state.

As many authors have pointed out (for instance Miles, 1989; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; CCCS, 1982; Gilroy, 1987), racism has been a significant factor in European societies for centuries. Its roots are manifold: they lie in the ideologies of white superiority which underpinned colonialism, in processes of ethnic exclusion as part of the development of nation-states, in chauvinist nationalist ideologies linked to intra-European conflict, and in attitudes and practices towards immigrant minorities. An adequate discussion is neither necessary nor possible here. For our purposes it is important to realise that Western European countries have long-established cultures of racism, which lead to a predisposition to ‘racialist’ immigrants and ethnic minorities, i.e. to categorise alleged differences between them and the majority group in either biological or in cultural terms, which are seen as ‘natural’ and hence immutable.

This predisposition may be seen as constant, but it is clear that racism as an empirical reality changes over time, with regard to its targets, its forms of expression and its intensity. For practical politics, it is crucial to understand and explain these variations. There is considerable evidence of increasing intensity of racism of all kinds—institutional practices, vilification, discrimination, harassment, violence—in most Western European countries since the early 1970s (Castles et al., 1984: Chapter 7). The recent outbreaks of racist violence in Germany, the strength of the extreme right in France and the emergence of new racisms in Southern Europe all point to a new strength of racist ideologies. Racism appears to be taking on a new character which is threatening not only to ethnic minorities, but to liberal democratic political forms in general.
The historical background to this are developments such as:

- the end of European colonialism;
- the decline of older industrial areas, the end of full employment (both as a reality and a policy aim), the erosion of the welfare state;
- the social and urban crisis in many parts of Western Europe;
- the economic ascendancy of some former colonies or semi-colonies, particularly in East and South-East Asia and oil-producing countries;
- mass migration and establishment of new ethnic minorities in European cities.

In the early 1970s, it could be argued that racism had the same character towards immigrants workers in all the labour-importing countries in Western Europe, and did not depend primarily on phenotypical factors (skin colour) or origins (non-European as opposed to European periphery). For example there were strong similarities in attitudes and behaviour towards Italian workers in Switzerland and black workers in Britain (Castles and Kosack, 1973). By the late 1980s, this was no longer the case: there appeared to be a much higher degree of social acceptance of intra-European migrants, which contrasted with strongly exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants from the South and minorities who were visibly different (through skin colour or other phenotypical differences). This change can be attributed to a number of factors: the end of migration from the European periphery; the absorption of some former European migrant groups into citizenship or secure resident status; the decline of individual European nationalisms due to European integration; and the tentative and gradual emergence of a ‘European consciousness’.

The danger is that this ‘European consciousness’ will be constructed in exclusionary and discriminatory terms towards the perceived threat of being swamped by the ‘desperate masses’ from the South. Indeed, it is possible that it might be constructed as a much narrower Western European nationalism, in view of fears of mass East-West migration. An example for the ambivalence of the situation was the reaction of Italians to the so-called ‘Albanian invasion’ of August 1989. On the one hand, there were calls for admitting the several thousand spontaneous migrants, on the grounds that ‘after all they are Europeans too’ and desperately in need of help. On the other hand, it was pointed out that letting in one group would encourage further waves, and, furthermore that it would be hard to justify excluding equally desperate people from Africa, except on openly racist grounds. In
the end, the reaction of the Italian state was uncharacteristically draconian and repressive: mass expulsion using military means.

At the moment, a further differentiation is emerging: Muslim immigrant groups are becoming the main targets of racist discourses. This is partly because Muslims form the largest non-European minorities in France and Germany, and amongst the largest in other countries. There is also a connection with historical conflicts between Christian and Muslim peoples in the Mediterranean region. A further link is with international affairs: in the early 1970s, the recession was blamed on the 'oil sheiks', while the Islamic Revolution in Iran and more recently the Gulf War have led to fears of a challenge to the dominance of the major industrial powers. Public debates on the 'population explosion' of the Maghreb increase the perception of an imminent invasion. Thus Muslim minorities appear threatening partly because they are linked to strong external forces, which appear to threaten the hegemony of the North, and partly because they have a visible and self-confident cultural presence. The Rushdie Affair took on major significance precisely because it linked all these factors. At the same time, such discourses present an ideological opportunity to the extreme right: by playing on such fears and linking them to European historical traditions, it can take on a new pan-European character, and break out of its old ultra-nationalist ghetto.

To sum up, it may be said that the current increase in racism, and the changes in its form and character, are closely linked to the processes of rapid economic, social and political change affecting the population of Western European countries in the last two decades. The main impact of the changes has been on the blue-collar urban working class which has seen its economic basis and social situation severely eroded. Immigrants and new minorities have become the visible symbol of this erosion and hence the target for resentment. Thus as Balibar (1988A: 289-302) points out, racism is not so much a result of the crisis as one form of its expression. Racism should not be analysed as a working-class phenomenon, but rather as one product of the dissolution of working-class culture and political organisation. As popular cultures have been pushed aside by mass, international, commodifying cultural industries, the power to deal with change and to absorb new influences has been lost. As the membership of unions and working-class parties has declined, the ideological and organisational basis for an effective response to the attack on living standards has been lost (Wievorka, 1991). Thus Balibar (1988B: 272-88) argues that the issue is not that of 'racism of the working class', but rather of 'the dissolution of parts of the working class into a racist mass'.
9. The constitution of new minorities, with distinct cultures, identities and institutions, is an irreversible process, which questions existing notions of national identity and citizenship.

The transformation of immigrant populations into new ethnic minorities was not inevitable. It would theoretically have been possible for immigrants in Western European countries to maintain their own languages and cultures, both individually and through associations, without any stigmatising consequences. It is only when they experience discrimination, and when processes of cultural maintenance are met with exclusionary institutional practices and informal racism, that immigrants in turn define their group boundaries in cultural terms. Ethnic minority cultures—even when they take on traditionalist forms—have the task of self-protection (in both material and psychological terms) against a hostile environment.

Today, the reversal of racist and exclusionary policies would no longer be sufficient to bring about the cultural and political integration of minorities, in the sense of eliminating the need for some degree of organisational and cultural autonomy. The point is that ethnic minorities are now firmly established, both culturally and organisationally, so that Western European countries have no choice but to accept some form of cultural pluralism for the foreseeable future. Policies based on political and cultural assimilation (the French model) or on exclusionary definitions of nationality (the German model) (see Brubaker, 1990) can no longer serve as effective forms of integration of the nation-state. The de facto ethnic diversity and pluralism of most Western European countries requires new approaches.

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1 Defined for the purposes of the present paper as: social groups whose boundaries are drawn by dominant social groups according to perceived phenotypical or cultural characteristics, and which have specific economic, social and/or legal situations imposed upon them.

2 Anyway, it is questionable whether this could ever happen in the first few generations of a migratory process even under the best possible conditions. It is also questionable whether such cultural homogenisation is desirable. These are are issues which will not be pursued here.
10. The Western European countries of immigration are being forced to examine the relationship between ethnic diversity, national identity and citizenship. Multicultural models of membership of civil society and the nation-state appear to offer their best solution, but there are substantial obstacles to their realisation.

The varying ways in which the 'imagined community' of the nation-state has been constructed in Western European countries in the past are losing their viability. The presence of new ethnic minorities is only one facet of the challenge. Others include:

— European integration and the emergence of a European consciousness. On the positive side this means overcoming the old chauvinisms linked to past wars; on the negative side it means erecting boundaries towards the rest of the world: the 'Fortress Europa' model.¹

— the development of a commodified global culture, borne by transnational capital and the mass media, which challenges national cultures.

— emergence of regional movements, often based on the re-discovered ethnic cultures of historical minorities within nation states.

— the emergence of a right-wing, populist nationalism as a reaction to the failure of modernity to keep its promise of material prosperity for substantial sections of the population.

It seems to me that the only viable solution lies in an approach to identity and citizenship based on the multicultural models which have emerged in Australia and Canada. These are countries which have consciously used immigration as part of the process of nation-building, and have in the long-run been forced to revise their concepts of national identity and their institutional structures to take account of the cultural diversity of their populations. These models are not without their problems (see Castles et al., 1990) but they have been fairly successful in managing ethnic diversity and maintaining good community relations. The Western European countries did not aim to change their demographic and cultural composition through immigration, but that has in fact happened, and the current debate on

¹ An interesting expression of this is the term 'extracomunitario' now widely used as a label for immigrants from outside the European Community in Italy. The term has become as perjorative as Arabe in France or Ausländer in Germany. It is a way of homogenising difference in exclusionary terms, whereby the core of difference is non-belonging to a (new) imagined European community.
national identity and citizenship must take account of this reality, by moving away from monocultural myths.

Certainly there is a debate on multicultural models in Europe. Sweden has gone some way to applying them, though with considerable difficulties (Alund and Schierup, 1991). It is important to look both at the general principles necessary to apply multiculturalism in Western Europe, and at specific issues like the social and political rights of permanent settlers, naturalisation polices, citizenship of the second generation and minority cultural rights. The main issue, however, is still that of the political will to move away from outmoded forms of nationalism and the nation-state. Major obstacles to the introduction of multicultural policies include:

— the conflict between immigration policy, as a form of differential exclusion from the territory and hence society, and citizenship as a way of including people in civil society and the nation-state;

— the gap between formal citizenship (as a system of civil and political rights) and the de facto restriction of economic and social rights of members of ethnic minorities, particularly due to economic restructuring and the decline of the welfare state;

— racism and nationalism.

11. In view of the multi-faceted links between the world economy, migratory processes, minority formation and the transformation of societies of immigration, research in this area can no longer be monodisciplinary and national in focus. There is a need for a multidisciplinary and international social science of migration and multicultural societies, combining elements of political economy, sociology, political science, law, demography, anthropology and related disciplines.

In the period of mass labour migration to industrialised countries, the focus of academic research was mainly on the economics of migrant labour, and on the sociology and social-psychology of 'immigrant-host relations'. Later, in response to the apparent ending of labour migration and the permanent settlement of immigrant groups, more critical approaches developed, which sited labour migration in the political economy of capitalism, examined the sociology of
minority formation and the racialisation of social relations, or looked at the politics of crisis management. It is now clear that labour migration did not end, but has merely changed its form. Indeed, migration and use of 'unfree labour' has always been part of the capitalist system (Cohen, 1987). It is also clear that minority formation and racialisation are central aspects of social relations at the national and international levels.

What is new is that it has become apparent that all these processes of migration and minority formation are taking place simultaneously and increasingly in many parts of the world. The long-term result seems likely to be the emergence of multicultural societies in many areas, leading in turn to new concepts of citizenship and the nation-state. The consequence for critical social scientists working on immigration, racism and ethnic relations should be a new awareness of the global and all-pervading scope of the subject of research. Monodisciplinary studies of particular facets are only justifiable within the context of an interdisciplinary theoretical and analytical framework which provides understanding of the links between the particular and the general, the local and the global. The study of migration and multicultural societies should therefore be understood as a social science in its own right, which is strongly multidisciplinary in its theoretical approaches and methodology.

12. The increasing volume of migration and its changing character, together with the emergence of ethnically heterogeneous societies in Europe makes a re-examination of political positions essential. We need to re-define the meaning of 'international solidarity' with regard to migration policies and the North-South divide, to examine potential contradictions in anti-racist positions, and to work out political agendas which can lead to democratic, multicultural societies.

Migration has often been an issue of contention within the labour movement, due to the potential threat to wages, conditions and organisational unity presented by immigrant workers. Policies have ranged from international solidarity through to racist exclusionism. Since 1945, the Western European left has generally taken an internationalist and anti-racist line. In the current situation, it seems necessary to
me to re-examine and re-define such positions. A number of dilemmas need to be addressed.

Immigration control is by its nature selective, exclusionary and restrictive. Should we therefore reject all control and demand 'open borders' (as has recently been debated within the German Green Party)? In the present circumstances this could lead to large and chaotic flows, resulting in conflict and racism, giving increased impetus to the extreme right, and probably—in the long run—bringing about even stricter control. On the other hand, there is a realisation by governments and international agencies that immigration control, in its present form, is increasingly ineffective (Purcell, 1990; Ministry of Labour, Sweden, 1990; SOPEMI, 1990).

South-North and East-West migration can present effective individual strategies for survival and improvement in life chances, but it cannot provide general solutions to global disparities. The number of people who could conceivably migrate to the industrialised countries is only a drop in the ocean, compared with the number of people facing severe economic and social problems in the LDCs. There is little evidence that migration, under current arrangements, does anything to support development in the areas of origin. Indeed individual movements can hamper development, for example by withdrawing people with desperately needed skills. In the past, the answer to this dilemma was found in the principle 'development in place of migration'. As pointed out above, it is now clear that these are false alternatives: development and industrialisation actually lead to increased migration for a substantial period.

