Adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption with a constant-sized ciphertext

Jongkil Kim  
*University of Wollongong*, jk057@uowmail.edu.au

Willy Susilo  
*University of Wollongong*, wsusilo@uow.edu.au

Man Ho Au  
*Hong Kong Polytechnic University*, aau@uow.edu.au

Jennifer Seberry  
*University of Wollongong*, jennie@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: [https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers](https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers)
Adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption with a constant-sized ciphertext

Abstract
In this work, we present an adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption system featuring constant sized ciphertext in the standard model. The size of the public key and the private keys of our system are both linear in the maximum number of receivers. Also, our system is fully collusion-resistant and has stateless receivers. Compared with the state-of-the-art, our scheme is well optimized for the broadcast encryption. The computational complexity of decryption of our scheme depends only on the number of receivers, not the maximum number of receivers of the system. Technically, we employ dual system encryption technique and our proposal offers adaptive security under the general subgroup decisional assumption. Our scheme demonstrates that the adaptive security of the schemes utilizing a composite order group can be proven under the general subgroup decisional assumption while many existing systems working in a composite order group are secure under multiple subgroup decision assumptions. We note that this finding is of an independent interest, which may be useful in other scenarios.

Disciplines
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies

Publication Details

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/5054
Adaptively Secure Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption With a Constant-Sized Ciphertext

Jongkil Kim, Willy Susilo, Senior Member, IEEE, Man Ho Au, Member, IEEE, and Jennifer Seberry, Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—In this paper, we present an adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption system featuring constant sized ciphertext in the standard model. The size of the public key and the private keys of our system are both linear in the maximum number of receivers. In addition, our system is fully collusion-resistant and has stateless receivers. Compared with the state-of-the-art, our scheme is well optimized for the broadcast encryption. The computational complexity of decryption of our scheme depends only on the number of receivers, not the maximum number of receivers of the system. Technically, we employ dual system encryption technique and our proposal offers adaptive security under the general subgroup decisional assumption. Our scheme demonstrates that the adaptive security of the schemes utilizing a composite order group can be proven under the general subgroup decisional assumption, while many existing systems working in a composite order group are secure under multiple subgroup decision assumptions. We note that this finding is of an independent interest, which may be useful in other scenarios.

Index Terms—Cryptography, public key, broadcast encryption, identity-based broadcast encryption.

I. INTRODUCTION

Broadcast encryption (BE) [1] is a cryptographic primitive in which multiple receivers share encrypted data with a sender. In BE, a sender chooses the set of receivers, adaptively, and encrypts secret data for them. The encrypted data only can be decrypted by recipients included in the set of receivers. BE has many practical applications such as secure databases and Digital Right Management (DRM) systems including DVD and Pay TV solutions.

The security of BE is defined by the security model it follows. A BE scheme is adaptive secure [2] if it allows the adversary to declare the set that he/she wants to attack by using the public parameters and private keys compromised under the restriction that the adversary cannot possess any decryption key of the users in the target set. The selective security [3], by comparison, requires that the adversary to decide the target set before the system parameters are chosen. Selective security is a weaker notion but it is relatively easier to achieve.

Broadcast encryption was extended to identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) [4], [5] in which each receiver is identified by his/her unique identity as in an identity-based encryption (IBE) [6]. As identities are arbitrary bit-strings, an IBBE should support exponentially many users as potential receivers. This implies that for an IBBE to be practical, the size of parameters such as public parameters, private keys and ciphertexts must not be related to the total number of users in the system.

IBBE is often simplified to mID-KEM (multiple identity-based key encapsulation scheme) [7], [8] which is the cryptographic primitive combining identity-based encryption and mKEM (multiple-receiver key encapsulation Mechanism). In mID-KEM [9] and mKEM, multiple parties share a secret key for their future secure communications to be protected by symmetric cryptographic algorithms.

A trivial solution to broadcast is to encrypt the same message under each receiver’s public key. However, this trivial solution possesses a ciphertext size linear with the number of receivers. Thus, the goal of broadcast encryption is to reduce the size. Although there are several realizations in broadcast encryption allowing polynomial users in the system of the ciphertext, achieving an IBBE scheme having efficient sized parameters remains a difficult problem because it has to support exponentially many users in the system using the limited entropy provided in public parameters.

An IBBE should satisfy several important properties. First, an IBBE scheme should be fully collusion resistant [10], [11]. This property requires that even if all the users collude, they should not be able to learn anything about the message if none of the colluding users is included in the set of receivers for the broadcast. The stateless receivers [12] property is also important for the efficiency of the system. If an IBBE scheme does not have stateless receivers, it must distribute private keys again whenever there is a change in the set of receivers.

In this paper, we introduce an adaptively secure IBBE scheme achieving a constant sized ciphertext in the standard
model. Our scheme allows exponentially many users in the system, but the maximum number of recipients in a broadcast is defined in the system setup. Our scheme is also fully collusion resistant and features stateless receivers. In order to prove the adaptive security of our scheme, we use the dual system encryption [13]–[15]. Our IBBE scheme achieves a constant sized ciphertext assuming only General Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption [16], which is static and simple.

### II. Preliminaries

Several existing broadcast encryption schemes [3], [13], [17], [18] achieve constant-sized ciphertext. While they are secure in the standard model, these schemes support only polynomially many users because they have parameters, such as public keys or private keys, which increase linearly with the number of total users in the system. In these systems, the users are normally labelled from 1 to \( n \).

Gentry and Waters [2] suggested the first adaptively secure identity-based scheme having sub-linear sized ciphertext. First, they introduced an IBBE scheme in which a linear sized Tag is included in the ciphertext to allow exponentially many users in the system. Subsequently, they suggested a way to achieve sub-linear sized ciphertext by reusing Tag in the original scheme and increasing the size of other components in a ciphertext from constant to sublinear.

Lewko, Sahai and Waters [19] introduced a revocation scheme based on a revocation system [12], [20] which achieves broadcast encryption not by including users but by revoking users. The size of the parameters does not depend on the total number of users in the system. However, the size of the ciphertext linearly increases with the number of revoked users in their scheme. In addition, while its parameters do not depend on the total number of users in the system, adaptive security has been proved when it allows a polynomial number of users. The system can only be proven selective secure if exponentially many users are to be supported.

Similarly, an adaptively secure Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme featuring constant-sized ciphertext and supporting exponentially-many attributes was introduced by Attrapadung [21]. As broadcast encryption is a special case of a KP-ABE of which the policy consists only of OR-gates, their scheme is also relevant to our discussion. We analyze this scheme when it works as a broadcast encryption scheme, and we find that our scheme is more efficient than this scheme. The size of the ciphertext and the number of pairing computations for the decryption of our scheme are two thirds of theirs. Also, the security of their scheme depends on some \( q \)-type assumptions while our scheme depends on some simple assumptions.

There are three IBBE systems using multilinear map [22]. Due to the properties of multi-linear map, they can be very efficient. However, although the number of the group elements of a ciphertext is constant, the size of the group elements is \( O(\log^2 N) \). Also, the security of these systems depends on some \( q \)-type assumptions, which is undesirable.

Attrapadung and Libert [23] introduced the first IBBE scheme having a constant sized ciphertext as an application of Inner Product Encryption (IPE). Since broadcast encryption can be interpreted as a special case having only OR-gates between recipients, broadcast encryption can be also achieved by IPE. Their scheme is constructed in a prime order group and has a constant sized ciphertext although the sizes of a private key and a public parameter of their scheme linearly increase with the size of maximum number of receivers in the system. To achieve this, they used the dual system encryption. Their scheme depends on standard assumptions (hardness of the Decision Linear Problem (DLIN) and the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH)). However, their scheme is designed for IPE and is not well adapted for an IBBE system. Some important features are missing in their construction arising from this matter. The security of their system fails if only one receiver is included in a ciphertext because their \( n \)-wise independence argument does not hold. Also, their computational complexity can be reduced if IPE is used to construct IBBE. They also achieved an adaptively secure broadcast encryption scheme by applying the dual system encryption to [24]. However, this scheme requires a subgroup decisional assumption, which cannot be reduced as General Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption.

We compare our scheme with the existing schemes, and the result is summarized in Table I. We note that we also use IPE for IBBE as in [23]. Nevertheless, we optimize the IPE scheme to support IBBE. Hence, in addition to a constant sized ciphertext, the computational complexity of our scheme only depends on the number of receivers for a broadcast. Also, we observe that there exists a possible failure in the security if only one receiver is included in a encryption. We provide a practical solution for this. Furthermore, the security of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>PK</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>CT</th>
<th>Decrypt</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GW [2]</td>
<td>( q )-type</td>
<td>( O(\sqrt{t}) )</td>
<td>( O(1) )</td>
<td>( 5\sqrt{t}G )</td>
<td>( 2P + (2\sqrt{t} + 1)E )</td>
<td>Adaptive</td>
<td>Prime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSW [19]</td>
<td>(DBDH, DLIN)</td>
<td>( O(1) )</td>
<td>( O(1) )</td>
<td>( (2t + 8)G )</td>
<td>( t(2P + E) )</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Prime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attrapadung</td>
<td>(DBDH, DLIN)</td>
<td>( O(\ell) )</td>
<td>( O(\ell) )</td>
<td>( 9G )</td>
<td>( 9P + tE )</td>
<td>Adaptive</td>
<td>Prime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attrapadung</td>
<td>( q )-type, SDs</td>
<td>( O(\ell) )</td>
<td>( O(\ell) )</td>
<td>( 6G_N )</td>
<td>( 6P + tE )</td>
<td>Adaptive</td>
<td>Composite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ours</td>
<td>GSD, SDs</td>
<td>( O(\ell) )</td>
<td>( O(\ell) )</td>
<td>( 4G_N )</td>
<td>( 4P + kE )</td>
<td>Adaptive</td>
<td>Composite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( t \): the maximum number of receivers, \( k \): the number of receivers for a ciphertext, \( G \): the size of a prime order group element, \( G_N \): the size of a composite order group element, \( P \): Pairing, \( E \): Exponentiation

We compare our scheme with the existing schemes, and the result is summarized in Table I. We note that we also use IPE for IBBE as in [23]. Nevertheless, we optimize the IPE scheme to support IBBE. Hence, in addition to a constant sized ciphertext, the computational complexity of our scheme only depends on the number of receivers for a broadcast. Also, we observe that there exists a possible failure in the security if only one receiver is included in a encryption. We provide a practical solution for this. Furthermore, the security of...
our system depends only on GSD assumption. As a result, our adaptively secure IBBE features low cost decryption by achieving a constant sized ciphertext and low computational complexity for the decryption process. More importantly, our decryption algorithm only depends on the number of receivers of the ciphertext, instead of the maximum number of receivers, which is part of the system parameters. This offers a big advantage in comparison to the other schemes.

