2018

Theatricalizing Law

Marett Leiboff

University of Wollongong, marett@uow.edu.au

Publication Details

Theatricalizing Law

Abstract
To theatricalize law is to ask lawyers to be aware and responsive to the world that creates them and to be conscious of worlds beyond words. For the theatrical reminds us that law has to see as well as to interpret, and that seeing occurs through the body, even more so than the intellect. Reviewing the work of some of the key scholars whose work engages with the concept of theatricalizing law, this article challenges the presumption of dramatic verities and certainties as the mark of an effective critical form in law. Instead, to think law theatrically challenges knowledge, expectations, beliefs, certainties, assumptions, and prejudices, and this article concludes with an example of the challenge wrought by a simple theatricalization in which a set of images that could and did mean anything were played, allowing the audience to make their choices because they were unguided. And then the most exceptional and meaningless of the images were explained, and the horror imbricated in them revealed. This theatricalization did its job, and the text revealed in ways that law as drama could not, as this article reveals, as a theatricalization of its own.

Keywords
theatricalizing, law

Disciplines
Arts and Humanities | Law

Publication Details

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3601
‘Theatricalizing Law’

Marett Leiboff

Abstract

To theatricalize law is to ask lawyers to be aware and responsive to the world that creates them and to be conscious of worlds beyond words. For the theatrical reminds us that law has to see as well as to interpret, and that seeing occurs through the body, even more so than the intellect. Reviewing the work of some of the key scholars whose work engages with the concept of theatricalizing law, this article challenges the presumption of dramatic verities and certainties as the mark of an effective critical form in law. Instead, to think law theatrically challenges knowledge, expectations, beliefs, certainties, assumptions, and prejudices, and this article concludes with an example of the challenge wrought by a simple theatricalization in which a set of images that could and did mean anything were played, allowing the audience to make their choices because they were unguided. And then the most exceptional and meaningless of the images were explained, and the horror imbricated in them revealed. This theatricalization did its job, and the text revealed in ways that law as drama could not, as this article reveals, as a theatricalization of its own.

To be enraged

“theasthai ... is to look with one’s mouth wide open, i.e. ‘to gape’ or ‘stare’”. One becomes nothing but an eye, rapitlygazing more than distinguishing matters clearly ... the mode of seeing that underlies both theoria and the word “theater” amounts, on a certain level, to marveling from a standpoint far from meaning – ecstatic vision, or gawking without understanding. Olga Taxidou has put it well: “the difference between philosophy and theoria is the body with all its senses. Possibly the difference between philosophy and theoria is that theoria needs to be experienced through the body – the senses, that is, the aesthetic”.¹

Hans-Thies Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theater 2016

There could be nothing more damning for law than the mark of the theatrical,² as shaped through its classical Platonic, Christian and Enlightenment inheritance which abnegates theater and the theatrical,³ as a danger to reason and intellect, and thus a failure of the ideal of law.⁴ Plato, Hans-

⁴ Martin Puchner, “Afterword: Please Mind the Gap between Theater and Philosophy,” Modern Drama 56, no. 4, (2013): 540-553, 542: “Philosophy ... is not an object of study, like theater, but an intellectual practice.”
Thies Lehmann suggests, is enraged by theater in the form of tragedy, but regardless, the ideal that Plato expresses results in legal assumptions that treats the theatrical with contempt, as code for speciousness, or as the mark of the histrionic, as we see in the two instances, the first from argument by counsel in a 2015 Australian superior court case, and the second contained in a brief judgment, again from an Australian superior court, 15 years earlier:

That means that without having to go through the utterly artificial, and we would submit unconvincing, notion of staging theatricals about who would have done what with increasing difficulties of assessing the probabilities of who would have done what, the matter raised by the non-disclosure is at the level of underwriting decision-making, raised in the forensic contest and it is the insurance decision-making, the underwriting decision which is at the heart of 28(3), and the disappointed insured puts forward their best case.

HIS HONOUR: I have listened to lengthy submissions, some of which have a degree of the theatrical, some at times hysterical, and nearly always irrelevant. The position has been reached where I must say that Mrs Von Risefer has not listened to what the Courts have told her on previous occasions and she is plainly abusing the process of the Courts. This application is an abuse of that process. It is only compassion for litigants who face eviction from their home that induces me to refuse the respondent’s application for indemnity costs.

