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Ideology and welfare provision in the Greek and Lebanese communities of Sydney

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IDEOLOGY AND WELFARE PROVISION IN THE GREEK AND LEBANESE
COMMUNITIES OF SYDNEY

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of the study is to examine the ideological content and practices of welfare provision among Greek and Lebanese immigrants in Sydney, and the role of state welfare funding related to this provision. The study examines ethno-specific welfare structures in the two communities as sites in which the concepts of ethnicity and welfare are articulated.

The community structures encompass such key liquifying practices in the constitution/construction of social reality as their symbolizations of the primordial community, the praxis of welfare/social workers and their relations to both 'community' and state.

I was led to this study from a growing concern about the serious social problems faced by 'unskilled' working class immigrants. For instance, studies on Lebanese and Turkish immigrants have highlighted problems of social inequality faced by them and other immigrant groups in the labour market, on the basis of education, age sex, racial discrimination and economic marginalisation [Humphrey 1984, Mackie 1982].

On the other side the state at the Federal level has been arguing that immigrants' social problems stem from cultural inequality. The welfare services provided to immigrants under the social policy of multiculturalism were said to have contributed significantly to the improvement of the immigrants' welfare [Galbally Report 1978, AIMA Report 1982].
A comparative study of the Greek and Lebanese social collectivities in Sydney allowed me to explore the different structures and ideologies of welfare, and trace out some of the key factors affecting these structures and ideologies. The Greek community was 'well established', large, diverse with few recent immigrants. The Lebanese communities, while more diverse, - primarily due to religious differences and the comparative recency of the concept of Lebanese nationality - were smaller, with a less developed bourgeoisie amongst the more recent arrivals, who, in turn, formed a much more significant proportion of the communities.

It would therefore be valuable to compare factors involved in the communal structures to the differing ideological, socio-cultural, political and economic periods of their migration and settlement as a means to better understanding. Their social position, the basis of the inequalities they experienced, and the strategies they have evolved in response to this environment.

While the differences are important it is also necessary to explore the similarities/commonalities experienced by Greek and Lebanese immigrants. Both immigrant groups are classified as Southern European, which in the Australian social milieu denotes the presence of a comparatively large number of unskilled workers. They also share some important characteristics with other NES immigrants, namely social class structuration, social inequalities and an ethnic dimension in Australian society.
Thus, the study raises the following questions in relation to the social inequalities faced by Greek and Lebanese immigrants:

1). Why are Greek and Lebanese working class people disadvantaged in the labour market?

2). What is the welfare provision role of Greek and Lebanese ethno-specific institutions and professionals?

3). What are the consequences of ethnic welfare ideologies and practices, and social inequalities on the Greek and Lebanese working class?

Given the central role of the labour market and employment as the providers of welfare for the mass of the population, welfare practices can only be radically addressed through a preliminary investigation of work, and the social process involved in the production of labour power. An explanation of their relationship can only be carried out through the application of class analysis, a perspective which is not a feature of mainstream migrant research studies on social policy, e.g. the ROMMPAS Report 1986.

However, a class analysis would argue that ethnic welfare and the social inequalities of working class migrants are outcomes of the interrelations between capital accumulation, state social policies, of the migration and settlement process, and of systems of cultural practices and domination [de Lepervanche in 'Australian Society' 1984: 217].
The underlying theme of the study is that social concepts and practices, like ethnicity and welfare, have to be seen as ideological constructs, as socially created phenomena, and not as innate or natural manifestations of the social world. For this reason in the study ideology is treated from the perspective of its construction of the class and social relations of people, the values and beliefs that mediate the social world for the individuals and affect their everyday relations and social consciousness.

Moreover, ideology in the study is treated more in terms of its social control role, than its social cohesion potential. The social control aspect of ideology concentrates on the ways and forms is mobilised by class and non-class interests to inhibit the development of alternative ideologies, and thus maintain social inequalities in capitalist society. An understanding of the operation of the social control aspect of ideology can, therefore, lead to an understanding of how to affect social change.

The discussion in the study is directly related to the current class-ethnicity debate over the applicability of each of the two concepts in interpreting migrants' experiences and social needs in Australia. Various social studies based on class analysis have identified as sources of inequalities for NES working class men and women the process of capital accumulation, their particular position in the labour market, their limited political

On the other hand, authors who have used the concept of ethnicity as an analytical and methodological tool have argued that NES immigrants' social inequalities stem from various factors like cultural intolerance, status closure, occupational disadvantages or lack of accessible welfare services [Encel 1981, 1984, 1985; Cox 1975, 1982; Birrells 1981; Bostock 1977].

Most literature on migrant welfare has treated the concept of welfare in its very limited interpretation of efficiency, effectiveness, accessibility and equity. These issues are important and the study attempts to address some of them. Nevertheless, the interpretation and use of the concept of welfare in the study is not limited to that of social welfare, but it implicitly treats welfare as:

"...satisfaction of human needs - defined initially as those necessary for the physical, psychological and social integrity of the individual". [Jakubowicz in 'Australia in Transition' et.al. 1985: 272]

Thus, the study of Greek and Lebanese ethno-specific institutions and professionals can provide many insights on the operation and impact of class, state and primordial ideologies on the lives of the working class people of the two groups.

Gramsci's model of ideology has served as both analytical and methodological tool of analysis in the
study. His concepts of hegemonic classes, the impact on the everyday lives of people by the institutions of the civil society (non-state institutions), and the role of intellectuals as articulators and organisers of the hegemonic classes, have been used to interpret the data.

On the basis of this model then it would be argued that social work approaches by ethnic organizations and professionals perform a very important social control role, because of their daily contact with the 'grass-roots'. It is at this level of social organization where class, primordial, and state social policy values and practices continuously and directly affect the personal and perception of social reality by Greek and Lebanese working class men and women.

The first four chapters comprise the theoretical part of the study. Chapters One and Two deal with the concept of ideology, Gramsci's theory of civil institutions and intellectuals, and with the social policy formulation and practices of the welfare state. The next two chapters refer to the experiences of migrants in Australia and the social policies related to that under different ideological periods (assimilation-multiculturalism).

Chapter Five outlines the methodology of the study. Chapters Six to Nine discuss the data. Chapter Six discusses the formation of the Greek National ideology and the pre-war migration and settlement of Greek and Lebanese migrants. Chapter Seven looks at the community development and welfare practices of the two groups during the
assimilation period. Chapter Eight is divided into three sections - secular ethno-specific, religious ethno-specific and generalist institutions - and examines the community relations and welfare provision to Greeks and Lebanese during the multicultural period.

The statistical data of the study on Greeks and Lebanese is at the national level in order to get a general impression of their position in the Australian society.

Finally, the conclusions drawn in the study and their interpretation reflect the researcher's views, and in a number of instances the respondents may disagree with them. Nevertheless, the contribution of the respondents was incalculable for the realisation of the study.
1.1: Definition of Ideology

The relationships between ideas and events are never direct; they are always mediated by consciousness, by conceptions of appearances of real relations. The system of ideas and beliefs produced by consciousness to interpret and understand the social and natural world forms ideology.

Rader argues that Marx perceived ideology as being a 'false body of ideas used, perhaps unconsciously, to conceal or excuse vested interests' [Rader 1979:42]. In this context Marx saw ideology in the sense of false consciousness in defence of class interests. By false Marx did not mean outright false, but rather false in the sense of illusory or distortion as ideology refers to something in reality.

For instance, one Marxist definition of ideology is that of Althusser's as given by Thompson:

"(Ideology is) a system of representations-composed of concepts, ideas, myths, and images in which people live their imaginary relations to the real conditions of existence" [Thompson 1986: 44].

However, some Marxist authors like Althusser himself, Gramsci, and Thompson, have dismissed as simplistic the interpretation of ideology as merely being false consciousness. The main reason for that is:

"Ideologies are seen as systems of representations, which signify a set of relation-
ships which are real, but hide another set of relations which are less real". [Sharp 1980: 92].

Marx's meaning of ideology is not confined only in its characterisation of all ideas in support of economic and political interests, but it has a rather wider interpretation [Rader op.cit: 42]. The formation of ideologies involves a more complex process. Ideologies are not necessarily class determined or products of the class struggle; they may assume some independent formation from the means of production.

As Thompson points out beliefs and values are important in class relations and domination if they:

"...can be examined in terms of their ideological effects and for their relationships to other discourses and discursive practices that are more directly class related". [Thompson op.cit: 23].

Within this context then, the efficacy of ideology does not lie in its intrinsic values, but rather in its ability to mobilise material and intellectual resources to gain or maintain power in society.

From a Marxist perspective then the central role of ideology, as well as its importance as a sociological issue, is to be found in its operation in the 'organization, maintenance and transformation of power in society' [ibid: 15].

Generally the concept of ideology is treated as meaning a form of belief, despite arguments against this interpretation as being rather limited, and most theorists on ideology tend to agree that it contains the element of distortion of the real social conditions and relations of
Thus, the role of ideology in the everyday life of individuals is important, not because it only interprets social reality, but it also forms the basis for social action towards that reality. As the social positions occupied by individuals, groups or classes, are based on unequal distribution of power, rather than free choice, ideology operates in underlying values of domination and subordination [Sharp op.cit: 102]. For this reason people's ideologies become their lives, and therefore extensions of themselves and that is why they are difficult to transform.

1.2: Ideology and Capitalism

Capitalism is based on the private ownership and control of the means of production. The social relations emanating from this organization of production are expressed in the formation of classes, with the bourgeoisie and the working-class being the two fundamental ones.

The object of capitalist economic activity is the accumulation of capital, the concentration of value creating commodities. Capital accumulation is realised through profit, which is achieved from the purchase and sale of commodities.

Profit is realised in the sale of goods and services, and in the surplus value generated by human labour, which is privately appropriated. This private appropriation of surplus value, and the increasing socialization of the means of production, constitute the main sources of
conflict between capital and labour.

The bourgeoisie in its desire to increase the volume and rate of capital accumulation changes continuously the methods of production and with them the social relations. This continuous division of labour renders existing social relations obsolete, and creates new ones together with new ideological constructs to interpret them.

On the question of the role of ideology in class societies Marx was definite as to what purpose it served:

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force". [McLellan 1977: 176].

Marx went on to explain that in capitalist societies, the bourgeoisie have control over the means of material production, and therefore of the mental production. The working class by lacking the latter, is subject to it.

An understanding of the significance of the role of ideology in capitalist societies and its critique is, therefore, imperative because:

"If, for instance, the fundamental contradictions in a capital social formation can be shown to derive from an inherent tendency of that mode of production to depend on the exploitation of one class by another, and ideology serves the function of distorting a perception of that exploitation, then sociological analysis should include a critique of that ideology". [Thompson op.cit: 23].

The definition of the concept of ideology itself, and its role in advanced capitalist societies has been a subject of continuous and intense debate. The apparent ability of post-war advanced capitalist societies to
survive successfully periodic crises and avoid open class conflict, has led various neo-Marxist theorists to concentrate more on the role of ideology in the maintenance of social order [Abercrombie 1981: 1].

For neo-Marxists like Marcuse, Habermas, Poulantzas, Milliband, the economic contradictions encountered at the economic base of capitalism, did not or have not yet proven sufficient factors to undermine or destroy capitalist societies [Loc.cit].

To these neo-Marxist theorists the role of ideology, as is expressed in the superstructures of capitalist society, plays a central role in the maintenance and reproduction of that society. Moreover, the emphasis on ideology is partly a response to counter-balance the economism of pre-war Marxist literature, and thus to offer a more dynamic analysis of capitalism.

One contentious argument over the role of ideology, is to what extent ideology derives from class relations, and represents class interests. Abercrombie in his book 'The Dominant Ideology Thesis', criticises Poulantzas, Marcuse, Habermas, for over-emphasising the role of dominant ideology in the reproduction of present capitalist societies [ibid: ix-x].

The dominant ideology thesis is based on the assumption that it has incorporated the working-class into the values of the capitalist system, thereby perpetuating its subordination [ibid: 1-2]. Abercrombie argues that Marx himself and Marxist theorists like Gramsci and
Althusser, did not pay much attention to the incorporationist aspect of dominant ideology. He then proceeds to say that the dominant ideology thesis is false and misleading, lacking any empirical proof.

At the same time, Abercrombie draws parallel comparisons between the dominant ideology thesis, and the common culture approach employed by functionalist theorists. He argues that both theories share a view of dominant set of values which act to provide a cohesive social order.

In the case of Durkheim and his followers, their concern is in the creation of a collective conscience, expressed in the form of organic solidarity in order to maintain the social order [ibid:30-58]. Parsons developed the theory of 'common culture', which culture is internalised by all individuals through the process of socialization, and thus the social order is retained. These core cultural values also play the role of prohibiting the rise of conflict and instability.

The subject of the dominant ideology thesis does not constitute the main issue of discussion of the study. It has been brought into attention, among other things, to clarify the operational use of the concept of ideology. Suffice to say, that historically every ruling class has tried to incorporate sections of other classes to its own value system, to strengthen and justify its own existence and claim for power.

Thus within the context of the present study there
would be more bias towards the role of ideology in exercising social control over subordinate classes, than in its incorporationist role. In the words of Abercrombie, ideology will be treated as being able to:

"...inhibit and confuse the development of the counter ideology of a subordinate class". [ibid., x].

1.3: Gramsci's theory of Ideology.

Gramsci is one important Marxist theorist who articulated successfully the role of ideology in mobilising intellectual and material resources in society. He based his theory on "rather complex forms of interaction of political, cultural and ideological negotiation within and between classes" [Thompson op.cit: 79]. Gramsci saw the role of ideology as:

"To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is 'psychological'; they 'organize' human masses and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc...". [Rader op.cit: 43].

Gramsci did not perceive ideology as a mere reflection of man's material existence. He treated ideology as having a certain degree of autonomy from the economic relations of society, though he acknowledged that in the final analysis, the economic relations between classes, are the determining ones.

According to the Gramscian theory, there are two fundamental classes in every society. In capitalist society these classes are bourgeoisie and the working class. Their
relations to the means of production are conflicting, contradictory and unequal. The constant struggle between the two classes takes place as well at the ideological level, with the social order of society at stake.

This ideological struggle between the two fundamental classes takes a broader character, as they forge alliances with other social classes or groups. The fundamental classes articulate the interests of the alliance to their own by means of ideological struggle, and thus become the hegemonic classes of society.

The ideological struggle between and within the hegemonic classes is a process of gradual transformation, as the existing ideologies are reinterpreted and combined in different ways, within the historical conditions of the period in question.

The aim of a hegemonic class is to become the ruling one, and to achieve this it must create a collective will, a moral and intellectual transformation, a common new world view. In Mouffe's words:

"Hegemony is the indisputable union of political leadership and intellectual and moral leadership, which clearly goes beyond the idea of a simple class alliance...[Gramsci] is using hegemony not only as a strategy for the proletariat, but uses it to think of the practices of the ruling class in general". [Mouffe 1979: 179].

A hegemonic principle becomes dominant, if it becomes a 'popular religion', gains the appeal and acceptance of the masses. "By dominant it is meant that it rules the allied classes and exercises domination over the opposing classes", [Loc.cit]. Such popular ideologies create the
conditions whereby, class rule and the whole process of social reproduction is controlled.

The Gramscian model of hegemony and popular world-view, therefore, has the dual roles of achieving social cohesion, and imposing social control. On the one hand in the formation of a common world-view, ideology plays a socially cohesive role, by binding together contradictory or opposing class interests to form one entity, to form an ideological community. This means that the dominant ideological community is projected as a social reality whose values, beliefs and norms, are perceived as comprising an inevitable social order, and consequently adherence to them is necessary for its function.

On the other hand, the social control aspect of ideology is found in the imposition of the dominant ideological world-view, that of the bourgeoisie, on the subordinate working-class as the only social reality. That is to say, the subordinate class is said to be living, or ought to be living, its social existence, according to the social relations and values expressed in the dominant ideological community, thus justifying its own preservation and domination.

As Mouffe points out:

"Expression of general interest does exist, but it is always limited to the interests of the fundamental class". [ibid., 10].

In this way unequal class relations are masked and mystified, and as a consequence inhibit the development of alternative ideologies to those of the dominant one.
However, the victory of the dominant ideology is never definite in controlling social antagonism, so the ideological struggle continues. [ibid: 131].

As ideological constructs are not expressed directly in class terms nor by class interests, to be operative, they have to mediated and mobilised in specific forms of processes and institutions [Thompson op.cit: 66]. Gramsci concentrated more on the role of the institutions of what he called Civil Society. Civil society is comprised of non-state institutions, like the church, media, political parties, trade unions, and social formations like the family.

For Gramsci the importance of those institutions rested on the fact that they are the social formations that consolidate the rule of the hegemonic classes. In capitalist society the bourgeoisie exercises its power by means of consent and coercion. Consent is generally practiced at the civil society level, which refers to the realm of culture, while coercion and force are exercised by the state, which belongs to the realm of power.

So the emphasis on the ideological importance of civil institutions over the state ones, is due to their generally consensus approach in comparison to that of the latter. The institutions of the civil society represent the culture of the hegemonic classes, their world-view, as it is expressed and lived in the everyday lives of people.

The political struggle between the opposing hegemonic classes, is to achieve control over the civil institutions,
and hence ideological control of a part of the cultural milieu of a hegemonic class. Although the civil society is not the only field where class hegemony is exercised; as Baci-Glucksman says "ideological practices appear already in the apparatus of economic production, in the factory", [1980: 67].

In the case of the subordinate classes in society, Gramsci believed that their conception of the social world is at the level of common sense [Abercrombie op.cit:13]. For this reason he saw the role of civil institutions as crucial, not only in their capacity as social control agents, but also as vehicles of educating the working class in order to bring about social transformation.

Gramsci believed that in the case of the subordinate classes in capitalist society, especially for the working class, their conception of the world operates as "fragmented, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is", [Abercrombie op.cit: 14]. This is where the working class encounters a discontinuation of its consciousness, between the experience from its daily economic activity, and preconceived ideas about the social world.

Therefore the institutions of the civil society are the principal media in transmitting and practicing ideologies, and in the case of the bourgeoisie to exercise their social control. Because of the dominance of the bourgeoisie on these institutions, it appears that there
are no other alternative ideologies or institutions than those of the bourgeoisie. Civil institutions are also organizational formations, the arenas of ideological struggle, which can raise the class consciousness of the working class, they can modify the common sense of workers, mobilise them politically.

For Gramsci the elaboration, interpretation and spreading of class and institutional ideologies is the function of the intellectuals. Mouffe explains in the following passage what Gramsci meant by intellectuals:

"Every social group coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic activity, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which gives it homogeneity and awareness of its own function, not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields". [op.cit: 140].

Thus for Gramsci the intellectuals do not constitute independent social formations, but are in fact representing the particular ideology of a hegemonic class. In articulating these ideologies the intellectuals organise and realise the interests of the hegemonic class. The intellectuals are characterised by the function they perform, which is essentially organizational:

"Within the realm of the superstructures the intellectual perform 'organizational and connective' functions within both the area of the civil society, or hegemony and the area of political society or the state". [Sassoon 1980: 136].

Gramsci identified two types of intellectuals, the traditional and the organic, each performing different functions at different historical periods [Buci-Glucksman
The traditional intellectuals belong to a different historical period than that of the new hegemonic class. They belong to pre-industrial societies, and usually these intellectuals are of the rural type, priests, teachers, lawyers and others who are linked to the peasantry [Sassoon op.cit: 142-146]. This type of intellectuals always claim to be independent and autonomous from the dominant social classes and institutions, but this evaluation is subjective.

In the new mode of production, in the capitalist society, the traditional intellectuals often become irrelevant to the demands of the new class. However, if they are won over by the new dominant class they perform for it a different organic function than that of the organic intellectuals. And this function has important consequences for the political role of the traditional intellectuals and the new class [Loc.cit]. This change of function happens often with the clergy, whereby it consolidates the ideological power of the new class by appealing to religious beliefs and ancestral values of the masses.

On the other hand the organic intellectuals are those who belong to the same historical period as that of the dominant class [Mouffe op.cit: 187]. They constitute the organizational and leading elements of the hegemonic institutions, and their skills are specialised and directive.

In capitalist society the organic intellectuals are
technicians, professionals, entrepreneurs and other specialists. However, due to the various professional, status and class positions they occupy in society, they can be non-organic for the dominant class, and ally with the subordinate hegemonic class.

In conclusion then, ideology from a Marxist perspective is treated in terms of its operation in the transformation of power in society, and its impact on the social class relations of individuals and structures. And for the concept of ideology to be approached in such a way, it has to be placed and analysed within the context of the particular social order it operates, and produced.

At the same time Gramsci's model provides a methodological and analytical approach in understanding the operation and impact of ideology at the Civil society level. The institutions of the Civil Society are nothing else but the materialisation of hegemonic principles in institutional formations. The importance of these formations lies in their actual and potential ability of political mobilization of classes and groups, and in the direct role these structures have in transfiguring the every day social relations of people.

The following chapter will deal with the role of ideology at the state level, with particular emphasis paid to the formulation of social policy for the definition and control of social relations.
2.1: The State and Social Policy

In advanced capitalist societies there are permanent structural and social inequalities. These inequalities stem from the unequal access and control over the means of production, and the means of organization and communication of social institutions and other social formations.

These inequalities can not be resolved in the imperfect free market, so the state has been increasingly involved in regulating economic and social relations. The state can be defined as the sum total of institutions and practices, involved in the maintenance and reproduction of socio-economic, political and ideological conditions and relations, necessary for the survival of a particular society [Jakubowicz et.al.1984: 3].

In capitalist society, the state performs an important ideological function, as it must fulfill two basic and often contradictory requirements, the growth of capital accumulation and legitimation [George 1984: p.236]. To achieve these goals, the state employs various policies, which can be defined as economic and social policies [Mishra 1981: 78].

The economic policies refer to state actions that facilitate economic growth, e.g. policies related to employment, industry, investment, taxation, etc. Economic and social policies are mutually interdependent, and each
one encompasses elements of the other.

Social policies refer to concepts and strategies, designed to address the conflicting social relations in society, and the social inequalities they generate [Jakubowicz et.al 1984: op.cit.3]. The social policies' purpose is to create a harmonious social environment, whereby capital accumulation can continue uninterrupted.

Jakubowicz distinguishes four broad goals of social policy [ibid., 3-9]:

1. To improve the living conditions of the population.
2. To create a cohesive and harmonious social order by reducing alienation.
3. To maintain the existing social order of capitalist society.
4. To exercise social control over elements or ideologies that can be disruptive to the system.

Though all four goals of social policy are interrelated the one on social control is the most significant because it is in the formulation of social policies, where the social control function of state and class ideologies is highlighted. It is at this level, where various dominant ideologies are expressed and materialised in state social policy concepts and strategies.

Social policy formulation is expressed in the creation of pathology models, like poverty, delinquency, ethnicity, etc., which contribute to the political stability of the social order. The consequences of adoption and reinforcement of such pathology models in defining social
"...see such problems as individual, family, or group terms rather than in terms of the malfunctioning of the economic or social system. Challenge to the existing political order is thus minimised or avoided. Dominant values and problem definitions are strengthened". [George op.cit: 194]

The processes of development and selection of social policy and strategies, is characterised by continuous debates about the values and concepts involved. The debates about the values of social policy are in effect ideological differences, as to the extent and form of allocating resources, the level of appropriation of the social surplus.

Gough argues that debates over social policy values and issues, have more to do with developing ideological constructs to interpret a given economic situation, than what the situation itself determines:

"The economic situation dictates nothing. What is crucial is how the economic situation is interpreted and the priority given to particular policies". [Gough 1981, 15].

Social policies in post-war advanced capitalist societies, have been directed towards the general improvement of the welfare of their population. Social welfare and the rise of the welfare state are regarded as having contributed to the general improvement of living conditions in these societies, and to these two issues the discussion would now turn.

2.2: Welfare and the Welfare State

Marx had found capitalist society antithetical to
welfare. He believed that in a welfare society, there has to be equitable distribution of power and control over the means of production and resources [Mishra op.cit: 72-74]. This was seen as necessary to satisfy the social and human needs of everybody, and to maintain social cohesion and solidarity.

Capitalist society by being unable to provide such a form of welfare, has developed its own ideological construction of welfare. Mishra has distinguished two ideological approaches of social policy to welfare, the residual and the institutional [ibid.: 110]. These two welfare types provide different ideological explanations of the concept of welfare, the definition of welfare needs of the individual, and the extent of state intervention.

The ideological assumptions of the residual type of welfare, emphasises minimum state intervention in the provision of welfare, usually only for the very needy. The mechanisms of the free market are seen as the major source of welfare for individuals and groups.

The concepts of individual initiative and competition are reinforced as the necessary primary characteristics to take advantage of the opportunities provided in the free market. Under the politically conservative residual type, welfare provision is delivered mostly through voluntary organizations, while the family and the community are encouraged to look after the welfare needs of their members.

For instance in the USA welfare social policy has
retained a strong residualist form, which has had a drastic and painful impact on the American working class. Anderson in comparing the impact of the American and W. European welfare systems notes, among other things, that the working class of the European welfare states has at least been spared of the destitution, humiliation and physical neglect of their American counterparts [Anderson 1974: pp.257-265].

The ideology behind the institutional approach to welfare, espouses greater state intervention for the allocation of resources which are not easily accessible through the free market. These resources are designed to guarantee a minimum standard of living, and a greater distribution of the social surplus, and at the same time preserve the capital accumulation at a profitable level.

These are the very basic assumptions upon which the welfare state has been established, and which will be dealt with in more detail, as it is closer to the Australian experience.

The emergence of the welfare state is a phenomenon of the post-war economic growth of advanced capitalist societies, notably of Britain and N. Europe, and of Social Democracy. The creation of the Welfare state represents one attempt by the above capitalist countries to address, on the one hand the functional needs of capitalism, capital accumulation, and on the other hand the issue of legitimation by attempting to meet the welfare demands of a well organised and unionised working class [Gough op.cit: 55-74].
To achieve the dual goals of capital accumulation and legitimation the welfare state has undertaken the responsibility of two important functions of capitalist society. [a] The production and reproduction of the working population, and [b] the maintenance of the non-working population [Gough op.cit: pp.44-5]. This responsibility is performed by the provision and distribution of the social wage. The social wage includes provision for social welfare [employment, health, housing, social security, personal care services], public education, public utilities and transport [Jones 1980: p.3].

To the Keynesian/Liberal social scientists the welfare state has been identified with social justice, equity, and a humane response to people's needs, primarily based on the rights of citizens to demand this from the state [Mishra op.cit:21]. As the welfare state has grown up, it has come to be perceived for the general and common interest.

The welfare state has been responsible for creating an image of a capitalist society that enhances human and social welfare, so to help to recreate a sense of social relations based on common bonds, -to re-establish the community spirit- and thus to achieve a more solidary and cohesive society. This impression of social solidarity is needed to address the high levels of alienation experienced by the working class populations of capitalist societies. For this reason the form of social control exercised by the welfare state, appears to be less coercive, and at least it is so when compared to the residual type of welfare.
Moreover, the welfare state itself is seen as having assumed an autonomous position from the bourgeoisie. It is thought to be acting as an independent arbiter to conflicting interests, without being seen as an instrument of domination.

Marxist authors, though not in total agreement among themselves, are critical of the role and nature of the welfare state, and its contradictions. Gough, O'Connor, and V. George have developed a class struggle or group model of analysis to explain the way social policy is formulated, and the emergence of the welfare state.

According to these theorists the form and content of social policy is determined by the level of development of a particular economy, and the relative strength of competing interest groups or classes, particularly between capital and labour.

In developed capitalist societies social classes are not uniform in their composition or interests, and are also in alliance with other ones. So they have different ideological interpretations and approaches to social policy issues, amongst them and even within fragments of the same class.

The acceptance of a particular social policy is contingent upon the relative power of group or class forces at a given time, which can impose their ideological interpretation on the state bureaucracy. The final application of social policy, therefore, reflects the relative ideological power of classes or groups, as it has
been mediated through the particular interests of the bureaucracy [Jakubowicz et.al. op.cit: 5].

Based on this model then, the emergence of the welfare state in post-war Britain and N.Europe, is viewed as the result of the class struggle between capital and a strongly organised labour movement [Gough op.cit: 127]. It was a political struggle fought at the state level, with the organised labour in a position to apply more pressure for greater welfare provision.

Sweezy, Bowan and Offe regard the development of the welfare state as the functional necessity of capital to affect the continuation of capital accumulation, and to minimise class conflict. The above authors, in general terms, argue that capital accumulation continued to grow, because the working class has been incorporated into the values of the welfare state, and subsequently accepted the social order as it is [Mishra op.cit: 83-6].

Most Marxist writers accept that to a certain extent the state has acquired some degree of autonomy from the domination of the bourgeoisie. State social policy may not necessarily serve only the interests of capital, to which it can even be against in the short term, but the rest of the population [Gough op.cit: 65].

Despite this, Marxist authors believe that the welfare state does not represent any harmony of interests. As the state's role is to maintain the existing social order, policies that are directed against the long term interests of capital will be undesirable and unworkable.
This is so, because the state by preserving the present social order, seeks to establish its own legitimacy, and that of the bourgeoisie. As Anderson remarks the welfare state can not represent the interests of the working class, because 'power in capitalist society derives from wealth, and the capitalist class has a grossly disproportionate amount of wealth', [Anderson op.cit: p.12].

Offe argues that the principal responsibility of the state is to ensure that the process of proletarianization - the reproduction of labour power- is affected continuously, and it is not left up to the individual [Offe 1984:95].

What the welfare state does in relation to this reproduction of labour power, is to offer the solution of the social wage to wage workers to minimise as much as possible their reproductive costs. In this way the welfare state creates a continuous and expanding pool of potential and actual surplus value creators for capital [ibid: 92-95]. At the same time the welfare state ensures that the surplus value produced is maintained at such levels where capital accumulation continues to grow.

According to Offe, the welfare state by being perceived by the people as a source of security and benefits, has obscured the reality of capitalist relations. He regards this perception as having a detrimental effect in the development of working-class consciousness and organization. In other words, he sees the welfare state itself as performing a social control function [ibid: 156].
The welfare state creates the perception of two separate and divided spheres of working life. The primary income distribution— the sphere of work, economy and production— and the secondary distribution, the sphere of citizenship, the state, and reproduction. The result is that:

"...the structural arrangements of the welfare state tend to make people ignore or forget that the needs and contingencies which the welfare state responds to are themselves constituted, directly or indirectly, in the sphere of production, and that the welfare itself is materially and institutionally constrained by the dynamics of the sphere of production and that a reliable conception of social security does, therefore, presupposes not only the expansion of 'citizens rights', but of 'workers rights' in the process of production". [ibid: 156-57].

The welfare state has become the centre of contentious interests, and itself a political issue and arena of political struggles. Though it has been under attack from the Liberals and the Left, for different reasons, both sides enjoy socio-economic benefits from the welfare state to wish to destroy it.

Despite this, the economic crisis of the last few years in capitalist societies has exposed the fragility and inability of the welfare state to affect any significant change in the distribution of resources and power in society. Marxist authors like Offe, George and Gough argue that the welfare state is in a state of crisis.

V.George, for instance, believes that one of the main reasons why the welfare state is undergoing a crisis, and has been unable to fulfill its supposedly welfare role, is to be found in the following fundamental contradiction of
capitalism [George op.cit: 237]. And this is, on the one hand the ever increasing socialization of costs, and on the other hand the continuous private appropriation of surplus value and profit. This process has a destructive impact as the welfare state:

"... is torn between public pressure for more social services which taxpayers are nevertheless unwilling to finance, and demands from capital for more support which capital then insists it cannot afford to pay for through increased taxation". [ibid: 248].

2.3: Personal Care Services or Social Services

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The personal care services [PCS] of the welfare state exist to address social problems created by the inequalities of the capitalist system in a humane way at the individual level. The primary roles of the PCS are to achieve social peace and exercise social control, so that capital accumulation can proceed unobstructed.

Social services promote the impression that they can improve, provide solutions, or even ameliorate the existing social problems, by addressing the individual needs of their clients. By working at the personal level, PCS are trying to reduce the level of alienation found in the social relations of individuals. Generally PCS do:

"..provide and combine elements of control and services provisions, impose sanctions and confer benefits". [ibid: 12].

The definition of clients' needs by PCS is based on pathology models, of individualistic, group or family characteristics. The PCS are not preventive in character,
as they address social problems and needs after they have occurred in the sphere of socio-economic relations.

An appropriate example of the the role of PCS is in relation to unemployment. Social security services identify unemployment as an individual failure, and not as a feature of the capitalist economic system. The usually low unemployment benefit rates and strict eligibility criteria, are discouraging people to leave the labour market voluntarily, thus enforcing the work ethic.

The social control value of the PCS is, therefore, very important because pathology concepts are exercised at the individual level. In this way the PCS help to achieve the maintenance and acceptance of dominant ideologies and structures, and their subsequent legitimation.

Offe argues that the PCS of the welfare state are repressive in character as:

"Such repressiveness is indicated by the fact that, in order to qualify for the benefits of the welfare state, the client must not only prove his or her "need", but must also be a deserving client, a client, that is, who complies with the dominant political and cultural standards and norms of the society". [Offe op.cit: 155-156].

One of the most important consequences of the intervention of the welfare state in society, is to politicise all social and economic relations. Although the intensity of the political conflict can be dangerous for the welfare state, its scope can actually provide for political stability. As George explains about the role of social services in reducing social conflict:

"...they contrive to turn political debate and
conflict to the issue of the distribution of the national product rather than the mode of production - which according to Marxist analysis is the crucial determinant of economic and social relations. The significance of such a change in the pattern of conflict is twofold. First, such conflict can be processed on the political plane. Second, such conflict becomes group conflict rather than class conflict because it is detached from the basic class cleavages of society. It can therefore be contained within the existing political system." [George op.cit: 216].

The PCS of the state are not the only institutions that are involved with welfare provision. The state intervenes in other areas of social reproduction to sanction other social formations, like those of the institutions of the civil society. It is due to the wider appeal and apparent consensus practices of these institutions to the masses, that the state extends its ideological influence.

This intervention in social formations like the family, community institutions, schools, etc., which produce and educate wage labourers, is necessary to exercise control over their members [Offe op.cit:94]. The state has to ensure that the reproductive role of such formations remain for the benefit of capital, and are in line with the dominant ideologies.

For instance, in the case of women their role as welfare providers for the family members has to be reinforced all the time so as to limit the use of social services as much as possible, and to continue the sexual division of labour. For example this traditional image of women is perpetuated through media stereotypes. On the other hand if women do use PCS, then the latter affect and shape
the traditional ideologies and expectations of women:

"Personal social services, by stressing family and community care as the natural and proper ways to care for the dependent, help to perpetuate women's imprisonment in traditional female caring roles...community care means family care, family care means care by women, care by women means the perpetuation of a discriminatory division of labour". [George op.cit: 214].

One of the strategies to deal with the problem of alienation and social conflict in capitalist societies, has been the rediscovery of the concept of community work. This concept assumes the existence of more affinitive personal and social relations based on shared common interests. As Gough explains the political and strategic value of this policy was based on:

"The development of community work organization and development...was intended to incorporate poorer working class areas into the restyled government by fostering a community identification and managing better the conflict between groups and various organs of the "local state". [Gough op.cit: 139-140].

With the introduction of community work, social work has become one of the most widely used methods of social and individual service provision, primarily designed to intervene in working-class families to make them conform and control their members' behaviour. Social work was one of the first forms of personal care service introduced in the early stages of capitalist society, in order the bourgeoisie to control and instil working-class families with the dominant middle-class values of family organization, child rearing techniques and the work ethic [George op.cit: 48].
As the primary socialization role of the family has been largely taken over by other institutions, social work functions to reinforce the dominant values, or to re-socialise individuals or groups into new sets of values. With the growth of the welfare state social work has become an integral part of social policy, and so too social workers have become involved in social control activities, and the rationing of scarce resources [ibid: 209-210].

Depending on the personal values of the social worker, his/her class consciousness, and the ideological orientation of the institution he/she serves, can be either a social control agent or agent of social change. As agents of social change, social workers though may not seek the total transformation of society, they can initiate social reforms, which can improve the social conditions of the marginal groups they represent.

We now turn to the Australian experience to examine the role of ideology in class relations, the social policies of the welfare state, and the position and relations of migrants to these ideological, economic, and socio-political developments.
3.1: Migration and Australia

The processes of migration and settlement entail complex interrelations for the individuals, groups and societies involved. To understand these two processes, and their consequences, they have to be placed within the the specific historical milieu they have evolved. That is to say, the capitalist mode of production, the class relations and ideologies generated, and the role of state social policies in affecting both migration and settlement.

Migration is not simply based on economic considerations, but also on the socio-political and cultural relations that exist inside the 'exporting' country at the time, in the receiving country, and generally in the arena of international capitalist relations. So migration to be understood has to be seen:

"...under the prism of the political and socio-economic structures of those [underdeveloped] countries, whose underdevelopment is not only a result of internal idiosyncracies..., but it is connected with the historical relationship of dependence of these countries on the developed capitalist countries, and the position which has been determined for them by the latter in the international capitalist system of division of labour". [Loukopoulos in 'Economic Development and Migration in Greece' (ed) Nikolinakos 1974: 102] [Greek text].*

In the context of this statement Australia at the end of WW II was a developing capitalist society as it possessed the necessary preconditions, financial,
structural, political, and the resources to develop industrially. The post-war large scale importation of workers to Australia was essential for capitalist and demographic growth. Migrant workers provided the necessary, ready made, labour power to create surplus value, expand markets and consumption, upon which the growth of capital accumulation relied. [Jakubowicz et al., op. cit: 1]

Australian political parties, business groups, and other interest groups, supported this form of economic growth and the idea of "populate or perish". The trade unions were initially reluctant to support the migration program, as they perceived it as a threat to the wages of the indigenous working class, but eventually they supported it. They supported migration especially when realised that non-skilled migrant labour posed no such threat to their occupational and social mobility [de Lepervanche in 'Australian Society' 1984: 197].

The policy of migration has always had a high priority for the Australian state as successive Federal governments introduced and implemented various policies conducive to migration. In an article published in 1950, E.J.B Foxcroft of the Department of Immigration, stated clearly the benefits of the migration program:

"At a time when our workforce is little more than stationary and when the Australian population shows a decreasing ratio of workers to dependents...migration helps to rectify this imbalance and has a beneficial effect upon our population and workforce structure... Many of the migrants bring to Australia skills that it has cost us nothing to produce, and which are related to our most pressing employment needs. Through a combination of the special selection of certain
classes of migrants...it is possible to attack some of the most acute bottlenecks in our economy". ["The Impact of Migration", issued by the Commonwealth Bank, October 1950].

Part of the immigration criteria referred to by Foxcroft, and used throughout the 50s and 60s, were those related to the White Australia policy. The selection of migrants was based on their work ability and suitability to the Australian economy, but also on cultural/racial and political criteria.

Immigration policy had a specific bias towards people of Anglo-Celtic background. This formed the basis of the White Australia policy, which was designed to maintain the cultural uniformity of Australia, by restricting Asiatic migration [de Lepervanche op.cit: 170]. However, the perpetuation of the Anglo-Celtic dominant class system and institutions, could not be maintained intact after 1947. Collins argues that this occurred as:

"The need to fill immigration targets overrode the perceived needs to maintain racial purity in Australia". [Collins in Bottomley 1984: 4].