A. Our Technique

The traditional way to prove the security of broadcast encryption is using \( q \)-type assumptions and partitioning the key space by the set of identities of receivers and others [2], [3]. The dual system encryption [13], introduced by Waters, gives a break-through in security proof methodology by introducing the concept of semi-functional keys and ciphertext which are only used in the security proof. However, proving the invariance between a semi-functional key and a normal key is still challenging because the simulator can detect this correlation by generating a semi-functional ciphertext which can be decrypted only by a normal key to distinguish whether the key is a semi-functional key or a normal key.

Dual system encryption is used widely to provide security protocols including BE [13], [19], [25], [26]. Lewko and Waters [14] suggested a way to solve this problem. In their suggestion, when the algorithm generates a semi-functional ciphertext, the ciphertext is correlated with semi-functional keys. This means if a valid semi-functional key is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the semi-functional key does not hinder decryption and works like a normal key, but this correlation between the semi-functional key and ciphertext is hidden to the adversary who cannot query a valid key for the challenge ciphertext.

Although the nominally semi-functionality is very helpful to prove the security, hiding the correlation is not trivial if the system has to support exponentially many users with limited entropy. Lewko and Waters [27] introduced the technique to overcome the shortage of randomness. To amplify the entropy, they localize semi-functional spaces by introducing ephemeral semi-functional space which is only used to prove the key invariance between a normal key and a semi-functional key. The random values, hiding the correlation between the key and the ciphertext, are only used in ephemeral semi-functional space. Then, the semi-functional spaces share only random values which do not interrupt to hide this correlation in ephemeral semi-functional space.

We prove the security of our scheme similarly with [27]. However, we prove the adaptive security of our system using General Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption [16] only. Specifically, in [27], when they proved the semi-functional invariance of their scheme, they used an assumption which cannot be reduced to GSD. In contrast, we prove semi-functional invariance without this assumption. Hence, the security of our scheme relies on fewer assumptions than Lewko and Waters’ scheme [27].

Our IBBE scheme achieves adaptive security by combining dual system encryption [13] with \( n \)-wise pairwise independence argument [23]. However, the \( n \)-wise independence argument does not hold if only one receiver is included in the system. Hence, first we restrict our scheme so that the number of receivers is larger than 1. Then, we provide a practical way to overcome this restriction. The computational complexity of the decryption algorithm of our scheme only depends on the number of receivers.

B. Broadcast Encryption Systems

Our broadcast encryption scheme consists of four algorithms, namely, setup (Setup), private key generation (KeyGen), encryption (Enc) and decryption (Dec) as defined below.

\[
\text{Setup}(\lambda, n, \ell) \text{ takes as input the number of receivers } (n) \text{ and the maximal size of a broadcast recipient group } (\ell (\leq n)). \text{ It outputs a public/master secret key pair } (PK, MSK).
\]

\[
\text{KeyGen}(i, MSK) \text{ takes as input an index } i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \text{ and the secret key } MSK. \text{ It outputs a private key } d_i.
\]

\[
\text{Enc}(S, M, PK) \text{ takes as input a subset } S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\} \text{, a message } M \text{ and a public key } PK. \text{ If } |S| \leq \ell \text{, it outputs a CT.}
\]

\[
\text{Dec}(S, i, d_i, CT, PK) \text{ takes as input a subset } S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\} \text{, an index } i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}, \text{ a private key } d_i \text{ for } i, \text{ a ciphertext } CT, \text{ and the public key } PK. \text{ If } |S| \leq \ell \text{ and } i \in S, \text{ then the algorithm outputs the message } M.
\]

It should be noted that the definition of BE above is general enough to describe IBBE.

C. Security Definition

We define the adaptive security model of IBBE. This basically follows the adaptive security model of [2]. The only difference being we adapt it for an ordinary IBBE scheme while the adaptive security model of [2] is for a key encapsulation scheme.

Both the adversary and the challenger are given as input \( \ell \) and \( n \), i.e., the maximal size of a set of receivers \( S \) and the maximum users in a system, respectively.

\textbf{Setup}: The challenger runs \textbf{Setup}(\lambda, n, \ell) \text{ to obtain a public key } PK. \text{ It gives } A \text{ the public key } PK.

\textbf{Phase I}: The adversary \( A \) adaptively issues private queries for identities \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \).

\textbf{Challenge}: If \textbf{Phase I} is over, The attacker declares two equal length message \( M_0 \) and \( M_1 \) and a challenge set \( S^* \) where \( S^* \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\} \) and the identities of \( S^* \) never have been queried in \textbf{Phase I}. If \( |S^*| \) is larger than \( \ell \), it outputs \( \bot \). Otherwise, the challenger randomly selects \( b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \) and runs encryption algorithm to obtain \( CT = \text{Enc}(S^*, M_b, PK) \). The challenger returns \( CT \) to \( A \).

\textbf{Phase II}: The adversary \( A \) adaptively issues private queries as \textbf{Phase I} except that added restriction that identities \( i \notin S \).
Guess: Finally, the adversary $A$ outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ and wins the game if $b = b'$.

We define the advantage of an adversary $A$ in attacking the identity based broadcast encryption system IBBE with inputs $(n, \ell, \lambda)$:

$$\text{Adv}_{\lambda}^{\text{IBBE},n}(A) := |Pr[b = b'] - 1/2|$$

We define that an identity based encryption system IBBE is adaptively secure if $\text{Adv}_{\lambda}^{\text{IBBE},n}(A) = \epsilon$ is negligible for all PPT algorithms $A$.

D. Composite Order Bilinear Groups

We briefly describe the important properties of composite order bilinear groups which were introduced in [28]. Let $G$ be a group generation algorithm taking a security parameter $\lambda$ as input and outputting a description of a bilinear group $G$. For our purposes, we will have $G$ output $(p_1, p_2, p_3, G, G_T, e)$ where $p_1$, $p_2$, $p_3$ are distinct primes, $G$ and $G_T$ are cyclic groups of order $N = p_1 p_2 p_3$, and $e : G^2 \rightarrow G_T$ is a map such that:

1. (Bilinear) $\forall g, h \in G$, $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $e(g^a, h^b) = e(g, h)^{ab}$
2. (Non-degenerate) $\exists g \in G$ such that $e(g, g)$ has order $N$ in $G_T$.

We assume that the group operations in $G$ in $G_T$ as well as the bilinear map $e$ are computable in polynomial time with respect to $\lambda$ and that the group descriptions of $G$ and $G_T$ include generators of the respective cyclic groups. We let $G_{p_1}$, $G_{p_2}$ and $G_{p_3}$ denote the subgroup of order $p_1$, $p_2$ and $p_3$ in $G$ respectively. We note that when $h_i \in G_{p_i}$ and $h_j \in G_{p_j}$, for $i \neq j$, $e(h_i, h_j)$ is the identity element in $G_T$ (i.e. $e(h_1, h_2) = 1$). This orthogonal property of $G_{p_i}, G_{p_2}, G_{p_3}$ will be used to implement semi-functionality in our constructions.

E. Complexity Assumption

Our scheme is adaptively secure under General Subgroup Decision (GSD) assumption [16]. To avoid duplicate statements in the security proof and demonstrate which GSD instances were used clearly, we include Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 which are special cases of GSD.

General Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption [16]: Let $G(1^\lambda)$ be a group generator and $Z_0, Z_1, ..., Z_k$ be a collection of non-empty subset of $\{1, 2, 3\}$ where each $Z_i$ for $i \geq 2$ satisfies either (1) or (2) following:

$$Z_0 \cup Z_1 \neq \emptyset \text{ and } Z_1 \cap Z_i = \emptyset \quad (1)$$

$$Z_0 \cap Z_i = \emptyset \text{ and } Z_1 \cap Z_i = \emptyset \quad (2)$$

Then, we define the following distribution:

$$G = (N = p_1 p_2 p_3, G, G_T, e) \leftarrow G(1^\lambda),$$

$$G_{Z_2} \leftarrow G_{Z_2}, ..., G_{Z_k} \leftarrow G_{Z_k},$$

$$D = (G, G_{Z_2}, ..., G_{Z_k}), T_1 \leftarrow G_{Z_0}, T_2 \leftarrow G_{Z_1}. $$

With the fixed collection of sets $Z_0, ..., Z_k$, we define the advantage of an algorithm $A$ in breaking this assumption to be:

$$\text{Adv}_{\lambda}^{\text{GSD},n}(A) := |Pr[A(D, T_0) = 1] - Pr[A(D, T_1) = 1]|.$$
As Decrypt(S, i, d, CT, PK) Suppose i ∈ S, and calculate \( Z \), the decryption algorithm outputs
\[
D = e(K_0, C_0)e(K_2, C_2) / e(K_1, C_1) = e(g, h)^{\delta s}
\]
Then, it outputs a message \( M = C / D \).

