Curbing reckless and predatory lending: A statutory analysis of South Africa's National Credit Act

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Abstract
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This article provides a statement and an analysis of South Africa’s statutory provisions aimed at curbing reckless lending, and preventing predatory lending, to financial consumers. The focus of the article is on the statutory mechanisms for combatting reckless and predatory lending, including a critique of the success or otherwise of the implementation of the relevant legislation. The article aims to provide a comparative analysis of what is, overall, an innovative and effective regime, the aim of which is to protect vulnerable financial consumers from reckless and predatory lending practices. As such, it is hoped, that the article will provide useful techniques for the protection of borrowers in other common law jurisdictions, such as Australia, Canada and the United States, or indeed wherever vulnerable consumers of finance are liable to be exploited.

I Introduction

South Africa is a developing country,¹ with a population of approximately 55 million people,² of which 40 million are regarded as economically-active, and fall between the ages of 15 and 64.³ Of this, approximately 25 per cent are unemployed,⁴ and in excess of 2.5 million adults are classified as illiterate.⁵ This presents opportunities for unscrupulous financial service providers, and

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⁴ United Nations, above n 1, 156.
especially lenders, to take advantage of the large number of unsophisticated financial consumers in South Africa. It is within this context that the South African legislation is noteworthy.

The amount of credit granted to consumers has increased substantially from R1.1 trillion in 2007 to R1.5 trillion in 2014. There were 21.7 million credit active consumers and out of these, 9.6 million (44.2%) had impaired records. This increase has also led to an evolution of the problem of household over-indebtedness. Household debt to disposable income in South Africa is still high, even though the overall household indebtedness is actually down from its early peaks: Q4 2008 — 81.9% and this fell to 74.3% in Q4 2013. This is an indication that a large portion of household incomes still goes to servicing debt.6

As an expression of an overarching policy for the protection of financial consumers, South Africa’s National Parliament enacted the National Credit Act7 in 2005. Its aim was to address the inadequacies of the previous legislative regime,8 which included an outdated and ineffective regulatory framework,9 comprised of inadequate mechanisms to promote the rehabilitation of consumers, or to assist already over-indebted consumers to deal with their debt.10

The objects and purport of this Act are, inter alia, to combat reckless lending11 (that is to say lending which is reckless as regards a particular consumer’s existing indebtedness), combat the problem of over-indebtedness generally,12 and prohibit predatory lending.

There are many who criticize this legislation, arguing that this will overburden the economy and will lead to significant costs for business ... despite the increased costs for business, the legislation is necessary in order to prevent the exploitation of consumers ... many acknowledge that the introduction of the National Credit Act shielded South Africa from some of the worst excesses of the global recession of 2008/2009.13

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7 National Credit Act 2005 (South Africa).
10 Ibid 13 [2.9].
11 See definition below, ‘Section 80: Reckless credit’. See also: CM Van Heerden and A Boraine, ‘The Money or the Box: Perspectives on Reckless Credit in Terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ (2011) 44 De Jure 392.
12 National Credit Act s 3(g). See also ch 4 pt D ss 78–88 (‘Over-indebtedness and reckless credit’) See also: Department of Trade and Industry, Republic of South Africa, above n 9, 30–2.
This is the first time in the history of South Africa’s consumer-credit legislation that such provisions have been enacted.\(^{14}\) The legislative mechanisms employed are at once farsighted and straightforward, and serve as a useful comparative model that other jurisdictions may wish to study in order, similarly, to discourage reckless and predatory lending.

Predatory lending creates overly indebted consumers, threatens livelihoods, and can trap people in a cycle of poverty.\(^{15}\)

The Act provides, chiefly, 12 innovations. These are as follows:

(i) Credit agreements must be in plain language.\(^{16}\)
(ii) All credit agreements must contain a quote as to costs, and the issuer is bound by the quote for 5 days.\(^{17}\)
(iii) The Act prescribes information that must be included regarding the costs of credit, to be contained in all advertising and marketing materials.\(^{18}\)
(iv) Credit sales at a person’s private dwelling or place of employment are strictly limited.\(^{19}\)
(v) Reasons must be provided if a credit application is declined.\(^{20}\)
(vi) Automatic increases in credit limits are prohibited,\(^{21}\) save for where the consumer has agreed in writing to such increases,\(^{22}\) subject to strict conditions.
(vii) Reckless lending is prohibited.\(^{23}\)
(viii) Interest, fees and charges are regulated on all agreements, including microloans.\(^{24}\)
(ix) Credit Bureau is regulated\(^{25}\) and consumers have the right to a free credit bureau record.\(^{26}\)
(x) Debt counselling is introduced, to enable restructuring of debts for over-indebted consumers.\(^{27}\)
(xi) The Act promotes the development of a ‘fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and

\(^{14}\) Renke, Roestoff and Haupt, above n 8, 244.
\(^{16}\) National Credit Act s 64 (1)(b).
\(^{17}\) Ibid s 92(3).
\(^{18}\) Ibid ss 76(4)(d), (5), 92.
\(^{19}\) Ibid s 75.
\(^{20}\) Ibid s 62.
\(^{21}\) Ibid s 74(2).
\(^{22}\) Ibid s 119(4).
\(^{23}\) Ibid s 80.
\(^{25}\) National Credit Act s 43.
\(^{26}\) Ibid s 70.
\(^{27}\) National Credit Act ss 14(a), 44, 46, 47(1), 48(2), 61(2)(c), 71, 83(3)(b)(ii), 85(a)–(b); 86–8; 129–30; 139(1)(b)(i), 152(1)(e).
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accessible credit market and industry’, by, inter alia, monitoring the ‘levels of consumer indebtedness and the incidence and social effects of over-indebtedness’, by conducting research and developing policies and proposing legislative amendments.

(xii) The Act establishes a National Credit Tribunal. First this article will provide a definition of reckless and predatory lending, followed by an analysis of how consumer protection policy is expressed by the National Credit Act. Third, an analysis of key provisions of the Act, and then fourth, a discussion of enforcement mechanisms. Finally, concluding observations are provided.

Throughout this article consumers will be taken to mean individual consumers who are natural persons. Issues in the protection of sophisticated consumers, or corporations as consumers, are not canvassed.

II Reckless and predatory lending defined

A Reckless lending

Reckless lending is a category of malpractice undoubtedly more egregious than irresponsible lending. Where irresponsible lending refers to credit extended despite being unsuitable to a consumer’s needs, reckless lending is understood in English common-law as more akin to gross negligence or a reckless disregard for serious harm.

Wilson is of the view that the South African approach is, as a result, more restrictive than an approach which prohibits irresponsible lending. She cites as evidence the consumer’s obligation to answer truthfully all questions put to them by the lender, where a failure to do so will afford the lender a complete defence against a claim of reckless lending. She states therefore, that the ‘consumer is therefore responsible for “reckless” borrowing’.

Based upon a comprehensive review of the Act, however, this analysis does not take into account the Act’s emphasis on the responsibility of the lender to ask whatever questions are pertinent and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the consumer understands and appreciates the risks and the costs of the loan; to assess the consumer’s debt-repayment history; and to assess the consumer’s existing financial means and obligations. If after all of those enquiries have been made, a consumer fails to answer fully and truthfully, that will nonetheless not be a complete defence, as Wilson asserts. It will only

28 Ibid s 13(a).
29 Ibid ss 13(c)(iv), 70(5).
30 Ibid s 13(d).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 National Credit Act s 81(4).
36 Wilson, above n 32.
37 National Credit Act s 81(2)(a)(i).
38 Ibid s 81(2)(a)(ii).
39 Ibid s 81(2)(a)(iii).
become a complete defence if the lender can demonstrate that the consumer’s failure to answer fully and truthfully had a material effect on the lender’s ability to make a proper assessment.  