Indeed non-British migrants constituted 60 percent of the post-war Australian migrant intake [Encel in 'Australian Society' 1984: 2]. At the official level, at least, the immigration program was targeted towards skilled labour, which was available mainly from the U.K and Northern Europe, while unskilled labour was supplied from Southern Europe.

One of the primary reasons why the intake of non-British labour to Australia increased, especially that of S. European, was due to the international capitalist system of
division of labour during the post-war period [Loukopoulos op.cit: 102]. That is to say, after WW II developed capitalist countries historically have exported few industrial workers, and particularly unskilled ones.

On the other hand cheap unskilled labour, needed for manual repetitive, low-paid and undesirable occupations, could only be found in under-developed countries with large peasant populations. These countries, like the S. European, have traditionally supplied capitalist industrialised countries with peasants, who in their majority were destined for industrial workers.

An appropriate example of the socio-economic conditions faced by migrants in their countries of origin in the 50s and 60s was the case of Greece. According to research carried out by the Greek Bureau of Statistics in the early 1960s, approximately 800,000 persons, or 23% of the total Greek labour force, was either unemployed or underemployed [Essays on Greek Migration 1967: 2]. As a result between 1961-65, 470,000 persons migrated overseas.

Until the early 70s then the cheap source of migrant labour to Australia was provided by S. European countries, mainly Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece. As table [1] indicates, migrants from the U.K. comprised more than half of the total overseas born population in 1954, while in 1981 just over one-third.
Table 1: Total Overseas born Population (%)

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK and Ireland</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Europe (a)</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Europe (b)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Europe</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (c)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a): Includes Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia.
(b): Includes Austria, Germany and Netherlands.
(b1): Includes Germany and Netherlands.
(c): Includes Lebanese.


By comparison, the Southern European population increased 9.4% from 1954 to 1966, to reach a quarter of the migrant population in 1971, and only to decline in 1981, when Australian capital started to import unskilled labour from other countries.

3.2: Migrant Settlement and Social Policy

The Liberal party remained in power for most of the first 25 years of post war migration to Australia. During this period, even the importation of migrants had residual characteristics, with the majority of U.K. and other N. European migrants receiving assistance, while the majority of S. European migrants had to pay their own expenses, thus their labour power cost even less [Birrell and Birrell 1981: 54].

The period of economic growth and political stability
in Australia during this period was due to the international economic stability and various social policies of the Australian state. The arrival of large numbers of culturally diverse migrant workers was not readily acceptable by the local working-class and Anglo-Australian bourgeoisie. The Assimilation policy was to provide the ideological framework for addressing this situation.

Assimilation was based on the sociological assumption that regarded the absorption of the dominant values as a natural process of social adaptation. Failure to do so, was seen as an individual incapacity, or anti-social behaviour [Jakubowicz vol.3.,no.3, 1983: 51].

Assimilation was designed to achieve two social control goals. On the one hand to placate the indigenous working class from any fears of possible threat to their socio-economic and occupational position by migrants. On the other hand, migrants, particularly NES working class migrants, had to be instilled with the work discipline and contained within the dominant values of the host society, thus entrenching more the institutional and ideological dominance of the Anglo-Australian bourgeoisie. As de Lepervanche comments on the ideology of assimilation:

"The problem of assimilation belonged to the immigrants; the host society remained unproblematic". [op.cit: 178]

In this way, Assimilation acted as a necessary strategy to affect labour discipline, to maintain the cultural dominance of Australian institutions and class
relations, and to achieve capital accumulation rate at its maximum capacity. Assimilation, by assuming the eventual absorption on NES migrants to the values of the host society, side stepped their socio-economic and cultural existence. As a result they were restricted in their communities, which became the main areas of their socio-political expression, denied them wider access to the resources and rewards of the host society, while at the same time this expression represented a form of resistance to the dominant culture and ideology of the host society.

3.3: The impact of Migrants on the Economy

Since 1945 the processes of proletarianization and urbanization of the Australian workforce continued to increase, with migration contributing to this acceleration. As a result of that the structure and composition of the Australian society changed, and so too that of the labour force.

In 1947 72.6% of the total workforce had employee status, as compared with 86.7% in 1976, while the comparative figures for employer status [6.9%] and self-employed [12.1%] in 1947, had been reduced to 5.1% and 8.7% respectively [Collins op.cit: 10].

The impact of migrant workers on the Australian economy and labour market is part of a constant debate within the general framework of the economic development in
Australia [Jakubowicz et.al. op.cit: 3]. And the opinions on this issue vary considerably.

Birrell and Birrell [1981] and J.Collins [1984 op.cit.] have both argued that the major negative effects of migration have been the lowering of the living standards of the Australian working-class, and impediment of technological development. However, each of the authors offers different interpretations for these effects.

The Birrells acknowledge that Australian capital relied for its growth on the immigrant labour. The authors argue that the primary motive for the continuation of migration had more to do with the desire of the Department of Immigration to maintain high numerical targets, and enhance its position in the bureaucracy, and less with employer pressure [Birrell and Birrell op.cit: 67-72]. As a result of that the number of S. European unskilled workers increased gradually as skilled labour became more scarce.

In this way the S. Europeans became the only available cheap labour to local employers, and were then channelled to the dirtiest, low paid and dangerous occupations of Australian industry [ibid: 79-109]. These occupations became identifiable as migrant occupations, because of the type of work they involved, and lack of career prospects, which deprived economically NES migrants, while the local population avoided them.

Then the Birrells go on to argue that the impact of the unskilled S. European labour on the Australian industry was to inhibit the development of technology, and high
productivity, as the industry adapted to the low skills of these workers, and this situation contributed to the lowering of living standards [loc cit]. Finally the whole migration program created uncontrolled urban growth, and a corresponding rise in the cost of infrastructures which reduced the availability of scarce capital [ibid: 264].

Although some of the Birrells' arguments are valid—like the creation of 'migrant' occupations and the economic deprivation of many S. Europeans—the dynamics of capital accumulation are ignored, and so the role of unskilled migrant labour in this process is diminished or misinterpreted. Labour studies in W. Europe and the USA have shown that even for developed capitalist countries, unskilled labour is imperative [Piore 1979].

Imperative in the sense of filling labour shortages in repetitive, low-paid and dangerous manual occupations which are often non-unionised. Unskilled labour is, therefore, an important element in the creation of surplus value because:

"Migrants undertake these occupations, not because they are illiterate and unskilled, but precisely for this reason, by being illiterate and unskilled they are necessary". [Loukopoulos op.cit: 102]. *

Even the Birrells themselves point out that the existence of quotas and tariffs, the domestic focus of industrial output and reliance on the export of primary products, increased the reliance of the local manufacturing sector on labour intensive techniques [Birrell and Birrell op.cit: 81]. And it would appear that
the above factors are more responsible for the low technological development of Australian industry and its low quality products, than the employment of unskilled workers.

Collins views the role of unskilled labour in the Australian economy, as the result of capital seeking to maximize a low cost labour force and achieve a higher rate of capital accumulation [Collins op.cit:1-8].

During the process of migration Collins notes that the Australian labour market has been fragmented along ethnic, sex, occupational and industrial lines [ibid: 11]. The main labour market fragmentation involves the creation of a skilled English-speaking labour force, and an unskilled NES labour force.

This can be seen clearly on table [2] where in 1971 90.1% of Greek males and 81.8% of Italian were without any qualifications, as compared with 71.4% of the total population, 62.4% for U.K. and 46.3% for Germany. Among females the discrepancy was more pronounced, with only 2.5% of the Greek females and 3.6% of the Italian having some form of qualifications, in comparison to 12.3% of the total female population and 33.3% of German women.
### Table 2: Population over 15 years of age: Level of qualifications by Year, Birthplace and Sex. (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level of Qualifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK &amp; Irel.</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Trade qualifications include technical and trade.


By 1981 the respective male and female qualification levels for all groups had shown increases, but still Greeks and Italians retained low levels. Very few NES workers had the time, opportunity and assistance to gain additional qualifications.

### 3.4: The Welfare of Migrants

The Australian welfare state that emerged after the war developed in an unplanned and ad hoc way, and never really developed to the extent of the N. European welfare states [Jones op.cit: 2]. Australia was spending 9.6% of its GDP in welfare in the early sixties, while the average
OECD figure was 13.2%, Austria's 19.6%, U.K. 12.6%, and the U.S 10.2%. In the mid seventies Australian welfare expenditure had risen to 12.8%, but still below the OECD average of 18.8%, 7% less than Italy's and just .9% more than that of Greece's [ibid:46].

The welfare state in Australia has been traditionally conservative towards social policy, with little future planning, and a strong reliance on the values of self-help, the work-ethic, and the deserving needy. This form of residual social policy has been employed by the Liberal governments, while the ALP, being a Social-Democratic party, tends to support more state intervention in society.

During the fifties and sixties, when the Liberals dominated Federal politics, there was very little done by the Australian state to increase the social wage. The main reason the Australian state adhered to residual welfare policies, was that political stability and economic growth justified the role of the free market as the main welfare distributor, and thus encouraged self-help welfare policies.

The assimilation policy had various negative consequences for the welfare of migrants. Firstly, it justified, ideologically, the fragmentation of the labour force along ethnic lines, which disadvantaged NES migrants occupationally, socially and economically, while the identification of 'migrant' occupations contributed in weakening the ideological insight of workers' solidarity on a non-racial/cultural basis.
To a large extent, trade unions followed assimilationist policies, which did not encourage or support the participation of NES migrants in the decision making process [L. Nikolaou, Occasional Papers EAC of NSW, 1986, no.10, pp.1-25]. Due to this attitude of unions, NES migrants could not push for their particular welfare needs through the labour union movement, and this might explain the present character of migrant welfare.

Secondly, the process of proletarianization had a great impact on the class structure of pre-war migrant communities. The post-war arrival of many industrial workers, who entered pre-war established communities of their countrymen, reversed the pre-war dominance of ethnic petit-bourgeois economic activity. This process was also affected by the increasing productive activity of monopolies and multinationals, which broke down the old mode of production and services.

This last observation is made by Collins, who notes that in 1947 28.4% of the total Greek and Cypriot population, and 16.7% of Germans were employers, and 21.5% and 20.3% respectively were self-employed [Collins op.cit: 14]. In 1976 the figures for the same groups were 6% and 5.4% [employers], and 12.6% and 9.5% [s.employed], while all ethnic groups had employment status characteristics closer to the national figure than in 1947.

This class restructuring of many NES communities and the political isolation of assimilation, made the former the only outlet for socio-political expression and
organization. There was an intense political conflict, as new ideological forms were developed for the re-alignment of class relations, and the control of institutions in the quest for more power, control and status.

Thirdly, the residual character of social welfare during this period was felt more strongly by NES migrants. Despite the general low level of welfare provision, noticeably in personal care services, the assimilationist state attitude excluded migrants from access to many benefits. Studies on the living conditions of NES migrants during this period, though they brought into light their welfare problems, they identified these problems in terms of various pathology models, mostly as being problems related to poverty [Cox and Martin 1975].

Most personal services for NES migrants could only be provided within their communities, by institutions which could not deal with the complexities of industrial and urban life, and limited themselves to individual cases of the deserving needy.

The family was another important welfare institution for NES migrants that became increasingly demanding on its women members. This was so, as the low wages of their husbands left many married migrant women with no option but to enter the workforce in order to increase the family's income, while at the same time they had to perform their traditional roles of housekeepers and emotional providers of the family. In 1971 married migrant women constituted 33% of the total married female workforce, though they
comprised 25% of all the married women in Australia [de Lepervanche op.cit: 207].

Marital and familial relations among S. Europeans were under continuous stress due to the migration process, economic insecurity, and anxiety in a new socio-cultural environment. The lack of primary supporting networks, like in the case of Greek women, was an additional burden, as well as the lack of child care provision [Cox and Martin op.cit: 30].

The main welfare distributor during this period was the labour market. Full employment and conservative residual state policies, despite the low wages and hard working conditions experienced by NES workers, were sufficient reasons to limit any form of protest for better state welfare services.

Overall, during the assimilation period the cost of production and reproduction of migrants was kept into a minimum level, while their productive capacity of surplus value at a maximum one. The exclusion of NES migrants from the secondary income distribution of production, which was supported by their lack of political participation, was an effective method of social control and enforcer of the work discipline. According to Jakubowicz:

"Migrants were thus supposed to have minimal impact on the fabric of Australian social relations, and migrant women were assumed to be totally invisible. Any process or action which heightened visibility had to be prevented. Thus national groups as avenues for the delivery of any service were anathema - the national (or ethnic) group was seen as the major barrier to assimilation. Any problems experienced by immigrants had to be the result of the individual
incapacity or pathology, either medical or psychological. Non-British migrants would have to earn their social rights through years of labour and taxation, only then would they be permitted to enjoy the social provision of an increasingly affluent society [et.al., op.cit: 27].

What was to change migrant social policies after the mid 60s was the NES migrants' increasing social awareness of their inequality, the growing questioning of the legitimacy of the Australian state and its institutions, of the Anglo-Australian bourgeoisie, and the deepening economic crisis of Australian capitalism in the 1970s.
CHAPTER 4
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THE MULTICULTURAL PERIOD - 1975 TO PRESENT
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4.1: Towards Multiculturalism - Integration
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In the late 60s and early 70s Australian capitalism and the Australian state experienced a period of legitimation crisis [Jakubowicz in Bottomley op.cit: 28-48]. That is, in general terms the social policies of the state were proving ineffective in their attempts to legitimise the social position of institutions and practices of Australian capitalism.

According to Jakubowicz this legitimation crisis was precipitated by:

"The increasing concentration and centralisation of the processes of capital accumulation during the 1960s had created an intensification of social dislocation and an increase in demand for collectively provided (state) services...The essential 'political' problems became those of diminishing the pressure by social movements and organised labour for greater state expenditure". [ibid: 29].

This Marxist interpretation of the Australian state legitimation crisis, is explained in terms of the inability of the state to satisfy the contradictory needs of capital accumulation and legitimation in capitalist societies [George op.cit: 239]. Habermas, among other Marxist authors like Offe and Gough, argued that this legitimation crisis is inherent in the capitalist mode of production. And this crisis is expressed in the failure of various system levels-economic, administrative, legitimation, and socio-cultural-
to produce the necessary results to satisfy both capital accumulation and the acceptance of capitalism [Loc.cit].

The failure of the various system levels is mainly due to the contradiction experienced between the assumed state of socio-economic relations espoused by the bourgeoisie and the state, and the social reality experienced by the working class. This contradiction occurs because for capital accumulation to continue to grow in advanced capitalist societies, exploitation has to be made legitimate, and for this reason adherence to more democratic principles and practices are needed at the same time to secure popular acceptance and obedience to the whole social structure.

However, democratic ideas challenge the legitimacy of accumulation, and the most fundamental expression of this contradiction is found in the increasing socialisation of social costs, and on the other side in the private appropriation of profit and surplus value. As George remarks about the role and position of the welfare state in relation to this contradiction:

"If the state does more to aid accumulation, as it must if private capital is to remain profitable, it must at the same time, spend more on welfare and social control if its legitimacy is to be safeguarded".[ibid: 238]

So in the late 60s the migrant presence became also a part of the legitimisation crisis facing the Anglo-Australian ruling class and institutions, and the state. There were a variety of reasons contributing to this crisis. Foremost was the realisation that the policy of assimilation was becoming increasingly unworkable:
"(Assimilation) failed to implement those goals of cultural, normative economic integration of migrants into a unitary Australian society". [Jupp et.al. 1984: 19].

What this failure meant in effect was that the consequences of assimilation policy - the proletarianization of migrants and their incorporation into the dominant class values and institutions - had undermined social peace and the legitimacy of those same forces that had promoted it in the first place [Jakubowicz et.al. op..cit: 41].

The failure of assimilation became gradually more evident in various social studies of the period, which showed the many social problems facing NES migrants and their children, health and mental problems, educational problems of children, 'poverty', high housing costs, and a general lack of welfare provision. The Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, for instance, provided an overview of the social and welfare problems encountered by NES migrants, as they had accumulated in the first 25 years of post-war migration [Cox and Martin 1975: 5-19].

Although by the late 60s most migrants had acquired citizenship and voting rights, their social status and political power had remained marginalised within their own communities. This status marginalisation and rejection was felt mostly by the ethnic petit-bourgeoisie, who resented the stigmatisation of their ethnic identity as an obstacle to forge closer relations and alliances with the Australian ruling class and state [Jakubowicz in Bottomley op.cit: 28].

The civil rights movement of the period, with its calls for equal citizenship rights and a more equitable and humane
involvement of the state in social life, provided the right ideological terrain for the ethnic petit-bourgeoisie to advance ethnic rights. The political mobilisation and demands of the ethnic petit-bourgeoisie to a large extent represented those of their own ethnic working class, but at the same time it was a reaction by the former to re-establish their legitimacy.

After many years of residual state policies, ethnic community institutions had reached a stage where they could not cope any longer with the complex demands and social problems of their working class members. This inability of ethnic institutions, together with the political unrepresentativeness of the ethnic petit-bourgeoisie, had undermined their legitimacy in their own communities, and made their calls for political participation, civic equality and welfare provision more vocal and urgent.

Another contributory factor that undermined assimilation was the fact that in the late 60s departures exceeded arrivals as migrants found unsatisfactory working and living conditions in Australia, while W. Europe was absorbing more S. European immigrants.

Already from the mid-sixties the state had reacted to these events by introducing progressively some integrative social policies to cope with the influx and settlement of migrants. The Good Neighbour Council, the introduction of the GIA program in 1968, some interpreting services, were among the first attempts to provide some forms of personal social services to migrants.
Simultaneously, integration, though not yet the dominant issue of ethnic social policy, was receiving more attention as a possible future ideological form in shaping the social relations of migrants. Martin's comments on integration, and the problems of practical application it presented, were among the most articulate and influential of the period [J. Martin 1972].

With the election of the ALP to power in 1972 assimilation policy was officially abandoned in favour of integration. The main proponent of this policy was the then Minister of Immigration Al Grassby, who perceived integration as an ideology and policy able to achieve a unitary society based on the cultural diversity of its population.

Whereas assimilation assumed the unproblematic nature of the host society and the inevitability of absorption of migrants into it, integration accepted the cultural pluralism of Australian society and a normative peaceful co-existence and competition between equally powerful groups [de Lepervanche op.cit: 184-5]. What integration sought to do was to accept the cultural identity of migrants as a civil right, and humanise the process of proletarianization of NES migrant workers by increasing the provision of welfare services for them.

Thus the socio-political isolation and rejection experienced by NES migrants under assimilation, was interpreted by integration as the failure of the state to accept and understand as legitimate their cultural identity.
The cultural intolerance of NES migrant workers was recognised by the state as the primary source of their socio-economic inequality, while the vigorous and dilapidating process of proletarianization of individuals and families, and their consequences, were ignored or at least it was assumed that increased welfare provision could ameliorate them. The main objective of integration then was to create social peace and order among the working class population, which were essential for the continuation of capital accumulation in an economy entering a deep and protracted economic crisis after 1973.

Integration was in line with other interventionist policies of the ALP, and after 1972 the lobbying by rival intra and inter ethnic petit-bourgeoisie groups and institutions, like the AGWS in Melbourne and Co-Assit in Sydney, intensified in search for more state funds for welfare programs and access to other state resources.

During this period the priority for the state was that gradually incorporated and co-opted ethnic leaders within existing bureaucracies, while at the same time sanctioned and helped the establishment of of some ethnic institutions, e.g the E.C.Cs, A.E.C.C.

Generally integration policy had a great impact on NES migrants, who for the first time received an official recognition of their existence, even though it was a limited one. Eventually though the ALP never managed to formulate an applicable migrant policy, as integration was a new concept, and also stayed in office for a short period of
time. Moreover, the assimilationist attitudes of the bureaucracy were another obstacle for the formulation and implementation of migrant policies.

Multiculturalism was to provide the ideological and practical framework for solutions to manage the migrant presence after 1975. It was the policy of multiculturalism that really asserted and established ethnicity as the principal determinant factor in interpreting migrants' social existence.

4.2: Theories of Ethnicity

Ethnicity has become an important topic of discussion among social theorists worldwide, because as a set of relationships based on primordial non-'rational' concepts it has managed to survive and gain a high profile within capitalist relations of production. These relations to operate effectively have to be defined by rational concepts to support the continuous increase of capital accumulation. Despite this not only the concept of ethnicity, but other non-'rational' concepts like race, religion, dominant ideas about the role of women have continued to exist under capitalist relations, which points out to their value as ideological forms of social control by the ruling bourgeoisie.

The issue of ethnicity became a part of Australian social literature during the late sixties, and gained more prominence in migration and settlement discussions in the following decade with the advent of multiculturalism.
Mainstream discussions on ethnicity have been dominated mainly by two theories, the one that treats ethnicity as a cultural experience and the other as a status characteristic. Marxist analysis of ethnicity is another theory, which will be considered first and compared and contrasted with the mainstream theories.

Bonacich in her class model of ethnicity has treated the concept as a socially created one, as an ideology, which although it calls upon primordial symbols and attributes based on a common ancestry, these must be activated within concrete historical, economic and socio-political conditions [E. Bonacich,'Class Approaches to Ethnicity and Race', Insurgent Sociologist,, Vol.X, No.2, 1980: 11]. That is to say, the nature and structure of the ethnic group will be determined by both the 'ethnic' characteristics of the group, and the material conditions encountered by it in the new environment.

Ethnic groups have a material basis in the means of production and because of that class differentiation occurs due to the different structural positions occupied by the people sharing the same ethnicity. The conflict arising out of this class differentiation is over the definition of the group's ethnicity, and takes the form of ideological struggle. Although intra-ethnic conflict is class based it is not necessarily expressed or perceived as such, but more as a political conflict [ibid: 9-21].

For this reason Bonacich regarded ethnic groups as essentially political groups whose dominant class mobilises
the rest of the group, by appealing to the ethnic symbolizations of the group in order to acquire more political and economic resources. In doing so the dominant ethnic class acquires more power to determine, or rather to define the 'ethnicity' of the subordinate ethnic class.

Australian class theories on ethnicity have been dominated mainly by discussions from Jakubowicz [1983, 1984, 1985], and de Lepervanche [1980, 1984]. Jakubowicz's general argument on ethnicity has been that, although it may not directly derive from class relations or expressed in such terms, ethnicity has to be treated in terms of its ideological function in affecting class relations in Australian society [Jakubowicz et.al op.cit: 16-17]. Moreover, the everyday relations of migrants do not constitute a form of false consciousness as they refer to a certain reality, however transfigured it may be.

In Jakubowicz's view ethnicity's interpretation and application in state social policies, has been used as an ideological tool to reconstruct social relations at times of capitalist crisis in order to maintain capital accumulation and legitimise the Australian state and the Anglo-Saxon dominant class. At the same time ethnicity as expressed in the form of multiculturalism is a ruling class ideology that aims to achieve social order, and maintain social control by masking and mystifying migrant class people's social relations and inequalities. In this way migrants perceive their social existence mainly as related to their ethnic background, and unconnected with the means and
relations of capitalist production.

The development of multiculturalism has also been explained by Jakubowicz as part of the overall neo-conservative ideology that was advocated by the Liberal government after 1975. During this period Federal social policies incorporated residual forms of welfare provision to migrants, and conservative perceptions about the nature of the individual [Jakubowicz in G. Bottomley 1984:28-48, and in Ethnic Politics in J. Jupp (ed), 1984: 14-28].

For de Lepervanche the emergence of ethnicity as a determining concept of migrants' social relations in Australia, is but another form of racism which has been a part of capitalism ever since its emergence and its imperialist adventures in non-European countries [G. Bottomley and M. de Lepervanche 1984, op.cit: 49-71].

In another paper though de Lepervanche argued the following as the main reasons for the promotion of ethnic heterogeneity and cultural pluralism after 1973:

"Ethnocentricism in home affairs was no longer an appropriate public stand. Ethnicity emerged as a crucial variable in Australian class society. When harnessed by the state and promoted as multiculturalism, it gave priority to ethnic rather than class differences, and thus provided an effective means of social control". [de Lepervanche op.cit:184].

Other authors who have taken consideration of the class implications of ethnicity in their research have been F. Mackie [1982], and by M. Humphrey [1984]. For example, Humphrey in his book 'Family, Work and Unemployment: A study of Lebanese settlement in Sydney' notes about the Lebanese:
"Social inequality in Australian society does not primarily derive from membership in an ethnic group. Inequality is mainly determined by the class structure. Individuals from the same ethnic group may share a common class position in Australia but this is not primarily a product of their ethnic origin but their former class status in their home society. But while class may largely determine relative disadvantage in Australian society, ethnic discrimination may reinforce it". [pp.1-2].

The development of an ethnic group through the process of migration entails the re-definition of its primordial identity in the new socio-cultural environment. This reinterpretation of cultural symbolisations involves a continuous synthesis of selection and manipulation, both inside and outside the ethnic group. So what becomes important about an ethnic group are not the symbolisations themselves, but in the way these symbolisations are reproduced and used [Kakakios in G. Bottomley op. cit: 145].

A class analysis of ethnicity, therefore, treats the concept itself as an ideology, while methodologically as descriptive, as a means of identifying a group of people distinct from another due to their ethnic characteristics.

The most common theoretical approach to define ethnicity is the culture approach. According to this theory, culture is the pattern of ideas, values, beliefs and practices into which people are socialised. Ethnicity and the ethnic group, therefore, are defined by a common culture, shared religious beliefs, which are transmitted by language or by primordial symbols and attributes based on common ancestry [Bostock 1977: 1-7].

This theory views language as having the central role
in the socialization of the individual and of the group, as socialization transmits and maintains cultural identity, solidarity and consciousness. Since socialization into cultural norms constitutes the premises of action for the individual and the group, those ethnic members with similar cultural background engage into similar patterns of activity [Loc.cit].

Within this concept of ethnicity then the individual is treated as an unchangeable cultural agent, living in a homogenous and cohesive group. Conflict arises only when there is absence of socialization to the core values of the group. This theory of ethnicity implies that the social existence and action of members of the ethnic group, or of the ethnic group itself, are directed by the common desire of all members to preserve their ethnicity, because the preservation of primordial characteristics is seen as an important activity in binding the ethnic group together.

This formulation of ethnicity offers very little to the understanding of both the ethnic group and of the cultural process itself. The fundamental assumption of this interpretation of ethnicity is aptly summed up by Jakubowicz who argues that:

"The most important component of such a view is that ethnicity transcends economic divisions, and
and implicitly contains a social order which all participants internalise as legitimate". [Jakubowicz et.al. op.cit: 11].

In other words the gender and class relations of the members of the ethnic group are not addressed, their social relations and inequalities are attributable to their
culture, rather than to the capitalist system and the hegemonic ideology that defines them. On the other hand, culture is not immutable, but is activated and reinterpreted within a given social and political milieu to meet the new social and cultural demands of the individual and the group.

Multiculturalism's interpretation of ethnicity is based on this model of culture, while ethnic communities have been treated as homogenous entities. The idea behind this is for an ethnic culture to continue to exist, and therefore the cohesive relations of the group and the community spirit to be maintained - to maintain social order and avoid conflict - then the primordial characteristics of the group have to be recognised and preserved. The consequences of this policy have been to obstruct the migrant working class of the ideological means to develop alternative forms of social organization and action.

However, Australian mainstream theories on ethnicity have been greatly influenced by the work of Glazer and Moynihan [1975a], and Weber's concept of status inequality. Glazer's study on ethnicity was mainly drawn from the nationalist movements of the underdeveloped countries and the civil rights movement of Blacks in the USA. His general argument is that the political mobilization of these ethnic/racial minorities was based on forms of self identification and conflict defined by ethnic criteria, rather than class criteria.

Glazer defines ethnicity as a common culture shared by people from the same national origin, with shared historical
experience and language [ibid: 18]. In comparison to the culture model of ethnicity, this model treats ethnicity as a status attribute, and the ethnic group as a status group motivated by material interests, rather than the primordial characteristics that constitute it [ibid: 1-25].

Moynihan and Glazer are treating ethnic groups as status hierarchies groups operating within a system of closure [Jakubowicz et.al.op.cit: 12-13]. That is to say, the cultural tolerance shown by the dominant group will determine the position of the ethnic group in the stratification ladder. The ethnic group mobilises its ethnicity when it feels marginalised, particularly in terms of social esteem. This feeling of marginalisation is expressed by the ethnic intelligentsia who feel most isolated, ignored or obstructed by the dominant cultural group and the state.

In this process the ethnic intelligentsia presents itself as representing the interests and feelings of the whole ethnic group, and expresses its feeling of cultural denial and esteem by challenging the legitimacy of the state and of the dominant group, by questioning the lack of access to resources and democratic rights as espoused by the latter.

Once the state recognises and accommodates the demands of the ethnic intelligentsia, social integration and order are established. The state, therefore, becomes the arbiter and distributor of social, political and material resources. As Glazer points out:
"The strategic efficacy of ethnicity (is) in making legitimate claims on the resources of the state". [Glazer and Moynihan op.cit: 11].

This theory has been used extensively by Martin [1978], Encel [1981] and Birrell and Birrell [1981] to analyse the emergence of the concept of ethnicity in Australia, to interpret the migrants' mobilisation after the 70s, and for social policy applications.

This position has been further discussed more recently by Encel, McCall and Burnley [1985]. In the introductory chapter of their book 'Immigration and Ethnicity in the 1980s', the authors' arguments on ethnicity run along the theory of status hierarchies. They argue that the analytical validity of the ethnicity concept lies in its ability, amongst other things, to expose unequal social and ideological relations, which are to a certain extent independent from class relations [ibid: 1-10].

In support of their arguments the authors raise the point that there is always a state supported hegemonic definition of cultural reality to which ethnic particularism represents a challenge [ibid: 10]. Assimilation and integration policies then are two examples that demonstrate the prevention or weakening of closure by the dominant majority in view of the challenge presented by the ethnic group.

Under multiculturalism the barriers of ethnic closure have been lowered. This is more evident in the area of welfare provision, which is seen by the ethnic elites as a means to act as welfare mediators between the state and
their communities, obtain positions in the bureaucracy and compete for scarce state resources [ibid: 29].

The status hierarchy approach provides a more dynamic analysis to the concept of ethnicity than the cultural model. However, this analysis fails to locate the different class positions occupied by members of social groups, thus failing to explain the material dominance of one group over the other, and consequently the contradictory inter and intra group relations and conflicts that develop because of that [Jakubowicz et.al. op.cit: 16]. For this reason a status interpretation of ethnicity will pose significant methodological problems at the intra-group level of analysis.

A relevant example of the application of the status analysis to ethnicity and race is the experience of Blacks in the USA. The Black civil rights movement in the USA in the 1960s achieved the recognition of the racial characteristics of Blacks as a civil right, and therefore their right participate equitably in all aspects of social life.

Twenty years later the middle class Black Americans have achieved equal status like their White peers, but the vast majority of Blacks still occupy the fringes of American society living in a vicious cycle of poverty and racism, which they find increasingly hard to break away from.

This example shares many similarities with the present situation in Australia, where the ethnic middle class has
achieved a degree of recognition by the ruling Anglo-Australian class, while working class migrants and marginal groups are slipping down the stratification ladder in greater numbers than before.

4.3: Multiculturalism under the Liberals 1975-83

In 1975 the conservative Coalition parties came to power with the intention to reverse the more institutional social policies of the ALP. The general direction of the state social policies during this period were residual in approach, emphasising the values of the free market and self-help welfare methods.

Such policies were deemed as necessary by the state to address the growing economic and social policies of Australia. In terms of social welfare, the state incorporated the same conservative ideological concepts in the form of increased payment of cash benefits closer to the poverty line, voluntary services, and to minimise universalistic programs, like the abolition of Medicare.

Migrant related social policies were dominated by the same ideological concepts and strategies. One of the first acts of the Fraser government was the re-establishment of the Dept. of Immigration, which had been abolished in 1974. In 1976 the ethnic Affairs section was added to the Department [ROMMPAS 1986:32-33].

This reshuffling was necessary for the government to formulate a more effective policy strategy of integration, which was latter came to be known as Multiculturalism. The
government initiated various reports and inquiries to define and implement its migrant policy. The Bailey report of 1976 proposed that mainstream services ought to be relative to the needs of migrants, as they are with the general population [Jakubowicz et al., op. cit: 72].

The same report also proposed a review of the role of the conservative Good Neighbourhood Councils, and the transfer of post-arrival responsibilities to DIEA, which happened in 1977. In the same year the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council, which had been appointed by DIEA, recommended what it believed were the guiding principals for a multicultural society. The recommended principles were social cohesion, cultural maintenance, equality of opportunity and access.

These state bureaucratic developments, also reflected the ongoing struggle among antagonistic ethnic petit-bourgeois groups, to gain more access to state resources. This struggle was intense due the structural differentiation occurring among the ethnic groups:

"The deeper structural issues were those of an industrial working class in a declining industrial sector, which lacked representation, power and control, having their interests projected by a leadership which was increasingly "of them", though not necessarily "for them". The most effective advocates of ethnic rights perspectives, such as those in the Greek welfare in Melbourne, were arguing that services could be best designed and provided by the ethnic communities - that is, by the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia of those communities on behalf of their own working class". [Jakubowicz op. cit: 68]

The Galbally Report of 1978 on 'Migrant Services and Programs: report of the review of post-arrival programs and
services for migrants', proved to be the watershed policy for Australian migrants. The Galbally report was presented in 1978 to the government, which contained the basic principles of the Liberal's neo-conservative, that is the belief that the free market is the major welfare distributor and self-help concepts on welfare [Jakubowicz in Bottomley 1984: 43].

The recommendations of the Galbally report, and their subsequent implementation, shaped up to the present date migrant social policy. The Report's implementation of multiculturalism was based on the concept of recognising ethnic communities as whole uniform entities, with no conflicting interests among their members. The ethnic community was identified as a form of organization, where it could act as a resource pool and structure for welfare provision. In this way, the ethnic community became a major organizational form of reproductive responsibility for the migrant working class.

The Report also recommended the extension of the GIA program, so that ethnic institutions and other generalist welfare organizations could employ social workers of ethnic background. One of the reasons of establishing ethno-specific services, was their low cost of operation. The GIA grant never reached a level of financial adequacy, thus forcing ethnic communities self-help methods, on volunteers, charity, and donations.

However, the most important reason for the funding of ethnic institutions was the favourable support of the
community concept among conservative ethnic bourgeoisie, and specifically by religious institutions. Conservative ethnic institutions were targeted as the main recipients of state welfare funds, and in the process they become mediators between the state and the members of their communities.

The emphasis of the Galbally report on the provision of personal care services to migrants through volunteer ethnic and non-ethnic community organizations, was to certain extent an unavoidable policy, as at that particular time there were no such services available in the government sector. This policy decision showed also the lack of political and ideological commitment of the state to quality and equatable migrant welfare service.

The real value of the PCS is to be found in their immediate form of social control they can exercise at the individual and group level. PCS by their very nature, are located at the end of the productive and reproductive processes of capitalist society, where they supposed to piece together people or groups who have suffered from these processes.

NES migrants have gone through such processes, and the economic recession, high unemployment, and falling standards of living, made PCS necessary instruments of control for any social discontent. So ethnic welfare institutions that received funds, and notably conservative ones, used social work and workers as methods to control their own working class.
These conservative organizations and practices, introduced migrant working class and other disadvantaged groups to the dominant values of Australian society. They have sought to contain them, and thus to restrict any alternative forms of ideology and organization.

Another notable recommendation of the Galbally report was the establishment of the Migrant Resource Centres, which were designed to provide a community development role and resources to localised ethnic groups. Through the MRC's the state intended to give a wider community acceptance to the status of conservative ethnic petit-bourgeoisie, by appointing them to the management committees of these Centres.

In terms of class relations, multiculturalism co-opted and established firmly the relationship between the conservative ethnic bourgeoisie and the state, and the Anglo-Australian dominant class. Moreover, the conservative ethnic bourgeoisie progressively increased its participation in the major political parties.

The state practice of funding politically conservative ethnic institutions, effectively isolated the progressive ones from state resources, and consequently their influence and legitimacy with community their members was reduced. Under multiculturalism, the NES working class found its real welfare needs - income security, better housing, education, health provision, general social services and psychological well being- ignored. Instead, their welfare needs were ideologically and materially fragmented.
Multiculturalism co-opted at the bureaucratic level not only ethnic conservative elements, but also progressive middle class elements and intelligentsia, so they could be neutralised. The establishment of organizations like the 2EA and 3EA in 1977, of AIMA, and of the SBS later on, had this intention.

4.4: The Economy and Migrants

Multicultural policy represented an ad hoc reaction to control the growing socio-economic problems of migrant workers, and at the same time to maintain the rate of capital accumulation. The restructuring of the Australian economy in the last 15 years, and its cyclic recessions, further eroded the living standards of working class migrants, and their position in the labour market.

Under the Fraser government immigration intakes remained high despite the recession, 93.177 [1982/3], while under the Labor government they were somewhat reduced 78.087 [1984/85] [ROMMPAS op.cit:416]. The immigration policy of the 1970s and early 1980s, lost much of the economic and cultural bias of the earlier migration years.

In 1984/85, 52.7% of the migrant intake was in the form of family reunion, 19% refugee, and only 9% due to labour shortage which showed a bias towards skilled migrants [ibid: 417]. Other factors that affected immigration policy in the seventies significantly were local and international political circumstances and pressures.
The end of the Indochinese war in 1975, and the commencement of the Lebanese civil war the same year, was followed by the arrival of thousands of people to Australia from these areas. At the same time, political pressure by ethnic groups in Australia, witnessed the arrival of more people under various settler statuses, i.e refugees, family reunion scheme etc.

Despite some cultural, socio-economic and educational differences between the post-70s NES migrants from underdeveloped countries and the earlier ones, in their majority the former constituted a new source of cheap, mainly unskilled, labour for Australian capital. These migrants, filled in the labour vacuum created after the cessation of S. European migration in the early 70s.

This new unskilled labour was cheaper for capital than the 'older' one, not necessarily in terms of wages, but in terms of labour discipline, lower union participation, working conditions and reproductive costs, attributes probably lost by the 'old' unskilled labour. Thus the more established migrant groups started to move out of unskilled occupations, and the newer immigrant groups replace them [Mackie 1982: 16].

There were also some important changes in the employment status of the working population between 1971-86, which were more noticeable among NES migrants. By 1986 the national employee status decreased by 10.2% for males and 10.9% for females, while Greeks of both sexes registered one of the biggest drops, 18.9% and 18.1%
Table 3: Employment Status by Birthplace (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
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<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>79.6</td>
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<td>78.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>77.2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>7.0</td>
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</table>


* Percentages calculated to those in workforce.
* 1986 Unemployment figures are only for persons seeking full-time work.


respectively table [3]. The Lebanese males had the lowest employee status percentage at 47.6%, and Lebanese females 46.8%.

Greek and Italian males for the first time since the 50s had similar workforce participation rates as the national one, around 74% in 1986, while Lebanese males had the same figure, though this was 7% higher than 1981. Migrant female workforce participation rates declined between 1971 and 1986 when compared to the national figure.

However, the most dramatic changes occurred in the unemployment status of NES migrants. The Lebanese male unemployment rates nearly doubled between 1981 and 1986 to reach 29.1%, which is more than three and half times of that of the Greeks and of the national average, while Lebanese female unemployment figures stood at 25.1%, four times more than the national average. What these figures do not show is the extent of hidden unemployment, which according to Humphrey is high among migrants [Humphrey 1984 op.cit:1].