Correctness Theorem can be computed as follows:
\[
E = e(K_0, C_0)e(K_2, C_2) / e(K_1, C_1) = e(g^s, h^s) e(v_i u_i, h^{\delta_i} Z_i)
\]
\[
= e(h, u_i) v_i e(h, Z_i) = e(g, h)^{\delta_i}
\]
\[
F = e((K^i_0), C_0) = \prod_{j=1}^{k} e((h^{\alpha_j} Z_j), u_i)
\]
As i is a root of \( \prod_{j=1}^{k} (Z - j) \), \( \langle X, Z \rangle = \sum_{j=0}^{k} x_j z_j = 0 \), this also implies that \( \sum_{j=1}^{k} x_j z_j = -z_0 x_0 \). Therefore, \( D = E / F = e(g, h)^{\delta_i} \).

We restricted our scheme to have \( |S| \). However, this can be accommodated by reserving one identity when system sets up and including this identity if encryption body want to share a secret with only one user. It should be noted that the private key for this reserved identity must not be given to any user.

B. Choice of Parameters

The size of parameters is determined by the security level which a broadcast system aims to achieve. In our construction, \( N \) is the product of three primes. The factors of \( N \) must not be revealed to the attackers. We recommend the size of \( N \) based on the result of Guillevic [29] in Table II for achieving equivalent security levels with AES. The sizes are calculated based on the attacks “Number Field Sieve attack” and “Elliptic Curve Method attack” [30]. The minimum of the size of parameters is calculated based on the cost (time) equivalence, while the maximum of the size of parameters is computed based on the computational equivalence [30].

### Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equiv.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES-128</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>2649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-196</td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>6897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-256</td>
<td>4614</td>
<td>13842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. Security Analysis

In order to prove the security of our scheme, the dual system encryption was used. The security can be proved by the invariances of security games.

A. Security Properties for the Dual System Encryption IBBE

Before we present the security proof of our construction, we define semi-functional keys and a semi-functional ciphertext which are not used in the real system, but necessary in the proof. In the definition, \( g_2, g_3 \) denotes generators of \( G_2, G_3 \), respectively. In order to create semi-functional keys, we generate \( y_i, \sigma R \in \mathbb{Z}_N \), first. These are shared parameters in semi-functional keys regardless of the identity of \( i \).

Semi-Functional Key: Let \( (K'_0, K'_1, K'_2, K'_3, j : j \in [1, \ell]) \) be a normal key generated by using the key generation algorithm. Then, we randomly select \( y_i R \in \mathbb{Z}_N \) for the identity \( i \) and define a semi-functional key as below
\[
K_0 = K'_0(g_2 g_3)^{y_i}, K_1 = K'_1(g_2 g_3)^{y_i}, K_2 = K_2(g_2 g_3)^{y_i}, K_3, j = K'_3, j : j \in [1, \ell].
\]

Semi-Functional Ciphertext: Let \( C'_1, C'_0, C'_1, C'_2 \) and \( C'_3 \) be a properly distributed normal ciphertext. Then, with randomly generated \( a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_N \), a semi-functional key is defined as below
\[
C = C'_1, C_0 = C'_0 g_2^a, C_1 = C'_1 g_3^b, C_2 = C'_2, C_3 = C'_3
\]

Semi-functional keys are only able to decrypt a normal ciphertext but not a semi-functional ciphertext although normal keys can decrypt both a normal and a semi-functional ciphertext. Now, we will prove that no PPT algorithm distinguishes the following security games with non-negligible advantage.

Game_{IBBE}^1 This is a real game following the adaptive security model of IBBE. All private keys and the challenge ciphertext are also normal.

Game_{k IBBE}^1 This is identical with Game_{Real}^1 except for the types of private keys and a ciphertext. In this game, the first \( k \) keys are semi-functional keys, and the rest of the keys are normal keys and the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.

Game_{IBBE}^final This is identical with Game_{IBBE}^1 where \( q \) is the total number of key queries besides the private keys. In this game, random elements from \( G_{p_1} \) are added to \( K_2, K_3, \ldots , K_{3, \ell} \) components of all semi-functional keys.

Game_{Final}^IBBE This is identical with Game_{IBBE}^final besides the challenge ciphertext. In this game, the challenge ciphertext is similar to the semi-functional ciphertext, but all components except \( C \) have additional random elements from \( G_{p_5} \).

Game_{IBBE}^Final This is identical with Game_{IBBE}^final besides the challenge ciphertext. In this game, the first component \( C \) of the challenge ciphertext is replaced by a random element from \( G_T \).

**Theorem 1:** Our IBBE system is adaptively secure under General Subgroup Decision Assumption.

**Proof:** This is proved by Lemmas 1 to 7. □
Lemma 1 (Semi-Functional Ciphertext Invariance): Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $Game_{\text{Real}}^{\text{I}} \text{Adv}_A - Game_0^{\text{BBE}} \text{Adv}_A = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 1.

Proof: $B$ is given $g_1, T$. It will simulate $Game_0^{\text{BBE}}$ or $Game_{\text{Real}}^{\text{I}}$ with $A$. $B$ chooses random exponents $y_a, y_w, y_h, a_0, \ldots, a_t, \delta \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1^u$, $u = g_1^y$, $w = g_1^w$, $v = g_1^v$, $h = g_1^h$. It publishes the public parameters:

$$PK = (g, u, w, v, o^{\alpha_i}, h, e(g, h) : j \in \{0, \ell\}).$$

Also, $B$ generates normal keys by the key generation algorithm because it knows both $PK$ and $MSK$.

In the challenge, $A$ sends $B$ two messages $M_0, M_1$ and the set of receivers, $S$. To make the challenge ciphertext, $B$ calculates $\tilde{Z} = (z_t, \ldots, z_0)$ where $z_j$ is an coefficient of $z_j$ of $\prod_{i=1}^{t} (c^i - j)$, and implicitly sets $g_1^u$ to be the $p_1$ part of $T$ (this means that $T$ is the product of $g_1^u \in G_p$, and possibly an element of $G_p$). $B$ also generates $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ randomly. It chooses $f \in \{0, 1\}$ by flipping a coin and sets:

$$C = M_f e(g, T)^{\delta}, \quad C_0 = T^{y_w} g_1^{y_0}, \quad C_1 = T^{y_w} g_1^{y_1}, \quad C_2 = g_1^{y_1}, \quad C_3 = g_1^{u_2}.$$

If $T \in G_p$, this is properly distributed normal ciphertext, and $B$ properly simulates the $Game_{\text{Real}}^{\text{I}}$. If $T \in G_{p_1} \cap G_{p_2}$, then we have a semi-functional ciphertext with $a = y_h$s and $b = y_0s'$; we denote the $G_{p_2}$ part of $T$ by $g_1^{s'}$ (i.e. $T = g_1^{s'}$). Since the values of $y_h$, and $y_w$ modulo $p_2$ are uncorrelated from their values modulo $p_1$, reusing the values from $G_p$, does not correlate with the normal key. So, this is a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext, and $B$ properly simulates $Game_0^{\text{BBE}}$.

Lemma 2 (Semi-Functional Security): Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $Game_0^{\text{BBE}} \text{Adv}_A - Game_{\text{Real}}^{\text{I}} \text{Adv}_A = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.

Proof: This is proved by Lemmas 2.1 to 2.3.

Lemma 2.1: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $Game_0^{\text{BBE}} \text{Adv}_A - Game_{\text{Real}}^{\text{I}} \text{Adv}_A = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2.

Proof: $B$ is given $g_1^2, g_2^2, X_1 X_3, T$. It will simulate $Game_0^{\text{BBE}}$ or $Game_{\text{Real}}^{\text{I}}$ with $A$. $B$ chooses random exponents $y_3, y_w, y_0, y_0, a_0, \ldots, a_t, \delta \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1^u$, $u = g_1^{s'}$, $w = g_1^1, v = g_1^1, h = g_1$. It publishes the public parameters:

$$PK = (g, u, w, v, o^{\alpha_i}, h, e(g, h) : j \in \{0, \ell\}).$$

When $A$ makes a ciphertext query by sending two messages $M_0, M_1$ and the set of receivers, $S$, $B$ responds to $A$ by choosing random $\tau, \tau', \tau'' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. Then, it randomly selects $f \in \{0, 1\}$ and returns

$$C = M_f (g, T)^{\delta}, \quad C_0 = T g_2^a, \quad C_1 = T^{y_w} g_1^{y_0} T^{y_0} (g, h)^{\delta}, \quad C_2 = h^{\delta}(g, h)^{\delta}, \quad C_3 = u'. $$

When $A$ makes private key queries, for some identity $i$, $A$ chooses a random $y_i, r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returns

$$\{ (X_1 X_2 y_i^{r_i}, (X_1 X_2)^{y_i})^r, (X_1 X_2)^{y_i} T^{y_i} (s_1^{\alpha y_2 s_1}) : j \in \{1, \ell\} \}.$$
Lemma 2.3: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $Game_{Final}^{BBE}Adv_A - Game_{Final}^{BBE}Adv_B = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 3.

Proof: $B$ is given $g_1, g_2, X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2, T$. It will simulate $Game_{Final}^{BBE}$ or $Game_{Final}^{BBE}$ using $A$. It chooses random exponents $y_g, y_u, y_v, a_0, \ldots, a_{\ell} \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1^{y_g}, u = g_1^{y_u}, v = g_1^{y_v}$ and $h = g_1$. It publishes the public parameters:

\[ PK = (g, u, w, v, a^{y_g}, a^{y_u}, a^{y_v}, e(T^{y_g}, g_1)) \]

When $A$ makes private key queries, for some identity $i$, $B$ chooses a random $y'_i, r'_i, \gamma'_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returns

\[ K_0 = T^{(y_u+y_v)\gamma'_i}(Y_2)(y_u+y_v)\gamma'_i, \quad K_1 = T^{h\gamma'_i}(Y_2)^i, \]
\[ K_2 = T^{y_u\gamma'_i}(Y_2^{y_v})^{y'_i}v^{r'_i}g_3^{r'_i}, \]
\[ K_{3,j} = h^{r'_i-x_i}c_{\gamma'_i}^{r'_i}g_3^{r'_i} : j \in [1, \ell] \]

If we write $Y_2$ and the $G_{p_3}$ part of $T$ as $g_3^{y_g}g_3^{y_u}$ and $g_3^{y_v}$, respectively, this implicitly sets $y_i = y'_i + \gamma'_i$ modulo $p_1$. Also, $y'_i$ equals to $y_g^i+y_u+y_v$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$, and $\gamma'_i$ equals to $y_g^i+y_y$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$. If $T \in G_{p_1p_3}$, $y'_i$ equals to $y_g^i+y_u+y_v$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$. If $T \in G$, $y'_i$ equals to $y_g^i+y_u+y_v$ modulo $p_2$ if we write the $G_{p_1}$ part of $T$ as $g_3^{y_g}$.

