South-South Cooperation in Southeast Asia: From Bandung and Solidarity to Norms and Rivalry

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Keywords
Southeast Asia, South–South Cooperation, Bandung, aid and development, foreign policy, norms

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**Introduction**

South–South Cooperation (SSC) is a messy concept. It came originally out of the Bandung Conference, promoting a vision of emancipatory, state-led development with the Global South working in solidarity against the Global North. It envisioned a broad range of economic, cultural, and technical cooperation initiatives among developing countries to this end. The United Nations Office for South–South Cooperation’s (UNOSSC, 2018) definition of SSC still pays homage to this heritage, describing it as a “broad framework of collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains.” However, in practice, as an administrative apparatus grew around SSC – in particular after the 1978 UN Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) – the focus became mostly on planned projects of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC). Some larger Southern donors also provide economic cooperation, mostly as loans. However, the original focus on cultural cooperation, creating progressive global governance structures, and combatting Northern hegemony have been lost. In other words, SSC started as a counter-hegemonic project but has shifted to become driven by a technical, depoliticised agenda over time – one much more in line with traditional aid practices (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018).

One of the key instruments now associated with SSC is triangular cooperation, which the UNOSSC defines as traditional donors and multilaterals facilitating SSC initiatives. The definitions of it are, in fact, contested, and the membership and roles of participants can change over time (OECD, 2018). While triangular cooperation started as a distinct instrument, it has become deeply entwined with SSC as traditional donors are now utilising it to “influence the norms and practices of Southern cooperation providers and recipients” (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013: 1484) and to enhance their legitimacy through association with Southern cooperation.

Most academic attention has been given to SSC efforts by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping. Southeast Asia, in contrast, has had little attention paid to it despite the fact that the very idea of SSC owes a lot to one of the region’s key nations, Indonesia. Further, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore also all have programmes that have expanded in tandem with global SSC efforts over the past decade (see Table 1). The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam have small programmes but have not expanded like the countries studied here. The significance often placed on the activities of the BRICS is questionable; as Ravi Palat argues, they have in fact been timid in their challenges to “the Euro-North American domination of world affairs” (2008: 721). This is still the situation today. Indeed, the Western capitalist order provides the foundation for the BRICS’ development projects and consequently they support – at times rather enthusiastically – the current system of global economic governance (Bond, 2015; Robinson, 2015). However, the BRICS have generated a new contestation over the “purposes, modalities and geographic orientation of aid and, in particular whether aid should be increasingly harnessed to commercial agendas” (Rosser and Tubilewicz, 2016: 7). Some of this contestation was more for show than of substance, as old or traditional donor motivations have always incorporated their own national economic and strategic interests. In recent years, most of the BRICS have seen their economic
progress slow down, and this has held back their SSC activities too. China has the largest programme and remains active, yet it is now regarded with some trepidation by many Southern recipients.

Traditional donors – those belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – have been critical of “new” donors on a range of fronts and sought to further distinguish out their own aid practices through a series of High Level Forums (HLFs) on Aid Effectiveness.1 The Busan 2011 HLF included for the first time not just aid recipients but civil society organisations and SSC providers. A new agenda had formed: the “orderly and formal inclusion [of SSC] in the global governance structure of international development cooperation” (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013: 1480). Moreover, old and new donors have largely converged around the primacy of economic growth for development (Fejerskov et al., 2016). The few left-of-centre Latin American states, in particular Venezuela and Cuba, that previously attempted to provide a more substantive challenge to development paradigms have dwindled in number and influence due to their own recent economic and political crises.

Emma Mawdsley (2012) has argued that the emergence of non-BRICS donors is a major challenge to the existing donor system. Nils-Sjard Schulz, meanwhile, posits that they offer “a welcome middle way between the traditional DAC donors and the BRIC push for global power stakes” (2010: 5). Equally, it is commonplace to emphasise both the potentials and the limitations of new donors and their diversity (de Renzio and Seifert, 2014; Quadir, 2013). A case study of Southeast Asia, which as noted has been

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Scale of SSC</th>
<th>Geographical focus</th>
<th>Sectoral focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2000–2013: USD 49.8 million; 2013 budget USD 5.64 million</td>
<td>ASEAN countries, especially CLMV</td>
<td>Agriculture, population and family planning, village empowerment, education, disaster preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2006 budget USD 16 million, 2,000 trained 1980–2011</td>
<td>ASEAN countries, especially CLMV, Central Asia, and Muslim countries</td>
<td>Public administration, agriculture, poverty alleviation, ICT, banking, English language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Budget 2010 USD 12 million (2014 THB 2.82 billion)</td>
<td>ASEAN countries, especially CLMV (strong focus on Laos)</td>
<td>Infrastructure (especially transport), agriculture, public health, education, banking, economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Almost 7,000 people trained per year; 80,000 1992–2011</td>
<td>ASEAN countries, especially CLMV, small developing island states</td>
<td>Transportation (sea, air, land), economic policy, and environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation, from government websites and reports.
Note: CLMV = Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam; ICT = information and communications technology.
subject to very little academic scrutiny, is therefore useful to shed light on the domestic and international dynamics at play in this setting – and, indeed, to inform the broader analysis of the impact and direction of non-BRICS SSC.

**Theoretical Considerations: SSC from Gramsci to Norms**

The article offers a neo-Gramscian analysis; however, it also engages with the constructivist literature on norm diffusion. The neo-Gramscian framework builds on previous research regarding the hegemonic neo-liberal development system, best called the post–Washington Consensus (PWC), which aims not so much to promote development as it does to globalise market-based development and capitalist political–economic relations across society (Cammack, 2012; Carroll, 2015; Engel, 2010). This produces scrutiny of how the ideological and political focus of dominant groups is affecting the theoretical, social, and political framework of SSC in Southeast Asia. This is a contested process that involved struggles, compromise, and a strong focus on ideas and the making of common sense.

Norm theorising also forms part of the analysis – not with the aim of creating a new synthesis with neo-Gramscianism, but because it has overlapping interests with such a framework when it comes to analysing non-structural change. Norms are standards “of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891) and the literature developed to understand change. From a Gramscian approach, norms have only limited engagement with power (material and otherwise) and do not give adequate attention to underlying social relations of production as the basis for social order (Wills, 2017). Norms scholars have often focused on case studies of progress in promoting human rights broadly understood, but norm research can also be agnostic about the nature and level of social change (Acharya, 2004). A Gramscian approach is always focused on what inhibits and what progresses social change. However, norm literature offers a modern language and relatively developed framework for evaluating change, and one which has not been applied to SSC. This eclectic theoretical framework and the specific focus on Southeast Asia differentiate the article from existing analyses of SSC and produces in-depth engagement with both domestic and regional drivers of diffusion.