In each, submission and judgment, we are left in little doubt - we see the sneer, the smirk, the sigh of exasperation at play. Barrister and judge speak to the antitheatrical prejudice, the dismissal of theater as subaltern and dangerous but through the adoption of the language of theater, debased as it is, engages in the most theatrical gesture, as it were, in order to negative a witness, a submission or a proposed course of action. That the Platonic ideal of justice through word and reason, through law contra the theatrical is found in this kind of everyday law, the law of insurance, the allocation of property rights, might seem surprising, for the image of the theatrical is rarely applied to law of this kind. The theatrical is seen to play out in the most visible forms of law, the criminal trial, the trial of high stakes that occurs in so-called ‘theaters of justice’. For Hannah Arendt the ‘staging’ of the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel in 1961 militated against law and justice, made worse by the bodily reaction of witnesses as ‘show’. The trial as show appalled her, ‘not just the figure of Eichmann but also his Israeli prosecutors and even the dramatic gestures of some of the holocaust survivors who

5. Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theater, 24: “Plato’s rage against (more than his critique of) tragedy.”
6. Bret Walker SC (Senior Counsel) in argument in Atradius Credit Insurance N.V. v Prepaid Services Pty Limited & Ors; Prepaid Services Pty Ltd v Optus Mobile Pty Ltd & Ors [2015] HCATrans 155 (19 June 2015).
took the witness stand during the trial. But in spite of herself, Arendt was overcome by her own bodily responses - Plato might have been enraged, but Arendt laughed, which 'caught her by surprise and overcame her', and permeated her writing about the 1961 trial.

Arendt’s *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963) might bear the mark of this laughter, but it is not a laughter of joy. Instead, this is a sneering laughter that points to the criticism of the modes of legality that occurred in the trial, and by extension, to the Israeli government. Despite her own treatment in Nazi Germany because of her Jewishness, Arendt adhered to forms of justice that accorded with Weberian perfection, and she could not abide the theatrical disruption that she witnessed, and led to her sneering account of the trial. She despised what she saw as theater, and so too the Australian barrister and Australian judge within the forms that law takes – submissions on the law and a decision on the law.

It is in this register that I will be taking this essay. The theatrical, as it were, has been crowded out by the prominence of the meta-trial, of the Eichmann-type, which can be all consuming of the field, that is, that they seem and are seen to represent law, and function as all law insofar as law might in some way speak to theater and vice versa. Instead, my purpose here is to take us back to the less visible and more prosaic law that embeds the anti-theatrical along with the physicality that resides in its alterity – the smirk, the laugh, the sigh of exasperation. For when I talk of law, I need to emphasise that it is not the popularly imagined trial, criminal or otherwise, or the execution of judgment to which I refer, nor plays about law. Or, indeed, spectacle or performance or image, in Peter Goodrich’s terms:

The trial has been a focus of studies of the theatricality of law, usually framed within a literary argot and method ... law in film has become a significant focus of interdisciplinary legal study, but again the subject is usually law as acted out in entertainment dramas ... *the spectacle of law as relayed through the monumental, written, embodied, and enacted performances of lawyers themselves, gains little express recognition or examination*. Modern historians and humanists address certain features and moments of the legal spectacle with a wealth of erudition, specialism, and insight, but their focus is generally the spectacle and not the law ... the show trial, as historical act and filmic genre, rather than the legal *mise en scène*, the juristic import and expression ...

This latter sentiment, which I will inevitably make less lyrical and more prosaic, touches on my concern here, that it is through the work of law in its texts and their reading by lawyers - judgments that hold the law as case law – and the awareness of the stories of lives contained within and that are plugged into them. It is these and the need for their reading to achieve justice, what Goodrich

---

10 Horsman, *Theaters of Justice*, 16.
calls the ‘theatrical arrangements that precede appearance and audition’,\textsuperscript{15} that needs attention, in a world that seems to be ready-made, a law of Google, and a law of the self.\textsuperscript{16} For justice requires lawyers to do more than read and apply law – it requires that they have an awareness that will enable them to seek justice, to counteract that image of law embedded through the logics that derive from Plato and Arendt and beyond, that enters the body, through the theatrical.