When $A$ makes a ciphertext query by sending $M_0, M_1$ and the set of receivers, $S$, $B$ responds to $A$ by choosing $a', b', s', t \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returning

\[ C = e(T^{y_g}, X_1, X_2)^{a'}, C_0 = (X_1, X_2)^{a'}(Y_2)^{a'} \]
\[ C_1 = (X_1, X_2)^{a'}(Y_2)^{b'}v^{\tilde{a}\tilde{Z}}t, \]
\[ C_2 = h^{\tilde{a}\tilde{Z}}t g_3^{r'_i}, \quad C_3 = a'g_3^{r'_i} \]

The random values are properly added into the $G_{p_2p_3}$ part of the ciphertext because of $a', b', s', t'$. If $T \in G_{p_1p_3}$, this properly simulates $Game_{Final}^{BBE}$. If $T \in G$, $e(g_2, g_2)^{\tilde{a}\tilde{Z}}$ additionally added to $C$ of the ciphertext. It should be noted that the value of $s'$ modulo $p_2$ appears $C_0$ and $C_1$ in the ciphertext, but its value is not revealed of $a'$ and $b'$ modulo $p_2$. Hence, $e(g_2, g_2)^{\tilde{a}\tilde{Z}}$ is uniformly random to $A$, and this has well simulated $Game_{Final}^{BBE}$.

B. Semi-Functional Key Invariance

It is quite challenging to prove that there is no polynomial time algorithm $B$ to distinguish between $Game_{k-1}^{BBE}$ and $Game_{k-1}^{BBE}$ with non-negligible advantage because there is no restriction on $B$. Hence it can generate a semi-functional ciphertext to test whether the $k$th key is semi-functional or normal by decrypting the semi-functional ciphertext using the $k$th key. In order to avoid this potential paradox, we designed oracles which output the challenge ciphertext and the private key unless the identities of the keys requested do not belong to the set of the recipients’ identities of the challenge ciphertext. However, constructing these oracles and proving the invariance between them is still challenging when we work with exponentially many users because we often have to amplifying the randomness of system with the limited entropy of public keys. Hence, we defined additionally ephemeral key and ciphertext which are similar with the ephemeral semi-functional key and ciphertext introduced in [27].

In this setting, an ephemeral key decrypts both a normal and a semi-functional ciphertext, but an ephemeral challenge ciphertext is decrypted only by a normal key.

Ephemeral key: Let $K'_0, K'_1, K'_2$ be a normal key generated by using the key generation algorithm. With random $y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_L \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} \mathbb{Z}_N$, we define

\[ K_0 = K'_0, \quad K_1 = K'_1, \quad K_2 = K'_2(g_{2g_3})^{y_0}, \]
\[ K_{3,j} = K'_{3,j}(g_{2g_3})^{y_L+j} : j \in [1, \ell] \]

Ephemeral ciphertext: Let $C', C'_0, C'_1, C'_2$ be a properly distributed normal ciphertext. Then with random $a, b, a'_0, \ldots, a'_t, t', t'' \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} \mathbb{Z}_N$, and outputs

\[ C = C', \quad C_0 = C'_0g_3^{a'}, \quad C_1 = C'_1g_3^{b'}, \quad C_2 = C'_2g_3^{t'}, \quad C_3 = C'_3g_3^{t''} \]

It should be noted that an ephemeral ciphertext has the parameter $\sigma$ shared with the semi-functional key.

1) Sequence of Games: In order to prove the invariance between $Game_{k-1}^{BBE}$ and $Game_{k}^{BBE}$, we additionally define security games having an ephemeral key and/or an ephemeral ciphertext and the added restriction in modulo $p_3$.

$Game_{k}^{BBE}$ This game is identical with $Game_{k-1}^{BBE}$ except for the added restriction that the identity of the $(k-1)^{th}$ key cannot be equal to any of the identities of the challenge ciphertext modulo $p_3$.

$Game_{k}^{EC}$ In this game, the ciphertext is semi-functional and the $k^{th}$ key is ephemeral. The additional restriction on the identities modulo $p_3$ is retained in this game.

$Game_{k}^{EC}$ In this game, both the ciphertext and the $k^{th}$ key are ephemeral. The additional restriction on the identities modulo $p_3$ is retained in this game.

$Game_{k}^{BBE}$ This game is identical with $Game_{k}^{BBE}$ except for the additional restriction on the identities modulo $p_3$. First, we will prove that $Game_{k}^{BBE} \approx Game_{k}^{BBE}$. Then, the steps $Game_{k-1}^{BBE} \approx Game_{k}^{BBE}$, $Game_{k}^{EC} \approx Game_{k}^{EC}$, $Game_{k}^{BBE} \approx Game_{k}^{BBE}$ and $Game_{k}^{BBE} \approx Game_{k}^{BBE}$ will be followed.

Lemma 3: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $Game_{k}^{BBE}Adv_A - Game_{k}^{BBE}Adv_B = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.

Proof: We suppose there exists a PPT attacker $A$ that distinguishes between $Game_{k}^{BBE}$ and $Game_{k}^{BBE}$ with non-negligible advantage. Because $A$ has non-negligible advantage, it produces two values $I, I' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ which satisfy $I \neq I'$ modulo $N$ but $I = I'$ modulo $p_3$ with non-negligible probability while it is simulating $Game_{k}^{BBE}$. We set $A$ as the g.c.d. of $I - I'$ and $B$ as $N/A$. Then, $p_3$ is divisible by $A$, and $B \neq 1$. There are two possible cases: 1) $p_1$ is divisible by $B$ and 2) $A = p_1p_3$, $B = p_2$. The rest of the proof can be described as the same manner of [14] and [27]. The case 1 can be used to break Assumption 2, and the case 2 can be used to break Assumption 3.
2) Oracle Lemmas: The invariance between $\text{Game}^{IBBE}_{k-1}$ and $\text{Game}^{IBBE'}_{k}$ will be proved by using the oracle lemmas. In the following proofs, $\mathcal{B}$ uses oracles to simulate the security games with $\mathcal{A}$, but it cannot distinguish which oracles with which it is working. We define four oracles ($O_0, O_1, O_2, O_3$). Each oracle can respond to an initial query, a challenge key query and a challenge ciphertext query. We summarize the relation between the oracles and the security games in Table III.

In order to respond to an initial query, the oracles randomly select $g, u, w, v, h \in G_{p_1}$ and $a_0, \ldots, a_r, s, a, \psi, y, y, \sigma \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and return the group elements:

\[
g^u, u, h, v, h^\psi u, h^\psi g^a,\]
\[
w^j(y_{2g})^y, y_{2g}^y, y_{2g}^y, j \in \{0, \ell\}.
\]

The responses that each oracle outputs as a challenge key and a challenge ciphertext have different distributions according to the type of oracle. They are distributed as the following:

**Oracle $O_0$:** If the oracle receives a challenge key query for an identity $i \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, it returns the group elements which are identical with a normal key. Upon receiving a challenge ciphertext query for a set of recipients $S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$, it calculates $\tilde{Z}$ for $S$ and selects randomly $h, t \sim R \mathbb{Z}_n$, then returns the group elements

\[
\{w^j g^u_{2g}^{\tilde{a}i} z^i, h^{\tilde{a}i} z^i, u^j\}.
\]

**Oracle $O_1$:** If the oracle receives a challenge key query for an identity $i \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, it selects randomly $y, y, y_0, \ldots, y_\ell \sim R \mathbb{Z}_n$, then returns the group elements

\[
\{w^j y, \tilde{y}, v^j y, y_{2g}^y, h^{(-a_0 y_j, y_0+a_j)}y_{2g}^y, : j \in \{1, \ell\}\}
\]

The challenge ciphertext response is identical with $O_0$.

**Oracle $O_2$:** If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext query for a set of recipients $S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$, it calculates $\tilde{Z}$ for $S$ and selects randomly $h, t, a_0, \ldots, a_r, t_0, t_2 \sim R \mathbb{Z}_n$, then returns the group elements

\[
\{w^j g^u_{2g}^{\tilde{a}i} z^i, h^{\tilde{a}i} z^i, u^j\}.
\]

It responds to a challenge key query in the same way as $O_1$.

**Oracle $O_3$:** If the oracle receives a challenge key query for an identity $i \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, it selects randomly $y, y, y_0, y_\ell \sim R \mathbb{Z}_n$, then returns the group elements

\[
\{w^j g^u_{2g}^{\tilde{a}i} z^i, h^{\tilde{a}i} z^i, u^j\}.
\]

The challenge ciphertext response is identical with $O_0$. The invariances of $(O_0, O_1, O_2, O_3)$ are proved by several lemmas with additionally defined sub-oracles. For the overview of proving sequences, we add Table IV.

**Lemma 4:** Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ such that $O_0Adv_\mathcal{A} - O_0Adv_\mathcal{A} = \varepsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ with advantage $\varepsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.

**Proof:** This is proved by Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 with an additional oracle $O_{0,1}$.

**Oracle $O_{0,1}$:** If the oracle receives a challenge key query for an identity $i \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, it selects randomly $y, y, y_0, \ldots, y_\ell \sim R \mathbb{Z}_n$, then returns the group elements

\[
\{w^j y, \tilde{y}, v^j y, y_{2g}^y, h^{(-a_0 y_j, y_0+a_j)}y_{2g}^y, y_{2g}^y, : j \in \{1, \ell\}\}
\]

It responses to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query in the same way as $O_0$. □

**Lemma 4.1:** Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ such that $O_0Adv_\mathcal{A} - O_0Adv_\mathcal{A} = \varepsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ with advantage $\varepsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2.