Consequently, a better understanding of the choice of the word ‘reckless’ in the Act may be one of semantics, and may in fact in the case of the South African legislation be more akin to ‘irresponsible’. To this end, Rapp states as follows:

falling somewhere between ‘negligence’ and ‘intentional misconduct,’ recklessness has evaded precise judicial interpretation for two hundred years.

In South Africa, reckless lending is defined by the Act by reference to processes and outcomes, specifically: as a failure to take reasonable steps to assess whether the consumer understands their rights and obligations under a credit agreement, along with a failure to assess the consumer’s credit history, coupled with a failure to assess the consumer’s capacity to repay, taking account of their current obligations. If the consumer is applying for a loan for a commercial purpose, the lender must take reasonable steps to assess the feasibility and the potential success of the venture. If the outcomes of such assessments were against lending the consumer money, and in addition, lending to the consumer would leave them over-indebted, but the lender extended the loan nonetheless, then that loan would be regarded as ‘reckless’.

B Predatory lending

Predatory lending is more difficult to define. Engle and McCoy define predatory lending to include at least two of the following: loans which result in serious harm to consumers; harmful rent seeking; loans involving fraud and deception; other instances of a lack of transparency which are not actionable as fraud; and requiring consumers to surrender their rights to legal redress. Goldstein defines predatory lending as containing three sets of essential characteristics, namely those relating to the terms and consequences of the loan; the manner in which the consumer obtained the loan; and finally, the power imbalance between the lender and the consumer, with particular reference to the consumer’s experience and access to information.

C Reckless as compared to predatory lending

Effectively, these are matters of degree. Put simply, reckless lending ignores a consumer’s circumstances. Predatory lending actively preys upon those circumstances. The Act specifically addresses ‘reckless lending’ but,
because predatory lending cannot be precisely defined, by addressing other malpractices that would typically enable predatory lending, the Act seeks to address that phenomenon too. It must be acknowledged, however, that in South Africa this has met with mixed results.

One, typical example of predatory lending often takes the form of so-called ‘payday’ loans, and there are examples of these in South Africa. While payday loans are not in and of themselves predatory, they often have predatory characteristics. Despite the legislative attempts to curb predatory lending in South Africa, there is evidence of predatory practices, and often these have been concealed within payday loans. Indeed, there is evidence not only of predatory payday lending practices in South Africa under the Act but, furthermore, that these practices were so egregious that they triggered civil unrest, which precipitated the ‘Marikana massacre’.

III The National Credit Act as consumer policy

A Aims

The purpose of the National Credit Act is to:

- promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit[50]
- and for that purpose to provide for the general regulation of consumer credit ... and improved standards of consumer information; ... to prohibit certain unfair credit and credit-marketing practices; to promote responsible credit granting ... to prohibit reckless credit granting; ... to establish national norms and standards relating to consumer credit; to promote a consistent enforcement framework ... establish the National Credit Regulator and the National Consumer Tribunal ...

The Act therefore seeks to do a number of things. These range from prohibiting reckless credit extension to creating a fairer industry, serving, henceforth, better-informed consumers. The Act tackles predatory lending practices by prohibiting misleading and unfair marketing and selling practices — an important provision in a society with a large number of financially unsophisticated consumers (see for example ss 90 (2)(a)(i)–(ii), which makes void any credit contract that contains provisions which are deceptive or fraudulent), and includes outlawing negative option marketing — that is to say, an agreement whereby silence will be regarded as consent, to the creation of the agreement.

This is a reflection of the concerns of the legislator: that in a country where many consumers are semi- or illiterate, opportunities for unscrupulous lenders to prey upon the weakest and most vulnerable consumers are almost limitless.

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47 See ‘Section 90: Unlawful provisions of credit agreement’ below.
49 See further: ‘F The “Marikana” connection’ below.
50 For a definition of what constitutes a credit agreement under the Act, see: Renke, Roestoff and Haupt, above n 8, 235.
51 National Credit Act Preamble.
52 Ibid s 76(4)(c)(ii).
53 Ibid.
54 National Credit Act s 74(1).
Moreover, the provisions aimed at prohibiting misleading and unfair conduct are worded sufficiently broadly that a court or tribunal can evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular practice is unfair or misleading, having regard to the circumstances of a particular consumer.

This is a feature that occurs throughout the Act: the onus is placed squarely upon lenders to both conduct themselves appropriately, and to know their customers, while courts and tribunals are empowered to take account of the consumers they have before them: consumers who are illiterate or semiliterate, and who represent the easiest prey to unscrupulous lenders would be entitled, under the Act, to protection from courts or tribunals, commensurate with their vulnerability. This acknowledgement in the Act of the different strata of consumers, and the different levels of protection that may be afforded, by way of leeway granted to courts and tribunals, places consumer protection at the core of this Act, and is, it is argued, from the standpoint of consumer policy, one of the most outstanding features of the South African legislation.

The Act prohibits unilateral changes to a credit agreement, notwithstanding any provision in the credit contract or at common law to the contrary, (or where the agreement as a whole purports to deprive a common law right)\textsuperscript{55} — in particular changes to the interest or fees payable,\textsuperscript{56} or the period of repayment or the minimum amount payable;\textsuperscript{57} nor may the credit provider unilaterally extend to the consumer increased credit facilities.\textsuperscript{58}

These provisions are aimed at curbing both reckless and predatory lending, by preventing consumers from being blind-sided by so-called loan interest ‘reset’ provisions (the practice by which consumers are enticed into entering into loan contracts by virtue of low, fixed interest rates, which then later ‘reset’ to higher, floating rates, often at levels that are unaffordable); prevent credit providers from being able to contract out of the provisions of the Act;\textsuperscript{59} and prevent credit providers from continuing to extend credit to unsophisticated consumers, until those consumers are over-indebted, and caught in a debt trap.

Both reset shock and poor risk assessment are specifically addressed by the National Credit Act, and so should be viewed not just as a form of consumer protection, but also as a potential bulwark against systemic threats to the broader economy.\textsuperscript{60}

There are at least four factors that can be identified [as causing the sub-prime disaster, two of which were]: reset shock, [and] poor assessment of the risks by the lending institution ...

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid ss 90(2)(c), as prescribed by the Minister under s 90(5).
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid ss 104 (1)(a)–(b).
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid ss 120 (1)(a)–(b).
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid ss 119(1)–(4).
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid ss 90 (2(a)(i), (2)(b).
Moreover, these provisions — namely prohibitions on unilateral changes to credit agreements — act as a break on a lender’s ability to force upon consumers standard-form contracts, that may contain provisions which would enable the lender to gain virtually unfettered power to change, vary or amend provisions in the contract, as they see fit. Compare this with the position in, for example, Australia, where standard-form contracts for financial services are typical, and where the only fetter upon the unscrupulous use of this power resides in the prohibitions on unfair contract terms contained in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), and then only in respect of contracts for the provision of financial services, where those contracts meet the definition of ‘standard-form’. Consequently the emphasis in the South African legislation is quite different from that of, for example, Australia: in South Africa changes cannot be made unilaterally. In Australia changes can be made unilaterally unless they can be proven to be unfair, and only if they form part of a standard-form contract. Consequently consumer policy is once again front and centre in the National Credit Act, with a clear emphasis on placing the onus on the credit provider to prove they are in compliance, not on the consumer to prove the credit provider is in breach.

