University of Wollongong

Research Online

University of Wollongong Thesis Collection 1954-2016

University of Wollongong Thesis Collections

2015

The factors which lead to the emergence of terrorist groups and influence their structure

Stuart C. Groombridge
University of Wollongong

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses

University of Wollongong

Copyright Warning

You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any copyright material contained on this site.

You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised, without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material into digital or electronic form.

Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the University of Wollongong.

Recommended Citation

Groombridge, Stuart C., The factors which lead to the emergence of terrorist groups and influence their structure, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, School of Law, University of Wollongong, 2015. https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/4906

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Title Sheet

THE FACTORS WHICH LEAD TO THE EMERGENCE OF TERRORIST GROUPS AND INFLUENCE THEIR STRUCTURE

*A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

From

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

By

STUART C. GROOMBRIDGE,
Bachelor Engineering (Computer) UOW, Post Grad Cert (Strategic Intelligence) QUT, Master of Justice (Strategic Intelligence) QUT

SCHOOL OF LAW

2015

CERTIFICATION

I, Stuart C. Groombridge, declare that this thesis, submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, School of Law, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.

(Signature)
Stuart C. Groombridge
20 October 2016

Acknowledgements

If I had known 9 years ago that doing a Doctorate part time would take me 9 years to complete, I would not have started. During this time, I have had to manage competing agendas of family, work, and study, which at times have not been as compatible as one would like.

I would like to acknowledge, this research has been conducted with the support of the Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship

I would also like to acknowledge the support, advice, assistance, and perseverance of my Supervisor Professor Adam Dolnik, over the duration of the doctorate. I would also like to acknowledge the patience and understanding displayed by my wife Mrs Karen Groombridge during the long period of study. Further, I would like to thank her and my mother Mrs Maureen Groombridge for proof reading the thesis prior to submission. I would also like to thank my brother Dr Paul Groombridge who also provided some support by proof reading sections of the thesis. I would also like to specially thank Ms Angela Bendeich and my wife Karen for conducting the final proof reading prior to final submission. I would like to thank my employer who has supported this process, specifically my managers Ms Leah Nicholson, Mr Carl Giampietro, Ms Kerryn Fowler, and Ms Angela West who approved my leave applications and pushed me to finish.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge my grandchildren who have sacrificed much time with their grandfather, so I could work on this Doctorate. I would also like to mention my oldest grandson, Jayden, who was only a few weeks old when I started this process and was at my proposal presentation at the start.

Contents

Table of Figures

Abstract

This thesis examines the factors, which lead to the emergence of terrorist groups and the evolution of their organisational structure. The three case studies used within this thesis examine terrorist groups as complex adaptive systems. Historically, the only group, which has been studied as a complex adaptive system, is Al Qaeda. This study builds on this work by examining three cases of historical terrorist groups: the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Weather Underground Organisation, and Kosovo Liberation Army, in an attempt to ascertain whether the concept of complex adaptive systems can be generalised to a broader range of groups.

The thesis found the potential size of the pool of recruits available to a group, was directly related to the amount of homophily the target community shared with the group. It was determined the amount of homophily the community shared with the group, was related to the environment. It was found the group's structure was a function of the physical length of the communications channels, the security of the channels of communications and the group's size, all of which were dictated by the environmental conditions across the conflict space.

The thesis argues the environment in which they emerge, drives the creation of these types of groups. The thesis further argues the structure these types of groups adopt is also a response to the environmental conditions. The thesis utilised the principles of preferential attachment (homophily) to describe how the environment affected the emergence of the group, its size, and its structure. The group's structure is defined by the topology of its communications network.

The case studies demonstrated the group structure was dynamic, was dependent on size, geographic dispersion, and lacked day-to-day centralised control. The structure of the groups was consistent with those of complex adaptive systems. The elements of the groups acted in parallel, working towards the same goal. The

structure of the group was built on pre-existing social structural elements, which acted as building blocks for the higher levels organisation. The various elements of the group adapted to meet the environmental challenges presented to the group over its life cycle, which led to the structure of the group evolving over time. It was found that groups, which were traditionally thought to maintain hierarchical structures, behaved more like networks, because of limitations placed on the communications channels by the environment. This led the groups to maintain a decentralised and distributed leadership model, where each of the elements worked independently towards the group's goal. This network structure, model of leadership and control, was found to be consistent with a complex adaptive system.

Even though all three case studies could be described as complex adaptive systems, further work will be required to ascertain whether this concept can be generalised to a greater diversity of groups. This analysis indicated this model holds promise and could assist in combating these types of groups. An understanding of the variables provides insight into methods, which could be used to mitigate the factors involved in the emergence of these types of groups.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

This thesis examines the emergence and evolution of the organisational structure of terrorist groups. This study examines these two aspects of the groups in the context of the environment in which they operated. It argues the environment is central in emergence and a significant factor in determining the group's structure. There have been extensive studies done over the last 50 years in this area. This study differs from those studies, in that it views emergence and the organisational structure of these types of groups from the context of complexity theory, and it examines these groups as potentially complex adaptive systems. This is not the first study to apply this methodology. There has been interesting work conducted by Bousquet, Marion and Uhl-Bien, and Beech, who have quite successfully viewed Al Qaeda through the lens of complex theory and specifically viewed Al Qaeda as a complex adaptive system. A literature review suggests this is the only terrorist group, which has been examined from this perspective. The aim of this dissertation is to extend and build on this work, which may assist in generalising this theoretical framework.

The intent is to examine three other groups utilising the same theoretical principle. The thesis aims to ascertain whether groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Weather Underground Organisation, and the Kosovo Liberation Army have similar properties, which will permit them to be categorised as complex adaptive systems. The intention is then to determine the factors, which lead to group emergence and influence the organisational structure of the group as a complex adaptive system.

The thesis examines the interrelationship of the emergence of these groups as a function of the environmental conditions. Bertuglia and Vaio describe a complex adaptive system as *"… an open system, made up of numerous elements that interact with one another in a nonlinear way and that constitute a single, organized and*

dynamic entity, able to evolve and adapt to the environment".[1] This definition suggests there is some validity in the assumption that terrorist groups are complex adaptive systems. Violent extremist or terrorist groups consist of a variety of elements, which interact with each other. In a way, they *"…constitute a single, organized, and dynamic entity…"*[2] embedded in a dynamic environment that the group has to adapt to, in order to survive.

The concepts of emergence and self-organising form part of complex adaptive systems. Each of these principles is interpreted within an environmental context. Every system is embedded within a dynamic environment, which drives emergence, self-organising, and complex adaptive systems. These processes rely on geographic proximity, which enables the various entities within the system to interact. These interactions are governed by a set of simple rules. The probability of interaction between the entities is determined by geographic location and the principles of homophily. As in network theory, structures emerge based on the capacity of the elements of the network to communicate. This capacity is determined by the length, security, and bandwidth of these communications channels. The geography distance between the components of the group determines length, which also influences bandwidth. The environment within a specific geographic location determines the security of the communication channels. Hence, the security of the communications channels can vary from location to location. The bandwidth of the channels is a function of how secure these channels are within that environment.

The thesis consists of three case studies, which were selected because they offer differing perspectives on the emergence of a terrorist organisation within three distinctive environments. Each case study provides insight into the factors, which influenced their evolution. They are also unique because the groups varied in size and structure, from small to large. Furthermore, the study also examines how

[1] Christoforo Sergio Bertuglia and Franco Vaio, *Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p 276; ibid.

[2] Ibid., p 278.

successful these groups were in achieving their goals. All groups achieved different outcomes, one failed, one compromised, and one succeeded.

This thesis has relevance, because it examines the factors, which are significant in a terrorist group's lifecycle. This study attempts to extend the previous work on Al Qaeda as a complex adaptive system and generalise the model so that it could be used in the study of other terrorist groups. It examines the emergence and growth of these types of groups and the evolution of their structure as part of a complex adaptive system. It also studies what environmental factors led to their growth and their success, failure or otherwise, in achieving their goals.

This type of study is relevant in the current environment with the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) and the potential rise of reactionary groups. The analysis may give some insight into how groups, like Islamic State, have been able to be so successful. It is also important to understand the environmental factors, which led to the emergence and growth of these types of groups. This knowledge could assist intelligence agencies, policing services and policy makers in mitigating the activities of terrorist and violent extremist groups. Further, an understanding of the structure and its evolution could also assist these government agencies in their disruption activities.

Chapter 2 – Definitions and key concepts

This chapter defines the main concepts and variables utilised in discussion within the thesis.

Defining Terrorism

Attempts to find a universally accepted definition of terrorism has been ongoing for decades and as such, this section is not an extensive review of this struggle.[3] It highlights the issues around deriving a definition and argues that rather than defining terrorism, it is more appropriate to identity key characteristics.

Those definitions used by the various bodies, which are involved in the struggle against terrorism all have definitions that typically suit the objectives of the organisation.[4] In the world of international relations, to have a universally agreed, clear and concise definition of terrorism, places governments in a difficult position. An international agreed definition of terrorism would place various governments around the world would potentially open them to allegations of being states, which sponsor terrorism. This would include governments in countries such as Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the West, who support groups, which engage in terrorist activities.[5] Countries support, or are sympathetic to, these types of groups for many reasons. In general, they are sympathetic to the group's cause due to, ethnic, cultural, political, or religious values.[6] Further, some of these groups are state proxies, which facilitate a particular foreign policy agenda in another country. The use of these groups as proxies, avoids the two nations coming into direct conflict.[7] In addition, some states also label opposing groups within their own countries, terrorist organisations, in an attempt to delegitimise the group and its grievance.

---

[3] Gregor Bruce, "Definition of Terrorism Social and Political Effects," *Journal of Military and Veterans' Health* 21, no. 2 (2013): p 26.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

The 2013 press release from the 68th United Nations Assembly highlighted the complexities of arriving at an internationally accepted definition:

> *"In seeking a definition, many delegates spoke of the need to distinguish between terrorism and the legitimate effort for self-determination by people under foreign domination. Speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Iran's representative reminded those present that the "brutalization of peoples under foreign occupation should continue to be denounced as the gravest form of terrorism"."*[8]

Researchers have argued any definition of terrorism should be all encompassing irrespective of the legitimacy of the group's grievance or agenda.[9] Academics require a definition to ensure they are using a common language and the terms used are agreed. This allows certainty in the discussion surrounding terrorism; everyone is discussing the same thing.

The courts and the legal profession require a definition to test the evidence, to ensure any prosecution is sound. In the context of law enforcement, a useable definition is required to identify the evidence required by the courts under law and the legal boundaries in which they operate. As such, a common definition is essential in this instance.

Within a national context, a definition has to serve a multitude of purposes. It must serve the government's foreign policy needs and must serve the needs of the legal system. These varying interests have differing needs from a definition. As each definition serves a different purpose, the definition will vary depending on the organisational goals. Again, this is another reason why an agreed definition is so elusive.

---

[8] "As Sixth Committee Commences Session, Delegates Once Again Call for Clear Definition of Terrorism, Consensus on Draft Comprehensive Convention," United Nations, http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gal3453.doc.htm.

[9] ———, "Definition of Terrorism Social and Political Effects," p 26.

By way of example, in a pamphlet issued by the Commonwealth Government of Australia, called *"Australia's counter-terrorism laws: Questions and Answers"*, "terrorism" or "terrorist act" is defined as:

> *"…an act, or a threat to commit an act, that is done with the intention to coerce or influence the public or any government by intimidation to advance a political, religious, or ideological cause, and the act causes:*
>
> - *death, serious harm or endangers a person*
> - *serious damage to property*
> - *a serious risk to the health or safety of the public, or*
> - *seriously interferes with, disrupts or destroys critical infrastructure such as a telecommunications or electricity network."*[10]

It does not define terrorism as such, but defines specific terrorism acts, which contravene the laws of Australia. These acts include being a member of, directing the activities of, recruiting for, training or receiving training from, acquire funds for, from or to, or providing support to a terrorist organisation.[11]

The above definition summarises Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, which defines acts of terrorism within a legal context that can be tested in a court of law. The Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation and the state legislation also define terrorism in the context of Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. As such, the Australian government, law enforcement, and its intelligence community all use a legalistic definition of terrorism and terrorist acts. The Australian Government further describes a terrorist group as an organisation, *"…a court finds is either directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting in*

[10] "Australia's counter-terrorism laws: Questions and Answers," ed. Attorney General's Department (Australian Government), p 4.

[11] Ibid., p 7.

or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, or an organisation that has been listed by the Government".[12] This definition of a terrorist organisation is flexible and is not constrained to acts carried out within Australia. It is also flexible in the fact the definition is limited to those groups the government or the courts deem to be terrorist organisations. As such, it does not impose an all-embracing definition, but provides flexibility in its application, which does not hinder the government's foreign policy agenda. By way of example, currently there are 20 listed organisations.[13] Of these 20 listed organisations, only parts of HAMAS and Hezbollah are on the list as terrorist organisations, Hamas' Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and Hezbollah's External Security Organisation (ESO).[14] Thus, it demonstrates the flexibility in the application of the designation, which is prudent when HAMAS is effectively the governing authority in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah forms a significant part of the elected government of Lebanon. The listing of HAMAS and Hezbollah demonstrate the pragmatic approach governments have to adopt, to ensure flexibility in foreign policy and international relations. It also illustrates why governments have difficulty in defining terrorism or terrorist organisations.

Academics and researchers face a different set of challenges. A significant number of researchers have attempted to address the issue of defining terrorism over the past 50 years.[15] Over this period, no general definition for terrorism has gained general acceptance by members of the academic community. Any definition of terrorism generally suits the needs of the organisation, researcher, or individual, who has created it. In the academic community, hundreds of articles and many books have been written, which attempt to gain a universally agreed definition of terrorism. In dealing with this issue, some academics have taken a more pragmatic approach; rather than adopting a definition, they identify characteristics of

[12] Ibid., p 6.

[13] "Listed terrorist organisations," Attorney-General's Department, Commonwealth of Australia https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Dipak K. Gupta, "Towards An Integrated Behavioral Framework for Analyzing Terrorism: Individual Motivations to Group Dynamics," *Democracy and Security* 1, no. 2005 (2005). p 5.

terrorism. Schmidt and Jongman conducted the most influential study in 1988. They carried out a survey of the definition of terrorism used by leading academics in the field at the time. They identified the key terms used in their definitions and summarised them into a table. The list below identifies the top twelve key characteristics listed by Schmidt and Jongman.[16]

Table 1 List of Key Terms or Characteristics of definitions of Terrorism

	Key terms or Characteristics	**% use**
1.	Violence, force	83.5%
2.	Political	65%
3.	Fear, terror emphasised	51%
4.	Threat	47%
5.	(Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5%
6.	Victim - target differentiation	37.5%
7.	Purposive, planned, systematic, organised action	32%
8.	Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5%
9.	Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30%
10.	Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28%
11.	Publicity aspect	21.5%
12.	Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination	21%

In recent times, Hoffman[17], Makarenko[18], Ganor[19], and Williams[20] have also departed from the use of a universal definition and have endeavoured to ascertain a set of characteristics or modus operandi to describe a terrorist organisation. Analysis carried out by Hoffman, Makarenko, Ganor and Williams determined that there is agreement that terrorism has a set of common characteristics, which was consistent with the findings of Schmidt and Jongman. In general, it is agreed terrorism involves the use of violence or threat of violence. It is used to support a political or ideological goal; it targets civilians or non-combatants to gain attention

[16] Alex P. Schmidt and Albert I. Jongman, eds., *Political Terrorism* (SWIDOC, Amsterdam and Transaction Books, 1998), p 5-6.

[17] B. Hoffman, "Chapter One: Inside Terrorism," in *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia University Press, 1998), p 40.

[18] T. Makarenko, "Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime: the emerging nexus," *The Centre for study of Terrorism and Political Violence* (2002): p 3.

[19] B. Ganor, "Defining Terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter," *Police Practice and Research* 3, no. 4 (2002): p 294.

[20] Clive Williams, *Terrorism Explained: The facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups* (New Holland Publishers, 2004), p 7-10.

and a reaction, it endeavours to create fear, and it is planned and involves target selection.

As it is impossible to obtain a definition of terrorism, which has universal acceptance, this thesis will identify terrorist groups based on a set of generally accepted characteristics identified above. This will avoid the hazards of a universal definition.

The above characteristics identified by Schmidt, Jongman, Hoffman, Makarenko and Williams when combined, provide a set of characteristics (below) by which groups can be tested and classified in this thesis.

1. The use of violence or threat of the use of violence,
2. The violence is selective and planned.
3. The aim is political, religious, or ideological.[21]
4. The targets are civilian or non-combatants.
5. The intent of the violence is to draw the public's attention to the group's cause.
6. The intent of the violence is to evoke a reaction.

Defining the Environment

The introduction highlighted within complexity theory, the influence the environment has on the emergence of groups. Further its influences on the bandwidth of the communications channels used by individuals and groups. The density and bandwidth of the communications channels influences the structure of groups. The introduction touched on the environmental variables, the next section defines these variables.

[21] Point 3 is not limited to Political goals. It also includes ideological and religious goals, which is reflection of the changing dynamics of terrorism and is consistent with Australian legislation dealing with acts of terrorism.

Defining the Environmental variables

The business and intelligence communities have overcome the issue of defining the social environment, by utilising the work of Aguilar. Aguilar's[22] work on business environmental scanning indicated that businesses were influenced by economic, technological, political and socio-cultural factors of the business environment. This form of analysis became PEST[23] analysis. Today, business schools and universities throughout the world, now teach this form of analytical methodology as part of their standard curriculum. This form of analysis further evolved. By the 1980s, two additional variables were added, the legal and environmental[24] variables, creating the PESTLE[25] model. Additionally, the concept of environmental scanning has been adopted by law enforcement agencies in crime analysis, this is especially true within the United Kingdom where this form of analytical method is a part of the National Intelligence Model (NIM). The NIM utilises a modified version of the PESTLE model, with the addition of an organisational variable, forming the PESTELO model.

The PESTELO model requires an assessment of each of the variables to provide an environmental scan of the factors, which influence the structural organisation of terrorist groups. PESTELO is a dynamic analysis methodology and is valid for the period of the information capture. As such, any study of the dynamic changes of the organisational structure of pre-existing groups should consider the changes in the PESTELO environment prior to an analysis of the organisation. It is reasonable to suggest that these changes are a result and a response to, prior changes in the environment in which the group operates. It is also important to note that the PESTELO model utilises seven variables, but these variables are dependent. For example, political change may influence the other variables in the model. Likewise, the other variables may influence the political variable. This is the same situation faced by chaos theorists, who overcame this problem by taking a snapshot of the

[22] F.J Aguilar, *Scanning the business environment* (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

[23] Political, Economic, Socio-cultural and Technological (PEST)

[24] Environment includes the ecological dimension that is the impact a business has on the traditional environment.

[25] Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, Technological, Legal and Environmental (PESTLE)

variables at the time of interest, separating the interdependencies and fixing the values for the variables of interest, as the initial conditions of the system. The intent is to adopt the same methodology in assessing the significances of the various PESTELO variables. That is, political grievances may not be the sole factor, which contributes to the emergence of a terrorist group or pre-existing groups engaging in terrorism, which is consistent with Crenshaw's observations. The emergence of the PIRA resulted from a combination of factors, political, economic and socio-cultural, which combined and were triggered by the events of 1969.

Definitions of the PESTELO variables

Political - The political environment relates to government, the state, public administration, and policy making. The political environment is complex consisting of many layers, such as its role in social, institutional and international conflict.[26] It also has a role in the economy and equality, political movements and the populations' involvement in the political process.[27]

Economic – Sociologists have studied the impact of economics on society for over a hundred years.[28] The first substantive works were formulated by Marx, Weber and Durkhiem.[29] It is generally agreed by sociologists that economic interaction occurs within a social context and that social interaction embodies power and inequality.[30] Thus, this analysis focuses on the disparities within the economic social context to ascertain whether this variable is a significant factor in the facilitation of the formation and lifecycle of a radical group.

Socio-cultural - The socio-cultural variable "… *Is that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, laws customs, and any other capabilities and habits*

[26] J. C. Johari, *Comparative Politics* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1984), p 65-67.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., *The Handbook of Economic Sociology*, Second Edition ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p 6-16.

[29] Ibid., p 4-5.

[30] Ibid.

acquired by [a human] as a member of society."[31] The analysis of the socio-cultural variable, addresses the socio-cultural change at the micro and macro levels and the impact, which this has on the changes within the terrorist group.

Technology - Technology is included as a variable, as it has been determined, technology alters any social form.[32] Technology has the capacity to warp geographic space-time allowing rapid communications over vast distances. Arquilla and Ronfeldt[33] have argued that communications technology has significantly contributed to the current nature of covert groups or dark networks. The use of internet and other forms of modern communications technology have allowed these covert groups to decentralise. Arquilla and Ronfeldt[34] have also argued that, in the case of anti-globalisation groups, technology has allowed the concept of swarming to be implemented. Swarming is a tactical technique, where disassociated groups using modern communications technology, can concentrate their limited resources on a single objective, using modern communication technology, such as mobile phones and the internet. The advances in communications technology has allowed the realisation of Louis Beam's concept of leaderless resistance.[35]

For clarity, the environmental variable within the PESTELO model is termed ecology, to avoid confusion in the different usages of the factor environment within this discussion. The ecology is the physical external ecological and geographic surroundings in which the groups exist. The reason for the analysis of this variable is to ascertain what influences it has on the size and structure of the group.

[31] "Learning to live together," United Nations Education, Scientific Organization (UNESCO), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/cultural-diversity/.

[32] Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, "Introductory essay: the social shaping of technology," in *The social shaping of technology.*, ed. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (Buckingham,: Open University Press, 1999), p 20.

[33] J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, "Chapter 1 - The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)," in *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, ed. J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (Rand Corporation, 2001), p 10.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Louis Beam, "Leaderless Resistance," *The Sedition* 12(1992).

The legal variable is the factor, which inhibits or enhances the group's ability to carry out activities and build its network. This variable was relevant when evaluating Aum Shinrikyo. DCSINT Handbook No 1.01: Case Studies in Terrorism[36] indicated that Aum Shinrikyo was able to maintain a complex organisational structure because the group exploited the Japanese Religious Corporation Law, which prevented Japanese law enforcement from investigating the activities of legally recognised religious groups. This legal protection created an environment, which shielded the group from oversight by law enforcement. Furthermore, the majority of Aum Shinrikyo's members had joined the group for peaceful religious enlightenment, rather than the violent overthrow of the Japanese state. The group maintained a tiered structure, with the layman making up the general membership of the group. Above this group was a smaller group known as the true believers, who were considered more enlightened than the layman. From this group, Asahara chose a small select core to facilitate his apocalyptic vision.[37] This environment of a tightly controlled small group, who had sole knowledge of the intent of the group's leader, further protected the group's agenda.

The organisational variable is a micro level variable, which addresses the factors within the group, which may influence the group's size and organisation. This includes factors such as the type of group (i.e. whether group goals are international, national, or local). The group type is based on the group's political goals or objectives, which includes nationalist (including separatist), revolutionary, reactionary or issue based. The group's ideological objectives can be divided into the following categories: left wing, right wing, anarchist, religious or issue based.[38] The methodological goal of the group: that is, does the group seek a military outcome; does the group seek a political outcome or a combination of both? Each of the objectives consists of strategic, operational, and tactical goals. In addition, there is an examination of the influence and role of leadership.

[36] Neal A. Clinehens, "Aum Shinrikyo and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study" (Air University, 2000), p 20.

[37] Ibid., p 6.

[38] Anti-Abortion, Environmental, Etc.

Defining Homophily

The role of social affinity or homophily in group formation

It is not the intention of this thesis to address the psychological motivations of why an individual becomes a member of a terrorist group. The intent is to adopt a different approach in describing terrorist organisations. This approach uses known principles of human interaction, embedding this behaviour within an environmental context. This is not to suggest that the psychological variable is not relevant.

An individual's reasons for joining a terrorist organisation are as diverse as the motivations of the terrorist groups. Within the same set of environmental conditions, which produces recruits for terrorist organisations, there is a majority of the population living under the same circumstances, who do not join. Not all those who become radicalised adopt violence and abandon the existing political, social, and legal frameworks to achieve their goal(s). Many will do nothing. Some may engage in the pre-existing political system to initiate change. Others may engage in non-violent direct action to bring the plight of the disadvantaged to the attention of the public and influence political change. If the preceding outcomes are more likely, it is important to understand how this small minority, which have concluded violent extremism and terrorism, is the only viable option, come together into groups.

A significant amount of research has been conducted in this area. Sageman and others have adopted a social network approach in analysing the emergence of terrorist groups. They have emphasised the social connections, which distinguishes those who are at risk of becoming involved in terrorism. This research, although not discounting a psychological aspect of why an individual becomes a terrorist, does highlight the importance of an individual's personal network of associates, as being a critical component of why individuals join and engage in terrorist activities. The

result of this research implies that social affinity (also known as homophily), is a prominent factor involved in radicalisation and the emergence of terrorist groups.[39]

The following discussion endeavours to understand the factors involved in homophily, which is hoped will provide a greater insight into terrorist group formation. McPherson's et al[40] discussion on homophily[41] indicates that there is a clear link between geographic proximity and homophily. Social network theorists have also made a similar observation. Hanneman and Riddle stated that "*The notion that similarity (or homophily) increases the probability of the formation of social ties is central to most sociological theories … It suggests that if two actors are similar in some way, it is more likely that there will be network ties between them".*[42] Krebs and Holley observed that *"networks, whether social or business…"*[43], which are *"…left to grow without a plan"* [44], are driven by two forces, homophily and geographic proximity.[45] This type of network consists of dense clusters, where everyone knows everyone else. Additionally, in these types of networks, there is a lack of information diversity. This suggests those who are socially similar and are geographically close are likely to interact and form network clusters, which potentially excludes those who do not share their beliefs and aspirations.

The concept of homophily indicates relationships are stratified. Within this stratification, race and ethnicity are the strongest of the homophyllic factors, followed in rough order of importance by other factors such as age, religion, education, occupation, and gender.[46] This group of homophyllic factors defines

[39] Marc Sageman, "Understanding Jihadi Networks," *Strategic Insights* IV, no. 4 (2005): p 9-11.

[40] Miller McPherson, Lyn Smith-Lovin, and James. M Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," *Annual. Review. Sociology* 27(2001).

[41] Homophily is the concept that likeminded individuals in geographic proximity will come together, that is *"Birds of a feather flock together"."*

[42] Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle, "Introduction to Social Network Methods," *University of California, Riverside* (2001): p 191.

[43] Valdis Krebs and June Holley, "Building Smart Communities through Network Weaving," (2006): p 4.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," p 415.

status homophily. Status homophily describes a set of characteristics with which individuals may identify themselves.[47] Other status homophyllic factors include social class and network position. Status homophily has the capacity to create social distance within a network.[48] This distance can potentially divide society into clusters of similar individuals, which the environmental factor can affect differently.

In addition to status homophily, there is also value homophily. Value homophily has also been determined to influence group and network formation, suggesting groups come together based on behaviour, attitude, abilities, beliefs, and aspirations. Variances in value homophily also influence social distance within a network.[49] The social distance created by these factors, can further divide society within a given set of environmental conditions. These are the factors, which potentially lead to individuals gravitating to various groups.

Both status and value homophily need a social context in which these homophyllic bonds can form. This context is based on geographic proximity, which enhances the capacity for information exchange. This information exchange takes place in the context of the family, within an organisation, or based on an individual's isomorphic positions within a social system.[50] Without this capacity to interact and exchange information groups would not form.

Further, Agrawal's[51] et al discussion regarding proximity and knowledge exchange, argue that geographic proximity is important in the process of group formation, indicating that as geospatial distance increases, the capacity for individuals to exchange knowledge, decreases. Geographic distance constrains social interaction, which in turn limits the group formation process. Latané and Liu stated and have

[47] Ibid., p 419.

[48] Ibid., p 428.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ajay Agrawal, Devesh Kapur, and John McHale, "How do spatial and social proximity influence knowledge flows? Evidence from patent data," *Journal of Urban Economics* (2008): p 1.

supported with empirical research, that spatial distance and the influence that an individual has on another, declines exponentially, the further individuals are from each other, suggesting a group's influence on other groups or individuals would also decline with distance.[52] Homophily suggests those who have significant influence within our social network are those who live closest to us, with their influence declining in a nonlinear manner as the geographic distance increases. This does not imply that this influence disappears, as the immediacy of modern communications technologies can facilitate communication over great distance, but it does suggest physical distance is still significant in attenuating this influence. The implications of these findings suggest that the emergence of terrorist groups is a localised process, due to the need for the immediacy of communications for the formation of these groups. This is consistent with the premise that homophyllic networks form, when likeminded individuals are in close proximity and interact. This feature of homophily could also explain why larger terrorist groups form regional organisational structures. It is suggested that these regional structures exist to manage extended communication networks and to address the variations in homophily from region to region.

The prior discussion only describes part of the process of homophily. As implied by McCauley and Moskalenko[53], this only describes a physical dimension. Agrawal et al further suggested that there is a social dimension involved in knowledge exchange. This social dimension exists outside of the physical domain. Agrawal et al argued a shared ethnic background enhances communications and knowledge exchange. Similar observations have been made within the academic community, where it was found there were limits on knowledge sharing between various academic disciplines, due to interdisciplinary prejudice. As such, physical geographic distance is not the only factor that hinders communications and the interchange of

[52] Bibb Latané et al., "Distance Matters: Physical Space and Social Impact," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 21(1995): p 795-96.

[53] Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 3 (2008).

knowledge. There are social factors, which creates social distance. Likewise, the absence of this trust hinders the sharing of information, creating isolation. In the context of a terrorist organisation, this factor can create an environment of secrecy, where a group is reluctant to share information with others who they do not share social affinity. In hostile environments, this secrecy is essential to the group's survival. The use of secrecy to maintain security of the group also influences the density of the channels of communications and in turn the structure of the group.

The work carried out by Agrawal et al implies that homophily can improve the capacity of groups to communicate, by reducing the social distance between groups and therefore improving a group's capacity to communicate and share information.[54] It can be argued that the greater the social similarity (homophily), the greater the levels of trust within the network because of shared values, attitudes and beliefs, which are interpreted within a common social context.

The trust within the network increases when members of the group are operating from a common social rulebook, allowing each member of the group to predict the behaviour of the other members, with some level of certainty. The concept of a common social rulebook, within a terrorist organisation, is necessary for the group to operate. The group needs to share common goals, beliefs, attitudes, and aspirations for the group to be effective. The rulebook is also essential for the various elements of the group to trust each other. This is most likely why these types of groups train and indoctrinate new recruits to the organisation. This indoctrination ensures the recruit shares the organisation's aspirations, and beliefs. It attempts to assure the other members the recruit's attitudes and behaviours are consistent with the group's objectives, creating trust between the group and the recruit.

[54] Agrawal, Kapur, and McHale, "How do spatial and social proximity influence knowledge flows? Evidence from patent data," p 2.

McPherson et al explained that there was a significant body of research that demonstrated homophily existed between individuals and groups, due to shared gender, age, religion, education, occupation and social class, network position, behaviour, attitudes, abilities, beliefs and aspirations.[55] He argued that *"…homophily characterizes network systems, and homogeneity characterizes personal networks."*[56] This comment indicates that our personal networks consist of people who are most like us. In addition, he highlights within "*diverse societies, race, and race-like ethnicity create the starkest divides".*[57] Further arguing that, *"…gender, age, religion and education"* are significant factors, which *"…strongly structure our relations with others."*[58] This indicates that similarities in race/ethnicity, age, religion, or education, are the strongest homophyllic factors.

Other factors or variables, which demonstrate significant homophily, are social factors such as network position and occupation. These factors on an organisational level influence with whom we have contact. Other factors, which possess strong homophily, are behavioural traits and intra personal values, such as beliefs. These previous factors or variables are only important in certain types of specific networks and originate from the other more significant basic socio-demographic status homophyllic variables.[59] These variables are potentially important in terrorism studies as many terrorist groups have political or social grievances based on race/ethnicity or religion. These groups typically maintain a Nationalist/Separatist or reactionary agenda, whereas other groups maintain agendas based on personal values or beliefs. These traits are typically associated with revolutionary or single-issue groups.

It has been argued that the importance of homophily increases in times of *"crisis or trouble"*. Wilhelmsen has claimed that the war within Chechnya, acted as a

[55] McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," p 419.

[56] Ibid., p 429.

[57] Ibid.

[58] ibid.

[59] Ibid.

radicalising influence within this nation.[60] Further, the terrorist group, the Islamic State (IS), is utilising the argument, Islam is under threat from Western values, to create a context of crisis, which successfully attracted over 20,000 recruits from overseas.[61] These two cases are consistent with research into homophily at times of crisis. As such, war can act as a radicalising influence, or it can provide a catalyst in which shared homophyllic factors become significant, creating unity within a cultural or religious group, who perceive their society at risk. This allows individuals within a community to put aside other differences to protect their social grouping. These comments are consistent with Crenshaw's contention that the formation of a terrorist group requires a trigger event (environmental perturbation). It is also consistent with other terrorism models, which implied that terrorism could not be detached from the specific political, economic, and social conditions within a designated geographic location.

McPherson et al noted, *"…different types of relations are structured by different levels of homophily on different dimensions, then multiplex relations among individuals may create systematic, important patterns of cross-cutting social circles"*.[62] McCauley and Moskalenko viewed radicalisation and thus terrorist group formation as a layered process.[63] In any discussion on the formation of terrorist groups, it is not possible to separate the impacts of radicalisation. Without radicalisation, the trigger for radical group formation would be absent. Thus, it is hypothesised, homophily in combination with environmental perturbations (or trigger events), are factors that initiate the radicalisation process, which leads to the formation of terrorist organisations.

[60] Julie Wilhelmsen, "When Separatists become Islamists: The Case of Chechnya," in *FFI/RAPPORT-2004/00445* (Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004), p 9.

[61] Peter R. Neumann, "Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s," ICSR, Department of War Studies, http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/.

[62] McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," p 437.

[63] McCauley and Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," p 415 — 33.

Definition of the Homophyllic Variables

The prior discussion within this dissertation has implied that variables related to homophily are important in understanding the size and structure of terrorist groups. Homophily implies that individuals and other social entities come together into groups based on similarity, which is *"birds of a feather flock together"*. As such, it argues that homophily gives society and organisations order, whether these entities are international alliances of nations, nations, businesses, governments, clubs, professional organisations, families, or friendship networks. Homophily is the social gravity, which binds us all.

Homophily is also the factor, which creates social distance between individuals and groups.[64] The model described within this dissertation, utilises homophily and the variables associated with homophily to describe and understand the accretion[65] process of extremist groups. Therefore, it is important to categorise the political and ideological objectives of the groups, in terms of the homophyllic variables.

The prior discussion indicates that the principle of homophily is involved in social organisation, and this occurs based on two homophyllic variables, known as status and value homophily. Homophily defines an individual's probable social affinity, that is, individuals are inclined to seek out groups and individuals like themselves. Individuals tend to choose to associate with groups, based on status homophily (i.e. race and ethnicity, age, religion, education, occupation, gender and social class) due to shared similarity. Value homophily further suggests that individuals tend to seek groups based on factors such as behaviour, attitude, abilities, beliefs and aspirations.

[64] Social distance is defined as "The similarity or closeness of social groups."

Miller McPherson, Pamela A. Popielarz, and Sonja Drobnic, "Social Networks and Organizational Dynamics," *American Sociological Review* 57, no. 2 (1992): p 155.

[65] Accretion is defined as a thing formed or added by gradual growth or increase.

The discussion within the previous section suggests it is possible to reduce the homophyllic factors into two single variables of political and ideological objectives. This distillation allows a simplification of the larger set of homophyllic variables into two variables, rather than the larger set described by homophily. The political objectives of the groups are Nationalist/Separatist, Structural/Revolutionary, Reactionary, or Agitation/Single Issue groups. Each of these categories is defined in terms of one or more of the two coarse homophyllic variables, status, or value homophily.

As per the definition previously provided in this chapter, the motivations of the Nationalist/Separatist relates to racial, ethnic, or religious factors within a society. This suggests that the formation of Nationalist/Separatist groups originate from variations of the sub-variables of status homophily of race, ethnic, or religious belief within a social entity.

The prior definition provided within this chapter suggests that the political aim of Structural/Revolutionary groups is to bring about a fundamental change in the existing political order based on their ideological or religious beliefs. The definition indicates that these groups are ideologically motivated. Ideology is *"...a set of beliefs by which a group or society orders reality so as to render it intelligible"*[66]. As such, ideological groups find unity and purpose through the value homophyllic variable of beliefs. These groups have a political goal to bring about a Structural/Revolutionary change within a society, although this goal may be motivated by other underlying grievances related to ethnicity, race, or religion. Thus, the group acquires unity and coalesces based on the value homophyllic variable of common beliefs, whether these beliefs are religious or based on a common political ideology such as Marxism.

[66] Richard L. Mayden, "Species, Trees, Characters, and Concepts: Ongoing Issues, Diverse Ideologies, and a Time for Reflection and Change," in *Agricultural and Biological Sciences » "The Species Problem - Ongoing Issues*, ed. Igor Ya. Pavlinov (Intech, 2013), p 171.

Counter Revolutionary/Reactionary groups are characterised by their support for what they perceive as traditional values (status quo ante) or by their resistance to radical change. This suggests that the aim of these types of groups is to maintain the status quo, which places them in opposition to any group that destabilises this aspiration. Thus, these types of groups can coalesce based on the status homophyllic factors of race, ethnicity, or religion, if their opponent has a political objective based on Nationalist/Separatist goals. Likewise, they can accrete based on the value homophyllic variable of belief, if their opponents are a Structural/Revolutionary group whose political objectives are ideologically motivated.

Northern Ireland offers a case study that can illustrate this point. Within Northern Ireland two types of groups operated. Firstly, there were the Republican groups, whose memberships were predominantly catholic and maintained a political goal of unity with the Republic of Ireland in the south. Secondly, there were the Loyalist groups whose memberships were predominantly protestant. They opposed unity with the Republic of Ireland, preferring to remain a part of the United Kingdom (Britain). The religious differences between the two groups suggest a religious motivation for the violence in Northern Ireland. The reality of the matter was that the Republicans sought union with the Republic of Ireland, as they perceived themselves as Irish, not British. They saw themselves as a distinct ethnic group whose religion was incidentally Catholic. Conversely, the Loyalist groups perceived themselves to be ethnically British and were incidentally Protestant. The Loyalist groups acted against the Republican groups and the Catholic population within Northern Ireland to ensure that Northern Ireland remained a part of the United Kingdom. The Loyalist groups acted to maintain the status quo, as such, defining groups as reactionary. The conflict was not about religion, it was about ethnicity. The two opposing groups coalesced, based on the status and value homophyllic variables of ethnicity, and shared aspirations.

Equally, in South America, in the 1970s, Counter Revolutionary/Reactionary groups coalesced, based on their opposition to left wing/Marxist groups. These groups typically maintained an ideology that supported capitalism and opposed the Marxist or Revolutionary groups' concepts of state ownership and the empowerment of the so-called working classes. Thus, these groups accreted, based on a shared ideology. The members of each group shared the same beliefs and aspirations, both value homophyllic variables.

Agitation/Single Issue groups typically do not maintain a political objective of seizing power or creating a separatist state, but rather through their actions change government policy or to influence their potential opponents such as businesses. These groups usually focus on social values such as the environment, abortion etc. Thus, the group comes together based on the value homophily factors of belief and shared aspiration.

The ideological objectives of the groups are defined as left wing, right wing, anarchist, religious, or other. These goals are described by value homophily, which encompasses a set of beliefs and aspirations held in common by the group. A common homophyllic factor within terrorist groups is the belief that violence is a legitimate tool, which can be used to assist them in achieving their aspiration (goal).

Radicalisation, value homophily and attitudes towards violence

One of the features of terrorism is the use of violence to achieve its goals or influence the actions of its opponents. Radicalisation of the group by the environment and events creates changes in attitudes. The model argues that the group coalesces, based on the shared value homophyllic variable of attitude. Not all radical political or social groups accept violence as a legitimate tool to achieve their goals. This implies that radicalisation is critical in the process of emergence. Thus, there is a need to understand and define the process of radicalisation, therefore permitting the modelling of the processes of emergence and structure.

Defining Radicalisation

Radicalisation is a commonly used term, which is rarely defined by those who use it. Reports and academic papers such as:

- the NYPD report on "Radicalization in the West"[67],
- the Rand Corporation's "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment"[68],
- the Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment) (FFI) report on "Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalization and Recruitment to Terror Networks"[69],
- Post's paper "The Radical Group in Context"[70],
- "Psychology of Terrorism"[71],

do not define radicalisation. It is implied the reader has an intuitive understanding of the meaning of radicalisation. In addition, there is an implication of what radicalisation means within the context of their discussions. There is general agreement among academics that radicalisation is a process, suggesting that radicalisation is not an instantaneous state change in an individual's or group's beliefs, but a progressive change from one state to another.

The Dutch Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) defines radicalism as:

> *"The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic*

[67] Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat," (New York: New York Police Department, 2007).

[68] S. Gerwehr and S. Daly, "Chapter 5: Al Qaeda: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," (The Rand Corporation, 2006).

[69] Laila. Bokhari, Hegghammer, Thomas., Lia, Brynjar., Nesser, Petter., Tønnessen, Truls H., "Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalization and Recruitment to Terror Networks." (paper presented at the Proceedings from a FFI Seminar, Oslo, Norway, 15 March 2006 2006).

[70] Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, "The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25(2002).

[71] Randy Borum, ed. *Psychology of Terrorism* (Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004).

methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect)."[72]

Gurr refers to radicalisation as *"…a process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective but failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists. Some become discouraged, while others intensify their efforts, lose patience with conventional means of political action and look for tactics that will have greater impact."*[73]

The European Union (EU) when defining radicalisation, acknowledges that there are scales or stratum of radicalisation. The EU makes a clear distinction by prefixing their definition with the term violent. The EU defines violent radicalisation as *"…the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism..."*.[74] The EU definition acknowledges not all will engage in violence. As such, violent extremism is one of multiple outcomes for those who enter the radicalisation process.

This is not an extensive review of available definitions, but these definitions indicate that radicalisation is typically viewed in negative terms. Historically, radicals are viewed with suspicion by society and in many cases; the community has initially rejected their ideas. There are many documented cases where radical views in their time, become mainstream ideals. Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s are now considered by most of society, as pioneers of equality. They brought about changes in society, which outlaws discrimination. The eco movement in the latter half of the twentieth century was considered a "*bunch of left wing*

[72] Catherine Bott et al., "Radicalization: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Sorce Literature - Final Report.," (Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, 2006), p 12.

[73] Ted Robert Gurr, "Terrorism in democracies: Its social and political bases," in *Origins of Terrorism*, ed. Walther Reich (Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Press Centre, 1998), p 87.

[74] EU, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning: Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation," ed. Commission of the European Communities (The European Union, 2005), p 11.

radicals", but the mainstream community and its political leaders now accept many of their views.

As previously stated, there are inconsistencies in the available definitions of radicalisation. The discussions are typically narrow and primarily focused on the violent and anti-democratic nature of some radical groups, implying a link with radicalisation and extremism. Radicalisation and extremism have been interlinked and at times these terms have been incorrectly interchanged. This is not to suggest that extremism and radicalism are mutually exclusive, but extremism is a subset of the larger radical set.

Other researchers have acknowledged that radicalisation is not a binary process, but have delineated radicalisation, establishing there are classes or layers of radicalisation. They indicate that only a few, who undergo the radicalisation process, end by adopting violent methodologies to achieve their goals. Kilcullen[75] divides radical groups into terrorist cells, subversive networks, extremist political movements, supporter and sympathiser networks.

Any definition of radicalisation shall use accepted meanings of words, as described within widely used and reputable peer reviewed academic papers. The definition shall be structured as such, that it captures the various aspects of the radicalisation process. Acknowledging that radicalisation does not result in everyone who entered the process becoming a violent extremist, but is a graduated process with multiple outcomes. Many are nonviolent, some of whom are willing to provide material and moral support to the violent extremist, and some are willing to cheer from the sideline, whilst others are sympathetic to the violent extremist but are not willing to act. Thus, radicalisation should be seen in its complexity with its multiple layers, not all radicals are violent.

[75] David J. Kilcullen, "Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 8 (2007): p 649-59.

Defining the scales of Radicalisation

The United States Army has derived a model, which attempts to define the levels of radicalisation as a set of concentric circles.[76] The outer level consists of the passive supporters, those who are sympathetic to the cause, but are unwilling, for whatever reason, to participate in the group's activities. The next layer consists of active supporters, these individuals are willing to assist the group in a support role, but are unwilling to participate openly in any direct action. The inner layer consists of the militants, those who are willing to participate in the direct action of the group, whether that group maintains a violent or non-violent ideology.

Figure 1 – United States Army radicalisation model



The model used by the United States Army has very broad layers of radicalisation. This model lacks the granularity between the supporter level and the violent extremists. This new layer needs to illustrate the effects of value homophily and its influence on how individuals align and coalesce into groups.

A modified version of the United States Army model will be used in this dissertation. Like the United States Army model, radicalisation is defined in layers. Thus, at the centre would be the violent extremists. The next layer out would be supporters of violent extremism or violent activist, these would be individuals or groups who would not necessarily partake in violent acts but would be willing to support the group financially, through intelligence etc. The next layer of the model would be those who shared the aspiration of the terrorist group, but did not share their belief

[76] U.S. Army, "U.S. Army DCSINT Handbook No. 1 (Version 3.0): A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century ", ed. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (2005), p 3-2 to 3-3.

in violence. This layer may include political activists and those who were willing to engage in non-violent direct action to achieve the shared aspiration. The outer layer of this group would be their supporters. The next layer would be those who were sympathetic to the aspiration but remain uninvolved. The final layer would be those who are uncommitted. Thus, the radicalisation process is graduated. The process creates subgroups of radicals, defined as sympathisers, supporters, activists, and extremists.

Definitions of Radicalisation and the Scales of Radicalisation

The following definitions are based on the models utilised by Kilcullen and the United States Army, which has been expanded to meet the needs of the ongoing discussion.

This dissertation uses the following definitions to identify degrees of radicalisation:

- **A radical**: is an individual or group who supports fundamental or extreme changes in existing views, habits, beliefs, conditions, or institutions.
- **Radicalisation**: is the process by which an individual or group undergoes a process that allows the individual or group to support fundamental or extreme changes in existing views, habits, beliefs, conditions or institutions. In extreme cases, radicalisation is part of the process, which leads to the formation of terrorist groups.

Part of the premise of this thesis is that radicalisation does not necessarily lead to violent extremism. The thesis suggests radicalisation has many outcomes. A review of the available literature, suggests many of the terms used to describe scales radicalisation, are employed without definition. The definitions below are based on general accepted usage of the terms in the terrorism literature:

- **Uncommitted**: is an individual or group who is unaligned to any ideology, belief, group, or cause.

- **A Sympathiser or Passive Supporter**: is a person or an organisation, which shares, understands, or identifies with the sentiment of the ideal or cause.
- **Supporter or Active Supporter (Non-Violent)**: is a person who contributes to the fulfilment of a need or furtherance of an effort or purpose of a non-violent group or organisation.
- **A Political or Social Activist**: is a person who believes strongly in political, social, or legal change that they will take action in support of this change through non-violent methods.
- **A Non-Violent Activist**: is a person who believes strongly in political, social, or religious change and will support or use typically non-violent direct and noticeable actions to achieve a goal.
- **Extremist Supporters (Violent)**: is a person who contributes to the fulfilment of a need or furtherance of an effort or purpose of a violent group or organisation.
- **Violent Activists (Extremist)**: is a person who believes strongly in political, social, or religious change and will support or use violent, direct, and noticeable actions to achieve a goal.

Defining Group Typology

The next variable, which requires definition, is the group's typology. The group's typology describes the group's goal(s) or aspiration(s) (in terms of homophily). The significance of this variable, based on previous discussions, lays in the environmental factors, which led to the group's emergence and likewise can be central to the group's disengagement from terrorism.

A review of the available literature does not provide a clear definition of the typologies of terrorism. Crenshaw subdivides terrorist groups into six categories.[77]

[77] Revolutionary and sub revolutionary, Nationalist, Minority Separatist Reformist, Anarchists or Millenarians, and Reactionary Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981): p 379-97.

Post et al used a typology defined by Schmid and Jongman[78], subdividing the various terrorist groups into five categories.[79] The now disbanded Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)[80] divided groups into eleven categories.[81] One commonality of these definitions was each of the group's motivations, but it failed to combine multiple goals or aspirations.

Victor Asal et al[82] uses a typology based on the groups audience (i.e. supernatural or terrestrial) combined with the political and ideological objectives. This typology was utilised to determine the group's lethality and not the structural organisation. It was not used in an environmental context, which is central to this thesis. The research questions within this thesis do not look at group lethality but emergence, size and structure. Thus, it will use a more traditional typology, focusing on the political and ideological objectives of the group.

A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century[83] takes a differing approach from the above. It attempts to address these shortcomings. They subdivide terrorist groups into three categories based on government affiliation, motivation[84], and ideology.[85] This approach has greater flexibility as it permits a group's typology to be defined on multiple levels.

[78] Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, "The Radical Group in Context: 2. Identification of Critical Elements in the Analysis of Risk for Terrorism by Radical Group Type," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25(2002): p 111.

[79] ———, "The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism," p 98.

[80] http://www.mipt.org/. This web site is no longer available and the site content is now maintained by The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. http://www.start.umd.edu/

[81] Anarchist, Anti-Abortion, Anti-Globalization, Communist/Socialist, Environmental/Animal Rights, Leftist, Nationalist/Separatist, Racist, Religious, Right-Wing Conservative and Right-Wing Reactionary

[82] Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "The nature of the beast: organizational structures and the lethality of terrorist attacks," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (2008): p 438-39.

[83] Army, "U.S. Army DCSINT Handbook No. 1 (Version 3.0): A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century " p 2-1 to 2-9.

[84] Separatist, Ethnocentric, Nationalistic, and Revolutionary

[85] Political, Religious and Social

Within this dissertation, the group classification is a modified version of the methodology utilised within A Military Guide to Terrorism. The political and ideological goals of the groups form the categorisation methodology. The reasoning for adopting this type of method is because it allows the utilisation of the homophyllic variables to categorise the groups.

Within this thesis, the political goals of the groups have four sub-categories, which include Nationalist/Separatist, Structural/Revolutionary, Reactionary, and Agitation/Single Issue groups:

1. **Nationalist/Separatist Groups** – The MIPT website defines Nationalist/Separatist terrorists are those who *"…see themselves as the representatives of their nation or national group. They commit acts of terrorism to defend what they believe to be the interests of their national group. Nationalist terrorist groups are often seeking statehood on behalf of a minority ethnic or religious group that is currently within a larger state, in which case the terrorists are separatists as well as nationalists".*[86]

2. **Structural[87]/Revolutionary Groups** – are ideological or religious groups who wish to overturn the existing regime or political system. Geraldine describes, revolutionary movements propose a fundamental social structural change with force.[88] Thus, Structure/Revolutionary groups wish to bring about a fundamental change in the existing political order, based on their ideological or religious beliefs.

[86] http://www.mipt.org/.

[87] Mehdi Mozaffari, "The New Era of Terrorism: Approaches and Typologies," *Cooperation and Conflict* 23, no. 2 (1988): p 179-96.

[88] Chalmers A. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Stanford: Stanford University Press,, 1982), p 1.

3. **Counter Revolutionary/Reactionary Groups** – are characterised by reaction against progressive or radical political or social change.[89] They typically support what they perceive as traditional values or previous state (status quo ante). Counter-revolutionary groups are examples of reactionary groups. It can also include government-sponsored groups involved in repression of opposition groups or sections of the community who are suspected to be in opposition to the government.

4. **Agitation/Single Issue[90] Groups** – these groups do not wish to seize power or replace the governing power, but commit acts of terrorism to influence government policy or influence the private sector actions, which are considered harmful. These types of groups include environmental, animal liberation, and anti-abortions groups.

The ideological objective (goal or aspiration) of the group is subdivided into four sub-categories of: left wing, right wing and anarchist, religious and social issues. These categories are:

1. **Left Wing/Socialist Groups** – The MIPT defines left wing Groups as *"…all groups that are on the liberal end of the political spectrum without being explicitly anarchist, communist or socialist. Leftists often see themselves as defending the equality, freedom, and well-being of the common citizens of a state"*. Within this dissertation left wing groups are characterised as being; egalitarianism, support for the (organized) working class. Socialist groups support egalitarianism, empowerment of the working class, common ownerships of production and distribution, planned economic activity (abandonment of the free market), abandonment of private ownership and

[89] John Foran, David Lane, and Andreja Zivkovic, *Revolution in the Making of the Modern World: Social Identities, Globalization and Modernity* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p 58.

[90] Mozaffari, "The New Era of Terrorism: Approaches and Typologies," p 179-96.

abandonment of religious institutions.[91] Thus, this definition includes communist groups at the extreme end of the leftist spectrum.

2. **Right Wing Groups** – The MIPT defines two types of Right Wing terrorism - Conservative and Reactionary.
    a. *"Right-wing conservative terrorists seek to preserve the established order, or to return to the traditions of the past. Right-wing conservative terrorists support the current government"*.

    b. *"Reactionary terrorists are right-wing groups that seek to overthrow the current political order in order to return to a past way of life. The Ku Klux Klan, for example, wants the American south to return to its pre-Civil War social order. These groups often have an inaccurate perception of what life in the past was like"*.

3. **Anarchist Groups** – MIPT defines Anarchists as ones who *"…are opposed to all forms of government. Anarchists are often allied with Leftist groups"*. Thus, Anarchist groups are those groups that are opposed to or sceptical of all forms of government, as they believe that governments are harmful and unnecessary.[92]

4. **Religious Groups** – The MIPT defines Religious Terrorists as those who *"…commit acts of terrorism in order to comply with a religious mandate or to force others to follow that mandate"*.

[91] Huseyin Durmaz, *Understanding and Responding to Terrorism* (Washington: IOS Press, 2007), p 354.

[92] Paul McLaughlin, *Anarchism and Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p 20-30.

Chapter 3 – Literature Review and Research Questions

This thesis examines the factors, which are significant in the emergence of terrorist groups and the evolution of their structure over time. This section is a review of the literature relating to the emergence of terrorist groups and the current understanding of the structure of these types of groups. It also attempts to ascertain whether the factors, which lead to the emergence of terrorist groups, are also the factors that influence the structure of the group. Thus, this is a lifecycle analysis. The intention of this review is to identify the factors involved and derive a set of research questions, which the thesis will endeavour to answer within a theoretical framework. Therefore, this chapter has two components. This is a review of literature relating to emergence, plus a review of literature relating to the structure of terrorist groups.

The Emergence of Terrorist Groups

The emergence of terrorist groups requires an appreciation of two processes, radicalisation, and group formation. This section reviews the literature relating to processes. In relation to group formation, this section specifically examines the current understanding of the formation of terrorist groups from a sociological and network perspective. This section endeavours to establish the relationship of sociological and environmental factors involved in both processes.

State of Current Research on Radicalisation and factors leading to terrorist group emergence

Radicalisation is a central process in the emergence of terrorist groups. Without this process and the capacity of these individuals to come together, the group formation process would not occur. As such, it is essential to understand the factors driving radicalisation, as it is the precursor to the emergence of these types of groups.

Radicalisation is a process that leads individuals to adopt extreme views and leads to the formation of groups, which adopt a radical agenda. Borum in the “Psychology of Terrorism” shows that there is a consensus amongst researchers that

radicalisation is a progressive process, which is initiated by a trigger event or events. [93] What the research indicates is that these events are personal and are unique to the individual. In the case of groups, the trigger event(s) can be seen as a real or perceived failure of the existing leadership, to respond to events in a manner considered appropriate by an "in group" or faction.

Psychologists have long understood the effects of the social environment on the individual. There have been many models developed to understand the reasoning and motivations behind terrorism and its environmental influences. The socio-political models endeavour to understand terrorism in terms of these environmental variables.

Lia and Skjølberg's[94] review of the causes of terrorism indicated a variety of theoretical approaches which all have relevance within specific contexts, but none universally describe the phenomena. The models described by Lia and Skjølberg within their review were the:

1. Relative deprivation and inequality
2. Contagion theory
3. Terrorism and mass media
4. Rapid modernisation
5. Poverty, weak states, and insurgencies
6. Democratisation
7. Political regime and legitimacy
8. Hegemony in the international system
9. Economic and cultural globalisation
10. Proliferation of weak and collapsed states

[93] Borum, *Psychology of Terrorism*, p 27.

[94] Brynjar Lia and Katja Skjølberg, "Cause of Terrorism - An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature," in *FFI/RAPPORT-2004/04307* (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004).

Each of the theories above suggests environmental factors are significant in the formation of terrorist groups and the radicalisation of its members. Apart from the Contagion Theory, each theory suggests political, economic, social, and legal factors are central to the emergence of terrorist groups. Thus, these theories infer that there are environmental mechanisms involved in the emergence of terrorist groups.

Victoroff[95] summarises the various psychological models utilised to describe terrorism. Victoroff, although providing a comprehensive review of the available models, quotes Walter Reich, *"...psychological accounts of terrorism with explanation that ignore or blur the variety and complexity…a product of loose and weak thinking, a disregard for the need for evidence and the habit, unfortunately endemic in so many psychological discourse, of having single idea and applying it to everything"*.[96] Victoroff summarises the various models into the broad categories listed below:

1. Psychopathological
2. Rational Choice
3. Sociological Theories
    a. Social Learning Theory
    b. Frustration Aggression Theory
    c. Relative Deprivation Theory
    d. Oppression Theory
    e. National Cultural Theory
4. Psychological Theories
    a. Psychoanalytic Psychological Theory
    b. Identity Theory
    c. Narcissism Theory

[95] Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 3 (2005): p 3-34.

[96] Walter Reich, ed. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychology, Ideology, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, D.C: The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998), p 262.

    d. Paranoia Theory
    e. Absolutist/Apocalyptic Theory
5. Non Psychoanalytic Psychological Theories
    a. Cognitive Theories
    b. Novelty Seek Theory
    c. Humiliation Revenge Theory
6. Group Theories
    a. Idiosyncratic Subcultures
    b. In Group Out Group
    c. Collective Identity

The sociological models provided above, suggest environmental factors are involved in radicalisation and the emergence of terrorist groups. The Relative Deprivation, Oppression, and National Cultural theories insinuate that political, economic, and social factors are involved in the creation of terrorist groups. The other models suggest a psychological basis for radicalisation and terrorism, although the Rational Choice, Humiliation Revenge Theory, Identity, and Group theories do suggest external factors are involved in radicalisation and the formation of terrorist groups.

Horn's discussion on the various models of terrorism acknowledges that there is no one consistent model, which describes the phenomena of terrorism. Horn summarised these models within a chart, "Models for Conflict and Terrorism – Psychology/Sociological":[97]

1. Social Psychological Model
2. Psychological Model
    a. Early Childhood Trauma Model
    b. Psychodynamic Model

[97] Robert E. Horn, "Models for Conflict and Terrorism - Psychological/Sociological," The Global Collaborative - The Nautilus Institute, http://www.globalcollab.org/gps/tools/visualisation-tools/#the-struggle.

    c. Psychoneurodynamic Trauma Model
    d. Personal Esteem Model
    e. Victim Model
3. Organisational Model
4. Multi-Generational Trauma Transmission Model
5. Religious Model
6. Ideological Model
7. Political Repression Model
8. Political Economic Model
9. Rapid Disruptive Social Change Model
10. Group Identity Model
11. Historical Evidence Model
12. Biopsychological Model
    a. Evolutionary Anthropological model of social groups
    b. In Group Out Group Model
    c. Adventurism and high risk behavioural traits
    d. Bonding in battle
    e. Perceived threat to In Group

The majority of the models listed above, suggest that environmental factors are involved in terrorism. Again, these models intimate political, economic, and social factors are the environmental influences that precipitate the legitimisation of terrorist acts. Thus, the analysis of the various models utilised to describe motivations for terrorism, indicate that there is a trend in the various models, which suggest terrorism is motivated by a grievance that has its roots in psychology, political, economic or social variables.

Crenshaw[98] argues that any broad discussion of terrorism must take into account political, social and economic conditions. Crenshaw further argues that these

[98] Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p 380.

factors are not the root cause of terrorism, but these variables must be considered in combination with a grievance and context. This grievance has to exist within an identifiable group. This group is typically a very small cross section of the broader community, who believe they are acting on behalf of the community they profess to represent.[99] In addition, the group has to perceive that there are no legitimate channels available, which would allow the addressing of the grievance. From this assessment, they have concluded violence is the only viable option. Crenshaw argues this in itself, does not create a terrorist group. There has to be a precipitating event(s), which forms the catalyst. Crenshaw states:

> *"Terrorists view the context as permissive, making terrorism a viable option. In a material sense, the means are placed at their disposal by the environment. Circumstances also provide the terrorists with compelling reasons for seeking political change. Finally, an event occurs that snaps the terrorists' patience with the regime. Government action is now seen as intolerably unjust, and terrorism becomes not only a possible decision but a morally acceptable one. The regime has forfeited its status as the standard of legitimacy. For the terrorist, the end may now excuse the means."*[100]

Thus, precipitating or trigger events, such as government actions, cause environmental perturbations or disturbances. These actions can change the environment, creating a belief that all legitimate mechanisms to bring about change are exhausted, and violence is the only mechanism left available.

Crenshaw further indicates that even if the environment exists for the formation of a terrorist organisation, very few individuals (within this environment) actually engage in terrorist activities. This has been the dilemma for terrorist researchers, as it suggests a psychological dimension. Even so, considerable research effort has been invested into ascertaining a profile of a potential terrorist, but to date no general profile has been obtained that adequately describes the psychology of a

[99] Ibid., p 384.

[100] Ibid., p 385.

terrorist. This implies that psychology is not the dominant factor involved in an individual's decision to engage in terrorism, but the catalyst for an individual adopting a terrorist persona is rooted in other factors. The review of the various terrorism models insinuates that political, economic, and social factors play a role in the radicalisation process.

The literature review suggests terrorist groups emerge because of a set of environmental factors, where there is a perception; legitimate mechanisms have failed to address their grievances. It is assessed violence is the only viable option. Emergence is not instantaneous, but a precipitating event or events are required, which causes perturbations within the environment, triggering the formation of the terrorist group.

Communications

A common theme within sociological papers is that the capacity of humans to communicate is the glue that binds the various social structures together. Howard argues, *"Social structures also are continually negotiated and redefined through individual action and interaction. The individual and society are mutually constitutive."*[101] Functionalists argue that structure within social networks is an everyday activity, bound in the human species capacity to communicate. These concepts are consistent with Dunbar's contention that communication is a critical component of social grooming, which is important in the creation of social structures and the building of social cohesion within the group.[102]

The previous discussion indicates that communications is a predominant feature of homophily. Communications allows the exchange of information and ideas permitting individuals to assess their homophyllic similarity of their social rulebook. Highlighted within the previous section, a lack of homophyllic similarity and increasing geographic distance reduces the effectiveness of communications.

[101] Judith A. Howard, "A Social Cognitive Conception of Social Structure," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (1994): p 210.

[102] R.I.M. Dunbar, "Co-Evolution of Neocortex size, group size and language in humans," *Behavioural and Brain Sciences* 16, no. 4 (1993): p 2.

This suggests, without the processes of exchange of information and comparison, facilitated by communications, the process of radicalisation would be hindered. Thus, the ability of individuals to communicate freely is a key factor in the radicalisation process and group formation, geographic proximity or modern communications technologies and social media facilitating this process.

A more detailed discussion of communications will occur later within this dissertation, based on environmental limiting factors.

The role of leadership

Casson and Giusta argue that the larger the networks grow, the greater the advantage of structure.[103] They further argue that with emergence of structure, there is a need for effective leadership if the group is to be a successful organisation.[104] The role of the leader or leadership within these types of groups is the key to the group's success. Krebs and Holley observed without *"…active leaders who take responsibility for building a network, spontaneous connections between groups emerge very slowly, or not at all. We call this active leader a network weaver. Instead of allowing these fragments to drift in the hope of making a lucky connection, network weavers actively create new interactions between them".*[105]

Casson and Giusta further argued that as the group grows, *"A leadership role may emerge, occupied by someone who exerts influence over the other members, and represents them in negotiations with outside groups. With the emergence of a leader, a network may acquire an identity, represented by a collective name, and possibly symbolized by a logo, crest or flag…"*[106]

[103] Mark Casson and Marina Della Giusta, "Entrepreneurship and Social Capital: Analysing the Impact of Social Networks on Entrepreneurial Activity from a Rational Action Perspective " *International Small Business Journal 2007; 25; 220* 25(2007): p 225.

[104] Ibid., p 239.

[105] Krebs and Holley, "Building Smart Communities through Network Weaving," p 6.

[106] Casson and Giusta, "Entrepreneurship and Social Capital: Analysing the Impact of Social Networks on Entrepreneurial Activity from a Rational Action Perspective " p 225.

Terrorist groups require leaders who have the capacity to bind groups in adverse conditions. They need to interpret current events within the framework of the group's ideology. The leader requires sufficient charisma so that, as argued by Fiol et al, they "*…effect frame alignment and mobilise followers to action. They link present behaviour to past events by citing historical examples. They articulate an ideology clearly, often using labels and slogans".*[107] These mechanisms are utilised by terrorist leaders such as Osama Bin Laden of Al Qaeda, who refer to the west in historical terms and imagery, such as the new Crusaders, making references to the clash of civilisations[108], and the pious Caliphate.[109] This comparison calls upon the follower's historical perceptions to vilify the West.

Fiol et al further argued this style of leader also *"…provides a vivid positive image of the future. Further they amplify certain values and identities and suggest linkages between expected behaviour and their vision of the future."*[110] Again, this is observed in Al Qaeda's Salafi ideology, which promises to purify Islam by returning to the values of the first four caliphs of Islam, the period known as "*Khulafa ar Rashidah*" (the period of the rightly guided Caliphs).[111] Furthermore, Salafi groups strive to implement Islamic Sharia law as the only legitimate legal process, claiming this is the only solution to the perceived problems experienced within the Middle East at this time.

Fiol et al suggested that leaders *"...by articulating an ideology vision and recruiting a number of followers who share the values of the vision, the charismatic leaders provide for the followers sense of identity with a collected sense of efficacy resulting*

[107] C. M. Fiol, D. Harris, and R. House, "Charismatic Leadership: Strategies for effecting social change," *Leadership Quarterly* 10, no. 3rd Quarter (1999): p 6.

[108] James A. Piazza, "Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?: An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 1 (2009): p 66.

[109] Angel M. Rabasa, ed. *Muslim World after 911* (Santa Monica, CA Rand Corporation, 2004), p 18.

[110] Fiol, Harris, and House, "Charismatic Leadership: Strategies for effecting social change," p 453.

[111] The first four political and religious leaders of Islam after the death of Mohammad

from membership in the collective."[112] Furthermore, Hunt et al observed the leader *"…creates a new or different world that is both "phenomenological valid" or real to the followers and different from the one before."*[113] The ideology espoused by Salafist groups has resonated with certain disenchanted sections of the Islamic community in the west. It has provided these individuals and groups with a sense of being part of the Islamic Ummah (community), working towards a greater and larger cause. They are assisting in the overthrow of oppressors of *"true Muslims",* the re-establishment of the Caliphate and guaranteeing their place in *"Jannah"* (Paradise). In addition, they interpret the world within the context of the Salafist ideology. Imprisonment and other hardships are seen in the framework of their ideological beliefs that "*Allah is testing them*" to ensure they are worthy of Jannah.

Taarnby has suggested the factors involved in the recruitment process include the identifying of individuals, who are isolated, lack an identity, or are confused.[114] As such, the leader fulfils a valuable role, by providing recruits and existing members with a collective sense of identity, by allowing these individuals a membership of a group, which has an identifiable history and future manifested within an ideological framework.[115] Taarnby did see leadership as a top-down process, but as a bottom up phenomena.[116] He viewed the emergence of terrorist cells in Europe as a self-organising process.[117] Furthermore, the leader only has the capacity to lead, attract new recruits and maintain group cohesion, whilst they are successful in their task of maintaining the phenomenological validity and reality of this new world.

---

[112] Fiol, Harris, and House, "Charismatic Leadership: Strategies for effecting social change," p 7 - 8.

[113] J.G. Hunt, K.B. Boal, and G.E. Dodge, "The effects of visionary and crisis responsive Charisma on followers: an experimental examination of two kinds of Charismatic leadership," *Leadership Quarterly* 10, no. 3rd Quarter (1999): p 424.

[114] M. Taarnby, "Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives," *Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus* (2005): p 38-39.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Ibid., p 23.

[117] Ibid.

This review of the role of leadership in groups is relevant to the study of leadership of terrorist organisations. As Hudson's review of terrorist groups (large and small) of the 1970s and 1980s suggested, *"One cannot assume to have a basic understanding of the mindset of a terrorist group without having closely studied the group and its leader(s)."*[118] Bokhari's et al examination of Islamic terrorist cells in Europe contended that the leadership of these cells was central to their formation.[119] Bokhari contended that these leaders were important in the roles of recruiting, indoctrination and the training process.[120] Leaders also acted in the function of providing legitimacy and justification for the group's existence.[121] The leader also provides the strategic direction of the group based on religious or moral grounds.[122]

In the last fifteen years or so, a concept referred to as "complex leadership" has emerged. The idea of a complex leader is similar to those proposed by Fiol, Casson and Giusta, Taarnby, Hudson, Bokhari, and Krebs and Holley. The concept of complex leadership does not view leadership as a top-down process. This concept has emerged out of the work conducted by Sageman, Taarnby and others who have found Al Qaeda does not fit the traditional organisational models. The proponents of the complex leadership model, such as Marion and Uhl-Bien, view leadership as an emergent property of a complex system. They describe complex leaders as network weavers who bring together various parts of the system.

> *"Rather than directing and controlling, complex leaders help negotiate conflicting constraints to create correlational bonds that produce aggregation (direct leadership). Creation of these bonds helps them to*

[118] R.A. Hudson, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes terrorists and why?," *Library of Congress* (1999): p 65.

