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Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind

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Publication Details
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Abstract
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Method: I review four areas of research (perception, action/agency, self, social cognition) where enactivist accounts have shown alternative ways of thinking about the brain.

Results: Taken together, such analyses form a comprehensive alternative to the classic conceptions of cognitivist, computational neuroscience.

Implications: Such considerations motivate the need to re-think our understanding of how the brain itself works. They suggest that the best explanation of brain function may be found in the mixed vocabularies of embodied and situated cognition, developmental psychology, ecological psychology, dynamic systems theory, applied linguistics, the theory of affordances and material engagement, rather than the narrow vocabulary of computational neuroscience.

Constructivist content: This account is consistent with an enactivist-constructivist approach to cognition.

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Decentering the Brain

Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind

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> Context • Challenges by embodied, enactive, extended and ecological approaches to cognition have provided good reasons to shift away from neurocentric theories. > Problem • Classic cognitivist accounts tend towards internalism, representationalism and methodological individualism. Such accounts not only picture the brain as the central and almost exclusive mechanism of cognition, they also conceive of brain function in terms that ignore the dynamical relations among brain, body and environment. > Method • I review four areas of research (perception, action/agency, self, social cognition) where enactivist accounts have shown alternative ways of thinking about the brain. > Results • Taken together, such analyses form a comprehensive alternative to the classic conceptions of cognitivist, computational neuroscience. > Implications • Such considerations motivate the need to re-think our understanding of how the brain itself works. They suggest that the best explanation of brain function may be found in the mixed vocabularies of embodied and situated cognition, developmental psychology, ecological psychology, dynamic systems theory, applied linguistics, the theory of affordances and material engagement, rather than the narrow vocabulary of computational neuroscience. > Constructivist content • This account is consistent with an enactivist-constructivist approach to cognition. > Key words • Internalism, perception, agency, autonomy, self, social cognition, predictive processing, enactivism.

Introduction: Internalism and methodological individualism in cognitive science

According to classic cognitivist, i.e., computationalist/internalist theories, the brain is the most central part of the central nervous system, where everything of importance concerning cognition, action, self-awareness and our relations with others happens. Michael Gazzaniga (1998), in his prediction that psychology will be a thing of the past, to be replaced by neuroscience, provides a nice example of an idea that operates in numerous theories of cognition, namely that psychological processes are reducible to neurological processes: "My view of how the brain works is rooted in an evolutionary perspective that moves from the fact that our mental life reflects the actions of many, perhaps dozens to thousands, of neural devices that are built into our brains at the factory. These devices do crucial things for us, from managing our walking and breathing to helping us with syllogisms." (Gazzaniga 1998: xiii)

The related claim by Alvin Goldman and Frederique de Vignemont (2009: 154) that the "central system of the mind [...] i.e., [...] the brain is the seat of most, if not all, mental events" represents a similar view. According to this classic orthodoxy, the brain is where emotions happen; it is where intentions are formed, and actions are prepared; it is where our understanding of others takes shape. If there is a self it is in the brain (e.g., Northoff et al. 2006), or as Francis Crick once put it: "You're nothing but a pack of neurons" (Crick 1994: 1). This neurocentric view has become so pervasive it is taught to parents who want to understand their children. Thus, a website devoted to children's health states: "The brain is like a central computer that controls all bodily functions [...]" Likewise, according to many researchers, improving education involves learning how the brain learns, since that is where learning happens (e.g., Blakemore & Frith 2005; Jones 2009).

In thinking about cognition, self, agency, free will, autonomy, social cognition, and other aspects of mind – and in thinking about when things go wrong in these domains (as in psychopathology) – neurocentrism (or neuroessentialism) is standard. Indeed, recently developed neuro-based disciplines – neurophilosophy, neurotheology, neuroeconomics, neuro-marketing, neuro-aesthetics, neuropolitics, neurolaw, neuroeducation, and so on – purportedly help us to explain any topic. Across a number of fields, neurocentrism has strong advocates who defend it as the only or best way to think about such things (e.g., Huber & Kutschenko 2009; Titley, Brunel & Hansel 2017; Shelley 2013; Lee, VanderPloeg & Strifler 2016).
4 In philosophy, neurocentrism as a form of internalism is represented by the well-known brain-in-the-vat thought experiment, which, beyond its use as a thought experiment, is sometimes proposed as a model for our best understanding of how things work.

Some form of internalism must be right because there isn’t anything else to do the job. The brain is all we have for the purpose of representing the world to ourselves and everything we can use must be inside the brain. Each of our beliefs must be possible for a being who is a brain in a vat because each of us is precisely a brain in a vat; the vat is a skull and the ‘messages’ coming in are coming in by way of impacts on the nervous system. (Searle 1983: 230)

5 Neurocentrism can be described as a “narrow” perspective on cognition. The term “narrow” is a technical term in philosophy of mind. It refers to processes contained “in the head” – for example, brain-based representational processes and contents. Narrow-minded views have been challenged by “wide” “E-approaches” – that is, embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, ecological approaches to cognition, which in various ways argue that the unit of explanation ought to be brain-body-environment. On such externalist views, the brain is not dismissed as unimportant for understanding cognition, action, emotion, human experience, and so on; rather it is decentered and given a partial, although still important, role to play along with bodily and environmental factors.