The emergence of SSC fits one pattern identified by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) in that it emerged internationally and then thereafter influenced domestic and regional agendas too. The first phase of SSC ran from the end of World War II through to the mid-1970s (Morais de Sa e Silva, 2010). It emerged from counter-hegemonic ideals and with close connections to Southeast Asia, before spreading out across the globe. However, the progressive Bandung ideals and the movements to promote them provoked a significant backlash; Morais de Sa e Silva’s (2010) second phase of SSC from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s was, as such, a quiet period, one that saw the SSC agenda atrophy. It was during this period that SSC, for the most part, can best be understood as shifting from being a counter-hegemonic ideal to a norm based on the instrument of technical cooperation; this only really became apparent during the third, current phase of SSC, however.
Thus, using a constructivist frame, SSC’s “tipping point” to emerge as an accepted norm (or “norm cascade”) slowly came about in this second phase (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Southeast Asia was somewhat insulated from the backlash against developmentalism and the economic havoc that the 1980s wreaked on many developing countries. Thus, during this period, Malaysia – under Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad – became the leading SSC proponent. The ebb and flow of these first two phases of SSC in Southeast Asia are the focus of the next section of the article. The third, or current, phase of SSC – which dates from the mid-1990s – is the focus of the second section of the article. This era has seen SSC re-emerge, cascade, and become internalised – the latter being Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) final phase of the norm life cycle.

Overall, the neo-Gramscian approach taken focuses the article on the meaning and content of SSC as part of a global battle of ideas over development – but one that is linked to local contestations over modes of production and leadership. SSC has been transformed through what Gramsci (1971) calls making things “common sense” and what constructivists call norm internalisation. The norms literature provides the framework for examining the dynamics of each phase of the debate in Southeast Asia. The case studies of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore demonstrate how the shift of SSC in Southeast Asia from a counter-hegemonic idea to one that is friendly to neo-liberal development has involved the entwining of global, regional, and local politics.

A Brief History of SSC in Southeast Asia

Phase One: The Emergence of SSC

SSC emerged originally in response to the Cold War, when newly independent countries sought a path between the superpowers. The Final Communiqué of the 1955 Bandung Conference promoted not just technical cooperation among Asian–African states but also outlined a range of areas wherein participants aimed to expand economic and cultural cooperation as well as support for their collective development. Its emancipatory aims were also evident in the support for human rights, equality, state sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries, with this last point targeted not just at the Cold War superpowers but also at the colonial powers.

Following its inception at Bandung, SSC – in its broadest sense – established an institutional framework with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) established in 1961 and the Group of 77 (G77) established in 1964, which also promoted economic and technical cooperation. SSC emerged at a time when development thinking was sympathetic to such ideas, when it was neither really left-leaning nor right-leaning; rather, there was a broad consensus that there should be more government intervention in the economy than previously (Rapley, 2002). These ideas were backed by the emergent Bretton Woods institutions and government-to-government transfers as key sources of capital flows for many developing countries. However, in the end, the outcomes of SSC efforts were limited: there were some preferential trade deals and a few development projects started, the most prominent of which involved China and India.
Indonesia was the Southeast Asian country with the most substantive involvement in early SSC efforts, leading by proposing and hosting the Bandung Conference in April 1955. The norm literature suggests that “norm entrepreneurs” play a key role in developing a critical mass around norms in the first phase of norm emergence (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), while Gramsci (1971) emphasises the role of leadership in ideological change. Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, undoubtedly played such a role for SSC along with other Southern leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, U Nu, Zhou Enlai, and Gamal Abdel Nasser. This was a remarkable group that the term “norm entrepreneurs” does not do justice to, though they certainly developed a powerful framing of, or ideology for, SSC found in the Bandung Conference’s Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation. This was centred on self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality. However, this leadership was faced with a myriad of challenges and had their limitations, both of which factors contributed to the limited progression of their ideals – including SSC.

For Indonesia, Bandung solidified the elite’s view that the country should play a leadership role among postcolonial nations and in Asia too and that its foreign policy should be “independent and active” (Weinstein, 1976; Wicaksana, 2016). Under Sukarno, Indonesia was a leader of, and active participant in, many political and practical SSC initiatives, though the number of projects remained small (Engel, 2017). Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there was little involvement in SSC; Thailand started providing some aid to other countries as early as 1963, mostly to its neighbours, and it was not part of broader SSC efforts at the time. The establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 could be seen as part of the emergence of SSC, yet in practice it was a small, pro-Western grouping that did little to progress SSC.

**Phase Two: SSC Cascades**

The second phase of SSC – the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s – saw reduced cooperation globally due to an inward turn after the economic turbulence of the 1970s, the developing-country debt crisis, and the subsequent neo-liberal (or Washington Consensus) structural adjustment programmes (Gosovic, 2016; Morais de Sa e Silva, 2010). SSC slowed, but an institutional structure slowly developed around it – or rather around TCDC, with the 1978 BAPA. Its counter-hegemonic ideals are clear in the foreword – BAPA sought to provide a blueprint for major changes in approaches to development assistance and for a dramatically heightened emphasis on national and collective self-reliance among developing countries as foundations for a new international economic order. (UNDP, 1978: 3)

Technical cooperation, meanwhile, was regarded as facilitating not only the spread of expertise, but also political solidarity between Southern states vis-à-vis an exploitative and “neocolonial” set of Northern state and private interests. (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018: 873)
BAPA was supported by a UN Special Unit for SSC. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that institutionalisation in rules and organisations represents a “tipping point” for a norm. However, progress was very slow after 1978, and multilateral economic cooperation among developing countries reduced (Kumar, 2008). There was, in fact, an active backlash against SSC from Northern countries – they unilaterally withdrew from international development dialogue in 1981, and partook in an “across the board ‘cold war’ offensive against the developing countries” (Gosovic, 2016: 734), including against their SSC efforts. Many of the elites in the South were prepared to abandon SSC ideals and focus on their own enrichment, and the debt crisis and structural adjustment disciplined those who did not repudiate these ideals and also many of those who did.