B Research

A further, noteworthy aspect of the Act, is the manner in which it seeks to shine a light onto debt practices in the Republic. In extreme cases, industries have sought to outlaw research into the harmful effects of the products they produce. One such example is the prohibition on the conduct of research into deaths by gun violence in the United States. In contradistinction to such an approach, the National Credit Act specifically requires the National Credit Regulator (‘NCR’) to conduct research into socio-economic trends in consumer credit in the Republic, especially as regards over-indebtedness, and to make known its findings.

These findings are contained in the NCR’s Annual Reports, and in research commissioned by the NCR. They provide insights into educational initiatives; trends in the credit market, such as increases in the use of

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62 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) sub-div BA s 12BF (‘Unfair terms of consumer contracts and small business contracts’).
63 Ibid.
66 Section 16(1)(c).
68 National Credit Act ss 16(1)–(2).
unsecured credit;\textsuperscript{70} trends in the number of consumers with impaired credit records;\textsuperscript{71} trends in the costs of credit;\textsuperscript{72} trends in alternative dispute resolution;\textsuperscript{74} trends in levels of household debt;\textsuperscript{75} distribution of debt by province;\textsuperscript{77} breakdowns of indebtedness by income bracket;\textsuperscript{78} compliance trends;\textsuperscript{79} trends in respect of debt counselling;\textsuperscript{80} trends in respect of complaints, investigations and enforcement, including significant court decisions;\textsuperscript{81} and a statistical report on the consumer credit market, tracking trends in consumer finance, issued quarterly.\textsuperscript{82}

Overall, research commissioned by the NCR has indicated various trends since the enactment of the Act. For example, while there has been evidence of improvements in access to credit,\textsuperscript{83} overall, access to credit remains

\textsuperscript{70} National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2011/2012}, above n 69, 14, 24; National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2012/2013}, above n 69, 27; National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2014/2015}, above n 69, 27; Motshegare, above n 69, 7.


\textsuperscript{72} National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2011/2012}, above n 69, 22; National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2014}, above n 6, 38; Motshegare, above n 69, 4.

\textsuperscript{73} National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2011/2012}, above n 69, 22; National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2012/2013}, above n 69, 32.

\textsuperscript{74} National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2011/2012}, above n 69, 22; National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2012/2013}, above n 69, 23.

\textsuperscript{75} National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2011/2012}, above n 69, 24; National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2014}, above n 6, 32–4.

\textsuperscript{76} National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2011/2012}, above n 69, 23.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid 25; National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2012/2013}, above n 69, 28; National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2014}, above n 6, 35.

\textsuperscript{78} National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2011/2012}, above n 69, 25; National Credit Regulator, \textit{Annual Report 2012/2013}, above n 69, 29; Motshegare, above n 69, 4.


A statutory analysis of South Africa’s *National Credit Act* persistently inadequate;\(^\text{84}\) anecdotal evidence suggesting that by capping interest rates and fees, loans to smaller and higher-risk consumers may have been discouraged, inhibiting access to credit by those consumers;\(^\text{85}\) more expensive credit-granting processes due to the provisions of the Act, (but potentially off-set against lower levels of bad debts);\(^\text{86}\) a decline in the cost of credit across certain categories;\(^\text{87}\) particularly furniture finance;\(^\text{88}\) serious inefficiencies and backlogs in debt counselling services;\(^\text{89}\) regulatory and legislative shortcomings leading to, for example, a low number of those consumers in need of debt review enjoying adjudication by the courts;\(^\text{90}\) reductions in average household debt;\(^\text{91}\) but persistent problems of financial vulnerability among consumers;\(^\text{92}\) trends in the granting of unsecured credit;\(^\text{93}\) trends in respect of developmental credit;\(^\text{94}\) obstacles in practice surrounding proof of recklessness;\(^\text{95}\) and a lack of transparency and price comparability for consumers wishing to compare loans.\(^\text{96}\)

There is evidence that, as at the time of the compilation of the report,\(^\text{97}\) the increase in the number of consumers with impaired credit records had increased by 426 000 year on year.\(^\text{98}\) Set against a total of 18,51 million consumers of finance in the Republic, of which 8,61 million had impaired credit records (47 per cent of total), an increase of almost half a million consumers with impaired records, year on year, might be regarded by some as evidence that there is already too much access to credit. It may be argued, therefore, that greater access to credit, especially in respect of high-risk microloans, facilitated by lower regulatory costs, would be to the overwhelming benefit of the lenders, not the consumers.\(^\text{99}\) It seems intuitive that increased loans by higher-risk micro-lenders, would return a higher percentage of impaired records than the overall level of impaired records for the entire consumer market. In light of the fact that the overall level of

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\(^{84}\) Developmentnomics, *Literature Review on the Impact of the National Credit Act (NCA) Has Had (sic) on South Africa’s Credit Market*, Final Report (National Credit Regulator, June 2012) 52.


\(^{86}\) Developmentnomics, above n 84, 34.

\(^{87}\) Hawkins, above n 83, 1.

\(^{88}\) Ibid 4.


\(^{90}\) Roestoff et al, above n 89, 247; Developmentnomics, above n 84, 13.

\(^{91}\) Developmentnomics, above n 84, 62.

\(^{92}\) Ibid 19.

\(^{93}\) Ibid 58.

\(^{94}\) Ibid 106.

\(^{95}\) Ibid.

\(^{96}\) Ibid 107.

\(^{97}\) Ibid.

\(^{98}\) Ibid 108.

\(^{99}\) See also: Mphahlele, above n 85.
impaired consumers is approaching 50 per cent, it would appear that the argument could be made that current regulatory costs are not high enough, much less too low.

Finally, there is evidence that some consumers are using the protection of the Act to game the system, although evidence of the need to protect illiterate and financially unsophisticated consumers, remains strong.\textsuperscript{100}

The most recent figures quarter-on-quarter, as at March 2016, indicate that the value of mortgages granted decreased by 16,45 per cent; secured credit granted decreased by 18,22 per cent; unsecured credit agreements decreased by 15, 97 per cent; credit facilities (consisting mainly of credit cards, store cards and bank overdrafts) decreased by 4,72 per cent; short-term credit decreased by 28,46 per cent; while developmental credit increased by 212,25 per cent.\textsuperscript{101}

C Ambit

The \textit{National Credit Act} previously regulated every type of entity that extended credit: banks, micro-lenders, pawn brokers,\textsuperscript{102} furniture and clothing retailers, entities both foreign and domestic, and organs of state.\textsuperscript{103} The only exception was credit granted not at arm’s length, such as between family members.\textsuperscript{104} Entities that extend credit, and which were captured by the provisions of the Act, were required to register with the NCR.\textsuperscript{105} Indeed, the only entities that extended credit, but were not required to register with the NCR, were those with fewer than 100 loans in their portfolio — such as ‘stokvels’ — or those whose portfolios were worth less than ZAR 500 000.\textsuperscript{106}

In South Africa, traditionally, black communities have assisted one another through the provision of so-called ‘stokvel’ finance. Stokvels operate as community savings clubs and are exempted from registration under the Act.\textsuperscript{107} Typically they have approximately 12 members or more, with each member contributing to a central fund on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis. Stokvels are virtually only utilised by low- or very low-income black South Africans — and then predominantly by older black South Africans. Members usually meet monthly at a party hosted by one of the members, and in return for which the host may be expected to make a small profit. The central fund is then loaned to each member, in turn, for anything from funeral expenses, the purchase of groceries, to home improvements.\textsuperscript{108} There are currently approximately 800 000 stokvels in South Africa, worth an estimated ZAR 45 billion, and with somewhere between 8, 6 and 9 million members. Most are

\textsuperscript{100} Developmentnomics, above n 84, 109.
\textsuperscript{101} National Credit Regulator, \textit{Consumer Credit Market Report (CCMR)}, First Quarter/March 2016, 1–2.
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{National Credit Act} s 1; Renke, Roestoff and Haupt, above n 8, 232.
\textsuperscript{103} Renke, Roestoff and Haupt, above n 8, 236.
\textsuperscript{104} For an account of types of agreement not at arm’s length, see: ibid 237.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{National Credit Act} s 40(1)(a).
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid s 8(2)(c).
represented by the National Stokvel Association of South Africa. Clearly the legislator did not intend to cover stokvels, as registration for these community savings clubs would be unduly onerous.