6 In this target article I review four areas or issues where challenges by these E-approaches have provided good reasons to shift away from neurocentric theories: perception, agency and free will, self, and social cognition. Each of these is a complex and multifaceted topic, and I will not be able to do justice to any one of them here.2 My intent is to paint a large picture and to suggest that, taken together, such analyses form a comprehensive alternative to the classic conceptions of cognitivist, computational neuroscience. If one thinks of these different areas of research as four distinct topics, then one might also think that these apparently dissociated investigations actually converge on some basic assumptions about how to best make sense of cognitive phenomena. I will try to show, as we go along, however, that the convergence of principles reflects deeper connections among these areas. Before turning to these topics, I will discuss the idea that we need to re-think our understanding of how the brain itself works, specifically from the perspective of phylogeny, the importance of which was already intimated by Gazzaniga.

Brain, body and beyond

7 The neural reuse hypothesis is an important and influential insight into how we understand brain functions. As Michael Anderson (2010) explains it, neural circuits originally established for one use can be re-used or redeployed for other purposes while still maintaining their original function. This hypothesis was originally understood in terms of an evolutionary notion of plasticity, exaptation: “the shift in the course of evolution of a given trait or mechanism, which is later on reused to serve new purposes and functions” (Gallese 2014: 6). A good example is Broca’s area in the human brain. The homologous area in the monkey involves motor functions. Across evolutionary changes it retains these original functions – movement preparation, action sequencing, and action imitation (Binkofski & Buccino 2004). But, in the human, this area is exapted for additional functions involving language and action recognition functions. Its function in speech production has been long known and well established (Broca 1861). The presence of mirror neurons in this area links it to action recognition (Rizzolatti et al. 1996). Mirror neurons are another example of reuse: originally motor neurons involved in motor control, they are exapted in the course of evolution to serve social cognition.

8 This idea of reuse has been appropriated by a narrow, internalist “weak” conception of embodied cognition (EC). According to weak EC, neither the physical body itself (its anatomy, activity, postural body-schematic processes) nor the environment is an important contributor to cognition. Rather, what is important for weak EC are B(ody)-formatted representations and the reuse hypothesis. B-formatted representations are non-propositional interective or motoric representations “of one’s own bodily states and activities” (Goldman 2012: 74). These B-formats are characterized as “sanitized” neural representations (Goldman & de Vignemont 2009), and are sometimes discussed under the heading of the “body in the brain” (e.g., Berlucchi & Aglioti 2010). On the weak EC view, the reuse hypothesis is put to use as follows: Any cognitive task that employs a B-formatted representation in either its original function or its exapted/derived function is, on this definition, a form of embodied cognition. Examples include not only mirror neurons and their role in social-cognitive simulation, but also Friedemann Pulvermüller’s (2005) language-grounding hypothesis – the idea that action words, like lick, pick, and kick activate cortical motor areas that involve tongue, hand, and foot, respectively. In this case, motor areas and interective, B-formatted motor representations are reused for language processing. Along this same line, by simulation or metaphor, one can explain the embodied roots of abstract thought (Barsalou 2008; Lakoff & Johnson 1999). Thus, “higher-order thought is grounded in low-level representations of motor actions” (Goldman 2014: 94).

9 The evolutionary principle of reuse can get reframed as a development principle, in, for example, Stanislas Dehaene’s (2005) “neuronal recycling” hypothesis, according to which there are ontogenetic changes in the “visual word form area” of visual cortex when a person learns

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Philosophical Concepts in 4e Cognition

For example, the reactivation of neural networks involved in the execution of a task can lead to changes in brain function, such as increased connectivity and plasticity, which can support the re-emergence of particular cognitive abilities over time. This highlights the importance of considering the role of metaplasticity in cognitive development and plasticity, as suggested by Malafouris (2015).

This broader enactive perspective on neural reuse and metaplasticity provides a more comprehensive understanding of how the brain and mind are shaped by experience, leading to the idea that the brain is not just passive substrate, but an active participant in the construction of knowledge and experience. This is supported by recent research on neural plasticity and cognitive development, which shows that the brain is capable of adaptively changing in response to environmental inputs.

In conclusion, the concept of neural reuse and metaplasticity offers a powerful framework for understanding how the brain and mind are shaped by experience and how they are able to adapt and change over time. This perspective highlights the importance of considering the role of experience, environment, and social context in shaping cognitive development, and provides a more comprehensive understanding of how the brain and mind are shaped by experience.
higher-level cognitive or conceptual representations, and all of this followed by motortic processing leading to action. This is what Susan Hurley (1998) critically called the “sandwich model” of perception, where sensory input leads to higher-order cognition resulting in action output. These processes may be conceived as being more or less dynamically integrated. Perception may be thought to be an inferential process as Hermann von Helmholtz (1867) and more recent predictive models (e.g., Hohwy 2013) would have it, where perception is constituted in top-down predictive processes (informed by generative models on what is typically considered the cognitive level), and, in some cases, active inference (when action is involved).

