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Leadership of Australian POWs in the Second World War

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LEADERSHIP OF AUSTRALIAN POWS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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CERTIFICATION

I, Katie Lisa Meale, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.

Katie Lisa Meale

5 November 2015.

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

Australian Imperial Force (AIF)

British Directorate of Military Intelligence (MI9)

GOC (General Officer Commanding)

Intelligence School 9 (IS9)

MBE (Member of the British Empire)

MO (Medical Officer)

MOC (Man of Confidence)

NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer)

OBE (Order of the British Empire)

OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)

POW (Prisoners of war)

RAF (Royal Air Force)

RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force)

RAN (Royal Australian Navy)

SBO (Senior British Officer)

MOC (Man-of-Confidence)

SMO (Senior Medical Officer)

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of one common aspect of the Australian POW experience across the Pacific and European theatres of the Second World War; leadership. The leadership of POWs is examined through a series of case studies based on three different types of leaders; positional (rank), professional (Medical Officers or chaplains) or emergent. Dependent on their leadership type, these men were responsible for a formal or informal group. Formal groups consisted of the POW population within a camp, compound, prisoner battalion or marching group. Informal groups were usually mates or acquaintances who found themselves in the same camp compound, working or marching group. Two other similar structures existed across the Pacific and European theatres; camp types and conditions. Four common camp types existed; transit, permanent, working camps or forced movement. There were three common camp conditions; relatively stable, volatile and extreme conditions.

Using this contextual framework this thesis' examination of POW leadership is structured through an examination and analysis of a leader's dominant behavioural style that he adopted in making his decisions and in the way he formed relations with and interacted with men and the captor. The work of leadership theorists, sociologists and behavioural scientists have informed the structure and composition of this study, but its disciplinary focus and methodology are historical.

Four leadership styles are examined in this thesis; authoritarian, transformational, democratic and self-sacrificial. The authoritarian leadership style was adopted by POW leaders in both theatres, albeit for very different reasons. Democratic and self-sacrificial leadership styles were unique to the context of captivity in relatively stable conditions in Europe and volatile and extreme captive settings in the Pacific Theatre. The only transformational leader examined in this thesis comes from the European theatre. The relatively stable conditions in Air Force Officer Camps combined with the particular circumstances and character of this individual, enabled this leadership style to be adopted.

For each leader examined in this thesis key questions have been posed. The manner in which they were selected for their leadership position, their behaviour and decisions as a POW leader and their interaction with and the relationship they formed with their

respective formal or informal group and the captor. These questions are posed and considered using a variety of examples of the leader's behaviour and his reactions to the respective challenges of leading men within their captive context.

Irrespective of the style a leader adopted, or the conditions they endured, a leader's ability to maintain his legitimacy from the perspective of his formal or informal group members impacted on his ability to perform and, in some cases, maintain his leadership positon. Some of the leaders examined in this thesis realised the fundamental importance of the group's perception of their decisions and the reasons for their decisions. These men worked hard to maintain the trust of their group. Others, either through choice or the nature of the volatile and extreme circumstances of their captive setting, chose to put their own interests and survivorship above the collective needs of their group. These leaders lost the trust of their men and in some cases their leadership position collapsed. The final chapter of this thesis examines what happened when the breakdown of leadership structures occurred in both formal and informal groups.

This thesis therefore, is essentially a study of human dynamics within the unique setting of POW camps. It considers what behavioural and leadership traits allowed positional leaders to retain legitimacy in captivity and the behaviour which led positional leaders to lose their leadership legitimacy. When the latter occurred, professional and/or emergent leaders responded to the physical and psychological needs of the group who, particularly in the Pacific Theatre, were powerless against the demands of their captor.

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Finally to my family, Wendy and Eric, Sally and Anita and Maddie, Oscar and Massie. This has been a long, hard journey which would never have been completed without your selfless love and support. Your belief has given me strength and hope throughout the hardest days and has allowed me come into the light.

DEDICATION

To Frederick Claude Meale, a proud member of the 2/19th battalion and to the men who served with him.

And to the leaders and followers whose story is explored in this thesis.

‘Rank does not confer privilege or give power. It imposes responsibility.’
Peter F. Drucker

‘People don’t follow discouraged leaders. They follow those who persist with hope.’
Rick Warren

‘It is easier to find men who will volunteer to die, than to find those who are willing to endure pain with patience.’
Julius Caesar

INTRODUCTION

The Second World War stands as the watershed in contemporary prisoner of war (POW) history. In a conflict fought on five continents involving 65 belligerent nations, some 35 million military personnel became POWs.[1] About 30 000 of these men were Australians.[2] Italy and Germany held about a quarter of them. The rest became prisoners of the Japanese.

Historical examination of the Australian captive experience has not been, to date, approached as a shared one. Instead, historians examine it through a strict division of theatres. The unstated assumption behind this is that the conditions experienced by prisoners in Europe and the Pacific were so different that they had to be dealt with separately. Yet historians, such as Bob Moore, Kent Fedorowich, Gerhard Hirschfeld, Peter Romijn, Pieter Lagrou and Hank Nelson, have argued that this division is largely a structural device imposed by historians and have called for studies that incorporate both theatres of war in their analysis.[3] In 1996 Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich began this scholarship by composing a metanarrative of the POW experience across both theatre of the Second World War.[4]

This thesis aims to continue this scholarship by responding, in part, to their call. It examines the captive experience of Australian POWs in both theatres of war from the perspective of leadership. Using case studies, the structure, styles, actions and legitimacy of men who were leaders of Australian POWs, and the men's responses to their leaders, are its focus. Despite differences in captors, captor imposed conditions and the other nationalities Australians shared imprisonment with, leadership was a

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[1] S. Mackenzie, 'The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II', *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 66, no.3, (1994), p.487.

[2] This statistic is derived from the figures given by Joan Beaumont in her entry to the Oxford Companion to Australian Military History. The precise number of Australian captives remains unknown. J. Beaumont, 'Prisoners of War', in P. Dennis et al (eds.), *Oxford Companion to Australian Military History*, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.474, 476-477.

[3] B. Moore and K. Fedorowich (eds.), 'Prisoners of War in the Second World War: An Overview,' in *Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War II*, (Oxford; Berg, 1996), pp.1-2; P. Romjin et al, 'Foreword,' in B. Moore and B. Hately-Broad (eds.), *Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: Captivity, Homecoming and Memory in World War II*, (New York: Berg, 2005), p.1; H. Nelson, 'Beyond Slogans: Assessing the Experience and the History of the Australian Prisoners of War of the Japanese', in K. Hack and K. Blackburn (eds.), *Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia*, (Oxford: Routledge, 2008), pp.28-29.

[4] Moore and Fedorowich, 'Prisoners in the Second World War,' pp.1-18.

common experience for all Australian prisoners, whether they were leaders or were members of groups led by others. Leadership formed the basis of their interaction with other prisoners and one of the dynamics of their captive experience. This thesis, therefore, offers one way in which the Australian captive POW experience of the Second World War may be examined in the same study. It is by no means that only way that the captive experience of Australians across the two theatres can be linked. More research focusing on uniting the captive experience of POWs is needed.

The question of leadership in captivity, of course, is not new. Inadvertently or intentionally, historians have examined men who were leaders, the role they had and how the prisoners they led as a group responded to them. Yet, these studies usually focus on one particular leader in one specific location. This thesis extends these studies by looking at selected examples of leadership across both theatres of war and the responses of those they led. Not all the leaders examined in this thesis are Australian. In the European Theatre, British leaders mainly led Australian prisoners. The reverse, however, was true for the Pacific Theatre where Australian prisoners were often under the command of fellow nationals.

Three broad categories of leadership existed in captivity: rank-based (or positional) leadership, professional leadership (medical officers [MOs] and chaplains) and emergent leadership. The success or failure of these leaders depended on their leadership style, which was based on their leadership vision and goal, how they used both and their ability to convey both to their followers. The primary focus of the thesis, then, is an analysis of how leadership was formed, maintained and legitimised, or lost, in selected settings. To do this, four leadership styles are examined: authoritarian, transformational, democratic and self-sacrificial. The collapse of leadership rounds out the work.

One of the key elements in evaluating the success or failure of leadership is the reaction of the groups to their leaders. Two groups are examined in this thesis, formal groups and informal groups. Formal groups were basically military units, either those that went into captivity or those formed by the captor, the Work Forces formed by the Japanese to work on the Burma-Thailand Railway being one example. Informal groups

were networks formed by the men within formal groups, a form of social interaction summed up by Australian POWs as mateship.

Thesis outline

The content and aims of this thesis has meant that it is not structured chronologically. Instead, it is structured according to the four leadership styles mentioned above. Within these styles, positional, professional and emergent leaders, and leadership within groups where relevant, are discussed. Each chapter examines the respective leaders' styles by explaining, through examples, their leadership vision and goals, their behaviour towards their men and how they attempted to protect their men from the captor. The success or failure of the leader in maintaining his group's structure, identity and collective purpose is examined from the perspective of his actions as well as the perspective of his men.

Authoritarian leadership is the first style explored in this thesis. This leadership style is traditionally associated with the military and was used by positional, professional and emergent leaders. The reasons why leaders retained this traditional military leadership style varied. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Australians at Changi POW Camp, for example, refused to even consider adapting his traditional military leadership style. Irrespective of his POW status, Galleghan considered that he and his men remained active soldiers. In contrast Captain Reginald William James Newton, leader of U Battalion D Force on the Burma-Thailand Railway, used a traditional authoritarian leadership style to ensure the survival of his men. In Stalag Luft III in Poland, British Squadron Leader Rodger Bushell applied an authoritarian leadership style for a very different purpose. Bushell used his reputation as an escape expert to become an emergent leader, inspiring British, Commonwealth and some American officers to voluntarily submit to his authoritarian control to plan what is now known as the Great Escape.

Transformational and democratic leadership is examined next. These leadership styles were adopted by leaders who were willing, and able, to depart from the traditional authoritarian military leadership style. The positional leaders examined in this section are from the European Theatre. British Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day is used to examine the nature of transformational leadership. Captured by the

Germans seventeen days into the war,[5] during his years of captivity Day was able to convince the men under his command that they could still contribute to the war effort through the escape and intelligence networks he organised. He gave the men under his command a sense of purpose. In accomplishing this feat, Day, arguably became the most successful positional leader amongst POWs in German captivity.

Democratic leadership was practised in two ways. In Germany, air force officers and non- commissioned officers (NCOs) were housed in separate compounds in the POW camps. This structural organisation was unique to the European Theatre. Lacking a positional leader, the NCOs elected their leaders. The two leaders examined here are Scottish Air Force Sergeant James 'Dixie' Deans and Australian Warrant Officer Alistair McGregor Currie. These men did not have the advantage of positional authority to exercise an authoritarian leadership style over their respective groups. They therefore adopted a democratic leadership style. Both men used a consultative leadership style based on committees and remained accountable to their formal group for their decisions. A democratic leadership style was also used by members of informal groups, or mates, in both theatres of captivity. Through relying on each other's strengths and skills, leadership shifted amongst, and between, group members based on the physical and psychological needs of the group.

Conditions in the Pacific Theatre were the reasons behind the emergence of the fourth leadership style explored in this thesis, self-sacrificial leadership, a selfless form of leadership where leaders place the group's interests above their own. The aggression and violence of the captor on the Burma-Thailand Railway, and during the death marches on Borneo, saw MOs, chaplains and emergent leaders adopt this leadership style. On the Burma-Thailand Railway, these leaders included MOs Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ernest Dunlop, Major Kevin James Fagan and Major Bruce Atlee Hunt. Two Australian chaplains also practiced this leadership style: Major Lionel Thomas Marsden and Private Harry Thorpe. Some work party leaders such as Petty Officer Raymond Edward Parkin and Flight Lieutenant Don Dewey also adopted a self-sacrificial leadership style, as did men amongst the work parties who helped

[5] S. Smith, *Wings Day: The Man who led the RAF's Epic Battle in German Captivity*, (London: Collins, 1968), p.14.

weaker and sick prisoners complete their work quota. On the forced marches from Sandakan POW camp to Ranau, when the Japanese showed little hesitation in killing the prisoners in their custody, Warrant Officer William John Kinder willingly adopted a self-sacrificial leadership style. These men chose to the put the needs of others above their own. They made this choice, even when they understood that it meant they would be physically punished, and possibly killed. Australian Corporal Rodney Edward Breavington's story rounds out the examination of self-sacrificial leadership.

The final chapter of the thesis examines what happened to formal and informal groups when leadership collapsed as leaders chose to protect themselves instead of their group members. In Europe it mainly occurred during the winter forced marches in 1944-1945. In the Pacific Theatre this reversion from leadership responsibilities was more marked, occurring on the Burma-Thailand Railway and in Borneo. The case studies in this chapter include Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes, Captain George Robin Cook, Warrant Officer William Hector Sticpewich, MO Captain Roderick Lionel Jeffrey and the men who decided that escape offered them the best chance of survival.

As the structure of the thesis is thematic rather than chronological, the following provides an overview of how Australians became prisoners, where they were held and how they were treated to provide context for the chapters that follow.

Prisoners of War in the Second World War

In both theatres of war, Australians were held as prisoners in four types of camps: transit, permanent (that is, the camp location remained static but not necessarily the prison population), work and special camps (interrogation centres, punishment camps or prisons). In the case of the forced marches to be discussed below, the camps were temporary, more akin to staging posts. Across these camps, three types of conditions existed: those that were relatively stable and those that were volatile or extreme.

The European Theatre

On 26 December 1940, at Giarabub in Libya, Italians captured the first Australian military prisoner of the Second World War.[6] This dubious honour belonged to Sergeant Kenneth Walsh, a member of the 6th Divisional Cavalry Regiment. Between 1941 and 1942, during fighting in the Middle East, a further 7115 Second Australian Imperial Force (AIF) officers and other ranks became prisoners.[7] Most were members of the 6th and 9th Divisions. The failed campaigns in Greece (April 1941) and then Crete (May-June 1941) resulted in a further 2065 and 3109 AIF captives.[8] These men became prisoners of the Germans.

Australian prisoners in Europe also belonged to the air force and navy. Germany held most of the 1476 air force personnel taken prisoner in this theatre.[9] These men usually belonged to one of three air force service groups, Royal Air Force (RAF), Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel attached to Bomber Command or the Second Tactical Air Force. Most of these men became prisoners after bailing out over Germany or occupied Europe. Then, during operations in British Somaliland, Crete, Tobruk, St. Nazaire and Anzio, the Germans, Vichy French and Italians captured a smaller number of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) personnel.[10]

Germany organised its prisoners according to arms of service, nationality and rank. Australians in this captive setting did not remain a distinct group. Instead, the Australians became part of a larger group of British and Commonwealth prisoners.

The German Wehrmacht (Army) controlled Allied Army prisoners. Officers were held in Offizierlager or Oflags. Most Australian Army officers were in four camps; Oflags VIIB (Eichateatt), VIB (Warburg), VC (Wurzach) and VA (Weinburg).[11] Australian

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[6] R. Reid, *In Captivity: Australian Prisoners of War in the Twentieth Century*, (Canberra: Department of Veteran Affairs, 1999), p.12.
[7] A. Field, 'Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,' in B. Maughan, *Tobruk and El Alamein: Australia in the War of 1939-1945,* series 1, vol. III, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1966), p.755.
[8] Field, 'Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,' pp.755-756.
[9] J. Herrington, *Air Power over Europe 1944-1945: Australia in the War of 1939-1945*, series 3, vol. IV, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial,1954), p.473.
[10] A. Walker, *Medical Services of the R.A.N. and R.A.A.F: Australians in the War of 1939-1945*, series 5, vol. IV, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1961), pp.79-80.
[11] L. Parker, Australian Prisoners of War in Europe - A.M.F Numbers in Enemy P.W Camps, p.1, AWM54 781/6/6.

other ranks were held in at least 24 Mannschaft-Stammlager or Stalags located in Germany, occupied Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania.[12] On 31 December 1943, the largest clusters of Australian other ranks were 1516 at Stalag VIIIB/344 (Lamsdorf), 1228 at Stalag XVIIIA (Wolfsberg) and 814 at Stalag XVIIIC (Hammelburg).[13] From Stalags, the overwhelming majority of other rank prisoners were sent to Arbeitskommandos (working camps). Most worked in coalmines, forestry and factories, or on farms and construction works. The Geneva Convention restricts the captor's ability to employ NCOs as labour,[14] but these prisoners can act as supervisors or, if they request, for proper remuneration they can engage in labour. In September 1942, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the German Armed Forces High Command responsible for prisoners, acknowledged these rights.[15] It created specific camps for non-working NCOs. Australian NCO's were mostly confined to two camps, Stalags 383 (Hohenfels) and 357 (Bremen).[16]

From 1941, the Luftwaffe assumed control of air force prisoners. Like their British/Commonwealth and American counterparts, Australian Air Force prisoners examined in this thesis were interrogated by the Luftwaffe at Dulag Luft (Oberursel), a transit camp. (The Luftwaffe interrogation centre was later relocated to Frankfurt and then Wetzlar). After a temporary stay in the Dulag Luft compound, they were transferred to other camps. From 21 March 1942, Stalag Luft III (Sagan) functioned as the central Luftwaffe camp.[17] The majority of Australian Air Force officers were held in three of its four compounds, East, North and Belaria.[18] Australian Air Force NCOs moved between five of the Luftwaffe camps; Stalag Luft I (Barth), III (Sagan), IV

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[12] Parker, Australian Prisoners of War in Europe, pp.1-2; Transcription of Cable 475, to Foreign Office from Geneva, Re STRENGHTS British P.O.W. Germany end NOVEMBER, 29 December 1944, pp.3-4, TNA:PRO:FO916/1156.
[13] Parker, Australian Prisoners of War in Europe, pp.1-2.
[14] Article 27, Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929, <http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/FULL/305?OpenDocument,> maintained by the International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed on 12 April 2014.
[15] A. Gilbert, *POW: Allied Prisoners of War in Europe, 1939-1945*, (London: John Murray, 2006), pp.145-148; W. Mason, *Prisoners of War: Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War*, (Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1954), pp.260-261; V. Vourkoutiotis, *Prisoners of War and the German High Command: The British and American Experience*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp.112-113.
[16] Parker, Australian Prisoners of War in Europe, p.2.
[17] Herrington, *Air Power over Europe 1944-1945*, p.477; O. Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time: RAF Bomber Command Prisoners-of-War in Germany, 1939-1945*, (London: Grub Street, 2003), p.70.
[18] Herrington, *Air Power over Europe 1944-1945*, p.477.

(Gross Tychow), VI (Heyedekrug) and VII (Bankau).[19] Due to overcrowding, some air force officers and NCOs, including Australians, were confined to a Stalag compound. It appears that Stalag VIIIB/344 (Lamsdorf) held the largest number of Australians Air Force NCOs.[20]

All navy prisoners, regardless of rank were confined to one camp, Marlag und Milag Nord (Westertimke). The Kriegsmarine (Navy) controlled this camp. L. Parker's records reveal that, over the duration of the war, 18 Australians were held there.[21]

Conditions in German camps varied. Most Australians had access to shelter, food, clothing and communal spaces. Air force officer camps experienced, on average, the best conditions. Army other rank prisoners assigned to coal mining Arbeitskommandos, and those in some of the permanent Stalags, experienced the worst conditions. In these camps prisoners were exposed to extremely dangerous work conditions, untenable work hours, food and water shortages, excessive overcrowding, derelict infrastructure, which, along with poor sanitation and hygiene, caused a range of health problems. In all German camps, Red Cross food parcels became a prisoner's saving grace. On its own, the German ration provided little nutritional value.[22] Food parcels, which arrived regularly from spring 1941 until about mid 1944, enabled prisoners to live above subsistence levels.

The tides of the war adversely impacted upon conditions in the camps. Allied bombing cut German transport lines and with it access to food (Red Cross parcels and German rations), clothing and fuel. These shortages were most acutely felt in the winter of 1944-1945.[23] This period coincided with an unsustainable rise in the number of

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[19] This pattern of movement is evident in the statements made by repatriated Australian Air Force prisoners. See AWM54 779/3/129 Parts 1-30.

[20] This compound held 74 Australian Air Force NCOs. See B. Collins, Statement by Repatriated Navy, Army or Air Force Prisoners of War taken at O.H.Q. RAAF, 12 April 1945, p.2, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 11; J. Kean, Statement by Repatriated Navy, Army or Air Force Prisoners of War taken at O.H.Q. RAAF, 12 April 1945, p.2, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 4; J. Saunders, Statement by Repatriated Navy, Army or Air Force Prisoners of War taken at O.H.Q. RAAF, 12 April 1945, p.2, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 4.

[21] Parker, Australian Prisoners of War in Europe, p.1.

[22] A. Walker, *Middle East and Far East: Australia in the War of 1939-1945,* series 5, vol. II, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1962), pp.416-419.

[23] W. Urke, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, 7 February 1945, pp.1-2, NAA:A705:163/1/743; A. Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, A.407822, 18 April 1945, p.1, AWM54

prisoners. At this time, most camps were overcrowded and prisoners were cold and hungry.

Germany's treatment of its prisoners largely reflected the latter's service arm. In Luftwaffe camps the Commandant, guards and Abwehr (security), for the most part, reacted only if provoked.[24] In some Oflags, Stalags and Arbeitskommandos, Commandants, guards and civilian bosses could be more temperamental. Across some camps unprovoked shootings occurred. This was usually the result of trigger-happy guards. However, some spiteful attacks did occur. In all camps, misbehaviour led to mass punishment. This usually took two forms; tampering with Red Cross food parcels and closing communal spaces. Some prisoners also endured reprisals. These reflected the German High Command's response to conditions endured by its own forces fighting and captured by the Allies. Reprisals included the chaining and handcuffing of prisoners' hands and the removal of basic hygiene items, cooking items, furniture and blankets.[25]

For most of the war, Germany largely adhered to the Geneva Convention[26] and treated its British, Commonwealth and American prisoners according to the principle of reciprocity.[27] The presence of visiting International Committee of the Red Cross and Protecting Power representatives undoubtedly influenced this behaviour. Notable exceptions, however, did occur. The most infamous was the killing of 50 of the Allied air force escapees who had participated in the Great Escape.

779/3/129 Part 11; Inspecting Power Report on Stalag VIIIB, 21-22 September 1944, pp.1, 4-5, TNA:PRO:WO244/27; H. Armstrong, Diary 28 December 1944 to 10 March 1945, AWM PR01247; A. Currie, handwritten notes in blue booklet, ff.7-31 AWM PR03373; I. Muckton., 'Life at Lamsdorf: An Extract from the Diary of I. Muckton,' in J. Holliday (ed.), *Stories of the RAAF POWs of Lamsdorf including Chronicles of their 500 Mile Trek*, (Holland Park: Lamsdorf RAAF POWS Association, 1992), pp.125-127.

[24] For an overview of the treatment of air force and army prisoners by the German Commandments and guards see Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.42-108; S. Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth: The Real Story of POW Life in Nazi Germany*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.111-124.

[25] For an overview of reprisals see Mason, *Prisoners of War*, pp.460-461; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, pp.243-249; J. Vance, 'Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943,' *The Journal of Military History*, vol.59, July (1995), pp.483-505.

[26] Vourkoutiotis, *Prisoners of War and German High Command*, pp.200-201.

[27] A. Kochavi, *Confronting Captivity: Britain and the United States and their Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), pp.2, 24.

For most prisoners in German custody, the final phase of their captivity was the most traumatic. As the Russian, British and American forces drew closer to POW camps, the Germans moved most prisoners in the line of the advancing enemy out of their camps. The reasons why the German High Command did this remain contested. Article 9 of the Geneva Convention makes the captor responsible for protecting detainees from the combat zone.[28] Yet this may not have the only reason for their movement. It is possible that Adolf Hitler saw these prisoners as his final bargaining tool.[29]

In January 1945, in the depths of a frigid winter, prisoners from fourteen base camps, and an unknown number of attached Arbeitskommandos, moved on foot (and if lucky by rail) from POW camps in East Prussia and Poland into Czechoslovakia or Germany.[30] In temperatures often below zero, these prisoners, including some Australians, trekked about 20 miles a day.[31] Some of these men marched for about three months, walking over 500 miles.[32] Lack of basic planning characterised these movements. Food and shelter were often wanting and columns divided and merged. Limited food supplies, poor health, loss of spirit and the chance to escape meant that many prisoners dropped out of the columns. Some of these prisoners stayed in hiding until the end of the war, while others were eventually picked up by advancing Allied forces. The prisoners who were last seen leaving a marching column, and who remained missing after liberation, were now either prisoners of the Soviet Union or presumed to be dead.[33]

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[28] Article 9, Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva.
[29] D. Foy, *For You the War is Over: American Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany,* (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), p.139; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.359.
[30] Analysis of information relating to movement of POW war camps in the path of the Soviet advance, not dated, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:AIR14/1239.
[31] Cipher from Berne to Foreign Office, No. 191, 26 January 1945, p.1, TNA:PRO:FO916/1156; Enclair from Berne to Foreign Office, No. 216, 1st February 1945, p.2, TNA:PRO:FO916/1156.
[32] Most Australians who endured this march were from Stalag 344 (Lamsdorf). For an overview of Australian Air Force NCOs experiences see J. Holliday (ed.), *The RAAF POWs of Lamsdorf including Chronicles of their 500 Mile Trek*, Section 5 "The March to Freedom," (Holland Park: Lamsdorf RAAF POWs Association, 1992), pp.193-294.
[33] L. Caplan, 'Death March Medic,' cited in J. O'Donnell, unpublished manuscript titled 'The Shoe Leather Express: The Evacuation of Kriegsgefangenen Lager Stalag Luft IV Deutschland Germany', pp.60-62, AWM MSS1437; D. Radke, 'Background to the March to Freedom, January 22 1945 to 30 March 1945', p.1, AWM PR86/181 Wallet 2; A. Crawley, *Escape from Germany: The Methods of Escape Used by RAF Airmen During the Second World War,* (London: HMSO, 1985), p.303; Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.121, 141-147.

By February 1945, about 250 000 British and American prisoners were on the road in three main groups.[34] In the south of Germany about 80 000 prisoners moved towards Nuremberg, Karlsbad, Eger or Czechoslovakia.[35] In central Germany, about 60 000 prisoners moved towards Berlin, Leipzig and Brunswick.[36] In northern Germany another 100 000 prisoners walked towards Hamburg and Bremen.[37] Then on 7 March 1945, Allied advances near the Rhine River forced prisoners in this area to move towards central Germany.[38] To the east, prisoners who had been placed by the Germans into one of the seven hastily formed prisoner reception centres were again forced onto the road because of the Russian advance.[39] Other prisoners, who had not reached a reception centre, never stopped walking. They simply turned around.[40]

The second phase of movement in the spring, again in response to Allied advances, proved almost leisurely. Warmer weather, more amendable guards, greater access to food and, in most cases, less than a month on the road, stood in stark contrast with the winter marches.[41] For prisoners and captives alike, one significant danger still remained; Allied strafing. Friendly fire killed an unknown number of prisoners, including some Australians. Some of these men were only days from liberation.

At the end of the war, Allied forces recovered 5378 Australian prisoners from Germany.[42] Prior to this, 812 had been repatriated, and another 97 had successfully

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[34] Field, 'Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,' p.814.
[35] Decipher from High Commission's Office, I.7948 SC 31, 8 March 1945, NAA: A816:67/301/134.
[36] *ibid*.
[37] *ibid*.
[38] Field, 'Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,' p.814.
[39] In March 1945 seven reception centres were operating. These were Stalag's IIIA (Lukenwalde), 357, XIB (Fallingbostel), XIIC (Hammelburg), VIIA (Mooseberg), XIIID (Nuremberg) and XIA (Altengrabow). Conditions in these camps ranged from sub-standard to notorious. All experienced excessive overcrowding and had limited food supplies. For an overview of conditions in reception camps see Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, pp.367-368; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, pp.459-460.
[40] O'Donnell, 'The Shoe Leather Express,' p.70; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.303; Herrington, *Air Power over Europe, 1944-1945*, pp.496-498.
[41] Telegram from International Red Cross Committee to British Foreign Office, no.612, 9th April, Re Report on the General Situation on 31st March 1945, pp.1-5, TNA:PRO:FO916/1182; Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.135-190; J. Nichol and T. Rennell, *The Last Escape: The Untold Story of Allied Prisoners of War in Germany, 1944-1945*, (London: Viking, 2002), pp.288-310.
[42] This figure is different from the figure cited above as it takes into account the number of Australian POWs transferred into German custody after the capitulation of Italy. See L. Parker, Australian Military Forces, Prisoners of War- against Germany and Italy. Summary of Recoveries and Deaths by Theatre of Operations in which Captured and Location of Prisoners of War, Table I, p.1, AWM54 781/6/6.

escaped and either rejoined allied lines or had gone in hiding for the duration.[43] Over the entirety of the conflict, 155 Australians died whilst in German custody.[44]

The Pacific Theatre

The Japanese captured over 22 000 Australians.[45] Most of these men, captured in the first three months of 1942, were members of the 8th Division. The Japanese took 1049 prisoners in New Britain, 1075 on Ambon Island, 14 792 in Singapore 1137 in Timor and 2736 in Java.[46] The Japanese also captured 354 RAN and 373 RAAF personnel.[47] Most of the Navy prisoners (320) were captured after the Japanese sank HMAS *Perth*.[48] The Japanese held Australian prisoners in camps in ten countries across their empire.[49] Broadly speaking, two types of camps existed: permanent camps and work camps. Conditions in these camps depended on their location, purpose and the war's progress.

Most Australians spent some time in a permanent camp. The largest were Changi (Singapore), Kuching (Sarawak), Sandakan (Borneo), Batavia (Java), Tantui (Ambon Island) and Hainan Island. In most of these camps, the initial stages of captivity were bearable. Most prisoners had enough food, water and shelter to survive. Japanese demands for labour, while strenuous at Sandakan, did not usually amount to a death sentence. Most Australian prisoners, particularly those at Changi, had enough energy to participate in recreation and educational activities.

For at least the first twenty months, prisoners who stayed in Changi camp had minimal interaction with the Japanese.[50] This changed in September 1943, when they were forced to begin construction on an aerodrome.[51] The pattern of captor/prisoner interaction in other permanent camps, however, was different. From the outset, most

[43] Parker, Summary of Recoveries and Deaths by Theatre of Operations in which Captured and Location of Prisoners of War, p.1.
[44] *ibid*.
[45] Reid, *In captivity*, p.20.
[46] Beaumont, 'Prisoners of War,' p.477; Reid, *In Captivity*, pp.19-20.
[47] Beaumont, 'Prisoners of War,' p.477; Reid, *In Captivity*, p.20.
[48] Walker, *Medical Services of the R.A.N. and R.A.A.F*, p.80.
[49] Beaumont, 'Prisoners of War,' p.479.
[50] The exception to this is the Selerang Barracks Incident. This is explained in Chapter 2.
[51] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 17 September 1943, Appendix 2B, AWM52 1/5/19/17.

Australians were exposed to violence. Perceived or real disobedience, or simply a prisoner's presence, could provoke a guard to attack. As the war continued, conditions in all the permanent camps deteriorated. The Japanese cut food rations, sometimes to the point of starvation. In almost every permanent camp, Japanese violence against the prisoners intensified in frequency and brutality. Changi Camp also operated as the central transit camp for the Pacific. Between February 1942 and December 1943, most of the Australians in this camp left with local and overseas Work Forces.[52] Those who remained were mostly sick and unfit. In total, 167 Australians died in Changi.[53]

The number of deaths in Changi was slight in comparison to the numbers of Australians prisoners who died in other permanent camps in the Pacific. Tantui (Ambon Island), Hainan Island and Sandakan camp experienced the most severe decline in conditions. There the Japanese deliberately starved the prisoners. Combined with sustained and increasingly sadistic violence and, in the case of Sandakan camp, labour demands, death rates quickly increased. At Ambon and Hainan Islands, 718 of the 807 Australian prisoners died.[54] At Sandakan camp, up until May 1945, about 700 had perished.[55] From late January 1945, those still alive at Sandakan were forced to endure the most horrendous experience of all those experienced by Australian prisoners in the Second World War.

On 24 January 1945, Major-General Manaki Takanobu ordered the prisoners in Sandakan Camp to march into the jungle.[56] Their destination was Ranau, some 256 kilometres away.[57] The prisoners left the camp in two groups, three months apart.[58] Men unable to keep up with the pace were shot. For starved, severely debilitated men, the result was inevitable. The first group set out with 470 Australian and British

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[52] For an overview of the departure of Australians from Changi see Walker, *Middle East and Far East,* pp.553-560.
[53] F. Galleghan, Prisoners of War Camps Singapore Report, Part 3, pp.14, 24, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 3.
[54] A. Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' in L. Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, series 1, vol. IV, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p.608; Beaumont, 'Prisoners of War,' p.479.
[55] Private K. Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, 14 November 1945, p.1, AWM 1010/4/17; W. Sticpewich, unpublished writings titled 'Excerpts from Important War Crime Trials', p.3, AWM PR00637 Folder 3.
[56] L. Silver, *Sandakan: A Conspiracy of Silence,* Third Revised Edition, (Burra Creek: Sally Milner Publishing, 2009), pp.188-189.
[57] Beaumont, 'Prisoners of War,' p.480.
[58] W. Sticpewich, unpublished writings titled 'Prelude to Sandakan- Ranau', ff.2-7, AWM PR00637 Folder 5.

prisoners.[59] Only 218 made it to Ranau.[60] The second group of 500 lost 360 men on the track.[61] When this group arrived at Ranau, only four Australians and two British prisoners from the first group were still alive.[62] At Ranau, the critically sick and dying prisoners were not allowed to rest. Some carried Japanese rations on long treks through the jungle. Others laboured on small projects. Physical abuse of the prisoners was widespread. In the end, out of a total of 620 Australians in the marches, only six survived.[63] These men survived because they escaped.

The Japanese use of prisoners as labour for Japan's war effort was not governed by the restrictions imposed by international law or subject to international inspection. It was also characterised by its brutality. Although most permanent camps had labour projects, the brutality associated with the use of captive labour was particularly evident with the Work Forces. The Japanese organised eleven of these using Australia, British, Dutch and American prisoners from Changi and Java.[64] These formal groups were sent to Japan and to work on the Burma-Thailand Railway.

Three Changi raised Forces went to Japan. The Australian components of these mixed British/Australian Forces comprised of 563 (C Force), 200 (G Force) and 300 (J Force).[65] These Work Forces were reinforced by Australians captured in New Britain and some of the survivors from Japan's greatest labour project, the Burma-Thailand Railway.[66] In Japan, Australians worked mostly in coalmines, factories, zinc factories, mills and on wharves.[67] Conditions in these settings varied. Most prisoners worked

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[59] Sticpewich, Excerpts from Important War Crime Trials, p.2.
[60] Eighty-eight of these men arrived after a stay of about a month at Pagination on the track to Ranau. Private K. Botterill, Testimony given at Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, May 1946, p.13, NAA:B4163 Reel 4 Part 1: Lance Bombardier W. Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, 19 November 1945, p.5, AWM 54 1010/4/107.
[61] T. Mort, Interrogation Report submitted by Capt T.L Mort obtained from the four Aus recovered PW ex RANAU, Part II, p.2, AWM PR00637 Folder 1.
[62] Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.4.
[63] In addition to the Australians marching, there were 217 British POWs. None of these men survived. See Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.604; P. Ham, *Sandakan: The Untold Story of the Sandakan Death Marches*, (Sydney: William Heinemann, 2012), pp.274, 344.
[64] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.546; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, pp.557-559.
[65] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.524-525; Walker, *The Middle East and Far East*, pp.651-652. Other smaller groups of Australians were also transferred to Japan. See Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.616-617.
[66] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.612, 614.
[67] An unknown number of RAN prisoners were kept in a permanent camp at Ofuna. Walker, *Medical Services of the R.A.N and R.A.A.F*, pp.82-83.

long hours, suffered from the cold, food shortages, exhaustion and some violence. In Japan, 190 Australian Army prisoners died.[68]

It was the Burma-Thailand Railway, however, that claimed the most casualties. In 1943, the Japanese sought to build what the British had deemed impossible, a 421km extension of the existing Moulmein-Yealong railway line through virgin malaria ridden jungle.[69] For this task, the Japanese recruited its most expendable labour source, military prisoners and civilians conscripted from occupied countries. To build the railway, the Japanese provided picks, shovels, hand held drills and dynamite, along with the occasional compressor and elephant. Starvation, beatings, monsoonal conditions and tropical diseases combined to create a hell on earth for these men. In total, one in four (2815) Australian prisoners died toiling for the Japanese on this project.[70]

It has been estimated that the labour force for the project consisted of between 61 000 and 64 000 POWs and 270 000 civilians.[71] About 13 000 Australians were part of that labour force.[72] The Australians were divided between nine Work Forces. Four worked on the Burma side of the project. Three of these groups were Black Force (593), Williams Force (number unknown) and a group led by Major L. J. Roberston (385), raised in Java.[73] Black Force laboured at Beke Taung (kilo 40), Williams Force at Tanyin (Kilo 35). Roberston's group, mostly survivors from HMAS *Perth*, were combined with the Changi raised A Force. A Force, comprised of 3000 Australians, was divided into three battalions.[74] These men laboured at Victoria Point, Mergui, Tavoy and Thanbyuzyat. A Force left Changi on 15 May 1942, before the Japanese

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[68] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.642.
[69] For reference to this statistic see Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.545.
[70] G. Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific – the Powerful Untold Story*, (London: Robson, 1995), p.222.
[71] P. Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, (Ringwood: Viking/Penguin, 1992), p.397; S. Flower, 'Captors and Captives on the Burma-Thailand Railway,' in B. Moore and K. Fedorwich, *Prisoners of War and Their Captors in World War II*, (Oxford: Berg, 1996), p.240; G. McCormack and H. Nelson (eds.), 'Introduction,' in *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History*, (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p.1.
[72] McCormack and Nelson (eds.) 'Introduction,' in *The Burma-Thailand Railway*, p.1.
[73] Black Force also contained 109 Americans. Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.546; Australian War Memorial Encyclopaedia, General information about Prisoners of the Japanese, <http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/POW/general_info.asp,> maintained by the Australian War Memorial, accessed on 10 April 2014.
[74] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.541.

separated officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel from the other prisoners.[75] Major General Cecil Arthur Callaghan appointed Brigadier Arthur Leslie Varley to lead it.[76] Varley was, therefore, the highest-ranking positional leader of any nationality on the Burma-Thailand Railway.

On the Thailand side of the Burma-Thailand Railway, Australians were represented in five Forces. Four Forces, D, F, H and H.6, were raised in Changi.[77] These Forces were comprised of 2222, 3662, 600 and 68 Australians respectively.[78] With the exception of H.6 Force, each Force had at least one Australian battalion.[79] H.6 Force was different. On Japanese orders, it consisted of mainly of Australian and British officers.[80] The fifth Work Force came from Java. Dunlop Force, named for its leader Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Edward Dunlop, was made up of 900 mixed Australian Army, Air Force and Navy prisoners and an unknown number of American survivors from the USS *Houston*.[81] On their arrival in Thailand, the Japanese expanded Dunlop Force by two battalions. The first compromised of 377 Australians, the second of 663 Dutch.[82] For reasons unknown, while in Thailand, H and F Force remained under Malayan-Japanese administrative control.[83] This order had devastating consequences. It meant that H and F Force were not allowed to access supplies from Japanese occupied Thailand. Instead, they had to wait on supplies from Japanese occupied Malaya.[84]

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[75] Galleghan, 'Prisoners of War Camps Singapore Report,' p.3; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.541.
[76] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.519.
[77] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.525; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, pp.558-559.
[78] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.525, 585.
[79] Dunlop Force had four battalions (O, P, Q, R), D Force had three battalions (S, T and U) and F Force had five battalions named after their positional leaders. These battalions were Pond, Tracey, Johnson, Abramovitch and Parry/Lewis. H Force had a single Australian Battalion referred to as the Australian Battalion. See H. Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand 5 May 1943- 23 Dec 1943, p.1, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5; E. Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop: Java and the Burma-Thailand Railway 1942-1945*, (Camberwell: Penguin, 2005), p.184; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, (Crows Nest: Acme Office, 1975), pp.571, 646.
[80] H. Humphries, Statement regarding Journeys and Employments of Prisoners of War known as H Force in Thailand, May-Dec 1943, 5th Feb 1945, Appendix 2, p.2, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5; F. Ball, H.6 Officers Party, 11 May 1944, Appendix 2, p.1, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5.
[81] E. Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of P.O.W. Working Camps and Hospitals in THAILAND, p.1, AWM54 554/5/5; R. Parkin, *Into the Smoother: A Journal of the Burma-Thailand Railway*, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1963), p.1.
[82] Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of P.O.W. Working Camps and Hospitals in THAILAND, p.1.
[83] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, p.654.
[84] Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.5; K. Kappe, History of F Force, 5 September 1945, Appendix 1, p.1, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 2; R. Oakes, unpublished writings titled 'Manuscript', p.319, AWM MSS1037.

Most of these supplies never arrived. This meant that the ration allowance for these Australians was significantly below subsistence level. The lack of rations, combined with poor leadership and violence from the captors, resulted in a higher rate of mortality for Australian POWs in H and F Force in comparison to other Australian Work Forces.[85]

For most Australians held by the Japanese, captivity was a prolonged and sometimes agonising struggle. For some it resulted in the most difficult challenge of all: facing death with dignity. In total, 8031 Australians prisoners in Japanese custody died.[86] Many of those that did survive bore physical and psychological scars for the rest of their lives.

[85] R. Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force – Changi 15 May 1944, p.27, AWM 54 554/11/4 Part 5; Sweeting, 'The Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.581, 585.
[86] Beaumont, 'Prisoners of War,' p.477.

CHAPTER 1: LEADERSHIP, SOURCES, CASE STUDIES, AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter establishes the theoretical, contextual and structural foundations required to explore leadership behind the wire. It falls into three sections. The first examines attempts to define leadership, the group, human dynamic and survivorship studies that have informed the analysis of the captive experience in this thesis and the theoretical approach used in its analysis. The second section outlines the sources used and the selection of case studies, and the third is a review of the relevant literature.

Leadership studies

Leadership studies and theory is an attempt to understand how leadership works and why some leaders are successful while others are not. Scholars in this field, however, have not been able to agree on a definition or description of leadership.[1] Robert Taylor and William Rosenbach best summarise the state of the literature, 'There are as many descriptions of leadership as there are people who write about it.'[2]

Sociologists and behavioural scientists developed leadership studies to understand the dynamics of human interaction within groups.[3] Leadership scholars agree that a leader is an individual who, in a particular situation or task, is responsible for a group of people.[4] The complexity stems from understanding how leaders are identified amongst small or large groups, the behavioural pattern they apply and how leaders maintain their status when the variables of their context and group dynamics are factored into an analysis of their behaviour.[5]

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[1] R. Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, Second Edition, (Fortworth Texas: Harcourt College Publishers, 2002), pp.4-6; J. Rost, *Leadership for Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Praegar, 1993), pp.6-11, 38-65.
[2] R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), 'Introduction', in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.1.
[3] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.4-26; D. Fleet and G. Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach, *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp.65-67; A. Lussier and C. Achua, *Leadership: Theory, Application and Skill Development*, (Ohio: South-Western College Publishing Thompson Learning, 2001), pp.4-16.
[4] C. Holloman, 'Leadership and Headship,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.98.
[5] Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.65-90; R. House and R. Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership: Quo Vadis?', *Journal of Management*, vol.23, no.3, 1997, pp.409-473.

Scholars have identified different types, or categories, and styles of leadership. Leadership type depended on how the leader acquired his or her position, that is, through appointment based on seniority, skills and/or experience or natural emergence from the group.[6] The latter type of leader, known as emergent, requires the consent of group members before they can function as its leader. Regardless of how leaders are selected, each leader will apply a behavioural model in making his or her decisions, sharing them and enforcing them amongst their group members.[7] These behavioural patterns, called leadership styles, are discussed below. The type and style of a leader will depend on the setting, purpose and goal of the leader and his or her group. Although professional and business studies are a significant element in the field,[8] it has also been a part of how western militaries have tried to understand what made past leaders successful and how future leaders can be trained more effectively and efficiently.[9]

Until the Second World War, the trait approach, which identifies character traits of successful leaders, was dominant.[10] During the 1940s, however, scholars began to focus on the importance of variables in defining leadership. Subsequent research developed five main theoretical approaches to leadership. The behavioural approach seeks to identify the different behavioural patterns of successful leaders.[11] The

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[6] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.441-442; W. Dimma, 'On Leadership', in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.54; A. Mant, *Intelligent Leadership*, (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp.25-27.
[7] T. Cronin. 'Thinking about Leadership,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.199; Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.72-81; J. Jiang, 'The Study of the Relationship between Leadership Style and Project Success,' *American Journal of Trade and Policy*, vol.1, issue 1, June 2014, pp.51-52.
[8] For example of the range of application of leadership studies to different sectors see J. Crook, 'The Evolution of Leadership: A Preliminary Skirmish,' in C. Graumann and S. Moscovici (eds.), *Changing Conceptions of Leadership*, (New York: Springer-Vales, 1986), pp.11-31; E. Potter and F. Fielder, 'The Utilization of Staff Member Intelligence and Experience under High and Low Stress', *Academy of Management Journal*, vol.24, no.2, 1981, pp.361-376; P. Ribbins and H. Gunter, 'Mapping Leadership Studies in Education: Towards a Typology of Knowledge Domains, *Educational Management Administration Leadership*, vol.30, no.4, October 2002, pp.359-385.
[9] The British and American military have been at the forefront of this research. For example see L. Matthews and D. Brown (eds.), *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989); R. Taylor et al, *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, Sixth Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009).
[10] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.43-50; J. Fleenor, 'Trait Approach to Leadership,' *Encyclopaedia of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Sage Publications, 2006), pp.830-832.
[11] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.50-55; Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.67-70

contingency, or variable approach, focuses on examining the impact of external factors on leaders and how they react to them.[12] The visionary or charismatic approach focuses on the methods and strategies leaders use to both motivate their followers and to gain and maintain loyalty from their group members.[13] The fourth approach is an extension of the visionary approach. It examines how leaders apply different emotional intelligences to gain the loyalty of their group members and inspire them to give their best efforts to achieving or even changing the group goal.[14] The most recent approach, developed during the 1980s, links specific traits with the identification of competent leaders within the context of corporate business.[15]

Some leadership scholars have used only one of the approaches outlined above. Others, however, recognising the complex nature of leadership, have merged some of these approaches together to create an integrative way of examining the behaviour of leaders and the way they interact with group members in response to their particular setting.[16] Irrespective of which approaches have been used, leadership studies have increasingly adopted a scientific approach to their studies since the 1950s.[17] This methodology develops hypotheses of how leaders will act in a particular situation, tests the hypotheses using either experimental or real life situations, and writes up the results in terms of affirming or questioning the hypotheses within the broader context of leadership theory. Many leadership scholars believe that this is an objective approach that can identify and train future leaders**,** particularly in the commercial sector.[18] Mats Alvesson, however, in 1996 suggested that the objective methodology sought by scholars was impossible.[19] Scholars had to acknowledge the subjectivity of

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[12] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.78-101; Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.70-74.
[13] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.141-146; Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.74-78
[14] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, p.148-227; House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership,' pp.439-443.
[15] House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership', pp.443-462; Jiang, 'The Study of the Relationship between Leadership Style and Project Success,' pp.51-55.
[16] Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.80-81; House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership,' pp.439-443; Lussier and Achua, *Leadership*, p.17.
[17] The scientific methodology in leadership studies has been used since the introduction of the behavioural approach. See Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.50-140.
[18] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.50-227; House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership,' pp.411-443.
[19] M. Alvesson, 'Leadership Studies: From Procedure and Abstraction to Reflexivity and Situation,' *Leadership Quarterly*, vol.7, no.4, 1996, pp.445-482.

their interpretation of the data and how they use their findings to engage with, challenge, affirm or extend leadership theory.

Despite the different theoretical approaches to studying leadership, the one approach that has been consistently used, is still used and is the most relevant for this thesis is the trait approach. The trait approach adopts an empirical methodology to identify traits that make successful leaders by listing the personal, physical and intellectual traits common to great political and military leaders.[20]

This approach dates back to ancient Chinese scholars. The Lao-tzu (wise leader) was 'selfless, hardworking, honest, able to time the appropriateness of actions, fair in handling conflict and able to "empower" others.'[21] Similar empirical studies were penned by ancient Greek scholars including Plato and Aristotle, and by scholars from medieval Europe, most notably Machiavelli.[22] The modern adaptation of this approach to leadership began with the 'Great Man Approach' to history developed by Thomas Carlyle in the 1840s.[23] By the 1860s a more complex level of trait scholarship had developed. Scholars were no longer satisfied with identifying leadership traits, but attempted to ascertain if leadership traits were innate or the result of education and experiences.[24]

In 1974 Ralph Stodgill reviewed the findings of this approach to leadership. He concluded that studies conducted using the trait approach between 1948 and 1970 had identified six essential leadership traits.[25] These were 'general intelligence, initiative, interpersonal skills, self-confidence, drive for responsibility and personal integrity.'[26]

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[20] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.43-50; Fleenor, 'Trait Approach to Leadership,' pp.830-832; Lussier and Achua, *Leadership*, pp.16-41. For example of application of trait approach see J. Luvaas, 'Napoleon on the Art of Command,' in L. Matthews and D. Brown (eds.), *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989), pp.18-25; E. Myer, 'Leadership: A Return to Basics,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp.79-84.
[21] S. Zaccaro et al, 'Leadership Traits and Attributes' in J. Antonakis et al, *The Nature of Leadership*, (Thousand Oakes Texas: SAGE Publications, 2004), p.101.
[22] *ibid*., pp.101-102.
[23] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, p.43; Fleenor, 'Trait Approach to Leadership,' p.830; Zaccaro et al, 'Leader Traits and Attributes,' p.104.
[24] Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' p.67; Zaccaro et al, 'Leader Traits and Attributes,' p.102.
[25] R. Stogdill, *Handbook of Research: A Survey of Theory and Research*, (New York: Free Press, 1974).
[26] *ibid*., pp.43-44.

A third edition of his study written by Bernard Bass in 1990, after Stodgill passed away in 1978, added three more essential traits to his list; 'aggressiveness, independence [and a] tolerance for stress.'[27]

The trait approach, however, had come under sustained criticism in the 1940s, coinciding with new approaches to the study of leadership based on the scientific research methods described above.[28] Critics were mainly concerned that a leadership model that examined leadership traits in isolation from the reaction and interaction leaders with their followers, and the achievement or failure of leaders to direct their group towards achieving their goals, lacked legitimacy. Stodgill argued that '[a] person does not become a leader by virtue of the possession of some combination of traits.'[29] The apparent methodological and substantive failure of trait leadership theory, therefore, had led to it being replaced by the more scientifically based leadership theories noted above.

Despite these criticisms, there has been a resurgence of trait theory since the 1980s.[30] New trait scholars combine empirical research with a scientific methodology to identify the traits of past and current leaders.[31] These scholars have largely focused on identifying particular cognitive, personality, motivational and social traits combined with the problem solving skills of successful leaders.[32] The new form of trait leadership theory is, therefore, an integrative theoretical model. It attempts to identify the behavioural, ethical, visionary and contingency traits of successful leaders. In this way, the new trait model combines past theoretical approaches to offer an empirical study of real leaders in real situations although its critics, such as Stephen Zaccaro,

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[27] B. Bass cited in Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, p.44. For reference to Bass' study see B. Bass, *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications,* Third Edition, (New York: Free Press, 1990).
[28] House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership,' pp.410-411; Rost, *Leadership for the Twenty-First Century*, pp.22-23; Zaccaro et al, 'Leader Traits and Attributes,' pp.106-107.
[29] R. Stogdill cited in Zaccaro et al, 'Leader Traits and Attributes', p.102.
[30] House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership,' pp.411-416; Zaccaro et al, 'Leader Traits and Attributes,' p.107.
[31] House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership,' pp.413-414; S. Zaccaro, 'Trait-based Perspectives of Leadership,' *American Psychologist*, vol.62, no.1, January 2007, pp.6-16; Zaccaro et al, 'Leader Traits and Attributes,' pp.107-109.
[32] P. Northhouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, Sixth Edition, (Thousand Oakes, Texas, SAGE Publications, 2012), pp.22-24; Zaccaro et al, 'Leader Traits and Attributes,' pp.109-118.

Cary Kemp, Paige Bader and John Fleenor, have argued that the methodological concerns raised in the 1940s largely remain the same.[33]

New trait scholars have created new lists of traits common to successful leaders. According to Robert Lussier and Christopher Achua these traits fall into five categories: leadership and extraversion, agreeableness, adjustment, conscientiousness and the ability to be open to new experiences.[34] Although these categories, and the traits listed within them, reflect the fact that the focus of this research was on leaders in business, military historians and personnel have used these in their analyses.

American General Edward Meyer, for example, used his experience in the Korean War and as an officer on the Chief of Staff to identify 'character, honesty, loyalty, courage, self-confidence, humility and self-sacrifice'[35] as common traits of successful military leaders in battle. Yet, theorists and retired military leaders have emphasised that it is impossible for military leaders to be born with leadership traits, they have to be taught.[36] Others, such as the American General Samuel Marshall, who was chief of Army during the Second World War and the Korean War, disagrees, arguing that 'not everyone can be taught…in most people success or failure is caused more by mental attitude then mental capacity. Many are unwilling to face the ordeal of thinking for themselves and of accepting responsibility for others.'[37] Marshall argued that what was required for a successful military leader was 'application to duty and thoroughness in all undertakings, along with that maturity of spirit and judgment that comes with percept, by kindness, by study, by watching, and above all, by example.'[38]

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[33] Fleenor, 'Trait Approach to Leadership' p.831; Zaccaro et al, 'Leader Traits and Attributes,' p.103.
[34] Lussier and Achua, *Leadership*, p.35.
[35] Meyer, 'Leadership,' pp.83-84. Also see J. Kouzes and B. Posner, 'The Credibility Factor: What People Expect of Leaders,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Leadership*, Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp.133-137; J. Stockdale, 'Educating Leaders,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp.65-69; J. Stokesbury, 'Leadership as an Art,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach, *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp.5-13; B. Ridgeway, 'Leadership,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Leadership*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp.22-31.
[36] S. Marshall, 'Mainsprings of Leadership,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach, *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp.71-72; Meyer, 'Leadership', p.84.
[37] Marshall, 'Mainsprings of Leadership', p.72.
[38] *ibid*., p.74.

Of the various approaches and models discussed above, the integrative empirical methodology of trait leadership theory is best suited for this thesis. It allows an evaluation of the behaviour of military leaders in captivity by examining their characteristics and behaviour, interactions with their group and captor, and their approaches to achieving their respective goals.

Leadership categories and leadership legitimacy

Two distinct types of leaders have been identified in the theoretical literature.

The first is leaders who have positional power.[39] These leaders, usually appointed because of their seniority or skills, have the ability to give rewards to their subordinates and determine punishment when subordinates do not follow their instructions.[40] Depending on the group's context, purpose and composition, a positional leader may also be elected from the group members. According to studies conducted by behavioural scientists Alvin Gouldner, Edwin Hollander, Stephen Wilson, Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, the tenure of elected positional leaders is dependent on retaining the support of their group.[41] Unlike a positional leader, who because of seniority or skill, has been awarded a leadership position, elected positional leaders are highly accountable to their group for all of their decisions. As a consequence, if the elected leader loses the trust of the group, a new positional leader may be nominated from the group members.

The second type of leader is an emergent leader who challenges the positional leader.[42] Instead of relying on positional power, an emergent leader is given leadership status voluntarily when members of a group see an individual's behaviour as deserving the status of leader. Emergent leaders lack official sanction and are usually found within

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[39] Daft, *The Experience of Leadership,* pp.441-442; Dimma,' On Leadership', p.54.
[40] Holloman, 'Leadership and Headship,' p.98.
[41] D. Cartwright and A. Zander, (eds.), 'An Introduction: Leadership and Group Performance', in *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory,* Second Edition, (London: Tavistock, 1960), pp.499-500, 504-505; A. Gouldner (ed.), Contexts: Informal Groups,' in Studies in *Leadership: Leadership and Democratic Action,* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp.100-103; E. Hollander, *Leadership Dynamics: A Practical Guide to Effective Relationships,* (New York: The Free Press, 1978), pp.4-16, 45-52; S. Wilson, *Informal Groups: An Introduction,* (Englewood Cliffs New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp.142-158.
[42] Daft, *The Experience of Leadership,* pp.442; Holloman, 'Leadership and Headship,' p.98; Mant, *Intellectual Leadership,* pp.25-27; Dimma, 'On Leadership,' p.54.

groups or in a volatile or extreme situation. Stodgill believes that emergent leaders are usually the more effective because, as the natural leader of their group, they usually have a greater connection with, and understanding of, their group's needs and can 'represent and articulate group goals and values to others both within and outside of the group.'[43]

In this thesis, positional leaders refer are the most highly ranked officer or NCO within a POW camp, compound or location. Emergent leaders are men of a lower rank who rise from within the group to attain the loyalty of the men because of their understanding of the physical and/or psychological needs of the group. In volatile and extreme settings, this usually occurs when positional leaders have failed to adequately protect their group.

This thesis also explores a third type of leader, the professional leader, a term coined specifically for this study to discuss the MOs and chaplains. Although the functions and actions of these leaders are often recognised in the literature examining captivity, they have not been allocated to a specific category in the literature.[44] This leadership category is based on the set of skills possessed by these men who had the capacity to understand and attend to different aspects of Australian captives' needs during the Second World War.

No leader can function without leadership legitimacy,[45] based on the belief, as Edwin Hollander argues, 'that the leader has the authority to exert influence.'[46] Legitimacy is determined by followership, that is, trust between leaders and their group, which is usually based on a leader's proven skill set to protect the best interests of group members. And although leadership legitimacy has been examined predominantly

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[43] R. Stogdill cited in Holloman, 'Leadership and Headship,' p.98.
[44] This group of leaders have been acknowledged, for example, by Rosalind Hearder and Mary Tagg. See R. Hearder, 'Careers in Captivity: Australian Prisoner-of-War Medical Officers in Japanese Captivity During World War II,' (PhD dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2003), pp.182-260; M. Tagg, 'The Prisoner Padre: The Impact of War on a New Zealand Cleric,' (MA dissertation, University of Waikato, 1997).
[45] J. Burns, 'Leadership and Followership,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence,* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp.222-224; E. Hollander, 'Legitimacy, Power and Influence: A Perspective on Relational Features of Leadership' in M. Chemers and R. Ayman (eds.), *Leadership Theory and Research: Perspectives and Directions,* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1993), pp.29-32.
[46] Hollander, *Leadership Dynamics*, p.45.

within civilian settings, military leadership scholars, such as William Litzinger and Thomas Schaefer, argue that the concept of leadership legitimacy also applies to military leaders.[47] Rank in and of itself is not enough to build trust between positional leaders and their subordinates.

Two methodologies developed by leadership scholars to analyse leadership legitimacy have been used in this thesis. The first is an assessment of legitimacy based on the group's perception of their leader's status, role and the contribution he or she makes towards the formation and achievement of group goals.[48] The second comes from the complementary field of group dynamics,[49] which is discussed below.

Leadership Styles

The different ways in which leaders approach their tasks have been classified as leadership styles. The literature on leadership styles is voluminous, yet reflects Thomas Cronin's basic definition of a leadership style as 'how a person relates to people, to tasks and to challenges.'[50] The most useful analysis of leadership styles for the purposes of this thesis comes from two complementary fields of research.

Sociologists and behavioural scientists have researched leaders' behaviour and the way they interact with group members.[51] Juanjuan Jiang's 2014 survey of the literature of leadership styles reveals the existence of 19 styles.[52] These styles are inextricably linked to the theoretical framework applied by the scholars. For example, behavioural leadership styles, largely identified between the 1940s and 1960s, are democratic,

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[47] W. Litzinger and T. Schaefer, 'Leadership through Followership', in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp.215-220.
[48] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.251, 256-261; Hollander, 'Legitimacy, Power and Influence,' pp.29-43; R. Kelley, 'In Praise of Followers,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach, *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp.99-107.
[49] Cartwright and Zander, 'An Introduction: Leadership and Group Performance,' pp.487-510; M. von Cranach, 'Leadership as a Function of Group Action,' in C. Graumann and S. Moscovici (eds.), *Changing Conceptions* of *Leadership*, (New York: Springer-Vales, 1986), pp.115-134; Hollander, *Leadership Dynamics*, pp.13-16, 45-52;
G. Homans, *The Human Group*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), pp.138-149.
[50] T. Cronin, 'Thinking about Leadership,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach, (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.199.
[51] For an overview of this literature see Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.65-90; House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership,' pp.409-473.
[52] Jiang, 'The Study of the Relationship between Leadership Style and Project Success,' pp.51-52.

autocratic and bureaucratic.[53] Contingency leadership theorists, who dominated leadership scholarship in the 1960s, applied variables to identify leadership styles.[54] They identified four styles: directive, supportive, participative and achievement-oriented.[55] In 1978 James Burn pioneered the study of transformational leaders.[56] This style of leader is able to form a special relationship with his or her followers to the point where the leader can change their perception of the group's purpose. From the late 1970s to 1990s, behavioural scientists extended this idea to explore the link between transformational leaders and charisma.[57] These studies led to the profiling of transformational leaders, that is, leaders who are focused on motivating their followers to achieve a precise goal, usually within a work environment.[58] Laissez-faire leaders, who largely allow their followers to make decisions on their own, will attempt to influence their followers but, because they lack genuine connection with them, have difficulty in applying visionary or motivational leadership styles, which are explained below.[59] From the late 1990s, leadership scholars explored the emotional intelligences exhibited by leaders in an attempt to identify how leaders could influence their followers' intellect and morality.[60] Six leadership styles have been identified in this category: visionary, coaching, affiliate, democratic, pacesetting and commanding.[61]

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[53] *ibid*., p.52. For example see A. Gouldner (ed.), *Studies in Leadership: Leadership and Democratic Action*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950); C. Graumann, 'Power and Leadership in Lewinian Field Theory: Recalling an Interrupted Task,' in C. Graumann and S. Moscovici (eds.), *Changing Conceptions of Leadership*, (New York: Springer-Vales, 1986), pp.83-99.

[54] For an overview of contingency theory of leadership see Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.68-72; House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership,' pp. 419-443; Lussier and Achua, *Leadership*, p.17.

[55] Jiang, 'The Study of the Relationship between Leadership Style and Project Success,' p.52.

[56] B. Bass, 'A Seminal Shift: The Impact of James Burns' Leadership,' *Leadership Quarterly*, vol.4 no.3-4, 1993, pp.375-377; House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership', pp.439, 442-443.

[57] Jiang, 'The Study of the Relationship between Leadership Style and Project Success,' p.52. For example see K. Klein and R. House, 'On Fire: Charismatic Leadership and Levels of Analysis,' *Leadership Quarterly*, vol.6 no.3, pp.183-198; R. House and B. Shamir, 'Toward the Integration of Transformational, Charismatic and Visionary Theories,' in M. Chemers and R. Ayman (eds.), *Leadership Theory and Research: Perspectives and Directions*, (San Diego: Academic Press, 1993), pp.81-107.

[58] Jiang, 'The Study of the Relationship between Leadership Style and Project Success,' p.52. For example see Burns, 'Leadership and Followership', p.223; Hollander, *Leadership Dynamics*, pp.7-8, 38-44; Rost, *Leadership*, p.30.

[59] Jiang, 'The Study of the Relationship between Leadership Style and Project Success,' p.52. For reference to the definition of laissez-faire leaders see R. Goodnight, 'Laissez-Faire Leadership,' in G. Goethals et al, *Encyclopaedia of Leadership*, (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Sage Publications, 2004), pp.820-821.

[60] For example see Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.181-227; J. Howell and B. Avolio, 'The Ethics of Charismatic Leadership: Submission or Liberation', *The Executive*, May 1992 Vol.2, No., 2, pp.43-54; House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership, pp.439-443.

[61] Jiang, 'The Study of the Relationship between Leadership Style and Project Success,' p.52.

The turn of the century saw behavioural scientists turn their focus to how leadership styles can influence businesses' success with a focus on identifying the styles of competent leaders. Three leadership styles have been identified under this category: engaging, involving and goal-oriented.[62]

Jiang's review of the literature on leadership styles reveals three significant features of the scholarship. Firstly, scholars have continued to add new leadership styles to the growing body of literature. Secondly, leadership styles are inextricably linked with the theoretical framework applied by the scholars. Lastly, despite using different theoretical frameworks, an overlap between leadership styles exists and, therefore, some of the titles given to leadership styles are either the same or supplementary. This overlap reflects the fact that it is impossible to isolate the characteristics of leaders from the characteristics and responses of their groups, the contextual variables in which the group functions and the goals set. It is for these reasons that Thomas Cronin's earlier approach identifying the differences between leadership styles is easier to understand and apply.

In 1984 Cronin identified six diametrically opposing leadership styles; autocratic and democratic, centralised and decentralised, empathetic and detached, extroverted and introverted, assertive and passive, engaged and remote.[63] Holloman and Rost confirmed Cronin's findings.[64] In the last thirty years of leadership scholarship, most sociologists and social scientists in the field recognise that the broad styles identified by Cronin can be used together by a leader to create group unity and achieve a group goal. Robert Lussier and Christopher Achua refer to this blending of leadership styles as integrative leadership theory.[65]

Groups, human dynamics and survivorship

From the 1930s sociologists and behavioural scientists began using empirical research combined with scientific methodology to study human interaction within groups.[66] In

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[62] *ibid*.
[63] Cronin, 'Thinking about leadership', p.199.
[64] Holloman, 'Leadership and Headship,' p.99; Rost, *Leadership*, p.99.
[65] Lussier and Achua, *Leadership*, p.17.
[66] R. Cartwright and A. Zander, (eds.), 'The Origins of Group Dynamics,' in *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, Second Edition, (London: Tavistock, 1960), pp.9, 16-19; Gouldner, 'Contexts: Informal Groups,'p.100; Homans, *The Human Group*, pp.1-21.

contrast to leadership studies, this field of research does not focus on the dominant group member's behaviour. Instead it examines how all group members interact with each other in different settings.

This field of research has, across different cultures, historical periods and settings, proven that the formation of groups is an inevitable consequence of human interaction.[67] Socialisation with others is, therefore, the basis of what humans see as normal structures. This field of research has sought to understand how and why groups form, function, add and exclude members, and why and how they often compete with other groups within a particular setting.

Scholars in this field use several theoretical models.[68] Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, in their review of the literature, identified seven major theoretical approaches in the field. Kurt Lewin's field theory focuses on examining the variables within the group's context.[69] Interaction theory, developed by Robert Bales, George Homans and William Whyte, examines group members' relationships, interactions and the way they approach and achieve goals.[70] Theodore Newcomb advocated a systems theory approach that focuses on the interaction between group members' roles and how the group collectively achieves a goal.[71] Jacob Moreno first introduced sociometric theory that examined group dynamics through the study of interpersonal interactions between group members and how these interactions allowed the group to form and stay together.[72] Psychoanalytical theory dates back to Sigmund Freud's study of groups.[73]

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[67] R. Cartwright and A. Zander (eds.), 'Issues and Basic Assumptions,' in *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, Second Edition, (London: Tavistock, 1960), pp.34-35; Mant, *Intelligent Leadership*, p.23.
[68] Cartwright and Zander, 'Issues and Basic Assumptions,' pp.40-45.
[69] Cartwright and Zander, 'Issues and Basic Assumptions,' p.40; Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.50-52.
[70] R. Bales, 'The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups' in T. Parsons et al, (eds.), *Working Papers in the Theory of Action*, (New York: Free Press, 1953), pp.111-161; Cartwright and Zander, 'Issues and Basic Assumptions', p.40; Homans, *The Human Group*, pp.1-21; W. Whyte, 'Informal Leadership and Group Structure,' in A. Gouldner (ed.), *Studies in Leadership and Democratic Action*, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1950), pp.104-112.
[71] Cartwright and Zander, 'Issues and Basic Assumptions,' p.40. For reference to Newcomb's breakthrough research in this area see T. Newcomb, *Personality & Social Change: Attitude Formation in a Student Community*, (New York: Dryden Press, 1943); T. Newcomb et al, *Social Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction*, Second Edition Revised (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).
[72] Cartwright and Zander, 'Issues and Basic Assumptions,' pp.40-41. For reference to Moreno's work see J. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive?: Foundations of Sociometry, Group Psychotherapy and Sociodrama*, (Beacon: Beacon House, 1983); J. Moreno, *Sociometry, Experimental Method and the Science of Society: An Approach to a New Political Orientation*, (Beacon: Beacon House, 1951).
[73] Cartwright and Zander, 'Issues and Basic Assumptions', p.41.

This theoretical approach scientifically examines the motivations of each group member to achieve a group's purpose.[74] Cognitive theory is similar. It examines the reasons why group members stay together, the relationship they have with each other and how these two factors influence their perception of others.[75] In contrast to the behavioural theoretical approaches, empiricist models use personality testing and statistical analysis to explain why some groups form and stay together.[76]

With the exception of the empiricist model, there are distinct similarities and overlaps between the group dynamic theoretical approaches to studying human interaction in groups. Cartwright and Zander therefore, concluded that scholars in the field often use a variety of complementary models to understand the groups they are studying.[77] Research methods of observation, field experiments based on established groups responding to an artificial scenario in a research laboratory, and people who are not in an established group responding to an artificial scenario in a research laboratory, are common across the theoretical models.[78] This field of scholarship is used in this thesis to formulate an understanding of the importance of group structures, how they work and why they succeed or fail.

A new sub-speciality of group dynamic research emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, which is important in understanding the dynamics of groups studied in this thesis.

Sociologists and behavioural scientists have explored what happens to group interaction when the group is faced with an extreme situation.[79] The work within this

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[74] *ibid*. For an overview of this theory see S. Scheidlinger, 'The Group Psychotherapy Movement at the Millennium: Some Historical Perspectives,' *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, vol.50, no.3, July 2000, pp.315-339.
[75] S. Andersen and S. Chen, 'The Relational Self: An Interpersonal Social-Cognitive Theory,' *Psychological Review*, vol.109, no.4, October 2002, pp.619-645; Cartwright and Zander, 'Issues and Basic Assumptions,' p.41.
[76] Cartwright and Zander, 'Issues and Basic Assumptions,' p.41.
[77] *ibid*., p.42.
[78] *ibid*., pp.48-54.
[79] For an overview of this literature see D. Milet et al, *Human Systems in Extreme Environments: A Sociological Perspective in Program on Technology, Environment and Man, Monograph #21*, (Colorado; Institute of Behavioural Science University of Colorado, 1975), pp.1-5; A. Wallace, *A Study of the Literature and Suggestions for Further Research Human Behaviour in Extreme Situations*, Publication 390, (Washington D.C; National Academy of Sciences National Research Council, 1956), pp.1-17.

field is voluminous. It includes the reaction of groups to natural disasters and mass scale accidents, such as plane crashes.[80] The most relevant studies in this field for this thesis are how human groups react to human conflict, in particular, civilian prisoners in concentration camps during the Holocaust. Holocaust survivors have written some of these studies.

Bruno Bettleheim was imprisoned at Buchenwald concentration camp between March 1938 and 20 April 1939 following Hitler's annexation of Austria.[81] After his release, Bettleheim migrated to the United States. In 1961, as a qualified child psychologist, he published *The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age*.[82] One section of his study, titled '*Behaviour in extreme situations: coercion*'[83] drew heavily on his personal experience of captivity. He concluded that in extreme situations prisoners 'were usually dependent for survival on group cooperation.'[84] In extreme situations, however, groups are susceptible to fracturing because group members often revert to childish behaviour.[85] For example, some group members who found an opportunity to gain extra food or other basic needs, would often take it and, in doing so, isolate themselves from their group. However, Bettleheim observed that these individuals, who had broken the trust of the group, quickly realised that they could not survive alone. Groups were the only way internees could pool their collective skills to seek out food, water and psychological comfort, although Bettleheim thought that relying on a group for psychological comfort was the sign of a weak prisoner who, if the group dissolved, often would not cope. When a prisoner was rejected from a group, or decided they no longer wanted to belong to a group because they had lost hope, they often slipped into apathy, which usually led to death.[86]

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[80] For example of this literature see G. Bennet, *Endurance: Survival at the Extreme*, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1983); J. Leach, *Survival Psychology*, (London: MacMillan 1994).
[81] R. Pollak, *The Creation of Dr. B: A Biography of Bruno Bettelheim*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p.63.
[82] B. Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1961).
[83] *ibid*., pp.126-159.
[84] *ibid*., p.136.
[85] *ibid*, pp.131-135.
[86] *ibid*., pp.151-152.

Elie Cohen, a Jewish Dutch physician, was captured by the Nazis on 13 August 1943 when he, his wife and three year old son were attempting to flee to Sweden.[87] Cohen and his family arrived at Auschwitz on 14 September 1943. His wife and son were killed on arrival. Cohen managed to survive by working as a doctor in the camp. Cohen's study, *Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp,* is based on his observations of human interaction in this extreme captive setting.[88] His study affirms Bettleheim's observations, but because of Cohen's more extreme captive setting, his observations are more detailed, blunt and brutal. Cohen's study also offer greater academic insights by linking his observation to psychological theories of behaviour. His study includes an exploration of the fundamental importance of selective friendship and group psychology amongst the inmates.[89] He also notes the lack of pre-existing group structures in civilian concentration camps contrasts to military prisoners who enter captivity with already established group structures and behavioural expectations.[90] The difference between the two, Cohen suggests, is that a civilian group 'will not react in any way that is characteristic of a group with a leader.'[91] Instead they have to form some structure for themselves amongst a crowd, a hard ask when most are paralyzed with fear. In comparison to civilian prisoners, therefore, military POWs had a distinct advantage because of pre-existing group structures.

Sociologists and behavioural scientists have confirmed that the key to survival for civilians in concentration camps was belonging to a group[92], despite the groups being what Herbert A. Bloch called 'crude and rudimentary forms of communal life which were, in effect, modern feral communities.'[93] Bloch noted that different types of groups emerged in concentration camps; groups based on commonalities, for example nationalities, and groups who resisted their oppressors. Despite their differences, groups had one essential commonality, their members all wanted to survive. Group

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[87] D. Patterson et al, (eds.), *Encyclopaedia on Holocaust Literature*, (Westport: Oryx Press, 2002), pp.32-32.
[88] E. Cohen, *Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp*, translated from Dutch by M. Braaksma, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954).
[89] *ibid*., pp.182-193.
[90] *ibid*., pp.204-210.
[91] *ibid*., p.210.
[92] H. Bloch, 'The Personality of Inmates of Concentration Camps,' *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol.52, no.4, January 1947,' pp.335-341; E. Luchterhand, 'Prisoner Behaviour and Social System in the Nazi Concentration Camps,' *Journal of Social Psychiatry*, vol.13, 1967, ppp.245-264.
[93] Bloch, 'The Personality of Inmates of Concentration Camps,' p.335.

leaders helped make survival possible, often by reverting to a parent-child relationship with their group members.[94] Curt Bondy, a professor of social psychology, interned at Buchenwald Concentration Camp, noted, that prisoners who had previously been in regulated groups prior to their imprisonment had better functioning groups than those whose previous groups had only been for social purposes.[95] Bondy based this argument on his observation of the behaviour of 'twenty young boys who were arrested on a training farm, together with the director of this farm.'[96] This training farm, Bondy explained, not only taught the boys how to manage the day-to-day operations of agricultural farms but also 'stressed character building, group consciousness and responsibility.'[97]

In 1967 Elmer Luchterhand offered a more academically comprehensive psychological study of group behaviour of inmates in concentration camps.[98] His study offered three more classifications of groups; stable pairs, small groups of three to eight prisoners, usually based on pairings of prisoners, and large groups comprising of nine of more prisoners.[99] Of the survivors he studied he noted that most belonged to small groups based on pairings.[100] This was because this type of group allowed 'reciprocal sharing.'[101] Small groups also 'kept alive the semblance of humanity.'[102]

Terrence Des Pres, an American academic who published a comprehensive study of survivors of concentration camps, agrees with Luchterhand, Bloch, Bondy, Cohen and Bettleheim's conclusion that membership of a group was the common characteristic of a survivor.[103] Des Pres, who based his study on oral interviews and an empirical methodology, placed the emphasis on 'solidarity'[104] within groups. He cites Bluma

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[94] *ibid*., p.340.
[95] C. Bondy, 'Problems of Internment Camps,' *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol.39, 1943, pp.456-459.
[96] *ibid*., p.457.
[97] *ibid*.
[98] E. Luchterhand, 'Prisoner Behaviour and Social System in the Nazi Concentration Camps,' pp.245-262.
[99] *ibid*., p.251.
[100] *ibid.*, pp.251, 253-255.
[101] *ibid*., p.254.
[102] *ibid*. p.260.
[103] T. Dres Pres, *The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp.vii, 96-147.
[104] Des Pres, *The Survivor*, p.121.

Weinstock who concluded that 'survival…could only be a social achievement, not an individual accident.'[105]

Survivor memories and academic studies of civilian internees, therefore, provide important insights into how informal group structures operate in extreme captive settings and these insights have informed the analysis of groups in this thesis.

In contrast to the scholarship on group structures amongst concentration camp prisoners, there is little analysis of group structures in studies of POWs. Those that do exist refer to the importance of group structures in passing, such as explaining why some men held as prisoners during the Korean War became apathetic. Harvey Strassman, Margaret Thaler and Edgar Schein, for example, concluded in their study *A Prisoner of War Syndrome: Apathy as a Reaction to Severe Stress*, that men taken prisoner by the Chinese had a greater chance of surviving if 'a buddy cajoled or forced them into activity and survival behaviour.'[106] If a prisoner lacked this support system, many lost interest in looking after themselves.[107]

Leadership in captivity during the Second World War

In a military setting, tradition and disciplinary structures mandate that leadership is determined by rank. Traditional military leadership is, therefore, positional because of the rank of the leader, even in captivity. According to the Australian Military Regulations and Orders (1927), military structures remained unchanged if men were captured.[108] In captivity, commanding officers, therefore, retained responsibility for their men's discipline, supplies, funds and most importantly for this thesis, attempts to preserve their health.[109] As soldiers, prisoners were expected to obey their commanding officer and any prisoner who contravened these regulations was liable to

[105] B. Weinstock cited in Des Pres, *The Survivor*, p.121.
[106] H. Strassman et al, 'A Prisoner of War Syndrome: Apathy as a Reaction to Severe Stress,' *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol.112, Jan-June 1956, p.1002.
[107] *ibid*., pp.997-1003.
[108] Regulation 76, The Defence Act 1903-1950 and Regulations and Orders for the Australian Military Forces, 1927, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1955.
[109] *ibid*., Regulations 1423-1425, 1427-1429.

punishment after liberation.[110] The commanding officer and his staff were responsible for reporting these breaches.[111]

International law also reinforced positional leadership in captivity. Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1929) acknowledged the right of prisoners to representation and a degree of self-organisation although the approval of POW leaders was subject to the captor's final decision.[112] This Convention decreed that the highest-ranking prisoner functioned as the captives' representative. With the aid of an interpreter, this prisoner was responsible for representing the formal group's interests and rights to the captor, Protecting Power and aid groups. These responsibilities extended to the organisation and distribution of supplies to their men. In the Second World War, Germany was bound by these rules.[113] Japan was not. Although a signatory of the Geneva Convention, Japan did not ratify it.[114] Japan's attitude towards prisoner leadership was, therefore, different.

In the German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe officer camps, the highest-ranking prisoner automatically became the positional and formal group leader.[115] In camps holding British/Commonwealth prisoners, this leader was known as the Senior British Officer (SBO). In Luftwaffe NCO camps or compounds, no clear hierarchy of rank existed. Instead of seniority, a vote determined the positional leader. In German Wehrmacht other rank camps, the method of determining formal group leadership appears to have been haphazard. For example in NCO compounds, the senior NCO sometimes

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[110] The commanding officer and his staff are responsible for reporting these breaches to the relevant defence force legal department. See *ibid*., Regulations 76, 305 and 1433.
[111] *ibid*., Regulations 305 and 1433.
[112] Articles 43 and 44, Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929 <http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/FULL/305?OpenDocument,> 2005, maintained by the International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed on 12 April 2014.
[113] Italy and Germany both signed the Convention on 27 July 1929. Italy ratified it on 24 March 1931, Germany on 21 February 1934. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 27 July 1929.
[114] As a signatory to the convention, Japan's legal obligations were unknown. In response to Argentine and American petitions, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigeonor Tojo, stated that Japan would apply the convention 'mutatis mutandis.' The legal ramifications of this statement and a subsequent announcement that Japan would consider its prisoners 'national and racial customs' remained unclear. See C. Roland, 'Allied POWS, Japanese Captors and the Geneva Convention,' *War and Society*, vol. 9, no.2, October (1991), pp.84-85.
[115] The following overview of formal leadership positions including their method of election is based on a survey of Protecting Power and International Red Cross Committee reports located at the National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA). See series AIR2, FO916, WO208, WO224. Writings by individual captives used throughout this thesis confirm these findings.

automatically took charge, but in other army compounds, a general vote determined positional leadership. The method of choosing the positional leader in other rank camps appears to have been influenced by two key factors – the seniority and personality of the NCO, and the size and national composition of the formal group. In air force and army other rank and NCO camps/compounds, formal group leaders were officially known as the Man-of-Confidence (MOC) or simply the camp leader.

In the German camps, committees assisted formal group leaders. In officers' camps, committees were comprised of the most senior ranking prisoners and sometimes prisoners who had skills relevant to the committee's purpose. In NCO and other rank camps, committee members were usually selected using one of two methods: appointment by the formal group leader or a general vote by the entire camp population. Committee roles usually included interpreter, assistant, senior medical officer (SMO), hut/room commanders and, in German Stalags, working detachment leaders. A secondary prisoner committee structure also existed in the German camps. These prisoners, usually selected on rank, skill or vote, organised the prisoners' daily activities. In most camps, the most powerful of these committees was a secret committee that organised escape.

Japanese Bushido culture did not officially acknowledge POWs.[116] Unless it was in Japan's interests, prisoners organised themselves, although from August 1942, the Japanese separated officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel from the other prisoners.[117] This meant that for almost the duration of captivity, formal group leadership was the responsibility of senior ranking Lieutenant Colonels.

Depending on the structure of the camp, formal group leaders in the Pacific were responsible for Australian or multi-national groups. Despite different national compositions, the standard criteria for leadership remained the same, seniority of

[116] I. Hata, 'From Consideration to Contempt: The Changing Nature of Japanese Military and Popular Perceptions of Prisoners of War Through the Ages,' in B. Moore and K. Fedorwich (eds.), *Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War II*, (Oxford: Berg, 1996), pp.253-276; Mackenzie, 'The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II,' pp.512-516; Roland, 'Allied POWS, Japanese Captors and the Geneva Convention,' pp.87-88.
[117] Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.3.

rank.[118] Work Forces usually had a two-tired structure; the composite group that was then subdivided into battalions. In most cases, the positional leader of the base camps in Changi or Java appointed the leaders at both levels. These appointments were made on rank, with one exception, Captain Reginald William James Newton, who is discussed in Chapter 3. Some of the forces that originated from Java were not divided into battalions until their arrival in Thailand or Burma. In these circumstances, the formal group leader appointed battalion leaders. For all Work Forces, rank remained the predominant criteria for selection.

As in Europe, most formal group leaders in the Pacific had the assistance of a staff. The number and type of staff positions depended on four factors; the amenability of the Commandant, and the size, location and purpose of the camp. Rank and skill usually determined staff positions. Common roles included second in command, battalion or area leaders, quartermaster, SMO and a hygiene/sanitation officer.

As members of the British Commonwealth, Australian formal groups in the Pacific technically remained under British command. In practice this only really occurred in one location; Changi. Here the Australian formal group leader, the GOC, came under the leadership structure of Malaya Command.[119]

German and Japanese demands often disrupted the structure and composition of formal groups. In both theatres, but particularly in Europe, some new formal groups were comprised of mixed service and multi-national personnel. In these circumstances, the most senior ranking officer from across the different services and nationalities usually functioned as the positional leader. In some instances, national groups retained a secondary leadership structure. These structures, based on rank, usually remained subsidiary to the authority of the group's leader.

Implicit in the discussion above has been the role of groups in captivity. Across the European and Pacific Theatres, two structures provided the framework for most

[118] The following overview of formal group leadership structures in Japanese camps relies on a survey of official camp diaries and formal group leader reports/statements. These are located in two series at the Australian War Memorial (AWM), AWM52 and AWM54.
[119] Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.3.

prisoner interaction: formal and informal groups. Despite different captive conditions, legal obligations and official leadership titles, the structure of formal and informal groups was essentially the same in both theatres.

At the macro level, formal groups reflected military structure at the moment of capture. Typically, in both theatres, army battalions and naval crews were captured at the same time, usually after formal surrender. Air force personnel were an obvious exception because their capture often occurred at the individual, or small group level, after being shot down over enemy territory. Irrespective of the means of capture, however, military structures were basically transferred intact from combat into captivity with positional officers in charge of units.

The captor also created formal groups. These fell into two categories. The first was the Work Forces where prisoners drawn from different units were ordered by the captor to work outside the wire. The second was the formation of groups, again often drawn from different units, for the forced marches in Europe and Borneo. In all cases, they were under the command of an appointed positional leader.

Collective transfer from battle into captivity meant that informal groups within battalions, squadrons or naval crews, based on mateship, remained intact, matching the theortical patterns of group dynamics discussed earlier in this chapter. These informal groups provided the core relationships in a prisoner's day-to-day life.[120] They were a prisoner's main defence against psychological and physical breakdown. The fundamental importance of this structure was reflected in the fact that, in both theatres, informal groups tried their utmost to stay together. Some prisoners, however, acknowledging the possibility that they could be forced to separate from their mates, retained a larger circle of friends and acquaintances. This meant that if an informal group was divided, men hoped they would know someone to form a new group. However, sometimes men knew no one. In these circumstances, informal groups were formed using different criteria; shared nationality, experience, interests, beliefs,

[120] The following overview of leadership structures in informal groups relies on a survey of private written records and interviews of Australian, and British/Commonwealth POWs. These records were located are the AWM, Australians at War Film Archive Project and Imperial War Museum (IWM).

civilian occupation and, in the most volatile and extreme settings, simply a shared location or hope for survival.

The leadership structure within informal groups reflected the conditions of their captive setting. In relatively stable settings, longstanding mates and/or those with the best interpersonal skills usually had seniority. In volatile and extreme captive settings, leadership usually fell to the prisoner with the best survival skills. Importantly within informal groups, leadership often shifted between and amongst group members. This fluid transfer of leadership status reflected the immediate needs, skills and health of group members. As captive conditions, group member's health and the compositions of groups changed, collective leadership emerged, as all physically able group members helped each other to survive. In sum, then, flexibility was a key characteristic of informal groups studied in this thesis.

In captivity, leadership legitimacy was vital. Formal and informal groups needed to know that their leader was genuine. Leaders had to prove their worth against the power and aggression of the captor and, sometimes just as importantly, against the anger and frustration of the men themselves. Positional leaders often had to re-earn the trust of their men as some questioned the relevance of positional leaders and a military organisation that had led them into captivity. In the captive setting, professional leaders had to earn the respect and followership of men by attending the physical, psychological and/or spiritual needs of their group. This meant that in volatile or extreme settings (see below), positional and professional leaders had to prove that they were willing to protect the interest of their men against the captor, even if it meant jeopardising their personal safety. When these leaders failed, emergent leaders sometimes stepped up and filled the role.

Ultimately in captivity, a leader's legitimacy depended on his ability to balance the physical and psychological needs of the group with the demands and/or aggression of the captor. The ability of a leader to successfully balance these demands legitimised his leadership status. Failure led to the men looking for an alternative leader, be he positional, professional or emergent. When a legitimate leader could not be found, or the legitimate leader was not as effective as they had hoped, the formal group often divided into smaller sub-groups. This pattern of behaviour reflects the behavioural and

scientific analysis of civilian and military groups in extreme situations discussed earlier.

However, in most extreme settings a time comes when even the strongest group structures break down. This usually occurs when most or some group members are dying. In the face of death, individual survivorship can trump collective identity. In these circumstances, leadership becomes redundant.

As noted earlier, the thesis explores a third type of leader, the professional leader in the form of MOs and chaplains. Across both theatres, in relatively stable camps, most Australian, British/Commonwealth prisoners did not consider MOs and chaplains as leaders. Instead, they offered professional services. Their transformation from being a professional into a leader occurred mainly in volatile and extreme conditions in the Pacific Theatre. In this context the lifesaving skills of MOs, combined with a willingness to try and protect their patients against the aggression of the captor, made them sometimes more important than the positional leader of their formal group, particularly when the positional leader failed to protect his men. In these circumstances, the professional leaders acquired leadership legitimacy. In contrast to MOs, chaplains became leaders for a select group of prisoners who admired the faith of men who continued to believe in their Christian teachings and inspired others to do the same.

As noted in the Introduction, three types of conditions existed in POW camps across the two theatres of war: relatively stable, volatile and extreme. Relatively stable captive settings existed when the men's basic needs were provided for either entirely by the captor, or by the captor and the Red Cross.[121] In volatile captive settings the survival of the prisoners was at risk because of insufficient food, lack of medical supplies, forced labour and/or violence. Extreme captive conditions existed when prisoner's basic needs were not met and, as a result, order within the group structures vanished and chaos took over. This definition of extreme differs from the way historians have previously evaluated captive settings. Joan Beaumont, Sibylla Jane Flower and Rosalind Hearder described extreme conditions as existing when

[121] Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, pp.165-166.

prisoners' survival was at risk.[122] This thesis defines this type of captive settings as volatile not extreme. Extreme conditions only existed when social structures broke down, usually when prisoners understood that the captor intended that none of them would survive and leadership ceased to have relevance. This definition of extreme settings reflects the survivorship literature outlined previously in this chapter where extreme settings exist only when a crisis imposed on a group destroys the structure of a group and in doing so pushes individuals 'to their limits and beyond.'[123] The literature, however, also notes that there can be exceptions to this general rule.[124]

Australian air force, army and navy POWs held by the Germans mostly lived in relatively stable camps until the forced marches during the winter of 1944-1945 when the conditions became volatile. Conditions in the Pacific Theatre, however, could move from stable to volatile and, in the end, extreme. Two POW camps provide an example.

Between February 1942 and mid-1943, conditions in Changi were relatively stable, (with one significant exception, the Selarang Barrack Square Incident, which is described in Chapter 2).[125] From mid-way through 1943, however, conditions began to deteriorate.[126] Emaciated, sick and broken men began returning from the Burma-Thailand Railway. The poor condition of these men put a strain on an already decreasing camp ration. Then the Japanese demanded men for a local labour project, the construction of an aerodrome. The transition from relatively stable to a volatile setting occurred when all of the prisoners were forced to move to the squalor and cramped conditions of the civilian jail in May 1944.[127]

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[122] J. Beaumont, 'Rank, Privilege, and Prisoners of War', *War and Society*, vol.1, no.1, 1983, p.87; Flower, 'Captors and Captives on the Burma-Thailand Railway,' p.277; R. Hearder, 'Overview of POW Historiography,' *Australian War Memorial Journal*, February 2007, p.2.
[123] Bennet, *Beyond Endurance*, p.xi. Also see Bennet, *Beyond Endurance*, pp.1-8, 70-72; Leach, *Survival Psychology*, pp.30-52; Wallace, *A Study of the Literature and Suggestions for Further Research Human Behaviour in Extreme Situations*, p.1.
[124] Bennet, *Beyond Endurance*, pp.70-72; Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart*, pp.135-146; Cohen, *Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp*, pp.182-184, 203-210; Des Pres, *The Survivor*, pp.96-147.
[125] Sweating, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.512-530.
[126] Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, pp.15, 22-23; E. Holmes, Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps Singapore Island – for Period 17 August 42 to 31 August 1945, 18 Sept 1945, p.8 AWM54 554/11/4 Part 10 Appendix 7; Sweating, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.527-528.
[127] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference held at Camp Office 1415 hours 25 April 1944, Appendix 13A, AWM52 1/5/19/23; Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, pp.21, 23-24; Holmes,

Conditions at the Sandakan POW Camp on Borneo moved from stable to volatile and finally extreme. Conditions in the camp were only stable for a short period of time, between 18 July 1942 and October 1942.[128] Prisoners caught stealing food from the Japanese gardens were beaten, work quotas for building the aerodrome were high and the guards were generally harsh in their treatment of the prisoners. By 1943, with the Japanese insisting on a quick completion of the project, conditions quickly become volatile.[129] The deteriorating conditions were exacerbated when, on the 22 July 1943, the Japanese guards discovered a combined prisoner/civilian intelligence network operating from the camp.[130] The Japanese reacted savagely. Food rations were significantly decreased, work demands, which were already at high, unsustainable levels, increased further and Japanese violence towards to the prisoners escalated.[131] Conditions moved from volatile to extreme from 24 January 1945 when the Japanese conducted the forced marches from Sandakan to Ranau.[132] As described in the Introduction, guards executed men who fell behind in the marches and the prisoners who reached Ranau were executed in three separate massacres. There were only six survivors from this extreme setting.[133] These men survived because they managed to escape.

