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Kemp Smith's account of Kant's transcendental deduction

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KEMP SMITH'S ACCOUNT OF KANT'S
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
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LINDSAY K. PORTER, B.A. Hons.
ABSTRACT

I have found it necessary to provide as a background to my critique of Kemp Smith's commentary to Kant's transcendental deduction a statement of my own views on the deduction. This statement amounts largely to a catalogue of what to me are obscurities in the argument. There is a detailed examination of A98-112, in the course of which the largely parallel argument of B129-43 is also examined. Some topics dealt with are the senses in which Kant uses 'synthesis' and 'unity', the paragraph at A104-5, the doctrine that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception, the arguments for the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception, and the argument in §20 to show that it follows from this principle that the categories relate to all objects. Brief discussions of the second half of the first edition deduction and the second half of the second edition deduction are given. My discussion of Kemp Smith's views on the deduction starts with a discussion of his views on the roles of the objective and subjective deductions. Then his paraphrases of the first and second edition deductions are discussed. Lastly his view that two conflicting doctrines - phenomenalism and subjectivism - are to be found in the deduction and his views on the relation between phenomenalism and the analysis of the concept of consciousness are criticised.
PREFACE

Norman Kemp Smith's prose sounds wonderfully portentous. On reading the preface to his A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' the student could well feel that he is about to be initiated into matters of the most profound importance. "The Critique of Pure Reason is a philosophical classic that marks a turning point in the history of philosophy" he tells us (as do so many other Kant commentators in their prefaces). The reader is led to think that the book he has before him will be an indispensable guide in grasping Kant's doctrines, because he is given the impression that the Critique of Pure Reason cannot be understood unless one has a huge amount of background knowledge of the circumstances in which it was written, and that Kemp Smith has brought his knowledge of this to bear in writing his commentary.

The student's hopes are further raised by the fact that quite a number of contemporary writers on Kant, such as Robert Paul Wolff, Jonathon Bennett and J.N. Findlay, and teachers of philosophy, have considerable praise for Kemp Smith's work on Kant.

However, when the student proceeds into Kemp Smith's nitty-gritty chapters he is bitterly disappointed to find them horribly obscure. I have some doubts as to whether anybody ever has bothered to get to understand the book, because (as I believe is clear from what I say in the body of this thesis) it seems impossible that its reputation could have survived this.

It is true that H.J. Paton has given us a masterly demolition of Kemp Smith's patchwork theory. However Paton seems to have had better things to do with his time than to spend it untangling Kemp Smith's actual account of the plot of the transcendental deduction. It is this task which I have undertaken in this thesis.
The thesis begins with an enormous chapter in which I give my views on the transcendental deduction. My main motives for the provision of this chapter are these: Firstly I think that an understanding of my views on some parts of the deduction is necessary for an understanding of some of my criticisms of Kemp Smith's interpretations. Secondly, I cannot give plausible interpretations of many crucial aspects of the transcendental deduction and I wanted to state what I see as obstacles to doing this in detail. One of my main criticisms of Kemp Smith is that he glibly makes out that something is clear when it is fraught with difficulties.

In this first chapter I have on a number of crucial points in the transcendental deduction discussed Paton's views, in order to show that the interpretations of this man, who I have some reason to believe is the most thorough and honest of Kant commentators, are open to serious objections. In some cases they are downright silly and grotesquely half-baked. He is too much possessed by missionary zeal, and his discussion of almost every passage from Kant has a happy ending in which the correctness and profundity of Kantian doctrines is triumphantly asserted (or at least said to be highly likely). Even the more plausible of Paton's interpretations are implausible if one assumes that Kant was a great philosopher, and this assumption is one of the very few tenets about Kant which virtually all people who deal with Kant have in common.

A.C. Ewing says that early in his career he adhered to Kemp Smith's views on Kant, but that with the publication of Paton's views he became converted to them. However in his Short Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason he tries to shed some sunshine in the world by saying that there is much of value in Kemp Smith's views.
One thing which I don't mention in my account of the transcendental deduction is which bits of the transcendental deduction are the objective deduction and which bits are the subjective deduction. I am unable to answer this question. My remarks about the objective and subjective deductions are all based on Kant's assertions about them in the first edition preface to the *Critique*.

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I will start my account of the first edition deduction at the place where the argument starts - at the beginning of the passage entitled 'The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition'. This passage is the first of the four passages into which all but the introductory passages of Section 2 of the first edition deduction is divided, and in which Kant at A98 and A115 says that he will deal separately and singly with questions with which he will deal in systematic interconnection in Section 3. I will show that it is false that Section 3 contains an interconnected exposition of material presented in Section 2. Kemp Smith's account of the transcendental deduction commits him to agree with me on this point.

Kant at the start of the section entitled 'The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition' says that all our representations must, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. He says it follows from this that they are subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense, and in it must be ordered, connected and brought into relation. He says that this is a fundamental presupposition of everything that follows.

Here are some hypotheses as to why Kant says this which are perhaps prima facie passable:

(a) The notion of synthesis plays a large role in the deduction. I am going to argue that synthesis is putting representations which initially occurred separately before the mind together. This is something that takes place in time. Therefore if our representations were not in time there would be no synthesis of them. Therefore all the premisses in the deduction which concern synthesis would be false.

(b) Kant holds that representations being in time entails that they cannot resemble things in themselves and hence that we cannot know what the nature of things in themselves is. Kant holds that it is a fundamental presupposition of the transcendental deduction that the things of which we are aware are not things in themselves, but appearances.1

1. A114.
(c) Kant may suppose that if representations were not in time it would be unnecessary to synthesise them to have them before the mind together.\(^1\) This is perhaps suggested by Kant's remark that in time representations must be ordered, connected and brought into relation.

Kemp Smith's view as to why Kant says that a fundamental presupposition of the transcendental deduction is that all representations are in time is different from the hypotheses I have given. I will argue against Kemp Smith's view below.\(^2\)

In the next paragraph Kant says that every intuition contains in itself a manifold. On many occasions Kant speaks of the manifold contained in an intuition. On some occasions\(^3\) he makes out that the representations in a manifold contained in an intuition are representations of bits of the object pictured by the intuition. However, at B142 it seems that the representations in a manifold contained in an intuition are concepts under which the object pictured by the intuition falls.\(^4\)

Kant says that for the manifold contained in an intuition to be represented as a manifold (which seems to be identified with the manifold being represented as contained in a single representation and with unity of intuition arising out of the manifold) an act of synthesis of apprehension is necessary. Synthesis of apprehension is identified with the act of running through and holding together a manifold.

The most straightforward interpretation of "running through and holding together a manifold" is "putting the manifold into consciousness together". Another interpretation\(^5\) is "conceiving a common feature of the elements of the manifold". However this interpretation is ruled out by the fact that at A78=B104 Kant identifies analysis with the act of bringing different representations under one concept, and Kant certainly does not identify synthesis and analysis.

1. This is Vleeschauwer's explanation of Kant's assertion (La Déduction Transcendental dans l'Oeuvre de Kant pp249-50)
2. pp266-70
3. A102, B137-8, B154, B162, A162-3=B203
A third interpretation\(^1\) of "running through and holding together the manifold" is "coming to hold that all the representations in the manifold are all representations of bits (or perhaps, instead, properties) of some one object". However Kant makes out that unity of intuition is the product of synthesis. I presume that the unity which Kant makes out is the product of synthesis is what he later calls synthetic unity. At B140 he gives as an example of representations between which the empirical unity of apperception holds (I take the empirical unity of apperception to be a subspecies of synthetic unity) the idea of a word and the idea of an object which the word suggests.\(^2\) These two ideas are not ideas of bits or properties of one object.

However, often in the first edition deduction\(^3\), and sometimes in the second edition deduction\(^4\), Kant uses 'unity' to mean what in the second edition\(^5\) he expresses as 'objective unity' — viz. 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or properties, which answer to the representations'.\(^6\)

Also, there is some hope of making sense of Kant's remarks on the synthesis of recognition at A103 if by 'unity' he means this. There is no hope at all of doing this if by 'unity' Kant means simply 'copresence in consciousness'. It seems that when Kant says at A99 that synthesis of apprehension is necessary for there to be unity he must also mean by 'unity' 'objective unity', since it seems that what Kant is arguing at A103 is that synthesis of recognition is necessary for the same goal as that for which synthesis of apprehension is necessary, and that for which he says synthesis of recognition is necessary is unity.

However, although it seems that by 'unity' at A99 Kant does not mean simply 'copresence in consciousness', and he

1. Bennett's interpretation. See Bennett Kant's Analytic pp107-8
2. See below (pp94-7) for a prolonged discussion of this.
3. A105, A106. It seems however that at A121-2 Kant means by 'unity' 'copresence in consciousness simpliciter'.
4. B137, B143.
5. B139-40, B142.
6. This interpretation is very similar to Bennetts.
says that synthesis of apprehension is necessary for unity of intuition, I nevertheless suspect that by 'synthesis' at A99 he means simply 'putting representations into consciousness together', owing to the fact that Kant says that synthesis of apprehension is necessary for a manifold to be presented as a manifold. For this it does not seem to be necessary that co-presence of the manifold in consciousness should be taken to be caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or properties, which answer to the representations. It only seems to be necessary that the representations should be brought into consciousness together. Kant also says that synthesis of apprehension is necessary for a manifold to be represented as contained in a single representation. For this also it is unnecessary that copresence of the manifold in consciousness should be taken to be caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or properties, which answer to the representations, unless 'representation' is being used in a sense which implies veridicality. When I speak of 'representation' being in a sense which implies veridicality I mean its being used in a sense such that if a person has a representation of an object, the object must exist where the person perceives it to be. In the place where Kant gives his catalogue of mental bits and pieces (A320=B376-7) 'representation' is given a definiens which does not imply veridicality. It is given as the genus of which every sort of mental item is a subspecies. Under 'representation' are subsumed both perceptions which relate solely to the subject as a modification of its state and objective perceptions. However I believe that 'representation' is sometimes used in a sense which implies veridicality.¹

I will often have occasion to mention this distinction between a word connected with cognition being taken in a sense which implies veridicality and its being taken in a sense which does not imply veridicality. I will speak of a

¹ e.g. A108-9 (perhaps), A116, B131-2.

For further evidence that Kant means by 'synthesis' the act of putting representations into consciousness together, see below, pp95,119.

I will however surmise that synthesis of recognition amounts to coming to believe that different representations of bits-of-objects or properties are representations of bits or properties of some one real object (see below, p22n1, pp119-21). According to Bennett this is what synthesis simpliciter is.
cognitive term being used in a sense which implies
veridicality as its being used in a got-it sense, and of
a term being used in a sense which does not imply
veridicality as its being used in a non-got-it sense. An
example of the use of a word in a non-got-it sense occurs
in the sentence "I see blossoms but the trees are bare".
I take the expression "got-it" from Ryle's The Concept of
Mind.

A further interpretation of "running through and holding
together a manifold" which one might feel tempted to adopt
is "discovering causal connections between the represent-
atations in the manifold". However this does not seem to be
necessary for a manifold to be represented as a manifold.

Thus I think we are obliged to conclude that by "running
through and holding together a manifold" (and hence by
"synthesis") Kant means "putting representations into
consciousness together".

Why Kant should want to say that to have a complete
picture of an object we must first perceive each of its bits
or properties separately and then piece these perceptions of
bits or properties together to make up a mosaic is one of
the problems which make me want to say that the central
question raised by the Critique is 'How is Immanuel Kant
possible?'.

Note that the definition which Kant gives here of
"synthesis of apprehension" (viz. "the running through and
holding together of a manifold") seems equivalent to the
definitions of "synthesis" simpliciter which Kant gives at
A77=B102-3 (viz. "the going-through-in-a-certain-way, taking
up and connecting of a manifold" and "the act of putting
different representations together, and of grasping what is
manifold in them in one cognition [Erkenntnis]". Thus one
is left wondering why Kant speaks of synthesis of
apprehension. Kant gives as his reason for calling the act
of which he is speaking synthesis of apprehension that it is
1. This is a variation on a remark of Dr. F. Knopfelmacher.
directed immediately upon intuition. An interpretation of what Kant means here is suggested by the very sketchy indications as to what Kant means by "synthesis of reproduction".

The first paragraph of the passage entitled "The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination", as far as I can see, has no relevance to anything Kant says in the deduction apart from an argument at A113 and an argument at A120-2. Neither of these arguments seems relevant to the main theme which is discussed from A98 to A103 — viz. that synthesis of apprehension is necessary for veridical copresence-in-consciousness of representations, synthesis of reproduction is necessary for synthesis of apprehension, and that synthesis of recognition is necessary for veridical copresence-in-consciousness of representations.

The doctrine which Kant asserts in this first paragraph of the passage entitled "The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination" is that for ideas (in Hume's sense) to become associated it is necessary that the impressions (in Hume's sense) of which they are faint copies should be constantly conjoined. Note that Kant fails to consider resemblance as a source of association.

In what seems like a bewildering change of topic, Kant in the next paragraph asserts and supports by examples the proposition that a synthesis of reproduction of the manifold contained in an a priori intuition is necessary for the manifold to be copresent in consciousness, and hence for the a priori intuition to arise in the mind. Kant seems to make out that this is connected with what he was saying in the first paragraph. However, his account of the connection is very cryptic, and since Kemp Smith in his account of the deduction makes hardly any mention of the first paragraph,¹ I will not launch into the reasons for my difficulty in seeing any connection, which are rather rambling.

¹. There is a brief and confused discussion of it on p247 and an equally confused allusion to it on p249.
Kant concludes from his examples to show that a synthesis of reproduction of the manifold contained in an a priori intuition is necessary for the a priori intuition to arise that synthesis of apprehension is "inseparably bound up" with synthesis of apprehension. From Kant's discussion of the example it is clear that reproduction is bringing a representation to mind after it has gone out of mind. Kant nowhere says what synthesis of reproduction is.

However, there comes to mind the following way of fitting together (a) Kant's assertion at A99 that synthesis of apprehension is directed immediately upon intuition, (b) the fact that by 'reproduction' is meant 'bringing to mind again a representation which has gone out of mind' and (c) Kant's statement that the synthesis of apprehension is inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction.

This is to take it that (a) by 'synthesis of reproduction' Kant means 'synthesis which involves reproduction', or perhaps, instead, 'synthesis of representations all of which are reproductions of representations which first occurred earlier' and that (b) by 'synthesis of apprehension' is meant 'synthesis of representations the last of which to occur is, at the time of the completion of the synthesis, not a reproduced image, but (in Hume's terminology) an impression'.

This is a bit far-fetched. However, it would entail that synthesis of reproduction is a necessary condition of synthesis of apprehension. Also, the interpretation of 'synthesis of apprehension' would give an (albeit strained) explanation of why Kant should say that synthesis of apprehension is directed immediately upon intuition. In line with my hypothesis as to what Kant means by 'synthesis of apprehension', I would take him to mean by 'apprehension' 'the having of an impression (in Hume's sense)'. This does not however seem to be borne out by Kant's assertion at B202 that for appearances to be apprehended is for them to be taken up into empirical consciousness. To take it that when Kant says that synthesis of apprehension is directed immediately upon intuition he
means that the last of the representations synthesised to occur is at the time of the completion of the synthesis an impression (in Hume's sense) involves taking it that by 'intuition' here Kant means 'impressions' (in Hume's sense). This is not borne out by Kant's assertion at B151 that imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object which is not itself present.

Thus my interpretation stands on shaky ground. However Paton's and Vleeschauwer's suggestions are not very helpful. Paton seems to take it that when Kant says that synthesis of apprehension is directed immediately upon intuition he means by 'intuition' 'impressions' (in Hume's sense); Paton's word is 'sense impressions'.¹ This is in accordance with what I have said (and, as I mentioned, not borne out by B151). However Paton really offers no interpretation of 'directed immediately upon intuition'.² He does have a suggestion to make on the subject of what synthesis of reproduction is — viz. that synthesis of apprehension and synthesis of reproduction are not two inseparable syntheses, but that the synthesis of apprehension includes reproduction as an element within itself.³ Thus he seems to hold that synthesis of reproduction is identical with synthesis of apprehension. This seems incompatible with the proposition that synthesis of apprehension is directed immediately upon intuition, but synthesis of reproduction is not necessarily directed immediately upon intuition. Kant seems to imply this proposition, and Paton⁴ explicitly asserts it.

Vleeschauwer surmises⁵ that when Kant says that synthesis of apprehension is directed immediately upon intuition he means that apprehension is the first stage after perception; that it is the lowest (i.e. least elaborated) synthesis.

1. Kant's Metaphysic of Experience ¹ p359
3. Ibid ¹ p364.
4. Ibid ¹ p359.
However, reproduction is a necessary element within synthesis of apprehension. Thus one would expect Kant to say that synthesis of reproduction is a necessary element within synthesis of apprehension (Kant often slides between talk of synthesis of reproduction or apprehension and talk of reproduction or apprehension). Also, the proposition that synthesis of apprehension is directed immediately upon intuition, but synthesis of reproduction is not necessarily directed immediately upon intuition (which proposition Kant seems to imply) entails that a synthesis of reproduction is not necessarily a synthesis of apprehension. Thus, contra Vleeschauwer, synthesis of apprehension is not the least elaborated form of synthesis; it involves something that synthesis of reproduction does not.

The third passage in Section 2 of the first edition deduction, that entitled "The Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept", commences thus:

If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. For it would in its present state be a new representation which would not in any way belong to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated. The manifold of the representation would never, therefore, form a whole, since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it.

At A115 Kant identifies recognition with the consciousness of the identity of reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were given. I take it that at A103 "what we think" is an intuition which contains a manifold which has just been synthesised and "what we thought a moment before" is the representations in the manifold contained in the intuition at the time of their debut in consciousness (at that time the representations were impressions, whereas now they are ideas; where Hume speaks of an idea being an
image of an impression, Kant speaks of an idea being identical with an impression 1). I say this because Kant makes out that "what we think" is something that is gradually generated, and it is only the intuition which contains the manifold, and not one of the representations in the manifold that is gradually generated.

The act of gradually generating the intuition which contains the manifold would be the act of synthesising the manifold.

In saying that if we were not conscious that what we think is identical with what we thought a moment before, what we think would not belong to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated, Kant seems to imply that if we were not conscious that what we think is identical with what we thought a moment before, what we think would not have been gradually generated. However, I presume that what he wishes to imply is that what we think would not seem to us to have been gradually generated.

Note that my interpretation of the above-quoted sentences entails that in the phrase "what we thought a moment before" "a moment" is being used to refer to a span of time and not to a single instant. This is because on my interpretation an unsynthesised manifold is thought in that moment, and, by definition, an unsynthesised manifold cannot be thought all in one instant.

I presume that what we think not belonging to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated amounts to our not realising that what we think is the product of the act whereby it was to be gradually generated.

As I mentioned above, 2 I don't think it is possible to make sense of the above-quoted sentences unless we suppose that by "unity" here Kant means what in the second edition deduction at B139-42/means by "objectiveunity" - viz.

1. See Kant's definition of 'recognition' at A115.
2. p 3
"copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which co-
presence was caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-
objects or properties, which answer to the representations."

I presume that Kant's reason for holding that it follows
from what we think not belonging to the act whereby it was to
be gradually generated that unity would not hold between the
representations in the manifold contained in what we think is
as follows: "What we think" is, in Hume's terminology, an
idea, not an impression. Kant would agree with Hume that the
only way to ascertain that an idea (in Hume's sense) of some
particular object is veridical is to discover an impression
from which the idea was derived. (Cf. "It must be some one
impression, that gives rise to every real idea [i.e., I
presume, idea we know to be veridical]" (Treatise Bk. I
Pt. IV S. VI Of Personal identity - Selby Bigge edn. p.251).

Note that this is not the same as the famous principle "That
all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived
from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and
which they exactly represent". (Bk. I Pt. I S. I Of the
origin of our ideas p.4). Hume seems to confuse these two
principles in the chapter on personal identity.)

However, it seems that according to Kant there is no
complex impression from which a complex idea (such as "what
we think") is derived. It seems that Kant holds that a
complex idea is derived from a collection of simple impres-
sions via a process of piecing together the simple impressions
like pieces in a mosaic. Thus Kant holds that only through
knowledge that "what we think" is the product of an act of
gradually synthesising the manifold contained in it can we
know that "what we think" is veridical. For "what we think"
to be veridical (i.e. objective) is for objective unity to
hold between the representations in the manifold contained in
"what we think". Thus Kant holds that only through knowledge
that "what we think" is the product of an act of gradually
synthesising the manifold contained in it can we know that
objective unity holds between the representations in the manifold contained in "what we think". I presume that when Kant says that it would follow from our not having knowledge that "what we think" is the product of an act of gradually synthesising the manifold contained in what we think that there would be no unity (i.e., I presume, objective unity) holding between the representations contained in "what we think", he means that it would follow that we would not know whether there is objective unity holding between the representations contained in "what we think". Here I am ascribing to Kant the same way of speaking as that which I have ascribed to him when he said that without recognition what we think would not belong to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated. (It will be recalled that I here interpreted Kant to be saying that what we think would not seem to belong to (i.e. seem to have been generated by) the act whereby it was to have seemed to have been gradually generated). The way of speaking to which I allude is saying that something would be the case when what you mean is that it would seem to be the case.

Kant goes on to give an example to show that if we did not know that what we think (an intuition of some object) was generated by a gradual synthesis of the representations in the manifold contained in "what we think", then there would be no unity holding between the representations in the manifold. In Kant's example "what we think" is the intuition of some particular number. I take it that what Kant says is that if, after counting the number of objects in a certain class, and thus bringing a certain number of units into consciousness, I forget that the units came into consciousness as a result of the process of counting (it seems that according to Kant counting is the putting of units into consciousness together), then I would not be aware that the number of units which are in my consciousness is identical with the number of objects I wished to count. Hence I would remain ignorant of the number.

1. See above, p10.
It seems that Kant would say that the units which get put into consciousness together are the representations in the manifold contained in our intuition of a number. It seems that he would say that for me to be ignorant of whether there is a class of objects in my vicinity the number of objects in which is identical with the number of units which are in my consciousness (in Kant's words: "which now hover before me") is for me not to know whether objective unity holds between the units which "hover before me".

Kant would say that the intuition of a particular number is an \textit{a priori} intuition. He gives it as an example of an \textit{a priori} intuition, along with the intuition of the time period from one noon to another and the intuition of a line, at A102. The synthesis of recognition of the manifold contained in an \textit{a priori} intuition will be different from that of the manifold contained in an empirical intuition in that the simpler representations which are pieced together to form an \textit{a priori} intuition are not, on the occasion of their debut in consciousness, impressions (in Hume's sense) but \textit{a priori} intuitions, each of which is embodied by an impression. It seems that Kant will not count \textit{a priori} intuition as veridical unless there is a veridical empirical intuition which embodies it.\footnote{See B147.} This would be why he maintains that to ascertain that an \textit{a priori} intuition is veridical (i.e. that objective unity holds between the representations contained in an \textit{a priori} intuition) it is necessary to recall the history of the piecing together of the \textit{a priori} pieces in the \textit{a priori} mosaic. It is difficult to see how an \textit{a priori} intuition could fail to be veridical if it is not necessary for it to be veridical that there should be a veridical empirical intuition which embodies it.

In support of his assertion "If, in counting, I forget that the units, which now hover before me, have been added to one another in succession, I would not be aware of [i.e. would not remember] the production of the total through the
successive addition of unit to unit, and hence we would not be aware of the number" (which assertion I have just been discussing), Kant says "For this concept [i.e., Kemp Smith and I presume, the concept of the number] consists merely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis".

This remark is baffling, at least on the interpretation of 'unity' which I have given. The consciousness of a co-presence-in-consciousness of representations which was caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits of objects or properties seems to be an intuition, not a concept. I would not have been surprised if Kant had said that the intuition (in a got-it sense) of the number is nothing but the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of the units in the number. This is because the intuition (in a got-it sense) of the number of the things we wanted to count would certainly come into existence if and only if the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of the units in the number came into existence.

1. Note that Kemp Smith's translation here "I should never know that a total is being produced through this successive addition of unit to unit" is misleading, since it implies that the total has not yet been produced. The German ("so würde ich nicht die Erzeugung der Menge, durch diese sukzessive Hinzutuung von Einem zu Einem ... erkennen") does not convey this. Kant has said that the units are now hovering before me, and so I presume he would say that a total has been produced out of them, although it is still undetermined whether it is known that there is a collection of objects the total of which is identical with the above total of units which has been produced in our minds. In second edition parlance, while unity simpliciter certainly holds between the units (i.e. they are copresent in consciousness), and we would know it does, it is undetermined whether we would know that objective unity holds between the units.
Kant does sometimes call representations which he really thinks are intuitions concepts. For instance, in the course of the 'Metaphysical Expositions of the Concept of Space' he argues that our 'concept' of space is an intuition. At A105 Kant speaks of the sides of a triangle as predicates of the triangle. One would expect such a confusion between bits and properties to be accompanied by a confusion between intuitions and concepts. Here it seems that he means by 'concept' simply 'representation'. However it seems that this is not the case at A103, since it seems that he is using the word 'concept' strictly at A103. This is because he goes on to say the word 'concept' might of itself suggest that the concept of the number consists merely in the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of the units contained in the intuition of the number. If a person appeals to the etymology of a word, one would expect him to be using the word strictly.

In support of this last assertion of his, Kant says "For this unitary consciousness [i.e. the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of the manifold contained in an intuition] is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation". For this to show why the word 'concept' might of itself suggest the remark "The concept of the number consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis [the unity of the synthesis of the units in the number]", a concept would have to be what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon reproduced, into one representation.

I have taken it that by "the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis" Kant means what in second edition parlance would be expressed by "the consciousness of the objective unity of the synthesis". Hence when Kant says that the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis is what "combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation", it seems that I
must take it that by "combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation" Kant means "brings it about that the manifold successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, is taken to amount to a mental picture of some real object".

Perhaps for the following reason a concept could be said to be what brings it about that the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced is taken to amount to a mental picture of some one real object. What concept we apply to some selection from a collection of bits of objects which we take to be real and which correspond to certain representations determines which of the representations we consider as representations of some one object, since we have no principle of individuation for objects.

I am afraid I have no interpretation which is more promising than this. Paton and Vleeschauwer are not very helpful here.

On p.375 of Volume I of Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Paton makes out that the concept which Kant identifies with the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis is not the concept of the particular number we are counting, but the concept of number in general. This is a rather strained interpretation. Paton says¹ that Kant's reason for saying that the word 'concept' (Begriff) might of itself suggest that the concept of which Kant speaks is the consciousness of the unity of synthesis is that the verb 'begreifen' (to conceive or comprehend) means to grasp together or comprehend. However, not any representation in which different representations are grasped together is a concept. A complex intuition which consists of several intuitions copresent in consciousness (which is the sort of representation which is brought about when it is brought about that unity, as I have understood it, holds between what Kant at A102 and A103 seems to have in mind as representations

¹. Ibid. p276.
contained in an intuition (viz. intuitions of bits of the object represented by the intuition which contains the manifold)) is not a concept.

In his discussion of the passage from A99 to 103 on the three-fold synthesis Paton generally seems to take Kant to mean by 'unity' 'copresence in consciousness' (although even within the short span of his discussion of this passage he on one occasion takes Kant to mean by 'unity' 'necessary and universal conjunctions between impressions' (in Hume's sense of 'impression')). If unity is copresence in consciousness, then it is even more difficult to see how the consciousness of the unity of synthesis can be said to be a concept than if unity is what I have supposed it to be (viz. copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or properties, which answer to the representations). Even my shaky explanation connected with the lack of a principle of individuation for objects would be ruled out.

However, in discussing a number of passages, Paton takes Kant to mean by a 'unity' the set of relations which hold between a collection of representations after they have been put into consciousness together. At A79=B104 Kant makes out that the categories give unity to the synthesis of the manifold and consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity. Paton takes the necessary synthetic unity referred to to be the properties of which the categories are representations. His justification for saying this is that an intuition having the property of which one of the categories is a representation amounts to certain relations holding between the representations contained in the intuition (i.e., on the above interpretation of 'unity', to a certain unity holding between the representations contained in the intuition).

Paton holds that also in the case of some properties of which concepts other than the categories are representations

1. Ibid. p359, pp361-2.
2. p371.
3. Cf. below, p82-3.
an intuition having a property amounts to certain relations holding between the representations contained in the intuition. ¹ This is of course plainly true.

Paton in his discussion of synthesis on p264 says that whenever there is a synthesis of the manifold contained in an intuition, some concept which amounts to a set of relations which hold between the representations in the manifold after the representations have been synthesised is the thing which controls the synthesis so that the finished mosaic comes out with the abovementioned relations holding between the parts. Paton's account of what Kant means when he speaks of a synthesis being in accordance with certain concepts is that Kant means that the concepts were the things which controlled the synthesis. This interpretation has the following unfortunate consequence: It commits Kant to say that a concept, an intuition's falling under which amounts to certain relations holding between the representations contained in the intuition, never arises through being abstracted from an intuition. This is because Kant holds that an intuition which contains a manifold of representations can never arise except through a synthesis. Hence if we take Kant to say that a synthesis of the manifold contained in an intuition is always controlled by certain concepts under which the intuition falls, we commit Kant to say that the existence of the concept is a precondition of the existence of the intuition. Hence the concept could not have been abstracted from the intuition.²

However, although Paton is unwittingly being uncharitable to Kant here, his interpretation of what Kant means when he speaks of a synthesis being in accordance with concepts is given some support by Kant's assertion in §40 of the Critique of Judgement that in cognition the agreement of the imagination and the understanding is regular under the

1. See his remarks about the synthesis of the manifold contained in the intuition of a house ¹ p264. See also ¹ p285, where the examples given are the concepts 'house' and 'ship'.

2. Kant certainly does think that empirical concepts are abstracted from intuitions - see A68=B93.
compulsion of determinate concepts.

From p209 of Kemp Smith's Commentary it seems that Kemp Smith holds Paton's view of what it is for a synthesis to be in accordance with a concept. He there speaks of concepts unifying and directing synthetic activities (on p209 Kemp Smith is speaking of A105-6). However in his comments on A103 on p246 Kemp Smith does not seem to adhere to this view. On p250 Kemp Smith speaks of the categories controlling and directing our interpretation of the given, which does not seem to be what Paton holds it is for a synthesis to be in accordance with the categories.  

The main point I wish to make now is that if we do take Kant to mean by 'a unity' 'a certain collection of relations which hold between representations in a manifold,' (as Paton does in interpreting A79=B104), then there is less difficulty in seeing how the consciousness of the unity of synthesis can be said to be a concept. That Paton does take Kant to be using 'unity' in this sense at A103 is suggested by the fact that in his discussion of this passage he makes out that being conscious of the rule of a synthesis entails being conscious of its unity. (I presume that the rule of the synthesis is the concept which, according to Paton, controls the synthesis; this concept amounts to a set of relations which hold between the representations in the manifold after the manifold has been synthesised).

To take the unity of a synthesis to be some set of relations which hold between the representations in the manifold after they have been synthesised would be incompatible with Kant's assertion that synthesis is a necessary pre-condition of unity arising unless the relations referred to are not universals but property instances. However if the unity of synthesis is a collection of relation-instances,

1. Cf. my comments below, pp274-5.
2. For further remarks on 'in accordance with' see below, p155.
then it seems that the consciousness of the unity of synthesis cannot be identified with a concept.

To accommodate this view that a unity is a collection of relations which hold between representations in a synthesised manifold to Kant’s remarks about the synthesis of recognition, we would have to take it that Kant means by 'a unity' 'a collection of relations which hold between a manifold of representations in a veridical intuition'. Otherwise I can't see why recognition should be necessary for the manifold to have unity.

I believe there is ground for preferring the course of action of (a) taking Kant at A99-103 to be speaking of unity and to be meaning by 'unity' 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property instances, which answer to the representations' to (b) taking Kant at A99-103 to be speaking of particular unities and to mean by 'a unity' 'a particular collection of relation-instances which hold between the representations in a synthesised manifold contained in a veridical intuition'.

I have slightly less qualms about the proposition 'the concept of the number is nothing but the consciousness of this unity of synthesis' on interpretation (b), since the consciousness of a property instance does seem a bit more like a concept than the consciousness of a copresence-in-consciousness of representations contained in an intuition.

However, interpretation (b) does not fit the example of unity which Kant gives at A103. Kant holds that our representation of a number consists of an intuition of as many units as there are in the number. At B15 Kant says that we represent these units to ourselves by means of intuitions of points or intuitions of fingers. If our intuition of the number is to be an a priori intuition I presume that intuitions of fingers cannot be used to represent the units. At A103 Kant makes out that consciousness that unity holds
between the intuitions of the units is necessary for us to know the number. I have argued above\(^1\) that this is quite plausible on interpretation (a) of what 'unity' means (viz. 'copresence in consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property instances, which answer to the representations'), provided that we grant Kant's assumption that our representation of a number is an intuition of a collection of units. However, on interpretation (b) of what 'unity' means (viz. 'the collection of relation-instances which hold between the representations in a synthesised manifold contained in a veridical intuition') it is plainly false that consciousness that any particular unity holds between the units is necessary for us to know the number. For me to be aware e.g. that the number of things I was trying to count was five, it is unnecessary that any particular collection of spatial relations should hold between the units which "hover before me". It doesn't matter whether, for instance, they are arrayed like this

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or like this

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All that is necessary is that the units should be copresent in consciousness and that I should know that for each of the things I was trying to count there is a unit, and for each unit there is one of the things I was trying to count. Thus I believe that interpretation (b) is ruled out as an interpretation of what Kant means by 'unity' at A103.

Vleeschauwer gives no explanation at all of how the consciousness of the unity of synthesis can be said to be a concept.\(^2\)

2. See *La Deduction Transcendental dans l'Oeuvre de Kant* Vol II p266.
Even if I could see how the concept of some particular number could be said to be nothing but the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of the manifold contained in the intuition of the number, it would seem to be a strange way of referring to this state of affairs to say that we had a synthesis of recognition in a concept.

The only sense which I can ascribe to 'synthesis of recognition' is 'synthesis accompanied by recognition of the representations synthesised'.

On both interpretation (a) and interpretation (b) of 'unity' (given above), in showing that synthesis of recognition is necessary for the manifold contained in an intuition to have unity (I have taken it that Kant really means: "is necessary for the manifold contained in an intuition to be known to have unity") Kant would be showing that synthesis of recognition is necessary for knowledge of objects. Kant says at A104 that without consciousness of the unity of synthesis knowledge of objects is impossible.

I take it that it is because he has been discussing certain necessary conditions of knowledge of objects that he says at A104 "At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by 'an object of representations!'". As far as I can see, the ensuing clarification of the concepts of an object, contrary to what Kant seems to imply in saying that 'at this point' we must clarify this concept, contributes nothing to the preceding argument to show apprehension, reproduction and recognition are necessary for knowledge.

The clarification of the concept of an object (which I take it stretches from A104 to A111) I take it amounts to an argument to prove the ultimate conclusion of the Deduction - that the categories relate to all objects of experience. This chain of argument does have a missing link (viz. there is no argument to show that the twelve categories

1. Perhaps however, when Kant uses the expression 'synthesis of recognition' he is referring to the ascription of different properties or bits to one real object. This is of course synthesis in a different sense from 'the putting of different representations into consciousness together'. Perhaps by 'synthesis of recognition' Kant means 'synthesis in the sense which involves recognition'.

2. See above, p.12.
relating to appearance is a necessary condition of the unity of apperception holding between the manifolds contained in the appearance). However this missing link is supplied by no other passage in the first edition deduction.

As far as I can see, the A99-104 argument to show that apprehension, reproduction and recognition are necessary for knowledge of an object contributes nothing to the argument at A104-111, other than to explain what recognition is.

The surprising change of theme at A104 led Vaihinger and Kemp Smith to claim that the passage from A104 to the end of the third subsection of the second section of the first edition deduction (A110) is taken from an early manuscript.

Kant commences his clarification of what we mean by 'an object of representations' by saying that since the only things with which we are ever acquainted are our own representations we can know nothing of objects of representations (since objects of representations are distinct from representations). Hence he concludes that when we think of an object of representations all we think of is something in general = x, since the sum total of our beliefs about an object of representations is that it is something in general.

Next Kant says that an object of representations is viewed as that which prevents our Erkenntnisse from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion. For in so far as they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object.

'Erkenntnisse' is the plural of 'Erkenntnis' ('veridical representation')

1. See below, pp 211-2
2. See below, p149
5. Below I will query Kemp Smith's translation of this sentence (see p26-7)
I will devote quite a few pages\(^1\) to commenting on this sentence, since it is obscure and open to a variety of interpretations, and might be thought to contain some insights vital to the Transcendental Deduction. I will end up arguing\(^2\) that I cannot see that it contributes anything to the Transcendental Deduction.

The most natural interpretation of 'agreement' is that \textit{Erkenntnisse} agreeing with each other is their being such that it is empirically possible for one object to have the properties represented by both \textit{Erkenntnisse} simultaneously. Note that unity in this sense does not entail that the properties of an object are in causal interaction with each other (\textit{contra} Kemp Smith\(^3\)). It is trivial that it is literally true that for \textit{Erkenntnisse} to relate to some one object it is necessary (but not sufficient) that they should agree with each other in the above sense. Kant might be interpreted as saying in the above-quoted sentences that unity in the sense "agreement of \textit{Erkenntnisse} with each other" constitutes the concept of an object. It is false that agreement of \textit{Erkenntnisse} with each other on the above interpretation constitutes the concept of an object. I can quite well picture to myself an object all of whose properties are such that it is empirically possible for an object to have them all, without there being an object answering to my mental picture, and without my taking it that there is an object answering to my mental picture.

It would be even more uncharitable to Kant to take him to mean by 'agreement of \textit{Erkenntnisse} with each other' 'the properties represented by the \textit{Erkenntnisse} being in causal interaction with each other', since the properties represented by a good many of the \textit{Erkenntnisse} which relate to some one object are not in causal interaction with each other.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[1.] pp24-44.
  \item[2.] p44.
  \item[3.] \textit{Commentary} p249.
\end{itemize}
Kant however seems to be committed to say that they are all in causal interaction with each other, since the Third Analogy is the doctrine that the properties of one object are in thoroughgoing causal interaction with the properties of every other object. Since there is no principle of individuation for objects, this doctrine entails that the properties of one object are all in thoroughgoing causal interaction with each other.

Kant's words "For in so far as they [Erkenntnisse] are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object" allow of interpreting him as identifying the unity which constitutes the concept of an object instead of with agreement-of-Erkenntnisse-with-each-other simpliciter\(^1\), with necessary agreement of Erkenntnisse with each other. This interpretation would of course entail that the objection which I above raised to taking it that Kant means by 'agreement of Erkenntnisse with one another' 'its being empirically possible for one object to have the properties represented by the Erkenntnisse simultaneously' - viz. the objection that it is neither sufficient for Erkenntnisse to relate to an object, nor for them to be taken to relate to an object, that it would be empirically possible that an object should have all the properties represented by the Erkenntnisse - is unsound.

When Kant speaks of something being necessary he sometimes means that it is necessitated. For instance at B141-2 Kant uses the expressions 'objective unity of apperception' and 'necessary unity of apperception' interchangeably. Thus it is natural to conclude that he means by 'necessary unity of apperception' 'necessitated unity of apperception', and that what he would wish to convey by the words 'necessitated unity of apperception' is 'unity of apperception which was not brought about by the spontaneous

\(^1\) The interpretation I mentioned two paragraphs back (p 24.)
working of the mind, but which the mind was compelled to
generate by something external to it'. Thus I think it
quite likely that Kant is using 'necessary' in the sense
I have just indicated when he speaks of Erkenntnisse
necessarily agreeing with each other at A104-5.

If so, then I can see how Erkenntnisse necessarily
agreeing with each other can be identified with their poss-
essing that unity which constitutes the concept of an
object. One fact which at least prima facie disconfirms
this interpretation of 'necessarily' is that the thought
of the relation of all knowledge to its object carrying
with it an element of necessity is said to amount (at
least in Kemp Smith's translation) to an object being
viewed as that which determines our Erkenntnisse a priori in some
definite fashion. It is the word 'a priori' which discon-
firms the interpretation of 'necessary' as 'necessitated
by something external to the mind'. Before I say why I
think this is the case I will have to mention what may seem
to be a mistranslation by Kemp Smith¹, and also make some
remarks about the expression 'to determine Erkenntnisse
a priori'.

A literal translation of the words Kemp Smith translates
thus:

Now we find that our thought of the relation of all
knowledge to its object carries with it an element
of necessity; the object is viewed as that which
prevents our modes of knowledge [Erkenntnisse] from
being haphazard or arbitrary and which determines
them a priori in some definite fashion.

But we find that our thought of the relation of all
knowledge to its object carries with it an element
of necessity, since the object is viewed as that

¹. I will however end up being inclined to think that Kemp
Smith's translation is correct.
which stands in the way, so that our Erkenntnisse are not determined at random or at pleasure, but instead are determined a priori in some definite fashion.

An ultra-literal translation of the latter part of this sentence would run:

... since the object is viewed as that which is against it, that our Erkenntnisse not at random or at pleasure, but a priori in some definite fashion determined are.

Note that in my not-quite-so-literal translation I have taken it that 'at random' and 'at pleasure' are adverbs modifying 'are determined'. My ground for doing this is that the German expressions of which these expressions are translations (viz. 'aufs Geratewohl' and 'beliebig', respectively) are (when taken in the only senses in which they could be being used here) adverbs, and the only verb they could be modifying is 'are determined'.

It will be noted that in the German it is not stated what the thing which determines our Erkenntnisse a priori in some definite fashion is, whereas Kemp Smith's translation makes out that it is the object. The German leaves open the possibility that the thing which determines our Erkenntnisse a priori in some definite fashion is the conscious subject.

The English expression 'to determine our Erkenntnisse' is virtually ungrammatical. We never speak simply of a thing being determined. 'To determine' is ambiguous. A determination is sometimes a finding out and sometimes a bringing about. In neither sense do we speak simply of a thing being determined. Whenever we use the word 'determine' (in either of the above senses) we speak of a particular determinable of a thing being determined. For instance, we speak of determining the temperature of a room. 'x determined
the temperature of the room' can mean 'x found out the
temperature of the room' and can mean 'x brought it about
that the temperature of the room was what it was'.

Kant uses a sentence of the form 'X determined the ___
of Y' (where the blank is filled by the name of a determin-
able) in the sense 'X brings it about that the ___ of Y is
what it is' in the section on the Third Analogy at A212=
B259. The sentence is "There must, therefore, besides the
mere existence of A and B, be something through which A
determines for B, and also reversewise B determines for A,
its position in time".

However, Kant uses the verb 'bestimmen' (which is the
word Kemp Smith always translates as 'to determine') in
quite a number of strange senses, in none of which is
'bestimmen' used in sentences of the above form.

In the sentence from A104, which I am discussing, 'to
determine' occurs in a sentence which is not of the above
form. He speaks of our Erkenntnisse being determined. He
does not use a sentence of the form 'The ___ of our
Erkenntnisse is determined by X'. Thus we are faced with
the choice between (a) taking it that when he speaks of our
Erkenntnisse being determined this is elliptical for saying
that some determinable or other of our Erkenntnisse is
determined or (b) taking it that Kant is here using
'determine' in one of his strange senses in which it does
not get used in sentences of the above form.

As I have mentioned above, the sentence-schema 'X
determines the ___ of Y' can mean (1)'X finds out what the
___ of Y is' and (2)'X brings it about that the ___ of Y
is what it is'. The sentence schema can of course only
mean (1) when X is a conscious being. In all of the strange
senses in which Kant uses 'determine', only a conscious
being can determine something. Thus our choice between
alternative interpretations of 'to determine our Erkenntnisse'
will be affected by whether we think that the thing that Kant
is saying determines our Erkenntnisse is a conscious being or not. As I have mentioned, Kemp Smith's translation embodies the supposition that the thing that Kant is saying determines our Erkenntnisse is not the conscious subject, but the object of knowledge.

The strange senses in which Kant uses 'determine' are as follows:

1. 'the determination of representations' = the synthesis of representations' B137-8 (perhaps), B154, A179=B221.
2. the determination of an object = the event of coming to know that an intentional object is objective A108 (perhaps) B166n, A258=B314.

At B ix-x Kant speaks of knowledge determining an object. He may mean 'a person coming to know that an object exists' (sense (2) above), and he might mean 'a person coming to know what properties a thing has'. He uses 'to determine a thing' to mean 'to come to know what properties a thing has' at A600=B628. In this sense 'to determine a thing' is elliptical for a sentence, or a collection of sentences of the form 'to determine the ___ of a thing' (the blank being filled with the name of a determinable and the sentence being taken to mean 'to find out the ___ of a thing').

I don't think that when Kant speaks of the determination of our Erkenntnisse at A104 he can have in mind the analysis of our concepts (strange sense (3)). This is because Kant says that an object is viewed as that which stands in the way of our Erkenntnisse being determined randomly or arbitrarily. An object is not viewed as that which stands in the way of our concepts being analysed randomly or arbitrarily.

It might be thought that when Kant speaks of the determination of our Erkenntnisse at A104 he has in mind the coming to know that objects are objective (strange sense (2)). Kant at A20=B34 defines "appearance" as "the undetermined object of an empirical intuition". Thus when Kant speaks of
the determination of an object at B166 and A258=B314, it seems that he would describe this event as the event of transforming an undetermined object into a determined object. Since it seems that Kant would also describe this event (the event of his coming to believe that an intentional object is objective) as "an intuition becoming an object for me" (Cf. B138), it seems quite likely that he would identify an undetermined object with an intuition. There are some features of the A104 passage under discussion which suggest that Kant is not using 'Erkenntnis' in the strict sense, in which for a representation to count as an Erkenntnis it has to be veridical, but instead is using it to mean simply 'representation' (e.g. the clause "For in so far as they [Erkenntnisse] are to relate to an object ..." suggests that some Erkenntnisse don't relate to objects). If so then intuitions are a sub-species of Erkenntnisse in the sense in which the word is being used at A104. Thus in identifying an undetermined object with an intuition Kant would be identifying it with a type of Erkenntnis. Thus it may seem possible that Kant in speaking of the determination of Erkenntnisse at A104 is speaking of the determination of undetermined objects, in the sense "the transformation of an undetermined object into a determined object" i.e. "the transformation of an Erkenntnis into an object" (which on Kant's weird view is that to which coming to know that an external object exists amounts).

However, that this is not the case is I think shown by the fact that Kant seems to make out that if Erkenntnisse do not relate to an object they are still determined (albeit at random or at pleasure).

The interpretation of 'determine representations' as 'synthesize representations' (strange sense (1)) I think fits fairly well in the sentence "the object is viewed as that which stands in the way so that our Erkenntnisse are not
determined at random or at pleasure, but instead are determined *a priori* in some definite fashion". 1 Kant speaks of accidental syntheses at A121.

This sentence implies that it is possible for a determination in the sense in which the word is being used here to be describable as *a priori*. This being the case it seems that determination of our *Erkenntnisse* at A104 can only be a finding out or a synthesis, since these are the only sorts of things which are (a) among the sorts of things which I have listed above as things which it is possible that Kant should have in mind when he speaks of a determination at A104 and (b) describable as *a priori* in regular senses of ' *a priori* ', or in senses of ' *a priori* ' in which I have found Kant using the term.

For a finding out to be *a priori* is for it not to be based on experience.

Kant's explicit statement of what it is for a synthesis to be *a priori* is that it is for it to be a synthesis of *a priori* representations (A77=B103).

However, this account of what it is for a synthesis to be *a priori* would not fit the sentence I have been discussing if by "determines" Kant means "synthesises" here. In this sentence Kant says that the object is viewed as the thing as a result of which *Erkenntnisse* are determined *a priori* in some definite fashion - i.e. (if by "determines" is meant synthesises") as a result of which *Erkenntnisse* are synthesised *a priori* in some definite fashion. If for a synthesis to be *a priori* is for it to be a synthesis of *a priori* representations, then it would be a strange way of saying that a synthesis of *Erkenntnisse* was *a priori* to say that the *Erkenntnisse* were synthesised *a priori*. I say this because to say that *Erkenntnisse* were synthesised *a priori* suggests that *a priority* is some property of the process-of-synthesis-to-which-the-*Erkenntnisse*-are-subjected, which property is

1. I will however below (pp31-2) note a difficulty for interpreting "determined" as "synthesised" here, which difficulty is caused by the word " *a priori* ".
possessed by the process quite independently of the nature of the Erkenntnisse.

Nevertheless syntheses are things which are in some cases described as a priori. So are acts of finding out. As I have mentioned, none of the other things of which I know which it is possible that Kant should have in mind when he speaks of determination at A104 are things which can be described as a priori in regular senses of the word, or senses in which Kant uses it. Thus the word 'a priori' seems to show that when Kant speaks of a determination at A104 he must have in mind either an act of finding out or a synthesis. Both acts of finding out and syntheses are things which can only be done by conscious subjects. Therefore it seems that Kemp Smith must be wrong in supposing that the thing which Kant is saying performs the determination of our Erkenntnisse is the object of knowledge.

Further confirmation that Kemp Smith is wrong in supposing that the thing which Kant would say determines our Erkenntnisse a priori in some definite fashion is the object comes from the following consideration: It seems that Kant would express what he is trying to say in the sentence I have been discussing in the following terms: "The object is viewed as that which brings it about that our Erkenntnisse are determined a priori in some definite fashion". That Kant would express what he is trying to say in these terms is implied by my not-quite-so-literal translation of Kant's sentence, viz:

... since the object is viewed as that which stands in the way, so that our Erkenntnisse are not determined at random or at pleasure, but instead are determined a priori in some definite fashion.

As I have mentioned, an ultra-literal translation of Kant's words would run

... since the object is viewed as that which is against it, that our Erkenntnisse not at random or at pleasure, but a priori in some definite fashion determined are.
I believe that any reasonable formulation of what he is trying to say would imply that he would express what he is saying in the words "The object is viewed as that which brings it about that our Erkenntnisse are determined a priori in some definite fashion".

It would be terribly strange that Kant should use these words to express what he is trying to say if what he is trying to say is that the object is viewed as that which determines our Erkenntnisse a priori in some definite fashion. If a person uses an expression of the form 'X brought it about that Y was Ød' it is natural to take him to mean that X caused some object other than itself to Ø Y.

Before I embarked on the discussion of how the sentence which I have been discussing is to be translated, and in what sense 'to determine' is to be taken in it, I promised that on completion of this discussion I would say why in the sentence I have been discussing, viz.

But we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity, since the object is viewed as that which stands in the way, so that our Erkenntnisse are not determined at random or at pleasure, but instead are determined a priori in some definite fashion.

the word 'a priori' disconfirms the interpretation of 'necessity' here as 'necesitation by something external to the mind'. As I will make clear, there is pressure to take 'necessity' here to mean 'necesitation by something external to the mind'. This pressure, together with the fact that this interpretation of 'necessity' seems incompatible with taking 'a priori' in any regular sense or in any sense in which Kant uses the word elsewhere, creates a pressure to take 'a priori' in a very strange sense - viz. to take it to

2. pp34-7.
here mean simply 'in advance'. In this very strange sense of 'a priori' it is possible for something other than a conscious being to determine something a priori.

The pressure to take it that the element of necessity which Kant says the thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it is an element of necessitation by something external to the mind arises for the following reasons:

Firstly, it does seem most natural to take it that this is that to which the element of necessity which Kant says, the thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it amounts. It is clearly true that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object does carry with it an element of necessity if by "necessity" is meant "necessitation by something external to the mind". As I have mentioned above¹, Kant does use "necessity" in this sense when he speaks of the necessary unity of apperception at B142.

The only other interpretation which occurs to me as to what the necessity which Kant says is carried by our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object is that this necessity is necessary laws holding between our Erkenntnisse. However, on this interpretation, what Kant is saying ("Now we find that the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity") would be highly controversial. The statement is not presented as though it were controversial (note the words "Now we find that...").

A second piece of evidence that the 'element of necessity' is an element of necessitation is as follows: The thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carrying with it an element of necessity is made out to amount to the object being viewed as that which brings it about that our Erkenntnisse are determined a priori in some definite fashion, which is in turn made out to amount to its being a necessary condition of Erkenntnisse relating to an

¹. p25.
object that they should necessarily agree with each other. Erkenntnisse necessarily agreeing with each other is I take it identified with the Erkenntnisse possessing that unity which constitutes the concept of an object (I above1 argued that the only other possible interpretation of Kant's words - this other interpretation being that Erkenntnisse agreeing with each other simpliciter is being identified with the Erkenntnisse possessing the unity to which the concept of an object amounts - is incompatible with the most natural interpretation of what it is for Erkenntnisse to agree with each other. This most natural interpretation of what it is for Erkenntnisse to agree with each other is that it is for it to be empirically possible for one object to instantiate the properties represented by both Erkenntnisse simultaneously).

Thus Kant is saying that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carrying with it an element of necessity amounts to its being a necessary condition of Erkenntnisse relating to an object that they should possess that unity to which the concept of an object amounts. Thus the element of necessity of which Kant speaks must by definition be involved in the unity to which the concept of an object amounts.

In the next paragraph Kant refers to the unity which constitutes the concept of an object as "the unity which the object makes necessary". He says there:

But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us - being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations - the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.

1. p24.
I presume that "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" refers to the same thing as that to which "the necessary unity...of the synthesis of the manifold" at A109 refers.

At A108 Kant makes out that the transcendental unity of apperception amounts to the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold. At A111-2 Kant makes out that it follows from the proposition that the transcendental unity of apperception exists that the categories relate to all appearances. From the complete lack of argument to show that this follows one would presume that Kant would say that the connection between the transcendental unity of apperception and the relation of the categories to all appearances is an analytic one. In the second edition an argument for the above inference is given, and this argument would entail that the connection is analytic.¹ I presume that Kant would say that the transcendental unity of apperception is also a necessary condition of the categories relating to appearances. If so, then Kant is saying that the transcendental unity of apperception on analysis is found to amount to the categories relating to all appearances. The categories relating to all appearances of course amounts to certain necessary laws holding among our Erkenntnisse.

Thus Kant is committed to say that the transcendental unity of apperception - which amounts to the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold - amounts to certain necessary laws holding among our Erkenntnisse. Thus if "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" at A105 refers to the same thing as "the necessary unity...of the synthesis of the manifold" at A109, then it seems that the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold must amount to certain necessary laws holding among our Erkenntnisse.

¹. See below, pp 212-34.
In the above-quoted sentence from A105 Kant bothers to give an argument in support of the proposition that the unity which the object makes necessary (i.e. the unity which constitutes the concept of an object) "can be nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" - the argument being that we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and the object which corresponds to them is nothing to us (i.e., I presume, the nature of the object is completely unknown to us). Hence it seems that the definition of "the unity which constitutes the concept of an object" which Kant would give at the outset of this argument is not "necessary laws holding among our Erkenntnisse", and does not involve the concept of necessary laws holding among our Erkenntnisse. As I mentioned above, the element of necessity which Kant says the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it is by definition involved in the unity which constitutes the concept of an object. Therefore it seems that the element of necessity which Kant says that the thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it cannot be necessary laws holding among our Erkenntnisse. Therefore I presume that this element of necessity is an element of necessitation by something over which the mind has no direct control, since this is the only other thing which occurs to me which it is possible Kant has in mind when he speaks of the above element of necessity.

So much for the pressure to take it that the element of necessity of which Kant speaks is an element of necessitation by something over which the mind has no control. I will now say why this interpretation of what the 'element of necessity' is seems incompatible with the interpretation of 'determined a priori' in any normal sense, and in any likely Kantian-sense-in-which-it-is-used-elsewhere, in the sentence

But we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity, since the object is viewed
as that which stands in the way, so that our Erkenntnisse are not determined at random or at pleasure, but instead are determined a priori in some definite fashion.

It can be seen that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carrying with it an element of necessity is being identified with the object being viewed as that which brings it about that our Erkenntnisse are determined a priori in some definite fashion.

From what I have said above it can be seen that it seems that the only things which are ever describable as a priori (in any usual sense of the word, and in any Kantian sense known to me) which Kant could have in mind when at A104 he speaks of a determination of our Erkenntnisse are a finding out and a synthesis. I above mentioned a consideration which makes it unlikely that Kant has in mind a synthesis (the consideration being that to speak of Erkenntnisse being synthesised a priori (as Kant would be if by 'determined' he meant synthesised) suggests that a priority is a property which the synthesis possesses independently of the nature of the Erkenntnisse synthesised, which is not true if 'a priori synthesis' is used in the sense in which Kant defines it at A77=B103 viz. 'synthesis of a priori representations'). Thus it is most natural to take it that when Kant speaks of an a priori determination of our Erkenntnisse he has in mind a finding out. Thus it seems likely that he is using "to determine a thing"in the sense in which it is used at A600=E628 - viz. "to come to know what properties a thing has". Thus it seems that by "to determine our Erkenntnisse a priori" Kant means "to come to know a priori the nature of our Erkenntnisse".

If so, then in the above quoted sentence our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carrying with it an element of necessity is being identified with the object being viewed as that which brings it about that we come to know a priori the nature of our Erkenntnisse.
An a priori representation is a non-empirical representation. At A20=B34 'empirical intuition' is defined as 'intuition which is in relation to the object through sensation'. I presume that 'empirical representation' would be defined as 'representation which is in relation to the object through sensation'. 'Sensation' is defined as 'the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, in so far as we are affected by it'.

Thus it seems that by 'empirical representation' Kant means 'representation which was directly or indirectly caused by the mind being affected by an object' (I add 'or indirectly' to allow for the possibility of empirical representations which arise when no object answering to them is present). If so, then Kant would mean by 'a priori representation' 'representation which was neither directly nor indirectly caused by the mind being affected by an object'.

By 'a priori knowledge' Kant means 'knowledge that is independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses' (B2) - i.e. 'knowledge that is independent of empirical intuitions' i.e. 'knowledge that is independent of intuitions which arose through the mind being affected by objects'.

Hence it would be contradictory to view the object as that which brings it about that we come to know a priori the nature of our representations. Hence there is pressure to give an interpretation of

the object is viewed as that which stands in the way, so that our Erkenntnisse are not determined at random or at pleasure, but instead are determined a priori in some definite fashion

other than

the object is viewed as that which stands in the way of our coming to know the nature of our Erkenntnisse at random or at pleasure, so that instead we come to know a priori the nature of our Erkenntnisse in some definite fashion.
I have argued that this interpretation (in which 'to determine X' is taken to mean 'to come to know the nature of X') is the only plausible interpretation in which 'a priori' is taken in a usual sense. Thus there is pressure to take it that Kant is here using 'a priori' in an unusual sense. 'A priori' literally means 'from that which comes before'. This literal sense is not the usual sense in which it is used. It is usually used to mean 'from that which comes before experience'. Perhaps Kant is in the passage under discussion using 'a priori' in a sense approaching the literal sense - perhaps he is using 'to determine a priori' to mean simply to determine in advance.¹

This would remove the major obstacle to taking it that the thing which Kant would say does the determination a priori of Erkenntnisse of which he speaks is not the conscious subject, but the object (which is the view implied in Kemp Smith's translation). The major obstacle to this, it will be recalled,² was that in the only sense of 'determination' in which a determination is describable as a priori in the usual sense of 'a priori', the only sort of thing which can perform a determination is a conscious subject. There is a sense of 'determine Erkenntnisse' (viz. 'bring it about that the nature of Erkenntnisse is what it is') in which a determination of Erkenntnisse is describable as a priori in the sense 'in advance', and in which a thing which is not a conscious subject can perform a determination of Erkenntnisse.

I above³ mentioned a second objection to taking it that the thing which does the determination is the object - viz. that any reasonable interpretation of what Kant is saying in the sentence under discussion would imply that he would express what he is trying to say in these words: "The object is viewed as that which brings it about that our

¹. There is some reason to believe that 'a priori' is used to mean 'in advance' at A105 - see below, p53.
². See p32.
³. pp32-3.
Erkenntnisse are determined a priori in some definite fashion. It would be very strange that Kant should use these words if the thing which he would say does the determining of Erkenntnisse which he mentions is the object. This objection stands even if we take 'determine Erkenntnisse' to mean 'bring it about that the nature of Erkenntnisse is what it is'.

However the interpretation of taking it that when Kant speaks of our Erkenntnisse being determined a priori he has in mind the object bringing it about in advance what the nature of our Erkenntnisse will be has considerable attraction (provided that, as I have argued is the case, we have reason to believe that Kant is using 'a priori' in an unusual sense here). The attraction of this interpretation I think outweighs the objection I have just mentioned.

The attraction of taking it that when Kant says the object is viewed as that which stands in the way, so that our Erkenntnisse are not determined at random or at pleasure, but instead are determined a priori in some definite fashion he wishes to say that the object is viewed as that which brings it about in advance that our Erkenntnisse are as they are is as follows:

As I have mentioned¹ Kant makes out that the proposition expressed by the sentence I have just quoted is what he has in mind when he says that the thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity. If in the sentence I have quoted Kant is saying that the object is viewed as that which brings it about in advance that our Erkenntnisse are as they are, then this sentence would entail that the thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessitation by something over which the mind has no control. Thus when Kant said that the thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries

¹ pp 34-5.
with it an element of necessity he would (if the interpretation I have just mentioned of the above-quoted sentence is correct) almost certainly mean by the sentence "our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity" that our thought of this relation carries with it an element of necessitation by something over which the mind has no direct control. I have above mentioned two advantages of taking it that Kant is saying this here - viz. (1) that if this is what he is saying, then what he is saying is uncontroversial, and Kant presents what he is saying as though it were uncontroversial and (2) that for reasons I have stated above, it fits well with what Kant says in the following paragraph (the paragraph starting "But it is clear that ...") to take it that when Kant says that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity he means that this relation carries with it an element of necessitation by something over which the mind has no direct control.  

Thus since the element of necessity of which Kant speaks being such an element of necessitation is compatible with the hypothesis that when Kant says the object is viewed as that which stands in the way, so that our Erkenntnisse are not determined at random or at pleasure, but instead are determined a priori in some definite fashion he wishes to say that the object is viewed as that which brings it about in advance that our Erkenntnisse are as they are, this hypothesis is confirmed.  

However there is another hypothesis as to what Kant wishes to say in the quoted sentence, which is perhaps passable, which is compatible with the element of necessity being an element of being necessitation and which, unlike the

1. pp34-7.
2. p34.
hypothesis have been discussing, does not involve saying that the thing which does the determining of which Kant speaks is the object (and so is not disprobabilified by the fact that it seems that Kant would express what he has to say by means of the words "The object is viewed as that which brings it about that our Erkenntnisse are determined a priori in some definite fashion").

This other hypothesis is that Kant wishes to say that the object is viewed as that which brings it about that the conscious subject comes to know the nature of its Erkenntnisse in advance. I have said that this hypothesis is perhaps passable. The only interpretation I can give to the words "the object is viewed as that which brings it about that the conscious subject comes to know the nature of its Erkenntnisse in advance" which makes the hypothesis at all passable is to take it that Kant wishes to convey that if we take a representation to relate to a real object we anticipate that under certain conditions we will have certain other representations which relate to the object (e.g. that if we change our position we will have a representation of the object from a different angle). I don't think that this is very promising. Suppose that it is untenable, and hence the hypothesis that Kant wishes to say that the object is viewed as that which brings it about that the conscious subject comes to know the nature of his Erkenntnisse a priori is ruled out. It would follow that the only hypothesis which occurs to me as to what Kant means in the sentence

\[ \text{the object is viewed as that which stands in the way, so that Erkenntnisse are not determined at random or at pleasure, but instead are determined a priori in some definite fashion} \]

which hypothesis is compatible with the element of necessity of which Kant speaks being an element of necessitation is the hypothesis that Kant wishes to say that the object is viewed
as that which brings it about in advance that our Erkenntnisse are as they are. Thus considerable support would be given to this hypothesis.

At the outset of my discussion of the paragraph "Now we find that our thought ... the concept of an object" I said that I was going to end up arguing that the paragraph contributes nothing to the Transcendental Deduction. That it contributes nothing is I believe shown by the opening sentences in the next paragraph:

But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us — being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations — the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. Therefore we say: we know the object when we have produced synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition.

It can be seen that the only premiss to which Kant appeals here in order to show that we know the object when we have produced synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition (i.e., I presume, the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations) is the proposition that the object which corresponds to our representations is nothing to us (i.e., I presume, its nature is completely unknown to us). This proposition was asserted in the paragraph before the paragraph "Now we find that our thought ...", and is quite independent of the proposition which was asserted in the latter paragraph — viz. that the object is viewed as that which brings it about that our Erkenntnisse are determined a priori in some definite fashion.
As can be seen from what I have said above, the object being viewed as that which brings it about that our Erkenntnisse are determined a priori in some definite fashion is at least made out to be involved in, and perhaps identified with its being a necessary condition of Erkenntnisse relating to an object that they should possess that unity to which the concept of an object amounts. The premiss to which Kant appeals in the above-quoted argument to show that we know the object when we have produced the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations - this premiss being that the nature of the object which corresponds to our representations is completely unknown to us - is also quite independent of the proposition that it is a necessary condition of Erkenntnisse relating to an object that they should possess the unity to which the concept of an object amounts. To say this is to say that the premiss to which Kant appeals is independent of the proposition that the concept of an object amounts to a certain unity.

I will now spend a few pages appealing to conclusions I have reached above in order to argue for a hypothesis as to what Kant has in mind when he speaks of unity when he says that the concept of an object amounts to a certain unity. It will be recalled that Kant identifies Erkenntnisse possessing that unity to which the concept of an object amounts with Erkenntnisse necessarily agreeing with each other. I have argued above¹ that the most plausible interpretation of what it is for Erkenntnisse to agree with each other is that it is for it to be empirically possible for one object to simultaneously have all the properties represented by the Erkenntnisse. I have further argued² that a plausible interpretation of what it is for Erkenntnisse to necessarily agree with each other is that it is for its being possible for one object to simultaneously instantiate all the properties represented by the Erkenntnisse to be necessitated by something over which the mind has no direct control. I then

1. pp24-5.
spent a good many pages\textsuperscript{1} considering the pros and cons of this interpretation in the light of other remarks which Kant makes in the paragraph "Now we find that our thought ... the concept of an object". The two interpretations as to what Kant means when he says that the object is viewed as that which brings it about that our Erkenntnisse are determined \textit{a priori} in some definite fashion, which interpretations I ended up concluding are perhaps passable, are such that the truth of either of them would confirm the above hypothesis as to what it is for \textit{Erkenntnisse} to necessarily agree with each other. (This hypothesis was that it is for its-beings-possible-for-one-object-to-simultaneously-instantiate-all-the-properties-represented-by-the-\textit{Erkenntnisse} to be necessitated by something over which the mind has no direct control.\textsuperscript{2}

The two perhaps passable interpretations as to what Kant means when he says that the object is viewed as that which brings it about that our \textit{Erkenntnisse} are determined \textit{a priori} in some definite fashion were (1) "the object is viewed as that which brings it about in advance that our \textit{Erkenntnisse} are as they are"\textsuperscript{3} and (2) "the object is viewed as that which brings it about that the conscious subject comes to know the nature of its \textit{Erkenntnisse} in advance".\textsuperscript{4}) Thus I am inclined to say that, in the sense in which Kant is using the words, for \textit{Erkenntnisse} to necessarily agree with each other is for its-beings-possible-for-one-object-to-simultaneously-instantiate-all-the-properties-represented-by-the-\textit{Erkenntnisse} to be necessitated by something over which the mind has no direct control. Thus I am inclined to say that for \textit{Erkenntnisse} to possess that unity to which the concept of an object amounts is for its-beings-possible-for-one-object-to-simultaneously-instantiate-all-the-properties-represented-by-the-\textit{Erkenntnisse} to be necessitated by something over which the mind has no direct control.

1. pp26-44.
2. pp26, 45.
3. p41.
4. p43.
Thus my above assertion\(^1\) that the sole premiss to which Kant appeals in the argument to show that we know the object when we have produced the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations (the premiss being that the nature of the object which corresponds to our representations is completely unknown to us) "is independent of the proposition that the concept of an object amounts to a certain unity" amounts to the following assertion: This premiss to which Kant appeals is quite independent of the proposition that the concept of an object amounts to the concept of Erkenntnisse being necessitated to be such that it would be possible for one thing to simultaneously instantiate all the properties represented by them.