For Jacob Hohwy (2016) and many others who champion Bayesian predictive coding, all such processing is brain-bound, tightly wrapped in a Markov blanket that strictly isolates the brain from body and world. Prediction-error minimization (PEM) in the brain does the important work; active inference (moving around the world) simply serves the central processes:

PEM should make us resist conceptions of [a mind-world] relation on which the mind is in some fundamental way open or porous to the world, or on which it is in some strong sense embodied, extended or enactive. Instead, PEM reveals the mind to be inferentially secluded from the world, it seems to be more neurocentrically skull-bound than embodied or extended, and action itself is more an inferential process on sensory input than an enactive coupling with the environment. (Hohwy 2016: 239)

In contrast to such internalist conceptions, phenomenology and enactive and extended EC approaches argue that perception should be understood as a set of dynamical processes that relate brain, body, and environment. Inspired by Merleau-Ponty, for example, enactivists argue that the body is involved in at least two ways in perception:

- Perception is closely tied to action, and thus partially constituted by sensorimotor contingencies (Di Paolo, Buhrmann & Baradaran 2017; O’Regan & Noè 2001; Noè 2004), and
- Perception is shaped by bodily-affective processes (Colombetti 2014; Gallagher 2017; Gallagher & Bower 2014; Thompson & Stapleton 2009).

In the case of sensorimotor contingencies, not only does motor control depend on perceptual input, any movement of one’s body changes one’s perception. Informed by detailed sensorimotor contingencies, enactive perception is often described in terms of affordances. In the phenomenological philosophers this idea can be traced back to Edmund Husserl’s (1989) notion of the “I can.” The idea is that I perceive the world in the pragmatic terms of what I can do, or in terms of my skill or my expertise. Perception is, as James Gibson (1977) argued, affordance-based. An expert trained in architecture may perceive more affordances than the novice, or different ones; a city-dweller may see the surrounding city environment or a rural pasture differently from how a farmer would.

Perception is shaped not only by pragmatic affordances related to sensorimotor contingencies – the “I can” – but also by affective factors of embodiment. Even if I am skilled and capable of grabbing an object, I may not feel “up to the task,” or I may not feel motivated or interested. I may not see the object in precisely the same way as I would if I were interested, or if I were not so tired. There may be an affective cost that diminishes what an object affords. Not only does one have a practical (sensorimotor) apprehension of accessibility, but one also has an affective take on that same accessibility, in terms of interest or inclination to follow through or in terms of the ease or difficulty of acting.

This affective dimension can be cashed out in terms of a more liberal predictive processing view where the priors or generative models are not reduced to brain-bound processes but can include embodied, affective components. Lisa Barrett and Moshe Bar (also see Barrett & Simmons 2015; Chanes & Barrett 2016), for example, have proposed the “affective prediction hypothesis,” which implies that responses signaling an object’s salience, relevance or value do not occur as a separate step after the object is identified. Instead, affective responses support vision from the very moment that visual stimulation begins. (Barrett & Bar 2009: 1325)

This is not just a matter of internal processing in the brain, but includes a dynamical relation between brain and body. Along with processing in the early visual area, for example, activation of the medial orbital frontal cortex (OFC) initiates a train of muscular and hormonal changes throughout the body. This generates interoceptive feedback from organs, muscles, and joints associated with prior experience, which immediately integrates with current exteroceptive sensory input. This means that the organism as a whole is responding and contributing to perception.

The OFC’s ongoing integration of sensory information from the external world with that from the body indicates that conscious percepts are indeed intrinsically infused with affective value, so that the affective salience or significance of an object is not computed after the fact. [...] The predictions generated during object perception carry affective value as a necessary and normal part of visual experience. (Barrett & Bar 2009: 1328)

Perception involves whole-body dispositions and adjustments and what Patrick Freund et al. (2018) call “anatomically informed priors” (see also Allen & Friston 2018). This implies, first, that perception is not just action-oriented, or recognition-oriented; it is also reward-oriented, hedonic, aesthetic, and affective in the broadest sense. Second, it means that perceptual networks are dynamically connected to and deeply affected by embodied processes that involve multiple systems, such as endocrine and autonomic systems (Gallagher & Allen 2018). Fatigue and hunger, for example, invoke extra-neural processes that influence brain function and have an effect on perception. Homeostatic regulation depends on chemical influences in the endocrine system. In hypoglycemic conditions (which can slow or weaken brain function) perception is modulated by complex chemical processes in the body-brain system as it couples with the environment.