### Theater

I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage. A man walks across this empty space whilst someone else is watching him, and this is all that is needed for an act of theater to be engaged.\textsuperscript{17}

Peter Brook \textit{The Empty Space} 1968

[tragedy and theater is] base \textit{poiesis}, merely the result of artisanal “doing” and not real activity in the higher, intellectual sense … If artistic mimesis in general already proves deficient and involves only what is sensory, then matters stand even worse when it is concretely embodied in acting; inasmuch as it occurs through speaking as another, mimesis endangers the stability of the citizen’s personal identity.\textsuperscript{18}

Hans-Thies Lehmann 2016

It is not hard to see why the term “theater” and “the theatrical” as a concept can be conflated with related terms that are familiar to anyone who has experienced literary drama and plays at school or elsewhere. What we learn quickly enough is that the literary quality and characteristic of these forms becomes the prime site of attention, as literature. The idea of spectacle and staging and play and performance, a word and concept I have been avoiding, not least the sense in which performance has become overborne by performatives of all varieties (as Alan Read remarks ‘We are all performers now’),\textsuperscript{19} and the means through which \textit{being} is created or resisted.\textsuperscript{20} The demand of expectation imbedded in common parlance relating to accomplishment in a range of instances (‘he performed well’, ‘she needs to improve her performance’), are all bound up in the notion that there is a representable text that demands conformity. We find this meaning imbricated in the Oxford English Dictionary definition: where reference to ‘theater, that can be ‘staged’, ‘performed’, and/or ‘acted’, in which drama became play, and play drama. Owing to its etymology from the Latin for ‘play’ and the Greek for ‘deed, action, play, especially tragedy, and to do, act, perform’,\textsuperscript{21} the contemporary definitions of drama are fundamentally antitheatrical, or at best, untheatrical: ‘A composition in prose or verse, adapted to be acted upon a stage, in which a story is related by means of dialogue and action, and is represented with accompanying gesture, costume, and scenery, as in real life; a play, melodrama, the dramatic branch of literature; the dramatic art, and a series of actions or course of events having a unity like that of a drama’.\textsuperscript{22} Drama, then, is storytelling, etymologically now far removed from its origins as doing and playing.\textsuperscript{23} Drama, thus

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{15} Goodrich, “Specters of Law,” 808.
\textsuperscript{18} Lehmann, \textit{Tragedy and Dramatic Theater}, 24.
\textsuperscript{19} Alan Read, \textit{Theater &Law} (London: Palgrave, 2016), 40.
\textsuperscript{20} Read, \textit{Theater &Law}, 41. I do not intend to consider the overly-worn path of J.L. Austin’s performatives here.
\textsuperscript{23} Cf. Korsten, “\textit{Öffentlichkeit} and the Law’s Behind the Scenes,” 404.
\end{footnotesize}
defined, is conceived as a work of the mind, rather than the work of the body, the ‘artesanal’ as mere cipher, who will stage, perform or accomplish, that is, that which is theater and theatrical, as a central conceit of antitheatricality.

To negate the body is precisely Arendt’s complaint of theatricality - as a debasement that occurs through unreasoning bodies that might be enraged or laugh. But as Hans-Thies Lehmann makes clear, the theatrical body is something far more than mere cipher, or unreasoning: ‘Body, rhythm, breathing, the here and now of the unthinkable presence of the body, its eroticism, these undermind the Logos. This body is at the same time the place of suffering and pain, the mute body ....’ 24 This mute body that thinks before the reasoning mind comes into play, operates at a higher level of function that operates beyond the limitations of text-based drama, 25 but rather functions in a space ‘on the borderline of logic and reason, on the threshold between what is thinkable and beyond reasoning’. 26 For reasons that are historically misplaced, Lehmann argues, European theater tradition has been dominated by text and word, 27 and ‘assigned the highest place in theater’. 28 The caesura marking a return to a theater beyond the text is traced at least to Artaud in the 1930s, 29 or indeed to earlier experiments at the end of the 19th century and into the early 20th century, through the work of Meyerhold and others. 30 To be brief, as Peter Brook’s famous epithet reminds us, all you need for theater is an empty space with two people, one to do and the other to watch or participate. To do this requires presence, attention and awareness, not only in that place, but in the preparation of the self so that the theasthai is rendered beyond a meaningless gawp.