This interpretation of 'unity' is not quite the same as that which I gave above\(^2\) in discussing the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition — viz. 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property instances, which answer to the representations'. The proposition that Erkenntnisse are necessitated by something over which the mind has no direct control to be such that it is empirically possible for one object to instantiate simultaneously all the properties represented by the Erkenntnisse does not entail the proposition that the Erkenntnisse are copresent in consciousness.

However I am inclined to think that the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations is copresence in consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property instances, which answer to the representations. It seems that 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' cannot be equivalent to 'the unity which the object

1. p45.
makes necessary' (which I identify with Erkenntnisse being necessitated by something over which the mind has no direct control to be such that it is empirically possible for one object to instantiate all the properties represented by the Erkenntnisse), since Kant thinks it necessary to give an argument to show that the unity which the object makes necessary is the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.¹

However, this very fact that Kant thinks it necessary to give an argument to show that the unity which the object makes necessary - which in the previous paragraph he identified with the relation of representations to an object - is the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations also disconfirms the interpretation of "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" which I have said I am inclined to give - viz. "copresence in consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations".

My account of synthesis of recognition involves taking "unity of synthesis" at A103 to mean "copresence in consciousness, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations", and I cannot think of any other account of synthesis of recognition which fits Kant's words and entails that synthesis of recognition is necessary for the consciousness of the unity of synthesis. I presume that "unity of synthesis" at A103 and "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" at A105 are equivalent. The only other creature from the Kantian menagerie I can think of with which the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations could be trivially identical is

¹. As I mentioned above, p37.
what in the first edition he calls "the unity of apperception" (I believe that in the second edition he refers to it as "the analytic unity of apperception"), which I take to be the consciousness of the numerical identity of the conscious subject which has one of the representations which I am normally inclined to call mine with the conscious subjects which own all the other representations which I am normally inclined to call mine (at A108 Kant refers to the unity of apperception as "the consciousness of the identity of the self"; for further discussion of it see below¹). I believe that the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations cannot be trivially identical with the unity of apperception because (1) at A106-7 Kant says that the unity of apperception is the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions (which I presume is trivially identical with the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations); and (2) at A108 Kant presents the proposition that the transcendental unity of apperception is identical with the necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts (which I presume is supposed to be trivially identical with the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations) as non-trivial.²

Thus, since we can't take it that the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations is trivially identical with the transcendental unity of apperception, the fear of multiplying Kantian concepts beyond necessity presses us to take it that "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" is trivially equivalent to "the unity of synthesis" (A103).

Thus, given my interpretation of "the unity of synthesis" I am committed to say that "the formal unity of consciousness

1. pp67-77.
2. The seeming incompatibility of (1) with (2) will be considered below (pp83, 99-100).
in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" means "copresence in consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property instances, which answer to the representations".

Further support for this interpretation of "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" is connected with the fact that it seems highly likely that this expression is equivalent to "the necessary unity ... of the synthesis of the manifold" (A109). However I will defer my elucidation of this until I come to discuss A109.¹

If the two expressions mentioned in the previous paragraph are equivalent, then Kant's statement at A105 that the unity which the object makes necessary is nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations is a somewhat surprising advance statement of his conclusion at A109 that the relation of any manifold of knowledge to an object is nothing but the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold.²

Before I launched into the above statement of evidence in support of my interpretation of "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" (viz. "copresence in consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits of objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations") I mentioned³ that this interpretation is disconfirmed by the fact that Kant bothers to give an argument in support of the proposition that the unity which the object makes necessary (which he has identified with the relation of a manifold of representations to an object) is nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations (the premiss of the argument being that we have no knowledge of the nature of...
an object). It seems that for a collection of representations to relate to an object it is not necessary that they should be copresent in consciousness at all, in which case the proposition "The relation of representations to an object is copresence in consciousness of the representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of bits of the object or property-instances of the object, which bits or property-instances answer to the representations", far from being so trivially true that no-one would bother giving an argument for it (as I intimated in the previous sentence), would be false. However, I suspect that when Kant speaks of the unity which the object makes necessary at A105 he really means "knowledge that we have a case of the unity which the object makes necessary". It will be recalled that Kant employed a similar manner of speaking at A103 when he said that if I did not realise that the representations which are copresent in my consciousness after having been synthesised, and which are contained in an intuition, are faint copies of impressions (in Hume's sense) which I had a moment ago, then they would lack unity. I took it\(^1\) that he really meant that I would not know that they had unity.

Certainly, Kant's second, shorter statement of the above conclusion from A105 is "... we know the object when we have produced synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition".

If Kant really wants to say that the knowledge that a collection of representations relate to some one object is knowledge that there is a copresence in consciousness of representations, which copresence in consciousness was caused by the juxtaposition of bits of the object or property-instances of the object, which bits or property instances answer to the representations, then it seems that what he is trying to say is true. However, it would be trivially true, and so the fact that Kant bothers to give an argument for the assertion at A105 which I have been discussing somewhat

\(^1\) p12.
disconfirms that in making this assertion Kant wants to say that the knowledge that a collection of representations relate to some one object is the knowledge that there is a copresence in consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by the juxtaposition of bits of the object or property instances of the object, which bits or property instances answer to the representations. However, I cannot think of any alternative interpretation of 'synthetic unity' which fit Kant's remarks at A103.

There are some passages in the first edition deduction in which synthetic unity it seems cannot be any sort of copresence in consciousness, since in these passages it seems that Kant holds that synthetic unity holds between all the veridical representations a person has ever had. However, the synthetic unity of which Kant speaks at A105 must hold between a collection of representations which relate to some one object, since this synthetic unity is identified with the unity which the object makes necessary. Furthermore, in the example of the triangle given at A105 the manifold between which the unity is made to hold is a collection of predicates of the triangle – viz. the 3 sides of the triangle. The unity of synthesis of which Kant speaks at A99-103 certainly holds between a collection of representations which relate to some one thing. Next Kant says

This [synthetic unity] is however impossible if the intuition could not have been produced through such a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule which makes the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary and makes possible a concept in which it [the manifold] is united.

There is an ambiguity here, in that it is a bit unclear whether it is the rule or the function of synthesis which is in accordance with this rule which is being said to make the

reproduction of the manifold *a priori* necessary and make possible a concept in which the manifold is united. I am inclined to agree with the interpretation implied in Kemp Smith's translation — viz. that it is the function of synthesis which is being said to do these things. The main reason for my agreement with Kemp Smith here is the occurrence of the word 'such' in 'through such a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule which...etc.'

I presume that in the above-quoted sentence 'a priori' is not an adjective qualifying 'manifold', but an adverb modifying 'necessary', since I can't see why Kant should wish to speak only of the unity of the synthesis of a pure manifold here (although Kant does have a slightly disturbing habit of speaking of syntheses of pure manifolds when one would expect him to speak of syntheses in general — Cf. A102, B137-8, B154 and A162-3=B203). If so, then I suspect that 'a priori' is here being used in the same strange sense as that in which I was inclined to say it was being used at A104 — Viz. 'in advance'.¹ Surely when we synthesise the manifold of an empirical intuition the reproduction of the manifold does not occur independently of experience (i.e. *a priori* in the usual sense) but is triggered off (perhaps indirectly) by the sequence of sense impressions.

In the next paragraph Kant says that a concept serves as a rule. I am not quite sure whether he holds that all rules are concepts. However, in virtue of the juxtaposition of this remark with the above sentence one would expect that the rule mentioned in the above-quoted sentence would be identified with a concept. If so, then it seems that Kant, in asserting that synthetic unity in the manifold of an intuition is impossible if the intuition could not have been produced through such a function-of-synthesis—*in accordance with a rule* which makes the reproduction of the manifold *a priori* necessary and renders possible a concept in which the

manifold is united, is elaborating on a doctrine which I have above argued is implied at A103 - viz. that a concept is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon reproduced, into one representation.

One thing which seems to disconfirm that Kant would identify the rule of which he speaks at A105 with a concept is the fact that he says that this rule renders possible a concept. However I suspect that he is identifying a rule with a universal (and that this is what he means in the next paragraph when he says that a concept serves as a rule), and that in the above-quoted sentence he would identify a concept with the representation of a universal. At A103 Kant is certainly identifying a concept with the representation of a universal, since he identifies the concept of a number with the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of the representations contained in our intuition of the number. However, I think that Kant's general woolliness about the relation between a universal and an idea of a universal (which is parallel to his woolliness about the relation between a particular and an idea of a particular) could reconcile (a) the fact that Kant seems not to identify the rule of which he speaks at A105 with a concept with (b) the hypothesis that, in saying at A105 that synthetic unity in the manifold of an intuition is impossible if the intuition could not have been produced by means of a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule, Kant is expressing the doctrine that a concept is what combines the manifold successively intuited, and thereupon reproduced, into one representation (which was implied at A103).

I have mentioned above that I can give no very promising explanation as to why Kant should assert this doctrine, and that Paton's explanation is very uncharitable. Since Kemp Smith does not have very much to say on the matter, I will

1. p15.
3. See above, p19.
not discuss the illustrations of the doctrine which Kant gives at A105-6.

After giving these illustrations, Kant, in the first sentence of the paragraph starting at the very bottom of A106 says that transcendental apperception is the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions. Kant obviously uses the expressions 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' (A105) and 'the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions' interchangeably, since he implies at A106 that the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions is a necessary condition of objects of experience (he may mean that is a necessary condition of knowledge of objects of experience), as though it was something he had already stated, while at A105 he argued that when we have produced the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations we know the object. It is not quite clear whether 'the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions' should be taken to mean 'the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations contained in any intuition of ours' or 'the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of all our intuitions with each other'. It seems that it would have to mean the former if it is equivalent to 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' (A105), since it is clear that the manifold mentioned here is not the sum total of all the representations a person has ever had, but the collection of representations contained in an intuition of some one object. On the other hand, if 'the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions' means 'the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of all our intuitions with each other', then it seems that it is what Kant means by 'the synthetic unity of

1. See above, p52.
appearances in accordance with concepts' at A110. ¹

After asserting the proposition that transcendental apperception is the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the first sentence of the paragraph beginning at the very bottom of A106 it may seem that Kant abandons discussion of this proposition until the final sentence of the paragraph.

In the next few sentences Kant I take it is arguing that knowledge that oneself is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes oneself to be (serially) identical cannot come from the division of sensibility which contemplates one's own mind.²

Kant refers to this division of sensibility as inner sense. Kant holds that the knowledge of the self which this division of sensibility yields is empirical. This doctrine is implied by Kant's view that the only a priori knowledge yielded by sensibility is geometry³, arithmetic⁴ and the general doctrine of motion.⁵

Kant's view that the knowledge of the self which is yielded by inner sense is empirical is manifested in the name he gives to inner sense at A107 - viz. "empirical apperception".

Kant no doubt wishes his reader to infer from the proposition that knowledge that oneself is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes oneself to be (serially) identical cannot come from empirical apperception, that it must come from non-empirical apperception. That a division of apperception (i.e. of consciousness of the self (B68)) should be non-empirical is not sufficient for it to be transcendental. At A56=B80-1 Kant

1. See below, pp 209-11.
2. I will suggest some possible connections between this argument and the first sentence of the paragraph below, on pp 58-61.
3. B40-1
4. Prolegomena §10
5. B49
defines 'transcendental knowledge' as 'knowledge by which we know that—and how—certain representations (intuitions or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely a priori'. (At A56=B80 Kant says that not all non-empirical knowledge is transcendental). However, in the next paragraph Kant, in defence of applying the name 'transcendental apperception' to the knowledge that oneself is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes oneself to be identical, does make out that this knowledge is necessary for "the purest objective unity, namely, that of the a priori concepts (space and time)". From a saliently parallel passage in the second edition deduction (B137-8) it seems that Kant would say that the "purest objective unity" of space and time is necessary for the a priori knowledge which in the Transcendental Aesthetic he argues rests on our a priori intuitions of bits of space and time (i.e. geometry, which he holds rests on a priori intuitions of bits of space, and the general doctrine of motion, which Kant holds rests on a priori intuitions of bits of time). This a priori knowledge is the a priori employment of a priori intuitions. Thus Kant would suppose it to follow from his assertion that the knowledge that oneself is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes oneself to be identical is necessary for the "purest objective unity" of space and time that this bit of knowledge about oneself is necessary for the a priori employment of our a priori intuitions of bits of space and time.

That a bit of knowledge should be necessary for the a priori employment of representations is I presume what Kant has in mind when in his A56=B80-1 definition of 'transcendental knowledge' he speaks of knowledge by which we know that certain representations can be employed a priori. Thus Kant in the paragraph beginning "There can be in us no Erkenntnisse ..." (A107) thinks he has shown that the knowledge that oneself is identical with the person existing a moment ago with
whom one normally supposes oneself to be identical is **transcendental** knowledge about oneself - i.e. transcendental apperception.

In the paragraph beginning "This original and transcendental condition..." (A106-7) Kant did not establish that this bit of knowledge about oneself is transcendental. However, as I mentioned above¹ he does argue that we do not have this knowledge from any empirical source, and I have presumed that he wishes the reader to infer that the bit of knowledge is **a priori**. My reason for presuming this is that otherwise I cannot see that the argument to show that one does not have the knowledge that oneself is identical with the person existing a moment before with whom one normally supposes oneself to be identical from any empirical source plays any role in the transcendental deduction. On the other hand, if Kant does infer from the proposition that one does not have this bit of knowledge about oneself **a posteriori** that one does have it **a priori** then the argument to show that we do not have the bit of knowledge **a posteriori** would (a) contribute to showing that a necessary condition of knowledge that one is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes oneself to be identical being transcendental - viz. that this knowledge should be **a priori** - is fulfilled and (b) make a necessary contribution to Kant's argument at A108 to demonstrate that the knowledge that one is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes oneself to be numerically identical is the knowledge that there is necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts.

I suspect that Kant's reason for placing the argument to show that one does not derive knowledge that oneself is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes oneself to be identical from any

¹ p56.
empirical source directly after his assertion that the
original and transcendental condition of the unity of
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our
intuitions is transcendental apperception is connected with
(a). What I have in mind here is that there is some likeli-
hood that Kant's reason for placing the argument after the
assertion is in order to explain why he calls the above bit
of knowledge about oneself 'transcendental apperception',
and hence to give the reader some idea of what he (Kant)
has in mind when he speaks of transcendental apperception
in the above assertion (the assertion that the original and
transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in
the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions is no
other than transcendental apperception). If this is Kant's
purpose in placing the above-mentioned argument where he
does place it, then his purpose is not realized until the
next paragraph. This is because as I have mentioned above,¹
even if one grants Kant his assumption that one does have
the above bit of knowledge, all that is established in the
paragraph starting "This original and transcendental
condition ..." is that this bit of knowledge is a priori.

The hypothesis that Kant places the argument to show that
one doesn't have empirical grounds for believing the above-
mentioned proposition about oneself where he does in purs-
uance of a plan to explain why the knowledge of this propo-
sition can be called 'transcendental apperception' is dis-
confirmed by the following considerations: The explanation
in the following paragraph as to why this putative bit of
knowledge deserves the name 'transcendental apperception'
is not presented continuously with the argument in the
paragraph at A106-7 to show that we don't have empirical
knowledge of the above-mentioned proposition about oneself.
Also the discussion of the question of why the above-mentioned
putative bit of knowledge about oneself deserves the name

¹. pp56-7.
'transcendental apperception' which is given in the next paragraph is presented as though it were discussion of a question about which Kant had hitherto said nothing.

There is another hypothesis as to what Kant's reason is for placing the argument in the paragraph at A106-7 to show that one does not derive knowledge that oneself is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one would normally say one is identical from any empirical source after his assertion that the original and necessary condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions is transcendental apperception. This hypothesis is connected with (b) above (page 58). The hypothesis is that the reason why Kant places the argument after the assertion that the original and transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions is no other than transcendental apperception is not that he wants to make clear what he has in mind when he speaks of transcendental apperception, but that he wants to make a start on an argument in support of his assertion that the original and transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions is no other than transcendental apperception. An argument in support of a relation holding between the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our representations and transcendental apperception is completed at A108, and this argument does seem to depend on the proposition that we don't have any empirical evidence that oneself is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one would normally suppose oneself to be identical. Thus one is tempted to take it that (a) the argument in the paragraph at A106-7 to show that we don't have any empirical evidence for this proposition about oneself is a first stage in this argument which ends at A108, and that (b) this argument at A108 is designed to support
the assertion in the first sentence of the paragraph at A106-7 that the original and transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions is transcendental apperception. There is however a complication here which I have already mentioned - viz. the relation which is said to hold between transcendental apperception and the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions at A108 is not "... is the original and transcendental condition of ...", but identity.2

Note that if, as I have above argued is likely, Kant does infer from the proposition that one has no empirical knowledge that oneself is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes oneself to be identical that one has a priori knowledge that this is the case, then Kant is assuming that we do have knowledge of one sort or another that this is the case. He gives no argument for this assumption here or in the second edition deduction.4

The final sentence of the paragraph at A106-7 is translated by Kemp Smith as follows: 

To render such a transcendental presupposition possible, there must be a condition which precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself possible.

This commits Kemp Smith to say that the condition of which Kant speaks is the condition of, and is hence distinct from, the transcendental presupposition of which Kant speaks. Here is an ultra-literal translation of the German, following the contorted German word order fairly closely:

There must be a condition, which precedes all experience, and the latter itself possible makes5, which [welche] is to make valid such a transcendental presupposition.

1. p49. 
2. I will comment on this further below, on pp83, 99-100. 
3. p58. 
4. See B132. 
5. This means 'and makes the latter itself possible'.
The gender of 'which' ('welche') is compatible with its referring either to the condition (Bedingung) - which is implied by Kemp Smith's translation - or to experience (Erfahrung). Taking it that 'which' refers to the condition commits one to say that this condition to which Kant refers is distinct from the transcendental presupposition to which he refers.

The words which Kant uses to refer to the transcendental presupposition - viz. 'such a transcendental presupposition' - show he has already recently referred to it. The obvious choice among hypotheses as to which words which Kant has recently used refer to the transcendental presupposition is the hypothesis that 'a condition' in the first clause of the sentence refers to the transcendental presupposition.\(^1\)

Furthermore, I think it highly likely that Kant would identify the transcendental presupposition of which he speaks with transcendental apperception (although this is not implied by the sentence under discussion, on my interpretation of it), since transcendental apperception is the only transcendental thingummybob which is mentioned in the paragraph beginning "This original and transcendental condition ...", or in the paragraph preceding this one, or in the paragraph succeeding it. Thus if we do not identify the condition of which Kant speaks with the transcendental presupposition of which he speaks, we make Kant out to be saying that there is a precondition of experience apart from transcendental apperception. I don't think it likely that if Kant is saying that there is a further precondition of experience the precondition is the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions. I say this because this would make the proposition that the condition makes experience possible irrelevant to the subject matter of the rest of the paragraph in which the sentence occurs, and irrelevant to the subject matter of the succeeding paragraph. Thus if the condition

\(^1\) This is obscured in Kemp Smith's translation by Kemp Smith's rearrangement of clauses.
is distinct from the transcendental presupposition then the condition has not previously been mentioned. Also the condition would be something which does not get mentioned again. Thus I think it highly likely that the condition which Kant mentions is identical with transcendental apperception, and hence with the transcendental presupposition which Kant mentions.

As I have mentioned above, this commits one to say that in the sentence

There must be a condition, which precedes all experience, and the latter itself possible makes, which is to make valid such a transcendental presupposition

the second "which" does not refer to the condition, but to experience. Thus in the final clause of the sentence Kant is saying that our ground for believing that the transcendental presupposition holds is that there is experience.

If, as I have argued, the condition is to be identified with the transcendental presupposition, then Kant, in saying here that there must be a condition which makes experience possible, is simply repeating an assertion which he made in the previous paragraph - viz. "There must ... be a transcendental ground ... of all objects of experience".

According to Kant, to speak of conditions of experience is the same as to speak of conditions of objects of experience.1

Kant's ground for saying that there must be a transcendental ground of all objects of experience was that there must be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and that (as Kant argued at A105) the concept of an object amounts to nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the

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synthesis of the manifold of representations (i.e., as I have argued above, the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions). That this is Kant's ground for saying "There must ... be a transcendental ground ... of all objects of experience" can be seen by filling in the second blank I have left in the quotation:

There must ... be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general and so of all objects of experience.

The final sentence of the paragraph at A106-7 is one of the innumerable places in the *Critique* where it is obvious that Kant is using 'experience' in a 'got-it' sense (i.e. a sense implying veridicality). As I have mentioned, in the sense in which Kant uses the word 'experience', there is experience if and only if there are objects of experience. For the proposition that it follows from its being the case that there must be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions that there must be a transcendental ground of objects of experience (A106) to be supported by anything Kant has said previously, Kant would have to be using 'object of experience' in the same sense as that in which he uses 'object' at A104-5. It is clear that he is there using 'object' to mean 'real object' and not merely 'intentional object', since at A104 Kant says that an object is viewed as that which brings it about that our representations are not determined at random or at pleasure. This is not true of intentional objects in general but only of those intentional objects which are also real objects.

1. p55.

2. See above, pp4-5 for an explanation of "'got-it' sense"
Furthermore, Kant says at A104 "appearances are themselves nothing but sensible representations". I take it that this means that intentional objects are representations. (This view is of course discredited today). Kant goes on to make clear that when he spoke of an object of representations in the first sentence of the paragraph he meant an object corresponding to and hence distinct from our knowledge. Thus by 'object' here he does not mean 'intentional object' but 'real object'. Thus at A106 Kant must be using 'object of experience' to mean 'real object corresponding to experience'. Hence Kant at A107 is using 'experience' in a sense such that there is experience if and only if there are real objects answering to the experience - i.e. in a sense implying veridicality.

Here are some other places in the Critique in which it is clear that Kant is using 'experience' in a sense implying veridicality:

(a) A237=B296, where the principles of pure understanding being the source of all truth is identified with their containing in themselves the ground of all experience,
(b) B275, where Kant says that a refutation of idealism "must show that we have experience, and not merely imagination of outer things" and
(c) A452=B480, where experience is opposed to dreaming.

I have not found any passage in the Critique in which 'experience' is used in a sense which does not imply veridicality.

At A95, A111, A124-5, A126, A130 and B161 Kant either states explicitly or says something which implies that his
strategy for proving that the categories relate to all objects of experience (to prove this is the aim of the transcendental deduction) is to show that the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience.

Kemp Smith, Weldon, Strawson, Bennett, Wolff and Wilkerson hold that in the course of arguing in the transcendental deduction for the proposition that the categories relate to all objects of experience Kant gives a refutation of idealism. However, if Kant's strategy for proving that the categories relate to all objects of experience is to show that the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and 'experience' is being used in a 'got-it' sense, then one may well wonder how a refutation of idealism can contribute anything to Kant's proof that the categories relate to all objects of experience. However, I will be obliged to ascribe to Kant an assertion at A108 which I believe he would say is incompatible with idealism - viz. an assertion that consciousness of what Kant in §§18-19 of the second edition would call objective unity is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self.¹

I will now return to my discussion of A107. I may have given the impression that in the first sentence of the paragraph beginning at the very bottom of A106 (viz. "This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception") Kant is only saying that the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions is transcendental apperception. However, a backward glance at the preceding paragraph shows that he is saying that the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of all objects of experience is transcendental apperception. In the first sentence of the first paragraph to begin on A107 I believe Kant is more or less

¹ See below, pp136-7. My remarks there are based on remarks on pp114-18, which occur in the course of a discussion of whether Kant at B133 says the same thing as in the sentence at A108 where I believe he makes the above-mentioned assertion.
repeating this. The sentence is

There can be in us no Erkenntnisse, no connection and unity of Erkenntnisse with each other, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible.

My reason for saying that this is more or less a repetition of the first sentence of the preceding paragraph is that

(a) in the sense in which Kant uses 'experience' there is experience if and only if there are real objects of experience, and experience is identified with empirical Erkenntniss at B147
(b) I presume that connection and unity of one Erkenntniss with another is identical with the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and
(c) the unity of consciousness to which Kant refers in the sentence I have quoted is identified with transcendental apperception in the following sentence.

The following sentence is "This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception". Note that here he is identifying a unity of consciousness with apperception. Thus it seems that he uses the expression "transcendental apperception" interchangeably with an expression he introduces a few lines further on - "the transcendental unity of apperception". I will now offer a tentative explanation of this.

A few lines further on Kant uses the expression "the numerical unity of this apperception". Since 'numerical' is commonly used to qualify 'identity' it seems that by 'unity' here Kant means 'identity'. In the next paragraph it seems clear that the transcendental unity of apperception is identified with the original and necessary consciousness
of the identity of the self. Thus here it seems that by 'unity' Kant means 'consciousness of identity'. I suspect that Kant would here define 'unity' as 'identity', but that he is here employing a way of speaking very similar to a way of speaking which I felt compelled to ascribe to him in discussing the remarks about synthesis of recognition at A103. The last-mentioned way of speaking was saying that something is or would be the case when what you mean is that it seems to be the case or would seem to be the case. The way of speaking I am inclined to ascribe to him at A107-8 is speaking of a thing when that to which you wish to refer is knowledge that the thing is the case - in particular, speaking of unity when you really wish to speak of knowledge that there is unity.

I have already mentioned that I feel constrained to conclude that Kant uses 'unity' in two senses - viz. 'that-it-should-be-empirically-possible-for-all-the-properties-represented-by-a-collection-of-representations-to-be-instantiated-by-one-object being necessitated by something other than the mind' (to which I have supposed 'that unity which constitutes the concept of an object' at A104 to refer) and 'copresence in consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property instances, which answer to the representations' (to which I have supposed 'the unity of synthesis' (A103), 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' (A105), 'synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition' (A105), 'the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our representations' (A106) and 'connection and unity of one Erkenntnis with another' (A107) refer).

As can be seen from what I have said two paragraphs back, at A107-8 I feel constrained to take Kant to be using 'unity' in yet a third sense - viz. 'identity' - which seems quite unconnected with the other two, when he speaks of the unity
of apperception. The anomaly is seemingly accentuated by the fact that he refers to the unity of apperception as 'that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions' at A107 and as 'the necessary unity of consciousness' at A109. These expressions are disturbingly similar to 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' (A105) and 'the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions' (A106).

I presume that this similarity is explained by an ambiguity in the word 'consciousness' which Descartes pointed out to Hobbes - viz. that 'consciousness' can mean 'states of consciousness' (i.e. 'representations') and can mean 'conscious subject'. When Kant refers to what in the first edition he calls the unity of apperception as the unity of consciousness it seems clear that he is using 'consciousness' to mean 'conscious subject', since here the unity of consciousness amounts to the consciousness of the identity of the self. I presume that when he speaks of the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations he is using 'consciousness' to mean 'conscious states', and that by 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' he means 'copresence-in-the-mind of conscious states resulting from the synthesis of these conscious states'. Kant certainly does use 'consciousness' to mean 'conscious state' at B136n, where he says that space and time "are not mere concepts through which one and the same consciousness is found to be contained in a number of representations". However my inclination to believe that Kant is using 'consciousness' to mean 'conscious states' when he speaks of the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations at A105 is slightly weakened by the fact that I believe that the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations (to which Kant also refers at A105 as 'synthetic
unity in the manifold of the intuition') is that to which Kant in the second edition deduction refers as 'the synthetic unity of apperception'. I will discuss this further when I come to discuss the argument at A108.1

Anyhow, it is clear that what Kant in the first edition calls 'the transcendental unity of apperception' is what Kant at A108 calls 'the consciousness of the identity of the self'. This slightly off-putting way of speaking - speaking of identity as though it were a monadic property - is also found in Hume's discussion of personal identity. As I implied in my discussion of the paragraph beginning "This original and transcendent condition ..." (A106-7), where the above-mentioned way of speaking also occurs, I presume that when Kant speaks of the consciousness of the identity of the self he means the knowledge that the self is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes it to be serially identical. My ground for taking it that he means this rather than taking it that he means the knowledge that I am identical with the person who is having one of the representations which I would normally be inclined to say I am having now, and that this person is identical with the people who are having the other representations which I am normally inclined to say that I am having now is as follows: At A107 Kant implies that for the self to be represented as numerically identical is for a standing and abiding self to present itself. Furthermore, it is with the question of the conditions under which a person existing at t2 can be said to be identical with a person existing at t1 that Locke and Hume dealt when they discussed personal identity.2

1. pp108-10
2. The closest Hume gets to discussing the question of whether the person who is having one of the representations I am normally inclined to say I am having now is identical with the person who is having each of the other representations I would normally be inclined to say I am having now is on page 259 of the Selby Bigge edition of the Treatise, where he says "every distinct perception, which enters into the composition of the mind, is a distinct existence, and is different, and distinguishable, and separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive"(italics mine) The question does not get discussed further.
On the other hand, at B138 Kant seems to mean by 'the analytic unity of apperception' (which I will argue is the expression he uses in the second edition to express the concept expressed by 'the unity of apperception' in the first edition) 'the knowledge that I am identical with the person who is having one of the representations which I would normally be inclined to say that I am having now, and that this person is identical with the people who are having the other representations I am normally inclined to say I am having now'. At B138 Kant says that the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception (which is formulated at B138 as "The synthetic unity of consciousness is ... an objective condition of all knowledge" and at B143 as "The manifold given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to [gehört notwendig unter] the original synthetic unity of apperception ... (§17)"; 'intuition' must here be being used in a 'got-it' sense) "says no more than that all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations". A comparison of the formulation I have just quoted with the B143 formulation shows that the synthetic unity of apperception is being identified with the condition under which alone I can ascribe all my representations in any given intuition to the identical self as my representations. It seems pretty clear that Kant would identify the ascription of all my representations in any given intuition to the identical self as my representations with the analytic unity of apperception, since he says at B133 that the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of the synthetic unity of apperception.

The representations in a manifold in a given intuition are copresent in consciousness. This can be seen from the fact that at B143 Kant says "The manifold-given in a

1. pp73-4.
2. Or rather, it seems, a certain subset of the other representations which I would normally be inclined to say that I am having now. See below, pp74-7.
sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception, because in no other way is the unity of intuition possible". For the second clause to be a ground for believing the first, that there should be unity of intuition would have to be a necessary condition of a manifold being given in an intuition. That Kant uses the expressions "the manifold—given in an intuition" and "the manifold in a given intuition" interchangeably can be seen by comparing the first clause of the sentence I have just quoted (this clause is a formulation of the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception) with the sentence "all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations [this condition being the original synthetic unity of apperception]" (this is also a formulation of the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception). Thus the unity of intuition must be a necessary condition of a manifold being in a given intuition. I have argued that in the second edition 'unity' must be taken to mean 'copresence in consciousness'. Since 'intuition' must be being used in a "got-it" sense here 'unity of intuition' must express the concept expressed by 'synthetic unity' in the first edition (Cf. 'synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition'(A105)) and by 'objective unity' in the second edition (Cf. §19) — viz. 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits of objects or property instances, which answer to the representations'. Nevertheless unity of intuition in this sense involves copresence in consciousness. Thus, since as I argued above, unity-of-intuition holding between a manifold is a necessary condition of the

2. See above, p71.
3. I believe that when Kant says 'objective unity' he means 'objective synthetic unity'. I will argue for this below, p97.
If you are not satisfied with the proof of this that I have just given, here is another one: One would presume that the representations in a manifold in an intuition are copresent in consciousness, since one would presume that Kant would say that the intuition does not exist until the manifold contained in it has been synthesised (i.e. until the bits in the mosaic have been pieced together). This presumption is borne out by the fact that Kant refers to the act of synthesising the manifold as the act of generating the intuition in which the manifold is contained at A103 (where the intuition is referred to as "what we think").

Thus in identifying the analytic unity of apperception (i.e. in first editionese, the unity of apperception) with the ascription of all the representations in any given intuition to "the identical self" as my representations Kant is identifying the analytic unity of apperception with the knowledge that certain representations which exist simultaneously are all his.

At B133 and B134 Kant refers to the analytic unity of apperception as the identity of apperception. I would expect this since because I have taken 'unity' to mean identity when he spoke of the unity of apperception in the first edition. However I presume that he is up to his old tricks and saying 'identity of apperception' when he really wants to say 'knowledge of identity of apperception'. Furthermore, the second 'of' in 'knowledge of identity of apperception' cannot be taken to indicate that the identity referred to is a property of the apperception. The identity referred to is made out to be a property of the

2. See above, p71.
self. This is borne out not only by the fact (which I have already mentioned) that the unity of apperception is at A108 identified with the consciousness of the identity of the self, but also by the fact that at B136 Kant refers to the analytic unity of apperception as the consciousness that the self is identical in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in an intuition. Thus I presume that the 'of' in the 'unity of apperception' (i.e. the second 'of' in 'the knowledge of the identity of apperception') does not mean 'which is a property of', but 'which bears a certain relation to ...', which relation the reader can work out from the context'. I suspect that 'of' is often used in this sense.

In the case of 'the unity of apperception', the relation which the 'of' together with the context indicates holds between identity and apperception is "... is a property of the thing represented by ...".

These considerations reconcile (a) Kant's identifying the unity of apperception with the consciousness of the identity of the self at A108 (b) his identifying the analytic unity of apperception with the identity of apperception at B133-4 and (c) my view that in the second edition 'the analytic unity of apperception' expresses the concept which is expressed by 'the unity of apperception' in the first edition.

Thus since Kant at B138 is identifying the analytic unity of apperception with the knowledge that certain representations which exist simultaneously (viz. the representations in the manifold in any given intuition) are all his, he is here identifying the consciousness of the identity of the self with the knowledge that certain representations which exist simultaneously are all his.

Since identity is not a monadic property the words 'the consciousness of the identity of the self' taken literally
amount to nonsense, and they must be taken non-literally, as meaning something which is expressed by an expression of the form 'the consciousness of the identity of ... and ... etc.'. The only expression of this form which could express what Kant means by

the ascription of all my representations in any given intuition to the identical self as my representations (B138)

is

the consciousness of the identity of (1) myself and (2) the person who is having one of the representations—which-I-would-normally-be-inclined-to-call-mine which are contained in some given intuition A and (3) the people who are having all the other representations—which-I-would-normally-be-inclined-to-call-mine which are contained in intuition A.

Thus it seems that this is what is meant by 'the analytic unity of apperception' in the second edition. This is further borne out by the fact that Kant refers to the analytic unity of apperception as the consciousness "of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of represent- that are given to me in an intuition" (B135).

Since the representations in an intuition exist simultaneously, my above interpretation of the second edition expression 'the analytic unity of apperception' (which it seems clear Kant would define as 'the consciousness of the identity of the self') is not equivalent to 'the consciousness that I am identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom I would normally suppose myself to be serially identical' — which was the interpretation which I concluded\(^1\) one should give to 'the unity of apperception' in the first edition at A107 (at A108 Kant identified the unity of

\(^1\) Above, p70.
apperception with the consciousness of the identity of the self). Thus, although, as I have argued, I think that 'the analytic unity of apperception' is intended simply as second editionese for 'the unity of apperception', in the second edition Kant seems to have in mind identification of the self with a different thing from in the first edition.

I am not quite sure whether

the consciousness of the identity of (1) myself and (2) the person who is having one of the representations—which-I-would-normally-be-inclined-to-call-mine which are contained in some given intuition A and (3) the people who are having all the other representations—which-I-would-normally-be-inclined-to-call-mine which are contained in intuition A

is equivalent to

the consciousness of the identity of (1) myself and (2) the person who is having one of the representations I would normally be inclined to say that I am having now and (3) the people who are having all the other representations which I would normally be inclined to say I am having now

I am not quite sure of this because I am not quite sure whether Kant would call the sum total of all the intuitions a person is having at a certain time an intuition. I suspect not. I suspect that Kant means by 'an intuition' 'a mental image of some one object', since at A320=B377 Kant says that an intuition 'relates immediately to the object'. Thus I suspect that the above two expressions are not equivalent.

However, it does seem strange that Kant in dealing with personal identity should be preoccupied with the question of under what conditions a person who is having a representation contained in the intuition of some one object can

1. pp73-4.
be said to be identical with the person who is having another representation contained in the intuition of that object.

My only ground for taking it that Kant at A107-8 meant by 'the unity of apperception' 'the consciousness that the self is identical with the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes it to be serially identical' was that at A107 Kant implies that for the self to be represented as numerically identical is for a standing and abiding self to present itself. That one can take Kant to be using 'the unity of apperception' in the sense I have just given throughout the first edition is given some support by the fact at A123 Kant seems to identify the standing and abiding I with pure apperception (I presume that he really wished to identify the consciousness of the standing and abiding I with pure apperception. He seems to identify pure apperception and the unity of pure apperception, a fact which I will try to explain below).

I don't believe that there is any further evidence in the first edition deduction as to whether Kant is using 'the unity of apperception' in the sense in which he seems to be using it at A107-8 and A123 or instead in the sense in which he seems to be using it in the second edition deduction.

I will now deal directly with the question which I raised at the outset of the above discussion of the unity of apperception - viz. the question as to how it can be the case that Kant uses the expressions "transcendental apperception" and "the transcendental unity of apperception" interchangeably at A107-8. My tentative explanation of this is that I think it quite likely that Kant would say the only transcendental knowledge that one has about the self is the consciousness of the 'identity of the self' - i.e. the

1. pp 77-8.
2. p67.
transcendental unity of apperception.

The sentence which seemed to indicate that the above expressions are used interchangeably was "This pure transcendental consciousness [the unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions] I shall name transcendental apperception". After this sentence comes the justification which I have discussed above for the application of the adjective 'transcendental' to the consciousness of the 'identity of the self'.

Next comes the sentence

The numerical identity of this apperception is thus the a priori ground of all concepts, just as the manifoldness of space and time is the a priori ground of the intuitions of sensibility.

I presume that Kant says that the unity of apperception is the a priori ground of all concepts on the ground that the unity of apperception is the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions (A106-7), and Kant identifies a concept with the consciousness of the unity of a synthesis (A103). Thus the sentence I have just quoted again raises the question of how a concept can be identified with the consciousness of the unity of a synthesis, to which as I mentioned in my discussion of A103, I can give no very promising answer. The sentence is connected with the first sentence of the paragraph where, as I mentioned, Kant repeats that transcendental apperception is the condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, which, as I have just mentioned, is one of the premisses from which I believe that Kant derives the proposition expressed by the sentence I have just quoted.

In the next paragraph, starting at the top of A108, is the argument, which I have mentioned above, to demonstrate

1. pp57-8.
2. See above, pp14-21.
4. pp49, 58, 60-1.
that the transcendental unity of apperception is identical
with the consciousness of the necessary unity of the
synthesis of all appearances according to concepts. It
may seem a bit misleading to describe this paragraph as
containing an argument for the proposition that the tran-
scendental unity of apperception. I say this because the
unargued premiss of the paragraph (for which Kant does not
argue anywhere in the first edition deduction) — viz. the
proposition that the transcendental unity of apperception is
impossible unless there is necessary unity of the synthesis
of all appearances according to concepts — seems a rather
hefty thesis simply to throw at people.

I presume that that to which Kant in this paragraph
refers as "a connection of all these representations [all
possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another
in one experience] according to law" and "a consciousness
of [a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances
according to concepts" is identical with that to which at
A106 he referred as "the unity of consciousness in the
synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions". I presume
this because the expressions resemble one another and,
again, I would rather not multiply Kantian concepts beyond
necessity. Also it is difficult to fit the paragraph I am
discussing in with what went before it and what comes after
it unless this identification is made.

However the identification creates two difficulties.

One of these difficulties is that perhaps the most natural
way to interpret "a consciousness of [a] necessary unity of
the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" is
to take it to mean "a consciousness of a necessary unity of
the synthesis of all appearances with each other according
to concepts". If this is how the expression is to be inter-
preted, then the above identification commits me to say that
"the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold
of all our intuitions" at A106 means "the unity of conscious-
ness in the synthesis of all our intuitions with each other".
However, as I mentioned above, it seems clear that Kant uses the expressions "the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions" (A106) and "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" (A105) interchangeably. As I also mentioned above, by the last mentioned expression Kant does not mean "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of all our representations with each other", but "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations contained in some one intuition". Thus I am committed to say that one should interpret "the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions" (A106) as meaning "the unity of consciousness contained in the synthesis of the manifold of representations contained in any intuition of ours" - a somewhat strained interpretation. Also, this interpretation is incompatible with the interpretation which I am committed to give to this expression if (a) it is to be taken to refer to the same thing as "a consciousness of [a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" and (b) the latter expression is to be taken as meaning "a consciousness of [a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances with each other according to concepts".

However, it may not be necessary to reject the identification of the respective references of "the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions", (A106) and "a consciousness of [a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108) in order to wriggle out of this difficulty. I say this because, just as the A106 expression admits of a somewhat strained interpretation, so does the A108 expression.

The verb "to put together" can be used in two ways. We can speak of putting the fragments of Humpty Dumpty together again, and we can speak of putting Humpty Dumpty together again. "To synthesise" comes from the Greek for "to put together".  

1. p55.  
2. p52.
together", and also can be used in these two ways. Thus, as well as admitting of the interpretation "a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances with each other according to concepts", the expression "a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108) admits of the interpretation "a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of the representations contained in the manifold contained in each appearance". This interpretation is equivalent to the interpretation which I am committed to give to the expression at A106.

"A connection of all these representations [all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience] according to laws" (A108) admits of the same two interpretations as "a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108), owing to an ambiguity in the word "experience" which Kant mentions at A110 at the start of passage 4. "Experience" can mean "the sum total of the empirical representations a person has had during his life" and on the other hand can mean "empirical representation" (I have noted that Kant always uses it to mean "veridical empirical representation"). If "experience" is being used in the former sense at A108, then "a connection of all these representations [all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience] according to laws" means the same as "a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances with each other according to concepts". On the other hand, if "experience" is being used in the latter sense ("empirical representation"), then "a connection of all these representations [all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience] according to laws" means the same as "a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of the representations in the manifold

1. For what I believe to be quite powerful evidence in support of this interpretation, see below, pp110-13.

2. Above, pp64-6.
contained in each appearance according to concepts".

However, it is impossible to take "the synthetic unity of appearances in accordance with concepts" at A110 to refer to a relation which holds between the representations contained in an intuition of some one object\(^1\). It seems that we must take it to refer to a relation which holds between all the representations a person has ever had.

Another difficulty in taking it that synthetic unity is a relation which holds between all the representations a person has ever had (this difficulty arises independently of whether "a consciousness of [a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108) is to be taken to refer to the same thing as "the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions" (A106)) is that it creates serious trouble for my interpretation of "synthetic unity". It will be recalled that I am inclined to say that in the first edition Kant generally means by "synthetic unity" "copresence in consciousness, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or properties, which answer to the representations"\(^2\). This is obviously an untenable interpretation of "synthetic unity" if synthetic unity is a relation which holds between all the veridical representations a person has ever had (no-one has such a good memory and such a copious power of attention). H.J. Paton interprets 'synthetic unity' as 'copresence in consciousness' in passages where this is convenient\(^3\) and blithely switches to interpreting 'synthetic unity' as 'universal and necessary coinstantiations between veridical impression-types' in the passages in the first edition deduction where synthetic unity seems to be a relation which holds between all the

1. See below, pp209-11
2. See above, p3.
veridical representations a person has ever had. Paton nowhere seems to note the inconsistency.

The second difficulty caused by identifying the reference of "a consciousness of [a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108) with the reference of "the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions" (A106), to which difficulty I alluded on p79, is a difficulty which I have already mentioned. The difficulty is that at A106-7 Kant says that transcendental apperception (which, as I have mentioned, Kant identifies with the transcendental unity of apperception) is the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, while at A108 he says that the transcendental unity of apperception is identical with a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, and his ground for saying this is that the latter is a condition of the former.

There is a strong temptation to believe that this proposition that consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts is a condition of the transcendental unity of apperception is what Kant intends to express when in the second edition deduction at B133 he says that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. One ground for saying this is that if the A108 assertion is not equivalent to the B133 assertion, then the A108 proposition never gets asserted in the second edition and the B133 proposition never gets asserted in the first edition, and Kant says that in the second edition he has not altered his proofs (although in some cases I believe this is not so;


2. pp49, 61.


4. However, I will end up inclined to say that the propositions are not the same. See below, pp114-36.

5. BXXXVii
for instance, an argument in the first edition at A120-2 occurs nowhere in the second edition, and I believe that there are changes in the argument for the first analogy in the second edition). Another and perhaps more compelling ground is that it seems that Kant means by 'the analytic unity of apperception' in the second edition something rather similar to what he means by 'the unity of apperception' in the first edition, and that Kant means by 'the synthetic unity of apperception' something similar to what he seems to mean by 'synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition' (A105) (which is equivalent to 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' (A105)) and by "the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis" (A103) and by "unity of the intuition" at A99 (I have argued\(^1\) that there is considerable pressure to take these expressions to refer to the same thing as "a consciousness of \([a]\) necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108)).

I have already\(^2\) mentioned some considerations which make it highly likely that Kant would identify the analytic unity of apperception with the consciousness of the identity of the self, which is that with which in the first edition\(^3\) he identifies what in the first edition he calls the unity of apperception. (However it will be recalled that the consciousness of the identity of the self seems to amount to consciousness of the identity of the self with a different thing in the second edition from the thing to consciousness of the identity of the self with which the consciousness of the identity of the self seems to amount in the first edition\(^4\)).

My evidence that in the second edition Kant means by 'the synthetic unity of apperception' something similar to 'co-presence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence

1. Above, p79.
2. pp73-4.
3. A108.
was caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations' (the sense I ascribed to 'synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition' (A105) and the similar expressions from A99, A103 and A105 which I mentioned above) is as follows:

In the second edition deduction, in §19, Kant says:

But if I investigate more precisely the relation of the given Erkenntnisse in any judgment, and distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding from the relation according to laws of the reproductive imagination which [relation] has only subjective validity, I find that a judgment is nothing but the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception. The copula 'is' in a judgment aims at this, in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. For it [the copula] signifies their relation to original apperception and its necessary unity, ...

It is unclear from this whether the objective unity of apperception is being identified with the objective unity of given representations. However, the title of §19 - 'The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Concepts which they contain' suggests...

1. The point I am making is obscured somewhat by Kemp Smith's translations here - viz. 'the objective unity of the apperception of the concepts' and 'synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of a priori sensible intuition'. It is one of the quirks of German grammar that in many cases both 'of' and 'of the' can be rendered by the genitive definite article 'des' (masculine and neuter) and 'der' (feminine). Hence 'Einheit der Apperzeption' is ambiguous. However 'the objective unity of the apperception of the concepts' is nonsense, since it implies that some particular apperception is of concepts, and in the sense in which Kant uses 'apperception' (see B68) apperception can only be of the self. The only intelligible translation of 'der objektive Einheit der Apperzeption der ... Begriffe' is 'the objective-unity-of-apperception of the concepts', which implies that one and the same unity is the unity of apperception and the unity of certain concepts. For further support of my view that the objective unity of apperception is to be identified with the objective unity of given representations, see below, pp90-3, and a longish parenthesis on p96.
that the objective unity of apperception is being identified with the objective unity of given representations. The same thing is suggested at B150, where Kant uses the expression 'synthetic unity of apperception of the manifold of a priori sensible intuition'.

The title of §19 also suggests that the given Erkenntnisse to which Kant refers when he says that a judgment is nothing but the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception are the subject-concept and the predicate of the judgment.

If we do grant that the Erkenntnisse which Kant has in mind are concepts, then that the concepts he has in mind are the subject-concept and predicate of the judgment is I think shown by the final sentences in §19:

Only in this way [i.e. through the Erkenntnisse which Kant has in mind belonging to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions] does this relation [this relation is a certain relation which holds between the Erkenntnisse which Kant has in mind; Kant does not say what it is; I am going to argue that it is copresence in consciousness] become a judgment, that is, a relation which is objectively valid, and is adequately distinguished from a relation of the very same representations in which there was merely subjective validity e.g. a relation in accordance with laws of association. In the latter case I could only say 'If I support a body, I feel an impression of weight'; I could not say 'It, the body is heavy'. What the latter sentence says amounts to this: These two representations are combined in the object, i.e. combined regardless of the state of the subject, and are not merely together in the perception (however often it may be repeated).

However, there are two interpretations which (a) conflict with each other and with the interpretation that the given-Erkenntnisse - in any-judgment of which Kant speaks, and

1. See p85 n.1
objective unity of which Kant (I have argued\(^1\)) identifies with the objective unity of apperception, are the subject-concept and predicate of the judgment and (b) receive some support from the text.

One of these interpretations is that it is only in the case of categorical judgments that the Erkenntnisse-in-any-judgment of which Kant speaks are the subject-concept and predicate of the judgment, and that in a hypothetical judgment or a disjunctive judgment the Erkenntnisse of which Kant speaks are two judgments— in a hypothetical judgment, the antecedent and the consequent, and in a disjunctive judgment, the two disjuncts. This is clearly a preferable interpretation to the interpretation that in every case Kant would say that the Erkenntnisse-in-a-judgment which he mentions are the subject-concept and predicate of the judgment, which interpretation is flatly incompatible with the first paragraph of §19 (The view implied there that the relation between the disjuncts of a disjunctive judgment is the same as the relation between the subject-concept and predicate of a categorical judgment is obviously a non-starter).

The other of the two interpretations to which I have alluded above\(^2\) is that the given Erkenntnisse which Kant says are in any judgment J, and objective unity of which Kant identifies with the objective unity of apperception are not concepts or judgments, but intuitions of property-instances of the properties represented by the concepts or judgments. This interpretation is supported by the fact that in the last-quoted passage from §19 Kant makes out that a relation which only has subjective validity can hold between the very same representations as a relation which has objective validity, and seems to give as an example of a relation with subjective validity and a relation with

1. pp85-6.
2. pp86-7.
objective validity holding between the same representations its being the case that if I support a body I feel an impression of weight and its being the case that the body is heavy. In speaking of its being the case that if I support a body I feel an impression of weight Kant seems to have uppermost in his mind a relation between intuitions. If so, then the relation he has in mind when he speaks of the body being heavy (he identifies this relation with the judgment) would have to be a relation between two intuitions (since Kant makes out that this relation would hold between the same representations as the first-mentioned one). However, it is possible that when Kant speaks of its being the case that if I support a body I feel an impression of weight he has in mind a relation between the concept of a body and the concept of weight.

More powerful evidence that the Erkenntnisse-in-any-judgment of which Kant speaks, and objective unity of which he identifies with the objective unity of apperception, are intuitions is the fact that Kant says that the representations in a judgment belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions. This is not knockdown evidence, since it is possible that Kant has in mind the synthesis of each of our intuitions, and that he is speaking in a manner analogous to speaking of putting Humpty Dumpty together. In this case the things which are synthesised with each other in the synthesis of intuitions of which Kant speaks may not be intuitions, but instead, at least in the case of a categorical judgment, a pair of concepts under which the intuition falls (the subject concept and predicate of a judgment about the object pictured by the intuition).

I am on the whole inclined to say that, at least in the case of a categorical judgment, the given Erkenntnisse in a judgment of which Kant speaks are, except perhaps in the

1. B142.
case of a singular judgment, the subject-concept and predicate of the judgment. Perhaps in the case of a singular judgment he would say that the representations-in-a-judgment of which he speaks are an intuition-of-the-subject-of-the-judgment and the predicate of the judgment. I doubt very much that Kant would describe any Erkenntnisse other than the subject concept or an intuition of the subject and the predicate of a judgment as 'the given Erkenntnisse in any judgment', at least given that Kant makes out that there are two such Erkenntnisse in every judgment. That the Erkenntnisse in a judgment which Kant mentions are generally both concepts (which would be the case if the only exceptions were in the case of singular judgments) is confirmed by the title of § 19: "The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Concepts which they contain". In § 20 Kant sums up what he believes he has established in § 19 as follows: "But that act of the understanding by which the manifold of given representations (be they intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments (§ 19)."

This is consistent with the view that (at least in the case of a categorical judgment) the given Erkenntnisse of which Kant speaks in § 19, and the objective unity of which he identifies with the objective unity of apperception are (in the case of universal and particular judgments) the subject-concept and predicate of the judgment or (in the case of singular judgments) an intuition of the subject and the predicate of the judgment.

1. However I agree with Paton (Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Vol 1 p282) that in the sentence "The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition;" (A79=B104-5) the various representations in a judgment are intuitions which fall under the predicate of the judgment.

2. In the above quotation from § 20, as in the title of § 19, Kant seems to forget his view that hypothetical and disjunctive judgments contain a relation "not of concepts but of judgments".
In the quotation from §20 it is clear that Kant is identifying the given Erkenntnisse in any judgment which he mentions in §19 with a manifold of given representations which relate to an object. I add the words "which relate to an object" because Kant would not say that a relation which is objectively valid (i.e., according to Kant (B142), a judgment) holds between a manifold of representations which do not relate to an object. As I have mentioned above, in the first sentence in §20—"The manifold-given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to \( \text{gehört notwendig unter} \) the original synthetic unity of apperception, because through this alone is the unity of the intuition possible"—Kant must be using "intuition" in a sense implying veridicality. Hence "the manifold-given in a sensible intuition" in the sense in which Kant is using the expression means "a manifold of representations which relate to an object". Thus Kant in §§19 and 20 identifies the manifold-given in a sensible intuition with the Erkenntnisse in any judgment which he mentions in §19.

Thus, since it seems that Kant identifies the objective unity of Erkenntnisse-in-any-judgment which he mentions in §19 with the objective unity of apperception, it seems that he would identify the objective unity of the manifold given in a sensible intuition with the objective unity of apperception. It will be recalled that in §19 Kant says

The copula 'is' in a judgment aims at this \([\text{the bringing of given Erkenntnisse to the objective unity of apperception}], in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective.\)

Kant has said that a judgment is the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception. Thus, since I take it that the objective unity of

1. p71.
2. pp85-6.
3. I quoted this sentence above, p85.
apperception is identical with the objective unity of given representations, I am committed to say that Kant would say that a judgment is the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of representations. This would lead one to think that Kant would not identify the judgment and the objective unity of representations. A few lines further down Kant says

Only in this way [i.e. through the Erkenntnisse which Kant has in mind belonging to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions] does this relation [as I mentioned on the first occasion on which I quoted this passage¹: this relation is a certain relation which holds between the Erkenntnisse which Kant has in mind; Kant doesn't say what it is; I will end up arguing that it is copresence in consciousness] become a judgment, that is, a relation which is objectively valid, and is adequately distinguished from a relation of the same representations in which there was merely subjective validity e.g. a relation in accordance with laws of association.

Here Kant identifies a judgment with a relation of representations which is objectively valid. Thus, since I am committed to say by the first of the above two passages from § 19 which I have quoted that Kant would say that a judgment is the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of representations, and this would lead one to think that Kant does not identify the judgment and the objective unity of representations, it may seem that I am committed to say that Kant would not identify an objective unity of given representations with the relation of representations which is objectively valid. This seems to be an unsatisfactory conclusion with which to be landed, since it is difficult to see how there can be two different relations which can hold between representations, both of

¹. p86.
which can be described in some cases as objective and in other cases as subjective.

This may seem to place pressure on me to abandon my identification of the objective unity of apperception and the objective unity of given representations since it was in virtue of this identification that the first of the above passages committed me to say that Kant would say that a judgment is the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of given representations.

However I think there is another way out of the difficulty viz. to say that Kant's two statements as to what a judgment is are inconsistent with each other. I believe that there are considerations which make an ascription of inconsistency here plausible. On Kant's first characterisation of what a judgment is ('the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception') a judgment is a process, or perhaps an event. On Kant's second characterisation of what a judgment is ('a relation [of representations] which is objectively valid') a judgment is a state. Thus the characterisations are certainly inconsistent. I think it highly likely that Kant would say that the state with which he identifies a judgment in his second characterisation of what a judgment is is the product of the process (or perhaps rather, event) with which Kant identifies a judgment in his first characterisation of what a judgment is. 'Judgment' does commonly have a process-product ambiguity, although the usual sense of 'judgment' in which a judgment is a product is not, I presume, what Kant means by 'a relation of representations which is objectively valid'; but rather (at least in the case of a judgment of subject-predicate form) 'a belief that a relation of representations is objectively valid'. I believe that it is due to confusion that Kant gives 'relation [of representations] which is objectively valid' as a definiens of 'judgment'. Anyhow, it is plausible
to say that Kant would say that a judgment in the sense 'a relation of representations which is objectively valid' is the product of a judgment in the sense 'the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception'. The conjunction of this and the supposition that the objective unity of given representations is identical with the relation of representations which is objectively valid of which Kant speaks (which supposition I argued above there is pressure to make) is not incompatible with the objective unity of apperception being identical with the objective unity of representations. In fact the conjunction of (a) the supposition that the objective unity of given representations is identical with the relation of representations which is objectively valid of which Kant speaks and (b) the proposition that the objective unity of apperception is identical with the objective unity of given representations entails that a judgment in the sense 'a relation of representations which is objectively valid' is the product of a judgment in the sense 'the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception'. Thus, given that Kant would say that a judgment in the sense given by his second definition is the product of a judgment in the sense given by his first definition, the fact that Kant gives the definitions of 'judgment' that he does gives some confirmation to the view that Kant would identify the objective unity of apperception and the objective unity of given representations.

I have argued above that it seems very likely that Kant would identify the objective unity of representations with the relation of representations which is objectively valid which he mentions. The conjunction of the proposition that Kant would make this identification and the proposition that Kant would identify the objective unity of apperception and the objective unity of given representations entails

1. pp91-2.
2. For further confirmation of this, see a longish parenthesis on p96.
that Kant would identify the relation of representations which is objectively valid which he mentions and the objective unity of apperception.

In §18 Kant identifies the transcendental unity of apperception with the objective unity of apperception and opposes the objective unity of apperception to the subjective unity of consciousness. I have already mentioned that Kant sometimes uses the expression 'unity of consciousness' to mean 'unity of apperception'. Thus I presume that by 'the subjective unity of consciousness' in §18 Kant means 'the subjective unity of apperception', since the subjective unity of consciousness is opposed to the objective unity of apperception. That Kant means by 'the subjective unity of consciousness' 'the subjective unity of apperception' is further supported by the fact that Kant seems to use the expressions 'the subjective unity of consciousness' and 'the empirical unity of apperception' interchangeably in §18 (as one would expect, since he uses the expressions "transcendental unity of apperception" and "objective unity of apperception" interchangeably), and towards the end of §18 it can be seen that he uses the expression 'empirical unity of apperception' interchangeably with 'the empirical unity of consciousness'. However, it seems that the expressions are not trivially interchangeable, since in the final sentence of §18 Kant bothers to give an instance to illustrate that the empirical unity of apperception has only subjective validity, which I presume is for the empirical unity of apperception to be describable as 'the subjective unity of apperception'. Here are the final sentences from §18:

That unity [the original unity of consciousness i.e. the transcendental unity of consciousness] alone is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception, which we are not considering here, and which besides is merely derived from the former under given conditions in concreto, has only subjective validity. One

1. pp68-9.
2. e.g. at A107, at A109 and B137.
man combines the representation of a certain word with one thing, another combines it with another thing; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical is not, as regards what is given, necessarily and universally valid.

Note that Kant uses the word 'combination' (Verbindung) interchangeably with 'synthesis'. Thus Kant at the start of the last sentence is saying that one man synthesises the representation of a word with one thing and another synthesises it with another thing. It is clear that Kant is here wishing to say that one man associates the representation of a word with the representation of one thing and another man associates the representation of the word with the representation of another thing. That this is given as an example of a synthesis whose product has subjective validity is very strong evidence that by 'synthesis' Kant means 'putting representations into consciousness together'.

That in the case of one man the representation of a certain word calls to mind the representation of one thing (via association) while in the case of another man the representation of the same word calls to mind the representation of a different object is given as an instance of its being the case that the empirical unity of apperception has only subjective validity (i.e., I presume, is describable as 'the subjective unity of apperception'). Thus the subjective unity of apperception it seems must be some relation which holds between the representation of a word and the representation of a thing after the former has called the latter to mind through association.

Furthermore, at the very top of B140 Kant makes out that the empirical unity of apperception arises through association of representations. Furthermore, if as I have argued²

1. See B130
2. See pp91-4. An earlier passage -pp85-6-, where I argue that the objective unity of apperception is to be identified with the objective unity of given representations, is also crucial here.
the objective unity of apperception is to be identified with the relation of representations which is objectively valid which Kant mentions at B142, then the subjective unity of apperception is to be identified with the relation of representations which has only subjective validity which Kant mentions at B142, and as an example of which Kant gives a relation of representations in accordance with laws of association. (I might note that the fact that Kant at the top of B140 makes out that the empirical unity of consciousness arises through association of representations, and that at B142 he makes out that in some cases the relation-of-representations with subjective validity which he mentions arises in accordance with laws of association confirms (a) that the empirical unity of apperception - i.e. the subjective unity of apperception - is to be identified with the relation-of-representations with subjective validity which Kant mentions at B142, and hence (b) that the objective unity of apperception is to be identified with the relation of representations which is objectively valid which Kant mentions at B142).

Thus the relation which holds between the representation of a word and the representation of a thing after the former has called the latter to mind through association, and which is to be identified with the subjective unity of apperception must be a relation of representations which arises through association.

Furthermore, the relation of representations with which we are to identify the subjective unity of apperception must be a subspecies of the unity of apperception simpliciter, and the unity of apperception simpliciter must be a relation of representations which also holds between the subject-concept and predicate of a judgment.

The only relation of representations of which I can think which meets all these requirements for a relation of representations to be identified with the subjective unity
of apperception is copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence does not have answering to it in the world a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or property instances, each of which objects etc. answers to one of the copresent representations. This relation (a) holds between the representation of a word and the representation of an object after the former called the latter to mind through association (b) was caused to hold between these representations by association and (c) is a subspecies of a relation which also holds between the subject-concept and predicate of a judgment—viz. copresence-in-consciousness simpliciter.

Thus I presume that in §§18 and 19 if Kant were to use the expression 'the unity of apperception' sans phrase he would say that its reference amounts to copresence-in-consciousness of representations.

Kant does not say in §§18 and 19 he has in mind the analytic unity of apperception or the synthetic unity of apperception. However, given that the unity of apperception of which he speaks in §§18 and 19 amounts to copresence in consciousness, it seems that the unity of apperception of which he speaks there must be the synthetic unity of apperception, since synthesis is connected with copresence in consciousness.

That Kant identifies the synthetic unity of apperception with copresence in consciousness is borne out by some of the innumerable formulations which Kant in §16 gives of the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. Some formulations of this proposition which bear this out are:

This thoroughgoing identity of apperception of a manifold

1. Note the difference between my translation here and Kemp Smith's ('the thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold ...')

Cf. above, p85 n.1.
given in the intuition\(^1\) contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis (B133).

That relation \([\text{relation of consciousness to the identity of the subject}]\) comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them (B133).

From these two formulations of the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception it is clear that the synthetic unity of apperception is the product of the synthesis of the representations contained in an intuition; this product is simply the copresence-in-consciousness of the representations contained in the intuition.

If synthetic unity of apperception is simply copresence in consciousness one might well wonder why Kant calls it synthetic unity of apperception. I presume that the explanation is that Kant calls it the synthetic unity of apperception simply because he holds that it is necessary for the analytic unity of apperception (the consciousness of the identity of the self), and hence for apperception.

Since it seems that Kant means by 'the synthetic unity of apperception' 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations', it seems that Kant means by 'the synthetic unity of apperception' something similar to what I am inclined to think that he means by 'synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition' (A105) - viz. 'copresence-in-consciousness

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1. Note the difference between my translation and Kemp Smith's ('in intuition'). 'In der Anschauung' is ambiguous. I believe it should be translated 'in the intuition', because a few lines earlier Kant spoke of 'the manifold representations which are given in a certain intuition' (Kemp Smith burkes 'certain' in his translation). See below, pp 101-2.
of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property instances, which answer to the representations'. I have argued above\(^1\) that there is strong pressure to take it that 'synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition' (A105) refers to the same thing as 'a consciousness of (a) necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts' (A108).

Thus there is both (a) pressure to take it that Kant in the second edition means something by 'the analytic unity of apperception' which is very similar to what in the first edition he means by 'the unity of apperception'\(^2\) and (b) pressure to take it that Kant in the second edition means by 'the synthetic unity of apperception' something very similar to what in the first edition he means by 'a consciousness of [a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts'\(^3\).

There is temptation to take it that the proposition that consciousness of a necessary unity in the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts is a condition of the transcendental unity of apperception is what Kant intends to express at B133 when he says that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception.

This brings me back to discussion of the second difficulty caused by identifying the reference of "a consciousness of [a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108) with the reference of "the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions" (A106)\(^4\). This difficulty was that at A106-7 Kant says that transcendental apperception (with which, as I have mentioned\(^5\) Kant identifies the transcendental

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1. p79.
2. See p84, where the reader is in turn referred back to pp73-4.
4. This difficulty was mentioned on p83.
5. pp67, 77-8.
The unity of apperception is the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, while at A108 he says that the transcendental unity of apperception is identical with a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts and his ground for saying this was that a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts is a condition of the transcendental unity of apperception.

The bearing on this of the above excursus into the second edition is as follows: If Kant at B133 is saying the same thing as at A108, the assertion at A106-7 that the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions is transcendental apperception is also incompatible with the statement at B133 that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception.

The above remarks on the second edition are also relevant to the first difficulty caused by identifying the reference of "a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108) with the reference of "the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions" (A106). This difficulty was that the most natural way to interpret "a consciousness of a necessary unity in the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108) is to take it to mean "a consciousness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances with each other according to concepts", while I am committed to say that "the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions" (A106) means "the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations contained in any intuition of ours". The bearing of the above remarks on the second edition on this difficulty is as follows:

1. I have mentioned, pp. 114-36, that I will end up inclined to think that he is not saying quite the same thing. See below, pp. 114-36.
2. pp. 79-82.
Whereas there is some pressure in the first edition passage where Kant says that synthetic unity is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self (Viz. A108) to take it that synthetic unity is something other than some sort of copresence in consciousness, owing to the fact that there is pressure to suppose that synthetic unity is a relation which holds between all the representations a person has ever had, in the second edition passage where Kant says that synthetic unity is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self (viz. B132-6) there is hardly any pressure to take it that synthetic unity is something other than copresence in consciousness, since virtually all the evidence strongly supports the interpretation that synthetic unity is a relation each instance of which holds between a small collection of representations.

It seems that in many cases, at least, an instance of synthetic unity holds between the representations contained in some one intuition. This is obscured by Kemp Smith's translation. The following expressions are ambiguous: 'alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung'\(^1\) ('all the manifold of the\(^2\) intuition' cf. 'all the manifold of intuition'), 'eines in der Anschauung gegebenen Mannigfaltigen'\(^3\) ('of a manifold which is given in the\(^2\) intuition' cf. 'of a manifold which is given in intuition'), 'in der Anschauung gegebene Vorstellungen'\(^4\) (representations given in the intuition' cf. 'representations given in intuition'), 'in der Anschauung, die davon [von dem Ich] unterschieden ist, kann es [etwas Mannigfaltiges] nur gegeben ... werden'\(^5\) ('only in the intuition, which is distinct from the I, can a manifold be given' cf. 'only in intuition, which is distinct from the I, can a manifold be given'). In each

1. B132
2. The italicisation of the definite articles is mine.
3. B133
4. B134
5. B135
pair of alternative translations the latter is the translation Kemp Smith gives. On the former translation in each pair, when Kant speaks of synthetic unity holding between the representations in an in der Anschauung gegebenen Mannigfaltigen¹ he is speaking of synthetic unity holding between the representations in a manifold contained in some one representation. On the latter translation in each pair when Kant speaks of synthetic unity holding between the representations in an in der Anschauung gegebenen Mannigfaltigen he is simply speaking of synthetic unity holding between representations in an intuitively cognized manifold, and one would not presume that the representations in the manifold mentioned are all contained in some one representation.