While entities other than stokvels, but which were below the threshold of 100 loans or ZAR 500 000 were previously not required to register with the Regulator, they were nonetheless subject to the provisions of the Act in every particular.

This led to conduct problems with small, unregistered moneylenders, who argued that they were not subject to the provisions of the Act. As a result the Act was amended, so that henceforth anyone who extends credit in an amount in excess of the amount set by the Minister would have to register as a credit provider. The Minister set this amount at nil ZAR, thereby capturing anyone who extends credit to another person, where the credit includes the repayment of any fees or interest. The only exception being loans made not at arm’s length, such as between family members.

every person or entity that trades as a credit provider, even the smallest, illegal and informal credit providers are encouraged to register ... regulate and monitor all credit providers ... in order to promote responsible credit lending, to curb reckless credit lending and reduce the over indebtedness of consumers ... registered credit providers are prohibited from engaging in unconscionable and unscrupulous conduct, such as the outright criminal practices often used by illegal and informal credit providers ... This new threshold is an innovation in the industry that will largely contribute to an equal playing field in the credit market. The threshold will increase legal and responsible credit lending, which will in turn lead to broader financial inclusion ...

A credit provider required to register in terms of the Act, but which does not register, must not offer credit, and if it does so, any such credit agreements are void from the date upon which they were entered into. In so doing, the responsibility is placed squarely upon the providers of credit, which if they fail to discharge, will leave them in a position of having no recourse against the consumer.

**D Enforcement of debts and contractual liability**

The Act prohibits heavy-handed debt enforcement processes, no doubt aimed at preventing debt collectors from frightening consumers into repayment. It is

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110 National Credit Amendment Act 2014 s 10.


112 National Credit Act s 8(3)(b).

113 Ibid s 4(1)-(2).


115 National Credit Act s 40(4). See also: Matthew Thomson, Am I Required to Register as a Credit Provider? Recent Changes to the National Credit Act and Regulations (21 June 2016) Dingley Marshall <http://www.dingleymarshall.co.za/am-i-required-to-register-as-a-credit-provider/>. 
suggested that while this is not aimed at achieving anything more than addressing the ‘how’ of the debt-collection process, as opposed to the ‘when’ or the ‘if’, it is nonetheless an important provision aimed at civilising the process and protecting consumers from intimidation. Put differently, if a consumer can be forced to repay their debts, good and well, but they should not, in the process of being subjected to debt collection, be terrorised.\textsuperscript{116}

The Act ousts the \textit{parol evidence rule} in favour of the consumer, by preventing credit providers from contractually escaping from any representations made prior to the commencement of the contract, which may have induced the contract.\textsuperscript{117} Moreover, the Act seeks to address inadequate consumer redress and dispute resolution, and even poor customer service.\textsuperscript{118}

\section*{E Access to credit}

In terms of access to credit — an important feature in a developing economy where a sizeable portion of the population has historically not enjoyed equality of access to credit — an applicant is, by law, assured that they will be granted any credit they apply for, unless there are legitimate reasons for a refusal.\textsuperscript{119} The Act does this by granting every person the right to apply for credit,\textsuperscript{120} and requires that credit only be refused on reasonable commercial grounds.\textsuperscript{121} The Act does not establish a right to require a credit provider to enter into a credit agreement, but merely that no discrimination takes place in the provision of credit.\textsuperscript{122} This prohibition on discrimination must, according to the Act, be read with the objects and purport of the Constitution,\textsuperscript{123} (which prohibits discrimination based upon ‘race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth’), and with the provisions of the \textit{Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act}. The relevant provisions are contained in ch 2 of the Act,\textsuperscript{124} which deal with the ‘Prevention, Prohibition and Elimination of Unfair Discrimination, Hate Speech and Harassment’, and within ch 2, by s 6, which is a ‘Prevention and general prohibition of unfair discrimination’; s 7, which is a ‘Prohibition of unfair discrimination on ground of race’; s 8, which is a ‘Prohibition of unfair discrimination on ground of gender’; s 9, which is a ‘Prohibition of unfair discrimination on ground of disability’; s 11, which is

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item[116] See, eg, \textit{National Credit Act} s 133 (‘Prohibited collection and enforcement practices’).
\item[117] \textit{National Credit Act} s 90(2)(b)(ii).
\item[118] Solli-Hubbard, above n 3, 72.
\item[119] Ibid.
\item[120] \textit{National Credit Act} s 60(1).
\item[121] Ibid s 60(2).
\item[122] Ibid s 60(3).
\item[123] \textit{Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996} (South Africa) s 9(3).
\item[124] \textit{Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act} 2000 (South Africa) ch 2.
\end{thebibliography}
A statutory analysis of South Africa’s National Credit Act

a ‘Prohibition of harassment’; and s 12, which is a ‘Prohibition of dissemination and publication of unfair discriminatory information that unfairly discriminates’.

These prohibitions against unfair and discriminatory treatment under s 61(1) extend to and include: assessing the consumer’s credit worthiness; accessing to an application for credit; any aspect of the costs involved; assessing or requiring compliance with any aspect of a credit agreement; exercising any of the credit provider’s rights; ‘determining whether to continue, enforce, seek judgment in respect of, or terminate a credit agreement’; or reporting any consumer’s record. Where an application does result in a refusal, the applicant has a right to know the reasons. This is an important provision, because credit providers will need to be accurate and circumspect in the reasons they provide. If the reasons are inadequate or unreasonable, then that would form the basis for a review of the provider’s decision. Put differently, the credit provider cannot provide generic reasons by way of a form letter. The provider would need to demonstrate a reasonable measure of engagement with the applicant’s circumstances. Furthermore, the provider will not be able to rely on reasons, other than the reasons provided to the applicant, and so will be compelled to provide reasons which are, to the best of the ability of the provider, complete and comprehensive.

Credit granters are obligated to ensure, not only that consumers can afford the credit, but also that they understand the costs and risks associated with that credit.