Plays, drama, spectacle – none of these things are needed for theater. Thea, in all its manifestations, is the etymological starting point for theory, a way to see, and theater and all its derivations. 31 But so too is theasthai. For as Lehmann reminds us in the opening epigraph with which I started this essay, and as we’ve seen with Arendt’s accidental laughter, seeing occurs through the body as much as it does through the intellect, and each shapes the other. This is not spectacle or bare show, or mere entertainment. To be caught in the body is to be responsive and responsible. I will return to how this might be made manifest at the end of this essay, but I get ahead of myself.

I have moved into accounting for the difference between the forms of theater and drama, before considering the meaning of theater, for a very good reason. Korsten, for instance, has begun to use the term ‘theater proper’ when referring to its meaning, 32 that is the etymologically perfect form of theater used in the OED: the ‘Latin theātrum, the Greek place for viewing, especially a theater, to behold or sight, view, a spectator’. 33 This is why I intervened with Lehmann’s more expansive

26 Lehmann, “From logos to landscape,”56.
27 Lehmann, “From logos to landscape,”56.
28 Lehmann, “From logos to landscape,”56.
29 Lehmann, “From logos to landscape,” 57.
30 For example, Robert Leach, Vsevolod Meyerhold, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
31 Weber, Theatricality as Medium, 2-3
32 Korsten, “Öffentlichkeit and the Law’s Behind the Scenes.”
accounting of *thea, and the difference between the theatrical and dramatic, and for reasons that are reiterate Goodrich’s concern that: ‘Law is a theater that denies its theatricality, an order of images that claims invisibility, a series of performances that desire to be taken as the dead letter of prose and so the dead hand of the law.’ 34 This is far from surprising, though, for to think in terms of Korsten ‘theater proper’ is to limit the thing that the theatrical can do for law and for lawyers (and judges). Without having a real sense in theater and theatrical function, it is necessary to move beyond the limits of etymology, into theater as I have already sketched – a place of the body, a place of responsibility, and a place in which response is shared.

This means returning the theatrical to its place within theater, with the position of theater scholars as a term of art within theater, 35 that has sought to re-orient Goffman’s idea of a theater (as drama, it must be said), 36 and Richard Schechner’s performance theory have opened theater and its concepts wide, beyond theater. 37 To narrow theater and the shape of theatricality, rather than the world at large is to think beyond the idea of ‘showing doing’ that is embedded within Schechner, 38 and asking that we try not to think about our conduct as dramatic scripts in the world (they are nothing of the sort). I use theater concepts to reorient in order to think about the productive capacity of theater to help us think in law about ways to see, and how we might train our bodies to use theater beyond sneering and sighing and laughing, to become more responsive lawyers and legal interpreters, to think in terms of a postdramatic law.

This also means I will be asking that we are sceptical of the OEDs ‘theater’ definitions which are still mired in a late 19th century imaginary. We are told of most of the definitions that ‘This entry has not yet been fully updated (first published 1912)’. That is not to say that there haven’t been inclusions since 1912, so much so that it holds onto meanings that were shaped in the 19th century and haven’t moved on. ‘Theatricality’, contrary to its usage noted above, is confined to: ‘A tendency to theatricality and effusiveness’ (1880); ‘The absurd theatricalities with which the … campaign is now mainly carried on.’ (1889). It is not hard to see where a judge or member of the Bar would get their own image of the theatrical, but these definitions also defer to an idea of theater within a narrow
dimension, that is, that it is a place, a building, that constitutes a theater, and so too, the audience that watches.

But the OED also synonyms theater with drama to mean: ‘Dramatic works collectively’, ‘theatrical or dramatic entertainment ... an action or work of art that has the quality of (good, etc.) drama or theatrical technique ... dramatic effect or sensation, spectacle, outward show without serious inward intent.’ And this is telling, because the words theater and drama are constantly misapplied, treated as being synonymous, but most importantly, result in misconceptions and errors that seek to turn ‘drama into theater’. The most extraordinary of these errors is found in the entry for Artaud’s theater of cruelty that strips it of theater and reinstated as drama: ‘a collective term for plays in which the dramatist seeks to communicate a sense of pain, suffering, and evil through the portrayal of extreme physical violence’. That is a profound misconception and misdescription of the Theater of Cruelty – it is theater (not drama) that seeks to penetrate or pierce our complacency, to make us respond, into the unconscious, through the body. Artaud warned against such a literal reading: ‘as soon as I said “cruelty” everyone took it to mean “blood”. But a “theater of cruelty” means theater that is difficult and cruel for myself first of all’. Moreover, the theater of cruelty requires no ‘drama’ at all, as the exemplary mode of theater, it is capable of functioning within Brook’s empty space: ‘Theater can re-instruct those who have forgotten the communicative power or magic mimicry of gesture, because a gesture contains its own energy, and there are still human beings in theater to reveal the power of those gestures’. The conflation of terms along with the inaccuracies built into the definition, do precisely what Goodrich notes is wrong about legal interpreters – that in law we believe words to always be correct (acknowledging the rule of statutory construction, that dictionary definitions are only opinions of words), but these definition of theater of cruelty in the OED demands conformity with expectation – drama as literature, and theater as something excess and unacceptable, as a body that has gone too far.