**Proof:** $\mathcal{B}$ is given $g_1, s_2, X_1X_3, T$. It will simulate $O_0$ or $O_{0,1}$ using $\mathcal{A}$. It chooses random exponents $y, y, y_0, \ldots, a_r, s, a, \tilde{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, and sets $g = g_1^{y_0}, u = g_1^{y_0}, w = g_1^{y_0}, v = g_1^{y_0}, h = g_1$. It sends the group elements to $\mathcal{A}$:

\[
(g, u, w, h, v, h^\psi g^a, X_1X_3^{y \psi y}, X_1X_3^{y \psi y}, X_1X_3^{y \psi y}, : j \in \{0, \ell\})
\]

If we write $X_1X_3$ as $g_1^{y_0}g_3^{y_0}$, this implicitly sets $y$ equal to $y_\ell$ modulo $p_1$ and $\tilde{y}$ equal to $y_\ell$ modulo $p_2$. Also, $\psi$ equals $y_\ell$ and $\sigma$ equals $y_\ell$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$. Because the values of $y_\ell$ and $y_\ell$ modulo $p_1$ do not correlate with their values in modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$, this is properly distributed.

When $\mathcal{A}$ makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, $S$, $\mathcal{B}$ chooses a random $h, t \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and returns the group elements

\[
\{w^j g^u_{2g}^{\tilde{a}i} z^i, h^{\tilde{a}i} z^i, u^j\}.
\]

When $\mathcal{A}$ makes a challenge key-type query for some identity $i$, $\mathcal{B}$ chooses a random $y' \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and returns

\[
\{w^j y, \tilde{y}, v^j y, T^y, T^{-a_0 y_j, y_0+a_j}) : j \in \{1, \ell\}\}
\]

This implicitly sets $g_1^{y'}$ to be the $G_{p_1}$ part of $T$. If $T \in G_{p_1}$, then this matches the distribution of $O_0$. If $T \in G_{p_1}$.
then this matches the distribution of $O_{0.1}$. Also this implicitly sets $a_j' = \alpha_j$, $\gamma_0' = r''y_u$ and $\gamma_j' = r'(-a_0x_j/x_0 + a_j)$ modulo $p_3$ when we write $G_{p_3}$ part of $T$ as $g_3''$. $\gamma_0''$ contains $y_u$ modulo $p_3$ which does not appear anywhere else. Also, for all $j \in [1, \ell]$, $\gamma_j'$ contains $a_j$ modulo $p_3$ which also does not appear anywhere else. Because $y_u$ modulo $p_3$ and $a_j$ modulo $p_3$ are not correlated with their values in modulo $p_1$, this challenge ciphertext is randomly distributed.

**Lemma 4.2.** Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{0.1}Adv_A - O_{1.0}Adv_A = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 3.

**Proof:** $B$ is given $g_1, g_2, X_1X_2, Y_1Y_3, T$. It will simulate $O_{0.1}$ or $O_1$ using $A$. It chooses random exponents $y_u, y_v, y_0, a_0, \ldots, a_\ell, s, t, \tau \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1''$, $u = g_1'', w = g_1'', v = g_1''$, and $h = g_1$. It sends the group elements to $A$:

$$(g, u, w, h, b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2, w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3), b, a, X_1X_2,w_0''(Y_2X_3)$$

This is implicitly sets $a = y_{x_2}$ modulo $p_2$ when we write $X_1X_2 = g_2''y_z^2$.

When $A$ makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, $S$, $B$ responds to $A$ by choosing a random $t \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returning

$$(\langle x_1x_2 \rangle^v, b, a, X_1X_2, t, h, a, Z_{t}, u).$$

This implies $b = y_vX_2$ modulo $p_2$. $a$ and $b$ are uniformly distributed because $y_v$ modulo $p_2$ does not appear anywhere else.

When $A$ makes a challenge key-type query for some identity $i$, $A$ chooses a random $y' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returns

$$w^y, h^y, b^yv, T^y, T - a_0x_j/x_0 + a_j : j \in [1, \ell].$$

The $G_1$ part of the challenge ciphertext is properly distributed if we write $g_1''$ as the $G_1$ part of $T$. If we write the $G_{p_3}$ part of $T$ as $g_3''$, this implicitly sets $\gamma_0' = r''y_u$ modulo $p_3$ and $\gamma_j' = r'(-a_0x_j/x_0 + a_j)$ modulo $p_3$. Because $y_u$ and $a_j$ modulo $p_3$ do not appear anywhere else, the $G_{p_3}$ parts of this challenge ciphertext is randomly distributed. Hence, if $T \in G_{p_1p_2}$, then this matches the distribution of $O_{0.1}$. If $T \in G$, then this matches the distribution of $O_1$ because $y_u$ and $a_j$ modulo $p_2$ do not appear anywhere else and does not correlate their values in modulo $p_1$ and $p_2$, this is the properly distributed challenge ciphertext.

**Lemma 5.** Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{1.0}Adv_A - O_{1.1}Adv_A = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.

**Proof:** This is proved by Lemma 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3 with additional oracles $O_{1.1}$ and $O_{1.2}$.

**Oracle $O_{1.1}$:** If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext query for a set of recipients $S \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$, it selects randomly $b, t, a_0' \ldots, a_\ell' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and returns the group elements

$$\{w^s g_2'' g_3^s b, a, z_1, h^s a, Z_{t}, u, a, g_3'' t\}.$$
This implies that $\gamma_i', \ldots, \gamma'_k$ are uniformly distributed. It should be noted that if $k = 1$, $\gamma'_1$ is equal to $\langle \tilde{a}, \tilde{Z} \rangle$ because $z_0$ equal to $-x_1/x_0$ and $z_1 = 1$. Also, we stress that $\gamma'_{k+1}, \ldots, \gamma'_l$ given to the adversary shares the $a'_0$, but the value of $a'_0$ is not revealed because for all $j \in [k+1, l]$, $\gamma'_j$ has $a_j$ which does not appear anywhere else.

**Lemma 5.2:** Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{1, \text{Adv}_A} - O_{2, \text{Adv}_A} = \epsilon$ . Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 3.

**Proof:** $B$ is given $g_1, g_3, X_1X_2, Y_2, T$. It will simulate $O_{1,1}$ or $O_{2,1}$ with $A$. It chooses random exponents $y_u, y_v, y_0, a_0, \ldots, a_l, \psi, y, \tilde{y}, \sigma \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1^{y_u}, u = g_1^{y_v}, \tilde{y} = g_1^w, v = g_1^h, h = g_1$. It sends the group elements to $A$:

$$(g, u, w, h, v^{a_j}, h^{a_j}, (X_1X_2), w^\gamma (Y_2Y_2)^{\tilde{y}}h^\gamma (Y_2Y_3)^{\tilde{y}}v^\gamma (Y_2Y_3)^{\tilde{y}} : j \in [0, l])$$

This implicitly sets $a = y_{x_2}$ modulo $p_2$ if we write $X_1 = g_1^{y_{x_2}}$.

When $A$ makes a challenge key-type query for some identity $i$, $A$ chooses a random $y_i', r, \gamma_i', \ldots, \gamma_k' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returns

$$(w^{y_i'}, h^{y_i'}, v^{a_j} (Y_2Y_3)^{\tilde{y}}h^{r(-a_0y_i'/x_0+a_j)} (Y_2Y_3)^{\tilde{y}} : j \in [1, l])$$

When $A$ makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, $S, B$ responds to $A$ by returning

$$\langle (X_1X_2)^{y_{x_2}}t^{y_i}(\tilde{a}, \tilde{Z}), T^{\tilde{a}}, T^{y_i} \rangle.$$ 

This implies $b = \psi_{y_{x_2}}$, $a$ and $b$ modulo $p_2$ are uniformly distributed because $y_{x_2}$ modulo $p_2$ do not appear anywhere else.

If $T \in G$, then this matches the distribution of $O_{1,2}$. If we write $(g_2g_3)^{y_i'}$ to be the $G_{p_2}$ part of $T$, then this implies that $t_1 = t_2 = t_1y_u$ and $a_j' = a_j$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$ for $j \in [0, l]$. Because $a_j, y_u$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$ do not appear anywhere else, these properly distribute similarly. If $T \in G_{p_1p_2}$, then this matches the distribution of $O_{1,1}$.

**Lemma 5.3:** Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{1,2} \text{Adv}_A - O_{2,2} \text{Adv}_A = \epsilon$ . Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2.

**Proof:** $B$ is given $g_1, g_2, X_1X_2, T$. It will simulate $O_{1,2}$ or $O_{2,2}$ with $A$. It chooses random exponents $y_u, y_v, y_0, \ldots, a_l, s, a, y_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1^{y_u}$, $u = g_1^{y_v}, v = g_1^w$, $h = g_1$. Then, the responses of the initial and challenge-key queries can be generated the same way as Lemma 5.1.

When $A$ makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, $S, B$ randomly selects $s, b, a_0, \ldots, a_l, t_1, t_2$ and responds to $A$ by returning

$$\langle w^{b^{g_2}}h^{t_0'}, h^{t_0'}, v^{a_j} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}}h^{r(-a_0y_0'/x_0+a_j)} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}} : j \in [1, l] \rangle$$

This is possible because $g_2$ was given. If we denote $g'_i$ to be the $G_{p_1}$ part of $T$, the $G_{p_1}$ part of the challenge ciphertext is properly distributed. If $T \in G_{p_1p_2}$, then this matches the distribution of $O_{2,2}$. If $T \in G_{p_1p_3}$, this matches the distribution of $O_{1,2}$ for the same reasons as for Lemma 5.1.