As noted in the Introduction, four leadership styles have been chosen for this thesis: authoritarian, transformational, democratic and self-sacrificial. The choice reflects the sources available and because some styles (such as authoritarian) reflect the fact that this is a thesis about military men. But the choice of styles also reflects the fact that leadership in captivity was far more complex than the simple military positional model

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Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps Singapore Island, pp.9-13; Sweating, 'Prisoners of the Japanese', pp.530-532.

[128] M. Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*: *Sandakan - Australia's Greatest War Tragedy,* (Sydney: Hachette, 2013), pp.7-17; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.77-102.

[129] Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.16-51; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.102-127.

[130] Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.70-101; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.131-207; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.597-599.

[131] Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.102-109; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.86-130, 265-274; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.599-601.

[132] Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.109-121, 134-137, 141-155, 160-176, 177-183; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.265-326, 343-357, 376-381, 404-421; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.600-603.

[133] Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.155-160, 176-180; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.358-370, 382-403; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.603-604.

allows. A fuller description of each of these leadership styles acts as a preface to the case studies.

One of the methodological issues faced in writing this thesis was linking the leadership style categories with the case studies used. At an aggregate level, the social sciences have little difficulty in creating broad categories to analyse human behaviour and responses. At the individual level, the task is far more difficult. Few of the individuals studied for this thesis slotted easily into one style. Jeffrey A. Matteson and Justin A. Irving argue that most successful leaders often use a mixture of styles to achieve their leadership goals,[134] a reflection of the new approach to trait theory discussed earlier in this chapter. Yet, it is also true that most have a core style, or what Matteson and Irving describe as 'a set of behaviours' that a leader will exhibit the majority of the time.[135] Other leadership styles can, and do, supplement or complement the dominant style chosen by the leader. This was certainly the case with the successful leaders studied for this thesis. They had a dominant set of behaviours, yet were capable of adapting their leadership style in a response to the conditions, needs and behaviour of the group.

Sources and the selection of case studies

Three main sources were used for this thesis: material generated by official sources, the memoirs of POWs (both published and unpublished) and oral histories of the POW experience, held by the Australian War Memorial, the Imperial War Museum, the National Archives of Australia, the Australians at War Film Archive and the British Broadcasting Peoples War Stories archives. These shaped the choice of case studies used for the thesis, which is discussed at the end of this section.

Official sources provided information on the camps, their conditions and the treatment of men as POWs. For both theatres, they included repatriated prisoners' questionnaires, statements and reports from positional and professional leaders on their experiences or roles within a camp committee.

[134] J. Matteson and J. Irving, 'Servant versus Self-Sacrificial Leadership: A Behavioural Comparison of Two Follow-Oriented Leadership Theories', *International Journal of Leadership Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2006), pp.36-51.
[135] Matteson and Irving, 'Servant versus Self-Sacrificial Leadership', p.37.

In the Pacific Theatre the AIF Diary at Changi provided valuable evidence for understanding the role, responsibilities and decisions of the positional leader of Australians, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan. The AIF Diary included official monthly reports by AIF HQ, routine orders issued by the positional leader, meeting minutes, transcripts of speeches made by the positional leader and correspondence with British Malaya Command.[136] Attached to the official AIF HQ records were a number of reports. Two of these reports were written by Galleghan as Australian GOC and British Malaya Command GOC E. Holmes during the period after their liberation by the Japanese, but while they were still awaiting repatriation.[137] These reports provide an overview of the entire period of their tenure as positional leaders, the reasons for their orders and their interpretation of their role as positional POW leaders. The other official reports attached to the AIF HQ Diary include those written by the positional leaders of Work Forces sent to the Burma-Thailand Railway who returned to Changi, that is, F and H Force. The report from H Force includes an attachment written by the Australian positional leader Roland Frank Oakes and the Australian chaplain Lionel Marsden.[138] Ten separate reports were written on the activities of F Force. These reports include a mixture of medical conditions, work conditions and chronicles of Japanese war crimes.[139] Edward Dunlop, who led Dunlop Force, also wrote an interim report on the experiences of his Work Force while he was awaiting repatriation from Thailand.[140] Similar reports exist for A and D Force.[141]

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[136] See AWM52 1/5/19.

[137] F. Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, AWM 54 544\11\4 Part 3; E. Holmes, Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps Singapore Island for Period 17 August 1942 to 31 August 1945, 18 September 1945 AWM54 554/11/4 Part 10 Appendix 7.

[138] L. Marsden, Report of the Work of Chaplain with H Force, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5 Appendix 2 Part 1A; R. Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, 15 May 1944, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5 Appendix 2 Part 1.

[139] For example see J. Huston, History of F Force Part 2: Medical Report, AWM54 554/7/5 Part 1; C. Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF "F" Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, 5 September 1945, AWM54 554/7/4.

[140] E. Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of P.O.W. Working Camps and Hospitals in THAILAND, 14 September 1945, AWM54 554/5/5.

[141] Eight reports were written on the activities of D Force from a medical perspective. Only one report, written by Edward Dunlop, who was not a member of D Force, attempts to chronicle their experiences as a whole. See E. Dunlop, Interview Report upon Experiences of Prisoners of War, Working Camps and Hospitals in Thailand, 14 September 1945, AWM54 554/5/5. Fifteen separate reports exist on the experiences of A Force. For example see C. Anderson, On Conditions of Prisoners of War, AWM54 554/2/4; C. McEachern, Reports on Conditions, Life and Work of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam, 8 October 1945, AWM54 554/2/1A; C. Ramsay, On Conditions of Prisoners of War Camps under Command during period February 1942 - August 1944, 8 October 1945, AWM54 554/2/5.

Sworn statements and affidavits made by repatriated prisoners to the War Crimes Board of Inquiry corroborates and offers further insights into incidents outlined in official reports and the prisoners' private records.[142]

The six survivors of the death marches from Sandakan POW Camp to Ranau provide the only insights into how prisoners interacted with each other in this extreme captive environment. Five of these men provided sworn statements to the Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry.[143] The transcript of Owen Campbell and Richard Braithwaite's preliminary interrogation, and Campbell's final interrogation, are helpful in understanding the conditions each of these men endured and how they managed to escape.[144] Statements from William Hector Sticpewich, Keith Botterill, Nelson Short and William Moxham were collected by 2 Echelon Army Headquarters.[145] These survivors also testified as to their experiences in a number of forums. Botterill testified at the Webb Inquiry.[146] Sticpewich, Botterill and Moxham testified at the trial of Japanese officers charged with war crimes because of their roles during the marches from Sandakan to Ranau.[147] Sticpewich also annotated the information gained from

[142] For example of statements to the War Crimes Board of Inquiry see Lieutenant C. Lee, War Crimes Trials Statement, 8 April 1946, AWM54 1010/4/89; Lieutenant G. Mansfield, War Crimes Trials Statement, 22 March 1946, AWM54 1010/4/95; Major R. Newton, War Crimes Trials Statement, 19 September 1946, AWM54 109/4/1.

[143] Private K. Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, 14 November 1945, AWM54 1010/4/17; Bombardier J. Braithwaite, War Crimes Trials Statement, no date recorded, AWM54 1010/4/19; W. Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, January 17 1946, AWM54 1010/4/107; W. Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, 19 November 1945, AWM54 1010/4/107; Private N. Short, War Crime Trials Statement, 16 November 1945, AWM54 1010/4/129; Warrant Officer W. Sticpewich, War Crimes Trials Statement, 19 October 1945, AWM54 1010/4/134.

[144] Preliminary Interrogation of Bdr J. Braithwaite who escaped from Sandakan Area British North Borneo, taken on 19 June 1945, AWM52 1010/1/2; Preliminary Interrogation of Private O. Campbell, 2/10 Fd Regt AIF, who escaped from Sandakan Area British North Borneo, 28 July 1945, AWM54 1010/1/2; O. Campbell, Statement of Received PW and Civilian relating to his or her self, 28 July 1945, AWM54 1010/4/27.

[145] Statements of Warrant Officer H. Sticpewich, Private K. Botterill, Private N. Short and Lance Bombardier W. Moxham, NAA:B3856: 144/1/372 Part 3.

[146] K. Botterill, Testimony to the Webb Inquiry, 14 November 1945, NAA A11049, Roll 1.

[147] K. Botterill, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, May 1946, AWM54 1010/3/98; K. Botterill, Testimony at the War Crimes Trial of civilian K. Kotoro, civilian K. Koyoski, S. Saburo, 25 May 1946, AWM54 1010/6/30; W. Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, May 1946, AWM54 1010/3/98; W. Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of M. Fukushiam of Borneo POW Camp, 30 May 1946, AWM54 1010/6/5; W. Sticpewich, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, May 1946, AWM54 1010/3/98; W Sticpewich, Testimony in the Trial of M. Fukushiam of Borneo POW Camp, 30 May 1946, AWM54 1010/6/5; W. Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial of Capt S. Hoshijiam, 8 January 1946, AWM54 1010/3/46.

the interrogation and affidavits of some Japanese military prisoners.[148] The testimony provided by Japanese defendants in these war crime trials provided a different perspective on prisoner leadership in this extreme captive setting.[149] Investigative reports written by L. Darling, a Prisoner of War Liaison Officer, and the Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry, also assisted in understanding what happened to the Australian prisoners on Borneo and the impact of these extreme conditions on leaders and followership.[150]

For prisoners in Europe, the only equivalent detailed information that exists for specific POW camps are the camp histories and reports written by air force officers and NCOs imprisoned at Stalag Luft III. Official camp histories were written by the British officers imprisoned in North and East Compounds and NCOs imprisoned in Centre Compound.[151] Various members of the Stalag Luft III escape and intelligence organisations also wrote detailed reports on their activities inside this camp and in other air force officers and NCO camps in Germany.[152] Protecting Power and International Committee of Red Cross Inspection Reports occasionally offered some insights into the role and problems of positional leaders.[153] The three series of statements made by repatriated POWs proved more useful. The National Archives of the United Kingdom hold two sets of relevant repatriation questionnaires, the initial interrogation reports and special questionnaires regarding escape and intelligence activities which took place in POW camps.[154] The Australian War Memorial holds

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[148] For example see Affidavits by Japanese Personnel in connection to charges arising from Sandakan-Ranau, Death Marches with Comments by Warrant Officer W. Sticpewich, AWM54 1010/4/179; W. Sticpewich, Notes on the Interrogation of TAKAHARA, AWM PR00637 Folder 3.

[149] For example see M. Fukushima, War Crimes Trial Statement January 1946, AWM54 1010/4/174; G. Watanabe, Testimony in Trial of Captain T. Takakuwa and Captain G. Watanabe, 30 November 1945, AWM54 1010/3/94.

[150] Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, AWM226 Box 3(a), item 8A; L. Darling, Report on Investigations of Australian and Allied Prisoners of War of 9th Division Area, August 1945, Part 2, Appendix A, AWM54 779/1/25.

[151] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, TNA:PRO:WO208/3283; Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, TNA:PRO:WO208/3283.

[152] For example J. Bristow, Report on Secret Radio Receivers Built and Maintained by Warrant Officer J.F. Bristow, TNA:PRO:WO208/5433; R. Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System, Appendix Z.I, 27 June 1945, TNA: PRO: WO208/3245; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report 'X', TNA:PRO:AIR40/285.

[153] These reports are found in the series TNA:PRO:WO224.

[154] For reference to the interrogation reports see TNA:PRO:WO208/3630-3662. For reference to Special Questionnaires see TNA:PRO:WO208/5437-5450.

statements made by repatriated or released RAAF prisoners held in Germany and a limited selection of statements made by repatriated or released army prisoners. Most of the statements by army officers have, however, been lost.[155]

Investigations by the Royal Air Force Special Investigation Branch into the Great Escape from Stalag Luft III, the Military Department of the Judge Advocate's office and the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry held at the camp itself, helped identify the role of positional and emergent leadership in this setting.[156] Proceedings from war crimes trials surrounding this event, and civilian statements, also helped explain the aftermath of this event and the impact of reprisals ordered by the OKW on British/Commonwealth POWs in Germany.[157] Correspondence amongst and between International Committee of Red Cross delegates in Germany, Switzerland and London, the British War and Foreign Office, the Australian High Commissioner, Australian Prime Minister and the Australian Department of External Affairs regarding the forced marches also provided information regarding the location and position of prisoners in this volatile captive setting.[158]

For Australians leaders in both theatres, service records provided supplementary and occasionally valuable information. Of most relevance were the attestation statements, citations and recommendations for awards of particular positional, professional and emergent leaders.[159] The Australian and Commonwealth Nominal Rolls and Commonwealth War Graves Commission Roll of Honour also assisted in confirming

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[155] See AWM54 779/3/126.

[156] Interim Report on the Investigation being made by the Military Department of the Judge Advocate General Office London, 7 August 1945, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2265; Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry held to Investigate the Shootings of Air Force Personnel at Stalag Luft III, 29 May 1944, TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121; Royal Air Force Special Investigation Branch, Stalag Luft III Murder Investigation Report Part 1, Summary of Facts, August 1945, TNA:PRO:WO208/5633.

[157] For example see German War Crimes, Alleged Crime: Ill Treatment – Taking Reprisals, Ref: MD/JAG/FS/22/19 (2c), TNA:PRO:WO311/186; M. Hinnsel, Voluntary Statement by Civilian Internee, 10 June 1946, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2265; United Kingdom Charges against German War Criminals, Shooting of 50 R.A.F. Prisoners of War from Stalag Luft III, July 1944, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2275.

[158] For example Memorandum for Headquarters Bomber Command, Bombing of Prisoner of War Camps from the War Office, no date provided, TNA:PRO:AIR14/1238; Telegraph to British Prisoner of War Branch from M. Edwards, Regarding Stalag 344, PW/BR/12388/45, 21 January 1945, TNA:PRO:AIR14/1238.

[159] For example see A. Garland, Attestation Form, NAA:B883: VX32307; List of Awards for Services rendered whilst PW, Captain Reginald William Newton, AWM119 173 Part 1; R. Mogg, Recommendation re Aus. 467822 W/O Currie A.M. (RAAF), TNA:PRO:AIR40/273.

the identity and location of prisoners, particularly those who were killed by the Japanese on Borneo.

There are a significant number of published and unpublished memoirs and diaries from Australian POWS who were held captive in the Pacific. The majority of published works are from POWs held in Changi or Java and who, at some point in 1942 or 1943, where transferred as a member of a Work Force to the Burma-Thailand Railway. These include, amongst other, works by Russel Braddon, Edward Dunlop, F. Power, D. McLagan, C. Moore, Ray Parkin, Rowley Richards, Rohan Rivett, George Sprod, Tom Uren, Roy Whitecross and Keith Wilson.[160] The unpublished manuscripts held at the Australian War Memorial are from a wider variety of captive locations including Borneo (Sandakan then Kuching POW camp), Changi, different Work Forces on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Japan, Java, Korea, Saigon, Sumatra and Timor. These works include the writings of Samuel Barlow, Harold Byrne, Stanley Francis Denning, Alexander Hatton Drummond who writes under the pseudonym Alexander Hatton, John Giles, Elliott McMaster, Roland Frank Oakes, Clive Riches, Donald Thomas, Robert Welsh and Bill Young.[161]

Only some of the published works are used in this thesis, while all of the manuscripts have been consulted and used as evidence. The published writings selected are those of prisoners who were part of the formal groups or positional, professional or

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[160] R. Braddon, *The Naked Island*, (London: Werner Laurie, 1952); E. Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop: Java and the Burma-Thailand Railway 1942-945,* (Camberwell: Penguin Group, 2005); D. McLaggan, *The Will to Survive: A Private View as a POW,* (Kenthurst: Kangaroo Press, 1995); C. Moore, *The Ill-Fated F Force.* (Australia: Self-published, 1963); R. Parkin, *Into the Smother: A Journal of the Burma-Siam Railway*, (London: Hogarth, 1963); F. Power, *Kurrah! An Australian POW in Changi, Thailand & Japan*, 1941-1945 (McCrae: R.J and S.P Austin, 1991; R. Richards, *A Doctor's War*, (Sydney: Harper Collins, 2005); R. Rivett, *Behind Bamboo*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Australian War Classics, 1991); G. Sprod, *Bamboo Round My Shoulder*, (Kenthurst: Kangaroo Press, 1981); T. Uren, *Straight Left*, (Milsons Point: Random House Australia, 1994); R. Whitecross, *Slaves of the Sons of Heaven: A Personal Account of an Australian POW 1942-1945,* (Sydney: Dymocks, 1953); K. Wilson, *You'll Never Get Off the Island,* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989).

[161] S. Barlow, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS1446; H. Byrne, unpublished manuscript titled, 'A Personal Story of World War II,' AWM MSS1719; S. Denning, unpublished manuscript titled 'Memoirs of Private S.F. Denning,' AWM MSS1542; A. Drummond, unpublished manuscript titled, 'The Naked Truth,' AWM MSS1530; J. Giles, unpublished manuscript titled 'The Lost Years,' AWM MSS2027; E. McMaster, unpublished manuscript titled, 'My War Experience, Friendship and 3 1/2 Years as a POW, 3 April to 3 October 1945', AWM MSS1522; R. Oakes, unpublished manuscript titled, 'Work and Be Happy,' AWM MSS1037; C. Riches, unpublished manuscript titled, 'My Army Days,' AWM MSS1711; D. Thomas, unpublished manuscript titled, 'Forty Years on I Remember,' AWM MSS1301; R. Welsh, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS1554; B. Young, unpublished manuscript titled, 'Return to a Dark Age,' AWM MSS1364.

emergent leaders studied in this thesis. This selection of case studies, outlined below, reflects two aims of the thesis. The first is the study of positional, professional and emergent leaders who have either not yet been examined by historians or to re-evaluate leaders who historians have previously analysed in the Pacific Theatre. The second is the evaluation of leadership in captivity. Case studies were selected where the official and other sources used for the thesis revealed a leader's style and the extent of his followership.

Some of the leaders of Australians in the European Theatre were not Australian. In these circumstances, the writings and recollections of British, New Zealand and South Africans prisoners also provided insights into these leaders. For this theatre a number of published and unpublished memoirs and diaries from British, Australian and American POWs were used. Most of these works were written by air force POWs who were either officers or NCOs. The writings of these men usually include an explanation of their time in transit camps, permanent POW camps and the forced marches. The published works include writings by Alan Burgess, Paul Brickhill and Conrad Norton, John Castle, David Codd, John Dominey (a pseudonym for Ron Mogg), Jim Holliday, Richard Pape, Richard Passmore, Delmar Spivey, Hilma Gibb and Gibb George, Frederick Richardson and Calton Younger.[162] Unpublished manuscripts held by the Australian War Memorial contain the memories of three Australia army prisoners in Germany, two Australian medical personnel in Germany including one doctor, four Australian Air Force personnel captured by the Germans, one unnamed prisoner of the Germans and one RAN prisoner.[163] The Imperial War

[162] P. Brickhill and C. Norton, *Escape to Danger*, Second Edition, (London: Faber, 1954); A. Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel: The True Story of the Great Escape,* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1990); J. Castle, *The Password is Courage*, (Long Preston: Magna, 1982); D. Codd, *Blue Job, Brown Job: A Personal Journey through World War Two,* (Bradford on Avon: ELSP, 2000); J. Dominey, *The Sergeant Escapers*, (London, Allan, 1974); J. Holliday (ed.), *Stories of the RAAF POWS of Lamsdorf including chronicles of their 500 mile trek* (Holland Park: Lamsdorf RAAF POWS Association, 1992); J. Pape, *Boldness by my Friend*, (London: Headline Review, 2008); R. Passmore, *Moving Tent*, (London: T. Harmsworth Pub, 1982); F. Richardson, *Man is not lost*: *The Log of a Pioneer RAF Pilot/Navigator, 1933-1946,* (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd, 1997); D. Spivey, *POW Odyssey: Recollections of Center Compound, Stalag Luft III and the Secret German Peace Mission in World War II,* (Attleboro: Colonial Lithograph,1984); C. Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, (London: Frederick Muller, 1956).

[163] For reference to the manuscripts of the Australian army POWs in Germany see H. Hammond, unpublished manuscript titled 'Personal Account of Henry Hammond', AWM MSS1730; S. McDougal, unpublished manuscript titled 'Rock City: An Experience. Blindheim Germany,' AWM MSS1710; N. Shute, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS0685. For reference to the Australian MO taken prisoner by the Germans see G. Anderson, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS1626; L. Le Souef, unpublished manuscript titled 'To War without a Gun', AWM MSS0783. For reference to the

Museum has a significant collection of unpublished manuscripts of POWs captured by the Germans, mainly from air force officers and NCOs in Stalag Luft III, Stalag VIIIB and prisoners from air force and army POW camps who were moved from their permanent camps during the forced marches.[164] Those manuscripts written by POWs in the same camp as the positional and emergent leaders studied in this thesis have been included. The catalogue system used in footnotes is the system that was in place when the research was conducted in 2008.

Oral histories have provided a significant source for understanding the role and perception by formal group members of positional, professional and emergent leaders. The interviews conducted by Donald Wall, Hank Nelson, the Imperial War Museum and the Australians at War Film Archive asked the repatriated prisoners about leadership within their camps.[165] If the repatriated prisoner remembered something about their positional leader, good or bad, the interviewer usually asked a series of follow-up questions. It is these questions that reveal the identities and roles of leaders. Listening to interviews and reading transcripts of repatriated prisoners from the same POW camp has, therefore, provided information as to who were considered to be leaders and the extent to which they gained, retained or lost leadership legitimacy behind the wire.

Nelson, Beaumont, Vourkouriotis, Mackenzie and Hearder have highlighted inherent methodological problems with prisoner recollections.[166] The accuracy of prisoner

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RAAF personnel taken prisoner by the Germans see I. Dack, unpublished manuscript titled 'So You Wanted Wings Hey!!', AWM MSS1511; O. Drigber, unpublished manuscript titled 'As I saw it', AWM MSS1412; J. Hancock, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS2154; R. Osborn, unpublished manuscript titled, 'The Last Landing of C. Charlie 23 Jan 1943,' AWM MSS1482. For reference to the unnamed Australian POW in Germany see unknown, unpublished memoir titled 'My Last Days in Germany, AWM MSS1973. For reference to the one manuscript by RAN prisoner see J. Hill, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS2045.

[164] For reference to manuscripts by RAF Officers in Stalag Luft III see N. Flesker, unpublished manuscript titled, 'Operations: Memoirs of the Great Escape,' IWM 99/82/1; H. Groocock, unpublished manuscript titled 'Mein Camp', IWM 01/30/01; J. Maddock, unpublished manuscript titled 'Memoires:1939-1945, IWM 67/406/1. For reference to manuscripts of RAF NCOs imprisoned in Stalag VIIIB see L. Shorrock, unpublished manuscript titled, 'Guest of the Fuhrer', IWM 80/2/1.

[165] The interviews conducted by Hank Nelson and Donald Wall were part of their research for their respective books on Australian POWs. These interviews can be accessed at the AWM. Conrad Wood and Peter Hart conducted a large proportion of the interviews of POWs held captive in Europe on behalf of the IWM.

[166] J. Beaumont, *Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity, 1941-1945*, (St. Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1988), pp.6-8; R. Header, 'Memory, Methodology and Myth: Some of the Challenges of Writing Australian Prisoner of War History,' *Journal of the Australian War Memorial*, vol. 40,

recollections can be distorted by distance in time and space and the displacement of individual thought by collective beliefs, national myths or memory. In an attempt to overcome this inherent flaw, at least three sources have been used to justify the description and analysis of leadership. The nature of some extreme captive/evasion settings and loss or lack of primary sources has meant, in some cases, this is impossible.

The number of writings and recollections of Australians held prisoner in the European Theatre is much smaller than those for the Pacific Theatre. In the German context, most writings and/or recollections from Australian prisoners come from air force personnel. This disparity reflects the better condition these men experienced and their protection from forced labour. Conditions in army officer and NCO camps were generally not as good as their air force counterparts but, protected from labour, these men did have time to write and reflect on their experiences. However, in comparison to air force prisoners, there are fewer writings and recollections by these men. It is possible that the post-war emphasis on escape in the European Theatre and a national focus on the horrors of captivity in the Pacific, made these men reluctant to tell their stories. The disproportionate authorship of primary sources by Australians in the European Theatre is made worse by the loss of a large number of Australian Army repatriation questionnaires.[167] During the course of researching this thesis, no reference to leadership has been found in any Australian naval POW camp in Europe. These problems shaped the parameters for the selecting leaders from the European Theatre. Therefore, in the German setting of captivity, there is a disproportionate emphasis on the leadership of Australian Air Force officers and NCOs.

Taking into account the difficulties with the sources discussed above, this thesis examines the leadership of Australians in the following settings in Europe; Dulag Luft, Stalag Luft's I, III, VI, Oflag XXIB, Stalag's 357 (Thorn then Fallingbostel), VIIIB/344 and the forced marches. The small amount of primary sources from Australians in Italy meant that exploring leadership in this captive setting was

February 2007, pp.2-4; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.411; Nelson, 'Beyond the Slogans', pp.31-32; Vourkoutiotis, *Prisoners of War and German High Command*, p.1.

[167] The Australian Army repatriated prisoner questionnaires for Germany/Italy are held at the AWM. Occasionally, an army prisoner's statement is included in a folder containing RAAF prisoner statements. Thousands of these statements are, however, missing.

impossible. This exclusion is not unique. Bob Moore, a scholar in this area of POW studies, has examined the Italian POW experience in Britain, including their day-to-day experiences, the British government's policies towards these POWs and their fate after the capitulation of Italy at the end of the war.[168] Moore has written the only comparative study between the experiences of Italian POWs in Britain and British POWs in Italy.[169] The disparity, in his words, reflects the sparse sources that exist on British/Commonwealth POWs' experiences in Italy.

In contrast to the practical limitations of examining leadership of Australians in the European Theatre, sources on Australians in the Pacific are voluminous. This meant parameters had to be set regarding which leaders and locations to examine. The first set of parameters were based on identifying camp types and conditions, that is, relatively stable, volatile and extreme. The secondary set of parameters reflected the objectives of the thesis discussed earlier, the re-examination of some well-known Australian and British leaders of Australian captives during the Second World War, while also drawing attention to previously unidentified leaders. These parameters have meant that not all prominent Australian positional and professional POW leaders from the Pacific Theatre are analysed in this thesis.[170] The formal groups chosen are the

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[168] B. Moore, 'Enforced Diaspora: The Fate of Italian Prisoners of War during the Second World War,' *War in History*, vol. XXIV, no.2 (2015), pp.174-190; B. Moore, 'British Perceptions of Italian Prisoners of War 1940-1947,' in B. Moore and B. Hately-Broad (eds.), *Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: Captivity, Homecoming and Memory in World War Two*, (Oxford: Berg, 2005), pp.25-40; B. Moore, 'The Importance of Labor: The Western Allies and their Italian Prisoners of War in World War II,' *Annali dell'Istituto Storico italo-germanico* in Trento XXVIII, (2002), pp.529-550; B. Moore and K. Fedorowich, *The British Empire and its Italian Prisoners of War 1940-1947*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); B. Moore, 'Turning Liabilities into Assets: British Government and Italian Prisoners-of-war during the Second World War,' *Journal of Contemporary History* vol. XXXI, (1997), pp.117-136; B. Moore, 'Axis Prisoners in Britain during the Second World War: A Comparative Survey' in B. Moore and K. Fedorowich (eds.), *Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War II*, (Oxford: Berg, 1996), pp.19-46; B. Moore and K. Fedorowich, 'Allied Negotiations on Italian Co-belligerency and the Prisoner-of-War Question, 1943-45' *International History Review*, vol. XVIII (1996), pp.28-47.

[169] B. Moore and B. Hately-Broad, 'Living on Hope and Onions: The Everyday Life of British Servicemen in Axis Captivity,' *Everyone's War*, vol. VIII (Autumn/Winter 2003), pp.36-45.

[170] The most prominent Australian positional leaders not examined in this thesis are Lieutenant Colonel's Charles Henry Kappe, the leader of F Force in the Pacific Theatre, Lieutenant Colonel William Scott, the positional leader of Gull Force in the Pacific and A Force MO Lieutenant Colonel Albert Coates. For reference to studies which have examined these leaders see J. Beaumont, *Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity, 1941-1945*, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988); W. Gherardin, *Against the Odds: Albert Coates a Heroic Life*, (Bakery Hill: Albert Coates Memorial Trust, 2009); W. Gherardin and W. Gherardin, *A Life: Glimpses of Sir Albert Coates, Master Surgeon, Soldier, Teacher, Humanitarian*, Second Edition, (Ballarat: Albert Coates Memorial Trust, 2000); P. Stanley, '"The men who did the fighting are now all busy writing,"': Australian Post-Mortems on Defeat in Malaya and Singapore, 1942-45' in B. Farrell and S. Hunter (eds.), *Sixty Years On: The Fall of Singapore Revisited*, (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), pp.290-312.

POWs in Changi, Pudu Jail, Dunlop Force, U Battalion D Force, the Australian Battalion attached to H Force, F Force, and the POWs who were forced to march from Sandakan camp to Ranau on Borneo.

Literature review

The studies by historians who have explored leadership in captivity fall into two categories: those that examine leadership peripherally and historians who explicitly examine prisoner leadership structures. In the first category, studies refer to positional, professional and emergent leaders within a larger description of captive locations, conditions and experiences. Here historians inadvertently describe leadership roles and sometimes provide insights into a leader's legitimacy and effectiveness.

Four types of historical works fall into this category. The first are Australian and New Zealand official histories of the Second World War.[171] The second are sweeping narratives of the Australian captive experience that usually span more than one conflict. Publications by the Australian Departments of Defence and Veteran Affairs dominate this category, with the obvious exception of Patsy Adam-Smith's study *Prisoners of war: from Gallipoli to Korea*.[172] The third category consists of battalion histories. Most Australian battalions that had men captured in the Second World War include a narrative in their history describing their experiences.[173] The last and most extensive category is the work of historians who address the experience of prisoners in a particular theatre of the Second World War. Historians in this category describe and analyse prisoner experiences, but do not deliberately address the question of leadership. The works in this category are numerous.

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[171] For example see A. Field, 'Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,' in B. Maughan, *Tobruk and El Alamein: Australia in the War of 1939-1945*, series 1 Army, vol. III, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1966), pp.755-822; J. Herrington, *Air Power Over Europe 1944-1945: Australia in the War of 1939-1945*, series 3, vol. IV, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954), pp.466-498; A. Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' in L. Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust: Australia in the War of 1939-1945*, series I, vol. IV, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial,1957), pp.511-642; W. Mason, *Prisoners of War: Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War*, (Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs,1954).

[172] For example of Australian government publications on POWs see R. Reid, *In Captivity: Australian Prisoners of War in the Twentieth Century*, (Department of Veteran Affairs: Canberra, 1999); M. Tracey, *Australian Prisoners of War*, (Department of Defence: Canberra, 1999). For Adam-Smith's work see P. Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War: from Gallipoli to Korea*, (Ringwood: Viking, 1992).

[173] The 2/19th battalion history provides the most extensive narrative on captivity. See Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19th Battalion A.I.F.*, (Crows Nest: Acme Office, 1975), pp.390-773. For a more extensive list of unit histories see the Bibliography.

Bob Moore has composed an overview of the experience and conditions of Axis and Allied POWs in Europe.[174] Studies by David Rolf, David Foy, Arthur Durand, Bob Moore and Barbara Hately, Oliver Clutton-Brock, Ariech Kochavi and Jonathan Vance provide insight into the experience of British/Commonwealth or American prisoners in Germany.[175] These studies focus on POWs capture, camp conditions, interaction with the captor, everyday experiences, including camp entertainment, food supplies and distribution, and escape. Vasilis Vourkoutiotis, John Nichols and Tony Rennell's studies focus on the experience of British/Commonwealth POWs during the forced marches and German OKW policies for British/Commonwealth and American prisoners.[176]

Peter Monteath provides the most extensive study of Australian prisoners in Germany to date.[177] He provides an overview of the circumstances of capture, the organisation and set-up of POW camps in Germany and finally a thematic study of their experiences. The themes explored are the everyday life of prisoners, life in labour camps, crime and punishment by the captor (including reprisals), escape, special camps and the forced marches. Throughout this analysis, Monteath mentions positional leaders and explains their role and importance to the men in the camp.

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[174] B. Moore, 'The Treatment of Prisoners of War in the Western European Theatre of War 1939-1945', cited in S. Scheipers (ed.), *Prisoners of War*, (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp.111-126.

[175] O. Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time: RAF Bomber Command Prisoners-of-War in Germany* 1939-1945, (London: Grub Street, 2003); A. Durand, *Stalag Luft III: The Secret Story*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); D. Foy, *For You the War is Over: American Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany*, (New York: Stein and Day, 1984); A. Kochavi, *Confronting Captivity: Britain and the United States and their Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2005); B. Moore and B. Hately, 'Captive Audience: Camp Entertainment and British Prisoners-of-War in German Captivity, 1939-1945,' *Popular Entertainment Studies*, vol. 1, (2014), pp.58-73; D. Rolf, *Prisoners of the Reich: Germany's captives 1939-1945*, (London: Cooper, 1988); J. Vance, *A Gallant Company: The Men of the Great Escape*, (California: Pacifica Military History, 2000); J. Vance, 'Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943,' *The Journal of Military History*, vol.59, July (1995), pp.483-504; J. Vance, 'The War Behind the Wire: The Battle to Escape from a German Prison Camp,' *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol.28, (1993), pp.675-693; J. Vance, 'The Politics of Camp Life: The Bargaining Process in Two German Prison Camps,' *War and Society*, vol.10, no.1 May (1992), pp.109-126.

[176] J. Nichol and T. Rennell, *The Last Escape: The Untold Story of Allied Prisoners of War in Germany, 1944-1945*, (London: Viking, 2002); V. Vourkoutiotis, *Prisoners of War and German High Command: The British and American Experience*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

[177] P. Monteath, *P.O.W: Australian Prisoners of War in Hitler's Reich,* (Sydney: MacMillan, 2011).

Eleven historians have addressed the Australian experience of captivity in the Pacific: Hank Nelson, Gavin McCormack, Pattie Wright, Don Wall, Kevin Smith, Lynette Silver, Cameron Forbes, Michelle Cunningham, Roger Maynard, Paul Ham, Peter Brune and Charles Roland.[178] Nelson, Forbes and Brune provide an overview of the Australian prisoner experience across different captive settings in the Pacific Theatre. Nelson and McCormack's edited work explores different themes, which arise out of the study of Australian prisoners on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Wright explores the experience of different Australian POWs on the Burma-Thailand Railway, while Maynard offers a narrative on the Australian POWs experiences at Ambon. Roland includes an analysis of officers' maintenance of their priviledge in captivity, an issue discussed in this thesis.

Donald Wall, Lynette Silver, Michele Cunningham and Paul Ham provide a narrative of the Australian prisoners' experiences at Sandakan and the forced marches to Ranau. By default, these historians explore positional, professional and emergent leadership within part of the larger narrative of what occurred at these locations. Robin Havers has explored captivity in Changi and the Burma-Thailand Railway.[179] Although Havers' study focuses on the British experience, he provides insight into Australians positional leadership because of the structure of British/Australian command in Changi camp. Gavan Daws' *Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific* provides a description and some analysis of mostly American experiences of

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[178] P. Brune, *Descent into Hell: The Fall of Singapore- Pudu and Changi - The Thai Burma Railway,* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2014); M. Cunningham, *Hell on Earth: Sandakan- Australia's Greatest War Tragedy,* (Sydney: Hachette, 2013); C. Forbes, *Hellfire: The Story of Australia, Japan and the Prisoners of War,* Pan Edition (Sydney: Pan McMillian, 2007); P. Ham, *Sandakan: The Untold Story of the Sandakan Death Marches,* (North Sydney: William Heinemann/Random House, 2013); R. Maynard, *Ambon,* (Sydney: Hachette, 2014); G. McCormack and H. Nelson (eds.), *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History,* (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993); H. Nelson, *POW: Prisoners of War Australians under Nippon,* (Sydney: ABC Enterprise for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1985); C. Roland, *Long Night's Journey into Day: Prisoners of War in Hong Kong and Japan,* (Waterloo Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2001); L. Silver, *Sandakan: A Conspiracy of Silence,* Third Edition, (Binda: Sally Milner Publishing, 2000); K. Smith, *Borneo: Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage,* (Armidale: Self-published, 1999); D. Wall, *Sandakan under Nippon: The Last March,* Fourth Edition, (Mona Vale: Self-published, 1995); D. Wall, *Kill the Prisoners,* (Sydney: Self-Published, 1996); D. Wall, *Abandoned: Australians at Sandakan, 1945,* (Mona Vale: Self-published, 1990); P. Wright, *The Men on the Line: Stories of the Thai Burma Railway Survivors,* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2008).

[179] R. Havers, *Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience: The Changi POW Camp, Singapore 1942-45,* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003); R. Havers, 'The Changi POW Camp and The Burma-Thailand Railway', in P. Towle, M. Kosuse and Y. Kibata (eds.), *Japanese Prisoners of War,* (London: Hambledon Press, 2000), pp.17-34.

captivity across different settings in the Pacific.[180] Like Durand's study of air force prisoners in Germany (mainly Americans at Stalag Luft III), Daws' study offers important insights into positional and emergent leaders. Daws' analysis of the formation, maintenance and fracturing of informal groups is particularly relevant to this thesis.

The second category of historians specifically analyse POW leadership as part of their studies. These works are both generalised and theatre specific.

Jonathan Vance's edited work *Encyclopaedia of Prisoners of War* is the first study to address some universal themes of captivity.[181] Two of these themes are positional and professional leadership. This reference text also includes detailed entries on the experience of prisoners in different types of camps. Sibylla Jane Flower's study focuses on positional leadership of British POWs on the Burma-Thailand Railway.[182] Through the description of events, these historians have, by default, identified some emergent leaders.

Simon Mackenzie's *The Colditz Myth: British and Commonwealth Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany* and Adrian Gilbert's *POW: Allied Prisoners of War in Europe 1939-1945*, offer a chapter that describes and analyses positional leadership.[183] Both studies address similar themes. These are the structure of formal groups, captor and captive perceptions of positional leaders' roles, leadership legitimacy, styles of leadership, the necessity for discipline and leadership evaluation. Gilbert's study includes a chapter on professional leaders. He outlines their roles, experiences and followership - or lack of thereof. Mackenzie's study also addresses professional leadership. His analysis is part of a greater theme '[B]ody and [S]oul.'[184] Both authors, through the description and analysis of the captive experience, refer to emergent leaders.

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[180] G. Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific,* (New York: William Morrow Company, 1994).
[181] J. Vance (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Prisoners of War,* (Santa Barbara: AB-CLIO, 2000).
[182] Flower, 'Captors and Captives on the Burma-Thailand Railway,' pp.227-252.
[183] A. Gilbert, *POW: Allied Prisoners of War in Europe, 1939-1945,* (London: John Murray, 2006); S. Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth: British and Commonwealth Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
[184] Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.154.

Nine historians have specifically addressed Australian POW leadership in the Pacific Theatre: Hank Nelson, Rosalind Header, Joan Beaumont, Peter Stanley, Michelle Cunningham, Gavan Daws, Ian Campbell and Lucy Roberston.

In his 1989 article, 'A Bowl of Rice for Seven Camels: The Dynamics of Prisoners of War Camps', Nelson explores how Australian prisoners interacted.[185] Across the breadth of Australian captive locations in the Pacific, Nelson addresses four themes: camp economies, discipline, prisoner-to-prisoner relationships and prisoner behaviour in the extreme situations where men were dying. Without using the labels utilised in this thesis, Nelson's article highlights the core feature of the Australian captive experience in the Second World War, the role of human dynamics amongst, and between, formal and informal groups.

Rosalind Hearder provides the most substantial analysis of a specific type of leader. In her thesis, *Careers in Captivity: Australian Prisoner-of-war Medical Officers in Japanese Captivity during World War II* (now published), Hearder analyses one type of professional leader, the MO.[186] Most of her analysis centres on two settings, Changi and the Burma-Thailand Railway. Hearder's study is, therefore, the first to offer an analysis of one type of leader in captivity, in more than one setting. For this reason, and because of its content, Hearder's study is the natural forerunner to this thesis.

Joan Beaumont briefly examines leadership in captivity in *Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity 1941-1945*.[187] She provides a chronological narrative of the experiences of Gull Force in battle and captivity that includes a four-page overview of the concept of leadership.[188] In 2015, Joan Beaumont, Lachlan Grant and Aaron Pegram's edited work, *Beyond Surrender: Australian Prisoners of War 1915-1953*, offers two chapters relevant to the examination of leadership within the POW

[185] H. Nelson, 'A Bowl of Rice for Seven Camels: The Dynamics of Prisoner-of-War Camps', *Journal of the Australian War Memorial*, vol. 14, (1989), pp.33-42.
[186] R. Hearder, 'Careers in Captivity: Australian Prisoner-of-War Medical Officers in Japanese Captivity during World War II,' (PhD dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2003). For reference to Hearder's publication of this thesis see R. Hearder, *Keep the Men Alive: Australian POW Doctors in Japanese Captivity*, (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2009).
[187] J. Beaumont, *Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity, 1941-1945*, (St. Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1988).
[188] Beaumont, *Gull Force*, pp.92-95.

camps.[189] Lucy Robertson explores the different methods the Australian GOC used to discipline and control his men.[190] Beaumont's chapter extends one of her previous research themes, the advantages of rank in surviving captivity on the Burma-Thailand Railway.[191]

Cunningham, Flower, McArthur, Nelson, Stanley and to a lesser extent, Daws, have also explored the question of officer privilege in captivity.[192] These historians have demonstrated that, on the Burma-Thailand Railway and in Changi and Sandakan POW camps, some Australian, American and British officers, under the orders of their positional leaders, were given extra privileges. In the volatile and extreme captive settings this meant that officers were more likely than the other ranks to survive. Eventually, the men realised this disparity and looked to their positional leaders to help ensure that their interests were protected. The willingness of a positional leader to react to his men's needs ultimately reflected their ability to adapt their position to the conditions of captivity. If a leader could not do this, Flower and Stanley's works explain how positional leaders lost their legitimacy amongst the men. An analysis of leadership in captivity is, therefore, more than a theoretical study. Prisoners in the Second World War considered leadership to be a vital element of their day-to-day activities and, ultimately, their survival.

Ian Campbell's thesis on the leadership of Brigadier Frederick Gallagher Galleghan in the Second World War assessed Galleghan's leadership as a commanding officer in training, battle and captivity against the prescriptive command 'model' also used by

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[189] J. Beaumont et al. (eds.), *Beyond Surrender: Australian Prisoners of War 1915-1954*, (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 2015).
[190] L. Robertson, 'Changi: Military Discipline in a Japanese Prisoner-of-War Camp, 1942-45, in Beaumont et al. (eds.), *Beyond Surrender: Australian Prisoners of War 1915-1954*, (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 2015), pp.135-173.
[191] J. Beaumont, 'Officers and Men: Rank and Survival on the Thai-Burma Railway,' in Beaumont et al (eds.), *Beyond Surrender: Australian Prisoners of War 1915-1954*, (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 2015), pp.228-238; J. Beaumont, 'Rank, Privilege and Prisoners of War', *War and Society*, vol.1, (1983), pp.69-94; J. Beaumont, 'Privilege in the Prisoner-of-War Camp: Some Reflections on the Position of Officers of the 2nd A.I.F. during Captivity in the Far East', *Australian War Memorial Seminar*, 12 February 1981.
[192] M. Cunningham, *Hell on Earth: Sandakan – Australia's Greatest War Tragedy*, (Hachette Australia: Sydney, 2013); M. Cunningham, *Defying the Odds – Surviving Sandakan and Kuching*, (Hachette Australia: Sydney, 2007); M. Cunningham, 'Leadership in POW Camps', unpublished seminar paper provided by author; Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese*, pp.22-24; Flower, 'Captors and Captives on the Burma-Thailand Railway', pp.227-252; B. MacArthur, *Surviving the Sword: Prisoners of the Japanese in the Far East, 1942-1945*, Illustrated Edition (London: Abacus, 2006), pp.297-324; Nelson, *POW*, pp.58-61; P. Stanley, "The men who did the fighting are now all busy writing", pp.298-312.

Beaumont, Flower and Cunningham in their work.[193] It offers an analysis of a particular positional leader in one captive setting and Galleghan's story certainly suits the command model where rank is important in leadership. This thesis, however, offers very different conclusions to Campbell's. It will argue that behind the wire, leadership could, and did, function without traditional military structures. The goal of positional leaders also changed as the object was no longer to win a battle, but to keep the men alive. Only by attempting or achieving this, did positional leaders gain legitimacy. Followership in captivity, therefore, required something more than rank. In a captive setting leadership cannot be assessed according to the same criterion as a military positional leader in training or battle. Lucy Robertson has recently questioned Galleghan's authoritarian approach to control his men behind the wire, an argument this thesis explores in a later chapter.[194]

Biographies can provide insights into the way a particular leader worked, although they need to be read carefully. Only four prisoner positional leaders in the Second World War have been the subject of this type of scholarship. The first is Stan O'Neil's celebratory narrative of Galleghan.[195] The second is an equally partial narrative of British Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day by Sydney Smith.[196] Biographies, by Julie Summers and Peter Davies, examine the same subject, British Lieutenant Colonel Philip Toosey.[197] Three biographies on Australia's iconic MO in captivity, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Edward 'Weary' Dunlop, have been written. Sue Ebury has written two of these studies.[198] Margaret Geddes wrote the other.[199] A New

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[193] I. Campbell, 'A Model of Battalion Command: Training and Leadership in the 2nd A.I.F: A Case Study of Brigadier F.G. Galleghan', (MA dissertation, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1991).
[194] L. Robertson, 'Discipline at Changi: Crime, punishment and keeping order inside the prison camp', Summer Scholarship Seminar Paper presented at the AWM 2013. <https://www.awm.gov.au/sites/default/files/2013%20Edited%20-%20Lucy%20Robertson's%20Paper_0.pdf>, maintained by the AWM, accessed on 12 December 2014.
[195] S. Arneil, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of Brigadier Sir Frederick Galleghan,* (MacMillan: Melbourne, 1983).
[196] S. Smith, *Wings Day: The Man who led the RAF's Epic Battle in German Captivity,* (London: Collins, 1968).
[197] P. Davies, *The Man Behind the Bridge: Colonel Toosey and the River Kwai,* (London: Athlone Press, 1991); J. Summers, *The Colonel of Tamarkan: Philip Toosey and the Bridge on the River Kwai,* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2005). Stan Arneil and Sydney Smith were prisoners under Galleghan and Day. Julie Summers is Toosey's granddaughter.
[198] S. Ebury, *Weary: King of the River*, (Carlton: Miegunyah Press, 2010); S. Ebury, *Weary: The Life of Sir Edward Dunlop*, (Ringwood: Viking, 1994).
[199] M. Geddes, *Remembering Weary*, (Ringwood: Hammodsworth Viking, 1996).

Zealand prisoner Chaplain, R.G. McDowall, has been the subject of a Master's thesis by M. Tagg.[200]

Oral history is an important primary source used by most historians in the works outlined above. Hank Nelson, in particular, based his work, *POW: Prisoners of War Australians under Nippon*, on interviews he conducted with repatriated POWs. In recent times, collated transcripts of oral histories by POWs have also been published. These works include Michael Caulfield's *War Behind the Wire: Australian Prisoners of War,* based on the Australians at War Film Archive.[201] Caulfield organised his selection of POW interviews from the European and Pacific Theatres into themes, including positional and emergent leadership.

Caulfield has produced three other edited collections. One of these collections, *Voices of War: Stories from the Australians at War Film Archive*, explores the Australian prisoner experience from across both theatres of the Second World War in a chronological narrative.[202] Charles Rollings and Mararet Geddes have produced similar collections of oral histories, which include POW stories, organised in a chronological narrative.[203] Brian MacArthur's work S*urviving the Sword: Prisoners of the Japanese 1942-1945* combines oral interviews and diaries to explain the experiences of British, Australian and American POWs across different captive settings.[204]

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[200] M. Tagg, 'The Prisoner Padre: The Impact of War on a New Zealand Cleric,' (MA dissertation, University of Waikato, 1997).
[201] M. Caulfied (ed.), *War Behind the Wire: Australian Prisoners of War,* Updated Edition, (Sydney: Hachette, 2010); M. Caulfied (ed.), *War Behind the Wire: Australian Prisoners of War,* (Sydney: Hachette, 2008).
[202] M. Caulfied (ed.), *Voices of War: Stories from the Australians at War Film Archive,* Updated Edition, (Sydney: Hachette, 2010); M. Caulfied (ed.), *Voices of War: Stories from the Australians at War Film Archive,* (Sydney: Hodder, 2006).
[203] M. Geddes, *Blood, Sweat and Tears: Australia's WWII Remembered by the Men and Women who Lived It,* (Camberwell, Penguin, 2004); C. Rollings, *Prisoners of War: Voices from Behind the Wire in the Second World War,* (London: Ebury, 2008).
[204] B. MacArthur, *Surviving the Sword: Prisoners of the Japanese in the Far East, 1942-1945*, Illustrated Edition (London: Abacus, 2006).

AUTHORITARIAN LEADERSHIP

Stalag XIB, Fallingbostel, Autumn 1944.
The prisoners stand rigidly at attention, boots shined, clothes clean, hopeful their improvised efforts will be enough.[1] He strides towards the morning parade with purpose, dignity and poise. He stops to inspect his men, the prisoners, his fellow captives. Finally, he bellows 'My name is Lord! J.C. Lord. Jesus Christ Lord, the only holy man in the British Army and don't you forget it!'[2]

Authoritarian leadership is a directive style usually adopted by positional leaders to achieve a specific task or goal.[3] It is characterised by an uncompromising belief that position legitimizes the act of 'telling'[4] subordinates or followers what to do. The leader, therefore, has control, and at times absolute power, over his subordinates.[5] Authoritarian leaders impose a pathway towards the achievement of their self-defined vision. This is demonstrated through the leader's ability to dictate followers' actions and behaviours along with rewards and/or punishments. Authoritarian leadership is the nucleus of military structure and power where rank gives authority. This positional power is legally protected by enforceable regulations.[6] Within this organisational structure it is a cultural expectation that a positional leader adopts an authoritarian style. Almost all military POW camps transferred regulatory hierarchical structures to the captive state. This structure allowed the ranking positional leaders and some emergent leaders to use an authoritarian style. The adoption of this leadership style was not forced. It was a conscious choice based in military culture.

Yet, even in the military, rank does not provide a leader with automatic followership from subordinates. Rather, rank only imposes 'headship.'[7] As Charles Holloman argues, 'Leadership is more a function of the group or situation than a quality which adheres to a person appointed to a formal position...'[8] Rank positional leaders

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[1] Rolf, *Prisoners of the Reich*, pp.40-41.
[2] E. Stonard cited in Rolf, *Prisoners of the Reich*, p.41.
[3] For an overview of authoritarian leadership see Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.50-55, 86-87; Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.68-70; House and Aditya, 'The Social Scientific Study of Leadership,' p.420; Lussier and Achua, *Leadership*, pp.69-74.
[4] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, p.86.
[5] C. Graumann, 'Power and Leadership in Lewinian Field Theory: Recalling an Interrupted Task,' in C. Graumann and S. Moscovici (eds.), *Changing Conceptions of Leadership: Springer Series in Social Psychology*, (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986), pp.87-91.
[6] Part 1 Division 2 and Part 3, The Defence Act 1903-1950 and Regulations and Orders for the Australian Military Forces, 1927.
[7] Holloman, 'Leadership and Headship,' p.104.
[8] *ibid*., p.97.

therefore have to earn legitimacy for their leadership through their actions and treatment of subordinates that, in turn, builds followership. In captivity, moral legitimacy becomes an even more important requirement for positional leadership because the legal authority of rank is compromised by captivity. The compromised authority of rank also means that positional leadership based on rank can be superseded in importance by leadership characterised by followership.

This section explores three different leaders who adopted an authoritarian style of leadership. The first is a positional leader within the Pacific Theatre, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan. As prisoner of the Japanese in Changi, Galleghan was the quintessential positional leader who maintained a traditional military style of authoritarian leadership based on regulations and procedures set down by the army. Despite his captive status, Galleghan never paused to consider any other sort of leadership style. Strict adherence to military regulations was the only standard he applied behind the wire, despite the deteriorating captive conditions in Changi. Galleghan believed that a strict continuation of military disciplinary procedures, including punishment, would allow him to achieve leadership legitimacy and build followership.

Captain Reginald William James Newton is the second leader explored in this section. Newton was a prisoner of the Japanese. Despite only being a captain, Newton became a positional leader of Australians in two volatile captive settings in the Pacific Theatre because he was the highest ranked officer: Pudu Jail in Kuala Lumpur and the Burma-Thailand Railway. To achieve his leadership goal of collective survival, Newton adopted an authoritarian style. Of the three leaders examined in this section, according to the men in his formal group, Newton acquired leadership legitimacy and a fierce followership. He did this by using his cunning, courage and sheer audacity in his attempts to outwit the captor to protect his men from the captor's aggression. This was a battle Newton largely won. In return for his efforts, men within and from outside his formal group not only recognised his status as a leader but also acknowledged his success.

The third leader, British Squadron Leader Rodger Bushell, is an example of an emergent leader whose legitimacy was based on an expertise highly relevant to men in

captivity, that is, escape. A prisoner of the Germans in Dulag Luft and Stalag Luft III, Bushell's expertise and experience in escape activities enabled him to become a leader amongst groups of multi-national prisoners. Bushell also exercised authoritative leadership over these men. His master plan of a mass escape enabled him to retain legitimacy despite his emergent status. Australian, British, Commonwealth and even American prisoners willingly accepted his uncompromising style of leadership for a slim, or even fool's, hope of freedom.

Although the leadership of the three men examined in this section was of an authoritarian style, each man had very different motives for applying this traditional military leadership style in captivity. Galleghan believed that the only way to secure the collective survival of the men under his command was to maintain the belief that they were soldiers, not prisoners: he ran Changi, he said, 'as if we were still in the army'.[9] Newton knew that he had to have absolute control over his men if he was to have any hope of achieving a leadership goal he shared with Galleghan: the collective survival of men under his command. Yet, he also knew that the traditional military methods would not work in the volatile conditions in which he led his men and so adapted his leadership style in a manner that would have been anathema for Galleghan. Bushell had more a selfish motive. He used an authoritarian leadership style to recruit and control the men of Stalag Luft III North Compound for his escape scheme so that he could have another chance to escape captivity.

The respective formal groups of these three authoritarian leaders reacted very differently to their leadership styles and their leadership goals. As will be argued in the chapters that follow, Galleghan's refusal to acknowledge the limitations of his power in captivity, and the reality of his conditions, meant that he struggled to achieve leadership legitimacy let alone followership amongst the men under his command. Newton, however, by accepting the fact that he was a prisoner of the Japanese (and all that it entailed) succeeded as an authoritarian leader. Bushell's execution by the Germans ensured that, in popular memory, his personal motivations would be largely forgotten because he had organised the largest mass escape of prisoners in Germany, the Great Escape.

[9] F. Galleghan cited in Nelson, *POW*, p.34.

CHAPTER 2: LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK (BLACK JACK) GALLAGHER GALLEGHAN

Frederick (Black Jack) Gallagher Galleghan, a Lieutenant Colonel in charge of the 2/30th Battalion, had aspirations of becoming a general.[1] As a member of the 8th Division his ambitions were dealt a bitter blow. The surrender of Singapore meant he became a POW. Stan Arneil, Galleghan's biographer, suggests the realisation of his fate was perhaps Galleghan's darkest hour. 'The frustrations he suffered and the agonizing of "what might have been" had the army not capitulated was a cross which he and others bore for three and a half years as pows [sic].'[2] Yet captivity offered Galleghan the opportunity to become an unequivocal leader of men. Sir Roden Culter suggests that this period may even have been Galleghan's happiest as captivity provided a setting where he could fulfil his leadership ambitions on his own terms.[3]

Galleghan's leadership style

As a Lieutenant Colonel in the Citizens Militia Force and then in the Second AIF, Galleghan founded his leadership style upon regulation, order and discipline.[4] He had an uncompromising authoritarian style coupled with an abrupt manner born from a resolute conviction in his abilities as a ranking officer. Even before captivity, Galleghan's style of leadership led to difficulties, both within units he commanded and with his superiors. His leadership style so antagonised AIF HQ that it took the intervention of former Prime Minister William Morris Hughes to secure his appointment at battalion level in the Second AIF.[5]

Galleghan's position as the ranking Australian officer in Changi was due to the Japanese decision to separate senior officers, defined as prisoners above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, from their men. Thus on 21 July 1942, on the authority of joint orders by Australian Major General Cecil Arthur Callaghan, and British Malaya Command Lieutenant General Arthur Ernest Percival, Galleghan was promoted from

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[1] Arneil, *Black Jack*, p.18.
[2] *ibid*., p.18.
[3] R. Culter, Foreword, in Arneil, *Black Jack*, p.viii.
[4] Arneil, *Black Jack*, pp.22-29, 58-60; A. Penfold, W. Bayliss and R. Crispin, *Galleghan's Greyhounds: History of the 2/30 Battalion*, (Sydney: 2/30 Battalion AIF Association, 1979), pp.3-4.
[5] Arneil, *Black Jack*, pp.58-59.

Lieutenant Colonel to GOC AIF.[6] Galleghan therefore inherited positional leadership of the Australian Compound in Changi. By this time, the Australians had been behind the wire for nearly five months. Galleghan, therefore, did not have the challenge of setting up leadership structures within the first few months of captivity. Instead, this responsibility had fallen to his superior, Callaghan.

On 19 February 1942, a few days after their capture, the Japanese threatened 'extreme measures'[7] if positional leaders were unable to control their men. Callaghan, taking the threat seriously, ensured his men realised that not only did rank authority remain in place behind the wire, but also that Australian military law remained operable. In doing so, he laid the foundation for legitimising positional leadership based upon an authoritarian style within captivity.

Callaghan, however, quickly discovered that transferring traditional military structure and discipline to captivity was not easy. In the earliest days, the relevance and legitimacy of positional leaders hung in the balance. Men's natural feelings of anger, resentment and fear were channelled into grievances against their officers.[8] Ill-discipline and displays of bad temper were commonplace. Many of the other ranks believed that the authority of officers ceased to exist in captivity. Callaghan responded to this challenge towards officer authority by implementing a 'flexible' transfer of Australian military structures in Changi. Having established an AIF HQ, he divided the Australian Compound into six areas based on Brigade, Battalion and Unit lines, each with its Commanding Officer.[9] Callaghan also realised that rank alone could not secure the control of Australians. In a letter to his officers, Callaghan explained, 'Discipline is not created by edict. You do not achieve discipline simply by giving

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[6] C. Callaghan, Special Order, 20 July 1942, p.1, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2; C. Callaghan, Special Order, 5 August 1942, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2; A. Percival, Court Martial Warrant, 20 July 42, AWM 3DRL/2313, Folder 2. In April 1944 the captor extended Galleghan's power to Deputy Camp Commander and Representative Officer to IJA. See F. Galleghan, Monthly Report April 1944, Appendix 14, p.2, AWM52 1/5/19/23.

[7] Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.3. Also see AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 19 February 1942, p.1, AWM52 1/5/19/8.

[8] For example see Kenny, 'How I Won the War with Three Aces and a Pair of Twos', p.1; Oakes, 'Singapore Story', p.257; Young, 'Return to a Dark Age', p.34; Wilson, *You'll Never Get Off the Island*, pp.6-7.

[9] In total Changi consisted of six compounds for the Australian, British, Dutch and Indian POWs. No interaction allowed except by their respective positional leaders under the authority of British Malaya Command. See Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.174; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.514.

orders; discipline is inspired, created and maintained by leadership. Without that inspiration and without that necessary leadership, you will never get discipline.'[10] To establish the legitimacy of their leadership in captivity, Callaghan was suggesting that his officers needed to rely on something more than military regulations. A combination of practical example, empathy and motivation was required. 'Always endeavour to look at things from the men's point of view...Your only concern is welfare and efficiency. Be strong and consistent. Don't try to impress. Be natural. Set your standards and adhere to it [sic].'[11] Callaghan, therefore, appealed to men's intrinsic natural loyalties and reinforced the view that the alternative, a mob mentality, was an inherent risk to their survival.[12] In effect, Callaghan was devolving some of the authority normally centred in HQ to the officers in the compounds.

Callaghan's approach to leadership in captivity did not mean that disciplinary standards would be allowed to irreversibly slide. To reinforce regulatory procedures, for example, he introduced an AIF detention barracks.[13] Unit patrols (provosts) acted as a deterrent to unacceptable behaviour.[14] Until barbed wire was erected around the compound on 28 February, he placed Australian sentries around the compound boundaries on Japanese orders.[15] Yet in spite of his carefully calculated response to their captive state, Callaghan never achieved complete control of his formal group. The AIF HQ War Diary reveals that discipline remained a problem, rooted in the

[10] C. Callaghan, Changi Address delivered by Brigadier J.H, Thyer to Officers, Warrant Officers and Senior NCOs in the Changi Prison Camp on 18 June 1942, p.2, AWM 3DRL/4035. This address was delivered by Thyer due to Callaghan's ill-health.
[11] *ibid*., p.8.
[12] *ibid.*, pp.2-8.
[13] AIF HQ Malaya, Re Capitulation and Revision of AIF Prisoners of War Administration Instructions 1942, pp. 3-4, AWM52 1/5/19/8; Galleghan, Singapore POW Camps Report, pp.1-2; Letter to the Officer Commanding all Camps in S'pore from unknown Brigadier, pp.1-3, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1.
[14] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 22 February 1942, Appendix 1, AWM52 1/5/19/8.
[15] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 10 March 1942, Appendix 2, AWM52 1/5/19/8; Major Kato, Regulations for Prisoners of War, 24 March 1942, p.2, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1. Barbed wire was not placed around the Australian Compound until 28 February. The Japanese made the POWs responsible for installing and maintaining their compounds boundaries. See Havers, *Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience*, p.57.

notion of the other ranks that rank had lost its authority in captivity.[16] Most Australian other ranks still saw their officers as the same men who had led them into captivity. [17] When Galleghan became positional leader in July 1942, the Australian Compound was operating of the basis of a traditional military structure, and Galleghan used this structure as the basis for his own positional leadership response.[18] However, unlike Callaghan's willingness to acknowledge the unique circumstances of captivity through applying a flexible approach to leadership, Galleghan saw captivity as simply a new military setting, and therefore his leadership approach remained unchanged from that which he had practiced within a service setting. Galleghan's leadership style and orders aimed to reinforce his men's identity as soldiers. He explained to historian Hank Nelson:

> I ran it as if we were still in the army. I remember I used to say to the troops as often as I could 'you're soldiers and when I march you out of this camp I'm going to march you out as soldiers. I'm not going to march you out as a mob. You'll still be soldiers on the day it's over.'[19]

That meant adopting an uncompromising authoritarian style. Nothing less than absolute control was acceptable.

The nature of Galleghan's orders provides evidence of his strict authoritarian style. For example, on 30 July 1942 he announced, 'HQ [AIF Changi] will control all policy and [the] commander will take full responsibility.'[20] Galleghan, therefore, quickly abandoned Callaghan's flexible approach to military regulations in captivity of

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[16] For example of the lack of authority in traditional ranks see AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 27 February 1942, p.13, AWM52 1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 18 April 1942, p.63, AWM52 1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 30 July 1942, p.138, AWM52 1/5/19/8. For example of rank and file perception of rank authority see L. Stable, Address to AIF Ordnance Battalion at Changi, 25 March 1942, AWM PR86/191; Young, 'Return to a Dark Age', p.34; Sprod, *Bamboo Round My Shoulder*, p.9.

[17] For example see Oakes, 'Singapore Story', p.257.

[18] For reference to Callaghan's organisation see AIF HQ Malaya, Capitulation and Revision of AIF Prisoners of War Administrative Instructions, 15 March 1942, pp.1-6, AWM54 54/11/21; Callaghan, Changi Address delivered to Officers, Warrant Officers and Senior NCOs in the Changi Prison Camp, p.2; Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, pp.1-3; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.511-519; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, pp.523-532.

[19] F. Galleghan cited in Nelson, *POW*, p.34.

[20] F. Galleghan, Notes of First Conference of Area Comds and HQ staff held by Lt-Col Galleghan ADM Comd AIF 30 Jul 1942, para 2, AWM 3DRL\2313 Folder 2. Also see AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 30 July 1942, p.138; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 15 August 1942, p.144, AWM52 1/5/19/8; Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.10.

devolving some power to officers within the six compounds. Instead, just as in times of training and battle, Galleghan centralised control and he used this power to its full extent. He promulgated hundreds of routine orders for Australian captives in Changi. These orders consolidated his positional power and demonstrated his authoritarian leadership style, even down to the smallest level. For example, he banned the use of two unspecified abusive words, prohibited other ranks from engaging in organised gambling, restricted movement between the unit areas in the compound, banned the growth of beards, introduced compulsory morse code classes for mental stimulation and vigorously enforced the saluting of Australian, British and Dutch officers.[21] Controversially, Galleghan also retained traditional officer privileges associated with active service. For example, Galleghan allotted officers higher pay, more rations and excluded them from compound fatigues and Japanese work parties.[22] Officers were also entitled to the services of full time batmen.[23] This practice was only abandoned when too many Australian other ranks had been transferred out of the camp in overseas Work Forces.

To reinforce his vision that the Australians remained soldiers, not prisoners, Galleghan structured the daily activities of his men. Beginning with reveille at 0800 hours and concluding with lights out at 2245 hours, the day for Australians in Changi consisted of five parades, three meal breaks, two work periods and nightly recreational activities.[24] Camp fatigues were compulsory for other ranks. Depending on Japanese demands, additional work could also be allocated to the men.[25] In the early period of

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[21] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 30 July 1942, p.139; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 8 September 1942, p.152A, AWM52 1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 29 December 1942, p.191D**,** AWM52 1/5/19/18; F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Orders, No.190, 1 September 1943, p.12, AWM52 1/5/19/18.

[22] For reference to the officers pay see Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, pp.17-18. For reference to allegations of officers receiving more rations see Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', pp.45, 63-64; J. Kerr, loose paper titled 'The End of the Track', AWM PR 86/191; S. Leonard, loose writings titled 'Officers', AWM PR01013 Folder 5; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, p.154; McLaggan, *The Will to Survive*, pp.70,79; Sprod, *Bamboo Round My Shoulders*, p.36. For reference to Galleghan protecting officers from compound fatigues and working parties see AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 8 September 1942, p.152A; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 17 September 1943, Appendix 2G, AWM52 1/5/19/8.

[23] F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Orders, No.140, 14 April 1943, AWM54 1/5/19/12 Part 2.

[24] C. Bayliss, Diary 13 January 1942, AWM PR00555. Galleghan's daily schedule was based upon Lieutenant Colonel Sugita's requirement for POWs issued on 10 March 1942. See unknown Brigadier, Preliminary Draft on Standing Orders for British and Australian Prisoners of War, 10 March 1942, pp.1-2, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1.

[25] For examples see M. Felsch, Diary 12 December 1942, AWM PR01391; Arneil, *One Man's War*, p.l; McLaggan, *The Will to Survive*, pp.66,70. These work parties remained housed in Changi. Other work

his positional leadership tenure, July 1942 to March 1943, Galleghan ordered that regimental exercises, competitions and instruction be held.[26] Instructions were delivered by officers to the ranks on subjects such as military drills, air raid practices, NCO training courses, and unit and brigade ceremonial parades. Participation in most activities was compulsory. Galleghan believed that by maintaining regular military routines, the men would cease to think of themselves as prisoners, rank authority would be maintained and his authoritarian leadership style would be legitimised.

Punitive discipline was central to Galleghan's authoritarian leadership. Originally, Galleghan had maintained Callaghan's 'flexible' disciplinary system.[27] This meant District Court Martials at compound level were convened for all charges against officers and for serious charges against NCOs. Commanding Officers dealt with the less serious breaches by NCOs and all other ranks. However, even in this largely decentralised disciplinary system, Galleghan ensured his presence was felt by suggesting punishments to compound Commanding Officers. The sentences he suggested included up to 28 days in the AIF detention barracks, fines of £5 in the equivalent in Japanese pay, extra fatigues or warnings. Not satisfied with the behaviour of the men, however, on 9 February 1943, Galleghan centralised punishment.[28] This meant all charges against any Australian officer or other rank were now subject to a centralised disciplinary proceedings, using normal military law, including, if it was necessary, District Court Martials which would be held at AIF HQ.

Assuming total control of disciplinary proceedings reflected Galleghan's belief that only he could strictly enforce his orders and thereby control the behaviour of the Australians within the compounds. However, it proved to be a mistaken belief: overall,

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parties had been formed in the immediate aftermath of surrender. These were permanently posted in other location in Singapore. See AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 22 February 1942, Appendix 1; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.519.

[26]After this date depleted access to clothing, deteriorating health and increased Japanese work demands curbed these activities. For reference to the regimental life of Australians in Changi see AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 26 January 1943, p.206, AWM521/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 4 February 1943, p.199, AWM52 1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 27 February 1943, p.206, AWM52 1/5/19/8; Galleghan, Prisoners of War Camps Singapore Report, p.4.

[27] Letter to the Officer Commanding all Camps in S'pore from unknown Brigadier, pp.1-3; A. Thompson, Memo Discipline, 23 August 1942, Schedule X, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1.

[28] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 9 February 1943, p.200A, AWM52 1/5/19/8.

under Galleghan's revised system, Australian disciplinary standards slipped.[29] Crime rates rose from the beginning of 1943 and by January 1944 it had reached epidemic levels.[30] Many reasons for this pattern existed. Survivors had returned from overseas Work Forces, in particular the Burma-Thailand Railway. At this location, Australians had endured volatile captive conditions including starvation, forced labour and sadistic violence by the Japanese. Back in Changi, basic rations had reached their lowest levels and the Japanese were demanding daily working parties to construct an aerodrome. All of these factors contributed to a growing dissatisfaction amongst the men as they slipped into a survivorship mode to cope with the deteriorating conditions. Yet, none of this forced Galleghan to reflect upon his leadership style. He refused to adopt a more flexible disciplinary regime to accommodate the acute physical and psychological needs of the men that might have ameliorated the situation. Instead, he saw the rising crime rate as a challenge to his authority and he reacted accordingly. For example, he amended Court Marital Procedures so that from September 1943 a prisoner charged with trading on the black market inside Changi now bore the burden of proving his innocence.[31] Nor was Galleghan afraid to publicly display his power as a leader. For example, the AIF HQ War Diary noted that from 30 January 1944, Galleghan installed himself as the only presiding officer in Australian Court Marital Proceedings.[32] Stan Arniel, one of Galleghan's greatest supporters, alleged that Galleghan even fixed trial results and likened Galleghan's approach to military law to that of a 'marshal of the wild west in the USA.' [33] Not surprisingly, the number of

[29] For example see AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 26 May 1943, Appendix B-10, pp.1-2, AWM52 1/5/19/14; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 23 July 1943, Appendix 3C, AWM52 1/5/19/16; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 6 January 1944, Appendix 2A, AWM52 1/5/19/23; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 20 January 1944, Appendix 2C, AWM52 1/5/19/23; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 14 April 1944, Appendix 2B, AWM52 1/5/19/23; P. Head, Memo Discipline-Trading, 15 August 1943, Appendix 10, AWM52 1/5/19/17.

[30] Substantial increase in crime can be observed from detention barracks admissions and re-admissions statistics noted in AIF War Diaries in January to March 1944. For example see D. Head, A.I.F. Detention Barracks Changi Monthly Return of Detainees M/In and M/Out of Barracks Period – Jan 1944, Appendix 21, AWM52 1/5/19/21; O.C Dent Barracks, Monthly Return of Detainees in Detention Period Feb- 1944, Appendix 23, AWM52 1/5/19/22; Officer I/C Detention Barracks, A.I.F. Detention Barracks Return for Month of March 1944, Appendix 29A, AWM52 1/5/19/22. Also see AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Malaya Command Conference 18 February 1943, p.1, AWM51 1/5/19/11 Part 1; F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Orders, 27 April 1943, Appendix S1, AWM52 1/5/9/12 Part 2.

[31] F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Orders No.192, 3 September 1943, Appendix 1B, AWM52 1/5/19/18.

[32] AIF HQ Malaya, AIF War Diary 30 January 1944, p.9, AWM52 1/5/19/21; Arneil, *Black Jack*, p.30.

[33] Arneil, *Black Jack*, p.30. Possible collaboration of this allegation exists in the writings of Hatton. See Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.121.

charges laid against, and guilty findings for, other ranks steadily increased.[34] Galleghan's rigid authoritarian leadership style, then, also contributed to the spiralling rates of crime.

Combined, these acts reveal the inherent contradiction within Galleghan's leadership style. To control his men, Galleghan himself breached traditional military disciplinary procedures. Through these illegal actions, Galleghan was admitting that his control over his men, despite his positional authority as GOC AIF, was insecure. Positional leadership through rank alone was not enough to secure his position as the Australian leader if his power and authority was not accepted by the men behind the wire.

Other illegal actions taken by Galleghan, as ranking officer, provide further evidence that he could not secure his leadership authority, let alone legitimacy, through his authoritarian leadership style. Prior to his forced departure, Callaghan had explicitly restricted Galleghan's authority as GOC in one area: Galleghan was not allowed to 'promot[e] officers, warrant officers or NCOs.'[35] Yet, in his position as GOC, Galleghan promoted rank and file to acting unpaid positions. [36] Galleghan rationalised this direct breach of his orders by pointing to the high rate of illness amongst the Australian prisoners and their movements out of Changi.[37] In his formal report on his leadership in Changi, Galleghan also stated that beaching Callaghan's orders were 'necessary… for the purposes of discipline and control.'[38] Under the pretext of discipline and control, Galleghan also decommissioned officers who disobeyed his orders.[39] While no precise instructions were left from Callaghan regarding officer decommissioning, it is clear from his selective promotion of officers who agreed with his leadership style, and the decommissioning of officers who questioned and disobeyed his orders, that Galleghan was creating a circle of supporters who would

[34] In the 12 month period from February 1942 to February 1943 332 men were detained. See AIF Detention Barracks POW Yearly Return of Men in Detention for the Year Ending 28th Feb 1943, pp.114-115, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1.
[35] Callaghan, Special Order, 20 July 1942.
[36] D. Head, WOs and NCOs Review, 14 February 1944, Appendix 15, pp.1-2, AWM52 1/5/19/21; Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.11; F. Galleghan, Routine Orders No.148, 7 April 1943, p.200, AWM52 1/5/19/12 Part 2; F. Galleghan, Routine Orders No.182, 7 August 1943, Appendix 1B, AWM52 1/5/19/17.
[37] Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.11.
[38] *ibid*.
[39] For examples of decommissioning of unpaid promotions see S. Arneil, Diary 20 June 1944, AWM PR88/076; J. Roxburgh, Diary 21 December 1944, AWM PR84/117.

follow his orders without question. Then, with their support, as GOC of Australians in Changi, Galleghan could ignore the limitations of his own rank because he believed that he had the authority and power to issue orders beyond those allowed under traditional military law.

Explaining Galleghan's leadership style

Although Galleghan's leadership goal was the collective survival of his men, as he made clear in his interview with Nelson discussed above, the most important reason underlying Galleghan's leadership style was his refusal to accept his status as a prisoner. He continued to perceive his role as that of a regular military positional officer in a new military setting. Underlying this perception was a deeply personal motive. He wanted his experiences as a military leader to become part of Australian public memory. In a letter to Australian Lieutenant Colonel Charles Henry Kappe, on 26 January 1943, he wrote: 'It is by these means [regular military discipline] we will create an AIF in Malaya that in the future will add fresh laurels to those already earned.'[40] The letter was written seven months into Galleghan's period as a positional leader when conditions in Changi were relatively stable and, as far as he was concerned, he was successfully establishing himself as a positional leader.

Prior to 1944, Galleghan's experience with the Japanese as captors had been relatively easy and, in fact, had given Galleghan an event that he regarded as both a victory over the captor and an affirmation of his leadership style. The event had come very early in his term as a positional leader.

Fourteen days after the transfer of senior officers, and on the same day as the execution of two Australian prisoners who had been recaptured after they attempted to escape (see Chapter 8), Galleghan and British Malaya Command were requested by the Japanese to sign a no-escape clause which stated; 'I, the undersigned, hereby solemnly swear on my honour that I will not, under any circumstances, attempt to escape.'[41] The Japanese threatened 'measures of severity,'[42] meaning the confinement

[40] Letter to Lt-Col C.H Kappe, Officers, NCOs and Men, 27 Inf Bde from F. Galleghan, 26 January 1943, p.1, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2.
[41] Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.16.
[42] Barrack Square Concentration, 1 September 1942, pp.1-2, AWM 3DRL/2313, Folder 3. Also see AIF HQ Malaya, Notes on Special Conference 1415 hours 30 August 1942, p.1, AWM54 1/5/19/8.

of the prisoner population, if they refused to sign. It was clearly meant to establish the authority of the captor over the prisoners. In response to this threat to his authority, Galleghan, in combination with British Malaya Command GOC Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Holmes, reacted with an authoritarian response to the Japanese.[43]

In the first joint meeting chaired by Holmes as the ranking officer in response to the Japanese request, the British Compound leaders and Galleghan refused to sign the clause.[44] Their objection was to the precise wording of the clause.[45] They wanted a direct order to sign the document which, they believed, would nullify the words 'honour' and 'promise'[46] thereby rendering it meaningless. Galleghan explained their position to the Japanese Commandant. He asked him 'how he [Galleghan] could be ordered to swear on his honour, and asked if his honour was subject to Japanese orders.'[47] This abrupt non-submissive tone demonstrates Galleghan's refusal to accept his captive status. He was not a subservient prisoner, but a defiant military leader who did not recognise the limitations of his position as a POW.

In response to the prisoner's stance, the Japanese Commandant ordered reprisals. At 1800 hours on 2 September 1943, 15 400 British and Australian POWs were rounded up and marched to Selarang Barrack Square.[48] The precise dimensions of the square are contested. Galleghan puts the dimensions at 150 yards by 250 yards.[49] Holmes extends this by ten yards.[50] In contrast the Official Australian History places the

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[43] Lieutenant Colonel E. Holmes outranked Galleghan. Therefore communications with the captor were conducted as a joint response. See Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.3; Galleghan, Notes of First Conference of Area Comds and HQ Staff held by Lt-Col Galleghan ADM Comd AIF 30 Jul 1942, para 2.
[44] E. Holmes, Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps Singapore Island for Period of 17 August 1942 to 31 August 1945, p.4, Appendix 7, AWM52 554/11/4 Part 10.
[45] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes on Special Conference 1415 hours 30 August 1942, p.1; Havers, *Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience*, p.66.
[46] Gallehgan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.17.
[47] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes on Special Conference 1415 hours 30 August 1942, p.1.
[48] This figure is based on Galleghan's report. See Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.16. In his notes on the Barrack Square Concentration Galleghan places the number of POWs confined as 15204. See Barrack Square Concentration, 2 September 1942, pp.1-2, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3. Holmes has the total at 15019. See Holmes, Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps Singapore Island, p.4. The Japanese agreed to exclude hospital patients from the punishment. See Holmes, Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps Singapore Island, p.4.
[49] Barrack Square Concentration, 2 September 1942, pp.1-2.
[50] Holmes, Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps Singapore Island, p.5.

dimensions at just over eight acres.[51] What is undisputed is that this space could not accommodate the number of prisoners. There were only seven three-storey buildings to house them. The Australians occupied one building.[52] Here men were assigned to rooms, hallways, stairs, the roof and the small area of open ground in front of the building. The prisoners were ordered by the Japanese to remain in the square until they signed the no-escape clause.

In this new setting Galleghan's leadership style remained authoritative.[53] He ordered men to remain in unit lines, established a 24 hour duty roster for essential services such as the construction of latrines on the open cement square, pickets to monitor prisoner behaviour and a sentry to guard the enforced perimeter. The last requirement was essential. The Japanese had surrounded the square with machine guns.
Within this confined and dangerous setting, British Malaya Command, along with the British and Australian leaders, remained defiant.[54] Over four days they presented the Commandant with four alternative drafts of the no-escape clause. The Commandant refused to negotiate as he did not have the authority to change the wording of the clause that originated from Tokyo.

With negotiations going nowhere, the situation for the prisoners in Serlang Barrack Square quickly became dire. Severe water and food shortages, combined with primitive sanitary conditions, created dangerous health conditions.[55] Lieutenant Colonel Glyn White, the Australian SMO in Changi, predicted that in these conditions there would be 400 cases of dysentery by the end of the first week, and after three

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[51] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.523. Galleghan concurs with these dimensions in his official report. See Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.16.
[52] C. Price, Notebook, p.6, AWM PR03336; Orr, Diary 2 September.
[53] Barrack Square Concentration, 2-4 September 1942, pp.1-4, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3; J. Wyett, Sequence of Events from 1-5 September, pp.2-7, Appendix 3, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 6.
[54] Barrack Square Concentration, 2-4 September 1942, pp.1-4; Holmes, Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps, p.5.
[55] For the duration of the incident the Japanese only supplied rations to convalescent patients. There were 235 Australian convalescents. The Australians only had access to two taps. A 24 hour duty roster based on unit lines was used to access this supply. All men were restricted to one gallon a day. Latrines were dug in the cement square. The heat, overcrowding, flies and lack of adequate sanitary systems was a serious health hazard. See Barrack Square Concentration, 2-4 September 1942, pp.1-4; Comd AIF, Re Move to Selarang Barrack Square Concentration and Return to Previous Lines, 8 September 1942, p.1, Appendix G, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 6; Holmes, Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps Singapore Island, p.5; R. Harper, Diary 3 September, 1942, AWM PR02037; Orr, Diary 2 and 3 September 1942.

weeks there would be no survivors.[56] The Japanese then threatened to move the hospital patients into the square and hinted at the possibility of executions. Only at this point did the positional Malaya, British and Australian leaders consider surrendering to the captor's demands.[57]

Yet, for some unknown reason, the Japanese Commandant began to waver. With a hint of victory, Galleghan's defiance returned. He urged his Australian and the British officers to stand firm. He explained his reasoning to AIF HQ. 'If we could get a direct order from the IJA we have gained something from the barrack square.'[58] Galleghan clearly interpreted this incident as a power struggle between his own positional power and that of the captor, a struggle which, despite the risk to his men, he refused to lose. On 4 September 1942 the Japanese re-issued Order Number 7. Back dated to 2 September it included a statement ordering the prisoners to sign the no-escape clause. Galleghan rejoiced in his victory.[59] When the Australians were still in Serlang Barrack Square, he addressed them. 'All you have to do for the present is play the game like men, be soldiers of the AIF, carry out your orders of the AIF and with the help of God I hope to lead you home again.'[60] This excerpt from Galleghan's speech reveals that, in his mind, the showdown with the captor had validated his perception of his status as a soldier and therefore the validity of transferring a military authoritarian leadership style into captivity. His victory, he believed, had confirmed that he was not a leader of prisoners but of active Australian soldiers in a military setting.

Yet, Galleghan's behaviour during this incident contradicted his leadership goal of collective survivorship. Above all, Galleghan wanted to lead his men home. He believed that only through the absolute control of the men could he achieve this goal.[61] Yet, his aggressive stance towards the Japanese in this incident demonstrates his willingness to place his men's lives at risk for the sake of his own leadership authority.

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[56] Barrack Square Concentration, 3 September 1942, p.3, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3.
[57] The Japanese had already executed four men. Two of these were Australians. See Chapter 9.
[58] Barrack Square Concentration, 4 September 1942, p.4, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3.
[59] Address by Lt-Col F.G Galleghan DSO, ED Comd AIF to all Troops of C.E.G and H Areas and Staffs of 2/9th FD AMB and 2 Con Depot on Parade on Buildings Occupied by AIF, Barrack Square, Selarang at 1830 hours, Friday 4 Sept 1942, p.3, Appendix B, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 6; Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.24.
[60] Address by Lt-Col F.G Galleghan DSO, ED Comd AIF to all Troops of C.E.G and H Areas and Staffs of 2/9th FD AMB and 2 Con Depot on Parade on Buildings Occupied by AIF, p.3.
[61] Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, pp.3, 10.

His refusal to accept the submissiveness of his position as a prisoner meant that Galleghan brought his men into a potentially catastrophic situation. His victory, however, affirmed his convictions about his leadership style and that the risk he had taken was justified.

Galleghan fiercely believed his authoritarian leadership style in captivity would bring him recognition for performing his duty. Yet, increasing his positional power, and the way he used that power as discussed earlier, led to the men questioning his authenticity and motives in being their positional leader in captivity. His continual blindness to the reality of this situation meant that for the majority of Australian prisoners Galleghan's 'headship' never transformed into legitimate leadership. Instead Galleghan became a threat to their survival.

The responses of officers and men to Galleghan's leadership style

The writings and recollections of Australians imprisoned in Changi reveal that there were three different responses to Galleghan's leadership. The first was support for Galleghan at different stages of captivity in Changi, although this support was spasmodic and not ongoing. Men whose reaction to Galleghan fell into this category were often prisoners who had known Galleghan prior to captivity, in particular the officers and men from his own battalion.

The second was amusement at Galleghan's perception of his power as a POW. The third response was open defiance. Some Australian officers and men remained constant in their perceptions of Galleghan, others fluctuated between the three different responses. Most, however, did not believe that his authoritarian style, and the decisions that he made, turned him into a legitimate leader.

One of the unique features of Galleghan's leadership in Changi is the difference between the allegiance of some of the men from Galleghan's own battalion and those from outside it.[62] Prisoner writings demonstrate that beyond his own battalion, Galleghan never received legitimacy for his leadership style and therefore, did not

[62] For reference to 2/30th Battalion's loyal followership of Galleghan see Letter to F. Galleghan from unknown officer at Jorore Bahru [sic], 30 July 1945, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2; Arneil, *One Man's War*, pp.73-74; Penfold, Bayliss and Crispin, *Galleghan's Greyhounds*, pp.267-268, 270-272, 378.

have followership. These Australians were unable to connect with, or even understand, Galleghan's rationale for pretending they were still active soldiers and not prisoners. This perception led to an inherent lack of trust in the motives and methods of Galleghan's authoritarian leadership. Historian Hank Nelson agrees that men outside of his own battalion were less tolerant of Galleghan's leadership style as they did not understand his methods.[63] For these men, Galleghan was not a legitimate leader, but an obstacle to their survivorship in captivity.

In contrast, some men from Galleghan's 30th Battalion, who had forged a relationship with and understanding of his leadership style in months of hard training prior to their deployment, understood that his rigid approach was meant to create group loyalty for the purpose of victory, however it was defined.[64] For most men this had been a slow and often painful learning process. However, when they finally understood his purpose, a bond formed between the 'old man'[65] and his loyal supporters. Galleghan's only public breakdown in captivity proves the strength of this relationship. On 16 December 1943 the first group of survivors from his 30th Battalion returned from the Burma-Thailand Railway.[66] The officers and men were unrecognisable. Emaciated shadows stood in front of him. In a powerful display of the loyalty and followership of these men, the survivors paraded before their commander. Stan Arneil recalls the incident.

> The sergeant major dressed us off and we stood in a straight line as he went over and reported to Colonel Johnston. Johnston went over to Black Jack Galleghan and he said, "Your 2\30 all present and correct sir." And Galleghan said, "Where are the rest?" The Major then said, "They are all

[63] Nelson, *POW*, p.33.
[64] Arneil, *Black Jack*, pp.61-74; Penfold, Bayliss and Crispin, *Galleghan's Greyhounds,* pp.3-22.
[65] This term was affectionately used to describe Galleghan. For example see Penfold, Bayliss and Crispin, *Galleghan's Greyhounds,* pp.vii, 267, 373. The term was not exclusive to the 30th Battalion. Garth Pattern's doctorate reveals it was a term commonly used to describe Australian Battalion Commanding Officers. See G. Pratten, 'The "Old Man": Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War', (PhD dissertation, Deakin University, 2005).
[66] For reference to this incident see Arneil, *Black Jack*, pp.121-123; Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, pp.432-434; Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese*, pp.219-220.

> here sir." And we were. Black Jack Galleghan, the iron man, broke down and cried.[67]

In this moment, for the first and only time in captivity, Galleghan was forced to face the reality of his status as a prisoner. Beyond the confines of Changi, he was powerless, he could not protect his men from the aggression and violence of the Japanese. Yet, even this shock did not give Galleghan pause to reconsider his leadership style. He continued to focus on what he could control, his authoritarian leadership of his formal group in Changi.

The lengths that Galleghan went to in an effort to prove that he and his men were not prisoners sometimes created moments of amusement. Most of these moments centred on Galleghan's insistence that the Australians observe routine military procedures at Changi. Galleghan's compulsory regimental parades provides one example of this reaction. The writings of Private Elliott McMaster describe his participation in the 20th Battalion's drill squad, which won a competition in Changi. McMaster's pride in this victory came at Galleghan's expense, as his battalion had defeated Galleghan's. 'I can well imagine much to Black Jacks [sic] regret, we were judged best, despite Black Jacks [sic] belief that no one could show his perfect 2\30 battalion how to drill...' [68]

Although Acting Corporal Douglas McLaggan's writings often reflected hostility towards Galleghan, these could be tempered. On 26 January 1943, Australia Day, Galleghan ordered a ceremonial review parade of all remaining infantry, artillery, motor transport and corps units in Changi. McLaggan wrote that the only things missing from this review parade were the men's 'bayonets and rifles.'[69] But, he added, 'We had to give it to the old bastard that he certainly had a lot of nerve.'[70] Few other positional leaders, he wrote, would have had the gumption to order a ceremonial parade whilst POWs. 'What the Japs thought of such a performance I never heard, but we got away with it, and considering what was to come in the next three years, glad it

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[67] S. Arneil cited in Nelson, *POW*, p.68. Galleghan's breakdown is confirmed by Leslie Greener. See L. Greener cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, pp.433-434.
[68] McMaster, 'My War Experiences, Friendships and 3 1\2 Years as a Prisoner of War 3 April 1941 to 3 October 1945', p.22.
[69] McLaggan, *The Will to Survive*, p.72.
[70] *ibid*.

happened. The finest hour for many who did not survive.'[71] For this short period of time he shared Galleghan's interpretation of captivity.

Some men openly ridiculed Galleghan leadership style and decisions in their writings. The reasons usually lay in Galleghan's refusal to adapt regular military procedures to reflect the reality of their captive status. Within these writings, questions regarding the relevance of positional leadership, which had been asked since Callaghan's tenure began, are strongly expressed. This negative perception of Galleghan's leadership can be examined according to three different themes; his disciplinary regime, the maintenance of officer privileges and the long-term existence of a thriving black market. For example, Private Alexander Hatton Drummond wrote:

> About the only penalty BJ [Galleghan] did not threaten…was banishment to Australia, while about the only penalty free crimes left were, sleeping with other men's wives, ors [other ranks] eating meals consisting of 20 courses of more, courting officers [sic] batman or female impersonation [sic] from the concert party and using lavender water at the toilet.[72]

Drummond's criticism of Galleghan's disciplinary regime reveals two things. First, the extraordinary amount of disciplinary measures Galleghan used to enforce his authority as GOC AIF led to the men mocking his overregulated daily routines. Secondly, the manner in which Galleghan enforced his regulations meant that the men did not automatically follow his orders, instead he had to 'threaten' punishments to secure his authority.[73] As far as Drummond was concerned, his GOC lacked leadership legitimacy. Douglas McLaggan's description of Galleghan's leadership was more trenchant. In February 1943 he wrote; 'Black Jack had... in no uncertain terms, set himself up as absolute dictator. No more or no less than a monarch of all he

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[71] *ibid*.

[72] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.50-51. Also see Interview with C. Gilbert on 2 October 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive No. 0812, tape 6, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1939.aspx>,maintained by the Australian Government Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 12 November 2013; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.153-157, 164, 167, 169, 247-248; McLaggan, *The Will to Survive*, pp.33, 50, 69-77,148,179.

[73] The official AIF HQ records confirm that Galleghan made this threat. See P. Head, Discipline to S. Area AIF, July 1943, Appendix 23, AWM52 1/5/19/16. Also see P. Head, Memo: Discipline – Bounds, 18 June 1943, p.55, AWM52 1/5/19/16.

surveyed.'[74] McLaggan belonged to Galleghan's own battalion and his description of Galleghan as a 'dictator' clearly indicates that he believed his CO had moved far beyond any reasonable extension of regulatory military authority, that he was in incapable of leading men in captivity – he could only order them about.