F The ‘Marikana’ connection

Despite these provisions, however, the Act has failed to completely remove the scourge of unsecured, predatory loans. Indeed, unsecured loans in South Africa have become the biggest growth market for the four major South African banks. In at least one instance, the reckless provision of loans, in a manner that many have argued was predatory, resulted in social conditions that ultimately gave rise to a massacre at the hands of the South African Police. As Bateman states:

125 National Credit Act.
126 Ibid s 61(1)(a).
127 Ibid s 61(1)(b).
128 Ibid s 61(1)(c).
129 Ibid s 61(1)(d).
130 Ibid s 61(1)(e).
131 Ibid s 61(1)(f).
132 Ibid s 61(1)(g).
133 Ibid s 61(1)(h).
134 Solli-Hubbard, above n 3, 72.
135 Ibid.
136 Stuart Theobald, The Risk of Unsecured Lending in South Africa, Occasional Research Report (10 June 2013) 7. For more on the dangers of sub-prime (or microcredit as it is also known), and the devastation caused by the extension of sub-prime loans to the poorest of the poor in ‘Bolivia, Bosnia, Pakistan, Nicaragua, Morocco and most catastrophically, in Andhra Pradesh State in India, site of 250 000 suicides by indebted farmers’, see: Bateman, ‘Microcredit and Marikana’, above n 15, 2.
we have perhaps just witnessed one of the most appalling microcredit-related disasters of all in South Africa. Extreme over-indebtedness by workers apparently helped precipitate the Marikana massacre on August 16 [2012]. Miners employed at Lonmin’s mine were gradually seduced by local lending institutions into accessing far too much microcredit.\(^\text{137}\)

With far too many miners apparently forced into spending more on interest payments each week ... no matter how hard they tried, they simply could not prise themselves away from taking out a microcredit in advance of payday ... The miners’ desperation and anger was palpable, Lonmin refused to back down, and a massacre ensued [when South African Police Services members shot striking miners].\(^\text{138}\)

### IV Specific provisions

This part provides an account and an analysis of specific provisions in the *National Credit Act*, which deserve particular attention. Only those sections which, in this writer’s view, deserve attention, and which demonstrate consumer protection principles, are repeated here.

#### A Section 64: Right to information in plain and understandable language

South Africa has developed an admirable focus\(^\text{139}\) on plain language, concomitant with its progression to a democratic political dispensation in 1994. Examples include both South Africa’s *Final Constitution*\(^\text{140}\) and the *Interim Constitution*\(^\text{141}\) which preceded it, and the *Consumer Protection Act*.\(^\text{142}\) In a country with a large proportion of the population ill-educated and in some instances illiterate, it serves to strengthen the position of vulnerable consumers, by making legislation as accessible as possible. This is not only true for South Africa; it would be true for any country where consumers, made vulnerable by, for example, their lack of language skills, are present.

Again, as is a general feature of this Act, the onus is upon the producer of the document or contract to ensure that it is in plain language, and again, as is also a feature of this Act, a court or tribunal is given philosophical direction, in terms of reaching a conclusion as to compliance with the Act, but is specifically mandated to inquire into the particular circumstances of a consumer, upon whose behalf a complaint is brought.

In so doing the Act references ‘consumer of the class of persons for whom the document is intended’.\(^\text{143}\) Set against that must be the expected ability of a consumer with average literacy skills, but minimal credit experience, to understand that document, without undue effort. In particular a court or...

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\(^{137}\) Bateman, ‘Microcredit and Marikana’, above n 15, 2.

\(^{138}\) Ibid 3.


\(^{140}\) *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* 1996 (South Africa).

\(^{141}\) *Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* 1993 (South Africa).

\(^{142}\) *Consumer Protection Act* 2008 (South Africa).

\(^{143}\) *National Credit Act* s 64(2).
tribunal must have regard to the vocabulary and sentence structure used in the contract.\textsuperscript{144}

It is not in dispute that this creates a large leeway for courts and tribunals. But in the context of heavily skewed power relations between credit providers, and a potentially vulnerable consumer, the Act clearly aims to favour the latter. As a corollary, it is incumbent upon credit providers to know their customers (‘KYC’), and to err on the side of caution in the formulation and provision of documentation.

B Section 66: Protection of consumer credit rights

This section serves to outlaw any attempts by a credit provider to punish a consumer for exercising their rights, or to punish another party to the agreement (such as a guarantor). It prevents a credit provider from installing into a contract any provisions which would allow some sort of sanction to be imposed upon a consumer who exercises their rights, or complains about their treatment. This is a valuable provision, in that it prevents credit providers from bullying or coercing consumers. It is also useful, as part of a wider effort, to combat predatory lending.

C Section 76: Advertising practices

The effect of this section is, principally, to outlaw advertisements or promotional materials that are designed to, or have the effect of misleading or deceiving consumers, or are fraudulent or illegal, and which fail to inform consumers of the costs of a particular form of credit.

Such a provision is clearly aimed at curbing predatory lending. Where it can be shown that a credit provider breached this section, the consumer may seek to have their indebtedness made void. This not only places the onus squarely on the shoulders of the lender, but also the risk: if a lender can be shown to have extended credit to a class of persons in breach of this or other sections, they may face a ruling from a court or tribunal which would render void the indebtedness of a whole class of consumers. That in turn may cause the collapse of the lender.

D Section 80: Reckless credit

This section defines credit to be reckless where the granting of such credit would leave the consumer over-indebted.

It placed upon the credit provider an obligation to ‘know their customer’. Moreover, the credit provider was to be judged according to what information was available at the time the decision to grant credit was made. This was potentially different from the information which the credit provider actually obtained. Thus a failure to make a reasonable investigation of the potential consumer’s position, and a concomitant lack of adequacy of information obtained would not, it is suggested, have constituted a defence. The Act attempted therefore to provide an incentive for the credit provider to make a thorough investigation.

\textsuperscript{144} These issues were addressed by the High Court of South Africa in \textit{Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Dlamini} [2013] 1 SA 219 [52]–[53], [64].
Nonetheless, credit providers were attempting to evade responsibility for granting credit recklessly, by blaming the consumer for the inadequate provision of information. The information that a credit provider is required to ascertain has, therefore, now been specified in later regulatory amendments, and is compulsory. These ‘Affordability Assessments’ require a credit provider to ascertain, at a minimum, and subject to certain exceptions (such as pawn transactions, school or student loans, developmental credit, public interest credit agreements, emergency loans, temporary increases under existing credit agreements, incidental credit and the like) the consumer’s existing financial means and prospects and existing financial obligations. It must do so by requiring from the consumer:

(i) three payslips or bank statements indicating three salary deposits; or
(ii) for consumers who do not receive a salary, three instances of documentary proof of income or three months of bank statements; or
(iii) for consumers who are not formally employed, three months of bank statements or their latest financial statement;
(iv) where there is a material variance in pay, the provider must average out the gross income over the preceding 3-pay periods;
(v) the consumer must accurately disclose all of their obligations;
(vi) the consumer must submit ‘authentic’ documentation;
(vii) the provider must take into account other sources of income and, where appropriate, joint household income, as well as ‘existing financial means, prospects and obligations’;
(viii) the credit provider must utilise the expense norms table, contained in the regulations, which provide as follows:

147 South Africa, Government Notices, above n 145, ch 3, s 2.
149 South Africa, Government Notices, above n 145, s 4(a).
150 Ibid s 4(b).
151 Ibid s 4(c).
152 South Africa, Government Notices, above n 145, s 5.
153 Ibid s 6.
154 Ibid s 7.
155 National Credit Act s 78(3).
156 Ibid s 81(2)(a)(iii).
158 Ibid 19.
A statutory analysis of South Africa’s National Credit Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Minimum Monthly Fixed Factor</th>
<th>Monthly Fixed Factor = % of Income Above Band Minimum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R0.00</td>
<td>R800.00</td>
<td>R0.00</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R800.01</td>
<td>R6,250.00</td>
<td>R800.00</td>
<td>6.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>R25,000.01</td>
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<td>R50,000.01</td>
<td>Unlimited</td>
<td>R4,905.38</td>
<td>6.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ix) the credit provider must utilise the following methodology: ascertain gross income; include statutory deductions and minimum living expenses to arrive at net income, to be set against payment of debt instalments; and calculate discretionary income to satisfy repayments of new debts after existing debts are taken into account.\(^{159}\)

(x) the credit provider must take into account the consumer’s debt repayment history.\(^{160}\)

Where what constitutes the reckless granting of credit has been the subject of litigation, courts and tribunals have asserted that there is no hard and fast rule as to the provision of information to prove recklessness.\(^{161}\)

Once again, in setting out a list of information that should have been provided, I do not wish to be prescriptive or to lay down a law of the Medes and the Persians. It may be that a Defendant does not have to go as far as I have suggested in the previous paragraph.\(^{162}\)

Instead, courts have stated that a party seeking a court to exercise its discretion — and it is a discretion — in terms of s 80, must place as much information before the court as possible, in order to persuade the court to exercise that discretion.\(^{163}\)

The mere submission or even proof of over-indebtedness does not place a mandatory duty on the court to make an order in favour of the consumer and merely opens the door for the court to use its discretion.\(^{164}\)

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\(^{159}\) Ibid s 10.