Finally, there seems to be a potential conflict between the ethnic minorities which developed out of the labour migrations between 1950 and the early 1970s, and the new immigrants. The former see the newcomers as a threat to the gains they are beginning to make, and as a catalyst for increased racism. Again, the actual content of solidarity needs to be discussed in this context.

There are no easy answers to any of these dilemmas. To find solutions it is necessary to perceive migrations and the shift to multicultural societies as a central aspect of contemporary global development. For the left in industrialised countries, that would mean developing and advocating a coordinated strategy which simultaneously addresses issues of migration, multiculturalism, foreign and trade policy, and development policy.
Migration

We do need a migration policy that balances international solidarity with the social and economic conditions of receiving areas. That means that each Western European country (and supra-national bodies such as the European Community and the OECD) needs to accept that a certain amount of both permanent and temporary migration will take place, and that it is better to plan and administer this, that to drive it underground by trying in vain to stop it. I have in mind something like the systems adopted in the USA, Canada and Australia, where regular decisions are made on the numbers to be admitted in the categories of economic migrants, refugees and family re-union. It is important to demand that all long-term migrants should have the right to permanent residence and family re-union, although this does not preclude some special temporary admission schemes for students and trainees as part of development policies. A further demand is that entry criteria should be free of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, country of origin, religion, culture or gender. This does not preclude discrimination on the basis of criteria like education or training (in economic migration categories), and need (in refugee categories).

The demand for a migration policy may seem paradoxical in view of previous remarks in this paper on the breakdown of migration control and the erosion of entry categories. Nobody should have the illusion that such a policy can be easily and fully implemented. My argument is that it is better for countries to have policies based on a reasonable amount of immigration, selected according to fair criteria, even if these can only be partially effective, rather than to have unrealistic and discriminatory policies which lead to chaotic, exploitative and conflictual situations.

Multiculturalism

Demands for a fairer immigration system must be accompanied by a struggle for improved rights for immigrants and their descendants once in Western European countries. In the final analysis, this means working towards public policies of multiculturalism. Citizenship for permanent settlers and their children is crucial. Where immigrants do not want to give up their previous nationality, dual citizenship, or latent citizenship of the country of origin are possible answers. An alternative is some type of quasi-citizenship, that gives essential rights, including the right to vote, but stops short of actual naturalisation. Multiculturalism also implies the guarantee of minority cultural and linguistic rights. These include not only the right to individual and collective expression, but also the provision of
necessary services, such as translation and interpreting facilities, to guarantee equal access to courts, social amenities, etc. Measures for children need to be two-fold: on the one hand support services to prevent disadvantage for children of different linguistic and cultural background in the mainstream school, on the other hand educational support for the maintenance of other languages and cultures. The core of multiculturalism is the demand for full political, economic and social participation of all members of society, whatever their ethnic background. Multicultural policy therefore necessarily includes a range of measures to counter discrimination, to ensure equal opportunities in all areas, and above all to combat racism.

**Foreign and Trade Policy**

Measures to reduce the North-South divide, and, in the long term, to reduce the need for migration, are as much issues of foreign and trade policy as of development policy. Stopping arms exports to LDCs could be the biggest single step towards cutting the number of asylum seekers. Trade policies which change the conditions and terms of trade in the favour of the South could make a major contribution. A drastic overhaul of the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy is an example. New attitudes towards social development in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and similar agencies would also be important. An important demand for the left in this context would be for a new emphasis on human rights in all international and trade relations.

**Development Policy**

As pointed out, in the short to medium term, development in the countries of the South will lead to increased emigration. Nonetheless, economic and social development is the only long-term solution to current imbalances, and should therefore be given priority. That means supporting development policies which involve real transfer of resources from North to South. A further demand is to include principles of ecologically sustainable development into all investment projects. Measures to improve health and social security in LDCs are also significant, in view of their long-term demographic consequences. Finally, development and migration policies should be linked, for instance through training schemes for migrants to provide the skills necessary for economic development upon return, or by making investment resources available to returning migrants.
Conclusion

Such proposals sound utopian, in view of the current priorities of the ‘new world order’. Even if they were introduced, they would not bring about quick solutions to the increasing problems of migration and racism. Global migration is certain to go on increasing for the foreseeable future, and it will take place under very difficult conditions. Nonetheless, it is important to be able to put forward an alternative long-term perspective, because it gives credibility to the more immediate demands: those for fair and humane immigration policies, and for the recognition of the rights of immigrants within multicultural societies.
References


The aim of this paper is to describe Italian immigration and settlement in Australia, and to show how the Italian presence is helping to shape Australian society in a period of rapid change. Since British colonisation in 1788, Australia has been a country of immigration. Apart from the 2 per cent of the population who are Aborigines or Torres Strait Islanders, the whole population are immigrants or descendants of immigrants. The largest waves of immigration were from about 1850 to 1890, and then from 1945 to the present. The first wave was mainly of people from Britain, whose settlement provided the basis for the construction of Anglo-Australia as part of the British Empire. The second wave has been much more diverse, consisting not only of Britons but also of eastern and southern Europeans, and then, increasingly, of Asians.

There was some Italian immigration before the Second World War, but most came between 1950 and 1970. Italian community formation is much more recent than in the Americas. Today, Italo-Australians are still the largest non-British group, but they are declining in numbers, and may soon be overtaken by Asian groups. The Italian presence coincides with two major changes. The first is the growth of ethnic diversity and the resulting search for a new national identity, no longer based simply on British heritage. The most obvious symbol of this is the emergence of multiculturalism as an official policy. The second is the end of Empire and Australia’s hesitant re-orientation towards the Asian-Pacific region. The central question is whether Italian influence on Australian culture and identity has helped

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1 This paper is based on a book on Italians in Australia edited by Stephen Castles, Caroline Alcorso, Gaetano Rando and Ellie Vasta, published in July 1992 in English and Italian. The research for the book has been coordinated by the Centre for Multicultural Studies at the University of Wollongong, and has been funded by the Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli of Turin. The full citations are given in the References. In this paper references will be given to the English edition.
maintain a eurocentric view of the world, or rather has helped prepare Australia for a post-colonial and post-European future.

**Italian Immigration and Settlement**

**The Colonial Period**
The colonies in Australia were established to provide an outlet for Britain's surplus population, pauperized and criminalized by the Industrial Revolution. Convicts were soon joined by free settlers, with the state playing a major role in organizing migration. British settlers drove the Aborigines from the land, and decimated them through warfare, disease and removal of their means of subsistence (Reynolds, 1987). Australia was established as a white settler society, based on British culture and fully integrated into the political and economic structures of the Empire. In the 19th century Australia became an important source of food and raw materials for Britain, with the gold rushes of the 1850s providing a major stimulus to development (Dyster and Meredith, 1990).

Australia, with its vast open spaces and relatively high wages, became a magnet for migrants. The population grew from less than 1 million in 1850 to 3.8 million by 1901. The largest non-British settler group were the Irish, but there were also Germans, Italians and other Europeans. Reactions were hostile when Chinese workers arrived, first as cheap labour recruited by employers, then as gold miners. Violent attacks by white miners were followed by exclusionary laws in several colonies. South Pacific Islanders, recruited by Queensland plantation owners, met similar reactions. One of the first laws passed by the Parliament, established when the Australian colonies joined as a Federation in 1901, was the Immigration Restriction Act. This was designed to keep out non-Europeans, and became known as the White Australia Policy. It remained in force until the 1960s.

Italian migration started early, though numbers were small. There were a few Italian convicts on the First Fleet in 1788. Some Italians came in the early 19th century as travellers, missionaries or political emigrés. The gold rushes brought more, including 2,000 Swiss Italians from Ticino, who formed the first Italian community at Daylesford in Victoria. Some were radicals, like Raffaelo Carboni, a leader and chronicler of the Eureka Stockade goldminers' rebellion of 1854, which played a major role in the development of democracy in Victoria. Most Italian immigrants were itinerant male workers, who roamed the colonies in search of jobs.
in agriculture, mines, construction or transport. Most returned to Italy, though some settled, often marrying Irish-Australian women. Pascoe (1992: 87-89) sees these ‘scouts’ as the first stage in the formation of Italo-Australian communities: they did not settle in groups themselves, but started ‘a buzz of gossip about economic opportunities throughout Australia’, which was to form the basis of later chain migration.

The 1891 census recorded 3,890 Italians in Australia, of whom only one sixth were women. In this year North Queensland employers began recruiting Italian workers to replace South Pacific Islanders on the sugar-cane plantations. Italian migration grew further in the 1920s, as restrictive immigration laws in the USA closed off that destination. It is in this period that Italo-Australian communities begin to emerge. Some of the sugar-cane workers of North Queensland pooled their resources to purchase their own farms and settled permanently. Other Italians established fishing industries in Western Australia, South Australia and New South Wales. Cooperation between family members and paesani (fellow-villagers) made it possible to purchase boats and equipment, and gave an advantage over the more individualistic Anglo-Australians. Fruit and vegetable farming were further activities which made use of the Italians’ pre-migration experience. Those who settled in towns often started small shops, cafés or restaurants. Successful immigrants brought in wives, relatives and friends. Soon distinctly Italian areas began to emerge in country and town. Social and cultural institutions made their appearance, including the Catholic Church, the festa (or street festival) and associations of various kinds (Pascoe, 1992: 89-90). The first Italian regional club was the Circolo Isole Eolie, founded in Sydney in 1903.

By 1939, Italo-Australians had a visible presence in many areas, although their numbers were still small. The Italian population grew from 8,135 in 1921 to 26,756 in 1933. In the latter year they were still only 0.4 per cent of Australia’s total population of 6.6 million, but they were concentrated in certain areas and occupations, and appeared threatening to some people. Many Anglo-Australians were hostile towards Italians. Commissions of inquiry were set up to investigate the effect of Italian immigration on wages. Laws were passed to limit the types of jobs non-British migrants could take, and restricting land ownership. There were ‘anti-dago’ riots in the Western Australian mining town of Kalgoorlie in 1919 and again in 1934. With the onset of war in 1939, Italians were classified as ‘enemy aliens’, even if they had become British citizens.1 They were treated with

1 There was no independent Australian citizenship until 1949.
suspicion and subjected to surveillance by the security forces. About 10 per cent of Australia's Italian population (4,727 people) were imprisoned in internment camps (Alcorso and Alcorso, 1992; Cresciani, 1988).

The Postwar Immigration Program

After 1945, Australia embarked on a mass immigration program which was to change not only the country's demographic and economic structures, but also its ethnic composition and national identity. The Japanese victories in the Pacific in 1941-42 had convinced Australia's leaders that the country could no longer rely on Britain for its security, and that a larger population and a strong economy with a modern manufacturing sector were essential. The first Minister of Immigration, Arthur Calwell, used the slogan of 'populate or perish' to help overcome working-class suspicion of immigration, telling the public that 'we must fill the country or lose it' (Collins, 1988: 21).

The aim was to attract migrants from Britain, but not enough wanted to come, and the Department of Immigration began recruiting elsewhere. Australia developed a system of preference for 'desirable types' of immigrants: the British were at the top, followed by northern Europeans, eastern Europeans and finally southern Europeans. Non-Europeans—particularly Asians—were to be completely excluded. There was great resistance to recruitment of southern Europeans, and only limited quotas were admitted in the late 1940s. Nonetheless, southern Europe became the main source of migrants in the 1950s, and Italy the largest single country of origin after Britain.

Spontaneous movements from Italy started in 1945, and 33,000 Italians came by 1950. In March 1951 a bilateral accord between Italy and Australia came into effect: 20,000 migrants per year were to be admitted for 5 years. They were to be provided with financial assistance by both governments, and with loans from Italian charitable organisations. Medical checks were to ensure that only healthy men were selected, while criminals, communists and fascists were to be excluded. Initial accommodation was to be provided in camps and hostels. However, 1952 was a year of recession in Australia, and many of the newly-arrived Italians found themselves unemployed and penniless in isolated camps, like Bonegilla in northern Victoria. They started to complain about the food, the hostility of the local population, and the failure to provide employment. The Australian authorities feared unrest and communist agitation. Matters came to a head with riots at Bonegilla, and
demonstrations by unemployed Italian workers in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane (Bosworth, 1988: 614).

As economic conditions improved in 1954, Italian immigration increased. New entrants were directed into jobs unwanted by Australians, in infrastructure projects like the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme, in heavy industry such as the steelworks of Newcastle and Wollongong, or in the new engineering and textile factories of Sydney and Melbourne. Others were sent to Queensland to cut sugar cane. Once migration got under way, most Italians came on their own initiative. Assisted migration accounted for only 20 per cent of total migration from Italy. Family reunion soon gathered momentum, since all permanent immigrants had the right to bring in their spouse and children, and to sponsor other relatives.