That the former translation in each pair is the correct one is shown by the fact that Kant at B132 refers to the sort of manifold he has in mind as 'die mannigfaltigen Vorstellungen, die in einer gewissen Anschauung gegeben werden', i.e. 'the manifold representations which are given in a certain intuition'. Here it is clear that the manifold referred to is contained in some particular representation. Kemp Smith in his translation blunts the effect of this passage by omitting the word 'certain'. At B135 Kant says that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception states the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition ('in einer Anschauung'). Kemp Smith omits the indefinite article.

It will be recalled² that Kant's remarks in §20 commit him to identify the manifold given in a sensible intuition with the Erkenntnisse-in-any-judgment which he mentions in §19. I have argued³ that it is likely that these Erkenntnisse are, in the case of a singular categorical judgment,

1. i.e. an in-(the ?)-intuition-given manifold.
2. See p90.
an intuition of the subject of the judgment and the predicate of the judgment, and in the case of a particular or a universal categorical judgment, the subject concept and the predicate of the judgment. I presume that in the case of a particular or a universal judgment he would say that the manifold of which he speaks is contained in each of a number (in some cases a huge number) of different intuitions. Nevertheless the manifold of which he is speaking comprises a small number of representations (in fact it comprises two representations), and it seems that when he speaks of an intuition he has in mind a mental picture of some particular object. One sentence in §16 which might suggest that an instance of synthetic unity holds between all the representations a person has ever had also contains indications that an instance of synthetic unity only holds between the collection of representations contained in the mental picture of some one object. The sentence is given as a reformulation of the very sentence in which the expression 'the manifold representations, which are given in a certain intuition' occurs. Here are the sentences (in my translation of the second sentence I have given Kemp Smith's translation of 'allgemeinen' - viz. 'universal'; I will query this translation below):

For the manifold representations which are given in a certain intuition would not one and all be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self consciousness. That is to say¹, as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal [allgemeinen] self-consciousness, ..²

It may seem that for representations to stand together in one universal self-consciousness is for them to be ascribed to the self which is having them along with every other

1. 'That is to say' is omitted by Kemp Smith.
2. B132.
representation which that self has ever had. This would suggest that when Kant speaks of the consciousness of the identity of the self he has in mind the consciousness that all my representations are mine. If this were the case, then it would seem that when Kant makes out that synthetic unity is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self the synthetic unity of which he speaks must be some relation which holds between all the representations a person has ever had. However 'allgemein' is ambiguous. It can mean 'universal' but it can also mean 'common'. If Kant is speaking of the representations contained in an intuition standing together in one common self-consciousness then it seems likely that he has in mind simply the ascription of this smallish collection of representations to the same self.¹

There are places other than A108 in the first edition deduction where there is pressure to take it that Kant is making out that an instance of synthetic unity holds between all the veridical representations a person has ever had. I have already² mentioned that this pressure is overwhelming at A110.³ At A116 Kant identifies pure apperception with the thoroughgoing identity of oneself in [bei] all possible representations. This might lead one to think that the synthetic unity which Kant would say is necessary for the consciousness of this thoroughgoing identity holds between all possible representations. The same thing is suggested further down in A116, and in the long footnote on A117. On A125 Kant describes what he calls "the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature" as the "unity of nature" and as "synthetic unity". Thus here it seems that (a) an instance of synthetic unity holds between all

1. I have been assuming that representations standing together in one allgemeinen self-consciousness is the analytic unity of apperception. There is however some reason to believe that it is the synthetic unity of apperception. However this does not affect the point I have made about "allgemein".

2. Above, pp55-6, 82.

the representations a person has ever had and (b) synthetic unity amounts to universal and necessary co-instantiations among impression-types. At A129 there occur the following most perplexing sentences:

Now this very account of the way things are that all these appearances, and consequently all objects with which we can occupy ourselves, are one and all in me, that is, are determinations of my identical self - expresses a thoroughgoing unity of them [the appearances] in one and the same apperception as necessary. It is also however in this unity of possible consciousness that the form of all knowledge of objects (through which [form] the manifold is thought as belonging to one object) consists.

In the first of these sentences the unity of apperception seems to be a relation which holds between all the representations a person has ever had, while in the second sentence it seems to be a relation which holds between the collection of representations which are representations of some one object (i.e., I presume, the manifold of representations contained in some one intuition).

There are a number of passages which come after the transcendental deduction in which unity seems to be a relation which holds between all the representations a person has ever had. However I have not discovered any such passage which was introduced in the second edition.

There is no place in the second edition deduction where synthetic unity seems to be a relation an instance of which holds between all the representations a person has ever had (apart perhaps from the above-mentioned sentence from B132.

1. It will be recalled that this is the interpretation of 'synthetic unity' to which Paton tends to resort in paraphrasing such passages. See above, pp82-3.

2. The German expression which I translate as "account of the way things are" is "Vorstellung" ("representation").

3. e.g. A216=B263, A619=B647, A693=B721, A495=B523, A696n = B724n.
in which Kant speaks of representations standing together in one allgemeinen self-consciousness, and I have argued that this passage admits of a translation which does not suggest that an instance of synthetic unity holds between all the representations a person has ever had\(^1\).

The fact that there is some pressure to take it that "[a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108) refers to a relation an instance of which holds between all the representations a person has ever had of course makes one a bit uneasy about saying that Kant is saying the same thing at A108 as at B133.

Even if one grants that the expression refers to a relation which holds between the representations contained in an intuition (i.e. a mental picture of some one object), there is a consideration which might give one qualms about saying that Kant is saying the same thing at B133 as at A108. This consideration is that §19 indicates that Kant in the second edition has in mind as the representations contained in an intuition (at least in many cases) a pair of concepts which relate to the object pictured by the intuition\(^2\). This is also suggested by B131n.. On the other hand the only relevant evidence in the first edition suggests that when in the first edition Kant speaks of the representations contained in an intuition he has in mind intuitions of bits of the object pictured by the containing intuition.\(^3\)

However, this consideration does not inhibit me from thinking that Kant would make out that he is saying the same thing at B133 as at A108. This is because, firstly, the

1. See above, pp103-4
2. pp86-90.
3. See A102, A103, A105 and A120n. Note that at A105 Kant describes the sides of a triangle as predicates of it. This seeming confusion between bits and properties may go some way towards explaining how Kant can slide from identifying the representations contained in an intuition with intuitions to identifying them (at least in many cases) with concepts.
inconsistency I have just mentioned holds not only between the two editions, but between §19 and other parts of the second edition deduction. At B137-8, B154 and B162 it seems that the representations contained in an intuition are intuitions of bits of the object pictured by the containing intuition. Secondly, I suspect that Kant in §19 has an ulterior motive for discretely contorting his doctrines about synthetic unity - the contortion to which I allude being making out that, whenever mention of synthetic-unity-of-the-manifold-contained-in-an-intuition is made in a doctrine, the manifold referred to should be taken to be the *Erkenntnisse*-in-a-judgment to which Kant refers in §19, (which *Erkenntnisse* will in many cases be both concepts). The ulterior motive to which I allude is as follows: As I have mentioned¹ there is a gap in the argument-from-A104-to-A111, which argument culminates in the grand conclusion of the transcendental deduction - viz. the conclusion that the categories relate to all objects of experience. The gap is that there is no argument for the final step in the argument - the step from the manifold given in a sensible intuition being subject to the unity of apperception to the manifold given in a sensible intuition being subject to the categories. In the second edition deduction Kant tries to bridge this gap in §19 and the latter half of §20. In §19 he believes that he has proved the proposition "But that act of the understanding by which the manifold of given representations (be they intuitions or concepts) is brought under one apperception in general² is the logical function of judgments (cf. §19)".³ In the latter half of §20 he appeals to the claim that he made in the metaphysical deduction that in making a judgment of a certain form one is thereby applying the category corresponding to the form of judgment. He concludes from this

1. pp22-3.
2. Kemp Smith omits "in general".
3. The quoted sentence comes from §20.
proposition together with the proposition which he believes he has established in §19, that the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories. It might seem to be less problematic that the act of bringing it about that objective synthetic unity holds between the representations in the manifold contained in an intuition (which is that to which I take it that bringing the manifold of given representations under one apperception amounts) is a judgment if the representations in the manifold contained in an intuition were (at least in the case of a categorical judgment) the subject-concept (or perhaps, in some cases, an intuition of the object about which the judgment is made) and the predicate of the judgment. Hence I think it likely that Kant had an ulterior motive for identifying the manifold contained in an intuition with the Erkenntnisse-in-a-judgment which he mentions in §19. Thus I suspect that Kant would say that when in §20 he speaks of synthetic unity holding between the representations contained in an intuition he has in mind the same thing as when in the first edition he spoke of synthetic unity holding between the representations contained in an intuition, although in fact he has done a bit of a fiddle.

It will be recalled that I mentioned some pages back\(^1\) that in the expressions 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' (A105) and 'the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions' (A106) I was inclined to take it that by 'consciousness' is meant 'conscious states'. I mentioned however that my inclination to believe this is slightly weakened by the fact that I believe that 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' (A105) refers to the same thing as that to which 'the synthetic unity of apperception' refers in the second edition. The reference to apperception in the latter

1. pp68-70.
expression seems to make it quite likely that Kant intends a reference to the self when in the first expression he describes the unity of which he is speaking as a unity of consciousness - i.e. that Kant means by 'consciousness' here not 'conscious states' but 'conscious subject'.

It might be objected that if this was the case then, in referring to synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition as 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' at A105, Kant is expecting a curious act of clairvoyance on the part of his readers. I have said¹ that I believe that the reason why Kant in the second edition refers to synthetic unity as 'the synthetic unity of apperception' is that he holds that it is necessary for the analytic unity of apperception, and hence for apperception. Likewise, if in the expression 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' the word 'consciousness' means 'conscious subject', then Kant's reason for calling synthetic unity 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' is that synthetic unity is necessary for the unity of apperception (i.e., in second edition parlance, the analytic unity of apperception) and hence for apperception. However argument to show that synthetic unity is necessary for the unity of apperception is not given until A108. Thus, if by 'consciousness' is meant 'conscious subject', then at A105 the reader would be completely in the dark as to why synthetic unity should be called 'the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations'.

However at A105 Kant explicitly makes the assertion that synthetic unity is necessary for the unity of apperception: "This unity of rule determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which make the unity of apperception possible". If Kant explicitly states this at A105, then he

¹ above, p98.
would be prepared to imply it in the name he gives to synthetic unity at A105.

I have for a good many pages\(^1\) been bringing up considerations which are relevant to the interpretation of the unargued premiss of the paragraph at A108 which I have been discussing - viz. the premiss that synthetic unity is necessary for the unity of apperception. In saying that the premiss is that *synthetic unity* is necessary for the unity of apperception I am in a way closer to what there is temptation to believe to be a second edition formulation of the doctrine - viz. "the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity".\(^2\) However, in both formulations at A108 it is consciousness of an act which is the bringing about of synthetic unity which is said to be necessary for the unity of apperception (i.e. for the consciousness of the identity of the self). This is what is stated in some second edition formulations of the doctrine too (e.g. "this thoroughgoing identity of apperception of a manifold which is given in the intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is only possible through the consciousness of this synthesis"\(^3\)). It may be that it is this way of expressing the doctrine which provides the best clues for working out what Kant's grounds for the doctrine can be.

Here are the two formulations of the doctrine which occur at A108:

For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in [the(?)] *Erkenntnis* of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of the function whereby it [the mind] synthetically combines it [the manifold] in one *Erkenntnis*.

\(^1\) pp79-110.

\(^2\) B133.

\(^3\) B133.
For the mind would find it impossible to think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations and indeed to think this identity \textit{a priori}, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and makes possible their connection according to \textit{a priori} rules.

In the translation of the first of these formulations I have left the difficult word 'Erkenntnis' untranslated. Kant generally uses 'Erkenntnis' to mean 'veridical representation' (at A320=B376-7 he defines it as 'objective perception'). I believe however that Kant does sometimes use it to mean 'knowledge', which is how Kemp Smith translates it here. Kemp Smith's translation seems to fit in the case of the first token of 'Erkenntnis' in this sentence. If 'Erkenntnis' were being used to mean 'veridical representation' here, then 'the Erkenntnis of the manifold' could only refer to the intuition which contains the manifold, and it would be a strange way of referring to an intuition which contains a manifold to refer to it as 'the Erkenntnis of the manifold'. On the other hand, I think that in the case of the second token of 'Erkenntnis' the only tenable translation is 'veridical representation', or perhaps rather simply 'representation' (I have mentioned\textsuperscript{1} that it seems that Kant uses 'Erkenntnis' to mean simply 'representation' at A104\textsuperscript{2}). I say this because the second token of 'Erkenntnis' is preceded by 'einer', which could be translated by 'an' or by 'one'. I do not think it implausible to make out that the first token of 'Erkenntnis' is used in a different sense from that in which the second is used. If the second token

1. p30.

2. However see below, pp115-17, for evidence that 'Erkenntnis' is here being used to mean 'veridical representation'.

\textsuperscript{1} A104.\textsuperscript{2} A104.
of 'Erkenntnis' is being used to mean 'representation' - i.e. if Kant is saying that the unity of apperception would be impossible if the mind could not become conscious of the function whereby it (the mind) synthetically combines the manifold in one representation - then it seems very likely that in the next sentence ("The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts...") Kant means by "[a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances" "a necessary unity of the representations in the manifold contained in each appearance". I have above committed myself to say that it would definitely follow from 'Erkenntnis' being used in this sense in the first formulation of the premiss of the paragraph that Kant means by "[a] necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances" "a necessary unity of the representations in the manifold contained in each appearance", since I have said¹ that the unargued premiss of the paragraph is that the transcendental unity of apperception is impossible unless there is necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts. That this is what the premiss of the paragraph is is strongly suggested by the second formulation of the premiss, in which that which is said to be necessary for the unity of apperception is consciousness of the identity of the act whereby all synthesis of apprehension is subjected to a transcendental unity. I think it highly likely that the transcendental unity to which Kant refers is the necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts. If so then Kant in this sentence is saying that the transcendental unity of apperception is impossible unless there is consciousness of the bringing about of the necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts. I presume that he would say this if

¹ p79.
and only if he would say that the transcendental unity of apperception is impossible unless there is necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts. Thus I presume that the latter proposition is the fundamental premiss of the paragraph. If so, then it seems from the first formulation of the premiss that the synthetic combining of the manifold in one Erkenntnis is the bringing it about that there is necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts. Thus it seems that by "necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances" must be meant "necessary unity of the synthesis of the representations in the manifold in each appearance".

From a comparison of the two formulations of the premiss it seems that when Kant speaks of the function whereby the mind synthetically combines the manifold into one Erkenntnis he has in mind the act whereby the mind synthetically combines the manifold in one Erkenntnis. Kant is saying that the consciousness of the identity of the self would be impossible if there was no consciousness of the identity of this act of synthesis. In speaking of the identity of an act I suspect that Kant has been confused by his own confusing expression "the identity of the self". I have mentioned that since identity is a relation, this expression must be taken as equivalent to an expression of the form "the identity of the self and...and...etc.". I have mentioned that it seems that in the first edition the expression of this form which is to be taken to be equivalent with "the identity of the self" is "the identity of the self and the person existing a moment ago with whom one normally supposes it to be serially identical", and that in the second edition it is "the identity of (a) the self and (b) the person who is having one representation

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1. I do not intend 'in one Erkenntnis' to qualify 'manifold'. I intend it to modify 'combines'. This can be seen from the fact that Kant's words are "the identity of the function whereby it [the mind] synthetically combines it [the manifold] in one Erkenntnis".
which I would normally be inclined to call mine and is contained in an intuition A and (c) the people who are having all the other representations which I am normally inclined to call mine and which are contained in intuition A". However it seems that there is no expression of the form "the identity of the act whereby the mind synthetically combines the manifold in one Erkenntnis and...and..." which could express what Kant has in mind when he uses the expression "the identity of the act whereby the mind combines the manifold in one Erkenntnis". Thus I believe that this expression is meaningless. I presume that all Kant really would want to say is that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of the act whereby the mind synthetically combines the manifold in one Erkenntnis. That when Kant speaks of the consciousness of the identity of an act he really would only wish to speak of the act itself is confirmed (provided that Kant would claim that he is putting forward the same doctrine at B133 as at A108) by the following formulation of the B133 principle: "this thoroughgoing identity of apperception of a manifold which is given in the intuition contains a synthesis of the representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis" B133.

There does however seem to be a difference between the A108 doctrine and the B133 doctrine. At least the second formulation of the premiss at A108 suggests this. The second formulation says not that the consciousness of the entire process of synthetically combining the manifold in one Erkenntnis is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self, but that consciousness of a particular part of this process - viz. the subjecting of synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity - is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self. (Thus it seems that the second formulation of the premiss is more
specific than the first, which could - at least if when
Kant speaks of the consciousness of the identity of a
function he really simply wishes to speak of the con-
sciousness of an action - be read as saying that con-
sciousness of the entire process of synthetically combining
the manifold in one Erkenntnis). On the other hand, the
formulation of the B133 principle which I have quoted in
the previous paragraph says that consciousness of synthesis
is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the
self. I believe this to be not equivalent to the propos-
tion that consciousness of the act which subjects
synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is
necessary for consciousness of the identity of the self.
However, there are some complications here which I will
discuss below.¹

Note that for transcendental unity to be something to
which a synthesis is subjected, and not something which
inevitably results from synthesis, it could not be that to
which I have argued² that Kant refers as 'synthetic unity'
in §§18 and 19 in the second edition - viz. copresence in
consciousness. This should not surprise us, for two
reasons:

The first reason is that in the second edition Kant
makes out³ that not all unity is transcendental unity. He
makes out that there is empirical unity as well as trans-
cendental unity, and identifies transcendental unity with
objective unity and empirical unity with subjective unity.
Thus in the light of what Kant says in the second edition
we would not expect him to be using 'transcendental unity'
at A108 to refer to copresence-in-consciousness simpliciter,
but instead we would expect him to use it to refer to what
in the second edition he calls 'objective unity' - viz.

1. pp118-35.
2. pp94-8.
3. §18.
copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property instances, which answer to the representations.

The second reason why we should not be surprised that Kant does not use 'transcendental unity' at A108 to mean 'copresence in consciousness' is that Kant nowhere uses 'unity' to mean 'copresence in consciousness' in the first edition (apart, perhaps, from A121-2). In all places in the first edition in which unity involves copresence in consciousness (apart from A121-2) it seems that it amounts to what in the second edition Kant calls 'objective unity' (I believe that Kant would in the first edition call all synthetic unity 'transcendental'). Thus in the light of what Kant says in the first edition we would not expect him to be using 'transcendental unity' at A108 to refer to copresence-in-consciousness simpliciter, but instead would expect him to be using it to refer to copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property instances, which answer to the representations.

If 'transcendental unity' is being used in this sense in the second formulation of the premiss of the paragraph at A108 then for this formulation to be equivalent to the first formulation of the premiss 'Erkenntnis' would have to be being used in its strict sense - viz. 'veridical representation' in the first formulation of the premiss. Unless 'Erkenntnis' is used in a sense implying veridicality the subjecting of a synthesis of apprehension to transcendental unity (in the sense 'the bringing it about that the copresence-in-consciousness of representations which is the product of the synthesis has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-

1. See above, p3.
instances, which answer to the representations') is not an event or a process which is involved in the synthetic combination of the manifold in one Erkenntnis, and so would not be describable as something whereby the mind synthetically combines the manifold in one Erkenntnis. Hence the two formulations of the fundamental premiss of the paragraph, viz.:

For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in [the(?)] Erkenntnis of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of the function whereby it [the mind] synthetically combines it [the manifold] in one Erkenntnis.

For the mind would find it impossible to think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations and indeed to think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and makes possible their connection according to a priori rules.

could not be equivalent. Thus 'Erkenntnis' in the first of these formulations must be being used to mean 'veridical representation'.

Note that the reason why 'unity' at A108 cannot be taken to refer to copresence-in-consciousness simpliciter - viz. that Kant makes out that unity is something to which synthesis has to be subjected, which implies that unity does not inevitably arise from synthesis - is also the reason why

1. I suspect that what Kant really means here is 'the coming to know that the copresence-in-consciousness of representations which is the product of the synthesis has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations'. In this case he would here again be using the way of speaking of saying that something is the case when one means that it seems to be the case, or that one knows that it is the case. Cf. above, pp10, 12, 50-1, 67-8.
'unity' cannot be taken to refer to copresence-in-consciousness simpliciter in the discussion of synthesis of recognition at A103. I think it certain that Kant would identify the act whereby the mind subjects a synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity with the act of recognition which he has in mind at A103 – i.e. with the act of coming to realise that the ideas (in Hume's sense of 'idea') which are now copresent in consciousness are copies of impressions (in Hume's sense of 'impression') which occurred separately (and hence successively) a moment ago. I think that it is certain that Kant would identify the act whereby the mind subjects a synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity with this act of recognition because one would infer from A103 that the only requirement for synthetic unity which is wanting after an act of synthesis has been performed is this act of recognition.

I will now directly address myself to the question of whether Kant's statement at A108 that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of the act which subjects synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity can be taken to be equivalent to the statement at B133 that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of a synthesis. From what I have said it can be seen that this question amounts to the question of whether the act of recognition which Kant discusses at A103 is a synthesis in the sense in which Kant uses the word 'synthesis' at B133.

I above gave two interpretations of what Kant meant by 'synthesis of recognition'. One interpretation was that he simply meant 'synthesis accompanied by recognition' (taking 'synthesis' here in the same sense as that in which it is used in the expression 'synthesis of apprehension') – viz.

1. This act of recognition would only be sufficient for synthetic unity on the assumption that the recognized impressions are veridical. For further evidence that the act which subjects synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is this act of recognition, see below, pp156-7.

2. p22
'putting representations into consciousness together'). If this is the sense in which Kant uses 'synthesis of recognition', then an act of recognition is not identical with a synthesis of recognition, or with any other sort of synthesis which Kant mentions.

However that Kant should use the words 'synthesis of recognition' to mean 'synthesis which is accompanied by recognition' would be very strange. Another interpretation of 'synthesis of recognition' which I have suggested is 'synthesis in the sense which involves recognition', the sense to which allusion is being made being 'the coming to believe that different representations of bits-of-objects or property-instances are all representations of bits or properties of some one real object'.

I have no knowledge of any passage in which it is clear that Kant uses 'synthesis' in this sense. Kant's definition of 'synthesis' - viz. "By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of adding different representations to each other, and of grasping their manifoldness in one Erkenntnis"1 - would give the above sense to the word 'synthesis' if 'Erkenntnis' is here being used in the strict sense - viz. 'veridical representation'. However, I think this highly unlikely, for two reasons. Firstly, in the same passage Kant says that synthesis is that which gathers together the elements for knowledge and unites them to form a certain content. Uniting representations to form a certain content does not seem to involve coming to believe that there is any real object answering to that complex content of consciousness. Secondly, a few lines further on Kant says that knowledge in the strict sense does not arise until a synthesis has been brought to concepts. Thus it seems that merely in performing a synthesis one is not combining representations in one Erkenntnis-in-the-strict-sense - i.e. in one representation which is known to be veridical.

1. A77=B103.
However, it seems clear that when in the first formulation of the unargued premiss of the paragraph at A108 which I have been discussing Kant speaks of synthetically combining the manifold in one Erkenntnis he means coming to know that different representations of bits-of-objects (or perhaps of properties) are all representations of bits (or perhaps properties) of some one real object (otherwise the first formulation could not be equivalent to the second). One would expect Kant to use 'synthetic combination in one Erkenntnis' interchangeably with 'synthesis' in virtue of the fact that Kant at A77=B102-3 describes synthesis as the act of going through the manifold in a certain way, taking it up and combining it\(^1\), and as the act of adding different representations to each other and grasping their manifoldness in one Erkenntnis. Also, it can be seen from B129-30 that Kant uses 'combination' interchangeably with 'synthesis'. Hence it seems from the first formulation of the unargued premiss of the paragraph at A108 that Kant would use 'synthesis' to mean 'coming to know that different representations of bits-of-objects (or perhaps of properties) are all representations of bits (or perhaps properties) of some one object'.

If this is a sense in which Kant sometimes uses 'synthesis', then it is a sense of 'synthesis' in which synthesis involves recognition. If so, then it seems quite likely that Kant means by 'synthesis of recognition' 'synthesis in the sense in which synthesis involves recognition', and that the sense of 'synthesis' to which he is alluding is that which I have just mentioned.

In the above possible sense of 'synthesis' a synthesis could be identified with an act of recognition of the sort which Kant has in mind at A103, since in coming to know

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1. Here Kemp Smith uses 'to connect' to translate 'verbinden', the verb he usually translates as 'to combine'.
that the reproduced images which are copresent in consciousness are identical with certain sense impressions which occurred separately (and hence successively) a moment before (i.e. in recognizing the sense impressions) one achieves knowledge that different representations of bits-of-objects (or perhaps, rather, of properties) are all representations of bits or properties of some one object. This suggests a still more natural interpretation of 'synthesis of recognition' than 'synthesis in the sense which involves recognition'. The still-more-natural interpretation to which I allude is to take it that the 'of' in 'synthesis of recognition' is a genitive of apposition - i.e. that we should take it that 'synthesis of recognition' means 'synthesis in the sense in which synthesis is identical with recognition'.

The fact that the above considerations give some support to the hypothesis that Kant sometimes uses 'synthesis' in a sense in which synthesis is identical with recognition may buoy up our hopes that (a) the act of recognition which Kant describes at A103 is a synthesis in the sense in which Kant uses the word 'synthesis' at B133 and hence that (b) Kant's statement at A108 that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of the act which subjects synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity (which act I have argued is identical with the act of recognition which Kant has in mind at A103) is equivalent to the statement at B133 that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of a synthesis.

However, there are considerations which seem to dash our hopes. I mentioned above that when Kant in §§18 and 19 speaks of the objective and the subjective unity of

1. Assuming that the recognized sense impressions are veridical.
2. pp115-18
3. p 97
apperception he must have in mind the objective synthetic unity of apperception and the subjective synthetic unity of apperception. I have also mentioned\(^1\) that the only reason of which I can think why Kant should call the synthetic unity of apperception (which I have argued\(^2\) amounts to copresence-in-consciousness of representations) 'the synthetic unity of apperception' is that it is necessary for the analytic unity of apperception and hence necessary for apperception.

Hence, since both objective synthetic unity and subjective synthetic unity get called 'synthetic unity of apperception' (i.e. Kant speaks both of the objective synthetic unity of apperception and of the subjective synthetic unity of apperception), it seems that Kant must hold that subjective synthetic unity can fulfil the same role in making consciousness of the identity of the self possible as can be fulfilled by objective synthetic unity. Thus it seems that Kant is saying in §16 not that objective synthetic unity is necessary for consciousness of the identity of the self but that synthetic unity simpliciter\(^3\) is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self. The only sense of 'synthesis' in which synthesis is involved in the bringing about of copresence in consciousness is simply 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together'. This is of course the sense which I have argued\(^4\), that Kant assigns to 'synthesis' in his definitions of 'synthesis' (A77=B102-3, A99). Thus it seems that when Kant says at B133 that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of a synthesis he must mean by 'synthesis' 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together'. This is a different sense of 'synthesis' from

1. p98.
2. Above, pp84-98.
3. It will be recalled that I argued (pp94-7) that in §§18 and 19 Kant means by 'synthetic unity' sans phrase 'copresence in consciousness'.
4. pp3-4, 119.
that which I surmised might be what Kant means by 'synthesis of recognition', and in which a synthesis would be identical with an act of recognition, and hence with the act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity (i.e. a different sense of 'synthesis' from 'the act of coming to believe that different representations of bits-of-objects or property-instances are all representations of bits or properties of some one real object'). Thus if, as I have argued seems to be the case, Kant is saying in §16 that synthetic unity simpliciter is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self, then the A108 statement that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of the act which subjects synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity cannot be equivalent to the B133 statement that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of a synthesis.

That 'synthesis' at B133 is being used in the sense 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together' (from which it would follow that A108 statement cannot be equivalent to the B133 statement) is also supported by the following: Kant nowhere mentions synthesis of recognition in the second edition, and hence even if Kant means by 'synthesis of recognition' 'synthesis in the sense which involves recognition' (and not 'synthesis accompanied by recognition'), one would presume that he is not using 'synthesis' at B133 in a sense which involves recognition, but, is instead using it in the only sense with which the reader of the second edition has been confronted - viz. 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together', the sense in which I have argued that it is defined at A77=B102-3.

1. I am not certain that Kant would ever use 'synthesis' in the sense 'the act of coming to believe that different representations of bits-of-objects or property-instances are all representations of bits or properties of some one object.'
One consideration which might seem to buoy up our hopes that the A108 statement is equivalent to the B133 statement is the fact that at B130-1 Kant says:

But the concept of combination involves [führt... bei sich], besides the concept of the manifold and its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the manifold. Combination is representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity can therefore not arise from the combination; rather, through its being added to the representation of the manifold it [the representation of this unity] first makes the concept of combination possible.

Here we find Kant using 'unity' and 'synthesis' in senses such that Kant supposes that it does not follow from the concept of synthesis that synthesis results in synthetic unity. My initial reaction to this would be to suppose that Kant is using 'synthesis' to mean 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together' and that he means by 'unity' what in §§ 18 and 19 he calls 'objective unity' — viz. 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property instances, which answer to the representations'. This was the interpretation I adopted in passages in the first edition where Kant seems to make out that synthetic unity does not by definition arise from synthesis (A103, A108).

That this interpretation should be given at B131 may initially raise our hopes that the above-mentioned statements from A108 and B133 should be equivalent. This is because that that 'unity' should be used to mean 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations' in § 15 would lead us to
presume that he is using it in this sense in § 16. This of course would overcome my first objection\(^1\) to taking it that the A108 statement is not equivalent to the B133 statement. This first objection was as follows: "The B133 statement to which I have been alluding (viz. 'this thoroughgoing identity of apperception of a manifold given in the intuition contains a synthesis of the representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis') is given as a formulation of the doctrine 'the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of some synthetic unity'\(^2\). In the sense in which Kant is here using 'synthetic unity' (viz. 'copresence in consciousness') the statement that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of synthesis could not be a formulation of the above doctrine unless synthesis is used in a sense such that the statement that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of synthesis (B133) is not equivalent to the statement that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of the act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity (A108)". If Kant in his assertion that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception means by 'synthetic unity' 'copresence in consciousness, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property instances, which answer to the representations', then the statement that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of synthesis \textbf{would} be a formulation of the doctrine that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception if 'synthesis' is used in a sense such that the statement that the

1. pp121-3.
2. B133.
consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of synthesis (B133) is equivalent to the statement that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of the act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity (A108).

A further consideration which suggests that when Kant says that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception he means that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes what from §§18 and 19 it can be seen that Kant would call 'objective synthetic unity' is this: The title of §16 is 'Of the original synthetic unity of apperception'. From B139-40 it can be seen that 'the original unity of apperception' 'the transcendental unity of apperception' and 'the objective unity of apperception' are all names of the one thing. Thus one might expect, in virtue of the title of §16, that the synthetic unity of apperception which Kant in §16 says is necessary for the analytic unity of apperception is the objective synthetic unity of apperception.

Yet a third consideration which perhaps suggests this is as follows: The last two sentences in §16 are:

I am conscious of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of the representations which are given to me in an intuition, because I call them all - which amount to one [representation] - my representations. That (i.e., I presume, my calling all the representations my representations) amounts to my being conscious a priori of a necessary synthesis of them, which is called the original synthetic unity of apperception, under which all representations which are given to me stand, but under which they

1. For further comment on this second consideration, see below, p128.

2. It is a bit unclear whether this sentence should be translated like this or rather instead like this "... because I call them all my representations and call them all representations which amount to one representation".
must be brought by means of a synthesis.

There is temptation to take this to be a reformulation of the doctrine expressed by "the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of some synthetic unity". If the sentences are intended as exactly equivalent, then we are landed with the conclusion that in the last-mentioned of the two remarks the synthetic unity to which allusion is made is objective synthetic unity.

However, I think that it might well be that the last two sentences in §16 are not intended as exactly equivalent to "the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of some synthetic unity", but are rather intended as a statement of a special case of this principle - the special case being the case in which the analytic unity of apperception holds between the owners of representations which representations go together to make up a veridical mental picture of some one object. My reason for thinking this is that the sentences are a statement of necessary conditions of my being conscious of the identity of the self in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in an intuition. I have mentioned above\(^1\) that when Kant speaks of the manifold given in a sensible intuition in the first sentence of §20 he is using 'intuition' to mean 'veridical mental picture'. The same reasons as operate here press us to take it that at the start of §17 Kant is using 'intuition' in this sense. Thus I think it highly likely that Kant is using 'intuition' to mean 'veridical mental picture' in the second-last sentence of §16. If so, then Kant is here stating necessary conditions of my being conscious of the identity of myself in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in a veridical mental picture.

1. p71.
While Kant gives as a necessary condition of this that I should be conscious of the original (i.e. objective) synthetic unity of apperception, it seems quite likely that he would say that a necessary condition of my being conscious of the identity of myself in respect of a manifold of representations which are not given in a veridical intuition is that I should be conscious of the empirical (i.e. subjective) synthetic unity of apperception.

The fact that the title of §16 is 'Of the original synthetic unity of apperception' is not very powerful evidence that when Kant says "the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of some synthetic unity" the synthetic unity to which allusion is made is the original synthetic unity of apperception. All that the title indicates is that in the course of §16 we are going to be told something about the original synthetic unity of apperception. That 'something' could well be that it is a necessary condition of my being conscious of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of the representations which are given to me in a veridical mental picture that I should be conscious of the original synthetic unity of apperception.

A fourth consideration which suggests that the synthetic unity which Kant says is presupposed by the analytic unity of apperception is the original synthetic unity of apperception is as follows: When Kant says "I also call the unity of it [pure apperception] the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge arising from it" I presume he has in mind the analytic unity of apperception, since he has not yet mentioned the synthetic unity of apperception. However, if the analytic unity of apperception does not presuppose the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception, but merely presupposes synthetic unity of apperception (be it transcendental or empirical), then a priori
knowledge does not arise from it. In fact no knowledge whatsoever would arise from it.

One might try to reconcile the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception with the proposition that the empirical synthetic unity of apperception can play the same role in making the analytic unity of apperception possible as that which can be played by the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception as follows: On B140 Kant says that the empirical unity of apperception is merely derived from the transcendental unity of apperception under given conditions in concreto. Thus it seems that Kant would say that the empirical unity of apperception presupposes the transcendental unity of apperception. If this is the case, then the proposition that the empirical synthetic unity of apperception can play the same role in making the analytic unity of apperception possible as that which can be played by the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception is of course compatible with the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception.

I might say however that the only thing of which I can think which Kant could have in mind when he says that the empirical unity of apperception (i.e. the subjective unity of apperception) is derived from the transcendental unity of apperception (i.e. the objective unity of apperception) under given conditions in concreto is this: 'A necessary condition of one representation A calling another B to mind via association is that there should have been a constant coinstantiation of a representation-type $\alpha$, of which A is an instance, and a representation-type $\beta$, of which B is an instance. The instances-of-the-two-representation-types which accompanied each other would (at least

1. It will be recalled that I argued that this latter proposition is given some support by the very fact that Kant speaks of an empirical unity of apperception. See above, pp121-2.
for the most part) be veridical impressions (in Hume's sense). Thus, since association is the cause of the subjective unity of apperception, a necessary precondition of the subjective unity of apperception holding between two representations A and B is that the objective unity of apperception should on quite a number of occasions have held between instances of α and instances of β.' Kant says this at A100-1. (It is of course false. Representation A resembling representation B can also lead to A calling B to mind. However it seems from A100-1 that this did not occur to Kant).

If this is the reason why Kant thinks that the empirical unity of apperception presupposes the transcendental unity of apperception, then the nature of the presupposition is not such that its being the case that a priori knowledge arises from the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception would entail that this a priori knowledge also arises from the empirical synthetic unity of apperception. Thus the propositions (a) "The empirical synthetic unity of apperception presupposes the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception" (b) "a priori knowledge arises from the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception" and (c) "The analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception (i.e. presupposes that there is either transcendental or empirical synthetic unity of apperception)" do not together entail that a priori knowledge arises from the analytic unity of apperception. Thus the above attempted reconciliation of the proposition "The analytic unity of apperception presupposes the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception" with the proposition "The empirical synthetic unity of apperception can play the same role in making the analytic unity of apperception possible as that which can be played by the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception" does not reconcile the proposition "a priori knowledge arises from the analytic unity of apperception" with the proposition
"The empirical synthetic unity of apperception can play the same role in making the analytic unity of apperception possible as that which is played by the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception". Thus the fact that Kant at B132 makes out that there is a possibility of a priori knowledge arising from the analytic unity of apperception seems to indicate that when Kant says that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception he means that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception (i.e. the objective synthetic unity of apperception).

I have been listing considerations which might suggest that this is what Kant means here.¹ As I have mentioned², this would overcome my first objection³ to taking it that the statement

For the mind would find it impossible to think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations and indeed to think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and makes possible their connection [Zusammenhang] according to a priori rules (A108) is equivalent to the statement

this thoroughgoing identity of apperception of a manifold which is given in the intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is only possible through the consciousness of this synthesis (B133).

It will be recalled that the first of the considerations which I listed which might suggest that when Kant says that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic

1. For another consideration which might suggest this, see below, pp185-6.
2. pp124-6.
3. This first objection was first stated on pp121-3 and restated on p125.
unity of apperception he means that it presupposes the objective unity of apperception was connected with these sentences from B130-1:

But the concept of combination involves [führt...bei sich] besides the concept of the manifold and its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the manifold. Combination is representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity can therefore not arise from the combination; rather, through its being added to the representation of the manifold it [the representation of this unity] first makes the concept of combination possible.

This passage might also suggest that my second objection to taking it that the above quoted sentences from A108 and B133 are equivalent is unsound. This second objection was as follows: The act which Kant mentions at A108 which subjects synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is (I have argued) the act of recognition which Kant has in mind at A103. Thus the B133 statement could only be equivalent to the A108 statement if in the B133 statement Kant was using 'synthesis' in a sense in which an act of synthesis is identical with an act of recognition, or at least involves an act of recognition. I have argued that it is quite likely that Kant uses 'synthesis of recognition' to mean 'synthesis in the sense in which synthesis is identical with recognition' (the sense of 'synthesis' to which allusion is made here being 'the act of coming to know that different representations of bits-of-objects or property-instances are all representations of bits or properties of some one object'). However synthesis of recognition is nowhere mentioned in the second edition, and so one would presume that at B133 Kant is using 'synthesis' in the only sense of the word in which the reader of the second edition has found Kant using it – viz.

1. Which was stated above, p123
2. pp119-21
3. Or rather 'synthesis' in the sense in which synthesis is identical with recognition of impressions which are known to be veridical.
'the act of putting representations into consciousness together'. In this sense of 'synthesis' synthesis neither is identical with nor involves the act of recognition of which Kant speaks at A103.

However, although in the second edition the reader has nowhere found Kant using 'synthesis' in a sense in which a synthesis is identical with an act of recognition of the sort which Kant has in mind at A103, in the above-quoted sentences from B130-1 Kant seems to be using 'combination' in a sense such that a combination is identical with an act of recognition of the sort which Kant has in mind at A103, and Kant announced in B130 that he was going to assign the title 'synthesis' to the act of combination. I say that Kant in the above-quoted sentences is using 'combination' in a sense such that a combination is an act of recognition of the sort Kant has in mind at A103 for the following reason: 'Synthetic unity' at B130-1 is obviously being used in a sense in which synthetic unity is not by definition the result of synthesis. One is therefore tempted, as I mentioned above\(^1\), to adopt the same interpretation of 'synthetic unity' here as there is ground for adopting in the first edition in passages where Kant seems to make out that synthetic unity does not by definition arise from synthesis (A103, A108) — viz. 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations'. If so, then in the first of the above-quoted sentences from B130-1 the concept of combination is said to involve the concept of copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations, and in the second of the above-quoted sentences combination is said to be representation of copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxta-

1. p124.
position of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations. Note that here 'combination' is being used to refer to a state rather than an act. Like 'synthesis' 'combination' has a product-process ambiguity (so far I have only mentioned the sense of 'synthesis' in which a synthesis is a process). Thus if Kant were to use 'combination' at B130-1 in a sense in which a combination is a process he would use it to mean 'the act of coming to know that a copresence-in-consciousness of representations has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations'¹. I think it highly likely that Kant would identify this act of coming to know with the act of recognition which he has in mind at A103. Thus, in virtue of the fact that Kant had announced that he would assign the title 'synthesis' to the act of combination, it may seem that it is highly likely that Kant would use 'synthesis' in a sense in which a synthesis is identical with the act of recognition Kant had in mind at A103².

However, there is clearly an inconsistency between Kant's use of words in the above sentences from B130-1 and his use of words in the paragraph which preceded the quoted sentences. In the quoted sentence Kant says that the concept of combination involves the concept of synthesis and some other concepts besides, whereas in the previous paragraph he made out that he was going to use 'synthesis' and 'combination' interchangeably. The simplest explanation of what has happened seems to be that both in the previous paragraph and in the quoted sentences Kant uses 'synthesis' to mean 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together', but that while in the previous paragraph he uses 'combination' to mean 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together', in the quoted

1. If one is willing to call a collection of things that aren't stuck together one object, then this is equivalent to 'the act of coming to know that different representations of bits-of-objects or property instances are all representations of bits or properties of some one object'. I have used this expression above, pp119, 121, 123, 132.
sentences he slid to using it to mean 'the act of coming to know that a copresence-in-consciousness of representations has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations'.

Thus the above inconsistency lends weight to the hypothesis that although Kant in the preceding paragraph makes out that he will use 'synthesis' interchangeably with 'combination' in fact he only uses the words interchangeably when 'combination' is used in one of the two senses in which Kant uses it - viz. 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together', and that we should not infer from the fact that Kant sometimes uses 'combination' to mean 'the event of coming to know that a copresence-in-consciousness of representations has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property instances, which answer to the representations' that Kant would use 'synthesis' in this sense.

If we should conclude that Kant never (at least in the second edition) uses 'synthesis' in this sense, but always (at least in the second edition) uses it in the sense 'the act of putting different representations into consciousness together', then, as I have argued, the above-quoted statement from B133 cannot be taken as equivalent to the above-quoted statement from A108.

I have now completed my statement of pros and cons of taking it that Kant is saying the same thing at A108 as at B133. It will be recalled that the two major prima facie obstacles to taking it that Kant is saying the same thing in these two places were (1) that there is some pressure to take it that the synthetic unity of which Kant speaks at A108 is a relation an instance of which holds between all the representations a person has ever had, while there

1. The statements are quoted on p131.

2. Discussion of whether Kant should be taken to be saying the same thing at A108 as at B133 started on p 83.
is overwhelming pressure to take it that the synthetic unity of which Kant speaks at B133 is a relation an instance of which holds between a small collection of representations - viz. copresence in consciousness or some subspecies thereof -¹, and (2) that there is very strong pressure to take it that the synthetic unity of which Kant speaks at A108 is what in §19 he would call 'objective unity', while there is some pressure to take it that the synthetic unity of which Kant speaks at B133 is what Kant in §19 would call 'unity simpliciter'.²

I am more inclined to be dissuaded from saying that Kant is saying the same thing at B133 as at A108 by the second of these two considerations than by the first.

I mentioned above³ that since Kant's strategy in the transcendental deduction is to prove that the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience (the word 'experience' being taken in a 'got-it' sense), it is difficult to see how a refutation of idealism can contribute anything to the transcendental deduction. However, as I adumbrated above, on my interpretation of it the unargued premiss of the argument at A108

For the mind would find it impossible to think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations and indeed to think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and makes possible their connection according to a priori rules.

is incompatible with idealism and scepticism, provided that it is granted that the mind can think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations. This is because on my

1. This was discussed above, pp100-6, 111-13
2. This was discussed pp114-35
3. p66
interpretation the act of subjecting synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is the act of coming to know that a copresence-in-consciousness of representations has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations. Whether or not this thoroughgoing identity of apperception of a manifold which is given in the intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is only possible through the consciousness of this synthesis (B133) is incompatible with idealism and scepticism will depend on whether by 'synthesis' Kant means 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together' or 'the act of coming to know that a copresence-in-consciousness of representations has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits of objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations'. Although there are some considerations which seem to indicate that 'synthesis' is being used in the latter sense here¹, I am on balance inclined to think 'synthesis' is being used in the former sense², in which case the B133 statement is not equivalent to the A108 statement, and is compatible with idealism and scepticism. Similarly, whether the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of some synthetic unity (B133) (which I believe is intended as a reformulation of the other statement from B133 which I have quoted) is compatible with idealism and scepticism will depend on whether by 'synthetic unity' is meant what Kant in §19 would call 'objective unity' or instead what in §19 he would call 'unity simpliciter'. On balance I am more inclined to think that it means the latter, in which case the sentence would not be incompatible with idealism. If the above two statements from §16 (and

1. See above, pp124-34.
2. See above, pp121-3, 134-5.
other statements in §16 which are intended as reformulations of the proposition expressed by them) are not incompatible with idealism and scepticism, then there is nothing in the second edition deduction which is incompatible with idealism.

I will now consider what ground Kant might have for believing the premiss of the paragraph at A108. As I have mentioned Kant nowhere in the first edition gives any argument for this premiss.

He does however in a footnote to B133 give an argument for the proposition which is expressed by the two statements from B133 which I have just quoted.

In this footnote Kant starts out saying

The analytic unity of consciousness is attached to all general concepts, as such. E.g. if I think red in general, I thereby represent to myself a property which (as a property-instance [Merkmal]) can be found in something, or can be combined with other representations; therefore only by means of a presupposed possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytic unity.

It seems clear that the example is given to illustrate the proposition that the analytic unity presupposes the synthetic unity, and not to illustrate the proposition that the analytic unity of consciousness is attached to all general concepts as such.

I have no idea as to why the analytic unity of consciousness should be said to be attached to all general concepts as such, at least if the analytic unity of consciousness is to be identified with the analytic unity of apperception (as it seems must be the case) - i.e. with the consciousness of the identity of the self. I have never been able to work out why the consciousness of the identity of the self should be described as the analytic unity of
apperception. I have supposed that synthetic unity was called *synthetic* unity because it is the product of synthesis. However what Kant calls 'analytic unity' — viz. consciousness of numerical identity — does not seem to be the product of analysis. However, one would suppose that one had some idea as to why something called "the analytic unity of consciousness" should be said to be attached to all general concepts, provided that one was not told that that thing was to be identified with the consciousness of the identity of the self, and provided that one was under the impression that "consciousness" here means not "conscious subject", but "conscious states". On these provisos one would suppose that one had some idea as to why Kant should say that something called "the analytic unity of consciousness" is attached to all concepts, because he says "By means of analysis different representations are brought under one concept" (A78=B104). It seems from this that Kant holds that abstraction (the process of discovering that an intuition instantiates some particular concept) is a species of analysis (which is the process which takes place when one discovers that a concept contains some particular higher concept). One would expect Kant to hold this, since he seems to wrongly hold that the relation between an intuition and a concept under which it falls is the same as the relation between a lower concept and a higher concept which is contained in the lower concept. (That he holds this is suggested by his assertion "Thus in the judgment 'all bodies are divisible', the concept of the divisible applies [bezieht sich] to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept to certain appearances that present themselves to us "¹).

Thus on reading Kant's assertion "The analytic unity of consciousness is attached to all general concepts as such"

1. A68-9=B93
one might presume (a) that the unity of consciousness is a one-in-the-many - a thing which many things of which one has been conscious have in common -, and (b) that when Kant says that it is attached to concepts what he has in mind is that it is represented by concepts and (c) that the reason why Kant describes it as analytic is that one comes to be conscious of it by means of analysis. This interpretation would enable us to take 'unity' here to mean 'identity', which is what Kant means by it when he speaks of the analytic unity of apperception.

On the other hand, bearing in mind that Kant in §§18 and 19 means by 'synthetic unity' 'copresence in consciousness due to an act of synthesis', on reading the assertion "The analytic unity of consciousness is attached to all general concepts as such" one might presume (a) that by "unity of consciousness" here Kant means 'simultaneous representation'¹ and (b) that when Kant says that analytic unity of consciousness is attached to concepts he means that it is effected by concepts and (c) that the reason why Kant calls the unity of consciousness of which he speaks here 'analytic unity of consciousness' is that it is due to an act of analysis. Thus the interpretation I have just sketched involves taking 'analytic unity of consciousness' to mean 'simultaneous representation due to an act of analysis'. Since, as I have mentioned², Kant confuses the intentional object of a representation with the representation itself, it seems that he would confuse simultaneous representation due to an act of analysis with copresence in consciousness due to an act of analysis. If he would then he would (on the interpretation I have just sketched) suppose that there is a complete parallelism between his use of the expression 'analytic unity' and his use of the expression 'synthetic unity' - that by 'analytic

1. By 'simultaneous representation' I mean the relation '...is represented simultaneously with...'

2. p65.
unity' he means 'copresence in consciousness due to an act of analysis' and by 'synthetic unity' he means 'copresence in consciousness due to an act of synthesis'.

One would expect Kant to say that simultaneous representation of different things can be effected by a concept and due to an act of analysis because Kant says that a concept relates to \( (\text{bezieht sich auf}) \) the object "mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common" (A320=B377).

It is not clear whether what Kant says in this footnote is that for me to acquire a concept it is necessary that (a) a property instance of it should be represented in synthetic unity with other property instances of some one object (I presume this would amount to having an intuition which falls under the concept which I am to acquire) or (b) intuitions of different objects which fall under the concept should occur in synthetic unity with each other. That Kant would think (b) necessary is probabilified by the fact that he seems to think that I can only abstract away a concept if I have seen more than one object which falls under it. ¹ It seems clear that in this passage by 'synthetic unity' is meant 'copresence in consciousness \textit{simpliciter}', and not 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations'. I say this because Kant says that for the analytic unity to arise it is sufficient that there should have been synthetic unity holding between merely possible representations (I presume that by 'merely possible representations' here Kant means 'representations of merely possible things').

¹ See A653=B681.
Kant says that analysis presupposes synthesis at A78-9=B103 and B130. In both these places I am inclined to think that what he has in mind is that for me to acquire a concept it is necessary that (a) a property-instance of it should be represented in synthetic unity with other property instances of some one object.

Interpretation (a) as to what Kant has in mind when he speaks of synthetic unity in this footnote — viz. the view that he has in mind copresence in consciousness of property-instances of some one object — fits better with the interpretation I am inclined to give of what Kant says in the body of the text in §16. The synthetic unity of which he speaks there (and with which he seems committed to identify the synthetic unity of which he speaks in the footnote) is (at least in all the cases which he mentions) synthetic unity holding between the representations contained in some one intuition. I inferred from Kant's remarks in §§19 and 20 that when Kant speaks of the representations contained in an intuition he has in mind a collection of concepts (to be precise, it seems a pair of concepts) which relate to some one object. It fits better with this to make out that when Kant speaks of synthetic unity in the footnote he has in mind synthetic unity holding between a collection of representations of property-instances of some one object than to make out that when Kant speaks of synthetic unity in the footnote he has in mind synthetic unity holding between a collection of representations of objects which all fall under some one concept.

However, regardless of what interpretation of 'synthetic unity' is adopted, I cannot see that the argument in the footnote to show that the analytic unity of consciousness presupposes the synthetic unity of consciousness shows that the analytic unity of apperception (in the sense 'the consciousness of the identity of the self') presupposes the
synthetic unity of consciousness. I cannot see this because as I mentioned, I cannot see that the analytic unity of consciousness, in the sense of 'the analytic unity of consciousness' in which it is demonstrated in the footnote that the analytic unity of consciousness presupposes the synthetic unity of consciousness, is identical with the consciousness of the identity of the self.

It is not only in this footnote that Kant makes out that there is some special connection between the consciousness of the identity of the self and concepts. As I have mentioned¹, Kant seems to identify transcendental apperception with the transcendental unity of apperception at A107. Kant does not use the expression 'transcendental apperception' in the second edition. However, whereas in the first edition (at A107) Kant refers to transcendental apperception as 'a pure original unchangeable consciousness' and contrasts transcendental apperception with empirical apperception, in the second edition (at B132) Kant uses 'pure apperception' interchangeably with 'original apperception' and contrasts pure apperception with empirical apperception. Thus it seems clear that what Kant calls 'transcendental apperception' in the first edition he calls 'pure apperception' in the second edition. Hence it seems that Kant would identify pure apperception with what in the first edition he calls 'the transcendental unity of apperception' - viz. the analytic unity of apperception. At B132 Kant identifies the 'I think' with pure apperception. Hence it seems that Kant would identify the 'I think' with the analytic unity of apperception - i.e. the consciousness of the identity of the self.

At the start of the chapter on the paralogisms² Kant says that it is easily seen that "the concept or, if the

1. p67, pp77-8.
2. A341=B399
term be preferred, the judgment, 'I think' is "the vehicle of all concepts". Thus here as in the footnote at B133-4 he is making out that there is some special connection between the consciousness of the identity of self and concepts.

Another place where Kant makes out that there is a special connection between the consciousness of the identity of the self and concepts is in the sentence from A107: "The numerical unity of this apperception is thus the a priori ground of all concepts". In my discussion of this passage above¹, I said that I believed that this proposition was derived from the propositions (1) that transcendental apperception (i.e. the consciousness of the identity of the self, which I presume is that to which Kant refers as "the numerical unity of this apperception") is the original and transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions (A106-7) and (2) that a concept is nothing but the consciousness of the unity of a synthesis (i.e. unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions) (A103).

I know of no other place where Kant makes out that there is a special connection between the consciousness of the identity of the self and all concepts. Of course the final stage of the argument which stretches from A98 to A112 is that it is necessary for there to be unity of apperception that the categories should relate to all appearances. However this is only a connection between the categories and the unity of apperception - not a connection between any old concepts and the unity of apperception.

The argument in the footnote on B133-4 is the only argument the Critique which is expressly given as an argument to show that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. However

¹. p78
there is a remark in §25, in the second edition transcendental deduction, which might be supposed to suggest a ground which Kant might have for saying that the consciousness of the identity of the self presupposes consciousness of synthetic unity. The remark to which I allude is "I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination;" (B158). The only hypothesis which occurs to me as to why Kant should say this is that he supposes that the conception of the self is no more than the conception of a synthesiser of the manifold. I have been inclined to express this interpretation thus: 'Whereas Hume conceives of the self as a show, Kant conceives of it as a stage-manager'. When I said 'a stage-manager' I did not have in mind a homunculus; this would involve an infinite regress. I simply had in mind a cause of the disposition of props and players on the stage. However this is still an inaccurate expression of the interpretation, since a stage-manager does not only put things on stage together. He sometimes brings out a character by himself to perform a soliloquy. The view that the conception of the self is the conception of the unknown immediate cause of our representations occurring when they do is perhaps plausible enough to make its ascription to Kant prima facie plausible. However, in the absence of any argument in support of it, the view that the conception of the self is the conception of the unknown somewhat which synthesises the manifold seems utterly whimsical. The self is commonly supposed to do so many different sorts of things (e.g. perceiving, having emotions, having concepts, intending), that it would seem to be arbitrary to pick on synthesis out of all these different sorts of acts, and make out that there is a special conceptual connection between synthesis and the self. However since Kant simply asserts "I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of
combination" without seeming to think it necessary to
give any argument for it - apart from to point out that
one does not have any intuition of oneself, and so one
cannot have abstracted one's conception of oneself from an
intuition of oneself\(^1\) - one is led to suppose that Kant
does suppose that one's conception of oneself is a con-
ception of nothing other than an unknown somewhat which
synthesises the manifold.

While the view that the conception of the self is
simply the conception of an unknown somewhat which synth-
esises the manifold is whimsical if by 'synthesis' is
meant 'the act of putting representations into conscious-
ness together', the view seems ludicrous if by 'synthesis'
is meant 'the act of coming to know that answering to a
copresence-in-consciousness of representations there is a
juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or property-
instances, which answer to the representations'. This, it
will be recalled, is the sense in which 'synthesis' would
have to be taken for

This thoroughgoing identity of apperception of a
manifold which is given in the intuition contains
a synthesis of representations, and is only
possible through the consciousness of this synth-
esis (B133).

to be incompatible with scepticism and idealism\(^2\), and for
it to be equivalent to

For the mind would find it impossible to think its
identity in the manifoldness of its representations,
and indeed to think this identity \textit{a priori}, if it
did not have before its eyes the identity of its
act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension
(which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and
makes possible their connection according to \textit{a priori}
rules (A108).\(^3\)

1. Kant seems to be saying this in the footnote at B157-8.
2. p137.
3. See pp118-21, pp122-3
If 'synthesis' is meant 'the act of coming to know that a copresence-in-consciousness of representations has answering to it a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations', then the view that the concept of the self is the concept of an unknown somewhat which synthesises the manifold involves saying that it is involved in the very concept of the self that the self is aware of external objects. If Kant does hold this view, one would not expect him to imply it at B158 and give no argument for it other than to say that one has no intuition of oneself. I say this because the view is so controversial. In the second edition Refutation of Idealism Kant gives an argument to show that I could not be conscious of my own existence as determined in time unless I am aware (in a 'got-it' sense) of external objects. This does not seem to involve saying that it is involved in the very concept of the self that the self is aware (in a 'got-it' sense) of external objects.

Thus, unless when Kant says "I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination" he means by "combination" simply "the act of putting representations into consciousness together", it seems that his ground for this assertion cannot simply be that the concept of the self is simply the concept of an unknown combiner of the manifold. Thus the remark at B158 sheds no light on what Kant's ground is for saying

For the mind would find it impossible to think its identity in the manifold of its representations, and indeed to think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and makes possible their connection according to a priori rules (A108).
I say this because, as I have argued above, Kant is here saying that consciousness of an act of recognition of the sort Kant has in mind at A103 is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self, and this is not entailed by the proposition that an act of synthesis in the sense 'act of putting representations into consciousness together' is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self.

The proposition that the concept of the self is the concept an unknown somewhat with synthesises the manifold of course entails that consciousness of synthesis is necessary for consciousness of the self, and hence that consciousness of synthesis is necessary for consciousness of the identity of the self. However, it does not entail that consciousness of synthesis is sufficient for consciousness of the identity of the self. It seems that Kant says that consciousness of synthesis is sufficient for consciousness of the identity of the self at B144n, where he says "This unity of the intuition [the unity-of-the-intuition, by which an object is given] always includes in itself a synthesis of the manifold given for an intuition, and so already contains the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception". Thus even if by 'synthesis' in §§16-20 Kant means simply 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together' (which, as I have argued¹, is a necessary condition of it being at all plausible to make out that Kant's ground for "I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination" is that the concept of the self is nothing but the concept of an unknown somewhat which synthesises the manifold) it seems that the remark "I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination" does not shed light on Kant's ground for his views.

¹. pp146-8
as to the connection between consciousness of the identity of the self and consciousness of synthesis in the second edition.

I don't know what Kant's ground for the premiss of the paragraph at A108 could be. Nor do I know what Kant's ground for the B133 doctrine that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception could be.

If, as I have argued, the act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is the act of recognition which Kant mentions at A103, then it seems that the material at A98-A104 does contribute something to the argument at A104-A112. This contribution would be to explain what the act whereby the mind subjects all synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is.

Having discussed the premiss of the paragraph at A108 which I have been discussing¹, I will discuss the inference from this premiss to the conclusion of the paragraph. The premiss of the paragraph - which is, I have argued, that consciousness of the act of recognition which Kant mentions at A103 is necessary for consciousness of the identity of the self - is, as I have mentioned², given two formulations, which in Kemp Smith's translation are the second and fourth sentences of the paragraph (The fourth sentence is the last sentence in the paragraph in Kemp Smith's translation. However in the German there is no change of paragraph after this sentence). The conclusion of the paragraph - that the consciousness of the identity of the self is identical with the consciousness of synthetic unity - is expressed by the third sentence of the paragraph.

In the sense in which Kant uses 'synthetic unity' in the first edition, at least in passages in which synthetic unity

1. Discussion of this premiss began on p78.
2. pp110-1.
seems to be a relation which holds between a small collection of representations, and not between all the representations a person has ever had\(^1\) (viz. 'copresence in consciousness, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations') is the product of an act of recognition of the sort which Kant has in mind at A103.\(^2\) Thus Kant's inference in the paragraph I have been discussing is from the proposition that consciousness of an act of recognition is necessary for consciousness of the identity of the self to the proposition that consciousness of the identity of the self is identical with consciousness of the product of recognition. If Kant's words are taken literally, and no suppressed premisses are ascribed to him, then this inference is clearly invalid. However I suspect that when Kant in his premiss says that consciousness of an act of recognition is necessary for consciousness of the identity of the self, he really wants to say that consciousness of an act of recognition is necessary and sufficient for consciousness of the identity of the self. Also I suspect that when Kant in his conclusion says that consciousness of the identity of the self is identical with consciousness of the product of recognition he is speaking loosely, and really wants to say merely that one is conscious of the identity of the self if and only if one is conscious of the product of recognition. If so, then Kant's conclusion follows trivially from his premiss.

In the second formulation of the premiss the act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is said to render possible the connection

1. It will be recalled that I have some qualms about saying that A108 is such a passage (see above, pp79-82, 100-1). These qualms of course also cause me to have qualms about saying that the act of subjecting synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is the act of recognition which Kant has in mind at A103.

2. This is only true on the assumption that the recognized impressions are veridical.
of representations according to a priori rules. In the statement of the conclusion Kant describes the synthetic unity of which he speaks (and which I have taken to be identical with the transcendental unity of which Kant speaks in the second formulation of the premiss) as a "necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, i.e. according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible, but also in so doing determine an object of their intuition, i.e. determine the concept of something in which they are necessarily connected".

I presume that the rules of which Kant speaks in the premiss and the conclusion are the categories, since in the premiss they are described as a priori rules. However, I presume that Kant would not claim to have shown that they are the categories yet.

In the statement of the conclusion Kant says that these rules "not only make them [all appearances] necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object of their intuition i.e. determine the concept of something in which they are necessarily connected". Here Kant seems to be saying that all appearances relate to some one object (Kant seems to say the same thing at A129\textsuperscript{1}). If one hadn't been told that the appearances referred to are all appearances one would presume that "their intuition" refers to an intuition in which the appearances are contained. Another thing which would (if one hadn't been told that the appearances of which Kant is speaking are all appearances) lead one to suppose that the appearances of which Kant speaks are the appearances contained in some one intuition is the fact that Kant says that the rules with which the "synthesis of all appearances" is in accordance make the appearances necessarily reproducible, and the

1. See above, p105
reproduction which Kant has made out is necessary for synthetic unity is reproduction of representations in the manifold contained in an intuition (see A102). 1

I don't know what Kant has in mind when he speaks of rules making appearances necessarily reproducible, any more than when he speaks of a synthesis being in accordance with rules (Kant at A108 identifies a synthesis being in accordance with rules with its being in accordance with concepts).

I might note that in passages such as the one I am discussing where the concepts with which Kant makes out that some synthesis is in accordance are a priori concepts, the objection which I raised above 2 to Paton's view of what it is for a synthesis to be in accordance with concepts does not hold. It will be recalled that Paton's view as to what it is for a synthesis to be in accordance with a concept F is that it is for concept F to control the synthesis so as to bring it about that the finished mosaic turns out as a picture of an object which falls under concept F.

My objection to this view was as follows: Kant holds that an intuition which contains a manifold of representations can never arise except through a synthesis (It seems that Kant would say that any intuition apart from a minimum sensib... contains a manifold). Paton holds that every synthesis is in accordance with certain of the concepts under which the object pictured by the mosaic which results from the synthesis falls (Perhaps he thinks that any synthesis is in accordance with every concept under

1. Note also that at A105 Kant makes out that a rule with which a synthesis is in accordance makes the reproduction of the manifold contained in an intuition necessary.

2. p18


which the object pictured by the mosaic which results from the synthesis falls). Hence, since Paton takes it that for a synthesis to be in accordance with a concept is for that concept to control synthesis so as to bring it about that the object pictured by the mosaic which results from the synthesis falls under the concept, Paton commits himself to say that the existence of a concept is a precondition of the existence of an intuition which falls under the concept. This is clearly untenable in the case of empirical concepts.

However it is not untenable in the case of \textit{a priori} concepts. Thus it might be objected that Paton's interpretation should be adopted in passages such as A108 where it seems that the concepts with which Kant says certain syntheses are in accordance are \textit{a priori} concepts. However, one would presume that Kant would use 'in accordance with' ('\textit{nach}') in the same sense throughout the \textit{Critique} (even though one's confidence in the univocity of Kantian expressions has taken a bit of a battering), and there are passages from which it does at least seem that Kant would say that some syntheses are in accordance with empirical concepts. At A105 Kant says that in order to think a triangle as an object we must perform a synthesis of the manifold contained in the intuition of the triangle, which synthesis is in accordance with a rule. Owing to the fact that Kant identifies concepts with rules, I presume that Kant would say that here he is saying that in order to think a triangle as an object we must perform a synthesis of the manifold contained in the intuition of a triangle, which synthesis is in accordance with a \textit{concept}. Since Kant describes the rule which I am supposing to be identified by him with this concept as "a rule in accordance with which such an intuition \footnote{There is however a complication here, which I have discussed above, p54.}
can always be represented", I presume that he would identify this rule with the concept of a triangle. I presume that Kant would say that the concept of a triangle is an *a priori* concept (although not a category). However the example concerning the intuition of a triangle is given in order to illustrate the general principle "this [synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition] is ... impossible if the intuition could not have been generated in accordance with a rule ..." In many instances of this principle I believe that the rule with which Kant would say that the synthesis is in accordance is an empirical concept. For instance, I believe that Kant would say that the concept with which the synthesis of the manifold contained in the intuition of a house must be in accordance for there to be synthetic unity in the manifold of the intuition of a house is the concept of a house.

Hence, since Paton's account of what it is for a synthesis to be in accordance with concepts does not seem to fit here, in the interests of univocity it seems that we should not adopt it at A108.

Kemp Smith points out the objection to supposing that empirical concepts play a role in syntheses which generate intuitions which fall under them\(^1\). However from pp209-11 of his commentary it can be seen that Kemp Smith interprets "in accordance with concepts" in some sense such that for a synthesis to be in accordance with concepts is for those concepts to play some role in syntheses which generate intuitions which fall under them.\(^2\) Kemp Smith seems to think\(^3\) that it is not implausible to ascribe such a sense of "in accordance with concepts" to Kant at A105 (where Kant implies that syntheses of intuitions which fall under

1. *Commentary* pp210-1
2. Cf. my remarks on p19 on Kemp Smith's interpretations of "in accordance with concepts".
empirical concepts are in accordance with those empirical concepts), on the ground that A104-10 is taken from a precritical manuscript. However, surely the view that empirical concepts play a role in syntheses which generate intuitions which fall under them is too mad to ascribe to Kant even in his precritical stage. Furthermore, as I have mentioned\(^1\), at A103 Kant implies that a concept is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced into one representation of an object which falls under the concept. I presume that this amounts to saying that a concept is that with which the synthesis of the manifold contained in an intuition of an object which falls under the concept is in accordance. Kant is speaking of all sorts of concepts here, including empirical concepts (although, as at A105, the concept in his example is an a priori concept – the concept of some particular number). A103 according to Kemp Smith\(^2\) is taken from the most recent of the four strata of manuscripts from which what Kemp Smith takes to be the various patches in the patchwork are taken.

The following considerations may throw some light on what we should take a synthesis being in accordance with concepts to be.

