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# Police who investigate Police: The construction of identity, management of occupational taint and influence of police culture

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*University of Wollongong*

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**Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts**

**Title**

**Police who investigate Police:  
The construction of identity, management of occupational taint and  
influence of police culture**

**Mark Francis Loves (MA, B.Sc.)**

**This thesis is presented as part of the requirements for the  
award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the  
University of Wollongong**

**16 April 2015**

## **Certification**

I, Mark Francis Loves, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, at the Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged below. The document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.

Mark F. Loves

16 April 2015

## ABSTRACT

Civilian oversight has emerged as one of the legitimate means to exercise checks on the abuses of police power. However, it is argued that seconded or former police officers may be critically compromised through their exposure and socialisation into police culture and the elements of camaraderie and loyalty that are traditionally associated with that culture.

The objective of this research was to identify underlying frameworks that both produce and promote behaviour and meaning for civil review agency police corruption investigators and to explore how they construct and maintain identity in the face of pervasive occupational stigma. The primary data collection method for the research was in depth interviewing of the target population. A narrative inquiry method was adopted as a medium for examination of the narratives so obtained.

Whilst organisational and police culture was the first of the theoretical frames for this research, of equal importance in answering the research questions was the theoretical concept of "*dirty work*" (Hughes, 1958, p. 122), and how the taint associated with this work is managed through a process known as "*normalisation*" (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; 2002, p. 217). The normalisation strategies identified in this research are consistent with predictions from the literature and include reframing, adaptation, diffusing, recalibrating and refocusing.

In examining these issues, I identified two typologies of police corruption investigator: *the Careerist and the Opportunist*. *Careerists* represent a changing of the guard; the transition from street cop to management, and shows that the individual is able to cast aside the semblances of police culture in an attempt to prove worthy of career progression. The *Opportunist* typology refers to a specific way of responding to job opportunities which involve self-interest, whilst turning their back on the principles, culture and shared camaraderie of the police organisations from which they emerged.

This study supports previous research in identifying embedded traditions of police culture amongst police corruption investigators and supports notions of permanence of character which critics of *police investigating police* embrace. However, the findings of this research are that the *Careerists* and the *Opportunists* provide a hedge against occupational alignment. Indeed, the outcomes of this research support the hypothesis that no other group could, or should be considered for this type of investigative work.

Finally, this study recommends that anti-corruption agencies realise and perceive their own institutional limitations; specifically, that investigative bodies heavily dominated by an excessively legalistic approach may not be the best vehicle for uncovering police corruption.

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## PREFACE

“I am utterly and abjectly pissed-off with this little lot. I’ve given the best years of my life to the job. I’ve got eighteen bloody commendations, if you include the one I didn’t get yesterday. And how does this ‘wonderful’ police force show its gratitude for all my years of unstinting effort? It bangs me up in a crummy little cell like some cheap little villain - all because a toerag called Hutchinson’s got a few bottles twitching on the Fifth Floor.”

**Jack Regan – The Sweeney (1978)<sup>1</sup>**

Having come from a policing background, I was well aware of the stigma attached to police internal affairs units and anti-corruption agencies. Police working within those units or agencies were almost universally distrusted or even despised within police organisations. In many cases, this intrinsic contempt did not seem to be based upon any overt intent to hide or secrete corrupt activity on the part of the police demonstrating these attitudes, merely an innate distrust of internal affairs police for having compromised the most fundamental principles of police culture: those of solidarity and loyalty. These principles were noted and examined by the New York Commission to Combat Police Corruption (CCPC, 2000, p. 5);

Specifically, the Mollen Commission found that many members of the Department viewed Internal Affairs Division as a “white socks” operation, i.e. an operation that harassed hardworking members for petty transgressions rather than an investigative body interested in the investigation of those committing serious misconduct and crimes. Further, the Mollen Commission found that many members of the Department were distrustful of IAD personnel, believing them to be incompetent investigators who were out of touch with the realities of “real” police work.

With this in mind, the issue that initially piqued my interest in this research was the following conundrum. Why would a police officer (or former police officer) choose

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<sup>1</sup> British police series on UK television in mid 1970s. Jack Regan, (played by John Thaw) is a hardened detective in the Flying Squad of London's Metropolitan police (called 'the Sweeney' from the Cockney rhyming slang 'Sweeney Todd'). Quote taken from episode 14, 'Jack or Knave', Season 4 (1978). Retrieved 10/9/13 from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0714440/>.

to go into a profession that is almost universally despised and stigmatised by the very culture into which they themselves have been socialised?

Initially, I surmised that these individuals might have had some exposure to corruption during their police careers and as such, might have developed an almost evangelical outlook to corruption prevention. Surprisingly, I found no evidence of this. I was also reasonably sure that for some, the motives would be career orientation. The answer seemed to lay within the police culture itself, and its influence upon the individuals who make such choices.

I explored some of these issues with my supervisors and given the cultural and individual aspects proposed, we decided upon an ethnographic approach to the research. This seemed the most appropriate methodology as it explores life from the point of view of the participants and avoids assessing culture from pre-existing frames of reference.

The biggest problem I faced initially was in accessing the target population of police corruption investigators who were notoriously operationally secretive; and if successful in doing that, breaking the blue veil of silence that often exists in pseudo-policing organisations and pervades those that have been socialised within them. I initially thought about approaching the research from the perspective of whether former police officers were the most suitable personnel to be investigating corrupt police. However, I thought that this approach might be too confrontational for the civil review anti-corruption agencies under whose watchful eye I would be conducting my interviews (interestingly, this issue framed one my major research outcomes!)

Instead, my main objective was to see things the way corruption investigators do and try to grasp the meanings that they use to understand their world. In this way, I anticipated that I could provide a rich understanding of the occupation and the individuals within it by reflecting on their lived experiences and observations, building thick descriptions to uncover symbolic aspects of behaviour, cultural or normative patterns. Ultimately, I wanted to delve into the cultural complexities of the world of police corruption investigators, searching for binding traditions, common patterns or attitudes towards their work, beliefs or behaviours.

Reflecting upon these goals a number of potential areas for exploration came to mind. Did corruption investigators see corrupt police as the enemy? How did the police

corruption investigators develop their moral compass? What direct experiences influenced them to seek a career in corruption investigation? Who had been their mentors, and had they been affected personally by corruption? Did they see the move to police corruption investigation as career enhancing? What frustrations did they face in their current roles and did they consider themselves successful in their anti-corruption endeavours? Did they fear alienation from policing and informal paybacks from the police they investigated? Had they experienced politicisation in their roles as police corruption investigators?

I was also particularly interested in the powers assigned police corruption investigators to carry out their roles and whether in their opinion, they needed enhanced powers of investigation to be successful in those roles. I was keen to explore how civil liberties influenced corruption investigation, particularly in regard to inquisitorial coercive powers at interview, and explore the difficulties experienced with using evidence so obtained in an adversarial legal system. Other aspects I was keen to examine were the critical skills, attributes and experience that the police corruption investigators considered most necessary to do the job.

My interest in policing and police stems back to my own time in the New South Wales Police Force and the personal traits that led me to pursue that career. Police are fundamentally inquisitive, searching for answers to questions that are sometimes too shocking or confronting for many people to face. This inquisitiveness has ultimately led me to my more recent academic work and indeed to this research, which examines how police corruption investigators externally adapt or internally integrate behaviours and solutions considered valid to their group. Ultimately, it identifies how they perceive, think and feel about the problems and issues they face as agents of anti-corruption in their roles as police corruption investigators.

## **CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION**

“I said this to the Knapp Commission over 25 years ago. We must create an atmosphere where the crooked cop fears the honest cop, and not the other way around.”

**Frank Serpico (1997)<sup>2</sup>**

### **1.1 Civilian Review**

The issue of police corruption in Australia is one that has never been far from the attention of the public, politicians and the media. The Wood Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (1994–97) and the Fitzgerald Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service (1987–89) reinforced the public perception that policing was an inherently high-risk occupation for corruption. The result has been an increasing public awareness of the types and impacts of police corruption and a resultant perception that the processes of public accountability have failed, not the least due to “the resilient and resistant nature of occupational police culture and its inability to change” (RCMP, 2009b, p. 3).

As a result, various oversight bodies designed to limit the independence of police in the form of civilian review were developed. The New South Wales Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) was established in March 1989 (ICAC, 2011); the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) in April 1998 - in January 2002 the CJC merged into the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC, 2010); the Western Australia Corruption and Crime Commission (CCC) in January 2004 (CCC, 2011); the Victorian Office of Police Integrity (OPI) in November 2004 (OPI, 2011) - in 2013, the OPI was absorbed into the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission, known as IBAC; the New South Wales Police Integrity Commission (PIC) in 1996 (Commission, 2011); The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) in 2006, and the office of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (ICAC) was established by the South Australian Government in 2012.

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<sup>2</sup> Francesco Vincent Serpico is a retired American New York City Police Department (NYPD) officer who is most famous for blowing the whistle on police corruption in the late 1960s and early 1970s, an act of valour that compelled Mayor John V. Lindsay to appoint the landmark Knapp Commission to investigate the NYPD. Most of Serpico's fame came after the release of the 1973 film *Serpico*, which starred Al Pacino. Quote taken from ‘Serpico resurrects his decades-old criticism of NYPD’, retrieved 6/9/13 from <http://edition.cnn.com/US/9709/23/serpico.brutality/#wall>.

These anti-corruption agencies have been at the forefront of the fight against police corruption, charged with the responsibility for preventing, managing, investigating and prosecuting police corruption in the face of an increasingly sceptical public, and diminishing confidence in the vestiges of public accountability.

To resource these programs, most agencies utilise seconded or former police officers to investigate police corruption cases referred to them, due mainly to the investigative skills, experience and knowledge that those personnel bring to the role. However there is an increasing number of critics that argue that shared occupational values and perspectives make it unlikely that corruption investigations can be conducted fairly and impartially under the umbrella of a pervasive police culture (Bennett & Corrigan, 1980; Goldsmith, 1991; Seneviratne, 2004).

Whilst the academic literature on police corruption and accountability is extensive, there have been few studies focusing specifically on the work environment of police corruption investigators in an Australian context, and none (that I am aware of) focusing upon civil review agency police corruption investigators. The Commission for Public Complaints against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police commented upon this lack of scholarly foundation in making the following observation (RCMP, 2009a, p. 22):

Advocating for more research is a predicable academic response to almost any problem, but this review makes it clear that PIP (police investigating police), and its alternatives, clearly lack adequate academic or policy research.

My research focused upon the experiences of Australian police corruption investigators, more specifically, seconded and former police officers attached to civil review anti-corruption agencies. A major focus of the study was the exploration of corruption investigation within the context of *dirty work*, that is, as an occupation that is viewed as “physically, socially, or morally tainted” (Hughes, 1958, p. 122). The research sought to identify underlying frameworks that both produce and promote behaviour and meaning within police corruption investigators and to explore how they construct and maintain identity in the face of pervasive occupational stigma.

This research has significance for knowledge, policy and practice, and provides an informed and scholarly basis for discussion on the practices of police corruption investigation and into the management of police related corruption, which is a critical component to the maintenance of public confidence in police agencies.

## 1.2 Police Investigating Police

It is argued that police independence is a necessary pre-requisite to shield police agencies from political interference and influence. Hence, the early approach to police corruption investigation and oversight was characterised by closed systems in which police were effectively responsible for disciplining themselves (Barton, 1970; West, 1998).

The Knapp Commission in the United States is an example of where a major crisis led to fundamental reform in the investigation and oversight of police organisations. The trend that emerged was civilian review, developed in the USA and other jurisdictions in the 1970's, which was a direct result of the failure of police agencies to discipline themselves and accept the legitimacy of public complaints of corruption (Barton, 1970; Culver, 1975; Prenzler, 2000).

Police have voiced strong opposition to the use of civilian review agencies in the complaint management processes, offering a number of arguments. The strongest of these arguments is that these agencies demoralise the police to the extent that increasing resignations and retirements leave the community unprotected. In addition, police propose that these agencies interfere with the authority of the police, making it impossible to control disciplinary mechanisms as well as interfere politically with police operations. Balanced against this is the argument that police cannot provide adequate and impartial investigations of their own misconduct.

## 1.3 Research Questions

To provide a clear agenda, the following primary question was adopted as the major focus of this research:

*What are the underlying frameworks (values, norms, symbols, beliefs, practices) that civil review agency police corruption investigators with a police background use to interpret and respond to the inherent cultural, structural, situational, debilitating or compromising occupational issues they face?*

To facilitate this exploration, the following sub-questions were adopted:

- a) What normalisation challenges do civil review agency police corruption investigators with a police background, face in their occupational role?*
- b) What tactics do civil review agency police corruption investigators with a police background use to normalise their work?*

- a) *How do civil review agency police corruption investigators with a police background identify with police culture and/or acknowledge the influence of police cultural conditioning on their practices, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours?*
- b) *What is their perception of the craft of police corruption investigation, including the knowledge, experience, skills and behaviours that are valued within the group?*

## **1.4 Methodology**

### **1.4.1 Purpose**

Criminal justice research can serve many purposes, including “exploration, explanation and description” (Hughes, 1958, p. 122). The purpose of this research was to *explore* the underlying frameworks that both produce and promote behaviour and meaning through a series of interviews and observations with civil review police corruption investigators (Kervin, Vialle, Herrington, & Okely, 2006; Marshall & Rossman, 2011).

### **1.4.2 Principles**

Social science has two paradigmatic principles: *epistemology*, which is how we have come to have legitimate knowledge of the world (the rules of knowing); and *ontology*, which studies what exists, and how things that exist are understood and categorised.

Epistemology explores the basis for knowledge; that is, how we know what we know (Taylor, 2010). This research adopted an anti-naturalist epistemological research approach for the flexibility it provided in research design. Human abstractions (for instance, *commitment* or *efficiency*) are difficult concepts to measure and research. It is only through the application of latent variables acting as indicators, that such concepts can be measured (O'Leary, 2010a).

The ontological focus of this research was based on idealist theory and the nature of police culture; how the norms, morals and values of that culture inculcate upon those seconded as police corruption investigators and how (if at all) they maintain a sense of allegiance toward and identification with an occupation that stigmatises their very existence. *Ontological* questions in sociology address the nature of human societies, their composition and how their components relate with each other (Taylor, 2010).

### **1.4.3 Interpretivist / Constructivist Approach**

The ideals that corruption investigators employ to help them construe their world are arguably socially constructed and are therefore highly ephemeral, altering according to context. An

interpretivist paradigmatic approach was therefore chosen for this research due to it being based on the idea that what people know and believe (their reality) is a social construction, formed as people interact with each other over time in a specific setting (LeCompte & Schensul, 1999).

*Constructivism* is one of several interpretivist paradigms and is concerned with the way that individuals construct their world. There are two major constructivist approaches. The first involves the individual and the second focuses on shared meaning and group constructions. Personal construct theory maintains that people make sense of the world on an individual basis, by personally constructing their reality (Williamson, 2006). Social constructivism places emphasis on people developing meaning from group activities, through a social construction of reality (Kelly, 1955). This research focused on both approaches to develop profiles of the police corruption investigator's world.

#### **1.4.4 Grounded Theory**

The research utilised a constructivist grounded theory approach, constructing theory as an outcome of the interpretation of the participant's stories. Grounded theory method does not start with a problem statement, but rather with an interest in the field (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). The research focus becomes clear through the use of open coding, theoretical sampling and constant comparison (Mavetera & Kroeze, 2009). The theory is emergent hence there is no requirement for a statement of problem.

Constructivist enquiry requires the adoption of a position of mutuality between researcher and participant in the research process, which necessitates a rethinking of the grounded theorist's traditional role of objective observer. The key to this approach was developing a partnership with participants to enable a mutual construction of meaning during interviews and a meaningful reconstruction of their stories into a grounded theory model.

#### **1.4.5 Ethnography**

Ethnography is both a research process and a research outcome. It explores the way of life from the perspective of the participants and avoids assessing culture from pre-existing perceptions and frames of reference, providing a cultural lens to observed behaviour. The aim of ethnography is to provide rich, holistic insights into the views and actions of cultural groups as well as the nature of the locations that they inhabit (Fetterman, 2009; Haigler, 1996).

As with all interpretivist research, ethnography is flexible in terms of research design. Ethnographic research design tends to be non-linear and iterative. Culture is the broadest



ethnographic concept and according to the “cognitive approach” culture comprises ideas, beliefs and knowledge that comprise a particular group (Fetterman, 2009, p. 545; Haigler, 1996). For the researcher, learning occurs through systematic observations and interviewing in the field.

In adopting an ethnographic approach to this research, the goal was not to “seek the truth” but to see things the way that the corruption investigators do, including how they apply meaning and make sense of the world around them. This ability to interpret meaning from within the culture and reflect upon the “lived” conversations, observations and experiences of its members provided the ideal opportunity to understand the world of the police corruption investigator from the participant’s perspective, through in depth interviewing and through delving beyond the “what is” to “why it is” (Fetterman, 2009; LeCompte & Schensul, 1999, pp. 1-10; Pearse & Kanyangale, 2009, p. 543).

Rather than an external reality that constructs and constrains individuals, the corruption investigators culture reflects an “emergent reality” in a continuous state of construction and reconstruction (Bryman, 2008, p. 20; Fine & Weis, 2005). That’s not to say that their inherent police cultural socialisation does not continue to influence them, rather that it is a reality that persists and antedates their participation within the integrity agencies, albeit with the potential to shape current perspectives.

It is important to make a distinction between *ethnographic (contextual) interviewing* (which was undertaken for this research) and *long-term ethnographic engagement*. They both involve observing and interviewing participants in their natural environment; however, they provide different types of data and have different strengths. The main weaknesses of true (long-term) ethnography are the high cost and schedule requirements, which made it inhibitive for research of this length and nature.

#### **1.4.6 Qualitative Strategy**

Qualitative research rejects practices of natural science (positivism) in preference for emphasis on individual interpretations (interpretivism). The objective is to uncover what is a “knowable truth” (Bryman, 2008; Kervin et al., 2006, p. 78).

Qualitative analysis typically implies an emphasis on process and meaning, that is not experimentally examined and if measured at all, measurement is in terms of “the value laden nature of inquiry” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 10). It emphasises an inductive approach with

an emphasis on generation of theory. It relies on unstructured interviewing as a primary strategy to capture “deep meaning” of experience in the participants words, and therefore provided an ideal platform for this research (Bryman, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Maxwell, 2009).

#### **1.4.7 Narrative Inquiry**

Narrative inquiry is a method that uses stories to understand the world of research subjects. It is an interpretivist, qualitative method that involves focusing on the meanings that subjects ascribe to their life and experiences. Narrative inquirers vary to the extent that they are present in the writing. Their voices can be authoritative, supportive or interactive (Trahar, 2009). Through an interactive approach, the researcher adopts a refracted medium to examine the narratives, including the subject’s positions, social locations, interpretations, and personal experiences. It is this voice that I chose to employ for this research.

### **1.5 Significance of the Research**

Marshall and Rossman (2011, p. 71) maintain that research questions should be linked to problem and significance and that the four areas of significance are “knowledge, policy, research and action.” The expected significant outcomes of this study therefore included:

- Significance for knowledge: contribution to filling gaps in existing bodies of knowledge on the implications of using former or seconded police officers in civil review anti-corruption agency investigatory roles;
- Significance for policy: outcomes for consideration by government and anti-corruption agencies that can constructively inform policy governing the use of former or seconded police officers in a civil review police corruption investigatory context;
- Significance for research: generation of original qualitative data derived from field observations and interviews in each respective domain of research interrogation, and;
- Significance for action: illumination of lived experience by providing rich description of the work life, trials and tribulations of civil review agency police corruption investigators.

## **1.6 Theoretical Orientations**

The research was framed by two major theories relevant to the research questions. Their notions were built upon within the research tools and used in conjunction with research methods to meet the research aims and objectives as summarised in this chapter. Those theories are:

1. Dirty Work, and;
2. Organisational Culture Theory.

### **1.6.1 Dirty Work**

Dirty work is defined as work that is perceived as “physically, socially or morally tainted” (Hughes, 1958, p. 122). Despite these taints, individuals seek to normalise their work in a given context through a process in which “the extraordinary is rendered seemingly ordinary” (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; 2002, p. 217; Ashforth, Kreiner, Clark, & Fugate, 2007).

Dirtiness is a social construct, imputed by people based on subjective standards. The nature of dirty work is that it exists as a symbol of degradation, physically disgusting, that wounds one’s dignity. Low pay and tediousness are not sufficient to justify a dirty work classification. Dirty work deals directly with polluting elements of social life, garbage, criminals, dirt, noxious and dangerous conditions.

Social systems are hierarchal and imply an unequitable power and status distribution. Without social privilege, there is no taint. This has a serious impact upon occupational identity on a daily basis, as dirty workers negotiate tainted identities derived from the broader social discourse relating to their occupation (Mills, Drew, & Gassaway, 2007; Sotirin, 2007);

Typically, although not always, attributions of dirtiness arise not because of the organizational membership or personal characteristics of individuals but because of their occupational membership (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 419).

### **1.6.2 Organisational Culture Theory**

Although the concept of organisational culture is subject to many differing views and opinions, it is normally defined by how people behave within a specific social context. It is generally agreed that any group with a shared history or perspective can be said to have its own culture, and that within that culture many sub-cultures may exist (O’Leary, 2010b).

As a basic social process, cultural development is based on creating meaning and action around everyday activities. Schein (1996, p. 10) defines culture as patterns of basic assumption which

are discovered, developed and adopted by social groups who externally adapt or internally integrate behaviours and solutions considered valid to the group, providing a way to perceive, think and feel about problems and issues. He maintains that there are three levels at which culture manifests. These are:

- 1) Observable artefacts;
- 2) Values, and;
- 3) Basic underlying assumptions.

Artefacts relate to what can be observed, felt or experienced upon entering a culture including manner, dress, routine, tradition, emotional intensity and other related phenomena.

Schein theorises that once a group comes to adopt common values and assumptions, this precipitates automatic programmed patterns of behaviour that provide security and stability to members of the group, as they are better able to predict events occurring around them and communicate this shared learning amongst culture participants.

For the researcher, once these assumptions are understood it enables appreciation and understanding of the behavioural and artifactual phenomenon observed. The objective of my research was to bring these assumptions to the surface through interactive insider knowledge, identified and highlighted through informal interviewing.

## **1.7 Overall Approach and Rationale**

Two issues drove the selection of the research design and methodology for this study. The first of these was the methodological recommendations from the review of the extant literature. The second contributor to the selection of research methodology came from research methods theory.

### **1.7.1 Literature Review**

The research commenced with an extensive review of the literature on police culture, police corruption, police corruption investigation, organisational culture and dirty work. It included discipline based reference materials, subject specific books and journal articles, grey literature (conference papers, unpublished research), newspapers, official publications, statistics and archives. The purpose of this review was to gather and review published material to gain a level of topical and methodological knowledge and expertise about the concepts under examination

and to identify potential gaps in the literature, which may assist with potential lines of research (literature is reviewed in Chapters 2, 3 & 4 of this thesis).

A qualitative research, grounded theory methodology was strongly recommended by the literature (Table 1). The interpretive/constructivist approach presented the best opportunity to develop theory through analysis of the meaning investigators confer upon their own actions and experiences, and the actions and experiences of others.

### **1.7.2 Research Methods Theory**

Theory can assist in the selection of research methods, organisation of data, as well as illuminating the findings of the research. It provides direction, purpose and justification for the research, as well as informing methodical decision (Maxwell, 2009, p. 224). This research adopted an *ethnographic interviewing approach* to explore the way of life from the perspective of the police corruption investigators and avoid assessing their culture from pre-existing perceptions and frames of reference. As with all interpretivist research methods, ethnographic interviewing is flexible in terms of data collection.

The focus was on what makes the investigators *tick*, how they behave and define their world, what is important to them, what they say and do, and the structural or contextual features influencing their thoughts, behaviours and relationships. This research used all of the following criteria as defining categories for the coding of the gathered data:

Beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, emotions, verbal and nonverbal means of communication; social networks; behaviour of group of individuals with friends, family, associates, fellow workers and colleagues; use of tools; technology and manufacture of materials and artefacts; and patterned use of space and time (LeCompte & Schensul, 1999, p. 4).

Understanding of the culture was generated through an emic perspective (involving analysis of cultural phenomena from the perspective of one who participates in the culture), with an emphasis on allowing meaning to emerge from the interviews. The interviews provided targeted data collection by asking semi-structured, but open-ended questions, with the emphasis on allowing the participants being interviewed to answer without restriction by pre-defined choices, providing a clear differentiation between this qualitative approach from more quantitative approaches. Each of the interview questions were chosen to align with one of the research sub-questions and objectives of the research, thereby providing a mechanism for

comparative analysis of responses and a foundation for coding upon which analysis could be based (refer Appendix A).

Table 1: Comparative Research Methods

Study	Focus	Methodology	Analysis	Sample	
(Ashforth et al., 2007)	The management of “dirty work” <sup>3</sup> occupations	Ethnography	Constant Comparative Method (Grounded Theory)	Semi structured depth interviews	54
(Pogrebin & Poole, 1988)	The strategic use of humor in police agencies	Ethnography	Qualitative (construct)	Observation / diaries, daily logs, informal interviews	83
(Gioia, Price, Hamilton, & Thomas, 2010)	Organisational identity formation within a State University.	Ethnography	Constant Comparative Method (Grounded Theory)	Semi structured interviews / archival data/ journals/ observation	33
(Stenross & Kleinman, 1989) <sup>4</sup>	Police detectives management of emotional labor	Ethnography	Constant Comparative Method (Grounded Theory)	Semi structured depth interviews	15
(Heinsler, Kleinman, & Stenross, 1990)	Comparing low status occupations / Detectives and University Campus police	Ethnography	Constant Comparative Method (Grounded Theory)	Semi structured depth interviews / observation	32

<sup>3</sup> Dirty work is defined as work that is ‘physically, socially or morally tainted’ (Hughes, 1958).

<sup>4</sup> The study suggested that a ‘qualitative’ inductive approach is especially useful for understanding workers alienation and job satisfaction

## **1.8 Data Collection**

### **1.8.1 Pilot Interviews**

In addition to a concurrent substantive literature review, the research also commenced with a series of unstructured interviews with key informants drawn from the social milieu under investigation. These informants were identified through their knowledge and experience in police corruption investigation and their attachment to the specific communities being researched. These interviews were used as a pilot to explore the main domains of the study prior to the commencement of the more formalised interviews.

This process provided a preliminary insight into the world of the police corruption investigators and enabled me to refine my research tools and ensure their efficiency in gathering the type of data required. This technique also provided the flexibility to adjust or add questions to encompass new perspectives.

### **1.8.2 Semi Structured Interviewing**

The interview technique utilised open-ended, semi-structured questions. The semi-structured interview format provided directionality and agenda for the interview instruments and was used to obtain focused qualitative data (refer Appendix A). The interview process was used as a dynamic method for exploring delineating factors and sub-factors related to the research (identified because they appear repeatedly in the data). The interviews were also used to further clarify or confirm the validity of central domains and factors within the formative analytical models, link variables within and across domains, and ultimately, provide a conceptual taxonomy of domains, factor variables and attributes to establish a coding system for the research.

With the permission of the interviewees, the interviews were all digitally recorded and transcribed. If upon analysis of initial fieldwork interviews, specific areas, subjects or topics were assessed as not having sufficient coverage, or lines of inquiry or investigation emerged that had not been sufficiently explored, revision was made for subsequent interviews to ensure topic coverage.

I endeavoured to exclude specific sensitive topics that may have been of a confidential nature, such as current corruption investigations. I specifically stated and made it clear to participants that no current, secret or operational information was to be divulged during the interviews, and this was included in the *Participant Information Package*, distributed prior to the interviews.

Despite my pre-caution, where data was revealed that may have had the potential to identify particular cases or individuals, I used a strategy of merging cases and identities in my reporting, for instance, reporting one participant's narrative as four different people.

## **1.9 Population and Sampling Strategies**

### **1.9.1 Population**

Police who investigate police may work in an internal police department or a civilian review body. It is acknowledged that there is also a third type of investigator of police, that is, a civilian investigator (one without a police background) who work in civilian review bodies and/or anti-corruption agencies. Civilian investigators have been subject of research by Smith (2013).

This research, however, focused upon interviewing Australian police corruption investigators, more specifically, *current and former police officers* attached to civil review anti-corruption agencies. It is acknowledged that this represents a subset of the total population of police corruption investigators in that it focuses on personnel with police backgrounds rather than non-police backgrounds.

All research participants were autonomous persons, capable of deliberation and of acting under the direction of such deliberation. These judgments were periodically re-evaluated through the course of the research to ensure that participants entered into the research voluntarily and with adequate information, and did not do so under some pre-ordained obligation or at the direction of their agencies.

As a guide, the literature recommended at least 20-50 participants for descriptive exploratory research (Kervin et al., 2006, p. 106; See also Table 1). I was ultimately able to secure 29 interviews with civil review agency police corruption investigators, comprising participants of mixed gender, age and ethnicity, spread across most Australian States and Territories.

The relatively small sample size (29 participants) negates notions of analytical significance, as well as generalisation of findings from this research. The same results in a larger data set might provide clearer interpretation of findings, however in stating this, the findings were never intended to be definitive and the intentions of the research was always exploratory. The research modality focused on developing the thick, descriptive, and local characteristics of the research setting.



One of the risks involved with recruitment of police corruption investigators through formally approaching specific anti-corruption agencies was that research participants may be influenced in their choice of whether to participate or not, for instance, by organisational pressure to participate in the research. Irrespective, the agencies were informed of the research, and approached to nominate individuals interested in participating. One agency in particular had its own ethics processes that had to be satisfied before they would give me access to their investigators.

To avoid undue influence (as much as it was possible) a snowball sampling strategy was employed where volunteers for interview were asked to nominate additional officers who they felt could contribute to the study, and who met the criteria specifications for study participants. As an informal means of reaching a target population, this method provided the advantage of a route to the required respondent population through relatively authoritative networks, which would otherwise remain hidden and difficult to locate. Communication with research participants was via email in the first instance, with subsequent follow up phone calls.

With one exception (telephone interview), all interviews took place at the participant's place of employment. The interview locations were selected according to the provision of an adequate level of privacy and to what was most convenient for the participant and his or her employer, thereby minimising (as far as possible) the risk of participant or employer inconvenience or expenditure of time.

### **1.9.2 Ethical Considerations**

Ethics approval was granted (reference HE11/475) and all conditions were complied with throughout the duration of this research. The interviews were conducted with due concern for the ethical standards that guide research procedures at the University of Wollongong. There were three major ethical considerations that served as a guide for this study:

1. Respect for Persons: this divides into two separate moral requirements; the acknowledgement of autonomy and the protection of those with diminished autonomy.
2. Beneficence: Persons are treated in an ethical manner not only by respecting their decisions and protecting them from harm, but also by making efforts to secure their well-being.

3. Justice: This involves who receive the benefits of research and who bears its burden. An injustice occurs when some benefit to which a person is entitled is denied or when some burden is imposed unduly.

Participants were informed about the extent to which confidentiality of their data would be maintained during all phases of the study, including who would have access to the data, what security measures would be used, and where the data would be stored. No pressure or inducement of any kind was applied to encourage any individual to become a participant. This element of informed consent ensured (as far as possible) conditions free of coercion and undue influence.

### **1.10 Data Analysis Procedure**

In the context of ethnography, “thick descriptions” refer to the attempt to discover underlying frameworks that both produce and promote behaviour and meaning and uncover cultural and normative patterns. Denzin (1989, p. 33) defines thick description as having the following features:

- (1) It gives the context of an act; (2) it states the intentions and meanings that organize the action; (3) it traces the evolution and development of the act; (4) it presents the action as a text that can then be interpreted. A thin description simply reports facts, independent of intentions or the circumstances that surround an action.

A number of thick description prescriptions were drawn from the literature, that were of value for the coding and analysis of the data. Those prescriptions were;

- Peer group structures (Reuss-Ianni, 1984, pp. 8-9);
- Use of titles (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 417);
- Symbols of tradition (Scott & Tracy, 2007, pp. 67-75);
- Use of artefacts (Mills & Schejbal, 2007, pp. 127-130);
- Protocol and ceremony (Niederhoffer, 1969, p. 45);
- Internalised stereotypes (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 417);
- Unwritten rules, codes and scripts (Stevens, 2005, p. 3);
- Strategic use of humour (Drew, 2007, p. 18), and;
- Rituals and taboos (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 427).

Data analysis involved coding qualitative data through the Nvivo computer program, as follows (Williamson, 2006, p. 88):

1. Transcribing the data into printed form.
2. Reading the data, making notes or memos about key points.
3. Categorising or coding passages of data according to content so that identically labelled or coded data can be retrieved as needed.
4. Conceptually organising the categories. This involved thinking about the similarities, differences, and relationships among the categories and representing this pictorially in a link chart.
5. Developing themes in preparation for the writing up of the research findings.


### **1.11 Coding**

The research used two complimentary methods to manage and analyse the qualitative data gathered. The framework approach is a method by which the aims and objectives of the research are highly focused and the researcher works with structured topic guides to elicit and manage data. This contrasts with the grounded theory approach, which is entirely inductive and develops in response to the data obtained and ongoing analysis (Smith & Firth, 2011). This research utilised a combination of the framework and grounded approaches. This process is depicted in Figure 1.

Strauss and Corbin (1990) identified two types of coding: Open Coding, where coding labels and phrases are identified in the transcript of text; and Axial Coding, where themes and categories are created by grouping codes or labels given to words and phrases. In this research, open coding was conducted by assigning a code or label to identify a particular segment of the narrative. Some themes and codes were also adopted from the extent literature. Once all the data narratives had been segmented, the initial coding process was complete.

The next step was to find relationships between the codes and labels and group them into themes or categories. This was the *Axial Coding* process. These themes or categories were identified through their propensity to answer the questions subject of the research. Sometimes, I found that several codes grouped together because of their common characteristics or types. These codes were subsequently put into a group of their own forming their own sub-code.

Figure 1: Combined Grounded Theory and Framework Analysis Method



In this way, a hierarchal arrangement of codes was established in a tree like organisation. Ideally, codes in the tree relate to their parents in some way. In this way, the research themes/categories were developed as well as codes and sub codes. An example of my hierarchal coding taken from this research is show in Table 2.

Table 2: Hierarchal Coding (example)

Theme	Category	Codes	Sub Codes
Normalisation Challenges	Relationships	Family	Affection
		Police	Contempt
		Media	Fear/Tension
		Private Life	Defensive

## **1.12 Research Weaknesses**

### **1.12.1 The Observer Effect**

A major weakness for contextual interviewing ethnography is the tendency of participants to alter their behaviour in response to knowledge of their being observed or recorded, sometimes called the '*Observer Effect*' (Hoey, 2009; Madrigal, 2011).

In order to manage this I tried to corroborate participant responses through asking the same question in different ways. I was also alert to respondent attempts to provide answers that they thought I wanted to hear rather than what they actually thought or felt; as well as politically correct responses which may have been motivated by organisational or occupational pressures.

This type of interviewing is far from perfect however. Ethnographic interviewing is subject to the same weaknesses as many other forms of self-report research, in that participants may distort, overlook and not remember important detail. In addition, whilst providing an exploratory platform, ethnographic (contextual) interviewing may not provide the *objective in depth* understanding of participants that full ethnography may.

### **1.12.2 Researcher Bias**

When conducting research one must account for inherent bias. Research bias takes the form of silent subterfuge in the research and methods of collecting data, and may result in the researcher unwittingly attempting to influence outcomes. As a former police officer interviewing other former police officers, I was overtly aware of the potential for bias, however I could not assume that awareness of bias could ultimately prevent it. Even if the research is entirely altruistic, the presence of bias is often not avoidable and indeed inherent to certain research designs.

The objective in my case was not necessarily to eliminate all types of bias, because this would be almost impossible to achieve, but rather to be aware of the potential for such bias, its impact on research outcomes and the risk of misinterpretation of data under certain circumstances.

### **1.12.3 Generalised Findings**

The research was focused on developing the thick, descriptive and local characteristics of the research setting, which in this case is the environment and practices of police corruption investigators attached to civil review anti-corruption agencies. With a sample as small as used in this research, I clearly could not draw generalised conclusions around the findings in any broader sense.

#### **1.12.4 Definitive Answers**

A major limitation associated with this type of exploratory research is that it is unlikely to result in detailed, definitive answers to research questions. Instead, *exploratory research* is likely to provide hints and insights to what might be occurring. Such was the nature of this research. Given the finite population sampled, it was unlikely that definitive and generalised outcomes or findings would be achieved. Instead, the research provided insight and familiarity with the world of the civil review agency, police corruption investigators not previously achieved. This defines the research significance.

#### **1.13 Conclusion**

This chapter set out the foundations and methodology for the research. It commenced by presenting a background to the study. The research question and sub-questions were outlined and the research methodology was presented. It described the rationale for selecting an interpretivist/constructivist approach to qualitative, ethnographic narrative inquiry. The chapter also described the significance of the research, theoretical orientations, data collection and population sampling strategies, data analysis procedures and research weaknesses.

Chapter 2 will continue with a detailed review of the literature that exists in relation to organisational and police culture. Embedded in traditions and history, police culture arguably imparts a permanence of character, which critics of “police investigating police” embrace. After all, “Is it possible for police to provide fair and effective investigation of themselves?” (RCMP, 2009b, p. 8).

## CHAPTER TWO – ORGANISATIONAL AND POLICE CULTURE

“Culture and corruption,” echoed Dorian. “I have known something of both. It seems terrible to me now that they should ever be found together.”

Oscar Wilde (*The Picture of Dorian Gray*)<sup>5</sup>

### 2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I provided an overview of this thesis and introduced the background and the rationale for my research question;

*What are the underlying frameworks (values, norms, symbols, beliefs, practices) that civil review agency, police corruption investigators with a police background use to interpret and respond to the inherent cultural, structural, situational, debilitating or compromising occupational issues they face?*

In this chapter, I begin an exploration of the literature pertaining to my research question, specifically, the themes of organisational and police culture.

Cultures carry the values, meanings, behaviours and predispositions of the actors who participate in them (Christensen & Crank, 2001). Therefore, the concept of occupational alignment implies by inference, that police culture engenders some level of permanence of character, which resonate as behavioural patterns accorded internalised shared values. An understanding of organisational culture is necessary to provide insight into the dynamics of organisations generally and provide confidence that assumptions made of police culture will be congruent with notions of permanence. In addition, an examination of police culture becomes important in identifying the influence of cultural conditioning on civil review police corruption investigators, including cultural values, norms, beliefs, practices, attitudes and behaviours.

Although the concept of organisational culture is subject to many differing views and opinions, it is generally defined by how people behave within a specific social context. Any group with a shared history or perspective can be said to have its own culture and within that culture, many sub-cultures may exist (O'Leary, 2010b). As a basic social process, cultural development is based on creating meaning and action around everyday activities. Culture is defined by deep phenomenon which is under constant construction and manifests itself at different levels of an

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<sup>5</sup> The Picture of Dorian Gray is the only published novel by Oscar Wilde, appearing as the lead story in *Lippincott's Monthly Magazine* on 20 June 1890, printed in the July 1890 issue of this magazine.

organisation or social group (Goulding, 1998; Schein, 1990). Schein (1996) defines culture as patterns of basic assumption which are discovered, developed and adopted by social groups who externally adapt or internally integrate behaviours and solutions considered valid to the group, providing a way to perceive, think and feel about problems and issues.

Generally policing has presented itself as an insular and protective occupation with a strong organisational culture. It is theorised that this culture is designed to shield officers and agencies from external criticism and to rationalise and defend police behaviour. It is generally accepted that police culture has the potential to inhibit or prevent fair and impartial corruption investigation by police, resulting from civilian complaints (Bennett & Corrigan, 1980; More, 1985). This becomes a critical issue when it is considered that most anti-corruption agencies in Australia utilise seconded or former police officers to conduct their investigations (Lewis & Prenzler, 2008).

Whilst the utilisation of seconded or former police officers brings experience and skills to investigations not normally afforded through civilian resourcing, some believe that these officers may be influenced by shared occupational culture and values that delimit the outcomes of their investigations. Prenzler's adoption of "capture theory" is derived from just this type of scenario and attempts to explain how police may influence and capture the civilian review agencies that are tasked with investigating them (Prenzler, 2000, p. 659). As a result, there is a consistent theme in the literature that the use of seconded or former police officers in investigating police corruption should be limited or avoided for fear of "occupational alignment" (Goldsmith, 1996, p. 38; Prenzler & Ronken, 2003).

## **2.2 Organisational Culture**

Organisational culture comprises basic processes, which create meaning and action, and which are intuitively logical and largely conceived as a group level phenomenon. It defines how people behave within an individual and social context (Goulding, 1998; Pearse & Kanyangale, 2009).

The popular use of the term *organisational culture* has led to it being applied to everything from football teams to corporations, though there is little agreement regarding a definition. There is, however, some consensus on its characteristics. Organisational culture is said to be (Gottschalk, 2007; Schein, 1990; Shanahan, 2000):



1. Holistic;
2. Embedded in traditions and history;
3. Socially constructed upon a pattern of basic assumptions;
4. Copes with problems of external adaptation and internal integration;
5. Works well enough to be considered valid, and;
6. Taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel about problems.

Some conceptualisations of organisational culture assume that its manifestation is at various levels. According to Schein (1984) some levels of culture are unconscious, in that those that operate within the culture fail to recognise cultural characteristics, having taken them for granted. Whilst more superficial aspects of organisational culture lend themselves to quantitative research design, deeper cultural aspects are more accessible through qualitative research methods such as grounded theory (Pearse & Kanyangale, 2009).

### **2.2.1 Cultural Capacity**

The capacity of organisations is said to exist at three levels (UNDP, 2009, p. 15):

- The enabling environment;
- The organisational level, and;
- The individual level.

The enabling environment refers to the broader system in which individuals and organisations operate. It includes policies, rules, norms, values, governing mandates, priorities, modes of operation and civic engagement. It is the rules of the game, for interaction between and among organisations.

The organisational level comprises the policies, arrangements, procedures and frameworks that allow the organisation to deliver on its mandate, and that enable the individual alignment of personnel capacities to work together to achieve goals.

The individual capacity of an organisation reflects the skills, experience and knowledge that are vested in people. Some of these are acquired through formal training and education whilst others are learnt through on-the-job application and experience. These capacities are both created and influenced by the culture of organisations. Whilst individuals bring some contribution to the formation of culture within such an environment, they themselves are a product of their histories, experience, biases and perceptions formed during and across their working lives.

### **2.2.2 Socialisation**

Human beings are socialised into the values of a society, the major variable being the degree and efficacy of socialisation. This process is often self-fulfilling, with the new identities and kinships they develop reinforcing notions of themselves (Young, 1981). In essence socialisation represents a process of identity transformation (McIvor, 2004). Gosling and Taylor (2010, p. 29) identify three levels of socialisation:

- Primary level, which includes family values;
- Secondary level, which includes schools and adulthood socialisation; and,
- Tertiary level where we are socialised into ethnic, gender and working identities.

### **2.2.3 Essentialism**

Essentialism is effectively the view that within any particular culture, there is a set of characteristics that are universally consistent to all members of that group and not dependant on context. Described as “invariable presence” it is a generalisation that has somewhat been discredited in policing research, however Brooker (2002, p. 89) argues that essentialism remains a useful tool of comparison and analysis, where the adoption of essentialist identities can facilitate a self-image of cultural competence and address fears of subjection or loss of identity. This is particularly important when examining how closely police corruption investigators identify with aspects of (what is popularly termed) monolithic police culture. Loss of identity in the transition from police officer to police corruption investigator was a critical focus of inquiry for this research.

### **2.2.4 Cultural Competence**

It is argued that when groups first form, there are usually dominant figures or founders, whose own beliefs, assumptions and values provide a model for how the group should behave, adapt, structure and function (Schein, 1990). Schein maintains that once an occupational group has learned to share cultural perceptions and attitudes then it becomes far easier for the individual to interpret meaning from implicit behavioural and artifactual phenomenon that is observed. These automatic patterns of thinking, feeling and behaving provide comfort, support and stability for the individual in trying to predict and understand the events going on around them in their work environment. The anxiety that results from the inability to understand is therefore reduced.

As the group adopts these assumptions, these beliefs and values form the basis for a level of cultural competence, which ensures the individuals ongoing participation and status within the group and may also provide the opportunity for groups to look for new members that are a good cultural fit; that is, they already have the right assumptions, beliefs and values (Jaskyte & Dressler, 2004; Pearse & Kanyangale, 2009).

To some degree, there is always constant pressure on any given culture to progress and evolve. However, just as with groups, individuals do not easily give up their identity and defence mechanisms (Schein, 1990). One particular focus of this research was an examination of why police corruption investigators chose to walk away from these cultural support systems. They seek out careers in occupations obviously stigmatised by the culture into which they have been socialised; if indeed they *ever were* accepted as culturally competent by that occupation (a theme which will be discussed further in the findings of this thesis).

It was through focused questioning involving motivated participants in intensive self-analysis that I sought to seek out and decipher underlying and (usually) unconscious assumptions to determine thought processes, feelings and behaviour, which might indicate elements of police cultural alignment.

### **2.2.5 Cultural Stability**

In policing, the basis for cultural competence is experiential, with choices made on what is competent according to situational context (Fielding, 1988; Manning, 1977). These practices, rules, principles and behaviours are said to link the modes of seeing, doing and believing (Bailey, 1995). The result is that police culture emerges as an immediate and shared reactive adaptation to a police officer's occupational environment (Christensen & Crank, 2001). The police occupational culture is always in construction, with an understanding of the present reflecting past perceptions and realities. Police culture can only ever be temporarily stable due to the dynamic nature of the work environment that forms its character.

Manning (1974) reflects on this dynamism in observing that policing organisations do not possess a common culture, but rather an elaborate, segmented and specialised hierarchal structure designed to maintain secret knowledge and organisational stratification. Whilst this may be more a commentary on the nature of police bureaucracy than police culture, it supports the idea that within any definable police structure there can be many sub-cultures, a theme that will be further developed later in this thesis.

The strength and stability of a culture is a function of the stability of the group, the length of time the group has existed, the intensity of the groups learning experiences, the mechanisms by which learning has taken place and the clarity of the assumptions held by the leaders of the group (Schein, 1990).

### **2.2.6 Norms**

A norm is something that affects the way an individual behaves, and how they see the world. Cultural norms become internalised through socialisation and become part of a person's identity and a source of morality. Where cultural affinity is strong, these norms constrain individuals and control patterns of behaviour through a sociological process known as structural functioning (Dallos & Sapsford, 1981; Gosling & Taylor, 2010; Muncie & Fitzgerald, 1981; Young, 1981).

## **2.3 Organisational Identity**

One of the key tasks for this research was to explore how nascent civil review police corruption investigation units develop a collective understanding of *who we are* and their identification as social actors within the context of a civil review anti-corruption agency. External attribution defines images of an organisation and not its true identity, so it was important to dig below the surface to see how closely the police corruption investigators world resembled and reflected police culture and the police organisations they investigated (Gioia et al., 2010).

First, the cases suggest that new organizations may attempt to mimic existing organizations. Second, how new organizations present themselves to their external audiences may be critical, not only to the formation of their identities but also to their survival (Gioia et al., 2010, p. 2).

### **2.3.1 Differentiation Perspective**

It is argued that as organisations grow and evolve, a process of differentiation takes place (Pearse & Kanyangale, 2009; Schein, 1990). This differentiation evolves around functional, geographical and operational elements. As a result, organisations begin to build their own subcultures. This is a natural evolutionary mechanism and differentiation will inevitably occur with age and size. Despite this, a differentiated perspective acknowledges cultural heterogeneity and plurality, as well as the potential for conflicting sets of values (Martin, 1992).

Individuals within the subculture may have varying beliefs about aspects of their organisational world but there must be a core set of assumptions without which the organisation could not

function. Martin and Frost (2004) maintain that all organisations demonstrate aspects of integration, differentiation and fragmentation. It is therefore essential that research consider all three perspectives when trying to understand the nature of the culture. It can be hypothesised that as cultures evolve and grow these processes may even occur simultaneously. Differentiation causes the culture to branch into various kinds of subcultures thereby creating diversity, however deeper elements of the culture remain congruent with each other due to the need for human consistency (Schein, 1990).

### **2.3.2 Experiential Contrast**

This differentiation perspective is best demonstrated through an examination of experiential contrasts. This involves a process of comparing past and present experiences (Gioia et al., 2010). Experience creates patterns of cognition within individuals, and as social actors, those individuals are usually heavily influenced by their history. This influence is represented in the form of an intellectual reach linking education and experience to the needs required to survive in the new cultural environment.

Where relocation occurs, such as that experienced when moving from a police to a civil review environment, social actors no longer have access to points of reference from their previous environment to refer to. Therefore, they may need to adopt other strategies to construct different identities. In the face of ill-defined organisational structures, or ones that are emerging, social actors will often refer to what they know, which is their previous experience. This assists them to make sense of themselves as a collective and provides a point of self-reference to orient themselves to their new programs (Gioia et al., 2010).

### **2.3.3 Optimal Distinctiveness**

Social actors need reassurance when moving from one environment to another, that not all processes and activities will be unknown to them, therefore, the adoption of practices and ways of thinking from their previous organisations would not be unexpected. However, some level of distinctiveness is required to differentiate themselves from their previous organisations. For police corruption investigators, some level of transitional interdisciplinary perspective is required; however, being similar enough to those they investigate (the police) whilst building new and individual identities is the operational ideal for civil review agency, police corruption investigators. This optimal distinctiveness is required so that they can orientate themselves and others about who they were, and about who they are now trying to be.

As a result of this conundrum, there is a continuing negotiation of identity claims and ongoing attempts to seek optimal distinctiveness (Gioia et al., 2010). Therefore, the new organisation is motivated to claim an identity that is both similar and different from the organisations from which it came; a strong focus of this process is on legitimacy seeking.

In negotiating this new identity, it is critical to build a sense of community about the way the new agency goes about things, and the way police corruption investigators position themselves in their overall operating environment. This may involve debating organisational values, where members engage to decide what identity claims they would make to define themselves to each other and to outside stakeholders.

In general, our findings suggest that although members of a new organization can decide the core attributes of who they want to be, to instil a consensual acceptance of those attributes, they need to make overt claims to each other and to outsiders and have those claims legitimised. Once legitimising feedback occurs, understandings are deepened and further claims fashioned that are consistent with that deepening understanding (Gioia et al., 2010, p. 36).

#### **2.3.4 Identity, Ambiguity or Void**

Often this process will lapse, thereby creating an identity void for organisations that have not sufficiently delineated their boundaries. At the individual level this identity formation process can be defined as managing the tension between unfolding demands presented by the answers to the continuously posed questions “what do you (the organisation) want from me?”; and “what do I want to be in the future?” (Linstead & Thomas, 2002, p. 5).

Sometimes, social actors will fill the meanings void by defining “who we are not,” because they find it easier to arrive at a consensus about this. Through this act of void filling organisational members articulate facets of organisational identity and formulate claims that they can test out amongst themselves and with outsiders. This involves questioning the rationale for the existence of the organisation.

Once these broad visions and boundaries have been demarcated and after members confront the meanings void, they then need to work to make sense of their new organisation, that is, to fill the meanings void so that they can develop a sense of who they are and refine their claims as an organisation. They need to develop a vision and work to develop claims that are consistent with that vision. Part of this process is confronting ambiguity.

A meanings void is said to be triggered where a new spin-off organisation does not completely identify with a parent organisation, or where a new organisational identity has not yet been formed to replace the original (Ashforth & Mael, 1996). Negotiation of claims is likely when organisational identity is under developed or ambiguous, as is most often the case during initial identity formation.

### **2.3.5 Legitimacy**

The process of organisational identity formation involves attempts to obtain legitimacy through mimetic processes, and to construct dimensions of distinctiveness within the organisational environment, as well as developing a receptive external context for the new culture. This process is legitimised through assimilating feedback from both internal and external stakeholders.

Receiving legitimising feedback pertains to stakeholder affirmations that the organisation's actions are desirable proper or appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Gioia et al., 2010; Suchman, 1995). Organisations use such feedback to affirm identity related beliefs and this may involve aspects of employment such as job titles and salary figures, which may be considered as major legitimising signifiers. One of the goals of this research was to examine how these signifiers might be used within the context of civil review police corruption investigation units.

### **2.3.6 Organisational Theory**

In order to attract prospective employees to a job position, retain current employees and effectively motivate them to perform consistently well, organisations must understand what workers want and what motivates them. There are many factors that influence an individual's motivation and these factors can be better understood in the light of organisational theory. Organisational theory and motivational theories such as cognitive evaluation theory and reinforcement theory, contribute to our understanding of the way in which workers strive to maximise their personal job satisfaction.

Motivation can be divided into intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation, both of which are affected by potential wage and non-wage amenities trade-off by employees. Intrinsic motivation is an individual's own incentive to engage in a certain activity or behave a certain way because they have learned that it is likely to result in satisfaction and a feeling of

accomplishment. This type of motivation is irrespective of external incentives such as monetary reward.

Extrinsic motivation is using those external incentives to entice the employee to complete certain tasks in a certain way, including using negative motivators such as fear of punishment. Extrinsic motivators usually encourage basic compliance instead of creativity and innovation; however, non-monetary incentives tend to foster job satisfaction and intrinsic motivation, thereby maximising a worker's utility: "Intrinsic motivation is usually seen as more effective because the impetus to move is from within" (Hollyforde & Whiddett, 2002, p. 272).

Job design can have a significant effect on the job satisfaction of employees and consequently on the levels of motivation and performance. Herzberg et al. (1959), for example, found that intrinsic job characteristics contributed more to job satisfaction than extrinsic motivators such as wages. Non-wage amenities ultimately increase employees' utility, and this must be considered in job design in order to produce positions or roles that are meaningful and challenging: "Job design should be a continuous and progressive movement in order to satisfy people's needs for growth and learning" (Mullins, 1989, p. 345).

Some examples of these non-wage amenities which impact police corruption investigation jobs include flexible working hours; a pleasant work environment; appropriate, accurate and consistent feedback from the executive; encouragement from supervisors and peers; prestigious job titles and levels of autonomy (Hackman & Oldham, 1980).

The implications for civil review anti-corruption agencies is that they need to invest time in understanding these affects if they are to attract new staff, satisfy current employees and maximise the effectiveness of anti-corruption operations.

## **2.4 Police Culture**

### **2.4.1 Police Organisational Culture**

Culture exists as a signifying system representing a whole way of life for a society and there are two perspectives that have traditionally been used to examine culture; these being sociological and psychological perspectives (Stevens, 2005). As a concept, police organisational culture comprises all the practices, values and beliefs framed by the occupation and into which its members are socialised. This signifies systems representing a whole way of life for a group or society of police. The nature of this culture is such that it is continually



undergoing development and change and as a result, it is argued that there should be some highly visible and symbolic signs of its influence (Gosling & Taylor, 2010; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Stevens, 2005).

There is general agreement that police culture is characterised by macho attitudes, authoritarianism, racist behaviour, resistance to change, overt male chauvinism and operational exposure to difficult and dangerous situations. Surprisingly, a general theme across police cultural literature seems to be the condemnation of a broad spectrum of police characteristics, which raises the question as to whether there are any positive aspects of police culture at all? (Bjork, 2008; Fielding, 1988; Manning, 1977; Reiner, 2000; Shanahan, 2000; Skolnick, 2002; Waddington, 1999).

Policing has variously been described as a “low status” or “morally tainted” occupation (Heinsler et al., 1990, p. 236; Niederhoffer, 1969), employing methods that are deceptive, intrusive, confrontational or defy the norms of civility, employing brutal behaviour and trickery to achieve its ends (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Drew, 2007; Drew & Hulvey, 2007).

Since Westley’s (1956) seminal study describing a single police culture, much research has focused on widely shared attitudes, values, and norms that manage occupational strains created by the nature of police work and the punitive practices of police management in an organisational environment (Brown, 1998; Christensen & Crank, 2001; Fielding, 1988; Reiner, 2000; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Van Maanen, 1974).