**TABLE 1: ITALIAN MIGRATION TO AUSTRALIA 1947-76**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>1947-51</th>
<th>1951-61</th>
<th>1961-71</th>
<th>1971-76</th>
<th>Total 47-76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Net Migration</td>
<td>33,280</td>
<td>179,420</td>
<td>72,333</td>
<td>-4,463</td>
<td>280,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Average</td>
<td>8,320</td>
<td>17,942</td>
<td>7,233</td>
<td>-892</td>
<td>9,675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures are for financial years from 1 July to 30 June. Net migration is the number of arrivals minus the number of departures. A negative figure means that more people departed than entered.

Source: Calculations from Table 2.2 of Price, 1979.

As Table 1 shows, the 1950s and 1960s were the main period of migration from Italy to Australia. Over 360,000 Italians came between 1947 and 1976, but about 90,000 departed, making a net migration of about 270,000. During the period 1951-60, 6.5 per cent of total emigration from Italy was directed to Australia, with an average of 17,000 entrants per year. After 1961 the proportion began to decrease as migration to western European countries, or from the South to the North of Italy, became more attractive. Only 4.5 per cent of Italian emigrants went to Australia from 1961-70 (Bosworth, 1988: 616). By the early 1970s, as a result of recession in Australia and growing prosperity in Italy, more Italian-born people were leaving Australia than entering.

The Italian born population of Australia increased from 120,000 in 1954 to 290,000 in 1971. Then it started declining, reaching 264,000 in 1990. However the Italo-Australian community continued to grow, as children were born to Italian settlers. Italians were the largest immigrant group after the British, making up over 12 per cent of the overseas-born population in the 1960s. Table 2 gives the figures at
various censuses. Italian-born people made up 2.3 per cent of the total population of Australia in 1966, a figure which fell to 1.7 per cent by 1986.

Most migrants came from Calabria, Sicily, Abruzzi and Campania, although there were some from the North, particularly the Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia. The majority were from rural areas, yet they soon concentrated in Australia's growing industrial cities. Most migrants were aged between 20 and 40 when they left Italy. They were usually impoverished, and came in order to obtain the means for family survival, or to earn the money needed to buy land or pay debts at home. Often their education was limited to primary school level, and most had not received any vocational training beyond the most basic level. Although there have always been some better-educated migrants, the failure to recognize their qualifications in Australia has often made it hard for them to pursue their professions: many skilled workers and professionals have been forced into unskilled manual work.

**TABLE 2: ITALIAN-BORN PERSONS IN AUSTRALIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Italian-Born Population</th>
<th>Per cent of Overseas Born Population</th>
<th>Per cent of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1,880</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>3,890</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>5,678</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>6,798</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>8,135</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>26,756</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>33,632</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>119,897</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>228,296</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>267,325</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>289,476</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>280,154</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>275,883</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>262,435</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Australian censuses as reported by Borrie, 1954; Price, 1979; Price and Martin, 1975; Jupp, 1988; DIEA, 1983. Note—n.a. = not available.

Most Italians migrated not as individuals, but as participants in migratory chains: the first migrant from a certain Italian village, usually male, established a bridgehead, finding somewhere to live and a livelihood. Then he was joined by his wife, children, relatives and paesani. This pattern was unintentionally reinforced by Australian immigration policy: under sponsorship arrangements, Italians already in the country could help their relatives get visas by undertaking to provide accommodation and work for them on arrival (Burnley, 1988: 626). Thus colonies were established—a whole group would move from a village in Italy to a
certain area of an industrial town or a farming district in Australia. This made it possible to keep links with the community of origin, and to maintain specific dialects and cultural practices in Australia.

Patterns of Settlement

Italian settlement is closely interwoven with the evolution of Australia's economic and regional structure. Before 1945, the greatest concentration of Italians (one third) were in Queensland, and most of them worked on the land. The introduction of cane-cutting machines in the 1960s drastically cut the need for rural labour (Menghetti, 1988). Today, less than 7 per cent of the Italian-born live in Queensland, and many of these are in Brisbane. Similarly, in Western Australia many Italians settled initially in the gold mining areas in the 1920s and in the agricultural areas in the 1940s and 1950s. By the 1960s they were moving into the Perth metropolitan area, where the great majority live today (Stransky, 1988: 605).

Before 1945 about 40 per cent of Italians in Victoria lived in country areas such as Shepparton, Wangaratta, Myrtleford, Mildura and Swan Hill. Italians in Melbourne were mainly in central areas, like Carlton, where many were shopkeepers. After 1945, the rapid expansion of manufacturing in Melbourne attracted most of the new immigrants. By 1981, almost 90 per cent of Italians in Victoria lived in Melbourne. Initially most lived in central areas: Sicilians in Brunswick, Pugliesi in Fitzroy and Viggianesi in Carlton. Within a few years, many moved out, mainly to the Northern suburbs, in search of better housing (Bertelli, 1988: 630-31).

Italian chain migration to Sydney started in the 1920s. By 1933 there were 400 Italians in the inner-city area of Leichhardt (Burnley, 1988: 627), as well as groups of fishermen in Balmain and market-gardeners on the western outskirts. The settlers in Leichhardt came mainly from the Lippiari Islands, Sicily, Vicenza and Udine (Ware, 1988: 618), while the market-gardeners were mainly Calabrians. Postwar migratory chains strengthened these communities, for instance Leichhardt had 6,000 Italian-born residents by 1961 (Burnley, 1988: 627). Italian settlement also increased in the west and south of Sydney, with employment shifting from the primary sector to manufacturing, construction and transport. Many market gardens became residential areas, as land values increased. Calabrians and Sicilians (some of whom had moved from North Queensland) settled in Fairfield in the west of
Sydney, making it the largest single Italian community in NSW (10,747 Italian speakers in 1986).

**Italo-Australians Today: a Statistical Overview**

The Australian population more than doubled from 7.5 million in 1945 to 17.3 million in 1990. Table 3 shows that the overseas-born population grew far more rapidly than the total population between 1947 and 1971. By 1971, immigrants made up one in five of the total population, a share which remained constant until 1986, reflecting the relative decline in immigration in the 1970s, and then grew slightly again. Nearly 5 million people migrated to Australia and settled permanently between 1945 and 1989 (BIR, 1990b: 32). Immigrants have come from an ever-wider range of countries. Although the British Isles played a major part throughout the postwar period, immigration from Europe declined dramatically from the 1960s, while immigration from New Zealand, Asia and Latin America increased. By 1990, immigration from Britain was only 18 per cent of total entries, compared with 54 per cent in 1966. Eight of the top ten countries of origin were Asian, and Hong Kong looked set to displace the UK from its top position. As a result, the ethnic composition of the population has shifted considerably. In 1947, nearly 90 per cent of the population were Australian-born, and most of the rest were from the UK. In 1986, 79 per cent of the population were Australian-born and 21 per cent were overseas born. Twenty per cent of the Australian born were children of immigrants. In other words, over two fifths of the Australian population were immigrants or children of immigrants.

**TABLE 3: AUSTRALIAN POPULATION 1947-1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Overseas -Born</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Overseas-Born Per cent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>744,187</td>
<td>7,579,358</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1,286,466</td>
<td>8,986,530</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,778,780</td>
<td>10,508,186</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,579,318</td>
<td>12,755,638</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2,718,318</td>
<td>13,548,448</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3,003,834</td>
<td>14,576,330</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3,247,301</td>
<td>15,602,163</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3,851,500</td>
<td>17,335,900</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: DILGEA, 1988: Table A3; Census, 1986; BIR, 1992. 1990 figures are provisional.

According to the 1986 census, 7.2 per cent of the Australian population were born in the UK and Ireland, a further 7.2 per cent in other European countries, 1 per cent in

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the Middle East, and 2.6 per cent in Asia. Two per cent of the Australian-born were Aborigines. Figure 1 shows how the composition of the immigrant population has changed since 1901.

**FIGURE 1**

* Australia: Per Cent of Overseas-Born Population by Continent of Origin

In 1986, the 262,000 Italian-born were the second largest overseas-born group in the population, following the UK and Ireland born.

**TABLE 4: THE TEN LARGEST IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN AUSTRALIA, 1986**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per Cent of Overseas-Born Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK and Ireland</td>
<td>1,127,000</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>262,000</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>212,000</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DILGEA, 1987

Because Italian migration virtually ceased 20 years ago, there are very few young Italian-born people. Most are concentrated in the higher age groups, with 14 per cent aged over 64 (compared with 10 per cent of the total population) (ABS, 1989). The Australian-born and educated second generation of Italo-Australians started entering the labour market in the 1970s and 1980s. Second-generation Italo-
Australians are still overwhelmingly concentrated in the younger age groups: in 1986, 37 per cent were aged under 15, 35 per cent from 15 to 24, 19 per cent from 25 to 34, and only 9 per cent over 35 (DILGEA, 1988b: 84).

Immigrants can become citizens after two years of residence in Australia. The 1986 census showed that 59 per cent of overseas-born persons had become Australian citizens. There are substantial variations for different countries of origin. Only 47 per cent of persons from the UK and Ireland and 24 per cent of persons from New Zealand had taken up citizenship. This compared with 76 per cent of Italian-born persons, 91 per cent of the Greek-born, 95 per cent of those born in the USSR and 63 per cent of persons born in Asia. Anyone born in Australia to parents who are either citizens or permanent residents, is automatically a citizen. Australian-born children of Italians are therefore Australians, even though they may still speak Italian and identify with their Italian heritage. In 1986, there were 300,997 persons who had been born in Australia with at least one Italian-born parent (DILGEA, 1988a: 82). Thus the Italo-Australian first and second generation together made up 563,000 people, or 3.6 per cent, of the total population of Australia.

Italians have tended to seek spouses within their own ethnic groups. However intermarriage is on the increase: in 1961 only 21 per cent of Italian-born men who got married in Australia had Australian-born brides; by 1976 the figure had risen to 51 per cent and by 1986 to 64 per cent. As for Italian-born brides, in 1961 only 3 per cent married Australian-born men; a figure which rose to 23 per cent in 1976 and 49 per cent in 1986 (ABS, 1989: 59). These figures show that women are less likely to marry outside the Italian community than men, but that the propensity is increasing for both sexes. However, a proportion of the Australian-born brides and bridegrooms are undoubtedly second (or third) generation Italo-Australians, so that precise data on intermarriage with other ethnic groups cannot be given.

The family and home ownership are high priorities for Italian immigrants. Over 90 per cent of their households in 1986 were family units without non-family members living in them. The figure was similar to that for other southern

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1 Usage of the term second generation varies. Here we use the term in a strict statistical sense, to refer to children born in Australia with overseas-born parents. Some people consider that children who were born overseas, but migrated at an early age (for example, less than ten) also belong to the second generation, at least in psychological terms.
Europeans (Greeks, Maltese, Yugoslavs), but much higher than for eastern or western Europeans (70-80 per cent), Asians (77 per cent) or the Australian-born (74 per cent). Altogether there were 161,600 households with Italian-born heads, with an average size of 3.6 persons (ABS, 1989: 64).

No less than 70 per cent of Italian households owned their own dwellings outright in 1986, while a further 19 per cent were still paying off housing loans. This is the highest rate of home ownership of any ethnic group in Australia. Italian migrants have always been eager to own houses, and have been willing to make great sacrifices to do so. It is generally believed that this is connected with their peasant origins: lack of land ownership put Southerners at the mercy of the baroni, so that owning land and house was always a priority. Owning a house also provides security for old age.

The 1986 census indicated that over 2 million people spoke languages other than English at home, the most common being Italian (416,000 people), Greek (267,000) and Chinese (131,000). One way of getting an idea of the size of the Italian community is to compare the number of Italian-born persons with the total number who speak Italian at home. The Italian-language speakers includes the majority of the first generation, plus those members of the second and third generations who regularly use the Italian language, and is a very rough indicator of maintenance of Italian culture. Table 5 shows the distribution of Italian speakers by state. Most Italo-Australians are bilingual, speaking Italian at home, and English at work or school. Often the language spoken at home is a distinct dialect such as Calabrese, Sicilian or Friulian (Rando and Leoni, 1992).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Italian-Born</th>
<th>Italian-Speakers</th>
<th>Italian-Speakers by State (Per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>109,204</td>
<td>178,097</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>73,174</td>
<td>113,203</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>17,418</td>
<td>26,115</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>29,607</td>
<td>48,179</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>27,751</td>
<td>43,590</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>2,721</td>
<td>3,951</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL AUSTRALIA</strong></td>
<td><strong>262,435</strong></td>
<td><strong>415,765</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jupp, 1988: 969-71
Some Italian farming communities still exist, but the major focus of Italian communities are the big cities: in 1986 three-quarters of Italian-born people lived in Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide and Perth, and only 16 per cent lived outside the 12 major urban centres (Ware, 1988: 617-18). There are no exclusively or even predominantly Italian areas, but local concentrations are large enough to give certain neighbourhoods a typically Italian character. Victoria has the greatest absolute number of Italians, with over 100,000 in Melbourne alone. All the main Italian areas are parts of Melbourne, either in the centre, or the north. The earliest concentration was in the central area of Carlton, which is today an up-market neighbourhood, near Melbourne University, with high-class Italian restaurants, cafés and shops. Migrants moved out of this original ‘little Italy’, buying houses in the surrounding suburbs. Others live in Broadmeadows around the huge Ford motor works, where many Italians work.