I have taken it\(^3\) that Kant would identify the concepts with which the "synthesis of all appearances" which he mentions at A108 is in accordance with the categories, since Kant describes these concepts as a priori rules (as I have mentioned\(^4\), I don't believe that Kant would claim to have established at A108 that the a priori rules of which he speaks are the twelve concepts in his list of categories). On A125 Kant says that the categories are

1. See above, p15.
2. Commentary p204.
3. Above, p151.
4. Above, p151.
contained in recognition, and describes the categories as the grounds of the recognition of the manifold, so far as they concern the form of an experience in general. It seems from this that the only sense of 'synthesis' in which a synthesis can be said to be in accordance with concepts is 'the act of coming to know that answering to a copresence in consciousness of representations there is a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations'. I say this because a comparison of A108 and A1125 suggests that for a synthesis to be in accordance with concepts is for the concepts to be the grounds of the recognition of the manifold. This could not be the case if by 'synthesis' is meant 'the act of putting representations into consciousness together', because synthesis in this sense does not involve recognition.

I might note that the above remarks from A125 confirm the view that the act which Kant mentions at A108 which subjects synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is the act of recognition which Kant has in mind at A103. So does the remark at A115 that apperception represents appearances empirically "in the empirical consciousness of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were given, that is, in recognition". This statement is very cryptic, as though Kant expects the reader to understand what he (Kant) is saying on the basis of something he has said elsewhere. If Kant's statement at A108 that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of the identity of the act which subjects synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is not a statement that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of the

1. I first expressed this view on p118. See p150 n.1 for a source of doubt as to the correctness of this view.
identity of the act of recognition, then Kant has nowhere asserted any relation to hold between apperception and recognition. Hence I presume that the above-mentioned statement from A108 is a statement that the consciousness of the identity of the self is impossible unless there is consciousness of the identity of an act of recognition.

A further consideration which suggests that the act which is mentioned at A108 which subjects synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity is the act of recognition which Kant mentions at A103 is the fact that unless this is the case recognition nowhere gets mentioned in the section entitled 'Of the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept', except in the very first paragraph of this longish section. This would be most peculiar.

I have now completed my discussion of what in Kemp Smith's translation is the first paragraph in A108.1

The first sentence of what in Kemp Smith's translation is the next paragraph is "Now also we will be able to determine more accurately our concept of an object in general". From this, what one would presume is about to happen is that Kant is going to appeal to the grand conclusion of his excursus on the transcendental unity of apperception — viz. that the consciousness of the identity of the self is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts — in carrying further the analysis of the concept of an object which analysis was begun at A104, and interrupted at A106 by the excursus on the transcendental

1. My discussion of this paragraph began on p78. It might be noted that in the German there is no change of paragraph between "...a priori rules." and "Now, also..."

2. This excursus extends from "All necessity, without exception..." (A106) to "...according to a priori rules" (A108)
unity of apperception. It seems that in the following passage Kant makes out that this is what happens, although there are some considerations which seem to suggest otherwise.

In what in Kemp Smith's translation is the paragraph beginning with the above-quoted sentence Kant repeats the assertions that he made in the paragraph at A104 at the outset of the analysis of the concept of an object. These assertions were that since the only things with which we are ever acquainted are our own representations we can know nothing of objects of representations (since an object of representations is distinct from the representations), and hence that when we think of an object of representations all we think of is something in general = x (since the sum-total of our beliefs about an object of representations is that it is something in general). As I argued above\(^1\), the concept which Kant is analyzing is the concept of a real object, not the concept of an intentional object. Kant gives the object of representations (in the sense in which he has been using the expression "object of representations") some names which he did not give it at A104. In virtue of his belief that the object of representations cannot be intuited he calls it "the non-empirical object" and "the transcendental object".

The first sentence of the next paragraph is

The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in the case of all our Erkenntnisse is always qualitatively the same\(^2\) = x) is that which in all our empirical concepts in general can provide relation to an object, i.e. objective reality.

I presume that Kant would say this is trivially true.

The second sentence is

1. pp64-5
2. The word which I translate as 'qualitatively the same' is 'einerlei'.
This concept [the pure concept of a transcendental object] cannot contain any determinate intuition, and will therefore refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis, so far as [i.e., I presume, 'provided that'] it [the manifold] stands in relation to an object.

I take it that Kant's conclusion here (that the concept "will...refer to nothing other than...etc.") is intended as trivially equivalent to this bit of the third sentence:

This relation [the relation of a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis to an object] is nothing other than the necessary unity...of the synthesis of the manifold through a common function of the mind for combining the manifold in one representation.

I take it that when in the second sentence of the paragraph Kant says that the concept of a transcendental object cannot contain any determinate intuition he means that it cannot contain any concept abstracted from intuition, which proposition would be derived from the conclusion reached in the previous paragraph that an object cannot be intuited by us, which was derived from the proposition that the only things with which we are ever acquainted are our own representations. The chain of inference from this proposition to the proposition that the concept of an object "refers to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis, so far as [i.e., I presume, 'provided that'] it [the manifold] stands in relation to an object" which is made here was made at A105:

But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is

1. 'der Erkenntnis'
nothing to us - being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations - the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.

I have presumed that "the unity which the object makes necessary" refers to the unity which Kant in the previous sentence argued constitutes the concept of an object. I have argued above\(^1\) that by "unity" here is meant "that-it-should-be-empirically-possible-for-all-the-properties-represented-by-a-collection-of-representations-to-be-instantiated-by-one-object being necessitated by something other than the mind". However, I have argued\(^2\) that the proposition that the concept of an object amounts to unity in this sense contributes nothing to the inference made at A105. Thus I could, without burking anything essential to what Kant was saying, rewrite the above sentence from A105 as follows:

But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that \(x\) (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us - being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations - the concept of an object can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.

This makes it clear that the above mentioned chain of inference, the first links of which are embedded in the paragraph which ends near the top of A109 and the last links of which are embedded in the second sentence of the following paragraph, occurs in the above-quoted sentence from A105.

Thus it seems that the conclusion of Kant's excursus on the unity of apperception - viz. the proposition that the unity of apperception is the unity of the synthesis of

1. pp45-6
2. pp44-7
all appearances according to concepts — does not contribute anything to Kant's argument for his doctrine that the concept of an object is the unity which must be found in a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis, which manifold relates to an object. This is because the argument he gives in support of this doctrine at A109 is the same as the argument he gave for it at A105, before he had so much as mentioned the unity of apperception.

However Kant in the third sentence of the paragraph which begins near the top of A109 seems to make out that the proposition that unity of apperception is the unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts does contribute something to his argument to show that the concept of an object is the unity which must be found in a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis, which manifold relates to an object. Here is the third sentence of the paragraph, quoted in full:

This relation [the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object] is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness, therefore also of the synthesis of the manifold through a common function of the mind for combining it [the manifold] in one representation.

Of course it would only follow from the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object being the unity of consciousness (i.e. the unity of apperception) that this relation is the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold if the unity of apperception were the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold. Thus unless Kant has fumbled his words here, he is making out that he is appealing to the proposition that the necessary unity of apperception is identical with the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold in order to demonstrate that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold.
However, an appeal to the proposition that the necessary unity of apperception is identical with the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold cannot yield the conclusion that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) \textit{Erkenntnis} to an object is the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold, since no demonstration has been given that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) \textit{Erkenntnis} to an object is the necessary unity of apperception. It seems that the only use to which Kant could, at this juncture, put his conclusion that the necessary unity of apperception is identical with the "necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" is to derive the proposition (a) that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) \textit{Erkenntnis} to an object is the unity of apperception from the proposition (b) that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) \textit{Erkenntnis} to an object is the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold. I say this because Kant has antecedently given an argument for proposition (b), but not for proposition (a). Not only is Kant in no position to use his conclusion that the necessary unity of apperception is identical with the "necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts" in order to derive proposition (b) from proposition (a) (owing to the fact that he has given no proof of (a)), but also, owing to the fact that he has given an argument for proposition (b), even if Kant was in a position to use his conclusion that the necessary unity of apperception is identical with the "necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts" to derive proposition (b) from proposition (a), there would be no point in doing so.

However, if Kant is to be taken at his word he is appealing to his conclusion that the necessary unity of apperception is identical with the "necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts"
in order to derive the proposition (b) that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the unity of the synthesis of the manifold from the proposition (a) that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the unity of apperception.

If the ultimate conclusion at which Kant is aiming in the paragraph which begins near the top of A109 (i.e. the final paragraph of the section "Of the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept") is that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the unity of the synthesis of the manifold, then as can be seen from what I have said, the grand conclusion of the A106-8 excursus on the unity of apperception - the proposition that the unity of apperception is the "unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" - does not contribute anything to the ultimate conclusion of the final paragraph of the section. If this is the case then, since as I have mentioned, there is no argument for the final inference in the A104-12 argument (the inference from the ultimate conclusion of the said paragraph to the proposition that the categories relate to all appearances), the excursus on the unity of apperception contributes nothing to the A104-12 argument.

The fact that there is no argument for the final inference of the A104-12 argument deprives us of a means of checking whether Kant can be taken at his word when he makes out that his ultimate conclusion in the section on the synthesis of recognition is that the concept of an object is the unity of the synthesis of the manifold. If there was an argument for this inference then we could see whether it was meant to immediately demonstrate that it follows from the proposition that there is synthetic unity of the manifold that the categories relate to all appearances, or whether rather it was meant to immediately demonstrate that it follows from the proposition that there is unity of apperception that the categories relate to all
appearances. In the former case we could conclude that
the ultimate conclusion of the final paragraph of the
section on synthesis of recognition is that the concept
of an object is the unity of the synthesis of the manifold,
while in the latter case we could conclude that the
ultimate conclusion of the said paragraph is that the
concept of an object is the unity of apperception.

However, the final step in the argument at B131-43
(§§16-20) in the second edition deduction is definitely
the proposition that it follows from there being original
synthetic unity of apperception (i.e., in first editionese,
unity of the synthesis of the manifold) that the categories
relate to all appearances. (It is perhaps misleading to
describe this as the final step of the argument, because
unlike in the first edition, an argument is given for it,
and this argument comprises a number of steps. The steps
are given in §§19-20). Thus one would presume that the
final step in the argument at A104-12 would be that it
follows from there being unity of the synthesis of the
manifold that the categories relate to all appearances.
Hence one would presume that the ultimate conclusion of the
final paragraph on the synthesis of recognition is that the
relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object
is the unity of the synthesis of the manifold. As I have
argued, if this is the case, the excursus on the unity of
apperception at A106-8 contributes nothing to the A104-12
argument to show that the categories relate to all appear-
ances.

However, whether or not the proposition that the
relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object
is the synthetic unity of the manifold is the ultimate

The original synthetic unity of apperception is what
Kant in §§18-19 calls the objective unity of apper-
ception.
conclusion of the paragraph, it certainly is a conclusion which Kant draws in the paragraph. I said above\(^1\) that the chain of reasoning from

(1) the proposition that the only things with which we are every acquainted are our own representations through

(2) the proposition that an object cannot be intuited by us, and

(3) the proposition that our concept of an object contains no concept abstracted from intuition, and

(4) the proposition that the sum total of our beliefs about an object is that it is something in general \(= x\) to

(5) the proposition that the concept of an object "will...refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?) Erkenntnis, so far as [i.e., I presume, 'provided that'] it [the manifold] stands in relation to an object"\(^2\)

which occurs at A108-9 also occurs in the sentence

But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that \(x\) (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us - being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations - the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations (A105).

Kant would be making the same chain of inference in these two places, provided that "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" (A105) refers to the same thing as "that unity which

1. pp159-60.

2. Propositions (1), (2) and (4) are expressed in the paragraph which ends in A109. Propositions (3) and (5) are expressed in the second sentence of the paragraph which begins in A109.
must be found in a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object\textsuperscript{1} (A109).

However, the general parallel between the two passages would lead one to presume that Kant is making the same chain of inference in both, and hence that the two expressions just mentioned refer to the same thing. The A109 expression certainly refers to a relation which holds between a collection of representations which relate to some one object. Thus we have yet another reason for believing that the A105 expression refers to such a relation. This removes an obstacle to interpreting the A105 expression as I did (i.e. as meaning "copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence was caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations").

What Kant says at A103 makes me want to give this interpretation to 'synthetic unity' throughout the first edition deduction wherever it does not seem to be a relation an instance of which holds between all the representations a person has ever had. I believe that 'that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object' (A109) refers to synthetic unity because of the parallel between the above-mentioned chains of reasoning at A105 and A109, and the fact that I don't think that Kant would refer to the unity of apperception as the unity which is found in a manifold, since the unity of apperception is a relation which holds not between representations, but between the owner/s of representations. Hence I am committed to say that 'that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis, so far as it [the manifold] stands in relation to an object' refers to copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations.

1. Along with the reasons I have given on pp48-50
In discussing the A105 inference, I said that on my interpretation of 'the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations', the conclusion of the inference - the proposition that the concept of an object\(^1\) can be nothing other than the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations - is trivially true, at least if when Kant says this he really wants to say that the knowledge that a collection of representations relate to some one object is knowledge that there is formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations (I argued\(^2\) that on my interpretation of "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" it was necessary to make out that Kant really wants to say this in order to avoid making the sentence "the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold" come out obviously false. I also brought up considerations which raise the plausibility of taking it that what Kant really wants to say is that knowledge that a collection of representations relate to some one real object is knowledge that there is formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.\(^3\))

Because I take it that "that unity which must be found in a manifold of \([\text{the (?) Erkenntnis, so far as [i.e. provided that]}\] it \([\text{the manifold, stands in relation to an object}\)" refers to the same thing as "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations", the assertion that the concept of an object "will... refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of \([\text{the (?) Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object}\)" will on my interpretation be trivially true, at least if when Kant says it he really wants

1. I here substitute the words 'the concept of an object' for Kant's words 'the unity which the object makes necessary' Cf. above, p160.
2. pp50-1
3. p51
to say that knowledge that a collection of representations all relate to some one real object will amount to nothing other than knowledge that there is that unity which must be found in a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object.

That on my interpretation the conclusion of the inference at A105 and A109 which I have been discussing should be trivially true would of course disconfirm my interpretation, simply because the proposition is the conclusion of an inference - Kant bothers to give an argument for the proposition.

One way of reconciling my interpretation of 'synthetic unity' with the conclusion of Kant's inference being non-trivial is to take it that when Kant speaks of the concept of an object he means not 'the concept or collection of concepts under which it would be contradictory to deny that an object falls', but simply 'the sum total of concepts under which we believe every object to fall'. If I were to embody this interpretation of 'synthetic unity' in an interpretation of Kant's conclusion that the concept of an object "will...refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object", I would interpret the conclusion thus: "The only property possession of which by a manifold of representations we believe is entailed (deductively or non-deductively) by possession by the manifold-of-representations of the property of relating to an object is the unity which must be found in a manifold of [the ?] Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object". On my interpretation of what this unity is, this virtually amounts to saying that the only property possession of which by a manifold of representations we believe to be entailed (deductively or non-deductively) by possession by the manifold of representations of the property of relating to an object is this very property of relating to an object.
H.J. Paton thinks that Kant uses 'the concept of an object' at A108-9 in the usual sense (viz. 'the concept or collection of concepts under which it would be contradictory to deny that an object falls'), and yet does not think that the conclusion that the concept of an object "will...refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object" is trivially true. Paton's account of the inference at A109 from the proposition that the concept of an object cannot "contain any determinate intuition" to the proposition I have just quoted is as follows:

All we really know about appearances when we assert that they are appearances of an object is that they possess necessary synthetic unity, and this necessary synthetic unity must be explained as due to the nature of the mind. Hence our concept of the transcendental object, so far as we actually employ it in knowing that appearances are appearances of an object, must be reduced to a concept of the necessary synthetic unity found in appearances.

Thus Paton is making out that Kant in the inference I have been discussing is saying that our official definition of 'object' does not capture the sense in which we in fact use the expression, and recommending that we give a second definition of 'object' which does capture the sense in which we in fact use the expression. This move is parallel to the move of an analytical behaviourist when he claims that our official definition of 'mind' does not capture the sense in which we in fact use it, and to Berkeley's move in the Third Dialogue, when he claims that our official definition of 'physical object' does not capture the sense in which we in fact use the word.

I will refer to a sense of a word which is claimed to be the sense in which we in fact use the word, but which is not given by the official definition of the word as a reductivist sense of the word. Paton holds that Kant does not recommend that 'object' should always be used in a reductivist sense, but that two different senses of it should be distinguished\(^1\) - the sense given by the official definition, and the reductivist sense.

Paton's interpretation is attractive, for the following reason: Kant certainly does distinguish between two different senses of reality - transcendental reality and empirical reality. I have mentioned that when Kant speaks of the concept of an object at A104 and A108-9 he has in mind the concept of a real object, not the concept of an intentional object. Thus corresponding to the ambiguity in Kant's use of the word 'real' there will be an ambiguity in Kant's use of the word 'object'. Furthermore, at A375-6 Kant refers to the transcendental sense of 'outside us' (which I presume he would identify with the transcendental sense of 'real', since he opposes reality to ideality) as the strict sense of 'outside us'. Also at A494=B522 Kant says:

\[
\text{[representations] in so far as they are connected and determinable in these relations (of space and time) in accordance with the laws of the unity of experience, are called objects. The non-sensible cause of these representations is completely unknown to us, and cannot therefore be intuited by us as an object. For such an object would have to be represented as neither in space nor in time (these being merely conditions of sensible representation), and apart from such conditions we cannot think any intuition. We may, however, entitle the purely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, but merely in order to have something corresponding to sensibility viewed as receptivity.}
\]

1. See *Ibid* Vol. 1 p422
It is clear from this that the reductivist sense in which Kant uses 'object' is 'representation which is connected and determinable in accordance with the laws of the unity of experience'. I presume that the unity of experience is what Kant at A109 calls "that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis, so far as it [the manifold] stands in relation to an object" and "the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold". I presume that the laws of the unity of experience are the categories.

In §49 of the Prolegomena Kant says

This doubt [doubt as to whether the objects of the outer senses that we place in space in waking really are to be found there] can easily be overcome, and we overcome it all the time in ordinary life by enquiring into the connection of appearances in both [space and time] according to universal laws of experience.

I presume that the universal laws of experience referred to here are the categories (or perhaps, rather, the principles of pure understanding).

At the very end of the final paragraph of the section on the synthesis of recognition Kant gives three formulations of a transcendental law which follows trivially from the sentence:

This relation [the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object] is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness, therefore also of the synthesis of the manifold through a common function of the mind for combining it [the manifold] in one representation.

The first formulation of this law is:

all appearances, so far as objects are to be given through them, must stand under a priori rules of the
synthetic unity of themselves, in accordance with which rules their relation \([\text{Verhältnis}]\) in [the ?] empirical intuition is alone possible.

One would presume that Kant's ground for saying that appearances so far as objects are to be given through them must stand under \textit{a priori} rules of the synthetic unity of themselves is the proposition that \textit{representations} in so far as they are connected and determinable in relations of space and time in accordance with the laws of the unity of experience \textit{are called} objects, which is asserted at A494=B522. However, this would only be the ground which Kant has given at A109 for his transcendental law if, as Paton maintains,

This concept \([\text{the pure concept of a transcendental object}]\) cannot contain any determinate intuition, and will therefore refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of \([\text{the (?)}]\) \textit{Erkenntnis}, so far as it \([\text{the manifold}]\) stands in relation to an object.\textit{is a reductivist argument.}

However, although Paton's interpretation of this sentence is attractive, there is an obstacle to my acceptance of it. This is simply that, on my interpretation of 'synthetic unity' (viz. 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property instances, which answer to the representations') there is no reduction involved in identifying the relation of representations to an object with synthetic unity holding between the representations. There is particularly strong pressure on me to adopt the above-mentioned interpretation of 'synthetic unity', since I believe that when Kant speaks of synthetic unity at A108 he is using the expression in a sense such that recognition is necessary for synthetic
unity. My reason for believing this is that I believe that 'act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension... to a transcendental unity' (A108) refers to the act of recognition.

Paton thinks that this expression from A108 refers not to the act of recognition, but to the act of transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which according to Paton is the synthesis "whereby space and time are held together as individual wholes". However, I believe that the evidence which I have produced above in support of identifying this act with the act of recognition is quite powerful.

In Paton's chapter on the final paragraph of the section on the synthesis of recognition there is no indication as to the sense in which Paton takes Kant to be using 'unity of the synthesis of the manifold' there. In discussing A108 Paton wavers between two of the eight or so different interpretations of 'unity' which he gives in the course of his discussion of the metaphysical and transcendental deductions. On p414 Paton identifies the necessary synthetic unity of which Kant speaks at A108 with the uniformity of the whole objective world. Thus here it seems that Paton is making out that by 'synthetic unity' Kant means 'universal and necessary coinstantiations of impression types'. This is an interpretation of 'synthetic unity' which, as I have mentioned, Paton is inclined to give in passages, such as A108, where there is pressure to take it that Kant is making out that an instance of synthetic unity holds between all the representations a person has ever had. However, in footnote 2 on p416 Paton seems to take it that Kant means by 'a unity' 'the set of relations which hold between a collection of representations

4. Above, pp82-3.
after they have been put into consciousness together'.

My evidence for ascribing this interpretation to Paton is that he speaks of the unity of a particular kind of synthesis and identifies this with the unity of a particular kind of object, and gives as an example of a unity the property of being a substance with accidents. As I have mentioned Paton gives this interpretation of 'unity' in discussing A79=B104 on p286. Paton seems to hold that "a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances" (which, like me, he takes to refer to the transcendental unity which is mentioned in the second formulation of the premiss of the paragraph) is the product of transcendental synthesis of the imagination, and is a unity which is found in all objects, while unities other than this transcendental unity (he refers to these unities as the unities of particular kinds of synthesis, and as the unities of particular kinds of object) are products of empirical syntheses. It seems that the properties to which Paton thinks that transcendental unities amount are a priori concepts, while the properties to which unities of particular kinds of synthesis amount are empirical concepts. I presume that Paton would say that Kant would not claim to have established at A108 which concepts are the a priori concepts to which transcendental unity amounts. Paton holds that "the necessary unity...of the synthesis of the manifold" at A109 refers to the unity which is the product of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination.

1. This set of relations of course amounts to a property possessed by the object pictured by the mosaic which results from the representations being put into consciousness together.

2. Above, p17. Some other passages where Paton gives this interpretation are on pp375, 467 and 507 of the first volume of his commentary.


6. See the final sentence of footnote 6 on p413 (which overflows onto p414), where Paton speaks of unities of empirical syntheses.

7. See p415n2.

8. p419.
Thus remarks in Paton's discussion of A108 suggest two hypotheses as to how he interprets "the necessary unity...of the synthesis of the manifold" (A109) (which I have taken to refer to the same thing as "that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the(?)] Erkenntnis, so far as [i.e., I presume, 'provided that'] it [the manifold] stands in relation to an object" (A109)). One of these hypotheses is that he takes these expressions to mean "universal and necessary coinstantiations of impression types", and the other hypothesis is that he takes these expressions to mean "a representation's falling under a priori concepts (under which a representation has to fall for it to count is veridical)". However, I doubt that Paton would say that he takes Kant to mean by "that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the(?)] Erkenntnis, so far as it [the manifold] stands in relation to an object" "universal and necessary coinstantiations of impression types", since it seems that the expression from A109 which I have just quoted refers to a relation which holds between a collection of representations which relate to some one object. Thus it seems likely that Paton takes the expression to mean "a representation's falling under a priori concepts". If this interpretation of the expression were correct then, as Paton holds, the identification of the relation of representations to an object with "that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the(?)] Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object" would indeed involve a reduction.

However, because, as I have mentioned, I take it that Kant at A108 uses "synthetic unity" in a sense such that recognition is a prerequisite of synthetic unity, I cannot accept the above interpretation of "that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object".
Thus I seem to be left obliged to forego the advantage of Paton's interpretation and adopt the interpretation which I above\(^1\) gave of

This concept [the pure concept of a transcendental object] cannot contain any determinate intuition, and will therefore refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of the *Erkenntnis*, so far as it stands in relation to an object,

- viz. "The only property possession-of-which-by-a-manifold-of-representations we believe to be entailed (deductively or non-deductively) by possession by the manifold of representations of the property-of-relating-to-an-object is co-presence-in-consciousness of the representations in the manifold, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations". On this interpretation, the ground that Kant is giving here for his transcendental law

all appearances, so far as objects are to be given through them, must stand under *a priori* rules of the synthetic unity of themselves, in accordance with which rules their relation [*Verhältnis*] in the empirical intuition is alone possible (A109)

would not be

[representations] in so far as they are connected and determinable in these relations (of space and time) in accordance with the laws of the unity of experience, are called objects (A494=B522).

The above-cited advantage\(^2\) of Paton's interpretation was that it does entail that this is the ground which Kant at A109 gives for his transcendental law which he states there.

1. pp166-8.
2. pp170-2.
Here is another advantage of Paton's interpretation over mine: On Paton's interpretation of the second sentence of the final paragraph of the section on synthesis of recognition ("This concept cannot contain...") it does support the above-mentioned transcendental law. On the other hand, on the interpretation of the sentence which I have given the sentence is utterly superfluous to the support of the transcendental law. Whether or not the only property possession-of-which-by-a-manifold-of-representations we believe to be entailed by possession by the manifold-of-representations of the property-of-relating-to-an-object is copresence-in-consciousness of the representations in the manifold, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations, this sort of copresence is certainly necessary for the knowledge that the manifold relates to an object, and this is all that is needed to support Kant's transcendental law, provided that my interpretation of "synthetic unity" is correct (and assuming that for there to be synthetic unity it is necessary that appearances should stand under a priori rules; this however is not a proposition the proof of which is supplied by the second sentence of the paragraph on my interpretation of it).

I regard this as a crushing objection to my interpretation of the second sentence of the paragraph.

I will now examine a passage from B137 in the second edition deduction where I believe that Kant is making an assertion equivalent to his assertion at A109 that the concept of an object "will...refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the(?)] Erkenntnis, so far as it [the manifold] stands in relation to an object", and enquire as to what Kant's argument in the second edition for the assertion is, and whether any proposition concerning the consciousness of the identity of the self plays any role in the argument.
At B136 Kant says all manifold representations of [the (?)] intuition are subject to the first of these two principles [the principle that all the manifold of [the (?)] intuition is subject to the formal conditions of space and time] in so far as the representations are given to us, and is subject to the second of the two principles [the principle that all the manifold of [the (?)] intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception], in so far as they must be able to be combined [verbunden] in one consciousness. For without that nothing can be thought or known through them, because the given representations would not have in common the act of apperception 'I think' and therefore would not be combined [zusammengefaßt] in one self-consciousness.

I have argued that the original synthetic unity of apperception is what Kant in the first edition calls the unity of the synthesis of the manifold\(^2\). Thus, subject to certain provisos, it seems that the principle expressed here as

all the manifold of [the (?)] intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception

is identical with the principle expressed at A109 as

all appearances, so far as objects are to be given through them, must be subject to a priori rules of the synthetic unity of themselves, in accordance with which rules their relation [Verhältnis] in [the (?)] empirical intuition is alone possible.

1. A possible translation of the German here ("alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung") is "every manifold of intuition".

2. Cf. above, p3, p98.
One of the provisos is that the synthetic unity mentioned at A109 should be a relation an instance of which holds between the smallish collection of representations which relate to some one object, and not a relation an instance of which holds between all the representations a person has ever had. I say this because I think it highly likely that the synthetic unity mentioned at B136 is a relation an instance of which holds between the smallish collection of representations which relate to some one object, for two reasons. One reason is that I know of no passage in the second edition where there is not overwhelming pressure to take it that synthetic unity is a relation an instance of which holds between a smallish collection of representations, such as a collection of representations which relate to some one object. Another reason for believing that the synthetic unity mentioned at B136 is a relation an instance of which holds between a smallish collection of representations which relate to some one object is as follows: The B136 principle is what Kant calls the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception. From other formulations of this principle it is clear that the synthetic unity mentioned in it is a relation an instance of which holds between a smallish collection of representations which relate to some one object. For instance in §20 the principle is formulated thus:

The manifold-given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception.

That the synthetic unity which Kant mentions at A109 in the above-quoted formulation of his transcendental law is a relation an instance of which holds between a collection of representations which relate to some one object is probabilified by the fact that the transcendental law is supposed

1. See above, pp101-6.

2. It can be seen from the German here ("Das mannigfaltige in einer sinnlichen Anschauung Gegebene") that 'manifold' is here an adjective and 'given' is a noun.
to follow from the proposition

This concept [the concept of an object]...will...
refer to nothing other than that unity which must be
found in a manifold of [the (?)] Erkenntnis, so far as
it stands in relation to an object.

However, the most natural way of reading
all appearances, so far as objects are to be given
through them, must stand under a priori rules of the
synthetic unity of themselves, in accordance with
which rules their relation [Verhältnis] in [the(?)]
empirical intuition is alone possible

is to take it that the synthetic unity of all appearances
which is mentioned is a synthetic unity which holds between
all appearances. That this is the correct interpretation is
suggested by the fact that it seems most natural to take it
that "their relation" refers to some relation which holds
between all appearances. Kemp Smith's translation of the
German here ('ihr Verhältnis') - viz. 'the interrelating of
these appearances' - does not seem unreasonable.

However, perhaps one could take it that the synthetic
unity mentioned refers to synthetic unity which holds between
the representations in the manifold in any appearance, and
that the relation is not a relation between all appearances
(perhaps it is the relation of an appearance to an object).
This interpretation, like Kemp Smith's, involves omitting
the definite article in front of 'empirical intuition'.

A second proviso which would have to hold for the above-
quoted principle from B136 to be equivalent to the above-
quoted formulation of a transcendental law from A109 is that
'intuition' at B136 would have to be being used in a 'got-it'
sense. At A109 Kant says that conditions of objective syn-
thetic unity must hold if objects are to be given through
appearances. At B136 Kant says that all the manifold of
(intuition is subject to conditions of objective

1. Throughout the first edition deduction I take it that
Kant means by 'synthetic unity' what in §§18-19 he
expresses by 'the objective unity of apperception'.
Cf. above, p3.
synthetic unity. Thus for the two assertions to be equivalent it would have to be the case that an intuition exists if and only if an object is given through an appearance. As I have argued, when Kant proposed to analyze the concept of an object at A104 he meant that he was going to analyze the concept of a real object (not the concept of an intentional object). Hence when Kant speaks of objects in the above formulation of his transcendental law at A109 he must have in mind real objects. Thus for the B136 assertion to be equivalent to the A109 assertion it would have to be the case that an intuition exists if and only if a real object is given through an appearance. For this to be the case 'intuition' would have to be being used in a 'got-it' sense in the B136 assertion.

It seems clear that this proviso for the equivalence of the above-quoted assertions from A109 and B137 does hold. I say this because Kant gives in support of the B136 principle that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception the proposition "it is the unity of consciousness to which alone the relation of representations to an object amounts" (B137).

I find Kant's assertion that all manifold representations of (the ?) intuition are subject to the principle that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition are subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception in so far as they must be able to be combined in one consciousness confusing.

Suppose that by 'consciousness' here is meant 'conscious state' and 'to combine a manifold in one consciousness' is being used to mean 'to come to know that answering to a co-presence-in-consciousness of representations there is a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances which answer to the representations'. In this case, for a manifold to be combined in one consciousness would be for the original synthetic unity of apperception (i.e. the objective synthetic unity of apperception) to be made to hold between
the manifold. Hence Kant's assertion that all manifold representations of (the ?) intuition are subject to the principle that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception in so far as they must be able to be combined in one consciousness would amount to the assertion: 'All manifold representations of (the ?) intuition are subject to the principle that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception in so far as they must be able to be made subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception'.

I can't see why he should be bothered saying this.

Suppose that by 'consciousness' is meant 'conscious state', but that 'to combine a manifold in one consciousness' is being used to mean 'to put representations into the mind together'. In this case the assertion which I have been discussing would amount to the assertion: 'All manifold representations of (the ?) intuition are subject to the principle that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition is subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception in so far as they must be able to be made subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception'.

At least this would be the case if by 'objective unity' Kant means not 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations', but 'knowledge that there is copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations'. It seems that this must be the case, since Kant identifies judgment with the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception (B142). Here Kant seems to be using a way of speaking which I have already on a number of occasions ascribed to him — viz. saying that something is the case when what you mean is that it is known to be the case or that it seems to be the case (See above, pp10, 12, 50-1, 67-8, 117).
conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception in so far as they must be able to be put into the mind together'. I can't see why Kant should want to say this, since it doesn't follow from representations being put into the mind together that the original synthetic unity of apperception holds between them.

Suppose that by 'consciousness' is meant 'conscious subject' and that 'to combine a manifold in one consciousness' is being used to mean 'to ascribe the representations in the manifold to the one conscious subject - oneself'. In this case the assertion of Kant's which I have been discussing would amount to this assertion: 'All manifold representations of (the ?) intuition are subject to the principle that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition is subject to the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception in so far as they [the manifold representations of (the ?) intuition] must be able to be ascribed to the one conscious subject'. If this is the assertion that Kant is making here, then he would here be making out that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the original synthetic unity of apperception. If so then I would have to add this assertion to the list of considerations which I gave¹ which support the hypothesis that Kant at B133 wishes to say that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the original synthetic unity of apperception.

Here is the next sentence:
For without that [i.e. without all manifold representations of (the ?) intuition being able to be combined in one consciousness] nothing can be thought or known, because the given representations would not have in common the act of apperception, 'I think', and therefore would not be combined in one self-consciousness.

1. Above, pp124-31, 133-4
This proposition is I presume given in support of the proposition that all manifold representations of (the ?) intuition must be able to be combined in one consciousness. If the last-mentioned proposition is the proposition that all manifold representations of (the ?) intuition must be able to be ascribed to one conscious subject then the first clause of the sentence I have quoted ("without that all manifold representations of (the ?) intuition being able to be combined in one consciousness] nothing can be thought or known" would I believe be equivalent to an assertion Kant makes at the start of §16:

otherwise [i.e. if the 'I think' was not able to accompany a representation] something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all.

I say this because I believe Kant would identify the 'I think' with the consciousness of the identity of the self.

However, if the 'I think' is the consciousness of the identity of the self then the last-quoted sentence from §17 disconfirms that 'to combine representations in one consciousness' is being used to mean 'to ascribe representations to one conscious subject'. I say this, because in this sentence Kant gives the proposition "If the manifold representations in (the ?) intuition could not be combined in one consciousness, then they would not have in common the act of apperception" as a ground for the proposition "If the manifold representations in (the ?) intuition could not be combined in one consciousness then nothing can be thought or known through them". Surely Kant would not do this if the proposition "If the manifold representations in (the ?) intuition could not be combined in one consciousness then they would not have in common the act of apperception 'I think'" amounted to the proposition "If the manifold representations in (the ?) intuition could not be ascribed to

1. For argument for this, see p143.
one conscious subject then they would not have in common the act of apperception 'I think', since the latter proposition is trivial (if representations having in common the 'I think' is their all being ascribed to the one conscious subject).

Thus we seem obliged to adopt one of the other interpretations of 'to combine representations in one consciousness' which I mentioned above — viz. 'to come to know that answering to a copresence-in-consciousness of representations there is a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations'¹ and 'to put representations into the mind together'². I have mentioned objections to both these interpretations.

The suppressed premiss in the argument at B136-7 to show that all manifold representations of (the ?) intuition must be able to be combined in one consciousness is that only if the manifold representations of (the ?) intuition have in common the act of apperception 'I think' can anything be thought or known through them. This is the assertion made at the start of §16, which I have quoted above³.

The argument is ultimately meant to demonstrate that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception, and presumably, to the original synthetic unity of apperception itself. In the course of the argument Kant argues that unless all the manifold of (the ?) intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception the representations in the manifold would not have in common the act of apperception 'I think' — i.e. there would be no analytic unity of apperception in respect of them. I mentioned above⁴ that Kant in the last two sentences of §16 says that the

1. P181.
2. P182.
original synthetic unity of apperception is necessary for analytic unity of apperception in respect of the manifold of representations which are given in an intuition. I sought to reconcile this with the view (which I am on balance inclined to adopt) that Kant does not in the second edition maintain that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the original synthetic unity of apperception, but merely presupposes synthetic-unity-of-apperception simpliciter\(^1\).

The sentences at B136-7 which I have been calling an argument are of course only a sketch of an argument. However, as I have mentioned, when one turns to the place where one of the key premisses in this argument - the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception - is discussed (viz. in the latter part of §16), the only argument for this premiss is in the footnote at B133-4, and I have been unable to see how this argument supports the premiss\(^2\).

In my discussion of A109 I said\(^3\) that Kant was not there in a position to use the proposition that the necessary unity of apperception is identical with the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold in order to prove that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold, since no demonstration had been given that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the necessary unity of apperception. In fact it had not even been asserted that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the necessary unity of apperception.

The position at B136 seems almost parallel. Just as Kant at A108 had discussed (although not given much of an argument for) the proposition that the necessary unity of apperception

1. The attempt at a reconciliation occurs on pp127-8.
2. See pp138-43.
3. p162.
is the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold, but was not at A109 in a position to use it to prove that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold (because he had nowhere demonstrated that the relation of a manifold to an object is the unity of apperception), so at B133-61 (the latter part of §16) Kant has discussed the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception, but at B136-7, where Kant wishes to use this proposition to prove that it is necessary for there to be an intuition2 that the manifold contained in a mental picture should be subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception, it seems that he is not in a position to use the proposition to prove this, because he has nowhere demonstrated that there being analytic unity of apperception in respect of the manifold contained in a mental picture is necessary for the mental picture to be an intuition in the sense in which Kant is using the word here.

However Kant has in the second edition deduction prior to B136-7 at least asserted that there being analytic unity of apperception in respect of the manifold contained in a mental picture is necessary for the mental picture to be an intuition. As I have mentioned, in the first edition before A109 there had not even been an assertion that the relation of a manifold

1. Or perhaps rather B132-6. I am not sure whether discussion of the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception starts with the words "For the manifold representations, which are given..." (B132), or with the words "That is to say, this thoroughgoing identity..." (B133) (Kemp Smith omits "That is to say...").

2. I have argued (pp180-1) that Kant is using 'intuition' here in a 'got-it' sense, i.e. a sense such that for a mental picture to count as an intuition it has to relate to an object.
of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the necessary unity of apperception.

The above-mentioned assertion from the second edition occurs at the start of §16:

The 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, which amounts to saying that the representation would either be impossible or at least nothing for me. That representation, which can be given before all thinking, is called intuition. Therefore all the manifold of (the ?) intuition has a relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found.

The following is further evidence that 'intuition' is being used in a 'got-it' sense in the second edition, and evidence that 'representation' in the quoted passage from §16 is being used in a 'got-it' sense: Kant generally uses 'thought' to mean 'the employment of concepts'. This can be seen from B145, where Kant opposes an intuitive understanding (such as the divine understanding) to "an understanding whose whole power consists in thought". At A92-3=B125 Kant says that there are "two conditions under which alone knowledge of an object is possible, first, intuition, through which it is given, though only as appearance; secondly, concept, through which an object is thought corresponding to this intuition". Kant says the same thing at B146. Thus it seems that the contribution of thought to knowledge is to bring it about that we know that there is a real object answering to a mental picture, since this is the only requirement-for-knowledge-of-an-object which is left unfulfilled after an object has been "given, though only as appearance". At A247=B304 Kant says "Thought is the action which relates given intuition to an object". Thus since Kant in the above-quoted passage from §16 makes out that thought is a necessary
condition of our having a representation or an intuition, it seems that Kant must be using 'representation' and 'intuition' here in 'got-it' senses. Paton thinks he is. Since Kant is using 'representation' in a 'got-it' sense, I take it that when in the above-quoted passage he speaks of something represented in me he means a real object which a representation represents.

The proposition that for a mental picture to relate to an object (i.e. for the mental picture to be an intuition in the sense in which Kant is using 'intuition' here) it is necessary that there should be consciousness of the identity of the self in respect of the manifold contained in the mental picture (which proposition Kant needs at B136-7, but for which he has not argued) may seem to have more going for it than the proposition that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the consciousness of the identity of the self (which proposition Kant needed at A109, but for which he had not argued). However I will not consider what grounds there might be for holding the above proposition which Kant needs at B136-7, in the first paragraph of §17. Whether or not there are grounds for assenting to the proposition, I cannot see that the argument in the first paragraph of §17 is sound until I can see reason for believing that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic.

In the second paragraph of §17 Kant gives an argument to show that the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception (i.e. the principle that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition² is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception) is the first piece of pure knowledge of the understanding³, on which all the

2. Perhaps rather: "every manifold of intuition"
3. reine Verstandeserkenntnis
rest of its employment is based. It seems that this proof amounts to a proof that the original synthetic unity of apperception is that to which alone the relation of representations to an object amounts. A proof of this would be a proof of the principle that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition is subject to the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception, which was the conclusion of the sketch-of-an-argument in the first paragraph of §17. From its brevity one would suppose that the proof in the second paragraph is only a sketch of a proof. A curious feature of this proof is that it does not seem to have as premisses the propositions (a2) that the relation of a mental-picture to an object requires the analytic unity of apperception, and (b2) that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. This is parallel to the fact that the argument in support of the transcendental law which is formulated three times at A109-10 (which transcendental law I have been inclined to take to be equivalent to the principle that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception), which argument is contained partly in what Kemp Smith's translation is the second last paragraph of the section on synthesis of recognition and partly in the second sentence of the last paragraph of the section, does not have as premisses the propositions (a1) that the relation of a manifold of (the ?) Erkenntnis to an object is the unity of apperception and (b1) that the unity of apperception is the unity of the synthesis of the manifold.

I will now discuss the argument in the second paragraph. The paragraph starts:

Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty of Erkenntnisse.¹

In the light of Kant's statement at A51=B75-6 that only

1. Erkenntnisse is the plural of Erkenntnis.
through the union of understanding and sensibility can knowledge arise, I presume that what Kant means here is that understanding is the faculty which supplies the final requirement for a mental picture to become an Erkenntnis.

These [Erkenntnisse] consist in the determined relation of given representations to an object. Generally Kant speaks of an object being determined or undetermined rather than of the relation of representations to an object being determined or undetermined.\footnote{See A20=B34, A108, B166n, B168-9, A258=B314.} It seems that a determined object is an intentional object which is known to be real while an undetermined object is an intentional object not known to be real.\footnote{There is a short discussion of this above, pp29-30.} I presume that a determined relation of representations to an object is a relation of representations to a determined object.

An object however is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united \[\text{vereinigt ist}\].

At A108 if Kant's words are to be taken literally an object is identified with the concept of something in which appearances are necessarily connected (notwendig zusammenhängen). Both of these statements are puzzling.

Surely Kant at A108 does not really wish to identify an object with a certain concept.

The above-quoted sentence from B137 is puzzling for the following reason: The usual meaning of an expression of the form 'the concept of a _____' is 'the concept expressed by the common name which fills the blank'. Thus the common name which fills the blank does not take as its reference a thing of the type to which it generally refers. However, we don't generally have to worry as to what its reference is, since we know that the phrase as a whole means 'the concept expressed by the common name that fills the blank'.

1. See A20=B34, A108, B166n, B168-9, A258=B314.
2. There is a short discussion of this above, pp29-30.
However, at least if in the above-quoted sentence 'the concept of ____' is being used in the usual sense (when used in the usual sense the blank is filled by an indefinite article followed by a common name), the above-quoted sentence forces us to ask what the reference of the common name which fills the blank is, since in this sentence the expressions 'object' and 'thing in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is being united' are being made out to be coextensive, or perhaps equivalent. However since the usual sense of 'the concept of a ____' is 'the concept expressed by the common name which fills the blank', it seems that when 'the concept of a ____' is used in the usual sense the common name must either refer to itself or to its regular sense (I am not sure which). Hence if Kant in the above-mentioned sentence were using 'the concept of ____' in the usual sense, then he would be committed to say either that (a) 'object' is coextensive with 'common name which expresses a concept in which the manifold of a given intuition is united' or else that (b) 'object' is coextensive with 'concept in which the manifold of a given intuition is united' (depending on which of the two hypotheses as to what the reference of the common name which fills the blank in 'the concept of a ____' is is true). It will be recalled that if his words are to be taken literally Kant asserts (b) at A108. Whether it is (a) or (b) which Kant would be committed to say if he were using 'the concept of ____' in the usual sense, charity bids us to take it that Kant in the quoted sentence from B137 is not using 'the concept of ...' in the usual sense.

At the start of §18 Kant says

The transcendental unity of apperception is that through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object.

I presume that this is given as a reformulation of Kant's conclusion at B137.
the unity of consciousness is that to which alone the relation of representations to an object amounts. One would like to presume that when Kant makes out in the first sentence of §18 that the manifold contained in an intuition is united in a concept of the object he is trying to convey the same thing as when he makes out that the manifold contained in an intuition is united in a concept in his definition of 'object' at B137. However, his words at B137 commit him to refer to this concept as 'the concept of the object', whereas he refers to it in the first sentence of §18 as 'a concept of the object'. There would be no inconsistency here if at B137 Kant were speaking of a concept-type, whilst in the first sentence of §18 speaking of a concept-token. If this is the case, or if the way of speaking at the start of §18 reflects Kant's thoughts better than that at B137, then Kant is not using 'concept of ___' in the usual sense here since in the usual sense of this expression there is only one concept of an object unless 'object' is ambiguous. 'Object' does have ambiguity in Kant, but I doubt that he would be alluding to this if he were implying at the start of §18 that there can be more than one concept of an object.

One would presume that when Kant speaks of the manifold of a given intuition being united in a concept he is trying to convey the same thing as when he spoke of synthesis of recognition as being in the concept. It will be recalled that I was inclined to say that by 'synthesis of recognition' Kant means 'synthesis in the sense which involves recognition'.

1. Paton in footnote 1 on p517 of Volume 1 of his commentary adopts a different interpretation. He takes it that when Kant says that an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united he means what he means at A106, when he says that an object "is no more than that something, the concept of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis [as that involved in the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions]". This however makes the premiss I have been discussing trivially equivalent to the conclusion of the argument.

2. Above, p119.
or 'synthesis in the sense in which synthesis is identical with recognition', the sense to which allusion is being made being 'the act of coming to believe that different representations of bits-of-objects or properties are all representations of bits or properties of some one real object'. It does seem likely that this is what Kant has in mind when he speaks of uniting the manifold contained in an intuition in a concept of the object, since in the first sentence of §18 the transcendental unity of apperception is called objective on account of its being that through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. From Kant's remarks at A103 it seems that when Kant speaks of a synthesis of recognition being in a concept he means that the concept is the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis. I explained above why I can't see how a concept can be identified with the consciousness of the unity of a synthesis. I also mentioned that it seems a strange way of saying that a concept F is the consciousness of the unity of a certain synthesis to say that the synthesis is in concept F. Hence, since I am inclined to take it that uniting the manifold contained in an intuition in a concept is performing a synthesis of recognition in a concept, I can't see why the uniting of the manifold contained in an intuition should be said to be in a concept. However, if the uniting of the manifold contained in an intuition in the concept of an object is the synthesis of recognition in a concept, then Kant in the above-quoted sentence from B137 is not using 'the concept of an object' in the usual sense (viz. 'the concept expressed by the common name "object"'), since the concept expressed by the common name "object" is not (or at least is not the only) concept in which Kant holds that syntheses of recognition occur.

1. p121.
2. p119.
4. p22.
The synthesis-of-recognition of the manifold contained in the intuition of some particular number according to Kant is in the concept of that number (A103). It seems that the synthesis-of-recognition of the manifold contained in the intuition of a triangle is in the concept of a triangle (A105). One gets the impression that Kant will go saying that a synthesis of recognition is in whatever concept is expressed by the name by which the object pictured by the mosaic which results from the synthesis has been called (which makes Kant's views about the connection between synthesis of recognition and concepts, whatever these views are, look very suspect). Thus it seems that the concept which Kant's statement

An object however is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united commits him to call 'the concept of an object' is not (or, at least, is not in every case) the concept expressed by the common name 'object'. Thus the sense in which Kant is committed to use 'the concept of an object' here is not the usual sense of the expression.

While I believe that Kant has formulated the premiss I have been discussing in terms of the concept in which a synthesis of recognition is, I believe that his views on the connection of concepts with synthesis of recognition (I am presuming that synthesis of recognition is that to which he here refers as unification (Vereinigung)) are superfluous to the argument I am discussing. I believe that without losing anything important he could have simply formulated the premiss thus: The relation of representations to an object is their being in a state of unification (a state of unification being the inevitable product of a synthesis of recognition).

My grounds for this are as follows: The argument for the proposition "the unity of consciousness is that to which

1. See above, pp54, 153-4, where a difficulty with my interpretation is mentioned.
alone the relation of representations to an object amounts''¹, minus the premiss I have been discussing, is as follows:

1

(1)

(2) Now all unification \(\text{Ver}e\text{n}i\text{g}u\text{ng}\) of representations demands unity \(\text{Einheit}\) of consciousness in the synthesis of them. \(\text{I presume that Kant would say that unity of consciousness in the synthesis of representations is not only necessary for representations to be in a state of unification, but also is that to which a state of unification amounts. Otherwise I can't think of any way of interpreting the argument which makes it come out valid}\)

(3) Consequently the unity of consciousness is that to which alone the relation of representations to an object amounts.

The proposition the conjunction of which with (2) entails the conclusion (3) (on condition that Kant really wants to build into premiss (2) that unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations is that to which a state of unification of the representations amounts) is the proposition which I have formulated above - 'The relation of representations to an object is their being in a state of unification.' The proposition that the process of which a state of unification is the product is in a certain concept (whatever it is to which this amounts) it seems cannot contribute anything to the argument. I suspect that Kant is using '\text{Ver}e\text{n}i\text{g}u\text{ng}\' to stand for a process, but I presume the word has a process-product ambiguity, and it would be the product not the process with which Kant would identify the relation of representations to an object. I presume that when he speaks of the relation of representations to an object he means knowledge that there is a

1. This argument is part of the argument to show that the principle of the understanding on which all its other employment is based is the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception.
relation of representations to an object. If so, and if
the state of unification is what I suppose it to be — viz.
'knowledge that different representations of bits-of-
objects or properties are all representations of bits or
properties of some one object' (this view as to what it is
is entailed by my view that this state of unification is
the product of synthesis of recognition) — then the prop-
osition 'The relation of representations to an object is
their being in a state of unification' is trivially true.

The second premiss in the argument to demonstrate that
the unity of consciousness is that to which alone the
relation of representations to an object amounts is this:

Now all unification [Vereinigung] of representations
demands unity [Einheit] of consciousness in the syn-
thesis of them.

I have already given reason for believing that what Kant
really wants to say here is that the product of the process
of unification (what I have called the state of unification)
amounts to unity of consciousness in the synthesis of rep-
resentations.

Since Kant concludes from the conclusion of the argument
(the proposition that the unity of consciousness is that to
which alone the relation of representations to an object
amounts) that the principle of the original synthetic unity
of apperception is the fundamental principle of the under-
standing, I presume that the unity of consciousness referred
to in the conclusion is the original synthetic unity of
apperception. Hence I presume that "unity of consciousness
in the synthesis of them [representations]" in the second
premiss refers to the original synthetic unity ofapper-
ception — i.e. to copresence-in-consciousness of represent-
ations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition
of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances\(^1\),
which answer to the representations. I suspect that at B137

1. In the light of §19 I believe that he has in mind
property-instances, and not objects or bits-of-
objects, in the second edition.
when Kant speaks of the original synthetic unity of apperception he really means knowledge that there is original synthetic unity of apperception. If so, and the product of the process of unification is what I have been surmising that it is — viz. knowledge that different representations of bits-of-objects or properties are all representations of bits or properties of some one real object — then it does seem to be true that unity of consciousness in the synthesis of representations is that to which representations being in a state of unification amounts. I say this because it is necessary for knowledge that a collection of representations of bits-of-objects or properties are all representations of bits or properties of some one object that the representations should be copresent in consciousness (at least in the sort of case Kant has in mind in the second edition where the manifold-contained-in-an-intuition which he seems to have in mind contains just two representations — the subject-concept and predicate of a judgment).

Thus on my (very tentative) interpretation of the argument to show that the unity of consciousness is that to which alone the relation of representations to an object amounts — the second premiss — which I have argued that Kant would really wish to formulate as "Unity of consciousness in the synthesis of representations is that to which a state of unification of the representations amounts" — is true. On my interpretation the first premiss — which I have argued could without loss of any feature essential to the argument, be reformulated as "The relation of representations to an object is their being in a state of unification" — is trivially true. Also the argument is clearly valid. Thus the argument on my interpretation is sound. However, it is extremely uninteresting, which disconfirms my interpretation somewhat.

1. p196.
2. pp196-7.
3. See p196.
Furthermore, on my interpretation the conclusion of the argument is trivial and so the fact that Kant bothers to give an argument for it disconfirms my interpretation. My original reason\(^1\) for investigating the first two paragraphs of §17 was that the proposition for which Kant is arguing here could well be taken as equivalent to a proposition for which he argued at A109 — viz. "[The concept of an object] will...refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?) Erkenntnis, so far as it [the manifold] stands in relation to an object". In fact I gave an interpretation of this sentence which is not quite equivalent to the interpretation I have given of the B137 conclusion "the unity of consciousness is that to which alone the relation of representations to an object amounts". In order to avoid making the A109 conclusion come out trivially true I interpreted it as meaning "The only property possession-of-which-by-a-manifold-of-representations we believe to be entailed (deductively or non-deductively) by possession by the manifold-of-representations of the property of relating to an object is the unity which must be found in a manifold of [the (?) Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object]"\(^2\). However I don't believe that the wording of the B137 conclusion admits of an interpretation of it which is equivalent to the interpretation of the A109 assertion which I have just mentioned. This will not be seen as a great disappointment when it is recalled that the interpretation-of-the-A109-conclusion which I have just mentioned only replaced one difficulty with another. While on this interpretation the conclusion is not trivially true, on the interpretation the conclusion contributes nothing to the support of the transcendental law which Kant makes out that it supports\(^3\). This transcendental law was

1. p177
2. p168
3. p177
all appearances, so far as objects are to be given through them, must stand under a priori rules of the synthetic unity of themselves in accordance with which rules their relation [Verhältnis] in [the (?)] empirical intuition is alone possible (A109)

I said above¹ that I believe that this law is equivalent to the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception i.e.

all the manifold of [the ?] intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception (B136)

The B137 conclusion "the unity of consciousness is that to which alone the relation of representations to an object amounts" is given in support of this principle. Thus if the B137 conclusion were given an interpretation equivalent to the above-mentioned interpretation of the A109 conclusion then the B137 conclusion too would be superfluous to the support of the principle it is supposed to support.

As I have mentioned², the interpretation which Paton gives³ of the premiss "An object however is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united [vermählt ist]" would make it trivially equivalent to the conclusion of the argument. Paton takes it that the manifold's being united is its being synthesised. This can be seen from Paton's paraphrase of the premiss "Now all unification [Vereinigung] of representations demands unity [Einhheit] of consciousness in the synthesis of them" - viz. "combination or synthesis is impossible apart from the unity of apperception"⁴. Paton thinks that Kant always uses "synthesis" in the sense "putting representations into consciousness together" (he seems to think that Kant nowhere means by it "coming to know that different representations

1. pp178-81.
2. p193 n. 1.
4. p517
of bits-of-objects or properties are all representations of bits or properties of some one object".

"Unity of consciousness in the synthesis of representations" must surely be taken to refer to the synthetic unity of apperception\(^1\). Paton holds the view (which I hold) that the synthetic unity of apperception is copresence in consciousness\(^2\). Thus Paton is committed to say that the second premiss amounts to the absurd proposition that it is impossible to put representations into consciousness together unless they are in consciousness together.

In discussing the argument which I have been discussing Paton makes no mention of a reduction of the concept of an object. However he makes out that the premiss "An object however is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united" is the doctrine which Kant was defending at A109\(^3\). Thus it seems that Paton would say that in asserting this premiss Kant is making a reduction of the concept of an object. Although, as I have mentioned\(^4\), this interpretation has a considerable attraction, I cannot adopt it here, because on my interpretation of the premiss, the premiss is literally true, and so involves no reduction of any concept (just as I could not adopt Paton's view that in the sentence

This concept [the concept of an object] ...will... refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of the Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object

Kant is reducing the concept of an object, the reason for this being that on my interpretation the sentence is literally true\(^5\)). Also, as I have mentioned\(^6\), I am inclined to

1. See above, p197.
2. pp513, 519-20.
4. pp170-2
5. See above, pp172-6.
think that that to which the above-quoted premiss from
the B137 argument commits Kant to refer as "the concept
of an object" is not the concept of an object in the
usual sense of the words, but some concept under which an
object falls in which concept is the synthesis of the
manifold-contained-in-the-intuition-of-the-object.

Kant concludes from the propositions (1) that the
unity of consciousness is that to which the relation of
representations to an object amounts and (2) that Erken-
tnnisse consist in the relation of representations to an
object¹ that the unity of consciousness is that to which
representations becoming Erkenntnisse amounts. Kant
concludes from the last-mentioned proposition together
with the proposition that the understanding is the faculty
of Erkenntnisse² that the unity of consciousness is that
on which the possibility of the understanding rests. Kant
concludes from this that the principle of the original
synthetic unity of apperception is the first pure piece of
knowledge of the understanding, and the piece of knowledge
on which all other knowledge of the understanding depends.

My stated reasons for examining the first two para-
graphs of § 17³ were that I wanted to enquire as to what
arguments are given there for the proposition that the
relation of representations to an object is simply the
original synthetic unity of apperception (which it seems
is intended as equivalent to the proposition that the con-
cept of an object "refers to nothing other than that unity
which must be found in any manifold of [the ?] Erkenntnis
which relates to an object" (A109)⁴) and whether any pro-
position concerning the consciousness of the identity of

1. This proposition is asserted in the second sentence
   of the paragraph.
2. This proposition is asserted in the first sentence
   of the paragraph.
3. These reasons were stated on p177.
4. The question of whether the A109 transcendental law
   is equivalent to the B136 principle was discussed on
   pp178-81.
the self plays a role in the argument.

I mentioned that in the first paragraph an argument is given in support of the proposition that all the manifold of (the ?) intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. In the sense in which Kant seems to be using 'intuition' here this proposition amounts to the proposition that for a manifold of representations to relate to an object it is necessary that the original synthetic unity of apperception should hold between them. This argument did have as premisses propositions concerning the consciousness of the identity of the self — viz. the proposition that for representations to relate to an object it is necessary that there should be analytic unity of apperception in respect of them and the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. I mentioned parallels and dissimilarities between the context of this argument and the context of an argument in the first edition at A109, which argument is similar to the B136-7 argument, although not exactly the same, as can be seen from this statement of the A109 argument (which I here formulate in the terminology of the second edition):

(1) The relation of representations to an object is the analytic unity of apperception
(2) The analytic unity of apperception is the objective synthetic unity of apperception

(3) The relation of representations to an object is the objective synthetic unity of apperception (i.e. the original synthetic unity of apperception).

If the above accounts of the two arguments are correct, then the arguments differ in two respects:

1. This argument was discussed on pp181-9.
2. or rather, that it should be possible that there should be analytic unity of apperception in respect of them.
4. My discussion on pp161-4 of this argument amounted to a consideration of whether the argument was a slip of the pen.
1. The premisses and the conclusion of the above-mentioned argument from A109 are each an assertion of a relation of identity, whereas the premisses and conclusion of the above-mentioned argument from B136-7 are each an assertion of a relation of presupposition.

2. The second premiss of the above-mentioned argument from A109 entails that the analytic unity is impossible without the objective synthetic unity of apperception, whereas the second premiss of the above-mentioned argument from B136-7 only entails that the analytic unity of apperception is impossible without unity-of-apperception simpliciter.

I am far from being completely confident that the second difference exists, since I am far from completely confident that the second premiss of the B136-7 argument (which is discussed in the latter part of §16) is not that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the objective synthetic unity of apperception. In stating my views on the subject I have said¹ that on balance I was inclined to say that in the second edition Kant only says that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes synthetic-unity-of-apperception simpliciter. I have listed² considerations which suggest that Kant in the second edition makes out that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the objective synthetic unity of apperception (on top of which considerations there is the general presumption in favour of ascribing the same doctrines to Kant in the second as in the first edition), as well as listing³ considerations which suggest otherwise.

One of my main motives for studying Kant has been a sometimes all-consuming desire to shove as many knives as possible into Strawson (not to mention innumerable other commentators), and Strawson holds that in the transcendental

1. e.g. p137.
2. pp124-34.
3. pp121-3, 134-5.
deduction Kant says things which are incompatible with and intended as objections to scepticism as to the existence of external objects. Strawson makes out that Kant gives no argument for these assertions which Strawson holds are directed against scepticism, and Strawson thinks that the assertions require argument. I don't think that the remarks from A111, A112 and A122 which Strawson says are directed against scepticism are in fact directed against scepticism, but I wanted to triumphantly proclaim that the transcendental deduction contains no assertions which Kant would claim are incompatible with scepticism. Thus it was a mortifying experience to reach the conclusion that "the act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension...to a transcendental unity" (A108) is the act of recognition which Kant has in mind at A103, and hence that the transcendental unity referred to - which is the unity which Kant at A108 says is identical with the unity of apperception - must be what Kant in §§18-19 in the second edition calls objective unity. This was mortifying because Kant would presumably say that the proposition that the consciousness of the identity of the self is identical with the consciousness of objective synthetic unity is incompatible with scepticism, since Kant says that the self is necessarily to be represented as numerically identical (A107).

This inference from the consciousness of the identity of the self to the veridicality of at least some of our representations is the inference which Strawson on p100 of The Bounds of Sense ascribes to Kant (in the paragraph starting "Comments are not arguments..."). Kemp Smith in his account of the first edition deduction, on pp251-2 of his commentary, ascribes a slightly different inference to Kant. Kemp Smith says that Kant argues that because the only knowledge of the self that we have is knowledge of its identity, we cannot be conscious of the self unless we are conscious of external objects.

2. Above, p118.
3. I comment on the reasoning Kemp Smith here ascribes to Kant below, pp311-12.
While I must concede that the above inference which Strawson ascribes to Kant is made by Kant at A108, I maintain fond hopes that Kant does not make the inference in the second edition — that Kant in the latter half of §16 only wishes to say that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes synthetic-unity-of-apperception simpliciter, not that it presupposes objective synthetic unity of apperception.

If I cannot say that Kant in the first edition deduction does not make the inference which Strawson says he is making, I will have to content myself with pointing out that taking the transcendental unity which is mentioned at A108 to be objective unity (which is the very bit of interpretation which commits me to say that Kant at A108 makes the above inference which Strawson ascribes to him) puts great pressure on us to say that the conclusion of the argument in which the proposition at A108 which would express this inference is a premiss — the conclusion being "[The concept of an object] will...refer to nothing other than that unity which must be found in a manifold of [the?] Erkenntnis, so far as it stands in relation to an object" (A109) — is trivial.

Not only must I ascribe to Kant at A108 an assertion which implies that the above inference which Strawson ascribes to him is valid, but I must confess that this assertion plays a crucial role in the argument at A109 which I have above formulated in second edition terminology. (The assertion was of course the second premiss in this formulation — "(2) The analytic unity of apperception is the objective synthetic unity of apperception"). However, as I have noted, this argument is quite unacceptable in

1. Cf. above, pp167-8. As I have mentioned (pp199-200), the way in which I tried on p168 to escape making the conclusion trivial only created further trouble.
2. p203.
3. This premiss is suppressed at A109.
4. p162.
the absence of argument for the first premiss ("(1) The relation of representations to an object is the analytic unity of apperception"), which is nonchalantly presented at A109 without so much as having been previously asserted. I mentioned above that in the second paragraph of §17 there occurs an argument to show that the relation of representations to an object is the objective synthetic unity of apperception. Thus this argument is unlike the argument in the first paragraph, and like the two arguments at A109, in that its conclusion asserts a relation of identity, and not a relation merely of presupposition, to hold between the relation of representations to an object and the objective synthetic unity of apperception. I have mentioned that this argument does not have as premisses (a2) the proposition that for representations to relate to an object it is necessary that there should be analytic unity of apperception in respect of them or (b2) the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. I mentioned that this is parallel to the fact that there is an argument, the earlier part of which is in the second last paragraph of the section on synthesis of recognition, and the later part of which is in the second sentence of the last paragraph of the section on the synthesis of recognition, which is in support of the proposition that the relation of representations to an object is the objective synthetic unity of apperception and which does not have as premisses (a1) the proposition that the relation of representations to an object is the analytic unity of apperception or (b1) the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception is the objective synthetic unity of apperception.

1. Note that the proposition that the relation of representations to an object is the analytic unity of apperception is not a premiss in the argument which Strawson on pp100-1 of The Bounds of Sense makes out lies behind Kant's assertions in the transcendental deduction.

2. This argument is discussed above pp189-202.

3. pp189-90.

4. p190.

5. Here I use second edition terminology.
However the two arguments to which I allude are not the same. The argument from A108-9 went like this:

1 (1) The only things with which we can ever be acquainted are our own representations A
1 (2) An object cannot be intuited by us 1
1 (3) Our concept of an object contains no concept abstracted from intuition. 2
1 (4) The sum total of our beliefs about an object is that it is something in general = X. 3
1 (5) The relation of representations to an object is the objective synthetic unity of apperception. 4 1

On the other hand the argument in the second paragraph of §17 goes like this (at least on my interpretation of it, in which interpretation I don't have very much confidence):

1 (1) The relation of representations to an object is the knowledge that representations are all representations of bits or properties of some one object. A
2 (2) Knowledge that representations are all representations of bits or properties of some one object is the objective synthetic unity of apperception A
1,2 (3) The relation of representations to an object is the objective synthetic unity of apperception 1,2 2

It is clear that no proposition concerning the consciousness of the identity of the self plays a role in the A109 argument. However one might suppose that the second premiss of the argument at B137 concerns the consciousness of the identity of the self, owing to the reference to the objective synthetic unity of apperception (Kant refers to

1. This is the paraphrase I gave on p165.
2. That this is my interpretation of the argument can be seen from pp 195-8.
it here as "unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them \{representations\}". However I have argued that objective synthetic unity of apperception is copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations, and that the only reason why it gets called objective synthetic unity of apperception is that synthetic unity is necessary (and, I suspect Kant would say, sufficient) for the unity of apperception, which Kant seems to think is necessary (and, I presume, sufficient) for apperception\(^1\). At least on the account of the grounds for believing it which I have given above\(^2\), the truth of premiss (2) - the proposition that knowledge that a collection of representations are all representations of bits or properties of some one real object is the objective synthetic unity of apperception - is quite independent of whether synthetic unity is necessary for consciousness of the identity of the self. Thus the concept of the consciousness of the identity of the self really plays no role in the argument.

Certainly no proposition which is incompatible with idealism plays any role either in the last-discussed argument from A108-9 or in the last-discussed argument from §17.

I have now completed my discussion of Kant's arguments at A108-9 and B136-7 in support of what Kant in the second edition calls the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception - i.e. the principle "The manifold-given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to \[gehört notwendig unter\] the original synthetic unity of apperception" (This is the B143 formulation of the principle).\(^3\)

At the start of the last of the four passages into which all but the opening paragraphs of the second section of the first edition transcendental deduction is divided Kant

1. p98.
2. pp197-8
3. Discussion of these arguments began on p157.
clearly uses the expression 'synthetic unity' to refer to a relation an instance of which holds between all the representations a person has ever had. I say this because Kant says

There is one single experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and orderly connection and then distinguishes the sense in which he is using 'experience' here from the sense in which experiences are perceptions, and then says that the thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions is that to which the form of experience amounts. I presume that 'experience' is here being used in the sense in which there is only one experience. Thus it seems that 'synthetic unity' here refers to a relation an instance of which holds between all the representations a person has ever had. As I have mentioned, this seems incompatible with many passages, in which synthetic unity seems to be a relation an instance of which holds between a smallish collection of representations, such as a collection of representations which relate to some one object, and is certainly incompatible with my interpretation of 'synthetic unity' as 'copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations (this was my interpretation of 'synthetic unity' in the first edition; my interpretation of it in the second edition was simply 'copresence in consciousness')². I have mentioned³ that Paton in such passages tends to take 'synthetic unity' to mean 'universal and necessary coinstantiations between impression-types'. There seems to be some support for this in the passage under discussion⁴, since there is some temptation

2. See above, p82.
3. pp82-3.
4. As I have mentioned, there is also support for this interpretation of 'synthetic unity' at A125. See above, pp104-5.
to take it that 'thoroughgoing and orderly \( \text{gesetzmäßigen} \) connection' in the first sentence of the paragraph refers to the same thing as 'thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions' in the last sentence of the paragraph. I will not dwell further on the difficulties here.