Early studies looked upon police culture as monolithic however, later studies assisted in establishing the idea that police culture was not monolithic and indeed, identity exists within clannish multiple police cultures (Chan, 1996; Holdaway, 1980; Paoline, 2004; Westmarland, 2008; Young, 1991). Westmarland (2008, p. 263) highlights the work of Holdaway (1983) and Young (1993) both of whom conducted police ethnographies whilst still serving police officers. Whilst she maintains that these works were “clearly tainted” from their inability to step outside their own cultural world, nonetheless they enjoyed insights and unrestricted access to their target populations, resulting in their becoming “part of the scenery” in their observations and investigations of police culture. As with the earlier studies, these researchers were able to identify a number of significant characteristics of police culture, most predominantly elements of racism and sexism (gender discrimination).

Reiner (2000) is credited with developing the argument supporting non-monolithic police culture. Irrespective, he maintained that even if police culture does exist in multiple forms, those forms could still maintain resemblance through shared values, norms, perspectives and craft rules, which lead to the maintenance and durability of cultural identities. His summary of the main police cultural characteristics has become an accepted standard in the literature on police culture. The main effect of these recognitions are that police activity and culture is now researched and analysed more fully, resulting in the broader identification of police cultural characteristics (Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Westmarland, 2008).

The offerings of closed institutions that value organisational secrecy and demonstrate tribal cultural behaviour have provided an irresistible challenge for social researchers. A major focus for this interest has been the police reform approach and the idea of controlling unwanted behaviour (Chan, 1996; Skogan, 2008). This focus has been further fuelled by media (and resultant public perception) painting policing as a morally tainted occupation of simple or dubious virtue, where workers are thought to employ methods that are deceptive, intrusive confrontational or which defy norms of civility (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999).

Policing promotes universal and persistent cultural characteristics across constituents that might be transmitted through socialisation, shared values, norms, perspectives and craft rules (Banton, 1964; Skolnick, 2008; Westmarland, 2008). It is within this framework that the role of civil review agency police corruption investigators was examined, with particular emphasis on how police culture and cultural conditioning affects occupational identity, practices, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. One objective was to assess how and if police corruption investigators are influenced by police culture, and if so, to examine the nature of, and determinedness of, that influence.

#### **2.4.2 Canteen Culture**

Whilst there may be differences between what police think and what they do, and whilst the existence of police sub-culture is acknowledged, it does not explain the reasons for the development of sexist or racist attitudes and beliefs in the first place. Waddington (1999, pp. 286-309) describes “canteen culture” as an oral tradition, not meant for public view, which operates as a rhetorical device to pass on knowledge and to assist in bonding. Talking and acting tough is part of the “cult of masculinity” which pervades policing and which is seen as a means for neutralising moral dilemmas and providing ideological justification for the authority that is

exercised. For Waddington, rather than being deviant, this type of behaviour represents “main stream functional elements of police life” which are not in need of reform.

Chan (1996, p. 112) however, argues that “canteen culture” as a concept has been poorly defined and holds little analytical value. She sees police culture as a major obstacle to reform and highlights four major criticisms. The first is that despite its claims of being non-monolithic, police culture is often described as a single culture, or a “street cop” culture. Her second criticism is that the idea of canteen culture implies that police are impassive learners in the socialisation process. Her third criticism relates to the apparent insularity of the culture from the “social, political, legal and organisational context of policing.” Finally, she criticises what she sees as the all-powerful, isolated, homogenous and deterministic conception of police culture, which protects the culture from its external environment and leaves little room or scope for reform.

It is argued that the influences of police culture can operate almost invisibly at a sub-cultural level, and this may well be the case with police corruption investigators. However, because sub-culture is continually undergoing development and change, it was considered that there ought to be some highly visible and symbolic signs of police characteristics and cultural influence (amongst corruption investigators) that could be detected during this research.

### **2.4.3 Police Cultural Characteristics**

Michael Banton (1964) is widely attributed with being the first to recognise police culture as a non-monolithic phenomenon as well as raising the issues of prejudice and discrimination within the context of police power and discretion. Similar to Banton, Jerome Skolnick (1966) focused his research on police attitudes and behaviours toward different types, classes and ethnicities. Skolnick identified the police as players in a game, where they are on opposing sides to those that would cause harm to society. He described the police as craft workers and maintained that there are distinct cognitive tendencies that exist within policing as an occupation. Not the least of these is the triplicates of exposure to danger, deference to authority and the need for efficiency. These tendencies lead to suspiciousness and social isolation from (so-called) normal people (the conventional citizenry), who are viewed as potential sources of threat or compromise. Skolnick maintained that this aspect of police culture is reflected and reinforced in each daily encounter. These early studies assisted in establishing the idea that police culture was not monolithic and indeed, identity exists within clannish multiple police cultures (Westmarland, 2008).

A definitive list of police cultural characteristics has yet to be agreed upon and the issue is possibly unresolvable because of the interpretation applied as a co-product of the observed and the predispositions of the observer (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Manning, 1989); however, there is strong support for the idea of police culture having “universal, stable and lasting features” (Skolnick, 2008, p. 35).

In reviewing the literature on police culture, this research identified (at least) fourteen common characteristics relating to police organisational culture:

1. Loyalty (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010);
2. Camaraderie (Crank, 1998)
3. Cynicism (Stevens, 2005);
4. Regulatory disdain (Manning, 1978);
5. Idealism (McClurg, 1998);
6. Mistrust (Reuss-Ianni, 1984);
7. Sexism (Harr, 2005);
8. Para-military (Harr, 2005);
9. Perseverance (Bjork, 2008);
10. Reflexive decision making (Giddens, 1976);
11. Violence and maintenance of respect (Wesley, 1970)
12. Resistant to change (Chan, 1997);
13. Secretive (Reuss-Ianni, 1984), and;
14. Strategic use of humour (Pogrebin & Poole, 1988).

These characteristics, along with elements of danger, power and authority cause police to draw upon distinct cognitive tendencies in developing “a set of adaptive rules, recipes, rhetoric and rites”, the central meaning of which is the exercise of force as a symbol of authority and power (Kelly, 1955, p. 88). Reiner’s (2000, pp. 118-131) summary of the main police cultural characteristics has become an accepted standard in the literature on police culture. He espoused seven major characteristics of that culture:

1. A sense of mission;
2. Suspicion;
3. Isolation / solidarity;
4. Conservatism;
5. Machismo;

6. Pragmatism, and;
7. Racial Prejudice.

Reiner maintains that through this culture police reflect and perpetuate the power differentials that exist within social structures, maintaining that the central meaning for many police officers is the exercise of force as a symbol of authority and power.

The major characteristics of police culture identified in this research are summarised and discussed in the following sections:

*a) A Sense of Mission*

An exaggerated sense of mission, where policing is conceived as protecting the weak and preserving a valued way of life, has long been a feature of police culture (Loftus, 2010; Reiner, 2000). The police picture themselves as a thin blue line between law and anarchy; organisation and chaos. This perception of shared threat helps foster police group cohesion and an “us vs. them” mentality (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010, p. 209). Organisational features such as command hierarchy, explicit rule systems and complex divisions of specialisation (which are all features of paramilitary organisations) may also foster these attitudes, through promoting a sense of mission amongst members (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). They serve as symbolic controls over behaviour that ensures social distance from outsiders. These attitudes are promoted by a sense that those outside the policing profession cannot assist the police in performing their duties, and even if did try to assist, they would not be of any real help (Paoline, 2004).

The situation is compounded by police socialisation, which ensures that individual officers develop appropriate responses to emotional cues. In a study by Pogrebin and Poole (1991), 332 police officers were targeted initially with self-administered questionnaires which probed the most tragic experiences in the respondent’s working lives. The police expressed the belief that there was a public expectation for them to be brave and fearless in the face of tragic events and to be able to handle their own emotions in a detached and objective manner. These standards that the police set themselves are described as “severe and uncompromising” and reflect what the police officers saw as their mission; that is, to suppress emotions both from the public and from their fellow officers whilst maintaining the thin blue line (Pogrebin & Poole, 1991, p. 397).

b) *Suspicion*

The nature of suspiciousness relates to cognition of mistrust. It is a condition in which one person maintains doubts about another, or believes another person to be responsible for some wrongdoing or crime, but without the necessary proof to make a positive case. The term *reasonable suspicion* is common in legislative vernacular and has a common usage in police training and socialisation. Therefore, there is a degree of suspicion that is inherent in the working personalities of police officers that encourages critical evaluation of the information provided to them.

Skolnick (2008, p. 36) attributes this to the police perception that they are in constant danger while working; therefore, they need to be suspicious in order to protect themselves and properly carry out their role as protectors; "...and police, especially police on patrol, are suspicious as they patrol the streets." More generally, officers face a variety of organisational norms, including expectations that they be suspicious (Tracy, 2004).

It is argued that police lead socially isolated lives, facilitated by suspicion and defensive solidarity with colleagues. Suspicion is a fundamental characteristic of police culture, which officers suggest is analogous to a sixth sense (Banton, 1964; Loftus, 2010; Manning, 1974). Police are particularly suspicious of the law and legal procedures under which they have to operate (Waddington, 1999). As is natural to the occupation, police also view scholarly research into policing with suspicion (Liederbach, Boyd, Taylor & Kawucha, 2007).

c) *Isolation / Solidarity*

Isolationism and solidarity have been strongly identified as cultural themes in police literature (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Loftus, 2010; Shanahan, 2000). As visible symbols of state authority and because of the secretive nature of the work they do, police are prone to become isolated from the public that they protect, which contributes significantly to the strong bonds of loyalty and the "us vs. them" attitudes of police (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010, p. 209). Police corruption investigators also operate in extreme conditions of secrecy. To that extent that they are unable to share details of their investigations with their closest friends or family members; their occupations create the potential for social and family isolation.

Social isolation can be sourced from an individual's attitude towards conventional society. Davis (1984, p. 244) describes social isolation as made possible by three elements:

1. Rejection from the conventional society;
2. Belief by the individual that he is being unjustly excluded from that society;
3. An attitude towards others with similar stigmatised occupations that sees them as rightfully rejected.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that police corruption investigators ascribe closely to (at least) some of Davis' attitudes and elements. They are certainly stigmatised by conventional police culture and in general recognise and consider that stigma unjustified, although many admit to propagating such perceptions in their previous lives as police officers. This suggests a level of estrangement from police culture as a pre-requisite for successfully embracing a career as a police corruption investigator.

Estrangement refers to "a disruption of a bond of friendship or loyalty and is often used where harmonious relationship has been replaced by hostility, indifference or alienation" (Brooker, 2002, p. 90). Alienation refers to an individual's estrangement with his / her traditional community, the dominant values of its society (normlessness) or even with themselves (self-estrangement). In general, it implies a lack of identification with a known world, which obviously has implications for how civil review police corruption investigators build new occupational identities once they leave the police.

Inherent within the literature on police culture is the idea of solidarity and loyalty amongst police. Isolationism and the inherent traits of solidarity it creates suggest that police see themselves as making up the 'us' component of the "us vs. them" view of the world (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010, p. 209). For many, camaraderie and solidarity have become defining characteristics of the occupation of policing. Danger and fear of violence are thought to be heightened amongst police officers through their work environment and therefore these aspects become essential for the maintenance of a mutually supportive operational culture (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Gottschalk, 2007; Manning, 1974). Hence, it is recognised that policing as an occupation has "a rare degree of camaraderie and loyalty" (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 122).

Due to a high degree of group identification and bonding, a masculine brotherhood ethic forms (Wood, 1997). These attitudes are passed onto new recruits and promoted as necessary attributes to be successful at the craft of policing. The acknowledgment amongst police of the need for this brotherhood in order to deliver what is considered the best policing service, promotes an atmosphere of secrecy and covert membership. It is well recognised that hostility

towards outsiders and resistance to change is a by-product of this siblingism, which emphasises the difference of the group from those that are on the outside (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Goldsmith, 1991; Shanahan, 2000).

As with normal families, siblingism within policing is said to be a first introduction to the notion of self-sacrifice and compromise, and of having to recognise the needs and wants of other members of the group. It is through these initial relationships that the police officer learns to gauge their own responses to those of others, so that they are seen to behave in appropriate ways acceptable to the group. Siblingism also provides an avenue for experience to deal with hierarchy, learning from observation in how to deal with those that are more powerful than the individual (Bank & Kahn, 1997). The inevitable outcome of this police siblingism is suspiciousness and social isolation from conventional citizenry (normal people) and from the police executive, both of whom are viewed by the police as potential sources of threat or compromise, attitudes which are reflected and reinforced in each daily encounter (Skolnick, 2008).

However, sociologists suggest that siblings become either closer, or that the bond between them are broken down irreplaceably through experiencing shared danger, fear and trauma. The ambiguity at the heart of this siblingism is that police may often be in competition with one another for promotion and other aspects of organisational favour, and that racial, sexual, and other discriminatory behaviour and tensions may well divide officers (Fielding, 1988). Even if the camaraderie, solidarity and excitement of policing presents its own reward to the individual police officer, there are inevitably elements that impact upon achievement, a sense of frustration and a feeling of fulfilment in regard to the objectives of the occupation. Solidarity and camaraderie then, might not extend to passing up golden opportunities for promotion through nepotistic networks, or to wrest further autonomy or control over work assignments at the expense of one's comrades (Bjork, 2008; Fielding, 1988).

#### *d) Conservatism*

In general, police are considered conservative in politics and morality. Their conservatism is represented as a cultural response to the uniqueness of the occupation and the observation that they do not easily suffered divergence from the norm (Loftus, 2010; Reiner, 2000; Shanahan, 2000). In a culture marked by cynicism;



The fact that a man is engaged in enforcing a set of rules implies that he also becomes implicated in affirming them (Skolnick, 1966, p. 59).

This conservatism is pervaded by an atmosphere of conformity, which involves strict adherence to standards by whatever means. Sanctions and endorsements become widespread and contribute to this climate of conformity. This internal pressure actively functions to exclude non-conformists thereby maintaining the status quo. The expression of unpopular or challenging views, or failure to be committed to the team, therefore has serious consequences.

For instance, one such pressure brought to bear is in relation to *pub culture* elements of policing (discussed further in the next section on machismo). Officers are encouraged to drink with their fellow officers. Failure to socialise is regarded as weakening the solidarity of the team. There are strong internal pressure to conform, and non-conformists find themselves ostracised with their careers significantly impacted (Frewin & Tuffin, 1998).

*e) Machismo*

Machismo is another characteristic considered important by police social researchers, particularly as regards the sexist nature of police culture and the gender related aspects of the culture. The macho aspects of policing include competitive games (presumably with criminals as well as other police), the threat of physical danger the occupation affords and the intrigue of solving crimes (Gosling & Taylor, 2010; Westmarland, 2008). Modern literature supports the idea or belief in police machismo: “Police are a sub culture of males in the prime of their life” (Niederhoffer, 1969, p. 126).

Such celebration of masculine ethos includes a preoccupation with paternalistic protection and the willingness to use force if necessary to achieve outcomes. Police play upon public collective perceptions of toughness and heroism and this forms a means of enacting and performing a preferred identity for them (Scott & Tracy, 2007). As well as devaluing more strategic and tacit approaches to controlling crime, it is said the aura of masculinity encourages toughness, a celebration of violence, and creates a haven for sexism and homophobia (Loftus, 2010; Shanahan, 2000; Tracy, 2004).

Female police officers are generally negatively received by their male peers. Women are subjected to sexual harassment, ridiculed and degraded, and experience discrimination in job assignments and promotion opportunities (Pogrebin & Poole, 1988). In masculine organisations like the police, women are seen as “the other”, “not part of” or “peripheral to its operation”

(Niland, 1996, p. 6). In many cases, women have to become more like men to survive and in some instances will survive by adopting the masculine values of their male counterparts:

However, in a profession where being tough, macho, and hardened serve as badges of belonging, for a woman to act shocked or bothered by sexualised comments is to admit that she cannot “take it” and is indeed different from (and lesser than?) male colleagues. By “going along,” women achieve approval but also condone, acknowledge, and perpetuate men’s position as gatekeepers to the club (Loftus, 2010, p. 253).

One offshoot of the macho culture of police organisations is the emergence of the drinking, or pub culture. It is noted that the cult of masculinity encourages drinking of alcohol as a sign of manliness (Frewin & Tuffin, 1998; McIvor, 2004; McNeill, 1996). In particular, there is the suggestion that an officer who does not drink with fellow officers faces sanctions, as they are considered to be weakening the solidarity of the team.

There is strong internal pressure to conform to the co-operative body. The discourse acts to ensure that aberrant influences are subjected to pressure. Non-conformists are ostracized and their professional life becomes extremely difficult (Frewin & Tuffin, 1998, p. 181).

These issues are of particular interest in this research as many police corruption investigators reported a sense of exclusion from the police agencies in which they were previously employed, due to their unwillingness to participate in such activity.

#### *f) Pragmatism*

Reiner (2000) describes police pragmatism as conceptual conservatism or a reluctance to contemplate innovation, experimentation or research. Research suggests that organisational reform and behavioural change within police organisations is difficult to achieve, and it is argued that change cannot be imposed effectively from outside a police organisation. It can be facilitated or even tolerated but only when the organisation is brought to the recognition of the need for change and the organisational willingness to bring change about exists. The reason for this is that police culture is said to exert considerable influence on the way officers think, feel and interact. Also, attitudes and perceptions that comprise the police identity can also undermine reform endeavours (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Goldsmith, 1991; Harris, 2012; Loftus, 2010; Paoline, 2004).

Chan (1997) developed notions of culture to explain the failure of attempted reforms in the New South Wales Police Force. In the process, she developed a model based on Bourdieu’s concepts

of field and habitus (Bourdieu, 1984) to articulate cultural influences and police officers predispositions. She maintained that the failure to account for the strength of police culture contributed to the inability for reform. Perhaps the greatest example of pragmatism working against police culture concerns formal education.

Niederhoffer (1969) argues that the police cultural push towards education and its benefits, may alienate some sub cultural members and create envy and hostility amongst those who lack the formal education to meet newly expected standards. Further, it is argued that a police cultural resistance to formal education may even undermine the occupations attempts to professionalise (More, 1985, p. 309). More describes a professional worker as:

One who performs advisory, administrative or research work which is based upon the established principles of a profession or science, and which requires scientific or technical training equivalent to that represented by graduation from a college or university on recognise standing, or one who performs work which is based upon science or other and which requires for its performance and acquaintance with the established facts or principles or methods gained through academic study or through extensive practical experience, one or both.

Formal education makes alternative job possibilities and careers outside the police organisations available, with career advancement no longer being tied to the police or relationships with fellow police (Reuss-Ianni, 1984), a point that is not lost on police corruption investigators, many of whom highlight career aspirations as a major influence for transitioning to their current roles.

#### *g) Racial Prejudice*

Of all the characteristics normally attributed to police culture, perhaps the most contentious is that of police racism. Whilst racial prejudice is identified as a generic characteristic of police culture generally (Chan, 1997; Innes, 2002; Liederbach, Boyd, Taylor, & Kawucha, 2007; Shanahan, 2000; Skolnick, 2008), the police as a whole are said to be only slightly more prejudiced than the communities they serve (Chan, 1997; Reiner, 2000). This perceived prejudice could therefore be seen as nothing more than a reflection of the dominant attitudes of Australian society as whole.

Smith and Alpert (2007) reflect upon racial profiling by police and the conscious or unconscious use of 'race' by police in discretionary decision making. Their examination of racial animus based explanations for disparate treatment of minorities by the police found its causes as largely

non-volitional racial profiling based on unconscious stereotypes. Stereotypes are cognitive structures contained within the mind of the perceiver and are made up of that person's knowledge, beliefs and expectations toward an identifiable minority group (Smith & Alpert, 2007).

An oft-cited explanation for disparities in policing statistics has been that minorities commit disproportionately more crime, and this argument is intuitively logical. However, given that social identities and stereotypes often represent a society's collective knowledge and beliefs about the social group around which it is constructed, then police attitudes are at least explainable, if not excusable.

#### *h) Loyalty*

Loyalty is a commonly identified feature in police culture literature. It is well recognised that paramilitary environments promote solidarity through their group members (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010).

These attitudes, values, and norms surrounding issues of loyalty inevitably include a distrust and suspicion of citizens and a tendency to assess citizenry in terms of potential threat. It also encourages "a lay low or cover your ass orientation" to police work that discourages initiation of contacts with citizens and supervisors, and reinforces a strong emphasis on the law enforcement elements of the police role thereby creating "a we-versus-they" attitude toward citizens (Paoline, 2004, p. 207).

In its most positive sense, loyalty is said to provide support and a nurturing environment through membership of a police family (Shanahan, 2000). Loftus (2010) argues that this sense of loyalty is most robust between officers on the same shift, and inevitably is encouraged by a predominantly white, heterosexual, male composition within the workforce. To some degree, this is seen as a positive cultural trait as it produces a high degree of teamwork. However, such loyalty has a sinister face, in so much that it encourages the protection and covering up of colleagues' procedural infringements (Westley, 1956).

These feelings of loyalty and siblingism no doubt sustain a silence code which unquestionably protects police against genuine threats to safety and well-being (Skolnick, 2008). In a negative sense it is argued that police loyalty to each other breeds solidarity, secrecy and corruption (Manning, 1977; Shanahan, 2000; Wood, 1997). Officers can develop personal conflicts by being placed in a position of having to choose between contradictory objectives, such as notions

of loyalty to fellow officers and honesty (ACJS, 1990). As Manning maintains (1978), loyalty and solidarity are cultural characteristics closely related to lying and secrecy.

Police culture encourages conformity and isolation, which also serves as a fertile ground for this code of silence to flourish. The code of silence is legitimised through peer pressure and by the premise that cops need to look after cops. From a utilitarian perspective the code of silence benefits both street level police officers and the police executive. Police officers benefit by escaping punishment for misconduct whilst police executives benefit by allowing the majority of misconduct to go unreported. This gives the perception to the community that all is well and that the police organisation is well run and well disciplined.

*i) Cynicism*

The trait of police cynicism is a re-current one throughout the literature and is described as a hardened, institutionalised outlook on the world, which develops over four stages (Stevens, 2005, pp. 2-3):

1. Over idealism;
2. Frustration;
3. Disenchantment, and;
4. Full-blown cynicism.

When a group feels threatened or intimidated, it is argued that it will fall back on its cultural code of values. The term *anomie* is used to describe the process whereby the use of an existing social system is supplanted by a new code. This creates a feeling of uncertainty and lack of purpose in the minds of the individuals as they attempt to maintain a sense of true belonging to a group. If this estrangement becomes too intense the end result can be self-destructive (Drew, Mills, & Gassaway, 2007; More, 1985; Niederhoffer, 1969).

Klockars (1980) argues that cynicism and passionate caring lead police to employ dirty means in order to achieve good desired outcomes. He sees this as an inescapable moral dilemma for police and highlights the risk for those who succumb, being to lose their sense of moral proportion. Others argue that cynicism is reflective of a certain type of personality to which the police occupation is conducive. This conductivity contributes to the theory that police personality may be one of the very factors that isolates individuals from the general public (Manning, 1974; More, 1985; Shanahan, 2000; Skolnick, 1966).

Niederhoffer (1969, p. 10) describes the characteristic of cynicism as being at the very core of police problems and identifies at least four potential sources of cynicism within police culture:

- The socialisation process;
- Contact with established police sub-culture;
- A product of occupational anomie, or;
- Personalities of police officers.

Niederhoffer (1969, pp. 105-110) hypothesises that police cynicism is a mode of adaptation to frustration. His research provides a significant insight into the role of cynicism in police culture and revolves around 11 hypotheses, the most relevant of which to this research are:

- One's degree of cynicism will increase in proportion to length of service – learnt as part of the police socialisation process;
- New appointees will show less cynicism than more experienced colleagues;
- Those approaching retirement will demonstrate less cynicism, and;
- Members of specialist squads are more cynical than members of youth divisions.

In describing typologies of police personalities, Hochstedler (1981, p. 304) ascribes the cynic perspective as, "...one that finds good and bad, we and they, right and wrong." For Hochstedler, the police officer with a cynical perspective allows no grey area, only black and white.

Bjork (2008) argues that police officers typically strive to avoid the temptations of cynicism; however, the methods and techniques used to achieve this often have their own drawbacks, represented by the over-enthusiastic, tempted to wage a war on crime.

Perpetrators claim to be victims. From time to time progress is barred by a wall of silence. Shall he make an arrest or not? Which of the suspects should be arrested? Just when he needs them most, the usual guideposts are silent. His wisest procedure is to trust no one. Cynicism improves his technique as an investigator (Niederhoffer, 1969, p. 64).

One of the foci of this study was to examine the levels of cynicism demonstrated by the corruption investigators and examine whether they revert to a police cultural code of values when threatened or intimidated.

#### *j) Regulatory Disdain*

Policing as an occupation appears to be characterised by a disdain for rules and what is sometimes described as rule bending (Manning, 1978; Prenzler, 1997; Shanahan, 2000; Westmarland, 2005b). Prenzler (1997, p. 48) identifies this disdain and disregard as manifesting

within four segments:

1. The treatment of suspects;
2. Disregard for due process due to dominant crime control models;
3. Disregard and disdain promoted through cynicism, isolationism and intolerance, and;
4. The solidarity of policing promoted through isolation and cynicism.

This solidarity often leads to lying and secrecy, a major cause of which is theorised to be the disjuncture between formal organisational rules and expectations and the daily realities of policing (Loftus, 2010; Manning & Van Maanan, 1978).

Whilst overt demonstrations of rule bending by corruption investigators was not detected in this research, nonetheless it was valuable to assess their attitudes to rules and regulations (particularly to management) and their frustrations in complying with bureaucratic models of corruption investigation applied by the civil review agencies to which they are attached.

#### *k) Idealism*

Most police officers commence their careers honest and idealistic. However, it is argued that their ideals and honesty are eroded over time by exposure to the harsh realities of policing and the “temptations of life on the street” (McClurg, 1998, p. 395). Without continual reinforcement, idealism yields to temptation, pressure and frustration, as police deal with an “unethical adversary”, whilst tethered by the moral constraints of public expectation.

One aspect of this research was an examination of idealism within police corruption investigators, both in how they went about their roles as police officers, and later, as corruption investigators. How, if at all, did such idealism change as they progressed through their careers and what were the catalysts for such change?

#### *l) Mistrust*

The issue of trust, or lack thereof, has been identified as a critical element of police culture (Banton, 1964; Manning, 1977; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Skolnick, 1966). Frequent charges of brutality and corruption have led to public mistrust and suspicion of the policing occupation resulting in calumny and contempt rather than respect being experienced daily in the media and the community (Reuss-Ianni, 1984). This mistrust is reciprocated, with an inherent lack of trust between the police and the people they deal with on a daily basis. The situation is compounded by police socialisation, which ensures that individual officers develop appropriate responses to emotional cues. The catalyst for this socialisation process is public expectation and the

requirement for police to provide a calm and controlled face in most extreme of situations. These expectations lead police to distance themselves through maintaining a social distance, a situation that fits in well with the “us-versus-them” attitudes engendered through police culture (Paoline, 2004; Pogrebin & Poole, 1991, p. 399; Shanahan, 2000; Stevens, 2005).

The expression of personal feelings is severely limited within police culture. Professional conduct norms dictate that officers must remain calm and in control, constantly guarding their emotions. They learn that emotions such as anger, disgust and sadness must not be displayed, if they are to maintain a professional image for the public and their fellow officers. This is regarded as a defensive measure by the police and a typical strategy of “*dirty workers*” (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 419) who use protective barriers to shield and distance themselves from outsiders who would vilify and pose a threat to them. This promotes and supports the idea of an isolationist culture within policing where a psychological boundary is drawn around the group, exacerbating their sense of difference and separation, if not isolation from others (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Drew & Hulvey, 2007; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Stevens, 2005).

As individuals coalesce into groups they come to view the world in terms of *us* (police) and *them* (non-police), a strategy used to justify policing in the moral order. Sometimes, because of these attitudes, police abrogate their responsibilities under legal codes to implement unwritten police codes of conduct required to manage the streets. New officers lose non-police friends, in consideration that only other officers can understand how and what they do. Personal isolation, group coalescence and defensiveness lead to secretiveness and occupational solidarity. This is the process under which distinctive and localised work group cultures embedded within an overall organisational culture are likely to be formed (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Van Maanan, 1978).

The social psychology of policing reflects these structural conditions through the context of a semi-secret society. The role reflects and rewards these attitudes which includes an “us-versus-them” suspiciousness of citizens and the potential to assess communities and individuals on the basis of threat or siege mentality (Paoline, 2004; Pogrebin & Poole, 1991, p. 399; Shanahan, 2000). These attitudes form a protective barrier from outsiders with the intention of maintaining distance and constructing barriers against those that intend harm (Drew et al., 2007).

One aspect of this research was examining the level of trust between police corruption investigators, the politicians and communities they serve, and the police organisations with



whom they deal. Another point emphasis was whether they developed a subculture perspective, by examining whether police corruption investigators fall back on the same cultural characteristics they were socialised into in order to manage emotional or stressful situations.

An interesting aspect is the debate about whether the police occupation creates these types of officers or whether certain personality types are attracted to the job. Behavioural scientists and police administrators want to know what, or who makes the best police officer; indeed, who or what makes the best corruption investigator? Whilst not a primary objective, this research identified a number of typological characteristics that could be attributed to individuals who choose to pursue a career in civil review police corruption investigation. These typologies are discussed further in the findings chapter of this thesis.

#### *m) Sexism*

Sexism was closely associated in the literature with the police masculine ethos. Whilst there is much literature and commentary on the camaraderie of police officers, it obscures the fact that police officers may often be in competition for promotion or favour, and that racial, sexual and other tensions may divide the officers (Fielding, 1988; Gosling & Taylor, 2010; Marks, 2004; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Westmarland, 2008).

It is argued that females working in male dominated organisations, such as policing, experience sexual harassment and gender discrimination from peers, supervisors and subordinates. Dehumanising and objectifying comments are not only directed at female co-workers, but also towards absent partners and wives (Harr, 2005; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Tracy, 2004).

‘They should be home having babies’ or ‘A mother shouldn’t be carrying a gun’ ... Generally, the issue of female officers is one on which most police officers were in agreement – they could not be depended upon because they were women (Reuss-Ianni, 1984, pp. 59-60).

Skolnick (2008, p. 42) suggests that affirmative action programs have been a widespread reform which have brought about necessary changes to police departments. However, he argues that police women may play a contributing role in propagating sexism:

Policewomen think they should be as fearless as men, especially when other police are endangered. They criticize the less successful female officers (the policewomen) for accepting a more limited police role.

Interestingly, in a study conducted by Harr (2005) on police recruits in the USA, three out of four Caucasian female recruits (75%) who self-initiated resignation, highlighted gender

discrimination directed at them by their supervisors as a contributing factor.

Meara (1974, p. 273) links sexism to work identity and honour (albeit in the context of dirty work). However, the consistencies with the policing occupation are of note:

This is a man's world ... herein lies the closest parallel to traditional threats to honour. Honour in work is enhanced by limiting what women may do. Honour is a property of men, not women, yet women's presence threatens honour. Something that women might do, apart from men's continuous skill and courage, would raise havoc with things as they are and should be.

The current research looked for signs of sexism in the occupational lives and attitudes of police corruption investigators and the communities within which they operate. This was most evident in the gender distribution of police corruption investigators across agencies.

#### *n) Paramilitary*

Police literature suggests that culture exists as one of two distinct systems of internal control within police organisations, the second being the formal military bureaucratic system of resting upon an hierarchal chain of command, characterised by strict internal disciplinary codes, internal investigatory units and high rates of punishment for disciplinary violations. Under such systems, police are expected to be obedient, obey orders and meet intellectual and physical demands in a highly structured and disciplined environment, under conditions of stress and potential harassment (Goldsmith, 1990; Gottschalk, 2007; Harr, 2005; Manning, 1974). Harr (2005, p. 442) comments:

The features of the paramilitary model that resignee's found to be particularly stressful included the authoritarian style of management, the process of breaking down individuals in order to build them back up as police officers, the strict standards of physical fitness, and the stringent physical exercise regimen.

Para-military bureaucratic organisations have top down authority structures, with an explicit chain of command, where incumbent positions in the hierarchy wield authority over subordinate positions. This structure remains almost exclusively paramilitary, and police officers learn authority relationships that reflect that structure. It is proposed that such organisation is a major contributor to the "us vs. them" orientation of police culture (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010, p. 209), where real police work is tied to crime fighting action, defensive tactics, car chases and arrests, rather than the more mundane issues of paper work, problem solving and partnerships.

The literature raises questions as to the suitability of such models to modern day policing (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Weisheit, Wells, & Falcone, 2003). Indeed, the organisation of civil review anti-corruption agencies are more attuned to traditional notions of public services mentality, than to models of command and control law enforcement agencies. They are staffed by public servants more attuned to normal working hours, rather than the rigours of twenty-four hour, seven day a week demands of policing.

The socialisation processes involved with police agencies are not unlike the military, in that they are designed to effectively convert civilians into non-civilians in terms of values, beliefs, perspectives and behaviours (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010). This research found that the transition from police officer to civil review police corruption investigator requires a re-civilianisation process for the individual and unlearning of the cultural conditioning of policing. This will be discussed further in the chapters that follow.

#### *o) Perseverance*

Bjork (2008) argues that perseverance in policing is a reflection of the realities of the job; in the requirements to stay motivated despite the disappointments and frustrations that plague the occupation. Self-motivation represents a specific case of sense making for the police officer. Bjork (2008, p. 88) describes this role as “the imperative of perseverance amid all the darkness”, arguing that police officers typically strive to avoid the temptations of cynicism through refocusing on their mission, thereby leaving them vulnerable to cynicistic antithesis, represented by over enthusiasm and a “wage a war on crime” mentality.

Perseverance was a strong theme identified in the police corruption investigator interviews. Faced with recognisable occupational stigma, the demands of a bureaucratic work environment, politicisation of the work place and misguided public perceptions of the objectives of the role, it provides a comforting confirmation of mission, that is, that police corruption is a pox on society and routing it out is a critical societal role.

#### *p) Reflexive Decision Making*

The reflexive nature of police decision making is a reflection of the interactional dynamism of the occupation, with police officers having to constantly maintain an awareness of themselves and monitor others closely to ensure their own safety and that of their peers. This reflexivity is based upon historical knowledge references, experience, intuition and prior reaction and adaptation to given situations (Fielding, 1988). Giddens (1976) argues that these reflexive

decision making frames of reference are marked by differentials of power. No matter their dependence on reflexivity, the police ultimately get their way through their technical knowledge, mobilisation of authority or force.

Reflexive decision-making can therefore prove difficult if contingent scripts or cues are inappropriate, such as in times of crisis. The understanding provided by script-based analogies is based on past contingencies, which may no longer be relevant. Information may be distorted or cue scripts may no longer be valid. Moreover, authority structures, information management systems, policies, procedures and promotion practices may change (Ashforth & Fried, 1988). This is particularly relevant when considering inter-cultural transitions, such as those experienced by police corruption investigators when transitioning from police organisations to civil review anti-corruption agencies.

Experience-based holistic recognition ... produces the deep situational understanding that leads to the expert's fluid performance. We seldom choose our words or place our feet, we simply talk and walk. The same goes for experts: Their skill has become so much a part of them that they are no more aware of it than they are of their own bodies (Trotter, 1986, p. 36).

#### *q) Resistance to Change*

Police cultural resistance to change is a strong theme throughout the literature. A number of researchers identify the socialisation of police officers, particularly at the academy stage, as deflecting meaningful change within police organisations. It is considered that theories around police cultural change fail to consider the roles played by the police officers themselves in perpetuating and transforming the culture (Chan, 1997).

There is general consensus that whilst the police culture appears to be in a transition stage, that to be effective, any changes in police practices need to take the existing cultural conditions into consideration (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Loftus, 2010; Reiner, 2000; Reuss-Ianni, 1984). If not, the traditions of police culture will inhibit any efforts for behavioural or attitudinal change (Marks, 2004).

For civil review anti-corruption agencies, this raises strategic questions around mission. Are they pseudo law enforcement agencies or agents of change? In order to achieve organisational change within police agencies, would oversight agencies simply base policy recommendations on specific instances of misconduct or would they adopt a more comprehensive review of existing cultural norms and attitudes? Is the goal toward *getting a body in the dock*, or is it about

closing the procedural holes that allowed the corruption to occur in the first place (Harris, 2012)?

*r) Secretive*

Another strong characteristic within police agencies is secrecy. Secrecy involves hiding or concealing information from certain individuals or groups, whilst at the same time, potentially sharing it with select groups or individuals who are trusted. In anthropology, secrets are the property of groups with established traditional relationships, such as the police. Civil review anti-corruption agencies have a reputation for maintaining secrecy in the face of public demand for openness and transparency. Driven by political incentive and protected through legislative requirements, the secrecy surrounding anti-corruption investigations is designed to protect individuals against false accusation or impugning through rumour.

It is argued that secrecy is a covert understanding every officer tacitly agrees to in order to maintain solidarity within the occupation. Mutuality and interdependence cloaked by secrecy develops closed systems that produce “organizationally positive and socially negative” results and propagate the myth of police organisational secrets (More, 1985; Reuss-Ianni, 1984, pp. 5-6; Westmarland, 2008). The cultural element of secrecy has been recognised for example, by the Knapp Commission and the Fitzgerald Inquiry as a significant factor leading to the propagation of graft and corruption within police agencies.

Secrecy is considered a critical element of police culture. It is built around the perception that police know something that no one else does. The truth is perhaps a little more insidious, where police secrecy is said to contribute to an accountability deficit and leads to the assumption that police internal arrangements are designed to save the police officers from the consequences of their misconduct (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Manning, 1978; Niederhoffer, 1969; Sen, 2010; Wesley, 1970; Westley, 1956; Westmarland, 2008); and is even said to be closely associated to lying (Manning & Van Maanan, 1978; McClurg, 1998):

Since the police are representatives of the moral order in everyday life, their credibility reflects upon the legitimacy of the politico-moral order. If lying is endemic in police operations, it is not an isolated commentary on either the moral status of policemen as individuals or even of police organizations; it is a commentary on the society in which the activity is rooted (Manning, 1974, p. 301).

The secrecy characteristic is said to begin with the socialisation processes at the police academy, where secrecy and isolation from outsiders is promoted as good and necessary; “what happens in the academy, stays in the academy” (Chan, 1996; Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010, p. 204; Shanahan, 2000). Manning (1974, p. 290) describes police organisations as “secret organisations”, that base the need for secrecy upon a perceived hostility of the community towards them. This manifests itself in the tendency to conceal information from the public and serves to pattern the functioning of the organisation.

Secrecy is a significant factor to consider in examining the work place culture of police corruption investigators. Corruption agencies present themselves as closed and operationally secretive, not the least to protect themselves from the risk of investigative leaks directed towards those they are targeting.

Controlling police corruption becomes difficult for those agencies, largely due to “the blue curtain” of silence which permeates police culture (Klockars, Kutnjak, Ivkovich, Harver & Haberfeld, 2000, p. 1; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Vito, Wolfe, Higgins, & Walsh, 2011). The blue curtain of silence has even been blamed for the lack of priori interest by sociologists into police cultural change, an opinion which is probably merited (Niederhoffer, 1969).

*s) Strategic Use of Humour*

Police organisations comprise strong cultures that are supported by shared values and beliefs. Humour is an integral part of the police cultural values, beliefs and behaviours and helps to create group solidarity (Bjork, 2008; Drew et al., 2007; Fielding, 1988). This type of humour and storytelling usually remains within the occupational community as outsiders would not likely understand or appreciate the intent and value of these exchanges (Drew & Hulvey, 2007; Pogrebin & Poole, 1988).

Driven by the need to portray a certain veneer to a social audience and thereby ensure adherence to cultural norms, police sometimes exploit humour to soften the immediate impact of tragic experience. Through this humour, they can empathise with each other through a collective coping strategy, enforce group solidarity and neutralise the emotional impact of the situations.

Management of emotional expressions enhances group functioning by maintaining collective action. Emotional anxieties and tensions are thus neutralized and normalized via collective coping strategies that reinforce group solidarity (Pogrebin & Poole, 1991, p. 402).

This particular aspect of police culture is further developed by Loftus (2010) who links humour

to cynicism, most profoundly expressed through a predisposition to joke about personal tragedy (black humour). This dark humour, however tasteless, is a valuable tool in releasing tension associated with tragic elements of police work. Meara (1974, p. 267) describes it as “a small celebration of their ability to overcome the mild horror of such work.” Such jokes momentarily bring shared consciousness to the ever present, depressing nature of the work.

Another aspect of police black humour is that it provides police officers with the opportunity to raise concerns that might otherwise remain unaddressed, with humour used as a strategic tool to gauge re-actions, acceptance or rejection. It promotes occupational solidarity through confirmation of shared meaning and interpretation. Police black humour provides a socially accepted means test to the feelings of group members and provides a forum for expression without threatening the system that fosters those feelings.

It is argued that the use of humour and joking by police is premised on institutionalised social ambiguity. That is, it arises in an environment that is both organisationally conjunctive and disjunctive. Shared laughter reflects the group’s common perspective and generates feelings of understanding and camaraderie thereby strengthening group norms and bonds. Solidarity may also be enhanced by directing humour at people outside the group members, affirming the group’s social boundaries of moral superiority.

Pogrebin and Poole identify four different ways in which police express humour within contextual occupational situations (Pogrebin & Poole, 1988, pp. 183-210).

1. Humour may be used in a deprecating way to bring attention to the inadequacies of superiors and managers (*jocular aggression*);
2. To disrepute or view public in cynical terms (*audience degradation*);
3. To express emotions without damaging a professional image of being fearless and confident (*diffusion of danger / tragedy*), and;
4. To justify violating procedural orders in order to obtain evidence to ensure a conviction (*normative neutralisation*).

A focus on humour and its purpose in assisting police officers in managing occupational stresses has direct applicability to the taint management strategies employed by ‘dirty workers’ (to be discussed later in this thesis).

## **2.5 The Value of Reiner's Categorisations**

Categorisation is the process by which ideas and characteristics are recognised, differentiated, and understood. Categorisation implies that behaviours or other characteristics can be split into categories, usually for some specific purpose; normally, to highlight a relationship between the subjects and objects of knowledge. In social science, categorisation is fundamental to prediction, that is, it involves extracting information from the labeled examples to allow accurate prediction of future examples.

Reiner's categorisations are therefore important because they form an abstraction of a rule or concept involving police behaviour. This clustering facilitates an inherent understanding (and predictor) of behaviour. The additional (twelve) characteristics discussed in this chapter enhance, complement and build on Reiner's categorisations.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

Research on police culture has generally focused on one of two models. The first views culture as an occupational phenomenon that encompasses all members of the police occupation differentiated only by the individual differences of the police officers themselves (Christensen & Crank, 2001). The second model suggests the emergence of police subcultures (segmentation) that delimit the occupational police culture (Chan, 1996; Paoline, 2004). The new framework recognises the interpretive and creating effects of culture and allows for the existence of multiple subcultures in policing within a political context and within the cognitive structures of police work (Chan, 1996; Loftus, 2010).

These subcultures become distinguishable through specialised vocabulary and shared internal beliefs, traditions and artefacts (Dallos & Sapsford, 1981; Muncie & Fitzgerald, 1981; Young, 1981). Such difference can be highlighted through an examination of the activities and attitudes of rank and file police officers, compared to specialists such as detectives. This police subculture schema is further highlighted through differentiation based upon gender assumptions relating to specialist areas (Skolnick, 2008; Westmarland, 2008). Therefore, if cultures are distinct and specific to local context and organisational settings, then anti-corruption strategy and policy must in some way take local dynamics into consideration (Christensen & Crank, 2001).

The development of police sub-cultural models is influenced by labelling, social structure, changing perspectives and motivations and desires of individuals. Labelling is particularly



critical as regards police malfeasance. It is argued that the effects of societal reaction and social control may result in the deviant personality identifying with a label attached himself, as each subculture develops ways of adapting and reacting against both its parent culture and other classes of culture which stands in opposition to it (Dallos & Sapsford, 1981). This has particular repercussions for police corruption investigators whose activities are (generally) adversely labelled by the very cultures into which they were socialised.

Group loyalty appears to be an integral part of police culture. However as conflicts between ranks and organisational emphasis on performance create an atmosphere of competitiveness, conflicts and fractures between rank and file subcultures become evident (Fielding, 1988; Loftus, 2010). This brings about attitudinal variation towards aspects of the occupational and organisational police environments. Perhaps of most interest has been the emergence of theory surrounding three distinct subcultures of policing: the commander, middle management, and line levels (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Manning, 1977; Paoline, 2004).

Whilst consistent characteristics of police culture emerged through the literature, some scholars have questioned whether such cultural leanings were actually reflected in police operations. Whilst not necessarily questioning the popular view of police sub-culture as having identifiable characteristics, some researchers question whether those characteristics actually influenced operational policing. If police acted fairly and impartially, then why should their attitudes matter? (Stevens, 2005; Westmarland, 2008). After all, it is not so much what police think, but more what they do that influences public law and order.

The next chapter will consider the nature and role of policing. The concept of job role is associated with social expectations applied to given positions. Organisational members have defined roles within a web of functional and hierarchical relationships. Roles evolve within situations and both shape, and are shaped by them. Role expectations are derived from a consensually shared image of the normative character of the role, and the occupation in general (Ashforth & Fried, 1988; Fielding, 1988).

A major issue arising is that policing is a function that is somewhat vague and poorly defined. It is said that police officers cope with the ambiguities of their roles by focusing exclusively on crime-fighting activities, as service, order maintenance, and community policing efforts have not historically been appreciated as real police work (Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Van Maanen, 1974). The police themselves cling to the crime fighter image as a central tenant to their work identities; however, the reality of police work may not be so (More, 1985; Paoline, 2004).

## CHAPTER THREE – THE ROLES AND NATURE OF POLICING

“The duties which a police officer owes to the state are of a most exacting nature. No one is compelled to choose the profession of a police officer, but having chosen it, everyone is obliged to live up to the standard of its requirements. To join in that high enterprise means the surrender of much individual freedom.”<sup>6</sup>

*Calvin Coolidge, 30th American president (1872-1933)*

### 3.1 Introduction

Roles evolve within situations and both shape and are shaped by them. Accordingly, the situations faced by police officers influence the emergence of roles within their occupation and within its interaction with the general community. Actions thus initiated and responded to reinforce that role occupancy on police (Fielding, 1988). These roles play a large part in perpetuating and transforming police culture, and locate police officers within a social and political context which heavily impacts on the scope and possibility for cultural change (Chan, 1997).

Whilst the *roles of policing* are situational and contextual, in contrast, the *nature of policing* reflects the essential characteristics and qualities of the culture, including the tendencies, desires or instincts governing behaviour. Westmarland (2008, p. 256) maintains that the nature of policing is closely bound to the, “mission/hero/winning the war” aspects of police culture, which she describes as a strong and pervasive aspect with the potential to lead to major injustices based upon preconception and a desire to always be right – to win the battle against the criminal. This view is supported through the axiom that police see themselves first and foremost as crime fighters, as soldiers in a war on crime, with battlelines drawn between us (the police) and them (the criminals) (Crank, 2004; Smith & Alpert, 2007).

A common metaphor used by police is that of the *thin blue line* between civility and anarchy, criminality and law abidance (Gordon, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2009; Westmarland, 2005b). If police see themselves as custodians of all that is good and in the public interest, then one would expect that police corruption investigators might view the war on corruption as their own personal battle. After all, this battle imagery is utilised by anti-corruption agencies around

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<sup>6</sup> Calvin Coolidge (1872–1933), U.S. president. Remarks of Governor Calvin Coolidge at Worcester Police Outing, Worcester, Massachusetts (October 2, 1920). Quote retrieved 12/6/13 from <https://www.tumblr.com/search/Worcester+Police>.

Australia to describe their operations and activities. Whether they perceive they are winning the war, and what impact that may have on their self-image and work identities was a consideration for this research. This chapter examines the roles and nature of policing including social expectations, and how policing is defined within a web of functional and hierarchical relationships.

### **3.2 The Roles of Policing**

The roles of policing are generally considered vague and poorly defined. This ambiguity is represented not only at the individual level but at the social level as well and requires sense making and sense giving on the part of the individual, both to create a sense of self-worth and to establish occupational identity (Ashforth et al., 2007; Hughes, 1958; More, 1985).

Paoline (2004) maintains that police officers cope with the ambiguity of their roles in society by focusing exclusively on what they see as their core function, that is, crime-fighting activities. This crime fighter image is a central tenet of police culture and its focus on criminality brings the masculine ethos of policing to the fore. It is most ably demonstrated through the relaying of war stories and exploits surrounding such work (McIvor, 2004). These tales of heroic extreme remove the tedium of policing and emphasise danger and violence, thereby strengthening the perceived importance of cohesive informal occupational grouping. This also creates barriers for informal acceptance of anyone from outside the group who cannot be counted on to conform to group norms.

Whilst detecting and catching offenders is elevated by the culture as the core justification for policing, much police work does not involve pursuing criminals. Rather, a large proportion of time is taken up in non-law enforcement activities. Instead of engaging in exciting criminal pursuits as envisaged, routine and mundane processes are the means by which much policing is conducted (Innes, 2002). Community policing efforts, completing paperwork and attending incidents that involve a service element are not generally accepted as authentic policing work within the culture (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Klockars, 1984; Loftus, 2010).

These minutiae of routine policing involve a high level of paperwork and social isolation that leads to greater dissatisfaction. Officers largely find their work unrewarding and monotonous, a condition they address through a profoundly cynical and pessimistic view of the social world. To complicate matters further, simple and routine tasks are often paired with repeated emotional transactions with members of the public, that are likely to contradict the officer's internal values

and self-definitions (Harr, 2005; Schaible, 2006). Role complexity and the variety of work tasks then, has significant implications for the roles of policing.

### **3.2.1 Role Complexity and Emotive Dissonance**

Where work tasks are more complex and less routine, they significantly mediate the impacts of emotive dissonance. Emotive dissonance has been described as the discrepancy between internal standards and expressive action (Schaible, 2006). At the self-identity level, officers may recognise that the organisational role conflicts with their own strongly held identities and values. Consequently, they are likely to develop feelings of alienation, burnout and inauthenticity regarding their roles as police. This feeling of inauthenticity comes about as a result of the officers being overtly aware that they are being untrue to themselves (Schaible & Gecas, 2010).

An important aspect of emotive dissonance has to do with self-concept and self-processes. If there are no conflicts between the officers expectations and the expectations placed upon them, dissonance should be at a minimum. Alternatively, if there is a great deal of distance between the officer's self-perception and the expectations of the police organisation, then dissonance will occur, resulting in less satisfaction, more alienation, and generally reduced psychological health (Schaible & Gecas, 2010).

### **3.2.2 Job stresses and Role Strain**

Simple and routine tasks are less intrinsically rewarding, more monotonous and less challenging. Arguably, this leads to dominant job stressors and role strain (ACJS, 1990; Schaible, 2006). Dominant job stresses include role conflict, role ambiguity, organisational reward inequity and lack of participation in decision-making (ACJS, 1990; Martin, 1982).

More (1985) maintains that law enforcement officials must make a serious attempt to better define police roles by moving away from the notion that policing is nothing more than enacting the *thin blue line*. The fundamental casting for the roles of police needs to reflect the realities of the job and the general expectations of the public at large. These expectations may involve work that is less intrinsically rewarding and self-verifying than the roles that characteristically occupy areas on the *dark side* of social life (Bjork, 2008).

### 3.2.3 Detectives

There is a pervasive myth that the police spend much of their time investigating crimes, and that police consider themselves *crime solvers*. Yet Niedehoffer (1969) suggests that the percentage of effort devoted to traditional policing functions does not exceed 10% (quoting from the research division of International Association of Chiefs of Police). He maintains that police are overwhelmed with onerous administrative duties, and there is general support for this in the literature (Klockars, 1984; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Stenross & Kleinman, 1989; Van Maanen, 1974).

In particular, detective work is arguably less glamorous than normally portrayed. Detectives consider themselves crime solvers (Klockars, 1985), yet most of their work is spent writing reports and sitting in courts. Detectives regard handling criminals as “real detective work” and are said to look forward to their encounters (Stenross & Kleinman, 1989, pp. 436-440):

Criminals, then, not only gave the detectives insights into the world of crime, but also served as an audience that could put the stamp of approval on the work they did.

To compensate for this, police detectives refer to glamorous media images of detective work to redefine themselves as “students of crime” (Heinsler et al., 1990, p. 236). This allows them to build a valued core identity and feel good around clerical tasks. Referred to facetiously as “clerks in a squad car” (Reuss-Ianni, 1984, p. 20), they call upon this core identity to reconstruct the administration and paperwork part of their job as an opportunity to assemble clues and develop insights (reframing). It is only where the administrative functions of the role become all-encompassing that the potential for role strain occurs (Stevens, 2005).

Covington (1992) suggests that individuals are always motivated to establish, maintain and promote a positive self-image and has proposed that one of the highest priorities is protecting their general belief that they are capable and competent individuals; something he refers to as self-worth. This self-worth and perceptions of competence have been found to have a high correlation to job performance, with perceptions of competence serving as a moderator to the negative effects of role strain on self-esteem (Mickey, 1989).

### 3.2.4 Competence

It is claimed that the basis for organisational competence within policing is experiential and that recognition of competent action is a follow on from the roles that individuals apply to themselves in a working context (Hughes, 1958; Manning, 1977). Police seek

acknowledgement of competence by conforming to articulated standards of performance. This recognition of competent action must initially locate and specify the organisational mandate under which such actions are performed (Fielding, 1988). Analyses of competence are sensitive to variation and cannot normally be generalised, with choices on what is competent and what is not relying on situational context and the perception of different officers.

Fielding argues that in order to approach this issue objectively it is first necessary to ascertain and specify the terms under which police officers attribute competence to practice, and to examine the constraints, both formal and informal, which influence their actions. For an understanding of realistic attributions of competence, the focus must be on skills relevant to specific incident types and how officers apply their skills to addressing those incidents (Fielding, 1988).

### **3.2.5 Skills**

A principal skill of routine policing is the capacity to negotiate, bluff and manipulate citizens (Lipsky, 1980). For instance, the ability to demonstrate or express a rapport might have the effect of neutralising the intrusiveness of police intervention. This skill level also has an impact on corruption within police organisations because, it is argued, the more skilled a police officer is, the less likely it is that he might consider corrupt activities, or illegal or unethical means to achieve objectives (Chan, 1997; Klockars, 1980).

One of the most critical and valuable skills a police officer can develop is the ability to think critically. Critical thinking includes a broad range of skills including problem solving, designing systematic plans of action, generating concepts from observation and the tactful application of discretion (Hess, Orthmann, & Cho, 2013).

### **3.2.6 Police Discretion**

Policing as a function is somewhat vague and poorly defined, albeit expansive in practice, with the end result that this ambiguity can only be addressed through tremendous discretion and considerable freedom of action in performing tasks (Bjork, 2008; More, 1985). As many laws under which police operate are ambiguous and others are simply obsolete, this discretion endorses the concept of selective justice. However, without discretion, the police role becomes one of unthinking enforcement.

Policing is generally viewed as a highly discretionary, coercive activity that takes place in private settings (Goldsmith, 1991; Gottschalk, 2007; Klockars, Kutnjak Ivkovich, Harver, &

Haberfeld, 2000; Vito, Wolfe, Higgins, & Walsh, 2011). Police discretion is therefore regarded as a defining characteristic of the job, with the potential to create and influence constructs for crime and criminality (More, 1985; Westmarland, 2008).

The existence of this wide scale discretion can be viewed as a two edged sword. It can allow police officers to use their authority appropriately or it may lead to discriminatory or corrupt action based on extra-legal considerations (Katz, 2003; Liederbach et al., 2007). The challenge is in regulating police discretionary action, ensuring degrees of consistency are afforded to customary practices and developing the interactional and cognitive skills of the individual officers that facilitate resolution to problematic situations (Fielding, 1988).

Officers may entertain critical differences of perspective concerning the use of discretion, their ideas of good practice might diverge, or more experienced officers may have esoteric reasons for acting in particular ways that might not be immediately apparent to novice police officers. If one acknowledges the variation in actions arising from discretion, then a major consideration becomes how the organisation's mandate provides a concrete guide for action, and how if at all, it impacts the officer's notion of their role. As Holdaway (1983) asserts, police discretionary action is decided by reference to central values of occupational culture and a close examination of responses under particular situation or stimuli. Understanding the practical influence of conventional interpretations of police mandate is a critical consideration. Police discretion arguably increases as one moves down the police hierarchy, providing greatest discretion to "the least visible and least easily controlled segment (the patrolman or police constable) of the organization" (Manning, 1974, p. 291).