Southeast Asia avoided the worst impacts of the debt crisis, though structural adjustment came into play after the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis. In the meantime, the region benefitted from the expansion of Japanese and other regional production networks and the shift away from governmental towards private capital flows – which negatively affected most other developing regions. Given the relatively strong position of many countries in the region, it is not surprising that a key norm entrepreneur for SSC in the early 1980s came from Southeast Asia; this time, it was Malaysia’s Mahathir. The Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP) was established in 1980 following the UN’s BAPA and before Mahathir became prime minister, but it still became synonymous with him. Mahathir is said to have been motivated by a personal opposition to Western hegemony and a desire to reform the rules of the international order (Dosch, 2014; Hamid, 2005).

In 1985, Mahathir announced that the country’s SSC objectives included expanding international economic cooperation and reducing dependence on developed countries. In 1989, he was said to have played a central role in the establishment of the Group of 15 (G-15) developing countries, which focused on cooperation in investment, trade, and technology (Hamid, 2005). This group took up SSC as a major theme in the second decade of twenty-first century. However, Mahathir’s adoption of the progressive language of SSC cannot hide the political and economic interests driving his policies. As Jayaratnam Saravanamuttu argues, Mahathir’s foreign policy was Malaysia’s “authoritarian capitalist political regime seeking its ‘neo-mercantilist’ niche in the rapidly changing international division of labour of a post–Cold War regional and global political realignment” (2010: 185). Thus, Mahathir’s role as SSC’s norm entrepreneur was ultimately not overly effective, as he did not have sufficient legitimacy among Third World countries.

In Indonesia, the brutal coming to power of Suharto saw the country take an early turn inward on SSC. In the 1980s, the debt crisis affected as the country and it came (again) under the discipline of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a period. Suharto’s rule saw Indonesia’s status as a non-aligned nation questioned in the 1970s (Weinstein, 1976). In 1981, the Suharto government established the Indonesian Technical Cooperation Program (ITCP). This was likely as much driven by norm cascading through the BAPA and regional rivalry with Malaysia as by a genuine commitment to SSC. Late in the Suharto era, there was a brief attempt to reinstate a more independent
foreign policy, but it was driven by concerns about shoring up Suharto’s domestic hegemony rather than by SSC priorities.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Philippines hosted a G77 meeting in 1976 whose communiqué endorsed economic and technical cooperation. It established the Technical Assistance Council of the Philippines (TACP) in May 1979 – in order to comply with international obligations under BAPA (Trinidad, 2014). TACP was replaced by the Technical Cooperation Council of the Philippines in 1992. As Trinidad notes, the programme has proved to be “stagnant and very modest in terms of its budget and scope” (2014: 47).

Singapore, under Lee Kuan Yew, did little on SSC internationally or regionally, despite his “Asian values” rhetoric. Nevertheless, norm cascading appears to have been at play as the Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP) was established in 1992 under Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (1990–2004). Thailand had little interest in SSC at the start of the second phase, its technical cooperation and training programmes with its neighbours had subsided as they became socialist or communist (Trinidad, 2014). It did start to establish a leadership role in ASEAN during the Cambodia crisis of the late 1970s (Emmers, 2014), and such national security concerns remain a key driver for its programmes today. In 1991, with the end of the Cold War, Thailand created a special fund for its neighbours – and it henceforth did become active in SSC (Trinidad, 2014). Japan, meanwhile, notably started its first triangular cooperation programme in 1975 – the Third Country Training Program – and it went on to become a pioneer of triangular cooperation (Trinidad, 2014).

These piecemeal and small-scale efforts in Southeast Asia meant that it was more active than most regions in the second phase of SSC, and thus it did play a role in its re-emergence at the end of the last century. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 saw countries in the region again subject to the influence of the WB and IMF, now in their PWC phase. But the backlash to their dictates promoted some new cooperation in the region, notably the Chiang Mai Initiative (on currency swaps) and the start of the ASEAN+ arrangements.

**Phase Three: SSC as an Accepted Norm**

The current phase of SSC dates from the mid-1990s up until the present day and has seen SSC pass a tipping point to become an accepted norm. SSC’s growth is related to the burgeoning interest in multilateralism after the end of the Cold War and to the rising economic and political importance of emerging economies in the early years of the new century – in particular China. Left-of-centre governments in certain Latin American states gave SSC “a pronounced political and emancipatory bent” (Gosovic, 2016: 735) and structural economic implications. However, the BRICS nations became the key leaders of SSC; this gradually shifted it in more traditional directions. This can be seen in creation of the New Development Bank and of the even more traditionally structured Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both of which entrench traditional modes of development finance (Bazbauers and Engel, 2016).
This phase has retained some of the traditional focus on politics but also added “new energy, new actors and new practices” (Morais de Sa e Silva, 2010: 4). It first gained momentum in around 2003, as shown by the progression of international conferences and related declarations (Morais de Sa e Silva, 2010). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) emphasise the importance of international organisations and networks in the norm cascade phase. No longer able to stop SSC – indeed, with the relevance of key Western aid institutions such as the DAC now in question – traditional donors have embraced SSC via the hitherto distinct instrument of triangular cooperation, with the result that it is now ubiquitous for donors and recipients to speak of South–South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018). The UNOSCC is now responsible for promoting both, and thus an SSTC bureaucracy has been established. SSC is an accepted and internalised norm; SSTC lags not far behind, though China largely rejects triangular cooperation and the DAC’s aim of formalising SSC operations and principles through the Aid Effectiveness Agenda (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013).

Developed countries have attributed their growing interest in triangular arrangements to the level of “developing country ‘ownership’ of” SSC projects” (United Nations General Assembly, 2009: 12); however, triangular cooperation gives traditional donors a more explicit role in, and control over, related activities (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013). It also helps to frame development not as a joint struggle for sovereign advancement but as a series of problems to be addressed by technical interventions (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018). Further, financing for SSC is overall very limited, and Northern capital is still central to many of these efforts – demonstrating its traditional disciplinary power. This could be described as a case of a norm being reframed to “limit the range of choices and constrain actions” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 894).