This definition, as in law, is remade to conform to expectations, in which the bodily cannot be comprehended. The Theater of Cruelty is the exemplary form through which the theatrical occurs – not perhaps the ‘theater proper’ of Korsten, but the theatrical as it was remade, from the late 19th century onwards, through Artaud. As Hans-Thies Lehmann points out, it is the theatrical (not drama) makes self-awareness manifest through anagnorisis, that is, that moment of awareness or realisation. Rather than operating as a dramatic self-awareness, in the postdramatic theater, this point of perception is meant to disrupt expectations:

We stand [now] before a theater that seeks less to “serve up” a work than to provoke renewed critical engagement and to elicit judgment and discussion of its relation to performance ... anagnorisis often does not occur in a dramaturgical capacity in contemporary theater; rather, it takes place as a caesura that regularly punctuates our understanding of the theatrical process ... Theater is not to be defined as a dramatic process, but as one that is corporeal, scenic, musical, auditory and visual – in space and time: a material process that implies its own being-- seen or participation, even as it

---

40 Artaud, Antonin Artaud, 60.
41 Artaud, Antonin Artaud, 61.
42 Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theater, 163.
This, of course, is precisely the thing that law is afraid of, what Arendt feared, and that our imagined belief in the ability of words to armour and defend against this kind of rupture that this kind of anagnorisis requires of us. As Christian Biet remarks, in its intervention in politics and the polis, theater: ‘complexifies the data it introduces in an ephemeral presence, or an ephemeral present, before and with co-present individuals. In doing that, it brings life to these judgements, gives them a body and flesh of a different kind than that of images.' The belief in a perceptual possibility is bound up within law, but of course it is something that normally is imagined as a form of the unconscious or the invisible. Theater, of course, through our bodies, makes this present in ways that are both dangerous and misunderstood. It is this kind of theater and its practices that has something to tell us in law, but one which has been largely overlooked in favour of the literary as drama, the political as theater, the theatrical as drama, though there has been a lively engagement with theater through Badiou, with Artaud, via Derrida, or the immensely significant work that has derived through Legendre through Peter Goodrich’s work, and the spectacle, the unconscious, and the mask. Bu there is theater too, theater of the kind that I have been playing out in this essay. There are limited instances of the theatrical at play. Peter Rush creates the exemplary theater experience in his essay in the first issue of Law and Critique, while my theatricalisations are sometimes read as stories, as a reframing as drama, in ways that I did not expect. That is not to say that the dramatic and the play as sites of law and as critical interventions as justice, is inconsequential. On the contrary. From the immense literature spawned by Hegel’s reading of Antigone and Benjamin’s Trauerspiel, from Aristodemou to Extabe, Paul Raffield’s readings of law displays a certain opacity that resists full perceptive penetration [wahrnehmende Durchdringung] just as much as it refuses complete rationalization.

43 Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theater, 424.
50 Maria Aristodemou, Law and Literature: Journeys From her to Eternity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), in particular ‘Theater as Woman Re-Playing the Word: Towards the Triumph of the Flesh in Aeschylus’ Oresteia’.
within Shakespeare as drama and theater,\textsuperscript{55} and the critical readings of law through the play as text, such as Honni van Rijskij’s readings of Sarah Kane’s \textit{Blasted},\textsuperscript{56} or the transcript of trials and judgments reinscribed as play - testimonial or tribunal theater – amply reveals the play and place of play and drama as a critical account of law and concerns of justice. Along with political theater, Augusto Boal’s \textit{spect-actor} and his legislative theater, this theater all tells us something about law, as too its filmic double; the move into theatrocrcy important as a political challenge, but it is the theatrical \textit{anagnorisis} that largely been overlooked in thinking about law,\textsuperscript{57} and that to my mind provides that thing to challenge To think law theatrically, then, is to think it as a means through which we are challenged in our beliefs, certainties, assumptions and prejudices, to be challenged to think what we are and who were are.