Galleghan's protection of officer privilege caused great anger amongst the other ranks. These men watched as their officers, protected from camp fatigues and Japanese working parties, used their additional pay to purchase more food items from the AIF canteen. Drummond believed that most food items went to the 'officers [sic] messes, individual officers, warrant officers, sergeants messes, individual warrant officers, sergeants...' and only then 'other ranks could scramble for the rest.'[75] Corporal F. Power noted that although Australian prisoners within the Australian Compound were technically able to buy food from the canteen to supplement their rations from late 1942, the reality was different. He wrote, 'We could spend this money in a canteen in camp, although prices for many articles, especially tinned meat were extremely high and out of reach for all except officers.'[76] The implications of this for the rank and file were clear; Galleghan's maintenance of officer privileges in terms of pay, along with the pricing of food items, meant that officers were better fed than other ranks.

Galleghan's maintenance of officer privilege also had serious implications for the health of the men in the other ranks. After the survivors had returned from the Work Forces on the Burma-Thailand Railway, a period which coincided with a decreasing base ration, the Japanese demanded that other ranks perform outside camp fatigues. Despite the other ranks now working both inside and outside the POW camp, Galleghan still refused to let go of the peacetime practice of officers receiving more food. Galleghan's decision, in combination with the physical debilitation caused by overseas and outside Work Forces, meant that disease began to take a real toll on the men of Changi.[77]

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[74] McLaggan, *The Will to Survive*, p.73. This view was shared by other ranks outside Galleghan's own battalion, including an anonymous Australian MO. See Anonymous, Papers, p.117, AMW 3DRL/6355; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.63; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.153-154; R. Braddon cited in Nelson, *POW*, p.34.
[75] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.151.
[76] Power, *Kurrah!*, pp.52-53.
[77] Australian General Hospital Report, April 1943, p.78, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1; Australian General Hospital Report, May 1943, p.82, AWM52 1/5/19/12 Part 2; Australian General Hospital Report June 1943, p.30, AWM52 1/5/19/15; Australian General Hospital Report July 1943, p.48, AWM52

The other ranks were also angered by Galleghan's protection of officer privileges in other ways. For example, Sergeant Alfred Montford wrote, 'They [the officers] have their formal mess safari jackets, pick of the food etc. I wonder if we all die one by one would the last one be the quartermaster or would he continue through to the last officers and "die that they may live."'[78]

The differences Galleghan imposed between officers and other ranks fuelled the growth of a thriving black market within Changi.[79] Instead of missing out on additional supplies the men took matters into their own hands. At 'Paddies' men and even officers traded and sold food and medical supplies. Prisoner writings reveal that a wide variety of men were engaged in this underground activity, including MOs, medical orderlies, mess staff, AIF gate guards, other ranks, contacts in the Malayan and Chinese populations, even some of the Imperial Japanese Army camp guard.[80]

Galleghan refused to allow the Black Market, which he saw as a clear threat to his authoritarian leadership legitimacy, to survive. In an effort to break it, Galleghan issued wide ranging new orders which included restricting men's movement in areas that contained saleable goods, a compulsory registration system for private foodstuffs and tradable personal belongings and a ban on lending money or trading goods without the prior permission of the group commanding officer.[81] None of these ideas

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1/5/19/16; Australian General Hospital Report November 1943, p.63, AWM52 1/5/19/20; Australian General Hospital Report January 1944, p.103, AWM 1/5/19/21; Australian Medical Report June 1944, p.56, AWM52 1/5/19/24; AIF Monthly Report 26 May 1943 p.65, AWM52 1/5/19/12 Part 2; J. Newey, Monthly Report February 1945 in Medical Appendix AIF War Diary February 1945, AWM52 1/5/19/30; G. White, Medical Appreciation of the Site at No 1 PW camp Changi Goal Area, 15 August 1945, p.56, AWM52 1/5/19/13 Part 3. NB The Medical Report for 1945 has been placed in the Changi War Diary records of April 1943.

[78] A. Montford, Diary 29 November 1944, AWM PR88/214. Also see McLaggan, *The Will to Survive*, pp.75, 79; M. Miggins, Diary 20 February 1943, 3 February 1943, AWM PR00373; Sprod, *Bamboo Round My Shoulder*, p.36.

[79] Sweeting, *'Prisoners of the Japanese,'* p.518*;* Havers, *Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience*, pp.114-115; Nelson, *POW*, pp.32-33.

[80] Letter no.14 to his wife from Staff Sergeant C. Price, AWM PR03336; J. Roxburgh, Diary 26 July 1943, 2 September 1943; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.154-155; McLaggern, *The Will to Survive*, p.82; Penfold, Bayliss and Crispin, *Galleghan's Greyhounds*, p.235; Whitecross, *Slaves of the Sons of Heaven*, pp.15-16.

[81] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 8 December 1942, p.183B, AWM54 1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 2 February 1943, p.198B, AWM54 1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 15 August 1943, p.10, AWM54 1/5/19/17; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 30 August 1943, p.19, AWM52 1/5/19/17; F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Order No.176, 21 July 1943, p.17, AWM52 1/5/19/16; F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Order No.181, 30 August 1943, Appendix 1B, AWM52

worked. In desperation, Galleghan significantly increased the punishment for men caught engaging in black market activities. For example, in April 1943, two men found guilty of participating in black market activities received a sentence of 120 days detention.[82] Despite his threats and draconian punishments, Paddies continued to thrive. Galleghan's inability to stop this illegal activity provides further evidence that the men did not accept that his leadership approach was in their best interests. Instead, the men looked to fulfil their needs in their own way.

To date, discussion has centred on the men who were in Changi from the start of their incarceration. Lieutenant Colonel Edward 'Weary' Dunlop offered an outsider's perspective on Galleghan's leadership style. Captured in Java, Dunlop arrived in Changi with his own group of Australian prisoners who were en route to Thailand. Dunlop found Galleghan's authoritarian approach to leadership in captivity completely unrealistic.[83] Having personally experienced beatings by the Japanese, Dunlop could not believe that the transfer of military procedures and regulations from battle into captivity could secure collective survivorship.[84] He found it simply staggering that Galleghan, by virtue of his rank and appointment as GOC AIF Changi, assumed that he had a positional responsibility for all Australians captured by the Japanese, even those in transition through Changi, as Dunlop's group was. [85] Galleghan's idea of what that meant was made clear in his interactions with the Australians captured in Java. The men arrived in Changi dressed only in rags. Galleghan, without stopping to ask why they were in such a debilitated condition, admonished their officers and other

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1/5/19/17; F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Order No.213, October 1943, p.16, AWM52 1/5/19/19; F Galleghan, AIF Routine Order No.46, 10 May 1944, p.12, AWM52 1/5/19/23; F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Order No.51, 26 May 1944, p.15 AWM52 1/5/19/23; F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Order No.68 June 1944, p.21, AWM52 1/5/19/24.

[82] Privates Edward Redpath and George Kennedy were awarded 120 days in the detention barracks. See F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Orders, 27 April 1943, Appendix S1, AWM52 1/5/9/12 Part 2.

[83] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.163-168.

[84] For reference to Dunlop's conflict with Galleghan over securing much needed supplies for his men see Letter to E. Dunlop from HQ AIF, not dated, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2; Letter to Command Java Party from HQ AIF, 9 January 1943, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2; Letter to Comd HQ Malaya from E. Dunlop, 19 January 1943, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2; Letter to E. Dunlop from Comd AIF, 21 January 1943, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2.

[85] Other POWs captured at Java shared Dunlop's opinion. For example see Interview with F. Skeels on 5 March 2004 for the Australians at War Film Achieve No. 1553, tape 6, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1300.aspx> maintained by the Australian Government Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 12 April 2013; Thomas, 'Forty Years on as I Remember', p.27.

Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.17-18.

ranks for their lack of respect for the Australian uniform and regulatory discipline.[86] Gunner Frederick Skeels reaction to Galleghan's outburst typifies the anger felt by these men. 'I don't think he knew or probably even cared [for our circumstances]...we cursed him to hell.'[87]

Nor could Galleghan understand how the officers and men accepted Dunlop, a MO, as their positional leader. Galleghan maintained that rank accorded to MOs was recognition of their professional skills; it was not combat positional rank. Unable to recognise leadership in a form with which he was unfamiliar, he dismissed Dunlop's leadership legitimacy. This led to a showdown between these two men.

It started when Galleghan sent a note to Dunlop requesting the name of the proper positional leader of his group and that this ranking officer assume positional leadership of the formal group: 'Comd AIF desires following information: Name of senior combatant officer with party. Suggest changing OC party to combatant officer. Is there any reason for not making change?'[88] Dunlop promptly responded to Galleghan's note explaining the Japanese did not recognise non-combatant rank and therefore, as he was a Lieutenant Colonel, the Japanese viewed him as the senior officer and leader of the group rather than Major W. Wearne, who was the ranking positional combat officer. Galleghan, who did not recognise the authority of the Japanese, refused to accept Dunlop's reasoning. By chance, Brigadier Arthur Blackburn, commanding officer of the 2/3rd Anti-Machine Gun Battalion, was at Changi at this time as he was en route to Formosa to join the senior officers' camp.[89] After hearing the details of the dispute, Blackburn provided Dunlop with a written memorandum which stated that 'I [Blackburn] have considered this matter and desire Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop to retain command for administrative and disciplinary purposes so long as the troops brought over by him remain together as one body.'[90] In a meeting with Galleghan, Dunlop took great pleasure in providing him with this written validation of his leadership authority.[91] After reading the memorandum, Galleghan still questioned

[86] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.145; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.17-18.
[87] Interview with Skeels, tape 6.
[88] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.144.
[89] Blackburn was in transit en route to join the senior officers at Formosa.
[90] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.144.
[91] *ibid*, pp.145-146.

Major Wearne, the ranking combatant officer with Dunlop's Java force, asking if he agreed that Dunlop should be the positional leader. Galleghan finally conceded that Blackburn, as a higher ranking officer, had the authority to order Dunlop to remain in command.

This entire incident is an example of how Galleghan could not recognise that other forms of leadership could exist in captivity. Dunlop's leadership legitimacy questioned Galleghan's approach to leadership. In contrast to Galleghan, Dunlop had adapted and changed his leadership style to fit the reality of the circumstances (which will be examined in more detail in Chapter 7). Dunlop's leadership also threatened Galleghan's control of Australians in Changi. For the first time, Australians within Changi realised that other Australians were being led by men other than positional officers who brought a different leadership style to protecting their men against their captors. This knowledge threatened the very core of Galleghan's leadership style and his capacity to be seen by Australians in Changi as their legitimate leader.

Dunlop, however, was amused by it all. In his published diaries he wrote, 'I remained bland and friendly and assured him I bore him no resentment (for meddling in my affairs) and that it was nice of him to go to all these pains on my behalf.' [92] Galleghan did not take this rebuke to his authority well and made sure that any assistance Dunlop needed was either denied, or given in such a way that confirmed his perception of leadership was the correct way Australians should be managed in captivity. For example, in response to Dunlop's request for essential supplies, which at the time were available in Changi, Galleghan refused.[93] Instead he insisted that Dunlop's men wait for the supplies that had been promised to them by the Japanese after their arrival in Thailand. As a result of Galleghan's order, Dunlop's men left Changi in the same boots that they had arrived in: '178 men without boots, 204 with unserviceable boots and 302 with boots urgently needing repair.'[94] Galleghan did offer Dunlop one concession, 5 gulden per officer for their personal needs.[95] Dunlop flatly refused this offer as Galleghan deliberately excluded the other ranks from his offer of payment. By

[92] *ibid*, p.146.
[93] *ibid*.
[94] E. Dunlop cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, pp. 263-264.
[95] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.147.

refusing his offer Dunlop refused to be complicit in Galleghan's maintenance of officer privilege in captivity. The men of Dunlop Force left Changi with very bitter feelings towards Galleghan. Chief Petty Officer Ray Parkin put it this way: 'We [Dunlop Force] are wearing our badge of disreputableness with pride… the well-dressed [the leaders in Changi] have much to learn about this POW business; their day will come, we say.'[96]

Galleghan's leadership failure: April 1944-August 1945

From April 1944 to August 1945, the Japanese interfered with Galleghan's ability to control his men. It began with the Japanese forbidding the punishment of rank and file through 'confinement and detention'[97] unless it took place under their direct supervision. In response to this threat to his own authority, Galleghan closed the AIF detention barracks.[98] Now instead of detention, offenders were punished through compulsory hourly reporting or**,** on medical advice, decreased rations or extra fatigues.[99] These new punishments signalled to the Australians that, despite their now seriously debilitated physical state, Galleghan still refused to compromise the standards of discipline that he saw as central to his leadership style. Galleghan remained unwilling to adapt to the changing circumstances that came with captivity. As has been shown, for some Australian prisoners in Changi, Galleghan's orders lacked any authority, now at this acute stage of their captivity in Changi most men did not even pretend that Galleghan had any authority over them. This state of affairs, however, had been reached by the Australians even before the Japanese forced Galleghan to step down as their positional leader.

[96] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.18; Havers, *Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience*, p.91. Also see Thomas, 'Forty Years on as I Remember', p.27. Cameron Forbes provides unreferenced evidence of the same feeling. See Forbes, *Hellfire*, p.243.
[97] Galleghan, Monthly Report April 1944.
[98] Galleghan, Monthly Report April 1944, p.45; F. Galleghan, Special Order 4 April 1944, Appendix 10, AWM52 1/5/19/23.
[99] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 14 April 1944, p.100, AWM52 1/5/19/23.

In May 1944 the Japanese ordered the transfer of all POWs in Changi to the Civilian Jail.[100] At this new location the prisoners were divided into two groups. The other ranks moved inside the jail with warrant officers, while all other officers lived outside the jail. The Japanese ordered that the warrant officers were now in charge of the men and that they were directly answerable to the Japanese. Galleghan was therefore no longer recognised by the Japanese as the Australian leader and he could no longer issue orders to the Australians. Yet, he continued to issue regulatory orders to be carried out by Australian warrant officers.[101] And his methods became even more draconian. For example, in an attempt to squash disciplinary problems he considered new forms of punishment including special penal companies for hard labour, public humiliation and restricting offenders to their sleeping quarters.[102]

For Gallegan the worst was still to come. On 21 July 1944 the newly appointed Japanese Commandant, Lieutenant Takashi, made a British member of the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force, Lieutenant Colonel J. Newey, the representative officer of all Australian, British, Dutch and American prisoners in Changi Jail.[103] By order of the captor, Galleghan's positional leadership ceased to exist. According to the Japanese, Galleghan could no longer control his men through regulatory orders. Galleghan refused to acknowledge Newey's leadership authority as it had been granted by the Japanese rather than through standard Australian Army procedures.[104] Galleghan petitioned Australian officers and other ranks to follow his lead and refuse

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[100] AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference held at Camp Office 1415 hours 25 April 1944, Appendix 13A, AWM52 1/5/19/23; Roxburgh, Diary 25 April 1944, 3 May 1944. Also see Havers, *Reassessing the Japanese POW Experience*, pp.137-138; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.530.

[101] P. Head, Notes of Address by Lieutenant Colonel Galleghan, DSO, ED, COMD AIF in Malaya to Warrant Officers, Changi Goal PW Camp, 3 September 1944, AWM52 1/5/19/27; F. Galleghan Note to All Ranks No.1, IV Group AIF, 27 September 1944, AWM52 1/5/19/27.

[102] P. Head, Notes of AIF's Conference 30 June 1944, Appendix AA, pp.1-2, AWM52 1/5/19/24.

[103] P. Head, Diary-AIF PW- No.1. PW Camp-Changi Gaol, Singapore for Period 1-31 July 1944, pp.1-2, AWM52 1/5/19/25; P. Head, Camp Diary 21 July 1944, p.116, AWM52 1/5/19/25; P. Head, Camp Diary 22 July 1944, p.116, AWM52 1/5/19/25; P. Head, Notes of Daily Conference 23 July 1944, Appendix V2, AWM52 1/5/19/25. Officers were placed outside the jail walls. They had a separate leadership structure. The Japanese appointed Australia's Lieutenant Colonel S. Pond as 'liaison officer.' Galleghan retained control over internal Australian officer matters. See P. Head, Diary July 1944, pp.1-2, AWM52 1/5/19/25.

[104] Newey accepted this interpretation of his power. He did not see how it detracted from his ability to exercise authority. For reference to arguments between Newey and Galleghan see F. Galleghan, Diary-AIF Prisoners of War No 1 PW Camp Changi Goal, Singapore, for period 1-31 August 1944, pp.1-2, AWM52 1/19/5/26; P. Head, Notes of Conference, 1 September 1944, Appendix R, AWM52 1/5/19/27; Letter to Col E.B Holmes, M Comd British and Australian Troops Malaya from F. Galleghan Re Conduct of Lt Colonel T.H Newey SSVF whilst "Representative Officer," 10 September 1945, pp.1-3, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2; Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, pp.23-24.

to acknowledge Newey's leadership. Stan Arneil writings noted the irony of Galleghan's request. He wrote:

> There is a strained atmosphere in official circles in the camp. The colonel now in charge is evidently a jun [sic], so all the other colonels in the camp have asserted their seniority and have resigned any jobs they may have been doing. [Yet a] few weeks ago we were lectured on loyalty to authority and cooperation between all ranks.[105]

In March 1945, Galleghan even attempted to usurp Newey's authority by issuing separate orders for Australians inside the Civilian Jail.[106] These orders were issued through the highest ranking of the two Australian officers on Newey's staff, Major A. Thompson.

Galleghan's obvious frustrations at his situation could be dismissed as an authoritarian leader attempting to cling to power. Newey's leadership was, however, controversial. Having been appointed by the new Japanese Commandant, Galleghan, and the prisoners, were deeply suspicious of his motives. Questionable behaviour, such as signing for Red Cross parcels before receiving them, refusing to advocate for the prisoners and incorporating Japanese punishments into his disciplinary regime, strengthened Galleghan's suspicions that Newey was collaborating with the Japanese.[107] On 5 July 1945, when Lieutenant Miura took over command of Changi and immediately replaced Newey, Galleghan believed this decision by Miura meant that his suspicions had been justified.[108]

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[105] Arneil, *One Man's War*, p.187.

[106] Thompson acted as quartermaster in Newey's staff. See F. Galleghan, Decisions Re Administration of Australian Other Rank Personnel in No 1 PW Camp, Changi Goal, Singapore 9 March 1945, Appendix O, AWM52 1/5/19/30.

[107] For reference to Newey's behaviour as positional leader and Galleghan perception of his motives see Interview with the I.J.A regarding Red Cross Parcel Stores, Appendix P4, AWM52 1/5/19/31; F. Galleghan, Diary-AIF Prisoners of War – No 1 PW Camp Changi Goal Singapore- for period 1-31 June 1945, p.1, AWM52 1/5/19/32; Havers, *Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience*, pp.160; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.530.

[108] From this date until liberation British POW Lieutenant Colonel F. Dillion acted as Representative Officer. Dillion acted on the orders of Holmes and Galleghan who continued to reside outside Changi Jail. See Galleghan, Diary AIF Prisoners of War-No.1 P.W Camp Changi Goal Singapore, period 1-31 July 1945, p.1, AWM52 1/5/19/32; Author unknown, Camp Order No.389, 5 July 1945, Appendix J2, AWM52 1/5/19/32; F. Galleghan, Discipline AIF – ORs, 8 July 1945, Appendix N1, AWM52 1/5/19/32. Even after his liberation, Galleghan insisted that Holmes take official action against Newey. See Letter to E.B. Holmes

Despite the captor forcing the end of his leadership of Australians in Changi, Galleghan's leadership style meant that for most prisoners he never achieved the status of a legitimate leader. As a POW Galleghan refused to adjust his leadership style to meet his men's needs. Instead, he firmly believed that an uncompromising authoritarian leadership style based on regulatory discipline was the only leadership style which was allowed for a positional leader.

Until his last days, Galleghan remained convinced of this truth. In Hank Nelson's *Prisoners of War*, Galleghan stated:

> We were able to continue in all the years to run Changi as an army. I know that got criticised. You've got Russell Braddon who wrote *The Naked Island*. Russell Braddon's idea of how to run that camp was that it was to be like a town council, of which the mayor would be elected and all the rest of it. After all Russell Braddon was a private.[109]

Even evidence of open hostility towards his methods by his men did not cause Galleghan to change his approach. Instead this opposition only made him more determined. From his first to his last days of captivity, the power and authority of rank remained more important to Galleghan than the acceptance of his status as a prisoner. Any adaption of traditional military leadership in captivity, even for the sake of the essential physical needs of his men for survivorship, would have been, to Galleghan, a personal failure.

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from F. Galleghan Re Conduct of Lt Col TH Newey whilst "Representative Officer" pp.1-3, AWM52 1/5/19/32.

[109] F. Galleghan cited in Nelson, *POW*, p.34.

CHAPTER 3: CAPTAIN REGINALD WILLIAM JAMES NEWTON

On 15 February 1942, Captain Reginald William James Newton became a prisoner of the Japanese.[1] Newton's introduction to captivity was particularly cruel, enduring sixty hours of interrogation by the Japanese at Malacca Jail.[2] Then on 20 February 1942, the Japanese transferred Newton to Pudu Jail at Kuala Lumpur,[3] joining about 600 other Australian and British POWs.[4] Although a captain, Newton was the highest ranked Australian POW in the camp and therefore served as the Australian formal group's positional leader.[5]

Newton's leadership style

When he assumed his leadership position, Newton realised the enormity of the task. Having already experienced the reality of his captors' willingness to inflict pain upon their prisoners, Newton based his leadership vision on the collective survival and protection of his men.[6] Initially, alongside his British positional leaders, Newton attempted to use traditional military techniques to protect his men against the Japanese. For example, one of the first challenges Newton and the British officers faced was the conditions in Pudu Jail. The Japanese had confined the prisoners to a 20-cell section of the jail with an open latrine in its open area.[7] With the British officers, Newton vigorously protested these conditions to their captors.[8] Then after a month of protests, on 20 April, the officers won some important concessions. The prisoners were allowed to spread out over the three story buildings in the jail's main section, which meant that the sick could be isolated and only two prisoners had to sleep in each cell.

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[1] Major R. Newton, War Crimes Trials Statement, 28 March 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/109. In later statements, Newton contradicts this date. In a statement dated 19 September 1946, the 20 February 1942 is recorded as his date of capture. See Major R. Newton, War Crime Trials Statement, 19 September 1946, AWM54 1010/4/109; Major R. Newton, War Crimes Trials Statement, 14 August 1947, AWM54 1010/4/109.

[2] Newton's war crime commission statement explains the circumstances of his capture yet does not refer to this interrogation. This statement does not account for a five-day period between Newton being captured and being transferred to Pudu Jail. Newton's interrogation is instead mentioned in the 2/19th battalion history. See Major R. Newton, War Crimes Trials Statement, 28 March 1946, p.1; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.471.

[3] Newton, War Crimes Statement, 28 March 1946, p.1.

[4] There was also smaller number of men from 2/30th, 2/10th, 8th Signals, two RAAF and Royal Naval Air Force members and two officers from SSVF and Federated Malay States Volunteer Force. See Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory*, p.472.

[5] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory*, pp.471-481.

[6] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory*, pp.471-482; List of awards for services rendered whilst PW, Captain Reginald William Newton, AWM119 173 Part 1.

[7] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory*, pp.471-472.

[8] *ibid.*, pp.473-474.

Newton and the British officers then petitioned the Japanese for improvements in the meagre Japanese rations.[9] Following their protests, the Japanese agreed to supply more food, even meat to the prisoners. The meat, however, was rotten which caused significant health problems for the POWs. According to the 2/19th battalion history, 'after three days we were able to keep some it in the stomachs.'[10] Dysentery also became a major problem. From this experience, Newton learnt to 'never under any circumstances to believe anything the Japs told us, for at no time did they tell the truth…'[11]

Newton began to seek alternative ways to supply his men with their basic needs. However, Newton was mostly confined to Pudu Jail.[12] His men, though, quickly discovered that they could use the civilians they came into contact with on their working parties to secretly buy extra goods. One particular working party location, the Kuala Lumpur Army stores, offered the Australians great opportunities to steal food and other goods that they needed.[13] The hardest part of these schemes was smuggling the goods back into their quarters at Pudu Jail. Newton solved this problem. While the Japanese were inspecting the returning working parties at the gates, Newton supervised the POWs. The men who had managed to buy and steal items, passed them secretly to Newton, who, because he was not part of the working party was not searched. Newton then smuggled them into the POW quarters in the jail.[14] Newton and the British officers then divided the goods between all the POWs.[15]

When the Japanese started to pay the POWS, Newton ruled that all those in his formal group would put a large portion of their pay into a collective pool to cover the costs of extra rations and medical supplies, both legally and illegally obtained.[16] Leading by example, Newton put two-thirds of his $25 a month pay into the pooled fund and asked the men to contribute half of their pay to the fund. He gave the funds to trusted

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[9] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, p.473; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.102-103,109-110, 118-120.
[10] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, p.473.
[11] *ibid*., p.481.
[12] *ibid*., p.478.
[13] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, pp.474-478; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.113-116.
[14] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, p.475.
[15] Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.118-120; Nelson, *POW*, pp.20-21.
[16] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/9 Battalion A.I.F.*, pp.476-477.

officers who accompanied the working parties and the British padre, Noel Duckworth. These men then bought goods illegally.[17] By introducing and maintaining these polices, Newton's formal group quickly came to trust him. They came to understand that Newton had their best interests, and not his own, at the forefront of his decisions. From these schemes, the Australians POWs at Pudu Jail formed an understanding of the role of officers in captivity. Australian Gunner Russell Braddon explained:

> From the very beginning officers postulated their entire behaviour on the fact that they were responsible for their men. They would not eat until the men had eaten. It was military etiquette to the ninth degree in favour of those who were less privileged. And it was magnificent. We were looked after by our sirs. And we needed to be looked after because life was grim.[18]

As the positional leader of Australians POWs in Pudu Jail, Newton realised that he needed cunning and unorthodox strategies not found in any military regulation manual to achieve his leadership goal of collective survivorship. In essence, he understood that he had to adapt to their unique circumstances, to find and take any advantage for his men that came his way.

Once his men understood Newton's leadership style and trusted that he would maintain it, they became even more eclectic in their illegal purchases and thieving activities. For example, from his men Newton received an electric radio and then a short wave transceiver.[19] Newton, determined to get the radio working, offered his services along with those of Lieutenant McQueen, a qualified electrician, to rewire the electricity in the jail for the Japanese. As Newton expected, the Japanese accepted their offer. Then having fixed the wiring, unknown to the Japanese, Newton 'tapped into' the supply, to operate his radio and then the short wave transceiver. To hide his

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[17] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, pp.476-477; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.113-115. For reference to Duckworth's part in buying the goods for the POWs see W. Wilkie, *All of 28 and More: The Diary of Edgar Wilkie*, Second Edition, (Brisbane: W.C and S. M Wilkie Publishing, 1987), pp.45-46; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.85-86; East Surrey Boy Bandsmen then Japanese FEPOW, WW2 People's War: An Archives of WW2 Memories, Article ID A5055734 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/34/a5055734.shtml> maintained by the British Broadcasting Commission, contributed on 13 August 2014.
[18] R. Braddon cited in Nelson, *POW*, p.21.
[19] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, pp.475-478.

prize possessions, Newton then had a POW build the radio into a wooden stool, which remained in Newton's cell. When the Japanese conducted their regular searches, he offered the stool to the Japanese officer to sit on, who from this position ordered his men to search Newton's cell. Newton's unorthodox solution gave his men a link to the world beyond their jail.

This sort of ingenious thinking, based on carefully interpreting the circumstances in which he found himself, and then exploiting any possible loopholes for his men, became the hallmark of Newton's positional leadership style. Newton epitomises the strength of POW leaders who understood that their unique situation meant that they had to apply a different set of skills to captivity to those required in battle. Newton also refused to accept that, as a POW positional leader, he was always subservient to the captor. Newton never stopped attempting to outwit the Japanese.

Whilst at Pudu Jail, Newton's sense of responsibility for his men as their positional leader led him to add another element to his leadership style, one that would endure. Soon after the re-wiring of the jail, POWs haggled for electric equipment from their civilian contacts.[20] Having smuggled their goods in, the POWs also tapped into the wiring. This inevitably resulted in regular electrical outages in the jail. Every time there was an outage, Newton and McQueen would be called to the guardroom and beaten for failing to do their job properly. Then they would be forced to fix the wiring. This happened quite regularly until the Japanese found the source of the problem, the electric equipment in the prisoners' cells. Having found the contraband they confiscated the equipment, violently assaulted the culprits then put them into solitary confinement for seven days. Newton was prepared to put his body on the line for his men, but he did not want to put his men into a position where they themselves became the victim. He also expected his officers and NCOs to follow his lead, as the history of the 2/19th explained:

> It was laid down as a firm and definite policy at Pudu and it was carried through, for the nearest officer or N.C.O., to always interpose himself between any Nip [sic] trying to inflict punishment on any of the men and

[20] *ibid.*, p.478.

> to take the brunt of any punishment, for we had learned very early, that the more junior the Jap was, the more senior the rank of any prisoner he could punish was more acceptable and the third class Jap private was very pleased to be able to pass on what he had been getting from his own seniors for so long.[21]

Newton also faced one of the most troubling decisions that he had to make as a POW leader at Pudu Jail. Sergeant Ken Bell, a member of Newton's formal group, approached him asking for permission to escape with a British POW.[22] Newton was torn. He understood Bell's desire, but doubted the practicality of his plan and feared the punishment that Bell might be forced to endure if he was caught, which he thought was probable. After arguing with Newton all night, Bell refused to listen. His fellow escapee, British Captain Michael MacDonald, informed the British positional officer, Colonel Hartigan, that he and Bell planned to escape that night. This was the same night that two British civilians, Bill Harvey and Frank Van Renan, also escaped from Pudu Jail.[23] The next day at roll call, Newton and Warrant Officer Carl Renkert, fudged the Australian POW figures by telling the Japanese that the missing man was on the 'banjo' (latrine). Then, 48 hours later, the missing POWs were caught. For lying, Newton and Renkert were violently assaulted in front of the Australian POWs. The recaptured POWs were handed over the Kempei-Tai (secret police), brutally interrogated and then executed. Newton was allowed to see Bell prior to his death but was not allowed to witness his execution.

While this was happening, the Japanese ordered the POWs to sign the no-escape clause issued to the men in Changi.[24] Newton was allowed to discuss the matter with the British positional leaders for 15 minutes before he and the five British officers were forced into confinement in a cell that was meant to hold only one prisoner. During those fifteen minutes, however, Newton had managed to get a message to his men to sign the clause. Newton explained that, as POWs, they were signing the clause under duress. Therefore, legally, it meant nothing. The difference between the

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[21] *ibid*., p.482.
[22] *ibid*., pp.479-481.
[23] *ibid*., pp.474-480.
[24] *ibid*., p.480.

leadership goals and styles of Newton and Galleghan, could not be more marked. Newton, realising the extremity of the situation, adapted to the circumstances and gave in to the Japanese on this occasion. He was not willing to risk the probability of violent repercussions being taken by the Japanese against his men. This decision reflects the way Newton interpreted his role as positional leader, that is, to try and secure the collective survival of his men, and that included attempts to manage the Japanese to avoid incidents that put his men at risk. Unlike Galleghan, who had placed his formal group at risk by ordering them not to sign the no-escape clause, Newton knew which fights he needed to win for the safety of his formal group and which fights to concede.

In total, eight Australians died at Pudu Jail, one from battle wounds, five from dysentery and three, including Sergeant Bell, who were executed.[25] Bell's death gave Newton's men an understanding of what could happen if they ignored his advice. The men also saw for themselves that Newton, who was willing to be assaulted by the Japanese for their mistakes, was trying to keep them alive. The men in his formal group at Pudu Jail understood what Newton was doing and why, and trusted him. The 2/19th battalion history summarised it this way: 'It was definitely laid down that it was now the responsibility of officers and N.C.O.'s to get our chaps home and in as good a health condition as we could.'[26] In sum, they understood his leadership style.

The size of Newton's formal group helped him in developing a leadership style based on a combination of unorthodox ideas and courage to gain essential needs for his men and, where necessary, personally protect them. The group was small enough to make his approach, despite his failures, manageable. His men were personally aware of the choices he was making and the risks he was taking for them to improve their chances of survival. As the 2/19th battalion history put it: 'The chaps knew that they had tried and solid leaders.'[27] Through his actions and experiences at Pudu Jail, then, Newton had legitimised his position as leader and forged a loyal followership amongst his men. And although he was not to know it at the time, it also laid the foundations for

[25] The 2/19th battalion history does not explain how the other two Australian POWs came to be executed. The only prisoner mentioned by name who was executed was Sergeant Bell. See Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, pp.479-482.
[26] *ibid*., p.480.
[27] *ibid*., p.482.

his ability to successfully lead a formal group in an even more volatile captive environment, the Burma-Thailand Railway.

Newton in Changi

Even before Newton was transferred to Changi, Galleghan was aware of Newton's different approach to positional leadership in captivity, one that ignored many of the rules set out in the Australian military regulations. Galleghan first discovered this when he received an informal nominal roll from Newton, listing the Australians held prisoner in Pudu Jail. Newton thought it was essential that Galleghan, as the Australian positional officer at the main POW camp in the region, should know that he and his men were alive and where they were being held. However, with the Japanese refusing to allow communication between prisoners in different camps, the only way Newton could get this information to the Australian GOC in Changi was through unorthodox means. Through a chance Chinese contact, when Newton was burying Private Kennedy who had died from dysentery, Newton arranged for a nominal roll, written on toilet paper, to be secretly delivered to Galleghan.[28] Knowing the risks his contact was taking in delivering the roll, Newton addressed it to 'Fred.'[29] Galleghan was not impressed.

When Newton and his men arrived in Changi POW camp on 3 October 1942, Galleghan was quick to admonish Newton for his lack of respect and failure to follow proper procedure in his nominal roll.[30] Galleghan then informed Newton, that, if in the future, he addressed an officer by their first name, as he had on his nominal roll, he would be court-martialled. Newton quickly pointed out that the behaviour of the Japanese towards POWs, and any civilian who was found to have helped them, made it impossible to follow proper protocol when filling out a nominal roll, which was being secretly delivered. He added that instead of pretending to play soldiers, positional leaders now had to do whatever they could to protect their men, even if meant breaking traditional military regulations.[31]

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[28] *ibid*., p.404.
[29] *ibid*., p.412.
[30] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.412; HQ AIF Malaya, War Diary 3 October 1942, AWM54 1/5/19/8.
[31] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.412.

Due to his rank as captain, Newton did not retain his role as the positional leader of an Australian formal group in Changi. He did, however, still retain a leadership position as the officer in charge of the 2/19th and 2/20th Battalion lines.[32] From this position, Newton maintained that Galleghan's approach to leadership in captivity was wrong.[33] Newton tried to convince the officers in Changi that Galleghan's belief that it was possible to treat captivity just as if it was another battle was utterly naïve. In other words, Newton rejected Galleghan's notion that it was business as usual between officers and other ranks in captivity. It is not surprising that, after only 10 days in Changi, Galleghan transferred Newton to a Singapore based working party under the leadership of Major John Green Fairley.[34]

If Galleghan thought this transfer would force Newton to accept his interpretation of captivity was correct, he was mistaken. Arriving back at Changi on 22 December 1942, Newton's view had not changed.[35] In his own unique way, Newton was trying to persuade Galleghan that the basic needs and rights of the men should be at the forefront of his leadership style. Newton, however, failed to even raise doubt in Galleghan's mind. He was, after all, only a captain.

Despite not having any impact on Galleghan, Newton's presence in Changi did raise questions in the minds of some of the other Australians POWs. When Newton and his men arrived in Changi, stories immediately started to circulate about what Newton had done for his men at Pudu Jail.[36] It became well known that Newton had willingly put his body on the line to help protect his men against the aggression of the Japanese and had issued orders, as their positional leader, that were outside traditional military regulations, in order to allow his men to gain vital supplies. Then, when Newton started openly questioning the choices Galleghan was making as the positional leader of POWs in Changi, Newton's behaviour may have contributed to some of Galleghan's formal group questioning his approach.[37] Newton's formal group from

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[32] *ibid*.
[33] *ibid*., pp.412-414, 416; Interview with R. Newton by the Gaden family, tape 1, AWM S01739.
[34] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, p.413.
[35] Interview with Newton, tape 1; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, pp.414, 416-418.
[36] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, pp.411-417; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.153-154.
[37] For an examination of POW questioning Galleghan's leadership approach see Chapter 2.

Pudu Jail understood that there was another approach to positional leadership behind the wire; adaptability and innovation on the part of officers to protect and provide for their men could work. And they talked. Some of Galleghan's formal group began to believe that Galleghan's approach to leadership in captivity, based on continuation of Australian military regulations, may not have been the best way to ensure survival in captivity. From his discussions with Newton, Galleghan must have been aware that this was a possible conversation taking place amongst members of his formal group. Galleghan would have realised that the loyalty of men towards Newton, and the latter's proven ideas about positional leadership in captivity, posed a threat to his control over his men and therefore his leadership legitimacy.

Galleghan attempted to deal with this threat to his authority in two ways. Initially, Galleghan claimed that one of Newton's decisions had in fact threatened the survivorship of all Australians in Changi.[38] When Newton's men left their base camp from their Singapore working party, each received a Red Cross parcel. Under Farley's and Newton's orders, the men consumed the contents of their packages before they arrived back at Changi. When Galleghan found out, he admonished Farley and Newton, arguing that the Red Cross parcels should have been handed over, intact, to the AIF supply depot at Changi. In reply, Newton quickly pointed out that the prisoners on the working party included men from Galleghan's own 2/30th Battalion who had also eaten the contents of their packages. In other words, the order had not been to the advantage of just the men from Newton's battalion. He also pointed out that men from the 2/30th, who had previously been on working parties and who had brought Red Cross packages back to Changi intact, had given their packages to the 2/30th kitchen. This meant that Galleghan's own battalion had, in fact, received more food than the rest of the prisoners in the compound. For Newton's apparent insolence, Galleghan punished the entire 2/19th Battalion. He refused to issue them with any extra food for Christmas. Galleghan then tried to replace Newton as leader of the 2/19th with Major Saggers of the 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion. Newton only discovered this when he arrived back at the 2/19th's lines. Newton promptly removed all of Saggers' belongings and told him to go back to his own unit. Saggers refused and both men went to see Galleghan. This time Galleghan directly ordered Newton to stand aside

[38] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, pp.416-417.

from the 2/19th Battalion and replaced both men with Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes of the 2/26th. Newton told Galleghan exactly what he thought about his decision. 'It [was] rather poor to have a complete stranger around the 2/19 battalion.'[39] With these words, Newton pointed out one of the most significant faults of Galleghan's positional leadership in captivity, that he did not understand how a positional leader could gain the followership of his men.

Newton's appointment and his leadership style for U Battalion D Force

On 7 March 1943 Galleghan made a surprise appointment. He made 36-year-old Captain Newton the positional leader of U Battalion, D Force. [40] This Force, comprised of 695 men, mostly from the 22 Brigade who, on Japanese orders, were to depart Changi for an unknown location.[41] The reasons why Galleghan selected Newton, a lowly ranked officer, to lead U Battalion are unknown. It is possible that it was to send the troublesome Newton away from Changi. Two other reasons, however, seem probable.

It is possible that Galleghan anticipated that the Japanese intended to use D Force for a work project. Newton himself foresaw this possibility and warned Galleghan of it.[42] Having experienced first-hand how the Japanese interpreted the role of a POW working party, both at Pudu Jail and then at Singapore, Newton warned Galleghan that their captor's promise of a land of 'milk and honey'[43] was completely unrealistic.[44] However, from Galleghan's perspective, Newton not only had experience in a POW working party, he had civilian training as an engineer.[45] Both factors may have led

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[39] *ibid*., p.417.

[40] P. Head, Force D, 7 Mar 1943, Appendix 7, AWM54 1/5/19/10; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, p.571; Nelson, *POW*, p.62. Unlike H, F and A Force, no official report exists for D Force. Therefore, this analysis of Newton's positional leadership on the Burma-Thailand Railway relies on private primary sources and, in particular, the 2/19th battalion history. Letters within Newton's private papers reveal that he played an integral role in compiling and writing this history. This source is therefore, vital in describing and understanding Newton's behaviour in this extreme captive setting. For reference to these letters with Newton's private papers see AWM PR01596, Wallet 1.

[41] U Battalion Nominal Roll, AWM PR01596, Folder 1. The force comprised of 8 members of the 2/18th Battalion, 321 members of the 2/19th Battalion, 200 members of the 2/20th Battalion and 40 members of the 8th Division A.S.P. See Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.572.

[42] Interview with Newton, tape 1.

[43] G. O'Connor cited in Nelson, *POW*, p.38.

[44] Interview with Newton, tape 1.

[45] Nelson, *POW*, p.62.

Galleghan to appoint him as U Battalion's positional leader. Galleghan may also have considered that Newton's skills, combined with his dominating personality, unorthodox leadership methods, and his loyal followership amongst the men, made Newton the best candidate for the job. Yet, Galleghan's rigid adherence to traditional military structures leaves this interpretation open to some doubt. Newton's relatively low rank should have concerned him. Yet, Galleghan passed over higher ranked officers, selecting Newton to lead Australian prisoners into the unknown. This suggests that, for some reason, Galleghan may have had confidence in Newton's ability to lead. In all likelihood, Newton's appointment was an interplay of all these elements, including removing a difficult junior officer from Changi.

U Battalion's unknown destination turned out to be the Burma-Thailand Railway. The battalion spent five months (March to August 1943) constructing the railway in Thailand and then from September 1943 to March 1944, performed maintenance work in the Thailand sector.[46] During his twelve months in Thailand, Newton was one of the lowest ranking positional captive leaders. Yet, the writings and recollections of survivors, from both U Battalion, D Force members and those outside his battalion, show that Newton was one of the most successful positional leaders on this horrific work project.[47]

Newton succeeded because he had already formulated his leadership style, established his leadership vision and knew that he had the conviction to apply it. It also helped that once again, as in Pudu Jail, Newton was in charge of a small group of POWs. This meant that the leadership style that he had established in Pudu Jail was directly transferrable to his new formal group, U Battalion, D Force. Newton's experiences at Pudu Jail also meant that he was not surprised by the captor's behaviour in Thailand; instead, he expected it. Newton, therefore, in structuring his formal group, and in decisions that he made as positional leader, applied the lessons he had learnt in Pudu Jail.

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[46] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, pp.571-637.
[47] For example see McMaster, 'My War Experience, Friendships and 3 ½ Years as a POW, 3 April to 3 October 1945', p.23; F. Baker cited in D. Wall (ed.), Singapore *and Beyond: The Story of the Men of the 2/20 Battalion told by the Survivors*, (East Hills: 2/20 Battalion Association, 1985), p.157; Interview with W. Williams on 2 May 2003 for the Australian at War Film Archive No. 0046, tape 7. <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/88aspx> maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs.

At Pudu Jail Newton observed that the Japanese were inclined to pay violent attention to those officers on working parties who, because of their protected status under Australian military regulations, refused to work.[48] Newton used this experience to form U Battalion. Instead of the standard thirty-five officers, for U Battalion he chose only six officers and an MO.[49] These officers were Captains K. Westbrook, Frederick Harris, E. Gaden, and Lieutenants Ralph Everett Sanderson, Frank Ramsbottom and C. Wiley.[50] The MO for U Battalion was David Clive Critchley Hinder.[51] Newton knew these men well and, most importantly, they knew and approved of Newton's approach to leadership in captivity.[52] By selecting these men, Newton ensured that he received unwavering loyalty for his leadership approach. Newton's six officers also fulfilled another essential criterion; each had experienced captivity outside the relatively sheltered confines of Changi. According to Newton, this meant that his officers had proven that they had the strength of character to deal with the grim reality of life as POW of the Japanese and the particular challenges that lay ahead.[53]

Newton also took every opportunity he could to negotiate key concessions from civilians and even his captors. He maintained absolute control of his men in an attempt to save them from not only their captor's aggression, but also their own weaknesses and fears. Through sheer force of personality, a genuine desire to protect and provide for his men and applying his unique unorthodox leadership techniques, Newton almost achieved his goal of collective survival in one of the most volatile environments that Australians experienced in captivity during the Second World War.[54]

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[48] Interview with Newton, tape 1.
[49] *ibid*.
[50] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.572; R. Mudiman, Diary 18 March 1943, AWM PR03377. Westbrook and Weily, accompanied by 150 men, left Changi on 14 March 1943, prior to the bulk of U Battalion. They were instructed by the Japanese to act as an advance force. However, on captive orders these men never reunited with U Battalion. Most, instead merged with S Battalion D Force and then O and P Battalions of Dunlop Force. See Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.578; List of U Battalion members attached to S Battalion, AWM PR01596, Folder 1.
[51] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*., p.572. Walker, *Medical Services of the R.A.N. and R.A.A.F*, p.607; Mudiman, Diary 18 March 1943.
[52] Interview with Newton, tape 1.
[53] *ibid*.
[54] In total 28 men died on U Battalion D Force. Of these men 20 died in Tahsao and Chungkai hospitals, seven from cholera while U Battalion was at South Tonchan and one man died from an accident. This figure compares to 28 POWs dying on S Battalion D Force. In total 2815 Australian POWs died on the Burma-Thailand Railway. See Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion*, pp.636, 638; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of War,' p.588.

When the reality of the prisoners' position in Thailand became apparent, Newton further adapted his leadership structures. He effectively reversed the traditional military hierarchical structure to make Hinder, the MO, the apex of all U Battalion's decisions.[55] For example, rather than issuing direct orders as positional leader, he followed, applied and enforced Hinder's rules for setting up base camp, collecting and distributing rations and the selection of men for the working parties. Hinder also identified for Newton the sickest men in his camp. These were the men who were most in need of Newton's protection from the aggression of the Japanese.[56] Peter Brune's assessment of U Battalion suggests that the unique power relationship between Newton and Hinder provided a model for survivorship on the Burma-Thailand Railway.[57] This is without doubt correct. Through his ability to adapt his leadership structures to suit the volatile situation in Thailand, Newton's leadership role evolved from being the positional leader solely in charge of his men, into the officer who vigorously applied and enforced his MO's advice to achieve his leadership goal of collective survival of his formal group. Through his unorthodox transfer of authority to Hinder, Newton's formal group also understood the extent to which Newton tried to protect them and keep them alive as the 2/19th battalion history explains:

> [I]t was the firm and definite duty of our No 1 that David Hinder's dictates were obeyed in each and every minute respect. Our job was to get as many home as we could, and there was to be no departures from this in any thought or action and everybody would comply.[58]

When U Battalion arrived at Bampong in Thailand, for reasons that remain unknown, their guards suddenly abandoned them.[59] Newton used this time to gather intelligence. Hearing rumours of starvation conditions, slave labour and widespread illness, Newton quickly realised that giving Hinder a dominant leadership role was not enough to ensure the survival of his men. What would be desperately needed was a continual supply of food. Therefore, in his unorthodox manner, Newton negotiated what was to

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[55] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.589-590.
[56] *ibid*., pp.577-578, 588-591, 597.
[57] Brune, *Descent into Hell*, p.642.
[58] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.590.
[59] Interview with Newton, tape 1; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.578-579, 642-644.

become his men's lifeline for the duration of their time in Thailand. He contacted Boon Pong, a Thai trader. Using his unique combination of persuasion, charisma and his refusal to hear the word 'no', Newton persuaded Boon Pong to follow U Battalion up the river with food and medical supplies. In return for the supplies, Newton promised full payment after the war. Until then, for payment in lieu, Newton gave Boon Pong a paper IOU in the form of an amended Bank of NSW cheque, which he had found during a search of his men's kits. Newton, a customer of the bank, crossed out the branch of Wahroonga and inserted the head office in Sydney. In a post-war interview with the Gaden family, Newton admitted that he had not even negotiated the interest rate. '[Boon Pong] agreed to take [the] paper. [Our] only concern was food and whatever medical supplies we could get. [We] were not worried about what interest he would charge.'[60] Had Newton not discovered the chequebook, it is probable that he would have found another way to secure Boon Pong's cooperation as he did this later on, when he arranged the delivery of supplies using promissory notes.[61] As early as his arrival in Thailand, Newton sensed that the acute needs of his men demanded such ingenuity.

Newton's relations with the captor

Newton's manipulation of traditional military structures, and his ability to negotiate supplies for his men, may have come to nothing if he could not gain some influence over the Japanese. In her journal article on positional leadership on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Sibylla Jane Flower concluded that 'limited cooperation with the enemy'[62] provided the best way for positional leaders to protect their men.[63] Newton had certainly learnt that at Pudu Jail. He had also observed that the Japanese respected positional leaders who retained control over their men.[64] Newton also discovered that feigning displays of respect for the Japanese often outweighed the consequences of open defiance.[65] With this in mind, Newton launched himself into a calculated crusade against Warrant Officer Aitaro 'Tiger' Hiramatusu, a test which Brune labels as 'one of Newton's greatest triumphs.'[66]

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[60] Interview of Newton, tape 1.
[61] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.614.
[62] Flower, 'Captors and Captives on the Burma-Thailand Railway,' p.245.
[63] *ibid*.
[64] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.482.
[65] *ibid*.
[66] Brune, *Descent into Hell*, p.637.

Hiramatusu controlled U Battalion for about nine months.[67] In this time, Newton used every conceivable ploy against him to gain life-sustaining concessions for his men. It began with the rigid control of his formal group. From the very formation of U Battalion, Newton built a cohesive and controlled unit, a process that began even before he left Changi. Newton had dismissed a man in the battalion who defied his authority. The 2/19th battalion history explains: 'One of the parade at the rear made a disparaging remark about Newton and he in turn went straight into the rank and dealt with the clown (who was dropped from the draft).'[68] This incident set the tone for the relationship between Newton and his men. Even before leaving Changi, Newton's formal group understood that under no circumstances would Newton allow insubordination from his men.

In the volatile conditions of Thailand, Newton's control became unequivocal. Newton enforced his orders with the threat of corporeal punishment.[69] He informed his men that any member who brought the safety of the group into danger would be punished. Newton's leadership goal of survivorship thus provided the foundation for group interaction. He realised that only as a cohesive, rigidly controlled unit could he attempt to protect the men. In return for his protection, Newton, expected them to respect and obey his authority. His men, mostly, complied.

Private Arthur Cooper's writings recall that in Thailand, Newton threatened one of his men with corporal punishment.[70] Hiramatusu had found out that someone had stolen food from the engineers and he threatened to behead an officer. Newton was livid. Calling a parade, he vehemently reminded his men that collectivism and not individualism, defined them.

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[67] U Battalion were placed under Hiramatusu's control on 1 June 1943. Some confusion exists as to the tenure of Hiramatusu's control. The 2/19th battalion history cites that, from 28 June to 28 July, when U Battalion were at Konyu and Hintok, the battalion were in the command of an unnamed Japanese officer. Then, on 28 July Hiramatusu again took control remaining in this position until March 1944. However, Newton's sworn statement to the Australian War Crimes Commission contradicts this disrupted command. Instead Newton states that Hiarmatusu remained in control of U Battalion's camp at Konyu. See Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.587, 610, 621, 630-631; Major R. Newton, War Crimes Trials Statement, 3 December 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/109.
[68] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.572.
[69] Interview with Newton, tape 1.
[70] A. Cooper cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, pp.166-167.

> Newton was like a raging bull walking in front of us and when he got right in front of me he said 'and you're the bloody culprit Shorty. Nobody's going to lose their head over a bastard like you. As a matter of fact I think I'll knock your feet right from under you now.'[71]

In his post-war interview, Newton recalled with pride that he only had to resort to corporal punishment twice; once in Thailand and once, later on, in Japan.[72] The culprit was the same individual. On the Burma-Thailand Railway, this unnamed Australian stole a fellow prisoner's watch. Newton considered this an appalling crime, a breach of group trust and a threat to their collective identity. Newton described how he handled the issue.

> I had to do something. I hit him myself. [Then I] said to his platoon, 'I don't care what you do with him. I'll bury him tomorrow if I have to.' That's the only way you could handle [it.][73]

Newton was not the only positional leader to enforce discipline through corporal punishment in Thailand.[74] The fact that he used it only twice reveals the extent of his men's faith and trust in him. His decisions and methods may not have always been universally popular, but his men did realise that his unorthodox approach offered them the best hope of surviving.

Newton's rigid control of his formal group enabled him to build a basic understanding with Hiramatusu. Through Newton's display of authority, Hiramatusu came to understand that U Battalion were survivors. Acting on Hinder's advice as to the fitness of the men, Newton ensured that U Battalion's base camps and working parties were organised in such a way that Hiramatusu did not intervene.[75] In comparison to other

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[71] *ibid*., p.166.
[72] Interview with Newton, tape 1.
[73] *ibid*.
[74] For example, Staff Sergeant Edward Gerrard Derkenne used corporal punishment against one of his formal group that stole from a fellow prisoner while they were at Konyu jungle camp. See E. Derkenne cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, p.162.
[75] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.588.

battalions, this meant that Newton's men were able to remain marginally 'fit'.[76] On average, in comparison to other Work Force battalions, recruitment for U Battalion working parties was, therefore, not as difficult.[77] Hiramatusu put this down to his own leadership, and Newton was prepared to accept that.[78] Yet, there was also an element of mutual respect involved in the relationship between the two men, as Frank Barker recalled.

> The Tiger used to respect reggie [sic] because reggie [sic] was a fellow who would stand up and bellow at everybody, of course that suited the Tiger down to the ground to think that we were being well disciplined by our own officers. And he did run a tight ship. So Tiger respected him to the point where he could argue, negotiate and not do too badly. U Battalion, because of that relationship, I believe suffered a lot less than some of the others.[79]

Having earned Hiramatusu's respect, Newton proceeded to exploit it, using it as 'a lever to wrest a thousand privileges.'[80]

Three examples reveal just how far Newton was able to manipulate Hiramatusu. Firstly, at Tonchan Central Camp, Newton successfully petitioned Hiramatusu to move their base camp to a more sanitary site.[81] This meant Newton could move his men away from a British battalion whose sanitary and hygiene practices allegedly threatened the health of Newton's men. The second example demonstrates Newton's cunning. In Thailand, Newton and his officers arranged several schemes that ensured U Battalion received regular food and pay. Two schemes were particularly important. At Tonchan South Camp, following an outbreak of cholera, Newton arranged for Boon Pong to approach Hiramatusu offering a deal.[82] In return for guaranteeing the acceptance of his deliveries, Hiramatusu could keep 10 per cent of the goods. This

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[76] H. McNamara cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, p.153.
[77] For an examination of the difficulties encountered by Dunlop and H Force's in meeting work quotas see Chapters 7 and 9.
[78] McNamara cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, p.153.
[79] F. Baker cited in Nelson, *POW*, pp.62-63.
[80] McNamara cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, p.153.
[81] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.610.
[82] *ibid*., p.597.

allowed Hiramatusu to indulge in his gambling habit. Hiramatusu accepted the deal, unaware it was Newton's idea. A similar deal was also offered to the Japanese officer in charge of the kitchen.[83] In return for U Battalion officers recording more prisoners on the working party than were actually present, which meant pay for other ranks who did not exist, this Japanese officer received 5 per cent of the profits which were earned from the non-existent workers.[84] Unlike some other battalions on the Burma-Thailand Railway, this agreement ensured U Battalion not only received their pay on time as the Japanese officer wanted his portion of the deal, but that they also received additional pay beyond what they were due.[85] Then, as in Pudu Jail, prisoners pooled funds into a central account, popularly known as 'Newton's Amenities Fund.'[86] From this collective fund, Newton and his officers purchased supplementary food and medical supplies. Newton also made sure that some of their money was sent down river to Tahsao and other base hospitals, where U Battalion patients were being treated.[87] Then, when these schemes were not enough to provide for his men, or the opportunity presented itself, Newton sometimes supplemented them with organised theft from the Japanese stores.[88] Newton's ability to orchestrate these schemes to provide vital food and medical supplies to his men, regardless of their location, earned him the only recommendation for protecting his men that was given to a positional leader on the Burma-Thailand Railway in the Official Australian Medical History.[89]

Newton supplemented his tactics and schemes with an unwavering stance against the excesses of the Japanese. Irrespective of the threat or use of violence, Newton became the antithesis of the submissive prisoner. In 'roaring Reggie'[90] Hiramatusu met his match. Driver Herbert James McNamara, in Donald Wall's history of the 2/20th Battalion, explains 'The Tiger had great admiration for Captain Newton with his 6 foot

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[83] *ibid*.
[84] This deal continued even when the Japanese officer demanded a 20 percent cut. To make up the difference in lost income U Battalion officers simply adjusted their own figures. See Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.598.
[85] For example, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Edward Dunlop's diary notes times when O, P Battalions of Dunlop Force received their pay late or a sum less than what was owed. Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.267, 282, 311.
[86] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, p.598.
[87] *ibid*.
[88] R. Newton, War Crimes Trials Statement, 17 January 1946, p.4, AWM54 1010/4/109. For an example of organised theft, see Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.619.
[89] Walker, *Medical Services of the R.A.N. and R.A.A.F*, pp.608-609.
[90] Unnamed sergeant cited in Nelson, *POW*, p.62.

height, his block-bashing voice and his iron efficiency.'[91] McNamara goes so far to suggest Newton's leadership style and manner allowed him to challenge Hiramatusu's power.[92]

Hiramatusu's acceptance of Newton's leadership style also led to more amicable captor/captive relations. For example, Newton's sheer determination and courage earned him an important concession from Hiramatusu. In Nelson's, *P.O.W Prisoners of War: Australians under Nippon*, Geoff O'Conner explained that, on one occasion, Newton demanded that his men be given more boots.[93] After his request was ignored, and knowing that he would be assaulted for his insolence, Newton continued to insist on more boots for his men. 'They gave him the treatment and stood him in front of the guardhouse and he kept on demanding the boots and they kept him there. Eventually the Japs got sick of him; they couldn't shut him up. And the men got their boots.'[94]

Hiramatusu's acceptance of Newton's leadership style, authority and legitimacy, also enabled Newton to pressure Hiramatusu into protecting one of his men, Driver Harry George Dunn.[95] At Tonchan Central, Dunn reacted to the growing aggression of the Japanese engineers by downing his tools. For this act of defiance, the engineers tied Dunn's hands behind his back with string and tied him to a tree with his feet suspended off the ground. Someone on this working party despatched a secret runner back to camp. Upon hearing the news, Newton goaded Hiramatusu into action.

> Newton told the Tiger that if that was the way the Jap Engineers behaved, he [Newton] would pull Dunn down and he, the Tiger, should investigate why the Jap Engineers were taking punishments out of the Tiger's hands.[96]

Hiramatusu took the bait. With Newton, he rushed out to the construction site, pulled Dunn down, and ordered U Battalion's men back to camp. According to Bombardier Hugh Vincent Clarke, a member of T Battalion, D Force, this may not have been an

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[91] McNamara cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, p.153.
[92] *ibid*., p.155.
[93] G. O'Conner cited in Nelson, *POW*, p.62.
[94] *ibid*.
[95] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.611-612; Mudiman, Diary 1 August 1943.
[96] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.612.

isolated incident. Clarke claims that at the Konyu-Hintok (Hell Fire Pass) cutting, Hiramatusu withdrew U Battalion from a work shift after Japanese engineers and guards mistreated U Battalion workers.[97] This incident is not mentioned in the 2/19th battalion history and according to that source, Hiramatusu had relinquished control of U Battalion during its time at this cutting.[98] Newton, however, in his statement to the Australian War Crimes Commission, stated that Hiarmatusu retained control of U Battalion's camp at Konyu.[99] Irrespective, it is clear that on least one occasion, Hiramatusu took protective measures against the engineers on behalf of the men of U Battalion. This suggests that Newton's leadership goals and the collective identity he fostered amongst U Battalion members extended to the enemy. According to Clarke, prisoners outside Hiramatusu's battalion observed this temporary alliance.[100]

> The tiger [sic] looked after Newton's mob, who arrived looking very fit. We thought they were giants, because we had all shrunken away. Nobody smiled and things were really bad, but then U battalion [sic] came and things improved a lot because the tiger would not allow the engineers to bash *his* men around. He would go down to into the cutting and say, 'Well, you don't do this sort of thing'.[101]

A further example of Hiramatusu's acceptance of Newton's leadership style is simply extraordinary. Hiramatusu ordered a Japanese funeral for Private Tommy Wardfield.[102] Killed by a falling tree, Hiramatusu declared Wardfield 'died whilst serving with the Japanese army and not as a prisoner.'[103] All members of U Battalion, Japanese camp guards and sector engineers attended. Hiramatusu and the chief engineer spoke at Wardfield's gravesite. The Japanese left flowers on the grave. Hiramatusu and the chief engineer also left food and drink to aid the journey of Wardfield's spirit into the next world. This incident appears to be unique. According

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[97] H. Clarke, 'Of Elephants and Men,' cited in G. McCormack and H. Nelson (eds.), *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History,* (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin), 1993, p.41.
[98] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.599, 610.
[99] Newton, War Crimes Trial Statement, 3 December 1946, p.1.
[100] Clarke, 'Of Elephants and Men,' p.37.
[101] *ibid*., p.41.
[102] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.611; Mudiman, Diary 9 August 1943; McMaster, 'My War Experience, Friendships and 3 ½ Years as a POW', p.26.
[103] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.611.

to Private Roy Clifford Mudiman, it occurred on 9 August 1943.[104] This date almost corresponds with the completion of the main phase of Railway construction.[105] Wardfield's funeral may therefore, have represented a wider acknowledgment by Hiramatusu of U Battalion's work and sacrifice in Thailand. Regardless of the motive, this symbolic concession reflected Hiramatusu's respect for Newton's leadership.

When Newton's unorthodox leadership methods failed to protect his men from the Japanese, he again put his body on the line. Newton demonstrated selfless courage within minutes of U Battalion arriving in Thailand. Prior to boarding steel train trucks in Singapore, two 8th Division Australian Army Service Corp prisoners, Privates Les Grey and George Frederick Day, informed Newton of their plan to escape.[106] Instead of talking them out of their foolhardy endeavour as he had tried to do with Bell, Newton provided them with a similar cover story. When the train stopped, he said, the pair left the train to go to the 'banjo', then without warning the train started to move. The two Australians successfully escaped, although their time at large was short.[107]

At Bampong, when the Japanese guards realised they were two prisoners short, they called Newton to the front of the parade.[108] In front of the entire battalion, the guards interrogated and assaulted him. Despite continued blows, Newton stuck to the cover story. Newton's selfless act established for the newly formed U Battalion an ingrained respect for their positional leader. Many had heard of Newton's selfless courage in Pudu Jail, now they saw it for themselves. This act provided Newton with the essential foundation of trust that, together with his success in gaining supplies and concessions from the Japanese, enabled him to become their legitimate leader. This a remarkable achievement for a man who was unpopular, even disliked, in training and during combat.[109]

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[104] Mudiman, Diary 9 August 1943.
[105] According to the 2/19th battalion history, U Battalion began maintenance work in September 1943. Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F,* pp.614, 617.
[106] *ibid*., p.575.
[107] Within two days, local Thais handed Grey and Day over to the Japanese Kempie-Tai (secret police). They endured about a week of interrogation during which both prisoners managed to stick to Newton's story. Miraculously their captors believed them. The Kempie-Tai released both men to work battalions. Day died labouring at Kinsasyok. Grey survived. According to the 2/19th battalion history these two men were the only escapees on the Burma-Thailand Railway not to be executed. See Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.575.
[108] *ibid*.
[109] Brune, *Descent into Hell*, p.500.

The timing of this incident also gave rise to a fundamental expectation. The men of U Battalion believed that Newton would protect them, not only with his words and unorthodox tactics, but also with his body. Newton did not disappoint. Throughout U Battalion's tenure on the Burma-Thailand Railway, but particularly at Konyu, Newton maintained his selfless stance.[110] Newton regularly won the camp tally for the number of bashings, his score usually double that of his nearest rival.[111] His sworn statement to the War Crimes Trials explained the motive behind his behaviour.

> I myself received 68 beatings and periods of punishment during PW period, mainly for interceding on behalf of personnel and requesting medical supplies. It was the policy for all my officers to always intercede on behalf of our men and draw attention away from the men.[112]

In contrast to some positional leaders, Newton had clearly adopted an expansive definition of positional responsibility, one that was capable of change as the circumstances changed. For example, as discussed earlier, Newton firmly believed his duties did not cease when members of his battalion left his camp, usually to be transferred to a base hospital. Instead, Newton maintained contact with these men, making regular visits to base hospitals located down the river.[113] Then when he discovered that most Australian Force leaders had sent their sick men to base hospitals without any practical support or representation, Newton acted on their behalf.[114] He provided some of his own battalion officers to act as Australian representatives to ensure that sick Australians at Tarsau and Chungkai hospitals had national representatives on the prisoner administration board of the hospital. Newton also provided men to represent sick Australians in hospital messes and gave monetary support to British officers for the Australian patients' food and medical supplies.[115]

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[110] Newton, War Crimes Trials Statement, 17 January 1946, p.2.
[111] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.604.
[112] Newton, War Crimes Trials Statement, 17 January 1946, p.2.
[113] Interview of Newton, tape 1; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.611-613.
[114] Interview of Newton, tape 1; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.581-582, 587, 598, 612-614, 619.
[115] Other battalions also provided monetary support to their evacuated men. For example see Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.5; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.317.

Newton's sense of positional responsibility was, therefore, an inclusive responsibility for all Australians in need of his assistance.

This expansive sense of duty became a continuing theme throughout Newton's time in Thailand. For example, in September 1943, while U Battalion was at Reng Tin, Newton heard rumours of an Australian battalion nearby.[116] Going 'walkabout' Newton found Major Alfred John Cough's battalion about ten kilometres inland.[117] These Australians were in an appalling state. Their Japanese Commandant had failed to recognise a separate Australian leadership structure, leaving Dutch prisoners in control. The 2/19th battalion history claims that this meant these Australians were given the last portions of the meagre ration, had minimal access to medical supplies and were overrepresented in working parties.[118] Newton arranged for these men to receive some of U Battalion's supplies and, if Cough could gain his Commandant's approval, for Boon Pong to deliver some supplies. Newton's efforts, however, proved to be in vain. The following day, Cough's battalion moved to an unknown location. Newton had more success helping nine isolated British Royal Northumberland Fusiliers.[119] At Hintok camp, Newton found these men without food, shelter or money. Newton folded these British prisoners into U Battalion. The 2/19th battalion history explained why Newton did this.

> It was always the fear that our lads would be placed in a similar position and without anybody to help them they would lose men unnecessarily, through no fault of their own.[120]

Newton's followership

Newton's self-defined leadership role and behaviour forged a deep loyalty between himself and his men. Newton successfully united Australian soldiers mostly from the 2/18th, 2/19th and 2/20th Battalions through his unorthodox positional leadership style

[116] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.617, 619.
[117] *ibid*.
[118] *ibid*. For other comparisons between Coughs T Battalion and Newton's U Battalion see Brune, *Descent into Hell*, pp.642-643.
[119] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.606.
[120] *ibid*.

and his ability to meet the promises he made to his men. For the members of U Battalion, therefore, Newton became a visionary and transformational leader.

The depth of trust U Battalion members had in Newton is best illustrated by the following example. During its time in Thailand, U Battalion experienced only one serious outbreak of cholera.[121] One unnamed Australian, a 'suspected' case, became hysterical, believing that if he were moved to the cholera lines, he would surely die. Newton approached him saying, 'Laddie, Doc suspects cholera and we will have to take you over to the cholera lines.'[122] The prisoner's response was a heart-rending plea for life. 'I am sure I am alright and you will condemn me to death if you take me there.'[123] Newton knew he could not allow one man's fear to comprise his goal of collective survival, yet, despite the risks, he took time to comfort the distressed Australian. Slowly, Newton convinced him, for the sake of his mates, to move. This prisoner's decision to leave on his own accord demonstrates Newton's leadership skills, even with men who believed that they were facing death.[124]

For some members of U Battalion, these bonds were never severed. For example on 22 April 1992, U Battalion survivor Peter Willington wrote to Newton telling him of his and fellow U Battalion survivor Noel Harvey's continued admiration and loyalty.[125] Importantly Willington also linked Hinder with Newton in his letter, writing '[B]oth of you were great Australians, you [were a] brave wise leader and Dave was a devoted and brave medical officer.'[126] Wellington went on to comment on Newton's care of his men, which never ceased under such trying conditions. He ended his letter with the following quotation from Moses Harvey:

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[121] This outbreak occurred at South Tonchan. See Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.596-597.
[122] *ibid*., p.596.
[123] *ibid*.
[124] It turned out that this "suspected" case did not have cholera. The time he spent in the cholera lines, however, permanently affected his mental health. Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*., pp.596-597.
[125] Letter to R. Newton from P. Wellington, 22 April 1992, AWM PR01596.
[126] *ibid*.

> ‘Great men are the gifts of kind heaven to our poor world; instruments by which the highest one works out his designs, light-radiators, to give guidance and blessings to the travellers of time.’[127]

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Grove Wright Anderson, the officer in-charge of 2/19th Battalion in battle, touched on Newton’s authoritarian style: ‘One of Reg’s qualities is that when he has something to say, those at the back can hear.’[128] In Nelson’s book, *POW: Prisoners of War: Australians under Nippon*, Geoff O’Conner, Cliff Moss and an unnamed sergeant agree with this memory of Newton.[129] Nelson adds that ‘Newton gave the men confidence that what could be done would be done.’[130] His schemes, his ability to outmanoeuvre the captor, combined with his sheer determination to help his men, meant that his formal group believed that Newton would find a way to protect them. He seldom let them down.

Men outside Newton’s formal group who worked on the Burma-Thailand Railway also knew of, and acknowledged, his leadership. Two call signs illustrate this. Along the length of the Railway in Thailand, U Battalion were known as the ‘U Beauties.’[131] At Tonchan Central, the adjoining English camp renamed the U Battalion camp as ‘Reggies retreat.’[sic][132] At Tampie, when U Battalion had finished its part in the construction of the railway and were moved down river into a holding camp with other POWs, a higher ranked English positional leader gave up his leadership role in favour of Newton. The English positional leader explained that Newton was better at dealing with the Japanese and would offer the POWs more protection from them than he possibly could.[133]

In Thailand, Newton almost realised his leadership vision of collective survival. In an volatile captive environment, of the 695 men in U Battalion, 33 died.[134] All but one of

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[127] *ibid*.
[128] Letter to Des from C. Anderson, 15 July 1976, AWM PR01596.
[129] Nelson, *POW*, pp.62-63.
[130] *ibid*., p.62.
[131] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.597.
[132] F. Baker cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, p.158.
[133] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, p.621.
[134] This figure is from a list of deaths compiled by G. Morris. Morris compiled this list from 2/19th Battalion records provided to him by Major R. Newton Jnr in September 2000. See G. Morris, Lists of Deaths in U Battalion D Force, AWM PR01596, Folder 1. Brune’s study also refers to Rod Beattie’s

these men died from illness. This achievement earned Newton respect and admiration from prisoners of all nationalities both during the war and after it.

After the war, other positional leaders acknowledged Newton's achievements. In a letter to Newton dated 14 October 1980, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Edward Dunlop described him as the 'king of the footsloggers and jungle dwellers.'[135] Anderson wrote to Australian Army Headquarters, recalling, 'I have not heard of any officer of any nationality more highly spoken of for his work with Pws [sic] by the Ors [sic] than Capt. Newton.'[136] These descriptions of the loyalty of Newton's formal group epitomize the fierce followership that his leadership methods gave him. Through stanch application of his leadership role, his defiance and selfless attitude, the gratitude men felt for Newton evolved into reverence and awe.

On 13 March 1946, when Newton's accomplishments were more widely known, Major General Cecil Arthur Callaghan recommended Newton for an Order of the British Empire (OBE).[137] It read:

> His consistent inspiring leadership, courage and personal example over a long period and under very adverse circumstances, inspired and raised the morale of those under his command and his fellow prisoners. His efforts on many occasions were directly responsible for saving many lives and casualties.[138]

Despite the praise Newton received from the men he led and from other officers and medical officers who lived through the hellish conditions forced upon them by their captor on the Burma-Thailand Railway, the Australian Army was less impressed. It had doubts about a captain who felt that it was perfectly legitimate to discard the

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analysis of U and T Battalion deaths on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Beattie gives the death count for U Battalion as 37. Of these one man died by a tree falling on top of him, nine died from amoebic dysentery, three from dysentery, four partially from dysentery. This means that dysentery caused 36 percent of the deaths of U Battalion. This is in stark contrast to 45 percent of deaths in T Battalion. This battalion total death rate was also substantially higher, 137 men died in this battalion. See Brune, *Descent into Hell*, pp.642-643.

[135] Letter to R Newton from H. and W. Dunlop, 14 October 1980, AWM PR01596.

[136] Letter to Australian Army Headquarters from Lieutenant Colonel C. Anderson, 20 January 1946, AWM PR0017, Folder 3.

[137] C. Callaghan, Citation of MBE Award Recommendation for Captain R. Newton, 13 March 1946, AWM PR01596/1, Folder 4.

[138] *ibid*.

military manual, and exceed the authority regulations allowed him, when it came to protecting his men in captivity. That found its quintessential example in Boon Pong.

When Newton was repatriated, he paid Boon Pong from his personal bank account.[139] Newton then applied to the Australian Army for repayment. He was informed that the Army considered his deal with Boon Pong was inappropriate, irrespective of the fact that that deal had been partly responsible for the fact that Newton's battalion lost the fewest number of Australians on the Railway. Newton took his story to the press. The matter was only resolved when the Red Cross reimbursed Newton.[140]

[139] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.643-644.
[140] *ibid*.

CHAPTER 4: SQUADRON LEADER ROGER BUSHELL

British Squadron Leader Roger Bushell, through his expertise in escape, became an emergent leader of British/Commonwealth and, for a time, some American Air Force officers, imprisoned in Stalag Luft III North Compound. Free from the official rank responsibility of collective survivorship of a formal group, Bushell's leadership was founded on organising a mass escape, popularly known as the Great Escape. In organising this escape, Bushell used a traditional authoritarian military leadership style. Bushell's ability to use this uncompromising leadership style is testimony to the leadership legitimacy he acquired from men who desperately wanted to believe that Bushell's idea might lead to their freedom.

Bushell's captive experience prior to Stalag Luft III North Compound

South African born Roger Bushell was the embodiment of the mythological German POW, that is, a prisoner obsessed with escape. Bushell was captured on 23 May 1940, after his Hawker Hurricane plane was shot down by enemy fire when his squadron was attempting to provide cover for evacuating British forces at Dunkirk.[1] Taken prisoner by the Germans, between May 1940 and March 1944 Bushell was imprisoned in two POW camps: Dulag Luft (Oberursel) and Stalag Luft III (Sagan).[2] He escaped from both camps.[3]

Bushell's first escape took place from the permanent compound at Dulag Luft, the Luftwaffe interrogation centre for all newly captured air force officers and NCOs.[4] Bushell was selected by Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day, the SBO, to stay in this camp as part of his permanent staff, which he did for about a year.[5] During this time Bushell became part of Day's secret escape organisation (see Chapter 5). Bushell not only accepted the challenge set by Day's secret operation; he thrived on it.

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[1] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.102; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.52; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.12.
[2] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.52, 56-68, 106-107, 126-176; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.102-103, 224-255;
Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.11-13, 34, 54, 68, 94-228.
[3] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.65; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.220.
[4] The interrogation techniques used in Dulag Luft are examined in Chapter 5.
[5] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.102-103; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.52.

For the escape from Dulag Luft, Day appointed Lieutenant Commander Jimmy Buckley as the executive officer and Bushell as intelligence and supply officer.[6] In consultation with Day, Buckley chose a tunnel as the escape method.[7] This meant Bushell, along with all of the other members of the permanent staff, also became a digger.[8] Over the period of about nine months, Bushell enthusiastically worked at his assigned tasks. As supply officer he created an escape fund from a portion of each permanent staff member's German pay[9] and used the money to create an escape kit for each member of Day's staff.[10] The kit compromised of goods that Bushell talked the German guards into giving him, food that the prisoners saved from their Red Cross parcels and maps of the Swiss frontier, drawn by Bushell based on his knowledge of this region from his past career as a champion skier for Britain.[11] Maps of the local area were also drawn by Day based on his careful observations when he and his men went on their parole walks with their German guards.[12]

Bushell's ability to talk the guards at this camp into handing over what were obvious escape aids, such as a civilian suit, reflects the relationship he had established with his captors.[13] Bushell had the advantage of knowing how to speak German.[14] At Dulag Luft, Bushell continued to practice his skills with any guard who was willing to talk to him.[15] The unique congenial atmosphere between Commandant Rumpel and Day's permanent POW staff meant that Bushell was also a favourite of the German staff. For example, in Sydney Smith's biography of Day, he describes one particular dinner party held by Rumpel for Day's staff. At this party, Bushell asked Rumpel and his staff to call him 'Von Bushell.'[16] Then Bushell role-played a conversation between himself, pretending to be an escaped POW captured on the German side of the Swiss border and Rumpel, who played the role of a German policeman.[17] Bushell's purpose

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[6] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.102; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.56; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.11.
[7] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.102; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.56; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.11.
[8] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.56.
[9] *ibid*., p.64.
[10] *ibid*., p.66.
[11] For reference to aids in the escape kit see Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.64, 66. For reference to Bushell's skiing career see Smith, *Wings Day*, p.52; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.11.
[12] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.41, 45.
[13] For reference to Bushell talking a guard at Dulag Luft into selling him a civilian suit see Smith, *Wings Day*, p.106.
[14] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.102; Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, p.1; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.63.
[15] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.63.
[16] *ibid*.
[17] *ibid*.

was to test his German speaking skills and convince Rumpel that he was a native German. He failed.

> A fast and noisy exchange followed at the end of which Rumpel switched to English, 'Roger, that third or fourth word was so absolutely English that even a stupid policeman would see through you.'[18]

Disgruntled with his failure, the game continued. After each go, Bushell asked Rumpel for advice on how to improve his monologue. The game continued until Rumpel despairingly told Bushell that 'no, there is only one man here who might get away with it, Vivian. His German is good.'[19] Summing up the exchange, Smith remarked that 'only a man like Roger Bushel could have tricked a man like Rumpel into giving him tips on how to argue his way across the Swiss frontier.'[20]

By the first weekend in June 1941, the tunnel was ready to be used.[21] It was to be a group escape but Bushell had an alternative plan for himself. He explained to Day that he wanted to hide in the goat-shed, located on the recreation field in the permanent compound, and then the night before the escape was due to take place, he would climb over the wire by himself.[22] Bushell was honest with Day about his motives. He explained that, as supply officer, he knew that he and Vivian had the best escape kits and the only real chance of successfully escaping, a chance that he believed that he could substantially increase if he left the night before everyone else. Not only would this would allow him to catch an earlier train than the other escapers, but his chances of success would not be adversely affected by another escaper's mistakes. Bushell's plan was clearly based on selfish motives. He did not want anyone else to jeopardise his chances of successfully making it to Switzerland. When the men on Day's permanent staff realised what Bushell was planning, they quickly pointed out to him that if he failed and was recaptured, it would mean the guards at Dulag Luft would

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[18] *ibid*.
[19] *ibid*.
[20] *ibid*.
[21] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.103; Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, pp.78-79; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.65; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.34-35.
[22] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.102-103; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.65-66.

heighten security thus making it impossible for the group escape to go ahead.[23] Bushell ignored them.[24] He was convinced that his plan would work. For reasons unknown, Day approved Bushell's plan. However it cost Bushell his reputation as a team player amongst the other prisoners who were scheduled to make their escape.

Bushell's plan almost worked.[25] The night before the planned escape, dressed in his civilian suit, Bushell came out of the goat shed and climbed over the wire. He made his train and was within a few miles of the Swiss border before he was stopped by a civilian who notified the police. Under guard, Bushell was then sent back to Dulag Luft. On the train back to camp, which was filled with prisoners under guard, Bushell again managed to escape.[26] This time, his scheme called for other prisoners to cooperate with him. These prisoners staged a card game while he and some other prisoners, who had volunteered to help him, cut a hole in the carriage floorboards that was large enough for one man to get through. Bushell and some other prisoners successfully escaped from the train. Bushell then paired up with Czech prisoner, Jack Zafouk. Both men stripped off their uniforms, which had disguised civilian clothes, and together they travelled by train to Czechoslovakia.[27] Here, Bushell spent three months in hiding. He was still waiting for contacts in the Czech underground to help him leave when the apartment he was hiding in was raided by the Gestapo.[28] The Gestapo were not looking for Bushell, they discovered him by chance. They were searching the city following the murder of Reich Protector Moravia, Reihard Heydrich.

Bushell was taken back into Germany and endured two months of interrogation by the Gestapo[29] who believed he had been fighting with the Czech underground. Bushell's release back into Luftwaffe custody only came after Commandant Rumpel and

[23] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.65.
[24] *ibid*., pp.65-66.
[25] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.103; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.34.
[26] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.176; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.34-35.
[27] Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.54.
[28] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.176; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.54-56.
[29] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.106.

Commandant Von Lindeiner, who was in charge of Stalag Luft III, and an unknown Luftwaffe General, ordered that he be returned to a POW camp.[30]

Upon his release, Bushell was sent to Stalag Luft III and placed in East Compound. According to Smith and Vance, he arrived gaunt, exhausted and almost broken.[31] Day, who was now also in this camp, immediately ordered him to cease all escape activity until he had recovered.[32] Smith, in his biography of Day, suggests that Bushell's horrific experiences at the hands of the Gestapo brought forgiveness for his selfish decision at Dulag Luft to put his own escape in front of that of his fellow prisoners.[33] His conclusion is certainly supported by evidence from the POWs. For example, L. Hall's interview with the Imperial War Museum and Nathaniel Flekser's writings suggest that, for the prisoners who had not met Bushell, his reputation and experiences commanded their respect.[34] According to British Air Force Sergeant, Ron Mogg, this respect extended to the NCOs who were in Centre Compound at Stalag Luft III.[35]

When Day and Buckley, who was still Day's escape organisation leader, and about 100 Air Force Officers were transferred to Oflag XXIB at Schubin, Bushell became the president of the escape committee at Stalag Luft III East Compound.[36] Something about Bushell's character, however, apparently worried Day and Buckley. Before they departed from East Compound, Day and Buckley 'seriously advised'[37] Bushell not to plan any new escape activities.[38] The Abwehr (security) guards were too suspicious and it would be better to let things cool down again before escape activities resumed.

Bushell, however, was already planning a new escape and now had the authority to put his scheme into practice. The perfect opportunity presented itself when the prisoners

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[30] According to Smith when Commandant Von Lindeiner found out that Bushell was in Gestapo custody he informed Day as SBO of Stalag Luft III East Compound. Day then wrote a report to the Red Cross to document how the Germans had treated Bushell. See Smith, *Wings Day*, p.106.
[31] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.106; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.55-56.
[32] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.106.
[33] *ibid*., pp.106-107.
[34] For example see Flekser, 'Operations', pp.34-35; Interview with L. Hall by P. Hart for the IWM in April 2005, reel 4, IWM 27271.
[35] Ron Mogg was the office manager for their MOC, Scottish Air Force Sergeant James "Dixie" Deans. Dominey, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.19-21. Note that Dominy is Mogg's pseudo.
[36] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.107; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.68.
[37] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.107.
[38] *ibid*.

received news that they were going to be transferred to a new compound, North Compound.[39] Upon hearing this news Bushell shared with men who had been on Buckley's escape committee his vision for a mass escape on a scale unparalleled.[40] It was this plan and its fruition that transformed the respect the men had for Bushell into leadership legitimacy.

Bushell's leadership vision and style

According to Vance, Bushell told the prisoners on the escape committee that he wanted them to use their transfer to North Compound to launch a new escape scheme. Bushell wanted this operation to be 'a big escape that would tie down thousands of soldiers and auxiliaries and really make a difference to the war effort.'[41] He confidently claimed that 200 or more POWs could escape in one attempt, and if successful, the same scheme could be used at a later date to allow other prisoners to also escape.[42] British POW Alan Burgess captured Bushell's passion for escape by quoting him in *The Longest Tunnel*.

> Everyone here in this room is living on borrowed time. By rights we should all be dead! The only reason that God allowed us this extra ration of life is so we can make life hell for the Hun... Realistically, how many men do we think are going to make it back to England, the U.S.A, the antipodes [sic], and all the other places? Very few. But we're going to give the Germans as big a shock in their Wagnerian war score as they've ever had. Not a bang on a big bass drum but an explosion of howitzer proportions...[43]

[39] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.10, 28; G. Harsh, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x4824, Attached Report, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5441; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.176; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.223.
[40] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.126; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.94-96.
[41] Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.94.
[42] For reference to Bushell's escape plan see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.7, 13-18, 26-36; Various Members of Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X", pp.12-14, TNA:PRO:AIR40/285.
[43] R. Bushell cited in Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, pp.13-14.

Bushell then announced the logistics of his plan. Instead of building just one tunnel, they would dig three simultaneously.[44] If the Germans discovered one or two tunnels, another tunnel would still be operable. In contrast to other escape attempts, Bushell explained that these tunnels would not be constructed according to an imposed timetable: rather security would be the most important feature of the plan.[45] As he put it,

> Finally we're not going to work to a deadline. Security is going to be paramount. If the goons get in a snit over something, I'm quite prepared to close up shop completely for a couple of weeks until the fuss dies down. Oh, and by the way, I don't want to hear the word tunnel again, we call the three Tom, Dick [and] Harry.[46]

To ensure success, Bushell explained to the members of the escape committee that he had to have absolute control over all aspects the operation including digging, security and the work of the escape factories.[47] He argued that nothing less than his personal micro-management, combined with strict authoritarian control, would allow the prisoners any chance of realising his vision. Bushell also warned that if his authority was questioned, or it broke down, the entire operation risked being exposed to the Germans.

To ensure that he had the control that he demanded, Bushell abolished the escape committee's overview and approval role instituted by Day. The escape committee could no longer approve any other schemes proposing escape through a tunnel.[48] All tunnelling efforts in the compound would be devoted to Tom, Dick and Harry. Bushell accepted that other types of escape attempts would still be allowed, but only if they

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[44] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.27, 38; Crawley, *Escape to Danger*, p.224.
[45] Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.173; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.224.
[46] R. Bushell cited in Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.95.
[47] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.10-12; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.175, 178.
[48] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.10-11; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.224.

were approved by his new hand selected escape committee and then Bushell himself.[49] Bushell reasoned that other escape attempts would provide a distraction from his own plan and if escape attempts from prisoners in North Compound stopped altogether the Germans might suspect the prisoners were busy planning a new scheme.[50] Once they were in North Compound, to ensure the Germans were not overly suspicious about Bushell's escape scheme, some of the most senior officers participated in other escape schemes.[51]

As noted earlier, Bushell changed the composition of the escape committee. He explained that, for his operation to work, the escape committee structure that Day had introduced during his time at Stalag Luft I and Stalag Luft III East Compound would have to be significantly expanded.[52] Intelligence officers, diggers, security and workers for a variety of escape factories would be essential. This would mean a significant increase in the number of prisoners working on escape activities would be needed. Bushell was confident that the officers in the compound would volunteer their time for such an important operation.

Bushell then gave himself a new title. Instead of being known as the executive, or president, of the escape committee, he declared that he would simply be known as 'Big X'.[53] Bushell explained that the purpose of this title was to protect his identity

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[49] Bushell's new escape committee comprised of Flight Lieutenant N. Canton, Major D. Jones, Flight Lieutenant R. Kerr-Ramsay and Lieutenant Commander N. Qnill. See Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.10.

[50] Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.95. In total three other prisoners who escaped from other schemes were successful in reaching Allied countries. Of these men, one was Dutch and two were Norwegian. For an overview of these other escape attempts in Stalag Luft III North Compound see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.42, 98-99, 40-44; R. Bethel, unpublished writings titled 'A Glimpse of Stalag Luft III North Compound', p.12, IWM 05/4/1; C. Campbell, unpublished writings titled 'A Kriegies Log by UN Lucky', pp.11-12, IWM 86/35/1; Interview with A. Bryett by Windfall Films for the IWM in 2003, reel 13, IWM 27051; Interview with S. Dowse by P. Hart for the IWM in November 2004, reel 5, IWM 27731; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.236; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.225-228.

[51] For reference to Day's escape attempt see Vance, *The Gallant Company*, p.45.

[52] H. Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x1304, Attached Report, pp.1-8, TNA:PRO:WO208/5439; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.1-2; R. Kerr-Ramsey, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/SP(1)/46, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:WO208/3341; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.178; Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, pp.14-21; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.95.

[53] Harsh, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1; T. Ferres, Speech transcript titled, 'My "Guest Speaker" talk to the (men's) Beecroft Probus Club," 22

and his anonymity amongst the general population of prisoners. However, despite his intention, prisoner writings and recollections reveal that the majority of POWs in North Compound were well aware that Bushell was Big X.[54] Prisoners such as Kenneth Noel Holland and W. Griffith, for example, explained in their repatriation reports that they worked 'for' Bushell.[55] Even Australian POW Horace Fordyce, who had transferred to Stalag Luft III North Compound from Italy, knew that 'Roger Bushell planned and organised everything.'[56]

According to the published recollections of Paul Brickhill and Conrad Norton, within a month of the prisoners moving in North Compound, Bushell's plan was being implemented.[57] With Flight Lieutenant C. Floody, who Bushell appointed as chief tunnel expert, the locations of Tom, Dick and Harry were selected. [58] Then Bushell appointed the prisoners to be in charge of each tunnel: Flight Lieutenants John Marshall, Robert Kerr-Ramsay and Leslie George 'Johnny' Bull. With Floody, each of these men drew up plans for their respective tunnels and had trapdoors made that were not easily detectable to Germans. Then the prisoners who had volunteered to dig began clearing dirt from each of the three sites.

Each tunnel was to be dug to a depth of 30 feet with a length of over 200 feet.[59] Tom, Dick and Harry each had 30 diggers assigned to them. The men worked in three

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February 1988, p.9A, AMWM PR090/035; Interview with G. Atkinson by C. Wood for the IWM in 1982, reel 3, IWM 6176; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.178.

[54] For example of prisoners who knew that Bushell was "Big X" see E. Lokuciewski, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS -x5938, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5443; P. Runnacles, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x469, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5447; Interview with Atkinson, reel 2.

[55] W. Griffith, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIB/158, p.3, TNA:PRO:WO208/3342; K. Holland, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/S.8, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3341.

[56] Interview with Interview with H. Fordyce on 19 June 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive No. 0523, tape 2, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1690.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 14 April 2014.

[57] Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.176-179.

[58] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.28; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1; R. Kerr-Ramsay, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; H. Rutherford, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War MI9/S/PG/LIB/179, Attached Report, p.2, TNA:PRO:WO208/3342; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X", pp.24-25; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.178, 239-240.

[59] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.29.

different shifts of about two and half hours, but it could stretch to four hours.[60] Shifts were carefully timed to ensure all prisoners could make it to the German appell or roll call. For the same reason, no digging took place at night. It was simply too difficult for barrack leaders to account for prisoners who were not in the barracks without arousing the suspicion of the guards during an inspection.

As the tunnels progressed, prisoner-designed air pumps provided essential ventilation.[61] John Travis and Bob Nelson, the prisoners in charge of the metal works, constructed three air pumps from the prisoners' supply of powder tins.[62] Under Bushell's orders, each tunnel's trapdoor and shaft was shored with wood.[63] The tunnel itself was also sourced with electric light,[64] 'gen men' being in charge of the electrical work.[65] They used the odds bits of wire that had been left behind from the Germans' construction in the compound and tapped into the barrack wiring system. Then using cables located under the floor, they ran these down into the shafts of the three tunnels. By using lamps stolen from the barrack blocks, the prisoners had electric lighting in the tunnels. Old tins filled with margarine functioned as the backup lighting system. Prisoners from the carpentry factory advised the diggers on how to install wooden support beams in the tunnels to stop them from caving in.[66] Prisoners found a ready supply of wood from their bed boards and the corner legs from their bunk beds.[67] Historian Jonathan Vance explains that squadron leader 'Willy' Williams,' who was 'a

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[60] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.26, 29-30; I. Muir, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG(), p.1, TNA:PRO:W0208/5444; K. Rees, transcript of interview conducted by Windfall Films in 2003 titled 'The Great Escape Revealed', pp.8-9, IWM 225029; T. Nelson, unpublished writings titled 'Tom, Dick and Harry of Stalag Luft III', p.2, IWM 84/45/1; Interview with Dowse, reel 5; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.240, 276.

[61] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.26; Interview with Dowse, reel 5.

[62] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.26; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.244-246.

[63] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.25; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.232-233.

[64] Flesker, 'Operations', p.52; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.244.

[65] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.29, 37; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.244.

[66] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.30; R. Phillips, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x469, Attached Report, p.2, TNO:PRO:WO208/5446.