However, this is about more than just limiting choices. SSC in its early form posed an existential threat to the Northern-dominated capitalist world; this was a case of creating a new common sense around SSC as a technical assistance norm, which could then be tamed. Given the power of China, in particular, the North could not ignore SSC or discredit it; instead, they worked to reshape it to fit with the existing global order. This also suited the desire of many Northern donor states to reduce aid budgets (the “beyond aid agenda”) (Eyben, 2012). Japan was the first traditional donor to provide significant such support and has been a major backer of Southeast Asian efforts (United Nations General Assembly, 2009). Japan has a large overall aid programme in absolute terms, but this represents only small as a percentage of its gross national income (GNI), and it is dominated by loans over grants – thus SSTC suits its modalities.

SSC has cascaded through Southeast Asia since the early years of the new century, mostly through TCDC. Malaysian leadership declined after Mahathir’s retirement, but the MTCP nevertheless continued to expand. Indonesia was quiet until the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004, and during his presidency, the country showed a level of activism not seen since the Bandung era. In 2006, Thailand “officially announced the new role of Thailand as an ‘Emerging Donor’ after more than 40 years as an ‘Aid Recipient Country’” (Joint Study on Effective TC for CD, 2008a: 6). Singapore has expanded its spending on SSC projects, though it prefers to keep its activities quiet.
The following section outlines the various SSC activities and analyses the motivations for those, of each of these major players since the start of this century.

**SSC Programmes in Southeast Asia**

**Indonesia**

Indonesia was still in the throes of its post-Suharto restructuring during the early years of this third phase of SSC. Yudhoyono revived Indonesia’s founding discourse of participation in global peace and social justice efforts (Agensky and Barker, 2012), and SSC became a prominent theme of his presidency. Along with an active and independent foreign policy, Yudhoyono (2008) argued that that the country needed an “all-direction foreign policy.” Despite the renewed activism, analysts saw Indonesia as remaining quite a conservative foreign policy actor (Anwar, 2010; Sukma, 2011). This is a fair assessment, and Yudhoyono’s focus on international legitimacy was likely driven by a desire to shore up his domestic legitimacy; though, when viewed in the Southeast Asian context, Indonesia looks rather less conservative.

Indonesia’s resurgent SSC agenda emerged shortly after Yudhoyono’s election, with the prominently celebrated fiftieth anniversary of the Bandung Conference. The April 2005 meeting of 89 Asian and African countries in Jakarta adopted the Declaration on the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership. This committed to practical and sustainable cooperation based on comparative advantage, equal partnership, common ownership and vision, as well as a firm and shared conviction to address common challenges. (Asia-Africa Summit, 2005: 4)

In practice, Indonesia’s SSC has not had a significant focus on Africa because its strategic priorities are in Asia. Indonesia became co-chair of the Task Team on South-South Co-operation in 2008; this was a Southern-led platform, but hosted by the OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, which aimed to enhance SSC knowledge (Task Team on South-South Cooperation, 2011). Knowledge sharing has been a key emphasis for Indonesia. In 2009, SSC was included in the “Jakarta Commitment: Aid For Development Effectiveness, Indonesia’s Road Map to 2014.” This was about reconfiguring Indonesia’s relationship with traditional donors – and its own role as a donor provided a key rationale for that. Signatories to the Jakarta Commitment pledged to support Indonesia’s SSC efforts (Government of Indonesia and its Development Partners, 2009), though only some donors actually do so in practice. In 2010, SSC was even included in the Medium-Term National Development Plan 2010–2014.

Indonesian SSC has also had some focus on political cooperation. It was a driving force behind the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009, the Human Rights Declaration in 2012, and the Bali Democracy Forums. Some scholars see these directions taken as being about Indonesia’s global image (Sukma, 2011), while others see more significant transformations at play (Acharya, 2015). Certainly, there is a strong performative element in Indonesia’s SSC; a common discourse is repeated across SSC and foreign policy documents about the country’s historical and
contemporary centrality to Southern solidarity (Engel, 2017). Brigg et al. argue that these engagements reflect Indonesia’s unique pathway, and its resultant capacity to embrace both “diversity and substantial illiberality” (2016: 419). However, the more important point here is that Indonesia’s focus on human rights differentiates it from other countries in the region and breaks with the Bandung principles, which prioritised non-interference. This is both a unique path in the region and, at the same time, suggests influence by Northern ideologies and donors, given their own emphasis on democracy.

Indonesia is also the only country in the region that seems to have taken any SSC initiative in economics, or more specifically trade. The 2014 Law 7 on Trade Policy says that: “The Government may provide unilateral trade preferences to the less developed countries while maintaining the national interest” (Law of the Republic of Indonesia, 2014). In practice, however, national interest seems to be the dominant concern; Indonesia has adopted measures across a range of areas that liberal economists call trade restrictions and “bad policy” but that are developmentalist in intent. They mostly affect trade with developing states, though (Paturu and Rahardja, 2015).

Indonesia’s efforts to progress its SSC have been strongest in technical cooperation where, historically, its programmes were fragmented. They include the ITCP (a South–South training and exchange programme), the NAM Centre for South-South Technical Cooperation, along with quite a number of small programmes conducted by a range of ministries. The bulk of the funding for these activities has long come from traditional donors. The estimated value of activities between 2000 and 2013 was around USD 49.8 million (Mauludiah, 2013). Geographically, Indonesia’s TCDC has prioritised ASEAN’s new member states – namely, the CLMV countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Key sectors of activity within the ITCP, meanwhile, have been agriculture, education (this includes scholarships), and national population and family planning (Indonesia South-South Technical Cooperation, 2010). Knowledge sharing has been a major focus of Indonesia’s more recent efforts (Somfan et al., 2014).

In 2006, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) restructure established a Directorate on Technical Cooperation (CEACoS, 2010) – showing the growing bureaucratisation of SSC, a feature of norm internalisation. In 2010, a Coordination Team on SSTC was established, and they drafted plans for Indonesia’s future SSC undertakings with significant support from JICA. In 2011, a Draft Grand Design and Blue Print was published (JICA and PT Indokoei International, 2011); the Coordination Team has been working towards a Master Plan. Other input was provided from the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit and the United States Agency for International Development. The depth of engagement by traditional donors in assisting Indonesia frame its SSC programme demonstrates how they seek to shape new donors and mould their approaches and activities based on DAC principles and norms (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013). Further, Indonesia’s programmes are now framed as SSTC, not SSC, and the planning documents posit SSTC as a “complement” to North–South cooperation (Somfan et al., 2014). This is a radical reframing of SSC away from its Bandung origins in self-determination and equality. It is also notable that the Draft Grand Design frames SSTC in terms of benefits to the Indonesian economy – there is no analysis made of partner countries’ needs. National interest has always been a central driver of aid, though it was
downplayed by many traditional donors during the early years of the twenty-first century. In East Asia though, national interest has remained a key goal of aid programmes (Rosser and Tubilewicz, 2016) and has returned to prominence some traditional donors.