The value of police paramilitary models have therefore been questioned, due to the fact that police at the bottom of the hierarchy have the largest discretionary powers and yet are stifled in an organisational context by strict hierarchical control systems (Shanahan, 2000). The result is that wide scale discretion has the potential to lead to corruption in the absence of direct supervision (Banton, 1964). The ability of police organisations to deter and enhance police integrity through bureaucratic control is limited by the values loyalty, camaraderie and secrecy of police subculture, which operate in situations where there are virtually no guidelines for action (Liederbach et al., 2007).

Problems are further exacerbated where officers bring their own preconceived ideas or working personalities to their roles, leading to numerous tensions which emerge as a consequence of the wider discretionary powers (Manning, 1974; Schaible & Gecas, 2010; Westmarland, 2008). In

this regard, there is some argument as to whether authoritarian police personality types are attracted to the work of policing, or whether, from a social causation view, the police culture produces the type of personalities that it needs (Niederhoffer, 1969; Stevens, 2005).

### **3.2.7 Working Personalities**

Skolnick (1966) argues that police officers possess a working personality which has both on and off duty distinctions. How an officer feels about certain issues reflect their own experiences and basic political attitudes, and their views and expectations on the management of power relationships. Skolnick (2008, p. 36) coined the term “working personality” around three enduring features of the police role. These are:

- a) The exposure to danger;
- b) The pressure to produce, and;
- c) The exercise of authority.

#### *a) Exposure to Danger*

The emotional and psychological impact of dealing with danger and potential violence on a daily basis has been described as an occupational hazard and a defining characteristic of the role of policing (Gottschalk, 2007; Shanahan, 2000; Smith & Alpert, 2007). Skolnick (2008) describes this exposure to danger as part of the working personality of police officers, generating perceptual tendencies similar to those of combat soldiers. A number of researchers have highlighted the anxiety associated with such exposure and the potential psychological dangers that are inherent (ACJS, 1990; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Smith & Alpert, 2007).

War stories glorifying violent and confrontational encounters with the public, place emphasis on danger and violence and strengthen the perceived importance of cohesiveness (social organisation) within the informal occupational police groups. These confrontations also heighten the barriers of formal acceptance for anyone regarded as external to the group, who cannot be counted on to conform to group norms, and serves to promulgate the notion of the police service as a masculine culture. (Loftus, 2010; McIvor, 2004; Schaible & Gecas, 2010). Skolnick (1975) goes as far as to align unacceptable deviance or criminal behaviour within police agencies with this danger characteristic. The atmosphere of uncertainty created by this exposure to danger appears to be a characteristic feature of policing, and one that uniquely characterises the role (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Gottschalk, 2007; Manning, 1977).



b) *The Pressure to Produce*

Whilst hierarchal structures may be inhibitive to the transparency required for measuring the productivity of police agencies, it may also be counter-productive to use performance and productivity criteria to measure officer output, as it is argued that this tends to alienate officers (Christensen & Crank, 2001). Internal pressures for results can exist both organisationally or as peer admiration for the *product of policing*, namely the arresting of suspects. These results are arguably of special relevance to status and sense of self for individual police officers (Westmarland, 2005b). As officers know that their activity is measured by the achievement of enforcement related objects, then this affects how they account for their labor and construes their relationship with the employing police agency (Fielding, 1988).

c) *The Exercise of Authority*

Klockars (1984) maintains that there are common features between power and authority. Both are social forms of domination and control. Both depend upon a concerted sharing and coordination of meanings and actions. The distinguishing features that differentiate power and authority relate to resistance and probability. The hallmark of authority is unquestioning obedience whilst power relations admit the contemplation and calculation of the cost of resistance.

Victims of police brutality as well as civil rights experts claim police have too much power, whilst the police, lawyers and political scientists all argue about whether law enforcement is hampered by inadequate or insufficient laws and powers (Klockars, 1980; Niederhoffer, 1969; Prenzler, 2004). Goldstein suggests that introducing specific forms of new authority may be the best means of reducing the abuse of authority by police officers.

Combating distrust (of the police) requires getting across the rather complicated message that granting the police specific forms of new authority may be the most effective means of reducing abuse of authority which is not theirs; that is the absence of properly prescribed forms of authority that often impels the police to engage in questionable or outright illegal conduct (Goldstein, 1977, p. 72).

Within interactions, the key accomplishment is the ability to convey the potential power of the office while containing its deployment. Yet, this does nothing to alleviate the opinion of those that believe that the police operate in a distinctive field of conflict and temptation that necessitates levels of accountability outside the norm (Prenzler, 2004).

The power of the police is implicit. It lies within the ability to obtain compliance with one's decisions, and if this is the criterion, the police are undoubtedly powerful. Yet they often do no more than allude to the power of their office and their own discretion to use physical force to obtain compliance.

### **3.2.8 Use of Force**

Intense training and socialisation prepares police officers for the realities of a potentially dangerous job that may involve the use of force. Efforts to reform police practice may founder on the lack of fit between what outsiders and insiders construe as competent practice. In order to understand these differences it is necessary to understand how police attribute competence to practice at incidents, and to examine the formal and informal constraints and goals which influence their action (Bittner, 1997).

Whilst authority power, persuasion and coercion are all designed to maintain control through mental and physiological domination, the use of force seeks to control a subject through physicality (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Klockars, 1984). Inherent to the police role are numerous tensions that emerge because of a wide discretion offered to officers in applying force (Loftus, 2010; Manning, 1977; Schaible & Gecas, 2010; Smith & Alpert, 2007).

Skolnick (2008) identifies the use of force as an enduring and troublesome feature of police culture, with police intervention focused on the use of the capacity and authority to overpower resistance. In studying the race riots in the USA in the 1960s, Skolnick claims that the spark that set off the riots was usually the police use of excessive force. The use of force therefore occupies an important position in the cultural identity of policing, and for some, it is seen as the defining characteristic of the role with ties to cultural disposition (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Hunt, 1985).

Skolnick (1966) attributes this disposition to the police occupational perception that they are in constant danger while working, and the need to be suspicious in order to properly carry out their role as protectors. This view, coupled with the discretionary authority to use force is viewed by police officers as necessary to achieve the outcomes expected by society. Behaviour that may be considered deviant by the majority of people is accepted by the police as a necessary norm and the practice is internalised and rationalised. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) maintain that this use of violence is in response to their mandate to use lawful coercive force and is consistent with theories concerning the machismo elements of enforcement.

### **3.2.9 Policing Styles**

Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) suggest that policing engenders a violent culture which promotes the use of violence in response to their mandate to use lawful coercive force in keeping the peace. This has some general support in the literature on police culture (Klockars, 1984). However, others see policing as having a more laid-back discretionary style, which is characterised as a “holiday style”, based around the idea that you don’t let the work get to you (Christensen & Crank, 2001, p. 83).

Whilst departmental expectations influence individual performance and behavior, police officers have their own unique styles based upon predispositions, which provide an array of responses to contextual situations. These reflect the police officers personal beliefs, professional aspirations, attitudes and morals. These different styles reflect the emergence of typologies within policing.

### **3.2.10 Police Typologies**

It has become popular to stereotype police officers based on typologies. Whilst research supports the notion that police officers have general styles, the consensus on the styles dissipates in light of context, situational, environmental and organisational variants. Police typologies have been proposed by Broderick (1977) and Muir (1977), White (1972) and Brown (1981). A summary of these typologies and their styles are depicted in Table 3.

The first of these typologies is Broderick’s *working personalities* (Broderick, 1977) which consists of four individual styles of policing (enforcers, idealists, optimists and realists). Enforcers see their role as strictly performing police work and become frustrated when required to perform non-crime-fighting activities. Idealists believe that every person has a good side and they try to bring it out while enforcing the law. Optimists are orientated towards helping people but realise the limits of trying to enforce the law, which can lead to frustration when their goals are not met. They acknowledge that they will not be spending most of their time fighting crime. Realists believe that there is little the police can do to resolve the matters that they face and that many problems will have no solution.

Muir (1977) claims that police officers develop distinctive styles premised on specific attitudes; specifically, passion and perspective. Passion relates to whether police officers recognise the need to use coercion and their willingness to employ it to attain their job-related objectives. Perspective relates to the extent to which officers empathise with the circumstances of citizens

and with other officers with whom they interact. Muir's four policing styles reflected these attitudes. Professionals possess both passion and perspective; enforcers possess passion but not perspective; reciprocators possess perspective but lack passion, and avoiders had neither passion nor perspective.

Table 3: Police Typologies

(Broderick, 1977)	(Muir, 1977)	(White, 1972)	(Brown, 1981)
<b>Enforcers</b> Outcome orientated; frustrated by admin functions.	<b>Enforcers</b> Cynical and coercive; passion but not perspective.	<b>Tough Cop</b> Outcomes orientated.	<b>Old Style Crime Fighter</b> Aggressive but selective; will use illegal means if necessary.
<b>Idealists</b> High ideals and commitment to social order.	<b>Professionals</b> Integrates coercion and sympathy; passion & perspective.	<b>Rule applier</b> Goes strictly by the book.	<b>Clean Beat Crime Fighter</b> Aggressive but selective; uses only legal means.
<b>Optimists</b> People Orientated; realise job has limits.	<b>Reciprocators</b> Cannot make up mind; over sympathetic; perspective but not passion.	<b>Crime Fighter</b> On a mission to wipe out certain crime; described as a zealot.	<b>Service Style</b> Sensitive to community values and needs.
<b>Realists</b> "Just a job" attitude; many problems have no solution.	<b>Avoiders</b> Avoids work; slacker; neither passion nor perspective.	<b>Problem Solver</b> Pays attention to people's needs.	<b>Professional Style</b> Non-selective and non-aggressive; using greatest amount of discretion.

White's typology (1972) describes four types of police officers; the tough cop (outcome orientated), the problem solver (pays attention to people's needs), the crime fighter (on a mission to wipe out a certain type of crime – described as a zealot), and the rule applier (goes strictly by the book).

Brown (1981) developed four individual policing styles around underlying dimensions; these being selectivity of enforcement and aggressiveness on the street. Old style crime fighters and

clean beat crime fighters are similar to Muir's enforcers in that they are very aggressive but also very selective. The difference between them is that the old-style crime fighter will solve problems using all available means legal or illegal, while the clean beat crime fighter will only use legal means. As with Muir's enforcers, they become very frustrated when forced to perform duties other than what they see as important for enforcing the law. Brown's service style is sensitive to community values and not overly concerned with the suppression of crime. They tend to be selective in enforcing those laws that are deemed important by community standards. Brown's professional type is non-selective as well as non-aggressive. They believe that enforcing the law is very important but is not the sole aim of policing. This professional style is directly linked with Muir's professional and Broderick's idealist police officers.

A number of common groupings can be identified across these typologies. The first is the *Problem Solver and Peacekeeper* orientation, which emphasises the elements of fairness and negotiation. As part of this type, arrests are de-emphasised and interaction and negotiation are emphasised. The second is the *Competent Law Enforcer* orientation, which emphasises a focus on the law and its correct application. The third orientation is the *Authority Figures* who are characterised by their desire to take control of the situation. The final orientation is that of *Knight in Shining Armour*. Here the emphasis is on resolving problems, including showing empathy with complainants and suspects.

This literature review identified 13 additional police typologies with relevance to this research. Some of these characteristically overlap the styles outlined above; however, most possess at least some unique characteristics of their own. These typologies are:

1. Tradesman (Hughes, 1958);
2. Artist (Hughes, 1958);
3. Entrepreneur (Hughes, 1958);
4. Professionals/ Old Pros (Fielding, 1988; Hughes, 1958; Paoline, 2004);
5. Careerist (Klockars, 1980)
6. Missionary / Evangelist (Hughes, 1958; Reiner, 2000);
7. Avoiders / Lay lows (Paoline, 2004; Reiner, 1978);
8. Clean beat crime fighters (Paoline, 2004);
9. Gatekeepers / Peacekeepers (Innes, 2002; Loftus, 2010);
10. Dirty Harry Enforcers (Klockars, 1980);
11. Problem Solvers (Paoline, 2004), and;

12. Craftsman (Klockars, 1980; Skolnick, 1966).

1. *Tradesman*

The Tradesman is someone who has acquired a certain skill set, hence considers those skills close to an art (Hughes, 1958).

2. *Artist*

The artist possesses a combination of special talents but in contrast to the tradesman, possesses ability as well as training in particular techniques (Hughes, 1958). Policing possesses characteristics of both the tradesman and the artist, the former in regard to the tacit knowledge that is built up over years of experience, and the latter being the training and formal qualification obtained through an academy education.

3. *Entrepreneur*

The entrepreneur bases his/her career on enterprise, and regards their work roles the same way they would when dealing with a commodity. There is no real sense of mission or adding value to the world in the entrepreneurs base of understanding (Hughes, 1958). As such the entrepreneur can be compared with corrupt police officers who have no regard for the role of policing in the community, but are more attuned to their own financial well-being through facilitating corrupt earnings.

4. *Professional/Old Pros*

The professional enters his/her profession through a period of long training. The professional typology is also characterised by an empirically operative criteria of competent practice which displays the attribution of competence (Fielding, 1988; Hughes, 1958). Alternatively referred to as “Old Pros” (Paoline, 2004, p. 222), these individuals are interested in the professionalisation reform movement and its impacts on street level policing, attitudes and behaviours. Autonomy is amplified as the occupation becomes more professionalised, inevitably developing its own norms, values, ideologies, and traditions that can often deviate from those of the broader society and culture (Bjork, 2008).

Police have an interest in being associated with professionalism as this defines and distinguishes them as members of a profession that does not condone misconduct and where corrupt practices can be exposed and addressed as part of the exceptional and accountable powers that police exercise. Professionals appear to be more willing to accept change and innovation that occur in

policing, generally hold favourable opinions toward citizens and supervisors, and generally regard the procedural guidelines for police work favourably (Geoetz, 2007; Paoline, 2004).

#### 5. *Careerist*

The careerist represents a changing of the guard, the transition from street level policing to management. Careerists emerge where the problems associated with surviving with a foot in both camps (street police and management) become polarised and irresolvable. A hybrid subculture develops as a way of adapting and reacting against both the core culture into which the individual has been socialised, and any other class of culture which stands in opposition to the achievement of the career objective (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002; Dallos & Sapsford, 1981).

Unfortunately, mobility in any type of bureaucracy imposes specific stresses upon individuals. Individuals must often sacrifice family relationships for career goals. In addition, climbing the organisational ladder tends to generate considerable envy amongst peers. An individual may begin to feel isolated as relationships become modified or dissolve. Police subordinates do not always view police superiors with respect and admiration (More, 1985).

#### 6. *Missionary*

The missionary typology is representative of individuals who feel they are being called or converted to a mission. It is epitomised by the evangelist, who proselytises about those who have moved away from the correct path. The missionary typology, therefore, is cult like (Hughes, 1958). Reiner (2000) describes the missionary typology as being one of the core characteristics of policing culture, with the police having an exaggerated sense of mission towards the role and craving work that is crime orientated and exciting. The strength of the culture is, therefore, based on a foundation that police work is indeed a mission, and not just another job. Anything done in pursuit of the mission is serving a greater cause. This is indicative of the service commitment inherent in police culture but can also be translated in a negative sense into getting the job done at any cost (Chan, 1997; Manning, 1977; Prenzler, 1997; Shanahan, 2000; Skolnick, 1966).

#### 7. *Avoiders / Lay lows*

Avoiders, as the label implies, are merely doing their time in the organisation, and avoiding as much work as is reasonably possible. The attitudes towards the work they do and the organisations they represent are neutral at best and negative at worst. Whereas the missionary is fixated with mission, the avoiders mission is to do just enough to justify the tenants of the

job and nothing more (Paoline, 2004; Reiner, 1978). Lay lows are said to possess many of the characteristics of the avoiders with the specific exception that they do not distrust citizenry, who they see as cooperative. The ability of these officers to indeed, lay low, is dependent on holding positive attitudes towards key players in the working environment, that is, citizens and supervisors (Paoline, 2004).

#### 8. *Clean Beat Crime Fighters*

In many ways, the clean beat crime fighter represents the image of the tough cop. These individuals are cynical, have a strong crime fighter orientation, and are often unsupportive of supervisors. What typifies these types is the never die pursuit to fight all crime (not just corruption) and the upholding of the notions of citizens' rights (Paoline, 2004).

#### 9. *Gatekeepers / Peacekeepers*

Gatekeepers possess an exaggerated assessment of their role as part of a complex and constructive societal process. Police are seen as gate keeping organisations, tasked with conducting enquiries into events where there is a potential transgression of law. Gatekeepers unequivocally see themselves as crime fighters and as the term would imply, as holding the keys to the gate of peaceful and lawful society (Innes, 2002; Loftus, 2010). Peacekeepers, like their gatekeeper cousins, see themselves as the thin blue line that stands between chaos and order and also, unequivocally see themselves as crime fighters. Moral values associated with police culture are an imperative for controlling *their patch*.

#### 10. *Dirty Harry Enforcers*

Dirty Harry Enforcers see the world divided into two camps: the good guys and bad guys, the innocent and the guilty (Hochstedler, 1981; Muir, 1977). This typology uses the street as a battlefield and views the police as warriors in the fight against crime and criminals. These officers strongly believe in aggressive tactics to enforce police functions and have no apprehensions about violating the rights of those they are targeting. These officers have a reasonable distrust of citizenry, whilst at the same time believing that citizens should cooperate with the police (Paoline, 2004).

The idea of the Dirty Harry enforcer is an internalisation of what Klockers (1980, p. 34) describes as "the Dirty Harry problem." This typology gets its name from the 1971 Clint Eastward movie of the same name. The Dirty Harry problem effectively juxtaposes the notion of moral ends against dirty means. It asks, to what extent does the morally good justify the use



of illegal or dirty tactics to achieve them? As such, the Dirty Harry problem is indeed a moral dilemma.

I know of not a single contribution to the criminological or sociological literature on policing which raises it explicitly and examines its implications. This is the case in spite of the fact that there is considerable evidence to suggest that it is not only an ineluctable part of police work, but a moral problem with which the police themselves are quite familiar (Klockars, 1980, p. 34).

A basic requirement of the Dirty Harry problem is that the person employing the dirty tactics must know, or have a sense that the tactics will result in the achievement of a good end. In many cases, the good end to be achieved must be so unquestionably good and so passionately felt that even a small possibility of its achievement demands that it be tried.

#### *11. Problem Solvers*

Like Avoiders, Problem-Solvers are not aggressive in their patrolling tactics but are selective in their enforcement (Paoline, 2004). Unlike Avoiders, these officers care very much about their job, especially with regard to helping citizens, which distinguishes them from all previous typologies. Problem-Solvers value their discretion, which they believe enables them to solve the problems that plague their community.

#### *12. The Craftsman*

The literature supports the idea that police have a self-image of themselves as “craftsmen” or masters of their trade (Klockars, 1980; Niederhoffer, 1969; Skolnick, 1966, p. 46). Klockars observes that in many situations, the craftsmen fail to see their actions of dirty means to achieve good ends (their craft) in the same moral class as those they pursue.

The craftsman refuses to see, as Skolnick thinks he ought to, that the dirty means he sometimes uses to achieve his good ends stand in the same moral class of wrongs as those he is employed to fight (Klockars, 1980, p. 46).

Whilst Skolnick’s description of police as craftsmen has invariably been described as demonstrating the futility of expectancy of any adherence to the rule of law, it also shows that police have an overwhelming desire to be seen, if not show themselves as competent craftsmen (Fielding, 1988).

Holdaway (1983) maintains that these claims to craftsmanship have their foundations in the central tenants of the occupational culture, and involve an agreement amongst police of the

need for process in order to provide what is considered to be the best policing service (Shanahan, 2000). This personal mastery is used in the pursuit of a certain level of proficiency that is constantly maintained and built upon as an indicator of lifelong learning. Shanahan sees this commitment to personal mastery as being a critical component of learning organisations. These operative assumptions are passed on to all new recruits and are promoted as a necessary attribute is to be successful in the policing craft (Klockars, 1980; Shanahan, 2000).

### **3.2.11 Operative Assumptions**

Klockars (1980, p. 39) maintains that police tend towards assuming that a suspect is guilty until proven innocent, a condition he refers to as the “operative assumption of guilt”. The situation is exacerbated by a second factor described by Klockars as “the worst of all possible guilt”. This is the situation where a police officer hypothesises that most suspects are not only guilty, but dangerously so and is based on the premise that those with the most to hide will try the hardest to hide it. A third operative factor of policing identified by Klockars relates to the psychological conditioning of the police officer, which he describes as “the great guilty place assumption.” This assumption works on the premise that many ordinary situations hide the potential for crimes waiting to happen:

That he comes to read a clump of bushes as a place to hide, a roadside rest as a homosexual “tearoom”, a sweet old lady as a robbery looking for a place to happen, or a poor young black as someone willing to oblige her is not a question of a perverse, pessimistic or racist personality, but of a person whose job requires that he strive to see race, age, sex, and even nature in an ecology of guilt, which can include him if he fails to see it so (Klockars, 1980, p. 39).

The final operative assumption of policing identified by Klockars (1980, p. 39) is the “not guilty (this time) assumption,” which is based upon the premise that police regard most people as having committed crimes for which they have never been caught, therefore people who are arrested and eventually released are only innocent *this time*.

### **3.2.12 Beliefs and Knowledge**

These beliefs and expectations regarding the practices and realities of police work have a considerable impact on the way police officers go about their roles. Existing beliefs are said to form mental models that influence both the operating environment for the police officers as well as the way they act in that environment, serving as a simple mechanism for rationalising

members conduct (Innes, 2002; Shanahan, 2000). They also serve as a basis for the development of knowledge both formal and informal (or experientially grounded) about the relationships between individual police officers and their general operating environment. The police propagate this knowledge through a combination of formal training, procedural guidelines, and informal values maintained by the occupational police culture which decides how police enact their mandate (Chan, 1997; Fielding, 1988; Reiner, 2000).

Policing knowledge can be both subjective and objective. Subjective knowledge is knowledge belonging to the individual police officer themselves, whilst objective knowledge is knowledge free from bias, opinion and prejudice, and emotionally detached from the subjects themselves (Gosling & Taylor, 2010). This knowledge drives decisions by police on how and why crimes tend to occur and what investigative practices are likely to be more successful. One of the unique features of police culture is the tendency to pass this knowledge on, in the form of *war stories*. This is a term normally applied by the police themselves and draws upon the idea that police officers view themselves first and foremost as crime fighters, involved in a war on crime with the battlelines drawn between us (the police) and them (the criminals), (Crank, 2004; Smith & Alpert, 2007).

### **3.2.13 War Stories**

The basis for war stories is the attempt by police to make sense of phenomena in the workplace, through telling stories that articulate their personal experiences as regards these phenomena. By serving as analogies, war story scripts provide morals upon which police can base their attitudes and perceptions. Hence, if the features of a situation match an existing script in the police officers mind, the officer can invoke the memory from the war story to provide guidance on how to act in a given situation. The task becomes one of recognition rather than construction (Ashforth & Fried, 1988; Bjork, 2008; Martin, 1982).

Shared organisational experiences and stories create a sense of shared reality amongst police, typically when the lessons from such stories are complex or even contradictory, or may be open to multiple interpretations, as is often the case in policing. They often recount tales of heroic extreme far removed from the normal tedium of everyday policing and often contradicting official procedures. They often emphasise danger and violence and strengthen the perceived importance of cohesive informal occupational loyalty and camaraderie, and heighten the barriers of informal acceptance for any outsiders, who cannot be counted on to conform to the group's norms. In this way it also perpetuates the notion of masculine culture (McIvor, 2004).

War stories are particularly important in an academy context as they capture the attention of recruits better than formal lecturing strategies. War stories are considered a timeout from the usual discipline expected within the academy environment, during which the recruits are allowed to laugh and enjoy the stories. This relaxed story telling strategy defines “what is truly valued in police work and in police culture” (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010, p. 208). Through discussing the stories, police recruits begin to understand the nature and roles of policing and how they are supposed to act in given situations (Van Maanen, 1973). It is claimed that these stories separate the good guys from the bad guys; another manifestation of the, *us versus them* dichotomy. The meaning of good moral behaviour is defined in classes, informally defined through the war stories and reinforced through modelling by superiors at the police academy.

The paramilitary culture of the police is reinforced, where real police work is considered to be crime fighting action, defensive tactics, car chases and arrests. Instruction on the softer side of policing, including community engagement, communications and problem solving, does not capture the excitement or interest of the recruits as much. Indeed it is argued that war stories provide potent informal lessons that may even undercut the formal curriculum (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010).

Post academy supervision plays a vital role in reinforcing messages learnt in the academy. Mentoring is used in a wide variety of policing contexts to benefit mentees through the sharing of knowledge and experience (McClurg, 1998). As common understandings emerge, the individual police officers develop a common stake in “the perpetuation of the collectivity” (Ashforth & Fried, 1988, p. 320). This “collectivity” thus provides an ongoing validation of that behaviour and understanding. Norms and expectations evolve through co-commitment. Often the war stories contradict formal messages from the police academy and it is claimed that the stories undoubtedly contain implicit or explicit expressions of power relations within hierarchal police organisational structures (Chan, 1996; Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010).

#### **3.2.14 Hierarchal and Administrative Structures**

Most police agencies, as paramilitary, bureaucratic organisations have clear formal authority structures with explicit chains of command and a hierarchy with authority over those holding lower positions. Recruits learn the structures and understand that discipline is required. The police academy is structured to teach these lessons, and to alter association patterns and interactions that might interfere with this formal command structure and discipline. The

negative aspects of these associations are counterbalanced by a sense of belonging to a group that supports its own (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010).

Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) question the value of the paramilitary model of policing, where police at the bottom of the hierarchy have the largest discretionary powers yet are stifled in an organisational context by a strict hierarchical system. It is argued that police organisations are adept at creating hierarchal structures that protect rather than explain, and seek scapegoats rather than admit mistakes (Shanahan, 2000).

Policing relies upon hierarchal command structure demanding cohesive group action, however this is often undermined by individualism or dissent (Sen, 2010). Manning (1974) proposes that elaborate hierarchal rank structures assist in replicating the distribution of secret knowledge, with social relationships among police determined around access to information, a structural fact that maintains organisational stratification.

This can lead to stressful role conflict situations where police officers feel that: they have too little authority to carry out their roles and responsibilities; they have too heavy a workload that cannot possibly be finished during the course of an ordinary working day; they are forced to do things against their better judgement; and they are not fully qualified for the role that is expected of them (ACJS, 1990).

### **3.2.15 Autonomy**

It is claimed that many officers reminisce about the old days of policing, where the public respected the cops, fellow officers could be relied upon, the bosses (high ranking officers) were part of the police family and where police autonomy was an essential part of the officers operational milieu (Vito et al., 2011). This contrasts with the present, where administrative influence encroaches on the personal enforcement styles of the police officers. This degree of autonomy in their work environment appears to be one of the most salient factors affecting psychological functioning and personality of police officers (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Schaible, 2006):

You think this is autonomy, you think this is a teamed group? If you would have come and rode in 1974 or 1975, we had a brotherhood in those days. We were family. We looked after each other. We only communicated off duty with other officers. You don't find that today. Every Friday night, we had a party. At the end of a shift, we'd go off somewhere, and get a six-pack of beer or something, and just go jaw. We sometimes talked from the end of the shift,

which we got off at 1:00, until 7:00 in the morning. It didn't matter if it was guys or girls, we'd just sit and talk about what we did. We laughed, we joked, we cried (Christensen & Crank, 2001, p. 91).

Highly structured and controlled organisations tend to operate through developed scripts that are learned through various organisational socialisation processes, work experience and autocratic management, which can lead to a form of mindless behaviour. This is neither positive for the individual or the organisation and serves only to increase role conflict and ambiguity.

Individuals who are subject to less managerial control and more discretion in how they execute their work functions are more likely to have psychologically beneficial experiences (Schaible, 2006). They develop a stronger sense of ownership and identification with the outcomes of their toil. They suffer less from adverse effects of emotional labour because they are allowed to act consistently with their internally held self-definitions and expectations for emotional expression. Police officers with less autonomy and greater managerial control are conversely, more likely to experience emotive dissonance.

It is argued that a necessary condition for police to see their work as honourable is that they are allowed to work within a permitted sphere of autonomous action. It is within this definable context that police interact with each other to generate perspectives around their roles (Meara, 1974).

### **3.3 The Nature of Policing**

#### **3.3.1 Paradoxical Organisational Mandates**

Loftus (2010) claims that police work is characterised by ongoing underlying tensions and paradoxes. Those tensions exist between expectations of what police work involves and its daily realities. Organisational ethics are constructed and continuously re-composed by officers as they develop solutions toward coping with these daily realities of the job. It is in this way that they are able to make sense of events and shape organisational micro practices that critically impact the ethics of police organisations (Gordon et al., 2009; Tracy, 2004).

From a law enforcement perspective, police organisations have an interest in being able to hold out to the public a set of internally valid standards for a profession where corruption is discouraged and exposed and where they are seen to be accountable for the exceptional powers they exercise. However, their actual practices may not always meet with public expectation (Manning, 1974). This presents a paradox for modern day policing, where autonomous,

decentralised and non-hierarchical affinity groups promote the ideals of creative direct action without being dictated to by formal organisation.

### **3.3.2 ASA Framework**

Schneider's (1987) attraction - selection - attrition (ASA) framework tends to indicate that different kinds of people are likely to be more effective in the role of policing than others. The processes and functions that emerge in organisations are functions of the people in them behaving in ways that facilitate the accomplishment of organisational goals. The attraction, selection and retention of certain kinds of people yield individuals who are similar to each other and will be personally attracted to each other. In this perspective, employees' job attitudes are really only a social construction of reality: their attitudes are a reflection of the social milieu in which they work. However, the ASA model has further implications for the role of corruption investigators and provides an ideal window for predicting the cultural impact of policing in these roles. It predicts that the same organisational conditions will be differently satisfying to people in different work environments and, conversely, the different work conditions can be equally satisfying to people in different settings. So for instance, the conditions that may be attractive and satisfy so many in the policing environment, may act as dissatisfiers for potential police corruption investigators.

The ASA model purports that positive job attitudes for workers in an organisation can be expected when the natural inclinations of the person are allowed to be reflected in their behaviours by the processes and structures that have evolved within that organisation. In short, Schneider argues that researchers have been seduced into thinking that organisational processes and structures create the attitudes and feelings and experiences meanings and behaviours of individuals within them. Cause is attributed not to the people attracted to and selected by the organisation, but to the signs of their existence in the organisation, structure, process and technology. He seeks explanation in people, not in the results of their behaviour.

### **3.3.3 Affinity Theories and Institutionalisation**

Affinity theories are based on a school of sociology called structural functionalism and maintain that cultural norms and values constrain individuals and control regular patterns of behaviour (Muncie & Fitzgerald, 1981). Cultural affinity is a key element in standard sociological explanations and influences the way in which police go about doing their work and the occupational choices they make. This affinity is reinforced time after time because the

knowledge it purports provides solutions to critical issues and problems and helps to reduce anxiety in critical situations (Marks, 2004). These social practices and processes of policing become accepted ways of doing things, and are referred to by social researchers as institutionalisation (Gosling & Taylor, 2010).

#### **3.3.4 Police Norms and Values**

Police institutionalisation involves the promotion of a distinct body of values, norms, attitudes and practices that are often exercised at the discretion of the individual officers. Police conduct is said to be heavily influenced by the norms and values of the culture and the craft rules of the policing occupation (Chan, 1996; Goldsmith, 1990; Gosling & Taylor, 2010; Loftus, 2010; Reiner, 2000; Skolnick, 2008).

A norm is something that affects the way police behave, how they view others, and how they see the world generally. However, norms specifying when different styles of behaviour are appropriate are often vague and ambiguous, potentially creating role conflict. Research and reflection on the police have long acknowledged the role that informal norms and values associated with policing have on their everyday decisions and practices (Hunt, McCadden, & Mordaunt, 1983; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Loftus, 2010; Schaible & Gecas, 2010).

For instance, it is argued that displays of emotion in both functional and dysfunctional ways are constructed within the constraints of police organisational norms, which are neither stated nor recorded, but are well understood by the officers themselves (Tracy, 2004). Whilst Tracey's examples are based on correctional officers, similar constraints can be recognised within policing. Social norms become internalised through socialisation and conditioning, becoming part of an officer's identity and morality.

#### **3.3.5 Police Socialisation**

Van Maanen & Schein (1979, pp. 209-212) maintain that police are involved in a continual process of socialisation, which begins when they enter into police work ("anticipatory socialization") and continues indefinitely throughout their careers. Police officers are actively constructing and referencing the police culture in guiding their actions. Transmission of culture occurs through a process of socialisation and internalisation through collection of (war) stories and euphemisms which instruct officers to see the world and act on it. Structure and function are traditional concepts that guide research in social organisations.



Such socialisation shapes officers in complying with prevailing social order by imparting knowledge to new members on how to think and behave, and to conform to the needs of the social group. Training becomes so structured as to limit individual initiative thereby increasing individual levels of insecurity and uncertainty and exposing recruits to the effects of peer pressure and group norming. This socialisation process also exposes recruits to informal rules such as the code of silence (to be discussed later in this chapter) and loyalty to fellow officers (McIvor, 2004). These values are also influenced by stereotypical notions about the profession. Once in the profession, new officers are likely to be deeply influenced by the police subculture, which tends to embrace a traditional crime fighter image of policing (Manning, 1977; Schaible & Gecas, 2010; Van Maanen, 1974).

However, they quickly discover that they are more likely to attract attention for a violation or mistake, rather than for their crime fighter exploits. This encourages a “lay low” or “cover your ass” attitude to develop (Paoline, Myers, & Worden, 2000, p. 578)

Irrespective, police culture is not necessarily all embracing and created through uniform socialisation. Such a model is silent to the social and political context of policing, as undoubtedly the stories contain implicit or explicit expressions of power relations within police organisations (Chan, 1996; Shanahan, 2000). Chan (1996) criticises the idea that police officers demonstrate implicit passivity in the acculturation process. She suggests that officers are not passive or manipulated learners. They are, however, the final mediators of structural and cultural influences of their occupation. Chan maintains it is up to the individual to accommodate or resist the influence of police culture.

Chan maintains that many social researchers considerably underestimate the power of the police culture within a social economic legal and political context. However changes can happen to habitus (the objectives of policing). In the realm of influence, behaviour, attitudes and practices are most changeable when they are based on direct experience, however unless those attitudes and practices are reinforced in the new habitus, individuals may revert to old dispositions (Chan, 1996; Smith & Alpert, 2007).

### **3.3.6 Social and Occupational Process**

Process structure is an analytical construct that captures how organisational action often has an established trajectory and dynamic nature, directed toward the accomplishment of particular objectives (Innes, 2002). It also accounts for actions of individual police officers who are

constrained and regulated by the legal and organisational contexts in which they operate. The police process culture is characterised by strict hierarchical structures and control systems, and is arguably more aligned with the civil service process culture, then with that of the tough guy macho culture that police often assign to themselves (Shanahan, 2000).

### **3.3.7 Control Systems**

Control systems begin with values, which define what is good and what is bad, what is expected, what is condemned, what is tolerated and what is not tolerated. The nature of police organisations is such that they are particularly immune to external control. Any potential for the deterrence and enhancement of organisational integrity through bureaucratic control is inherently limited by the realities of police work. Opportunities for misconduct are plentiful and the level of discretion given to police officers to make decisions in the absence of direct supervision abound (Banton, 1964; Goldstein, 1977; Liederbach et al., 2007). Internal controls are further undermined by a police subculture that values both secrecy and the use of violence to maintain public respect (Westley, 1956).

With reference to controlling corruption, More (1985, p. 206) identifies three major areas of significant inflow;

1. Administrative control;
2. Control by media, and;
3. Control by watchdog groups.

Whilst police accountability must combine both internal and external controls (being one reason for the rise in popularity of civilian oversight), it is difficult if not impossible to address a widespread problem or systematic corruption in organisations where management refuses to accept that there is an issue (More, 1985; Sen, 2010). More (1985) asserts that there is little or no serious effort in police organisations to seek out corruption in the absence of complaints. The development of large and powerful anticorruption agencies, coupled with bureaucratic administrative processes are a recognition of the inability of traditional policing agencies to change and regulate human behaviour by way of rulemaking (Goldsmith, 1991).

### **3.3.8 Cultural Conflict**

Part of group self-identity is the development of standardised emotional responses to common situations. The more important an identity to the individual the more often he or she acts in expression of that identity; hence, the individual's self-perception greatly influences their

behavioural alternatives.

Police organisational control systems begin with values, which define what is good and what is bad, what is tolerated, what is not tolerated. Street cop culture provides salience and meaning to this social organisation within police agencies, but a competing ethos now finds salience and meaning not in traditions of the job, but rather in new managerialism and public administration. Within the literature, the different perspectives on police work were most evident between those that work at the coal face (street cops) and command staff, who were removed from having to deal directly with the less attractive aspects of operational policing (Pogrebin & Poole, 1991; Reuss-Ianni, 1984).

New managerialism originated in business and industry and organises departments hierarchally, with advancement on merit rather than personal characteristics and relationships, and a “managers' v workers” orientation. This conflict between cultures is described as a classic case of what organisational theorists call the “opposition of bureaucratic and organic forms of organisation” (formal and informal organisation) (More, 1985; Reuss-Ianni, 1984, pp. 5-6).

The organisational ethos of the street cop is best demonstrated through the ideal of the “good old days” when cops put their lives on the line for their job and management were part of that culture. Everyone in the police department was socialised into that ethos. However changing political structure and introducing competition for scarce resources has pitted agency against agency. A new “management cop culture” emerged which was positively orientated towards public administration. However, for the street cop, gut reaction, experience and ability to recognise identify and respond to situations still epitomised “good policing”, rather than internalised standardised rules and procedures that characterise “management cop culture”. Street cops maintain that bosses have forgotten about being cops: “they would give us up in a moment, if necessary, in order to save their own careers” (Reuss-Ianni, 1984, p. 3).

Career mobility imposes additional specific stresses upon police agencies. The climbing of the organisational ladder tends to generate considerable envy amongst peers. An individual may begin to feel isolated as peers become subordinates and effective relationships become modified or dissolve. The cultural distance between police managers and front line staff may lead to contradictory goals within the organisation (More, 1985; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Skolnick, 2008; Westmarland, 2008).

An interesting observation for this study was the relationships between the police corruption

investigators and the managerial staff (normally lawyers) attached to anti-corruption agencies. Of specific interest to this research was the aspects of organisational goal setting, perceptions of support and the adoption and acceptance of policy and strategy across investigative operational units.

### **3.3.9 Occupational Anomie**

Police experience their careers in stages of contingency, representing thresholds at which they can decide to withdraw from further commitment or continuation in police work. Any decision to resign is contingent, in part, on their stake in conformity and commitment to the occupation and to organisational expectations and norms (Harr, 2005; Van Maanen, 1974). For instance, Baker (1985, pp. 53-54) describes an erosion process that takes place in police recruits from the time they leave the academy. They see their ideals become tarnished with “calluses growing thick and hard over his ability to feel”. Baker maintains that the police officer feels let down by the criminal justice system to which they pledged service. Given that officers exhibit strong preference for specific values which are compromised or come into conflict with sub-cultural, organisational or public demands, it is inevitable that some level of dissonance is experienced (McClurg, 1998; Schaible & Gecas, 2010).

Anomie is a term popularised by French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858 – 1917) and describes a morbid condition characterised by absence of standards, apathy, confusion, frustration, alienation and despair. Anomie occurs where old values of a social system are supplanted by a new system. This creates a feeling of uncertainty and lack of purpose in the minds of the individual as they attempt to establish a sense of true belonging to the group. If this estrangement becomes too intense the end result can be self-destructive (More, 1985).

At the self-identity level, individuals may come to recognise that the institutionalised roles and values of socialisation into policing culture are in conflict with their own strongly held identities and values. They therefore experience, what has been termed, “value dissonance” (Schaible & Gecas, 2010, pp. 318-319). In addition, at the experiential level, they may be exposed to behaviours and interactions which compromise their own strongly held beliefs, thereby creating “emotive dissonance”.

It is argued that because of this emotional labour resulting from dissonance between values, norms and behaviours, that individuals are likely to experience consequences such as alienation, depersonalisation, burnout and inauthenticity. In as much as officers exhibit a strong preference

for specific values which come into conflict with the subcultural, organisational, or public demands, officers are likely to experience some level of dissonance (Schaible & Gecas, 2010).

One of the tasks for this research was to assess whether the police corruption investigators experienced *anomie* when transitioning from police organisations to anti-corruption agencies:

Anxious over personal failure, the individual policeman often disguises his feelings with a cynical attitude, and thus negates the value of the prize he did not attain. Frequently he includes in his cynicism all persons who still seek that prize or have succeeded in winning it ... As the cynic becomes increasingly pessimistic and misanthropic, he finds it easier to reduce his commitment to the social system and its values (Niederhoffer, 1969, p. 101).

Niederhoffer points out that the typical adaptation to *anomie* is cynicism, which was highlighted earlier in this thesis as a major characteristic of police culture.

### **3.3.10 Reality Shock**

Another cause and aspect of police cynicism has been referred to by Niederhoffer (1969, pp. 51-53) as “reality shock”. This concept propounds that police officers commence their careers with a faith in the systems of criminal justice and police organisations. They soon discover, however, that each situation or case that they face has profound repercussions for which they were neither prepared nor aware. As a result, officers learn to replace authoritative dictum with individual interpretation, learning to neglect formal rules and norms. In such an environment, Neiderhoffer (1969, p. 56) theorises that officers have to make a choice between a “pragmatic precinct approach” and professional ideals of policing.

For this research, the concept of reality shock was used as an assumptive mechanism for examining how civil review anti-corruption investigators develop “on the job attitudes”, and whether there is a change from when they first join the agencies to a more cynical approach once they become more aware of the realities of their work and the potentially mechanistic and inhibitive nature of the systems in which they operate.

### **3.3.11 Burnout**

Burnout is a well-documented phenomenon that occurs within policing, and which (it is argued) occurs at a much more significant rate than in other occupations (Harr, 2005; More, 1985; Schaible & Gecas, 2010). Burnout includes psychological withdrawal, loss of enthusiasm and the loss of a sense of identity or mission in one’s occupation.

Adherents of burnout theory support the notion that police who resign after relatively long periods of police service, do so because they experience a gradual state of burnout due to the accumulative influences of both occupational and organisational stresses (Harr, 2005; Harris & Baldwin, 1999; Reiser, 1974; Sparger & Giacomassi, 1983).

Given the length of police service and occupational experience of the majority of the police corruption investigators interviewed for this research, this became a critical issue in examining their decisions to leave the police service and pursue a career within civil review anti-corruption agencies.

More (1985, pp. 287-291) argues that burnout represents itself in the police occupation in one of three ways:

1. Emotional symptoms include apathy, anxiety, irritability and mental fatigue;
2. Behavioural indicators include withdrawal and social isolation;
3. Whilst the physical ramifications include frequent illness and physical exhaustion.

In her seminal work, Hochschild (1983) proposes that when organisational and institutional expectations and pressures conflict with self-identity, then workers are likely to experience a sense of inauthenticity and alienation. At the experiential level, workers engage in behaviours and interactions that cause emotive dissonance. The emotional labour resulting from dissonance between values and behaviours can thus cause a range of consequences for the individual, including burnout and cynicism, and may even manifest in increased levels of scepticism, alcoholism, drug abuse, divorce and suicide, which are traditionally high risk considerations for policing (Niederhoffer, 1969; Schaible & Gecas, 2010; Skolnick, 2008; Violanti & Marshall, 1983).

For this research, the truly interesting aspect of this phenomenon was in identifying the levels of emotive and value dissonance amongst the corruption investigators. They were all socialised into police cultures that value traits of secrecy, camaraderie and loyalty and yet they were motivated to join occupations so obviously stigmatised by the very culture into which they had been socialised.

### **3.3.12 Code of Values**

The literature supports the concept that each police subcultural grouping has their own code of values, which the individual sometimes finds it difficult to live up to. If that becomes the case they are inclined to ignore the code altogether by rationalising feelings of guilt by disparaging

those that would promote the code. Through this process, it is argued that a code of values that is not consistent with the cultural sense of reality may impede professionalisation of policing (More, 1985; Niederhoffer, 1969; Pogrebin & Poole, 1991; Stevens, 2005).

### **3.3.13 Professionalism**

More (1985, p. 310) describes seven steps by which professionalism may be achieved within police organisations:

1. Prescribed course of study;
2. Application of prescribed methods in practice, teaching, reading and briefing;
3. Postgraduate courses specialise in specific field;
4. Internship for application of theory to practice for the purpose of developing skill;
5. Acknowledge and acceptance of self-imposed ethical standards of professional practice and personal conduct;
6. Examination to determine fitness to practice and enter the profession, and;
7. Continuous study and research for improvement and investment of professional techniques.

Goetz (2007) maintains that such attributes are distinguishable factors in identifying someone as being a member of a profession rather than simply having a job. However in any such profession, the discipline of professionals is not a matter of strict liability and normally involves an element of intent, knowledge, judgement and autonomy. This autonomy is best exemplified in the practice and practitioners of law, where professionalism inevitably creates its own norms, values, ideologies and traditions which may be seen to deviate from broader societal values, were they obvious (Bjork, 2008).

Police professionalism is often practised within an authoritarian culture (Brehm & Gates, 1993; Gottschalk, 2007). As police become more professionalised and less subject to public or political control, they will arguably become more wieldy to central power to define roles in a working environment that constantly creates new dilemmas for them. Manning (1974) argues that this continuing professionalisation, without major internal changes such as horizontal recruitment, decentralisation or greater clarification of police policy, will consolidate many of the bad habits (for instance, lying) which have traditionally been used by officers to deal with structurally or occupationally induced conflicts.

More (1985, pp. 323-324) has an opposing view, and maintains that police professionalism breaks down traditional secrecy and encourages more open communications, encouraging less

loyalty to the department and more to the occupation itself. He also comments upon police managerial ambivalence to such professionalisation:

Improved self-image, increases internalise performance accountability, more role taking and less role making, less loyalty to the department and more to the occupation at large, and decreased secrecy of operations ... Administrators are understandably ambivalent about these changes because they undermine direct executive control and require placing greater trust in their supporters.

### **3.3.14 Power Based Interactions**

Identifying characteristics that refer to relationships with others is a critical component of social identity; for instance, the relationship between power and authority (Gosling & Taylor, 2010; Klockars, 1984). Both are social forms of domination and control. Both depend upon a concerted sharing and coordination of meanings and actions. The hallmark of authority is unquestioning obedience whilst power relations admit the contemplation and calculation of the cost of resistance.

An individual's present and past actions are given meaning by persons with whom he or she characteristically interacts. Behaviour is seen very much as developing within the context of the most influential socialising groups. How a person feels about acting in a certain manner reflects their own experiences and basic political attitudes, their views and expectations as to the proper way of managing power relationships (Dallos & Sapsford, 1981). These politically orientated models of organisation typically draw upon social exchange or inducements-contributions theory (Ashforth & Fried, 1988), which maintains that individuals are motivated by self-interest and interact only to further that self-interest, and that individuals continuously monitor current and potential interactions for exchange value. This has critical implications for corruption investigations particularly where investigators are interviewing suspect police officers. An element of trust building and negotiation is critical in this transaction and provides the structure and basis for interlocked action. The power of the investigator is implicated in the production of meaning in the interaction. Roles evolve within interview situations and both shape and are shaped by those situations (Fielding, 1988; Gordon et al., 2009).

Ethically speaking these power relationships are designed to facilitate compliance in which the first priority is to avoid a clash of occupational values with those perceived to be in positions of power. However, these propositions are irreconcilably in conflict given that investigators and the investigated are normally coming from opposing sides of the legal/ethical spectrum, and



their understanding (from criminal justice system experience) that saying the wrong thing or making admissions can forever impact the police officer's life and career (McClurg, 1998).

### **3.3.15 Police Brotherhood**

The police "brotherhood" is said to not have any jurisdictional boundaries (Barry & Walton, 1977, p. 25). Conformity is an essential part of this fraternity. Often, to fully claim membership, an officer needs to act outside what their own personal values dictate. An officer consistently acting within his or her own personal values and outside group norms, runs the risk of being labelled as a problem. Conformity is necessary in accomplishing the police mission. Police responding to tactical situations must act in unison with all officers acting as a team. If all police officers were to act of their own accord then their response to emergency situations would be ineffective.

There is a great deal of pressure for conformity amongst police officers and within police organisations, with peer influence being one of the most profound pressures operating within organisations (Reiser, 1974). Reiser argues that the cost of this group conformity is a loss of autonomy in the areas of values and attitudes. This gives rise to phenomena such as the blue curtain of silence where police officers may be defined under a banner of lying to protect each other.

### **3.3.16 Investigation and the Law**

Innes (2002, p. 678) describes how the concept of framing captures various structural aspects of police life and can be seen to constitute a context that impacts upon performance. This framing is marked by differentials of power. The reflexive elaboration of frames of meaning is characteristically imbalanced by three key influences:

1. The particular qualities and circumstances of the incident;
2. The social organisation of the police response;
3. The law as a system of labels, a mode of rationality and a set of constraining and enabling resources.

This is particularly relevant to the investigative work carried out by detectives, a group to which the majority of police corruption investigators once belonged.

Police corruption investigators operate in a highly legalistic environment, managed by judges and lawyers. This relationship between the investigative function and the legal process is understood as exhibiting traits of morphogenesis, in that each can be considered as mutually

influencing and productive of the other. Investigation protocol establishes the basis upon which the legal process will be enacted but at the same time, the ways in which the brief of evidence is constructed as knowledge about the criminal event, is framed by the legal context in which it is situated (Fielding, 1988; Innes, 2002).

The social organisation of the investigator response is maintained through administrative and conceptual knowledge structures. The strategies, procedures and tactics, taken together, can be said to constitute an investigative methodology. The law both enables certain forms of investigative action but also regulates and constrains others. It establishes institutionalised practices, which allow the complexities of social life to be reduced in such a way that the cause of an incident can be unambiguously identified (Innes, 2002).

### **3.3.17 Education**

It is argued that a police cultural resistance to formal education tends to undermine the occupations attempts to professionalise. The US Bureau of the Census has established the following pre-requisites as considerations for professionalism:

A professional worker is one who performs advisory, administrative or research work which is based upon the established principles of a profession or science, and which requires scientific or technical training equivalent to that represented by graduation from a college or university on recognise standing, or one who performs work which is based upon science or other and which requires for its performance and acquaintance with the established facts or principles or methods gained through academic study or through extensive practical experience, one or both (More, 1985, p. 309).

This cultural push towards education and its benefits, may alienate some sub cultural members and create envy and hostility amongst those who lack the formal education to meet newly expected standards (More, 1985; Niederhoffer, 1969).

In 1986, a formal review of police education was conducted at the request of the Australian Police Ministers Council (APMC). The review surveyed 529 police managers across Australia. Whilst the majority of respondents were in favour of police orientated university courses, they also expressed some scepticism in regards to university education and doubted it made them better police managers (Trofymowych, 2007).

You can make an academic out of a policeman, but you cannot make a policeman out of an academic (Rawson, 1986, p. 140).

Increased education makes alternative job possibilities and careers outside the police organisations available, with career advancement no longer being tied to the police or relationships with fellow police (Reuss-Ianni, 1984), a point that is not lost on police corruption investigators, many of whom highlighted career aspirations as a major influence for transitioning to their current roles.

### **3.3.18 Barriers to Reform**

Research suggests that organisational reform and behavioural change within police organisations is difficult to achieve and measure, and it is argued that change cannot be imposed effectively from outside a police organisation. It can be facilitated or even tolerated but it is only when the organisation is brought to the recognition of the need for change that the organisational willingness to bring about change might exist. The reason for this is that police culture is said to exert considerable influence on the way officers think, feel and interact. As a result, attitudes and perceptions that comprise the police identity can undermine reform endeavours (Christensen & Crank, 2001; Goldsmith, 1991; Harris, 2012; Loftus, 2010; Paoline, 2004).

Chan (1997) developed notions of culture to explain the failure of attempted reforms in the New South Wales Police Force. In the process she developed a model based on concepts of field and habitus to articulate cultural influences and police officers' predispositions. There are some practical implications of this research, not the least being that failure to account for the cultural field contributes to the inability to reform.

In recent years there has been a growing consensus that police culture is in a state of transition, due in no small part to cultural, ethnic, and gender diversification of police organisations and the influence of cooperative strategies such as community-based policing (Chan, 1997; Loftus, 2010). However, for these changes to be effective it is suggested that they must capture the hearts and minds, values and commitments of the individual officers. These are changes that can only be achieved through internal mechanisms of police agencies themselves and through an understanding of the cultural dynamics of policing including the values and commitments of individual officers, required to facilitate such desired change (Chan, 1997; Christensen & Crank, 2001; Goldsmith, 1991). As Goldsmith suggests (1991, p. 102):

Change cannot be imposed effectively from outside a police organisation. It can be facilitated but even then only when the organisation can be brought to recognise the need to change and some willingness exists to bring it about.

### **3.3.19 Managing Emotions**

It is argued that police officers do not discuss their emotional issues with fellow officers for fear of being seen as inadequate in their work roles. This could lead to suspicion by others about the officer's capacity to handle the pressures of police work and could be seen to be in contradiction to one of the doctrines of police culture; that is, to develop a toughness ethic. The police response therefore is to adopt an aloof or detached manner about their work to avoid compromising the "us vs. them" dichotomy referred to in chapter 2 (page 36). In effect, they draw a psychological boundary around their group, exacerbating their sense of difference and separation, if not isolation from others (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999).

Police officers see their own emotions as an occupational weakness, which impairs their ability to do their job, resulting in feelings being routinely suppressed. A secondary impact is the officers' personal relationships with both family and friends. If officers are made to talk about their personal feelings there is a risk that they will not be able to control them, and hence be viewed as not being in control of their own emotional responses:

Being perceived as emotionally predisposed, whether for expressions of anger or sympathy, can lead to suspicions and concerns on the part of others regarding the officers' ability to withstand the pressures of police work (Pogrebin & Poole, 1991, p. 398).

Therefore the demands on emotional labour (a form of emotional regulation wherein workers are expected to display certain emotions as part of their job), and job focused emotional labour, denote the level of emotional demands in the occupation. Employee focused emotional labour denotes the employee process, or experience of managing emotions to meet work demand (Hochschild, 1983).

### **3.3.20 Scripts**

In discussing the nature of organisational practice and experience, Ashforth and Fried (1988) refer to the mindless development of internal scripts to guide behaviour. They maintain that individuals cognitively link components of their behaviours and put them into differential subroutines with built-in decision rules for identifying and programming future enactments. It is in this way that repetitive behaviours become cognitively encoded.

For police, this experienced-based holistic recognition then produces a deep situational understanding that leads to the expert's exponential behaviour. On-the-job experience reinforces and extends the lessons of formal organisational socialisation, whilst experiences are heavily conditioned by the characteristics of the job and the police organisation itself (Ashforth & Fried, 1988). It is argued that in this way cognitive scripts control behaviour based upon experience and that behaviours are developed through a combination of organisational socialisation and on-the-job experience.

These routine procedures become a summation of police experience and provide a guide to how the organisation has dealt with similar situations in the past (Innes, 2002). Individuals become predisposed to internalise these behavioural programs as a means of fitting in with the rest of the organisation and relieving role ambiguity.

We seldom choose our words or place our feet, we simply talk and walk. The same goes for experts: Their skill has become so much a part of them that they are no more aware of it than they are of their own bodies (Trotter, 1986, p. 36).

Scripts emerge through socialisation and experience, through the consistency and reliability of event queues and through reliance on a number of repetitively invoked action rules.

### **3.4 Conclusion**

This chapter examined the roles and nature of policing. In a community service sense it is understood that police presence or action will assist in preventing certain immoral or illegal behaviours. The deterrent aspect of police work has been noted previously by Muir (1977) in his research of police as street corner politicians. However deterrence has a much more insidious nature/dimension when considering police corruption. The ability of police organisations to deter and enhance police integrity is severely limited by the realities (roles and nature) of police work.