[67] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.30; Phillips, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2; Interview with Fordyce, tape 2.

big, curly headed aussie [sic],'[68] was responsible for collecting the wood supply, a task which he performed 'with all the zest his countrymen were known for.'[69] The collected wood was also used to make trolleys that moved on rails and operated inside each tunnel.[70] This invention, constructed by the prisoners' engineers, not only carried diggers to and from parts of the tunnel, but was also used to transport the dirt and sand to the trapdoor.

One major problem that Bushell faced was what to do with the dirt removed from the tunnels, which was mostly sand based, unlike the surface soil in the camp.[71] If the Germans saw any trace of sand, they would know that an escape attempt was being planned.

Bushell placed Lieutenant Commander Peter Fanshaw in charge of the dispersal of the diggings from the three tunnels.[72] This involved collecting and transporting the material from the digging sites and dispersing it throughout the compound in such a way as to not alert the guards that the prisoners were digging in the compound.[73] Fanshaw's original solution was for his men to collect the sand in pairs using a cloth material, that when filled, formed a cylinder secured with pins and string at each end. The prisoners then placed the filled cylinder bag underneath their coats and moved through the compound to find a suitable place to dispose of the sand. Once they found their dispersal location, they loosed the string on the cylinder cloth bag, and slowly dispersed the sand through their coat sleeves or coat pockets. Some prisoners, who found this method too slow, took off their coats to disperse the sand. Bushell quickly realised this scheme was impracticable, and he said so.

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[68] Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.131.
[69] *ibid*.
[70] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.25, 30-31; Phillips, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2; Flekser, Operations, p.57; Interview with Dowse, reel 5; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.242; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.234.
[71] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.225, 236.
[72] P. Fanshawe, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War MI9/S/P.G?I/21, p.3, TNA:RPO:WO208/3341.
[73] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.32-34; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.243.

> Very shortly we're going to run into a problem with dispersal. The method we're using now is just not satisfactory. The bags are too difficult to fill, and it is far too risky with the dispersal having to take off their coats to unload the sand. Beside, in the warm weather, chaps wandering about in great coats are going to look rather suspicious.[74]

Fanshawe came up with a new solution. The tailoring factory designed long johns that included the cloth cylinder in them.[75] This allowed the dispersal men to collect the sand and then walk to different parts of the compound, loosen the tie or pin and then disperse the sand as they walked. To offer increased protection against the Germans detecting the sand, dispersal locations were chosen by men working the security detail who selected sites that could conceal the sand.[76] Once they were in the suitable spot, the dispersal men usually gathered as a group, pretended to talk while they loosened the string on their built-in cloth cylinder bag, and let the sand fall out.[77] The dispersal men would then start moving and stomp the sand into the ground.[78] The sand dispersal men became known as the 'penguins.'[79]

When it became difficult for the security men to find a safe place for the penguins to disperse their sand, Flight Lieutenant Vivian Phillips organised diversions such as boxing matches and volleyball games.[80] Then when Commandant Von Lindeiner allowed the prisoners to have a camp garden, penguins dispersed sand in this area,

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[74] R. Bushell cited in Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.125-126.
[75] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.33; Flekser, 'Operations', p.53; L. Hall, unpublished and untitled writings, IWM 05\68\1 p.9; Nelson, 'Tom, Dick and Harry of Stalag Luft III', p.2; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.243.
[76] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.34; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.243; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.239.
[77] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.33; Phillips, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2; Flekser, 'Operations', p.53; Hall, untitled writings, p.9; Nelson, 'Tom, Dick and Harry of Stalag Luft III', p.2; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.243.
[78] Hall, untitled writings, p.9; Interview with Bryett, reel 15; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.243; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.237-238.
[79] Hall, untitled writings, p.9; Interview with M. Driver by P. Hart for the IWM between 2004-06, reel 10, IWM 27064; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger* p.243.
[80] Phillips, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1. Also see Interview with Bryett, reel 12; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.243; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.238-239.

while the prisoners working in the garden raked the sand into the garden beds.[81] However as the tunnels progressed, even these schemes could not safely handle the disposal of the diggings. At this point Bushell ordered sand to be dispersed secretly under huts, in hut roofs, under the floor of the compound theatre, and then in the spare Red Cross parcel boxes.[82] Despite these new solutions, according to Paul Brickhill and Conrad Norton, 'Bushell, Floody and their fellow-brains were never completely comfortable about the dispersal problem.'[83]

To assist the dispersal teams and to protect the men working on other aspects of the escape plan, Bushell expanded Day's duty-pilot system under the direction of Squadron Leader Kirby Green and Flight Lieutenant G. Marsh into North Compound.[84] This system monitored the movements of Germans inside the compound to warn prisoners engaged in escape activities whenever a German approached. 'Stooges'[85] (prisoners working with the security detail) were rostered to sit near the gate to the compound and record the name of each German guard who entered.[86] A guard who was not considered to be a serious threat was shadowed by a prisoner. If the guard came too close to escape activities the men were signalled and work ceased. If the guard was considered a significant threat, all activity immediately ceased. This guard was carefully watched by several prisoners and only after he had left the compound did escape activities resume. The duty-pilot scheme was also adopted to

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[81] Flesker, 'Operations', pp.54-55; Interview with Bryett, reel 12.

[82] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.35; Phillips, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.1-2; Hall, untitled writings, p.9; Nelson, 'Tom, Dick and Harry of Stalag Luft III', p.2, 5; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.125-126, 187.

[83] Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.243.

[84] Day's duty pilot system is examined in Chapter 5. For reference to Bushell's expansion of this system see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.12; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2;
R. Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, 27 June 1945, Appendix
Z.I, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:WO208/3245; A. Rumsey, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War MI9/S/PG/LIB/132, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3342; Various Members of Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X" p.10; Interview with A. Cassie by P. Hart for the IWM in June 2004, reel 20, IWM 26558; Interview with J. Rae by P. Hart for the IWM in 2005, reel 6, IWM27813; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.226-227.

[85] Flesker, 'Operations', p.40; Interview with Rae, reel 6; Interview with Bryett, reel 12.

[86] For reference to the prisoners who led the escape organisation security system see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.38; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.1-2; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.226; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.114.

assist the penguins when they operated at night.[87] These men were tasked with secretly dispersing sand from the tunnels underneath the prisoners' theatre by accessing the trap door built underneath one of the theatre seats. The work was carried out before 'lock-up at 2100 hours',[88] which meant that barrack leaders did not have to worry about prisoners being absent during a lock-up inspection check. According to Harsh, colour flash lamps were used to pass on information about where Germans guards were located in the camp.[89]

By the time of the penguins' night operations, and to Bushell's dismay, the German guards had become increasingly suspicious of the amount of sand in the compound.[90] The underground microphones installed by the Germans to track any vibrations in the earth caused by digging were also recording more sounds than usual. The Germans suspected that another tunnel being built. They just did not know where. As a result of this suspicion, 'there were always guards within the camp and at night.'[91] In this high risk environment Bushell reminded the stooges that if they did not do their job properly, the entire operation risked being exposed.[92]

To impose an extra layer of security to protect the penguins' night duty-pilot system, the intelligence department, led by Australian POW Geoff Cornish, was mobilised.[93] Prisoners in Cornish's department spoke German fluently and were mostly prisoners that Day had previously used as intelligence officers in Stalag Luft I and Stalag Luft

[87] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.35-36; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.3; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.226-227.
[88] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.35-36.
[89] Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2. Also see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.12.
[90] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.7; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Reports, p.2; Interview with Bryett, reel 12; Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.46.
[91] Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2. Also see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.7-8.
[92] Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X", p.36.
[93] Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2; Interview with G. Cornish by D. Firth for the IWM on 28 May 2003, reel 3, IWM 23327.

III East Compound.[94] At night these men were strategically placed around the camp, in areas that were well away from any escape work. The prisoners were instructed to engage their assigned guard in conversation for as long as they could. This diversion seems to have worked. According to Harsh's repatriation report, these prisoners talked with their assigned German 'for hours [often] argu[ing about] National Socialism or the merits of German womanhood.'[95]

Bushell also instructed these men to continue the duties that Day had introduced for intelligence officers, duties that he himself had undertaken under Day.[96] These prisoners were encouraged to cultivate their assigned guard to gain any relevant information and escape aids. This usually occurred once the prisoners had convinced their contact to come into their barracks. Once inside, the prisoners steered the conversation towards the propaganda which made it seem inevitable that the Allies would win the war and, as a consequence, it would be better for the guards to help the prisoners.[97] If they did, the prisoners would be able to vouch for their character when the Allied armies liberated the camp. Some guards believed them and provided essential escape aids and intelligence that would help the prisoners once they were outside the wire.[98] Flight Lieutenant Kenneth Noel Holland's repatriation questionnaire explains that the intelligence officers were instructed to 'obtain electric light bulbs and any information of local civilians e.g refugees, population, morale after

[94] For an examination of Day's intelligence system see Chapter 5. For reference to the continuation of this work under Bushell see Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, p.2; Interview with A. Bryett, reel 12; Interview with Cornish, reel 3.
[95] Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2.
[96] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.20-23; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2; A. Wiseman, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIB/120, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3342; Rumsey, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIB/132, p.2; Hall, untitled writings, p.8; Holland, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/S.8, p.1; Interview with Bryett, reel 12.
[97] The propaganda system originated as part of Day's intelligence system. This system is examined in more detail in Chapter 5. Also see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942- January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, pp.83-84.
[98] For example of intelligence and escape aids provide to the prisoner intelligence officers see Holland, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Rumsey, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, p.2; Wiseman, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1.

bombing, attitude towards Ps/w [sic], etc.'[99] This information was then to be passed onto Bushell.[100]

Cornish's interview with the Imperial War Memorial reveals that some contacts were not so easy to manipulate.[101] In these circumstances, Cornish explained that he turned to blackmail. This system worked by firstly befriending the guard and earning his trust. Then Cornish would ask him to bring him in little items, such as soap and chocolate. Eventually these items included basic escape aids. Cornish explained that once the guard began to refuse his requests, he would tell the guard that he would report all of the items and information he had already provided. Knowing he was trapped, the guard had no choice but to continue to assist the prisoner. Using this method, Cornish obtained a compass and German money from his contact.
The only time the duty pilot or contact system did not work was when the Germans undertook a search of the entire compound.[102] At this time, the prisoners hid all of their escape equipment and anxiously waited. After the search was completed, prisoners who worked the security detail were rostered on to search the entire compound before activities resumed. Bushell considered this precaution essential because it was too risky for escape activities to resume when it was possible that guards might still be in the compound.

As noted earlier, the guards were considered either low-risk or high-risk when it came to monitoring their movements. The high-risk German guards were from the Abwehr department.[103] Popularly known to the prisoners as 'ferrets,'[104] these guards were responsible for detecting signs of escape activity. In Stalag Luft III North Compound the Abwehr guards were led by Unteroffizier Glemnitz who answered directly to the

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[99] Holland, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1.
[100] *ibid*.
[101] Interview with Cornish, reel 3. Also see Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.277.
[102] Kellet, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System, p.1; Interview with Fordyce, tape 6.
[103] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.6-7; Flesker, 'Operations', pp.40-41; Hall, untitled writings, p.7; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1; H. Massey, First Witness Testimony in Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, 29 May 1944, p.4, TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.227.
[104] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.6; Hall, untitled writings, p.7; A. Lees, unpublished writings titled 'Before it's too late: An Autobiography', p.47, IWM 06/51/1.

Commandant.[105] Glemnitz, who the prisoners called 'rubberneck,'[106] had been with most of the prisoners since Stalag Luft I in 1940/1941.[107] He was known as a fair, smart officer who was 'incorruptible' and therefore, a keen opponent.[108] In their efforts to try and find any evidence of escape activities, Glemnitz and his men went under, in and out of barrack huts and common buildings with torches, metal spikes, screwdrivers and pliers.[109] They patrolled the camp day and night, often eavesdropping on prisoner conversations or bursting into barracks unannounced. They had the authority to shoot prisoners who were found outside their barracks at night.[110]

The Abwehr were supported by armed guards in sentry boxes above the compound who were equipped with searchlights.[111] These guards had orders to shoot prisoners who attempted to cross the perimeter warning wire located inside of the compound boundary.[112] The official report of the escape committee, the 'X' Report, explained that within these conditions, the security operations of the prisoners' escape scheme implemented by Bushell were vital to it's success.

> Security might well be called the keystone of the arch leading to successful escapes. Without good security and by good is meant as

[105] Massey, First Witness Testimony in Proceedings of Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, p.4; D. Codd, unpublished writings titled 'Blue Job, Brown Job: A Personal Journey Through World War Two', p.143, IWM 06/117/1; Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, p.272.
[106] Flekser, 'Operations', p.40; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.277; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.147.
[107] Interview with Cassie, reels 17, 22; Interview with Driver, reel 8; Interview with P. Royle by J. Bannister for the IWM on 2 December 2003, reel 5, IWM 26605; Interview with Rae, reel 6; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.277; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.76-78, 94-95, 127-128, 133.
[108] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.6-7; Flekser, 'Operations', pp.40-41; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.277; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.147.
[109] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.6-7; Flekser, 'Operations', p.40; Lees, 'Before it's too late', p.47; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.24, 140.
[110] G. Naville, Protecting Power Inspection Report on Stalag Luft III, 6 and 7 July 1943, p.8, TNA:PRO:WO224/63A; G. Naville, Protecting Power Inspection Report on Stalag Luft III, 22-24 February 1944, p.10, TNA:PRO:FO916/840. For example of Abwhr shooting which took place in Stalag Luft III North Compound see Letter from Berne to Foreign Office, reference No.2313, 24 May 1944, TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121.
[111] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.5-7.
[112] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.6-7; Codd, 'Blue Job, Brown Job', p.143; Lees, 'Before it's too late', p.47. For example of shootings in Stalag Luft III North Compound see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.5; C. King, unpublished writing titled, 'A Wartime Log', p.66, IWM 85/50/1; Massey, First Witness Testimony in Proceedings of Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, p.6.

> near one hundred percent [sic] efficient as it is humanely possible to attain, the attempt of any escaping activity, the duration of which is to be more than a few days might just as well never be tried, as it is bound to fail.[113]

The escape factories[114] were another extension of Day's original escape organisation. In Day's model, a few prisoners worked on preparing the necessary papers, outfits and food supplies that escapers needed once they had breached the wire.[115] Bushell significantly expanded this idea to create separate groups of factories that were responsible for creating specific items as part of a prisoner's escape kit. The factories produced maps, forged documents, compasses, clothing and food supplies, producing the most sophisticated prisoner escape kits that any air force officer had seen.[116] They matched a prisoner's escape identity and plan with the relevant maps, railway timetables, identity papers and clothes that were necessary to convince a German soldier, civilian or Gestapo officer that they were genuine. However, as Brickhill and Norton explained, not all prisoners received the same level of attention.

> Everyone was to have at least one official paper of some kind, most had two and the men with elaborate identities, like Roger Bushell and some of the German speakers had as many as half a dozen, including letters of credit and incidental forged personal letters, just for effect.[117]

The most prominent Australian contributors in Bushell's escape factories were Flight Lieutenant Alan Hake, who was in charge of the compass factory, John Williams who

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[113] Various Members of Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X", p.36.
[114] Interview with Cassie, reel 18; Interview with J. Bertram by C. Wood for the IWM on 23 June 1981, reel 5, IWM 4987; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.236-237.
[115] For an examination of prisoners working in Day's escape organisation on escape aids see H. Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x1304, pp.1-4, TNA:PRO:WO208/5439; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.56, 66, 114, 117-118.
[116] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.13-19, 25-27; Statement by S/Ldr R. Abraham Officer I/C Clothing Stalag Luft III (Sagan), pp.1-6 cited in Various Members of Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X", TNA:PRO:AIR40/285; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X", pp.11-14, 21-22; Interview with Cassie, reels 18-19; Interview with Dowse, reel 5; Interview with Fordyce, tape 6; Interview with James, reel 5; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.236-237, 267-272, 282-284.
[117] Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.284.

was in charge of carpentry and Geoff Cornish who was in charge of intelligence gathering.[118] Other Australians played a smaller role in a variety of activities such as metal work, supply requisition, tunnelling, photography, map making and intelligence.[119] In addition to these men, several Australian repatriated prisoner questionaries note involvement in the escape committee without listing a specific task.[120] It is presumed that these men participated in the largest operations, security or sand dispersal.[121]

Bushell's leadership style

There is little doubt that Bushell applied an authoritarian leadership style.[122] It is evident in the way he dealt with the men who volunteered to make his escape scheme possible, the decisions that he made regarding the scheme's progress and his final decision to order the escape.

Throughout all of the phases of the escape scheme, Bushell ensured that he retained absolute control.[123] While members of the escape committee could, and did make suggestions, Bushell alone made the decisions. His decisions then assumed the authority of orders. They were not subject to further input, compromise or

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[118] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.19, 25; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.236-237, 271; Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.36; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.131-133,167-168.

[119] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942- January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, p.33; Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.24, 36; Kerr-Ramsay, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; R. Mulligan, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/SP/PG/MIS-x5926 p.2,TNA:PRO:WO208/5444; Interview with Cornish, reel 3; Interview with Fordyce, tape 6.

[120] For example of these questionnaires see A. Comber, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/GEN/MIS-x, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5438; L. Simpson, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, A.401542, 31 July 1944, p.4, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 2; P. Kingsford-Smith, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, A402241, p.1, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 2.

[121] Australian involvement in security and dispersal is confirmed by T. Ferres and P. Royle. See Interview with Royle, reel 4; Ferres, Address to Beecroft organisation 3 February, p.9A.

[122] For reference to Bushell's control see T. Calnan, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/GEN/INT/MIS-x4848, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5438; Bethel**, '**A Glimpse of Stalag Luft III North Compound', pp.2-3; Flekser, 'Operations', p.39; Interview with M. Leng by C. Wood for the IWM on 25 August 1991, reel 5, IWM 12217; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.280.

[123] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.10-12; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.175, 178.

interpretation. As British POW Nathaniel Flekser explained, 'Roger's decision was final.'[124]

The language used by POWs to describe their part in the Great Escape also reveals the extent to which he exercised an authoritarian leadership style. For example, British POW John Wilson recalled that he and some other POWs became involved in the escape scheme early in the piece simply because 'Roger sent for us.'[125] Wilson then explained why he did not question Bushell: it 'seemed to be something [that] you had to do.'[126] Flekser's writings recall how Roger 'summon[ed]'[127] him and some other POWS. Bushell then told them that 'You, you and you will be stooges on internal security. The rest of you will be "penguins" and disperse sand.'[128] Alan Bryett's memory of how he was assigned tasks in the escape scheme, however, is different. He remembered that '[t]he X organisation would come round the night before [tell you] what duties you were on [and] where to report to.'[129] As the scheme progressed, therefore, Bushell's presence was not overt. Instead of personally assigning men to their task, Bushell let his appointed men issue his orders. This may well have reflected Bushell's attempt to attain a level of anonymity as Big X, but, as noted earlier, the identity of Big X was well known. It is more likely that Bushell was confident enough of his own control of the scheme to know that any decisions he made would be implemented.

In his interview with the Imperial War Museum British POW Sydney Dowse explained that Bushell's authoritarian style was a natural extension of his personality. 'He just had leadership qualities... he was always at the forefront because he was the sort of chap that would take over and say we ought to be doing this and doing that...'[130] In his interview Alex Cassie explained that Bushell was able to issue orders

[124] Flekser, 'Operations', p.65. Also see A. Johnson, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/GEN/INT/MIS-x2233, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5442; Calnan, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Interview with Bryett, reel 13.
[125] Interview with J. Wilson by C. Wood for the IWM on 1 May 1995, reel 3, IWM 15336.
[126] Interview with Wilson, reel 3.
[127] Flekser, 'Operations', p.36.
[128] *ibid*., p.39.
[129] Interview with Bryett, reel 14.
[130] Interview with Dowse, reel 4.

to the prisoners because of his 'forceful personality.'[131] Richard Churchill believed that Bushell had a 'natural authority'[132]

Interestingly, Australian Geoff Cornish's recollections reveal that his willingness to cooperate with Bushell in his escape scheme was founded on the regimental structures that Bushell introduced through his authoritarian leadership style. 'Oh, you accepted it, it was an order and it was given to you very clearly and with good reason.'[133] British POW B. James agreed. His writings explain that Bushell simply 'decreed'[134] what the prisoners had to do.

The extent of Bushell's authoritative power over his enterprise is also shown in the way that orders that changed his overall plan for escape were not debated. For example, when Bushell found out that a new compound was being built for the American air force officers, where Tom was meant to break out, he made an instant decision.[135] According to Flekser, Bushell announced that they would 'shut down Dick and Harry [for a] concentrated blitz on Tom.'[136] This broke his own rule regarding tunnel construction. It had devastating consequences. With about 30 feet to go until Tom reached beyond the wire, a 'ferret' discovered Tom's trapdoor.[137]

Having suffered this setback, Bushell then announced to his escape committee that instead of keeping Dick and Harry operational, they were going to focus all their efforts on Harry.[138] Dick was now to be used to store sand taken from Harry.[139] The writings and recollections are confused as to whether Bushell had a choice in making

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[131] Interview with Cassie, reel 17.
[132] Interview with R. Churchill by C. Wood for the IWM on 5 August 1993, reel 4, IWM 13296.
[133] Interview with G. Cornish on 2 July 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, No. 1388, tape 6, < http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/.409aspx> maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 15 April 2014.
[134] Interview with James, reel 5.
[135] Nelson, 'Tom, Dick and Harry of Stalag Luft III', pp.2-3; Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.44; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.234-235.
[136] Flekser, 'Operations', p.54.
[137] Flekser, 'Operations', p.54; B. James, 'The Second World War Memoirs of Squadron Leader BA James', p.95, 110, IWM PP\MRC\255; Nelson, 'Tom, Dick and Harry of Stalag Luft III, pp.2-3; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.235-236.

[138] Bethel, 'A Glimpse at Stalag Luft III North Compound: Section titled Harry', p.1; Crawley, *Escape from Danger*, pp.229, 246-256, 264; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.136-137, 145, 240-250; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.185-186.
[139] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.235.

this decision. Smith and Crawley stated that the point where Dick was meant to breakout was being cleared by the Germans for another American Compound.[140] If this is the case, Bushell had no other option. However, if there was some possibility that Dick still could have been used, Bushell's decision to sacrifice Dick meant that he now only had one functioning tunnel. The Germans suspected that Tom was not the only tunnel in the compound.[141] Bushell's decision effectively meant that if something went wrong with Harry, or the 'ferrets' found it, his entire operation was over. Bushell's decision that Harry was ready to 'go' was also controversial. Harry's exit was short of the adjoining wood and within fifteen feet of a guard watchtower.[142] This meant that it was possible for the German sentries in this watchtower to see prisoners exiting the tunnel. If this happened to the first prisoner to leave Harry, the German guards would swarm the compound and its perimeter before even one prisoner had made it to the trees and the entire escape enterprise would have been for nothing. Despite this significant threat to the integrity of his plans, Bushell was willing to take the risk.

Therefore, just after 10pm on 24 March 1944, dressed in a civilian suit, overcoat and hat, for the last time, Bushell escaped from German captivity.[143] Bushell was one of the 80 POWs from North Compound that made it out of Harry.[144] According to SBO,

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[140] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.234; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.141.
[141] For reference to this suspicion see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.7; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2; Interview with Bryett, reel 12; Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.46.
[142] Flekser, 'Operations', pp.50, 62, 72; James, 'The Second World War Memoirs of Squadron Leader BA James', p.110; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.290-291; Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, pp.44-45; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.164, 212-219; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.141.
[143] Bushell planned escape route was via Breslau, Dresden, Leispzig, Frankfurt, Paris and then with the help of the French underground, cross the Channel to England. See Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.31; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X" pp.1-2; Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.8.
[144] List of 80 RAF who Escaped via a Tunnel from North Compound at Stalag 3, 24 March 1944, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2728; Massey, First Witness Testimony in Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, p.3.

Group Captain Herbert Massey, five more prisoners were caught in the tunnel.[145] Three prisoners successfully made 'home-runs'.[146]

The majority of escapers were captured within 50 miles of Sagan.[147] According to Flight Lieutenant R. Wallace-Tarry, Bushell was caught on the Danish frontier.[148] The interim report of the investigation made by the military department of the Judge Advocate General Office in London found that most of the recaptured prisoners were assembled in different locations: 35 prisoners were held at Gorlitz, eight at Hirschberg, three at Prague, five in Berlin and one in Munich.[149] Of these men, 50 were driven to unknown locations and shot. Four Australians were amongst the dead.[150] On 29 March 1944, somewhere between Saarbrucken and Kaiserslautern, Bushell was executed.[151]

Bushell's execution was not unexpected. Upon his release from Gestapo custody, an explicit threat had been made against his life. British Squadron Leader Bertram James recalled; '[H]e was released with a warning that he would be shot if he attempted to escape again.'[152] Flekser's writings reveal that Hauptman Pieber, one of the prisoners' best German contacts, warned them that the Gestapo were being given an increasing

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[145] Massey, First Witness Testimony in Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, p.3. The list of 80 prisoners who escaped has only four prisoners being caught in the tunnel. See List of 80 RAF Officers who Escaped in a Tunnel from North Camp at Stalag Luft III, 24 May 1945.

[146] The three men who made home runs were Sergeant Per Bergsland, Second Lieutenant Jens Einar Müller and Flight Lieutenant Bram van der Stok. Bergsland and Müller managed to get to Sweden. Van der Stok escaped to Spain with the assistance of the French Resistance. See Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.50; Interim Report on the Investigation being made by the Military Department of the Judge Advocate General Office London, 7 August 1945, Part III, p.3, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2265.

[147] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.261.

[148] R. Wallace-Tarry, Fourth Witness Testimony in Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, 29 May 1944, p.1, TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121.

[149] J. Grocott, Twelfth Witness Testimony in Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, 29 May 1944, p.43, TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121; H. Massey, Summary of proceedings of Court of Inquiry held to Investigate the Shootings of Air Force Personnel at Stalag Luft III, pp.3-4, TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121; Interrogation of Max Richard Hansel at No 6 G.O.C US Army Moosberg by Flight Sgt. N. McDaniel and Interpreter Sgt Van Giessen, taken on 20/5/46, pp.1-7, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2265; Voluntary Statement by Civilian Internees Former Obrescharfuhrer Robert Schroeder, 2 June 1948, p.1, TNA:PRO: WO208/5635; Interview with T. Nelson by C. Wood for the IWM in 1984, reel 3, IWM 8276.

[150] The four Australians executed were J. Catanach, R. Kierath, A. Hake and J. Williams. See List of 80 RAF Officers who Escaped in a Tunnel from North Camp at Stalag Luft III, 24 May 1945, pp.1-2.

[151] Royal Air Force Special Investigation Branch, Stalag Luft III Murder Investigation Report, Part 1, Summary of Facts, August 1945, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5633; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.260.

[152] James, 'The Second World War Memoirs of Squadron Leader BA James', p.68. Also see Flekser, 'Operations', p.35.

amount of control over escaped POWs.[153] As SBO of North Compound, Massey, alongside the other SBOs of Stalag Luft III, had been warned on two separate occasions that escaped POWs, especially those in civilian clothes or German uniform, could be liable for the death penalty.[154] These warnings concerned the SBOs of North, East and South Compound to such an extent, that they lodged two complaints with the Protecting Power.[155]

The writings of liberated POWs also reveal that in the days immediately prior to the escape, Bushell was lectured by his SBO, Massey, and one of his closest friends, Sydney Downey, regarding his personal safety. Massey left Bushell in no doubt as to the possibility that if caught, he would be shot.

> The Luftwaffe are meticulous in abiding by the rules of the Geneva Convention. The Gestapo are not and their power is growing every day. They know that when the war ends they will have committed enough bloody crimes to put them away for years to come. So one more murder or execution will make no difference. Yours, for example, Rodger [sic][156]

Dowse also warned Bushell that his death was a likely outcome.[157] He begged Bushell to see reason. Bushell's blunt response to these concerns reveals that his all-consuming desire for escape had warped his sense of reality. To Dowse's concerns, Bushell replied, 'Nothing doing, Sydney. I've lived for this and I'm going.'[158] In his interview with the Imperial War Museum, Dowse recalled that in response to these

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[153] Flekser, 'Operations', p.58.
[154] These warnings took the form of an OKW order in April 1943 and a letter by Commandant Von Lindeiner to the SBOs in all compounds in Stalag Luft III in October 1943. See Grocott, Twelfth Witness Testimony in Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, p.43; Massey, First Witness Testimony in Proceedings of Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, p.8; H. Marshall, Statement in United Kingdom Charges Against German War Criminals, Shooting of 50 R.A.F. Prisoners of War from Stalag Luft III, July 1944, p.3, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2275; M. Williams, Investigation into the Death of 50 British and Allied Prisoners, Members of the Royal Air Force of Stalag Luft III, Sagan, Germany on March 24 in July 1944, pp. 40-41, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2275; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.139,194.
[155] G. Naville, Protecting Power Inspection Report on Stalag Luft III, 25 and 26 October 1943, p.6; TNA:PRO:WO224/63A; G. Naville, Protecting Power Inspection Report on Stalag Luft III, 22 and 24 February 1944, p.10, TNA:PRO:FO916/840.
[156] H. Massey cited in Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.49.
[157] Interview with Dowse, reel 7; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.150; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.195.
[158] Bushell in Smith, *Wings Day*, p.150. Also see Interview with Dowse, reel 7.

warnings, Bushell's authoritarian style and blind ownership of his escape scheme meant that he was unable to apply any sort of common sense to the likely outcome of his escape. '[Bushell was] quite arrogant in the sense that I'm not going to be captured this time. I'm going to make it...he was very, very confident.'[159]

When he made the decision that Harry was ready to 'go', Bushell was well aware of the dangers facing the escapers. They were in civilian clothes, they carried no identity disks and he knew that escapers would be turned over to the Gestapo. [160] Bushell's refusal to listen to these warnings reveals a man who refused to accept waiting out the war behind the wire. It was a vision shared by many others.

Leadership legitimacy

Bushell was undoubtedly a leader of prisoners in Stalag Luft III North Compound. His grand vision, passionate belief in his cause and past escape experience meant that the men listened to his idea and participated in his scheme. The 'X' Report states that Bushell's control of escape was 'practically 100 percent.'[161] Prisoner estimates of the number of them involved in the escape attempt and scheme vary widely. British POW Richard Churchill, placed the figure at '80 percent,'[162] which according to R. Mulligan was approximately 750 men, including the majority of the 44 Australians held in Stalag Luft III North Compound.[163] Australians Paul Brickhill, Horace Fordyce and British POW B. James, however, place the figure as low as 500.[164] Irrespective of the exact number of prisoners involved, it is clear that Bushell motivated the men to

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[159] Interview with Dowse, reel 7.

[160] B. Green, First witness Testimony in Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, 29 May 1944, p.4, TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121; A. Poynter, Second Witness, Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry held to Investigate the Shootings of Air Force Personnel at Stalag Luft III, assembled at R.A.F. Station Weeton on 29 May 1944, p.6, TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121; A. McDonald, Third Witness, Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry held to Investigate the Shootings of Air Force Personnel at Stalag Luft III assembled at R.A.F. Station Weeton on 29 May 1944, p.8, TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121; Interim Report on the Investigation being made by the Military Department of the Judge Advocate General Office London, Part III, p.2; Statement by S/Ldr R. Abraham Officer I/C Clothing Stalag Luft III (Sagan), pp.1-6; Extract of Mr Eden Foreign Secretary to the House of Common, TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.198.

[161] Various Members of Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X", p.25.

[162] Interview with Churchill, reel 4.

[163] Mulligan, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1. For reference to the number of Australian officers involved see Dr. Lehner, Protecting Power Inspection Report, Stalag Luft III, visited on 26 July 1943, p.1, TNA: PRO: WO224/63A.

[164] James, 'The Second World War Memoirs of Squadron Leader BA James', p.110; Interview with Fordyce, tape 6; P. Brickhill in M. Winston (ed.), *Spotlight on Stalag Luft III: Souvenir by Editorial Staff of Scangriff The Newspaper of Stalag Luft III*, (London: Ramsden Williams Printers, 1946), p.7.

become part of his escape 'lifestyle.'[165] Most prisoners in North Compound, then, endowed Bushell with leadership legitimacy.

Australian POW Geoff Cornish, who held a high ranking position in Bushell's escape organisation, was one of his greatest admirers. In an interview with the Imperial War Museum, Cornish explained that he believed Bushell 'was brave and cunning. He was the ideal type.'[166] Other prisoners called him their 'leading light,'[167] 'tower of strength,'[168] 'legendary mastermind of escape'[169] and labelled him as a 'genius.'[170] British POW, Alan Burgess, echoed Cornish's praise: 'Bushell was a man of prodigious and uncommon talent, [he had] extraordinary leadership in captivity and enduring courage.'[171]

The recollections of Jack Rae, Patrick Welch, L. Hall, B. James and Sydney Dowse infer that, from their point of view, Bushell's authoritarian persona was essential for his escape scheme to have any hope of working.[172] Although Bushell was not the positional leader in North Compound, these men believed in his escape scheme and Bushell's need to have absolute control over all escape activities in a rigorously disciplined operation for it to have any chance of working. The fact that these prisoners accepted Bushell's authoritarian leadership style means they not only legitimised his leadership style, they also gave him their followership.

Other prisoners' views of Bushell were less fulsome. According to Flekser 'Rodger's [sic] autocratic manner attracted a lot of flak'[173] from prisoners who had little or no knowledge about his escape plan. British POW Maurice Driver knew the details of Bushell's scheme, but he believed that the number of prisoners that Bushell wanted to

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[165] Interview with Churchill, reel 2.
[166] Interview with Cornish, reel 2.
[167] Interview with R. Lamb by C. Wood for the IWM on 2 March 1981, reel 3, IWM 4809.
[168] Interview with E. Chapman by C. Wood for the IWM on 2 December 1990, reel 2, IWM 11194.
[169] Flekser, 'Operations', p.34. This description is also used by L. Hall. See Hall, untitled writings, p.9.
[170] Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.48, 75.
[171] Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.173.
[172] Interview with Cassie, reels 17-18; Interview with Dowse, reel 4; Interview with Hall, reel 4; Interview with James, reel 5; Interview with Rae, reel 6; Interview with P. Welch by C. Wood for the IWM on 22 March 1989, reel 2, IWM 10643.
[173] Flekser, 'Operations', p.39. For reference to this secrecy policy see Interview with Fordyce, tapes 2 and 6; Interview with Royle, reel 3; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.174, 233, 236.

escape was 'ludicrous', and as a result he 'was not too interested'.[174] Driver also believed that Bushell's authoritarian leadership style was not only unrealistic but was also an unwelcome presence. 'He must have got things done but I didn't have anything to do with him. He didn't inspire me with anything except to distaste [sic].'[175] Bryett was also critical of Bushell's leadership style, saying in his interview,

> He was a very testosterone man who said very little [and] who always looked rather grumpy and irritable. He didn't communicate with anyone at all unless he was directly talking to them and then he was just asking them questions to which he was wanted the answer and that was the end of it.[176]

New Zealand Prisoner Jack Rae carefully chose his words when he described Bushell. 'He left the impression of being relatively, I would not use the impression of arrogant, I am not putting him down. He was just a super confident man with a strong personality.'[177] Clearly, there were some men in the compound who either did not like Bushell as an individual, or saw his escape plan as grandiose. But these were a minority. Bushell's followership was strong and extensive, but as an emergent leader, it was still restricted because of his rank.

Bushell approached Day about what he saw as a potential security threat posed by one of the prisoners, Byrne. According to Day's biographer, Sydney Smith, Bushell was blunt in his suggestion as to how the matter should be handled: 'This man Byrne must be eliminated, bumped off if necessary. He is too friendly with Von Massow. He will sell the tunnel for a repatriation. It's a completely unacceptable risk. He has to be got rid of!'[178] Not surprisingly, Day refused Bushell's solution. As a positional leader, Day had to maintain a careful balance between his intelligence and escape activities and his duty as SBO to protect the welfare of his formal group. As an emergent leader, Bushell had no such responsibilities to consider. He had a single leadership goal – escape.

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[174] Interview with Driver reel 10.
[175] *ibid*.
[176] Interview with Bryett, reel 12.
[177] Interview with Rae, reel 6.
[178] R. Bushell cited in Smith, *Wings Day*, p.145.

Despite the fact that he motivated many men to share his vision of a mass escape, the driving motivation for Bushell was always a personal one: a hatred of the Germans and his own escape. Cornish recalled that Bushell 'loathed the Germans. Absolutely and utterly.'[179] Flekser agreed, describing Bushell as a 'cold, aloof man …wholly dedicated to escape, and consumed by his hatred of the Germans.'[180] The importance of his own escape is clearly reflected in the final preparations made for the Great Escape.

Just as he had at Dulag Luft, in organising the Great Escape Bushell ensured that he gave himself every advantage that he possibly could to increase his chances of making a successful escape. He had a range of forged documents and a sophisticated escape kit. He was also to be one of the first men to escape.

The escapers were selected by a somewhat complicated process. Bushell personally selected escapers numbered 1 to 30.[181] These were men who he considered were the most likely to make a successful escape, and presumably men who would not impact adversely on his chances of successfully escaping. These prisoners became the first tiered escapers. Amongst the prisoners, they were called the 'VIPs.'[182] The next 40 escapers, however, were decided by ballot.[183] To be eligible, a prisoner had to be considered by the escape committee to be one of the 'forty most prominent workers.'[184] Then the names of the remaining prisoners who worked on the escape scheme were put into ballot for the fourth group and so on until a planned number of 200 had been reached. The second and subsequent groups of escapers were considered less likely to succeed and as a result, were allocated the more risky escape plans. For example Australian Horace Fordyce, who won the ballot to become escaper number 86, was told he had to be a 'hard-arser'.[185] This meant his escape plan was to walk,

[179] Interview with Cornish, reel 2.
[180] Flekser, 'Operations', p.45
[181] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.45; Interview with Fordyce, tape 8.
[182] Interview with Fordyce, tape 8.
[183] *ibid*.
[184] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.45. For further reference to the ballot system see Interview with Fordyce, tape 8; Interview with Nelson, reel 2; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, pp.282-283.
[185] Interview with Fordyce, tapes 2, 8.

mainly at night. He had little German and was only equipped with the most basic equipment and papers.

The use of a ballot system, after Bushell had chosen the first 30, suggests that Bushell realised that he risked losing leadership legitimacy if he denied the opportunity to escape to the men who had worked on his scheme. The evidence suggests that he fully cooperated with a process that contradicted his leadership style. Yet, it is also probable that Bushell cooperated with the democratic election process of the other escapers because he knew that it would not adversely impact upon his own ability to escape. Bushell had ensured that he had done everything possible to give himself the best chance to escape. It was now up to him alone to succeed in his task. His leadership legitimacy was, therefore, no longer his pressing concern.

Bushell's image post World War Two

In his study of Stalag Luft III, historian Arthur Durand suggests that Bushell's leadership inspired the men of North Compound to realise a collective vision: 'No other camp activity so exhibited the prisoners' ingenuity, dedication and sense of community spirit and purpose.'[186] This thesis argues that instead this was in fact a by-product of Bushell's personal goals: his own escape, which in turn was his form of revenge on the Gestapo.

Durand agrees that Bushell's motivation for his escape scheme was revenge for the treatment he received at the hands of the Gestapo after he was arrested in Czechoslovakia.[187] As noted earlier, both Cornish and Flesker commented on his hatred of the enemy. Alan Burgess described Bushell as a 'hard man, resolute, tough, coldly determined [and] driven relentlessly by his own emotional imperatives.'[188] Only one prisoner thought of the consequences of Bushell's Great Escape. Thomas Nelson thought that Bushell's leadership contributed to his own death and the deaths

[186] Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, p.282.
[187] *ibid*., p.287.
[188] Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.4.

of his fellow escapers.[189] Yet even then, Nelson tempered his criticism of Bushell by arguing that greater consideration should have been given by all prisoners to the potential consequences of a mass escape.[190] In all the other sources examined, however, Bushell is not blamed for the executions that followed his mass escape. Instead he is lauded as hero. Hall proclaimed that Bushel's 'name had become a legend as the chief planner and leader of the great escape [sic].'[191] Flesker believed that 'Stalag Luft III became synonymous with Roger Bushell [who was] the genius architect of the great escape.'[192] Burgess judged Bushell as 'a man of prodigious and uncommon talent, extraordinary leadership in captivity and enduring courage.'[193] The execution of Bushell and other members of the Great Escape has led to the unquestioning reverence of many for Bushell.

The popular memory of the Great Escape is also based on Bushell's ability to transform passive prisoners into men who participated in his complex multi-layered escape organisation. Yet, this is not really Bushell's achievement: it was Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day's. Bushell, in fact, only extended Day's model to suit his particular vision with none of the responsibilities for the wider security and safety of the prisoners borne by leaders such as Day. Yet in the aftermath of the executions, Day's contribution has largely been forgotten. Instead, in death, Bushell has been transformed from an authoritarian leader who was obsessed with his personal escape to the point where he willing put other prisoners' safety at risk into a prisoner who selflessly planned and led the largest number prisoners to escape captivity within Greater Germany.

[189] Interview with Nelson, reel 4.
[190] *ibid*.
[191] Hall, untitled writings, p.8.
[192] Flekser, 'Operations', p.33.
[193] Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.173.

TRANFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Stalag Luft I Barth 1941.

On Christmas Day 1941, British and Commonwealth Air Force officers gathered outside Wing Commander Melville Arbuthnot Day's barracks.[1] *The men were in good spirits, having consumed their fill of homemade beer. The men cheered as Day greeted them. Then, with his cap on backwards, and with the men's help, he climbed on the back of the compound's wooden handcart that was used to transport Red Cross Parcels. The men then took it turns to tow Day around the perimeter compound, stopping at each German sentry box. Once in position, with his men crowded around him, Day led his men in serenading the German guards with a medley of 'A life on the Ocean Wave', 'When I die', 'Tipperary' and 'the Red Flag.'*[2] *This incident reveals the unique ability of Day to inspire his men to forget, even for a short time that they were captives of the enemy, on a day which should have been spent surrounded by loved ones. Day's ability to do this is indicative of the unique level of followership he acquired as their positional leader.*

In 1978, James Burns coined the term transformational leadership to explain the ability of some leaders to influence their followers to such an extent that they willingly accepted the leader's directive to change the group's purpose.[3] For such a fundamental change to occur, Burns argued that each group member had to be motivated to change their personal perceptions of their role in the group.

Burns' concept was built on the work of other leadership scholars who were trying to identify the precise qualities a leader needed to have such a significant impact on his or her followers. Some leadership scholars had turned to psychologists, such as Lawrence Kolherg, to understand why some leaders were able to influence the moral and ethical views of their group members to such an extent that they were willing to change the group's purpose.[4] Leadership scholars who pursued this line of enquiry came up with concept of leadership courage.[5] Richard Daft, in an overview of this field of scholarship, argued that the core of leadership courage was moral leadership. These leaders guided their groups by using a personal sense of what they thought was

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[1] Smith, *Wing Day*, p.93.
[2] *ibid*.
[3] Burns, 'Leadership and Followership,' pp.221-226; Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.147-149.
[4] L. Kolberg, 'Moral Stages and Moralisation in Cognitive Development Approach', in T. Likona (ed.), *Moral Development and Behaviour: Theory, Research and Social Issues*, (Austin: Rinehart and Winston, 1976), pp.31-53. For reference to leadership studies which focus on a leaders moral and ethical values and their ability to change these values in their group members see J. Graham, 'Leadership, Moral Development and Citizens,' *Business Ethics Quarterly*, vol. 5 no.1, January 1999, pp.43-49; J. Weber, 'Exploring the Relationship between Personal Values and Moral Reasoning,' *Human Relations*, vol.46, no. 4, April 1993, pp.435-463.
[5] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.219-227.

right, regardless of the personal consequences to their reputation or position. They did so in the hope that they could 'achieve something about which [they] care[d] deeply.'[6] Moral leaders, therefore, acted with a sense of higher purpose for the betterment of their group members.

Other leadership scholars believed that leaders possessing charismatic qualities enabled them to change the views and roles of their group members. Scholars such as Katherine Klein, Robert House and Jane Howell advocated that leaders endowed with this remarkable, but largely undefinable, quality were able to convince their followers that the group had to establish a new purpose and goal based on the leader's vision.[7] As Richard Daft argues, 'Charismatic leaders create an atmosphere of change and articulate an idealised vision of a future that is significantly better than what now exists.'[8] Charismatic leaders, like leaders defined as having moral leadership, also took risks to demonstrate the worthiness of their leadership vision. This risk taking behaviour, combined with their influential and infectious personality, allowed them to gain the trust and respect of their group members who accepted their leader's change in the direction of the group's purpose and goal.

Burns' transformational leadership theory combined these. He argued, 'Transforming leadership ultimately becomes moral in that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical inspirations of both leaders and led, this has a transforming effect on both.'[9] According to this theory, the moral concerns of the leader elevate the concerns of the group members beyond their own personal needs to that of a larger purpose. American and British military leadership scholars have been particularly interested in Burns' theory. Using the trait approach described in Chapter 1, they have tried to determine if it is possible to teach transformational leadership, or establish if it is a leadership style that can only be applied by leaders who have particular innate qualities, and who find themselves in the right contextual setting to allow their group

[6] *ibid*., p.219.
[7] R. House and J. Howell, 'Personality and Charismatic Leadership', *Leadership Quarterly*, vol.3, no.2, 1992, pp.81-108; Klein and House, 'On Fire', pp.183-198; J. O'Connor et al, 'Charismatic Leaders and Destructiveness: A Historiometric Study', *Leadership Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 4, 1995, pp.529-555.
[8] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, p.145.
[9] Burns,' Leadership and Followership,' p.223.

members to accept a change in the group's purpose.[10] No conclusive answer has been found.

British Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day matches Burns' model of the transformational leader. Day, captured by the Germans when he bailed out over the Ruhr Valley, endured all but the first weeks of the war as a prisoner of the Germans.[11] Throughout his six years in captivity Day struggled to cope with his status as a POW. Feelings of helplessness and enforced idleness were compounded by the genuine fear that he had left his wife and children, who lived on the south English coast, vulnerable to being attacked by the enemy.[12] Yet, he was also driven by the belief that, even as a POW, he could still assist the British war effort.

Day's transfer into Luftwaffe custody on 18 December 1939 signalled the start of his active approach to his role in captivity.[13] From Dulag Luft, the interrogation camp in which all newly captured air force personnel started their captive experience, Day's gregarious personality allowed him to advocate to his men that they could still contribute to the war effort. Under the direction of careful leadership, from behind the wire, Day organised his men into groups who planned and participated in coordinated escapes, while also gathering intelligence that could be communicated back to Intelligence School 9 (IS9), a branch of British Intelligence.[14] Day established this escape and intelligence organisation in Stalag Luft's I (Barth), III (Sagan) and Oflag XXIB (Schubin).[15] Some of Day's formal group members were transferred by the

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[10] For example see C. Buckingham, 'Ethics and the Senior Officer,' in L. Matthews and D. Brown (eds.), *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 1989), pp.135-142; P. Lewis et al, 'Defining Character in Military Leaders,' in L. Matthews and D. Brown (eds.), *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 1989), pp.122-127; Stockdale, 'Educating Leaders', pp.67-69; M. Wakin, 'Ethics of Leadership,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach, *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp.50-64; A. Zaleznik, The Leadership Gap,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach, *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp.89-94.
[11] H. Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, no. 05175, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO344/87/1; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.20-21.
[12] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.56.
[13] Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.3.
[14] R. Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, 27 June 1945, Appendix Z.D, p.6, TNA:PRO:WO208/3245.
[15] Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.73-102.

Germans to other POW camps. These men took Day's ideas with them. In this way, Day's leadership vision spread beyond his own camps and effectively transformed air force POWs and some army POWs into active participants of the war effort, despite their POW status.

Day escaped himself four times, but after his escape from Stalag Luft III on 24 March 1944, he was captured by the Luftwaffe and sent to Berlin for interrogation.[16] After a preliminary investigation Day was transferred to Sachsehausen concentration camp. Despite the extremity of his new location, Day retained his leadership style and goal.[17] Here Day found four RAF men and some Russian military POWs.[18] Together with his men he started planning, then digging, a tunnel for an escape. After successfully breaking out of the camp, Day was quickly recaptured by the Gestapo. This time he was sent to the death block at Sachsehausen concentration camp. According to his biographer, fellow POW Sydney Smith, Day explained to his interrogators the reason for his zealous commitment to escape:

> I am a professional solider. My father became a distinguished administrator. My grandfathers and their father were soldiers and sailors. One of them was decorated by Queen Victoria with the Victoria Cross, the equivalent to your 'pour le merite' a long time before any of your fathers were born. I have served in two world wars. In this war I requested and obtained transfer from the staff in order to lead a squadron in the air. At the very beginning …I was shot down and became a prisoner. Death would have been preferable. Since then I have been vegetating without hope, except that of escape to help my country. My proper place is in their ranks. I am a Royal Air Force Officer. Do you not understand what that means? I am not a spy, nor a partisan, nor a saboteur. My professional honour as well as my pride, my ambition too, if you like, has always forced me to return to the fight.[19]

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[16] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942 – January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.57; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.148-160; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.196.
[17] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.180-192.
[18] Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.174.
[19] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.195-196.

Day coped with six years in captivity because he believed that his leadership goal meant that he was still, in some way, contributing to the war effort. His fellow prisoners, wanting to feel something other than being redundant, believed in his vision. They adapted their daily routines to achieve Day's vision, but not before Day's personal behaviour in Dulag Luft, which included a close relationship with the Commandant, had been questioned by his fellow POWs.[20] Day overcame those suspicions and, in time, gave his men a sense of purpose, gaining their respect and loyal followership.

[20] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.60.

CHAPTER 5: WING COMMANDER HARRY MELVILLE ARBUTHNOT DAY

On Friday 13 September 1939, with the war less than two weeks old, British Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day voluntarily led the 57th RAF squadron's first mission over Germany.[1] He was an officer of 23 years standing, and the recipient of the Albert Medal in the First World War.[2] Despite protests from senior officers, and while personally considering the mission nothing less than suicidal, Day felt compelled to lead by example. According to his biographer Sydney Smith, Day's reasons were clear-cut: 'Yes Sir, I think it is most necessary that I should go on this trip. I think my pilots want a bit of a boost and if I palm this one off on some junior officer, well, it's not a very good lead.'[3] Day did not return from the mission. German air defences forced him to bail out over the Ruhr Valley.[4] The prospect of spending the duration in captivity almost broke him.[5] However, Day found a purpose in captivity in the way he interpreted his role as a positional leader. Along with other POW leaders, the physical and psychological wellbeing of his men, based on the goal of collective survivorship and endurance, was important to him. However, the relatively stable conditions in Stalag Luft officer compounds allowed Day to construct a very different positional leadership goal: Day wanted his men to remain active participants in the war effort in two ways, by providing intelligence to IS9 in London and by planning and executing escape activities.[6]

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[1] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.9-19.
[2] In the First World War Day served as a royal marine. He received an Albert Medal for rescuing two crew members from the ship's wardroom after it was torpedoed. Smith alleges that Day remarked he had been looking to rescue the bar keys. For reference to Day's award and his remark see Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.11.
[3] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.11.
[4] Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.20-21.
[5] For reference to Day's psychological response to captivity see Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.4; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.27-30, 33-34, 38, 61, 86-88; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.8.
[6] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-6; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.1-8; H. Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x1304, draft, ff.1-2, TNA:PRO:WO208/5439. For reference to the conditions in Stalag Luft Officer Compounds being relatively comfortable see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.1-2; Naville, Protecting Power Inspection Report on Stalag Luft III, 22-24 February, pp.2-3.

Day's leadership history and legitimacy

From November 1939 to March 1943, by virtue of his rank, Day served as SBO in five camps. These camps were: Oflag IXA Spangenberg (1 November 1939-18 December 1939), Dulag Luft Oberursel (18 December 1939-5 May 1941), Stalag Luft I Barth (5 May 1941-April 1942), Stalag Luft III East and North Compounds Sagan (April 1942-October 1942, March 1943-March 1944), and Oflag XXIB Schubin (October 1942-March 1943).[7] In these camps Day forged a relationship with his formal group based on his leadership goals of intelligence gathering and escape. However, this only occurred after Day made an almost catastrophic mistake at Dulag Luft.

After capture, Day was transferred on 1 October 1939 to Oflag IXA, a castle at Spangenburg.[8] It housed mixed British and French army and air force prisoners. Here Day became SBO for the first time. Smith's biography of Day reveals that at this early stage of his captive experience, Day was unsure as to what the position entailed and how to interact with the captor. Initially, Day declined any privileges as SBO, believing that by doing so he might forge a connection with the growing number of mixed military personnel from Britain and the Commonwealth who had been taken prisoner.[9] In his interactions with the Germans, Day mostly presented a united front with his French counterpart.[10] Together they presented their complaints to the Commandant: the lack of mail, Red Cross parcels and reading material. They also criticised the restrictions the German guards placed on the prisoners, as they were not allowed to move freely about the castle. These discussions did not yield any significant results. Day's relations with the Commandant may have been strained because he did not even learn the Commandant's name.[11] Basically, his positional leadership was passive.

This changed when, on 18 December 1939, Day was transferred to Dulag Luft at Oberursel, an interrogation camp for new prisoners before they were sent to other

[7] Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.30, 47, 73, 75-76, 96-97, 109.
[8] This camp was later named Oflag XIA. For reference to Day's tenure at these camps see Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.27-34.
[9] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.34.
[10] *ibid*., pp.30-31.
[11] *ibid*., p.30.

camps.[12] Day spent 15 months in this Luftwaffe camp.[13] The Germans planned Day's long tenure. Commandant Rumpel had selected him to be the permanent SBO. In contrast to Oflag IXA, Day was comfortable in this camp. Along with his staff, he lived in permanent quarters and received privileges beyond those given to the prisoners who moved through the camp en route to other camps.[14] These privileges were significant. They included an endless supply of Red Cross parcels, regular dinner parties hosted by Commandant Rumpel in his quarters and, under guard, Day and his staff enjoyed parole walks and were allowed to attend Church. In the winter months, Day and his staff even went skiing with the German officers. Clearly, Day had formed a close relationship with the German staff at Dulag Luft.

In his post-war questionnaire, Day explained the thinking behind this relationship. His objective of apparently cooperating with the captor was to 'lull the Detaining Power into a sense of security [through] friendliness and cooperation within limits [that] can be adopted.'[15] What he was actually doing was leading the planning for an escape. Therefore Day readily accepted the concessions given to him and his staff by Rumpel because they facilitated his planning. Rumpel also had his own agenda. He hoped that the comforts he provided Day and his men would entice them to talk.[16] In this way he hoped to gain strategic information about the RAF.

Over a period of about nine months, Day and his staff dug a tunnel that would lead them out of their permanent quarters, under the camp fence and into the adjoining forest.[17] During the construction of the tunnel, Day and his men continued to ostensibly cooperate with the German staff, and this allowed them to secure contraband items from the guards that were needed to complete the escape attempt.[18] These included maps of the district and railway timetables. Day also used his parole walks to draw a map of the area and scout the best possible route for the escapers once

[12] Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.3.
[13] Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1.
[14] For an overview of the conditions experienced by the permanent POW staff at Dulag Luft see Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.100; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.34-72.
[15] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1.
[16] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.100; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.45, 58.
[17] Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, p.78; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.56- 65; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.13.
[18] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, p.11.

they had left the tunnel.[19] There was, however, one significant flaw in Day's plan. For the sake of secrecy and keeping up appearances with the Dulag Luft staff, only his permanent staff knew the reason why they were seemingly cooperating with the Germans.[20] This meant the overwhelming majority of prisoners who passed through Dulag Luft only saw Day and his staff on friendly terms with the Germans. The consequences would be significant.

As the SBO in Dulag Luft, Day was responsible for POWs during their most vulnerable period, that is, when they were coming to terms with their captive status and were being interrogated by the Luftwaffe staff. The interrogation methods used by the Luftwaffe were mostly psychological. Prisoners were held in isolation cells and then, when they were led into the interrogation rooms, they were asked to fill in a fake Red Cross form, designed to trick the prisoners into providing information about their mission and training.[21] The Luftwaffe interrogators also used a variety of techniques to start, and then keep, the prisoners talking. For example, they would engage the prisoner in discussions about their homes, families and interests and then, once the prisoner was comfortable talking to them, the interrogators would slip in questions about their squadron, weapons and mission.[22] In his examination of these techniques on American Air Force prisoners, David Foy found that some POWs fell for these ploys.[23]

For the prisoners who proved to be more resistant, there were two other strategies the Luftwaffe interrogators used. These men were told that their crewmembers had already told the Luftwaffe interrogators all they needed to know, which meant that the prisoners felt little guilt in answering the questions.[24] If this did not work, a Luftwaffe officer, posing as a POW, could be placed in their cell. The officer then persuaded the POW, whose defences were down, to share his story.[25]

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[19] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.45.
[20] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1.
[21] Herrington, *Air Power over Europe 1944-1945*, p.474; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.250.
[22] Foy, *For You the War is Over*, pp.55-56; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, pp.250-251.
[23] Foy, *For You the War is Over*, p.55-56.
[24] Rolf, *Prisoners of the Reich*, p.23.
[25] A. Barker, *Behind Barbed Wire*, (London: B.T. Batsford, 1974), p.64; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.251.

After interrogation, the prisoners were moved into the transit area of the camp.[26] Here they observed Day and his staff interact with the Germans. These men had just endured interrogation, were trying to overcome their sense of failure at becoming a prisoner and knew nothing of Day's motivations. What they saw was an SBO and his staff, comfortably quartered and the recipients of privileges, on friendly terms with the enemy. They saw this as nothing less than a betrayal of the British war effort.[27]

What made matters worse was that as the SBO of Dulag Luft, Day was responsible for distributing Red Cross parcels.[28] In 1940/1941, when the delivery of these essential food parcels broke down, some of the prisoners accused Day of hoarding their food supply.[29] This claim, combined with his behaviour at Dulag Luft, led to the prisoners accusing Day of being a collaborator. The prisoners lodged their complaint with the British Air Ministry in London, and the Ministry ordered an official inquiry into his behaviour.[30] The accusation tormented Day.[31] In his repatriated questionnaire, Day reflected on how he managed to get himself into that position.

> [If there is] too much friendliness and cooperation [with the captor] the morale of the camp [is low] and [it] results in a lack of discipline with many of the ps/w [sic] who do not know what is going on and they lose confidence in their leaders.[32]

Once he knew of the allegations, Day realised that the only way to prove that his cooperation with the Germans was subterfuge was executing the planned escape.[33] On

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[26] H. Clarke, C. Burgess and R. Braddon, *Prisoners of War*, (Sydney: Time-Life Books in association with John Ferguson, 1988), p.24; Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.16-17; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.43.
[27] D. Luddock, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, no.52738, pp.1, 3, TNA:PRO:WO344/191/1; Ferres, 'My "Guest Speaker" talk to the (men's) Beecroft Probus Club," p.9; Interview with Driver, reel 7.
[28] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.60.
[29] For example of the prisoners suspicions against Day see Lubbock, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1, 3; Ferres, My "Guest Speaker" talk to the (men's) Beecroft Probus Club, p.9; James, 'The Second World War Memoirs of Squadron Leader B.A. James', p.42; Interview with Driver, reel 7; Richardson, *Man is Not Lost*, p.192; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.60-61, 73-74.
[30] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.60, 74-75.
[31] *ibid*., pp.60-61. In Stalag Luft I, after he had cleared his name Day suffered a mental breakdown, which manifested itself in paralysis of the face. See Smith, *Wings Day*, p.88.
[32] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.3.
[33] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.61.

the first weekend in June 1941, Day, along with 17 of his permanent staff, escaped from Dulag Luft.[34] It was the first mass escape from any POW camp in Germany.[35] Day remained on the run for only one night. [36] He was captured the next day only about an hour and half away from the camp. Despite his failure, Day believed that his escape attempt validated his behaviour at Dulag Luft.

Following his recapture, Day was transferred to Stalag Luft I at Barth.[37] As the highest ranked officer in this camp, Day continued in his role as SBO. He brought with him an understanding of his mistake at Dulag Luft. In captivity, rank alone no longer mattered when it came to leadership legitimacy and authority.[38] Instead, prisoners made judgements about the legitimacy of their rank leaders based purely on their observed behaviour. In this way, prisoners determined who they would or would not follow. Rank, therefore, was not enough to retain leadership legitimacy. Day also observed a related issue raised in earlier chapters in this thesis: that the men, once they became POWs, felt that they 'were not subject to military discipline and, therefore, each man began to act as he thought fit'.[39]

In essence, Day realised that effective leadership in captivity depended on earning and retaining the trust of his formal group, which, in turn, encouraged discipline. As a result, in Stalag Luft I, Stalag Luft III East and North Compounds and at Oflag XXIB, Day did his utmost to ensure that his men were looked after by their officers and were protected against the Germans and the frustration generated by their status as prisoners. For example, at Stalag Luft III North Compound, Day intervened to stop the growing power of two enterprising POWs who had established a compound trading

[34] One Australian prisoner was involved in the preparation phase of this escape but he did not participate in the actual escape. See Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.103; Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, pp.78-79; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.34-35.
[35] The Germans defined a mass escape as an escape involving five to seven men. See Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.5.
[36] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.70-71.
[37] Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1. For reference to the escape attempt see Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, pp.78-79; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.103; Vance, *A Gallant Company*, pp.34-35.
[38] Day's repatriation questionnaire has this date as 5 May 1941. This however, is impossible. He did not escape from Dulag Luft until first weekend in June. This meant that Day confused his months on his repatriation questionnaire and meant that he left Dulag Luft on 5 June 1941 and arrived on 5 June 1941. See Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.8.
[39] *ibid*.

racket, popularly known as 'foodacco.'[40] Day announced a referendum in the camp. The question to be decided: should foodacco be 'nationalised'. According to British POW Kingsley Brown what followed was 'a spirited campaign on both sides.'[41] The vote was a resounding no. Irrespective of his referendum loss, as SBO and for the good of the compound, Day ordered that foodacco be nationalised. Day reasoned with the men that in this way, there would be no monopoly on supplementary food items, which were becoming more important as the German ration decreased and the weekly issue of parcels were now shared amongst prisoners.[42] While his decision was not popular amongst those prisoners who were making a substantial profit in cigarettes (the replacement currency for money) other men realised that Day's intervention was necessary to ensure that all men experienced the same standard of living in the compound.[43]

Day extended his SBO duties beyond his formal group. As explained in the Introduction, air force NCOs were forbidden to work by the Germans, but they also received less pay from the captor than air force officers.[44] Knowing this, Day tried his utmost to also ensure that the British/Commonwealth Air Force NCOs were as comfortable as possible in the camps in which he was held. At Stalag Luft I, Day established a special fund for them.[45] The money was deducted from the officers' pay and managed by Flight Lieutenants Bob Stark and John Gilles who were also chartered accountants.[46] The money collected was then given to the MOC of NCO Air Force compounds. Initially these funds were used to fund leisure activities, such as

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[40] Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.138. For reference to this incident see Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, pp.138-139.
[41] K. Brown cited in Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.138.
[42] Red Cross parcels were essential to supplement the German ration. As the war dragged on the German ration diminished and Red Cross parcels, which had once been plentiful, arrived less frequently. From mid-1944 in Stalag Luft III, only half a Red Cross parcel issued to each man once a week. By January 1945, prisoners were sharing one parcel between four men. See S. Charleswilliam, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no. A.408098, 19 June 1945, p.1, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 11; A. Rightetti, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no. A.401151, 28 June 1945, p.1, AWM54 779/4/129 Part 3; Codd, 'Blue Job Brown Job,' p.140; Maddock, 'Memories,' pp.94, 106; G. Moulton-Barrett, unpublished and untitled writings, p.7, IWM 90/18/1
[43] For reference to the unpopularity of Day's decision see Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, pp.138-139.
[44] Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, pp.206-207; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.260.
[45] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound,p.13; G. Naville, Protecting Power Inspection Report Stalag Luft I, 22 February 1943, pp.8-9, TNA:PRO:AIR2/6366.
[46] Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, p.84.

paying for musical instruments and sports equipment.[47] Smith, Day's biographer, explains that later in the war this money was also used for the 'bribery [of German guards], obtaining German currency, wireless components, films and other articles for escape activities.'[48] This fund continued to operate within Stalag Luft I and was introduced to Stalag Luft III upon Day's transfer to that camp.[49] In his interviews with Protecting Power representatives and Commandant Von Lindeiner in Stalag Luft III, Day constantly petitioned for better conditions for air force NCOs, particularly those who were being held in the Air Force Compound at Stalag VIIIB.[50]

Day also worked to ensure that amicable relations were maintained between British and American air force officers. For example, in Stalag Luft III, the British and American prisoners received different pay rates, with the British worse off.[51] Day brokered a deal with the American Air Force Colonels Delmar Spivey and Charles Goodrich where the Americans agreed to use their extra funds to pay for purchases for the British canteen.[52] Prisoners in both compounds therefore received the same amount of foodstuffs and personal pay. Day also negotiated for the British and American officers to share a communal Red Cross clothing pool, which meant that all of the air force officers in Stalag Luft III, regardless of their nationality, received essential items of clothing from the clothing pool.[53]

Initially, Day capitalised on the good will that he had earned by escaping from Dulag Luft to build followership.[54] He and his men explained to the formal group at Stalag Luft I how they had managed to pull off the mass escape of 18 prisoners. Then, after his prisoners understood the instrumental role he played in planning this escape, including the reason for his behaviour with the Germans in Dulag Luft, Day introduced his men to his leadership goals: intelligence and escape.

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[47] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.85.
[48] *ibid*.
[49] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, p.13.
[50] H. Massey, Recommendation of Wing Commander H.M.A Day, A.M, 4 July 1945, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:AIR40/1489; Naville, Protecting Power Inspection Report Stalag Luft I, 22 February 1943, p.1.
[51] Foy, *For You the War is Over*, p.206.
[52] *ibid*.
[53] Senior American Officer, Report 1 September 1943, p.1, TNA:PRO:AIR40/266.
[54] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.74-75.

Day's leadership style

As an SBO Day launched an active campaign against his captors centred on intelligence and escape.[55] Day laid the foundation for his leadership goals and style at Dulag Luft and Stalag Luft I. Then over time, at Stalag Luft III and Oflag XXIB, as a result of his men's faith in his genuine intentions, and Day's refusal to remain a passive prisoner, organising intelligence and escape activities grew to become the defining response of air force officers to their captive state.[56]

Intelligence

When Day was taken prisoner, he quickly realised that he had to establish a way to communicate with the British military or intelligence departments. He wanted to do this for two very different reasons. Firstly, Day wanted to remain a part of the war effort as a means of coping with his imprisonment.[57] The second reason reflected his sense of duty clearly evident in his explanation for leading the operation that led to his capture. As an air force officer, Day had listened to the lectures on his responsibilities if he became a POW.[58] These included writing coded letters back home to the British intelligence department, which might in some small way assist in military operations. However, he faced one significant problem: he had not learned how to write in code.[59] So in Dulag Luft, as prisoners passed through the transit compound, Day asked them if anyone had learned how to write in code. Day found one, a British Sergeant Pilot, who had learnt this skill.[60]

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[55] *ibid*., p.82.

[56] For reference to prisoner who held this view see R. Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, 27 June 1945, Appendix Z.A, pp.1-5, TNA:WO208/3245; Letter to D.D. T.G, from Air Force Liaison Officer MI9/I9, 29 August 1946, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2457; Massey, Recommendation of Wing Commander H.M.A Day, pp.1-2; Report on British Officer Ex-Prisoners of War Interned at Stalag Luft III, Germany, Dealing with the Receipt and Despatch of Messages to England, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:WO208/3245; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X" pp.4-5.

[57] This opinion is shared by POWs who knew Day. See Letter to D.D. T.G. from Air Liaison Officer MI9/I9,
pp.1-2; Interview with Dowse, reel 4; Burgess, *The Longest Tunnel*, p.4.

[58] Massey, Recommendation of Wing Commander H.M.A Day, p.1; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.6; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.97.

[59] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.44.

[60] *ibid*.

It was not until Day himself arrived at Stalag Luft I that an existing ad hoc approach to intelligence evolved into a systematic operation.[61] Day's decision to transform intelligence into a fully functioning operation was not a decision that he made alone. In Stalag Luft I, from late 1941, Day received special parcels from IS9, a branch of the British Directorate of Military Intelligence (MI9).[62] These parcels contained coded intelligence messages and escape aids. After he realised that these parcels were going to be a continual part of their captive experience, Day created an intelligence team amongst his formal group, which was based on a cell structure.[63] Each cell in his intelligence network was responsible for one particular intelligence activity and trusted prisoners were recruited to carry out each cell's activity.

The first layer of Day's intelligence cell network was responsible for ensuring that Day received IS9 parcels unopened.[64] For this task Day recruited prisoners to work in the parcels centre at the camp. These men were responsible for identifying and collecting IS9 parcels before the Germans guards took custody of them and either x-rayed them or physically searched them. In his special questionnaire on escape, Day explained that because so few German guards worked in the parcel centre and because they were often slack, the prisoners managed to slip most of these parcels past the Germans.[65] On some occasions, however, they failed. These parcels were then either confiscated, or the prisoners encouraged and sometimes manipulated friendly guards

[61] *ibid*., pp.83-84.
[62] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.3.
[63] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, pp.78-80; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-6; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.2-6; Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, Appendix Z.A, pp.1-2; R. Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, 27 June 1945, Appendix Z.E, pp.1-3, TNA:PRO:WO208/3245.
[64] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, pp.78-80; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-6; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.2-3; Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, Appendix Z.A, pp.1-2; Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, Appendix Z.E, pp.1-3.
[65] Day, Special Questionnaire for British American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.2-3.

to turn a blind eye and allow them to take these parcels away from the parcel centre without them being searched.[66]

To gather strategic information that might be useful to IS9, Day recruited prisoners to act as interrogation officers.[67] These men, led by Day himself, gathered information from two different sources. The first was the prisoners themselves. Interrogation officers interviewed all newly arrived POWs who entered the camp and any prisoners who were forced to return to the prison camp after a failed escape attempt. From 1942 until June 1943, these officers questioned not only British/Commonwealth Air Force officers, but with the consent of Senior American Officer Spivey, American Air Force officers.[68] All of the prisoners who were interviewed were asked questions to ascertain any relevant tactical observations that they had made on any aspect of the German war effort during their journey to the POW camp or during their time on the run.[69] In his special escape questionnaire, Day explained that the most useful intelligence that he and his officers gathered was from prisoners who had escaped on foot.[70] From these men, Day built up a working knowledge of the local area, procedures at railway stations and any other information they gained from conversing with civilians and even soldiers.

The second source of information was more problematic to collect. Day ordered a different group of German-speaking prisoners to establish a relationship with selected German guards and interpreters with the aim of cultivating them as sources of

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[66] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2; M. Marsh, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG, pp.1-4, Attached Report, TNA:PRO:WO208/3341; A. Ogilvie**,** Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x4843, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5445; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X," pp.25-26.

[67] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942- January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, p.64; Marsh, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.1-4;Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X", pp.15-17.

[68] Spivey agreed with Day that it was better for the Allies to have all their intelligence from air force prisoners originating from the same source. After June 1943, the Americans interrogated their own prisoners within their own compounds. See R. Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, 27 June 1945, Appendix Z.L, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3245.

[69] For a sample list of questions asked by the interrogation officers to POWs see R. Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, 27 June 1945, Appendix Z.D, pp.1-3, TNA:PRO:WO208/3245.

[70] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.6.

information.[71] These officers reported daily to the interrogation officer in charge of German sources who briefed them on what information they should focus on obtaining from their contact. For the most part, these officers were asked to find out about internal matters such as the movements of Commandant Von Lindeiner, the possibility of searches being conducted in the prisoners' quarters of the camp, any new security measures which the Germans had introduced to assist them in stopping prisoners from escaping and any other information that they thought was relevant.

In Stalag Luft III East Compound, these same prisoners were ordered by Day to deliver propaganda messages to their contacts.[72] Wing Commander R. Collard, who also wrote a weekly newssheet for all prisoners called the 'Plug', created these messages.[73] They were based on current news items, heard on the 'public' radio that was hidden by the prisoners.[74] Their purpose was to undermine the morale of the German guards with the hope that they would see the futility of the German war effort and, therefore, provide assistance to the POWs, particularly in their escape activities, which would stand them in good stead in the event of an Allied victory.

The continuity of German staff from Stalag Luft I to Stalag Luft III East and then North Compound helped the prisoners selected for this job establish friendly relationships with their allocated German guard or interpreter.[75] Over time some of these men were successful in exploiting these relationships. For example, Captain Hans Pieber, who was with the prisoners in Stalag Luft I and Stalag Luft III East and North Compounds, had been an aircraft designer in civilian life.[76] Over a cup of tea

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[71] W. Barrett, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/s/PG/LIB/183, p.3, TNA:PRO:WO208/5437; A. Featherstone, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIB/187, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5440; Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, Appendix Z.D, pp.4-5; Massey, First Witness Testimony in Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, p.1; Interview with Cornish, tape 2; Interview with Dowse, reel 5; Interview with Fordyce, tapes 2 and 7.
[72] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942- January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, pp.83-84.
[73] *ibid*., p.83.
[74] *ibid*. For reference to the existence of this radio see E. Wicks, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/1/2/140374, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3341; Interview with E. Fionette by C. Wood for the IWM in 1982, reel 2, IWM 6095.
[75] Interview with Cassie, reels 17, 22; Interview with Driver, reel 8; Interview with Royle, reel 5; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.76-78, 94-95, 127-128, 133.
[76] Kellet, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoner of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, Appendix Z.D, p.5.

with Day, Pieber provided intelligence on German aircraft, and according to intelligence reports from Stalag Luft III, 'valuable information of secret weapons.'[77] By the time of the Great Escape from Stalag Luft III North Compound in March 1944, Pieber had also given Day essential escape aids, such as maps, a camera and vital radio parts.[78] Other officers exploited their Germans contacts to find out other intelligence information, such as the location of factories, airfields, German troop movements, weapons and even air tactics.[79] Over time the same contacts were also used to help the prisoners in their escape attempts.[80] As Day had done with Pieber, the other intelligence officers convinced their German contacts to give them maps, information on the surrounding region, gate passes, money, cameras, civilian clothing, radio parts, uniform insignia and railway timetables.[81]

A fourth group of prisoners were charged by Day with another intelligence task. These men were responsible for watching aircraft that passed over the camp to try to ascertain which flights were for training purposes and which ones were genuine military missions.[82] Using this information, these men were then responsible for daily, weekly and monthly statistical analysis of their data. At the end of each month, these statistics were presented to the SBO in graph form. This information was then analysed to measure German aircraft traffic on a yearly basis. This information formed part of the intelligence that Day ordered to be passed on to IS9.

Once intelligence had been gathered by his officers, Day himself accumulated and evaluated the information and passed on what he believed was relevant information to a fifth group of prisoners. These men were code and letter writers.[83] Their task was to

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[77] *ibid*.
[78] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.128-129, 146.
[79] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942- January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, pp.78-79; R. Norman, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIB/179, p.1, TNA:PROWO208/5445.
[80] Massey, First Witness Testimony in Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, p.3; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.102.
[81] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.24; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-3; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.2, 5; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X", pp.15-18, 35-36.
[82] Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, Appendix Z.D, p.6.
[83] R. Churchill, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MISx-484, p.1, TNA:PROWO208/5438; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.4; Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in

apply a secret code to what looked like normal letters home to their families. Depending on the time delay between the prisoners sending their coded letters and British authorities receiving them, the information Day compiled was of some tactical use.[84] The fact that Day received coded letters in reply to the information sent from his camps, usually in the special parcels, confirms that his intelligence operations were taken seriously in London.[85]

Day's code writers also wrote coded messages that were sent between the prisoner compounds in Stalag Luft III and then between different POW camps.[86] These messages were usually placed inside personal cigarette parcels or were contained in letters addressed to brothers in another compound or camp. MO's letters and reports addressed to other MOs in other POW compounds or camps were also used to pass on these messages. At Stalag Luft III coded messages were also secretly passed between SBOs and MOCs when they attended meetings with the Commandant, or representatives from the Protecting Power or the Red Cross.[87] The purpose of these messages was twofold: to communicate progress in escape plans, particularly important for messages that were passed between compounds of the same camp, and more generally, to gain information regarding the welfare and movement of prisoners.

German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, Appendix Z.E, pp.1-6; R. Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, 27 June 1945, Appendix Z.F, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3245; D. Williams, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x4907, pp.1-4, TNA:PROWO208/5450.

[84] As the intelligence network in his camps developed, Day shared this task with R. Kellett. See R. Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, 27 June 1945, Appendix Z.C, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3245.

[85] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942- January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, p.59; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.3-6. The American POWs in Stalag Luft III also used the code developed by Day's officers. See Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, Appendix Z.L., pp.1-2.

[86] G. William, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MISx-92663, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5450.

[87] W. Holland, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x2160, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5441; B. Morris, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MISx4856, TNA:PRO:WO208/5444; D. Pincibeck, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MISx4875, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5446; S. Tuck, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MISx1004, p.1, TNA:PROWO208/5449.

The special parcels that Day's men collected and passed on to him increased their efficiency in communicating with IS9. In these parcels, the prisoner received typewriters, radio receivers and radio parts.[88] The contents of these parcels enabled Stalag Luft III North Compound to receive messages from IS9 on their radio from August 1943.[89] This radio was reserved for the use of intelligence officers only. The 'public radio' referred to earlier in East and then North Compound at Stalag Luft III was used for listening to the BBC news service.[90] The private radio also allowed Day's radio operators to collect intelligence from another source, coded messages from IS9 contacts living in Germany. This information, combined with information Day's intelligence network accumulated from other sources, was then passed on to IS9 through coded radio contact.

In his various camps, Day recruited at least five Australians to his intelligence network. In Stalag Luft I East Compound, Flight Lieutenants P. Roberts, A. Slater and A. McSweyn worked as code letter writers.[91] In Stalag Luft III North Compound, Wing Commander R. Norman secured supplies through his German contact and Flight Lieutenant J. Gordon became a member of the radio maintenance team.[92] It is probable that other Australians were also involved in other parts of Day's intelligence network, in particular the security operations, whose members provided warnings of approaching Germans to the intelligence officers when they were speaking to their assigned contact.

Day's relationship with his captors is one of the reasons that his intelligence officers were so successful in exploiting their assigned German contacts. In each of the Stalag

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[88] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.24.
[89] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.103-106; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.5; R. Standford-Tuck, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x1004, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5449; E. Wicks, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War MI9/S/PG/1/2/GEN/140374, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:W0208/5450.
[90] Wicks, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Interview with Fionette, reel 2.
[91] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942- January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, p.69; A. Slater, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x479, TNA:PRO:WO208/5448.
[92] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.24, 104.

Luft camps where Day was a captive, the Germans viewed him as a respectful officer who controlled and disciplined his men with purpose, and they tended to trust him.[93] This provided the structure, motivation and skills for his men to exploit the trust that he instilled in the Germans. The trust that he had now earned from his formal group because they knew what he was doing allowed his intelligence cells to work effectively. In his repatriation questionnaire, Day reasoned that the size of his formal group and the level of personal control that he now had over his formal group were the keys to his intelligence success.[94]

Escape

Whilst intelligence activities were important for Day in transforming his men from prisoners feeling that their war had ended into men believing that they could still be active members of the war effort, the centrepiece of his leadership goal remained escape. To his permanent staff in Dulag Luft and then to his formal groups in Stalag Luft I, III and Oflag XXIB, Day consistently reminded his men it was their duty to try to escape.[95] He argued that escape gave them the opportunity to contribute to the Allied war effort, despite being prisoners of the enemy. Prisoners' repatriated questionaries and their personal writings reveal that Day's passionate enthusiasm for escape resonated deeply with his men, even if in different ways.[96] British POW G. Atkinson, for example, recollected,

> [It was a] corporate policy and intent that it was part of our duty to play a part in escape arrangements, it was one of the devices in which we kept the Germans on their toes and shall we say pinned some down. By and large

[93] For reference to the Germans perception of Day's control as a leader see Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.35-36, 72, 78, 96, 103, 127.
[94] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2.
[95] For reference to Day explanation of this duty to his men see Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.97, 133, 169. For explanation of this duty see Memorandum on the desirability of and proposals for facilitating the escape of British Prisoners of War in Germany, Appendix A, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3247; Bomber Command Intelligence Instruction No. 1, 4th March 1940 Conduct of Crews Forced Landed in Hostile or Neutral Territories and Methods of Escape, pp.1-6, TNA:PRO: AIR14/353; Escape Aids given to British Crews 1940, p.1, TNA:PRO: AIR 41/353; Minutes of a Meeting between SIO's of Bomber Fighter and Coastal Commands and MI9 held at Beaconsfield on 26/8/41, TNA:PRO:AIR14/355.
[96] For example see Codd, 'Blue Job, Brown Job', p.144; C. Grant, unpublished writings titled, 'The War Experiences of Flight/Lieutenant CEL Grant from Guyana (then British Gulana) in the Royal Air Force, 1941-1945', p.16, IWM 05/68/1; Flesker, 'Operations', p.22; Interview with Wilson, reel 3.

> as loyal members of the Royal Air Force most of us accepted this principle whether we felt particularly enthusiastic about it or not.[97]

Atkinson's recollections show that Day's formal group understood his agenda, although the prisoners had different reasons for participating in his escape activities. Influenced by Day, some prisoners believed that escape was one way they could actively contribute to the war effort and, therefore, were duty bound to participate. Others had more pragmatic reasons. Some wanted to escape themselves. Others were bored with the monotony of life as a prisoner and escape activities provided one way to relieve that boredom.[98]

There is no doubt that Day led by example. In his six POW camps, Day escaped four times.[99] Smith, Day's biographer, explained why: it was the 'duty of the leader was to lead.'[100] Or, as British POW Alex Cassie put it, 'He wouldn't ask anybody to do anything he wouldn't do himself.'[101] A survey of repatriated questionaries reveals that Day succeeded in creating the image of a defiant prisoner through his escape activities as prisoners inextricably tied Day's legacy to his escape attempts.[102] In this way, from the perspective of his men, Day's refusal to accept his passive status as a prisoner and to instead continue to fight against the Germans became his trademark as a leader.

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[97] Interview with Atkinson, reel 2. This perception of a duty to escape is reflected in numerous private records of POWs in Day's camps. For example see Grant, 'The war experiences of flight Lt CEL (cy) Grant, from Guyana (then British Guiana) in the Royal Air Force', p.16; Interview with J. Bertram by C. Wood for the IWM on 23 June 1981, reel 6, IWM 4987; Interview with Dowse, reel 5; Transcript of interview with D. Jones conducted by Windfall Films for the IWM in 2003, pp.4-5, IWM 25025; Transcript of interview with Rees, p.7; Interview with Rae, reel 6.

[98] Transcript of Interview with A. Bryett by Windfall Films for the IWM in 2003, p.8, IWM 25028; Interview with Dowse, reel 5; Transcript of interview with K. Lee by C. Wood for the IWM on 13 March 2001, p.7, IWM 21063; Transcript of interview with J. Lyon by N. Haslam for the IWM on 10 February 2005, transcript, p.17, IWM 28532; Interview with A. Williams by C. Wood for the IWM on 12 May 1988, reel 3, IWM 10202; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.3-7.

[99] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.62-70, 119-123, 147-166, 183-188.

[100] *ibid*., p.121.

[101] Interview with Cassie, reel 17.

[102] For example see A. Erye, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x 3208, p.5, TNA:PRO:WO208/5439; A. Panton, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MISx3333, p.5, TNA:PRO:WO208/5446; Runnacles, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.5; E. Shore, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x MI9 2668, p.5, TNA:PRO:WO208/5448; F. Tams, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War MI9/INT/SP.MIS-x 43076 p.5, TNA: PRO: WO208/5449. In addition, two writings note the role of the SBO in the escape organisation without specifically naming Day. See Interview with Nelson, reel 1; Transcript of interview with Rees, p.8.

By watching Day prepare for, and take part in his escape attempts, there is no doubt that he fuelled the desire and passion for this activity amongst his men. In contrast to his intelligence operations, which were based on a needs to know basis, Day organised escape on a collective principle. He believed that even if a prisoner did not want to attempt an escape himself, he would be willing to help others that did,[103] a goal he achieved as Atkinson's statement quoted earlier shows. Based on this rationale, at Stalag Luft I, Day introduced the prisoners to the concept of the escape committee.[104] At this camp, the escape committee comprised of a president and two staff.[105] As the SBO, Day appointed the president. He entrusted this position to a prisoner who had helped him organise the mass escape from Dulag Luft, Lieutenant Commander Jim Buckley. Buckley then appointed his staff, selecting Squadron Leader Roger Bushell and an unnamed British Air Force officer. Day then created a second tier for the committee. Each barrack hut, by popular vote, appointed three officers who functioned as their barrack escape committee. Any prisoner who wished to make an escape attempt was required to present his plan to his barrack escape committee. These men, after working with the potential escapee to refine his plan, were responsible for presenting the final plan to Buckley and his staff.

In Stalag Luft I, Buckley and his staff, therefore, functioned as panel of review and approval for any escape attempts to be made from the camp. In this way they sanctioned, coordinated and scheduled all camp escape activity. This was a significant improvement to the ad hoc escape attempts that had occurred prior to Day's arrival in the camp. Some of these attempts had ended in one prisoner's scheme cancelling out another prisoner's attempt because their planning, materials or dates overlapped. A collective escape effort, led by Day, allowed every potential escaper to have the benefit of the information that Day's intelligence operators had gathered on German military movements, local landmarks and transport. A centralised escape organisation also meant that escapers had the benefit of any supplies the POWs had managed to obtain from secret parcels and their contacts. Security was also organised collectively. Prisoners working on escape aids were protected by prisoners placed strategically

[103] Smith, *Wings Day.*, p.81.
[104] *ibid*., pp.81-84.
[105] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-2; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.4; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.110-111.

around the compound to warn them when a German guard or guards were approaching.[106] In this way, for the first time, prisoners were working in a coordinated way to increase the security surrounding their escape attempts. In effect, Day's introduction of a centralised approach to escape fostered and promoted collectivism amongst the prisoners.

When Day and his men were transferred to Stalag Luft III East Compound at Sagan in April 1942, they found a new method was being trialled by the Germans to stop prisoners digging tunnels in an attempt to escape.[107] In this camp, the POWs lived in huts built on stilts. This change proved to be no deterrent. In fact, in order to cope with the increasing number of escape applications, Day had to change the structure of his escape committee model.[108] The central committee now comprised of at least five officers, reflecting the growth in the number of prisoners' escape plans.[109] Buckley was still the president but now he appointed officers who were in charge of escape security, intelligence, supply and planning. Buckley's planning staff consisted of four other officers who were responsible for reviewing and coordinating the four different types of escape; tunnelling, climbing over or cutting the wire, walking out of the camp gates in disguise and hiding in transport that came in and out of the compound.[110]

To aid Buckley in his role of preparing escapes on a larger scale, Day introduced a multi-level surveillance operation known as the duty pilot system.[111] One prisoner was located near the camp/compound entrance. His job was to observe and record the names of any Germans who entered the compound. Strategically placed prisoners then

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[106] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.94.
[107] Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1.
[108] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-4; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.98-105.
[109] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-4; A. Crawley, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/MIS-x3433, pp.1-4, TNA:PRO:WO208/5438; B. Mitchell, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIB/150, pp.2, TNA:PRO:WO208/3342.
[110] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, pp.16-18, 42-43;Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organization, Report "X", p.7; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.15-19, 182-185.
[111] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, pp.17-21, 30-33; Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.20-24; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.4; Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officers Prisoners of War Interned in German Luftwaffe Camps on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System inside Germany, Appendix Z.D, p.4; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organization, Report "X", pp.15-18, 35-36.

monitored the movements of each German who entered the compound. Through a signalling system, prisoners warned anyone engaged in intelligence or escape activities that a German was approaching. In this way the integrity of an escape attempt could be maintained. While he was SBO at Stalag Luft III East Compound, and up until the time of Great Escape from North Compound in March 1944, most prisoners participated in this system at one time or another.

In Stalag Luft III Day's formal group were confident that his escape system reflected his genuine motive to transform his men into active war participants. His personal example, along with the success of his intelligence operation and the professional way in which escapes were now being managed in his camps, meant that his formal group were confident that he was a genuine POW leader. Previous doubts regarding his intentions had vanished. Instead of questioning his loyalty, his men now enthusiastically embraced his collective and disciplined model of escape. In this way his men demonstrated their support of Day's vision of his men as active participants in the war effort. The escape organisation transformed the prisoners' way of life in air force camps, particularly in Stalag Luft III.

Day's transformation of his men into active participants in the war effort can clearly be seen in the number of prisoners who participated in his escape organisation in Stalag Luft III East and then North Compound. For example, the security officer's roster comprised of 100 to 150 prisoners.[112] Most of these men participated in the duty pilot system.[113] The intelligence officer, who worked closely with Day, maintained a roster of 50 to 80 prisoners, while the supply officer had about 50 volunteers.[114] Then there were the men who staffed the seven workshops constructing materials that escapees required to successfully breach the wire and then, once they had escaped, essential items that would allow them to remain at large until they successfully reached safety in England, Switzerland or even Allied lines.[115] In Stalag Luft III East

[112] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1.
[113] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.12-13, 38; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.1-2; D. Myles, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War MI9/S/PG/1/2, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3341; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Committee, "Report X." p.10.
[114] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2.
[115] For example of work produced by these factories see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, p.33; Camp History of

and then North Compounds, Australians were heavily involved in the construction of escape materials within these workshops. The most prominent prisoner was Flight Lieutenant Alan Hake, who ran the compass factory.[116]

When the Germans transferred Day and about 100 members of his formal group to Oflag XXIB, those left behind at Stalag Luft III East Compound continued to operate the escape committee.[117] With Day's absence, the structure of the escape committee expanded to suit the growing agenda of its new president, Roger Bushell.[118] Then, when these officers were transferred to the newly opened North Compound, Bushell's plan evolved into the Great Escape, discussed in the previous chapter.[119]

Irrespective of any changes made to the escape committee's structure, including those made by Bushell, Day's overarching authority remained constant.[120] During his tenure as SBO, Day appointed the committee president and retained the right to review all of its decisions.[121] Then when Group Captain Herbert Massey and Group Captain D. Wilson arrived in Stalag Luft III East and North Compounds and, because of their higher rank, assumed the role of SBO, they acted as SBO in name only.[122] Although Day described his status at this time as 'advisor'[123] to the SBO, his advisory role was in fact the continuation of his self-defined leadership role. Smith explains why Massey

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Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.13-18, 25-27; L. Howard, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War MI9/INT/SP/MIS6725, p.2, TNA:PRO:WO208/5441; Statement by B'Ldr R. Abraham Officer I/C Clothing Stalag Luft III (Sagan), pp.1-6; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Committee, "Report X." pp.12-14, 22.

[116] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.19, 104; M. Jones, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A402240, p.1, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 2.

[117] Harsh, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.1-2; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.126-127.

[118] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.7.

[119] For reference to the transfer of these officers from East to North Compound Stalag Luft III see Meeting Minutes from 2 IRCC Representatives on the Conditions at Stalag Luft III on 14 September 1942, p.1, TNA:PRO:AIR40/266; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.233; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.126-127.

[120] Massey, First Witness Testimony in Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at RAF Station Weeton, pp.2-3.

[121] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, pp.7-8; Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2; Massey, Recommendation of Wing Commander H.M.A Day, p. 1;Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Committee, "Report X," p.4.

[122] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.105.

[123] Massey, Recommendation of Wing Commander H.M.A. Day, p.1.

allowed Day to continue in his leadership role. Massey knew Day well as they had both served together in Egypt during the Great War. From this experience, and Massey's reflections on Day's experience as SBO in captivity and the way in which he had transformed his formal group into defiant men, Massey believed that it was best to leave the leadership of the men as it was. As far as Massey was concerned, '[b]y now Wings had well mastered his responsibilities.'[124] Massey then defined his SBO role as helping Day negotiate with the Germans.[125] In this way, Smith explains that Massey 'lightened Day's [leadership] burden.'[126] When Massey was repatriated back to England due to ill health, Australian Group Captain Wilson assumed the role of SBO.[127] Smith suggests that Wilson continued to practice his SBO responsibilities as Massey had defined them.[128]

In Stalag Luft I and Oflag XXIB, Day supplemented his intelligence and escape network by instructing his men to be 'as disobedient and uncooperative ... as possible' in their dealings with their captor in what was known as his 'open warfare' order.[129] It is probable that in Stalag Luft I, when Day struggled to convince his formal group that his intentions were genuine, this order may have reflected his desire to prove, beyond doubt, his loyalty to the British cause and, in doing so, develop a community spirit amongst his formal group. However, Day's 'open warfare' order led to such an oppressive German presence that it effectively curtailed escape and intelligence activities for a month.[130] Day was astute enough to rescind the order, which allowed escape planning and activities to resume. During his tenure as SBO at Stalag Luft I, Day's escape organisation oversaw 49 escapes, including an escape by one air force officer, who successfully made it back home to England, and two others who reached Sweden.[131]

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[124] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.105.
[125] Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, p.109.
[126] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.106.
[127] For reference to Massey's repatriation and Wilson taking over as SBO see D. Wilson, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x4812, pp.1-3,TNA:PRO:WO208/5450.
[128] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.133-135, 138-143.
[129] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2.
[130] Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2; Smith, *Wing's Day*, p.78.
[131] Smith, *Wing's Day*, pp.89, 98, 108; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, pp.142-143.