SSC has been continued by President Joko Widodo (2014–present), though there are differences now emerging. The focus on advancing the country’s role as a middle power and on SSC was included as one of the items in Jokowi’s Nine Development Priorities Agenda – his official policy platform (Parameswaran, 2014; Tahalele, 2015). Like Yudhoyono, shortly after his election Widodo led an anniversary of Bandung – this time the sixtieth one. Widodo’s opening speech employed some fairly emphatic language, reminiscent of the early years of SSC. He said (2015) that the world “today is still fraught with global injustice, inequality, and violence,” that rich nations consume 70 per cent of the planet’s resources, and that there is an unequal structure of financial management upheld through international financial institutions. These organisations, he said, cling to “obsolete” ideas and that it is imperative to “build a new international economic order that is open to new emerging economic powers” (cited in Danubrata and Greenfield, 2015).

This language suggests a more active challenge to the international order than under Yudhoyono. However, as Prashanth Parameswaran (2014) has highlighted, Widodo faces a range of foreign policy challenges, a number of which are very relevant to his capacity to progress SSC/SSTC. A key one is ensuring “that Indonesia’s rising nationalism does not undermine its internationalist outlook” (Parameswaran, 2014: 158). Widodo has flamed nationalist sentiments and seems to have a limited interest in foreign policy matters, which does not bode well for SSC. There is also a “gap between Indonesia’s commitments and the limited resources it has to implement them” (Parameswaran, 2014: 157), one that is becoming more intense. Triangular cooperation provides one avenue to help overcome this constraint, which is among the reasons why Indonesia has pursued it – yet this pathway locks Southern countries into the Northern aid architecture, as triangular cooperation partners to date have all been traditional donors.

Malaysia

As noted, Malaysia became very active in the second phase of SSC in the 1980s under Mahathir. He established the political and technical components of Malaysia’s SSC, and these directions continued to be taken under his respective successors Abdullah Badawi and Najib Razak – though they adopted softer and more pragmatic styles in foreign policy (Dosch, 2014; Saravanamuttu, 2010). It is too early to say what the return of Mahathir in 2018 will mean for the country. But SSC in its various forms sat quite well with the four official themes that assumed a prominent place in Malaysian foreign policy under Abdullah and then Najib: non-alignment or neutrality (meaning balancing and hedging Western dominance), regionalism as a pathway to promoting peace and stability, engaging with globalisation, and Islam (Saravanamuttu, 2010).

Both Abdullah’s and Najib’s tenuous political positions meant foreign policy and SSC took a back seat under their respective rule. Rather than SSC, there was a focus on
improving bilateral relations with Singapore, the United States, Australia, and China. Foreign policy was focused on improving “Malaysia’s development and its regional and global position” (Dosch, 2014: 31). Nevertheless, one legacy of Mahathir is that “Malaysia’s voice still carries some weight in the Global South, and particularly in the Islamic world” (Dosch, 2014: 23). Further, its main SSC programme – the MTCP – attracts quite a bit of attention within SSC discussions. It’s budget has expanded during the third phase of SSC, but otherwise Malaysia has only pursued a few minor, new SSC initiatives.

Since 1980, the MTCP has been run under one specialised agency; it grew significantly from the new century onwards. In 2006, Malaysia provided USD 16 million or 0.001 per cent of its GNI in total aid to it (UN ECOSOC, 2008). The majority of this was for technical cooperation, though 36 per cent went to multilaterals – which is a high figure and can been seen as a form of SSC. There was a 25 per cent increase planned in technical cooperation between 2006 and 2010 (UN ECOSOC, 2008). By 2010, the MTCP was estimated at USD 164 million (UN ESCAP, 2011), which is the most recent data to be found.

Similar to Indonesia’s programme, the MTCP mostly involves long- and short-term training in Malaysia as well as a number of other activities – including study visits, technical cooperation, socio-economic development projects, and the supplying of equipment and materials. The depoliticised view of development as technical inputs to solve development problems is very clear in its planning documents (e.g. Joint Study on Effective TC for CD, 2008b). Its top three recipients in 2005 were Indonesia, Myanmar, and Cambodia (UN ECOSOC, 2008). There has been some focus on Central Asia, which is unique in the region, and is based partly on shared Islamic identities and partly on the Central Asian desire to follow certain aspects of Malaysia’s own authoritarian developmental state model (Stark, 2006).

Malaysia’s main sectors of activity have been public administration, agriculture, poverty alleviation, investment promotion, information and communications technology, banking, and the English language (UN ECOSOC, 2008). There is some overlap here with Indonesia in agriculture and poverty alleviation – in agriculture this is not surprising because they share areas of expertise, for example, tropical agriculture, farming, and veterinary programmes. Changes to Malaysia’s already neo-liberal technical cooperation as development programme have added in a focus on the concerns of the PWC. This added to neo-liberal Washington Consensus policies a limited concern with poverty alleviation and a focus on good governance (Engel, 2010); this is visible in Malaysia’s contemporary focus on public administration and banking governance.

Malaysia has also engaged more and more in triangular cooperation, predominantly with Japan – its biggest partner – and with UN agencies. The focus is in-Malaysia training, study visits, and placement of third-country officials (UN ECOSOC, 2008). Malaysia has conducted needs assessment missions jointly with Japan to a range of countries, which is unique in SSTC across the region; a focus on partner country needs reflects the most progressive parts of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda. The
influence of Japan on Malaysia’s programme is of note. One joint Malaysia–Japan study concluded that:

In many ways, much of the design of MTCP has been developed from the approaches/programmes of other donors. Malaysia has learned much from the modalities used by donors, especially Japan, and has adopted them for the context of SSC. (Joint Study on Effective TC for CD, 2008b: 19)

Through triangular cooperation, development is no longer viewed as a competition between the North and the South – as Mahathir in his first period as prime minister espoused. Rather, development is a technical project where the North provides resources, while the South contributes things like contemporary experiences of development (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018). SSC is thus reframed as norm complementing – that is, not competing with – the traditional aid architecture.