In view of the high unemployment rates and declining employee status positions, self-employment represented an alternative to this situation, and this was reflected in the general increase of self-employment status between 1971-86. NES migrants recorded the highest increase of self-employment, with the Greek, Italian and males and
females registering increases from 4.7% to 7.7%.

The comparatively high self-employment rates among NES persons, did not necessarily correlate to high income. A recent study showed that the four lowest income groups were the Vietnamese ($9,400), Lebanese ($9,600), other Middle Eastern countries ($9,800), and Greeks ($10,300) [ROMMPAS op.cit: 400]. The average income of persons with native born parents is $13,000, for Yugoslavs $11,000, Italians $11,700, from U.K. $14,300, and for Germans $14,900.

The high unemployment rates among NES migrants, were due to the restructuring of the Australian economy since the middle of seventies. This activity was more widespread in the manufacturing sector, which was the traditional source of employment for NES migrant workers.

The rationale of capitalist restructuring, effectively being one method to improve capital accumulation, pays little attention to the social and economic consequences of those mostly affected. In fact the only respect capitalism has for the individual, is her/his actual or potential ability to produce surplus value. In a capitalist economy the major source of welfare for the working population is income from employment, with the social wage acting to minimise the reproductive cost of the worker and his/her family. Thus unemployment acts as a disciplinary method to enforce the work ethic on the working class, and control wage increases in periods of economic recession.

Restructuring meant a shift towards the development of the financial and service sector, which demanded a more
skilled workforce, both technically and linguistically. This process resulted in the growth of occupations which were beyond the reach of NES unskilled workers, and generally of most NES workers. For instance de Lepervanche mentions that between June 1971 and October 1977 there was an increase of 485,000 jobs in the tertiary sector, while in the manufacturing there was a loss of 150,000 jobs [de Lepervanche op.cit: 207].

The manufacturing sector witnessed a general fall in the rate of workforce participation, though this was more visible among NES migrants. In 1976, Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav males in the manufacturing sector had an average participation rate of 68.8%, compared with 48.8% of Australians, and Germans table [4]. By 1981 the corresponding figures were 62.2% and 43.3%, with the Greeks registering the biggest single fall from 66.2% to 54.2%.

Table 4: Occupational Percentage in Manufacturing/Trades.

<table>
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Other economic policies that contributed to the high unemployment levels of NES workers were the introduction of labour saving technology, retrenchments, export of capital to underdeveloped countries of the region to employ
cheap labour to manufacture and import the same goods that used to be made in Australia.

The two issues discussed thus far, high unemployment and the labour market disadvantage of NES migrants workers, have been taken up by Collins. He argues that although many migrant workers share many similar positions in the labour market as Anglophone workers, the location of most NES workers in unskilled positions, creates more disadvantages for them [Collins in Bottomley 1984 op.cit: 11].

The consistently higher than average rates of unemployment among NES migrant workers, and the higher increases and duration of it, gives these workers a particular role in the reserve labour army. According to Lever-Tracy, migrant workers form an important source of the reserve labour army in their countries of origin. Once they arrive in Australia they join the workforce, and cease to perform this role, particularly as related to exercise discipline for the rest of the workforce.

Collins disagrees with Lever-Tracy's argument on the role of migrants in the reserve labour army, by arguing that as an integral part of the workforce migrants are also subjected to periods of unemployment [ibid: 6-7]. As migrant workers, however, occupy different positions in the labour market, they do not form a cohesive body of workers.

Given the fragmentation of the labour market, it could be said that unskilled NES migrant workers are the most vulnerable to labour market changes. Unskilled NES labour, due to its structural inequality, does not constitute a
threat to the majority of the workforce, especially for the skilled and organised, nor it ever intended to do so.

As table [5] shows, NES migrant workers had more than double the average 'Labourers NEI' participation rates, in both manufacture and trade and in other unskilled positions. In relation to skilled occupations, only the Italians among the NES sample, had a higher percentage of bricklayers than the national average.

It could be argued, therefore, that NES unskilled workers are acting as the reserve labour army to the particular positions they occupy, to themselves. Though they are not destined for permanent unemployment, their higher and longer rates of unemployment will further marginalise their socio-economic position.

The importance of migrant unskilled labour to the Australian economy, as well as its vulnerability, is aptly demonstrated by the participation of migrant women in the manufacturing sector. As table [6] shows in 1976 only 10.6% of the total female workforce was employed in the manufacturing sector, in contrast to 54.3% of the Yugoslav, 50.7% of Greek and 37.8% of Italian.

In 1981 the national female participation rate in the above sector had fallen to 9.1%, but migrant women still maintained five times higher participation rates, with Yugoslav women having the highest of all at 47.9%.
Table 5: Manual Occupational Status by Birthplace (%)

<table>
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Table 6: Female Participation in Workforce and in Trade Manufacturing by Birthplace. (%)

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This fall in the workforce participation of females in the manufacturing sector reflected the impact of restructuring, which was also accompanied by cheap overseas imports. The most dramatic demonstration of this change could be seen in the textile/clothing industry and the growth of outwork. As shown in the graph of the following page, between 1976-81 the total percentage of female participation in the textile/clothing industry was reduced dramatically from 29.7% to 15.3%.

The graph shows Southern European migrant women were over-represented in this sector as it had been a traditional source of employment for them, as well as for other NES migrant women. Thus, in 1976 47.9% of Italian women and 38.1% of Greek were employed in this sector, whereas in 1981 their employment levels had dropped to 20.3% and 17.3% respectively.

This reduction in employment was caused by the growth of outwork. Outwork involves mainly industrial sewing done at home for clothing and textile manufacturers. Outwork became widespread because of the advantages it offered to the employers and middlemen in the form of very low wages, and the absence of responsibilities and entitlements offered to factory workers ["Women Outworkers", Women's Co-Op Feb.1986:1-9]. Outwork created a hidden economy made up of women, mostly migrant, which is characterised by naked exploitation and labour market marginalisation.

Migrant outworkers are very vulnerable and financially dependent on this form of economic activity,
because of their lack of employment opportunities, lack of child care facilities, and sometimes they have to provide care for elderly relatives [ibid:6]. Wages paid to outwork workers range between $2-$3 per hour, as compared to $6.55 p/f to full-time factory workers, or $8.50 to casual [Australian Society March 1987: 10-12].

4.5: Multiculturalism under Labor

The ALP government was elected to power in 1983 because of the failure of the conservative Liberal party to manage the growing socio-economic crisis of Australian capitalism. However, the current Labor government shares few of the innovative and progressive ideas of its 1972 predecessor.

With conservative ideologies firmly entrenched in the bureaucracy, the ALP has pursued monetarist economic policies, and in the process has almost abandoned the Social Democratic social policies is identified with. In relation to ethnic social policy, the government has retained almost intact the conservative concepts, policy directions and structures of multiculturalism.

The first indication of the continuation of the previous migrant social policies, came up with the AIMA review of 1983. Despite the critical findings of the Committee that reviewed AIMA, like its conservatism, and biased sexist and racial ideologies, the government retained the Institute, and also accepted the majority of its recommendations on the evaluation of the Galbally
The most important social policy initiative by the ALP into ethnic relations and services has been the 1986 ROMMPAS report headed by J. Jupp. The Jupp report, commissioned by the Minister of DIEA, was to review the current strategies and principles of state migrant policy.

The Report at least moves away from the folkloric concepts that have been associated with multiculturalism, giving more emphasis on the structural disadvantages of migrants. Equity and participation constitute the main themes of the Report, which are seen as the means to address the disadvantages faced by migrants [ibid: 1-15]. The Report maintains the right of cultural diversity, and accepts multiculturalism as the guiding concept for future migrant policy.

Nevertheless, the Jupp Report has already been criticised as not being a watershed policy for migrants, but actually offering 'more of the same, just better' [Collins, "Report no watershed for migrants", SMH, 25.11.86]. Collins identified the following major weaknesses of the ROMMPAS Report:

1. The same basic service structures related to migrants have been retained, though they would be provided with more resources.

2. The issues of mainstreaming and ethno-specific services were not addressed.

3. Although the report recognised the disadvantages of many NES migrants, and migrant youth, in the labour
market, it offered no recommendations.

4. Most of the solutions offered are bureaucratic in form, mostly related to the re-shuffling of Departments and departmental responsibilities.

5. The needs of the most disadvantaged groups among migrants, were not examined.

6. The Report offered very few policy initiatives, with the authors arguing that the role of the stage I of the report was to advise, while stage II of the report will recommend new directions.

If Collins' assessment of the Jupp Report is valid, then there seems to be few possibilities in affecting the present residualist implementation of multiculturalism. The domination of reactive social policy approaches to migrants, was reflected on 1986-87 Budget cuts on ESL programs, the abolition of AIMA, and the uncertainty concerning the SBS.

Nine years after the implementation of the Galbally Report, there is little evidence to suggest that multiculturalism has improved the general welfare of migrant working-class. The uncertain and negotiable provision of state resources to migrants reflects the ad hoc nature of multiculturalist policy. Moreover, the capitalist economic crisis of the last 12 years, has highlighted the precarious position of unskilled migrant workers in the labour market. As the Birreells have commented 'multiculturalism seeks to improve ethnic social status, it does not get to the core of the problem in the workplace'
Multiculturalism as a social control mechanism has attempted to curb the aspirations of the migrant working class by creating and trying to fit them in an ideological straight jacket. It is difficult to measure if this policy has managed to control protest or resistance by migrant working class.

The many contradictions of multiculturalism - particularly that of its stated ideal relationships and the social reality experienced by working class migrants - have turned it into an issue of continuous controversy and debate along the whole political spectrum. As ethnic relations and welfare have been moved into the political arena, the struggle for access to resources and equality at the state and societal levels is more likely to intensify. The nature and operation of migrant welfare at the voluntary level is, therefore, one area where this ideological and political struggle is unfolding.
The study draws on two models of analysis. On the class analysis of ethnicity, and on Gramsci's model of civil institutions and intellectuals. The first model, argues that ethnicity is an ideology which defines social relations in terms of the primordial attributes of groups and individuals. The concept of ethnicity is used by the state and the Australian ruling class to define the social reality of migrants and exercise social control, while the dominant ethnic class is attempting the same thing by defining the 'ethnicity' of the subordinate ethnic class.

The second methodological model, that of civil institutions argues that it is at this level the ideological and political struggle of the hegemonic classes takes place and is more visible [Mouffe op.cit: 10]. The impact of these institutions on the popular culture and intellectual concepts on the daily lives of the masses is important, because it is at this level where the hegemonic beliefs shape practical ideologies and penetrate the level of common sense. On the other hand, the intellectuals articulate, transmit and organise these beliefs for the political and material interests of the hegemonic classes they represent.
5.1: The study

In empirical terms the ethnic and non-ethnic institutions of the study constitute Gramsci's civil institutions. The ethnic institutions of the sample comprise the major civil institutions of the Greek and Lebanese communities. The non-ethnic institutions are part of the wider Australian society, and are linked in with the Greek and Lebanese communities, and their institutions, via their social/welfare workers.

The organic intellectuals of the study are the social/welfare workers, and community leaders whose institutions are products of the capitalist mode of relations, e.g. a worker's club. The traditional intellectuals are represented mostly the priesthood, who perform an organic function for the Greek and Lebanese bourgeoisie.

5.2: The organizational sample

The research was based on an organizational survey contacted by interviews with Lebanese and Greek representatives or employees in the non-government volunteer sector. The sample covered community, welfare and professional organizations. The criteria for selecting the sample organizations were:

1. Greek and Lebanese institutions, and generalist welfare organizations, in receipt of state welfare funds.

2. Greek and Lebanese welfare professional
associations with membership made up of professional welfare workers from either the volunteer or state sectors.

The Greek and Lebanese institutions constituted the primary focus of the research, while the generalist institutions were included in the study because of the employment of Greek and Lebanese social/welfare workers in them.

The second criterion included one welfare professional association from each group. The reason for including these institutions in the sample was due to their active political role and influence, both at the community and state levels on welfare related issue.

The sample included a total of 18 organizations, 15 ethno-specific and 3 generalist. Of the ethno-specific institutions, 10 were Lebanese and 5 Greek. The institutions of the sample were divided in three categories: a. Secular ethno-specific, b. Religious ethno-specific, and c. Generalist.

The first category included ethno-specific institutions that combined only secular elements, or both secular and religious elements, but the secular aspect was the dominant one. The second category contained only religious institutions or their welfare agencies. And the third category was defined by: a. generalist community organizations and b. by the professional associations. The latter were included in the generalist category of organizations because their organization and membership were based on professional rather than primordial criteria,
and were not aligned with ethno-specific institutions of their communities.

Each category is characterised by different ideologies, different values and perceptions about the existence and position of Man in the world, about the concepts of community and the individual. For this reason each category operates different forms of welfare practice, and interpretations of social needs. Moreover, every ideological category uses varying forms, levels and methods of social control, or alternatives of social change.

The distribution of the organizational categories between Greeks and Lebanese was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEBANESE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEKS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The variety of organizations selected for the sample was designed to be as much as possible wide and representative of each community's organizational and welfare provision. The exclusion from the study of charitable organizations of each community, of ethnic political parties, and of welfare/community institutions that do not receive state funds, may thus not reflect the full picture of each community. Nevertheless, the exclusion of these institutions is thought of having a rather limited impact in understanding the fundamental structure and relations of each community.

In the case of the Lebanese sample, due to their institutional fragmentation along religious, political, and
regional lines, it was impossible to include all the institutions that fell within the criteria of the study. The most important Lebanese secular institutions have been included in the sample, as well as the main religious groups, - Maronites, Orthodox and Muslims - are represented either directly, or indirectly by at least two institutions from each.

Most of the Lebanese organizations were found in the 'Arabic Resource Directory', or referred to the researcher by various respondents. The existence of the Greek organizations was either known to the researcher, or he was referred to them by some of the respondents.

5.3: The Respondents

The selection criteria for the respondents was based on their past, or present positional role in the institutions of the sample. They were employees - welfare/social workers- or members of the organizations, community leaders. This selection was necessary to obtain the contrasting views and values of the respondents about the past and present community relations of each group, the social needs identified, and the welfare methods employed.

There was a total of 19 respondents, 11 of whom were Lebanese and 8 Greeks. All Lebanese respondents were interviewed between December '86 and March '87. Five of the Greek respondents had been interviewed in 1985, as a sample of an Honours sociology thesis by the researcher. The
additional 3 Greek respondents were interviewed between March and April '87 in order to update the information, and provide an additional number of institutions.

The organizational representation of the Greek and Lebanese respondents was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Secular</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Generalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREEK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEBANESE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four out of the eleven Lebanese respondents were community leaders, seven welfare/social workers, while the corresponding number for Greeks was three and five respectively. There were three female and eight male Lebanese respondents, while the Greeks had four respondents from each sex.

5.4: The Interviews

All interviews were conducted by the researcher at the institutions' premises. All respondents but one, volunteered to give a recorded interview. The only respondent who refused to do so, however, volunteered some written statements, and for this reason he was included in the sample.

There was no structured interview schedule used during the interviews, which proceeded more in the form of discussion, but all respondents were asked the following questions:

1. How do they see the general role of their organization in their community, and specifically as related to
welfare.

2. How do they perceive the roles of social work practice and of the welfare/social workers.

3. To identify the main needs/problems facing their 'communities'.

4. Their opinion on multiculturalism and mainstreaming.

Due to the attitudinal, open-ended, form of the questions, the respondents volunteered additional information during the interviews. The average length of the interviews was 40-50 minutes. Three interviews were contacted in Greek, while the rest in English. All respondents co-operated fully and there were no cancellation or postponement of interviews.

5.5: Data Analysis

For the analysis and discussion of the data to be more comprehensible in a sociological, ideological, and historical context, the following method was used: a) A reference on the national/ethnic identity of both groups; b) A discussion on the pre-war migration and settlement of Greeks and Lebanese in Australia. Then the main body of the data was analysed and discussed.

A class analysis on the content and operation of ethnicity - particularly as related to first generation migrants - has to be addressed not only within the historical conditions it has evolved in Australia, but as well as to those of their country of origin. A discussion of ethnicity in the Australian milieu ought to contain a
discussion and recognition of the national/ethnic identity of migrants as it developed in the first place in their homelands.

In other words for the ethnicity of a migrant group to be understood, an analysis and discussion of the ideological and class construction of its national/ethnic identity prior to migration is needed. Such an approach would provide more insights about certain particular 'ethnic' characteristics of various migrant groups. For instance, it could explain why Greeks tend to have higher levels of self-employment than other NES groups, or what makes self-employment to Greeks more socially and financially desirable than wage employment.

This approach has not been a common feature of many migrant studies in Australia. One of the main reasons for this appears to be the lack of availability of appropriate literature in English or other languages, and this in turn may have inhibited the methodological application of this approach.

However, whenever such literature has been used for reference on the national/ethnic sentiments of migrants in their country of origin, the sources have tended to rely more on anthropological data - thus enhancing more the cultural interpretation of ethnicity - rather than historical, sociological or political studies.

This lack or limited bibliographical support on the subject of national/ethnic identity, is evident in the author's discussion on Greek national ideology, which has
been mostly drawn from his own reading of various Greek studies on the issue.

The second method is needed to connect the experiences -socio-cultural, economic political and ideological- of pre-war and post-war Greek and Lebanese migrants. In this way a continuity will be established between past and present similarities and differences, thus providing a better understanding of the present.

The analysis and presentation of the main body of the data, will be made within the general framework of the ideological stages of the Australian class relations and state social policies, as outlined in the theoretical part of the study. The ideological stages are, Assimilation and Multiculturalism, while Integration is a transitory stage and would not be dealt with in detail.

The advantage of such a method of data analysis and presentation is, that the ideological stages would provide a continuous developmental picture of the social experiences of Greeks and Lebanese, by highlighting the following:
A. In general the position and relation of Greeks and Lebanese to the economy, the political process, and the social institutions of the wider Australian society.
B. The intra-communal relations and conflicts of each community.
C. The development and the form of welfare provision of each community.
D. The role of the Greek and Lebanese institutions and
'intellectuals', in generating ideologies that affect the daily relations and perceptions of the members of each community. Special attention will be paid on the social control aspects of such ideologies, and the possibilities they represent for social change.

E. The effect of state social policies on each of the abovementioned.

In the assimilation period the data on both groups will be contrasted and compared separately. This is needed to underline from the beginning any major ideological, or structural similarities or differences between the two groups. The institutions of each community are treated together.

In the multicultural period the data will be divided into the three ideological/organizational sections, secular ethno-specific, religious ethno-specific, and generalist. Each section will be divided in three main parts:

1). Social work and Social workers which will deal with the communal relations of both groups, and the reasons of each ideological section for the employment of social workers and the practices of social work.

2). Will discuss the identification of needs as defined by the respondents.

3). Will discuss the issues of multiculturalism and mainstreaming.

Moreover, the last section will compare and contrast the views of the respondents from all sections.

There is also data related specifically to Greeks and
Lebanese, like research studies, statistical material, sociological studies and reports, and other material. Finally statements by Greek respondents with an asterisk (*) at the end indicates that they have been translated from the Greek language into English.
6.1: Greeks and National Ideology

The roots of the Greek national identity, of Hellenism or Greekness, can be traced in the creation of the modern Greek State, the Orthodox Church, and the Greeks of the old overseas Greek Communities, the Diaspora.

The geographical area of modern Greece, as the whole Balkan peninsula, was under Ottoman rule since the 15th century. The only institution acceptable to the Ottoman Empire was the Greek Orthodox Church. The church acted as a form of unofficial government, and provided the link between the Greek speaking population and the Empire [McNall 1974: iv-vi].

The Orthodox Church had limited administrative responsibilities, it maintained the religious faith and Greek language, and its priests were the leaders and organisers of community life. In other words, Greeks at the time identified themselves as belonging to a religious community, and not a national one.

From the 17th century until the middle of the 20th there were throughout central Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, numerous prosperous Greek communities, led by plantation owners and merchants. The French revolution of
1789, the creation of the European nations, the rediscovery of Ancient Greece by the West, all of them had a great impact on the Greek intelligentsia of Diaspora. The need for a Greek nation, in a geographical and ideological meaning, plus the persecution and oppression of Greek Christians, were the main reasons for the overseas intelligentsia and nationalist Greek merchant class to seek the overthrow of the Ottoman rule in Greece.

The official Orthodox Church initially was not supportive to the idea of a Greek nation, as it undermined its monopoly of power and authority. However, it was won over by the overseas leadership, and became the moral symbol of the 1821 national revolution. The modern Greek state was established in 1832, with the leadership of the Diaspora playing a central role in the organizational, financial, and literary fields, and in the formation of the new Greek national identity.

Orthodoxy became the state religion, thus reinforcing the concept of being Greek and Orthodox Christian through the state apparatuses. The Greek nationalist bourgeoisie after the revolution of 1821 fought another 100 years of wars in the Balkan peninsula to extent the geographical and demographic area of Greece, which reached its present boarders in 1947 when Italy returned the Dodecanese islands.

The role of the Greeks of Diaspora was instrumental in the creation of the modern Greek state and national identity. Moreover, the overseas Greek communities had
another important ideological impact and dimension on Greek nationalism. These Greek communities flourished during the 18th and 19th centuries, when the Greek merchant class, like the Armenian and Jewish ones, acted as middleman class in the sale and distribution of manufactured goods from England.

These Greek communities were seen as representing the ideal of Greek character, hard working, independent individual, thrifty and prosperous, deeply religious with high family ideals, and a bearer of the Greek civilization. These attributes constitute the concept of Hellenism. It was, and still is, a view of a world seen through the eyes of the mercantilistic class, which said very little about the social division within the communities themselves, or their role in the national economies of the countries they lived in.

Greek communities in Russia, Asia Minor, Central Europe, Egypt and N. Africa declined and disappeared within the first 70 years of this century. This happened once the industrialised countries started to export capital and undertake their own distribution of goods in underdeveloped countries, the middleman foreign classes could not compete, became irrelevant and forced out of the market.

Related to this situation, were the national and independence revolutions that took place where Greeks lived. Their socio-economic and political position often meant that they became the first targets of nationalist feelings.
Throughout this century in Greece both the concepts of Hellenism and Diaspora were vigorously promoted by the Greek bourgeoisie as the ideal Greek identity. Socialisation into the values of Hellenism became a state responsibility, through the educational system, other state activities, and in popular culture [ibid:106].

Identified with the idea of Hellenism in Greece was a mode of social mobility that emphasised bureaucratic appointments and mercantilistic activities, which appealed to the petit-bourgeoisie tendencies of Greek peasants as models to aspire for themselves and their children, thus reinforcing them.

The main features of the Greek society in the 50s were a slow industrial development, high rates of unemployment and under-employment, a large public sector, and deep social and political divisions after the end of the Civil War in 1949. The mass migration of Greek peasants in the 50s and 60s was the most important testimony of the unreality of Hellenism to satisfy the socio-economic and political aspirations of these people in Greece.

Hellenism was looked upon by prospective Greek migrants as the ideal to which they should aspire. In this way Greeks carried with them pre-defined ideological constructs about their life expectations overseas. During this century the ideology of Hellenism became increasingly problematic to Greek migrants who migrated from rural areas, not in underdeveloped countries as in the previous centuries, but in developed capitalist countries to work as
industrial workers.

This ideology was challenged strongly by the Greek guest workers of W. Germany and other W. European countries, for whom the process of proletarianization and lack of alternative non-industrial employment, led to the development of a stronger working class mentality. While in Australia, Canada and the U.S., more possibilities of social mobility and self-employment, contributed to the comparative relevancy of the value of Hellenism and this hampered the growth of an alternative strong working class ideology.

6.2: The Greeks: Pre-War Migration and Settlement

Greek migration to Australia commenced in the 1830s and followed a pattern of kinship and regional migration movement until the end of world war II [Price 1963]. The majority of Greek migrants were from certain Greek islands, like Kythera, Ithaca, and Castelorizo. The lack of skills among the first Greek arrivals, and the small industrial base of the Australian economy, led them into shopkeeping occupations mostly in catering.

The Greek migrants displayed a high level of organizational and institutional activity. The basis of this activity was reflected in the concept of community, an organizational feature of rural Greece at the time. A community could be established, where a number of people living in a certain area collected money to set up a church, schools and a secular administration to run the
activities of the community. The first Greek Orthodox Community in Sydney was established in 1898, which later on became known as the Central Community.

By the 1920's the Greek Orthodox Communities [GOC] were under the control of a strong petit-bourgeoisie, which had grown up through an expanded shopkeeping activity in the previous years [Kakakios et.al 1984: 149]. For this class the control of the GOC's had both economic and socio-political importance.

First of all, the Greek community provided the shopkeeper petit-bourgeoisie with a cheap source of labour, as the majority of Greeks were employed by Greek business. This economic domination was strengthened by other factors, such as the increased level of dependency on the sponsor, and the employment of family members, mostly women as unpaid labourers, both of which acted as forms of labour discipline and conformity [ibid: 148-49].

Secondly, the GOC's provided the petit-bourgeoisie with an institutional setting, whereby they could exercise their political power, claim legitimacy and social status.

The ideological dominance of the Church, coupled with the Church's close identification with Greek culture, made it a compelling symbol of Greek identity. For the rising Greek bourgeoisie, control over Church affairs became an issue of central importance and in turn a potent tool of dominance, social recognition and control within the Community [loc.cit].

The issue of defining the role of the Church in social life, was projected by competing petit-bourgeoisie groups in the 1920s as the major source of conflict. The arrival
of more migrants in the preceding years, was one reason that led to a challenge of authority of the established petit-bourgeoisie in the GOC's. The new arrivals attempted to establish a Church authority independent of the GOC, with the support of the Archbishop of Constantinople. After a 10 year community split, Constantinople conceded the role of the Church affairs to the GOCs, and established for itself only the spiritual guidance of the Greek Church in Australia [ibid: 149].

During this period the Greek press reinforced the belief that family values, and the family unit itself had to follow the spirit of Hellenism, which was seen as an ideal form of social life, ethnic identity and cohesion.

In the pre-war period the Greek population in Australia remained very isolated from the general socio-economic, and political processes. Three factors that seem to be largely responsible for this situation were: 1. The limited economic activity of Greeks dominated by petit-bourgeoisie shopkeeping; 2. Lack of common cultural characteristics with the dominant Australian values and institutions, e.g. like religion, which could enable them to assimilate or integrate more; and 3. Related to that there was no class solidarity or co-operation between Greek social classes or groups and Australian ones, nor any state links.

6.3: The Lebanese: Pre-War Migration and Settlement

The first Lebanese migrants reached the shores of
Australia in the 1880s. These first settlers were classified as Syrians because at the time Lebanon did not exist as a nation until 1926. The Lebanese followed a pattern of migration similar to that of Greeks based on regional and kinship ties, but it also involved an additional element, that of religion [Battourney 1985:20-48]. These migrants were predominantly Christians from rural areas, with the Maronites comprising the largest group, and some Melkites, and Antiochean Orthodox.

Like their Greek counterparts at the time, Lebanese migrants left their country for economic reasons, and concentrated on trade occupations which did not require any skills. Their main economic activity was peddling and hawking, an extension of the jobs they performed in their country [ibid: 34].

Once they managed to accumulate capital they would become commercial shopkeepers, where unpaid labour was crucial, as with Greek shopkeepers, for capital accumulation. Battourney also mentions that Lebanese women not only helped in the shops, but played and important welfare role "in maintaining unity in the family, prepare food, and look after the children and sick" [ibid:43].

During the 1920's Lebanese migration stopped due to a sharp decline of the population caused by famine. There is no much detailed history available, covering the Australian community relations of the Lebanese at this period of time. From what is available, unlike the Greeks, Lebanese showed no signs of establishing institutional structures. This was
mainly due to two factors, which had important implications in the future make up of Lebanese institutional formations. Firstly, there was a very small number of Lebanese in Australia to stimulate organizational activity. Until 1947 ABS statistics classified Lebanese as Syrians, and the first specific reference on Lebanese in 1954 showed their numbers as 3,861. The other important factor at the time was that the Lebanese settlers did not have a strong national ideology, but strong religious identities. Though they defined themselves a Syrians, their primary identification was with their respective religious communities [ibid:57].

Of all three main Christian denominations, only the Antiochean Orthodox established their own Church in the 1920s, because of their strong Eastern character, which did not fit well with the dominant western culture of Australia. However, some Lebanese Orthodox went to Australian Catholic churches for worship.

The Maronites and the Melkites, both of them Catholics, used to worship in Catholic Australian churches, so the need to establish their own did not arise. This was in contrast to Greeks, whose mutual reinforcing aspect of ethnic and religious identity, made Greek and Orthodox identities seem as inseparable [Mackay, 'Religious Diversity and Ethnic Cohesion: A Three generational analysis of Syrian-Lebanese Christians in Sydney', International Migration Review, Vol.19. Summer 1985: 319]. Mackay argues that the Catholic and Protestant
Churches in Australia, absorbed the pre-war Lebanese Christians and this contributed to their speedier assimilation [ibid:323-25]. He sights as a major proof of that the loss of their Arabic language.

Battourney observes the same process, particularly with the more westernised Maronites, and sees the role of the Catholic Church in Australia as having provided a medium for greater access to Australian society [Battourney op.cit:48]. Given the petit-bourgeois economic activity of many Lebanese during this period, the Catholic Church provided them with the language skills, and the social contacts to advance their socio-economic interests. Unlike the Greek petit-bourgeoisie, the Lebanese one, and mostly the Maronite, found in the Australian Catholic Church a cultural and social medium, that introduced them to the dominant values of Australian institutions, thus accelerating their assimilation.

Moreover, as the Lebanese at the time were classified as Asians, there was additional pressure to assimilate [ibid:25]. Mackay notes that the same pattern of Lebanese bourgeoisie assimilation took place in the U.S. as well, where:

"Syrian-Lebanese in the USA have emphasised economic success and fairly easily to the middle class values of American society...They wanted to assimilate". [Mackay op.cit:329]

The absence of national identity by the Lebanese during this period, their access to Australian religious institutions, strong familial and regional ties, combined
to enhance the economic and social participation of the Lebanese pre-war petit-bourgeoisie in Australian society.

At the end of WW II the dominant ideological position of pre-war Lebanese migrants, as well as that of their Greek counterparts, was a petit-bourgeoisie one, with emphasis on independence, hard work, strong familial, religious and regional loyalties, and conformity to the dominant values of the host society.
CHAPTER 7

THE ASSIMILATION PERIOD 1947-1972

7.1: Greek and Lebanese Migration in the 1950s and 1960s

In the first 25 years of post-war migration, Southern Europeans dominated the proportion of NES migrant unskilled workers arriving in Australia. During this period Lebanon provided a very small percentage of migrant labour to Australia, due to the relative economic growth of the country until the mid 1960s. In addition to that, Australia at the time had classified Lebanon as an Asian country, and under the White Australia policy and consequently Lebanese migration was not encouraged.

The Lebanese population in Australia increased from 3,861 in 1954 to 10,668 in 1966 table [7].

Table 7: Population by Birthplace

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>12,291</td>
<td>25,862</td>
<td>77,333</td>
<td>140,089</td>
<td>160,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>(a) 1,886</td>
<td>3,861</td>
<td>7,253</td>
<td>10,668</td>
<td>24,218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Included in Syria


Until the mid 60's economic considerations were the main reasons for Lebanese migration, but various political events in the Middle-East, like the Six Day war in 1967, accelerated their migration [Bat ourney op.cit:51-60]. By 1971 14,500 Lebanese had arrived in Australia, which meant
that their numbers increased threefold in ten years.

In contrast to the Lebanese, the Greeks constituted one of the main S. European migrant groups to arrive in large numbers in Australia. Greek migration was delayed by the Greek civil war [1947-49], and between 1947 to 1954 only 13,500 Greeks migrated to Australia, bringing their total number in 1954 to 25,862 table [7].

The large scale Greek migration started after 1954, when during the years 1955 to 1966 more than 540,000 Greeks left Greece as permanent immigrants to industrialised countries [Essays on Greek Migration op.cit:158]. The majority of these migrants left for economic reasons, belonged to the 15-44 years age group, and 90% of them were from rural areas. This unprecedented level of migration was reflected in the 1965 Greek statistics, where the natural increase of the Greek population stood at 10%, and migration at 13.9% [ibid:25].

The Greek population of Australia increased by 51,500 between 1954-61, by 62,700 between 1961-66, and by 20,100 between 1966-71, and reached a peak of 160,200 in 1971 table [7]. These figures do not include Greek-Cypriots, Greeks from Egypt, or the offspring of Greeks generally. Tsounis had estimated that in the middle seventies, there were approximately 300,000 Greeks in Australia, including their offspring [Tsounis 1974:2].

Greeks and Lebanese migrants of this period display similar patterns of settlement and employment in most areas. Both groups, as the majority of migrants, settled
in the large urban centres of Australia where the manufacturing industries were concentrated. As table [8] shows, both Greek and Lebanese migrants record increased urbanization levels between 1954 and 1966, nearly 24% up, in comparison to the Australian born population [2%], and a decline in non-metropolitan residence.

Table 8: Population by Birthplace Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan, Australia. (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Metropolitan 1954</th>
<th>Metropolitan 1966</th>
<th>Non-Metropolitan* 1954</th>
<th>Non-Metropolitan* 1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Non-Metropolitan includes Other Urban, Rural, and Migratory.

Sources ABS 1954, 1966.

By 1966 58.1% of the total Australian population lived in metropolitan areas, whereas the comparable percentage for the Lebanese was 90.9%, and 87.1% for the Greeks.

This high level of urbanization was significant for both migrant groups. On the one hand, urbanization for the groups represented a complete reversal of residential environment to their previous rural one. This meant that one of their first priorities and needs, was cheap and accessible housing. Furthermore, there was an increased demand for social and health services necessary for the production and reproduction of migrant workers, which
though were not available or accessible during assimilation period.

On the other hand, in the process of migration both the informal and formal networks of rural Greeks and Lebanese, either broke or became irrelevant in the new urban and cultural environment. Most often than not, new informal networks had to be re-established, and the role of the institutions to be reinterpreted and recreated, under different socio-economic, cultural, and political conditions. Thus, in this period the ethnic community, was not only a source and an area of welfare and political activity for NES migrants, but also an important refuge from alienation.

Another important aspect of the migration process, was that of proletarianization. For both Greeks and Lebanese, as for all migrants, this process was quite drastic. Although the process of becoming wage-labourers had already taken place in their homelands, it had a more profound character in Australia. Proletarianization in Australia was done within an industrial setting, affected by urbanization, cultural and linguistic factors, lack of socio-political power in the wider society, the assimilation policy, all of which created high levels of alienation and social dislocation.

One way the proletarianization process can be seen is through the changing employment status of Lebanese and Greek migrants. The employer/self-employed status among
Table 9: Birthplace by Employment Status (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emplm.status</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M A L E S</td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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Greek males decreased from 36.1% in 1954 to 16.4% in 1971, and for Greek females 22.2% to 9.9% respectively table [9]. For the same period the employee status among Greek males...
increased from 59.9% to 81.4%, and for Greek females from 67.1% to 86.4%.

For the Lebanese, unfortunately, the ABS statistical figures for the period were not consistent, as most statistical data for 1966 and 1971 referred only to the large migrant groups. Nevertheless, these fragmented figures show that Lebanese migrants followed similar employment patterns as Greeks.

The Lebanese male employer/self-employed status group is reduced by 3.8% between 1954 to 1961, and for Lebanese females by 9.6% table [9]. The Lebanese figures for employee status for the same period are somewhat distorted by the economic crisis of the early 60's. For Lebanese males there was a decline from 68.8% in 1954 to 65.5% in 1961, which was attributable to the high unemployment levels they were experiencing, 2.2% to 9.6% respectively. For Lebanese females the employee status increased by 1.8% in 1961, and their unemployment from 0.5% to 8.8%.

Another significant aspect of Greek and Lebanese labour of the period was their higher rates of workforce participation. Between 1954-71 this rate for Greek males remained constant at around 87%, for the Lebanese [1954-61] there was a small decline of 1.5%. For the Australian males the workforce participation rates increased from 60% in 1954 to 79.6% in 1971.

The rate of proletarianization also showed a rapid increase among migrant women. For instance, Greek female workforce participation rose from 20.9% in 1954 to 48.8% in
1971, which was one of the highest and well above the 1971 national figure of 37.1% table [9]. For the period 1954-61 Lebanese female workforce participation rate increased by 2% to 31.3%, while in 1954 it was 29.4% as compared to the 20.9% for Greek females. One the main reasons why Greek and Lebanese women, along with other NES women, were drawn in large numbers in the labour market, was the low wages paid to their husbands.

The majority of Greek and Lebanese women in the labour market were married, had to supplement the family's income, look after their children, house duties, and husbands, without having any institutional support like child care [Cox 1975 op.cit: 16].

Thus, the main features of both Greeks and Lebanese migrants until 1971 were a high and rapid rate of proletarianization for both sexes, and a sharp fall in the employer/self-employed status. This was the general pattern for the total Australian population, with the important difference of the employer/self-employed status among the migrant petit-bourgeoisie of pre-war communities, declining faster and more steeply than the national figure.

The changes in the employment status of Lebanese and Greeks, were accompanied by changes in their occupational status as well. Between 1954-71 the participation of the Greek males in the manufacturing sector, increased from 26.2% to 44.9%, and for Greek females from 33.3% to 54.6% table [10]. For the same period the Australian-born male participation rate in the manufacturing sector was reduced
from 26.3% in 1954 to 21.6% in 1971, and for females from 25% to 14.7% respectively. In the construction sector, by 1971, 10% of the Australian born males were employed, a drop of only 0.7% since 1954, while the Greeks and Yugoslavs recorded increases of up to 4%.

Table 10: Males and Females classified according to Industry by Birthplace 1954, 1961*, 1971. (%)

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</table>

1961* There are no 1971 statistics available for Lebanese

Finally, other significant changes and differences in occupational status can be seen in the administrative and 'amusement' sectors. Greeks, Lebanese and Yugoslavs were grossly under-represented in administrative occupations. There was also a sharp decline in the participation of Greeks in the 'amusement' sector, which included catering, by 22.1% for males and 26.3% for females [1954-71], who were mostly absorbed by the manufacturing sector.

The general characteristics of settlement and work for Lebanese and Greeks during the assimilation period were high and sharp increases in the process of proletarianization, concentrated in the manufacturing sector, a decline of self-employment status, and high levels of urbanization. Both the Greek and Lebanese communities in the first 25 years after the war, change from petit-bourgeois shopkeeping based, to working class based.

The ensuing intra-communal conflicts that developed within each community, were portrayed by the protagonists as conflicts over ethnic symbols, which actually represented deeper socio-political and economic interests between conservative and progressive class alliances.

7.2: Post-war settlement of Greeks and the Greek Community

The Greek Orthodox Communities [GOC's], were the only institutions that provided Greeks with a form of political representation and participation, and a focus of social, cultural, and religious activities. The Central Community
of N.S.W. at Paddington, was the largest and most influential, and was regarded as the representative body of the whole community.

In the late 40's and 50's, the GOC's across Australia were still under the control of the pre-war petit-bourgeoisie. This monopolization of power, resources, and prestige by the old conservatives, however, came under increasing threat in the mid 50s. Many factors were involved in the erosion of the power of the conservatives, amongst the most important were:

a. The large number of Greek migrants arriving in Sydney led into a larger institutional fragmentation in the community.

b. The absorption of the vast majority of the new arrivals by the Australian economy weakened the control of the old petit-bourgeoisie over the labour power of Greek workers. So, the old settlers shifted their economic emphasis in treating the whole community as a consumption market [Kakakios op.cit: 152-59].

c. The high level of proletarianization of the new settlers, and their lack of wide socio-political expression, increased the pressure on the community institutions to become more representative and responsive to their new aspirations and social needs.