In Oflag XXIB at Schubin, Day had a very different motive for ordering 'open warfare' against the Germans. In this camp the order stemmed from the personality of Wehrmacht Commandant Hauptman.[132] In October 1942, Day and about 100 men were transferred from Stalag Luft III East Compound to Oflag XXIB.[133] Their transfer came at a most inconvenient time for Day, as he was busily engaged in a new plot to escape from Stalag Luft III East Compound. Crawley's published memoir and Day's biography suggest that the timing of their transfer was not a coincidence as the German staff had suspicions that the prisoners were planning an escape.[134] In Oflag XXIB, camp conditions were not up the usual comfortable standards that air force officers had come to expect. [135] What made matters worse was Commandant Hauptmann's attitude towards Day.

Day was used to having the respect of his Commandants.[136] In this camp, however, he regularly participated in shouting matches with Commandant Hauptman, which continued until the German Commandant worked out that the only way to deal with Day was with courtesy.[137] This understanding, however, did not help Day to negotiate concessions for his men, as no matter what the request, the Commandant's answer always seemed to be no. Commandant Hauptmann believed that prisoners should be seen and not heard, and that the basic rights of prisoners, such as those decreed by the Geneva Convention, were a luxury.[138] Day refused to allow his duty to his escape and intelligence operations to be curtailed by a repressive Commandant whom he judged to be both vindictive and bitter.

In this oppressive atmosphere, the motivation of the air force officers to escape was high.[139] Despite their enthusiasm, however, planning for escape took time. It was not until 3 March 1943, that 40 prisoners, led by Day himself, breached the wire from a

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[132] For reference to order see Day, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2. For reference to the meaning of the order see Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.208; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.137; Smith, *Wing's Day*, pp.108-115.
[133] Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.200.
[134] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.191; Smith, *Wings Day*, p.107.
[135] For an overview of conditions in this camp see Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.154; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.199.
[136] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.35-36, 72, 78, 96, 103, 127.
[137] Interview with Bertram, reel 5; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.110-114.
[138] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.109-113; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.137.
[139] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.114-115; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.203-204.

150-foot tunnel that originated from a latrine.[140] Of all the prisoners who escaped, only one managed to elude recapture, Jim Buckley, who is believed to have drowned while attempting to cross into Sweden.[141] This was Day's most successful mass escape and its consequences must have given him immense satisfaction: the court marital of Commandant Hauptmann and his staff by the OKW.[142]

Day and his men were then transferred back to Stalag Luft III and placed in the North Compound. Day arrived in time to oversee the preparations that Bushell was making for his mass escape. As explained in the previous chapter, by this time Bushell was obsessed with escape. Day was the only prisoner who could reason with him. Day cast a careful eye over Bushell's plan and helped him to achieve the greatest mass escape by prisoners in Germany in World War Two.[143] Day himself participated in this escape. He was buddied with Polish POW Peter Tobolski.[144] Their cover story was that Tobolski was acting as Day's personal Luftwaffe escort and was taking him on the train to Berlin. From there Day hoped to contact a Dane he knew who, in turn, might be able to contact an escape organisation to get him out of Germany. Day never made it to Berlin. Instead, on their fourth day outside the wire, both he and Tobolski were arrested by the Gestapo. Day was then taken to Berlin for questioning and for some unknown reason, transferred to Sachasenhausen concentration camp.[145] Ironically, this transfer probably saved Day's life because he was not one of the 50 POW escapers who were executed by the Germans.[146]

Day's followership

Simon Mackenzie's analysis of prisoner behaviour in German camps suggests that a positional leader's ability to control the impulse to escape embodied '[leadership]

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[140] This proved to be the most successful escape during Day's tenure as SBO. See Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, pp.43-44; Brickhill and Norton, *Escape to Danger*, p.154; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.182, 204-208; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp. 89-90, 98-101, 119-125.
[141] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.208.
[142] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.208; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.137.
[143] Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.126-127, 135-141, 145.
[144] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942 – January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.57; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.148-160.
[145] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942 –January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, p.57; Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Massey, Recommendation of Wing Commander H.M.A Day, p.1.
[146] For reference to the execution of these men see Royal Air Force Special Investigation Branch, Stalag Luft III Murder Investigation Report, Part 1, p.1.

legitimacy and authority.'[147] Day achieved this feat, despite his shaky start. Report 'X', written by various members of the escape committee in Stalag Luft III, along with other sources, confirm that Day's leadership goal, combined with his 'likeable and powerful'[148] personality won over the men in his formal group and in the process transformed them from downtrodden men, who had been captured by the enemy, into an active participants of the war effort irrespective of their status as prisoners.[149]
In order to operate his intelligence and escape network, Day needed the absolute loyalty of his formal group. There is little doubt that he had that, as the writings of POW R. Churchill indicate:

> I think if Day had said well I'm afraid [we are] going to have heavy casualties, from this idea but I'm asking for volunteers to storm the wire in order to get a few people out ...he would probably have had a lot of volunteers.[150]

The majority of the prisoners in his formal group were prepared accept the risks associated in performing these tasks inside a POW camp.

Even outsider observers who visited Stalag Luft III North Compound noticed the respect the men had for Day. The Swedish lawyer, Henry Soderberg, who came to the camp on behalf of the YMCA, observed that he 'never knew what Wings was doing but knew that he was doing something important'.[151]

Perhaps the greatest evidence of the breadth and depth of Day's followership is the decision of Massey and then Wilson to defer their authority as the highest-ranking officers in Stalag Luft III North Compound to Day. Massey and Wilson understood the remarkable achievements Day had made in captivity and were aware of the respect the men had for Day.

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[147] Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.327.
[148] Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report "X", p.34.
[149] Smith, *Wings Day*, p.106.
[150] R. Churchill cited in Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.327.
[151] H. Soderberg cited in Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, p.318.

Despite the fact that after his first escape the Germans must have surely seen him as a man to watch, Day was still able to establish good relations with the captor and in that sense fulfil his role as SBO to protect the men under his command. In part, this reflected his personality, which was also an integral element in his leadership style. Prisoners' writings and recollections recall that Day had a unique, infectious desire to continue active service behind the wire that motivated them.[152] Day combined his mission with immeasurable charm and courage along with a defiant spirit with an irrepressible larrikin streak.[153] Yet, his nickname 'Pricky' reveals that when angered Day could be 'formidable.'[154] For British POW E. Hall, Day was a 'hell of a character.'[155] His complex persona and his dedication to his leadership goal allowed him to harness the instinctive desire of his men for freedom.

After the war, Massey recommended Day for an award for exceptional services.[156] In part it read:

> Amongst prisoners of war generally, one could sense a feeling that, although seemingly out of the war, something still could be done by concentrating on escape and the work which, if only indirectly, would help in the general war effort. I mention all this as it was quite obvious to me that this state of affairs existed almost entirely as a result of Day's leadership and his organising ability…[H]e was quite literally loved and respected by all. His great indomitable spirit, his complete selflessness, his

[152] R. Baines, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, A.401086, June 1945, p.2, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 3; G. Carter, unpublished writings titled 'Memories of War', p.67 IWM 96/4/1; R. Nightingale, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy A.422003, 23 June 1945, p.2, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 23; YM Translation by the London Delegation of the International Red Cross Committee, Stalag Luft III visited on the 22nd February 1943, p.7, TNA:PRO:AIF2/6366; Interview with J. Acquier by C. Wood for the IWM in 1982, reel 2, IWM 6091; Interview with Lamb, reel 2.
[153] For example see T. Taylor, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x4864, TNA:PRO:WO208/5449; Interview with Dowse, reel 4; Interview with E. Hall by C. Wood for the IWM in 1982, reel 2, IWM 6075; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.92-94, 135; Spivey, *POW Odyssey*, pp.38, 80.
[154] For reference to Day's nickname see Interview with Hall, reel 4. For reference to prisoners labelling Day as 'formidable' see Interview with Cassie, reel 17; Interview with Dowse, reel 4.
[155] Interview with Hall, reel 2.
[156] Official History of Stalag Luft III North Compound March 1943 to January 1945, Appendix A, p.1; Massey, Recommendation of Wing Commander H.M.A Day, pp.1-2.

> coolness in emergency, and his determination to continue the war effort whatever might befall, were an inspiration to us all.[157]

Adrian Gilbert, Arthur Durand and Simon Mackenzie agree that as a positional leader in Germany, Day's leadership goal inspired escape to become a way in which British/Commonwealth Air Force officers coped with their captive state.[158] Day, through his vision and modelling behaviour, gave them the method and belief that they could still contribute to the war effort. Day did not realise this goal alone. Men such as Jimmy Buckley and Roger Bushell helped him and did so willingly because they came to share Day's vision. Yet, most British/Commonwealth Air Force officers realised that any escape attempt that they made embodied Day's spirit.

[157] Massey, Recommendation of Wing Commander H.M.A Day, pp.1-2.
[158] Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, p.75; Gilbert, *POWs*, pp.124-125; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.138.

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP

Lower Saxony, Germany, April 1945.

On the orders of their guards, the prisoners from Stalag 357 are moving.[1] *On the banks of the Elbe River, their leader, Sergeant James "Dixie" Deans, organises a distribution of Red Cross food parcels. While starving men consume their fill, British Typhoons open fire. Sixty are killed.*[2] *Appalled at the senseless loss of life, Deans takes matters into his own hands. On an aged bicycle, accompanied by a German guard, he sets out to cross the British lines.*[3] *He hoped to inform the British Commander of his men's position to spare them from further attack. Against the odds, he succeeds. Then, when offered freedom, Deans chooses to return to his men. To the perplexed British General, Deans explained that his men still needed him and 'courtesy' compelled him to keep his word to his Commandant.*[4]

Democratic leadership is a very different style from those examined to date and, at first glance, appears to be the antithesis of military structures.[5] Leadership legitimacy is not defined by positional power but by the followers' mutual consent based on respect.[6] Although technically a positional leader because his position as leader is officially recognised, this type of leader is always accountable to his formal group, and often depends upon a consultative leadership style to implement feedback and ideas from the formal group into the decision making process.[7] Moreover, it can be multilayered, with delegation of responsibilities through a committee structure. The works of Richard Daft, David Fleet and Gary Yukl, Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander have identified three basic models that have informed the analysis in this chapter.[8]

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[1] Interview with J. Deans by C. Wood for the IWM on 1 April 1982, reel 4, IWM 6142.
[2] *ibid*., reel 4.
[3] *ibid*, reels 4-5.
[4] *ibid*., reel 5.
[5] For an overview of democratic leadership see Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.50-55, 86-87; D. Cartwright and A. Zander (eds.), 'Introduction: Group Cohesiveness' in *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, Second Edition, (London: Tavistok, 1960), pp.69-89; D. Cartwright and A. Zander (eds.), 'Introduction: Group Pressures and Group Standards,' in *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, Second Edition, (London: Tavistok, 1960), pp.167-183; Cartwright and Zander (eds.), 'Leadership and Group Performance,' pp.492-505; D. Cartwright and A. Zander (eds.), 'Introduction: Individual Motives and Group Goals,' in *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, Second Edition, (London: Tavistok, 1960), pp.252-366; Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.67-70.
[6] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, p.50.
[7] For reference to democratic accountability see A. Birch, *Key Concepts in Political Science: Representation*, (London: MacMillan, 1971), pp.106-108; D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987), pp.66-71, 101, 195-196, 258, 283-258; C. Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp.23-25, 27, 36.
[8] Cartwright and Zander (eds.), 'Introduction: Individual Motives and Group Goals,' pp.259-366; Cartwright and Zander (eds.), 'Leadership and Group Performance,' pp.492-505; Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.50-55; Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.67-70.

The first model is hierarchical in its structure. A leader is chosen by popular election, or the implied consent of group members, and the leader alone determines the group's course of action.[9] The second involves a delegation of leadership authority where the leader can choose to delegate some of his responsibilities to group members, or even the group as a whole. In this case, the leader becomes a facilitator or guide, and decisions are made collectively. This style allows for flexibility in the group structure. If the group is faced with a crisis, such as the leader's absence, or changes within the group's membership, it will not fold but instead seek ways to adapt to the new variables.[10] Studies conducted on the behaviour of inmates in concentration camps reveal that the democratic leadership model was used by informal groups whose members survived this extreme setting.[11] The third democratic leadership style is an extension of the second model. In this structure group decisions are made on the basis of majority consent. Every group member is an equal stakeholder assuming shared responsibility for the group's actions.[12] Irrespective of the form it takes, democratic leadership is essentially an expression of human dynamics where belonging to, and participating in, a group instils a sense of collective identity, ownership and accountability for the achievement of group goals.[13] The group can replace leaders judged to be incompetent, or who make questionable decisions, or who are simply disliked. A leader's personality, character and vision, therefore, are critical for this leadership style. In a sense, they reflect the argument put by military scholars William

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[9] Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.67-68. For further explanation of this model see J. Bachler, 'Individual Group and Democracy,' in J. Chapman and I. Shapiro (eds.), *Democratic Community* NOMOS XXXV, (New York: New York University Publications, 1993), pp.36-39; Birch, *Key Concepts in Political Science*, pp.13-21; R. Katz, *Democracy and Elections*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.100-106; D. Pickles, *Democracy*, (London: Methuen, 1971), pp.29-78; M. Saward, *The Terms of Democracy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp.68-86.

[10] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, p.50; Cartwright and Zander (eds.), 'Leadership and Group Performance', p.505; Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' p.68. For further explanation of the features of this model see D. Bell, 'Notes on Authoritarian and Democratic Leadership,' in A. Gouldner, *Studies in Leadership: Leadership and Democratic Action*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp.403-404; Cranach, 'Leadership as a Function of Group Action,' pp.120-133; Homans, *The Human Group*, pp.109-129,132-155; Whyte, 'Informal Leadership and Group Structure,' pp.105-112.

[11] Bennet, *Beyond Endurance*, pp.205-211; Bloch, 'The Personality of Inmates in Concentration Camps,' pp.339-340; Leach, *Survival Psychology*, pp.137-147.

[12] Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, p.52; Cartwright and Zander (eds.), 'Introduction: Individual Motives and Group Goals,' pp.359-366; Fleet and Yukl, 'A Century of Leadership Research,' pp.68-70.

[13] Cartwright and Zander (eds.), 'Introduction: Group cohesiveness,' pp.69-89; Cranach, 'Leadership as a Function of Group Action,' pp.119-133; J. Gardner, 'The Antileadership Vaccine,' in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership*, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.186; Lussier and Achua, *Leadership*, pp.229-233.

Rosenbach and Robert Taylor that the most effective 'leaders come from the ranks of followers.'[14]

Admittedly, democratic leadership is rare in the history of captivity during the Second World War. Yet, in response to particular conditions and the social composition of the group, it did emerge in the stable captive conditions in Europe and in the volatile and extreme captive settings in the Pacific Theatre. In the European Theatre, it was evident in the election of leaders of formal groups. In the Pacific Theatre, it was evident in informal groups in volatile and extreme settings. In both cases, a combination of the three different types of models described above was used. This combination of models was a response to the physical and psychological needs of their men, the skills of their formal or informal group members and the demands placed on the group by the captor.

The first of the case studies in the following chapter examines the air force NCOs in Germany. Housed separately from their officers in relatively stable conditions in their own compounds, and all being of a roughly similar rank, official positional leadership only came into play when men from the officers' compound, such as Day, visited the NCO's compound. The second case study examines democratic structures within informal groups, where it was more common. Amongst informal groups the roles of leader and follower were shared amongst group members with leaders emerging based on the needs, desires and skills of group members. In informal groups democratic leadership styles were, therefore, applied in their most pure sense.

For the air force NCOs held as prisoners in the European Theatre, the defining feature of their military command was the absence of a hierarchical rank structure, as most of them were sergeants.[15] Historian Adrian Gilbert argues that because of the absence of a hierarchy of rank, air force NCO's earned respect 'not from years of dutiful service but from technical ability.'[16] These men were, therefore, used to judging each other on merit. This method of assessing each other's abilities meant that, in captivity, they

[14] R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), 'Introduction to Part 2: Followers and Leaders', in *Military Leadership*, Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.79.
[15] Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.127.
[16] Gilbert, *POW*, p.131.

chose positional leaders because of their skills in organising and protecting the formal group from the captor, and if necessary, from themselves.

They selected their leaders by casting votes in democratic elections.[17] These men were proud of their unique method of appointing their leaders, boasting that their election process made them different from, if not more intelligent than, the rest of the British/Commonwealth prisoners because they were not blinded by allegiance to rank.[18] However, democratic power could pose problems for the leaders themselves. They could not issue orders that their formal group had to follow or, as stipulated in military regulations, be held accountable for their disobedience.[19] Men chose to follow their leader's directions because they believed they were in the best interests of the formal group. If the formal group disagreed with a direction, they could choose to ignore it and, if this happened frequently, the formal group could choose to remove the elected positional leader and then hold a new election to replace him.[20] This process would continue until the formal group were satisfied that their elected leader was working in the best interests of the group. As elected leaders, air force NCO positional leaders were thus democratically accountable for their decisions.

Air force NCO leaders, therefore, implemented the democratic leadership model for very pragmatic reasons. The most successful leaders were able to effectively use the consultative leadership style discussed earlier, implementing feedback and ideas from the formal group into their decision making process. They also used a multiple leadership structure to gauge the reactions of their groups, taking into account the reactions of their groups to their decisions, and if necessary, amending them to suit their group's needs. The multiple leadership structure ranged from camp elected

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[17] Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.127.

[18] For example see Shorrock, 'Guest of the Fuhrer', p.126; Interview with D. Bernard for the Imperial War Museum by P. Hart, reel 8, IWM 1651; Interview with R. Buckingham by the IMW by C. Wood on 30 July 1981, reel 2, IWM 5131; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.19-20, 61; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.25, 147.

[19] For reference to the unique nature of the air force NCOs leaders power see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, p.17, TNA:PRO:WO208/3283; E. Maher, 'My Experiences as a Prisoner of War in Germany', p.18, AWM PR00873; M. Stretton, unpublished and untitled notes, p.7, IWM 99/80/1; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.21-22.

[20] For reference to air force NCOs holding new elections see Interview with Deans, reels 2 and 4; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.127. The use of elections to solve camp disputes is noted by Gilbert as one way in which POWs solved camp tensions. See Gilbert, *POWs*, p.133.

committees to nominated and elected barrack leaders and national representatives. The escape committee in the NCO camps, however, usually worked as an independent committee and it was essential for the elected positional leader to have a working relationship with the escape committee, or he risked being labelled irrelevant or inefficient by members of his formal group.

To retain their position, these leaders had to be very good at their job. They had to have the ability to clearly identify their leadership goals, explain to their formal group how they were going to achieve these goals, then actually achieve them. In essence, these men had to prove to their formal group that they could protect them against the captor and build and maintain group cohesion to protect the physical and psychological needs of each POW. If an air force NCO positional leader achieved this, and he continued to uphold the goals that he had promised on his election, he not only gained leadership legitimacy but also, because of the unique level of accountability within his formal group, acquired followership.[21]

The writings and recollections of Australian POWs reveal that the two elected positional leaders examined in this chapter, Scottish Air Force Sergeant James 'Dixie' Deans and Australian Warrant Officer Alistair McGregor Currie, both acquired leadership legitimacy through their ability to implement their leadership goals and, as result of their success, gained loyal followership. In the chapter that follows, more time is given to Deans simply because there are more primary sources for Deans than for Currie. Deans was elected leader in six different camps, which had large transit populations. As a result, more prisoners came into contact with Deans and reflected on his role as leader in their diaries, letters, repatriation surveys and post-war interviews. In contrast, Currie was an air force leader for a shorter time within a mixed compound of air force NCOs and army other ranks in an army other rank camp run by the Wehrmacht. Yet, despite these differences, both men implemented the same leadership style. For their ability to translate their leadership goals into effective leadership of

[21] For reference to this fierce loyalty see Interview with Buckingham, reel 2; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.19-20; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.147.

men in captivity, both men were made a Member of the British Empire (MBE) after their repatriation.[22]

Democratic leadership in informal groups reflected the captive settings of the prisoners. In more stable settings, where the threat to survivorship was, for the most part low, roles were interchangeable, meaning men could be both leaders and followers. In volatile and extreme settings, however, democratic leadership in informal groups was vital for survival, as was belonging to a group. Group members rotated leadership responsibilities according to conditions and the needs of the group. The final section of the following chapter examines the role of democratic leadership among the groups working on the Burma-Thailand Railway and during the forced marches in Europe.

[22] For reference to Deans MBE see Interview with E. Hall, reel 4; Interview with R. Morton for the IWM by C. Wood on 27 October 1997, reel 1, IWM 17643. For reference to Currie's MBE see Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 17 January 1946, p.83.

CHAPTER 6: POSITIONAL AND INFORMAL DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP

Air Force Sergeant James 'Dixie' Deans and Warrant Officer Alistair McGregor Currie were two air force NCO elected positional leaders. The chapter begins with a brief history of both men in captivity, then examines how Deans and Currie balanced the needs of their formal groups with the unique nature of their leadership authority in order to create and apply a democratic leadership style in captivity. With an ability to adapt their leadership style in response to their men's physical and psychological needs, both men became respected POW leaders who gained loyal followership.

Sergeant James 'Dixie' Deans

Sergeant James 'Dixie' Deans bailed out over Berlin on 10 September 1940.[1] Captured by the Germans, Deans was transferred into the custody of the Luftwaffe and interrogated at Dulag Luft before being transferred to his first camp, Stalag Luft I.[2] Over the course of the war, Deans would be held in six camps run by the Luftwaffe for air force POWs[3] and, mixed service personnel camps at Stalag 357 at Thorn, then at Fallingbostel, which were run by German Wehrmacht.[4] Then, in April 1945, with the Allied forces approaching Fallingbostel, Deans and his men were forced to evacuate the camp via train and then on foot.[5]

For the most part, the conditions in the Luftwaffe camps were relatively stable.[6] Permanent barracks had been built for housing the prisoners, there were regular arrivals of Red Cross parcels to supplement the German ration and to pass the time the POWs were allowed to participate in a variety of leisure and educational activities.

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[1] Gilbert, *POW*, p.137; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.24.
[2] J. Deans, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War no. 42218, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO 344\87\2.
[3] Deans was held in the following permanent Luftwaffe camps: Stalag Luft I, Stalag Luft III Centre Compound and Stalag Luft IV. See Deans, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; J. Deans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5439.
[4] Deans, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Deans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1.
[5] Deans, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Interview with Deans, reel 4.
[6] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, pp.1-2; Protecting Power Inspection Report of Stalag Luft III, 13 September 1942, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO224/63A; Protecting Power Inspection Report of Stalag Luft III, 13 May 1942, p.2, TNA:PRO:WO224/63A; F. Seamer, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A402478, 23 April 1945, p.1, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 5.

Relations with the Luftwaffe Commandants and guards were, for the most part, relatively amicable.[7] The one significant exception to this was Stalag Luft IV in Heydkrug.[8] Stalag Luft IV already held 3000 NCOs when Deans and some of his formal group arrived.[9] This number grew to 6000, following large transfers of American POWs. From this time onwards, Deans' men experienced overcrowded conditions in temporary accommodation and Red Cross parcels became fewer and smaller.[10] In the aftermath of the Great Escape, the amicable relations with the Commandants established in previous camps ended.[11] Some prisoners were shot during escape attempts and the German guards were openly violent towards the prisoners.[12]

In Stalag 357 at Thorn and then at Fallingbostel, Deans' men felt the real impact of Germany's failing war effort. Deans' formal group arrived at Thorn after a particularly trying train journey of four days in overcrowded truck cars.[13] When they arrived at the camp, 7000 army NCOs were already there.[14] This figure soon reached 9000 POWs and kept climbing.[15] Shortages of German rations and Red Cross parcels continued.[16] At Fallingbostel, they found themselves in a reception centre for POWs who would soon be forced to leave the camp and march away from the approaching Allied

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[7] Interview with Cornish, reel 4; Interview with Fordyce, reel 5.
[8] Interview with A. Kerr by J. Bannister for the IWM on 18 March 2003, reel 5; Interview with D. Winn on 4 March 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.1508, reel 8, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/333.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 15 June 2014; Interview with C. Younger by D. Firth for the IWM in November 2002, reel 5, IWM 23329; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.107-110; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.115-124.
[9] Field, 'Prisoners of the Germans and Italians', p.805; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.404.
[10] L. Frith, unpublished writings titled 'What a way to win a war,' p.75, IWM 94/25/1; Maher, 'My Experiences as a Prisoner of War in Germany', pp.19-20; Gilbert, *POWs*, pp.200-201; Rolf, *Prisoners of the Reich*, pp.147-148.
[11] Interview with Deans, reel 4; Interview with Winn, reel 8; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.107-110; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.115-124.
[12] R. Davies, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A400342, pp.4-5, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 1; E. Maher, Prisoners of War Statements RAAF for Repatriation Conference, no.166727, 27 November 1945, NAA A.705 163/1/743; Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.100-106; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.81.
[13] Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.404.
[14] Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.164-165; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.404.
[15] Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.164-165; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.404.
[16] J. Cassidy, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A413823, 21 June 1945, p.1, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 15; S. Smith, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A404310, 27 July 1945, p.1, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 8; Interview with A. Kerr on 3 March 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.1489, tape 7, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1219.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 13 May 2014.

forces.[17] Here Deans' formal group mostly lived in makeshift tents on the parade ground, with no heating or lighting, and existed on rations that fell below subsistence levels.[18]

On the open road in April 1945 Deans controlled an expanded formal group of about 12 000 men, spilt into sections of about 1000 each.[19] During the day Deans, rode between the groups on an old bicycle to ensure that the men had sufficient rations, were given rest breaks and were treated fairly by their guards. [20] At night, Deans cycled between the barns that he had arranged as a billet. Deans also had another challenge to deal with, British air strafing of his column. This final phase of captivity ended on 2 May when Deans' column was liberated by the American army.[21]

When Deans arrived in Stalag Luft I, his first camp, he found a formal group who believed that their elected leader was making life very comfortable for himself but not for his men.[22] An election soon followed, with Deans winning the vote. From this point on, Deans retained the position of MOC for the duration of his captive experience in six camps.[23] He did so because he won the right to act as the positional leader of his respective air force NCO formal groups through elections. At both Stalag Luft III Centre Compound and Stalag 357 Fallingbostel, for example, Deans was elected MOC as the previous MOCs were forced to resign by their respective formal groups.[24] At Stalag 357 at Thorn, where the formal group consisted of mixed air force NCOs and army other ranks, the acting SBO, Captain Bonham-Carter, aware of

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[17] Military Board Adjutant-General Officer in Charge 2 Echelon, Statements made by Repatriated Prisoners of War, Appendix, p.39, NAA: B3856 144/14/23.
[18] For an overview of conditions in this camps see Davies, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, pp.1-2; Seamer, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.1, Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.146.
[19] Interview with Morton, reel 1; Rolf, *Prisoners of the Reich*, p.166.
[20] Interview with H. Dawson on 10 May 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.2015, tapes 5 and 6
< http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1469.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 12 May 2104; R. Watchhorn, unpublished writings section titled 'March out of Fallingbostel 8 April 1945', p.93, IWM 95/35/1; Interview with Deans, reel 4; Dominey, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.126-127; Younger, *No Flight From the Cage*, pp.234-243.
[21] Watchhorn, 'March out of Fallingbostel 8 April 1945', p.93; Interview with Morton, reel 1.
[22] Gilbert, *POWs*, p.139.
[23] Interview with Buckingham, reel 2.
[24] Interview with Deans, reels 2 and 4; Dominey, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.66, 117; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.127.

Dean's reputation, stepped down to allow an election of a new leader.[25] Deans won the majority of votes against his main opponent, the previous MOC of the army contingent of the camp, Regimental Sergeant Major Turner.[26]

It is important to note that different men formed Deans' formal groups. The Luftwaffe transferred POWs, either as individuals or in small numbers, from camp and camp, or from compound to compound within a camp. This ad hoc transfer policy meant that in his six different camps, some of the same men remained with Deans, while others did not. This changing composition of formal groups and, in the case of Stalag 357 at Thorn and then at Fallingbostel where the formal group consisted of mixed service personnel, makes Deans' ability to retain his position as MOC even more remarkable.

Warrant Officer Alistair McGregor Currie

Warrant Officer Alistair McGregor Currie was an Australian member of the 12th RAF Squadron.[27] A sheep station worker in civilian life, Currie's war ended on 15 March 1942 when his plane was shot down at St. Nazaire in western France. He was interrogated at Dulag Luft and then transferred to Stalag VIIIB/344 in Lamsdorf, Poland, on 15 March 1942. Currie spent two years and eight months in this camp. This was a mixed camp and was one of the worst British army other rank POW camps run by the German Wehrmacht.[28] Nor were the air force NCOs housed in their own compound. In a letter penned in October 1942 to his wife Bel, Currie described the Air Force NCO Compound in Stalag VIIIB as a mixed compound with 1000 air force NCOs, of which 74 were Australian, and 500 other ranks from the army.[29] This mixed

[25] Interview with C. Beckett by C. Wood for the IWM on 9 March 1986, IWM 16827; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.187-189.
[26] Interview with Buckingham, reel 2; Interview with Younger, reels 12-13; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.177; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.187-189.
[27] A. Currie, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, no.A407822, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO344/80/1.
[28] For an overview of the conditions of this Stalag see Interview with E. Hall, reel 2; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, pp.99-100. For an overview of this classification for Stalag VIIIB see Letter to British Foreign Office from H. Satow President of International Red Cross Committee Geneva, 25 February 1942, TNA:PRO:FO916/244; Inspection Report by the International Red Cross on Stalag VIIIB visited on 11 December 1941, pp.1-6; TNO:PRO:FO916/244.
[29] Letter to Bel from A. Currie, 2 October 1943, p.1, AWM PR00973.

population, however, did not last long as the Commandant created a compound for air force NCOs.[30] Currie was elected MOC of this compound in March 1943.

Although historians have described Stalag VIIIB as one of the most notorious POW camps in Germany,[31] there were variations in terms of conditions between compounds. The worst conditions were found in the other rank army compounds. In comparison, conditions in the Air Force NCO Compound were better.[32] There were fewer German guards, originally more space within the barracks and compound and more food was provided for the air force NCO prisoners. As 'special prisoners', they were barred from working for the Germans.[33] This meant that they were largely left to their own devices.

Until the arrival of Commandant Rudolf Gylek just prior to the reprisals explained below, the Air Force Compound remained locked, isolating the air force NCOs from the rest of the POW population in Stalag VIIIB.[34] Gylek, however, ordered the Air Force Compound gates remain open until 9.00pm daily.[35] This order was intended to stop persistent attempts by the air force NCOs to find ways out of their compound. What it did, though, was facilitate one of the more popular escape schemes – swapping identities with an army other rank prisoner in an attempt to be transferred out of the camp to a satellite Arbeitskommando (working camp) where the men thought the chances of escape were better.

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[30] Memorandum to the Foreign Office (Directorate of Prisoners of War) from the War Officer (Directorate Prisoners of War), serial no.612, 22 July 1942, TNA:PRO:FO916/244; Stalag VIIB and Lazaret visited by the Swiss, February 12 1942, p.1, TNA:PRO:FO916/244.

[31] Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.28-28; Field, 'Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,' pp.791-781; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, pp.97, 99-100, 132-133.

[32] For an overview of the better conditions in the Air Force Compound of Stalag VIIIB see A. Currie, Personal Papers, AWM PR03373; Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp 28-29; J. Holliday (ed.), 'Life in Lamsdorf' in S*tories of the RAAF POWS of Lamsdorf including Chronicles of their 500 Mile Trek* (Holland Park: Lamsdorf RAAF POWS Association, 1992), pp.99-118; Muckton, 'Life at Lamsdorf,' pp.118-129.

[33] Gilbert, *POW*, pp.145-148; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, pp.260-261; Vourkoutiotis, *Prisoners of War and the German High Command*, pp.112-113.

[34] J. Badcock, unpublished writings titled 'Barbed Wire City: section titled Introduction', ff.4-5, IWM 99/47/1; Letter to Bel from A. Currie, p.2; Interview with T. Blatch by C. Wood for the IWM on 12 July 1988, reel 2, IWM 10252; Pape, *Boldness by my Friend*, p.112.

[35] Letter to Bel from Currie, p.2.

Although conditions were better in the Air Force NCO Compound, there were still difficulties. The location of the camp in Poland, combined with the lack of basic winter supplies, made for poor living conditions. Sickness, including typhus, was a constant presence in this camp.[36] Although fewer German guards were assigned to the compound, there was one guard who caused significant problems. Unteroffizier 'Ukrainian Joe' Kussel, popularly known by the air force POWs as 'The Bastard,'[37] was responsible for numerous violent assaults against the POWs.[38] Then, on 9 October 1942, the air force POWs in Stalag VIIIB became part of a POW reprisal program organised by the OKW.

This program was the OKW's reaction to the Dieppe incident. Germans, who had been taken captive by the Allies during the Dieppe Raid, were discovered dead with their hands tied behind their backs.[39] In retaliation, the OKW ordered that prisoners' hands be tied with string from the Red Cross parcels, from 7 in the morning until 8 o'clock at night.[40] After numerous complaints to the Commandant and the Protecting Power that the string was cutting off the blood supply in men's wrists, the guards used shackles and handcuffs instead of string. To further punish these men, the contents of Red Cross parcels were withheld from October 1942. Over time, however, these restrictions were relaxed, particularly after some of the POWs became experts in picking the locks and gaining their freedom during the supposed hours of

[36] Inspection Report by the International Red Cross on Stalag VIIIB visited on 11 December 1941, p.1; Inspection Report by the International Red Cross on Stalag VIIIB visited on 27 January 1942, p.1, TNO:PRO:FO916/244; RW2/4 Telegram to Foreign Office from the International Red Cross Committee Regarding Stalag VIIIB, 27 February 1942, f.1, TNO:PRO:FO916/244; Pape, *Boldness be my Friend*, pp.140-142.
[37] Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, p.29.
[38] It is also possible that that Unteroffizier Kussel threatened and did shoot some of the air force NCOs in Stalag VIIIB. The sources are contradictory on this point. See Affidavit of Flying Officer James Patrick Dowd, DCM, Relating to an Assault on Himself at Stalag 8B about September 1942, p. 1, PRO:TNA: WO309/2148; Interview with D. Bruce for the IWM in 1978, reel 7, IWM 3175; Interview with P. Avery by J. King for the IWM on 1 October 2003, reel 1, IWM 23290; Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, p.29. For reference to prisoner shootings in this camp which may or may not have been conducted by Unteroffizier Kussel see D. King, Affidavit, 7 August 1946, PRO:TNA:WO309/2178; United Nations War Crimes Commission Alleged Crime of Murder, Registered Number 2546/UK/G/456, PRO:TNA:TS26/634; Holliday, 'Life in Lamsdorf,' p.117; Muckton, 'Life at Lamsdorf,' pp.121, 125.
[39] German War Crimes, Alleged Crime: Ill Treatment -Taking Reprisals, pp.1-10, TNA:PRO:WO311/186.
[40] *ibid*., p.1.

confinement.[41] By the end of the reprisal period on 22 November 1943, historian Oliver Clutton-Brock described the reprisals as more a 'nuisance than a punishment.'[42]

Towards the latter stages of the war, the camp population in Stalag VIIIB exploded, particularly after the capitulation of Italy in September 1943. As a result of the influx of prisoners into the camp, the OKW divided the work camps originally attached to Stalag VIIIB and then renamed the camp Stalag 344.[43] Overcrowding, however, remained a significant problem.[44] The Germans did not provide any significant increase in essential provisions for the new influx of prisoners, including those in the Air Force NCO Compound. Combined with the onset of a Polish winter, camp conditions went from liveable to intolerable. Shortages of basic supplies for the POWs became even more pronounced as the tide turned against the Germans in the war.[45] The Germans also began planting 'stool pigeons', or Germans posing as POWs, in the Army and Air Force Compounds to detect prisoners' escape plots.[46] They enjoyed particular success during the winter of 1943 to 1944. Deteriorating conditions and the work of the German spies led to the significant downturn in prisoner morale. In this atmosphere, members of the formal group found it difficult to trust anyone, including their MOC.

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[41] German War Crimes, Alleged Crime: Ill Treatment, pp.1-10; Badcock, 'Barbed Wire City: section titled Chain Gang', ff.1-2; G. Moreton, unpublished writings titled 'The Barbed Wire Medico', pp.475-487, IWM 89/16/1; Interview with Blatch, reel 2; Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, p.32.
[42] Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, p.32.
[43] Extract from Letter by RSM S. Sherriff, Camp Leader Stalag 344, 30 December 1943, TNA:PRO:WO224/27.
[44] A. Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A407882, 20 July 1945, pp.1-3, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 1; C. Nind, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A401531, 2 May 1945, p.1, AWM54 779/4/129 Part 3; W. Reed, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War camps in Germany and Italy, no.A402479, 19 December 1944, p.1, NAA:A705:163/1/743; Urke, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.1.
[45] Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, pp.1-3; J. Kean, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.1; A. Currie, handwritten notes in blue booklet, ff.7-31, AWM PR03373; C. Medley, Diary 1 December 1944, IWM 02/25/1; Interview with D. Butterworth on 2 July 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.1601, tapes 6 and 8, < http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1739.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 1 June 2014; Interview with R. Middleton on 4 March 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.1422, tape 6, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/372.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 20 May 2014.
[46] Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, p.36. Also see Badcock, 'Barbed Wire City, Section titled London Calling', f.6; Groocock, 'Mein Camp', pp.53-54.

From late 1944, the situation worsened as the Red Army began its advance westwards. Stalag 344 became a staffing target.[47] Red Cross parcels, vital supplements to the now very poor German ration, became extremely rare.[48] Then, on the 22 January 1945, in the face of advancing Soviet forces, the OKW ordered the evacuation of Stalag 344.[49] As they left the camp, each man was given one Red Cross parcel.[50] These men endured the worst of the forced marches discussed in the Introduction.[51] They evacuated on foot during the height of the Polish winter. Their first objective was to reach Stalag VIIIA at Gorlitz. They arrived on 3 February, having walked, according to Currie, 270 kilometres, with about 350 men being forced to leave the column, usually due to a combination of hypothermia, sickness and exhaustion.[52] Those who could still walk were ushered out of the camp on 10 February to keep walking. The weaker POWs were left behind. Then, on 29 March 1945, these men were forced to turn to the east.[53] This time they were trying to outmarch the approaching British and American armies. Advancing Americans liberated Currie's marching column on 4 April 1945.

The trying conditions inside Stalag VIIIB/344 meant that the job of the MOC was particularly difficult. The dismissal of at least five British/Commonwealth MOCs prior to Currie's election in March 1943 is evidence of just how difficult it was to be seen as acting in the best interests of the formal group and win over its members' trust.[54]

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[47] Memorandum for Headquarters Bomber Command, Bombing of Prisoner of War Camps, no date, p.1, TNA:PRO:AIR14/1238; Telegraph from M. Edwards to British Prisoners of War Branch, Stalag 344, 21 January 1945, TNA:PRO:AIR14\1238; Telegraph from M. Pearson to British Prisoners of War Branch, The War Office, Stalag 344, 10 April 1944, TNA:PRO:AIR/1238.
[48] Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.1; Inspecting Power Report on Stalag VIIIB, 21-22 September 1944, pp.1, 4-5, TNA:PRO:WO244/27; Armstrong, Diary 28 December 1944 to 10 March 1945; Currie, handwritten notes in blue booklet, ff.7-31; Munckton, 'Life at Lamsdorf', pp.125-127.
[49] Currie, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Currie, handwritten notes in blue booklet, pp.32-33.
[50] Letter to Ian from A. Currie, p.2, AWM PR03373, Wallet 2.
[51] Currie, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoners of War Camps in Germany and Italy, pp.3-4; A. Currie, unpublished writings titled 'March from Stalag 344 to Gorlitz VIIIA: Diary Monday 22 January to 3 February, AWM PR03373, Wallet 2; A. Currie, notebook 2, AWM PR03373; J. Holliday (ed.), 'The Trauma of Liberation', in *Stories of the RAAF POWS of Lamsdorf including chronicles of their 500 mile trek* (Holland Park: Lamsdorf RAAF POWS Association, 1992), pp.193-194.
[52] Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.4.
[53] Currie, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoners of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.4.
[54] Currie, Statement by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, pp.1-3; A. Currie, Statement of Conditions existing in Stalag 344, RAF, during the period from 3

Currie's official and personal writings testify that he himself found being MOC extremely difficult.[55] Yet, he remained the elected MOC of this compound, making him the longest lasting MOC during the existence of the Air Force NCO Compound at Stalag VIIIB/344. Currie only relinquished his leadership role when the camp was forced to evacuate. Then like Deans, Currie became the positional leader of a marching column.[56] When they were ordered out of Gorlitz, he was in charge of between 200 and 300 air force POWS who continued to march until, as noted earlier, they were liberated.[57]

Deans and Currie's democratic leadership structure

Despite their different camp locations and captive conditions, Deans and Currie shared the same leadership power and the same leadership vision, that is, the collective endurance of their formal group in captivity.[58] Deans and Currie believed that endurance encompassed both physical and psychological matters. To achieve this goal, both men became the advocates and protectors of their respective groups, a goal they could only achieve if their formal groups understood their intentions.

To achieve their leadership vision and to ensure their men understood it, Deans and Currie implemented a consultative democratic leadership model within their camps. As noted in the preface to this chapter, the model consisted of three layers of consultative leadership structures that effectively allowed group members to play a role in decisions made by Deans and Currie, communicate those decisions and reasons

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August 1943 to 21 June 1945, para 2, TNA:PRO:AIR40/275. The previous MOCs in the Air Force NCO Compound were British Warrant Officer J. Taylor-Gill, British Army NCO E. Hall, South African Air Force NCO Sergeant L. Morris and Canadian Flight Lieutenant H. Davidier. See Currie, Statement Regarding the Conditions existing in Stalag 344, para 2; H. Davidier, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIB/181, p.2, TNA:PRO:WO208/3341; J. Taylor-Gill, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIB/57, p.2, TNA:PRO:WO208/3341; R. Watchorn, unpublished writings titled 'A Wartime Log', p.23, IWM 95/31/1; Interview with E. Hall, reels 3 and 5; Interview with J. Phillips by C. Wood for the IWM on 22 October 1980, reel 1, IWM 4769.

[55] Currie, Statement of Conditions existing in Stalag 344, para 2; Currie, Statement by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, pp.1-3; Letter to Bel from Currie, pp.1-2.

[56] Currie, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; R. Mogg, Recommendation Re Aus. 467822 W/O Currie A.M. (RAAF), p.1, TNA:PRO:AIR40/273.

[57] Currie, Statement by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.4.

[58] Letter to Bel from Currie, pp.1-3; A. Currie, Report to Protecting Power of March from Stalag VIIIA Gorlitz to Stalag IXA Ziegenhain, p.1, AWM PR033373, Wallet 2; Interview with Deans, reel 2.

for them to all POWS, and so effectively maintain control of their formal groups.[59] It was a transparent leadership model, a concession to the unique leadership role they filled and a recognition of the potential fragility of their power amongst equally ranked air force NCOs. Although both men used the same approach to leadership, the specific ways in which they implemented that approach, however, differed, a reflection of the differences in the camps in which the men were held.

The leadership committee formed the first layer of this consultative leadership model.[60] The task of this committee was to assist the MOC in the practical application of his leadership duties. This included organising the men for daily camp parades, advocating the needs of their formal group to the Germans by attending conferences with the German Commandant and liaising with the Protecting Power and Red Cross.[61]

Following his election as MOC, Deans was allowed to appoint his own staff.[62] Deans chose to have a small staff of two: an assistant and officer manager.[63] In his six camps, British Air Force Sergeant Ron Mogg acted as Deans' office manager.[64] From the surviving records, it cannot be ascertained who acted as Deans' assistant. Then, alongside Deans' personal staff, an election was held to appoint men to the leadership committee. In his interview with the Imperial War Museum, Deans remembered that there 'was probably about 10'[65] on the committee. The existence of a larger elected leadership committee suggests that in Deans' camps these men were held accountable for the running of the camp/compound and, in the performance of these duties, worked

[59] Deans and Currie's leadership model was the normative leadership structure used by elected MOCs. See Field, '*Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,*' p.781; Foy, *For you the war is over,* pp.119-120; Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.125.
[60] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, pp.2-4; Currie, Statement by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.1; Mogg, Recommendation Re Aus. 467822 W/O Currie A.M, p.1.
[61] Currie, Statement by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.1.
[62] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, pp.2-4; Interview with Deans, reels 2 and 3; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers,* pp.89, 91, 99, 104.
[63] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, pp.2-3.
[64] Interview with Deans, reel 3; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.89, 91, 99, 104.
[65] Interview with Deans, reel 2.

closely with Deans and his personal staff, to shape and implement his leadership decisions.

Currie's personal staff in Stalag VIIIB/344 consisted of three men: British Warrant Officer W. Ford as the compound interpreter, Canadian Warrant Officer S. Bailey as secretary, and British Air Force Sergeant Wilkinson as compound quartermaster.[66] It is unclear from the sources if a general election was held in Currie's compound for nominations to the leadership committee, and then he selected men for positions on the committee, or if Currie personally appointed these men.

Below the level of the leadership committee were the barrack leaders. In Deans' camps, barrack leaders were elected.[67] It is not known how barrack leaders were appointed in Currie's camp.[68] Irrespective of their method of appointment, what is certain is that these men were not on the leadership committee. Barrack leaders, however, were probably the most important of the leadership position within Deans and Currie's organisations.

Barrack leaders were responsible for three tasks.[69] They relayed the decisions that had been made by the MOC and his leadership committee to men in their barracks. They monitored and, if necessary, intervened in the day-to-day interactions between the POWs. Lastly, barrack leaders reported to the MOC the mood, opinions and any incidents that had occurred between prisoners in their barracks. In this way, barrack leaders gave Deans and Currie a way of monitoring the behaviour, reactions and opinions of their formal groups to their leadership decisions, and, if necessary, allowing them to modify or change their decisions if they proved to be too polarising for their formal group. Barrack leaders, in essence, provided the MOC with the

[66] Wilkinson's first name is unknown. For reference to Currie's staff see Mogg, Recommendation Re Aus. 467822 W/O Currie A.M, p.1.
[67] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, p.3; Maher, 'My Experiences as a Prisoner of War in Germany', p.16; Interview with Deans reel 2.
[68] Mogg, Recommendation Re Aus. 467822 W/O Currie A.M, p.1; R. Sherman, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, A.404804, 4 July 1945, p.1, AWM 779/3/129 Part 1; J. Holliday, unpublished writings titled 'Hand-tying and Hand-cuffing: Did the Germans have Justification?', p.3, AWM PR91/092.
[69] Mogg, Recommendation Re Aus. 467822 W/O Currie A.M, p.1; Sherman, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.1; Holliday, 'Hand-Tying and Hand-Cuffing,' p.3; Interview with Younger, reel 8.

knowledge he needed to gain, and then maintain, his leadership legitimacy and the followership of his men.

It is interesting to note that past MOCs in Currie's compound in Stalag VIIIB/344 became barrack leaders.[70] These were the men who had been forced to step down from the positional leadership position because they had lost the trust and respect of their formal group. Two possible explanations can be offered for this. Currie wanted these men working with him, instead of working against him, possibly causing tension within the formal group about the validity of his decisions. Or, as MOC in a difficult captive setting, Currie may have found their experience and insights invaluable. By keeping them close, Currie could learn from their experiences and mistakes. Currie admitted that he found his position as MOC a very difficult one. In particular he found his task of liaising with the Germans a 'continuous struggle.'[71] For Currie, the input of past MOCs would have offered him some form of support in this difficult task.

National representatives formed the third layer of leadership in the consultative model used by Deans and Currie.[72] This role complimented that performed by the barrack leaders by giving the MOC a complimentary means of monitoring the reactions of the formal group to their decisions. The national representative was also in a unique position to detect any possible perception by the POWs of any decision made by Deans or Currie that reflected national bias. If tensions, based on a sense of disadvantage by a national group, emerged, it was essential that the MOC be aware of them and act swiftly to nullify them before his leadership legitimacy could be affected or even broken.

Deans and Currie, however, used their national representatives differently. Under Deans, national representatives were responsible for monitoring the psychological wellbeing of fellow nationals within the camp as well as ensuring that their physical needs were being met. For example, Warrant Officer F. Seamer, who acted as the

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[70] J. Hunter, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, A.400800, p.1, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 1; Taylor-Gill, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.2; Interview with E. Hall, reel 3.

[71] Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.2.

[72] Prisoner writings and recollections are unclear in regards to how these men were selected. See Seamer, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, pp.3-4; Sherman, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, pp.1-2.

Australian national representative in Deans' camps in Stalag Luft III (Centre Compound) and then in Stalag Luft VI, described his role as meeting all newly arrived Australian POWs, introducing these men to the Australians already in camp and monitoring supplies to ensure that the Australians had access to their basic needs.[73]

In Currie's camps, the national representatives took a more active role in ensuring the physical needs of their national compatriots were being met. For example, the Australian representative, Warrant Officer R. Sherman, monitored the welfare of Australians and also performed the administrative tasks needed to ensure that these men were receiving their food and goods parcels by communicating with overseas headquarters, the Australian Red Cross and the Australian Comforts Fund.[74] National representatives in Currie's camps, therefore, not only provided the MOC with a means of monitoring the mood of the men but also checked with outside agencies the status of the parcels their men were entitled to. This additional role suggests that an extra level of accountability was needed in Currie's compound to prevent any potentially polarising of the prisoners that the distribution of goods parcels might have caused. By designating this task to national representatives, Currie distanced himself from the distribution of parcels at barrack level and could not be held personally responsible for any delayed or missing Red Cross parcels. The introduction of this system also suggests that equitable distribution of Red Cross parcels had been a problem in the Air Force NCO Compound in the past.

Deans initially took a different approach to the distribution of Red Cross parcels. In Stalag Luft I and Stalag Luft III Centre Compound, he set up a group of prisoners, separate from the leadership team, to distribute the parcels.[75] In other camps, such as Stalag Luft VI and Stalag 357, however, it appears that this system ceased to exist. According to Australian Flight Lieutenant Eric Maher, Deans and his leadership team supervised the distribution of food parcels,[76] a claim Deans corroborated.[77] The fact

[73] Seamer, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, pp.3-4.
[74] Sherman, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, pp.1-2.
[75] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, pp.2-4.
[76] Maher, 'My Experiences as POW in Germany', p.16.
[77] Interview with Deans, reel 2.

that Deans' leadership team controlled the distribution of goods parcels, and not the national representatives who could be personally blamed if something went wrong, is evidence that Deans had a stronger followership than Currie because his men trusted his leadership team to distribute these vital parcels equitably.

If the distribution of parcels reflected a level of trust on the part of the groups, why was there an apparent lack of trust in Currie's leadership? In part, the answer lies in camp conditions. The conditions in Stalag VIIIB/344 were more difficult.[78] The Wehrmacht German Commandant and his guards were also more hostile to the POWs. And constant food shortages eroded the trust of the prisoners in their MOC. Currie's own reflections on his role as MOC linked his men's morale to the level of Red Cross parcels being received and distributed amongst the POWS: 'When we had a full parcel issue the morale was a quite high standard. When food was short the men became restless, found dissatisfaction with trivial matters, and discipline would unconsciously relax.'[79] He saw discipline as essential in performing his role as MOC, saying, 'Without the maintenance of discipline I could not adopt the firm stand at the conference with the Commandant. As I had no power to punish offenders, I found that I had to trade on personality and tact to keep things on top line.'[80] Separating the task of distributing Red Cross parcels from his role as positional leader allowed Currie to protect himself from accusations of bribery or corruption, retain the trust of his group and therefore his fulfil his role as MOC.

In his post-war interview for the Imperial War Museum, Deans likened his system of leadership to a 'town council'[81] whereby the 'community… always had opportunity of raising any points of difficulty that they wanted sorting out'.[82] Maher agreed: 'If one were to search the world over, one would never find a display, a true display, of democracy in government as successful as that which existed in this particular POW camp.'[83] According to Deans, the most important advantage of his consultative leadership style was the knowledge it gave him of his men's reactions to the decisions

[78] For an overview of these conditions see the explanation at the start of this chapter.
[79] Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.2.
[80] *ibid*., pp.2-3.
[81] *ibid*.
[82] Interview with Deans, reel 2.
[83] Maher, 'My Experiences as a Prisoner of War in Germany', p.16.

he made. This knowledge allowed him to be proactive if any prisoner, or group of prisoners, questioned his ability to lead. 'I had my finger on the pulse of the camp and I knew if anything was going wrong what it was that was causing the upset, if there was an upset, and I could do something to put it right,' he said.[84]

Accommodating the escape committees

An elected captive leader, whose legitimacy was founded on democratic structures, had to tread carefully. This sometimes meant that the leader had to delegate or transfer some of his authority to ensure the continued support of his formal group. For Deans and Currie, examples of this have already been shown above. One of the best examples of transference of power that both men implemented, however, is evident in their relationship with their respective escape committees.

As special POWS who were forbidden to work, air force NCOS were unable to leave the confines of their camp.[85] Trapped behind the wire, they became obsessed with escape. Australian Air Force Sergeant Douglas Butterworth, held captive in Currie's compound in Stalag VIIIB/344, summed it up this way: '[You felt that you must] get your freedom at any cost... It was there, so burning and you feel so useless. Just sitting, sitting there and vegetating. You felt you had to do something.'[86] Therefore, the escape committee trumped even the leadership committee put in place by Deans and Currie for men planning to escape.

Deans and Currie both knew and understood the psychological importance that planning for, and participating in, escape activities had for their men. Currie, in particular, understood Butterworth's passionate desire to escape as he had also attempted to escape prior to his election as MOC.[87] Currie used the switch technique discussed earlier.[88] He 'swapped' places with an army prisoner who took Currie's

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[84] Interview with Deans, reel 2.
[85] Gilbert, *POW*, pp.145-148; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, pp.260-261; Vourkoutiotis, *Prisoners of War and the German High Command*, pp.112-113.
[86] Interview with Butterworth, tape 6.
[87] Currie, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of war, pp.1-2; Letter to Bel from Currie, pp.1-2.
[88] Currie, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; E. Evans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIBx5801, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5439; E. Morris, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIB/74, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3341; L. Morris, Special Questionnaire for British/American

place in the Air Force NCO Compound. Posing as the army prisoner, Currie left Stalag VIIIB, under German escort, and was transferred to a satellite Arbeitskommando. From there he made his escape. He remained at large for five days before he was recaptured and taken back to Stalag VIIIB. As he explained in a letter to his wife Bel, he wanted to once again be himself.[89] Currie believed that if he could only escape, his frustrations with captivity would disappear. After being recaptured, Currie accepted that his attempts would not bring him freedom and found a purpose to life in his role as MOC. To Bel he wrote, '[S]ince I got the job a couple of months ago, I have given up all ideas of escape….I have felt much better since I acquired my job [I am] much more alert mentally and quite energetic.'[90] Currie's acceptance of his captivity, however, was buttressed by a false hope. In October 1943 he wrote that 'in any case it [the war] can't go much longer now.'[91] Currie was therefore more than willing to transfer any power that was necessary to the escape committee in order to give his men the chance to escape and to succeed where he had failed, even at the risk of German reprisals.

Deans, however, never had an opportunity to personally experience escape because, soon after arriving at his first permanent camp at Stalag Luft I, he was elected MOC.[92] Despite this, Deans was well aware of the desire for freedom evident amongst most of his men.[93] Like Currie, Deans therefore transferred a certain level of his authority to the escape committee. Considering the camps in which he found himself, he may have had little choice in the matter. In Dulag Luft and Stalag Luft I, Deans' formal group had originally been intermixed with air force officers. Here, under Day's leadership, escape became an operational mission of the POWs.[94] Then when Deans was MOC of the Air Force NCO Compound at Stalag Luft III, the officers were planning the Great

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Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIBx3631, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5444; K. Thompson, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/LIBx1432, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5449; Castle, *The Password is Courage*, pp.47-48.

[89] Letter to Bel from Currie, pp.1-2.

[90] *ibid*., p.2.

[91] *ibid*.

[92] Deans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Interview with Deans, reel 2.

[93] Interview with Deans, reel 2.

[94] E. Hall, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x4887 pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:WO208/5441; L. Harold, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x.4899 p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5441; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.101-111; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.17-21, 44-75; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, pp.33-34; Smith, *Wing*'s *Day*, pp.81-94.

Escape.[95] In his own compounds, Deans' POW formal group included Sergeant George John William Grimson who, in his own right, became a legendary escape figure and was the first chief of Deans' escape committee.[96] Combined, this meant that if Deans had challenged his men's plans for escape, his leadership legitimacy would most likely have fractured beyond repair.

Deans' escape committee ran on the same lines as that developed by the British/Commonwealth Air Force officers.[97] He had learnt from Day who, as the SBO of East and then North Compound at Stalag Luft III, under the pretence of checking on the welfare of the NCOs, visited Deans.[98] During these visits Day informed Deans about the officers' escape committee structure and the intelligence activities that were taking place in his compound.[99] Day also arranged for the North Compound escape committee to secretly tutor the NCOs in the Centre Compound on their escape organisation and the work of the escape factories.[100] As a result of these visits, the previously unsuccessful NCO escape committee, renamed Tally Ho, was restructured to undertake both escape and intelligence work according to Day's operational model.[101] The men in Currie's escape committee probably also had this information. Most air force NCOs went through Dulag Luft and some air force NCOs were also transferred from the Air Force NCO Compound at Stalag Luft IIII to Stalag VIIIB/344.

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[95] Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.101-111; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.17-21; Durand, *Stalag Luft III*, pp.81-83; Smith, *Wing*'s *Day*, pp.81-94; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, pp.33-34.
[96] Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.38, 46-68.
[97] L. Bruce, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x5940, pp.1-10, TNA:PRO:WO208/5437.
[98] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942- January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, pp.81-82; J. Deans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2, TNA:PRO:WO208/5439; R. Kellet, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System Report RAF Intelligence, 27 June 1945, Appendix Z.H, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:WO208/3245; International Committee Red Cross Meeting Minutes, 14 September 1942, p.1, TNA:PRO:AIR40/266; Report of Visiting Representative of the International Red Cross Committee, 22 February 1943, p.1 TNA:PRO:AIR40/266; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.19-20, 36; Smith, *Wing's Day*, p.85. The practice of using NCOs as officer orderlies also allowed the lines of communication to remain open in Stalag Luft I and III. See S. Booker, unpublished writings titled 'The Royal Air Force in Buchenwald 1944', pp.162-163, IWM 97/9/1; King, 'A Wartime Log', pp.46-48; Smith, *Wings Day*, pp.84-85.
[99] Dominey, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.36.
[100] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, p.17.
[101] Bruce, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-10; E. Hall, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Harold, Special Questionnaire, p.1; Maher, 'My Experiences in Germany as a POW', pp.20-21; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.30-36, 40-41, 44-70, 70-76, 85-110.

One significant difference, however, existed between the officers' and NCO's escape committees. In the officers' committees, by virtue of their positional rank power, the SBOs retained the authority over the escape committee in regards to the final decisions as to if, and when, an escape was to take place.[102] In theory, Deans and Currie were meant to have the same authority.[103] But over time, with a history of successful breaches from the wire, Deans' and Currie's authority on escape became subservient to their escape committees in these matters. Unlike SBOs such as Day and Massey, Deans and Currie did not have the power to overrule their respective successful and therefore popular escape committees, even when their decisions threatened their leadership goal of collective endurance.

In order to comprehend the risks that the transfer of authority to the escape committees posed for Deans and Currie's leadership goal of collective endurance, closer examination of the work of their respective escape committees is required. In Deans' camps, George Grimson became the escape committee executive officer.[104] Through adopting Day's operational structure, Grimson transformed unorganised, ad hoc and often ill-disciplined escape attempts into a highly organised and successful escape committee.[105] For example, in Stalag Luft III Grimson's escape committee orchestrated the first successful undetected escape by a member of Deans' formal group.[106] Then, in Stalag Luft VI, Grimson organised the escape of five men with one of these men successfully reaching England.[107] Through these and other successes,

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[102] For an explanation of how SBO maintained power over the escape committee within the camps see Chapter 5.
[103] Currie, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Interview with Deans, reel 2.
[104] Deans, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1; J. Gibson, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/PG/LIB/x-116, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5440; E. Hall, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1.
[105] For reference to Deans' revised escape committee basing their escape activities on the officers of Stalag Luft III see Note to DDMI (P/W) J. Sparkes from C. Flockhart, 1 November 1945, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO344/87/2; B. Lascelles, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/PG/LIB/x-5940, pp.10-14, TNA:PRO:WO208/5443; Dominey, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.30-35.
[106] Gibson, Special Questionnaire for British/America Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.70.
[107] Deans, Special Questionnaire For British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Section titled 'Recommendations', p.1; Gibson, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Interview with D. Bernard by P. Hart for the IWM in June 2004, reel 14, IWM 26561; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, p.198; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.72-79, 99; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.78-81.

Grimson instilled in Deans' formal group a genuine belief that escape was not a fool's hope, but a real possibility. It was at this point, that Grimson's leadership may have threatened to eclipse Deans'. However, before this threat could be realised, Grimson himself escaped.[108] Instead of attempting to reach home, Grimson decided to stay in Germany to arrange a safe escape line for other prisoners.[109] This decision, and his ability to continue to communicate it to the men still behind the wire, transformed him into a legend.[110]

Deans acknowledged that Grimson's vision was a powerful one for the men and, although it presented a challenge to Deans' belief in collective endurance, he accommodated it to ensure that he still had control over his men. His repatriation questionnaire and interview reveals that throughout all of the escape activities in his camps he remained a quiet yet constant presence.[111]

Deans' interaction with Day instilled in him two vital understandings. Firstly, illicit activities conducted by the positional leader could further cement the loyalty of his formal group and, more importantly, the positional leader could take control of the intelligence network within his camp.[112] Through listening to Day and watching the work of Grimson, Deans came to understand that by introducing and becoming the leader of his camp's intelligence network, he could, to a certain extent, counter Grimson's power by offering an alternative to escape. Deans, therefore, set up his own intelligence network and maintained absolute control over its activities.[113]

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[108] Deans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, 'Recommendations'p.1; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.282-285; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.46-48, 58, 68-70, 101-110, 135; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.115-124.
[109] For an explanation of Grimson's attempt to set up an POW escape line see Interview with Bernard, reels 14-15; Crawley, *Escape from Germany*, pp.282-285; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.13.
[110] It is unknown what happened to Grimson after he left Stalag VI. See Deans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, 'Recommendations', p.1; Interview with Bernard, reel 15; Interview with Buckingham, reel 2; Interview with Kerr, tape 6; Dominey, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.13, 135.
[111] For reference to Deans preference of a quiet camp see Interview with Deans, reels 2 and 3; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.90. For an overview of Deans support of Grimson's escape activities see Deans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.3; Interview with Deans, reel 3.
[112] For an explanation of how Day controlled his own camps/compounds intelligence activities see Chapter 5.
[113] Deans, Special Questionnaire for British/America Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Interview with Deans, reels 3 and 4.

In this role Deans personally interviewed all newly arrived POWs in the hope that he could glean from their experiences some intelligence worthy of transmission back to London. For this task, Warrant Officer J. Bristow built a camp radio.[114] The radio was also used to code and decode messages coming in and out of the camp. Although Deans' intelligence operation in no way challenged that operated by Day, it did exactly what he had hoped it would: it gave Deans another way to interact with his men and the illicit nature of his activities confirmed in the eyes of his men that Deans was the legitimate leader of their formal group.

Deans also used his intelligence network to strengthen his leadership legitimacy in more pragmatic ways. He knew that his men were desperate for information about the progress of the war. Deans, therefore, allowed selected prisoners to use the camp radio to listen to BBC news broadcasts.[115] These prisoners would then pass the information on to the other POWS, usually through the barrack leaders or designated newsreaders.[116] Although this threatened the security of his intelligence operations because of the danger of leaks, it met his formal group's psychological needs.[117] His permission for a camp news service would have gone a long way to ensuring that the men understood the power Deans had come to hold in his position. The fact that Deans hid the camp radio in his gramophone also let the men know that Deans was willing to personally take risks to ensure that their need for news was met.[118] His strategy of conceding some authority to the escape committee and countering its attraction with other activities revealed a shrewd leader. His actions confirmed for his men that he deserved their trust, respect and ultimately their followership.

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[114] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, pp.50-59; Deans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.1-4; Gibson, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Interview with Bernard, reel 14; Interview with Deans, reels 3 and 4; Interview with Kerr, tape 6; Dominey, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.86-87.
[115] K. Holden, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:WO208/5441; Interview with Buckingham, reel 2; Interview with Dawson, tape 5; Interview with E. Hall, reel 4; Interview with Kerr, tape 7; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.19.
[116] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, pp.56-57; Holden, Report, p.1; J. Liley, 'Jack's War 1939-1945', p.45, AWM MSS1436; Interview with Middeton, tape 6.
[117] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, p.15; Holden, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2; Dominey, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.19; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.130-131.
[118] Deans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, attached report, p.4; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.111-112; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.114-115.

Currie's personal history of escape and his notion that escape gave prisoners the opportunity to feel like themselves again meant that he was more accepting of transferring some his leadership authority to the escape committee. As Stalag VIIIB/344 was a mixed camp, the favourite escape attempt was the one Currie had used, the 'switch'.[119] In order for this scheme to work, the air force prisoners cooperated with, and essentially gave the dominant role in organising escapes, to the Army Compound's escape committee. Currie's transfer of authority, then, was to not only the air force escape committee, but also to the army escape committee led by their MOC, Regimental Sergeant Major Sidney Sherriff.[120] Sherriff had tight control of his escape committee. He retained the power to approve or veto all escape attempts and, if the prisoner making the escape was a POW who was wanted by the Germans for questioning or punishment, or the prisoner was a transit naval officer, Sheriff organised the escape himself.[121] Sherriff's power over his escape committee was complete. In a multiple-national other rank POW compound in a camp known for its difficult conditions and violent incidents, both between guards and prisoners and even between prisoners themselves, Sherriff understood the importance of retaining absolute control.[122] Currie clearly trusted Sherriff's ability to control his escape committee and exercise proper precautions for the safety of his men. In fact, he had a

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[119] For an explanation of the swap escape scheme see Davidier, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-2; E. Evans, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/x-1508, pp.1-3, TNA:PRO:WO208/5439; W. Harrison, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/x4584, pp.1-3, TNA:PRO:WO208/5441; K. Hyde, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG/MIS-x1432, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5441; Morris, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoner of War, MI9/PG/LIB/74, pp.2-3; R. Stronger, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/S/PG, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:WO208/3341.

[120] Currie, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-2; S. Sherriff, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP. MIS-x 2173, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:WO208/5448; Interview with J. Moran by C. Wood on 12 February 1991 for the IWM, reel 4, IWM 4816.

[121] For reference to Sherriff's control of escape see S. Derry, Allied Interrogation Section: Report Derived from a Party of POW Repatriated from Germany in January 1945, 7 March 1945, p.10, AWM54 779/3/127; Sherriff, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, pp.1-2; Interview with Moran, reel 4. For reference to Sherriff's organization of particular escapes see C. Medley, unpublished manuscript titled 'The Day the War Began', pp.28-28B, IWM 02/25/1; W. Stephens, unpublished and untitled writings, p.38-43, IWM 86/7/1; R. Wilson, unpublished manuscript titled 'Five Years Easy', pp.115-117, IWM 83/4/1; Interview with E. Handscombe by the IWM on 11 February 1996, reel 5 IWM 16909; Interview with Moran, reel 4.

[122] For reference to the temperamental control Sherriff had over his formal group see Protecting Power Report, Stalag VIIIB, August 1941, p.5, TNA:PRO:WO224/27; T. Williams, Prisoners of War Statements RAAF for Repatriation Conference, no.408667, 4 July 1943, pp.1-2, NAA:A705:163/1/743; Interview with E. Hall, reel 3; Passmore, *The Password is Courage*, p.86.

deep respect for Sherriff and described their relationship as amicable and one that gave him 'very little trouble.'[123]

Yet even with his background of escape, deferring power to a British Army RSM had the danger of undermining his own leadership legitimacy. In the circumstances of Stalag VIIIB/344, however, the transfer of Currie's authority to the army escape committee was necessary for any air force NCO to have a genuine chance of successfully escaping. Currie, therefore, had to be flexible in his leadership approach and his transference of power. He had to transfer personal control to two escape committees and to another MOC to accommodate the men's desire to escape. Clearly, the decision was a good one because the transfer of power helped give him leadership legitimacy and followership. The proof of that lies in the fact that Currie was the longest serving air force MCO in Stalag VIIIB/344.

Relations with the captor

A key component of a leader's ability to acquire the trust of his formal group was successful negotiations on the group's behalf with the captors. For democratically elected leaders, this was even more important. In examining both men's interactions with their captor and their formal group's perceptions of their abilities, it quickly becomes apparent that Deans' was more confident and successful in dealing with the Germans than Currie. Deans, however, did have it easier. He was often dealing with the more flexible Luftwaffe Commandants and lived in camps that usually had good conditions for his men. He also spoke German fluently.[124] Yet, despite these advantages, there was something about Deans' nature that allowed him to gain significant concessions from the German Luftwaffe Commandants.

His formal group, for example, believed that Deans' success could be attributed to more than his language skills: they believed that Deans understood the German psyche.[125] British Air Force NCO Edgar Louis Graham Hall described Deans' ability

[123] Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.1.
[124] Interview with Deans, reel 4.
[125] Interview with Beckett, reel 1; Interview with Deans, reel 4; Interview with Dawson, tape 5; Gilbert, *POWs*, p.137.

to negotiate with their captors as 'extraordinary.'[126] Deans knew just how far to push his Commandants without instigating reprisals or punishment and, for the most part, he came away from a Commandant's office having got what he wanted. Deans described his technique in dealing with the Germans as reverse psychology. '[I] usually tried to convince them that it was in their interests as well as ours that they should meet our requests and usually it worked,' he said.[127] He added, 'I had fair degree of confidence in what I could ask them and what was reasonable to ask them and what I could insist on and that made a big difference'.[128]

The trust Deans' group had in him largely stemmed from his tenacity in dealing with the captor. Mogg, his assistant, described Deans' method of dealing with the Germans: '[h]e could argue his principles with skill and hang on with the tenacity of a bulldog.'[129] Most prisoners agreed that Deans' success lay in the respect he gave his Commandants and the respect he demanded in return. If that respect was breached, Deans would not give in until the Germans had conceded the point and order, according to Deans' perception, had been restored.[130] He also brought one other element to his negotiations, a lack of animus. As he explained, 'I was never a hater. There are some people who can't avoid hating and it so happened that the Germans were the enemy and they were all bitter and full of hatred towards the Germans. Well, I wasn't…It was against my nature to hate just for the sake of hating.'[131]

Deans was not above pandering to the captor. For example, when a visiting Luftwaffe General came to visit Stalag Luft III, Deans, acting on his Commandant's suggestion, organised his men to perform a German military parade. Then, at Stalag Luft VI, Deans and the Commandant both attended the prisoner organised 'races', which the Commandant may have interpreted as the POWs finally accepting their status as

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[126] Interview with E. Hall, reel 7.
[127] Interview with Deans, reel 2.
[128] *ibid*.
[129] Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.76.
[130] Interview with Bernard, reel 11; Interview with J. Bristow by C. Wood for the IWM in 1982, reel 1, IWM 6178; Interview with E. Hall, reel 4; Interview with E. Sanderson for the IWM by C. Wood on 21 March 1995, reel 4, IWM 15027; Interview with A. Wilson by C. Wood for the IWM on 31 July 1997, reel 2, IWM 17751; Dominey, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.76; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.54-55.
[131] Interview with Deans, reel 4.

prisoners.[132] Deans stored up the credit he accrued from activities like these to negotiate concessions for his men.[133] For example, Deans convinced the Commandant in Stalag Luft I, that the normal captor practice of pooling the contents of the Red Cross tins into one heap was a health hazard.[134] Deans' prisoners then received the contents of their Red Cross packages in their original condition. This was a small concession, however, in comparison to those Deans was able to negotiate during the forced marches during the final stages of captivity.

As his men were led out of their camp at Fallingbostel to the local train station, Deans bluntly told his Commandant that he was not allowed to squeeze 25 prisoners into each train car. Instead, 'It was 12 or 13 or nothing.'[135] The Commandant acquiesced. Then, when his men were matching, Deans talked his Commandant into giving him permission to leave the marching column to find Red Cross food parcels as his men had little left to eat.[136] Deans, found a Red Cross Representative and negotiated the delivery of 6000 food parcels for his men. Once these parcels had been used, Deans then commandeered a truck, with one of his fellow prisoners and a German guard who acted as his escort, to find more Red Cross parcels. The three unlikely companions spent one night in a German services club, before finding a Red Cross depot and put 200 food parcels in their truck. The biggest concession Deans negotiated with his Commandant came on 19 April 1945.[137] Just as his men had stopped marching to have their lunch break, British Typhoons opened fire on them. Sixty of Deans' men were killed. As explained in the preface to this chapter, Deans realised that these killings were not going to be a one-off incident. The Typhoons would be back. Deans gained permission from his Commandant to cross British lines to tell the British sector commander that the group of men they had targeted were not Germans but British/Commonwealth POWs. In the chaos of the last days of the European war, despite the overwhelming odds, Deans succeeded in accomplishing his task. Having passed on his urgent message, the British commander wanted to fly Deans back to

[132] Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.72.
[133] Interview with Wilson, reel 2; Interview with Younger, reel 9.
[134] Interview with Bernard, reel 11.
[135] Letter to O. Clutton-Brock from Sergeant R. White, 14 July 2000, cited in Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, p.117.
[136] Interview with Deans, reel 4; Interview with Younger, reel 22.
[137] Interview with Deans, reel 5.

England. To his amazement, Deans refused this offer of freedom. In his post-war interview Deans explained the reasons behind his decision.

> I said no. I felt I came there with this purpose in mind to contact the British and warn them about the POW presence there and having done that I felt that I had to go back to the POWs that I was still leading.[138]

This act is evidence of the extent to which Deans' dedication to his leadership outweighed considerations of his own self-interest. For this action, historian Simon Mackenzie labelled Deans a 'true man of confidence.'[139]

The behaviour of Deans' formal group, however did not always make his job easy. In his successive camps, baiting the guards, popularly known as goon baiting, became an art form. Prisoners stole and sabotaged their guards' rifles, bleated like sheep during compulsory head counts, destroyed their identity cards and when they were being re-made, stuck a stamp of King George VI over the camera lens.[140] The prisoners also became highly skilled at deliberately delaying count parades to mask a fellow prisoner's escape attempt. On one such occasion, they held a bonfire, a sing-a-long and then constructed a human pyramid.[141] Deans only intervened when the prisoners placed themselves in danger from the guards.[142] Up until that point, he allowed the prisoners to have free reign to cause as much inconvenience to their captors as possible.

There was one incident, however, where Deans, no matter how hard he tried, had no influence over his Commandant. Following a successful escape attempt from Stalag Luft VI on 19 April 1944, the Germans found, arrested and took into custody Leading Aircraftman (later Warrant Officer) R.B.H Townsend-Coles, Warrant Officer Nat

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[138] *ibid*.
[139] Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth* p.362.
[140] R. Mogg, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x4816, p.2, TNA:PRO:WO208/5445; Maher, 'My Experiences as a Prisoner of War in Germany', p.14; Interview with Kerr, tape 7; Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.98-100; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.79-82; Passmore, *Moving Tent*, pp.167-168; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.79-81.
[141] Rolf, *Prisoners of the Reich*, p.108.
[142] Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.51.

Leaman and six other unnamed air force NCOs.[143] These men had been recaptured wearing civilian clothes, which in light of the aftermath of the Great Escape horrified Deans. Despite his best efforts, the Commandant refused to allow Deans to see his men. Then on 6 May, without any warning, the Germans transferred Townsend-Coles out of the camp to Tilsit civil prison. Through enquires made to the Protecting Power, Deans discovered that Townsend-Coles had been court martialled on charges of espionage and collaboration with the Polish underground. Townsend-Coles was sentenced to death and executed.

Deans did, however, manage to help Nat Leaman. Somehow he managed to send Leaman a uniform and his identity tags.[144] Then accompanied by Sergeant Peter John Mitchell Thomas, a trained barrister, Deans presented a formidable defence at Leaman's court marital. Despite their efforts, Leaman was found guilty and sentenced to three months hard labour.[145] Luckily, Leaman never served his sentence. His court marital had been delayed until 15 January 1945 and by this time Germany was facing bigger problems than punishing a failed POW escaper.

These incidents, and especially the execution of Townsend-Coles, were a sharp reminder to Deans of the limits of his capacity to protect his formal group. Despite his close relationship with the Germans and his ability to gain important, and at times life saving concessions Deans' influence over his captor was limited. It was a stark reminder to Deans and his formal group that their safety depended on the whims of their captors, that Deans could only deliver them safely home if their captor wanted them to live. Yet, despite his failures, Deans' followership did not break. He retained his men's trust to the very end.

No substantial writings by Currie or his formal group exist on his interactions with the captor. Reasons for this lack of evidence have previously been explained. Currie only briefly described his interactions with the Commandants in his camp. In his official statement explaining the conditions for the Air Force Compound within Stalag

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[143] Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.104-105; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.107-110; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.120-127. For reference to Townsend-Coles changing rank see Clutton-Brock, *Footprints on the Sands of Time*, pp.43, 103-105.
[144] Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.122-123
[145] Dominy, *The Sergeant Escaper*, p.119.

VIIIB/344, Currie stated that 'complaints of all types were frequently addressed both to the Commandant and to the delegate to the protecting power [sic], and from time to time some slight improvement in conditions was noticeable.'[146] These small concessions, according to Currie, only occurred after 'quite a deal of verbal struggling with the German Commandant.'[147] Mogg, who also served with Currie as well as Deans, had a more positive assessment of Currie's leadership. In his written recommendation of Currie's leadership he stated, 'This warrant officer at all times handles [sic] the Germans well and obtained the maximum of concessions from them at the same time maintaining a high standard of discipline and morale amongst the RAF prisoners.'[148]

Deans' followership

Due to the lack of prisoner writings and recollections on Currie's leadership, the narrative below only examines Deans' followership.

Deans' followership was exceptional. In the six camps where he was elected MOC, the loyalty of his formal group was unquestionable. The POWs themselves best describe the extent of their loyalty. They described him as 'outstanding,'[149] 'wonderful,'[150] 'excellent'[151] 'Mr. Steadfast,'[152] and 'King Dixie.'[153] Despite his failures, these men credited Deans with the collective survivorship of his formal groups.[154] For them, Deans was nothing less than their 'guiding inspiring light.'[155] Deans' ability to inspire such strong followership when he faced the restrictions of democratic accountability is testimony of his ability to make his men feel that they

[146] A. Currie, Accurate account of Conditions existing in Stalag 344 RAF during the Period from 3 August 1943 to 21 June 1945 during which time I was RAF Trustee and Compound Commander, p.1, TNA:PRO:AIR40/273.
[147] Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, p.2.
[148] Mogg, Recommendation Re Aus. 467822 W/O Currie A.M, p.1.
[149] A. Forrest-Perceival, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A425306, 22 June 1945, p.4, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 25; Interview with Dawson, tape 5; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.244.
[150] Interview with Beckett, reel 3; Interview with Bernard, reel 8; Interview with Morton, reel 3.
[151] Interview with J. Leakey by the IWM in December 2006, reel 9, IWM 29522.
[152] Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.9.
[153] Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, p.9; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.25.
[154] W. Betts, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A402563, p.3, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 5; Interview with Dawson, tape 5; Interview with Leakey, reel 9; Interview with Younger, reel 17; Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers*, pp.9, 19; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.224.
[155] Maher, 'My Experiences as a Prisoner of War in Germany', p.18.

were participants in his decision-making and were protected by his leadership. His ability to continually manage his unique form of power is nothing short of remarkable. His formal group also understood this. The Official History of Stalag Luft III Centre Compound states that: 'He [Deans] maintained his position by virtue of his popularity [as he] could not give orders.'[156] The officers' history of North Compound also commended Deans' on his ability to control his men because, in comparison to the SBO who exercised leadership authority based on rank, Deans' authority was not. Instead they described his leadership context as being more similar to the 'laws of the jungle [than] military laws.'[157]

In return for his selfless service, the men gave Deans their devoted loyalty, a loyalty that, even many years after the war, motivated his men to press the British military for further official acknowledgment of his services. Many of his men did not consider the MBE was adequate recognition of Deans' role as a POW leader. Hall, for example, believed that Deans 'wasn't treated particularly well or honoured as he should have been…he was a most remarkable leader.'[158] Upon his return to civilian life, Deans was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.[159] During his years as MOC Deans would have been suffering from the early stages of this crippling degenerative disease. This makes his achievements even more remarkable. Deans became the embodiment of hope for his men. He was their protector, guide and friend, a leader who inspired his men to endure the boredom and frustration of captivity with dignity. Through his calm presence, words and actions, Deans reminded his men that, despite their POW status, the war would end, and when it did, they would have the opportunity to live their lives to the full. Australian POW, Warrant Officer Calton Younger, aptly summed up the importance of Deans to the men, '[H]e was the man the hour brought forth…[h]e was predestined to lead.'[160]

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[156] Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, p.17.
[157] R. Kellet, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System, Appendix Z.M, pp.1-2, TNO:PRO:WO208/3245.
[158] Interview with E. Hall, reel 4. Also see Interview with Morton, reel 3.
[159] Interview with Buckingham, reel 2; Interview with E. Hall, reel 4; Interview with Morton, reel 3; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.224.
[160] Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, p.187. Also see Maher, 'My Experiences as a Prisoner of War in Germany', p.17.

Democratic leadership amongst informal groups

Democratic leadership structures are more often found within informal groups where the traditional roles of leader and follower are shared amongst group members, and leaders emerge based on the needs and desire of group members.[161] In informal groups democratic leadership styles are, therefore, applied in their purest sense.

Amongst informal Australian groups in captivity in the Second World War, the extent to which group members changed roles depended on their captive conditions. In relatively stable captive settings it was possible for all group members to interchangeably lead and follow. The dynamic status of group roles in this captive environment reflected the fact that the captor provided for most of the prisoners' basic needs. Therefore, there was little threat to the survivorship of group members. In these circumstances, a prisoner's social skills, empathy, patience and ability to distract their fellow informal group members from their boredom enabled them to emerge as a leaders of their groups. At other times the needs, mood and activities of group members meant that these men were followers. Australian prisoners across both theatres spent some time in relatively stable captive settings and groups were therefore also relatively static.[162]

In volatile captive settings, however, informal group membership became much more fluid, allowing prisoners to continue to part of an informal group when their original group had either been disbanded or had collapsed.[163] As Gavin Daws, Hank Nelson

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[161] Sociological and socio-psychological studies confirm that democratic structures are used in groups. See Bell, 'Notes on Authoritarian and Democratic Leadership,' pp.403-404; Cartwright and Zander (eds.), 'An Introduction: Leadership and Group Performance,' p.492; Cranach, 'Leadership as a Function of Group Action,' pp.120-133; Homans, *The Human Group*, pp.109-129,132-155; Wilson, *Informal Groups*, pp.142-158; Whyte, 'Informal Leadership and Group Structure,' pp.105-112.

[162] For example see H. Marshall, unpublished and untitled writings, p.787, AWM PR03508 Wallet 4; J. Morshel, unpublished writings titled 'A Wartime Log,' pp.39-42, AWM PR00506; N. Pritchard, unpublished and untitled writings, pp.6-8, AWM PR86/003; McLaggan, *The Will to Survive*, pp.41, 68-75; Wilson, *You'll Never Get Off the Island,* pp.62-63; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.44, 61.

[163] For example see T. Hamelin, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A436224, 9 April 1945, p.1, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 30; J. Akdersley, unpublished memoirs titled 'Memories of World War Two,' pp.12-13, IWM 07/14/1; M. Edwards, unpublished and untitled writings, p.16, AWM PR88/66; Miggins, Diary 10 May 1943, 8 June 1943; Interview with D. Dunn on 18 November 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive no.0074, tape 2, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1562.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 12 February 2014; Interview with J. Ling on 2 May 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive No. 0015, tape 2, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/24.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 1 May 2014.

and Cameron Forbes have argued, prisoners understood that belonging to a group increased their chances of survival.[164]

Democratic leadership structures were a critical contributing factor to survival for prisoners in volatile captive settings. In these settings, group members rotated leadership responsibilities based on those who, at any given moment, were more capable of helping weaker or sicker group members, or could gain concessions and supplies for group members. When a prisoner became apathetic or was dying, responsibility for this man were assumed by prisoners in the group who had a special connection with him. Usually these men were particularly close mates or shared a special trust or even a shared experience. They could use this connection to snap a man out of apathy or provide comfort to a dying prisoner.

This section examines democratic leadership structures that existed amongst informal groups in two volatile captive environments, the Burma-Thailand Railway and the forced marches during in Europe in the winter of 1945.[165] The examination of informal groups using democratic leadership structures in these settings is focused on two themes: how prisoners collected and then distributed food in both theatres, and how group members on the Burma-Thailand Railway behaved when one of their own was sick or dying.

Burma-Thailand Railway

On the Burma-Thailand Railway, the options for informal groups to supplement the captor ration and any extra food supplied by their positional leader for their base camp were limited. The largely uninhabited jungle setting meant that bartering was restricted to the occasional Thai traders who operated on river barges. Other options for securing additional food were capturing wild animals or stealing from the Japanese or other prisoners.[166]

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[164] Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese*, p.270; Forbes, *Hellfire*, p.287; Nelson, *POW*, pp.56-57.
[165] Analysis of Information relating to Movement of Prisoner of War Camps in the Path of the Soviet Advance, not dated, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:AIR14/1239; Cipher to Foreign Office from Berne, No. 191, 26 January 1945, p.1, TNA:PRO:FO916/1156; Enclair to Foreign Office from Berne, No. 216, 1 February 1945, p.2, TNA:PRO:FO916/1156.
[166] Prisoners stealing from each other is an example of self-preservation overriding informal group's structures and democratic leadership styles. This type of behaviour is examined in Chapter 9.

In the initial stage of their transfer to Thailand, most men within informal groups were physically capable of engaging in some hunting activities and taking it in turns to walk the distance to and from the creek to collect and boil drinking water. For example, in February 1942 at their base camp at Konyu, members from informal groups in Dunlop Force caught fish, collected clams and captured wild animals.[167] Group members either performed these acts as a collective group or divided into pairs focusing on different activities in an effort to increase their chances of success. This division of tasks demonstrates that men understood that by pooling their knowledge, resources and skills, their group stood a better chance of supplementing their food supplies.

However, the ability of all group members to contribute equally to gathering food and water supplies did not last long. When the prisoners moved to the main construction phase of the railway, the intensity and volume of the work demanded by the captor, combined with the violence of the guards and engineers, meant that most men soon became physically incapable of performing any additional tasks. The onset of the monsoon season brought with it significant disruptions to the Japanese supply lines to prisoner base camps up river, so the ability and willingness of group members to find extra food became essential.[168] This task now fell to the healthiest and strongest group members. Lance Corporal Alan Michael Middleton provides an example.

Because of his large physical stature, Middleton coped better than most of his informal group members with the physical demands of working on the railway.[169] He became the procurer of extra food. After finishing his shift, Middleton usually walked three miles uphill to Konyu River to barter with passing Thai traders. He made sure that his informal group members received their fair share of any extra food he had obtained. Middleton continued to make this trek even after he became sick. In an interview with Patsy Adam-Smith, Bill Haskill explained that Middleton believed that he was responsible for gathering whatever food he could because he considered himself as better off than the rest of his mates. Haskill painted a vivid picture of Middleton:

[167] G. Thompson, Diary 11 February 1943, AWM PR89/167; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.41.
[168] Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, p.396; Barker, *Behind Barbed Wire*, p.107; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.580.
[169] Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, pp.421-422.

> At the end of a day's toil, if there happened to be a barge down the river (which was about 3 miles away), you'd find Middy going down to do business with the Thais, and I should imagine on many occasions to his advantage because he wasn't afraid to use a little bit of force if he had mates who were suffering. He'd get an egg or some salt or a bit of tobacco or something, but [he] always would do that extra three, sometimes six miles to pick up stores so that he'd be able to pass them on to his mates.[170]

Prisoners also used theft and cooperation with other informal groups to secure extra food for their mates. Private Elliott McMaster recalled members of U Battalion D Force watching British POWs acting as cattle herders for the Japanese.[171] Australians from different formal groups worked together to capture a straggling cow. Once they had successfully stolen and killed the animal, they then sought out their own informal group members to share the meat with. McMaster's memoirs recall that his mate Private Syd Creek, who was one of the prisoners involved in the theft, had been a butcher in civilian life. Creek made sure that the carcase was properly dressed and cooked and that his informal group received the best cuts of meat. As McMaster recalled: 'We ate well that night. I can still taste that meat.'[172]

Petty Officer Raymond Edward Parkin recalled a similar privileging of members of an informal group when it came to food distribution.

> Tonight two air force chaps who caught [a king cobra] were cooking him over their private fire. By the time they began to eat, they were already surrounded by the curious and hopeful. But only a couple of the most intimate friends were privileged to taste.[173]

These examples of democratic food distribution amongst informal groups are not exceptional. The practice of healthier informal group members searching for food and

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[170] B. Haskell cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea,* p.422.
[171] McMaster, 'My War Experiences, Friendships, and Three and a Half Years as a Prisoners of War,' p.23.
[172] *ibid*.
[173] Parkin, *Into the Smother,* p.41.

then dividing it equally amongst mates became common practice amongst Australians in this volatile captive setting. As Signaller Charles J. Parkes, remarked, 'If you got something extra you'd take it back to share it with your mates.'[174]

Hank Nelson and Gavan Daws argue that the regular distribution of extra food amongst mates in an informal group was common, describing it as a unique democratic quality of Australians aimed at achieving the collective survival of the group's members.[175] Daws drew a sharp distinction between Australian practices and those of the Americans who 'tended to look after themselves as individuals.[176]

The sharing of food continued if a group member became sick. Food was designated specifically for the sick POW and their mates often forced them to eat. Ray Parkin and Gunner Russell Braddon recalled that group members used various tactics to get these men to eat. For the most part they baited and bullied the sick men into eating. To take one example from Parkin's writings: one of the camp doctors told Parkin's informal group that one of its members, Robert Bertram Blackie, had diarrhoea and had to eat.[177] Two of his best mates within the group, 'Ken and Fatty', took it upon themselves to get the job done. When simply relaying the doctor's instructions to Blackie failed to work, they teased and bullied him and gave him 'pep talks'. It worked.[178] Similarly, Braddon's closest mate, Hugh, forced him to drink water and eat rice when Braddon was sick with malaria.[179] However, soon after, captor's orders separated Braddon from his informal group.[180] Braddon quickly found another informal group who accepted him and these men protected Braddon from the captor when he contracted beriberi and relapsed with malaria. His new informal group assumed Hugh's responsibilities for ensuring that Braddon continued to eat and

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[174] Interview with C. Parkes on 16 July 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.2236 , tape 4, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/226.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 25 June 2014.
[175] Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese*, p.298; Nelson, *POW*, pp.56, 65-67; H. Nelson, 'Measuring the Railway: From Individual Lives to National History,' in H. Nelson and G. McCormack (eds.) *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History*, (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin), 1993, p.19.
[176] G. Daws, 'Mateship was the Key to our Survival,' *Advertiser*, 27 May 1983, AWM PR85/054. Also see Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese*, p.298.
[177] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.189.
[178] *ibid*.
[179] Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.212-213.
[180] *ibid*., pp.183-184, 189, 191, 193.

drink.[181] Lance Sergeant Cyril Reginald Gilbert captured this ethic when he said in an interview,

> When you were sick and you didn't feel like eating, if you had a mate, he'd force you to eat, he'd feed you like, you know, make you eat it all, because if you didn't eat, you died.[182]

The persistence of exhausted, hungry men to force their sick mates to eat is evidence of the importance they placed in the collective survival of their informal groups. Instead of taking advantage of their mate's illness and eating his share for themselves, these men persisted in trying to rouse life back into their group member, knowing that not if, but when, roles were reversed, their mate would do the same for them.