The main Italian areas of Sydney are in the industrial inner-west and outer-west. One of the earliest areas of settlement, Leichhardt, has maintained its Italian flavour, although many Italians have moved out to surrounding areas, or to the sprawling western suburbs. Fairfield has the largest Italian-born population in absolute numbers. Outside Sydney, there are two major concentrations: the steel city of Wollongong, which has also had an Italian fishing community for many years, and the agricultural area of Griffith, which actually has the largest Italian percentage of population of any area in NSW. Adelaide has Italian neighbourhoods in several central districts, with Italian-born people making up over one fifth of the population in some cases. There are relatively few Italians in non-metropolitan areas of South Australia. Western Australia has concentrations of Italians in its capital city, Perth, particularly in the centre and north of the city. However there is also a large and long-established community in the harbour and fishing town of Fremantle. In Queensland, Italians are concentrated in Brisbane, though many remain in the sugar-cane areas of the north.

Work and Social Mobility

Many pre-1945 Italian settlers had become independent farmers or small business-owners, but most of the post-1945 migrants started work on building sites or in factories. For example, 68 per cent of Italian workers in Melbourne in 1971 were manual production workers (Lever-Tracy and Quinlan, 1988: 55-6). Italian and other southern European migrants were often scathingly referred to as ‘factory
fodder'. Most were of peasant background, with little education or industrial experience. The 1986 census showed that 6 per cent of Italian-born people in Australia in 1986 had not been to school at all, while 30 per cent had left school at the age of 12 or younger. Only 1.4 per cent had tertiary qualifications (BIR, 1990b: 12-15). Even those with skills were often steered into unskilled work. The question is whether Italian settlers have been able to achieve upward social mobility in the long run.

Figures 2 and 3 examine the employment status of Italian men and women from 1947 to 1986. The charts show that high proportions of both Italian men and women were employers or self-employed in 1947. By 1966, however, about 80 per cent of both men and women had become employees. Only 8 per cent of Italian men were employers and 11 per cent were self employed. For women the rates in 1966 were 4 per cent employers and 6 per cent self employed. However, the trend was reversed in the 1970s, as Italian-born people left the factories and set up businesses. By 1986, only 67 per cent of Italian men were employees, while 10 per cent were employers and 17 per cent were self employed. For women, the figures were 72 per cent employees, 7 per cent employers and 13 per cent self employed.

**FIGURE 2**

*Italian-born Men by Labour Force Status, Per Cent*

![Graph](image-url)

Note: Family helpers and the unemployed are left out
Source: Censuses of the various years
FIGURE 3
Italian-Born Women by Labour Force Status, Per Cent

Note: Family helpers and the unemployed are left out
Source: Censuses of the various years

In 1966, the overwhelming majority of Italian born men (68 per cent) were labourers and related workers, while only 4 per cent were managers and administrators and 1 per cent were professionals. The proportion of women who were labourers and related workers was 54 per cent, while 1 per cent were managers and administrators and a further 1 per cent were professionals. Figures 4 and 5 show the occupational patterns for Italian-born men and women in 1986, in comparison with the total workforce of Australia.

Figure 4 shows that Italian-born men still have an occupational distribution which differs markedly from the overall Australian pattern: they are over represented in the manual categories of trades, plant operators and labourers, and under represented in the white collar categories of managers, professionals, para-professionals, clerks and sales and services. The manager category needs some interpretation, since it is generally seen as a high status area. In fact it includes small shopkeepers and farmers, so that the fairly high representation of Italians does not necessarily indicate upward mobility. For women, Figure 5 shows a somewhat similar picture. However the over representation in the manual categories of plant operators and labourers is even more marked, and the under representation as clerks is also dramatic.
It is also useful to look at the distribution by industry. In 1966, 39 per cent of Italian men were employed in manufacturing and 23 per cent in construction. By 1986, the proportion in manufacturing had fallen to 24 per cent and that in construction to 18 per cent. The decline in these sectors was matched by a shift into the service sectors. As for women, the peak figure for manufacturing was 62 per cent in 1954, declining to 26 per cent in 1986 (few women are employed in construction). Again, there was a
marked shift into the services. A comparison with the rest of the population in 1986 shows a slight over representation of the Italian born in agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and a marked over representation in manufacturing and construction. The Italian born were under represented in finance, property and business, public administration and defence and community services (BIR, 1990a).

The conclusion which emerges is that Italian immigrants have been able to move out of manual jobs in manufacturing and construction to some extent in the last 25 years. This shift is due partly to the decline in such jobs as a result of restructuring, partly to the ageing of the migrant generation, many of whom have left the workforce, and partly to upward mobility. However, compared with the Anglo-Australian workforce, both Italian men and women still remain substantially over represented in such jobs, and under represented in higher status white collar jobs. But this finding must be modified by two factors. The first is the situation of Italians in business. The other is the position of the second generation.

Many Italians used small business as a route out of factory work, when other opportunities were blocked by poor English or lack of recognized qualifications. By 1981, 24 per cent of Italian-born men and 17 per cent of women were self-employed or employers, compared with 16 per cent of Australian-born men and 12 per cent of women. Italians were highly represented in food and beverage manufacturing, clothing and footwear manufacturing, construction, retail trade and personal services. Distinct niches emerged: one third of all fruit and vegetable stores in Australia were run by Italians in 1981, and they played a major part in clothing stores, shoe repairers, bread and cake shops, fish shops, take-away food stores, and some building trades such as concreting. Although small business was the rule, some Italians were able to establish large-scale enterprises, especially in the food manufacturing and construction sectors. Business success was generally based on very long hours of work, frugality and family cooperation. Italian-owned businesses played a major part in community development, providing visible focal points for ethnic neighbourhoods, and symbolizing the Italian presence for Anglo-Australians (Collins, 1992).

As for the second generation, census figures show that children of Italian-born people had much higher levels of educational attainment than their parents. There are clear signs of upward mobility. Many children of manual workers have moved into white-collar employment, with some reaching managerial, executive or
professional status. However, it appears that average occupational status levels for the second generation are still below those of Anglo-Australians (Vasta, 1992).

The Italo-Australian Community

Forty years after the inception of the main wave of Italian migration and twenty years after its completion, is it possible to speak of an Italo-Australian community? Certainly there are many sources of division. Patterns of settlement often reflected regional differences in Italy. There are also divisions of class between the predominantly working-class groups in the main areas of settlement, the successful entrepreneurs who have moved up and out, and the middle-class immigrants who always had a distinct role. Gender divisions are significant too: migration to Australia has led to a questioning of patriarchal family structures by many women, who sometimes prefer Australian norms on relations between men and women. All these divisions re-crystallise around the generation gap. The second generation are better educated than their parents and often have better jobs. Many have social relations with people of non-Italian background, and intermarriage is common. The second generation often move out of the ‘Little Italies’.

Yet it would be wrong to dismiss the idea of an Italo-Australian community, for there are tangible signs of its presence. The most obvious lies in the creation of Italian space in Australian cities. There are neighbourhoods where the two key markets (labour and housing) have been gradually taken over by Italians. Home ownership and small business lead to a concentration of the ethnic group, and also form the basis for economic security and social networks. Shops, cafés and restaurants give streets a visible Italian character, as well as providing points of communication. Soon agencies relating to migrants’ needs (travel agents, tax advisers, etc) are set along with ‘ethnic professionals’ such as doctors, lawyers and accountants.

The communitas gives rise to other processes, designated by Pascoe (1992: 94-5) as ‘naming, ritualization and institutionalization’. The first refers to Italianization of the names of streets or areas, sometimes through corruption of English words—a process linked to the evolution of a specific Italo-Australian linguistic code (Rando and Leoni, 1992). Ritualization refers to religious and regional festivals, which are transplanted to the new environment and take on new characteristics and
significance. Institutionalization refers to the establishment of mutual aid societies, cultural associations, social clubs and the like.

The institutional structures of the Italo-Australian community are many-faceted. The Catholic Church has played a central role. It was an Irish church before large-scale Italian settlement, and was not always welcoming towards the newcomers. Italians often found the rituals unfamiliar, and missed the social role of the church to which they were accustomed. Italian priests, particularly of the Capuchin and Scalabrinian orders, came with the migrants. They introduced services in Italian and gained (often with difficulty) the consent of the Australian bishops to celebration of saints days which were significant for the migrants (such as the Sicilian Festa dei tre santi). Italian priests and services in the Italian language became common.

Social clubs have played an extremely important role in maintaining social links within the Italian community. Clubs like the Marconi in Western Sydney and the Fraternity in Wollongong have grown from small beginnings to enormous buildings catering for family entertainment, meals, sports, gambling, weddings, political meetings, etc. Their central role in the Italo-Australian community is documented by the fact that politicians—including the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition—visit them to canvass for votes. The clubs link the generations, providing a meeting place for the aged as well as a safe venue for teenage dances (Alcorso et al., 1992: 106-13). Today these clubs also have many non-Italian members.

Italo-Australian associations are too numerous to deal with in detail here. In the early stages of settlement, mutual aid associations based on villages or regions of origin were common. They often developed into more broadly-based social, cultural, welfare and educational organisations. Many were concerned with maintenance of language and culture, setting up weekend schools for migrants' children. There are two competing welfare organisations at the national level: COASIT, which is close to the Church and fairly conservative, and FILEF which has a left-wing orientation. The rivalry between the two has often been bitter, and has centred not only around the question of who can best represent the Italian community, but also around obtaining funding from the Australian Government. At present both associations are developing programs relating to the needs of the second generation, such as youth work and drug counselling (Alcorso et al., 1992: 113-6).
Another facet of the Italian community is its mass media. *La Fiamma* appears twice a week with a print-run of 28,000. It reports on Italian and Australian affairs in Italian, but also has a two-page English language section, in recognition of the poor Italian of some of the second generation. *Il Globo* appears weekly with a print-run of 35,000. It is similar in character to *la Fiamma* but lacks an English section. Both papers are thought to be close to the *Democraziana Cristiana*. There are a number of monthlies, including the FILEF's *Nuovo Paese*. Italian is also widely used in radio broadcasting, both on the government multicultural stations 2EA and 3EA and on a number of private transmitters. Italian films and a weekly news-bulletin are transmitted on the government multicultural television station, SBS (Alcorso *et al.*, 1992: 116-21).

Taking all these practices and institutions together, it seems undeniable that there is an Italo-Australian community, and that it is linked to specific forms of Italo-Australian culture and identity. None of these can be seen as monolithic, but at times they can transcend the divisions of regional origin, class, gender and generation mentioned above. Perhaps it is more realistic to speak of a set of interlocking networks which coalesce or divide in different ways according to the issue. The Italo-Australian community originated partly out of the need for solidarity in the face of discrimination and racism in the early period of settlement. Today there may be unity on some issues and deep conflicts on others (Vasta, 1992).

The growth of the *communità* has influenced the wider society too. The Italian neighbourhoods were at first seen by Anglo-Australians as threatening 'ethnic ghettos'. Today the *ambiente* has come to be seen as exciting and attractive. The original Italian centres of Carlton in Melbourne and Leichhardt in Sydney have become highly fashionable, with expensive restaurants and gourmet shops. Similarly, the *festa* has become gentrified. For instance the main Melbourne arts events was until recently known as the Spoleto Festival. Italian culture and lifestyle is seen as an enrichment of Australian society.

**Italian Settlement and Australian Multiculturalism**

Together with over one hundred other immigrant groups of varied ethnic and cultural background, Italo-Australians have helped to change Australia's culture and national identity. This was never envisaged by the architects of the postwar...
immigration program. Policies were designed to bring about social and cultural assimilation, so that immigrants would become indistinguishable from Anglo-Australians. Politicians and social scientists believed that any special measures for migrants would hinder assimilation. It was best to totally immerse the newcomers in Australian society. There was public discrimination against people speaking other languages, who were told to 'shut up or speak English'. Migrants were to work, live and go to school among Australians.