\textbf{Reading}

During a talk to a group at a university I once tried to illustrate how an audience affects actors by the quality of its attention. I asked for a volunteer. A man came forward, and I gave him a sheet of paper on which was typed a speech from Peter Weiss’s play about Auschwitz, \textit{The Investigation} … The volunteer was too struck and too appalled by what he was reading [and] … something of his seriousness and concentration reached the audience and it fell silent. Then at my request he began to read out loud … Immediately the audience understood.

\begin{quote}
Peter Brook \textit{The Empty Space} 1968\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

‘The Theater Lab seeks a spectator-witness, but the spectator’s testimony is only possible if the actor achieves an authentic act. If there is no authentic act, what is there to testify to?’\textsuperscript{59}

\begin{quote}
Jerzy Grotowski 1969
\end{quote}

The Frankfurt Auschwitz trials are barely remembered now, but when Peter Brook got his student to read the text of Peter Weiss’ play (that would now be called testimonial theater), the events in Germany were fresh in people’s minds. In the early-mid 1960s, along with the Eichmann trial, the conduct of life and death in Nazi Germany and beyond was raw and live. Peter Brook had no trouble getting his volunteer student to read the text, with no acting or hamming, and the audience deeply responding. In this epigraph, we also notice that something happened in silence, too, that is before any words were read. The student, whose silent read had already said enough, changed the atmosphere, that caused an attentiveness and a response – in the sense of forming a responsibility – in those present. In Jerzy Grotowski’s terms, the young reader’s authenticity created a form of testimony in those who spectate, whose responsibility is shaped through that encounter. Let me now break the spell, for Brook did the same thing with another student, giving him the names of the French and English from \textit{Henry V}. It was terrible. The second student hammed, putting on posh and


\textsuperscript{57} I will be by-passing the recent work on theatrocrcy, which speaks more to politics than theater.

\textsuperscript{58} Brook, \textit{Empty Space}, 27-28.

declaiming, not reading. The audience, needless to say, did not respond. In attempting to unpick the problem, the answer of the students was simple. Auschwitz was in a near past, Agincourt aeons before. Brook then got the student actor to read and audience respond with the Shakespearean text, as names as lived individuals, ‘as if the butchery had occurred in living memory’. Brook describes a situation where the reader now read the names as if they were live, and the audience concentrated hard. Now the names hung with a heavy silence after each name was read out, the reader responding to the lives that had been lost, and the audience responded - as spectator-witnesses. It was now an authentic, and marked a profound anagnorisis, not in any didactic or lyrical sense, but through the bodies of those who read and responded. But these bodies were not empty vessels, the theasthai of their silent responses shaped through another body, whose silence (or laughter or enragement), demands a response. The precise neurobiological basis for this response is now understood, but in the 1960s was yet to be uncovered. For I stress, this is a response of the body, first and foremost, despite the involvement of words. In the first instance, there was silence which drew in the audience, just as the words repelled in a vacuum but were redeemed with a sense of being.

Of course, the 1960s are now 50 years ago, and the events of Nazi Germany that were still so horrifically fresh at the time now bear a stronger resemblance to Agincourt in terms of time, place and distance, at an intellectual level. New horrors have taken over. Brook would tell actors to reach into what they know to make Weiss’ play speak now, or Shakespeare’s. Without that point of connection, which dramaturg Hana Worthen calls a nodal knot, there can be no ability for connections between actors and audience to be made. In other work, I have shown how easily the texts of law become something different once a generation or two loses sight of the events of a past that are imbricated within law, reordering texts accordingly. Without that point of connection, there is a tin ear. But of course, this is serious when texts are altered to suit, when the point of an anagnorisis is misplaced and reordered to suit politics or purpose. What this suggests is that the point of the theatrical is that the way we read is a two-way street, one that demands an active and conscious response or responsiveness.