Apathy was handled with similar tactics. Private Raymond John Ridley, attached to U Battalion D Force, recalled how his mate Private Jack C. Scott snapped him out of his apathy at Tarso Camp: 'I dropped my bundle well and truly. One day Jack Scott (Scotty was a bloke with a virtually unquenchable spirit) came home from working on "hellfire pass" dragged me off my bed, made me bathe and tore a strip off me. From then on I improved.'[183]

The bonds forged between informal group members also meant that group members did not face death alone.[184] Ken Gray explained that 'It was here [in Thailand] that we all quickly learned the great lessons of brotherly love and mutual dependence. No man died alone, but surrounded with love and compassion.'[185] Gilbert recalled how this difficult task was done. 'You'd talk to him, you'd do everything you could for him,

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[181] *ibid*., pp.193-194, 201-202.
[182] Interview with Gilbert, tape 6. Also see interview with Ling, tape 6; A. Coates cited in Wigmore, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.550.
[183] R. Ridley cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, p.159.
[184] Letter to R. Newton from K. Gray, 7 September 1993, AWM PR01596. This memory is confirmed by the writings and recollections of F. Baker, S. Denning, C. Fotheringham, C. Gilbert, I. Jones, J. Ling, E. McMaster and W. Miggins. See Denning, 'Memoirs of Private S.F. Denning', p.35; C. Fotheringham, unpublished and untitled writings, ff.14-20, AWM PR01341; McMaster, 'My War Experiences, Friendships and Three and a Half Years as a Prisoner of War,' pp.22-23; Miggins, Diary 8 June 1943; Interview with Gilbert, tape 6; Interview with Ling, tape 1; I. Jones cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, p.419; F. Barker cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, p.157.
[185] This view is confirmed by Gilbert and Ling. See Interview with Gilbert, tape 6; Interview with Ling, tape 1.

even though you knew you couldn't do anymore for him. Talk and try and comfort him... tell them lies, "we're gonna do this, we gonna do this when we get home."'[186]

Parkin's writings reveal that the death of a group member could bring with it forgiveness. At Hintok Road Camp, the youngest member of Parkin's informal group, Izzy, who had only just turned 20, was banished from the group for stealing food from his fellow group members in May or June 1942.[187] However, in August, when Izzy was struck down with amoebic dysentery, Parkin and his mates, despite his past behaviour, did not let Izzy die alone.[188] One morning Parkin found him slumped on the ground attempting to reach the banjo. Parkin lifted him, carried him to the banjo, held him upright, wiped him down and then carried him back to his tent. Then Parkin attempted to rouse a response from the cheeky youngster he once knew. He said: 'You'll be alright, you'll get over it. Just try and stick it out.'[189] Izzy's response revealed that he knew Parkin was lying.

> He gave me a weak, grey smile and faintly shook his head, as if he had entered a realm of understanding I should never know… 'I don't think so chief. Yesterday 51 times. Today 39 so far.' Not twelve hours of the day had gone.[190]

Izzy soon succumbed to his illness. His courage in facing death restored his standing amongst his informal group. Parkin wrote, 'From somewhere, in his last weeks, he produced an endurance and courage I greatly admired. He died better than many.'[191]

When an informal group lost a member they were forced to face their own mortality and the fact that their goal of collective survivorship in volatile conditions may have been unrealistic. Nevertheless, the loss was deeply felt as Dunlop recorded. At Hintock Mountain Camp, at the height of the speedo, Dunlop watched one group farewell their mate. 'Pte RJ Watson of 2\3 MG bn died at 1430 hours…Lt Col

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[186] Interview with Gilbert, tape 6.
[187] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.116.
[188] *ibid*., pp.186-191.
[189] *ibid*., p.186.
[190] *ibid*.
[191] *ibid*., p.187.

McEachern conducted the service with Maj Greiner chief mourner. Aged 24 years, he was borne to the graveside by his special chums, one of whom could not control his grief.'[192]

The forced marches in occupied Europe

Most prisoners subjected to the forced marches realised that their informal group would provide their best chance to provide their basic needs and, therefore, their survival. The air force prisoners who evacuated from Stalag Luft officer and NCO camps received some form of advanced notice of their forced movement out of the camp, something denied the army prisoners, particularly those held in Polish Arbeitskommandos.[193] This allowed the air force informal groups to plan who would be responsible for collecting as much food and clothing as possible while also making decisions on how to carry these important items.[194] Prisoner writings and recollections reveal that most informal groups divided their goods between two or four men. Some air force officer groups, such as Australians from Stalag Luft IV, used their bed boards to construct makeshift sledges to carry their possessions.[195] Some informal groups made makeshift swags to carry on their backs.[196] Then as they were leaving their camps, the groups re-arranged their gear to include the final issue of Red Cross food parcels and any useful items from the last personal parcels delivered to their camp.[197]

Most prisoners' food supplies soon ran out during the march. The delayed decision of the OKW to move prisoners away from the advancing Soviets in Poland and Lithuania

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[192] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.280.
[193] For example see Protecting Power Report, no.56, 30 April 1945, p.1, TNA:PRO:FO916/1158; Liley, 'Jack's War 1939-1945,' pp.51-52; B. Lumsden, unpublished writings titled 'An Experience of World War Two', p.83, AWM PR91/116; Interview with Acquier, reel 3; Interview with Lyon, reel 8; Field, 'Prisoners of the Germans and Italians', p.809; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.377.
[194] For example see R. Cantillion, G. Castle and J. Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile trek to Ziegenhain,' in J. Holliday (ed.), S*tories of the RAAF POWS of Lamsdorf including Chronicles of their 500 Mile Trek* (Holland Park: Lamsdorf RAAF POWS Association, 1992), p.279; Liley, 'Jack's War 1939-1945', pp.51-52; Radke, 'Background to the March to Freedom', p.8.
[195] For example see R. Lattin, unpublished writings titled 'I Missed the Boat: Memories of the Australian Armed Forces 1934-1946', p.12, AWM PR01851; Lumsden, 'An Experience of World War Two', p.83; Interview with Cornish, tape 6.
[196] For example see Liley, 'Jack's War 1939-1945', p.51; Radke, 'Background to the March to Freedom, p.6; Interview with Kerr, tapes 7, 10. Most groups had to change their possessions into a makeshift swag when the snow thawed. For example see A. Edwards, unpublished writings titled, 'The Excavation from Stalag Luft III, p.90, IWM 99/83/1; Morshel, 'A Wartime Log,' p.47; A, Playfair, unpublished writings titled, 'A Wartime Log,' p. 27, AWM PR03000.
[197] For example see Interview with Fionette, reel 5; Interview with L. Pearman by L. Smith for the IWM on 16 January 1989, reel 3, IWM 11191; Passmore, *Moving Tent*, pp.206-207.

meant very few transport trucks were available to transport the previously arranged Red Cross parcels and German rations to the prisoners while they were marching.[198] Most of these foodstuffs did not arrive at the prisoners' makeshift camps. When the transport was available and found the marching columns, the rations were meagre.

Australian Air Force POW J.H.T (Bert) Bullock, from Stalag 344, recalled that during the initial 13-day march from Lamsdorf to Gorlitz, a distance of 262 kilometres, his column received a total ration of 3450 grams of bread and 271 grams of margarine.[199] In the second phase of the march, when men walked over 536 kilometres from Gorlitz to Hunderdorf, the prisoners received an average daily ration of 330.8 grams of bread, 76.7 grams of meat and 21.5 grams of cheese.[200] However, as the columns spread out more widely, some men received no rations at all. Four of these men were Australians who received no official ration for seven days. [201] Food shortages were not the prisoners' only problem. The Germans had not organised access to drinking water.[202] To survive these conditions informal groups formed what Scottish POW A. MacDougall described as a 'food sharing pact.'[203] Informal groups shared amongst themselves their personal stocks of food and when they ran out, they relied on each other efforts to scrounge, pilfer and barter for food from the civilian population.[204]

To perform these tasks, leaders emerged from within the groups based on their skills. For example, Australian Air Force prisoner Warrant Officer Jack William Liley was

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[198] Imperial Prisoner of War Committee, Sub-Committee B: Memorandum for Meeting 9 April 1945, pp.1-4, TNA:PRO:FO916/1183; Imperial Prisoner of War Committee, Sub-Committee B: Relief Supplies for Prisoners of War in Germany via Switzerland, 10 March 1945, pp.1-3, TNA:PRO:FO916/1183; Supplement: Relief Supplies for Prisoners of War in Germany Report on the General Situation on March 31 1945, pp.1-5, TNA:PRO:FO916/1183.
[199] J. Bullock, loose paper titled 'Table Recording Travels on the March', AWM PR91/193.
[200] *ibid*.
[201] Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile trek to Ziegenhain,' pp.280, 286.
[202] T. Brummell, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, no.A429213, 3 July 1945, p.1, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 28; A. Kadler, Special Report on Conditions during the Forced March of Americans and British Prisoners of war from their Former Camps to Stalag IIIA, Luckenwalde, no date, p.5, TNA:PRO:FO916/1156; Interview with A. Barnett on 1 October 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.0781, tape 8, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/190.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 10 March 2015.
[203] A. MacDougall, unpublished manuscript titled 'My Memoirs of the War Years 1939-1945 or Home for Christmas Stalag IIID', p.106, IWM 01/29/1.
[204] For example see Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 mile Trek to Ziegenhain,' p.283; Edwards, untitled writings, pp.87-88, 92-93; Williams, unpublished manuscript titled 'Playing for Keeps' pp.31-32, AWM MSS1470; Interview with Dawson, tape 6; Interview with Kerr, tape 7; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.221-223.

nominated as the main food provider for his group because he could speak French. [205] This skill allowed him to barter with French foreign workers passing his marching column to secure bread for his group. Groups without language skills nominated a prisoner or a pair of prisoners who used sign language to communicate their needs to German and Czech citizens, foreign workers and refugees.[206] Records left by Australian prisoners show that this worked and informal groups bartered for food, including chocolate, along with soap and cigarettes. Through trial and error, the prisoners soon identified those members with bartering skills.[207] These men became permanently responsible for gaining the best deals for their groups.

Prisoners exchanged personal items, such as watches or rings, for food. Australian Air Force NCO Warrant Officer David August Radke's wrote,

> Like so many others, I sold my good Rolls watch for one loaf of bread during a rest day – it was divided three ways with my then two matelots muckers and lasted probably ten minutes – but oh! The taste, even in its dry state, was like the best of any cake.[208]

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[205] Liley, 'Jack's War 1939-1945', p.56. For reference to other British and Australian examples see B. Cooper, unpublished and untitled writing dated 8 February 1945, p.11, IWM 78/52/1; S. Stratton cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, p.170.

[206] For example of civilians bartering with Australian and British POWs see Letter addressed to Darling by M. Edwards, written at sea, not dated, p.18, AWM PR88/66; Marshal, untitled writings, p.798; Medley, 'The Day the War Began,' p.33; Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile trek to Ziegenhain,' p.287. For example of British and Australian POWs bartering with foreign workers see W. Sub Van Haften, unpublished and untitled writings, p.56, IWM 84/53/1; Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile trek to Ziegenhain,' p.283. For reference to examples of an Australian POWs bartering with refugees and receiving gifts of food see Interview with R. Corbett on 2 April 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.1718, tape 7, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/306.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 10 March 2015. For example of an Australian and British POWs receiving gifts from civilians see B. Ethridge, unpublished memoirs titled 'Time Out: Remembrances of World War II From the Diary of an Ex-Prisoners of War', p.111, IWM 99/43/1; Interview with E. Kelly on 6 July 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no. 2071, tape 8, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1559.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 21 May 2014; Interview with Winn, tape 10.

[207] For example of Australian informal groups behaviour see Cooper, unpublished and untitled writings, pp.9-10; M. Edwards, Transcription of Personal Diary, p.93, AWM PR88/66; G. Manners, unpublished writings titled 'The Art of Necessity. The Diary of a Prisoner of War 1940-1945', pp.79-80, IWM 95/17/1; N. Newey, unpublished and untitled manuscript, p.97, IWM 90/4/1; Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile Trek to Ziegenhain,' pp.281, 283, 286.

[208] Radke, 'Background to the March to Freedom', pp.25-26.

Not all bartering exchanges were conducted in good faith. Australian Warrant Officers R. Cantillion, Gordon Castle and John Kean's recollections include a description how they duped a child to obtain bread.

> Jack and I managed to keep our watches so far but decide today that they will have to go. Jack's has no hands or glass and will not go but its solid gold and of great sentimental value to him. I managed to get 3 kilos of bread for his watch from a school boy who was so anxious to grab it and get away before the guards caught him he did not have time to open the case to see it if was going. You should have seen his face when he discovered no glass and no hands.[209]

Informal group members who stumbled across an opportunity to steal foodstuffs also became the provider for their group. This happened to Australian RAAF Warrant Officer Russell Walter Mann. When his column stopped for the night he took the opportunity to sneak away and steal a chicken from a nearby farm. Liley's writings explained what happened.

> Mac and I were cooking. Russ came up 'Quick, help me hide this.' At that moment a squawk came from beneath his greatcoat. Mac, the country boy, guessing it was chook reached out and wrang its neck.[210]

Stolen farm produce was a common source of food for informal groups on the march, particularly swedes, potatoes and sugar beets.[211] Despite most of the produce being frozen, men quickly gathered what they could for their group, sometimes cooking the produce or if they did not have time or the necessary makeshift equipment, eating it raw. The desperation of prisoners for food was such that some informal groups stole and ate food meant for animal consumption.[212]

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[209] Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile trek to Ziegenhain,' p.287.
[210] Liley, 'Jack's War 1939-1945', p.62.
[211] For reference to Australian examples see Williams, 'Playing for Keeps, pp.31-32; Interview with Cornish, tape 6; Interview with Dawson, tape 6; Interview with Kerr, tape 7; Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile trek to Ziegenhain,' p.285.
[212] For example see N. Crocker, Reports made by Repatriated Prisoners of War, No.508, p.3, AWM54 779/4/14; Lattin, 'I Missed the Boat', pp.11-12; Manners, 'The Art of Necessity.', p.151; Newey, untitled writings, p.97; Interview with J. Weddle by H. Moses for the IWM on 10 September 2010, reel 16, IWM 12247; Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile trek to Ziegenhain,' p.286.

The Australians earned a certain notoriety for their ability to steal food. British Air Force NCO Sergeant Ron Mogg described the behaviour of a group of Australians who unexpectedly found themselves amongst a flock of sheep. 'There wasn't even a bleat as the sheep were snatched up, quickly despatched, skinned and jointed while still on the march.'[213] Mogg even boasted about it, claiming 'Of all our people, the Aussies seemed best able to look after themselves and live off the land.'[214]

Prisoners stealing food, however, took a significant risk. If they were discovered leaving or returning to the column, it was probable that would be physically punished or even shot.[215] Yet, as Cantillion, Castle and Kean wrote, 'The risks we are taking to get extra food are becoming greater but I am afraid these risks are necessary to keep going.'[216]

Theft was not the only example of Australian adaptability noted by British POWs. Edward Chapman was astounded by the quick reaction of Australian prisoners in his column when they were billeted in a factory for the night.

> The Aussies I couldn't believe it, these farmer chaps, educated chaps too they were Air Force officers ...they were quite skilled in every damn things. With the prospect of a thaw, they even made little carts with wheels and hubs and shod them with tyres. They found a blacksmith shop and carpenter's shop in this glass works and they worked all night. They made three or four little carts. Quite incredible.[217]

It is unclear from these examples if the Australians were acting within their informal groups or as impromptu groups. Irrespective, they do demonstrate the ability of

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[213] Dominy, *The Sergeant Escapers,* p.126.
[214] *ibid*.
[215] For reference to this threat see Akdersley, 'Memories of World War Two,' p.13; Groocock, 'Mein Camp', p.85; Liley, 'Jack's War 1939-1945', p.62; Crawley, *Escape to Danger*, p.341. For reference to examples physical punishment for POWs caught stealing or falling out of the marching column see Badcock, 'Barbed Wire City: Section titled The March Back,' f.4; Manners, 'The Art of Necessity' p.153; Interview with Kerr, tape 7; Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile Trek to Ziegenhain,' pp.286-287.
[216] Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile trek to Ziegenhain,' p.286.
[217] Interview with Chapman, reel 2. For other examples of Australian ingenuity on the marches see D. Hustler, unpublished manuscript titled 'Long March into Germany', p.16, IWM 06/72/1; Interview with Buckingham, reel 3.

informal groups to find essential food or transport items to help the group cope with conditions on the march.

That the spoils gathered by group members, even impromptu groups, were distributed equally amongst all group members is not surprising. Even before the marches, sharing food was an ingrained practice for prisoners of the Germans. In their camps, prisoners were given their Red Cross parcels and captor ration within a food group or combine.[218] For prisoners democratic methods of sharing food were, therefore, normalised behaviour. Yet, if Mogg is to be believed, along with the recollections of the prisoners themselves and those of British POWs, this practice was more marked amongst the Australians. For these men their identity remained tied to collective survivorship of their informal group.

For Australian prisoners in volatile captive settings, the democratic leadership evident amongst informal groups reflected the way these men linked personal survivorship with the collective survival of their informal group and, on the Burma-Thailand Railway, that the informal group sustained a collective spirit even when men were starving, sick and dying. In his post-war interview Australian Gunner Fredrick Dunn, a prisoner in D Force, summed up the fluid democratic responsibilities that characterised informal groups in a single noun.

> I think the whole time there was mateship. The Australian mateship was something that you could not imagine how strong it is under those conditions because you did whatever you could for each other...we mostly look upon each other as stronger than a brother. With your brother at home, he didn't go through what we went through. You form that bond between you, it is unbreakable.[219]

[218] For example see T. Carrol, unpublished untitled writings, p.3, AWM PR00400; J. Henry, untitled writings, p.3, AWM PR 91/02; Liley, 'Jack's War 1939-1945', p.39; Medley, 'The Day the War Began,' p.29; Morshel, 'A Wartime Log,' pp.65-71; Interview with Jones, reel 17.
[219] Interview with Dunn, tape 3.

SELF-SACRIFICIAL LEADERSHIP

Hintok Mountain Camp, Burma-Thailand Railway, June 1943.
Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Edward Dunlop stands to the side silently watching the scene unfold.[1]*The desperately ill, who had been placed on a log, have been instructed on their part. The Japanese approach. The bark of 'kura' echoes through the jungle.*[2] *Dunlop tenses, willing his men not to move, not to react, to remain still. The prisoners play their part. Dunlop strides forward. Reaching the first defeated soldier, he bends and lifts the fragile frame. Like a baby, Dunlop carries the broken prisoner towards the Japanese commander. He offers the ill prisoner's services as a human sacrifice. 'This man, Nippon?'*[3] *Dunlop knows full well the Japanese could not accept such a sick man for work. But it is still a risk.*

Self-sacrificial leadership is a selfless form of leadership that places the physical and psychological needs of group members above the personal ambitions and needs of the leader. The reasons why some leaders adopt this selfless leadership style have been examined by a variety of disciplines including sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, biologists and economists.[4] Although it was initially developed within a business context, its application can be extended to other situations, as is clear in its application in this thesis.

Self-sacrificial leadership as a specific leadership style came from research conducted into transformational and charismatic leadership.[5] This has meant that self-sacrificial leadership has been examined from two perspectives; the leader and the follower.

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[1] R. Parkin cited in Nelson, *POW*, pp.50-51.
[2] *ibid*., p.50.
[3] *ibid*.,p.51.
[4] For reference to sociological studies of self-sacrificial leadership see A. Gouldner, 'The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement,' *American Sociological Review*, 1960, vol. 25, pp.161-178. For reference to psychological studies on self-sacrificial leadership see D. Krebs and D. Miller, 'Altruism and Aggression' in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, Third Edition, vol. 2, (New York: Random House, 1985), pp.1-71. For reference to political scientists studies on self-sacrificial leadership see R. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, (New York: Basic Books, 1984). For reference to biologists studies on self-sacrificial leadership see R. Trivers, 'The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism', *Quarterly Review of Biology*, 1971, vol.46, pp.35-37; E. Wilson, *On Human Nature*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); E. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). For reference to economists studies on self-sacrificial leadership see D. Collard, *Altriusm and Economy: A Study in Non-Selfish Economies*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
[5] Y. Choi and R. Mai-Dalton, 'The Model of Followers' Responses to Self-Sacrificial Leadership: An Empirical Test,' *Leadership Quarterly*, 1999, vol.10, no.3, pp.401-402; Y. Choi and R. Mai-Dalton, 'On the Leadership Functions of Self-Sacrifice', in *Leadership Quarterly*, 1998, vol.9 no.4, p.476; S. Halverson et al., 'Self-Sacrificial Behaviour in Crisis Situations: The Competing Roles of Behavioural and Situational Factors,' *The Leadership Quarterly*, 2004, vol. 15, pp.264-265; B. van Knippenberg and D. van Knippenberg, 'Leader Self-Sacrifice and Leadership Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of Leader Prototypicality,' *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 2005, vol. 90, no.1, p.25; Matteson and Irving, 'Servant versus Self-Sacrificial Leadership,' *International Journal of Leadership Studies*, p.36.

The first model exploring self-sacrificial leadership was published in 1998 by Yeon Choi and Renate Mai-Dalton. They defined self-sacrificial leadership as a style which 'den[ied] self-interests or personal comfort and safety, limiting personal privileges, or sharing pains and hardships with the followers.'[6] Choi and Mai-Dalton divided this self-sacrifice into three categories: the division of labour, distribution of rewards and the exercise of power.

According to Choi and Mai-Dalton, a leader could apply a self-sacrificial style for a short period of time in response to an immediate crisis, or a leader could apply the style over a considerable length of time, continually responding to the enduring crisis and the needs of group members.[7] Leaders adopting this style in the short term were usually responding to an immediate crisis. If, however, the situation was ongoing, Choi and Mai-Dalton argued that a leader's self-sacrificial style could become his or her normal behaviour, resulting in their followers expecting nothing less than a continuation of selfless behaviour from their leader which, in turn, could lead to other leaders in the organisation adopting the same style and normalising it as the expected standard of behaviour by leaders within the organisation.[8] If this change of culture occurred, the followers' behaviour, values, attitudes, goals and perceptions of the leader-follower relationships would also change. Examples of both short and ongoing situations are examined in this section of the thesis.

In a crisis situation, therefore, Choi and Mai-Dalton concluded that a self-sacrificial leader was capable of modelling the expected behaviour that was needed by their group members to cope with, and overcome, the crisis.[9] In this way, they argued, a leader who was respected by his or her group not only earned leadership legitimacy but could expect a level of reciprocal behaviour by his or her followers.[10] Sociologists J. Adams, Alvin Gouldner, George Homans and Martin Greenberg also found that

[6] Choi and Mai-Dalton, 'On the Leadership Functions of Self-Sacrifice', p.476.
[7] *ibid*., pp.477-481.
[8] *ibid*., pp.482-483.
[9] *ibid*., p.486.
[10] Choi and Mai-Dalton, 'The Model of Followers Responses to Self-Sacrificial Leadership', pp.401-404; Choi and Mai-Dalton, 'On the Leadership Functions of Self-Sacrifice,' pp.484-493.

reciprocal behavioural responses by group members occurred when a leader adopted a self-sacrificial leadership style.[11]

Choi and Mai-Dalton argued that the nature and extent of reciprocal behaviour by followers depended on a number of variables, such as leader competence and charisma.[12] Stefanie Halverson, Courtney Holladay, Stephanie Kazama and Miguel Quinones and Barbara van Knippenberg and Daan van Knippenberg extended this work.[13] They concluded that a self-sacrificial leader who had charisma was more likely to be effective in a crisis.[14] These leaders could motivate their followers to reciprocate their behaviour for the benefit of all group members by using what David De Cremer, David Mayer, Marius van Dijke, Barbara Schouten and Mary Bardes called prosocial behaviours.[15] Jeffrey Matteson and Justin Irving defined prosocial reciprocal behaviours of a self-sacrificial leader as 'altruism, taking initiative, empathy, role modelling, provid[ing] justice, developing people, building community, providing leadership, shared vision, empowering followers, serving followers [while] yielding status, privileges [and] power.'[16]

Choi and Mai-Dalton concluded that reciprocal self-sacrificial behaviour would only occur if two essential prerequisites were met. Firstly, the leader had genuine motivations for his or her self-sacrificial behaviour that were linked to the group's goals and not their own personal ambition.[17] Secondly, there had to be the possibility that self-sacrificial behaviour by leaders and followers gave some hope of surviving

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[11] J. Adams, 'Towards an Understanding of Inequity,' *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1963, vol.67, pp.422-436; A. Gouldner, 'The Norms of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement,' *American Sociological Review*, 1960, vol.25, pp.161-178; M. Greenberg, 'A theory of indebtedness' in K. Gergen et al, (eds.), *Social Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research*, (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), pp.1-26; G. Homans, *Social -Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961).
[12] Choi and Mai-Dalton, 'The Model of Followers Responses to Self-Sacrificial Leadership', pp.402-413.
[13] Halverson et al, 'Self-Sacrificial Behaviour in Crisis Situations', pp.263-275; van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg, 'Leader Self-Sacrifice and Leadership Effectiveness,' pp.25-27.
[14] Halverson et al, 'Self-Sacrificial Behaviour in Crisis Situations', pp.264-272; van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg, 'Leader Self-Sacrifice and Leadership Effectiveness,' pp.25-27, 34.
[15] D. De Cremer et al, 'When does Self-Sacrificial Leadership Motivate Prosocial Behaviour? It Depends on Followers' Prevention Focus,' *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 2009, vol.94, no.4, pp.888-889, 895-896.
[16] Matteson and Irving, 'Servant versus Self-Sacrificial Leadership,' p.42.
[17] Halverson et al, 'Self-Sacrificial Behaviour in Crisis Situations', p.270.

the crisis.[18] Choi and Mai-Dalton concluded that if all hope of survivorship was lost, followers would not see any point in copying the self-sacrificial behavioural style of the leader and place their own interests above those of the group. John Leach and Glin Bennett in their studies of civilians in extreme environments, including survivorship patterns in concentration camps, have observed this, along with feelings of absolute hopelessness that come with it.[19] Both observed that when internees believed that they had nothing left to fight for, they turned away from being a member a group and instead adopted one of two behaviours: aggressive individual survival or passive acceptance of death.[20]

Choi and Mai-Dalton also considered what would happen to leader and follower behaviour if the organisation itself operated within a crisis sector, such as charity organisations and the military.[21] They concluded that in an employment sector where crises were expected, self-sacrificial behaviour became the normalised response of leaders. In formulating this conclusion Choi and Mai-Dalton drew heavily on the work of Emile Durkheim's *Le Suicide: étude de sociologie,* published in 1897. Durkheim compared the behaviour of military and non-military personnel in crisis situations. He concluded that military personnel were more likely to apply a self-sacrificial leadership style, which he titled altruistic suicide, than non-military personal. Durkheim concluded that this difference in leadership style was based on the training of military personnel that resulted in an ingrained sense of collective responsibility for a group. Military leaders therefore, were trained to resist behavioural patterns that focused on individual survival.[22] This thesis argues that training alone could not explain the adoption of a self-sacrificial leadership style by men in captivity.

In the volatile and extreme captive settings across the Pacific Theatre of the Second World War, a leader's legitimacy often depended on his willingness to place his group's physical and psychological needs before his own. A positional, professional or

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[18] Choi and Mai-Dalton, 'The Model of Followers Responses to Self-Sacrificial Leadership', pp.402-413.
[19] Bennet, *Beyond Endurance*, pp.69-72, 196-211; Leach, *Survival Psychology*, pp.44-46, 52, 91-96, 160, 166.
[20] Bennet, *Beyond Endurance*, pp.69-72, 196-211; Leach, *Survival Psychology*, pp.44-46, 52, 91-96, 160, 166.
[21] Choi and Mai-Dalton, 'On the Leadership Functions of Self-Sacrifice', pp.488-490.
[22] E. Durkheim, *Le Suicide: étude de sociologie*, cited in Choi and Mai-Dalton, 'On the Leadership Functions of Self-Sacrifice', pp.489-490.

emergent leader who made this choice understood that the decision to protect his men in whatever way he could against the aggression of the captor meant that he risked his own survival. This section of the thesis examines a variety of different leaders who, knowing the potential consequences of their actions, believed that they had a duty to try and protect the men who trusted them to do what was right for the most vulnerable members of their group.

The first chapter in this section focuses on the iconic self-sacrificial POW leaders of the Second World War, the MOs on the Burma-Thailand Railway. This is not a new area of research. It has been referred to by a number of historians, biographers and liberated prisoners in broad narratives of the POW experience in the Pacific.[23] As discussed in Chapter 1, Rosalind Hearder has also produced a doctoral study, now published, on MOs who cared for Australian POWs at numerous camps in the Pacific, including Changi and different camps on the Burma-Thailand Railway.[24] This chapter, however, differs from these previous explorations of MOs on the Burma-Thailand Railway by approaching their experiences through an examination of their leadership style, legitimacy and followership. The experiences of three MOs are explored; Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ernest Dunlop, who on captors' orders, acted as both professional leader and MO of Dunlop Force, Major Kevin James Fagan, a surgeon attached to H Force, and Major Bruce Atlee Hunt, an MO attached to F Force. This chapter explores the reasons why each of these men chose to evolve from being an MO who provided a professional service to the sick and injured into a professional leader who adopted a self-sacrificial leadership style to not only treat the sick and injured as best they could, but to also protect men from being assigned to working parties or being beaten by Japanese guards. The chapter explores the personal consequences of this choice and the leadership legitimacy and followership Dunlop,

[23] For example see P. Brune, *Descent into Hell: The Fall of Singapore- Pudu and Changi - The Thai Burma Railway,* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2014); H. Clarke, *A Life for Every Sleeper: A Pictorial Record of the Burma-Thailand Railway*, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986); H. Clarke et al, *Prisoners of War,* (Sydney: Life-Time Books in Association with John Ferguson, 1988); S. Ebury, *Weary: King of the River*, (Carlton: Miegunyah Press, 2010); S. Ebury, *Weary: The Life of Sir Edward Dunlop*, (Ringwood: Viking, 1994); C. Forbes, *Hellfire: The Story of Australia, Japan and the Prisoners of War,* Pan Edition (Sydney: Pan McMillian, 2007); D. Wall, *Heroes of F Force*, (Mona Vale: Self-published, 1993).

[24] R. Hearder, 'Careers in Captivity: Australian Prisoner-of-War Medical Officers in Japanese Captivity During World War II,' (PhD dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2003). For reference to Hearder's publication of this thesis see R. Hearder, *Keep the Men Alive: Australian POW Doctors in Japanese Captivity,* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2009).

Fagan and Hunt acquired from their respective formal groups as a result of their leadership style.

The second chapter in this section of the thesis explores a variety of different positional, professional and emergent leaders who also adopted a self-sacrificial style. On the Burma-Thailand Railway, a number of men, by virtue of their rank, became positional leaders of small working parties sent to the Railway. Some of these men, despite the significant risk to their own survival, chose to do whatever they could to alleviate the work load forced on their men by the Japanese guards and engineers and endured the beatings that followed when men could not reach their work quotas. For different reasons, some chaplains assigned to Work Forces also choose to place themselves at risk for the sake of providing spiritual comfort and guidance to POWs who were willing to listen. In Borneo, the survivors of the death march revealed that one group leader, Warrant Officer John William Kinder, maintained a self-sacrificial leadership style, even when he understood that the Japanese were executing any prisoners who fell behind on the trek through the jungle from Sandakan POW Camp to Ranau. In turn, this chapter examines each of these leaders' self-sacrificial style, the consequences of this choice and the followership they attained from their respective group because of their courage and self-sacrifice in protecting vulnerable men.

This chapter concludes with the examination of a very different type of self-sacrificial leader. Through his own behaviour, Australian Corporal Rodney Breavington showed a mixed group of Australian and British POWs who were facing their executors at Telok Paku Beach how to die with courage.

CHAPTER 7: THE SELF-SACRIFICAL LEADERSHIP STYLE OF MEDICAL OFFICERS ON THE BURMA-THAILAND RAILWAY

The writings of prisoners who toiled on the Burma-Thailand Railway reveal the fundamental role MOs played in their survival.[1] In a volatile captive environment characterised by slave labour, violence, starvation and disease, illness and injury became a way of life. Nearly all of the prisoners suffered from one or more of the following diseases: dysentery, septic sores, skin infections, pellagra, beriberi, diphtheria, malaria, cholera and a condition similar to trench foot.[2] MOs attempted to treat the sick and dying without basic medical supplies and in appalling conditions.[3]

When positional leaders failed to protect their formal groups, some MOs assumed their leadership role.[4] This transition was based on a conscience choice to adopt a self-sacrificial leadership style. This leadership style involved accepting the personal consequences that followed attempts to protect the men in their formal group from the demands of the captor. These men were regularly assaulted when they placed themselves between their patients, or men from their formal group, and the Japanese. This protective stance, alongside their willingness to continue questioning Japanese orders for the sake of their formal group's wellbeing, became the central feature of the MO's self-sacrificial leadership style on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Hearder argues that although MOs held positions of responsibility over their formal group, they essentially had 'responsibility without authority'.[5] This thesis disagrees with this analysis. MOs who assumed a self-sacrificial leadership style, and were seen by their formal group as the legitimate leader, did gain leadership authority and followership.

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[1] For example see Miggins, Diary 15 May 1943; Thomas, 'Forty Years on as I Remember', p.33; Interview with D. Whalley on 2 December 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.1261, tape 7, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1265aspx> maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 17 May 2014; L. Cody, *Ghosts in Khaki: The History of the 2/4 Machine Gun Battalion, Eighth Australian Division A.I.F.*, (Carlislie: Hesperian Press, 1997), p.243; Uren, *Straight Left*, p.36.

[2] E. Dunlop, 'Medical Experiences in Japanese Captivity,' *British Medical Journal*, October 5 1946, vol. II, pp.279-286; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, pp.580, 583, 588-589, 596-597, 599, 603-604.

[3] For an overview of conditions see Hearder, 'Careers in Captivity,' pp.108-149; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese', pp.541-586; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, pp.580-641.

[4] This analysis concurs with Header's view that in situations of life and death, the role of the MOs became vital. See Hearder, 'Careers in Captivity', p.228.

[5] Header, 'Careers in Captivity,' p.229.

Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ernest Dunlop, Major Kevin James Fagan and Major Bruce Atlee Hunt were three Australian MOs who adopted a self-sacrificial leadership style in this captive setting. Originally, the leadership responsibilities of these three men were different.

Dunlop was unusual in that he held positional leadership from the beginning. Because of his rank as a Lieutenant Colonel, the Japanese appointed Dunlop as a Work Force positional leader in Java.[6] He was officially responsible for 878 Australian army, navy and air force prisoners captured in Java.[7] When Dunlop Force arrived at Konyu in Thailand, Lieutenant Usuki Kishio (Okada) added two more POW battalions to Dunlop Force, although Dunlop had little interaction with these men.[8] From 25 April 1943, Dunlop Force was further supplemented with about 200 Australians from D Force, S Battalion.[9] On 9 May Dunlop handed over his positional leadership responsibilities to the Australian commander of S Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Cranston Albury McEachern.[10] Therefore, for about three months in Thailand, Dunlop worked both as the SMO and the positional leader of his formal group. During this time, Dunlop not only responded to his men's health needs, but also their discipline, hygiene, sanitation and the division of rations. The stance taken by Dunlop with the Japanese shaped how his fellow officers in his force interacted with the captor.

Kevin Fagan (a surgeon) and Bruce Hunt (a physician), were attached to Australian Work Force battalions of H and F Force respectively.[11] In contrast to Dunlop, neither

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[6] Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of P.O.W. Working Camps and Hospitals in THAILAND, p.1.

[7] *Ibid*. An unknown number of American survivors of the USS Houston were also attached to this Force. See Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.1; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.562, 564.

[8] Under Okada's orders Dunlop assumed positional command of R Battalion (623 Dutch prisoners) and Q Battalion (377 Australians). Each of these battalions had their own senior officer who retained day to day control of these men. From 11 March 1943 Dunlop had very little contact with either battalion. See Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of POW Working Camps and Hospitals in THAILAND, pp.1-2; Cody, *Ghosts in Khaki*, p.238; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese', p.562.

[9] Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of P.O.W. Working Camps and Hospitals in THAILAND, p.1; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.246; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.610.

[10] Lieutenant Colonel E. Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 30 October 1945, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/46; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.257.

[11] Hunt left Changi in group six of the Australian contingent of F Force which comprised of 20 officers, 538 other ranks, and 22 medical staff. Fagan accompanied a group of 600 AIF prisoners in H Force and was assisted by one other MO, Major H Morrison SSVF. Captain M. Winchester, a dentist, was also originally attached to Fagan's group when they left Changi. For reference to Hunts group composition see Roll of AAMC Officers and Chaplains Proceeding with Medical Detachment F Force, 15 April 43,

man held any official positional responsibilities as the military officers attached to their battalions outranked them.[12] Fagan and Hunt's duties were limited to the task of serving the POWs in their capacity as medical professionals. Like many of their colleagues on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Fagan and Hunt soon discovered that the volatile conditions required MOs not only to treat their patients, but also to protect them. Both Fagan and Hunt's positional leaders also struggled to cope with the responsibilities and challenges of positional leadership in this captive setting.[13] Having watched their respective positional officers falter in their duties to protect their formal groups, Fagan and Hunt both made the choice to not only operate as MOs but to accept leadership responsibilities for their formal groups. As a consequence of this choice, like Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt became responsible for the survivorship of their formal groups.[14]

This chapter's examination of Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt's self-sacrificial leadership style is divided into two sections. The first section explores the reasons why Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt were willing to move from being MOs providing a professional service into becoming leaders of their formal groups who adopted a self-sacrificial leadership style. The second section explores how each of these men undertook their leadership responsibilities and the physical consequences of their leadership style that

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p.1, AWM54 481/8/25; P. Head, F Force, 13 April 43, p.1, AWM54 481/8/25. For reference to Fagan's group composition see Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, pp.1, 8.

[12] Lieutenant Colonel Charles Henry Kappe was the OC of Australian POWs attached to F Force. Lieutenant Colonel Rowland Frank Oakes was the positional officer of the Australian POWs attached to H Force. For reference to F force positional leaders see Head, F Force, 13 April 43, p.1. For reference to H force positional leaders see K. Fagan, War Crimes Trials Statement, 8 April 1946, p.1, AWM52 1010/4/50 Part 1.

[13] The inability of Oakes to cope with positional responsibilities in the volatile captive setting of Thailand is examined in Chapter 9. For reference to Kappe's inability to cope see Stanley, "The men who did the fighting are now all busy writing," pp.300-308.

[14] For reference to Fagan's leadership responsibilities of his base camp see Barlow, manuscript, p.50; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.177-181, 185-187, 189, 191; B. O'Sullivan cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, p.410; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.178-199, 184-185, 187. For reference to Hunt's unofficial positional leadership role see Interview with R. Cahill on 11 April 2002 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.0662, tape 6, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1765aspx> maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 27 April 2014; Interview with C. Gilbert on 2 October 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.0821, tape 7, http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/search.aspx maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 2 February 2014; Interview with M. Venables on the 12 May 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.2044, tape 6, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1504aspx> maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 1 May 2014.

led to leadership legitimacy and strong followership from their respective formal groups.

Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt

The primary reason why MOs adopted a self-sacrificial leadership style lay in their sense of professional duty to use their medical skills to treat the sick and injured.[15] Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt's interpretation of their professional duty would not allow them to passively stand by when sick and injured prisoners were forced to labour and were assaulted by the captor. In these circumstances, these three doctors gave the sick and vulnerable their protection, even when this meant risking their own personal safety. When Fagan, for example, was asked after the war why he was willing to risk his own survival for the men, especially one prisoner who was accused of stealing food from the other men. Fagan simply replied, 'He was a patient.'[16]

Dunlop echoed Fagan's sense of professional responsibility. As the commander of Number One Allied General Hospital at Bandoeng, Dunlop placed himself between critically ill patients and Japanese guards who threatened them with fixed bayonets.[17] As he explained to Hank Nelson, 'Oh hell, I had to intervene and say you can't do this. You'll have to kill me first.'[18] Yet, Dunlop's reasons for adopting a self-sacrificial leadership style were more complex than simply his sense of professional duty. Dunlop used his willingness to stand between his men and the Japanese as a way to unite his mixed formal group of service personnel. He believed that it was also 'the beginning of good discipline'[19]

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[15] This professional duty has existed for medical practitioners since the fifth century when the Greek physician Hippocrates outlined the obligations of a doctor to their patient**.** It was not until after the completion of the Second World War, that the ethical duties of a medical practitioner to treat the sick and wounded became international law. See The Declaration of Geneva, World Medical Association International Code of Medical Ethics, adopted by the Third General Assembly of the World Medical Association, 1949 cited at <www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c8/index.html> maintained by the World Medical Association. This code has subsequently been amended in 1968, 1983 and 2006.
[16] Interview with W. Nankervis on 27 May 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive No.0236, tape 6 <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1758aspx> maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[17] Interview with E. Dunlop by H. Nelson on 22 June 1982, reel 2, AWM S00358. Dunlop's courageous defiance against Japanese aggression towards his patients was rewarded with one night's reprieve to organise the transfer of 806 Australian and British patients. Of these men 477 had to walk 10 miles to the goal at Tjimah and 329 critically ill patients were moved to 'some sort of hospital' at Tjimah. See Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.7-8.
[18] Interview with Dunlop, reel 2.
[19] *ibid*., reels 2-3.

Dunlop's belief that a self-sacrificial leadership style would not only protect his men but also help consolidate his formal group is demonstrated in an incident that took place at Makasura POW camp in Java. When the Japanese Commandant asked Dutch officers about conditions in the camp their reply, when translated into English, was 'nothing to report.'[20] When Dunlop discovered this, he was livid and the next day when the Commandant asked about conditions in the camp, Dunlop spoke up: 'You do not feed us. You do not treat us like good sailors (or) soldiers. [You are] abusing all the rules of the game and the rules of war.'[21] Dunlop continued in similar vein until the guards, armed with rifles and bayonets, began 'pricking my tummy.'[22] Dunlop's response to this danger typifies his uncompromising defiance. 'Looking down I said, "I see your point, but there will be more tomorrow."'[23] Dunlop's willingness to challenge the captor gave his formal group confidence in his ability to stand up to the captor for their basic needs, irrespective of the personal consequences.

The three men studied for this chapter combined their sense of professional responsibility with personal codes of morality in their leadership style. For Dunlop this moment came when he understood how the Japanese treated their prisoners, especially the sick. Dunlop, as a surgeon, could not perform his professional duties to the best of his abilities and there is no doubt that he harboured feelings of animosity towards the Japanese.[24] This animosity spiralled into an all-consuming hatred for his captors in Thailand. In his diary Dunlop wrote:

> These days, in which I see men being progressively broken into emaciated, pitiful wrecks, bloated with beriberi, terribly reduced with pellagra, dysentery and malaria, and covered with disgusting sores, a searing hate arises in me whenever I see a Nip. Disgusting, deplorable, hateful troop of men – apes. It is a bitter lesson to all of us not to surrender to these beasts

[20] *ibid*., reel 2. Lieutenant Colonel E. Lyneham was the positional leader in this camp. See E. Dunlop, Report on 2/2 Casualty Clearing Station, AAMC June 1942-August 1945, p.1, AWM54 554/5/7.
[21] Interview with Dunlop, reel 2.
[22] *ibid*.
[23] *ibid*.
[24] For example see Interview with Dunlop, reels 1-3; Dunlop, *The Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.37-38, 40.

> while there is still life in one's body. It is squalor [sic] and degradation of body and mind.[25]

Prisoners' writings and recollections suggest that it was Bruce Hunt's personality that reinforced his allegiance to his professional responsibilities and enabled him to adopt and maintain a self-sacrificial leadership style.[26] Hunt was a regular army MO. He believed that his experiences in the First World War and subsequent service as an officer in the inter-war years, combined with his medical knowledge, meant that the men in his formal group should respect and listen to him.[27] As a consequence, Hunt forcefully imposed his views on others, be they friend, foe, subordinate or superior. When Hunt understood how the Japanese treated the prisoners, particularly the sick on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Hunt channelled his self-righteous attitude into a defiant stance against the Japanese in an attempt to protect his patients and the men of his formal group. In an interview with the *West Australian* newspaper after his repatriation, Hunt explained that his aggressive leadership style was his attempt to try and even out of the odds of his men's chances of surviving. The Japanese, he said, 'understands *force majeure* and so the only way to meet him is to have the *force majeure* yourself'.[28]

For Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt, the survival of their patients was paramount. As MOs, by virtue of their skills and training, they could have saved many of the sick and injured if they had been given the opportunity and equipment to do so. Unlike other leaders examined in this thesis, the survival of the sick for these officers was not an abstract concept but a professional obligation. And because they remained with their Work Force battalions on the Burma-Thailand Railway, their familiarity with their

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[25] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.264-265. For further reference to Dunlop's hatred of his captors which influenced his ability to act as a self-sacrificial leader see Interview with Dunlop, reel 3.

[26] For example see Letter to the Chairman of the National Health and Medical Research Council from A. Derham, 18 March 1946, AWM3DRL/3517, Folder 3; Interview with Cahill, tape 6; Interview with W. Holding on the 11 December 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive no.1317, tape 6, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/435aspx> maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 10 April 2014.

[27] For reference to Hunt's service during the First World War see B. Hunt, Statement of Service, p.4, NAA: B883:WX11177; B. Hunt, Officers Record of Service, p.2, NAA:B883:WX11177.

[28] B. Hunt in author unknown, 'Under the Heel: The Siam-Burma Railway. How the Australian PW Suffered,' *The West Australian*, November 1945, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 3.

patients heightened their sense of duty to protect them. The sick and dying were not anonymous figures but men with names, stories and mates.

In order to fully comprehend the enormity of the self-sacrificial acts these three MOs performed on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt's leadership experience will be examined in turn.

Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ernest Dunlop

In his attempts to protect sick, weak and injured prisoners from labouring with the working parties on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Dunlop matched the Japanese scream for scream, particularly with Corporal Usuki Kishio or Okada, the Japanese MO in Dunlop's camps (who Dunlop renamed 'Doctor Death'),[29] his assistant Warrant Officer Tadano, the camp Commandant, Lieutenant Osuki and the Japanese Commandant in charge of the sector where Dunlop Force worked, Lieutenant Colonel Ishi[30], HQ clerk Kamamoto[31], a Korean, Private Hiramura or 'the Lizard''[32] who collected the working parties from Dunlop's base camp for shifts set by Lieutenant Hiroda, the chief engineer of the Hintok-Kanyu sector.

At Konyu and initially at Hintok Mountain camps, Dunlop, as the positional leader, was responsible for arranging working parties[33] with the support of Major A. Moon and Major E. Corelette as MOs, and his battalion officers. Two problems quickly arose: the inability of the battalions to produce enough healthy men for work; and if a man assigned to a working party became ill, Dunlop was not able to excuse him from the working party.

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[29] Lieutenant Colonel E. Dunlop, War Crimes Trial Statements, 27 June 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/46. The Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry used different Japanese names to identify the same people. The names used in this chapter reflect the names Dunlop used in his writings. For reference to the other titles given to these men during the Australian War Crimes Trials see G. McCormack, 'Apportioning the Blame: Australian Trials for Railway Crimes,' in G. McCormack and H. Nelson (eds.), *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History*, (Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1993), p.91.

[30] Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 27 June 1946, p.1; Lieutenant Colonel E. Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 6 September 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/46.

[31] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.243.

[32] Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 6 September 1946, p.1.

[33] Following a meeting on the 25 January 1943, between Dunlop and his second in command Major Wearne with their Japanese Commandant, Dunlop delegated the duty for selecting POW work parties to Major H. Greiner and Major A. Woods, the POWs he had placed in charge of O and P Battalions Dunlop Force. Greiner and Woods agreed to select POWs for working parties based on medical advice. As conditions deteriorated and the number of sick and injured prisoners grew, Dunlop assumed this responsibility. See Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.175-177, 182-183, 218-219.

Dunlop, with the help of Corelette and Moon as fellow MOs, tried to get around the first problem by assigning men who were not well enough for a shift on the railway to light duties in the camp.[34] However, as Dunlop recorded in his diary, the Japanese stopped this practice. 'Ns [Japanese] fixed for all light duty men to go out to work and terrific beat up of all available labour, with none left for sanitation and anti-malaria work.'[35] Dunlop confronted his captors in an attempt to protect the sick:

> I ruled no light duty or no duty men to go and we fell them out (46 in all). Then began a terrific row; I attacked Kanamoto furiously, saying that the men were sick and must not go. [The] Engineer said march them over. I went too... I was furious... [I] told Hiroda that I objected strongly to his sending sick men to work, adding a few comments on the rations, camp sanitation, bad medical arrangements and the general bloodiness of N. I invited him to make good his threat to shoot me (rifles were trained on me). 'You can shoot me, but then my 2 I/C is as tough a man as me, and after him you will have to shoot them all.'[36]

On this occasion, as in many others, Dunlop's efforts failed to protect his men. Hiroda forced the light duty men onto a working party and made them leave base camp without having had any food or water.[37] In response to his failure, Dunlop lashed out at Osaka:

> I [told] him exactly what I thought of the arrangements... I told him after making us administrative officers they did not accept our decisions on the men's health etc. And therefore they could go to hell and run the camp themselves. They were a lot of murderers and (indicating a cross on the ground) that was the fate for us. I finally swung the bomb at him that if sick men driven to work all would 'down the shovels.' This threw him

[34] *ibid*., p.183.
[35] *ibid*., p.222.
[36] *ibid*., pp.222-223.
[37] Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 6 September 1946, p.1.

> into a severe rage and he raved at the men as if working himself in to a passion to hit me (but I bet he never could if I was looking at him).[38]

In time Dunlop learned that his confrontational approach, while occasionally easing demands for workers, would often do more harm than good. Irrespective of the amount of noise and threats he made, Okada, Kanamoto and Hiroda not only assigned Dunlop's light duty men to work, but also went on indiscriminate sweeps of the hospital, forcing patients out of their makeshift beds to fill their working quotas.[39] The Japanese found plenty of men in the hospital lines. As early as 8 May 1943, 122 men from O Battalion, 115 men from P Battalion and 27 men from S Battalion were in the hospital lines.[40] The number of sick prisoners would escalate when cholera struck Dunlop's camp on 19 June 1943.[41]

Despite the growing numbers of sick men and Hiroda's orders that no men would be allowed to stay in camp to work on sanitation, water or anti-malaria schemes, Dunlop still tried to assign men to light or no duties in the camp[42] and failed. It became a regular practice for Okada, Kanamoto and Hiroda to sweep the hospital lines for workers. In his War Crimes Trial Statement, given on 27 June 1946, Dunlop explained the consequences of this practice:

> In May-June and July 1943, it was a daily spectacle to see scores of emaciated sick men forced out to gruelling labour tottering along with the aid of sticks. Others too sick to even walk were by his [Hiroda] orders carried to the engineer's lines to labour in the lying or seated position.[43]

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[38] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.223. This incident is confirmed in the writings of Lance Corporal Kenneth Norman Heyes. See K. Heyes, Diary 22 March 1943, AWM PR86/232. For other examples of Dunlop adopting this aggressive tactic in an effort to protect his men see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.218-219, 238, 338; Thompson, Diary 14 April 1943.
[39] For further examples of Dunlop's aggressive tactics leading the captors to force men from the hospital lines onto working parties see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.229, 259, 276, 258, 281, 287-289; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.148-149.
[40] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.256.
[41] *ibid*., p.283.
[42] For example see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.232, 235, 238, 257.
[43] Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 27 June 1946, p.1.This incident is confirmed by the War Crimes Testimony of Major Wearne. See Major W. Wearne, War Crimes Trials Statement, 18 March 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/145.

Dunlop quickly realised that he had to come up with another tactic and one proved useful. On 5 April 1943, Dunlop ordered the 133 patients in the hospital lines to 'look as sick as possible.'[44] Then when Kanamoto came looking for more workers in the hospital lines, he failed to find a single 'fit' prisoner.

This victory was short lived. Dunlop's aggressive tone, combined with his growing hatred of the Japanese, and his despair at his failure to protect his men, meant that he struggled to find a balance between strongly advocating for his patients and pushing his captors too far. When Dunlop got the fragile balance wrong it had devastating consequences for the men in the hospital lines who were carried out to the railway to work.[45]

Dunlop only really succeeded in protecting his patients when McEachern replaced him as the positional leader at Hintok Road Camp on 9 May 1943.[46] Dunlop's writings reveal his relief when McEachern assumed positional leadership responsibilities for the camp, allowing him to focus all of his attention on his patients.[47] McEachern's even temperament helped Dunlop find more balance in his negotiations with the Japanese, ensuring that he backed down from screaming matches when they threatened to sweep the hospital lines for more workers.[48]

With McEachern's support, Dunlop was able to apply his self-sacrificial leadership style using more calculated techniques. One example is the wailing log, described in the vignette in the preface to this chapter.[49] Lifting and carrying the sick to the Japanese guard, forcing the guard to make the decision, seemed to work**.** Petty Officer Raymond Edward Parkin, who observed the tactic, explained that '[e]ven the most

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[44] Thompson, Diary 5 April 1943.
[45] For other examples when this occurred see Staff Sergeant J. Ross, War Crimes Trials Statement, 20 May 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/124; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.148-149.
[46] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.257.
[47] For reference to Dunlop's relief that McEachern arrived in his base camp and then when McEachern assumed the role of positional leader see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.249-250, 257, 283. Ray Parkin's writings also explain that McEachern's presence in the camp eased some of Dunlop's burden and helped him cope a little better with their situation. See Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.128-129.
[48] For reference to McEachern's calming effect on Dunlop see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.257, 337.
[49] For example of the use of the wailing log as a negotiation tactic see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.277, 279, 280-282; R. Parkin cited in Nelson, *P.O.W.*, pp.50-51; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.149.

hardened Japanese found it difficult to accept a man proffered in Dunlop's arms as fit to labour on the railway.'[50] However, this tactic was not fool proof. On the occasions when it did fail, Dunlop instructed the men to collapse. This usually convinced the guards that they were too sick to work and had to stay in the camp. Some of the prisoners' performances were very authentic. On 14 June 1943, Dunlop wrote in his diary, '[s]taged three collapses of men who had gone sick during the night. Poor wretches, they were convincing enough - so much so that Okada suspected one of being cholera, yet advanced to feel his pulse. Gallant fellow!'[51] The combination of Dunlop's aggression and McEachern's calm approach set the tone for the way officers in Dunlop's camps created a 'firm front'[52] to protect sick men from working parties.

Day in and day out, Dunlop also risked his personal safety in his attempts to protect the sick and vulnerable men in his formal group. Interestingly, during the main construction phase of the railway, Dunlop's diary only refers once to the physical consequences of his leadership style.[53] This is in stark contrast to the writings and recollections of officers and men of Dunlop Force who remarked that Dunlop's bravery regularly ended in a bashing.[54]

There are two possible reasons for Dunlop including the one reference to being assaulted at Hintok River Camp in his published writings. First, it was the only time when Dunlop overpowered his attacker. Second, the consequences of this incident resulted in his transfer from Hintok River Camp to Tarso Base Hospital, where he stayed until 16 January 1944.[55] On 3 October 1943, Dunlop was assaulted by the same guard twice in one day. During the second altercation, Dunlop had had enough. He

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[50] Parkin cited in Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.50.
[51] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.280.
[52] *ibid*., p.266.
[53] *ibid*., pp.332-333.
[54] For reference to men in O and P Battalions Dunlop Force who witnessed Dunlop being assaulted see McMaster, 'My War Experiences, Friendships and 3 ½ Years as a Prisoner of War', p.24; Letter to Mr. Prime Minister from J. Graham, 7 October 1955, AWM PR00926, Subseries 5, File 39; Cody, *Ghosts in Khaki*, pp.126-127; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.50-51.
[55] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.333, 367. Dunlop became Second in Command at Tarso Base Hospital from late October 1943 until 16 January 1944. From here Dunlop went to Chungkai Base Hospital where he acted as SMO. On 22 May 1944 Dunlop was transferred to Nakom Patom Hospital. He remained at this location serving both as a surgeon and in an administrative support role to Lieutenant Colonel Albert Ernest Coates until his liberation. For reference to Dunlop's positions in these locations see Thompson, Diary 21-31 October 1943; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.369, 411-412.

overpowered the guard and took away his rifle. Then, after Dunlop had been escorted to the guardroom, the same guard thrashed him with a bamboo stick. Dunlop overpowered the guard again taking away the bamboo stick. Finally, the guard used a piece of wood to hit Dunlop. It was only when the camp clerk came running into the guardhouse after hearing screams that Dunlop, who was now hitting the guard with the wood, stopped. Both men were sent to Okada and then Hatorisan. Dunlop's diaries explain what happened next:

> I saw Okada, showing him my abrasions to hand and forearm and bruises, cuts and abrasions to the leg. I told him of the subsequent developments and asked him if he would take me to the commander. This he did and introduced me, apparently referring to the incident. I then further explained in English, making a strong protest. Hatorisan pondered this for a long time and finally said 'you must avoid such incidents with Nipponese soldiers!'[56]

As explained above, this violent incident also led to Okada arranging Dunlop's transfer out of the Hintok River Camp to Tarsau Base Hospital. Dunlop explains this turn of events by suggesting that Okada genuinely feared for his safety,[57] and in his interview with Hank Nelson, Dunlop himself admitted that Okada 'saved my life on one or two occasions.'[58] Clearly, Okada provided him with some level of protection against the other guards and engineers. Dunlop, however, dismissed this. Instead he focused on how Okada allowed so many of his men to suffer and die when some simple supplies and protection from working parties might have saved many men during the seven month period his men worked on the railway.[59]

Historian Cameron Forbes argues that Dunlop's relationship with Okada was complex.[60] Okada did attempt to help Dunlop on some occasions. For example, he donated a forequarter of beef to the sick mess, only for it to be taken back when the

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[56] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.332-333.
[57] *ibid*., p.337. Dunlop added a note to his diary after the war, confirming that his transfer out of Hintok River Camp occurred because Okada genuinely feared for his safety. See *ibid*., p.333.
[58] Interview with Dunlop, reel 3.
[59] For an explanation of the basic supplies that Dunlop believed MOs on the Burma-Thailand Railway needed to save their patients see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.175, 193-194.
[60] Forbes, *Hellfire*, pp.323-326.

Japanese guards found out.[61] Okada also gave Dunlop occasional pep talks encouraging him to heal the sick faster.[62] None of these interventions eased his hatred of the Japanese. He told Nelson, 'Total hate was there. You see so many people die in such misery. The hate is intensive.'[63]

Dunlop's followership

Dunlop's self-sacrificial behaviour gave rise to a collective spirit amongst his formal group. For example, Acting Bombardier Tom Uren explained that Dunlop's personal example and his introduction of compulsory deductions from the pay of all men and officers to purchase essential food and medical supplies allowed the men to retain their identity as a formal group.[64]

> We lived by the principle of the fit looking after the sick, the young looking after the old and the rich looking after the poor... It is the collectivism that Weary bred in us... Not all Australian camps were like ours. Our survival rate was due, basically, to Weary's leadership.[65]

Yet, Dunlop's own writings and those of his men reveal that there was a significant difference between the leadership legitimacy Dunlop acquired as their doctor and as their positional leader. During his tenure as positional leader, he struggled to maintain control over the discipline of the formal group. For example, his diary recorded fights between the men at Konyu Camp on 28 January 1943.[66] On 31 January, a warrant officer, who had been appointed as the quartermaster, was relieved of his duty because he had been stealing food.[67] On 6 February, Dunlop warned his warrant officers and

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[61] *ibid*., p.324.
[62] For example see Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 27 June 1946, p.1; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.181, 251, 276, 277, 337; Forbes, *Hellfire*, pp.323-326.
[63] Interview with Dunlop, reel 3. For other references to Dunlop's intense anger see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.264-266, 269, 274, 297.
[64] For reference to compulsory pay deductions by all members of O and P and then S Battalions see Interview with Dunlop, reel 3; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.161, 174, 185-186, 198-199, 216, 227, 267, 311-312, 317; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.81.
[65] T. Uren, 'Journey's in Captivity,' in G. McCormack and H. Nelson (eds.), *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History*, (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993), pp.54-55. Dunlop also made sure that 'fit' prisoners shared the responsibility of walking to Tarsau to collect these goods. See Interview with Dunlop, reel 3; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.178, 183-184, 231, 242-243.
[66] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.184.
[67] *ibid*.

sergeants that if they did not maintain better control over their men they risked insubordination from the other ranks.[68] That, he said, would place the survival of the entire formal group at risk. Yet, isolated pockets of theft continued into April.[69] One of Dunlop's men, Private Alf Denton, stole a can of sardines from the Japanese as late as August 1943.[70] Dunlop witnessed Denton's punishment by the Japanese and did nothing to stop it. He also had problems with some of his officers when he informed them that they had to join working parties to allow the sick men to remain in camp.[71] Some officers immediately volunteered, some had to be persuaded, others refused outright.

Poor discipline posed a potential threat to collective survival, but Dunlop considered the black market run by the prisoners in his camps as a greater threat. The prisoners who were involved in these rackets stopped river barges loaded with foodstuffs, or secretly went down to Konyu to purchase supplies.[72] To Dunlop's disgust, most of these men sold the food they had purchased to their fellow prisoners, including hospital patients, for a profit. However, although Dunlop disapproved of the practice, he understood why men resorted to this kind of behaviour, stating in his interview with Nelson, 'If you thieve off me, you were going to survive and I wasn't… It was just surviving.'[73]

Dunlop clearly struggled with his duties as positional officer and he often put his medical duties first when he was the positional leader. As noted earlier, he welcomed the arrival of McEachern to take over the positional leadership duties in his camps. What earned Dunlop leadership legitimacy and followership amongst the men was, therefore, his role as their doctor. As Parkin noted at Konyu Camp on 3 February: 'He [Dunlop] is our camp CO but primarily our doctor.'[74]

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[68] *ibid*., p.190.
[69] For example see Hayes, Diary 13 April 1943; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.248; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.57, 107, 133, 154.
[70] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.315.
[71] Thompson, Diary 23 March 1943; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.218, 223, 238, 240, 319; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.57, 129-130.
[72] For reference to black market schemes in his camps see Thompson, Diary 1 May, 8 May, 25 May, 30 May 1943; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.268, 311, 312; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.107.
[73] Interview with Dunlop, reel 3.
[74] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.50.

The importance Dunlop attached to his role as doctor, the fierce protectiveness that characterised his attitude towards his patients, and the self-sacrificial nature of his leadership style sometimes brought with it feelings of guilt and inadequacy. Despite his own health problems, included bouts of malaria, a light case of cholera, and what Dunlop himself admitted was 'fairly bad' tropical ulcers, he felt guilty about receiving medical treatment for himself.[75] Receiving a mouthful of food above the ordinary ration made him uncomfortable, seeing anything extra he received as tantamount to stealing life from the helpless. Eggs provide one example of the complicated interplay between Dunlop's sense of responsibility and protectiveness for the sick, and his discomfort about receiving 'extras'.

A rare supply of eggs arrived in the camp one day. After a long day working in the hospital, Dunlop arrived back in the officers' lines and his mess man gave him his meal: 'a plate of dry rice with two fried eggs on top.'[76] Just as he was about to take his first bite, Dunlop saw two British prisoners being forced to carry a heavy log. Suddenly, one of them faltered, which led to both men collapsing. Dunlop 'got up and said a few things to the Jap.'[77] Parkin, who observed the incident, reasoned that '[s]omething in the big man's subtle presence must have affected the Jap, for he left the tommies in Weary's care.' [78] After treating them, Dunlop suddenly became very conscience that both men were eyeing his meal. His mess man, who had watched the scene, intervened. He said, 'Now look here. We don't get eggs every day, you know. Mostly it is rice and seaweed soup, same as you. These are the first we have had for a long while. The colonel would have eaten his by now, only he's working hard in the hospital lines all day. He needs them more than you do. You eat them colonel. Go on.'[79] Unable to eat, Dunlop retreated to his tent and 'scrapped together a few biscuits and palm sugar'[80] for the men, who quickly demolished them. After they had gone, Dunlop ate his eggs, but did not enjoy them. He explained to Parkin that 'he felt a

[75] For reference to Dunlop's guilt see Interview with Dunlop, reel 3; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.271, 272, 277-278. For reference to some of Dunlop's illness see Interview with Dunlop, reel 3; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.199, 201, 254, 260, 262, 269, 271, 324, 331.
[76] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.147.
[77] *ibid*.
[78] *ibid*.
[79] *ibid*.
[80] *ibid*., pp.147-148.

keen disappointment in himself.'[81] This is not the only time when Dunlop's own behaviour disappointed him. His diary chronicles other times when he describes his reaction to the suffering around him as selfish, which caused him to be 'full of self-loathing.'[82]

Dunlop's writings also reflect a sense of inadequacy, even despair, over what he saw as personal failures to protect his men from both the brutality of the Japanese and the illnesses that cost his men their lives in Thailand. Too many men who trusted his skill and courage died. Dunlop's last entry before he was transferred to Tarsau Base Hospital epitomised these thoughts. 'I find now that my policies of keeping our group of Java party together was in the end a failure… I just didn't reckon on the inhumanity of the last three months or the cholera.'[83]

Dunlop's sense of failure is the antithesis of his men's writings and recollections about his leadership.[84] That Dunlop often failed in his quest to protect sick and vulnerable men did not matter. What did matter was that he never gave up. For his men, Dunlop's leadership style meant that he had acquired leadership legitimacy and a followership that could be fiercely protective as two incidents reveal.

The first took place in Java at Makasura Camp. One of Dunlop's men kicked a soccer ball at the Japanese Commandant.[85] The Japanese reacted by fixing their bayonets and filling their guns with ammunition. After this display, the Japanese gave Dunlop permission to dismiss his troops, but as he was giving them a salute, he received 'an upper cut in the teeth.'[86] Not expecting the blow, Dunlop fell to the ground. When he got back on his feet, as he recalled, '[a] samurai sword came out and he [the Japanese Commandant] ran at my neck. This was the one thing I blessed boxing for, I got out of

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[81] *ibid*., p.147.
[82] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.269. Also see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.266.
[83] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.315. Also see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.199-200, 254, 258, 274.
[84] For example of the fierce followership that Dunlop acquired on the Burma-Thailand Railway see Thomas, 'Forty years on I Remember', pp.29, 33-35; Letter to Prime Minister from J. Graham cited in Uren, 'Journey's in Captivity,' pp.54-55; Cody, *Ghosts in Khaki*, pp.126-127; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.50-51, 73, 84, 88; T. Uren cited in H. Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.53.
[85] Interview with Dunlop, reel 2.
[86] *ibid*.

the road but he got my larynx with a sickening crash.'[87] As Dunlop lay on the ground, he looked up and saw his men breaking ranks. Fearing a massacre, Dunlop desperately motioned for his men to back off. To Dunlop's relief, the men obeyed him but did not leave their lines until he was safe. The second occurred at Hintok River Camp, when Dunlop was being assaulted. As Private Maxwell Lawrence McGee recalled,

> There was one parade where all the men were on show and the bashing started. A certain amount was always accepted but when Weary got more than his fair share, there was a sudden concerted growl from the men. That was the only time I remember the Japs backing down. We would have got them all even though a lot of us would have been shot.[88]

Dunlop's physical presence became a symbol of hope to men enduring the heartache and hell of captivity in Thailand. Parkin, for example, wrote:

> Weary has been down from the road a couple of times. He seems in good health and high spirits. This, in itself, is a tonic to the men. It went around the camp when the workers came in, 'Weary has been down and he looks well.' He is a symbol and a rock to us.[89]

He added, 'This selflessness, this smile, commands more from the men that an army of officers waving a manual of military law.'[90]

The men were not blind to Dunlop's heartache at the loss of so many patients or his health problems. On 21 July 1943, at the height of the speedo, Lance Corporal Kenneth Hayes, a prisoner who worked as an orderly in Hintok Mountain Camp, wrote in his diary 'Weary is working day and night and hasn't a hope with no equipment. I'm afraid the strain on him is beginning to show.'[91] Other men's writings

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[87] *ibid*.
[88] M. McGee cited in J. Bellair, *From Snow to Jungle: A History of the 2/3 Machine Gun Battalion,* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987), p.127.
[89] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.8.
[90] *ibid*., p.58.
[91] Hayes, Diary 21 July 1943.

include a chronicle of Dunlop's health problems alongside their own, along with the sense of protectiveness described earlier.[92] Parkin, for example, wrote:

> Weary's legs are bad, ulcers and beri beri [sic] swelling. But he keeps going all day at the hospital. This affects the fellows in the camp. They feel for him and worry about him. Many of them try to think of some ruse to keep him off his feet, none had been found.[93]

The men on Dunlop Force, of course, realised that Dunlop did not perform his medical duties alone. They consistently wrote and recalled that he was assisted by Moon and Corlette.[94] They also acknowledged the bravery and skill of the medical orderlies who assisted the doctors. Yet it is clear, that out of all these men, it was Dunlop who acquired a strong followership. He stood above the others through his selfless leadership style. Gerald Bourke, a chaplain on the Burma-Thailand Railway, explained to Dunlop's biographer, Sue Ebury, that Dunlop had 'Christ like virtues.'[95] Brigadier Arthur Blackburn, the officer who was in Changi at the time when Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan questioned Dunlop's authority to lead a formal group, praised Dunlop's work in Java and Thailand with these words:

> [N]o mere award can ever begin to express and appreciate the thanks of the many thousands of men who are alive today solely because of your self-sacrificing work.[96]

Hearder's study of MOs on the Burma-Thailand Railway explains that Dunlop was a man who was respected for his work in Thailand,[97] but notes that Dunlop was not the only MO who became a legitimate leader for the prisoners within his formal group.[98] Fagan and Hunt were two others.

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[92] For example see Thomas, 'Forty Years on I Remember', pp.33-35; Thompson, Diary 2 April, 9 May and 5 June 1943; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.188.
[93] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.84.
[94] For example see Letter to R. Newton from K. Gray, no date, p.1, AWM PR01596; McMaster, 'My War Experiences, Friendships and 3 ½ Years as a Prisoner of War', p.24; Miggins, Diary January 3 1944; Thomas, 'Forty Years on I Remember', p.29; Thompson, Diary 19 February 1943; Cody, *Ghosts in Khaki*, p.125.
[95] G. Bourke cited in Ebury, *Weary*, p.432.
[96] Letter to E. Dunlop from A. Blackburn, 8 May 1947, AWM PR00926, Subseries 5, File 39.
[97] Header, 'Careers in Captivity', pp.199-200, 329-332. Also see Hearder, 'Memory, Methodology and Myth,' p.6.
[98] Header, 'Careers in Captivity,' p.333; Hearder, 'Memory, Methodology and Myth', p.6.

Major Kevin James Fagan

Major Kevin James Fagan was attached to Group Three of H Force as its surgical specialist.[99] Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes led this group of 600 Australians.[100] From its initiation in Changi, this force was different. Due to the unavailability of other ranks from Changi as a result of illness, and the significant number of prisoners who had already left on other Work Forces, H Force was a mixed group, half having been captured in Java, half in Singapore.[101] Even before they left Changi, the health of the Australians on this Work Force was, at best, mediocre. Oakes claimed that '[s]omething like 25 percent of the personnel of H [F]orce were medically unfit'.[102] According to the 2/30th battalion history, many of these men had been unable to work for months, and others had only recently been discharged from the Australian General Hospital at Changi.[103] Oakes was hesitant about taking sick men with the Work Force, but Galleghan allowed it because the Japanese had assured him that the sick and unfit prisoners would be well looked after.[104] The mixed composition of H Force was also a problem: this formal group lacked cohesion. When the reality of conditions in Thailand became apparent, this lack of unity had devastating consequences for the prisoners, especially when their officers became hesitant and when some stopped advocating on their behalf to their captors.[105] Fagan, however, established his willingness to protect sick, vulnerable and exhausted men from the beginning.

When they arrived at Bampong, like other Work Forces before them, the men were forced to march to their base camp. However, as H Force was one of the last Work

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[99] Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.1.
[100] Oakes was also second in command of H Force. See Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.1; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.581-582.
[101] Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.59.
[102] Lieutenant Colonel R. Oakes, War Crimes Trials Statement, 19 November 1945, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/110.
[103] Penfold, Bayliss and Crispin, *Galleghan's Greyhounds*, p.387.
[104] Oakes, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.1.
[105] For reference to the deterioration of the Australian H Force camps see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.293; Various Members of the 2/19 Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, pp.600, 603. The choice of some officers on H Force not to protect their men is examined in Chapter 9. The impact this choice had on informal groups in H Force is also examined in Chapter 9.

Forces to arrive in Thailand, their base camp was the furthest up the line on the Thailand side of the construction project.[106] These Australians, therefore, marched about 90 miles from Bampong to Malaya Hamlet. At the beginning of their march, the officers refused to let go of the non-essential items that they had been allowed to bring with them from Changi. Fagan explained to Nelson that: '[w]e were told we were going to a holiday camp, good food, bring the old piano and musical instruments.'[107] As the prisoners marched on, some of the officers sold their possessions to the natives, while others were determined to struggle on with their surplus gear.[108] As these officers were concerned only with their own welfare on the march, Fagan filled the void.

Most of the other ranks, particularly the ones who were already classified as unfit, struggled on the march. Even the Japanese threat to assault prisoners who fell behind was not always enough to get sick men back on their feet. At this early point, Fagan's actions evolved from providing a professional medical service into professional leadership. The writings and recollections of Gunner Russell Braddon, Private Patrick George Pringle, Lieutenant Robert Molesworth Goodwin and even Oakes himself reveal that the skills of Fagan and his medical orderlies were essential in getting the prisoners to Malaya Hamlet. Braddon recalled:

> Not only did he treat any man needing treatment to the best of his ability, he also carried men who fell; he carried the kit of men in danger of falling, and he marched up and down the whole length of the column through its entire progress. If we marched 100 miles through the jungle, Kevin Fagan marched 200. And when, at the end of our night's trip, we collapsed and slept, he was there to clean blisters, set broken bones and render first aid.[109]

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[106] Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.3.
[107] K. Fagan cited in Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.38.
[108] H. Humphries, Statement regarding Journeys and Employment of Prisoners of War known as H Force in Thailand, May- December 1943, 5 February 1945, p.1, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5.
[109] Braddon, *The Naked Island*, p.178. Also see Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.2; Oakes, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.10; Oakes, 'Work and Be Happy', pp.315, 319; Clarke, *A Life for Every Sleeper*, p.46; Goodwin, *Mates and Memories*, pp. 140-141; P. Pringle cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, pp.189-190.

Through these selfless acts, Fagan laid a foundation of trust amongst the mixed formal group.

The Australians finally reached their base camp on 21 May 1943, six days after they left Bampong.[110] Like the other Work Forces on the Burma-Thailand Railway, the men on H Force found a somewhat cleared space, which they were forced to convert into a camp site, while at the same time providing working parties to start construction on their section of the railway.[111] Initially the Japanese engineers in this sector ordered the officers to supply 200 workers for the day shift and another 200 workers for the night shift.[112] Once the officers and the men understood the nature of their work, and the unreasonable demands by the Japanese for sick men to labour, the officers, led by positional leader Oakes, largely stopped their efforts to protect their men because they did not want to risk their personal survival. Fagan, however, remained their defender and in doing so, became their legitimate leader.[113]

Little is known of the techniques Fagan used to protect the sick from working parties. However, from Braddon, Captain Bernard Matthew O'Sullivan and Private Alexander Hatton Drummond's writings, it can be presumed that Fagan used all of his cunning, courage and professional skill in his attempts to protect the sick, injured and weak from being assigned to working parties. For example, in Patsy Adam-Smith's study of Australian POWs, O'Sullivan, an officer in the Australian Battalion of H Force, reflected on Fagan's efforts to protect the sick from working parties:

> Dr. Fagan was with us, he was absolutely marvellous, every man of us owes much to him. He was a quiet man, a surgeon, gentle with us and strong with the Japs. He defended our men as best he could. Fagan fought like a demon to keep sick men off work parties. If a man could show [he] was bandaged it was okay with the Japs, but sick men had to go to work because the Japs thought Fagan was sheltering bludgers; what Fagan was

[110] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.582; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.615.
[111] Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.615.
[112] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.583.
[113] Cody, *Ghosts in Khaki*, p.244; Forbes, *Hellfire*, p.360.

> doing was trying to help the men stay alive. As I said, all of us on H force [sic] owe our lives to this man.[114]

The official report on the activities of H Force describe the MO's protection of their patients as 'unremitting and self-sacrificing.'[115] Oakes' report explains that Fagan, along with Major H Morrison of the SSVF, 'did everything that was humanely possible'[116] for the sick, including defending them 'bravely'[117] against Japanese aggression. The H Force report concluded that his behaviour saved many lives.[118] Drummond (writing as 'Alexander Hatton') believed that Fagan's protective stance was vital for the Australians as the senior officers of the camp were mostly unwilling to put their bodies on the line to protect the men.[119] Drummond's writings even suggest that the leadership legitimacy and followership Fagan acquired from these self-sacrificing acts were resented by the other officers because it contrasted with their decision to protect themselves.[120]

In contrast to prisoner writings and recollections on Dunlop and F Force, there are no specific references to Fagan being assaulted during his attempts to protect the sick from being forced onto working parties. However, within the context of the Burma-Thailand Railway, and the official reports and private writings and recollections noting Fagan's bravery, it is highly likely that Fagan was assaulted during his attempts to protect the sick.[121]

Despite his self-sacrificial leadership style, like Dunlop, Fagan had mixed success protecting sick men in his camp from the Japanese demands for labour. The official report on H Force states that 'doctor's opinions as to the fitness of individuals were frequently ignored and men were often dragged from their beds in order to make up deficits in numbers.'[122] Oakes confirmed that despite Fagan's best efforts, the sick

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[114] B. O'Sullivan cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, p.410. Also see Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.187, 189, 191; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.182, 187, 209.
[115] Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.8.
[116] Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.5. Also see Oakes, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.3.
[117] Oakes, Report of AIF section of H Force, p.5.
[118] Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.8. Also M. Windchester, H Force Dental Officer Report, p.1, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5 Appendix M.
[119] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.180-202.
[120] *ibid*.
[121] Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.5.
[122] Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.7.

were forced to work. Oakes also recalled Fagan's reaction when Oakes told him he had to pick the 50 least sick men in his camp for work. Fagan replied: 'It's no good asking me for the least sick. They're all sick.'[123]

As a leader who applied a self-sacrificial style, Fagan's response to Oakes' question was not surprising. He had an enormous number of men to protect. According to the *Official Australian Medical History*, when the Australian Battalion of H Force arrived at Malaya Hamlet, about one-third of the men were sick.[124] Then, on 16 June, cholera struck.[125] By the end of the month more than 200 men had contracted the disease.[126] Braddon wrote that with few medical supplies, 'their only sustenance was the tireless strength and devotion of Major Fagan.'[127] Drummond's writings also stress that Fagan was their only hope.[128]

Fearing that they too would catch the deadly disease, and in the face of Fagan's demands for medical supplies, food and rest for the men, the Japanese engineers agreed to reduce the numbers of men required in the working parties.[129] To make up the shortfall, the Japanese brought in reinforcements, a British Battalion of H force, comprised of 266 men.[130] These men also fell ill. In his official history, A. J. Sweeting explains that by 4 July, out of a total camp population of 750 men, 91 had died.[131] Another 110 had cholera and 118 men were suspected of having the disease.[132] By the end of July, 217 men were dead, 111 Australians and 106 British prisoners.[133] Despite this, the Japanese still expected the prisoners to work on the railway in eight-hour shifts. At the end of five weeks, by the time H Force had finished construction, one out of every six men in this camp had died. In total 165 other ranks and 4 Australian officers died.[134]

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[123] Oakes, 'Singapore Story,' p.323.
[124] Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.616.
[125] C. Mansfield, Diary June 16 1943, AWM PR00111; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.584; Various Members of the 2/19 Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, p.657.
[126] Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.616.
[127] Braddon, *The Naked Island*, p.187. Also see Clarke, *A Life for Every Sleeper*, p.46.
[128] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.186, 198.
[129] Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.616.
[130] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.584.
[131] *ibid*., pp.584-585.
[132] *ibid*.
[133] Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.616.
[134] Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.27; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.585. In total 880 men from the combined Australian, British and Dutch Battalions of H Force died. This figure accounting for 29.6% of the men assigned to H Force. See Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.27.

In an interview with Nelson, Fagan described his worst experience in Thailand. It occurred after construction had been completed in their sector. Just when he thought their hell was over and his patients might have a chance to recover, the Japanese ordered him to select 100 men to go further up-country to Konoita, to help another battalion that had fallen behind schedule. Fagan believed that what the Japanese had really asked him to do was choose 100 men to die.

> There were about 300 of us left out of 600. From that group, none of whom were well, all of whom had malaria, were malnourished, and some of them were shivering on parade, dressed in laplap or a pair of shorts, rarely any boots. I had to select 100 men to march another 100 miles into the unknown, certainly to worse and not to better. I never saw any of those men again. I felt that I had come to the end at that stage because these were the fellows whom I had nursed through difficult times and there was a bond of affection between us. I would have understood if they'd cursed me, turned on their heels and walked away. Instead they came and shook hands with me and wished me good luck. And I found it necessary to walk into the jungle and weep…[135]

Although the Japanese had forced Fagan to make this choice, it haunted him, even after the war. He could not cope with the fact that no matter what he did, he could not save these men.

Fagan's followership

Fagan's attempts to protect the sick against the demands of the Japanese, even when he failed, created a loyal followership. Oakes himself admitted that Fagan emerged as the natural leader of the Australians and British prisoners at Malaya Hamlet.[136] The men in Fagan's formal group understood that his every word and action sought to aid

[135] K. Fagan cited in Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.55.
[136] Oakes, 'Singapore Story,' p.319.

their survival.[137] They were confident in the belief that Fagan, despite the cost to himself, would not falter in his efforts to protect them.

The most powerful evidence of the level of followership Fagan had acquired was the reactions of his formal group when Fagan himself became critically ill after the survivors arrived back in Singapore. Instead of going back to Changi, they stayed at Sime Road Camp.[138] Here Fagan collapsed.[139] News of his dire condition spread like wildfire amongst his men. The mood of the camp was sombre. Distraught men tried to find some way to help the man who had been willing to risk his life to help them through hell. In return for his sacrifice, the men gave Fagan what scant belongings they had. Braddon wrote:

> To the fibro-cement room where he lay, from all over the camp, came an endless pilgrimage of soldiers bearing tinned food, money, oil, soap, clothes, all their most cherished possessions. 'Brought this for the Major' they would say, 'thought it might help' then wandered off. No other man in the entire Malayan force could have won so spontaneous a tribute of treasures.[140]

In time Fagan made a full recovery. While the relief was palpable in the camp, Braddon's writings also reveal how grateful the prisoners were to have had the opportunity to show Fagan the depth of their gratitude for the selfless and courageous leadership he had given them in the midst of the jungle.[141]

Major Bruce Atlee Hunt

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[137] For reference to the men believing that Fagan was their protector see Barlow, Manuscript, p.49; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.177, 180-182, 185, 187-191, 197; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.178-179, 184-185, 187, 209; Cody, *Ghosts in Khaki*, p.254.
[138] H Force survivors stayed at Sime Road Camp in Singapore until April 1944. At this time they re-joined the other Australian prisoners at Changi civilian jail. See Penfold, Bayliss and Crispin, *Galleghan's Greyhounds,* p.387.
[139] Braddon, *The Naked Island*, p.224; Wall, *Singapore and Beyond,* p.194.
[140] Braddon, *The Naked Island*, p.224.
[141] *ibid*. For his medical services as a POW Fagan was recommended for mention in despatches in 1946 and received an Order of Australian Medal in 1987. See Investiture Booklet for the Order of Australia, 28 August 1987, p.3, AWM PR00926, Subseries 5, Item 1/54; Recommendation for Mention in Despatches for Services Rendered whilst Prisoner of War, AWM119 173 Part 1.

Bruce Atlee Hunt's self-sacrificial leadership style was similar to Dunlop's selfless and passionate defence of sick and vulnerable prisoners. However, Hunt's decision to apply a self-sacrificial leadership style, whilst similarly based on protecting the sick and vulnerable men in his F Force Battalion, was also based on personal and professional pride. He refused to allow the Japanese to treat him as a subservient, passive prisoner. In the context of F Force's experiences on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Hunt's defiance of the captor enabled him to become the legitimate leader of his formal group.

F Force consisted of 7000 prisoners, including 3662 Australians, of whom 125 were classified as unfit before they left Changi.[142] Australian Lieutenant Colonel Charles Henry Kappe was the ranking officer of the Australian contingent of F Force. Most of the Australians assigned to F Force came from the 27th Brigade, but there were also some prisoners from other units.[143] The Australian contingent of F Force arrived at Bampong between 28 and 30 April.[144] By the end of May 1944, 1060 or 44 percent of these Australians were dead.[145] Most of the dead came from the other ranks.[146]

F Force received an even more hostile reception than H Force had. After arriving at Bampong, they were forced to march 180 miles to their base camps, with some Australians even crossing the border into Burma.[147] The Australian contingent was divided between four base camps.[148] The largest group of Australians (1800) were at Lower Songkurari Number 1 camp. Smaller groups of Australians prisoners were located at Upper Songkurai (393) and Konkoita (700). Another 200 Australians were sent to F Force headquarters, originally at Lower Nieke then at Nieke. During the construction phase of the Burma-Thailand Railway, Hunt was firstly based at Konkonita camp and then at Lower Songkurari camp.[149]

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[142] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.571.
[143] Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.593.
[144] History of the 2/30 Battalion A.I.F. Association, P.O.W. F Force, http://www.230battalion.org.au/history/pow/FForce/FForceMain.htm, accessed on 2 February 2015.
[145] Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.593.
[146] Less than one percent of Australian officers died on F Force. See Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.101.
[147] Nelson, *P.O.W.*, pp.38-39; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.527-573.
[148] Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.574; Various Members of the 2/19 Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, p.648.
[149] Hunt moved to Lower Sonkurari Camp when cholera broke out at this location. He arrived on 16 May. See C. Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left for Thailand in April 1943, Part 1 Organisation of the Force, p.14, AWM54 554/7/4.

Peter Stanley has argued that some positional leaders in F Force, realising the personal consequences that followed trying to protect the men from the Japanese, chose not to risk their own survival for the sake of their men.[150] The positional officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Henry Kappe, led this reversion from their duties. The men in Kappe's formal group rechristened him 'kappe-san'[151] or 'kappeama'[152] because of his refusal to help his men against the demands of the Japanese, which, according to the men of the Australian Battalion of F Force at Lower Songkurari, made Kappe 'jap-happy.'[153] When Kappe returned to Changi POW camp in Singapore, he explained the reason for his behaviour to his superior officers: 'I had to look after myself to tell the story.'[154] In a similar way to Fagan, Hunt moved from being a MO performing a professional service into a positional leadership role. Fellow Australian MO Captain Richard Lloyd Cahill explained that Kappe accepted this *de facto* transfer of his official leadership responsibilities to Hunt. In his interview with the Australians at War Film Archive project, Cahill recalled that,

> You had to have the best you could [leading the camp]… Fortunately the CO of the camp really had handed over to Bruce Hunt, the doctor, so that he ran the camp.[155]

Hunt's major antagonist at Lower Songkurari camp was Lieutenant Fukuda, who quickly 'christened' Hunt 'Hunt Tai, Hunt Tai'[156] because of his aggressive manner in dealing with the Japanese demands on his men. Fukuda learnt that, in his attempts to protect the sick from being assigned to working parties, Hunt never cowered or backed down from strenuously arguing his point that the men were too sick and weak to work. Cahill recalled that Hunt was 'fearless'[157] in his attempts to protect his patients.

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[150] For example see Stanley, "The men who did the fighting are now all busy writing", pp.298-312.
[151] Stanley, "The men who did the fighting are now all busy writing", p.301.
[152] *ibid*.
[153] *ibid*. Stanley's analysis is confirmed by the interviews of survivors conducted by the Australians at War Film Archive Project. For example see Interview with Cahill, tape 8; Interview with Gilbert, tapes 4 and 7; Interview with Parkes, tapes 3 and 5.
[154] D. Wall, *Heroes of F Force*, (Mona Vale: Self-Published, 1993), p.126. Also see Wall, *Heroes of F Force*, p.79. According to Peter Stanley, Hank Nelson's interview with Sergeant Erwin Ernest Heckendorf and the recollections of MO Lloyd Cahill confirm the 'gist' of Kappe's explanation for his behaviour. See Stanley, "The men who did the fighting are now all busy writing", p.311.
[155] Interview with Cahill, tape 6. Confirmed in Interview with Gilbert, tape 7; Interview with Venables, tape 6.
[156] Interview with Cahill, tape 7. The translation of 'Hunt Tai' means 'against Hunt'.
[157] Interview with Cahill, tape 7. Also see interview with Gilbert, tape 7.

According to Cahill, Hunt 'didn't care' about the personal consequences: 'He just talked them down.'[158]

Hunt's often defiant style of negotiating did not protect him from being physically assaulted. Australian prisoner Private Maxwell Venables' interview for the Australians at War Film Archive project described the consequences of Hunt's determination to protect the sick:

> Major Hunt took more of a hiding than anybody up there. He had to find these troops [for the work parties] and he'd say no I haven't got them and they'd come up and bash him. And he'd say, 'I haven't got them.' Sometimes he'd fall down, they'd kick him and Major Hunt took a lot of bashings up there for us. He saved us. [159]

Lance Corporal Erwin Heckendorf's memories of Hunt's self-sacrificial leadership style are similar. He described his memories to Hank Nelson and Gavin McCormack:

> He was [a] fantastic man. He took bashings from the Japs and took abuse. They'd come along and want to pull men out of the hospital to take them to work. He'd try and stop them.[160]

The 2/10th battalion history remarks that Hunt 'was always eager to seize on any excuse to stop his men working.'[161] For example, when cholera struck the Australians at Lower Songkurari, like Fagan, Hunt used the Japanese fear of the disease to his

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[158] Interview with Cahill, tape 7.
[159] Special Immediate Award, OBE Citation for B. Hunt, NAA:B883: WX11177; Interview with Venables, tape 9. For reference to similar views of the physical bashings Hunt received see Letter to Major Hunt from N. Couch, 17 December 1945, pp.2-5, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 7; Letter to B. Hunt from G. Nichol, 12 October 1945, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 7; Letter to B. Hunt from F. Stahl, 14 May 1944, pp.1-2, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 7.
[160] E. Heckendorf cited in Nelson, 'Measuring the Railway,' p.19.
[161] R. Goodwin, *Mates and Memories: Recollections of the 2/10th Field Regiment R.A.A., (*Rochedale: Boolarong Press with 2/10 Field Regiment Association, 1993), p.137. F Force Report reveals that the concession Hunt was able to get for his men from his captors saved lives. See C. Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part D: Initial Distribution of the Force and Conditions during May and June 43, pp.15-17, AWM54 554/7/4. For reference to sanitation measures Hunt introduced to the POW camp at Lower Songkurari see Interview with Cahill, tape 6.

advantage.[162] He called a meeting with Fukuda who agreed that all construction work should stop on the railway until the disease was under control. This concession, however, only lasted three days.[163] Fukuda then returned to his practice of demanding sick men fill the quotas for working parties.[164] Despite Hunt's best efforts, 210 prisoners contracted cholera. Of these men 101 prisoners died: that constituted 47 percent of all the prisoners in Hunt's camp.[165]

Hunt's sense of responsibility for the men prompted him to leave the camp, sometimes without permission, in an attempt to gain vital supplies for his formal group.[166] The trek was not easy, as Kappe recorded in his official report on F Force.

> On occasion Major Hunt walked to NIEKE and returned with medical stores and special diet food. The loads of these stores, which he carried through rain and mud, were far beyond the physical capabilities of the average man and would have deterred any but the most determined. [167]

On one occasion, when he was accompanied by Major N. Johnson, Hunt used his time out of base camp to demand an interview with Colonel Banno, who was in charge of the POW camps in the sector.[168] During this meeting, Banno was handed a written complaint regarding the conditions and treatment of the men in the camp, and the lack of basic food and medical supplies that the Japanese provided for the prisoners. According to the 2/10th battalion history, Hunt demanded that the report be forwarded to the Red Cross in Switzerland.[169]

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[162] Goodwin, *Mates and Memories*, pp.137-138. For an overview of the cholera epidemic at Lower Songkurari see Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part D, pp.16-17.
[163] Kappe, Report on Activities of F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part D, p.16.
[164] J. Dillon, Report on the Conditions in Thailand May to December, 1943, p.7, AWM3DRL/3517, Folder 3.
[165] Kappe, Report on Activities of F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part D, p.19.
[166] For reference to Dunlop leaving camp to gain supplies see Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, pp.239-240, 242-243, 271-272.
[167] C. Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Appendix VI, p.1, AMW54 554/7/4.
[168] Kappe, Report on Activities of AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part D, p.15.
Hunt and Johnson also wrote letters of complaint to Colonel Banno while they were in their camp. See Letter to the Officer in Charge of Shimo Sinkuari Camp from Major N. Johnson Comd. AIF troops Shinto Sonkuari Camps and Bruce Hunt AAMC, pp.1-4, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 3.
[169] Goodwin, *Mates and Memories*, p.137.