Technical cooperation in areas like agriculture and science can be viewed as progressive for recipients, but many activities promote neo-liberal development, reflecting Malaysia’s position as an economically very open state that relies heavily on exports of intermediate goods. As Saravanamuttu notes, it is “an authoritarian capitalist political regime seeking its ‘neo-mercantilist’ niche” (2010: 185). Mahathir used SSC as part of his “Asia is different” / “Asian values” argument, reflecting his position as a relatively dominant prime minister who could challenge the West. His successors lacked the same degree of domestic political dominance, but their party remained at the forefront until 2018 when it was eventually brought down by the old political elite – shocked into action by the scale of Najib’s corruption. The focus on domestic issues meant that foreign policy, SSC, and competition with Indonesia as well as other states for leadership in Southeast Asia were not a strong priority. It will be interesting to follow now whether SSC makes a comeback with Mahathir 2.0.

Thailand

The Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation (DTEC) was established in 1950 to coordinate assistance to Thailand, and it started providing TCDC as early as 1963. In 2004, DTEC was replaced by the Thailand Technical Cooperation Agency (TICA); in 2006, the government announced its role as an “emerging donor” (Joint Study on Effective TC for CD, 2008a; Wajjwalku, 2011). This shift from recipient to donor indicates that middle-income countries have internalised SSC as a norm in aid and development. However, the shift also connects to two long-term Thai foreign policy themes. These came together under the activist foreign policy of the Thaksin government (2001–2006), wishing to see the country take a greater leadership role in the region – including through SSC (Busbarat, 2014; Chachavalpongpun, 2009).

The first theme is the promotion of subregional economic linkages. This started in the early 1990s with the “Quadrangle Economic Cooperation” programme connecting China, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand through the development of transport corridors. This fed into the Greater Mekong Subregion Project, and also to Thaksin’s initiative of the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) – a
cooperation framework between Thailand and the CLMV countries (Busbarat, 2014). The second theme is the “Look West” foreign policy initiated by the Chavalit government (1996–1997). This aimed to position Thailand as a link between South Asia and Southeast Asia using the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC); this was later advanced by Thaksin too. These two themes formed the core of his “Forward Engagement” foreign policy focused on pragmatic economic cooperation, using both bilateral and multilateral initiatives.10 Thaksin pursued a leadership role for Thailand in Southeast Asia and, while it was firmly based on Thai (and Thaksin’s own) economic interests, he did also promote the idea of a shared Asian identity and self-help in the region (Busbarat, 2014). Thailand’s SSC strategy directly supported this programme. Its focus has been primarily on the CLMV countries, though they have cooperated with over 50 other ones (Joint Study on Effective TC for CD, 2008a).

Thailand’s programme has two core components: First, technical cooperation (run by TICA). This has the same format as the other TCDC programmes studied here, though Thailand also sends volunteers to other countries. The programme initially operated in the areas of agriculture, public health, and education but has since been expanded to banking, economics, finance, transport, and science and technology, indicating a shift to a more neo-liberal PWC focus. Assistance is through bilateral programmes, reciprocal technical cooperation projects, regional and subregional projects, and triangular cooperation with traditional donors – which is becoming more and more prominent. By 2008, Thailand had triangular programmes with at least 12 traditional donors (Joint Study on Effective TC for CD, 2008a).

The second and largest component of Thai aid – being unique in Southeast Asia – is concessional loans. This is done through the Neighboring Countries Economic Development Cooperation Agency (NEDA) within the Ministry of Finance and, to a lesser extent, through the Export–Import Bank of Thailand – which the country counts as part of its SSC activities. NEDA’s main projects are continental transport linkages, and Laos has been its major recipient (Wajjwalku, 2011). NEDA’s loans are tied – 50 per cent of procurement must be done in Thailand itself (Wajjwalku, 2011). Of Thailand’s total official development assistance (ODA) in 2005 – representing 0.05 per cent of GNI – 70 per cent was concessional loans. Meanwhile, 83 per cent was distributed to neighbouring countries and over 80 per cent was in infrastructure (roads, bridges, dams, power stations) (UN ECOSOC, 2008).

Between 2010 and 2014, Thai ODA rose from THB 1.49 billion to THB 2.82 billion – with loans now averaging around 30 per cent of the total amount given (TICA, 2018). The vast majority of loans again went to Laos. As such the focus on loans has reduced but is nevertheless still substantial – despite the fact that Thailand itself sought out technical cooperation over loans to maximise its own development (Joint Study on Effective TC for CD, 2008a). This suggests that Thai SSC is based more on self-interest than cooperation, though its formal approach is reaping mutual benefits and self-help (Wajjwalku, 2011). My analysis of SSC complements Pavin Chachavalpongpun’s (2009) depiction of Thaksin’s foreign policy as “mercantilist,” with economic elements directly benefitting firms connected to Thaksin and his
Chachavalpongpun argues that these policies reveal “the exploitative nature of Thailand’s foreign policy towards its less developed neighbours” (2009: 451). Yet its loans are fairly concessional (UN ECOSOC, 2008); though with current low global interest rates, the difference between concessional and commercial loans tends to be quite small.

Mawdsley (2012) notes the intertwining of geoeconomic and geopolitical motivations in Thailand. In terms of geopolitics, Thailand’s focus on its neighbours is about stability and security concerns where “it hopes to lessen the risks of disease pandemics, political instability and large-scale migration” (Mawdsley, 2012: 134). The centrality to Thai foreign policy of economic growth through building regional economic/production networks and SSC has continued since 2006, despite a number of post-Thaksin regimes attempting to differentiate themselves from his foreign and other policies. Further, the focus on infrastructure loans and on TCDC replicates traditional donor modes (Wajjwalku, 2011). The fall of the Thaksin government saw Thailand’s capacity for leadership in Southeast Asia wane, as it returned to its usual pattern of coups and unstable governments – this has left most foreign policy enactment to the bureaucracy (Busbarat, 2014). Thailand’s SSC programme does seem to have maintained some momentum post-Thaksin, but the country is no longer an SSC norm entrepreneur.