Wide scale discretion was identified in this chapter as a major characteristic of policing that has the potential to lead to corruption in the absence of direct supervision (Banton, 1964). In addition, internal controls can be circumvented by a police subculture that values loyalty, camaraderie and secrecy (Liederbach et al., 2007). These issues present particular challenges for the investigation of police corruption and the management of stigma attached to police corruption investigation roles.

The next chapter looks at issues of police corruption investigation and stigma management, examined through the concept of *Dirty Work* (Hughes, 1962).

It is a truism that we are judged by the work that we do. For many of us, what we do is a central part of who we are and so it influences how we judge ourselves. Dirty workers attempt to revise public perceptions as well as their own in order to construct positive self and occupational esteem (Drew & Hulvey, 2007).

Individuals' views of themselves are sustained or changed through others confirming or challenging them in various ways through social interaction. As 'dirty workers', police corruption investigators engage in a variety of manoeuvres to manage, control, and distance themselves from the *taint* associated with their jobs. Dirty work occupations collectively attempt to secure positive meaning from their working lives through fostering strong group relations and workgroup culture based around widely held and deeply shared systems, beliefs and norms. These serve to protect the occupation from the threat that stigma represents and act as a collective resource that the group draws upon. The outcome is work identification – they define themselves in terms of the occupation (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 414).

If it is accepted that scripting and exposure to police culture are critical to the experience base of police corruption investigators, it is difficult to see how non-police personnel could develop the expertise and experience required to investigate police corruption. However, it remains arguable whether exposure to the culture is at all advantageous or whether viewing police corruption with a fresh set of eyes (from a civilian perspective) has its own advantages. These issues will be further explored in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER FOUR – DIRTY WORK AND POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION

“Now every occupation is not one but several activities; some of them are the “dirty work” of that trade ... it may be dirty work that in some way goes counter to the more heroic of moral occupations.”

*Everett Hughes 1958<sup>7</sup>*

### 4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I provided an overview of the literature pertaining to the roles and nature of policing, including the social and organisational expectations surrounding the occupation. Police socialisation describes how police learn about and generally conform to norms and values of their social group. Self-identity is developed through socialisation. These identities are not fixed but negotiated every day through social interaction. Individual officers become predisposed to internalise certain behaviours as a means of fitting in and to relieve role ambiguity. The police organisation promotes this through training, on-the-job experience and behavioural programming (Ashforth & Fried, 1988).

As discussed in Chapter 2, loyalty is highly valued in law enforcement and is deeply embedded in the ideology of police organisations. However, the virtues of loyalty and duty to tell the truth are paradoxical to the management of police misconduct. When officers decides to break the bonds of loyalty and investigate, or give incriminating testimony against a fellow officer, they risk alienating themselves from their brother police officers. In most situations such an officer will be seen as a traitor and the loyalty previously shown to him/her by fellow officers will be replaced with condemnation (Barry & Walton, 1977; Reuss-Ianni, 1984).

The Internal Affairs Division (IAD) is the internal security system designed, say the cops, to protect the department and the police commissioner from embarrassing revelations of misconduct ... Precinct cops consider such cops “turnarounds” (i.e. traitors) and believe that many of them are cops who got “jammed up” through some offence and have accepted this assignment in lieu of harsher disciplinary measures (Reuss-Ianni, 1984, p. 50).

This stigma applied to police corruption investigators was never more apparent than with the

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<sup>7</sup> Hughes, E. C. (1958). *Men and their work*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

example of the Ceja Task Force in Victoria (Australia) which operated from 2002 to 2006 (OPI, 2007a). The Ceja Task Force was involved in investigations into drug related activity by members of the Victorian Police Force. The Office of Police Integrity (OPI) report into the investigation highlighted the fact that a number of seconded Ceja investigators faced ostracism and resentment on their return to the mainstream police force, including direct threats to themselves and their families. Ceja investigators took these threats seriously and there was a resultant detrimental effect on them and their family's wellbeing. On re-integration into the police force, corruption investigators were subjected to intimidation and belittling from fellow police officers. In its 2007 report on the Ceja investigations, the OPI highlighted that corruption investigators needed to be resilient to such negative attitudes, and that officers needed to be "highly motivated, meticulous, resourceful, astute and experienced" (OPI, 2007a, p. 8; 2007b). Such a dramatic redefinition of identity by "others" has been referred to as "spoilt identity" (Gosling & Taylor, 2010, p. 21).

Spoilt identity is a derivative concept of '*Dirty Work*', which was introduced in Chapter 1 as a major theoretical orientation for this thesis. Dirty work is defined as work that is perceived as "physically, socially or morally" tainted (Hughes, 1958, p. 122). Despite these taints, individuals seek to normalise their work in a given context through a process in which "the extraordinary is rendered seemingly ordinary" (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; 2002, p. 217; Ashforth et al., 2007).

Dirty work has been the subject of much research recorded in the extended literature. Occupations covered include: correctional officers (Tracy & Scott, 2007); attorneys (Drew, 2007); police (Drew & Hulvey, 2007); fire fighters (Scott & Tracy, 2007); truck drivers (Mills, 2007); secretaries (Sotirin, 2007); nurses (Mills & Schejbal, 2007); crime scene investigators (Gassaway, 2007); university campus security guards (Heinsler et al., 1990); and managers of dirty work occupations (Ashforth et al., 2007).

This chapter considers the issues of spoilt identity and '*Dirty Work*', including how dirty workers negotiate tainted identities derived from the broader social discourse relating to their occupation (Mills et al., 2007; Sotirin, 2007). The survival of these jobs is vital for the continuation of things that the community holds as ideal. All groups, no matter their status, confer greater or lesser honour or shame upon its members (Meara, 1974). However, somebody has to do the dirty work. There are identifiable survival predictors within dirty work. Accepting certain realities of stigma as part of the working experience is one of them. These acts of



recognising the unpleasant nature of the job is in itself a form of social protection. Without a reference point from which to reframe tasks as acceptable, all dirty work becomes viewed from a negative situation making it difficult for dirty workers to achieve a valued core identity (Heinsler et al., 1990; Reuss-Ianni, 1984). The importance of research into this phenomenon is that it identifies ways to improve the social esteem of this work and hence assists in providing some level of survival tactics for dirty workers.

## **4.2 Dirty Work**

Hughes maintains that “dirty work” is work that may be physically disgusting or work that may symbolise degradation or wound one’s dignity (Hughes, 1958, pp. 49-50). Dirtiness is a social construct, imputed by people based on subjective standards. Low pay and tediousness are not sufficient to justify a dirty work classification. Dirty work deals directly with polluting elements of social life, garbage, criminals, dirt, noxious and dangerous conditions. In all aspects, dirty work remains a construct of occupational membership (Mills et al., 2007; Sotirin, 2007):

Typically, although not always, attributions of dirtiness arise not because of the organizational membership or personal characteristics of individuals but because of their occupational membership (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 419).

Dirty Work is integrated into the whole of an occupational psyche and into the “prestige bearing role” of the people involved in that occupation. Occupational prestige, privilege, and its maintenance appear to be important considerations. Without social privilege there is no taint. Social systems are hierarchal and imply an inequitable power and status distribution. This has serious impacts upon occupational identities on a daily basis, as dirty workers negotiate tainted identities and attempt to climb the ladder of social acceptance. Table 4 sets out primary taints and prestige levels for dirty work occupations identified in the literature.

Hughes claims that those that can cleanse society are often absolved from the un-cleanliness of their task, and lawyers in particular maintain their concept of self and role by delegating many of the “dirty work” roles required of their occupation, thereby avoiding moral taint through an effective cleansing by way of a “moral division of labour” (Hughes, 1958, pp. 70-71).

Table 4: Levels of Prestige for Dirty Work Occupations.

Primary Taint	Prestige (relatively) Low	Prestige (relatively) High
Physical		
• Garbage, death, effluent	• Butcher	• Funeral director
• Noxious conditions	• Miner	• Dentist
Social		
• Regular contact with stigmatized others	• Prison guard	• Social Worker
• Servile relationship	• Shoe shiner	
Moral		
• Sinful or dubious virtue	• Exotic dancer	• Casino manager
• Deceptive, intrusive, confrontational.	• Bill collector	• Police interrogator

(Adapted from Ashforth, et.al. 1999: p.416)

#### 4.2.1 Taint

Physical, social and moral taint has the effect of reducing occupational prestige. The literature supports the concept that most dirty work occupations have relatively low prestige and lack a “status shield” from taint (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 429). Taint severely threatens the social validation processes that sustain social identity including work group identity, as esteem enhancing. This has important implications for taint management across all occupations. Table 5 sets out the different types of taint accorded to occupations covered in the literature and regarded as dirty work.

#### 4.2.2 Stigma

The ancient Greeks originated the term stigma, referring to something unusual and bad about the moral status of the individual. Societies categorise persons according to attributes that are thought to be ordering and natural for members of each social category. The character that society imparts to individuals can be considered a characterisation, in effect, a virtual social identity. Stigma refers to a discrediting attribute of that identity.

Table 5: Conceptual Models of Occupational Taint

Category (Hughes, 1958)	Criteria (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999)	High Occupational Taint
Physical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directly associated with garbage, death, effluent, and so on.</li> <li>• Thought to be performed under particularly noxious or dangerous conditions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emergency room nurses</li> <li>• Fire fighters</li> <li>• Morticians</li> </ul>
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular contact with people or groups that are themselves regarded as stigmatised.</li> <li>• Incumbents appear to have a servile relationship to others.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Internal affairs police officers</li> <li>• Social service counsellors</li> <li>• Surveillance / probation officers</li> </ul>
Moral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regarded as somewhat sinful or dubious in nature.</li> <li>• Employ methods that are deceptive, intrusive, confrontational, or defy norms of civility.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Abortion clinic medical staff</li> <li>• Animal researchers</li> <li>• Personal injury lawyers</li> </ul>

(Adapted from Ashforth, et.al. 2007: pp.151-152)

People who perform dirty work tend to become stigmatised; that is, society projects negative qualities onto them and their work. Attributing dirtiness to others effectively devalues them. Stigma comes from the view of the work as distasteful or threatening to the moral order. Stigma may foster a stronger culture with robust protective techniques for warding off social threat and enhancing self-image: “The culture may effectively “inoculate” members against the slings and arrows of misfortune” (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 427).

A crucial variable is the individual’s belief that they have unjustifiably been defined as a dirty worker. This belief does not necessarily result in social isolation, but it appears to increase the probability that social isolation might occur. The stigmatised person sees themselves as a good person doing dirty work, and therefore often lacks the feedback of daily social interaction with others. This isolation can cause suspiciousness, depression hostility and anxiety. There is a tendency for a stigma to spread from the stigmatised individual to their close connections and this is a reason why some relationships are either avoided or terminated.

In reviewing their moral career, a stigmatised individual may retrospectively highlight experiences which account for the new beliefs and practices that they now have regarding their own kind and normal (those considered main stream to the population). Life events can thus have an impact on moral career, first as immediate objective grounds for an actual turning point, and later as justification for the position the person has now taken (Goffman, 1963).

#### **4.2.3 Stigma Awareness**

Most “dirty workers” report being quite aware of the taint attached to their occupations. Many use words like “dirty” or “stigma” when referring to their occupations. Most maintain that the societal perceptions are unjust, a common perception amongst the stigmatised. Many find ways to diminish the taint attached to their roles, either through their body language, verbal comments or facial expressions to express their disgust for certain aspects of the job (Ashforth et al., 2007, p. 156; Gassaway, 2007; Reuss-Ianni, 1984).

However, membership in a stigmatised group does not necessarily lead to self-stigmatisation. Being aware of the negative attitudes and prejudices towards one’s group does not inevitably lead to the internalisation of these judgements (Shih, 2004).

#### **4.2.4 Strategies for Managing Stigma**

Shih (2004) proposes two models that can be used to overcome stigma. The first of these is the coping model, which predicts that overcoming stigma is a draining process; whilst the empowerment model proposes that overcoming stigma is an energising and empowering experience.

Specifically, coping models are models of prevention. Coping models predict that overcoming stigma is draining for the individual, and that individuals are motivated to avoid negative consequences rather than to create positive ones. The second model is one of empowerment. These models see individuals not as passive targets of prejudice, but as operating in social settings where they seek to understand the social world and create positive outcomes.

A number of factors will influence whether stigmatised individuals adopt the coping or empowerment models for handling their stigma. Where it is perceived that the stigma has been unjustly forced on the individual, that person may react with anger and be spurred into action to remove the stigma. The second factor involved is group identification. Individuals who highly identify with their group, despite the stigma associated with the group, are more likely to be empowered. Stigmatised individuals who are thriving in their society despite a stigmatised

status tend to adopt the empowerment model over the coping model (Shih, 2004).

#### **4.2.5 Group Relations**

It is argued that the stigma of dirtiness fosters strong group relations and workgroup culture, including the building of a base for sharing widely held and deeply shared systems, beliefs and norms. It is claimed that this strong work group culture acts as a defence mechanism to transform the meaning attached to these jobs and moderates the impact of the social perceptions of dirtiness and stigma. Subcultures and distance from society can be so strong that individuals tend to socialise only with their own, and in the case of corruption investigators, withdrawing from the social life of their former police compatriots. Hence whilst stigma undermines the status of certain occupations, it works in reverse to develop strong occupational cultures within those groups stigmatised (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Drew et al., 2007; Mulcahy, 1995).

In sum, the greater the salience of dirtiness, the greater the threat to a positive sense of workplace self and the more likely that a strong occupational or workgroup culture will emerge to combat the threat. The more that dirty work defines the work role, the more that incumbents will attempt to redefine the dirty work (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 431).

Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) claim that dirty work develops a strong work group culture and defence mechanisms that transform the meanings of these jobs, so as to moderate the impact of the social perceptions of dirtiness and stigma.

#### **4.2.6 Normalisation**

Structuralists argue that workers simply experience work as they find it, accepting the good with the bad. Alternatively, symbolic interactionists argue that workers will find a way to make bad work better. Normalisation serves to protect an occupation from the threat that stigma represents, becoming a collective resource that the group draws upon. It is about regulating socially undesirable emotions. The literature supports a broad range of methods for normalisation (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, 2002; Heinsler et al., 1990).

Most employees, regardless of occupation, are striving to establish a satisfying sense of self in their work ... What's more, how individuals attempt to establish this sense of self identity in communication with others shapes how the job gets done (or does not get) (Scott & Tracy, 2007, p. 72).

##### *a) Diffusing*

Diffusing is best described as an attempt to dissipate undesirable emotions or to weaken the

impact of such emotions. This can be achieved through humour, redirecting one's attention, or through apologies that acknowledge responsibility and express remorse (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002). Diffusing tends to be used on an ad hoc basis to dissipate unwanted emotions. To the extent that diffusing techniques prove effective they are likely to become shared and institutionalised overtime, and can assume elements of organisational ritual. As a result, organisational members may come to use similar means across the organisation for diffusing emotion.

*b) Reframing*

Reframing involves recasting an undesirable emotion or reason for an emotion in a manner more consistent with the goals and culture of an organisation. This occurs through re-orientation of perspective or perception. Reframing involves transforming the meaning attached to a stigmatised occupation. This is achieved through infusing the stigma with a positive value (badge of honour) where the negative value of stigma is negated or rationalised (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002; Drew et al., 2007).

Many professions use a core-valued identity to reframe their dirty work as valuable. For instance, despite their tedious tasks and difficult interactions with victims of crime, police detectives might reframe their perspective and see themselves as esteemed workers. They can make this transformation because their supervisors encourage this framework and because they based their own self-image upon glamorous media images. In this way, it is possible for them to redefine their work in ways that make the work feel honourable (Heinsler et al., 1990).

*c) Adaptation*

Adaptation is the process through which reactions to stimuli are reduced. Habituation and desensitisation are most represented in the adaptation processes. By definition, adaptation occurs over time as increasing familiarity with stimuli blunts emotional impact. As a result, adaptation becomes a by-product of continual exposure and prolonged association. The most difficult feature of adaptation is arguably surmounting the initial exposure to such stimulus. The first shock of such stimulus can be buffered via pre-emptive reframing and gradual increases in the reality of the stimulus (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002).

*d) Ritualism*

Members of dirty work occupations create rituals, traditions, collective values, languages and meanings that identify individuals as well as the work in more positive terms. This reframing

allows dirty work to be worn as a badge of honour. Ritualism involves the enactment of standardised procedures and provides a sense of control and a momentum of meanings that reduce emotional responses. It comprises sets of techniques or behaviours that the culture uses to manage anxieties and express common identity. This is used as a means of normalising emotions and providing a sense of control. These rituals serve to signal change in, or reaffirm an individual's status (rights of enhancement, degradation or renewal). It also serves to facilitate and signal inclusion (rites of passage), unifies individuals and moderates conflict. It is the standardised techniques and behaviours that the culture prescribes to express common identity (Ashforth & Fried, 1988; Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002).

Rituals have the effect of strengthening the structure of community assistance, affirming interpersonal bonds between co-workers, recognising positions of members, and initiating new members to a profession through rites of passage. Organisational rituals and traditions reveal the cultural realities of groups. Rituals provide members with a sense of shared reality.

*e) Recalibrating*

One of the taint management strategies described by Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) is recalibrating, where individuals adjust their criteria around the valued attributes of dirty work and magnify non-stigmatised aspects of their job. This differentiation creates value and adjusts the implicit standards that are invoked to assess the magnitude (how much) or valence (how good) of a dirty work attribute (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Drew et al., 2007).

*f) Refocusing*

Refocusing involves shifting attention from stigmatised features of the job to valued aspects of the employment. It allows individuals to overlook specific job requirements thus allowing them to wilfully ignore features of work that are socially problematic. It involves a shifting attention from stigmatised to non-stigmatised aspects of work (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Ashforth et al., 2007; Drew et al., 2007).

*g) War Stories*

In the police world, morality separates the *good guys* from the *bad guys* and is another manifestation of the, *us versus them* dichotomy that is taught during police academy training, which has been described in chapter 3. This morality is formally defined in training and informally defined through *war stories* told by fellow police officers. These stories that seek to reinforce the myth of policing as the custodian of moral order are situated within police

organisational milieu and are used to build self-image and work identity (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Gordon et al., 2009).

In an example from the literature, Mills (2007) uses truck drivers in the United States to demonstrate how war stories are used by dirty workers. Mills' research provides evidence that truck drivers share war stories in truck stops complete with heroes and villains. They learn to manage their identities and minimise taint through passing on various attitudes and methods as part of these stories. Shunning was one method of communicating their uniqueness and separation from other groups.

*h) Titles / Status*

Many dirty workers lack a status shield, and must cope with implicit assaults upon their character and worth. Prestigious titles offer status shields for workers by cultivating a demeanour of authority. The presence of titles, uniforms, segregated facilities and the like are indicative of status distinctions and are held to be important in managing the implications of dirty work (Ashforth & Fried, 1988; Stenross & Kleinman, 1989).

*i) Use of Humour*

The emotional charge of dirty work can be diffused by sharing it with others. Individuals engage in emotional comparison to gauge the appropriateness of feelings and to make sense of their world. Nowhere is this more evident within policing than in the use of humour. Humour is an integral part of the police subculture values, beliefs and behaviour. This humour creates group solidarity.

Humour and storytelling usually remain within the occupational community as outsiders would not likely understand or appreciate the intent and value of these exchanges. The use of humour allows occupational members to share experiences and opinions that would not otherwise be expressed. It allows them to raise group concerns and to normalise crises, thereby fostering group cohesion. In addition, it is an effective way through which group culture is transmitted to new members (Drew et al., 2007). Through this social sharing officers are able to rationalise the emotions attached with dirty work. However, in the absence of information from their peers regarding their shared experience, an individual may regard the stimuli as innocuous, thereby becoming habituated to an aversive stimuli (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002; Drew et al., 2007; Pogrebin & Poole, 1988).

A number of studies have been conducted in regard to the use of humour in managing taint



within dirty work occupations. Tracey and Scott (2007) examined the use of humour in the context of corrective services officers and found that recalibration was particularly evident in the officers' self-deprecating humour. Officers took pride in, or at least were resigned to, being framed by prisoners as unlikeable. They turned this potential stigma into a sign of toughness through the use of humour.

Gassaway (2007) examined the use of humour in the context of police crime scene investigators. Crime scene specialists commonly confront their work with humour and almost continuous verbal interaction with their peers to help divert attention from the more objectionable aspects of the work. Crime scene investigators used humour to lessen the impact of the type of work they were performing by focusing on the lighter side of their work situations. For instance, one of the terms used by the officers was "goobers", to describe any human tissue that may be blown away from the body by gunshot or torn away by some other violence (Gassaway, 2007, pp. 158-160). This is a recognition of humour as a coping device. Through this interaction and joking with each other, crime scene investigators were able to distance themselves emotionally, socially and intellectually from the homicide, suicide or other instance they were investigating.

#### **4.2.7 Stand Alone or Inter-connected**

An important issue is how normalising strategies may either stand alone or be inter-connected. Ashforth, Kreiner, Clark and Fugate (2007) speculate that the strategies relate in three ways: First, they are generally *complementary*, in that one tends to reinforce the others. Secondly, the normalising tactics may *substitute* in specific situations. Thirdly, the means of normalising may be related *temporally*, in that investigators might initially attempt change-oriented and relatively proactive approaches to remove taint. This is most likely to entail confronting those that perpetuate the stigma. However, under normal circumstances, they claim that this will normally give way to more coping-oriented and reactive approaches as a fall back means of coming to terms with the failure to change the status quo.

### **4.3 Dirty Work Case Studies**

#### **4.3.1 Correctional Officers**

Tracey and Scott (2007) based their research upon participant observation and interview data gathered over the course of eleven months with officers at two correctional facilities. Correctional officers face social taint because of their servile relationship with prisoners, who

are already stigmatised by society. Correctional officers employed a number of creative taint management strategies that helped them manage their work identities. This enabled the workers to develop an acceptable collective identity of self-worth. The researchers identified several taint management strategies that had not typically be identified by dirty work theorists. These strategies were distancing, de-personalising and blaming the prisoners.

Initially the officers did a lot of work to distance themselves physically from the prisoners they dealt with. Some of these tactics were for security reasons; however, it also allowed the prison officers to maintain their separate existence from the inmates. To maintain this distance, the officers developed an ability to depersonalise those inmates and ignore their abuse and complaints. Sometimes the officers went beyond physical distance and social depersonalisation to openly blaming the inmates, thereby neutralising their role in the stigmatisation. The strategy of blaming went beyond the practice of negating the officer's work in the stigmatised role. It strategically suggested superiority over the dirty party.

#### **4.3.2 Fire Fighters and Ambulance Officers**

Scott and Tracey (2007) also conducted dirty work research into fire fighters and ambulance officers. Fire fighters were found to be potentially threatened by the servile role they must play with clients. In addition, some fire fighters felt threatened by an association with a political system that they believed rewarded immoral behaviour. Members often displayed frustration at their role in having to attend the very kind of calls that they found most threatening to their preferred identities as heroic professionals.

Fire fighters also use symbols of tradition such as uniforms and badges to manage taint, as these represented what is valued as real or authentic to the fire fighters. What counted as real to the fire fighters was the rugged manliness associated with working on a fire truck. Through social comparison, the fire fighters selectively and strategically highlighted these more desirable, crucial and riskier aspects of their job in preference to the more mundane everyday roles that they carried out; for instance, assisting people who have locked themselves out of their homes or extinguishing small fires in residential areas. There was effectively a refocusing toward celebrating manliness and the masculine occupational identity of fire fighters. The researchers describe the frequent and blatant nature of this refocusing, including social comparison with perceived feminine weakness embodied by outsiders, and dominant sexuality used as a tool for managing identity threats. For instance, the privacy of the fire stations backstage provided a fitting space for moments of sexual humour.

A variation on this was the ridiculing of emotional descriptions of tragedy in preference to engaging in locker room discussions of sexuality. Fire fighters played upon the public and collected perceptions of toughness and heroism in their occupations and this provided a means of enacting and performing a preferred identity for their working lives. Cultures and identities are not fixed; they are always in the process of evolving. The work of fire fighters, as with corrective services officers, was potentially tainted by association with less desirable elements of society (described by the fire fighters as shit bums). The findings of this study suggested that organisational leaders should pay attention to the manner in which organisational and occupational identities are managed, so that employees find a satisfying sense of self-work.

#### **4.3.3 Crime Scene Investigators**

Gassaway (2007) conducted dirty work related research focused on crime scene investigators. Crime scene specialists commonly confront their work with humour and almost continuous verbal interaction with their peers to help divert attention from the less objectionable aspects of their work. They are proud of their work and say they make a difference in removing violent criminals from society. The research focus was on trying to understand the degree to which these investigators perceived that they were somehow tainted, socially physically or morally, and how they managed repeated encounters with death.

Crime scene investigators commonly pointed to the importance of their work by stating that it was their job to speak on behalf of the victims of crime, especially in homicide investigations. They saw themselves as giving the victim a voice. Crime scene investigators found ways to diminish the taint attached to their roles, particularly the physical aspects of their jobs by dressing in protective clothing and through their body language, including verbal comments and facial expressions, they expressed their disgust for certain aspects of the job. This act of recognising the unpleasant nature of the job is in itself a form of social protection. It allowed the investigators to prove to themselves that they had not relaxed their own personal standards despite the pressures encountered during the dirty work.

Investigators appeared to share a common belief that they were beyond taint because they were on the side of righteousness. However, they did indicate that they were unable or unwilling to talk with their spouses or significant others about many of the aspects of their roles because of the violent and foul nature of their work. If they needed to talk to somebody they would talk to their peers in the work environment. One way investigators were able to diminish the impact of their work was through using the right language. By developing their own jargon to describe

crime scenes, they were able to come to grips with the situation as if they were using medical terms. Casual conversation at crime scenes, even without humour, was also part of a coping mechanism. By carrying on running conversations, the investigators were able to create something on which they could focus their attention, thus diverting from a constant, direct focus on the crime scene.

#### **4.3.4 Us v Them**

Drew and Hulvey (2007) claim that policing is socially tainted because it puts police officers in a servile relationship to stigmatised groups and other members of the community. In order to maintain some dignity police officers construct barriers creating safer distance from less desirable sections of the community. Policing is also morally tainted, this occurring where the occupation is generally regarded as being of simple or dubious virtue, or where workers are thought to employ methods that are “deceptive, intrusive, confrontational or defy norms of civility” (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 45). In addition, the media create an image of police interrogators or detectives who lie or use trickery, apply brutal behaviour or expect free meals at local shops. These media images contribute to a public perception of police as morally tainted.

This research identified both private and public strategies used by police to manage taint. Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) maintain that dirty work threatens the ability of occupational members to construct esteem enhancing social identity. Through their interactions with co-workers, friends and family, the officers tried to maintain their identity as good people doing dirty work. They were hesitant to eat in public. They believed that restaurant personnel may be spitting in their food if shop owners knew they were a cop. This attitude produces an “*us versus them*” type attitude that creates cohesiveness for the officers. Many officers closely associated with the traditional image of policing; keeping the bad guys off the street. Police identity was also closely linked to material culture and artefacts. This included patrol cars, uniforms, badges, service items and other police related gear.

## 4.4 Police Corruption

**Det. Chief Supt. Braithwaite:** The good old days are gone forever Jack. You can't keep villains banged up while you decide what to stick on them. Not anymore.

**Det. Insp. Jack Regan:** You can if your governors back you up.<sup>8</sup>

Police must often determine which forms of conduct are subjected to the criminal process and in consequence, they are exposed to situations involving almost unlimited discretion and virtually no guidelines for action. There are strong corrupting influences in police work and they are therefore subject to many conflicting and potentially corrupting pressures. Corruption investigators too will experience their own conflicts and pressures to conform, not the least coming from the government, their own agencies and the police organisations they investigate.

One aspect of this research was to address and develop a conceptual basis of understanding around corruption investigation. This examination takes place with due consideration to the principle outputs of the investigative process, which is a narrative of the event, constructed in compliance with a mediated understanding of the particular demands and concerns of legal discourse, creating a legalistic construction such that a mission and inclusion of legally relevant facts results in the most expeditious and ethical outcomes (Innes, 2002; Manning, 1974).

### 4.4.1 Subset of Organised Crime

Police corruption involves illegal behaviours as well as acts that are not always illegal but may be considered inappropriate under the circumstances, such as receiving free meals from restaurants. Police corruption can also involve organisational policy violations such as sexual misconduct, money corruption and abuse of authority (Barker, Troth, & Mak, 2002). Ultimately, corruption can be seen as an action or omission, a promise of action or omission, or an attempt by single or groups of police officers to act corruptly, characterised by misuse of official position motivated in significant part by the achievement of personal gain (Vito et al., 2011).

Why is police corruption such a prominent issue today? Sociology is about understanding the social world and also its participants, particularly how societies and culture make us who we

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<sup>8</sup> The Sweeney: Latin Lady (#4.12) (1978). Quote retrieved 3/12/13 from <http://www.imdb.com/character/ch0027617/quotes>.

are (Gosling & Taylor, 2010). Corruption therefore impacts beyond the agency involved and may even reflect the values of the community in which it exists. The beliefs that integrate the members of the community are critical to understanding the cultural norms that may be either supportive of, or threatened by police corruption.

The impacts of police corruption can therefore be argued to extend beyond the agency involved, with significant impact upon the vestiges of public confidence and also on the self-image of police officers themselves. The postulate that all police are corrupt is the most threatening aspect to norms and values that integrate the members of the culture (Stevens, 2005). With damning insightfulness, Westmarland (2005b, p. 160) describes policing as: “An occupation ripe for misconduct with unsupervised working, and a ‘code of silence’ to protect the corrupt.”

Corruption is strongly linked to the opportunities that police have to act corruptly (based upon the level of discretion they are afforded). It is argued that police officers attract corruption because of their ability to enforce or ignore the law through the application of discretion. This makes officers who are unethical or facing financial stresses vulnerable to offers of illicit payments. This level of discretion appears to vary according to the needs of the subcultural group, and therefore it might be different across different departments or jurisdictions (Westmarland, 2008).

Organised police corruption can therefore be considered a subset of organised crime, whose opaque nature of networks and lack of transparency combined with clandestine actions and goals undermine police cultural values and norms and good governance of the community (Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011).

#### **4.4.2 Meat Eaters and Grass Eaters**

The Knapp Commission in the USA used two terms to describe the nature and significance of police corruption: meat eaters and grass eaters. A meat eater aggressively pursues corrupt activity for personal gain whereas a grass eater is one that simply accesses payoffs thrown their way. The Commission felt that grass eaters were at the heart of the problem because the widespread promotion of this corrupt practice made it more respectable, whilst a police code of silence protected those involved in this type of activities (Gosling & Taylor, 2010, p. 21; More, 1985; Stevens, 2005; Westmarland, 2005a).

#### **4.4.3 Blue Curtain (or Code) of Silence**

What many have described as the “blue code”, “blue curtain” or “blue veil” of silence, allegedly supports and protects corrupt behaviour within police organisations (Westmarland, 2005b, p. 146). One of the main reasons given for the existence of this phenomenon is that officers have to look out for each other and protect each other from external dangers. However, the reality appears that the code of silence has been responsible for police lying to protect fellow police officers; “Tradition of the old days suggested that a “good guy” sticks with his colleagues no matter what.” (Reuss-Ianni, 1984, p. 50).

Organisations based on concealment and secrecy have internal differentiation and rituals which profoundly separate initiates (Manning, 1974). Ritualised formal actions or *rites* serve to reaffirm or change an individual’s status and signal inclusion into a (normally) closed organisation. These rites unify individuals and moderate conflict (Ashforth & Fried, 1988). The blue code of silence, which is promoted and propagated through the police socialisation process, is a rite that serves to link the present to the past, reaffirming cultural values (solidarity, loyalty, machismo) and a sense of pride in membership.

#### **4.4.4 Noble Cause Corruption**

If all is fair in love and war, then one must consider that the *winning the war* aspect of police culture may lead to what has been described as *noble cause corruption* (Klockars, 1980), where police approach their work with preconceived ideas of guilt and where they consider bureaucratic rules hinder the interests of justice.

The Wood Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Force (Wood, 1997) revealed that many corrupt police officers described their wrongdoing in terms of noble cause corruption. Ultimately the end justifies the means because this behaviour ostensibly produces good convictions and is in the best interest of the public (Gordon et al., 2009; Westmarland, 2005b).

#### **4.4.5 John Wayne Syndrome**

Noble cause corruption is inexorably linked to what Clemson (2008) describes as *the John Wayne syndrome*. This is essentially a choice between *the way of the coward*, and *the way of the warrior* and is said to provide explicit guidance on police behaviour. The message is essentially that when evil threatens, the individual can either respond (the way of the warrior) or run away (the way of the coward). The potential for misconduct from such an approach is obvious.

Policing is therefore recognised as a morally dangerous profession, and the morally upright character and good intentions of police are not always in themselves enough to offset the risk posed by a fervent sense of duty. Lying, misrepresentation and dishonesty are practices that seek to undermine value principles and the continuation of those parts of police culture anchored in moral principles (Girodo, 1998; Vito et al., 2011).

#### **4.4.6 The End Justifies the Means**

Although there are undoubtedly a multitude of reasons why police might be tempted to illicitly keep secrets or lie, the most prominent appears to be a false belief that the ends of convicting guilty persons overrides the illicit means for doing so. By elevating the importance of establishing guilt over moral and ethical responsibilities, it is argued that police become conditioned to believe that they are not acting wrongly. The “ends justifies the means” approach becomes a form of self-justification (McClurg, 1998, p. 411). Through the adoption of such an approach the police officer is able to rationalise their conduct and minimise dissonance that would otherwise result from conflicting cognitions.

This noble cause approach to policing has been termed by Klockars (1980) as the *Dirty Harry Problem* (covered in chapter 3). A major danger is that the tactic becomes an end in itself, thereby subsuming powers of courts to allocate punishment. The reality then becomes a “dirty means to a dirty end” rather than the good end described above. The Dirty Harry Problem is an inescapable moral dilemma for police where those that succumb to its temptation risk losing their sense of moral proportion. Whilst police are mainly conservative in politics and morality, their culture is steadily marked by cynicism leading to support for the dominant ideologies of society and hostility towards those sections of society that challenged conventional morality. Therefore, it is argued that cynicism or passionate caring leads them to employ dirty means in order to achieve desired outcomes (Loftus, 2010).

#### **4.4.7 Moral Conflict**

Klockars (1984) claims that police cannot responsibly avoid situations that bring them into moral conflict. The police officer often perceives risk to himself or others as implicit in police/citizen encounters. Police officers tend to identify themselves with legal and moral order and violations to same are seen as a challenge to the police officers self-esteem. Honesty codes are trumped by competing moral codes based around solidarity and sense of duty. The coercive responsibility of that solidarity obliges police to lie regularly and supplies them with moral



justification to do so, and imbeds the blue code of silence into the occupational culture (Manning, 1974; McClurg, 1998; Skolnick, 2008; Westmarland, 2005b).

Police develop an understanding on how to interpret conduct, retain loyalties, express opinions, and use and abuse authority. These occupational rules are rarely obvious and unlike formal ethical codes, they are never written down or recorded. Described as “emotional demeanours” (Tracy, 2004, p. 530), they are largely created through the interaction of individual police officers and their rationalisations impacting moral order. These *emotional demeanours* impact upon police camaraderie and solidarity, where officers might think, in noble cause terms, that isolated and minor discretions by one of their colleagues does not deserve to be punished more severely than that of an ordinary member of the community, and therefore deserves some additional protection. For police who just want to get on and do their jobs, maintaining morality becomes problematic and requires a rather low profile, strong group support mechanisms and a selective circle of like-minded friends (Westmarland, 2005b).

#### **4.4.8 Theories**

##### *a) Erosion Theory*

Whilst there is no excuse for corruption, regular and persistent exposure to crime and its impacts can change attitudes and behaviours of some officers. McClurg (1998) describes this as *erosion theory*, where values and attitudes are diminished in an erosion process that is impacted by the exposure to crime and its effects.

##### *b) Rotten Apple Theory*

Police are exposed to situations involving almost unlimited discretion and virtually no guidelines for action. In addition there are strong corrupting influences in the street. Police are therefore subject to many conflicting pressures. Police departments take the official position that corruption exists only in isolated cases, hence the rotten apple theory. The rotten apple metaphor refers to the assumption that in every organisation there will be some individuals who choose the path of deviancy despite the overall good moral climate and culture of the organisation and the individuals of which it is comprised. Police management and police agencies themselves have an interest in being associated with a profession where bad apples and bad practices can be exposed and addressed, and where police agencies are seen as accountable for the discretionary powers given to them. However, some argue that police

misconduct is more than just a few bad apples, but rather a result of failed organisations (Harris, 2012; Herzog, 2001; Lewis, 1999).

Punch (2003, p. 172) advances the notion of “rotten orchards” to highlight police deviance at the systemic level. He notes; “... the metaphor of ‘rotten orchards’ indicate(s) that it is sometimes not the apple, or even the barrel that is rotten but the system (or significant parts of the system)”. The way this deviance becomes systemic is that in some ways, it is encouraged or perhaps even protected by elements of the formal system, which includes the police organisation, the criminal justice system, and the broader socio-political context.

## **4.5 Police Corruption Investigation**

Police corruption is considered impossible to penetrate using conventional means such as complaints investigation (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001). Despite this, complainants remain a key stakeholder for police internal affairs and civilian review agencies. Nonetheless, it is argued that perhaps the most salient feature in the mind of complainants remains the fact that police investigate police, and fear of retaliation if they do make a complaint (Prenzler, 2004; Sen, 2010).

Complicating this issue is the trend for society to change its cumulative mind as to what is criminal or not, and indeed, as to what is corrupt. For instance, the popularity of the Clint Eastwood Dirty Harry movies might indicate societal condoning for the practices of noble cause corruption. Whilst such behaviour may be condemned by the legal system, often attitudes of what is acceptable and what is not actually change, particularly where police corruption may play a role in maintaining social order (Gosling & Taylor, 2010).

### **4.5.1 Review Boards**

Resistance to change is an eminently strong cultural characteristic of policing (as discussed in chapter 2). Police have voiced strong opposition to external review and the use of civilians in the complaint process, offering a number of arguments. The strongest of these items is that review boards demoralise the police to the extent that increasing resignations and retirements would leave the community unprotected. In addition review boards interfere with the authority of the organisation making it impossible to control disciplinary mechanisms. Some other reasons for opposing civil review are civilians are not qualified to judge police and may interfere politically with police operations (More, 1985). Irrespective, there is general agreement across the extant literature as regards the following principles (Ross, 2007, p. 159):

- External oversight is a necessary aspect of police accountability;
- Such oversight makes a positive contribution to police accountability;
- Effectiveness of external oversight depends on the overall monitoring role of police as it is particularly important to change police organisations;
- There is little empirical evidence to demonstrate a relationship between oversight agencies and the quality of day-to-day police work, and;
- External oversight is not the entire solution.

#### **4.5.2 Internal Affairs Units**

Police corruption investigation has traditionally been conducted by organisational internal affairs units. More (1985, p. 135) describes these units as either the policeman's "friend or foe". Often they are looked upon with suspicion and hostility by police officers due to the fact that the vast majority of them do not understand the purpose or need for such units. These officers tend to become stigmatised; that is, there is a tendency for the policing community to project negative qualities onto them and their work. Attributing dirtiness to police corruption investigators effectively devalues them. Stigma comes from the view of the work as distasteful (by fellow police officers) or threatening to the moral order (the maintenance of loyalty to brother officers). The irony is that the public may also look upon police internal disciplinary processes as lacking credibility and creating apprehension in the minds of a sceptical public that the aberrant police officer will not be brought to account by their departments or superiors for the corrupt actions (Sen, 2010).

In its most simplistic terms, the control of corruption within police agencies has evolved around a number of concepts. The first is that police are incapable of managing their own corruption problems. The second is an intuitively attractive claim that complaints against police are better dealt with by agencies outside the influence of police organisations. The third and less reassuring countering point is the proposal that non-police organisations can effectively and competently investigate incidents of police corruption and address the underlying causes of misconduct (Harris, 2012).

#### **4.5.3 Civilian Review**

Inquiries have repeatedly condemned police internal affairs as being incompetent, ineffective, or complicit in corrupt activity (Lewis, 1999; Liederbach et al., 2007; Prenzler, 2004). Questions concerning the integrity and fairness of police internal investigations, consistently high non-sustained conviction rates, questions around the objectivity and quality of internal

investigations and alleged inherent bias of investigating police officers, led to reforms that included civilian oversight, developed as a counter to the charge that police internal investigations were compromised by their natural tendency to close ranks. Although progress has been inconsistent since that time civilian oversight has progressed resulting in a patchwork of structures for reviewing police complaints (Liederbach et al., 2007). There is general agreement that civilian participation in the police corruption complaints handling process is essential to the police image of being community conscious. The purpose of civilian review is not simply to punish individuals but to demonstrate community responsibility, and promote and maintain community confidence in policing and police services (Goldsmith, 1991; Sen, 2010; Tinsley, 2009).

Sen (2010, pp. 172-173) identifies three broad types of civilian involvement in review of police misconduct:

- 1) The externally supervised in-service model: civilians outside of the police Department conduct investigations of citizen complaints with access to police documents and records. There may or may not be a coinciding investigation by the police themselves of the same allegations.
- 2) Independent investigation with police adjudication model: the investigation is conducted by the civilian oversight body that reports to the chief of police and recommends the nature of disciplinary action to be taken. However the final outcomes of the case including disciplinary action remain in the hands of the police.
- 3) The independent model: recording of the complaint and the investigation is carried out by a civilian oversight body civilian review investigators have the same legal powers as police officers. Police are advised of the outcome but virtually have no authority to overview the final disciplinary decisions made by the external body.

There are a number of essential pre-requisites undermining the successful operation of a civilian review agency. The first is to gain some understanding of the police organisational culture being investigated. Without this insight the external body lacks credibility in the eyes of both the public and those they are investigating (Goldsmith, 1991). The second pre-requisite is that the external agency must establish good relations with the police organisation they are investigating. Complete externalisation of corruption management is probably not realistic as there needs to be a degree of liaison and co-operation with the police in filtering of complaints, for the external agency to be effective (Prenzler, 2000). The third pre-requisite is that there

should be a clear separation between the police and the external regulator. Whilst it is acknowledged that complete externalisation of discipline and corruption investigation is inherently problematic, civilian oversight agencies must also have independent investigative capacity in order to be effective (Sen, 2010).

It is argued that the investigators should comprise not only police, or ex-police officers, but also investigators with having different backgrounds like academics, lawyers, and doctors who cannot be charged with having private police sympathies. The agency should also have budgetary independence otherwise it is at risk of financial constraints for political reasons. Whilst resistance to external oversight is ardent (particularly by the police), Sen (2010, pp. 37-38) highlights four reasons in support of civilian review:

1. Citizens will be more objective than police officers and conduct more thorough and objective investigation;
2. Objectivity and thoroughness in the investigation will lead to a higher number substantiated complaints and greater number of disciplinary action against the errant officers;
3. High-end number of substantiated complaints followed by disciplinary action will deter misconduct, and;
4. Actual or perceived independence of civilian review will produce higher level of satisfaction of the public and increase the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.

#### **4.5.4 Regulatory Capture**

One significant potential source of ineffectiveness of civilian oversight agencies is undue influence or regulatory capture by the police (Prenzler, 2000). Capture theory explains poor performance in regulation with reference to the group being regulated subverting the impartiality and zealousness of the regulator. This may take the form of subtle forms of inappropriate influence sometimes with the best intentions in mind. These sources of influence include interpersonal exchange and identification with occupational values, a point particularly relevant to this research. Goldsmith (1996, p. 38) refers to this as “occupational alignment” or the tendency for protective solidarity to extend from one organisation, through to other organisations that it works with.

#### **4.5.5 Selection of Corruption Investigators**

Selection of the correct personnel is seen as a key factor in the success of corruption investigations. A number of suggested selection criteria are outlined by More (1985, p. 135):

Investigative personnel should be volunteers; investigative personnel must have a demonstrated high degree of investigation skills; and personnel must have excellent reputations in terms of their integrity and overall performance.

Independent investigation and adjudication of police corruption is arguably necessary in order to achieve public confidence, however, Reiner (1991) argues that it is an innovation with purely symbolic advantages in the battle for public opinion. He argues that whilst independent investigation sounds attractive, someone without a police investigative background wouldn't know where to start as part of their investigation as police have a built-in self-protection factor. It is argued that normally the investigatory skills and expertise required to investigate police corruption can only be found in the police service or with former members of that service (Freckleton, 1991). In addition, there is the opinion that corruption investigation officers must have some degree of professional competence and expertise in policing; otherwise they will not command the respect and attention of the police they are investigating, as according to police, the basis of organisational competence is experiential (Manning, 1977; Sen, 2010; Tinsley, 2009). Fielding (1988, p. 60) maintains that experienced police officers will often speak critically of younger ones in regard to their level of experience and comments such as, "they don't know what they're doing or, they don't know how to talk to people," are common.

Traditionally, corruption investigation was handled exclusively by sworn police, specifically administrators and first-line supervisors working in internal affairs units. However, the existence of consistently low conviction rates raised obvious concerns about the quality and objectivity of internal investigations (Liederbach et al., 2007).

Many civilian review bodies employ serving or former police officers as investigators. It is considered that the presence of these police officers helps in the proper understanding of the various acts and responses of the police under investigation. After all, according to the police, the basis of organisational competence is experiential and it is only through working as a police officer that one learns the craft of policing (Fielding, 1988; Manning, 1977; Prenzler, 2004).

It is generally agreed that police investigators are in the best position to penetrate police culture using their inside knowledge to advantage with police experience recognised as an invaluable resource. However, Sen (2010) argues that investigation arms composing exclusively police or ex-police would affect their credibility, despite the recognition that without some understanding of police work and police culture it would be difficult for outsiders to properly investigate police or receive cooperation from them. An option highlighted by Sen is for civilian review agencies

to employ former police officers to provide investigative training for other employees, thereby providing a mixed team of civilian and former police investigators for serious complaint cases. Through this process civilian review agencies could then claim to have an inter-disciplinary identity or culture (Gioia et al., 2010). Prenzler (2000) asserts that because of the use of current or former police officers, many agencies still appear to be dominated by an organisational culture that is an amalgam of traditional policing and legal cultures. An independent system is essential to ensuring public confidence and avoiding the perception of bias in corruption investigation (Prenzler, 2004). These themes will be explored further in the chapters that follow.

#### **4.5.6 Difficulties in Recruiting**

Irrespective of the benefits derived from having current or former police officers attached to external civil review agencies, there are a number of issues that were highlighted through the work of the Ceja Task Force in Victoria. The Ceja Task Force involved the successful prosecution for drug-related offences of former members of the now disbanded Victorian Police Drug Squad. The Office of Police Integrity (OPI) report (OPI, 2007a) on the operation highlighted three factors that might explain the difficulties in recruiting investigators to police corruption investigation agencies. These were: the nature of the work (targeting police and drugs); a perceived negative impact on career prospects, and; the professional and ethical standards required of the individual. Of particular concern were the career considerations. The investigation was lengthy and for individuals moving out of the mainstream workforce, it was likely to impact and reduce opportunities for promotion and training once they returned to the police force. In addition, there had been widespread publicity in 2003 about threats to Ceja investigators (OPI, 2007b).

In 2002 the decision was made to grant Ceja investigators a gratuity payment equivalent to 8% above normal base salary. This provided a mixed response from members of the task force with most saying that it made no difference to their willingness to do the job. However, some did consider that it provided adequate compensation for the natures of the duties and career limiting impact that participation in the task force might have. Calls for expression of interest to join the Task Force did not refer to the gratuity in an effort to ensure that investigators were properly motivated to join the task force.

The Ceja Task Force report also served to highlight major considerations for civil review anti-corruption agencies considering using current or former police as investigators (OPI, 2007a). These included: the complexities of ongoing investigations; the psychological impact of the

work on members; potential opportunities lost to investigators through joining the agency; personal development of individuals; ostracism and resentment from former police workmates, and; the transition from a police cultural working environment to the more corporate / interdisciplinary environment of the anticorruption agency.

#### **4.5.7 Detectives**

As the majority of corruption investigators come from detectives ranks, a focus for this study became the *craft of corruption investigation* (examined further in Chapter 7) and what it means to be a good corruption investigator. Detective culture is said to be defined by results and the view of police primarily as crime fighters. This image of deterring and investigating crime is reinforced by the media. Young persons are drawn towards a policing career because of the excitement of these portrayed activities. Detectives are able to call upon this glamorous image to construct a valued core identity. They see themselves as “students of crime”, an identity that is reinforced and supported by departmental supervisors and peers (Heinsler et al., 1990, p. 236; Klockars, 1985; Stenross & Kleinman, 1989). Furthermore, it is claimed that detectives have their own socialisation processes.

However there is considerable support for the idea that this image is inaccurate and that detective work is often less challenging and less demanding than perceived. It is argued that detective work involves a considerable amount of hit or miss, and that the capacity of detectives to solve crimes is greatly exaggerated. Despite this detectives do not feel that their efforts are boring or wasted. They called upon their valued core identity to reconstruct the administration and paperwork part of their jobs as an opportunity to assemble clues and develop insights (reframing), (Ericson, 1981; Heinsler et al., 1990; Hobbs, 1991; More, 1985; Young, 1991).

As noted earlier in this chapter, many professions use their valued core identities and esteemed public image to reframe their *dirty work* as valuable. Despite their tedious tasks and difficult interactions with victims of crime, detectives are able to reframe their perspective and see themselves as esteemed workers. Innes (2002), in his study of homicide detectives, describes these police as ascribing moral identities to those having a role in the murder. Presumably they also apply moral descriptors to themselves.

A number of studies have found that detectives looked upon their interactions with criminals as an opportunity to redefine their emotional labour as higher status mental work - that is, “real detective work” - whereas with victims, they cannot transform the experience into anything



better (Stenross & Kleinman, 1989, p. 440; Van Maanen, 1974). The confirmation of identity and interactions with suspects and corrupt police was an important aspect of this research.

#### **4.5.8 Investigation Challenges**

Conducting corruption investigations under such conditions is not always an easy undertaking. Enforcing the law requires the allocation of resources, manpower concentration, an awareness of police priorities and a focus on particular type of investigative activities in an environment where the police under investigation know the rules of the game and can and do employ counter investigative techniques and strategies (Manning, 1974). This situates corruption investigation and detective work in a wider legal context, where accounts of incidents may be challenged, contested and altered at different stages of the adversarial process (Innes, 2002).

Police are aware of the lies and excuses that members of the public provide; they are also aware that witnesses can be mistaken in recalling evidentiary detail. In order to deal with this, there is a degree of suspicion inculcated in the working personality of police officers which encourages critical treatment of information provided (Innes, 2002; Skolnick, 1975). In addition, misinterpretations and following false leads, whilst an important aspect of investigations, can cause investigations to be dragged out and resources over-extended, although such difficulties tend to be down played at the conclusion of the investigation. This can lead to a condition known as *theory fixation*, where in the face of contradictory or partial evidentiary accounts, detectives ignore their own pragmatic conceptions of truth to draw conclusions that may not be appropriate to the circumstances (Innes, 2002, p. 686). This is used by detectives as a “coping strategy” when under pressure to come up with results.

It is important to recognise that motive and intent are subjective states, and can only be inferred on the basis of identified actions of the suspect. As a result the ability to prove intent is quite problematic for police in that they need to draw upon other detail established within the investigated narrative to infer a motive and contribute to the understanding of the case within the judicial process (Innes, 2002). This situation is exacerbated when investigating corrupt police who are said to “understand the rules of the game” (Klenowski, 2012, p. 471) and therefore can place themselves in a position to anticipate or block attempts to identify motive or intent.

#### **4.5.9 Proofs**

Some have argued that the traditional civil standard of proof is an appropriate standard in police corruption matters, and ultimately, whether the requirement for clear and convincing evidence of corruption properly refers to the quality of the evidence and not to a higher persuasive burden (Goetz, 2007). Goetz argues that this is required in light of the exceptional powers that society reposes in police organisations. He argues that the discipline of corrupt police is not a matter of strict liability, but that there is almost always an element of intent, knowledge and poor judgement in how the corrupt acts are carried out.

This is an important issue given the limitations on admissibility of coercively obtained evidence in civil review anti-corruption hearings, and its use and applicability within our adversarial legal system. This creates significant difficulties in obtaining criminal convictions against corrupt police, which is a major cause of societal dissatisfaction with civil review anti-corruption agencies and their investigations.

#### **4.5.10 Greater Powers**

Prenzler (2004) argues that civilian oversight agencies often experience extreme frustration in their attempts to investigate corrupt police, which leads them to be constantly seeking greater powers. This occurs in two main areas: the first involves the capacity to act independently of the police to investigate matters where police responses are considered to be inadequate; and the second area is greater input to police responses in regard to disciplinary recommendations. Prenzler highlights that the issues of oversight and community confidence in police agencies cannot be separated from issues of agency powers, resources and due process constraints.

#### **4.5.11 Coercive Powers**

There is a broad acceptance within Australian jurisdictions that anti-corruption agencies require coercive powers to achieve their stated aims of combating corruption within subject agencies. The reason this support exists is largely due to the acceptance of the idea that corruption is a more insidious and difficult problem to address than traditional crime. However, there is a sensitive relationship between preventative initiatives and unwarranted intrusion in the name of community protection which would not necessarily be tolerated within traditional criminal justice control strategies. Findlay and Stewart (1992) maintain that it is because of the covert nature of corrupt conduct, with the lack of any complainant to report the crime and how it was carried out, the coercive powers are warranted and in fact necessary. The aim of investigating

corrupt conduct is to provide public exposure and ensure that corrupt individuals are identified. The silent nature of corruption means that without coercive powers, this is unlikely to happen.

Media coverage of anti-corruption agency failures creates negative perceptions in government and the community about the effectiveness of these agencies. These negative perceptions can reduce political will, a key driver for systematic change (McCusker, 2006). However media articles which implicitly or explicitly criticise the coercive powers, inevitably fail to disclose the protections against the use of compelled evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings.

Courts have defined coercion quite specifically. Under the law of confessions, a pre-trial statement made by a person accused of a criminal offence is only admissible if the party attempting to admit it (typically the Crown prosecutor) can establish that the statement was made voluntarily, and not as the result of a threat or inducement held up by a person of authority, or indeed as a result of oppression (Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s128). The practical application of this rule is that a compelled statement by a police officer is inadmissible in evidence if in a subsequent trial it is shown that that statement was made under threat or inducement (Stenning, 2000). This rule however has no relevance for the admissibility of the statement taken as part of disciplinary or public complaint proceedings, civil lawsuits or administrative hearings.

Specifically, the principle against self-incrimination is a well-founded one. Any statement which is against its maker's self-interest will only be considered to be covered by this principle if it is considered to be made as a result of some coercion. However, it is also important to highlight the fact that the principle against self-incrimination can only be invoked by the person who makes the statement. This means that any officer who gives a compelled statement cannot invoke the principle against self-incrimination to prevent that evidence being used in subsequent proceedings against fellow officers, or other individuals (Stenning, 2000).

#### **4.5.12 Informants**

The management of informants is critical in the investigative process, not the least when investigating corruption. Exposure of informants can lead to serious repercussions including social stigma, lawsuits, criminal charges and in the most extreme cases, the death of informants (Marks, 2004). Exacerbating this situation is that informants may have personal relationships with corrupt police and the protection of such individuals may conflict with variable public expectations regarding the arrest and conviction of known offenders (Manning, 1974).

#### **4.5.13 Establish Trust**

Another challenge for corruption investigators is that of building trust within investigations. Police agencies are said to be trust-based organisations (Lauchs et al., 2011) where members build trust by working together in dangerous and life-threatening situations. It has therefore been strongly argued that police cannot be trusted to police themselves, as an element of loyalty may impede prudential judgement on investigative action (Goldsmith, 1991; Prenzler, 2004). This has led to an emerging trend in many countries of the world towards a stronger form of external review. But there is a requirement of the oversight agencies to persuade police to appreciate the wider impact of the complaints made against them. Police must understand that reduced complaints will lead to greater trust of citizens and better cooperation in respect of programs designed to reduce crime and disorder (Sen, 2010).