These considerations lead away from narrow, internalist conceptions of the mind, even in predictive processing (PP) theories. Andy Clark points in this direction:
Philosophical concepts in 4e cognition

In contrast to Hohwy, who makes the “neurocentrically skull-bound” generative model do most of the work, Clark (ibid: 133) emphasizes active inference–active, embodied engagement that manipulates the environment in order to reduce prediction errors. Enactivist interpretations of the predictive model move even more in that direction (Allen & Friston 2018; Bitbol & Gallagher 2018; Bruineberg, Kiverstein & Rietveld 2018; Gallagher & Allen 2018; Ramstead, Badcock & Friston 2018). As Karl Friston puts it:

“...We must here understand ‘model’ in the most inclusive sense, as combining interpretive dispositions, morphology, and neural architecture, and as implying a highly tuned ‘fit’ between the active, embodied organism and the embedded environment.” (Friston et al. 2012: 6)

Action, agency, and autonomy

“...As Friston (2013: 213) summarizes, “an agent does not have a model of its world – it is a model.” With this it is not clear that we still need to think of the brain as requiring its own model of the world, or even that we need to keep the concept of a model. Rather than a generative model, which implies an additional internal dynamics separate from bodily and environmental processes, we can refer to a generative dynamics coordinated across brain, body and environment. To develop a conception of enactive perception, we need to understand active inference in terms of action rather than prediction error minimization (see Bruineberg, Kiverstein & Rietveld 2018).

Action, agency, and autonomy

“...The well-known experiments by Benjamin Libet (1985, 1992) suggested that if free will does exist it is to be found in processes that span the 150 milliseconds of neuronal activation occurring just prior to issue of a motor command. Libet showed that we become conscious of the decision or urge to move only after some 500–850 milliseconds of brain activity (the “readiness potential,” which correlates with preparation for that specific action) have already occurred. This suggests that consciousness does not play a role in causing the action, at least until approximately 150 milliseconds before motor activation. We should note two things about this result. First, this has nothing to do with free will. I have argued that Libet’s experiments were about motor control processes that typically remain unconscious, and that free will involves larger timescales and factors that cannot be reduced to neuronal processes. I will return to this point. Second, 150 milliseconds of neuronal activation in pre-motor processes is plenty of time to generate a sense of agency that is experienced, pre-reflectively, as intrinsic to one’s action. This has been a standard way to think about the sense of agency (Haggard & Magno 1999; Haggard & Eimer 1999; Gallagher 2000) – as something that anticipates the action itself generated in neuronal processes that just precede motor command.

“...The sense of agency, however, is more complex than just this experience of motor control. It also includes a sense of what one is doing in the world – a sense of what one’s action is accomplishing (Gallagher 2012; Haggard 2017). Even more than this, one’s experience of agency depends on a variety of factors that go beyond physical bodily action or its immediate intentional aspect. It may include the scope of affordances available to the agent in specific environments; it can also include prior intention formation that may benefit from communications with other people, as well as retrospective attribution that may take shape in narrative. Action is always situated in physical, social and cultural circumstances. Importantly, other people and social forces have an effect on one’s sense of agency. Even on the pre-reflective level, the presence of others can have an effect on my perception of action possibilities. An agent may be both capable of and proficient at performing action A, for example, throwing a basketball through a hoop. Nonetheless her performance, and her sense of agency, may be negatively affected simply by the fact that there is an audience of basketball superstars watching her. She may in fact feel a degree of inadequacy in such circumstances, simply because a specific set of people are present. Likewise, and in contrast to many analyses of agency in philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences, deliberation, intention formation and motivation to act are not simply mental states in one’s head, or causal brain states. Rather, they are often processes or states co-constituted with others in processes of communication. Consider also the effects of peer pressure, implicit or explicit social referencing, or one’s habitual behavior in the presence of others. Such phenomena may detract from or increase one’s feeling of agency and ability to act. It is also the case that specific types of long-standing social arrangements, such as apartheid, can have prolonged effects on a person’s or a people’s long-term sense of agency, essentially robbing them of possibilities for action (Gallagher 2012).

“...Returning to the question of free will, I have argued that we should not think of the exercise of free will as equivalent to the initiation and control of bodily movement (mental causation), which is the target of the Libet experiments, and the standard way of thinking of free will from Descartes to many contemporary philosophers and neuroscientists (Gallagher 2006). Motor control, the body-schematic details of which we are not usually conscious, is not the same thing as the exercise of free will. The consciousness that pertains to action is not (as in the Libet experiments) focused on deciding to move one’s body. Rather, awareness of bodily movement is typically minimal and recessive.

“...Given the prevalence of the traditional conception of free will (as involving mental causation of bodily movement), it may be productive to shift to the concept of autonomy. The notion of autonomy, at least, is not associated with abstract motor processes that make up intentional actions; it applies to an engaged, situated agent and intentional actions themselves, described at an appropriate pragmatic level of description. Immanuel Kant (1996) is the locus classicus for the traditional conception of autonomy, which involves self-sufficiency, self-legislation, or self-determination. Following this tradition, most contemporary discussions of autonomy take it to be an individualistic concept. Harry Frankfurt (1982), for example, frames it in terms of ra-
tional-reflective decision-making processes – a deliberation leading to the formation of second-order intentions or desires. Other theorists take narrative competency to be an important part of the precise kind of self-reflection that informs decision-making. David Velleman (2005), for example, argues that narrative-based reflection provides a framework for forming and testing one’s intentions and for guiding actions and the formation of self-identity. This allows for autonomous self-governance, which depends on forming intentions that are consistent with one’s narrative understanding of oneself.