[119] Bokhari, "Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalization and Recruitment to Terror Networks.," p 10.

[120] Ibid., p 39.

[121] Ibid., p 31.

[122] Ibid., p 20.

emerge as leaders in the system (e.g., leaders "bubble up" and are held up by the system; when one falls, another can rise up as a replacement)."[123]

In a complex leadership model, these leaders empower others. The role of the leadership as defined by Marion and Uhl-Bien is to:[124]

1. Define the goals and aspirations of the organisation
2. Recruit new members
3. Promote the organisational actions and activities within the context of the group's mission
4. Provide resources
5. Facilitate network connections.

Thus, the role of the leadership cadre is to act as facilitators, rather than top down controllers. The leadership gives up direct control of the mission and actions of its members.[125] This model has been applied to Al Qaeda and appears to give credible results in describing the organisational structure of the group. It is likely also to be successful in describing the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham organisational structure. It is of note that ISIS is a progeny of Al Qaeda and the insurgency in Iraq. Even so, this model has not been applied to other types of terrorist groups, such as Nationalist/Separatist, single-issue or Revolutionary/Structural groups.

An empirical study conducted by Abrahams and Potter, of militants operating in the Middle East, found as the capacity of the leadership to exert top down control over the organisation declined, the more likely the lower echelons of the group were to resort to terrorism.[126] This suggests the strength of the communications channels

[123] Russ Marion and Mary Uhl-Bien, "Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership," *Emergence* 5, no. 1 (2003): p 71.

[124] Ibid., p 73.

[125] Ibid., p 72.

[126] Max Abrahms and Philip B.K. Potter, "Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics," *International Organization* 69, no. 2 (2015): p 335.

weaken due to changes in the environment. Command and control breaks down. This results in the leadership of the organisation losing operational control. In this situation, the leadership is only able to exercise strategic control of the organisation. Without centralised leadership, the tactical and operational decision-making devolves to the members of the organisation conducting the operations. In this instance, the organisation reverts to a complex leadership model.

This raises the question; does the type of leadership model enhance the resilience of the group? Johnston, in his study of the effectiveness of decapitating the leadership of insurgency groups, found it was an effective strategy in about 25-30% of cases.[127] Price undertook a similar study and arrived at results, which were similar to those found by Johnston. Price determined decapitation worked in about 30% of cases.[128] They also found it failed to yield any effective results in the remaining 70-75% of cases. Both claimed, based on the results, it was an effective methodology; although Johnston did indicate that, it was not a "*silver bullet*".[129] Price found no correlation with the effectiveness of decapitation and the group's size, structure or ideology.[130] Johnston also found in the 30% of cases where decapitation was effective, there was not any evidence to suggest group structure guaranteed a group's durability, when the leadership cadre was lost.[131] Price[132] and Johnston[133] both stated that their findings were not in general agreement with many other researchers, who saw decapitation as an ineffective and counterproductive methodology.

---

[127] Patrick B. Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," *International Security* 36, no. 4 (2012): p 77.

[128] Bryan C. Price, "Leadership Decapitation and the End of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 36, no. 4 (2012): p 43.

[129] Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns."

[130] Price, "Leadership Decapitation and the End of Terrorist Groups," p 37.

[131] Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," p 53.

[132] Price, "Leadership Decapitation and the End of Terrorist Groups," p 9.

[133] Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," p 47.

It is noted; Price and Johnston rest their argument on a 30% success rate as a measure of success. Jordan's work on the decapitation of the leadership cadre in terrorist groups, on the other hand, found this to be an ineffective methodology of destroying a group and was counter-productive.[134] Jordan found this to be true for large, older, religious, or separatist groups.[135] Jordan suggests the reason decapitation does not work in these instances, is that these groups typically have a decentralised network structure rather than a hierarchical structure, which makes them more resilient[136], implying these groups utilise a complex leadership model, rather than a top down centralised control model.

Research into the leadership of terrorist groups indicates the role of the leaders is to provide the group its mission and aspiration, resources, recruits, weave networks, and promote the group. Terrorist leaders arise as part of the process of group emergence. The leadership model adopted by the group emerges because of the group's interaction with the environment. The leadership model also provides some insight into the structure of the group.

Summary

The literature review implies environment, social affinity or homophily, the capacity to communicate and the message espoused by the leadership of the group are significant in radicalisation and the emergence of terrorist groups. The review highlights that political, economic and social grievances are factors in the process when there exists a perception redress is not possible through existing mechanisms. The review also implies homophily is also a significant factor, as it distinguishes risk groups or individuals who may identify with these grievances. Thus, it classifies groups based on homophily, who are potentially at risk of radicalisation, noting; radicalisation is part of the process involved in the emergence of terrorist groups.

[134] Jenna Jordan, "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation," *Security Studies,* 18, no. 4 (2009): p 754.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Ibid., p 755.

The message framed by the leadership of the group was also important. The message has to offer a viable alternative, which addresses the current grievance. This message has to attract recruits. Further, the leadership also had an important role in network weaving, resource allocation and promotion, which are central to the group's emergence process. The review also found the formation of the leadership cadres was also part of the group's emergence process.

The review highlighted communications as central to the whole process. As such, geographic proximity and modern communications technology are crucial to the process. Modern communications technology has the ability to overcome the limitations of geographic distance, creating a virtual geographic proximity.

Hypothesis

From the literature review, the following hypothesis can be drawn:

H1a: When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups.

H1b: Homophyllic and geographic proximity, influences the ability of individuals to communicate and this influence is central to group formation.

Variables

The literature review suggests the emergence of terrorist groups is a function of:

1. Political, economic and social environmental variables
2. Homophily
3. Leadership

Influences on the Size of Terrorist Groups

Any arbitrary review of the size of terrorist groups indicates their size varies from a few individuals to cases of tens of thousands of members, with extensive support networks. This section is a review of literature, which discusses factors involved in the growth of groups and the potential limitations on their size.

Research conducted by Jones and Libricki[137] suggest terrorist groups in high-income countries tend to be small, whereas those in low-income countries tend to be large. They define small groups as those with 100 or less members, medium size groups as those between 100 and 1000, large groups as those between 1000 and 10000 members, and very large groups, those greater than 10000.[138] Their research indicates the size of the group was negatively correlated to the income level of the country.[139] They offer two possible reasons for this:

> *"There are two possible explanations. On the one hand, rich countries tend to be democratic and politically stable and therefore avoid having disaffected citizens in numbers sufficient to form such large groups. On the other hand, small terrorist groups in high-income and media-saturated countries may be more likely to show up in the terrorism database (which is built from media reports) than would similar groups in countries with less income."*[140]

They also suggested there was a relationship between the group type and size, but suggest this was not a dominant factor.

[137] Seth G. Jones and Martin G. Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida." (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008). p 38 - 43

[138] Ibid., p 38.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid., p 38 - 39.

> *"Very large groups are likely to be of the left-wing or nationalist type. Medium-sized groups, by contrast, are more apt to be religious. Otherwise, the differences are modest."*[141]

The Logistic Equation and its influence on group size

Pierre-François Verhulst in 1838 proposed a model for population growth within a defined ecosystem. Verhulst used this equation to describe population growth within certain ecological environments[142], linking the population size to the environment in which the population lives. Verhulst related various factors involved in population growth into a simple formula known as the logistic equation. The logistic equation has also been utilised in economics to describe the limits on the growth of markets. The equation has also described the growth of organisations as a function of the environment in which they operate. A modified version of the logistic equation has also been utilised to explain the sizes of two organisations or species that are in competition for the same environmental resources. Thus, the logistics equation establishes a link between the size of any entity and the corresponding environmental conditions.

The concept of environmental ecology is relevant to the study of terrorist or extremist groups. The logistic equation indicates a link and an interrelationship between the environmental conditions and the size of a group.[143]

The logistic equation indicates the environment has a carrying capacity, which limits the maximum size of any population. The implications that this equation has on this model is that it implies there is a limit on the maximum size a group can obtain. It further indicates that this limit is dictated by the environmental factors in which a group operates. Previously the suspected environmental variables involved with group emergence related to the political, economic, and social environmental

[141] Ibid., p 39.

[142] Jos Kint, Denis Constales, and André Vanderbauwhede, "Pierre-François Verhulst's Final Triumph," in *The Logistic Map and the Route to Chaos* (Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer, 2006), p 13.

[143] Ibid., p 13-14.

variables. Previously, it was found changes in these variables, in combination with homophily, can in extreme cases, lead to the emergence of terrorist groups.

The political, economic, and social environmental variables, in combination with homophily, are also involved in determining the potential maximum size a terrorist group could obtain. It is reasonable and logical to suggest that within an environmental space, there are only a limited number of potential recruits. This limit, combined with attrition due to arrests, deaths and desertions, sets the maximum size of the group and its growth rate. In addition, the equation acknowledges that the group size is constrained by the initial environmental conditions. Although the equation concedes, the environment is not static, as it can vary over time within the changing political, economic, and social environments. Therefore, the number of potential recruits may increase or decrease based on the prevailing environmental conditions.

Another factor, which can intuitively influence the size of a group, is homophily. The greater the affinity a population has with a group, the larger the pool of recruits. Based on previous discussions, the level of homophily is influenced by the environmental factors. Environmental factors can increase or decrease the social affinity with a terrorist group. As previously indicated in the last section, times of crisis can enable homophily and bring people together in a common cause. The affinity with the group can be enhanced when the goal of the group, as articulated by the leadership, appeals with a broad cross section of the community.

Summary

The literature review, infers the size of a terrorist group is determined by the environmental factors and the homophily the community shares with the group. This is consistent with the previous discussion, which implied homophily or social affinity was a function of the environmental factors. The review also suggests the environment and the population, based on homophily or social affinity, are factors, which limit the size of the group.

Hypothesis

From the literature review, the following hypothesis can be drawn:

H2a: The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, economic, and social environment in which the group operates.

Variables

The size of terrorist groups is a function of:

1. Homophily
2. Political, economic, and social environmental variables.

Influences on the Structure of Terrorist Groups

Environment and Network Structure

Frank, Hooper, and Battin suggest that social structure or complexity is an evolutionary process, requiring certain environmental conditions for the development of structural complexity.[144] They indicated that within stable environments, complex structures could evolve. This evolution leads to the emergence of specialisation and rules governing the behaviour of the group's members. They have further argued that if the conditions for environmental stability change, the organisation will evolve to an organisational structure, which achieves group stability under the new environmental conditions. They have supported this argument through the work of anthropologists and their study of the evolution of social structural stability and how the various social structures (Clique, Band, Mega band, Tribe, Village, to the Nation State) creates a level of stability, but each step rests on the stability of the prior. As such, if a social environmental disturbance occurs and the structural stability of the current level of social organisation degenerates, then the social system will seek stability in less complex organisational structures. Social structure is a response to the prevailing environmental conditions and social structures will influence the social environment, creating change within the environment. If the change is

[144] Aaron Frank, Paul Hooper, and James Battin, "The Emergence of Social Complexity," *Santa Fe Institute Event Wiki*(2007), http://www.santafe.edu/events/workshops/index.php/The_Emergence_of_Social_Complexity.

advantageous to the group, the group has the opportunity to evolve structurally, in a manner, which is beneficial to the group and its goals.

The principles defined within emergence suggest, groups, which maintain territorial ascendancy, would evolve an organisational structure of greater complexity than those operating without territorial dominance. The principles defined within network theory are applicable to the study of the structural choices available to groups involved in terrorism. Mishal and Rosenthal indicated that groups operating within a stable environment and maintaining a level of territorial dominance, operate using a hierarchical organisational structure, with a set of defined rules, behaviour and division of roles within the organisation.[145] Groups operating in an environment with the lack of territorial control, adopt a looser organisational network structure, forming alliances with other groups who share similar goals.

An examination and analysis of the structure of terrorist groups and their association with their operational environment, tentatively supports the above premise. Within Britain, the 07/07/2005 bombers were a small cell consisting of four known members. They operated in a hostile environment due to the British government's concerted counterterrorism efforts at that time. Al Fatah maintained a small cellular structure in its early gestation, due to the hostility towards Palestinian activism within the Middle East in the 1950s.[146] Only when the environment changed, was Fatah able to exploit rivalries between various Middle Eastern governments, allowing it to obtain a state sponsor and a safe haven from which it could grow.[147]

These examples are consistent with sociological research which has observed that different social environments will cause organisations to vary their structure and

[145] S. Mishal and M. Rosenthal, "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organisation: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organisations.," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28(2005): p 461-82.

[146] Tony Walker and Andrew Gowers, *Arafat - The Biography* (London: Virgin Books, 2003), p 23-24.

[147] Ibid., p 29-31.

behaviour of their members. Any structure adopted by a group imparts both organisational advantages and disadvantages. Hence, terrorist group organisational structure is a balance between operational effectiveness and the ability to remain covert.

Cognitive limits

The discussion to this point has highlighted that communications influences the organisation of groups. A common point presented in the review of this literature, is that communication is the bond that holds social groups together. The human ability to communicate is a result of the evolution of the human brain over millions of years in the same manner as our eyesight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. These are all mechanisms that have evolved so that we receive and perceive information from the world around us. All these information-gathering mechanisms available to us have limitations. We have very limited night vision, our hearing is not as developed as that of bats, which can see the world in sound and our sense of smell is not as sensitive as that of dogs. All these abilities are limited, but are a result of evolutionary forces. These forces have selected our abilities to allow us to survive within the physical environment. Likewise, our ability to communicate also allows us to compensate for the shortcomings for some of our physical abilities, permitting us to operate in coordinated groups, exchange information and pass on historical lessons. Even though our ability to communicate is extraordinary, when compared to other animals on the planet, it is still finite. Our discussion to this point indicates ability to communicate, enables our capacity to create social structures, but this ability is finite in nature, which implies that there are limits to how society can structure itself.

Our complex communication skills have evolved, not by chance, but to allow us to survive. Like other primates, humans are social animals and our ability has evolved in this context, in a time when humans lived in small communities and a time when the populations were not as dense as they are today. Our ability to communicate evolved in a time when human society was based on hunting and gathering, where

the family was the basic social form. These family groups were not large (no more than 3-5 individuals), but these were the individuals who we dealt with day to day on an intimate basis.[148] Beyond this was the band, which is the extended family or kinship group consisting of between 30-50 individuals.[149] The band is a group which came together infrequently either to hunt or for some ritual. Beyond this, other groupings have been identified by anthropologists, the mega band of around 500 individuals and the tribe (Linguistic group) of 1000-2000.[150] Hunter-gatherer society evolved within a homophyllic context, as group size increased there was a decreasing level of contact or interaction. Our ability to communicate has evolved within this environment. As such, these primeval influences remain with us today. This evolutionary process has taken place over tens of thousands of years. For modern humans, living in high-density populations is only a recent occurrence. Within most societies, high density living is only a few hundred years old. Although cities have existed in some societies for around four thousand years, at that time, the majority of the population did not live in cities, but in smaller communities. Therefore, there has been an insufficient passage of time to allow the evolutionary forces to overwrite these prehistoric patterns of social interaction. These patterns still seem embedded in modern day society.

As previously discussed, there appears to be sufficient information obtained from research that links homophily and communications as the principle forces in bond formation within social networks. The examination of the hunter-gatherer societies, further suggests a hierarchy in our communications networks, based on the frequency of contact. Typically, those we have most contact with, consist of a small group of no more than 3-5 individuals.[151] As the number of individuals increases, the frequency of contact declines. This implies that it is logical to suggest a limit exists

[148] W.-X. Zhou et al., "Discrete Hierarchical Organization of Social Group Sizes," *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 272(2005): p 440.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Ibid.

[151] Ibid., p 3.

on the number of these links an individual is capable of maintaining and this limitation dictates to a degree how society organises itself.

A modern researcher, Robin Dunbar, has carried out work comparing various sizes of primate groups to the size of their neo-cortex and found that there was a relationship between these two variables. When extrapolated to the size of the human neo-cortex, he predicted that the mean limit of human group size was 150 individuals. He further carried out research into the various sub groups within societies, the clique, sympathy group, band, and cognitive group, by investigating various social interactions including survivalist groups, anthropological studies, Christmas card lists, and data from other sociological studies. The results of these investigations identified clustering of relationship data around certain nominal values. The results obtained from the survivalist groups study found clusters at values of five (support cliques), 12-15 (sympathy groups), 35 (bands), 150 (cognitive groups), 500 (mega bands) and 1000-2000 (linguistic groups or tribes).[152] Hill and Dunbar[153], who investigated the size of social networks based on Christmas card lists, found that support cliques clustered around a mean value of 4 ± 2, sympathy groups around a mean value 11 ± 6, bands around a mean value of 38 ± 17 and cognitive groups around a mean value of 148 ± 46. Zhou et al approached the issue by utilising prior studies by other sociologists. Zhou's analysis implied the existence of discrete hierarchies within human social groups. The numeric data set used within their research project, suggested a power series of 3.5. That is, group sizes cluster at 3.5, 12.4, 42.9, 150.1, 525.2, and 1838.3 (3.5^1, 3.5^2, 3.5^3, 3.5^4, 3.5^5…). These values are consistent with anthropological work on the sizes of cliques (4), sympathy groups (12), bands (43), cognitive groups (150), mega bands (525) and linguistic groups or tribes (1838). Zhou also suggested that there are upper and lower limits to these values, which infer the values, are not fixed but exist within a range. [154]

[152] R. A. Hill and R. I. M. Dunbar, "Social Network Size in Humans," *Human Nature* 14, no. 1 (2003): p 67.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid.

Table 2 – Comparison data for size of the various social groupings.

	Anthropological	Dunbar	Dunbar & Hill	Zhou	Military[155]	Military Unit Types
Cliques	5	5	4	4	3-4	**Sub section/Fire Team**
Sympathy Group	12	12	11	12	8-13	**Section/Squad**
Band	30-50	35	38	43	27-50	**Platoon**
Cognitive Group		150	148	150	70-250	**Company**
Mega Band	500	-		525	300-1000	**Battalion**
Tribe	1000-2000	-		1838	2000-5000	**Brigade/Regiment**

These results are consistent with sociological papers, which emphasize the importance of the triad[156] in social networks and its stability.[157] Zhou et al compared these results with known military hierarchical organisations and found that the results were favourable. These results are summarised in the table above however, they acknowledge further research is required before arriving at any firm conclusions.[158] Dunbar acknowledged that these findings are not definitive. Even so, the results were consistent with other sociological research.

A similar power series, known as Zipf's law, is also applicable in various applications including social structures[159],

"...Zipf's law accounts remarkably well for the distribution of city sizes... as well as firm sizes all over the world,...Recently, Zipf's law has also been found in Web access statistics and Internet traffic characteristics... as well as in bibliometrics, informetrics, scientometrics, and library science...".[160] Zhou's et al findings of a power series in social groups is consistent with the results Zipf's relationship for population size of cities and the number of individuals employed by firms or

[155] Derived from a variety of sources, the military units described are predominantly western in origin.

[156] A triad is a group of three individuals.

[157] Hanneman and Riddle, "Introduction to Social Network Methods," p 65.

[158] Zhou et al., "Discrete Hierarchical Organization of Social Group Sizes," p 7.

[159] A. Saichev, Y. Malevergne, and D. Sornette, "Theory of Zipf's Law and of General Power Law Distributions with Gibrat's law of Proportional Growth," *arXiv.org* (2008): p 3.

[160] Ibid.

companies. By extension, this suggests that these may also be applicable to the size and organisational structure of terrorist groups.

A review of Zipf's law, anthropological research in hunter-gatherer social groupings, work carried out by Zhou and Dunbar, and the examination of military structures, suggests a consistency of the clustering in human social networks.[161] A preliminary review of sizes of 178 terrorist groups from the MIPT website and the Military Balance 2008 implied that there was clustering of terrorist group sizes at values 1-6, 10-25, 30-60 100-250, 300-350, 500, 1000-2000, and 3000-5000.[162] Although the accuracy of the size data of the various terrorist groups is questionable and the methodology used to obtain the clustering was a simple histogram, the results suggest a clustering at similar values to the social groupings provided in the above table. As such, it cannot be discounted that terrorist groups may cluster around similar social groupings, indicating that it is worthy of further analysis.

Emergence of Structure

The previous section suggests there is an underlying structure, which exists within society. It also implies, as the size of social groups increase, so does the structural complexity of these groups. This process was described by Krebs and Holley.[163] They devised a model to depict the evolution of network structures over time. This model implied that networks progress through four stages of evolution, each stage acquiring greater complexity in its structure. They indicated that the driving force of this process was homophily and the efforts of an individual known as a network weaver. Their research shows that emergent groups transition through various states including:[164]

1. Scattered network fragments
2. Single Hub-and-Spoke network

[161] Zhou et al., "Discrete Hierarchical Organization of Social Group Sizes," p 8.

[162] "Non-State Groups," in *The Military Balance*, ed. James Hackett (London: Routledge, 2008), p 461-82.

[163] Krebs and Holley, "Building Smart Communities through Network Weaving."

[164] Ibid.

3. Multi-Hub Small-World network
4. Core/Periphery network

The model proposes that in the initial stage of the network, evolution only consists of scattered fragments comprising of very few individuals. Over time, within these scattered fragments, a network weaver(s) (leader(s)) emerges. This network weaver brings together some of the fragments into a single hub and spoke network. The network consists of the network weaver at the centre of the hub. At the centre of the network, the network weaver holds the other fragments together. The next stage in the development of the network, involves the network weaver bringing other hub spoke networks together into a multiple hub small world network.[165] The final stage of the evolution of the network, which is the ultimate structural goal, is to attain the core/periphery network topology. Krebs and Holley also argue this topology emerges after many years of network weaving. They further indicate that this type of network is stable and has the capacity to link to other networks in other geographic regions. The structure of core/periphery networks consists of the core, which are the key members of the network. The periphery consists of three groups. The first group is new members endeavouring to gain membership of the core. The second group consists of bridges to other communities. The third group consists of those who have access to resources outside the network.

Network weavers are effectively leaders who bring the scattered fragments together, evolving the primitive structures of the single hub and spoke, and multi hub small world networks. If these leaders are successful, influence becomes concentrated in a core/periphery network.

The model proposed by Krebs and Holley is useful in describing the emergence of network structures, but it does not describe the emergence of hierarchies. In addition, there also has been a consistent failure of homophily to describe the

[165] Ibid.

emergence of hierarchies in social systems. There is a body of research, which has indicated that Neolithic, Hutterite and Academic communities seem to maintain social cohesion between values of 100 - 200 individuals.[166] Beyond these values, the communities fracture and splinter. Between these values, there seems to be a tipping point. This tipping point appears to occur when the group's size reaches approximately 150 individuals. This value has been statistically related to the cognitive limits of the human brain, which restricts the number of other people one individual can effectively deal with. Beyond this, human groups become unstable without the introduction of a formal structure.

Zhou's et al power series offers a solution to the maintenance of social cohesion. The series suggests a natural organisational hierarchy within human society and which offers a solution to how hierarchies emerge. The power series suggests a process of stratification, which maintains an individual's social network within the 150 limit.[167] That is, at the base level of the hierarchy an individual may be part of a clique consisting of three other individuals. One person within this clique is designated the leader, who also resides in a leadership clique. Within this leadership clique, there would be a leader, who also belongs to the leadership clique in the next layer in the organisation. The process repeats as you traverse the hierarchy upwards (see Figure 2).

Thus, hierarchical structures are a function of size and a solution to a specific organisational problem. The problem of managing the limits imposed by the human brain restricts the number of communications channels an individual can maintain. Hierarchical structures will emerge when the organisation obtains sufficient size. Hierarchies emerge to reduce the communication overload within a large organisation by breaking that organisation up into smaller manageable components, which exploit the cognitive limits of the human brain. In doing so, it

[166] Dunbar, "Co-Evolution of Neocortex size, group size and language in humans," p 7.

[167] Ibid.

creates efficiencies in communications and restores stability to the organisational structure.

Figure 2 - A Hypothetical Chart of a Clique Structured Hierarchy (Directionally Coupled Network)



The following discussion utilises Jackson's model.[168] Jackson argues:

> *"Within an organization, the ability of a commander or opinion leader to exert different types of authority is defined by the nature of the relationships among the members (e.g., how influential is the leader, will he or she be "listened to" when orders or suggestions are given?) and the communications mechanisms available for the leader to communicate with members. Even in organizations with strong and charismatic leaders, limits on their ability to communicate with their members reduce their ability to exert authority at all three levels. Such limits could arise simply from practical constraints on the bandwidth and frequency of their communications modes, or from more complex operational security concerns. In such cases, isolated components of the group may diverge from the intent of the leadership because of the weakness of the connection between them, even in the absence of any intentional effort to change strategy or tactics."*[169]

[168] B. A. Jackson, "Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 2 (2006).

[169] Ibid., p 245.

Jackson makes no distinction between networks and hierarchies. Jackson views hierarchies as a special case of a network. In Jackson's model, he views hierarchies as tightly coupled networks.

> *"The most frequently cited example of such tightly coupled groups is the classic hierarchy which, in addition to specific structural characteristics, have clear and stable authority relationships where leadership can exert all three forms of control over their subordinates. This control is exerted unidirectionally from "higher to lower" within the organization…"*[170]

Jackson emphasises how the capacity for a group to communicate determines the strength of the connectivity between the elements of an organisation. In effect, this capacity to communicate regulates the structure of the group. Jackson also highlighted the strength of these channels were influenced by environmental considerations, such as group security. This implies, the greater the risk of disruption to these communications channels, the frequency of the channels used would decline. Therefore, reducing their bandwidth, that is, the amount of information transferred on these channels and as such, the level of control the leadership cadre can exert. Thus, the strength of the communications channels underscores the structure of the terrorist group.

The density of the coupling of the various components of the network in Figure 2, above, would be expected of a group that operated in friendly environments. The environment would impose few impediments to communications between the various elements of the group. As such, there would be an expectation that an element would be able to maintain daily contact with all other elements within the group. Therefore, as per Jackson's model, the leadership would be able to exercise strategic, operational, and tactical control over the organisation as a whole.

[170] Ibid., p 247.

As the harshness of the environmental conditions increases, the coupling of the communications networks within the structure weakens or decreases. This would lead initially to the loss of tactical control of the lower levels of the group. Figure 3, below, illustrates the weakening of this network.

Figure 3 - A Hypothetical Chart of a Clique Coupled Network



The diagram (Figure 3) above illustrates the weakening of the links between upper and lower levels of the organisation. As per Jackson's model, this relates to the environmental conditions, which increases the risk of contact between elements of the organisation, hence decreasing the influence the upper levels have over the tactical operations of the group.

As the environmental conditions further degrade, so does the capacity of the group to communicate, leading to the uncoupling of the network as shown in the diagram below (Figure 4). The ability of the upper levels of the organisation to communicate with the lower levels of the organisation without risk diminishes further. The reduction in the coupling of the network decreases the ability of the upper levels of the organisation to exercise operational, as well as, tactical control. This loss of influence leads to an organisation of loosely coupled groups, which are aligned to the strategic objectives of the larger organisation, but operate with independent tactical and operational objectives.

Figure 4 - A Hypothetical Chart of a Clique Uncoupled Network



In this type of group, the elements of the network are not directly linked to the organisation that provides the strategic direction. There are a number of organisational outcomes in this type of system. The simplest result of this type of network is an independent cell operating on its own initiative, but taking the strategic direction from another organisation. Another outcome is a large group, which is not directly aligned or connected to the organisation, providing the strategic direction. This type of system allows for many possible organisational outcomes, the two previously discussed are offered as examples.

Summary

The literature review indicates, as the size of a group increases, the group's structure also emerges to manage the increasing complexity of the communications channels. Work conducted by researchers involved in the analysis of social networks and anthropology, suggests structure is evolutionary, and determined by the strength or weakness of the communications channels, which connect the components of the network. The review also indicated group structure was dependent on the environmental factors in which the group operated. This indicates there is a direct relationship between the security environment and the strength or weakness of the communications channels within the network, which tied the organisation together. The review also indicated the geographic distance between components of the organisation, further influenced the structure of the organisation. At the micro level, researchers like Dunbar have claimed there is a maximum limit to the number of communications channels an individual can

effectively manage, which would further influence the structural choices available to the group. Dunbar argued this limit has an underlying impact on social structures.

Thus, the literature review suggests group size, geographic distance, environment, and the cognitive limits of the human brain are all factors, which potentially influence a terrorist group's communications network and therefore its organisational structure. It further suggests group structure is evolutionary over time.

Hypothesis

The literature review allows the formulation of the following hypothesis:

H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time.

H3b: Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the group.

Variables

The structure of terrorist groups is a function of:

1. Group size
2. Political, economic and social environmental variables
3. Cognitive limits
4. Geographic distance

Chapter 4 – Modelling Terrorist Groups as Complex Adaptive Systems

Complexity theory and the concept of complex adaptive systems have been applied, to a limited extent, to the study of terrorism. Bousquet[171], Marion and Uhl-Bien[172], and Beech[173] have all applied complexity theory and the concepts of complex adaptive systems to the study of Al Qaeda. These researchers found a good match, but their studies focused on one case and they did not look at other terrorist groups to ascertain whether these principles could be more generally applied.

This chapter endeavours to derive a model based on the theories of complexity and complex adaptive systems to describe the emergence of terrorist groups and their structure. This complex adaptive model and the literature review, will be used to formulate a set of hypothesises to test this premise and to ascertain whether it can be extended to cases beyond the single case studied to date.

An introductory background to Complexity Theory

Complexity theory or Chaos theory, as it is also known, grew out of the study of systems, which displayed mathematically chaotic natures. These systems could not be described by the traditional mathematics of linear systems. These systems were described by non-linear equations, which were mathematically impossible to solve. It was not until the advent of the digital computer and its ability to carry out millions of computations per second, did the dilemma of attempting to solve and gain an understanding of how these equations behaved, become possible. The first to realise this and attempt to gain insight into the behaviour of these types of systems, was a meteorologist named Edward Lorenz. In 1961, Lorenz was studying the chaotic nature of weather systems, running simulations on an early computer. In an attempt to save time, Lorenz, rather than starting the simulation from the beginning using his initial data, started the simulation using data from half way

[171] Antoine Bousquet, "Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad," *Journal of International Relations and Development*(2011), www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/.

[172] Marion and Uhl-Bien, "Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership."

[173] Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Beech, "Observing Al Qaeda through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism" (U.S. Army War College 2004).

through his last iteration of the simulation. To his surprise, he discovered that the results he received at the end of the run were completely different to the previous test. On examining his results, in an attempt to understand what when wrong, Lorenz discovered that the computer calculated the results of his equations with six-digit accuracy, but the printout of the results was limited to three-digit accuracy. Thus, he discovered that very small changes in initial conditions resulted in very large changes in output conditions, which provided insight into weather systems. This insight suggested that the prediction of weather systems could only be guaranteed over a short time period, as the inaccuracy in the measurements would lead to prediction and reality significantly diverging as the period of the prediction increased. This was due to the interrelationships of the variables and the limited accuracy by which they could be measured. This meant that the variables needed regular measurement to ensure the ongoing accuracy of any predictions.

Thus, complex systems were found to be sensitive to their initial conditions, due to the interaction and feedback between all the variables involved. As such, small perturbations or changes in initial conditions could lead to dramatic changes over time.

Terrorist Groups as a Complex Adaptive System

The concept of complex adaptive systems is a specialised field of complexity theory, which grew out of the biological sciences.[174] A complex adaptive system is both self-organizing and learning.[175] A complex adaptive system also reflects the complexity of their environment.[176] Further, they are non-linear, interactive, self-organising, and self-reproducing.[177] *"Systems may be called adaptive if they can adjust to such*

[174] Bousquet, "Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad". p 6.

[175] Kevin J. Dooley, "A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organization Change," Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences 1, no. 1 (1997): p 77.

[176] Jochen Fromm, *The Emergence of Complexity* (Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2004), p 182.

[177] Bertuglia and Vaio, *Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems*: p 296.

changes while keeping their organization as much as possible intact".[178] Bertuglia and Vaio describe a complex adaptive system as an *"…adaptive complex system is an open system, made up of numerous elements that interact with one another in a nonlinear way and that constitute a single, organized and dynamic entity, able to evolve and adapt to the environment"*.[179]

Bousquet defines a complex adaptive system *"…as a dynamic network of many agents acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting to what the other agents are doing. The control of a complex adaptive system therefore tends to be highly dispersed and decentralised. Any coherent behaviour in the system arises from competition and cooperation among the agents themselves. It is the accumulation of all the individual decisions taken by the multitude of agents that produces the overall behaviour of the system, and which can thus be said to be emergent."*[180] This definition originates from a complexity theorist from the Santa Fe Institute, John Holland. The types of systems, which can be described as complex adaptive systems, include "*living organisms, insect colonies, bird flocks, ecosystems, businesses, stock markets and other forms of social and cultural organisation with the constituent agents being cells, species, individuals, firms or nations"*.[181]

John Holland described the characteristics of a complex adaptive system as follows:

1. A complex adaptive system is a network of many entities acting in parallel and interacting in a dynamic environment, which is a product of these interactions.[182]

[178] Francis Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," (Brussels: Center Leo Apostel, Free University of Brussels, Belgium, 2001), p 15.

[179] Bertuglia and Vaio, *Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems*: p 276.

[180] Bousquet, "Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad". p 6.

[181] Ibid.

[182] Fromm, *The Emergence of Complexity*: p 183-84.

2. Control of a complex adaptive system tends to be distributed across the system, but coherent behaviour arises out of competition and co-operation between the parts of the system.[183]
3. A complex adaptive system has many levels of organisation with parts of the system acting as building blocks for a higher level.[184]
4. A complex adaptive system constantly rearranges its building blocks as it learns and adapts to changes in the environment.[185]
5. A complex adaptive system is emergent and self-organising.[186]

Intuitively, terrorist groups share all the above characteristics, except point 2. There is a trend to consider terrorists as being centrally controlled, with a well-defined hierarchy. Since the 911 attack on the twin towers by Al Qaeda, this premise has been called into question by a number of researchers. These include the likes of Sageman, Gunaratna, Jackson, Bousquet, Marion and Uhl-Bien, and Beech. There is acceptance within the research community that Al Qaeda operates like a franchise or a loosely coupled network, which is not centrally controlled. Likewise, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), outside its area of control, operates in a similar manner.

The problem with the above model is the concept of decentralised control, which could be problematic in the study of terrorist groups. Groups such as the Irish Republican Army are considered centralised hierarchical organisations. One of the premises in this thesis is, on paper, they appeared to be centralised, but in reality, they are not. This premise has some support from other researchers. Marion and Uhl-Bien, in their study of Al Qaeda, have argued leaders are not created by the system but are emergent products of the system and enhance the fitness of the

[183] Ibid., p 184.

[184] Ibid.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Bousquet, "Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad". p 6.

system.[187] They further argue these types of leaders use indirect leadership.[188] They are not necessarily embedded in a formal position but permeate the system.[189] These leaders also act as network weavers, coupling the different and diverse parts of the system.[190] As such, leaders are the product of the evolution of a complex adaptive system. Thus, point 2 is consistent with overall premise that a terrorist group is potentially a complex adaptive system.

Emergence and Self-organising

The following two sections discuss in detail, the concepts of emergence and self-organising, which are central to complex adaptive systems. From these discussions, the key variables involved in the study of terrorist groups as a complex adaptive system, are isolated.

Emergence

The aim within this section is to define a model based on complexity theory's concept of emergence. There is no intention to derive a quantitative model, but to use the principles of emergence to derive a qualitative description when used in conjunction with the hypotheses. The goal is to put these factors into context within the larger system.

Emergence is a poorly defined concept within complexity theory.[191] The concepts of emergence and self-organising are often confused and interchanged[192], although *"…emergence and self-organisation each emphasise very different characteristics of a system's behaviour. Both phenomena can exist in isolation and they can co-exist in a dynamical system."*[193] In most instances, emergence is described as a global

[187] Marion and Uhl-Bien, "Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership," p 55.

[188] Ibid.

[189] Ibid., p 55-56.

[190] Ibid., p 56.

[191] Tom De Wolf and Tom Holvoet, "Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising When Combined," in *Engineering Self-Organising Systems* (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005), p 1.

[192] Ibid.

[193] Ibid.

phenomenon, which results from the interaction of local elements of the system.[194] In the context of this thesis, local elements, emergents, or entities, are the individuals or groups involved in the process, which leads to emergence.

Emergence is characterised by the unexpected appearance of properties or structures that come into existence, due to the interactions of individuals or groups. These interactions do not occur in isolation.

> *"The components should interact freely with each other and with the environment, mutually adapting so as to reach an intrinsically "preferable" or "fit" configuration (attractor), thus defining the purpose of the system in an "emergent" way."*[195]

Emergence occurs at the boundary of the system, between the system and the external environment.[196] The system must reach a point of criticality or *"edge of chaos"*[197] where the environment undergoes significant change or perturbation.[198] In this type of system, the environment is not static, but dynamic. The system draws energy from the changes (perturbations) in the environment, which in turn drives emergence. In the science of complexity, energy is information, resources, or anything that drives change within the emerging system.

Emergence is typically a bottom-up process, *"…but is not possible without a top down feedback process."*[199] As has previously been indicated, it is characterised by local interactions. These interactions require an energy (information, resources etc.)

---

[194] Ibid., p 2.

[195] Carlos Gershenson and Francis Heylighen, "When Can We Call a System Self-Organizing?," in *Advances in Artificial Life* (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer 2003).

[196] Jochen Fromm, "Ten Questions about Emergence." p 3.

[197] Ibid., p 11.

[198] Ibid.

[199] Ibid., p 2.

exchange mechanism (communications conduits) and is a product of positive and negative feedback between the macro and micro levels of the system.

The concept of emergence utilised within this thesis, argues the local interaction of individuals or groups within a defined set of unstable local environmental conditions, which leads to the emergence of new entities. More specifically, Wolf et al states:

> *"A system exhibits emergence when there are coherent emergents at the macro-level that dynamically arise from the interactions between the parts at the micro-level. Such emergents are novel w.r.t. the individual parts of the system."*[200]

The term "emergents", as defined by Wolf et al, is *"…a general term to denote the result of the process of emergence: properties, behaviour, structure, patterns, etc."*[201] Within this thesis, the "emergent" is defined as the group and its structure. Wolf et al describe the micro and macro levels of the system as follows:

> *"The 'level' mentioned refers to certain points of view. The macro level considers the system as a whole and the micro-level considers the system from the point of view of the individual entities that make up the system."*[202]

The interactions at the micro level are considered to take place within a dynamic environment. For these interactions to take place, the parts of the system (or entities) must be local to each other, that is, geographically close.

The system and processes we are discussing are the factors, which lead to the emergence of terrorist groups. As suggested previously, the environment in which

[200] Wolf and Holvoet, "Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising When Combined," p 3.

[201] Ibid.

[202] Ibid.

entities interact is important in the emergence of these types of groups. It is also noted, the formation of terrorist groups is an extreme response to these environmental factors, and other types of less extreme groups can co-evolve within the same environmental system.[203]

Within this thesis, the PESTELO model is used to define the environment. PESTELO is an acronym for political, economic, socio-cultural, legal, ecological, technological, and organisational factors that make up the environment. The PESTELO model will be discussed in further detail in a later chapter within the thesis. In short, the model has an intelligence and business background and is not traditionally applied in academic work. Even so, the model does capture all the variables that describe the environmental space in question, used by other academic researchers.

Local interactions imply geographic proximity. Technology also plays a role, as it has the capacity to create virtual proximity within cyberspace, which means physical proximity is no longer an overriding requirement. Modern communications technology can create virtual proximity in real time.

When discussing local interactions, the physical environment, as defined by the PESTELO model, varies from location to location. As such, it is not uniform over the geographic space in question. It can vary, creating areas of relative advantage and disadvantage. Thus, the probability of interactions taking place also varies and requires context. People in society interact for a variety of reasons, but the likelihood of individuals interacting increases when they share common backgrounds, interests, and values.[204] Hence, social affinity or homophily is a significant factor in enabling these interactions. A detailed discussion of homophily occurs in a later chapter.

[203] Kilcullen, "Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe," p 658 - 59.

[204] Michele; Frasca Starnini, Mattia; Baronchelli, Andrea, "Emergence of metapopulations and echo chambers in mobile agents," *Physics and Society*(2016). p 8.

Thus, emergence occurs because of changes in the environment that drive local interactions of entities, which occupy the same physical or virtual local geographic space. These local interactions enable information exchange, which is the energy that drives the emergent system. The individual or group interpret this information in the context of how the environmental changes affect the specific individual or group. They also interpret this feedback in terms of how the changes within the environment affect their homophyllic group. This interpretation can potentially act as a radicalising factor within the group.[205] Further, these changes in the environment may present an opportunity to address long-standing grievances.[206] Radicalisation does not directly result in the formation of terrorist organisations, but is part of the emergence process. Radicalisation is a stage in the emergent process. This process and these types of interactions can lead to many outcomes and do not always lead to terrorist group formation. Therefore, changes in the environmental factors can lead to individuals or sections of the community becoming radicalised. In extreme cases, this can lead to the emergence of terrorist groups, but this outcome is not certain.

It is also important to acknowledge, not everyone involved in the radicalisation process concludes violence is the only viable mechanism that is capable of bringing about the required change(s) to the existing system. Radicalisation can lead to the creation of non-violent protest movements or political parties, which are willing to work within the existing system. The body of research conducted over the last 40 years or so, indicates very few individuals within a given adverse environment become terrorists.

[205] Alex P. Schmid, "Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review," (Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013), p 4.

[206] Ibid., p 4 - 6.

There is another form of emergence called “diachronic”:

> *“Diachronic emergence refers to a historical sequence of systems or system types. In the course of evolution one system is linked to another— the old to the new—by emergence; that is, the first one gives rise to the second.”*[207]

In the terms of this thesis, diachronic emergence suggests, at the time of emergence, the terrorist groups may inherit the structures of their parent group, from which they arose. Thus, it implies these types of groups could build on the structure of what has come before.

In summary, the model of emergence used within this thesis, consists of the following elements and relationships.

1. The entities (individuals or groups) must share physical or virtual geographic proximity. This proximity enables the exchange of information.
2. The individuals and groups share the PESTELO environment.
3. The probability of interactions and communications between the individuals or groups is more likely when they share similar social affinity or homophily
4. Changes in the environment drives the radicalisation process, where individuals or groups could coalesce in response to the environmental conditions. As such, radicalisation is part of the emergence process.
5. Groups coalesce and emerge based on a common aspiration and belief of how this aspiration can be achieved. Thus, homophily is part of the engine, which drives emergence, as it determines the

[207] Cristian Fuchs, "Some Implications of Anthony Giddens’ Works for a Theory of Social Self-Organization," *Emergence* 4, no. 3 (2002): p 8.

likelihood of interaction. It forms part of the rules of preferential attachment.

6. At the extreme end of this spectrum, terrorist groups emerge based on a shared belief that violence is the only method, which will bring about their aspiration(s). Other groups may emerge, which share the terrorist group's aspirations but do not share the group's belief in the use of violence as a legitimate tool or as the only method available.

Figure 5 below, illustrates the hierarchy of variables, which are involved in radicalisation and emergence.

Figure 5 - Hierarchy of variables involved in Radicalisation and Emergence



The outer two green layers define the physical and virtual distance between the entities and describes the proximities of the individuals or groups. It illustrates their capacity to interact as required in emergence. This level also defines the confines of the local environment. The next green layer is the ecological environment, which is not a factor, which is studied in this thesis, but is included for completeness, as

ecological factors have been the cause of extremist activity in the past and will likely continue to be an area of grievance in the world experiencing climate change.

The next two purple layers specify the factors used to describe the non-physical environment. The outer layer consists of the non-physical factors, such as those that define the political, economic, and legal variables and can be areas of potential conflict in any social system. The inner layer comprises of the organisational and socio-cultural environmental variables, which are structural factors.

The orange layers describe the homophyllic variables, which determine the likelihood of individuals or groups interacting at the micro level within the emergent system. The outer layer is status homophily, which *"…includes the major sociodemographic dimensions that stratify society—ascribed characteristics like race, ethnicity, sex, or age, and acquired characteristics like religion, education, occupation..."*[208] This layer represents how society categorises and divides its members and defines how individuals and groups identify. These are effectively societies self-organising rules. This is also the layer where changes in the environment can create divides and conflicts, which potentially can lead to terrorism. This layer is the interface with the environment.

The inner layer is value homophily, which *"…includes the wide variety of internal states presumed to shape our orientation toward future behavior."*[209] This layer contains the less tangible aspects of social stratification. It identifies the aspirations and beliefs of individuals or groups. Within this model, these are the factors, which define the emergence of terrorists groups. These groups have goals (aspirations) based on their grievance and as previously mentioned, they may share the same or similar aspirations with other groups, but what makes them distinct is their belief that violence is required to achieve this aspiration. These individuals or groups are

[208] McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," p 419.

[209] Ibid., p 419.

at the extreme end of the radicalisation process. Specifically, their willingness to use violence in a selective and planned manner against civilian or non-combatants in support of their aspirations, with the intent to draw the public's attention to their cause. The use of violence has the intent of provoking a response from their opponents. These aspirations and beliefs may be latent for years, but the perturbations in a given set of environmental conditions enable the emergence of these groups.

The final component of emergence is radicalisation. This is the mauve inner circle. The radicalisation process can result in the emergence of violent extremist or terrorist groups, but it can also result in other types of emergent behaviours or groups. Individuals or groups can become sympathetic or supportive of the aspiration, but reject violence. Others may engage in non-violent activism or create political groups to achieve the aspirations to work within the existing system or attempt to subvert the system. At the extreme end, others may support the use of violence, but are unwilling to engage in violence. These individuals or groups may provide logistical, material or financial support to a violent extremist group or terrorist organisation. They may also provide intelligence or safe houses to violent extremists, violent activists, or members of a terrorist group. At the apex of the scale, are the violent extremists. This is not a homogenous group and can be delineated into various roles.

The scales of radicalisation utilised within this dissertation, extends on the work conducted by Kilcullen.[210] Kilcullen broadly divided these scales into the core, cadre, members, supporters, and sympathisers.[211] Kilcullen also acknowledged extremist political organisations, non-violent subversive networks, sympathiser networks, and the criminal/terrorist nexus.[212] Figure 2 illustrates the enhanced scales of radicalisation.

[210] Kilcullen, "Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe," p 649- 59.

[211] Ibid., p 659.

[212] Ibid., p 650.

Radicalisation is also a bidirectional process. An individual can transition up the scale or down, depending on their changes in belief or aspiration at any given time. An individual can leap a step or steps depending on their individual circumstance. As such, the process is not linear. The triangular shape of the diagram illustrates the declining numbers of individuals who reside at each level of radicalisation, although the triangular shape is illustrative rather than a definitive representation of the actual numbers. There is a greater likelihood these numbers follow a non-linear relationship and exponentially decay as behaviours become more violent and extreme.

Figure 6 – Scales of Radicalisation



Within this thesis, violent extremists or terrorists are divided into four categories, which may overlap. These categories include the ideologue, the hard-core, the followers, and the opportunists. An individual may fit into one or more of the categories. The definition of these categories utilise the work in this area conducted by Bokhari[213], Kilcullen[214], Makarenko[215], and Mullins.[216] This delineation of the categories of violent extremists, results from differences in the variables in value homophily. Those involved in violent extremism or terrorism, share the same or

[213] Bokhari, "Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalization and Recruitment to Terror Networks.," p 11.

[214] Kilcullen, "Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe," p 649-59.

[215] Makarenko, "Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime: the emerging nexus," p 1-10.

[216] Sam Mullins, ""Global Jihad": The Canadian Experience," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25, no. 5 (2013): p 742-54.

similar aspirations, and believe violence is a legitimate tool, but some have the behavioural traits or the aptitude for violence and others may not. Some may possess abilities and aptitudes, which predispose them to other roles within a terrorist or violent extremism organisation.

Figure 7 – Categories of Violent Extremists



Figure 3 above, illustrates the overlap of the various categories of violent extremists. The ideologues are those who formulate the group's message and provide justification for the group's actions. In many respects, these are the public face of the group. The hard-core members are the core, cadre, and members of the organisational machine and include the fighters, bomb builders etc. The opportunists, as their title suggests, are those who attach themselves to a group for personal gain, whether this gain is political, criminal, financial etc. In some instances, they align with the group because they believe they will be on the winning side and they see personal advantage in doing so. The last group are the followers. In general, followers are defined as members of the groups who are not in leadership roles. In this thesis, followers are those who are on the periphery group, who are seeking membership of the group. In recent history, some terrorist cells, which have operated in the West, have claimed allegiance to groups such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). These groups have carried out

attacks or attempted to carry out attacks in these groups' names, although not directly linked to these groups.

Self-Organising

The aim within this section is to define a model based on complexity theory's concept of self-organising. There is no intention to derive a quantitative model to describe how terrorist groups self-organise. The goal is to use the principles of self-organising as defined in complexity theory, to derive a qualitative model to describe the evolution of the structure and size of terrorist groups.

Self-Organising is defined as*"…the spontaneous creation of a globally coherent pattern out of local interactions"*.[217] Self-organising is also, *"…a dynamical and adaptive process where systems acquire and maintain structure themselves, without external control."*[218] The theory of self-organising also requires a set of simple rules, which describe how the entities in the system are to interact, behave, and communicate.[219] All entities in the system share these simple rules. In addition, a self-organising system, to be sustainable, must be able to maintain and replenish itself.[220] Meer and Koppen also indicate a self-organising system must be resilient. That is, if the system loses an input variable, the system must adapt in response to this change.[221]

Like emergence, self-organising occurs at the boundaries between the environment and the system.[222] It is at this boundary it draws its energy/information.[223] Self-organising systems are non-linear, involving positive and negative feedback between the micro and macro levels of the environment, which determines the

[217] Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," p 1.

[218] Wolf and Holvoet, "Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising When Combined," p 7.

[219] Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," p 4.

[220] Hermann De Meer and Christian Koppen, "15. Characterization of Self Organization," in *Advances in Applied Self - organizing Systems* (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2005), p 237.

[221] Ibid., p 227.

[222] Fromm, "Ten Questions about Emergence". p 10

[223] Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," p 14.

system's capacity to transfer information (communicate).[224] The environment is the medium, which enables the local interactions and hence, the environment mediates all communications. This mediation is termed stigmergy.[225] There is no external direction of the self-organising process and it is an internal response to the changing environmental conditions.[226] Self-Organising is characterised as a "bottom-up" process, which results from the *"random changes, disequilibrium or something else* [perturbations]"[227], an input of energy from the environment, which creates instability (edge of chaos) within the structure(s).[228] Without explicit pressure or control from outside the organisation[229], the instability in the structure, causes the organisation to a point of criticality (tipping point), where the organisation is no longer stable in its current state (attractor).[230] The instability drives emergence and the group to seek a new state (attractor), through re-organising (self-organising) its structure to attain dynamic equilibrium.[231] In effect, the system evolves to meet the environmental challenges or does not survive.[232] Further, evolution may involve a number of intermediary steps, before it arrives at an optional structure.[233] It is a process where the system endeavours to find a new point of dynamic stability, gravitating to an attractor.[234] When the system evolves, it also changes the environment, because it interacts with the environment as a complex adaptive system.[235] In addition, the environment does not drive all change. Internal interactions can also drive change.[236] When discussing systems, such as the structure of terrorism groups, these types of groups or systems do not operate under a

[224] Meer and Koppen, "15. Characterization of Self Organization," p 235.

[225] Fromm, "Ten Questions about Emergence". p3

[226] Ibid. p3

[227] Bertuglia and Vaio, *Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems*: p 271.

[228] Ibid.

[229] Ibid., p 272.

[230] Ibid., p 277.

[231] Ibid.

[232] Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," p 3.

[233] Ibid.

[234] Bertuglia and Vaio, *Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems*: p 271-72.

[235] Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," p 4.

[236] Ibid.

common environment, which varies from location to location. Thus, in this type of system, evolution is a distributed and parallel process, with differing results or solutions for differing environment's problems.[237]

The problem with self-organising systems is how we define the organisational structure of the system under examination. Within this dissertation, the term "structure" equates to a network, which self-organises at the time of emergence. Self-organising and emergence are utilised to understand how these networks evolve in response to environmental changes.

Gershenson et al, indicates the observed structure of a self-organising system is dependent on the observer's perception of what they are attempting to discover.[238] If the observer is examining the system to ascertain the network involved in commodity flows and none exists, then the observer will discover disorder or entropy.[239] To ascertain the nature of the system, the observer must focus their attention on the purpose of the system.[240] The discussion within this thesis is about the command and control structures of the organisation or group. Thus, this thesis examines the flow of information. In addition, it examines how the group organises to utilise information to achieve its goals or aspirations, without comprising the security of the organisation in a given environment. As such, we are examining the network, which permits the communication of information throughout the network. To ensure there is no misconception, the communications networks within terrorist groups are the structures, which are the subject of examination within this thesis.

The structure of the terrorist groups emerges from the interaction of local entities, which self-organise, based on a set of shared self-organising rules. The capacity of

[237] Ibid.

[238] Gershenson and Heylighen, "When Can We Call a System Self-Organizing?," p 607.

[239] Ibid.

[240] Ibid., p 611.

the entities to self-organise and exchange information depends on the ability of the group to use the available communications channels through the environment in a manner, which does not compromise the groups. Thus, the local environmental conditions determine the ability of the group to transfer information. Therefore, the structure of the groups will emerge and self-organise to reflect the environmental conditions. This suggests the structure of a terrorist group may vary, depending on the geographic distribution of the group and on the local environmental conditions, from one location to another.

Self-organising further suggests that for a group to remain viable over time, the environmental conditions have to be such, so the group can sustain itself. That is, the environmental conditions must be such that the group can resource itself (financially and materially), sustain recruitment, and maintain support within the general population.

Self-organising implies if the environmental factors were to change in such a way where the group could no longer justify its existence, the group would have to adapt. It would have to evolve to cater for the new conditions. If it did not, it could become unstable and potentially cease to exist if it could not find a new equilibrium. In terms of terrorist groups, this means they may have to abandon violence and evolve into a nonviolent political entity. Otherwise, they may cease to exist as a unified entity.

In developing a model to describe the self-organising structure of terrorist groups, it is important to identify the key properties.

1. Environmental factors
    a. The entities (individuals or groups) must share physical or virtual geographic proximity. This proximity enables the exchange of information/communications.

b. The individuals and groups share the PESTELO environment and are subject to the same environmental perturbations.

2. Self-organising rules
    a. Rules of Interaction as defined by homophily or social affinity.
    b. There are cognitive limits to the number of entities another entity can connect to.

Figure 8 below illustrates the hierarchy of variables involved in the self-organising process.

Figure 8 - Hierarchy of variables involved in the Self-Organising Process



Figure 8 above illustrates the hierarchy of variables involved in the self-organising process. The outer layers of the model consist of the physical and virtual geographic factors, the environmental and homophyllic variables, which are identical to those involved in the processes of radicalisation and emergence. This is consistent with complex theory as emergence and self-organising are closely related. A self-organising system requires a set of simple rules, which instruct the entities how to arrange themselves. The inner two circles define these rules. Homophily is the rule of preferential attachment, which is a feature of the principles of self-organising.

This rule defines the probability of entities interacting and as such, a group emerging. The inner circle defines the limits on the number of attachments an entity can maintain and consistently service to ensure effective information exchange. Robin Dunbar has suggested there is a cognitive limit to the number of links or communications channels people can effectively maintain. Typically three to four, but it can be as low as one, or as high as seven.

As the system is a complex adaptive system, there are a number of feedback loops between each of the layers. The group is part of a greater system where any group, entity, or agent has the capacity to change the environment in which they operate. The group must reproduce or replenish itself, learn and self-organise (evolve) to adapt to the environment as it changes. This model suggests the combination of all of these factors will result in the system gravitating to a particular structural attractor. It also means, as the environment across the conflict space is not homogeneous, the overall structure of the group may be impossible to predict.

Summary

From the discussion above, it is important to understand the environment, as any complex adaptive system is a part of the environment and interacts with it. Thus, an understanding of the environment is important. As we are looking at the terrorist groups through the lens of complexity, it is vital to understand the initial environmental conditions and the perturbations within this environment to understand the interactions, which had driven the emergence of the group. Further, complex adaptive systems are self-organising. It is essential to understand the environment's influence on the group's structure. In addition, it is necessary to understand the underlying simple rules of self-organising, which govern and limit the structural choices.

Above, contains the fundamental research questions, which require answers to extend the work by Bousquet, Marion and Uhl-Bien, and Beech. These researchers have managed to describe Al Qaeda as a complex adaptive system. This thesis

intends to attempt to extend this hypothesis by applying the model above to further case studies of historical terrorist groups. The model above goes beyond the work of Bousquet, Marion and Uhl-Bien, and Beech, as it endeavours to identify the key variables involved in the processes of emergence and self-organising. This is an attempt to generalise the premise that terrorist groups are complex adaptive systems, whose emergence and structure can be described and understood through complex systems analysis.

Chapter 5 - Methodology

Introduction

The case studies will be utilised to test the hypothesis outlined in previous chapters. This chapter outlines the analytical method, case study section, assumptions, and the limitations of the methodology and the dataset.

Analytical method

The case study is the analytical methodology used within this dissertation. This dissertation uses three case studies, each due to their distinct characteristics. A cross case analysis is conducted in an attempt to determine commonalities between the cases to test the validity of the hypothesis outlined in the previous chapters. Thus, the cross analysis is conducted to ascertain whether any generalities can be derived from the cases under study. The case study methodology is well suited to this work. By definition, it attempts to conduct:

> *"…an in-depth inquiry into a specific and complex phenomenon (the 'case'), set within its real-world context. To arrive at a sound understanding of the case, a case study should not be limited to the case in isolation but should examine the likely interaction between the case and its context."*[241]

Cross case, analysis is utilised to test the hypotheses. The use of this methodology will provide insight into the validity of the findings.[242] The methodology utilised is explanatory, which will attempt to examine the causal effects relating to each of the five hypotheses. The intention is to compare the results of each of the case studies to ascertain if the findings can be generalised. As such, each case study documents a set of outcomes and attempts to explain these outcomes.[243]

[241] Robert Yin, "Validity and generalization in future case study evaluations," *Evaluation* 19, no. 3 (2013): p 321.

[242] Ibid., p 322.

[243] Ibid.

Each of the case studies follows the same structure, as defined by Stake.[244] Stake indicates each case should address each of the following points:

> "*Case research seek out both what is common and what is particular about the case, but the end product of the research regularly portrays more uncommon…, drawing from all at once from*
>
> 1. *the nature of the case, particularly its activities and functioning;*
> 2. *its historical background;*
> 3. *its physical setting;*
> 4. *other contexts, such as economic political, legal and aesthetic;*
> 5. *other cases through which this case is recognised; and*
> 6. *those informants through whom the case can be known."*[245]

Reliability and Validation (Trustworthiness)

Issues related to qualitative case studies are - they are subject to criticisms of the validity and reliability of their findings. To improve the reliability and validity of the findings of this study, it uses both theory and triangulation.[246] Huberman and Miles have suggested there is no consensus on methodology *"upon which findings are considered plausible or convincing".* [247] Huberman and Miles[248] suggest some tenants to overcome this issue. This study will adopt Huberman and Miles' methodology. The methodology requires the researcher to shift between cycles of inductive data collection, and analysis to deductive cycles of testing and verification.[249]

Huberman and Miles' methodology is similar to that used within the intelligence profession, where information is collected and tested. The first test is to establish the reliability of the sources. The basis of the reliability test is the determination of

[244] Robert E. Stake, "Qualitative Case Studies," in *The Sage Hand Book of Qualitative Research Third Edition*, ed. Norman K. Dean and Yvonna S. Lincoln (California: Sage Publications, 2005).

[245] Ibid., p 445.

[246] Yin, "Validity and generalization in future case study evaluations," p 323-24.

[247] A. M Huberman, and Miles, M.B, *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Sage Publishing, 1994).

[248] Ibid., p 438.

[249] Ibid.

the sources historical reliability, that is, whether the source is considered reputable. Further, it is also prudent to establish the source's impartiality. Testing the impartiality of the sources is useful in teasing out information, which may distort the analytical process. This is particularly relevant in the use of media and government reports, evidence provided in court and biographical accounts, where the source may have an underlying agenda, which could cloud or distort the facts.

The second test is to establish whether the information is consistent with other reputable and reliable independent sources. This methodology is useful as it can permit the use of information from sources where the reliability is unknown. If the validity of the information is uncertain, it drives another cycle of the information collection process, in an attempt to establish its reliability.

The analytical process is also cyclic and involves the collation of the information and data in a logical manner so it assists the analytical phase. The analytical process is deductive and involves cyclic attempts to create meaning from the available information. It attempts to identify information gaps within the data. These gaps then initiate another collection phase, which attempt to address these gaps, followed by another analytical phase.

The final phase is the documentation of the results and the establishment of whether the conclusions are logical and consistent. Further, this review would identify any gaps in the analytical process. To address any gaps, an additional cycle of analysis or information/data collection may need to be undertaken.

Case selection

The three case studies selected, potentially provide some insight into the variables, which are significant in this study. The cases were selected because it has traditionally been believed they maintain a hierarchical structure, which permits the testing of the premise that they are potentially complex adaptive systems. This suggests their structure and leadership model is far more flexible and fluid than

originally suspected. Secondly, the complex adaptive model has only been applied to Al Qaeda, which is a contemporary day religious group. The cases selected are historical groups with either a Nationalist/Separatist or a revolutionary agenda. The three cases selected were the Weather Underground Organisation (WUO), the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

Table 3 - Summary of the characteristics of the selected case studies

Group	Approximate Maximum Number Members	Type	Goal	Structure	Year formed	Year Disbanded	Years Active	Outcome
KLA	20,000+	Nationalist/ Separatist	Independent Kosovar state	Mixed structure	1991	1999	8	Successful
PIRA	1000+	Nationalist/ Separatist	Union with the Irish Republic	Allegedly hierarchical	1969	2005	36	Partial achieveme nt of goals through a negotiated peace.
WUO	100+	Revolution ary/ Structural	A communist government in the USA	Allegedly cellular	1969	1981	12	Failed

The five hypothesises formed the selection criteria for the choice of each case studies.

H1a: When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups.

H2a: The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, economic, and social environment in which the group operates.

H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time.

H3b: Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the group.

All cases emerged in volatile environmental conditions and used violence in an attempt to achieve their goals. As such, the three case studies are suitable to test hypothesis H1a. They also emerged under different environmental, homophyllic

and geographic conditions, which allows a cross case analysis to test hypothesises H1a, H1b and H2.

Further, the sizes of the groups are significantly different and all varied in size over time. The WUO was a moderate sized group, with less than 100 members and over its lifetime, its membership declined, until it eventually disbanded. The PIRA was a medium sized group. At its peak, it maintained a membership of over 1000, which later declined to around 700. The KLA was a large group, which grew from a small core cadre of four members to over 20,000 members at the end of its life. Thus, each group allows an analysis of the potentially homophyllic and environmental factors, which potentially influenced the group's size. Further, the variation size also allows the testing of the generalisation of the complex adaptive premise. As such, these cases are suitable for a cross case analysis to test hypothesis H2a.

The longevity of the groups was also a reason for their selection. Longevity permits an analysis of the changing homophyllic and environmental factors over time, and their impact on the size and structure of the groups, under the complex adaptive model. The study excluded small groups. The reason for this is all groups are small at the time of their emergence. Some thrive and grow; others stagnate, or only exist for a brief period and cease to exist for a variety of reasons. The issue of small group emergence forms part of the analysis of the three case studies. As each of the groups under study, existed for 8 years or more, in different homophyllic and environmental contexts, their selection allows the testing of hypothesis H3a.

Each of the three cases had varying levels of structural complexity, but each differed in their structural organisation. Each case also operated in differing environmental conditions. Therefore, each of the cases allowed a cross case analysis, which permitted the possible identification of the factors that led to the organisational outcomes. The differing environments and organisational structures enable the testing of hypothesis H3b.

The level of success of each of the groups was also a factor in their selection. The WUO failed in its objective, the PIRA gained concessions and compromise, but did not achieve its ultimate goal. The KLA was successful in the long term, in gaining independence. The reason for the choice was to ensure factors like success or failure did not skew the final findings.

Furthermore, the availability of information written by reputable sources to permit a serious study of the groups was also a factor. Though each group is historic, the historic nature of each of the groups permitted a life cycle study to be undertaken. In addition, there were multiple sources available, which permitted validation of the information provided by the authors of these studies. As such, each case study was not reliant on the work of a single author, thus mitigating the potential influence of bias within the studies.

A possible limitation of the selected cases is they only cover two types of terrorist or violent extremist groups. The two larger groups (KLA and PIRA) were Nationalist/Separatist groups and the smaller was a Revolutionary/Structural group. None of the groups was religiously or single issue motivated. Neither of the groups is contemporary. Although, as noted previously, a study of Al Qaeda, a religious group, has already been undertaken by a multitude of researchers. As such, these findings stand outside of this thesis. At this time, it is not possible to ascertain whether exclusion of other types of terrorist groups will be a limitation or have a significant impact on the generalisation of the findings.

Outline of methodology and assumptions

The selected case studies will attempt to establish the validity of the five hypotheses identified, under the complex adaptive model, in the earlier portion of this work. This thesis will utilise three case studies, each selected to determine common variables, which lead to emergence, growth and the evolution of structure. Three case studies are also utilised to improve the validity and

generalisation of the findings resultant of the analysis. Each of the case studies are framed within the context of the theoretical model for the emergence, size and the evolution of structure based on the concepts of emergence and self-organisation to further enhance the validity and triangulation of the qualitative findings of the research.[250] The case studies examine the group over its life cycle from emergence to their end.

The concepts of complex adaptive systems, emergence and self-organisation, as previously discussed, indicates the evolution of any system is dependent on the initial conditions of the system. As such, each group is set within terms of the broader background historical context. This description details the environmental factors (as defined by the PESTELO model), which led to their emergence. The underlying assumption within this approach, is that group emergence is directly related to environmental factors within any given conflict space, as suggested by the principles of complexity and complex adaptive systems. This assumption has foundation, as complexity theory establishes a significant causal relationship between the concepts of emergence, self-organising, and the environment.

The study of the effects of the environment, as part of a complex adaptive system, will be investigated to ascertain its effects on radicalisation, preferential attachment (homophily) and their relationship with the size of a terrorist organisation. In addition, the analysis will also endeavour to determine if there is a relationship between the environmental factors, homophily and group size. As previously indicated, the size of terrorist groups are suspected to be limited by homophily and the environment. There are no apparent assumptions within this section of work, as each concept is based on already well established theoretical frameworks.

The variables in each case study will also be examined using a cross comparison analysis to evaluate whether there is any relationship between the environment

[250] Yin, "Validity and generalization in future case study evaluations," p 323-24.

variables, physical geography and the cognitive limits of the human brain on the structure of a terrorist group. The analytical assumption is, the bandwidth of the communications channels between the elements of the network, determined the structure of the group. The previous discussions within this dissertation provide some foundation for this assumption, based on the work of Jackson[251] and Shapiro.[252] The concepts of emergence and self-organisation support this assumption, as they argue complexity emerges when elements of a system are able to exchange energy or information, implying the bandwidth of the communication channels is critical in determining structure.

Limitations

Brewer argues that the covert nature of terrorist groups limits the collection of information on these groups.[253] Without access to detailed data on these types of groups, this study is reliant on open sources of information, which is limited. This study uses redacted government sources. These sources generally provide sufficient detail about active members of the groups, but are limited in the information they provide on the broader networks related to sympathisers and supporters. Public Domain Databases are limited in that they provide information of a general nature, and typically draw their information from common sources. The information provided regarding the size and structure of the organisation is typically coarse in nature and of questionable quality. Furthermore, the information compiled within these databases, is as indicated by the MIPT website:

> *The information contained in this website has been carefully compiled from sources believed to be reliable. However, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) does not guarantee its completeness, accuracy or usefulness.* [254]

[251] Jackson, "Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda."

[252] J.N. Shapiro, "Organizing Terror: Hierarchy and Networks in Covert Organizations," (2005).

[253] G. Brewer, "Heroes or Villians: The Tupamaros in Uruguay.," *War in Peace* 1984, p 1212-13.

[254] http://www.tkb.org/TermsOfService.jsp

The majority of these types of databases are compiled from open source information, much of which comes from the internet. These database compilers have limited resources to compile and validate the information. As such, the reliability and validity of the information cannot be fully guaranteed.

The uses of court proceedings also have their limitations. Rules of evidence govern court proceedings, which will provide some insight into the core group, but it is unlikely to provide insight into the larger organisation. Furthermore, agencies that bring these individuals before the courts often provide evidence in closed hearings, the content of which are not made public. As such, this creates information deficits that could have provided further insight for the researcher or provided further information to test the research hypothesis.

Libel laws and the protection of sources also limit the completeness of information contained in books and media reports, which potentially leads to the omission of critical information and insight. When protected sources are used, these sources are not known or readily available to the researcher. As such, it is difficult to test the credibility of the source. The accuracy of biographical accounts must be tested against other sources, to determine if the information is verifiable prior to use. This is to overcome problems such as bias and political or other agendas of the author. Even though biographical accounts are useful and insightful, they have their limitations and are not definitive.[255] Likewise, media and government reports may be selective in the analysis and reporting of information. These types of reports may have an underlying political agenda or purpose. Therefore, they could be selective in their analysis and interpretation of data, which also needs to be accounted for and acknowledged. There are also issues with academic papers and books examining these groups. As previously stated, information regarding these types of groups is limited. This creates problems, as authors at times, may be utilising the

[255] Hudson, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes terrorists and why?," p 46.

same sources to conduct their analysis. Hence, this makes the validation of information difficult, which will further affect the analytical process.

This thesis uses only three case studies, as space does not permit further cases. Therefore, it may create difficulties in generalisation, as it only takes one conflict case to undermine any findings. Another potential limitation is all the groups, which have emerged from parent organisations. Two of the groups had emerged from organisations that had not engaged in violence previously and one group from an organisation that had abandoned violence. These groups became separate entities from their parent organisations. There are no cases, which address the issue of a peaceful group as an organisation becoming violent. Even so, this may not be a limitation. Sageman argues that radicalisation takes place in a groups context, whether that be through informal networks, family or from within an organisation.[256] Thus, radicalisation, which is a precursor of terrorist group formation, takes place in a group context. Some argue the lone wolf terrorist phenomenon undermines this argument. The case of the Unabomber indicates even lone wolves are radicalised within a group context. Covill indicates the Earth First! Movement inspired the Unabomber, of which he was a member, but acted outside the movement and unilaterally.[257] As such, even lone wolves can emerge from peaceful organisations. Even so, it is acknowledged that there may be instances where peaceful organisations can become violent. As such, it is recognised as a limitation.