Singapore

There has not been much written about Singapore’s SSC efforts, which is interesting because on the basis of the number of people that it claims to train each year this is likely the biggest programme in the region by a significant margin. Still, the lack of available information about the city state’s SSC efforts makes it difficult to determine their exact nature. Although the programme is large in comparison to the wider region, it still seems small for a country of Singapore’s wealth – which fits with the city state’s unstated foreign policy intent of not being seen to have developed-country responsibilities. Indeed, long after the country was classified as a high-income one, leaders occasionally still claimed Singapore was a developing country. Further, its foreign policy explicitly argues for formal equality between the countries of the region – it is the strongest advocate in ASEAN for equal contributions being made by member states.

Still, it is notable that SSC was accepted as a norm by Singapore, and it established a programme in 1992 – thereby building on earlier ad hoc efforts and programmes. The SCP is run by the Technical Cooperation Directorate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similar to the other technical cooperation programmes examined in this article, SCP focuses on training. It has trained some 80,000 people from 170 countries and claims to currently provide education to around 7,000 people per year (Singapore Government, 2011). The primary focus is ASEAN, especially the CLMV countries and also small island developing states – though, as noted, trainees have come from across the globe. A 2009 study indicates that transportation has been the primary focus of the SCP, accounting for around 49 per cent of courses offered (Morohashi, 2009). Transportation includes civil aviation and port management, which Singapore considers “crucial for safeguarding national security” (Morohashi, 2009: 41). As the country with
the largest military budget in the region (SIPRI, 2018), security has certainly long been a key focus for the island nation (Tan, 2015).

Through the Initiative for ASEAN Integration, Singapore established a training centre in each CLMV country and pledged about USD 170 million for the programme. The largest element of Singapore’s SSC is the Third Country Training Programme (TCTP). This is a triangular cooperation programme that works with 44 donor countries and international organisations to provide technical assistance and training. The SCP has a high level of engagement with emerging donors and with established international organisations (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, UNDP, Colombo Plan, IMF, WB, World Trade Organization, and World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO, among others). This reflects Singapore’s broader foreign policy strategy of seeking “diplomatic space” through engagement with key international organisations (Acharya, 2007; Tan, 2015).

However, the choice of international organisations is also telling – a very large component of the TCTP is conducted in collaboration with the IMF. This has been running since 1997 and trained 4,299 officials from the region in macroeconomic and financial policies (Singapore Government, 2011). Cooperation with the IMF, WTO, WB, and WIPO demonstrates a strong neo-liberal focus, which is not surprising as Singapore’s economic strategy has long been focused on economic and financial openness and integration into the global capitalist system (though it does retain a strong – if unspoken – role for the state). Singapore’s economic strategy also explains the SCP’s focus specifically on transportation, as it is positioning itself as a regional infrastructure hub with support from international organisations.¹³

Singapore’s foreign policy has often been regarded by critics as “self-aggrandizement at the expense of the region” (Tan, 2015: 333). It has always been based on a strong sense of vulnerability and a siege mentality as well as a “self-help philosophy” (Tan, 2015: 334). Critics see it also as “a free-rider in global governance” (Tan, 2015: 334, 350); this has some truth in the SSC realm, where it has committed resources but seemingly not in line with its significant available wealth. The strong focus on training indicates a very strategic honing in on areas that benefit its economy and soft power the most. As an authoritarian state – with the People’s Action Party led by Lee Kuan Yew’s son Lee Hsien Long – Singapore shows little interest in a progressive SSC agenda – growth, stability, and power remain its overriding concerns.

Conclusion

SSC started in Southeast Asia as a counter-hegemonic expression of discontent with colonial rule, superpower interventions, and with the exclusion of the Global South from international rule-making processes and the world economic system. The norm framework has helped shed light on the cascading of SSC across Southeast Asia, emphasising the interaction between local agency, interests, leadership, and institutions. But focusing purely on the spread of SSC as a norm masks the fundamental change occurring in the political ideals underlying SSC, a shift that taking a neo-Gramscian approach illuminates. This perspective – with its focus on broad structural change – explains that calls
for a New International Economic Order did not resonate in Southeast Asia, despite Malaysia’s SSC leadership during the 1980s. This is because the regional leaderships were by this time already committed to illiberal development within a global capitalist order. During the current third phase of SSC, where a handful of states have sought to return to a more politically oriented view of SSC, the Southeast Asian countries have continued to promote SSC as depoliticised technical assistance – reflecting the region’s largely authoritarian and capitalist political regimes. Still, a focus on norms, as well as on national and regional drivers, demonstrates the specific flavours present in Southeast Asia.

Singapore probably has the largest programme in the region, designed to spread a neo-liberal, free trade approach through, for example, training officials from the region – in collaboration with the IMF – in macroeconomic policy. The promotion of globalisation and some desire to be seen as meeting the appropriate standards of behaviour of a high-income country – as a norm approach highlights – competes with its foreign policy tendency to be a free rider in global governance. Thailand’s programme is also largely neo-liberal as the strong focus therein on loans demonstrates. Loans are not outside the remit of mainstream development assistance; they were the norm in its early years and continue to be a dominant modality for some traditional donors as well as for new ones too, China, for example. Malaysia’s programme was crafted by Mahathir who was a key norm leader during SSC’s cascading phase. Yet Mahathir’s rhetorical efforts to separate Malaysia out from the Western camp were belied by the country’s neo-liberal economic strategy. Under his successors, the country’s technical cooperation programme retained its depoliticised view of development as a series of problems requiring appropriate technical expertise – but added in greater focus on governance over poverty alleviation, in line with the PWC. The growth of illiberalism and corruption meant there was little actual focus on progressive change.

Indonesia took the most proactive stance in the region on SSC under President Yudhoyono who sought to reclaim the country’s founding role in it. This continued under Joko, though with less prominence. Seen in global terms, the Yudhoyono administration took a middle-of-the-road position on SSC – with its focus on technical cooperation and knowledge sharing promoting depoliticised development (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018). Democracy and human rights have since featured in a notable break with Bandung principles, likely being prompted – as the norm literature suggests – by a desire for legitimacy in the post-Suharto transition. However, the approach to democracy – like that to good governance and to poverty reduction – has tended to take an attenuated form. Northern donors have shaped Indonesia’s programme, funding consultancies to establish its rules and structures and operating through triangular cooperation. Indonesia’s leadership on SSC is now being undermined by the rising nationalist tone of its domestic political discourse and by its hostility to some of its ASEAN neighbours, especially Malaysia (Aspinall, 2016).