By the 1960s, the basic contradiction of assimilationism was becoming obvious: 'New Australians' were meant to speak English, behave like Australians, and to be absorbed into the population. At the same time they were needed as manual workers in factories and construction, to replace Anglo-Australians who were moving into white-collar jobs. Institutional barriers often kept immigrants in low-paid jobs, while welfare services were sometimes inaccessible to immigrants, and did not meet their special needs. Not only closeness to the factory, but also experience of racism in Anglo-Australian neighbourhoods caused immigrants to cluster together. In the inner-city areas, immigrants could create their own communities. The reconstitution of the ethnic group in the new country provided support networks and a sense of belonging.

Assimilationism was based on the idea that only Anglo-Australian culture was legitimate, and that other cultures would have to disappear. It fitted in with other racist elements in Australian identity, in particular the oppression of Aboriginal people, and the exclusions of Asians through the White Australia Policy. But by the 1960s, world-wide decolonisation and anti-racist movements were leading to a questioning of Australian racism. In 1967 a referendum decided overwhelmingly that Aborigines should be granted full citizenship. Australia's international relations were changing too: by 1966, Japan was Australia's biggest export customer, and trade with south-east Asia was growing rapidly. The White Australia Policy was a serious embarrassment, and was abandoned in the mid 1960s.

The reforms introduced by the 1972-75 Australian Labor Party (ALP) Government included non-discriminatory immigration rules and the first enunciation of the doctrine of multiculturalism. However, the government was not primarily concerned with cultural pluralism but rather with the improvement of welfare and educational systems, and their adaptation to a multi-ethnic society. Nonetheless, the involvement of spokespersons and organisations of migrant groups did encourage the formal constitution of ethnic community organisations, and the growth of an
The 1975-82 Liberal-Country Party Government retained multiculturalism, but redefined it in cultural pluralist terms. Multiculturalism was now said to mean that Australian institutions should adapt to the diverse composition of the population, while ethnic groups should be allowed to retain their languages, traditions and cultural identity, as long as they were loyal to the 'overarching values' of Australian society. Migrant organisation were given a subsidized role in welfare service delivery. Special institutions and services included the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs, the Multicultural Education Program, the Adult Migrant Education Service and the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) (Castles et al., 1988: 66-67).

The ALP returned to power in 1983, and the 'Great Immigration Debate' started. There were calls for restrictions on immigration and warnings of a threat to identity and social cohesion through the 'Asianization of Australia'. Politicians of both right and left began to feel that there was widespread opposition to multiculturalism. In 1986, the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs was abolished, funding for English as a Second Language teaching was cut, and plans were made to merge the SBS with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). But the cuts led to an ethnic mobilisation which threatened the Labor hold on marginal seats in Sydney and Melbourne. Many of the cuts were reversed in 1987. The new direction was signalled by the establishment of an Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA), with powers to monitor government policy; the setting up of a Prime Minister's Advisory Council on Multicultural Affairs (ACMA) and the dropping of the proposed ABC-SBS merger.

Since 1988, the ALP Government has reshaped multiculturalism. It argues that an ethnically diverse population is better placed to respond to the challenges of increased international trade and communication, and above all to provide the opening to Asia which is seen as crucial to Australia's future. The most significant statement of the new approach is contained in the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (OMA, 1989), which identifies 'three dimensions of multicultural policy'—cultural identity, social justice and economic efficiency. Multiculturalism is not defined in terms of cultural pluralism, but as a system of rights of all citizens in a democratic state. These rights, however, are limited by an overriding commitment to the nation, a duty to accept the Constitution and the rule of law, and the acceptance of basic principles such as tolerance and equality, English as the national language and equality of the sexes. The document recognizes that some groups are disadvantaged by lack of language proficiency and education,
as well as by discrimination based on factors such as race, ethnicity, gender or culture. It is seen as the role of government to combat such discrimination through legislation and institutional structures.

Italo-Australians have played an active role in bringing about the shift from a monocultural identity and an assimilationist policy to a multicultural concept of Australian society. It was a two-sided process: through their cultural and political activities, Italians contributed to the establishment of multiculturalism, which in turn became the context for the emerging Italo-Australian community. As the largest non-British immigrant group, Italians appeared as the main cultural alternative from about 1950 to 1980, offering a distinctive and attractive lifestyle. They refused to be assimilated, constructing their own urban space and challenged existing ways of doing things. They showed the benefits of diversity for culture and society, and paved the way for the contribution of other ethnic groups (Pascoe, 1992: 97; Vasta et al., 1992).

The Italo-Australians also developed a political presence, although not with a high profile. They have not established their own political parties or trade unions, nor have they gained significant representation in parliaments. On the other hand, there are a large number of local councillors and some mayors of Italian origin. There are no machine politics or ethnic blocks, yet the 'ethnic vote' appears to be an issue which influences the behaviour of Australian political leaders. Not only do they approach Italian (and other ethnic) associations to mobilise electoral support, they also make concessions to ethnic needs and interests in their policies.

The explanation for this combination of a low political profile with fairly successful interest articulation seems to lie in the relative openness of the Australian political system. Postwar immigrants to Australia encountered a very different situation than the large pre-1914 influxes to North America. There, both employers and governments followed exclusionary or divisive strategies, with new immigrant groups being used as cheap labour and strike breakers. Where they resisted, the full force of the state was used against them. In Australia, governments and strong unions combined to guarantee orderly industrial relations, which would not threaten the conditions of local workers. Policies of assimilation may have been discriminatory because they set out to destroy migrants' cultures, but by providing civil rights and citizenship, they did lay the ground work for political integration. Multiculturalism has given a recognized role to ethnic organisations in policy making. This has often led to co-option of ethnic
leaderships, and a process of consultation rather than confrontation in the articulation of ethnic interests (Castles et al. 1992: 125-39). However, the fact that ethnic groups were allowed to voice their interests does not mean that they have obtained a share in real political power. The key positions in the corporate sector, the parties, the bureaucracy, the professions, the media and the unions are still held by men of British or Irish origin (Jupp, 1984: 182).

**Italo-Australians on the Pacific Rim**

For the first 150 years of the existence of white Australia, the essential factors which structured the world for its inhabitants were dependence on Britain, and a strong eurocentrism—that is a belief in the moral, technological and cultural superiority of white civilisations based on European ideas. The Australian world view thus had two central elements: the first was the ‘cultural cringe’, the taking-for-granted of being an adjunct of a more powerful and capable society. The second was the idea that other cultures—and particularly those of Asia—were inferior and threatening.

Britain’s defeat in the Pacific in 1941-42, and the subsequent crumbling of the Empire, shook this world-view, but did not shatter it: Britain could for a while be replaced by our ‘great and powerful friend’, the USA. The real crunch for Australia has come since the 1970s. Today, the end of the Cold War, the economic decline of the USA, the move towards unification of western Europe, the rise of Northeast Asia and the growing significance of transnational capital, are all leading to realignment of political, economic and military structures. The most significant factor is the economic ascendancy of Japan and other Asian capitalist countries. It is increasingly obvious that Australia needs to change its orientation away from Europe and the USA, towards the Asian-Pacific region (Garnaut, 1989).

The Australian economy is indeed shifting its focus. By the end of the 1980s, half of foreign trade was with Asian countries. Their hunger for raw materials and, more recently, for foodstuffs, fitted well with Australia’s desire for manufactured goods. On the other hand investment flows between Australia and Asian-Pacific countries are still low. In any case, economic openness to Asia is no guarantee of technological advancement or improved export performance. Japanese and other Northeast Asian countries have already achieved a high level of market penetration in Australia. This has been a major factor in the failure of Australia’s attempts to achieve a
strong manufacturing sector. At the same time, these countries maintain high tariffs against Australian agricultural products, and use their situation as near-monopoly buyers to control the prices of mining commodity exports. Yet Australian production has always been highly integrated with the world economy, and any attempt at national autarchy would be disastrous. Australia, therefore, appears to be damned if it does open up to Asia but also damned if it doesn’t.

Increasingly, it is being realised that the only resolution to this dilemma lies in cultural change. On the one hand this means the development of a ‘productive culture’ to bring Australian technology and management up to world standards. On the other hand it means a cultural opening to allow new forms of communication and interaction with the Asian-Pacific region. However, attitudes are still determined by generations of cultural distance, ignorance about Asian societies and racist contempt for Asian people. The Australian education system virtually ignored Asia until the 1980s. Asians were regarded as mysterious and inscrutable; their languages were incomprehensible, and their cultures impenetrable. Steps are now being taken to remedy this through the teaching of Asian languages and the study of Asian social, economic and political institutions.

The basic contradiction of the Australian condition is that a society established as an outpost of Britain has been cut off from its antecedents by global change, and is now compelled to relate to the Asian-Pacific region which surrounds it. A national identity constituted through insularity and racism has to come to terms with the all-too-obvious decline of white, European superiority. It might be argued that the whole two century episode of British settlement has been an historical aberration, an accidental conjuncture of colonialism, which will disappear without trace, as Asia develops in the next century. However, British colonialism in the Pacific can also be seen as one facet of the process of historical change which started with the Italian Renaissance. The expansion of long-distance trade and colonialism brought wealth, new commodities, and new ideas to Europe. These provided the basis for the emergence of capitalism, industrialisation and modernity, which spread as a new global culture throughout Europe, and then to the Americas and Asia. The Asian form of industrialisation has a unique dynamic, but it would be unthinkable without the preceding emergence of a world capitalist market. British culture in Australia may have been narrow and exclusionary, but it was only one sub-set of the broad and pervasive culture of modernity.
It is in this historical perspective that we can see the significance of Italian influence. Mass immigration of Italians and other Europeans undermined Anglo-Australian narrowness, showing not only that there were other ways of doing things, but also that these ways were often more successful, dynamic and rewarding. Integration and community-building did not only change the immigrants and their cultures; they also influenced Australian institutions, life-styles and world views. European settlement made it necessary to shift from assimilationism, based on Anglo-Australian cultural dominance, to multiculturalism, which is premised on acceptance of cultural diversity.

Today, Australian multiculturalism can provide a workable answer to a question which affects many countries: how can a diverse population be incorporated within a single nation state? This requires a new definition of national identity, which is not based on national or ethnic origins. It is true that multiculturalism is not universally accepted in Australia, and that racism re-surfaces regularly in public debates on immigration and identity, and in discrimination and hostility against minorities. But today racism evokes a response from the organised ethnic communities, from a broad section of the public which welcomes cultural diversity, and from political leaders who see multiculturalism as vital for Australia's political and economic interests.

Thus, we may conclude that the Italians who migrated to the Pacific rim not only helped to open Australia to a greater diversity of European cultures. They also paved the way for Anglo-Australian awareness of new geo-political realities, and in the long run for the opening to Asia. Perhaps this seeming paradox will, in the future, be resolved by new forms of international interchange and co-operation, that may make it possible to move towards a truly global culture. Mass migration and the emergence of multicultural societies can help prepare the ground for this development, and history may well judge that the Italians who migrated to Australia played a small but significant part.
References


CHAPTER 5

GLOBAL WORKFORCE, NEW RACISM AND THE DECLINING NATION STATE

Introduction

In the closing decade of the 20th century, the world is marked by increasing ecological, economic and cultural interdependence. Yet the nation state remains the dominant political form. It maintains a near monopoly over the means of violence, it is the central focus of most political struggles, and its ideological force is demonstrated by the resurgence of nationalism in many areas. The breakup of the Soviet Empire has opened the door to a wave of nationalisms based on ethnicity. Reunification of Germany and the influx of ethnic Germans appears to confirm the idea of a resurgence of nationalism based on the myth of common blood.

Despite these trends, I will argue in this paper that some of the main factors which led to the ascent of the nation state in the last two centuries are now diminishing in significance. The nation station is beginning to lose its position as the main focus of power and political identity. It is not likely to disappear altogether, but rather to lose many of its functions, and to become one focus among others of identity and political power. The countervailing tendency in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is the result of uneven development due to a political system which cut the region off from the mainstream of economic and political development for half a century. It should not blind us to the main tendency in the capitalist world.

The nation state is a form of political organisation which arose from the economic and cultural requirements of the period of industrialisation which started in the 18th century. The nation state provided internal cultural, political and economic integration, thus creating the conditions for defending and expanding external boundaries. It played a crucial role in the development of the world market and the dissemination of the global culture of technology and modernisation. Today, the interlocking hierarchies of inequality—mainly along the dimensions of gender,
class and ethnicity—are still constituted in specific forms within nation states (although as general phenomena, of course, they transcend the nation state).