Finally, Krebs identified three limitations with network analysis of covert networks, which could govern the research outcomes:[258]

[256] Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terrorism Networks in the Twenty First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008), p 84 - 88.

[257] Christopher J. Covill, "Greenpeace, Earth First! and The Earth Liberation Front: The Progression of the Radical Environmental Movement in America" (Honours Thesis, University of Rhode Island, 2008), p 65.

[258] Vladis E. Krebs, "Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells," *Connections* 24, no. 3 (2002): p 2.

- *Incompleteness – the inevitability of missing nodes and links that the investigators will not uncover*.
- *Fuzzy boundaries – the difficulty in deciding who to include and who not to include.*
- *Dynamic – these networks are not static, they are always changing.*

Case Study 1 – The Weather Underground Organisation (WUO)

The Weather Underground Organisation (WUO)[259] was prominent between 1969 and 1981 when the organisation ceased to exist. It was part of the New Left, which arose out of the student protest movement of the 1960s. The group maintained a Marxist-Leninist ideology and taking their inspiration from revolutionaries, such as Che Guevara and Fidel Castro.[260] The Weather Underground emerged from a faction of the Students for Democratic Society (SDS) known equally as either the Weatherman or Weathermen. At its height, it claimed over 500 members across the US.[261] It was also the subject of intense Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) focus during the course of the late 1960s to its demise.

Chapter 6 – Historical Background

Prior to the start of the 1960s, the black Civil Rights movement in the United States had been campaigning for equality with white members of American society. The activism of this movement inspired young members of the socialist Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID).[262] The SLID's parent organisation, the League for Industrial Democracy (LID), by comparison, had achieved very little in its 55-year history.[263] The SLID abandoned its association with the LID and the old labour emphasis of their predecessors. They broadened their focus and changed their name to the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The first meeting of this group occurred in October 1960 and by 1962, the group had drafted its manifesto known

[259] Originally known as the Weatherman, also known as the Weathermen and the Weather Underground.
Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.* (London: University of California Press, 2004).

[260] Mark Rudd, "Che and Me," http://www.markrudd.com/?violence-and-non-violence/che-and-me.html.

[261] Ibid.

[262] The SLID was a socialist student organisation, with a long history of activism on US campuses. It was anti-capitalist, anti-fascist, and anti-war and did not support militarism on United States campuses. It was a strong supporter of civil liberties and academic freedom. It had a long history of organised protest action.
"Handbook for the Student League for Industrial Democracy - History, Program and Organisational Guide," ed. Student League for Industrial Democracy (New York 1935).

[263] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*

as the Port Huron Statement, which was adopted by the group at its first convention, in June of the same year.[264]

The Port Huron Statement outlined the manifesto of the SDS. It was a broad document, which laid out the views and thoughts of the new organisation, it called for sweeping political, economic, and social change. The content of the document denounced imperialism, elitism, poverty, and capitalism.[265] It supported peace, education, civil rights, disarmament, and health reforms.[266] This was a departure from the Old Leftist ideology, which maintained a narrow focus on the working class. The New Left had a global vision of America's role in this new world.[267]

Initially the SDS was active in the Civil Rights movement. In 1963, the SDS issued a new document called "America and the New Era", this document according to Harold Jacobs:

> *"…criticizes the inadequacy of the Kennedy Administration's New Frontier program to solve the problems of disarmament, social justice, and racial equality. As an alternative to collaboration with liberal groups, the document calls for the independent organization of emerging insurgent forces within the civil rights, peace, and student movements."*[268]

In the same year, the SDS set up the Education Research Action Project (ERAP). The project aimed to improve the educational standards of poor white and non-white children in ten northern states.[269] The program was intended to broaden the appeal

[264] Harold Jacobs, ed. *Weatherman* (Rampart Press, 1970), p 3.

[265] Tom Hayden and Robert Alan Haber, "Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society, 1962," (Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) Archives and Resources 1962).

[266] Ibid.

[267] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 131-40.

[268] Jacobs, *Weatherman*, p 3.

[269] Ibid.

of the movement, having theorised that the movement meant little if it were isolated within academic communities.[270] The program involved members of the organisation living and working within poor communities in an attempt to disseminate their message. The program failed as it "…*had difficulty transcending the class barriers separating them from those they sought to help*".[271]

The SDS was not the only leftist oriented group involved in campus politics at that time. Along with other socialist groups on United States campuses including the black and third world student groups, the Progressive Labor party (PL) had formed a campus student group called the May 2 Movement (M2M). M2M was mostly active in the East Coast campuses, organising the first significant protests against the Vietnam War, taking place in New York in 1964.[272]

America's involvement in the Vietnam War escalated in 1965, with the SDS organising its first anti-war protest in April of that year, which drew over 15,000 participants. The success of this protest led to the rapid expansion of the SDS across American University Campuses.[273] It also led to the PL disbanding the M2M, and the PL integrating with the SDS.[274] Through its involvement within the SDS, the PL quickly became the largest faction within the SDS. In 1966 the SDS activities increased, the SDS *"…pushes radical draft resistance as the dominant thrust of its political organizing. It also calls on its campus chapters to protest or disrupt appearances of representatives of the military-industrial complex."*[275]

A critical aspect of the SDS' beliefs was that the working class was a key element of their struggle. At this time, the SDS had no defined all-embracing ideological

[270] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*

[271] Ibid., Kindle Location 343.

[272] David Barber, *Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2008), p 146.

[273] Jacobs, *Weatherman*.

[274] Barber, *Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed*: p 146.

[275] Jacobs, *Weatherman*, p 3.

platform, which encompassed how they would solicit the working class to support the SDS' stances on Civil Rights, the Vietnam War, imperialism and the underprivileged.

In 1968, the strong SDS chapter at Columbia University protested the building of a new gymnasium by the University of Columbia, which encroached on the black suburb of Harlem. The SDS took the position that this gym served no benefit to the community. Furthermore, Columbia's association with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the type of research the CIA funded at the university, also disturbed the Columbia's SDS Chapter. Initially, the group challenged the university's position through the normal channels. After this method failed to achieve any results, a group within Columbia SDS, known as the Action Faction, took a more confrontational approach. What followed was the occupation of four university buildings and in doing so, the SDS effectively closed the university down.[276] The protest was broken after about a week, by the conservative university's governing body. The university called in the police, who arrested about 700 of the protestors.[277] The action received national and international media coverage, both on television and in print.[278] In addition, out of these types of protest actions, the leadership cadre of the Weather Underground emerged; one prominent member being Mark Rudd.

The SDS benefitted from the prevalence of television within the United States in the 1960s. Television provided the SDS and its protest actions, a broad audience. This audience had not been accessible to groups prior to the1960s, as the previous technologies failed to provide the national coverage, the immediacy, and the visual impact of television. This exposure led to a dramatic increase in the membership of the SDS between 1968 and 1969. It was estimated in 1969, the membership of the

[276] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 371-77.

[277] Ibid., Kindle Location 385.

[278] Ibid., Kindle Location 384.

SDS had risen to 100,000 members.[279] The SDS was becoming an umbrella organisation for a variety of socialist campus student groups, which led to a rapidly increasing membership, but it also led to increasing factionalisation within the SDS. Varon describes the atmosphere and debate within the SDS during 1968:

> *"In America, ideological and strategic debates were carried out most strenuously within SDS, where Marxism had become the common coin of political discussion. Some SDSers took to Marxism with striking zeal, as if they had discovered a previously hidden language that promised to make transparent the deep structure of their society. Yet in the rush to tap its analytical power, activists often applied Marxism with little sophistication or willingness to revise assumptions that squared poorly with contemporary realities. This was conspicuously true of those who, like the Progressive Labor Party (commonly called PL), clung to the idea that the industrial working class was the exclusive agent of revolutionary change."*[280]

PL had emerged, in the mid-60s as a Maoist group. It possessed considerable organisational skills and in a brief time, had become influential in some important chapters of the SDS.[281] The PL as *"… its main initiative, it tried to build "worker-student alliances" on campuses, while condemning militancy-and violence especially-as dangerous expressions of "left-wing adventurism" divorced from "mass struggle." "*[282] In the period 1966 to 1968, the PL organised its supporters on the various university campuses into Worker Student Alliances (WSA). The PL brought to the SDS its interpretation of Marxism, which to some in the SDS appeared dogmatic. Although the PL had emerged as a result of the Civil Rights movement and had worked actively to support this movement, its involvement in the riots in

[279] Dan Berger, "The Weather Underground's place in history: A response to Jonah Raskin," *Socialism and Democracy* 20, no. 2 (2006): p 145.

[280] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 666-70.

[281] Ibid.

[282] Ibid., Kindle Locations 672-73.

Harlem in 1964 had led it to the ideological conclusion that all Nationalism was reactionary.[283] Based on this ideological platform, the PL "…*withdrew support from the Black Panthers, the National Liberation Front of Vietnam, and other progressive Third World struggles in this period. PL also eschewed the counterculture as contradictory to organizing "the working class"".*[284] The PL was a conservative organisation who had framed the struggle and political arguments beyond race and the third world. This allowed it to appeal to a greater cross section of the white students on American campuses.[285]

The PL, as a faction, threatened other groups within the SDS, especially the factions within the SDS who had been actively building alliances with the Civil Rights movement and black nationalists, such as the Black Panthers. The PL attempted to create a unifying vision. The PL was an extremely disciplined group with a significant capacity to organise its members, which intimidated other factions within the SDS.[286] The PL used its capacity to organise and mobilised its members to be the dominant faction at the 1968 SDS national conference. The PL used these numbers to gain the passage of the "*Fight Racism; Build a Worker-Student Alliance; Smash Imperialism*." proposal.[287] This proposal stated:

> *"Nationalism has replaced pacifism as the main ideological weapon of the ruling class within the Black Liberation Movement. Nationalism is used to divert Third World people from struggle on a class basis and from making alliances with white workers and students. Because of the special super-exploitation of black people, their struggle is national in form and working class in content. Thus, at SF State there was a separate TWLF [Third World Liberation Front]. Usually a nationalist feeling is the initial conscious impetus*

[283] Berger, "The Weather Underground's place in history: A response to Jonah Raskin," p 140.

[284] Ibid.

[285] Barber, *Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed*: p 147.

[286] Ibid.

[287] Ibid., p 147.

towards struggle among black people. But the material basis of this struggle is class oppression. Consciousness of this oppression must become the predominant ideology for these struggles to win."[288]

Many of the mainstream members of the SDS were unhappy with the PL's proposal, as it marginalised and undermined one of the founding tenants. The black Civil Rights movement had inspired the founding members of the SDS. The "*Fight Racism*" proposal bundled black Civil Rights and the struggles of the Third World into a concept of the international struggle by the working class.[289]

Mainstream SDS members, who were concerned with the growing influence of the PL, came to form a loose group of activists, who were predominantly friends and shared similar political beliefs, known as the Radical Youth Movement (RYM). The group emerged from activists in the Michigan-Ohio region of the SDS. The group initially took control of the Ann Arbor SDS[290] and at the December 1968, conference presented a written proposal called "*Towards a Revolutionary Youth Movement*". The key element of this document was to decide the direction the SDS, in regards to the working class. The document proposed that the SDS should radicalise working class youth as they had a lesser stake in the current system, which *"…subjected them to the draft, few economic opportunities, and harassment by authorities*".[291] The document proposed that the SDS play a revolutionary role, awarding the vanguard status of the movement to "*…black radicals, and the Black Panthers especially, in the movement as a whole. Radicalizing working-class white youth therefore meant educating them about racism and the need to accept black leadership*."[292]

---

[288] Ibid., p 146.

[289] Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (Vintage Books, 1973), p 283 - 95.

[290] The SDS chapter within the city of Ann Arbor, included University of Michigan, and other local colleges and universities such as, Concordia Lutheran Junior College and Cleary College.

[291] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Location 693.

[292] Ibid., Kindle Locations 696-97.

The RYM proposal differed from the PL's "*Fight Racism*" doctrine. The RYM placed the black movement at the centre of the revolution, where the PL proposed the whites would lead the revolution. The PL argued the resolution of the injustices faced by the working class, would also resolve the injustice faced by blacks and the third world, as they were all part of one homogeneous working class. The PL and RYM disillusioned many of the older members of the SDS and alienated others[293], by coaching their proposals in Marxist doctrine, espousing a revolutionary ideology, and arguing over the correct interpretation of Marxist writings.[294]

The dynamics of student politics changed dramatically in November 1968, when black students at San Francisco State University initiated a strike at the behest of English instructor George Mason Murray, who was also a member of the Black Panthers. The students demanded a Black Studies department within the university. The strike gained the support of the Asian and Latino students from the Third World Liberation Front (TWLF). Although initially supporting the strike, the PL based on its ideological platform, "*Fight Racism*", condemned the strike by the Black students as reactionary.

The strike gained significant media coverage, as did the breaking of the strike by the police, who were called in, by the university president. The media captured images of the police breaking up the strike with batons, and of the bloodied students. The advent of satellite communications allowed these images to be broadcast across the nation and the world. This incident and the mass arrests of Black Panthers within the US, acted as a catalyst, which triggered student strikes across the nation. The Vietnam War remained a central issue for student activists, but was temporarily pushed aside. At this time, the issues affecting the black and Third World students

[293] Ibid., Kindle Locations 697-700.

[294] Ibid.

became dominant. In strikes at San Francisco State University, the SDS had only a supporting role; black and third world students had led the strikes.

The RYM had consisted of three regional groupings of activists, plus a group of non-aligned RYM members. The first group came from the Chicago National SDS office and the regional SDS offices. This group attempted to gain a greater understanding of the current events in the context of Marxist theory.[295] The second group emerged out of the Midwest regional SDS and was referred to as the Jesse James Gang, due to their predisposition for confrontational tactics during protests.[296] The third group consisted of members from New York and Columbia Universities and were known as the Action Faction. In the scale of radicalism, they were more radical than the Chicago group and more moderate than the Midwest groups.[297] The RYM consisted of members and factions of the SDS, who had demonstrated they possessed the capacity and were willing to engage in a more confrontational approach, to bring their grievances to the attention of the public.

The RYM's analysis of the student protests on American campuses in 1968, led to the group, in June 1969, splitting into two factions, the RYM I and the RYM II. The split occurred based on ideological grounds. The RYM I (Weatherman) saw the black activists as having leadership in the revolutionary struggle. The Weatherman felt that the white working class could not lead this revolution because of their white skin privilege.[298] The RYM II disagreed; they saw the leading forces in the revolutionary struggle as the proletariat.[299] They made no distinction based on race, but only on class.

[295] Barber, *Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed*: p 148.

[296] Ibid., 148.

[297] Ibid.

[298] Ibid., p 175.

[299] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 800-05.

The RYM I, in an effort to counter the PL doctrinal dominance of the SDS, drafted its own manifesto.

> *""You Don't Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows" after a lyric from Bob Dylan's "Subterranean Homesick Blues… The statement's principal author was J. J. (John Jacobs), a charismatic but notoriously domineering Columbia graduate who had defected from PL and now used his considerable knowledge of Marxist theory on behalf of a new revolutionary model. With the statement, the RYM members sought to limit PL's power in SDS by responding to what they felt were PL's heresies: its single-minded focus on the industrial working class; its refusal to fully support the Black Panthers and Vietnam's National Liberation Front… and its opposition to SDS's youth politics".*[300]

Unlike the PL faction of the SDS, the RYM I saw the black movement as central to the struggle and acknowledged the black movement had been at the vanguard of the struggle in addressing working class injustices, of which the Vietnam conflict was a part. As such, the RYM I repudiated the PL stance and marginalisation of the black Civil Rights movement and black militant groups such as the Black Panthers. In the case of the Black Panthers, the RYM I acknowledged the leadership role in the revolutionary struggle and the cost this role had inflicted on the group in the form of government repression and the death of some of its leading members.[301]

The RYM II defined the black community in the United States in colonial terms; they viewed black communities as United States colonies within a white America and as such argued for their self-determination and for their status as a free Nation.[302] This view contradicted that of black activist groups, such as the Black Panthers, who

[300] Ibid., Kindle Locations 711-17.

[301] Barber, *Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed*: p 155.

[302] Ibid., p 162.

were in a practical sense, only seeking the control of the institutions within their communities.[303]

The RYM I manifesto was presented at the 9th Annual SDS conference to the 2000 delegates at the Chicago Coliseum. The manifesto had been authored by an 11 member committee of the RYM I. To pre-empt a possible takeover of the Conference by the PL, a plebiscite was held, which excluded the PL from the rest of the conference.[304] The RYM I manifesto was passed with a small margin and its members were elected to the key leadership roles of the SDS National Office. The RYM I Weatherman manifesto was significant and from then on, the group became known as the Weatherman. The Weatherman won a pyrrhic victory; their actions had splintered the SDS. The PL remained in control of its base in Boston and claimed to be the true SDS leadership, many other members and factions of the SDS, disillusioned by what had happened, withdrew from the SDS.[305]

Prior to this conference, the Weatherman had been building support for a protest known as National Action. It was *"….conceived…as a series of conventional protests against the war, racism, and domestic repression".*[306] The protest was approved by the June 1969 SDS conference. Now the RYM I (Weatherman) had the leadership of the SDS, they renamed the protest to the Days of Rage.[307]

> *"They left the scenario for Chicago vague but spoke of their intention to "tear up pig city" and "kick ass" when fighting the police. Violence was the incessant theme of Weathermen promoting the action to student activists*

[303] Ibid.

[304] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Location 721.

[305] Ibid., Kindle Location 727.

[306] Ibid.

[307] Ibid., Kindle Locations 885-86.[308] Ibid., Kindle Locations 888-89.

around the country, and rumours quickly spread that they intended to bring guns to Chicago."[308]

The intent to "…*tear up pig city"* was consistent with the prior behavioural traits of the action driven members of the Weatherman, although it was an escalation on previous protests organised by these activists.

The Days of Rage were scheduled to be between the 8th and 11th October 1969. The Weatherman's Days of Rage was heavily promoted in schools and in teenager hangouts, in an effort to get the working class young involved in the protest.[309] The Weatherman also engaged in low-level harassment of the police leading up to the protest.[310]

The Weatherman signalled the start of the Days of Rage with its first act of terrorism. On 7th October 1969, a small cadre of Weatherman detonated a bomb in Chicago destroying a statue that honoured eight police officers who died during the Haymarket riots of 1886. The target was selected because it represented a symbol of state repression of the working class.[311] In 1886, the courts had condemned to death, leaders of labour unions involved in what was initially, a peaceful strike meeting at the Haymarket square. The History Channel website records the incident:

> *"What begins as a peaceful labor protest in Haymarket Square in Chicago, Illinois, turns into a riot, leaving more than 100 wounded and 8 police officers dead. After Chicago authorities arrested and detained nearly every anarchist and socialist in town, eight men, who were either speakers in or organizers of the protest, were charged with murder.*

[308] Ibid., Kindle Locations 888-89.

[309] Ibid., Kindle Locations 890-98.

[310] Ibid., Kindle Locations 898-900.

[311] " May 4, 1886: A riot breaks out in Haymarket Square," ed. The History Channel website (The History Channel website).

The day before the riot, a couple of people were killed and others were wounded in an unprovoked attack by police officers firing into a crowd of striking workers at the nearby McCormick Reaper Works. Despite tension the following day, the crowd at Haymarket Square was listening quietly to speakers advocating a mandatory eight-hour workday for employees. As the final speaker was winding the rally down, police officers forced their way toward the stage to disperse the crowd, provoking someone to throw a bomb into the crowd.

After the explosion, officers began firing wildly in all directions, inciting a riot among protestors. About sixty police officers were wounded and eight died. Although the public was later led to believe that the deaths resulted from the bomb, seven of the eight fatalities and the great majority of the injuries were caused by shots fired by fellow officers during the confusion."[312]

The intention of the Days of Rage was to protest the United States role in the Vietnam War. The Weatherman had promised there would be 25,000 activists on the streets of Chicago.[313] The black activist groups, such as the Black Panthers, did not support the action proposed by the Weatherman. The Panthers feared police repression after the Days of Rage protest had ended, when the white protestors had all gone home and left them with the consequences of their actions.[314] When the protest commenced, there were only about 300 participants[315], who were heavily outnumbered by the police. Many of the protestors were arrested and detained by the police. The protests were violent, with the Weatherman destroying property and attacking police. The Police control of the protestors was equally violent.[316] The protests failed in their objective. There was no mass mobilisation of

[312] Ibid.

[313] Barber, *Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed*: p 183.

[314] Ibid., 183.

[315] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Location 1066.

[316] Barber, *Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed*: p 183-85.

the white young working class, neither was it supported by the broader membership of the SDS.

This is not to suggest that Americans were not interested in ending the Vietnam War, as the Moratorium march of 15th October 1969, a few days after the Days of Rage, demonstrated. This march was the largest anti-war march of the 1960s, attracting an estimated 2000,000 participants nationwide.[317] This was an indication that very few involved in the anti-war and Civil Rights movement supported the escalation of the violence proposed by the Weatherman. It also suggested the Weatherman were now moving to the extreme fringe of the anti-war and Civil Rights movements and had disconnected from the mainstream members of these movements.

Prior to the Days of Rage, the Weatherman had planned for part of the organisation to go underground.[318] This decision was partly motivated by the FBI's interest in the group. The FBI had maintained an ongoing interest in the SDS and as such the Weatherman, as a faction of this group. The FBI had also infiltrated the SDS. These infiltrators regularly attended SDS meetings and conferences.[319] As part of their surveillance of the SDS, the FBI monitored the public statements made by the Weatherman.[320]

The FBI's interest in the Weatherman escalated after the Days of Rage. The FBI took a greater interest in the organisation. The FBI listed the group as a threat to national security and the FBI alerted local law enforcement of this assessment.[321] Law enforcement subjected the group to greater attention, many of its activists were harassed, and its offices were raided. In part, these actions by law enforcement

[317] Ibid., p 187.

[318] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 2156-57.

[319] Ibid., Kindle Location 2158.

[320] ibid.

[321] Ibid., Kindle Location 2161.

created the perception of a hostile legal environment, which made it difficult for the group to operate aboveground.[322]

At this time, the FBI was also heavily committed to disrupting the Black Panthers. This process led to the suspicious deaths of three leading members of the Panthers, at the hands of law enforcement, and was thought to be state sanctioned executions.[323] This further aggravated the sense of impending repression by state officials if the group continued in the open. The Weatherman concluded that the traditional methods of protests had failed. This, combined with the failure of the Days of Rage, had led the Weatherman to the decision that the only option left to bring about their goals, was with revolutionary violence. At the National Conference, held in Flint Michigan, the decision was made for the Weatherman to become an underground revolutionary group.[324] Furthermore, as the leading faction in the SDS, the Weatherman made the decision to disband the SDS as an organisation. Even though the SDS had effectively disintegrated after the July 1969 National Conference, into rival factions, it continued in a number of guises until the early 1970s.[325]

Varon[326], Gilbert[327], and the FBI COINTROPRO[328] records indicate, after the Weatherman bomb factory accidentally exploded in New York's Greenwich Village in March 1970, killing 3 Weatherman, there was a split in the leadership of the group. This incident resulted in discussions about how best to approach the revolutionary struggle. A meeting was held in April 1970 by the group's leaders to

[322] Ibid., 6Kindle Locations 2166-70.

[323] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2176-206.

[324] Ibid., Kindle Location 2239.

[325] Ibid., Kindle Locations 727-28.

[326] Ibid.

[327] David Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond." (Oakland, CA, USA PM Press, 2012).

[328] "State Department Bombing by the Weatherman Underground: Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: United States Senate; Ninety Four Congress; First Session. January 31, 1975," ed. Committee on the Judiciary (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).

assess the consequences of the Greenwich Village incident. The bomb factory was in the process of creating shrapnel bombs to be placed at a dance to be held at Fort Dix in New Jersey.[329] The bombs were anti-personnel device, intended to kill and injure.

Serious questions were raised over whether attacks should target people. The leadership endeavoured to determine the best approach to be taken by the Weatherman. They finally concluded their attacks should not take lives and their focus should be on damaging property. Jeff Jones, who was the leader of the New York collective in Greenwich Village, was held personally responsible for the explosion. Jones was *"…sent on indefinite leave, never to rejoin the group*".[330] Varon further indicates:

> *"Other Weathermen voluntarily made what Ayers described as an "honorable retreat from the craziness" and left the organization, paring it down to well below one hundred."*[331]

[329] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Location 2464.

[330] Ibid., Kindle Location 2574.

[331] Ibid., Kindle Location 2577.

Chapter 7 - The Environment – Leading to the emergence of the WUO

The following is a review of the environmental conditions, based on the PESTELO, model in which the Weather Underground emerged. It is acknowledged the SDS was not the only activist group operating on American campuses during the 1960s. There were many groups, some attempting to achieve similar goals to the SDS. There were also right wing and conservative groups operating on the same campuses, who opposed the New Left. This chapter is an analysis of the factors, which led to the emergence of the WUO. The WUO differed from the other groups during this time, which were on average peaceful. As such, this chapter focuses on how the violent WUO emerged from its more peaceful parent, the SDS.

Political

The 1960s was a time of significant social change within the United States as well as other Western Countries, although the factors in each country differed based on local conditions. It was within this environment, the SDS and finally the Weather Underground emerged. The effectiveness of the Civil Rights movement in the United States Southern States had inspired the SDS to break away from its parent organisation, the League for Industrial Democracy and broaden its focus on more than the plight of the working class. The SDS embraced such issues as imperialism, civil rights, and disarmament.

In the beginning, the SDS was a small organisation, which focused its efforts on the poor and Civil Rights movement in the US. It had felt the Kennedy administration had failed to address the issues of disarmament, social injustice, and civil rights. As America's involvement in the Vietnam War grew, this also became a dominant issue, which the SDS also wished addressed. These environmental factors led to the rapid expansion in membership of the SDS, which in the long term, precipitated the group's demise and the formation of the Weather Underground.

The expanding role of the United States in Vietnam broadened the appeal of the SDS, due to the SDS' early activism in protesting the United States involvement in

the war. It was an issue, which had a direct impact on the student membership of the SDS and those students outside the SDS. With America's expanding role in Vietnam, the size of the United States military grew. By 1969, there were about 550,000 United States servicemen in Vietnam.[332] These additional troops were due to increased numbers of conscripts.[333] Between 1964 and 1966, the annual draft increased from 100,000 to 400,000 per year[334], about 62% of infantrymen in Vietnam were conscripts.[335] There was a general dislike of the draft on United States campuses. Although students were exempt from the draft until they graduated, many did not want to be drafted and fight in Vietnam, which was perceived as an unjust war.[336] The SDS reached its peak membership in 1969 when President Johnson removed the deferments for postgraduate students, in February that year.[337] The largest protests against the Vietnam War occurred in October 1969, the then defunct SDS did not lead them. The protests against the war continued until conscription ended in 1973 and were a significant factor in the ending of conscription.[338]

The SDS' stance and protests over the Vietnam War created an environment, which attracted greater numbers of students to its ranks. It also created an environment, because of its leadership and growing membership, where rival student organisations such as the M2M, which had limited appeal due to its political orientation, sought to merge with the growing SDS. This influx of new members

[332] Robert J. McMahon, "The Political, and Geopolitics, of American Troops Withdrawals from Vietnam, 1968-1972," *The Journal of the Society for History of American Foreign Relations: Diplomatic History* 34, no. 3 (2010): p 471.

[333] George Q. Flynn, "Conscription and Equity in Western Democracies, 1940-75," *Journal of Contemporary History* 33, no. 1 (1998): p 7.

[334] John Whiteclay Chambers, ed. *The Oxford Companion of American Military History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p 180.

[335] "Military Conscription, Recruiting and The Draft," (About.com, 2013).

[336] Jessie Kindig, "Vietnam War: Draft Resistance," (Pacific Northwest Labor and Civil Rights Projects, University of Washington 2008).

[337] Flynn, "Conscription and Equity in Western Democracies, 1940-75," p 7.

[338] Ibid., p 19.

created a situation where the group had to contend with a greater diversity of political opinion within the organisation.

The SDS also endeavoured to engage with disadvantaged communities and supported many of the protest actions of the Civil Rights movement. The SDS also formed alliances with militant black groups, such as the Black Panthers. There was also considerable debate within the organisation over the role of the SDS. Some factions within the organisation, such as the PL, saw themselves and the SDS as the vanguard of the revolution.

The SDS was disenchanted with American democracy, liberalism and the failed promises of the Democratic Party, which had held office for most of the 1960s:

> *"…liberalism was the target of relentless attacks by the left from the mid 1960s on. Partly, enmity toward liberalism grew out of activists' sense that so much of what was wrong with America had been perpetrated or was presided over by liberals. The Vietnam War, its critics repeatedly said, was a "liberal's war," insofar as it had been conceived and then expanded by the Democratic administrations of Kennedy and Johnson."* [339]

Economic

The SDS and the Weatherman faction viewed the world of economics through a Marxist ideology. As part of the New Left, they viewed the working class as being exploited by the capitalist system. They saw the working class as those who generated the wealth of American society, but did not reap the benefits of their labours. They also concluded that the problems within the Third World were also rooted in the exploitation of the many, by the few. The Civil Rights movement was viewed in similar terms. Even so, there were varying views on how their struggle should be labelled, in the context of Marxism. This dilemma occurred due to the

[339] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 403-05.

varying interpretations of Marxism ascribed to by the different factions within the SDS. It was generally agreed the black communities were disadvantaged, but how this issue could be addressed was a matter of considerable debate. Some factions, such as the PL, viewed the black struggle for equality, as part of the greater struggle of the working class. Others viewed the black communities' struggles in colonial terms, suggesting this was where the root of their problems resided. The Weatherman viewed the black communities as the vanguard of the revolutionary struggle.

Socio-cultural

The New Left, the SDS, and the Weatherman viewed American society as fundamentally flawed. They viewed racism, social disadvantage of the working class, nuclear weapons, conscription, and the Vietnam War as social evils, which required change. The New Left saw all social injustices and oppression as being interconnected.[340] They had rationalised all social inequalities originated from a single source, which they referred to as "*the System*".[341] The New Left believed the injustices and oppression were perpetrated by Corporate – Government elites and the Corporate-Military alliances.

The New Left were intent on bringing about real social and political change by changing the system. For most in the SDS, the burning issue was conscription and the Vietnam War, for others, these were issues of a greater whole. As the 1960s was ending and the traditional methods of protests had not brought about any significant change in government policy, some members of the SDS felt that change could only be brought about by emulating other revolutionary movements in the world. Members of the RYM I (Weatherman) faction viewed, with admiration, the success of the Cuban revolution, which had been achieved by a small cadre of militants, who inspired a nation to rise up against a repressive Batista government. The RYM I members were also inspired by the success of the North Vietnamese

[340] Ibid., Kindle Location 341.

[341] Ibid., Kindle Locations 355-56.

against their much stronger military opponent. From these examples, the Weatherman concluded that a small group of individuals could bring about a revolution and real social change by motivating the working class populace to rise up against their oppressors.

Technology

Television was the significant and new technology of the 1950s and 1960s, which was able to bring into the homes of Americans, events happening within the country and around the world. Television played a role in the rising awareness of social injustice by bringing to the attention of the public, issues which they may not have been aware:

> *"As television emerged as a dominant visual medium in the 1950s and 1960s, it was increasingly vital in documenting the civil rights struggle. Intentionally or otherwise, it served the immediate needs of the movement: as a window through which millions could witness the black struggle; a means for bringing African Americans into private homes where they would never have been invited; a way of educating and inspiring black activists around the country; and a catalyst for persuading a skeptical nation to face problems it had heretofore ignored."* [342]

Television played a similar role in raising awareness of the Vietnam War:

> *"From 1965 to 1975, television played an unprecedented role in shaping American perceptions of the Vietnam War. New technology and unlimited access to the battlefields of Southeast Asia invested field reporters with the ability to broadcast what became known as "bang-bang" coverage. The carnage of the war and the consequences for American morale, both on the*

[342] "The Documentary role of Television News," in *For all the World to See: Visual Culture and the Struggle for Civil Rights* (Center for Art, Design and Visual Culture, University of Maryland, Baltimore County and the Smithsonian National Museum of African American History and Culture, Washington, D.C. , 2013).

battlefield and at home, led to deep divisions in how Americans viewed the role of government, the military, social change, and war itself."[343]

The media played a significant role promoting the protest at Columbia in 1967, with the university student strike being broken by the police using batons. The video images of beaten and bloodied student activists were transmitted nationally and internationally.[344] These images inspired others and the French students to stage their own protests, which nearly toppled the French government.[345] Due to the visual immediacy of television and the associated satellite technology which permitted these images to be viewed anywhere in the world, television had a significant impact on public opinion. In addition, it had the capacity to radicalise others who were not directly affected by the events displayed on the television screen.

Legal

The SDS and its factions had been the subject of FBI surveillance for some time. The FBI, since 1962, had undertaken surveillance of student organisations with leftist leanings. The FBI systematically cultivated informants in these student groups to infiltrate the organisations.[346] After the death of three student Civil Rights workers in the south, the movement became of interest to the FBI and its Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) in late 1964.[347] COINTELPRO officially started reviewing the New Left in 1966.[348] COINTELPRO is described by the FBI website as follows:

[343] "The Living Room War: Television & Vietnam," The Paley Center for Media, http://www.paleycenter.org/education-class-living-room-war-television-vietnam/.

[344] Emile de Antonio, Haskell Wexler, and Mary Lampson, "Underground," (United States of America: Sphinx Productions, 1976).

[345] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Location 382.

[346] James Kirkpatrick Davis, "Assault on the Left: the FBI and the sixties antiwar movement." (Westport: Praeger Publications, 1997), http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy.uow.edu.au/lib/uow/docDetail.action.

[347] Ibid., p 26.

[348] Ibid., p 32.

"…The FBI began COINTELPRO—short for Counterintelligence Program—in 1956 to disrupt the activities of the Communist Party of the United States. In the 1960s, it was expanded to include a number of other domestic groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Black Panther Party. All COINTELPRO operations were ended in 1971. Although limited in scope (about two-tenths of one percent of the FBI's workload over a 15-year period), COINTELPRO was later rightfully criticized by Congress and the American people for abridging first amendment rights and for other reasons".[349]

The aims of COINTELPRO were to disrupt the activities of groups considered subversive. The FBI recorded the purpose of the program as follows:

"The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the activities of the various new left organizations, their leadership, and their adherents. It is imperative that activities of those groups be followed on a continuous basis so that we may take advantage of all opportunities for counter intelligence and also inspire action where circumstance warrant. The devious maneuver, the duplicity of these activists must be exposed to public scrutiny through cooperation of reliable news media sources, both locally and at the seat of government. We must frustrate every effort of these groups and individuals to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents. In every instance, consideration should be given to disrupting organized activity of these groups and no opportunity should be missed to capitalize on organizational or personal conflicts of their leadership."[350]

[349] "COINTELPRO," Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://vault.fbi.gov/.

[350] "Counter Intelligence Program: Internal Security: Disruption of the New Left," ed. Federal Bureau Of Investigation, COINTELPRO - New Left - Section 1: 100-449698 (Aubany: Federal Bureau Of Investigation, 1968).

Under COINTELPRO, the FBI had conducted raids on student groups as early as 1964. One of these first raids was on the offices of the PL, which seized a Vietcong propaganda film.[351] The FBI attended meetings of the SDS and other student groups, collecting names of the speakers. The FBI used this information internally and provided this information to other intelligence agencies.[352] As the war escalated, so did the FBI surveillance of Leftist groups.[353] By 1965, the FBI had advised the United States government that the anti-war movement and SDS were effectively under Communist control.[354] The FBI also engaged in activities, which were intended to undermine the credibility of the anti-war movement, and academics who had expressed anti-war views.[355] Many of the universities worked with the FBI and provided them information on antiwar protestors.[356] Some universities fired academics that held anti-war views.[357] During this period, the FBI attended the protests and left wing group meetings, watching, listening, and taking photographs of activists, recording all the collated information in a central database in Washington.[358]

The effect of the North Vietnamese Tet offensive (3rd January 1968) against United States forces in Vietnam, triggered the highest levels of unrest on United States campuses. Many students who were uncommitted to the anti-war movement flocked to groups such as the SDS.[359]

Not all university protests focused on national issues, specific issues of a local nature triggered many. The protests within the Columbia University were a result of conditions specific to that location. In the case of Columbia University, the

[351] ———, "Assault on the Left: the FBI and the sixties antiwar movement," p 26.

[352] Ibid., p 30.

[353] Ibid.

[354] Ibid., p 32.

[355] Ibid., p 34.

[356] Ibid., p 35.

[357] Ibid.

[358] Ibid., p 36.

[359] Ibid.

radicalising factor was the policies of the university's administration. There was no student or faculty involvement in the formalisation of university policy and administering of university policy. This power resided in the hands of the administrators, who prided themselves on the fact the university was not a democracy.

The administration also had become detached from the mostly black community adjacent to it. As part of the university's expansion plans, it had been buying properties in the poor black suburb of Harlem. In its role of landlord, it had collected rent from the poor community, but had spent very little in return in the maintenance of the buildings and over time, had progressively evicted their black tenants to facilitate the university's expansion. Furthermore, the university in 1958 had gained a 99-year lease on land, which was a public park in Harlem. In 1968, it intended to build a gym on this land, which would have very limited benefit to the black community and denied this community access to what was previously open to the public, in an area where open public places were rare. These practices had agitated the black students on the campus.

In addition, the SDS had learnt of Columbia's involvement in government military projects, specifically with the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). The SDS had opposed this association. As part of this opposition, the SDS had staged a minor demonstration on campus to convince the Columbia administration to sever its ties with the group. Conservative student groups opposed this demonstration. The SDS occupied the lower library building. At the end of the protest, the university singled out and punished the six leaders of the protest for breaches of the university's "no indoor protest" rule. The rules of the university permitted the university president to punish the students, without a public hearing or oversight. The students attempted to get the punishment of the six leaders overturned, to no avail. The students perceived this application of the punishments handed out to the leaders, as a form of political oppression. The actions of the administrators of the university

triggered a larger protest and after Spring Break, the students made demands for changes to the administration of the university. They demanded the construction of the gym in Harlem be stopped, the president of the university resign, the disciplinary action on the six leaders be ceased, the ban on indoor demonstrations be lifted and the university's association with IDA end. Further, they demanded all hearings on student disciplinary matters be held in the open and in front of a student and faculty body, which would apply due process. The university rejected the demands and the police broke up the demonstration violently.

In the short term, the student demands were not met, but as a result of the protest, the Columbia University president resigned and the new president implemented all the student demands.

The Columbia University strike in April 1968, also demonstrated to the student activists to what measures the state would go, to break up the protest. The police had arrested 711 students, but had used batons to break up the strike, injuring 92 activists.[360] The police actions, which were televised, had the unintended result of radicalising large sections of the student community that until this point had remained on the sidelines.[361] The larger student movement, although triggered by local issues, saw the events at Columbia, as being representative of the problems of America as a whole.

The New Left and the anti-war activists were not only of interest to the FBI, but also the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).[362] The IRS proved to be a useful FBI ally. The FBI kept extensive records on leading activists and underground organisations. At times, the FBI provided this information to the

[360] Ibid., p 42.

[361] Ibid.

[362] Ibid., p 45.

IRS, for targeted audits[363], in an attempt to disrupt these individuals and organisations, by attacking their financial foundations. The FBI also kept records of debts incurred by these organisations, such as unpaid phone bills.[364] Again, the FBI would work in concert with these service providers. In one instance, the FBI:

> *"In a confirming memo to Washington, the Chicago office confirmed a pre-convention contact with the Illinois Bell Telephone company regarding National Mobilization's unpaid phone bill of $2,167. Chicago reported that direct contact by special agents had disrupted National Mobilization in its preparation for demonstrations, "since communication between the Chicago office of NMC and NMC offices in other areas of the country were greatly restricted.""*[365]

Davis, in the *"Assault on the Left"*[366] provides a detailed description of other FBI activities on United States campuses, in their attempts to disrupt the New Left. The FBI built an extensive network of informants and undercover agents on United States campuses. Through this network, an extensive database of information was built up on leading activists, the various anti-war groups, and their members. After the Columbia strike, the FBI increased its activities in an attempt to disrupt the anti-war movement and groups like the SDS. Part of this activity included providing information about student activists to university administrators and local law enforcement. The FBI claimed that some leading activists were in fact working as government informants. The FBI also provided propaganda material to student groups, which were opposed to the anti-war movement, again in an effort to discredit the movement as a whole. The FBI also provided local police with information, which identified illicit drug users amongst the activists, in an effort to have these individuals arrested on possession offences. They wrote anonymous

[363] Ibid., p 46, 67, 76, 80, 95, 142, 50.

[364] Ibid., p 77.

[365] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1181-83.

[366] Ibid.

letters to the parents of activists, endeavouring to influence the parents in an attempt to gain their assistance in mitigating their child's activities in the protest movement. The FBI forwarded anonymous letters to employers, in an attempt to have the employment of activists terminated. This again was an effort to diminish the financial capacity of activists, to support their activities. They also provided information to university administrators, in an attempt to have activists employed by the university terminated, activist groups banned from campus and activist students expelled or suspended. Further, it was hoped this information would be used by universities to exclude these groups from using university facilities to conduct their business and hold meetings. Later this policy would extend to include high school principals in the hope the information would prevent activists gaining access to the high schools and their students.

One of the goals of the FBI was to create disunity amongst the anti-war groups, create factional tensions within the SDS, all in an effort to disrupt the movement. The FBI saw the factionalisation and splintering of the SDS at the 1969 National Conference as vindication of their activities, since 1964. In addition, the FBI attempted to disrupt and eliminate the channels of communications available to these groups. This was done, firstly, by attempting to restrict the audiences available to these types of groups and secondly, by limiting the group's capacity to organise, by denying these groups access to the telephone network. The FBI also attacked the ability of these groups and individual members to finance their activities.

Organisation

The SDS initially started as a student group, which had abandoned the ideology of the Old Left and with a goal of supporting the black Civil Rights movement and the eradication of social injustice in the early 1960s. As part of this agenda, the group became involved in the anti-war movement. As the United States involvement in Vietnam expanded, it successfully led one of the first anti-war protests. Due to the success in organising this protest and proceeding protests, the group's membership

rapidly expanded and Chapters of the SDS spread across United States campuses. The rapid expansion of the SDS led to a diverse number of pre-existing campus based Leftist groups merging with, or working under, auspices of the SDS. Each of these groups and unaligned members brought their own ideological and political viewpoints into the SDS. Under the influence of these groups, the SDS progressively adopted a Marxist ideology. It also changed the organisational environment, which created tensions within the SDS as the varying ideological factions vied for control of the leadership of the group. These varying ideological viewpoints created opportunities for the FBI to exploit the differences between the SDS factions. The tensions created by the FBI's interference within the SDS, further factionalised the group. The infiltration of the SDS by FBI agents also cultivated an air of mistrust between the factions.

Factions of the SDS progressively became radicalised throughout the 1960s, as their protest actions failed to change government policy and the government's response to these protests became increasingly violent. The RYM, a faction of the SDS, rationalised that the only way real change could be achieved, was by engaging in a revolutionary struggle, through the mobilisation of the working class youth and working in conjunction with black militants, such as the Black Panther Party. This group had moved away from peaceful protest to violent direct action. This faction of the RYM became known as the RYM I, or the Weatherman. The Weatherman judged violence as a legitimate tool to bring about change.[367] This belief led to the split in the SDS, as the other leading faction within the SDS, the PL, did not share this opinion. The Weatherman also split with other members of the RYM based on a difference of interpretation of where the black militants fitted into the revolutionary struggle. The Weatherman saw the black militants as the vanguard of the struggle, whereas the members of the RYM II regarded black militants as part of the greater struggle of the working class. The Senate Committee of Internal Security in 1969 reported on the reason for the split as follows:

[367] Antonio, Wexler, and Lampson, "Underground."

"On June 22, 1969, SDS broke into two factions near the conclusion of its national convention at Chicago. One group, the Maoist-orientated Progressive Labor Party (PLP) faction headed by John Pennine, established its headquarters in Boston, Mass. The second group the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), remained in Chicago and took over the SDS national office. The RYM itself divided into two factions, RYM I or Weatherman faction headed by National secretary Mark Rudd and RYM II headed by former National Secretary Michael Klonsky. RYM II claimed that the Weatherman's street fighting tactics would alienate rather than attract the masses of supporters needed for the success of any revolutionary movement. RYM II advocated recruiting working youth and eventually even older workers by a strategy in which SDS showed an interest in the day-to-day grievances of black and white workers and joined with them in "united front" demonstrations and strikes to improve their conditions. The PLP faction of SDS also advocated patient efforts to recruit worker support, but proposed that SDS remain basically a student organization having an "alliance" with workers beginning with those employed on college campuses."[368]

The FBI, in their campaign of disruption, again exploited these differences. The FBI provided misinformation to one faction about another, to reinforce their prejudices. Mistrust was also cultivated within each faction, by spreading rumours that members, especially about prominent members, whom it was claimed, were working for the government. This campaign led to the factional leadership becoming more secretive. This secrecy resulted in decisions being made without reference to its membership, which undermined the democratic nature of the New Left. This resulted in the leadership losing touch with its grass roots members and becoming distant from its membership.[369]

[368] "SDS Plans for America's High Schools: Report by the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, First Session.," ed. Committee on Internal Security (washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p 13.

[369] Davis, "Assault on the Left: the FBI and the sixties antiwar movement," p 131.

Radicalisation

The members of the New Left, SDS and the Weatherman were white, well educated, and young, with an average age of 25. They came from middle or upper middle class backgrounds or came from families with Marxist sympathies. All had been involved in student activism prior to becoming members of the Weatherman:

> *"Their radicalization had typically entailed years of political education, membership in left-wing organizations, interaction with black activists, participation in demonstrations, and skirmishes with police."*[370]

In addition, they were frustrated by the failure of traditional protest tactics to bring about any significant change of government policy. As well as their interpretation of recent historical events within Cuba, they felt a dedicated cadre of revolutionaries could create an environment where the populace would rise up in support of the revolution and overthrow a draconian government. They were further inspired by the successes of the North Vietnamese in defeating a superpower in Vietnam. Furthermore, the state's use of violence to put down student strike actions and protests was also a radicalising factor and was a factor, which led the group to go underground.[371] The death of the Black Panthers leader "Jake" Winters at the hands of local police, created a feeling within the Weatherman, they were operating in a "*war zone*".[372] Furthermore, the Weatherman had been the subject of scrutiny by police who had arrested 23 members of the Weatherman, after someone had fired shots at a Cambridge police station.[373] The FBI COINTELPRO also acted as a radicalising factor. Along with the police raids on SDS offices, initiated by COINTELPRO, this was another factor, which led to the Weatherman taking the decision to go underground.[374]

---

[370] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 1118-19.

[371] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2214-15.

[372] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2171-73.

[373] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2166-67.

[374] Ibid.

Chapter 8 - Analysis

Does the WUO meet the criteria to be described as a Terrorist group?

Raskin, an ex-member of the WUO, argued strongly the WUO was not a terrorist group.[375] Raskin suggested prior to the Town House explosion, the WUO was heading in this direction, but he suggested the explosion led them to rethink their goals as an organisation.[376] The redefining of the group brought about a commitment by the organisation that the WUO would only attack property and would give sufficient warning so loss of life could be avoided. On the surface, the WUO, throughout its life, appears to have honoured this commitment, although there are bombings, which took place in the WUO's areas of operation, which did claim lives, but were never claimed by WUO or any other left wing groups. As such, these attacks remain unattributed.

The WUO meets the criteria of a terrorist group. The WUO:

1. Used violence or the threat of violence - The WUO engaged in an extensive bombing campaign between 1969 and 1977.
2. Used violence, which was selective and planned - All targets selected by the WUO had been chosen because of their perceived link to repression within the United States and overseas. The targets selected included non-combatant military instillations, law enforcement, government agencies, banks and other businesses, which the WUO claimed, were involved in repression of the third world and the working class.
3. Aims were both political and ideological - The WUO was a revolutionary group who wanted to destroy the existing governmental institutions, to create a Marx-Leninist state.
4. Selected targets were civilian, or non-combatants - As previously indicated, the group bombed non-combatant military installations (such as ROTCs),

[375] Jonah Raskin, "Looking Backward: Personal Reflections on Language, Gesture and Mythology in the Weather Underground," *Journal of the Research Group on Socialism and Democracy - Online* 20, no. 2 (2006): p 131.

[376] Ibid.

law enforcement, government agencies, banks and other businesses which the WUO claimed were involved in repression of the third world and the working class.

5. Violence was selected to draw the public's attention to the group's cause. The targets were chosen because of their significance and association with events in the community or events overseas. The bombing of the New York Department of Corrections offices in August 1971, was in retaliation for the 29 prisoners who died in the suppression, by authorities, of the Attica prison uprising of that year.[377]
6. The intent for the violence was to evoke a reaction. The WUO viewed their actions as a form of "*armed propaganda*", intended to highlight the injustices perpetrated by the United States government home and abroad.[378]

Category of Terrorist Groups

The WUO is categorised within this dissertation as a Structural[379]/Revolutionary Group. That is a group who wished to overturn the existing regime or political system requiring a fundamental change in the social structure.[380] Thus, the WUO wished to bring about a fundamental change in the existing political and social order based on their ideological beliefs. The WUO emerged from the New Left within the SDS. The WUO drew heavily from the teachings of Lenin, Mao, and Che Guevara.[381] As such, the WUO was a left wing revolutionary terrorist group.

[377] Dan Berger, *Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity* (AP Press, 2005), p 330.

[378] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Location 2146.

[379] Mozaffari, "The New Era of Terrorism: Approaches and Typologies," p 179-96.

[380] Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*: p 1.

[381] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Location 794.

H1a: When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups.

The analysis of the PESTELO variables indicates the Weather Underground Organisation (WUO) emerged from the pre-existing civil rights and anti-war movement, specifically from members of the SDS. Other groups involved in the protest movement of the 1960s shared the political, social, economic, ecological, technological, and legal environments. The factor, which was significant, was the organisational variable in the PESTELO model. The emergence of the WUO was triggered by the perceived failure of traditional tactics used by the protest movement to bring about change, combined with the increasing use of violence in the state's response to the protest movement and the counterintelligence activities of the state. Thus, the WUO emerged from the SDS, due to diverging beliefs in which methodology was best suited to achieve the organisational goal of ending United States involvement in Vietnam and social injustice within the nation. The WUO was created due to differences in the homophyllic variables.

The homophyllic factors, which led to the emergence of the WUO, are more discernible than the PESTELO variables. Homophily is divided, based on two broad variables of status homophily and value homophily. Homophily stratifies society based on these two variables, groups organise based on the status homophyllic sub-variables of race and ethnicity, age, religion, education, occupation, gender, social class and network position. Value homophily further suggests that groups also accrete based on the value homophyllic sub-variables of behaviour, attitude, abilities, beliefs and aspirations. This case study implies the trigger event or environmental perturbation, which led to the emergence of the WUO, was the debate in the 1960s within the SDS, regarding the most appropriate tactics to achieve the common goal of the SDS. Within the SDS, there was a variety of Marxist ideologies followed by the various factions. The Weatherman faction, through its analysis and interpretation of prior events, believed that revolution was the only

action, which could bring about real change. Many of the other factions within the SDS did not share this interpretation. Therefore, the WUO could be considered a splinter group of the SDS, where other SDS factions did not share the WUO interpretation of the events or the environment.

Using the COINTELPRO membership profiles[382] and information contained within the committee of the Judiciary report to the senate on the WUO membership[383], lists 158 members of the WUO who had come to the attention of the FBI and other agencies, because of their above and underground activities. As such, this sample of members is considered representative of the hard-core activist in the WUO, but not necessarily a complete list of all members.

The following has been gleaned from the COINTELPRO status homophily variables. The ethnicity of the documented members of the WUO, were white American. The average age of the members who went underground in 1970, was 25 years. It is of note there was a difference in the average age of male and females. The average age of males in the underground part of the WUO was 25 years but for females was 24 years. The maximum and minimum age for males was between 17 and 35 years. The maximum and minimum age for females was between 17 and 36 years. From Figure 9 it can be seen that the majority of male underground members (about 85% of male members) were 26 years or younger (40) with only 5 members being 27 years or older. Figure 9 also shows the age of male members' peaks at 24 years and declines after that age. The distribution of the ages of the female members was more evenly distributed, with the age range between 21 and 28 years. With 29 female members, about 85% of the female members were 27 years old or younger and five were 28 years or more. This suggests on the most part, female activists in

[382] "Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976," ed. Federal Bureau of Investigation (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1976).

[383] "The Weather Underground: State Department Bombing by the Weatherman Underground: Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: United States Senate; Ninety Four Congress; First Session. January 31, 1975," ed. Committee of the Judicary (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).

the underground part of the WUO were on average, older than their male counterparts. Although interesting, the data set is small and only encompasses members known to the FBI, and as such, is most likely statistically insignificant.

Figure 9 - Distribution of the ages of male and female members of the Underground organisation of the WUO.



In the aboveground component of the WUO, the average age of the males and females was 25 years. The maximum and minimum age for males was between 17 and 35 years. The maximum and minimum age for females was between 20 and 36 years. From this, it can be seen that the majority of male aboveground members were 30 years or below (85% of male members) with only 6 members being 31 years or older.

Figure 9 also shows the age of male membership, peaks between 21 and 25 years and declines significantly after these ages. The distribution of the age of the female members peaks between 19 and 28 years (85% of female members). With only five female members older than 28 years, for the most part, there were a high percentage of older male activists than their female counterparts. The ages of the female members were more tightly clustered than male members.

Figure 10 - Distribution of the ages of male and female members of the aboveground organisation of the WUO



Within the leadership cadre of the WUO, the Weather Bureau, these statistics are repeated. The ages of the leaders ranged between 23 years and 35 years, the average age of the cadre was 26 years. The male members of the cadre were younger than the female members with an average age of 26 years, and the females 27 years. Of the five male members, three were 23 years old, one was 26 years old and one 35 years old. All the female members were 25 years old or more. Of the five female members, one was 25 years old, two were 27 years old, and two were 28 years old. On average, the female members of the leadership cadre were older than their male counterparts. In addition, there was not the same wide distribution in age ranges between the female members' ages (3 years) than the male members (12 years).

Thus, female members of the WUO were typically older than their male counterparts and their ages were more densely clustered than the males. Further, there were a greater percentage of males within the organisation, who were under the age of 25 years (64% of males and 50% of females).

Figure 11 illustrates that there was a greater percentage of female members in the group over the age of 25 years (36% of males and 50% of females).

Figure 11 - Commutative Distribution of the ages of male and female members of the WUO



Typically, terrorism organisation membership is predominantly male. The WUO and other left wing groups stand out because of the high profile involvement of females within the groups. Out of the 158 members of the WUO profiled by the FBI, 45 males were involved in the Underground organisation with 34 being females, which equated to 57% and 43% of the membership respectively. In the aboveground part of the organisation, there were 41 males and 38 females, 52% and 48% respectively. The information collated by the FBI suggests a slightly greater percentage of male involvement in the underground organisation than in the aboveground organisation. The differences in the numbers of males and females in the aboveground organisation are so small, that they are almost equal. In the overall organisation, 86 were male and 72 were female, 54% and 46% respectively. As such overall, there was almost parity between the two genders.

As a Marxist group, the group members are technically atheist, therefore religion should not be a factor. There is no information contained in the FBI profiles, which identify the member's prior religious observance. The prior religious observance is not recorded in other articles written by academics.

There is no itemised information contained within the FBI profiles of group members, which individually list their educational qualifications, although the FBI indicated the majority held graduate or postgraduate qualifications. Varon indicates the majority of the members of the WUO held university degrees, with many holding postgraduate qualifications. As such, the two sources suggest the majority of the WUO were well educated, with some members of the aboveground elements of the WUO holding legal qualifications and were qualified to practice law.[384]

There is very little information within the FBI profiles regarding what employment members of the WUO undertook. It was noted, a few members were legal professionals, and a small number had been academics. Others had held employment in the private sector, the nature of their employment was not specified. As part of the disruption of the New Left, one of the tactics employed by the FBI was to attempt to influence their employers to dismiss them. Many had been professional activists and students. The SDS employed some like the core leadership group of the WUO and a few others, in an official capacity. Gilbert, Ayers, and Raskin claimed during their time underground, they took low paying unskilled jobs to cover their living expenses.

The majority of the WUO underground came from well-to-do families and would be considered middle or upper middle class. For example, Bill Ayers' father was the CEO and Chairman of Commonwealth Edison, Kathy Boudin's father was an attorney, Mark Rudd's father was an ex-army officer, though some like Terry Robbins came from more humble backgrounds, Robbins' father worked in a garment factory.

[384] ———, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*

The core group of individuals who came together to form the WUO were known to each other through their work in the SDS and as part of the RYM I. As such, they were part of the RYM I/SDS radical network.[385] Many had been involved in the Days of Rage protests.[386] In addition, the FBI profiles of the WUO members, indicates some were members of the same family (i.e. brother and sister, brothers or sisters), other members were married to each other and others were considered couples prior to joining.[387] Thus, pre-existing social networks appear to be central to the group's emergence.

Based on the analysis of the profiles of the 158 known WUO members, as previously discussed, the members of the Weatherman were white, well educated, and young, with an average age of 25. They came from middle or upper middle class backgrounds or came from families with Marxist sympathies. There were, on balance, similar numbers of males and females. This differs for other extremist groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) where the membership was predominantly male. Varon offered a possible explanation for this difference. Varon suggested the strong presence of females in the group:

> *"…was evidence of how deeply outrage at the Vietnam War and racism cut across gender lines; women and men joined Weatherman for essentially the same reasons."*[388]

It also should be considered that many factions of the SDS maintained a Marxist ideology. The writings of Marx and Engels argued for gender equality and, it is noteworthy that there had always been a high percentage of female terrorists in

[385] "Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976."

[386] Ibid.

[387] Ibid.

[388] ———, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 862-63.

left wing groups. The German Red Army Faction (RAF) membership consisted of 50% females.[389] The German Red Zora only recruited women.[390] The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) alleged about 30% of its combatants were females[391], and also about 50% of the membership of the Shining Path were females.[392]

The value homophyllic variables, based on the available information, appears to be significant in determining what roles an individual may undertake within an organisation such as the WUO, that is in the above or underground organisation. In the broader context, those individuals who are attracted to the WUO share the same aspiration[393] or goal as those who are attracted to the SDS and broader Peace and Civil Rights movement. Both groups of individuals wish to end the war in Vietnam and address the social injustices in the US. These two groups shared the same belief that action has to be taken to achieve these goals or aspirations. It could also be suggested that some form of agitation has to be taken to bring about these changes. Where they differ, was the belief in what methods were best suited to initiate change. The Peace and Civil Rights movements contained a diverse spread of opinion on how best to achieve this aspiration. Some, like those who are members of groups, such as the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, believed this goal was best achieved by influencing the political process with peaceful non-violent protest. Those who were attracted to the WUO believed non-violent activism or protest was futile and the current political process had failed and the only way change could be brought about, was through revolution. As such, change could only be produced by the use of dramatic, direct action and tactics. These actions would involve bombings of public buildings. Thus, these individuals occupy the extreme end of the radicalisation spectrum of the Peace and Civil Rights movement.

[389] Hudson, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes terrorists and why?," p 54.

[390] Ibid.

[391] Ibid., p 53.

[392] Ibid.

[393] Aspiration being a sub-variable of Value Homophily

Therefore, the homophyllic variable of belief, combined with how an individual arrives at this belief (radicalisation) is a significant factor in the emergence of the WUO. The key value homophyllic variable is their belief in which tactics would bring about the movements goal.

This extreme end of the Peace and Civil Rights movement is further stratified by other value homophyllic variables such as behaviour, attitude, and abilities. Although some may believe and support the extreme actions of the WUO, they may not engage in extreme action, because their behavioural traits do not predispose them to engage in violent exploits. Likewise, they may not have the capacity or the ability to engage in these types of activities. These individuals are most likely to engage in support roles of the group, where they feel their specific skills are best utilised.

A further factor, which must be considered in combination with the behavioural traits, is the status homophily variable of network position. Sageman indicated the pathway for others may involve friendship or kinship networks which cause individuals or groups of individuals to create or gravitate to extremism and seek out violent extremist groups.[394] Therefore, some individuals who do not necessarily believe in violent direct action may become involved due to the expectations placed upon them by their social network. The FBI profiles of the WUO indicate that many of the members of the WUO were in kinship and friendship networks and joined the group as part of this network.

Members of the WUO shared similar status homophyllic characteristics with other members of the SDS. Therefore, in terms of age and social background etc. (Status Homophily), they were not aberrations within the SDS. Analysis of the events leading up to the emergence of the WUO does not indicate it emerged because of a single perturbation within the environment. The WUO emerged over time due a

[394] Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terrorism Networks in the Twenty First Century*: p 66-69.

multitude of perturbations. Each perturbation acted as a progressive radicalising factor on this small group within the SDS. Over time, although the SDS and WUO shared similar aspirations, the WUO diverged based on the analysis of the environment, and the belief in how the aspirations could be achieved. The information suggests the frustration of not being able to achieve their goals through peaceful means, radicalised the group, which led them to adopt the belief, violence was the only methodology which would bring about change. This belief and their perception of the environment led to the emergence of the WUO.

The environment was not the sole factor, which led to the emergence of the WUO. Within this environment, there was a homophyllic group, which had concluded, change could not be implemented by peaceful means. They had arrived at this conclusion based on their interpretation of the events occurring within the environment. The radicalisation of the group did not occur based on a single perturbation. The group's radicalisation occurred over time and was based on a multitude of events. There had been a transition from peaceful activism, to direct action, to violent direct action and finally to terrorism. The transition occurred when each methodology failed to bring about change. Thus, the environment created conditions which allowed the extreme fringe of the student protest movement to evolve into a terrorist group. It should be noted there were many groups within the same environment, which persisted with the non-violent approach.

H1b: Homophyllic and geographic proximity influences the ability of individuals to communicate and this influence is central to group formation.

In this section, it is intended to determine which factors in the homophyllic and PESTELO variables were significant influences in creating an environment which led to individuals joining the Weatherman and eventually going underground as part of the WUO. This question can only be answered by reviewing the case studies of individuals who were part of the organisation. There are limited, individual biographies of a broad spectrum of the members. The personal biographies of the

leadership cadre are documented quite well in open sources and autobiographies, as well as FBI COINTELPRO and other government documents released under freedom of information. This information gives sufficient detail of 34 known members and associates of the WUO.

Some major points, which can be drawn from the analysis of the limited data set, shows the members of the WUO all shared the same PESTEL environmental factors as other individuals involved in the protest movement of the 1960s. They shared the same opposition to the Vietnam War, conscription and the social injustices suffered by the black community in the US.

The following has been compiled from a number of sources, Weather Underground Summary[395], Jacobs[396] and the Congressional report on WUO bombings.[397] From a homophyllic perspective, 8 of the 34 WUO activists identified previously, came from Marxist or left wing activist family backgrounds.[398] Thus, out of this same group, fewer than 25% held leftist views prior to attending university. Some members had come from the Progressive Labour party. The majority came from families where one or both parents were professionally qualified. At least two had worked for Martin Luther King. All had previous involvement in the Civil Rights or anti-war movements. All had prior involvement in other left wing groups or in the SDS before becoming part of the WUO and all were involved in previous demonstrations organised by the SDS. Out of the 158 known and suspected members of the WUO, 23 had kinship, marital, personal or friendship bonds with other members of the WUO. All shared the belief peaceful protest had failed.

[395] "Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976."

[396] Ron Jacobs, *1997* (New York: Verso, The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground).

[397] "The Weather Underground: State Department Bombing by the Weatherman Underground: Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: United States Senate; Ninety Four Congress; First Session. January 31, 1975."

[398] Ibid.

From information compiled from FBI and other government sources[399], there is insufficient biographical information to determine where the other members were radicalised. Although, considering the radical nature of university campuses at the time, if they did not hold radical views prior to entering university, they were most likely to have acquired these views whilst on campus.

Figure 12 - The universities where the members of the WUO were radicalised



Figure 12 illustrates the distribution of the universities where members of the WUO were most likely radicalised. The bar chart shows 2 peaks in the number of members at Chicago and Columbia, which is not a surprise, as in Chicago, the SDS chapter was dominated by the Jesse James Gang and Columbia, by a group known as the Action Faction. Both groups had favoured dramatic and direct action. This was also the core group, which led to the formation of the RYM. This group had emerged out of the Columbia, Chicago, and Mid-West SDS chapters in Ohio and Michigan.[400] The distribution of the membership of the WUO suggests it was

[399] "Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976."

[400] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Location 680.

strongest in those states, which are adjacent to the Great Lakes and the Canadian border.

It is also of interest that the WUO members mainly came from the North Eastern and Mid-Western States of the United States, these members being concentrated in the states of New York, Ohio and Illinios. There was a small faction in Washington State based in Seattle. The information from the FBI and the other government agencies, does not suggest the WUO maintained a strong presence in the Western Mountain States, apart from Colorado. According to Gilbert, there was a small WUO collective in Denver.[401] The government sources and the memoirs of the various Weatherman do not record any collectives in the Southern States.

Figure 13 - The Number of WUO members per US Region.



The chart suggests geographic location was a factor in the formation of the extremist group. It is of note the WUO appeared to emerge out of the environmental factors present in two Universities, Columbia, and Chicago. This raises the question, what were the factors, which enabled this emergence?

[401] Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond," p 186.

Initially, the SDS emerged as a left wing group, which was primarily concerned with Civil Rights, and their initial work was conducted in the community. In the beginning, the SDS maintained a non-violent philosophy and attempted to inspire the youth.[402] The SDS, from its early days, had a strong Mid-West connection, with the early leaders coming from the Michigan and Ann Arbor Campuses.[403] By 1965 the SDS successfully mobilised 15,000 activists and staged the first large scale protest action against the Vietnam War.[404] The success of the 1965 protest allowed the Mobilization Committee to end the war in Vietnam to attract nearly 100,000 activists to protest the Vietnam War, of which 35,000 marched on the Pentagon in October 1967.[405] The SDS supported the Pentagon protest and it encouraged its members to take part, as long as it did not interfere with local and regional programs.[406] The National Mobilisation committee (MOBE) acted as an umbrella group, which oversaw the organisation of demonstrations, inviting other activist groups to take part. It did not dictate the form of civil disobedience. The march on the Pentagon ended in a melee between some of the rioters and the civil authorities. The use of violence by the state against the demonstrators, affirmed in their minds, the state's willingness to use violence against its own citizens. The Pentagon march had led to an explosion in the membership of the SDS.[407]

> *"Weatherman Scott Braley described how the frustration of making modest demands in the mid 1960s fed the more ambitious rebellion of the late 1960s: "There were very few wins in the sense that you got anything you wanted.... We might have fixed some smaller issues, but we didn't want to fix*

[402] Robbie Lieberman, *Prairie Power : Voices of 1960s Midwestern Student Protest.* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004), p 2.

[403] Caron Gentry, "The Relationship between New Social Movement Theory and Terrorism Studies: The Role of Leadership, Membership, Ideology and Gender.," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 2 (2010): p 282.

[404] Max Elbaum, "What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?," *Radical History Review*, no. 82 (2002): p 39.

[405] "Pentagon Riot of October 21, 1967," (GlobalSecurity.org, 2011).

[406] Simon Hall, *Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p 121.

[407] Elbaum, "What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?," p 39.

smaller issues. We wanted to fix issues that would change the world. It was clear to many people that something much more radical was needed.""[408]

The increasing use of police violence to suppress the demonstrations and the efforts of the university administrators to control the student population, radicalised students who were not necessarily interested in the other political aspects of the SDS.[409] There were differences in the political outlooks of the National and Local leadership of the SDS and the grass roots activists.

> *"…the perspective of national SDS leaders and local activists. The oral histories begin with SDS national leaders who were regional organizers in the prairies. These are the people who were self-conscious about using the term prairie power to differentiate themselves from the old guard. They had strong ideas about the direction in which the movement should go, and when they took over the national leadership of SDS they carried out their own vision of campus organizing."*[410]

> *"…organizing people around their own oppression, focusing on students dissatisfied with the bureaucratic and authoritarian manner in which universities were run and with the irrelevancy of the curriculum, connecting student power to broader social issues. They emphasized building the new society in the shell of the old, an idea dating back to the Industrial Workers of the World, and connecting the personal to the political..."*[411]

[408] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 366-68.

[409] Lieberman, *Prairie Power : Voices of 1960s Midwestern Student Protest.*: p 13.

[410] Ibid., p 21.

[411] Ibid.

The local leadership shared some *"…of the characteristics of the national prairie power leaders…"* but were*" …less ideological and more focused on student rights than the old guard..."*[412]

There was a third group, which consisted of grass roots activists.

> *"These are students who joined demonstrations on their own campuses but did not necessarily identify strongly with either local or national organizations. While some of them might not have described themselves as New Leftists, much less identified with the term prairie power, they are in fact more typical of student protesters than either group of leaders."*[413]

In 1968, the Columbia SDS and the Chicago regional SDS had been involved in the planning of and participation in, the demonstrations of the 1968 Democratic National Convention. These two events, along with the 1967 Pentagon protest, were the most confrontational protest actions to date. Both actions were suppressed with the use of violence by the state. Police used batons to break up the protest at Columbia. The Chicago demonstration against the Democratic convention was also broken up and supressed by the state's use of violence. The protestors had clashed over 5 days with *"… 11,900 Chicago police, 7500 Army troops, 7500 Illinois National Guardsmen and 1000 Secret Service agents…"*.[414]

The SDS chapters at Columbia and Chicago regional offices had established reputations for direct and confrontational action. As previously discussed, the RYM emerged because the SDS':

> *"…internal politics were becoming both more influenced by Marxism and more factional, due in part to the presence of cadres from the then Maoist*

[412] Ibid.