#### **4.5.14 Negotiations**

Negotiation skills, then, are critical to the corruption investigation processes. Negotiation includes bargaining and various forms of ingratiation and strategic interaction. Negotiation is intrinsically consensual and is a concept based upon the assumption that individuals will continuously organise themselves to arrive at some form of social cohesion (Fielding, 1988). For police corruption investigations, this becomes a critical skill given the penchant for corrupt police officers to draw upon the blue veil of silence.

#### **4.5.15 Undercover Strategies**

Of particular difficulty in the management of corruption investigations against police is the employment of undercover strategies. Whilst undercover strategy can be seen as an effective investigative tool in police corruption cases it is not without its difficulties.

Girodo (1998) maintains that the discretionary powers and lack of decision-making guidelines for undercover strategies create legal, social and ethical consequences. It is suggested that the absence of guidelines for these types of investigations may lead to some investigators stretching the legal and ethical boundaries and risk going too far with undercover investigation.

Girodo (1998) argues that specialised investigation methods should not replace traditional methods but rather be used as a last resort of investigation or at least in exceptional circumstances only. In his opinion, these methods are intrusive and involving trickery, with the potential for investigators to conceal the truth. The risks involved in such investigations include misconduct through a development of sympathy with the criminal element and the development

of cognitive styles characterised by heightened suspicion, caution, and cynicism. This leads to situations where officers become less sensitive to the critical thinking upon which public confidence so often depends.

#### **4.5.16 Integrity Testing**

Another contentious area of corruption investigation is integrity testing. Integrity testing falls between two categories of targeted and random testing. Both types involve simulated events that present police officers with an opportunity for unethical decision-making (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001). The evidence suggests that integrity testing is not common place within policing; however, there are concerns based upon the ethical and legal implications of such actions (Klockars et al., 2000; Vito et al., 2011). These include privacy, perception, entrapment, provocation and legal rights. Irrespective, it would seem that integrity testing is legal in Australia barring evidence of provocation, coercion, or criminal conduct. Some argue for integrity testing based on the view that policing presents a special case. The fact that police are employed to enforce laws as well as having special powers above those of ordinary citizens means they represent a major force to civil liberties if the power is misused.

It is argued that effective integrity testing needs to demonstrate a capacity not only to identify and remove misconduct but also prevent its recurrence (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001). Therefore, the case for targeted testing with no preceding grounds for suspicion, appears strong.

#### **4.5.17 Politics**

Politics and politicisation are considered major causes of cynicism within policing. The 1980s in Australia saw a growing politicisation of policing issues amongst police forces themselves. Given the organisational need to generate enforcement action, the processes of politics and policing have become somewhat routinised and the outcomes institutionalised, with expectation to serve all sections of society. The individual police officer comes to regard his or her distilled role as a *duty*, performed without negotiation or explanation (Ashforth & Fried, 1988; Loftus, 2010).

Where civil review agencies make a fatal mistake is in taking governments which create them at face value when they claim to be in support of the agency and its enabling legislation. If a government fears that it would lose more votes than what it would gain by attempting serious reform of policing practice, then the civil agencies efforts are wasted; without executive support the chances of success are never more than minimal. The fundamental problem for civil review

anti-corruption agencies, therefore, is a political one. Action to counteract police misconduct and abuse will only take place when governments have the political courage to insist upon it (Goldsmith, 1991; Gosling & Taylor, 2010; Prenzler, 2004; Sen, 2010).

#### **4.5.18 Police Unions**

In the 1980's, police forces stepped up their campaign for additional funding, staffing and powers. It was recognised that for a political party with an election in the offering, to antagonise a police union was tantamount to suicide. The police union would immediately consolidate its allegiance with the opposing party and the non-compliant parties would run the risk of being portrayed as soft on crime or anti-law and order (Goldsmith, 1991).

In many jurisdictions police and police unions have been strident in their opposition to civilian oversight, often mobilising to curtail agency powers. Accusations include that civilian review involves a kangaroo court system in which basic constitutional rights are not observed and one which impacts and undermines police morale (Goldsmith, 1991; Sen, 2010). Police opposition to civilian oversight is said to be based on the idea that citizens are not directly involved with law enforcement activities and cannot properly assess types of police behaviour, resulting in a lack of appreciation of the intricacies of police work; the constraints under which police operate, and the dangers of vexatious complaints. It is also said that police see jurisdiction over discipline as belonging exclusively to the police command structure (Sen, 2010).

Despite anecdotal evidence, it is argued that there is no hard empirical research to support the contention that civilian review produces adverse impacts on police morale and performance (Sen, 2010). Goldsmith (1991) considers the police arguments to be more emotional than reasonable; however, he acknowledges that these complaints do highlight the need for the establishment of a complaints mechanism which is legitimate in both the eyes of the police and the public.

#### **4.5.19 The Media**

A significant challenge for anti-corruption agencies is the management of the media. In many countries the media plays an important role in holding police accountable for its conduct. Sensational cases of police abuse and scandal covered extensively by the press often evoke criticism of the police (Sen, 2010). The media may also have a significant impact upon the quantity of information generated by police due to the interest of the public in such

investigations. In some cases police may even be seen to be colluding with the media in the gathering of such evidence.

Cooperation with the media is seen as a way of managing media interests to avoid detrimental impact on investigations, and also in providing a cost effective instrument for networking with a large number of potential witnesses and informants comparatively quickly. Media interest is particularly intense in cases where there is an unusual aspect of the crime, such as large-scale or high-level police corruption (Innes, 2002).

Unfortunately, media interest does create a significant source of pressure upon investigations, creating the perception of the need to get a result. Often this may create a situation where anti-corruption agencies are required to invest a large amount of resources in such cases for longer periods of time than was originally intended (Innes, 2002).

#### **4.5.20 Family and Work**

Another focus of this research is on the impact on the investigators families as a result of their choice of occupation. Researchers describe the dilemma in trying to reconcile the *competing urgencies* of family with police work (Harr, 2005; Hochschild, 1989). Given the confidentiality of the work they do it was also necessary to explore how investigators shared concerns and offset stresses resulting from the workplace environment. After all, they could not take these problems home to be shared with their partners, families and friends. Of course, secrecy and isolation from outsiders has long been identified as a characteristic of policing, and isolation and associated secrecy in the policing occupation has already been acknowledged in the literature (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Westley, 1956). However, for this research, there was a unique opportunity to explore these issues in the context of the operations of civil review anti-corruption agency investigation units.

### **4.6 Conclusion**

This chapter identified police corruption investigators as *dirty workers*. Dirtiness is a social construct, imputed by people based on subjective standards. This has a serious impact upon occupational identity on a daily basis, as dirty workers negotiate tainted identities derived from the broader social discourse relating to their occupation (Drew et al., 2007; Sotirin, 2007). “In all aspects, dirty work is a construct of occupational membership” (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999, p. 419).

If the tag of *dirty worker* and the stigma attached to their role were not challenge enough, bad

publicity and the existence of consistently high non-sustained conviction rates often raise obvious concerns regarding the quality and objectivity of civilian review police corruption investigations.

Police corruption investigators claim that the system is working against them in that they are effectively battling against the legal system, and against the cultural and structural roadblocks of the police organisations that they investigate. In addition, investigators are very limited regarding what they can reveal about the operations of their agencies. Due to a perceived need for secrecy, very little information is available regarding the operations of civilian oversight bodies and very few have been subjected to rigorous evaluation through independent research. Whilst secrecy is an element of police culture that contributes to accountability deficit (Goldsmith, 1991), the same might well be said of civil review anti-corruption agencies. The result has been a trend toward civilian oversight which has failed to benefit from lessons of the past, resulting in a patchwork of structures for the review of police corruption complaints (Liederbach et al., 2007).

The next chapter uses an interactive approach to focus on the investigators' beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, behaviours, emotions and relationships; how they define their world; what is important to them; and the structural and contextual features of their work environments. This is achieved through examining their narratives and through a consideration of their interpretations and personal experiences.

Work, as a life domain, is critical for self-construction. This construction is particularly impacted upon where professional or work roles entail stigma or taint. In essence, the police corruption investigators build a narrative identity through stories about who they were, who they are, and how they became that way. This narrative identity is embedded in a wider cultural discourse, using themes such as character portrayals, settings, storylines and institutionalised scripts.



## CHAPTER FIVE – NORMALISATION CHALLENGES

“We have normality, I repeat we have normality.” She turned her microphone off --- then turned it back on, with a slight smile and continued: “Anything you still can’t cope with is therefore your own problem.”

*The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (1979)<sup>9</sup>*

### 5.1 Introduction

In their 2007 study on “normalizing dirty work”, Ashforth, Kreiner, Clark, & Fugate conducted fifty four semi-structured interviews across a sizeable cross section of managerial occupations. Their research questions were as follows (Ashforth et al., 2007, p. 150):

Research Question 1. What normalization challenges do managers in dirty work occupations face?

Research Question 2. What tactics do managers’ report using to normalize dirty work?

These questions were adopted (albeit, from a corruption investigator perspective) as a praxis for the qualitative data collection and analysis phase of this research project. Normalising includes institutionalised processes by which “the extraordinary is rendered seemingly ordinary”. These processes are embedded in structure and culture, where extraordinary is defined as “an acute or chronic stimulus that is highly salient and triggers socially undesirable emotions” (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002, p. 217). Normalising refers to how individuals attempt to regulate the occurrence of unwanted emotions. These are processes that are arguably institutionalised, that is, they are shared by group or organisational members. Four means of normalising emotion - diffusing, reframing, adaptation, and ritualism – were reviewed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

This chapter further explores normalisation by reporting on interviews conducted with 29 police corruption investigators (in accordance with the methodology outlined in Chapter 1). It uses narratives drawn from these interviews to focus on the investigators’ beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, behaviours, emotions and relationships; how they define their world, what is important to them, and the structural and contextual features of their work environments.

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<sup>9</sup> Adams, D (1979). The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy is the first of five books in the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy comedy science fiction “trilogy” by Douglas Adams. Quote taken from Chapter 11.

## 5.2 Narrative Identity: The Stories We Are.

In Chapter 1, the idea of narrative inquiry was introduced. Narrative inquiry is a method that uses stories to understand the world of research subjects. Individuals form identity by integrating life experiences into an evolving story of self. This provides the individual with a sense of workplace identity and purpose through the integration of a reconstructed past, perceived present and projected future (McAdams & McLean, 2013). Narrative identity is effectively a layer of personality with formation and organisation of memory being a core focus. Narrative identity, therefore, is any internalised and evolving life story.

Self-narratives provide a transition bridge across gaps between old and new workplace roles and personalities. When individuals narrate their experiences of a new work environment, their narratives will tend to reflect both their background (where they came from) and their future goals (where they're going) and this provides an insight into the influence and impact of their previous working lives (Ashforth, 2001). Self-narration is particularly important during transition periods (from cops to police corruption investigators) as role movements involve changes of action and demeanour as well as the need to verbalise reasons associated with the change (Strauss, 1977).

Emotional discomfort occurs when individuals are unable to draw continuous links between their old and new selves. As a result, emotive dissonance results from discrepancies between what individuals feel and the images they choose to convey in their new social interactions (Insead & Barbulescu, 2010). Stories help individuals' articulate transitional selves, link past and future and enlist others to provide confirmation of desired outcomes and image. They provide authenticity to self through providing continuity across time and situations.

## 5.3 Normalisation Challenges

Normalisation is defined as; "... the processes by which the taint of dirty work is actively countered or at least rendered less salient, thereby enabling dirty workers to perform their tasks without (or with less of) the burden of stigma" (Ashforth et al., 2007, p. 150). Personnel working as civil review agency police corruption investigators face normalisation challenges from a number of sources, not the least being, working in a stigmatised profession.

The first of the normalisation challenges covered in this chapter is the *management of stigma*. As identified in Chapter 4, people who perform dirty work tend to become stigmatised; that is,

society projects negative qualities onto them and their work. Attributing dirtiness to others effectively devalues them. Stigma comes from a view of the work as distasteful or threatening to the moral order. As a major focus of this thesis, management of stigma was a logical priority for examination as part of this chapter.

The second normalisation challenge covered in this chapter is *transitioning from a police culture to a civilian review culture*. As identified in Chapter 2, police organisational culture comprises all the practices, values and beliefs framed by the occupation and signifies systems representing a whole way of life for police. Transitioning from one culture, particularly one as insular as policing, to a more open civilian review culture is a significant normalisation challenge for former police officers joining civil review anti-corruption agencies.

The third normalisation challenge covered in this chapter is *the management of emotive dissonance*. Emotive dissonance was discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. It is the conflict between emotions experienced by police corruption investigators and those required by their agencies. Police corruption investigators are often viewed as having betrayed the most sacrosanct of police cultural conventions, that being loyalty. At the self-identity level, investigators may recognise that their new organisational role conflicts with their own strongly held identities and values. Irrespective, it is a fundamental transition required by their agencies, and as such, poses a significant normalisation challenge for police corruption investigators.

Finally, this chapter will look at the normalisation challenges posed to police corruption investigator in managing post-transitional professional and family relationships. The investigator's lives cannot be understood outside the social context in which they operate either directly or indirectly. Views of themselves are sustained or changed through others confirming or challenging it in various ways through social interaction. Managing the relationships upon which these confirmations are based, then, becomes a critical component in building a positive work identity.

### **5.3.1 Challenge 1: Managing Stigma**

For a myriad of reasons, some occupations are not held in high esteem and are regarded as dirty work. When a person works in a job that is not held in high esteem, they are blocked from receiving much needed validation of normalcy from their community. People need to feel normal and have that normalcy validated by their own communities.

Few police officers join the police force with the sole intention of investigating fellow police officers. The challenge thus posed is to provide a normalising function through framing a new core identity and *making sense* of their predicament as stigmatised workers. This is not normally a planned cognitive process, but occurs through adaptation to new working surrounds.

As covered in Chapter 4, persons who possess a stigma have an undesired difference from the particular expectations of those considered main stream to the population (so called ‘normals’). Often, disapproval is expressed by way of ridicule, which is not only a way of enforcing group conformity but also a way of disarming cultural challengers who are mobilised (Feree, 2004). These investigators commented on this ridicule:

*I suppose I knew out of my work place what people thought of toe cutters. Well you’re just a toe cutter, you’re gutless or whatever (PCI-14<sup>10</sup>, interviewed September 2012).*

*The ethical standards department was called ‘the filth’ and the Ombudsman was referred to as ‘the filth of the filth’ or ‘the filthiest’ along those lines, so they were never highly regarded (PCI-4, interviewed September 2012).*

However, the notion of stigma applies to more than acts of ridicule. Stigma implies an impaired collective identity where group membership is a source of discredit and devaluation and comes from a view of the work as distasteful or threatening to the moral order (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Goffman, 1963). The police organisational norms of loyalty, solidarity and reliance are well documented in the literature and have been discussed in Chapter 2. Loyalty matters to police more than it matters to most, as individual police officers need to know that their partner is covering their back when they are on the street carrying out potentially life threatening activities. Whilst loyalty is a desirable feature in most cultures, it does present problems for police governance (Ewin, 1990; Murphy & McKenna, 2007). Disloyalty is viewed as a vice and non-conformity with group conventions is viewed as a cultural violation. Stigma is used as a strategy to limit any temptation for others to follow the lead of the non-conformist. These investigators commented upon this anomaly:

*Oh, those sorts of people would say, oh you’re being a traitor to your kind, you’re investigating your kind, and all that, which comes back to a police culture thing. But that’s how I would*

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<sup>10</sup> PCI is an acronym for Police Corruption Investigator. This coding and consecutive numbering system has been adopted to maintain anonymity of interview participants, their organisations and other identifying features which might otherwise be apparent from interview transcripts.

*say they'd view it. There's a stigma attached to internal affairs and internal corruption investigation, no doubt (PCI-24 interviewed September 2012).*

*I think some could see it as a betrayal. I think some could observe it as a betrayal. So from my perspective that, of itself, then creates an environment where anyone who challenges, you know, and is prepared to investigate the behaviour of that close knit vocation, I think unfortunately the stigmas always going to be there (PCI-21, interviewed June 2012).*

The manner of the stigmatisation is that police corruption investigators are disqualified from full acceptance in the eyes of police, in so much as they do not conform to the expectations of those police. One investigator reflected on the nature of this discrimination:

*Yeah, and my example of some of the Police command that I share a good rapport with, business rapport and we can talk about lots of things including social things but I know they wouldn't piss on me if I was on fire, but they're professional, they do what they have to do but there's no, you know, they'll do exactly what they have to do and I suspect not much more (PCI-14).*

Such stigma may foster a stronger culture within police corruption investigation units, with robust protective techniques for warding off social threat and enhancing self-image. This makes it possible for investigators to fail to live up to what police culture effectively demands and yet be relatively untouched by this failure. This investigator felt that rejection was more a reflection on others than on himself:

*Basically, if someone thinks that I'm a rat or whatever, oh get fucked, and that's probably a poor reflection on them as much as anything else. The reality of today is everyone will be held to account. I'll be held to account if I do something wrong, it's just the way it is today (PCI-12, interviewed September 2012).*

Self-stigma refers to the degree to which investigators internalise these judgements and stereotypes. Just because an investigator is aware of these negative attitudes and prejudices it does not inevitably lead to internalisation (Shih, 2004). These investigators refused to accept or internalise the stigma targeted at them, and instead viewed themselves as delivering a responsible and conscientious service to those they investigate:

*Look, I think some do, absolutely, some do and I'm at peace with that. I understand that and I understand why they think that. I think they're wrong but I understand why and I don't begrudge them that. .... I think the only way we can redress that, what I believe is a*

*misconception about people that work in the ethics and integrity field, is by positive interactions with people. I know now there's a whole pile of people I've dealt with who have thanked me, who have made contact with me afterwards, after the matter's finished, said thank you for the way you treated me, I understand you had a job to do, thank you for being reasonable and fair, all those sorts of things (PCI-20, interviewed June 2012).*

*This case that we're working on at the moment, one of the really young guys said to us, oh you know, everyone says when we start knocking on your door you're fucked, and it's like well actually, no, you're not, because we can offer you a level of protection as well. We can offer you the opportunity to tell your side of the story (PCI-22, interviewed August 2012).*

The voluntary maintenance of distance is often employed strategically by police corruption investigators. By declining and avoiding friendship and intimacy the investigator can avoid the consequent obligation to divulge their true identity. By maintaining distant relationships they ensure that time will not have to be spent with *the other*, for as more time is spent with *the other* the more chance there is of disclosure of secrets (Goffman, 1963). This is an adaptation strategy which lends itself to the police cultural characteristic of social isolation and secrecy, discussed in Chapter 2. One investigator told of his experience, where he was socially rejected once his professional identity was revealed:

*Definitely. So much so that I had an email from a former colleague in the Police saying about some of the old lot that I worked with were having a catch up and a get together and what have you. I said, oh it'd be nice to catch up and see a few blokes or whatever, and I flagged it as an issue and I said, Do you know what I do for a living now? Would I be welcome at that thing? And he said, what do you do? I said, Police Corruption Investigator. He said, you know what, now you've said that I don't have a problem but probably best you don't come. So definitely, yeah, definitely (PCI-7, interviewed September 2012).*

There are psychological processes that investigators adopt to assist in handling such stigmatisation. One of these is a focus on multiple identities (Shih, 2004). Multiple identities were a common theme expressed throughout the interviews, exemplified by the experiences of these police corruption investigators. The most common identities adopted were that of *the public servant* or *government investigator*:

*Generally I'm a public servant, I just work for the government, I just run an investigation team, and leave it at that, and then move across to other stuff if necessary. Why do I do that?*

*I think I always have to be honest. I just never really tell anybody, I just tell them what they need to know (PCI-23, interviewed October 2012).*

*I don't tend to tell everybody what I do. If people ask me what I do I just tell them I work for the government and try and avoid it (PCI-9, interviewed September 2012).*

*Generally the standard answer here is what do you do? I'm an investigator for the Department of Justice. Oh what does that mean? I write reports. That usually stops conversation (PCI-20, interviewed 5 June 2012).*

*Well, one because I don't want them knowing I'm a corruption investigator purely for my own safety because you just don't know who you're dealing with and who they're speaking to. Oh, I mean that's where I cover with, I work for solicitors in a government department. That's how I go with it, because I do (PCI-17, interviewed March 2012).*

*No, it's like being a cop. As soon as you say it, it seems somebody says, oh this cop did this to me, and no, it's just not worth it. I just say I work for the government (PCI-6, interviewed October 2012).*

Most investigators reported being quite aware of the taint attached to their occupations. Many used words like *dirty* or *stigma* when referring to their occupations. Most maintained that the police perceptions were unjust, a common perception amongst the stigmatised:

*There's certainly a stigma in the police service. I went to a 15 year reunion some years ago, I guess and I thought it was interesting that one fellow who was there who was kicked out because he was corrupt, a corrupt copper, he was buying beer at the bar for people and he was everybody's mate and not many people wanted to talk to me and I was interested in that and disappointed (PCI-9).*

*If it's said to my face, I've had that a few times where people will have a chip at you and say, well you're just a toe cutter, you're gutless or whatever, and you think well hang on, it's actually far from being gutless, it's actually showing a lot of courage to be able to do what you're doing. If someone challenges me I'll talk to them about it and whether they choose to accept it or not that's their issue (PCI-13, interviewed June 2012).*

*I just think that it's not for everyone. It's not easy, it's difficult, even for investigators there's a stigma attached to it. People have to be aware of that from day 1 when they come and work in these environments. It's not all rosy there's going to be a lot of shit....Yeah, look you have*

*to be aware of the stigma. You have to be aware that there can be a fair bit of negativity (PCI-5, interviewed June 2012).*

Family or intimates play a special role in the investigator's management of social situations. Even when their acceptance of him or her is not influenced by the stigma, their duties in social situations will be. Stigmatised investigators families may serve as a protective circle. The notion that stigma management only concerns the investigators and police is therefore incorrect:

*It's not stressful, it's just alienating I suppose. Like, we have very few friends and it's basically because of that. My wife says, are you going to go to this function, and I say, no. Because you've got to avoid that conversation, you know, what do you do for a job? (PCI-5).*

*My young bloke plays football and there's a copper who's a parent as well. There's other families and you've just got to stick to that story all the time and it is, you sort of distance yourself from it, you don't get too involved, which is disappointing at times. I mean I still support the kids and everything and go to all their sport and everything, but yeah (PCI-6).*

*Yeah, you may have read articles in the paper about bullets in the letterboxes and death threats against the family and quite significant death threats against his family sort of thing and just terrible. And he's scarred for life over that. I don't know he told me that, we were talking about something completely remote and different and he just came out of that, it was just an off the cuff. I thought, fuck, you poor bastard (PCI-4).*

Investigators who readily admit to possession of a stigma may make a great effort to minimise the impact of that stigma. The objective is to reduce tension and to make it easier for the investigator and others to withdraw attention from the stigma and maintain spontaneous involvement in the official content of the interaction. The more allied the investigator is with the police, the more they will see themselves in non-stigmatic terms. In some cases the stigmatised individual can either embrace the 'normal' police group or will let it go. This ambivalence seems to be found most acutely in the process of "nearing" (Shih, 2004, p. 107):

*I've got to say I had a fairly positive relationship with the State Police while I was there. I mean we didn't always agree but we were fairly open and fairly direct. I think that soured over time and that was to be expected, I guess, because you're often in conflict over some of these things. It was quite a positive and meaningful relationship and myself and others had close ties previously, or working relationships, with officers within it, so it was quite positive (PCI-18, interviewed November 2012).*



*I think the more experienced people who have been around a bit and are a bit more senior and have probably done some internal investigations themselves are more likely to not stigmatise, than perhaps the young blokes who haven't been down that path yet (PCI-1, interviewed September 2012).*

*I don't think so. I think they're quite used to the fact that we're here. They're quite used to the fact of oversight. With police officers here now they seem to be quite happy to talk to us because they feel that we're fairer than IAU and I've got that comment from the last police officers that I've interviewed, I'd much prefer to be interviewed by you blokes than IAU (PCI-8, interviewed September 2012).*

Another investigator spoke of how the police force might even appreciate the watch dog role his agency plays:

*I mean that stigma's only a pretty small thing, to be honest, at least from my perspective and I think even to this very day. I mean I think the police force as a whole simply appreciates and accepts the fact that there needs to be a watch dog over the activities of police. Yeah, it's not everyone's cup of tea. Not everyone's going to put their hand up and say, look, I want to go and be an investigator and go and investigate my own. You know, that's exactly where I found myself (PCI-2, interviewed September 2012).*

Schneider's (1987) attraction - selection - attrition (ASA) framework was discussed in Chapter 3. With respect to police corruption investigators, Schneider's framework indicates that different kinds of people are likely to be more effective in the role of police corruption investigator than others. This means that different dimensions or traits will be predictive of the ability and preparedness to deal with the stigma attached to the role.

The framework suggests that different kinds of people are attracted to, selected by, and stay with certain organisations. Stigmatised occupations therefore may attract certain kinds of individuals because of their psychological social characteristics (Davis, 1984). These officers remarked upon the type of individual required to do the job:

*Look, I imagine there's a lot more pressure there and it would take a particular person because you would be continually be challenged because having my one foot on the road or on the horizon thing, one day I'm going to get promoted and get out of internal affairs and I want to go back into uniform and want to be everyone's, not everyone's mate, but you want to continue on with your career and the stigma and everything else that goes around that. Perhaps you park your career (PCI-14).*

*You have to be a pretty positive person to be able to see over the top of that and see the light at the end of the tunnel. If you want to come here for the work, and especially in our area, you're giving away a career. Your career path is virtually gone once you come here. You might, I mean even in here, so you've got to understand that you're giving away, if you're going to stay in it, you're giving away virtually a career path. You've got to be content to do that (PCI-5).*

Groups of individuals share values and adhere to sets of social norms regarding contact, conduct and expectations and anyone who does not adhere to these norms can be regarded as a deviator. One such group of deviators are those that voluntarily and openly choose and accept their deviation and act rebelliously toward the basic culture (Goffman, 1963). These investigators exemplified that approach:

*But the type of work we do is not welcome so there would be a stigma attached to what we do but there's a stigma attached to being a copper. It's never worried me, I don't give a rat's (PCI-12).*

*Water off a duck's back, couldn't give a shit. It really, really doesn't bother me. I'm absolutely comfortable in what I do (PCI-7).*

Attempts to manage stigma have normally focused on removing the stigma from the identity at the collective level, through education, protest and contact (Shih, 2004). Whilst great inroads have been made with police organisations in this regard, the prejudices of the overriding culture remain. Removing these prejudices and changing police mind-sets towards corruption investigators is generational. It will take a great deal of time and patience to realise the goal.

In the meantime, police corruption investigators will need to find ways to legitimise and maintain valued core identity in the face of such stigma. In the meantime, police corruption investigators will need to find ways to legitimise and maintain valued core identity in the face of such stigma. Rationalising ideologies are particularly important for newcomers faced with the reality shock of career transition. Ideology serves as an important bridge to transition from police insider to outsider and provides edifying and alternative interpretations to problematic features caused by the transition. The transition is especially difficult given the conflicting values and practices between traditional policing and the more corporate environment of the civil review anti-corruption agency.

### 5.3.2 Challenge 2: Transitioning - Police to Civilian Review Culture

There are connections between the ways that people create their own social identities and the way organisations become socially constructed. Social identity comes from the awareness of group membership, where one's sense of self is derived from different collectives (groups, teams, organisations), and where individuals imbibe emotional and intrinsic value from belonging to the collective. This is not, however, always a seamless process however.

#### a) *Lawyers*

One of the greatest normalisation challenges for police corruption investigators is adjusting to a 'civil review' environment managed by former judges and lawyers. Most police anti-corruption agencies are headed by former judges and significantly staffed by lawyers. The police and lawyer relationship is a problematic one. Both occupations work within an adversarial system and at times find themselves on opposite sides in corruption cases. For police, gut reaction, experience and ability to recognise, identify and respond to situations epitomise good investigation rather than the legalistic and arduous processes of interpreting laws and applying legal principles within an atmosphere of risk adversity. These investigators expressed their frustration:

*Well, that's fine to have a lawyer base giving you legal advice, it's wonderful. In fact, what we do here, if we've got a tickly situation, we have a direct line to the Government Solicitors, whereas some of the other organisations have lawyers in house. But lawyers can be lawyers but they're as far as I've heard, not investigators (PCI-27, interviewed September 2012).*

*Working with lawyers, some are good, some are just absolute morons and of course you try to seek out the good ones when you need some assistance or some advice on something but that doesn't always happen (PCI-1).*

*The lawyers tend to want to think that they ought to be consulted about things that they need not be consulted about (PCI-9).*

A number of corruption investigators complained about the political nature of the lawyers and their lack of investigative experience:

*Everything's political here. We're lawyer led for one. No decisions are made without a lawyer's input which half of these lawyers have never stepped foot out in the streets and dealt with what these guys investigators are dealing with (PCI-6).*

*There are times when I think investigators leach into the lawyers' domain and quite rightly should get their noses flicked but there are equally times when lawyers try and influence investigative strategy too much and I think that's the difficult thing. And we've made a lot of effort to try and define where that line is (PCI-20).*

*They're fucking hopeless. Fucking hopeless. In this organisation there are lawyers who work in the operations directorate and there's lawyers who work in the legal services directorate. Now the lawyers who work in the operations directorate they're pretty careful about who they choose. They tend to target younger ones who want to be up and comers, they get them in there and they train them. And then we get people into legal services area who have no experience and who are just incompetent and start telling investigators and these other lawyers that they're wrong or they want to get an affidavit for some sort of warrant or something like that and the legal services people want to write 400 page affidavits and stuff which a 1 or 2 page affidavit will do (PCI-9).*

Police behaviour can be explained in terms of the rules which order the relations with lawyers and which are usually mutually acknowledged by both. Their encounters are normally governed by an asymmetrical status norm, both in the courthouse and in the management of civil review anti-corruption agencies, where deference is often given to those with legal qualifications over policing experience. This deference is sometimes reflected in the working environment of the corruption agencies:

*You go into like, I was in one agency for a while, the police had the grey melamine desks, you go to the lawyers and they've got the wood paneled walls and the beautiful furniture and you'd think how so? As a young bloke, mmm, I wonder why we get the grey melamine desks and the lawyers get the wood things (PCI-14).*

#### *b) Management*

The divide between street cops and management cops was discussed in Chapter 3. Street cops tend to distrust policy decisions made by the management cops who they believed trade their experience for the physical comforts of office work as well as positional power. However, it is argued that management feel that they have a more realistic view of the organisation in all aspects, social, political and operational (Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Vito et al., 2011).

Deference to authority is a typical characteristic of policing, and one which seemingly carries through to police corruption investigation. A number of the police corruption investigator interviewed were quite critical of the management of their agencies:

*The difficulty they have is not anything to do with anything other than poor management practices here. The managers here are, in my view, completely incompetent (PCI-8).*

*And similarly I suppose in the management of the place, you don't need to be a gun homicide investigator with 20 years under your belt and umpteen homicides solved but you do have to understand the moving parts, and that's where I think the lawyers are smart by halves, they don't understand the moving parts yet they won't admit it and they won't look into it any further. They say, I can run this, I can do this (PCI-14).*

*The police, we struggle here. The Commissioner is obviously a lawyer and he likes the lawyers' interpretation of things more so than the coppers' interpretation and that's something I keep saying we have to just come to speed with. We can't change it. We can't tell the Commissioner who has been a bloody lawyer for 30 or 40 years of his life, plus a Judge and a QC that he's wrong, we just have to adapt and change. But it is frustrating when Blind Freddy can see something and the lawyer takes a different view of it (PCI-28, interviewed October 2012).*

Several investigators spoke of their frustration at the *corporate services* atmosphere within their agencies:

*I'm being disparaging, but like a corporate services, we need a computer on the desk, we need a legal interpretation, ... and they've got a dog in the fight and the tail is now starting to wag the dog and that's very frustrating for people who haven't experienced it before, but it is also frustrating for those who have, because there's really no easy way out of this and it's going to become a liability. It's going to constipate the organisation, I think (PCI-14).*

*Yeah, yeah, definitely corporate, and you've got to remember you're not talking with your mates and you know how cops talk. Inappropriate jokes and you've got to wind it in sometimes and just remember where you are. Yeah, it's very corporate... I found it hard and I found it bloody hard to be honest but I've been sort of 18 months maybe now, nearly 2 years, you adapt, evolve and you move on (PCI-6).*

c) *Autonomy*

Reuss-Ianni (1984) argues that *the good old days* is an organisational ethos of the street cop. Many officers refer to the old days in terms of their ability to act individually on their own to solve problems. This contrasts with more recent changes where administrative influence and accountability encroach on personal styles.

The degree of autonomy that workers experience appears to be one of the more salient factors impacting their approach to their work. Individuals in more autonomous labour arrangements are less likely to experience adverse effects of emotional labour because autonomy affords them the opportunity to act consistently within their internally held self-definitions.

These investigators identified a loss of autonomy as the greatest challenge they faced in their agencies:

*It is quite a difficult thing to adjust to losing that autonomy that you had as a police officer and working in an environment where you can't make the decisions about whether or not you should charge somebody or whether you've got enough evidence to charge somebody. You're relying on other people who you might not necessarily have an awful lot of confidence in (PCI-1).*

*Oh well, in the police, as you probably know, if you've got a job and you're the case officer you go out and do it. Largely you have that independence. Here, which is the hardest thing is its run by lawyers and so you have to get all your methodologies and strategies through lawyers to get approval, which are largely risk averse and largely might not necessarily have the same operational experience. That's the hardest thing to get your head around and it's just a process. It's, I guess, a bit more corporate, but it's a completely different culture to the police (PCI-26, interviewed October 2012).*

d) *Recognition*

Whilst loss of autonomy was a major challenge for police corruption investigators, the impact of this loss could be compensated to some degree by an appropriate level of recognition of their work. This recognition provides the investigators with sense of status within the organisation. Recognition was viewed as a critical motivator in the work place, providing investigators with a sense of pride and identity in their work and providing their work with meaning. These investigators commented upon the level of recognition they received in their agencies:

*Like I'll do staff appraisals on a regular basis and I'll say if someone does a good job. I'll make sure that I make a comment on the staff appraisal. And I have to say the reward here for good work is acknowledgement and the reward for good work in policing was more work. That's a difference (PCI-2).*

*Look, I would say very, like they're pretty good with that. Sometimes I think though, it's a hard thing, you know, sometimes you'll get a parade when all you really need is a pat on the head and sometimes you'll get a pat on the head when you think, oh, I should have had a parade. But that's just the nature of things, isn't it, you know, sometimes people kind of miss the level but it always happens in some sense (PCI-20).*

Not all investigators, however, were happy with the level of recognition they received:

*Probably not much, same as anywhere. Yeah. Probably don't even get to hear about it (PCI-28).*

*No, you're paid to do a good job. Oh, they have recognitions when they give out awards at the end of the year usually, but yeah, there's no, oh that was a good job, well done, no. I've sort of come to be used to it, I think that people are people and they want to get a pat on the back occasionally, that's all you want. You don't want accolades or awards, you just want to be told yeah, that was a good job, well done. And I think that goes for everyone. I think they should do that when everyone finishes a job and it's been successful. It's just a little thing (PCI-8).*

*We do have corporate awards here and I've certainly put people up and we have certainly got those corporate awards as a result of the work that a team has done. There may be a perception by some people that there is sort of favoritism, that particular people always get recognised ... They would then do a - yes, well, thank you very much, good job done, we'll make sure that goes into the annual report (PCI-23, interviewed October 2012).*

#### *e) Office Humour*

As discussed in Chapter 2, humour was found to be an integral part of the police subculture values, beliefs and behaviours. This humour creates group solidarity. However, police humour and storytelling usually remains within the police occupational community as outsiders would not likely understand or appreciate the intent and value of these exchanges. These investigators commented upon the non-transferability of police humour to a more corporate setting:

*Yeah, like some people get really offended by some of the police, I mean you can't, you've got to be careful what you say or a person's offended, you know, they find what you said offensive, oh just joking around, just a bit of, and banter, like that's another thing, that's the police culture is banter (PCI-26).*

*Yeah, go for a beer and everyone have a bit of a joke. Yes, it was sad the bloke jumped, but you should have seen him when he landed, he was in a million pieces, yeah, whatever. So, but because it's a percentage of people are police in the organisation but so many people that are above those police are non-police and never been police, it is a different work force and that's why I say it's very public service orientated and you have to be very considerate of them (PCI-14).*

*We have lawyers, we have admin staff as well, it's not appropriate in the workplace most definitely. Normal humour we all have a laugh and a giggle but there's also a time for that and there's time to work as well and to get a cohesive work environment, work unit, humours not a big part of it (PCI-23).*

#### *f) Reports and Paperwork*

Paperwork was identified in Chapter 3, as one of the greatest causes of dissatisfaction amongst those that resign from police agencies. Completing paperwork and attending incidents that involved a service element were not considered authentic policing experiences (Loftus, 2010). When questioned about the parts of the job they liked least, these investigators were in no doubt:

*The thing I like least? The same as everyone else, paperwork. It's just the way I guess it works here, more detail, reports are a lot more detailed here (PCI-28).*

*Look, I would have no issue with it at all other than to make sure they understand what the work is. It's not Elliott Ness or anything else that you see. It's probably the same warning I'd give anyone joining the police force, you know, best job in the world spoilt by paperwork and this is very much the same. It can be really, really good, interesting work, challenging, fulfilling work and then there's the report writing and the memos and the case management stuff and so it's much the same (PCI-20).*

*Some of the paperwork and some of the needless things that you have to do at times is frustrating but, you know, basically I still enjoy coming to work, even though all the upheaval that's going on within the organisation. I still get out of bed every day and enjoy going to work (PCI-5).*



*Very, very, it's massive, massive. It is huge here. There's no two ways about it and I think that comes back to being an integrity agency, and this is just my thoughts, I don't know if it's true. Our affidavits for warrants, they're a million times more complicated than the ones in the police, a million times, and they don't have to be but I just think that's because we have to be absolutely right, you know, we are the premier integrity agency. Our affidavits go into so much detail, much more than the police ones' ever did and the police get the phones off, the police get their warrants, and our disclosure, you know, we put up our disclosure briefs and we disclosed absolutely everything. Maybe the coppers do now but they certainly didn't when I was there and again it probably comes back to the fact that we are squeaky clean, we do things absolutely the right way. We um and ah over things to death. We agonise over things and we sort of look at case law from 1710 whereas the coppers just go out and do it. We've got to kick a door in, let's do it. So yeah, paperwork and bureaucracy, a million times more than the police. (PCI-7).*

g) *Politicisation*

Politicisation was discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. It was argued that where civil review agencies make a fatal mistake is in taking governments which create them at face value when they claim to be supportive of the agency and its enabling legislation. If a government fears that it would lose more votes than what it would gain by attempting serious reform of policing practice by civil agencies, the chances of success are never more than minimal.

Perceived openness to electoral defeat has a significant influence on whether politicians will enact controversial anti-corruption legislation. If political leaders believe that taking effective measures against corruption may result in their loss of office, they have an incentive to block reforms.

A common theme in the literature is that elected leaders set up anti-corruption mechanisms in environments of growing public outrage around corruption. However, in an excess of zeal, they set up mechanisms with greater power and autonomy than they are willing to tolerate. This is exemplified when anti-corruption investigations focus on political leaders, who then strive to undermine those efforts and curtail the investigators' powers. It then becomes important to determine which groups, individuals or other influences within the political economy are driving (or obstructing) the anti-corruption efforts.

These investigators commented upon the level of politicisation within police corruption agencies:

*Very political. High profile, reputational, you know, certainly as a new organisation, often the politics and the consequences to recitation influence heavily decisions on how things were done and taken. More often than not I saw things argued and rationalised on legal advice and you know legal advice is a technical term for getting the answer you want, that I didn't often agree with and I found certainly some of the decisions around legal aspects and made by legal people, I didn't agree with but they were able to rationalise through a whole raft of medias including legal advice and so forth (PCI-18).*

*As an organisation we can't overlook that we operate in the political realm though and we tend to overlook that at times, I think, but no, I think we've been very cautious about the political thing (PCI-9).*

There is often a lack of political will to implement police reforms. State governments oppose setting up complaints authorities and other instrumentalities to ensure that they do not undermine police morale and also their own constitutionally established authority over the police (Sen, 2010). That was certainly the experience of this officer:

*The government pressures, they exist from the bureaucracy, so in our case, you know, your Departments of Justice and these types of things and there's pressure comes from those groups, particularly around the prosecution legislation and stuff that they don't like. So they don't like the, you know, you might recommend legislative change to The Police Regulation Act, which they don't like, so they apply pressure to you (PCI-11, interviewed June 2012).*

There is support, then, for the proposal that the efficacy of an oversight agency is very much contingent upon its political context. The fundamental problem with civil review agencies then becomes a political one. Action to counteract police misconduct and abuse will only take place when governments have the political courage to insist upon it:

*Don't treat people like you're still in the police, it's more political so there's other factors that work outside the parameters of your specific investigation with a commission like this and I, myself had to realise that. You can't just blindly go on with the investigation and not care about what's going on around you, it's very political these sorts of places (PCI-10, interviewed March 2012).*

The requirement for an oversight body that is independent of police and politicians to serve as a check on police misconduct cannot be overemphasised. In an ideal world, whilst oversight agencies are clearly part of government in terms of their establishment and funding, the

performance of their mandate must be free of government direction and intervention. Unfortunately, this is not always the case:

*Well that gets frustrating with these politicians that can't make decisions and they make comments off the cuff without the knowledge. Since our new Director's come on board he's got a couple of the heads of the Premier and Cabinet and Justice Department heads to come here. They've never been here. They didn't understand what we had, the resources, infrastructure, what we had, so that's been really disappointing. I would have thought people at those levels that are overseeing organisations like this would want to come and have a knowledge of what they're looking after and they haven't, so that's been frustrating in the last couple of months. But yeah, look, the influences from outside, you know (PCI-5).*

Fighting police corruption is costly and once the political will diminishes, this can have adverse impacts on agents of reform such as civil review anti-corruption agencies. The correlation between anti-corruption efforts and political will is a recurring theme. The success of police corruption reform will always be determined on the basis of its political appeal and the absence of subsequent scandals rather than on the true impact the reform has had on actual police corruption:

*We are a little political pawn and I didn't, when I joined here I didn't appreciate just how political this organisation was. We are a product of the previous government and, of course, that government used us, or tried to use us to the best of its ability to take out his opponents previously. We've got all that history (PCI-25, interviewed June 2012).*

*I think the nature of anti-corruption opens it to politicisation and again you can view across the world, across our country, that it is a sensitive subject and particularly when it brings in a range of players. It could involve politicians, senior bureaucrats, police, links to organised crime, so these are sensitive issues for the community. So unfortunately the propensity then for anti-corruption to be politicised is real (PCI-21, interviewed June 2012).*

The more difficulty investigators have in adapting to the corporate environment and political penchants of anti-corruption agencies, the more likely they are to develop feelings of alienation, burnout and inauthenticity regarding their roles as corruption investigators. This feeling of inauthenticity comes about as a result of the investigators being overtly aware that they are being untrue to themselves (or at least, their former selves).

If investigators have no conflicts between themselves and the expectations imposed upon them

by civil review agencies, emotive dissonance should be at a minimum. Likewise, if there is a great deal of dissonance between their self-perception and the expectations imposed upon them, that dissonance has an array of potentially adverse consequences.

### **5.3.3 Challenge 3: The Management of Emotive Dissonance**

Police officers develop resources to deal with the isolation from the community that results from the job and the police socialisation process. These police cultural attributes include shared attitudes, values and understandings of the world, which in some ways result in a blue curtain of silence (these themes were discussed in Chapter 2).

Emotive dissonance is a negative feeling that can develop when a person views an emotion as a potential conflict to his or her identity, and describes the discrepancy between internal standards and expressive action. Under normal circumstances, individuals experience greater emotive dissonance when they have to frequently adapt their emotions to comply with client and managerial demands:

*Internally you have people with different opinions, again that's borne from different backgrounds, for me, as a manager, having to manage expectations because people have different views, different cultural backgrounds, other policing backgrounds or just general backgrounds in general so for me that's hard. Those things are the personnel issues really, the stresses that it causes people (PCI-13).*

*So it was very, very difficult. I found that probably the most challenging was managing some of our internal expectations (PCI-18).*

*Well, because you talk about that law feeling, you talked about that esprit de corp but you've got to have loyalty to the organisation. As the organisation that employs you, it has certain expectations of you and those expectations should override your own personal goals or at least be meshed to those personal goals and it's easier to look at it in that light than any other light, to say well, I have obligations to this organisation, for this organisation to be ethical and up front (PCI-2).*

*Look, if not on induction day, certainly when I first joined and I had my first sort of talk with my team manager, he certainly said to me, I know you've come from a short time with the Police, you're not in the police now, forget that world. There are going to be times when you come up against, investigating people you know and made sure I'm aware. Any loyalties, put them aside (PCI-7).*

Typically, emotive dissonance occurs during interactions between corruption investigators and the police officers they investigate. Within this cognitive emotive work, investigators attempt to change their ideas or thoughts in the hopes of changing the feelings associated with them. Emotional dissonance occurs when investigators are not able to control their emotions. These investigators commented on the difficulties of managing these emotions:

*You'd get a very small percentage that will come in and just start to say, yeah, I have done the wrong thing and my wife left me and my dog shit itself and, you know, all the rest of it, and you can feel some sympathy for those people in a way. Some of them were led into misconduct because of other factors in their life and quite often out of their control and so you hear some sad tales about that sometimes (PCI-11).*

*I do feel sorry for them, however, I always think I can rationalise back, well hang on, no one held a gun to their head for them to do what they did. They made their own choices, they're intelligent people who made decisions in their lives rightly or wrongly and they've chosen a path to go down and that's the way I explain it (PCI-13).*

*I felt sorry for them. Disappointed that they'd put themselves in that situation and also a degree of empathy in the knowledge that nobody's perfect and that everyone's capable of making a mistake, everyone's capable of making a bad decision (PCI-19, interviewed March 2012).*

*I felt sorry for junior people who were put into positions where they've either breached guidelines or committed criminal acts because of the pressure of senior people. I felt sorry for junior people in those situations where you can always argue well, at the end of the day you should have done what's right. But I think that you must take into account what it means to have a person of authority directing you or forcing you or manipulating you to behave in a certain way. I don't think you can exclude that from your investigation or your thinking, so I've felt sorry for people in that space. I've felt sorry for people who have, for whatever reason, but clearly a motivation, set aside decades of career for one act. I've felt sorry for those people. I can't condone the act they've done in most instances but I've felt sorry for them. I've felt sorry for crooks that I've locked up, you know, because not everyone is a crook by choice sometimes. There is normally a journey that has led people. A lot of police will talk about offenders who were the victims of violence for their whole childhood. Their destiny was always going to be a certain outcome, so you know, you feel sorry. You've still got to do your job (PCI-21).*

These real emotions can become an obstacle to job performance. Emotional labour can become dysfunctional for investigators when there are differences between felt emotions and the displayed emotions required by an agency. On the other hand, self-alienation may result if investigators cease to recognise or even feel authentic emotions:

*We had a bloke who was summonsed to a public hearing and a few days before he was due to appear he went and popped himself. And of course we became the reason why he went and killed himself. I think maybe we were a small part of that but I think as events have unfolded the reason why he went and popped himself was because he knew he was going to go to gaol for a very long time and it wasn't the public exposure or humiliation that was the motivating factor. It's tough, and you've got to feel for the family (PCI-1).*

*And I remember one of the first cases I dealt with. I had the wife, who was a member, of a guy I was investigating ring me and scream down the phone at me, you've ruined our life, you've done this, you've done that, and I let her go and I let her go and let her go. Then when she came up for air I said, I appreciate the situation you're in, emotionally it's very difficult for you at the moment, I said, however it isn't my fault, your husband made a choice and now he has to take responsibility for that life choice that he made, that is going to affect your family for a long time and I feel sorry for you. You had no idea, none at all, but you have to understand that it's not my fault, it's your husband's, he made ...Yeah, I do, I do feel sorry for her (PCI-22).*

Work roles which involve emotional labour also carry pressure to internalise role demands, because failure to internalise organisational display rules will ultimately lead to poor perceived job performance and job loss. These investigators (apparently) had no difficulty in internalising these role demands:

*Oh look, it just kicks in as soon as you're in there. We've had people telling us stories about the reasons they've done things and their wife's dying and all this sort of stuff. Yeah, I don't feel sorry for them, no (PCI-27).*

*I mean I guess we, my look on it is that we're here to either prove or disprove. I don't suppose you get any great pleasure in finding out that the police are doing the wrong thing, it's just for me, the job and that's what it is so I haven't got any loyalty (PCI-28).*

*So do I feel sorry for, I don't feel sorry for police, I just feel sorry for anyone who's going through that level of trauma and more particularly I feel sorry for the ones that end up going through that trauma trying to cover for some dickhead who should never have been covered*

*for and which is this blind law again. And we find the blind law brings so many intrinsically good people down its just unbelievable (PCI-3, interviewed June 2012).*

*Just the same as the crooks. You know, when you used to go to court and the crooks are being locked up and they're going to go to gaol or they go to gaol and mum and dad are up the back crying and disappointed and stuff like that, they make those choices so I don't feel sorry for them (PCI-5).*

*For me you're investigating a potential crook whether they've got a badge or not doesn't matter, so I've moved on well and truly past that (PCI-13).*

The negative consequences of emotional labour emerge when an individual does not embrace the expectations imposed on him or her, yet is forced or compelled to engage in emotional displays consistent with those expectations. The problem with emotional labour emerges when an individual does not internally embrace and accept the expectations imposed upon them, yet is forced or compelled to act in a manner consistent with those expectations.

#### **5.3.4 Challenge 4: Managing Relationships**

Personal identity reflects how you see yourself, and why and how individuals justify seeing themselves this way. For instance, a person may see themselves as attractive because they fit the cultural norm of attractiveness as defined on television. Even the ideas we have about ourselves, whether we are intelligent, stupid, attractive or something else, arise from our social relationships.

How others see police corruption investigators influence their behaviour. This poses a significant normalisation challenge, particularly where stigmatisation is involved. The management of relationships (both internal and external) is therefore problematic for police corruption investigators, not the least because they adopt a police view of outsiders as potential sources of threat or compromise.

##### *a) The Police*

People by their very nature are motivated in interactions with others to reduce interpersonal uncertainty, form impressions and develop affinity. Being socialised into the world of police corruption investigation provokes sense making as new comers endeavour to understand their jobs and work context and attempt to form positive social identities. Investigators must become comfortable with routinely investigating their former colleagues, and must also contend with

the negative views others hold towards their occupation. In particular, police agencies and the relationship with corruption investigators can be problematic. These investigators commented up the nature of their relationships with police agencies:

*Well, they just think we're pieces of shit but then in saying that I'd like to think that some of the police officers that I've spoken to in my time here have changed their perceptions (PCI-22).*

*That would really vary a lot. When we were doing a public hearing in the police we fare very badly. When we were in the newspapers talking about corruption in the Police in a big way we'd fare badly. The general police would not like us, you know, but when we weren't in the media as an agency creating those sorts of issues, in those quieter times, actually we got on pretty well (PCI-11).*

All occupations are amenable to being ideologically recast in edifying ways. Even police corruption investigators seek acceptance through social validation, and to view themselves as merely good people doing dirty work:

*The vast majority I'd say would say that we're needed. I go across to the police quite regularly to speak to some people over there, most of them are more than happy with us and see that we're required. If you're not doing anything wrong you've got nothing to hide (PCI-23).*

*Look, I think one of the reasons why the coppers that I speak to have a reasonable amount of confidence in this place is because of the nature of the staffing. They see that the investigators are generally ex-police officers, so that gives them a certain level of comfort, I guess, knowing that, you know, they've got the right experience and skills to be able to investigate police (PCI-1).*

*Detectives who have a bit more dealing with us because they know the nature of the job, they do a lot of gigs and that sort of stuff, come across a lot more information that's useful for us, they seem to have a very positive reaction to our involvement in their investigations and when you ring them up and you tell them, look, we're taking on this. You know, you put that information forward and we're taking a job on for it, you get very positive response from them (PCI-27, interviewed March 2012).*

For a number of the corruption investigators interviewed, their relationships with police and police agencies is a moot point, as they are convinced that the police do not even know who



they are, an issue that reflects upon both the marketing of the anti-corruption agency and their exposure to those police agencies:

*The majority of them wouldn't even know we're here. The ones that we've dealt with, see we serve notices to say they can't say they've been spoken to by us so they would obviously keep it to themselves, hopefully (PCI-12).*

*A lot of them probably don't know what we do. A lot of the youngsters probably haven't heard of us. Some appreciate the work we do. I guess some don't, don't care (PCI-10).*

Whilst police relationships can be problematic, police unions in particular, have proven themselves to be highly successful collective labour organisations which at times, have succeeded in cutting back the powers of civil review anti-corruption agencies, or even closing them down. Therefore, the relationship between police corruption investigators and police unions is a tenuous one.

#### *b) Police Unions*

The challenges involved in managing anti-corruption agency / police union relationships was discussed in Chapter 4. With their potential to become active players in the Australian political environment, as well as the working environment of their members, unions pose a significant challenge to police anti-corruption agencies.

During the course of this research evidence was gathered in regard to the dealings between police anti-corruption agencies and police unions, and not all reflected a good working relationship between the two. One corruption investigator commented on this relationship:

*What some of those agencies (anti-corruption) did, is that they made enemies of the Police Union and the Police Association and when you're at battle one on one with organisations like that, I think corruption agencies are always going to lose and so, you know, you made an enemy of the Police Associations and Police Unions and they're not going to sit there and take what you might be saying about them lightly. They're just going to use whatever means they can to fight back and I think they did and I think that's one of the reasons why (agency name redacted) are on the way out (PCI – 1).*

According to another investigator, the contest between police unions and anti-corruption agencies commences at the police academy, where both sides engage to win over the support of new police recruits:

*The average cop, and I mean every recruit that goes through the training college, I present to and usually I do it straight after the president of the Police Association. After his spiel, and he and I are good friends, we have a good laugh and when we're doing it he says, look, I just told them they want to join the union and not speak to you lot. I go, that's all right, I'll dissuade them of that perception (PCI-2, interviewed September 2012).*

The 1980s in Australia saw a growing politicisation of policing issues and of police forces themselves. Police forces stepped up their campaign for additional funding, staffing and powers. It was recognised that for a political party with an election looming, to antagonise a police union was tantamount to suicide. A senior investigator provided this perspective on the political activism of police unions:

*Well, for example, the police union in Victoria. Probably the strongest pressure group within the Victorian community. In fact they've had a couple of elections attributed to them in terms of losses or wins. They have the ear of the Minister and they have the ear of persons in the media. They are very influential. They also have had a very fractious relationship with civilian oversight bodies. Many years ago, I think, in the eighties, they had the (name of agency redacted) which I think lasted no more than 18 months before it was closed down after enormous lobbying and pressure applied to the government of the day by the Police Association. The OPI has also been subjected to fairly fierce criticism and fairly severe lobbying by the association and the membership more broadly, because the associations comprised of 98% of sworn officers, so it's got a very strong following (PCI-3, interviewed June 2012).*

The problem, according to another investigator, was that the police unions worked within an 'us and them' mentality where police were inculcated with the idea that co-operation with the anti-corruption agencies was against the rules. He commented upon his former union involvement and the challenges posed by police unions:

*I was a delegate for the Police Association and same thing, if any one of the blokes in my area were accused of doing anything wrong there was a strict set of rules of what you can and can't say and do and what the bosses can do. So that was that 'us and them'. I think from my current role it's near impossible to beat the police association, especially right across the country. The Police Federation of Australia are a pretty large, pretty strong organisation, full of bullies, if you will, as far as I'm concerned but probably like all unions. You see it in the trade unions as well, it's very similar but thankfully I haven't had to deal with that (PCI-4, interviewed September 2012).*

Further criticism has also been levelled by unions, toward the competency of corruption investigators, with claims that they lack the prerequisite experience to investigate police corruption fairly. A senior investigator highlighted how unions would attack the competence of the investigators:

*Obviously the police union's caused a lot of grief and the media, the battles with (newspaper name redacted), that's been really bad. We've had comments made in regards to, how we conducted investigations. Like, that we had listening devices in salt and pepper shakers in a café which is just total bullshit, but that's been put out in the media and then we get phone calls from other organisations, what are you blokes doing over there? (PCI-5, interviewed June 2012).*

The issue of police unions and their use of the media was a contentious one. A number of investigators supported the claim that police unions use the media to attack the anti-corruption agencies. These senior investigators described why this occurred:

*Well what we find is that the union has the ability to generate negative publicity for you and they do that because journalists require information and the best source of the information is going to be the police and the association, effectively trading on information. They provide stories to journalists. There's no doubt its quid pro quo, and when it comes time for the agency to get beaten up, the journalists seem to be fairly happy to do that (PCI-3).*

*I mean I'm thinking specifically here, you know, they had real problems with the media, got the shit down there and they targeted some (allegedly) corrupt cops and one cop in the police union was well known to certain sections in the media down there and they really went on the front foot, the union, to attack the agency and I think it did some damage in the end (PCI-6, interviewed October 2012).*

However, not all those interviewed were disparaging in their view of the police unions. A number of the corruption investigators commented upon their convivial relationships with police unions, specifically with union lawyers:

*I've had quite a lot to do with the police union lawyers and I've always found them very good. They've been very fair, they understand what I'm trying to do, and they're the conduit between me and their members. They sort of understand what we're doing, they advise their members accordingly and I've not had a lot to do with the union other than union lawyers who, I guess, are appointed by the union, they're acting on the behest and the behalf of the union. I've actually found them pretty good (PCI-7, interviewed September 2012).*

*Yeah, I deal with them all the time. We do interviews at their office. One of our ex-investigators is a police union lawyer now. We have no problem at all (PCI-8, interviewed September 2012).*

It has been argued that the rise of financially and politically powerful police unions have created a significant challenge for anti-corruption agencies. The reason given for this is that unions typically defend police who are accused of misconduct, sometimes through a purposeful fostering of media contacts and networking. For police anti-corruption agencies, managing relationships with the media is often critical for success.