In the third paragraph of the passage Kant simply asserts without argument that the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and concludes from this that they have \textit{a priori} objective validity (I presume that what he means is that they are valid \textit{a priori} for all objects of experience; this is how he states his conclusion at B161). As Kant says, this is the grand conclusion of the transcendental deduction. In the next paragraph Kant asserts without argument that the reason why the categories are valid for all objects of experience is that all appearances stand in a necessary relation to original apperception. I presume that this is intended as equivalent to the second formulation of the transcendental law which Kant had thought he had established at the end of the section on synthesis of recognition. The second formulation was:

appearances in experience must stand under conditions of the necessary unity of apperception, just as appearances in mere intuition must stand under the formal conditions of space and time.

It will be recalled that Kant always uses 'experience' in a 'got-it' sense. Thus appearances in experience will be veridical appearances. This is borne out by a comparison of the second formulation of the transcendental law with the first formulation of it:

all appearances, so far as objects are to be given through them, must stand under \textit{a priori} rules of the synthetic unity of themselves, in accordance with which rules their relation in the empirical intuition is alone possible.
Thus it seems that what Kant really wants to say at A111-2 is that the reason why the categories are valid for all objects of experience is that all appearances through which objects are given to us are subject to conditions of the necessary unity of apperception. I presume that he would say that what he is asserting here is that the categories are these conditions of the necessary unity of apperception.

The main point which I wish to make is that there is no argument to demonstrate this - no argument to demonstrate that it follows from the transcendental law, which Kant believes he established at the end of the section on the synthesis of recognition that the categories are valid a priori for all objects\(^1\). It might be thought that it is unreasonable to expect an argument for this in the passage under discussion, since it is entitled "Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Categories as Erkenntnisse a priori", and that we should expect to find an argument for this in the third section of the first edition deduction (A115-30). However this expectation is disappointed. At A119 Kant gives no argument to show that the relation he there asserts to hold between the unity of apperception and the categories does hold. At A125 Kant gives no argument to show that the relation he there asserts to hold between recognition and the categories does hold. At A129 Kant gives no argument to show that the relation he there asserts to hold between the unity of apperception and the categories does hold. A119, A125 and A129 are the only places where the categories enter into arguments in the third section of the first edition deduction.

There is however an argument in the second edition deduction (in §§ 19 and 20) to demonstrate that it follows from this transcendental law - or perhaps, rather, from the first of the three formulations which Kant gives of it at

\(^1\) I have mentioned this in a number of places above. See pp 22-3, 36.
A109-10 — that the categories are valid a priori for all objects of experience. I add "or perhaps, rather, from the first formulation", since this formulation says that all appearances through which objects are given to us are subject to conditions of the synthetic unity of the appearances (i.e. of the original synthetic unity of apperception), whereas the second formulation says that all appearances through which objects are given to us are subject to conditions of the necessary unity of apperception (i.e. in second editionese, the analytic unity of apperception). This is reason for saying that Kant in §§19 and 20 is trying to demonstrate that it follows from the first formulation of the A109-10 transcendental law that the categories are valid a priori for all objects of experience because it can be seen from §§19 and 20 that what Kant would say that he is demonstrating there is that it follows from the proposition "The manifold-given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception" (to which, as I have mentioned, Kant refers as the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception) that "the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to categories."^3

I discussed §19 in some detail above in the course of arguing for an interpretation of 'synthetic unity'. In §19 Kant identifies the manner in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception with judgment. As I have mentioned, since Kant says that hypothetical and disjunctive judgments contain a relation not of concepts

1. I have mentioned this argument above, pp36, 107-8, 164
2. This is the first sentence in §20
3. This is the last sentence of §20
4. pp85-94. On pp94-7 I interrelated material from §18 and §19 in pursuing the search for the meaning of 'synthetic unity' further.
5. p87
6. B141
but of judgments, it seems that the representations between which objective copresence-in-consciousness (i.e. the objective unity of apperception) holds are according to Kant in some cases the subject-concept and predicate of a categorical judgment, in other cases the antecedent and the consequent of a hypothetical judgment and, in a third class of cases, the disjuncts of a disjunctive judgment. The view that objective synthetic unity holds between the disjuncts of a true disjunctive judgment would be shown to be untenable by a moment's reflection.

In the second edition deduction an argument roughly parallel to the argument at A104-12 is given at B131-43 - i.e. in §§16-20. §15 seems to fulfil much the same function as A98-104 - viz. to explain Kant's views about synthesis. I can't see that §15 supplies any premiss of the argument ending at B143 with the conclusion that the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to categories.

In the first two sentences of J2D Kant gives a résumé of the section-of-the-argument from §17 (where Kant argued that the manifold-given in an intuition (a veridical mental picture) is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception) to §19. He then makes some obscure statements which I presume are supposed to entail that a category is applied when a judgment of the form corresponding to the category is made, and concludes that the manifold in a given intuition is subject to categories.

I will now give a detailed discussion of §20. I will quote each sentence and then comment on it.

1 (1) The manifold-given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to [gehört notwendig unter] the original synthetic unity of apperception, because only through this is the unity of the intuition possible. (§17) A

1. I have argued that when Kant uses the expression 'the objective unity of apperception' he has in mind the objective synthetic unity of apperception. See p97. What I say there is the culmination of argument beginning on p84.

2. He is here appealing to a doctrine propounded in the metaphysical deduction.
On the interpretation I have given, the original synthetic unity of apperception - i.e. the objective synthetic unity of apperception - is simply objective synthetic unity i.e. copresence-in-consciousness of representations, which copresence (a) has answering to it a juxtaposition of real objects, bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations and (b) was brought into existence by an act of synthesis. I presume that 'the unity of an intuition' means 'copresence-in-consciousness of the representations contained in an intuition, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations'. I add the clause 'which copresence has answering to it... [etc]' because I take it that 'intuition' in the second edition is a got-it word.

Thus I am committed to say that the inference Kant makes in the above sentence amounts to an inference from the proposition that there is copresence-in-consciousness of the representations contained in an intuition, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations to the proposition that there is copresence-in-consciousness of the representations contained in an intuition, which copresence (a) has answering to it a juxtaposition of real bits-of-objects or property-instances, which answer to the representations, and (b) was brought into existence by an act of synthesis. For this inference to be valid is for it to be the case that objective unity can only be brought into existence by means of a synthesis.

Since my interpretation commits me to say that Kant is making out here that the two fundamental premisses of the transcendental deduction are that there is unity of the intuition and that the unity of the intuition can only be

1. p98.
2. p140.
3. pp71, 180-1, 188-9
brought into existence by means of a synthesis, my interpretation is confirmed by this footnote at B144:

The argument rests on the represented unity of the intuition, through which an object is given, and which always implies a synthesis of the manifold-given for an intuition, and already contains the relation of this manifold-given to unity of apperception.

However, the proposition that objective unity can only be brought into existence by means of synthesis was asserted in this sentence from §15: "we cannot represent anything to ourselves as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves". Thus it may seem that my above assertion that §15 contributes nothing to the argument to show that the manifold in a given intuition is subject to the categories must be false.

However, although Kant in the first sentence of §20 and in the footnote from B144 seems to say that the proposition "we cannot represent anything to ourselves as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves" is a crucial premiss of the transcendental deduction, I can't see how it can be.

The claim which seems to be made in the first sentence of §20 and the B144 footnote is that the above proposition is a crucial premiss in reaching the conclusion of §17 - the proposition "The manifold-given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception". It will be recalled that there seem to be two independent arguments for this proposition. The first is in the first paragraph of §17 and went like this:

1. 'eine Synthesis des mannigfaltigen zu einer Anschauung Gegebenen'. 'Given' is a noun. 'Manifold' is an adjective qualifying 'given'. 'For an intuition' is an adjectival phrase qualifying 'given'.

2. p 214.
(1) It must be possible for there to be analytic unity of apperception in respect of the manifold contained in an intuition (i.e. in a veridical mental picture).

(2) The possibility of the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception.

∴ (3) The manifold contained in an intuition is subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception.

The proposition that copresence-in-consciousness of the representations contained in an intuition can only be brought about by a synthesis plays no role in Kant's grounds for either premiss. His stated ground for the first premiss was that a representation which cannot be accompanied by the 'I think' would be a representation of something which cannot be thought.

The second argument in support of the conclusion of §17 was given in the second paragraph of §17 and went like this:

1 (1) The relation of representations to an object is
the knowledge that representations are all representations of bits or properties of some one object.

2 (2) Knowledge that representations are all representations of bits or properties of some one object is the objective synthetic unity of apperception.

1,2 (3) The relation of representations to an object is
the objective synthetic unity of apperception.

1,2 (4) The manifold contained in an intuition (a veridical mental picture) is subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception.

The ground I ascribed to Kant in support of premiss (2) was that knowledge that a collection of representations of bits-of-objects or properties are all representations of bits

1. This argument was discussed above, pp181-9, 203-7.
2. B131-2
3. This argument was discussed on pp189-202, 207-9.
or properties of some one real object requires that the representations should be copresent in consciousness. Thus it seems that the only thing which the proposition that objective unity (unity of the intuition) can only be brought about by means of a synthesis contributes to Kant's ground for premiss (2) is that it entails that all objective unity is objective *synthetic* unity, and hence that instead of formulating premiss (2) thus

Knowledge that representations are all representations of bits or properties of some one object is objective unity.

Kant can formulate it thus

Knowledge that representations are all representations of bits or properties of one object is the **objective synthetic unity of apperception**.

This in turn enables Kant to formulate his conclusion thus

The manifold contained in an intuition is subject to the original **synthetic unity of apperception** (i.e. the **objective synthetic unity of apperception**).

instead of like this

The manifold contained in an intuition is subject to **objective unity**.

However I don't see that it is crucial to Kant's argument as a whole that he should be able to formulate his conclusion in terms of the objective synthetic unity of apperception.

If Kant in \(\S\) 19 can say that a judgment is the way in which *Erkenntnisse* are brought to objective unity, then his argument works equally well if objective unity cannot be described as the objective synthetic unity of apperception as if it can.

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1. See pp197-8
Thus I cannot see how Kant's statement in the first sentence of §20 and the footnote at B144 that the fundamental premisses of the deduction are that there is unity of intuition and that unity of intuition implies a synthesis of the manifold contained in the intuition can be true.

The next sentence in §20 is

2 (2) That action of the understanding...through which the manifold of given representations...is brought under one apperception in general is the logical function of judgments (§19) A

It seems that 'the logical function of judgments' must refer to a type not a token, and that the logical functions of judgment are the twelve forms of judgment in the A70-B95 table. I say this because one would presume that 'function of judgments' here refers to the same thing as 'function for judging' in the fourth sentence of §20, and the proposition expressed by this fourth sentence implies that there is a category corresponding to each function for judging. Also Kant's usual name for the forms of judgment in his table is 'functions'. Also, the title of §19 is 'The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Concepts contained in them'.

However, what Kant asserted in the body of §19 was that a judgment is the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception. A form of judgment is not identical with any judgment. It is a property which some judgments have. Thus it seems that in the title of §19 and in the second sentence of §20 Kant is inaccurately stating the doctrine put forward in the body of §19.

The next two sentences in §20 are

1,2 (3) Therefore every manifold, so far as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging,

1. 'unter eine Apperzeption überhaupt gebracht wird'. It is not clear whether 'eine Apperzeption' should be translated 'an apperception' or 'one apperception'. It is not clear whether 'in general' qualifies 'apperception' or modifies 'is brought under'.

2. (2) That action of the understanding...through which the manifold of given representations...is brought under one apperception in general is the logical function of judgments (§19) A

It seems that 'the logical function of judgments' must refer to a type not a token, and that the logical functions of judgment are the twelve forms of judgment in the A70-B95 table. I say this because one would presume that 'function of judgments' here refers to the same thing as 'function for judging' in the fourth sentence of §20, and the proposition expressed by this fourth sentence implies that there is a category corresponding to each function for judging. Also Kant's usual name for the forms of judgment in his table is 'functions'. Also, the title of §19 is 'The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Concepts contained in them'.

However, what Kant asserted in the body of §19 was that a judgment is the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception. A form of judgment is not identical with any judgment. It is a property which some judgments have. Thus it seems that in the title of §19 and in the second sentence of §20 Kant is inaccurately stating the doctrine put forward in the body of §19.

The next two sentences in §20 are

1,2 (3) Therefore every manifold, so far as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging,
through which [function] it is brought to one consciousness in general 1, 2

and

4 (4) Now the categories are nothing other than these functions for judging, in so far as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in respect of them. (§13) A

If we want to derive (3) from (1) and the proposition which Kant in fact asserted in §19 ("a judgment is nothing other than the way of bringing given Erkenntnisse to the objective unity of apperception") we need also the following premiss:

\[ \alpha (\alpha) \]

The given Erkenntnisse in a judgment are determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging, through which they are brought to one consciousness in general. A

It will be recalled that the Erkenntnisse in a categorical judgment are the subject-concept (or, perhaps, in the case of a singular judgment, an intuition of the subject) and the predicate, the Erkenntnisse in a hypothetical judgment are the antecedent and the consequent and the Erkenntnisse in a disjunctive judgment are the two disjuncts.

A proposition which follows immediately from (3) and (4) is

1, 2, 4 (β) Every manifold, so far as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in respect of one of the categories 3, 4

1. 'durch die es nämlich zu einem Bewußtsein überhaupt gebracht wird'. It is not clear whether 'einem Bewußtsein' should be translated 'one consciousness' or 'a consciousness'. It is not clear whether 'in general' qualifies 'consciousness' or modifies 'is brought to'.

1
I will now examine what Kant could mean when he speaks of the manifold given in an intuition being determined in respect of a form of judgment. It is in §14, and not, as what Kant says would lead one to expect, in §13, that Kant elaborates on a sentence which bears some syntactical resemblance to

4 (4) Now the categories are however nothing other than these functions for judging, in so far as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in respect of them [in Ansehung ihrer] (§13) A

When I mentioned this to my supervisor, Professor Chipman, he said "Not much good on Kant scholarship, is he - the old Kant?"

The sentence from §14 which resembles (4) is

They [the categories] are concepts of an object in general, through which the intuition of an object is regarded [angesehen¹] as determined in respect [in Ansehung¹] of one of the logical functions for judging (B128)

To say that a category is that through which an intuition is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging (which is what Kant says in the sentence from §14) is not the same as to say that a category is a logical function for judging, in so far as an intuition is regarded as determined in respect of the logical function for judging (which is what Kant says in (4)). From a comparison of the two sentences it seems that an intuition is determined in respect of a logical function for judging if and only if the manifold contained in the intuition is determined in respect of the logical function for judging.

1. I presume that there is no great importance in the fact that 'angesehen' is cognate with 'Ansehung'.
In §14 Kant illustrates what he means by the above-quoted sentence from §14. The case he chooses for his illustration is the case of the category of substance. Kant's words are:

Thus the function of the *categorical* judgment was that of the relation of the subject to the predicate; e.g. 'All bodies are divisible'. In respect [in Ansehung] of the merely logical employment of the understanding it remained undetermined to which of the two concepts the function of the subject and to which the function of the predicate is to be assigned. For one can also say 'Something divisible is a body'. Through the category of substance however, when I bring the concept of a body under it, it is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always be considered as subject and never as mere predicate. Similarly with all the other categories.

It is a bit unclear whether Kant would refer to the empirical intuition of which he speaks as the empirical intuition of a body or as the empirical intuition of the concept of a body. To suppose the former would be to ascribe to him a more natural way of speaking. However, I presume that if Kant would use the expression 'the empirical intuition of the concept of a body' he would mean by it 'the empirical intuition of a thing which falls under the concept of a body' which is what is meant by 'the empirical intuition of a body'.

It seems that Kant would say that it is determined that the function of the subject is to be assigned to the concept of a body if and only if it is determined that the empirical intuition in experience to which Kant refers (which, as I have just mentioned, I take to be the intuition of a body) is always to be considered as subject. When he
says that the intuition of a body is always to be considered as subject I take it that he means that every intuition-of-a-body is to be considered as subject. This commits me to take it that 'its empirical intuition in experience' (the expression in the above passage which I take it refers to the intuition of a body) refers to an intuition-type.

In §19 at B142 Kant says that when one makes the judgment 'The body is heavy' one asserts that the Erkenntnisse in the judgment are combined in the object. One presumes that he would say that when one makes a universal or a particular judgment one asserts that the Erkenntnisse in the judgment are combined in a number of objects (in some cases a huge number). It can be seen from a comparison of the second and third sentences in §20 and the statement from §19 "judgment is nothing other than the way in which given Erkenntnisse are brought to the objective unity of apperception" that Kant refers to the Erkenntnisse in a judgment as the manifold given in one empirical intuition. Again, one presumes that he would say that the Erkenntnisse in a universal or a particular judgment are given together in a number (sometimes a huge number) of empirical intuitions.

Thus when Kant says in §14 that a category is that through which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging, one suspects that his assertion is only formulated to fit cases connected with singular judgments. One suspects that in cases connected with universal judgments (such as the very case Kant gives as an example in §14, which is connected with the judgment "All bodies are divisible") and in cases connected with particular judgments Kant would say that a category is that through which a number of intuitions (sometimes a huge number) are

1. As I said, p103.
regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging.

One might be inclined to take it that the empirical intuition in experience which Kant mentions - and to which I have taken it that Kant would refer as 'the intuition of a body' - is the intuition which Kant would say is determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment. However, suppose that this is the case. Suppose also that, as I have mentioned that there is some reason to believe, when Kant speaks of the intuition which is regarded as determined in respect of a logical function for judging he really ought to speak of the intuition or intuitions which is/are determined in respect of a logical function, and that the number of intuitions which is/are determined in respect of a logical function varies with the quantity of the judgment in virtue of which the intuition or intuitions is/are an-intuition/intuitions (i.e. is/are veridical). It would follow that although Kant would say that in the case of the universal judgment "All bodies are divisible" when the concept of a body is brought under the category of substance it is determined that every intuition-of-a-body is to be considered as subject, he would say that in the case of the particular judgment "Some bodies are divisible" when the concept of body is brought under the category of substance it is only determined that some intuitions of bodies are to be considered as bodies, and that in the singular judgment "This body is divisible" when the concept of a body is brought under the category of substance it is only determined that some one intuition of a body is always to be regarded as subject.

1. I presume Kant would describe a judgment as that in virtue of which a mental picture is veridical, but that in doing so he would be using his way of speaking of saying that something is the case when he means that it seems to be the case.
This seems an unfortunate conclusion with which to be landed, since at least if bringing the concept of a body under the category of substance is the act of coming to realise that the concept of a body contains the category of substance (and I presume that this is what it is), one would expect the bringing of the concept of a body under the category of substance to have the same implications for all intuitions of bodies, regardless of the quantity of the judgment about bodies which one happens to be making.

Thus there is pressure to take it that the set of intuitions which Kant would say are regarded as determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment through the category of substance is not necessarily identical with the set of intuitions which are instances of the intuition-type to which "its empirical intuition in experience" refers.

It seems that in the example given in the above-quoted passage from §14 the category of substance is the concept of an object in general through which all intuitions of bodies are determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment. In Kant's example the judgment which was the bringing of the manifold contained in each mental picture of a body to the objective unity of apperception, and which hence was the judgment in virtue of which all the mental pictures of bodies are intuitions (i.e. are veridical) is the judgment 'All bodies are divisible'. Thus in the example the manifold contained in each intuition of a body consists of the concept of a body and the concept of divisibility.

The determination of every intuition-of-a-body in respect of the function of the categorical judgment through the category of substance amounts to the determination of which term of the relation-of-which-the-function-of-the-
categorical-judgment-is-the-function is the term as which any intuition-of-a-body is to be considered by the concept of a body being brought under the category of substance. I have mentioned that it seems that Kant would identify (a) the determination of which term of the relation-of-which-the-function-of-the-categorical-judgment-is-the-function is the term as which any intuition-of-a-body is to be considered with (b) the determination of which term of this relation is the term as which the concept of a body is to be considered. I have also mentioned that I presume that what Kant in §14 calls the determination of an intuition in respect of one of the functions for judging is what in §20 he calls the determination of the manifold contained contained in an intuition in respect of one of the functions for judgment. In Kant's example the manifold in the intuitions of objects which Kant has in mind consists of the concept of a body and the concept of divisibility. It seems that the determination of this manifold in respect of the function of the categorical judgment amounts to the determination of which term of the relation-of-which-the-function-of-the-categorical-judgment-is-the-function is to be assigned to which of the two concepts in the manifold. Kant refers to the two terms of this relation as the function of the subject and the function of the predicate (notice the ambiguity in 'function' between its use here and its use in 'the function of the categorical judgment').

Kant's view that the manifold contained in a mental picture which is being made into an intuition by means of a categorical judgment is determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment (in the above-mentioned sense) through one of the concepts in the manifold being brought under the category of substance is based on the false supposition that, in the sense of 'subject' and 'predicate' in which his assertion 'the function of the categorical judgment
was that of the relation of the subject to the predicate' is true, '...is a subject' and '...is a predicate' are not extrinsic properties which a concept possesses according to the position which a word which expresses it occupies in a sentence (in which case one and the same concept could be the subject in one sentence and the predicate in another sentence), but intrinsic properties one or other of which any given concept possesses eternally. It seems that Kant thinks that in the senses of the words in which a categorical judgment is a judgment in which the relation of subject to predicate is asserted to hold between two concepts, for a concept to be a subject is for it to be a concept instances of which are substances and for a concept to be a predicate is for it to be a concept instances of which are accidents. If this were the case, and it were also the case that of the two concepts in a categorical judgment one must be a subject and the other must be a predicate, then it would be true that which term of the relation of the subject to the predicate (i.e. the relation of which the function of the categorical judgment is the function) is to be assigned to which of the two concepts in a categorical judgment is determined through one of the concepts being brought under the category of substance (provided that the proposition that the category of substance relates to objects is not made out to amount to the law of conservation of matter).

At the end of the above-quoted passage from §14 Kant glibly says "Similarly with all the other categories". However, it seems impossible to generalize from the account which Kant gives of what it is for a manifold contained in an intuition to be determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment (viz. that it is for which term of the relation-of-which-the-function-of-the-categorical-judgment-is-the-function is to be assigned
to which of the two concepts in the manifold to be determined) to arrive at a general account of what it is for a manifold contained in an intuition to be determined in respect of a logical function for judging. I say this because in the case of no functions for judging other than those of relation is a function-for-judging a function of a certain relation. Thus Kant's remarks in §14 give limited guidance in interpreting the sentences in §20 in which Kant speaks of the manifold contained in an intuition being determined in respect of logical functions for judging.

The first such sentence was

1,2(3) Therefore every manifold, so far as it is given, in one empirical intuition, is determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging, through which it is brought to one consciousness in general. 1,2

Premiss (2) in the argument in §20 purports to be a statement of the conclusion of §19. I mentioned above that it misrepresents the conclusion of §19 somewhat, and that if we wish to derive (3) from (1) and the proposition which Kant in fact asserts in the body of §19 ("a judgment is nothing other than the way of bringing given Erkenntnisse to the objective unity of apperception") we need also the following premiss:

\( \alpha \) (\( \alpha \)) The given Erkenntnisse in a judgment are determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging, \( \alpha \)

From §14 it seems that for Erkenntnisse to be determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment is for it to be known of each Erkenntnis whether it is a concept things which fall under which are substances or a concept things which fall under which are attributes. If this
is what it is for Erkenntnisse to be determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment, then it is not only the Erkenntnisse in a categorical judgment - and for that matter not only Erkenntnisse contained in a judgment - that are determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment. In fact virtually all Erkenntnisse are determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment. However, if being determined in respect of the function of a categorical judgment is what it seems to be in §14, then I suppose that it is true that the given Erkenntnisse in a categorical judgment are determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment.

The second of the two sentences in §20 in which Kant speaks of Erkenntnisse being determined in respect of logical functions for judging is this:

4 (4) Now the categories are nothing other than these functions for judging, in so far as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in respect of them (§13) A

If a manifold's being determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment is what it seems to be in §14 then Kant seems committed to say that every manifold is determined in respect of the function of the categorical judgment. Surely he would say that we know which representation in any manifold is a concept things which fall under which are substances and which representation in the manifold is a concept things which fall under which are accidents (Kant's views on which concepts are concepts things which fall under which are substances and which concepts are concepts things which fall under which are accidents are however founded on confusion). Thus in virtue of (4) Kant seems committed to say that the function of the categorical judgment is always the category of substance.
I mentioned above that (4) is not equivalent to the §14 sentence.

They [the categories] are concepts of an object in general, through which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging.

However, even if (4) were entailed by the §14 sentence, we would not for that reason have reason for believing (4), because the §14 sentence is false.

One presumes that when Kant implies

\[ \alpha \] (\( \alpha \)) The given Erkenntnisse in a judgment are determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging.

what he really wishes to imply is

\[ \alpha' \] (\( \alpha' \)) The given Erkenntnisse in a judgment are determined in respect of one logical function for judging from each of the four classes of logical functions for judging.

The contribution which he must think that \(( \alpha' \)) and (4) make to his argument is to entail

\[ \alpha'4 \] (\( \alpha'4 \)) The given Erkenntnisse in a judgment are necessarily subject to categories. \( \alpha'4 \)

One presumes this because \(( \mathbf{8} \)) is the proposition which together with

\[ 1(1) \] (\( 1(1) \)) The manifold-given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception, because only through this [unity] is the unity of the intuition possible. \( 1(1) \)

and the proposition which Kant in fact asserted in the body of §19

a judgment is nothing other than the way of bringing given Erkenntnisse to the objective unity of apperception.

entails the conclusion of §20.
Therefore the manifold in a given intuition is also necessarily subject to [steht notwendig unter] categories. 3, 4

The conclusion (5) is vague. One presumes that the manifold in a given intuition being subject to a concept amounts to the concept relating to the object pictured by the intuition (since Kant at A85=B117 identifies the transcendental deduction of concepts with the explanation of the manner in which concepts can relate a priori to objects) and to the concept being valid for the object pictured by the intuition (since Kant at B145 describes the transcendental deduction as the demonstration of the a priori validity of the categories in respect of all objects of our senses.2) One presumes that a concept relating to an object is the object falling under the concept, since at A84-5=B116-7 a deduction of a concept is identified with a demonstration that one has a right to employ the concept. A demonstration that one has the right to employ a concept can only amount to a demonstration that some object falls under the concept (or else perhaps that it is highly likely that the object falls under the concept; however, surely Kant in the transcendental deduction does not want to demonstrate that it is highly likely that objects fall under the categories).

Although I am confident that the manifold in a given intuition being subject to categories amounts to the object pictured by the intuition falling under categories, (5) is vague because it doesn't state explicitly whether every intuition falls under every category, or only under a selection of the twelve categories. In the title of §20

1. I here cite the premisses from which the conclusion is immediately derived and the assumptions on which it ultimately rests in the actual setting out of the argument in §20.

2. Kant at B144-5 makes out that in §20 he had not established that the manifold in an empirical intuition is subject to the categories (the final conclusion of the deduction), but only that the manifold in a given intuition in general (whatever that is) is subject to the categories. See below, pp244-7.
the conclusion is formulated "All sensible intuitions are subject to the categories" (italics mine). This doesn't make matters perfectly clear. However, I presume that the conclusion of the transcendental deduction is not at variance with that of the analytic of principles. It seems that there he asserts that every object falls under what at B102 he calls the category of quantity and that every object falls under what I presume he would call the category of quality. Thus it seems that he would only say that each object falls under one out of the three categories of quantity and under one out of the three categories of quality. On the other hand he asserts that every object falls under the category of causality and under the category of community. Since the first analogy amounts to the law of conservation of matter, it seems that it cannot be a statement either that a certain concept applies to each object or that a certain concept applies to some objects. The principles of modality are not statements that the categories of modality relate to appearances. Each principle of modality is a statement that the corresponding category is coextensive with a stated concept.

However, this ramshackle collection of conclusions it seems could not be yielded by the argument in §20. As Mackie says it seems that the only conclusion which could be yielded by the argument in §20 is that every appearance falls under one or other category of quantity, one or other category of quality, one or other category of relation and one or other category of modality. This is suggested by a consideration of this inference:

\[ \alpha' (\alpha') \]

The given Erkenntnisse in a judgment are determined in respect of one logical function for judging from each of the four classes of functions. A

4 (4) The categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, in so far as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in respect of them. A
One would presume that the conclusion yielded by (\(\mathcal{X}'\)) and (4) would be that the given Erkenntnisse in a judgment are subject to one category from each of the four classes (which together with (1) and "a judgment is nothing other than the way of bringing given Erkenntnisse to the objective unity of apperception" would entail "The manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to one or other of the categories of quantity, one or other of the categories of quality, one or other of the categories of relation and one or other of the categories of modality").

One presumes that (4) is a spelling out of the relation between forms of judgment and categories which is asserted to hold in the metaphysical deduction. Many commentators note that the second edition transcendental deduction relies on the metaphysical deduction (in the argument in §20 in support of the inference from the manifold in an intuition being subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception to its being subject to the categories, for which inference no argument is given in the first edition transcendental deduction). However I have not yet seen it noted that the second edition transcendental deduction contributes nothing necessary to a proof that we can know a priori that the categories relate to objects which is not found in the metaphysical deduction. The metaphysical deduction starts out with the assumption that some judgments are true and claims that in performing a judgment of a certain form we apply a certain concept and concludes that this concept relating to an object is a necessary condition of the truth of the judgment. It contributes nothing to add that the objective unity of apperception is that to which the relation of representations to an object amounts, and that judgment is the manner in which representations are brought
to the objective unity of apperception. This is all that is added in the transcendental deduction. Thus in plugging the gap left in the argument at A104-12 Kant creates a short circuit.

I have now completed my discussion of the argument in §§19 and 20 which is designed to plug this gap - i.e. to demonstrate that it follows from the proposition that the manifold contained in an intuition is subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception that the manifold contained in an intuition is subject to the categories.1

Glancing back at the whole of the A104-12 argument and at the whole of the parallel B131-43 argument it can be seen that the two arguments are arguments to demonstrate that all real objects fall under the categories. This can be seen from the A111 formulation of the conclusion

Therefore they [the categories] are also fundamental concepts by which to think objects in general for appearances provided that one bears in mind that by 'object' here is meant 'real object'.2 It can also be seen from the B143 formulation of the conclusion

Therefore the manifold in a given intuition is also necessarily subject to categories provided that one bears in mind that 'intuition' here is being used in a 'got-it' sense (a sense implying veridicality).3 It is difficult to see how a refutation of idealism could contribute anything to a demonstration of the above conclusion. I have been obliged to attribute to Kant, at least in the first edition argument, a premiss which Kant would say is incompatible with idealism - viz. the premiss that consciousness of the act of subjecting

1. Discussion of this argument began on p212.
2. For evidence for this, see pp64-5.
3. For evidence that this is the case, see pp180-1, 188-9.
synthesis of apprehension to objective synthetic unity is necessary for the consciousness of the identity of the self\(^1\). However, I have noted\(^2\) that this premiss only seems to play a role in one of what seem to be two independent arguments for the transcendental law which is formulated at A109-10, and which Kant in the second edition calls the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception. No argument is given for the premiss. Although the premiss is incompatible with idealism, neither the ultimate conclusion of the argument in which it occurs (the conclusion discussed above), nor the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception ("all appearances, so far as objects are to be given through them, must be subject to a priori rules of the synthetic unity of themselves" (A110)) is incompatible with idealism. The premiss is not given in support of the proposition that it is a necessary condition of experience in a non-got-it sense that there should be some veridical representations which fall under the categories. Kemp Smith and Strawson both suppose that Kant is arguing for this proposition in the transcendental deduction.

Here ends my discussion of the A104-12 argument and the B131-43 argument.

Both the second half of the first edition deduction (what is called the Third Section - A115-30) and the second half of the second edition deduction (§§21-7) are puzzling, although for different reasons. My discussion of both will be brief.

Kant says at A98 and A115 that the Third Section of the first edition deduction contains in connected form what was presented separately and singly in the Second Section (A95-114). This is false.

At A115 we get one of Kant's occasional statements that there are three sources of knowledge. The three sources given here are sense, imagination and apperception. There are difficulties in seeing how this classification is consistent with three-fold classifications of sources of knowledge which Kant gives elsewhere. Kemp Smith uses the seeming inconsistencies in his patchworkery. Other such three-fold classifications of sources of knowledge are given at A78=B94, A94, A97 (here the three sources are connected with the three sorts of synthesis discussed at A98-104), A120-2, A124-5, B130-1 and A155=B194.

At A116-7 Kant seems to give a brief statement of the argument at A104-10 in support of what Kant in the second edition calls the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception.

At A118 a very curious aspect of Kant which appears on a number of occasions crops up. Kant seems to think that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination plays a role in the transcendental deduction. It seems that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is the synthesis of the manifolds contained in a priori intuitions. At A118 Kant says that since the synthetic unity of the manifold (i.e. in second edition parlance, the objective synthetic unity of apperception) is a priori necessary, the synthesis presupposed by it must be a priori. In view of the fact that for a synthesis to be a priori is for it to be a synthesis of a priori representations (A77=B103), I can't see why this follows.

At A119 Kant says

The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding; and this same unity in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the pure understanding.

1. Or rather it seems some sub-species thereof.
It will be recalled that at A108 Kant said that the unity of apperception is impossible without consciousness of an act of synthesis. I would presume that what he is saying at A119 is that the unity of apperception to the extent that it is rendered possible by the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, while the unity of apperception to the extent that it is rendered possible by the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is the pure understanding. One would presume that all synthesis is synthesis of the imagination, since 'the imagination' is defined as 'an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold [the manifold of perceptions contained in an appearance]' at A120 (although in the second edition Kant speaks of a very mysterious sort of synthesis other than synthesis of the imagination, which he calls combination through the understanding¹). Thus my view that in the above-quoted sentence Kant is saying that the unity of apperception to the extent that it is rendered possible by the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding commits me to say that he is saying that the unity of apperception sans phrase is the understanding (since the unity of apperception always presupposes synthesis). This may seem to be an unwelcome consequence with which to be landed. However Kant at B133n says

And so the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point, to which one must fasten all use of the understanding... Indeed this power [dieses Vermögen] is the understanding itself.

At A118 Kant said that the synthetic unity of the manifold presupposes an a priori synthesis. This together with the A108 doctrine that the unity of apperception is the synthetic unity of the manifold entails that the unity of apperception presupposes an a priori synthesis. On my

¹ See §§ 24 and 26.
interpretation; in the second clause of the above-quoted sentence from A119 Kant is saying that the unity of apperception to the extent that it is rendered possible by the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is the pure understanding. Thus unless the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is not a priori synthesis simpliciter, but instead some subspecies thereof, I am committed to say that Kant is committed to say that the unity of apperception sans phrase is the pure understanding, and hence that the understanding is the pure understanding. Hence I am led to think that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is some subspecies of a priori synthesis.

Kant concludes from the proposition that the unity of apperception in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is the pure understanding that

In the understanding there are then pure a priori Erkenntnisse, which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in respect of all possible experience.

Then Kant asserts without argument that these a priori Erkenntnisse are his categories.

A118-9 should be compared with A78-9=B104, where Kant gives his first statement that there are three sources of knowledge. These three sources were (1) the manifold of pure intuition (2) the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination and (3) certain concepts, which it seems later turn out to be the categories. Kant's initial description of the concepts is "The concepts which give this pure synthesis unity, and consist merely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity". At A76-7=B102 Kant said that the manifold of a priori intuition is the content of the categories. The passages I have just cited are in the section on the metaphysical deduction, and from the obscure paragraph at A79=B104-5 one might conclude that
the manifold of pure intuition plays a role in the metaphysical deduction.

Pure synthesis is mentioned at A101-2.

At A123 as at A118 the synthetic unity of the manifold is said to presuppose \textit{a priori} synthesis.\(^1\)

From some remarks in §18 one might be led to believe that Kant implies there that the objective unity of apperception presupposes a pure synthesis, while the subjective unity of apperception (to which he refers as the empirical unity of apperception) presupposes an empirical synthesis.

The transcendental synthesis of the imagination also plays a role in §§ 24 and 26.\(^2\) I am inclined to think that it plays a different role here from elsewhere.

I find all these remarks about the transcendental synthesis of the imagination quite bewildering. Perhaps if I understood them I would understand why Kant at A98-9 says that the proposition that all our \textit{Erkenntnisse} are in time is a fundamental assumption of the transcendental deduction.

At the start of the next stretch of text after that from A116 to A119 (the stretch from A119 to A123) the reader could well think that he was in for a rehash of the discussion of the three sorts of synthesis which was given at A99-104. Firstly synthesis of apprehension is said to be necessary for a complete image of an object to occur. Next reproduction is said to be necessary for synthesis of apprehension. The reader expects now to be told that a third requirement of knowledge of an object is that the reproduced images should be recognized. Instead he is told that a third requirement is what Kant calls 'affinity'. Whereas the reason why recognition was a requirement for knowledge of an object was not that it was a requirement for reproduction (it wasn't a requirement for reproduction), what Kant says at A121-2 would if true

1. For discussion of a curious feature of the A123 remarks on transcendental synthesis, see below, pp242-3.
2. See my remarks about this below, pp244-7.
entail that affinity is a requirement for knowledge of an object because affinity is a requirement for reproduction. On the other hand the discussion of affinity is parallel to the discussion of reproduction in that just as Kant in the section on synthesis of recognition said that consciousness of recognition is necessary for the unity of apperception, so Kant at A121-2 says that affinity is necessary for the unity of apperception.

Both the reasoning which would if sound entail that affinity is a requirement for knowledge of an object and the reasoning which would if sound entail that affinity is necessary for the unity of apperception (and for that matter the above mentioned remarks on apprehension and reproduction) occur in the course of an argument to demonstrate that there is affinity. I will explain what I think affinity is in the course of my exposition of the argument.

My paraphrase of the argument involves ascribing to Kant assertions such that madness could not explain a person's wanting to make them, since madness can generally only explain crazy remarks on subject matter which is charged with lurid emotion, and one might not be inclined to say that this is true of the transcendental deduction. Perhaps a Freudian could make something of all the talk about affinity, apprehension, unity and reproduction. However the following paraphrase is the best I can do for Kant:

1 (1) Synthesis is necessary for copresence in consciousness of the manifold contained in an intuition, and hence is necessary for knowledge of an object. (A120-1). A

2 (2) Association is necessary for it to be assured that there is synthesis of the manifold contained in an intuition. (A121). A
3 (3) For the association of the representations contained in an intuition it is necessary that there should be an objective ground of association. Kant later calls this ground 'affinity'. (A121-2).

I think it likely that affinity is the existence of universal, or at least very frequent, coinstantiations between appearance-types, since as I have mentioned Kant only seems to consider coinstantiation of appearance-types as a source of association. That resemblance gives rise to association seems to escape his notice (see A100-1). Furthermore universal coinstantiations between two appearance-types seems describable as an objective ground of association.

1,2,3(4) Affinity is necessary for it to be assured that there is copresence in consciousness of the representations contained in an intuition. (A121)

5 (5) Copresence in consciousness of the representations contained in an intuition is necessary for there to be unity of apperception. (A122)

6 (6) It is assured that there is unity of apperception (i.e. consciousness of the identity of the self) (A122)

1,2,3,4,5,6(7) There is affinity. (A122)

Of course I baulk at the suggestion that a synthesis is necessary to generate an image of any object (i.e. at premiss (1) in my paraphrase). Surely this is not necessary if the object is reasonably small.¹

Also, in cases in which synthesis is necessary for a person to acquire an image of an object (i.e. in which the object is too big to be taken in at a glance) association is not what is responsible for our intuitions of bits of the

1. The doctrine against which I am protesting is also asserted at A99 and B130. I protested against it above, p5
object being put into consciousness together (and so premiss (2) is false). Mental images of things we have just seen simply linger for a short time quite independently of association.

Even if coinstantiation of impression types was the only source of association, premiss (3) is false if by 'affinity' is meant universal coinstantiations between appearance-types. Frequent coinstantiations between impression types suffice for association. However, I am not sure that Kant doesn't mean by 'affinity' frequent coinstantiations of impression-types.

Premiss (4) is similar to if not identical with the doctrine put forward at A108.

Having given the above argument to show that there is affinity Kant does not seem to put his conclusion to any use. I can't see what relevance the conclusion could have to a deduction of the categories. Perhaps by 'affinity' Kant means 'every event having a cause', in which case he would in the above argument be giving a deduction of one of his categories. I don't think this likely.

After giving the argument Kant gives a discussion of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. In this section he says that transcendental synthesis of the imagination is the process of which necessary unity in the synthesis of every manifold of appearances is the product. I am not surprised that he should say this since he said it at A118. However he also says that the affinity of all appearances is a necessary consequence of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. This surprises me, since it does not follow from anything he has said. In the argument to show that there is affinity he argued that synthetic unity presupposes affinity, not vice versa. Thus it does not follow from what he says in this argument together with his belief that synthetic unity presupposes transcendental
synthesis of the imagination that affinity presupposes the transcendental synthesis of the imagination.

After discussing the transcendental synthesis of the imagination further, Kant at A124-5 says:

Actual experience which consists of apprehension, association, (reproduction) and finally recognition of appearances, contains in the last and highest (of the merely empirical elements of experience) concepts, which make possible the formal unity of experience, and with it all objective validity (truth) of [the ?] empirical Erkenntnis. These grounds of the recognition of the manifold, so far as they concern merely the form of an experience in general, are the categories.

No argument for any proposition concerning recognition has been given in the stretch of text leading up to this conclusion (which stretch started at A119), since discussion of recognition was replaced with discussion of affinity in the discussion of triple sources of knowledge at A120-3. The discussion of affinity does not get related to the above-quoted conclusion in any way.

In the rest of the first edition transcendental deduction up to the final summary Kant does not give any more arguments to show that the categories relate to all appearances.

In what is supposed to be the final summary Kant gives what may seem to be a completely new argument. The argument seems to take idealism as a premiss:

1 (1) All objects with which I can occupy myself are in me. A

2 (2) To say that all objects with which I can occupy myself are in me is to say that there is complete unity of them in one and the same apperception. A

3 (3) The unity of apperception is the relation of representations to a real object. A
4 (4) The existence of the unity of apperception entails that the categories relate to the intentional object of the representations one is having. (Suppressed). A

3,4(5) For representations to relate to a real object it is necessary that the categories should relate to the object. (Suppressed) 3,4

3,4(6) The categories relate to all real objects of representations. 5.

There is no other place in either the first or the second edition deduction where (2) is stated. However it seems that the appearance of novelty in this argument is illusory, since premisses (1) and (2) seem to play no role in the argument. Premisses (3) and (4) seem to do all the work, and they of course are the crucial premisses in the arguments at A104-12 and B131-43.

I have mentioned above\(^1\) that the above argument is one place where a statement in which the unity of apperception seems to hold between all the representations a person has ever had (premiss (2)) is alarmingly juxtaposed with a statement in which it seems to hold between representations in a manifold which relates to some one object (premiss (3)).

As I have mentioned, the second half of the second edition deduction (§§21-27) is puzzling for an entirely different reason from the reasons for which the second half of the first edition deduction is puzzling. Kant makes out\(^2\) that in § 20 it has been established that the categories relate to objects of sensible intuition like and unlike ours (i.e. objects of intuition which arises through the mind being affected, whether it has space and time as its forms, or some other forms). He makes out that it is not until § 26 that it is established that the categories relate to all

1. p105
2. Compare his remarks at B144-5, B150-1 and B159 (in the start of § 26).
objects of human intuition. However, surely it follows trivially from the categories relating to all objects of sensible intuition that they relate to all objects of human intuition (which is sensible).

At B144-5 Kant expresses the § 20 conclusion that the categories relate to all objects of sensible intuition like and unlike ours as that the categories prescribe a certain unity to the manifold of a given intuition in general. Looking back at § 20 we presume that this unity is the original synthetic unity of apperception - i.e. the unity of the intuition which Kant mentions in the first sentence of § 20. I have taken this unity to amount to something with which we are all acquainted - viz. copresence in consciousness of concepts, which copresence has answering to it a juxtaposition of real property-instances of the concepts.

In § 26 Kant refers to this unity as "the unity of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in an original consciousness". In § 24 Kant refers to this combination as "combination through the understanding (synthesis intellectualis)" and says that it is purely intellectual. It is opposed to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is described the synthesis of the manifold a priori sensible intuition. Thus one presumes that this combination is called intellectual because it is a combination of intellectual representations. Thus I am committed to say that the unity of intuition mentioned in § 20 is a synthetic unity holding between intellectual representations. I suppose this is consistent with my account of section § 20, since I supposed that the representations

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1. This first sentence might suggest that the original synthetic unity of apperception is distinct from the unity of the intuition. However, see my discussion of the sentence above, pp 214-19.
between which the unity holds are a pair of concepts (the subject-concept and predicate of a judgment). Concepts are intellectual representations (representations yielded by the understanding). However I am a bit unhappy about the situation. I am inclined to think that Kant is using 'intellectual' in a more portentous sense that in which measly empirical concepts are intellectual representations. This would create a lot of trouble.

In § 21 at B144-5 Kant outlines his strategy for demonstrating that the categories relate to all objects of human intuition. It is to demonstrate that the unity of the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility (i.e. the unity of the synthesis of the a priori manifold in space and time) is identical with the unity of the intellectual synthesis, which unity he has shown to be prescribed by the categories in §20. Kant asserts the identity of these two unities in §26 (the place he in §21 promised he would demonstrate it), but I don't think it can be said that he demonstrates it there. It would of course follow from this identity that the unity of the synthesis of the a priori manifold in space and time is prescribed by the categories. Kant says in §26 that the synthesis of the manifold contained in an empirical intuition (to which he here refers as synthesis of apprehension) must conform to the unity of the synthesis of the a priori manifold in space and time (I don't know what this conformity amounts to). He seems to conclude from this together with the proposition that the unity of the synthesis of the a priori manifold is prescribed by the categories that the synthesis of the manifold contained in an empirical intuition is subject to the categories. He concludes from this that the object pictured by any empirical intuition falls under the categories.

The details of this argument are utterly obscure to me. It seems that Kant would identify the synthesis of the manifold of a priori intuition in space and time (or perhaps,
rather, the subspecies of it which he has in mind in §26) with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination (see §24). It seems that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination plays a different role in the above argument from that which it plays in the first edition deduction.

H.J. Paton holds that the second half of the second edition transcendental deduction contains the subjective deduction. However, it can be seen from Axivii that what Kant calls the subjective deduction of the categories is a search for the psychological causes of our knowledge that the categories relate to all objects. Such an enquiry is not an essential part of a proof that the categories relate to objects. Kant says so at Axivii. However Kant certainly does think that §26 is essential to his proof that the categories are valid a priori for all objects of human experience (see B144-5). Therefore Paton's view that §§21-26 contain a subjective deduction must be false.

However, for reasons given above, I can't see why the transcendental deduction doesn't end at §20.

2. pp244-5.
CHAPTER 2.

KEMP SMITH'S ACCOUNT OF THE ROLES OF THE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE DEDUCTIONS.

Since Kemp Smith does not give one long paraphrase of the Transcendental Deduction, but discusses the bit of it he thinks is the objective deduction separately from the bit of it he thinks is the subjective deduction, I will firstly discuss his discussion of the roles of the Subjective and Objective Deductions which is given on pp 235-241.

On p 236 he gives definitions of 'subjective deduction' and 'objective deduction'. On pp 236-9 he gives argument to show that Kant was wrong to say in the Preface to the first edition that the subjective deduction is unessential to the objective deduction (Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the two deductions commits him to say that the subjective deduction is essential to the objective). On pp 239-41 Kemp Smith discusses the nature and interrelations of the objective and subjective deductions.

I will deal with the p 236 definition and the pp 239-41 discussion of nature and interrelations before discussing Kemp Smith's argument to show that the subjective deduction really is essential to the objective deduction.

Kemp Smith starts out quoting the passage from the first edition Preface where Kant discusses the objective and subjective deductions. Then Kemp Smith gives the following definitions:

The subjective deduction seeks to determine the subjective conditions which are required to render knowledge possible, or to use less ambiguous terms the generative processes to which human knowledge is due. It is consequently psychological in character. The objective deduction, on the other hand, is so named
because it deals not with psychological processes but with questions of objective validity. It enquires how concepts which are \textit{a priori}, and which as \textit{a priori} must be taken to originate in pure reason, can yet be valid of objects.

The account of the objective deduction I believe contains an inaccuracy, but it is an inaccuracy which is contained in Kant's own definition of 'objective deduction' (viz. - that it 'is intended to expound and render intelligible the objective validity of its [the pure understandings] \textit{a priori} concepts'). This is inaccurate because the task of the objective deduction is not merely to show that \textit{a priori} concepts have objective reality, but to show that we can know \textit{a priori} that they have objective reality.

The subjective deduction does seek to determine the subjective conditions which are required to render a particular subspecies of knowledge possible - viz. the knowledge yielded by pure understanding. Also, it does according to Kant turn out that this knowledge is necessary for all knowledge. However, all that is true in virtue of the definition of 'subjective deduction' is that the subjective deduction seeks to discover what the subjective conditions are which are required to render possible knowledge of pure understanding - not knowledge \textit{simpliciter}. Kant's definition of 'subjective deduction' is that the subjective deduction 'seeks to investigate the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests', and that it is an answer to the question 'how is the faculty of thought ... possible?'

However, in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the Transcendental Deduction the subjective deduction at one stage putatively demonstrates that certain synthetic processes are necessary for knowledge that time exists, and demonstrates this quite independently of whether the knowledge that the categories

1. Axvii.
2. Axvi-xvii.
3. Axvii.
relate to all objects of experience is necessary for knowledge that time exists.

The stage at which this is putatively demonstrated is step 2 in the summary of the subjective deduction which Kemp Smith gives on pp 243-4:

1. Consciousness of time is an experience whose actuality cannot be questioned; by its actuality it will therefore establish the reality of everything/can be proved as its indispensable condition.
2. Among the conditions indispensably necessary to all consciousness of time are synthetic processes whereby the contents of consciousness, occurring in successive moments, are combined and unified. These processes are processes of apprehension, reproduction and recognition.
3. Recognition, in turn, is conditioned by self-consciousness.
4. As no consciousness is possible without self-consciousness, the synthetic processes must have completed themselves before such self-consciousness is possible, and consequently are not verifiable by introspection but only by hypothetical construction.

[1, 2, 3 and 4 are steps which can be stated independently of the argument of the objective deduction]

5. Self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of objects, and consciousness of objects presupposes the synthetic activities of productive imagination whereby the matter of sense is organised in accordance with the categories. These productive activities also are verifiable only by conjectural inference, and only upon their completion can consciousness of any kind make its appearance.

6. Consciousness of self and consciousness of objects thus alike rest upon a complexity of non-phenomenal conditions. For anything that critical analysis may show to the contrary, consciousness and personality may not be ultimates. They may be resultants due to
realities fundamentally different from themselves.

5 is a conclusion obtained only by means of the objective deduction. 6 is a further conclusion, first explicitly drawn by Kant, in the *Dialectic*.

Thus what Kemp Smith gives as the subjective deduction contains something superfluous to a subjective deduction in Kant's sense (viz. "an investigation of the subjective conditions which are required to render knowledge of pure understanding possible"). This superfluous thing which it contains is an investigation of certain subjective conditions which are necessary for a bit of knowledge other than knowledge of pure understanding (viz. knowledge that time exists), and are necessary for it quite independently of whether knowledge of pure understanding is necessary for this bit-of-knowledge-other-than-knowledge-of-pure-understanding.

Kemp Smith refers to stages 1 - 4 in the above paraphrase of the subjective deduction as the initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction. According to him it is in these initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction that premiss 2 in the summary of the objective deduction which Kemp Smith gives on p 244 - viz. "Among the conditions necessary to all consciousness of time is self-consciousness" - is proved.

Here is the p 244 summary of the objective deduction:

1. The starting-point coincides with that of the subjective deduction. Consciousness of time is an experience by whose actuality we can establish the reality of its indispensable conditions.

2. Among conditions necessary to all consciousness of time is self-consciousness.

3. Self-consciousness, in turn, is itself conditioned by consciousness of objects.

4. Consciousness of objects is possible only if the categories have validity within sense-experience.
5. Conclusion - The empirical validity of the categories, and consequently the empirical validity of our consciousness alike of the self and of objects, must be granted as a *conditio sine quo non* of our consciousness of time.

Kant gives a second characterisation of a subjective deduction - viz. an answer to the question "how is the faculty of thought possible?"\(^1\) Owing to his previous characterisation of it (viz. "an investigation of the subjective conditions which are required to render knowledge of pure understanding possible") I presume he is departing from his usual terminology and using "the faculty of thought" to stand for the faculty of *pure* thought.

I believe that the question schema "How is X possible?" can be taken to mean "Is X possible, and, if so, what grounds are there for holding this?"

The answer to the question "How are *a priori* synthetic judgements possible?"\(^2\) which Kant gives is a demonstration that *a priori* synthetic judgements are possible. Thus it seems that he must mean by the question "Are synthetic *a priori* judgements possible and, if so, what grounds are there for holding this?"

Kant's definition of 'transcendental deduction' is 'the explanation of the manner in which concepts can ... relate *a priori* to objects'.\(^3\) However, since a deduction has been defined\(^4\) as a proof that we have the right to employ a concept, and we don't have a right to employ a concept unless we know that it relates to an object, Kant must mean by 'an explanation of the manner in which concepts can ... relate *a priori* to objects' 'a demonstration that concepts relate *a priori* to objects'. This is further evidence that Kant

1. AXVii
2. B19
3. A85 = B117
4. A84-5 = B116-7
sometimes means by "How is X possible ?" "Is X possible, and, if so, what grounds are there for saying this ?". I say this because an explanation of the manner in which concepts can relate \textit{a priori} to objects is an answer to the question "How is it possible for concepts to relate \textit{a priori} to objects ?"

The answer Kant gives to the question "How are \textit{a priori} synthetic judgements possible ?" is not only a demonstration that \textit{a priori} synthetic judgements are possible, but a demonstration that there are \textit{a priori} synthetic judgements. Likewise, by 'an explanation of the manner in which concepts can relate \textit{a priori} to objects' Kant means not merely 'a demonstration that objects can relate \textit{a priori} to objects', but 'a demonstration that objects do relate \textit{a priori} to objects'. I say this because only a demonstration that concepts do relate \textit{a priori} to objects is a demonstration that we have a right to employ them - i.e. a deduction of them.

At BXXvi Kant identifies a concept's having real possibility with its having objective validity.

All this shows that sometimes Kant means by "How is X possible ?" "Is X the case, and, if so, what grounds are there for saying this ?"

However, when Kant characterises the subjective deduction as the answer to the question "how is the faculty of thought [i.e. pure understanding] ... possible ?" he can't mean by this "Is there a faculty of thought, and, if so, what grounds do we have for holding that there is ?" I say this, because if this was what Kant meant, a subjective deduction would itself be an objective deduction.

There is another, and, I believe, more common sense of "How is X possible ?". This sense is "What are the causes of X ?"

For instance, that someone's fresh fingerprints were found in a room in a city recently is a demonstration that he was in the city recently. However, it is not an explanation
how it is possible that he should have been in the city recently. Such an explanation might amount to a statement of the causes of his being in the city recently or else to a statement which ascribes to some phenomenon—which-seems-to-have-a-cause—which-is-incompatible-with-the-person's-having-been-in-the-city-recently a cause which is compatible with his having been in the city recently.

It is clear that Kant is using the question "how is the faculty of thought ... possible ?" in the sense correlated with one of the senses of "explanation how", which I have given above, since he says¹ that an answer to this question is a search for the cause of a given effect.

I believe that 'cause' has a broad sense which is compatible with the fact the discovery of which is the culmination of a search for the cause of a given effect being that some phenomenon—which-seemed-to-have-a-cause—which-is-incompatible-with-something-we-know-to-be-the-case-being-the-case in fact has a cause which is compatible with the thing's being the case.

A search for the cause of a given effect takes the proposition that the effect exists and is of a certain nature as a premiss. The effect referred to is the existence of knowledge yielded by a pure understanding (i.e. knowledge that the categories relate to all objects of experience).

Hence a subjective deduction is not an objective deduction, since a subjective deduction assumes what an objective deduction has to prove.

It also follows that Kemp Smith's account of what the subjective deduction is must be false, since according to him the subjective deduction, among other things, provides a proof of premiss 2 of the objective deduction. The fact that the subjective deduction assumes what an objective deduction has to prove entails that this would be circular.

I will now discuss Kemp Smith's discussion on pp 239-41 of the nature of and interrelations between the objective

1. Axvii
Kemp Smith makes three points. The first is:

Though the subjective deduction is in its later stages coextensive with its objective counterpart, in its earlier stages it moves wholly on what may be called the empirical level. The data which it analyses and the conditions which it postulates are both alike empirical. The objective deduction, on the other hand, deals from start to finish with the *a priori*.

The earlier stages of the subjective deduction are stages 1 - 4 in the pp 243 - 4 summary of the objective deduction. The later stages are stages 5 and 6 in this summary. Of these stages, stage 5 alone is supposed to occur in the deduction itself. Kemp Smith gives no indication as to where it occurs.

Step 5 is a conjunction of three propositions:

(a) Self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of objects.

(b) Consciousness of objects presupposes the synthetic activities of productive imagination whereby the matter of sense is organised in accordance with the categories.

(c) These productive activities also are verifiable only by conjectural inference, and only upon their completion can consciousness of any kind make its appearance.

The conditions postulated by the subjective deduction are synthetic processes. It seems from p 248 that when Kemp Smith says in the above quotation from p 239 that the conditions postulated by the earlier stages of the subjective deduction are empirical while those postulated by the
objective deduction and the later stages of the subjective deduction are \textit{a priori}, his criterion for synthetic processes being empirical is that the concepts "referred to as unifying the syntheses" and the self-consciousness which is "proved to condition the syntheses" should be empirical.

Kemp Smith would say that the examples which Kant gives in the early stages of the subjective deduction of empirical concepts which unify the syntheses of which he speaks are the concept of a number (A 103), the concept of a triangle (A 105) and the concept of body (A 106). Thus Kemp Smith must here be including mathematical concepts among empirical concepts (i.e. he must only be counting the categories as \textit{a priori} concepts).

Kant's criterion at A77 = B103 of a synthesis being empirical is that a synthesis should be a synthesis of an empirical manifold.

Even if Kemp Smith did count mathematical concepts as \textit{a priori} concepts, his criterion for an empirical synthesis would not be coextensive with Kant's, since it is possible for the synthesis of an empirical manifold to be in accordance with an \textit{a priori} concept.

Note that H.J. Paton holds that while Kant doesn't say so, the syntheses mentioned in what Kemp Smith holds are the initial stages of the subjective deduction are unified by the categories as well as by the empirical concepts which Kant mentions.

Kemp Smith also on p 248 gives as a criterion of an empirical synthesis that the synthesis should be conditioned by empirical self-consciousness. As I will note, it is \textit{transcendental} self-consciousness that plays a big role in the argument which contains what Kemp Smith says comprises the
initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction.

From p 239 one receives the impression (a) that Kemp Smith is saying that it is correct to say that the conditions which must be postulated to account for the data analyzed in the initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction are empirical, and (b) that Kant would acknowledge that the conditions which he postulates are empirical. Kemp Smith elsewhere contradicts both these propositions.

On p 248 Kemp Smith says that Kant holds that the conditions he postulates in the earlier stages of the empirical deduction are not empirical. I hold for the following reason that the first of the above two propositions - that it is correct to say that the conditions which must be postulated to account for the data analyzed in the initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction are empirical - is also contradicted. Kemp Smith's definition of "transcendental" as applied to synthetic processes is "rendering experience possible". This is not equivalent to Kant's definition: "taking place a priori ... [and] conditioning the possibility of other a priori knowledge". While transcendental synthetic processes in Kant's sense are clearly opposed to empirical synthetic processes, it is not clear why transcendental synthetic processes in Kemp Smith's sense must be. Nevertheless Kemp Smith does oppose transcendental to empirical syntheses. The synthetic processes which are postulated by the subjective deduction are supposed to render possible a certain experience - experience of time - and hence are supposed to be transcendental in Kemp Smith's sense. Hence Kemp Smith is committed to deny that the conditions which must be postulated to account for the data analyzed in the initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction are empirical.

1. Op.Cit p 76
2. B 151
3. see Op.Cit pp 247-8
Also, on pp 210-11 Kemp Smith says that it is pre-critical to say that empirical concepts unify syntheses. Hence, if, as on p 248, the concept which unifies a synthesis being empirical is taken as a criterion for the synthesis being empirical, it would follow that it is pre-critical to say that it is possible for there to be empirical syntheses. Hence it would be precritical to say that the conditions which must be postulated to account for the data analyzed in the initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction are empirical.

So far I have been discussing Kemp Smith's second reason on p 239 for saying that the subjective deduction in its earlier stages "moves wholly on what may be called the empirical level" — viz. that the conditions which it postulates are empirical.

Kemp Smith's first reason for saying this is that the data which the earlier stages of the subjective deduction analyse are empirical. However from Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the subjective deduction it seems that he would say that the datum analyzed in the earlier stages of the subjective deduction is the consciousness of time.

Kemp Smith in the above quotation from p 239 says that the objective deduction deals from start to finish with the a priori. Thus it seems that he would say that the data analyzed by the objective deduction are a priori.

The third of the three points on pp 239-40 concerning the interrelations between the objective and subjective deductions is that in the subjective deduction the subject matter to which analysis is chiefly devoted is awareness of time, while in the objective deduction it is awareness of objects. This is surely to say that the datum chiefly analyzed in the subjective deduction is awareness of time and, in the objective deduction, awareness of objects.
However, awareness of time is, according to Kant, an \textit{a priori} datum, and awareness of objects an empirical datum.

Hence it seems that Kemp Smith is committed to deny his assertion on p 239 that the data which the subjective deduction analyses are empirical, while those which the objective deduction analyses are \textit{a priori}.

There seems to be some doubt as to whether Kant as he appears to Kemp Smith can claim that consciousness of time is an \textit{a priori} datum. (If he can't then so much the worse for Kemp Smith's interpretation of Kant). I say this because Kemp Smith holds that Kant holds that consciousness of a series of mental contents as in succession to one another is necessary for consciousness of time. Thus, when the contents are empirical the representation of time will be empirical too.

Remarks which Kemp Smith makes in the course of discussing the second of his three points concerning the interrelations between the subjective and objective deductions suggest that he would not after all say that the datum analyzed by the initial stages of the subjective deduction is consciousness of time.

I will discuss these remarks in discussing this second point.

The second point is:

2. The later stages of the subjective deduction are based upon the results of the objective deduction. The existence and validity of \textit{a priori} factors having been demonstrated by transcendental, i.e. logical, analysis, the subjective deduction can be extended from the lower to the higher level, and can proceed to establish for the \textit{a priori} elements what in the earlier stages it has determined for empirical consciousness, namely, the nature of the generative processes which require to be posited as their ground and origin. When the two deductions are properly
distinguished the objective deduction has, therefore, to be placed midway between the initial and the final stages of the subjective deduction.

The reason why Kemp Smith concludes that the objective deduction has to be placed midway between the initial and final stages of the subjective deduction, instead of simply before the entire subjective deduction is no doubt that, as I have mentioned, Kemp Smith holds that it is in the initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction that premiss 2 of the objective deduction (that consciousness of time presupposes self-consciousness) is proved.

I presume that the *a priori* elements whose existence and validity Kemp Smith says is demonstrated in the objective deduction are the categories. If so then it seems from the above quotation that Kemp Smith would say that the data which are analysed in the later stages of the subjective deduction are the categories. If so then one would expect that he would say that the data analysed in the earlier stages of the subjective deduction are empirical concepts. That he would say this is probabilified by the fact that Kemp Smith spoke of data which the initial stages of the subjective deduction analyze — not of a datum which they analyze.

However Kemp Smith in the above quotation says that the datum the nature of the generative processes of which is investigated in the earlier stages of the empirical deduction is empirical consciousness, which I presume amounts to empirical intuitions rather than empirical concepts.

It is false that in the earlier stages of the subjective deduction, on Kemp Smith's account of it, generative processes responsible either for empirical intuitions or empirical concepts are investigated. The only thing the generative conditions of which are investigated there is consciousness of time. Hence if when Kemp Smith spoke of the data which the early stages of the empirical deduction analyze he meant the
data the generative processes responsible for which these stages investigate, then we are indeed landed with the conclusion that the data which the early stages analyse are \textit{a priori}.

As I have mentioned, the third point which Kemp Smith makes in his discussion of the interrelations between the objective and subjective deductions is that the awareness of time is the main subject manner of the subjective deduction while the awareness of objects is the main subject matter of the objective deduction. In my discussion of Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the subjective deduction I will argue that the awareness of time is not the subject matter of any part of the Transcendental Deduction.

I will now discuss Kemp Smith's arguments on pp 236-9 to show that Kant was wrong to say in the first edition Preface that the subjective deduction does not supply anything essential to the objective deduction.

Firstly note that, as I mentioned above\(^1\) it would be circular if the subjective deduction supplied something essential to the objective deduction, since Kant says that the subjective deduction is an enquiry as to the cause of the state of affairs whose actuality is demonstrated in the objective deduction - viz. that we have \textit{a priori} knowledge that the categories relate to all appearances.

In my discussion of Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the objective and subjective deductions I will argue that the contribution which according to Kemp Smith the subjective deduction purports to make to the objective deduction (viz. proof of what in Kemp Smith's p 244 summary is given as premiss 2 of the objective deduction - viz. "Among the conditions necessary to all consciousness of time is self-consciousness") is in fact not argued for in the passage where Kemp Smith says argument for it occurs\(^2\).

1. see above, p 254.
2. see below, pp 266-79.
On p 237 Kemp Smith says that Kant has an unquestioning conviction that the *a priori* originates independently of the objects to which it is applied. From remarks on p 236 it seems that Kemp Smith means by 'the *a priori* 'representations with an *a priori* origin'.

However, if this is what Kemp Smith means, then Kant's definition of 'sensation' at A 19-20 = B 34 ('The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation in so far as we are affected by it') shows that it would be trivially analytic that the *a priori* originates independently of experience.

Kemp Smith's statement that Kant had an unquestioning conviction that the *a priori* originates independently of experience suggests that Kemp Smith does not take this proposition to be analytic.

Kemp Smith next says that the independent origin of the *a priori* is only describable in mental or psychological terms, and concludes from this that the subjective deduction is essential to the objective deduction.

This would not follow if by 'the *a priori* ' is meant 'representations with an *a priori* origin', since what the objective deduction has to show is that we can know *a priori* that the categories relate to all appearances. The question of the nature of the origin of the categories is irrelevant to the question of whether we know *a priori* that they relate to all appearances.

Also, the subjective deduction does not investigate the origin of the categories. It investigates the cause of our *a priori* knowledge that the categories relate to all appearances.

All these things probabilify that Kemp Smith means by the *a priori* not, 'representations with an *a priori* origin', but 'a priori knowledge'.

However, even if this is the case Kemp Smith has still not shown why knowledge of the nature of the origin of the
*a priori* is relevant to the demonstration that we know *a priori* that certain concepts relate to all appearances. For this demonstration we will have to know that the origin (in the sense 'grounds') of the knowledge that the concepts relate to all appearances is *a priori*, but Kemp Smith has not shown why we will have to know anything else about the origin (in the sense 'causes') of this knowledge.

If we don't have to know anything else about the origin (in the sense 'causes') of this knowledge, then the fact that the origin of the knowledge is psychological does not entail that psychology has anything essential to contribute to the demonstration that we can know *a priori* that the certain concepts relate to all appearances.

Note that on Kemp Smith's account of the Transcendental Deduction the vital contribution which the subjective deduction makes to the objective is not the discovery of the psychological causes of our knowledge that the categories relate to all appearances, but the discovery of the psychological causes of our consciousness of time, together with an argument to show that self-consciousness is necessary for the existence of these psychological causes.