\(^{160}\) Ibid s 13.

\(^{161}\) SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [56]. See also: Liphoko v ABSA Bank Ltd [2010] ZANCT 10 [4.2].

\(^{162}\) SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [69].


\(^{164}\) Kreuser, above n 163, paraphrasing Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales [2009] 3 SA 315 (D) [13].
Wisely, however, a loan from a pawn broker is an exception. For example, these agreements are not subject to the prohibitions on reckless lending.\textsuperscript{165} This provision is particularly insightful, because a loan from a pawn broker is set-off against movable property, which the creditor ‘pawns’, on the understanding that if the loan is not repaid, the property will be forfeited. Thus, collateral is provided, and if the consumer cannot repay, then the collateral is lost to the consumer, but nothing more. Put differently, loans from a pawn broker, where the consumer provides collateral, will not lead to a spiral of indebtedness. Moreover, individuals who pawn property are often in such a perilous financial position that loans to them would often, if not almost always, be categorised as ‘reckless’. The combination of financial desperation and fixed collateral is thus rightly, in this writer’s view, regarded as more important than the prohibition on reckless lending, which if enforced would prevent the consumer from being able to pawn their property.

E Section 82: Assessment mechanisms and procedures

This section allowed the credit provider to develop its own evaluative mechanisms, models or procedures to enable it to conduct the creditworthiness and suitability assessment, as was required above; provided the mechanisms that the credit provider develops are fair and objective. A credit provider may submit its mechanisms, models or procedures to the regulator, for pre-approval.

The National Consumer Tribunal (‘NCT’), on the recommendation of the NCR, may impose mandatory guidelines on a credit provider who is consistently found to use evaluative mechanisms or procedures that are unfair and subjective. Put differently, this empowers a tribunal to punish and impose conditions upon credit providers who have a track record of acting contrary to the spirit or the letter of the Act. Given time and sufficient opportunities for ventilation, this stricture may have a civilising effect on the industry as a whole, and may contribute to the development of a culture that favours prudent, ethical conduct towards consumers, by rendering contrary business practices unsustainable.

Subject to s 82(3), the NCR may publish guidelines for assessment mechanisms and procedures by credit companies. While the guidelines which the NCR may publish are not binding, the fact that a tribunal may subsequently impose them as binding, by way of an order, makes the guidelines highly persuasive. For one thing, following the guidelines as published could later be used by a credit provider to convince a tribunal that it has a clean track record. This may prove useful, because a determination by a tribunal that a credit provider does not have a clean track record opens up the possibility that the tribunal may impose other processes as binding, in addition to the guidelines as promulgated by the NCR.

\textsuperscript{165} National Credit Act s 78(2).
F Section 83: Court may suspend reckless credit agreement\textsuperscript{166}

This section effectively provides courts with unfettered discretion to apply the prohibitions on reckless lending. This includes the power to set aside a loan contract, despite the prima facie validity thereof in terms of the common law or statute, or a contractual provision. In making the determination the court need only have regard to what it determines to be just and reasonable grounds, and with reference to the provisions prescribed by s 80(1) (see above).

This section has the effect of making reckless lending a precarious business for the credit provider: while the credit provider may initially succeed in extending reckless loans, the credit provider is effectively denied of any certainty of title. If at a later stage either the consumer or the NCR forms the view that the loan was reckless, it may then be challenged, and all of the consumer’s obligations rendered void. This serves as a powerful disincentive to credit providers to ‘chance their luck’.

Put differently, if the court finds the loan reckless, it can set aside all or part of the consumer’s obligations. In effect, therefore, the court can punish a lender under this section, for making a reckless loan, by voiding all or part of the loan, leaving the lender with no further recourse. The flexibility given to the court, by which it can suspend ‘all or part’ of the obligations, according to whatever is ‘just and reasonable’, is particularly noteworthy.

G Section 85: Court may declare and relieve over-indebtedness (read with s 127: Surrender of goods and s 128: Compensation for consumer)

Similar to s 83, this section allows a court to inquire into whether a consumer is over-indebted, notwithstanding a provision in the loan contract, or at common law or statute, that purports to deprive the consumer of the right to be relieved of their debt if they are found to be over-indebted.\textsuperscript{167} Clearly, therefore, the legislator has placed the onus to ‘know your customer’ on the credit provider, while at the same time firing a shot across credit providers’ bows, to the effect that if they engage in reckless lending, whereby a consumer is placed in an inescapable debt trap, then responsibility will rest with the credit provider, as indeed will the consequences. In order for a consumer to convince a court that they are over-indebted, the following requirements would have to be met, in terms of evidence of the consumer’s financial position:

\\textsuperscript{166} Subsequently amended by National Credit Amendment Act 2014 (South Africa) s 25, in which jurisdiction is extended to include tribunals.

\\textsuperscript{167} For more, see: J Otto, ‘Recent Decisions under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ (2012) Northernlaw Newsletter 1, 2 <http://www.northernlaw.co.za/important_information_for_members/articles_by_prof_j Otto_on_ncr/MAY_2012_REPORTS.pdf> and the decision in Andrews v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 3 SA 82 (ECG) [19].
an outline of each Defendant’s assets and liabilities, income and expenditure sufficient to enable the Court to ascertain whether the allegation of over-indebtedness is bona fide ...\textsuperscript{168}

In the event that a court finds that credit has been extended in a manner that is reckless, it may rearrange the consumer’s obligations, including by recalculating those obligations,\textsuperscript{169} which may include holding that the credit agreement is void ab initio;\textsuperscript{170} requiring the credit provider to refund the consumer, with interest;\textsuperscript{171} or it may cancel all of the creditor’s rights to recover monies or goods;\textsuperscript{172} or it may cause the creditor’s rights to recover to be forfeited to the State.\textsuperscript{173}

If the consumer has a valid complaint that, but for the recklessness of the credit provider, the consumer would never have become involved in the credit transaction, it might be ‘just and reasonable’ to ‘set aside’ the agreement. In that event, the agreement would be null and void and as if it had never been. As a consequence, the credit provider, who remains the owner of the vehicle, would be entitled to restoration of the vehicle. On the other hand, the consumer, who no longer has any obligations under the agreement that has been set aside would be relieved of any further indebtedness or deficiency claim under the agreement. In certain circumstances, this would be a fair and symmetrical resolution.\textsuperscript{174}

In determining an outcome under s 85, courts will examine whether the consumer has surrendered the goods under 127\textsuperscript{175} for sale, subject to the fair price provisions of s 128.\textsuperscript{176} A consumer is not required to surrender the goods according to s 127, but where a consumer has retained the goods, it is less likely they will come under the protection of s 85.\textsuperscript{177} Furthermore, courts will take a dim view of an application under s 85, where the consumer has failed to take steps to resolve the dispute, after receiving notice under s 129(1)(a).\textsuperscript{178}