[413] Ibid., p 22.

[414] "Brief History Of Chicago's 1968 Democratic Convention," (All Politics, 1997).

Progressive Labor Party (PL) since 1966. SDS leaders opposing PL, unwilling to be outflanked on the left, increasingly came to embrace a form of Third World Marxism. Contact was established between influential members of SDS and Cuban and Vietnamese communists. An alliance was also forged between key SDS leaders and the Black Panther Party; Panther support work became an integral part of many chapters' activity and the Panther influence on SDS became not just generally ideological but direct and personal."[415]

The RYM consisted of three groups from within the SDS. The two more radical action driven factions of the RYM, as previously indicated, were the Jesse James Gang from the Chicago region of the Mid-West and the Action Faction based at Columbia University within New York State. It was these two factions of the RYM, who were to form the core of the WUO. Neither faction had a strong representation in the Western states of the United States.

The WUO emerged from two specific geographic locations, Chicago and Columbia Universities. The information also suggests the leadership and the majority of the membership of the WUO originated from these two universities and the outlying regions. Government sources indicate the majority of the membership did not possess radical ideation prior to attending university. Therefore, it is likely their geographic proximity with radical students at their specific university, led to their radicalisation. Thus, their geographic proximity and contact with the radical student movement were most likely significant factors, which led to them adopting radical views.

The FBI sources claimed most of those who formed the WUO were known to each other, with some having familial or other close relationships. Therefore, the founders of the WUO shared the same networks of associates, which imply network

[415] Elbaum, "What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?," p 44.

position is also a factor in the radicalisation process, which led to the emergence of the WUO.

The Columbia and Chicago chapters of the SDS were similar in homophyllic terms of aspirations, beliefs, and behaviours. What brought these two chapters together was their shared opposition to the PL. They opposed PL ideologically and opposed any leadership of the SDS by the PL. Furthermore, both chapters were frustrated by the failure of any of their actions to bring about change. Therefore, the two SDS chapters shared similar homophyllic beliefs and aspirations, which played a significant role in creating the RYM. The RYM, over time, evolved into the WUO.

It would be unlikely these two chapters would have been able to come together without a communications channel, which permitted them to exchange information over distance. The telephone system, which had become commonplace in the United States by the 1960s, was the medium that permitted distant elements of the group to communicate. From FBI reports, the telephone system played a significant role in the exchange of information and enhanced the group's capacity to organise the various geographically dispersed elements of the group. The reports further indicated the FBI attempted to disrupt the communications channel by soliciting the telecommunication service providers to terminate the SDS phone services, which reinforced the importance of this mode of communications.

H2a: The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, economic, and social environment in which the group operates.

The WUO emerged out of the SDS in 1969. Between 1960 and the fall of 1968, the SDS had experienced an almost exponential growth in membership, as in the graph below (see Figure 14). The data in Figure 14 was compiled from Sale's book "SDS" which covers the development of the SDS from 1960 to 1969.[416] Sale compiled the data from SDS membership records. Sale admits these records were not complete. The Chart shows gaps in the data for various periods. Even so, the graph

[416] Sale, *SDS*: Appendix v-vi.

demonstrates an increasing trend in membership, which illustrates a dramatic increase in membership after 1965. After June 1968, the SDS stopped keeping accurate records and as such, the figures are estimates taken from Sale. The figures used for June and November 1968 are mid-range values of the upper and lower estimates.

Figure 14 - The Growth of Chapters and membership of the SDS between 1960 and 1968.



The SDS, from its early days, had been a highly factionalised organisation.[417] The SDS grew by incorporating existing groups into its structure, groups such as the PL. The SDS also encouraged the local SDS chapters to act independently, set their own agendas, and deal with local issues. The SDS prided itself on its inclusive and democratic nature, and willingness to encompass all views. The SDS was not a hierarchical organisation, although it maintained national, regional, and local leadership cadres. All these groups and factions shared the common principles of the organisation. They wished, through their actions, to create a better world. They shared a common anti-war, civil rights, and social justice agenda, but they differed from chapter to chapter on the local issues. On a strategic level, the chapters shared

[417] Ibid., p 36.

a common national PESTELO environment, but the regional and local PESTELO environments differed from region to region and university to university.

The different strata of the organisation had varying organisational goals. These goals varied based on the different local PESTELO environments. The National leadership had a strong understanding of the direction of the organisation. They operated within an ideological framework and maintained a clear strategic vision. The strategic view involved the building of relationships beyond the SDS, linking local student issues to the greater struggle outside the universities as part of the larger effort of achieving social justice within the US.

The local and regional leadership were less ideological than their national counterparts were. Unlike the national leadership, the local and regional leadership gave greater attention to local issues, which were of concern to the students at their specific locations.

The third level and the greater portion of the SDS membership, was the grass roots level. This group was not necessarily concerned with matters that influenced the leadership of the SDS at all levels. Some may not have even identified as New Leftist. They typically joined the SDS due to local issues at the campuses where they studied and because of their opposition to the draft and the Vietnam War.

> *"Most SDSers did not participate directly in the internal debate over doctrine or support any of the main sides. But several thousand—including a large percentage of those who were by now devoting nearly all their waking hours to politics—were invested in the outcome. And tens of thousands more, while repelled by the messiness of factional battle, shared the broad Third World Marxist view that seemed to inform all sides."*[418]

[418] Elbaum, "What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?," p 44.

Thus, the SDS was able to attract a large membership, because its goals were sufficiently broad enough and relevant to a wide cross section of the student community.

By the end of 1968, two factions, the PL and the RYM, dominated the national leadership. Their differences were ideological and methodological. That is, how to bring about their goal of social change. The differences resided in the homophyllic variables. As previously indicated, within the RYM, there were also factions who differed on the implementation of the RYM manifesto. The two RYM factions differed in the analysis of which part of the community would be at the vanguard of the revolution. The RYM I had concluded the Black activists were at the vanguard, marginalising the working class, whereas the RYM II viewed the working class as central to the struggle and revolution, viewing the black Civil Rights movement as part of the greater working class struggle.

The exponential increase in the size of the SDS mirrored the growth in the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War and the United States Army's increased need for soldiers. The resultant political reverse suffered by the United States Army (a consequence of the Tet offensive) further fuelled the growth in membership of the SDS. The ever-increasing membership of the SDS did not necessarily mean a growing pool of recruits for the WUO. The membership growth was fuelled by environmental factors, which were dissimilar to those, which created the WUO. The WUO may have shared a common aspiration to end America's involvement in Vietnam with the grass roots members of the SDS. The grass roots members may have also aspired to bring about social change and society with greater equality, but they did not necessarily share the WUO's belief that this change was best brought about by revolution. In addition, they did not share the view that change could only be brought about by violence. The small numbers of protesters who attended the Days of Rage protest, which were organised by the WUO, highlights this. This

contrasted with the millions who attended the more peaceful Moratorium anti-war marches.

Furthermore, the WUO (RYM I) also alienated those within the SDS who shared their revolutionary ideation. Many shared the WUO's left wing political revolutionary beliefs. The WUO shared similar value homophyllic beliefs and aspirations with other left wing factions within the SDS. The problem for the WUO was the Weatherman Statement. This Statement did not engage or unite the factionalised leadership of the SDS. The Weatherman Statement did not inspire the membership of the SDS as the Huron Statement had, 7 years earlier.[419] The language within the Weatherman Statement made it difficult to understand, it was permeated in the language and rhetoric of the Old Left. It was heavily criticised by those members of the SDS who understood Marxist ideology. Its language and ideological framework distanced the WUO from the mass membership of the SDS. Most of the SDS membership aspired to ending the Vietnam War and addressing other social injustices, but did not share the strategic vision of the WUO. Furthermore, the WUO marginalised the student movement as agents of change, subordinating it to the black Civil Rights movement, as such, distancing the creators and supporters of the Weatherman Statement, from the large membership of the SDS.[420] The Statement failed to appeal to a broad audience, minimising the attractiveness of the group to a wider pool of members. The FBI COINTELPRO files suggest the activists and supporters of the WUO at most, numbered between 150 and 200 individuals, which by the early 1970s had declined to less than 50. The COINTELPRO files suggest the hard-core membership of the WUO, may have only numbered around 30.[421] This juxtaposes the peak membership of the SDS of between 80,000 and 100,000 members, with a hard-core membership, which numbered in the thousands.

[419] Sale, *SDS*: p 391.

[420] Ibid.

[421] "Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976," p 186.

In conclusion, the growth of the SDS contrasts the growth of the WUO. The SDS grew in size because it was active in student politics and issues in the broader community. The SDS was able to attract other like-minded groups to align with it because of its perceived success. The SDS goals (aspirations) were general enough to be relevant to a wide cross section of the student community across the US. It was able to remain relevant across the varying geographic PESTELO environment to maintain enough affinity (homophily) with a significant portion of the student population. This relevance was applicable at a local, regional, and national level.

The WUO was unable to grow because its goals and aspirations failed to resonate with the wider student population. Their message contained Marxist ideology, which was complex and not easily understood by the larger audience. Simply, they failed to communicate with the masses they had hoped to inspire in terms, which were relevant to them. The group failed to establish its relevance across the various issues present in the geographic PESTELO environment. The WUO failed to demonstrate its relevance and affinity with the section of community it claimed to represent and wished to recruit. As such, the perceived lack of shared homophily limited the number of recruits who would be inspired by and drawn (flock) to, the organisation. This lack of homophily and affinity hindered the creation of links with the community, which could have assisted in building the organisation by attracting new members. No one wanted to join the WUO. Hence, the WUO failed to grow.

The environment also changed after the ending of the Vietnam War, which further reduced the WUO relevance and affinity with the broader community. The group's lack of success led to division within the organisation and failed to inspire any new members to join. This resulted in a decline in the membership of the WUO, and eventually, the group fractured and disbanded.

It is also of note; there were other actors in the PESTELO environment. These actors had greater affinity with the community and were able to mobilise large sections of

the community in support of civil rights and the ending of the Vietnam War. These groups were able to achieve their goals and aspirations through the existing democratic processes and without the use of violence. Thus, the democratic system provided a safety valve within the PESTELO environment, which circumvented the need to bring about change with violence or terrorism.

Thus, in this case study there is a link between the PESTELO environment, homophily and the size of a group. The case study also illustrates within the PESTELO environment, the terrorist group competes with other actors for members and supporters. Their size and support is dependent on the level of homophily between it and the general population. This case study further indicates changes in the PESTELO environment can reduce homophily and lead to a decline in the size of a group.

H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time.

The SDS was a loose network of various student groups who shared a common aspiration to end the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War. Beyond this common goal, there were scales of divergence, objectives, and aspirations of the extensive membership and factions of the SDS. Some groups focused on local issues within their communities and universities. Others, like the Weatherman faction, had concluded the injustices in the United States and the injustices perpetrated by the United States in other countries, such as Vietnam, could only be addressed through revolution. The revolution would change the system of government. The government model adopted by the Weatherman, was based on the teachings of Karl Marx. The group looked to Cuba for inspiration. They were influenced by the likes of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara who had taken a small band of revolutionaries, which had limited initial support from the general populace and created a revolutionary movement that overthrew the American supported, Baptista Government. Cuba was to be influential on the Weatherman faction of the SDS.

A book written by Regis Debray called "Revolution in the Revolution?" published in 1967 further influenced the WUO. The premise of Debray's theory was a small group of revolutionaries could inspire a population to rise and overthrow the current government. This was to be achieved through the formation of foco groups, a theory proposed by Che Guevara, which would operate independently of an aboveground political entity. The role of the foco groups was to become*"… a pole of attraction for the whole country"*[422] through its underground actions. The Weatherman faction was inspired by Che Guevara's focal theory[423]. Rudd writes:

> *"Like Che, we believed that U.S. imperialism was in the process of crumbling to pieces. The military defeat in Vietnam was the prime indication of its weakness, the key to recognition that live-or-die revolution was already underway within this country and around the world. And Che Guevara's foco theory, certified by Fidel, was the way to push it along. The revolt of black and other third-world people inside the U.S., led by the Black Panther Party, demanded white allies."*[424]

Based on WUO's analysis of the environmental factors within the United States, the WUO incorrectly believed the foco model was the appropriate organisational structure for the group. Rudd acknowledges, with hindsight, the WUO's analysis of the model, ignored its failings in Latin America.[425]

Rudd continued:

> *"To my eternal shame, I was part of the leadership of Weatherman which scuttled SDS—the largest radical student organization in the country—in*

[422] Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle In Latin America* (London and New York: MR Press, 1967), p 45.

[423] Mark Rudd, "Che and Me," http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/5_2/Rudd5_2.html.

[424] Ibid.

[425] Ibid.

1969 at the height of the war. A small group of less than ten people made this suicidal decision believing that with SDS dead we would be free to build an underground guerilla army organized into focos around the country. Each foco, through its exemplary armed actions, propaganda, and contacts with the aboveground mass movement, would attract recruits to expand the incipient revolutionary army's military capabilities…"[426]

Senior members of the Weatherman faction of the SDS who visited Cuba as part of the Venceremos Brigades, saw what they perceived to be the success of the Cuban revolution, which had been sparked by a small group of no more than 82 dedicated revolutionaries, who had defeated a much larger foe. The WUO wished to emulate the Cuban success in the United States.

Whilst still an aboveground and open organisation the WUO established communes throughout the US. Within these communes, they formed foco, which were intended to inspire and recruit others to join the revolution. The Weatherman had embedded these communes within poor communities, in an effort to engage with these people, in an attempt to recruit the youth and working class to the revolution, from these sections of society.[427] The Weatherman was also active on campuses throughout the United States, again attempting to build broad support amongst the student population. This was consistent with creating a "pole" to attract new recruits. The precise number of communes is not clear, although Grathwohl reported the Weatherman operated collectives in New York, Buffalo, Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Denver, San Francisco,

[426] Ibid.

[427] Frank Reagan Larry Grathwohl, *Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen* 2nd ed. (New York: Arlington House Publishers,, 2013), Kindle Locations 1528-32.

Oakland, Berkeley, and Seattle.[428] The FBI estimated that communes' sizes were between 10 and 30 individuals.[429]

In January 1970, with the decision to go underground made at Flint, the Weatherbureau closed the SDS National Office in Chicago. This action was to deprive the WUO of an aboveground presence and would have lasting consequences as it detached the WUO from the larger leftist movement within the United States and no attempt was made to correct this action until 1974.

As part of its transition underground, the Weatherbureau, the leadership cadre of the WUO, engaged in a process of purging the membership. Those who were suspected of being police informants and those they thought, not to be totally committed to the revolution, were removed from the group.[430] These actions reduced the size of the WUO, although it is not clear from documented sources, by how much.

A war council of 12 members known as the Weatherbureau led the WUO. The Weatherman was also organised into three major regional groupings, the West Coast, the Midwest, and the East Coast. The WUO consisted of major collectives in San Francisco, New York, Chicago, and Detroit.[431] Members of the Weatherbureau ran each regional group, independently.

> *"Members of the West Coast collective, headed by Dohrn and Jones, spent time in Berkeley and San Francisco's Haight-Ashbury district, but avoided public political activities and quietly plotted bombings. The Midwest*

[428] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2782-83.

[429] "The Weather Underground: State Department Bombing by the Weatherman Underground: Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: United States Senate; Ninety Four Congress; First Session. January 31, 1975," p 10.

[430] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 2419-22.

[431] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2437-39.

collective, headed by Ayers, built an arms cache and fabricated crude bombs with Grathwohl's help. The most dangerous of the bombs, dynamite with a burning cigarette as its trigger, was placed outside a Detroit police station, putting at risk both police and passersby, but failed to detonate. The New York collective was the most militant. Its leaders, J. J. and Terry Robbins, thought that whites would move in a revolutionary direction only through the prompting of dramatic acts of violence, and they were dead set on providing the drama. The collective was headquartered in the fashionable Greenwich Village townhouse of Cathy Wilkerson's father, a broadcast executive, while he was on vacation in the Caribbean. Though not technically underground, members of the collective virtually disappeared from public life and built a large stockpile of dynamite, purchased by Weathermen using false names from demolition supply companies in New England."[432]

The explosion of the Weatherman bomb-making factory in New York in March 1970 accelerated the Weatherman's transition to an underground organisation. The explosion led to borderline members of the organisation to question their involvement in the group. The explosion also led to an exodus of members who questioned the WUO's tactics and direction.
The FBI reported in April 1970:

"…the Cincinnati field office reported that the Weathermen were the only New Left activists in the area, and that they were limited to two small communes. The one in Columbus was staffed by about "seven hard core Weathermen." The other, in Cincinnati, was staffed by as many as ten. Neither group had been able to mount any significant activity in the area. Cincinnati did add that the "underground tactics"" of the group, and rapid

[432] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2439-45.

movement from one commune to another, made the obtaining of reliable information from undercover informants far more difficult."[433]

The FBI reports suggest the collective sizes were not large, having only 7 to 10 members. It should also be noted these collectives were mobile, not remaining in one location for any extended periods. Originally, the collectives were intended to be embedded into poor communities in an effort to educate the communities about the revolution and solicit recruits. Without the stability of remaining in one location for any amount of time, these collectives were unable to grow or engage with the communities, which they were intended to educate. Without an aboveground organisation, the group was not able to educate the masses and build a support base.

By December 1970, the membership of the WUO had been reduced to less than 100 individuals.[434] The remaining members of the WUO were now part of an underground organisation. The FBI reported:

> *"…the Weathermen had become convinced they could accomplish more working in small focals, or action groups, in an underground environment than they could by being an open movement. In preparation for this phase, many Weathermen had to be purged so that a fighting force could be organized. Weathermen would now operate in focals of three to six individuals within the framework of a collective in target cities. On any particular action, each focal would be given only enough information to carry out its part of the assignment. This policy would protect other members as well as themselves. Collectives in each city would be responsible for selecting*

[433] Davis, "Assault on the Left: the FBI and the sixties antiwar movement," Kindle Locations 2125-28.

[434] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Location 2577.

and destroying targets. However, if needed, they could call on the national Weather Bureau to send in additional help."[435]

The FBI reports suggest the focal groups were not large, having only 3-6 members. The detail of the report further indicates the group was under intensive FBI surveillance, which made the legal environment in which they operated, extremely hostile. Furthermore, many members had outstanding court matters for their previous involvement in aboveground actions undertaken by the SDS and the Weatherman faction in 1968 and 1969. As such, not only was the size and structure of the WUO dictated by the legal environmental factors, the organisational environmental variables also had a role in dictating the structure and size of the group.

The legal environment, in which the collectives operated, meant they had to move regularly to avoid detection by law enforcement. The WUO were not without aboveground supporters, some provided safe houses for those in the WUO, when required. The WUO also had some level of support amongst other leftist groups who were able to provide refuge for WUO members in communes. They also had the support of the National Lawyers Guild who provided representation in court for those members who had been arrested and charged by the police.

The United States' involvement in the ground war in Vietnam ended in December 1972 and with this, the draft was effectively discontinued in 1973. The two major environmental factors, which had driven the anti-war movement, had gone. There were also changes in the economic environment initiated by the energy crisis in 1973, which created an economic recession in the United States and other parts of the world, which in turn, led to high unemployment. These were significant political and economic environmental changes within the United States. Along with the change in the political and economic environments, came a change in the social

[435] Larry Grathwohl, *Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen* Kindle Locations 2586-91.

environment. American youth felt: *"they were no longer politically threatened by the state as a group unless they chose to be. With the exception of a few radical communities and newspapers, the culture assumed a predominantly ultra-liberal content which, at best, preached cultural and personal freedom and political cynicism."*[436] The political, economic, and social changes led to a decline in the counterculture rhetoric of the WUO.[437]

Within this environment, by 1974, the WUO had declined to about fifty members, operating in small units, which moved about the country. The WUO realised if it were to survive, there was a need for an aboveground entity to represent its goals, and its goals needed to be relevant in the current environmental context. In the words of the authors of the Prairie Fire, the aboveground organisation role was to create a "*sea' for the guerrillas to swim in*".[438]

> *"In Prairie Fire the WUO leaders instructed their followers to become active in support of virtually every revolutionary issue from homosexuality and women's rights through backing the PLO and Mrican?, Puerto Rican, Chicano, American Indian and black revolutionary and terrorist groups."*[439]

Prairie Fire acknowledges this American revolution would be a protracted affair, requiring both an underground army and an aboveground political group, to spread and educate the populace.[440] The WUO view of itself had also evolved. No longer did the WUO see itself as: *"…a foco organization whose role was to commit armed actions without any concern for organizing a political movement to support those acts."*[441] The group now saw itself as *"…the beginnings of a revolutionary people's*

[436] Ron Jacobs, *The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground* (Verso 1997), p 72.

[437] Ibid.

[438] Ibid., p 78.

[439] Ibid., p 75.

[440] Ibid., p 76.

[441] Ibid.

army aligned with the revolutionary movement."[442] The Prairie Fire document expressed the view, the WUO needed to build a mass movement, which Rudd acknowledged they had abandoned in 1969[443], following the group's disillusionment after the Days of Rage.[444] The desire for a mass movement had to be contrasted against a changing political, economic, and social environment within America, which was a society with ever declining numbers of people who were willing to engage in revolution. This decline was a result of the changing environmental factors, which resulted from:

> *"…the signing of the Vietnam peace accords, an increasing cynicism among youth, a growing awareness of the limitations of a culture based on youth and leisure, and the effectiveness of the government's counterinsurgency efforts insured that ever smaller numbers of American activists were committed to revolution."*[445]

The ending of the Vietnam War was the significant factor, which diminished the potential pool of recruits for groups, such as the WUO. The effects of the war, as an environmental factor, cut across all classes within American society and as such, acted as a unifying factor for Americans from diverse social backgrounds. The other factors, which had inspired the New Left, such as civil rights, imperialism and working class disadvantage, were factors, which did not affect the broad majority of American society. Thus, did not contain sufficient social gravity (homophily) to attract large numbers of new recruits to leftist groups, like the WUO.

The Prairie Fire manifesto led the WUO to create an aboveground organisation called the Prairie Fire Organising Committee (PFOC) in 1975. Chapters were set up

[442] Ibid.

[443] Rudd, "Che and Me".

[444] Jacobs, *The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground* p 78.

[445] Ibid., p 80.

in San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Boston, Seattle, and Chicago.[446] The creation of the PFOC was intended to create a mass movement. In the early part of 1976, PFOC and the WUO convened the "*Hard Times*" conference, which was designed to develop a unified platform for the Left in the United States. The conference failed. As a result, there were recriminations within the WUO over the reasons for the failure.

The WUO became divided on political differences within the Organisation. The insurgent faction, predominantly based on the East Coast, challenged the long-time leadership of the group, who favoured "inversion" or taking the organisation aboveground. The debate declined into recrimination. The leadership of the WUO were either expelled from the group, or left of their own accord.[447] The East Coast faction, who had defeated the WUO leadership, took on the WUO mantle.

The legal environment within the United States also changed in 1976. The United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (colloquially referred to as the Church Committee) had found intelligence gathering on the New Left by United States government agencies was illegal. The legal environment had been changed by the ruling of the Church committee which found *"...the intelligence community at times violated specific statutory prohibitions and infringed the constitutional rights of American citizens*."[448] By 1977, inactive high profile members of the WUO started to hand themselves in to law enforcement, a process that continued into the mid-1980s. Jacobs argues this process was assisted by the Carter amnesty for "draft dodgers".[449] This process was also accelerated, by the light sentences imposed on the many who came out of

[446] Ibid., p 83.

[447] Ibid., p 85.

[448] "Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and Rights of Americans: Book Ill, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.," ed. United States Senate (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976).

[449] ———, *The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground* p 87.

hiding. Varon explains the process by which the members of the WUO emerged from the underground:

> *"Over the next several years, the great majority of Weathermen turned themselves in, prompting local news stories that read like the final obituaries of a withered radicalism. After negotiating deals with prosecutors (typically probation; some jail time in select cases), they then turned their energy to the difficult task of rebuilding old relationships, a sense of political purpose, and, for some, a basic sense of self. Soon they reintegrated themselves into "normal life," raising families, developing careers, and sustaining their activist commitments around the issues, such as fighting racism, imperialism, and economic inequality, that had always motivated them. Their professional lives, in all cases I have found, have some broad social value, whether education, various forms of political advocacy, or service to disadvantaged communities.*[450]

What members remained of the WUO, continued its attacks on government targets. In 1977, the WUO bombed the Immigration and Naturalisation Service Offices (INS) in San Francisco, but the group's actions no longer attracted significant media coverage. Next they plotted to bomb the offices of the*" …reactionary and high-profile California State Senator John Briggs*".[451] Five WUO members were arrested in late 1977, in relation to the plot.

The INS bombing was the last action conducted by the WUO. Some of those who did not hand themselves in, went on to form the May 19 Organisation, along with members of the Black Liberation Army. Many of those who handed themselves in to the authorities did not recant their radical agendas and many of these still maintain their radical ideologies even today.

[450] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 4241-45.

[451] Jacobs, *The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground* p 86.

In conclusion, as an aboveground entity, the WUO structure reflected that of the geographic distribution of its members across the United States. WUO was divided into three regions West Coast, Mid-West and the East Coast. The leadership group, known as the Weatherbureau, oversaw the regions. Each collective within the region was permitted to act on its own recognisance, but would come together to carry out coordinated attacks. When the WUO became an underground organisation in 1970, clusters of members of the Weatherbureau oversaw each region. The group structure of the WUO did not evolve beyond the initial structure the group adopted, when it first went underground.

The group did not have an overseeing aboveground political body, which could build a mass movement from which the WUO could draw further recruits. Members of its leadership cadre acknowledged this as a failing of the group. The leadership cadre's belief that its actions would act as a "pole" to attract new recruits, was based on the Debray model, which was a failed theoretic concept even before the group went underground. The group was able to sustain itself over a long period because it operated in small units, which took advantage of islands of supporters within the community, who were willing to provide safe houses and safe locations such as communes for members of the group, to hide and to carry out operations.

The WUO was never able to embed itself within the community, in a stable location, to educate and recruit from the populace. In fact, the size of the group declined in the number of members over the course of its life cycle. The failings of the group's structure were recognised with the changing political, economic, and social environment of the mid-1970s. In this period, the group attempted to re-organise itself and create an aboveground entity, which could create a mass movement. This attempt failed and exposed division within the WUO, which finally led to the group's split and final demise. The legal environment changed within the United States, after 1976, due to the Church Committee's findings into the intelligence

collection activities of government agencies within the United States, were illegal. This provided those members of the WUO, an opportunity to resurface, without serious and long-term legal consequences. This, combined with the other factors previously mentioned, led to the demise and structural collapse of the group.

In conclusion, there is no concise information, which gives a detailed account of the WUO's structure. Thus, this assessment of the group's structure has been inferred from the available sources. Before going underground, the Weatherman faction of the SDS maintained a number of communes throughout the Northern States of the United States. Thus, when the Weatherman made the decision to become an underground organisation, the initial group's structure was based on the existing communes, with around 7-30 members. A leadership cadre known as the Weatherbureau oversaw these communes. After the Greenwich Bomb factory explosion, the WUO created a regional command structure, the leadership of which was divided amongst the members of the Weatherbureau. Changing environmental conditions, later in the WUO's life, led to the creation of an aboveground political wing, but this act was unable to reverse the decline of the group.

The commune, based on the available information, appears to be the day-to-day structure of the group. The group utilised a different operational structure for carrying out attacks. The operational component, which could be drawn from a single commune, would consist of foci or cells with 3-6 members. These foci activities were compartmentalised to ensure security. The Weatherbureau would also allocate members to the foci, based on the operational skills required to carry out the task. The communes could also undertake their own operations, as long as they were consistent with the strategic objectives, which had been outlined by the Weatherbureau.

The WUO maintained a flexible cellular operational structure, which provided a level of operational independence to the various elements of the WUO. Towards

the end of the group's lifecycle and demise, the information suggests the group's commune structure had ceased to exist, due to declining membership and the group becoming fractured on ideological grounds. It further suggests in the changing PESTELO environment, the operational capacity of the group had also declined. Based on biographical accounts, the formal structure of the group had potentially ceased to exist, with the group declining into a network structure.

H3b: Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the group.

There is no clear information, which provides a detailed understanding of the group's size or structure. The following has been constructed from the memoirs of some of the members of the WUO and the files released by United States government bodies, such as the FBI and Senate.

There is a common consensus amongst the sources, prior to going underground, the Weatherman faction of the SDS had engaged in a process of collectivisation in 1969.[452] Varon suggests, whilst the Weatherman were still an aboveground organisation, there were about 500 Weatherman members contained within these collectives.[453] The FBI files relating to the Weatherman's Flint War council in late 1969 claim there were about 400 attendees at this meeting. As such, a membership of 500 is feasible. These 500 or so members were distributed across 13 collectives throughout the United States.[454] Four were located on the West Coast, 6 in the Mid-West and 3 on the East Coast, all overseen by the Weatherbureau. The location of each of the collectives was selected based on the prevalence of a pre-existing anti-war and anti-racist culture in each of the locations.[455] As such, the locations were

[452] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 831-36.

[453] Ibid.

[454] Ibid.

[455] Howard Machtingter, "You Say You Want a Revolution," In these Times, http://inthesetimes.com/article/4251/you_say_you_want_a_revolution.

selected to embed the collectives in a political and socially friendly environment. The Weatherbureau was based in Chicago.

The group was reorganised after the townhouse explosion in March 1970. The group was organised as an underground organisation based on the foco theory. As part of this reorganisation, some members were selected to work aboveground, others were selected to work in the underground organisation, some were to work independently of the group, and finally, others were purged, having no further involvement in the group.[456] With this purge, there was a decline in numbers. Government sources suggest the WUO membership declined to about 150.[457] This included underground members and supporters. The reorganisation involved putting in place regional leadership. These leaders came from the Weatherbureau. The group structure was based on a centralised democracy.[458] The Weatherbureau exercised absolute power within the organisation, setting organisational objectives, appointing and sacking leaders of collectives, purging members they felt were unsuitable and reallocating members to collectives as they saw fit. The regional leaders were members of the Weatherbureau and as such, they were able to provide direction to the collective under their control. The appointed leaders of the collectives were responsible for the day-to-day running of their collective. Apart from regional based collectives, at times the WUO formed an all-female collective to carry out operations. In 1972, the all women Proud Eagle Tribe of the WUO carried out an attack against Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The best estimates of size of the WUO membership, are provided in the Senate Committee Report into the WUO, which listed 38 active underground members in 1970, with an additional 120 aboveground supporters who had come to the FBI's attention at various times. Some of these supporters, over time, became part of the

[456] Larry Grathwohl, *Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen* Kindle Locations 2249-50.

[457] "The Weather Underground - Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary - United States Senate - Ninety Fourth Congress - First Sessions," (Washington: United States Senate, 1975), p 46.

[458] Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond," p 164.

underground (during the group's life cycle) and members of the underground, left on their own accord or were arrested. Therefore, determining the precise size of the WUO based on membership is not possible.

The information collected by law enforcement monitoring the Flint War Council in 1969, suggests the figure of 120 supporters may be on the low side. The number was more likely in the hundreds. It also suggests the figure of 38 in the underground organisation, may also be low. Gilbert, Ayers, Raskin, and Rudd all acknowledge that beyond the active supporters, there were many in other left wing groups, which were sympathetic to the Weatherman cause. Raskin made the point that family and friends provided many activists support. Furthermore, they also received support from "hippie" communes throughout the country.[459] The WUO also obtained assistance from the National Lawyers Guild (NLG), which provided legal support to members of the Weatherman and the WUO when they were arrested, and eventually resurfaced. The NLG had a long history of supporting and acting in a legal capacity for Leftist groups, communists, and Cuba. These activities had brought the NLG to the attention of the FBI.[460]

One element the WUO lacked was an aboveground political wing, and this was later acknowledged as a failing by the leadership of the group. Without an aboveground political wing, the WUO was unable to build a mass movement, which could provide the group impetus beyond that of conscription and the Vietnam War. The WUO rode on the wave created by the anti-war movement in the United States in the 1960s and early 1970s. This anti-war movement sustained the group underground. Once the United States disengaged from Vietnam and discontinued conscription, there was insufficient impetus in the community to sustain and justify the group's activities. The political, economic, and social environments were also changing in the United States. Within this changing environment, the WUO endeavoured to

[459] Raskin, "Looking Backward: Personal Reflections on Language, Gesture and Mythology in the Weather Underground," p 127.

[460] Berger, *Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity*: p 56-60.

maintain its impetus through the creation of the Prairie Fire Organising Committee (PFOC). PFOC was an attempt made by the WUO, to create a political wing, which could create a mass movement. Within the changing PESTELO environment, the support of left wing groups within the United States had declined, so too did the membership of the WUO. Gilbert indicates during this time, some of the WUO members started to leave the organisation.[461] Towards the end of the group's life cycle, its membership had declined to less than 50 members.

The underground members were organised into foci. As previously indicated, these groups consisted of 3-6 members.[462] These foco groups were based around the remaining collectives. Ayers and Grathwohl, in their respective memoirs of their time with the WUO suggest, although the foco were technically attached to the collectives, the membership of the foco and the locations of the foco were dynamic. Members of a specific group could be reallocated and relocated at the direction of the leadership. These documents also suggest the foco and its members were mobile, not fixed to a single location, moving regularly around the countryside, staying in safe houses and in communes run by sympathetic left groups around the country. Foco did not have direct contact with each other, for security reasons.[463] Varon indicates each foco was permitted to act independently in their assigned area, but were occasionally brought together to act as one, in major operations.[464]

Gilbert[465], Varon[466], Ayers[467] and Grathwohl[468] indicate communication between foco, individual members, the collectives and the Weatherbureau, was conducted either

[461] Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond," p 195.

[462][462] Larry Grathwohl, *Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen* Kindle Locations 2585-91.

[463] Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond."

[464] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*

[465] Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond."

[466] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*

[467] William Ayers, "Memoirs of an Anti-War Activist," In *2009*. (Boston, MA, USA Beacon Press).

[468] Larry Grathwohl and Frank Reagan, *Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen* 2nd ed. (New York: Arlington House Publishers,, 2013), p 237.

by one on one meetings in designated safe locations or via pay phones. Gilbert stated that communication between foco was directed through the Weatherbureau. Gilbert indicated the organisation was heavily compartmentalised. Pay phone to pay phone contact was the main means of communication between the group members, who were spread across the United States.[469]

Gilbert, Ayers, and Grathwohl within their memoirs, describe an environment where they assumed they were constantly under surveillance. They also describe how they would acquire and use false identifications to rent safe houses, and buy and register cars. They further describe how they would use their contacts within the aboveground to assist those who were arrested, or assist those who suspected they had been compromised, to escape the risk of capture. The organisation had strong links through the National Lawyers Guild who would provide legal assistance to those who had been arrested. They also had supporters in likeminded left wing and civil rights groups. The WUO maintained an association with the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)[470] and the Black Liberation Army.[471] In addition to these contacts, the WUO maintained strong links within the community, where it was not without supporters.

The environment, in which the WUO operated, was politically and legally hostile to the group. There were islands of support for the group, which could provide some safe havens for the group's members in times of need. The active interest in the WUO by United States law enforcement meant the members of the group had to be constantly on the move. The group believed they were under constant surveillance and believed that a small cadre of dedicated revolutionaries could inspire the masses to rise up. This environment heavily influenced the organisational structure of the group and its size. The WUO was a heavily compartmentalised cell based

[469] Ayers, "Memoirs of an Anti-War Activist," p 248.

[470] Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.*: Kindle Locations 4160-62.

[471] Ayers, "Memoirs of an Anti-War Activist," p 227.

organisation. With a core leadership group, this group provided strategic and operational objectives for the organisation. The cells were dynamic and the leadership group could reallocate membership of the cells. The cells had general areas of operation but were mobile. The membership of the group was small. Not all members of the New Left agreed with the tactics of the WUO and the WUO did not have an aboveground political wing, which could present its message to a wider audience. This further limited the pool of recruits for the organisation. The WUO did have its supporters and sympathisers within the New Left, but was unable to attract large numbers of new members. This issue became further apparent as the environmental conditions changed, after the United States disengaged from Vietnam. In this period, the membership of the group also declined, as the group endeavoured to find new context and relevance.

The geographically dispersed nature of the group also influenced the structure. Secure communications were only possible by pay phone or one on one meetings with the leadership. The regional structure of the WUO, with the regional leadership coming from members of the Weatherbureau, ensured the strategic and operational objectives of the organisation were theoretically consistent across the nationwide organisation. However, this type of structure meant any disagreements amongst the leadership could lead to fragmentation of the organisation. This occurred as disagreement arose between the supporters of the PFOC and the old leadership cadre of the WUO after the Hard Time conference in 1975. The result of this conference was a split in the group and the group's final demise.

As previously indicated, in hypothesis H2a, the environment in which the WUO operated, influenced the group's size. The WUO was a small group spread over a large geographic area. The structure reflected the extended lines of communications. The cellular or foco structure of the group reflected the need for security within the harsh environmental conditions. The WUO were able to maintain a loose hierarchical structure by creating a leadership cadre in each of the

regions, which shortened the lines of communication. The structure was also flexible. The WUO maintained regional based foco and created ad hoc cells or foco to carry out specialised operations.

The foco, the underground elements of the WUO, were small, consisting of around 3-6 members. Each foco had a leader, who was appointed by the leadership cadre of the group, the Weatherbureau. In total, the WUO operated 12 collectives, divided into 3 regions. Members of the Weatherbureau oversaw each region. Each region had between 2-4 foco. The structure of foco was dynamic and membership was allocated in accordance with the Weatherbureau's needs.

The information regarding the structure of the WUO is incomplete, due to its reliance on biographical accounts and government sources. These lack detail, although the available information does suggest it is consistent with Dunbar's hypothesis, that the structure of human groups is dependent on the cognitive limits of the human brain. It is important to highlight, this structure is also consistent with other descriptions and theories of social organisation.

At the lowest level, the foco consisted of 3-6 members, which is consistent with the size of the smallest structures within human society, known as the clique. The next tier in the organisational structure is also consistent with Dunbar's hypothesis, with 2-4 foco being under the command of regional leaders. Further subdivision of the WUO into three regions, is also consistent with Dunbar's hypothesis. It is not clear from the available information, how many individuals were in any given region. The numbers could have ranged from between 7-27, which includes the regional leadership group. As such, the regional sub group of the WUO ranged in size from a sympathy group to a band. This is again consistent with Dunbar's hypothesis, but may not be the only explanation of the clustering, as these numbers are also consistent with anthropological analysis of groupings within society. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether Dunbar's hypothesis is the only explanation.

The biographical accounts of the WUO suggest the formal structure of the WUO had collapsed towards the end of its life, due to the changing environmental conditions. The change in environmental conditions had called into question the relevance of the WUO, and membership of this group declined. At the time of the split within the WUO, many of its remaining members were constantly on the move. Some had become inactive. As such, the structure of the WUO towards its demise, would best be described as a network.

In the case of the WUO, it can be argued the two primary factors, which dictated the structure of the group, were its geographic dispersion and the PESTELO environment. The environment was the key factor, which determined the operational structure of the group. The group did not control territory and had limited support within the community. In this type of environment, historically the cell is the safest organisational choice. The group size dictated the number of frontline operational units (cells or foco) the WUO could create and determined its overall operational capacity.

Chapter 9 - Conclusions

H1a: When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups.

The environment was not the sole factor, which led to the emergence of the WUO. Within this environment, there was a homophyllic group, which had concluded, change could not be brought about by peaceful means. They had arrived at this conclusion, based on their interpretation of the events occurring within the environment. The radicalisation of the group did not occur based on a single perturbation. The group's radicalisation occurred over time and was based on a multitude of events. There had been a transition from peaceful activist, to direct action, to violent direct action and finally to terrorism. The transition occurred when each methodology failed to bring about change. Thus, the environment created conditions, which allowed a group of the student protest movement to evolve into a terrorist group. It should be noted, there were many groups within the same environment, which persisted with the non-violent approach. Those who formed the WUO were no different to other non-violent student activists in terms of status homophily. They were similar ages (between 17 and 28), and came from comparable social and educational backgrounds. In many respects, they shared similar value homophyllic characteristics. The two groups shared the same aspirations, but differed in the belief on how best this goal was to be achieved.

This raises the question, what homophyllic variables create these two distinct groups within the organisation of violent and non-violent activists. Hudson's work into those who engaged in violence in the form of terrorism indicated that for all intents, the majority of extremists are not the subject of any psychological dysfunction, which would predispose them to acts of violence.[472] Hudson also indicated that work conducted by other psychologists, such as Jerrod Post and Walter Laqueur, could not identify any unique personality traits which would permit

[472] Hudson, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes terrorists and why?," p 60.

the identification of individuals who were at risk of engaging in terrorist acts.[473] Sageman has indicated the pathway to terrorism is based on the individual's social network and their personal history.[474] As such, those who engage in violent acts on behalf of the WUO are likely to be subject to the same mechanisms described by Sageman. This was found in the analysis of the social network of members of the SDS. Those who gravitated to the WUO underground had prior associations within the context of the SDS. The FBI COINTELPRO indicates that some were involved in personal relationships, married, or shared kinship bonds.

Hudson's research implies it is not possible to identify those who ordained to become involved in violent acts of extremism. This case study does suggest an analysis of a group aspiration within a given environmental context, combined with their capacity to achieve this goal peacefully, has the potential to identify risk groups that may be susceptible to radicalisation and violent extremism. This conclusion does not contradict Hudson's research, as it is still not possible to identify these individuals. Although, it does imply it may be possible to identify individuals or groups at risk.

H1b: Homophyllic and geographic proximity influences the ability of individuals to communicate and this influence is central to group formation.

This case study suggests the importance of geographic proximity of individuals in the radicalisation process and network formation. Geographic proximity brings homophyllic similar individuals and groups into contact with each other, allowing the creation of networks. Geographic proximity also enhances the capacity of individuals and groups to communicate, as proximity shortens the communications channels.

The WUO was formed, by the merging of two geographically dispersed chapters of the SDS, who shared similar homophyllic aspirations and beliefs. What permitted

[473] Ibid.

[474] Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terrorism Networks in the Twenty First Century*: p 41-70.

these two geographically distant groups to come together and communicate? By the 1960s, the telephone system pervaded the United States. This system permitted immediate communications. This communications technology allowed the various elements of the RYM and later the WUO, to communicate and organise. Without this communications technology, the WUO would not have been able to emerge as a geographically dispersed cohesive group.

In conclusion, homophily was central to the WUO formation. Geographic proximity was also important in radicalisation and the formation of local networks. The group formation was additionally assisted by telecommunications technology, which eliminated the time lag in geographically long communications channels. This technology assisted in bringing geographically distant homophyllic groups together and allowed them to coalesce into a single entity, known as the WUO.

H2a: The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, economic, and social environment in which the group operates.

In conclusion, the growth of the SDS contrasts the growth of the WUO. The SDS grew in size because it was active in student politics and issues in the broader community. The SDS was able to attract other like-minded groups to align with it because of its perceived success. The SDS goals (aspirations) were general enough to be relevant to a wide cross section of the student community across the United States. It was able to remain relevant across the varying geographic PESTELO environment to maintain enough homophily with a significant portion of the student population. This relevance was applicable at a local, regional, and national level.

The WUO was unable to grow because its goals and aspirations failed to resonate with the wider student population. Their message was couched in Marxist ideology, which was complex and was not easily understood by the larger audience. Simply, they failed to communicate with the masses they had hoped to inspire, in terms, which were relevant to them. The group failed to establish its relevance across the

various issues present in the geographic PESTELO environment. The WUO failed to create a homophyllic link with the pool of potential recruits. As such, the WUO failed to grow in size and as the environment changed, after the ending of the Vietnam War, the membership of the WUO actually declined. The group fractured and disbanded.

It is also of note; there were other actors in the PESTELO environment. These actors were able to mobilise large sections of the community in support of civil rights and the ending of the Vietnam War. These groups were able to achieve their goals and aspirations through the existing democratic processes and without the use of violence. Thus, it could be argued, the democratic system provided a safety valve within the PESTELO environment, which circumvented the need to bring about change through violence or terrorism.

Hence, in this case study, there is a link between the PESTELO environment, homophily and the size of a group. The case study also illustrates within the PESTELO environment, the terrorist group competes with other actors for members and supporters. Their size and support is dependent on the level of homophily between it and the general population. This case study further indicates changes in the PESTELO environment can reduce homophily and lead to a decline in the size of a group.

H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time.

When the WUO initially went underground, it utilised its pre-existing collective organisational structure. The WUO reorganised after the initial purges of the members. The collective structure remained in place, but operationally it adopted a cellular structure based on the foco. It was intended, each foco would be drawn from the collective. Thus, the WUO maintained a due organisational structure, one for the day-to-day activities of the group and another that compartmentalised the operational aspect of the organisation.

It is difficult to ascertain the structure, as the membership declined in the changing environment. The available information, suggests it operated more like a loose network. The biographical accounts indicate in the later days of its life, many members were in hiding, on the run, or had been arrested. Based on these accounts, it would suggest any formal structure might have disappeared.

For most of its life, the WUO lacked an aboveground political organisation, which could represent it in the aboveground world. The WUO had endeavoured to address this organisational deficit in the twilight years of its existence. Due to differences in belief about what the objectives should be, this led to the splintering of the group and its eventual demise.

H3b: Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the group.

The PESTELO environment and the geographic dispersion of the group, determined the structure of the WUO. The formal structure was hierarchical, with a command and control structure based on the geographic location of the units. The initial structure was an artefact of the group's pre-existing aboveground collective organisation. The regional leadership was implemented to ensure the group, which was spread over a vast geographic area, operated within the bounds of the strategic objectives outlined by the Weatherbureau. At a local level, the group operated in cells, which were drawn from pre-existing collectives. This cellular structure was adopted, based on the WUO leadership analysis of the environmental factors and their historical review of insurgencies in Cuba and South America. The lack of general support for the WUO within the community, and the pressure placed on the group by law enforcement, meant the WUO was incapable of mobilising large units. Within this environment, their communication channels were vulnerable, so attacks using larger units was hazardous, which would have potentially led to the group's compromise. Thus, environment also dictated a cellular structure.

At the end of the WUO's existence, the formal structure seems to have disappeared, and was replaced by a network structure. This change in structure does not appear to be a conscious choice, but a result of declining membership and loss of relevance within the changing PESTELO environment within the United States. The available information suggests, the membership declined to a point where the group could no longer maintain its formal organisational structure and it devolved into a network.

The structure of the group was consistent with Dunbar's cognitive limits hypothesis. The structure was also consistent with other anthropological theories on the structure of human society. As such, it is not possible to ascertain whether the cognitive hypothesis is relevant in describing the WUO structure.

Thus, size, geography distance, the PESTELO environment, and the security of the communications channels, were key factors, which determined the organisational structure of the WUO and its structural evolution throughout its life cycle.

Case Study 2 - Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

Chapter 10 - Historical Background

The foundations of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), can be traced to before the partition of Ireland in 1921. British involvement in Ireland dates long before this, when the first Norman adventurers landed in Ireland in 1166 AD. The Norman conquest of Ireland started in 1171 AD, with the conquest of kingdom of Leinster, plus the towns of Waterford, Wexford, and Dublin, and part of Meath.[475] The British invaded Ireland *to* avert Ireland's becoming a rival Norman state.[476] By 1175 AD, the High King of Ireland accepted the overlordship of the English King, although English authority was only secure in the pales.[477]

In the following years and centuries, there were major revolts in Ireland against English overlordship. It was not until the Tudors came to the throne of England, that the British seized control of Ireland and created a centralised government. From the mid-16th century to the early 17th century, the British colonised Ireland with English and Scottish Protestants. The Catholics in Munster, Ulster, Laois, and Offaly were dispossessed of their land and replaced by these colonists. Many laws were introduced in Ireland to encourage Catholics to convert to Protestantism.

Throughout the Stuart reign of England and the period of the Republic, Ireland was decimated by rebellions and for a brief period between 1642 and 1649, England lost control of Ireland. In this period, Ireland was a confederation. From 1649 to 1653, Oliver Cromwell, for the English Commonwealth, reconquered Ireland. During this period, Ireland lost about a third of its population and the majority of the better lands within Ireland were handed over to the Protestant settlers, as retribution for the uprising.[478] Later, the Irish Catholics' support of James II against parliament led

[475] David Hughes, *The British Chronicles*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Heritage Books, Great Britain, 2007), p 313 - 15.

[476] Ibid.

[477] Ibid.

[478] Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop, *Dictionary of Genocide*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2008), p 91.

to the Irish Catholics being further dispossessed of their land and property. The penal law also dispossessed Catholics of many of their civil rights. Between 1739 and 1741, the Great Frost led to crop failures in Ireland resulting in an estimated 400,000 deaths.[479]

After the Great Frost of 1740-41, Ireland experienced an economic and population boom. With this boom, there was some relaxation of the restrictions placed on Catholics and there were attempts to broaden the franchise to some Catholics. Among the reformers, some felt, that the Protestants within the Irish parliament were resistant to these reforms and the emancipation of Catholics. The reformers were of the opinion that the politicians' allegiances were with Westminster rather than Ireland.

Inspired by the American and French revolutions, the United Irishman rose in revolt in 1798, against British rule in Ireland. The British acted quickly and crushed the rebellion. Even so, the organisation did not cease to exist, nor did the concept of a United Ireland. The rising did demonstrate that Irish unity was fragile, as there had been some instances of sectarian violence between Catholics and Protestants. Furthermore, after the act of union of Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1800, William Pitt levelled some of the blame for the 1798 uprising on the sectarian policies of the Protestant Parliament in Dublin. Both sides politically exploited the sectarian violence of 1798 in later years, although the context of the violence was often forgotten. Many Protestants in Ireland were loyal to the British government and as such, the uprising by the Catholic United Irishman was perceived as an act of disloyalty.

In 1801, the Act of Union was passed in Westminster and Dublin, leading to the abolition of the Irish Parliament, which resulted in elected Irish members sitting in Westminster. The union of Ireland and Britain also held promise for Irish Catholics

[479] Richard Killeen, *A Brief History of Ireland* (London: Constable and Robinson, 2012), Kindle Locations 1728 - 33.

that the Penal Law would be appealed and lead to emancipation. Though emancipation was resisted and was not passed until 1829 when the then Prime Minister the Anglo-Irish Duke of Wellington, the hero of Waterloo, used his personal prestige to ensure its passage into law. This was also a period of rural unrest in Ireland and sectarian violence. Some Catholic Irish politicians, sitting in Westminster, who attempted to have the Act of Union repealed, exploited these events.

During the period between 1800 and 1846, the Irish population had been progressively increasing. By 1846, the population had reached a peak of 8.3 million[480], which was equivalent to 1/3 of the population of the United Kingdom, which was about 26 million at the time. The potato famine and immigration decimated the population, which had dropped to about 4,000,000 by 1922 and 2.8 million by 1961.[481]

There remained an undercurrent of nationalism within Ireland after the emancipation, resulting in nationalist uprising in 1848 and 1867. The latter half of the 19th century was a period of reform within Ireland. One significant reform involved the breaking up of the large estates of the absentee landlords and returning ownership to the Irish. The passing of the Local Government (Ireland) Act in 1898 broke the control of the landlords, giving control to the elected local councils, but the debate over home rule also created divisions between the Protestant and Catholic communities.

Nationalists gained hope in 1885, when the British Prime Minister Gladstone, announced he was a supporter of Irish home rule. This unsettled the Protestants in Ireland and triggered the formation of the first Unionist organisation, which had spread to Ulster by 1886. Gladstone's first attempt to pass a Home Rule bill, failed

[480] "Historical Atlas: Population of the British Isle. ," (2013).

[481] Ibid.

in the House of Commons in the same year. He attempted again in 1893, but this time, it was voted down in the House of Lords. Although these bills did not pass into law, they created considerable fear within the Unionist movement, which by 1905, had become a well-disciplined and united organisation, representing the Protestant interests, united under the Ulster Unionist Council. The issue of home rule in Ireland created divisions.

In the intervening years, the issue of home rule simmered, but it was not until 1910, home rule became a prominent political issue in Westminster. In 1911, the political landscape had changed and it was apparent both Houses of Parliament would pass a Home Rule bill. The Protestants engaged in a political campaign to oppose home rule and threatened to establish a provisional government in Belfast if the bill was passed. They feared that they were going to be abandoned by London and they would be a minority within a predominantly Catholic country. Their preference was to maintain the union with Britain. In response, Protestants formed the Ulster Volunteer Force in 1913, with the intent of opposing home rule and creating a provincial government in Ulster. The Nationalists responded with the creation of their own militia force to support home rule, the Irish Volunteers.

The Home Rule legislation passed through Parliament in 1914 with an amendment, which temporarily excluded Ulster to avoid an Irish Civil war. The outbreak of the First World War led to the British government delaying its implementation until the war ended. The outbreak of the war created a rift within the Nationalists. The majority of the members of the Irish Volunteers joined the British Army, but a small minority dissented. This small cadre would form the core of the group, who initiated the Easter Uprising in 1916. In the wake of the uprising, there was a shift in Irish opinion, primarily brought about by the British response involving the imposition of martial law and the execution of 15 of the uprising's leaders. It also saw a shift in the British views on Ireland.

After the Easter Uprising, the British government attempted to expedite home rule, but were unable to gain broad support. The two attempts in 1917 and 1918 failed. The primary sticking points in the negotiations was the status of Ulster and Protestants in a united Ireland.

A further stumbling point was the linking of home rule in Ireland with conscription. The situation in Ireland was further complicated by the heavy losses suffered by the British Army on the Western Front during the 1918 German spring offensive, which reignited the debate regarding conscription within Ireland, which was seen as an untapped source of manpower. Ireland had been quarantined from conscription, which had been implemented in Britain in January 1916. The linking of home rule and conscription by the British radicalised moderate Nationalists, increasing support for Nationalist groups such as Sinn Fein. This resulted in moderate Nationalists losing electoral support to Sinn Fein. In the British general election in December 1918, Sinn Fein became the dominant party, winning 73 of the 105 Irish seats in Westminster. The victors met in Dublin on 21 January 1919, declaring independence and forming the first Dáil Éireann. The declaration led to British intervention, resulting in the Anglo-Irish war and Irish independence in 1921. Ireland was now divided, with Ulster remaining part of the UK.

Within Ulster, a significant Catholic population remained, which included republicans and former members of the IRA who had participated in the Anglo-Irish war. These people maintained the IRA structures. In the period between 1921 and the start of The Troubles, this cadre of the IRA engaged in two major actions, the Northern Campaign during World War II and the Border Campaign between 1956 and 1962. Both campaigns failed to achieve any significant outcomes.

The failure of the Border Campaign led to the IRA reviewing its approach. The new leadership of the group moved the organisation away from an armed struggle to a political one. The environment within the Northern Irish Catholic community had

also evolved. There was a newfound confidence, based on the success of the Civil Rights movement in the United States, to challenge the existing political system and agitate for change.

Chapter 11 - The Environment - Northern Ireland prior to The Troubles

The following is an assessment of the environmental factors, which led to the emergence of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in 1969. This assessment is conducted as a case study, atomising the case using the PESTELO environmental model. The PESTELO model defines that environment in terms of the political, economic, socio/cultural, technological, ecological, legal, and organisational variables within that environment. The use of this model is intended to derive a set of variables, which can be directly linked to the emergence of the PIRA.

Economic Environment

In addition, the traditional industries in Northern Ireland of linen and shipbuilding were in decline. These industries were the main consumers of Protestant skilled and unskilled labour. Unemployment in Northern Ireland was double that of Britain, even with attempts to entice replacement industries to the state.

Social Environment

Since the end of the Second World War, the Northern Irish, Catholics and Protestants alike, benefited from the British welfare state. Catholics and Protestants received unemployment benefits, which exceeded those paid to individuals in the Irish Republic. In addition, the Northern Irish also had better access to education than their southern counterparts. There were no laws barring the marriage of Protestants or Catholics. Statistically, Catholics were as equally likely to attend university as Protestants.

Thus, under British law, Catholics and Protestants were equals. This was not the reality of the situation in Northern Ireland. Protestants were more likely to hold positions in the Government service. They were more likely to receive the better government controlled housing. They were more likely to hold the high paid skilled jobs. In areas of Northern Ireland, such as Londonderry (Derry), preferential treatment was given to Protestants, but in instances where councils created new housing estates in Catholic areas, some of the local Protestants perceived this as a

demonstration that the Catholics were receiving favourable treatment, at the detriment of Protestants.

Political Environment

When assessing the political environment in Northern Ireland, it is necessary to address the environment from the perspective of the main groups involved in The Troubles. It is not a simple case of viewing the environment as containing two main actors. The situation is far more complex, as the environment contained multiple actors. The obvious actors are the Unionists and the Republicans, but beyond these two main protagonists, there were other actors who also had a vested interest in Northern Ireland, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. Beyond these were others, who also were able to influence the political environment in various ways. The general Northern Irish population, who were not overtly Nationalist or Unionist[482], and further afield, were the significant Irish Catholic diaspora in North America, who were a significant source of financial support.

Nationalist

By 1962, the IRA was an organisation in transformation. The failure of the Border Campaign (Operation Harvest) had led to recrimination within the IRA. Cathal Goulding became the Army Council's new Chief of Staff. Under his leadership and against the opposition of the traditionalists within the IRA, he reshaped the organisation, moving the IRA away from armed struggle and instead adopting a Marxist ideology and engaging in a political struggle to achieve their goals. Goulding was not without support. Many members of the IRA who were incarcerated during the period of the Border Campaign, also adopted a Marxist ideology.[483] This change in direction of the IRA was not without opposition, which predominantly came from members of the Belfast Brigade.[484]

[482] Michael Burleigh, *Blood and Rage* (New York: Harper Colins Publisher, 2009), p 287.

[483] Ed Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), Kindle Locations 1414-19.

[484] Ibid.

In Derry/Londonderry there was far less opposition to the changes in the IRA direction. Derry differed from Belfast, as the Nationalists/Catholics were the majority within the city. When the IRA split into the Officials and the Provisionals, the Nationalists in Derry/Londonderry supported both organisations.[485]

Unionist

The Unionists had maintained control of the Northern Irish Government since 1921. Two thirds of the population of Northern Ireland were Protestant and by virtue of these numbers, the founding Stormont Government was able to create a gerrymander, which guaranteed their ongoing dominance in the Northern Irish Parliament.[486] In Nationalist strongholds, such as Derry/Londonderry, where the population was predominately Catholic, the Unionist had introduced electoral reform, which ensured their political ascendency was not assailed.[487] In other instances, local government was assumed by Stormont, where the Unionists also dominated, disenfranchising the local Catholic population.[488]

Within the Public Service, only 10% of the public servants were Catholic and none occupied senior positions. In the Northern Irish Police Force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, only 11% were Catholic.[489] All the judges were Unionist aligned, that is, Protestant. As such, the Unionists maintained a firm grip on power and the instruments of power.

There was also a change in the Unionist political leadership in Northern Ireland in 1963, with Terrence O'Neill, a moderate reformist, taking the reins of power at Stormont from the Conservative Unionist Lord Basil Brookeborough.[490]

---

[485] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1927-29.

[486] Burleigh, *Blood and Rage*: p 287.

[487] Ibid.

[488] Ibid.

[489] Ibid., p 288.

[490] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 1384-86.

During this period, there were improving relations between Dublin and Belfast, leading, in 1965, to a meeting of the Premier of Northern Ireland Terrance O'Neill and the Taoiseach Sean Lemass, of the Irish Republic, for the first time since the 1920s.[491]

O'Neill's primary goal was to guarantee the Union. He had hoped by improving the economic conditions of the Catholics, they would support the Union and thus undermine the Republican movement. He was also well aware the new Labour Government in London could be sympathetic to the Nationalist aspirations, if his government was not seen to be addressing the divide between Catholics and Protestants. Moloney states:

> *"O'Neill was also aware that there was now a Labour government in London that was more likely to listen sympathetically to nationalist complaints of discrimination and human rights abuses."* [492]

O'Neill also had to frame his reformist policies in a context, which would be seen as beneficial to both Catholics and Protestants. Given the Protestants' distrust of the Catholic community, O'Neill contextualised his reforms in a security framework. O'Neill claimed, by improving the lot of the Catholics within Northern Ireland, it would in turn, undermine the Republican movement and the Catholic Church.

Moloney illustrates this point by quoting a speech once given by O'Neill:

> "On one famous occasion he explained his approach in almost racist terms:
>
> > *It is frightfully hard to explain to Protestants that if you give Roman Catholics a good job and a good house they will live like Protestants*

[491] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1404-07.

[492] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1391-92.

because they will see neighbours with cars and television sets. They will refuse to have eighteen children but if a Roman Catholic is jobless and lives in the most ghastly hovel he will rear eighteen children on national assistance…. If you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration and kindness they will live like Protestants, in spite of the authoritarian nature of the Church."[493]

The Orange Order

The Orange Order was a body, which exercised significant influence in Unionist politics. Founded in 1795, as described on their website:

> *"In 1795, following the culmination of attacks on Protestants in County Armagh at the Battle of the Diamond, in which Protestants routed those who had attacked them and attempted to burn properties, it was decided to form an organisation which would protect Protestants. This body, drawing on existing Orange Clubs in the neighbourhood, was named the Loyal Orange Institution."*[494]

The website further indicates that goal of the order is seen as

> *"...defending Protestantism is not so literal as it was in 1795, but it requires us to take a stand for truth in an age of secularism and in order to defend our culture and traditions."*[495]

The Orange Order opposed home rule wishing to maintain the union with Britain, as they believed that this was the only way they would maintain the religious freedom. In the Order's own words:

---

[493] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1395-400.

[494] "About Us - Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland," Grand Orange Lodge, www.grandorangelodge.co.uk/what-is-the-orange-order.

[495] Ibid.

"Our Civil and Religious Liberties we will maintain".[496]

To maintain this liberty, the Orders influence in Unionist politics was significant. There were very few members of the Stormont parliament on the Unionist side of politics that did not belong to an Orange Lodge. Their website documents:

> *"The vast majority of Unionist M.Ps. during the 51 year period of the Stormont Parliament were members of the Orange Order. Of the 95 who never received cabinet rank until 1969, 87 (including one woman) were members of the Order. The remaining eight were women and three were elected for the first time in 1969. Only three members of the cabinet during this period were not Orangemen and three others who were left the Institution later. Every Stormont senator during the 1921-68 period was an Orangeman, except the one woman senator. And of the 56 members of the Westminster parliament in the same period, all but two (both women) were lodge members. Every Prime Minister of Northern Ireland during the period 1921-72 was an Orangeman. An estimated 35 of the 60 Unionist members returned to the Northern Ireland Assembly in June 1998 were Orange Order members. Most of them in the Ulster Unionist Party with a significant number in the DUP."*[497]

The Orange Order acted as a unifying factor in a diverse Unionist community that embraced all classes, geographic locations, and Protestant denominations.[498]

The Order was highly suspicious of the Catholic minority and fearful that the British Government would come to a political accommodation with the Irish Free State,

[496] Ibid.

[497] Ibid.

[498] David; McVea McKittrick, David, *Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict.* (Penguin UK, 2009), p 6-8.

later the Irish Republic, which would result in the reunification of the North and the South of Ireland, where the Protestants would be the minority.

Furthermore, to maintain Unionism within Northern Ireland and its union with Britain, the Order encouraged its members to join the Security Forces, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). The Order maintained a close association in the 1970s, with the second largest Protestant paramilitary group, the Orange Volunteers.[499]

British

The British policy in Ireland since the mid-19th Century was disengagement. Prior to the First World War, the British had been working towards Irish Home Rule. This policy was not universally supported, especially among the Unionists and hard-core Nationalists, but resonated amongst the moderate members of the community.

In reaction to this policy of Home Rule, the Unionists formed the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in July 1913, to oppose the change in status of Ireland. The Irish Republican Brotherhood formed the Irish Volunteers in response to the UVF. Civil War was only averted by the outbreak of the First World War, when home rule was placed in abeyance until the cessation of hostilities. In general, there was broad support for the war amongst constitutional Nationalists. This created a split in the Irish Volunteers. The majority, who supported the British war effort, formed the National Volunteers and the minority remained with the Irish Volunteers. In this group lay the cadre of the Easter Uprising of 1916.

The British response to the Easter Uprising, created a tipping point. In the aftermath of the rising, 90 people were sentenced to death, of which, 15 were eventually executed. These executions created a shift in Nationalist opinion. Combined with

[499] "Orange Volunteers," University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/oorgan.htm#ov.

the conscription crisis in 1918[500] many moderate Nationalists shifted their political aspirations from home rule to independence.

After partition, although maintaining the right under legislation, the Ireland Act, to intervene in Northern Irish politics, Westminster refused to interfere in the Stormont Parliament in Belfast, permitting the Unionist Government to rule Northern Ireland unhindered. The British Governments had a policy of keeping Northern Ireland *"...at arm's length*".[501] Throughout the 1920s and beyond, the British government was reluctant to interfere in Northern Ireland. When approached by Northern Ireland Nationalists with complaints about the discriminatory policies of the Unionist Government, the British Government maintained its *"…arm's length"* approach and would refer the matter back to the Unionist control Parliament at Stormont.[502]

Legal environment

The Special Act, also known as the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922, was one of the key tools, which the Northern Irish Government had used against the IRA during the Border Campaign of 1956-1962. It was a harsh piece of legislation which:

> *"...gave the authorities exceptional powers to arrest, detain without trial, and suppress political dissent. So severe were its penalties, which included the death penalty for some firearms offenses, flogging, and the confiscation and destruction of property, that a South African prime minister during the*

[500] During the First World War Ireland had been exempt from conscription, service with the British Army had been voluntary for Irish Catholics and Protestants. In 1918, the British Army was suffering from a serve shortage of manpower, and conscription was one of the elements voted in Westminster to help address this problem. The passing of this act caused unrest in both Catholic and Protestant communities in Ireland and became known as the Conscription Crisis.
Source : Keith Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p 4-7.

[501] McKittrick, *Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict.*: p 2.

[502] Ibid., p 6-10.

apartheid era once famously remarked that he would swap all his emergency laws for one clause of the SPA."[503]

The Act was intended for use in times of emergency in Northern Ireland and was primarily used as a tool to circumvent the activities of the IRA. It was also used in a proactive manner, predominantly against the Republicans/Catholics. In 1951, Republican politicians were imprisoned just prior to the Royal visit to Northern Ireland[504] and it was again used in the *"...1967 banning of the Republican Clubs when they appeared to have been engaged in legitimate political activities".*[505]

The Catholics of Northern Ireland also distrusted the Northern Irish judicial system. There was a perception the judges and magistrates were political appointments, with a significant imbalance between Catholic and Protestants holding these positions.[506] In addition, this distrust was further reinforced by the property requirement for jurors and the restriction on challenging jurors, which meant the juries were predominately composed of Protestants.[507]

The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), when it was originally formed in 1921, was intended to be non-sectarian and representative of the population of Northern Ireland. One third of the positions in the RUC were reserved for Catholics.[508] This goal was never achieved; at best, only about 20% of the force was ever Catholic, but typically, only about 10% of the force was Catholic.[509] There were many reasons for the under representation of Catholics in the RUC. Firstly, there was the perception that the RUC was an instrument of the Stormont Unionist Government, reporting

[503] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 1083-86.

[504] Andrew Hamilton, "'Discrimination and the Administration of Justice' from 'Perspectives on Discrimination and Social Work in Northern Ireland," Unversity of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/gibson4.htm#top.

[505] Ibid.

[506] Ibid.

[507] Ibid.

[508] McKittrick, *Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict.*

[509] Burleigh, *Blood and Rage*: p 288.

directly to the minister and carrying out the will of the parliament.[510] Secondly, the RUC, unlike other police forces in the UK, had a paramilitary role. They were involved in the suppressing of the IRA and dissenting republicans on behalf of the Unionist government, through the enforcement of the Special Powers Act. [511] Thirdly, the association of the RUC with the Orange Order did not motivate Catholics.[512] Fourthly, Republican groups also intimidated any potential Catholic recruits. All these factors discouraged Catholics from joining the RUC.

In addition, the RUC maintained a reserve force known as the B Specials, which were particularly despised by Catholics. The CAIN Website describes the role of the B Specials, as being:

> *"...given the task of combating potential subversion of the state, they were recruited as an exclusively Protestant paramilitary force. There were open ties between the B Specials the Orange Order and also with illegal Protestant paramilitary forces such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Many members of the B Specials were also members in the latter forces, and the units of the B Specials often used Orange Order lodges for training exercises and practice drills... The B Specials engaged in activities such as manning roadblocks and protecting selected installations during times of suspected IRA activity. Due to the large number of Protestant extremists in their ranks, the B Specials gained notoriety for their use of violence in the execution of their duties; offences included beatings, harassment, and body searches of Catholics at checkpoints. Some of the victims were known to the B Specials as neighbours, but were nonetheless subjected to harsh treatments, unlike Protestants who were merely waived through... The B Specials came to be universally loathed by the Catholic community as a tool of Protestant*

[510] McKittrick, *Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict.*: p 11.

[511] Hamilton, "'Discrimination and the Administration of Justice' from 'Perspectives on Discrimination and Social Work in Northern Ireland".

[512] Ibid.

repression and intimidation as a result of these and other well-published incidents."[513]

Other Actors in the environment

Ian Paisley

Ian Paisley was a unique actor in Northern Ireland Politics. He was the Moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church.[514] Paisley held, and continues to maintain, fundamentalist Protestant religious views, which include staunch anti-Catholic beliefs. These beliefs are stated on Paisley's website:

> *"...The Institute is part of the ministry of Martyrs' Memorial Church. Its purpose is to expound the Bible and expose the Papacy and to promote, defend and maintain Bible Protestantism in Europe and further afield. It will assist all who are engaged in the struggle against the Papacy in both the religious and the secular worlds; provide courses suitable to all ages in the controversy with Rome; and supply information on all aspects of the Papacy today..."*[515]

Cain Web services describe Paisley in the 1960s:

> *"... as a vociferous opponent of the unionist political establishment accusing it of seeking to betray the interests of Northern Ireland Protestants by seeking to reach an accommodation with Irish nationalism."*[516]

Paisley was an outspoken sceptic and critic of O'Neill's attempts to modernise and reform Northern Ireland. In particular, he opposed O'Neill's meeting with the Irish

[513] Landon Hancock, "Northern Ireland: Troubles Brewing," University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/landon.htm.