But for lawyers, the idea of the theatrical can be so easily misunderstood. In 2006, Sir Alan Moses, then a judge, presented a lecture called The Mask and the Judge at Trinity College Oxford that was later reproduced an article in the Southern Cross Law Review in Australia. The purpose of the mask was to shield the court, the judge, from their own personal response to injustice, for the law to be applied. In 2014, he left the Court of Appeal, moving to a press complaints role. In The Guardian’s view ‘He is the court of appeal judge who showed too much personality to advance to the very summit of the judiciary.’ As Connal Parsley reminds us (along with the critical position of the mask and persona in law), the mask and persona, in the Ciceronian sense, was to ensure a conformity and expectation of being, and more recent work on the personhood in law turns us away from the theatrical of the kind that is productive in law – that is for lawyers to move beyond the theatrical as a negative and the body of the interpreter as a negative, and move towards the body as positive.

We can look to the work that Ann Genovese, Shaun McVeigh and Peter Rush have carried out on office, responsibility, and the forms of training that a jurisprudent should carry out for a more

---

60 Brook, Empty Space, 27-29.
62 Leiboff, “Theatricalising Law in Three”.
64 Owen Bowcott and Roy Greenslade, “Here comes the judge – the maverick aiming to tame Britain’s raucous press,” The Guardian Friday 16 May 2014 https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2014/may/16/sir-alan-moses-ipso-profile
responsive exercise of writing through jurisography. Their recommendation is to undertake training in responsibility through Pierre Hadot’s training in philosophy through the practice of writing:

Since the nineteen eighties, law and humanities scholarship and its various institutions have developed a number of distinct modes of investigating forms of law and the ways in which we might conduct lawful relations or belong to law. One way centres on the question of how might a life be lived and lived well. This question, which has links to the Greeks, and since, sits at the centre of particular traditions of philosophy, history, and jurisprudence. We call this the conduct of life tradition, and following the historian Pierre Hadot, we are interested in how these disciplines - especially philosophy - treat their daily tasks as ‘spiritual exercises’ or forms of training in how to live and meet the obligations of their disciplinary, or later institutional, office. At least in part, jurisprudence, we argue, can be treated as a training in *persona* and office. For us, jurisography is a way to train ourselves, as a form of discipline or exercise, to explain how we think and act with the writing of jurisprudence. It is not so much conceptually programmatic as a studied acknowledgement of the relational duties of the writer and the jurisprudent, and of the experiences of a life lived with law. The duties that attach to the persona of jurisographer, we suggest, are to take care of the many forms and sources of the material expression and styles of jurisprudence that the jurisographer inherits, and, to be clear, that they are not only inherited from jurists, judges and jurisprudents. It is also to understand how the fragmentary sources and forms of jurisprudence that people live with everyday (the official, and the unofficial) condition and contour the conduct of their lawful relations in our own time (references omitted).

But one thing is missing here, in the forms of writing and the conduct of office that they recommend. And that is that there is an assumption – that responsibility will come through writing. I suggest, instead, that it has to come through the body and to acknowledge that a trained body will not laugh when they ought not, will not be outraged when they ought not, and that the body will respond carefully – so long as the body (of lawyer, judge, reader) is made responsive and responsible beyond the self. Olivia Barr’s movement, 67 and Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 68 in the places and spaces of movement, asking us to notice how we walk and what that walk entails, 69 and what materialities afford, and through that the responsibilities that the jurist holds and enacts. Thus law is a call to response and responsibility, to a form of training in life and lifeworld to be an active lawyer. 70

**Training the body to take responsibility**

In Poland there is a small company led by a visionary, Jerzy Grotowski, that also has a sacred aim. The theater, he believes, cannot be an end in itself ... [it] is a vehicle, a means for self-study, self-exploration, a possibility of salvation. The actor has himself as his field of work ... [and] does not

---

hesitate to show himself exactly as he is, for he realizes that the secret of the role demands his opening up ... so that the act of performance is an act of sacrifice ... his gift to the spectator.\textsuperscript{71}

Peter Brook \textit{The Empty Space} 1968

The core of theater is encounter. The man who makes an act of self-revelation is one who establishes contact with himself.