This last factor was evident in the growth of a major political institution in Sydney during the 50s, of the Atlas Workers Club. According to the respondent from Atlas, the club was established around 1942, possibly as a
sporting club at the beginning. During the war some Greek freight ships were stranded in Sydney harbour, and many Greek seamen became members of Atlas. Later on the majority of these sailors worked either as water side workers or labourers, joined unions and in this way Atlas became a workers club.

The first post-war members of Atlas were mainly Greek-Cypriots, not Greeks from Greece. The reason for this was that Atlas was a left wing organization active during the Cold-War era, and its membership was under surveillance, so Greek-Cypriots who were British subjects could not be easily expelled. The few other Greek members, according to the respondent from Atlas, used mostly aliases. Some of Atlas' members belonged to the CPA, and the Club had strong links with left-wing unions.

As the number of Greek migrants arriving in Australia in the 50s increased, so did the membership and political activity of Atlas. The GOC under the control of the conservative petit-bourgeoisie bitterly opposed Atlas, while the latter targeted the GOC for political influence. The respondent from Atlas, explained how the Left approached the political conflict between the new and old settlers:

"We saw the participation of the Left in the GOC as a part of the struggle for the democratisation of the community, not as a war against religion, or the Church. We saw that the Right, the reactionary forces in our community, were represented by the clergy. As there was no participation of Greeks in the conservative [Australian] political parties, there was none in the Liberals, and in the ALP only a handful. So,
the Rose Bay siders, the aristocrats, were together with the Archdiocese, and wanted to keep the others out. And we saw the struggle as a democratisation of the GOC to include also the new Greek migrants, to represent and reflect the views of the newcomers, who came to fight for their livelihood, and were not rich. They had to fight, so the GOC could develop certain activities which were to relieve Greeks. To try to promote union membership, to take a stand against assimilation, to create Greek schools, to provide charity... *

Clearly Atlas saw its role, and possible influence through the GOC, as a leading one in the community, while identified the conservative elements of the GOC and the Archdiocese, which was part of the GOC, as the main obstacles for the democratisation of the community. Atlas appeared to be prepared to work towards a more dynamic and participatory community, willing to pursue wider social issues, and link into Australian working class institutions, while at the same time to retain and develop the cultural identity of Greeks.

An important point raised by the respondent in the statement, as well as in other ones of his throughout the interview, was the lack of access of the Greek petit-bourgeoisie in the Australian political parties. Those few Greeks who were members of the ALP at the time, were mostly leftists seeking a safe cover to avoid deportation.

In the 1950's two broad political alliances emerged within the GOC's. On the one hand, there was an alliance of progressive petit-bourgeoisie forces with the growing working class, and on the other hand an alliance between old and new conservative petit-bourgeoisie.
The political and socio-economic conflict of interests of the two alliances and their struggle for control of the GOC, was expressed in the form of manipulating the same cultural identity of Greeks, their Greekness. In other words, the ideological and political conflict of the two opposing groups, was presented by each group as the most appropriate interpretation of Greekness in the new social environment.

What emerged as the apparent source of conflict between the progressive and conservative forces, as in the 1920's, was the role of the Church in social life. The GOC combined both secular and religious functions. However, such a structure had a contradictory role in an industrialised society, which had no state religion, and the social and religious spheres of life were clearly defined.

This contradiction, and its consequent conflicting interpretations, was presented by both sides as the real source of the conflict, and it was partly true. The progressive alliance wanted to assert the dominance of the secular over the religious part, whereby the GOC Council could have the absolute authority to organise the social and cultural life, choose priests for its churches, and for the Archdiocese to attend to its religious and national duties.

At that time the Archdiocese, through its priesthood, had the power to veto GOC Council decisions, or ignore them. The conservative forces, were under increasing
attack, pressure and diminishing representation by the new arrival, closed ranks with the Archdiocese to counter the progressive forces, and stem the tide of loosing control of the GOC's.

This intra-communal conflict, was also affected by wider ideological processes taking place in Australia and Greece. After the end of the Civil War in Greece in 1949, the right wing governments embarked on a permanent and repressive anti-communist propaganda, which lasted for 25 years. Greeks who disagreed with either the government or the state, which was virtually the same, were branded communists, anti-Orthodox, traitors, and anti-Greek. This form of ideological social control and oppression inhibited any possible wider support or participation in left-wing organizations.

In Australia the Cold-War period further discouraged left-wing participation, and also helped to accentuate the political differences of the two Greek opposing groups. The identification of the progressive alliance with the left provided the conservatives, and especially the Church, with many opportunities to criticise them severely, and use their anti-communist position as an additional justification to set up a new independent, moral, and national leadership.

Eventually the conflict came to a climax in 1959. In that year the conservative alliance was removed from the GOC Councils by the sheer number of the progressive forces [Kakakios op.cit:155]. As a result of that the Greek
community was split across Australia. The progressive alliance retained the control of the Central Community of N.S.W., and of some other GOC's, while the Archdiocese with the support of the Conservatives, and indirectly of the Greek Consular representatives, set up the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese [GOA], independent from the control of the GOC. Archbishop Iezekei was the first leader of the GOA.

In the following statement, the priest respondent from the Archdiocese stated explicitly the motives for the establishment of the independent GOA:

"After 1960 the Church gradually starts to get organised, with the creation of parish-communities, independent now, because the Church saw the problem in that Hellenism should have a new structure, and the only structure to survive was for the parishes-communities to multiply, so every group in every area to have an interest. And this action proved to be soul-saving, nation-saving, because all are unified...there is no other force to unite them". *

The new Archdiocese, therefore, did not see the role of the Church restricted only to religious activities, but in the wider context of community leadership. The use of the term Hellenism by the respondent, instead of Greeks, has significant ideological context as it has already been said. Thus, the Archdiocese assumed the role of moral, spiritual and national guardian and leader of the Greek community.

The parish-community structure of the GOA proved successful and efficient, because of the political support it received, and its decentralised nature. The councillor positions created in the new communities were filled in
with the disaffected members of the old and new petit-bourgeoisie. Some Communities accepted the authority of the Archdiocese only in religious matters, while they retained the property titles of the church buildings.

The respondent from Atlas gave the following statement to describe what happened after the split, and the Left's perception of the situation. In retrospect, he acknowledged the mistakes made in the evaluation and action towards the Archdiocese, that is, the entanglement and preoccupation of the left with primordial issues:

"The Archbishop used to go to various suburbs, find respectable citizens, mainly illiterate people who had a shop, he will get them to mortgage the shop, buy a little house and make it a church. And his aim, of course, was to encircle the GOC with various off-shoots, as we used to call them, which eventually weakened the GOC and kneeled it down. Unfortunately, we didn't see that from the beginning. In general the Community people didn't see this trick by the Archbishop, and the GOC restricted itself in declaring that the off-shoots don't exist, they're vegetating, and we didn't try to enter [the parishes] as there were opportunities. Had they have seen it correctly at the time, it could had been over, or very small. He [the Archbishop] continued the paper-war with the GOC, 'you're communists - no we're not', 'you're dismissed - no we're not, we're dismissing you'...etc. That was the mistake, that we got involved, not only with the paper-war, but also with the religious issue. And basically, the Archbishop disorientated us, and we have to accept that. We fell into his trap, and instead of mobilising the community to focus on its problems...all our efforts were spent to build a church, and create a hierarchy".*

The progressive alliance tried to assume the dominance of the secular sector over the religious, and partly succeeded in that within its own sphere of influence. Simultaneously it attempted to use the religious issue for
its own benefit, as a means to achieve power within the whole community.

In the struggle with the Archdiocese the GOC, and to a large extent the Left, became so preoccupied with the religious question, that left the organization and development of alternative ideologies for the Greek working-class underdeveloped and inarticulate. As a result both the GOC and Atlas, whose political links and fortunes became inextricably tied together in the 1960's, lost their representativeness, influence and ability to offer real organizational and intellectual alternatives, to those offered by the Archdiocese.

Tsounis argues that the Greek Left in Sydney, and generally in Australia, never managed to develop an analysis and interpretation of the conditions, and needs of the Greek working class and its allies. The community split was not the only reason, but in addition to that the assimilation policy employed by the state and by some unions [Tsounis, M 'The Greek Left in Australia', Australian Left Review 29, March 1971, pp.53-60].

The GOC's were petit-bourgeois institutions geared to cultural maintenance and they proved a continuous source of conflict and ideological confusion for the Left [Kakakios op.cit: 159]. They tried to redefine Greekness by offering more of the same - more schools and cultural activities - as the Archdiocese.

On the other hand the Archdiocese, after the late 60s became the dominant institutional and ideological
expression of the conservatives in the community. Certainly the Archdiocese had its own esoteric reasons to leave the GOC, namely the creation of parishes under its own jurisdiction, and the acquisition of the church properties of the parishes which could best guarantee its survival.

The conservatives proved more successful than their opponents in using the priesthood to advance their socio-political and economic interests. They were very quick to realise the ideological, and political importance of their alliance with an independent Archdiocese. The conservative petit-bourgeoisie, found in the cultural tradition of the Greek Orthodox Church, as espoused by the Archdiocese, the perfect medium to achieve the impression of a homogenous ideological community, based on the concept of Hellenism.

In this way the conservative alliance covered its real interests, economic, social, status and political power, behind Hellenism, which helped it to increase their legitimacy and dominance, while this ideology inhibited the development of alternative ideologies by the progressive alliance.

In a study of a Greek community split in a USA city, Simon describes how the Greek-American middle class modified the Orthodox Church, in order to achieve wider socio-economic and political access to the host society [Simon 1979:158-69]. Simon's argument is that the separation of state and church in the USA, meant that the Greek Orthodox Church was the only non-suspicious and legitimate institution where middle class Greeks could
develop formal and informal social business networks.

These Greeks started to modify the Greek Church along the lines of the Protestant one, by creating layity positions for men through parishes, communities, and other structures. Consequently, the traditional role of women as the support group of the Church was reduced, and directed towards charity functions.

This process also involved the promotion of a stronger work ethic, with emphasis on the development of entrepreneurial skills. In this way the Greek-American middle class managed to assimilate in the American society, as they tried to be culturally less noticeable, and projected this new image to their communities as the true spirit of Hellenism.

This process in Australia started at a slower pace and under different conditions, and with different characteristics. The small number of Greek middle class in Australia, the large number of industrial workers, the intra-communal conflict (which actually accelerated this process), the nature Australian economy, and the policy of assimilation were among the main contributing factors for this slow development.

The participation and acceptance of the Greek bourgeoisie in Australian institutions, starts during the 60s and accelerates in the 70s, when multiculturalism consolidated this process. In this period the upward social mobility of Greeks shifts from being dependent on entrepreneurial initiative, to educational attainment
The community split had a negative impact on the Greek working class. The conflict alienated the majority of Greeks from both institutions, and the rate of membership, participation, and interest declined. The reasons for that were the politics of power, personal ambition, the animosity between the two opposing groups, and ultimately the increasing irrelevancy of the institutions in the daily lives of people. N.S.W. had about 1/3 of the Greek pre-war migrants in Australia, with a strong conservative petit-bourgeoisie presence, and this also affected the development of Greek Women's organizations outside the church charity organizations.

The success of the conservatives in Sydney in political and ideological terms, can be attributed partly to the political failure of the Left to develop alternative working class ideology, the presence of a large pre-war petit-bourgeoisie class in N.S.W., and that Sydney was the basis of the Greek Orthodox Church. In contrast to the situation in Sydney, in Melbourne the balance of power tipped in favour of the GOC's, and the Archdiocese has little political influence there. In the Greek community of Brisbane the balance of power is in favour of the Archdiocese, while in Adelaide there is more or less equal distribution of power in the community.

7.3: Welfare in the Greek Community

The size of the Greek migration, proletarianization
and urban settlement, had generated complex welfare problems for Greek workers. Without any state services or support for migrant welfare provision, the labour market acted as the main welfare distributor. The structure, mentality and knowledge of Greek institutions was not geared to the demands of an industrial society, and therefore were unable to address them.

There is no available literature that specifically examines the provision of welfare in the Greek communities of that period. Tsounis refers only in general terms on this subject [Tsounis 1975]. He lists as the main providers of welfare the GOC's, the church, Brotherhoods, associations and other clubs. These organizations provided a residual form form of welfare like charity, donations, for the deserving needy, and generally self-help practices.

As the GOC, the Archdiocese, and Atlas were the dominant socio-political and cultural institutions of the community, the focus will be on their role as welfare providers. An important institution in the provision of welfare was the Greek Church, which was acting through both the GOC's and the Archdiocese.

Although the ideological role of religion will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, a brief outline of its ideological and welfare role is necessary to understand these roles during the assimilation period. One of the definitions of religion is given by Cox as being:

"The capacity of the human organism to transcend its biological nature through the construction of objective morally binding and encompassing
Universes of meaning... it is a system of faith which helps men to cope with the basic problem of human existence". [Cox 1982:1]

Thus, the need of believers to practice, experience and propagate their beliefs, unite them into a single moral community, the church. In this sense the church comes to be a moral and ritual community, and the basic values and perception of society are concentrated around the sacred.

Religion tries to subordinate the empirical to the non empirical. That is to say, the interpretation of social needs by religion is unlikely to be a true reflection of them, as the social relations necessary to achieve the religious realisation of these needs, are subordinated to the assumed power of a supernatural being. [loc.cit].

This universalistic conception of society and Man by religion, will influence the development of all social forms of organization in society. Consequently, the church has an important socio-political role to play in determining the nature, and structure of social organization.

According to Mishra, religion plays a central role in the welfare of people of rural societies, such as the type of society the post-war Greek and Lebanese migrants came from:

"Religion - both as a set of beliefs and as an organization - symbolizes and upholds the idea of community...these are integrative functions par excellence". [Mishra op.cit:50]

The Greek Archdiocese saw its welfare role as central to its activities. The Archdiocesan priest described how
the Church viewed the initial arrival of Greek migrants:
"There were two churches and two priests. They were surprised by the migration, as they hadn't been informed. There was nobody, absolutely nobody to help the church with the responsibilities it had to face". *

The priests were the leaders and organisers in the provision of spiritual and material assistance. However, they did not possess the skills and resources to deal with the complex demands of an industrial society. As the same respondent explained:

"The priests had around them groups of people who paid visits to hospitals, hostels etc...We used to have sermons to encourage them, to give them information, but all these were happening because of some good people, not because there was something concrete, organised or to do with something to claim any rights...We couldn't talk about rights, because of assimilation".*

The denial of social rights under assimilation was strongly felt by the Church, and this was due to two main reasons: a) It denied the ethnic Church of legitimacy and access to state resources, and the conservatives of their social class status, b) The denial of cultural recognition was perceived as threatening the existence of the Church.

Except the Archdiocese, welfare activities were performed by volunteers, bi-lingual professionals, charitable organizations, while the Greek coffee shops operated as information centres. The GOC's main welfare activities centred around the churches belonging to them. The GOC respondent summarised in the following statement the state of welfare provision in the Greek community at that time:

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"Welfare (during this period) was to plug some holes, to approach certain deserving individuals... it was much a reaction to misfortunes that had befallen on individuals."

Together with the GOC and the GOA, Atlas was also involved in welfare activities. According to the respondent from Atlas, the club staged theatrical plays, organised talks on various issues, published a weekly pamphlet, and a fortnightly bulletin with labour news. However, the largest part of Atlas' activity was related to that of the working conditions and rights of the newly arrived Greek migrants. According to the respondent from Atlas:

"There were many migrants coming by ships, and we from Atlas would go with pamphlets to welcome them. We explained to them what the Atlas club is ... their rights in their work, the unions, what they could claim as citizens. But most of all, information on work, conditions of life, and wages".*

The respondent gave an example of some of the working conditions faced by the new arrivals, and the role of Atlas in helping the Greek workers in cases where their rights had been abused:

"As at that time they used to get a lot of young women to Bonigilla, some rich people used to go there, and take them to work as housemaids or in the shops they owned... Yes, Greek rich people, and there was great exploitation. They used to work 7 days a week like slaves. They wouldn't go out at all, so not to come in contact and learn what they were entitled to... With the help of the Hotel, Clubs and Restaurants union, we found some, mainly young women or even young men, who were exploited in this way in Milk Bars, restaurants etc. We took up their cases, went to court, and got compensation for lost wages etc, (at times) for hundreds of pounds".*

So in contrast to the GOA or GOC, whose welfare practice was charity and spiritual appeasement, Atlas
followed a different welfare practice. This practice involved the rise of the class consciousness of the Greek working class, to organise it and fight for better working and living conditions. As the respondent from Atlas explained, individual cases of misfortune were not seen in a limited way, only to improve the condition of the individual, but to affect changes in the general welfare of Greek workers:

"Since the establishment of Atlas, there were members of the CPA who worked as members of Atlas...and they tried to point out to members the social forces that drive society...The purpose was to show the existence of the capitalist system. And every case we undertook, was to show people that the system is responsible for all the exploitation. It wasn't a matter of charity, 'he's working 20 hours a day, let's go and tell his boss to reduce them to 18...'. In other words, there was a start for strengthening the progressive forces within the community. And always we saw welfare in this way... To find certain cases where the individual himself was prepared to get in front, and the organization to provide back up, so to claim something that will have a larger impact, and not to be confined only in the relief of the individual".*

Thus, throughout the 50s and 60s the Greek institutions tried to come into grips with the social needs of Greek workers, using different ideologies and practices. The deepening political divisions in the Community, the strengthening of the conservatives forces, and the policy of assimilation, all combined to undermine any positive directions towards meeting the welfare needs of Greek workers.
The post-war settlement of Lebanese in Sydney followed some important similarities and differences, with their pre-war counterparts. The pattern of chain migration based on regional and religious affiliations continued, though migration of kinship was reduced. Like the first Lebanese migrants, the post-war ones were migrating mainly from the rural areas of Lebanon. The early post-war Lebanese migrants were predominantly Christians, and only after the early 60's Muslim Lebanese started to migrate to Australia.

Some of the new arrivals found work in Lebanese businesses, or became self-employed, the majority of them though became factory workers [Barney op.cit 74]. There was considerable pressure from the old petit-bourgeoisie, on the new migrants to conform to the new values, and adopt an independent, hard working attitude for a successful economic and social mobility.

This middle-class ideology of the old settlers came into conflict with the Lebanese national identity of the new arrivals, and their more working class attitude. As in the case of the Greeks, the conflict between the opposing political groups was fought over the definition and control of Lebanese identity [ibid:75-6].

The post-war Lebanese had a stronger sense of national identity than the pre-war settlers, though this identity was fragmented by religious and regional factors. Lebanon became a nation in 1926, and gained its independence under
the French mandate in 1947. Under this mandate all six major religious sects were represented in the state apparatus. The Christian sects were the Maronites, Melkites, and Orthodox, while the Muslim were the Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Druze.

This arrangement turned out to be destructive and divisive for Lebanon and led to the Civil war in 1975, which is still going on [ibid:14]. The concept of nation is that of a solidary ideological community, a community based on the realm of culture - of a common language, religion, customs or political experience and territorial area [Thompson op.cit:59]. On the other hand nationalism masks class relations and inequalities in society.

The development of such a national identity did not take a very strong hold in Lebanon because of external and internal factors. Externally, the establishment of Israel, the Egyptian national revolution, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and other Middle East events created new or accentuated existing domestic political problems in Lebanon.

Internally, Lebanese regionalism remained strong. More importantly though, the religious compartmentalisation of Lebanese society acted as a catalyst in bringing to a violent stage its socio-economic and political inequalities. Lebanon had identifiable and distinct religious ideological communities. The Christian and Muslim communities shared the same language and many customs, but had different positions and roles in the political and socio-economic life of Lebanon.
The religious diversity of Lebanon was not the main obstacle for national unity. Many European countries, Australia and the USA, have religious diversity but still have achieved a strong sense of nationalism. What proved to be the obstacle for a strong Lebanese national identity and unity was the high degree of institutionalisation of the religious communities that made up the state. It was the mobilisation of religion as a political ideology for political participation that led to the civil war in Lebanon [A. Scboul in 'The Arabic Community: Realities and Challenges', AWI 1985: 19].

Lebanon went through a substantial economic growth during the 50s and 60 with the main economic activity been comprador trade between East and West. The financial and trading activity was concentrated among Christians, with the Maronites dominating it. Under the French mandate, the president of Lebanon was always a Maronite, while the prime minister a Muslim.

The increasing socio-economic and political marginalisation of a sizeable proportion of the population was perceived and expressed to a large extent in sectarian terms. The Muslims became particularly disadvantaged, and they saw that as a result of the wealth and the political power of the Christians, mainly of the Maronites.

Gradually the state came to be seen as acting on behalf of a section of society, of the Christians, and lost its legitimacy. As Thompson points out, the state can only survive if:
"...in so far as it harnessed the solidarity feelings of the national community in support of its power. Reciprocally, the nation could only preserve its distinctive identity, its culture, through the protection it received from the power of the state". [Thompson op.cit: 59].

In Lebanon's case, the institutional sectarian structure and its effect on the state, could not affect the harnessing of the national identity. The Lebanese state became openly an institution for preserving, promoting, and reinforcing the interests of a section of society, and consequently lost its legitimacy and authority. For this reason civil war in Lebanon became unavoidable.

Despite this, the post-war arrivals had a stronger Lebanese national and cultural identity, than the post war migrants. The impact of this was felt in the revival of traditional Lebanese institutions, mostly related to the establishment of churches. The Maronites established their own church in 1956, while the Melkites in 1977.

In the first twenty years of post-war Lebanese migration, the Lebanese population of Sydney remained relatively small, and so the number of formal institutions. The main division was that between old and new migrants, expressed in terms of confessional identification. Political activity was restricted to some families, and there were no newspapers to form public opinion and discuss community issues. As the Orthodox Lebanese priest explained:

"The rumours, the problems or the friction, were more or less restricted to a certain area, or certain families...Newspapers started in 1972, they were attempts before, but failed".
The only secular Lebanese institution at the time was the Australian Lebanese Association [ALA], which attempted to provide an overarching platform for socio-political participation. The ALA was established in 1949 by the old Lebanese petit-bourgeoisie on a charter based on non-political, non-sectarian, non-profit lines, and membership was open to all people of Lebanese descent. In 1964 the Association participated, together with the Lebanese government and other overseas Lebanese organizations, in the establishment of the World Lebanese Cultural Union, and after that the ALA forged stronger links with the Lebanese state.

The ALA's political and welfare function, however, became increasingly unworkable, as the old petit-bourgeoisie wanted to assume complete political dominance in the organization and the community. The Lebanese Orthodox priest provided the following account of his experience with the ALA in the 1960s:

"I joined the ALA to help...As in every ethnic community, there are always the people who try to exploit their position for self promotion. We had to fight selfishness, power struggle...people didn't care. Especially there was a gap between those who came before the war, and those who came after the war, and the animosity between them was tremendous".

The political and ideological gap between the old and new Lebanese migrants was never bridged. The old petit-bourgeoisie, mostly Maronites, did not manage to establish an ideological and political alliance with the new arrivals and their representatives in the ALA. This in turn strengthened the religious and regional identification of
Lebanese, and at the same time deprived the new arrivals of resources and leadership skills. The ALA gradually came to be seen as a bastion of the old petit-bourgeoisie [Battourney op.cit: 87].

7.5: Welfare in the Lebanese Community

The ALA had established a welfare sub-committee, which was an attempt to provide some form of welfare service to the new arrivals. The Orthodox priest was a member of this sub-committee:

"I joined (the ALA), and we had a very successful welfare sub-committee, of which I was the convener...We had a very good social worker...We had started interpreting for health services myself and my wife...We started sessions with migrants and doctors...It remained like this for 8 years".

As in the case of Greeks, so with the Lebanese the churches of the various denominations, played a very important role in the provision of residual welfare, as they were also the only alternative institutions to the ALA. The Lebanese Orthodox priest recalled his experience at the time:

"Until the early 70’s there was nearly nothing...The Church was the only body which could provide some help, but only on a limited way...The main purpose was more religious and spiritual, but to be able to be pre-occupied with their daily needs was extra work. All churches were like that, not only mine, Maronites, Melkites, Muslim...And people wanting help used to come to the church and ask the priest in every area, customs, police, housing, everything was solved in the church. And the church didn’t have the manpower to facilitate these needs, because really the church was meant to be a different structure".

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A similar situation to that of Sydney, existed with Maronite Church in Melbourne. According to the Maronite priest:

"The church didn't have the structure to offer help...In Melbourne monsignor Paul was virtually like a social worker...He would help everybody, to buy furniture, marry people...He will be the organiser, he will be virtually the centre of whatever activities were happening, whether religious, social or welfare".

Bat ourney also refers to the activity of the Maronite church in Melbourne, which responded to the welfare needs of Christian and Muslim Lebanese [ibid: 89].

As in the case of the Greek priesthood, the Lebanese too was compelled to mix parochial and spiritual guidance to organise and meet some welfare needs of their communities' members. It is also quite clear from the priest respondents, that their agrarian churches had neither the structure, nor the means to meet the social and psychological needs of their working class populations.

Muslims during this period were very few in number so there were not any religious structures and very few welfare activities. The Muslim respondent from the Muslim Welfare Centre referred to only the following form of welfare provision for Muslims in the 1960s:

"...In 1967 there was a house where people could gather in and provide few services. The co-ordinator used to seat in that house, in his spare time, and assist people, because he had come to Australia some 30 years ago. And through his involvement in the welfare field he came to know more about the welfare activity going around than anyone else in the community. He used to assist those Muslims who were present at that time in whatever capability".

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After 1967 the Lebanese population settling in Australia started to grow rapidly, and so did the inability of the existing community structures to cope with the needs of the new arrivals. This situation, and the political conflict in the community, led to an increased ideological and institutional fragmentation. According to the Lebanese Orthodox:

"From the 1970s onwards organizational thinking spread...The ALA weakened by internal trouble, didn't fulfill its charter of servicing the Lebanese community...The churches had their own welfare structures. Because of the failure of the ALA, the village associations came up. They tried to take up, more or less, the role of the church by providing services to their members..."

With the active intervention of the state in ethnic communal affairs, the nature of the political struggle in the Greek and Lebanese communities changed, as did the provision of welfare. Institutional and class legitimacy for the Greek and Lebanese petit-bourgeoisie became interwoven with their claims for state resources and recognition.
Greek and Lebanese Migration after 1971

The Greek born migrant settlers in Australia reached their peak at 160,200 in 1971, and after that their numbers steadily declined to 152,908 in 1976, 146,625 in 1981, and 137,637 in 1986 (table [11]). For the same period the Lebanese born population stood at 24,218 in 1971, showed a dramatic increase of 25,000 between 1976-1981, while in 1986 had reached 56,341.

Table 11: Population by Birthplace

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>160,200</td>
<td>152,908</td>
<td>146,625</td>
<td>137,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>24,218</td>
<td>33,424</td>
<td>49,625</td>
<td>56,341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The reasons for the increased Lebanese migration were tied to the Middle East events after 1967, and the continuous Lebanese civil war since 1975, which disrupted the lives of Lebanese and forced many of them to leave the country. Many Lebanese were invited in Australia by their kin, and whereas the earlier settlers were economic migrants, the post-75 Lebanese arrivals were classified as quasi refugees.

Quasi refugee status meant that people have left
their country voluntarily for their own safety, but may return back if the danger ceased to exist. This arrival status denied Lebanese of many services and help which is available to groups classified as refugees, as in the case of the Indo-Chinese.

During the period 1954-1981 the Lebanese and Greek populations of NSW remained fairly stable. In 1954 there were 2,766 Lebanese in NSW or 71.6% of the total Lebanese population in Australia, while in 1981 the respective number was 36,952 or 74.5%. The Greeks in 1954 had 9,175 persons living in NSW or 35.5% of their total population in Australia, and in 1981 47,606 or 32.5% [ABS 1981]. Also in 1981 the total Greek and Lebanese population with the same birthplace for both parents was 244,205 and 74,134 respectively [ABS 1981].

The employment status of the two groups has already been discussed in Chapter 4 table [3]. The most important changes in the employment status of the two groups were their declining employee status, the extremely high unemployment levels experienced by Lebanese men and women, and an equalisation of the male workforce participation rates, while Lebanese females continued to have low participation rates in the labour market.

The limits of occupational opportunities for NES migrants was well illustrated in their occupational mobility. Table [12] shows that in relation to occupational changes for Greeks, Lebanese and Italians between 1966 and 1981, there was very little improvement in professional and
administrative occupations for them when compared to the Germans, UK & Ireland and Australians. For the same period there was a general decline in participation in manual occupations, with Greek men and women registering the highest fall 19.9% and 27.5% respectively. In the service sector Australian, UK & Irish, German and Lebanese female participation decreased, while for Italian and Greek women there was an increase of 4.5%.

Table 12: Occupational Status by Birthplace by Sex. (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Profess.</th>
<th>Admin.</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>7.5</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK &amp; Irel.</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>62.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>69.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>67.6</td>
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<td>59.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1961a</td>
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<td>11.5</td>
<td>60.0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>55.4</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Profess.</th>
<th>Admin.</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Service</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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<td>18.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uk &amp; Irel.</td>
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<td>2.7</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a): There are no 1966 statistical figures for Lebanese.  
There were some other important similarities and differences between post-war Greek migrants, and post-1975 Lebanese migrants. One significant difference is the noticeable age composition of the two groups. In 1966 both Greek and Lebanese migrants had very similar age group figures, table [13]. In 1981 the most noticeable change was in the age bracket 0-19, where there were only a small proportion of Greeks 5.8%, while the Lebanese had 24.2%, while the Greeks had 16.3% more people between the ages 45-59.

Table 13: Age distribution between Greeks and Lebanese (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1966</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources ABS 1966, 1981.

Considering that the Lebanese are in their majority a new migrant group, they have a larger proportion of younger population than that of Greeks and Lebanese in 1966. Nearly 1/4 of the Lebanese population in 1981 was under 20 years old, which meant that there were fewer Lebanese of employable age, and therefore more pressure on the working family members to provide sufficient support.

The young age of the Lebanese population becomes a greater problem because of the large size of Lebanese families as shown in table [14]. In 1981 31.4% of Lebanese
women had more than four children (20.4% had more than five), as compared to 13.0% of Greek women of whom 58.6% had between 2-3 children.

Table 14: Females over 15 years of Age and over: Birthplace by Total Issue. 1981. (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Number of Issue Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABS 1981.

In terms of general educational level the Lebanese had considerably higher percentages than Greeks, as table [15] indicates. The main reasons for this is that education in Greece was not compulsory until the 1950's, as well as the war affected the educational opportunities of many people. The Lebanese are a younger group of migrants, and therefore had more educational chances than the post-war migrants. The only Lebanese percentage that was higher of any Greek in negative terms, was the 17% of Lebanese women who never attended school, as compared to 8.3% of the Greek.

When both Greeks and Lebanese were compared with the national figures they had lower educational standards, especially in the age group <13-16. At the 17-18 years of age group, there was no much difference between the Lebanese and the national total, while in the over 19 years
of age group both Greeks and Lebanese had higher percentages than the national one. This last difference was probably due to a certain extent, to interruption periods caused by war, which both old Greek and new Lebanese migrants have experienced, which meant extended attendance at school.

Table 15: Persons 15 years of age and over by Birthplace by age left school 1981. (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>&lt;13</th>
<th>13-16</th>
<th>17-18</th>
<th>19+</th>
<th>Never attended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>&lt;13</th>
<th>13-16</th>
<th>17-18</th>
<th>19+</th>
<th>Never attended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source ABS 1981.

If specific qualifications are taken into account then there is not much difference between the two groups, but they look outstanding when compared to the total population as table [16] shows. The qualification differences between Greeks and Lebanese and the rest of the population are quite obvious and large to be elaborated, which explain the two groups' particular occupational status, mostly unskilled.
Table 16: Persons over 15 years of age by Birthplace by Level of Qualifications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MALES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FEMALES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source ABS 1981.

The only noticeable differences in terms of qualifications between Greeks and Lebanese is, that the latter had 0.8% more trade qualifications and 4.6% less without any qualifications than the former.

In the last 15 years occupational immobility, lack of employment opportunities and of educational qualifications, political powerlessness, familial breakdown, health and housing problems, and racial/ethnic discrimination all of them have combined to increase the social and economic and inequalities of Greek and Lebanese working class people.

Thus, state welfare provision for migrants at both state and community levels assumed priority, not so much to address the growing social and human inequalities experienced by NES working class migrants, but more to control these inequalities from becoming political threats to the status quo of Australian society and to the conservative ethnic bourgeoisie.
Under the policy of Multiculturalism the crucial determinant factor in the balance of power in intra-communal relations became the increasingly active intervention of the state in the form of provision of welfare funds to ethnic institutions. For opposing intra-communal classes and groups, the quest for state funds proved to be both the justification for the maintenance of primordial characteristics, and to seek legitimacy by the Australian state and ruling Australian class.

After the Galbally Report of 1978 new welfare organizational forms and practices emerged in the ethnic communities and the volume, range, and form of government funding increased. The next three sections of this chapter will deal with the ideological and practical welfare responses of Greek and Lebanese institutions and professionals to the social class and cultural inequalities experienced by Greek and Lebanese workers.
8a.1: The Lebanese

Secular ethno-specific institutions, along with religious ethno-specific, have been the main targets of state welfare funding. This policy was based on the proposal of the Galbally Report which suggested that funding to these institutions can meet better the needs of their members [Cox, 'Welfare services in a Multicultural society', Australian Social Work, 1983, vol.36., no.3: 11].

This proposal asserted that ethnic communities exist as unitary entities. By treating ethnic communities as unitary formations the state hoped to achieve social cohesion and harmony, both at the community level and in the Australian society. However, ethnic communities have never existed in unity, as there has always been continuous socio-political conflict by opposing classes or groups for control of their institutions and dominance in the community. Thus the idea of harmonious ethnic communal relations was in effect a social control mechanism intended to impose this idea as the reality of the social existence of migrants.

Multiculturalism by encouraging the maintenance of the cultural identity of migrants provided with a legitimate incentive various ethnic groups and classes to seek state funds. In most cases this provision of funds, in
combination with intra-communal conflicts, resulted in an increased institutional and political fragmentation of various ethnic communities.

This situation is no more evident than in the case of the Lebanese. Until the early 1970s Lebanese welfare provision was limited to that provided by religious institutions. The development of new Lebanese welfare structures was brought about by the economic and social difficulties faced by the continuously increasing number of Lebanese workers from the early 70s, and by the unresponsiveness of government services to migrant welfare needs.

The large number of Lebanese arriving in the 70s and 80s had different socio-political views from the established Lebanese, as well as this number contained a large portion of Lebanese Muslims. Thus the social relations of the Lebanese were intersected by the class and ideological differences between old and new Lebanese settlers, by religious factors, primarily expressed in the conflict between Muslims and Maronites, by regional considerations, and by the political and ideological conditions found in Australian society that defined their class and cultural experiences.

Following the failure of the the ALA to attract and unite disparate political and religious Lebanese factions, and provide secular welfare services, the village associations were formed to complement the welfare functions of both the ALA and the churches. The village
associations were initially small informal structures with strong familial and religious identities, and performed some welfare functions, like child care. The small size of these associations, and their specific functions and nature, provided many obstacles and limitations in the welfare services they could provide.

Around the mid 70s some village and regional associations combined together to set up specialised welfare structures. This institutional approach to the changing welfare demands of Lebanese settlers, contained an important contradiction. On the one hand, there was further institutional fragmentation, while on the other hand, a petit-bourgeois alliance was established, which frequently overrode religious and regional sentiments. In this way these secular welfare associations became important institutional arenas where the new and old petit-bourgeoisie could gain power and status.

The Tripoli El-Mina Association, based in Lakemba, is one of the first such welfare organizations. This association is one of the most sizeable, visible and active in Lebanese welfare provision. In 1975 nearly 500 people from the Tripoli El-Mina area of Lebanon held a public meeting, and elected a honourary committee to establish and operate the Association. According to the respondent from the Association:

"...the management committee was paying the rent of the office, the bills, and provided service to the community in a voluntary basis. That was up to 1978. Then we received a part-time grant from the EAC until 1982 for one day a week. In 1982 we
received a full-time grant from YACS. There were lapses of funding between 1978 to 1982.

Thus, for a period of three years, 1975-78, the operation of the centre was on a self-help basis with voluntary work, and financial contribution from the membership. At the time of the interview, the Association had a full-time worker, and few others on short term funding programs. Its main services included child care service, the running of various groups and cultural activities.

The Australian Welfare Lebanese Association (AWLA), based in Merrylands, is an umbrella organization of 21 village associations and also has individual membership. The AWLA was established in 1979, and initially co-operated closely with DIEA in providing services to Lebanese migrants. The respondent from AWLA explained what happened:

"They (the AWLA) approached the DIEA and got a GIA fund. Initially (the operation of AWLA) was related only to immigration."

Actually the AWLA operated from the offices of the Parramatta Migrant Resource Centre, run by DIEA, until 1983. After that the organization was given another GIA grant, and moved to its present location at Merrylands. The establishment of the AWLA represents one case where indirect state intervention helped to set it up, fund it, firstly for immigration matters, and later on for general community welfare services.

An additional consideration for this state initiative with the AWLA was the political character of the
organization. AWLA's membership is mainly made up of old established petit-bourgeoisie Orthodox Lebanese, and some Maronites. The AWLA at the time of the interview had one GIA worker, one part-time GIA, and two CEP workers, and support from volunteers.

The Lebanese Welfare Council of Canterbury/Bankstown (LWC), based in Punchbowl, was established in 1983 when it received GIA funding. Unlike the Tripoli El-Mina Association, which is Muslim dominated, and the Christian dominated AWLA, the LWC's membership shows a significant convergence of class interests among different religious groups. The LWC is comprised of different religious and volunteer welfare organizations of the area. These are:

1. The Muslim Adawa group. 2. The Lebanese Orthodox church of St. Nicholas in the area. 3. The Maronite St. Charbel monastery in the area. 4. Tripoli El-Mina Association. and 5. The Australian Arab Senior Citizens Association.

The respondent from LWC explained the formation of the Council:

"(The LWC) was the welfare sub-committee of the Canterbury Community Aid, but there were not satisfied with the administration there. So they broke away and formed the Council. The composition of clientele, reflects its membership. We serve all the Arabic Community...Lebanese are the majority".

The way in which the LWC was formed seems to have been based on a combination of factors. On the intra-communal alliance, motivated by the probable unresposiveness of the generalist organization, and the
availability of funds to establish a separate ethno-specific service. The respondent was the only worker employed by the LWC.

The last Lebanese secular organization of the sample that provides welfare services, is the Australian Lebanese Association, the ALA. The history and welfare activities of the ALA have already been discussed. The ALA's social worker was the only person of the sample who declined to provide a recorded interview.

According to the written statements he provided, the ALA was the first Lebanese organization to receive GIA funding. At one stage the ALA was employing a GIA worker, and three other workers. The GIA fund stopped more than two years ago because the organization did not comply with the fund's guidelines. There was no more elaboration on that issue. At the time of the interview the respondent was the only worker at ALA, funded by a state fund.

So far the picture that has emerged from the description of the Lebanese organizations, shows an institutional fragmentation along religious, regional and political lines, but at the same time signs of a coalition of cross sectarian and class interests. Another important pattern that emerged, is that nearly all organizations received state funding after 1978, and mostly in the early 1980s.