But the very historical success of the nation state has eroded the conditions for its continued dominance, and made it a barrier to continued development. The political economy of the modern world market relies on increasing international circulation not only of capital, resources and commodities, but also of labour (i.e. people). This is linked both to cultural homogenisation (in the sense of the pervasiveness of the norms of rationality and efficiency) and cultural diversification (in the sense of the intermingling of peoples from different backgrounds). In other words, the growing economic integration of the world, and the increasing intermingling of national cultures encouraged by migration, travel and mass communication, make it hard to see why political legitimacy should be exclusively concentrated at the level of the nation state. Indeed the growing importance of supranational bodies (like the European Community or the World Bank) and the increasing strength of regionalism are seriously questioning its dominant role.

This paper is concerned with one aspect of these developments: the effects of mass labour migration and the emergence of new ethnic minorities on national identity and political legitimacy in advanced industrial countries. The nation state typically constitutes its boundaries through processes of inclusion and exclusion based on the construction of 'race' or ethnicity. According to Ernest Gellner ‘...nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state...should not separate the power-holders from the rest’ (Gellner, 1983: 1). Nationalism is based on the idea that every ethnic group should have its own state, with flag, army, Olympic team and postage stamps. Similarly, Benedict Anderson defines the nation as ‘...an imagined political community’ (Anderson, 1983: 15). The membership and territory of the sovereign nation is limited, and is defined through the belief in ‘a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 1983: 16). But this community is ‘imagined’ because members of a nation can never personally know most of the other members. The question is therefore: what causes individuals to feel solidarity with some people and not others, or, in other words, how is ethnicity constituted and why is it regarded as more meaningful than other forms of solidarity?

The growing ethnic minorities within virtually all developed countries are often excluded from the ‘imagined community’ of the nation, through both informal and
institutional racism. Currently, these processes of exclusion are based on the 'new racism': an ideology of the incompatibility of different cultures and the inevitability of conflict between distinct ethnic groups. But if groups which belong to the economic and social life of a country are excluded from the political sphere, this undermines the legitimacy of the state, and questions its relationship with civil society. Caught in the contradiction between the desire to maintain nationalism as an instrument of political integration, and the problem of managing community relations in increasingly diverse societies, states have developed a variety of strategies, ranging from permanent exclusion and marginalization of minorities (the West German model), to attempts to integrate minorities through citizenship and multiculturalism (the Australian model). Before discussing these in more detail, it is necessary to describe the development of a global workforce, the formation of new ethnic minorities, and the way new racism sets out to stabilise national identity.

**Labour Migration and the Development of a Global Workforce**

Labour migration has always played a central role in capitalist development. In the early colonial period, forced labour and slavery in Africa, Asia and the Americas were a major source of capital accumulation for Western Europe, making possible industrial revolutions, which in turn led to recruitment of migrant workers: the Irish in Britain, Poles and Italians in Germany and France. In the case of the USA, nearly 30 million immigrants, mainly from Europe, entered between 1861 and 1920, providing the labour for industrialisation. This was followed by the Great Migration of blacks to the industrial area from the former slave states of the Deep South. Then the Great Depression and a series of restrictive laws kept migration from overseas low until 1965. Within Europe, there was little migration between 1918 and 1939, but the Second World War soon led to new mass population movements, while the Nazi War machine ran on forced migrant labour.

Since 1945, there have been two main phases (although the exact forms and periods have varied for different countries and regions): the period 1945 to about 1973 was characterised by centralisation of productive capacities and recruitment of migrant labour in Western Europe and North America. The subsequent period was characterised by a trend towards the siting of mass production industry in new areas, with concentration of high-technology industry, financial control, design and
development capacities mainly in the highly-developed countries. Mass labour migration has been central to the restructuring of the labour process and reconstitution of the working class in developed countries in both phases. In the early phase, the emphasis was on recruitment of low-skilled workers for manufacturing and construction; in the later phase the migrant labour force has been polarised between highly-skilled workers from less-developed countries (the 'brain drain') and unskilled workers both for manufacturing and the services. At the same time, rural-urban migration and overseas emigration has been part of the process of incorporation into the world market and industrialisation for newly industrialising countries.

Labour migration is a central element of the new forms of global organisation of finance, production, distribution and control, which have been emerging in the last two decades. Even Japan, which has hitherto relied on internal labour sources, is now experiencing an influx of undocumented workers from the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other poorer Asian countries. Migrant women are employed as bar-girls and dancers, while men work illegally in construction. In early 1990 the Japanese government rejected a legal 'guestworker' program (Sekine, 1990) and illegal migration looks certain to grow.

In view of growing populations in poor countries and declining birth-rates and increasingly aged populations in rich countries, the pressure for labour migration continues. Political conflicts are giving rise to increased refugee streams, while international and even intercontinental transport is becoming more accessible. At the same time, policies designed to contain migratory flows are proving difficult to implement, particularly for democratic countries with existing immigrant populations (SOPEMI 1990: 2). Thus there can be little doubt that the mass population flows of the last half century will be dwarfed by those to come in the next fifty years. It is necessary to look at different regions in more detail.

**Western Europe**

The major period of labour migration to most Western European countries was 1945 to 1973, followed by a phase of family reunion in the 1970s. Most migrants came either through contract labour systems (the so-called 'guestworkers'), or were citizens of former colonies (Castles et al., 1984; Castles, 1986) Immigration was low for most countries in the early 1980s, but began increasing again by the end of the decade. The largest influx was into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with about 650,000 new entrants in 1988 and nearly a million in 1989, of whom about
350,000 were from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (SOPEMI, 1990). Labour migration from outside the European Community is increasing again at present. Some former emigration countries are now experiencing mass immigration: Italy, Greece and Spain all have influxes of undocumented workers from African and Asian countries. Since the 1970s there have been streams of refugees from Latin America, Africa and Asian countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and these have accelerated in the last few years.

At present there are 15-20 million people of migrant origin in Western Europe, making up between 5 and 15 per cent of the populations of various countries. Britain, France and the German Federal Republic all have over 4 million people of migrant origin, of whom 40-50 per cent are of non-European background (Castles, 1986, SOPEMI, 1990).

The USA
The USA too has become more cosmopolitan through recent migrations. Just as European colonialism eventually led to the immigration of colonised peoples to the metropoles, now the peoples of the USA’s neo-colonial world empire are coming to the centre. The Immigration Act of 1965 created a system of worldwide immigration, in which the most important criterion for admission was kinship with US citizens or residents (Briggs, 1984). In the Reagan era the economic focus moved from the heavy industrial and engineering industries of the North and mid-West, to the new light industries of the Southern Sunbelt, and the services sectors of the great cities, and millions of new jobs were created. The result was a dramatic upsurge in immigration, reaching 600,000 legal entrants per year, plus about 100,000 refugees by the mid-1980s. In addition agribusiness encouraged the entry of up to 300,000 illegal workers per year from Mexico and other Latin-American countries. Something like one million new migrants now enter the USA annually.

Forty per cent of population growth in the 1970s came through immigration. By 1980 there were 13.9 million overseas-born people in the USA—6.2 per cent of the total population. In recent years, Latin Americans and Asians have come to dominate migrant intakes, leading to a gradual shift in the ethnic composition of the population. It is predicted that Hispanics and Asians will soon outnumber Blacks in many areas of the USA. Asians are concentrated in certain areas, with Chinatowns and Koreatowns in several major cities.
Oil-Producing Countries

The dramatic increase in oil revenues after 1973 led oil-producing countries to embark on ambitious programs of industrialisation. The result was massive recruitment of migrant workers. Kuwait, for instance had 384,000 foreign workers by 1980. In the latter year they made up no less than 78 per cent of the labour force. In 1980 there were 2.7 million migrant workers in the Gulf oil states (Birks et al., 1986). The workers came mainly from Arab countries, particularly from Palestine and Jordan, but also from Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Philippines. Non-Arab oil countries also looked to migrant labour: Venezuela imported large numbers of foreign workers in the late 1970s, from both Latin American countries, and Southern Europe (Cohen, 1987: 247). Workers streamed into Nigeria from other African countries. In both these cases there was little state control or planning. Spontaneous flows of undocumented workers fitted well with labour demand.

When the oil boom began to deflate in the early 1980s, some countries adopted draconian measures: there were mass expulsions from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985, and from Libya in 1985. But in the case of Kuwait, although the inflow declined, an increasing proportion of immigrant workers were remaining after the completion of their initial contracts (Birks et al. 1986). Despite the strict regulations governing the situation of migrants in Gulf states, economic and social factors were leading to longer periods of residence. These included continued demand for personnel to run the new industries, employers' desire to maintain existing labour forces, and the growing employment of domestic servants. However, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 has led to a massive exodus of migrant workers, and future patterns are hard to predict.

The Newly-Industrialising Countries (NICs)

One reason for the decline in labour migration to Western Europe was the development of a 'new international division of labour', in which labour-intensive production stages were relocated to Third World countries. The main attraction for the foreign companies was the very low wages, long hours and lack of social costs in these areas. The result was a new wave of migratory movements, both internal and international, particularly of women, whom employers regard as most suitable for the light assembly work in the new electronics or clothing factories. Employers take advantage of patriarchal structures, which make women workers cheaper and easier to control.
The growth of manufacturing in NICs generally does not lead to reduced overseas emigration. Rural-urban migration in countries of Latin America and South-East Asia is bound up with the capitalist revolution in agriculture. The transformation of rainforests into woodchips and of arable land into hamburger ranches liberates more peasants than can be absorbed by the new world market factories. So for many the exploding cities of Brazil, Mexico, Korea or India are mere staging posts on the way to Europe, North America, Australia or the Gulf states.

**The Changing Role of Migrant Labour in Developed Countries**

In the 1970s and 1980s there were major changes in the structure of the world capitalist economy, which led to substantial restructuring of finance, industry and distribution in the advanced industrial countries. 'Global cities' such as New York, Los Angeles, Tokyo, London, Paris, Singapore and Sydney, become centres of planning, management and innovation for the transnational corporations (Sassen-Koob, 1985). One result is a new polarisation emerging in the labour markets of these countries. While demand for highly-trained specialists increases, there are also growing numbers of low-skilled jobs in unregulated and non-unionised branches, such as catering, the retail trades and light manufacturing. As traditional manufacturing declines, the relatively favourable wages and employment conditions achieved by generations of blue-collar trade unionists are being eroded. Labour market entrants without the required educational credentials, particularly migrants, refugees, members of ethnic minorities and women, find they have to take low-skilled non-unionised jobs where they have little bargaining power or security of employment. The 'global cities' pull in highly-qualified personnel from all over the world, but also attract low-skilled migrants to service the needs of the corporate elite. These developments have had profound effects on the situation of migrant workers.

Firstly, the mass immigration of low-skilled workers has declined considerably. Many countries have tried to stop entries, through closing down recruitment schemes, or refusing entry and work permits to people without skills. However, illegal migrants and refugees continue to provide a source of unskilled labour, and this is often tacitly condoned by governments, particularly in the USA and—most recently—in Japan. Immigration policies have favoured entry of highly-skilled,
professional and managerial workers, often leading to a 'brain drain' from the Third World.

Secondly, most of the pre-1974 migrant workers have been unable to achieve occupational mobility, and remain in unskilled jobs in manufacturing, construction and the services. Often their children share this position, as education systems have failed to provide them with adequate schooling or vocational training. This group has borne much of the brunt of industrial restructuring: lacking skills, language proficiency and educational credentials they have been the first to lose their jobs, and have high rates of unemployment.

Thirdly, the traditional sites of migrant incorporation into labour markets have been eroded. Typically, newcomers used to get unskilled factory or construction jobs while they found their feet in the new country, and were able to use these as a base for finding better work and establishing social networks. Now most newcomers (except those with highly recognised skills) often undergo long periods of unemployment, or have to take insecure and often illegal jobs in the services sector. This makes initial settlement very difficult, and often leads to long-term poverty and isolation.