Kemp Smith next says that in the second edition transcendental deduction there is no subjective deduction, but that the teaching of the subjective deduction and the distinctions it draws between the different mental processes, are necessary to render definite and provide backing for many assumptions of the objective deduction.

When Kemp Smith speaks of distinctions drawn between different mental processes I presume he is referring to the distinctions Kant draws between the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, since these are the mental processes which Kant discusses in what Kemp Smith holds is the subjective deduction.

The role that reproduction plays in synthesis is so obvious that I think that the second edition Deduction loses nothing through a lack of reference to it.
I am at a loss to see what the second edition loses through its lack of mention of synthesis of recognition.

Kemp Smith goes on to make out that the proposition that though connection or synthesis can never be given, it is yet the generative source of all consciousness of order and relation is an initial and indispensable assumption of the second edition objective deduction which could only be clarified (perhaps Kemp Smith would also say proved) in a subjective deduction.

Kemp Smith reformulates this assumption as that factors which are transcendental in the strict or logical meaning of the term rest on processes which are transcendental in a psychological sense. Thus it seems that order and relation must amount to the categories relating to appearances.

However, the objective deduction in the second edition does not rest on the assumption that consciousness of appearances falling under the categories is generated by synthesis. In fact even in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the second edition deduction the proposition that consciousness of appearances falling under the categories (or the consciousness of appearances being subject to some order which later turns out to amount to their falling under the categories) is generated by synthesis is nowhere asserted.

The broad outline of the second edition deduction according to Kemp Smith is that apperception is necessary for experience-in-a-non-got-it-sense, knowledge of objects is necessary for apperception, the categories relating to appearances is necessary for knowledge of objects, and hence the

1. See especially point (8) in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the second edition deduction, p287.
2. See above, pp4-5, for an explanation of the expression 'got-it sense'.
categories relating to appearances is a necessary condition of experience in a non-got-it sense. What the cause of the categories relating to appearances is nowhere enters into Kemp Smith's paraphrase.

On p 238 Kemp Smith says that Kant's chief reason for refusing to recognise the subjective deduction as a genuine part of the critical enquiry is that it is hypothetical (i.e. hypothetico-deductive), and that in transcendental philosophy nothing hypothetical can have any place.

Kant does not state his ground for saying that the subjective deduction is not essential to the objective.

Kemp Smith says that that the subjective deduction is hypothetical is a bad ground for saying that it is not essential to the critical enquiry, since transcendental philosophy is essentially hypothetical. In support of this he says "The very essence of his [Kant's] transcendental method consists in the establishment of a priori elements through proof of their connection with factual experience." I agree that this is what Kant does, but nevertheless his method is not hypothetico-deductive. What Kant does is to try to discover necessary conditions of experience. Thus it follows deductively from the existence of experience that these conditions hold. The hypothetico-deductive method is to try to find sufficient conditions of given data. The existence of the data only probabilifies that the conditions hold.

We see here a frequent ploy of Kant commentators—to try to cast an aura of respectability on Kant's work by making out that it is similar in important ways to disciplines and doctrines which are respectable.
KEMP SMITH'S ACCOUNT OF THE PLOT OF THE SUBJECTIVE DEDUCTION.

Kemp Smith holds that the foundational premiss of the Transcendental Deduction is that we are aware of time\(^1\) — that the argument consists of the discovery of necessary conditions of the consciousness of time.

He holds that the Transcendental Deduction by itself contains a refutation of idealism, and that the awareness of time is something which even an idealist or a sceptic would accept.

In support of his view that the foundational premiss of the Transcendental Deduction is consciousness of time Kemp Smith says\(^2\) that this is the foundational premiss of the arguments for the three Analogies, and implies that we would expect the method of proof in the Analytic of Principles to be the same as that in the Transcendental Deduction.

In fact, while the foundational premiss of the argument for the First Analogy is the consciousness of time, the foundational premiss of the Second Analogy is knowledge of objective succession, and that the foundational premiss of the Third Analogy is knowledge of objective coexistence. (It might be noted that a sceptic does not accept that we have knowledge of objective succession or of objective coexistence).

The only evidence from the text of the Transcendental Deduction which Kemp Smith presents for the proposition that the foundational premiss of the Transcendental Deduction is the awareness of time is the following\(^3\).

... all the contents of our knowledge are ultimately subject to the formal condition of inner sense, that is, to time, as that wherein they must all be ordered, connected and brought into relation to one another.

1. p 241-2
2. p 243
3. A 99
This is a general remark which the reader must bear in mind as being quite fundamental.

This seems to me weak evidence for Kemp Smith's claim. That the deduction proceeds by the discovery of necessary conditions of the consciousness of time, is not entailed by the deduction's being dependent on all Erkenntnisse being in time, which is what Kant says.

Why Kant says this could be explained by hypotheses other than Kemp Smith's.

It may be that Kant says that it is fundamental to his argument that all our Erkenntnisse are in time because synthesis can only take place in time or because it is unnecessary to synthesise representations which are not in time in order to bring them before the mind together. This hypothesis is perhaps probabilified by Kant's remark at A 99 that in time all our Erkenntnisse must be ordered, connected and brought into relation.

Perhaps Kant says it is fundamental to his argument that all our Erkenntnisse are in time because their being in time according to Kant entails that they are Erkenntnisse of appearances, and Kant holds that it is a fundamental presupposition of his argument that the objects of which we are aware are appearances¹.

Kemp Smith² says that he thinks that the first edition version of the deduction is superior to the second edition version because in the first edition version there is "more explicit recognition of the temporal aspect of consciousness" and because in the first edition version consciousness of time is the initial starting point. Thus Kemp Smith implies that consciousness of time is not the starting point of the second edition version of the deduction. Indeed it isn't and Kemp Smith does not make out that it is in his paraphrase of the second edition Deduction³.

1. A 114
2. p 242
3. pp 284-91
Kemp Smith holds that in the first edition deduction Kant proves that self-consciousness is necessary for consciousness of time and that the categories applying to objects of experience is a necessary condition of self-consciousness\(^1\) while in the second edition deduction he only proves that the categories applying to objects of experience is a necessary condition of self-consciousness and takes self-consciousness as his ultimate premiss. Thus Kemp Smith holds that a good deal of the argument in the first edition is found in the second edition, and that the taking of consciousness of time as the initial starting point only involves tacking an extra step which isn't found in the second edition onto the front of the argument.

Nevertheless, at Bxxxvii Kant does say that the proofs he gives in the second edition are the same as those given in the first edition\(^2\), which gives some support to interpretations of the above quotation from A 99 which do not involve making the starting point of the first edition deduction different from that of the second edition deduction.

The second premiss of the subjective deduction according to Kemp Smith\(^3\) is that the synthesis of apprehension, the synthesis of reproduction and the synthesis of recognition are necessary for consciousness of time\(^4\).

Kemp Smith says that Kant says that for a person to be aware of a series of contents (sense-data), a, b, c, d, e, f, as in succession to one another and as together making up a total of six the different sense data would have to be held simultaneously before the mind. Kemp Smith holds that this holding of representations simultaneously before the mind is what Kant means by "the synthesis of apprehension".

Kemp Smith must hold that our experiencing a series of sense data as in succession to one another is a necessary condition of consciousness of time, or what he is saying

1. p 243
2. However this does not seem to be true in the case of the First Analogy.
4. Kemp Smith would say that this step is stated A 99-A 104.
would not establish that synthesis of apprehension is a necessary condition of the consciousness of time. I can't see why he mentions that it is necessary to perform a synthesis in order to experience the series of mental contents as making up a total of six.

I believe that a close reading of the Deduction (in particular A99 and A102) makes the conclusion that synthesis is putting representations before the mind together inescapable.

However I don't think that the thing for which Kant at A99 says that synthesis of apprehension is necessary is the representation of a series of representations as in succession to one another.

Kemp Smith's interpretation of Kant as saying that our experiencing a series of sense data as in succession to one another is a necessary precondition of consciousness of time is incompatible with the following remark of Kant's from argument No. 1 from the Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space: "For neither coexistence nor succession would ever come within our perception if the representation of time were not presupposed as underlying them a priori."²

At A99 Kant says that synthesis of apprehension is necessary for the representation of a manifold as a manifold and as contained in a single representation. I take him to mean that if each of a collection of representations comes before the mind by itself without the different representations being brought before the mind together we would not be aware that there is a manifold of representations.

Kant says that every intuition contains a manifold to which the synthesis of apprehension must be applied if the manifold is to be represented as a manifold. I take it that these intuitions containing manifolds are intuitions of objects. Generally when Kant gives an example of a synthesis it is a synthesis of representations which relate to some one object.

1. pp2-5
2. A30 = B46.
or to each of a set of objects.

Kemp Smith does not mention the intuition in which Kant says a manifold to be synthesised is contained. If as Kemp Smith holds, the result for which Kant is saying a synthesis of apprehension is necessary is the representation of a series of representations as in succession to one another then the representations in the manifold to which the synthesis of apprehension of which he is speaking would not necessarily all relate to one object. They could be any old representations which are in succession to one another.

Kant does give the representation of time as one possible result which a synthesis of apprehension can have. However Kant makes out that the representation of time would be the result not of any old synthesis of apprehension, but of synthesis of apprehension applied to the *a priori* manifold contained in the *a priori* intuition of time.

All this is further evidence that the first edition deduction is not a spelling out of necessary conditions of the consciousness of time.

Kemp Smith says that Kant next says that synthesis of apprehension is conditioned by synthesis of reproduction.

He explains this (as does Kant) as that after the mind has passed from a to f, f can be apprehended as having followed upon a, b, c, d, e only if these earlier contents are reproduced in image. From this it is clear that Kemp Smith holds (correctly) that reproduction is bringing to mind again a representation which has gone out of mind. However, Kemp Smith doesn't make clear what he thinks 'synthesis of reproduction' means (neither does Kant).

It seems that it is not equivalent to 'synthesis of apprehension'. I have in my account of the first edition deduction surmised that Kant would say it is equivalent to 'the synthesis of a, b, c, d, e' (i.e. 'the synthesis of a series of representations all of which are, in Hume's

1. A99.
2. pp7-8.
terminology ideas'), and that 'synthesis of apprehension' is equivalent to 'the synthesis of a, b, c, d, e and f' (i.e. 'the synthesis of a series of representations the last of which is, in Hume's terminology, an impression'). I mentioned that it is also possible that Kant means by 'synthesis of reproduction' 'synthesis which involves reproduction' (in which case all syntheses of apprehension would be syntheses of reproduction).

At the start of the section entitled 'The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept' Kant says:

If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless.

Kemp Smith paraphrases this sentence thus:

In order, however, that the reproduced images may fulfil their function, they must be recognised as standing for or representing contents which the self has just experienced.

Kant's next two sentences are:

For it [what we think] would in its present state be a new representation which would not in any way belong to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated. The manifold of the representation would never, therefore, form a whole, since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it.

I take it that Kemp Smith would claim to be paraphrasing these two sentences when he says:

Each reproduced image would in its present state be a new experience, and would not help in the least towards gaining consciousness of order or number in the succession of our experiences.

The fact that Kemp Smith says that each reproduced image would in its present state be a new experience, while Kant says that what we think would in its present state be a new representation suggests that Kemp Smith would identify "what we think" with a reproduced image in the manifold and "what we
thought a moment before" with the representation of which the reproduced image is a copy. That this is what "what we think" and "what we thought a moment before" are is compatible with Kant's definition of recognition at A115.

However, in the second of the above-quoted sentences from Kant, Kant makes out that what we think is something that was gradually generated. It is not true of a reproduced image in the manifold contained in an intuition that it was gradually generated. This is only true of the intuition which contains the manifold.

Kemp Smith goes on to say that the recognition is recognition of a succession as forming a unity or whole. The thing recognised is identical with "what we thought a moment before", and the recognition of what we thought a moment before is the realisation that it is identical with what we think. Therefore, that the recognition should be recognition of a succession as forming a unity or whole is incompatible with "what we think" being a reproduced image in the manifold.

A single instance of recognition of a content the self has just experienced (the realisation that it is identical with a reproduced image) is not sufficient for recognition of a succession.

If the recognition is recognition of a succession, then what we thought a moment before must be the entire manifold unsynthesised, and "a moment before" must be being used loosely to refer to a span of time, since an unsynthesised manifold by definition is not thought all in one moment. "What we think" would have to be the entire manifold synthesised (a manifold of reproduced images).

If Kemp Smith takes "what we think" to refer to the entire manifold synthesised, then his interpretation is compatible with what we think being something that was gradually generated. I mentioned above that Kemp Smith makes out that Kant says: Each reproduced image would in its present state be a new experience, and would not help in the least towards
gaining a consciousness of order or number in the succession of our experiences.

However there is no mention of order in the sentences from Kant which Kemp Smith is paraphrasing.

I will now deal with Kemp Smith's claim in the above sentence that a thing for which Kant says recognition is necessary is the gaining of consciousness of number in the succession of our appearances. Kant proceeds to make out that in counting it is necessary to be conscious that "what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before" in order for us to be aware of the number we are counting. However he is giving counting as an example of the synthesis of a manifold contained in an intuition, the intuition in this example being the intuition of a number. (He also gives the example of the synthesis of the manifold contained in the intuition of a number at A102). He would not say that the goal of every synthesis of recognition is to render possible consciousness of the number of representations in a manifold.

Kemp Smith concludes from the above-quoted assertion:

Recognition is therefore, a third form of synthesis, indispensably necessary to consciousness of time.

The only thing which Kemp Smith has said which could possibly be taken to entail this is that without recognition each reproduced image would not help in the least towards gaining a consciousness of order in the succession of our experiences. As I mentioned above, I can't see why Kemp Smith
supposes that gaining of consciousness of **number** in the succession of our experience could be supposed to be necessary for gaining consciousness of time.

Whether the recognition of which Kemp Smith speaks is identification of one of the reproduced images in the manifold with the impression (in Hume's sense) of which it is a faint copy, or the identification of the entire manifold of reproduced images with the whole manifold of impressions, then (**contra** what Kemp Smith says in the last-quoted sentence) recognition is not a form of synthesis. Recognition on Kemp Smith's account of it cannot be identical with synthesis of recognition.

Next comes the assertion which I mentioned above suggests that Kemp Smith holds that Kant's words "what we think" refer to the whole manifold of reproduced images:

But further, the recognition is recognition of a succession as forming a unity or whole, and that unity is always conceptual.

However, Kant is not using 'recognition' to mean the recognition of something as having some property (i.e. the recognition that something has a certain property) e.g. the recognition of a succession as forming a unity or whole. When 'recognition' is used in the context 'the recognition that something has a certain property' it has a very broad meaning - viz. simply 'cognition'. Kant is using 'recognition' in its usual, narrower, sense - viz. identification of something we are seeing now with something we saw in the past. He doesn't say that the recognition of which he speaks is the recognition of a manifold as forming a whole, but that it is necessary for a manifold to form a whole (i.e. to have synthetic unity).

Kant does identify the consciousness of this synthetic unity with the concept of the thing pictured by the intuition in which the manifold is contained (in Kant's example, the concept of the number being counted). Kemp Smith does quote
the sentence in which Kant says this\(^1\) in support of his assertion that Kant says that recognition is recognition of a succession as forming a unity or whole and that this unity is always conceptual.

Thus when Kemp Smith makes out that Kant holds that the unity of which Kant speaks is conceptual it seems that what he says is true, provided that he means that the consciousness of the unity is a concept. This seems a strained interpretation of Kemp Smith's words, unless unity can be identified with the consciousness of unity (in which case for the consciousness of the unity to be a concept would be for the unity to be a concept. That the unity is a concept is a passable interpretation of Kemp Smith's statement that the unity is conceptual).

Whether the unity can be identified with the consciousness of the unity will depend on what the unity is. Kemp Smith is never very explicit about what he means by 'unity'.

If unity means what it seemed to mean at A103 (viz. objective copresence before the mind) then it seems that it cannot be identified with a concept.

Wherever Kemp Smith speaks of the unity of the self\(^2\) by 'unity' he means identity.

If Kemp Smith were using 'unity' in this sense here\(^3\), then again it may seem that the unity of a manifold cannot be

\begin{enumerate}
\item These sentences are the sentences about the example of counting (A103).
\item \textit{Op cit.} p208, 251.
\item I don't think we can take Kant to be using 'unity' to mean 'identity' at A99, since he seems to make out that it is a necessary condition of a manifold being represented as a manifold that unity of intuition should arise from it.
\end{enumerate}
identified with the consciousness of itself or with a concept. However if when Kant speaks of the manifold having unity Kemp Smith takes him to mean the manifold seeming to have unity, then the unity of the manifold could be identified with the consciousness of the unity of the manifold. Furthermore it seems plausible to say that the unity of the manifold could be identified with the concept under which the intuition which contains the manifold is subsumed since the concept we apply determines how many, and which, representations we count as representations of one thing.

Here then is an interpretation of 'unity' which would make Kemp Smith's statement that the unity of which Kant speaks is conceptual come out true.

On p 227 Kemp Smith speaks of the logical unity of the concept and on p 247 of the unity of some concept, without explaining what he means in either case.

On p 249 Kemp Smith speaks of the unity of an object. If by this he means the identity of an object then my latest guess given above as to what Kemp Smith means by 'unity' on p246 is that he is speaking of the unity of the object in the p 249 sense.

Kemp Smith says that the third step of the subjective deduction is that recognition of reproduced images as standing for past experiences presupposes self-consciousness. He says: For it is obvious, once the fact is pointed out, that the recognition of reproduced images as standing for past experiences can only be possible in so far as there is an abiding self which is conscious of its identity throughout the succession.

I can't see why this is so, unless to be conscious of a mental item is to be conscious of oneself, in which case self-consciousness would be a necessary condition not only of recognition, but of the consciousness of any mental item. This is not what Kemp Smith has in mind, or he would simply
assert straight off that self-consciousness is necessary for consciousness of time, instead of concluding this from the propositions that recognition is necessary for consciousness of time and that self-consciousness is necessary for recognition. Furthermore, he would be committed to say that the deduction need not adopt as its starting point consciousness (in a got-it sense) of time, but could take as its starting point consciousness (in a non-got-it sense) of anything. This is because he would be committed to say that self-consciousness is necessary for any consciousness (even for any consciousness in a non-got-it sense).

I certainly can't see that there is a special need of self-consciousness for recognition.

Kant nowhere in what Kemp Smith seems to take to be the subjective deduction (viz. A98-A110) says (at least explicitly) that self-consciousness is necessary for recognition.

The only passage I know where Kant says that recognition presupposes apperception is A115-6, where he says that empirical consciousness is grounded a priori in pure apperception. In the Second Edition Deduction he says that it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations. If the sort of representation Kant has in mind is an intuition which contains a manifold (cf. a representation in a manifold), then the proposition that it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations would, if we assume that recognition is, as Kant says, necessary for the manifold contained in an intuition to form a whole, follow from the proposition that self-consciousness is necessary for recognition.

However, it seems certain that the latter proposition is not Kant's ground for the former, since Kant's stated ground for the former proposition ("for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be

impossible, or at least would be nothing to me") contains no reference to recognition, and recognition is nowhere even mentioned in the Second Edition Deduction.

I think that Kemp Smith supposes that Kant says that self-consciousness is necessary for recognition because between A103 and A107 there is a bewildering transition from discussion of recognition to discussion of self-consciousness.

At A103-4 Kant says things which entail that recognition is necessary for knowledge of objects.

At A104-5 he says things which entail that the relation of representations to an object is the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.

At A108 he says that the unity of apperception exists if and only if the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations exists.

At A109 he identifies the necessary unity of apperception and the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold with the relation of representations to an object.

None of this entails that self-consciousness is necessary for recognition.

It is true that at A106 Kant says that transcendental apperception is a condition of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions. Kant has said that recognition is a necessary precondition of synthetic unity. It is possible that it is from this proposition and the proposition that apperception is necessary for recognition that Kant derives the proposition that apperception is necessary for synthetic unity. However, Kant does not in what Kemp Smith seems to hold is the subjective deduction, (i.e. A98 - A110) actually say that recognition presupposes apperception.

The assertion at A106 that transcendental apperception is a condition of synthetic unity is troublesome, since it seems incompatible with Kant's statement at B133 that the analytic
unity of apperception (which is a condition of pure apperception) presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception (which it seems is synthetic unity simpliciter).

Likewise, the propositions that recognition presupposes apperception, that synthetic unity presupposes recognition and that apperception presupposes synthetic unity are an inconsistent triad. Kemp Smith does not mention this difficulty.¹

Kemp Smith states the conclusion which has been established by the argument so far as that consciousness of time, and hence consciousness simpliciter "is conditioned by complex synthetic processes, and that these synthetic processes in turn presuppose a unity which finds two-fold expression for itself, objectively through a concept and subjectively in self-consciousness".

Kant identifies 'a concept' with 'the consciousness of a unity of synthesis'. He doesn't exactly say that some unity finds expression through a concept.

The unity of which Kant speaks is the product of synthesis of recognition.

Kemp Smith has said that Kant argues that synthesis of recognition presupposes self-consciousness, from which I presume he would conclude that it presupposes the unity of self-consciousness. I believe it would be false to say that the unity of self-consciousness finds expression in self-consciousness. The unity of self-consciousness is I believe consciousness of the numerical identity of the self which has one of my representations with the self which has another. The relation between the consciousness of this self/these selves and the consciousness of the identity of this self/these selves is not that the former expresses the latter.

It is true that Kant identifies 'consciousness of the unity of synthesis' (with which he identifies 'a concept') with the unity of apperception (A108).

¹ Cf. above pp83, 99-100.
In Kemp Smith's outline of the subjective deduction on pp 243-4 there next occurs a step (step 4 in Kemp Smith's paraphrase) which receives no mention in Kemp Smith's discussion of the subjective deduction on pp 248-9:

4. As no consciousness is possible without self-consciousness, the synthetic processes must have completed themselves before such self-consciousness is possible, and consequently are not verifiable by introspection but only by hypothetical construction.

The previous step of Kemp Smith's paraphrase was that recognition is conditioned by self-consciousness (i.e. that self-consciousness is necessary for recognition). Contra Kemp Smith, it doesn't follow from this, in conjunction with the proposition that no consciousness is possible without self-consciousness, that recognition (and the synthesis thereof and hence the other synthetic processes) is presupposed by consciousness, and so is not something of which we can be conscious.

For this conclusion, Kemp Smith would need the proposition that recognition is necessary for self-consciousness (in conjunction with the proposition that no consciousness is possible without self-consciousness).

Kant nowhere in the Critique says that the synthetic processes are not verifiable by introspection.

From p 269 it seems that Kemp Smith holds that transcendental syntheses are unconscious and that empirical syntheses are conscious. On p 248 he says that Kant holds that the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition which are mentioned in stage two are in some cases transcendental syntheses, but that Kant is wrong to say this — that these syntheses are really empirical. Thus Kemp Smith is committed to say that the above syntheses are really always conscious, but that Kant holds that they are sometimes/conscious. In fact Kemp Smith says that these syntheses are really always conscious on p 269.
Thus Kemp Smith is committed to say that step four in
his paraphrase of the subjective deduction is false.

I quite agree with Kemp Smith's view on p 269 that
apprehension, reproduction and recognition and the syntheses
thereof are often conscious processes (Kemp Smith says they
are essentially conscious processed).

Thus if Kemp Smith wishes to maintain that certain
synthetic processes are necessary for consciousness of time
and that these processes are unconscious (and it seems that
he does), he will have to say that the synthetic processes
which are necessary for consciousness of time are synthetic
processes other than the syntheses of apprehension, reproduc-
tion, and recognition.

Indeed, Kemp Smith\(^1\) holds that in Section 3 of the first
deduction Kant puts forward the view that experience
(in a non-got-it sense) is brought about by unconscious
synthetic processes, and that these processes are synthetic
processes other than syntheses of apprehension, reproduction
and recognition. Kemp Smith places section 3 in the third
of his four 'strata'. He claims that when Kant came to write
A98 - 104 (which Kemp Smith places in his fourth stratum),
Kant rejected this view, but that he reverted to it in the
second edition deduction.

Kemp Smith's grounds\(^2\) for saying this are (1) that in
Section 3 of the first edition deduction Kant says that only
productive synthesis can take place \textit{a priori}, and that the
reproductive rests on empirical conditions. Kant seems to
say either that transcendental synthesis in imagination is
identical with synthesis which can take place \textit{a priori} or
that it is a division of it.\(^3\) (2) at A123 Kant calls the
division of imagination which performs \textit{a priori} synthesis
productive imagination. He seems to assign the name 'trans-
cendental function of imagination' (which I presume is co-
extensive with 'the division of imagination which performs

1. pp 263 - 9
2. pp. 224, 268
3. A118.
transcendental synthesis in imagination') either to the division of imagination which performs a priori synthesis or to a subdivision of this division of the imagination. (3) in the second edition deduction Kant calls the division of the imagination which is responsible for the transcendental synthesis of imagination productive imagination, and distinguishes it from the reproductive imagination, which he says is entirely subject to the laws of association.

It seems that Kemp Smith holds that this shows that in Section 3 of the first edition deduction and in the second edition deduction Kant held that the synthetic processes which bring about experience are processes other than apprehension, reproduction and recognition because transcendental synthesis is there opposed to reproductive synthesis.

At A121 Kant does seem to use 'the reproductive faculty of imagination' to mean 'the faculty which performs synthesis of reproduction in imagination (in the A100-2 sense)' and he says that this faculty is merely empirical.

However, as I mentioned above, while Kant does not say what 'synthesis of reproduction' means, the most plausible hypotheses as to what he means by it are 'synthesis of representations all of which are ideas (in Hume's sense)' and 'synthesis which involves reproduction'. If it means the former, then all synthesis of more than two items involves synthesis of reproduction. If it means the latter, then all syntheses are syntheses of reproduction.

In either case, if there are synthetic processes which are presupposed by experience in a non-got-it sense (Kemp Smith identifies such syntheses with transcendental syntheses), then synthesis of reproduction will be among them (provided that these syntheses which are presupposed by experience in a non-got-it sense are each a synthesis in the sense 'act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one cognition')

1. B 152
2. I will have occasion to cast doubt on this.
3. A 77 = B 103.
Thus, whether Kant means by his assertion that the reproductive faculty of imagination is merely empirical
(a) that it is a faculty which only performs empirical synthesis in the sense "synthesis of empirical representa-
tions" (the definiens given at A77 = B103 and A99), or
(b) that it is a faculty which only performs empirical synthesis in the sense "synthesis which is subject to
empirical laws (the laws of association)"¹ (Kant makes out that reproductive synthesis is subject to empirical laws at
A118 and B152), the above assertion of his seems inexplicable.

One possible way of explaining it is as follows. At A121 Kant identifies the reproductive faculty of imagination with
the subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the subsequent perception to
which it has passed, and so to form whole series of perceptions. At A120 he defined 'perception' as 'appearance combined with
consciousness'. At A20 = B34 and A127 an appearance is identified with an empirical intuition or an object of an
empirical intuition. If appearance is being used in this sense in the A120 definiens of 'perception', then at A121 Kant is
identifying the reproductive faculty of imagination with the subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding
empirical-representation-combined-with-consciousness alongside the subsequent empirical representation-combined-with-
consciousness to which the mind has passed.

This is of course to say that the reproductive faculty of imagination is empirical in the sense "a faculty which per-
forms empirical synthesis (in the sense "synthesis of empirical representations")".

¹ It seems that Kemp Smith thinks that for a synthesis to be empirical is for the concept which Kemp Smith holds
unifies it (i.e. the concept in which a synthesis of recognition is) and the self-consciousness which Kemp Smith
holds conditions it to be empirical.
However, I would be surprised if Kant were to define "the reproductive faculty of imagination" as "the faculty for performing synthesis of reproduction on empirical representations."

Again, at A108 and B160-2 Kant makes out that synthesis of apprehension is empirical. However, Kant's definition of "synthesis of apprehension" at A99 ("the running through and holding together of the manifold") seems equivalent to his definition of "synthesis simpliciter" at A77 = B102-3 ("the act of going through the manifold in a certain way, taking it up and connecting it").

The definition of "synthesis of apprehension" given at B160 ("that combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition (as appearance), is possible") is different from that at A99. That synthesis of apprehension is empirical (in the sense: "synthesis of an empirical manifold") is built into the B160 definition.

However, I would be surprised if Kant were using "synthesis of apprehension" at A108 in a sense other than that given at A99.

Thus, I can't see why Kant should say at A108 that synthesis of apprehension is empirical and at A121 and B152 that synthesis of reproduction is empirical.

I believe his remarks in these places commit him to say that the transcendental synthetic processes are processes other than apprehension, reproduction and recognition.

However I cannot see how there can be any synthetic processes other than apprehension, reproduction and recognition, if by 'synthesis' is meant 'the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one cognition' (i.e. I presume, the act of putting different representations before the mind together'). Kant

1. A77 = B103.
does sometimes seem to use 'synthesis' in senses other than this. For instance, at A123 Kant says that affinity (which Paton\(^1\) and I and, it seems, Kemp Smith\(^2\) hold is the existence of necessary and universal conjunctions between impressions (in Hume's terminology)) is said to be the product of transcendental synthesis of the imagination. It doesn't seem to be the product of putting representations before the mind together.

However, it is only synthesis in the sense 'the putting of different representations before the mind together' which is putatively demonstrated to be necessary for consciousness of time in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of what he calls the initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction (i.e., it seems, A98-110).

Thus if Kemp Smith holds that synthesis in some sense other than this is necessary for consciousness of time (and as I have above argued, he would have to say this since he wants to maintain that synthetic processes other than the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition are necessary for consciousness of time (and hence for experience in a non-got-it sense)), then he cannot claim that his paraphrase of the 'initial empirical stages' establishes this. Also he is committed to say that the argument in this paraphrase is unsound, since he holds that it is false that empirical syntheses are presupposed by experience.

However he speaks as though he was contented with the argument in this paraphrase (he calls it a "simple and cogent argument"\(^3\)). Also he holds that it is in the "initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction" that premiss 2 in his p 244 paraphrase of the objective deduction ("Among the conditions necessary to all consciousness of time is self-consciousness")\(^4\) is proven.

1. Kant's Metaphysics of Experience I p 445
2. Commentary p 254
3. p 246
4. p 250
In the fourth premiss of his summary of his paraphrase on pp 243-4 in making out that it has been established that no consciousness is possible without certain synthetic processes, Kemp Smith is implying that no consciousness is possible without consciousness of time. This is because what has putatively been established in the paraphrase is that these synthetic processes are necessary for consciousness of time.

If the synthetic processes necessary for consciousness of time were the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, then, given Kemp Smith's account of why apprehension, reproduction and recognition are necessary for consciousness of time, it could not be true that no consciousness is possible without consciousness of time. This is because, on Kemp Smith's account, consciousness of time is impossible unless we have had consciousness of a series of representations as in succession to one another.

Kemp Smith's view that transcendental syntheses are not discoverable by introspection is shown to be false by the fact that at B154 Kant appeals to introspection to show the necessity of transcendental synthesis for having a complete representation of a geometrical figure.

The remainder of the discussion of the 'initial empirical stages of the subjective deduction' deals with points which are not mentioned in the pp 243-4 summary. Kemp Smith says:

So far I have stated the argument solely in reference to serial consciousness. Kant renders his argument needlessly complex and diminishes its force by at once extending it to cover the connected problem, how we become aware of objects. ... An analysis of our consciousness of objects, as distinct from the immediately successive, forces us to postulate further empirical conditions. Since the reproductive imagination to whose agency the apprehension of complex unitary existences is psycho-

logically due, acts through the machinery of association, it presupposes constancy in the apprehended manifold.

Kemp Smith then quotes Kant from the first paragraph of the section on the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. There Kant does say that association presupposes constancy in the apprehended manifold.

In the next two paragraphs Kant does go on to say that synthesis of reproduction is necessary for synthesis of apprehension, and hence for us to have images of whole objects. However, he gives no indication of a change of topic, and as I have argued, he has been talking about consciousness of objects (he takes time as an example of an object at A99) right from the outset of his discussion of the three-fold synthesis.

The remaining steps which Kant gives in his summary of the subjective deduction which he gives on pp 243-4 are:

5. Self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of objects, and consciousness of objects presupposes the synthetic activities of productive imagination whereby the matter of sense is organised in accordance with the categories. These productive activities also are verifiable only by conjectural inference, and only upon their completion can consciousness of any kind make its appearance.

6. Consciousness of self and consciousness of objects thus alike rest upon a complexity of non-phenomenal conditions. For anything that critical analysis can prove to the contrary, consciousness and personality may not be ultimates. They may be resultants due to realities fundamentally different from themselves.

Note that there would be an inconsistency in Kant as he appears to Kemp Smith if the synthetic processes mentioned in step 5 were identical with the synthetic processes mentioned in steps 2 - 4. This is because the synthetic processes
mentioned in premisses 2 – 4 are said to presuppose self-consciousness, which is said to presuppose consciousness of objects, which is said to presuppose the synthetic processes mentioned in premiss 5. Thus if the synthetic processes mentioned in steps 2 – 4 are identical with those mentioned in premiss 5 Kant as he appears to Kemp Smith would be committed to say that these synthetic processes presuppose themselves.

It seems that Kemp Smith does hold that in a version of the Deduction which was purged of inconsistency the synthetic processes mentioned in steps 2 – 4 would be identical with those mentioned in step 5. I say this for the following reason. On p 248 Kemp Smith says that the concepts which unify the synthetic processes mentioned in steps 2 – 4 are empirical and makes out that the concepts which unify synthetic processes are empirical if and only if the synthetic processes are empirical. It seems that he has in mind when he speaks of empirical concepts any concepts other than the categories, since among the concepts which are said to unify the synthetic processes mentioned in steps 2 – 4 are geometrical concepts (the concept of some particular number (A103), and the concept of a triangle (A105)).

On p 269 Kemp Smith says that the synthetic processes mentioned in steps 2 – 4 are empirical.

However, on pp 247-8 he says that Kant wrongly describes these synthetic processes as transcendental.

Kemp Smith holds that when Kant applies the word 'transcendental' to synthetic processes he means by it 'rendering experience possible'. The synthetic processes mentioned in steps 2 – 4 are certainly supposed to render experience of time possible. Hence Kemp Smith would say they are transcendental. Kemp Smith holds that empirical syntheses and transcendental syntheses are mutually exclusive.

Hence he is committed to say that in a version of the Subjective Deduction which was purged of inconsistency, the

concepts which unify the synthetic processes mentioned in steps 2 - 4 would be categories.

However, I presume that synthetic processes which are unified by the categories are the synthetic processes whereby the matter of sense is organised in accordance with the categories (i.e. the synthetic processes mentioned in step 5).

Thus Kemp Smith is committed to say that in a version of the subjective deduction which was purged of inconsistency the synthetic processes mentioned in steps 2 - 4 would be identical with those mentioned in step 5.

Hence for the reasons given above, Kemp Smith is committed to say that a version of the subjective deduction which was purged of inconsistency would commit Kant to say that the synthetic processes mentioned in steps 2 - 4 presuppose themselves.

Kemp Smith says that 5 is a conclusion first obtained by means of the argument of the objective deduction. It is true that in Kemp Smith's account of the objective deduction it is putatively proved that self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of objects, and that consciousness of objects involves the categories relating to all appearances. There is no discussion of synthetic processes in Kemp Smith's account of the objective deduction.

Because of this dependence on the objective deduction Kemp Smith delays discussion of these steps until pp 263-70 and proceeds firstly to discuss the objective deduction. On pp 263-70 no further proof is given of the part of step 5 which is putatively proved in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of what according to Kemp Smith is the objective deduction (viz. the proposition that self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of objects and consciousness of objects presupposes the synthetic activities of productive imagination whereby the matter of sense is organised in accordance with the categories). What Kemp Smith does on pp 263-70 is to discuss some putative ramifications of the proposition that the productive activities whereby the matter of sense is organised in accordance with
the categories are unconscious. These ramifications are not of importance for Kemp Smith's account of Kant's argument, and so I will not discuss them.

The ramifications are not, as the title of the section at pp 263-70 ("The later Stages of the Subjective Deduction") would lead one to expect ramifications discussed by Kant somewhere in the Deduction, but ramifications concerning the motives Kant had for holding or changing his mind on certain of his doctrines.

Kemp Smith does not say where in the deduction Kant states stage 5.

Kemp Smith says\(^1\) that stage 6 is first stated in the Dialectic\(^2\). It is nowhere else mentioned in Kemp Smith's account of the transcendental deduction.

1. p 244.
2. I presume Kemp Smith has in mind remarks in the discussion of the doctrine that the soul is simple in both the first and second edition Paralogisms (A358-60, B419-20) and some remarks at B427-8.
CHAPTER 4.

KEMP SMITH'S ACCOUNT OF THE OBJECTIVE DEDUCTION
IN THE FIRST EDITION.

While to a large extent, Kemp Smith, in his account of what he takes to be the Subjective Deduction, does try to follow the text fairly closely, his account of the Objective Deduction is a flight of the fancy. He generally gives no indication of where he thinks Kant says the things he says he says, and often the assertions attributed to Kant are nowhere to be found in the Deduction.

Kemp Smith's discussion of the Objective Deduction on pp 248-63 starts out with the remark that in the first edition the transition from the preliminary stages of the subjective deduction to the objective deduction is made by further analysis of the objective unity of empirical concepts (Kemp Smith says that the transition could also have been made by further analysis of the subjective unity of empirical self-consciousness).

Kemp Smith says that Kant is asking what is meant by an object corresponding to our representations, and answers by his objective deduction.

Thus by 'the objective unity of the empirical concept' Kemp Smith must mean the concept of an object corresponding to our representations.

Kemp Smith's words here suggest that the objective deduction amounts to no more than an analysis of the concept of an object corresponding to our representations. This would be incompatible with the short summary of the objective deduction given on p 244, since the summary has as its first premiss consciousness of time, as its second premiss the necessity of self-consciousness for consciousness of time, as its third premiss the necessity of consciousness of objects for self-consciousness, and as its fourth premiss the necessity of the
categories having validity in the field of sense-experience for consciousness of objects. Thus it is only the fourth premiss of the argument presented here that could be an analysis of the concept of an object corresponding to our representations.

The argument which Kemp Smith on pp 250-3 proceeds to ascribe to Kant is the same as that given on p 244, except for the following difference: Instead of having as its basic premiss the existence of consciousness of time and as its second premiss the necessity of self-consciousness for consciousness of time, the pp 250-3 paraphrase takes as its basic premiss the existence of consciousness and as its second premiss the necessity of self-consciousness for consciousness.

However, Kemp Smith on p 250 says that it has been proved in the preliminary stages of the Subjective Deduction (i.e. stages 1 - 4 in the pp 243-4 summary) that all consciousness involves self-consciousness. What was putatively proved in steps 1 - 4 of the Subjective Deduction is, however, that consciousness of time involves self-consciousness. Thus, in claiming that in the Subjective Deduction it was proved that all consciousness involves self-consciousness, Kemp Smith must be appealing to a suppressed premiss - that consciousness of time is necessary for all consciousness, and implying that the basic premiss of the subjective deduction was that there is consciousness. It seems likely that the propositions that consciousness of time is necessary for all consciousness and that there is consciousness were Kemp Smith's (suppressed) ground for the basic premiss in his paraphrase of the subjective deduction, and in his p 244 summary of the Objective Deduction - that there is consciousness of time. This would make his p 244 account of the Objective Deduction the same as his pp 250-3 account of it.

Note that Kemp Smith is committed to deny that consciousness of time is necessary for all consciousness, since he has said that for consciousness of time it is necessary that we
should have had consciousness of each of a series of mental contents and then to have synthesised them.

Even if the pp 250-3 paraphrase did have a different basic premiss and second premiss from the p 244 paraphrase, it would nevertheless be clear that it is not simply an analysis of the concept of an object corresponding to our representations, since it has all its other premisses in common with the p 244 paraphrase.

After saying that Kant answers the question of what is meant by an object corresponding to our representations by his objective deduction, Kemp Smith says:

He substitutes the empirical for the transcendental object, and in so doing propounds one of the central and most revolutionary tenets of the Critical philosophy. Existence takes a threefold, not a merely dual form. Besides representations and things in themselves, there exist the objects of our representations - the extended world of ordinary experience and of science... The originality is not in the bare thesis, but in the fruitful, tenacious, and consistent manner in which it is developed through detailed analysis of our actual experience.

Thus it seems that Kemp Smith is at least saying that part of Kant's answer to the question of what is meant by an object corresponding to our representations is that an object corresponding to our representations is an empirical object.

If the 'fruitful, tenacious and consistent' development of the thesis that apart from representations and things in themselves there exist empirical objects is the proof that the categories relate to all objects of experience that is found in the Transcendental Deduction and the proofs in the Analytic of Principles that particular categories relate to all objects of experience, then it seems that Kemp Smith would say that Kant's answer to the question of what is meant by an object corresponding to our representations is simply

1. p 245.
that what is meant is 'an empirical object'.

Nothing in Kemp Smith's discussion of the Objective Deduction shows why the argument of the Objective Deduction depends on our meaning by 'an object which corresponds to our representations' 'something which is empirically objective'. Hence I will not comment on Kemp Smith's view of what Kant's doctrine that the objects of experience are empirically real amounts to.

Kemp Smith next says that the first stages of the objective deduction coincide with 'the paragraphs which deal with the transcendental object'. I believe that the paragraphs referred to extend right from A104 to A110, since Kemp Smith holds that these paragraphs are all from the one pre-Critical stratum. Kemp Smith's subsequent remarks bear it out too.

Kemp Smith says that Kant starts out saying:

When we examine the objective, we find that the primary characteristic distinguishing it from the subjective is that it lays a compulsion upon our minds, constraining us to think about it in a certain way. By an object is meant something which will not allow us to think at haphazard. Cinnabar is an object which constrains us to think it as heavy and red. An object is thus the external source of necessity to which our thinking has to conform.

Kant does at A104 say that an object is that which prevents our Erkenntnisse from being haphazard or arbitrary. However our Erkenntnisse of an object being prevented from being haphazard here amounts to their being made to agree with each other (i.e. I presume to be consistent with each other). I

1. p249.
doubt that this is what Kemp Smith has in mind when he speaks of an object laying a compulsion upon our minds, constraining us to think about it in a certain way.

When Kant mentions cinnabar at A100-1 he isn't saying that it constrains us to think of it as heavy and red, but that the thought of cinnabar would not become associated with the thought of redness unless cinnabar was always red.

Nowhere outside the supposedly pre-Critical stretch from A104 to A110 does Kant in the first edition Deduction say anything about objects laying a compulsion on the mind.

Next Kemp Smith says that the argument of the Objective Deduction first begins to diverge from the argument of the paragraphs on the transcendental object when Kant sets himself to demonstrate that our consciousness of the external necessity imposed by an object is made possible by means of categories which originate from within. Kemp Smith holds that when Kant wrote A104 - 10 he assigned to empirical concepts the role he later assigned to the categories. I presume he would say that Kant assigns this role to the concept of a triangle (A105) and to the concept of body (A106). I am not sure what role these concepts play. Kant does say¹ that the concept of a triangle limits the manifold to conditions which make the unity of apperception possible, which seems to be the role which is elsewhere assigned to the categories².

The categories are said to be necessary conditions of objectivity at A111 and A119. At A125 Kant says that only by means of the categories "can appearances belong to knowledge or even to our consciousness, and so to ourselves". A111, A119 and A125 are the three places in the first edition Deduction where the categories make an entry. Kemp Smith doesn't say what passage he has in mind.

1. A105.
Kemp Smith next says that Kant prepares the way for the conclusion that our consciousness of the external necessity imposed by an object "by an analysis of the second main characteristic constitutive of an object, viz. its unity" (the first characteristic constitutive of an object according to Kemp Smith, being its not allowing us to think at hazard).

Kemp Smith says:
This unity is of a twofold nature, involving either the category of substance or the category of cause and effect. The two categories are ultimately inseparable, but lead us to conceive the object in two different modes. When we interpret an object through the a priori concept of substance and attribute, we assert that all the contents of our perceptions of it are capable of being regarded as qualities of one and the same identical substance. No one of its qualities can be incongruent with any other, and all of them together, in their unity, must be expressive of its substantial nature.

It is trivially true that the proposition that a collection of accidents are accidents of the one substance entails illatively that these accidents are not incompatible with each other (if by "incompatible with each other" is meant "such that they cannot be accidents of the one object").

Here it seems that the unity of an object is the consistency of its properties with one another. The only place I know where Kant seems to use 'unity' in this sense is at A104.

Kemp Smith goes on to say that the 'causal interpretation of the object' is, indeed, simply a further and more adequate mode of expressing the substantial unity of the object. All the qualities must be causally bound up with one another in
such a way that the nature of each is determined by
the nature of all the others.

This is false. It is possible for an object to change
in shape without changing in colour. While the Second
Analogy does not commit Kant to say that the nature of each
of a thing's qualities is determined by the nature of all
the others, it seems that the Third Analogy does. The Third
Analogy is the proposition that the properties of one object
and the properties of any other object mutually determine
one another.\(^1\) However, since there is no principle of individu-
ation for objects, this entails that the properties of any
one object must determine one another.

It doesn't follow from properties determining one another
that they must be compatible with one another (in the sense
'capable of being properties of one object'). Hence I can't
see that 'the causal interpretation of the object' is a
further and more adequate way of expressing 'the substantial
unity of the object' (if the latter is all the object's
properties being consistent with each other).

Next Kemp Smith says that since the determination of a
thing's properties by each other cannot be revealed in the
manifold of sense, our consciousness of it
cannot originate from without, and must be due to
those \textit{a priori} forms which, though having their source
within, control and direct our interpretation of the
given. Though the objective compulsion is not itself
due to the mind, our \textit{consciousness} of it has this mental
\textit{a priori} source.

Kemp Smith must be identifying the objective compulsion
of which he speaks here with the necessity to which our
thinking has to conform and the concept of the external source
of which was identified with the concept of an object two
paragraphs back. Otherwise he would not in the present
paragraph have shown that Kant prepares the way for the
conclusion that our consciousness of the necessity-the-concept-
of-the-source-of-which-has-been-identified-with-the-concept-of-
\(^1\) B257-8.
an-object is made possible by categories which originate from within (which is what he made out he would do).

However, the objective compulsion of which Kemp Smith here speaks is also identified with the determination of each of an object's properties by all the others. The determination of each of a thing's properties by all the others is not identical with the determination by an object of the way in which the mind thinks about it.

There seems to be the same ground for saying that the necessitation-of-the-way-we-think-about-an-object by the object cannot be revealed in the manifold of sense as there is for saying that the necessitation of one of a thing's properties by all the others cannot be revealed in the manifold of sense — viz. that all that can be revealed in the manifold of sense is what is, not what must be. However if we adopt as our argument for the conclusion that our consciousness of the necessitation-of-the-way-we-think-about-objects by objects cannot be revealed in the manifold of sense, and hence must be due to a priori forms,

that all that can be revealed in the manifold of sense is what is, not what must be,

then an analysis of the unity of an object will not have prepared the way for our conclusion.

Thus Kemp Smith has failed to show how an analysis of the unity of an object prepares the way for the conclusion that our consciousness of the necessitation of the way-we-think-about-an-object by the object is made possible by categories which originate from within.

Nowhere in the Transcendental Deduction does Kant single out the categories of substance and causality and define the unity of an object in terms of them. He only uses expressions which are something like 'the unity of an object' (e.g. 'the unity which constitutes the concept of an object' (A105)) in the 'pre-Critical' passage from A104 to A110, and Kemp Smith makes out that he is commenting on some (strangely illusive)
tract other than this. Kant says that the unity which constitutes the concept of an object is identical with the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold — i.e., I presume, in second edition parlance, the original synthetic unity of apperception. I believe that the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold holding between representations amounts to the intuition in which the representations are contained falling under the categories. The necessity of the categories is said to rest on the relation in which all possible appearances stand to original apperception. However, the necessity of all the categories is said to rest on this relation, and so if Kant's assertion supports the identification of any categories with the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold (and hence, according to me, with the unity which constitutes the concept of an object), it supports the identification of the conjunction of all twelve categories with it.

It is true that there are rumblings at B110 and A160 = B199-200 which suggest that it is the dynamical categories which are identified with the original synthetic unity of apperception, and rumblings at A178 = B220 and Pro. §26 which suggest that it is the categories of relation which are identified with the original synthetic unity of apperception.

These rumblings are that it is the dynamical categories or the categories of relation alone whose relation to an intuition is sufficient for the intuition to be objective. This suggests that it is the dynamical categories or perhaps the categories of relation which are identified with the original synthetic unity of apperception, since the original synthetic unity of apperception holding between representations is sufficient for the representations to be objective.

1. Cf A105.
2. A111.
3. A109, B137.
The proposition that the unity which constitutes the concept of an object is the categories of relation is pretty close to Kemp Smith's assertion that the unity of an object amounts to the categories of substance and causality. However the only evidence that Kant wished to assert it comes from outside the Transcendental Deduction.

I can sympathise with Kemp Smith for lighting on substance and causality. They are the friendliest of all the categories. Furthermore the categories of relation are the only categories which are at all passable as criteria of objectivity.

When Kemp Smith says that the consciousness of the necessitation of the way we think about an object by an object must be due to a priori forms it seems that the a priori forms that he has in mind are the categories of substance and causality alone, since he goes on to say "The concept of an object consists in the thought of a manifold so determined in its specific order and groupings so as to be interpretable in terms of the categories of substance and causality".

Kemp Smith is not committed to say that the consciousness of the necessitation of the way we think about an object by the object (the "first main characteristic of an object") must be due to the categories of substance and causality by his earlier assertion that the unity of an object (the "second main characteristic of an object") "is of a two-fold nature, involving either the category of substance and accident or the category of cause and effect".

Next Kemp Smith says

But the problem of the deduction proper is not yet raised. On the one hand, Kant has defined what the concept of the objective must be taken as involving, and on the other, has pointed out that since the given as given is an unconnected manifold, any categories through which it may be interpreted must be of independent origin; but it still remains to be proved that the above is a valid as well as a possible mode of construing the given appearances.
Kemp Smith is saying that Kant has shown that the concept of the objective must be taken as involving the categories of substance and causality. This would entail that any objective appearances must fall under the categories. This I believe is all that Kant is trying to prove in the Transcendental Deduction\(^1\). At A95 he says that he is trying to show that the categories are *a priori* conditions of a possible experience. There is abundant evidence (which I have cited elsewhere\(^2\)) to show that Kant uses 'experience' in a sense which implies objectivity.

If, as Kemp Smith says, Kant has shown that the concept of the objective involves the categories, then the only thing which would have to be proved to show that to take appearances to fall under the categories is "a valid and not merely a possible mode of construing the given appearances" would be that there are some objective appearances. Indeed, the subsequent course of Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the Objective Deduction seems to indicate that he thinks that this is all that remains to be proved\(^3\).

He says\(^4\)

Kant's method of proof is transcendental, i.e. he seeks to demonstrate that this interpretation of the given \([i.e. the proposition that the categories relate to appearances]\) is indispensably necessary as being a *sine qua non* of its possible apprehension.

From Kemp Smith's subsequent remarks it can be seen that by "the apprehension of the given" he means the given's merely coming to mind. Kant never uses "transcendental proof" in the sense here ascribed to him by Kemp Smith.

A deduction in the sense given by Kant at A84 = B116 ('a proof that we have the right to use a concept') is a proof that the concept relates to some object. Kant defines 'a transcendental deduction' as 'the explanation of the manner in

1. see above, p234-5.
2. see above p 64-5.
3. see below pp 302-4.
which concepts can ... relate a priori to objects'. Thus Kant, if he were to use 'transcendental proof' in a manner consistent with the above definitions, would use it to mean 'a priori proof that a concept relates to an object'. This amounts to 'proof that we can know the proposition that the concept relates to the object to be true a priori'. Since we cannot know by performing an act of analysis that any concept relates to any object, 'a proof that we can know the proposition that a certain concept relates to a certain object to be true a priori' will be 'a proof that the proposition is synthetic a priori'.

Thus Kant, if he were to use the expression 'transcendental proof' would use it to mean 'proof' that a proposition is synthetic a priori', not 'proof that something is necessary for the possibility of consciousness'.

I rather suspect that Kemp Smith is responsible for a good deal of the pseudo-Kantian doctrines and terminology which even today hang heavy in the air in many a chamber of many an academic institution.

Kemp Smith's account of Kant's proof in the objective deduction that the categories relate to appearances is as follows:

The basic premiss is that there is consciousness.

The second premiss is that all consciousness involves self-consciousness, which KempSmith says was established in the preliminary steps of the subjective deduction. As I mentioned above, what was putatively established in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the subjective deduction was not that all consciousness involves self-consciousness but that consciousness of time involves self-consciousness. As I have also mentioned, the basic premiss of the subjective deduction according to Kemp Smith is not that there is consciousness, but that there is consciousness of time. The p245 paraphrase of the Objective Deduction does give as the basic premiss that

1. A85=B117.
2. p292.
there is consciousness of time and, as the second premiss, that self-consciousness is necessary for consciousness of time.

As I have also mentioned, Kant as he appears to Kemp Smith is committed to deny that consciousness of time is necessary for all consciousness. Hence on Kemp Smith's own account, no argument is given in the subjective deduction to show that all consciousness involves self-consciousness.

Kant as he is in himself does at A117n seem to say that all consciousness involves self-consciousness. One must beware of Kant's use of the word 'consciousness'. Sometimes (e.g. A123-4, B276) Kant uses 'consciousness' in a got-it sense. I believe, however, that he is using it in a non-got-it sense at A117n. It is possible that Kant also says that all consciousness involves self-consciousness at A122.

In the second edition Deduction there is the assertion at B131 that it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations. However I suspect that 'representation' is here being used in a got-it sense. There is no other place in the second edition Deduction where Kant might be saying that all consciousness involves self-consciousness.

The third premiss is that only if appearances are empirically objective is self-consciousness possible.

On pp 250-2 Kemp Smith states what he takes to be Kant's argument for the third premiss.

Then, on p 252, Kemp Smith gives what he takes to be the fourth and final premiss of the objective deduction: "this not-self, consciousness of which is necessary to the possibility of self-consciousness, must consist in empirical objects apprehended in terms of the categories".

1. See above, pp292-3.
2. See above, pp188-9.
3. The first three premisses of the argument are stated on p 250.
In the third premiss it was already stated that the not-self, consciousness of which is necessary to the possibility of self-consciousness, consists in empirical objects. Thus the only thing new in the fourth premiss is that empirical objects can only be apprehended in terms of the categories.

In the fourth premiss in the p 244 summary of the argument there is no such overlap with the third premiss:

4. Consciousness of objects is possible only if the categories have validity within the sphere of sense-experience.

This proposition (which is equivalent to the bit of the fourth premiss on p 252 which does not overlap with the third premiss) is the definition of what the concept of the objective must be taken as involving for which Kemp Smith claims Kant argues early in the objective deduction¹ and Kant's argument for which Kemp Smith claims is the stage in the objective deduction where it first begins to diverge from the argument of the 'pre-Critical' paragraphs from A104 to A110.

Apart from the fourth premiss, the argument is a proof that there are objective appearances. This was my ground for saying² that Kemp Smith seems to hold that after Kant had shown that the concept of the objective must be taken as involving the categories, the only thing which had to be proved to show that to take appearances to fall under the categories is "a valid and not merely possible way of construing the given appearances", was that there are some objective appearances.

Strangely, when Kemp Smith comes to discuss the fourth premiss on pp 252-3 he says that Kant gives no argument in the first edition deduction to show that "the forms of unity demanded by apperception" are the categories. The argument Kemp Smith has attributed to him in support of the above-mentioned definition of what the concept of the objective must be taken as involving together with the argument which he

1. Kemp Smith discusses this argument on pp 249-50.
2. p301.
attributes to him in support of premiss 3 ("only by means of the interpretation of appearances as empirically objective is self-consciousness possible"), constitutes an argument to show that "the forms of unity demanded by apperception" are the categories.

The argument\(^1\) for the third premiss ("only by means of the interpretation of appearances as empirically objective is self-consciousness possible at all") which Kemp Smith attributes to Kant is as follows.

Kemp Smith says that the self-consciousness of the subjective deduction is empirical, and that in the objective deduction Kant develops on more Critical lines the argument that accompanied his earlier doctrine of the transcendental object. Kemp Smith holds that Kant does this in propounding "in what is at once the most fruitful and the most misleading of his tenets, that the ultimate ground of the possibility of self-consciousness and therefore also of empirical self-consciousness is the transcendental unity of apperception".

However, at A107-8 (which is I presume where Kemp Smith's premiss 3 of the subjective deduction (that self-consciousness is necessary for recognition) is supposed to occur) it is transcendental apperception that plays a big role. Empirical apperception is only mentioned in passing in order to be contrasted with transcendental apperception.

Thus it seems that Kemp Smith is saying that when Kant puts forward the proposition that all consciousness involves self-consciousness as the second premiss of the objective deduction it is not equivalent to the conclusion of the subjective deduction that all consciousness involves self-consciousness (since in the subjective deduction when Kant says "self-consciousness" he has in mind empirical self-consciousness, while in the objective deduction he has in mind transcendental self-consciousness).

That **transcendental** apperception is presupposed by all consciousness turns out to be crucial to the objective deduction on Kemp Smith's account of it, since the argument Kemp Smith gives in support of the third premiss (that only by means of the interpretation of appearances as empirically objective is self-consciousness possible) only holds if the self-consciousness mentioned either is transcendental self-consciousness, or else is impossible without transcendental self-consciousness.

Kemp Smith says that one reason why the deduction is found so baffling is that Kant assigns a very definite meaning to the expression "unity of apperception", but gives only "the briefest and most condensed" indication as to what it is. Kemp Smith gives the following account of what it is:

The true or transcendental self has no content of its own through which it can gain knowledge of itself. It is mere identity, I am I. In other words, self-consciousness is a mere form through which contents that never themselves constitute the self are yet apprehended as being objects to the self.

To make Kemp Smith come out giving what I believe to be a true interpretation of Kant, I will assume that when he says that the transcendental self has no content of its own through which it can gain knowledge of itself he does not mean that the transcendental self has no properties and hence cannot get to know itself by contemplating its own properties. I presume he means that the transcendental self has no knowable properties and hence cannot get to know itself by contemplating its own properties.

At A107 Kant does seem to use the expressions 'transcendental apperception' and 'transcendental unity of apperception' interchangeably, which does suggest that he would identify what we know of the transcendental self with "mere identity, I am I".
The only intelligible interpretation I can give to Kemp Smith's assertion that the transcendental self is mere identity, I am I, is that all that we know about the transcendental self is that the transcendental self which is the owner of one of the representations, which I am normally inclined to call mine, is identical with the transcendental self which owns every other representation which I am normally inclined to call mine.

I am not sure how it follows from this that self-consciousness can be said to be a form.

I will assume that for contents to be apprehended as objects to the self is (a) for me to be aware that the contents are being had by me, or perhaps rather (b) for me to be aware that the contents are being had by me whilst simultaneously taking them to be objective. If it means (b), then I can't see that it follows from the self being "mere identity, I am I" (taking this to mean that all that we can know about the transcendental self is that the transcendental self which owns one of the representations which I am normally inclined to call mine, is identical with the transcendental self which owns every other representation which I am normally inclined to call mine) that through the self contents that never themselves constitute the self are yet apprehended as being objects to the self.

I say this because I can't see that it follows from the transcendental self being "mere identity, I am I" in the above sense that I take contents to be objective.
Kemp Smith in the second of the above quoted sentences says that it is through the transcendental self that contents are apprehended as being objects to the self. If he is merely trying to say that if the self did not exist or was unknown contents could not be apprehended as being objects to it, then he has chosen a strange way of saying it. However I can't think of what else he could be saying.

In identifying the proposition that the true or transcendental self "is mere identity, I am I" with the proposition that self-consciousness is a mere form through which contents which never themselves constitute the self are yet apprehended as being objects to the self, Kemp Smith is, if taken literally, implying that the only self-consciousness is transcendental self-consciousness.

I take it that he really would want to say that transcendental self-consciousness is a mere form through which contents which never themselves constitute the transcendental self are yet apprehended as being objects to the self.

I don't believe that Kemp Smith would wish to identify empirical apperception (at least if he takes it to be what Kant at A107 says it is - viz. the flux of inner appearances) with a mere form. The contents which Kemp Smith mentions certainly do constitute the flux of inner appearances.

However Kemp Smith's statement that the self-consciousness of the subjective deduction is empirical seems to indicate that he has strange ideas about what empirical apperception is. Hence perhaps the above
considerations do not indicate that he does not really want to say that self-consciousness *simpliciter* is a mere form through which contents which never themselves constitute the self *simpliciter* are yet apprehended as being objects to the self.

Next Kemp Smith gives an argument to show that we must postulate a transcendental unity ofapperception - i.e., I presume, to show that our knowledge that the self which owns one of the representations which I am normally inclined to call mine is identical with the self which owns every other representation which I am normally inclined to call mine is non-empirical.

This proposition of course does not entail that the transcendental self is "mere identity, I am I" (i.e., I presume, that the only fact that we know about the self/selves which is/are not known empirically is that the self-which-is-not-known-empirically which owns one of the representations which I am normally inclined to call mine is identical with the selves-which-are-not-known-empirically which own all the other representations which I am normally inclined to call mine).

To argue for the proposition that the transcendental self is "mere identity, I am I", Kemp Smith would have to fight off the person who wants to say that we can know more of the transcendental self/selves than that the transcendental self which owns one of the representations which I am normally inclined to

1. Op.Cit. p251 "that identity can never ... to give to appearances."
call mine is identical with the transcendental selves that own all the other representations which I am normally inclined to call mine. Kemp Smith doesn't both doing this here.

Further, it does not seem to me to follow from our knowledge that a self which owns one of the representations which I am normally inclined to call mine is identical with selves which own the other representations which I am normally inclined to call mine being non-empirical that these selves which are known to be identical with each other are not/is not identical with a self with which we are empirically acquainted.

Thus, even if he has established that our knowledge that the self which owns one of the representations which I am normally inclined to call mine is identical with the self which owns every other representation which I am normally inclined to call mine is transcendental, he has not thereby fought off the person who wants to say that there is no transcendental self—which is another thing he has to do if he wants to argue for the proposition that the transcendental self is "mere identity, I am I".

Thus Kemp Smith has left this proposition undefended on both fronts.

Next Kemp Smith says¹:

To summarise before proceeding. We have obtained two important conclusions: first that all consciousness

¹. p251.
involves self consciousness [the third premiss of Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the objective deduction]; and secondly, that self-consciousness is a mere form, in the terms of which contents that do not constitute the self are apprehended as existing for the self [above Kemp Smith identified this with the proposition that the true or transcendental self is mere identity, I am I]. The first leads up to the second,... Then Kemp Smith proceeds:

... and the second is equivalent to the assertion that there can be no such thing as a pure self-consciousness, i.e. a consciousness in which the self is aware of itself and nothing but itself. Self-consciousness, to be possible at all, must be at the same time be a consciousness of something that is not-self.

The first of the "two important conclusions" (that all consciousness involves self consciousness) does not lead up to the second (that self consciousness is a mere form etc.), if by "lead up to" is meant "entail".

Kemp Smith has given no argument at all for the second conclusion, let alone an argument for it which takes the first conclusion as a premiss.

Above I mentioned that if a content being apprehended as being an object to the self involves our taking the content to be objective, then I can't see how the proposition that the true or transcendental self is mere identity, I am I, can be identical with the proposition that the self is a mere form through which contents which never themselves constitute the self are yet apprehended as being objects to the self. I also can't see this if a content being apprehended as being an object to the self involves the content being objective.

As I also mentioned above, I can't see how the self's being mere identity, I am I, can be its being a form of some sort. However, I presume that at least part of what Kemp
Smith is getting at when he says that self consciousness is a mere form through which contents which never themselves constitute the self are yet apprehended as being objects to the self is as follows: Our representation of the self is nothing but the thought of an unknown somewhat to which different representations all bear the relation "...is had by...". (This proposition does seem equivalent to the proposition that the self is mere identity, I am I, at least on my interpretation of this latter proposition - viz. "all that we know of the self/selves is that the self which owns one of the representations which I am normally inclined to call mine is identical with the self which owns every other representation which I am normally inclined to call mine").

From this it might be thought that it follows that we cannot have a representation of the self unless we have these other representations which are supposed to all bear this relation to the self, and which are representations of things other than the self.

However, I can't see how it follows from the proposition that our representation of the self is nothing but the thought of an unknown somewhat to which different representations all bear the relation "...is had by..."

that we cannot have a representation of the self unless the above-mentioned representations of things other than the self are objective.

Kemp Smith gives no argument to show that this follows.

Therefore, since the passage on p251 which I have just discussed is the only support Kemp Smith gives in support of the third premiss of his paraphrase of the objective deduction ("only by means of the interpretation of appearances as empirically objective is self-consciousness possible at all"), I do not accept this premiss.

I mentioned above¹ that nothing in Kemp Smith's discussion of the Objective Deduction depends on our meaning by 'an object which corresponds to our representations' 'something which is empirically objective'. To see this, the crucial bit of Kemp Smith's commentary to look at is his argument on p251 in

¹  p294.
support of the third premiss. Nothing which Kemp Smith says indicates why for the possibility of self-consciousness it is necessary that appearances should be taken to be empirically rather than transcendentally objective.

Nowhere in either the first or the second edition Deduction does Kant argue for the proposition that for self-consciousness it is necessary that appearances should be taken as empirically objective. It is only in the second edition Refutation of Idealism that argument for this is found.

Kemp Smith says that for proof of the fourth and final premiss in his paraphrase of the Objective Deduction ("this not-self, consciousness of which is necessary to the possibility of self-consciousness, must consist in empirical objects apprehended in terms of the categories") Kant again appeals to the indispensableness of apperception. As no intuitions can enter consciousness which are not capable of being related to the self, they must be so related to one another that, notwithstanding their variety and diversity the self can still be conscious of itself as identical throughout them all. In other words, no intuition can be related to the self that is incapable of being combined together with all the other intuitions to form a unitary consciousness.

I presume that for intuitions to form a unitary consciousness is for synthetic unity to hold between them, since Kant seems to say that it is necessary for self-consciousness that synthetic unity should hold between all our representations at A108, A117n and A122.

Here is another ground for taking it that for intuitions to form a unitary consciousness is for synthetic unity to hold between them: According to Kemp Smith self-consciousness amounts to consciousness of "mere identity, I am I" - i.e., I have presumed, consciousness that the self which owns one of my representations is identical with the self/selves which owns/own all my other representations. I believe that this

1. see my remarks on this matter above, p234-5.
consciousness is that to which Kant refers in the first edition as "the unity of apperception" and "the unity of consciousness", and in the second edition as "the analytic unity of apperception". The only thing other than synthetic unity holding between intuitions which occurs to me to which intuitions forming a unitary consciousness could amount is consciousness that the self which owns one of the intuitions is identical with the self/selves which owns/own all the other intuitions. However Kemp Smith has already made out that this consciousness is necessary for self-consciousness (and is, in fact, what self-consciousness amounts to) in the course of arguing for premiss three.

It follows trivially from the above consciousness being necessary for self-consciousness that the above consciousness is necessary for an intuition to be related to the self. Hence, if when Kemp Smith says that no intuition can be related to the self which is not capable of being combined together with all the other intuitions to form a unitary consciousness, he means by "intuitions forming a unitary consciousness" our being conscious that the self which owns one of them is identical with the self/selves which owns/own all the others, then he would be repeating the assertion he made in the course of arguing for premiss three. Hence I think we must conclude that by "intuitions forming a unitary consciousness" Kemp Smith means synthetic unity holding between the intuitions.