[514] Brendan Lynn, "Biographies of Prominent People - 'P'," University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/people/biography/ppeople.htm#paisleyi

[515] "About the European Institute of Protestant Studies (EIPS)," European Institute of Protestant Studies, http://www.ianpaisley.org/about.asp

[516] ———, "Biographies of Prominent People - 'P'".

Republics Taoiseach Sean Lemass. In addition, Paisley also opposed the Civil rights marches, organising counter marches, which in most instances, erupted in violence. These Counter demonstrations further destabilised Northern Ireland.

Northern Ireland's Civil Movement

The Northern Irish Catholics benefited from the 1947 education reforms, which provided greater access to higher education. By the 1960s, these benefits had provided Northern Ireland, a pool of well-educated middle class Catholics who were willing to challenge the status quo and seek reforms within Northern Ireland, for the Catholic minority through the legitimate democratic practices. These individuals were further inspired to take civil action when the Conservative Party in Westminster, was replaced by a Labour Government of Harold Wilson. They also had received further hope that civil action would gain success when they observed what gains the Civil rights movement in the United States had achieved.[517]

The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) emerged from a group known as The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland, whose stated goal was:

> *"The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland was inaugurated on 17th January, 1964, for the purpose of bringing the light of publicity to bear on the discrimination which exists in our community against the Catholic section of that community representing more than one-third of the total population."*[518]

In mid-1964, the Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland Committee engaged in correspondence with the British Minister for Northern Ireland, Sir Alec Douglas, and the Prime Minister Harold Wilson, to address religious discrimination in Northern Ireland. Their campaign was unsuccessful. Both the Minister and the Prime Minister used the same tactic, as many British governments had done since

[517] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations1483-588.

[518] "Northern Ireland - Why justice cannot be done.," in *Cain Web Services*, ed. Northern Ireland The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland (Londonderry: University of Ulster, 1962).

1921, by distancing themselves and indicating that the matter was an issue for the Stormont Parliament in Northern Ireland.

Thus, in the concluding statement of a pamphlet published by The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland Committee, they stated:

> *"To sum up, therefore, we have established with Sir Alec Douglas Home that:*
>
> *(1) The Parliament of the United Kingdom has the ultimate responsibility for discrimination in Northern Ireland, but the Prime Minister is unwilling to ask Parliament to intervene.*
> *(2) Despite the fact that the British Prime Minister told us that allegations of discrimination could be dealt with by law, he is now either unable or unwilling to let us know how this can be done.*
>
> *We are left wondering if Sir Alec spoke in error, or if in fact he has no real interest in the problem of the minority and the facts of religious discrimination in Northern Ireland."* [519]

The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland, in a series of pamphlets, highlighted the discrimination against Catholics in housing, jobs in the public and, private sectors, voting, business and in the law. When The Troubles erupted in 1969, they continued their work by publishing alleged brutalities committed by the British Armed Forces and the RUC.

The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland Committee attempted to bring to light the plight of the Catholics through letter writing, publication of pamphlets and newsletters. Although they did not have any real success with the politicians, they did inspire other groups. One group to emerge out of The Campaign for Social

[519] Ibid.

Justice was the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) formed in 1967 in Belfast. NICRA was a loose coalition of various groups of middle class Catholics, students, and Unionists, Nationalists, moderates, and radicals. For a short time, there were a small number of Protestants involved, but most withdrew after the street marches became violent in 1968.[520]

NICRA's manifesto includes some key reforms or demands:[521]

(1) One-man one vote, under the current system, a high percentage of Catholics had no vote, where some Unionists had up to six votes.
(2) Scrapping of the Gerrymander system, which gave Unionists control, even when there was a majority of Catholics.
(3) A points list for public housing to ensure a fairer allocation of public housing. There were many instances where single Protestants were given public housing over Catholic families.
(4) The disbandment of the RUC's Ulster Special Constabulary or B Specials.
(5) Removal from legislation the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922

NICRA avoided the contentious issue of creating one Ireland.[522]

Events leading to The Troubles

Within this environment in the 1960s, the Catholics of Northern Ireland were now more willing to engage in direct action to achieve equality. With this increasing willingness, also came escalating violence by the Protestant dominated government and other sectarian groups.

[520] Aaron Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles: Operation Banner 1969–2007*, Essential Histories (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011), Kindle Locations 47-50.

[521] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 1592 - 97.

[522] Martin Melaugh, "Abstracts on Organisations - 'N'," University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/norgan.htm#nicra.

The first of many instances of violence between Republicans and Unionists occurred in October 1964. Paisley and Unionist groups marched into the predominantly Catholic area of Belfast, to remove an Irish tricolour flag from the headquarters on Davis Street, of the Sinn Fein candidate in the up and coming Westminster election. To circumvent violence between the Paisleyites and the Republicans of the area, the RUC took control of the situation and removed the flag. Their actions resulted in 2 days of rioting in the Lower Falls Road area of Belfast; neither the Catholic nor the Protestant communities in Northern Ireland saw this outcome as positive.

The UVF conducted its first attack in 1966. The plan was to seek out the IRA leadership, but resulted in the death of three ordinary Catholics. The UVF had feared that the IRA would conduct an operation on the 50th Anniversary of the 1916 Easter uprising by the Irish Republican Brotherhood. In June 1966, Paisley brought a group of supporters, en-route to a protest at the centre of Belfast, to protest against ecumenical Protestants. Paisley, in a provocative act, marched his group through a Nationalist market area.

By 1966, there was an increasing willingness and confidence within the Catholic community, to work with the state to achieve the reforms, to improve the conditions for Catholics. There were reservations within the Catholic community that O'Neill's reforms were moving too slowly. In addition, there were also reservations among Unionists that O'Neill's reforms were undermining the Protestant community, removing the privileges they had historically enjoyed. The formation of the UVF in 1965 was an indicator of the growing protestant concern. These concerns were also voiced by Paisley in his speeches, and the Protestant community's direct involvement in street marches.

The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in 1968 conducted its first protest, staging a sit-in at a council house in county Tyrone, which had been allocated to an unmarried protestant female, over a Catholic family. The NICRA's

next protest took place in Derry/Londonderry. It was intended to highlight the poor housing conditions of Catholics, in a city in which they were the majority, but ruled by Unionists. The march was poorly attended, but gained public attention when the RUC blocked the protestors and dispersed the crowd, using water cannons and batons. The events that unfolded were captured on film and broadcast around the world.[523]

The NICRA attempted a second time, to march into Derry/Londonderry in November of the same year. This time the march attracted around 15,000 protestors, the outnumbered RUC let the protestors proceed. The NICRA's march concerned O'Neill, Paisley and his supporters, and the British Government in Westminster. The British Government placed O'Neill under pressure to address the Nationalist demands.[524] O'Neill asked the NICRA to refrain from further protests, which they did, so that he would be given time to address their concerns.

The civil rights movement was not a united or centralised group. It was a loose affiliation, of a variety of groups, all with similar and varying agendas. One of these groups from Queens University, The People's Democracy, mistrusted O'Neill and his agenda and planned an independent march in early January 1969, between Belfast and Derry/Londonderry. The marchers planned a route through predominately-Unionist areas. Paisley's supporters met the protestors at the outskirts of Derry/Londonderry stoning and fighting them.[525] As a result, riots broke out between Catholics and the RUC in the Bogside, a Catholic enclave of Derry.

In March 1969, the UVF exploded bombs at a Belfast Electrical Substation, which the UVF hoped would be blamed on the IRA. The culminating pressures from Paisley who questioned O'Neill's leadership, the escalating violence in the streets and the

[523] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 1611-15.

[524] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1634-36.

[525] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1639-42.

resignation of many of O'Neill supporters, left O'Neill with no options and he resigned in April 1969. James Chichester-Clark replaced O'Neill on 1st May 1969.

The initial enthusiasm of the early 1960s was replaced by escalating radicalisation of both Northern Irish communities, the Republicans and the Unionists. Each blamed the other for the current events. The situation deteriorated from this point. In July, Protestant vigilante groups were formed in Belfast, to "defend Protestants". Violent clashes between Protestants and Catholics became commonplace, with some Catholics being evicted from their homes.

On 12 August in Derry/Londonderry the annual Apprentice Boys Parade, which traditionally marched past Catholic areas, triggered rioting in the Bogside, Derry/Londonderry between Catholics and Protestants. The RUC attempted to disperse the rioters with water cannons and CS gas. The RUC actions triggered two days of rioting, which became known as, "The Battle of the Bogside".[526]

By 13 August, the Bogside riots in Derry/Londonderry caused rioting in other areas of Northern Ireland. The RUC was hard pressed to control the situation and the B Specials were mobilised. The Irish Government had been following the situation and threatened to intervene in defence of the Nationalists.[527] The RUC, in an attempt to maintain control, placed armoured vehicles equipped with heavy machine guns, on the streets of Belfast.[528] By 14th August, the RUC was exhausted and the Stormont government was forced, by the deteriorating situation, to request help from the British Army. The local British Military forces, in Northern Ireland, were deployed to

[526] Martin Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1969," University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch69.htm.

[527] The invasion of Northern Ireland by the Irish Republic was given serious consideration by the Irish Government. Invasion plans were drawn up. In 1969, the Irish did not possess the troops, the equipment, or air support to intervene in Northern Ireland.
Source: "If the Irish army had entered the North in 1969… the difference between an invasion and an incursion," The Cedar Lounge Revolution, http://cedarlounge.wordpress.com/2009/09/01/if-the-irish-army-had-entered-the-north-in-1969/.

[528] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 1691-94.

the streets on the same day. Serious battles continued on 15th August in Belfast, between Catholics, the RUC, and Loyalists. Many Catholics, living in predominantly Protestant areas, had their houses set either alight, or were forced to leave their homes. The British army was forced to erect physical barriers between the two communities, known as the peace lines, to keep the two warring factions apart. Many Catholics, who left their homes in other parts of Belfast, took refuge in West Belfast. A smaller number of Protestants were also displaced by the 2 days of civil unrest, finding refuge in protestant dominated areas of Belfast.

The toll of the civil unrest amounted to eight dead (2 Protestants and 6 Catholics) and many more injured.[529] Between 14 July and the end of 1969, 10 Catholics and 8 Protestants were killed in Northern Ireland.[530] During this period, the depleted membership of the IRA was unable to intervene on any large scale. In Belfast, the IRA deployed its depleted membership to defend Catholics, but their efforts were ineffectual. In Derry/Londonderry, activists and members of the IRA were involved in forming and organising the Derry Citizens Defence Association (DCDA), which would play a dominant role in the Battle for the Bogside.

Radicalisation

Those who founded the PIRA in 1969 had a long personal or family history of involvement in the IRA or republicanism. The events of 1968 and 1969 had not radicalised these individuals, as they already held radical ideations. The inability of the leadership to defend the Catholics of Belfast, led to a loss of confidence in them, by leading members of the IRA in Belfast. This loss of confidence, led to them establishing a rival leadership cadre, which would emerge as the PIRA.

The events of 1968 and 1969 also acted as a catalyst for the radicalisation of the individuals and communities. As previously discussed, radicalisation is not a process

[529] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1695-96.

[530] Malcom Sutton, "Malcolm Suttons An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland " University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1969.html

that occurs instantaneously. It occurs over time, based on an accumulation of events and personal experience, which each individual interprets differently. The events surrounding the Civil Rights Marches in 1968 and early 1969 in Derry/Londonderry, had led to the formation of the DCDA in that city.[531] The DCDA was an organisation with very limited structure[532], but had significant public support when the Battle for the Bogside started in August 1969. The radicalising factor was the perception within the community that they were under siege from the state. As such, only they could protect themselves as no one else would.

The radicalising factor in Belfast was the displacement and burning of Catholic homes by Protestants in the riots, which engulfed their community, as a result of the Battle of the Bogside. Again, like Derry/Londonderry, they felt the state was incapable or unwilling to protect them. As such, only they could protect themselves, as no one else would.

These events shifted personal perceptions and created a situation where individuals shifted on the radicalisation scale. Not everyone was affected the same way as the documentary of the Battle of Bogside[533] highlighted. This documentary illustrated the different roles, members of the community undertook.

1. There were the organisers who coordinated the defence of the Bogside,
2. The young were typically, but not exclusively, on the frontline fighting the RUC,
3. Others were involved in sourcing supplies, such as stones and petrol bombs,
4. Others were involved in the manufacture of weapons,
5. Others built barricades,
6. Some gave medical and first aid treatment to the injured,

[531] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Location 7594.

[532] Vinny Cunningham, "Battle of the Bogside," (United Kingdom and Republic Ireland: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Bórd Scannán na hÉireann, Northern Ireland Film and Television Commission See more 2004).

[533] Ibid., Kindle Locations 7592-98.

7. Some opened their homes to the rioters, giving them somewhere to sleep,
8. Others fed the rioters and,
9. Others just left the community for somewhere safer.

Thus, there was broad scale involvement within the community in its defence. Although the Catholic community was radicalised by these events, it was in the defence of their communities against the RUC and Protestants, as the IRA was non-existent at this time. The Catholics of Derry/Londonderry and Belfast welcomed the British Army on the streets, as it ended the violence.[534]

The Catholic community were not radicalised by a failed nationalistic aspiration for Irish unity. It was radicalised by the State's inability or unwillingness to protect them against sectarian violence. As such, they had to defend themselves. Not all those affected engaged in violent acts, many acted in support and ancillary roles. This suggests radicalisation is a graduated scale. The Protestant community was radicalised by a fear they were going to lose their privileged position within Northern Ireland and would have to share power with Catholics. They further feared that if the republicans were to win and achieve the reunification of Ireland, they would become a minority in a predominately-Catholic nation.

Organisational Environment - The Emergence of the Provisional IRA

As the events of July-August 1969, unfolded and violence swept the two major cities in Northern Ireland (Derry/Londonderry and Belfast); the IRA was not in possession of the manpower or the equipment to intervene in any significant manner.[535] The local Catholic communities defended their own streets. They erected barricades to prevent Loyalist/Protestant incursions. In the absence of the IRA, they had set up their own defence committees to patrol and defend the streets of their

[534] Peter Taylor, "Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein Episode 1," in *Provos* (United Kingdom: British Broadcasting Commission (BBC), 1997).

[535] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 1746-50.

community.[536] Former Belfast IRA men blamed Goulding for depleting the IRA's operational capacity, leaving Catholics defenceless.[537]

The events of July and August lay bare the divisions within the IRA as Moloney wrote:

> *"Goulding and his allies ignored dangerous signals from Belfast. In late August a group of former IRA men, people who had long disagreed with the leadership and had either left or been expelled, met in the New Lodge Road district of the city to decide what they should do about the Belfast leader ship of the IRA then in the control of a Goulding loyalist, Billy McMillen. They were angry about McMillen's failure to organize the August defense and they blamed Goulding for the Catholic deaths"*[538]

This meeting resulted in another meeting between former IRA men and the leadership of the Belfast Brigade. Moloney again describes the events:

> *"The old guard resolved to oust McMillen, and in September its opportunity came when McMillen called a meeting of IRA commanders in the Lower Falls Road area. Armed men led by Billy McKee were sent to demand his resignation. McMillen refused, and after heated arguments a compromise was hammered out. The Belfast IRA would withdraw from Dublin control for three months, McMillen would add some of McKee's men to his operational staff, and weapons would be sought. If Goulding had not abandoned his strategy by the three-month deadline, McMillen would be replaced and Belfast would be run by a separate Northern Command. Meanwhile the*

[536] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1672-75.

[537] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1746-50.

[538] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1751-54.

Belfast units would play no part in the coming debate about abstentionism, effectively opting out of it."[539]

The battle lines were now drawn between the leadership of the IRA and the dissenters. Goulding had called an IRA convention for December to ratify his political approach and seek approval for the IRA and Sinn Fein to abandon abstentionism, which had been a long-standing policy of the IRA since partition. Moloney again describes the events:

> *"An IRA Convention was called for December, and Goulding prepared well for it, ensuring that this time a majority of the delegates would be in his camp. They were, by a majority of thirty-nine to twelve. The anti-Goulding faction walked out and, with MacStiofain as its leader and new chief of staff, elected a caretaker IRA Executive and Army Council that would be loyal to the traditional principles and doctrines of republicanism*
>
> *The new dissident IRA bodies were interim and temporary; the Executive and Army Council could be ratified only by a General IRA Convention, which was not scheduled to meet until September of the following year. But until then they would represent the new group. News of the split and the formation of the rival IRA was leaked to the press by Goulding's people in late December 1969, and in a statement confirming the story the new group claimed that already a majority of IRA units had sworn allegiance to the Provisional Army Council and Executive of the IRA..."*[540]

The Provisional IRA was born, although at this time, it was predominately a Belfast based organisation.

[539] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1756-61.

[540] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1777-84.

Chapter 12 - Analysis

Does the PIRA meet the criteria to be described as a Terrorist group?

The PIRA meets the criteria of a terrorist group. The PIRA:

1. Used violence or threat of violence. The PIRA engaged in an extensive bombing campaign and killings between 1969 and 1998.
2. Used violence, which was selective and planned. All targets selected by the PIRA had been chosen because of their perceived link to repression by the British and Northern Irish governments. The targets selected, included non-combatants military personnel, law enforcement, government agencies, banks and other businesses, which the PIRA claimed, were involved in repression of Republicans and Catholics.
3. Aims were political. The PIRA was a Nationalist/Separatist group who aspired to reunify Ireland.
4. Selected targets, which were civilian, or non-combatants. As previously indicated, the group bombed establishments where Protestants gathered, such as pubs, law enforcement, government agencies, banks, and other businesses. The PIRA also carried out bombing and mortar attacks in the United Kingdom.
5. Violence was selected to draw the public's attention to the group's cause.
6. The PIRA intended for the violence to evoke a reaction. The PIRA's use of violence was designed to intimidate the Protestant opponents and persuade the British to depart Northern Ireland.

Category of Terrorist Group

The PIRA is categorised within this dissertation as a Nationalist/Separatist group. It was a group, who supported the separation of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and a union with the Irish Republic, which is consistent with the MIPT definition.[541] The PIRA was a Republican organisation who wanted to reunite the six counties of Northern Ireland with Irish Republic.

[541] http://www.mipt.org/.

H1a: When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups.

The emergence of the PIRA resulted from a number of environmental factors described by the PESTELO[542] model. Many of these variables are intertwined and overlap. For example, political conditions can affect economic conditions and vice versa.

Politically, Northern Ireland was a divided community, where political power resided with the Protestant majority. It was a state, which has a significant minor religion-ethnic group who, were effectively, politically disenfranchised. Since the foundation of the province in 1921, the Protestant community felt uncertain of the willingness of Westminster to maintain the union. In addition, in Northern Ireland's short history there had been a long-standing enmity between the two communities (Nationalist and Unionists), which lived side by side. It was also a climate where the British government in Westminster adopted a "hands off" approach, effectively allowing the Protestants a free hand in the government of Northern Ireland with minimal interference.

One of the perturbations within this environment was the change in political leadership in the governing Ulster Unionist Party. This new leader came to the role with a reformist agenda. His goal was to ensure the economic and political survival of the union, by engaging with the Catholics of Northern Ireland and through a raft of proposed reforms; he hoped to create a more inclusive society. Unionists did not universally support these reforms, and were opposed by the traditionalists within the Unionist community. In addition, Catholics and Nationalists also treated these reforms with varying levels of enthusiasm and scepticism alike.

[542] PESTELO is a model, which describes the environment in terms of the political, economic, socio-cultural, technology, ecological, legal, and organisational environmental variables.

Politically, Northern Ireland had other actors who exercised significant influence over the political environment. Within the Unionist ranks, there was the Orange Order, whose members permeated the unionist political parties. The Orange Order strongly espoused the dominance of Protestantism and the continuing union with Britain. Furthermore, the influential Presbyterian preacher, Ian Paisley built a following in the 1960s with his staunch anti-Catholic rhetoric and opposing the reunification with the Irish Republic. In the 1960s, Ian Paisley was not part of the political unionist establishment, but through his charismatic personality, was able to frame his message in such a manner that it resonated with the working class Protestants. His message voiced the concerns and reservations of parts of the unionist community, to the proposed reforms. Thus, he was able to influence events beyond that of an ordinary Protestant.

A third factor in the political environment was the shift by the IRA away from force of arms as their primary method to achieve their goal of reunification, substituting armed struggle with political agitation. In conjunction with this shift by the IRA, there was a growing Catholic and Nationalist Civil Rights movement within Northern Ireland, which were inspired by the successes of the Civil Rights movement in North America. This growing movement in Northern Ireland was a mix of various groups who shared similar agendas and goals. The improving education standards of Catholics, since the Second World War, had created a stratum in the Catholic community, which was confident in their ability to take action and create change, through “direct action”.

In the 1960s, Northern Ireland was declining economically, traditional industries were closing, and the unemployment rate in Northern Ireland was twice that of Britain. The new Prime Minister of Northern Ireland was attempting to counteract this decline, by attracting new industries and part of the strategy involved, was the reform of the social environment, attempting to create a more inclusive society by engaging the Catholics. The effects of the decline in the economic situation in

Northern Ireland did not only affect the Catholic community, but also the Protestant community, who also formed part of the ranks of the unemployed.

Socio-culturally, there had been a long history of discrimination against the Catholics, in education, employment, housing, and within the legal system. Protestants received preferential treatment in the allocation of housing. The skilled jobs and civil service jobs were more likely to be occupied by Protestants. The statistics of who occupied these jobs, did not equate to the demographics of the two cultural groups.

Within the legal institutions, the Catholic community was under- represented in the Police Force and the legal system as judges, magistrates, and jurors. In addition, the Catholic/Nationalist community, perceived the Special Powers Act as a method used by the Protestants to limit the political descent of the Catholic community.

The organisational environment of the IRA was in a state of flux. Recriminations from the failed Border Campaign, led to a change in leadership within the IRA and a new direction for the group that was not universally supported by a significant portion of its membership. Goulding was only able to push through his agenda by purging his opponents from the IRA and replacing traditionalists with his supporters.[543] Many, who were purged, were later to have a role in the formation of the PIRA. The result of this process was the IRA adopting a Marxist political ideology and preferring political agitation, rather than armed struggle. The leadership of the IRA chose this change at a time when political agitation had reaped benefits for the Civil Rights Movement in the United States.

The Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland, although it was inspired by the successes of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States and the promises of reform by the new leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party at Stormont, was

[543] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 1525-31.

operating in a different environmental context. Northern Ireland was not the United States. The United States was a democratic society with two competing political parties, who could create balance within the society. They acted as safety valves for the various social, economic, and political stresses of the society. That is, one party could be removed from power by the electorate and replaced by the other, if they were perceived by the electorate not to be meeting the needs of the society as a whole. The Civil Rights Movement and Civil Rights Bill that were passed in 1964 in the United States had broad support within both political parties and the majority of voters in the Northern States. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement did not engender this level of support within the Protestant majority, or their political representatives.

In Northern Ireland, there was only one ruling elite, the Ulster Unionist Party, which had held power since the partition of Northern Ireland in 1921. The dominance of this party in government was the political weakness of the state. The party represented all Unionists, whether Conservative/Traditionalist or Liberal/Reformist. The party was all encompassing representing the Protestant elite, workers, the poor, and a small minority of Catholic Unionists. Northern Ireland was a democratic state in name only. The Unionists effectively disenfranchised a third of the potential voters. As such, it was effectively a one party semi democratic state.

There was no effective opposition, no alternative government, which could represent alternative views. The British Government's disinterest in Northern Ireland also contributed to the problem, by closing off a potential conduit by which grievances could be addressed. There was no political safety valve, where the people of Northern Ireland could express their displeasure with the current ruling party.

The violence of August 1969 and the failure of the RUC to act impartially and restore order, led to a radicalisation of the two communities, with each community

engaging in retaliation reprisals against each other. Catholics were dispossessed of their homes in predominantly Protestant areas and likewise Protestants in Catholic areas. In Northern Ireland, places like Belfast became polarised communities, because the state had failed to protect them. The communities organised their own defences. In this environment, the IRA was not to be seen on the streets, which vindicated the traditionalist view that the armed struggle was the only legitimate course of action and reinforced their belief that the political approach had nothing to offer.

By 1969, the IRA was a divided organisation. Under Goulding's leadership, the IRA had moved to the left and had abandoned the armed struggle, adopting a broad political approach to achieve its goals. These changes had emerged from the failure of the Border Campaign (1956-1962) and the lack of support the IRA received from its Catholic constituents. Moloney indicated as the events of 1969 unfolded, rather than preparing for the defence of Catholic enclaves in Belfast and elsewhere, the leadership was devoting its resources into the up and coming battle with the traditionalists at the December IRA Convention.[544] As the sectarian violence increased, and the new guard in the IRA failed to act, the rift between the traditionalists and the new guard widened and deepened. The Belfast Brigade members were the most outspoken opponents of Goulding's reforms. Goulding's failure to recognise the changing environment and the deterioration of events, especially in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry and adapt his tactics, created a situation where traditionalists within the IRA, felt they were forced to act. Thus, at the December conference, they walked out and by the end of the year the majority of companies in the Belfast Brigade, had aligned themselves with the Provisional IRA.[545] The new organisation did not view itself as a splinter group, it perceived itself as a continuation of the IRA. The dissenters viewed the organisation as provisional

[544] Ibid., p 50.

[545] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1777-80.

and their role as caretakers of the IRA traditions until they could obtain ratification by the General IRA Convention scheduled for September 1970.[546]

Thus, the provisional IRA emerged from perturbations in the political, economic, and social environments of the PESTELO model. These perturbations were a result of increasing sectarian violence between 1966 and 1969. These factors had significant influence on the organisational variable of the PESTELO model. The IRA had always viewed itself as the defenders of the Catholic communities within Northern Ireland. The events of August 1969 in Belfast created tension within the IRA. With Goulding's abandonment of the armed struggle for a political struggle based on a Marxist-Leninist ideology, the IRA no longer possessed the weapons to undertake the defence of Catholic communities within Northern Ireland.

Although, in homophyllic terms, the two factions within the IRA shared the same aspiration of a united Ireland, they differed, in homophyllic terms, as to the best mechanism to achieve this goal. The Belfast faction had concluded, based on the recent outbreak of sectarian violence, the political approach had been discredited. They had concluded the armed struggle was the only legitimate mechanism, which would allow the IRA to achieve its goal or aspiration. The perturbations in the political, economic, and social environments, especially those in Belfast, discredited the political approach. Many of the members of the Belfast faction had never viewed the political approach as a viable option. They felt the current events had vindicated their stance.

Thus, the split in the IRA was heavily influenced by the events (perturbations) in the PESTELO environment. The origins of the split resided in the differing beliefs on how the organisational aspirations could best be achieved. These aspirations included the defence of Catholic communities in the current environment of sectarian violence and a united Ireland. In addition, there were fundamental issues, regarding

[546] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1781-82.

Goulding's leadership of the IRA, that caused discontent, which included *"…his recognition of the Irish and British parliaments; the move to embrace extreme socialism; illegal internal disciplinary methods; the failure to defend Belfast; and the policy of defending the Northern parliament at Stormont."*[547]

H1b: Homophyllic and geographic proximity influences the ability of individuals to communicate and this influence is central to group formation.

Throughout most of the history of the IRA, the members of the Irish Republic dominated the Army Council. This did not change after the failed Border Campaign. The new leader of the Army Council, Goulding, a southerner, had set out to evolve the IRA into a revolutionary movement, which would engage in constitutional politics, subordinating the armed struggle. Moloney also noted

> *"Goulding and his allies resorted increasingly to the tactic of purging their enemies. Senior Northern IRA figures were forced out or left in disgust at the tactics being used against their friends. Among them were men who would play key roles in the formation of the rival Provisional IRA a few years later, characters like Jimmy Steele, who had spent twenty years in jail for IRA activity, and Sean Keenan from Derry, a republican stalwart for years. With other Belfast men who had left or were eased out during this period—people like Joe Cahill, Jimmy Drumm, Billy McKee, the Kellys of North Belfast, the Hannaways, and Seamus Twomey—they were to form the core of a bitter opposition just biding their time to strike back at Goulding."*[548]

The situation deteriorated in Northern Ireland, especially Belfast in August 1969. Other leading members of the IRA Army Council, such as Sean MacStiofain, Ruairi O Bradaigh, John Joe McGirl, and one other opposed Goulding.[549] Not only did MacStiofain opposed these fundamental changes to the IRA ideology; he also

[547] Ibid., Kindle Location 1906.

[548] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1538-43.

[549] Ibid., Kindle Location 1776.

cultivated support within the leadership of Belfast IRA, who were on the frontline in the upsurge of sectarian violence. They were not only opposed to the abandonment of the armed struggle, but they also opposed other features of Goulding's reform of the IRA. They were also very uncomfortable with the "extreme socialism" being adopted by the Goulding camp, as they believed the goal was to create a Marxist dictatorship, which would not benefit the Irish Nationalist cause.[550] To the men who were to form the PIRA, they had joined the IRA to fight British oppression by force of arms, not to fight class oppression through revolution.[551] In the case of the IRA men in Belfast, the political ideology was the least of their concerns. The events of August had demonstrated the IRA had failed in its key role, to defend the Catholic population in the city, and they laid the blame for this soundly at the feet of the Army Council. The IRA in Northern Ireland at this time was a denuded organisation; it had few volunteers and very few arms to conduct any reasonable defence of the Catholic population. The Northerners blamed the Southerners for being out of step with the unfolding events in the North and as such, saw the Southern based General Headquarters (GHQ) as irrelevant.[552]

The geographic proximity of the PIRA's creators to the changing PESTELO environment heavily influenced the PIRA emergence. Although civil unrest had engulfed Northern Ireland, places such as Derry/Londonderry had demonstrated that the Catholic population, which was in the demographic majority, was more than capable of defending itself against Unionist incursions, as exemplified by the battle of the Bogside. Belfast in contrast, was a city where the Unionists had the demographic advantage; it was also the city, which experienced some of the worst sectarian violence. Furthermore, it was the location where the PIRA was born with the first IRA units defecting to the new PIRA. Some units within Belfast delayed, but

[550] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1843-46.

[551] J. Bowyer Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*, Cass Series on Political Violence (London: Taylor and Francis, 2013), Kindle Locations 1969-71.

[552] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2018-25.

by early 1970, 9 out of the 13 joined the new incarnation of the IRA.[553] At the time of the split, the PIRA only consisted of about 40-50 members.[554]

Outside of Belfast, the existing units of the PIRA were not very strong and at times operated in conjunction with the Officials. Derry/Londonderry was a strongly Nationalist community. When the IRA split, the PIRA had to start from scratch.[555] Therefore, the PIRA was practically non-existent within Derry/Londonderry and due to this, the British Army considered the city to be safe for off duty soldiers.[556] This lasted until mid-1971.[557] Between 1969 and mid-1971, the PIRA within Derry/Londonderry was small with no more than 15 members, which was decimated when most of its members were interned in July 1971.[558] From this point, the membership of the Derry Brigade grew, but did not rival the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA), who remained the larger and dominant Republican organisation. In addition, there was not the hostility between the OIRA and the PIRA within Derry/Londonderry, which was present within Belfast.

In the country areas, it was common for the PIRA and the OIRA to conduct operations together. Again, there was not the bitterness, which pervaded their relationship within Belfast. This was most likely a reflection of differing experiences with the leadership of the IRA, prior to the split. Unlike Derry/Londonderry and Belfast, the country areas were not subject to the same levels of sectarian violence.

The two micro case studies highlights that emergence cannot be generalised, local PESTELO conditions play a significant role in the process. The environmental conditions in 1969, within Belfast, created the impetus for the emergence of the

---

[553] Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, *The Provisional I.R.A.* (Corgi Books, 1988), p 141.

[554] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: Kindle Location 2028.

[555] J Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA. Revised Third Edition* (Transaction Publishers, 2008), p 374.

[556] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 7635-38.

[557] Ibid.

[558] Ibid., Kindle Locations 7651-56.

PIRA. Although the PIRA emerged in Northern Ireland's second largest city, it remained small as the PESTELO environmental variables differed in the two locations.

Those who joined the IRA, prior to the split in 1969 typically had a long family association with the IRA. Gerry Adams was born into a family, with extensive Republican credentials extending back into the 19th Century.[559] These credentials existed on both his mother and father's side. Goulding also had a family heritage of involvement in republicanism, dating back to the 19th Century.[560] These two examples were common. Those who did not have an extensive or immediate family involvement in the IRA, were influenced by members of their extended family, who were associated with the organisation. Sean MacStiofain, the Chief of Staff of the PIRA, was born in the UK and was heavily influenced by his Irish mother who maintained strong Irish Nationalist sympathies.[561] Due to the tightly knit Republican community in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, those who wanted to join the IRA, had to be sponsored by those already in the organisation. As such, new members of the IRA, prior to 1969, were already well known within the Republican circles.

This changed after 1969. The new PIRA recruits joined, not because of a belief in republicanism, they joined because they sought arms to defend their communities against incursion by the loyalists. The new members who came to the PIRA were volunteers, typically with no prior involvement in republicanism and saw the PIRA as defending them against the loyalists.[562]

Thus, the homophyllic variables from the recruits prior to 1969 and after 1969 varied significantly. Prior to 1969, the recruits aspired to a united Ireland and

[559] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1715-19.

[560] Ibid., Kindle Location 1352.

[561] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1825-29.

[562] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: p 78-80.

believed in Republicanism. The traditional recruits believed violence through the force of arms would bring about this goal. They also believed they were the defenders of the Catholic community within Northern Ireland and they were willing to use violence to achieve this goal, although by 1969 they lacked the means and ability to do so.

The new recruits after 1969 typically did not aspire for a united Ireland or hold Republican aspirations. What they shared with the PIRA, especially in Belfast, was the aspiration of defending their communities and belief by joining the PIRA and the OIRA, they would acquire the weapons to do so. These individuals did not travel to Dublin to join the IRA. They sought out their local units through locally known IRA men. Moloney wrote:

> *"The IRA before August 1969 was an organization kept going by family tradition. Membership was passed from father to son, mother to daughter, but the recruits who flocked to the ranks of the Provisionals were a new breed, motivated by an atavistic fear of loyalist violence and an overwhelming need to strike back. Known as Sixty-niners, they joined the IRA literally to defend their own streets, were resolved that the near-pogroms of August 1969 would never be repeated, and were ready, if the opportunity arose, to retaliate. They joined the Provos because the Officials had failed to defend their communities in the way that was expected, and they automatically associated the Officials' obsession with politics with military weakness and betrayal."*[563]

Thus, geographic proximity played a central role to the emergence and growth of the PIRA. The new recruits joined units of the PIRA, which were within their own communities. They did this by communicating with known IRA men. Those who

[563] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 1939-44.

joined the PIRA after 1969 did not join the PIRA motivated by a Republican belief system or aspiration, neither were they motivated by an aspiration for a united Ireland. They joined because they believed the PIRA was capable of defending their communities against the Loyalists. They also believed the only way to defend their communities was through violence and the PIRA would provide them with the tools (firearms) to facilitate this defence. They joined for survival. Even though in homophyllic terms this was a ambiguous match, in the extreme environment of late 1969 and 1970, it was sufficient for the PIRA in Belfast to grow from about 40 or 50 members[564] in 1969, to about 1000 in 1971.

From a status homophyllic perspective, Bell describes the newly created PIRA recruits in the following terms:

> *"These recruits from outside the movement were not unlike those who had been attracted during the previous generation: young men and now women of limited formal education, without property or profession, eager, enthusiastic, determined to serve, to act for the greater good. These recruits were mostly in their late teens or early twenties. A few were older but these were seldom. Those younger, if used at all, were incorporated in youth organizations like Fianna Éireann or told to wait. Few attracted to the Provisional had formal training or great skills, in part because few nationalists, i.e. Catholics, did in Northern Ireland, and in part because those with training and skills were elsewhere employed, at work at the university, in a law office, or in front of a class. Many of the working class in the six-counties did not work and so were available for assignment. The Provisional were thus largely composed of underutilized young people, parochial, marginal, badly educated but often capable of far more than society had on offer. In a sense the Provisional offered everything — a vocation".*[565]

[564] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: p 77.

[565] Ibid., p 82.

Gills and Horgan survey of 1240 PIRA recruits, found it was a predominately-male (95.1 %) organisation.[566] They also found the organisation progressively aged over its 30 years life. Between 1969-1976 the average age was 22.25 years, 1977-1980 25.22, years, 1981-1989 26 years, 26.5 years, 1990-1994 28.13 years and 1994-1998 32.67 years.[567] They also found 41.6% were married at the time of recruitment or during their services.[568] In terms of occupation, they found it was highly likely the recruits came from a working class background, with very few having a profession. They found the highest categories of occupations of recruits were; 35.7% came from a construction background, 27.7% worked in service/industrial industries, and 11.4% unemployed.[569] Students (2.8%) and professionals (3.5%) had very low levels of participation in the IRA.[570] Furthermore, the majority of the recruits were born in the 6 counties in Northern Ireland (82.7%), with 13.9% born in the Irish Republic, with very small percentages born in the diasporas in countries such as the UK and the United States (3.4% combined).[571]

Thus, the status homophyllic variable of age, gender, education occupation, social class and ethnic background indicates the new recruits were male, working class, in their very early 20s, born in Northern Ireland, had an average education and was working in a skilled or non-skilled job, although there was a portion of the recruits who were unemployed. Those with a higher education and working in a professional career were unlikely to be an overt member of the PIRA.

[566] Paul Gill and John Horgan, "Who Were the Volunteers? The Shifting Sociological and Operational Profile of 1240 Provisional Irish Republican Army Members," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25, no. 3 (2013): p 443.

[567] Ibid., p 440.

[568] Ibid., p 450.

[569] Ibid., p 451.

[570] Ibid.

[571] Ibid., p 444.

H2a: The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, economic, and social environment in which the group operates.

Determining the size of any covert organisation is always difficult. There is a tendency for the covert organisation to overstate the number of members. In the case of government organisations, who collect intelligence relating to a covert organisation, no matter how good or reliable this information, will tend to either overestimate or underestimate the size of the group, due to the uncertainties in validating the sample. Furthermore, government agencies also have to contend with the ambiguous boundaries and the dynamic nature of these types of groups, which can create errors in estimates. Thus, making it difficult at times to ascertain who the active members of the group are and who were supporters or sympathisers. Furthermore, in the case of the PIRA, which also maintained a political wing that was a legitimate aboveground organisation, it can be difficult to ascertain where the boundaries of the illicit organisation and the legitimate organisation begin and end. In the case of the PIRA, there are strong arguments, especially in the later years of The Troubles, that it and Sinn Fein shared members, especially at the senior level of the organisation.

At the time of the split with the OIRA, the PIRA was a Belfast based organisation and illustrated the influence of the environmental factors on the size of the group. In late 1969 and early 1970, the PIRA was estimated to have about 40-60 members.[572] The PIRA's Belfast Brigade at the start of 1970 had an estimated membership of just over a dozen members.[573]

The Catholic "no go" areas established in 1969 to separate the two warring communities, had by 1970 become de-facto states within a state, administered by the PIRA in Belfast and the OIRA in Derry/Londonderry. The unrest persisted and escalated in 1970. Within Belfast, there was a continuation of communal violence

[572] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Location 2089.

[573] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: p 371.

and the initial friendly relationship between Catholics and the British Army deteriorated. The deaths of OIRA and PIRA members killed by the British Army in gun battles, led to a further decline in the relationship between the Catholic community and the Army.[574] Within this uncertain environment, the Belfast PIRA membership had expanded from about 60 members at the time of the split to a few hundred members by the end of 1970.[575] This was a dramatic increase in a very brief period.

In January 1971, in the ”no go” areas under its control, the PIRA started to administer punishments for criminal acts within Belfast. The PIRA also took on the role of a police force in areas under its protection. The rioting, communal violence, searches by the British Army, and gun battles between the British Army and the PIRA, created instability in the PESTELO environment. In this environment, the membership of the PIRA’s Belfast Brigade, in early 1971, grew. Estimates suggest it exceeded a thousand members.[576] Bowyer indicates the new recruits joined the PIRA not as Republicans, but as defenders of their communities.[577] A desire for Irish unification did not drive the PIRA’s growth. The growth of the PIRA membership was a response to the instability in the environmental conditions, created by the failure of the political system, through the military and the police, to restore order. It was not for a desire for Irish unification. In addition, the invasive searches conducted by the British Army in Catholic areas, further alienated the Army from the Catholic population, which originally welcomed them as saviours.

The situation further deteriorated in August 1971, when the Stormont Government, backed by the British Army, introduced internment and the imprisonment of 342 people, most of whom were Catholics. During the period between 9 August 1971 to

[574] Martin Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1970," University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch70.htm.

[575] Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA. Revised Third Edition*: p 371.

[576] Ibid.

[577] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: p. 80.

5 December 1975, 1981 people were interned. Of these, only 107 were Protestants, the remainder were Catholic.[578] As such, the internment was perceived as an anti-Catholic measure, which was perpetrated by the Westminster and Stormont Governments and enacted by the British Army.

> *"Internment had been proposed by Unionist politicians as the solution to the security situation in Northern Ireland but was to lead to a very high level of violence over the next few years and to increased support for the IRA."*[579]

The violence in Northern Ireland escalated throughout 1971.

Increased support for the militant Republican groups in Northern Ireland occurred after the killing of 14 marchers in Derry/Londonderry in 1972 on Bloody Sunday by the First Battalion Parachute Regiment (1 Para) of the British Army.[580] The relationship between the British Army and Northern Ireland Catholics had progressively deteriorated since 1970, but the Bloody Sunday events did more to radicalise the community than previous events had.

> *"In the days afterward young men and women literally queued up to join the Provisionals, while the remaining moral qualms about the use of violence against the British vanished."*[581]

The year 1972 was the worst year of violence for the whole period of The Troubles.

> *"In a sense until mid-1972, the situation did not change for as the number of convinced and dedicated Republicans increased so did the number of*

[578] Martin Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1971," University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch71.htm.

[579] Ibid.

[580] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 7677-80.

[581] Ibid., Kindle Locations 7680-82.

recruits. With the growth in size, the IRA increased the intensity of the campaign and so the need for more recruits than could be easily Republicanized. This was true not only in Belfast, the core of the Provisionals for much of the armed struggle, but in Dublin and Derry and to a degree even in the country. Some recruits had all but to create their own units."[582]

Throughout this period, the PIRA suffered a severe shortage of arms and was not able to offer all the new recruits the opportunity to serve. The security forces in Northern Ireland were also learning from the operational experience.

The year 1972 was the high tide mark of the growth of the membership of the PIRA, a peak that it would retreat from, for operational reasons.

"The influx of volunteers peaked in 1972. In Northern Ireland British coercion began to narrow the battle arena, deny operational opportunities to the many, require the formal IRA structure to be adjusted and downsized. There were fewer opportunities to serve and so fewer recruits: the secret army became more secret, more skilled, less open to volunteers too young to have served in the first influx."[583]

Further, 1972 was also a turning point in British strategic thinking. On 9 February 1972, Westminster abolished the Stormont Parliament and implemented direct rule. On 31st July, the British launched operation Motorman, which was intended to take back the "no go" *areas "…of the Creggan, Brandywell and Bogside in Londonderry (now officially called Derry City) and barricaded districts of Belfast".*[584] It was the largest military operation conducted by the British since World War II,

[582] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: p. 81.

[583] Ibid., p. 84-85.

[584] M. L. R. Smith and Peter R. Neumann, "Motorman's Long Journey: Changing the Strategic Setting in Northern Ireland," *Contemporary British History* 19, no. 4 (2005): p 413-14.

involving some 30,000 military personnel.[585] The rationale of the operation was to deny the paramilitary groups, such as the PIRA, safe havens in which to operate.

> *"Using their footholds in the 'no go' areas the IRA 'shifted to an offensive campaign of resistance in all parts of the occupied area' in October 1970. In 1971 the level of violence rose gradually, with 1756 and 1515 shooting and bombing incidents respectively, resulting in 174 deaths. The scale of the violence escalated dramatically the following year with 10,628 shootings and 1853 bombings. The death toll for 1972 was 467 dead, 208 of whom were the result of known Provisional IRA actions."*[586]

The goal of Operation Motorman was to deny these groups, like the PIRA, their operational safe havens.[587]

> *"The loss of the no-go areas broke up the hard core of IRA operatives in Belfast and Londonderry and severely eroded the organisation's operational capacity. These areas were the IRA's most vital military asset. They provided safe havens from where it could plan attacks while remaining effectively immune from the security forces. Further, these districts were also used by the Provisionals to foment a constant level of rioting and sniping that did much to keep urban areas in a state of disorder."*[588]

Motorman also put the PIRA under severe operational pressure. They were no longer able to operate with impunity.

> *"Within weeks military forts were constructed right on the IRA's doorsteps, and the organization's freedom of movement was severely curtailed. Now*

[585] Ibid., p 414.

[586] Ibid., p 419.

[587] Ibid.

[588] Ibid., p 426.

able to put the IRA under close surveillance in both cities and to screen thousands of civilians for IRA sympathies, British army intelligence on the IRA improved markedly. Within two years the British grip on areas like West Belfast was so tight that the Belfast Brigade was forced to move its operational headquarters to the southern outskirts of the city, to the affluent Malone area."[589]

Motorman was successful as there was a dramatic decline in the violence in 1973 and significant improvement in intelligence collection capabilities, which is a key factor in a counter insurgency conflict.

In 1973, the PIRA reduced its size, although Bowyer claimed it was due to a change in operational priorities. As previously stated, it was a consequence of the loss of the "no go" areas.

"The only great difference, when the period of provocation faded into a conventional campaign, was that more of the structure became covert — and the numbers were larger. Everyone no longer knew everyone for the first time since the 1930s. Specialization had occurred by 1972– 73, for the army was too large for each to be involved in everything. Then as the impetus shifted from defence to offence the security forces escalated pressure again transforming the Northern Ireland arena. At this point in 1973, the active army began to be reduced in size by circumstances…"[590]

After Motorman, the operational environment further changed for the PIRA, the OIRA disengaged and declared a cease-fire in mid-1972, which it maintained until the end of The Troubles. This saw a further influx of hard-core OIRA members to the

[589] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 2682-86.

[590] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: p. 131-32.

PIRA. The British Army improved its intelligence gathering capacity in Northern Ireland and improved the training of the soldiers deployed in the six counties.

By 1975, the British security forces and the RUC had effectively contained The Troubles and the PIRA evolved from an urban guerrilla force into a terrorist organisation.[591] The cease-fire in 1975 also saw a change in strategy by both sides. The British had demonstrated its unwillingness to withdraw from Northern Ireland. The British adopted a long-term strategy, which was to deny the PIRA the capacity to continue the struggle, encouraging them to enter settlement discussions.[592] Part of this strategy involved the Security Forces, but also included a revamping of the criminal justice system, which criminalised paramilitary activities.[593] Subjected to these changing environmental forces, the PIRA adopted the long war strategy. This strategy required a strong political wing to build a sound political base for the paramilitaries.[594]

From 1975 onwards, British Intelligence gathering became more sophisticated and over time, computer systems managed the large amounts of information collected.[595] In 1976, the RUC took over the role of patrolling the streets from the Army. The Army provided support to the RUC as required. There was also increased undercover surveillance conducted by the Army, which included the deployment to Northern Ireland of specialised forces, such as the Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF), 22nd Special Air Services Regiment (22 SAS), 14 Intelligence Company (Det) and later, the Force Research Unit (FRU).[596] The RUC also created its own specialised covert unit called the Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU). From the late 1970s through to the 1990s, the conflict in Northern Ireland became an intelligence

[591] David Chandler, G and I Beckett, *The Oxford History of the British Army* (Oxford University Press, 2003), p 361.

[592] Brendan Lynn, "IRA Truce: 9 February 1975 to 23 January 1976 - Summary of Main Events," University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/truce/sum.htm.

[593] Ibid.

[594] Ibid.

[595] Chandler and Beckett, *The Oxford History of the British Army*: p 351.

[596] Ibid.

war. The intelligence campaign was effective in containing the PIRA and bringing them to the negotiation table. These changes in tactics by the security forces placed the PIRA and other paramilitaries within a hostile security environment.

Furthermore, with the massive influx of volunteers in 1969 to 1972, it was not possible to vet all those who joined. This left the PIRA with a legacy of having informants or members turned by the likes of MI5 embedded within the organisation.[597] Some of these informants, over time, obtained quite influential and senior positions within the organisation, where they were able to provide the security forces with valuable information.[598] This environment did not permit the large-scale operations, similar to those undertaken by the PIRA, prior to 1973. Thus, there was not the need for the large number of volunteers. The PIRA downsized its membership to about 400 members and these members developed greater levels of specialisation.[599] The PIRA maintained this size for the remainder of The Troubles until the peace process had run its course.

Even within this hostile environment, the PIRA was able to forge links with Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who at various times from the mid-1970s provided the group with an estimated 120 tonnes of weapons, explosives, and ammunition.[600] In addition, it is alleged, he also provided the PIRA with financial support.[601] Thus, although contained, PIRA possessed the resources to continue the struggle, which they did throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

Thus, the size of the PIRA was dependent on the environmental factors. The failure of the political and legal environments to protect the Catholic communities within Belfast created an environmental context, which led to the split in the IRA. The IRA

[597] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Location 9024.

[598] Ibid., Kindle Location 907.

[599] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: p. 132.

[600] "The 38-year connection between Irish republicans and Gaddafi," BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-12539372

[601] Clive Maltby, "Exposure: Gaddafi and the IRA," (United Kingdom: ITV, 2011).

(in Belfast) failed to protect Catholics in the August 1969 riots, which tarnished its reputation. The PIRA, untarnished by these events, attracted a significant influx of members between 1970 and 1972. This new membership came as defenders of their Catholic communities. The “no go” areas created in 1969 permitted the PIRA to grow. These were areas where the RUC and the British Army maintained no permanent presence. As such, the role of law enforcement and protection of the community fell upon groups such as the PIRA and the even smaller OIRA. Within these safe havens, the PIRA was able to recruit, train, and launch attacks with minimal hindrance from the state. In this environment, the PIRA in Belfast was able to grow in size with a peak membership in excess of a thousand volunteers in 1972. Operation Motorman changed the environmental landscape in mid-1972. Operation Motorman re-established government control and authority over the ”no go” areas. Thus, removing the safe havens in which the PIRA had operated, with a resultant drop in PIRA attacks. A consequence of Motorman was the reduction in the membership of the PIRA, because in this new environment, the PIRA could not covertly maintain a group that size, without compromising the security of the organisation.

The PIRA membership suffered two further blows in the preceding years. In 1986, with the vote to drop abstentionism and allow elected Sinn Fein members to take their seats in the Dáil, led to a small group splitting from the PIRA. These dissidents formed the Continuity IRA (CIRA), which maintained the IRA’s traditional abstentionist stance. Again, the PIRA split in 1997, when some members of the PIRA, opposed to the 1997 ceasefire and the PIRA’s involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process, walked out of the General Army Convention. Those who opposed the new direction, in which the PIRA was moving, along with other disaffected members, formed the Óglaigh na hÉireann (Army of Ireland), which became known as the Real IRA (RIRA).

The environmental conditions within the Derry/Londonderry differed to those within Belfast. Demographically Derry/Londonderry differed to Belfast. In Belfast, the Catholics were in the minority, representing only about a third of the city's population. In Derry/Londonderry, the Catholics were the majority, representing about two thirds of the city's population. Furthermore, the Catholics in Derry/Londonderry had not experienced the pogroms at the hands of the Protestant community, which had occurred in Belfast. In Derry/Londonderry, the OIRA defended the Catholic community, unlike their counterparts in Belfast. The OIRA had also been active during the battle of the Bogside. As such, the Catholic community's perception of the OIRA differed to that of their counterparts in Belfast. In Derry/Londonderry, the PIRA was small and the OIRA was the dominant Republican paramilitary group in the City.

Likewise, in country areas, for similar reasons, the OIRA also remained dominant, although there may have been small cadres of the PIRA present in those locations. The rural areas of Northern Ireland, where the IRA had a presence, were overwhelmingly conservative and maintained a traditional Catholic outlook.[602] After the split in the IRA in 1969, the country units of the old IRA did not instantly align themselves with the new organisation. The ideological differences meant little in areas such as Tyrone.[603] In some areas, the PIRA created new units from scratch, but the PIRA in the country areas remained small.[604] This situation was to change in mid-1971 with the introduction of internment and the Army's role in cratering the roads in the border regions, which joined Northern Ireland to the Republic. The cratering of these roads caused rioting in rural areas, which had been moderately peaceful up until this event. The situation in the rural areas further deteriorated when the British Army, at a checkpoint, killed two OIRA men, in 1972. The commanders of the OIRA failed to avenge the killings.[605] Thus, the commanders of the OIRA lost

[602] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 1420-22.

[603] Ibid., Kindle Locations 6631-32.

[604] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2375-78.

[605] Ibid.

credibility among rural OIRA units. Matters in the rural areas further declined when the OIRA declared a ceasefire, in 1972, in response to opposition, from Catholics in Derry/Londonderry to the murder of William Best by the OIRA.[606] Best lived in Derry/Londonderry and was a serving member of the British Army on leave at the time of his murder. Best was a member of the Royal Irish Rangers a Northern Irish Regiment, which was excluded from serving in Northern Ireland due to its close connection to the six counties and the potential of split loyalties.[607] The OIRA maintained the ceasefire for the remainder of The Troubles. Thus, those who wished to fight the British in the rural areas had little option but to join the PIRA. Thus, in 1972 many of the rural OIRA units aligned themselves with the PIRA. In addition, within this changed environment, the PIRA was able to expand existing units and form new ones to absorb the influx of volunteers.[608]

Therefore, the capacity of an emergent terrorist group to grow in size is dependent on their location in the conflict space and the effects of the perturbations (events) experienced in this location. Northern Ireland indicates the environmental perturbations vary across the space. By way of example, in Belfast the impact of the events of August 1969 was more significant than in the country areas or in Derry/ Londonderry. The emergence of the PIRA indicates the PESTELO variables are not constant across the geography of the conflict space. Furthermore, there has to be sufficient homophily between the group and the local population for the group to grow. There needs to be a shared value homophily of belief or aspiration between the two entities, the group, and the potential recruits. Furthermore, there has to be a belief by the potential recruits the group can achieve its goal. The IRA had always portrayed itself as the defenders of the minority Catholics. The events of August 1969 demonstrated to the founding members of the PIRA in Belfast, that the leadership of the IRA had failed to keep this covenant. These failures re-affirmed their belief the political approach of the leadership of the IRA was flawed. It also

[606] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2556-61.

[607] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2557-61.

[608] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2375-78.

confirmed the belief military action was the only viable option to achieve their goals. Thus, the founders of the PIRA split from the IRA based on differences in the value homophyllic variable of belief. The two groups shared the same Republican aspirations. The membership of the PIRA grew because there was sufficient similarity in the aspirations of the PIRA and its new volunteers. Not all the volunteers shared the PIRA's aspiration of a unified Ireland, but they shared the belief one of the roles of the PIRA was to defend the Catholic community and many of the recruits in the early days of the PIRA aspired to do so.

H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time

The PIRA inherited the organisational structure, which had been the mainstay of the IRA since the 1919-1921 War of Independence. PIRA inherited a traditional military structure, consisting of brigades, battalions, and companies. It was a vestige of the times of British rule.[609] In many respects, these formations were not the equivalent of those in the British Army. A British Army brigade would have an order of battle of 3-4 battalions, each battalion would consist of 3-4 companies, and a company would consist of 3-4 platoons. Each platoon would consist of 30-50 men, a company would have an establishment of around 200 men, a battalion comprised 800-1000 men, and finally a brigade consisted of 3000-4000 men. The PIRA never achieved this level of establishment. Thus, the unit naming convention should be considered as an indicator of where the unit existed within the command and control structure, and not a reflection of the unit's military or operational capacity.

At the time of the split, the PIRA consisted of the Belfast Brigade, which comprised a single battalion with 16 companies and an estimated establishment for the whole brigade at 50-60 men.[610] Of the 16 companies, 15 had defected to the PIRA by April 1970; the other company remained with the OIRA.[611]

[609] Ibid., Kindle Locations 3441-42.

[610] Ibid., Kindle Location 2089.

[611] Ibid., Kindle Locations 1815-17.

The volatile PESTELO environment in Belfast and the isolation of the Catholic communities within "no go" areas, between 1970 and 1972, led to an explosion in the membership of the PIRA in Belfast. At its peak, the Belfast Brigade had in excess of 1000 members.

> *"With their ranks swollen by new recruits, the IRA expanded from one Belfast battalion to three, each with its own complement of companies. The First Battalion was based in Andersonstown and the Upper Falls Road area. The Second Battalion encompassed Ballymurphy and the Lower Falls Road area. The Third Battalion took in the rest of Catholic Belfast, principally the isolated and often besieged ghettos of Ardoyne in North Belfast, the Short Strand in East."*[612]

Beyond these standard units, the Belfast Brigade, under the command of Gerry Adams, created two Special Operations Cells referred to as "the Unknowns".[613] The cells were formed some time in 1972.[614] The cells initially consisted of three members, later expanded to four.[615] They were independent to the rest of the Belfast Brigade*, "they carried out their own intelligence work and acted on it themselves…"*[616]

The Derry/Londonderry PIRA was small; at best, it had a dozen individuals. The unit possessed a limited number of weapons and it was a new unknown organisation with no history. The OIRA was larger and better established and as such, attracted the bulk of the recruits. The PIRA maintained little strength in the rural areas of Northern Ireland, which remained aligned to the OIRA up until 1972.

[612] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2083-86.

[613] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2788-91.

[614] Ibid., Kindle Locations 3438-39.

[615] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2788-91.

[616] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2788-90.

Operation Motorman and the OIRA ceasefire in 1972 changed the operational environment. Within this environment, the organisational structure of the PIRA evolved. The organisation was able to expand in Derry/Londonderry, where it had been very small and under the shadow of the OIRA. It was also able to expand in the rural areas, where its presence had been small. The PIRA expanded by absorbing disaffected OIRA units or by the creation of new units.

The OIRA ceasefire also led to divisions within the OIRA. In December 1974, these divisions created a split in the OIRA, with the dissenting members creating the Irish Republican Socialist Party and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).[617] These organisations emerged from the OIRA with the assistance of other activists in the socialist community in Northern Ireland.[618] Thus, the changing PESTELO environment can lead to the emergence of new organisations from existing ones. The organisation emerged due to differences in the value homophyllic variable of belief. The senior members of the OIRA believed a political approach would better achieve their goals, whereas those who split felt the only way to achieve their goal, was through violence. There was insufficient homophily between them and the PIRA, to merge with the PIRA. As such, they formed their own group as it best suited their needs.

The changing operational environment after Motorman onwards, led to the devolution of the structure of the PIRA, the harsher security environment imposed on the PIRA led to units becoming isolated.[619] According to Moloney, Adams drafted a new organisational structure for the PIRA at the request of the Army Council.[620] The structure proposed by Adams was based on a cellular model. The smallest unit was a cell known as an Active Service Unit (ASU), consisting of four members. Each ASU would specialise in specific tasks such as snipping, bombing, and intelligence

[617] "Irish Republican Socialist Movement Twenty Years of Struggle," Irish Socialist Republican Movement (IRSM).

[618] Ibid.

[619] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: p. 132.

[620] Ibid., Kindle Locations 3445-47.

work. According to Moloney, the ASU were given a *"…roving commission and could operate anywhere in the IRA's war zone so that the British would find it more difficult to identify which ASU had been active where."*[621] The cellular structure ensured the security of the PIRA as an organisation. With the intention to hinder the efforts of the security forces to infiltrate the group, it allowed the PIRA to purge those members who were not considered fully committed to the Republican cause.

The ASU were the operational component of the PIRA. The ASU was a component of a large non-operational component. The supreme governing authority of the PIRA was the General Army Convention (GAC), which was a body of 100-200 delegates. Delegates came from the:

> *"…currently active Volunteers, prisoner 'representatives' (i.e. those representing the views of imprisoned PIRA members), Brigade staffs (i.e. regional 'commanders' such as the O/C (Officer Commanding or Officer Commandeering)), General Headquarters members and usually all members of the Army Council (this includes the Chief of Staff, Adjutant General and Quartermaster General…)."*[622]

The GAC was supposed to meet every two years, but throughout the course of The Troubles, it only met three times in 1969, 1986 and 1996.[623] It is of note, at each of these meetings, the IRA and its progenitors split. In 1969 the PIRA emerged, in 1986 the CIRA emerged and in 1996 the RIRA emerged.

Below the GAC, the next level of the organisation was the Army Executive, consisting of 12 members, selected by the GAC and was supposed to meet every 6 months, but the frequency of these meetings depended on the security situation at

[621] Ibid., Kindle Locations 3448-49.

[622] John Horgan and Max Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (1997): p 4.

[623] Ibid., p 5.

the time.[624] It consisted of senior and experienced members of the PIRA, who elected the seven member Army Council.

The Army Council was the operational command of the PIRA. The Army Council allegedly met about once a month and it had the authority to make peace or war, but these decisions required ratification from the GAC.[625] Many members of the senior level of the organisation and non-combatant arms of the PIRA were part-time.[626] The Army Council elected a Chief of Staff, who then appoints the members of the GHQ.

- IRA Quartermaster General
- IRA Director of Finance
- IRA Director of Engineering
- IRA Director of Training
- IRA Director of Intelligence
- IRA Director of Publicity
- IRA Director of Operations
- IRA Director of Security

The PIRA inherited this structure from the OIRA at the time of the split in 1969. In the late 1970s, the structure was refined to reflect the increasingly hostile operational environment. The PIRA created two commands. This was a departure from the traditional operational structure of the IRA. The PIRA divided into Northern and Southern Commands. Northern command consisted of the six counties of Northern Ireland and the five bordering counties, which was effectively the war zone. The Southern Command consisted of the remaining counties in the Irish Republic, which were outside the war zone.

[624] Ibid.

[625] Ibid.

[626] James Dingley, *The IRA: The Irish Republican Army* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), p 160.

Northern Command was divided into brigades, each brigade consisted of 3-4 ASUs, and each ASU had about four members.[627] It was estimated that a third of the strength of the PIRA came under the command of the Belfast brigade. By the mid to late 1970s, the organisation of the PIRA had grown from a single brigade in Belfast to five brigades throughout Northern Ireland. The new membership led to an expansion of the number of battalions in Belfast to three. Similarly, the events, such as Bloody Sunday, had led to an enlargement, by an influx of new members of the PIRA units in Derry/Londonderry. Originally, the PIRA units in Derry/Londonderry were organised as the Derry Battalion under the command of the South Derry Brigade. The South Derry Brigade originally consisted of two battalions, the Derry Battalion, and another in Donegal. The increasing size of the membership of Derry based PIRA units, led to the Derry Battalion becoming detached from the South Derry Brigade and being redesignated the Derry Brigade, consisting of two battalions. Other brigades existed in Donegal, Armagh, that consisted of three battalions and one in Northern Armagh and two in South Armagh and a further brigade in Tyrone/Monaghan, which was also known as the East Tyrone Brigade. Smaller unassigned units existed in Fermanagh, South Down, and North Antrim.

In 1978, the PIRA adjusted their organisational structure further by adding an internal security unit to investigate, interrogate, and punish suspected informers within the PIRA.[628] The creation of this unit was a result of the changing environment in which the PIRA was operating and a fear of infiltrators working for the security forces.

The traditional structure of battalions and companies existed in parallel with the new structure. These structures acted in a support role and were responsible for policing in Nationalist areas, safe houses, gathering of intelligence, and hiding of weapons.[629]

[627] Horgan and Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," p 5.

[628] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Location 14879.

[629] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: p 131.

Southern Command's structure shared similarities with its Northern counterpart. It consisted of brigades and ASUs. Horgan estimated there was about 70-85 members of the command in ASUs.[630] Southern Command's role differed to the Northern Command. Southern Command was responsible for logistics, provision of weapons dumps and safe houses.[631] The Janes Intelligence Review[632] reported there were a number of ASUs spread throughout the Southern Command, with a small number of members throughout the countryside. The Janes Review highlighted the lack of information, which made it difficult to predict the number of members within Southern Command.

The hunger strikes between 1980 and 1981 politicised the Republican struggle, which created a further shift in PIRA tactics. The leader of the PIRA hunger strikers, Bobby Sands, was elected as the MP for Fermanagh in South Tyrone. The hunger strikes demonstrated that in the right environment, the political approach could reap benefits. When the hunger strikes ended with the deaths of ten PIRA hunger strikers, the Republican movement, as embodied by the PIRA and Sinn Fein, saw the benefits of a dual strategy of the "Armalite and the Ballot box".[633] This strategy was adopted and endorsed by the Army Council. From this point on, the PIRA was both a paramilitary and political organisation, which had the capacity to exploit the environmental conditions using a combination of approaches. This approach created conflicting priorities within the organisation. Before the adoption of this new strategy, the PIRA was a loosely controlled entity. Many of the units operated independently of central control, with upper echelons of the organisation approving or endorsing their actions after the event.[634] This type of command and control structure was not well suited to the now dual strategy. As such, through the 1980s

[630] Horgan and Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," p 9.

[631] Ibid., p 8.

[632] Sean Boyne, "Uncovering the IRA," http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/org.html

[633] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 14918-20.

[634] Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*: p 141-42.

the Northern Command, under the leadership of Martin McGuinness, started to assert greater control over the paramilitary organisation. Northern Command took responsibility for the appointment of brigade and ASU commanders and the approval of operations.[635] Under this command and control structure, the PIRA adopted a policy of only attacking British military personnel and it laid down strict policies, in regards to the attacks on Loyalists.[636] Later, this would lead to bans on the bombing of commercial targets. Although not always effective, the command and control structure did permit those involved in the peace process (from 1994 onwards) to negotiate with a certain level of confidence, that independent actions by the PIRA would not undermine their position at the negotiating table.

Thus, the structure of the PIRA emerged over time, initially adopting the structure, which it traditionally knew and understood. At first, the PIRA was a small organisation mostly concentrated in Belfast, with its command and control structures safely housed in the Irish Republic. As the environmental conditions within Northern Ireland deteriorated, growing numbers of disaffected Catholics flocked to join the PIRA. The organisation expanded its traditional structures adding more battalions and companies. In areas, such as Derry/Londonderry where the OIRA's reputation was untarnished by the events of 1969, it remained the dominant organisation. It was not until the OIRA's ceasefire in the mid-1970s, which saw a significant expansion of the PIRA in these areas. Again, the expansion of the organisation used the traditional structures of brigades, battalions, and companies. Prior to 1972, the PIRA, along with other paramilitary groups, were able to operate unencumbered by the security forces, in the "no go" areas in locations such as the Catholic and Protestant dominated enclaves in Belfast. This situational and environmental advantage significantly changed in mid-1972 with Operation Motorman, which removed the paramilitaries 'safe havens. Operation Motorman was a turning point in the security forces intelligence war against the PIRA. The new

[635] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Location 679.

[636] Ibid., Kindle Locations 15040-48.

intelligence environment hindered the PIRA's ability to operate unconstrained. This hostile environment led to the PIRA adopting a cellular structure based on the ASU in the latter part of the 1970s. Bell indicates the reorganisation was just an official acknowledgement of the structure, which had evolved out of the hostile security environment after Motorman. Furthermore, the size of the organisation shrunk, due to the hostile operational environment, which limited the operational opportunities of the PIRA and as such, reduced the need for a larger organisation. The reduction of the size of the PIRA and adoption of the cellular structure, improved the security of the organisation in an environment where the intelligence services of the security forces were taking a more prominent role.

The command and control structure, up until the mid-1980s was loose, with Northern Command and the Army Council setting the strategic goals of the organisation and the brigades, companies, and later the ASUs, planning, and implementing their own operations. The commanders were appointed at a local level, with the core leadership group certifying operations once they had been completed. The command structure became more centralised in the mid-1980s onward and the PIRA adopted a dual strategy involving armed forces and political engagement. Both had to complement each other. A formal command and controlled structure was required to ensure the armed wing of the movement did not undermine the political process. The political process relied heavily on the support of the broader community, which was significantly influenced by the events in the countryside and the streets of Belfast and Derry/Londonderry.

The structure of the PIRA was influenced by the environmental conditions in which it operated. Changes in the environmental conditions brought about changes in the size and structure of the organisation. The departure from a purely military approach to a combined political and military strategy influenced the structure. It also influenced the command and control mechanisms. The PIRA evolved from a loosely controlled organisation, to a group where control was exercised over the

organisation by the leadership, so the military wing did not hamper the political efforts of the organisation.

H3b: Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the group.

As previously indicated in hypothesis H2a, the environment in which the PIRA operated, influenced the group's size. The geography in which the group operated also influenced the group structure. The PIRA was a group, which was throughout Northern Ireland. The group maintained an extensive network of brigades, companies, and ASU in locations from which the group drew its support.

Initially, the PIRA operated on a traditional military structure of brigades, battalions, and companies, which it had inherited from the OIRA, from which it split. At the time of emergence, the membership of the PIRA was small, about 50 members, primarily concentrated in Belfast. Thus, the inherited structure was sufficient. As the environmental conditions within Belfast deteriorated and the number of members of the PIRA grew, the existing structure was sufficiently flexible to absorb the increasing membership. The structure allowed the creation of new units to absorb the growing members.

The Belfast Brigade of the PIRA was dispersed geographically throughout the Catholic enclaves. At its peak, the 1000 members of the brigade were dispersed into three battalions. As previously indicated, the First Battalion held responsibility for the areas of Andersonstown and the Upper Falls Road. The Second Battalion took responsibility for the areas of Ballymurphy and the Lower Falls Road. The third took responsibility for *"…the rest of Catholic Belfast, principally the isolated and often besieged ghettos of Ardoyne in North Belfast, the Short Strand in East Belfast, and the Markets district in South-central Belfast."*[637] Thus, geography influenced the

[637] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2085-86.

structure of the PIRA with various units taking responsibility for specific geographic locations; also, these units were located in environmentally friendly locations.