In any event my view is that the NCA does not envisage that a consumer may claim to be over-indebted whilst at the same time retaining possession of the goods which form the subject matter of the agreement. Such goods should be sold to reduce the defendant’s indebtedness.\textsuperscript{179}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[168] SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [68(i)].
\item[169] National Credit Act s 86(7)(c)(i)(dd).
\item[170] Ibid s 89(5)(a).
\item[171] Ibid s 89(5)(b).
\item[172] Ibid s 89(5)(c)(i).
\item[173] Ibid s 89(5)(c)(ii).
\item[174] SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [46].
\item[175] National Credit Act.
\item[176] Ibid.
\item[177] Ibid. See further the provisions of s 130(1), ibid; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [49].
\item[178] National Credit Act; FirstRand Bank Ltd v Olivier [2008] JOL 22139 (SE) [14]–[15]. See also: Kreuser, above n 163, 13.
\item[179] Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Panayiotts [2009] ZAGPHC 22 [77] (Masipa J) and cited with approval in SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [48]. See also:
\end{footnotes}
It seems unlikely that the legislature ever intended that the consumer could keep the ‘money and the box’.\textsuperscript{180}

One further consequence of s 127\textsuperscript{181} is that it gives the consumer an ‘extraordinary right’ to escape from a credit agreement whenever there are goods involved, by unilaterally deciding to return the goods to the credit provider, so that they can be sold.\textsuperscript{182} The consumer will, however, run the risk that the sale of the goods will not cover the debt, and where that is so, the consumer will still be liable to the lender for the balance. Section 128\textsuperscript{183} provides a range of protections to the consumer, to ensure that the goods are sold at ‘the best price reasonably attainable’.\textsuperscript{184} If the credit provider fails in this regard, a tribunal may order that it pay an additional amount, exceeding the sale proceeds, to the consumer.\textsuperscript{185} The better view is that ‘goods’ here refer to movable property.\textsuperscript{186}

Because a creditor must demonstrate that it complied with the Act in terms of ‘know your customer’ at the time when credit was extended, any credit extended after the point where the consumer would henceforth become over-indebted, whether by one or multiple creditors, would be liable to be deemed reckless. Put differently, where a consumer has been left over-indebted by multiple creditors, it would be open to the consumer to attack all or any of the creditors who extended credit to the consumer in a manner that was reckless.

\textbf{H Section 90: Unlawful provisions of credit agreement}

This section contains some of the far-reaching consumer protection provisions of the Act aimed at curbing predatory lending, by declaring a variety of potential contractual terms unlawful. These include provisions, which in the view of the court, attack the spirit of the Act, or subject the consumer to deceptive or fraudulent provisions. The section extends to provisions in contracts that waive or exclude the consumer’s rights or the provider’s obligations.

\begin{flushright}
Corlia van Heerden, ‘Section 85 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005: Thoughts on its Scope and Nature’ (2013) 46 De Jure 968, 985.
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\textsuperscript{180} SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [45].
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\textsuperscript{181} National Credit Act.
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\textsuperscript{183} National Credit Act.
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\textsuperscript{184} Ibid s 128(2).
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\textsuperscript{186} Coetzee, above n 182, 572.
\end{flushright}
Further, the section makes unlawful any provisions that exempt conduct on behalf of an agent of the provider, or excludes liability for any representations that may have induced the contract. It prevents a provider from contractually acquiring the right to repossess any goods, by entering the consumer’s premises without, it is assumed, a court order.

Significantly, it also prevents a provider from nominating, as a forum, a Division of the High Court of South Africa, when a Magistrate’s Court will do. This, it is argued, is aimed at preventing a creditor from intimidating a consumer, by selecting a court where the processes are more onerous, and the costs considerably higher. In addition, the creditor cannot select a jurisdiction which is remote from where the consumer resides, in order to make attendance at court more difficult or onerous for the consumer.

The section also prevents the creditor from forcing the consumer to agree to a garnishee order,\textsuperscript{187} that is to say, an order in which the consumer agrees to give the creditor access to the consumer’s salary before it is paid.\textsuperscript{188} Finally, the section prohibits recourse by the creditor to punitive interest rates.

Where an agreement contains an unlawful provision, that provision will be void ab initio, and the court is empowered to sever that provision from the agreement. If the provision cannot be severed, then the court may declare the contract void from inception, and make any other orders that the court deems fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

\textbf{V Enforcement}

\textbf{A Statutory enforcement bodies}

Section 12\textsuperscript{189} establishes the NCR. Section 13\textsuperscript{190} invests the NCR with responsibility to create a ‘fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and industry’, specifically to serve the needs of those consumers who were historically disadvantaged by racial discrimination under Apartheid; low income consumers and low income communities; and consumers who reside in remote, isolated or low population density regions.

Under s 15 of the Act,\textsuperscript{191} the NCR is given responsibility for enforcement by, inter alia, receiving complaints of alleged contraventions; monitoring the consumer credit market with a view to preventing contraventions, or detecting and prosecuting same;\textsuperscript{193} issuing and enforcing compliance notices;\textsuperscript{194} conducting investigations;\textsuperscript{195} referring anti-competitive behaviour

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187 For more on the abuse and corruption of these orders, see: Theobald, above n 136.
189 \textit{National Credit Act}.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid s 15(b).
193 Ibid s 15(c).
194 Ibid s 15(e).
195 Ibid s 15(f).
\end{flushright}
to the Competition Commission;\textsuperscript{196} referring matters to the tribunal;\textsuperscript{197} or accepting referrals from the tribunal.\textsuperscript{198}

Section 26\textsuperscript{199} establishes the NCT, which may adjudicate any application in terms of the Act, or make any order provided for in the Act. It may also adjudicate in relation to any allegations of prohibited conduct, and impose a remedy provided for in the Act.\textsuperscript{200}

The Act establishes jurisdiction for both courts and tribunals; the latter partly to expedite judicial review without relying on over-burdened courts.\textsuperscript{201} Tribunals are tasked with tackling prohibited conduct,\textsuperscript{202} as defined by the Act, whereas courts are tasked with punishing offences.\textsuperscript{203} Generally speaking, offences are more serious in nature,\textsuperscript{204} and involve intention ("mens rea"), whereas prohibited conduct, or a failure to comply with required conduct, is covered by a penalty regime involving administrative fines,\textsuperscript{205} and does not require the element of intention.\textsuperscript{206} These fines are capped at 10 per cent of the respondent’s annual turnover during the previous financial year, or ZAR 100 000, whichever is greater.\textsuperscript{207}

In the event that an offence is committed, the Act sets out potential punishments.\textsuperscript{208} Where the offence involves a failure to comply with an order from a Tribunal to remedy a form of prohibited conduct, the punishment may involve a fine, or imprisonment of up to ten years, or both.\textsuperscript{209} For any other contravention that constitutes an offence, the punishment may be a fine, or imprisonment not exceeding 12 months, or both.\textsuperscript{210}