On his way back to his base camp, Hunt would 'beg, borrow or steal'[170] any medical supplies that he could. The 2/10th battalion history describes how Hunt usually arrived back in camp with 'three or four… haversacks [of supplies] over his shoulder.'[171] Because Hunt often undertook these journeys without Japanese permission, when he returned to camp he was beaten.[172] Hunt's willingness to repeatedly engage in this behaviour, knowing full well the personal cost, demonstrated his willingness to accept the consequences of risky behaviour if it gave his men the chance to survive.

Like Dunlop, Hunt expected his men to reciprocate his self-sacrificial leadership style by looking after each other. When his men broke this agreement, Hunt interpreted this behaviour as a personal affront. Captain J. Dillon's report on the conditions in Thailand described one incident at the Lower Songkuari Camp.[173] At the height of the cholera outbreak, Hunt discovered that some of the 'fit' men were engaging in the theft and black marketing of food products that were meant for the sick. Hunt was livid. He had worked hard to get more basic food supplies into camp for the men, and he had personally paid the price by putting his body on the line for their essential needs. Hunt gathered all the 'fit' prisoners and bluntly explained that there could be no greater crime than stealing food from men who would surely die if they did not receive it. In contrast to Dunlop who faced a similar problem, Hunt threatened corporal punishment to any man who continued to engage in such behaviour. Most of the men stopped this behaviour. Private O'Rourke, however, did not. Hunt acted on his threat. The entire 'fit' prisoner population was ordered to gather on parade. Hunt then explained why he had to punish O'Rourke:

> I told them I regarded it was my duty to get as many sick home alive to Great Britain and Australia as possible and that I would not permit any selfish actions as that of O'Rourke to prevent me from doing so.[174]

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[170] *ibid*.
[171] *ibid*.
[172] *ibid*., pp.137-138.
[173] B. Hunt, Notes for F Force Report, pp.1-2, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 2.
[174] *ibid*., p.2.

In front of the entire parade, O'Rourke received 20 strokes with a cane on his backside. Captains Walker and Roberts, two officers who supported Hunt in his administration of the camp, administered the punishment. Hunt's report explained that as a result of this public punishment, discipline in the camp 'improved considerably' and black marketing 'practically disappeared.'[175] The Japanese officers also respected Hunt's heavy-handed punishment, and rewarded him with more regular food supplies for the men. Hunt's report, however, did not regard the Japanese reaction, or the improvements in discipline, as the most important outcome of this event. Rather, it was the approval of his tough punishment by the majority of the men. He wrote: 'I was told afterwards by many hundreds of men that they regarded my actions as having been very well justified in the interests of the camp.'[176]

On 26 June 1943, Lieutanant Tanio, the Japanese MO at Lower Songkurari Camp, announced that a hospital would be established for F Force prisoners at Tambaya, about 50 kilometres from Thanbyzayat in Burma.[177] This announcement was not a surprise to Hunt. He, in fact, had been suggesting it to Tanio for quite some time. Tanio also announced that Hunt would be in charge of the hospital. Therefore on 1 August 1943, Hunt left Lower Songkurari camp. Hunt knew that it would be a struggle for sick prisoners to reach the hospital, so en route to the hospital's location, he set up staging camps for the sick. However, the Japanese guards escorting them beat any man who fell behind. This behaviour, combined with the appalling conditions and sickness of the men, meant that when the first party reached the hospital, they were less the 46 men who had died on the journey.

The conditions at Tamabaya Hospital were not much better than at Hunt's original camp. There were dire shortages of food and medical supplies, and no light or water.[178] Only non-infectious cases were allowed in the hospital, which meant most prisoners were suffering from diseases associated with malnutrition, such as

[175] *ibid*.
[176] *ibid*.
[177] Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part D, p.27; Kappe, Report on activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Appendix VI, p.1; Goodwin, *Mates and Memories*, p.138.
[178] Goodwin, *Mates and Memories*, p.138.

beriberi.[179] At first, the death rate was extremely high. Between 1 August and 24 November 1943, nearly 700 patients died. Of these men 45 percent were British and 21 percent were Australian. The survival rate increased when Hunt managed to negotiate with A Force's Hospital, which was close by, to buy food supplies on a daily basis.[180]

Throughout his time at Tamabaya Hospital, Hunt became not only a leader of Australians but also of British patients, medical orderlies and doctors. His determination in the face of Japanese cruelty, his negotiation techniques and above all his kindness to his patients, earned him universal acknowledgement as a leader who brought hope to the helpless.[181]

Hunt's followership

The writings and recollections of men from F Force who were located either at Hunt's camps or hospital describe him in glowing terms. Signaller James Ling referred to him as a 'wonderful' and 'magnificent' man.[182] Cahill called him 'extraordinary'[183] even if he was 'arrogant'.[184] Private Donald Wall remarked 'he was hard to match',[185] while Captain W. Nankervis proclaimed him a 'saint.'[186]

The prisoners praised Hunt's unflinching, stubborn stance with the Japanese and his courage in enduring continuous assaults on their behalf.[187] Drummond believed that Hunt's willingness to stand up to the Japanese was the reason for the few precious concessions made by the captor. For example at Tamabaya Hospital,

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[179] For example of this view see Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part D, p.17; Interview with Cahill, tape 6; Interview with Gilbert, tape 7.
[180] Goodwin, *Mates and Memories*, p.138.
[181] *ibid*.
[182] Interview with Ling, tape 1.
[183] Interview with Cahill, tape 6.
[184] *ibid*.
[185] Interview with D. Wall on 3 June 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.0429, tape 6, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1684.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 3 February 2014. Also see Interview with F. Fitch on 16 September 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive no. 0988, tape 6, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/566.aspx>, maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 3 February 2014.
[186] Interview with Nakervis, tape 8.
[187] For example see Hunt, Report on the Conditions in Thailand, p.6; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.159-161;
Interview with Gilbert, tape 7; Interview with Holding, tape 6; Interview with Venables, tapes 6 and 9.

> He [Hunt] soon got into his stride annoying the japs [sic] for more food, better dressings, drugs, you name it. Hunt asked for it. They dished out physical punishment, Hunt took their bashings and then repeated his request. After the easy targets they'd been [hitting]… men like Hunt was [sic] a complete enigma to them. They gave in because they couldn't win.[188]

Drummond was not alone in thinking that Hunt's success with the Japanese was the result of his refusal to give in to their demands, irrespective of the personal costs. Gilbert and Cahill's recollections also attribute Hunt's success to his courage.[189] Private Walter Holding believed that Hunt's physical stature, combined with his courage, helped him achieve some concessions from the Japanese. In his interview with the Australians at War Film Archive project Holding explained that Hunt

> … was a big bloke. He was about 6 feet 2 but big physically in every way and he'd bark at those bloody Nips. Go crook and half of them were frightened of him, I'm bloody sure of it. He used to have some arguments.[190]

Although Dunlop used similar tactics, he failed to achieve any real concessions for his men. Hunt, on the other hand, did. For example Lieutenant Norman Clayton, who was an orderly or ward master under Hunt at Lower Songkurari, recalled one occasion when Hunt's courage allowed him to bargain with Lieutenant Fukuda to gain extra medical supplies for the men.

> Major Hunt endeavoured to discuss the issue but Fukuda had worked himself into a terrible rage, and his reply was to knock the Major down into the mud. Undeterred, Bruce Hunt rose on one knee and told Fukuda he would have more men for work if he would supply quinine for the treatment of malaria. Fukuda, taken aback by the sudden directness of

[188] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.220.
[189] Interview with Cahill, tape 6; Interview with Gilbert, tape 7.
[190] Interview with Holding, tape 6.

> reply from Major Hunt, agreed to allow an officer with a guard to go that day and bring back a haversack full of quinine tablets.[191]

Quinine was a vital drug for all doctors on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Hunt also managed to reduce the number of prisoners required for construction work from 1300 to 1220 over two shifts at the height of the cholera outbreak in May 1943.[192] With 88 men in hospital, 327 unfit for duty, 70 assigned to light duties and 250 men and officers on camp duties, including those establishing vital hygiene and sanitation requirements to stop cholera from spreading, any concessions in Japanese demands for workers could save lives.[193]

Like Dunlop, Hunt also refused to allow his men to intervene on his behalf when he was being punished. For example, during the initial march from Bampong, Hunt found himself in charge of 60 Australians.[194] During a transit stop at U Battalion's camp at Tarsau, Hunt arranged with the Japanese medical orderly for 27 of his sickest men to remain behind. When the party was paraded, however, the Japanese corporal refused to allow these men to stay. In full view of Captain Reginald William James Newton and Dunlop, Hunt placed himself between these sick prisoners and their guards. With horror, Newton and Dunlop watched as the Australian interpreter, Captain C. Wild, and then Hunt were brutally bashed.[195] Dunlop's diaries note that this bashing was particularly savage and it seemed to Dunlop, noting Hunt's past injuries, that this had become a common occurrence.[196] Lying on the ground, and still being kicked, Hunt saw some of his men break ranks. He screamed out to them. 'Keep out of this you bastards! This is a private fight.'[197]

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[191] N. Clayton, 'Major Bruce Hunt Medical Officer (MO) F Force' cited at Prisoners of War of the Japanese, 1942-1945, http://www.pows-of-japan.net/articles/100.html, maintained by Lt Col P. Winstanley OAM RFD (Retired), JP, accessed on 2 February 2015.
[192] Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part D, p.16.
[193] *ibid*. For a further example see Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.159; Interview with Venables, tape 6.
[194] C. Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part C: March to Nieke Area p.10, AMW54 554/7/4; Interview with Cahill, tape 7; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.254; Goodwin, *Mates and Memories*, p.133; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 Battalion*, p.586. The exact number of POWs in Hunt's group varies between 32 and 60 men in these sources.
[195] Kappe, Report on activities of AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part C, p.10; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F*, pp.647-648.
[196] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.254.
[197] Goodwin, *Mates and Memories*, p.137.

The writings and recollections of the prisoners emphasise the way Hunt treated his patients with kindness and dignity. For example, the 2/10th battalion history recorded:

> A memory of Bruce Hunt stands out in the minds of many, himself exhausted and recently beaten, but visiting the sick, pausing to place a hand gently on a feverish forehead and murmuring in his beautiful voice, 'poor old boy, God rest his soul.'[198]

Hunt could be direct with his patients when he thought they were not trying to live, giving them one of his 'pep talks'.[199] In these talks, Hunt used the loyalty that he had attained from his followership to try and influence despondent and sick men not to give into the darkness, but to fight for the future that awaited them back at home. What Hunt was really doing was bullying these men into surviving. This bullying approach was evident when he first arrived at Lower Songkurari. He found a disorganised camp, one overwhelmed doctor, Cahill, and no hygiene measures put in place to control the spread of the infection. After surveying the scene, Hunt gathered the prisoners and gave them a pep talk:

> Now you've just got to pull together and get together if you want to live. Your only chance of getting back to Australia is if you do what I tell you... The first thing that you'll do is get all this earth off the ground here and we'll get this camp going. Who can do this? [200]

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[198] *ibid*.

[199] N. Johnson, Report of Journey from Singapore to No.1 Camp and Conditions at No 1 Camp (Shimo Sonkuari), p.17, AWM54 554/7/4 Section 6; Letter to Hunt from Nichol; Interview with Cahill, tape 7; Interview with Gilbert, tape 7; Interview with H. Hassett on 17 November 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.0974, tape 8, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/546.aspx>, maintained by the Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 3 February 2014; Interview with Venables, tape 7.

[200] Interview with Cahill, tape 6. In total 210 Australians at Lower Songkuari Camp contracted cholera. Of these 101 died. For reference to these statistics see Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part D, pp.15-16. For reference to Hunts ability to transform the prisoners from passively accepting death from fighting for their survival see S. Harris, Recommendation for Distinguished Services Order or Equivalent Award, p.1, AWM54 544/7/4; Johnson, Report of Journey from Singapore to No.1 Camp and Conditions at No 1 Camp, p.1; Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Appendix IV, p.1; G. Beard cited in R. Maharry, 2*/26 Infantry Battalion Eighth Australian Division, AIF: The Battalion Story*, (Jindalee: WR Magary, 1994), p.239.

According to Cahill, the reaction of the men was extraordinary. They understood that this man offered them a chance to get home and they did as he asked. Captain Norman Couch's letter addressed to Hunt, written on 16 December 1945 after he arrived home, reveals just how much influence Hunt had had on his survival and the nature of Hunt's pep talks. He wrote,

> Your actions throughout that trying period defy comparison with those of your senior officers…I shan't forget who obtained more than sufficient volunteers to work in a cholera compound…nor shall I quickly forget the Major Hunt, who was in the darkness of a rainy Thailand evening, when death faced hundreds of men cold, hungry and without a place to sleep much less a keep dry [and who] cheered him loudly after he had abused them foully and called them bastards. Words could not convey what joy you gave, what life you gave to hundreds of starving, desperate, dying and semi-frantic men.[201]

Hunt's followership did not break when he left the men at Lower Songkuari to go to Tamabaya Hospital. This loyalty reveals the intensity of the bond forged between Hunt and his men.[202] Instead of feeling abandoned or betrayed by him, the prisoners accepted Hunt's reason for leaving: patients needed him.[203] Kappe, who had been unofficially replaced by Hunt as positional leader at Lower Songkuari, attempted to resume the duties that he had chosen to push aside for the sake of his own survival.[204] This change in leadership only served to confirm for the men the true value of Hunt's leadership. The men from his formal group at Lower Songkuari Camp and at Tamabaya Hospital were adamant that Hunt's leadership allowed them to survive the horrors of the Burma-Thailand Railway.[205]

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[201] Letter to Hunt from Couch, p.3.
[202] For reference to the continuity of Hunt's followership see Letter to Hunt from P. Wolfe, 14 September 1945, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 7; Letter to B. Hunt from unknown author, October 3, 1943, AWM 3DRL/2517, Folder 7; Interview with Gilbert, tape 7; Interview with Venables, tape 6.
[203] For reference to Hunt's petition to the Japanese to establish a hospital in an attempt to protect the sick from further working parties see Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF F Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, Part D, p.19; Interview with Cahill, tape 9.
[204] Interview with Cahill, tape 8; Interview with Gilbert, tapes 4 and 7; Interview with Parkes, tapes 3 and 5; Stanley, "The men who did fighting are now all busy writing", pp.300-312.
[205] Letter to B. Hunt from Allan, 24 October 1945, p.2, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 7; Letter to B. Hunt from B. Huton, 2 February 1945, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 7; Interview with Gilbert, tape 7; Interview with Ling, tape 1; Interview with Vernables, tape 9; Interview with Whalley, tape 1.

After the war, only Dunlop and Hunt were officially acknowledged for their services, with both men receiving OBEs.[206] In his later life, Dunlop became the iconic doctor of the Burma-Thailand Railway. His public persona became the story of all doctors who treated patients in inhumane conditions and who were willing to practice a self-sacrificial style of leadership for the sake of their formal group. Yet, of the three professional leaders on the Burma-Thailand Railway examined in this chapter, Dunlop was, initially, the least successful in achieving his leadership goal of protecting his patients against the captor. Dunlop struggled to protect his patients when he was both both their positional leader and their doctor. His uncompromising negotiation technique aggravated the captor and on several occasions Dunlop's angry responses to Japanese demands led to a sweep of the hospital lines for patients to work with the construction working parties. Dunlop openly acknowledged in his writings that once McEachern took over positional responsibilities in his camp he had more success in protecting his patients from the Japanese in his leadership capacity as a doctor. McEachern had a calming influence on both Dunlop and the Japanese Commandant, and the officers in the camp worked with Dunlop to protect the sick prisoners. Hunt and Fagan, however, functioned as both the MO and the default positional leader. Hunt, acting in both roles, had more success in manipulating his Commandant into vital concessions that protected some of his patients – once he had endured the physical beatings. Although the sources on Fagan are more limited, they suggest that he was as successful as Hunt.

Irrespective of the degree of success each of these professional leaders had, their example inspired and shaped the behavioural responses of some of the officers and other ranks in this volatile captive setting. Their behaviour offered a model for these men to follow, albeit on a smaller scale. How they did so is examined in the next chapter.

[206] Special Immediate Award, OBE Citation for E. Dunlop, NAA:B883:VX259; Special Immediate Award, OBE Citation for B. Hunt.

CHAPTER 8: GROUP, POSITIONAL AND EMERGENT SELF-SACRIFICIAL LEADERSHIP IN VOLATILE AND EXTREME CAPTIVE SETTINGS

This chapter continues the examination of self-sacrificial leadership in the Pacific Theatre by extending the analysis beyond the MO**s** to other positional, professional and emergent leaders in the volatile conditions on the Burma-Thailand Railway and the extreme captive setting of Borneo. It concludes with the case of Australian Corporal Rodney Breavington, whose act of self-sacrificial leadership did not occur in either Thailand or Borneo, but at Changi.

Positional leaders of working parties on the Burma-Thailand Railway

The survival of men working on the construction of the railway depended on their working party's positional leader's style. Normally, warrant officers, NCOs or prisoners appointed as acting in these ranks were placed in charge of Australian working parties.[1] Small in number, most officers attached to the Work Forces studied in this thesis (D, H, F and Dunlop Forces) were allocated to camp duties. Some officers, however, chose to accompany their men on working parties.[2] Hank Nelson concluded that this choice reflected their sense of duty to the men.[3]

Depending on whether the officer had come from Changi, Java or Borneo, the officers who volunteered to accompany men on the working parties had very different perceptions of what they would have to do to protect their men. Most of the officers from the Australian Battalions of D and F Work Forces had come from the relatively stable captive setting of Changi. They assumed that their rank authority would protect them and their men on the construction site and they joined working parties thinking

[1] E. McEachern, Recommendations for Honours, Awards, Decorations and Promotions, subsequent 15/2/42, pp.1-3, AWM PR00017. The Australian officers on H.6 Battalion of H Force were the exception to this general rule. This battalion consisted of officers who were forced to provide manual labour on the construction site in Thailand. For reference to the protection of most Australian officers from the construction site see Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.59; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.562. For an overview of H.6 Officer Battalion see A. Ball, H.6 Officers Party Changi, 15 May 1944, pp.1-2, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.585; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, pp.615-617.
[2] Sweating, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.562.
[3] Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.59. Arthur J. Barker and Walter Wayne Mason have also stated this argument as the reason for British officers electing to accompany working parties on the Burma-Thailand Railway. See Barker, *Behind Barbed Wire*, p.107; Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.333.

that they would act as a 'protective foreman.'[4] In contrast, the Australian prisoners who had been captured in Borneo and Java had experienced the realities of Japanese captivity.[5]

The Changi officers who had volunteered to lead the working parties, quickly discovered that rank offered no protection for themselves. They were treated like any other prisoner and were forced to work on the railway construction.[6] In these circumstances, it became clear that to have any chance of protecting their men against the captor, officers had to have the courage and stamina to endure violence. Some officers made the choice to put the safety of the men above their own. For example Private Alexander Hatton Drummond recalled how his working party leader, Flight Lieutenant Don Dewey, seemed almost at ease with the responsibility of protecting the men. Dewey even sought out the most sick and vulnerable men for his working party. Drummond wrote:

> Dewey was the type of man you meet all too seldom in life. A handsome young man he remained, even in the mud of Thailand, always immaculate. He was kind, brave, considerate and completely overawed the Japs. The way he bluffed the Japs was an object lesson. He actually sought sick men for his WP and usually had 6 to 7 men to boil the billy, he stood up to the Jap bashing and appeared completely unconcerned by them.[7]

Dewey's selection of sick men for the working party was an attempt to protect them from hard labour. He assigned these men light duties, such as boiling the billy, despite knowing that he would receive a beating from the captor. Dewey, who had seen Hunt in action in base camp, most likely modelled his leadership style on Hunt's example. Other working party leaders did not have Dewey's élan, yet shared his sense of responsibility for their men. F Force survivor Sergeant Donald Moore remembered one such man.

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[4] Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.59.
[5] The experience of prisoners captured in Java has been discussed in Chapter 7 in connection with Lieutenant Colonel E. Dunlop's leadership. The experiences of prisoners captured on Borneo is examined in conjunction with the leadership of Warrant Officer H. Sticpewich and Captain G. Cook in Chapter 9.
[6] Mason, *Prisoners of War*, p.333.
[7] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.201.

> There was one officer I knew who was dedicated to duty. He knew that was expected of him; he was an officer. He did have moral fibre. But he visibly shook when nervous, and he still did his job. Sometimes he was ineffectual, sometimes he made it. I remember him physically putting himself between the Japanese and some of the boys, realising that he could probably have stayed aloof, but he got into that situation which meant he copped it. He would be visibly shaking, but he did it.[8]

Private Clifford Morris, a member of D Force Q, Battalion, explained to Nelson the psychological importance of having an officer who stuck by the men on their working party. 'It made an awful difference if you had officers that would have a go.'[9] However, as Nelson has argued, if leaders of a working party refused to adapt their leadership style to suit the conditions in which they found themselves, the guards and engineers paid closer attention to their group.[10] Any prisoner identified as being at risk of falling behind his work quota generally led to beatings for both the prisoners and also the working party leader. This extra attention could also lead to collective punishment for all prisoners in the working party, including an increase in each man's quota and the suspension of any rest or meal breaks.

The majority of working party leaders, however, were not officers. Yet, they faced the same dilemma. For a prisoner in charge of a working party to be accepted as a legitimate leader, he had to find the right balance between what was considered acceptable intervention on his part to protect his group members and the level of intervention which would lead the captor to punish them, the weaker workers and impose collective punishments on the entire group.[11] It became a matter of trial and error.

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[8] D. Moore cited in Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.59.
[9] C. Morris cited in Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.59.
[10] Nelson, *P.O.W.*, pp.59-60.
[11] For reference to this precarious balance see McEachern, Recommendations for Honours, Awards, Decorations and Promotions, p.1. For examples of prisoners reflecting on their officers trying to find the right balance see Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.177, 187; R. Mudiman, Diary 28 May 1943, AWM PR03377. Parkin's writings describe how he himself tried to find the right balance to protect his men before the captor inflicted collective punishment on his group. See Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.163-172.

Petty Officer Raymond Edward Parkin led a working party that originally consisted of 30 men that was then increased to 50.[12] These prisoners came from O, P and S Battalions of Dunlop Force at Hintok Mountain Camp. He tried different tactics to ease the physical demands the Japanese guards and engineers placed on his men. Through trial and error, Parkin discovered that the tone of his voice when he addressed his men allowed him to manipulate his guards. He wrote:

> As number 1 I am expected to drive the men for the Japanese. So I yell at the men in rough overbearing manner and the nips [sic] think I am 'yuroskui' (good) number one. But the Japs don't know that what I am yelling at the men is a string of awful insults about our bosses and their ways, what we think of them and what we would like to do with them, but it has practical results, for when I ask for a man to be allowed to yasume [rest] sometimes they allow it.[13]

When his men were most in need of his protection, however, Parkin discovered that this tactic did not always work. On one shift, when two of his men collapsed with malaria and another prisoner was suspected of having cholera, Parkin launched into a verbal tirade against his guards in an attempt to allow these sick men to go back to camp.[14] Like his positional leader, Dunlop, Parkin was persistent, despite a violent response:

> I haggled with the nip [sic] corporal all afternoon to be allowed to send them back. He roared and swung at me with whatever he had in his hand at the time – shovel, bamboo or hammer- but I moved discreetly and none of the blows fell solidly.[15]

It was not until some hours later that the guards finally relented. However, they would not let 'healthy' workers help the sick prisoners back to camp.[16] Parkin watched the two prisoners with malaria provide stumbling support for the man suspected of having

[12] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.163-172.
[13] *ibid*., p.167.
[14] *ibid*., pp.170-172.
[15] *ibid*., p.170.
[16] *ibid*., pp.170-172.

cholera, until the burden became too much and all men collapsed to the ground. The two men with malaria crawled towards shelter. It was not until hours later that the suspected cholera case was carried back to camp on a stretcher carried by medical orderlies.

In a trial and error system it was inevitable that not all of the tactics used by men in charge of working parties were successful. When they failed it was inevitable that physical punishment would follow. For example, Private Roy Mudiman's writings describe what happened to his NCO who pushed the guards too far in his attempt to gain more rest breaks for his men.

> Sgt French received a devilish beating for insisting on a smoko. He was belted and kicked in the privates until he collapsed. They then laid the boot in, jumping on him every now and then.[17]

The choice of men in charge of working parties to continually attempt to negotiate for their men, knowing that if they got the balance between making demands and conceding to the captor's authority wrong they risked a severe beating, allowed them to become legitimate leaders of their small formal groups. Single acts of courage, whilst acknowledged and deeply appreciated by the men, were not the actions of a leader. Instead leadership could only be attained through a continual pattern of self-sacrificial behaviour for the purpose of negotiating better conditions for the prisoners at work.

Parkin's leadership extended beyond the construction site to the base camp where he encouraged the development of close bonds between the men by encouraging them to tell the group their life stories, bonds that Parkin described as a 'little spirit de corps of a tattered sort'.[18] When more officers and NCOs were transferred to Hintok River camp, Parkin was removed from his position as a working party leader.[19] Parkin was relieved at no longer having this difficult responsibility. His men, however, were

[17] Mudiman, Diary 28 May 1943.
[18] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.167.
[19] *ibid*., pp.160-172.

openly disappointed by the news: 'My chaps cut up rough about it.'[20] The men's reactions demonstrate the followership that he had acquired, a followership based on a consistent pattern of behaviour and his men's belief that his leadership choices were based on his group's best interests rather than his own survivorship.

Parkin, of course, was not unique. After the war, for example, General Army Headquarters received a letter from men of the 2/19th Battalion who were attached to D Force U Battalion praising the leadership of Acting Warrant Officer Desmond Malcahy.

> He [Malcahy] imparted to all under his command the example of determination set to himself and this will to win is all that carried many our troops safely through the misery and suffering of prisoner of war life. For a warrant officer to have retained such a high standard of discipline among his own troops, whilst at the same time commanding the respect of the severe and often inconsiderate Nippon authorities… [embodied] leadership, courage, honesty and devoted attention to the comfort of his troops.[21]

It is an apt summary of the men, who, irrespective of rank, became legitimate leaders of their working parties.

Emergent leadership within working parties on the Burma-Thailand Railway

Not all appointed leaders were capable of making the sacrifices evident in the case studies discussed above. When they failed, emergent leaders from within the smaller formal group came to the forefront.

In 1989, Donald Wall, a survivor of F Force, interviewed Gunner Owen Colin Campbell and Bombardier Richard 'Dick' Braithwaite, two survivors of the Sandakan marches to Ranau. Braithwaite explained that in his extreme captive environment,

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[20] *ibid*., p.162.

[21] Letter addressed to General Army Headquarters AIF Victoria Barracks Sydney regarding NX35370 Acting WO Desmond Mulcahy 2/19 Battalion from Members of the 2/19 Battalion, no date, AWM PR01376.

when a positional leader chose not to protect his men, or his attempts to do so did not work, some men within the same formal group chose to help each other. These men became emergent leaders. 'They would have come up like mushrooms. [It] only stands to reason that when the situation arises they were up.'[22] Donald Wall agreed with Braithwaite's observations. He explained that the same experience occurred in working parties on the Burma-Thailand Railway when the positional leader reverted from his responsibilities in order to protect himself. He said:

> The experience sorts the men from the boys. There were pathetic NCOs and officers [and] other ranks that came to the top as far as leadership was concerned. It was a just a natural thing to happen. Various blokes emerged as leaders.[23]

The memoirs and statements of other POWs corroborate Wall's claim. Some men put the needs of others, particularly the weaker, sick and more vulnerable prisoners, in front of their own, making this their intuitive behavioural pattern. These men, deeply respected for their self-sacrificial leadership style, acquired followership from their group who trusted that they would do all that he could to protect them from further harm.

For Private Stanley Francis Denning, a prisoner attached to H Force, it was Private George Edward Cubby. On the march from Bampong to Malaya Hamlet, Cubby looked for prisoners who were struggling to carry their packs.[24] These men would then hear 'Cubby will help.'[25] The phrase became one of hope for men who were close to collapsing.

Lance Corporal Alan Michael Middleton's decision to protect not only the weaker prisoners but also all members of his working party enabled him to become a legitimate emergent leader. Privates James William Bernard Haskell recalled:

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[22] Interview with R. Braithwaite and O. Campbell conducted by D. Wall, 24 May 1989, tape 1, AWM S04102.
[23] Interview with K. Botterill conducted by D. Wall, no date, tape 10, AWM S04080.
[24] Denning, 'Memoirs of Private S.F Denning,' pp.54-55.
[25] *ibid*.

> Middy was always on the hammer and tap. He would select the weakest of the party to hang on to the bit while he did the hammering. When we kicked off it was a meter a day that had to be sunk in the type of stone up there on the cutting. It gradually increased until it was three metres a day, which was way above the capacity of a lot of men. This was where Middy really came into his own. He'd be clobbering holes and giving his tally over to other people and he'd just rouse around like a chook mothering her hens and work to make sure that the weakest were getting their quota and this protected them from being bashed.[26]

Sometimes the selfless behaviour of one member of a working party to protect weak prisoners transformed the collective behaviour of the entire working party. For this to occur, the selfless behaviour of one POW had to be accepted as the legitimate acts of a leader by the formal group. Then, the followership that this leader earned through his actions enabled his behaviour to become the new code of conduct amongst the group. Bombardier Tom Uren achieved this. Attached to Dunlop Force, Uren modelled a selfless behaviour pattern of looking after sick and weak prisoners.[27] As one of the larger men on the work site, he considered that this was his responsibility. In time, Uren's behaviour became the normal response of the more physically able prisoners in his working party, even if, at first, he had to constantly remind his men that this was the expected practice within his working party.

> I also made sure that the other big blokes did their share. I just said 'Listen, come on, we've got to help so and so, he's a bit crook'. I would try to protect the bloke who was bit smaller or who wasn't quite so well. We always knew who was genuinely crook and would try to help as best we could.[28]

Gunner Russell Braddon's writings also demonstrate that self-sacrificial group behaviour evident in the example above occurred within smaller group structures in

[26] B. Haskell cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, p.421.
[27] Uren, *Straight Left*, pp.27, 34.
[28] *ibid*., p.27.

working parties. In Thailand, when Braddon was separated from his mates,[29] he retreated into himself, convinced that he could survive on his own. However, the physical demands of the forced labour on the working parties, combined with a lack of food, soon meant that he was suffering from beriberi. Unable to reach his work quota on his own, Braddon latched onto a group of Australians within his assigned working party, who without asking any questions, allowed him to work with them. Braddon's writings explain how important their decision to let him into their group became.

> In truth, things would have gone very badly for me had it not been for the generous help of the men. At all times they covered up for me so that the guards did not realise how slowly I worked. And when they had finished their own quota of work then they would do mine too.[30]

Braddon's new informal group gave him a chance to survive. One man in particular, who Braddon refers to as 'Snowy Bernard',[31] helped him the most to cope with his work tasks. Bernard was always partnered with Braddon on the worksite.[32] When both men were carrying wood or bamboo back to camp, Braddon often collapsed under the weight of his load. When this happened Bernard kept going onto camp and then came back to carry Braddon's load and help him to walk back to camp.

Braddon's new group continued to protect him, even after his behaviour compromised their relationship. Braddon, waking up shaking with fever, was told by his group to stay resting in the tent and that they would work his quota for him. Braddon soon ran out of boiled water. A mate, Jimmy, had left a full bottle in camp. Braddon's writings recall what happened next:

> Five minutes later I had furtively uncorked that bottle. I knew what I was doing. I was stealing water, more precious than gold, from a man who at that moment was doing my work. Breaking the one hard and fast rule –

[29] Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.184, 189, 191, 193.
[30] *ibid*., p.193.
[31] *ibid*.
[32] *ibid*., pp.193-194, 201-202.

> that every man is responsible for providing his own water. I drank a mouthful.[33]

When Jimmy returned that night, Braddon confessed. To his amazement, Jimmy understood: 'For a moment Jimmy was silent – "that's the trouble with the bug makes you mighty thirsty"'.[34] Jimmy then offered Braddon the rest of his water, collected the cans the prisoners used to collect and then boil water, and walked half a mile to the waterhole to replenish not only his own drink bottle, but Braddon's as well.[35]

With trial and error, and time, the men in charge of working parties came to understand that what they needed was astute judgement to interpret the particular circumstances in which they found themselves, as well as adaptability, negotiating skills, perseverance and a significant amount of luck, combined with courage and resilience in order to find the right balance referred to earlier. These characteristics were essential qualities for men to become legitimate leaders of the working parties. Nelson described the process as an exercise in 'fine judgement.'[36]

Nelson argued that it was the 'exceptional officer' who evolved into a leader in the volatile captive setting of the Burma-Thailand Railway.[37] To survive, this officer had to have 'the presence, the command of language, and the tolerance of pain to keep pressing the men's cases against the Japanese.'[38] However, it is clear from the case studies that this characterisation applied to all leaders of the working parties who attempted to strike this balance, irrespective of rank. And, as the examples of Uren and Braddon demonstrate, self-sacrificial leadership could inspire a collective sense of self-sacrifice within the group itself.

Chaplains on the Burma-Thailand Railway

In times of training and war, the responsibilities of military chaplains can broadly be described as spiritual and moral. They perform religious ministries and provide advice

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[33] *ibid*., p.201.
[34] *ibid*., p.202.
[35] *ibid*.
[36] Nelson, *P.O.W.*, p.59. Also see Nelson, *P.O.W.*, pp.58-61.
[37] *ibid*., p.59.
[38] *ibid*.

to men who seek their help. Some men who regularly attend services, and who may ask for, and listen to, their advice, try to integrate the chaplain's teachings into their everyday lives. When this occurs, for this individual the chaplain becomes a legitimate leader. The ability of a chaplain to become a leader is, therefore, based on the faith of the individual and the importance the individual places on the chaplain's role in influencing his ideals and behaviour.

The same distinction between men who saw chaplains as leaders and those who only viewed them as men providing a professional service existed in captivity.[39] In relatively stable camps in the Pacific and Europe, such as Changi and Stalag Luft III, chaplains largely assumed a passive role. In Changi chaplains were mostly separated from the ranks, but provided religious services and were available to offer advice for those who wanted it.[40] Simon Mackenzie explained that in Stalag Luft camps, chaplains gave advice and prayer services to those prisoners who wanted them.[41] In the volatile captive setting of the Burma-Thailand Railway, however, chaplains had the potential to play a vital psychological role for men trying to cope with fear, exhaustion, sickness and violence. For the men who sought comfort in religious rituals and teachings of hope, compassion and mercy, chaplains, through their words and actions, could provide spiritual comfort and in some cases, a living example of how to withstand the hardships of this volatile captive environment with dignity. For some prisoners, that proved to be the case and the chaplains, for them, moved from a professional role to a leadership role.

The willingness of chaplains to continually perform their professional duty within the volatile conditions of captivity on the Burma-Thailand Railway was a different form of self-sacrificial leadership. These men did not offer their bodies, for example, as protection for sick prisoners. Instead they offered moral strength to men seeking to

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[39] For examples of this perception of chaplains see Anonymous, untitled and unpublished papers, pp.88-89, 90-92; Lumsden, 'An Experience of World War Two', pp.63-67; Morshel, 'A Wartime Log', pp.104-106, 108-110; L. Orr, Diary 13 August 1944, AWM PR89/77; Interview with Cornish, tape 7; Arneil, *One Man's War*, pp.21,171,193,107, 210.

[40] For reference to the role of chaplains in Changi POW camp see AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary, Notes of Conference 8 September 1942, p.152A; AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary, Notes of Conference 24 November 1942, p.178A, AWM52 1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary, Notes of Conference 29 December 1942, p.191D; Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.13.

[41] Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, pp.166-167.

cope with their inhumane circumstances for the duration of their time in Thailand. These men, therefore, sacrificed their own psychological wellbeing to try and help exhausted men find the strength to keep going, tried to comfort sick men and attempted to bring some form of peace to prisoners who were dying.

In the writings and recollections of prisoners who worked in D, F and H Force, two Australian men who worked as chaplains fulfil the criteria of self-sacrificial leadership. Only one, however, was officially a chaplain.

Australian Chaplain Major Lionel Thomas Marsden was attached to H Force.[42] From his arrival at Bampong, Marsden realised that his contribution was needed to help the men endure the ninety mile march to Malaya Hamlet.[43] Like MO Kevin James Fagan, Marsden offered not only encouraging words but also practical help to the men. According to Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes, Marsen 'was up and down the line, cheering the men, carrying their burdens, helping in the medical treatment, acting as a true padre, unsparing in his selflessness.'[44] Marsden explained that he felt compelled to do this because his status as a chaplain at Changi had protected him from physical labour.[45] Marsden, like the other chaplains in Changi, was also permitted to draw extra rations. Marsden knew the men were not as lucky. Many of them were already weak, sick and vulnerable to exhaustion. In his report, Marsden explained that his actions on the march were one practical way he could fulfil his duties.[46] To men struggling to put one foot in front of the other, kind words of encouragement and his practical help were not only appreciated but were also acknowledged as the actions of a leader.[47]

Originally Marsden was attached to Konyu Number 2 Camp. During the day, when the men were out at work, Marsden assisted the medical staff in their duties and offered comfort to the sick.[48] At night, when the men returned, he usually offered a prayer

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[42] Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.3.
[43] *ibid*., p.2.
[44] Oakes, 'Singapore Story,' p.319.
[45] Marsden, Report of the Work of Chaplain with H Force, p.1.
[46] *ibid*.
[47] For example see Clarke, *A Life for Every Sleeper*, p.45; Goodwin, *Mates and Memories*, pp.140-141; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.582.
[48] Marsden, Report of the work of a Chaplain with H Force, p.1.

service for them. In the middle of June, the Japanese Commandant in charge of H Force gave Marsden permission to visit the nine other H Force camps.[49] This coincided with the outbreak of cholera. [50] His report explained that most of his days were spent 'giving religious services, visiting the sick and, where necessary, giving the last rites to the dying.'[51] This daily routine continued until 21 August when H Force had finished its construction work.[52] Despite his regular interaction with the sick, Marsden's own health remained 'good.'[53] He credited this to the positional leaders in all the camps he visited making sure that he received the necessary rations to sustain him in his work. By providing spiritual guidance and comfort for the sick and dying, Marsden was recognised as a leader for men who had faith or recognised the symbolism of his office.[54]

Marsden was humble in describing the personal cost of his work. His final comment in his report stated: 'I had the most satisfying duty that any man could wish for and to be able to do it was a full compensation for any demands that were made of me.'[55] Despite his self-effacing tone, his duty must have placed great emotional and physical strain on him. Unlike the doctors who had skills to use to heal the sick, Marsden's work demanded a more personal and arguably emotional cost. For three months of his time in Thailand, his days consisted of trying to bring humanity and compassion to desperate exhausted men, hoping that his words would in some way ease their burden. This was the easier part of his job. Marsden also administered the ritual of the last rites to the dying, trying to find some way to give peace to these men in their final hours knowing that soon he would be consecrating their graves. To perform these duties across all of H Force's camps, which had one the highest mortality rates of all

[49] Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.16; Marsden, Report of the Work of a Chaplain with H Force, p.1.
[50] Marsden, Report of the Work of a Chaplain with H Force, p.1. It is interesting to note that Ray Parkin believed that cholera spread to Dunlop Force camp at Hintok Mountain Camp because of a travelling Roman Catholic Padre. It is possible that Marsden was this chaplain. See Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.158.
[51] Marsden, Report of the Work of Chaplain with H Force, p.1.
[52] *ibid*.
[53] *ibid*., p.2.
[54] *ibid*.
[55] *ibid*.

Australian Work Forces, would have pushed Marsden to his limits.[56] Writing for the *Catholic Weekly* after liberation, he gave some insight into what that meant.

> In no time cholera was raging. It was quite a common thing for the commanding officer, a few others and myself to go to the cemetery at 9 a.m. and dig a grave for one man. By 10 o'clock a messenger would come to say that another cholera patient had been taken to hospital. Leaving my pick and shovel I would return to the camp give the Last Sacraments, if the lad was a Catholic, and if not, say with him acts of Faith, Hope and Charity, Contrition and an act of love of God. Then back to the cemetery to help increase the size of the grave.[57]

Denning described Marsden as 'a tower of strength to each and everyone.'[58] The number of attendees at Marsden's final service reflected the level of his followership. Denning wrote, 'Anyone who could walk, crawl or be carried [attended].'[59] At this service Marsden tried to offer words of comfort and compassion to his congregation.

> He prayed for us all, he prayed for the sick, he prayed for the dying and offered prayers for those on cholera hill, most of whom would be dead within a few hours. The good padre then offered prayers for our inhuman captors... He finished the prayers like this 'Oh God, oh God, forgive them for they know not what they do.[60]

The next day Marsden left the camp. According to Denning, Marsden's absence caused despondency to creep back into the men.[61]

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[56] For reference to the high mortality rate of Australian POWs on H Force see Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, pp.2-3; Sweating, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.586; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.620.
[57] L. Marsden 'Under the Heel of a Brutal Enemy Our Catholic Boys Kept the Faith, *Catholic Weekly*, November 15, 1945 cited in The Catholic Diocese of the Australian Defence Force, <http://www.military.catholic.org.au/stories/changi-prison1.htm>, accessed on 1 July 2009.
[58] Denning, Memoirs of Private SF Denning, p.37.
[59] *ibid*.
[60] *ibid*.
[61] *ibid*, pp.37-38.

Australian Private Harry Thorpe's story is different. He was not an official chaplain because he had only completed two years of theological studies prior to enlisting.[62] When Captain Reginald William James Newton organised the officers for U Battalion on D Force, he sought a chaplain willing to join them.[63] Newton thought a chaplain would help his men cope with the hardships that Newton believed his men were bound to encounter. Newton only received one response from the 33 chaplains at Changi. However, he considered the volunteer too old to cope with what the prisoners might encounter in Thailand. Knowing that Newton had not found a suitable chaplain, Thorpe, a private from the 29th Battalion volunteered.[64] Based on his theological training and good health, Newton accepted Thorpe's offer. As an unofficial chaplain Thorpe had to earn his leadership legitimacy without the assistance of the symbolism of his position, yet he did so.

At Tarso, Thorpe explained to Australian and British prisoners how each of them could apply Christian teachings to their current circumstances. The 2/19th battalion history explains: 'He was persuasive, articulate and he gave the chaps something to think about.'[65] The willingness of men to listen to Thorpe and reflect on his words reveals the respect the men had for him, even in the early stages of his time as acting chaplain.

At South Tonchan, U Battalion experienced its one and only outbreak of cholera. Thorpe was the only non-MO allowed to visit the cholera lines.[66] In spite of the risks to his own health, like Marsden, Thorpe willingly accepted that his duties included offering comfort to the sick and dying. Thorpe's presence in the cholera lines also

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[62] H. Thorpe, Attestation Form, p.1, NAA:B883:NX44915; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 A.I.F. Battalion*, p.572.
[63] Thorpe, Statutory Declaration, NAA:B883:NX44915; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 Battalion*, p.572.
[64] Thorpe was not the only "volunteer" chaplain to leave Changi. Australian Alan W. Garland, a Religious Minister at the Church of Christ, enlisted in the AIF as a medical orderly for the 2/9 Field Ambulance. When E Force left Changi, Garland accompanied them as 'acting' chaplain. Unlike Thorpe's "promotion" given by Newton, Galleghan officially approved Garland's promotion. Garland died on 18 March 1945 on the first death march from Sandakan. See A. Garland, Attestation Form, p.1, NAA:B883:VX32307; Letter to the Officer in Charge District Records Office from Cameron and Lowenstern Barristers and Solicitors, 25 October 1955, NAA:B883: VX32307; Letter to Cameron and Lowenstern Barristers and Solicitors from Central Army Records Office, 8 November 1955, NAA:B883:VX32307.
[65] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 Battalion*, p.572.
[66] McMaster, 'My War Experiences, Friendships and 3 ½ years as a Prisoner of War', pp.22-23.

served a secondary purpose. Beyond providing comfort to the patients, their mates knew that the sick were not facing their darkest hour alone: 'Happy Harry'[67] was with them.[68]

Thorpe's sincerity touched not only men from U Battalion but patients and staff in the base hospitals at Tarso and Tamunag.[69] According to Dunlop, against Japanese orders Thorpe, 'jump[ed] on a barge' to help prisoners who were being sent down the river to the base hospitals.[70] Once he was there, Thorpe continued in his role as a chaplain, tending to the sick and dying, while also offering comfort to the staff. The strength of Thorpe's followership at these locations is revealed in the high attendance rates at his services. For example, at one of his services over 1000 prisoners attended.[71]

Thorpe's leadership did not go unnoticed. After liberation, McEachern**,** the positional leader who took over from Dunlop at Hintok Mountain Camp, attempted to have Thorpe retrospectively appointed to an official chaplaincy position.[72] Accompanying McEachern's recommendation was a reference supplied by British Lieutenant Colonel A. Knight.[73] Knight's words reveal the extent to which Thorpe had become a legitimate leader of men in Thailand:

> He spared no efforts in his work and his influence on the spiritual welfare of the prisoners of war was evidenced by the large attendances at his services. His work in visiting and comforting the sick brought happiness

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[67] For reference to this title see McMaster, 'My War Experiences, Friendships and 3 ½ years as a Prisoner of War,' pp.22-23; Brief History of the Royal Army Chaplains Department in World War II, FEPOW WW2 People's War: An Archives of WW2 Memories, Article ID A7247487, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/87/a7247487.shtml>, maintained by the British Broadcasting Commission, accessed on 13 August 2014.

[68] McMaster, 'My War Experiences, Friendships and 3 ½ years as a Prisoner of War', pp.22-23.

[69] Letter to Senior Chaplain Church of England 2 AIF Malaya from E. Dunlop, 9 June 1944, AWM PR00926, Subseries 5, File 39; A. Knight, Note dated 18 September 1945, attached to Letter to GOC Allied Land Forces Siam from C. McEachern, 18 September 1945, AWM PR00017.

[70] Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.322.

[71] Brief History of the Royal Army Chaplains Department in World War II, paragraph 5.

[72] Knight, Note dated 18 September 1945 attached to Letter to GOC Allied Land Forces Siam from McEachern. As a consequence of both Lieutenant Colonel Cranston Albury McEachern and Major General Cecil Arthur Callaghan efforts, Thorpe was promoted to Chaplain Fourth Class on 12 March 1946. See Thorpe, Statutory Declaration, p.1; Officers Record of Service, NX44915, p.1; NAA:B883:NX44915.

[73] Knight, Note dated 18 September 1945, attached to Letter to GOC Allied Land Forces Siam from McEachern. McEachern's letter was also supported by British Lieutenant Colonel M. Lillry. See M. Lillry, Note undated, attached to Letter to GOC Allied Land Forces Siam from E. McEachern, 18 September 1945, AWM PR00017.

> to many dangerously ill and bordering on death. Only those who have experience of Japanese prisoner of war camps can realise the appalling conditions and difficulties under which Thorpe performed his duties in most exemplary manner.[74]

Marsden and Thorpe's stories reveal that a chaplain could become a legitimate leader of men in a volatile captive setting. Their ability to do so rested on the willingness of men to accept their presence as a symbol of hope and comfort. Some prisoners, of course, could not reconcile their message of hope with the horror that surrounded them.[75] But other men found that their presence was essential for them when coping with their day-to-day experiences. Despite their calm public personas, however, Marsden and Thorpe must have struggled with the disparity between their teachings and their lives as a prisoner on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Yet, they did not doubt the importance of their work and risked their own health to undertake their duties, which earned them followership.

Warrant Officer John William Kinder

At Sandakan POW camp on Borneo, Australian and British prisoners lived in a volatile and then extreme captive setting.[76] Sandakan has provided three cases studies for this thesis, Captain George Robin Cook and Warrant Officers William Hector Sticpewich and John William Kinder. Cook and Sticpewich will be examined in the next chapter.

In late January 1945, when the Japanese feared that that the Allies were capable of launching an attack to recapture Borneo, they put the Australians and British prisoners in Sandakan camp through hell.[77] These men, divided in two groups, then subdivided into smaller groups, were force marched about 160 miles through the mountains to

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[74] Knight, Note dated 18 September 1945, attached to Letter to GOC Allied Land Forces Siam from McEachern.

[75] For example of prisoners who held this view see Interview with Dunn, tape 5; Interview with Gilbert, tape 8; Interview with Parkes, tape 6.

[76] For an overview of conditions in Sandakan POW camp see Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.7-109; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.54-248; Silver, *Sandakan*, pp.46-171.

[77] For reference to the date of the movement of prisoners from Sandakan POW camp see Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, p.110; Ham, *Sandakan*, p.274; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.600.

Ranau.[78] There was a day's interval between the marching parties. According to Lynette Silver, the prisoners were told that they were being sent to a different part of Borneo where there would be better living conditions and more food.[79] As a result, most men were eager to be included in the first march. Cook, the Australian positional leader at Sandakan, organised the marching groups and assigned the leaders for each group. The prisoners assigned to the first march were given a small issue of food, extra shorts and a shirt and, and for the prisoners who did not have footwear, rubber latex slip on shoes.[80]

The promises were false. The promised food turned out to be 30 kilos of rice, reserved mainly for the Japanese.[81] The men were expected to carry it, along with the Japanese officers' gear. For the duration of the march, most prisoners survived on small amounts of watered rice. Men supplemented this small ration with anything they thought was edible from the jungle. The debilitated condition of the prisoners and Lieutenant General Yamawaki Masataka's orders to move the prisoners as quickly as possible (which was interpreted by the Japanese officers on the march as permission to execute any man who fell behind) turned this forced movement through the mountainous jungle into a death march.[82]

The writings and recollections of Lance Bombardier William Dick Moxham and Private Keith Botterill reveal that one man, who was given the responsibility by Cook of leading a marching column during the first march, became a self-sacrificial leader. Warrant Officer John William Kinder chose to put his concerns about his own survivorship aside in an attempt to protect the men in his group. Originally Kinder was responsible for the seventh group, comprising 55 Australians, including Moxham.[83] On the march, Kinder quickly learned that the promises given to them at Sandakan

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[78] The exact distance between Ranau and Sandakan POW camp is disputed. Sweeting states the distance as 160 miles, while Walker notes it as 140 miles. See Sweating, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.600; Walker, *Middle East and Far East*, p.648.
[79] Silver, *Sandakan*, p.188. Also see Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, p.111; Ham, *Sandakan*, p.276.
[80] Silver, *Sandakan*, pp.188-189.
[81] Forbes, *Hellfire*, p.433; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.289-293.
[82] Ham's research reveals that the interpretation of Mastaka's order into a directive to kill the prisoners was 'vague and inconsistent' with his meaning. See Ham, *Sandakan*, p.277. It is clear by their behaviour, however, that the Japanese soldiers on the march interpreted the order as permission to kill. See Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.110-114; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.276-281.
[83] Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.5; Smith, *Borneo Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage*, p.128; Wall, *Sandakan under Nippon*, p.62.

were worthless. His immediate concern was what happened to the men who fell behind. The prisoners had been told that these men would be collected and kept in 'rest houses'.[84] This seemed unlikely to Kinder, who had not seen any built structures during the early stages of the march. Kinder and the other prisoners soon realised that these men were being executed by their captor.[85] Japanese soldiers captured after the Allies assumed control of Borneo testified that Captain Shoichi Yamamto, the commanding officer of the first march, and Captain Takuo Takakuwa, the commanding officer of the second march, organised execution squads to follow the last group of prisoners in each march.[86] Determined to do all that he could to protect his men, Kinder began to negotiate concessions with the Japanese officer leading his group, Lieutenant Sugimura Shinichi.

Kinder's decision to approach Shinichi was a risk. If Shinichi objected to being addressed by a prisoner, and asked to give concessions to the prisoners, Kinder risked being physically assaulted, if not killed. This risk, however, paid off. Surprisingly, Kinder discovered that Shinichi was willing to negotiate with him in order to help keep his men alive.[87]

In the initial stages of the march, Kinder persuaded Shinichi to allow one sick prisoner to return to Sandakan.[88] Then, when his group had marched too far from Sandakan to risk sending any men back to camp because they were not physically capable of making the journey, and risked being caught by the execution squad, Kinder convinced Shinichi that the sickest men in his group should be given a head start each morning before the rest of the group set out on the track.[89] Kinder hoped that this

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[84] Silver, *Sandakan*, p.188.
[85] For reference to prisoners understanding the fate of the men who fell behind on the march see Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.31, AWM226 Box 3(a), Item 8A; Botterill, War Crime Trials Statement, p.3; Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.1; Short, War Crime Trials Statement, p.2; Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan – Ranau March', ff.3, 6-7.
[86] Lieutenant Abe Kazuo led the killing squad on the first march. Lieutenant Genzo Watanabe was in charge of the killing squad on the second march. For reference to the formation and activities undertaken by these squads see Interrogations of Officers and NCOS who came over in the First Ranau March in February 1945, pp.1-7, AWM54 779/3/5; Record of Military Court Japanese War Criminals Capt. Takakawa and Capt. G. Watanabe, 3-5 January 1946, pp.1-56, AWM54 1010/3/94; Record of Military Court- Japanese War Criminals, Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, May 1946, pp.1-118, AWM54 1010/3/98; Report on War Crimes Investigation British Borneo, Appendix A, p.1, AWM54 1010/1/5.
[87] Moxham, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.2; Smith, *Borneo Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage,* p.128.
[88] Smith, *Borneo's Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage*, p.128.
[89] Interview with Botterill, tape 7.

tactic would lessen the chances of the sick men falling behind the pace of the main group during the day. When the men's deteriorating physical condition meant that even with an earlier start men still fell behind, Kinder was sometimes given permission by Shinichi to retrace the group's steps to try and find the missing prisoners.[90] Men volunteered to accompany Kinder in his searches. The ability of Kinder to find volunteers to help him in this task, knowing that these men were most likely sick themselves and had had very little food, demonstrates that Kinder had been accepted as the legitimate leader of his group. His men were willing to follow his example, risking their own survivorship, to help others.

In his post war testimony to the military court, Moxham recalled that while they were marching, Kinder heard the cries of a prisoner.[91] Shinichi gave him permission to find the prisoner. Kinder found Private Roderick Richards, from the sixth marching group.[92] This group had been ordered to carry Lieutenant Tanaka Shojuir's boxes and trunks.[93] These items, which required six prisoners to lift them, had been arranged on bamboo poles. The Formosan guards in their group were quick to beat any prisoner who failed to keep the pace, especially those carrying Shojuir's possessions. Richards had taken exception to constantly being poked in the back. As a result of his insubordination, the guards tied Richards up, savagely beat him and then kicked him off the track into a gully.[94]

Kinder and his volunteers assisted him back to their marching group. With the help of the men in Kinder's group, Richards began walking. However, despite their efforts, Richards only lasted one day before, on 11 February 1945, at age 23, Richards, a member of the 2/10th Field Ambulance Medical Corps, died as a result of his beating

[90] Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, pp.16-17; Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.4.
[91] Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, pp.16-17.
[92] There is some confusion between the sources regarding the identity of this prisoner. Silver and Smith have accepted that Private Roderick Richards was the prisoner who was assisted by Kinder and his men. However, Ham refers to this man as an unknown prisoner. See Ham, *Sandakan*, p.297; Silver, *Sandakan*, p.203; Smith, Borneo *Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage*, p.129.
[93] Silver, *Sandakan*, p.203; Smith, *Borneo Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage*, p.129.
[94] Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, pp.16-17; Silver, *Sandakan*, pp.203-204.

and illness.[95] For possibly the first time on the march, Kinder was faced with the harsh reality that he was unable to protect a man for whom he claimed responsibility. This feeling of powerlessness soon became Kinder's constant companion. Moxham's testimony reveals that there were at least six prisoners from his group who dropped out. Shinichi, on these occasions, refused to allow Kinder to find them.[96]

The concessions that Kinder was able to negotiate with Shinichi appear to be unique. The men who survived the march and escaped at Ranau were unable to recall any other marching group leader being able to negotiate any concessions with their Japanese officer. Instead Botterill (group 3 of phase 1 of the first march to Paginatan), Private Nelson Alfred Ernest Short (group 4 of phase 2 from Paginatan to Ranau) and Campbell (group 5 of phase 2) only recalled the extreme violence of the Japanese officers and Korean guards who escorted them on the march.[97]

In one way, therefore, Kinder was fortunate. He was assigned a Japanese officer who was willing to listen to him and grant concessions to help him protect his men. However, Kinder's willingness to initially ask for help, and having been successful, to keep badgering Shinichi for more concessions for his men, is evidence of his courage, tenacity and dedication to his leadership goal: to keep as many men alive as possible. Yet even Kinder could not protect all of his men. Sickness, the arduous nature of the march and Shinichi's refusal of some of Kinder's requests took their toll. When his group reached the rallying point for groups 6 to 9 at Paginatan, 138 miles from Sandakan POW camp, only 44 of the 55 original prisoners were still with him.[98] In

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[95] According to the Roll of Honour, Richards died as a result of his illness. However the circumstances leading to his death suggest that he may have been executed by the captor. See Photograph Description of NX4415 Private Roderick Moncrieff Richards, AWM P02467.026; R.M. Richards, Grave Registration Report, <http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead/casualty/173444/RICHARDS,%20RODERICK%20MONCRIEFF>, maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, accessed on 21 February 2015; R. M. Richards, Roll of Honour, <http://www.awm.gov.au/people/rolls/R1699969/>, maintained by the AWM, accessed on 21 February 2015.

[96] Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.4; Lance Bombardier W. Moxham cited in Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.130, AWM226 Box 3(a), Item 8A.

[97] This analysis does not include the experiences of Warrant Officer Hector William Sticpewich. His experiences as a leader are examined in the Chapter 9. For reference to Botterill, Short and Campbell's recollections of their group leaders see, Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, pp.2-3; Interrogation of Private Campbell who escaped from Sandakan Area British North Borneo, p.9; Short, War Crimes Trial Statement, pp.2-3; Interview with Botterill, tapes 1, 3, 7; Interview with K. Botterill and N. Short conducted by D. Wall, tape 1, AWM S04095.

[98] Moxham cited in the Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.130.

comparison to other groups at Paginatan, Kinder's men suffered the lowest mortality rate. Group 9 had the highest with 36 percent of its members dead before they reached Paginatan.[99]

At Paginatan, the Japanese ordered the prisoners to make their own camp, while also providing the Japanese with labour for fatigue duty.[100] In total, from groups 6 to 9, about 170 Australian and British prisoners made it to this point alive.[101] Most, however, were critically ill and therefore incapable of the physical labour needed to construct their own barracks, let alone the labour demanded by the Japanese.[102] Any prisoner, however, who did not contribute to the construction of the camp or Japanese fatigues was brutally beaten. As a result, an average of four or five prisoners died at the beginning of their stay at this camp.[103] The death rate quickly grew. After a month, only 60 men were still alive.[104]

The groups were re-organised and new men were attached to Kinder's group, including Botterill. Kinder continued to apply a self-sacrificial leadership style in a vain attempt to protect the sick and the dying in his group from further physical punishments. He tried to negotiate with the Japanese for more rations and less physical work.[105] When this failed, Kinder took it upon himself to complete the labour of men who were too sick to even attempt it. Moxham remembered the consequences this had for Kinder:

> There was a lot of beatings there, sick and all. We had to carry and get our own wood, clean up the barracks. A Warrant Officer Kinder took charge of

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[99] Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.118-119; Silver, *Sandakan*, p. 204.
[100] Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.5.
[101] Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.118-119; Silver, *Sandakan*, p.204; Smith, *Borneo Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage*, p.130; Wall, *Sandakan under Nippon*, p.73. Men marching in groups 1 to 5 were ordered to march straight through to Ranau. In total 70 out of 265 prisoners died on this march. See Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, p.118; R. Reid, *Sandakan, 1942-1945*, (Canberra: Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, 2008), p.29.
[102] For an overview of conditions at Paginatan see Moxham cited in the Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, pp.129-130; Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, pp.2-5; Interview with NX 19750 Lance Bombardier W. Moxham conducted by Casualty and Repository Section, 6 December 1945, p.1, NAA:A705:166/22/357.
[103] Wall, *Sandakan under Nippon*, p.74.
[104] Silver, *Sandakan*, p.205.
[105] Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.5. Also see Smith, *Borneo Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage*, p.130, Wall, *Sandakan under Nippon*, p.74.

> us, eventually taking charge of the whole of the parties at Paginatan. He went up to some of the Japs and was able to get some food from some of them. Some of the Japs, however, would come down and beat the men and Kinder himself was beaten when he took somebody else's part. He was belt [sic] with sticks.[106]

Moxham's testimony and his recollections suggest that Kinder never considered applying a different style of leadership, despite the physical consequences that it incurred.

Even when Kinder understood that the men were not meant to survive, as he did at Paginatan, his commitment to his men's survival remained unchanged. The personal cost of that commitment, and the strength of the followership he commanded, would find their quintessential expression during the march from Paginatan to Ranau.
On this phase of the march, an Australian sergeant stopped walking.[107] He taunted the Japanese guards, still under the command of Shinichi, to shoot him. When they did not listen, the prisoner begged. Botterill, who witnessed this incident, recalled that nothing said by Kinder, his fellow prisoners, or even Shinichi, made a difference. He has lost the will to live. Finally, Shinichi agreed to shoot the prisoner. However, faced with murdering a prisoner in cold blood, Shinichi was incapable of pulling the trigger. Kinder finally took the gun and shot and killed the sergeant. According to Botterill, the men in Kinder's group understood why he had killed one of his own men. The sergeant, he said, 'went raving mad', he was a 'lunatic' who 'went right off his head'. Kinder, he said, 'had to shoot him'.[108] Kinder's group realised that this prisoner jeopardised the survival of the entire group. In these extreme circumstances, despite the horrific act he had committed, Kinder retained leadership legitimacy and followership from his group.

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[106] Interview with Moxham conducted by Casualty and Repository Section, p.1.
[107] Private K. Botterill cited in Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.127, AWM226 Box 3(a), item 8A; Botterill, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, p.13; Botterill, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.3; Interview with Botterill, tape 7; Interview with Botterill and Short, tape 1; K. Botterill cited in Wall, *Sandakan under Nippon*, p.65. There is some confusion between Botterill's recollections in his interviews and statements regarding the identity of the warrant officer involved in this incident. Botterill's written statement has Warrant Officer Clive William Warrington as the officer in charge of this group. While in his interviews with Donald Wall, Botterill insists that it was Kinder. While it is impossible to discern the absolute truth behind the identity of the Australian warrant officer involved in this incident, in light of Kinder's actions during the march and at Pagination and Ranau, it is highly probable that Kinder who was involved in this incident.
[108] Interview with Botterill and Short, tape 1.

In April 1945, Kinder and the 38 survivors from Paginatan reached Ranau.[109] Here they found about 60 survivors from the initial marching groups 1 to 5.[110] In this new location, Kinder still tried to protect his men. The Japanese did not make his job any easier, continuing to demand that prisoners perform manual labour that included walking back to Paginatan and carrying rice for the Japanese, which weighed about 20 kilograms a bag, back to Ranau.[111] Knowing full well the physical consequences of any defiance of Japanese orders, Kinder informed the guards that the prisoners refused to carry any more rice.[112] The Japanese Commandant, Second Lieutenant Saburo Suzuki, refused to even consider the matter. On Anzac Day 1945, when American bombs fell on their camp, Kinder rushed from the makeshift prisoner hospital to find Suzuki.[113] Screaming at him, Kinder was successful in getting Suzuki to let the prisoners take shelter in the air raid trenches they had dug for the Japanese. Suzuki also agreed to Kinder's practical suggestion that the prisoners' camp should be moved one mile into the jungle to protect them against further air raids. By this time, 46 only men from the first march were still alive. As Botterill recalled, the prisoners at Ranau considered Kinder to be their leader or 'boss.'[114]

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[109] Between 20 and 30 POWs at Paginatan were too ill to march. Thus in the period of about a month, about 140 POWs died at Paginatan. See Smith, *Borneo Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage*, p.130. For reference to the number of men capable of marching and Kinder's leadership see Moxham cited in Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.130; Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.5.

[110] It is believed that 350 prisoners from groups one to five in the first march made it to Ranau. This means that 120 prisoners died during the march. Then, when these men merged with the survivors from group's six to nine from Pagination, only about 60 were alive at the end of April 1945. For reference to the number of prisoners that arrived from groups one to five on the first march see Interrogation report submitted by Captain T. Mort, OC 3 PW C and I Teams, obtained from the four Aus recovered PW ex RANAU, pp.1-2, AWM PR00637 Folder 1.

For reference to the number of survivors at Ranau upon Kinder's arrival and at the end of April 1945 see Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.6; Darling, Report on Investigations of Australian and Allied Prisoners of War of 9th Division Area, p.22; Excerpts from Important War Crime Trials, p.3, AWM PR00637 Folder 3.

[111] Statement by Ishii Fujio, Formosan Suga Butai, p.1, AWM PR00637 Folder 3; Interview with Botterill, tape 6.

[112] Interview with Botterill, tapes 6, 7, 10.

[113] Moxham, War Crimes Trial Statement, pp.6-7.

[114] Interview with Botterill, tape 10. Also see Silver, *Sandakan*, p.208.

Kinder died on 10 June 1945.[115] Moxham, who had nursed Kinder in the last days of his life, dug Kinder a grave and marked it with his name.[116] It is unlikely that Moxham performed this task alone: the prisoners, upon hearing of Kinder's death, performed one last collective task for their leader. Most of the men who died at Ranau were buried in mass graves. No other grave, beside Kinder's, was marked with the name of the prisoner who lay there.[117] The leadership legitimacy and followership Kinder had earned from his men meant that he alone was granted this privilege.

Until his last moments, Kinder retained a self-sacrificial leadership style, knowing that there was every likelihood that he would not survive. His leadership style came from his belief that, as a leader, he had no choice but to do everything he could to protect his men. Yet, this overlooks the fact that it was also a personal choice to take on the responsibilities he believed came with leadership. Other leaders did not, a matter that will be examined in the next chapter.

An emergent leader facing execution

To date, this thesis has examined examples of self-sacrificial leadership carried out over a relatively sustained period of time on the Burma-Thailand Railway and in Borneo. Yet, it was possible for this leadership style to manifest itself for a far shorter period of time, yet still be powerful enough to be remembered by those who witnessed it. This was certainly the case with an Australian Corporal, Rodney Edward Breavington.

On 12 May 1942, Breavington and Private Victor Lawrence Gale escaped from their prison camp at Bukit Timah.[118] They did not remain at large for long and were back in captivity in June 1942. On 2 September 1942, at Telok Paku Beach, the Japanese

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[115] Interview with Moxham conducted by Casualty and Repository Section, p.1; Letter to Mrs H. Hope from M.C. Langslow, Casualty Section, 13 December 1945, NAA:A705:166/22/357; J. W. Kinder, Roll of Honour, <http://www.awm.gov.au/people/rolls/R1720526/>, maintained by the AWM, accessed on 22 February 2015.

[116] Interview with Moxham conducted by Casualty and Repository Section, p.1; Interview with Botterill, tape 7.

[117] J. W. Kinder, Grave Registration Report, < http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead/casualty/2677559/KINDER,%20JOHN%20WILLIAM>, maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, accessed on 22 February 2015; Ham, *Sandakan*, p.377; Silver, *Sandakan*, p.211. The marking of Kinder's grave enabled his body to be recovered. See Interview with Botterill, tape 7.

[118] L. Stewart, Re Cpl R.E Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, ff.1-2, AWM PR01013, Folder 4.

executed four POWs who had attempted to escape captivity.[119] These men were Breavington, Gale and two British Privates Harold Waters and Eric Fletcher, who had also briefly escaped from Japanese captivity. For the Japanese, the execution of these men served two purposes. Their deaths would provide a powerful a deterrent for other prisoners who were contemplating escape. And, at the time of the executions, the Japanese Commandant at Changi had presented the British and Australian positional leaders with the non-escape clause discussed in Chapter 2: the executions were also designed to pressure British Malaya Command GOC Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Holmes and Australian GOC Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan into signing the clause.[120] While the execution of the four prisoners stopped other men from planning their own escapes while they were held captive in Singapore, the second purpose failed. As discussed in Chapter 2, instead of inducing Holmes and Galleghan into submissively signing the non-escape clause, the deaths of their men led Holmes and Galleghan to strengthen their resolve, resisting the Japanese demands. The key lay in Breavington's behaviour at this execution.

For a time, it must have seemed to Breavington that the Japanese had forgiven or forgotten his escape attempt. Both men were returned to the Australian lines in Changi. Breavington was immediately admitted to the Australian General Hospital, suffering from malaria.[121] However, without warning, on 1 September, while he was still recovering in hospital, Breavington was suddenly arrested by the Japanese and sent to Curran Camp, a Japanese punishment camp.[122] Gale, Waters and Fletcher were already there.[123]

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[119] Lieutenant Colonel F. Galleghan, War Crimes Trials Statement, 23 November 1945, p.2, AWM54 1010/4/56; N. Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, 8 September 1945, pp.1-2, AWM54 554\11\4 Part 9 Appendix 6; Stewart, Re Cpl R.E Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, ff.1-2. Also see Havers, *Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience*, pp.68-72; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.522.

[120] Galleghan, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.2; S. Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, 22 August 1945, p.5, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3; Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.1.

[121] Stewart, Re Cpl R.E Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1; Sweating, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.522.

[122] Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.1; Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1.

[123] The exact date these men arrived at Curran camp is unknown. Their transfer occurred sometime between 31 August 1942 and the morning of 2 September 1942. See F. Magee, First Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, 22 August 1945, pp.1, 4, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3.

No official files or private recollections record what happened to these men at Curran. It is uncertain if they even had contact with each other. If the Japanese deliberately kept them isolated, it is possible that these men may not have understood the reason why they had been removed from Changi. If the captor did keep them in the same area, or allowed them to see each other, they would have known that they were to be punished. It is possible that one, or all of them, may have even anticipated their execution. If this is the case, it is impossible to know how these men coped with this knowledge. If Breavington realised what was to happen, he had the least amount of time to prepare for his death.

The importance of the execution for the Japanese was evident in the orders issued by Major-General Fukuye. Holmes and Galleghan, accompanied by three British compound commanders, Lieutenant Colonels Stanley Wakefield Harris, Edward William Francis Jephson and Arthur Edward Tanney, and the Indian Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel John Griffith Firth, were ordered to witness the executions.[124] Two British chaplains, John Frederick Watson and John Northridge Lewis Bryan, and Galleghan's personal assistant, Australian Captain N.G Maculey, were also present. Eight of the witnesses provided statements for future war crimes trials. Not surprisingly, given the nature of the event and the fact that the executions took place early in the experiences of these men as prisoners of the Japanese, the accounts are inconsistent. The sources have different sequences of events and there is some confusion about what actually happened. Despite these inconsistencies, however, they agree that Breavington's behaviour was courageous and provided a model for the other three men to follow.

The sources suggest that the Japanese deliberately made it difficult for the four condemned men to cope with their impending execution. At least three of the men waited for over an hour at Telok Paku Beach for the arrival of the fourth prisoner before they faced the firing squad.[125] The majority of the witnesses suggest that

[124] E. Holmes, Report Command British and Australian Troops Malaya to Comd Relieving Forces Singapore, pp.1-5, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 9.
[125] Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; A. Tannay, Fifth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, 22 August 1945, p.5, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3; J. Watson, Eighth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, 22 August 1945, p.8, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3.

Breavington was the fourth man. This would make sense, as he was only removed from the Australian General Hospital at Changi the day before and his illness meant that he would have been difficult to move to the site. Three witnesses also described how Breavington, still dressed in his pyjamas, walked towards them with the aid of a crutch.[126] However, Maculey and Watson's statements suggest that Fletcher, who had also been forcibly removed from his hospital bed in the British section of Changi, was the prisoner the three other men were waiting for.[127] Irrespective, when the four condemned men were present, they were still forced to wait: the Sikh firing squad had yet to arrive. The witnesses' estimates range from the men being forced to wait from between 40 minutes to two hours for the firing squad.[128] Tannay believed that the delay was a deliberate ploy to add to the distress of the men.[129]

When the firing squad finally arrived, the Japanese officer in charge, Lieutenant Okasaki, addressed the four men. Through an interpreter, Okasaki informed the men that they were 'guilty of escaping or attempting to escape contrary to Imperial Japanese Army orders and that they were to be shot forthwith '[130] Perhaps it was instinct, but Breavington immediately questioned the details of the charge, only to be cut short by Okasaki who curtly responded that the details 'didn't matter.'[131] Realising that the Japanese were determined to carry out the executions, Breavington then pleaded for Gale's life, explaining that Gale was his rank subordinate and that he had ordered Gale to escape with him.[132] He argued that Gale should not be executed for following orders of a superior officer. He was, he argued 'responsible for the whole

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[126] J. Bryan, Seventh Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, 22 August 1945, p.7, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3; Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; Magee, First Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.1.

[127] For reference to Fletcher being forcibly removed from the British Hospital in Changi see Holmes, Report Command British and Australian Troops Malaya to Comd Relieving Forces Singapore, p.1. For reference to Maculey and Watson's belief that Fletcher was the last to arrive see Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.1; Watson, Eight Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.8.

[128] For reference to the different estimates of time spent waiting see Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; E. Holmes, Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, 21 August 1945, p.3, NAA:B3856:144/14/65; Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1.

[129] Tannay, Fifth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.6.

[130] Bryan, Seventh Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.7.

[131] Watson, Eighth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.8.

[132] AIF War Diary, Barrack Square Concentration, POW File 749/36/1, pp.1-2, AWM 3DRL/2313, Folder 3; Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1; J. Wyett, Sequence of Events from 1-5 September, p.1, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 6.

thing... he was the leader.'[133] Harris, Tannay, Bryan and Watson's recollections, however, noted that Breavington also extended his plea for clemency to include the two British prisoners.[134] If so, Breavington was arguing that he alone should be executed, that his execution should be enough for his captor. It remains remarkable that, despite the fact that he was facing execution, Breavington was not only capable of quickly articulating a reasoned argument but was also attempting to save the lives of his three companions. It had no effect. Okasaki's response was brief: the Japanese Major General had ordered the execution of the four prisoners and he could do nothing to reverse the decision.[135] In that exchange, however, Breavington had demonstrated to his companions that even when they were facing death, they did not have to be submissive prisoners.

Before the execution, Holmes sought permission for the chaplains to address the prisoners.[136] As all four men were belonged to the Church of England, Padre Bryan approached them. His delivered what comfort he could. His evidence also reveals that Breavington played an important role in comforting the men and he read a passage from the Bible as the firing party prepared its rifles.[137]

When the men were finally lined up, facing the shooting party, Maculey recalled that Breavington instigated a salute to their commanding officers.[138] British Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Wakefield Harris recollections differ stating that it was the officers who instigated the salute and Breavington responded.[139] Irrespective of the order of events, his fellow condemned followed his lead.[140] Through this action, Breavington reminded the men of their identity as soldiers who had done their duty by trying to

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[133] Holmes, Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.3.
[134] Bryan, Seventh Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.7; Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; Tannay, Fifth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.5; Watson, Eighth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.8.
[135] Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.5; Holmes, Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.2; Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.2.
[136] Holmes, Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.3.
[137] Bryan, Seventh Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.7; Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1.
[138] Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.2.
[139] Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4.
[140] Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.2; Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1

escape and now they were paying the ultimate price for doing so. Having saluted their officers, Breavington then turned to the men and shook their hands.[141] The men were offered blindfolds which, according to Holmes, all four 'scornfully refused.'[142] It is probable, considering his behaviour, that Breavington instigated this last act of courage.

All who witnessed the executions agreed that they were botched.[143] Breavington, Gale, Waters and Fletcher, with their backs to the sea, stood about three yards from the firing squad who stood on slightly elevated ground. Perhaps because of the angle of fire from the firing squad, it took over fifteen shots before all four men were dead. Breavington is reported to have suffered the most. At some stage during the shooting, Breavington stood up and screamed at the firing squad: '[F]or God's sake, shoot me through the head and kill me. You have only hit me in the arm.'[144] Breavington was then shot in the leg and stomach. He continued to scream until death finally took him.

It can be argued that Breavington's emergent leadership was intertwined with a sense of duty associated with his higher rank and its responsibilities. Breavington was a corporal; the other three men were privates. Yet this thesis has argued that rank alone did not in itself induce acceptance of the responsibilities associated with rank or followership. The ability of a leader to provide a means of responding to the physical or psychological needs of their formal or informal group determined if they were seen as a legitimate leader. Breavington did this with his calm courage, defiance and stoicism, a model the others followed. Breavington willingly chose to place the psychological welfare of his 'men' above his own needs.

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[141] Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1.
[142] Holmes, Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.3. Also see Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1; Adam-Smith, *From Gallipoli to Korea*, p.258; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.522.
[143] For example see J. Firth, Sixth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, 22 August 1945, p.6, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3; Galleghan, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.3; Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; Holmes, Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi p.3; Magee, First Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.1; Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, pp.1-2.
[144] Galleghan, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.3. For example of the different interpretations of Breavington's last words by the witnesses see Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; Holmes, Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.3; Tannay, Fifth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.5.

Breavington's men were not the only ones to recognise his leadership. When Galleghan returned to the Australian Compound at Changi, he held a meeting of his staff, ordering that his officers inform all Australian troops of Breavington's bravery.[145] Galleghan, who was trying to cope with what he had seen, then wrote a letter to his wife, requesting that she pass on these words to Breavington's wife: '[Y]our husband's calmness and bravery was outstanding. He was to me the bravest man I have ever seen.. [y]ou should know how his bravery in the face of death was an inspiration to those who saw it and will remain an inspiration to us all. Believe me.'[146] The tone in this letter stands in stark contrast with Galleghan's usual authoritarian tone. These were not the words of a superior officer trying to comfort the next of kin of a lost loved one, but an officer honouring the bravery and selflessness of a man who had reminded the men that even though they were prisoners, they could still be defiant, proud soldiers.

Once the story was told to the men, Breavington's actions quickly turned into legend. As with all legends, soon fact and fiction began to merge. Sergeant James A. Roxburgh's diary records that he heard that 'one of these men [Breavington] when the bullet struck him turned and saluted Black Jack before he fell.'[147] Corporeal Leonard Albert David Stewart's writings were closer to the truth: '[he] was tortured beyond the wildest of imagination.'[148] Stewart's writings also record the rumour that Holmes had described Breavington as the bravest man that he had ever seen, and through his actions the ghosts of the ANZACS had come alive.[149]

The poem 'Greater Love'[150] written in Changi in the days after Breavington's death, reveals the extent to which he had acquired followership from Australians POWs:

> Doubtless deeds of courage by which Australia's known
> Shall flourish on forever from a new seed that's been sown

[145] AIF War Diary, 2 September 1930 Hours Conference, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 6 Appendix 3; Barrack Square Concentration, 1 September 1942, p.1.
[146] Letter to Mrs R.E. Breavington from F. Galleghan, 3 September 1943; NAA:B3856:144/14/65.
[147] Roxburgh, Diary 5 September 1942.
[148] Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E. Gale, f.1. Also see Orr, Diary 2 September 1942.
[149] Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E. Gale, ff.1-2.
[150] Author unknown, 'Greater Love,' AWM PR02023.

By a soldier of the AIF who face to face with God
Pleaded for his comrades before a traitor's firing squad.
But the pleadings of this noble man beneath the sunlit sky
Were unavailing, so he stood and showed them how to die.
The old slouch hat lay battered with its dinted rising sun
And an Angel softly murmured 'Duty nobly done.[151]

One of the core characteristics of self-sacrificial leadership is the capacity to put collective or group needs above those of the individual. Although his group was small, and his time as leader short, Breavington still provides a powerful example of the self-sacrificial leadership style.

[151] *ibid*.

THE COLLAPSE OF LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES

Ranau Number One Compound, Borneo, April 1945.
In April 1945 at Ranau number one compound, between 180 and 60 Australian and British prisoners congregate.[1] Most are dying.[2] Realising their fate, an Australian MO, Captain Rodney Lionel Jeffrey, plots. His response to the grim situation is very different to Dunlop's. In a desperate attempt to stay alive, Jeffrey enters into a pact with the Japanese. In return for some food and medical supplies, he treats them. Most of these precious goods that Jeffrey receives for his services, he keeps for himself. A group of hostile Australians confront him over his betrayal. In response to their bitter protests, he tells them to 'stuff it, to mind our own business. He [is] doing the best for [them] ...'[3]

Survivorship studies argue that in extreme settings, where people are dying because they are not receiving their basic physiological needs, it is common for group structures to breakdown.[4] In these dire circumstances, some individuals believe they are more likely to survive if they cut themselves off from other people and only look after themselves.[5]

The literature in this field, particularly studies conducted on the reflections of survivors of concentration camps reveals, however, that in extreme settings it is not the loners who survive, but those who remain part of a group structure.[6] This is for two reasons. Firstly, the survivors realise that it is only in groups that they have a chance to pool their skills to try and meet basic physiological needs.[7] Secondly, group structures also provide a way for members to draw courage, conviction and hope from each other, even when all seems lost.[8] The nature of the Holocaust meant that for groups to achieve these two functions, group structures had to be flexible.[9]

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[1] The exact number of prisoners at Ranau Number One Compound during April 1945 is unknown. About 180 POWs reached here after the first march from Sandakan. Of these men, 60 were still alive when Americans bombed the compound on 25 April 1945. See Botterill, Testimony at Court no R125 held at Rabaul, p.13; Darling, Report on Investigations of Australian and Allied Prisoners of War of 9th Division Area, p.22; Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.5.
[2] Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.4; Interview with Botterill by Wall, tapes 6-7.
[3] Interview with Botterill by Wall, tape 6.
[4] Bennet, *Beyond Endurance*, pp.70, 172-192; Leach, *Survival Psychology*, pp.51-52.
[5] Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart*, pp.151-152; Cohen, *Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp*, pp.158-165; Pres, *The Survivor*, p.121.
[6] Bennet, *Beyond Endurance*, pp.195-197; Bloch, 'The Personality of Inmates of Concentration Camps,' pp.335-341; Cohen, *Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp*, pp.182-19; Luchterhand, 'Prisoner Behaviour and Social System in the Nazi Concentration Camps,', pp.245-262.
[7] Bennet, *Beyond Endurance*, p.89; Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart*, p.136; Leach, *Survival Psychology*, pp.137-142; Pres, *The Survivor*, pp.96, 132-134.
[8] Bennet, *Beyond Endurance*, pp.69-72; Leach, *Survival Psychology*, pp.137-142; Pres, *The Survivor*, pp.97-98, 136-140, 199, 203.
[9] Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart*, pp.131-135; Pres, *The Survivor*, pp.122-129.

POWs in some volatile and extreme captive settings experienced the same tension between individual survival and collective identity. This tension resulted in some Australian POWs abandoning a collective survivorship mentality and instead thought only of their own survival. This self-reversion existed at most of the levels studied for this thesis. It was found at the leadership level, whether it was positional or professional, and amongst the groups, whether they were formal or informal. It was not found, however, at the emergent leadership level, primarily because emergent leaders had stepped in to fill a gap left by the failure of positional leaders.

This thesis has examined two volatile settings (the Burma-Thailand Railway, the forced marches in Europe in 1944-1945) and one extreme setting (the forced marches from Sandakan to Ranau). Using case studies, this chapter examines examples of the collapse of leadership and group cohesion and a basic instinct, self-preservation, came into play in both settings.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first is an analysis of the reversion of three positional leaders from their responsibility to protect their men: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes, the positional leader of the 600 Australians attached to H Force sent from Changi to work on the Burma-Thailand Railway; and Captain George Robin Cook and Warrant Officer Hector Sticpewich during the marches from Sandakan to Ranau. The second section examines a professional leader, MO Captain Roderick Lionel Jeffrey at Ranau. The third section examines the behaviour of informal groups when individual needs became more important than collective identity.

CHAPTER 9: THE COLLAPSE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES

An examination of men who, in volatile and in extreme conditions, choose to protect themselves instead of their men or group is difficult to write. In a similar vein to Joan Beaumont's approach in her study of Gull Force, the purpose of this chapter is not to judge the decisions these men made.[1] Instead it is an attempt to understand their choices and the impact those choices had on formal and informal groups. And although most men were able to adapt to the volatile or even extreme conditions in which they found themselves, particularly when led by men such as Captain Reginald William James Newton or Warrant Officer John William Kinder, others could not. To ignore this is to ignore an integral aspect of the POW leadership experience.

Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes

In May 1943, Galleghan appointed Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes as the positional leader of 600 Australians attached to H Force,[2] the second last Work Force to leave Changi. According to Oakes, about '25 percent' of the men were sick or unfit.[3]

Apart from a period of about seven months when he had accompanied a Singapore based working party, Oakes had spent most of his time within the confines of Changi.[4] Oakes' exposure to the captor before bing placed in command of H Force, according to his unpublished memoir and official report, was minimal. He rather naively expected that the Japanese would respect his rank authority.[5] The forced march from Bampong to Konyu for the Australians in H Force, and the first week at Hell-Fire Pass, made him realise his mistake.[6] Oakes also discovered that the captor's promise of plentiful food and medical supplies was a lie. At the end of the first week at Malaya Hamlet,

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[1] Beaumont, *Gull Force*, p.11.
[2] AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 7 May 1943, p.2, AWM52 1/5/19/12 Part 2; Letter to R. Oakes from F. Galleghan, Warrant for the Convening and Confirming of District Courts Martial, Appendix A2, AWM52 1/5/19/14; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.581-582; Walker, *The Middle East and Far East*, p.614.
[3] Oakes, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.1. Also see Penfold, Bayliss and Crispin, *Galleghan's Greyhounds*, p.387.
[4] Oakes, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.1; Oakes, 'Work and be Happy,' pp.295-310.
[5] *ibid*., pp.310, 312.
[6] *ibid*., pp.312-323.

Oakes' base camp at Konyu, over 100 of his men were in the hospital lines.[7] Oakes realised that, if his men were to survive, he had to do something.

At morning roll call, as Private Kurakuni collected the working parties for the day, Oakes spoke up as the positional officer of H Force. He told Kurakuni that he

> … would not take the responsibility of sending the men out [to work], because I would be held responsible when I got back to Australia, and that I considered that if they were sent out a large number would die.[8]

Kurakuni laughed.[9] He then informed Oakes that if he did not provide the number of prisoners needed to work, he would go into the hospital and force prisoners out of their makeshifts beds to make up the numbers. Oakes backed down without any further remark. This confrontation, initiated by Oakes, tested his leadership legitimacy. His concession to Kurakuni's authority laid the foundation for his reversion from his positional leadership responsibilities at Konyu. The men who watched this confrontation must have realised that Oakes was not only powerless as a POW positional leader but, when challenged, gave in to the demands and threats of the Japanese. His formal group, therefore, could not look to their positional leader for protection.

Captain Richard Vanderbyl Pockley's War Crimes Trial Statement reveals that if Oakes' initial failure in his dealings with Kurakuni sowed doubts in the minds of his men, these were confirmed by a second incident. On this occasion, Oakes attempted to stop Kurakuni from forcing 11 prisoners, who he considered to be too sick to work, from leaving the camp.[10] Kurakuni did not even bother talking to Oakes. Instead he lined up the 11 prisoners that Oakes had identified and, in turn, asked them what was wrong with them. Regardless of the answer, Kurakuni bashed each man. In his statement, Pockley explained that he found the event so traumatic that he turned away. The dismay Oakes must have felt because he had identified these men for the captor

[7] Oakes, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.6.
[8] *ibid*.
[9] *ibid*.
[10] Captain R. Pockley, War Crimes Trials Statement, 27 March 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/116.

broke the courage that he had left to defend his men. For the men watching this second showdown, Oakes' second failure to protect his men must have confirmed for most that Oakes did not have any leadership legitimacy in Thailand.[11] This is clearly evident in the writings and recollections of the men examined who were in H Force. Unlike the writings and recollections of the men led by Dunlop and Newton, where the decisions and actions of their positional leaders are central, most of the men of H Force do not mention Oakes' name.

Yet, Oakes' personal writings reveal that he still felt responsible for his men.[12] In his memoir Oakes explained his predicament:

> I ceased to be an Australian solider on active service in control of other fighting soldiers fighting for the defeat of an enemy... and became a prisoner of war of this same enemy, responsible in theory for the survival of other prisoners of war but without the real authority I had formerly enjoyed.[13]

As Oakes struggled to reconcile his powerlessness with his leadership responsibilities, cholera struck his camp.[14] As explained in Chapter 7, at this point the prisoners realised that the survivorship of the entire group rested on the medical skill, knowledge and self-sacrificial leadership style of Major Kevin James Fagan.[15] Once Oakes understood that Fagan was willing to risk his personal survivorship to help protect his patients, Oakes deferred his responsibilities to him and others.

Each morning, when the Japanese guards collected the working parties, he recalled 'constant nagging and arguing and pleading and fighting between my administration and the guards to adjust the working party numbers.'[16] It is interesting to note that Oakes refers to 'my administration': he does not describe himself as personally

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[11] For example see Hatton, 'The Naked Island', ff.177, 183, 186-188.
[12] Oakes, War Crimes Trial Statement, pp.4-7; Oakes, 'Work and be Happy,' pp.285, 315-316, 321, 323-325.
[13] Oakes, 'Work and Be Happy,' p.285.
[14] Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, pp.3-5; Oakes, War Crimes Trial Statement, pp.6-7.
[15] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.187,189, 191; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.182, 187, 209; B. O'Sullivan cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, p.410.
[16] Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', p.323.

participating in these negotiations. Instead, his staff performed this task, acting on Fagan's advice as to which men were physically able to work and which men needed their protection.[17] Oakes had stopped trying to negotiate with his captors. In fact, unlike Newton and Dunlop, Oakes did not even know the name of his Japanese Commandant.[18] Oakes was protecting himself from a becoming a target.

Yet, despite his attempts to isolate himself from the captor, there were occasions when the Japanese forced Oakes into situations where he had to respond. For example, a Japanese guard at the camp caught an Australian prisoner trading with a native,[19] a practice banned by the Japanese at Malaya Hamlet. As a consequence, the Japanese guard demanded that Oakes punish the Australian prisoner for breaching the ban by beating him in front of the entire camp. Oakes' memoir reveals his response to the demand:

> This was a tricky one. 'We can't do it' admonished Dicky [Lieutenant Richard Wigram Austin, Oakes' interpreter]. 'I haven't the slightest intention of doing so' I assured him, at the same time wondering how I could get out of a beating myself.[20]

Through Austin, Oakes managed to convince the guard that docking the prisoner's pay was the gravest punishment he could give. He argued that if he hit the prisoner, Oakes himself would get into 'serious trouble'[21] with his own superiors after the war. The guard accepted this. Oakes' success in deescalating this situation suggests that he was capable of negotiating with the guards to protect his men. Yet, his memoir suggests that his major motivation was not the protection of the prisoner, but rather a desire to avoid a potential beating by refusing the guard's demands.

This incident appears to have been the exception. The records left by Oakes show that on most of occasions when the Japanese confronted him, it became his policy, and that

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[17] Oakes, War Crime Trials Statement, p.7.
[18] Oakes, 'Work and be Happy,' pp.326-327.
[19] *ibid*.
[20] Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', pp.326-327. For reference to Austin's position as interpreter see Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.3.
[21] Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', p.327.

of his officers, to pretend that they did not understand what the Japanese were telling them.[22] This, he believed, would avoid any suggestion that their orders were being questioned, thereby sparing them the likelihood of physical assault.

Between April and August 1943, the Japanese increased the working hours and work quotas on the railway in what became known as the 'speedo'. At its height in July 1943, a Japanese sergeant approached Oakes with a proposal.[23] In return for the prisoners butchering one of the cows that the Japanese were herding past the camp, the prisoners could keep half the meat. This scheme would have given his malnourished men some much-needed protein. Oakes, however, refused the offer because he believed the potential risk of collective punishment outweighed the short-term benefits of one meal for his men if the deal was discovered. It was a cautious decision and, perhaps, warranted. Yet Oakes also knew that his men were on a smaller ration than the men in the Thailand based Work Forces. On the captor's orders, H Force retained its status as a Malaya based battalion, which meant it was supplied from Malaya rather than from Thailand.[24] H Force, however, was based in the most northern part of the Thailand cutting with some battalions, including Australians, crossing over into the Burma side of the project. The logistics of supply meant that supplies could be delayed and consequently the men were on a smaller ration. Irrespective, Oakes' decision stands in stark contrast to the schemes Dunlop and Newton initiated to provide for the needs of their men.

As noted earlier, Oakes had difficulty adjusting from being an officer in command of fighting men to being an officer in charge of POWs. That may account for the curious fact that at Malaya Hamlet he maintained the custom of officer privilege. It was familiar and probably reflected the fact that Galleghan had maintained it as part of his administration in Changi. Officers were excused from the working parties, even during the speedo when men worked 15-hour shifts.[25] The officers lived in better tents and were spared the task of collecting the daily ration from the Japanese food depot, an

[22] *ibid*., p.312.
[23] *ibid*., p.321.
[24] Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p. 5; Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', p.319; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.*, p.654.
[25] Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, pp.2-6; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.186; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, p.187; Cody, *Ghosts in Khaki*, pp.253-255; Goodwin, *Mates and Memories*, pp.140-142.

eight-mile return journey.[26] That task fell to the men who, after their shift, were rostered to collect bags of rice. The weight of the bags, the debilitated physical state of the men and the distance, meant that four prisoners were needed to carry one bag.[27] Most of this rice fed the Japanese.