The shape of SSC debates in Southeast Asia also fits Rosser and Tubilewicz’s (2016) macroanalysis of donor aid agendas in Asia Pacific, namely as the product of contestation between diplomatic, commercial, and development priorities. The states analysed here have followed the pattern of developmental states in East Asia, where domestic competition has largely been between aid for commercial or for diplomatic
purposes. Economic ministries promote commercial ends, while foreign ministries promote diplomatic ones – the latter being particularly clear in the focus on the ASEAN region. Somewhat progressive developmental norms – for example local ownership – were little more than a side influence; however, traditional donors have never progressed as far on this front as they would have recipients believe (Eyben, 2012).

Rosser and Tubilewicz (2016) studied states whose place in the capitalist order is more secure than the Southeast Asian ones studied here. The region’s regulatory and increasingly authoritarian capitalist states are equally uninterested in questioning the hegemonic order, as is the case in East Asia. Thus, in contrast to the potentially emancipatory view of middle powers in SSC expressed in some of the literature, this article concludes that Southeast Asia’s middle powers have not just supported the development of a technically focused, depoliticised SSC but have facilitated it. Southeast Asia’s historical role in SSC means that its strong backing for it in contemporary times is likely to have added to the legitimacy of this reformulated, neo-liberal SSC. Even the jockeying between Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore ultimately acts to legitimise technical cooperation as an instrument. And, triangular cooperation is on the march – being promoted by old donors attempting to retain their legitimacy and engagement in the internal decision-making of countries in the Global South.

As Schulz explains, the Northern donors’ preference is for cooperating with “second-wave” emerging economies rather than the BRICs, because they are: “Less aggressive [. . . ] in their struggle for a share in global power [. . . ] focus on joint solutions [. . . ] and they are more flexible when engaging in development partnerships” (2010: 3). Further, he argues that they “generate few contradictions in policy and practices” (Schulz, 2010: 3-4) for DAC donors. Illiberal contemporary Southeast Asia does not just “generate few contradictions” for the North; the region also relies on the capitalist and global governance infrastructure established by it. The norms literature might say that SSC in Southeast Asia demonstrates conformity with the “normative consensus” of the institutions of the rulers (Acharya, 2011); however, taking a neo-Gramscian view on the shared regional economic structure is ultimately more enlightening.

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Notes
1. “New” is in inverted commas here because some of these donors are not new at all; China, for example, started providing support to fellow socialist states in the 1950s. Thus, “new” is used here to encompass both new and re-emerging donors.
2. Amitav Acharya has labelled such expansion norm subsidiarity, which is a “process whereby local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors” (2011: 95).

3. China and India have had some impact, though the former’s massive programmes tend to be finance through traditional bilateral mechanisms.

4. In addition to the usual concerns of economic development and security (i.e. ensuring territorial integrity), foreign policy emphasised engagement with the United Nations – especially peacekeeping and the external promotion of democratic values and human rights (though not for separatist groups within Indonesia). Engagement with ASEAN and the region remained as cornerstone of policy. The policy framed the country as an emerging middle power with a distinct “international identity” as the fourth most populous nation in the world, the largest national Muslim population, and the world’s third largest democracy (Anwar, 2010). Indonesia’s inclusion in the G20 has been given much prominence in foreign policy, as has been the inclusion in the so-called CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa) grouping of emerging economies.

5. The performative element is visible too in the country’s activism in international fora on SSTC – it was co-chair of the Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation for one term (which came out of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011) and it was co-chair of the G20 pillar on knowledge sharing. It hosted a Knowledge Sharing Forum in Bali in 2012, where knowledge hubs in disaster risk reduction, human development and poverty reduction, and peacebuilding and good governance were launched (Sofjan et al., 2014). This shows the main pillars of SSC engagement: technical cooperation and knowledge sharing.

6. Indonesian Technical Cooperation Program (ITCP) is coordinated by the Bureau for Technical Cooperation in the State Secretariat. Its main activities are training programmes; supporting study visits to Indonesia for other governments to learn from that country’s experiences, as well as organising visits by Indonesian officials to other developing countries; apprenticeships for farmers; and expert group meetings. By the end of 2013, ITCP had more than 4,000 participants from over 90 countries. ITCP first received donor support in 1982, with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funding. In the 1990s, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) became the major funder (Centre for East Asian Cooperation Studies, CEACoS, 2010), and there are a range of other donors (Coordination Team of South-South and Triangular Cooperation, n.d.).

7. Further, there is a tension in these plans between the desire to help fellow developing countries and potential competition with them in the Indonesian state’s areas of comparative advantage. This potential competition is seen as a significant force within Southeast Asia.

8. Malaysia has been pretty quiet in ASEAN, even when it had the chair (Dosch, 2014). In the trade arena, it has focused on bilateral free trade agreements.

9. In 2008, Malaysia launched the International Science, Technology and Innovation Centre for SSC under the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In 2009, they launched a UNESCO-Malaysia Cooperation Programme to promote SSC in the Asia Pacific region. In the first year, USD 5 million was provided, and thereafter has come USD 1 million per year to fund Malaysian expertise, services, and institutions (Malaysia-UNESCO Cooperation Programme, 2015).

10. A further dimension was the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, its high point being the Asian Bond Scheme, which was included in the Chiang Mai Declaration in 2003 (Busbarat, 2014).

11. The author requested an interview with the Singapore Cooperation Programme, they initially agreed and then delayed and eventually declined an interview. They do not publish an annual
report or other such documents and their website has only limited information – indeed, it seems to have recently been taken down and replaced with a Facebook page.

12. Before this, Singapore was involved in the Colombo Plan, the Commonwealth Technical Assistance Program, and the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation – and was also a significant donor to these programmes (Hamid, 2005: 83). The government launched Singapore Volunteers Overseas in 1991.

13. In 2013, the International Finance Corporation’s Global Infrastructure Facility was located in Singapore, and in 2015, the World Bank Group established a Singapore Hub for Infrastructure and Urban Development. The infrastructure agenda was a likely key reason for Singapore’s support for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. It is concerned about ensuring that China does not dominate the infrastructure agenda. The country’s technical expertise in transportation is likely be useful for many developing countries meanwhile.

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