The South African penalty regime under the Act derives its concept of civil penalties for prohibited conduct from the Australian model,\textsuperscript{211} and reserves criminal prosecutions only for the most serious contraventions.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{196} National Credit Act s 15(h).
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid s 15(i).
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid s 15(h).
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid s 27. See also ss 142–8, dealing with tribunal consideration of complaints, applications and referrals and ss 149–52, dealing with tribunal orders.
\textsuperscript{202} Solli-Hubbard, above n 3, 77.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{204} See: National Credit Regulator v Season Star Trading 333 CC [2013] ANCT 41 (NCT) [32] citing with approval Re Competition Commission (South Africa) [2003] ZACT 43 [99].
\textsuperscript{205} National Credit Act s 151.
\textsuperscript{206} National Credit Regulator v Season Star Trading 333 CC [2013] ANCT 41 (NCT) [39]–[40].
\textsuperscript{207} National Credit Act s 151(2).
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid s 161.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid s 161(a).
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid s 161(b).
\textsuperscript{211} National Credit Regulator v Season Star Trading 333 CC [2013] ANCT 41 (NCT) [33].
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid. See also: Vicky Comino, ‘Effective Regulation by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission: The Civil Penalty Problem’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 802, 804 n 8.
B Specific enforcement provisions and penalties

A judicial officer (judge or magistrate) may order that premises be searched\textsuperscript{213} where the commission of a breach is suspected, and when searched, powers of search and seizure of both persons and evidence are comprehensive.\textsuperscript{214} Juxtaposed with this power is a requirement\textsuperscript{215} that persons being searched are entitled to their dignity (including that they not be physically searched by an officer of a different gender),\textsuperscript{216} freedom, security and privacy;\textsuperscript{217} that the search be conducted with regard to decency and order, and that persons present be advised of their right to legal representation,\textsuperscript{218} which they may insist be present during the search.\textsuperscript{219} Items over which the persons being searched assert privilege may not be searched,\textsuperscript{220} but can be seized, pending a court determination as to whether they should be regarded as privileged.\textsuperscript{221}

Throughout this process inspectors may use reasonable force against persons or property.\textsuperscript{222}

The Act includes the power to summon witnesses,\textsuperscript{223} as well as the power to compel a witness to be sworn in,\textsuperscript{224} or produce a book or document\textsuperscript{225} when ordered to do so. Similarly, the Act\textsuperscript{226} makes it an offence to refuse to answer a question fully or to the best of the witness’ ability,\textsuperscript{227} subject to the provisions of s 139(5), which states that a self-incriminating answer provided under s 159(a) cannot be used in criminal proceedings against the witness, except on a charge of perjury. In this writer’s view this strikes a sensible balance: individuals who have, or who are connected with entities that have engaged in reckless or predatory lending, cannot stymie a court from uncovering the truth, but at the same time will not be forced to self-incriminate.

Section 160\textsuperscript{228} makes it an offence to ignore an order of a tribunal (punishable by a fine or up to ten years imprisonment, or both),\textsuperscript{229} obstruct an investigation, engage in a personal attack on a member of a tribunal, provide false information to a tribunal, or ignore a search warrant (punishable by a fine or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or both).\textsuperscript{230} Under s 151\textsuperscript{231} a tribunal may impose administrative penalties that amount to up to 10 per cent of the

\textsuperscript{213} National Credit Act s 153.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid s 154.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid s 155.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid s 155(2).
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid s 155(1).
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid s 155(3)(a).
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid s 155(3)(b).
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid s 155(5).
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid s 155(6).
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid s 155(7).
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid s 158(a).
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid s 158(b)(i).
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid s 158(b)(ii).
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid s 159.
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid sub-s (a).
\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid s 161(a).
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid s 161(b).
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid.
respondent’s turnover during the preceding year, or ZAR 100 000, whichever is greater. In determining the administrative penalty, the tribunal is authorised to take account of a broad range of factors that relate to the gravity, extent and duration of the offence, the loss or damage caused by the offence, the behaviour of the respondent, the market circumstances surrounding the contravention, the profit earned through the contravention, the level of co-operation which the respondent provided to the NCR, or whether the respondent has previous convictions for contravening the Act. This allows courts to identify recidivist lenders, and to increase penalties where a pattern of misconduct can be identified. Bad apples can, potentially therefore, be removed from the industry. However, as identified below, this has met with mixed results.

Recently the NCR has taken steps against a number of lenders for reckless lending. In the aftermath of the fine levied against African Bank, and African Bank’s subsequent collapse, other micro-lenders have, or are as at the time of writing, being taken to task. These include Shoprite Holdings Ltd and Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. This is commendable, but at least in the case of African Bank, is a case of closing the stable door after the horse had bolted.

But there’s a nasty taste to this rescue. Bloomberg reports that African Bank charged borrowers rates as high as 5% PER MONTH. So not only was ABIL [African Bank Investment Ltd, which was the parent company to African Bank] able to keep its retailer alive by providing loans to the poor so they could buy furniture they couldn’t afford, it also fleeced them on interest rates. You would think that such a bank should be allowed to fail, wouldn’t you? Not a bit of it. According to Bloomberg, the central bank’s reason for rescuing it was to ensure that the poor could continue to borrow. The South African central bank and government between them have bailed out a predatory lender.

The lesson to be learned from this failure, by observers in other jurisdictions, is that while the South African legislation is far-reaching, insightful, and consumer-centric, without being draconian, the legislation is merely the framework, and framework alone is not enough. Implementation must be concerted and enforcement must be rigorous. Indeed, on the available evidence, it appears that the NCR is late to a party in which microcredit

232 National Credit Act s 151(2)(a).
233 Ibid s 151(2)(b).
234 Ibid s 151(3)(a).
235 Ibid s 151(3)(b).
236 Ibid s 151(3)(c).
237 Ibid s 151(3)(d).
238 Ibid s 151(3)(e).
239 Ibid s 151(3)(f).
240 Ibid s 151(3)(g).
institutions have operated virtually unfettered; where consumer debt, especially among the most vulnerable is growing steeply, the NCR has, traditionally, been overcautious.

There is no evidence of government bodies specifically regulating microcredit institutions so as to restrict their lending activities to appropriate levels. The growing crisis of unsecured credit non-repayment is reflected in worsening ratings for the most risky of local financial institutions. Consumer debt is reaching record levels, encouraged until recently as a short-term economic stimulant.

One of the most serious obstacles for the protection of consumers in South Africa, and one of the most serious practical failings of the National Credit Act has been the use of garnishee orders — sometimes multiple garnishee orders — against the poorest and most vulnerable, and while this issue is beyond the purview of this article, this aspect deserves concerted and urgent further attention. If the allegations about widespread corruption of, and collusion with, court officials in the creation of such orders is founded, then one potential solution may be the creation of statutory provisions for both disgorgement and punitive damages.

VI Conclusion

Reckless lending is antithetical to the concept of consumer protection, and in a worst case scenario can contribute to, or even precipitate financial contagion and crisis. Predatory lending is unconscionable and has no place in a modern economy. In South Africa there is a credible argument to be made that unrestricted predatory lending precipitated a massacre of citizens by armed agents of the State.

What this article has been concerned with, however, is not solely the implementation of the National Credit Act, but rather also its legislative mechanics, combined with an analysis of its philosophical underpinnings, its objects and its purport. To that end the South African legislation provides a

244 Bateman, ‘Microcredit and Marikana’, above n 15, 3.
245 National Credit Act.
247 Theobald, above n 136.
248 For more on the role played by the National Credit Act in insulating South Africa from the Global Financial Crisis, see: Woker, ‘Why the Need for Consumer Protection Legislation’, above n 13, 217–18, 231 n 6. See also: Wilson, above n 32, 79.
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robust legislative framework which, if emulated and adequately enforced would, in this writer’s view, provide for both consumer protection and the prevention of practices which are ethically indefensible and economically unsustainable.

If the *National Credit Act* were emulated elsewhere, the devil would surely reside in the details, and specifically the successful protection of consumers would depend upon the details of implementation and enforcement. Put differently, this car is well-made and thoughtfully designed. From here, passenger safety and comfort will depend upon the skill and prudence of the driver.