« 30 » Embodied action, however, happens in a world that is not only physical but also social. Our actions and our decisions often involve other people; they are often joint actions steered by physical and social forces and affordances. In this respect, autonomy is relational (Christman 2004; Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000). In contrast to traditional models of an autonomous individual, Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (2000: 4) suggest that we think of autonomy “as a characteristic of agents who are emotional, embodied, desiring, creative, and feeling, as well as rational, creatures.” Indeed, our deliberations, and our intentions may be formulated in communicative practices, and may not be reducible to processes that are exclusive to one individual. In that sense they may be co-constituted in one’s interactions with others. They may be shaped by institutional forces, social practices, and normative expectations. Accordingly, autonomy is a matter of degree, something that is enhanced or reduced by various physical, social, economic, cultural factors, our relations with others, as well as our own narrative practices. Individuals are always embedded in social contexts, characterized by intersubjective and normative relations that can either enhance or impoverish the control they have over their lives and can expand or constrict their action possibilities. For this reason, it is best to conceive of agency, intention, and autonomy in these embodied and socially situated terms, rather than in terms of brain processes measured in milliseconds.

« 31 » Autonomy, as I mentioned, is closely connected to notions of self-determination, self-legislation, and self-sufficiency, and even if these are understood in relational terms, it refers us directly to some concept of self. To understand action and agency we need to understand the agent, and precisely what it is that constitutes the agent.

Self

« 32 » There is a long tradition of looking for the self in the brain. Even those who would deny that the self is reducible to brain processes consider the self to have a special relation to the brain. Karl Popper and John Eccles (1977), for example, defend a dualism that takes the self to be an autonomous entity that significantly interacts with and controls neural processes. “The self-conscious mind acts upon […] neural centres, modifying the dynamic spatio-temporal patterns of the neural events” (Popper & Eccles 1977: 495).

« 33 » There is still great interest in how various aspects of self relate to brain, or how specific brain areas correlate with self-related phenomena. Self-referential processes, including autobiographical knowledge, personal beliefs, self-conceptions, and face self-recognition are related to left hemisphere activity (Turk et al. 2003; see also Kircher et al. 2000) or right frontal cortex (Platek et al. 2003), or right lateral parietal cortex (Lou et al. 2004) or medial prefrontal cortex bilaterally (Fossati et al. 2003). Moreover, cortical midline structures (CMS) process information related to self when subjects reflectively think about themselves, or when they make judgments about their own personalities (D’Argembeau et al. 2007; Gutchess et al. 2007; Northoff & Bermpohl 2004; Northoff et al. 2006; Ruby et al. 2009). Northoff contends that the CMS includes a unitary neural network responsible for all self-related phenomena (Northoff et al. 2006). The CMS also connects to subcortical areas, suggesting a relation to an embodied self (Northoff & Panksepp 2008).

« 34 » Given the diversity and large number of cortical areas correlated with self-reference, Seth Gillihan and Martha Farah (2005) were led to suggest that there is no specialized brain area responsible for generating “the self.” Dorothée Legrand and Perrine Ruby (2009) argue in a complementary way that no area of the brain is exclusively self-specific since “every significant activation in the [self condition] was also found in either the [other person condition] or the [general semantic] condition, or both” (Crack et al. 1999: 30; also Gillihan & Farah 2005: 94). It thus seems right to say that the self is both everywhere and nowhere in the brain (Vogeley & Gallagher 2011). It is not just that the brain is so complex, however, but also that the concept of self is ambiguous. Accordingly, in any analysis of self we need to define the precise aspect of the self under study. Selves consist of a variety of aspects – experiential, ecological, agentic – and are capable of various forms of self-recognition, self-related cognition, self-narrative, and self-specific perception and action. In this respect, selves are more “in-the-world” than “in-the-brain” (Vogeley & Gallagher 2011: 129).