Fourthly, a new informal sector is developing, in which members of ethnic minorities are both marginal entrepreneurs and workers. For example, the revival of the garment industry in the highly developed countries, is due to the exploitation of migrant women, whose wages have been forced almost as low as those of their counterparts in Asia and Latin America (Waldinger 1986, Phizacklea 1987). The services of the great financial centres like New York, Los Angeles, Paris and Frankfurt are run by Black, Hispanic, Asian, North African, Turkish and Southern European entrepreneurs. Typical migrant workplaces are ethnic restaurants, fast-food chains, retailing, garment outwork and sub-contracting in the construction area (Castles et al., 1990). Migrant-run small businesses play a major role in sectors too small, unprofitable or insecure to interest the large corporations. Some groups have found 'ethnic niches' in specific occupations: the Chinese now dominate the New York 'rag trade' (replacing the Jewish entrepreneurs and workers of an earlier migrant generation), while Koreans play a big part in fruit and vegetable distribution (Waldinger, 1986).
The previous section discussed the increasing significance of labour migration for most developed countries since 1945, and the shifts in migratory patterns and forms of incorporation of migrant labour in recent years. Migrations of various types look set to continue, so that an increasingly international labour force will be a feature of Western Europe, North America, Australia and Japan for the foreseeable future. This obviously means increasing ethnic diversity in the populations of these countries. It is important to understand that, although migrant labour forces are heterogeneous with regard to areas of origin and skill levels, certain sections of the immigrant population have taken on an ethnic minority position in each receiving country.

Ethnic minority status is not a matter of numbers, but rather of processes of social exclusion, which constitute distinct groups with inferior legal rights and/or socio-economic status. Not all immigrants belong to ethnic minorities. Although no generalisation is true of all cases, it may be said that, on the whole, immigrants with high occupational status, from relatively developed countries, and with a similar cultural and ethnic background are not likely to be treated as ethnic minorities. On the other hand, immigrants with low skill levels, from less developed countries, and with distinct cultural and ethnic background are likely to become ethnic minorities. Nor do all ethnic minorities consist of recent migrants: aboriginal peoples in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Scandinavia are all victims of processes of social exclusion and marginalization. The USA has long established black and hispanic minorities. Most European countries also have 'old' ethnic minorities, created by conflicts within the historical process of nation building. And finally, Gypsies still have ethnic minority status throughout Europe. However, we shall not deal with these old minorities here.

Rather, what we are concerned with here is the process of constitution of new ethnic minorities as a result of the post-1945 migrations, the causes of the process, the mechanisms by which this takes place, the effects on society as a whole, and the consequences for the relationship between civil society and nation state. My argument is that exclusionary policies and practices towards the new ethnic minorities arise from attempts to control migrant labour and to preserve the (assumed and desired) cultural and ideological integrity of the nation states concerned, but that these objectives cannot be achieved in the long run, once the internationalisation of the labour force and population has become irreversible.
Ethnic minorities are constituted through processes whereby dominant groups ascribe (real or imagined) characteristics to the group concerned, and use these to justify exclusion from equal participation in the legal, political, economic, social and cultural arrangements of society. These processes may be seen as racism, both institutional and informal. *Institutional racism* means the development by a dominant group of structures (such as laws, policies or administrative practices) which exclude or discriminate against the dominated group. *Informal racism* is when members of a phenotypically or culturally demarcated group express prejudice or carry out discriminatory practices against members of another such group in an unorganised manner.¹

Racist practices, whether institutional or informal, are based on racist beliefs (which may be held consciously or unconsciously). 'Scientific racism' which developed in the 19th century, put forward biological theories of inherent and immutable differences between human groups, classified according to real or imagined physical differences. It was argued that differences in intelligence, character, behaviour and ability could be related to these assumed phenotypes, and that these differences inevitably led to hierarchical relationships between the groups concerned (Miles, 1989). Such theories were used to justify European imperialism and the exploitation of colonised peoples, as well as 'Nordic superiority' and anti-semitism within Europe. This type of racism may be defined as the belief that certain groups are intrinsically superior to others, and are therefore entitled to dominate or exclude them. This belief is far from dead, playing a major part in the ideologies of extreme-right groups, as well as in popular culture. Nonetheless, it has been discredited, both by revulsion against the extreme violence of Nazi racism, and by the ending of direct colonial domination. Moreover, most natural and social scientists reject the validity of the concept of 'race' in classifying human groups (Montagu, 1974).

The main ideology used to justify exclusionary practices against minorities in developed countries today is a set of beliefs which have come to be called 'new racism' (Barker, 1981). This is a discourse on 'natural difference', generally based on the pseudoscience of sociobiology. The theory claims not to be racist, because it is not based on ideas of racial hierarchy, and generally does not use the term 'race', preferring 'tribe' (Morris, 1971) or 'ethnic group' (Van den Berghe, 1981). Balibar

¹ It should be noted that the self-definition of cultural and social identity by members of an ethnic minority is also relevant in this context. This will be discussed below, in the section on the reconstitutions of culture and identity by ethnic minorities.
speaks of 'racisme sans race' (Balibar, 1988: 36). New racism asserts that all human groups are in principle equal, yet their cultures are different and incompatible, and each must therefore remain on its own territory. In most variants, these cultural differences are seen as immutable, since they are based either on 'human nature' or on long historical processes. Where groups share the same territory through migration, conflict is likely, and can only be prevented by excluding the interlopers from equal participation in society, for instance by denying citizenship. The power of this ideology lies in the way it provides an explanation of immigration and formation of ethnic minorities that fits in with commonsense notions of natural difference and the threat of outsiders. It presents a pseudoscientific justification for exclusion and discrimination, while not appearing to be racist in the traditional sense.

**Immigration, Citizenship and Nation: a Comparison of Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany**

The construction of ethnic minorities must be considered in relation to four sets of factors:

- economic and social factors which lead to relative segregation, hierarchy, competition and conflict in areas of immigration;
- legal and institutional arrangements;
- attitudes and behaviour towards minorities;
- the reconstitution of culture and identity by minority groups within the process of migration and settlement.

Rather than attempting to present a general model of the interaction of these factors, I will describe them briefly in the case of two countries with widely differing policies towards immigrants and minorities: Australia and the FRG. They are also countries with very different traditions of nation-state formation and citizenship. The two countries may be seen as extreme cases; any similarities we find between them are likely to be of relevance for other countries too.

**Economic and Social Factors in the Formation of Ethnic Minorities**

Both Australia and the FRG had mass, organised labour migration from the Mediterranean region in the postwar period, Australia from 1947 until the early 1970s, the FRG from 1956 to 1973. Both countries recruited low-skilled workers to support the expansion of their manufacturing and construction sectors. Primary
migration was followed by family settlement. In both cases, new migratory flows, often of refugees, developed in the late 1970s, with migrants coming from a wide range of non-European countries.

Currently Australia has an immigrant population of around 3 million—about 20 per cent of the total population. Another 3 million are children of immigrants—the so-called second generation. However, over two fifths of immigrants are from Britain or New Zealand, and cannot be considered to have ethnic minority status. There are over 80 different ethnic groups, the largest being the Italians, Greeks, Germans, Lebanese and Vietnamese. The FRG has a foreign population of 4.5 million—7.5 per cent of the total population. One third of them are Turks; the other large groups are mainly from Southern Europe.

Lack of education and training, together with various types of institutional and informal discrimination restricted migrant workers' job opportunities. They became heavily concentrated in factory work and building, though there was a subsequent shift into the services sector. There has been relatively little upward social mobility of the original migrant workers, so that labour forces show marked segmentation by area of origin and gender. Certain types of work—such as car assembly—are done predominantly by migrant men, while others—such as garment manufacturing and food processing—are done predominantly by migrant women. The availability of migrant labour forces has made upward mobility easier for a section of the local labour forces.

In both countries, concentration in certain types of work was one factor leading to concentration in certain types of housing and residential areas: generally low quality housing in city centre or industrial areas. Other factors were institutional and informal racism in allocation of housing, and the desire of migrants to live near their compatriots. In both Australia and Germany there are identifiable areas of migrant concentration. Here the infrastructure for ethnic communities can develop. On the other hand, the indigenous population develops a perception of distinct—and perhaps threatening—ethnic enclaves.

Thus, apart from the relative size of the ethnic minorities, there are considerable similarities between the two countries in the economic and social situation.
Institutional and Legal Arrangements Towards Ethnic Minorities

However, when we look at the character of the nation-states and the way in which immigrants have been incorporated, we find major differences. Australia is a new nation, settled by British colonists in the 18th and 19th centuries. The relatively small Aboriginal population was killed or pushed aside and excluded from the emerging nation. Australia became a sovereign state in 1901, though still closely linked to Britain. Until the Second World War most settlers were from Britain, although there were some Irish and other Europeans. Identity was based on British culture and traditions, and on being part of the Empire, although distinctively Australian features began to emerge in the early part of the 20th century.

From 1901 until the 1970s, the White Australia Policy shaped entry to the nation in explicitly racist terms. In 1947 a mass immigration policy was introduced, to increase population for strategic reason and to provide labour for industrial growth. The aim was to bring in predominantly British migrants, but not enough were available. When it proved necessary to bring in Eastern and Southern Europeans, policies were designed to bring about complete political and cultural assimilation. State policy towards migrants was inclusionary: they were treated as 'New Australians', and encouraged to settle as families and become Australian citizens. Naturalisation was granted after five years (later reduced to three and then to two years), and migrants formally had full rights in every social sphere.

Nonetheless there were (and remain today) a number of institutional barriers which prevent migrants from fully participating in society, and lead to economic and social disadvantage. Indeed it can be argued that labour market policies which lead to ethnic segmentation directly contradict the ideology of assimilation. Moreover assimilation itself is a racist policy, in that it labels immigrants' cultures as inferior, and tries to obliterate them. As will be discussed later in this paper, assimilationism was abandoned in the mid 1970s in favour of the a policy of cultural pluralism called multiculturalism.

However, it is significant that Australian citizenship is inclusionary. It is based on *ius soli*, that is on territoriality rather than ethnicity, and is designed to make people from varied backgrounds part of the 'imagined community'. In other words membership of the civil society is a membership ticket to the nation. The state, through immigration policy, can decide who is to become part of the civil society,
and then, through the mechanism of naturalisation, make them into part of the people.

Germany, on the other hand, is an historical nation, with roots which go back many centuries, although attempts to define the nation in cultural terms did not become significant until the 18th century, and the demand for a German national state did not become significant until the 19th century (Hoffmann, 1990: 74). When the German Reich emerged as the first real German state in 1871, it was far from including on its territory everybody considered German. Indeed no German state has ever done this, although the Reich put this forward as an aim, just as the later Bundesrepublik claimed to represent all Germans, even those who had never stepped on its soil. German nationality was defined not through territoriality, but through ethnicity, that is through language and culture. Essentially, a person could only obtain German nationality by being born into the German community, so that ‘blood’ became a label for ethnicity, and the ethnic group became the Volk.

German citizenship, then, is based on *ius sanguinis*, and the nation-state is a *Volkstaat*. Anyone who can claim German ethnicity (or ‘blood’) is entitled to citizenship. When Hitler annexed Austria in 1938, he could claim that its citizens were going ‘home to the Reich’, though they had never belonged to it. Similarly Germans from the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union, etc. can receive a passport the moment they arrive in the FRG. But nobody who is not born German can become it. The Nazis took away the citizenship of Jews and Gypsies whose ancestors had lived in Germany for centuries, because they allegedly lacked German ‘blood’. Today, immigrants who have worked and lived for 20 years in the FRG are denied naturalisation, and their children, born in the FRG, can never be German, because they have the wrong ‘blood’. Some exceptions are made: in 1987 37,810 persons were granted German citizenship, at which rate it would take 125 years before the whole foreign population became German (SOPEMI, 1990: 187).

German citizenship is thus based on exclusion, and is fundamentally racist, defining the ‘imagined community’ on the basis of culture or ‘blood’. Millions of foreign workers have been recruited for the economy. They have settled and become part of civil society, but they are excluded from the nation, and from incorporation in the state. This is the political rationale behind the seemingly absurd slogan ‘the FRG is not a country of immigration’. Foreigners can become members of the civil society, but not of nation and state (see Hoffmann, 1990). It is obvious that this model cannot be stable, as will be discussed further below.
Attitudes and Behaviour Towards Minorities

When we turn to popular attitudes towards immigrants, we again find marked similarities between Australia and Germany. Both countries have traditions of racism which have their roots in 19th centuries ideas of ‘Nordic’ racial superiority. Popular culture, as reflected in the mass media and in ‘commonsense’ knowledge, is replete with racist stereotypes. Both countries have a history of racism towards members of certain European ethnic groups. For instance, anti-semitism was strong in both countries up to 1945, and has still not disappeared altogether. Past treatment of labour migrants (such as the Irish and Southern Europeans in Australia, Poles and Italians in Germany) was discriminatory and exploitative. Attitudes and behaviour towards non-Europeans goes back to genocide against Aborigines and exclusion of Chinese and other non-Europeans through the White Australia Policy in the case of Australia. German colonialism, marked by brutal treatment of black people in South West Africa and other territories, has left widespread prejudice against non-Europeans.