Oakes admitted that allocating his men to collect the food ration caused problems.[28] At the height of the speedo, men returning from the construction site were not physically capable of performing this task. Oakes then ordered the convalescent hospital patients, who had been protected from construction work by the officers, to perform this task.[29] At no point did Oakes consider ordering his officers to walk the eight miles to collect the bags of rice.

When Oakes and his men returned to Singapore, they were transferred to Sime Road POW Camp. There, his men openly complained that the officers had lived better than the men in Thailand.[30] Oakes vehemently denied these allegations, blaming them on men wanting to make 'trouble.'[31] However, to some extent, his official report to Galleghan contradicted this.

In his report Oakes claimed that his leadership was based on 'co-operation with Nippon as regard[s to] transport, extra water, food and clothing',[32] which, he claimed, alleviated the stress of the volatile conditions on his men and provided for their basic needs. In this way, he suggested, he 'maintain[ed] strict discipline, appearance and morale'[33] amongst his formal group. However, his 'co-operation with Nippon' did not lead to extra food, water and clothing for his men. Private Alexander Hatton Drummond (one of the few to mention Oakes) provides an insight into both how Oakes was regarded by the men and whether Oakes' policy of cooperation benefited

[26] Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.5; Barlow, untitled manuscript, pp.52-53; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth,' ff.186-191; Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', pp.320, 322-323; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, p.187.
[27] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.186.
[28] Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', pp.321-322.
[29] For example see Denning, 'Memoirs of Private SF Denning', p.34; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth,' ff.190, 191-192; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, p.196.
[30] Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', p.306.
[31] *ibid*.
[32] Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.4.
[33] *ibid*.

his men. He wrote that at Malaya Hamlet 'Oakes was not over-endowed with courage and from the time he arrived at Kanu [sic], retreated from contact with the Japs… isolated from the brutality and misery of the ORs [other ranks].'[34] As far as Drummond was concerned, Oakes was 'Jap happy.'[35] At no point, however, does he suggest that Oakes' policy of 'cooperation' had secured extra food, water or clothing for the men.[36] The description of starvation, beatings and forced labour by other members of H Force at Malaya Hamlet, combined with schemes they attempted to gain more food, corroborate Drummond's account.[37]

Oakes' claim that his 'co-operation' with the Japanese allowed him to retain discipline and control of his formal group is a curious one. It may have reflected the fact that he had distanced himself from his positional responsibilities as argued earlier and therefore had no knowledge of discipline within his formal group, or he may have been protecting his own reputation. The writings and recollections of men, however, do not mention Oakes maintaining discipline, as, for example, the men under Newton did. Even Oakes' official report to Galleghan suggest that there were discipline and morale problems with the formal group. It acknowledged that tension and division existed between the men and the officers:

> The men, wore [sic] out, were very difficult to get working, even to the point of insubordination. With the guards pushing on one side, and the men failing to respond on the other, the officers had a worrying time.[38]

Oakes' personal memoir also acknowledges that some of his men slipped beyond his control. Some prisoners, he wrote, 'sank to the lowest depths of miserable selfishness and cowardly depravity…help[ing] no one, even robbing the dead of their few poor belongings.'[39]

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[34] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.177.
[35] *ibid*., p.183.
[36] For example see Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.163-165, 177-195.
[37] For example see Lee, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.1; Corporal H. Lloyd, War Crimes Trial Statement, 25 January 1946, pp.1-2, AWM54 1010/4/91; Mansfield, War Crimes Trial Statement, pp.1-2; Barlow, untitled manuscript, pp.50-69; Denning, 'Memoirs of Private SF Denning', pp.33-38; Braddon, *The Naked Island*, pp.172, 190-202.
[38] Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.3.
[39] Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', p.325. Also see Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', p.328.

With his administration attempting to protect sick men from working parties, Oakes turned to other tasks. He helped construct the camp hospital.[40] Then, when his men began dying, Oakes helped bury the dead or, if a patient died from cholera, cremated the body of the deceased.[41] This task both consumed and haunted Oakes. He retreated from sight, infrequently making contact with the rest of the camp.[42] Despairing that so many of his men were dying without a sense of peace that could only be achieved by being surrounded by family and loved ones,[43] he constructed a cross to serve as a symbol of salvation to men in their final moments and help alleviate their suffering. On 22 August 1943, when the main phase of construction work had been completed under the speedo, Oakes unveiled it at the entrance to the camp cemetery. On it he had inscribed, 'To our Australian and British Comrades. Here laid to rest 1943. *Amatos eorum dues aspicat*.'[44] Of the prisoners' writings, recollections and testimony examined, only two mention the project. Drummond was the only one to comment on it.[45] He remarked, perhaps ironically, that '[t]his fine gesture allowed the men who died after its completion to see their monument before they died.'[46]

From their position at Malaya Hamlet, the Australians in H Force could observe Newton's camp. They soon realised Newton organised his camp very differently. They witnessed officers attached to working parties who worked alongside the men and tried to protect them from the guards. They watched Newton's officers performing camp fatigues, including collecting the ration and buying extra food with money pooled from the men's and officers' pay.[47] This may have prompted some of the officers at Malaya Hamlet to become more active in their efforts to protect the men.[48] For example,

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[40] Humphries, Report H Force Ex Changi POW camp, p.16; Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', pp.325-326.
[41] Humphries, Report H Force Ex Changi POW camp, p.16; Oakes, War Crime Trials Statement, p.7; Oakes, 'Work and be Happy,' p.325.
[42] Dunlop's writings suggest that Oakes' isolation was forced by the Japanese after Oakes rectal swab, shared with two other men on the same slide, came back positive for cholera. Oakes does not mention this reason for his isolation from the rest of the camp in his own personal writings or his official report. This view contrasts with Drummond who notes that Oakes simply disappeared from view. See Hatton, 'The Naked Truth,' f.187; Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p.293.
[43] Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', p.325.
[44] 'May God look down with compassion on the loved ones of these men.' Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', p.325
[45] Denning also mentions Oakes project but does not share an opinion. See Denning, 'The Memories of Private SF Denning', p.36.
[46] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth,' f.177. Also see Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.197.
[47] Barlow, untitled manuscript, p.60; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.182, 185, 189, 192, 203; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 Battalion*, p.603.
[48] For example see Denning, 'The Memoirs of Private SF Denning', p.35; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.146, 152, 192; Various Members of the Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 Battalion*, p.603.

Drummond considered that Major Kenneth Carlyle Moulton, who tried to protect the sick from working parties and attempted to negotiate concessions for the men, had taken over from Oakes as their positional leader.[49] Flying Officer R. Gibbs, however, in his statement to the War Crime Trials, thought that Major G. Gaskell became the positional leader of the camp.[50] Gibbs explained that on at least one occasion, Gaskell willingly placed his body between sick men and Japanese guards and, despite his failures, never wavered in his duty to protect them, even when threatened with violence. Private Samuel Ambrose Barlow wrote that some officers assumed responsibility for men on the construction site.[51] One unnamed officer, for example, accompanied his working party, and, despite repeated beatings, gave permission for his men to go to the banjo during their shifts. The confusion in the prisoners' recollections about who their positional leader actually was reveals the extent to which Oakes' reversion from his leadership responsibilities had destroyed his leadership legitimacy, leaving a gap that was filled by others.

At the end of the main construction phase of the railway, 217 of Oakes men were dead.[52] Nowhere in his private or official writings did Oakes admit that his own leadership failings contributed to some of these deaths. Instead, he blamed his captors and, on occasions, the poor discipline of his men.[53]

Captain George Robin Cook and Warrant Officer William Hector Sticpewich

Captain George Robin Cook and Warrant Officer William Hector Sticpewich were positional leaders at Sandakan and during the forced marches to Ranau. Both men took a very different path to that taken by Kinder discussed in the previous chapter. Cook's reversion from his positional responsibilities had begun in the Sandakan camp. Sticpewich followed Cook's example.

[49] Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.187
[50] Flying Officer R. Gibbs cited in Llyod, War Crime Trial Statement, pp.1-2.
[51] Barlow, untitled manuscript, pp.52-68.
[52] Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.27; E. Marsden, SMO Report with Vital Statistics as Furnished to DDMS Malaya Command, p.6, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5; Oakes, 'Work and be Happy,' p.325.
[53] Oakes, 'Work and be Happy', p.328.

On 22 July 1943, the Japanese exposed a complex underground intelligence, supply and escape network in the camp.[54] This network consisted of different channels of communication and mutual assistance between officers at Sandakan Camp, interned civilians at Sandakan, civilian medical practitioners at the Sandakan hospital, POWs and civilian internees at Berhala Island, and Filipino guerrilla forces on Borneo who were in contact with the Australian and American military.[55] In response, the Japanese transferred all but eight officers and two chaplains from Sandakan POW Camp to Kuching POW Camp in October 1943.[56] By virtue of his rank, Cook became the positional leader of the Australians imprisoned at Sandakan.[57] Michele Cunningham and Lynette Silver argue that the captor made sure that Cook became the positional leader of the Australians by not transferring him from the camp.[58] He had ensured that the Japanese had the men required for the working parties.[59] According to Australian MO Major Hugh Rayson, Cook willingly jeopardised the safety of the men in this task,[60] by questioning Rayson's medical judgment and his authority over his patients:

> Capt [sic] Cook began to show up in a very unfavourable light, being apparently definitely in favour with the IJA authorities and to keep this position he did not hesitate to sacrifice the interests of the PsOW [sic]. He repeatedly challenged my authority over the hospital group notwithstanding the written authorisation I held from Lt Col [sic] Sheppard.[61]

On assuming command, Cook organised a leadership committee to assist him.[62] The committee consisted of the remaining seven officers and senior NCOs, including Warrant Officers Sticpewich and Kinder. As the positional leader of Australian POWs,

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[54] Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.71-77; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.190-208.
[55] For reference to Japanese exposure of the underground network see Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.71-77. For an overview of the actions by the underground intelligence network, the interrogation of suspects and their punishments see Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.52-101; Ham, *Sandakan*, pp.131-262; Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' pp.594-599.
[56] Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, p.77. The Japanese began removing officers from Sandakan camp from 5 June 1943. See Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.64-65.
[57] Braithwaite, War Crime Trials Statement, p.2; Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial by Military Court of Captain Hoshijiam, pp.14-18; Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan-Ranau March', ff.6-8.
[58] Cunningham, 'Leadership in POW Camps,' p.17; Silver, *Sandakan*, p.141.
[59] Cunningham, 'Leadership in POW Camps,' pp.16-17; Silver, *Sandakan*, pp.118, 141.
[60] Cunningham, 'Leadership in POW Camps,' pp.16-17.
[61] H. Rayson, unpublished manuscript titled 'Prisoner of War Days,' p.18, AWM PR00720.
[62] Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial by Military Court of Captain Hoshijiam, pp.13-18.

Cook openly aligned himself with the Japanese. He imposed strict orders governing the behaviour of the men.[63] Any man who breached these orders was punished. Cook also incorporated the captor into his punishment regime by asking the Japanese Commandant, Captain Susumi Hoshijma, to build an extra punishment cage.[64] This cage, Cook told Hoshijma, would be used to confine Australians who had committed 'short term offences or [for] a softening up period for longer terms...'[65]

In his War Crimes Statement, Private Keith Botterill reported that Cook handed over five Australians to the Japanese for stealing the captor's rations.[66] Botterill also claimed that Cook insisted that three of these men be imprisoned in one of the confinement cages 'for the duration.'[67] As a result of their confinement in the cages, Privates Leonard Jack Annear and Albert Anderson, and Sergeant Errol David Bancroft died within three months.[68]

Between October 1944 and May 1945, as a result of forced labour, sadistic violence and starvation at Sandakan, approximately 1100 Australians died in the camp.[69] The conditions were so extreme that there were times when Cook did make protests to the camp Commandant. Yet, he usually made these in writing.[70] By using this method of communication, Cook appeared to be doing something to protect his men's interests while at the same time avoiding any confrontation with the Commandant. But there was one occasion when he did make a protest face to face. When three prisoners were viciously assaulted, the leadership committee forced Cook into making a protest to the captor in front of the men.[71] On parade, the men watched Cook act on their behalf. The guards ignored his protests and then proceeded to beat Cook and his leadership team.[72]

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[63] Silver, *Sandakan*, pp.161-163.
[64] Botterill, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.1; Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial by Military Court of Captain Hoshijiam, pp.19-20; Silver, *Sandakan*, pp.161-162.
[65] G. Cook cited in Silver, *Sandakan*, p.162.
[66] Botterill, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.1. Also see interview with Botterill, tape 7.
[67] Botterill, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.1.
[68] *ibid*.
[69] O. Campbell, Broadcast from Simpson, Transcript, p.2, AWM54 779/4/11; Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial by the Military Court of Captain Hoshijima, pp.13-14, Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan-Ranau March', ff.1-6; A. Moffitt, *Project Kingfisher*: *Terrible Story of the Massacres of the Sandakan POWs in Borneo and the Secret Plan for a Rescue that Never Happened*, (Sydney: ABC Books for the Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1995), p.64.
[70] Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial by the Military Court of Captain Hoshijima, pp.14, 17, 30; Interview with Botterill, tape 7; Wall, *Sandakan Under Nippon*, pp.41, 43.
[71] Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial by the Military Court of Captain Hoshijima, p.20.
[72] *ibid*, p.20.

Cook left the camp with the seventh group on the second forced march to Ranau.[73] According to Private Nelson Alfred Ernest Short and Japanese Private Takahara, on at least one occasion, Cook protested about the treatment of the sick men in his group.[74] His protests were ignored.

Cook made it to Ranau. Here, amongst sick and dying men, he isolated himself.[75] Instead of being assigned to a work party, for some reason, perhaps because he had been cooperative at Sandakan POW Camp, the Japanese allowed Cook to spend his time maintaining the nominal roll of his formal group. Cook must have hoped that this concession by the captor meant that he would survive. He was wrong. Sometime between the 15 and 28 August, in one of three separate massacres of the surviving prisoners, the Japanese executed Cook.[76] A few days before his death, Sticpewich, whose story is examined below, approached Cook about his escape plans and once Cook made it clear he would not accompany him, Sticpewich asked Cook to hand over the nominal roll.[77] He refused. Instead, sometime before his execution, Cook entrusted the document to Captain Genzo Watanabe, the Japanese officer in charge of the prisoners at Ranau.[78] Watanabe promptly burnt it. Botterill summed up what must have been the prevailing view of the men in Cook's formal group: they saw him as their enemy, not their leader.[79]

Even before the Japanese removed most of the officers from Sandakan, Warrant Officer William Hector Sticpewich's behaviour, like Cook's, had caused rumblings of discontent amongst the formal group.[80] A carpenter by trade, Sticpewich used his skills

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[73] Silver, *Sandakan*, p.222; Smith, *Borneo*, p.137.
[74] Short, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.3; Sticpewich, Notes on the Interrogation of TAKAHARA, p.3.
[75] Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan-Ranau March', f.7; Interview with Botterill, tape 11.
[76] The exact date is unknown. See Fukushima, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.1; T. Yoshikawa, War Crimes Trial Statement, January 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/174; Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan-Ranau March', f.8; Moffitt, *Project Kingfisher*, pp.280-281.
[77] Mort, Interrogation Report submitted by Capt Mort obtained from the four Aus recovered PW ex RANAU, p.4; Interview with Botterill, tapes 2, 7.
[78] G. Watanabe, War Crimes Trial Statement, 8 December 1945, cited in the Trial of Captain T. Takakuwa and Captain G. Watanabe, Exhibit F, 3-5 January 1946, p.52, AWM54 1010/3/94.
[79] For reference to survivors view of Cook see Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, pp.1-2; interview with Botterill, tapes 2 and 7. Also see Silver, *Sandakan*, pp.161-162, 167, 215.
[80] Interview with Botterill, tape 6. Also see Interview with A. Moffitt on 1 September 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive no.0779, tapes 3, 5, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/184aspx> maintained by the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 10 March 2015.

to persuade the Japanese to set-up a 'technical party.'[81] This party consisted of prisoners trained as 'carpenters, engineers, plumbers, electricians and drivers'.[82] This group, led by Sticpewich, was initially responsible for the maintenance of the camp. Then, when men began dying, they were ordered to make coffins for the dead.[83] In return for their specialised services, unlike the rest of the men who were forced to labour at the aerodrome, the technical party received extra rations in return for their services. These men were also spared the regular beatings endured by the aerodrome workers. Prior to the forced march, Sticpewich's men were the healthiest prisoners at Sandakan POW Camp.

Sticpewich never explained why he requested to set up his technical party. He may well have considered that by making himself known to the Japanese as a valued prisoner with special skills, he could protect himself from the aggression of the Japanese, which as time went on, became more extreme. However, it is important to note that, unlike Cook, Sticpewich shared this protection with his select group of tradesmen. It is impossible to know if Sticpewich's motives for allowing other men to join his scheme were a result of his genuine attempts to protect these men from the captor or whether their combined skills made his team more attractive to the Japanese.

Men outside Sticpewich group viewed his technical party and its work as a form of collaboration with the enemy.[84] They saw how he and his men escaped the physical and psychological impact of the quickly diminishing ration, forced labour and beatings. The willingness of Sticpewich and his men to make coffins for the dead most likely confirmed the men's views that his privileged position came at their expense. They also watched a close relationship form between Sticpewich and his party's guard, Private Takahara.[85]

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[81] Sticpewich, War Crime Trial Statement, p.2.
[82] Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan-Ranau March', f.1.
[83] Sticpewich, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.2; Interview with Botterill, tape 6; Interview with Moffitt, tape 3; B. Gordon, 'How Feisty Dihil hid Diggers from the Japs,' The Sunday Mail, 11 June 1989, no page number provided on cutting, AWM PR00637.
[84] Interview with Botterill, tape 6.
[85] For reference to this close relationship see Sticpewich, War Crime Trials Statement, p.11; Interview with Moffitt, tape 3; Silver, *Sandakan*, p.243.

Sticpewich's behaviour in Sandakan, however, remains something of a conundrum. He had worked with the underground intelligence network that operated out the camp. Using his specialised work as a cover, Sticpewich had collected food and medical supplies for prisoners from civilian contacts and had made part of a radio.[86] When the Japanese discovered the network, they also discovered his involvement.[87] Sticpewich was arrested and interrogated by the Japanese. They believed that he had been involved in the operation of an illegal radio, yet could not directly link it to him.[88] Sticpewich had, in fact, removed the radio and buried it in the officers' lines. In his testimony during the War Crimes Trial of the camp Commandant, Sticpewich claimed that he was sentenced to three weeks in a punishment cage, yet his repatriation statement notes that he was released after only four days.[89] The absent radio may well have convinced the Japanese that Sticpewich had played only a minor role in the underground network; or perhaps they viewed both him, and his team, as necessary in terms of the camp's infrastructure, and his punishment was a token gesture. Then, with the transfer of officers to Kuching, the Japanese promoted Sticpewich, appointing him as 'area master for the number 1 area (compound).'[90] This startling transition from punishment to appointed leader, suggests that, the Japanese believed that they could manipulate him into making decisions that were in their interests. In a show of good faith in his judgement, the Japanese allowed Sticpewich to resume his duties as the leader of the technical party.[91]

Little is known about Sticpewich's behaviour as compound leader. In his statement for the War Crimes Trials, Sticpewich claimed that he volunteered to take the place of sick men assigned to aerodrome working parties on two occasions.[92] He also claimed that he was part of the leadership committee that forced Cook to protest the treatment

[86] Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan-Ranau March', f.1; Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, p.72; Moffitt, *Project Kingfisher*, p.75.
[87] Sticpewich, War Crime Trial Statement, p.4.
[88] Sticpewich's decision to move his radio part from its hiding spot and bury it in the officer's lines most likely assisted the Japanese to believe that he had not played an important role in the underground network. See Sticpewich, War Crime Trial Statement, p.4; Cunningham, *Hell on Earth*, pp.72-73.
[89] Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial by Military Court of Captain Hoshijima, pp.19-20; Sticpewich, War Crime Trial Statement, p.4.
[90] Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial by Military Court of Captain Hoshijima, p.14.
[91] Sticpewich, War Crime Trial Statement, p.2.
[92] *ibid*.

meted out to the three Australian prisoners discussed earlier in this Chapter.[93] None of the other five men who survived the forced marches in Borneo could corroborate his repatriation statement or testimony.

Until he left the camp on the second forced march, Sticpewich remained the leader of the technical party and an Australian compound.[94] It can therefore, be presumed that Sticpewich's behaviour did not anger or challenge the captor's order and control over the men. As the Japanese predicted, Sticpewich was not willing to risk his protected position in the camp. His self-interest, therefore, compromised his responsibilities to his men.

On the forced march from Sandakan, Cook placed Sticpewich in charge of a group of 50 prisoners, 42 of whom were hospital patients.[95] These men quickly fell behind the pace set by the Japanese. Sticpewich complained to his guards about the rough treatment of the sick men in his group.[96] The reply came swift and fast: if he wanted to survive, he would not help the sick. On only one other occasion did he attempt to help one of the men in his group. At a river crossing, as the prisoners tried to walk along a single log above raging waters, one Australian in his group suddenly stopped.[97] With the Japanese threatening to shoot him, Sticpewich, who had already crossed to the other side, crawled back and coaxed him into moving. Then when they reached the bank, the Japanese seized the prisoner, stripped him of his gear, bashed him and then ordered the group to keep marching. Sticpewich had watched and then, when ordered to, walked away. That characterised his behaviour during the march to Ranau. After that incident, he watched as the guards graduated from harassing his men to beating them before they disappeared, the victims of illness and injury, or the execution squads following the columns.[98]

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[93] Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial by Military Court of Captain Hoshijima, pp.13-14, 17, 20; W. Sticpewich, Cross-Examination in Trial by Military Court of Captain Hoshijima, 9 January 1946, p.30, AWM54 1010/3/46.
[94] Sticpewich, War Crime Trials Statement, p.2.
[95] *ibid*., pp.6-8.
[96] *ibid*., p.7.
[97] *ibid*., p.8.
[98] For reference to the treatment of the POWs in Sticpewich's marching group by the Japanese see Sticpewich, War Crime Trials Statement, pp.7-8; Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan-Ranau March', ff.6-7; Sticpewich's Notes on the Interrogation of TAKAWA, p.2.

Upon reaching Ranau, realising that Cook had abandoned his leadership responsibilities, Sticpewich claimed leadership of the 189 men still alive.[99] However, his own safety remained his first priority. At this new location, Sticpewich again used his trade skills as a means of self-protection. With Japanese permission, Sticpewich built a hut for the prisoners, with five helpers.[100] On 5 July 1945, when his work party numbers were short, Private Masao Fukushima went down to where the sick and dying Australians were lying.[101] He selected Private Richard Bird, a survivor from the first march, to join Sticpewich's working party. Bird did not come quietly. He argued with Fukushima, repeatedly telling him that he was not well enough to work. Even after being slapped and knocked down, Bird still refused to relent but was finally beaten into submission. Sticpewich, who had been watching the scene, rejected Bird for his working party. In his testimony in the War Crimes Trial of Fukushima, Sticpewich explained why:

> I didn't want Bird and he couldn't do the job as it was no use having him climbing around the building as he was not fit for work, and for my insolence I was smacked over the ear and Bird sent to another party… I thought Bird was not fit for my party because he was very sick at the time.[102]

Sticpewich's rejection of Bird on the grounds of the latter's ill health is plausible, yet needs to be considered within the context of the conditions in the camp and the behaviour of the Japanese guards. Sticpewich well knew that the guards would have watched Bird very closely and any hint that he was falling behind, or not contributing to the workload, would have resulted in a bashing, and perhaps, not just for Bird. By rejecting him as part of his working group, Sticpewich was also protecting himself. Fukushima accepted Sticpewich's decision and ordered Bird onto an outside working party.

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[99] For reference to statistics see Sticpewich, 'Excerpts from Important War Crime Trials', p.3. For reference to Sticpewich's assuming responsibility for the POWs see Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan-Ranau March', f.7.
[100] Sticpewich, War Crime Trials Statement, pp.9-10.
[101] Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of Fukushiam of Borneo POW Camp, p.2.
[102] Sticpewich, Testimony in the Trial of Fukushima of Borneo POW Camp, p.7.

Two types of outside working parties existed: prisoners either laboured all day splitting wood and bamboo, or were forced to walk a six mile return trip to the Japanese food dump to carry bags of rice and vegetables back to Ranau.[103] Fukushima assigned Bird to split wood and bamboo.[104] He never even made it to the worksite. On the way, he collapsed and was unable to move.[105] For more than ten minutes the prisoners watched as the guards kicked Bird in the testicles, head and mouth. The attack continued as the guards led the prisoners away. In the afternoon as his working party staggered back to camp, they found Bird lying unconscious where they had left him that morning. Carried back to camp, an MO, Captain Domenic George Picone, took one look at Bird, and, knowing there was nothing he could do, walked away.
Following the completion of the prisoners' hut, Sticpewich found another way to protect himself by securing a place on the cattle butchering parties.[106] In this role he had the opportunity to obtain extra food, usually small portions of cattle stomach and intestines. He also had an ally in Private Takahara. As noted earlier, the two men had formed a close friendship at Sandakan Camp and Takahara secretly supplied Sticpewich with food and medical supplies at Ranau.[107] It is unclear if Sticpewich kept these supplies for himself or shared them. What is clear, however, is that Sticpewich was determined to keep himself alive.

Then, on 27 July 1945, Takahara warned Sticpewich that the Japanese were planning to execute the surviving prisoners.[108] Sticpewich immediately approached Cook and three remaining MOs, Picone, Captain John Bernard Oakeshott and Captain Roderick Lionel Jeffrey, informing them of the news and offering them the opportunity to escape with him. All four men turned down his offer. Sticpewich did not share his information with any of the other prisoners. Nor did he offer any other prisoner the chance to escape with him. Sticpewich's reasons were simple enough: he believed that

[103] Botterill, War Crime Trials Statement, pp.3-4; Sticpewich, War Crime Trials Statement, pp.9-10.
[104] Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of Fukushiam of Borneo POW Camp, p.2.
[105] K. Botterill, Testimony in the Trial of M. Fukushiam of Borneo POW Camp, 30 May 1946, p.5, AWM54 1010/6/5; Sticpewich, Testimony in the Trial of Fukushiam of Borneo POW Camp, p.8.
[106] Sticpewich, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.11.
[107] Sticpewich's statement only refers to keeping the supplies. Lynette Silver agrees with this analysis. However, Donald Wall believes that Sticpewich shared these supplies out amongst the men. See Sticpewich, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.11; Silver, *Sandakan*, p.243; Wall, *Sandakan Under Nippon*, p.106.
[108] Sticpewich, War Crime Trials Statement, p.11.

the 32 men still alive were either 'too sick or incompetent'[109] to escape. However, Sticpewich did not escape alone. Private Algie Reither accompanied him.[110] Silver suggests that Sticpewich did not agree to take Reither with him out of a sense of duty, but rather because Oakeshott insisted that Reither be given the chance to escape.[111] The fact that five other prisoners escaped Ranau, and lived, shows that there were others he could have taken with him. That, and his reluctance to take Reither with him, suggests that his primary motivation remained his own survival. For that he was prepared to abandon the men at Ranau, knowing that they would be killed.

The other five escapees who survived have questioned the accuracy of Sticpewich's recollections.[112] Even before the forced march from Sandakan Camp, according to Botterill and Captain Athol Motiff, an army legal officer who investigated the events surrounding the death marches, most of the men considered Sticpewich a traitor.[113] In an interview with Donald Wall, Botterill suggested that had the prisoners been freed from Sandakan camp in January 1945, they would have killed Sticpewich.[114]

It is, therefore possible, that in an attempt to save his reputation, Sticpewich's evidence and recollections were purposely flawed, that he was attempting to construct a narrative that would put him in the best possible light post-war. This would explain some of the apparent contradictions in his behaviour. He claimed, for example, that at Sandakan he willingly collected food and medical supplies for the prisoners from civilian contacts, despite the risks involved.[115] He did protest against the treatment of the sick prisoners on the march to Ranau. Yet, the only evidence we have of this is Sticpewich's testimony, a testimony that others doubted. What is clear, however, is that in extreme conditions, despite his leadership position, Sticpewich preferred to

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[109] *ibid.*
[110] Sticpewich and Reither successfully escaped. Twelve days later, accompanied by friendly natives, Sticpewich reached an SRD unit. Reither had died in the jungle. See Sticpewich, War Crime Trials Statement, pp.12-13; Letter to War Graves Unit from W. Sticpewich, 18 August 1946, pp1-2, AWM PR00637; Gordon, How Feisty Dihil hid Diggers from the Japs, p.2.
[111] Silver, *Sandakan*, p.251. It is unclear where Silver attained this information. None of the primary sources consulted in in this thesis included this information. Paul Ham and Michele Cunningham do not include this perception of events in their studies on the death marches.
[112] Interview with Botterill, tapes 4, 6, 7; Interview with Campbell, tape 1; Interview with Moffitt, tapes 3, 6; Silver, *Sandakan*, pp.272, 275, 280.
[113] Interview with Botterill, tape 6. Also see Interview with Moffitt, tapes 3, 5.
[114] Interview with Botterill, tape 2.
[115] Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan-Ranau March', f.1; Moffitt, *Project Kingfisher*, p.75.

remain a passive observer, using his skills to give himself the best chance of making it home alive.

The choice made by Oakes, Cook and Sticpewich as positional leaders to protect themselves instead of their men meant that they lost their leadership legitimacy. Even in volatile and extreme captive settings it seems that Australian other ranks believed that their officers remained responsible for their men. As far as the men in their formal groups were concerned, their leaders had not simply failed them: they saw their reversion from their responsibilities as leaders as a betrayal.[116]

The reversion of MOs

As noted in the previous chapter, MOs in volatile captive settings were faced with a moral choice when it came to discharging their professional responsibilities. Men, like Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt, chose to put their patients first by placing themselves between the sick and the captor's demand for labour, despite the physical consequences that such actions could bring. Others did not. The references to these men are often fleeting in the sources studied for this thesis. For example, the 2/19th battalion history described one unnamed MO in Thailand whose treatment regime involved 'a daily walk or almost run through the hospital saying "how are you, better?"'[117] On the forced marches in the European Theatre discussed in Chapters 1 and 6, one unnamed British MO in a column from Stalag 344 chose to remain silent rather than report that the men in his column were suffering from exhaustion, starvation, dysentery and chest complaints.[118] A South African MO, also from Stalag 344, went one step further by refusing to intervene to protect sick men from German orders to continue marching.[119] The reasons for this choice are unknown. It is probable that the personal consequences of defying German orders influenced his behaviour. These men were never named, but in the forced march from Sandakan Camp to Ranau, Keith Botterill named an MO who reverted from his professional obligations.

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[116] For example see Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', ff.177, 179-180,183; Interview with Botterill, tapes 2, 6.
[117] Various Members of the Unit Association, *The History of the 2/19 Battalion*, p.590.
[118] A. Kadler, Special Report on Marching Conditions of a Group of British POWs From their Former Camp, Stalag 344 Lamsdorf to their New Destination in the West of Germany, no date, p.2, TNA:PRO:WO311\221.
[119] H. Weiner, unpublished manuscript titled, 'They Lost Their Freedom Fighting For Yours', p.98, IWM 97\15\1.

On 29 January 1945, Australian MO Captain Roderick Lionel Jeffrey, left Sandakan Camp with the first marching party.[120] Kevin Smith's study suggests that during the course of the march, Jeffrey tended to the sick.[121] It is unclear how Smith knows this. No one from this marching group survived. Nor do any of the statements, testimonies or recollections of the six survivors from the marching groups give any indication of Jeffrey's behaviour apart from Botterill who was with Jeffrey at Ranau.[122] This assessment of Jeffery's behaviour is, therefore, reliant on his memories.

At Ranau, Jeffrey did not immediately revert from his duties. As the only MO on the first march, Jeffrey tended to the sick with limited supplies, diligently kept records of the dead and passed this information on to the Japanese interpreter.[123] Jeffrey, however, could do little to stem the tide of death. Approximately 180 prisoners from the first march reached Ranau alive.[124] Most were critically ill. They suffered from malaria, beriberi, tropical ulcers, open sores and/or dysentery and, as noted earlier, the Japanese made their precarious condition worse with forced labour, starvation and beatings.[125] On 25 April 1945, when American bombers destroyed the compound, only 60 prisoners, including Jeffrey, were still alive.[126]

Jeffrey spent three months at Ranau. At some point during those three months, Jeffrey decided to protect himself by using the only tactic available to him. In return for medical supplies and food, he also treated the Japanese.[127] As Botterill recalled, this did not go down well with the prisoners: '[W]e used to go crook at Jeffrey's. He told

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[120] Sticpewich, War Crime Trials Statement, p.6.
[121] Smith, *Borneo Australia's Proud Heritage,* p.126.
[122] Moxham arrived at Number One Compound Ranau in early April 1945. By this time, Jeffrey was suffering severely from beriberi. Moxham testified Jeffrey spent most of his time confined to "bed." He offers no further insights into Jeffrey's behaviour. See Moxham, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.6.
[123] F. Masmo, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, May 1946, p.110, AWM54 1010/3/98; Interview with Botterill, tapes 6 and 7. The other two Australian MOs, Captain's John Bernard Oakeshott and Domenic George Picone, were on the second forced march.
[124] Botterill, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, p.13. These were the survivors from groups one to five. A further 170 prisoners stayed at Pagination for about a month. Of these, about 38 made the final journey to Ranau. See Moxham, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.5.
[125] For reference to the precarious health of the prisoners see Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, pp.3-4; Moxham, War Crimes Trial Statements, p.6; Interview with Botterill, tape 7. For an overview of the conditions see Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, pp.3-5; Salunti cited in the Report on Investigation of Australian and Allied Prisoners of War, 9th Division Area, Aug to Nov 1945, Appendix B Part 2, p.32, AMW54 779/1/25; Interview with Botterill, tape 6.
[126] Darling, Report on Investigation Australian and Allied Prisoners of War of 9th Division Area, p.22.
[127] Botterill, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.4; Interview with Botterill, tapes 6 and 7.

us to stuff it, to mind our own business. He was doing the best for us.'[128] Jeffrey may have convinced himself that his choice to treat the Japanese helped the formal group. His alliance with the Japanese provided him with some medical supplies and he certainly used these in part to treat the prisoners.[129] Yet, this was occasional: most of the medical supplies were used to treat the Japanese.

According to Botterill, the Australian prisoners refused to believe Jeffrey's claim that he was doing his best for them.[130] They expected Jeffrey to treat and comfort the sick prisoners, not the captor. Botterill captured the sense of animus felt by the prisoners by quoting Sergeant Cole Smythe: "You're a mongrel, a bastard Doctor Jefferys [sic].'[131] When tested, Jeffrey's had failed to lead.[132]

Jeffrey's attempt to save himself proved futile. On 6 May 1945, suffering from acute beriberi, Jeffrey joined the growing list of the dead.[133] When word of his death spread, the prisoners descended on his hut.[134] They looted his supplies and then attempted to treat each other. Using surgical instruments, they split open each other's carbuncles. Some gave the sickest men injections and distributed to all the prisoners Jeffrey's supplies of the anti-malaria drug, quinine. This crude attempt at treatment proved too little, too late. When survivors from the second march reached Ranau, of the 470 Australian and British prisoners who had left Sandakan on the first march, only six were still alive.[135]

The reasons why Jeffrey chose to abandon his professional and leadership responsibilities, of course, can never be known. The extreme captive conditions, the hopeless task of treating the sick with few medical supplies and the brutality of the captor may have triggered his reversion. If Botterill is any guide, the prisoners had a

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[128] Interview with Botterill, tape 6.
[129] *ibid*., tapes 6 and 7.
[130] *ibid*., tape 6.
[131] *ibid*.
[132] Botterill, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.4; Interview with Botterill, tapes 6 and 7.
[133] R. L. Jeffery, Roll of Honour, < https://www.awm.gov.au/people/rolls/R1686807/>, maintained by the AWM, accessed on 21 February 2015.
[134] Botterill, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.4; Interview with Botterill, tape 6.
[135] For reference to the number of prisoners on the first march see Sticpewich, 'Excerpts from Important War Crime Trials', p.2. For reference to the number of survivors as of 26 June 1945 see Botterill, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.4; Sticpewich, 'Excerpts from Important War Crime Trials', p.3.

very different view. They maintained that, as MO, Jeffrey's behaviour should have been uncompromising. Jeffrey was the only one with the skills to treat the sick and ease pain at the first Ranau Compound. As far as they were concerned, this should have made him the leader of the damned. His reversion, however, denied the Australians the chance to die amongst the collective structure of compassion and humanity. As a MO, Jeffrey could have offered this dynamic to the group as other MOs had, but his reversion from his responsibility demonstrated that he was unwilling to accept it. Instead, he chose to save himself, a choice that Botterill could neither forgive nor forget.

Self-preservation at the group level

In the two volatile and one extreme captive setting examined in this thesis, it was the informal group dynamic that drove the groups. Friendships, mateship and mutual interest networks fed into the group ethic of collective survival and encouraged a sense of loyalty to the group. Although the majority of men remained loyal to the group, some did not. The references to these men are often fleeting, but where they exist, they are stinging because prisoners who put themselves above the collective group risked other men's lives.

Four responses emerged amongst prisoners who chose to put their own survivorship above their loyalties to the collective survivorship of their group: feigning or exaggerating illness, pretending to have completed a work quota, stealing from other prisoners and withdrawal from the group.

Feigning or exaggerating illness was found in groups working on the Burma-Thailand Railway and the forced marches in Germany. (The men who tried this tactic on the marches from Sandakan to Ranau ran the risk of being shot by the Japanese.)[136] For example, Major Albert Ernest Saggers' diary noted that on the march from Bampong to Malaya Hamlet, some Australians attached to H Force, overwhelmed with the conditions, sat down and refused to move. These men claimed that they were ill and

[136] Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.31; Moxham, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.1; Short, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.2; Sticpewich, 'Prelude to Sandakan – Ranau March', ff.3, 6-7.

could go no further.[137] Sagger's writings described his failure to resolve the problem and the one element that did resolve it.

> I would scold, growl, entreat, sympathise, encourage and beg of them to rise, but I might have spoken to the Sphnix [sic] – they just lay there like dead men, but immediately a Jap grunted at them they were up like a shot.[138]

Russell Braddon experienced a similar dilemma on the march to Malaya Hamlet. On the second day of the march, he and his mate, Roy, came across Smokey who refused to get up. He explained to Braddon that he could not move his legs. Braddon and his mate, who was suffering from dysentery, carried the prisoner between them. Two hours later they caught up with the end of their marching column and found MO Kevin Fagan. Fagan replaced Roy and then suddenly stopped. The sick prisoner fell to the ground. Fagan instructed Braddon to 'kick him in the seat of the pants. Hard.'[139] Dumbfounded, Braddon refused. Fagan, however, did.

> Impatiently Fagan strode over to the prostrate Smokey and applied a vigorous boot in his paralysed posterior. With a howl of pain, all symptoms of paralysis suddenly vanished. Smokey leapt to his feet and fled. 'Playing possum', Fagan explained. Roy Death looked rueful. 'Guess that's the easiest couple of hours march he'd ever had.'[140]

As far as Saggers was concerned, men like these were 'the scum of the AIF'[141] The writings and recollections of prisoners in this captive setting, irrespective of what Work Force they were attached to, shared Saggers' opinion.[142] Men who feigned or exaggerated illness risked other men's lives by forcing men, who were often sicker than the prisoner attempting to protect himself, to take the malingerer's place on a

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[137] A. Saggers cited in Sweating, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.582.
[138] *ibid*.
[139] Braddon, *The Naked Island*, p.179
[140] *ibid*.
[141] A. Saggers cited in Sweating, 'Prisoners of the Japanese,' p.582.
[142] For example see Barlow, untitled manuscript, pp.68-69; Hatton, 'The Naked Truth', f.181; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.78-79, 89.

working party or expend more energy in an attempt to provide the 'sick' with protection while on the march.

Fagan's attitude towards Smokey, of course, was not unique. In camps where MOs assumed a self-sacrificial leadership style, the selfishness of men who feigned or exaggerated illness was not tolerated. For example, Barlow described the reaction of his doctor to a prisoner who 'fainted' on the work parade.

> There was one chap who was a known bludger. When they were lined up to go [to work] he threw a faint. The Dr had a look at him and went and got a bucket of cold water and threw it over him. He sat up and the Dr said now you will go as I am not sending a sick man to die in your place.[143]

Feigning illness usually did not have such an impact on the survival chances of their group members during the forced marches in Europe. These men were usually left behind by their marching column either in a reception camp, another POW camp or in the nightly billet, sometimes under guard. Sometimes entire informal groups decided to feign illness to stay together.[144] Feigned or genuine illness sometimes led to the separation of informal groups, with some group's members finding themselves alone and having to join a new group, if other prisoners were willing to let them.[145] Warrant Officer David Radke, for example, had little trouble finding a new group when his mate, Tom, left the marching column.[146] He quickly found two fellow Australians willing to absorb him into their informal group. Tom Collins, who also found himself alone on the march, also used his nationality to merge into a new group of Australian POWs.[147] Other men were not so lucky, remaining isolated for the rest of the march.[148]

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[143] Barlow, untitled manuscript, pp.68-69.
[144] For reference to Australian example see Henry, unpublished and untitled writings, p.4; Radke, 'Background to the March to Freedom,' p.10; S. Campbell, 'From "Snow" Campbell's Diary' in J. Holliday (ed.), *Stories of the RAAF POWS of Lamsdorf including chronicles of their 500 mile trek,* (Holland Park: Lamsdorf RAAF POWS Association, 1992), p.229; Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile Trek to Ziegenhain,' pp.285-286, 289.
[145] Radke, 'Background to the March to Freedom', p.25.
[146] *ibid*.
[147] T. Collins cited in Campbell, 'From "Snow" Campbell's Diary,' p.229.
[148] For example see Weiner, 'They Lost their Freedom Fighting for Yours', p.103; Younger, *No Flight from the Cage*, pp.216-218.

Pretending to have completed a work quota was unique to the Burma-Thailand Railway. On the construction site, a working party was allocated a daily quota that was then subdivided into a quota for each member of a working group. Some prisoners devised ways to avoid their quota. This tactic inevitably meant that the other workers in their party had to complete their own quota and make up the shortfall. As noted in the previous chapter, the men in the working parties had no hesitation in doing extra work for the sick or the weak, but they had little time for the malingers as Parkin's writings show:

> Today has been particularly bad, we got mixed with a lazy crowd of low morale who cloak their laziness with an affected patriotism that they will do as little as possible for the enemy. It doesn't trouble them that what they don't do will fall on their mates.[149]

Stealing food and the personal belongings was evident across all captive settings. The theft of personal items had an emotional impact on the victim of the theft,[150] but in the volatile conditions experienced on the Burma-Thailand Railway and, to a lesser extent, during the forced marches in Europe, the theft of food threatened group cohesion.

Ray Parkin, Samuel Barlow, Major A. Thompson and Lance Corporal K. Hayes' writings note how their informal groups struggled to remain civil with each other when they became desperate for food.[151] Mates bickered with each other and closely monitored each mouthful of food each group member received to ensure a fair distribution. Those who stole food, however, became outcasts and were ostracised by the group. Parkin recorded one such example.

Izzy, the 18-year-old seaman who had a plum job in the Japanese kitchens (see Chapter 6) also stole food from his mates' tents when they were working.[152] At Hintok Road Camp, when his health deteriorated, he spent time in the hospital lines.[153] He was

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[149] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, p.79.
[150] For example see Medley, 'The Day the War Began', p.34; Interview with Bruce, reel 10.
[151] Barlow, untitled manuscript, p.52-69; Hayes, diary 13 April 1943; Thompson, diary 25 January 1943, 28 January 1943 and 4 May 1943; Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.27, 60, 113, 158.
[152] Parkin, *Into the Smother*, pp.115-116, 122-123.
[153] *ibid*., pp.109, 113, 186-187.

replaced in the kitchen by one of Parkins' group, Jim, a man who was sicker than Izzy.[154] Izzy assumed that once he recovered, he would return to his job. As Parkin recorded, it was not to be.

> Izzy came out of hospital yesterday and went down to the Nip engineer's kitchen for his job back. Jim flared up at him. He called Izzy everything. Izzy whined back, 'Well, I'm entitled, I don't want to go out and work in the jungle.' Jim had to be held back from bashing him. 'You ---- What about the others more sick than you have been – they've got to go out while crawling bastards like you (with a good pair of boots) stay in. Why don't you take your bloody turn.'[155]

Izzy's behaviour deteriorated from this point. He begged for cigarettes. Then he traded some of the food he had stolen for more cigarettes. Despite threats from his mates to 'half-kill him', Izzy's behaviour did not change. In the end, the group refused to have him in their camp.[156] Izzy's story matches Bettelheim's and Cohen's models described in Chapter 1: he was rejected by the group because he had betrayed his mates by stealing food but could not survive without the group.[157] As described in Chapter 6, it was only when he was dying that his behaviour improved and he was forgiven by his mates.

For some prisoners, however, the theft of food could never be forgiven. On the march from Sandakan to Ranau, one of the Australians in Botterill's party was forced to carry an excessive load of stores. When this prisoner began to fall behind, Botterill's mate, Private Richard Murray went to help him.[158] Botterill talked Murray out of it. In an interview with Donald Wall he explained why. At Sandakan Camp, this prisoner had, like Izzy, stolen food. Botterill described him as 'the greatest bastard in the world…[he] used to sit outside the kitchen all night and…knock food off.'[159] For

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[154] *ibid*., p.109.
[155] *ibid*., p.116.
[156] *ibid*., pp.115-116, 121-122, 136.
[157] Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart*, pp.151-152.
[158] Interview with Botterill, tape 3.
[159] *ibid*.

Botterill, this act of betrayal, even when the perpetrator faced certain death, could not be forgiven.

During the volatile conditions created by the forced marches in the European Theatre, particularly those from Poland during the winter of 1944-1945, Australian POW Snow Campbell recalled that his marching group had 'reached a stage of almost the limit of human endurance.'[160] In these conditions, prisoners stole food from each other. Some prisoners, such as Australian Flight Lieutenant R. Bethal, described these acts as merely 'petty theft amongst kreigies.'[161] Other men recorded what was stolen without making further comment. For example, Australian Flight Lieutenant Alfred Playfair noted on February 1 1945, 'incidents of biscuits stolen.'[162] In his interview with the Australians at War Film Archive project, Flying Officer Herbert Edward Dawson explained his mental state regarding the allocation of food on the forced marches: 'It doesn't matter about my mate, as long as I got something.'[163]

Withdrawal from the group took three basic forms: men could isolate themselves from the larger group by forming sub-groups with the larger body of men, men could withdraw physically from the group as the men who dropped out of the forced marches did in Europe, hoping to hide until liberation, and men could escape.

The volatile conditions endured by the men on the forced marches in Europe, led to the larger formal groups breaking down into subgroups or pairings based on a sense of loyalty to a best mate or mates. Considering the suddenness with which the marches were organised, and the ad hoc nature of the formation of the multi-national and multi-service marching columns, the men believed that these subgroups offered a better chance of survival. In effect, they adapted the notion of collective survivorship to a smaller group setting. As Bloch, Luchterhand and Des Pres have argued, in some circumstances it was better for a few to look after each other, than a larger group trying to collectively survive.

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[160] Campbell, 'From "Snow" Campbell's Diary,' p.226.
[161] Kreigies is the abbreviation of 'Kriegsgefangenen', the term that the the Germans used for POWs. R. Bethell, unpublished manuscript titled 'Second March from Marlag –Milag to Ramstedt to Lubeck', p.1, IWM 05/4/1.
[162] Playfair, 'A Wartime Log,' p.24.
[163] Interview with Dawson, tape 6. Also see Interview with Donald, reel 10; Younger, *No Flight From the Cage*, p.196.

For example, on the march from Stalag XXA at Thorn, British signalman G. Manners explained how he and his mate isolated themselves from the chaos of the march. 'JH and I in good shape, but many tempers getting frayed and many unkind things said, so we are keeping as much to ourselves as possible in this struggling mess of humanity.'[164] Australian RAAF POW Warrant Officer Rex Alan Austin and his mate Reg Tyce also formed an exclusive pairing.[165] To survive the march, these men constantly switched roles of provider, motivator and organiser. Australian Air Force Warrant Officers R. Cantillion, Gordon Castle and John Kean's writings reinforce the view that in smaller groups, Australian prisoners on the march in Europe, found a way to cope with the volatile conditions: 'As muckers we three are doing fairly well as compared to others and have managed to stick [together] and help each other remarkably well.'[166] These subgroups lasted for the duration of the march.

For some prisoners marching in columns where their guards either turned a blind eye to, or did not severely punish, prisoners who either attempted to, or did, drop out of the marching column, this option seemed to promise their best chance of surviving.[167] Corporal Raymond Stewart Middleton was one. In his interview with the Australians at War Film Archives project, he stated that when his foot injury meant he could not keep up with the rest of the men, he planned to leave the march.[168] His mate, however, would not join him, and Middleton left him with the column. Middleton's decision to leave the column on his own was rare. Unless prisoners were desperately ill, most men

[164] Manners, 'The Art of Necessity,' p.148.
[165] Interview with R. Austin on 5 June 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive No. 0302, tape 8, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1601.aspx>, maintained by the Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 8 April 2014.
[166] Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile Trek to Ziegenhain', p.284.
[167] For reference to this behaviour by Germans guards see Protecting Power Inspection Report Stalag Luft III now at Nuremberg- Langwasser, 13 March 1945, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO224/63A; Pritchard, unpublished and untitled manuscript, p.8; Interview with Acqueir, reel 3; Cantillion, Castle and Kean, 'Diary of 500 Mile Trek to Ziegenhain,' p.279. For reference to other columns where guards punished and killed failed escapers see Report on Repatriation of Australian Prisoners in Europe Great War 1939-1945 copy 1, 3 July 1945 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces PWX Branch, AWM54 779/9/2; Badcock, 'Barbed Wire City: Section titled The March Back,' p.1; Interview with J. Douglas by M. Moses for the IWM on 20 July 2003, reel 20, IWM 25111.
[168] Interview with Middleton, tape 6.

dropped out of the march either in pairs or small groups.[169] Very few, such as Middleton, felt confident enough to take this risk alone.

As explained in Chapter 6, on the Burma-Thailand Railway, once the prisoners understood their new routine of labour, violence and sickness, informal group loyalty became essential for physical and psychological survival. Overwhelmingly, prisoners' writings and recollections emphasise that in these small informal groups, mates physically helped each other or even bullied into each into survival.[170] However, despite this overwhelming metanarrative, there are some examples of informal groups fracturing to the point where some group members believed that withdrawal from the group would ensure their personal survival. Izzy was one.

Others simply chose to die. Signalman James Ling's mate made this choice. Nothing Ling did or said made a difference. Ling remembers this decision not with anger, but with awe. 'Fancy just having the guts to decide you were going to do that.'[171] Barlow also saw men make the same choice. Most of these men, he believed 'died as though their heart was broken.'[172] Cyril Gilbert, however, had another explanation: 'If you didn't have a mate you died. If you didn't have somebody to look after you or you look after them.'[173] For some of these men, it is possible that they had pushed their informal group members away, or had been banished by their group for their survivalist behaviour, or had been separated from their mates, either by Japanese orders or by death. Bombardier Philip Relf, however, thought that the drive for personal survival was the dominant response of men to captivity, trumping even mateship:

> To a prisoner, self becomes all-important. It is yourself who must survive. That philosophy is above even mateship…Very few men would give up his

[169] D. Elliott, untitled writings, p.11, IWM 98/7/1; Radke, 'Background to the March to Freedom', p.10; Interview with Corbett, tape 7; Interview with E. Haddock by C. Wood on 15 December 1996 for the IWM, reel 4, IWM 16404.
[170] For example see Denning, 'Memoirs of Private S.F Denning,' pp.37-38; Letter to Newton from Gray, p.1; R. Ridley cited in Wall, *Singapore and Beyond*, p.159; I. Jones cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, p.419.
[171] Interview with Ling, reel 2.
[172] Barlow, untitled manuscript, p.55.
[173] Interview with Gilbert, tape 6.

> life for a mate if the actual pinch came. The 'alone-ness' of a man was starkly revealed.[174]

There is no doubt that some of the men who dropped out of the forced marches in Europe did so with the intention of escaping. Generally speaking, their motivations mirrored those of the men who were part of the escapes discussed earlier in this thesis, a desire for freedom. In the extreme captive setting of the forced marches in Borneo, however, the motivation was very different – it was survival. Escape could be an act entirely motivated by self-preservation, as Sticpewich's escape clearly was. He knew of the coming massacre. Other escapes by an individual could also be seen in the same light. Yet, small groups of men also planned and undertook their escape as the conditions endured by the prisoners began to undermine the notion of collective survival and the Japanese intentions as to the fate of the prisoners became clear. Escape, then, is the most complex of the withdrawal examples studied in this thesis because it could range from the clearly selfish to the only choice left for men in an extreme captive environment. The following case studies reflect those complexities, complexities evident in the literature analysing the behaviour of groups in extreme situations discussed in Chapter 1.

The number of men who attempted to escape alone during the forced marches from Sandakan to Ranau is unknown. Many may have tried and failed, but Gunner James Braithwaite succeded.[175] In his interrogation and repatriation statement, Braithwaite stated, 'I took to the jungle and from there I lay all day until afternoon thinking…and I decided that I had nothing to lose and would try and make the end of the river for I knew the PT boats were near LUBAK [sic].'[176] After five days crawling along the riverbank and then crossing the river, Braithwaite stumbled across local people who nursed him and then, once they thought it was safe, carried him to Allied forces. At no point in Braithwaite's statement or interrogation did he explain why he chose to escape alone. In one sense, his escape could be seen as self-centred as Sticpewich's had been, believing that he was more likely to survive by cutting himself off from the group. It is

[174] P. Relf cited in Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea*, p.426.
[175] Braithwaite, Australian War Crimes Trials Statement, pp.14-16; Preliminary Interrogation of Braithwaite who escaped from Sandakan Area British North Borneo, pp.1-5.
[176] Preliminary Interrogation of Braithwaite who escaped from Sandakan Area British North Borneo, p.3.

interesting, then, to note that it was Sticpewich, not Braithwaite, who in the aftermath of the war, was labelled as the only Sandakan survivor who abandoned the group to ensure self-survival. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that Braithwaite was not a leader, but was one of the other ranks.

The more common escape attempts, however, were made by the subgroups referred to earlier, although even then the basic instinct of self-preservation could come into play.

At Ranau Number 1 Jungle Camp, Gunners Walter Crease and Albert Cleary escaped, but were recaptured by local villagers and returned to the Japanese.[177] The Japanese tortured both men as an object lesson. Somehow, Crease escaped a second time, leaving Cleary behind.[178] The Japanese stripped Cleary naked, tied him up, suspended him off the ground, starved, beat and urinated on him daily. This went on for 10 days before the Japanese cut him down. According to Botterill, it was not only the physical punishment that killed him. Having been abandoned by his mate, he also died of 'a broken heart'.[179] Crease was found and executed by the Japanese.

After six days on the march from Sandakan POW Camp, Gunner Owen Colin Campbell, Corporal Edward Victor Emmett, Private Sidney Arthur Webber, Private Edward Kenneth Skinner and Private Keith Hamilton Costin planned their escape.[180] Their opportunity came when American planes dropped bombs near their marching group on 6 June 1945. As their guards and the other prisoners sought cover, these men stumbled in a different direction into the jungle. For four days these men attempted to trek further into the jungle. By following this route, the group hoped to avoid the Japanese. However, because they were so sick, their pace often slowed to a literal crawl. On the fourth day, Skinner stopped moving. Even after a few days' rest, Skinner's health had not improved. At this point the group fractured; Emmett, Webber

[177] Botterill, Testimony in the Trial of civilians K. Kotoro, K. Koyoshi and S. Saburo, pp.4-5; Moxham, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.2; Interview with Botterill, tape 6.
[178] For 10 days Crease alluded capture. Then the Japanese found and executed him. See Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, pp.4-5; Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.2; Interview with Botterill, tape 6.
[179] Interview with Botterill, tape 6.
[180] Preliminary Interrogation of Private Campbell, pp.2-4; Message from Smythe Moretal, August 30 1945, take 1, NAA:B883:QX14380; Message to Landforce 31 383 From Land Ops, p.1, NAA:B883:QX14380; Wall, *Sandakan Under Nippon*, pp.92-96.

and Costin kept going, while Campbell, suffering from malaria and beriberi, stayed with Skinner. Skinner urged Campbell to leave him and go with the others. Campbell refused to listen. Then, on their second day alone, when Campbell went down to the river to collect water, Skinner cut his own throat. In his repatriation statement, Campbell had no doubts as to what his mate's suicide meant.

> Before this he [Skinner] had tried to persuade me that I should go on and that there was no hope for him. There have been other men who have done the same thing that my mate did, but there have been none braver... I buried him and then pushed on.[181]

Of the five men in this sub-group, only Campbell survived.[182] Costin died from malaria. The Japanese shot Emmett and Webber as they hailed a passing native canoe.

The last of the case studies in this section is the subgroup that included men from Ranau whose precarious health, in Sticpewich's opinion, would have compromised his own attempt to survive.[183] On 7 July 1945, Lance Bombardier William Moxham, Privates Keith Botterill and Nelson Short, and Driver Andrew Anderson escaped.[184] According to Botterill, these men agreed to escape before they became too weak to make an attempt to flee. They decided not to discuss their plans with Cook because 'we were afraid he may report us.'[185] They asked 'a lot of men to come with us,'[186] but those they asked were 'either too weak or frightened to come after seeing the treatment that had been meted out to Crease and Cleary.'[187] In his interview with Donald Wall, Nelson Short tells a different story**.** Initially, Short had doubts about escaping. Suffering from beriberi and ulcers on his feet, he was almost convinced by other Australian prisoners that his best hope of survival was to wait to be rescued. In the end

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[181] Preliminary Interrogation of Private Campbell, p.4.
[182] Preliminary Interrogation of Private Campbell, p.4; Statement made to Major H. Jackson at Beluran on 11 January 1947 by C. Kulang of Kampong Maunad at Beluran District Concerning the Assistance Rendered to Escaped Aust PW, pp.1-2, AWM PR84/231 Item 9; Statement made to Major H. Jackson at Beluran on 12 January 1947 by AMIT of Kampong Sapi, p.1, AWM PR84/231 Item 9; Silver, *Sandakan*, pp.239-241; Wall, *Sandakan under Nippon*, pp.92-96.
[183] Sticpewich, War Crime Trials Statement, p.11.
[184] Botterill, War Crime Trials Statement, p.5; Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, pp.6-7; Sticpewich, War Crime Trials Statement, p.13.
[185] Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.5.
[186] *ibid.*
[187] *ibid.*

it was the importance of collectivism which made him decide to go. 'I think I'll go with mob', he said.[188] Three succeeded because local villagers helped them: the fourth, Anderson, died from illness.[189]

In terms of the captive environments in which POWs found themselves, Sandakan was the most extreme. In that sense, then, it throws into sharp relief the way that a primeval desire to survive could come into play because these prisoners were not faced with a threat to life but with the certainty that their captor intended to take it. Braithwaite escaped alone, Sticpewich wanted to, yet the other examples discussed above involved men acting together, an indication that although the notion of collective survival had long gone within the larger groups, as Botterill found when trying to get other men to join him, it was still evident at the subgroup level for some of the prisoners. Yet even then, the instinct for self-preservation was strong. Crease abandoned Cleary and Emmett, Webber and Costin abandoned Skinner and Campbell.

For the most part, Australian informal groups remained loyal to each other in the volatile and extreme captive settings examined in this thesis. It was rare for men to put their own survival above that of their mates. It did, however, happen. This chapter demonstrates that an individualist response emerged out of four themes; feigning or exaggerating illness, pretending to have completed a work quota, stealing from other prisoners and withdrawing from the group that included escape. Of these themes all but one, escape, reflected an individual's choice to try and protect themselves from harm, even if this meant putting the lives of other prisoners at risk. Escape was more complex. It was adopted for both personal survival and group survival. The men in the forced marches in Europe believed it offered them the chance to wait until the Allies found them, away from the danger of their German guards. In essence their choice reflected the desire for freedom. In the jungle of Borneo, only the men who successfully escaped survived this extreme setting, whether they escaped alone or as part of an informal group. Yet their desire to live meant that they had to leave others prisoners behind, including for some men, their mates.

[188] Interview with Short, tape 1.
[189] Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.5; Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.7.

CONCLUSION

Historians' examination of the Australian captive experience in the Second World War has not been conducted as a shared narrative across the European and Pacific Theatres. Instead, as explained in the Introduction, historians have examined the experience of Australian POWs in this conflict through the structural device of captor and location.[190] This thesis has, through a series of case studies, united the experience of Australian POWs through the structure of leadership which existed in two different group structures; formal and informal. In formal groups positional leaders, by virtue of their rank, retained legal control over their men, regardless of the captive conditions. Informal groups, which largely consisted of mates who trained, fought and then were captured together, became the most important leadership structure in the day-to-day interaction of POWs. In examining these two leadership structures, this thesis has drawn attention to the similarities and differences of positional, professional and emergent leaders' styles, interaction with the captor and ability to manage and assist their formal or informal group cope with their captive conditions. From this examination and analysis one fundamental difference emerged that affected the operation and status of leaders; the captive conditions. The difference between the relative stable, volatile and extreme captive settings in Europe and in the Pacific Theatre meant that while distinct differences have been observed in this thesis on the Australian POW leadership experience, such as the application of specific styles of leadership, expectations placed on leaders in their interactions with the captor and control of their men in order to advance survivorship, similarities did exist.

Ultimately regardless of the type of captive conditions, Australians expected their positional leaders to maintain their leadership responsibilities. This manifested itself in two forms; positional leaders had to present their formal groups' needs to the captor, regardless of the personal risk this posed. They also had to retain a cohesive formal group to ensure a collective mentality to help their men cope with their POW status and conditions and establish the legitimacy of their leadership. According to Australian

[190] Moore and Fedorowich, 'Prisoners of War in the Second World War,' pp.1-2; Nelson, 'Beyond Slogans',
p.7; Romjin et al, 'Foreword,' p.1.

POWs, therefore, the new setting of captivity had done nothing to lessen rank responsibilities. In fact, captivity had sharpened positional leaders' obligations to serve their men's best interests.

In the setting of captivity, serving the men's best interest meant that positional leaders needed to be adaptable. As acknowledged in the Introduction, it was, for most leaders, impossible to retain one single leadership style for the duration of their captive experience. This thesis has, therefore, examined the predominant leadership style used by leaders in their interactions with their men and captors. It was through their application of a leadership style that their formal groups understood how their leaders perceived their responsibilities in captivity and managed these tasks. The group's observations of these tasks then allowed them to assess their positional leader's ability to serve the formal group's needs and accord them leadership legitimacy or declare them a failed leader.

Four styles of leadership were evaluated in this thesis; authoritarian, transformational, democratic and self-sacrificial. Authoritarian leadership, the traditional regulatory military leadership style, was the most common style applied by positional leaders. It is based on the traditional military hierarchical model of controlling subordinates through orders. This leadership style works in times of peace, training and battle because of the operation of a regulatory disciplinary system that supports the orders of higher-ranking officers. In captivity, this supporting regulatory system ceases to exist because the positional leader is subservient in authority and power to the captor. Positional leaders who recognised this limitation, like Captain Reginald William James Newton, adapted their leadership structures to ensure that they could still retain leadership legitimacy amongst their formal group.

Having endured 60 hours of interrogation by the Japanese upon capture, Newton had no illusions about the true nature of his status as a POW or the capabilities of his captor. Newton, therefore, understood that, in captivity, positional leaders were first and foremost responsible for the collective survivorship of their men. To achieve this leadership goal, Newton realised that more than a traditional regulatory military leadership style would be required. Newton tested his leadership style at Pudu Jail where he learnt that a combination of innovation, resourcefulness and offering himself

in lieu of one of his men for physical punishment were the best ways that he could achieve collective survival. Having learnt these essential leadership skills, Newton came into his own in Thailand. Through his unorthodox techniques with civilian contacts and his staunch opposition to his captors, Newton achieved the lowest death rate of any battalion leader on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Newton was only able to use these techniques because he had absolute control over his men, a control he achieved because the men trusted his judgement and because they understood that Newton would do everything he could to ensure that as many men as possible survived. This leadership goal led not merely to leadership legitimacy, but to loyal followership.

Newton accepted that he had to adapt his leadership goals and methods to achieve his goal of collective survival to suit the structures of captivity. Newton did have the advantage of being in charge of a small static formal group and he was a Captain. His junior rank may have meant that he did not have an ingrained sense of duty to regulatory procedures. In contrast Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan refused to compromise the integrity of military regulations. For him, captivity did not diminish or even slightly change military protocol or regulations. Instead, captivity was a new military setting, similar to a training camp. Therefore, he saw no need to change his traditional authoritarian leadership style and maintained military regulations, including officer privileges, discipline and Court Martials, and imprisonment for those men who breached his orders. His early victory with Malaya Command against the Japanese Commandant during the Serlang Barrack Square Incident in Changi affirmed, in Galleghan's mind, that traditional authoritarian leadership was the only response necessary to captivity.

Galleghan's refusal to adapt his leadership style to the reality of his POW status meant that, with the exception of some of the favoured officers and men from his own 2/30th Battalion, Galleghan never acquired leadership legitimacy behind the wire. His formal group, Changi's prisoner population, was disturbed at his inability to adapt his leadership style, even when conditions in Changi deteriorated. For the duration of his time as a POW leader Galleghan faced opposition from his formal group. Men subversively then openly questioned his orders. When the men from H and F Working Forces returned to Changi barely alive, many men who had previously put up with

Galleghan's authoritarian leadership style, now refused to humour him. Their sole concern at this point was not Galleghan's perception of his leadership authority, but their own survival. Irrespective of the acute needs of his men, Galleghan, refused to adapt his leadership style. Even when the Japanese forcibly separated Galleghan from his formal group, he still tried to control the Australians, something he had not been able to achieve when he was in the same compound.

In contrast to Newton, Galleghan did have a more difficult formal group. It was a considerably larger and dynamic group, with men who were coming in and out of his charge. Yet, Galleghan's uncompromising traditional authoritarian leadership style reveals a leader who failed to acknowledge the reality of his status as a POW and the risks confronting his men. Unlike Newton, who adapted his leadership goal to suit the challenges of his captive settings, Galleghan refused to acknowledge that anything had changed. Followership, therefore, was not a priority for Galleghan. His rank was enough, in his eyes, to retain his position as a legitimate leader, regardless of what his men thought.

British Squadron Leader Roger Bushell was an emergent leader who also used an authoritarian leadership style. In the relatively stable setting of air force officer camps in Germany, Bushell based his leadership status on a scheme for a mass escape. This leadership goal resonated with the men of Stalag Luft III North Compound who, bored with life behind wire, wanted to be part of something that might also allow them a slim chance of regaining their freedom. The desire of these men to be part of a scheme which would fill their days with a genuine purpose, combined with Bushell's past escape record which had elevated him to the status of hero, allowed him to use an authoritarian leadership style.

Bushell's leadership reveals that in relatively stable captive settings, if a prisoner had a special skill and his scheme offered the formal group a distraction, men would not only listen to him, but were willing to follow his orders. Bushell's past success allowed him to acquire leadership legitimacy, and the scope of his plan allowed his followership to be maintained throughout the two years of preparations. For the men who believed in his cause, rank was irrelevant to his status as a legitimate leader and his acquirement of followership, two of the major characteristics of an emergent leader.

Bushell's authoritarian leadership, however, must be understood in its proper context. His authoritarian leadership style, even his leadership goal, would never have been accepted without the achievements of Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day who introduced intelligence and escape work into British/Commonwealth air force camps in Germany and its occupied territories. Bushell used Day's escape network system and the prisoners' acceptance of Day's transformational leadership (see below) to launch and sustain enthusiasm for his escape scheme. Bushell himself recognised the limits to his leadership legitimacy. He realised that as an emergent leader, he did not exercise absolute power over his men. Day, along with SBO Group Captain Herbert Massey, who were his superior officers, were the only two prisoners who could reason with and over-ride Bushell. The inclusion of a ballot in selecting second tiered escapers, instead of allowing Bushell to select those who should be given the opportunity to escape as he had wanted, provides evidence of Day and Massey's ability to place limitations on Bushell's authoritarian planning of the Great Escape.

Authoritarian leadership in captivity, therefore, only worked if the formal group recognised and accepted that their leader's goal was genuine. For this to happen, the leader had to acknowledge the reality of his captive status and adapt his leadership goal to suit the circumstances. If this failed to happen, as it did with Galleghan, the leader failed to gain leadership legitimacy and was considered a hindrance, not a help, to the formal group's collective purpose.

Of all the different types of leaders examined in this thesis it is Day that best fulfils the requirements of James Burns' model of a transformational leader.[191] Day's organisation of intelligence and escape activities in air force officer camps in Germany and its occupied territories, combined with his participation in these schemes, inspired not only his men, but prisoners in other camps to reconsider their status as prisoners. The relatively stable captive settings of the Stalag Luft camps, combined with Day's gregarious personality and his utmost belief in, and dedication to, his cause allowed Day to empower passive prisoners by convincing them that they were still active

[191] Burns, 'Leadership and Followership,' pp.221-226; Daft, *The Leadership Experience*, pp.147-149.

servicemen, even behind the wire (a belief Galleghan shared but failed to translate into an effective policy behind the wire).

Day began this quest for personal reasons. He found life as a POW intolerable and, captured two weeks into the war, felt like a failure. In Dulag Luft, Day coped with these feelings by secretly laying the foundation for what would become an escape organisation. Over a period of almost 12 months, Day became consumed by his task. Yet, he kept it secret from most of the men in the camp. Not knowing the reasons for his apparent cordial relations with his captors, to most men Day's actions looked like those of a collaborator. In hindsight Day realised his mistake and at Stalag Luft I went about rectifying it by transforming his escape organisation into a transparent operation. In this way he regained the trust of his formal group and acquired leadership legitimacy.

The extent to which Day's leadership goal became shared by not only his, but also other formal groups, provides insight into the extent to which prisoners, inspired by his leadership goal, changed their perception of their status as a POW. Day's personality had a lot to do with this. In contrast to Bushell, Day was a charmer, able to put both officers and men of any nationality, including the enemy, at ease. The ability of Day to win over so many different men to his cause, despite his shaky start, is evidence of his integrity, an essential prerequisite for any legitimate leader in captivity.

The relative stable captive conditions in Europe, in comparison to the volatile and extreme captive settings in the Pacific, meant that some leadership styles were particular to one theatre. The relative stable captive conditions of Air Force NCO compounds, combined with the absence of a hierarchical authority amongst these captives, meant that democratic leadership, the antithesis of military hierarchal authority, became the predominant style of two successful air force NCO leaders. In the Pacific, the volatile and extreme settings meant that professional and emergent leadership were forced to adopt a self-sacrificial leadership style to achieve their leadership goals of collective survive.

Scottish Air Force NCO Sergeant James "Dixie" Deans and Australian Warrant Officer Alistair McGregor Currie both adopted a democratic leadership style. It is

important to understand that these men did not choose this leadership style on their own initiative. Instead both men understood that it accurately reflected their leadership status authority. Air force NCOs did not have a hierarchical rank system. The absence of a hierarchical culture, combined with the practice of electing their leaders, meant that these groups would not consent to their leader adopting an authoritarian style, an attitude reinforced by the fact that the NCOs were housed in their own compound.

In their respective POW camps, Deans and Currie managed to find the right balance between including their formal group members in their decision making process while also acting as a leader. It is no coincidence that in the performance of this task both men adopted a similar leadership model based on different layers of collective, barrack and national consultation. Through these consultative layers Deans and Currie were aware of the different opinions, interests and perspectives of their formal group members. This knowledge empowered them to deal swiftly with any complaints or suspicions before any rumours threatened their leadership authority and legitimacy.

In and of itself, however, a consultative leadership model alone was not enough to secure leadership legitimacy. Deans and Currie also had to transfer some of their authority to another important leadership structure in their camps; the escape committee. Both leaders carefully used escape and, Deans also used intelligence work, in a controlled manner to contain the increasing levels of boredom and frustration amongst their formal group members. By allowing this careful transfer of power, Deans and Currie gained a significant amount of goodwill from their formal groups. In this way, combined with their consultative leadership style, Deans and Currie retained leadership legitimacy and gained followership from their respective formal groups. This trust was retained on the open road during the forced marches.

As noted above, in the volatile and extreme captive settings of the Pacific examined in this thesis, it took a special leader to gain and retain leadership legitimacy and followership, the self-sacrificial leader. The nature of these captive settings meant that a POW leader had to continuously take personal risks to advocate his formal group's basic needs to the captor. Of the leaders examined in this thesis only two positional leaders were able to meet these challenges; Newton and Warrant Officer John William Kinder. As a positional leader of U Battalion D Force in Thailand, Newton's ability to

accept personal risks on behalf of his men for the sake of collective survival was remarkable. On the Borneo death marches, Kinder accepted this risk, despite understanding that he would die.

Kinder engaged in continuous haggling with the Japanese Lieutenant in charge of his marching group in an attempt to offer some protection to his sickest men. The acute levels of illness, starvation and exhaustion amongst his group, combined with the threat of the execution squads waiting to kill any prisoner who fell behind, meant that Kinder, despite adopting a self-sacrificial style, was never going to succeed. In time Kinder must have realised this. Yet despite this knowledge, he never gave up trying to offer some advantage or assistance to his men against the cruelty of the captor. Kinder used his words, his body and labour to aid his men. His persistent efforts and refusal to compromise his positional duties for the sake of easing his own suffering, even when he himself was dying, meant that his original marching group, and then his expanded formal group at Paginatan and Ranau, acknowledged him as their legitimate leader. In this most extreme captive setting, Kinder's loyalty, humanity and dignity won the admiration and loyalty of exhausted, violated and heartbroken men.

On the Burma-Thailand Railway, professional leaders filled in the void when positional leaders were unwilling or unable to protect and lead their formal groups. This thesis has defined professional leaders as prisoners who were able to offer particular skills to help formal groups physically and/or psychologically within the context of their captive setting. To be acknowledged as a leader, a prisoner had to regularly offer these skills as part of his leadership goal and the formal group had to see their relevance to a leadership goal of collective survivorship. These prerequisites meant that, for the most part, professional leaders were MOs. Some practicing/acting chaplains also fulfilled these requirements.

The most iconic Australian self-sacrificial POW leaders on the Burma-Thailand Railway are the MOs. Although they all shared a sense of professional duty to use their medical skills to treat the sick and injured, they also differed in their motives, methods and success rate in protecting patients and sick, weak prisoners in their formal groups. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ernest Dunlop's choice to protect his men was largely fuelled by hatred and contempt for his captive's behaviour towards his patients. Major

Kevin James Fagan's motives were more akin to those of a MO willing to put his body between sick men and the demands of the captor because it was the right thing to do. Major Bruce Atlee Hunt's behaviour was more complex. He firmly believed that his experience as an army MO in the First World War and inter-war years meant that by virtue of his experience, his word demanded respect, not only from his men but also from the Japanese.

Despite the different motives for their behaviour, all three MOs adopted a self-sacrificial style in attempt to gain any concession they could from the captor for their patients and sick men assigned to working parties. In performing this task, all three were regularly beaten. They each had some success and all experienced failure. Yet despite the poor odds and the personal risk, Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt refused to give an inch. For their resilience and genuine attempts to protect the most vulnerable men, all three MOs were acknowledged by their formal groups as leaders. Men within their formal groups trusted Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt unconditionally to do the right thing by of all the men. For this their leadership legitimacy evolved into fierce followership.

Unlike the MOs, chaplains could not offer a skill that eased physical pain. Instead, for those who chose to listen and respect their words, chaplains offered a message of hope and compassion, alongside a chance to participate in religious services that brought comfort to some POWs. These actions alone were not enough for chaplains to be acknowledged as leaders. Something more beyond symbolism and words were necessary. The two chaplains on the Burma-Thailand examined in this thesis, in different ways, practiced a self-sacrificial leadership style. Major Lionel Thomas Marsden and Private Harry Thorpe acted above and beyond their professional duties and became recognised by some men within their formal groups as leaders. By assisting their MOs, particularly in the cholera lines, both men chose to put the needs of sick and dying men above their own. Here they offered comfort to the dying, last rites where appropriate and ensured that the dead were buried with dignity and the rituals associated with their beliefs. These acts also provided comfort for those struggling to live, particularly those with mates in the cholera lines. These men were reassured that because of Marsden and Thorpe, their mates did not die alone.

Marsden and Thorpe often undervalued their contribution to their respective formal groups. However, the writings and recollections of survivors of H Force and U Battalion D Force show that their presence, teachings and choices were critical in enabling some Australian POWs to cope with the heartache, forced labour and violence of this captive setting. The classification of these men as leaders reveals that self-sacrificial leadership did not have to be practiced against the captor in order to gain followership. It was enough that they risked their lives by treating the living and the dying gently and with dignity.

The example of self-sacrificial professional leaders inspired some positional working party leaders to adopt the same style. These men understood that, on the construction site, sick prisoners were at their most vulnerable and, in this setting, working party leaders were responsible for stepping between the sick prisoner and the captor. This thesis has demonstrated that men of different ranks and men in acting ranks assumed this role. Each working party leader who adopted this style had a favourite tactic, learning by trial and error what particular schemes best helped protect their sickest men and which tactics led to reprisals for not only the prisoner they were attempting to save, but also for themselves and the rest of their group. The legitimacy of working party leaders was only acquired once the men understood that their ranking officer, NCO or the man acting in these ranks, would be persistent in their efforts to try and protect them. One sole act of self-sacrifice, while undoubtedly courageous, was not enough to be a leader.

When working party leaders failed to protect their men, or chose not to, emergent leaders from amongst the group could take their place. These men made a conscientious choice to protect the vulnerable members of their working parties, knowing that it would mean doing extra work and, most likely, a bashing. The men who continually adopted this self-sacrificial behaviour were acknowledged by their group as their leader. The more influential emergent leaders shaped the behavioural code of their group, emphasising collectivism rather than individual survival.

All of the self-sacrificial leaders mentioned so far had time to understand their captive conditions and choose to adopt a self-sacrificial leadership style, fully aware of the potential consequences. Corporal Rodney Edward Breavington was different. Without

warning, Breavington found himself facing execution with three other POWs for his failed escape attempt from Malaya that had taken place four months earlier. Breavington's decision to adopt a self-sacrificial leadership style, more than any other leader examined in this thesis, was instinctive. After he failed in his attempts to convince the Japanese that he alone should be executed, Breavington showed his fellow condemned how to die with courage and dignity, not as POWs, but as soldiers. The reasons for his choice can never be known. However, his story is an example of an exception to the observation that one sole act of courage was not enough to make a leader. In this immediate extreme setting, with little time left to live, Breavington's behaviour demonstrates that some acts of leadership were so selfless, brave and powerful that they demanded instant followership.

Of all the leadership styles examined in this thesis, a self-sacrificial leadership style was practiced by the three different types of leaders in captivity in the Pacific; positional, professional and emergent. This reflects the nature of this leadership style; self-sacrificial actions are not innately tied to positional or professional obligations but are the result of a moral choice by individuals to put the interests and wellbeing of others above their own. Adopting and maintaining this leadership style was a choice based on the assumption that collective survival, compassion and dignity were more important than personal survivorship.

For Australian POWs in the Second World War, it was rare for positional leadership structures to collapse. In the case studies used for this thesis, it only happened in volatile and extreme conditions found in the Pacific. Yet even then, the reversion of positional leaders from their responsibilities was abhorrent to the men under their command. Australians expected their officers to protect them against the excesses of the captor, even when it meant they would get hurt or all hope of collective survivorship was lost.

The men of Australian Battalion H Force judged Lieutenant Colonel Frank Rowland Oakes to be a failed leader. On most occasions Oakes choose to put his own survivorship above the collective interests of his formal group in Thailand. On some occasions, he did try to help his men but the men considered this to be an exception to his normal response in the volatile conditions on the Railway. Men's writings and

recollections largely recall how Oakes backed down from protesting to the captor on behalf of his formal group when he was threatened with, or received, a bashing. For this choice, Oakes' formal group were unforgiving. The contrasting self-sacrificial behaviour of Fagan in the same camp affirmed in the minds of most the men that Oakes was only concerned with his own survival and not that of his formal group. Even during the death marches on Borneo, Australian POWs expected their positional leaders to fulfil their duties. The work of Kinder demonstrates that this expectation was not unrealistic. For their contrasting choices, the men judged Captain George Robin Cook and Warrant Officer William Hector Sticpewich as traitors. For the sake of their own protection, Cook and Sticpewich turned their backs on their positional responsibilities. Sticpewich, in particular, manipulated the situation to ensure maximum protection for himself against the harshest work demanded of the sickest POWs and the inhumane cruelty experienced by dying men at the hands of the Japanese at Ranau. For this, the five survivors never forgave him.

At Ranau Captain Roderick Lionel Jeffrey's betrayal cut even deeper. As an MO, Jeffrey had the ability and skill to make sick and dying POWs as comfortable as possible with the limited supplies he had. Jeffrey, therefore, had the ability to give the men some dignity before they died. Instead, for the slim hope that he himself would be spared, Jeffrey turned his back on his professional and moral duties to his patients and treated the Japanese first. The anger the men felt towards this betrayal reveals that the Australian POWs firmly believed that Jeffrey's professional and moral obligations as a doctor had not been lessened because of the extreme captive setting. If anything, it meant that Jeffrey should have tried his utmost to help them.

Formal groups were the secondary social structure in the prisoners' daily lives. Informal groups, based on friendships and shared experiences, were where the majority of the day-to-day interactions occurred within captivity. At the beginning of captivity, these groups consisted of the men who had trained and fought together and had then been captured together. They knew each other well and felt comfortable in each other's company. In captivity, these men helped each other adapt to their new life as a POW. In relative stable captive settings, across both theatres of war, usually the most charismatic group members who were able to cope with their captive status assumed

the roles of group leaders by modelling coping strategies. These strategies included the use of humour, irony and daily routines to induce a sense of normalcy.

In time, as conditions deteriorated and Australians were transferred to volatile captive settings, leadership structures within informal groups became more fluid. Informal group members shared leadership responsibilities with the more physically able group members assisting weaker group members cope with the demands of forced movement and labour. They also collected, bartered or stole food for their group members and then distributed it fairly amongst their group. This responsibility continued even when some group members refused to help themselves. In these circumstances, such as on the Burma-Thailand Railway, the more physically able group members did all they could to force apathetic, sick and weak men to survive.

Informal group structures on the forced marches in Europe could afford to be more flexible than those on the Burma-Thailand Railway. The recollections and writings of Australians examined in this thesis reveal that group members relied on the most innovative and physically able members to look for extra food and devise new ways of easing the burden of carrying their goods, by making sleds or carts. In this volatile captive setting, the recollections of Australian POWs and POW from other nationalities who observed their behaviour on the march, reveals that even outside of the wire, Australians informal groups maintained democratic structures both initially and in their revised groups when members dropped out of the marching column because of illness or exhaustion.

For Australian POWs, democratic informal group leadership structures, therefore, existed across both theatres of captivity. Irrespective of the captive setting, the purpose of this leadership style was the collective survivorship of all group members. In Borneo, however, this was to be severely tested.

During the death marches to Ranau, the collective spirit of informal groups was tested in the most extreme circumstances. Due to the high death rate, new informal groups were constantly formed from those who were still alive at Paginatan and then at Ranau. The recollections and testimony of the six surviving prisoners revealed that, even in these horrific circumstances, the men tried to maintain democratic structures, with the

strongest trying to help and protect the weakest, and that the POWs who were still alive maintained a collective mentality based on group survivorship. However, when it became clear that the Japanese intended that none of the prisoners were meant to survive, escape became a survival option for some informal groups.

Pairs of mates or smaller informal groups tried to escape together. It is not known how many men attempted to escape, but sources record four informal group attempts at escape. None survived in their entirety. Gunners Walter Crease and Albert Cleary, for example, were both killed in their attempts to escape. Sticpewich survived but his companion, Private Algie Reither, did not. Three survivors did come from one informal group; Lance Bombardier William Moxham, Privates Keith Botterill and Nelson Short. This group still lost one man, Driver Andrew Anderson, to illness. The significance of three of the six survivors from this captive setting coming from one informal group is important. These men were able to survive because they motivated each other with the will to live and physically helped each other. However, in this extreme setting, their informal group was not the most important reason for their survival. These men, who were not in the final stages of malaria, by sheer luck, managed to avoid Japanese patrols and found friendly natives who helped them. In such dire circumstances, these events proved more important than collective group structures for their survival.

It is clear from the thesis that similarities existed across the leadership structures of Australia POWs in the Pacific and European Theatres of the Second World War. The structure of group dynamics in both formal and informal groups, and the leadership styles applied by positional leaders were similar, although leadership styles were usually applied for different purposes. For example, in the Pacific Galleghan used an authoritarian leadership style to control his men by applying traditional military regulations, while Newton used authoritarian control to maintain a sense of collective identity which allowed his group to cope with, and survive, the volatile conditions in Thailand. In Europe Bushell applied this style to recruit POWs to an escape project. This example demonstrates the importance of captive conditions in leaders selecting and applying their leadership style, while also choosing their leadership goal and the willingness of their group members to accept these choices.

The difference between relative stable captive conditions in Europe and volatile and extreme captive settings in the Pacific meant that some leadership styles were particular to one theatre. For example, positional group leaders only practiced a democratic leadership style in Europe, while professional leaders adopted a self-sacrificial leadership style in the Pacific, usually when their positional group leader had proved inept at protecting the men or chose not to place themselves at risk for their sake of collective survivorship.

Despite the contextual differences across the European and Pacific Theatres of war, the ultimate test of a leader's style was the group's response to his behavior and decisions. The men's perception of a leader's motives, interest in and concern for his men's welfare impacted on their willingness to accept their leader's status and afford him leadership legitimacy and followership. To pass this test, leaders, regardless of their type, had to be considered genuine in their motives, understand the reality of their weakened power as a POW and be willing to repeatedly defy the power imbalance between themselves and the captor, even when this meant personal harm, to secure the best possible conditions and concessions for their men. Rank, medical qualifications and/or courage, therefore, was not enough to be accorded the status of a leader in captivity.

Some leaders, such as Newton, Deans and Day, relished these tasks. Others like Kinder, Dunlop, Fagan, Hunt, Marsden, Thorpe and Breavington, persevered despite their fear and often anger. Cook, Sticpewich, Jeffreys and Oakes, to different degrees, according to their men, failed in these tasks. With the exception of Galleghan, these ranking officers and NCO along with one MO, choose to put their own survivorship above the needs of their formal group. For this choice, their men refused to acknowledge them as leaders in captivity. Galleghan's leadership choices were different to the other failed leaders. His men, while grudgingly accepting his authority, even as conditions deteriorated within Changi, refused to adapt his leadership style to the realities of the new captive setting. For his rigid application of regulatory military discipline, he failed to gain leadership legitimacy and therefore followership. Like the other failed leaders, his men did not trust that he would put their interests above his perceptions of his authority.

The inconsistencies of formal group leadership meant that, across both theatres and captive conditions, informal groups not only existed, but also provided an important alternative leadership structure when conditions required it. Mates helped each other persevere and survive. For some Australians in volatile and in particular, extreme captive settings, informal groups became the only leadership structure left. In these settings, despite the overwhelming fear and innate survivalist instinct of each man left alive, informal groups remained intact and were, therefore, valued by the men.

This thesis has explored one aspect of the captive experience of Australians during the Second World War across both theatres of war – leadership. Yet, as noted in the Introduction, it is only one aspect of the research linking the captive experience of POWs that is needed when it comes to exploring the possibilities raised by Bob Moore, Kent Fedorowich, Gerhard Hirschfeld, Peter Romijn, Pieter Lagrou and Hank Nelson in their call for further studies that incorporate both theatres of war in their analysis. Two areas that this research has raised are whether any Australian national characteristics influenced leader or follower behaviour and the captors' views of Australian and Allied leaders.

The belief that nationality impacted on leadership style is a complex phenomenon. The nature of the captive setting, the personality of the leader, his group goal and perception of duty, all contributed to a leader's ability to fulfil the quintessential qualities of the Australian soldier as explored in works by Jane Ross and John Laffin.[192] And it is clear from the writings and recollections of Australian POWs in the Pacific that the POWs believed that a positional, professional or emergent leader's nationality could make a difference to the way they lead their men. Russell Braddon, Raymond Parkin, Tom Uren and Edward Ernest Dunlop, for example, stress in their writings the unique characteristics of the resilient Australian who, with an understanding of mateship, adopted a leadership style which aimed to protect all group members from further harm. In contrast, positional leaders such as Cook and Oates, who chose to protect themselves, failed not just as leaders but also as Australians in the eyes of their men.

[192]J. Laffin, *Digger: The Legend of the Australian Soldier*, Second Edition, (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1986); J. Ross, *The Myth of the Digger: The Australian Soldier in Two World Wars*, (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1985).

Studies by POW historians in both the Pacific and European theatres have noted the importance and pride Australian prisoners took in being different to POWs of other nationalities.

In his study of Australian POWs held captive on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Nelson argues that a unique national character enabled Australian informal groups to cope better with the volatile conditions of imprisonment than other informal groups compromised of different nationalities, in particular the British and the Dutch. The ability of Australian POWs to risk their survivorship in order to look after each other is also noted by Daws, who contrasts the behaviour of American, British and Dutch POWs in Thailand to that of Australians. Header's analysis of MOs' behaviour in Thailand reflects the selfless characteristics assumed by some Australian informal groups. These findings are echoed in the examination of the behaviour of Dunlop, Hunt and Fagan to their formal groups in this thesis. In contrast to these studies, Beaumont's study of the relationship between rank privilege and survivorship in Thailand and Ambon argues that in and of itself, Australian nationality did not necessarily equate with a selfless style of leadership for the sake of collective survival. This was clearly the case with Cook and Oates.

Mackenzie describes how Australian POWs in Stalag VIIIC at Hohenfels questioned the British MOC's leadership decisions, insisting that blind loyalty to rank was not an Australian characteristic, instead the leader had to prove himself worthy of their trust.[193] At the same camp, Monteath describes a prominent Australian identity emerging amongst the large contingent of Australian POWs. This identity was based on 'a combination of mateship and dedicated self-reliance'[194] which the Australians considered to be unique to their national character. On the forced marches in Germany, British POWs Edward Chapman, D. Hustler and Ronald Buckingham also observed Australian informal groups displaying ingenuity to look after their group members in this volatile setting.

[193] Mackenzie, *The Colditz Myth*, p.131.
[194] Monteath, *P.O.W.*, p.180.

It is clear from this overview and the findings in this thesis that the exact relationship between Australian national characteristics, leadership type, style and followership is, as noted earlier, complex. Further analysis of the link between perceived Australian national character, the different types of leadership and followership is, therefore, an area of POW studies worthy of further study.

The second area for further research offered by this thesis is that of an opposing perspective; how the captor viewed POW leaders. In both the European and Pacific theatres of war, POW positional leaders had to maintain a relationship with the captor for them to retain the leadership legitimacy of their formal group. The different ways POW leaders sought to initiate and then maintain their leadership position with their captor has been an integral part of this study and it is clear that men like Newton, Day and Deans, over time and through trial and error, established a relationship with their captor that helped define their leadership style and achieve leadership legitimacy and followership amongst their respective formal groups. And although the primary focus of this study has been the captives' side of the story rather than the captors', it has offered glimpses into how the captors saw their prisoners. We know, for example, that Commandant Rumpel at Dulag Luft saw his prisoners as fellow officers and ran a benign camp, partly in the hope that a relaxed atmosphere would lead to slips on the part of the prisoners that would provide intelligence. The commandants at Stalag VIIIB, however, ran a far harsher regime in an attempt to control one of the largest other rank POW camps in occupied Germany. The Japanese view of their prisoners is far easier to characterise – it was universally harsh, Sandakan being an extreme, but telling, example. Yet, even within a culture that saw POWs as men without honour, respect by a captor for a captive could emerge as was clearly evident in 'Tiger' Hiramatusu's relationship with Newton and, to a lesser extent, Kinder's relationship with Shinichi.

Other historians have also offered some insights into the captor's views on their prisoners, notably Nelson, Mackenzie, Cunningham, Hearder, Gilbert and Beaumont. Yet, this is an aspect of the POW history across both theatres in the Second World War that needs further examination.

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86/232	K. Heyes
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