Each battalion within Belfast had around 200 - 300 members.[638] Each company had between 20 - 60 members.[639] Each unit operated in its own area and the membership was predominantly male, from a working class background.[640] In reality, the battalion of the PIRA equated to the size of a company within the traditional military organisation and the company was equivalent to that of a platoon or oversized platoon at best. Thus, the brigade was only equivalent to an undersized battalion within the British Army. The companies operated independently of each other, identifying their own operations and only operated within their battalion's zone of responsibility.

From 1972 onwards with the harshening environmental conditions within Northern Ireland and the OIRA ceasefire, the PIRA attracted many disaffected OIRA units and members. In addition, the PIRA also received new members due to incidents such as Bloody Sunday. By the mid-1970s, the structure of the PIRA significantly expanded, with the inclusion of units from Derry/Londonderry and the rural areas of Northern Ireland. Thus, the PIRA created regional brigades to administer the units. The use of regional structures was an acknowledgement, as an organisation, the PIRA could not be administered from a centralised location, due to the unique environmental conditions, which existed in each location. The establishment, in 1976, of Southern and Northern Commands, acknowledged the different environmental conditions in each region. Northern Command oversaw the war zone and Southern Command was a peaceful safe haven well suited for training and logistics. Northern Command consisted of the six counties of Northern Ireland and the five border counties of the republic. These counties were considered the war zone. The role of the units based under Northern Command was to fight the British Army and the Northern Ireland

[638] Dingley, *The IRA: The Irish Republican Army*: p 155.

[639] Ibid., p 155-56.

[640] Ibid.

security forces. The Southern Command consisted of the remaining twenty-one counties of the republic and it was to act as the logistical arm of the PIRA. It was a safe haven for training, manufacturing explosives and storing the PIRA arsenal.

Northern Command heralded *"…a significant switch in the internal balance of power. The IRA's principal business was to fight a war against British forces in Northern Ireland, and those who controlled how that war was conducted—and those who appointed them—would inevitably wield the greatest influence in the organization. The Northern Command would have its own staff, which would shadow that in GHQ, which promptly lost its responsibility for conducting operations in the North and was thus weakened. Thereafter GHQ's direct military role was confined to the IRA's international activities, principally in Britain and Europe. The construction of a Northern Command would make the position of Northern commander one of the most important positions in the organization."*[641] This structure acknowledged the differing environmental factors over the geographic space, in which the group operated.

The changes in the environment in which the PIRA operated, also led to a contraction of the organisational structure and the adoption of the cell as the basic building block of the organisation. This reorganisation was intended to increase the organisational security. A cell, referred to by the PIRA, as an ASU consisted of 5-8 individuals.[642] Active Service Units (ASU) also ranged in size from 4-6 members and in the country areas, the ASU could reach sizes of 12-14 members.[643] Within areas where the PIRA was strongly supported by the community, the traditional brigade, battalion and company structure remained unchanged. By the 1990s, the ASU of the PIRA had become specialised, focusing on specific tasks, such as robberies, training, bombings, intelligence etc.[644]

[641] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*: Kindle Locations 3484-89.

[642] Sean Boyse, 1996, Uncovering the Irish Republican Army, Jane's Intelligence Review

[643] Dingley, *The IRA: The Irish Republican Army*: p 158.

[644] Shapiro, "Organizing Terror: Hierarchy and Networks in Covert Organizations," p 14.

The command and control structure of the ASU organisation involved each cell being independent of the other with no interconnection. The leader of the cell, who was the only member having any contact with any other part of the organisation, reported to the brigade commander within their regional area.[645] Each of the battalion commanders was in charge of 3-4 ASUs.

According to Boyne[646] in the early to mid-1990s, there were around 100 members in Belfast; 70-80 members in Derry and North Donegal, South Armagh, and North Loth operated two large ASUs, with up to 20 members. South Armagh/North Louth, West Fermanagh/Donegal, South Fermanagh, Coslisland area South Derry, North Armagh, Down and Castlewellan, are believed to have had a single ASU in their areas of operation. In Southern Command, it was suspected there was a single ASU in Dublin, with other cells spread across the Irish Republic.[647]

Thus, the structure of the PIRA was dependent on the geographic distribution of its units across the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland, with brigades and battalions having specific geographic responsibilities and based in areas where there was significant support for the PIRA. Likewise, the old companies and later the ASUs also recruited and were based in areas friendly to the PIRA. In areas such as Belfast, Derry/Londonderry, and South Armagh, the local environmental factors permitted the PIRA to grow to a significant size, which required a more complex structure to administer its members. Environmentally, these were socio-cultural friendly areas. As such, the risk of a large organisational structure was reduced. Belfast and Derry/Londonderry were also areas where the security forces had a substantial presence, thus at the tactical level of the organisation, the cell or ASU provided the PIRA with the greatest level of operational security. South Armagh was, for the security forces, a hostile environment, which was commonly referred to by the

[645] Dingley, *The IRA: The Irish Republican Army*: p 158.

[646] Boyne, "Uncovering the IRA".

[647] Ibid.

media, as Bandit Country. South Armagh was strongly Republican[648], which made it difficult for the security forces to operate. Due to the support within the local community, South Armagh did not adopt the ASU structure, but continued to maintain the traditional battalion structure. Within South Armagh, there were two battalions with 40 members.[649] Throughout the rest of Northern Command, the ASU structure was dominant. Southern Command took on the role of maintaining weapons dumps and stores. This was the logical location, as this placed the weapons out of reach of the well-equipped British Army and the Northern Ireland security forces.

There is insufficient information to assess whether the structure of the PIRA was consistent with the cognitive limits as proposed by Dunbar. The size of the ASU whether it is 3-5 or 5-8 members, is consistent with these limits. Likewise, if Dingley's assessment that 3-4 ASUs reported to a battalion commander is correct, it is consistent with Dunbar. The number of battalions reporting to each brigade was between one and three; again, this is consistent with the cognitive limits. Various sources report the PIRA operated five brigades (Armagh, Belfast, Derry, Donegal, and Tyrone/Monaghan).[650] If this is also correct, the number of brigades reporting to Northern Command is also consistent and within the cognitive limits defined by Dunbar, although there are other possible anthropological explanations for this structure.

The senior levels of the organisation are also consistent with Dunbar's limits. The Army Council consisted of seven members and GHQ consisted of 6-7 members. All these figures are consistent with Dunbar and other anthropological models. Thus, it is not possible to clearly state Dunbar's limits were significant in determining this structure as there are other possible anthropological explanations.

[648] O'Brien, *The Long War: The IRA & Sinn Féin from Armed Struggle to Peace Talks* (Dublin: Press Ltd, 1993), p 161.

[649] Ibid., p 206.

[650] ibid., p 158.

Therefore, the structure of the PIRA was dependent on the geographic dispersion of the group. The size and structure of the group was also dependent on the local environmental factors, which varied across the geographic space of Northern Ireland. Both the geographic and environmental factors influenced the size (bandwidth) of the communications channels. As such, the structure of the organisation was determined by the length and risk to these channels. The available information suggests the group's structure is consistent with Dunbar's limits, although these structural connections are also consistent with other anthropological models.

Chapter 13 - Conclusion

H1a: When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups.

The PIRA emerged as a direct result of the worsening PESTELO environmental conditions in Northern Ireland, in the late 1960s. The PIRA was a Belfast phenomenon, where the Catholic community was in the minority, and by 1969, was subject to increasing levels of sectarian violence from the Protestant community. It was also an environment where this minority community was unable to receive protection from the Northern Irish or British governments. Further, it was an environment where the IRA, the perceived traditional defenders of the Catholic community, was unwilling or incapable of taking on this role.

From an organisational perspective, these environmental factors created divisions within the IRA as an organisation. Current and prior members of the IRA from Belfast interpreted the escalating violence as an indictment of the current IRA leadership's policies for a non-violent political approach to achieve the organisational goals. Thus, though the two factions shared the same goals or aspirations, they differed on methodology. The local environmental conditions had led one faction to view violence as the only legitimate approach to counter the sectarian conflict unfolding on the streets of Belfast. The two factions also differed in the belief in whether the non-violent or violent approach had the greatest merit. Therefore, they diverged in homophyllic terms.

The PIRA formed due to specific local perturbations in the PESTELO environmental factors within Belfast. Another factor was the IRA's organisational environment, whose leadership wished to persist with the non-violent approach. The IRA leadership was unwilling to accommodate any differing views and the leadership would expel any dissenters. When these factors combined, they resulted in a split in the organisation and the emergence of the PIRA. As such, the PIRA, like the WUO,

emerged from a pre-existing organisation where factions had arisen based on disagreements on organisational strategy.

H1b: Homophyllic and geographic proximity, influences the ability of individuals to communicate and this influence is central to group formation.

Those who formed the PIRA were responding to local conditions, which were not necessarily the same across the whole of Northern Ireland. The majority of the founding members of the PIRA came from Belfast and were known to each other. The first units of the IRA to come across to the PIRA were also from Belfast. The influx of new members into the PIRA came from this city. The environmental factors in isolation were not sufficient to create the PIRA. It was this environment and the perturbations created by the escalating sectarian violence, which triggered the group's formation.

The history of the creation of the PIRA highlights the meetings and communications between the dissenting members and former members of the Belfast Brigade. It highlights their concerns about what was happening in Belfast and their shared belief that the current direction of the IRA had failed the Catholics in that city. Thus, the ability of these individuals to communicate and their beliefs, were central to the creation of the PIRA. Likewise, the Belfast units who defected to the PIRA also shared the common experiences of the events of 1969 with those who formed the PIRA. Although not documented in the histories used within this thesis, it is probable they also shared the belief the old IRA had failed the Catholics of Belfast.

The environment, combined with homophily and geographic proximity, played a significant role in the creation of the PIRA. Geographic proximity facilitated their ability to communicate. The violence gave cause for those who opposed Goulding's political strategy for the organisation to argue the approach was flawed. This argument found support in Belfast because those in Belfast shared the same experience and based on this experience drew the same conclusions. They had come to the belief, the only effective strategy to defend the Catholics of their

community, was to counter violence with violence. Those who formed the PIRA in Belfast, as previously stated, were known to each other, and had a long history with the IRA. In the current environment of increasing violence, this group defined themselves not initially as Republicans but as the defenders of their community. This simple definition created greater social affinity or homophily with those in the Catholic enclaves in Belfast, who also wished to defend and protect their families. As Wilhelmsen has argued, war or crisis has the capacity to radicalise a community and draw it together.[651] The failure of the Northern Irish and British governments to protect this community left a vacuum, which the PIRA, in the absence of any other viable group, was able to fill.

H2a: The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, economic, and social environment in which the group operates.

Membership of the PIRA, at the time of the split with the IRA, was only small with around 50 members. The membership of the group grew, especially in Belfast, behind the barriers of the "no go" areas, which had created safe havens for the OIRA and PIRA. The membership of the organisation peaked around 1500, by 1972. The increasing levels of violence in Northern Ireland also saw an increase in the membership of the PIRA. The PIRA membership did not increase as rapidly in Derry/Londonderry or in the conservative rural areas. Due to the perception among Catholics, that the IRA had failed them in August 1969 there was greater affinity or homophily towards the PIRA in Belfast. The IRA's support of the protestors during the Battle of the Bogside, had created greater affinity or homophily with the organisation than existed in Belfast. The two cities had differing perceptions of the IRA. As such, the OIRA attracted the greater number of recruits in that city, than the PIRA. In Derry/Londonderry, the OIRA was the dominant Republican organisation. The conservatism of the rural areas of Northern Ireland resulted in most of the old IRA aligning with the OIRA in this period. Thus, the environmental conditions had created greater affinity or homophily between the Catholic community with the Republican movement. This affinity had led to an increase in membership. The

[651] Wilhelmsen, "When Separatists become Islamists: The Case of Chechnya," p 10.

affinity or homophily with the two Republican organisations, the PIRA or OIRA, was dependent on the environmental conditions at the specific geographic location. It was determined there was a direct relationship between environment and homophily, the greater the homophily, the greater the number of recruits.
The environmental conditions changed within Northern Ireland in mid-1972. Operation Motorman denied the Northern Irish paramilitaries of their safe havens, internment ended, and the OIRA declared a ceasefire, which it effectively maintained until the end of The Troubles. This resulted in the PIRA expanding into areas previously loyal to the OIRA. The PIRA were able to establish substantial units in areas previously dominated by the OIRA. This occurred because those who wished to continue the Republican struggle had few options left. The PIRA was the larger and the more successful of the remaining Republican groups.

After 1972, the British changed tactics, defining the counter terrorism effort in law enforcement terms and successfully increased their intelligence collection efforts. The British had also been able to infiltrate the PIRA because the vetting of the new members, prior to 1972, had been poor. In this environment, it became hazardous for the PIRA to maintain a large number of members. Furthermore, in the 1980s they also adopted a dual strategy of an armed struggle combined with a political approach. In response to the changes in their operational environment, the PIRA reduced its membership to around 700 members. This membership level remained constant until the end of The Troubles in the late 1990s. Therefore, adverse changes in the environment in which the PIRA operated restricted the size of the organisation, not due to a lack of homophily with the Catholic community, but due to the hazards of maintaining a large organisation. This again reinforces the relationship between the size of the organisational structure and the environment in which it operates.

To conclude, in this case, there was a relationship between homophily, the PESTELO environment and the size of the group. Furthermore, in this case the PESTELO environment was a limiting factor on group size.

H3a The structure of any group emerges over time.

When the PIRA first emerged, in late 1969, it utilised the structure it had inherited from the IRA. The structure evolved to accommodate the increasing membership. This evolution involved creating new units to accommodate the increasing membership. These units were added to the existing organisational structure. This structure was based on areas of regional control, with the brigades and battalions being given areas of regional responsibility. When elements of the OIRA defected to the PIRA, they were absorbed into the existing structure. When new areas aligned with the PIRA, which had no pre-existing presence, the PIRA created new units and defined their area of responsibility.

The structure of the PIRA also evolved to accommodate the changing environmental conditions, but this evolution was within the existing structure. This evolution occurred at the tactical level of the organisation, with the tactical elements adopting a cellular structure, abandoning the traditional military unit organisation it started with. These cells or ASUs were assigned to the various brigades or battalions.

When the PIRA split from the IRA, it maintained the existing organisational structure of the Belfast Brigade. As the size of the organisation grew, new units were added to the existing structure. In response to changes in the PESTELO environment, the structure of the group adapted, by adopting a cellular organisation at the tactical level of the group, but continued to maintain the brigades and battalions, which oversaw the activities of the lower levels of the organisation.

H3b: Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the group.

The PIRA maintained a traditional military organisational structure throughout The Troubles. The organisation was overseen by the General Army Council, which met infrequently, but set the strategic direction of the organisation. It had a General Headquarters, which was responsible for the operational aspects of the group, such as financing, engineering, logistics, training, security etc. The PIRA also divided Ireland into two commands Northern and Southern. Northern Command was responsible for the management of the conflict zone defined by the six counties of Northern Ireland and the adjoining counties in the Irish Republic. The Southern Command was responsible for the remainder of the Irish Republic. Southern Command acted in a support role for Northern Command, housing weapons dumps and being a safe area for training. The division of the PIRA into commands was an acknowledgement of the differing environmental conditions in each location. This structure permitted the PIRA to exploit these conditions to its advantage.

The PIRA used a regional based structure in which it defined the areas of responsibility of the brigades and battalions. This structure provided two advantages. Firstly, the brigades were responsible for a city or county and a level of operational independence. This meant the brigades could exploit the unique PESTELO environmental conditions to their advantage. The only constraint was that they operated within the strategic framework of the group. Secondly, the PIRA avoided using technologies like the telephone system for communications and relied heavily on one on one communications. This was out of fear of these channels being unsecure and thus compromised. The regional structure shortened its lines of communications, allowing information to flow quickly and securely in person.

The brigades were the regional administrative unit. Each brigade had between 1-3 battalions under it. Each battalion managed a number of companies and later ASUs. Each battalion was allocated and operated in a part of the brigade's area of responsibility. The units, which formed part of the battalion, planned and conducted their own operations. These types of activities required a significant level of communications between the elements involved in the operation, to plan and undertake. Thus, at the lower levels of the organisation, the structure considerably reduced the length of the lines of communications. These shorter lines of communications were more secure and permitted the exchange of larger amounts of information.

At this time, the "no go" areas provided the PIRA with safe havens. These safe havens provided members of the PIRA the freedom to move unhindered, which ensured the security of the communications channels. Once these "no go" areas were removed by the British in 1972, the environment in which communications took place, had changed. Communications between the various low level elements of the group became more difficult. It was in this time the PIRA, at the tactical level, devolved into a cellular organisation, based on the ASU. Some have suggested this was a planned reorganisation. Others have suggested this change was a result of the changes in the PESTELO environment, which had reduced the security and bandwidth of these channels. The reduction of the bandwidth had isolated the lower levels of the organisation from the core of the group, the brigades, and battalions, effectively turning them into cells. South Armagh Brigade was the exception, as it was the only group to maintain the previous organisational structure. This argument has some credence as the South Armagh Brigade maintained its battalions and companies; it did not adopt the ASU. The South Armagh Brigade was unaffected by Operation Motorman. It operated in an area, which had strong Republican sympathies, and the security forces were hesitant to enter or operate. Thus, the South Armagh Brigade operated in a safe haven. Its communications channels were not threatened in the same manner as those

operating in Belfast or Derry/Londonderry. Therefore, it was able to maintain its centralised command and control structure.

The prior discussions highlighted, in the case of the PIRA, there was a relationship between the PESTELO environment and homophily. Likewise, the high levels of homophily increased the PIRA's pool of recruits. As the size of the PIRA increased, the increase was accommodated within the existing structure through either absorbing the new members into existing units or creating new ones. The loss of the PIRA's safe havens in 1972 resulted in a decline in the membership of the PIRA. The loss of the safe havens created a harsher environment in which the PIRA had to operate. In this environment, it was more difficult to sustain secure lines of communications. This change in the environment made it more hazardous to maintain a complex organisational structure with a large number of members. It adapted by decentralising the tactical elements of the group. The organisational environment also changed when the PIRA abandoned a purely military approach for a dual political and military strategy. Thus, the size and structure of the PIRA adapted to the changing PESTELO environment.

There is insufficient data to permit an analysis to determine whether the cognitive limits of the human brain, as proposed by Dunbar, was a factor, which influenced the structure of the group. In addition, one case study would not provide definitive findings for a generalisation.

At the time of emergence, the PIRA utilised the pre-existing structure within the IRA. The structure of the PIRA evolved to meet the challenges of the PESTELO environment over its life. This structure reflected the geographic dispersion of the group to manage the information exchange over extended lines of communications. In the initial environmental conditions, the safe havens created by the "no go" areas, protected the operational and tactical lines of communications, permitting the PIRA to maintain a hierarchical structure. The harshening of the PESTELO

environment, in 1972 after Operation Motorman, reduced the capacity of the tactical elements of the PIRA to communicate, devolving the tactical elements of the group into a cellular organisation. The environmental conditions varied across Northern Ireland, and the PIRA structure varied with the PESTELO environment. The environment had a significant influence on group structure. The environment also created a pool of recruits and limited the group's capacity to absorb these potential members safely. As such, not all those who wanted to join, could.

Case Study 3 – The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

Chapter 14 - Historical Background

The area of the Balkans known today as Kosovo has a long history. It dates from classical antiquity, as a province within the Roman Empire. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the Kosovo region was absorbed into the remaining Eastern Roman Empire, Byzantium.[652] As the power of the Byzantine Empire declined, the Kosovo region was incorporated into the Medieval Serbian Empire, where it became a central part of Serbian social identity and religious culture.[653] Kosovo was seen by Serbs as the *"…cradle of the Serb nation".*[654] It was the home of the Medieval Serbian Orthodox Church with the "See" established at Pec in 1297.[655] In 1389, the expanding Ottoman Empire defeated the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo and took control of the area. By 1455, the Ottomans had completed their conquest of Serbia and Kosovo, laying the foundation for the events in the 1990s.

The ethnic mix of Kosovo, prior to the area coming under Ottoman control, is unknown and open to debate.[656] Under Ottoman rule, Albanian speakers became the dominant ethnic group within Kosovo. The Habsburgs briefly controlled this region between 1686 and 1690. With their withdrawal from the region, many Serbs left the area. Tens of thousands of Serbs departed Kosovo leading to a decline in the Serbian population.[657] The Serbs knew this period as the Great Migration, which obtained mythological importance in the Serbian cultural identity. The Albanians occupied the vacated Serbian lands within Kosovo.[658]

---

[652] Benedict Weiss, *Collapse Theory: Yugoslavia, state according to needs* (Portal Dpmovinski rat, 2011), p 30 - 31.

[653] Ibid.

[654] Robert Bideleux, "History Today: Kosovo Conflict," History Today Ltd, http://www.historytoday.com/robert-bideleux/kosovos-conflict

[655] Ibid.

[656] Paul A Cohen, *History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis* (New York: Columbia Universty Press, 2014), p 8.

[657] Branimir Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p 70.

[658] Cohen, *History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis*: p 8.

Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Serbs rose up in revolt against Ottoman rule, at times supported by the Austrians or the Russians. By 1817, the Serbs had won a degree of autonomy under Ottoman rule.[659] In 1830, the Ottomans granted Serbia full autonomy as a principality.[660] The Napoleonic Wars had changed the political landscape in Europe and in the Balkans. By 1844, there existed a movement to recreate Serbia with its old medieval borders.[661] This new Serbian state would include Kosovo and Bosnia, which remained under Ottoman rule. Serbian independence was recognised in the 1878 treaty of San Stefano, which concluded the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78.[662] The treaty of San Stefano rewrote the borders of the Balkans. Many European powers were dissatisfied by the treaty, which was amended by the treaty of Berlin in mid-1878. Under the treaty, the Ottomans ceded Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Austrians.[663] This treaty also stifled the growth of nationalism within the Balkans, especially Serbian desires to recover territory, which they perceived to be part of a Greater Serbia, which included Kosovo.[664]

In the early part of the 20th Century, relations between Austria and Serbia were in a state of decline. Austria's annexation of Bosnia in 1908, did not improve the relations between the two nations.[665] The recovery of Kosovo, by the Serbs, had become a national mission.[666] In 1912-13, Serbia engaged in the two Balkan wars, which saw the Ottomans driven from Europe. One result of these wars was, Serbia's recovery of Kosovo, but this deepened the rift between Serbia and the Austrians. Austria forced the Serbs to give up its conquest of Albania.[667] The Austrians who were once allies of Serbia were now rivals. The Austrians saw the Serbs as an

[659] "Timeline: Serbia," (2012).

[660] Ferdinand Schevill, *History of the Balkans* (Ozymandias Press, 2016), Kindle Locations 4837 - 38.

[661] Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski, eds., *Understanding the War in Kosovo* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p 16., p 16

[662] Schevill, *History of the Balkans*: Kindle Locations 6036 - 54.

[663] Ibid., Kindle Locations 6915 - 23.

[664] Bieber and Daskalovski, *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, p 14.

[665] Schevill, *History of the Balkans*: Kindle Locations 6936 - 43.

[666] Bieber and Daskalovski, *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, p 17., p 17

[667] Schevill, *History of the Balkans*: Kindle Locations 7140 - 225.

obstacle to their expansion in the east. This rivalry was one of the factors, which caused the First World War, triggered by the assassination of Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand, by the Serbian Black Hand, in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914.
In the First World War, the Serbians achieved some initial successes in the first battles of the war, although the combined forces of Austria, Germany, and Bulgaria overwhelmed Serbia, in late 1915. The remnants of the Serbian Army retreated, on 27 November 1915, to the Adriatic Sea and evacuated to Corfu by the Italian and French Navies.

Serbia lost approximately 627,000 soldiers and civilians in the First World War from a pre-war population of 5 million.[668] As a part of the treaty of Versailles, Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and the Slovenes, which was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. Between 1918 and 1920, the Serbs forced thousands of Kosovars off their land in Kosovo, most of who went to Turkey. The Serbs colonised the vacated land with Serbian colonists, although the Serbs remained in the minority. There were further plans, just prior to the Second World War, to force hundreds of thousands of Kosovars to migrate to Turkey. The Yugoslav government had successfully completed negotiations with Turkey to accept these people, but the war intervened and nothing came of the plan.

In 1939, Italy invaded Albania and in 1941, the Germans invaded Yugoslavia. As part of the administration of the new territory, the Germans ceded the southern two thirds of Kosovo to Italy. Italy administered Kosovo as part of a united Albania. Some Kosovars saw the Axis powers as liberators, not as oppressors.[669] It freed Kosovo from the control and oppression of Belgrade and Belgrade's pre-war plan to colonise Kosovo with Serbs. As such, there was little support within Kosovo for groups with the goal of liberating Kosovo. In addition, the main opposition groups to the Axis occupation were predominately Serb. This was problematic for those

[668] John Ellis and Michael Cox, *The World War I Databook: The Essential Facts and Figures for all Combatants* (London: Aurum Press Ltd, 2001), p 269.

[669] Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (London: University of California Press, 1999), p 287.

Kosovars wishing to oppose the Axis powers. Clark illustrated this point, he stated that the "*…major obstacle to the growth of a resistance movement in Kosovo was the prevalent anti-Serb feeling.*"[670]

The Kosovars exploited this early period of the occupation, by displacing the Serbian colonists of the 1920s and 1930s.[671] The enthusiasm with which the Kosovars engaged in this activity alarmed both the Italians and Germans.[672] From 1941 to the liberation of Yugoslavia, Kosovars periodically engaged in attacks on the Serbian inhabitants of Kosovo driving many Serbs out of the province. Estimates of the number of Serbs driven out of Kosovo in this period are unclear; the figures vary between a few tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands.[673]

Opposition to the occupation of Albania and Kosovo did not catalyse until 1942. The Balli Kombtëtar (BK) or the National Front was an Albanian organisation. An organisation created to resist Axis occupation of the combined state of Albania and Kosovo. Its goal was to drive out the Italians, but maintain the union of the two entities. The second group, also founded in 1942, was Lëvizja Nacional Çlirimtare (LNÇ) or the National Liberation Front. Unlike the BK, which was a Nationalist group with moderately leftist ideology[674], the LNÇ was a group that embraced a communist ideology. The LNÇ did not share the BK's goal of a greater Albania, which included Kosovo. The Yugoslav communists' (who controlled the LNÇ) goal was to reinstate Yugoslavia, within its original boundaries. Although the groups originally maintain a fragile alliance, this was broken in 1943 when the LNÇ, acted on instructions to destroy the BK. The destruction of the BK was justified by suggesting the group possessed fascist leanings.

[670] Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p 29.

[671] Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What everyone needs to know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p 44.

[672] Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*: p 29.

[673] Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*: p 287.

[674] Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A short History* (London: Pan Books, 2002).

With the Italian Collapse in 1943, the Germans quickly moved to occupy the Italian Balkan territories. The German occupation did not differ from that of the Italians. At times, the Germans attempted to raise local forces for territorial protection, releasing their troops for deployment elsewhere, but these efforts met with limited success. Those forces raised by the Germans did not attract large numbers of recruits, and those recruits it did attract, progressively deserted as the war progressed.

The British Special Operations Executive (SOE) also cultivated Kosovars in the struggle against the Germans and they were initially successful. When the British Government decided to support Tito's Communist Partisans[675], the British abandoned the small number of Kosovar recruits, which Tito's Partisans later eliminated. Tito not only fought the Axis powers, but also rival groups who could potentially challenge Tito for power at the war's conclusion. There was also little support for Tito's Partisans in Kosovo, very few Kosovars joined his organisation. Most Kosovars saw Tito's Partisans as being a predominantly Serbian organisation[676] and were reluctant to fight with their perceived historical oppressors.

As the Axis powers retreated from Kosovo, Tito's Yugoslav partisans occupied Kosovo and Kosovars rose up in opposition. Tito's partisans quashed the uprising with military force and Albanian sources claimed they executed 36,000 Kosovars for their involvement.[677] At the end of the Second World War, there was a general mistrust of Kosovars because of the perception, among the victorious communists, of Kosovo's support for the Axis powers. Kosovar communists had argued for Kosovo independence based on self-determination, one of the principles of international communism, these appeals were ignored. Yugoslavia integrated Kosovo into the state, not as an independent republic, but as a province within the Republic of Serbia.

[675] Ibid.

[676] Ibid.

[677] Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*: p 287.

In 1948, Yugoslavia split with the Soviet Union. The split occurred for many reasons; the Soviets' discomfort regarding Yugoslavia's expansionist policies in the Balkans, the proposed placement of Yugoslav troops in Albania to protect against a possible Greek incursion, the support of Greek communists, the perception the Yugoslavs were following a nationalist form of socialism, which aligned with the Soviets' internationalist agenda. The Yugoslav split with the Soviet Union did have benefits; it provided Yugoslavia with access to the Marshall Plan and United States financial support.

The end of the war was not a positive outcome for the Kosovars, due to the mistrust of Kosovars because of their alignment with the Axis powers during the war. This resulted in a period of repression, which was to lay the seeds of events in the 1990s.

The split with Stalin also created a split with Albania, creating a mistrust of Kosovars who were seen as fifth columnists, who could potentially undermine the integrity of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The Interior Minister of Yugoslavia, Aleksandar Ranković of Serbian birth, engaged in a policy of repression in Kosovo. During this time, the local communist party was dominated by Serbs. Various aspects of the Muslim faith were suppressed, these included Mosque Schools, Sharia Law and the wearing of the veil. There was no significant federal investment in Kosovo until 1957. The worst period of oppression in Kosovo occurred in the period 1953-1956, in which Ranković[678] encouraged 200,000 Kosovars to immigrate to Turkey. As part of the planned repatriation, Serbian and Montenegrin colonists replaced the departing Kosovars.[679] During Ranković's time in Kosovo, Kosovars were systematically persecuted, many being *"...arrested and tried for political offences and other alleged crimes*".[680]

[678] Ranković was a senior member of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Serbian by birth, and was First Minister of the Interior.

[679] Klejda Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31, no. 12 (2008): p 1105.

[680] Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*: p 289.

Ranković was removed from office in 1966. With his removal, there were calls for a Kosovar Republic, which was supported by student protests in 1968 (Mulaj 2008).[681] Tito visited Kosovo in 1967 and admitted that mistakes had been made, acknowledging the Serbs had received preferential treatment in employment. The Kosovo provincial government was given more autonomy. Secondary schools were set up and Albanian, which had been banned as a teaching language, was given equality with Serbian, which had been the only language used in schools up to this time. By 1968, Kosovars also became the majority ethnic group within the provincial communist party. These changes were positive for the Kosovar community, but were not universally embraced by the Serbian community within Kosovo.

In 1969 and 1971, constitutional reforms recognised Kosovo as a territorial entity.[682] In 1974, further constitutional reform created Kosovo as an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia. Part of these reforms was that, the presidency of Yugoslavia rotated between the various republics and autonomous provinces. This was a significant change. Though Kosovo was not recognised as a republic, it had all the rights of a republic, excluding the right to secede. Like previous reforms, these changes undermined the Kosovo's Serbian population's sense of confidence and security in Kosovo or Serbia.

Yugoslavia, throughout the cold war era, received financial support from the Western allies and the Soviets. Yugoslavia, unlike other communist countries, permitted its citizens to travel freely outside the country. The freedom of travel created positive benefits for Yugoslavia. A result of this policy was a growing Kosovar diaspora in Germany and Switzerland. The growing diaspora sent money home to support families in Yugoslavia. The influx of foreign currency bolstered the Yugoslav economy.

[681] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1105.

[682] Besnik Pula, "The emergence of the Kosovo "parallel state," 1988–1992," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 32, no. 4 (2004): p 801.

The constitutional reforms to education, of the 1960s and 1970s, created educational opportunities within Kosovar, which previously had not existed. The founding of the University of Pristina led to the emergence of a new educated class amongst the Kosovars, which was previously non-existent. This educated class was to take a leading role in oppositions to Milošević in the 1980s and 1990s.
Many of the reforms in Kosovo were positive, although the reforms failed to alleviate the underlying ethnic and economic issues within Kosovo. The oil price shocks of the 1970s placed great stress on the Yugoslav economy, causing conflict between the republics, such as Croatia and Slovenia, who had well developed economies, and other parts of Yugoslavia, such as Kosovo, whose economic development was funded by these successes.[683]

Tito was the personification of Yugoslav unity. After he passed away in May 1980, there was no figure or heir apparent within the Yugoslav political system to fill the political vacuum. In his place, the republics and autonomous provinces administered Yugoslavia. They shared the rotating presidency of the nation. Yugoslavia, with the death of Tito, lost the one person who could mediate the disputes that arose between the republics or could remove individuals who hindered change. The various republics and autonomous provinces bickered amongst themselves and in many instances, these representatives worked solely for the benefit of their own republic or autonomous province, not for Yugoslavia as a whole. Serbia saw the passing of Tito as an opportunity to redress its grievances with the 1974 constitution. Many Serbians saw Tito's changes to the constitution, which gave Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomy, as part of Tito's plan to reduce Serbian influence within Yugoslavia.

In this political environment, a minor demonstration (in 1981) initiated by a dispute over the quality of the food served at the University of Prishtina in Kosovo, grew beyond the initial catalyst. Many in Prishtina joined the student protest. The result

[683] Ibid., p 801 - 02.

was that and other grievances became intertwined. Some elements involved in the protest called for republic status for Kosovo and others called for Kosovo unification with Albania.[684] The Yugoslav government's heavy-handed response to the protest did not defuse the situation. The protests were supressed with force, resulting in 2000 arrests and 1200 convictions leading to substantial sentences.[685] Furthermore, there were also recriminations within the communist party with some 500 members losing their membership.[686] The protest unsettled many Serbs. The heavy-handed suppression of the protest, the mass arrest, and harsh sentences handed down by the courts, radicalised many Kosovars.

In 1982, many of those arrested and sentenced for their involvement in the riots of 1981, were released from custody. A significant portion preferred exile in Germany, Switzerland, and other countries, rather than staying in Yugoslavia. These activists formed the embryonic beginnings of the groups, which would eventually bring about Kosovo's independence.

The protest had unsettled the Yugoslav leadership. The Provincial Secretary of Internal Affairs claimed that there were 30 large radical Kosovar groups operating in Kosovo.[687] He further claimed that some of these groups were supported by Albania. Political leaders in Serbia feared matters were getting out of control and attempted, with little success, to have the 1974 Constitutional reforms reviewed.

Matters between Serbs and Kosovars declined further during the 1980s. Kosovo Serbs made claims of human rights violations by the Kosovars, including assaults and rape. Many of the claims made, regarding crimes committed by Kosovars against the Kosovo Serbs, are not supported by the criminal statistics collected at the time. In fact, the rates of murder and rape within Kosovo were less than in other

[684] Malcolm, *Kosovo: A short History*.

[685] Ibid.

[686] Ibid.

[687] Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*.

parts of Yugoslavia.[688] Irrespective of the reliability of the claims made by Kosovo Serbs, nationalist Serbian political leaders seized upon these claims, as these allegations suited their nationalistic agenda. It reinforced their view Kosovo Serbs were being persecuted by Kosovars and the only solution to this issue was for Kosovo's autonomy to be stripped and for Kosovo to once again come under the administration of Belgrade.

In 1986, a group of Serbian academics presented a petition to the governments of Serbia and Yugoslavia demanding actions on the alleged atrocities committed on Serbs by Kosovars in Kosovo. The petition contained some 215 signatures.[689] Later that year, the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts published a Memorandum[690], known as the Cosic Memorandum:

> *The Cosic memorandum demanded that Kosovo's autonomy be revoked. Cosic viewed autonomy as a pit-stop on the path to independence. The memorandum demanded protection for the 40 percent of Serbs living outside of Serbia proper—in Kosovo, Croatia's Krajina, and Eastern Bosnia. Echoing demands of the Serbian Orthodox Church, it called for the protection of Serbia's Orthodox heritage in "Old Serbia." Cosic made the case for Serbia's domination of Yugoslavia, equating nationalism with Serbian dignity.*[691]

Slobodan Milošević , who at the time, was a fairly minor Serbian Communist Party official, utilised the content of the Memorandum for his own political benefit. Milošević, at a rally in early 1987, called for a reduction in Kosovo's autonomy. By

---

[688] Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*.

[689] David L Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention* (NBC Publishing. Kindle Edition., 2012), Kindle Locations 637-41.

[690] Commonly referred to as the Ćosić Memorandum, although Dobrica Ćosić was not one of the authors. "Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) Memorandum," Roy Rosenzweig Center for History & New Media, http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/674.

[691] ———, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*: Kindle Locations 645-49.

the end of 1987, Milošević had become president of the Serbia League of Communists.[692]

Milošević, in 1988, proposed a number of reforms to reduce the autonomy of Kosovo, which were passed by the Serbian National Assembly. Following these reforms, Milošević was able to obtain the dismissal of two leading Kosovars in the Communist Party, who were opposed to Kosovo's reintegration into Serbia. These two political figures were replaced with others who were willing to assist Milošević in the removal of Kosovo's autonomy. In 1989, Milošević revoked Kosovo's autonomy.[693] This action resulted in protests within Kosovo. The miners from Trepča marched on Priština and with the support of local students, stayed outside the local party headquarters. Within Serbia, a counter protest was arranged. At this protest, Milošević spoke to the protestors, reinforcing Serbia's claims over Kosovo. Milošević exploited the protest by the Serbs for his own political advantage.

The loss of Kosovo's autonomy was followed by a policy of serbianising the government institutions of Kosovo, including the education system.[694] This action provoked mass protests within Kosovo, which resulted in a state of emergency being declared, allowing Yugoslav troops to enter Kosovo to quell the protests and arrest those involved. The protests continued into 1990 with the state of emergency only being lifted in April. At this time, many Kosovar school children were admitted to hospital with stomach pains, although the cause was never conclusively determined, Kosovars believed their children had been poisoned by Serbs. This triggered revenge attacks on the homes of Kosovo Serbs. Belgrade sent 25,000 Serbian police to Kosovo to re-establish order.

Belgrade also introduced the "Programme for the Realization of Peace and Prosperity in Kosovo". Under this program, Serbian money was used to build new

[692] Malcolm, *Kosovo: A short History*.

[693] Ibid.

[694] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1105.

homes for previously displaced Kosovo Serbs. Kosovars were encouraged to seek work outside of Kosovo, family planning was introduced for Kosovars who were not permitted to buy or sell property without the approval of the state. In mid-1990, further measures were introduced which included the banning of Albanian language newspapers, the closing of the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Science, and the mass dismissal of Kosovar state employees who would not take the Oath of Allegiance to Serbia. Limits were also placed on the number of Kosovars who could undertake Higher Education[695], and the Serbian Security Forces replaced the Kosovar Police force. Finally, in July, the Kosovar Provincial Government was permanently dissolved by Belgrade. In September, Serbia adopted a new constitution, which enshrined Kosovo as an indivisible part of Serbia. A state of emergency was declared in Kosovo and the Serbs deployed 80,000 military and paramilitary troops to Kosovo. These forces engaged in a policy of repression through harassment, the conduct of house searches, arbitrary arrests, and detention.

The Kosovars opposed the imposition of Serbian rule. In 1991, under the shadow of the military intervention in the province, an unofficial referendum was held in Kosovo where Kosovars voted to leave the Yugoslav Republic. The referendum resulted in overwhelming support for independence, with a 99% voter turnout and 87% in favour. In October, Kosovo declared its independence from Yugoslavia and Serbia. Government elections followed in 1992, Kosovars voted for the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK)), under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova.[696] Thus, a parallel system of government was set up in Kosovo, with its own administrative, education and medical systems. The LDK maintained its own tax system to finance the parallel bodies, 3% was levied on local Kosovar businesses and the government in exile, levied 3% on 500,000 Kosovars who worked abroad.[697] Rugova engaged in a policy of passive resistance, seeing armed struggle as futile.

[695] The intake of Kosovars into university was reduced from 40,000 to 18,000.

Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*.

[696] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1106.

[697] Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*: Kindle Locations 1188-89.

The LDK set up parallel governmental organisations and sought international support.[698] The Kosovar government received limited support from Western governments; few viewed its independence as a viable option. Concurrent with the demands for Kosovar independence, the Western democracies were also contending with issues surrounding the war in Bosnia. As such, the international community did not consider Kosovo a high foreign policy priority.[699]

[698] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1107.

[699] Ibid.

Chapter 15 - The Environment – Kosovo Prior to the Uprising

Political

Since the end of the Second World War, there had been a consistent view amongst Kosovars, that either Kosovo should be permitted to unify with Albania, or Kosovo should be a republic within Yugoslavia. During the period from the end of the war, to the mid-1950s, there had been an ongoing policy, within elements of the Yugoslav government, to encourage the Kosovars to leave Kosovo and immigrate to Turkey. During this period, various organisations arose to work towards the goal of unification with Albania. The majority of these Kosovar organisations were underground movements and purposely so, due to Yugoslav laws, which prohibited any discussion of secession. Kosovar nationalist disenchantment with the status of Kosovo culminated in 1968 with demonstrations within Kosovo, which called for either greater autonomy within Yugoslavia or unification with Albania.

In 1974, Kosovo was granted greater autonomy, not as a republic, but as an autonomous province within Serbia. Kosovo was not the only benefactor of the reforms of 1974. There had been increasing pressure within the republics to mitigate the perception of Serbian influence within the nation. To appease the various nationalities, Tito gave autonomy to the various republics and the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which formed part of Serbia. Although appeasing the Croats and Slovenes, the granting of autonomy by the Yugoslav leadership to Kosovo, fell short of republic status within Yugoslavia. Republic status would have been recognition of Kosovo as a nation of people on par with the other republics within Yugoslavia.[700]

The new constitution did not please the Serbs, who had a historical connection to Kosovo, and viewed the granting of autonomy as diluting their historical right to the province. The reforms of 1974 were to lay the foundation of the disintegration of

[700] A.R. Bekaj, "The K.L.A. and the Kosovo War: From Intra State Conflict to Independent Country," (Berlin: Berghof Conflict Research, 2010), p 10.

Yugoslavia in the 1990s. As part of the constitutional reforms, many senior positions within the government rotated between the various republic and autonomous provinces, when disagreements arose they were mediated by Tito.[701] With the passing away of Tito, the presidency of Yugoslavia was managed in a similar manner. The presidency rotated between the various republics and autonomous provinces, but with Tito gone, it lacked a body to mediate any disputes.

Tito

Since the end of the Second World War, Tito had been a stabilising influence within Yugoslavia. He suppressed the nationalist aspirations of the various republics. His death in 1980 left a political vacuum. It was also a time in which other European nationalists, under Soviet rule, were attempting to assert their national identities.[702] With Tito now gone, major decisions had to be reached via consensus between the leaders of the republics.[703] The leadership of Yugoslavia was shared between the republics, through a rotational process, where each republic assumed the presidential role for a period time. Within the various republics, there was a rising tide of nationalism, which was fanned by the local leaders. In this environment, consensus was difficult to achieve, and those decisions made by the leadership of Yugoslavia, were almost impossible to impose at a regional level.

Milošević

Milošević was a populist leader who exploited the latent nationalism of the Serbs and the historical myths of the importance of Kosovo to the Serbs as people, which had been suppressed by the Communist Party and Tito. He came to power in a time of significant political and economic change within Serbia and Yugoslavia as a whole. The majority of Serbs had been born and grown up within and under the socialist regime of Tito, which brought with it a level of economic certainty. Nationalists were also suppressed under the Tito regime, in an attempt to create a

[701] "Yugoslav Government," http://www.countriesquest.com/europe/yugoslavia/government.htm

[702] Jr. Perritt, Henry H., *The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtissaari Plan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p 25.

[703] "Yugoslav Government".

unified country out of people with differing cultural and religious backgrounds. Milošević acquired power when these certainties were evaporating under the transition to a free market economy, which was an attempt by the Federal Government to revitalise the Yugoslav economy. Milošević also resisted the move by the other republics to turn Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of states. He saw Yugoslavia as a nation, where Serbia was politically dominant. As part of this goal, he also espoused the reintegration of the independent provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, back under Serbian control. The New York Times describes Milošević as a skilful politician who exploited the Kosovo myth for his own political ends.

> *"In private conversations with foreign visitors, Milosevic was prone to dismiss Serbia's ancient obsession as "bullshit," yet he cleverly moulded it to his political purposes. His propaganda cultivated a popular sense of victimization at the hands of foreigners. That was the source of his strength, apart from his consummate capacity for lying, intrigue, and secrecy."*[704]

The integration of these two previously independent provinces back into Serbia, created serious concerns for the other Yugoslavian republics, which had significant minority Serbian populations within their borders. Along with Serbian resistance to the reform of Yugoslavia politically and economically, the act of reintegrating Kosovo and Vojvodina into the Serbian republic, directly led to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the three wars that ensued in the 1990s.[705] Milošević maintained his grip on power in Serbia throughout the 1990s, by controlling the media, suppressing political opposition, and forming strategic alliances with other political parties. Once Yugoslavia started to disintegrate and his popularity waned, Milošević maintained control over the Serb population through force.

[704] Louis Branson and Dusko Doder, "Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant " *New York Times on the Web: Books*(1999), http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/b/branson-milosevic.html.

[705] Nicholas Miller, *Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture*, ed. Richard Frucht (Santa Barbara: ABC-CIO Inc, 2005), p 529-82.

"…by 1990, men of talent and substance began issuing warnings that Milosevic was leading the whole of Yugoslavia into disaster. His popularity had plunged; a huge crowd of demonstrators burned a large photograph of Milosevic in central Belgrade on June 13, 1990, shouting: "Red Bandits" and "Out with the Communists." And the man who had promised the Serbs three years earlier that "No one will ever dare beat you again!" now sent thousands of police with truncheons and tear gas against them…"[706]

Economic

Within Kosovo from the end of the Second World War, the majority of the Kosovar population was bound to the land either as peasant labourers, or as part of the working class. Throughout the recorded history of Kosovo, the Kosovar economy has relied on two industries, agriculture and mining. Under the Ottomans, Kosovo was a source of timber, cereals, and meat for the empire. In the interwar years, Kosovo was seen as a cheap source of raw materials, which sold outside of Kosovo. There was little effort on the part of the Yugoslav government to develop industries which could value add to these products by turning them into goods that could be sold on to other parts of Yugoslavia.

Under the rule of Tito's communists, some efforts were made to develop the Kosovo economy. Over the years, investments were made in a tyre plant, battery plant, a smelter, and the generation of electricity. Most of these developments did not directly benefit the people of Kosovo, as the production was utilised outside the province. During this period, the average incomes of Kosovars declined significantly from the levels just after the Second World War. Although they had improved by the 1980s, they had not recovered to the previous levels and were still lower than those throughout the rest of Yugoslavia.[707]

[706] Branson and Doder, "Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant ".

[707] James Pettifer, "Kosovo Economy and Society After 1945: Some Observations," (Camberly: Conflicts Study Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 2002), p 4.

Prior to Tito's socialist government, the majority of the Kosovars were engaged in agriculture. Historically, farms were operated by family units or to a lesser extent, were organised into cooperatives[708], the communist government continued with the practice. The traditional timber industry in Kosovo, which was over exploited by the Yugoslav Communist government, was in decline. Furthermore, the Communist government, under Tito, prohibited the trade of traditional goods over the Albanian/Kosovar border. This policy hindered the economic development of the region.

Under the Tito government, Kosovo's infrastructure was also, seriously neglected. The telecommunications network was well developed in the major towns. Beyond these towns, the network ceased to exist. Furthermore, there was a separate phone system for Party officials and the Military. In addition, the road system was not built for the benefit of the local communities, but to benefit the military and Yugoslavia as a whole. These limitations on Kosovo's infrastructure limited Kosovo's economic development and the development of local business.[709]

The Albanian diaspora was a significant economic factor within Kosovo. There have been three principle phases of immigration of Kosovars. The first phase was between 1960 and 1988. In this phase, many Kosovars took up residence principally in Germany and Switzerland, as low skilled foreign workers, sending money back to family in Kosovars.[710] The migration and the change of Kosovo status within the Yugoslav Constitution, which was given autonomy in 1974, meant that by the 1980s, Kosovo was not economically dependent on Belgrade.[711]

The second phase was between 1989 and 1997. This phase consisted of two waves, the first in 1989 with the mass dismissal of Kosovars from the civil service, after

[708] Ibid., p 5.

[709] Ibid., p 6.

[710] Muhamet Mustafa et al., "Diaspora and Migration Policies," (Prishtina: Forum 2015, 2007), p 27.

[711] Pettifer, "Kosovo Economy and Society After 1945: Some Observations," p 7.

Belgrade revoked Kosovo's autonomous status. The second wave occurred between 1991 and 1995 during the Balkan Wars of Independence. In this period, many skilled Kosovars fled Yugoslavia to avoid service in the Serb dominated Yugoslav military.[712]

Socio/Cultural Environment

In the rural areas of Kosovo, Kosovar society was clan based. The Albanian clan system was extensively studied in the 1930s.[713] The clan system was a central feature of Kosovar rural society, in pre-communist Yugoslavia. The clan was based on familial relationships, with a prominent male being the leader of the group. The leader held the position due to either being elected by the elders of the clan, or inheriting from a family member. The clans were intermixed and interlinked by marriage and assumed blood ties. The role of the leader was to ensure the equitable distribution of clan property, such as land. When the communists took power in Yugoslavia, they introduced a collectivist farming system, dispossessing pre-existing landholders, but in the case of the Kosovars, they left the pre-existing clan system in place, as it was consistent with their concepts of collectivism. The clan system also created high levels of social cohesion, with well-developed mechanisms and rules for conflict resolution. Part of this system was the Honour system, where a man, as a clan member, was held accountable for their actions and words. The Honour system also required that the men of the clan were responsible for the defence of its honour. Violence was one of the tools available to address any perceived attack on the clan or its honour.

The leadership of the clan was either an elected older male, based on his knowledge and experience, or an inherited position. The clan leader or master, would make decisions, divide labour, and mediate disputes in accordance with clan customs and norms. The clan leader was also responsible for the provision of firearms to young male members of the clan when they came of age, to partake in blood feuds. A clan

[712] Mustafa et al., "Diaspora and Migration Policies," p 27.

[713] Georgi Tsekov, "Sons of the Eagle: Clan Warfare, organized crime and state disintegration in the Western Balkans," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* (2002): p 3.

typically consisted of 40-50, family members. The clan leader had a high level of freedom in his decision-making process, but his decisions were expected to be consistent with, and within the bounds of, customary law or Kunun. One of the significant elements of the Kunun is the honour of the clan. Any transgression of this honour code required the transgression be addressed immediately. If blood was drawn, then the transgression would have to be avenged in blood, which could result in blood feuds.

Technology

As previously discussed, Kosovo lagged behind other parts of Yugoslavia in terms of infrastructure and technology. The roads and communication system were poorly serviced within Kosovo. During the war in Kosovo, many used the internet to contact those outside Kosovo and provide insight into what was happening within the province.

Legal

The loss of Kosovo's autonomy, also involved the loss of the majority of its legal privileges in 1989. From this date, Belgrade administered Kosovo. Serbian police replaced the local police and the Albanian language newspapers were closed.[714] Belgrade also instituted a regime of oppression and human rights abuses, arresting and imprisoning dissenters and engaging in a policy of harassment of the Albanian population, by curtailing employment and educational opportunities, suppressing freedom of speech, and limiting the Kosovars rights to buy and sell property.[715]

Radicalisation

Radicalisation is a unique individualistic process. It is a path, which has many routes, not everyone travels the same road, and not everyone arrives at the same conclusion about the correct approach to achieve the goals of the radical agenda. The emergence of the independence movement, of which the KLA was a part, within Kosovo, highlights this point. The LDK's non-violent passive approach

[714] Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*: Kindle Location 581.

[715] Ibid., Kindle Location 830.

acknowledged the fact, that unlike Croatia and Bosnia, Kosovo did not have the weapons or the militia to take up arms in a struggle for Kosovo independence. The LDK's approach relied heavily on the international community intervening on the Kosovar's behalf. This approach found significant support amongst the Kosovars within Kosovo, although the LDK was not the only Kosovar political organisation, which sought Kosovo's independence.

Outside Kosovo, in the diaspora communities emerged two other groups in the 1980s, the National Liberation of Kosovo (Lëvizja për Çlirimin Kombëtar të Kosovës (MNLK)) and the Movement for an Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia (Lëvizja për Republikën e Shqipërisë në Jugosllavi (LRSHJ)).[716] The founders of these groups were the exiles and political prisoners of the protests in the 1980s, who, through their own experience and their assessment of the situation in Croatia and Bosnia, viewed armed resistance as the only viable option.[717]

The LRSHJ by the 1990s had become the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (Lëvizja Popullore për Republikën e Kosovës (LPRK)).[718] Neither group viewed Rugova's non-violent resistance as a viable approach. Both organisations considered armed resistance as the only practical method of gaining Kosovo independence. The LPRK at the time of its creation adopted a Marxist ideology. By 1993, some of its leaders felt that this ideology could damage their cause and sought to change the group name. In addition, there was disagreement over the methodology of achieving the goal of Kosovo's independence. The LPRK split into two new organisations, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës (LKÇK)) who favoured an intifada[719] and the

[716] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1108.

[717] Henry H. Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinious Press, 2008), p 23-24.

[718] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1108.

[719] Ibid.

Popular Movement for Kosovo (Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës (LPK)) who favoured guerrilla warfare.[720]

The LPRK by 1990 had created a network of activists within Kosovo. The group engaged in a number of attacks in Kosovo targeting military and police establishments.[721] By 1992, 100 of its activist had received military training in Albania. When they attempted to return to Kosovo, most were captured or killed.[722]

On its formation, the LPK created a special branch within their organisation, of four men, to investigate the establishment of an armed wing to carry the fight to the Serbs. Out of their deliberations emerged the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK) or the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1993.[723] Athough the KLA had undertaken limited operations after its formation, it was a clandestine organisation living in the shadows. Rugavo discredited these operations as acts of violence undertaken by the Serbian security forces to discredit the peaceful approach advocated by the LDK.[724]

The sucess of the KLA, depended on the support of the people of Kosovo and in this early period of its formation this was not present. Perritt wrote :

> *"Revolution does not succeed without popular support "Without a political goal" said Mao Tse tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." Che Guevara agreed "The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable condition.""*[725]

[720] Ibid.

[721] Ibid., p 1109.

[722] Ibid., p 1108.

[723] Ibid., p 1108-09.

[724] Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency*: p 47-50.

[725] Ibid., p 42.

Perritt indicated

> *"In the early nineties, the KLA was still tiny, fragmented mostly rural organization whose existence was denied by the Peaceful Path Institutionalists. The outcome of the struggle for the hearts and minds of Kosovar Albanians remained in doubt".*[726]

Furthermore, Perritt stated

> *"…support for the KLA was never strong in Prishtina, in such municipalities in the South and East as Gijilan and Ferizaj, or among urban elites in other cities such as Prizren and Mitrovica. The efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Kosovar Population involved three competing visions. The KLA thought the best way to win over the population was to start fighting to show that it was possible. Other groups, such as Murati's LKÇK (National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo), thought fighting should be deferred until after the population had been conditioned to accept violence. The Peaceful Path Institutionalists thought Kosovar Albanians goals could be achieved without fighting."*[727]

The KLA and LPK were unable to overcome the popularity of the LDK and Rugova's pacifist approach, until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, at the end of the war in Bosnia. This single event discredited Rugova's passive resistance approach. The Dayton Peace Agreement excluded Kosovo. Phillips records in his book, *"Liberating Kosovo"*:

> *"According to Albin Kurti, head of the Kosovo Students Union, "We thought that the LDK was too passive. It relied too much on international factors.*

[726] Ibid.

[727] Ibid.

Rugova created the illusion that the international community would resolve the crisis and that independence would come as gift."… For Rugova, "internationalization was a goal, not a means to an end… Kosovo Albanians were losing faith in the international community. An increasing number became radicalized as social and economic conditions deteriorated, human rights conditions degenerated, and the prospect dimmed of realizing their political objectives through peaceful means…"[728]

Phillips continued:

"Dayton was a game-changer. Kurti maintained, "Freedom starts with the mind's liberation. We thought the VJ [Yugoslavia Armed Forces] was omnipotent, but the VJ's defeat in Croatia and Bosnia showed that they could be beaten. The myth of the Yugoslav Army was burst."] The Code of Lek required Albanians to avenge their oppressor. Kurti continued, "Even Montenegro was talking about fighting Serbia. Every Slavic republic had challenged Milosevic, but the Albanians had not." A leader from the Drenica Valley, always a hotbed of Albanian nationalism, affirmed, ''we have learned from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia that the outside world cannot solve our problems for us. We must fight for our own freedom.''[729]

Dayton proved to be a significant turning or trigger point in the Kosovars struggle for independence.

Later, a senior KLA figure implied that Kosovo was excluded so that an agreement could be brokered with the Serbs regarding Bosnia.[730] Dayton also demonstrated, armed conflict was a tool that could be used to defeat the Serbs through the application of international pressure and force.

[728] Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*: kindle Location 1968.

[729] Ibid., Kindle Location 1987.

[730] Ibid., Kindle Location 1848.

Another key event was the failure of the Albanian state, triggered by the collapse of various pyramid investments schemes in 1997, which threw Albania into chaos. This instability led to the ransacking of the Albanian military armouries, creating a situation where the country was awash with arms. This produced an opportunity for the KLA, allowing it to acquire large quantities of weapons cheaply[731], thus making an armed struggle a viable option.

Up until 1998, some members of the U.S. Government considered the KLA a terrorist organisation.[732] This perception was encouraged by the Serbian Government, who later attempted to destroy the organisation using the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavie (VJ)) and Ministry of Interior Affairs forces (Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslava (MUP)) in military operations described as counter terrorist operations.

[731] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1110.

[732] Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*: Kindle Location 2436.

Chapter 16 - Analysis of the environmental factors

The emergence of the KLA resulted from a number of environmental factors described by the PESTELO[733] model. Many of these variables are intertwined and overlap. For example, political conditions can affect economic conditions and vice versa.

Historically, the province of Kosovo held a special place in Serbian cultural and historical mythology, which ignored the changing religious and cultural demography of the region. Tito maintained Yugoslavia's unity by suppressing the nationalist aspirations of the various ethnic groups and republics. Tito's death led to the rise of nationalism amongst the various ethnic groups within Yugoslavia, which was exploited by Milošević in Serbia. Milošević cultivated popular support within the republic for the reintegration of Kosovo, "the lost province" back into a Greater Serbia.

At the time the KLA emerged, Kosovo was politically a divided community. Serbia had reintegrated the once autonomous province, back into the greater Serbia. Many of the rights won under Tito's leadership of Yugoslavia were lost. The majority of the Kosovar population had been politically disenfranchised, under Milošević's leadership of Serbia. In response to Milošević's reduction of previous cultural, religious, and political freedoms held by the Kosovars, the Kosovars set up their own shadow government and government agencies, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. Not wishing Kosovars to be subjected to bloodshed experienced by the Bosnians, Rugova's LDK government adopted a policy of passive resistance. The majority of Kosovars supported this policy. Whilst other independence groups in Kosovo did not share this view, the LPK on its formation in 1993, created a four-man cell to look into the formation of a guerrilla force to fight for Kosovo's independence. From the deliberation of this group, emerged the KLA, although

[733] PESTELO is a mode, which describes the environment in terms of the political, economic, socio-cultural, technology, ecological, legal, and organisational environmental variables.

initially it did not receive significant support from the majority of the Kosovar population.

The KLA framed its struggle in terms of nationalism; even the majority of the province's Kosovar population followed the Islamic faith. In addition, many Kosovars were supportive of Rugova's passive defiance of the Serbian regime, so at this time the KLA remained small, with most of its leadership in exile in Germany and Switzerland.

> *"The KLA organizers not only had to overcome the perception that defeat was certain. They also had to persuade the mass of Kosovar Albanians that the KLA was the right agency to lead the rebellion and, that the potential for the KLA and its predecessors was greater than that for Ibrahim Rugova's passive resistance. Such an effort to change public opinion among Kosovar Albanians manifestly did not succeed in the first half of the 1990s.*[734]

The emergence of the KLA was facilitated by two trigger events. The first was the exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton agreement, which led to the discrediting of Rugova's peaceful approach in the eyes of the majority of Kosovars. Dayton suggested violence was the only mechanism, which would focus the international community's attention. The second was the failure of the Albanian state, which created a ready supply of weapons, which were required for any violent uprising by the Kosovars, against the Serbian state.

[734] Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency*: p 47.

Chapter 17 - Analysis

Does the KLA meet the criteria, to be described as a Terrorist group?

The KLA meets the criteria of a terrorist group. The KLA:

1. Used violence or the threat of violence. The KLA engaged in an extensive campaign and killings to suspected collaborators and attacks on Serbian security forces in the 1990s.
2. Used violence, which was selective and planned. All targets selected by the KLA had been chosen because of their perceived link to repression by the Serbian governments. The targets selected included non-combatants, military personnel, law enforcement, and government agencies. Individuals were also killed, if they were suspected of collaborating with the Serbs to dissuade others.
3. Aims were political. The KLA was a Nationalist/Separatist group who aspired to gain Kosovo's independence.
4. Targeted civilian, or non-combatants. As previously indicated civilians were targeted, who were suspected of collaborating with the Serbs to dissuade others.
5. Violence was selected to draw the public's attention to the group's cause. The attacks on the security forces within Kosovo were intended to attract public attention to highlight initially, the differing approaches of the LDK and the KLA. It was also intended to draw the attention of the international community and solicit their support in achieving the aspiration of Kosovo's independence.
6. Violence was intended to evoke a reaction. The KLA's use of violence was designed to provoke the Serbs and alter the environment so the LDK's peaceful approach would be discredited. It was also intended to provoke the international community's intervention, which would assist in achieving the KLA's goal.

As such, the KLA initially, was considered a terrorist group. With its success in the initial stages, it was considered one by the United States and the international community up until their intervention.[735]

Category of Terrorist Group

The KLA is categorised within this dissertation, as a Nationalist/Separatist group, which is a group that supports the separation of an ethnic or religious group from a larger population. The KLA was an organisation, which sought the independence of Kosovo and the ethnic Kosovars from Serbian rule. As such, it meets the criteria of a Nationalist/Separatist group.

H1a: When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups.

The KLA emerged from the PESTELO environment in Yugoslavia of the 1980s and early 1990s. Within Kosovo, there was significant disparity in the political, economic, social, and legal macro variables between the Kosovar and Serbian communities in the Greater Serbia. There was also a significant divide within the Kosovar independence movements in the homophyllic variable of belief in the correct methodology to achieve the goal of the organisation. As such, the organisational variable within the PESTELO model was also a factor, but these variables alone did not create the KLA. These variables have to be considered in the context of the events, or the energy, which was being expended by other actors in this PESTELO environment. The events of the 1980s and early 1990s led to the creation of competing nationalist movements within Kosovo. Initially, the majority of the population supported the pacifist approach of the LDK to achieve independence. The cornerstone of this approach was a belief the international community would intervene on behalf of the Kosovars. The exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton agreement discredited the LDK's approach, suggesting that armed struggle was the only legitimate approach to achieve the goal of independence and

[735] Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*: Kindle Locations 1293-306.

bring the plight of the people of Kosovo to the attention of the international community. The disintegration of the Albanian republic provided the KLA with resources (weapons) to fight the Serbian security forces, which it had lacked previously. The escalating use of violence by the Serbian security forces also assisted the KLA along with the displacement of Kosovars from the communities. This suggests that a single perturbation will not necessarily lead to a formation of a group, it requires an accumulation of energy over time before a tipping point is reached, which triggers the formation process.

It is also noteworthy; the KLA was initially the creation of members of the Kosovar diaspora, not a creation of those who resided in Kosovo and initially only had support in the western rural areas, which had a tradition of resisting authoritarian regimes. This further suggests the variance of the local geographic PESTELO variables, were significant in its formation. The competing nationalist movement the LDK, for the first half of the 1990s, maintained significant support within the urban centres within Kosovo, up until Dayton. This further suggests the PESTELO environment is not contiguous across the geographic space.

Thus, when considering the PESTELO environment, the environmental variables vary from geographic location to location. Therefore, it would be imprudent to generalise the environmental model across a complete geographic space.

H1b: Homophyllic and geographic proximity, influences the ability of individuals to communicate and this influence is central to group formation.

The KLA emerged from the PESTELO environment in Yugoslavia of the 1980s and early 1990s. Within Kosovo, there was significant disparity in the political, economic, social, and legal macro variables between the Kosovar and Serbian communities in the Greater Serbia. There was also a significant divide within the Kosovar independence movements in the homophyllic variable of belief in the correct methodology to achieve the goal of the organisation. As such, the organisational variable within the PESTELO model was also a factor, but these

variables alone did not create the KLA. These variables have to be considered in the context of the events or the energy, which was being expended by other actors in this PESTELO environment. The events of the 1980s and early 1990s led to the creation of competing nationalist movements within Kosovo. Initially, the majority of the population supported the pacifist approach of the LDK to achieve independence. The cornerstone of this approach was a belief the international community would intervene on behalf of the Kosovars. The exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton accord in 1996 discredited the LDK's approach, suggesting that armed struggle was the only legitimate approach to achieve the intervention of the international community. The disintegration of the Albanian republic in 1997 provided the KLA with resources (weapons) to fight the Serbian security forces, which it had lacked previously. The Jashari family massacre in March 1998, by Serbian forces was the final trigger event. This suggests that a single perturbation will not necessary lead to the formation of a group, it requires an accumulation of energy/events over time, before a tipping point is reached, which triggers the formation process.

It is also noteworthy; the KLA was initially the creation of members of the Kosovar diaspora, not a creation of those who resided in Kosovo, and initially only had support in the western rural areas. It emerged from those who viewed the pacifist approach of LDK as flawed. There were always small bodies of individuals who held the view; the use of arms was the only way Kosovo would get its independence. Even within the pacifist LDK, there were those who believed an armed struggle was the only method, which was going to achieve Kosovo's independence. Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, the Kosovo Prime minister in exile, formed the Armed Force of the Republic of Kosovo (Forcave Armatosure ë Republikes ë Kosoves - FARK) as part of the parallel government created under Rugova's leadership of the LDK.

> *"During 1991 and 1992 a hundred recruits from Bukoshi's LDK-branch* [FARK] *and the Popular Movement trained at Labinot, Albania, the same place*

where the Jasharis trained a few years before. Yet both sides suspected the other of attempting to get control over most weapons and funds. Many trained LDK- and LPRK-members were captured in Kosovo. The Serb authorities tried more than a hundred of them, accusing them in September 1993 of belonging to the Popular Movement or Bukoshi's 'Ministry of Defence and General Staff of the Republic of Kosova'. Bukoshi's shadow police force in Kosovo ceased to function by the end of 1994 due to numerous arrests."[736]

FARK formed as a professional force, which recruited ex-conscripts from the Yugoslav Army and Albanians who had fought with the Croats and Bosnians against the Serbs.

Resistance to Serbian rule initially started on a small scale:

"The KLA's predecessors kept operating openly in Switzerland and secretly in Kosovo, engaging in small-scale violence, sabotage and vandalism. The LPRK approached the militant clan of the Jasharis in the village of Donji Prekaz in Kosovo's central Drenica region during late 1989 and early 1990. Adem Jashari was the clan's leader; his brother Hamza and their father Shaban were deputies. They and a few friends like Sami Lushtaku went to Albania at a secret location to train for war."[737]

Thus, the initial struggle for the independence of Kosovo emerged on a small scale. The group utilised existing social structures, such as friendship and kinship networks. In the rural areas, it exploited a traditional social structure, the clan.

[736] Pavlos-Ioannis Koktsidis and Caspar Ten Dam, " A success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Bulkans," *East European Quarterly* XLII, no. 2 (2008): p 165.

[737] Ibid., p 164.

From these small beginnings, the KLA emerged and came into existence from discussions in August 1993, between members of the LPRK and around 100 local leaders in the province of Drenica.[738] Again, the LPRK utilised existing social networks. It is also of note; the KLA emerged from the rural areas of Kosovo, not the cities. This further suggests the variance of the local geographic PESTELO variables were significant in its formation. The urban areas of Kosovo were keen supporters of Rugova and the LDK's pacifist approach in the early part of the 1990s. The LDK maintained significant support within the urban centres of Kosovo, up until the 1995 Dayton Accord, which excluded Kosovo. After Dayton, the Serbs increased their oppression within Kosovo.[739] There was a shift in support away from the LDK, to groups such as the KLA, who promoted the armed struggle as the only legitimate tactic to achieve the goal of Kosovo independence. Dayton Accord changed the political environment in Kosovo.

The KLA, for the first half of the 1990s, remained small and most Kosovars considered it a shadow organisation. In this period, the KLA only had a few hundred members and undertook the occasional attack.[740]

Thus, when considering the PESTELO environment, the environmental variables change from geographic location to location. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to generalise the environmental model across a complete geographic space.

The majority of the KLA fighters were younger than 25 years old and came initially from rural areas so were physically fit due to the manual nature of farm work.[741] They came from families who were targeted by the Serbian regime.[742] Later, many came from the Kosovar Diaspora.[743] The majority came from within Kosovo with

[738] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1108.

[739] Ibid., p 1109.

[740] Ibid.

[741] Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency*: p 57-58.

[742] Ibid.

[743] Ibid.

about a fifth coming from overseas.[744] The KLA recruits were volunteers who were free to come and go. Typically, they were recruited and fought in the areas in which they lived and grew up. Thus, they had intimate knowledge of the area in which they fought and knew the people in the communities.[745]

The geographic proximity and local social networks were central to the initial formation of the KLA.

H2a: The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, economic, and social environment in which the group operates.

The KLA was the creation of a small 4-man committee within the LPRK, based in Switzerland in 1990.[746] Before the 1990s, the LPK had operated smalls groups of activists in Kosovo, who engaged *"…in small-scale violence, sabotage and vandalism."*[747]

Between 1990 and 1991, the LPRK had a small network of activists within Kosovo, who carried out their first attacks on the Serbian Police.[748] By 1992, it had trained around 100 activists, many of whom were either killed or arrested whilst returning to Kosovo.[749] Those who were left, carried out periodic attacks against the Serbian Police, the army, and intelligence services.[750] During this period, there was little support for an armed struggle against the Serbs as Rugova's LDK had the support of the majority of Kosovars. The KLA faced serious problems of funding and arming itself, therefore, a large influx of recruits could not be absorbed by the emerging organisation.