**Lemma 6:** Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{2, \text{Adv}_A} - O_{2, \text{Adv}_A} = \epsilon$ . Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.

**Proof:** This is proved by Lemmas 6.1 to 6.9 with additional oracles $O_{2,1}$, $O_{2,2}$, $O_{2,3}$, $O_{2,4}$, $O_{2,5}$, $O_{2,6}$, $O_{2,7}$ and $O_{2,8}$.

**Oracle $O_{2,1}$:** If the oracle receives a challenge key query for an identity $i \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, it selects randomly $y_i', \tilde{y}, r, y_0', \ldots, y_k' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, then returns the group elements

$$\langle w^{y_i'}h^{y_i'}v^{a_j} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}}h^{r(-a_0y_i'/x_0+a_j)} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}} : j \in [1, l] \rangle$$

It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query in the same way as $O_{2,1}$.

**Oracle $O_{2,2}$:** The response for an initial query is identical with that of $O_{2,1}$ except that $h^{y_i'} (g_2g_3)^{y_i'}$ replaces $h^{y_i'} (g_2g_3)^{y_i'}$.

If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext query for a set of recipients $S \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$, it selects randomly $b, a'_0, \ldots, a'_l, t, t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4, t_5 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, then returns the group elements

$$\langle w^{y_i'}v^{t_0'}h^{y_i'}v^{a_j} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}}h^{r(-a_0y_i'/x_0+a_j)} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}} : j \in [1, l] \rangle$$

It responds to a challenge ciphertext query in the same way as $O_{2,1}$.

**Oracle $O_{2,3}$:** If the oracle receives a challenge key query for identity $i \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, it selects randomly $y_i', \tilde{y}, y_0', \ldots, y_k' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, then returns the group elements

$$\langle w^{y_i'}v^{t_0'}h^{y_i'}v^{a_j} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}}h^{r(-a_0y_i'/x_0+a_j)} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}} : j \in [1, l] \rangle$$

It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query in the same way as $O_{2,2}$.

**Oracle $O_{2,4}$:** The response for an initial query is identical with that of $O_{2,1}$.

If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext query for a set of recipients $S \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$, it selects randomly $s, b, a'_0, \ldots, a'_l, t, t_1, t_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, then returns the group elements

$$\langle w^{y_i'}b^{g_2}h^{y_i'}v^{t_0'}h^{t_0'}v^{a_j} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}}h^{r(-a_0y_i'/x_0+a_j)} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}} : j \in [1, l] \rangle$$

It responds to a challenge ciphertext query in the same way as $O_{2,3}$.

**Oracle $O_{2,5}$:** If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext query for a set of recipients $S \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$, it selects randomly $s, b, a'_0, \ldots, a'_l, t, t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, then returns the group elements

$$\langle w^{y_i'}b^{g_2}h^{y_i'}v^{t_0'}h^{t_0'}v^{a_j} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}}h^{r(-a_0y_i'/x_0+a_j)} (g_2g_3)^{\tilde{y}} : j \in [1, l] \rangle$$

It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query in the same way as $O_{2,4}$.


Oracle $O_{2.6}$: If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext query for a set of recipients $S \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$, it selects randomly $s, b, t, t_3, t_4 \overset{R}{\rightarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N$, then returns the group elements
\[
\{w^s g_2^b (\bar{a}, \bar{Z})_t, h^{\alpha t_3}, h^{\bar{a}, \bar{Z}}_t, g_3, u^t s_3^t\}
\]
It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query in the same way as $O_{2.5}$.

Oracle $O_{2.7}$: If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext query for a set of recipients $S \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$, it selects randomly $s, b, t \overset{R}{\rightarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N$, then returns the group elements
\[
\{w^s g_2^b (\bar{a}, \bar{Z})_t, h^{\bar{a}, \bar{Z}}_t, u^t\}
\]
It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query in the same way as $O_{2.6}$.

Oracle $O_{2.8}$: If the oracle receives a challenge key query for an identity $i \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, it selects randomly $y', y^*, r', r''$, $\gamma'' \overset{R}{\rightarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N$, then returns the group elements
\[
\{w^{y'} (g_2 g_3)^{y''}, h^r (g_2 g_3)^{y''}, v'^t (g_2 g_3)^{y''}, g_3^t, h^{y''t} (\alpha s^{x_a} / s + a) g_3^t : j \in [1, \ell]\}
\]
It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query in the same way as $O_{2.7}$.

Lemma 6.1: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{2.1} \supseteq A = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2.

Proof: $B$ is given $g_1, g_2, X_1 X_3, T$. It will simulate $O_2$ or $O_{2.1}$ with $A$. It chooses random exponents $y_g, y_u, y_v, w, a_0, \ldots, a_t, y, \sigma \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1^{y_g}$, $u = g_1^y$, $w = g_1^w$, $v = g_1^v$, and $h = g_1$. It sends the group elements to $A$:
\[
(g, u, w, h, b', a, h', h', h_2, (X_1 X_3)^{y_g}, (X_1 X_3)^{y_u}, (X_1 X_3)^{y_v} : j \in [1, \ell])
\]
This implicitly sets $g_1^t = X_1 \bmod p_1$. Also, $v$ equals $y_u$ and $\sigma$ equals $y_v$ modulo $p_2, p_3$.

When $A$ makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, $S$, $B$ responds to $A$ by choosing random $b, t, a_0, \ldots, a_t, t_1, t_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returning
\[
\{w^s g_2^b (\bar{a}, \bar{Z})_t, h^{\bar{a}, \bar{Z}}_t, g_3, u^t g_2^t : j \in [1, \ell] - 1\}
\]
If we denote $X_1 X_3 = g_1^{y_1} g_3^{y_3}$, this implicitly sets $r' = y_3$ modulo $p_1$. We note $y_0' = \gamma y_0$ modulo $p_2$ and $y_0' = y_3 y_0$ modulo $p_3$, also $y_0' = \gamma = (-a q_{x_i}/x_0 + a_j) \bmod p_2$ and $\gamma = y_3 = (-a q_{x_i}/x_0 + a_j) \bmod p_3$.

Let $T \in G_{p_1}$ and $g_1^{y'}$ be the $G_{p_1}$ part of $T$, then this matches the distribution of $O_{2.1}$ because $y_u$ and $a_0, \ldots, a_t \bmod p_2$ do not appear anywhere else.

Lemma 6.2: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{2.1} \supseteq A = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 3.

Proof: In this lemma $G_{p_2}$ and $G_{p_3}$ parts of Assumption 3 are reversed. $B$ is given $g_1, g_2, X_1 X_3, Y_1 Y_3, T$. It will simulate $O_{2.1}$ or $O_{2.2}$ with $A$. It chooses random exponents $y_g, y_u, y_v, y_0, a_0, \ldots, a_t, y, \sigma \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1^{y_g}$, $u = g_1^{y_u}$, $w = g_1^w$, $v = g_1^v$, and $h = g_1$. It sends the group elements to $A$:
\[
(g, u, w, h, b', a, h', h', T, w^{y_2 (Y_2 Y_3)^{y_u}}, h^y (Y_2 Y_3), v^{y_2 (Y_2 Y_3)^{y_v}} : j \in [1, \ell])
\]
This is properly distributed if we denote the $G_{p_1}$ part of $T$ by $g_1^{y_1}$. Also, this sets $v = y_u \bmod p_2, p_3$. If $T \in G_{p_1 p_2}$, this is a properly distributed set of group elements of $O_{2.1}$. If $T \in G$, this is properly distributed set of group elements of $O_{2.2}$.

When $A$ makes a challenge key-type query for some identity $i$, $A$ chooses a random $r', y_0', \ldots, y_i' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and it returns
\[
\{(X_1 X_3)^{y_0}, (X_1 X_3)^{y_u} u'^t (Y_2 Y_3)^{y_v}, h^y (Y_2 Y_3), v^{y_2 (Y_2 Y_3)^{y_v}} : j \in [1, \ell]\}
\]
This is properly distributed a challenge-key. It should be noted that $y_u$ modulo $p_3$ was used but not revealed because there is random parameter $y_0$ modulo $p_3$ which does not appear in any other component.

When $A$ makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, $S$, $B$ responds to $A$ by choosing random $t', t'' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returns
\[
T^{y_w t} e^{y_3 (\bar{a}, \bar{Z}) t''} b (\bar{a}, \bar{Z}) t'' s^{y_2} : g_2^t, g_2^t, t^t \in \mathbb{Z}_N
\]
We denote the $G_{p_1 p_2}$ part of $T$ as $g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_3}$. This implicitly sets $s = \tau$ and $t = t' + t'' \bmod p_2$. Also, $G_{p_2}$ parts of the challenge ciphertext distribute $g_2^{y_2} g_2^{y_3}$, $s^{y_3}, t^{y_3}, t^{y_3}$, where $b = \bar{t} (y_w + y_u (\bar{a}, \bar{Z}) t'' - \bar{a}, \bar{Z}) t''$, $t_1 = t' + t'' \bmod p_2$, $t_2 = y_v t' t'' + t''$, $b$ is not correlated with $t_1$ and $t_2$ because $y_0$ modulo $p_2$ appears only here. Also, due to $t'$ and $t''$, $t_1$ and $t_2$ do not correlate. Therefore, the $G_2$ terms here are properly distributed. If $T \in G_{p_1 p_2}$, this $B$ has properly simulated $O_{2.1}$. If $T \in G$, we must argue that the $G_3$ terms attached to the ciphertext are uniformly random in order to claim that $B$ simulates properly $O_{2.2}$. Let us denote by $G_3$ the part of ciphertext $g_3^{y_3}, g_3^{y_3}, g_3^{y_3}$. If we also denote by $G_3$ the part of $T$ as $g_1^y$, then $t_3 = t'' (y_u + y_v (\bar{a}, \bar{Z}) t'' - \bar{a}, \bar{Z}) t''$ and $t_3 = t'' (y_u t' + t'' \bmod p_3$). Neither $t_2$ nor $t_4$ correlates with $t_3$ because of $\bar{a}, \bar{Z}$ which is randomly distributed as $\bar{a}, \bar{Z}$ modulo $p_3$ do not appear anywhere. Also $t_3$ and $t_4$ do not correlate to each other because $y_0$ does not reveal its value although it appears within the challenge key. So, the $G_3$ parts of the challenge ciphertext are properly distributed.