The most significant aspect of state funding has been its role in encouraging the establishment of these welfare organizations. Multiculturalism's identification of social
groups on the basis of their cultural or ethnic characteristics, has provided a legitimate basis for seeking state funding. As a Lebanese social worker commented:

"The divisive approach of the welfare industry which deals with all groupings regardless of their sectarian role, adds more force to the fragmentation of the Arabic speaking community. This approach is basically justified by arguing that ethnic communities should be assisted, in order to became on an equal footing with the rest of our society...Funding bodies support to a great number of primordial groups". [Taber in 'The Arabic Community Realities and Challenges', op.cit: 25].

This passage contains an explanation of the state's rationale for welfare funding, which has encouraged regional and village associations to establish welfare structure of their own. And in turn these structures are perceived by Lebanese as legitimate forms of social organization, thus perpetuating their political, religious, regional, and familial ideologies. So state welfare funding plays an important social control function in the maintenance and reproduction of the ideologies of these social formations.

The perpetuation of the primordial characteristics of Lebanese is best reflected in the population these welfare structures serve, or suppose to serve. All Lebanese respondents at various stages of their interviews indicated that the services of their organization are available to all, irrespective of sectarian background. Despite these assertions these institutions by their very nature can provide only limited services to people who share the same
beliefs and values as them.

The interests of the Lebanese working class, of women, and other marginalized groups, get completely distorted and unrepresented in the maze of institutional and ideological formations among Lebanese. De Lepervanche makes the same observation about ethno-specific institutions generally, and points out also a gender dimension in relation to that:

"The proliferation of ethnic groups and their official encouragement has reinforced male social domination as ethnic males, perhaps denied sufficient opportunity for status enhancement and political action in mainstream society, have found alternative arenas in their ethnic organizations. Most ethnic leaders and spokespersons are men, and they represent male and bourgeois interests rather than those of women or the working class majority". [op.cit: 189]

A case of study of open state intervention to create an appearance of harmony and unity in a ethnic group, is the establishment of the Lebanese Community Council (LCC). The Lebanese institutional fragmentation along political and sectarian lines, meant that there was not a secular Lebanese organization that could claim communal representation and legitimacy. The majority of the Lebanese had rejected the authority of the ALA, and the cancellation of its GIA fund was probably a recognition of that by the state.

The political considerations of the state to help the establishment of the LCC were also supported by administrative ones. State funding bodies could not decide or identify clearly which Lebanese organizations were entitled to welfare funds.
The DIEA initiated the establishment of a committee composed of various Lebanese leaders to make a study of their community, and report back their findings and recommendations. The Lebanese Orthodox priest, who was a member of the committee and a founding member of the LCC, described how the Council came into existence:

"They (the Lebanese) were trying to shift the blame from one person to another, and I would paint myself white, and the other side black, and vice versa. And this really has done a disservice to the community, because the government and the Departments were confused how to channel their services to the community...This is why the need to set up a settlement Lebanese committee which will study and communicate to the government the true facts. It is a fact finding committee, a research committee. To bring together all sects, all Lebanese sections of the community to work on social problems. There was a convention in Nanaru in 1983, where 97 delegates from 52 major organizations, sat down for three days highlighting the problems...Because of the failed ALA, lack of harmony, we threw in the idea of the LCC...We formed an interim committee. I was chairman of the LCC till 1984".

The LCC was intended as an institution that would gain wide appeal and support from all Lebanese factions. The government hoped that by supporting the establishment of the LCC it would secularise the social relations of the Lebanese, and the LCC would act as the main secular legitimate institution of united Lebanese 'community'. In other words, the state tried at the ideological level to instill in the minds of the Lebanese, and of the Australian public the impression of a unitary Lebanese community.

The respondent from the LCC explained the ideological reasons for the establishment of the organization:

"In a country like Australia, which is
lay, where it is open to everybody, where you have a multitude of religions, why should you concentrate on one section of the community alone?"

The same respondent, however, was aware of the limitations of the LCC, and of the political power struggles in the community and their effects on it:

"The Council can be conceived as a democratic body, a structure in which all Lebanese organizations, or individuals can take part...It does not pretend to speak in the name of all the Lebanese. It wants to serve those who are affiliated with it...Within every community you have barons, who are usually businessmen, and have been involved in Australian politics, and have gained momentum. And because of their leverage have been used by the community and the government. They are a source of votes".

The conflicting and contradictory institutional, sectarian and individual interests of the LCC's membership, undermine and underline its limited genuine support and legitimacy. The fluidity of the political relations among the Lebanese help to magnify the inability of the LCC to affect significantly the direction of these political relations and processes, and by extension the distribution of state welfare funds.

As the respondent from the LCC said the main role of the institution is restricted to more or less a public relations exercise:

"The target is. To boost the image of the Community...In Australia, Lebanese are synonymous with drug dealings, dole bludgers...Events in Lebanon affect this discriminatory attitude...It's a classic case. Every community has gone through that...To concentrate on common issues of concern in the Community...It's hard for the Lebanese to work together, because this is something new in the country, but the fact that it (LCC) is still standing on its feet,
despite many attempts from within and outside to undermine it. It's already an achievement in itself."

8a.2: The Greeks

In the case of the Greek community the power struggles that had raged in the first 25 years of post-war migration, started to subside in the late 1970s. With the Greek conservative bourgeoisie on the ascendancy, the religious question became secondary to other more important social issues. The relative integration of Greeks in the wider society made intra-communal politics less important and appealing.

The direction and intensity of Greek communal conflict shifted from the direct confrontation between the Archdiocese and the GOC, to that between the Archdiocese and the Communities. At the centre of this conflict was the Archdiocese's intention to gain the transfer of the property titles of the churches of the various Communities under its Canonical jurisdiction.

The Archbishop Stylianos in a speech he gave in 1981 titled 'The Church - The solution to a problem', tried to persuade community leaders why they should transfer the property titles of their churches to the Archdiocese. In this speech he also identified the types of Greek communities in operation and the alternative type he favoured [Papageorgopoulos 1981: 78-97].

The most common type of Greek communities to be found is the one where the church building has been paid by the
members of that community, the committees are made up of the financial members of the community, while most of these communities accept the Canonical jurisdiction of the Archdiocese. The other type of community organization involves the communities controlled by the GOC. And the third type the community-parishes which are under the direct property and Canonical control of the Archdiocese, but are very few in numbers [ibid: 84-90].

The Archbishop in his speech appealed to the national and religious sentiments of the 'independent' community leaders, and compared the disadvantages of their own community structure with the advantages of that envisaged by the Archdiocese:

"By registering in advance the title of the church directly with the Church Authority, which is neither a person nor a group of people nor a Company, it is guaranteed that the Church building will remain a church...In this way, since the Church will belong automatically to all Orthodox people, there will be no reason for the parishes to be organised as societies...Thus there will be no fights for worldly or political pursuits at the expense of the faithful people within the parish boundaries". [ibid: 90-94]

Thus the Archdiocese's interest in acquiring the 'worldy' property titles of the community churches, is due to its own realisation that unless this happens, its legitimacy, social control ability, and future survival will always be under threat.

On the other side the GOC saw its power and influence in the 70s been reduced under the successful policies of the Archdiocese. Another factor that contributed to the decline of the GOC, was the emergence of various opposing
groups within the organization itself. The Left that dominated the Council of the GOC did not manage to create new alliances with other groups within the GOC, and failed to attract new groups and individuals from the community.

In the opinion of the respondent from Atlas this policy of the Greek Left proved destructive, because with the advent of the provision of state welfare funds the GOC was in a weak political position to have sufficient community support to attract funds:

"In the 70s, because the base of the GOC had shrunk so much, it didn't have the persons who could benefit, or even claim equal treatment with the Archdiocese, or an 'x' treatment for the benefit of Greeks who followed the GOC. There were no people. Persons who were community minded left the GOC, only because they found themselves selves against a certain clique or situation".*

Atlas followed the same path of political decline of the GOC and was actually split in 1983. The fundamental problem for Atlas, which was transferred to a large extent to the GOC through its membership, was the issue of defining the precise character of the organization. The presence of SPA members in Atlas meant that their views affected its perception and role. The conflict that erupted within Atlas had to do with defining its role as a political party, or a mass organization. As the respondent from Atlas explained, the reasons for its split were:

"Atlas was never an instrument of the Communist party. It was established by progressive people...It always had members of the Communist party, they never hide it...In the last 10-15 years Atlas went through various stages, which unfortunately had a retarding effect on the work and appearance of the organization."
Unfortunately the splits in the international communist movement were carried in Atlas, in the mass organization. By giving greater emphasis, as it is said by some people, to the political activity, instead to the broad cultural activity, contracted the base of the organization, which slowly resulted in its isolation from the community. The cultural activities stopped, the talks, etc...Slowly the character of the organization became very limited, to the degree that some people were saying that Atlas is a left-wing organization. Some of its members wanted to promote it as a left wing political organization, not only participating within the left wing movement generally, but as a particular part of this movement. As a political party. This alienated a lot of its members".*

When the state welfare funds were made available to the Greek community the Archdiocese was the first one to get a GIA grant in 1973, and later on established the Greek Welfare Centre in 1975. The welfare activity of the Archdiocese will be discussed in the next section.

In 1975 the GOC received a GIA grant as well. No other Greek institution received any funding. In 1978, however, the GIA fund of the GOC was terminated. A delegation of six Council members of the GOC went to visit the then minister of DIEA M.Mckellar to discuss the reasons for the termination of the fund. The respondent from the GOC, who was a member of the delegation, described in the following statement the meeting with the minister:

"...And the first thing he asked was: 'How's the Atlas club?'. The Atlas club is a workers' club and a left-wing club, and everybody knows that. And that was a totally inappropriate question to ask before he even said good-afternoon...It made us think that they knew how's the community like, that had received advice, and the advice was totally against us".

It is evident from this statement the government's
decision to terminate the Central Community's GIA fund, was politically motivated. The close links of the GOC with Atlas were perceived as potentially troublesome, meaning probable non-compliance with the neo-conservative social policies of the Fraser government. As the GOC respondent explained:

"We are seen by them (the government) as quite a rebel organization...To that extent this is unfair...We are willing to buck the system to some extent. If the interests of the community are threatened, we're willing to take them on".

For the respondent the source of advice to the government about the GOC, appeared to have originated from within the community, and particularly from the conservative forces. In the following statement the respondent from the GOC implied that the political links of the Greek conservative alliance were used to influence the government's decision:

"The way in which the Church functions is...it has an advisory committee which seats the Archbishop, made of some very wealthy, primarily pre-war Greeks, but also some wealthy post-war Greeks, some of which are very active in the Liberal party, and some are donors to the Liberal party. Therefore they have direct access to the leadership of the Liberal party...But it is tougher to swallow how some Greek Labor party politicians are using the patronage of the Church as means of carving out political careers".

Since 1978 the GOC re-applied many times to have the GIA fund reinstated to it, and despite some positive indications at the bureaucratic levels, the applications were always rejected. Finally, the grant was given back under the Labor government in 1984. During the period 1978-
the welfare activities of the GOC had to be carried out with small State funds and from its own resources.

Even at present the GOC has to rely in its own diminishing resources for welfare activities. For the financial year 1984-85 it recorded a deficit of $133,000, and in 1985-86 $32,000 [GOC Directors' Report 1986]. At present the GOC has a full time GIA worker, one part-time and two child care centres in the Western suburbs, for which it receives State funds.

The termination of the GIA fund to the GOC in 1978 and the increasing funding to the Archdiocese after this period had important implications for the community. This decision legitimised even further the authority and power of the Greek conservative bourgeoisie and that of the Archdiocese as the sole Greek institution that enjoyed government support and recognition. In this way, the form of social control that was imposed on the subordinate classes and groups in the community, reinforced conservative political and ethno-cultural ideologies and practices.

For the GOC the lack of state funds, combined with its internal problems, made the organization less effective within the community, and consequently minimised its legitimacy, thus contributing to its perceived irrelevancy. The decline of Atlas and of the GOC, meant that the Greek working class and its allies, have largely lost the existence of any popular and alternative political organizational formation.
The unequal distribution of welfare funds in the Greek community did not result in any large scale fragmentation as in the case of the Lebanese. Nevertheless, this state intervention had similar effects on both the Greek and Lebanese working class because fragmented further their social relations and ideologies, reduced institutional collaboration and reinforced the power of conservative petit-bourgeoisie elements.

8a.3: Social Workers and Social Work

For the Lebanese and Greeks the welfare state and its services represented a new experience for them in Australia. The welfare state either did not exist in their countries, or was very underdeveloped. The form of welfare found in their countries at the time of their departure was of residual type. The personal care services of the welfare state, like social work, were unknown to them.

Social work is a response to the complex life of industrialised societies, and the unequal distribution of rewards. In a capitalist society, characterised by inequalities and alienation, social work intends to provide a human response, at the individual level, to the personal needs of marginalised groups [Davies 1981: 195].

In doing so the social worker maintains the stability of society, both in terms of social unity and social control. As Davies explains:

"Social work is about reconciliation and compromise, reconciling the personal and the political, the individual and the state".

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In this mediating role the social worker is a part of the state machinery, as his/her salary is paid by it to interpret and implement its welfare policies [Galper 1980: 3-15]. At the same time the social worker acts and advocates on behalf of the client or the group he/she represents.

The role of the social worker is to re-socialise the individual or group to accept at the ideological level the existing pattern of economic and socio-political domination. This is done through the individualistic approach of social work to societal problems. In turn this approach distorts the individual's perception of his/her problems, as they are located at the immediate environment, either at the individual or community level.

For these reasons social work encourages individual solutions to societal problems based on the Liberal ideological constructs of individual responsibility and success. Social work concepts and practices, however, are not uniform because of the different socio-political ideologies they are based upon.

There are three main approaches to social work that attempt to provide different solutions to individuals and groups:

a) The consensus or conservative approach views society largely unproblematic, with no inequalities or opposing interests [Thorpe et.al 1985:13]. If this approach accepts the existence of social inequalities, these are either
recognised as personal or group ones, or due to lack of knowledge about services that can ameliorate or resolve their problems. These values together with the concepts of community participation, co-operation, individual casework, self-help, and the welfare role of the family, are used by this approach as means to achieve social cohesion, and social control.

b) The pluralist or institutional approach is based on the idea of welfare as a citizenship right [Mishra op.cit:21]. The citizen rights consist of three different elements, the civil, the political and the social. These three elements constitute the basis for the equal status of the individual as a member of society. The interplay of political and civil rights enhances the social rights, and thus the individual and community sense of belonging and participating as a full member of society.

This welfare approach treats the state as the main provider of welfare services to people in an unbiased and democratic way. This involves the re-direction of state resources to the disadvantaged by means of lobbying, pressure, advocacy and bargaining [Thorpe op.cit: 14-15]. Community action, pursuit of issues, and self-help, are regarded as other methods of personal and group welfare provision.

c) The structural conflict model or radical perspective, views social problems as being generated by the conflicting interests of classes and groups of society, and the unequal distribution of resources and power between the dominant
and subordinate classes or groups [Thorpe ibid: 14]. The social service institutions are regarded as serving low-income people as an extension of the dominant political and economic forces [Galper op.cit: 9].

Through casework and political participation the social worker can identify and act towards the socio-political and economic structures of society. The social worker is viewed as an active agent of change for the interests of the marginilised groups. The main aim of this approach is to make the individual more aware of his/her marginal position. Nevertheless, this radical approach is not easy to implement, because social work, and particularly casework, is structurally conservative.

All three social work models are certainly not ideal types, but rather are found in combinations. These combinations depend on state welfare policies, the ideology of the voluntary institutions, and the personal and political views of the workers themselves.

The provision of welfare funds to ethnic institutions meant the employment of social/welfare workers. The employment of social workers by ethno-specific organizations proved to be very important, because they provided the most immediate form of contact between the organization and the state, the community/individual and the state. Social/welfare workers in their capacity as organic intellectuals acted as carriers, interpreters and distributors of knowledge, which was beyond the ideological, organizational, and functional capabilities of the
traditional intellectuals.

The management and leadership of the secular ethno-specific institutions, though not belonging to another era of socio-economic relations, ideologically are more involved and aware of their intra-communal interests and conflicts. As the primary role of these institutions is the maintenance of primordial characteristics, capitalist socio-political and economic inequalities faced by the ethnic working class, are interpreted by the institutions through primordial concepts, and are presented as possible threats to the primordiality of the group.

However, this primordial perception and interpretation of the nature of the community and of the individual, is the outcome of a social construction of reality that hides other social relations. Primordial values and beliefs are in effect themselves creations and expressions of social values that are continuously generated in the sphere of material, class and ideological relations of capitalist society.

Ethnic social/welfare workers employed by ethno-specific institutions, therefore, mediate these social values and beliefs of the institutions through their social work practice. In most cases the workers employed by ethno-specific institutions share the values of these institutions.

Turning now to the respondents statements on their views on the role of social/welfare workers in their communities, the respondent from LWC said:
"The role of the social worker is to educate the Community about services and departments, about how the system works, the welfare system, and that is important to facilitate their integration in the community".

While the respondent from the AWLA added:

"There is some ignorance in the Community, it is not the fault of the people, because of the new system".

Both respondents saw as the primary role of the Lebanese social worker to educate the community about the existence and use of various welfare services. The aim is that through this education the Lebanese would be integrated in the Australian society. The welfare state and its services were therefore seen as being able to provide solutions to the social problems faced by Lebanese.

The respondent from LCC defined more clearly the linking role of the Lebanese welfare workers to the Australian social conditions:

"Most of the new arrivals are not aware of the Australian structure and access to information and rights. So welfare can occur through friends, or through the worker. The social worker knows the contacts...(he) has a very important role to play. He's the link, the information provider, he's the referral body, the connection".

Thus the Lebanese respondents described the role of the Lebanese social workers as that of primarily re-socialising the Lebanese into a new value system, that of the Australian welfare state. The respondents saw the role of the social workers as integrative, as mediators between the 'old' and new value system.

The respondent from the GOC saw the role of the Greek social workers extending beyond the limits of service
delivery and information provision. In his opinion, social workers could be more effective and helpful to their community if they were to participate in the political process. That is, for the workers to see themselves as active agents of social change, to challenge certain dominant values, than merely transmit them:

"There's a high burn out among social workers. I think, in part, they don't see any future, and they get so demoralised with their work, with the constant flow of social problems flotsam and jetsam...There's only one way to overcome the burn out, and that is to actually view themselves as agents of change, get involved into an organization, participate and fight".

The GOC's view of the role of social work represents a more radical approach than that employed by the Lebanese sample. This difference in political ideology is crucial because it determines the way in which the individual and the community are perceived by the institution and what methods and policies it uses in relation to them. Although the GOC has a cultural maintenance role, its control by progressive elements means that is using Greekness to challenge socio-political inequalities that affect the Greek working class.

As far as the Lebanese institutions of the sample are concerned, they are predominantly petit-bourgeois representing a mixture of conservative and Liberal ideologies. For them the maintenance of their primordiality, coupled by their limited sphere of influence in the Lebanese community, is far more important than to challenge inequalities created by capitalist society.
The extent to which ethno-specific organizations can provide the welfare service that they are supposed to is complicated by other factors. According to Cox one of the important reasons why these organizations are receiving state funding is that they are cheap to operate, easy to establish, and often employ base-grade untrained staff to deal with the most difficult cases ['Welfare services in a Multicultural Society', Australian Social Work, Sep. 1983, vol.36, no.3: 17].

In addition to the above factors these organizations have structural limitations, financial restrictions and lack of overall professional organization, which makes welfare provision a really arduous exercise. As a former social worker with the GOC, employed at the time of the interview with the St. George Migrant Resource Centre, explained:

The GOC has its own assets, so it can depend on its own income, but because it is a non-profit organization it isn't run professionally. You have people working on a volunteer basis. You'd find it may be run not as efficiently as it could be...When you're a worker in a ethno-specific organization, you'd find that you're usually a lone worker, on your own, and that means that you need to depend on yourself, and on any person on the management committee that might have an interest in welfare".

Although some of the details of the above statement may specifically be relevant to the GOC, it generally reflects the situation experienced by ethno-specific organizations with limited funds. The majority of the Lebanese respondents expressed similar sentiments. However, what renders the position of these organizations and of the
social workers helpless, is the sheer volume of social and cultural problems they are called upon to address. And this situation is more evident with the Lebanese as the respondent from AWLA commended:

"What the social worker is supposed to do? Not to create miracles... If we can't eliminate these problems, then we're trying to decrease them, to give some awareness to these problems".

While the respondent from Tripoli El-Mina Association added further:

"...there's a high expectation from the community members. They expect you to know everything, answer all queries and solve all problems. They look at you as a miracle angel who is going to solve their problems just like that... it's impossible to do all these things".

What the two statements share in common is the word 'miracle'. The word itself indicates symbolically the critical position of many Lebanese migrants, and the realisation by the workers themselves of their powerlessness to affect any change. At the same time the Lebanese clients, due to the magnitude of their problems, are more demanding on the social workers.

Thus secular ethno-specific welfare organizations are not in the position to deal with the social dislocations created by capitalist social relations. What in effect they are doing is to reduce alienation, offer some personal service and maintain the community concept, not only as a form of social cohesion, but also as one of social control.

The social control role of these organizations is also exercised through the implementation of particular
welfare practices. Most of the service provision of the institutions of the sample is limited to casework, and this is even more so for the Lebanese ones.

The respondent from AWLA gave a description of his organization's work schedule:

"Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday we provide casework. Tuesday and Friday are mainly for community programs and community development".

Casework has practical applications in that it can solve immediate problems, or identify the needs of the clientele, and it is used as the main method to address social problems [Cox 1983, op.cit: 15]. The fundamental problem with casework is that it deals with issues that are very restricted, and the danger from the application of casework is:

"...(that) if social work concentrates on the individuality and uniqueness of each client, the possibility of locating and resolving social problems within the structure of society, are limited [Social Work Practice 1981: 42].

The consequence of casework practice by the secular ethno-specific organizations is that it strengthens individualistic perceptions, and thus the primordial aspect of the individual's social position and problems. Another issue that is a source of value conflict for ethnic social workers and NES migrants, is that welfare concepts and practices, despite their primordial reinterpretation, operate through a middle class Anglo-Australian cultural perception.

Mackie in her study of Turkish and Lebanese families in Melbourne, raises the issue of state intervention and
its possible consequences on migrants groups characterised by strong personal and informal networks of organization:

"In such a cross-cultural situation, principles upon which welfare policy, organization and delivery are based can be (without necessarily having that intention) diametrically opposed to principles upon which the culture of the recipients is based. If this is not understood, resistance towards welfare...can be misinterpreted simplistically as a single motive of the preservation of culture, with a resistance to change". [Mackie op.cit: 12].

The respondent from LWC echoed some of Mackie's remarks in her following statement:

"Try to look at the attitude of the community towards welfare. No welfare system exists in Lebanon, so the concept of welfare and welfare structure in Australia is quite new to the Community...Community involvement and meetings...I don't think the (Lebanese) Community understands exactly the role of the welfare or social worker is".

In the statement the respondent queried the appropriateness and relevancy of the community work concept imposed by the state on the Lebanese community. The concepts of community work and community development are state strategies designed for the achievement of social control, whereby the state imposes as real the imaginary, participatory and cohesive concept of community. The DIEA and YACS are two government departments, that have persistently pursued this policy in their allocation of funds.

For the Lebanese the community concept has a strong localistic/geographical importance. The majority of Lebanese welfare organizations are found in areas where there is a high concentration of Lebanese population, in
the South-western suburbs of Sydney, in Lakemba, Belmore, Punchbowl, Bankstown, Merrylands, where most of the new arrivals are concentrated. The names of most Lebanese welfare agencies refer to the particular area they serve, or origin from Lebanon, thus reinforcing the community concept both in primordial and geographical meanings.

In the case of the GOC its specific location has been an additional contributing factor in its decline. Until the late 60s the majority of Greeks lived in the inner suburbs of Sydney, and the GOC's location in Paddington was accessible. However, after that period the Greek population dispersed in other suburbs, making the GOC less visible and less relevant to the people's needs. Only in the last three years has the GOC started a decentralisation drive towards the Canterbury/Bankstown area, where incidentally the Archdiocese's presence is not very strong.

8a.4: Identification of needs

The large number of Lebanese secular welfare institutions has resulted in wastage of resources and skills, and the creation of small power centres. More importantly, this large number of welfare agencies contributed to a fragmented perception of the welfare needs of the Lebanese working class and of other marginal groups, and this was reflected in the respondents' statements.

All Lebanese respondents shared a common pattern of thinking, in the sense that they emphasised and prioritised as important social needs those needs of their
institutions' clientele and membership, and invariably they presented these needs in generalist terms, as being 'Lebanese'.

For instance, the respondent from AWLA identified as one of the most important needs of the Lebanese the provision of culturally relevant services to the aged:

"There's a great problem with the Aged...We have completed a study on the Lebanese Aged. We have established an Aged (persons) group...providing English classes, establishing a centre for the Aged...The main problems are accommodation, isolation, language problems...".

The welfare provision to ethnic aged persons is very underdeveloped, with generalist services, like the Senior Citizens Centres, being either irrelevant to the needs of ethnic aged, or inaccessible ['Ethnic Aged', Migration Action, Vol v No.1, 1981: 20-24]. Thus much of the responsibility of caring the ethnic aged falls on the family, mostly on women, or on the limited resources of the community. For the above statement to be fully understood in its reference to the Lebanese aged, it has to be looked on from the perspective of the AWLA.

Most of the membership of the AWLA, and a sizeable percentage of its clientele are old Lebanese settlers, and mostly Christian. So although the Association's services for the aged may well be designed to be generalist in character, the religious aspect of it and the length of settlement of some Lebanese aged, are important variables in determining the relevancy and the priority of this particular service to the general needs of aged Lebanese.
Most of the Lebanese respondents regarded unemployment as one of the most serious social problems facing Lebanese at present. The respondents perceived unemployment in terms of lack of employment opportunities, and most significantly, in terms of its impact on the family and the community at large.

To the respondent from Tripoli El-Mina Association, which has a predominantly Muslim clientele, unemployment was a very important issue:

"The government doesn't know how to solve the problem in the community, in the country, how do you expect people to do anything about it?...How about grown up men with families, where are they to go?...They lack the language, they know little of what is required...For example, if you want to be a process worker you have to have 5 years experience. Where are you going to get that experience if they don't give you the chance?".

The respondent saw unemployment as a general social problem for which there is no immediate solution. In relation to the Lebanese the respondent regarded linguistic ability in English, as one of the reasons for the high unemployment levels experienced by the Lebanese, and the lack of work experience.

Lack of English is an additional hurdle for the employment prospects of recent Lebanese arrivals. This is more pronounced for the unskilled Lebanese workers, who are trying to secure employment in a declining manufacturing sector. And for the skilled Lebanese workers linguistic difficulties, and lack of recognition of their overseas qualifications, make their employment possibilities not very promising. As the respondent from Tripoli El-Mina
"They're required to do tests and they don't know the language. For example, a tradesman, a carpenter, works as a cleaner, a professional will work as a bus driver, solicitors working in factories...".

Economic necessity is forcing skilled Lebanese migrants to undertake unskilled, or other irrelevant to their qualifications occupations in order to live. Similar examples and comments were made by other Lebanese respondents.

Humphrey in a paper he delivered in 1985 at a seminar on the Arabic community in Sydney and titled 'Racism and Unemployment among Lebanese Immigrants', summarised well the increasing marginalisation position of Lebanese, and its consequences:

"...the struggle between capital and organised labour in the present economic climate results in the increasing marginalisation of workers in the secondary sector jobs. The response of these workers is increased dependence on the welfare system, the informal economy and family and community networks". [The Arabic Community: Realities and Challenges].

The issue though that dominated the comments of all Lebanese respondents was the changing nature of the Lebanese family, and the protection of its values was identified as the most important need for Lebanese. Humphrey points out the central role of the migrant family unit in the settlement process:

"The family as the basic cultural and organizational unit surviving in migration mediates the process of incorporation of individuals into the Australian system of class relations". [In Bottomley 1984 op.cit: 184]
The high priority given to family life and values by the respondents stemmed from a variety of reasons. Firstly, for the Lebanese primary relationships, like family ties and loyalty, religion and regional identities, are stronger than institutional relations, i.e. the ones related to the state. For example, Lebanese political parties have been founded by large families, which have provided the successors to the leadership of these parties, and thus have acted as source of loyalty.

Secondly, the village and regional associations were initially founded on the basis of strong familial ties, and to act as support groups to families. The secular organizations of the sample have retained this particular interest on the welfare of the family.

Thirdly, there is a general community concern expressed by the social workers of the sample, about the impact of unemployment and migration on the Lebanese family.

The respondent from LWC described the situation many Lebanese unemployed and their families find themselves in:

"The family unit is actually in a very threatening position. It's not as quite as stable as previously, because there's a lot of conflict (due to) migration, economic hardship, a lot of marital discord, and also generational alienation. And all that because of the high level of unemployment in the Lebanese Community...and the consequences of high unemployment are quite drastic".

The respondent from Tripoli El-Mina expressed similar views:

"Imagine a person who used to go to work
everyday, and come back at night and find his wife and his family waiting for him. They enjoyed life. And suddenly he's unemployed, he's staying 24 hours a day at home. He's staying at home with his kids, with his wife, problems are created and tension, and wife and husband start abusing each other about the present situation in the family... And this is where the problem starts, that they can't provide the family with the necessities of life. On the other hand she has the expectations from the husband..."

What the two statements do point out is the human and social cost of unemployment on those affected by it, as economic hardship and cultural alienation combine together, in creating complex social and psychological conflicts that affect every aspect of a person's life.

The last statement gives an image of a family discontent as viewed, largely, from the husband's perspective. That is, unemployment causes the loss of the traditional role of the Lebanese man as the breadwinner and the head of family, and the consequent erosion of his authority and happiness affect all family members.

It was this last issue that underlined the most significant concern of the respondents, namely the changing nature of the sexes' relations in the family, the perceived change in the sexual division of labour. The respondents saw the family as the primary unit of socialisation, and therefore the primary carrier and transmitter of sex roles and relations as defined by primordial values. The respondents focused their concern on the changing role of women in the family, and how this change affects the relations between the sexes and the nature of family.

Before discussing the respondents' views on the
subject of family, a general description of the Lebanese family is needed. Although the Greek respondents did not address the subject of Greek families, a bibliographical comparison between the family types and values of the two groups is necessary to ascertain any similarities or dissimilarities.

For both Greeks and Lebanese there is very little data available on their family structure and family relations in Australia. Socio-economic and cultural differences within each group would indicate different levels of structuration, thus making the acceptance of traditional family model not very reliable. For instance, middle class Greek and Lebanese families would tend to have family and life values closer to the Australian model of middle class families, than with the Greek and Lebanese working class families.

One of the few sources that can provide some idea of the Greek and Lebanese family structure in Australia, be that may be limited, is statistical. In 1981 the ABS statistics showed that both Greek and Lebanese had identical percentages of male headed family type of 'head spouse and dependents', or nuclear family, at 56%, 20% higher than that of the general population table [17].

If the statistical family type 'head, spouse, other adults and dependents' means the extended family, then 15% of Greek male headed families and 18.5% of Lebanese belong to this family type. When these figures are compared to the national figure of 9.3% are high, but not that high as to
make the extended family type structure, as it usually suggested for Mediterranean migrants, the dominant one. Of course what the statistics can not show, is the level of outside support to families, which is unknown, but usually includes child care, household duties, and other forms of self-help.

Table 17: Families by Family Type by Birthplace and Sex of Head 1981. (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family type</th>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M A L E S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head with dependents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head &amp; spouse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head spouse &amp; depen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head &amp; oth. adults</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head oth adults &amp; dep.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head spouse &amp; oth ad.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head spouse other adults</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dependents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<th></th>
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<th>F E M A L E S</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head only</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head with dependents</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head &amp; spouse</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head spouse &amp; depen.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head &amp; oth. adults</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head oth adults &amp; dep.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head spouse &amp; oth ad.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head spouse other adults</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dependents</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MALE</td>
<td></td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FEMALE</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source ABS 1981.

Most perceptions about the 'Lebanese family' are based on its traditional form found in Lebanon, where is supposed
to be a patriarchal endogamous structure, with wide and complex kinship ties [In Storer ed. 1985: 180-83]. It is an extended type of family unit, one household which acts as an economic, social and welfare structure. However, religious factors among the Lebanese give rise to different familial forms and relations, as in the case of Muslim families where traditional collective and social values are encouraged, the sexual division is maintained, while men are the heads of the family and responsible for the moral and social position of women [Humphrey in Bottomley op.cit: 185].

Generally the extended family unit in the absence of extensive Lebanese state welfare structures has been the major welfare provider. The family is supposed to look after the children, the sick and the old, and provide financial assistance to its members.

Whether this family structure is or was the norm in Lebanon it can not be said definitely. The protracted civil war, increased urbanization, migration and religious factors, may all have affected changes in family structures and the roles of the sexes in the family.

In relation to Australia it is even harder to ascertain with confidence the structure of Lebanese working class family. Humphrey notes in his study of the Lebanese that due to migration they have established more nuclear households, they are more composite, while Muslims tend to have larger nuclear households, 6.2% as compared to 5% for Christians [Humphrey 1984:38-9]. Nevertheless, whenever the
Lebanese respondents discussed changes in the family, their assumptions were based on the traditional view of the Lebanese family.

Although Greeks have been longer in Australia, research on Greek working class families is not much better than that for the Lebanese, a point noted also by Susan Hearst in a study of her own on Greek families [In Storer op.cit: 121-142]. It is difficult, therefore, to reach definite conclusions as to the structure and sex relations of the Greek working class families in Australia.

Most of the literature on the subject of Greek families is based on anthropological studies of small Greek rural communities, and it is doubtful whether they apply to the Australian social milieu. In its typical form, the husband of the nuclear Greek family is supposed to be the breadwinner and the disciplinarian, while the wife has a more subordinate role, concentrated on her home duties and the welfare of the family members [loc.cit].

The usually low wages paid to working class men in Australia, forced an increasing number of Greek women in the workforce to supplement the family income. Martin and Cox observed about the Greek working wives:

"There is no basic cultural objection to (Greek) women working, but there are problems when they come to Australia and the women start to work...As their husbands are often unskilled, the women often earn as much as the men, and this threatens the husband's predominance in the household". [Martin and Cox 1982: 44]

The traditional sexual division of labour of the Lebanese families is being challenged under the
contradictions generated by migration, socio-economic hardship, and the different value system found in Australia. These contradictions between the 'old' and 'new' way, leads to conflicting expectations between the spouses. The respondent from LWC described some of the changes in the role of Lebanese women:

"There's a change of the role of women here. Their role in Australia has taken a more varied role...She has house duties, because of economic necessity works, and she's exposed to quite a different environment. Migrant women here take both the man's and the woman's role. She's working and she's expected to do her house duties. There is an awareness of rights...With family problems, gambling, drugs, and alcohol also affecting the family unit".

This statement includes the basic predicament of migrant working class women. Their work exposes them to new processes and ideas, thus creating a new awareness and identity of themselves, but they are still expected to fulfill their traditional roles, as the emotional providers, especially if the family is facing the kind of problems mentioned in the last paragraph of the statement.

This emotional and supportive role of Lebanese women towards their family and husbands was seen by the respondent from AWLA as weakening. He perceived Lebanese women as being no longer strong to fulfill their traditional roles as wives and mothers, and although this change is viewed as threatening to the husband, a compromise is regarded as the best possible way to reconcile and cope with the new demands and roles of the two sexes:
"Women aren't strong anymore... 'No you can't talk to me in this way anymore, you can't insult me anymore. We're equal in this country'. She's threaten him... Unless there's some understanding...".

The same respondent blamed also the lack of English by many Lebanese men, as primarily responsible for the loss of their social esteem and authority in the family and the community:

"The father who used to be a respectable member of his community in the village or town, and now he's in a place where he doesn't even speak the language, can't communicate properly. He's got to rely on friends, relatives, children and social workers. This is a demoralising thing... They think they have a problem, a deficiency of some kind. That will generate a lot of stress, and has to explode in a way".

Command of the English language is an additional problem that undermines an individual's social esteem, the ability to externalise his/her thoughts, and communicate with new environment. Absence of competent linguistic ability impedes an individual's social integration and development of his/her personal identity.

To a large extent, however, the respondent's statement implied a pathological approach to the linguistic problem faced by many Lebanese people. That is to say, if that particular problem can be overcome, then most other problems will be overcome too. And although command of the English language may provide a medium of communication, such a diagnosis does not address the structural changes and problems - familial, socio-economic and cultural - that can override language incompetence, and may well enhance it.
Length of residence, socio-economic position, cultural and religious factors, can all combine to place limitations on the position of Lebanese women. The respondent from LWC gave an example on this issue:

"Then you have women who have worked, interacted in the community, they have a lot of problems realising their position. What happens, they're restricted by their husbands in terms if they want to follow up education. They've found out that their children have grown up, and they want to develop their personalities, and their husbands are the barriers".

The respondent is the only female respondent of the Lebanese secular ethno-specific sample, and her sensitivity and concern about Lebanese women's position is more evident than that of the other male respondents. In her statement the respondent referred mostly to problems encountered by Lebanese women who have been settled in Australia for a long time, and are usually of petit-bourgeois Christian background.

The respondent from Tripoli El-Mina gave a different perspective of the problems encountered by Muslim women in search of employment:

"For Muslims there're different problems... Harassment at work, sexual abuse at work...Husbands worry about their wives, they don't go to factories to work, especially with males, because they hear a lot. You can't blame them...They (the men) live in similar situations...The males are not working, how about the women...".

The respondent's statement highlighted the generally degrading work practices encountered by migrant women in the manufacturing sector. For the Lebanese Muslim husbands their concern over such practices, however justified, is
probably used as an additional excuse not to allow their wives to work. In this way the possibilities of improving their family's standard of living is further reduced.

This attitude of Lebanese Muslim husbands towards the employment of their wives may also stem out of the idea that large families form an important element of their identity in Australia, and this idea controls the development of alternative attitudes among Muslim women. As Humphrey remarks:

"Large families place demands on women to remain in the home, reinforce the traditional sexual division of labour and help promote a sense of family identity and belonging".[Humphrey 1984 op.cit:46].

It is interesting also to note on table [17] that 10,9% of Lebanese women and 10,6% of Greek were heads - breadwinners- of nuclear families as compared to 4,6% of the total population. It could be argued that one of the main reasons for the high percentage of female heads of nuclear families, is the high rate of unemployment among their husbands.

The lack and accessibility to child care services is another factor that affects the employment opportunities of Lebanese working class women, as well as most working class migrant women. Government agencies have long assumed that the extended family is prevalent among NES migrants, and therefore there is not much need for such services. An additional problem for migrant working class families is their limited financial ability, and sometimes the cultural relevancy of existing child care services.
These factors put more pressure on the family unit, as they restrict its ability to earn extra income, and also restricts women who wish, or have to work. The respondent from LWC explained the dilemma faced by Lebanese families:

"Employment and child care are interrelated. The lack of child care support and affordable child care... A working woman, if she finds child care, has to pay $180 p/w... Because of their economic situation they need to work, but because of their skills, the language - those two aspects - that's the problem... If you look at the services for women, as a whole, are limited... They're not culturally relevant".

Humphrey in his study of the Lebanese families in Sydney raised the issue of child care provision among Muslim Lebanese women [ibid: 90]. In his study sample he noted that there were some notable differences between the two Muslim sects, the Sunni and the Shiites, in the provision of child care.