[744] Ibid.

[745] Ibid., p 57-59.

[746] Tim Judah, "Kosovo Liberation Army," *Perception* September - November(2000): p 66.

[747] Koktsidis and Dam, " A success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Bulkans," p 164.

[748] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1108.

[749] Ibid.

[750] Ibid.

> *"The LPK, on the other hand, favored a guerrilla war. It was LPK who appointed a four-man "Special Branch"—KadriVeseli, Hashim Thaci, Xhavit Haliti, and Ali Ahmeti—to work on the preparation of armed forces."*[751]

By 1993, the LPRK met with about 100 local leaders in the Drenica region, to solicit support. By this time, there were divisions within the LPRK and they split on ideological grounds. Those who formed the LPK favoured a guerrilla form of warfare, where the others favoured an intifada.[752] In December 1993, out of the deliberations of this group, the KLA formed. The KLA lacked money, recruits, and arms. The KLA was still a fringe organisation within Kosovo. The Kosovar media was controlled by the LDK and the LDK denied the existence of the KLA[753] at the time, claiming it was a creation of the Serbian Police.[754]

The KLA appeared publically for the first time in June 1996. At this time, the group had around 300-500 members, but was not a unified organisation with any central command structure.[755] The LPK created the KLA, but KLA was not subordinated to a political party.[756] From this period onwards, the KLA slowly gained the support of the public.

> *"Gradually the KLA began to gather public support among the major Kosovo clans, who had traditionally had small, armed units for the protection of their clan compounds. The recruitment program of the rising KLA was also structured in accordance with the traditional forms of Albanian social organization. While individual members were recruited all the time, the ranks of the army were also enlarged by the joining of entire units."*[757]

---

[751] Ibid., p 1109.

[752] Ibid.

[753] Ibid.

[754] Ibid.

[755] Larry Wentz, ed. *Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience* (CCPR, 2002), p 17.

[756] Ibid.

[757] Tsekov, "Sons of the Eagle: Clan Warfare, organized crime and state disintegration in the Western Balkans," p 8.

The KLA ideology also created support:

> *"The encompassing ideology of the insurgency was ethnonationalism in a peculiar combination of Marxism and tribalism."*[758]

The ideological framework appealed to the patriarchs of the rural villages and clan based society.[759] KLA's exploitation of these social structures further made the group difficult to infiltrate by the Serbian security forces.[760] The KLA was able to broaden its support in the rural areas of Kosovo because its political and social ideology resonated with the rural population. This was not the case in urban areas, where Rugova drew the majority of his support. The rural areas had a history of rising up against perceived repression, which had its foundation in the tradition of the Albanian Kacak.[761]

Dayton, as previously discussed, was another trigger point. It was an event, which discredited Rugova's premise that Kosovo would achieve independence through the intervention of the international community. It was at this point, where the LDK's approach within the Kosovar community, gained acceptance and Rugova's strategy was seen to have failed. Dayton had demonstrated, the use of violence focused the international community's attention, and their intervention was the only way Kosovo would achieve independence. Dayton radicalised the Kosovar community.[762] Even so, at this time, the KLA had neither the funds nor the access to the weapons to equip a larger force. This issue was resolved in 1997, when the Albanian civil government broke down, due to an uprising within the country and the ransacking of the military armouries throughout the country. Firearms cost, within Albania, as little as $5.[763] The cheap and ready source of arms meant the KLA could recruit more

[758] Ibid., p 9.

[759] Ibid.

[760] Ibid.

[761] Judah, "Kosovo Liberation Army," p 70.

[762] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1109.

[763] Ibid., p 1110.

members, inexpensively. By 1997, the attendance at the funerals of KLA members, killed by the Serbs, was in the tens of thousands.[764] Even so, in 1997, although the size of the KLA was estimated to be 300-500 members, the number of active members was estimated to be around 150.[765] The growth of the organisation was limited. The:

> *"…probability of success of the KLA in its early existence was low, while participation costs were high. This disadvantage was reinforced by the general belief that the Serbian army was very strong and ready—as Rugova put it—to "wipe the Kosovar Albanians out." Therefore, KLA's ability to solicit popular support was hampered by the fact that the prospects of its victory in the early stages of the fighting were quite poor, and correspondingly the expected net returns to membership were quite low. In other words, KLA's prospects of success were a function of its base of popular support."*[766]

From October 1997, there was an escalation in violence in Kosovo as the Serbian force attempted to rout the KLA, but the KLA responded in kind:

> *"In the first half of 1997 KLA undertook on average ten attacks per month on Serbian military. That average reached thirteen by September of that year."*[767]

By February 1998, the Serbian Police had effectively withdrawn from Drenica, due to KLA actions in the region, targeting police and suspected collaborators.[768] Collaborators were defined in general by the KLA, as those Kosovars who had joined

[764] Ibid.

[765] Ibid., p 1111.

[766] Ibid.

[767] Ibid., p 1112.

[768] *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj*, IT-04-84bis-T, p 222 (2012).

the Serbian security forces or assisted the Serbian authorities.[769] On 28 February, the Serbian force in Drenica, in revenge attacks, killed 26 Kosovars. On 4 March, the Serbian force assaulted the family compound of the KLA leader in the region Adam Jashari, killing 56 family members.[770] The death of Jashari and many of his family was a turning point. On the same day, the Serbian forces also attacked two other family compounds.[771] Serbian forces and the KLA progressively intensified their military actions throughout the summer of 1998.

> *"The 'Drenica offensive' lasted until late March and killed eighty Albanians, mostly unarmed civilians. More 'anti-terrorist' campaigns followed: between 28 Feb. and 28 Sep. Serb forces killed at least 1,270 Albanians, mostly old men, women and children. Albanians felt their lives in danger; they turned to the KLA to protect them. New recruits flooded the rebel army."*[772]

This demonstrates a direct link between the worsening environment and the increasing membership of the KLA. As the Serbian forces oppressed and killed Kosovars, so the ranks of the KLA swelled.

The violence in Kosovo only subsided when the United Nations negotiated a ceasefire in late October 1998, which led to the withdrawal of Serbian forces in large numbers.

This escalation in violence drew greater media attention and increased the level of funds coming to the KLA from the Kosovar diaspora via the Homeland Calling Fund.[773] Up until 1998, the KLA had around 300 members.

---

[769] Ibid., p 228.

[770] Judah, "Kosovo Liberation Army," p 69.

[771] *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj*, p 56.

[772] Koktsidis and Dam, " A success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Bulkans," p 169.

[773] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1112.

In July 1998, the Serbs started a counter-offensive, which swept through Kosovo. The KLA was ill equipped and organised to resist, and withdrew to the mountains. The Serbian forces burnt villages as they moved forward, creating a humanitarian crisis, displacing 200,000 people.[774] The Serbian actions within Kosovo forced many Kosovars to flee to the hills.

In April 1998, there were probably around 400-500 hard-core KLA members, with another 3500-4500 members in training at various locations throughout Kosovo and Albania.[775] Serbian military estimates provide much higher membership numbers, but are generally not accepted as valid estimates. [776] During this period, due to the VJ attacks on villages, villages throughout Kosovo started to organise their own defences, acquiring weapons, digging trenches and setting armed watches. These defences were local arrangements, created out of a fear of Serbian attacks. Sometimes these local defence groups were created in consultation with the KLA and at other times they were created based on local initiative.[777] Although not formally part of the KLA, many villages looked to the KLA for assistance and some involved in the defence of their villages, wore uniforms, which mimicked that of the KLA and others donned KLA badges to identify their allegiance to the KLA.[778] As such, if these facts are accounted for, the Serbian estimates may be more reliable. Although not part of the KLA, these village defence groups were affiliated with the KLA, which from a military intelligence perspective would make them indistinguishable from the KLA. The Serbs had estimated the KLA strength to be around 5,000 by mid-1998, with 15,000 Kosovars issued with weapons.[779] Again, a

[774] Judah, "Kosovo Liberation Army," p 71.

[775] *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj*, p 8.

[776] Ibid.

[777] Ibid., p 15 - 19.

[778] Ibid.

[779] Ibid., p 8.

further deterioration of the environment led to an increase in the size of the KLA. The KLA were perceived as the defenders of the Kosovar population, this perception attracted recruits.

By mid-1998, estimates suggest, the KLA was in control of about 40% of Kosovo.[780] The deteriorating situation gained international recognition in 1998.

> *"The cruelty of Serbian reprisals in Kosovo shaped both the perception of the international community about the relationship between human rights abuses in the province and Kosovo Albanians' demand for self-governance, and also the necessity of doing something to halt human rights infringements.67 Concomitant with the increasing level of violence in Kosovo, the UN Security Council issued a number of resolutions which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities (Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998), and declared the situation in Kosovo to be a threat to international peace and security and laid the responsibility for the situation on Serbian military forces in the province (Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998). The international community was now willing to consider policy responses that were ruled out earlier in that decade when Kosovo was considered an internal matter of Serbia."*[781]

The KLA during this time was active in promoting its cause:

> *"The KLA adopted a basic but effective communications strategy, using mobile phones to contact journalists and tell them what was happening in the field. This "CNN factor" also played a significant role in raising international awareness. Europe had been flooded by Bosnian refugees in the early 1990s, and European countries were loath to see another exodus of*

[780] Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1113.

[781] Ibid.

victims knocking at their doors. NATO conducted a multilateral exercise on Serbia's border to signal its concern and readiness."[782]

Rugova met with Milošević in mid May 1998 and engaged in negotiations, under the patronage of the United States.[783] Rugova's influence was waning in Kosovo, even among the LDK. In June, the United States initiated contact with the KLA.[784] The KLA promoted a meeting with the United States using the new and emerging technology of the Internet, posting photos of their meeting, which *"…went viral…"*[785]

There was also a fear within the United States and other members of the United Nations, of a humanitarian crisis, if a ceasefire was not concluded before the onset of winter.[786] Negotiations continued between the United States and the Serbs. The United States pushed Milošević for a ceasefire, backing their negotiating position with the threat of NATO airpower.[787] Milošević *"…agreed to a ceasefire and a partial pullback of Serbian forces. He would allow NATO access to Serbian airspace, entry by humanitarian agencies, and the return of displaced persons to their homes. He also agreed to political negotiations on enhanced autonomy for Kosovo. Holbrooke insisted that Milosevic be judged by his actions, not by his words. He had seen Milosevic's rope-a-dope routine before. The ACTORD was extended to October 27, which served as the deadline for Milosevic to fulfil his commitments."*[788]

On October 27, the Serbs withdrew thousands of their troops based in Kosovo and many of the displaced Kosovars returned. During the ceasefire, the KLA publicly demonstrated its strength, by wearing their uniforms on the streets.[789] They also

[782] Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*: Kindle Locations 2496-500.

[783] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2588-89.

[784] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2582-87.

[785] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2587-88.

[786] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2594-601.

[787] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2626-28.

[788] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2633-37.

[789] Ibid., Kindle Locations 2684-88.

took the opportunity to reorganise. The KLA centralised its command structure and divided Kosovo into five regions with its own commander. During the period of the ceasefire, the KLA membership grew further in size. By March 1999, estimates suggest the KLA membership was around 17,000 members.[790]

> *"These included activists from Kosovo and emigrés from Switzerland and Germany; about 300 ex-JNA personnel who had served in two Croatian Army battalions in the Croatian Homeland War; and a large number of part-time auxiliaries, all supported by funds from Albanian emigrés in the West."*[791]

In addition, in late 1998, the KLA increased its size by absorbing the LDK's rival, the Saudi funded force, known as FARK.[792] The increased media attention also attracted a number of overseas recruits.

> *"Five Islamic groups served in the UÇK: the ABiH Black Swans; the 400-strong Albanian-American Atlantic Bde under Gami Shehu; a 120-man Iranian unit at Donji Prekaz; a Bosnian-Albanian unit led by an Egyptian, Abu Ismail; and Mujahedin from Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. The UÇK was trained by CIA and British SAS instructors at camps at Kukës, Tropojë and Bajram Curri in NE Albania and Labinot near Tirana."*[793]

Between October 1998 and March 1999, there was a heightened diplomatic effort to resolve the dispute peacefully, but the United States and NATO also planned for military action against Serbia if the talks failed. Part of this diplomatic effort was the Rambouillet accord, which was intended to bring peace to Kosovo. The KLA was willing to make concessions, but the Serbian Government was not. In March 1999,

---

[790] Nigel; K Mikulan Thomas, *The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992– 2001*, ed. Martin Windrow, No. 2 (Elite 146) (Oxford: Osprey Publishing., 2006), Kindle Location 762.

[791] Ibid., Kindle Locations 762-64.

[792] Ibid., Kindle Locations 766-68.

[793] Ibid., Kindle Locations 776-79.

the Serbs started to amass its armed forces on the border of Kosovo for a renewed offensive. This action initiated a United States led NATO intervention. Airstrikes against Serbia and Serbian forces in Kosovo, were initiated and continued until the Serb withdrawal on 20 June 1999.[794]

Thus, the size of the KLA was dependent on the homophyllic variables as well as the political, economic, and social conditions within Kosovo. When the LDK initiated the formation of the KLA, there was very little support for armed action against the Serbs to achieve Kosovo's independence. The majority of the population supported the LDK's peaceful approach of soliciting international help to gain independence. Thus, there were two groups, which shared the same homophyllic aspiration of Kosovar independence, but differed in homophyllic belief as the most appropriate method to achieve their goal (aspiration). At the time the KLA emerged, the political and social environments within Kosovo were such that few were willing to gravitate to the KLA. Also early in the life of the KLA, it was not named and its membership was very small, less than 100 members. It was not until 1993 the KLA was given its name and became active in recruiting. The denial of the group's existence by its political rivals, who controlled the media outlets, also hindered the group's growth. The lack of resources and money prevented it from expanding its membership. Thus, the economic and political environmental variables played a prominent role in limiting the size of the KLA prior to 1995. It was not until the LDK's strategy of international intervention was discredited by the Dayton Accord, did the political situation start to favour the KLA. Other factors in the KLA's favour were the clan based social structures within the Kosovar rural communities, which had a history of resisting oppression. The clans within Kosovo also maintained small, armed groups and when they decided to support the KLA, this aided their rapid expansion. The failure of the Albanian Government in 1997 allowed the KLA to acquire large quantities of small arms at relatively cheap prices. Furthermore, the discrediting of

[794] "A Kosovo Chronology," Public Broadcasting Services, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html.

Rugova's political approach, after Dayton, saw an influx of money from the Kosovar diaspora, which had previously gone to the LDK. Thus, the changes in the political and economic environments favoured the KLA.

A key success of the KLA was how it framed the conflict in Kosovo between the Serbs and the Kosovars. It was not identified as a conflict regarding politics or religion. It was not defined as a Marxist or Islamic struggle against the oppression of the non-believers, as had been the case in the past and is today. It was framed in an all-embracing ethno-nationalistic context. This context, in terms of homophily, superseded these other, more exclusive attributes. Defining the conflict in Kosovo as ethno-nationalist also appeased fears in the West, of Islamic revivalism and its historical distrust of leftist leaning nationalistic separatist groups.

After 1995, even though the group only had around 300 members, it was able to undertake a large number of offensive operations against the Serbian forces positioned within Kosovo. These attacks spurred the Serbian forces to retaliate. The consequence of their counter-attacks on the KLA was the increased involvement of more Kosovars in the conflict. As the Serbs attempted to force the KLA out of their suspected strongholds in the various family compounds of rural Kosovo, they not only killed KLA members, but also their families (the elderly, women and children). The effect was to shift the Kosovar's support away from the LDK to the KLA and consequently increased the number of recruits to the KLA cause. The events of 1997 and 1998 also resulted in the internationalising of the conflict. Thus, these attacks changed the political environment.

The KLA, through its actions, had created a political environment where Serbs felt forced to act. In acting, the Serbs also changed the political and social environments and created a ground swell of support for the KLA. The Serbs' actions also changed the political environment internationally; those Kosovars fleeing the violence drew international attention to the conflict. The changes in the political environment

created a change in the homophyllic variable of belief among the Kosovar population. The membership of the KLA increased due to an acceptance by those outside the KLA, the non-violent approach espoused by Rugova and the LDK, had failed. This change in belief and acceptance of violence legitimised the KLA's approach of armed confrontation and self-defence.

The KLA was not strong or well-equipped enough to defeat the Serbian armed forces alone, international intervention was the only way the KLA was going to succeed. The KLA's success in internationalising the conflict in Kosovo was to reap benefits of funding from the Middle East. In addition, the apparent success of the KLA created an influx of recruits from the Middle East, the United States and from the Kosovar diaspora. When the conflict resumed after the October 1998 ceasefire in March 1999, the KLA had about 17,000 members.

The estimated membership by the end of the conflict in June 1999 was about 20,000.[795] The International Organisation of Migration (IOM) documented and verified those who alleged service with the KLA.[796] The IOM identified 25,000 veterans who had validated service with the KLA.[797] The IOM also identified the length of service with the KLA. From these findings, they determined only 400 of the 25,000 had served with the KLA prior to 1998.[798] Only 10,000 joined prior to the second half of 1998.[799] A further 11,000 joined between June 1998 and March 1999, with 4000 joining after March 1999.[800] These figures indicate the growth in the membership of the KLA, suggests a link to the changing PESTELO environment, and the rapidly and dynamically changing political and social environments. There were

[795] Michael Mayerhofer, "From Combatants to Cops: The Integration of Kosovo Liberation Army Veterans into the Kosovo Police and its Impact on Police Performance" (University of Vienna, 2013), p 15.

[796] Ibid.

[797] Ibid.

[798] Ibid.

[799] Ibid.

[800] Ibid., p 16.

no significant rivals to the KLA. As such, it attracted the majority of Kosovars who wanted to expel the Serbian forces within Kosovo.[801]

H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time

The structure of the KLA emerged over time. They exploited the existing clan structure of the rural Kosovars. The clans within Kosovo traditionally maintained small bands of armed men.[802] The KLA not only accepted individual recruits but also incorporated whole units from clans, which aligned with the KLA.[803] The KLA utilised existing social structures to enlarge its organisation. From the beginning, the KLA was a loosely structured organisation, although the senior leadership of the group was a *"…closely knitted group…"*[804] and all were *"…former commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the regular and reserve units of the JNA and territorial defence units."'*[805]

As the situation within Kosovo deteriorated from 1997 onwards, the KLA became a loose confederation of various groups, all with varying political and social agendas. Many of these groups had gravitated to the KLA due to its success, and became a part of the organisation, where others adopted the name and the iconography of the group. Koktsidis identified at least six factions within the KLA. To quote Koktsidis, the KLA consisted of the following factions:

1. *The LPK.*
2. *The LKÇK, which in 1998 had temporarily become KLA's propaganda mouthpiece and auxiliary force as many of its members fought alongside or joined the Liberation Army.*
3. *Hashim Thaçi (b. 1968) who with other student activists "joined forces with...the LPK to found the armed movement."*

[801] Koktsidis and Dam, " A success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Bulkans," p 168.

[802] Tsekov, "Sons of the Eagle: Clan Warfare, organized crime and state disintegration in the Western Balkans," p 8.

[803] Ibid.

[804] Koktsidis and Dam, " A success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Bulkans," p 166.

[805] Ibid., p 166 - 67.

4. *Bujar Bukoshi, of the LDK-led exile government who tried and failed to join forces with the LPRK but whose supporters infiltrated the KLA.*
5. *Adem Demaçi, the 'Yugoslav Mandela' who had many admirers within the KLA and was its spokesman from August '98 till May '99 when he resigned in protest against the Rambouillet peace accord.*
6. *The Jasharis, who deflected with LPRK-helped a Serb police attack in 1990 on Donji Prekaz, but perished in a much larger assault in 1998…*[806]

By 1998, the general staff consisted of around 10 members; these members were spread across Albania, Kosovo, and Europe.[807] By this stage, not all members knew each other and not all communicated.[808] The KLA was a decentralised organisation, so the level of control the general staff exercised over the organisation, was limited.[809]

Due to the increasing size of the KLA and the number of villages aligning themselves with the KLA, a structure started to emerge. Kosovo was divided into Operational Zones of which there were seven.[810] The zone represented geographic regions of Kosovo, the 1st Operational Zone Drenica, 2nd Operational Zone Dukagjin, 3rd Operational zone Z Llap, 4th Operational Zone Shala, 5th Operational Zone Pashtrik, 6th Operational Zone Nerodinle and the 7th Operational Zone Karadak.[811] Each Operational Zone was assigned its own commander and each Operational Zone was sub-divided into sub-zones. The level of organisation varied between the zones. Drenica and Dukagjin were the most organised, due to their early confrontations

[806] Ibid., p 166.

[807] *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj*, p 6.

[808] Ibid.

[809] Ibid., p 7.

[810] Ibid., p 9.

[811] Ibid.

with the Serbian security forces.[812] The others were less organised, but had started to develop an organisational strategy by autumn 1998.[813]

The KLA had created the Homeland Calling Fund to finance its activities in 1995.[814] It also received financial support from the Bukoshi Fund up until 1998[815], when it was frozen by the Germans.[816] Some sources allege the KLA also sourced additional funds to finance its activities from the illicit drug trade.

> *"After the fund accounts in Germany and Switzerland were frozen in 1998, and that measure failed to cut the KLA's funding, it became clear that other channels existed. The origin of these funds is believed to be connected with large scale trafficking in drugs carried out by Albanian groups along the Balkan route into western Europe; these funds amounted to one half of all the insurgency money."* [817]

The KLA also maintained a training infrastructure, initially in Albania, but as numbers increased, in Kosovo.

The structure of the KLA emerged over time to manage the increasing size of the organisation. The KLA also created a special unit referred to as the Black Eagles. This unit formed between April and May 1998.[818] The unit ceased to exist by September 1998.[819] The Black Eagles was an independent unit intended to operate anywhere

---

[812] Ibid.

[813] Ibid., p 10.

[814] Ibid.

[815] Ibid.

[816] Tsekov, "Sons of the Eagle: Clan Warfare, organized crime and state disintegration in the Western Balkans," p 11.

[817] Ibid.

[818] *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj*, p 40.

[819] Ibid.

within the Dukagjin Operational Zone.[820] It consisted of 20-30 members.[821] The Black Eagles was a rapid deployment force, which would deploy 3-5 members to villages under attack from the Serbs.[822] The role of the Black Eagles was to intimidate the Serbian forces and provide protection to the KLA's strategic supply routes.[823]

The KLA in the Dukagjin Operational Zone, also created a Military Police Force around July 1998, to enforce discipline within the KLA units within that Operational Zone, and investigate any breaches of that discipline.[824] The size of this unit is unclear, but could have been platoon size.[825] The Military Police had a responsibility to report to the General Staff of the Dukagjin Operational Zone.[826] It is unclear, based on the available information, whether Military Police units operated outside the Dukagjin Operational Zone, although there is some suggestion it was a KLA wide group supported by Senior KLA leaders.[827] The available information also suggests it was a disorganised unit.[828] Around the same time a Military Police Unit formed, the KLA in the Dukagjin Operational Zone also created an Intelligence Unit.

In May 1999, Agim Çeku was appointed the commander of the KLA. Çeku was an ex Yugoslavian officer who had served with the Croatian Army in the early to late 1990s.[829] During this time, he acquired experience leading his troops against the Serbs during the Croatian war.[830] Çeku proceeded to reorganise the KLA along traditional Military lines.[831] Çeku built on the existing Operational Zone, but

[820] Ibid., p 41.

[821] Ibid., p 42.

[822] Ibid., p 43.

[823] Ibid., p 43 - 44.

[824] Ibid., p 44 - 47.

[825] Ibid.

[826] Ibid.

[827] Ibid., p 48 - 49.

[828] Ibid., p 48.

[829] Paul C. Forage, "The battle for mount Pastrik: A preliminary study," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 14, no. 4 (2001): p 60.

[830] "Who's who in Kosovo," (Prishtinë/Pristina: International Crisis Group, 1999), p 12.

[831] Thomas, *The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992– 2001*: Kindle Locations 767-68.

organised the KLA troops within each Operational Zone into brigades. The KLA was organised regionally and the table below lists their areas of responsibility:[832]

Table 4 – Organisation of the KLA

OZ	Location	Region	Brigades Assigned	No Brigades
GHQ	Kukës	North Eastern Albania	Training Units	
1	Drenica	North Central Kosovo	111-114	4
2	Llap	North Eastern Kosovo	121-125	5
3	Rrafshi i Dukagjinit	Western Kosovo	131-134 and 136 -137	6
4	Shala ë Bajgores	Northern Kosovo	141-143	3
5	Pashtricku	South Central Kosovo	151-153	3
6	Nerodime	Eastern Kosovo	161-163	3
7	Kara Dagh	Southern Kosovo	171-173	3
Total Number of Brigades				27

Note: OZ= Operational Zone

Each Operational Zone would have between 1-6 Brigades.[833] The KLA, as part of the restructure, attempted to adopt NATO force structures and operational procedures as its benchmark.[834] The intention was, each brigade would have four battalions, each battalion would have three to four companies, and each company would have three to four platoons of about 30 men.[835] Typically, the size of the brigades and the units were never achieved and as such, it remained an idealised structure.[836] The village defence units were organised into local militia, which had the role of staying close to home and defending that location.[837] The capacity of the Operational Zone command to exercise control was limited. The units within the Operational Zones remained in the most part, autonomous for the remainder of the war. In reality, the

[832] Ibid., Kindle Locations 782 - 803.

[833] Ibid., Kindle Locations 768-69.

[834] Bekaj, "The K.L.A. and the Kosovo War: From Intra State Conflict to Independent Country," p 22.

[835] Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency*: p 101.

[836] Thomas, *The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992– 2001*: Kindle Locations 768-70.

[837] Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency*: p 101.

GHQ and Operational Zone commanders exercised limited control over the regional units.[838]

Due to the deteriorating situation in Kosovo and the Serbian attacks on rural villages, local villagers started to create village defence units. In many instances, these village defence units were created without any assistance from the KLA, but in other instances, the villages were created in concert with the KLA. Irrespective of how these units came into existence, they were perceived by the Serbian forces to be KLA.[839] Many of the village defence units aligned with the KLA or took guidance from the KLA.[840] To administer the village defence units, the KLA created subzones within the Operational Zone. The subzone had a commander, who was either elected or appointed by the KLA.[841] These commanders were responsible for a number of villages in close geographic proximity and were responsible for reporting to the commander of the Operational Zone.[842] The subzones, although reporting to the Operational Zone commander, were not necessarily bound by any of the decisions or instructions issued by the commander.[843] The structure of the subzones was very loose, but the villages were aligned to the KLA's overall goal of Kosovo's independence.

Towards the end of the war, the KLA adopted a traditional Military structure based on brigades, battalions, companies, and platoons. This structure was never fully adopted, it was an acknowledgement due to its size; it was no longer a traditional guerrilla army. The KLA's structure identifies there were two aspects of the KLA, a field force and a local defence force and these two aspects of the KLA had differing

[838] Thomas, *The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992– 2001*: Kindle Locations 775-76.

[839] *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj*, p 7 - 8.

[840] Ibid., p 15 - 19.

[841] Ibid.

[842] Ibid.

[843] Ibid.

roles. The field force role was to confront the Serbian forces and the local defence force to protect the villages against attack from either the Serbian Security forces or the local Serbian Militias. This new structure utilised a centralised control arrangement of a traditional army. At the end of the war, the KLA remained a decentralised organisation with each regional commander having a high degree of autonomy. Furthermore, these commanders were not able to exercise complete control over the units under their command, as these subordinate commanders also had a high degree of independence.

H3b: Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the group.

The organisational structure of the KLA was dependent on the environmental conditions within the area in which it operated.

When the KLA first emerged, the number of members was small and the political and social environments were hostile. In this environment, the KLA utilised existing social structures. The KLA used a cellular structure. They referred to these cells as points and a point consisted of 2-3 individuals.[844] The original members of the KLA came from the same location and from the same clan. As such, they were known to each other. In an environment where the KLA was not well known among the broader Kosovar community and had no major sponsor overseas, a tightly knit group ensured the group's survival. Within this type of structure, the channels of communications are short. The communications with the higher levels of the organisation involved one on one meetings with the leadership group or its representatives. These meetings discussed the group's overall strategy and objectives. In addition, the cells acted independently of each other, but shared a common goal, Kosovo's independence. Thus, there was no need for dense or broad bandwidth channels of communications. As previously discussed, these types of communications channels did not exist within Kosovo, which was poorly served by

[844] Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency*: p 112 - 13.

most forms of telecommunications. Operational planning was conducted locally and amongst the members of the local group. Those who were to undertake the operation lived in close geographic proximity, thus the geographic length of these communications channels was short. Typically, the cell members were from the same clan and the exchange of information could be carried out at a personal level. The original operations, conducted by the KLA, were small and did not require a sophisticated command and control communications network to coordinate.

The available information suggests the cellular type of structure was maintained by the KLA for the majority of its existence. The structure of the group evolved as the size of the group increased from 1997 onwards. After 1997, the environmental factors within Kosovo changed with the large-scale intervention by Serbian forces within Kosovo. The targeting of rural communities within Kosovo, led to an increase in the membership of the KLA. The KLA's membership increased from around 300 to nearly 10,000 by 1998. Some insight into how the KLA's structure emerged during this period of transition was found in the United Nations report with respect to Case IT-04-84bis-T. Case IT-04-84bis-T, dealt with the suspected Human Rights violations by KLA commanders Ramush Hardinaj, Idiriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, which was heard by the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. The report provides a detailed description of the KLA structure and its evolution in the Dukagjin province in Kosovo. Drenica and the Dukagjin were the first two regions in Kosovo where the Operational Zone structure first emerged. This emerged due to the region's early involvement in fighting with the Serbian forces.[845] Prior to this, KLA groups within these regions, operated independently and the villages, for self-protection, had created their own, armed groups. The Operational Zone structure had emerged so the activities of all the groups within a region could be coordinated in the defence of the region and its

[845] *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj*, p 9.

villages. Therefore, groups had emerged within multiple geographic locations and in a response to the environmental factors at these locations. Although Drenica and Dukagjin were the first Operational zones to emerge, by the autumn of 1998, five other Operational Zones had come into existence.[846]

Drenica and Dukagjin, of all the Operational Zones within Kosovo, were the most developed. By way of example, Dukagjin by June 1998 had developed a subzone structure within its Operational Zone. Initially there was no operational commander or staff structure to oversee the activities of the Operational Zones.[847] KLA units had emerged, built on family or clan power bases. There were three dominant clans in the Dukagjin area.[848] The initial efforts to organise the KLA into a structured organisation within the Dukagjin regions, was a consultative process between the village representatives, who discussed and created the subzones based on a process of negotiation and consultation.[849] Through the process of consensus, the commander of the Operational Zone was appointed and the subzone leaders were elected.[850] The regional staff were also appointed. The command structure within the Operational Zone was not vertical, but horizontal. The commander of the Operational Zone acted as a coordinator, rather than providing orders which had to be mandatorily followed by lower levels of the organisation.[851] The commander's role was to facilitate cooperation between the subzones during attacks by the Serbs.[852] In addition, the commander was also responsible for chairing the weekly meeting between the commanders of the subzones at his headquarters.[853] Thus, at this point of the KLA's evolution, the commander was a consensus leader, not a traditional military leader, due to the fluid nature of the organisation structure,

[846] Ibid.

[847] Ibid., p 23 - 26.

[848] Ibid., p 15.

[849] Ibid., P 21.

[850] Ibid., p 21.

[851] Ibid., p 23 - 26.

[852] Ibid.

[853] Ibid., p 26.

which merged a diverse variety of groups. The structure of the group was mediated via one on one communications between individuals. It was also dependent on the interpersonal relationships between these individuals and their ability to negotiate constructively.

The lack of a technologically based communications network between the various KLA elements hindered the formation of hierarchical command and control structures within the KLA. Communications were carried out either via mobile phone (cell phone) or one on one.[854] The nature of the communications used by the KLA was slow and as such, could not react to immediate threats, which could emerge in a dynamically evolving combat space. Due to this limitation, the KLA relied on the initiative of the commanders on the ground.

As part of the process of consensus, some locations within Dukagjin remained independent of this structure.[855] The Jabllanicë village operated outside and was independent of the Dukagjin Operational Zone command structure, although it had about 200 trained KLA soldiers located within its area of operation.[856] The Jabllanicë KLA came under the control of the Dukagjin Operational Zone command structure in July 1998.[857]

In July, the KLA also started to adopt a formal military structure, with the formation of brigades and the appointment of their commanders.[858] The first three brigades were formed in July and were assigned specific areas of responsibility.[859] In July in the Dukagjin region, the FARK[860] and the KLA had merged and the FARK officers

[854] ———, *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency*: p 113 - 14.

[855] *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj*.

[856] Ibid., p 27.

[857] Ibid.

[858] Ibid., p 32.

[859] Ibid., p 34 - 35.

[860] FARK (Forca e armatosura të Republikës së Kosovës) were created as the Military wing of the LDK

were spread throughout the brigades,[861] but this merger was short lived after FARK deserted the battle when the Serbian offensive started in August. By September and October, although the KLA in Dukagjin had formed battalions and companies, it remained an army in the process of organising.[862] The battalion was a name given in most instances to a unit, which was typically only about 100 men and the company being much smaller.[863] In June, the Dukagjin region had around 10,000 men under arms. After the Serbian offensive, many had faded away and there were about 56 members remaining, who were mostly relatives of the commander of the region.[864]

The process of reorganising the KLA was conducted in an environment of ongoing conflict with the Serbs, but the process was given impetus by the Serbian offensive in August.[865] During this transition period, the KLA in the Dukagjin region also created a training centre for the training of new recruits.[866] The process of reorganisation was carried out within the environmental context of each region.

The structure of the KLA within the Dukagjin region implies the KLA consisted of clan and village based groups, who identified as KLA or were affiliated with the KLA, but operated independently. They shared the common goal of the defence of their people against Serbian attack. It is not clear from the available information whether they all shared the aspiration of an independent Kosovo, but Serbian aggression, within their region, was sufficient to bring these groups together under the banner of the KLA, to cooperate in their mutual defence. Within this structure, the

---

Thomas, Nigel; K Mikulan (2013-02-22). The Yugoslav Wars (2): No. 2 (Elite 146) (Kindle Locations 766-767). Osprey Publishing. Kindle Edition.

[861] *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj*, p 35.

[862] Ibid., p 34.

[863] Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency*: p 113.

[864] Ibid., p 109.

[865] *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj*, p 34.

[866] Ibid., p 32.

commander acted as a coordinator. He had no authority to issue orders. As each village sourced their own weapons and funded their own activities, they were not dependent on the KLA for resources. Hence, they were able to act independently of the KLA command structure and could ignore directions from the KLA, as they were not dependent on the KLA for resources.

In the autumn of 1998, the leadership of the KLA abroad, attempted to assert some control over the KLA within Kosovo by ordering the formation of brigades and battalions.[867] This group was known as the General Staff.[868] The rate, at which these units were formed, varied from region to region. These orders were conveyed to each of the regions verbally, by a member of the General Staff, who travel Kosovo making contact with each of the KLA Commanders.[869] The level of conformance with the General Staff's orders depended on the personal relationship between the commanders and the General Staff and the capacity of the units to be self-sufficient in weapons and material.[870] Some regions, due to their geographic location, had created their own arms supply and funding networks, which permitted them a level of independence from the General Staff, where other geographic locations were dependent on the General Staff for financial and material support.[871]

Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the group.

Therefore, the structure of the KLA was determined by the geographic dispersion of the group, as reflected in the Operational Zones and sub zones. The need for structure was driven by the increasing size of the group. Although the group

[867] ———, *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency*: p 113.

[868] Ibid.

[869] Ibid., p 113 - 14.

[870] Ibid.

[871] Ibid., p 114.

mimicked a military organisation, its structure was effectively a loose network. This structure emerged due to the environmental factors, which limited the size of the communications channels. The groups also lacked technological solutions to mitigate the environmental influences on the size of the communications channels. There is insufficient information relating to the group's structure to ascertain whether Dunbar's cognitive limits had significant influence on the structural outcome of the group. Thus, the significant factors, which influence structure, were size, geographic dispersion and the limited size (bandwidth) of the communications channels.

Chapter 18 – Conclusion

H1a: When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups.

The KLA emerged due to perturbations in the political, economic, social, and legal environments, where Serbia stripped Kosovo of its autonomy and their political, economic, social, and legal rights. The emergence of the KLA indicates the environmental conditions varied across Kosovo. Initially, the KLA emerged and gained its support in the rural areas of Kosovo. The reason for this appears to be due to social factors. Those in the urban areas placed their faith in the LDK and its passive resistance, whereas in the rural areas, there had been a long tradition of armed resistance against oppressive governments.

This situation did not change in the urban areas, until the Dayton Accord failed to address the issues surrounding Kosovo in its settlement. This failure discredited the LDK's approach. The Dayton Accord was a trigger event, which brought Kosovars to the realisation the international community would not act on their behalf. The support for the KLA grew, in other areas, when the Serbs, from 1995 onwards, engaged in ever increasing violent oppression of the Kosovars throughout the province. Thus, perturbations within the PETSTELO environment triggered the formation of the KLA.

H1b: Homophyllic and geographic proximity influences the ability of individuals to communicate and this influence is central to group formation.

Kosovar political dissidents outside of Kosovo, created the KLA. These dissidents did not share the belief that passive resistance would yield the aspiration of Kosovo's independence. The group emerged because of discussions between members of the LPRK and the meetings with clan leaders in rural Kosovo. The limited communications technology within Kosovo meant all communications had to be conducted in one on one meetings. The clan leaders formed their own units or cells.

Hence, there were strong social connections within each of the cells. Members of these cells came from the same clan. As such, they were geographically close and possessed strong homophily, sharing a common clan culture and common social rulebook.

As Kosovo lacked significant communications technology, geographic proximity was critical to the formation of the group. Likewise, homophily was central to the group's formation. The clans shared the aspiration of the group's founders, the LPRK. The clans who formed the original cells of the KLA, unlike the urban counterparts, shared the belief that violence was a legitimate tool to oppose the Serbs. The KLA was weak at the time of its emergence in urban areas. The urban areas of Kosovo shared the aspiration of an independent Kosovo, but differed in how best to achieve this goal. The urban Kosovars shared greater affinity with the approach of passive resistance, as espoused by the LDK. The changes made to the political, economic, and legal environments by the Serbs were consistent throughout Kosovo, but there were significant variances in the socio-cultural environmental factors. These differences enhanced or limited the affinity (homophily) between the KLA and the Kosovar population.

Therefore, environment, the ability to communicate and homophily, were significant factors in the group's formation. It is also noted, the variances in the environmental conditions across Kosovo influenced the level of affinity, or homophily individuals shared with the group.

H2a: The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, economic, and social environment in which the group operates.

In the initial phases of the conflict in Kosovo, the KLA was small. The main areas of support for the KLA was within the rural areas of Kosovo, where the clans shared the goals of the KLA, but also the belief the only way these goals could be achieved was through violence. The majority of the Kosovar population shared the aspiration of Kosovo's independence, but did not believe violence would bring this about.

Urban and rural areas differed because of differences in geographic environmental factors. The urban areas supported and believed the passive resistance approach, championed by the LDK, combined with international intervention would bring about their goal or aspiration. Although the KLA and the LDK shared the same aspiration, they differed in their belief in which method would be the most effective. Therefore, the KLA had its greatest homophily within the smaller rural communities within Kosovo. This limited support meant the group was small with no more than two hundred active members.

The exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton Agreement discredited the LDK's approach, which led to a greater number of Kosovars concluding independence could only be achieved through violence. This, combined with the increasing use of violence by the Serbian security forces to suppress dissent, further assisted the KLA. This created an environment where the potential pool of recruits increased dramatically. The KLA membership increased from a few hundred to nearly 20,000. The size of the KLA was limited by the level of homophily it shared with the community. This case study indicates, within a given environmental context, the majority will attempt to achieve their goal or aspiration using peaceful methods, whilst they believe this approach has a chance of success. When there is a perception there is no mechanism within the existing power structures to have their grievances addressed, there will be greater levels of support for violence. The level of support for violence further increases, when the state uses its power in an indiscriminate manner against its citizens, or fails to protect a community from violence perpetrated by others. This led to Kosovars either gravitating to the KLA or creating independent institutions to defend their communities. This environment led to the rapid growth in size of the KLA. The crisis increased the level of homophily between the Kosovar community and the KLA. As such, the size of the KLA was a function of the level of homophily or affinity between the group and the Kosovar population. The magnitude of the homophily between the KLA and the Kosovar community was influenced by the varying environmental factors across Kosovo.

H3a The structure of any group emerges over time.

At the time of emergence, the KLA utilised the pre-existing clan structure within the rural Kosovo. These clans formed the basis of the early cells of the organisation. This structure was well suited for the environment in which they operated. It was a hostile environment where the KLA had limited support amongst the Kosovar population. The KLA had a central command, which operated abroad, but the control of the cells within Kosovo was limited. The command of the KLA set the strategic goals of the organisation. The cells operated within this context. Thus, the KLA was a network of cells.

As the KLA grew, the cell evolved into larger units. With its increasing size, the KLA started to adopt a formal military structure. In the rural areas, village defence units emerged independently, but over time, they aligned themselves with the KLA. To manage this growing organisation, regional commands were created and the various elements of the KLA were organised into brigades and battalions. The level of control exercised by every level of the KLA relied heavily on the interpersonal relationships between the various commanders. Thus, the KLA, throughout its life, remained a network organisation with its channels of communications becoming more formalised.

H3b: Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the group.

There was insufficient detailed information relating to the lower levels of the structural organisation of the KLA to determine whether the cognitive limits were a significant factor in the structure of the KLA.

The initial covert cellular structure of the KLA was a reflection of the environment in which it operated and the pre-existing social structures in rural Kosovo. The KLA was geographically dispersed across the rural areas of Kosovo, with the leadership cadre

outside the country. Communications, due to the limited telecommunications network within Kosovo, were primarily carried out through one on one meetings. The cells operated within the strategic framework as defined by the leadership, but were operationally and tactically independent.

Dayton changed the environment in Kosovo. After Dayton, there was an increased level of sectarian violence. The Serbian security forces increased their operations to regain control of Kosovo and supress the KLA. This led to increasing levels of international support for the KLA. In the environmental context, the KLA's size increased dramatically. Although larger units were formed such as brigades and battalions, communications remained rudimentary. The command cadre remained outside Kosovo and was only able to set the strategic goals of the organisation. Command and control relied heavily on the reputation, trustworthiness, and interpersonal skills of the various commanders at all levels of the organisation. In an attempt to manage the communications overhead across Kosovo, regional command structures were formed, within each region; brigades and battalions were created. In addition to the military structured units, there were independent forces and village defence units, which had aligned themselves with the KLA. The increased size allowed for the formation of specialised units. On paper, the KLA was evolving into a traditional military force, but in reality, it was a core periphery network where each of its elements worked within a strategic framework towards a common goal.

Chapter 19 – Cross Case Analysis and Conclusions

The three case studies indicate complexity theory and the principles of complex adaptive systems provide a useful model in which to analyse the factors that lead to the emergence of terrorist and extremist groups. Complexity theory describes the emergence of order within an environmental context, based on a set of simple self-organising rules. This thesis examines the emergence of these types of groups based on the political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, ecological, legal, and organisational (PESTELO) environment, plus the influences of physical distance, within a geographic space. The emergence uses a simple set of self-organising rules, as defined by homophily and the cognitive limits of social connections. Within the context of complexity theory and complex adaptive systems, the environmental and homophyllic factors determine the size of the group. Homophily being the primary self-organising rule. The changing environment affecting the homophily between the group and the larger population, also influences the group's size. When there is more than one entity within a system, they will optimise their communications networks to ensure secure communications between each of the entities. Thus, how a group organises its communications channels to operate effectively as a cohesive entity over a geographic space and within a varying environment, defines the group's structure.

H1a: When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups.

The three case studies highlight the importance of the environmental factors in the emergence of terrorist groups and their growth. The environmental factors are also significant in the demise of these groups.

Thus, an analysis and understanding of the political, economic, socio-cultural technological, ecological, legal, and organisational environmental variables is essential when examining the emergence of terrorist groups. The three case studies indicate that within a society, there needs to be a perception of political, economic,

socio-cultural, and legal equity. The case studies indicated, when there are disparities in the environmental variables it creates divisions within society, which permits the emergence of terrorist groups.

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was a nationalist group, whose goal was the unification of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic to create an Irish nation, ending the state's partition. It operated within an environment where, about a third of the population was Catholic, but not all Catholics were Nationalists. The PIRA emerged from the IRA, which after the Border Campaign had abandoned the armed struggle, adopting a political approach to address its grievances. The events of 1969, in Belfast, had discredited the existing leadership of the IRA. From the melees on the street in Belfast, the PIRA emerged. In Derry/Londonderry and the conservative rural areas of Northern Ireland, the IRA, now known as the Official Irish Republican Army, maintained its support amongst the Republican communities. In these areas, the PIRA only emerged as small cadres. It was not able to create a larger organisational base until the OIRA, in 1972, ceased hostile actions, and declared a ceasefire. This left the PIRA as the only viable alternative for those who harboured Nationalist aspirations. There were other Nationalist groups, such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), which were never to grow in size to rival the PIRA. Thus, the PIRA emergence was resultant of local geographic variances in the organisational factors in the PESTELO environmental variables.

Though the PIRA emerged from differences in the organisational variable within the IRA, this is not sufficient to explain the creation of the PIRA. There must be further examination of this variable in the context of the complete PESTELO model. In Northern Ireland, the Catholic community was politically, economically, legally, and socio-culturally disadvantaged and discriminated against. The PIRA emerged in a society, which was dominated by the majority Protestant community. In addition, the Westminster government, in London, had failed to act against the sectarian nature of the administration of Northern Ireland. From about 1966, there had been

a growing non-violent protest movement within Northern Ireland, which was agitating for political reform. Further, Protestant reactionary groups had emerged, which engaged in confrontational tactics with these activists and protesters. One reactionary movement led by Ian Parsley, fuelled sectarianism and undermined the reformist policies of a progressive Northern Ireland government. The violent suppression of the protest movement by the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the lack of a legitimate political mechanism, which permitted the addressing of these grievances, fuelled further communal violence and the organisational tensions within the IRA. This violence culminated in 1969 in Belfast, and led to the displacement of Catholics and Protestants from their homes. This situation only ended with the intervention of the British Army. These events were trigger or tipping points, where the system had lost stability and the emergence of the PIRA was a response to the chaos.

The events in Belfast triggered the initial creation of the PIRA; the reasons for this were purely environmental. The IRAs' inability to respond to the unfolding events in Belfast discredited the IRA. As the sectarian violence increased, Belfast Catholics flocked to join the PIRA. The PIRA rapidly increased in size from about 50 to many hundreds. The environmental factors were different in Derry/Londonderry. The majority of the city's population was Catholic and during the events of the Battle of the Bogside, the IRA had maintained a positive image within the Catholic community. Thus, when the IRA split, the PIRA was only able to establish a small cadre within the city, whereas the OIRA was able to grow its structure. Within the conservative Catholic rural areas, the OIRA maintained its support. It was not until after the OIRA ceasefire in 1972, the PIRA was able to create cadres within these locations. Hence, the PIRA emergence was a response to the instability within the local environmental factors in Belfast.

Thus, the key factors to the emergence of the PIRA was due to environmental variables, which adversely disadvantaged a section of the Northern Irish community

that had no legitimate mechanism for these issues to be addressed. The governments of Northern Ireland and Westminster failed to resolve these issues. Large sections of the Protestant community acquiesced and preferred to maintain the status quo at the disadvantage of the Catholic community. The RUC failed to bring the escalating levels of violence, within the community, under control. In addition, the RUC was far from impartial. It favoured one section of the community over another. As such, the PIRA did not emerge due to a single trigger event. The PIRA emerged due to an accumulation of factors, which were not consistent across Northern Ireland as a whole. The PIRA emerged from the disaffected IRA units in Belfast. It emerged due to an accumulation of environmental factors, which were specific to Belfast in 1969, and the perception the existing IRA organisation had failed to defend the Catholic communities within Belfast.

The KLA was also a National/Separatist group, which emerged from a political organisation who viewed armed struggle against the Serbs as the only method by which to bring about Kosovo's independence. The KLA emerged in an environment, with many other competing political organisations, holding differing views on how best to create an independent Kosovo. They also held differing political ideological models with which they interpreted the environmental factors and they differed on the best methodology to achieve independence. Rugova's approach of peaceful resistance within a shadow government maintained pre-eminence among the majority of the Kosovars for the first half of the 1990s. The Rugova government believed Kosovo's independence would come as part of the international community's efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina. The 1995, Dayton Accord discredited the Rugova government. This combined with a climate of escalating violence and repression from the Serbian state, which was in part, fuelled by the escalating attacks on Serbian security forces by the KLA, led to an increase in support for the KLA's approach.

The KLA emerged out of a pre-existing political organisation, who believed the peaceful approach would not gain Western intervention and would not bring about the independence of Kosovo. Thus, they created the embryonic KLA as a response to this belief.

The KLA emerged in an environment where Serbian President Milošević had removed most of the Kosovars political, economic, socio-cultural, and legal rights. Unlike Northern Ireland, Kosovo was not subjected to the levels of sectarian violence, which led to the emergence of the PIRA in Belfast. In addition, within Kosovo there was also a viable political alternative, which was absent in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, unlike Catholics within Northern Ireland, Kosovars in Kosovo represented the bulk of the population. Geographic and socio-cultural factors were also significant in the emergence of the group. The KLA initially lacked support in the urban areas, but was able to gain some support in the rural regions of Kosovo where there had been a long tradition of opposing repressive regimes. The KLA remained small and embryonic, whilst the vast majority of the Kosovar population supported Rugova's non-violent political approach. The complete emergence of the KLA and other groups did not occur until the Dayton Accord discredited the LDK's non-violent approach in 1995.

Thus, the KLA was a response to the political, economic, socio-cultural, and legal disadvantage experienced by Kosovars in the 1990s. Its emergence was also due to the international community's failure to address these issues in their attempts to resolve the problems, which beset the failing Yugoslav Republic in the 1990s. Thus, there were two PESTELO environments acting on the microenvironment in which the KLA emerged. The first was the environment created by the Serbian government within Yugoslavia. The Serbian government disenfranchised the Kosovar people politically, economically, socially, and legally, to fulfil their political agenda. The Serbs ignored the current and historical demographic realities of Kosovo in an attempt to recreate a greater Serbia. The second factor was the

external international environment, whose leading actors failed to respond appropriately to address the problems, which beset the failing Yugoslav Republic. The international community's failure to act discredited the supporters of the peaceful approach. The inaction of the international community suggested to the Serbian government they could act unhindered in Kosovo. As such, they implemented a harsher and repressive regime in Kosovo, to ensure it remained a part of the Greater Serbia. The International community's inaction and the Serbian repression, led to the emergence of the KLA as a viable alternative for those who wished to achieve Kosovo's independence, or for those who just wanted to defend their communities against Serbian aggression.

The Weather Underground Organisation (WUO) emerged from the student protest movement of the 1960s. The WUO emerged from the highly factionalised university based SDS, which had originally emerged and supported the Civil Rights movement, in the 1960s. As the Vietnam War escalated, the membership of the SDS grew exponentially. The SDS opposed the Vietnam War and the perceived social injustice within the United States. The organisation was also highly successful in organising large protests. The SDS comprised of many leftist factions who at times, vied for control of the organisation and its members. As the organisation became larger and more successful, its leading members drew the attention of law enforcement agencies. They feared the socialist ideology of the group, and its potential alignment with its Cold War adversaries. There was a diversity of leftist thinking within the SDS. WUO was one of these factions who had hoped they could inspire the working class masses to rise up against their oppressors. They viewed themselves as the cadre or vanguard of a revolutionary army. The WUO believed their struggle would inspire the working classes to join them.

Thus, the WUO shared the same PESTELO environment as the SDS, but differed in homophily with the majority of the SDS members. The WUO believed peaceful protests had failed. Therefore, the WUO emerged due to homophyllic differences in

the organisational variable of the PESTELO environmental model. The emergence of the WUO occurred because of a variation of a belief, in the best methodology to achieve the organisational goals. The WUO emerged as a small organisation because the large majority of the SDS membership did not share its views and philosophies. Therefore, the differences in the organisational variables were significant in the emergence of the WUO.

At a micro level, the political, economic, socio-cultural, and legal variables were significant. Inherently, the WUO shared the same political, economic, socio-cultural, and legal grievances as the SDS, as a whole. They both wished to create an American society with greater equality for all. The members of the WUO and SDS came from the same economic and socio-cultural backgrounds.

All three case studies indicate the PESTELO environmental model can be utilised to describe the emergence of terrorist groups. The case studies reveal, for the group's understudy, the political, economic, socio-cultural, legal, and organisational variables are significant in the formation of these groups. In each of the cases, there was significant deviance in the political, economic, socio-cultural, and legal variables between sections of the communities. There was significant social distance between the terrorist groups and the group, which held power or government. The organisational variable is also significant, in each of the case studies. Each terrorist group emerged from a pre-existing organisation, which shared the goals and aspirations of the terrorist group, but differed on the best methodology to bring about the goal. In all three cases, the parent organisation of the terrorist group was involved in political defiance to highlight the plight of the section of the community they represented, or aspired to represent. In each case, a faction of the political movement concluded the non-violent approach had not generated the required outcome. This group concluded the required change could only be brought about by violence.

The emergence of the terrorist group is not only contingent on favourable PESTELO variables. There also needs to be an event or events, which will discredit the political approach, giving legitimacy to violence as a methodology for bringing about the required change. The use of violence by the group, gains further credence if their opponents use violence against those, who the group claims to represent, but are not necessarily involved with the group.

The ecological and technological variables, in the PESTELO model, were not discussed within this dissertation, as factors, which have led to the formation of terrorist groups. Even so, there are examples where these factors are important in the emergence of these types of groups. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is an example of an ecological extremist group, which emerged due to a concern for the eco-system or ecological environment and its degradation through economic exploitation. Likewise, the technological variable has been a factor in the formation of groups who have been opposed to the introduction of technology because it has disadvantaged them economically. The Luddites in the late 18th and early 19th centuries are examples. In terms of terrorist groups of the 20th and 21st centuries, technology has become an enabler. It has been a medium by which issues, in the broader community, can be brought to the attention of a wider audience. As discussed in the chapters dealing with the WUO, the nightly images of the Vietnam War, allowed the peace movement to mobilise vast numbers of Americans in protest marches against the war, and demand the withdrawal of Unites States troops from the country. Television also permitted the Civil Rights movement to bring to the attention of the American people, the relative deprivation, and discrimination, experienced by black Americans to a wider audience. This forced American politicians to act and pass sweeping Civil Rights legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. The two events received significant coverage on American television. These reports and images acted as radicalisers for some sections of the American community. Technology, through television and public availability of telephones, circumvented the tyranny of distance, which has historically created time lags in

communications channels. The four-dimensional world of length, width, height and time, now had a fifth dimension. This fifth dimension nullified the effects of geographic distance. It compressed the previous time lags in the communications channels, in some instances, compressing this lag to effectively zero. In the three case studies, technology allowed the groups to access a broader audience, which in the past had not been available. It permitted them to reach beyond those in their immediate geographic audience. Technology also permitted these groups to strike fear in their opponents through visual impact of their acts on television. It further allowed them to solicit new recruits and supporters on a global scale. It also had its disadvantages; it allowed their opponents to portray the groups negatively, which could undermine the group's support base. Even so, technology in these three case studies, demonstrated the potential of technology as an enabler.

Therefore, terrorist groups emerge where a group perceives there are adverse political, economic, socio-cultural, ecological, and legal environments, which disadvantage the community they purport to represent. These prevailing conditions do not necessarily lead to the instantaneous emergence of a terrorist group. In all three case studies, there was a need for a trigger event or multiple trigger events, which acted as radicalisers within the affected community. Within each of the case studies, not all members of the affected community were radicalised. In all three cases, few adopted violence to achieve their goals, but many were supportive or sympathetic to the goals of the terrorist organisation. Those who were sympathetic did not necessarily become directly involved. Those who were supportive may have engaged in non-violent direct action, such as protests. Some would engage in the political process. Others may have provided financial or material support. Further, others may have become involved in the group in ancillary roles, such as the gathering of intelligence, providing safe houses, hiding weapons etc. Very few actually engaged in violent acts.

The case studies support the premise in Chapter 2, that radicalisation is an integral part of the emergence of terrorist groups, but it results in the formation of other non-violent groups. Radicalisation is a process, as supported by the case studies, which has scales and can have many outcomes, many of which are not negative. In terms of complex adaptive systems, radicalisation is a response to changes in the environmental conditions. These changes create perturbations or trigger events. The case studies highlight, there can be a multitude of outcomes. In the cases selected, the radicalisation of the affected community only resulted in the emergence of terrorist groups in extreme cases. In each of the case studies, other non-violent groups also emerged and typically had greater support within the community than the violent extremist groups. Thus, the emergence of terrorist groups is a complex process and dependent on a multitude of variables, summarised in Figure 15.

The figure below illustrates the complexity of the radicalisation process:

Figure 15 –Hierarchy of Variables



The above figure illustrates the hierarchy of variables involved in the radicalisation process, which leads to the emergence of terrorist and other groups. It also illustrates the complexity of the interrelations between the variables involved in radicalisation and emergence. These interrelationships indicate this system and its behaviour is typical of a complex adaptive system.

The figure above is a development of the model provided in Figure 15, based on the knowledge acquired from the analysis of the three case studies. The outer circle consists of the environmental variables, which assist or hinder communications. In complex adaptive systems, the exchange of information or communications is critical. This layer includes the physical enablers or inhibitors to information exchange. That is, the geographic distances between the entities and the availability of technology, which can create a virtual space or fifth dimension where entities can communicate. Ecology can also be an inhibitor or enabler communications. The physical ecology can constrain the placement of communications technology. In doing so, it can hamper the use of communications technology. Geographic proximity technology and ecology are enablers or inhibitors of communications, which are mediated through the next two environmental layers, in which perturbations and grievances originate. Ecology is an environmental variable, which can also be a factor in the environment, which leads to emergence. In terms of complex adaptive systems, changes in the ecology[872], political, economic, and legal environmental layers can trigger emergence and self-organising.

[872] The outer circle is the ecological variable and is included as an acknowledgement the ecological environment, in the future, will be a potential source of conflict and generator of violent extremism (terrorism). It is a variable, which will have a direct impact on the next layer, which includes the political, economic, and legal environmental variables. The socio-cultural and organisational variables are excluded from the environmental layer of the PESTELO model. The case studies indicated these variables were best included in the homophyllic layer of the model. In effect the socio-cultural and organisation variable are homophyllic variables as they describe how people organise themselves in a social context and are better described in this layer of the model.

In the next section of the model, the outer layer, consists of status homophily factors, which consist of gender, religion, class, ethnicity, education etc. These variables define how individuals generally describe themselves. The middle layer of the homophyllic section of the model describes how individuals interact; that is through organisations or networks. The inner layer of this section of the model is age. The three case studies highlighted age as a central factor in the emergence of terrorist or violent extremist groups. The case studies underscored the significance of age in homophily (social affinity), and in the radicalisation and emergence processes. The ideologues and the leaders were typically over the age of 30. Those who engaged in violent acts were mostly in their twenties. On average, those who engaged in violent acts were under the age of 28, but most were older than 20, with the average age being around 25.

The final two layers consist of the value homophily variables, which further refine the definition of entities that are more likely to form or become involved in violent extremism. The outer layer defines the grievance or aspiration. It also defines the belief. The case studies highlighted, individuals or groups have to believe all other legitimate mechanisms have failed and violence is the only option left, if they are to achieve their aspiration. The inner layer defines where on the radicalisation scale an individual resides. It suggests aptitude, abilities, and behaviours are factors, which lead to individuals gravitating to violent extremism. These factors also suggest, those who do not necessarily possess the right aptitude, abilities or behaviour to become a violent extremist, may still join a group but take on another role in support of the group's activities. Consequently, implying a scale of radicalisation as highlighted in Figure 16.

The case studies also highlight democracy acts a safety valve. It does not prevent the emergence of violent extremist groups but does provide a mechanism to address grievances and limits the size of the groups. Where there is no such

mechanism, these groups can grow to be quite large, and a resolution can only be achieved, by the defeat of one side or the other.

The homophyllic layers are effectively the self-organising rules of the complex adaptive system, which is the violent extremist or terrorism group. It defines, based on the environmental factors, those who are more likely to interact and form links, within a specific physical or virtual geographic space. Within the context of a complex adaptive system, interaction is central to emergence and self-organising.

Thus, radicalisation cannot be viewed as a binary process, which is, you are radicalised, or not radicalised. Radicalisation is an analogue process, with many varying levels with no distinct transition between one level and another. It is suspected where an individual resides on the radicalisation scale, is related to their value homophily. An individual may share the aspiration(s) of the group; believe violence is the only method, which will bring about the aspiration(s), but lack, in terms of value homophily, the behavioural traits, or ability, to engage in violence. Among those who believe in violence as a legitimate methodology and share similar aspirations, the specifics of the aspiration may vary. That is, what form of government should be created? For example, whether this government should be secular or religious, or whether it is a democratic state or dictatorship. These differences can lead to the emergence of a variety of groups, within the same PESTELO environment, attempting to achieve similar aspirations.

In addition, another group may share the aspirations of the terrorist group and have been radicalised by the same events within the PESTELO environment, but diverge in value homophily, in the belief that violence is a legitimate tool. Those in this group, believe change should take place within the existing political system, and engage in the political process and/or take non-violent direct action. Thus, within a PESTELO environment, the radicalisation process may produce a multitude of

different groups aspiring to achieve similar goals using differing methodologies. The figure below illustrates the radicalisation process and the scales of radicalisation:

Figure 16 – Scales of Radicalisation



Note on the left hand side of the figure, the reducing numbers who occupy the various levels of radicalisation. The figure also illustrates there are various entry points on the radicalisation scale. Some radicalise quickly, for others it takes multiple trigger events within a harshening environment. Very few become violent extremists. Some may support violent extremist groups by becoming involved in an indirect support role: funding, logistics, intelligence collection etc. Others may engage in direct political action, such as non-violent protests or political activism. Even more may just support the goals of the group, but not wish to become involved and finally, others may be just sympathetic. Note, the figure also suggests when the environmental factors change and the need for violence subsides, those involved in violent extremism are not necessarily de-radicalised, but disengage to a lower level on the radicalisation scale.

Thus, the case studies demonstrated that a failure of peaceful means to address political, economic, and social grievances has the potential to result in the emergence of violent extremist or terrorist groups. This is especially valid in a volatile environment where the state or other actors, use violence to suppress or marginalise those with grievances. The case studies indicate radicalisation is part of the emergence process and violent extremism is not the only potential outcome of this process. The case studies demonstrated radicalisation has a multitude of outcomes, many of which are peaceful. In the three case studies in this thesis, the

emergence of terrorist groups can be described in terms of complex adaptive systems.

H1b: Homophyllic and geographic proximity influences the ability of individuals to communicate and this influence is central to group formation.

The results of the analysis of the geographic factors of the three case studies indicate, geographic proximity was an important variable in the emergence of all three groups, and was central to the formation of the groups. The results indicate the PESTELO variables were important in the formation of these groups. As noted previously, the PESTELO environment is not contiguous and does vary across the geographic space.

The WUO emerged predominately from two groups, which operated out of Columbia University and the University of Chicago. Both these campuses and their chapters of the SDS had built reputations for confrontational direct actions, focusing on national issues. The actions undertaken by these two campuses, at times, had brought them into violent confrontation with national and state authorities. Other chapters on other campuses focused more on local and regional matters and did not necessarily become involved in the larger issues, which the national leadership attempted to address. Hence, they did not necessarily experience the same levels of confrontation with the state. The factors, which radicalised these two factions, were not only local issues, but also issues in the national environment. The geographic proximity of individuals, enhanced their capacity to communicate, which allowed those who share homophyllic similarity, to come together more readily. The varying influences of each of the PESTELO environmental variables from geographic location to location, combined with the national issues, were factors in Columbia University and the University of Chicago being the centres of emergence of the WUO. Therefore, the geographic proximity of individuals sharing the same PESTELO environment, which enhanced their capacity to communicate, facilitated the emergence of the WUO.

The PIRA emerged from a set of PESTELO environmental variables, which were very specific to Belfast. Members of the Belfast IRA created the PIRA because they had become disillusioned with the direction the IRA was adopting politically and the lack of response from those who led the IRA to the escalating violence within their city. The escalating violence in Belfast brought together those within Belfast who opposed the current leadership. In terms of the homophyllic variables, the Belfast dissidents shared the leadership's aspiration of a united Ireland, but differed in their belief in how this goal would be achieved. After the failed Border Campaign, the abandonment of the armed struggle for a political approach gained support. By the end of 1969, about 18 months of violence and specifically the events of August in Belfast had discredited this approach within Belfast. These men from Belfast, who had a long association with the IRA (some of these associations were generational), split with the leadership of the IRA, not with the intent of creating a new organisation, but with the goal of replacing the leadership. The PIRA emergence was influenced by the geographic proximity of the creators, to the changing PESTELO environment specific to Belfast. Although civil unrest had been felt across Northern Ireland, places such as Derry/Londonderry had demonstrated that the Catholic population, which was in the demographic majority, was more than capable of defending itself against Unionist incursions. This was exemplified by the Battle of the Bogside. The rural areas in Northern Ireland were conservative and spared much of the sectarian violence in 1969. Therefore, the PESTELO environment was not conducive to a split with the IRA and the majority of the rural areas remained loyal to the IRA until it declared a ceasefire in 1972. Belfast, in contrast, was a city where the Unionists had the demographic advantage. It was also the city, which experienced some of the worst sectarian violence. Thus, the environmental factors, which led to the emergence of the PIRA, were not contiguous geographically, across Northern Ireland. Even within Belfast, not all units of the IRA defected to the PIRA; a few units remained loyal to the established leadership of the IRA.

Thus, the creation of the PIRA was effectively the creation of a rival IRA leadership. It emerged geographically in one location, due to a set of distinct PESTELO variables within that location and proximity. This shared experience of the environment created communications channels, with minor lag, where individuals could share and plan. Because of the homophyllic affinity, Belfast units created, through shared experiences, the rival leadership for the IRA. This leadership emerged and was able to assimilate disaffected elements of the IRA. This disaffection did not occur in Derry/Londonderry and the majority of the rural areas, until the OIRA declared a ceasefire in 1972. By this time, the PIRA had defined itself as the leaders in the struggle. The OIRA ceasefire also left limited alternatives to those who wished to join the struggle. As there was significant homophily between the OIRA and the PIRA, those who wished to continue the struggle, aligned themselves with the PIRA leadership.

There were many political organisations within Kosovo, many of which had been pre-existing, and others emerging after Kosovo lost its autonomy and Kosovars were disenfranchised by the Serbs in 1989. The peaceful non-violent approach initially appealed to most Kosovars, though this view was not universally accepted. Many of those in exile, who were central to the formation of the KLA, had been involved in the Protest movement in the 1980s. From this experience, they had adopted the view; violent confrontation was the only method, which would achieve independence. The KLA emerged from a political group, the LPK, in 1993. Although the LDK and LPK shared the same goal of Kosovo's independence, they differed in value homophily, in the belief, of the best method to achieve this goal. The LDK believed it could be achieved through peaceful methods with international support. The LPK believed the international community would only act if the violent approach were adopted. At the time of its emergence, the KLA could only engender support from the rural areas of Kosovo; whose clan based social structure had a tradition of Kaçak, resisting oppressive and colonialist governments. The KLA did not resonate with the urban population or the intellectuals of Kosovo. Up until 1995-6,

the KLA remained an embryonic organisation, relying on the support of clan leaders and their clans within the rural areas. Thus, the original members of the KLA consisted of two groups. The leaders in exile came together, based on a common belief in violence as the only methodology, which would bring about Kosovo's independence. They aligned themselves with clan based rural communities, which had traditionally used violence to resist central authority, who also aspired to an independent Kosovo.

Geography played a central role in the emergence of the KLA. The Leadership Abroad shared geographic proximity and the clans, which initially aligned themselves with the KLA, shared the benefits of geographic proximity. The shared homophily and geographic proximity of the group, which would form the leadership of the KLA, enhanced their capacity to communicate and was central to the formation of the group. As the leaders were not resident within Kosovo, homophily was central to the creation of the KLA. The communications channels between the leadership and the KLA aligned clans were long and inefficient. Within the KLA's aligned clans, the communications channels were short, due to the very close geographic proximity of its members. Typically, they lived within the same compound or adjoining compounds. The clans also had very strong homophyllic ties. The family ties created a strong status homophily between clan members. A shared clan history, a shared experience of the PESTELO environment, a shared upbringing, and a common social rulebook, created strong value homophyllic links within the local group.

The geographic distance between the clan based groups and the leadership, even though they shared strong homophyllic attachment, meant the communication channels were long. Thus, the leadership cadre had to travel to Kosovo and actively seek out those who would be willing to join or align with the group. For the group to emerge, the leadership had to be proactive in the creation of the KLA, seeking out like-minded individuals. There was a large physical geographic distance between the

cells involved in direct action and the leadership. As such, the KLA was initially a loosely connected network of cells. The large geographic distance created narrow bandwidth communications channels. Technically, although not a leaderless resistance group, it operated within that context. Each cell was tactically and operationally independent, working within a common strategic framework.

Thus, these three case studies indicate geographic proximity of homophyllic similar individuals is central to group formation. Geographic proximity increases the probability that homophyllic similar individuals or groups will meet. Further, geographic proximity increases the bandwidth of the communications channels, permitting a greater exchange of information. The greater exchange of information can reinforce the homophyllic similarities, permitting the formation of a tightly knit group. All three case studies indicate it is still possible for a group to emerge, when geographically dispersed. In this environment, the network connections are looser. Even so, the group can still be effective if there is a well-defined strategic goal and sufficient homophily to unite the group.

H2a: The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, economic, and social environment in which the group operates.

The three case studies indicate homophily and the environmental factors limit the size of terrorist groups. Each case study highlighted the factors involved in the size each of the groups was able to obtain.