With regard to the first I have suggested that the media became at some point a captive of police union viewpoints - at what point and to what degree awaits further research. Of course here as elsewhere in civil society, the role of diverse and critical media with a sceptical and inquiring eye is vital (Finnane, 1999, p. 14).

c) *The Media*

Of all the issues covered in this research, the one that drew the most emotional response from the investigators was that of the relationship between anti-corruption agencies and the media. When questioned about their agency's management of the media, many investigators maintained that the media could not be managed. Their comments are reflected in the observations of this senior investigator:

*How do you combat what I consider to be unfair and prolonged criticism, as a result of your investigating journalists or the activities of newspapers because of serious leaks or compromised investigations ... and that's where you don't have the ability to manage if they go feral and you've just got to wear it, which is about having the courage to do it in the first place. It's quite a big issue for us when we know we're going to get beaten up by the press to take a job on (PCI-3).*

Whilst perceptions of media bias and unfairness were widespread amongst police corruption investigators, so were criticisms of media strategy employed by anti-corruption agencies. The majority of corruption investigators interviewed were quite critical of their agency's media strategy and some were quite explicit in describing their agency's management of the media:

*Shit house. I think we do a shit house job, to be blunt (PCI-1).*

*I reckon the management of the media in the anti-corruption business in general is really critical and I think we do a shithouse job of it (PCI-9, interviewed September 2012).*

*It is really important and it's something we do very poorly here. Our Commissioners don't like (pause), they'll just take the criticism (PCI-8).*

The media play an important role in holding police and integrity agencies accountable for their conduct. Sensational cases of police abuse and scandal covered extensively by the press often evoke criticism of the police. Despite these controversies, the results of a national survey of public attitudes reported that Australians still possessed great respect for the police (Swanton, Wilson, Walker, & Mukherjee, 1988). For civil review anti-corruption agencies, media relations are often complicated by the nature of this police / public relationship:

*Well, the police are popular. You know, people love the police for the most part. I think certain newspapers, they've got an interesting relationship with the police. They can be quite critical of them at times but then quite incredibly protective and the media really like celebrity cops much more than I've ever seen anywhere else. If we catch one of these celebrity cops doing something wrong - well they should be forgiven. It becomes this really small by-line that accompanies a page and a half of what a nice bloke he is, or why are we wasting our time on this nice bloke, you know, and it's like, no, no, think about what he did; and they just can't get past that (PCI-10, interviewed April 2012).*

Media manipulation by police agencies and corrupt police is a problematic issue for anti-corruption agencies. One corruption investigator described how a particular Australian Police Commissioner manipulated the media to present his police force in a shining light, to the detriment of the anti-corruption agency:

*The Police Commissioner, he's a very good media strategist and he's a brilliant public figurehead for the police and I think he has swayed the public very cleverly to believe that nobody does wrong in the police, they're an absolute paragon of virtue, all of them, and they're the shining light. And then we come along and we're very much the bad guys and we go after these glorious police officers who have given 30 years of loyal service to the police (PCI-7).*

A number of investigators explained how the anti-corruption agencies might sometimes underestimate this police / media relationship, to their detriment:

*Well, the guys were saying that the decision was made (not to prosecute a high profile police officer). No explanation was provided which sort of leads to a bit of frustration. At the end of the day the Police Officer is quite powerful and has strong allies in the media particularly and has gone on the front foot now to attack them (the agency executive). So all of a sudden they*

*thought it was going to go away by doing nothing and all of a sudden they're under attack (PCI-6).*

*You know, you had on the other side long standing relationships between police that we regarded as being corrupt, and media outlets, media personalities, commentators, who had been manipulated for years without any other alternate voice so you were seen as the enemy (PCI-11, interviewed June 2012).*

Media interest creates a significant source of pressure upon investigations, particularly the need to get a result. This pressure is exacerbated where anti-corruption agency Commissioners are focused on pleasing their political masters by creating a good impression for the media. These investigators commented:

*The media obviously make it more difficult because they raise those expectations and they magnify the small failings, if you will, or the small oversights that the oversight bodies are supposed to (pause); there's an expectation that oversight bodies, the Ombudsman, anti-corruption commissions, whatever they are, are supposed to be 100% accurate first time every time, and that's just not possible, not practical. But the media portray that, and it's probably a fair expectation too that people expect, that we're to be above all else (PCI-4).*

*They wanted investigations to show that the legislation was good, so they would say, go out and look at this, this is what we need to show. Now that's just unethical, it is completely unethical ... they would say, we've just heard that the media were out at this place because someone is complaining, go out there and make sure you have your photo taken to show that we're doing something. Not, go out there and investigate it and find out what's going on, go out there and make it look like something's going on. I didn't like it (PCI-12, interviewed September 2012).*

The key to winning over the media lies in communication. The anti-corruption agency determines how much and how well they communicate with the media and the public, and to their immense cost, many agencies underestimate the significant challenges involved in developing and maintaining an effective communications strategy. When a media event occurs, the absence of an agency's response may lead to assumptions about the agency's legitimacy and competency:

*We organisationally take a view to not feed any more fuel into a fire, just let it start itself and go out. My personal belief is I think that's a sound approach but you also have to know when to hold them and when to fold them and there's been some times we could have come out on*

*the front foot and said something that was factual, non-salacious and got the point across and closed down the argument instead of letting it naturally die a thousand deaths (PCI-14, interviewed September 2012).*

Anti-corruption agencies don't necessarily have to fear the media but rather, media groups can become strong supporters of the agencies and their ongoing battle to address corruption, provided those agencies know how to work with them. Communication becomes the newest weapon in the anti-corruption agencies arsenal. Many investigators interviewed were critical of the secrecy and media shut out strategies employed by many of the integrity agencies:

*I don't necessarily agree with it (media shut out). I think that it should be more subjective. I think we should deal with it on a case by case basis. I think the blanket approach of not commenting on anything often does us a disservice. I think that that does us a disservice in the eyes of the police particularly because the story's not always getting out there (PCI-15, interviewed April 2012).*

*We're not allowed to deal with the media. The only person that's allowed to deal with the media is our media liaison person and the Commissioner, so we're not allowed to talk to them and we never have, we've never had a leak from the Commission to the media, never. There's fairly stringent penalties (PCI-8).*

A number of investigators interviewed were quite critical of their Commissioner's non-preparedness to engage with the media. This was an extreme source of frustration for them, as reflected in the comments of these investigators:

*The Judges or the Commissioners won't stand up and make a comment out there. They're media shy, they're media reactive but they're media shy. I think this is ingrained in them. And you know what the judiciary are like, they don't comment and I think that's still here. I don't think they actually realise - I'm not a Judge anymore (PCI-16, interviewed September 2012).*

*I'm anxious about criticising it, but this organization doesn't have a bona fide communication strategy. It has a media advisor who publishes media releases from time to time, and this reflects the inherent conservatism of the judicial officers at the head of them, they think that the reports we publish say everything that needs to be said and they should speak for themselves. Well, I don't disagree with that, except no one fucking reads them (PCI-9).*

Not all investigators were critical of the media shut out policy. One investigator supported the *no comment* policy, stating that it was a decision for senior management, not himself. He describes bad publicity as *riding the storm* and recommends waiting out the issue:

*Definitely very important. But then again it's no different to any other investigation, I mean, you manage the media for your own gain really. Personally, I think the way to do it is just ride the storm, see what happens. We all know there is the fact that these things are issues for a short while and then another week has passed and it's all forgotten about anyway (PCI-17, interviewed March 2012).*

One senior investigator described what happened when the *no comment* policy was reversed. Even though his Commissioner was *railroaded* into giving the media conference, he recognised that this strategy could be of benefit to the agency:

*So the best thing we've ever had was when the former Commissioner almost got railroaded into it, was when he actually opened himself up to the media and said, look, ask me anything you want if I can't tell you I won't and if I can, I'll tell you. And the media loved it and for ages we got this positive press because there is so many misconceptions about what we do (PCI-16).*

These comments can be contrasted with those of another investigator, whose experiences were just the opposite. He described how, faced with a media manipulating foe and an over controlled organisational response, a poor outcome was inevitable:

*It was all controlled media statements, the view was not to comment, not to engage, certainly not to deal with the media. We had a very controlled media liaison officer and I don't know if that was necessarily the right way. I think everyone was always very self-conscious or cautious not to be compromising operations or the secrecy provisions because there were penalties for doing that, hence the reason why we had a very restrictive media engagement policy and I think we ultimately paid the price for that. Once we started to hook into some high profile political targets who did know how to manipulate and use the media we had no store, we had no credits, you know, we'd built no relationships and we got flogged (PCI-18, interviewed November 2012).*

These investigators described how non-engagement with the media tends to create a vacuum of conversation which leaves misinformation to inform public opinion:



*There was an attitude here for a while that, you know, why bother communicating because they're just going to report it the way they like it anyway? And certainly with some publications that's always going to be the same, it doesn't matter where you work. When I first started here, we actually, the Commission did actually employ media liaison people, a private sector media liaison company to communicate with the media and it worked well, even if they did run off and print whatever they liked, at least we seemed to be talking and engaging with the public (PCI-19, interviewed April 2012).*

*Managing the scrutiny, managing the misinformation that's out in the media, because that has a huge impact on the people here and unfortunately we can't go, hey, hey, hey, you're wrong. Sometimes there's a full on investigation that we can't comment on. We've just recently started going into setting the record straight, basically, on some things but they're reports that we've already provided and those sorts of things, so you can put up those things (PCI-13).*

Despite the benefits that might be served from embracing the media, there are inherent risks to integrity agencies, such as compromising investigations or revealing informant identities, thereby putting their safety at risk. Not all those interviewed were supportive of embracing the media:

*I don't think this place should give anything out personally. I think we give far too much out and I think I can say on one occasion the media here cost us a job, a good conviction I think, because we sent something through to DPP. It was a political job. Within 6 hours of us taking it over there, a media release from here, I say a media release, it wasn't even an authorised media release, a reporter ringing up somebody they knew, an ex-cop that works here. They met, he's recorded the conversation and there was a slip of the tongue and it's out there in the papers, the DPP just went [makes noise] we don't want it, there you go (PCI-6).*

Both the media and the public pass judgement on the work of the anti-corruption agencies, with the media largely determining whether they are against or for the integrity agency. It is argued that where public and media support is lost, then the agencies work becomes futile. If the media and public are in favour of the agency, it is argued that the agency is more likely to be successful:

*I just think if the public realised what our role is and that we are not just going after a police officer who takes too many sick days or something. We are out there looking to get rid of your bad apples for you, you know, we are looking to get rid of corrupt police officers, this is what we do. We don't always succeed. I just think if the public were better informed of what we're*

*doing and what we're trying to achieve I think they'd sort of warm to us a bit more. I just think we could sort of stop this beat up we always get if the public were better informed? (PCI-7).*

Public opinion can be a powerful tool in promoting an integrity agencies work and the media play a significant role in shaping public perceptions and norms about corruption. These perceptions, promoted by the media, seriously impact upon public perceptions and can overwhelm an agency and force it to become defensive:

*It does need to have a public hearing or some sort of public exposé of issues at which there's a winner and a loser because the media like winners and losers, so they create an adversarial situation, they won't even really tolerate a draw, so they want to make sure someone's a winner and someone's a loser and you find yourself just having to engage in that just to get sort of enough space to do this other good work (PCI-11).*

The media can distort the reality of corruption events and investigations by pursuing their own agendas, which often distort and impact public opinion. If the public misunderstand the issues they are less likely to fight in support of the agency and against corruption.

*d) The General Public*

Public confidence is a primary criterion for evaluating police discipline and a number of public opinion surveys have been conducted on the issue of who should handle complaints against police. For instance, the British Social Attitudes Survey has included a question on police complaints processing since 1990 (Prenzler, 2004). Prenzler notes that public opinion is generally favourable of existing external agencies, and their effectiveness in making police accountable — although it is often apparent that respondents are not aware of the precise division of labour between police and the external agency.

In February 2008, the Western Australian Corruption and Crime Commission (CCC) commissioned an independent research survey of 380 Western Australians to measure their perceptions and attitudes toward the Commission and the public sector in general. The survey resulted in a very high level of awareness of the Commission, with 9 in 10 respondents claiming to be aware of the Commission and 80 percent of these correctly identifying some aspect of the Commission's role. Confidence was equally high with 8 in 10 respondents confident that the Commission would properly investigate their complaints (CCC, 2008).

Similarly, in 2010-11, the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) conducted

a survey about public awareness of, and confidence in, its activities. Public confidence in the CMC's complaints processing had increased since 2008; and there has been an increase in the public's inclination to report events to the CMC rather than the Queensland Police Service (QPS). Most people also believed that complaints should be dealt with by an independent body rather than the QPS (CMC, 2011).

Relationships form a critical component of social identity and define the particular society or group within which they exist. There was a common perception amongst those interviewed that the general public had no idea what they do:

*I don't think the general public know we exist. I think those of us in the business know we exist. I think the police service knows we exist ... I don't think Joe Public knows that much about it (PCI-9).*

*I don't think the general public really have any idea what we do. I don't think a lot of them care (PCI-1).*

*I think the general public, the majority of them, don't really know what we do or they're not interested in it or they don't understand it (PCI-5).*

Not all the investigators interviewed were convinced on the issue of the agencies public anonymity:

*Oh, they know we exist because of all the adverse publicity we get (PCI-3).*

The secrecy surrounding police corruption investigation creates a social buffer around those tasked with this function. One investigator commented upon the impact of secrecy on public relations, thereby highlighting a major reason for the ignorance of the general public to the roles and functions of police corruption investigators:

*I think generally the public don't know because of the secretive nature of what we do, or the confidential nature of what we do. Sometimes the public might just be apathetic about it as well and don't really care (PCI-13).*

Whilst most investigators thought that the public knew very little about what they did, this did not stop them commenting on the public perceptions of the value of the work they do:

*I'm reasonably comfortable that the vast majority of people out there see that we're required (PCI-23).*

*How I gauge that, I suppose I speak to people but they know me, you see, so they'll generally say, oh no, that's a good job, you're doing all right, keep going. I think that people can still come in our door and complain to us and so as long as that continues to happen I think the public have got some amount of faith in us (PCI-25, interviewed June 2012).*

*Funny enough, if you went by the papers you'd think everyone thought we were useless, but I bump into people and they find out what I do and they go, oh we love the fact that you guys, you know, go after, because we've really gone after politicians over here and they love it, so I think we're reasonably well perceived (PCI-8).*

Not all officers interviewed were confident the general public would see them in a good light. Bad publicity and media exposure can lead to situations where the vestiges of public confidence are diminished and the effectiveness of police anti-corruption agencies questioned. The toothless tiger was a common image evoked by investigators:

*That we're ineffective. So if the cop is still walking around then you've failed, you've failed in trying to achieve what the public expects you to achieve and thinks you're supposed to achieve (PCI-14).*

*Toothless tiger ... I think this organisation at one time was quite powerful and quite proactive. I don't think they're that anymore. I think we're deemed as a bit of a political tool and one government using us to besmirch the other and a lot of the things we do bring up or we should prosecute police for it doesn't happen (PCI-6).*

*Toothless tiger....Oh yeah, definitely, definitely.....Some people think you're a big hard core spy and, you know, desire to be you or something ... I think the general public think we're hopeless (PCI-26, interviewed October 2012).*

*Oh look I think the general public has a very poor view of us. I think that is largely as the result of a couple of things. I don't think this agency's been particularly good at selling what we do (PCI-20).*

Public confidence is almost universally cited as a primary criterion for maintaining police discipline. This is because abuses of police power can negatively impact public perceptions concerning the integrity and legitimacy of police agencies. Therefore the complaints and discipline processes must be transparent, accountable, responsive and accessible to legitimate allegations of misconduct. Whilst independent investigation and adjudication of police corruption is necessary in order to achieve public confidence, it is an innovation with purely

symbolic advantages in the battle for public opinion.

e) *Family*

Police corruption investigators face relationship challenges from multiple stakeholders, each of which might have a different perception or reaction to what they do. Perhaps none of these are as critical as the relationship the investigator fosters with his or her own family:

*Well, I mean I obviously don't go into the nitty gritty of the job. I mean I would say yeah, I keep a lot of it away from my family and friends. I think part of its, it's like my neighbours know what I do as well but they're not really, I think they're at the point of friendship that they realise that I'm wasting my time asking about it because he's not going to tell you anyway because they know I just don't want to tell them. And I don't want to tell them because it may put them in a spot as well (PCI-17).*

*Look, to be quite honest, even with policing, you wouldn't take it home and talk to your family about it anyway. Very rarely, even in my policing days, would you go home and talk outside. I certainly wouldn't talk to any of my friends who are non-police about policing matters that I was working on, you know (PCI-18).*

*I've never discussed my work with my wife, any job. I think because the police work was so stressful, this is just such a different, you know, this is fuckin' easy, so I mean if I get annoyed, I just get annoyed but I don't get stressed like I used to in the coppers (PCI-12).*

*No, no. My wife thinks I'm a secret agent. I mean initially she was always asking questions but I mean having worked with the financial aspects of major corporate fraud and all that stuff she's pretty accepting (PCI-23).*

The sometimes chaotic work life of police corruption investigators can place unusual stresses on families. Long suffering partners tend to endure in silence, tolerating the situation and curbing criticism. These stresses are particularly hard on the children in the family:

*I know for people with older children it's a real thing. I was lampooned on the bloody, you know, vilified in the paper. My daughter came home from school and she was getting asked at school, oh what's your dad done? You know, she was going, Dad, are you going to gaol or something? What's going on? You say, no, it's just all crap, don't believe what you read (PCI-11).*

*I speak to my 6 year old on the way home from school and I say to her, how was your day, darling, what did you do? Just stuff. And I think well, she does. And then my husband said to her the other day, come on, tell Mum what you did today? She goes, why should I, all she says to me when I ask her, how was your day, she goes, just worked. So you know, she's right (PCI-22).*

*They sit back and look at, well how does something that is absolutely false and baseless be a headline in a legitimate newspaper and then peddled for days on end. So from a family perspective they obviously find that very difficult. So you try to help them understand that that's the unfortunate and sad price that you pay for public office but it's a reality so you try to help them understand that (PCI-21).*

Some officers commented on how their shift from police officer to police corruption investigator has actually benefited their family lives:

*Funnily enough once people are there, there are some benefits, not many but some, so you predominantly work day shifts, weekends off, not too many call outs. So if you're a family oriented bloke or lady, you've got kids and you want good quality family time it's quite good in terms of that (PCI-2).*

*She is much happier that I'm out of policing. She didn't really like me being a policeman. She didn't like the fact that I drank a lot, away from home a lot, get called out in the middle of the night a lot, just a piss poor lifestyle. It wasn't really conducive to a good marriage nor to a good upbringing of the children and she's pretty much on the money. So when I left my wife was pretty happy. I see much more of the family as well (PCI-12).*

*I guess I got used to that good life and weekends off, no night shifts, no afternoon shifts, you can plan your holidays 6 months in advance and all that sort of stuff that goes with that (PCI-4).*

Within policing culture, secrecy and isolation from outsiders is defined as good and necessary and has long been acknowledged in the literature. Unfortunately, this secrecy element places undue stress on marriages and family groups and creates a dilemma in reconciling the competing urgencies of family and work.

## 5.4 Conclusion

Chapter 4 of this thesis introduced the concept of normalisation in the context of *dirty work*. Utilising self-narrative perspectives, Chapter 5 examined major normalisation challenges facing civil review agency police corruption investigators.

Investigators draw upon their occupational identity as part of their overall social identity. The major normalisation challenge for police corruption investigators is to develop an acceptable collective work identity. In doing so, corruption investigators are required to transition through a multiplicity of social identity dimensions before they can achieve a much needed validation of normalcy from their new work place communities.

The narratives provide some insight into the influence and impact of police culture on the investigators. Given the level of discretion and autonomy afforded police generally, many police corruption investigators expressed frustration in adapting to their new corporate working environment and report having to regulate their emotions on the job to be able to deal with their corrupt former colleagues.

The following chapter provides further insights drawn from the interview data, focusing on the strategies employed by police corruption investigators to address these challenges and normalise their work in the face of transitional work identity. These strategies are embedded in structure and culture and implicate emotion, cognition and behaviour. It is through such strategies that police corruption investigators adapt and implement institutionalised processes by which “extraordinary is rendered seemingly ordinary” (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002, p. 217).

## CHAPTER SIX – NORMALISATION STRATEGIES

“I don’t feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning.”

*Michel Foucault*<sup>11</sup>

### 6.1 Introduction

Normalisation refers to the social processes that take place within organisations through which everyday actions come to be seen as normal, and become taken for granted as part of the operational milieu. Michel Foucault (1978) used the term to describe the construction of an idealised norm of conduct, in his case, the way a soldier should present arms, march or stand. These behaviours were then awarded or punished depending on their deviation from the ideal. Others, like May (2009) have expanded normalisation process into a theory which pays attention to the ways that material practice become routinely embedded in a social context as a result of individual and collective agency.

This chapter looks at the issue of normalisation, and how police corruption investigators attempt to regulate the unwanted or undesirable emotions attached to their role. This normalisation enables the investigators to develop an acceptable collective identity of individual self and work identity. As with the previous chapter, the concept will be examined through the lens of self-narratives, where the research subjects narrate their experiences of a new work environment, reflecting both their background and narrative identity.

In their 2007 study on *normalizing dirty work*, Ashforth, Kreiner, Clark, & Fugate (2007) conducted interviews across a sizeable cross section of managerial occupations. Their work was used as a foundation for designing the thematic coding for this research. Consideration was given to how each of the normalising strategies outlined in that work, might be represented in the current research narratives, and a model quote was developed to act as a prompt for recognition and analysis (refer Table 6).

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<sup>11</sup> Foucault, M. (1982). Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault. Retrieved 15 October, 2014, from <http://foucault.info/documents/foucault.technologiesofself.en.html>



Table 6: Normalising Tactics / Primary Thematic Coding for Study

<b>Tactic</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Model Quote</b>
<b><i>Occupational ideologies</i></b>		
Reframing	Infusing work with positive value and/ neutralizing negative value.	“Without corruption investigators, the corrupt cops would take over.”
Recalibrating	Adjusting implicit standards used to assess the work.	“Being able to tell if someone is lying to you, now that a real skill.”
Refocusing	Emphasizing non- stigmatized aspects of the work.	“Where else would they pay you and give you time off for study.”
<b><i>Social buffers</i></b>		
Social buffers	Distinctive in-group(s) that provide a bulwark against identity threats.	“You go to corruption conferences and find out that everyone is in the same boat.”
<b><i>Confronting police and publics perceptions</i></b>		
Confronting public perception of taint	Extolling the value of the work and/or rebutting specific issues; using humour to soften taint.	“The public thinks that we look after the corrupt cops, but that’s not true.”
Confronting police perceptions of taint and behaviours that contribute to taint.	Extolling value of the work, the worker, and the police; acting contrary to occupational stereotype.	“I’m not here to fix anyone up. If you’ve done nothing wrong, you’ve got nothing to fear”
<b><i>Defensive tactics (typically reactive means of adapting to status quo)</i></b>		
<i>Behavioural:</i> Avoiding (physical; passing; withholding information)	Tactics that allow one to evade attributions of dirt.	“If I’m at a party, I usually tell people I’m an airline pilot or something like that.”
<i>Cognitive:</i> Accepting (just deal with it)	Resignation that one cannot affect certain events; tolerating status quo stoically.	“I can’t change the way they look at us, I just do the best I can in a difficult job.”
<i>Cognitive:</i> Social comparison (organisations, occupations, individuals)	Comparing oneself to others perceived as worse off (or to one’s past) thereby drawing self-enhancing inferences.	“It’s better than being out there on the street doing night work and running RBT.”
<i>Cognitive:</i> Condemning the condemners	Criticising those who criticise them, thereby impugning their legitimacy as critics.	“How would they (street cops) know how we work? Half of them are crooks anyway.”
<i>Behavioural/cognitive:</i> Blaming and/or distancing from mainstream policing (including parting ways)	Pinpointing the police as the cause of stigma and/or separating oneself from the occupation.	“I just don’t see myself as a copper any more, there’s just too much corruption going on there.”
<i>Behavioural/cognitive:</i> Distancing from role	Separating oneself from stigmatized aspects of the work.	“They’re not blaming you, it’s just the system. You learn not to take it so personally.”

(Adapted from Ashforth, et.al. 2007: pp.158-159)

The most prevalent normalisation strategies identified in the literature are:

- a) War Stories (reviewed in Chapter 3, page 72);
- b) Strategic Use of Humour (Chapter 2, page 51);
- c) Relaxation and Stress Relief Strategies (Chapter 3, page 57);
- d) Reframing (Chapter 4, page 99);
- e) Adaptation (Chapter 4, page 99);
- f) Diffusing (Chapter 4, page 98);
- g) Ritualism and Ceremony (Chapter 4, page 99);
- h) Titles and Status (Chapter 4, page 101);
- i) Recalibrating (Chapter 4, page 100); and
- j) Refocusing (Chapter 4, page 100).

Studying narratives is useful in revealing realities around social life and culture. Narrative analysis allows for the systematic study of personal experience and meaning particularly in regard to how events have been constructed by the investigators. These interpretations will now be discussed in the context of the normalisation strategies outlined above.

## **6.2 War Stories**

Police war stories provide the opportunity for police corruption investigators to orientate themselves and others about who they were and who they have become, using established referents that would be somewhat familiar to those colleagues from policing backgrounds:

*So the easiest way we can do that, as a former police officer, I understand that the best lessons are often learnt through the way of war stories. So that's where we're able to influence culture by providing examples of people who've run afoul of policy procedure and law and show a reasonable outcome in regards to that. All that sort of oral history stuff tends to sort of crop up a little bit organically (PCI-20).*

There are always pressures upon cultures to evolve and develop. But just as individuals do not easily give up their personal identities, so police corruption investigators do not readily relinquish the basic underlying assumptions that bonded them to policing in the first place and into which they were socialised. Investigators need to reassure themselves that as they move from their previous experience to a new beginning, that not all will be unfamiliar to them. War stories assist this transition:

*I guess you find often newcomers might have a question. Have you ever experienced this or has there ever been a situation where you're worried about your safety and things like that, but they ask these questions because you don't often get those answers before you start here, you don't know about it, so you're often coming in blind. So yeah, people ask those sort of questions and I think yeah, fairly generic answers along the lines of, well on the whole we don't generally have to worry that much about our security, just as long as we continue to have things in place that manage the risks, it's not something you have to worry about up here, as long as you're managing the risks and I won't go into them, but we have things in place to manage risks (PCI-19).*

*Part of the culture is the stories that are told so, you know, a bit like it is in the police meal rooms, you know, people just talking and talking about jobs and it was the same there. People would talk about jobs they'd done or investigations they'd been part of or stories about things they'd done and as I say, a lot of people from different backgrounds so there were a lot of fresh ears for all their stories, you know, when you go somewhere like that (PCI-11).*

*Yeah. I mean storytelling, I think's important in any vocation and I think good leaders can use storytelling to an advantage. I think people can learn from storytelling. It's a way of passing on knowledge and experiences so I think there's a place for it but there's also some parameters around it. It's not everything. But I think it can be an effective way of sharing knowledge and corporate knowledge and history (PCI-21).*

*Oh look, I think old warries are pretty useful because you can put the theory into context or practice, I suppose. Somebody might ask a question about, oh well, why do you do things this way? If you've got a war story to explain and justify why something happened that way and what the outcome was that's a very useful way of getting the message across (PCI-1).*

The purpose of war stories is to make sense of phenomena in the workplace by telling stories that articulate personal experiences as regards these phenomena. By serving as analogies, war story scripts provide morals upon which the investigators can base their attitudes, perceptions and action. Hence if the features of a situation match an existing script in the investigator's mind, they can invoke the memory from the war story to provide guidance on how to act in a given situation. The task becomes one of recognition rather than construction:

*I used a story where I nearly got stabbed by a guy giving him a breath test on the side of the road, and this was part of my argument as to why tasers are a useful tool for police, because I didn't have one at the time, it was prior to us bringing them in and my only other option*

*would have been to shoot the guy, luckily the circumstances were that I didn't have to, but I was this close to having to do that. So these are things, when I explain it to people, you know, I can say well in half a second, literally, I had to decide what am I going to do? You can sit there for hours and ruminate over it but I had [clicks fingers] that time to make a decision, so that's where we can use those war stories to sort of educate and give some context around what people are talking about in a more academic sort of sense (PCI-20).*

Organisational experiences and stories create a sense of shared reality amongst police; typically the lessons from such stories are complex or even contradictory, or may be open to multiple interpretations. They often recount tales of heroic extreme far removed from the normal tedium of everyday policing and often contradicting official procedures. They often emphasise danger and violence and strengthen the perceived importance of cohesive informal occupational loyalty and camaraderie, and heighten the barriers of informal acceptance for any outsiders, who cannot be counted on to conform to the group's norms. But these stories are not always appropriate for the corporate environment of a civil review anti-corruption agency. These investigators commented:

*I could tell war stories of a fairly graphic nature and lots of black humour, where we couldn't have that same conversation with the two other girls down the end of the hall, albeit they're at the same level that I'm at, they come from different backgrounds and different areas. But yeah, they build relationships, they inject some colour, if you will, into a pretty sterile environment where it's just the same, reading documents and emails and telephone calls sort of stuff all the time, it breaks it up (PCI-4).*

*You've got to be very careful with non-police and war stories so I would say when I've done training. I got up and did my first thing and told some war stories. At the end of it I was told, don't tell them war stories. I thought when I first started I told war stories because I thought they'd be interested, the feedback I got was, look at this arrogant ex-copper up here telling stories and that's not the perspective any of us were coming from but again, unless you're in the culture, people just think you're big noting yourself. Whereas war stories are bloody part and parcel of daily policing (PCI-12).*

Although war stories appear to be common place within the corruption investigation environment, there is still a question around their purpose and efficacy. These investigators questioned the relevance of war stories in a contemporary context:

*They give you street cred and all that sort of stuff but I think people in this office would be more impressed with the fact that I've got two degrees than they would about some war story that I could tell them about. War stories are good for other cops but they lack meaning and context for non-police. So if I tell a story about something that happened 20 years ago when I was in the cops it'd just go over their head or they'd think, oh well, you know, what's the relevance of that? (PCI-2).*

*Oh yeah. We used to have a manager here that would be able to hold court for at least an hour talking about himself and his war stories before he'd actually deal with what was on the agenda and in the end everyone was going, oh here we go again, you know ... people get a bit fed up with hearing those after a while (PCI-25).*

Self-reflection is the means by which individuals exercise retrospection and learn more about their fundamental nature and purpose. In learning environments, self-reflection is an important process in order to maximise the utility of having experiences. One senior investigator commented upon the use of the war stories to reflect upon the lived experience, and to consider what value that experience may offer:

*Oh look, I've been guilty of that too, you know, because you have a good job you make light of it and you have a bit of a war story and when you go and have a few beers we all tell war stories, there's no doubt about it. But I didn't know until before, it just makes me think about it, in terms of how you deal with things and strategise things. At the end of the day I can say, right, I can put that in a box for the day, I'll go home and not let it get to me because some of the things I've dealt with over the years have been quite horrific and you just think, well, if you sit there and think and fester about it you're going to end up in a screaming heap in the corner. So that's the way I deal with it and I exorcise those demons when I walk out the door (PCI-13).*

This thesis has argued that a large proportion of police time is taken up in non-law enforcement activities, which are not the *sine qua non* of real police work. In particular, the unrewarding and monotonous nature of investigation work was discussed in Chapter 3. In contrast, many war stories recount tales of heroic extreme by emphasising danger and violence. These investigators commented on the monotonous nature of corruption investigation work and the role of war stories in relieving that monotony:

*It's breaking up the monotony and talking about how you've done things in the past and the issues that you've had in the past and why it happened and make sure it doesn't happen again*

*and things like that ... I mean war stories for a cop is when you're on General Duties and you get involved in a big punch up or you have to pull your firearm on somebody ... there's nothing like that here. You come to work, you pretty much sit in silence for 7 hours a day in front of a screen. You very rarely get to leave the building (PCI-5).*

*I think it's just to reflect on your experiences and things like that and again, often that, you're telling war stories about good experiences or that you can have a laugh and things like that. It's breaking up the monotony ... Yeah, we often have war stories (PCI-12).*

Cultural norms were discussed previously in Chapter 2. These norms become internalised through socialisation; they become part of identity and control regular patterns of behaviour. One of the functions of war stories then, is to assist newcomers to an anti-corruption agency to become socialised into the new agency. Socialisation describes how new corruption investigators learn about and generally conform to norms and values of the group, with self-identity developed through this socialisation:

*Oh well, we have strategy meetings, like if we've got an operation or investigation and we're just starting strategy we'll get in, you know, we had example the other day, a person who came from a counter-terrorism background and we needed to get access to this old listening device and the techs couldn't handle that door, I mean how are we going to get in there? And he gave a scenario that he gave in previous experience that worked really well and we were like, oh that's great, because it was that previous experience and then you can get it through the hierarchy very easily to get approved with the risk assessments because you can say, well this person's done it before on this job and it works, so you can cite it with evidence (PCI-26).*

*I think they're good learning experiences because you look back and even not necessarily just police war stories. If you look at war stories from previous matters that we've dealt with here, you can go, OK, in this one we did this and it really didn't work and remember in such and such we had this one and we did this, this, this and this. So they can be good sort of tools to learn mistakes from or to identify things that worked really well or other methodologies that could use for different cases (PCI-22).*

According to one corruption investigator, the problem with war stories was that they were often told from a policing perspective, rather than from the perspective of police corruption investigation:

*To be quite honest the life span of investigators here is only usually a couple of years, so you don't have that long, I was in police 27 years and you might work with blokes for 6 or 7 years,*

*so there are war stories that you tell, but in here, you don't have the level of war stories because, the war stories that get told here are police war stories (PCI-3).*

Another investigator discussed how he had discontinued using police war stories and instead, now adapted the war story vehicle to corruption investigation:

*No. I don't use copper war stories anymore, I use corruption investigation war stories but only when I'm giving those talks, where you're giving that education process where you're saying, this is what's happened in other jurisdictions (PCI-27).*

Of the corruption investigators interviewed for this research, only one denied the use of war stories within her agency. Instead, she stated that corruption investigators learned their trade by reading final investigation reports:

*We don't do war stories here, that's a real policing thing, the old war stories. We tend to learn by reading the final investigation reports what was done and then you can go and ask clarifying questions so war stories don't really apply (PCI-8).*

Perhaps the role of war stories in the context of civil review anti-corruption agencies is not so much to propagate the old police culture, but more a recognition of where the corruption investigators have come from, and where they find themselves now. More than anything, they are creating a new history, one that is validated by the norms and traditions of the past, but very much focused in the present:

*Oh, they're (war stories) part of the culture. I'm sure some of those stories will go on in time, you know, remember the time, blah, blah, blah, did that, as they do with the cops, maybe even more so in agencies like this because that's what they are doing, they're creating their history so I think you'll find if anything they're most probably more prevalent than what they might be in the cops (PCI-18).*

Police culture is supported by shared values and beliefs, demonstrated through language humour and stories. The use of civilian (non-police background) investigators is based, in part, on the argument that police investigative skills are not necessarily unique to policing and that non-police background, civilian investigators are not bound by the values or interests of the police culture. Because humour and storytelling usually remain within an occupational community, it is unlikely that as outsiders, civilian (non-police background) investigators would understand or appreciate the intent and value of police war stories and black humour exchanges in the work place.

War stories are considered a timeout from the usual discipline expected within the corruption investigation environment, during which the investigators are allowed to laugh and enjoy the stories. This relaxed story telling strategy defines what is truly valued in police corruption investigation, and in police culture generally, through discussing the stories and providing a socially accepted feedback mechanism for how investigators are supposed to act in given situations.

*Oh, there's always generic stories you know, I guess humour in the way somebody may have been described, you know, physically described, and you sit around laughing at the way witnesses remembered you and things like that. But no, I won't go into specifics because there's too many aspects, but yeah, that's always good for a laugh, newcomers enjoy a bit of a giggle. From a humour purpose, yeah, that's probably about it, nothing more than that (PCI-19).*

### **6.3 Strategic Use of Humour**

Driven by the need to portray a certain veneer to a social audience and thereby ensure adherence to cultural norms, police sometimes exploit humour to soften the immediate impact of tragic experience. Through this humour, they can empathise with each other through a collective coping strategy, enforce group solidarity and neutralise the emotional impact of the situation:

Management of emotional expressions enhances group functioning by maintaining collective action. Emotional anxieties and tensions are thus neutralized and normalized via collective coping strategies that reinforce group solidarity (Pogrebin & Poole, 1991, pp. 401-402).

This corruption investigator commented on the role of humour in police corruption investigation:

*To lighten the moment. There's a lot of negativity. There's more negativity in policing than anything else that I could ever fathom, stuff I've seen that, in a war zone there's a lot of negativity as well but it's nothing like that of course. But you're dealing with negative people all the time, blood and guts, death and mayhem and lots of really bad stuff all the time. Yeah, yeah. You make light of a really bad situation to break that pressure, to break down that stress (PCI-4).*

Sometimes referred to as black humour or gallows humour, it provides a ritualistic means of diffusing emotions for police officers: "if we can still laugh it can't be all that bad" (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002, pp. 224-226). Gallows humour is also used to confront stereotypes held by



the public or police alike (Ashforth et al., 2007). For the police corruption investigator, this often takes the form of humorous self-deprecating descriptions for the work that they do:

*Rat's squad or feather feet. That's what you call them, because you never hear them coming, they've got feathers on their feet (PCI-20).*

*Soft shoe shufflers was one of them. Oh, and the rubber sole brigade, creeping about all the time (PCI-17).*

For police corruption investigators, humour allows occupational members to share experiences that would be difficult to express otherwise. It allows investigators to raise individual concerns with the group without indicating that intent and allows them to normalise crises and dilemmas thereby fostering group cohesion. One investigator commented:

*I think you've got to have a sense of humour about things. You know most coppers develop a fairly black sense of humour over time as a coping mechanism. I see using humour and jokes and things like that as a way of humanizing the work force. There seems to be a push to almost de-humanise it and become robots so being able to laugh about things is one way of, I guess, relieving the stress and the tension and coping with difficult and stressful situations (PCI-1).*

Humour can be regarded as a ritualistic means of diffusing or even reframing emotion. That humour and the cynicism often associated with clichéd versions of police culture become a police corruption investigator's reality, particularly in situations where they are taking away the livelihood of officers with whom they formerly shared occupational values. Jokes and humour are a means by which investigators can deal with the gravity and seriousness of the matters they investigate. It becomes a small ritual of celebration of their ability to overcome their police cultural influences and enables them to feel honour rather than shame in their work:

*Oh, it's massive. We spend half our life dicking around. Yeah, but when it's serious, it's serious. Oh, you just can't be intense all the time or you'll go nuts, you just have to have a laugh. You get a skewed perspective, I'll go back to being a copper, you get a skewed perspective on life because everyone you deal with is a shit pot, you lose your empathy to victims after a while because you become a bit of an automaton, you just do the process. And here's probably the same a bit, we only investigate corrupt people, but probably 90% of coppers, well I would hope 99% of coppers and 90% of the public servants aren't, so you've got to have a reality check, you know, you've got to have it all in perspective and mucking around and telling jokes and hanging shit on each other is the way it is (PCI-12).*

However, the type of black humour accepted within policing environments is not always considered appropriate in the corporate environment of a civil review anti-corruption agency:

*And when you're out and you work with public servants and you're hanging shit on them like you would another copper it probably won't go down well if they're not used to the culture. You know if I hang shit on you I expect you to hang shit on me because I'm trying to, you know, knock around with you, like if I'm calling you Knackers or whatever, I don't expect you get upset and go to the boss and say, he's not being very nice to me (PCI-12).*

*In that sense, yes, it was and you try and, not black humour as you would in policing, but you try and sort of make the best of a bad lot, but you're very aware that you've got the Parliamentary Inspector looking at you and he's going to be talking to different people and you wouldn't want things turned on you to say you're laughing about a bloke that's killed himself and, yeah, you'd just be on the road to nowhere (PCI-14).*

*There's a lot of people that do not come from a policing background in this organisation so they just don't get that black humour so yeah, not really. When we're in the car with a couple of ex-coppers, yeah, that black humour comes out but not in general around the Commission (PCI-8).*

*Oh yeah, yeah, but not openly within the investigations unit in general because you've got to remember the investigations unit is made up of non-police background people as well, so there's some humour that investigators might sit around and think of as classically funny and some of the analysts might just sit there with their mouths on the floor and want to complain at the first opportunity. So people know what's appropriate and what's not in context of who's around, so yeah, dark humour has its place (PCI-19).*

Pogrebin and Poole (1988, pp. 183-184), in their year-long study of the strategic use of humour amongst police, identified different types of characteristic humour within police agencies;

- jocular aggression
- audience degradation
- diffusion of danger/tragedy
- backstage humour

a) *Jocular Aggression*

Jocular aggression takes the form of humorous attacks against supervisory management personnel. It is a way that some officers can collectively denounce departmental policies,

regulations or directives. Jocular aggression thus avoids a direct confrontation with superiors that could lead to operational sanction. Jocular aggression provides the means by which investigators can express dissatisfaction with their leaders or with the organisation itself, although they are obviously mindful not to make comments that are directly offensive or insulting to the agency management:

*Lawyers are generally not very humorous people, I must admit and some of the public servants aren't... I'm being very judgmental here, but we, I kind of go around and take the piss out of people that take themselves too seriously and stuff like that (PCI-24).*

*One of the lawyers down there, used to always wear his, he'd get into work about 9 o'clock, and he used to ride his pushbike in and he'd wear these bike shorts, see, and the bike shorts left little to the imagination so all the women would say, oh shit, here he comes again. He'd be walking around the office in these bike shorts with his slug moving from side to side and the women in the office would be, oh my God, will you just go away, you know. So we used to take a bit of piss out of him over his bike shorts and stuff like that (PCI-11).*

#### *b) Audience Degradation*

Audience degradation involves swapping stories about encounters with corrupt police and the chance to exploit the humour in the troubles and foibles of those police officers. Because they are often called upon to extricate these individuals from the organisations to which they are bonded, the investigators come to see these police in rather cynical terms. This backstage derogation of corrupt police is a strategy employed to maintain morale and to confirm in the minds of the police corruption investigators that they have made the break from a dominant police culture to a new domain:

*Oh look, I think it was part of it, yeah, part of the place. It was a significant, you know it can be a fairly sombre environment and everyone takes it a bit serious, but I think at the heart of it there was a very dry humour, might I suggest. It was not so much raucous you know, but that often quite perceptive, very, very, very dry humour about things that would happen and more times than not you often related it to like cops, you know, instances or things that occurred whilst undertaking investigations (PCI-18).*

*To a point, never to anything that I think that has ever crossed the line but I think human beings are hilarious, honestly, the things people do sometimes are just mind bogglingly stupid to the point of hilarity, so we will have a bit of a giggle or a bit of a snide comment about something and all have a bit of a chuckle about it. Now, I think everybody understands that*

*we're not serious and it's certainly not going to impact how we deal with people. It's always about what they've done rather than the individual themselves usually. I think we're a much more mature lot. We're not too worried about we're going to go and pick on someone's appearance or ethnicity or anything like that but it's usually about how stupid people have been, so we'll have a bit of a giggle about what they've done (PCI-20).*

c) *Diffusion of Danger / Tragedy*

In a police context, diffusion of danger takes the form of joking relations concerning dangerous interactions with criminals, and to express their emotions without damaging their professional image as fearless. The use of humour as a diffusion tactic is less common amongst police corruption investigators than it is amongst police, simply because they do not face the same level of threats or violence as do the police:

*Being a police officer, when you're seeing dead bodies and policing the street is very difficult, then I think humour plays a massive role. It's that culture that brings the police family together. We don't have that to a degree that we're investigating corrupt police officers. But at the end of the 10 hour shift or whatever it is people go home, they're unlikely to be traumatized of what they've seen or heard during the day (PCI-23).*

*Not so much that but just in terms of you can have a very brutal conversation with someone and they just walk away and that's just the way police communicate. In a civilian oversight body if you have a direct conversation with someone it most of the time will end in tears, so that's one element of it, in terms of the communication style within policing. Some of the black humour in policing is not appropriate, Oh no, no. No, no, certainly not like it used to be in policing, but I don't think you have to. That coping mechanism here, perhaps isn't required as much, because working with homicide and then before that I did Coronial, so yeah, you're dealing with a lot of dark stuff so the dark humour was definitely there, but it had to be, you had to cope with what you were seeing and what you were dealing with and here it doesn't need to be. I don't think it needs to be. It's not something that sits on your mind and plays on your mind as much as some of the other stuff you used to see and do (PCI-3).*

d) *Backstage Humour*

Backstage humour represents a strategic means of managing the consequences of tragic events. For police corruption investigators, this might take the form of seeing the effect that prosecuting corrupt police might have on their families, particularly their children. It allows the investigators to vent feelings in an acceptable manner and provides a collective diffusion of

emotional response to such tragedy. It supports normalisation through emotional distancing, as reflected in the comments of these investigators:

*Yeah, go for a beer and everyone has a bit of a joke. Yes, it was sad the bloke jumped, but you should have seen him when he landed, he was in a million pieces, yeah, whatever (PCI-14).*

*Oh yeah, yeah, we've got Nerf guns downstairs. Now we hide those because some people in this place would be very disapproving but you know, there's nothing quite as much fun as having a quick Nerf competition with somebody, so just silly things like that, they're inconsequential and they're nothing but it just relieves the tension for 5 minutes and that relief will last a while (PCI-20).*

Shared laughter reflects the investigator's common perspective. It affirms the group's social boundaries of moral superiority over the police they investigate through directing humour at people outside the group, therefore enforcing a "laughter of inclusion" (Pogrebin & Poole, 1988, p. 184).

## **6.4 Relaxation and Stress Relief**

As discussed in Chapter 4, different societies assign stigmatised individuals with devalued and denigrated identities. This stigma is thought to increase stress levels for individuals associated with it. As a chronic stressor (a source of stress that is constantly present) it was anticipated that police corruption investigation would be a considerably stressful challenge. This was not always found to be so:

*Well, it doesn't stress me, to be honest. I think because the police work was so stressful, this is just such a different, you know, this is fuckin' easy, so I mean if I get annoyed, I just get annoyed - I don't get stressed like I used to in the coppers (PCI-12).*

*Mark, my job is not particularly stressful to be honest. I look at what I used to do as a commander. My phone would ring 9, 10 times a night with whatever issues. I spent 15 hours a day at the office doing one thing or another. This is not the same (PCI-2).*

*You talk to colleagues a lot, obviously people within the agency, but the stress levels are very different here. You're not getting with those types of jobs where you're trying to lock up a rapist or a murderer or you've come in at 9 o'clock, oh my God, we've got someone in custody, he's axed three kids or something. The stress levels are different. You're dealing with slow, protracted enquiries that they're all stressful in that way in that, gees, is there every going to*

*be light at the end of the tunnel. But it's not that same stress where you've got the pressure of a DI on your back saying, I want results, I want someone in custody. You haven't got that same sort of stress. The sort of stress here is like the same old stress of waiting for documents to come back from the bank or something. You haven't got those stress levels (PCI-7).*

Not all investigators interviewed were so relaxed about the role. Physical exercise was a typical stress management strategy employed by those investigators.

*Generally I play a bit of sport so that sort of helps me a bit. I'll take the dog for a walk when I get home and you just switch off. Sort of having been a copper for a long time and working in areas like the Child Abuse Unit, you've got to learn to be able to switch off. If you can't switch off you're going to burn yourself out very quickly, so I always make a bit of a conscious decision once I get in the car to go home at the end of the day works over and private life begins (PCI-1).*

*I de-stress by exercising, like I've always been a big exercise person so I get out of bed in the morning half past 5.00 and go ride my bike for 30 Ks and go running and stuff like that and I need that in my life for a bunch of reasons which go beyond work and which go beyond just being fit. But one of the reasons is work and it gives me the opportunity to think about stuff and work stuff out (PCI-9).*

*Look, a lot of the guys, like some of the guys exercise together, they'll go off and do, a couple of guys particularly, they'll often do triathlons and stuff together so they'll sort of socially interact and sort of get off a bit of that energy. Yeah look, its funny (PCI-20).*

In the circumstances, a proactive approach to stress identification and management was strongly supported:

*I don't know. I don't know, but you see it in policing all the time. And when people are very unhappy in the job they don't like the sort of work, they can't handle the stress, and they find the political overload, the media overload, too intense. I say, listen, this mightn't be the job for you, and you can facilitate moves elsewhere but I think they see it as being perhaps a sign of weakness which is a human trait (PCI-3).*

*Look, one of the important things we've done is actually looked at stress relief at the front end and we've done a lot of psychometric testing on the people who we bring in. Now you've got to be careful you don't clone and build an empire that's all the right people because that's very dangerous, but when we first started we clearly brought people into the organisation that*

*had very little ability to resist stress for any prolonged period and they went bum up left, right and centre (PCI-20)*

*Well, you've got to create a work place that I think acknowledges those stresses, first and foremost, and not in denial of them. Secondly, you've got to make sure that the people who have been given the privilege of leading the staff are actually leading them and are focused on their wellbeing. You've got to make sure that you're making the right decisions. It's not for everyone. So as soon as the warning signs are there you need to respond to that and need to be brutally honest about it (PCI-21).*

One investigator expressed the opinion that there was more time to spend on investigations than there was in police working lives. This provided considerable stress relief:

*Well, you don't have the time constraints that you used to have in the police or the sheer amount of work. I mean I've got four investigations going at the moment, two are just sitting there waiting for one piece of paperwork to come so they're not causing me any stress. The other two are long termers, I'm under no obligations to rush, because I do my investigations fairly expediently. No, for me there's none, I just get it done. Some people take longer to do things so the managers might be onto them, you know, get onto it, and make sure this is done by this time. I don't have that issue, right, I don't sort of get that issue happening with me (PCI-8).*

Because of the confidentiality of their work, it is difficult for police corruption investigators to take problems home. Secrecy and isolation from outsiders and family were generally considered as necessary. Most investigators spoke of the dilemma of reconciling the competing priorities of work and family, and the necessity to maintain confidentiality around investigations. Irrespective, for this investigator, family still had a role to play in stress relief and normalising police corruption investigation work.

*I talk with my wife, I guess, if there's something that's bothering me I talk with her. I'm a family man. I've got two little boys, my eldest has just started school this year and the other one just turned three. I try and spend as much time as I can with them when I'm not at work basically, whether that be fishing, hiking, walking, even just going to the mall, you know, spending time with them and I have, you know (PCI-19).*

## 6.5 Reframing

Reframing is the process by which stigmas are infused with positive value transforming them into a badge of honour (infusing). Reframing involves transforming the meaning attached to a stigmatised occupation, and was discussed in Chapter 4.

This transformation is achieved through infusing the stigma with a positive value (badge of honour); and through neutralisation, where the negative value of stigma is negated or rationalised. Such strategy was evident from the responses of these investigators:

*Basically if someone thinks that I'm a rat or whatever, oh get fucked, and that's probably a poor reflection on them as much as anything else. The reality of today is everyone will be held to account. I'll be held to account if I do something wrong, it's just the way it is today (PCI-12).*

*Well, I know at the end of the day that if I wasn't doing it somebody next to me would be doing it or somebody else next to me would be doing it, i.e. I'm not the one responsible for what's happening to this person, it's their conduct. At the end of the day their conduct and the people around them is causing this and I'm not responsible for it. What I can do is do my job to the very best of my ability (a) because I take pride in my work and (b) because yeah, we have a duty and whilst doing that I can still deal with people with empathy (PCI-19).*

*In fact, I think there are times that we, as investigators, actually advocate on their behalf. In one case I have, and obviously I won't go into detail, but one case I have, an officer was put in a completely untenable position and technically committed an offence by not reporting a senior officer. So what can I do in that regard? I can realise the dynamic that person was in. I can make sure my report is balanced, fair and reflective of that and I can then advocate on his behalf to my director in regards to a suitable recommendation, not sweeping it under the carpet, recognizing it, dealing with it, owning it, but making sure that people don't go OTT on this poor guy (PCI-20).*

*Yeah, I mean, look it's a reality of life and you've got to remind yourself that that's the job we're there to do, is to ensure the integrity of the other 99.9%. I remember things going back 2 decades ago where the behaviour of a particular police officer was the worst kept secret in a particular city, everybody knew the corruption that this particular officer was going in, and this was in my early days, and it was a stand up joke about that policing organisation. And so who benefits from that? Who benefits from that being kept quiet and swept under the carpet when it's a stand up joke amongst the community, stand up joke, in fact, amongst journalists*



*or stand up joke amongst other police forces? So it's very easy for me to remind myself why I was doing what I was doing (PCI-21).*

*The fact that they've actually stepped over that line and went to, you know, the way I see it corrupt police officers are just criminals in uniform, that's all they are, really, and they're just using, just using, the face I suppose, of a police officer ... actually they've got an advantage when you come to think of it. If you put them in the mould of just being criminals, they've actually got a better advantage than your bog standard criminal has, because they've got that experience and access to facilities and data bases to make it better for themselves (PCI-17).*

The *criminals in uniform* metaphor was a common example of reframing, used by the corruption investigators:

*And I've heard people say a lot about the criminal thing too, you know, well they're not cops, they're criminals in uniform and that's how you rationalise that, you know, and you just wonder because the thing that makes me think if it was your brother and he did something wrong would you come down on him and lock him up and if it was your mum or your dad would you say, well yeah, I'm sorry you're my mum and you're my dad but you've done something wrong and you're a criminal, you're going in. And sometimes that policing bond is as strong as family (PCI-6)*

*Well look, these guys deserve what's coming to them because they're crooks, just like you said, and I've heard the term crooks in uniform, criminals in uniform. So people are able to rationalise that and say, well they're just criminals (PCI-28).*

*To use the vernacular, crooks in uniform. So that just lessens the impact; there's the negative connotations that come with it but also amongst the rank and file police that have got nothing to concern themselves with, you're doing a good job, so you're offering in fact a good service and you're trying to assist them, so I don't find it being an impediment to what we do, in fact quite the opposite (PCI-15).*

*I think so, yeah, I do, I do. I wouldn't say it's a passion for me but one of the things I always used to think was, what a scrote, he's a criminal who doesn't pretend to be anything else. He goes and does his crime and he doesn't pretend to be anything else. A bent copper is even worse, he's someone masquerading as this law enforcer and then on the sly he's breaking the law and to me I always had a real, it used to irk me so much and that's why I like being, it's not a passion but it's probably not far off a passion, I really feel strongly about it (PCI-7).*

## 6.6 Adaptation

Adaptation is a significant normalising strategy for police corruption investigators, and was discussed in Chapter 4. Adaptation is the process through which reaction to stimuli is reduced. Over time an increasing familiarity with stimuli tends to blunt the emotional impact.