Child care arrangements by both groups were almost exclusively made through family and friends, rather than institutions. The Shiites had a larger level of settlement concentration, in Rockdale, and thus they were able to utilise community networks more than the Sunni [ibid.:89]. As a result of that, Sunni women had lower employment participation rates (14%) than Shiites (21%), which was also correlated to family unit size, 6.2 to 5.9 respectively.

The final subject of concern about Lebanese women by the respondents was related to separation or divorce. In either case Lebanese women find themselves under enormous social and community pressure to reconcile with
their husbands. If these women stay separated or divorced from their husbands, they then face an alien socio-cultural environment, with usually no appropriate skills to cope with, and usually with many children to care for.

According to the respondent from LWC some of the problems facing single Lebanese mothers are:

"A lot of women I see are on supporting parents benefit, and don't have any other support...They have added responsibility... They've come from complete dependence to nothing at all. They've got to be self-dependent, self-reliant, and that's quite hard, it's left isolated. There're women who haven't worked at all, and were completely dependent on their husbands".

The respondent's statement is supported by the figures on single parent families on table [18]. Greek and Lebanese women in 1981 had a larger proportion of single parent families than the total population, and given their limited occupational and educational skills they were more likely experiencing very difficult living conditions.

The percentage of separation and divorce among Greek and Lebanese persons was lower than that of the total Australian population, table [18]. However, between 1981 and 1986 the rate of divorce of Lebanese and Greek women was double of that of the national total, while Lebanese women had similar separation percentages as the rest of the country. These increases in the divorce/separation rates of Greek and Lebanese women between 1981-1986 were bound to deteriorate their individual position and that of their families.
Table 18: Total Persons by Marital Status (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Aus.</th>
<th>Gr.</th>
<th>Leb.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
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<td>54.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now Married</td>
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<td>63.4</td>
<td>60.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>83.6</td>
<td>63.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Separated not</td>
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<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>26.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Separated Not</td>
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<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<td>Widowed</td>
<td>1966</td>
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In relation to Lebanese incidents of separation and divorce, there is some resentment among Lebanese in the legal intervention of the state in matters of family law. Humphrey in his article "Religion, Law and family disputes in a Lebanese Muslim Community in Sydney", examined the conflicting ideologies of traditional Islamic law as practiced by Lebanese Muslims, and Australian Family Law, and their effects on those Lebanese persons involved [Humphrey in Bottomley op.cit: 183-197]. These conflicting ideologies come to a head in cases of marital breakdowns:

"Islamic law forms a central ideology in the recreation and perpetuation of family relations in migration. It espouses a traditional moral view...Australian family law puts aside questions of moral blame in favour...of ensuring satisfactory social and economic security for individuals after the divorce". [p: 196].

The role of state personal state services, and some forms of legislation, are designed to allow the state to intervene in working class families in order to maintain the family structure by re-socialising family members to values that contribute to the process of proletarianization and support dominant ideologies. As Gough remarks about the role of the welfare state in relation to the family:

"The welfare state denotes state intervention in the process of reproducing labour power and maintaining the non-working population. It represents a new relationship between the state and the family in this process. The dynamic of capital accumulation continuously alters both the requirements of capital, particularly with regard to the first, and the capacity of the family to meet these requirements". [op.cit: 49].

The Lebanese respondents of the sample described their role as educating their community into the new values of
Australian society, institutions, and the welfare system. All of them did not question their role as they took it for granted. However, as Humphrey's study on the conflict between the practice of Islamic Law and Australian family law indicated, Lebanese working class people do not appear to favour state intervention in their familial relations.

The greatest resistance to this intervention appears to emanate from the Lebanese men who perceive the preservation of the primordial values of their families, as the last bastion of resistance to external cultural and social pressures. These pressures are personal, obvious and direct in the way they affect their roles as men in the family and society. The intervention of social work in Lebanese families, therefore, would be opposed more by men, because it is seen as an attempt to re-arrange the relations between spouses and children, which invariably weakens the position of men in the family.

Resentment against the intervention of social workers in the Lebanese family may develop if it challenges traditional ideologies that do not encourage or enhance the availability of family members for wage labourers. For instance, values that encourage women to work. This perpetuation of oppressive ideologies and practices to women, could be also seen as a response to the economic and personal insecurity individuals experience outside their household.

On the other hand, the traditional sexual division of labour in Lebanese families could be actually reinforced
more by the social work practices of conservative secular ethno-specific institutions, particularly as some of the male respondents' belief in the patriarchal values of the Lebanese family implied.

Morgan argued about the impact of patriarchalism on women, children and society at large:

"Patriarchalism, then, involves two dominances, that of men over women and parents (particularly fathers) over children. These patterns of dominance are learned in the family, projected in the wider society, encountered in the wider society and reflected back from that society on the family". [Morgan 1975: 211].

Overall, in the case of both Greek and Lebanese working class families the traditional division of labour, the relations between parents and children, and the nature of the family unit itself, appear to be in a continuous flux. It is difficult to point out which changes in these families are positive or not, though changes that have a positive effect on the subordinate status of women should be encouraged.

What makes personal and social change for working class Greeks and Lebanese more difficult, and even resentful, are the circumstances under which these changes are happening. For the Lebanese in particular, who in their majority have recently settled in Australia, high unemployment levels, economic recession, cultural and racial intolerance and discrimination, make their integration very problematic and difficult. Any form of personal or social change under these conditions is bound to strip away from individuals a great deal of their human
and social dignity.

The respondents from the GOC and the LCC did not go to any detail over specific welfare needs of their respective community members. This was so as both of them were not social workers, and their organizations have a broad community role, that a specialised welfare.

The GOC respondent's following statement summarised the organizations' view of the Greek individual and community:

"The primary approach of the Council, the (social) worker and myself is not much of an individual problem, but structural...Capitalist society is in decline, going into recession. We're looking at the individual at the bottom of the heap..."

The respondent identified as the major source of inequality for the individual the capitalist system itself, and realised the powerlessness of his organization to change these inequalities.

The respondent from the LCC saw the needs and problems of the Lebanese as more dependent on administrative and bureaucratic policies:

"Generally (the Lebanese) are a young community, the impact of migration is being very high...The community was not able to contain all these people...After arrival services weren't followed up...That's why the present problems. They had to organise themselves anyway they could...What they lacked was official backing. They had to do it themselves".

The social worker from the ALA made few written statements which, nevertheless, indicated clearly the conservative attitude of the organization towards welfare:

"There's too much expense in welfare...Some
workers create more problems in order to perpetuate the system...I believe in self-help rather than perpetuating the system".

And he also added the following:

"The increased availability of welfare services created more problems...In the 60s they (the Lebanese) were better citizens. Now they rely a lot on government help... They've lost the initiative...(state welfare) is getting out of control...waste of money. Self-help, self reliance and work by volunteers is needed".

It is quite obvious that the respondent expressed the ALA's ideology, that of a Maronite middle class, business oriented ideology. In the respondent's statement there was a continuous repeat for self-help practices, while state welfare provision was seen a been manipulated by both social workers and recipients alike, which in turn has contributed to the loss of individual initiative in the new arrivals.

8a.5: Multiculturalism and Mainstreaming

The majority of the respondents approached the question of multiculturalism more in terms of its wider social implications, than in terms of specific state social policies. All respondents supported multiculturalism as an ideal way of social organization, though they had many reservations about its actual practice.

Most Lebanese respondents expressed strong feelings towards the discrimination and racism encountered by Lebanese, and generally the Arabic speaking people in Australia, which affects every aspect of their life. Some respondents had some reservations whether Lebanese
themselves understand the concept of multiculturalism. As the respondent from LWC commented:

"At the moment the whole community isn't ready. (Multiculturalism) is a new thing, and I don't think they have a clear understanding...I mean you're talking about diversity. It's a theory at the moment, it's not a practice as yet".

This lack of understanding of multiculturalism by Lebanese, stems partly from their strong familial, regional, and religious identities, which do not make the acceptance of non-primary concepts and relations easy to accept. Nevertheless, there are other important intervening factors that pose barriers, making multiculturalism an illusory way of life, rather than real. Humphrey explains the most important factor:

"During periods of economic recession when competition for jobs gets worse so discrimination and racism often become more explicit. Ethnic group or national origin becomes the focus for stereotyping and cultural and personal attributes are put forward to explain poverty and disadvantage...Presently, throughout Western industrial countries, poor and disadvantaged immigrant minorities are blamed for causing unemployment among native workers and have become the focus of discrimination... in Australia (are) the Lebanese, Indo-Chinese and Aboriginal population. [Humphrey 1984 op.cit.: 3].

The LWC's respondent echoed in her statement Humphrey's comments:

"Racism is a feeling throughout all of them, whether is women, employment, education, youth, teachers. A lot of racism. Of course we're the most recently arrived community, and I think every new community goes through that. But we've be going through that for a long time...Compensation frauds, events in Lebanon as presented by the media, affect the people, especially Muslims. A distorted image for the Arabic community, and the Muslim community as
And the respondent from Tripoli El-Mina expressed similar views on multiculturalism as the LWC respondent:

"Frankly speaking (multiculturalism) is a theory. In practice it's not there. There's no trust in the government to apply it in the community. It's a folkloric approach, dancing, dresses... This isn't it. Multiculturalism is understanding each other, let's put something new in the community, and accept it by other people in the community. It's the understanding of the needs of different community groups. Let them get to know each other more, understand them more, accept their contributions as fortunate for the country".

The stigmatisation of certain groups on the basis of their race or ethnicity, raises many questions about the real achievements and impact of multiculturalism on Australian social relations. In a capitalist society, an ideology and state social policy that interprets socio-economic, political and cultural inequalities in terms of ethnicity or race, is bound to create distorted perceptions for those groups of people identified in such terms. Multiculturalism further undermines working class solidarity, and inadvertently strengthens racial or ethnic stereotyping.

Contrary to the other Lebanese respondents, the one from the LCC was more supportive of multiculturalism:

"It responds to the basic human right of a person being himself. I think (multiculturalism) is the only way to mold the Australian society as a whole unity in diversity. (It's) a powerful formula in any aspect of social life".

The Greek respondent from the GOC also stressed the difference between the theory and practice of
multiculturalism, mainly drawn from the experience of his institution with state welfare funding:

"I see multiculturalism as a positive thing... It's progressive because it allows diversity... However, there's a difference in ideology and practice to a certain extent. The ideological theme should be justice, access... While in practice of course this isn't the case".

The reaction of the respondents to the question of mainstreaming was similar to that of multiculturalism, that is, positive in theory, uncertain about its implementation. The respondent from AWLA thought of the success of mainstreaming as more dependent on its successful implementation in the linguistic terms:

"I don't mind it. But they (the government) have to provide interpreters, bilingual workers... The policies are good, but the population has to support it... If you solve the language problem, you can direct everything back to the mainstream".

While the respondent from LWC added:

"It should go hand in hand with ethno-specific services. They're not in touch with the grassroots level. In the long run you have to send them back to mainstreaming. You need interpreters, bilingual officers... Mainstreaming can't fulfill the role of advocacy and independent assistance and advice... (the governments) are tokenistic at the moment".

This respondent too saw the need for mainstream services to be linguistically accessible to migrants, and the need for ethno-specific institutions to continue to function, and perform a social work role which can not be done by mainstream services. This last point also implies the need for state funding to continue for ethno-specific organizations, which is almost imperative for their
existence. All Lebanese respondents saw the welfare state as the only one capable of responding to the needs aspirations of the Lebanese.

8a.5: Conclusion

The proliferation of Lebanese welfare secular institutions was not only due to the particular 'ethnic' characteristics of the Lebanese. More importantly these institutional formations were also products of state welfare funding, which helped the growth of these institutions.

The high number of Lebanese welfare organizations, and the establishment of the LCC, were clear indications that multiculturalism's intervention was shaping the development of ethnic institutional structures of new migrant groups more than the 'old' ones, thus making the dependence of the former almost complete on state resources.

The implications of the above observation could be seen when the GOC and the Lebanese welfare institutions were compared. The welfare role of both Greek and Lebanese organizations did not extent beyond the limits of information provision, advocacy, casework and some community development. However, the GOC, despite its rather limited political influence in the community, as a larger community structure with progressive social values had the potential to affect some form of change within the Greek community.

As far as the Lebanese institutions of the sample were
concerned though small individually, in their totality had a high visibility in the Lebanese community. The specific welfare function of the these institutions, their petit-bourgeois outlook, their complete financial dependence on the state, their conservative social values as in the case of women and their willingness to perpetuate their cultural separateness, meant that they would continue to perform a social control role.
As it has already been stated the study's primary concern with the subject of religion was not to deal with the intrinsic values of each religion of the sample. Rather religion was treated as an ideology. The efficacy of an ideology does not lie in its intrinsic value or truth, but in its ability to mobilise social forces to seek and establish power and social control within their social milieu, as well as to act as social 'cement' [Thompson op.cit: 30-65]. The social control aspect of religion is manifested in its metaphysical interpretation of social experience based on the primacy of the moral and spiritual condition of Man for the sake of peace and order.

In Chapter 7 on the Assimilation period some important points emerged as to the role of religion as an ideology and a form of social organization.

Firstly, religion's universalistic perception of human and social relations means that it will tend to dominate every aspect of social organization, exercising social unity and control towards the achievement of this goal. This practice is realised through the concept of community, the unification of believers in a single moral community, in the Church, where the sacred assumes dominance over the empirical.

Thus in this kind of community the form of social organization and relations can only be realised through
their subordination to the spiritual and moral values of religion. Where religious and national communities are identified as mutually reinforcing, as in the case of Greeks, then the Church assumes the role of the sole guardian of ethnic identity.

Secondly, the original religious charismatic community becomes institutionalised as formal religious structures develop. This occurs as religion in its quest to dominate the social and spiritual world accepts, supports and allies itself with the ruling class and its institutions. However, religion can also be used by a subordinate class as an ideological and organizational instrument, through which that class can promote its interests, become the hegemonic class of a new alliance that will contest the dominance of the ruling class in all its forms.

This last example of the religion's role was demonstrated in the split of the Greek community. Both the Archdiocese and the GOC tried to use Orthodoxy as a means of promoting the socio-political interests of the conservative and progressive alliances respectively. Furthermore, the establishment of an independent Archdiocese from the GOC represented a new institutional structure of the Greek Orthodox Church. To this extent, the establishment by the Archdiocese of parishes-communities was designed to preserve an image of informal communal relations, and thus maintain a firmer ideological control over the working class population of these parishes.

The Maronite priest gave a good example of the
establishment of an institutionalised religious community and the subsequent changes of relations between the church and social classes. According to the respondent it was not until after the II Vatican Council in the 1960s, when the Vatican agreed for the Maronite Catholic Church to be able to establish their own Dioceses in immigration countries. The first Maronite Diocese in Australia was established in Sydney in 1973 and its first, and still current, Bishop was the Archbishop Abdul Khalife.

The following statement by the Maronite priest is important to understand religion's concept of community as viewed by the church itself:

"The timing coincided with Rome appointing an Archbishop for the Maronites, which meant that the nature of the community was going to change, its structure was going to change. There was going to be a visible head of the community, transforming it from a community to a Diocese, which meant that everything that goes with a Catholic Diocese, hierarchy, organization, structure...And these short of things meant that people who might have enjoyed a certain type of power, because they were somehow seen as people of influence in their own particular areas of activity, now had to realise that they may have to share that with, or relinquish that to a parish priest. To that fact the bare association is no longer the only, or say the most powerful association, but there's really that something that overrides that. And that's it the Diocese. There was a compromise between the secular and the religious. (Before) there was only secular organization. Once the Archbishop arrived, it was his duty to bring with him and to establish order and organization. And we're still in that phase of transformation, though the most difficult part has passed".

And he added to that statement:

"We're a religious community, not a secular society. We're a religious society. By that I mean that our religion and values, and
structures, which are given by our particular religion, overflows and strongly affects the quality of our social life structure".

Both statements are quite explicit and clear, but some important comments need to be made in relation to both statements. The creation of the Maronite Diocese, as in the case of the Greek Archdiocese, represented the establishment of a religious headed institutionalised community, which was seen as necessary for order and organization within the community, and with the Archbishop as the visible and undisputed leader of it.

This necessity arose from the need to replace, in the words of the respondent, the 'bare association', the real socio-economic and political relations, with a religious one, to instill on this 'association' the moral authority and legitimacy of the Church.

This process entailed a compromise between the secular and the religious. On the one hand the Diocese had to gain, or demand support from the Maronite bourgeoisie, and even rest some power from it in order to strengthen its own establishment. On the other hand the Maronite bourgeoisie, or at least the section of it that accepted this new role of the Diocese, was instilled with a moral and spiritual - institutionalised now - interpretation of its dominance and superiority.

The creation of the Maronite Diocese, and the whole religious organization of the Lebanese, has to be placed within the wider context of the socio-political conflict among Lebanese, particularly as it is expressed between
Maronites and Muslims.

The failure of the Australian Lebanese Association to achieve any religious, or even a tangible class alliance with the post-war petit-bourgeoisie Lebanese migrants, resulted in the complete rejection of the organization by the new arrivals and lost its legitimacy. At the same time the Maronite bourgeoisie, due to their economic and political power, could exert control over community resources through state institutions and political parties.

The establishment of the Maronite Diocese, therefore, can be seen as a reaction to both internal and external political factors. Except the obstacle from the Vatican for the establishment of ethnic Catholic Dioceses, the two other major factors that contributed to the establishment of the Maronite Diocese were:

a. The rediscovery of ethnicity by a section of the Maronite bourgeoisie for whom the Diocese became the leading new structure to represent their newly found ethnic identity. Multiculturalism encouraged this process. Thus the Diocese expressed the universalistic character of religion, which provided the Maronite bourgeoisie with a better institutional form to achieve state acceptance and legitimation in the affairs of the Lebanese community.

b. Related to that was the ever increasing number of new Lebanese arrivals, especially of Muslims, whose socio-political experiences were in contrast and conflict with those of the established Lebanese settlers, and as a result
of that the political relations of the Lebanese became more fluid and fragmented. This meant that the Maronite bourgeoisie had to establish an institution that will have a wider moral and social appeal among the Lebanese, so to affect the new relations of the Lebanese community.

The Maronite respondent was quite explicit about how the Maronite Diocese perceived the Lebanese 'community':

"But when you talk about Lebanese of course, we don't talk about a Lebanese community, but of Lebanese Communities. [emphasis his]. If we talk about Lebanese, we can talk about either Christian or Muslim, or Druze. The Muslims are Shiites, Sunnis and Druze sect, or Christians about Catholic and Orthodox...".

Contrary to the Lebanese priest, the Greek priest from the Archdiocese saw the Greek community as united:

"The community isn't divided. The Greek Orthodox Community has fewer members, and has schools, which is stealing from other communities by infiltrating them. There's nothing to justify its existence. It's a schismatic, politicised organization, which uses the Orthodox title improperly". *

The next part of this section will examine religion's perception of social work practices and of social workers.

8b.1: Religion: Social workers and Social work
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The ability of the ethnic churches to provide for the welfare needs of their communities during the assimilation period very limited. The lack of state welfare provision to NES migrants, and the rural structure and mentality of many ethnic churches, meant that the priesthood could not cope with the social complexities of industrialised societies.

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The processes of migration and proletarianization of NES migrant workers, and the approaches required by the ethnic churches to address the problems generated by both processes, left the churches with no other choice but to try to adjust to the new circumstances. This adjustment is seen by Cox as fundamental:

"If the major function of the ethnic church is to serve the religious and social needs of its people, and if these needs change with the process of integration, then the ethnic church must also change or disappear". [Cox 1982: 9].

The provision of state funds under multicultural policy enabled the ethnic churches to introduce and develop new welfare structures, e.g. welfare centres. Cox argues that ethno-religious agencies have a greater potential for development, particularly in the early stages of settlement, than ethno-secular [Cox 1983 op.cit.: 13]. This is one of the reasons why ethno-religious agencies receive a high priority in the distribution of state welfare funds.

The primary reason though for the distribution of state welfare funds to ethno-religious institutions is political. The domination of the conservative forces in the Greek community of Sydney benefited the Archdiocese as it received the lion's share of government welfare funding. In 1985/86 the Archdiocese's Greek Welfare Centre was in receipt of a GIA block fund of $91,230, while the Greek Orthodox Community of NSW of a $29,480 GIA fund [ROMMPAS op.cit:475-476]. Also both institutions received a variety of other State grants.

In Victoria, where the community power is in the hands
of the progressive forces, the Australian Greek Welfare Society for the same period was in receipt of a block fund of $152,050, while the Archdiocese was understood to be receiving a lot less [ibid: 477-478].

The respondent from the Archdiocese saw the institution's first application for a GIA fund in 1975 as an attempt to counteract a similar move by the GOC:

"There was an attempt, also, that the provision of social welfare, the organization of welfare, will be politicised".*

In this statement the respondent attempted to project the Archdiocese as a non-political institution, as a guardian of Greeks against politicised forms of social organization. In reality the GOA saw in the provision of funds the further legitimation of itself, and of the Greek conservative forces by the state, the Australian ruling class and the Greek community.

The respondent from the Greek Welfare Centre (GWC) gave a another interpretation of the initial GIA fund to the Archdiocese and the GOC:

"This is a very easy question to answer, and it doesn't need any great deal of discussion. First of all, there was an application (for a GIA grant) and it was approved. The Holy Archdiocese is recognised as the (official) Church. It's quite clear that for political reasons (the government) gave both parties (a grant) so there wouldn't be any complaints...They couldn't do otherwise. And in my opinion it's a tragic mistake by the government that divides the community by giving (grants) here and there...".*

At least this respondent recognised the government's political motives in funding both organizations. However, the respondent's disapproval of GIA funding to the GOC
reflected the Archdiocese's desire to monopolise state resources and power in the community. For this reason the respondent did not regard the GOC as part of the Archdiocese's concept of Greek community.

Similar monopolistic attitudes of community control and of state resources was expressed by the respondent from the Muslim Welfare Centre (MWC). Actually he was more explicit on the subject of the centre's relationship to the state than the two previous Greek respondents. He saw the MWC as the only appropriate representative body for Muslims, as the only organization that can address and understand the needs of the Muslim Community:

"Because we're a welfare centre titled "Muslim Welfare Centre", then anything we do it will have to have the guidance of Islamic teaching. So we're sometimes a guide to government, in how to deal with the Muslim community, because we know the religion, the culture, and the people. And we see ourselves as the most appropriate people to be consulted with in matters affecting the Muslim community".

The Muslim respondent's statement reflected an identical ideological trend as that of two previous Greek respondents. That is to say, the existence of a Greek community under Archdiocesan leadership, and of a Muslim community under the leadership of the Mosque's Imam, were seen by both religions as necessary organizational forms to address the welfare needs of their communities.

The Maronite priest described his Diocese's involvement in community welfare in the same ideological framework as the Greek and Muslim respondents, though his use of language was more subtle:
"Part of the policy of the Archbishop is to be able to allow the Apostolate of the Church to enter into the organization of life, and the community development phase of the expansion and the forward movement of our communities. And for that reason his Grace has established, what we call, the Maronite Family and Social Apostolate... We're structuring ourselves to be able to come into that (like the GWC) within the next five years. We would probably have something very similar to that".

As far as the Antiochean Orthodox Church is concerned it does not have its own welfare centre, though it is a member and liaises with both the AWLA and LWC. As the Lebanese Orthodox priest, whose church is based at Redfern, explained:

"In the Eastern suburbs (Lebanese Orthodox) are more settled. They can look after themselves. My services are confined to counselling, marital problems, charitable activities. We don't have ongoing welfare. No. We contribute by being members of other organizations".

Thus one of the most important social control roles by ethno-religious institutions, as this was strongly expressed by the Greek, Muslim and Maronite respondents, is their desire to monopolise access to resources. This is done by presenting themselves as the only guardians of their religion and culture, which then allows them to define the nature and form of organization for both their communities' and the individual's needs.

The provision of state welfare funds to ethnic churches introduced them to new forms and concepts of welfare delivery. With the establishment of ethno-religious welfare centres came the employment of social/welfare workers. The employment of social workers for the welfare
activities of ethnic churches, reinterpreted and recreated new sets of relations between them and the individual, the church and the state.

The following statement made by the GOA priest provided the main explanation for the Archdiocese's decision to employ social workers:

When I was the general Manager at the Archdiocese's offices many people with nervous breakdowns were coming, prisoners...many...There wasn't any mechanism to solve these problems. Unfortunately, we have the other type social worker (according to whom) it's prohibited to advice Man of what is right and what's wrong. There's a new theory that says we shouldn't impose our cosmotheoretical [world] views and solutions, but to leave them in the wind...'Do you want marijuana? that's where you'll find it'. 'Do you want to have an abortion? That's where you should go'. And you don't say that: 'What you're doing will probably create psychological consequences, which may make your life difficult'. And that's why the Church established the GWC, so it could be in a position to offer in a scientific way, with all the comforts and the know-how of modern science, a correct direction".*

The Greek clergy's mentality and training was geared to the needs of a largely agrarian society whose mode and relations of production, and the ideological constructs required to interpret them, were quite different than those found in industrialised Australia. The clergy did not possess the skills, knowledge and resources to respond effectively to the new social needs encountered by the Greek working class. Thus the Archdiocese embraced social work and social workers as the new mediators between itself and the individual, the individual and the state.

Social work shares some fundamental conceptual
similarities with religion in relation to the individual's social position. Social work has a humanitarian approach to the social needs of the individual; it has a commitment to care for him/her, and realises the individual's potential for survival and growth. As Davies explains:

"The practice of social work can be seen as a form of pastoral care in a secular society. Like the medieval church, contemporary state welfare agencies have a variety of functions, -punitive, protective, compensatory, watchful- and like priests social workers are at their best when their attention is focused on the needs of individuals, or small communities, it then that they act to represent the interests of ordinary men and women to the state and vice versa". [Davies 1981: 210].

As the Greek priest explained in his last statement, the main concern of the Church, except its political considerations involving the allocation of funds, was the spiritual and moral position of the individual in the community and society at large. This concern for the individual forms the basis of all religions. Religion has a universalistic conception of Man, which implies the inseparable dichotomy between his position in the universe and his social position.

The priest from the Greek Archdiocese explained how the Church views the individual:

"It's difficult to separate philanthropy [benevolence] and the material support from the Church, because by nature the Church has always been on the side of Man...The Church sees Man as a whole, and takes care as much as it's possible, and for the soul of Man, to which of course it gives priority, and is committing a crime whoever also ignores the needs of Man within society".*

And the respondent from the Muslim Welfare Centre
expressed the same idea about Islam's perception of Man:

"Islam isn't a religion that only deals with the spiritual side of a human being. No. We consider Islam as to be a whole life system in itself."

In the context of the universality of Man religion then views the moral and spiritual condition of the individual's social position as the primary source of suffering [Ronald 1969: 46]. A priest or a believer, express their feelings towards a certain condition of the individual in the form of benevolence. Benevolence constitutes an emotional attitude of good will towards another man in a state of misfortune [Roberts 1973: 97].

However, there is a rational hierarchical order that determines to which person benevolence should be directed to. Benevolence is therefore based on subjective criteria, that is to say, the subject sees the object of his emotion, even if the diagnosis is wrong, as he/she believes it to be [Roberts ibid: 10].

In other words, a person in misfortune to whom benevolence is directed, becomes the deserving needy only if he/she acknowledges this act of benevolence. The reciprocity of benevolence reinforces the bond between the benefactor and the person in misfortune, and only then benevolence is realised. Such an act basically entails the spirit of self denial of material world, forgo one's rights for the sake of peace.

For instance, for religious institutions the deserving poor is the poor person who will accept benevolence as a means of making poverty less
satisfactory, rather than the one who does not accept poverty at all. Thus the concepts of benevolence and of the deserving needy form the basis of religion's social control role, because by making the deserving needy feel as members of the community these concepts contribute to the acceptance and preservation of the dominant values and structures of society.

The Church's benevolent ideology and its identification with charity has posed some problems for ethno-religious welfare agencies. As the respondent from GWC explained:

"At the beginning we had many misunderstandings with social welfare...They (the clients) thought of it as financial support for poor people. And one of the main aims of the Centre is to educate, to inform the Greek community that the Centre doesn't exist for that reason...but it can provide a service...We still have difficulties, but many people understand what the Centre offers".*

The introduction of the new forms of welfare provision by the Greek Orthodox Church represented a reinterpretation of its traditional welfare role. Although the GWC still relies for the finance of a significant part of its activities on fund raising from the community and the Archdiocese's churches, its primary role is to educate the community in the welfare and dominant societal values of Australian society, and not deliver charity.

The Maronite priest described his Diocese's involvement in the organization of welfare as also driven by its concern with the spiritual and moral condition of the individual and the community:
"... In this (the Maronite Family and Social Apostolate) we have a youth worker, a family planning ministry. We're looking for a professional Apostolic group for doctors, for solicitors, for engineers, people of this caliber, to be able to use their professional skills to the expansion of the work of the Church on the religious, on the social, the welfare level".

At the time of the interview the Maronite Diocese seemed to be more concerned with the provision of welfare services to the youth. As an overall welfare strategy the Diocese was seeking to win over a wide range of 'organic intellectuals' to spread its ideology and influence.

The Lebanese Orthodox priest's expressed concern was that the spiritual and moral well being of the individual is not taken into account by the social workers:

"Today this is one of the most serious things lacking in communication between clientele and the social worker... You'll find a lot of people are trying to solve the problem by the book, or by the way they were told, systematically. And people tend to resent this. While you're helping the person, he needs to feel that you're feeling with him. Feeling is lacking...".

What has emerged thus far from the respondents' statements and the discussion, is that both the Greek and Muslim religious institutions regarded the provision of state welfare funds as crucial for the continuation of their welfare services, and their domination over their respective communities. The Maronite Diocese did not see state funding as the main means to support its welfare services, because it relies more on self-help strategies, as its search for organic intellectuals will suggest. However, all three religious orders saw the organic
intellectuals as the new mediators and articulators of their ideology, and thus indispensable members of their secular activities.

The respondents' opinions on the role of the social workers and the form of welfare provision was not unanimous. This difference of opinion had rather little to do with the intrinsic values of each religion. It was related more to their disparate and opposing socio-political ideologies and interests they represent both inside their own communities, or with the state and the social order generally.

For instance, the Lebanese Orthodox priest did not see the Lebanese welfare religious institutions as the proper agencies for the provision of welfare to Lebanese people:

"The number of newcomers leans more towards Muslim composition. If they go to the Lebanese Muslim Association, or to any other Muslim organization where there's welfare (service), there're always restrictions because of the way these services are rendered, in line with their beliefs, and it's more or less a binding short of a service... They prefer to go to Australian or mainstream organizations, where they'll not ask them, 'what do you believe?', and all that... and they'll feel more at ease, and also because of their pride...Because if I go to this organization they know that I'm seeking help. So for them poverty is a stigma, and they don't want to be finger pointed".

In his statement the respondent is opposed to the delivery of welfare services by Lebanese institutions that often follow strict religious and cultural eligibility criteria, which identify clients as the deserving needy, thus denying them of their self-esteem. As far as the number of Lebanese Muslims is concerned in 1986 there were
The same respondent was equally critical of the welfare role of most of the village and regional associations:

"Some of them are doing their best... However, I think those which are more or less controlled by village and regional organizations, are using the welfare activities as a facade, a widow to justify their existence, or to boost their or as ways and means to get funds from the government".

The criticism and rejection of most of the Lebanese religious and regional organizations by the priest as appropriate welfare agencies, reflected his political view of a Lebanese community united on a secular basis. Such a form of social organization was perceived by the respondent to be based on the rights of individuals as citizens, on a Socio-Democratic concept, and not as members of sects. That is why the respondent promoted the idea of the LCC as the only hope for a Lebanese secular leading organization:

"The LCC isn't affected by religion or politics. That's the only organization which enjoys freedom from mainstream organizations...I left them also because of the charter...I'm a priest...but I thought if I'm still on the Council they'll use it against the Council, they'll say 'there's the clergy'. I think this (the LCC) is the only solution that the Lebanese community can come into some short of success in rendering service".

The Maronite respondent compared the role of the social worker in relation to the other Lebanese religious sects:

"If I could say this respectfully. and I hope I'm not misrepresenting anybody...and it seems
that the welfare officers now employed within the Muslim community, these are people who are making a very very important contribution... meeting the needs of the Muslim inquirer in respect of whatever their problem or need might be... The Maronites have not had that problem. Because they've always had their clergy, it's always been the responsibility, seems to be the of the to come for all these things, because of their background...The parish priest is the leader of the community..."

And further down he added to that statement:

"Where they (the Maronites) have had needs, they can, especially if they can speak English, go and see a Catholic priest as well, or Catholic Diocese agencies, which is an important thing to remember...But, by and large, if the Maronite, has been found, isn't able to go to one of the clergy, or to some other person within the community who's a solicitor or accountant for instance, very often they just sit and suffer".

The Maronite priest acknowledged the real need for social workers within the Muslim community, though the perceived limited welfare role of the Muslim clergy was seen as a disadvantage. However, the use of priesthood and various organic intellectuals for welfare purposes by the Maronite Diocese, appears to be the preferable method because it encourages self-help and other types of residual welfare practices.

The demand for welfare services depends on the socio-economic and cultural position of a class, or group of people and this was realised by the Maronite respondent, when he compared the Maronite with the more recent Lebanese arrivals:

"The Maronites have, because of their resourcefulness and their success in the business world, I suppose, had had some degree of immunity from the acute needs for counseling, referral etc...".
However, the respondent's statement was expressed in such a way that implied the superiority of the Maronite bourgeoisie in economic activities as an explanation for the absence of welfare need for the Maronites. This idea of social, political and economic success of the Maronite bourgeoisie interwoven with the Maronite religion, constitutes the ideological cornerstone of Maronitism.

Maronitism is an ideology that perceives the class position of the Maronite bourgeoisie, and the creation of bourgeoisie itself, as based on innate characteristics. Thus these innate and superior human and social traits place the bourgeoisie in a privileged position in society.

This ideology was more explicitly articulated by the Maronite respondent when he compared the Greek and Maronite bourgeoisie, and it was presented as a Lebanese trait that the recent arrivals should aspire to:

"And Australia, of course, having such a wonderful reputation as being a land of opportunity for everyone who's willing to work hard and apply themselves...Similar to the Greeks, the Lebanese are very very enterprising, they have a real flair on a merchant oriented economic system. Despite, in the main, of their humble educational background, were (the Lebanese) able to do exceptionally well in the business world, by virtue of the fact of their enterprising spirit, and their willingness to work hard... Old families set up themselves in such a way that they're virtually seeing Australia as their country, and have entered politics and have been very successful. They have assimilated completely".

Contrary to the Maronite priest, the Muslim respondent saw the role of social/welfare worker and social work, as
having two major roles: a) To act as a link between the state and the Muslim community, via the MWC. b) As the link between Islam and the individual. In the words of the Muslim respondent:

"The role of the welfare worker is to try his best to bring information within the community, and to bring about community awareness. For instance, to hold sessions from different government departments, hold seminars, conferences, in order to make these people aware, and to encourage them as much as possible in the community".

The respondent saw the role of the Muslim social worker as integrative, introducing the Muslims to state institutions, values and practices. This desire to seek wider state contacts is due to at least two main reasons. Firstly, the Muslim community does not have the level of resources and expertise to meet the complex welfare demands of working class Lebanese Muslims. According to the respondent:

"The Muslim community, I say frankly, depends to a large extent on donations from its own members. So we're totally dependent on community donations and contributions".

This lack of community resources can be partly attributed to the fact that the Muslim community is newly established. Another factor is their religious organization centred around the Mosque is not as institutionalised and organised as that of the Christians. Moreover, the socio-economic basis of Muslims is not well established, with a comparatively small petit-bourgeoisie, and a large working class suffering from high levels of unemployment and family breakdown. The absence of a strong petit-bourgeoisie with
wide state, socio-political and economic links puts Islam in a disadvantaged position, while the fragmentation of the Lebanese working class along religious lines means that there are no effective alternative secular institutions for the Muslim workers to express themselves.

Secondly, and the most significant reason for Islam's pursuit of state linkages and acceptance, is that Lebanese 'community' resources and access to the state and political organizations, are to a large extent controlled on the basis of religious and class affiliation. One cannot speak of a single Lebanese community, but of various religious Lebanese communities, of which the Maronite is seen by the Muslims and other Lebanese groups, as the one in control of most resources, and access to state and social power and status.

This instability in the Lebanese 'community' and the process of migration have strengthened Muslim identity. For both structural and political reasons then, the Imam, the religious leader of Muslims, -like the Greek and Maronite Archbishop's- has assumed a political role in his involvement in communal affairs and in securing welfare funds. As Humphrey explained:

"...the mosque has increasingly eclipsed the parochial village and urban-quarter community-based voluntary associations and the secular political organizations active in the Lebanese Muslim community. Secondly the mosque, following the lead of the Lebanese Christian churches, has emerged as an important political focus in the contest to influence Australian public opinion over the continuing social upheaval and political violence in Lebanon...(While) among Lebanese Muslim migrants Islam also assumes the character
of a sectarian ideology counterpoised to the ideology of Lebanese Maronitism. In Australia, Lebanese Muslims continue to experience Maronitism as an ideology of a relatively privileged group... The Lebanese Muslims regard with suspicion the Maronite's apparent ability to have their views and interests prevail in government circles. In this way Islam assumes a sectarian character and becomes a focus for counter-political mobilization". [Humphrey in Bottomley op.cit: 196-197].

The Mosque at Lakemba, to which the MLW belongs to, has been at the centre of a continuous political controversy over the past few years. At the centre of the controversy has been the Imam of the Mosque Sheihk al-Hilaly who has been identified by the state and conservative Lebanese Christian leaders as a supporter of Iran's version of Islam, and consequently as disturbing social peace in the Lebanese community.

However, Humphrey in a Sydney Morning Herald article on the Lebanese in Sydney argued that the controversy surrounding the presence of Sheihk al-Hilaly had little to do with religious affairs in the Lebanese community, but more with the threat the Imam's presence meant to the political influence of conservative Christian leaders at the state level:

"...(it) is not so much a matter of traditional Christian versus Muslim rivalry but a contest between new leaders seeking to give a voice to the younger, weaker Muslim community, and established Christian Lebanese leaders who resent losing their previously exclusive right to speak for the Australian Lebanese". [SMH 30/1/86].

These observations were echoed by the Muslim respondent's comments on the need to forge closer relations between the state and the MWC:
"So what we're trying to do when we try to have ties with the government, is to ask them, 'if you want anything, we're more than happy to provide you with'. So the Muslim Centre here plays a very important role in two ways: enlightening the government to know more about the Muslim Community, and vice versa to enlighten the community itself of what the government is providing to them, and what are their rights and obligations towards the country. So any action we do has to have Islamic guidance with it, and this can be gained through the Imam who's the leader of the Community...

The social workers, therefore, under the guidance of Islam and of the Imam are expected to express and redefine in an Islamic way the new social, political and welfare experiences of Muslims. According to the respondent from the MWC:

"The role of the Muslim employed social worker is different, because when we go out to solve the problem, we don't attend to it in a way a different social worker will do. We have our religious background. That's why we stress that the person who comes here, to have a little bit of knowledge, because that will help him very much to solve the problem in an Islamic way..."

This statement verifies that the selection criteria for social workers in ethno-religious organizations appear to be based more on the personal and religious beliefs of the worker. This does not mean automatically that all social workers employed by such organizations share all the values of the latter, as there may be other considerations for seeking employment there, like occupational, financial, and professional ones. What is important though is how the organizations themselves see the social workers they employ.