The WUO emerged from an organisation, which had nearly 100,000 members. The SDS achieved a large membership because it was able to appeal to a significant portion of the student population in the 1960s. It was predominantly a white, middle class organisation, but it championed a wide range of issues, which appealed to its diverse membership. It was active on issues relating to civil rights, it opposed the Vietnam War and it campaigned on local university issues. The driving force behind its exponentially growing membership was America's deepening involvement in the Vietnam War and the increasing demands by the military for

conscripts. These two factors directly affected the young student population at that time. The SDS' leadership in the protest movement, combined with the successes in staging large protests, led to those who wanted change, to gravitate to the SDS, thus dramatically increasing its membership. The SDS maintained broad goals and through direct action, attempted to change American society. These broad goals and its success attracted other homophyllic similar groups, to align themselves with the organisation. In essence, success breeds success. The SDS became an umbrella organisation for a multitude of similar thinking groups. The embryonic beginnings of the WUO were a part of this organisation.

The original members of the WUO initially shared the goals of the many other groups who formed the SDS. These members, over time, became disillusioned with the effectiveness of the peaceful direct action tactics of the SDS. They formulated the view that violence and revolution were required to bring about these changes. This group managed to gain the leadership of the SDS, with the intent of turning the organisation into a revolutionary movement. When the group called for the Days of Rage, the turnout was small and poor. Although the SDS and the WUO faction of the SDS existed within the same environment, sharing similar status homophyllic variables, they differed in terms of value homophily. Both groups shared an aspiration to change American society, but differed on how best to bring this about.

The SDS, at the time of the split, had nearly 100,000 members. The WUO estimated membership, at the time of the split, was between 150 and 200 active members and supporters, which was no more than 0.20% of the total membership of the SDS. As such, the WUO was a small portion of a broader movement. The WUO would decline in size from this point up until its demise. The decline resulted from the changes in the PESTELO environment created by the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam and the passing of Civil Rights legislation. The Oil Shock of 1973 also altered the environment, leading to a period of economic decline in the United

States. In this period, the membership of the WUO declined to about 50 and may have been as low as 30.

The WUO also failed to mobilise support within the community. In addition, the working class were disinterested in groups, such as the WUO. The WUO failed to create an aboveground political organisation, which could represent it in the community. By the time the WUO created a political organisation, it had become irrelevant within the changed environment.

The environmental factors which created the WUO, and by which the WUO had defined its struggle, were no longer issues or relevant to the broader American population. There was never a significant level of support to bring about change through revolution and violence within the Student Movement and their supporters in the community. The democratic system of the United States meant the system had a safety valve. The democratic process allowed political change, without the use of violence. It was also a society, which permitted political descent, which if ignored by the political elite, would lead to electoral defeat. These factors cannot be ignored, as revolution was not required to bring about change. This environment was not conducive to the growth of extremist groups, like the WUO. As such, this environment led to the declining size of the membership of the WUO and the eventual demise of the group.

In 1969, the PIRA membership was between 40- 60 members. The increasing levels of sectarian violence and a failure of the RUC to act impartially and decisively, led to Catholic and Protestant communities, in cities such as Belfast and Derry/Londonderry, creating ”no go” areas for protection. The Catholics initially welcomed the intervention of the British Army to assist in maintaining law and order.

As the British Army was under the command of the Northern Irish Government at Stormont, the enthusiasm for the British Army dissipated. The British Army's intervention in the Catholic enclaves on the instructions of the Protestant dominated Northern Irish Government, called into question its impartiality. The PIRA was able politically, to capitalise on these interventions, portraying the Army as a tool of Protestant repression. The PIRA created a perception of a community under siege from the British Army and the Protestants alike, which permitted the PIRA to depict itself as the defenders of Catholics.

The "no go" areas also created safe havens from which to plan, organise and recruit. The "no go" areas made it difficult for the RUC and the British Army to operate. In effect, these areas were outside governmental control. The vacuum was filled by the OIRA and PIRA, who effectively protected, governed, and policed these areas. In this environment of uncertainty for Catholics, the ranks of the PIRA's Belfast Brigade grew from a few dozen at the beginning of 1970, to a few hundred at the end of that year. By the end of 1971, it was estimated the Belfast Brigade had over a thousand members.

Due to the policy of internment in 1971 and Bloody Sunday at the start of 1972, the British Army had lost most of its credibility with the Catholic population. Bloody Sunday in Derry/Londonderry, triggered an influx of new members of the PIRA. The OIRA's unilateral ceasefire in the same year also assisted. The increased membership also saw increased PIRA activity, which gave the organisation greater credibility as an effective defender of Catholic communities, which also enhanced their capacity to recruit.

Furthermore, unlike the OIRA, that had adopted a Marxist ideology, which did not appeal to traditional Catholics, the ideological framework of the PIRA was more broadly acceptable. The group was leftist but not Marxist; it promoted the defence of Catholic communities with the ultimate goal of a reunified Ireland. Thus, those

who joined between 1970 and 1972 did not need to be hard-core Republicans. They predominantly joined to defend their families and communities, as they believed the existing political and legal institutions in London and Stormont had failed to do so.

The year 1972 was the high tide mark for the PIRA; there were significant changes in the environment from 1972 onwards. The Stormont government was disbanded, with Northern Ireland being ruled directly from Westminster. Operation Motorman denied the PIRA and other paramilitary groups their safe havens and the British Army took on a more supporting role, giving the RUC the lead role in countering the paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland. The British, over the next 25 years, enhanced their intelligence capabilities within Northern Ireland and ensured the "no go" areas did not re-emerge, thus, denying the PIRA its safe havens in the cities of Belfast and Derry/Londonderry. In this environment, the PIRA could not maintain the large membership. As a large organisation, the PIRA was more susceptible to infiltration by the security forces. In adapting to the new environment, the size of the PIRA shrank to about a third of its original establishment. For the remainder of The Troubles, the PIRA's membership was static.

The emergence of the KLA and its growth was linked to the changing environment within Kosovo, throughout the 1990s. In the early part of the 1990s, the LPK and its predecessor LPRK maintained a small network of activists within Kosovo. It drew the majority of its support from the rural areas, with most of the urban population supporting the LDK's passive resistance approach. At this time, in terms of homophily, the LPK and LDK shared the same aspiration, the independence of Kosovo. The KLA had been an underground organisation leading up to 1996, when it surfaced. Another factor, which favoured the KLA, was the breakdown of law and order in Albania, which provided cheap and ready access to weapons in 1997. By 1997, the KLA had grown to an organisation with 300-500 members, of which about 150 were active. In reality, it was still a small organisation and the participation cost

of being a member of the group was high, with a low probability of the group achieving its goal/aspiration. However, this small cadre was actively attacking Serbian targets, which led to the Serbs imposing a more oppressive regime within the province. The escalation in the level of violence increased the number of civilian displacements, casualties, and deaths. Within this environment, the Kosovar community felt greater homophily with the KLA, which resulted in an increase in the number of recruits.

The two organisations differed in homophily on how to achieve the goal. The LPK believed the violent resistance of Serbian rule was the only method, which would bring about the group's aspiration. Whereas, the LDK and the majority of the Kosovar population, were of the belief peaceful resistance and international intervention could bring it about. This belief and the support for the LDK dominated the Kosovar's political environment up until the Dayton Agreement in November 1995, which discredited the LDK's approach. Dayton had demonstrated that violence focused the international communities' attention. Dayton, along with the escalating use of violence by Serbian security forces, radicalised the Kosovar community. This led to a homophyllic shift in the belief and acceptance in the use of violence, primarily for defence against the Serbs, but secondly to bring about the independence of Kosovo.

By mid-1998, the KLA had an estimated 7000 members, active or in training. The increasing levels of violence also attracted international attention. The threats of air strikes by the international community, led to a Serbian withdrawal from the province, in October 1998. Correspondingly, there was also an increase in the size of the KLA, which reached around 17,000, by March 1999. During this time, villages had formed defence militias to protect themselves against Serbian attacks. The KLA had kept their goals general, the independence of Kosovo. Their success and access to weapons also broadened their appeal to a wide cross section of the Kosovar community. Many of the village militias aligned themselves with the KLA and took

on KLA iconography. The KLA was also able to attract recruits from the Kosovar diaspora. It further attracted recruits from other Muslim countries, who came to defend fellow Muslims. KLA managed to engender broad appeal by defining their struggle in simple nationalistic terms with a simple goal, independence. This definition also permitted the KLA to appeal for, and solicit, international support.

In summary, initially the KLA's growth was hindered by the environmental factors within Kosovo and was only able to establish itself in areas where there was a tradition of taking up arms to resist the governing authorities. The majority of the population, though sharing many homophyllic similarities with the KLA, such as an aspiration for independence, did not share the belief violence was the only tool available to achieve the goal (aspiration).They preferred the LDK's approach of peaceful resistance. The KLA only started to grow when the Dayton Agreement changed the political environment. Dayton, in the minds of ordinary Kosovars discredited the LDK's peaceful approach. The increasing use of violence by the Serbs to suppress the independence movement also created an environment conducive to the KLA's growth.

In this political environment, the homophyllic factors, within Kosovo, shifted to the KLA's advantage and its membership rapidly expanded. The environmental factors were significant in radicalising Kosovars and bringing about the acceptance of violence as the only way Kosovars were going to achieve their dream of independence. The political support of the international community further altered the PESTELO environment, which increased the chance of success of the KLA. Individuals and groups tend to gravitate to organisations, which appear to be successful.

The three case studies establish a relationship between the size of a terrorist group and the PESTELO environment. To grow in size, a group requires a favourable PESTELO environment. A hostile PESTELO environment will cause a reduction in the

size of the group. As previously discussed, in terms of emergence of the groups, the PESTELO variables are not contiguous over the entire geographic space. The PESTELO variables can change from location to location and from population to population. The organisational variable was a significant determining factor in the size of the group. The amount of homophily the organisation shared with the community, was also significant in determining the size of the group. The greater the homophily, the larger the group could grow. Two value homophyllic variables were important. Those who align themselves with the group shared the group's aspiration (goal) and the belief violence was a legitimate methodology to achieve their goal. Thus, to appeal to the greatest cross section of their homophyllic group, it was important to keep this goal broad and not couch it in a political ideology, which would limit its attraction within their target audience. There also has to be a belief, among potential recruits, the group had the ability to achieve the aspiration. The group had to demonstrate it had the ability to succeed.

From an environmental context, the population has to have the perception the existing political structure has disengaged with their homophyllic group. That is, they are acting in the interests of another homophyllic group within the community. As such, the existing political system fails to maintain the perception of equity between the homophyllic groups, which make up society. The KLA and the PIRA are both examples of such political systems, where the governing bodies had neutralised the dissenting voice in the legitimate political process, removing a legitimate avenue to vent political, economic, social, and legal grievances. There was no political safety valve to relieve social pressures or to address grievances. The political system was driven by sectarian self-interest.

Both groups are examples of where increasing levels of sectarian violence led to a corresponding increase in the size of the group. Neither of these groups were passive actors within this environment. Both, through their actions, were able to manipulate the environment, both were successful and in their success, attracted

more recruits. In addition, they both highlighted the importance of physical safe havens. A physical safe haven allows the group to increase their size, because it provides the group security by limiting the capacity of their opponents to operate, gather intelligence, and disrupt their activities. The PIRA illustrates the point where the loss of a safe haven affects the size of the group. The loss of safe havens in 1972 led to a decrease in the size of the membership of the PIRA, although not necessarily a loss of support from within the community.

The WUO is an example of a group with very limited support for its violent acts within the community or its goal (aspiration) of revolutionary change. It existed in an environment where the governing bodies, through the democratic process, were willing to engage in political and social change. Thus, the environmental safety valve was able to relieve the environmental pressures. In this environment, the group was unable to increase its size. As the government started to address the issues, which created the group in the first instance, the size of the group decreased. In this case, it used violence in an environment where political and social change could be brought about peacefully through the weight of public opinion. This further diminished the relevance of the WUO and distanced it from the homophyllic group they purported to represent.

H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time

The three case studies demonstrated structure emerges over time. They further indicated structure is dependent on the size of the group and the environment in which it operates. The WUO and the KLA case studies suggest emerging groups initially start with a cellular structure. All groups had a command structure to oversee the group and cells. The PIRA differs from the WUO and the KLA, initially inheriting the command and control structure of the old IRA. This suggests, when groups emerge, they utilise the existing social structures as their initial organisational model. This is also supported by the WUO and KLA case studies. Both organisations utilised pre-existing social structures already in existence at the time of emergence. The initial structure of the WUO used the pre-existing communes

aligned with the WUO. The KLA utilised the pre-existing clan structure of the rural Kosovar communities who had aligned themselves to the KLA.

The PIRA grew within the structure it inherited from the old IRA. As the number of members, increased, new units were added to the old structure. The old structure of top down command and control relied on unhindered lines of communication. As the environment became more hostile and the safe havens of the “no go” areas were lost, these lines of communication became susceptible to disruption. The lower levels of the organisation devolved into a cellular structure, although the upper level of the command and control remained intact. The most likely reason for this was, the upper echelons of the organisation met infrequently, but during these meetings, they set the long-term strategic objectives of the organisation. The brigades were responsible for the day-to-day operational and tactical aspects of the organisation. This type of control required denser lines of communication, which are possible in an environment, which is not hostile to the organisation and permits a centralised command within a formalised structure. The loss of the “no go” areas created a hostile environment where communications channels were more readily disrupted. In this environment, the PIRA devolved into a cellular structure. In this environment, the operational and tactical responsibilities filtered down to the cell level of the organisation. The brigade was now responsible for setting the strategic objectives for units within their area of operation.

The PIRA was dispersed geographically, with varying degrees of support in different locations. Each area was administered by a brigade, with differing numbers of cells under their control. It is of note, South Armagh did not adopt a cellular structure, and the area in which it operated remained a “no go” area for the security force, which commonly referred to it as “Bandit Country”. Thus, South Armagh remained a safe haven for the brigade, which was able to maintain its lines of communications, therefore its structure. Hence, structure was dictated by geography and the environmental factors within each geographic location. Thus, the structure of the

PIRA emerged within the environmental context and the geographic dispersion of elements. The structure of the group evolved to meet demands placed on the organisation's communications channels by geography and environment.

It is also noteworthy, the WUO and KLA, although adopting a cellular structure initially, based these cells on pre-existing social structures. The WUO created its cells around its pre-existing communes spread across the United States.

The WUO structure did not evolve beyond that of the cell. The WUO failed to connect in terms of homophily with the community it claimed to represent. The WUO command control structure did evolve over the life of the group. The cells, which spread across the United States, were difficult to control under a centralised command in one location. The command structure evolved a regional command organisation between the Weatherbureau (the central leadership) and the cells, to more effectively control the cells. Like the PIRA, the structure of the group evolved to meet demands placed on the organisation's communications channels by geography and environment.

The organisation of the KLA's original cells in the rural areas was based on the traditional clan and village social structures of rural Kosovo. Like the PIRA, both the WUO and the KLA co-opted consciously or unconsciously, the existing social structures as the initial building blocks of their organisation. The deteriorating environment within Kosovo led to an increase in the number of recruits. Combined with its control of territory (safe havens), the KLA was able to adopt a more traditional military structure. The Kosovo was divided into operational zones. Each operational zone had a defined geographic area of operation. Each operational zone contained brigades. Each brigade contained battalions. The number of brigades and battalions varied from operational to operational zone. Along with brigades and battalions, village defence units also aligned themselves to the KLA. On paper, the KLA appeared to be highly structured, but in reality, it remained a loosely connected

organisation relying on consensus and personal contacts within the command and control structure, to conduct operations. Like the PIRA and WUO, the structure of the group evolved to meet demands placed on the organisation's communications channels by geography and environment.

The structure of the three groups emerged and evolved over time. All three case studies initially utilised existing social structures when they emerged. Over time, the structure evolved to manage the communications channels within the organisation. The geography and environment in which the group operated, dictated the group's structure. Groups operating over large geographic areas were divided into regional command structures to reduce the overhead in the communications channels. Groups operating in environmentally hostile geographic locations typically utilised a cellular structure, where the cell determined its own operational and tactical imperatives. The senior group leadership, in the upper echelons of the organisation, determined the strategic agenda of the group. This structure gave the cells a high level of operational independence. Groups operating within a friendlier environment typically utilised a traditional military organisation, employing a centralised command and control structure. If the environment became hostile, then the structure devolved into a cellular organisation, as the lines of communication became more vulnerable to disruption. Therefore, the length of the communications channels (geographic distance) and the security of the communications channels (risk of disruption) determined group structure.

H3b: Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the group.

As the previous section highlighted, structure emerges and evolves in an effort to manage the growing size of a group. The three case studies suggest structure in these groups emerged to permit greater efficiency in command and control of the organisation. Even within the smallest elements of a group, a cell, there is a leader. This leader may emerge or be appointed. The leader is a communication hub who

sets the goals of the group and coordinates the activities of the group, whether this be the WUO, which was a small group with a dozen cells or foci, or large group like the KLA or PIRA, which were regionally divided, utilising a military command and control structure, based on brigades, battalions etc.

Each group had an overseeing leadership body. In the case of the WUO, it was called the Weatherbureau, the PIRA was overseen by the Army Council and the KLA by a group, referred to as, the Leadership Abroad. The role of this group was very specific. It was responsible for setting the strategic vision of the group and typically ensuring the actions conducted by the operational and tactically oriented elements of the group were consistent with this vision.

The larger groups, such as the PIRA and KLA, had specialised units, such as financing, intelligence policing, internal security, logistics training etc. In addition, there was an aboveground political arm, which represented the group in the overt world. Whereas, in the smaller groups, such as the WUO, there were no specialised units, they were typically self-sufficient. When a cell lacked a specific skill, someone was assigned from within the organisation, to the cell that possessed that skill, either to train the cell members or become part of the cell or foci. Although, the 7/7 London bombers of 2005 were not one of the case studies, within this thesis, their activities are sufficiently well documented by others, to draw a comparison. The group who carried out the 7/7 bombings was a cell consisting of four members, who are generally considered not to be part of a larger organisation.[873] They were inspired by the Al Qaeda ideology and strategic manifesto.[874] They had a leader, the oldest member of the group; they were self-sufficient in respects to financing. They were also self-sufficient in terms of logistics, they sourced all the materials required to manufacture the explosives. They also were technically independent. They taught

[873] Aidan Kirby, "The London Bombers as "Self Starters": A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30(2007): p 416.

[874] Ibid., p 420.

themselves how to manufacture the explosives.[875] Thus, the larger the group, the more likely the structure of the group will incorporate specialised units, with specific skill sets. The smaller the group, the more self-reliant the individual cells will be.

All three groups initially used structures, which were pre-existing. The WUO based its initial organisational structure on the commune and the foci. The PIRA utilised the pre-existing structure it inherited from the IRA, of brigades, battalions, and companies, although at the time of its emergence, they had very few members. The KLA exploited the existing social networks within Kosovo. The original structure was cellular and based around the clan. Thus, in the instance of these three case studies, at the time of emergence, the groups initially exploited existing social structures and their pre-existing established communications networks. In the case of the 7/7 London Bombers, the members of the group belonged to a pre-existing social network.[876]

The three cases also indicated the structure of the groups was influenced by the geographic distribution of the group. All three case studies, during their life cycle, were, or became, geographically dispersed. The WUO maintained communes/foci east to west across the northern half of the United States. This created extended lines of communication, to ensure each collective carried out acts, which were consistent with the Weatherbureau manifesto. The collectives were divided into three geographic regions, and one or more members of the Weatherbureau were assigned to each region, to shorten the lines of communication and to act as overall commander.

The PIRA continued the practice of its predecessor, the IRA. It maintained the regional based brigades, which had the responsibility for operations and recruiting

[875] Ibid., p 421.

[876] Ibid., p 418.

within each specific geographic region. Due to the large numbers of recruits, in the initial phases of The Troubles, the brigade areas were further subdivided geographically into battalions and companies. The PIRA's command and control of operational units was limited. In many instances, the units would carry out operations and the leadership would retrospectively approve the operation after it was completed. Thus, the PIRA was a loosely controlled organisation. As the PIRA matured as an organisation, it adopted a combined approach with the political and military wings working together towards the organisational goals. The PIRA attempted to exert greater control over the operational units. The General Staff approved individuals appointed to leadership roles and the Quartermaster retained control over the materials of war. The quartermaster only allocated arms and other materials when operations were approved. The need for greater control became important as the peace process in the mid-1990s started to take shape, as ill-conceived operations could undermine the PIRA position in this process.

The KLA initially emerged in the rural areas of Kosovo. The rural areas of Kosovo still maintained a clan based social structure. It was within this context the KLA found its initial recruits and its structure emerged. It was a cellular organisation, with the cells being created from members of specific clans.

As the leadership of the KLA resided outside Kosovo, the lines of communications were extended and narrow in bandwidth, which only permitted the leadership to provide a strategic framework for the group. Therefore, the decisions regarding operations and tactical aspects of the group's activities were made at the cell/clan level of the organisation. These decisions were made within the context of the strategic goals of the organisation. The cellular organisation was decided at the clan level, the clan appointing the leaders and supplying the cell members. As the clan is a family based social structure, there were strong homophyllic links between the cell members, which made infiltration of the cell almost impossible.

As the size of the KLA grew, Kosovo was divided into Operational Zones. Each Operational Zone raised brigades and battalions, adopting a traditional military structure. This change in organisational structure was a direct result of the increased number of recruits, the safe havens in Albania and parts of Kosovo, and the KLA's ready access to material, such as weapons. It is also of note, like the PIRA, a KLA brigade or battalion was not equivalent to similarly named units within the traditional military. They were much smaller in size and did not share the same fighting capacity. Typically, a KLA brigade was much smaller than a traditional battalion used in a traditional army. A KLA battalion operated at the strength of an undersized company, of around 100 men.

In the latter half of the KLA's life cycle, when the group started to adopt a formal military structure, the leadership of the KLA, known as the General Staff, appointed the leaders of the Operational Zones. Each of these zones operated independently of each other. The lines of communications between the General Staff and the operational units within Kosovo remained extended and narrow in bandwidth. Communication with commanders in the field had to be conducted in person. Thus, the General Staff's level of influence remained at a strategic level, having no or limited capacity to influence the operational and tactical aspects of the organisation.

The adoption of a traditional military structure within the KLA improved the communications channels. It gave a structure in which instructions from the General Staff or the Operational Zone leaders could be passed, in theory, to all levels of the organisation. In reality, it did not necessarily give the commanders of the KLA greater control over the organisation. Command and control within the KLA from its creation, to the end of the conflict, was a consultative process. It was dependent on the interpersonal relationships between commanders and their bond with those who they commanded. The KLA leadership model was not vertical but horizontal and heavily reliant on consent and consensus.

The level of control of the KLA by the General Staff was further hindered by the fact some of the KLA's units were self-sufficient, and were not completely reliant on the General Staff for money or materials. Thus, some units with impunity could ignore instructions issued by the General Staff.

At its height, although the KLA had adopted a traditional military structure, it still maintained a loose and informal command and control structure, whose effectiveness was dependent on the interpersonal relationships of the commanders in the conflict zone. In addition to the military structures, a village defence network had also emerged. This network, in many instances, had aligned itself with the KLA for aid when it came under attack and for access to resources, such as weapons.

The three case studies also indicated the PESTELO environment influenced the structure of the three groups. The WUO only maintained an organisational presence in the northern half of the United States. The group went underground and adopted a cellular structure, based on the already existing communes it had previously established. The group also purged members who were not considered devoted enough to the cause and tested any new members out of fear of infiltration. The group perceived the PESTELO environment as hostile to their cause. Through their analysis of the environmental conditions, they concluded the cellular structure, based on the foci, would ensure the group's survival and the foci would become the seeds of a revolutionary movement. The WUO had misread the environmental conditions and by the 1980s had ceased to exist, although some diehard members did join other radical groups, after the WUO had faded from existence.

The PESTELO environment also influenced the structure of the PIRA. In the initial stages of The Troubles, the PIRA maintained a large traditional military structure, which consisted of brigades, battalions, and companies. In the early stages of The Troubles, the "no go" areas within Belfast and other towns and cities afforded the

PIRA safe havens. The Belfast Brigade in some areas of the city used a cellular organisational structure, due to the hostile environment. In the early stages of the struggles, the PIRA was not universally supported across Northern Ireland. In many geographic locations, the PIRA was not the only Republican group operating. In the case of Derry/Londonderry, the PIRA lacked sufficient homophily with the local population to maintain a large structure or recruit members. As such, the Derry/Londonderry element of the PIRA was only a battalion and was not restructured into a brigade until its more successful rival, the OIRA, declared a ceasefire, effectively leaving the PIRA in Derry/Londonderry as the only significant group in the city. Similar comments can be made in terms of the PIRA rural units. In the rural areas, the PESTELO environment was conservative and favoured the pre-existing organisation, the OIRA.

After 1972, the environment within Northern Ireland became more hostile. Operation Motorman denied the PIRA and other like groups, the safe havens behind the barricades of the “no go” areas. Furthermore, there was an increased and concerted intelligence effort by the security forces to undermine the PIRA. This included the infiltration of the group. Although the PIRA claims, it was a planned and conscientious restructuring of the group into cells to mitigate the security forces efforts to infiltrate the group, there is information, which contradicts this claim. This information strongly suggests the hostile environment, after 1972, had made it hazardous for the units of the PIRA to openly communicate and operate, This isolated the units of the PIRA from each other, which meant the various units of the PIRA, had effectively become cells. The changes in the environment imposed a cellular structure on the PIRA, which was formalised in the latter half of the 1970s. The South Armagh IRA differed from other rural units in Northern Ireland, it joined on the formation of the PIRA. When the rest of the PIRA adopted the cellular structure, it maintained the traditional brigade and battalion organisation. It was self-sufficient both financially and materially. It maintained an independent technical capacity and it was proficient in creating improvised explosive devices. It

operated in an area, which was strongly Republican, and the members of the brigade had strong family and community connections, decreasing the likelihood of infiltration. Furthermore, the brigade's activities made South Armagh a hostile operational environment for the security forces. This ensured the communications channels between the units in South Armagh, were not disrupted, permitting the South Armagh Brigade to maintain the formalised military structure.

The PESTELO environment also affected the KLA structure. Initially, the PESTELO environment was hostile. The KLA was only able to raise small units in the rural areas where the population had a history of opposing repressive regimes. Thus, the clans shared greater homophily with the KLA than those who lived within the urban areas. The urban areas shared greater homophily with the LDK, who were the KLA's main rival. At this time, there was not the support in the urban areas for the use of violence to achieve Kosovo's independence. The PESTELO environment differed in the urban and rural areas.

The KLA units raised in the early part of the conflict were based on existing social structures and as such, were cellular in nature. As the PESTELO environment deteriorated and the rival LDK started to lose credibility within the Kosovar population, the size of the KLA marginally increased, but the structure of the group remained constant. It was not until the Serbs intervened in Kosovo with significant force, did the number of KLA recruits increase. By the end of 1998, the KLA controlled significant amounts of territory and enjoyed the support of a significant portion of the Kosovar population. Due to the attacks on Kosovar villages in the rural areas, many villages formed their own units to defend their homes. These village defence units were not formally part of the KLA at the time of formation, but due to the success of the KLA, many of these village defence associations aligned themselves with the KLA, taking on KLA iconography and dress. The success of the KLA led to unaligned groups seeking to become part of the KLA. This is similar to Islamic extremist groups and Sunni tribesmen in Iraq aligning their group or tribe

with Islamic State. The perception of success leads to others wanting to be part of that success.

The PESTELO environment was also altered in the KLA's favour, by the intervention of the international community, which enhanced the KLA's probability of a victory. In this environment, the KLA started a process of restructuring on a military model. Superficially, the KLA had a military structure, but this was not completely the case. In this time of transition, the KLA was reorganising into a formal military structure, but in many respects, it still operated as a cellular networked organisation. The culture was an artefact of the earlier evolutionary stage of the group, that is; the KLA was an amalgam of many previously independent units, which worked within a defined strategic framework, but were operationally and tactically independent of the central command. This was the structure, which remained in place until the end of the conflict.

There is insufficient information to ascertain whether Dunbar's cognitive limits are significant in the structuring of the three case studies. There was insufficient detailed information about the organisational structures of the three case studies to conduct any analysis with any level of confidence. Furthermore, the analysis of the available information indicates these groups, at the time of emergence, utilised pre-existing social structures. Their aim was to form an army. In reality, the KLA was the only group, which neared this goal. As such, its final structure was in the process of converging on that of a traditional military organisation. The structure of the military around the world follows the same model, with some minor variations. These structures have been honed by centuries of warfare, and are accepted as best practice. Thus, the structure of the KLA was predetermined by this goal and not by the cognitive limits of the human brain. In all three case studies, the PESTELO environment and homophily were the most significant factors that determined the structure of each group.

The case studies suggest the emergent structure of terrorist groups, utilise the existing social structures, which is consistent with complexity theory and the theory of complex adaptive systems. The environment and the physical geography, in which the group operates, govern the density of the communications channels, which in turn, determines the structure of the group. In harsh environments, the bandwidth of the communications channels is narrow. In environments with narrow channels of communications, the leadership cadre can only set the strategic goals of the group. The limited size of the communications channels between elements of the group limits the transfer of information. As such, a cellular organisation emerges, where the operational and tactical imperatives are determined by the cell, within the group's strategic framework. In moderately friendlier environments, a formal structure will start to emerge, because the density of the communications channels within the organisation increases. As it takes time for new communications channels to propagate, the structure will become a loosely connected network, where command and control remains weak. If the group is perceived to be successful, other groups may align with it. In this type of structure, the command and control would be consultative and based on consensus. If the group controls territory (safe havens) and its resources, a formalised military style structure will emerge. If the group is geographically dispersed, a regional command structure will emerge. As the environmental factors vary across the geographic space, so will the structure of the group, as structure is dependent on local environmental factors and the density of the communications channels. Thus, the group may have a formalised structure in one region, a loosely coordinated network structure in another and a cellular structure in regions with a harsher environment.

Figure 17 below, illustrates an environment, which transitions from harsh to friendly, with the structure evolving from a simple cellular organisation, to a disconnected cellular organisation with a leadership cadre, to a networked structure with a leadership cadre, to a loosely connected military style structure and finally a formalised military structure. Likewise, the organisation will devolve down

the same path, as the environment becomes harsher. It is a bidirectional transition. The density of the communications channels within the organisation, determines structure.

Figure 17 – Evolving Structure as a function of Environment



Are terrorist groups, complex adaptive systems?

John Holland described the characteristics of a complex adaptive system as follows:

1. A complex adaptive system is a network of many entities acting in parallel and interacting in a dynamic environment, which is a product of these interactions.[877]
2. Control of a complex adaptive system, tends to be distributed across the system, but coherent behaviour arises out of competition and co-operation between the parts of the system.[878]
3. A complex adaptive system has many levels of organisation with parts of the system acting as building blocks for a higher level.[879]

[877] Fromm, *The Emergence of Complexity*: p 183-84.

[878] Ibid., p 184.

[879] Ibid.

4. A complex adaptive system constantly rearranges its building blocks as it learns and adapts to changes in the environment.[880]
5. A complex adaptive system is emergent and self-organising.[881]

A goal of the thesis was to investigate whether the description of Al Qaeda as a complex adaptive system could be extended, more broadly, to other types of terrorist groups. For this to be the case, each of the groups would have to be consistent with the five characteristics outlined by Holland.

A complex adaptive system is a network of many entities acting in parallel and interacting in a dynamic environment, which is a product of these interactions.
Hypothesises H1b, H2a, H3a and H3b suggested this characteristic was valid for all three groups under study. Each of the groups effectively operated as a network. The KLA, PIRA, and WUO were all loose affiliations of individuals and groups, which were independently working in parallel towards a shared goal or aspiration. Each of the groups operated and interacted in a dynamic environment, which was influenced and altered by their actions and the actions of others, outside the boundaries of the network.

Control of a complex adaptive system tends to be distributed across the system, but coherent behaviour arises out of competition and co-operation between the parts of the system.
Analysis undertaken in the testing of hypothesises H1b, H2a, H3a, and H3b indicated the command and control of each of the three case studies were not centrally controlled. They further indicated the various elements typically responded independently to local environmental conditions, but the actions of the various elements, of each of the groups, were consistent with the overall strategic goal of the group. Although all groups had a centralised leadership and on paper a

[880] Ibid.

[881] Bousquet, "Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad". p 6.

hierarchical structure, the leadership was incapable of exercising operational or tactical control over the elements of the groups. In each case, their influence was limited to setting the strategic framework. Each of the elements operated and co-operated in a coherent manner within the strategic framework towards the common goal.

A complex adaptive system has many levels of organisation with parts of the system acting as building blocks for a higher level.

Hypothesises H1b and H3a indicated group structure emerged over time and was built of pre-existing social and organisational structures. The smallest element of each of the groups studied was the cell. These cells were organised as part of a larger organisation. In its simplest form, the group's leadership controlled the cell, but as the group grew in size, intervening levels of organisation emerged to coordinate the activities of the groups, through consensus and co-operation, optimising the group's communications network. As the groups grew larger, further layers of the organisation emerged to manage the communications overhead of the groups. Each part of the group was a building block for high levels of the organisation. Thus, the group structure was consistent with a complex adaptive system.

A complex adaptive system constantly rearranges its building blocks as it learns and adapts to changes in the environment.

Hypothesises H1a, H1b, and H2a indicated the environment was a significant factor, and central to each of the group's emergence and growth. In each case, there were already pre-existing entities within the environment, which formed the initial building blocks of each of the groups. Hypothesises H2a and H3a demonstrated how each of the group's structure evolved, adapted, and changed to meet the changes in the dynamic environment in which they operated. The fundamental feature of the group's structure was its communication network. This network evolved and optimised for the environmental and geographical conditions in which the group

operated. Security of this network was paramount, but the maintenance of security influenced the bandwidth of this network, thus influencing the amount of control the leadership could exercise over the organisation. The geographic distance between the building blocks of the group, also influenced the group's structure, as environmental conditions could and did, vary from location to location. Thus, an organisation structure in one location may not have been appropriate in another. Hypothesis H2a demonstrated the environment also affected the level of homophily shared between the group and the community and in turn influenced the size of the group. The KLA and PIRA are good examples of this point. When environmental conditions in Kosovo and Northern Ireland changed, to the detriment of the community in question, the community shared a greater affinity (homophily) with these groups. The increase in affinity (homophily) led to an increase in the membership of each of the groups. This was not the only factor, which influenced their growth. Each of these two groups also had safe havens to accommodate this growth, which presented the groups with favourable environmental conditions allowing this growth without risk.

In the case of the KLA, during its period of expansion, it controlled large areas of rural Kosovo and in the case of the PIRA, it had safe havens in the "no go areas", prior to Operation Motorman. In this environment, each group was able to develop quite complex structures. As the KLA grew, it gravitated to a traditional military structure, but the conflict ended before the re-organisation could be formalised. Significantly, when the PIRA lost these areas in 1972, after Operation Motorman, the size of the PIRA declined. With this decline, the structure of the group evolved. A simpler structure emerged. This occurred for a number of reasons directly related to the environment. Firstly, it was a reflection of the group's decline in membership. Secondly, the changed environment did not permit the PIRA to maintain the complexity of structure, which it had prior to Operation Motorman. The WUO is an opposite case. The WUO lacked affinity with the community and in reality had no significant safe havens, so, as the environmental factors, which had led to the

emergence changed or disappeared, the WUO size declined. These changing environmental conditions eventually led to the demise of the group. As such, there were many levels, with each part acting as a building block of a higher level**.** Therefore, each group constantly rearranges its building blocks or structure as it learns and adapts to changes in the environment, as highlighted in H3a and H3b.

A complex adaptive system is emergent and self-organising.

A key feature to emerge from this thesis is the dependent relationship between the groups, the connections the groups share with the community (homophily) and the various elements of the PESTELO environment. Hypothesises H1a, H1b, and H2a indicated the environmental factors were significant in the groups' emergence and growth. Geographic proximity and social affinity (homophily) were central to the groups' emergence. Geographic proximity and social affinity (homophily) created a shared experience of the environmental conditions and increased the probability of the interaction of the various individuals or entities who would come together to form the group. As such, the three case studies were found to be emergent.

Hypothesises H2a, H3a, and H3b showed each group studied was self-organising. Hypothesises H2a, H3a and H3b indicated the group's structural organisation was a response to the environment in which it operated and evolved to meet any challenges created by environmental change. For example, as the environmental conditions, which led to the creation of the WUO, changed to a state where they were no longer significant to the broader population, the size of the WUO declined to a point where the group ceased to exist.

In the case of the PIRA, as the environmental conditions within Northern Ireland were harsh, the size of the group increased, which led to the creation of new units to accommodate the new members. In these environmental conditions, whilst the PIRA controlled the "no go" areas, it was able to maintain a military style structure. When parts of the organisation lost these safe zones, the group devolved into an

organisation based on the cell or ASU. The size of the group also decreased. Those units of the PIRA, which still operated in friendly areas or safe zones, maintained their pre-existing structure, as there was no environmental imperative to change. As such, there was a clear relationship between the environment and the structural organisation of the group.

In the case of the KLA, initially the environment was harsh and it lacked support in the urban areas of Kosovo. In this period of its life cycle, the KLA maintained a cellular structure. As the environment changed with the Serbs using military force to maintain control of the province, the Kosovars gained international support. This combined with the KLA's effective control of rural areas, led the KLA to grow in size and evolve from a group of cells to a network, which was starting to adopt a military structure. Thus, the changing environment led to the growth in the size of the group, which self-organised into networks and in the final stages of the conflict, the emergence of military style structures.

The study of the three terrorist groups suggests, in terms of structural organisation in certain environments (harsh to friendly), the groups gravitated to common structural organisations. In very harsh environments, the cellular structure was common. As the harshness of the environment declined, the structure became a network of disconnected cells with a leadership cadre, followed by connected network structure and leadership, then a loosely connected military structure where command was based on consensus. In each of these models, leadership could only exercise control at a strategic level. In friendly environments, the structure would resemble a centralised military structure. The commonalities of the structures suggest these are points of dynamic stability and in terms of complexity theory are "Attractors". On paper, these groups technically had a hierarchical structure, but in reality the hierarchical command and control structure, did not exist. The leadership set the strategic goal of the group and the various elements of the group operated independently to achieve these goals.

Hypothesis H1a, H1b, H2a, H3a, and H3b indicate the three case studies displayed characteristics of emergent and self-organising systems. In conclusion, the three case studies share all five of Holland's characteristics of a complex adaptive system. As such, in these cases, the complex adaptive systems model is a useful tool to understand the factors, which led to the emergence of the terrorist groups and the influence on their structure.

Summary

The basis of the model used within this thesis resides in the complexity theory and the theory of complex adaptive systems. It does not consider terrorist groups in isolation, but as a part of an ever-changing dynamic environment. This environment is described by the individual political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, ecological, legal, and organisational environmental factors. The principles of emergence and self-organising embedded in this environment are used to describe the emergence of these types of groups and how these groups self-organise. Homophily (social affinity) is the rule of preferential attachment used to describe the underlying principle involved in emergence and self-organising. As part of complexity theory, the size of the group is considered in terms of the environmental and homophyllic factors. That is the level of homophily determines the size of the group. The changing environment can affect the homophily between the group and the larger population, and in doing so, influences the group's size. When there is more than one entity within a system, they will optimise their communications networks to ensure secure communications between each of the entities. Thus, the structure of the group is defined by its attempts to self-organise its communications network, so it can operate effectively as a cohesive entity over a geographic space and within a dynamic environment.

The thesis found terrorist groups emerge in environments where a social group has a grievance and concluded that there is no legitimate avenue within the environment to have this grievance addressed. This in itself is not sufficient for a group to emerge. As Crenshaw previously indicated, there needs to be a trigger event or events. These perturbations, within the environment, can lead to the radicalisation of individuals or groups. This radicalisation process does not necessarily lead to the formation of terrorist groups, but forms part of the process of emergence. The groups in the case studies emerged from other organisations who were engaged in a peaceful, political approach to bring about change. Those who formed the terrorist group had rationalised the peaceful approach was not

going to succeed and success could only be achieved through violence. The case studies highlighted radicalisation as a scaled process, with the uncommitted at the bottom, consisting of multiple levels, with the violent extremists at the top.

The case studies also highlighted the importance of homophily in the formation of the groups and the need for individuals to be in geographic proximity to permit them to communicate and come together, which is consistent with the principles of complexity theory and the theory of complex adaptive systems. The three case studies also indicated the size of the group, related to the amount of homophily the group had with the broader community, which was influenced by the PESTELO environment. The case studies indicated the environment creates a pool of recruits. The more adverse the environment was to a social group, the larger the pool of recruits and vice versa. The case studies also indicated; if the group did not possess safe havens, then this limited the size of the group.

The case studies demonstrated the groups' structure was dynamic, was dependent on size, geographic dispersion, and lacked day-to-day centralised control. The structure of the groups was consistent with those of complex adaptive systems. The elements of the groups acted in parallel, working towards the same goal. The structure of the groups was built on pre-existing social structural elements, which acted as building blocks for the higher levels of the organisation. The various elements of the groups adapted to meet the environmental challenges present to the groups over its life cycle, which led to the structure of groups evolving over time. It was found that groups, which were traditionally thought to maintain hierarchical structures, behaved more like networks, because of limitations placed on the communications channels by the environment. This led the groups to maintain a decentralised and distributed leadership model, where each of the elements worked independently towards the group's goal. This network structure, model of leadership and control, is consistent with a complex adaptive system.

It was not possible, based on the limited available data, to ascertain whether Dunbar's cognitive limits played a role in the structure of the groups, but the results were consistent with other anthropological social organisational theories. There were hints of a possible relationship, but there were also other explanations. This area of the thesis may be worthy of further study.

It would also be worthwhile to test a broader range of other terrorist groups to ascertain whether the complex adaptive system model can be applied more generally. The three case studies in this thesis and the work conducted by others in regards to Al Qaeda, suggest this could be the case. This model and method of analysis and study could have far broader application, providing additional insight into the emergence, structure, and demise of terrorist groups.

Bibliography

"The 38-Year Connection between Irish Republicans and Gaddafi." BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-12539372

"About the European Institute of Protestant Studies (Eips)." European Institute of Protestant Studies, http://www.ianpaisley.org/about.asp

"About Us - Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland." Grand Orange Lodge, www.grandorangelodge.co.uk/what-is-the-orange-order.

Abrahms, Max, and Philip B.K. Potter. "Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics." *International Organization* 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-42.

Agrawal, Ajay, Devesh Kapur, and John McHale. "How Do Spatial and Social Proximity Influence Knowledge Flows? Evidence from Patent Data." *Journal of Urban Economics* (2008).

Aguilar, F.J *Scanning the Business Environment*. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

AIVD. "From Dawa to Jihad: The Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order." edited by Ministery of Interior and Kingdom Relations: General Intelligence and Security Service, 2004.

Antonio, Emile de, Haskell Wexler, and Mary Lampson. "Underground." 87 mins. United States of America: Sphinx Productions, 1976.

Anzulovic, Branimir. *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide*. New York: New York University Press, 1999.

Army, U.S. "Dcsint Handbook No. 1.01, Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism." edited by US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2005.

———. "U.S. Army Dcsint Handbook No. 1 (Version 3.0): A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century ", edited by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2005.

Arquilla, J., and D. Ronfeldt. "Chapter 1 - the Advent of Netwar (Revisited)." In *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, edited by J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt: Rand Corporation, 2001.

"As Sixth Committee Commences Session, Delegates Once Again Call for Clear Definition of Terrorism, Consensus on Draft Comprehensive Convention." United Nations, http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gal3453.doc.htm.

Asal, Victor, and R. Karl Rethemeyer. "The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks." *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (2008): 437–49.

"Australia's Counter-Terrorism Laws: Questions and Answers." edited by Attorney General's Department: Australian Government.

Ayers, William. "Memoirs of an Anti-War Activist." In *2009*. Boston, MA, USA Beacon Press

Barber, David. *Hard Rain Fell : Sds and Why It Failed*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2008.

Beam, Louis. "Leaderless Resistance." *The Sedition* 12 (1992).

Beech, Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. "Observing Al Qaeda through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism." U.S. Army War College 2004.

Bekaj, A.R. "The K.L.A. And the Kosovo War: From Intra State Conflict to Independent Country." Berlin: Berghof Conflict Research, 2010.

Bell, J Bowyer. *The Secret Army: The Ira. Revised Third Edition*: Transaction Publishers, 2008.

Bell, J. Bowyer. *The Ira, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence)*, Cass Series on Political Violence. London: Taylor and Francis, 2013.

Berger, Dan. *Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity*: AP Press, 2005.

———. "The Weather Underground's Place in History: A Response to Jonah Raskin." *Socialism and Democracy* 20, no. 2 (2006).

Bertuglia, Christoforo Sergio, and Franco Vaio. *Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Bideleux, Robert. "History Today: Kosovo Conflict." History Today Ltd, http://www.historytoday.com/robert-bideleux/kosovos-conflict
Bieber, Florian, and Zidas Daskalovski, eds. *Understanding the War in Kosovo*. London: Frank Cass, 2004.
Bishop, Patrick, and Eamonn Mallie. *The Provisional I.R.A.*: Corgi Books, 1988.
Blanchard. "Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology." *Congress Research Services, The Library of Congress* (2004).
Bokhari, Laila., Hegghammer, Thomas., Lia, Brynjar., Nesser, Petter., Tønnessen, Truls H. "Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalization and Recruitment to Terror Networks." Paper presented at the Proceedings from a FFI Seminar, Oslo, Norway, 15 March 2006 2006.
Borum, Randy, ed. *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004.
Bott, Catherine, Jennifer Leetz, Shelley Kirkpatrick, and John Markey. "Radicalization: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Sorce Literature - Final Report.", 1-229: Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, 2006.
Bottero, Wendy, and Kenneth Prandy. "Social Interaction Distance and Stratification." *British Journal of Sociology*
54, no. 2 (2003): 177-97.
Bousquet, Antoine. "Complexity Theory and the War on Terror: Understanding the Self-Organising Dynamics of Leaderless Jihad." *Journal of International Relations and Development* (2011), www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/.
Boyne, Sean. "Uncovering the Ira." http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/org.html
Branson, Louis, and Dusko Doder. "Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant " *New York Times on the Web: Books* (1999), http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/b/branson-milosevic.html.
Brewer, G. "Heroes or Villians: The Tupamaros in Uruguay." *War in Peace*, 1984, 1212-13.
"Brief History of Chicago's 1968 Democratic Convention." All Politics, 1997.
Bruce, Gregor. "Definition of Terrorism Social and Political Effects." *Journal of Military and Veterans' Health* 21, no. 2 (2013): 26-30.
Burleigh, Michael. *Blood and Rage*. New York: Harper Colins Publisher, 2009.
———. *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2009.
Casson, Mark, and Marina Della Giusta. "Entrepreneurship and Social Capital: Analysing the Impact of Social Networks on Entrepreneurial Activity from a Rational Action Perspective " *International Small Business Journal 2007; 25; 220* 25 (2007): 220-44.
Centrex. "Guidance on the National Intelligence Model." edited by National Centre for Policing Excellence. Bedford: Centrex, 2005.
Chambers, John Whiteclay, ed. *The Oxford Companion of American Military History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Chandler, David, G , and I Beckett. *The Oxford History of the British Army*: Oxford University Press, 2003.
CIPD. "Pestle Analysis." (2008), http://www.cipd.co.uk/subjects/corpstrtgy/general/pestle-analysis?cssversion=printable.
Clark, Howard. *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*. London: Pluto Press, 2000.
Clinehens, Neal A. "Aum Shinrikyo and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study." Air University, 2000.
Cohen, Paul A. *History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis*. New York: Columbia Universty Press, 2014.
"Cointelpro." Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://vault.fbi.gov/.
"Counter Intelligence Program: Internal Security: Disruption of the New Left." edited by Federal Bureau Of Investigation, 168-70. Aubany: Federal Bureau Of Investigation, 1968.
Covill, Christopher J. "Greenpeace, Earth First! And the Earth Liberation Front: The Progression of the Radical Environmental Movement in America." Honours Thesis, University of Rhode Island, 2008.
Crenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-99.

———, ed. *Political Explanation*. Edited by Peter R. Neumann. 2 vols. Vol. 1, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism Volume 1 - Club De Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism. Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005.
———. "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." In *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, edited by David C. Rapoport, 13-31. London: Frank Cass Publisher, 2001.
Cunningham, Vinny. "Battle of the Bogside." 48 mins 49 secs. United Kingdom and Republic Ireland: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
Bórd Scannán na hÉireann, Northern Ireland Film and Television Commission See more 2004.
Davis, James Kirkpatrick. "Assault on the Left: The Fbi and the Sixties Antiwar Movement." Westport: Praeger Publications, 1997.
Debray, Regis. *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America*. London and New York: MR Press, 1967.
Dingley, James. *The Ira: The Irish Republican Army*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012.
"The Documentary Role of Television News." In *For all the World to See: Visual Culture and the Struggle for Civil Rights*: Center for Art, Design and Visual Culture, University of Maryland, Baltimore County and the Smithsonian National Museum of African American History and Culture, Washington, D.C. , 2013.
Dooley, Kevin J. "A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organization Change." *Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences* 1, no. 1 (1997): 61-96.
Dunbar, R.I.M. "Co-Evolution of Neocortex Size, Group Size and Language in Humans." *Behavioural and Brain Sciences* 16, no. 4 (1993): 681-735.
———. "The Social Brain Hypothesis." *Evolutionary Anthropology* 178-190 (1998).
Durmaz, Huseyin. *Understanding and Responding to Terrorism*. Washington: IOS Press, 2007.
Edwards, Aaron. *The Northern Ireland Troubles: Operation Banner 1969–2007*, Essential Histories. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011.
Elbaum, Max. "What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?" *Radical History Review*, no. 82 (2002): 37-64.
Ellis, John, and Michael Cox. *The World War I Databook: The Essential Facts and Figures for All Combatants*. London: Aurum Press Ltd, 2001.
Emerick, Y. *Understanding Islam*: Alpha, 2002.
EU. "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Concerning: Terrorist Recruitment: Addressing the Factors Contributing to Violent Radicalisation." edited by Commission of the European Communities, 1-15: The European Union, 2005.
Fiol, C. M., D. Harris, and R. House. "Charismatic Leadership: Strategies for Effecting Social Change." *Leadership Quarterly* 10, no. 3rd Quarter (1999): 449-82.
Flynn, George Q. "Conscription and Equity in Western Democracies, 1940-75." *Journal of Contemporary History* 33, no. 1 (1998): 5-20.
Forage, Paul C. "The Battle for Mount Pastrik: A Preliminary Study." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 14, no. 4 (2001): 57 - 80.
Frank, Aaron, Paul Hooper, and James Battin. "The Emergence of Social Complexity." *Santa Fe Institute Event Wiki* (2007), http://www.santafe.edu/events/workshops/index.php/The_Emergence_of_Social_Complexity.
Fromm, J. "On Engineering and Emergence." *arXiv.org* (2006).
Fromm, Jochen. *The Emergence of Complexity*. Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2004.
———. "Ten Questions About Emergence."
Fuchs, Cristian. "Some Implications of Anthony Giddens' Works for a Theory of Social Self-Organization." *Emergence* 4, no. 3 (2002): 7-35.
Ganor, B. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter." *Police Practice and Research* 3, no. 4 (2002): 287-304.
Gentry, Caron. "The Relationship between New Social Movement Theory and Terrorism Studies: The Role of Leadership, Membership, Ideology and Gender." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 2 (2010): 274-93.

Gershenson, Carlos, and Francis Heylighen. "When Can We Call a System Self-Organizing?" In *Advances in Artificial Life*, 606-14. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer 2003.
Gerwehr, S., and S. Daly. "Chapter 5: Al Qaeda: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment." The Rand Corporation, 2006.
Gilbert, David. "Love and Struggle : My Life in Sds, the Weather Underground, and Beyond." Oakland, CA, USA PM Press, 2012.
Gill, Paul, and John Horgan. "Who Were the Volunteers? The Shifting Sociological and Operational Profile of 1240 Provisional Irish Republican Army Members." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25, no. 3 (2013): 435-56.
Gleick, James. *Chaos*. London: Cardinal, 1987.
Grathwohl, Larry, and Frank Reagan. *Bringing Down America: An Fbi Informer with the Weathermen* 2nd ed. New York: Arlington House Publishers,, 2013.
Gurr, Ted Robert, ed. *Economic Factors*. Edited by Peter R. Neumann. 2 vols. Vol. 1, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism Volume 1 - Club De Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism. Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005.
———. "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases." In *Origins of Terrorism*, edited by Walther Reich, 86-102. Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Press Centre, 1998.
Hall, Simon. *Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.
Hamilton, Andrew. "'Discrimination and the Administration of Justice' from 'Perspectives on Discrimination and Social Work in Northern Ireland." Unversity of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/gibson4.htm#top.
Hancock, Landon. "Northern Ireland: Troubles Brewing." University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/landon.htm.
"Handbook for the Student League for Industrial Democracy - History, Program and Organisational Guide." edited by Student League for Industrial Democracy. New York 1935.
Hanneman, Robert A. , and Mark Riddle. "Introduction to Social Network Methods." *University of California, Riverside* (2001).
Hayden, Tom, and Robert Alan Haber. "Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society, 1962." Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) Archives and Resources 1962.
Heylighen, Francis. "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity." 1-26. Brussels: Center Leo Apostel, Free University of Brussels, Belgium, 2001.
Hill, R. A., and R. I. M. Dunbar. "Social Network Size in Humans." *Human Nature* 14, no. 1 (2003): 53-72.
"Historical Atlas: Population of the British Isle. ." 2013.
Hoffman, B. "Chapter One: Inside Terrorism." In *Inside Terrorism*: Columbia University Press, 1998.
Horgan, John, and Max Taylor. "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (1997): 1-32.
Horn, Robert E. "Models for Conflict and Terrorism - Psychological/Sociological." The Global Collaborative - The Nautilus Institute, http://www.globalcollab.org/gps/tools/visualisation-tools/#the-struggle.
Howard, Judith A. "A Social Cognitive Conception of Social Structure." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (1994): 210-27.
Huberman, A. M, and Miles, M.B. *Handbook of Qualitative Research*: Sage Publishing, 1994.
Hudson, R.A. "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes Terrorists and Why?" *Library of Congress* (1999).
Hughes, David. *The British Chronicles*. 2 vols. Vol. 1: Heritage Books, Great Britain, 2007.
Hunt, J.G., K.B. Boal, and G.E. Dodge. "The Effects of Visionary and Crisis Responsive Charisma on Followers: An Experimental Examination of Two Kinds of Charismatic Leadership." *Leadership Quarterly* 10, no. 3rd Quarter (1999): 423-48.
"If the Irish Army Had Entered the North in 1969… the Difference between an Invasion and an Incursion." The Cedar Lounge Revolution, http://cedarlounge.wordpress.com/2009/09/01/if-the-irish-army-had-entered-the-north-in-1969/.

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor V Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, IT-04-84bis-T (2012).
"Irish Republican Socialist Movement Twenty Years of Struggle." Irish Socialist Republican Movement (IRSM).
Jackson, B. A. "Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 2 (2006): 241–62.
Jacobs, Harold, ed. *Weatherman*: Rampart Press, 1970.
Jacobs, Ron. *1997*. New York: Verso, The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground.
———. *The Way the Wind Blew: A History of the Weather Underground* Verso 1997.
Jeffery, Keith. *Ireland and the Great War*: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Johari, J. C. *Comparative Politics*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1984.
John Foran, David Lane, and Andreja Zivkovic. *Revolution in the Making of the Modern World: Social Identities, Globalization and Modernity*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.
Johnson, Chalmers A. *Revolutionary Change*. Stanford: Stanford University Press,, 1982.
Johnston, Patrick B. "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns." *International Security* 36, no. 4 (2012): 47–79.
Jones, Seth G., and Martin G. Libicki. "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida." Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008.
Jordan, Javier, and Nicola Horsburgh. "Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28 (2005): 169-91.
Jordan, Javier, Fernando M. Mañas, and Nicola Horsburgh. "Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroot Jihadist Networks: The Madrid Bombings." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31, no. 1 (2008): 17-38.
Jordan, Jenna. "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation." *Security Studies,* 18, no. 4 (2009): 719–55.
Judah, Tim. "Kosovo Liberation Army." *Perception* September - November (2000): 61-77.
———. *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Juergensmeyer, Mark, ed. *Religion*. Edited by Peter R. Neumann. 2 vols. Vol. 1, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism Volume 1 - Club De Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism. Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005.
———. "Religion and the New Terrorism." In *A Political Terrorism - a Survey*, edited by Andrew T H Tan, 2006.
Kalish, Yuval, and Garry Robins. "Psychological Predispositions and Network Structure: The Relationship between Individual Predispositions, Structural Holes and Network Closure
" *Social Networks* 28 (2006): 56-84.
Kilcullen, David J. "Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 8 (2007): 647-66.
Killeen, Richard. *A Brief History of Ireland*. London: Constable and Robinson, 2012.
Kindig, Jessie. "Vietnam War: Draft Resistance." Pacific Northwest Labor and Civil Rights Projects, University of Washington 2008.
Kint, Jos, Denis Constales, and André Vanderbauwhede. "Pierre-François Verhulst's Final Triumph." In *The Logistic Map and the Route to Chaos*. Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer, 2006.
Kirby, Aidan. "The London Bombers as "Self Starters": A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30 (2007): 415-28.
Koktsidis, Pavlos-Ioannis, and Caspar Ten Dam. " A Success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Bulkans." *East European Quarterly* XLII, no. 2 (2008): 161 - 90.
"A Kosovo Chronology." Public Broadcasting Services, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html.

Krebs, Valdis, and June Holley. "Building Smart Communities through Network Weaving." (2006).
Krebs, Vladis E. "Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells." *Connections* 24, no. 3 (2002): 43-52.
Larry Grathwohl, Frank Reagan. *Bringing Down America: An Fbi Informer with the Weathermen* 2nd ed. New York: Arlington House Publishers,, 2013.
Latane, Bibb, and James H. Liu. "The Intersubjective Geometry of Social Space." *Journal of Communication* 46, no. 4 (1996): 26-34.
Latané, Bibb, James H. Liu, Andrzej Nowak, Michael Bonevento, and Long Zheng. "Distance Matters: Physical Space and Social Impact." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 21 (1995): 795-805.
"Learning to Live Together." United Nations Education, Scientific Organization (UNESCO), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/cultural-diversity/.
Lia, Brynjar , and Katja Skjølberg. "Cause of Terrorism - an Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature." In *FFI/RAPPORT-2004/04307*, 1-84. Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004.
Lieberman, Robbie. *Prairie Power : Voices of 1960s Midwestern Student Protest.* Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004.
"Listed Terrorist Organisations." Attorney-General's Department, Commonwealth of Australia https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx.
"The Living Room War: Television & Vietnam." The Paley Center for Media, http://www.paleycenter.org/education-class-living-room-war-television-vietnam/.
Lorenzo, Vidino. "The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 7 (2007): 579-92.
Lynn, Brendan. "Biographies of Prominent People - 'P'." University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/people/biography/ppeople.htm#paisleyi
———. "Ira Truce: 9 February 1975 to 23 January 1976 - Summary of Main Events." University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/truce/sum.htm.
Machtingter, Howard. "You Say You Want a Revolution." In these Times, http://inthesetimes.com/article/4251/you_say_you_want_a_revolution.
MacKenzie, Donald, and Judy Wajcman. "Introductory Essay: The Social Shaping of Technology." In *The Social Shaping of Technology.*, edited by Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman. Buckingham,: Open University Press, 1999.
Makarenko, T. "Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime: The Emerging Nexus." *The Centre for study of Terrorism and Political Violence* (2002).
Malcolm, Noel. *Kosovo: A Short History*. London: Pan Books, 2002.
Maltby, Clive. "Exposure: Gaddafi and the Ira." 46 mins 02 secs. United Kingdom: ITV, 2011.
Marion, Russ. *The Edge of Organisation*. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1999.
Marion, Russ, and Mary Uhl-Bien. "Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership." *Emergence* 5, no. 1 (2003): 54 - 76.
" May 4, 1886: A Riot Breaks out in Haymarket Square." edited by The History Channel website: The History Channel website.
Mayden, Richard L. "Species, Trees, Characters, and Concepts: Ongoing Issues, Diverse Ideologies, and a Time for Reflection and Change." In *Agricultural and Biological Sciences » "the Species Problem - Ongoing Issues*, edited by Igor Ya. Pavlinov: Intech, 2013.
Mayerhofer, Michael. "From Combatants to Cops: The Integration of Kosovo Liberation Army Veterans into the Kosovo Police and Its Impact on Police Performance." University of Vienna, 2013.
McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 3 (2008): 415-33.
McKittrick, David, and David McVea. *Making Sense of the Troubles*. London: Penguin Books, 2001.
McKittrick, David; McVea, David. *Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict.*: Penguin UK, 2009.

McLaughlin, Paul. *Anarchism and Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.
McMahon, Robert J. "The Political, and Geopolitics, of American Troops Withdrawals from Vietnam, 1968-1972." *The Journal of the Society for History of American Foreign Relations: Diplomatic History* 34, no. 3 (2010).
McPherson, Miller, Lyn Smith-Lovin, and James. M Cook. "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks." *Annual. Review. Sociology* 27 (2001): 415-44.
Meer, Hermann De, and Christian Koppen. "15. Characterization of Self Organization." In *Advances in Applied Self -Organizing Systems*, 227-46. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2005.
Melaugh, Martin. "Abstracts on Organisations - 'N'." University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/norgan.htm#nicra.
———. "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1969." University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch69.htm.
———. "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1970." University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch70.htm.
———. "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1971." University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch71.htm.
Mertus, Julie A. *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*. London: University of California Press, 1999.
"Military Conscription, Recruiting and the Draft." About.com, 2013.
Miller McPherson, Pamela A. Popielarz, and Sonja Drobnic. "Social Networks and Organizational Dynamics." *American Sociological Review* 57, no. 2 (1992): 153-70.
Miller, Nicholas. *Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture*. Edited by Richard Frucht. Santa Barbara: ABC-CIO Inc, 2005.
Mishal, S., and M. Rosenthal. "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organisation: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organisations." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28 (2005): 275-93.
Moloney, Ed. *A Secret History of the Ira*. London: Penguin Books, 2007.
Mozaffari, Mehdi. "The New Era of Terrorism: Approaches and Typologies." *Cooperation and Conflict* 23, no. 2 (1988): 179-96.
Mulaj, Klejda. "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31, no. 12 (2008): 1103 — 19.
Mullins, Sam. ""Global Jihad": The Canadian Experience." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25, no. 5 (2013): 734-76.
Mustafa, Muhamet, Mrika Kotorri, Petrit Gashi, Ardiana Gashi, and Venera Demukaj. "Diaspora and Migration Policies." Prishtina: Forum 2015, 2007.
Nesser, Peter. "Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 4 (2006): 323–42.
Neumann, M. L. R. Smith and Peter R. "Motorman's Long Journey: Changing the Strategic Setting in Northern Ireland." *Contemporary British History* 19, no. 4 (2005): 413 - 35.
Neumann, Peter R. "Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s." ICSR, Department of War Studies, http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/.
"Non-State Groups." In *The Military Balance*, edited by James Hackett, 461-82. London: Routledge, 2008.
"Northern Ireland - Why Justice Cannot Be Done.". In *Cain Web Services*, edited by Northern Ireland The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland. Londonderry: University of Ulster, 1962.
O'Brien. *The Long War: The Ira & Sinn Féin from Armed Struggle to Peace Talks*. Dublin: Press Ltd, 1993.
"Orange Volunteers." University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/oorgan.htm#ov.
Pape, Robert. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. Melbourne: Scride Publication Pty Ltd, 2005.
"Pentagon Riot of October 21, 1967." GlobalSecurity.org, 2011.

Perritt, Henry H. *Kosovo Liberation Army: The inside Story of an Insurgency*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinious Press, 2008.
Perritt, Jr., Henry H. *The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtissaari Plan*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Pettifer, James. "Kosovo Economy and Society after 1945: Some Observations." Camberly: Conflicts Study Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 2002.
Phillips, David L. *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*: NBC Publishing. Kindle Edition., 2012.
Piazza, James A. "Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?: An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 1 (2009): 62-88.
Post, J. M. "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind.*, edited by Walter Reich. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Post, Jerrold M., ed. *Psychology*. Edited by Peter R. Neumann. 2 vols. Vol. 1, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism Volume 1 - Club De Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism. Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005.
Post, Jerrold M., Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw. "The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25 (2002): 73-100.
———. "The Radical Group in Context: 2. Identification of Critical Elements in the Analysis of Risk for Terrorism by Radical Group Type." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25 (2002): 101-26.
Price, Bryan C. "Leadership Decapitation and the End of Terrorist Groups." *International Security* 36, no. 4 (2012).
Pula, Besnik. "The Emergence of the Kosovo “Parallel State,” 1988–1992." *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 32, no. 4 (2004): 797-826.
Rabasa, Angel M., ed. *Muslim World after 911*. Santa Monica, CA Rand Corporation, 2004.
Raskin, Jonah. "Looking Backward: Personal Reflections on Language, Gesture and Mythology in the Weather Underground." *Journal of the Research Group on Socialism and Democracy - Online* 20, no. 2 (2006): 121-35.
Reich, Walter, ed. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychology, Ideology, Theologies, States of Mind*. Washington, D.C: The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998.
Rudd, Mark. "Che and Me." http://www.markrudd.com/?violence-and-non-violence/che-and-me.html.
———. "Che and Me." http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/5_2/Rudd5_2.html.
Sageman, Marc. *Leaderless Jihad: Terrorism Networks in the Twenty First Century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008.
———. "Understanding Jihadi Networks." *Strategic Insights* IV, no. 4 (2005).
Saichev, A., Y. Malevergne, and D. Sornette. "Theory of Zipf’s Law and of General Power Law Distributions with Gibrat’s Law of Proportional Growth." *arXiv.org* (2008).
———. "Theory of Zipf’s Law and of General Power Law Distributions with Gibrat’s Law of Proportional Growth." *arXiv* (2008).
Sale, Kirkpatrick. *Sds*: Vintage Books, 1973.
Schevill, Ferdinand. *History of the Balkans*: Ozymandias Press, 2016.
Schmid, Alex P. "Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review." Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013.
Schmidt, Alex P., and Albert I. Jongman, eds. *Political Terrorism*: SWIDOC, Amsterdam and Transaction Books, 1998.
"Sds Plans for America's High Schools: Report by the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, First Session.". edited by Committee on Internal Security. washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.
"Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (Sanu) Memorandum." Roy Rosenzweig Center for History & New Media, http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/674.
Shapiro, J.N. "Organizing Terror: Hierarchy and Networks in Covert Organizations." (2005): 1-32.

Silber, Mitchell D., and Arvin Bhatt. "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat." New York: New York Police Department, 2007.
Smelser, Neil J., and Richard Swedberg, eds. *The Handbook of Economic Sociology*. Second Edition ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
Stake, Robert E. "Qualitative Case Studies." In *The Sage Hand Book of Qualitative Research Third Edition*, edited by Norman K. Dean and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 443-65. California: Sage Publications, 2005.
Starnini, Michele; Frasca, Mattia; Baronchelli, Andrea. "Emergence of Metapopulations and Echo Chambers in Mobile Agents." *Physics and Society* (2016).
"State Department Bombing by the Weatherman Underground: Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: United States Senate; Ninety Four Congress; First Session. January 31, 1975." edited by Committee on the Judiciary. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
Stern, Jessica, ed. *Culture*. Edited by Peter R. Neumann. 2 vols. Vol. 1, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism Volume 1 - Club De Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism. Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005.
"Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and Rights of Americans: Book Ill, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.". edited by United States Senate. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976.
Sutton, Malcom. "Malcolm Suttons an Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland " University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1969.html
Taarnby, M. "Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives." *Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus* (2005).
Taylor, Peter. "Provos: The Ira and Sinn Fein Episode 1." In *Provos*, 48 min 48 secs. United Kingdom: British Broadcasting Commission (BBC), 1997.
Thomas, Nigel; K Mikulan *The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992–2001*. Edited by Martin Windrow, No. 2 (Elite 146). Oxford: Osprey Publishing., 2006.
"Timeline: Serbia." 2012.
Totten, Samuel, and Paul R. Bartrop. *Dictionary of Genocide*. 2 vols. Vol. 1. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2008.
Tsekov, Georgi. "Sons of the Eagle: Clan Warfare, Organized Crime and State Disintegration in the Western Balkans." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* (2002): 1=24.
Varon, Jeremy. *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.* London: University of California Press, 2004.
Victoroff, Jeff. "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 3 (2005): 3-42.
Walker, Tony, and Andrew Gowers. *Arafat - the Biography*. London: Virgin Books, 2003.
"The Weather Underground - Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary - United States Senate - Ninety Fourth Congress - First Sessions." Washington: United States Senate, 1975.
"Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976." edited by Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1-210: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1976.
"The Weather Underground: State Department Bombing by the Weatherman Underground: Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: United States Senate; Ninety Four Congress; First Session. January 31, 1975." edited by Committee of the Judicary. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
Weiss, Benedict. *Collapse Theory: Yugoslavia, State According to Needs*: Portal Dpmovinski rat, 2011.
Wentz, Larry, ed. *Lessons from Kosovo: The Kfor Experience*: CCPR, 2002.
"Who's Who in Kosovo." Prishtinë/Pristina: International Crisis Group, 1999.

Wilhelmsen, Julie. "When Separatists Become Islamists: The Case of Chechnya." In *FFI/RAPPORT-2004/00445*, 1-72. Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004.

Williams, Clive. *Terrorism Explained: The Facts About Terrorism and Terrorist Groups*: New Holland Publishers, 2004.

Wolf, Tom De, and Tom Holvoet. "Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising When Combined." In *Engineering Self-Organising Systems*, 1-15: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005.

Yin, Robert. "Validity and Generalization in Future Case Study Evaluations." *Evaluation* 19, no. 3 (2013): 321–32.

"Yugoslav Government." http://www.countriesquest.com/europe/yugoslavia/government.htm

Zhou, W.-X. , D. Sornette, R.A. Hill, and R.I.M. Dunbar. "Discrete Hierarchical Organization of Social Group Sizes." *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 272 (2005).