Grotowski \textit{Towards a Poor Theater} 1968\textsuperscript{72}

I will end now, with a series of epigraphs, and a small story of a presentation. I am in the process of finalising the writing of a long-overdue book, \textit{Towards a Theatrical Jurisprudence}, and I am indebted to Grotowski, the title of my book referencing the one theater theorist who I took far too long to understand, and his seminal book of writings. I leave you with a small sense of the Grotowskian encounter, and the demands it makes on the spectator.

It is December 2015 and I present a piece at the Law Literature Humanities conference at UTS in Sydney. My piece has been placed in a Law and Literature panel. Theater is a hard nut to crack. I play a series of images, prefaced by a few references from Lehmann and one or other of these remarks of Grotowski. I play images that might be read, or misread, that have no text, and very little to do with what I am saying. I refer to a brand-new defamation decision, and the way that counsel in the case was able to remind the court of the Holocaust, in the face of a defamation claim by a self-declared Holocaust denier. The court had no trouble understanding this argument of counsel for the defence, which spoke to a time before. The images flowed, some making immediate sense, the Nazi entering Paris, and others that seemed to make no sense at all. I asked a French colleague to come, as I knew she would know the images that made no sense. These were of the Vel d’Hiv, an infamous moment in French history, that were recently denied as a French obligation by Marine Le Pen, in 2017. I write these final words on these pages just as she was defeated as the candidate for President of the Republic. The images didn’t lie, and most of France did not forget The Great Stain. Law thinks that it is fine to know rules, without knowing, or understanding how to know. We can look to theater to be reminded that, an unknowing self has the potential in law to do harm.

\textbf{The Present}

The cinema flashed on to a screen images from the past. As this is what the mind does to itself all through life, the cinema seems intimately real. Of course, it is nothing of the sort ... The theater, on the other hand, always asserts itself in the present. This is what can make it more real than the normal stream of consciousness. This is also what can make it so disturbing.\textsuperscript{73}

Peter Brook \textit{The Empty Space} 1968

\textsuperscript{71} Brook, \textit{Empty Space}, 66-67.


\textsuperscript{73} Brook, \textit{Empty Space}, 111.
These weren’t the only images I showed. There was a moment of confusion, where I placed images of Mai ’68 as a link between those of Nazi Germany and what was to come, and because 1968 was the year that Peter Brook, Jerzy Grotowski, and Richard Schechner published or contributed to publications inaugurating profound changes in the understanding of theater in the west. But there was another reason, because these images could be and were hard to read, seemingly speaking to World War Two images of Paris that had just ended. These images meant nothing, for a reason.

Some people in the room knew, but I wanted the confusion to be palpable, to obtain that momentary realisation of being out of one’s depth, where a confusion of images appeared that did not make sense. I felt fright and anticipation in the room. But then comfort – of the worst kind - new and familiar horrors were restored as the images moved again, into the present. They became familiar. Charlie Hebdo, the Bataclan, raw and alive, then and there. The images started to make sense, and those earlier unfamiliar images had the potential to mean something, that might have something to do with the horrors unfolding in Europe during 2015. The other images, of Mai ’68, could now be read, to an extent. The audience was silent. It was present. It was alive.

It was disturbing

And then I explained the most disturbing images of all. They weren’t from the present, or Mai ’68, but of those events that animated those men and women who developed theater in the 1960s. Here it was. A few images of men in the street and men at a train station. And of the Vel d’Hiv, images that looked so ordinary and everyday. But they were not silent, for Jewish men were being arrested in the street and deported, and the buses outside the Vel d’Hiv were waiting to deport those entrapped there – to be deported out of France. The words I spoke of the Vel d’Hiv mattered. They probably won’t be recalled by those there, and I won’t repeat it here, on these page, but they made the anagnorisis I sought manifest, in that experience and encounter that makes us notice injustice, and how to keep reminding ourselves how law, without experience, creates the conditions of injustice.

At these rare moments, the theater of joy, of catharsis, of celebration, the theater of exploration, the theater of shared meaning are one. But once gone, the moment is gone and it cannot be recaptured slavishly by imitation – the deadly creeps back, the search beings again.  

Peter Brook The Empty Space 1968

Here then, on the brink of an unwritten history, on the edge of the positive unconscious of law, similar in kind to the encryption, is a synecdoche, a mark of a hidden history of the juridical. We have literally to look behind the scenes, into the emptiness that is filled by images and imaginings, to apprehend the staging of law as a theatrical and present drama. 

Peter Goodrich

74 Brook, Empty Space, 151.