In the opinion of the Archdiocesan priest the social...
workers' role was seen as:

"They (the social workers of the GWC) didn't take their task as a kind of occupation, but as a mission...as charitable care in the Community...They're conscientious people... nobody's working over there for his salary".*

8b.2: Identification of needs

In the preceding part the discussion was centred on the reasons the ethnic churches needed to establish welfare agencies of their own, and how they viewed their welfare role and of the social workers. This section would deal with the way the ethno-religious organizations perceive and interpret the specific social needs of their individual members, and of their own community.

As the primary concern of religion is the moral and spiritual well being of Man, the interpretation and identification of social needs, are directed towards the ones perceived as the most harmful to the psychological and emotional state of the individual and the community. In other words, religion is more preoccupied with the consequences of social problems, than addressing the causes of social problems.

Religion's concern with the inner self and peace of mind of Man means that social work practice through religious organizations will tend to be conservative. Social problems and needs, therefore, would be diagnosed as individual, as pathological, where professional therapy - casework and counselling- would be the main methods of dealing with these problems.
More specifically on the ethno-religious institutions Cox argues that they tend to be more identity related, concerned with interpersonal needs and community support structures, and thus concentrate more on casework than community development [Cox 1983 op.cit: 13-15].

The welfare approach of ethno-religious institutions could be better understood by the following statement of the Greek respondent from GWC, where he defined the welfare needs of Greeks as perceived by the Church:

"Certainly (the worker) is to help as much as possible the client to feel in the foreign country he lives more comfortable, and be serviced this way. From the various pressures he had in the first years (of settlement), because he didn't have this sort of office, which could help and understand his problems, and in this way suppressed everything he suffered. They (the Greeks) have quite few psychological problems".*

The respondent identified as psychological and cultural the main needs of Greeks. The processes of migration and proletarianization and the strong feelings of alienation they generated, have left many psychological scars on Greek working class people. So the need to address these problems is important. However, this psychological approach in the identification of the social needs of Greeks has important implications because it implies religion's notion of benevolence.

This means that the social position of the Greek client who seeks welfare is viewed by the Church as misfortunate, and the ensuing psychological consequences created by his/her social position are seen as needing most of the attention. Consequently efforts to address this
condition are directed at the impact, rather at the initial causes of the problem which are located in the dynamics of the social relations of capitalist society.

On the psychological condition of migrants Nikolinakos makes the following observation about S. European migrants in W. Europe:

"Discrimination against foreigners in employment, housing, and education, which is usually understood as a psychological phenomenon, is in reality integral to a system of migration engendered by the capitalist process of accumulation". [de Lepervanche op. cit: 198].

The other issue raised by the respondent's statement, that of cultural and linguistic familiarity offered by ethno-religious institutions, is important as well. This familiarity helps to breakdown a realistic barriers of communication, and trust is established between the social worker and the client. That is why the respondent described also the GWC as a cultural sanctuary in a 'foreign' land, thus reinforcing the ideology of Hellenism.

The use by the Archdiocese of both psychological and cultural interpretations about the Greeks' social needs, plays a social control role by obscuring the causes of these needs, and by not providing any alternatives to improve their social position.

As the social workers' role is to change the way of thinking of his/her clients, and to the extent the clients co-operate, then they would be able to utilise that personal service. Both religion and social work have punitive and compensatory functions, so the selection
criteria for servicing individuals and groups in an institution like the GWC will tend to be conservative in nature.

That is to say, the GWC would favour those clients who are more prepared to accept the Centre's services as are offered to them, and whose social needs do not demand the pursuit of wider social issues, or challenge the dominant values of the community and society. In other words through this selection process of the deserving needy social control is exercised.

The respondent from the GWC explained how the client selection criteria functioned in the Centre:

"The criteria are...If they can't be really serviced by a government department, and at the end if there's a need, he will be serviced (by us). If there's no need he won't be helped...there're needs and needs. If we feel that the case deserves to be serviced, is always serviced. Depends on the person who sees the cases to decide that...".*

Turning now to the Muslim Women's Association, the primary concern of which is the Muslim women's place and needs in the workforce and in the family. Muslim women due to their religious background, their culture and the type of jobs are seeking, mostly unskilled, are even more disadvantaged and discriminated than other migrant women. According to the respondent from the Association:

"The practicing Muslim woman has to cover her face, (and this) causes problems in the work field. No one will employ a woman dressed like that. We feel this is discrimination... (However) the dress isn't the main thing... Some Muslim women are very educated and skilled... We're answerable to God if we don't work and do everything with consciousness... We
prove ourselves in work, and the dress shouldn't be a barrier".

The way in which some Muslim women dress was seen by the respondent as an obstacle for their employment opportunities, though the non-recognition of their skills in the workforce was treated as a more important obstacle. The respondent also justified the Muslim women's ability and capacity to work as being dictated by primordial characteristics, by their religion.

In the consequent statements of the same respondent some interesting conservative petit-bourgeois concepts emerged about the role of Muslim women in the workforce and the family. For instance, the respondent saw fit for a skilled Muslim woman to engage only in typical white collar female occupations:

"A Muslim woman can work as long as she chooses a field that will not cause her to be in the middle of men, or racing [competing] with men. Like she can choose the field of welfare, be a doctor, a nurse, a teacher... (She's) feeling better than being an engineer...working in the middle of men...".

When the respondent was asked to identify the Islamic guidelines for Muslim women who do not possess such skilled qualifications, she replied:

"If living is forcing them to do that, yes...but there's a difference. There's a necessity and there's a luxury. Our religion will tell us 'you should be content with what your husband brings home'. If you have a good living, fair enough. But if you're in debt and if you're in trouble - if you don't want to bring up your family in an average way- that's different. If it's a necessity the wife will go out to work, and if there aren't any other jobs except those (factory ones) it's an option for her to take".
According to the respondent, therefore, a Muslim woman or rather a working class Muslim woman, should be working only if circumstances demand it, through no fault of her family. While unskilled occupations could be taken up only if she opts to do so. Sexual harassment and discrimination in factories with a high concentration of migrant women, is one reason the respondent may implicitly objecting to, and this is understandable. Nevertheless, the values espoused by the Muslim respondent do not offer any constructive help to the critical socio-economic position many working class Muslim families find themselves in, but rather they retain the traditional sexual division of labour in the family.

Humphrey in his study sample of Lebanese families in Sydney found that Sunni Muslims had the lowest proportion of all age males and females in paid employment, with 34% and 11% respectively, while the figures for males among Shiites was 53%, Antiochean Orthodox 52%, and Maronites 45% [Humphrey 1984 op.cit:90]. The overall Lebanese employment levels were 50% for males and 22% for females [ibid: 90]. Humphrey gave as the major reason for the low proportion of Sunni Muslims in employment their high concentration in unskilled occupations 75%.

In the section on secular ethno-specific organizations the issue of child care provision was sighted by some Lebanese respondents as one of the main reasons of the low employment participation levels of Muslim women. Considering then that the Muslim Women's Centre belongs to
the Sunni sect, its views on the Muslim women's role and position assume greater importance:

"Like any other woman to bring up her children properly, to look after the house, to do her best to have a successful family, a happy family. We feel that if women had fulfilled their role at home, then we feel she should be able to go out and do something else. But number one (priority) is her house, and if every mother and woman looked after her family and children properly, we wouldn't have the present rate of divorce, and the number of children with drug problems, with misbehaviour".

If external factors like employment opportunities and discrimination make a decent living difficult for Muslims, then such ideas about the role of Muslim working class women is an additional obstacle. The maintenance of this kind of cultural beliefs strengthens the traditional caring role of women in the family and community, despite the adverse impact it may have on familial and social relations. The the same respondent added to her last statement:

"The supervision of children by the mother at home is necessary. And we believe that everything that's happening in the world these days, is because of the mother going out to work, and the children aren't supervised properly".

It is evident then from the last two statements of the respondent that the role of the Muslim social worker would be to intervene in the family unit, and this intervention would be explained as the spiritual need of Islam to maintain the family's moral values under the Islamic law. As the respondent commented:

"Our aim is to bring families together. We try to counsel...We're against the urge and easiness that other social workers take as people get into
problems, 'you go your own way'... We're trying to speak to him and her, and if we can't reach a solution, we take to our Imam to solve our problem. And if there's nothing else (we can do), then we proceed with separation and divorce...".

The last reference by the respondent on separation and divorce is significant. It would appear that the rate of marital breakdown among Lebanese Muslims has reached a critical level. This assumption can be drawn by the following statement of the MWA respondent, where she mentioned the intention of her organization to seek government grants for the establishment of a Muslim women's refuge:

"A refuge house for Muslim women, rather than go to a normal refuge house, because often they go there and change completely. We have our customs, and we do things that other refuges will not accept to do in theirs...".

Generally religious institutions do not encourage women to use women's refuges, let alone seek to establish such institutions. Nevertheless, it seems that Islamic perceptions about marriage, and the practice of the Islamic law have become increasingly incapable of responding to the different socio-cultural needs of Australian society.

Thus the idea of a Muslim women's refuge centre by the MWA is a response to a situation that can not be contained any longer within the family. If social control can not be maintained within the family, then a Muslim refuge will extend the conservative petit-bourgeoisie interpretation of Islam over Muslim women outside the family unit. The idea of a Muslim women's refuge then represents an adoption of new institutional forms to
overcome the new social problems faced by Muslim women.

If one was to compare the following principles of the Islamic law with the idea of a Muslim women's refuge, then the latter would not appear as a complete contradiction to the former: As Humphrey explained about the Islamic law:

"Islamic law offers a coherent ideology for organising family relations, and observance of it is a concrete expression of one's Muslimness in migration. Moreover, it is an ideology which claims to transcend the limitations of temporal political power and places the responsibility for realising the correct moral order in the hands of individual believers. In other words, the political environment the 'correct way' can be lived, albeit often in isolation from the rest of the host society". [Humphrey in Bottomley op.cit: 197].

The other respondents expressed similar ideas and sentiments about the family and the role of women. The Maronite priest regarded the changing moral values of the family unit and family relations as the main causes of familial discontent. And this concern was viewed as traumatic for the Church:

"Family life in Australia has a completely different value than it has in Lebanon. Everything in Australia is so economically determined. Economic expediency is almost a law. Morality is based on economic expediency. This is totally unacceptable to us. Tantamount to immorality. The integrity and sacredness of family life, the authority of parents with children, the respect and duty children have towards parents. These used to be important aspects of the foundations of the Australian way of life, but it isn't any more like that...No rest houses for Lebanese in Australia. Why? These things are a cause of pain and indignation...".

The respondent's reference to the economic expediency of relations between sexes is probably drawn from his own experience of middle class Maronites. He also regretted the
loss of the Australian middle class familial values which many Maronites have assimilated to.

The Greek priest identified as the main needs of Greeks those related to the family, and particularly the isolation of women and the lack of moral values in the young:

"The problem is the young generation. The people of our generation have not yet understood that we're loosing our children by giving them only food and a good house, and not family and good upbringing like they themselves had. People in their 40's and 50's...there's a language problem. Isolation of old people. Young mothers who don't know the language to get out to participate in local organizations and talk. The reasons for that are: 1. They work. 2. They have families. 3. They can't communicate. They're denied of all opportunities provided by the whole environment".*

The Greek priest, like the Maronite one, expressed concern about the future of their young generation, about their values being determined more by materialistic interests than spiritual, and he blamed the Greek parents for this situation. This concern of the ethnic church for the young ethnic generation is important, because it needs to instill it with the religious and cultural heritage, which in turn will guarantee the survival of the ethnic church after the first generation migrants have gone.

For the Lebanese Orthodox priest the major problem facing the Lebanese today is their religious, political and regional fragmentation. He understood this fragmentation as the main obstacle to improve the general welfare of those Lebanese migrants in 'need':

"The most serious problem facing the Lebanese
today in Australia, is their ability of detaching themselves from the politics and chaos which is plaguing Lebanon. Fragmentation of the Community which is harming the innocent victims, the migrant who's in need. More specifically we have an aging problem. Our Community has a lot of senior citizens. We don't have the facilities...Housing problem which is general".

The respondent regarded his concept of a secular based community as the only way to unite the Lebanese, and thus reverse the unequal access and distribution of resources amongst the Lebanese:

"We're (the LCC) trying to organise the potential we have, the resources, but we find it difficult because of the situation in Lebanon. 'I won't come and meet with you because you're a rightist, or your background is rightist, and mine is leftist'. You see this is a silly idea...But that will go away in time...".

The Orthodox priest was looking for a national reconciliation among Lebanese in Australia, which he hoped could be achieved through a secular institution like the LCC. He also saw the problems of the Lebanese community in Australia as deriving mainly from the present political situation in Lebanon. Although this assessment is partly correct, it contradicts some of his earlier statements and as a result of that overlooks the political and class animosity of the various Lebanese religious groups. This statement also sidesteps any critique of multiculturalism which encourages the manipulation of primordial characteristics, thus making for Lebanese the reconciliation process very hard to achieve.

On the other hand the Maronite priest saw the needs of the Lebanese as related both to the community in general,
and to the Maronites specifically. He described the role of the Maronite Diocese as having a moral responsibility in consulting and liaising with the government in the interpretation and assessment of the 'needs' of the Lebanese. In other words through the Diocese the Maronite bourgeoisie can maintain control over the allocation of state resources to the Lebanese:

"His Grace has a moral responsibility to work with the government departments to make sure, the projects and good things the government wishes to do, not only for his Maronite flock, but for the Lebanese in general, will be relevant to and consistent with their real needs. The ongoing assessment of needs, as an ongoing dialogue between the Archbishop and the government is a very very important thing. And has to be seen as essential that this dialogue takes place".

The respondent also recognised the economic difficulties faced by many post-1975 Lebanese migrants, and he considered the non-granting of refugee status to these arrivals, as an additional disadvantage:

"Given the fact that many Lebanese came to Australia as refugees after 1975, but they weren't given refugee status. People took loans with high interest, whereas other people were given refugee status, Lebanese were not. Economic pressures felt acutely for those who came after 1975".

Thus far most of the Maronite respondent's statements have been either comparative to other Lebanese groups, or he had praised the successes of the Maronite bourgeoisie. In one of the very few instances during the interview the respondent recognised some of the socio-economic differences between the old Maronite settlers and the post-1975 ones:
"After 1975...what we had then was virtually two types of Lebanese Maronites here. We had those who were established or establishing themselves, in transition, learning the ropes in the business, social world, etc. And then you had these Lebanese here who were virtually flying the turmoil and insecurity (of Lebanon) in order to make a better life for themselves".

So within the Maronite community there are at least two different classes or groups, of which the bourgeoisie is the dominant one, while the working class and other groups are the subordinate. Humphrey in his study on the Lebanese found that the majority of Maronites were employed in trade, family business and professional occupations, whereas the Muslims had the reverse occupational status, concentrated more in factories and labouring. The Lebanese Orthodox and the Melkites had a more evenly spread occupational representation, though they had an extremely low number of people with professional skills [ibid: 78].

In relation to unemployment the same study revealed that among the various sects the figures were 75% for Sunni Muslims, 45% for Maronites, and in the low 50% for the other sects. Despite the fact that the sample was too small to reflect the national unemployment figures of the Lebanese, it nevertheless gave an indication that the Maronites as well have considerable high unemployment levels, which implies among other things more need for welfare provision.

The Maronite bourgeois ideology of entrepreneurial success, independence, hard work, and self-help, permeates every Maronite institution and defines social relations,
whether within the Maronite community or outside. In relation to the Maronite community this is a very imposing ideology over all its subordinate groups and defines, determines and controls all their social being.

It is for these ideological reasons that the Maronite Church is perceived, or has been promoted to be seen, as the only appropriate welfare institution for the Maronites, and consequently the most suitable to exercise social control over the subordinate classes or groups. Contrary to the Maronite respondent's belief that the employment of social workers by the Church is not a matter of necessity or of urgency, himself provided an example which proved such a belief false:

"This came as an experiment we did at the church couple of years ago. We offered for our people at the church an officer from one of the government departments, who was available within certain hours, once a week for any short of referral, or consultation, or assistance. It was only advertised, I think, three times, just briefly at parish masses. But the response from that continued for months and months and months, and it was after that the amount of casework that particular government officer had was rather amazing. You'd see people coming out of the woods! Taking advantage of this, when they weren't going to government offices".

The strong response by people seeking information and other services by the government officer came as a great surprise to the respondent. However, his main justification for this response was that the services themselves were located in the church building. So he saw the provision of these services from the church as providing the ideal spiritual sanctuary from the feeling of alienation, a
similar sentiment already expressed by the Greek respondent for the Greek Welfare Centre. In the words of the Maronite priest:

"One of the reasons, of course, why such an influx of people to take advantage of this particular service, was because it was located at the church, and they felt safe there. They also knew this particular man, he was Lebanese...We even had people who were not Maronites. We had Muslim people, who were quite happy to come physically in the offices of the church...and have whatever assistance was available there. It was part of our policy not to turn away anybody, anyone comes for help. It was very gratifying...It was gratifying because Muslims were coming to the Maronite church, whereas I don't think Maronites could go to a Mosque...You know there might be all sorts of reasons for that...".

The last two paragraphs of the statement warrant some attention. For the respondent it was a gratifying, and somehow surprising experience, to see Muslims visiting a Maronite church to seek welfare services. On the other hand the psychological, or ideological inability, or unwillingness of Maronites to visit a Mosque for the same purpose, strongly indicates the power of the Maronite bourgeois ideology.

In the opinion of the respondent from the Muslim Welfare Centre the establishment of Mosques, was seen as the urgent need for Muslims at the present:

"The main problems Muslims are facing in this place (Australia) is religious discrimination on the basis of building their own Mosques. We're finding a great difficulty in getting approval from local councils to build Mosques. We're always faced with local residents gathering up together, and giving petitions to councils saying: 'We don't want a Mosque build in that place'. Sometimes the only reason they use is that the Mosque will cause traffic jams. While if
they look at it positively what's causing traffic jams more these days, is this one (in Lakemba) because it caters for them (the Muslims). But if this was spread in the suburbs, where say you have Mosques for every community, then the load from this centre will become less".

Islam is a minority religion in a predominantly Christian country like Australia. Furthermore, the often negative image of Arabs portrayed by the media, reports on the cruel Lebanese civil war, and popular perceptions about Islamic practices, are seen by some residents as unwelcome additions to their daily lives. The hostility shown by some local residents, and the use of various technicalities by local councils to block the establishment of Mosques, represent serious forms of religious discrimination in a country that guarantees religious freedom by law.

The other important need identified by the Muslim respondent, and interrelated to the issue of Mosques, was the one concerning the establishment of private Muslim schools. Again the local councils provide the main obstacle for this to happened, which in a way shows how the concepts of community and community development localise conflict, and to a large extent detract the wider social and political implications of such conflicts:

"(The Muslims) having their own private schools. For example, we know that in Australia there're plenty of Catholic schools, and they're private. When we apply through the local councils, again our applications are almost always knocked back. The first application was knocked back when we applied for the Chullora school, and the second one for Greenacre to build a primary school and a high school, was also knocked back...".

Most religious institutions establish their own
schools. For the ethnic churches the provision of schools, mostly at the primary level, is necessary not only for religious reasons, but also to transmit their culture, language, customs, and history. The Maronites and Greeks have even high school education, while the Greek Archdiocese is receiving a government grant to operate a private school, that of St. Spyridon at Kingsford.

During the interview the Muslim respondent was also asked to give his opinion about unemployment among Lebanese, and his reply to this question was:

"The communities with the largest unemployment figures, are the Turkish and Yugoslav, and then is the Lebanese community. Among Muslims there're a number of unemployed people. There're reasons for that. They came from a war-torn country in a period where any form of education was almost stopped. So they didn't have any educational background whatever. We don't blame them, we blame the system, the war...".

The respondent was correct to point out some of the consequences of the Lebanese civil war in relation to the educational attainment of some of the post-1975 Lebanese migrants. However, on the question on the high unemployment levels experienced by the Lebanese, and its effect on families, the respondent's reply was totally inaccurate, though not surprising. This statement serves as a good example to demonstrate how a number of ethno-religious welfare agencies see the social problems of their working class members.

In fact among the Lebanese respondents only the Antiochean Orthodox priest addressed the problem of unemployment, and showed awareness about its implications:
"(There's) very high unemployment among Lebanese, and spinning from this problem come also marital problems. When there's unemployment there's friction at home...".

Finally, all respondents indicated that their institutions and leadership had varying levels of liaison with community or government organizations, or other groups in the welfare field. The Greek respondent from GWC did not indicate any community institutional liaison, but only with individual social/community workers:

"I don't know about liaison. As far as information is concerned there's always contact with community workers, different Greek social workers, whether from the government or not...".*

Among the Lebanese respondents all said that had various forms of liaison with different Lebanese welfare organizations, and mostly with those with shared religious and political views. All Lebanese religious institutions of the sample were members of the LCC, and except the Orthodox priest, the others did not seem to regard it as the only, or potentially the only Lebanese representative secular institution.

The Maronite respondent confirmed that there was mutual recognition and respect between their two religious leaders. As the Maronite priest commented:

"I think it's fair to say that the relationship between the Archbishop and the Muslim Community has been exemplary. So much so that at the feast of St. Maroun, from whom we take our name, his Grace invites the Sheikh to speak at the Cathedral Hall. And reciprocally, his Grace has gone to the Mosque to address the Muslim people in their great feast day. This is extraordinary!".

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All respondents regarded multiculturalism as the only correct state policy in relation to ethnicity. This came as no surprise as multiculturalism recognised the existence of the ethnic churches, it legitimised them, and accepted their right to participate and advise the government on community issues. However, there were some variations in the level of support towards multiculturalism, ranging from unequivocal support to some criticism as to its actual practice, and this reflected the comparative power relations of the respondents's Churches within their communities, and with the state.

The Lebanese Orthodox priest described multiculturalism in terms of access and equity for migrants and ethnic communities:

"I think that multiculturalism is a door that's opening little by little to migrants, to get access and to be on the same footing as the Australians...It has given to the Communities the opportunity to express themselves, to contribute, to participate to the political, social and cultural life of Australia".

The Maronite respondent saw the societal effects of multiculturalism on the Australian society, though he acknowledged that there still is room to improve the present social relations:

"Multiculturalism is virtually like going from here to the moon for Australia. It brought Australia into a very abrupt awakening. And I suppose the physical isolation of Australia from the rest of the world, contributed in the build up of a very one-eyed view of what it needs to be an Australian...But you can only take people at a certain speed...I mean you might realise that
there's a lot that has to be changed. But human beings can adjust so much".

Despite the celebrated rediscovery of its ethnicity, the Maronite Diocese is still under the strong influence of the Maronite bourgeois ideology. The extent of assimilation of the Maronite bourgeoisie to the Australian dominant values, make the Maronite Diocese to view critically any mentality which attempts to create ethnic community ghettos. The Maronite priest attempted to dispel such a mentality as a general characteristic of the Lebanese, meaning actually of the Maronite bourgeoisie:

"But I want to make it very very clear that in no way, never has been said or even hinted, that the Lebanese or Maronite wants to make a ghetto, to construct or to fabricate one...We're far too outgoing and we don't just have this way".

In contrast to the Maronite priest the respondent from the MWC was more critical of the implementation of multiculturalism by the Federal government. He believed that the government did not exercise sufficiently its authority to implement the access and equity policies of multiculturalism:

"In fact multiculturalism is not implemented to a large extent, even within government departments. Although the new premier of NSW is trying, and we welcome his moves very much, it's best to associate and go out and know more about ethnic communities. And that's what we would like to see from the Australian government. It isn't (sufficient) only to say: 'We are multiculturalist'. No, we want the (Federal) government to exercise, implement multiculturalism, and to bring the communities more together, in order that would understand and live with every culture of a particular place, rather than introducing this culture in such a way which would make disunity in the community in Australia".
The Muslim community is newly established and more disadvantaged in comparison to the old communities. So the establishment of co-operation on more equal terms with the Australian state is seen as crucial. Therefore, the implementation of non-discriminatory policies by the state, was regarded by the respondent as fundamental to counteract any possible policies and ideologies that could undermine the perception of social peace and unity in the Muslim and Lebanese communities, and Australian society.

The Greek respondent from the GWC interpreted multiculturalism not as an integrative form of social organization, as the Lebanese Orthodox respondent had, but as a social formula to maintain the individuality and separateness of ethnic communities, and the control of the ethnic church over community affairs. In the respondent's words:

"Multiculturalism has helped in the development of welfare. (However), personally multiculturalism, whatever is called, I don't understanding it myself very much, because there have been various interpretations. What I can see in relation to Hellenism, is that it can not be put together with other ethnic groups. I agree we're all migrants. However, everyone is a different race, has different customs and different language and religion. And we can't get them all in a pot and stir them up and call them multicultural. The Greeks are Greeks, the Italians are Italians, etc. Every organization and every community should look after their own needs and responsibilities, in their own way, within the framework of multiculturalism or not, it doesn't matter. But at least freedom should be given to every ethnic community to do their own things".*

Thus, the need to preserve the Greek culture, or the ideological community of Hellenism in the respondent's
words, could only be achieved by the Greek Archdiocese. For migrants to maintain their cultural identity, ethnic institutions should always have access to state resources, irrespective of the name of the policy that provides such access.

The Lebanese Orthodox priest had indirectly implied throughout his statements his support for mainstream services. The Greek respondent from the GWC was one of the few respondents that referred specifically to the policy of mainstreaming. Given his last statement it was not unexpected that he equated mainstreaming as a new form of assimilation. He saw the reduction of the welfare role of the church as a possible loss of legitimacy and control over the community:

"It's a policy that turns us back 20-30 years of assimilation...that's what they're trying to do. I don't believe that Hellenism, or any other ethnic community is in a position to be mainstreamed or to be assimilated. What they're trying to do is to force us, willingly or unwillingly, to obey what the government thinks is right for Hellenism. And I don't believe that the government knows what's right or wrong. I feel that we, Hellenism, know what's best for the Greek community".*

Contrary the the Greek respondent the Muslim supported mainstreaming indirectly, but he did so for other obvious political reasons:

"What we would like to see, is that for the government to introduce more bi-lingual officers within government departments...It isn't enough to get a grant and be away from the actual system. We need to be within the system, to understand the system in order to help your community, and at the same time the government".

The Muslim respondent saw the allocation of grants as
insufficient to enhance the political influence of his institution at the government level. The direct state provision of welfare services were regarded by the respondent as means whereby it would allow the Muslims' needs to be recognised by the state, thus giving them the opportunity to have more input in government decision making.

8b.4: Conclusion

The overriding theme of all respondents of the sample was that the worldly needs of the individual and the community could only be met through their spiritual and moral salvation. With the exception of the Lebanese Orthodox priest, all other respondents expressed the view that the salvation of the individual was to be found in a harmonious religious community.

This difference of opinion between the Lebanese Orthodox respondent and the other respondents, reflected the different political interpretation of the role of their Churches in social life, and how social needs and relations were perceived.

The direct confrontation between the Archdiocese and the GOC has shifted in the political arena of the state, where both are trying to increase their share and influence on the provision of state resources. In the meantime intra-communal conflict is focused more on the attempts of the Archdiocese to take over the property titles of independent communities.
Among the Lebanese sample the most obvious intra-communal political polarisation is that between Maronites and Muslims. The readiness of the MWC to seek state recognition of Muslim rights, shows not only the level of ethnic co-option under multiculturalism, but also the extent to which ethno-religious institutions are prepared to accept dominant social values for the sake of legitimacy and social power.

Finally, the ideology and social practices of ethno-religious institutions are likely to be less integrative and more assimilationist for their working class populations. This is so because the social control role of these institutions is exercised through their unquestionable acceptance of the status quo, and their desire for social peace. In the case of the Greek and Lebanese bourgeoisie the Church provided them with an acceptable institution in the host society to further their socio-economic and political interests, while the religious Muslim Lebanese institutions at present seek their legitimacy primarily from the state, rather than in combination with class alliances in the wider society.
The respondents from generalist welfare institutions shared the common ideological approach of institutional or pluralist welfare. This was in contrast to the almost conservative ideological uniformity of ethno-religious institutions, and the contrasting ideological variety of the secular ethno-specific ones.

Institutional welfare regards the state as having the responsibility to provide direct services to people on the basis of their citizenship rights. Institutional social work practice is concerned with the welfare policies of the state, the pursuit of social/welfare issues, and with community development. According to Mishra the main aim of this welfare approach is:

"...It concerns the gap between formal entitlement or existence of rights to their actual utilization or enjoyment between formal equality, status as a citizen, and the substantive inequality resulting from the facts of stratification...Thus, how to ensure proper utilization of services for the poor...". [Mishra op.cit:31].

As the institutional welfare approach is a by-product of the ideology of Social-Democracy, it does not really concern itself with the nature and structure of the capitalist system. Social inequalities tend to be perceived more in terms of unequal distribution and access to state resources, rather than in terms of unequal distribution of
However, given the fact that many working class migrants experience significant forms of inequalities at the secondary level of income distribution, institutional welfare practices by independent ethnic social/welfare workers can be beneficial and constructive. These social workers are called independent because they are employed by ethno-specific organizations.

The pluralist social work concept has its own perception of the individual and of the community, and therefore a different view of the role of the ethnic social/welfare worker. The Greek respondent from the Ethnic Child Care Development Unit at Marrickville saw that role as:

"Our role is to educate our own people...in some of the new concepts...It is very hard...Intergenerational conflict...The system doesn't acknowledge a different value system. We Greek social workers are trying to be mediators between families and between the system and the families, or the individual and the system, so we can facilitate communication".

This statement included the fundamental role of the independent ethnic social worker, to link the individual or families with the 'system'. The word system refers to the bureaucracy of the welfare state. Thus, the basic social control role of the institutional form of social work is to define the social inequalities of clients or groups as primarily derived from inadequate and inappropriate services, or policies of the welfare state. In this way a perception is reinforced on clients that the
The welfare state is the major source of welfare, and its failure to deliver appropriate services or eradicate inequalities, becomes the major target of criticism. As the same respondent explained:

"As far as I'm concerned with my role I used to do individual casework, but I didn't see casework as just the problem. I tried also to see what was the cause behind it. Most often the cause was the system itself...The system didn't provide enough information, or didn't do the work properly, mainly because it didn't have bi-lingual people, cultural sensitivity about the different people's needs".

And the Greek respondent from the St. George Migrant Resource Centre at Rockdale expressed similar views as the last respondent:

"You look at the immediate needs, you're trying to help and solve those for the person or the community. But your main obligation is to look at the roots of the problem, and try to change that, and that obviously is a long term thing, it's a struggle. It's the system that's causing the problem...The welfare state..."

So both respondents identified two strategies of institutional social work practice to respond to individual/group needs: a) At the individual level to use casework as a method to address the immediate problem; b) At the community or societal levels to tackle problems generated by the welfare state, lack of information, proper and relative services and access, etc.

In comparison to the other respondents from the ethno-specific organizations, a respondent from the independent social workers realised the different and conflictual value system of state welfare practices in relation to the individual migrant client and its intervention in the
The Greek respondent from Marrickville commented on that:

"The funding body sets down guidelines and criteria under which you have to fit. Of course there's conflict. Many times I was approached... The man said: 'Stop interfering in the family affairs, it's none of your business'. The concept of counselling of social workers and psychologists is very alien to Greeks...The extended family was the one that was solving the problems, and was helping, and in a lot of situations was very good".

Halmos argues that both the conservative and institutional forms of social work practice have a therapeutic mode of thought in treating individuals [Halmos 1970: 18]. That is to say, both approaches will use certain techniques and pathology models to identify, describe and rectify social or psychological problems of individuals.

Despite this, there are some important differences between institutional and conservative social work practices concerning migrant people as the Greek respondent from Marrickville indicated:

"At the same time is to try to work with the people themselves, so you can equip them with skills, so they can look after themselves...and I think, to a certain extent some of the agencies, because of having funding, all this money, they don't really want to equip people with skills to solve their own problems, because they want to have a lead to show with statistical figures".

The respondent saw as the role of the social worker to encourage client independence, provide counselling and advice, and through these practices to provide the clients with sufficient skills to cope with their lives. Her criticism towards some agencies was specifically directed towards the Greek Welfare Centre, which in the respondent's
opinion seemed to be more concerned with producing statistics, than to help individuals and challenge inequitable legislation that affect both the Greeks and their community:

"For example with the Archdiocese... I think most of the workers (of GWC) what they do is see people, casework, have a few meetings where they discuss about their work, and not really about issues that will change the attitude of the system, or bring some challenge, some laws, some legislation that's not constructive with the people they're dealing with".

The respondent regarded the practice of casework by the GWC as exercising social control over the individual and the Greek community. One of the negative aspects of casework is that:

"...There is a danger of persuading clients that this (casework) will satisfy all their needs, that they must accept impoverishment and come to terms with it, rather than actively attempt to change it". [Social work in practice op.cit: 50].

In other words casework enhances the benevolent belief of religion and the acceptance of the existing social order. The Greek respondent from the Botany Migrant Resource Centre at Eastlakes realised the same problem with the GWC's welfare practice, its lack of participation in welfare issues concerning the community:

"If you have more workers you become more active and more involved...It doesn't mean to withdraw or become less active. The GWC has more grants...".

The two criticisms labelled against the GWC by the Greek respondents so far, its interest to show statistical figures and concentrate on casework, were actually verified by the respondent from the GWC, though as proof of the
Centre's efficiency:

"...The centre doesn't need to prove anything to the government, because everybody shows statistics and work...We don't give (statistics) to please, but to show where's the best service".*

In 1985 the GWC held a conference to mark the 10 years since its establishment in 1975. At this conference a paper was presented by a GWC worker titled "Casework". Among other things in the paper the criticism against the extensive casework practice of the GWC was acknowledged, but it did not discuss the issue at any length, nor it offered any justification for its extensive practice:

"There have been, and no doubt we will continue to have our share of critics and debates regarding the effectiveness of casework. The argument being that individualised focus hinders general social concern and reforms, but this is a debate to be left for another opportunity".

The Lebanese respondents too saw the role of the Lebanese social/welfare workers in ethno-specific organizations concentrated mainly to casework. They did not deal in detail about the effect of casework on the individual, as the Greek respondents did, but considered casework's impact more at the community level. They seemed to believe that Lebanese social workers should be directing their attention and their organizations' resources towards community development, and challenging government policies.

According to the Lebanese respondent from the Migrant Resource Centre at Canterbury:

"A lot of workers do see they have a role beyond providing a direct service. They do see there's a role in encouraging mainstreaming, advocacy, community development...They're so bogged down
with direct service work...Funding bodies do like to see figures on how many people you see... There's that pressure from funding bodies and management committees which may sometimes don't understand the concept of community development... Small associations are bogged down with casework..."

This statement raised again the inability of ethno-specific institutions to deliver a satisfactory and appropriate welfare service to their clientele, and highlighted the pressure the funding bodies exert on them, which limits even further their provision of welfare.

The respondent from the Arabic Welfare Interagency [AWI] noted the same problems facing Lebanese community welfare institutions, but he identified another very important role for the ethnic social worker:

"Social workers' role is limited to direct casework...Community development picked up lately. They're concentrating on casework because (the Lebanese) are newly arrived migrants...(We're) trying to develop a mentality of community development, and establish a pressure group to tackle the policies instead of casework...A good example is the immigration policy where people are running against a brick wall...All workers realised the government policy will get them nowhere...We managed to convince these people to tackle the actual policy...I see the role of the social worker concentrating more at community development, as a lobby group...That's the switch. Block voting has to be co-ordinated linking with workers and organizations...It seems that immigration policy is one of the things we get a lot of backing...".

The respondent saw the role of the social workers as been in the forefront of community awareness and organization, in fulfilling the the precise role of organic intellectuals. He saw social workers as giving leadership direction and expertise to the Lebanese community

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organizations to act as a pressure and lobbying group. Within this context then the respondent's reference to block voting and community development is significant as it underlies the awareness of the potential ability of the ethnic group's political mobilisation. Moreover, the respondent's use of the community development concept appears to have more a political dimension that restricted to that of welfare.

Thus, the dynamic role of independent ethnic social workers as agents of social change lies in their ability to mobilise their communities on issues of general interest, and by presenting these issues as being devoid of any specific primordial characteristics. In other words social issues, by far and large, are not presented as important for the maintenance of specific cultural characteristics, but as issues that affect the everyday and future lives of individuals and the standing of the community and its members in society.

The AWI then was seen by the respondent as an institution that had the ability to forge alliances with community workers, leaders and organizations, and this was the primary reason for its establishment:

"It was an attempt to get away from the sectarian and regional structure of the community. To get away from the division of the community".

Lewins argues about the wider social implications of the future development of migrant political direction:

"...ethnics' increased access to key social resources has only come about through their growing recognition that they are ultimately
responsible for their own future and for initiating structural changes to realise this. If one accepts this politicised strategy for ethnics to realise their goals, and given that key institutions like education, the economy and health are controlled by Anglo-Australians, then it is obvious that ethnics' political activity to increase their access to the resources, which these institutions dispense, must take place in the confines of the one, common, comparative, institutional milieu. Political activity of this sort entails confrontation, which, in turn, involves conflict and tension". [Jupp et.al., op.cit: 33]

The Greek respondent from Eastlakes was even more explicit how she perceived the role of social workers:

"Some social workers are leaders and are seen as such and this is very important. They will inspire others, and mobilise others to be the people in the future that will mobilise the rest of the community in the future. This's one of the most important things. They have been catalysts with other leaders in the community".

A good example how organizations like the Arabic Welfare Interagency and the Greek-Australian Welfare Workers' Association [GAWWA] can organise and mobilise sections of the ethnic communities, is the one related to the 1986 budget cuts to multicultural programs. GAWWA took the initiative to organise a public meeting of ethnic workers to protest and take action against government policies. However, after the initial spur of protest the activity fizzled out as major ethnic representative bodies and ethno-specific organizations did not provide any substantial political support to this protest. According to the Greek respondent from Rockdale:

"There was a lot of enthusiasm at the meeting, and following that for a few weeks because we had the set rallies...After the initial furore and the Canberra rally, as usual, people lost
interest and enthusiasm. They felt: 'What can we do? We can't change anything. What's the use of running around?' A core of 8-10 people was left. We felt that we needed to have this committee ready for any future things that may come up, because we saw it as an attack, and it isn't going to stop".

The respondent recognised the disorganization, disenchantment, powerlessness and inability of ethnic social workers to affect any real changes without a broad base of political support. This highlighted the social control role of the conservative ethno-specific institutions which seldom criticise government policies:

"The sad thing is that as welfare workers, as social workers, as community people we aren't organising ourselves to fight that. We're sitting there and we're taking it, and if we're fighting we're fighting spontaneously and reacting. We're letting ESL being cut and then we're shouting. The ALP is attacking the working class generally...The government is trying to please the business sector".

This last example is also related to other aspects of the role of independent ethnic social workers. Those social workers who are employed by generalist community organizations, and advocate on behalf of their communities, face an important dilemma regarding their relationships with their communities. The welfare workers' organizations of the sample, the AWI and GAWWA, can be classified as Social-Democratic in relation to welfare ideology.

On the other hand, although social workers form a professional group, and their objective class position is middle-class, their subjective class position as individuals can politically vary from conservative to Social-Democratic or even radical.
The basic problem for the above two organizations of the sample, and for many individual independent ethnic social workers, is to what ethno-specific institutions they can relate ideologically or forge alliances with them. As these workers regard themselves as professionals they can not accept easily the primordial dominance of ethno-specific organizations, thus lacking broad institutional community political support and resources.