Lemma 6.3: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{2.2} \supseteq A = \epsilon$. Then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 3.

Proof: $B$ is given $g_1, g_3, X_1 X_2, Y_2 Y_3, T$. It will simulate $O_{2,2}$ or $O_{2,3}$ with $A$. It chooses random exponents $y_g, y_u, y_w, y_v, a_0, \ldots, a_t, s, a, y \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1^{y_g}$, $u = g_1^{y_u}$, $w = g_1^{y_w}$, $v = g_1^{y_v}$, and $h = g_1$. It sends the group elements to $A$:

$$(g, u, w, h, v^{a_j}, h^{a_j}, h^{Y_2 Y_3})^\nu, h^Y(Y_2 Y_3), v^Y(Y_2 Y_3)^\nu : j \in [0, \ell]$$

This implicitly sets $\psi = y_u$ and $\sigma = y_v$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$.

When $A$ makes a challenge ciphertext for the set of receivers, $S$, $B$ responds to $A$ by choosing random $b', t', t_1, t_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returns

$$(w^b(Y_2 Y_3)^b (X_1 X_2)^\nu (\tilde{Z})^{t'}) \cdot \left((X_1 X_2)^{(\bar{a} Z) \nu}^r \cdot \left(g_3^{t_2} \cdot (X_1 X_2)^{\nu} g_3^{t_3}\right)\right).$$

Then the $G_1$ part of challenge ciphertext properly is distributed and $t = t' \mod 3$. We write $X_1 = g_1^{y_1}$. Also, the $G_2$ part of challenge ciphertext, $t_1 = t' \mod 3$ and $t_2 = y_u t'$ modulo $p_2$, are properly distributed. Moreover, if we denote $Y_2 Y_3$ a $\tilde{g}_2^{y_2} g_3^{y_3}$, $b$ modulo $p_2$ equal to $b' y_2$. The $G_3$ part also properly distributed with random values, $t_3 = b' y_3$ modulo $p_3$, $t_4$ and $t_5$.

When $A$ makes a challenge key-type query for some identity $i$, $A$ chooses a random $r', \gamma_0', \ldots, \gamma_L'$ in $\mathbb{Z}_N$ and returns

$$(T^{\nu_1}, T, T^{\nu_2} u^{t'} (Y_2 Y_3)^{\gamma_0}, h^{t'(-a_0 x_1 + s_0 a_1)} (Y_2 Y_3)^{\gamma_L} : j \in [1, \ell])$$

If $T \in G_{p_1 p_3}$, the challenge key-type response is identically distributed to a response from $O_{2,2}$. If $T \in G_{1}$, then the challenge key-type response is identically distributed to a response from $O_{2,3}$.

Lemma 6.4: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{2,3} Adv_A - O_{2,4} Adv_A = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 3.

Proof: In this lemma, $G_{p_2}$ and $G_{p_3}$ parts of Assumption 3 are reversed. $B$ is given $g_1, g_2, X_1 X_2, Y_2 Y_3, T$. It will simulate $O_{2,3}$ or $O_{2,4}$ with $A$. It chooses random exponents $y_g, y_u, y_w, y_v, a_0, \ldots, a_t, \psi, y', \sigma \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and set $g = g_1^{y_g}$, $u = g_1^{y_u}$, $w = g_1^{y_w}$, $v = g_1^{y_v}$, $h = g_1$. Then, initial response, normal keys can be responded by generating them as the same way of Lemma 6.2.

When $A$ makes a challenge key-type query for some identity $i$, $A$ chooses a random $r'$, $\gamma_0', \ldots, \gamma_L' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returns

$$(X_1 X_3 g_2)\nu, (X_1 X_3 g_2)^{b} u^{t'} (Y_2 Y_3)^{\gamma_0}, h^{t'(-a_0 x_1 + s_0 a_1)} (Y_2 Y_3)^{\gamma_L} : j \in [1, \ell])$$

This is properly distributed challenge-key. It should be noted that $y_o$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$ was used but not revealed because there is random parameter $r'$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$ which does not appear anywhere else.

When $A$ makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, $S$, $B$ responds to $A$ by choosing random $t', t'', t''' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returning

$$\begin{align*}
T^{\nu_1}, &\quad T^{\nu_2} (\bar{a} Z)^{t''} \cdot h^{t''(\bar{a} Z)^{t''}} g_2^{t''},
T^{\nu_1}, &\quad T^{\nu_2} h^{t''(\bar{a} Z)^{t''}} g_2^{t''},
\end{align*}$$

Identically with lemma 6.2, if $T \in G_{p_1 p_2}$, this properly simulates $O_{2,4}$. Also, if $T \in G$, $G_{p_2}$ part of the challenge ciphertext distributed randomly, and this properly simulates $O_{2,3}$.

Lemma 6.5: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{2,4} Adv_A - O_{2,5} Adv_A = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2.

Proof: $B$ is given $g_1, g_2, X_1 X_2, Y_2 Y_3, T$. It will simulate $O_{2,4}$ or $O_{2,5}$ using $A$. It chooses random exponents $y_g, y_u, y_w, y_v, a_0, \ldots, a_t, s, a, y \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1^{y_g}$, $u = g_1^{y_u}$, $w = g_1^{y_w}$, $v = g_1^{y_v}$, and $h = g_1$. It sends the following group elements to $A$:

$$(g, u, w, h, v^{a_j}, h^{a_j}, h^{Y_2 Y_3})\nu, (X_1 X_3)^{y_3}g_2^{y_3}, (X_1 X_3)^{y_3}g_2^{y_3}, : j \in [1, \ell]).$$

This implicitly sets $g_1^y = X_1$ modulo $p_1$ and $g_2^y$ modulo $p_2$. Also, $\psi = y_u$ and $\sigma = y_v$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$.

When $A$ makes a challenge key-type query for some identity $i$, $A$ chooses a random $r'', \gamma_0'', \ldots, \gamma_L'' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returns

$$(X_1 X_3 g_2)^{y_3 r''}, (X_1 X_3 g_2)^{y_3 r''}, (X_1 X_3)^{y_3 r''} g_2^{y_3}, (X_1 X_3)^{y_3 r''} g_2^{y_3} : j \in [1, \ell])$$

Let us write $X_1 X_3$ as $g_1^{y_3} g_2^{y_3}$, this implicitly sets $y'' = y_1 y''$ and $r'' = y_1 r''$ modulo $p_1$. $y''$ equals to $y''$ modulo $p_2$ and $y''$ modulo $p_3$. Also, $\psi = y_u$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$, and $\sigma = y_v$ modulo $p_2$ and $p_3$. $\gamma_0''$ equals $\gamma_0''$ modulo $p_2$ and $y_3 r'' y''$ modulo $p_2$. For $j \in [1, \ell]$, $y_j''$ equals $y''$ modulo $p_2$ and $y_3 r'' y''$ modulo $p_2$.

When $A$ makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, $S$, $B$ responds to $A$ by choosing random $b, t, a_0', \ldots, a_t', t_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and returning

$$(w^b T^{\nu_1} (\bar{a} Z)^{t''} g_2^{(\bar{a} Z)^{t''}} T^{\nu_2} g_2^{t''} \nu_2)$$

where $a'_j = (a_0', \ldots, a_t')$.

If $T \in G_{p_1 p_1}$, it is the $G_{p_1}$ part of $T$, then this matches the distribution of $O_{2,4}$. If $T \in G_{p_1 p_3}$, it is the $G_{p_1 p_3}$ part of $T$, this implicitly sets $t_3 = (a, Z)^{t''}$ modulo $p_3$ and $t_4 = y_u t''$ modulo $p_3$. This matches the distribution of $O_{2,5}$ because the $G_{p_3}$ part in the challenge ciphertext is $k$-wise independent as in Lemma 5.1.

Lemma 6.6: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $O_{2,5} Adv_A - O_{2,6} Adv_A = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 3.

Proof: $B$ is given $g_1, g_3, X_1 X_2, Y_2 Y_3, T$. It will simulate $O_{2,5}$ or $O_{2,6}$ with $A$. It chooses random exponents $y_g, y_u, y_w, y_v, a_0, \ldots, a_t, \psi, y \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $g = g_1^{y_g}$, $u = g_1^{y_u}$, $w = g_1^{y_w}$, $v = g_1^{y_v}$, and $h = g_1$. It sends to $A$ the group elements:

$$(g, u, w, h, v^{a_j}, h^{a_j}, X_1 X_2, w^{Y_2 Y_3})\nu, h^Y(Y_2 Y_3), v^Y(Y_2 Y_3)^\nu : j \in [1, \ell])$$


This is properly distributed if we set \( X_1X_2 = g_1^y g_2^h \). Moreover, this implies that \( \sigma = y_0 \mod g_2^h \).

When \( \mathcal{A} \) makes a challenge key-type query for some identity \( i \), \( \mathcal{A} \) chooses a random \( y', i', y'_0, \ldots, y'_f \in \mathbb{Z}_N \) and returns
\[
(w^y (Y_2 Y_3)^{y''}, h^x (Y_2 Y_3)^{y''}, v^r (Y_2 Y_3)^{y''}) : j \in [1, \ell]).
\]

When \( \mathcal{A} \) makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, \( S, B \) responds to \( \mathcal{A} \) returning
\[
\{(X_1X_2)^{y''} T_{y''}, g, \bar{Z}, T, T_{y''} \}
\]

Because \( y_0 \) and \( y_0 \mod p_2 \) do not appear anywhere else, \( g_2^h \) is randomly distributed. \( T \in G_{p_1 p_2} \), \( (\bar{a}, \bar{Z}) \) modulo \( p_3 \) appears to be uniformly random to the adversary since \( a_j \) and \( y_0 \mod p_3 \) do not appear anywhere else. Hence, this matches the distribution of \( O_{2.6} \). If \( T \in G \), this implies that \( \alpha' = a_j \mod p_2 \) and \( t = t' \) and \( t'' = y_0 u' \) where we denote \( G_2 \) the part of \( T \) as \( g_2^h \). It should be noted that \( y_0 \mod p_2 \) does not appear anywhere else. So, \( t_2 \) is also uniformly random to the adversary. Therefore, this matches the distribution of \( O_{2.5} \).