« 35 » In contrast to theories that would reduce the self to one particular type of thing – for example, a self-model generated by neuronal processes, and nothing more (e.g., Metzinger 2004); or the abstract product of narratives, and nothing more (e.g., Dennett 1991); or nothing more than a 3-second-long experience sans body or agency or narrative (Strawson 1999) – plu- ralist theories suggest that the self is many things. William James (1950), for example, distinguished between physical, social, and private selves. Ulrich Neisser (1988) distinguished ecological, interpersonal, conceptual, extended, and private selves. In an attempt to capture the plurality of self-related factors and the idea that the agentic self is more “in-the-world” than “in the brain,” I have proposed a pattern theory of self (Gallagher 2013b). In brief, the pattern theory of self (PTS) argues that a self is constituted as a pattern or dynamical Gestalt comprised of a sufficient number of characteristic factors, including embodied, experiential, affective, behavioral, intersubjective, psychological/cognitive, reflective, narrative, extended and normative factors (see Table 1). It is important to note that this is not an additive list of factors; rather these components or aspects are dynamically interrelated in a pattern or Gestalt arrangement (Gallagher & Daly 2018). Accordingly, a change in one element, above a certain threshold, will lead, via dynamical interactions, to changes in others. For example, as suggested above, aspects of self-experience, such as the sense of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of the pattern</th>
<th>Brief description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embodied elements</td>
<td>Core biological, ecological and interoceptive factors, allowing the system to distinguish between itself and what is not itself – extremely basic to all kinds of animal behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal experiential elements</td>
<td>First-person, pre-reflective, conscious experience, reflecting the self/non-self distinction, manifest in various sensory-motor modalities (kinaesthesia, proprioception, touch, vision, etc.) – including a sense of ownership (the “mineness” of one’s experience) and a sense of agency for one’s actions (Gallagher 2012; Rochat 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective aspects</td>
<td>Affect/emotion/temperament, ranging from bodily affects to what may be a typical affective or emotion pattern (Newen, Welpinghus &amp; Juckel 2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral aspects</td>
<td>Behaviors and actions make us who we are – behavioral habits reflect, and perhaps actually constitute, our character. This is a classic view that goes back at least to Aristotle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intersubjective interactions and capacities</td>
<td>Human are born with a capacity for attuning to intersubjective existence, which develops into a social self-consciousness – a self-for-others (Mead 1913), manifested behaviorally in mirror self-recognition (Gallup, Anderson &amp; Platek 2011), joint actions and communicative practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological/cognitive elements</td>
<td>Traditional theories of the self focus on these factors, which may range from explicit self-consciousness to a conceptual understanding of self as self, to personality traits of which one may not be self-conscious at all – psychological continuity and the importance of memory are highlighted in the literature on personal identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflective capacities</td>
<td>The ability to reflect on one’s experiences and actions – closely related to the notions of autonomy and moral personhood, including the capacity to reflect and form second-order volitions about one’s desires (Frankfurt 1982; Taylor 1989).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative capacities</td>
<td>Although some theorists make the strong claim that narratives are constitutive for selves (Schechtman 2011), for PTS one can lose the ability to construct a self-narrative (as in cases of dysnarrativa) and still remain a self to the extent that other elements of the pattern remain in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended/situated elements</td>
<td>Including the possibilities presented by physical pieces of property, and various things that we own (James 1950). Not only may we identify with our material belongings, or the technologies we use, our professions and the institutions we work in, but we are also dynamically related to the action possibilities they afford.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative factors</td>
<td>Ranging across possibilities presented by the kind of family structure and situation in which we grew up to cultural and normative practices, involving physical and mental health, gender, race, and economic status, that define our way of living.</td>
</tr>
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Table 1 • Dynamical aspects of the self-pattern (from Gallagher & Daly 2018).
Tsakiris (2014: 8) claim that a PP account “provides flexibility, with fewer constraints on what types of information can drive self-recognition.” The strong claim is that predictive models can explain all of the various factors that contribute to the self-pattern. As they note,  

“This is particularly important, given the evidence to suggest that the continuity of the self may be underpinned by many different types of information, the integration of which leads to a coherent sense of one’s body.” (ibid: 9)  

To be clear, this type of analysis sends us back to issues previously discussed (in the section on perception) about how we might best interpret predictive processing models. Although Hohwy and John Michael (2017) build an internalist PP model of self, it is interesting to note that they see their account as consistent with PP accounts of minimal phenomenal (experiential) selfhood, or self model (Limanowski & Blankenburg 2013; Metzinger 2004), bodily self-awareness (Apps & Tsakiris 2014), interoceptive aspects (Seth, Suzuki & Critchley 2011), intersubjective aspects that relate self and other (Moutoussis et al. 2014), social understanding of self and other (Frith & Friston 2015), and psychodynamical notions of self (e.g., Fotopoulou 2012), thereby touching on many elements of the self-pattern. All of this, however, on their account, is reducible to the brain’s predictive model. Rather than taking the fully embodied self to be the agent of active inference, or part of a dynamical system that includes the brain, Hohwy and Michael take the body to be a representation in the internal model of the agent:  

The body is nothing special, it is just one among many causes interacting with each other in the environment, and in the course of this impacting on the senses. Representation of the body is nothing special either; it is just one among many causes that get represented in the internal model used for prediction error minimization.  

(Hohwy & Michael 2017: 367)  

In contrast to reducing the self to neuronal patterns, or to the patterns of inference that constitute a self-model, PTS argues that the self-pattern is a “real pattern” (Dennett 1991) of dynamical relations among brain-body-environment (broadly speaking). Such dynamical relations may be partially indexed or traced by neuronal processes to the extent that the latter partially underpin various factors of the self-pattern, but they are not reducible to such processes. One important component of this pattern includes the agent’s intersubjective interactions and capacities for social cognition, phenomena that are clearly more than just brain processes.  