Standards of what is ordinary or normal are necessarily socially (and often locally) constructed and, therefore, bounded by cultural and historical factors. Consequently, the most difficult feature of adaptation is surmounting the initial exposures to a stimulus. That first shock can be buffered via pre-emptive reframing and gradual increases in the reality of the stimulus. These investigators were able to implement adaptation as a coping strategy:

*If they're a cop and they've done something wrong they deserve everything they've got, that's the story from my eyes. You do feel empathy because you think they've done the wrong thing but you can see why they've done it or they've just made a genuine mistake and it's come back and bit them in the arse but the ones that are involved in criminality or the ones that do stand over interviews and make threats of violence during interviews and things like that, no, no sympathy or nothing for them (PCI-6).*

*Just the same as the crooks. You know, when you used to go to court and the crooks are being locked up and they're going to go to gaol or they go to gaol and mum and dad are up the back crying and disappointed and stuff like that, they make those choices so I don't feel sorry for them (PCI-5).*

*Thinking as a copper, if we were to get to that stage where we let that affect us, then you may as well be in another job doing something completely different because that's just part and parcel of it. It's again along those lines that it's not my fault that your husband is an armed robber, or it's not my fault that your husband killed that kid or did that or it's not my fault that your husband, while yeah, he might be a good man, but he stole money because he was greedy or because he didn't want to tell you that he gambled away or was out with prostitutes or pissing all the money up against the wall, so he stole money to cover for his own failings basically. Like, you've got to deal with that, that's got nothing to do with me at the end of the day, I'm just doing my job. I guess I've had to look at it that way. How does a pathologist cut up dead bodies all day, every day and deal with that one, sort of thing, and that's how I've looked at it that way (PCI-4).*

*No. No, I gave evidence earlier this year in the District Court against a corrupt officer, no empathy whatsoever, none whatsoever. We had the wife in the back of the court sobbing and*

*I knew that he'd run a very, the thrust of his defence had been that he had a wife on anti-depressants who was close to suicide and he'd been having to juggle this, but none whatsoever, none whatsoever (PCI-7).*

## **6.7 Diffusing**

Diffusing is where undesired emotions are dissipated or their impact is reduced, and was discussed in Chapter 4. Social support is often integral to diffusing as a sympathetic audience provides protective mechanisms for prompting and validating diffusion efforts. Amongst police corruption investigators, diffusing tends to be used on an ad hoc basis to dissipate unwanted emotions. For this investigator, diffusing comes down to the shared experience and sharing the emotional burdens with the team:

*Well we're not allowed to talk about it outside of here, which you've got that confidentiality clause so that kind of puts the knockers on that. But yeah, we generally talk about it to ourselves and sometimes we can have some pretty robust conversations downstairs. That generally lets off a bit of steam. We'll have a few social functions, like the other 2 weeks ago we went out for a nice little lunch, so we do things like that. We have quite good little social functions here like Christmas and bits and pieces (PCI-25).*

## **6.8 Ritualism and Ceremony**

Organisational rituals and traditions reveal the cultural realities of groups, and were discussed in Chapter 4. Rituals provide members with a sense of shared reality. They serve positive and negative functions, including initiating new members to the profession through rites of passage. Rituals can be viewed as repeated patterns of symbolic behaviour.

For police corruption investigators, hearings represent a form of ritual and characterise the legal adversarial systems that they are used to from policing:

*We call people in here, they are compelled to answer questions, the rules of evidence don't apply, they're not privy to the rules of disclosure, you know, it's a fairly major event when you get called in here and to a sort of quasi courtroom process and sometimes the hearings are public and the media are present (PCI-7).*

*I mean we summons a lot of people. We can do directed interviews where you haven't got an option, you've got to sit there and answer, like discipline interview. We do voluntary interviews. We do hearings which are all summonsed. We can go and search police stations and seize documents. Having said that, our hearings, it's all about an inquisitorial process,*

*we're just trying to get to the truth. There's a big debate raging at the moment between our legal department and investigators; they are arguing about what use we can make of evidence given in a hearing, bearing in mind it's coerced. They are basically saying you can only use it in criminal matters for perjury and misleading. I say you should be able to use it for other offences, criminal offences and certainly against other crooks, so there's a big debate on that at the moment, it's all a question of interpretation (PCI-25).*

*Yeah, yeah, and we always get hammered about bringing people into public hearings or private hearings and that may become public later, that we're exposing them, and they're saying, well it's not a fair system but we're not a normal court. And whilst the people making these complaints are QC's and senior people who know better, they use it as their mechanism for gaining leverage in the media, but part of the investigative process is the hearing. It's not the court like in a normal system where the court's the end part of the process and you're guilty or not guilty. This is part of an investigation we're trying to get to the truth of the matter and if we can't do anything else then we have to bring you in and put you in the box and you've got to sing for your supper (PCI-14).*

*I always found the hearings quite interesting and being involved in the inquisitorial use of justice as opposed to the adversarial, so I'd find it quite interesting to be part of that. So you know, you'd watch the hearing on the closed circuit TV and there'd be a break so you'd go off into the Judge's chambers and you'd talk about it with the Examiner, talk about the tactics you've used and what they were covering, what they weren't covering and the investigator would be part of that as well. And so the forensic aspects of it were very tangible to you, you know, the forensic interviewing techniques and that sort of stuff, so I found all that really interesting, sort of one interesting part of the job. And for many police it was a very difficult experience for them to go and see, having to go through those hearings (PCI-11).*

Honorific rituals are seen most commonly in high status occupations, for instance, coronations or academic processions. Anti-corruption agencies are no different and corruption hearings provide a sense of confirmation of status and a ceremonial celebration. These hearings are conducted with the legal authority of permanent or special purpose committees and take place in quality settings, the decor and architecture of which are pervaded by symbols of authority:

*It looks like a courtroom. When the Commissioner walks in people nod, as you would to a Judge, respecting the fact he's Commissioner, so they give their evidence on oath or affirmation, so yeah, it's definitely got the feel of a, and when I explain to witnesses when*

*they're Summoned, I do actually say, it has the feel of a courtroom and you will feel that you are in a courtroom, so air of ceremony in that respect, yes, it has (PCI-7).*

*Was there was an air of ceremony? Yeah, intentionally so because you had to create that air of gravitas around the hearings that people would feel under some pressure to make sure they did the right thing and they understood it was a court with the powers of a court. So you did tend to have that ceremony around it (PCI-11).*

For police corruption investigators, these ritualised formal interactions or rites serve to unify individuals within the context of their new surrounds and working lifestyles.

## **6.9 Titles and Status**

Prestigious positions and titles offer status shields for those working in these organisations. Titles and status were discussed in Chapter 4. Such symbolic effects are quite potent, largely because they are so subtle and pervasive:

*Yes, nomenclature and naming, there seems to be some, it's a hybrid between the public sector, as in the public service, and policing and so the police sort of come back with their rank structure, certainly State police, and then you cross pollinate that with level this and level that and so you end up with this everyone's got to be a senior. I think it's just some way of acknowledging that people's past or their contemporary knowledge, you're right, there's a high level ... and again too, title, remuneration, so they're quite, in comparative terms, quite well paid (PCI-18).*

*Well, we're fairly top heavy and a lot of the top heaviness is about actually paying for skills rather than leadership. Well, we expect everyone to be a leader but we brought in Principal Investigators because we just couldn't get enough skilled Investigators. Our Senior Investigators, we've got very few Investigators as such, and that's probably where you would like to have a structure like that it's actually almost a reverse pyramid ... That's the only way, in a public sector environment, you can actually buy in the skill you need (PCI-3).*

*I'm an Investigator. I believe I should be a Senior Investigator just based on my experience. I've presented my arguments to them, they've said, yes, you should be but we're not going to make you one because we don't believe we can, we don't think HR will allow us to do it. And I've said, well why not, you've done it for other people? That's something that I'm involved with at the moment and negotiating. There's no difference in the duties. There's no*

*supervisory component to a Senior Investigator as opposed to an Investigator, so there's no difference in the duties, big difference in pay but that's about it (PCI-8).*

The presence of *senior* titles are indicative of status distinctions and are held to be important in managing the implications of stigma within police corruption investigation.

### **6.10 Recalibrating**

One of the normalisation strategies described in Chapter 4 of this thesis was recalibrating, where employees adjust their criteria of what they regard as a valued attribute, and magnify non-stigmatised aspects of their job. Recalibrating also involves adjusting evaluation criteria to magnify non-stigmatise parts of the job:

*There's nothing that I can actually recall too much. You get the usual internal affairs people, they were hated much more than us because they were regarded as turncoats, you know. So they were the filth and the toe cutters and all that. But there wasn't a label they tended to apply to us (PCI-11).*

*And I always say to them that I can do this work because I don't want them, at 3 o'clock in the morning, to be working with someone in a van that they have serious doubts about because of the reliance that police officers have to have upon each other and it may be someone you've never worked with before (PCI-20).*

*I used to think how Internal Affairs coppers they should almost be like the elite, you know, they're good coppers investigating bad coppers, but they were truly despised, the rubber shoe brigade, the toe cutters and they used to get called ... then I remember getting interviewed by them as a witness and they were fine, they were just normal (PCI-7).*

### **6.11 Refocusing**

Refocusing involves shifting attention from stigmatised features of the job to valued aspects of the employment, and was discussed in Chapter 4. It involves shifting attention from stigmatised to non-stigmatised aspects of work. Social comparison with weakness embodied by outsiders, is a common tool used by police corruption investigators for managing identity threats:

*It helps, it helps if you have good investigation skills and most of the investigators actually come from a crime command so they are qualified detectives and they've received appropriate training for the role. Sometimes that's not always possible. They are very senior people too,*

*I might add, so the investigators are at least at the rank of a Detective Sergeant or better, so they are all pretty skilled people (PCI-2).*

*It's a really, it's a really good skill and coppers get it. Oh well, not all coppers get it but good coppers get it. I don't think it's something you can just create over-night (PCI-16).*

*So for me it was the opportunity to get back into this sort of field where it's a bit, the pressure level's up a little bit, the skill level evolved is up a little bit more compared to a lot of the other government investigative jobs that you get where a lot of those powers are not in existence (PCI-27).*

By refocusing on corrupt police as super criminals, this corruption investigator subconsciously reflects on his own competency as an investigator. After all, it takes a super cop to catch a super criminal:

*I think the first point really is that they know what we know, because being law enforcement themselves, umm, and especially the harder targets because they have lengthy experience dealing with criminals, and claim to be (laughs) moral criminals you might say, because they use their skills and experience of (pause), gathered whilst investigating crime to their own benefit, but their better at it, should we say. Better than a criminal because not only are they using the skills of a criminal but their also using the skills of a police officer as well. I think that's the real challenge of it, is, trying to be better than them, to understand how they work, knowing full well that they have those, sort of, two skill scenarios (PCI-17).*

Finally one police corruption investigator refocused on the opportunity provided to him for future employment:

*And, the thing about it as well, when doing corruption investigation, the way I see it is that at least if you go for another position somewhere else, in another agency or another job, the fact that you've been doing corruption investigations, tells whoever is interviewing you, whoever you applied at the agency you applied for, that your squeaky clean, and you understand how those sort of things work as well (PCI-17).*

## **6.12 Conclusion**

This chapter looked at the issues of normalisation of police corruption investigation work. Interviews with the population of police corruption investigators revealed evidence of each of

the major normalisation strategies identified in the literature review, including reframing, adaptation, diffusion, recalibrating and refocusing.

There are identifiable survival predictors within police corruption investigation. Accepting certain realities (such as stigma) as part of the working experience is one of them. Police corruption investigators use protective barriers to shield themselves from stigma and from outsiders. They share common experiences with co-workers and promote shared experience through telling jokes and stories. Organisational hearings and superior titles reveal the cultural realities of the group and provide a sense of status and shared reality.

Humorous attacks against management (particularly lawyers) are common, as is diffusion of emotional responses involved in the investigation and prosecution of corrupt police. Their working ideology is framed on the inherent superiority of their investigative skills, decision-making and common sense, and their self-perceived moral character provides a pedestal upon which they build their individual and collective work identities.

The next chapter looks at the influence of police culture and police socialisation on police corruption investigators; their ongoing identification with the culture and the enduring elements and influences that both frame and construct their understanding and views of the world. In addition, the chapter looks at the craft of corruption investigation including the investigator's perceptions of the knowledge, experience, skills and behaviours that are valued within police corruption investigation.



## CHAPTER SEVEN – THE INFLUENCE OF POLICE CULTURE ON (POLICE BACKGROUND) CORRUPTION INVESTIGATORS AND THE CRAFT OF CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION

‘The most important kind of freedom is to be what you really are. You trade in your reality for a role. You trade in your sense for an act. You give up your ability to feel, and in exchange, put on a mask. There can’t be any large-scale revolution until there’s a personal revolution, on an individual level. It’s got to happen inside first.’

**Jim Morrison<sup>12</sup>**

### **7.1 Introduction**

Goldstein (1990) in his seminal paper *Problem Orientated Policing* argues that the biggest contributor to the demise of police reform projects has been that the architects of change fail to recognise the power of police subculture and the need to deal with the factors that contribute to the ongoing influence of that culture. Police cultural knowledge is shaped by social and political order. This knowledge contains basic assumptions about descriptions, operations, perceptions and explanations regarding the social and physical world. Cultural knowledge is seen as fundamental to the way in which police go about doing their work and the choices they make. This cultural knowledge is reinforced time after time because it provides good solutions to critical issues and problems and helps to reduce anxiety in critical situations (Chan, 1996). The issues surrounding culture and its influences were discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.

For police corruption investigators, socialisation into police culture leaves its influence through predictable permeations of character. Not the least of those influences is considered to be an overwhelming concern to show themselves as competent “craftsmen” or masters of their trade (Fielding, 1988; Klockars, 1980, p. 46).

This chapter looks at the police corruption investigators’ allegiance to, or identification with, police culture. It examines whether corruption investigators see themselves as ‘craftsmen’ and

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<sup>12</sup> James, L (1970), *Interview with Jim Morrison (1970)*, retrieved 10/12/13 from <http://www.cinetropic.com/morrison/james.html>. James Douglas Morrison (1943-1971) was an American singer, poet, songwriter, writer, and film director. He is best known as the lead singer and lyricist of The Doors.

explores their perceptions regarding the craft of police corruption investigation. The chapter considers the following questions:

1. Do the investigators still see themselves as police?
2. What are the best and worst aspects of police culture?
3. What are their police cultural influences (if any)?
4. Does being a former police officer bring any benefits to the role of police corruption investigator?
5. Do they maintain a particular kinship to policing?
6. What unique knowledge or special attributes make a good police corruption investigator?

## **7.2 Still a Policeman?**

Policing is an occupation that can be said to instill the individual officer with a permanence of character. The occupation operates according to observable rules which control and regulate the behaviour of officers. Its control systems consist of values, which define what is good and what is bad, what is expected, what is condemned, what is tolerated and what is not tolerated.

A good place to start an examination of the influences of police culture on police corruption investigators, then, was whether they still saw themselves as police. Whilst the responses were mixed, they revealed an underlying deference to the occupation and its influences:

*Yeah, I think so. It's not going to come out right, but you think you're doing something to help the community. You think every little small piece ... if the government performs its job properly, effectively, efficiently and that includes minimising corruption and those sort of serious dimensions. Hopefully it's a better place for everyone and that sounds a bit wanky, but you think that you're here to do a job and hopefully it's making a small difference (PCI-14).*

*Yeah, absolutely. I don't do anything different other than I don't wear a standard police force type uniform. I still investigate, I still interview, I still prosecute at times, I still write investigation reports. And it was funny, for the first year or so I kind of thought, I tried to remind myself, you're not a policeman anymore, and then when you sort of think about it in those terms, or what is a policeman? You know, a policeman is a person who does, and you could probably rattle off a whole pile of things that individually you think a policeman does, and I do all of them (PCI-20).*

*I still use my regimental number as my PIN number. In my heart of hearts, yes I do, it's ridiculous, but I do, yes. I think in order to flourish outside the police service, certainly in the career I've had, you need to be prepared to embrace other ideas. And one of the weaknesses of policing, certainly in the eighties was like group think (PCI-9).*

*I guess I do in some ways, just a slightly different one. Well, I suppose, you know, spending 25 years in the police that goes a long way towards forming your identity so although I don't investigate criminals, as such, anymore, I still investigate different types of conduct, so I'm still doing a policing type role and I still see the functions that I fulfil as some sort of quasi law enforcement type role, I guess (PCI-1).*

*If I'm honest I reckon I do. There's an element of, as you rightly described before, there's that element of sort of, we're all going to stick together, and we're all going to protect each other's back. There's an element of it everywhere. We all have to look after each other. But because I never really felt like I was going to blur those lines of what's right and what's wrong I guess you always hope that your partner's got your back so in regards to that kind of situation then you'd always hope that someone here had your back. That doesn't mean that they had to do the wrong thing to have your back, if that kind of explains it (PCI-22).*

*Yeah. I still think like a policeman. Let me spin it another way. If someone said do you want to go back to the Force tomorrow I'd be only too happy to go back. So I don't see myself as having done a U-turn and never going back. I still like policing, I like what it stands for and I'd be only too happy to be part of it (PCI-3).*

Some have challenged traditional interpretations of police culture by critically interrogating its assumed homogeneity and universality (Cockcroft, 2005; Fielding, 1988; Hobbs, 1991; Loftus, 2010). Adherents of this approach argue that orthodox characterisations of police culture no longer make any sense. They argue that developments in policing have brought about the demise of traditional police culture and the beginnings of new cultures. Perhaps this is what influenced these investigators to vehemently reject the suggestion that they might still see themselves as police:

*No. Yeah, again, my separation from the police force was quite distressing for me. I'd been at policing for nearly 30 years but when I decided I was going I was going and that was that and yeah, I was pretty teary on the day. But not long thereafter I just stopped viewing myself as a policeman, that's not what I am (PCI-2).*

*No, I don't. It's actually quite nice to be, I mean you've still got that mentality you're looking, you know you promptly survey what's around you and who's who and what's what but it's*

*nice to be blissfully unaware of actually who is who and who is actually doing what. But this is as close to being a cop that I'm ever going to get without re-joining (PCI-6).*

*We're not cops now so I draw that line, you know, if they say its cops looking at the cops they're not talking about me because I'm not a cop anymore (PCI-28).*

*Not really. I'd say no. I just don't. I think half the time when I was in the police I didn't see myself as a policeman in some respects but I don't see myself as a policeman. We still deal with the police here and sometimes we go and do joint things and I kind of cringe when I hear all the jargon and stuff that they go on with, it kind of makes me cringe a bit. I don't know (PCI-24).*

*No. And it took me a while to get used to the fact that I wasn't a cop any more. When I left that was a wrench, I think, as I think it would be for most people. Why? Something I've always wanted to do. Something I've really enjoyed. Something that I thought was worthwhile doing, I suppose, and again, you make so many mates in the job. But I always maintained friendship outside of the job. I actually made a very conscious thought that I would not be solely, what's the word, sort of enveloped, I suppose, in the culture. I wanted a life outside the job and I always made sure that I had that (PCI-25).*

*No. No. It took me a while. I resigned with great reluctance but I couldn't understand why I was reluctant to. First few months here I regretted it, I missed it, I wanted to go back to, even though like I touched on before, the night shifts and all the crap that goes with it, the politics and what not. I still had a yearning sort of for that. My whole life I wanted to be a copper so the hardest thing to do at nearly 40 years old was to pull the pin on that, having wanted and done it for such a long time. I don't know, it just dawned on me one day (PCI-4).*

For those that did not see themselves as police, they continued to hold onto the vestiges of police cultural life through the use of descriptors such as law enforcement officer, or investigator. As discussed in Chapter 6, the presence of roles and titles suggests that status distinctions are important. Job titles serve as identity badges, providing occupational prestige. Their consideration as elite investigators, is reinforced by the titles assigned them by their organisations, and by their own opinions and those of their peers:

*I guess I see myself as being law enforcement, yeah. Not so much a cop, but certainly law enforcement generally (PCI-23).*

*No. I just see myself now as an investigator. I'm not a policeman anymore (PCI-27).*

*No, no, not at all. I'm an investigator. I'm a manager for a law enforcement agency but I don't see myself as a police officer, not even close (PCI-23).*

*No, no, I don't. I'm an investigator and there's no doubt whatsoever my background has got me here and the skills that I've got are thanks to the police, but I'm not a policeman. I can very, very easily and regularly do, investigate corrupt police, bent police and do it with absolutely no problem whatsoever (PCI-7).*

*That's a very interesting question. I don't know that I do actually. No. I don't think I associate as being a policeman. I still see myself as being in law enforcement, if that makes sense, but I don't see myself as being a police officer (PCI-15).*

### **7.3 Best and Worst Aspects of Police Culture**

Organisational culture involves unwritten rules that constrain the behaviour of its organisational members. For police officers, cultural distinctions are dictated by the functions of policing itself, which arguably promote the characteristics of conformity and solidarity. These characteristics provide a supportive platform for officers to manage the strains that originate from a police work environment. Unfortunately, these characteristics may also reinforce unacceptable cultural elements and contradictions arising from notions of loyalty.

#### *a) Double Edged Sword*

Some investigators commented on this anomaly when asked about the best and worst aspects of police culture:

*Well certainly the, they are double edged sort of swords, you know, like mateship, sense of camaraderie, backing each other up in the field, that's a very positive thing for police to achieve their goals. When integrity's wrong it's a very bad thing, so. Well, it provides a group culture that won't report corrupt behaviour and allows for practices to develop that go unquestioned because we're there backing each other up, we don't question and interrogate each other or criticise each other. So yeah, things like that aspect of the culture and your loyalty, things like that, they can be very good or very bad, depending how they're led, how they're managed (PCI-11).*

*Well, I actually think they're incredibly inextricably linked, the things that make it strong are also the things that can be their greatest risk, and the reason I say that and particularly doing this work, is I see that the support you get from other officers without question is vitally important, particularly in the cut and thrust of a hot job as it's happening. But I also see that*

*that can be taken too far and obviously in the role I have now I see that even more because people will defend the indefensible. They will take a minor transgression and all of a sudden a conspiracy will form around it amongst their cohort of friends within the job and turn it into something ten times more problematic than it ever needed to be (PCI-20).*

*Both the same thing. When you're in the police service it's like being in a big family, you know the family's there for you, you know if you're in trouble they're all going to be there for you, both when you're at work and when you're not at work. I don't reckon there's anything like it. But that's also the worst thing, isn't it because all the obligations that go along with being part of a family, you know, you've got to play by the family's rules. Yeah, the family doesn't tolerate people who don't look the same as the family that easily (PCI-9).*

*The best aspects, I think it can be the same thing for both things. I'd say the camaraderie and the banter and the relationships and the networks you develop, they can be good and bad. Good, because you've got the support and you've got your mates and you're all in it fighting the fight. Bad, because the influence can be put on you, put in certain situations and then lean on that relationship, oh well, we're mates so you owe me, so I think that's the best and bad things (PCI-25).*

*The best aspect is the camaraderie between each other, provided you're all on the same page together and you don't have a rogue element amongst you. The worst side ... as far as the brotherhood is concerned I can fully understand that, you know, as a good thing. Provided it is not used to facilitate or to help corruption to take place, or to involve others in corruption. You sometimes find that, it's the fact that that the police culture, brotherhood, is protecting those in the brotherhood (PCI-17).*

*b) Reliance and Solidarity*

Inherent in any paramilitary environment, in general, is promotion of the norms of loyalty, solidarity and reliance. These are well documented in the policing literature (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Niederhoffer, 1969; Skolnick, 1966). Without doubt group loyalty and camaraderie were identified by the investigators as the best characteristics of police culture. In its most positive interpretation, this camaraderie provides support and nurturing for members of the police family:

*Camaraderie, the fact that you're part of a family, you've got a workplace culture that generally is very supportive, like any organisation you get a bunch of dickheads in it sometimes, but that's no different (PCI-16, interviewed September 2012).*

*I think the mateship. You work with some good people. Generally you're all working together to catch a crook and get a good result, so you know, it's all team work and put in the hard yards, do the hours, be thorough and diligent and the results will come. That's the good part of it (PCI-12).*

*So, on the one hand you talk about that sense of loyalty, the esprit de corps, so they can be very positive things but they can also be really negative things too. The sense of kinship, the sense of family, the sense of pride, they are all really positive things in my view (PCI-2).*

*I think you look after each other. That example you're getting a flogging in the pub and you hear the sirens you think, thank Christ someone's coming, and you know that's what's there, that you support each other and it's not a negative (PCI-14).*

*The camaraderie. I'd love nothing more than you'd finish night shift about 4.00 in the morning and you'd sit around and have a beer together and chat about the week. I love that sort of stuff and I sort of miss that (PCI-8).*

*The best aspects of it? Mmm. I guess it comes down to that again, the loyalty to your mates, the discipline, yeah, the hard work, the good work ethic basically, when the job's on, the jobs on and you can work hard and play hard. The ability to, it's a skill that comes from it, but whilst it's a serious business I think it helps you keep check of reality and what's important and what's not important in life basically (PCI-4).*

*From my own personal perspective well the camaraderie is the best aspect because as I said earlier that's what I miss, you know, like it was that close working relationship and friendships you develop with people through those working relationships (PCI-15).*

### *c) Bonding in Times of Crisis*

Another cultural characteristic that was strongly identified by the investigators was the ability to bond and work together in times of crisis. This bonding facilitates support networks that in general, will go out of their way to help other police officers in times of difficulty or grief:

*We're like a disparate group of individuals, I think, you know that might wear a common uniform, but it's in times of need and so forth that they do come together. But like any family we have our disputes and there's not always agreement, in fact there must be more disagreement than agreement in many ways but it rises above common interest to a greater good. That's, I think, that's the real strength of police culture (PCI-18).*

*Yeah. Well, that's right. A tendency or a preparedness to look after each other in spite of some overwhelming evidence that a person's done the wrong thing ... even when we arrested and charged [name redacted] for these horrendous offences people go, no, the poor bloke, no, that's not right, that can't be right, until such time as the evidence was borne out in court and they think ooh. It takes a few years down the track before it comes to light (PCI-13).*

*The best part about it? I guess if I was just to, just from a purely objective point of view, I guess the loyalty to each other, the friendship. When you're working on a big job and it comes off, the sort of satisfaction you'll share (PCI-10).*

*The best aspects of the culture, well when I first joined it used to be when the chips were down the boys were there no matter what. You might not have seen eye to eye with them all but they were still there for you if you needed them sort of thing. The discipline, yeah, the hard work, the good work ethic basically, when the job's on, the jobs on and you can work hard and play hard (PCI-4).*

*You go out there and you give a lot of yourself. You wear a lot of other people's misfortunes, grief, loss, etcetera and you wear that for the benefit of other people and so as a unit you draw together and you're very strong and if someone on the team is having a hard time with anything in particular, even if it's got nothing necessarily directly to do with the job, it might be relationship problems at home, whatever, people rally around. The team is like your family, they rally around and look after you. That's probably one of the best things about police culture. It's this ability to care for others and to care for your own. I think that's an admirable part of police culture but it can also be in some ways an ugly side of police culture when it becomes an expectation for people to toe the line and to take one for the team and to conform (PCI-19).*

#### *d) The Worst Aspects*

An interesting aspect of this research was, whilst camaraderie and loyalty were seen as admirable attributes of police culture, they were also seen as potential deviant influences. Officers are said to be coerced into corrupt activity at the probationary stage of their careers and learn to keep their mouths shut about dubious practices, including those in breach of the rules which more experienced officers consider necessary in discharging police responsibilities. Secrecy becomes a “protective armour shielding the force as a whole from public knowledge of infractions” (Reiner, 2000, p. 93).



Therefore, for many police corruption investigators, the best and worst features of police culture were effectively the same thing:

*The worst aspect is, God, you could almost say the same thing. If you get the wrong people you can end up with a really sinister type of camaraderie but if you've got the right, right people the camaraderie's great, if you've got the wrong people it's not very nice at all (PCI-1).*

*Well, the one I find frustration is dealing with police officers who can assist who are not corrupt and are quite good but they still don't want to help because they don't want to give up that person even though they know that the person's off, they still are reticent to help. Yeah, yeah, they're still loyal, even though, and it's almost like they don't want to be loyal but they feel compelled to (PCI-10).*

*Well, I think as I said, I think that's been maligned in the past and there's been instances where a sub-culture develops and corruption's not part of police culture but perhaps a sub-culture where corruption is a theme and using that coming together, rising above, it's actually being facilitated or assisted in corrupt acts (PCI-18).*

*The worst aspects of the culture would be the, I wouldn't say bullying, but the, I can't think of the word, the peer pressure to do things that you don't want to do, to be the same as everybody else because if you're not the same then you can't be trusted sort of thing, and I think that was the worst part (PCI-24).*

If there is one issue that has the potential to impact camaraderie and police group loyalty, it is job mobility and careerism. Competition for promotion has the potential to sever loyalties by creating systems where each police officer looks out for his or her own career interests.

*e) Careerism*

For those intent on pursuing promotion to officer ranks within the police, it requires leaving behind the loyalty structures most evident in street level policing and demonstrating a readiness to fulfil a higher role through preparedness to sacrifice personal loyalties for career goals. Climbing the organisational ladder tends to generate considerable envy, and accusations of disloyalty amongst peers.

The problem is exacerbated where dirty tactics are considered to have been used (nepotism, false kudos), motivated by career advancement and promotion:

*The bad part of it is in the end where it becomes so called merit based, is you would do that and then all of a sudden all the work you did appears on someone else's bloody resume and they're getting promoted or getting a better job and all this sort of, so that is the bad part (PCI-12).*

*The culture? I think that's the worst part there is it's now cut-throat. It's cut-throat between members, like blokes you work the van with, you know, who you're applying for the same jobs with and some blokes are more cut-throat than others, more career orientated, more, you know, determined to get on at any cost and if that's to belittle someone else that's applied for the job or shit can them or pinch, you know, you did a job together but take all the credit for it, I think that's the worst culture now (PCI-16).*

*The thing that really annoys me about police culture is that they don't have a system that is fair for promotion. They have a system that is designed to, people will promote people that reflect themselves. They don't have a system that brings the cream to the top. They have a system that just brings the same type of people forward. And I'm not saying that it should all be educated people, I'm not saying that at all. What I'm saying is that firstly they should find out with promotion if a person wants to be promoted. Secondly they should find out whether they have the ability to do the job because the amount of times I saw people promoted that just couldn't do the job it astounded me and then I'd end up being the Acting Sergeant because they couldn't do their job, yet I'd just competed against them for a Sergeant's position. I found that infuriating. I think that they've lost their way, they've become completely management driven, completely KPI driven. KPIs mean nothing, you know they just mean nothing, it's how you interact with the community and I think they've lost that. That community policing type model that was really being pushed in the eighties really started to get some traction and then all of a sudden they just dropped it like a stone for this KPI management model of policing. I just don't believe it works in Australia (PCI-8).*

*The bad aspects of the culture? The culture I recall in the later stages of my career was, there was a culture of you can't trust anyone. And there are people there that will take credit for the work that you do, like there's just this one-upmanship and that's what I touched on before ... it certainly seemed to play it that way in the end, but that's how things started to filter down, that if you wanted to get ahead you had to start stepping on toes and doing the wrong things by your mates, it was that divide and conquer kind of culture that seemed to come into it. It created this, you are your own entity and no one else is going to look after you (PCI-4).*

Extreme careerism, which is the pursuit of career advancement at any cost, involves a range of negative behaviours which include buck passing, blaming, intimidation and taking false credit. These forms of bullying are often motivated by the desire to protect oneself from a perceived superior performer. However, if bullying behaviour goes unchallenged and individuals receive undeserved acclaim for achieving outcomes, it is probable that other police will perceive a culture which tolerates, condones and encourages bullying.

f) *Bullying*

Policing literature supports the idea or belief in police machismo; “police are a sub culture of males in the prime of their life” (Niederhoffer, 1969, p. 126). They are said to celebrate masculine exploits, show willingness to use force and engage in informal working practices. McNeill (1996) notes that this macho culture also encourages the drinking of alcohol and other behaviours serving as signs of masculinity. Bullying of individuals not wishing to join in such activities resonates in the comments of the corruption investigators:

*I'll speak about the CID, this hard drinking, macho culture. I think it's hard, if you're a non-drinking, black, lesbian female it would be very hard for you to get on as a Detective because there is still, 4 years ago, 5 years ago, there was still this culture of on a Friday afternoon or an afternoon you'd be expected to stop back and have a glass of Scotch with your Sergeant or your DI. If you were dealing with a job that involved some type of porn or sexual element to it, you'd be expected to view the footage or view the photos and love it and think, oh big tits and all that, I love it, and be part of it. If you were dealing with a paedophile well he must be gay as well. There's still that white Anglo Saxon protestant mentality and they don't buy into minorities very well and they don't buy into someone who's a little bit out of the norm who doesn't drink because they're a fitness fanatic or they go to church ... it takes a long time (PCI-7).*

*Being isolated I found it completely uncomfortable because I'd never ever been in that situation before and I hate that term workplace bullying but it was just, you're just not involved. Like I'd be sitting around because I'd have nothing to do and they'd say, we're going to do something today, and I'd go for a walk just because I had nothing to do. I'd come back they'd all be gone out of the office. We'd go and do our own surveillance on targets and I'd be left out there, they'd all return to the office and leave me out there, just shit like that. And after a while I started to get really pissed off about it, so in the end I went to the boss and said, not on, you need to do something about it or I will. So he transferred me (PCI-8).*

*Like there was one guy, one of the Sergeants came to me once when I was a junior Detective and asked for money to pay for some guy who smashed a car, one of the coppers and he'd got pissed, smashed a car and then ran off. And the way I saw that I thought, well that's, so he came and asked me and he went, he didn't ask me, he said, get your money out and give me 5 bucks for this thing, and I said, what's it for? And he said, it's for [name redacted], this guy. And I said, no, I don't want to, if he's stupid enough to fucking drink and drive and smash the car and then run off that's his fucking problem. And they were, he almost punched me out, like he got really offended by that, and I said, I'm not going to pay, and he goes, I'm not fucking asking you, I'm telling you, and I said, I'm not fucking doing it. So that aspect I didn't like (PCI-24).*

Bullying (indirectly) proliferates through the systemic (institutional) and situational (contextual) factors that shape police culture, as well as through the peer relationships that cultivate and promulgate cultural knowledge. Ultimately, however, police corruption investigators are the final arbiters of the structural and cultural influences upon their occupation. It is up to the individual to either accommodate or resist those influences. However, police cultural influences can, at times, operate almost invisibly at a sub-cultural level. Therefore, there ought to be some highly visible and symbolic signs of the influence of police culture through analysis of the police corruption investigator's narratives.

#### **7.4 Police Cultural Influences**

Essentialism is the view that, for any particular entity, there is a set of characteristics all of which any entity of that kind must possess. It is a generalisation stating that particular characteristics owned by a group are universal, and not dependent on context. Essentially, there are underlying values and behaviours that betray their true nature. The concept of essentialism was discussed in Chapter 2.

Once a cultural group has learned to hold common assumptions, the result is automated patterns of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and behaviour. These provide meaning, stability, and reduce anxiety for the group through the ability to understand or predict events based on shared learning.

##### *a) Institutionalisation*

Life as an individual is bound up in social context and social institutions. Social researchers use the term institutionalisation to describe how social practices and processes become accepted

ways of doing things. The level of institutionalisation can be defined by the length and intensity of each individual's policing experience, which may explain why some police corruption investigators become more institutionalised than others. These investigators were asked whether they felt institutionalised by police culture:

*I wouldn't say I'm institutionalised but yeah, I've spent most of my working life in the police until 42 so, you know, I went to the academy in '85 and left in '05 so it's definitely, my wife would probably say it's institutionalised me (PCI-10).*

*Yeah, that's what we were talking about before marrying cops, living with cops, socialising with cops, you do become institutionalised (PCI-26).*

*No, I don't, I don't overtly think it. I don't, probably not as much as when I spoke to guys who are in the military really feel like, but I think they've become very institutionalised. I think you can feel that, if you've become institutionalised in the police, which is very easy to do, that's what we were talking about before (PCI-26).*

Policing already has accepted patterns of doing things with social practices, values and beliefs making up police culture and placing expectation on how police should behave. Police corruption investigators were asked how police culture had influenced the way they go about their current role:

*Well, the policing culture instilled values into me. I mean I joined policing at 18 so I knew of nothing else. I had the values my father and mother instilled in me and what was important for me is that those values were not only a strong part of what policing was about but policing introduced other values to me. Well integrity is the critical one. You know, you learn very quickly that there's always two choices and you learn very quickly why a particular choice is always going to be the right one and you know that there can be no slight detour from what's right because it's a slippery slide. Once you start a small detour, it only gets bigger the detour and it gets worse and worse. And you need only talk to former police officers who've been the subject of criminal investigations who, if they could wind the clock back, I'm sure they would (PCI-21).*

*On many levels I think. One is that you know from being a police officer and having spent 12 years that I did in the policing environment I know it's not an easy job. I know that decisions are often made with limited information, the challenges are high and it's not always fair to sit back afterwards and judge people on decisions etcetera that were made in good faith. So that aspect, I think, is important because I know, even from working here (PCI-19).*

*Police culture, I don't know. Policing training, police courses, police methodology is a given, that's the backbone of what I do. Police culture, I don't know that it's influenced me, it's probably assisted me in that I've got an understanding of police culture in that when I investigate policemen now, I understand what they're up against with that police culture. I don't think it's influenced me. I think it's assisted me in that I understand what the police culture is (PCI-7).*

*That's hard. I think it influences you in every aspect of it, from the time you walk in the door. I'm always thinking about charging someone with something or what evidence I need and I think it just gives you that, I don't know. It's kind of every aspect, everything you do (PCI-24).*

Whether we recognise it or not, our personalities are framed by our backgrounds and one cannot easily walk away from the influences of their past. This is because the process of socialisation and past experience instruct us on how to see the world and act on situations we face. Police learn about and generally conform to norms and values of their social group. Social norms become internalised through socialisation; they become part of identity and a source of morality. These investigators were asked how (if at all) their police backgrounds benefitted them in their roles as corruption investigators:

*It just gives me more of an understanding what these guys do in their daily jobs and probably what they do out of work as well, you know, how they socialise and how they interact with each other and realistically when we get a complaint I sort of look at it a lot, there are people here who just want to scalp cops. Well I look at it objectively and I think well, come on, this could be vexatious, you know, instead of making an opinion straight away, because we're supposed to be down the line, you know, we're not supposed to take sides, we're here to discover the truth. I don't think that always works (PCI-6).*

*Yeah, it does. But, if you know what I mean, it allows people to feel that perhaps they're going to get a bit of a fairer go because here's somebody who understands the job we do. It also allows us, as investigators, to understand enough about personalities within police and how different personalities behave in different policing environments and different policing situations. And if you've been in the job long enough that becomes more than a sixth sense. It's something that's reinforced and you're able to, in some way, understand where risks for corruption can be more prevalent than other areas. You understand what level of control needs to have been applied. Sometimes it's from your own experience of saying, well I*

*remember when we worked at, you know, we used to do jobs for drug squad, gee, and I don't think we ever had any controls in relation to that there, gee, you know (PCI-19).*

Culture, ideology and social weighting are group level constructs, resulting in institutionalised responses. Role identification, cultural internalisation and experience are individual level constructs. These investigators commented upon the individual experiences that exposure to police culture and policing has had on them:

*The culture itself I don't think does, the experience does, you know, so for me I know that because of what I've done in the past and the way that I conduct myself now I get respected for that which is why people want to hear from me when I go and do lectures and information sessions. They want to sit down and chat. That, for me, is great and that's obviously a direct result of being a copper, the fact that you can spend your time and you can address people. I mean I think that's a positive, yeah (PCI-27).*

*It doesn't. Oh look, I understand what it's like to face an angry man and I understand how police officers are only human and they will react ... I understand the other side that, well it is ugly, you're dealing with angry people and angry people aren't reasonable and you've got to use force. So that side, yes. But in terms of do I meet with police officers after work and stuff like that? Yeah, occasionally I bump into them at the pub but I don't mix with police officers and I never really used to (PCI-8).*

Schneider's attraction - selection - attrition (ASA) framework was discussed in Chapter 3. In regard to understanding organisational behaviour, Schneider asserts that if people do not fit an environment well, they will tend to leave it. This framework provides an excellent context to explore why some police corruption investigators may have chosen to leave their police organisation to pursue a corruption investigation career.

Police officers are sometimes subject to varying demands from within their commands to act in a manner which conflicts or aligns with their own values. Therefore, even though officers may have a strong preference for specific values, if these come into conflict with organisational demands the officer is likely to experience some level of dissonance:

*Probably the culture that I sort of started off in it changed. I was there in '88 when you used to see suspects being assaulted and things like that, the drinking and all that, that was evident say for the first 3 years of my career and then that started to change. I mean I went into an area where that wasn't prevalent but even general policing and the Detectives' offices, things like that, that started to change with the Royal Commission. That behaviour was no longer*

*acceptable and it sort of changed so I sort of come out of that area into these environments having left that behind, but it's still, because you were a part, you were not so much a part of it, you saw it, you still understand it and you know where, if in the police forces now that it's still entrenched you can understand it (PCI-5).*

These experiences provide both a useful insight into the working lives of police officers, and an appreciation of the differences involved in transitioning from police officer to police corruption investigator. These investigators commented:

*It probably helped me in terms of police command might, you may have to engage the police on a particular issue or brief them when something's about to happen or engage them, want them to help you with an investigation, which is often what you have to do. And they'd come to you and they would lobby for one thing or another or put their point of view. So I suppose having been from the police I had an appreciation of their management dilemmas with these issues and I always sought to try and achieve a workable outcome for them while still getting what we wanted to get done. If I didn't have a policing background I probably wouldn't have appreciated some of the dynamics that I had to manage. That's probably the main area, I suppose (PCI-11).*

*I probably walked away from it and thought this doesn't work. I run my team very, very differently from how a police officer would run his team. Because it's a different role, it's a different type of work that we do, you know the command and control structure that the police service require, they require it for a good reason, I don't think we need it in an organisation like this. The biggest thing for a police officer to come into this organisation, I always sit down with them when they come into my area and say this is not a police station, this is not a police environment, it's a civilian environment, this is a corporate environment therefore you potentially need to leave your perceptions and your beliefs on how command and control structures work at the door, it doesn't have a place here, we're a team. There's no I in team (PCI-23).*

## **7.5 Kinship to Policing**

Human beings are socialised into the values of the societies in which they exist. There is an unwritten and largely unspoken values system which cannot but help to bond participants, forming a kinship through the beliefs that integrate the cultural members. These investigators recognised that enduring kinship to policing:



*Yeah. Yeah... Well, it's just what I've always done and in a way I'm doing exactly the same thing as what I did before just with a different title (PCI-26).*

*Absolutely, I could go back tomorrow. Because when it's in your bones I don't think you can get rid of it ... It's not knowing that I can change the world, because I can't change the world. I think it's more, I just love getting out there and just sorting shit out, you know. Sorry, it's so hard for me to quantify it, it's just in my bones and you know, I've talked to a lot of people who say that it's very difficult to let it go. But I'll admit when I came here I needed a break. I was at the point at home where I could have quite easily have given it away (PCI-22).*

*Yeah, I think so. I think after so many years you can't get away from that fact that that's where you come from ... So you know, elements of the culture I think are carried through (PCI-18).*

*Yeah, yeah... Because I spent 17 years of my life doing it, I think. So like I said, I still feel defensive to police, I get annoyed when they're criticised on the tellie and all that type of stuff (PCI-12).*

There is a need to develop a culture within anti-corruption agencies that meet the exclusivity and affiliation needs of its investigators as well as being aware of the potential for capture (regulatory capture was discussed in Chapter 4). The key to success appears to be the recognition of skills and experience developed through policing, whilst maintaining sufficient relational distance from the police themselves. In doing so the investigators better preserve their clarity of purpose and objectivity. However the relationship cannot be a totally arms-length due to the need for collaboration with the police to carry out the functions of the agency. These investigators commented upon this maintenance of distance:

*Not really. I've been out 6 years. I made the decision and I remember speaking to ex-coppers and people and they said to me whatever you do, when you leave, never go back, that's a part of your life, really hold onto your life and that you enjoyed it, but never go back. And so I made that conscious break. No, I just don't. I don't at all (PCI-8).*

*Not really. To those that I started out with and those that I've come to know throughout the years and I've become mates with and you know, some that I've looked to. We touched on a fellow before that, he left a mark on me a long time ago and a kinship, not as much as I used to, and I think I made that decision when I decided to resign, I had to. I had to resign (PCI-4).*

*Not overly, no. It's a chapter that's closed ... one can't look back and sort of pine for the good old days, I guess. You know, I chat about upstairs with the guys and we talk about the people we're investigating and what do they mean to us. They're criminals ultimately and we only look at the worst cases of corruption and they're not police officers. They may wear the uniform of a police officer but they're no longer police officers and the police service doesn't want them as police officers and therefore why should they be called police officers and why should we think of them as police officers (PCI-23).*

## **7.6 Benefits of being a Former Police Officer**

One of the questions that this thesis has set out to answer is whether there are benefits to be derived from having former police employed in police corruption investigation agencies. This is important because most civil review police corruption investigation agencies in Australia employ current or former police officers. There is a prevailing view in the literature that the use of former or seconded police officers should be limited or avoided where possible, due to the potential for compromise (Goldsmith, 1991; Landau, 1996; Prenzler & Ronken, 2003). A number of the officers interviewed recognised and commented on this potential:

*But I guess there can be a tendency with some of the investigators to feel, perhaps, a little bit more than empathy for the officers that are being subjected to investigation. I think empathy's very good. I think more than empathy is not, because if it starts influencing decisions that should be completely independent decisions then I don't think that's right. There's absolutely nothing wrong with doing your job but doing it in a humanitarian manner and understanding how this person may have got to be where they are and understanding how they are feeling and understanding what it's doing to them. It's something, in this job, you live with every day, that quite often you're not dealing with people who have necessarily chosen to go out there and rob banks and be your classic criminal. You're dealing with people who have made poor decisions and sometimes been influenced into certain relationships with other people and find themselves exposed and start, as a result, taking part in conduct that they might not necessarily have chosen to do so. So I think it's important that we do know that and that we are empathetic to that but if it goes too far and we start influencing the path of an investigation for it to no longer be objective, I think that can be dangerous (PCI-19).*

*Certainly I'd answer the same question there, you need that sympathetic sort of, yeah, and I think because I mean that's what I say, sometimes with a complaints officers I've said to them, you know, oooh, hold on. You know, I'll be speaking over certain issues and they'll say, well look, that police officer he did the wrong thing, he belted that guy, and I say, yeah, but hold*

*on, I said, you need to understand why that happened. I said unfortunately for them they haven't been in law enforcement. There's probably a reason why he's done it, whether it be the fact that he's been on shift for 12 hours, he's got problems at home and this, that and the next thing, doesn't make it right what he's done but it helps you understand why he's probably done it (PCI-17).*

*But I think in a way it's good because I know that to get some of your best results sometimes you've got to put trust in police and I think some people come here as investigators, we don't have any more, we did have investigators here who were never from the police and honestly they were woeful, absolutely woeful because they didn't understand the culture. They didn't understand, I guess, the risks and the difficulties of policing and the things that you face and how sometimes policing is a contact sport and they don't understand that sometimes police can make mistakes and also, you know, the mindset of police, but also how to relate to police and even when you're interviewing them and knowing how to, you have to be either an ex-cop or a police officer on secondment or something, I think, to be successful (PCI-26).*

The use of civilians instead of police officers in corruption investigations is premised on the assumption that civilian investigators are not bound by the values or interests of the police culture and are therefore more likely to be more transparent and impartial. It also provides reassurances to a sceptical public that corruption investigations are conducted impartially, without being overly sympathetic or influenced by police interests. Whilst this thesis did not attempt to reach a conclusion on the relative merits of police and non-police backgrounds, a number of the investigators commented on the benefits of a policing background for police corruption investigations:

*Being able to quickly identify issues and being able to talk to people on a one to one basis in terms of establishing credibility and understanding the environment they work in. Because it's policing, it's also a working environment where they face a lot of stress, anxiety and all these types of things (PCI-13).*

*Know thy enemy. I know them. Because they've got to not, they don't have to be old style dinosaurs but they've got to have that gravitas, I think when you're confronting these people and also dealing with them and you've got to have had the experience in doing these major investigations and not just doing them, leading them (PCI-10).*

*I think the knowledge of how police culture is and how police think and the inner workings of a police agency allows you to understand, you know, especially doing our work what police might do and things, you can sort of second guess them at what they'll do (PCI-5).*

*Because you've got that understanding of how police works, how being a cop works. You've got an understanding of how the organisation works, so I mean if you've got somebody who hasn't been a police officer and you get a job in and it's like, they don't particularly start looking at duty books, duty diaries, what structure the shifts take, all that kind of thing, it's just general things that the general public don't know. But also we run operations to do with covert, it used to be covert, and we run operations, with the benefits from being a cop it'd be hard to run an operation without just for that, you know, that plan and that preparation, coming up with strategies, just coming up with methodologies to achieve what you want to do. Personally I don't think without that experience, and that experience of being on the streets and talking to people. We have got an investigator here who hasn't been a cop and he's not that good at talking. He's not that good at interacting with people and if a volatile situation erupts he particularly can't handle that very well (PCI-6).*

The broad investigative experience that former police officers bring to police corruption investigation roles needs to be balanced against the risks posed by their perceived cultural alignment. In the opinions of those that work in the occupation, and from the perspective of this research, there is no doubt. You need one (a former police officer) to catch one (a corrupt police officer):

*I think the first point really is that they know what we know, because they have lengthy experience dealing with criminals, and claim to be (laughs) moral criminals you might say, because they use their skills and experience of (pause), gathered whilst investigating crime to their own benefit, but their better at it, should we say. Better than a criminal because not only are they using the skills of a criminal but their also using the skills of a police officer as well. I think that's the real challenge of it, is, trying to be better than them, to understand how they work, knowing full well that they have those, sort of skill scenarios (PCI-17).*

## **7.7 What Knowledge or Attributes make a Good Corruption Investigator?**

Hobbs (1991) states that detective work is one of the clearest indicators of multiple cultures existing within policing. He maintains it would be naïve to assume one single culture could explain the many functions that operate under the banner of policing.

Both Hobbs (1991) and Young (1991) describe detectives culture as being defined by results,

which frames the question; “What it is to be a good detective in an elite corp” (Westmarland, 2008, p. 274). It was this very question that provided the prompt and context for examining what makes a good corruption investigator.

a) *Adoption of Moral Identities*

Klockers (1985, p. 86) ascribes to the idea of detective work as a “morality play”, with detectives focused upon righting some moral wrong. As a result, it was presumed that police corruption investigators may also adopt moral identities for themselves. Therefore, an interesting avenue for investigation for this research was how corruption investigators saw themselves in the overall moral context:

*I mean you’ve got to live your life properly, you can’t give up any ideas about being shit faced in a town centre pub where serving police will see you as a corruption investigator or for instances if horses are your thing or the casino’s your thing, forget any ideas about being seen putting hundreds of dollars across at the TAB. So I think you’ve got to live your life properly and in quite a sort of regimented way and I’d say forget it if the 3.00am nightclub scene is your thing, I mean you can forget that (PCI-7).*

*You’ve got to have your own ethics. You’ve got to have your own, you know, I suppose it comes down to your ethics. I mean to be an investigator, anybody can be an investigator. You’ve got your police trained investigators. I think they’re always the better ones, purely because of the courses you get given as a police officer but I think it comes down to your own ethics, your own transparency and your own conscience (PCI-6).*

*They need to have that internal fortitude (PCI-21).*

*Obviously having a good moral footing is an important one, yourself, which they do security vetting here and they check your history and things like that so I’d like to think that nobody would get in here if they’ve had complaints or heavy suspicion against them in the past (PCI-27).*

*They’ve obviously got to have some moral ethics and those sort of attributes. How do you identify that within a 45 minute interview? I guess you have to take on face value that they’re applying for the job and therefore a corrupt person wouldn’t, one hopes, be attempting to join an organisation such as us. It has happened, I think, that obviously QPS officers who’ve applied for positions here as part of their QPS role but they’ve been knocked back after vetting. We carry out a certain amount of vetting on civilian investigators as well to identify what their*

*backgrounds are and whether they've got any outstanding issues (PCI-23).*

For police corruption investigators, moral heroism and superiority are a facilitative mechanism to achieve normality in the work place. Heroic moral identity makes their stigmatised work more acceptable, and even meritorious.

*b) Resilience*

Resilience can be viewed as “the capacity of a system to absorb and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks” (Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004, p. 2). A major factor in the promotion of resilience would appear to be the ability to self-enhance, that is, to perceive oneself as possessing more positive attributes than the average person.

Little surprise then, that resilience was a recurring theme in response to the question: *What makes a good corruption investigator?*

*Good question. Look, I think you've got to be definitely be resilient and you've got to be able to cope with that, whether it's perceived or whether it's real, that tension, you know the people ringing you up telling you to fuck off and when you ask them to come in and do an interview. I know a lot of the guys at the [redacted] Royal Commission, some of the uniformed guys that were there that weren't Detectives, didn't really like doing that. They'd always get me to ring people up and ask them to come in for an interview and stuff, so you've got to be resilient I think, definitely, and I think you've got to have a bit of, I don't care what you think, type sort of thing, I'm doing the right thing. I think you've got to be confident in yourself that you're doing the right thing. Because if you think you're not doing the right thing you're never going to be able to take that abuse (PCI-24).*

*Resilience would be a big one. So having the ability to be able to cope with the rough and tumble of working in that environment. They might be a real good investigator but if you're lying awake staring at the ceiling all night because of what might happen tomorrow over some controversial issue and you end up down at the doctor's on a bunch of pills and stuff, you know, it's not good. That's one example, so I really should have focused heavily on the resilience (PCI-11).*

*Lateral thinking, being able to navigate a multitude of legislative provisions, being able to think clearly but predominantly having a very robust attitude to it or being resilient to external influences such as media scrutiny. We're under a huge amount of media scrutiny here,*

*scrutiny from the courts, scrutiny from police officers. You're dealing in a very sometimes toxic and very hostile environment and you go out to talk to police, they don't want to see you because they see us and its bad news (PCI-13).*

*All right. They have to have resilience, its just number 1. They have to have an overwhelming sense of fairness, which is terribly important, and they need to be meticulous, but as I say that resilience, that sense of fairness, are really strong, they both have to be strong (PCI-3).*

*You have to be resilient to change because you never know what's around the corner (PCI-22).*

The concept of resilience needs to be considered in the context of the dynamics of police corruption investigation. The collective capacity of the investigators to maintain resilience depends largely upon their adaptability. Adaptability can be viewed as their ability to act together to manage the changes in their working lives, by altering attitudes, outlooks, practices or processes in response to those dynamics.