As I have mentioned, what it is for synthetic unity to hold between representations is unclear. In some passages \(^1\) synthetic unity is made out by Kant to be a relation which holds between the collection of representations which relates to some one object. It sometimes \(^2\) seems clear that this relation is copresence in consciousness, although perhaps always in the first edition deduction \(^3\), and sometimes in the second edition deduction \(^4\), Kant says "synthetic unity" when he means

2. B140.
3. e.g A105, A106, A109.
4. B137.
"objective synthetic unity" (i.e. copresence-in-consciousness of representations which is caused by a juxtaposition of objects, bits of objects or property instances each of which answers to one of the representations). However, in some passages in the first edition deduction\(^1\), Kant seems to make out that synthetic unity holds between all the representations a person has ever had. If, as I have made out, by "intuitions forming a unitary consciousness" Kemp Smith means synthetic unity holding between intuitions, then the assertion of his which I have been discussing seems to imply that synthetic unity is a relation which holds between all the representations a person has ever had. In passages where Kant seems to say this, it seems that for synthetic unity to hold between representations is for representations to be law abiding. It seems that this is what Kemp Smith means by "representations forming a unitary consciousness" in the passage which I am discussing, since at the bottom of p254 Kemp Smith identifies the objective unity "which is the correlate of the unity of self-consciousness" (which objective unity he must be identifying with the unitary consciousness I have been discussing) with objective affinity, and identifies objective unity and objective affinity with objective order.

The conjunction of the above-quoted argument of Kemp Smith's and the proposition that it follows from representations being combined together to form a unitary consciousness that they fall under the categories, contra Kemp Smith, is not an argument to show that the not-self, consciousness of which is necessary to the possibility of self-consciousness, must consist in empirical objects apprehended in terms of the categories,

which appeals to the indispensableness of apperception.

It is a proof that the categories relating to appearances is necessary for self-consciousness which bypasses all mention of objectivity and renders premiss three in Kemp Smith's paraphrase ("only by means of the interpretations of appearances as empirically objective is self-consciousness possible at all") superfluous.

Kemp Smith gives as a place where Kant says that no intuition can be related to the self that is incapable of being combined together with all the other intuitions to form a unitary consciousness one of Kant's many formulations in §16 of the second edition deduction of the proposition that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic.

Kant is saying here that no representation in a manifold is contained in an intuition/related to the self that is not combined with all the other representations contained in the intuition to form a unitary consciousness.

He is not, as Kemp Smith seems to say, saying that no intuition can be related to the self that is incapable of being combined together with all the other intuitions that that self has ever had. However, Kant does seem to say this at A108, A117n and A122.

Kemp Smith says that the place where Kant says it in the first edition is in this sentence from A116:

We are a priori aware of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which belong to our knowledge as a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations.

However, this is not an assertion that no intuition can be related to the self that is incapable of being combined together with all the other intuitions to form a unitary consciousness. Kant holds that we can relate an intuition to the self if and only if we are conscious of the identity of the self. Thus the above-quoted sentence from A116 is not at all an assertion that something is necessary for an intuition to be related to the self, but an assertion that something which is the case if an intuition can be related to the self is necessary for something - in particular for the possibility of all representations.

Kemp Smith goes on to make the remark which I have mentioned above which is true but which contradicts Kemp Smith's attribution to Kant of the argument in support of the "definition of what the concept of the objective must be taken as involving" which Kemp Smith discusses on pp 249-50. viz./that Kant gives no argument in the first edition to show that the "forms of unity demanded by apperception" are the categories.

1. See above, pp101-4
2. See above, pp104-6
5. p304.
Having completed his paraphrase of the objective deduction, Kemp Smith proposes to "consider Kant's doctrine of 'objective affinity'", which he says "excellently reinforces the main thesis which he is professing to establish, namely that the conditions of unitary consciousness are the conditions of all consciousness".

In contrast to Kemp Smith's discussion of what he takes to be the main argument of the objective deduction, in which the reader was given no idea of where Kant was supposed to be making the assertions attributed to him, the discussion of the doctrine of objective affinity abounds in lengthy quotations. However, it becomes apparent that the reason why Kemp Smith confronts his readers with these huge undigested slabs of text is that Kemp Smith himself never digested them.

As I mentioned above, the argument which Kemp Smith gives in support of the fourth premiss of his paraphrase of the objective deduction ("this not-self, consciousness of which is necessary to the possibility of self-consciousness, must consist in empirical objects apprehended in terms of the categories") really directly supports the proposition that for self consciousness it is necessary that the categories relate to appearances.

I have also mentioned that if we insert this proposition into Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the objective deduction, premiss 3 (consciousness of objects is necessary for self-consciousness) is rendered superfluous.

Kemp Smith implies that Kant derives the proposition that for self consciousness it is necessary that the categories should relate to appearances from the two propositions:

(a) No intuition can be related to the self that is incapable of being combined together with all others to form a unitary consciousness.

(b) Intuitions cannot combine together to form a unitary consciousness unless the categories relate to appearances.

Thus this proposition that the conditions of unitary consciousness are the conditions of all consciousness, which Kemp Smith says is the main thesis which Kant is trying to establish, is what is entailed by

(1) : Premiss two, objective deduction : All consciousness involves self-consciousness and

(2) : (a) No intuition can be related to the self that is incapable of being combined together with all the other intuitions to form a unitary consciousness.

Kemp Smith firstly\(^1\) gives a free paraphrase of the doctrine of objective affinity, and then\(^2\) quotes and comments on four passages in which he holds that this doctrine is expressed.

There are quite a number of obscurities in the paragraph where Kemp Smith's free paraphrase of the doctrine of objective affinity is given. However it can be seen that the doctrine he is mainly concerned to defend in this paragraph is that the unity of consciousness is a necessary precondition of association.

Since the doctrine that the unity of consciousness is the outcome of the mechanism of association is later\(^3\) ascribed to Hume, it seems that the unity of consciousness holding between representations must be identity between the self which owns one of the representations and the self/selves which owns/own all the others. I say this because Hume says\(^4\) that personal identity "depends on the relations of ideas, and these relations produce identity by means of the easy transition they occasion".

One proposition which Kemp Smith seems to give in support of the doctrine that the unity of consciousness is a necessary precondition of association is that the unity of

4. Treatise p 262 (Selby Bigge edn.)
consciousness is a necessary condition of consciousness. I presume that a premiss in the argument which takes this proposition as a premiss is that association is a process which involves consciousness. Indeed, this argument is stated with the latter proposition explicitly given as a premiss in Kemp Smith's discussion\(^1\) of one of the passages in which Kemp Smith holds that Kant expresses the doctrine of objective affinity (viz. A113-4).

Another proposition which is given in the paragraph of the paraphrase of the argument in support of the doctrine that the unity of consciousness is a necessary precondition of association is that it is not sufficient for ideas to become associated that they should coexist. In fact Kemp Smith at one place in this paragraph makes out that this proposition is Kant's total argument for the doctrine that the unity of consciousness is a necessary precondition of association, which is scarcely flattering, and incompatible with Kemp Smith's comments\(^2\) on the passage at A113-4.

There is no mention of objective affinity in the proposition that the unity of consciousness is a necessary precondition of association, or for that matter, anywhere in the paragraph in which Kemp Smith gives his paraphrase of Kant's argument for the doctrine of objective affinity.

However, in his discussion of the passage at A113-4 he identifies objective affinity of representations with objective order or unity, and says that objective order or unity is the correlate of the unity of self-consciousness (i.e., I presume, of the unity of consciousness).

Kemp Smith then asserts that objective affinity of representations "is what conditions and makes possible their associative or empirical connection". It seems likely that Kemp Smith would identify this last proposition with the doctrine of objective affinity.

I presume that something being a correlate of the unity of consciousness entails that it is a necessary condition

of the unity of consciousness. If so, then the proposition that objective affinity is a necessary precondition of association follows from the conjunction of

(1) the proposition that objective affinity is the correlate of the unity of consciousness and

(2) the proposition which seemed to be the main thing which Kemp Smith wished to defend in the paragraph where he gave his paraphrase of the argument by Kant for the doctrine of objective affinity - viz. that the unity of consciousness is a necessary precondition of association.

This probabilifies that Kemp Smith would identify the proposition that objective affinity is what "conditions and makes possible" association with the doctrine of objective affinity.

As mentioned above, Kemp Smith has said that the doctrine of objective affinity "excellently enforces" the main thesis which Kant is professing to establish in the objective deduction, which Kemp Smith said is "that the conditions of unitary consciousness are the conditions of all consciousness".

In my remarks on this thesis on pp319-21 I have presumed that unitary consciousness here is not consciousness in which there is unity of consciousness but consciousness in which there is objective unity. I presumed this for the following reason.

If the unitary consciousness referred to were consciousness in which there is unity of consciousness, then the thesis that the conditions of unitary consciousness are the conditions of all consciousness would be entailed by premiss two in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the objective deduction ("all consciousness involves self-consciousness") all by itself. Hence I don't think that Kemp Smith would describe the thesis that the conditions of unitary consciousness are the conditions of all consciousness as the main thesis which Kant is professing to establish in the objective deduction if the

1. I use "unity of consciousness" here to mean "unity of self-consciousness", which, as I have mentioned, is the sense in which Kemp Smith seems to be using it on pp 253-7. (see above, p 319)
unitary consciousness referred to were consciousness in which there is unity of self-consciousness.

If the unitary consciousness referred to is consciousness in which there is objective unity, then the thesis that the conditions of unitary consciousness are the conditions of all consciousness is not enforced by the doctrine that objective affinity (i.e. objective unity) of representations "is what conditions and makes possible their associative or empirical connection", unless association is a necessary condition of consciousness - which it isn't. Kemp Smith says¹ "representations must exist in consciousness before they can become associated."

However, as I have mentioned², sometimes Kemp Smith seems to derive the proposition that the unity of consciousness (i.e. the unity of self-consciousness) is a necessary precondition of association from the propositions (1) that consciousness is necessary for association, and (2) that the unity of consciousness (i.e. of self-consciousness) is necessary for consciousness. This second proposition, together with the proposition in virtue of which it follows from the unity of self-consciousness being necessary for association that objective affinity (i.e. objective unity) is necessary for association (viz./that objective unity is necessary for the unity of self-consciousness), does entail that the conditions of unitary consciousness (i.e. consciousness with objective unity) are the conditions of all consciousness.

Thus from a selection of the premisses from which the doctrine that objective affinity is what conditions and makes possible association is derived we can piece together an argument which enforces the thesis that the conditions of unitary consciousness are the conditions of all consciousness.

However, the premisses of this argument are the same as the premisses in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the objective deduction from which this thesis is derivable, and Kemp Smith, in his paraphrase of the argument for the doctrine of objective affinity, gives no argument for these premisses.

Thus Kemp Smith's claim that what he takes to be the doctrine of objective affinity gives independent support to the thesis that the conditions of unitary consciousness are the conditions of all consciousness is utterly baseless.

I will now deal with the question of whether Kant says what Kemp Smith says he says in the passages in which Kemp Smith says that the doctrine of objective affinity appears.

Note firstly that Kant does not use the expression "objective affinity". He always speaks simply of affinity.

The first passage which Kemp Smith cites is from A113-4, where Kant first introduces the term 'affinity':

... how, I ask, is association itself possible? ...

On my principles the thorough-going affinity of appearances is easily explicable. All possible representations belong as representations to the totality of a possible self-consciousness. But as this self-consciousness is a transcendental representation, numerical identity is inseparable from it and is a priori certain. For nothing can come to our knowledge save in terms of this original apperception. Now since this identity must necessarily enter into the synthesis of all the manifold of appearances, so far as the synthesis is to yield empirical knowledge, the appearances are subject to a priori conditions, with which the synthesis of their apprehension must be in complete accordance ... Thus all appearances stand in a thorough-going connection according to necessary laws, and therefore in a transcendental affinity of which the empirical is a mere consequence.

The gaps in quotation occur in Kemp Smith's quotation of this passage.

This passage is not intended as an argument to show that affinity is a necessary precondition of association, which might be suggested by the fact that the quotation starts with the question "... how, I ask, is association itself possible?". In the first gap in quotation Kant identifies the ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold, so far as it lies in the object, with the affinity of the manifold, and makes out that it follows that in order to answer his question "How is association possible?" he should ask the question "how are we to make comprehensible to ourselves the thoroughgoing affinity of appearances, whereby they stand and must stand under unchanging laws?"

Thus the quoted passage is not an argument to show that affinity is a necessary precondition of association, but an argument to show how affinity is comprehensible. This argument takes the form of an argument to show that there is affinity.

Kemp Smith seems to identify the empirical affinity mentioned at the end of the quotation with association and transcendental affinity with what he calls objective affinity, since the final clause of his paraphrase (which seems designed to parallel the final clause in the quoted passage) is "it [objective affinity of representations] is what conditions and makes possible their associative or empirical connection".

Even if empirical affinity is identical with association, there is no argument in the above passage to show that association is a consequence of transcendental affinity, but simply a blunt statement that it is.

If Kant were to be using "empirical affinity" to refer to association he would be making a terminological slide from his statement at A113 that affinity simpliciter is the ground of the possibility of association. I am inclined to think that transcendental affinity is appearances being
subject to the Principles of Pure Understanding and that empirical affinity is their being subject to causal laws. If so, it seems he would be saying what he says at A126, A127-8 and B165.

However Kant has an alarming habit of identifying appearances being subject to causal laws and association (see A113 and A766 = B794).

Appearances standing in a transcendental affinity is identified with their being subject to a priori conditions. The only things I can think of with which these a priori conditions could be identical are the categories. That they are the categories seems to be shown by the fact that appearances being subject to them is said to follow from the identity of self-consciousness entering into the synthesis of the manifold of all appearances.

Thus it seems that the above-quoted passage contains a brief sketch of the main argument of the Deduction which was given at A107-10. It does not, as Kemp Smith makes out, contain a subsidiary argument which is meant to enforce the main thesis of the main argument.

Kemp Smith makes out1 that Kant is giving the following argument:

(1) Consciousness is necessary for association.
(2) Affinity is necessary for consciousness.

(3) Affinity is necessary for association.

I have already mentioned that the above passage does not contain an argument to show that affinity is necessary for association. Premiss (1) does not occur in the passage.

Neither, I am inclined to say, does premiss (2). Kant argues not that affinity is necessary for consciousness, but that it is necessary for empirical knowledge.

Empirical knowledge is not necessary for association.

Kemp Smith says that the "main point" (that objective affinity is what "conditions and makes possible" association) is very definitely stated in A101:

If we can show that even our purest a priori intuitions yield no knowledge, save in so far as they contain such a connection of the manifold as will make possible a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction, this synthesis of the imagination [which acts through the machinery of association] must be grounded, prior to all experience, on a priori principles, and since experience necessarily presupposes that appearances can be reproduced, we shall have to assume a pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination [i.e. such synthesis as is involved in the unity of consciousness] as conditioning even the possibility of all experience.

The explanations in square brackets are Kemp Smith's. If Kemp Smith's explanations are correct this passage, contra what Kemp Smith has said, does not by itself contain an assertion that affinity is a necessary precondition of association. All it would contain is an assertion that unity of consciousness is a necessary precondition of association.

For it to contain this, the thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction which is necessary for our a priori intuitions to yield knowledge would have to be distinct from the pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination.

If these two syntheses are distinct then Kant has given no argument to show that we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination. He has given an argument to show that we must posit a certain thoroughgoing synthesis of the imagination (this argument is that (1) this synthesis is necessary for our a priori intuitions to yield knowledge and that (2) (suppressed premiss) our a priori intuitions do yield knowledge). However he gives no argument to show that it follows from our being obliged to assume this thorough-
going synthesis of the imagination that we are obliged to assume a pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination.

Thus charity bids us identify the two syntheses.

A second reason for identifying them is that immediately after the quoted passage Kant gives examples of the pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination which he has concluded we must assume, and these examples are all examples of the thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction which Kant claims is necessary for our a priori intuitions to yield knowledge.

It seems impossible that Kant should hold that the thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction which Kant mentions should, as Kemp Smith says, act through the machinery of association, since Kant says it is grounded, independently of experience on a priori principles. At B152 Kant identifies synthesis which is subject to laws of association with synthesis which is subject to empirical laws.

Kemp Smith says that in A121-2 Kant expresses his position in a more ambiguous manner. Kemp Smith says that this gives rise to the impression that Kant is merely arguing that there must be constant conjunctions between impressions (in Hume's sense) in order that the corresponding ideas "may be associated, and experience may be possible".

Kemp Smith comments: "But the general tenor of the passage as a whole, and especially the concluding sentences, enforce the stronger, more consistent, thesis". It turns out that the "stronger, more consistent, thesis" that Kemp Smith has in mind is "that the unity of experience, i.e. of consciousness, is what makes association possible at all" — the main proposition which Kemp Smith wished to assert in the paragraph in

which he gave his free paraphrase of the argument.
Here is the passage at A121-2:
"[The] subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is named the association of representations. If this unity of association did not also have an objective ground, which makes it impossible that appearances should be apprehended by the imagination except under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehension, it would be entirely accidental that appearances should fit into a connected whole of human knowledge. For even though we had the power of associating perceptions, it would remain entirely undetermined and accidental whether they would themselves be associable; and should they not be associable, there might exist a multitude of perceptions, and indeed an entire sensibility, in which much empirical consciousness would arise in my mind, but in a state of separation, and without belonging to one consciousness of myself. That, however, is impossible. For only insofar as I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (original apperception), can I say all perceptions that I am conscious of them. There must therefore be an objective ground (that is, one which can be recognised a priori, antecedently to all empirical laws of the imagination) upon which may rest the possibility, nay the necessity of a law which extends to all appearances...
Kant is not only asserting here that there must be constant conjunctions between impressions for association to occur. However, I believe that, among other things, he is asserting this here (although not very explicitly). My reason for saying this is that he says that association must have an objective ground. I think it most likely that this objective ground is constant conjunctions among appearances. I say this because the only requirements for association other than that

1. I comment on this passage above, pp239-42.
the subject should have a power of association are that representations should resemble each other or else that there should be constant conjunctions among impressions.

Since Kant seems to ignore resemblance as a source of association, it seems that the objective ground of association referred to must be constant conjunctions among impressions.

Kant does not in the above passage assert the "much more important thesis, that the unity of experience, i.e. of consciousness, is what makes association possible at all". Far from it, he asserts that association is a necessary precondition of the unity of consciousness being assured:

and should they [perceptions] not be associable there might exist a multitude of perceptions, and indeed an entire sensibility, in which much empirical consciousness would arise in my mind, but in a state of separation, and without belonging to a consciousness of myself.

His entire argument in this passage is

1 (1) Affinity (i.e. an objective ground of association) is necessary for association. A.

2 (2) Association is necessary for it to be assured that perceptions are not in a state of separation. A.

3 (3) Representations not being in a state of separation is necessary for me to know that there is unity of consciousness. A.

2, 3 (4) Association is necessary for it to be assured that I know that there is unity of consciousness 2, 3.

1, 2, 3 (5) Affinity is necessary for it to be assured that I know that there is unity of consciousness. 1, 4.

6 (6) It is assured that I know that there is unity of consciousness. A.

1, 2, 3, 6 (7) There is affinity 5, 6.

Thus Kemp Smith's hare-brained Hume-bash does not even have Kant's imprimatur.

CHAPTER 5.

KEMP SMITH’S ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION
IN THE SECOND EDITION. 1

Kemp Smith’s account of §15 does not explain any of the puzzling statements Kant makes in this section. The first three points in Kemp Smith’s eight point paraphrase of the second edition Deduction occur in §15.

The first point is that the representation of combination is the one kind of representation which can never be given through sense. Combination is later in §15 identified with synthesis. Kemp Smith does not say what he thinks Kant means by 'combination' or 'synthesis' in §15. In stage 2 of his paraphrase of the first edition subjective deduction Kemp Smith took synthesis to be putting representations before the mind together. However, since combination is made out to be a representation rather than a process, it seems that if combination here has anything to do with copresence before the mind, it must be the product of the process of putting representations before the mind – viz. copresence-before-the-mind itself. However, if this is what 'combination' means here, then Kant’s assertion in §15 that the representation of combination can never be given through sense is ludicrous.

Kemp Smith says that the proposition that combination cannot be given through the senses is a fundamental assumption of the transcendental deduction.

It may be that that there should be a lot more putting-before-the-mind-together than one would suppose occurs is implied by Kant’s assertion in the deduction that putting representations before the mind together is necessary for self-consciousness (i.e., in Kant’s second edition terminology, that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic); putting before the mind together seems to be a

relatively rare mental occurrence. However, I can't see that any crucial premiss in the deduction presupposes that the senses can never yield two different representations simultaneously.¹

I will not discuss the second and third points in Kemp Smith's paraphrase - viz. (2) that besides the manifold and its synthesis a further factor is involved in the conception of the combination, namely, the representation of the unity of the manifold,² and (3) that the unity thus represented is not that expressed through the category of unity. Kemp Smith comments on these obscure points are unexplanatory.

The fourth point in Kemp Smith's paraphrase comprises two points. These are the two main points Kant makes in §16. The first is:

A manifold though given is not for that reason also represented. It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany it and all my other representations.

Kemp Smith doesn't say what it is for a manifold to be given or what it is for a manifold to be represented. I presume that for a manifold to be given is for it to exist in the mind (consciously or unconsciously) and that for it to be represented is for it to exist in the mind consciously. I say this because when Kant says that in the deduction he establishes that the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, Kemp Smith takes him to be using 'experience' in a non-got-it sense ⁴ in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the second edition deduction the fundamental premiss is that a manifold is represented. Thus unless Kemp Smith means by 'a manifold being represented' 'our being conscious of it' the second edition transcendental deduction would not be a proof that the categories are necessary conditions of experience in a non-got-it sense.

Note that it is not clear that Kemp Smith is right to say that Kant says that the 'I think' accompanying a manifold is a necessary condition of the manifold being represented. Kant makes out that the 'I think' accompanying a representation R is a necessary condition of something being represented. His words don't reveal whether the 'something' is the representation R or a real object which this representation represents.

As I have mentioned¹, I am inclined to think that the 'something' is a real object which the representation represents, since Kant makes out that the something should be thought is a necessary precondition of its being represented, and in a number of places thought is made out to be what confers objectivity on representations (e.g. "Thought is the action which relates given intuition to an object". A247 = B304)

The second point in point (4) in Kemp Smith's paraphrase is the second point in §16 - that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception (which Kemp Smith, correctly, I believe, describes as the synthetic unity of the manifold). This is one of the most mysterious assertions in the deduction.

Here is point (5) in Kemp Smith's paraphrase:

The unity of apperception is analytic or self-identical. It expresses itself through the proposition I am I. But being thus pure identity without content of its own, it cannot be conscious of itself in and by itself. Its unity and constancy can have meaning only through contrast to the variety and changeableness of its specific experiences; and yet, at the same time, it is also true that such manifoldness will destroy all possibility of unity unless it be reconcilable with it. The variety can contribute to the conditioning of

¹ pp188-9
apperception only in so far as it is capable of being combined in a single consciousness. Through synthetic unifying of the manifold the self comes to consciousness both of itself and of the manifold.

Note that the proposition for which Kemp Smith is arguing here ("Through synthetic unifying of the manifold the self comes to consciousness ... of itself") is the second point which was made in point (4). Thus it was misleading of Kemp Smith to state this point in point (4).

There is no textual evidence that Kant gives the argument in support of this proposition which Kemp Smith ascribes to him. The argument in B133-4n, while it is unclear what it is, could not be the argument Kemp Smith ascribes to Kant.

At the place in the first edition where Kant asserts that through synthetic unifying of the manifold the self comes to consciousness of itself, no argument is given in support of this proposition and so there is no textual support to show that Kant gives the argument which Kemp Smith ascribes to him in the second edition. In Kemp Smith's discussion of the first edition transcendental deduction there was no mention of the material at A108 at all.

To interpret Kemp Smith in a way which makes him give an interpretation which approaches what I take to be a true interpretation of Kant, I will assume that when Kemp Smith asserts in the above quotation that the self is mere identity without content he means that all we know of it is that that self which owns one representation which I am normally inclined to call mine is identical with the self which owns every other representation which I am normally inclined to call mine, and that hence our representation of the self has no content of its own.

I assumed this when Kemp Smith made this assertion in the course of arguing for what he holds is premiss 3 of the first

1. see my discussion of this argument above, pp138-43
edition objective deduction (viz. "only by means of the interpretation of appearances as empirically objective is self-consciousness possible at all").

Thus I take it that the argument which Kemp Smith in the above quotation attributes to Kant is as follows:

1. (1) All that we can know of the self is that the self which owns one of the representations which I am normally inclined to call mine is identical with the self which owns all the other representations which I am normally inclined to call mine, and hence our representation of the self (i.e. the unity of apperception) has no content of its own. A

2. (2) If all we can know of the self is that it has unity (i.e. that the self which owns one of the representations which I am normally inclined to call mine is identical with the self which owns all the other representations which I am normally inclined to call mine), then knowledge of the unity of the self is necessary for knowledge of the self. A (Suppressed)

1, 2. (3) Knowledge of the unity of the self is necessary for knowledge of the self 1, 2 (Suppressed)

4. (4) If our representation of the self has no content of its own, then we can only have knowledge of the unity of the self through contrast with the variety and changeableness of its specific experiences. A (Suppressed)

1, 4. (5) We can only have knowledge of the unity of self through contrast with the variety and changeableness of its specific experiences. 1, 4

6. (6) We can have knowledge of the unity of the self through contrast with the variety and changeableness of its specific experiences only if the variety and changeableness of its specific experiences is reconcileable with the knowledge of the unity of the self. A

7. (7) The variety and changeableness of the self's specific experiences is reconcileable with knowledge of the unity of the self only if specific experiences are capable of being combined into a unitary consciousness. A

1, 2, 4, (8) That specific experiences should be capable of 6, 7 being combined in a single consciousness is necessary for knowledge of the self (i.e. necessary for our represent-
ation of the self, which is the representation of the unity of the self; it seems that Kant refers to this representation as "the analytic unity of apperception") 3, 5, 6, 7.

If Kemp Smith identifies the synthetic unifying of the manifold with the combining of the manifold in a single consciousness then by 'consciousness' here he means not 'self', but 'representation'. If so then to combine experiences in a single consciousness is to put them before the mind together.

However, if this is so, then it is no less of a mystery why premiss (7) in my paraphrase (the proposition that the combination of the manifold into a single consciousness is necessary for the variety and changeableness of the manifold to be reconcileable with knowledge of the unity (i.e. identity) of the self) should be true, than it is why the conclusion of the argument (that the possibility of combination of the manifold into a single consciousness is necessary for knowledge of the unity of the self) should be true. Kemp Smith gives no support for premiss (7).

Suppose that Kemp Smith does mean by "consciousness" here "self". It would follow that for experiences to be combined into a single consciousness would be for experiences to be combined and for the combination of them to be a necessary and sufficient precondition of consciousness of a single self.

In this case, it is no lesser a mystery why combination of the manifold into a single consciousness is necessary for the variety and changeableness of the manifold to be reconcileable with knowledge of the identity of the self.

In Kemp Smith's conclusion ("That specific experiences should be capable of being combined in a single consciousness is necessary for knowledge of the self") the necessity mentioned is illative, not merely material. This being so, the conclusion doesn't follow from the premisses unless in premiss (4) ("If our representation of the self has no content
of its own, then we can only have knowledge of the unity of the self through contrast with the variety and changeableness of its specific experiences”) the consequent means "we can have knowledge of the unity of the self only if there is contrast with the variety and changeableness of its specific experiences" with "only if" taken illatively.

However, if premiss (4) is to be taken as meaning this, then I can't think of any reason for assenting to it.

The sixth point in Kemp Smith's paraphrase is a paraphrase of §§17 and 18.

Here is the sixth point in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the second edition transcendental deduction:

The transcendental original unity of apperception is an objective, not a merely subjective, unity. Its conditions are also the conditions in and through which we acquire consciousness of objects. An object is that in the conception of which the manifold of given intuitions is combined. (This point, though central to the argument, is more adequately developed in the first than the second edition). Such combination requires unity of consciousness. Thus the same unity which conditions apperception likewise conditions the relation of representations to an object.

Ewing makes a laudatory mention of this passage in his Short Commentary.

It seems from the first two sentences in the above quotation that by "an objective unity" Kemp Smith means "a unity whose conditions are also the conditions in and through which we acquire consciousness of objects".

The third to the last sentences from the quoted passage are a paraphrase of Kant's argument in the second paragraph of §17 to demonstrate that the unity of consciousness is that to which alone the relation of representations to an object amounts.

As can be seen from my discussion of the argument it contains quite a number of obscurities. The interpretation I offered I admitted to be quite unsatisfactory. Paton's interpretation of it is, as far as I can see, mad. Kemp Smith virtually quotes the premisses verbatim and offers no explanation.

1. p116
2. pp190-202
3. pp198-200
4. pp200-1
Kemp Smith does not even note that Kant's conclusion, if taken literally, does not follow from what seem to be his premisses, if they are taken literally.

Kemp Smith also does not note that in §18 Kant says not that any old unity of apperception is sufficient for the relation of representations to an object, but only that the objective unity of apperception is sufficient for it.

Immediately after the above quoted passage which I have been discussing, Kemp Smith says:

The unity of pure apperception may therefore be described as an objective unity for two reasons: first, because it can apprehend its own analytical unity only through discovery of unity in the given, and secondly, for the reason that such synthetical unifying of the manifold is also the process whereby representations acquire reference to objects.

I take it that Kemp Smith would say that the first of these reasons is given in point (5) (the second half of §16) and the second in point (6) (§§17 and 18).

I am inclined to think that Kant does not hold that the unity of pure apperception simpliciter can be described as objective. My reasons are as follows:

When Kant says that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic, I take it that he must mean that the analytic unity of pure apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. I say this because I believe
Kant would say that empirical apperception has no unity at all. At A107 he says:

Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense, or empirical apperception. What has necessarily to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data.

When Kant distinguishes between the objective and subjective unity of apperception in §§18 and 19 I take it that the distinction must be between the objective synthetic unity of apperception and the subjective synthetic unity of apperception. I say this because subjective unity amounts to copresence of representations before the mind, which copresence does not give any ground for belief in a juxtaposition of objects or properties answering to the representations, and objective unity amounts to copresence before the mind of representations which does give ground for belief in a juxtaposition of objects or properties answering to the representations.

This is a criterion for objectivity of synthetic unity (i.e. of copresence before the mind) which cannot be extended to cover analytic unity (i.e., I presume, numerical identity).

The only ground I can think of that Kant could have for calling the synthetic unity of apperception the synthetic unity of apperception is that it is presupposed by apperception. He has only given ground to show that the synthetic unity of apperception is presupposed by apperception if he holds that the reason why it is presupposed by apperception is (1) that it is presupposed by the analytic unity of apperception, and (2) that analytic unity of apperception is
presupposed by apperception. Hence I presume that these two propositions, together with Kant's assertion that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception, constitutes Kant's reason for holding that the synthetic unity of apperception is presupposed by apperception.

Provided that when in §16 Kant says that it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations he is using 'representation' in a got-it sense, I can't think of any reason for holding that Kant holds that empirical apperception (i.e. inner sense) presupposes any unity of apperception. I have argued above¹ that it is likely that Kant is using 'representation' in a got-it sense in the above assertion (If Kant were using 'representation' in a non-got-it sense in this assertion, then he would be saying that all consciousness presupposes the possibility of pure apperception, from which it would follow/inner sense presupposes the possibility of pure apperception. Since it seems that Kant holds that pure apperception presupposes the analytic unity of pure apperception, it would follow that inner sense presupposes the analytic and hence the synthetic unity of pure apperception).

Hence (provided my assumption about the above remark from §16 is correct) it would only be pure apperception which Kant would say presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. Hence, since it seems that Kant's ground for calling synthetic unity of apperception the synthetic unity of apperception is that it is presupposed by apperception, it seems that when he speaks of the synthetic unity of apperception he must have in mind the synthetic unity of pure apperception.

If so, then the objective unity of apperception and the subjective unity of apperception, since they are two subspecies of the synthetic unity of apperception of which Kant speaks, would be two subspecies of the synthetic unity of pure apperception. Thus, contra Kemp Smith, Kant would not

¹ pp188-9, p 332
describe the unity of pure apperception *simpliciter* as an objective unity.

Even if my assumption about the above remark from §16 is false it would be rather strange that Kant should call the synthetic unity of apperception the synthetic unity of *apperception* because it is presupposed by apperception if the only reason why it is presupposed by apperception is that it is presupposed by all consciousness. This would be the only reason why the synthetic unity of apperception is presupposed by *empirical* apperception if my assumption that when Kant says that it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations he is using 'representations' in a got-it sense is false.

Thus even if my assumption is false it is likely that when Kant speaks of the synthetic unity of apperception he means the synthetic unity of *pure* apperception, and hence that he would not identify the unity of pure apperception *simpliciter* with the objective unity of apperception.

It is true that Kemp Smith's view that Kant would identify the unity of pure apperception with the objective unity of apperception is directly supported by this remark from B132: "The unity of this apperception [*pure apperception*] I likewise entitle the *transcendental* unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of *a priori* knowledge arising from it". This is because Kant identifies the transcendental unity of apperception with the objective. However, in view of the above considerations against Kemp Smith's view, I can only attribute this remark from B132 to confusion.

I presume that Kemp Smith would say that Kant would give the two reasons which Kemp Smith says Kant gives in support of the proposition that the unity of pure apperception may be described as an objective unity in support of the proposition that the transcendental unity of apperception may be described as an objective unity. I agree that Kant

1. B139.

2. I am no longer entirely confident on this point. See above, pp203-6 (I wrote Chapter 1 last).
asserts the latter proposition.

However, to say that the two propositions which I presume Kemp Smith would say are reasons for believing the proposition that the transcendental unity of apperception may be described as an objective unity are independent reasons for believing it is false. The two propositions ("The unity of apperception can apprehend its own analytical unity only through discovery of unity in the given" and "such synthetic unifying of the manifold is also the process whereby representations acquire reference to objects"

*together* constitute a reason for this proposition.

The seventh point in Kemp Smith's paraphrase is a paraphrase of § 19.

In this seventh point Kant is correctly reported as saying that in a judgment two representations (the subject concept and the predicate) are combined in the object. Kemp Smith renders Kant's statement that the copula indicates the relation of given representations to original apperception and its necessary unity as that the copula "indicates that the representations stand in objective relation under the pure unity of apperception". This leaves it unclear whether Kemp Smith thinks that Kant is saying that the unity of original apperception itself holds between the subject concept and predicate of a judgment. (Whether Kant says this is a question which has troubled me).

Kemp Smith then correctly reports that the objective unity of representations in judgment is opposed to the subjective unity of representations in association.

Next Kemp Smith comments on Kant's remark that even in contingent judgments the representations belong to each other in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception, even though they do not necessarily belong to one another.

Kemp Smith seems to hold that the representations united in a judgment belonging to each other in virtue of a necessary unity amounts to its being the case that judgment

1. See above, pp85-6, 214-16, 245.
presupposes the existence of necessary relations (even when it is not concerned to assert them).

I presume that the necessary relations referred to are the relations of substance to accident, of cause to effect and of reciprocity between agent and patient, or some other relations which are asserted to hold in an application of the categories (I can't think of any others; I can't think of any relations which are asserted to hold in applications of categories other than categories of relation).

However, that representations belonging to each other in virtue of a certain unity presupposes the existence of necessary relations does not entail that the unity is necessary.

I have taken it that when Kant calls the objective unity of apperception the necessary unity of apperception he means that it is a unity which external circumstances necessitated (i.e. caused) the mind to produce (as opposed to a unity which the mind produces of its own accord, e.g. through association). Thus in saying that a unity is necessary Kant is, I take it, simply saying that it is objective.

Point (8) in Kemp Smith's paraphrase is a paraphrase of §20. Kemp Smith makes out that Kant makes out in §20 that he has shown that apperception is necessary for experience, that that representations should be brought to the objective unity of apperception is necessary for apperception, and that to bring representations to the objective unity of apperception is to make a judgment.

While I agree that Kant takes the existence of experience as the foundational premiss of the deduction, as I have mentioned before, Kant uses experience in a got-it sense, while Kemp Smith always supposes that he uses it in a non-got-it-sense.

Kant does not, at least explicitly, say in §20 that apperception is necessary for experience. The proposition that it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all
my representations asserted in the start of §16 is an assertion that apperception is necessary for experience. For reasons which I have given, I believe that it is an assertion that apperception is necessary for experience-in-a-got-it-sense.

Kant does not assert in §20 that it is necessary for apperception that representations should be brought to the objective unity of apperception. The fact that he calls subjective unity the subjective unity of apperception suggests that he thinks that it is not necessary for apperception that representations should be brought to the objective unity of apperception—that representations being brought to the subjective unity of apperception will also suffice for apperception.

Kant's first premiss in the résumé of his argument which he gives in §20 is "The manifold given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception, because in no other way is the unity of intuition possible (§17)". An examination of §17 reveals that this must amount to the original synthetic unity of apperception being necessary for the relation of representations to an object. Thus, as I have argued, it seems that the second edition deduction, like the argument in the first edition deduction which is given at A104 - A111 and at A116-9, is an argument to show that the categories relating to appearances is a necessary condition of experience in a got-it-sense.

1. Above pp 188-9, p332.
Kemp Smith makes out that Kant in §20 adds to the above series of premisses given in previous sections and of which he has given a resume' in §20 (which series according to Kemp Smith entails that judgment is necessary for experience-in-a-non-got-it sense) the premiss that the categories are the possible functions of judgment (which Kemp Smith says was proved in the Metaphysical Deduction). Kemp Smith then makes out that Kant concludes from all this that the categories relating to appearances is a necessary condition of experience in a non-got-it sense.

It is true that Kant does add the conclusion of the Metaphysical Deduction as the last premiss of the second edition Transcendental Deduction.

Kemp Smith does not note that there is some obscurity as to what relation Kant thinks he has in the Metaphysical Deduction proved holds between a form of judgment and its corresponding category. In a supplementary discussion of point (8) in the bottom half of p 287 Kemp Smith says that in the Metaphysical Deduction the categories "are discovered and systematised through logical analysis of the form of judgment" while in the Transcendental Deduction the categories "through transcendental analysis of the function of judgment" are "shown to be just those forms of relation which are necessary to the possibility of knowledge".

It would only follow from the propositions that judgment is necessary for experience and that the categories bear to the forms of judgment the relation which it was demonstrated that they bear to them in the Metaphysical Deduction that the categories relating to all appearances is a necessary condition of experience

if (a) the relation which it is demonstrated holds between a form of judgment and its corresponding category is that in making a judgment of the form we eo ipso apply the category to an appearance and (b) every judgment is of every form of judgment.
(b) is of course ludicrous.

If (a) and (b) were true, then the premiss that the categories bear to the forms of judgment the relation which the Metaphysical Deduction demonstrated that they bear to them here by itself establishes that the categories relating to appearances is necessary for experience-in-a-got-it-sense.

Thus, contra Kemp Smith, I hold that if the conclusion of the Metaphysical Deduction is to play the role which it is supposed to play in the second edition Transcendental Deduction, then the conclusion of it must not merely be that the twelve concepts in Kant's list of categories are in fact categories (i.e. pure concepts).

It also follows that as I have mentioned, on my, but not on Kemp Smith's, interpretation of the second edition Transcendental Deduction, the second edition Transcendental Deduction contributes nothing which is essential to a proof that the categories relating to appearances is necessary for experience and which is not found in the Metaphysical Deduction. This is because I hold that Kant is using 'experience' in a got-it sense, while Kemp Smith thinks that Kant uses 'experience' in a non-got-it sense.

Kant in §20 cites §13 as the place where he has asserted that the relation which he thinks holds between the categories and the forms of judgment holds between them. In fact it is in §14 that this relation is elucidated. As I have mentioned, the elucidation is fraught with obscurities and difficulties. Kemp Smith says nothing about it.

Kemp Smith says that Kant's statement in §21 that the argument in §§15-20 is "the beginning of a deduction of the pure concepts of understanding" is very surprising. In this I quite agree with Kemp Smith.

I would go further than Kemp Smith, in that, as I have mentioned, I cannot see why the second edition deduction does not end at §20. The conclusion reached in §20 is that the manifold of a given intuition in general is subject to the

1. Above, pp221-30.
categories. The final conclusion of the deduction given in §26 is that the manifold of a human sensible intuition is subject to the categories. I can't see why the latter conclusion doesn't follow trivially from the former.

Kemp Smith says that Kant is led to underestimate the importance of §§15-20 by "a temporary preoccupation with the problems of schematism". Kemp Smith holds that all that is needed to complete the argument after what has been given in §§15-20 is a statement of the doctrine of schematism, and that this is given in §26.

It is true that the doctrine of schematism is the doctrine that a transcendental determination of time (which Kant identifies with a schema) mediates the subsumption of appearances under a category.

In §26 also a priori intuition plays a role in the subsumption of appearances under the categories, although as Kemp Smith notes, in §26 it is a priori intuition of space as well as of time which is said to play a role in the subsumption.

Thus it does seem plausible to say that what §26 contains is a statement of the doctrine of schematism.

The doctrine of schematism is an explanation how we can know a priori that the categories relate to appearances, not a demonstration that we do know a priori that the categories relate to appearances.

This may seem to support Paton's claim¹ that the second edition Deduction does (contra Kemp Smith) contain a subjective deduction, and that it is given in §§22-26. (Note that Paton also holds that §§22-26 deal with the categories as schematised. This does not however seem to commit him to say, as Kemp Smith does, that what they contain is a statement of the doctrine of schematism).

I mentioned above² that 'an explanation how something is the case' might mean 'a statement of the causes leading up

2. p 253-4
to it' and might mean 'a demonstration that some phenomenon which seems to be incompatible with the thing's being the case is not in fact incompatible with it'.

The schematism is an explanation how in the second sense. It is an attempt to show how the fact that a category cannot be 'intuited through sense' or 'contained in appearance' is compatible with intuitions being subsumed under pure concepts 1.

If 'cause' is taken in the strict sense ('necessary ingredient of a sufficient precondition'), then the schematism does not state what the cause of our a priori knowledge that the categories relate to all appearances is.

If Kant is using 'cause' in the strict sense at Axivii, the subjective deduction is an explanation how in the first sense given above, since Kant at Axivii describes it as the search for the cause of a given effect. Hence if Kant is using 'cause' in the strict sense here, then, contrary to first appearances, Paton's view that what §26 contains is the 'essence of the subjective deduction' 2 is incompatible with Kemp Smith's view that what it contains is a statement of the doctrine of schematism.

I have argued above 3 that if Kant is using 'cause' in the strict sense when he says that the subjective deduction is the search for the cause of a given effect, then Paton's view that §26 contains the second edition statement of the subjective deduction must be false.

1. Cf. A137-8 = B176-7
2. Paton. Kant's Metaphysic of Experience I p 537
3. p247.
KEMP SMITH'S CHAPTER ENTITLED "THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHENOMENALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM".

In this chapter Kemp Smith defines phenomenalism and subjectivism. Kemp Smith holds that each of these two conflicting doctrines had its attractions for Kant, and that some passages of the Transcendental Deduction express subjectivism and others express phenomenalism. Kemp Smith thinks that phenomenalism is Kant's maturer doctrine, and that it alone is compatible with the conclusions of the transcendental deduction. Thus Kemp Smith's characterisation of phenomenalism in this chapter is at the same time an overview of what Kemp Smith thinks has been established in the transcendental deduction and what he thinks Kant's transcendental idealism amounts to. Kemp Smith identifies phenomenalism with critical idealism on p. 274.

The chapter is very confusing owing to the collection of seemingly unconnected pairs of opposed doctrines which are said to be involved in the distinction between phenomenalism and subjectivism.

Note for the time being that by "phenomenalism" Kemp Smith means something very different from what is meant by it in common philosophical parlance today. This is suggested by the fact that it is opposed to subjectivism.

The chapter starts with a statement of four reasons why the transcendental deduction is so obscure.

The first is that the deduction deals with what Kemp Smith says is the most difficult problem in metaphysics - to explain how, though man's natural existence is that of an animal organism, which occupies a limited spatio-temporal part of the universe, his consciousness ultimately seems capable of connecting man cognitively with reality as a whole.

This putative fact to be explained seems as though it may be supposed to be connected with one of the doctrines with which phenomenalism is identified (although Kemp Smith does not draw any connection).

At one place Kemp Smith seems to make out that it is part of phenomenalism to hold that a person has two lots of sensations. One lot, to which Kemp Smith refers as the manifold of the special senses, are described as animal in character. The other lot, to which Kemp Smith refers as the primary manifold, are made out to be noumenal. (On p278 Kemp Smith says that Kant applies the distinction between mental processes and the sensuous material with which they deal to the noumenal conditions of our consciousness by analogy from conscious experience itself. Since the noumenal sensuous material is opposed to the sensations of the bodily senses, I presume Kemp Smith would identify the noumenal sensuous material with the primary manifold).

The doctrine which phenomenalism seems to be said to entail and which seems as though it might be supposed to be connected with the fact that though man's natural existence is that of an animal organism, which occupies a limited spatio-temporal part of the universe, his consciousness ultimately seems capable of connecting him cognitively with the universe as a whole, is this:

While a man's animal sensations do not run parallel to the entire objective system of natural existences (Cf. a man's animal existence not being the sum total of the universe), a man also has a manifold of noumenal sensations which does contain the material for all modes of objective existence.

I presume that this proposition would be used to explain how it can be that a man's animal sensations do not run parallel to the entire objective system of natural existence, and yet he seems to be capable of cognitive contact with reality as a whole.

Kemp Smith does not, at least explicitly, connect the above proposition, which phenomenalism seems to be said to entail, with the fact which he claims that the transcendental deduction is meant to explain (that though a man's natural existence is that of an animal organism, which occupies a limited spatio-temporal part of the universe, his consciousness seems ultimately capable of putting him in cognitive contact with the universe as a whole).

Nevertheless, it does seem likely that Kemp Smith thinks that there is a connection, especially since he makes out that phenomenalism is the ultimate conclusion of the transcendental deduction.

That he would say that there is a connection is further suggested by the fact that Kemp Smith says on p 270 that to explain the fact that a person can have knowledge of things that lie beyond his animal existence (i.e. his empirical self) we must postulate a transcendental self (a noumenal self).

On p 276 Kemp Smith gives as a reason for postulating noumenal sensations that our animal sensations do not exhaust our immediate objects of consciousness (although the reason Kemp Smith initially gives for postulating noumenal sensations is different from this — viz. that the existence of animal sensations cannot account for the existence of consciousness at all (let alone for the existence of consciousness of something beyond one's empirical self)).

Kemp Smith makes out that the part of the transcendental deduction that is directly concerned to explain the "absolutist aspect of our consciousness" (the fact that it can bring us into cognitive contact with the universe as a whole) is the "doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception". As I have mentioned, there are some passages in which the synthetic unity of apperception seems to be a relation which holds between all representations and others.

2. pp52, 79-82. pp100-6
3. All such passages are in the first edition e.g. A106, A108, A110, A116, A129.
in which it seems to be a relation which holds between the collection of representations which relate to an object.

I suspect it is the former passages which lead Kemp Smith to suppose that in the "doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception" Kant is trying to explain how it is possible that despite the fact that man's animal existence only occupies a small spatio-temporal part of reality, man's consciousness has the potential to yield him knowledge of the whole of reality. I can think of nothing else that would yield the impression that Kant is trying to explain the above fact.

All that Kemp Smith says in support of his contention that Kant is trying to explain this is that Kant maintains in the transcendental deduction that apperception is conditioned by objectivity. Kemp Smith implies that Kant then makes out that consciousness of objectivity involves consciousness of a single cosmical time and a single cosmical space within which all events fall and within which they form a whole of causally interdependent existences. It seems that Kemp Smith thinks that the latter consciousness implies the potentiality for the consciousness of the whole of reality.

A lesser goal at which Kemp Smith holds that Kant also aims in his "doctrine of the unity of apperception" is simply to explain the possibility of consciousness of things that lie beyond one's animal existence. This is of course simply to explain the possibility of the consciousness of objectivity.

I have argued in my account of the deduction and in my account of Kemp Smith's account of it that Kant nowhere in the deduction argues that apperception simpliciter presupposes consciousness of objectivity. What he argues in the deduction is that consciousness of objectivity presupposes the objective unity of apperception.

1. A109, A129, B132-4, B137, B139(perhaps) B140, B142(perhaps) B143.
2. pp234-5. Kant does however assert at A108 that apperception presupposes consciousness of objective unity.
3. Above, pp313,337.
Thus I deny that the problem of the deduction is what Kemp Smith says it is.

The finite capacity of the human mind certainly is an obstacle to the possibility of a person knowing everything about the whole of reality. However, I do not regard this as a paradox to be resolved, since I simply deny the above possibility. I cannot see how the finite capacity of the human mind is an obstacle to the human mind knowing something about something external to itself (although I do think that there is an obstacle to this - viz., what Kemp Smith calls the older formulation of the problem of knowledge: the problem of how, starting with the subjective, the individual can come to knowledge of the independently real\(^1\)).

The second reason which Kemp Smith gives for the obscurity of the deduction is that it depends on conclusions reached elsewhere in the Critique. I believe this to be false, but for lack of space I will not discuss it.

The third reason given is that the first edition deduction consists of a patchwork of passages written at diverse dates during the years of preparation of the Critique, and that in the intervals between the dates of writing of different passages, Kant changed his mind on important issues, so that different passages contradict each other.

The fourth source of obscurity given is that Kant in the course of writing the deduction was alternatively attracted by two conflicting doctrines, subjectivism and phenomenalism, which gave rise to contradictions.

The fourth putative source of obscurity is connected with the third. One of Kemp Smith's major guides in deciding whether a passage in the first edition deduction is from an early or a late manuscript is whether it expresses subjectivism or phenomenalism.

There follows\(^2\) an account of what subjectivism and phenomenalism are. On pp 274, 280 and 282 Kemp Smith says that

2 Op.Cit. pp 272 - 82. I discuss this account of subjectivism and phenomenalism on pp 353-413.
phenomenalism involves what he calls a reformulation of the problem of knowledge¹ (i.e. that phenomenalism entails that what was previously thought to be the obstacle to our seeing how knowledge can be possible is not an obstacle to this, and that something which was previously not thought to be an obstacle to seeing how knowledge can be possible is an obstacle to this). After discussing all this, I will discuss² whether subjectivism and phenomenalism are both to be found in the deduction and whether they conflict.

Subjectivism is defined on p 272 as the doctrine that subjective or mental states (ideas in the Lockean sense) are the sole possible immediate objects of consciousness. On p 274 Kemp Smith seems to identify phenomenalism with the doctrine that we look out onto a common world of genuinely independent existence. I presume he wishes to convey that a mind-independent world is an immediate object of consciousness. If so then he is here identifying phenomenalism with a doctrine which is contrary to subjectivism as defined on p 272.

After giving his statement of what phenomenalism is on p 274 Kemp Smith says

In developing this position Kant is constrained to revise and indeed completely to recast his previous views both as to the nature of the synthetic processes through which experience is constructed, and of the given manifold, upon which they are supposed to act. From the subjectivist point of view the synthetic activities consist of the various cognitive processes of the individual mind, and the given manifold consists of the sensations aroused by material bodies acting on the special senses. From the objective or phenomenalist standpoint the synthetic processes are of a noumenal character, and the given manifold is similarly viewed as being due to noumenal agencies acting, not upon the sense-organs, which as appearances are themselves noumenally conditioned, but upon what may be called "outer sense".

1. I discuss this below, pp413-15
2. pp415-16.
On pp 276-7 Kemp Smith explains that by "outer sense" he means the noumenal conditions of the self which constitute our sensibility. From p 278 it seems that Kemp Smith would say not merely that from the phenomenalist standpoint the given manifold is due to noumenal agencies but also that, from the phenomenalist standpoint, the given manifold is itself noumenal.

In the above quotation Kemp Smith makes out that from the phenomenalist standpoint synthetic processes which act on the noumenal manifold generate experience. On p 276 he makes out that from the phenomenalist standpoint these synthetic processes generate the phenomenal world, clearly implying that this is true if and only if the doctrine that they generate experience is true.

Experience consists of representations. Despite the fact that in the above quotation Kemp Smith makes out that from the phenomenalist standpoint the given manifold is noumenal and due to noumenal agencies, what Kemp Smith on pp 275-7 says is true from the phenomenalist point of view is that there are two manifolds, a noumenal one and a phenomenal one. Thus it seems that when Kemp Smith makes out that from the phenomenalist standpoint the synthetic processes which act on the noumenal manifold generate experience, he must mean either that they generate the noumenal manifold or that they generate the phenomenal manifold. He can't mean that they generate the noumenal manifold, since the noumenal manifold is the raw material on which the synthetic processes work. Thus in saying that these synthetic processes generate experience, it may seem that Kemp Smith could only mean that they generate the phenomenal manifold.

Kemp Smith is committed to say that the proposition that these synthetic processes generate the phenomenal manifold of which he speaks (to which he refers as the manifold of the special senses) is not true-if-and-only-if the proposition that they generate the phenomenal world is true. This

1. See above, p 349, for my evidence for this.
is because on p 276 and p 279 he says that the manifold of
the special senses is part of the phenomenal world.

Thus, unless Kemp Smith believes that there is some
manifold of representations other than the manifold of
noumenal sensations and the manifold of phenomenal repres-
entations which he mentions on pp 275-6, he is committed
to say that the proposition that the synthetic processes
which act on the noumenal manifold generate the phenomenal
world is not true-if-and-only-if the proposition that they
generate experience is true.

Remarks of Kemp Smith's on p 277 commit him to the
existence of a manifold other than the two he mentions on
pp 275-6. On p 277 he says that the synthetic processes
which act on the noumenal manifold precondition consciousness.
It cannot be that Kemp Smith identifies this consciousness
with the phenomenal manifold which he mentions on pp 275-6,
since on these pages he argues against the possibility of any
phenomenal manifold constituting consciousness. Further, it
cannot be that Kemp Smith identifies the above consciousness
with the noumenal manifold which he mentions on pp 275-6,
since it is this manifold on which the synthetic processes
mentioned act. Thus Kemp Smith seems committed to the
existence of a second noumenal manifold with which to identify
the consciousness which he says is preconditioned by the
synthetic processes.

Further, since Kemp Smith makes out\(^1\) that the synthetic
processes of which he speaks precondition consciousness, it
seems that he would say that these synthetic processes
generate the consciousness of which he speaks (which it seems
is consciousness in general) if and only if they generate
the phenomenal world (since Kemp Smith says\(^2\) that the
phenomenal world is the sole object of consciousness).

The first argument which Kemp Smith gives in support of
the proposition that the manifold on which the synthetic

processes of which he speaks on pp 275-6 act is noumenal is only valid if it follows from consciousness being noumenal that the manifold on which the synthetic processes of which he speaks act is noumenal. This may suggest that he identifies consciousness with the manifold on which the synthetic processes act, which would be incompatible with these processes preconditioning consciousness.

However, he might well think that he has reason to hold that it follows from consciousness being noumenal that the manifold on which the synthetic processes act is noumenal if consciousness were not identical with the manifold on which the synthetic processes act. If consciousness is preconditioned by the synthetic processes, then it is also preconditioned by the noumenal manifold on which these synthetic processes act. Kemp Smith seems to hold that the noumenal cannot be preconditioned by the phenomenal, since he assumes this on p 275 in concluding from the proposition that the manifold on which the synthetic processes act is noumenal that this manifold is due to noumenal agencies. Thus we have no reason to believe that Kemp Smith identifies the manifold on which the synthetic processes of which he speaks act with consciousness.

Thus Kemp Smith does not say anything which is incompatible with his identifying consciousness with a noumenal manifold which is distinct from the noumenal manifold which he mentions on pp 276 and 278.

Thus I think that we can with some degree of confidence ascribe to Kemp Smith a belief in this second noumenal manifold, and take it that when Kemp Smith speaks of synthetic processes generative of experience, the experience referred to is this second noumenal manifold.

I am going to question whether Kant holds that there are any synthetic processes which are generative of

1. As I mention below, p 361.
2. As I mention below, p 361.
experience. However I will continue to speak of the synthetic processes generative of experience.

One would presume that, when Kemp Smith speaks of the above propositions being true from the subjectivist and phenomenalist standpoints respectively, what he wishes to convey is that they follow from subjectivism and phenomenanism respectively.

However, it is not altogether clear whether this is what Kemp Smith wishes to convey.

It may be that Kemp Smith wishes to convey not that the above propositions which are said to be true from the standpoints of subjectivism and phenomenalism respectively are propositions which follow from subjectivism and phenomenalism, but that they are propositions which are entailed by premisses which include at least some of the premisses from which Kant (at different stages in the development of his thought), deduced subjectivism and phenomenalism respectively.

The nature of one of the grounds which Kemp Smith ascribes to Kant for holding that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience is noumenal\(^1\) may seem to commit Kemp Smith to say that this proposition follows from phenomenalism. However the nature of the ground which Kemp Smith ascribes to Kant for holding that the synthetic processes generative of experience are noumenal\(^2\) does not commit Kemp Smith to say that this proposition follows from phenomenalism. The nature of the ground does however commit Kemp Smith to say that the premisses from which Kant derives the proposition that that the synthetic processes generative of experience are noumenal are all included among the premisses from which Kant derives phenomenalism.

Thus it is unclear what the relation between phenomenalism and the propositions which Kemp Smith says are true from the phenomenalist standpoint is supposed to be.

Kemp Smith discusses and argues for thephenomenalist view of the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act on pp 275-6.

He initially made out that this is a view of the nature of the given manifold - viz. the doctrine that the given manifold is noumenal and is due to noumenal agencies. However this would be a ludicrous view, since it is obvious that there is a phenomenal manifold. Also it is not the doctrine which Kemp Smith discusses on pp 275-6. The doctrine which Kemp Smith discusses on pp 275-6 is the doctrine that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal and is due to noumenal agencies.

At the start of the paragraph on pp 275-6 in which Kemp Smith discusses this doctrine, he gives yet another misleading characterisation of it - viz. that it is the doctrine that sensations have a twofold origin, noumenal and mechanical. This gives the impression that it is one and the same lot of sensations that have a noumenal and a mechanical origin. However on p 276 Kemp Smith says that the manifold of the special senses (which is the manifold which has a mechanical origin) is radically distinct from the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act (which is the manifold which has a noumenal origin). As I have mentioned above, from p 278 it can be seen that Kemp Smith wishes to assert that the manifold of the special senses differs from the primary manifold not merely in that the origin of the former is phenomenal and the origin of the latter is noumenal, but also in that the former is itself phenomenal and the latter is itself noumenal.

Kemp Smith gives three arguments in support of the doctrine that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal and has a noumenal origin.

2. pp 349,354.
The first, which is given on p 275 is as follows:

Kemp Smith argues that the action of an object on the brain (i.e. the phenomenal and mechanical cause of a phenomenal sensation) accounts only for the occurrence of a visual sensation as an event in the empirical time sequence, and not for the consciousness of the visual sensation. This, says Kemp Smith, is because a (phenomenal) sensation just as little as an event in the external world can carry its own consciousness with it. Kemp Smith gives as a reductio of the proposition that a sensation can carry its own consciousness with it that to assert this proposition "is to endow events in time with the capacity for apprehending objects in space."

Next Kemp Smith says:

In dealing with causal connections in space and time we do not require to discuss the problem of knowledge proper, namely, how it is possible to have or acquire knowledge, whether of a motion in space or of a sensation in time.

I presume that Kemp Smith holds that this follows from the proposition that a (phenomenal) sensation cannot carry its own consciousness with it. I presume his reasoning is that it follows from this last-mentioned proposition that there is no consciousness, and hence no knowledge, in the phenomenal world (since the only possible candidate in the phenomenal world for a thing whose existence is sufficient for the existence of consciousness — viz. phenomenal sensations — has been ruled out). Hence in giving an account of how the things in the phenomenal world (which are the objects which are involved in events which are the terms of causal relations in space and time) are possible it is unnecessary to give an account of how knowledge is possible. Hence in dealing with causal connections in space and time we do not require to discuss the problem of knowledge.

I believe that it is from the proposition that there is no knowledge in the phenomenal world that Kemp Smith also
derives his next assertion - that when we raise the question of how knowledge is possible "we have to adopt a very different standpoint". I presume that by this assertion Kemp Smith means that to answer the question of how knowledge is possible we have to investigate things not as they appear, but as they are in themselves.

As I have mentioned above, an explanation how something is possible can mean 'a statement of the causal chain leading up to it', or 'a statement which ascribes to a phenomenon which seems to have a cause which is incompatible with the thing's being the case a cause which is compatible with the thing's being the case'.

Surely when the problem of knowledge is identified with the problem of explaining how it is possible to have or acquire knowledge "explanation how" is being used in the second sense. However Kemp Smith implies that some people are tempted to give the proposition that an object acts on the brain, giving rise to a sensation and the consciousness of the sensation and hence to knowledge of the object as an explanation how it is possible to acquire knowledge. However, this proposition is an explanation how a thing is possible in the first sense given above. Therefore it is trivial that it is not a solution to the problem of knowledge.

On pp 274 and 280 Kemp Smith says that for a subjectivist the problem of knowledge is a difficulty of explaining how, starting from the subjective, the individual can come to knowledge of the independently real. Kemp Smith says that for a phenomenalist the problem of knowledge is a difficulty of explaining how, if a common world alone is immediately apprehended, the inner private life of the self-conscious being can be possible.

On p 275 Kemp Smith it seems must have in mind as the problem of knowledge a difficulty distinct from either of the above - viz. the difficulty of saying what consciousness (a necessary condition of knowledge) amounts to.

1. p 253-4
Suppose, as I have made out, that Kemp Smith derives his assertion that to answer the question of how knowledge is possible we must "adopt a very different standpoint" from the proposition that there is no knowledge in the phenomenal world. Suppose that, as seems to be the case, Kemp Smith takes this assertion to entail that an object acting on the brain cannot be the cause of knowledge. It would follow that Kemp Smith, in deriving the above assertion from the proposition that there is no knowledge in the phenomenal world, is assuming that events in the phenomenal world cannot cause anything in the noumenal world to come into existence.

As I mentioned above\(^1\), Kemp Smith takes it that it follows from the proposition that consciousness is to be found not in the phenomenal world, but in the noumenal world, that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal. However, as I have mentioned, I think that we must take it that his reason for holding that this follows is not that he identifies with consciousness but that this manifold is a precondition of consciousness (thus Kemp Smith here also seems to suppose that the noumenal can only be preconditioned by the noumenal).

I will now comment on Kemp Smith's argument to show that there is no consciousness in the phenomenal world. Kemp Smith maintained that a sensation just as little as a motion in space can carry its own consciousness with it. In the following discussion I will assume that by "a sensation's own consciousness" Kemp Smith means "the consciousness which pictures the sensation" (and not "the consciousness which is necessary for a sensation to result in the apprehension of an object distinct from the sensation"). I will later give grounds for doubting that this is what is meant, but on the whole I think that it is most likely that it is what is meant.

I am inclined to think that we use 'consciousness' in two different senses, in both of which it is true that a sensation

\(^1\) p 355-6.
cannot carry its own consciousness with it. The first sense is what I have called the got-it sense of 'consciousness'. This is the sense in which for A to be conscious of B is for an image of B-in-its-present-state which was caused to come into existence by B to exist in A's consciousness. I say 'in A's consciousness' instead of 'in A's mind' to allow for the possibility of A perceiving B unconsciously.

The second sense is what I have called the non-got-it sense of 'consciousness'. This is the sense in which for A to be conscious of B is simply for an image of B to exist in A's consciousness. In many cases of consciousness in this sense B is a merely possible object (This is the case in dreams and hallucination).

In either of the above senses of 'consciousness' it is false that a sensation can carry its own consciousness with it, since it doesn't follow from the existence of a sensation in a person's mind that an image of the sensation (i.e. an object distinct from the sensation and which resembles it (or, to be kind to central state materialists, which somehow corresponds to it)) exists in the person's consciousness.

I have a nagging inclination to say that where B is a bodily sensation or an emotion 'A is conscious of B' often means 'B exists in A's consciousness' since I feel uneasy about saying that to be conscious of an emotion or bodily sensation of mine a picture of the emotion or bodily sensation has to exist in my mind. On the other hand, I am uneasy about saying that A's being conscious of B could amount to something so different from a picture of B existing in A's consciousness.

Kemp Smith it seems does not think that 'A is conscious of B' is ever used to mean 'B is contained in A's consciousness', since in this sense a sensation does carry its own consciousness with it. This is because it is analytic that a sensation is contained in a consciousness (i.e. in a mind).
If a thing which we now call a visual sensation were taken out of the mind in which it exists we would no longer call it a sensation, but simply a picture.

In each of these analysans of 'A is conscious of B' the word 'consciousness' occurs. By 'consciousness' I here mean 'that division of the mind in which it is necessary for an idea to exist in order that we should be conscious of something'. Thus "is conscious of ..." occurs covertly in each of the above analysans. Thus they are all circular definitions. Nevertheless, they serve to indicate differences between the senses in which 'A is conscious of B' is used.

I have an inclination to identify 'a consciousness' (i.e. 'the conscious part of a mind') with 'a container' simpliciter, which would render the above definitions non-circular.

I equally have an inclination to think that by 'a mind' all that is meant is 'a container'. When I think of a person perceiving something all that comes to mind is a picture of the thing coming to exist somewhere in his cranium.

Thus the concept of a consciousness seems to be identical with the concept of a mind. Thus it seems that when people speak of the unconscious mind, what they are speaking of is a consciousness, or perhaps a collection of consciousnesses, which cohabit/s a body with what they call the conscious mind, occasionally seize/s control of that body (e.g. in slips of the tongue) and have/has effects on the nature of the contents of the conscious mind (e.g. a belief in the unconscious mind that something which the conscious mind would find frightful is the case gives rise to feelings of anxiety in the conscious mind).

Thus what the psychoanalysts call the mind is it seems a collection of minds. If these minds (containers) are juxtaposed with each other, then what the psychoanalysts call a mind is a mind, since a collection of containers which share
each other's walls is itself a container. The way people sometimes speak of the unconscious mind suggests that their conception of the mind is as I have just adumbrated it; they speak of the unconscious mind as a compartment of the mind.

If 'a consciousness' is identified with 'a container' and 'A is conscious of B' is identified with 'B is contained in A's consciousness', then 'A's consciousness' cannot be identified with 'the consciousness in A's body', because the above definitions would entail that there are an indefinite number of consciousnesses in A's body - e.g. A's unconscious mind (if he has one), and A's stomach.

We might identify A's consciousness with A. Alternatively, we might take as the principle whereby we decide what things go together to make up A that A's consciousness (a certain container) is a bit of A, and that whatever body bears a certain relation to this consciousness is also a bit of A. If we adopt this policy, we may (depending on what relation we say a body has to bear to A's consciousness to be part of A) be forced to acknowledge that one body is a bit of two different people. We might adopt as the principle whereby we decide what things go together to make up A that a certain body is a bit of A and that the consciousness which bears a certain relation to this body is also a bit of A (A's consciousness). If we adopt this policy, then a definiens of 'A's consciousness' which we could adopt which seems to be coextensive with 'A's consciousness' is 'the consciousness which has immediate control over A's body most of the time'.

The policy of adopting the above definitions of 'A is conscious of B' whilst adopting the above definition of 'consciousness' is open to two objections. Firstly, it would commit us to say that a lot of things which we would not normally say are capable of being conscious of anything are conscious of things. These violations of our common-sense beliefs occur in the case of each of the above definitions of
'consciousness'.

The above policy would commit us to say that any container is conscious (in the second sense) of any object (a) which something which the container contains resembles or (b) to which something which the container contains somehow corresponds.

Further, the above policy would commit us to say that a room which is empty of people in which a television set is presenting a live show is conscious (in the first sense) of the actors in the show, and that a camera is conscious (in the first sense) of a scene which it records.

The only difference between the things which we normally call conscious in the first sense and a television room, is that the things we normally say are conscious (in the first sense) (1) as well as containing pictures of reality contain concepts, beliefs that certain of the pictures and concepts which they contain are veridical, emotions and bodily sensations and (2) react in certain ways to these things which they contain. There is no contradiction in supposing a paralytic person who undergoes conscious states. Thus (2) is not essential to being conscious. Perhaps however we would not count a person as conscious of an object unless he had in his head not only an image of the object but also some mental states other than images. If so, then (1) is a necessary condition of consciousness and so a television room would be ruled out from being conscious of the actors in the live show. However it is not clear that we would demand that a person should have any mental state other than an image of an object in his head before granting that he is conscious of the object. If this is not the case, then I would be quite happy to say that the television room is conscious of the actors.