Social cognition  

Standard approaches to social cognition (theory of mind – ToM) typically accept the assumption of methodological individualism. Although ToM seeks to explain how we understand the minds of others, via mindreading processes, all those processes are said to be contained in the observer’s own head/brain. Either a theory of mind module (ToMM) in pre-frontal areas activates subpersonal processes that constitute a “tacit theory” or implicit use of folk psychology (Carruthers 2015), or mirror neurons generate subpersonal processes that simulate the actions and minds of others (Gallese 2001; Goldman 2006).  

The alternative phenomenological-enactive approach to social cognition, interaction theory (IT), rejects the idea that we mindread the hidden mental states of others. It focuses on embodied interaction processes that draw on multiple semiotic resources in the other’s postures, movements, gestures, facial expressions, vocal intonations, communicative practices and actions in contextualized social and cultural environments. This includes an enactive model of direct social perception of the other person’s embodied mental states (especially intentions and emotions) (De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher 2010; Gallagher 2005, 2008a; Reddy 2008). For example, if emotional episodes, as Giovanna Colombetti suggests:  

Correspond to specific self-organizing forms or second-order constraints – emotion forms, as I call them – that recruit or entrain various processes (neural, muscular, autonomic, etc.) into highly integrated configurations or patterns.  

(Colombetti 2014: 69)  

and if these patterns include bodily expressions, comportments, and actions, then (consistent with what we said in previous sections) my perception of another person’s emotions may be considered a form of perceptual pattern recognition – one that is action- (or interaction-) oriented and takes that pattern as a social affordance for further response on my part. On this view we are not engaged in third-person observation of others, but in second-person (“I-thou” or “we-mode”) interactions. In contrast to methodological individualism, what does the work of social cognition are not mechanisms internal to the individual, but our engaged interactions that happen in our shared, intersubjective world and that build on shared or reciprocal social affordances.  

Scientific evidence for this is found in developmental studies of infants, from birth onward, in their face-to-face, primary intersubjective relations, and their pragmatically contextualized secondary intersubjective relations (Trevarthen 1979). Primary intersubjectivity involves innate or early-developing sensory-motor capacities that bring us into relation with others and allow us to interact with them. In part, these capacities involve action and perceptual experience – we are able to see or more generally perceive in the other person’s bodily postures, movements, gestures, facial expressions, gaze direction, vocal intonation, etc. what they intend and what they feel. We respond with our own bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions, gaze, etc. On this view, the other’s mind is in her embodied comportment, and manifests itself in second-person interactions. For infants, these highly embodied and situated interactions form the basis for a developing understanding of others.  

Infants already have a sense, from their own self-movement and proprioception, of their own agency, and they see this kind of agency in others. They respond, interactively, to certain kinds of entities (specifically to other agents) in the environment. They can respond in a distinctive way to human faces (Johnson 2000; Johnson, Slaughter & Carey 1998; Legerstee 1991), for example. From birth infants are capable of perceiving and responding to facial gestures presented by others, and seem to be directly attuned to the actions and gestures of other
humans (Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1994; Gallagher & Meltzoff 1996). Although claims about neonatal imitation remain controversial, this is not a worry for IT. Whether it is differential imitation or a mere arousal response (Anisfeld 2005; Keven & Akins 2017; Jones 2006, 2009; but see Nagy et al. 2013; Nagy, Pal & Orvos 2014; Vinciini et al. 2017a, 2017b; Vinciini & Jiang 2018) it nonetheless leads infant and caregiver to intersubjective interaction. An initial adult facial gesture may motivate the infant's arousal and response; in turn the infant's response has an effect on the adult who is encouraged to continue with facial games, etc. In this way, even a mere arousal response could facilitate early social interaction.

44 Primary intersubjectivity can be specified in much more detail. At 2 months, infants are already attuned to the other person's attention; they follow the other's head movements and gaze (Baron-Cohen 1995; Maurer & Barrera 1981). Also at 2 months, second-person interaction is evidenced by the timing and emotional response of infants' behavior (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997). This is part of a mutual attunement that characterizes interactions and that can be specified in detail in their dynamical relations and the integration of the intrinsic temporali- ties of the agents' movements (Trevarthen 1999; Trevarthen et al. 2006). At 5–7 months infants can detect visual-audio correspondences specifying the expression of emotions (Walker 1982; Hobson 1993, 2002). At 6 months they see grasping as goal-directed. At 10–11 months infants can parse intentional boundaries within some kinds of continuous action (Baldwin & Bairra 2001; Bairra & Baldwin 2001; Woodward & Sommerville 2000).

45 Such expressions, intonations, gestures, and movements do not float freely in the air; they are situated in the world, anchored to specific contexts. Accordingly, towards the end of the first year, infants start to notice how others engage with the world. For joint attention and secondary intersubjectivity context becomes very important, and it helps us to intersubjectively co-constitute the meaning of the world.