*c) Adaptability (thinking on your feet)*

Ashforth and Fried (1988, p. 306) maintain that formal, highly structured organisations tend to have developed “scripts” learned through organisational socialisation and various work experiences. Scripts were discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. As a result, much organisational behaviour is argued to be performed mindlessly. Whilst scripts maintain cognitive capacity and provide a means for evaluating behaviour, they also lack authenticity in operating routines. Actions are determined by established procedures, not by working through the problem. For the police corruption investigators, the ability to think outside the confines of scripts, and maintain adaptability, is considered critical:

*I suppose in their previous experience. It nearly runs along the board, their objectivity and their ability on difficult, and I'm not talking necessarily your serious crime, protracted and complex investigations, but their tenacity, their way of approaching the problem of the investigation, working through it. What do they bring? Are they just by the book? Do they think outside the square, are they innovative, do they have the drink? Do they have the passion or is it just a job? And all the moving parts, whether does that all fit in (PCI-14).*

*I think the ability to be able to strategise on your feet, I suppose, put the pieces together pretty quickly, understand the motivation, why people do the things they do, I think is important, having some empathy as well and able to understand human nature pretty well I suppose.*

*Yeah, I suppose just be able to think on your feet, I reckon Mark, most of the time. We've got a couple of investigators downstairs who no matter how you try and teach them and show them they're just wired differently in their brain, I suppose, and there's no way of saying, well you need to think like this. They just don't see why you need to think like that and they miss things and bits and pieces, yeah (PCI-25).*

*I think you have to be able to think on your feet. I think you have to be able to be methodical. You have to be prepared that there's going to be change that you might be going down here but then this comes up and you've got to go over here. It doesn't mean you need to forget about here but it means you just need to have a think about what's going on here. It has to be fluid. You have to be able to plan but you have to be aware that that plan will change (PCI-22).*

*I've never really thought about that too much before. You need to be adaptable to your environment. You need to be able to understand the purpose of what you're used for. Obviously there's those typical run of the mill, eye for detail type things, good investigative skills and an understanding of the coercive environment or probably an ability to quickly gain that type of ability (PCI-1).*

If the basis of organisational competence is experiential, then police organisations provide officers with a stock of pragmatic, experientially grounded knowledge and values, which can be employed in police corruption investigation. Nowhere, is this experience more highly regarded, than in the detectives' branch.

#### *d) Detective Experience*

The view of police primarily as crime fighters deterring and investigating crime is reinforced by the media. Young persons are drawn towards a policing career because of the excitement of these portrayed activities, in particular, the myths about investigation work where part of the mystique is the impression that detective work is higher status mental work (Stenross & Kleinman, 1989).

As discussed in Chapter 3, a good deal of detective work is not exciting. It is often less challenging and less demanding than those handling patrol work and it is arguable whether special skills and knowledge are required for detective work. Also, the capacity of detectives to solve crimes is greatly exaggerated.



Counter arguments are based on the assumption that civilians do not possess the requisite investigation skills required for police corruption investigation and that these skills can only be acquired through actual police investigative experience. In addition, it is argued that civilians will be less likely to receive cooperation from police agencies as they lack the legitimacy that only experience in a policing environment will provide.

There was strong support amongst the police corruption investigators for such proposition, who claim that police detective experience was critical to be successful in a corruption investigation environment:

*Gee, that's a good question. My test of what makes a good corruption investigator might be different to others. I think some background in policing would be handy but not necessarily definitive. I would say what makes a good corruption investigator is some sort of capacity to analyse facts, analyse the law and work out what they mean in relation to each other and the capacity to talk to people and the capacity to write and put those analysed facts and the law together in a report or a brief in a way that makes sense. Now, if you've been a Detective you're going to have those skills presumably ... because they are the core skills, I would think, of a Detective. All I'm saying is that I don't think that having been a Detective necessarily, or if you haven't been a Detective it doesn't follow necessarily that you won't have those skills or be able to acquire them, that's all. It's just hard to justify investing in people sufficiently long enough to develop them (PCI-9).*

*I think a broad base of knowledge. I think definitely policing experience I think's a fundamental, the ability to talk to people, interview them, develop relationships, whether they be with witnesses, persons of interest or sources, so that's why I think policing's just a natural fit for it because you're dealing with people and often in the context of corruption and so forth, they're very, very difficult offences to investigate (PCI-18).*

*Well I keep saying, they have to be ex-police for a start. With a wealth of criminal investigation to understand why, not to understand, to do your job properly (PCI-17).*

*Broad based experience, knowledge of, so exposure to different types of investigation, be it fraud, sex crimes, homicide and all that sort of stuff. Stuff that's probably at the more difficult end of the spectrum to investigate. Stuff that takes a bit of tenacity, drive, self-drive, you know, and commitment really to investigate because that's the type of work that corruption investigation is. You've sort of got to have a view to the longer term. You can't sort of treat each thing as an easy win because it's often much more complicated than that (PCI-15).*

*Look, what I find is that you've got to have that experience. You've got to have that police background. The ability to interview, I mean if I was to pull up a job description for an investigator, for example, it's got to be someone who has a demonstrated ability to interview people, with investigation experience. You've just got to know. It's that thing that you know as a copper, which way you should be looking and where you should be going, yeah (PCI-27).*

*I mean ideally it would be somebody who has experience in policing and corruption environment, but that's not always the case. When I was employed to this environment I had limited experience. I'd worked with the anti-corruption branch but not for an extended period of time, so it wasn't as if I was a seasoned anti-corruption investigator, but what comes from that experience is an understanding of the various motivators for corruption. The layman out there thinks it's all about money, it's not (PCI-19).*

Detectives tend to assume their superiority over uniform police due to their self-perceived unique skills and knowledge (Niederhoffer, 1969). Detectives can be seen as having moved away from the constraints of a uniform through joining a closed and somewhat elite sub-cultural group, whose strengths include inside support of other members.

## **7.8 Conclusion**

This chapter looked at the influences of police culture on police corruption investigators and their perceptions of the knowledge and attributes that make a good police corruption investigator. The knowledge and attributes that the police corruption investigators valued and perceived as essential in the investigation of corrupt police were: the adoption of a moral identity; resilience; detective experience; adaptability and the ability to think on their feet.

Whilst the majority of investigators acknowledge some influence from police culture there were a number who were vehemently opposed to the idea. There is strong evidence, however, that influences of police culture are pervasive. Even for those that no longer saw themselves as police officers the vestiges of police cultural life remain ever present, represented in job titles, daily routines and professional practices that emulate those of their former police occupations.

The best and worst aspects of police culture were also examined through the eyes of the police corruption investigators. The general consensus was that these aspects are inextricably linked. Whilst characteristics of conformity and solidarity provide a supportive platform for the management of strains that originate from police work, the same characteristics may also reinforce unacceptable cultural elements and contradictions arising from notions of loyalty. In

addition, reliance on solidarity and bonding in times of crisis were seen as the best aspects of police culture, whilst bullying and careerism were seen as the worst aspects.

Where police cultural knowledge and exposure were seen as most advantageous was in regard to the development of requisite skills required for police corruption investigation that, arguably, can only be developed through actual police investigative experience. An understanding of how police organisations work and an appreciation for how police think and the situations they face in their working lives was deemed essential. The unwritten and largely unspoken value systems which integrate police cultural members need to be recognised and experienced.

The concluding chapter of this thesis will summarise the various issues covered and articulate how the thesis contributes to the body of knowledge by presenting the general conclusions relating to my research. It outlines the theoretical and practical implications arising from my research, identifies policy implications arising and reinforces the thesis statement by revisiting the research questions in light of the body of literature that has been examined, and the original qualitative data that has been generated and analysed.

## CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

“It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.”

*Sherlock Holmes*<sup>13</sup>  
*A Scandal in Bohemia (1891)*

### 8.1 Introduction

I set out to explore the underlying frameworks (values, norms, symbols, beliefs and practices) that civil review agency police corruption investigators (with a police background) use to interpret and respond to the inherent cultural, structural, situational, debilitating or compromising occupational issues they face. A major focus of this research was the exploration of police corruption investigation as a type of ‘*Dirty Work*’; that is, as an occupation that is viewed as socially or morally tainted. To facilitate this exploration, answers to the following questions were pursued:

- a) *What normalisation challenges do civil review agency police corruption investigators with a police background, face in their occupational role?*
- b) *What tactics do civil review agency police corruption investigators with a police background use to normalise their work?*
- c) *How do civil review agency police corruption investigators with a police background identify with police culture and/or acknowledge the influence of police cultural conditioning on their practices, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours?*
- d) *What is their perception of the craft of police corruption investigation, including the knowledge, experience, skills and behaviours that are valued within the group?*

The rationale for this research was not necessarily to arrive at detailed, definitive answers that could be generalised across the population of police corruption investigators, but rather, to add to the body of knowledge in this field by providing insights into what may be occurring, including the influence of police culture and how police corruption investigators apply meaning and make sense of the world around them. In this way, this research provides a rich understanding of the occupation and the individuals within it by reflecting on their lived

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<sup>13</sup> Conan Doyle, A (1891, p. 5). Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective created by Scottish author and physician Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. A Scandal in Bohemia was the first of Arthur Conan Doyle's 56 Sherlock Holmes short stories to be published in The Strand Magazine.

experiences and observations, building thick descriptions to uncover symbolic aspects of behaviour, cultural and/or normative patterns. Given the finite population sampled, it was unlikely that definitive and generalised outcomes or findings would be achieved, however the significance of the research is in providing insight and familiarity with the world of police corruption investigators, not previously achieved.

The research began with a review of the literature pertaining to organisational and police culture. The concept of occupational alignment implies by inference, that police culture engenders some level of permanence of character, which resonates as behavioural patterns accorded internalised shared values. This research supports such proposal and there was certainly evidence to support this arising from the research.

The literature review provided a foundation for building theory and interpreting data derived from the narratives, and included a review of the literature on the roles and nature of policing. If police culture does indeed impart some permanence of character upon its cultural members, then it was important to understand why this might occur, the nature of the characteristics, and why an individual might be motivated to turn their back on the culture.

The literature review identified that there have been no studies focusing specifically on the work environment of civil review police corruption investigators (with a police background) in an Australian context. The significance of this is that, nonetheless, an increasing number of critics have argued that shared occupational values and perspectives make it unlikely that corruption investigations can be conducted fairly and impartially by seconded or former police officers. If this is true, then it raises fundamental questions regarding the current practices and efficacy of civil review agency police corruption investigation in Australia, including, who then is better placed to conduct fair and impartial investigation of police corruption? This research, therefore, has significance for knowledge, policy and practice, and provides an informed and scholarly basis for scrutiny of the practices of police corruption investigation and the management of police related corruption, which is critical to the maintenance of public confidence in police agencies.

This concluding chapter will commence with a summary of the preceding chapters of this thesis. Secondly, key findings of the study will then be highlighted. Thirdly, it will identify policy implications arising from the research and posit how the findings of this research may affect practice in the field of police corruption investigation. Finally, this chapter makes some final

observations and presents suggestions for ways to build on the research in order to meet the challenges of police corruption investigation in the future.

## **8.2 Chapter Summary**

### **8.2.1 Chapter 1**

Chapter 1 outlined the orientation of the research for this thesis, which was the academic discipline of *ethnography*. An interpretivist paradigmatic approach was chosen for the research due to its focus on how people interact with each other over time in specific settings. A narrative inquiry method was also adopted as it uses stories to understand the world of research subjects and focuses on the meanings that subjects ascribe to their life and experiences.

The study was framed by two major theories relevant to the proposed research questions: 1. Dirty Work; and 2. Organisational Culture Theory. Dirty work is work that is perceived as socially or morally tainted. This characterisation has serious implications for occupational identity as dirty workers negotiate tainted identities derived from the broader social discourse relating to their occupations. Organisational culture theory was chosen due to its ability to predict behaviour, its focus on socialisation and the individual adoption of cultural values and assumptions.

### **8.2.2 Chapter 2**

As an introduction to the first of the major theories framing the research, Chapter 2 examined the multiple themes of organisational and police culture. An understanding of organisational culture was deemed necessary to provide insight into the dynamics of organisations generally. An examination of police culture was seen as important to identify universal and persistent cultural characteristics that might be transmitted through socialisation, shared values, norms, perspectives and craft rules.

The process of organisational identity formation was reviewed as was the potential for loss of identity in the transition from police officer to police corruption investigator, which was a critical part of this research. The term *anomie* was used in the chapter to describe the feeling of uncertainty and lack of purpose in the minds of individuals as they attempt to maintain a true sense of belonging to a group. If this estrangement becomes too intense the end result can be self-destructive.

### **8.2.3 Chapter 3**

Chapter 3 examined the roles and nature of policing, including social expectations and how policing is defined within a web of functional and hierarchical relationships. Police officers cope with the ambiguity of their roles in society by focusing exclusively on what they see as their core function; that is, crime-fighting activities. This self-worth and perceptions of competence have been found to have a high correlation to job performance, serving as a moderator to the negative effects of role strain on self-esteem.

At the self-identity level, individuals may come to recognise that the institutionalised roles and values of police culture are in conflict with their own strongly held identities and values. They therefore experience, what has been termed, “value dissonance” (Schaible & Gecas, 2010, pp. 318-319). In this context, the attraction - selection - attrition (ASA) framework was also examined. The framework has particular implications for the outcomes of this study, as the conditions that may be attractive and satisfying to many in the policing environment, may act as dissatisfiers for others, leading them to contemplate other career options; such as police corruption investigation.

The chapter examined a number of enduring features of the police role, including power, persuasion and coercion, as well as the use of force. It explored police typologies and examined how beliefs and expectations regarding the practices and realities of police work have a considerable impact on the way police officers go about their roles.

Finally, police subcultures were examined, with the different perspectives on police work identified as most evident between those that work at the coal face (‘street cops’) and command staff. The distance between police managers and front line staff had significant implications for the outcomes of this research.

### **8.2.4 Chapter 4**

Chapter 4 introduced the concept of ‘*Dirty Work*’, the second major theoretical orientation for this research. When an officer decides to break the bonds of loyalty and investigate, or give incriminating testimony against a fellow officer, they risk alienating themselves from their brother police officers. This chapter looked at how dirty workers negotiate tainted identities derived from the broader social discourse relating to their occupation, and how normalisation strategies serve to protect the occupation from the threat that stigma represents by regulating socially undesirable emotions.

The chapter reviewed the investigatory skills, experience and expertise required to investigate police corruption. The use of coercive powers and their effectiveness in an adversarial legal system was reviewed, as was the impact of family, media, unions and politicisation on police corruption investigation. The major challenges associated with police corruption investigation were examined including the blue curtain of silence and noble cause corruption.

### **8.2.5 Chapter 5**

Chapter 5 was the first of three chapters to present an analysis of original qualitative data drawn from interviews conducted with 29 police corruption investigators from across Australia. It employed a narrative inquiry technique to identify the normalisation challenges faced by police corruption investigators. Self-narratives provide a transition bridge across gaps between old and new workplace roles and personalities. These narratives tend to reflect both their background (where they came from) and their future goals (where they're going) and this provided an insight into the influence and impact of their previous working lives.

### **8.2.6 Chapter 6**

Chapter 6 drew on the interview data to examine the strategies used by police corruption investigators to address the challenges of their occupation, normalise their work and regulate the unwanted or undesirable emotions attached to their roles. As with the previous chapter, the concept was examined through the lens of self-narratives, where the research subjects narrate their experiences of a new work environment, reflecting both their background and new identities.

### **8.2.7 Chapter 7**

Chapter 7 examined the influence of police culture on the investigators and their perceptions on the 'craft' of police corruption investigation. Police culture has been represented as a signifying system representing a whole way of life. This way of life is said to embody a permanence of character. In contrast, for police corruption investigators, a competing ethos finds salience and meaning, not in the traditions of policing, but rather in the internalised rules and procedures that characterise anti-corruption agencies.

## **8.3 Key Findings**

My research has used organisational culture and the concept of '*Dirty Work*' as a platform to examine the evolving cultures of police anti-corruption investigators. Little research has been



conducted into the cultural environment of police anti-corruption agencies, and none (as far as I'm aware) into the working lives of police corruption investigators. As such, this research provides a unique insight into the world of police corruption investigation and presents a significant original contribution to the base of knowledge surrounding this occupation.

As previewed in the preface to this thesis, my initial interest in this research was piqued by the question; why police corruption investigators chose to join the profession in the first place? My initial assumptions, that individuals might have had some exposure to police corruption during their careers and as such, might have developed an evangelical outlook to stamping out corruption, were proved to be incorrect. On the one hand, for some, the motivations were certainly career orientated. Of the remainder, the motivations were more opportunistic.

Some of my research findings confirm expectations formed from the general extant literature on policing. These findings serve to advance on previous research and are of interest because they add a new depth to our understanding of the working lives of Australian police corruption investigators. The focus, however, is on the original contributions or additions to knowledge resulting from the research. In Table 7, I have set out the advances and original contributions to knowledge derived from this research.

In designing and planning the research, I came across the concept of '*Dirty Work*' almost by chance. The idea that someone, or some group of people, openly chose to enter into professions that no one else wanted to enter, was intriguing. Dirty work, of course, is work containing attributions of stigma applied by members of the community within which the dirty worker co-exists. Police corruption investigation and '*Dirty Work*' appeared to me, to be a perfect match.

I assessed that if I could get behind the façade and truly explore the reasons why investigators chose to enter the profession, then this would direct me to the answers to my thesis; that is, identifying the normalisation challenges they face; identifying the tactics they use to normalise their work; their identification with police culture and the influences of that culture on them; and finally, ascertain their perceptions on the knowledge, skills and behaviours valued by their group.

In Chapter 3, my literature review explored the nature of policing, specifically looking at police typologies. Typologies provide a cognitive window to an individual's developmental experiences and the subsequent formation of their work identity. Typologies also reflect common practices and perspectives of individuals located within groups that have had similar

developmental experiences. Therefore, typology was an ideal base through which the research themes could initially be explored and expanded.

Table 7: Advances and Original Contributions to Knowledge

Research issue / Proposition	Themes	Advances Knowledge or Original Contribution
Typologies	Careerist/Opportunist	Original Contribution
Normalisation Challenges	Stigma Management	Advances Knowledge
	Transitioning to a Civil Review Culture.	Original Contribution
	The Management of Emotive Dissonance / Administration and Paperwork	Advances Knowledge
Normalisation Strategy	Strategic Use of Humour, Stress and Relaxation	Advances Knowledge
	Reframing; Adaptation; Diffusion; Ritualism and Ceremony; Titles and Status; Recalibration; Refocusing; War Stories	Advances Knowledge
Police Culture	Identification with Police Culture	Original Contribution
	Strong support for (police background) investigators	Original Contribution
Perceptions on the Craft of Corruption Investigation	Resilience / Adaptability / thinking outside the square	Original Contribution
	Detective Experience	Advances Knowledge

### 8.3.1 Typologies Identified

Whilst the research supports the notion that police officers have general typologies, the emergence of these typologies are dependent on situational, environmental and contextual organisational variants. During the course of my research, two typologies of police corruption investigators emerged: *the Careerist* and *the Opportunist*. All 29 investigators interviewed for this research could be categorised into one, or the other, of these typologies.

a) *The Careerist*

In policing, *Careerists* represent a changing of the guard; a transition from street cop to management cop. *Careerists* were previously identified as a typology of police officers by Klockars (1980). For police corruption investigators, the *Careerist* typology represents a moving away from recognised main stream street police culture, through a demonstration of preparedness to turn on the loyalty and camaraderie aspects of the culture into which the *Careerist* was socialised. Rather than being driven by an evangelical zeal to stamp out corruption, the *Careerist* is demonstrating to an observant organisation or community, that they are ready to move on with their careers, rejecting the old police cultures and embracing new managerialism. The *Careerist* finds salience and meaning not in the traditions of policing, but rather in public administration and the internalised rules and procedures that characterise civil review anti-corruption agencies.

Career paths within the policing industry is what these police administrators aspire to. In the process, a new subculture develops as a way of adapting and reacting against both the parent (police) culture into which the individual has been socialised, and any other class of culture which stands in opposition to the achievement of career objectives.

b) *The Opportunist*

Rather than adopting the negative connotations that opportunism affords, The *Opportunist* is one that flexibly adapts to changing circumstances they find themselves in to maximise their prospects of employment. The *Opportunist* typology refers to a specific way of responding to job opportunities which involve self-interest, whilst turning their back on the principles, culture and shared camaraderie of the police organisations from which they emerged.

In many cases, at the self-identity level, *Opportunists* have come to recognise that the institutionalised roles and values of police culture are in conflict with their own strongly held identities and values. They therefore experience *value dissonance*. At the experiential level, they may be exposed to behaviours and interactions which compromise their own strongly held beliefs, thereby creating *emotive dissonance*. This may result in psychological withdrawal, loss of enthusiasm and the loss of a sense of identity or mission. Adherents of burnout theory support the notion that police who turn their backs on the culture do so due to the accumulative influences of both occupational and organisational stresses. This study found such to be the case with the group of police corruption investigators identified as *Opportunists*.

One of the greatest challenges for police corruption investigators is convincing a sceptical public that they have left behind the aspects of loyalty and comradeship that police culture demand. Described by one police corruption investigator as ‘removing the hat’, this step is a critical one in making the transition from street cop to management cop; “*if you can take the police hat off then you’ve got a chance. If you’ve still got the police hat on you’re going to find it difficult (PCI-12).*”

For the *Opportunist*, this test has already been passed. They have made a conscious decision to leave the police (normally because of frustration) and they have already turned their back on the brotherhood elements of policing – they have already *removed the hat*. Schneider’s (1987) attraction – selection – attrition (ASA) model was discussed in Chapter 3. In regard to understanding organisational behaviour, Schneider asserts that if people do not fit an environment well, they will tend to leave it. Such is the case with the *Opportunists*.

If one accepts that some characteristics of policing are endemic to the culture, then *Opportunists* typically exist as outliers to those cultural expectations. These are people that have truly experienced *anomie* as purported by Moore (1985); that is alienation, depersonalisation and feelings of inauthenticity brought about by cognitive dissonance (a realisation that they don’t belong). Many cited unfair promotions practices and nepotism as reasons for this dissonance, and for having left the police in the first place

Corrupted promotion systems, where nepotism, cronyism and sycophants are rewarded, are powerful de-motivators. On a number of levels then, the tensions within police culture caused by promotion systems and careerism are clear and inextricably linked to the police corruption investigation profession, and provide a window of reasoning to why some police corruption investigators leave the police force.

It has been theorised that dissatisfaction with policing has a high correlation to resignation from police work, with major factors affecting satisfaction including salary, rank, overtime, compensation, working hours, promotional prospects and retirement incentives (Harr, 2005). This was certainly found to be the case with the *Opportunists*. Civil review anti-corruption agencies need to be cognizant of these transitional challenges and develop strategies to address them if they are to attract and retain quality police corruption investigators.

Police departments are not immune to the conflicts inherent in any large-scale bureaucracy, when new public management schemes for increasing efficiency, effectiveness, accountability

and transparency are imposed on old style police cultures. Individuals must be prepared to show that they can turn their backs on the loyalty and camaraderie aspects of the culture to progress these objectives. In such an environment, *the Careerists* and *the Opportunists* provide a hedge against Goldsmith's "occupational alignment" (1996, p. 38).

### **8.3.2 Normalisation Challenges**

#### *a) Stigma Management*

Police corruption investigators are, for most parts, stigmatised by their former police colleagues. As a result, they are blocked from receiving much needed validation of normalcy from the police community, a community into which they have been socialised. A normalising challenge for these investigators, then, is to develop a core identity which whilst new, maintains remnants of the life they left behind, and the values and perspectives which led them to a career in policing in the first place. For some, this was not an active cognitive process, but rather, a sub-conscious leaning towards a life they are familiar and comfortable with.

Their impaired collective identity is re-enforced every day through their dealings with operational and corrupt police officers. These dealings remind the investigators that they are no longer part of the police family, but go beyond the normal ostracism served as a warning to those who contemplate disloyalty to the police occupation. Rather, it is an outright declaration of their status as social outcasts.

Most investigators were quite aware of the stigma attached to their occupation; after all, some reported having held or at least being exposed to similar views during their tenure as police officers. Most maintained that the organisational perceptions were unjust, a common perception amongst the stigmatised. This alienation is however, deflected by their refusing to internalise these judgments and stereotypes.

Families or partners also play a role in the police corruption investigators management of stigma. For police corruption investigators, families serve as a protective circle, particularly in difficult social situations, where the investigators might have to hide their true identity.

#### *b) Transitioning from a Police Culture to a Civil Review culture.*

A major finding of this research was that police corruption investigators find it difficult to adopt the assumptions, beliefs and values of the civil review anti-corruption agencies. This is evidenced by their (generally) cynical outlook on the competency of agency management and

legal staff. Irrespective of the difficulties involved, such adoption is required however, as it forms the basis for cultural competence in the agency context and ensures their ongoing participation within the agency.

Police anti-corruption units are invariably structured along paramilitary lines. Paramilitary bureaucratic units have top down authority structures, with explicit chains of command. These structures may be relevant for operational police work, where car chases, defensive tactics and arrests are the hallmark of street policing, however it is debatable whether they are suitable to the more corporate environment of civil review anti-corruption agencies, which are more attuned to traditional models of public service than to models of command and control enforcement.

Transitioning from one culture, particularly one as insular as policing, to a more open civil review culture is a significant normalisation challenge for former police officers joining civil review anti-corruption agencies. This transition requires a re-civilianisation process and unlearning the cultural conditioning of policing. The transition is complicated by the need to adjust to a corporate environment managed by judges and lawyers; a subordination that most find uncomfortable, complicated further by an asymmetrical status norm within agencies which gives deference to those with legal qualifications over policing experience.

Without exception, the investigators understood that traditional police black humour (used normally to maintain group solidarity) is not encouraged or appreciated by their new colleagues. Loss of autonomy and failure of management to recognise and acknowledge the value of their work were other critical factors highlighted by the investigators.

The more difficulty investigators have in adapting to the corporate and political environment of anti-corruption agencies, the more they reported developing feelings of alienation and inauthenticity regarding their roles as corruption investigators, which is consistent with theories of emotive dissonance proposed by Hochschild (1983) and Schaible (2006), amongst others.

Anti-corruption agencies need to be more cognisant of the demands of the role of police corruption investigators, including their ability to conform and adapt to the expectations of their new workplace, their enculturation and socialisation during transition from policing to their new environment, their social isolation and required secrecy and the levels of bureaucracy, stress and anxiety attached to their new positions. The potential result of ignoring these normalisation challenges is that corruption investigators may experience 'reality shock'

(Niederhoffer, 1969) once they become more aware of the realities of their work and the potentially mechanistic and programmed nature of the systems in which they now operate.

*c) The Management of Emotive Dissonance*

In planning this research, I assumed that emotive dissonance might occur during interactions between corruption investigators and the police officers they investigate. These real emotions can become an obstacle to job performance if they are internalised; however, I was wrong. Whilst some investigators were sympathetic to the plight of corrupted police, most investigators reported having no difficulty with the emotive demands of the role. Part of this was due to their use of reframing strategies to view their investigative targets as 'criminals in uniform,' rather than as former colleagues. Such negation and rationalisation is consistent with strategies proposed in the literature (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002) for the management of stigma in dirty work occupations.

Police corruption investigators report greater emotive dissonance when they have to frequently adapt their emotions to comply with managerial demands, than they do in their dealings with corrupt police officers.

A number of police corruption investigators reported being frustrated by the fact that they weren't involved in the same dynamic environment that they were, whilst in the police. Police are trained to take control of situations and this is a natural position for them to assume in their work day activities. Police corruption investigations are normally long term, meticulous and tedious operations, reflecting the compliance heavy environment in which they operate. This is a significant adaptation for most corruption investigators, with a strong potential for emotive dissonance resulting in less satisfaction, alienation from the agency and impacts on psychological health.

*d) Administration and Paperwork*

Paperwork was reported as one of the greatest causes of dissatisfaction amongst police corruption investigators. Given their experiences in the police, most investigators understood that the amount of paperwork involved with their corruption roles would be onerous, but none expected the level of administrative challenge it would pose. This was particularly the case with elements of the work such as affidavit preparation, reflecting the risk adverse nature of their agencies.

### 8.3.3 Normalisation Strategies

In considering normalisation strategies, one must first consider that which might be viewed as normal for the occupation. Normality engenders some sense of familiarity and comfort with working surrounds and an ability to adapt to the changing demands of the job environment. For police corruption investigators, normality originates within the context of police work and police investigations.

Loyalty is highly valued in law enforcement and is deeply embedded in the ideology of police organisations. When an officer decides to break the bonds of loyalty and investigate, or give incriminating testimony against a fellow officer, they risk alienating themselves from their brother police officers. The loyalty previously shown to them by fellow officers will be replaced with condemnation. An inevitable outcome is that these officers are stigmatised by the very occupation and culture into which they had been socialised. The outcomes of this research support the common adaptations for normalising emotion propounded in the literature (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002). Reframing was the most strongly associated stigma management strategy.

The most prevalent normalisation strategies identified by this research were: the strategic use of humour to lessen the impact of work outcomes (reviewed in chapter 2); the employment of relaxation and stress relief strategies (reviewed in chapter 3); reframing stigma attached to the occupation (reviewed in chapter 4); reducing harmful stimuli through adaptation (reviewed in chapter 4); dissipating unwanted emotions through diffusion (reviewed in Chapter 4); reducing undesirable emotions and expectations through ritualism and ceremony (reviewed chapter 4); the maintenance of senior titles to enhance status (reviewed chapter 4); magnifying non stigmatised parts of the job through recalibration (reviewed Chapter 4) and the use of war stories to both relieve monotony and to socialise new comers into the agency (reviewed Chapter 3) .

#### *a) Strategic Use of Humour*

The use of black humour in policing is well documented (Pogrebin & Poole, 1988). However the type of black humour accepted within policing is not considered appropriate for the more corporate environment of an anti-corruption agency. For police corruption investigators, humour most commonly took the form of jocular aggression in attacking senior management of the agency. This jocular aggression provided the opportunity for the investigators to denounce management whilst avoiding direct confrontations that could lead to agency sanction.



From a different perspective, humour, in the form of audience degradation, was used by investigators to maintain morale and confirm their separateness from a dominant police culture. In the office, shared laughter operates to affirm the police corruption investigators moral superiority over the police they investigate, through directing humour at individuals outside their group, supporting theory put forward in the literature (Pogrebin & Poole, 1988). The use of humour as a diffusion tactic was less common within police corruption investigation, simply because the investigators do not face the same levels of danger as do operational police officers.

#### *b) Stress and Relaxation*

The majority of police corruption investigators reported that their occupation was far less stressful than was expected. This is because they compared corruption investigation with the chronic stresses they experienced whilst police officers. In addition, they appeared to have far more time to complete their investigations, and professional advice to assist them in their investigatory roles, thereby reducing operational stress.

It was expected that due to their socialisation into police drinking culture, that alcohol would be identified as the relaxation strategy of choice. This was simply not the case. Possibly due to the minimal level of socialising identified within these groups, alcohol consumption was not identified as an issue. Instead of hanging back after work to drink with their work mates, most investigators expressed a preference to going home and spending more time with their families, a luxury they did not have whilst serving police officers. Instead, one of the most common strategies used by the investigators to address the stresses they experienced in the work place was physical exercise, reflecting the social isolation of the occupation.

#### *c) Reframing*

Reframing was the most common stigma management strategy employed by police corruption investigators and is consistent with the theory outlined in the literature (Ashforth et al., 2007). Reframing was achieved by infusing their stigma with a positive value, the most obvious being, to assume a moral superiority to those police they investigate.

For police corruption investigators, moral heroism and superiority are a facilitative mechanism to achieve normality in the work place. Heroic moral identity makes their stigmatised work more acceptable, and even meritorious. Denial of normal status can thus be countered by defining themselves as *better* or *more moral*, than the average police officer.

The use of the '*criminals in uniform*' metaphor to describe corrupt police was a common reframing medium for the police corruption investigators, providing a rationalising context to their work.

*d) Adaptation*

Adaptation is the process through which familiarity with stimuli tends to blunt the emotional impact. The key area of adaptation for police corruption investigators involved their prosecuting of operational police officers. Given their enculturation, I considered that this might be a particularly difficult situation for the officers and one in which evidence of adaptation may be forthcoming. This was certainly the case for some investigators, but the results were inconsistent, with a number of investigators reporting having no sympathies for the corrupt police they investigated. Certainly, acceptance of the inevitability of stigmatisation was a critical adaptation strategy identified.

*e) Diffusion*

Diffusing is where undesired emotions are dissipated or their impact is reduced. Diffusing tends to be used by investigators on an ad hoc basis to dissipate unwanted emotions and has strong links to the literature on stigma management strategies (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002). For many investigators, diffusion involved sharing experience and the emotional burdens with their team. The use of humour as a diffusion tactic was less common amongst police corruption investigators, simply because they do not face the same level of threats or violence as do the police:

*f) Ritualism and Ceremony*

For police corruption investigators, corruption hearings represent a form of ritual and characterise the legal adversarial systems that they are used to from policing. These rituals provide investigators with a sense of shared reality. Corruption hearings also provide a sense of confirmation of status and a ceremonial celebration of the importance of the work of police corruption investigators, through a certification ceremony that rhetorically transforms the output of their investigations into definitive evidence.

*g) Titles and Status*

Anti-corruption agencies offer status shields for their investigators by cultivating a professional demeanour of authority and experience. Of all the agencies examined as part of this research, it

was rare to find an investigator with a title subordinate to *senior investigator*. This may merely reflect the level of experience required for entry into organisations and roles of this kind, however, the presence of senior titles suggests that status distinctions are important to police corruption investigators.

#### *h) Recalibration*

One of the normalisation strategies described in the literature (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999) was recalibrating. Recalibrating involves adjusting evaluation criteria to magnify non-stigmatise parts of the job.

Surprisingly, recalibration was particularly evident in the corruption investigators self-deprecating humour. Many investigators took pride in, or at least were resigned to, being framed as unlikeable. Through this, they turned a potential stigma into a sign of toughness.

#### *i) Refocusing*

Refocusing involves shifting attention from stigmatised features of the job to valued aspects of the employment. For police corruption investigators, this refocusing centred upon their investigative abilities and competencies, which they saw as superior to the average police detective. It gives the investigators an opportunity to redefine their emotional labour as higher status investigative work. By refocusing on corrupt police as *super criminals*, corruption investigators were able to subconsciously reflect on their own competency as *super investigators*.

#### *j) War Stories*

My research found that some investigators used war stories to relieve the monotony of their work, but ultimately, their function within civil review police anti-corruption agencies is to assist newcomers to become socialised into the new agency.

Overall, the role of war stories in the context of civil review anti-corruption agencies is not so much to propagate the old police culture, but more a recognition of where the corruption investigators have come from, and where they find themselves now. This is conducive to the socially accepted feedback mechanisms identified in the literature (Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Van Maanen, 1973).

### **8.3.4 Identification with Police Culture**

My research has found that the influence of police culture on police corruption investigators is profound. The strength of the culture leaves an enduring and indelible influence and a permanence of character upon them. This is evidenced through their choice of normalisation strategy (outlined above), including the use of war stories, rituals and ceremony, titles and status, and their strategic use of humour. Police corruption investigators cannot help referencing the police culture as a guide to their actions.

There was general consensus amongst the investigators in regard to the influences of police culture on the way they operate. Some investigators, however, drew distinctions between being influenced by police culture, and the development of experience through immersion in that culture. This perspective reflects their rejection of the vestiges of traditional police culture; a survival tactic required when one enters an occupation that is stigmatised by those whom they formally regarded as colleagues. This allows them to adapt themselves for their next life as police corruption investigators.

Whilst the more superficial characteristics of police culture were easier for the investigators to recognise (such as camaraderie and loyalty), some levels of police culture operating on the investigators at a sub-conscious level were either not recognised, or taken for granted. These characteristics included elements of secrecy, suspiciousness and social isolation, evidence of which pervaded the interviews. This complements the claims in the literature (Schein, 1984) regarding the sub-conscious operation of police cultural influences.

Even for those police corruption investigators who disputed their affiliation to police culture, the vestiges of police cultural life remain ever present, represented in job titles, daily routines and professional practices that emulate those of their former police occupations.

I have highlighted evidence that corruption investigators continue to maintain police cultural characteristics such as macho attitudes, resistance to change and aversion to authority (particularly to agency management and lawyers). Whilst overt signs of sexism or racism in occupational lives and attitudes were not detected, it was interesting to note the gender distribution of police corruption investigators across the agencies. Less than 10% of the 29 investigators interviewed were female, whilst all investigators were Caucasian. These distributions are certainly not representative of gender divisions within normal police

investigation units. It is unclear what conclusions can be drawn from these distributions other than to state they would be of interest for future research.

One of the most intriguing findings for me, was that the best and worst aspects of police culture are inextricably linked, with police camaraderie and loyalty identified by the investigators as both a defining characteristic of the culture, and also a major corruption risk.

An exaggerated sense of mission, where policing is conceived as protecting the weak and preserving a valued way of life has been identified in the literature as a strong feature of police culture. Police corruption investigators view themselves as the thin line between societal expectations of police and the corrupted ideals of the police they investigate (reframed as *criminals in uniform*). This perception contributes to an ‘us vs. them’ mentality and through the voluntary maintenance of distance from those in the police who would stigmatise them. By maintaining distant relationships, police corruption investigators ensure that time will not have to be spent with former police colleagues who might re-enforce their stigmatisation. This strategy is consistent with the police social distancing theories discussed in the literature.

As an adjunct to this, many investigators reported having to adopt ‘multiple identities’ to conceal their occupation and to protect family members from any likely fall out of their involvement in police corruption investigation. The most common identities adopted were that of the public servant or government investigator. These strategies are consistent with the stigma management (multiple identity) strategies proffered in the literature (Shih, 2004).

### **8.3.5 Perceptions on the Craft of Police Corruption Investigation**

For police corruption investigators, attempts to attain legitimacy are pursued through mimetic processes and through overt claims to each other and to outsiders (particularly police). Such action is motivated by the desire to manage inherent stigma, and to claim an identity that is both similar to, and different from, the policing culture from which they came. This concept is known as optimal distinctiveness, and was discussed in Chapter 2. Prior cultural experience predisposes investigators to perceive their new environment as would a police officer. Therefore, exploring their perceptions of the craft of police corruption investigation provided insight into their cultural biases and into the knowledge and skills that they have used to manage the transition from policing.

a) *Resilience*

The dirty work strategy of *condemnation of the condemners* was highlighted in Chapter 6 (Table 6) of this thesis. Condemning condemners involves impugning the legitimacy of those who stigmatise the police corruption investigators. Because stigmatisation creates at least a tacit threat to the investigators work identity, the investigators are motivated to use social comparison to demonstrate their moral and ethical superiority and their resilience as a group.

Resilience can be defined as an individual's ability to adapt to stressors and adversity. Individuals demonstrate resilience when they rise above diversity through a combination of positive emotionality, a positive self-concept and confidence in personal strengths and abilities. Resilience plays a particularly important role in the working lives of police corruption investigators as they struggle to transition from their former police identities to their new working environment. Their collective capacity to maintain resilience is a measure of their adaptability and determines whether they successfully manage the transition from policing, or not, and can be linked to the police cultural characteristic of '*perseverance*', which was discussed in Chapter 2.

b) *Adaptability*

Scripts facilitate sense making, the prediction and control of behaviour, and legitimate organisational activities. Whilst exposure to invariant events and values is necessary, these scripts may blinker perceptions and inhibit creativity and innovation. For the police corruption investigator, the ability to think outside the confines of scripts, and maintain adaptability, is considered critical. Whilst adaptability is viewed as a particularly important characteristic of police corruption investigation, script development does provide individuals with cognitive links to past repetitive (policing) behaviours. These links can be regarded as the fundamentals of experience, which is critical to their success as police corruption investigators. Adaptability can be linked to the police cultural characteristic of '*reflexive decision making*', which was discussed in Chapter 2.

c) *Detectives*

This *crime fighter* image, which is a central tenet of police culture, arguably places police corruption investigators (with a police background) in a unique position in obtaining police cooperation and establishes their legitimacy in the investigative process. Police corruption investigators still see themselves as crime fighters; merely opposing a different enemy.

There was strong support amongst the police corruption investigators interviewed that police detective experience was critical to be successful in a corruption investigation environment. By calling on their valued core identities as detectives, the police corruption investigators are able to reframe and re-enforce their self-image as esteemed investigators through an acknowledgement of their detective skills, knowledge and experience.

## **8.4 Implications for Policy and Practice**

### **8.4.1 Suitability**

This study supports previous research in identifying embedded traditions of police culture amongst police corruption investigators and supports notions of permanence of character which critics of *police investigating police* embrace. Whilst this cultural influence was not unexpected, the level of influence detected was not so pervasive as to impact the fair and impartial investigation of corrupt police.

Whilst the potential for ‘occupational alignment’ exists, there is no doubt that corruption investigators need to be thoroughly acquainted with police organisations and police culture. However, they must guard against the danger of becoming co-opted through over familiarity into police ways of thinking, as one of the primary conditions of regulatory capture is recruitment of personnel from a regulated body. To guard against this, investigators should be recruited from outside the jurisdictions within which they served as police officers (interstate or overseas).

From the organisations examined as part of this research, the New South Wales Police Integrity Commission (PIC) is considered most representative of this type of police corruption investigative model in Australia.

### **8.4.2 Leadership and Recruitment**

The findings of my research are consistent with those of Schein (1990) in that it identified a number of dominant figures within police corruption investigation teams, whose own beliefs, assumptions and values provided a model for how the teams should behave, adapt and function. Invariably, and some might argue by necessity, these individuals were from policing backgrounds. Their leadership provided comfort, support and stability for police corruption investigators and reduced the anxiety that results from entering a new work environment. In general, the leadership of corruption investigation teams were generally attuned to the strategic

objectives of the organisation, however there is a critical risk to agencies if the wrong individuals are recruited to these positions.

Whilst there is a strong argument for the need to have former police officers in leadership positions within agencies, mainly for their operational experience, agencies should ensure that they have some corporate leadership and assimilatory experience outside the police force prior to recruitment. That is, that they are a good cultural fit as regards assumptions beliefs and values of the agency.

### **8.4.3 Orientation and Training**

The individual capacity of organisations reflects the skills, experience and knowledge that are vested or inherited through the individuals comprising its workforce. Interestingly, there was little or no orientation, or training reported by the police corruption investigators, when transitioning to civil review anti-corruption agencies.

If one is to rely upon the literature, the likelihood of investigators adopting the values of their new workplace will depend upon the efficacy of orientation and socialisation processes, which at present, are sadly lacking within police corruption investigation agencies. In essence, the findings of this research support those of McIvor (2004), that, in the absence of a structured process of identity transformation, police corruption investigators will fall back on self-fulfilling identities that reinforce notions of themselves as police officers, rather than adopting the civil servant persona of the organisations of which they join. For civil review anti-corruption agencies, the implications are that assimilation of officers with police backgrounds will become increasingly problematic. With the lack of formal transitional training and orientation, war stories will become the medium by which the police corruption investigators propagate universal and persistent police cultural characteristics across the work force.

Given the literature on the potential for ‘occupational alignment’ highlighted in this thesis, this should ring alarm bells for police anti-corruption agencies. Loss of identity in transitioning from one career to another was a critical part of my research.

### **8.4.4 Media Management**

The relationship between the media and police corruption investigators has always been a problematic one. The overriding requirement for secrecy which emanates from these agencies is reflective of their police culture characteristic roots, and does nothing to endear them to



information hungry media outlets. Managing these relationships poses one of the greatest challenges for police anti-corruption agencies and the investigators attached to them.

One of the lessons learnt from the demise of the Office of Police Integrity (OPI) in Victoria is that anti-corruption agencies must embrace media strategy and better manage public attention to corruption enquiries. Press conferences, press releases and other self-initiated coverage must be prepared. This presents a wonderful opportunity for policy relevant agencies to share their knowledge of corruption issues more broadly and help frame the questions raised about police corruption issues. Relationships with the press must be nurtured as a crucial element in police corruption investigative work. Under these circumstances an agency can often promote public trust through acting on an agreed media strategy. This provision of information does not necessarily involve acceptance or denial of allegations. Instead public interest can be satisfied with basic background information on why allegations arose, and how it is being addressed.

## **8.5 Future Research**

Policing has universal and lasting cultural features and is heavily influenced by underlying cultural values. It's offering of closed institutions which value organisational secrecy and demonstrated tribal cultural behaviour provide an irresistible challenge for social researchers. In particular, police and politician corruption investigations which have recently dominated the media, carry with them the weight of public expectation that corrupt officials will be made to pay for their indiscretions. However, this is not always the case.

It is suggested that future research should concentrate on developing more practical, powerful and collaborative civilian oversight and investigative models. Corruption hearings often look and act like courts mimicking adversarial process with witnesses examined and cross-examined and counsel representing those under examination. They are almost invariably headed by judges, former judges or senior counsel. This explains why the media and public alike expect *criminal court* like outcomes from these hearings.

Despite public and media perceptions, judicial enquiries are in fact appointed by governments to perform an executive function, the principal role of which is to gather information and make reports to support government decision-making. Whilst they maintain a range of coercive powers they do not exercise an adjudicative function. Specifically, they cannot make or draw conclusions as to criminal guilt or innocence, an issues that is often lost on an ignorant public.

Whilst these enquiries are clearly performing executive functions, they choose to proceed judicially in that they comply with the legal system's notion of evidence gathering and appropriate conduct. This frames public expectations and limits the capacity for proactive investigation. As a result, many agencies suffer from an identity crisis; are they judicial agencies of inquiry or law enforcement agencies? Many adopt an amalgam of the two without consideration for the intricacies of police corruption investigation and the public expectations that accompany such models. Therefore, adoptive models need to be reviewed in light of investigative efficacy and management, media exposure, public expectation and the requirements of executive government.

Reflecting upon the literature and the outcomes of this research, a number of potential areas for future research were identified:

1. How do various aspects of PIP (Police Investigating Police) contribute to, or undermine, the public legitimacy of the civilian overview and review process?
2. Given the alleged persistence and significance of police culture in rationalising questionable activities and resisting external review, what models or strategies might be developed to enhance police cooperation and collaboration within various external review systems?
3. Is there a case for more robust models of (police corruption) civilian review with broader mandates that include a capacity to oversight police internal corruption investigations, make risk based recommendations about operational policy, review procedure and recommend change around the various organisational conditions that create complaints?

Future research could also focus on how to measure the performance and impact of police anti-corruption agencies. We should be wary of simplistic assertions about any anti-corruption agency's impact on corruption. Many agencies missions are broadly defined in terms of reducing corruption or changing values; outcomes that are, at best, very hard to measure. Measurement of results is only feasible where objectives are concretely defined and reliable data are available on agency outputs and intermediate outcomes, such as successful prosecutions, moneys recovered, and preventive recommendations adopted.

### **8.5.1 Differentiation Perspective**

Civil review police anti-corruption agencies are in a state of evolution, and in the process of building their cultures. A natural evolutionary mechanism will inevitably occur with age and size. As corruption agencies grow and evolve, a process of differentiation, integration and fragmentation takes place which evolves around functional and operational elements. In negotiating this evolution, it is essential that anti-corruption agencies assist assimilation by recognising the distinctiveness of their police corruption investigators.

Future research might consider looking at differences in operations and attitudes within police corruption investigation units using the variables of age and size (maturity) of the agency. Given the outcomes of this research and the permanence of character implicit in police culture, it can be expected that deeper elements of police culture will remain congruent, irrespective of the agencies maturity.

## **8.6 Final Reflections**

My research has drawn on insights from a wider range of disciplines to contribute to the understanding of police corruption investigators. Social psychology, organisational theory, social theory, criminology and behavioural science amongst others, all offer valuable perspectives for understanding the world of police corruption investigators.

Personal identity is how you see yourself, and why and how individuals justify seeing themselves this way. Others confirm and reinforce identity by looking at the individual with approval or admiration. This reinforces social identity. Detectives, in particular, obtain support for their valued identity through collegiality and perceptions of exclusivity. They collectively reinforce images of themselves as uniquely skilled sleuths or problem solvers.

There is a need to develop a culture within anti-corruption agencies that meet the exclusivity and affiliation needs of its investigators as well as being aware of the potential for capture (discussed in Chapter 4).

### *a) Dirty Workers?*

Every occupation is not one, but several activities; some of them are the '*Dirty Work*' of that trade. Police corruption investigation is attributed a '*Dirty Work*' stigma because the occupation runs counter to police cultural ethos. If police corruption investigators look to police agencies for affirmation, their ability to achieve a sense of a work place identity will become tenuous.

Policing itself, is one of those occupations that is attributed a '*Dirty Work*' attribution despite the moral and heroic connotations of the job. Whilst most people would regard the police as necessary, they tend to remain psychologically distanced from the occupation, glad that someone else is doing it. Such is the case with police corruption investigators. If policing can be interpreted as '*Dirty Work*', then corruption investigators can truly be considered the '*Dirty Workers, Dirty Worker*'.

For individuals moving from the relative normalcy of policing, to the more corporate confines of civil review anti-corruption agencies, '*Dirty Work*' presents a number of complex challenges. Initially they have to navigate a new environment which requires a different set of knowledge, skills and attitudes. The nature of this transition means that police corruption investigators are required to think differently. At the same time that they're navigating this new environment, they have to adapt to moving from an occupation that is generally well respected to one that is almost universally despised and stigmatised by the very culture into which they have previously been socialised.

*b) Politicisation?*

Political will is integral to the overall success of any police anti-corruption agency. Unless the government acknowledges the need and agrees to implement reforms to reduce police corruption then they simply will not be implemented. Even advocates of legislative oversight of the police have acknowledged that its effectiveness is contingent on the political will to launch an investigation into police practices and a problem of sufficient gravity to warrant the expenditure of time and resources.

*c) Legalistic?*

A major criticism of anti-corruption agencies is that they are not operating as inquisitorial forums as intended. An "excessively legalistic" approach has led to an unexpected number of prosecution dismissals (Prenzler, 2000, p. 666). It appears there is an expectation that a finding of corrupt conduct should automatically convert to a criminal conviction. This perception highlights a lack of understanding of the functions of many anti-corruption agencies, which have as one of their functions, exposing unconscionable conduct and encouraging high standards of behaviour in public officials, even if that conduct cannot be proven to be criminal (Symons, 2008).

The Fitzgerald inquiry in Queensland and the Wood inquiry in New South Wales successfully created a public expectation that all recommendations will be fully acted upon to the extent that prosecutions were probable rather than possible; this public expectation has shown to be a remarkably durable. Agencies must realise and perceive their own institutional limitations, that investigative bodies heavily dominated by private sector laws may not be the best vehicle for uncovering political and administrative problems and police corruption.

These anti-corruption agencies have been at the forefront of the fight against police corruption. The common rhetoric of the 'war on corruption' conjures images of an enemy that can be defeated. However, such an absolute objective can be regarded as unrealistic; likely to be disproportionately costly, rigid and risks compromising human rights. Public interest on these issues has been fed by a voracious media and promoted through television programs such as 'Underbelly' and 'Blue Murder'. The result has been an increasing public awareness of the types and impacts of police corruption and a resultant perception that the processes of public accountability have failed, not the least due to the resilient and resistant nature of occupational police culture and its inability to change.

In the middle of this scenario sit the police corruption investigators. Defined by police culture and stigmatised by the very occupation into which they were socialised, theirs is an unenviable task. Stigmatisation is inevitable for those that turn their backs on police culture; so it is for police corruption investigators. Somebody, however, has to do the dirty work. There are identifiable survival predictors amongst '*dirty workers*'. Accepting certain realities as part of the working experience is one of them. It is only through such acceptance that the work of police corruption investigators can be reasonably normalised and through this realisation, *the extraordinary can be rendered seemingly ordinary*.

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## APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Research Question	Open Ended Interview Questions
<b>A. What normalization challenges do corruption investigators face?</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What parts of the job do you like most? Why? What parts do you dislike the most? Why?</li> <li>2. What are the greatest challenges of your job? Why?</li> <li>3. What attracts investigators to come here?</li> <li>4. Why do investigators leave here? Why do they stay?</li> <li>5. Do you ever feel compromised by your role as a corruption investigator – i.e. internal conflicts / unresolved issues?</li> <li>6. How do you think the general public sees your job? Why do you think they see you this way? How do police see you? Why?</li> <li>7. What does your spouse/family/friends think about this job? Why?</li> <li>8. How political is this environment and have you experienced aspects of politicisation of corruption investigations?</li> <li>9. Do parts of your job make you feel like you're being deceptive or misleading? If so, how do you cope with them?</li> <li>10. Are there things that used to bother you about the job but don't anymore? How did it change?</li> <li>11. To what extent do you socialise with people at work outside business hours?</li> <li>12. How does this job compare to others you've had?</li> <li>13. Do you think you're fairly typical corruption investigator? How so?</li> <li>14. How would you categorise the different types and personalities of corruption investigators? What are the different types? What sort of people are they?</li> <li>15. Is there a stigmas attached to your role. How does that make you feel?</li> </ol>
<b>B. What tactics do corruption investigators report using to normalize dirty work?</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>16. How difficult is it for a new corruption investigator to settle in and feel comfortable with the work? What are the biggest challenges they face?</li> <li>17. What kinds of advice would you give them to help them cope with these challenges? About keeping a good attitude? About managing parts of the work they don't like? About how they could talk about this job with their friends and family?</li> <li>18. How big a role do jokes and humour play within your role and within the agency?</li> <li>19. Are there war stories you or others tell newcomers to help them feel more at home? Like what?</li> <li>20. Are there certain things or kinds of people that you try to avoid? Why? How?</li> <li>21. How about interactions with other police officers – how do you prepare for that?</li> <li>22. What about your managers in the Agency – what are their biggest challenges? How do you help them meet them?</li> <li>23. Are there typical ways that more experienced investigators deal with the public/media/police that are different from newcomers? What are they?</li> <li>24. Has there ever been a circumstance where you or one of your fellow investigators had an extremely</li> </ol>

	uncomfortable/unpleasant/rough/awkward experience? What happened? What was it? How did they respond?
	25. What are some of the worst things that happen here? How do you deal with those situations?
	26. Do you worry about what others think about this job? How do you deal with it?
	27. Have you ever chosen to keep things about your job from your family or friends?
	28. If you were at a party and a stranger asked about your job, how would you describe it?
	29. If you were at a party and someone was criticizing the Agency or its investigators, what would you want to say to them?
	30. If your son or daughter said they wanted to do what you do when they grow up, what would you say to them?
	31. Would you consider employing "dirty" or questionable means to obtain a corruption conviction?
	32. How do you celebrate (if at all) the successful conclusion of a corruption case. Is it cause for celebration?
	33. Is there a sense of occasion around corruption hearings? Why or why not?
	34. Is having a credible title important to you? Why or why not?
<b>C. How do police corruption investigators identify with police culture and/or acknowledge the influence of police cultural conditioning on their practices, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours?</b>	35. Do you still see yourself as a policeman? If so, why? If not, why not?
	36. Do you still feel a kinship to policing? – Why or why not?
	37. How is this kinship (or lack thereof) demonstrated in how you go about your work.
	38. How has police culture influenced you (if at all) in the way you go about your current role?
	39. Tell me about your police career. Did you have a mentor (how did they help you)? What were your reasons for leaving?
	40. Did you observe and/or participate in corrupt activity whilst you were in the police? How do that make you feel?
	41. Do you ever feel hypocritical in your current role?
	42. What are the best aspects of police culture? What are the worst aspects of police culture?
	43. Do you believe that police culture facilitates or propagates corruption?
	44. Are reform efforts required to enhance or change police organizational culture? If so, why? If not, why not?
	45. Could you do this job if you had not previously worked as a police officer?
	46. What benefits does socialization into police culture bring to the way you approach your job? What are the disadvantages that exposure to police culture brings to your job?
	47. Do all police see the world through the same lens? If so, why? If not, why not, and what are the different ways that police view the world?
	48. Do you agree that in order to do their jobs properly, police officers must sometimes bend the rules and overlook occupational and legal guidelines?
	49. Are police corruption investigators "different" from other cops?
	50. One of the characteristics of police culture has been described in the literature as having an "us and them" attitude or outlook. Do you see yourself as "us" or "them" and why?

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**D. What is their perception of the craft of police corruption investigation, including the knowledge, experience, skills and behaviours that are valued within that group?**

51. What makes a good corruption investigator? How do you identify their capacity (agency) to carry out the role?
  52. What (if any) unique knowledge, experiences, skills or attitudes make a good police corruption investigator?
  53. What is the one special attribute that an effective police corruption investigator requires?
  54. When a corruption investigator does a particularly good job, how likely is it that top management will recognize his or her performance?
  55. How important is management of the media in police corruption investigations?
  56. How do you manage non-compliant witnesses? Is there an element of intimidation that must be employed?
  57. What is your opinion on coercive powers? Are they necessary to effectively do your job?
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