**Lemma 6.7:** Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm \( \mathcal{A} \) such that \( O_{2.6} \) \( \mathcal{A} \) - \( O_{2.7} \) \( \mathcal{A} \) = \( \epsilon \). Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm \( \mathcal{B} \) with advantage \( \epsilon \) in breaking Assumption 2.

**Proof:** \( \mathcal{B} \) is given \( g_1, g_2, X_1, X_3, T \). It will simulate \( O_{2.6} \) or \( O_{2.7} \) with \( \mathcal{A} \). It chooses random exponents \( y_0, y_0, a_0, \ldots, a_\ell, s, a, \bar{y}, \bar{Z} \in \mathbb{Z}_N \), and sets \( g = g_1^y, u = g_1^y, v = g_1^y, h = g_1 \). It sends to \( \mathcal{A} \) the group elements:
\[
(g, u, w, h, v^{a_j}, h^{a_j}, h^s g_2^h, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y, T_{y''}^2 : j \in [1, \ell]).
\]

This is properly distributed. Also, \( \psi = y_0 \) and \( \sigma = y_0 \mod p_2, p_3 \).

When \( \mathcal{A} \) makes a challenge key-type query for some identity \( i \), \( \mathcal{A} \) chooses a random \( y''', i', y'_0, \ldots, y'_f \in \mathbb{Z}_N \) returns
\[
\{(X_1 X_3 g_2^y)^{y''}, (X_1 X_3 g_2^y)^{y''}, (X_1 X_3 g_2^y)^{y''}, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y : j \in [1, \ell - 1] \}
\]

When \( \mathcal{A} \) makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, \( S, B \) randomly choose \( b, t, t_2 \) and \( s \) and returns to \( \mathcal{A} \) by returning
\[
(w^y (Y_2 Y_3)^{y''}, h^x (Y_2 Y_3)^{y''}, v^r (Y_2 Y_3)^{y''}) : j \in [1, \ell]).
\]

This implicitly sets \( g_1^y \) to be the \( G_{p_1} \) part of \( T \). If \( T \in G_{p_1} \), then this matches the distribution of \( O_{2.6} \). If \( T \in G_{p_1 p_2} \), for the same reasons as Lemma 6.5, this matches the distribution of \( O_{2.6} \).

**Lemma 6.8:** Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm \( \mathcal{A} \) such that \( O_{2.7} \) \( \mathcal{A} \) - \( O_{2.8} \) \( \mathcal{A} \) = \( \epsilon \). Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm \( \mathcal{B} \) with advantage \( \epsilon \) in breaking Assumption 3.

**Proof:** \( \mathcal{B} \) is given \( g_1, g_2, X_1, X_2, Y_2, Y_3, T \). It will simulate \( O_{2.7} \) or \( O_2 \) with \( \mathcal{A} \). It chooses random exponents \( y_0, y_0, y_0, a_0, \ldots, a_\ell, s, a, \bar{y}, \bar{Z} \in \mathbb{Z}_N \), and sets \( g = g_1^{y''}, u = g_1^{y''}, v = g_1^{y''}, h = g_1 \). It sends to \( \mathcal{A} \) the group elements:
\[
(g, u, w, h, v^{a_j}, h^{a_j}, h^s g_2^h, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y : j \in [1, \ell]).
\]

This is properly distributed and implies that \( \psi = y_0 \) and \( \sigma = y_0 \mod p_2, p_3 \).

When \( \mathcal{A} \) makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, \( S, B \) responds to \( \mathcal{A} \) by choosing random \( t, t_2 \) and returns
\[
(w^y (Y_2 Y_3)^{y''}, h^x (Y_2 Y_3)^{y''}, v^r (Y_2 Y_3)^{y''}) : j \in [1, \ell]).
\]

When \( \mathcal{A} \) makes a challenge key-type query for some identity \( i \), \( \mathcal{A} \) chooses a random \( \bar{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_N \) and returns
\[
\{(X_1 X_3 g_2^y)^{y''}, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y, (X_1 X_3)^{y''} g_2^y : j \in [1, \ell]) \}
\]

This implicitly sets \( g_1^y \) to be the \( G_{p_1} \) part of \( T \). If \( T \in G_{p_1 p_3} \), the \( G_{p_3} \) part of the challenge key is properly distributed
because $y_u$ and $a_j$ modulo $p_3$ do not appear anywhere else. Hence, this matches the distribution of $O_{2.8}$ if $T \in G_{p_1}$, then, this matches the distribution of $O_3$.

Lemma 7: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that $\text{Game}^{\epsilon}_{k-1} \text{BBE}_{A \sigma} - \text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{k-1} \text{BBE}_{A \sigma} = \epsilon$. Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm $B$ with advantage $\epsilon$ in breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.

Proof: We assume there exists a PPT attacker $A$ who distinguishes between $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{A \sigma}$ and $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{k-1}$ with non-negligible advantage. This means that $A$ can distinguish at least one of following pairs of oracles such as $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{1}$ and $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{1 \sigma}$, $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{2}$ and $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{2 \sigma}$, $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{3}$ and $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{3 \sigma}$ with non-negligible advantage. If this adversary exists, this can be used to create a PPT algorithm $B$ distinguishing one of following pairs of oracles such as $O_0$, $O_1$, $O_2$ and $O_3$ with non-negligible advantage. However, this violates one of Lemmas 4, 5 and 6.

Assuming that $B$ interacts with one of $O_0$, $O_1$, $O_2$ and $O_3$. Each oracle outputs as an initial response the group elements

\[ \{g, u, w, h, v^j, h^a, h^s, w^j(g_{2g})^{w^j}, h^i(g_{2g})^{w^j}, v^j(g_{2g})^{w^j} : \forall j \in [0, \ell] \} \]

$B$ randomly chooses $\delta \in Z_N$, and gives to $A$ the public parameters,

\[ PK = \{N, G, g, u, w, v^j, h^a, e(g, h) : \forall j \in [0, \ell] \} \]

To create the first $k - 1$ semi-functional keys, $B$ generates $K_0, K_1, K_2$, and $K_{3_j}$ using the key generation algorithm. Then, it randomly chooses $\delta, y'_j \in Z_N$ and, by using the semi-functional elements in the initial response, constructs semi-functional keys as:

\[ K'_0 = g^\delta K_0(w^j(g_{2g})^{w^j})^{y'_j}, K'_1 = K_1(h^i(g_{2g})^{w^j})^{y'_j}, K'_2 = K_2(w^j(g_{2g})^{w^j})^{y'_j}, K'_{3_j} = K_{3_j} : j \in [1, \ell] \]

This implicitly sets $y_i = yy'_j + y''_j$ modulo $p_1$ and $y = yy'_j$ modulo $p_2, p_3$ when we let $y''_j$ be a randomization parameter shared in the first three components of the normal key for identity $i$.

For responding normal keys ($> k$), $B$ generates normal keys by the key generation algorithm. This is possible because $B$ knows $MSK = \{\delta\}$. It forwarded a normal key to the $A$.

If $A$ requests the $k$th key for some identity $i$, $B$ makes a challenge key-type query to the oracle with $i$. Then, oracle returns group elements, $\{T_0, T_1, T_2, T_{3_j} : j \in [1, \ell]\}$. $B$ constructs the challenge key for $A$ as:

\[ K_0 = g^\delta T_0, K_1 = T_1, K_2 = T_2, K_{3_j} = T_{3_j} : j \in [1, \ell] \]

If the oracle which $B$ interacts with is $O_0$, this challenge key is a properly distributed normal key. If the oracle is $O_1$, this key will be a properly distributed ephemeral key. If the oracle is $O_2$, this key will be distributed as ephemeral key, properly. If $B$ is interacting with $O_3$, this will be distributed as a proper semi-functional key.

When $A$ requests challenge-ciphertext with the set of receivers $S$ for messages $M_0, M_1$, $B$ forwards this query to the oracle and the received group elements $(T'_1, T'_2, T'_3)$. Then $B$ choose $f \in [0, 1]$, and construct the ciphertext as:

\[ C = M_f e(g^\delta, h^s g^2), C_0 = h^s g^2, C_1 = T'_1, C_2 = T'_2, C_3 = T'_3 \]

and returns it to $A$.

If $B$ is interacting with $O_0$, $O_1$, $O_3$ then the challenge ciphertext will be a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext. Otherwise, if the oracle which $B$ interacts is $O_2$, then the challenge ciphertext will be an properly distributed ephemeral ciphertext.

Thus, if $B$ interacts with $O_0$, $O_1$, $O_2$ and $O_3$, then it has properly simulated $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{1}$, $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{2}$, $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{3}$ and $\text{Game}^{k \text{BBE}}_{3 \sigma}$, respectively. Thus, if $A$ distinguishes at least one of the pairs of games with non-negligible advantage, $B$ can use this to distinguish a corresponding pair of oracles with non-negligible advantage. This violates Lemmas 3, 4 or 5.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we introduced the adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption scheme featuring constant size ciphertext. The public parameters and private keys in our scheme increase linearly with the maximum number of receivers; but not the total number of users. Also, the computational complexity of the decryption process of our scheme only depends on the number of receivers. Finally, we showed that our scheme is adaptively secure under the general decisional subgroup assumption instead of multiple subgroup decisional assumptions in the standard model through the use of the dual system encryption technique.

REFERENCES