However, there is, as indicated above, a second objection to the above policy with regard to "A is conscious of B" and "a consciousness", which policy I have been discussing.
This objection is that in the case of the beings which we are normally inclined to call conscious it is very doubtful that there is any container the sole contents of which at any given moment m are (a) the sum total of mental images which correspond to objects of which a certain person A is conscious at moment m.

If we suppose the human mind to have all the features which Descartes gives as involved in the notion of immateriality (which include not being extended or having a position in space, as well as not being perceivable by the regular five senses), then a consciousness cannot be a container in the literal sense. I am unhappy about positing non-spatial particulars, and cannot assign any sense to the expression 'unextended container'. However if the human consciousness could be identified with an unextended container and mental items could be said to be unextended (or if the human consciousness could be said to exist in a different space from that in which physical objects exist), then it may be possible to identify the human consciousness with a container the sole contents of which at any given moment m are (a) above. If so, then the way would be open to identify the concept of a consciousness with the concept of a container simpliciter, or else with the concept of a container which contains concepts emotions bodily sensations and beliefs (or perhaps a selection of these) whilst adopting the above two definitions of "is conscious of ...".

If we wish to maintain that for A to be a picture or image of B it is necessary that A should resemble B, and we wish to maintain that many of our ideas are images of physical objects, then we will have to maintain that these ideas lack one of the concepts which Descartes gives as contained in the concept of immateriality - viz. being unextended and without a position in space -, but possess another - viz. being imperceivable via the regular five senses (by which Descartes must mean 'imperceivable via the
operation of the physical sense organs of the regular five senses'). This is because there is no object A in a person X's skull which is perceivable via the operation of the physical sense organs and which resembles an object B and comes into existence when and only when person X has an idea of object B.

Unless we wish to say that the mind and its contents exist in a space distinct from that in which physical objects exist (and I don't), then if we want to say that the mind is in space we will have to find a place for it in the physical universe.

However, if we put it in the place where most people would wish to put it - in the skull -, there will be brain cells and blood vessels in the very same place as the place where a person's conscious ideas are, and hence in the person's consciousness. Thus, whether we defined 'a consciousness' as 'a container', or as 'a container which contains concepts, emotions, bodily sensations and believings', we would be committed to say (a) that the person is conscious (in the first sense) of any object which resembles one of these blood vessels or brain cells and caused it to come into existence and (b) that the person is conscious (in the second sense) of any object (real or merely possible) which resembles one of these blood vessels or brain cells.

Note that this is not a knock-down objection to the above accounts of what people mean by "A is conscious of B", because I suspect that many people simply do not consider whether there are any physical objects within the bounds of a person's consciousness.

The objection could perhaps be avoided by stipulating that for A to be conscious of B it is not only necessary that B should be contained in a certain container, but also perceivable by a certain means.

Suppose that we were to identify ideas with states of neurones or states of collections of neurones. I doubt that
all the neurones states of which would be identified with conscious ideas which a person is having at a given moment are juxtaposed with each other; they would most likely be separated from each other by bits of the brain which are not rendering-possible consciousness of anything. Thus there would be no one container the sole contents of which at a given moment m are the sum total of mental images which correspond to objects of which the person is conscious (in the first and second senses) at moment m. If we were to define 'a consciousness' as 'a collection of containers' instead of as 'a container' then our definition would not be subject to the above objection.

However, I rather fear that the brain will so disappoint my metaphysical expectations, that it will turn out that no particular collection of regions of the brain at all given moments m contains nothing but the mental states which at moment m are rendering-possible consciousness of things.

Thus, assuming that my common sense judgments as to when I am and when I am not conscious of a thing are correct, it is very likely that my being conscious of them cannot amount to (1) a picture of the thing in its present state which was caused-to-come-into-existence-by-the-thing existing in a certain container (or in one of a certain collection of containers) or (2) a picture of the thing existing in a certain container (or in one of a certain collection of containers).

If ideas are taken to be things which are imperceivable via the operation of the physical sense organs and which resemble the things of which they are ideas, then if there is some one container such that either (1) or (2) is true of it in every case in which a person says he is conscious of it, then (1) or (2) will also be true of this container in the case of many things of which the person would not say that he is conscious (viz. objects (almost all of them mere possibilia) which resemble brain cells and blood vessels).
If ideas are states of neurones or of collections of neurones, then it is rather unlikely that there is any container of which (1) or (2) is true when and only when a person judges that he is conscious of something.

I am nevertheless inclined to think that (1) and (2) are the senses in which people use "A is conscious of B", even though in these senses their judgments as to when they are conscious of things are very likely generally false. If ideas are states of neurones or states of collections of neurones, then the senses of "A is conscious of B" which would make people's common sense judgments as to when they are conscious of something come out true probably involve reference to complex neurophysiological states of affairs with which the common man is completely unacquainted, and hence which are completely unconnected with his concept of consciousness.

I suppose I am taking a bit of liberty in ascribing to the common understanding a definition of "... is conscious of ..." which would both (a) be vigorously disowned by the common understanding and (b) probably make most of the common understanding's judgments as to whether it is conscious of something come out false. In many philosophical issues one lot of philosophers puts up with (a) being true of an analysans because (b) is not true of it, while the other lot put up with (b) being true of an alternative analysans because (a) is not true of it.

However, much as people would reject the idea that it is sufficient that a picture of B should be contained in a certain container in A for A to be conscious of B, I don't think they can point to anything else which they have in mind when they think of A being conscious of B (apart, perhaps, from A containing concepts, emotions, bodily sensations and believings, or a selection thereof).

Kemp Smith's argument to show that a sensation cannot carry its own consciousness with it (that a sensation's carrying its own consciousness with it would entail that an event in time has the capacity to apprehend an object in space)
is unsound.

When Kemp Smith says that a sensation cannot carry its own consciousness with it he must mean that a *phenomenal* sensation cannot carry its own consciousness with it. This is because he holds that it follows from a sensation not being able to carry its own consciousness with it that it cannot be our consciousness of anything. However Kemp Smith does not wish to deny that noumenal sensations are our consciousness of things - he is arguing for the proposition that they are.

When Kemp Smith speaks of an event in time apprehending an object in space I presume that the event in time referred to is a phenomenal sensation and the object in space is the object which produced the sensation by acting on the mind.

Kemp Smith is speaking strangely in speaking of a sensation apprehending an object in space. 'To apprehend' is usually used in a sense such that it is a mind, not its representations, which apprehends.

It may be that the objection which Kemp Smith is raising is that a phenomenal sensation cannot be the consciousness of an object in space since a sensation cannot resemble an object in space, since a phenomenal sensation is not in space. Note that the proposition to which I have here said that the proposition that an event in time cannot resemble an object in space is a *prima facie* objection is that a phenomenal sensation is the consciousness of an object. It is not this proposition, but the proposition that a sensation cannot carry its own consciousness with it, which is the immediate target of Kemp Smith's attack. For the following reasons, the proposition that an event in time cannot resemble and hence cannot apprehend an object in space is certainly not an objection to the proposition that a phenomenal sensation cannot carry its own consciousness with it.

It may be that Kemp Smith would mean by "A sensation carries its own consciousness with it" simply "The existence of a sensation is sufficient for consciousness of the
sensation". If so then the proposition that an event in time cannot apprehend an object in space is no objection to the proposition that a sensation can carry its own consciousness with it. This is because the existence of a phenomenal sensation being sufficient for the consciousness of it does not entail that the consciousness of a phenomenal sensation is a phenomenal sensation. Hence the existence of a phenomenal sensation being sufficient for the consciousness of the phenomenal sensation is not necessarily a case of a phenomenal sensation apprehending something, and hence not necessarily a case of a phenomenal sensation apprehending an object in space.

However, it is possible that Kemp Smith would use "A sensation carries its own consciousness with it" in a sense which implies that a sensation is identical with the consciousness of it. In this case of course, my above objection to Kemp Smith's argument would be unsound.

There is however an objection to Kemp Smith's claim that the proposition that a sensation can carry its own consciousness with it entails the proposition that an event in time can apprehend an object in space, which objection holds on all possible interpretations of "a sensation can carry its own consciousness with it". This objection is that, on all possible interpretations, a phenomenal sensation carrying its own consciousness with it is a case of phenomenal sensation ("an event in time") being apprehended, and not (or, at least, not necessarily) a case of an object in space being apprehended. Hence a phenomenal sensation carrying its own consciousness with it is not necessarily a case of a phenomenal sensation ("an event in time") apprehending an object in space.

I have been assuming that by "A sensation's own consciousness" Kemp Smith means "the consciousness which pictures the sensation", and not "the consciousness which is necessary for the sensation to result in the apprehension of an object
in space to which the sensation corresponds". If it was
in the latter sense that Kemp Smith was using "a sensation's
own consciousness", then a phenomenal sensation carrying its
own consciousness with it would be a case of a phenomenal
sensation apprehending an object in space. Thus it seems
that charity bids us to take Kemp Smith to mean by "a
sensation's own consciousness" not "a consciousness which
pictures the sensation", but "the consciousness which is
necessary for a sensation to result in the apprehension of
an object in space to which the sensation corresponds".

However, that Kemp Smith means this is disconfirmed by
the fact that Kemp Smith also says that a motion in space
cannot carry its own consciousness with it, and he could not
mean by "a motion in space's own consciousness" "the con-
sciousness which is necessary for a motion in space to result
in the apprehension of the object (or event) in space to
which the motion in space corresponds". There most often is
no object or event in space to which the motion in space
corresponds.

I will now deal with the proposition that an event in
time cannot resemble and hence cannot apprehend an object in
space qua objection to the proposition that a phenomenal
sensation cannot be the consciousness of an object in space.

Either of two answers could be given to this objection :
(1) Sensations are in space or (2) It is unnecessary for a
mental item to be the consciousness of something that it
should resemble it. Hume would feel inclined to opt for (1)¹.
A central state materialist would opt for (2) (He would also
assert (1), but this is not essential to his answer).

I would find both (1) and (2) more acceptable than a
denial that a phenomenal sensation is our consciousness of
an object. This denial would leave us with the problem of
hunting around for something else with which to identify our
consciousness of an object. Kemp Smith's answer - that our

1. See Treatise Bk I Part IV Section V 'Of the
immateriality of the soul'.
consciousness of an object is noumenal - lands us with an even greater problem than that which on my account of Kemp Smith's argument it was designed to avoid. A noumenon is neither in space nor time and so can resemble an object in space in even fewer respects than a phenomenal sensation (even on Kemp Smith's and Kant's assumption that a phenomenal sensation is not in space) can.

The weakness of the argument which I have ascribed to Kemp Smith suggests (via the principle of charity) that Kemp Smith is not putting forward this argument at all. It may be that the only argument he is putting forward is an argument which I will mention shortly (on pp374-5).

My reason for suspecting that Kemp Smith is giving the above argument is the fact that he refers to a phenomenal sensation as an event in time and to an object to which it corresponds as an object in space, which suggests that he wishes to emphasise that a phenomenal sensation is not in space. The proposition that a phenomenal sensation is not in space plays a big role in the above argument, but none at all in the argument which I will mention below.

In my paraphrase of Kemp Smith's argument I have attributed to him an inference from his assertion that a sensation cannot carry its own consciousness with it to a suppressed assertion that there is no consciousness in the phenomenal world.

Suppose that by "a sensation's own consciousness" is meant "a consciousness which pictures a sensation", and "consciousness" is used in a sense in which a picture of X, existing in a being's mind is a necessary condition of the being being conscious of X (these are two necessary conditions of the truth of the proposition that a sensation cannot carry its own consciousness with it). It would follow that the inference from the proposition that a sensation cannot carry
its own consciousness with it to the proposition that there is no consciousness in the phenomenal world is invalid.

It would not even follow from the proposition that a sensation cannot carry its own consciousness with it that there is no consciousness of phenomenal sensations in the phenomenal world, since the former proposition does not rule out all possible phenomenal candidates for consciousness which pictures a sensation. The possibility remains open that something in the phenomenal world which is not carried by a sensation is a consciousness which pictures the sensation. The obvious candidate for a consciousness which pictures a phenomenal sensation is a further phenomenal sensation.

Even if the consciousness of a sensation is not to be found in the phenomenal world, it would not follow that no consciousness of anything is to be found in the phenomenal world. To be conscious of an object it is not necessary to be conscious of one's mental picture of it.

Kemp Smith's dissatisfaction with the proposition that the existence of a sensation caused by an object is sufficient for consciousness of the object I would presume is at least partly caused by an uneasiness about calling such things as cameras and television rooms conscious (although the ground which I above surmised that Kemp Smith gives for rejecting the above proposition - that a phenomenal sensation is not in space and so cannot correspond to an object in space - is unconnected with this).

That Kemp Smith's dissatisfaction with this proposition is at least partly caused by this uneasiness is I think shown by the fact that Kemp Smith says that a sensation just as little as a motion can carry its own consciousness with it. Kemp Smith is appealing to our desire to avoid positing states of consciousness outside the things we normally regard as minds.

Further, the argument which I have above surmised is
Kemp Smith's argument for the proposition that a sensation carry its own consciousness (viz. that anything in time but not in space cannot resemble an object in space) would not (even if a thing's carrying its own consciousness with it necessarily endowed it with the capacity for apprehending that a motion or an object in space) entail a motion in space cannot carry its own consciousness with it.

If this uneasiness is the reason for Kemp Smith's dissatisfaction with the above proposition, then his response to the uneasiness - viz. claiming that the mysterious extra element in consciousness which entails that television rooms aren't conscious is to be found in the realm of noumena - seems to me not very much sillier than a response to the above uneasiness which is very popular today. I allude to the doctrine that intentionality is the mark of the mental. I can't see what an intentional object can be other than a possible object (which may also be an actual object) to which an idea corresponds. To make it non-trivial that intentionality is the mark of the mental we would have to generalize this definition of 'intentional object' to say that an intentional object is a possible object to which a picture corresponds. It is quite clear that the pictures in an art gallery have possible objects to which they correspond (provided there are such things as possible objects; if not, then there are no such things as intentional objects), and so taking intentionality as the mark of the mental we are committed to say that art galleries (not to mention television rooms) are conscious. I have some inclination to say that television rooms are conscious, but I believe that the doctrine that intentionality is the mark of the mental is meant to rule this out.

A further pathetic attempt to rule out such things as television rooms which are empty of people from being things which contain conscious states is to suppose that an essential requirement of consciousness is that inside a would-be mind
there should be an observer to observe the would-be ideas.

The above argument to show that our consciousness of the phenomenal world (i.e. the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act i.e. the sensations out of which the phenomenal world is constructed) is a noumenal manifold neither takes phenomenalism as a premiss nor has as premisses any of the premisses from which phenomenalism is derived. Thus this argument gives us no basis for saying that it is from the phenomenalist standpoint that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal. As I have mentioned above, Kemp Smith on p276 does give an argument to show that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal which may take phenomenalism as a premiss.

On the first two of three construals which I will give of Kemp Smith's grounds for believing the premiss of the argument, the argument is that since the sensations of the special senses are part of the phenomenal world, the sensations of the special senses (i.e. phenomenal sensations) cannot be the manifold on which the synthetic processes which generate the phenomenal world act in order to generate the phenomenal world (i.e. the sensations of the special senses cannot be the raw materials out of which the phenomenal world is constructed). It may be that Kemp Smith derives the premiss that the sensations of the special senses are part of the phenomenal world from phenomenalism. On p279 Kemp Smith makes out that it is part of phenomenalism to maintain that subjective existences are objective. This is equivalent to the above premiss, which he formulates thus: "they [subjective states] are themselves part of the natural order which consciousness reveals".

1. Here ends my discussion of Kemp Smith's first argument (Op. Cit. p275) to show that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal. This discussion began on p359.

2. p357.

3. The first construal is discussed on pp381-5, the second on pp385-7 and the third on pp387-9.
I will now spend a few pages discussing whether this argument is such as to entail that the proposition that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal follows from phenomenalism.

Then I will evaluate the argument.

For phenomenalism to be opposed to subjectivism as defined on p272 (i.e. the doctrine that subjective or mental states, ideas in the Lockeian sense, are the sole possible objects of which we can have immediate awareness), it would have to be a doctrine that some specified class of objective things are immediate objects of awareness, or else that there are some objective things which are immediate objects of awareness, or else that all objective things are immediate objects of awareness, or else that all immediate objects of awareness are objective.

A sense in which Kemp Smith says that subjective states are objective (i.e. are part of the natural order which consciousness reveals i.e. are a selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world) is that they are "objects and immediate objects for consciousness".

If phenomenalism were the doctrine that all immediate objects of awareness are objective in this sense, then it would be trivially analytic. Thus it seems that phenomenalism cannot be the doctrine that all immediate objects of awareness are objective-in-the-above-sense.

If phenomenalism were the doctrine that all immediate objects of awareness are objective, then the above-mentioned proposition which may be a premiss of the above-mentioned argument from p276 to show that the manifold on which the synthetic activities generative of experience act is noumenal (viz. that the sensations of the special senses are a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world) would follow from phenomenalism. Hence the nature of this argument would entail that the doctrine that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal follows from phenomenalism.

The only alternative to taking phenomenalism to be the doctrine that all immediate objects of awareness are objective is to take it to be the doctrine that all objective

things are immediate objects of perception (which is suggested by p 274). If this latter doctrine was what phenomenalism was, then the premiss that the sensations of the special senses are a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world would not follow from phenomenalism.

Unless we can find a sense in which Kemp Smith uses "objective" in which it is not trivial that all immediate objects of awareness are objective, and in which Kemp Smith would say that they are objective, we cannot take phenomenalism to be the doctrine that all immediate objects of awareness are objective. Thus it would follow that the nature of the p 276 argument to show that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal is not such as to entail that this proposition follows from phenomenalism.

It is possible that Kemp Smith uses "objective" in a sense in which he holds that all immediate objects of awareness are objective, but in which this doctrine is not trivial. This sense is "causally determined".

Wherever Kant gives a criterion for objectivity which is connected with causality, being causally determined is made out to be a property which pertains to some things but not to others. Kant says that those things which have it (perhaps along with the other categories) are objective, while those which don't have it are subjective1.

On p 279 Kemp Smith makes out that there are two different senses of "objective". The extension of the first of these according to Kemp Smith is identical with the class of things we normally suppose to be objective. The extension of the second sense of "objective" according to Kemp Smith comprises all our objects of awareness.

As I have mentioned, the sense of "objective" which Kemp Smith gives on p 279 the extension of which he says comprises

1. See A197 = B242, A452 = B480.
all our objects of consciousness is simply "object of immediate awareness."

Kemp Smith deviates from Kant's doctrines in that he gives as the sense of "objective" whose extension coincides with the class of things which we normally suppose to be objective (the sense in which there are some things which are not objective) not "causally determined" simpliciter, but "determined by purely physical causes" (as opposed to being determined also by physiological and psychological causes). Kemp Smith claims to be paraphrasing Kant in giving this analysis of objectivity. He not only misrepresents Kant, but also contradicts his own analysis of objectivity which he gives on p 249 in the course of his discussion of the objective deduction (where he identified objectivity in a sense in which not everything of which we are aware is objective with a thing's falling under the categories of substance and causality).

Thus Kemp Smith on p 279 maintains that all things of which we are aware are causally determined. As I mentioned above, I suspect that when Kemp Smith makes out that all our objects of awareness are objective, he is using "objective" to mean "causally determined". Against this suspicion stands the fact that Kemp Smith on p 279 gives as a sense of "objective" in which all things (other than noumena) are objective "an object and an immediate object of awareness". However, in support of the suspicion there is the fact that on p 280 Kemp Smith seems to identify sensations, feelings, etc, (i.e. the things we normally call subjective) being part of a common world with their being "no less mechanically conditioned than motions in space". The suspicion is also supported by Kemp Smith's assertion at the bottom of p 279 that "the distinction between the subjective and the objective is now made to fall within the system of natural law".

1. p378.
If phenomenalism were the doctrine that all immediate objects of awareness are objective in the sense "causally determined", then it would not be trivially analytic. Thus it is possible that Kemp Smith would identify this doctrine with phenomenalism.

If so then, on the first two of the three construals which I will give of Kemp Smith's grounds for the premiss of the argument which Kemp Smith gave on p276 to show that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal, the nature of the argument would entail that this doctrine follows from phenomenalism.¹

I will now evaluate this second argument which Kemp Smith gives in support of the proposition that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal.

It may be that the suppressed foundational premiss of this argument is that the sensations of the special senses (i.e. the phenomenal manifold) are a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world. Kemp Smith does not actually state this proposition on p276 where he states this argument, but he does state it on p279.

If the above proposition is a premiss in the argument, then it is from it that Kemp Smith derives the premiss given on p276 - that to explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is virtually to equate it with a small selection of its constituent parts. It is unclear whether the small selection of constituent parts referred to are the sensations of the special senses or a collection of objects which Kemp Smith would say can rightly be said to be constructed out of the sensations of the special senses.

Kemp Smith implies that because the phenomenal world is not constructed out of the manifold of phenomenal sensations

¹. This is because (a) as I have mentioned (above, p377) on these first two construals the stated premiss of the argument ("To explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is virtually to equate it with a small selection of its constituent parts") is derived from the proposition that the sensations of the special senses are a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world and (b) the last-mentioned proposition follows from the doctrine that all immediate objects of awareness are objective.
we must conclude that it is constructed out of a manifold of noumenal sensations. As I mentioned above\(^1\), he must be making out that this proposition is true if and only if the proposition that experience is constructed out of a noumenal manifold is true.

If the phenomenal world is generated by synthetic processes, then it does indeed follow from the proposition that the phenomenal world is not constructed out of phenomenal sensations that it must be constructed out of noumenal sensations, since synthetic processes must act on some manifold or other, and that manifold must be either phenomenal or noumenal.

I will criticise Kemp Smith's assumption that it would follow from the phenomenal world being constructed out of a noumenal manifold that experience is constructed out of the noumenal manifold later\(^2\), when I come to discuss a further argument which Kemp Smith gives to show that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal.

It may be that Kemp Smith's ground for the proposition that to explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is to equate it with a small selection of its constituent parts is as follows:

1. (1) To explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is to equate it with the sensations of the special senses.\(^A\)

2. (2) The sensations of the special senses are a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world. \(^A\)

1,2 (3) To explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is to equate it with a small selection of its constituent parts. \(^1,2^3\)

Note that ascribing this reasoning to Kemp Smith involves taking the small-selection-of-the-constituent-parts-of-the-
phenomenal-world-which-Kemp-Smith-says-we-are-committed-to-
equate-with-the-whole-phenomenal-world-if-we-say-that-the-
phenomenal-world-is-constructed-out-of-the-sensations-of-
the-special-senses to be the sensations of the special senses.

If the above is Kemp Smith's reasoning then his argument is only sound if 'A was constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' is used in the sense 'A's coming into existence was the juxtaposition of B₁, B₂...Bₙ in such a manner that certain relations were made to hold between them'. If 'A was constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' was used in any other sense in which it is possible that it should be being used, premiss (1) is false.

Another sense in which 'A was constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' is sometimes used is 'A's coming into existence was the transformation of the stuff out of which B₁, B₂...Bₙ were made in such a manner that the stuff fell under the concepts under which a lump of stuff would have to fall for us to call it 'A'' . This is a broader sense of 'A was constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ', of which the first sense given above is a sub-species. No cases of construction in the second sense in which n is 1 (e.g. constructing a fish hook out of a pin) are cases of construction in the first sense, since juxtaposition is something which can only be done with a plurality of things.

In the second sense of 'A is constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' it is not always true that to explain A as constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ is to equate A with B₁, B₂...Bₙ. This will not be true where the transformation of the stuff of which B₁, B₂...Bₙ are made which is involved in the construction of A is such that B₁, B₂...Bₙ are destroyed in the process of the transformation. In this case, the life span of B₁, B₂...Bₙ will not overlap with that of A. Hence B₁, B₂...Bₙ cannot be identical with A.

I confess some uneasiness at claiming that two things/one thing made out of the same stuff are not identical. However even if (a) the two things/one thing ought to be said
to be identical, and so we ought to say that a thing $A$ which was constructed out of $B_1, B_2...B_n$ in the sense that $A$'s coming into existence was the transformation of the stuff out of which $B_1, B_2...B_n$ were made in such a manner that the stuff fell under the concepts under which a lump of stuff would have to fall for us to call it 'A', is necessarily identical with $B_1, B_2...B_n$ and (b) Kemp Smith is using 'constructed out of' in the above sense,

I don't think it would follow from the phenomenal world having been constructed out of the sensations of the special senses that the phenomenal world is to be *equated* with the sensations of the special senses in the sense of 'equated' intended by Kemp Smith.

However, I doubt that when a philosopher speaks of constructing the phenomenal world out of sensations he ever uses it in this second sense.

A philosopher in saying that we construct the phenomenal world out of sensations would not take this to imply that the stuff out of which the phenomenal world is made is identical with the stuff out of which the sensations were made unless he was using 'A is constructed out of $B_1, B_2...B_n$' in the first sense given above — viz. 'the coming into being of A was the juxtaposition of $B_1, B_2...B_n$ in such a manner that certain relations were made to hold between $B_1, B_2...B_n$'.

A philosopher who would say that we construct the phenomenal world out of sensations in this sense of "construct out of" would be a Berkeleian idealist.

Philosophers in saying that the world is constructed out of sensations, sometimes do use 'A is constructed out of $B_1, B_2...B_n$' in a sense other than this. For instance, when Kemp Smith asserts the conclusion of the argument I am discussing — that the phenomenal world is constructed out of noumenal sensations — he certainly isn't using 'A is constructed out of $B_1, B_2...B_n$' to mean 'the coming into existence of A is the juxtaposition of $B_1, B_2...B_n$'. Kemp Smith certainly would not
wish to say that in being confronted with the phenomenal world we are confronted with a lot of juxtaposed noumenal sensations. However, Kemp Smith certainly would not wish to imply that the phenomenal world is made out of the stuff out of which the noumenal sensations out of which the phenomenal world was constructed were made.

I am not quite sure in what sense Kemp Smith is using 'A was constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' here. However, perhaps it is something like this: "A is the last member of a series of things each of which differs slightly from the last, so that the difference between a member of the series and the next but one is greater than the difference between the former member and the next member; B₁, B₂...Bₙ are the first member of this series".

Thus in the sense in which Kemp Smith is using 'A is constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' when he makes out that the phenomenal world is constructed out of a noumenal manifold it is not true that in explaining A as constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ we are equating A with B₁, B₂...Bₙ.

Above are my grounds for saying that if 'A was constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' is used in any other sense than 'A's coming into existence was the juxtaposition of B₁, B₂...Bₙ in such a manner that certain relations were made to hold between them' in which it is possible that it should be being used the first premiss in the above paraphrase of Kemp Smith's argument (viz. "To explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is to equate it with the sensations of the special senses") is false.

Thus charity bids us to take Kemp Smith to be using 'A was constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' in the sense 'A's coming into existence was the juxtaposition of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' in this premiss. However, as I mentioned, if this is the case, then to explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is to be a BERkleian
idealist. Kemp Smith seems to make out that a subjectivist (a person who holds that the sole immediate objects of consciousness are subjective states) is committed to say that the phenomenal world is constructed out of the sensations of the special senses. Thus if Kemp Smith is using 'A is constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' in the only sense which makes the above argument sound he commits himself to say that subjectivism entails Berkeleyan idealism. I do not believe that he would wish to say this (subjectivism certainly does not entail Berkeleyan idealism).

Further, it doesn't follow from the proposition that the phenomenal world is not constructed out of the sensations of the special senses in the sense 'not brought into being solely by means of a juxtaposition of the sensations of the special senses' that it must be constructed out of a noumenal manifold in the sense in which Kemp Smith wishes to conclude that it is constructed out of a noumenal manifold.

This is because the proposition that the phenomenal world is not constructed out of the phenomenal manifold (in the sense 'not brought into being merely by means of a juxtaposition of the sensations of the special senses') does not entail the proposition that the phenomenal world is not constructed out of the phenomenal manifold in the sense in which Kemp Smith wishes to conclude that the phenomenal world is constructed out of a noumenal manifold.

Thus, if Kemp Smith's ground for his premiss that to explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is virtually to equate it with a small selection of its constituent parts is as I have represented it above, then the argument I am discussing is invalid.

However, it may be that Kemp Smith's ground for this premiss is not that given above, but is as follows:
(1) The sensations of the special senses are only a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world. A

(2) The objects constructed out of the sensations of the special senses are only a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world. 1

(3) To explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is to equate it with a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world. 2

Note that ascribing this reasoning to Kemp Smith involves taking the small-selection-of-the-constituent-parts-of-the-phenomenal-world-which-Kemp-Smith-says-we-are-committed-to-equate-with-the-whole-phenomenal-world-if-we-say-that-the-phenomenal-world-is-constructed-out-of-the-sensations-of-the-special-senses to be objects which Kemp Smith would say can rightly be said to be constructed out of the sensations of the special senses.

Here '...is constructed out of ...' is throughout used consistently in the sense in which it is used in Kemp Smith's conclusion (that the phenomenal world is constructed out of a noumenal manifold).

However, premiss (1) is only true if 'phenomenal world' is used in the sense...'the sum total of causally determined things', while it is not in this sense of 'phenomenal world' that the subjectivist explains the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses, but in the sense 'the sum total of things which are determined by purely physical causes.'

1. This is my second construal of Kemp Smith's grounds for believing the stated premiss of the argument.

2. This is the sense which 'phenomenal world' has if 'objective' is used in the sense in which it seems to be used on p260 (Cf. above, p379).

3. This is the sense which 'phenomenal world' has if 'objective' is used in the first sense which is given on p279 (Cf. above, p379).
It follows from Kemp Smith's doctrines that the proposition that the phenomenal world in the sense "the sum total of things that are causally determined" is constructed out of the sensations of the special senses would entail that the sensations of the special senses are constructed out of themselves (since the sensations of the special senses are, according to Kemp Smith, part of the phenomenal world in the above sense). No subjectivist, or anybody else, would want to maintain this.

This is, however, not an objection to Kemp Smith's argument on a third construal of it which, like the construal of it which I have just discussed, involves taking it that Kemp Smith's immediate ground for his premiss

To explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is virtually to equate it with a small selection of its constituent parts

is the proposition that the objects constructed out of the sensations of the special senses are only a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world (i.e. premiss (2) of my last construal of Kemp Smith's ground for this premiss). In the sense of 'phenomenal world' in which a subjectivist would say that the phenomenal world is constructed out of the sensations of the special senses it is not true that the sensations of the special senses are a small selection of the parts of the phenomenal world. They are not parts of the phenomenal world (in this sense) at all. Nevertheless, Kemp Smith holds that phenomenalism involves holding that the sensations of the special senses are minor incidents in a more comprehensive totality\(^1\) - which seems to involve saying that there is not one phenomenal sensation to each external object. Thus in most cases an empirically real object would not have been constructed out of a phenomenal sensation. Hence it might be concluded that to explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is virtually to equate it with a small selection of its constituent parts.

In fact Kemp Smith even says\(^1\) that (phenomenal) subjective states do not run parallel to the objective system of natural existences. I presume he would not deny that some subjective states run parallel to some objective existences. If he does wish to deny this, then he is committed to maintain that no parts of the phenomenal world are constructed out of phenomenal sensations. Hence he would not hold that the objects constructed out of the sensations of the special senses are a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world. Hence this last proposition could not be Kemp Smith's ground for holding that to explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is to equate it with a small selection of its constituent parts. Hence we would have to adopt the first hypothesis given above\(^2\) as to what Kemp Smith's reason for maintaining that to explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is virtually to equate it with a small selection of its constituent parts is. As demonstrated above, on this hypothesis the argument I am discussing to show that the manifold on which synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal is invalid.\(^3\)

The third construal of Kemp Smith's reasoning makes the proposition that the sensations of the special senses are part of the phenomenal world play no role in the argument. Thus the reason I have hitherto surmised is Kemp Smith's reason for holding that the nature of the argument I am discussing entails that the doctrine that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal follows from phenomenalism (viz. the proposition that it follows from phenomenalism that the sensations of the special senses are part of the phenomenal world) would

2. p381.
3. I suppose that on the third construal Kemp Smith's argument would be sound provided that (1) it is not the case that for each physical object there is a phenomenal sensation out of which it could have been constructed and (2) the phenomenal world (the world of physical objects) is constructed out of sensations. An idealist who reduces physical objects to phenomenal sensations would deny (1). An idealist who does not reduce physical objects to sensations (but instead says that there are no physical objects) and a realist would deny (2). I would find denial of (1) or (2) more palatable than positing a noumenal manifold.
not be his reason for holding this. His reason may be that phenomenalism entails that there is not one phenomenal sensation for every objective existence of which we are aware. I can't see why phenomenalism (whether it is taken as the doctrine that objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness or the doctrine that all immediate objects of consciousness (and all objects of consciousness) are objective) entails this. Perhaps Kemp Smith does not hold that the doctrine that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal follows from phenomenalism. Perhaps his reason for saying that from the phenomenalist standpoint the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal is that one of the premisses from which on my latest construal he derives the proposition that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal (viz. that in most cases there is no phenomenal sensation out of which an objective existence could have been constructed) is compatible with phenomenalism, but not with subjectivism.  

Kemp Smith gives yet a third argument in support of the proposition that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal. It is that to explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the special senses is to account for the origin of the phenomenal world by means of events which can exist only under the conditions which it itself supplies (these events being the sensations of the special senses). I presume that the conditions under which alone Kemp Smith is saying the sensations of the special senses can exist are event types in the external world, a thing's being an instance of which is sufficient for it to be a cause of a phenomenal sensation.

I don't think that these conditions could be the categories since the categories relating to appearances,
according to Kemp Smith (and Kant), is a necessary pre-
condition of the consciousness of objects, and hence it
seems not something that the phenomenal world could supply.

Perhaps the conditions are self consciousness and the
synthetic processes. In this case Kemp Smith’s assertion
that the conditions are supplied by the phenomenal world
would be intended as meaning that the conditions are
supplied by consciousness of the phenomenal world. His
grounds for the assertion would be steps 1 - 3 in the p 244
paraphrase of the objective deduction in the first edition
(Kemp Smith holds that step 2 is proved in the subjective
deduction). I criticised these steps above, pp 302-13.

I will proceed to criticise Kemp Smith’s latest argu-
ment to show that the manifold on which the synthetic
processes generative of experience act is noumenal on the
assumption that the conditions mentioned are event types in
the external world, a thing’s being an instance of which is
sufficient for it to be a cause of a phenomenal sensation.

It is true that in all of the senses of 'A was con-
structed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' which I have given, if A was
constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ then B₁, B₂...Bₙ must have
come into existence before A. Hence, that the phenomenal
world was constructed out of the sensations of the special
senses is indeed, as Kemp Smith makes out, incompatible with
the proposition that the causes of the sensations of the
special senses are objects in the phenomenal world. Thus
Kemp Smith has given a valid argument to show that it cannot
be that the phenomenal world was constructed out of the mani-
fold of the special senses.

From this it follows, granted that the phenomenal world
is generated by synthetic processes, that the phenomenal
world was constructed out of a noumenal manifold.

The conclusion which Kemp Smith originally set out to
establish was that experience was constructed out of a
noumenal manifold - i.e. that the manifold on which the
synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal. I have noted above\(^1\) that Kemp Smith simply assumes that this is true if and only if it is true the phenomenal world was constructed out of a noumenal manifold.

I have noted above\(^2\) that this assumption commits Kemp Smith to posit a second noumenal manifold with which to identify experience, since the noumenal manifold which he mentions on pp 275-6 is not generated by synthetic processes, but is the raw material on which they act, and Kemp Smith thinks that the phenomenal manifold does not run parallel to the objective system of natural existences (i.e. the phenomenal world). He at most thinks that it runs parallel to a small selection of the constituent parts of the phenomenal world, and perhaps he doesn't even think this. Thus if Kemp Smith identified experience with the phenomenal manifold it seems that he would not assume that the proposition that the phenomenal world is generated out of a noumenal manifold is true if and only if the proposition that experience is generated out of a noumenal manifold is true.

However, even after one has ascribed to Kemp Smith a belief in this third manifold, the above-mentioned assumption is still troublesome.

As I have noted, Kemp Smith always uses 'experience' in a sense which does not imply veridicality. Not all experience in this sense runs parallel to the objective system of natural existences. Thus it seems that for once Kemp Smith is using 'experience' in a sense which implies veridicality.

Difficulties still remain. Experience running parallel to the phenomenal world seems to be a necessary condition of Kemp Smith's having any reason to believe that if the phenomenal world is constructed out of a noumenal manifold, then so must experience be constructed out of it. However, experience running parallel to the phenomenal world certainly does not seem to be a sufficient condition of Kemp Smith

2. p 354-5.
having reason to believe this. The common sense view is that there are a great many causes which contribute to the generation of experience-in-a-sense-which-implies-veridicality which do not contribute to the generation of the external world, and that the only reason why the causes which contribute to the generation of the external world contribute to the generation of experience is that the phenomenal world is a cause which contributes to the generation of experience. On this common sense view it certainly does not follow from the proposition that the phenomenal world is constructed out of a noumenal manifold that experience is constructed out of a noumenal manifold. On none of the _definien_ of 'A was constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ' which I have given¹ does it follow from A's being constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ and A's being the cause of C that C is constructed out of B₁, B₂...Bₙ.

It seems that we would only have reason for holding that it follows from the phenomenal world being constructed out of a noumenal manifold that experience is constructed out of this noumenal manifold if experience were identical with the phenomenal world. However, Kemp Smith is committed to deny that experience is identical with the phenomenal world. This is because the phenomenal world is according to Kemp Smith that of which we are immediately aware, and hence the identification of the phenomenal world with experience would commit Kemp Smith to the doctrine that experience is that of which we are immediately aware - i.e. it would commit him to subjectivism. However Kemp Smith rejects subjectivism.

1. My first _definien_ was given on p382, my second on p382 and my third on p384.
Thus, since Kemp Smith must deny that experience is identical with the phenomenal world, it seems that he can have no reason for saying that it follows from the proposition that the phenomenal world was constructed out of a noumenal manifold that experience was constructed out of this noumenal manifold.

Thus this third argument of Kemp Smith's to show that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal is invalid, on the above construal of it.¹

I will now discuss the second proposition which Kemp Smith holds is true "from the phenomenalist standpoint" - viz. that the synthetic processes generative of experience are noumenal. Kemp Smith asserted this proposition to be true from the phenomenalist standpoint on pp274-5. However, when we turn to the page where Kemp Smith discusses the nature of the synthetic processes generative of experience "from the phenomenalist standpoint" (p277) we find it nowhere asserted that these synthetic processes are noumenal. We only find argument which if sound would support the proposition that the synthetic processes might for all we know be noumenal.

The argument is that these synthetic processes must take place and complete themselves before consciousness can exist at all, and so we can know virtually nothing about them. Kemp Smith doesn't actually say that we can't know whether they are phenomenal or noumenal. He says that we can't know whether or not they are conscious, whether or not they are mental, and whether or not they are activities of a noumenal self.

If Kant holds that the synthetic processes of which he speaks are supposed to be open to introspection, then Kant's

¹. Here ends my discussion of the first proposition which Kemp Smith makes out is true from the phenomenalist standpoint - viz. that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal. This discussion began on p358.
remark that we cannot represent anything as combined in the object that we have not ourselves previously combined\(^1\) conflicts violently with the deliverences of everyone's introspection. Thus I can sympathise with Kemp Smith's wishing to make out that Kant holds that we are not conscious of the synthetic processes generative of experience.

However, Kant nowhere says that any synthetic processes are unconscious. Kemp Smith says that on the issue of whether synthesis is conscious "Kant's own expositions remain thoroughly ambiguous"\(^2\).

It is not all syntheses which Kemp Smith holds that Kant holds are unconscious, but only transcendental syntheses\(^3\). I presume he would identify the transcendental syntheses with the synthetic processes generative of experience.

However, at B154 Kant appeals to introspection to show the necessity of a transcendental synthesis for copresence before the mind of the \textit{minima sensibilia} of geometrical figures. Thus here Kant's exposition is not ambiguous, but quite committal to transcendental synthesis being conscious.

Another thing to note is that at B154, as everywhere else where Kant makes a clear statement on the matter\(^4\) synthesis is putting representations before the mind together. Kemp Smith himself, in his commentary to A99 makes out that synthesis is putting representations before the mind. He states this quite explicitly on pp 277-8. However, if this is what synthesis is, there seems to be no reason to hold that it must take place before any consciousness can exist.

Note that Kant at B154 identifies \textit{transcendental} synthesis of the imagination with synthesis of an \textit{a priori} manifold. If this is what transcendental synthesis is it is difficult to see why it should be said to be generative of experience. In the second half of the second edition deduction Kant does say that it is because the synthesis of the \textit{a priori} manifold is in accordance with the categories

1. B 130
2. \textit{Op Cit.} p 277
3. See \textit{Ibid.} p 269
4. e.g. A77 = B102-3, A99, A102.
that the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience\(^1\). This may suggest that Kant would say that transcendental synthesis is generative of experience. However all it commits Kant to say is that transcendental synthesis is a necessary precondition of experience.

Also, as I have mentioned, Kant always uses 'experience' in a sense which implies veridicality, and so in saying that transcendental synthesis is necessary for experience Kant would not commit himself to say that it is a necessary precondition of any consciousness.

However the passages in the first edition deduction in which the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold seems to be made out to hold between all the representations a person has ever had\(^2\) do suggest that synthesis is something other than putting representations into consciousness together. This is because the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold (i.e. synthetic unity) is the product of synthesis, and no one can put all the representations he has ever had into consciousness together. Paton when he discusses such passages often\(^3\) takes synthetic unity to be universal and necessary conjunctions holding between objective representation types. This commits him to take synthesis to be the mind's influencing the generation of objective representations so that they turn out with universal and necessary conjunctions holding between representation types (although Paton never gives this as a definiens of 'synthesis', but always gives 'putting representations into consciousness together'). Paton makes out\(^4\) that that these conjunctions holding between objective representations amounts to the categories relating to them. If

3. Kant's Metaphysic of Experience I pp 414 (on A108) 430 (on A110)
so then in his comments on the above first edition passages he is committed to agree with Strawson's view that synthesis is the mind's influencing the generation of representations so that they come out falling under the categories. This interpretation is suggested by Kant's identification of synthetic unity of perceptions with representations being represented as in thoroughgoing and orderly connection at A110.

On this interpretation of 'synthesis' synthesis is part of the generation of experience-in-a-got-it-sense.

Kemp Smith seems to interpret 'synthesis' in this way on p 238, where he says that synthesis is "the generative source of all consciousness of order and relation".

Note that the proposition that the synthetic processes generative of experience precondition consciousness of time is premiss 2 in Kemp Smith's paraphrase of the subjective deduction. I have remarked above that Kemp Smith sometimes seems to jump from saying that something is necessary for consciousness of time to saying that it is necessary for consciousness simpliciter. Thus it seems he would say that premiss 2 of the subjective deduction entails that the synthetic processes generative of experience precondition consciousness simpliciter.

Since this is the premiss from which Kemp Smith derives the proposition that the synthetic processes generative of experience may be noumenal and Kemp Smith holds that the transcendental deduction entails phenomenalism, it may seem to follow that the premiss from which Kemp Smith derives the proposition that the synthetic processes generative of experience may be noumenal is one of the premisses from which Kemp Smith derives phenomenalism.

1. The Bounds of Sense pp 31-2, p 96.
3. p292.
Thus it is probabilified that this is what Kemp Smith has in mind when he says that from the phenomenalist standpoint the synthetic processes generative of experience are noumenal.

I can't see what it could be for synthetic processes generative of experience to be noumenal other than for the manifold on which they act to be noumenal. Thus I can't see why Kemp Smith presents the proposition that the synthetic processes generative of experience are noumenal and the proposition that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal as two separate propositions which are true from the phenomenalist standpoint.

Since Kant holds that we are aware of our own minds only as they appear, I presume that Kant would say that there is a noumenal as well as a phenomenal manifold. However, since Kant holds that there is a noumenon corresponding to each phenomenon, and only says that there may be noumena which do not correspond to phenomena, it seems that he doesn't hold that there is a manifold of noumenal sensations which, like the one of which Kemp Smith speaks, does not run parallel to the manifold of phenomenal sensations, but is "much more comprehensive" than it.

Certainly none of the arguments which Kemp Smith gives in support of the existence of such a noumenal manifold are to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

On p279 Kemp Smith says "Now Kant is here giving a new, and quite revolutionary, interpretation of the distinction between the subjective and the objective". It seems that "here" is wherever it is that Kant is supposed to propound phenomenalism.

2. Loc.cit.
4. Here ends my discussion of Kemp Smith's remarks (Op. Cit. pp274-8) about the phenomenalist view "as to the nature of the synthetic processes through which experience is constructed and of the given manifold on which they are supposed to act" (p274). My discussion of these remarks began on p353.
Kemp Smith continues:

The objective is for the Cartesians the independently real; the subjective is that which has an altogether different kind of existence in what is entitled the field of consciousness. Kant, on the other hand, from his phenomenalist standpoint, views existences as objective when they are determined by purely physical causes, and as subjective when they also depend on physiological and psychological conditions.

I have already\(^1\) mentioned that this analysis of objectivity deviates from the one Kant always gives when he gives an analysis of objectivity in terms of causality (Kant's analysans being simply "causally determined"), and from the one which Kemp Smith himself gave on p 249.

Kemp Smith makes out that Kant in espousing phenomenalism is giving this interpretation of the objective/subjective distinction. However, phenomenalism, whether taken as the doctrine that objective existences are immediately perceived or as the doctrine that all immediate objects of perception are objective, does not entail this or any other interpretation of the objective/subjective distinction.

Thus charity bids us to try to think up another reason why Kemp Smith should say that in espousing phenomenalism Kant is giving the above interpretation of the objective/subjective distinction. Perhaps Kemp Smith's reason for saying this is that Kant's reasons for adopting this interpretation of the objective/subjective distinction entail phenomenalism.

A reason which Kant sometimes seems to have for adopting interpretations of the objective/subjective distinction (he gives different interpretations of it in different places, and his reasons for his interpretations vary) does entail phenomenalism (in the sense "the doctrine that objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness").

The distinction between veridical and non-veridical representations is closely connected with the distinction between objective and subjective existences. At A197=B242, in the section on the second analogy, Kant gives an argument for adopting as our interpretation of the distinction between veridical and non-veridical representations "causally determined representation/not causally determined representation" (which is quite close to Kemp Smith's interpretation of the distinction between objective and subjective existences). This argument commits Kant to the doctrine that objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness. At A197=B242 Kant says that the only things of which we can ever become conscious are representations. He then asks how we can ever come to posit an object for representations, and ascribe to them some mysterious kind of objective reality. No doubt his reason for asking this is that, if we can never be conscious of an object it seems that we can never tell whether there is an object to which a representation of ours relates. In asking how we come to ascribe some mysterious kind of objective reality to our representations, Kant is implying that he has given up hope of finding an explanation how we can come to ascribe dinkum objective reality to our representations.

His answer is that all we generally mean by "relation to an object" is "causal determination by another representation" - in Kant's words, that the new character which relation to an object confers upon a representation is nothing more than our representations being subject to a rule.

We can take "relation to an object" to be "veridacility" here, because relation of representations to an object is said to be sufficient for their objective validity at B137, and objective validity is identified with truth at A125. Thus Kant is giving "causally determined" as an interpretation of "objective" here.

Thus Kant's explanation how we come to posit an object for representations, despite the fact that we are never
conscious of a dinkum object, and so cannot see whether or not there is an object answering to a representation, is that all we generally mean by "veridical representation" is "causally governed representation" (i.e. "representation of a state of an object, the coming into being of which state was causally determined"), and our observation of a representation can reveal whether it is causally governed.

I believe that in the context of the above argument Kant would use the expressions "object" (which is equivalent to Kemp Smith's word "objective existence") and "representation which relates to an object" interchangeably. I say this because at A137-8, after identifying "representations which relate to an object" with "representations between which the transcendental unity of apperception holds" he slides to saying that the transcendental unity of apperception is "a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me".

Since it seems Kant would use "object" and "representation which relates to an object" interchangeably, it seems he would give an argument for adopting as our interpretation of the distinction between objective and subjective existences "causally determined representation/not causally determined representation", which argument would run exactly parallel to the A197=B242 argument for adopting as our interpretation of the distinction between veridical and non-veridical representations "causally determined representation/not causally determined representation".

Since according to Kant at A197=B242 the only things of which we are ever conscious are representations, I think it likely that Kant would express the distinction "causally determined representation/not causally determined representation" as simply "causally determined thing/not causally
determined thing". Thus it is likely that that Kant would express the conclusion that we should adopt as our interpretation of the distinction between objective and subjective existences "causally determined representation/not causally determined representation"
as that we should adopt as our interpretation of the distinction between objective and subjective existences "causally determined thing/not causally determined thing".

This proposition is very close to the proposition which Kemp Smith on p 279 ascribes to Kant - that existences are objective when determined by purely physical causes and subjective when also dependent on physiological and psychological conditions.

The argument which I have argued Kant would give in support of the proposition that we should adopt as our interpretation of the distinction between objective and subjective existences "causally determined thing/not causally determined thing" would entail the doctrine that objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness. This is because the above argument involves identifying objective existences with causally determined representations, and representations are immediate objects of consciousness.

In five places¹ in the section on the second analogy I think it quite likely that Kant gives an argument similar to the above argument, in which, instead of saying that all we generally mean when we say that a representation is veridical is that it is causally determined, he says that all that we generally mean when we say that there is a relation of succession between two objective states of affairs is that the former contains or is contemporaneous with the cause of the latter. In other words, it is quite likely that he is reducing objective succession to causally determined succession. (Note that he would be making this reduction via (a) pointing out that for a succession to be

objective, the order in which the representations in the succession occur must be determined by some extra-mental cause and then (b) reducing necessitation of the order of a succession of representations by an extra-mental cause to necessitation of a succession of representations by some condition contained in the preceding representation).

This involves identifying "objective states which are in succession to one another" with "representations in succession to one another, which succession is causally determined by some condition contained in the preceding representation". Thus it entails that objective states which are in succession to one another are immediately perceived.

(I do not, however, rule out the possibility that Kant proceeds from the proposition that the order of a veridical succession of representations is necessitated by some extra-mental cause to the proposition that a veridical succession of representations is necessitated by some condition contained in the preceding representation not by a reduction of the concept of necessitation by some extra-mental cause to the concept of necessitation by some condition contained in the preceding representation, but by a sheer confusion of the two concepts (in Strawson's words, "a non-sequitur of mind numbing grossness"). This is because Kant seems to confuse the two concepts at A193-4 = B238-9 and A198-9 = B243-4. However, the clearly reductivist nature of the argument at A197 = B242 (shown by Kant's speaking of some mysterious kind of objective reality) makes me think that the five-times-repeated argument is reductivist too.

If Kant were proceeding via the above mind-numbing non sequitur which Strawson ascribes to him, then the five-times-repeated argument would not entail that objective states which are in succession to one another are immediately perceived.)

At B258 and A212 = B258-9 (in the section on the third analogy) Kant I take it reduces "objective existences which
exist simultaneously" to "objective existences, each of which has properties which are causes of properties of the other".

It can be seen that all the above arguments which Kant would give in support of interpretations of the distinction between objective and subjective existences (some of which interpretations are quite close to the interpretation which Kemp Smith on p279 ascribes to Kant — viz. "determined by purely physical causes/also dependent upon physiological and psychological conditions") entail phenomenalism (in the sense "the doctrine that objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness").

This may suggest that when Kemp Smith makes out that in espousing phenomenalism Kant is giving as an interpretation of the distinction between objective and subjective existences "determined by purely physical causes/also dependent upon physiological and psychological conditions", what he is getting at in saying this is that Kant's grounds for adopting this interpretation entail phenomenalism.
However, it seems that this cannot be the case, since it seems that the only grounds Kemp Smith ever gives in support of any interpretation of the distinction between objective and subjective existences which remotely resembles the interpretation of this distinction which Kemp Smith ascribes to Kant on p 279 do not entail that objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness. I am alluding to the grounds Kemp Smith gives on p 249-50 in support of the doctrine that the concept of an object "consists in the thought of a manifold so determined in its specific order and groupings as to be interpretable in terms of the categories of substance and causality."

Kemp Smith's ground in support of this doctrine is that it is necessary for us to take an existence to be objective that all the contents of our perceptions of it should be "capable of being regarded as qualities of one and the same object", and that all its qualities should be "causally bound up with one another in such a way that the nature of each is determined by the nature of all the others, and that if any one quality be changed all the others must undergo corresponding alterations". In my discussion of this argument I derived the second of these two requirements of objectivity, by a slightly tortuous route, from the third analogy (the argument for which I take to be a reductivist argument, and hence an argument which entails that objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness). However since Kemp Smith does not mention the category of reciprocity in the course of the argument, I doubt that it is from the third analogy that Kemp Smith derives the second of the above two requirements of objectivity. Furthermore, Kemp Smith does not hold that the argument for the third analogy is a reductivist argument.

1. Above pp296-300.
2. See pp296-7
3. See Kemp Smith Op Cit. p 382
If the grounds which Kemp Smith ascribes to Kant for viewing existences as objective when they are determined by purely physical causes and as subjective when they are also dependent on physiological and psychological conditions are not reductivist, then I cannot think of any grounds which Kemp Smith could have for this doctrine which entail phenomenalism, in the sense "the doctrine that objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness".

I cannot think of anything which Kemp Smith could have in mind when he makes out that in espousing phenomenalism Kant gives the above interpretation of the objective/subjective distinction, and which could make it come out true that in espousing phenomenalism Kant gives the above interpretation of the objective/subjective distinction.

Kemp Smith continues:

On this latter view the difference between the two is no longer a difference of kind; it becomes a difference merely of degree. Objective existences, owing to the simplicity and recurrent character of their conditions are uniform. Subjective existences resting upon conditions which are too complex to be frequently recurrent, are by contrast extremely variable. But both types of existence are objective in the sense that they are objects, and immediate objects, for consciousness.

Kemp Smith seems to give this last assertion that both types of existence are objective as a ground for his assertion that the difference between objective and subjective existences is a difference of degree. If so, it is a bad ground, since he is maintaining that both objective and subjective existences are objective in an utterly different sense of 'objective' from that connected with the distinction between the objective and subjective existences of which he speaks.

What Kemp Smith has said would only entail that from the phenomenalist standpoint the difference between objective
and subjective existences is one of degree if phenomenalism
is the doctrine that all immediate objects of consciousness
are objective (instead of merely being the doctrine that
objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness).

As I have above noted\(^1\), Kemp Smith could not mean by
'phenomenalism' 'the doctrine that all immediate objects of
consciousness are objective-in-the-sense-in-which-he-says-
here-that-they-are-all-objective (viz. "objects and
immediate objects for consciousness")'. This is because
this doctrine is trivially analytic. However, as I have also
noted, Kemp Smith at the bottom of p 279 and on p 280 seems
to give another sense of 'objective' in which he would claim
that both objective existences (in the sense 'existences
determined by purely physical causes') and subjective
existences (in the sense 'existences also dependent on
physiological and psychological conditions') are objective,
but in which this proposition is not trivial. This sense
of 'objective' is 'causally determined'.

Immediately after the sentences above quoted Kemp Smith
temporarily abandons discussion of whether the difference
between objective and subjective existences is a difference
of degree or of kind to draw some inferences from the prop-
osition that both objective and subjective existences are
objective (with which, as I have just mentioned, there are
indications that Kemp Smith identifies phenomenalism).

The propositions which he infers from this proposition
are (a) that subjective states do not constitute our
consciousness of nature and hence (b) that subjective
states do not run parallel to the objective system of
natural existences.

In all this, when Kemp Smith uses the expressions
'subjective states' and 'subjective existences' he must mean
by them 'phenomenal sensations'. This is because he does
hold that noumenal sensations run parallel to the objective
system of natural existences (on p 277 he says that they

1. p 377.
"contain the material for all modes of objective existence"). Also I have argued\(^1\) that Kemp Smith's suppressed immediate ground for saying on p 275 that when we raise the question of how it is possible to have and acquire knowledge we have to "adopt a very different standpoint [from looking at things as they appear]" is that it is noumenal sensations which constitute our consciousness of nature.

The inference from the proposition that subjective as well as objective existences are objective (i.e. part of the phenomenal world) to the proposition that subjective states do not constitute our consciousness of nature is made in Kemp Smith's second argument to show that the manifold on which the synthetic processes generative of experience act is noumenal, on my first and second accounts of it\(^2\). The inference is made via different routes in these two accounts of the argument. I have argued above that both routes are unsound\(^3\).

I suppose I am committed to say that the inference from the proposition that subjective states do not constitute our consciousness of nature to the proposition that subjective states do not run parallel to the things that make up nature is valid. This is because I hold that for me to be conscious of X is for something which somehow corresponds to X to exist in my mind. However, since Kemp Smith doesn't hold this, he is committed to deny that the above inference is valid. Kemp Smith would I presume say that it is a necessary condition of my being conscious of X that something which somehow corresponds to X should exist in my mind. Thus his beliefs entail that the proposition that subjective states (i.e. phenomenal sensations) do not constitute our consciousness of nature removes a reason for believing that subjective states run parallel with the things that make up nature.

1. pp359-60.
2. The first account is given above, p381 and the second on p385-6.
3. I argue that the first route is unsound on pp382-5, and that the second route is unsound on pp386-7.
After drawing the above inferences from the proposition that both objective and subjective existences are objective, Kemp Smith reverts to the discussion of whether the difference between objective and subjective existences is one of kind or only of degree. He says:

That they [phenomenal sensations] contrast with physical existences in being unextended and incapable of location in space is what Kant would seem by implication to assert, but he challenges Descartes' right to infer from this particular difference a complete diversity in their whole nature.

I presume that when Kemp Smith says that Kant asserts by implication that subjective states are unextended and incapable of location in space Kemp Smith has in mind A22 = B37 and A34 = B50.

The only place I know of in the Critique at which Kant says anything that looks at all like a challenge to Descartes' right to infer from subjective states not being in space a complete diversity between them and physical existences is in the course of discussion of the doctrine that the soul is simple in the first edition Paralogisms (at A357-61) and at B427-8. However, what Kant says here is that we cannot know whether or not the self as it is in itself is identical with the something which underlies outer appearances (i.e. bodies i.e., in Kemp Smith's terminology, physical existences). This is quite compatible with the proposition that there is a complete diversity of nature between the mind as it appears (and phenomenal sensations) and physical existences. In fact Kant even asserts this latter proposition. As I have mentioned above, when Kemp Smith speaks of subjective states at p 279, he must mean 'phenomenal sensations'.

Next Kemp Smith says that subjective states constitute the empirical self, which is "integranal connected with the material environment, in terms of which alone it can be understood".
I cannot think of anything with which Kemp Smith could be identifying the connections between the empirical self and the material environment to which he refers other than causal connections. The only arguments which Kemp Smith has given which could support his assertion that the empirical self can only be understood in terms of the material environment are the arguments which he ascribes to Kant in the first and second edition deductions to show that consciousness of objects is necessary for self consciousness. I have argued above that these arguments are invalid and are not to be found in either the first or the second edition deduction.

Next Kemp Smith says that what Kant is really doing in performing "this reformulation of Cartesian distinctions" is "to substitute the distinction between appearance and reality for the Cartesian dualism of the mental and material". No doubt what Kemp Smith has in mind when he speaks of Kant substituting the distinction between appearance and reality for the Cartesian distinction between the mental and the material is that Kant identifies what on p 279 Kemp Smith calls the independently real with reality and the non-independently-real with appearance, whereas Descartes identified the independently real with the material and the non independently-real with the mental. I can't see what Kemp Smith could have in mind when he speaks of the independently real other than that which is independent of the mind. Thus I can't see how one can avoid identifying the non independently-real with the mental. Also, appearance seems to be necessarily mental (although all things mental may not be appearance).

1. Kemp Smith ascribes to Kant an argument to show this in the first edition at Op.Cit.pp 251-2 (I have discussed this argument above pp 311-12). Kemp Smith ascribes a different argument to show this in the second edition at Op.Cit.pp 285-6 (I have discussed this argument above at pp336-7)
If as I have supposed Kemp Smith's assertion that Kant substitutes the distinction between appearance and reality for the Cartesian dualism of the mental and the material means that Kant identifies the non independently-real with appearance and the independently real with reality instead of identifying the non independently-real with the mental and the independently real with the material (as the Cartesians do), then this assertion of Kemp Smith's is misleading. This is because on this interpretation the assertion suggests that the Cartesians would deny that the non independently-real is identical with appearance and that the independently real is identical with reality. A Cartesian would of course not deny this.

The reformulation of Cartesian distinctions in performing which Kemp Smith says what Kant is really doing is substituting the distinction between appearance and reality for the distinction between the mental and the material is of course the interpretation of the objective as that which is determined by purely physical causes, and the interpretation of the subjective as that which is also dependent on psychological and physiological conditions.

I presume that when Kemp Smith makes out that in reformulating the distinction between the objective and the subjective what Kant is really doing is to substitute the distinction between appearance and reality for the distinction between the mental and the material, what Kemp Smith means is as follows: "To say that Kant is substituting the distinction between appearance and reality for the distinction between the mental and the material is a more comprehensive statement of what Kant is doing when he reformulates the distinction between the objective and the subjective than to say that he is reformulating the distinction between the objective and the subjective; substituting the distinction between appearance and reality for
the distinction between the mental and the material **involves** making Kant's reformulation of the objective/subjective distinction".

However, if everything I have said about the assertion of Kemp Smith's which I am discussing is true, it may seem that this assertion must be false. Suppose that (a) the substitution of the distinction referred to between appearance and reality for the distinction between the mental and the material were the identification of the distinction between appearance and reality, instead of the distinction between the mental and the material, with the distinction between the non independently-real and the independently-real, (b) the reformulation of Cartesian distinctions referred to is the interpretation of the objective as that which is determined by purely physical causes and the interpretation of the subjective as that which is also dependent on physiological and psychological conditions and (c) that by "Inf *ing what X is really doing is *ing" Kemp Smith means "X's *ing is involved in his *ing".

The Cartesian would identify both the distinction between the mental and the material and the distinction between appearance and reality with the distinction between the non-independently-real and the independently-real. The distinction between the mental and material is I presume the distinction between the subjective and the objective which Kemp Smith on p 279 says the Cartesians identify with the distinction between the non independently-real and the independently real.

Thus identifying the objective with that which is determined by purely physical causes and the subjective with that which is also dependent on physiological and psychological conditions is certainly not involved in identifying the distinction between appearance and reality with the distinction between the non independently-real and the independently real.
This is what may suggest that given my beliefs about what Kemp Smith means by his assertion that what Kant is really doing in reformulating the Cartesian distinction between the objective and the subjective is to substitute the distinction between appearance and reality for the Cartesian dualism of the mental and the material, this assertion is false.

However, identifying the objective with what is determined by purely physical causes and the subjective with what is also dependent on physiological and psychological conditions is (assuming that it is the only alternative to identifying the objective with the independently real and the subjective with that which has an altogether different kind of existence in what is entitled the field of consciousness) involved in denying that the distinction between the mental and the material (i.e. the subjective and the objective) is identical with the distinction between the non independently-real and the independently real.

Denying that the distinction between the mental and the material is identical with the distinction between the non independently-real and the independently real is involved in substituting the distinction between appearance and reality for the distinction between the mental and the material. Therefore identifying the objective with what is determined by purely physical causes and the subjective with what is also dependent on physiological and psychological causes is after all involved in substituting the distinction between appearance and reality for the distinction between the mental and the material. That is to say, Kemp Smith's assertion on p 280 that what Kant is really doing in reformulating the Cartesian distinction between the objective and the subjective is to substitute the distinction between appearance and reality for the Cartesian dualism of the mental and the material is after all true.
Next Kemp Smith conveys that Kant identifies reality with noumena. Then Kemp Smith repeats the conclusion he reached on p 275 that the question of how knowledge is possible can only be answered by investigating noumena. I presume that the ground he would have for this here is the same as what I have argued is his ground for it on p 275 — viz. that consciousness and its preconditions are in the realm of noumena.

I have now completed my discussion of Kemp Smith's discussion of what phenomenalism and subjectivism are.1 I will now proceed to discuss the reformulation of the problem of knowledge which Kemp Smith says is involved in phenomenalism. Kemp Smith gives three statements of this reformulation, on pp 274, 280 and 282. I will discuss the p 280 statement.

Kemp Smith says on p 280 that the problem of knowledge (i.e. the question which must be answered before we can see how it is possible to have or acquire knowledge2) is not how, starting with the subjective, the individual can come to knowledge of the independently real; but how, if a common world is alone immediately apprehended, the inner private life of the self-conscious being can be possible and how such inner experience is to be interpreted. How does it come about that though sensations, feelings, etc., are events no less mechanically conditioned than motions in space, and constitute with the latter a single system conformed to natural law, they yet differ from all other classes of natural events, in that they can be experienced only by a single consciousness.

From the second statement of what the problem of knowledge is from the phenomenalist standpoint, which is given in the second sentence which I have quoted here, it can be seen that the sense of "objective" in which Kemp Smith would assert the proposition that all that is apprehended

1. My discussion of this began on p353.
is objective (from which proposition he concludes that all that is apprehended is common) is "causally determined".

A thing's being objective in this sense (or for that matter, in the sense "determined by purely physical causes") does not seem sufficient for it to be potentially perceivable by more than one consciousness (i.e. potentially common). Hence that everything should be objective in either of these senses seems no obstacle to some things being perceivable by only one consciousness.

If a common world were alone apprehended, then I agree it would be very difficult to see how it would be possible that some things can only be perceivable by a single consciousness, because the proposition that a common world is alone apprehended, but some things are perceivable by only one consciousness is simply a flat contradiction.

Kemp Smith says that Kant's solution to the problem is in terms of his fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. Though everything of which we are conscious may legitimately be studied in terms of the natural system to which it belongs, consciousness itself cannot be so regarded. In attempting to define it we are carried beyond the phenomenal to its noumenal conditions. In other words, it constitutes a problem, the full data for the solution of which are not at our disposal. This is by itself a sufficient reason for our incapacity to explain why the states of each empirical self can never be apprehended save by a single consciousness.

Thus Kemp Smith is again appealing to his p 275 conclusion that consciousness is in the realm of noumena.

It is impossible that the nature of our consciousness of the sensations of the special senses or of the world of objects which are determined by purely physical causes should resolve the contradiction between the sensations of the special senses being perceivable only by a single consciousness and
the only thing we apprehend being a common world.

Kant nowhere gives an answer to the 'problem' of how if a common world is alone apprehended the inner private life of the self-conscious individual can be possible, and for that matter nowhere even mentions the problem.

I will now, as promised, discuss whether phenomenalism and subjectivism are both to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant certainly often commits himself to subjectivism - the doctrine that the sole immediate objects of consciousness are ideas (in the Lockean sense). In fact Kant often asserts that ideas in the Lockean sense are the sole possible objects simpliciter of consciousness.²

Phenomenalism, if it is taken as the doctrine that all immediate objects of consciousness are objective, is nowhere to be found in the Critique.

There is only one place in the Critique where phenomenalism, in the sense "the doctrine that objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness" is explicitly stated, and that is in the second edition refutation of idealism.

I have mentioned above that an argument at A197=B242 in support of an interpretation of the distinction between the objective and the subjective commits Kant to say that objective existences are immediate objects of consciousness. However, I also noted that the reason why it does this is that it involves identifying objective existences with representations of a certain class (viz. representations which present events as being causally determined). This of course would render subjectivism and phenomenalism compatible.

Thus Kant's identifying objective existences with representations of a certain class removes one of Kemp Smith's major grounds for the patchwork theory, since whether a passage expresses subjectivism or phenomenalism is one of the

1. Above, p353.
major criteria Kemp Smith uses in deciding whether a given passage from the deduction was written early or late. To take Kant to be identifying objective existences with certain representations seems to me the only way to avoid attributing the inconsistency which Kemp Smith holds exists between phenomenalism and subjectivism to Kant.

I take it that 'empirically real', expresses a reductivist sense of 'reality', whilst 'transcendentally real' expresses the literal sense of 'reality'.

1. See above, pp170-1.
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