46 A good example of secondary intersubjectivity can be found in conversation analysis, the rich analysis of speech acts situated in circumstances that involve our own and others' postures and movements, along with environmental arrangements and affordances (Goodwin 2000, 2017). Charles Goodwin shows that meaning emerges in action and interaction, specifically at the intersection of social, cultural, material and temporal structures of the environment. Meaning is accomplished, not just via speech but by drawing on “different kinds of semiotic resources” available in the environment and in whole-body pragmatics. “For example, spoken language builds signs within the stream of speech, gestures use the body in a particular way, while posture and orientation use the body in another, etc.” Goodwin emphasizes the “visible, public deployment of multiple semiotic fields that mutually elaborate each other” (ibid: 1494): vocal intonations (some of which have a deontic rather than descriptive force); movements, postures and bodily orientations; institutional norms; references to completed actions; interruption of activities, and so on.

47 As an example, Goodwin provides a detailed analysis of a dispute between two young girls over a game of hopscotch.

48 Unlike talk, gestures can’t be heard. “This means [Carla [one of the girls] actively works to position her hand gestures so that they will be perceived by Diana [the other girl] […] Carla’s hand is explicitly positioned in Diana’s line of sight […] thrusting the gesturing hand toward Diana’s face twists Carla’s body into a configuration in which her hand, arm and the upper part of her torso are actually leaning toward Diana.” (Goodwin 2001: 1498)

49 Importantly, interaction is not one-sided. A response draws a further response. In the interaction, the conversation is not confined to vocalization and gesture – reference is made to the surrounding environment, joint attention is established and then broken and then re-established. The accomplishment of meaning is not under the control of just one individual; rather it depends upon two-way interaction. According to IT, social understanding builds on precisely this complex integration of primary and secondary intersubjective capacities, situated within pragmatic and social contexts, supplemented with and supporting communicative and narrative processes. In this regard, it is the interaction itself that contributes something not reducible to the actions of the individuals involved, or to individual brain states (De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher 2010).

50 IT does not deny that the brain is an important part of the body or that it plays an important role in cognition and social cognition. Indeed, mirror neurons, motor control processes, and notions of reuse may play some role in explaining social cognition. It is reasonable to think that reuse is in some way constrained by original use. If so, then the fact that our perceptual-motor systems were originally designed for action, rather than for observation, is significant (Anderson & Chemero 2017). It is likely that this action orientation carries through to the reuse of our motor systems in contexts of social cognition, but again (as I indicated in §§13–14) this requires a reinterpretation of reuse in relation to wider contexts involving plasticity. Thus, I see your action as an affordance that motivates my own action – I see it as something I can respond to in broader contexts of social interactions, joint actions, cultural practices, etc., and that is precisely how I understand your action.

51 The interaction that is essential to social cognition is not reducible to the interaction of neurons; it requires agentic bodies, and others, situated in physical, social, cultural and normatively constrained environments in support of interactions that happen in the world rather than in individual brains.

Conclusion

52 Since the 1990s, the assumption in cognitive science has been that neuroscience will at some point replace psychology and that we will adjust our philosophies of mind accordingly (Gazzaniga 1998). The expectation was that the best explanation of brain function would be worked out in the vocabulary of neuroscience. In contrast, I want to suggest that the best explanation of brain function may be found in the vocabularies of embodied and situated cognition.
The nervous system emerges from a preneural dynamic. Thus when the nervous excitation occurs, it can’t play an important role in the organization of the nervous system. This organization is not so much due to the functioning of the neuron as to the growth of the total organism. The preneural system of integration ‘strides across’ the nervous functioning and it doesn’t stop when it appears. So the nervous system can’t be the ultimate explanation. Then we must admit an intrinsic potentiality of growth, a dynamic system reacting to its surroundings as an organism would do. It replaces the function of conduction as being a consequence, not a principle of the system.** (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 192)

In this article I have considered a sampling of research areas in the cognitive sciences – perception, agency, self and social cognition. In each case I have argued against a narrow or neurocentric reductionism. These are basic phenomena upon which many cognitive capacities are built. One could easily see the same principles at work in a number of other areas where more comprehensive accounts have been developed by taking embodied, ecological, enactive and extended approaches seriously – for example, research on memory (Sutton 2010), expert performance (Hoffing 2015; Ilundain-Agurruza 2016), collective intentionality (Tollfksen & Gallagher 2017), psychopathology (Gallagher 2013c), and psychotherapy (Garcia & Di Paolo 2018; Röhrich et al. 2014). In each case one can acknowledge the importance of what the brain is doing, operating as part of a larger circuit that includes body and environment. The brain is not at the center of a circle with radii of control extending to other elements; it is one component arranged in the circuit, or in what Viktor von Weizsäcker (1986) called a Gestalt circle of brain, body, and the (physical, social, cultural) environment.

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