Postwar Southern European labour migrants to both Australia and the FRG encountered considerable hostility and discrimination. In the last 15 years or so, both countries have had less European immigrants, and an increase in entries from other parts of the world: the Middle East, South-East Asian and Latin America, in the case of Australia; Turkey, North Africa and other parts of Africa and Asia in the case of the FRG. It appears that ‘otherness’ is now primarily constructed around non-European origin. In addition Islam is taken as a special marker of difference (Commission of the European Communities, 1989; Goot, 1988). Racial attacks, public statements, discrimination and the activities of extreme-right groups all concentrate on non-European minorities. In Australia and the FRG (and indeed in most other developed countries) the incidence and virulence of racism is on the increase. There are powerful political forces calling for the stopping of immigration, the reduction of minority rights and even mass deportation.

Increased racism has relatively little to do with the characteristics of the minorities themselves. Rather it is linked to the economic and social crisis arising through economic restructuring and rapid social change. In particular the working classes of countries like Australia and Germany have suffered severe and sudden changes in their conditions of work and life in the last two decades: new technology, deskilling, decline in blue-collar employment, urban crisis and declines in the welfare services. These changes have occurred at a time when immigrants, particularly of non-European origin, have become increasingly visible in the cities.
They appear as competitors for jobs, housing and social amenities, and as a threat to security and life-styles.

Neo-conservative theories of difference and conflict provide an ideological justification for such ‘commonsense’ interpretations of ethnic competition and conflict. These in turn provide the basis for state strategies of crisis management based on exclusion and control of minorities. In this area the difference between the FRG and Australia is that the discourse of exclusion has prevailed in the former, while in the latter it has not. The reasons for this lie partly in the different ways in which the nation-state is constituted in the two countries, as discussed above, and partly in the problems of managing community relations in a country with very large minorities, as will be argued below.

The Reconstitution of Culture and Identity by Ethnic Minorities

In the process of migration and settlement, migrant groups create their own social networks. These provide support and social contact in a strange and sometimes hostile environment. They are often based on chain migration and some degree of residential proximity. Typically, these networks provide a form of community (within the wider society), marked by language and cultural maintenance, development of educational, cultural and political organisations, and emergence of an ethnic petit-bourgeoisie. Ethnic communities find a source of identity in homeland culture, though this is applied in uneven and contradictory ways, and often considerably modified in the new situation. This process is very complex, and varies considerably in character in different immigration countries and for different groups. A detailed discussion is not possible here.

The existence of ethnic communities is in part a reaction to informal racism: where settlers encounter discrimination and exclusion, they group together for physical and psychological protection. This in turn may appear to local people as a threatening enclave or ghetto, thus confirming racist fears of ‘swamping’. Equally, institutional racism and labour market segmentation cause residential clustering, by forcing minorities into a common low status position. Nonetheless, maintenance and adaptation of migrant cultures and the development of communities in the cities is a major force of social change and renewal. In both Australia and the FRG this type of community formation has taken place, and in both cases has led to a discourse on enclaves and Überfremdung. The difference is that Australian policies of granting full rights and citizenship to immigrants grants greater legitimacy to the cultural and political expression of minorities. Often this is articulated through the
development of minority petit-bourgeoisie's, which act both as forces of social
control and as sources of economic and cultural innovation. In the FRG, in contrast,
exclusionary policies deny legitimacy to such developments.

The point to be emphasised is that ethnicity does not arise because of 'primordial
sentiments' or the desire to maintain a separate identity within the country of
immigration. Since most migration is part of a transition from rural to industrial, it
must be assumed that most migrants are open to cultural and social change. Rather
ethnicity is part of a process of dynamic interaction, in which migrant groups use
the cultural resources available to them to cope with a particular situation within
the migratory process. Exclusionary policies by the receiving society will encourage
a trend towards traditionalism and separatism (and even fundamentalism). Denial
of cultural pluralism by racist structures and practices thus actually creates
pluralist demands from the minorities. In contrast, where receiving societies create
structures which permit equality of opportunity and civil rights to settlers,
separatism is unlikely, and migrant cultures will survive in a form of creative
interaction with the majority culture.

Whether the majority accepts the cultural rights of minority groups or not, their
survival affects the character of the nation state. Members of migrant minorities
inevitably have multiple identities, based—in varying contexts—on aspects of
homeland cultures and receiving country cultures, and on a synthesis of both. If the
minorities are excluded from the nation (as in the FRG), that very exclusion
questions the legitimacy of the state, while the denial of rights leads to conflicts
within civil society. An exclusionary nation-state must, in the long run be a
repressive and racist one. If, on the other hand, cultural pluralism is accepted, then
the whole society has to recognise a multiplicity of identities. This may undermine
a national identity based on ethnicity, and cause a redefinition of the boundaries of
the nation.
Multiculturalism and the Nation

The comparison of immigration and minority formation in Australia and the FRG has shown both similarities and differences. The similarities include:

— Large-scale immigration and settlement since 1945, with increasing numbers of non-European migrants in recent years;

— Institutional and informal practices which concentrate certain groups of migrants in manual employment, leading to marked segmentation of the labour market according to ethnicity and gender;

— Residential concentration in urban areas, affected by housing problems and poor infrastructure, where competition and conflict with local people, especially members of the working class, develop;

— The growing significance of racist discourses, based mainly on 'new racism', which use the presence of minorities as an explanation of economic and social problems, and advocate exclusion and discrimination.

The differences include:

— Larger relative size of the immigrant population in Australia;

— An inclusionary concept of the nation in Australia, where access to the civil society leads to inclusion in nation and state, compared with an exclusionary, racist form of the nation in the FRG;

— An immigration policy based on permanent settlement and citizenship in Australia, compared with a policy based on temporary residence in the FRG.

With regard to the similarities, both countries are fairly typical of the situation in most developed countries. With regard to the differences, they represent opposite poles on a continuum, where most other countries are somewhere in-between. In view of the likely continuation (and even expansion) of migration to developed countries, it is my hypothesis that the German model of temporary migration and exclusion from the nation cannot be maintained in the long run, because it negates a central principle upon which the legitimacy of the contemporary liberal state is based: that it should appear to incorporate all significant sections of civil society, and take account of their interests. By excluding a large and growing section of civil society, the German model creates the conditions for separatism and conflict. The only way of managing the real ethnic diversity of society while maintaining an exclusionary form of nation and citizenship is by raising the new racist discourse on difference to an official ideology. Certainly, there are strong forces, especially
within the CDU-CSU, which are trying to do just that, as the new *Ausländergesetz* shows. However they can only postpone the inevitable shift to a more inclusionary model, and in doing so cause a great deal of conflict and hardship. They cannot prevent the shift in the long run. The needs of administration and community relations have already led to the emergence of multicultural policies in some areas in education, welfare and local government. Such policies are eventually likely to extend to areas of central government such as immigration policy, labour market rights, welfare entitlement and citizenship.

It is therefore important to look in more detail at the development of policies for managing diversity within Australia, and to realise that multiculturalism is not without its contradictions and problems (the following account is based on Castles *et al.* 1988). As already mentioned, assimilation was seen as the basic principle for dealing with immigrants in the early postwar period. Access to citizenship, together with assimilationist educational and social policies were designed to make them ‘New Australians’—indistinguishable from Anglo-Australians by the second generation. Assimilation was thus an attempt to preserve Anglo-Australian ethnicity as a principle for defining the nation, through cultural absorption. It failed because labour market segmentation, residential concentration and the maintenance of migrant cultures combined to produce continued ethnic pluralism. By the late 1960s the explicitly racist construction of identity through assimilationism and the White Australia Policy had to be abandoned.

The Australian Labor Party Government (ALP) from 1972-75 emphasised migrant rights and cultural diversity as a principle for making the welfare system more open to disadvantaged groups. However it was the Liberal-Country Party Government of the late 1970s that really made multiculturalism a principle of social policy. This was done within the framework of a neo-conservative agenda devoted to cutting government expenditure, and privatising welfare. Ethnicity, defined in primordialist terms, was made the principle for welfare delivery and social control. By recognising the ethnic group, as represented by traditionalist, male, petit-bourgeois leaders, the conservative government could avoid confronting issues of class, gender and racism. Multiculturalism in this period was thus an ideology of cultural pluralism, with no consequences for the central economic and political structures of society.

In the period of ALP Government since 1983, multiculturalism has been redefined in a process of public debate and conflict, in which the main contenders have been:
— Federal and state bureaucracies concerned both with economic efficiency and social control;
— Ethnic minorities, with a variety of conflicting interests and needs;
— A labour movement concerned with potential threats to conditions both through immigration and a divided labour force;
— Progressive intellectuals who advocate a cosmopolitan and open concept of the nation;
— New racist intellectuals, who have tried to mobilise public opinion around an exclusionary concept of national identity.

The concept of multiculturalism which has become predominant in policy-making since about 1987 is one which accepts cultural pluralism as a long-term feature of society, but no longer sees this as a central policy-focus. Rather the central issue is seen as one of full equality of rights and opportunities for all citizens, whatever their ethnic background. The *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia*, an official policy document launched by the Prime Minister in July 1989, names three dimensions of multicultural policy (OMA, 1989):

— Cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and religion;
— Social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and opportunity, and the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender or place of birth;
— Economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilise effectively the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of background.

This program is notable for its inclusionary rhetoric: it speaks not of minorities but of ‘all Australians’. It reiterates the rights of all citizens in a liberal society, and then goes on to recognise the existence of structural barriers which have to be removed to achieve these. The third dimension is a justification of the first two in terms of an ideology of modernisation. It is a statement of faith in the integrative power of the capitalist economy and the liberal state. But the program is based on recognition that lack of language proficiency and education, together with still-existing mechanisms of marginalization require special measures to improve the situation of minorities. The measures announced in the *National Agenda* are predominantly concerned with increasing equality of educational and occupational opportunities, rather than with cultural pluralism. They fit in with a whole gamut
of special institutions and services introduced in the last few years to increase equality of opportunity and make government services accessible to people of all ethnic backgrounds. Laws on equal opportunity in employment, and against racial vilification and incitement are also part of the process of removing barriers.

Nobody would claim that racism has been overcome in Australia, nor that inequalities of ethnicity and gender have been removed. It is also significant that the issue of class is not mentioned at all in the National Agenda, although inequality of income distribution, and the number of very poor and very rich Australians are currently increasing. However, it is important that multiculturalism has now been defined as a necessary aspect of the constitution of the liberal state, and that it is conceptualised in terms of economic, social and political rights. It seems to be that this principle is significant for all states which have experienced mass immigration, and that the best way of countering racism is firstly to fight for the introduction of this principle, and secondly to work to give it real social content—something which is still necessary in Australia too.

**Conclusion**

Migrants inevitably have multiple identities. These last for generations and lead to links with countries of origin as well as country of residence. But then, most people have multiple identities which relate to family, peer groups, hometown, voluntary groups and so on—for migrants the issue of plural national identity is added. However, this leads to a dilemma, which is already very visible in the Australian case: if the nation can no longer be defined by ethnicity, because the civil society is made up of many groups, nor by exclusion, because the nation-state needs to incorporate all significant groups, what is its basis? If we add to this that the economy is increasingly international, and that culture and language no longer function as sufficient national markers, then the problem is obvious. If being Australian is only defined through possession of certain economic, social and political rights, then how is it different from being a citizen of any other liberal democratic state?

Some people have suggested that the answer is a return to territoriality, which was the principle for defining political status prior to the bourgeois revolutions. A person was automatically the subject of a certain monarch, through simply being on the soil of his or her territory. A modern version would be that as soon as a migrant
was allowed to enter a country, he or she would be a citizen with all rights and duties. This is an attractive option in many ways, but it effectively abolishes the nation-state based on ethnicity. It would presumably mean the end of nationalism, because who would be willing to die for a state which was held together only by the legal status of a citizenship which could be readily exchanged for another one?

This would not be a reason for despondence. The only tangible function left to the nation-state in this age of population movements and internationalisation of economy and culture is a political one: the nation-state can to a limited extent develop national ideologies and loyalties; it can control the means of violence; it can manage social conflicts. The state can also provide the systems of social security, education and training needed to reproduce the working population. The nation state thus survives because it is still the most effective agency for managing civil society and for social control. But this function is not one that most people on the left would want to defend.

However, the nation-state is not on the verge of extinction. I would suggest that its political and ideological basis has become shaky in countries with large and diverse immigrant populations like Australia, although even here there are strong racist and nationalist sentiments. It also appears to me that similar problems for the definition of the nation-state will develop in other countries like the FRG, France and Britain, as it becomes obvious that ethnic diversity can only be effectively managed by making immigrants not only members of civil society but also full participants in the nation. I suggest that this will give further impetus to the development of new forms of social identification and political legitimacy, which will erode the still-dominant role of the nation-state.
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