The other problem for ethnic professional organizations can be the lack of wide professional membership. This lack of representativeness was recognised by the respondent from AWI, and it was actually in the last year or so when the AWI membership was extended to non-government employee and ethnic institutions. In contrast to the AWI, GAWWA has membership from all levels of state, local and community organizations:

"We don't claim that we're community representative, but of course we have strong relations with community organizations because of the non-sectarian role we play...".

However, the lack of community representation of the AWI, and its desire to establish a power base independent from Lebanese/Arabic community institutions, was seen by the Lebanese Orthodox priest as a major drawback:

"The AWI...Unfortunately I'm completely critical of the agency because it is formed of public servants...They aren't community based. You see I'm always very weary of people trying to form organizations when they're themselves social workers. Social workers should be supplementary to the organization, or the one who will work with the organization. Not themselves to compete with other organizations. This is the idea".
The respondent was quite explicit and unequivocal about the role of Lebanese, and generally ethnic social workers. They should be or see themselves as the organic intellectual leadership of ethno-specific organizations.

The respondent from GAWWA, who at the time of the interview was the secretary of the Association and was employed in the community services of the Canterbury Municipal Council, saw the problems facing community organizations and social work practice from a different perspective. The major problem in her opinion was that community based organizations, both ethnic and non-ethnic, are becoming less relevant to the needs of people, and less representative. In other words the community concept is becoming increasingly unworkable. Among the main reasons for that the respondent recognised the complicated procedure involved in the establishment and running of these organizations, and the dominance of professionals in the administration and selection of the social needs of the groups they represent:

"In principal I believe in community based organizations...In practice it doesn't work. If you look at most community based organizations they're dominated by professionals. So it isn't really the community. Sure professional people often do represent the community, but not always. Also community management is becoming incredibly complicated just in terms of procedure, incorporation etc. I don't know...Often organizations don't represent their members. There're some centres that work effectively".

Thus far the respondents' statements have indicated two broad areas where independent social workers face obstacles in creating alliances, or liaisons with ethno-
specific institutions. Managerial and ideological. Ethno-
specific community organizations have many structural, 
administrative and professional limitations. As the primary 
function of these organizations is cultural maintenance 
they have ideological limitations, and certain welfare 
issues presented to them by independent social workers as 
worthy of consideration, may be treated as being against or 
irrelevant to their specific political and primordial 
interests, and consequently they would be unlikely to be 
supportive of them.

Of course there would be instances that ethno-
specific institutions will support certain welfare, or even 
political issues presented to them by independent social 
workers. However, this would depend on which class or group 
controls the balance of power within the community, and 
therefore they would define in primordial terms the actual 
class and political importance or non-importance of the 
issues involved.

The bi-polar Greek community split is a good case in 
point to show the political implications and difficulties 
in establishing alliances between the GOC and the 
Archdiocese and the independent Greek social workers. The 
Greek respondents of the sample had mixed feelings towards 
both Greek community institutions, though some of them, 
like the Greek respondent from Marrickville, was more 
explicit in her views:

"As a community I'm very disappointed with the 
way we're split up, and don't come to meet on
common issues. Both the Archdiocese and the Greek Orthodox Community are trying to use the money they're getting from the government in order to show that they have power. The Archdiocese to keep a hold on people, because I'm sorry they're not helping for self-esteem, in the people's rights. We have the nepotism (and the Archdiocese) reinforces that; doesn't participate in the issues that are really relevant in relation to equality, rights, equal opportunity and so on. They're the elitist few who have access and keep the rest ignored'.

She also added the following clarification to her last statement:

"I'm not against the Archdiocese or the Church itself. But I'm against the people who are ruling the Church. They're the ones who are causing a lot of problems in the community, and amongst the people. As an institution the Church is part of our culture and we accept it...".

Clearly the respondent did not object to the Church itself, a common criticism used by the Archdiocese against its critics, but to the political and social direction it has adopted. Furthermore, the respondent saw the role of the Archdiocese and of the conservative forces that support it, as exercising social control over the community and the Greek people that is hindering the improvement of their social position.

The Archdiocese because of its political domination in the Greek community has adopted a policy of isolation as a method of strengthening its position. For instance, it discourages membership and participation of the Greek Welfare Centre's social workers to GAWWA, because the Archdiocese neither supports nor controls GAWWA, thus making professional and community co-operation extremely difficult. All Greek independent social workers of the
sample were at the time of the interviews members of GAWWA.

However, this policy of isolation by the Archdiocese has not worked out completely in its favour. The Greek Welfare Centre's staff was reduced from 13 full and part-time workers in 1985 to about 7 in 1987. Although this reduction represents partly the impact of cuts in funding to 'established' communities in favour of more recent and smaller ones, it also has to be seen as a negative reaction to the Centre's welfare policy and strict code of employment practices for female employees which do not help to attract many applicants for its advertised positions.

As far as the GOC was concerned, the Greek respondents acknowledged that it was more co-operative on welfare and community issues that the Archdiocese, but still posed some specific problems. As the respondent from Eastlakes remarked:

"The GOC has a small welfare section, not much staff, not well structured. They're getting involved with issues, while the GWC isn't getting involved. There's liaison. Could be more and better co-ordinated, because of the community split is difficult to do that".

While the respondent from Rockdale, who used to be employed as a social worker at GOC, observed the following structural limitations of the GOC:

"In the GOC welfare was never seen as a priority. If you look at the history of the GOC was set up mainly for the maintenance of language and religion... The committee is male dominated... and women and the young find it difficult to join in the Council... It has become a bit irrelevant... It has alienated a lot of people".

The respondent from Marrickville saw the role of the
The Community (GOC) is the oldest organization, and thanks goodness is there otherwise we would have been assimilated. However, they've got their own problems too, they're political. Because there's a group of people who are dominating the whole thing, they have lost a lot of the support they had from the community...The people out there do accept the community concept, but because of these people who are there, they don't belong anywhere".

The respondent's reference on the assimilationist impact of the Archdiocese has already been discussed in the previous section. Saloutos in an article about the assimilation of middle-class Greeks in the USA noted that the Greek Orthodox Church played a central role in the assimilation of second and third generation Greek-Americans [Saloutos 'The Greek Orthodox Church in the United States and Assimilation', International Migration Review, Vol.VII,No.4, 1973: 395-407]. The Church had reduced the identity of these generations to only a religious one, thus losing their 'ethnic/national' dimension and accepting the dominant values of American society.

Moreover, the high political profile of the GOC was sighted by the respondent as the main cause for its declining influence in the community. These comments on the political character of the GOC underline other implications related to the role of the social workers. Jordan has argued that social workers are encouraged to see their activity as apolitical, neutral, while in practice social
work is a political activity [Jordan 1983: 1].

In other words:

"Social work, whether it believes itself to be so or not, is a form of political activity involving advocacy and client organization, as well as love and caring" [Social Work in practice op.cit: 47].

So social workers, whether as individuals or as a professional group, do not want to be seen as politically active or espousing certain political views. Although the respondents thus far tried to give this impression, in practice they were politically active, and expressed definite views on their communal institutions. Furthermore, state revenue is the source of livelihood of social workers, as well as the acceptance or challenge of any state social policies are products of political processes.

An example that demonstrated the social control role of the Archdiocese and the political activity of independent social workers, was the case of the so-called 1978 'Greek Conspiracy' of Social Security. In 1978 the Federal police raided the homes of 586 Greek invalid pensioners and arrested them on charges of attempting to defraud the Commonwealth, by misrepresenting their medical condition [Jakubowicz et.al 1984 op.cit: 80].

Another 105 invalid pensioners living in Greece, together with those arrested in Australia, had their pensions suspended. Overall 1,400 people were implicated as taking part in the 'conspiracy'. (There is a very good report on this issue by GAWWA on the Greek Action Bulletin titled, "The FRAUD REPORT", Vol.4, No.1, March 1979, pp.1-11).
This government action was an attack against the Greek community, and particularly against the Greek working class, as those pensioners involved had claimed invalid pensions because of the injuries they suffered in the hazardous industrial occupations they had been employed [loc.cit]. Those who suffered most from the whole affair were those personally involved, who saw their personal integrity being humiliated, suffered financial hardship, broken families and psychological problems.

The respondent from Marrickville, together with other Greek social workers, was one of the persons who played a central role in the affair. Her comments therefore on the events of this period were significant, and when compared with those statements from the respondents of the GOC and the GWC, helped to reconstruct a general picture of the political situation in the Greek community at the period the events of the 'Conspiracy' were unfolding.

According to the respondent from Marrickville the 'conspiracy' was the result of:

"...When the government wants to cut down on something, they have to find a sort of an excuse to do that...The whole thing happened at the weekend, when we weren't at our offices...We found out about it on Monday...they were treated like criminals...".

The respondent's reference to government cut-backs, was related to the policy of the then government to reinforce social control on the working class. The leading role in this policy initiative was played by the Department of Social Security, which was instructed by the government
to tighten the eligibility criteria for benefits and pensions [loc.cit]. The 'Greek conspiracy' became a part of this campaign.

Soon after the arrests the GOC organised a series of public meetings. The respondent from the GOC:

"We were the first organization to organise against the attacks within the community. We organised some very significant meetings at the time to try to inform people in what is happening. We attacked the government quite severely, we lobbied politicians...They (the Archdiocese) stayed back and away from the limelight... wait and see...They lobbied behind the government".

For about a year Greek social workers and other Greek community organizations used to see people involved with the 'conspiracy', on the political front though there was not much progress with the government. Then the following happened according to the respondent from Marrickville:

"A year later we were in the same situation. What really cut us was that when the Archbishop, he should be in the church and he shouldn't be a community leader and make statements on behalf of the community, met with the minister and issued a statement, which practically said that he believed that these people were really guilty and should be punished".

After that incident the independent social workers collected statistics from welfare organizations that used to see the accused pensioners, and a delegation made up of some of these workers went to Canberra to meet with the minister of Social Security to discuss the issue. According to the respondent from Marrickville the minister proposed at the meeting, to look at individual cases, which was seen by the delegation as a ploy to delay the settlement of the
whole affair. The same respondent on the meeting with the minister:

"The minister, the first thing she said and that's very strange, was: 'We acted from information of your Greek Organizations'. Now, which were the Greek Organizations? I don't know really. The minister was misinformed".

As far as the role of the Greek organizations on the 'conspiracy' case was concerned, the same respondent commented:

"The GOC held a public meeting and so on, and their social worker got involved with the Greek Welfare Workers group. [GAWWA's name at the time]. The GWC, they said, were doing unofficial representation and so on...The Archdiocese said they don't want to become involved in any political issue. And of course they saw this as a very highly political issue, and also it involved justice. Of course it involves justice, but you have to see justice on both sides, not one".

On the other hand the GWC's respondent volunteered only the following statement on the 'conspiracy' case:

"The GWC came into contact with the DSS to help people who had lost their pensions to get them back. We had meetings with the minister. Whoever was sent to the Centre by the DSS was serviced. For us it was a great honour, and we felt very proud that the Centre had such a great value for the government to give us this freedom. The Centre offered financial assistance, sent telegrams...". *

By late 1982 all defendants had the charges against them either withdrawn or they had been discharged. The ALP, while in opposition, had promised to compensate those involved in the affair, and once it gained office in 1983 proceeded in finalising the compensation claims, and at the same time made a public apology to the Greek community for the handling of the whole affair.
Thus, the 'Greek conspiracy', however ill conceived and badly executed, illustrated clearly the political willingness in times of tension in capitalist relations to use conservative political ideologies and practices at the state level, to apply social control and manipulate racial feelings towards whole ethnic minorities.

At the same time the unequal distribution of welfare funds in the Greek community underscored the political implications and consequences of this policy. That is to say, only the independent social workers, and to some extent the GOC reacted against the 'conspiracy', while the Archdiocese used its powerful position to limit the political damage of the government within the community.

The Lebanese respondents shared similar views as the Greek respondents about ethnic community institutions and community relations. Where the Greek respondents could actually name the Greek community organizations they referred to, because they are only two major ones, the Lebanese respondents due to political reasons of their perceived independent role could not do that.

Nevertheless, this did not stop the respondent from the AWI from being highly critical of Lebanese religious welfare organizations:

"Unfortunately to have a sectarian welfare service is to implement division in the community. I don't believe religious sects or groups understand the problems of the community. They claim to provide (services) to everyone...So the only thing they can do is some direct service. As far as community development is concerned, they can't do it because they have special interests, which they're trying to keep."
So it's against their interests to establish a whole community program...And you'll find out that the secular group will start to take over...because (with) the sectarian group welfare services have failed, and it will fail to provide a whole community development program...".

The other Lebanese respondent from Canterbury was not as unequivocal as the last respondent on the division in the Lebanese 'community':

"There isn't much difference in what they believe in, but there's a difference on what people identify as their community...The community isn't divided...because divided can mean that people don't work together at all, which isn't exactly the case, because some of these organizations work close together".

The same respondent recognised also political and socio-cultural implications of the welfare practices of religious institutions, though not in the same critical way as the respondent from AWI did:

"Churches and Mosques play a very important role in providing services. They receive main funding from the state, and do fund raising activities...Well if you want to get funding for your organization you have to know the right people and pull the right strings. That's the way it works...They [the religious organizations] will give a general direction which is compatible with their beliefs....At the Mosque, for there're certain activities that will not be seen as relevant, so they wouldn't be held there,...like family planning".

Like their Greek counterparts so did the Lebanese independent social workers faced a problem in establishing a political base, or alliance with the Lebanese ethno-specific institutions. The LCC was established as a secular umbrella organization over the fragmented Lebanese, but even this was not seen by the respondent from AWI as relevant to the interests of the independent social workers
and very difficult to succeed in uniting the 'community':

"For the LCC is going to be a very difficult job, because their structure is based on sectarian groups, (and) they have contradictory interests. Theoretically it is very good. It's very hard work taking (into account) the situation as it is. Events are still happening in Lebanon. (The LCC) has only nominal membership".

The other set of relationships that was problematic for independent ethnic social workers, was their relationship with the state. As Davies commented about the position of the social workers:

"The social worker is an inherent part of the machinery of the state, and must in practice operate within contemporary policies, whatever their ideological complexion". [Davies op.cit: 193].

So for independent social workers the main dilemma with the state was not the acceptance of its authority and legitimacy. The main contradiction these workers encountered was in what way they could compromise their relations between the state and their communities; how to implement or criticise state welfare policies, and at the same time be seen as apolitical and professionals.

This dilemma is even greater for workers or personal service professionals who are employed directly by government agencies. Although the relationships of this group are not the subject of the present study, the Greek respondent from GAWWA who was employed by a local government instrumentality, raised some important points:

"I find that workers are getting increasingly tired and bureaucratised too. People working in government departments have their hands tied on particular issues. I'm aware of that and I find it frustrating. Some workers don't realise that."
We say get people in the bureaucracies because then they can help our community. And we pushed for that, but I think very often if you aren't very careful, if you stay there a while you end up selling out a lot of your principles. I think you can work for a bureaucracy and advocate on behalf of your community, but you have to be very careful".

The respondent pointed out the major problems and restrictions faced by ethnic professionals employed by the state or government authorities. A fundamental component of multiculturalism's policy has been the co-option of ethnic leadership into the state apparatuses in order to support conservative ethnic classes, or to neutralise progressive intellectuals. A consequence of that policy was that the migrant working class was denied of important leadership material in its struggle to improve its general welfare and political position.

Despite these restrictions, the independent social workers regarded state welfare policies as responsible for the fragmentation of their communities. Although they were conscious of the intra-communal power struggles, the state was seen as encouraging the maintenance of conservative and inappropriate forms of welfare structures and services.

In the opinion of the Lebanese respondent from AWI:

"The government policy towards the community has always been based on divisiveness. The politics of funding are a very political issue. When you give funds to a group, disregarding what effects this fund will have on the whole community, this policy then is very damaging. So if the government funds religious groups, it isn't the fault of their welfare services. They (the government) don't give a damn about the community as far as I'm concerned".

The Greek respondent from Marrickville expressed
similar views as the Lebanese respondent from AWI about the consequences of state funding:

"...I think because of the fact that little money is given to us, and is thrown out there, everybody rushes for it, and try to scramble and tear and whatever to get the money. (And) I think the government wants to do that to put one group against the other, and can justify cuts in other things. But we're stupid enough to take that bite, and because of that a lot of group aren't really working together, they're not honest with each other and they're trying to discredit each other, so that they can get the money...instead of combining together on issues. Not only on issues, we have so much scope to get so much money from the government, if we all combined...We can do many big projects....".

Throughout their statements both the Greek and Lebanese respondents used the concept of community in different contexts and levels, which invariably referred to the Greek, Lebanese, Arabic, Ethnic and Australian 'communities'. However, at every 'community' level the respondents encountered ideological difficulties in articulating exactly what short of community they want to see, though they definitely saw the secular sector as the dominant one in any community structure.

The employment of the community concept points out its conceptual shortcomings of analysis and interpretation of social relations, and the inability it poses in articulating clear alternative political and social strategies.

8c.2: Identification of needs
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This part would deal with the specific welfare needs of Greeks and Lebanese as they were identified by the
respondents themselves. In comparison to the parts on the identification of welfare needs by the ethno-specific organizations, this part is comparatively short. This discrepancy is not due to any indifference on behalf of the independent social workers about their communities, but rather it could be attributed to at least two reasons:

a. In the previous part the independent respondents saw the establishment of a united community, as most of the respondents from the ethno-religious institutions, as the major prerequisite to address the welfare needs of the individual and the 'community'. The main concern of the independent social workers was the policies and services of the welfare state, as these were regarded as the primary distributors of welfare. These social workers, therefore, were bound to be more preoccupied with the implementation and effect of these policies and services.

b. The other important reason was that not all independent social workers were involved specifically with their own ethnic communities. All respondents, with the exception of the one from AWI, were employed in organizations that did wider community work, so they were not necessarily aware of all social problems facing their communities, or the impact of these problems.

For both Lebanese respondents unemployment was identified as the most important social problem facing the Lebanese at present. According to the respondent from Canterbury:

"On the top of the list it would have to be
unemployment. It's a serious problem in the Lebanese community, due to the decline of unskilled jobs available. This is a major factor.

The other Lebanese respondent from AWI, saw the lack of unskilled occupations also as important factor for the high unemployment levels experienced by the Lebanese, but he did not offer any solutions to this:

"Unemployment level is high...The whole economic picture is bad, so we suffer first because a lot of people are unskilled, and the unskilled market is bad...With Vietnamese is the same thing".

Another way that the high unemployment levels of Lebanese workers can be seen is through their numbers in receipt of unemployment benefit in table [19]. Although these statistics do not give a complete picture of these people's actual unemployment levels, when compared with the Greeks, who are three and half times more than the Lebanese, then the magnitude of their plight is striking.

There was a high numbers of Greeks on unemployment benefit during the deep recession of 1983/84, but since then their numbers declined, not necessarily due to improved working employment conditions as some of them transferred on other benefits. In contrast the number of Lebanese persons on unemployment benefit jumped by nearly 5,000 from 1982 to 1984 and continued to rise. In May 1987 in the total percentage of overseas born beneficiaries the Lebanese had 6.2%, the Greeks 3.4%, the Indo-Chinese 12.4% and the Yugoslavs 4.4%.
Table 19: Number of Persons on Unemployment Benefit by Country of Birth by Year. Total Population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Greeks</th>
<th>Lebanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1982</td>
<td>3,604</td>
<td>2,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1983</td>
<td>6,090</td>
<td>4,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1984</td>
<td>6,418</td>
<td>7,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1985</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>7,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1986</td>
<td>4,839</td>
<td>8,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1987</td>
<td>4,510</td>
<td>8,339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quarterly Survey of Unemployment Benefit Recipients, Department of Social Security.

The respondent from AWI stated the immigration policy as another problem that needs to be addressed. Although for the Lebanese immigration issues are important, the AWI had also some vested interests in giving priority to this issue:

"The Immigration issue is an emotional one, because families are split. The family reunion is bad. You're applying to bring your brother or sister here, and you're judged on the points system. The government doesn't realise that. The government uses the unemployment figures to justify its immigration policy. I strongly believe it isn't the community's fault."

The Greek respondent from Marrickville identified unemployment as affecting the lives of Greek workers, though she did this diagnosis in the form of pathological symptoms that need therapy. The statement is typical in its use of pathological terminology employed by many social workers and psychologists, the respondent been the latter, to describe various conditions of the individual:

"Income security, they can't provide for their children, their future is bleak. The syndrome of the failed migrant, the person who has come to
work hard, to make something material, a family...This doesn't happen...They're in their middle age, unemployed and (it's) very difficult to understand and cope with that. The husband breaks down or gets ill, then the wife has to take up, then she breaks down, and the children have to take up. Families need therapy...the system hasn't got a remedy. There are very few Greek family counselors".

This was the only Greek respondent who referred specifically to the middle aged group of unemployed Greeks, and the effects of unemployment in their families. Unemployment among Greek working class people is concentrated in the age groups 40's and 50's. As the majority of Greeks have been employed in unskilled occupations for a long time, the contraction of the availability of these occupations has meant that they are experiencing high rates of unemployment. Unfortunately, there are no recent studies on the levels and effects of unemployment on Greek people, but they ought to share the same effects as those experienced by the Lebanese.

An indication of the comparative age of Greek and Lebanese unemployed, and their length of unemployment, can be found in the quarterly survey of Unemployment Benefit recipients of the Department of Social Security. In the May 1986 survey for unemployed persons over 50 years old the Lebanese had 44.2% unemployed for three years or more, while the Greeks 38.9%, table [20]. However, in this age group there were 27.2% of the total Greek unemployment benefit recipients as compared with 9.9% of the Lebanese.
Table 20: Unemployment Benefit Recipients aged 50 years and over by Country of Birth by length of Unemployment 23 May 1986 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>6 MON</th>
<th>1 YEAR</th>
<th>2 YEARS</th>
<th>3 YEARS</th>
<th>3 YEARS+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quarterly Survey of Unemployment Benefit Recipients, Department of Social Security.

The impact of ageing, incapacity to work, widowhood, marital breakdown and their socio-economic interrelations for Greeks can be seen in their number and proportion on various pensions. In June 1979 there were 20,700 Greek persons on pensions, while in April 1987 36,128 which represented an increase in relation to the total population from 1.1 to 1.7 (Demographic and other characteristics of pensioners and beneficiaries 1987, DSS).

In April 1987 of the 36,128 Greek pensioners (who had 9,744 dependent children) 40.7% were on Age pension, 48.1% on Invalid and 9.0% on Widow's and Supporting parents benefit [Loc.cit]. The last two groups of Widow's and SPB recipients had 29.2% of all children, and the Invalid pensioners (of which 48.0% were in the age group 50-59) had 53.6%. Also 84.4% of the Greek pensioners were entitled to the full rate of pension.

The Greek respondent from Rockdale saw Greeks' greater needs in two areas, youth and women:

"Youth and aged are isolated...No social networks. Youth have to adopt into a society, or community really warped. I mean drugs,"
violence...Women are always the underdogs and missing out. Working class women having many problems because of their sex, ...exploited at work, oppressed at home...Non working women are isolated, no social networks...Lack of information, lack of access to information...".

While the Lebanese respondent from Canterbury indicated similar problems facing Lebanese women, mainly lack of networks, but the number of children many Lebanese women have was an additional obstacle for their social participation:

"There are few networks, a lot of women are still isolated to participate through lack of transport, lack of money, through having a lot of children are stuck with them. But there are few networks, like the Muslim Women's Association, the Arabic Education Society, Arabic Women's Federation. So there's quite few women's organizations that women can link in with...However, the average woman will not participate in them with 2-3 children to look after...Most likely (women) with western ideas (are more likely to participate)...

From the respondent's statement can be assumed that a number of Arabic speaking Women's organizations, like the Muslim Women's Association of the sample, are middle class oriented and can not really provide the networks and activities that are relevant to working class Arab women.

It is also interesting to note that institutional organization among Greek women is very underdeveloped in Sydney and is confined mainly to Church benevolent groups. Some reasons for this may be the strong conservative influence of the Greek bourgeoisie, which was strengthened by the conservative attitudes found in NSW in the 50s and 60s, and by the fact that many Greek working class women were drawn in the labour market almost immediately after
their arrival.

8c.3 Multiculturalism and Mainstreaming

All respondents proved to be very critical on multiculturalism and mainstreaming. Like many respondents from the secular ethno-specific welfare organizations, the independent social workers accepted multiculturalism as an ideal model of social engineering, but regarded it as unworkable under the present political conditions. The same sentiment was also expressed about mainstreaming.

Irrespective of the uniformity of opinion on the two policies by the independent social workers, various respondents offered different reasons for their criticisms, and sometimes contradictory in relation to some of their previous statements. For example, the Lebanese respondent from AWI commented:

"It has become lately, unfortunately, a very political issue. If you want to win ethnic votes, just start talking about multiculturalism. It isn't, I believe, a genuine policy, not even of the ALP. I've raised that question after the ESL (cuts). If that happens it just gives you an indication of how non-genuine is the approach of multiculturalism, very superficial...Its has reached a dead end, and why?...Because it was used for political purposes by both governments...".

This statement could be interpreted in terms of the independent social workers' attitude of not wanting to be seen as political. However, the same respondent in previous occasions had criticised government policies, and saw the use of ethnic political mobilisation as necessary to affect changes in state social policies. This contradiction serves
to highlight the delicate relationship of social workers with the state.

The Greek respondent from Canterbury treated multiculturalism as an ideological construct designed to achieve social control, while its attempts to achieve structural changes as superficial:

"In practical things, interpreters, translators, training, etc., I think it's quite easy, that's viable. Nothing fancy about it...Now in terms of society I think multiculturalism glosses over a whole lot of other issues, like the other basic inequalities that we have...Like multiculturalism assumes that we all live harmoniously, we're all coping, there aren't any other divisions, whether it is social class divisions, between genders, it tends to gloss over these inequalities...".

While the Lebanese respondent from Canterbury believed that multiculturalism is proving unworkable:

"It's going down the drain...Well I think people felt there was a hope before, people felt it was a priority for the government. How far it's going to go, or how much cuts they're going to do, I don't know...".

The issue of racial discrimination against the Lebanese, and Arabs in general, was brought up by two independent respondents as an implicit failure of multiculturalism to change racial attitudes. Discrimination is an experience that affects Arabic speaking people continuously in their daily lives, and this has been mentioned by respondents who identify closer to the new Lebanese arrivals, especially with the Muslims. In the words of the Lebanese respondent from Canterbury:

"Another major issue for Lebanese, and the Arabs in general, is discrimination. Given the political situation in the Arab world, whenever there's something happening in the Arab world,
people feel very tense about their existence here in Australia... People feel a bit threatened about this type of thing, that they're being watched, that they're not really trusted, treated like terrorists. It's an issue. It affects people and attitudes towards them".

Humphrey has identified as the root of racial discrimination against the Lebanese and other new migrant arrivals, the inequalities they experience in the labour market, in the capitalist relations of production, and the ideologies they generate and encourage in periods of economic recession:

"...increased competition for jobs in the secondary sector with the decline in jobs has resulted in increased discrimination in employment on the basis of ethnicity and explicit racist politics extreme right-wing parties and the main conservative party. The Lebanese have become one of the targets of the politics of racism". ["The Arabic Community: Realities and Challenges' op.cit:35]

The Greek respondent from Rockdale also referred to the discrimination encountered by the Lebanese, by using as an example the inability of Muslims to get permission to establish their own schools, an issue that was raised by the Muslim respondent from the Muslim Welfare Association:

"I think these short of schools that segregate children are not healthy, and need to be in the mainstream schools, etc. Now I don't agree with any private education whatsoever. But why pick at the Muslims and say: 'You can't have your own schools'. And yet Catholics can, and the Church of England people can, and even the Greek Orthodox now can. Why? Because you're stronger you have more power, so your word counts more. Your culture, your ethnicity is more important than that of Muslims', which are getting such a bashing in the newspapers about extremist religion. Because they're new settlers they don't have much say...".

In relation to mainstreaming the respondents felt that
it has been used by the government as a device to justify cuts in ethno-specific services, rather than to achieve equity, access and relevance in mainstream agencies. The Lebanese social worker from Canterbury thought that ethnic workers and communities were led by the government to believe differently about the real purpose of mainstreaming policy:

"And a lot of bureaucrats who're selling it to people are really believing in that. Behind all that there's a hidden agenda that's there to cut resources, not having ethno-specific services".

The other Lebanese respondent from AWI saw mainstreaming too as a policy of denying ethno-specific organizations of welfare funds, as he regarded the services of these organizations as necessary for the time being:

"Theoretically is very good. It's going to be a long way before mainstreaming policy is implemented. Is a matter of mentality as yet. It's a case that for the next 10 years you can't abolish the ethno-specific services, because the alternative has not been provided as yet in government departments".

While the Greek respondent from Rockdale regarded the whole state apparatus as incapable to implement genuine mainstream policies and services, due to the existence of preconceived notions towards minorities:

"The concept is good, but it's unrealistic, and there's no way our welfare system is geared to that short of thing. It's a copt-out by the government. My interpretation of mainstreaming policy is one of cutting funding from ethno-specific services, and not setting up anything else for them. Racism always existed, and people always use a scapegoat and minorities always suffered. I mean how do you get rid of that with a policy statement, say with mainstreaming?"

One final issue worth mentioning is the level of
relevant qualifications of the social/welfare workers of the sample. All Greek professional respondents had tertiary qualifications on either social work or psychology, while the Lebanese had none, although some of the latter had other tertiary or technical qualifications in other fields.

The reasons for this discrepancy appear to be two fold. On the one hand the Greeks are established longer in Australia and more second generation Greeks have gone through the educational system. In addition to that except the Greek respondent from Marrickville all other Greek professionals of the sample graduated in the early 80s, when ethnic welfare policies increased the demand for professionals.

On the other hand the predominantly Christian Lebanese settlers of the 50s and 60s were not interested in human services sources, because of more emphasis on economic achievement and lack of demand for welfare practitioners. Only when the Lebanese started to arrive in large numbers in the last 15 years, their growing social problems and the policy of multiculturalism all combined to propel Lebanese educated persons in the welfare field as there were no available qualified social/welfare workers.

This difference of qualifications between Greek and Lebanese does not necessarily mean that the latter are less capable of performing the duties. However, the possession of qualifications would make a difference as the involvement of Lebanese gets more complicated with the concepts and practices of the welfare state and welfare
provision. This difference was to a certain extent evident between the more articulate, structured and technical comments of the Greek respondents, and the more descriptive ones of the Lebanese.

8c.4: Conclusion

The preoccupation of the independent social workers with the welfare policies and practices of the state, in reality pointed out their political awareness and involvement, which contradicted their stated apolitical position. Although these respondents ideologically belonged to diverse political spectrums, their structural positions and financial dependence on the state made it difficult to resist by themselves state social policies.

It was obvious from the statements of the respondents that as welfare provision became more complicated, their superior technical knowledge of the operation of the welfare state brought them into conflict with the communal leadership. At present they could only forge with ethno-specific institutions ad hoc alliances.

Unlike the respondents from ethno-specific organizations, the independent ones were institutionally spread across the welfare sector, thus their perception of particular welfare needs of their communities was rather limited, or influenced by the respective fields they were employed.

The independent social workers' potential to act as agents of social change, individually or collectively, was
counter balanced by their equally potential role to act as agents of social control. This latter point was manifested in their concern to deal more with the technicalities of the welfare state, rather than with policies that have larger impact on the general welfare of working class migrants, e.g. programs related to more equitable workforce participation.
I began the study by suggesting that 'ethnic welfare' practices are significant in the reflection and support of particular definitions of social reality and social problems. I used the evidence from state welfare practices, and those of Greek and Lebanese institutions and professionals, to explore the socio-economic location of both groups in the labour market, and the role of women in the family.

Greek and Lebanese immigrants have become an integral part of Australian society. An entrepreneurial oriented petit-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie class has emerged among Greeks and Lebanese, with the latter been dominated by the Maronites. Overall though the majority of Greeks and Lebanese have remained industrial, unskilled workers.

The major source of inequality for Lebanese and Greek working class migrants was located in the labour market, which was compounded by their period of arrival, age and racial discrimination. In general the predominantly unskilled occupational status of these workers, as well as that of other NES workers, has shown little improvement in the last 40 years. The main factors contributing to the perpetuation of this situation have been the important role of unskilled labour in the process of capital accumulation, and the lack of educational and technical qualifications.
and opportunities to these workers.

The restructuring of the Australian industrial sector over the last 15 years has effected significant changes in the employment status of Greek and Lebanese workers, and thus to their financial security. This period has witnessed a decrease in the employment status of these workers, while unemployment rates continued to increase, particularly for the more recently arrived Lebanese to nearly four times higher than those of the total population.

On the other side Greek married women for decades have retained very high workforce participation rates (around 50,0%), and at the same time had to fulfil their traditional female roles. In contrast Lebanese women have never achieved high labour market representation due to their entry in Australia during a period of high unemployment rates, and because of cultural pressures.

The class analysis employed in the study argued that the apparent 'naturalness' of people's ideologies, of their consciousness, was in effect a social creation of their class and non-class relations. Gramsci's model of civil institutions and intellectuals was able to demonstrate the above role of ideology. This was shown in the construction of ethnicity and welfare concepts and practices of the Greek and Lebanese institutions and professionals, their relationships with the wider society, and the use of these ideologies by hegemonic classes to exercise social control.

The intra-communal conflicts of Greeks and Lebanese over the definition of their primordial symbolizations were
actually political conflicts that emerged due to opposing class, status, and material interests, and took place at the institutional level. These political struggles involved the process of cultural re-interpretation of the two groups' past experiences in a new socio-cultural environment. Despite the distortion of social reality created by these symbolizations, they were an integral part of people's new social existence and experience.

De Lepervanche argued that the change from assimilation to multiculturalism represented a change at the ideological level, rather than a structural one [de Lepervanche in 'Australian Society' op.cit: 216]. By this she meant that under multiculturalism the dominant Anglo-Australian institutions and class relations retained their basic characteristics, and were rather reinforced by the acceptance of conservative ethnic bourgeoisie elements in their ranks.

It was in the multicultural period, therefore, that the interplay between ethnicity and welfare assumed a crucial role in the re-definition of migrants' social reality and problems. This emerged as the principal role of Greek and Lebanese institutional and professional welfare practice, and generally of migrant welfare.

The recognition by multiculturalism of NES migrants' inequalities as culturally derived, increased institutional fragmentation in ethnic communities, and made ethnic institutional activity independent of state intervention almost unattainable. The religious and regional
fragmentation of the Lebanese served as good case to study the effects of multiculturalism funding policies.

For instance, the experience of Lebanese secular institutions showed that state intervention in this mostly 'new' ethnic community was initiating and supporting organizational growth and fragmentation, more than in that of the 'old' Greek community. The Lebanese organizational growth and fragmentation was taking place at a faster pace, because these structures had to fulfil the legitimation needs of both the state and of their own petit-bourgeoisie. Thus, the welfare needs of Lebanese working class people became the means in realising this process.

V. George saw the significance of personal care services in their contribution of definition and support of social reality and particular social problems as fourfold: a. They provide individualised definitions and explanations of problems; b. They are seen as able to provide ameliorative solutions; c. They contribute to a segmented and fragmented view of problems; and d. They deradicalise political protest, [George op. cit: 199-201].

Thus, the role of the welfare practices of Greek and Lebanese institutions and professionals, and their consequences on the working class of both groups, could be summarised within the context of the above four points.

The conservative ethno-specific institutions of the sample identified as the major source of inequality of their community members their ethnicity. For this reason
the extensive use of casework by these institutions helped the preservation of primordial characteristics, which were used as a social control mechanism to maintain dominant social values. So, questions about the nature of the whole social structure were never raised.

On the other hand the independent social workers saw the welfare state and its services as responsible for the inequalities of Greeks and Lebanese. Although this was a more progressive approach in comparison to that of the conservative ethno-religious institutions, it also left questions about the present social order unanswered.

All conservative ethno-specific institutions saw as their primary ameliorative role the re-socialisation of their working class clientele to the dominant values of the welfare state and host society, and their services as a complement to this process. In particular for ethno-religious institutions the only way they could address the material needs of the individual and the community, was through the improvement of the spiritual and moral condition of the latter.

The independent social workers did not perceive the ameliorative ability of social work practice limited in casework, but also in the pursuit of social issues. The case of the Greek 'Conspiracy' showed that such action could have beneficial results for disadvantaged groups or individuals.

However, these professionals saw the services of the welfare state as been able to provide solutions to the
needs of the working class migrants, and consequently their social control role was significant. This was more evident with the Lebanese, whose increasing dependence on welfare services and benefits did very little to enhance the possibilities of greater and more equitable participation in the labour market.

The existence of the progressive GOC showed that such community structures have a more holistic view of social problems, and therefore a greater potential to affect some degree of social change for the conditions of migrant workers. Despite the limited political influence of the GOC in the Greek community, its operation showed that conservative social and cultural domination in ethnic communities is not inevitable or totally acceptable.

The institutional and ideological fragmentation of Greeks and Lebanese was not only a product of their primordial differences, but also of their class position in the Australian society and of the policy of multiculturalism. As a result of that the ideological interaction between primordial/socio-political definitions of social problems was fragmented and segmented.

In this way the respondents of the study viewed one aspect of social inequality at the time - racial discrimination, religious intolerance, unresponsive state social services, the impact of unemployment, the condition of the family and the role of women in it - thus obscuring the totality of the needs of their working class populations and the causes of these problems. So, the role
of Greek and Lebanese workers in the process of capital accumulation, and the ideological constructs that contributed to the enhancement of their socio-economic and cultural inequalities generated from this process, remained mystified.

Although the welfare practices of Greek and Lebanese institutions and professionals contributed to the relative easing of immediate problems of their working class clientele, the causes of these problems were located at the individual, group, or community level, rather than the whole social structure.

Thus, multiculturalism's role has been to legitimise the political mobilisation of the ethnic bourgeoisie, and co-opt them into the dominant class and institutional structures of Australian society. On the other hand, multiculturalism attempted to limit any potential political protest by migrant workers by segmenting their social organization, and by defusing and restricting their welfare needs in its arguments about the technicalities of the welfare state [Jakubowicz et al, op.cit: 101].

The Birreells have been correct in their observation of one of the major consequences of multiculturalism on the migrant working class:

"The only other government response has been to support the ideals of cultural pluralism and ethnic consciousness and to aid some ethnic associations, but these efforts do nothing for the material conditions of Southern European migrants or their occupationally derived low status. Nor have there been efforts to provide additional opportunities and training for Southern European migrants wanting to move into
other, more skilled, and better jobs".[Birrell and Birrell op. cit: 258]

Multiculturalism has failed to provide policies and programs for migrant workers that could improve their living conditions, such as training and re-training, affordable housing, better educational opportunities and health services, child care services, and services for the aged. The ROMMPAS Report did not offer any new directions or initiatives towards these areas.

The increasing reduction of industrial positions for NES migrant working class men and women is already creating great financial, familial, and emotional hardships for them. At the same time the increased competition for scarce job vacancies has increased racial/ethnic discrimination, especially towards new migrant groups like the Lebanese, and other non-Europeans.

Under such circumstances the longer welfare provision for migrant workers remains a separate issue from the mainstream debates on social wage allocation, the greater are the possibilities that their welfare will remain a low state priority, and most likely would deteriorate.


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Page 11: Footnote on De Lepervanche should read: