Towards a model of empathetic communication in teaching history

Harvey Waddington Newman
University of Wollongong


This paper is posted at Research Online.
NOTE

This online version of the thesis may have different page formatting and pagination from the paper copy held in the University of Wollongong Library.

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

COPYRIGHT WARNING

You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any copyright material contained on this site. You are reminded of the following:

Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material into digital or electronic form.
TOWARDS A MODEL OF EMPATHETIC COMMUNICATION IN TEACHING HISTORY

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

from

THE UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

by

HARVEY WADDINGTON NEWMAN, B.A., M.ED[Hons.]

SCHOOL OF LEARNING STUDIES
(1988)
- TABLE OF CONTENTS -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table of Figures</th>
<th>(vi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>(vii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>(viii)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER ONE - PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY.

1.1 Purpose of the Study 2
1.2 Significance of the Research 4
1.3 Scope and Limitations of the Study 6
1.4 Organisation of the Study 7

CHAPTER TWO - AN APPRAISAL OF EMPATHY DEVELOPMENT AND PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH EMPATHETIC APPLICATIONS.

2.1 Introduction 13
2.2 Interest in Empathy Studies in Australia 13
2.3 Influence from Britain 14
2.4 Empathy Research in the Australian Context 15
2.5 A Problem of Definition 18
2.6.i British Background in Empathy Development 19
2.6.ii The Influence of Coltham and Fines 20
2.6.iii An Influential Criticism 21
2.6.iv Promotion of Empathy by Schools Council Projects 23
2.6.v Fines - A Reassessment 27
2.6.vi A Call for Re-definition 30
2.6.vii Development of Two Schools of Thought? 32
2.6.viii Place, Time and Society Project 8-13 (F. Thompson) 33
2.6.ix Empathy as an Imaginative Device (Little) 35
2.6.x Differences of Interpretation 37
2.6.xi Structural Imagination and Empathy 38
2.6.xii Present Research Directions 42
2.6.xiii Shemilt - A hierarchy of Stages 43
2.6.xiv Lee - Empathy and Imagination as Supposal 49
(ii)

2.6.xv Clarification of Empathy Rationale - A Necessity 52

2.7.1 The Australian Context - Similar Problems in Samples from Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia 56

2.7.ii Victoria - Supposing as an Empathetic Strategy 57

2.7.iii New South Wales - Confusion over Sympathy 58

2.7.iv New South Wales - A Need for Procedural Analysis of Empathy? 59

2.7.v South Australia vs New South Wales - Differentiating Between Aims and Objectives 61

2.8 A Central Problem of Description and Communication 65

CHAPTER THREE - COLLINGWOOD: A PHILOSOPHICAL BASE FOR EMPATHY.

3.1 Introduction 70

3.2.i Return to Collingwood: What is History? What is History For?? 71

3.2.ii Three Basic Questions - Collingwood[1946] 72

3.2.iii Proposition 1: History as Reconstruction 74

3.2.iv Proposition 2: History as Re-enactment of Past Thoughts 75

3.2.v Proposition 3: History as Self-Knowledge 78

3.2.vi Self-Knowledge in South Australian Curriculum Examples 79

3.3 British Schools Council Applications - An Inadequate Representation of Empathy? 81

3.4 Need for a Broader Psychological Direction in Empathy 86

3.5 Rogers - An Indirect Influence 90

3.6.i Stockley and Empathetic Reconstruction 94

3.6.ii Pitfalls in the Use of Supposition - Dependence on Role Play and Simulation 97

CHAPTER FOUR - THE IMPORTANCE OF ROLE TAKING TO AN HOLISTIC TREATMENT OF EMPATHY.

4.1 Introduction 101
5.2.iii An Alternative Theory - Berlo | 151
5.3.1 Perspectives on Role Taking Theory | 153
5.4 Mead and Collingwood | 158
5.5 A Summary of Role Taking Components | 161
5.6 Flavell - A developmental Descriptive Framework for Role Taking | 164
5.6.i A Leading Question | 164
5.6.ii Successive Hurdles Characteristic | 166
5.7 Significance of Psychosocial Role Taking to History | 168
5.7.i Three Representations of Empathy | 169
5.7.ii Hooper - Illustration from Work of Mainstream Historians | 173
5.7.iii A Critique of Shemilt in Light of Present Findings | 174
5.8 Conclusion | 176

CHAPTER SIX - A MODEL OF EMPATHETIC COMMUNICATION.

6.1 Introduction | 178
6.2 Developmental Role Taking Tasks Relevant to an Empathetic Approach in History Teaching | 178
6.2.i Recognition of Empathetic Perspective | 178
6.2.ii Appropriate Selection and Application of an Empathetic Perspective | 179
6.2.iii Methods of Analysing and Predicting Outcomes of an Empathetic Perspective | 181
6.2.iv Maintaining an Empathetic Perspective | 200
6.2.v Interpretation of an Empathetic Perspective | 204
6.3 The Teacher's Task | 206
6.4 The Student's Task | 207
6.5 Reconciling the Two Procedural Outlines | 208
6.6 Conclusion | 212

CHAPTER SEVEN - EVALUATION OF CONTEMPORARY EMPATHETIC TREATMENTS IN LIGHT OF THE MODEL.

7.1 Introduction | 214
7.2 An Inadequate Methodology for Empathy | 216
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Influence of Cognitive-Oriented Theory</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 A Taken for granted Experience</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 Specific/General Empathetic Development and the use of Contextual Evidence</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6 Development of an Empathetic Perspective</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7 Calls for a Wider Application</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8 Conclusion</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER EIGHT - SYNOPSIS OF THE MODEL: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 General Summary</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Summary of Evaluation of Model in Light of Contemporary Treatments</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 Implications and Recommendations for Future Research</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDICES.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Transcript of Waldron Trial</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Life and Death at the Diggings (Goldfields description)</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Life and Death at the Diggings - Deaths at Lambing Flat</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. extract from 'Beauty and the Philosopher' - (D. Shemilt 1984)</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. extract from 'Empathy an Aim and a Skill to be Developed' - (F. Thompson 1983)</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. extract from 'Empathetic Reconstruction in History and History Teaching' - (D. Stockley 1981)</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. extract from 'Empathy in History-From Definition to Assessment' - [Southern Regional Examinations Board (SREB) 1986]</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. drama exercise based on the Diaries of Mungo Park - (F. Thompson 1983)</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. simulated conversation in 'Assessing Student Achievement in History in Year 10' [Draft] - (ed. D. Cowling 1983)</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY.</strong></td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- TABLE OF FIGURES -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Developmental Empathetic Process in History.</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Developmental Role Taking Tasks Relevant to an Empathetic Approach in History</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Table of Underlying Assumptions for an Empathetic Approach in History</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Lynne, Martin and Chris for their inspiration and loving encouragement.

To Dr. A. J. Fielding, my supervisor, for his technical competence, professional wisdom, personal assistance and loyalty to this study.

To Joe Zahradnik for his unqualified personal support.

To the numerous history students at St. Mary's College, Wollongong for their enthusiasm and interest in 'all things historical.'

"Man is the creature that knows his fellows only in himself".

Marcel Proust; La Prisonniere.
- ABSTRACT -

The study of more human aspects of history has settled somewhat uncomfortably into the discipline of history. The close association of human characteristics and subjective analysis has tended to be in conflict with the objectivity required to maintain history's discipline. The introduction of empathy to historical treatments has accentuated this conflict. A closer examination of what gives history its objectivity in more subjective treatments and the processes involved is important in clarifying the extent to which empathy can be incorporated into the study of history. To deal with these issues is the central purpose of this study; in particular the problem addressed is to devise an holistic model of the empathetic process which may be applied as a general psychosocial process and as a substantial methodological process for the teacher and student of history. The implications of the importance of psychosocial theory to explain empathy are in need of closer scrutiny in historical interpretation. This scrutiny, if successful, may then be employed as a means of negotiating the objectivity of subjective 'human' treatments of history. In this study empathy is interpreted as a fundamental process of communication and thus arguably, one of the most important strategies for teaching and studying history.
The thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any University, and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Harvey Newman.
CHAPTER ONE

PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
CHAPTER ONE.

1.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY.

The major purpose of this study is to develop an holistic model of empathy as a process of communication which caters for the individual's involvement in the free expression of cognitive and affective behaviour. No model exists at present which successfully illustrates how the human aspects of history can be developed by the treatment of empathy in its affective sense. The model demonstrates how an empathetic methodology can be developed by viewing empathy as an interactive communication process characterised by teachable psychosocial role taking tasks from the affective domain.

This study demonstrates by a review of the theory and literature associated with empathy that much confusion surrounds its usage in teaching history. The thesis argues that this confusion has been generated by the inadequacy of attempts to explain empathetic understanding. A further purpose of this study is to offer a means of reducing uncertainties associated with current treatments which will elevate the status of empathy as a method of historical inquiry by making it both more accessible to teachers and more easily taught.

The thesis model is proposed to remedy a central problem identified in this study that empathy is not being used as effectively as it could be in teaching procedures to develop historical understanding. Portal
Confirms this position in existing teaching procedures by expressing a fear that "empathy as 'odd one out' among skills of an entirely predictable kind may find itself in the position of an optional extra." Research in this study indicates that empathy's contribution as a means of teaching history is not being considered with sufficient seriousness in present treatments. Consequently history teachers appear to be unsure of just what to do with empathy and show little confidence in coming to terms with its application. The above problem is expressed in the inability of present theory to adopt a consistent rationale for empathetic treatments in history teaching. Conflicting opinions exist over the importance of empathy in historical applications. Descriptions of empathy range from that of being an occasional aid or heuristic for other historical skills to being considered fundamental to historical understanding as a skill to be developed and an objective to be attained. The central problem of empathy's effectiveness in historical treatments is highlighted by an absence of a tangible empathetic methodology. This situation is clearly recognised by Ashby and Lee (1987:62) who state "it is surprisingly difficult to pin down...how it should be taught, or what...might validly assess it." Overall the inclusion of empathy in historical treatments has been disappointing. This thesis argues that initial diagnosis of what empathy can do in the learning of
history has been incomplete because explanations of empathy have been made largely on the premise that it is a cognitive activity. The view taken in this study is that an emphasis on cognitive learning is reductionist in character in that it restricts the opportunity for full historical experience. Such experience can be made available through the application of the thesis model by the expansion of empathy's description to include learning from the affective as well as the cognitive domain of human behaviour.

1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH.

The significance of this study is that it offers a methodology for the development of empathetic understanding which to date has not been supplied by present historical treatments. The thesis model identifies a number of teachable empathy skills within an overall developmental approach which gives guidance to teachers in recognising and maintaining an empathetic perspective. The model also allows for a stronger emphasis on empathy as an important historical method which elevates its status to a central position in historical treatments. The holistic approach of the thesis model offers a rationale which effectively embraces the different descriptions and emphases of empathy in present treatments. Attempts to explain such terms as imagination, sympathy, identification and
inference in relation to empathy in contemporary treatments have been fraught with uncertainty because of a reluctance to recognise and appreciate that explanation is more readily arrived at through the capabilities of these terms to engender affective responses. The inclusion of elements from the affective domain enables the development of a fuller empathetic understanding than treatments governed by cognitive descriptions of empathy.

An important major outcome of the study which has emerged somewhat serendipitously from the development of a suitable historical empathetic methodology has been the model's provision of a whole new range of strategies for those working in curriculum in general. These strategies may be applied to reassess existing curriculum theory on empathetic communication as a step towards a general theory of empathy.

The research suggests that empathy be seen in a new light but in so doing requires a reassessment of present accepted theory. This study recognises that the line between subjectivity and objectivity in some aspects of educational theory is a particularly fine one (e.g., in psychological judgements). The subtleties of empathy suggest that a central part of its objectivity can be gained from its subjective nature. This apparent paradox is at the heart of empathy and is explained by the thesis model's attention to the development of adductive psychosocial procedures in comparison to
deductive sociological methods in contemporary treatments. If a wider application of empathy is sought (as Portall 1987 suggests) it demands firstly a wider interpretation. This study points out that by referring to a wider theoretical base through aspects of social psychological theory empathy can be developed as a process of communication which caters for the inadequacies of present applications to describe past events imaginatively and subjectively. The thesis argues that a great deal of what effective historians do in explaining character motive and relationships can be treated in more subjective empathetic exercises. A further significance of this study is that by attuning empathy more closely to a philosophical base (Collingwood 1946) teaching procedures may be linked more stringently to the somewhat removed world of the academic historian. A broader theoretical empathetic framework is justified by the fact that it allows for the possibility that empathy may be taught rather than used as an heuristic and consequently, increases its accessibility as an historical method for practising teachers.

1.3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY.

The scope of the study is limited to a treatment of empathetic developments in Great Britain and Australia. A great deal of attention has been given to empathy in the United Kingdom and Australia has followed its lead.
This study includes an assessment of the general trends and influences only in both countries in order to highlight the dependence of Australian researchers on their British counterparts. There has been no attempt made to cover all possible associated programmes. This situation is particularly evident in the samples from the Australian context which centre predominantly on New South Wales and Victoria. Likewise in assessing developments in the United Kingdom there has been a deliberate emphasis placed on those programmes considered to be the most influential in and representative of empathetic development.

1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY.

This study is presented in eight chapters. Chapter 2 traces the development of empathy as applied to the teaching of history by a comparative review of the literature from the United Kingdom and Australia. The review identifies a variation in emphasis given to empathy's importance to learning history displayed in conflicting theories as well as a lack of a definite empathetic methodology. A failure to isolate a central rationale for using empathy in teaching history indicates the need for a model of empathy which caters more readily for the above discrepancies revealed in the literature.

Chapter 3 takes up the need for a central rationale for empathy in history teaching by an examination of Debbins'
interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy of history. A more rigorous application of Collingwood's philosophical analysis in this chapter reveals that empathy is more applicable to the affective domain of human behaviour than the cognitive domain. Consequently contemporary and influential treatments based on cognitive oriented theory are found to be misreading Collingwood's theory. The emphasis which Collingwood gives to the assessment of thoughts and feelings and the importance of self knowledge as an historical objective are explained by the need for a psychological direction in empathy treatments.

Chapter 4 demonstrates how the misrepresentation of Collingwood's theory in contemporary treatments of empathy is due to a confusion between role taking and role playing as outlined by Coutu (1951). A major finding of this chapter is that the psychosocial process of role taking should be used in explaining empathy in history in preference to the overt sociological concept of role play. Also argued in this chapter is that by looking to a more holistic model of empathy based on role taking the psychological direction called for in Chapter 2 may be catered for by linking thoughts and feelings in history through a greater emphasis on affective behaviour. Support is found from the current historical climate for an holistic treatment of empathy which calls for more social psychological applications in history. It is
argued that in view of Coutu's(1951) role taking theory the way is opened for the examination of social psychological theories of empathy to obtain components for the thesis model.

Chapter 5 is concerned with two issues. First by examining social psychological theories of empathy the conceptual components for the model of empathy (put forward in Chapter 6) are identified. From these components empathetic skills or abilities are isolated. Secondly the thesis advances a typology of three distinct representations of empathy on a specific/general continuum to describe the empathetic communication process. The process defined for the model in Chapter 6 is an integrative one which allows for the inclusion of the work on inference by Asch (1952) and on role taking by Berlo (1960), Turner (1963) and Flavell (1975). The methodological implications of this integrative approach are considered in terms of the theories of both Collingwood (1946) and Mead (1956) and for the development of role taking components from psychosocial theory to explain empathy. The conclusion is reached that role taking processes must be taken into account to adequately explain empathy in the learning of history. The framework developed in this chapter is used as the conceptual basis for the model of empathy advanced in Chapter 6.

The model is described according to a general
descriptive framework in 5 stages (Recognition, Need, Analysis/Prediction, Maintenance and Interpretation) after Flavell (1975). The third of these stages is presented as the central component of the model with detailed description and examples of 11 abilities or skills required to develop empathy as a teachable communication process. A further 10 associated skills are listed as important needs in recognising and maintaining an empathetic perspective. The conceptual base in Chapter 5 is used to show how the model can be put together, as an expression of authentic human experience, to counter the problem that history curriculum is not being successfully implemented in contemporary treatments of empathy.

Chapter 7 evaluates the thesis model against contemporary treatments of empathy. It is found that these contemporary treatments are falling short in comparison. The evaluation looks at five key issues:

1. the adequacy of empathetic methodology;
2. the influence of reductionist theory;
3. the perception of empathy as a taken for granted experience;
4. the development of specific/general understanding in empathy; and
5. the use of source materials and questioning.

A conclusion drawn from the analysis in this chapter is that the holistic thesis model is more comprehensive in its approach to empathy than contemporary treatments. The contemporary treatments are exposed as catering only for an elementary stage of empathy as described by the model.
Analysis in this chapter reveals that very recent literature on empathy is pointing in the direction of the thesis model.

Chapter 8 offers a synopsis of the thesis model, draws conclusions on the implications of the study to the development of curriculum theory and to the teaching of history and suggests possible avenues for future research.
CHAPTER TWO

AN APPRAISAL OF EMPATHY DEVELOPMENT AND PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH EMPATHETIC APPLICATIONS
CHAPTER TWO.

2.1 INTRODUCTION.

Chapter 2 is concerned with identifying a central problem associated with the use of empathy in the teaching of history. By an analysis and survey of the literature on empathy development, particularly in Great Britain – but also in Australia, this problem is initially described as one of definition. Differences in interpretation and opposing theoretical rationales in present empathy studies have not tended to foster an emphasis on procedural elements of empathy. Descriptions of what empathy is or is not have outpaced methodological developments required to explain how empathy is achieved. Clarification is required to describe the psychological constructs of empathy as well as to suggest how it can be used more effectively as a means of communicating history to both teachers and students. The need for a definite, more identifiable rationale for empathy highlights the practical need for a central descriptive model of empathetic communication as a fundamental requirement in clarifying much of the confusion and uncertainty over the term's usage.

2.2 INTEREST IN EMPATHY STUDIES IN AUSTRALIA.

The term 'empathy' as applied to the teaching of history has become prominent in recent years in Australian schools. Official sanction for empathy
studies is given by the various State curriculum authorities in syllabus form and a number of texts have included empathy exercises in line with these directives. (NSW Board of Senior School Studies 1986: 6, 49, 64; Stockley & Foster 1982: 9). There appears to be an acceptance by curriculum authorities of the worthwhileness of empathy as a new method and skill in teaching history and although much of what can be called 'empathy studies' is proceeding through an experimental stage (some States are more advanced in the application of empathy than others) there is little objection raised to its inclusion.

2.3 INFLUENCE FROM BRITAIN.

This recent rise to prominence is due to the reference to, and usage of, the term in programmes in Great Britain over the past fifteen years. Enthusiasm for the inclusion of empathy studies in curricula has been generated by the widespread acceptance of the 'new history' movement, more specifically by attempts to apply the rationale behind the British Schools Council materials (1976) and extensions of them. Contacts with this programme have been encouraging and visiting lecturers and workshops have helped to create the present climate. Macintosh, speaking at a National conference in Adelaide in 1981 stressed the importance of empathy studies to the Programme by making the point that "The Project always regarded empathy as absolutely crucial to the
understanding of history".

As a consequence, attempts to empathise in our classrooms are, naturally enough, dependent to a considerable degree upon the continuing lead from programmes in Great Britain where teachers, researchers and academics have been wrestling with the problems of empathy over a greater period of time. The influence of research and studies in Britain on our systems is clearly evident and appears likely to remain so as long as it is seen as necessary to bridge the gap between the two.

2.4 EMPATHY RESEARCH IN THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT.

Whereas much of the emphasis on the 'new history' movement has been concerned with other aspects of the British programmes, namely the hypothetico-deductive approach to the treatment of evidence and the breakdown of skills and objectives, there has been some serious consideration given to the question of empathy in the Australian context. Stockley (1981) has pointed to the value of empathetic reconstructions and offered suggestions as to how these may be applied. His suggestions and reservations are very much attuned to those of his British counterparts. Stockley's clarification of reconstruction as a process (more of 'eliminating misconceptions') is concerned with identifying approaches tied closely to the evidence - "a combination of analytical and emotional skills and
requiring substantial contextual knowledge". (Stockley 1981: 15) This is very much akin to earlier British thinking on this topic and while Stockley is coming to terms with a rationale for empathy, he is quick to point out in a later article on assessment that "empathy is conceived in narrower terms in VISE (Victorian Institute of Secondary Education) than in History 13-16" (Stockley 1981: 25) and shows that he is aware of limitations in the rationale used in Victoria.

Groups of teachers have been concerned with the implementation and assessment of empathy. In NSW in 1983 a teachers' workshop (led by Cowling) has prepared draft materials to assist in the assessment of empathy in Year 10 which offers greater clarification to teachers seeking guidelines in this area. An interesting outcome of this work with assessment would appear to be slightly paradoxical in that certain measures to assess empathy have been isolated before actual teaching methods and strategies. Cowling (1983: 43) notes that sub-skills of empathy have yet to be clarified, indicating perhaps a need for a breakdown of empathy skills. The group itself identifies empathy as both a process objective to be attained and a skills objective to be developed. The Junior History Syllabus (NSW Department of Education 1986–7) would seem to be going some of the way towards identifying sub-skills of empathy based on most recent research into the British Schools Council approach. This
NSW draft document lists Empathetic Understanding as being developed in five stages with stage examples such as "can consider the viewpoints of opposing sides". (NSW Department of Education 1986-7:17) The document identifies empathy as an aim in History Years 7-10 (page 6) and empathetic understanding as an objective to be attained by the end of Year 10 (page 7).

Clearly these inadequacies and weaknesses need to be investigated and clarified. This thesis aims to resolve them by presenting a design for a psychosocial model of empathetic processes so that some success in implementing empathy in history education can be achieved. In the detailed literature research of this chapter the following conclusions are strongly evidenced in regard to curriculum development and research into empathy in Australian schools.

a) Applications are, as yet, in their infancy.
b) There is a growing awareness of the usefulness of empathy as an objective and a skill.
c) There is a natural leaning towards Britain for a lead.
d) Empathy is being seen as giving direction to history in an overall general sense (as a cognitive objective) and also in a specific sense (as a skill in reconstruction).
e) Empathy is being seen as able to develop beliefs, values and attitudes as well as identify with individuals and groups.
2.5 A PROBLEM OF DEFINITION.

The following section examines the historical development of empathy with reference to the contributions of a number of researchers notably Coltham and Fines (1971), Rogers (1972), Gard and Lee (1978), Shemilt (1978) and Boddington (1980). Different emphases are highlighted to support the conclusion that empathy is open to diverse interpretation. As a result of different emphases and interpretations empathy may be beginning to mean 'different things to different people'. If correct, this conclusion indicates a confusion as to what empathy actually is and how it can best be utilised. There are distinct differences in emphasising skills of reconstruction, developing an empathetic process, inculcating values and identifying with individuals and groups which would all seem to be serving as 'empathy' at present. This indicates a problem of clarification both in rationale and definition. Whether empathy is meaning 'different things to different people' may be the first question to be answered. Certainly in Britain this has been encountered as a problem by Boddington (1980) who diagnoses a confusion and frustration in regard to the nature, uses and assessment of empathy and suggests "it is necessary to try to gain a clearer view of the nature of empathy before devising a place for it in the history curriculum". (Boddington 1980:13) Because empathy, in many quarters, already has a 'place' in our curriculum this
diagnosis would appear to be particularly relevant.

A number of terms have become associated with the definition of empathy. These terms such as 'inference', 'identification', 'sympathy', 'using a second record', 'sharing a common humanity', 'supposing', and developing 'a feel for history' have done little to clarify that definition because of the different levels of importance placed on them by researchers and curriculum theorists. Empathy has been classified as a knowledge skill and a reconstruction skill as well as an aim and a process objective. The uncertainty of a central rationale for empathy is largely responsible for these differences which are widened by a lack of description of elements of procedure associated with empathy as a communication process.

The major impetus for empathy studies has come from Great Britain. To begin any diagnosis and analysis it is most appropriate to assess the British development of interest in empathy.

2.6.i BRITISH BACKGROUND IN EMPATHY DEVELOPMENT.

The 1960's in Britain were noted for curriculum reform; traditional history, particularly, was challenged by concerned teachers wishing to introduce new elements of assessment and new approaches to the use of evidence.

In this climate Gosden and Sylvester (1968) refer to this aspect of the imagination[which
provides] an important part of the means whereby the experience and understanding of other people is extended beyond the limitations of immediate contacts. (quoted in Boddington 1980: 13)

Watts (1972: 47) writes

by a combination of sympathy and objectivity, the historian allows the personality of his characters and the nature of society to stand forth in a way which... does justice to them in terms of their own time.

2.6.ii THE INFLUENCE OF COLTHAM AND FINES.

It was in the above climate that Coltham and Fines (1971) wrote their 'Educational Objectives for the Study of History' and consequently the term 'empathy' emerged. At the same time Gard and Lee (1978: 21) recognised the emergence of this climate and describe it as "an opportune moment when there was a widely felt need for a solid theoretical basis for this process of re-thinking". Coltham and Fines (1971: 7-9) describe historical imagination in emotional terms as requiring sympathy ("the power of entering into another's feelings or mind") and empathy ("the power of entering into another personality and imaginatively experiencing his experience"). This particular article (which consisted largely of a taxonomy of objectives concerned with the classification of conative, affective and cognitive behaviour) and the subsequent denunciation of aspects of it by Gard and Lee (1978), and disagreement with its basic tenets by others
such as Shemilt (1978) and Little (1983) has, perhaps more than any other, determined the approaches towards empathy through the 70's and into the 80's. The effect of these approaches can be seen on present interpretations of empathy such as, for example, that of Stockley (1981).

Although empathy was being alluded to earlier, the attempts by Coltham and Fines to isolate and categorise empathy from a behaviourist perspective have raised its status as well as helped to shape thinking towards it. Condemnation of the propositions of Coltham and Fines has led to placing empathy more to the fore rather than less, but with a set of guidelines determining its applicability. These guidelines have dominated thinking on empathy in the past decade and steered that thinking towards it in a particular direction.

2.6.iii AN INFLUENTIAL CRITICISM.

Gard and Lee (1978:23) criticize Coltham and Fines' (1971) classification of 'imagining' (including empathy) as 'conative behaviour' on the grounds that all behaviour has a conative aspect and hence 'imagining' should be "classified as a cognitive activity". They also point to the confusion between the terms 'conative' and 'affective' commenting on their "interchangeability" as "misleading". They question 'imagining' as not an attitude, that it is only "vacuously conative" and dismiss outright what they call the "unanalysed ambiguities" between sympathy,
empathy, identification and involvement which run together in Coltham and Fines' classification.

Gard and Lee (1978:32) state "it is a serious mistake to confuse identification and involvement with historical imagination". They cite an example of identification with Hitler (often quoted since):

> Historical imagination does not require taking the part of a historical agent. Do we really want children to identify with Hitler (or for that matter with Gandhi or Churchill?) or indeed to become 'emotionally involved' with him?

(Gard and Lee 1978:32)

Gard and Lee (1978:33) agree with Coltham and Fines (1971) that there is more to imagination than imagining but suggest that it is not some kind of intuition let alone 'identification', but something akin to 'supposing' and finally that to see a situation from someone else's point of view, and to understand his purposes and intentions, is to be done by inference from evidence requiring a high level of thinking.

The influence of this denunciation of Coltham and Fines' classification and similar ones (cf. Rogers in Dixon 1972) has largely determined the policy adopted to empathy since then. The retreat from the affective, conative behaviourist aspects has been unmistakable and yet the term 'empathy' has survived. 'Sympathy', as discussed later in this chapter, has been less fortunate.
2.6.iv PROMOTION OF EMPATHY BY SCHOOLS COUNCIL PROJECTS.

The survival of empathy is, in no small measure, attributed to its description in the 1976 Schools Council Projects. The rejection of Collingwood's rationale by Rogers (1972) in explaining reconstruction has also attributed to the clarification of what is considered as empathetic reconstruction.

Earlier Schools Council Project work under Blyth (1975) claims that cognitive skills are needed to understand objectively another point of view, without agreeing with it necessarily, while affective skills are needed to 'feel' into another situation. Boddington (1980) points out that whereas this earlier view by Blyth ascribes to both cognitive and affective features of empathy the later Project work (Schools Council Project 13-16) is less developed seeing empathy as a 'vicarious experience'. The basis of this vicarious experience is an interaction between evidence and imagination in which the affective notion is as if controlled by the cognitive.

He (the student) has to be able to enter into the mind and feelings of all the persons involved in an event and appreciate their differing attitudes without necessarily approving of their motives if he is to understand why, given their situation, they acted as they did. The important point here is that the imagination must be disciplined by the evidence available. (Boddington 1980:14)

This view on the disciplining of imagination with evidence was being expressed from another quarter by Rogers (1972)
which reinforced the cognitive aspects of empathetic reconstruction. Rogers, by an analysis of the philosophical aspects of history arrives at the conclusion that

```
reconstruction can only be undertaken on the basis of evidence not just of particulars, but of that interplay between conceptual and particular evidence already described. (Rogers 1972:112)
```

While Rogers (1972:110) claims that "reconstruction is a vital part of historical work in that it imposes a powerful check upon various forms of distortion" he rejects the philosophical rationale of Collingwood (1946) as too intuitive. Rogers' reasons for this and his later reference to empathy itself will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4. This modification of Collingwood's argument for reconstruction is further explained by Rogers in the context of teaching when he refers to the problem of 'imaginative activity' or 'creativity' being undisciplined without genuine evidence and consequently becoming "mere imaginative composition or art". (Rogers 1972:121) Rogers' answer is to reconstruct the past through critical assessment of evidence by inference and constant cross-referencing. Rogers offers an example which he calls "an attempt at a genuine historical reconstruction" (Rogers 1972:131) of life in an industrial town during a specified period. He states "reconstruction was made not only in terms of information directly obtained from the sources, but of inferences drawn
from them". (Rogers 1972: 132) For example, the pupils were asked to
draw up shopping lists in terms of a (rudimentary) cost of living and
probable family income and in terms of the size of their families and
information in the Census returns to work out in what sizes of house they
would probably have lived. (Rogers 1972: 131-132)

This explanation of reconstruction has been transferred quite freely to explain empathetic reconstruction (see Stockley 1981). Although the influence of this view of reconstruction on empathy is difficult to assess it underlines thinking on empathetic reconstruction.

Shemilt (1978) has explained empathy not so much from the perspective of reconstruction but from pupil understanding of empathy. Shemilt's assessment of the British Schools Council Project is revealing from the aspect of the children's experiences. He confirms that the empathy concept is critical to the student's total understanding of history if three basic propositions are accepted. These basic propositions are not specifically cognitive or, for that matter, tied to evidence. They are

a) we share a common humanity with people in the past and can therefore think ourselves back into their situation.

b) the values and attitudes, theories and assumptions are specific to each time and place.

c) knowledge of biography can assist in empathetic reconstruction. (Shemilt 1978: 72)

(Later in this chapter Shemilt's 1984 review of these
basic propositions shows a broadening of this base.)

Yet, in the final analysis, Shemilt's research (1978) demonstrates that when propositions such as these are put to the test in the classroom detailed mastery of several content areas beyond normal expectation is demanded. Both teachers and students tend to process more material at greater speeds sometimes leading to the students' drawing 'nonsensical' and illogical conclusions. (Shemilt 1978:76)

At least two points may be advanced to explain these tendencies. Firstly, that a need is perceived (as Rogers 1972 suggests) to supply ample content or evidence in order to reconstruct and subsequently the climate, throughout the seventies, demanded disciplining of imagination with substantial evidence and the Project simply followed that line or; secondly, that Shemilt's basic propositions were considered too conative or affective as assumptions and needed superabundant evidence to legitimise them. Shemilt's observations, here at least, indicate the extent to which empathy is being considered as a cognitive activity. A further suggestion of these observations is that affective elements are not being extended in terms of their implications for a psychosocial model of empathy but rather are being contained in terms of the degree to which they may be workable within a cognitive framework.

This above analysis of Rogers (1972), Shemilt (1978) and Gard and Lee (1978) indicates that a number of criteria have
clearly influenced empathy studies and research during this period. Basically they have been as a critical reaction to Coltham and Fines'(1971) educational objectives. These criteria are:-

(1) empathy is only achievable through a balance of imagination with evidence;

(2) there is no place for 'sympathy' because of a fear of lack of objectivity;

(3) historical empathy, in the long run, is basically cognitive.

2.6.v FINES – A REASSESSMENT.

Fines(1981) eventually recovers to reply to the charges, ten years after writing the objectives, and observations of his defence are interesting from a number of points. Fines(1981:8) admits that:-

(a) he "did not define conative objectives well".

(b) he denounces as "outrageous" that he required children to "think like Hitler".

(c) he believes "much of the central educational concerns of the Framework still stand" and that Gard and Lee(1978) show "a predisposition to the promotion of empathetic approaches and to the use of primary sources as against the hypothetico-deductive approaches and secondary sources".

(d) he applauds the use of the term
'supposition' as a "convenient bridge between empathetic and hypothetico-deductive modes".

(e) he restates "inferential reasoning is clearly something we should encourage in children".

(f) he believes "the empathetic mode of enquiry requires further thought" and suggests this "bridge area" as being the "most promising".

(g) he sees the need for "inferential reasoning" akin to "happy side-slips between edges of the evidence intuitively but enforced by experience".

(h) he admits "the empathetic mode is not as accurate or faithful as the hypothetico-deductive mode" but only if these are "the only criteria used" and thus questions if other criteria as well as accuracy and faithfulness need to be considered.

(i) he re-affirms that "imagination remains the richest tool for the learner who wishes to gain experience quickly".

Of all the above points by Fines perhaps the most readily acceptable notion is that the 'Framework' still has much to offer, it is a yardstick by which much of empathy development is measured. Research in recent years tends not to refute many of Fines' propositions. This is evidenced in the importance placed on establishing the link between imagination and empathy. Lee (1984:89) argues that "empathy is part of (and a necessary condition of) historical understanding, and
imagination as supposal is criterial for that same understanding". Shemilt (1984) appears to support Fines' distinction between empathy and sympathy in reference to the Hitler example for instance. Shemilt (1984:83) claims

An adolescent may empathize with Adolf Hitler, and ponder his distaste for Himmler's lampshades and habit of drawing the blinds whenever his train passed through bombed cities, without a shred of sympathy or fellow-feeling for the Fuhrer.

Plummer (1983) affords an example of the use of solely primary source materials for empathetic reconstruction (in Fines 1983:195). Little (1983) in analysing the use of imagination in historical writing appears to be not at odds with Fines' comments on inference when she assesses "the greatness of the best historians is... in part the product of imaginative insight". (Little 1983:31)

Although Gard and Lee (1978) are perhaps correct in dismissing a 'full-fledged' educational objectives approach for history as unworkable (in the light of Fines' reassessment) because it is too rational for the present climate and because their analysis of the objectives of history is only a partial analysis of the discipline of history, the point remains that, ten years on, the Fines (1981) article confirms that historical imagination still requires "something more". (Coltham and Fines 1971:7) Boddington (1980) correctly describes the work of Coltham and Fines as "influential" in clarifying the direction and development of present classroom procedures in history.
2.6. vi A CALL FOR RE-DEFINITION.

Boddington (1980) sees that the way to gaining a clearer view of empathy is to employ a definition which is "rather less all-embracing". He describes empathy as "a philosophical activity" and hence that it should be seen more as a means to understanding, not as a creative activity but as a rational intellectual activity which is discreetly distinguishable from meanings such as 'identification', 'involvement', 'sympathy' and 'portrayal'. (Boddington 1980:18)

Boddington diagnoses this notion of empathy as "taking a narrower view" and likens it to 'predictive empathy' as espoused by Cooper (1976) in the Schools Council Project: History, Geography and Social Science 8-13 and originally termed by Gribble and Oliver (1973). Boddington (1980) arrives at this 'narrower view' by an assessment of Bailey's (1975) five uses of empathy. Bailey (quoted in Boddington 1980:14) distinguishes "five separate uses" for the word empathy:

(1) Empathy as a simple synonym for knowing and understanding others.
(2) Empathy as motor mimicry.
(3) Empathy as imagining oneself in the place of others.
(4) Empathy as evoking the other within myself.
(5) Empathy as a rather mysterious way of knowing that goes beyond any normal modes of cognition.

Boddington pinpoints from these five, the two most applicable to historical empathy - "empathy as imagining oneself in the place of others" and "empathy as evoking the other within myself". (Boddington 1980:14) Because of
the difficulty associated with the latter (he equates this with a "strong sense [my emphasis] of empathy") in attempting to assess the affective component, Boddington leans toward the former "weaker" [my emphasis] use of empathy in history as "imagining oneself in the place of others". (Boddington 1980:14)

In stressing the importance of empathy as being philosophically based and emphasising 'understanding' as the central issue in empathetic studies Boddington is attaching less significance to other aspects of empathy such as 'identification' and 'sympathy'. This, then presumably allows greater ease in establishing aims, objectives, strategies and assessment. Questions which can be asked, given this approach, are whether empathy should retain the prominence that it has received in some programmes if it is to be narrowed in this way? - and alternatively, is Boddington reducing the notion of empathy by not catering fully for affective elements to something far less than it actually is? At the back of this narrower view is the problem of categorising aims and objectives and distinguishing the affective component in empathy. By beginning to classify this way and, apparently, steering towards the 'weak sense' of empathy Boddington is really taking the argument of Gard and Lee (1978) one step further. If, for example, this 'other within myself' usage were to be used as a stronger element, whereas it may not assist greatly the
categorisation of aims and objectives it may still help to generate 'understanding' and restore a fuller affective meaning to empathy.

In some ways, Boddington has placed a limitation on empathy to the extent of conforming with the previous 'cognitive' oriented arguments of Rogers and Gard & Lee. In this area he has done little to clarify empathy except beyond the important point that empathy encourages 'understanding'. This runs counter to other important influences present in history today (viz. the growth of psychohistory - see Briggs in Dickinson and Lee 1978). If one asks the question, where does such an explanation as this lead? - the answer appears to be that it does not fully answer the call for 'feeling' and 'imagination' in history and that there may develop a fear of the gradual loss of the importance attached to that affective component of history and, in the process, the loss of a fuller, imaginative meaning of empathy. A closer examination of the reasons Boddington gives for this narrowing in definition of empathy is required beyond the need to clarify aims and objectives, particularly in terms of other detectable influences in history today. These issues are sufficiently important and detailed to require treatment in a separate chapter. (see Chapter 4)

2.6.vii DEVELOPMENT OF TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT?

Articles published in Great Britain since Boddington's
call for clarity relating to empathy demonstrate
interesting developments which are as worthy of
comparison with his assessment as much as to show
present variations in direction. Two schools of thought
have emerged, one related primarily to the work of
Thompson, the other to that of Little.

2.6.viii PLACE, TIME AND SOCIETY PROJECT 8-13 (F. THOMPSON).

Thompson (1983), in analysing the place of empathy in
the 'Place, Time and Society Project 8-13' in Great
Britain diagnoses empathy as "a social skill to be
developed" and also as

a free standing aim that is to be
achieved by a curriculum design that
embraces the intellectual skills of
using resources, communicating
information and interpreting
information supported by attitudes and
values that foster discrimination and
curiosity. (Thompson 1983: 22)

Thompson, in arguing that empathy must be accepted as an
integral part of a school's philosophy, is interpreting
empathy, in this sense, as an aim. He suggests that its
development as a skill can be achieved by "drama, role
play, experiential opportunity and music". (Thompson 1983: 23)

From a dramatised exercise Thompson reflects on the
'identification' by students with people in the past as
"establishing empathy". From this, and other exercises, he
identifies the following characteristics which combine
"to develop an ability to empathise".
1. Projection into the personality of someone else.
2. Identification with other people.
3. Understanding of conditions affecting people.
4. Adoption of someone else's characteristics.
5. Consideration of other people in their own situation.
6. Interpretation of other peoples' reactions to situations.
7. Representation in various ways of other peoples' reactions.
8. Communication by various means of other peoples' condition and of environmental background.

Thompson's deductions are supportive of the 'Place, Time and Society Project 8-13' throughout. His assessment of work in the primary school on empathy leaves him with little doubt that "empathy begins in the early years in school". (Thompson 1983:26) In an earlier article Thompson (1982) has made similar observations on the importance of empathy to the same project. Of the tabled project objectives, listing skills as 'Intellectual, Social and Physical', he states the one that is most vital is the ability to empathise. Empathy with its requirement of close identification with people of other times and in other places... that means, for example, children should step into the clogs of those pressganged into the early factory system... demands that a variety of sources be explored, that children should be able to evaluate information, and that they should have an awakening of social awareness. It was felt by the Project team that empathy should be a fundamental aim as well as an objective. (Thompson 1982:21-22)

One point to note, regarding this project, is that this was the original project 'History, Geography and Social
Sciences 8-13' (directed by Blyth) to which Boddington (1980) refers as being "more developed" than the Schools Council Project: History 13-16 in its view of empathy.

2.6.ix EMPATHY AS AN IMAGINATIVE DEVICE -(LITTLE).

Little, after identifying Collingwood's 'structural imagination' in an historian's work to be largely cognitive, examines empathy as "another type of imaginative activity frequently attributed to historians". (Little 1983: 30-31) She concludes that

> it is simply not possible to think another's thoughts or feel another's feelings. What one does is to imagine or entertain the thoughts and feelings one supposes him to have. The activity is therefore cognitive, though the impulse spurring one to it, as with all imaginative activity is affective. (Little 1983: 30)

Little further explains:

> He (the historian) must take account of past feelings as well as past thoughts because human activity is motivated at least as often by feeling as by thought, normally by a mixture of both. (Little 1983: 31)

Little lists the dimension of feeling as fundamental to understanding but points out that the historian does not normally use empathy

> only rarely can he 'feel' his way into the shoes of another. He does not think past thoughts or feel past feelings he imagines them and when he writes about the past so imagined, he does not try to persuade his readers to think past thoughts, or feel past feelings or even,
very often to imagine them. (Little 1983:31)
To Little, empathy is "an heuristic device which the historian abandons when it has done its work". (Little 1983:31)

Three years on from Boddington's call for clarity much of his statement concerning 'understanding' and a break from aspects such as 'identification' and 'involvement' in respect of empathy can be applied to this assessment by Little. Her stance, though, appears to have placed more emphasis on the affective use of empathy in accounting for past thoughts and feelings — and yet, she describes little beyond the recognition of the need for this emphasis. This view by Little is close to Blyth's (1975) earlier one concerning the importance of both affective and cognitive aspects (in the original History, Geography and Social Sciences 8-13 project).

While it is perhaps debatable as to whether Boddington (1980) has moved substantially from this view by Blyth (I believe he has 'affectively' retreated somewhat) the work of Thompson clearly indicates the new Place, Time and Society Project is moving off at a tangent. Thompson advocates that more emphasis be given to the importance of empathy as 'interpretation'. In Thompson's case empathy is not being 'narrowed' or even seen as an 'heuristic device' but something fundamental to history which is far more embracing and includes the coverage of
social skills and even the development of "an awakening of social awareness". (Thompson 1982:22) Thompson's analysis indicates, perhaps, not so much a substantial shift from Blyth's earlier project as regards affective/cognitive aspects but more a weighty transference of rationale for the project.

The evolution of British interpretations of empathy (particularly in terms of Boddington's call for clarity of definition) has reached an interesting, and even crucial stage in the light of these descriptions and analyses by both Thompson and Little. Closer examination of the above propositions concerning empathy indicates two seemingly divergent schools of thought. Broadly speaking, these are synonymous with project work associated with the Place, Time and Society Project 8-13 and extensions of the History 13-16 Project. Other broad influences (indirectly or otherwise) include that of individual contributions, eg. Blyth and Fines, to the developments of each project. The evolutionary nature of research into empathy has also been sustained and nurtured from sources (viz. Little, Rogers) apparently independent of these programmes.

2.6.x DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION.

Boddington's (1980) interpretation of empathy in the 'narrower' sense is in line with prior research by Gard and Lee (1978) which has been concerned with the clarification of objectives. This clarification has been
concerned specifically with the identification of cognitive and affective components, as per Coltham and Fines (1971) and cognitive interplay of imagination and evidence, as per Rogers (1972).

Little's (1983) observations are even more enlightening than this analysis by Boddington. Although still clarifying cognitive and affective modes (in the Fines tradition), she gives a special place to empathy, beyond the definition of Boddington. This description by Little represents such a substantial shift forward, in comparison to Boddington, to constitute a separate line of thinking again. If Little's assessment is taken to its logical conclusion much of the earlier attempts to define empathy by Project teams and individuals appears less convincing. What has been alluded to as empathy from these sources is considered by Little to be "structural imagination" as Collingwood would have interpreted it. (Little 1983:28-29) Much of what has been called empathy by Boddington (1980) and Thompson (1982, 1983) and alluded to by Gard and Lee (1978) according to Little's classification is not really empathy at all.

2.6.xi STRUCTURAL IMAGINATION AND EMPATHY.

Collingwood (1946) describes his 'structural imagination' as that employed "when evidence is interpreting something more than it signifies directly". (Collingwood in Little (1983:28)
Instances of this structural imagination are supplied by Little from a range of aspects which have been associated previously by others with empathy. Little shows where structural imagination, to Collingwood, is employed to give continuity.

Caesar is at one time in Italy, later in Gaul - the historian's imagination fills the gap thus supplying the fact that he made a journey from one to another. (Collingwood in Little 1983:28)

Also, by considering ways of explaining a gap between events structural imagination supplies different interpretations, that is, alternative constructions of the same evidence envisage possibilities of what 'might have happened'. (Collingwood in Little 1983:29) Structural imagination is cited as a means of discovering further evidence in an example from Ryle (1979).

Discovering from his sources that it rained heavily throughout the day, the historian imagines what it must have been like to a soldier in the field at Waterloo, feet squelching in the mud. Thus prompted he seeks further and finds letters home from riflemen complaining of rain-soaked boots and rations. (quoted in Little 1983:29)

In explaining how to arrive at a generic statement Kitson-Clark (1967) states that this can be achieved by three alternatives;

(a) pre-conceived ideas.
(b) detailed examination of a variety of different cases.
(c) forming a general impression and allowing the imagination to supply what might be missing. (quoted in Little 1983:30)
Little equates this third proposition to another example of structural imagination. These examples of supplying different interpretations and posing alternative constructions are, to Little, examples of 'supposing' suggested by Gard and Lee (1978) and looked towards by Fines (1981) as a possible description of empathy.

The distinction between this structural imagination and empathy is made by Little on the grounds of empathy being able to supply "a convincing explanation of someone's behaviour" by the involvement of intuitive and inferential elements, by relying on the sharing of "a common form of life" and the presence of a person's "second record". (Little 1983: 30) A second record is interpreted as one's own convictions and intuitions on what is already known or recorded about a subject against which the overall explanation is weighed. Empathy is seen as being concerned with taking account of past feelings and past thoughts to attain a full understanding. Little refers to this in Trevor-Roper's (1980) description where

> to enter into the minds and passions of people...the function of historical imagination is to penetrate the minds, the strange and complicated minds, sometimes even the barbarous and repellant minds to understand the springs and compulsions, the dilemmas and predicaments, the genius and folly of the human decisions. (quoted in Little 1983: 30)

Assuming that Adolf Hitler may fit one of these descriptions, this view of Trevor-Roper's suggests a close
involvement with characters is much more essential than Gard and Lee (1978) are prepared to admit. Lee (1984) is still troubled by this close involvement with characters. He states "such feelings may be a hindrance rather than a help" and "should one expect the historian (or his audience) to share the grim satisfaction of a Nazi at the fate of the Jews?" (Lee 1984:113) Lee overcomes the problem of when to use sympathy for characters by assuming that "in history sympathy is more a matter of recognizing the appropriateness of feelings or beliefs than of sharing them". (Lee 1984:97) He does not explain clearly how this recognition can come about without sharing feelings or beliefs to some degree.

Little finally also points to further evidence of this concern with taking into account past feelings and thoughts by Wedgwood (1957, in Little 1983:30) who refers to "the capacity for entering into the fervour of our ancestors with full intellectual sympathy".

Little's assessment of empathy, if accepted, demonstrates inadequacies of notions of 'supposing' to explain empathy. It also finds a place for sympathy included in empathy—a suggestion that has been previously persistently rejected. Coltham and Fines (1971) had originally defined empathy as "the power of entering into another personality" and sympathy, separately, as "the power of entering into another's feelings or mind". Gard and Lee reject this classification. (Dickinson and Lee 1978:32)
The view of Boddington (1980) of 'understanding' is not expressed specifically with the same dimension of 'feeling' attributed to 'understanding' by Little (1983). In view of the place ascribed to empathy by Little a question to be raised is whether Macintosh's (1981) comment that "the Project always considered empathy as crucial" is in need of some qualification.

On the other hand, Thompson's (1983) analysis demonstrates that empathy is being emphasised from a much broader base. This application of empathy shows little concern for clarification of the issues which seem to have dogged empathy research in the 1970's. Apart from a warning that there is a danger of confusing empathy with sympathy, this is not explored. (Thompson [1983:23] explains the difference as empathy being equated with 'admiration' and 'involvement' and sympathy with 'compassion'.) Thompson associates empathy with identification, projection into a personality, adoption of someone else's characteristics and representation in various ways of other people's reactions. To achieve the above characteristics Thompson advocates empathy be used as a skill; by drama, role play, research, experiential opportunity and music. (Thompson 1983:23-26)

2.6.xii PRESENT RESEARCH DIRECTIONS.

Recent research in Great Britain (Shemilt 1984; Lee 1984) is demonstrating a much keener awareness of
characteristics of empathetic understanding and has advanced quite markedly towards identifying ways in which empathy can be adapted to classroom procedures in history. This research is not only interesting in terms of the new ground broken and in the clearer perceptions of empathy (Appendix D) but also because of its position in relation to the earlier developments outlined above. Examples are offered too, of the expansion and modification of previous theories expounded by individual researchers, notably Shemilt and Lee themselves.

2.6.xiii SHEMILT - A HIERARCHY OF STAGES.

Shemilt (1984) has produced the most far reaching analysis to date of the possibilities for using empathy in teaching history. The recognition of three forms of hierarchical empathy being suggested in curriculum material is evidence of an acceptance of Shemilt's influence in the United Kingdom (Southern Regional Examinations Board [SREB] Cambridge 1986).

Shemilt (Dickinson 1984: 39-84) offers a clarification of the concept of empathy by the investigation of how adolescents empathise and puts forward what is described by Dickinson (1984: x) as "probably the first systematic analysis of empathetic exercises". Shemilt advances a series of hierarchically ordered objectives for teaching and assessing empathetic construction which he considers to be developing "towards a practical pedagogy". (Shemilt 1984: 65)
Empathy is defined by Shemilt through interpreting three competing portraits of Collingwood's empathising historian who is favoured as a 'time-traveller' projecting his own psyche into the past and mentally reliving events from the situation, rather than the standpoint of the other. (Shemilt 1984:41)

Shemilt argues that empathy can be taught if the historian is armed with a "model of mind" (a set of transformation rules) belonging to a class, place and time. Establishing an "idea of period" is important to Shemilt's argument and he extends his basic assumptions concerning empathy outlined earlier in this chapter to include

(a) the perspectives of the past are likely to differ from those of the present.

(b) we share a common humanity with people in the past.

(c) past 'forms of life' are genetically connected to the historian's own.

and (d) people in the past behaved rationally. (Shemilt 1984:47-48)

Shemilt's observations of children's empathetic constructions lead him to identify hierarchical stages. This stage development is based on student abilities to overcome attitudes of patronising predecessors towards sharing equally with them which leads to recognising 'everyday empathy' and then 'historical empathy'. The last stage of development is seen as the recognition of empathetic methodology. (Shemilt 1984:50-55)
Analysis as to why students think constructions concerning motive are important and what the connections are between history as action and history as event is undertaken by Shemilt. Five stages are explained by Shemilt (1984:55-65) in terms of

1. student ability to disassociate action and event.
2. the importance given to a superordinate fate.
3. the importance placed on teleological explanations.
4. the grasping of the significance of intended as against unintended actions or the genesis of causal explanation.
5. the articulation between empathetic and causal explanation.

Shemilt identifies these stages to unravel the distinct languages of meaning and intention from cause and effect in his analysis of student responses.

Approaches to teaching empathy are classified by Shemilt according to the nature of empathetic responses demanded, either descriptive or explanatory. The logic of the task and the nature of the activity varies according to either type. Shemilt (1984:66) analyses these activities in twelve "far from exhaustive" approaches which include drama, games and simulation, on-site re-enactments, experimental re-enactments, biography, projective exercises, imaginative reconstructions, decision-making exercises, disconfirmation exercises, empathetic dilemmas, structured contrasts and the linking of culture and economy all according to their enactive or reactive nature. The analysis includes criticism of some
activities in light of their appropriateness for empathetic history. For instance, on-site re-enactments are said to succeed in empathetically (re)constructing the situation of people in the past but not their perspective. (Shemilt 1984:69) Similarly, in regard to imaginative (re)constructions he states that they "appear to have little to recommend them". (Shemilt 1984:69) Drama is said to be a "very occasional albeit spectacular weapon in the teacher's armoury". (Shemilt 1984:67) He favours decision making approaches based on games and simulations as constituting "a major class of weaponry in the empathetic armoury". (Shemilt 1984:71) Exercises which he generally associates with an explanatory response (rather than a descriptive response) such as disconfirmation exercises, the empathetic dilemma, structured contrasts between past and present and exercises linking culture and economy are favoured by Shemilt and their natures explained by simulations, games and experimental re-enactments. These methods are ranked according to levels of empathetic and pre-empathetic understanding.

Shemilt's view is based on the following assumptions concerning teaching and assessing empathy.

(1) Adolescents cannot be taught to empathise 'authentically' but students' attempts at empathetic construction can be justified in terms of the facts they know or believe to be the case.

(2) Empathetic construction should be taught
and assessed as a cognitive and not an affective activity.

He does not argue against an 'affective' component of historical empathy but is convinced that "affective empathy cannot be taught without degenerating into indoctrination". (Shemilt 1984:78)

(3) An understanding of history cannot be taught to adolescents in the round.

Shemilt argues that constructing a sense of period should not be attempted whilst considering problems of evidence and cause and effect should not be confused with analysing problems of intentional action until a certain level of understanding is reached.

(4) Teaching and assessment should seek to mesh aims excogitated from analysis of the nature of the subject with the ideas adolescents hold at given stages of conceptual (ideational not operational) development.

He offers a general model of developmentally primitive concepts to do this.

(5) Teaching methods requiring empathetic explanations are, in general, more effective than those demanding description.

(Shemilt 1984:78-79)

This later view by Shemilt demonstrates a continuation of previous cognitive directed research suggested by Gard and Lee (1978) and supports Boddington's (1980) call for clearer objectives, in particular. Shemilt has greatly extended the classification of empathetic objectives by pinpointing levels of empathy based on children's
developmental perceptions and demonstrates significant advances based on ways to get the period right.

Much of what Shemilt prescribes differs from the outline by Thompson (1983) in that he analyses activities such as drama more closely and highlights limitations in their widespread use. Shemilt advances his original propositions concerning empathy by applying more cognitive restraints to which he has alluded previously. The use of biography as previously listed (Shemilt 1977) in these propositions has been omitted.

This theory by Shemilt has greatly clarified the previous attempts to see empathy as a cognitive activity as suggested by Little (1983). However it has not significantly countered affective components of empathy which have been outlined previously and by opting for the 'time-traveller' type of empathising historian has continued to express empathy in the 'weaker sense'. The activities and methods advocated (simulations, reconstructions, re-enactments and dilemmas) whilst being separated and re-defined are still very much geared to explaining empathy in this weaker sense. In so doing the limitations expressed earlier in this chapter in regard to viewing empathy in a stronger sense have not been significantly reduced. The influence of this enlargement of prior research by Shemilt is being seen as dominating present curricular exercises on empathy. The greatest influence appears to be in the definition of empathy as a
hierarchy of cognitive stages to be achieved and even though objectives are well ordered and examples are given, actual skills still remain somewhat illusory.

2.6.xiv LEE—EMPATHY AND IMAGINATION AS SUPPOSAL.

Lee (1984) has described empathy largely in the context of its relationship with imagination. His argument is that

empathy is part of (and a necessary condition of) historical understanding and that imagination as supposal is criterial for that same understanding. (Lee 1984:89)

Lee defines empathy as a power; that is "that we share a common form of life at a very basic level with all other humans". (Lee 1984:89) He also sees empathy as an achievement; that is

being in a position to entertain (not necessarily to share) beliefs and being in a position to consider the impact of these emotions (not necessarily to feel them). (Lee 1984:89)

As well he views empathy as a propensity; that is a disposition to take into account "other points of view", and as a process; that is "a special means of finding out". (Lee 1984:90) Lee dismisses the role of empathy as a power in history, but considers the need to see empathy as achievement and as a disposition. (Lee 1984:90) To Lee, empathy as achievement is closely related to historical understanding which is defined as being broken down into knowing an agent's goals and intentions and knowing the
situation in which he acted as well as seeing how these provided reasons for the action that is to be understood. (Lee1984:90) The situation may be seen in static or dynamic terms analysable by terms of conditionals, i.e., if so and so happens then such and such is the case. This is directly associated with the notion of supposal as applied to empathy and in terms of previous research is a theoretical extension of his earlier point on supposal made in association with Gard(1978). Lee talks of imagination as supposal where a lack of imagination is a failure to 'cash' or 'cash in' what is already known. (Lee 1984:93)

Lee's comment on imagination as supposal explains further the concept which Fines(1981) has earlier suggested as having the most possibilities for incorporating empathy. The implications for empathy of Lee's comments on imagination offer an interesting comparison with Shemilt(1984). Lee considers thoughts and feelings as Little(1983) has done, as previously mentioned in this chapter, and although he accepts that there is a link with the 'affective domain' he considers that emotions and feelings have a cognitive base. Although Lee considers the affective domain and returns to an analysis of emotions and feelings he sees empathy in the same light as Shemilt - as a cognitive process from a 'time-traveller' perspective.

There are instances where Lee is more advanced than
Shemilt in recognising other aspects which can be applied to empathy. Whereas Shemilt has a more sympathetic view of Piagetian development Dickinson and Lee, according to Thompson (1984), have questioned Piaget's value. This has led Lee to consider empathy more as a process, to consider imagination from a general psychological position and to raise the possible importance of work by Donaldson (1978) on 'embedded' and 'disembedded' thinking and Flavell (1974) in determining a type of process. (Lee 1984:108) This avenue of research into imagination allows Lee to assess sympathy in the context of imagination as supposal being criterial to empathy. Here Lee shows an advancement on his earlier work in that, given these restrictions, he now finds a place for sympathy whereas previously he had not. Lee now recognises sympathy as 'partial' and 'impartial'. (Lee 1984:98)

Lee raises issues which show a divergence of opinion from that of Shemilt but is still largely working from the same base in that imagination and that part of imagination 'criterial' to empathy is a cognitive process. Lee (1984:98), as a result of this, still separates identification from empathy and considers sympathy, which is separated from notions of supposing, as unworkable because of the danger of bias.

Rogers (1984) goes beyond Lee by arguing that Bruner's (1967) ikonic mode of representing knowledge can become more
and more symbolic in its function without ceasing to be visual. (Rogers 1984:154) Rogers recognises the value of empathy as "a very important aspect of reconstruction" where visuals constitute the 'enabling knowledge' necessary to empathise. (Rogers 1984:159) This is a further direction of recent research which controls the use of evidence. It is interesting that Rogers has modified his earlier (1972) view that imaginative reconstruction should control evidence to one which includes empathy, albeit specifically related to ikonic representation.

2.6.xv CLARIFICATION OF EMPATHY RATIONALE - A NECESSITY.

Clearly empathy is being interpreted differently and a variety of emphases are being placed on aspects of empathetic understanding. Clarification is required as to why this is so; as to whether any one emphasis is unacceptable; as to whether all these emphases should be termed empathy; as to whether this diversity is less extreme than suggested and can in fact be reconciled; or, as to whether differences in emphasis are important in determining the overall direction of empathetic research. Has Shemilt's (1984) influence countered the directions advocated by Thompson (1983), for example?

Whereas the approaches followed by Boddington (1980), Little (1983), Shemilt (1984) and Lee (1984) to define empathy's use have been confined largely to the explanation of
empathy as an acceptable tool in the discipline of history, that of the Place, Time and Society project (explained by Thompson 1983) has defined empathy according to its use across a wider range of disciplines beyond even History and Geography. The difference between the approaches may well be the difference between "doing what historians do" and "learning to do what historians do in a limited sense" as Dickinson, Gard and Lee have suggested. (Dickinson 1978:14)

Thompson's view would seem to find some support in Dickinson's conclusion on evidence in the classroom.

It may be a necessary prerequisite of learning history that certain activities in some respects conflicting with the strict canons of professional practice occur in schools. (Dickinson 1978:14)

The acceptability of this prerequisite must depend ultimately on the rationale for the inclusion of empathy in the first place and fundamentally, the rationale adopted for the study of history itself.

The evolution of empathy throughout the seventies in Britain has adhered to a rationale concerned with maintaining the discipline of history by clarifying cognitive and affective modes of empathy. Although Boddington (1980) has called for a narrower view of empathy the objection can be raised that this preoccupation with rationalising empathy by him has been from a perspective which is itself 'narrow' in terms of a full understanding of history as a discipline.
Gard and Lee (1978) have criticised Coltham and Fines (1971) for trying to apply a narrow 'objectives' approach to history. (Dickinson 1978: 30) The doubt remains as to whether this has been substantially avoided by not adhering to classifications of conative and affective modes of empathy. Has the emphasis been on end products, objectives and objectivity rather than the processes involved?

Lee's later work (1984) on empathy as a process would seem to recognise this fact but goes little beyond this recognition perhaps because of cognitive restraints. Shemilt (1984) is still very closely associated with emphasising objectives.

Thompson's (1983) empathy rationale includes that of developing a 'better' person; of understanding present society; of using empathy to develop an awareness of others and to consider their points of view as well as to present history in a more 'enjoyable' fashion. In comparison, Boddington (1980), Little (1983), Shemilt (1984) and Lee (1984) for example (whilst perhaps allowing for this to occur) seem not to stress this as fundamental but rather to adopt the position that empathy is primarily concerned with empathising with past characters and situations in period by hindsight and not to empathise with individuals or groups in the present. Any 'enjoyment', in the case of Boddington and Little for example, would come naturally from experiencing proximity
to real understanding.

One significant aspect of these differing rationales is that empathy studies are seen by Thompson as applicable to a wider range of students whereas Little, Boddington and Shemilt tend to see them applied at a significantly advanced level. This is borne out by applications of empathy in the British Schools Council History 13-16 materials (Scott 1982). Shemilt (1984) has advocated an hierarchical development progressively towards an advanced level. Possibilities for a wider application of empathy are alluded to (though not greatly explored) by Rogers (1984) in his work with ikonic representation and by Lee (1984) in reference to Donaldson's 'human sense' as applied to student learning.

The fact that History is represented in both approaches demonstrates a necessity to clarify these differing rationales. If both are to be espoused, at least some determination of where, in an overall history education perspective, they can be applied best or reconciled is required. Suggested questions in this area include - is the age difference for 8-13 year olds and 13-16 year olds sufficient to account for the difference in the approaches? - is there an overlap? - do levels of difficulty explain sufficiently the wider applicability by Thompson and the correspondingly more elite coverage by other programmes such as the 13-16 British Schools Council project? - is empathy to be treated differently
for different age groups?

This clarification of rationale is fundamental to any further definition of the nature of empathy which, almost a decade on from Boddington's call, still requires a great deal of attention.

If, as stated earlier, empathy in Australia is being interpreted as meaning 'different things to different people' this is even more so in present applications in Great Britain. Interpretations of empathy in the Australian context reflect a dependence upon British developments. The lack of clarity in these British interpretations of empathy outlined above highlights the fact that in the transfer to the Australian context there is a long way to go before a common viewpoint on empathy is likely to emerge. An effort is needed to examine and assess historical empathy from an Australian point of view and to recognise that in adapting British programmes which are themselves in formative stages of development there lies the danger of misapplication of a coherent rationale for empathy studies.

2.7.1 THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT - SIMILAR PROBLEMS IN SAMPLES FROM VICTORIA, NEW SOUTH WALES AND SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

Stockley (1981) argues that empathetic reconstruction is not "solely an imaginative act" and lays more stress on 'understanding' than on "vague notions of feeling like
other people". (Stockley 1981:12) He stresses that empathetic reconstruction is a difficult task requiring considerable structuring, forethought and contextual knowledge and by remaining faithful to the historical evidence... supported by the skills of historical method, it does not seem to allow greater flexibility and creativity by the student and perhaps brings the student a little closer still to the approach of the professional historian". (Stockley 1981:13)

2.7.ii VICTORIA - 'SUPPOSING' AS AN EMPATHETIC STRATEGY.

Stockley (1981) suggests that 'imagine that' exercises provide little guidance and direction for the student and offers "structured dilemma" exercises and a "variation of the structured dilemma - the notion of 'supposing' as an important element". (Stockley 1981:16) He states "empathetic reconstruction of the past is well within the capabilities of..16 year old Australian pupils" (Stockley 1981:14) and emphasises empathy as a 'feel' for an historical period. Stockley sees simulation games and role playing as natural extensions of 'supposing that' and 'structured dilemma' exercises.

With these emphases, and specifically those of structuring evidence and including 'supposing that' exercises, Stockley's interpretations follow closely the views of Gard and Lee (1978) as qualified by Boddington (1980) and not the more detailed recent analysis by Lee (1984) of the importance of supposal in determining when a
student should 'cash in' what is already known. The 'feel' for history expressed by Stockley is not as clearly explained as in the interpretation of Little who states

he (the historian) must take account of past feelings as well as past thoughts because human activity is motivated at least as often by feeling as by thought. (Little 1983: 31)

2.7.iii NEW SOUTH WALES - CONFUSION OVER SYMPATHY.

The examples from the workshop headed by Cowling (1983) in New South Wales reflect parallels with the United Kingdom situation. Cowling's examples, in keeping with Boddington's (1980) approach stress the methodological point that empathy is closely linked with the historical evidence. According to Cowling (1983:39) "empathy is not sympathy"; however his examples reinforce the important point subscribed to by Little (1983) that "the ability to sympathise is a necessary first step towards empathy". 

(Cowling 1983:39) Lee (1984) argues further that

in history sympathy is more a matter of recognizing the appropriateness of feelings or beliefs than of sharing them [and] . . . separated from notions of supposing, entertaining and evidence, identification and even sympathy are signs of partiality, lack of detachment or just plain bias. 

(Leel984:97-98)

Thus it is clear that a great deal of confusion exists over the exact position and application of sympathy in empathetic understanding. In this writer's view this
confusion further illustrates the need to develop a model of the empathetic process.

2.7.iv NEW SOUTH WALES - A NEED FOR PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS OF EMPATHY?

Attempts to classify empathy as a process objective and empathetic reconstruction as a skills objective reflect in Cowling's New South Wales workshop the seventies decade of objectives-oriented approaches to empathy in Britain although differences between cognitive/affective modes are not isolated. The results of Cowling's workshop reveal an important point which, as yet, has not been fully explained in any of the interpretations of empathy; that is that "there are no sub-skills mentioned in the Syllabus which relate directly to the achievement of empathetic reconstruction". (Cowling 1983:42) This observation by Cowling refers to ways of explaining to students and teachers actual steps as to how empathy can be achieved. This point is also identified by Ennals (1984) in relation to developing historical thinking in computer programmes. He states that

no clear account of information processing in history is developed. Emphasis is theoretically given to skills, but no convincing hierarchy or progression of skills has been provided, nor is there agreement as to how the various skills are applied. (Ennals 1984:25)

As in Great Britain there is difficulty in clarifying procedures or pinpointing sub-skills. This is apparent
in the examples supplied by Plummer (1984) where instructions suggested as to "why pictures can be useful as evidence about people in the past" are supplied. Plummer states:

It's as if they give us a window through which we can look into people's minds. By doing so, they can help us to understand what people are feeling at a particular time. Historians call this kind of understanding empathy... we shall see how pictures have helped us to understand empathy... we shall see how pictures have helped us to understand the ideas, values and beliefs of three groups of people in history. (Plummer 1984:4)

There is often an assumption that the teacher or student should be allowed scope for individual differences or should intrinsically know what to do to achieve empathy. (If Thompson's classification of role play, drama and music is looked at from the viewpoint of Little, for example, it can be argued that the elements of procedure are even more transient in the Place, Time and Society Project 8-13.) Shemilt has accentuated the problems associated with this assumption in demonstrating the limitations and inadequacies of drama, projective exercises, on-site re-enactments and imaginative reconstructions to explain empathy procedures. (Shemilt 1984:67-68)

Whereas empathy is being suggested as a necessary skills objective in history teaching there are no clear indications of these skills being isolated, of whether they are hierarchical in character or, in fact, how they
may be applied in the classroom.

2.7.5 SOUTH AUSTRALIA vs. NEW SOUTH WALES — DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN AIMS AND OBJECTIVES.

The K-12 Syllabus in New South Wales, by suggesting empathy be introduced in the primary school, is more in line with Thompson's view of a wider range of empathy studies to diverse age groups. Thompson suggests that "empathy begins in the early years in school" because it is "a skill that opens out the development of many other intellectual skills". (Thompson 1983:26)

The 1986 Year 11 Syllabus for Modern History in New South Wales demonstrates a lack of clarity in terms of empathy applications for these senior students. Empathy is seen as an aim, presumably as Thompson has envisaged it, and not as a skill or objective as is evidenced elsewhere in New South Wales (viz. Cowling). Increasing this confusion, empathy is listed as a 'knowledge aim' which is difficult to reconcile with other classifications of empathy. The closest this Syllabus comes to including empathy as a skills objective is in the section entitled 'Communicating Results' — "the ability to reconstruct aspects of the past using historical evidence and the imagination" (NSW Syllabus 1986:9) and under 'Attitude Objectives' — "to develop a feeling for the past and an understanding of why people acted the way they did". (NSW Syllabus 1986:10) In the rationale listed for the New
South Wales 2 Unit People and Events Syllabus empathy is included under the title 'Modern History's Contribution To These Students' as a means by which this course will help students to "develop an empathy with other people and societies in the recent past". This is expounded later as a specific aim - "to help students develop an empathy with other people and societies". (NSW Syllabus 1986:52) To include reference to empathy in broad terms as an aim indicates a rationale more attuned to that of Thompson (1983). A question to be raised is whether this rationale is the most advantageous to 'senior' historical enquiry?

The South Australian document 'Planning the History Curriculum 8-12' (1983) offers a clear enunciation of the difference between aims and objectives:

the aims of the history curriculum are the broad, long-range targets for the subject, while the objectives state specific learning outcomes which can be demonstrated by the student (South Australian Syllabus 1983:15)

and classifies empathy as an objective underlying the aim to help students understand themselves and others, through a study of cultural groups in their own and other societies, both past and present. (South Australian Syllabus 1983:17)

Whether this inclusion has been arrived at independently or otherwise of Thompson's project there is a distinct parallel between empathy studies in South Australia and the Place, Time and Society Project 8-13 in the United
Kingdom. This is most noticeable by contrasting with corresponding documents in New South Wales. In South Australia empathy is also included as a skill for social living - 'empathising with other people' which indicates a preference for the broader concept of empathy. This skill is described as

understanding and identifying with certain individuals and groups through a study of one's own society past and present, considering developments of beliefs, values and attitudes and problems of people of other cultures, understanding human relationships and motivations, being aware of bias, controversy and prejudice.

(South Australian Syllabus 1983:25)

This description of empathy would seem to be more 'worked out' in terms of elements than those listed earlier by Thompson.

Also included in the South Australian document under 'Skills for social living' is the identification of 'personal and social characteristics' as separate from 'empathising with other people'. The description is interesting from the point of view that it chooses to separate the two. This will be referred to with reference to Collingwood's(1946) description in Chapter 3 and Boddington's(1980) reference to Bailey, to show that such descriptions as "identifying own personal and social characteristics, studying people in other times and places to highlight characteristics of self"(South Australian Syllabus 1983:25) are necessary aspects attributed to empathy itself.
It is worth noting that the Draft Junior Syllabus (New South Wales 1986) states in the 'Aims of History' that students are asked to empathise with human activity through the pursuit of knowledge and that the 'need to show empathetic understanding' is stated as an objective. This syllabus relies on the acceptance of the hierarchy of empathy explaining the stages of everyday empathy, stereotyped historical empathy and differentiated historical empathy. It recognises the influence of recent British Schools Council approaches in the wake of Shemilt's (1984) research, in particular. Under the heading 'How is empathy taught, measured and assessed?' the objectives for empathy are listed as

(a) that pupils be able to distinguish for themselves between everyday, stereotype and differentiated empathy.

(b) that pupils respond to this vocabulary in empathetic writing.

(c) that pupils appreciate the falsity of equating imaginative reconstruction with empathy.

(d) that pupils recognise the nature of historical empathy.

(NSW Draft Syllabus 1986:9)

One purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the inadequacies of objectives such as these to teach, measure and assess empathy when considered alongside the emphasis on the self awareness characteristic mentioned in the South Australian document (1983).
2.8 A CENTRAL PROBLEM OF DESCRIPTION AND COMMUNICATION.

The foregoing analysis and critique has identified a number of serious problems in relation to the interpretation and application of empathy in history teaching. Despite Boddington's call for clarity, little clarity has emerged. This is due to the existence of conflicting theories on how empathy is used in history. To some, it appears as all important, an essential part of historical understanding. To others it is little more than a device to be closely monitored. This underlying disagreement over the scope and importance of empathy to history finds expression in the varying degrees of importance attributed to possible aspects of empathy such as 'intuition', 'inference', 'sympathy' and 'sharing a common humanity' and also to the methods used to encourage empathy such as 'supposing', 'predicting', 'developing a "feel" for history', relying on 'thoughts and feelings' of characters or, using 'a second record'. Differences exist over the degrees to which empathy is considered a cognitive or affective activity. The recognition given to empathy has been determined often by the fact that it is seen as a cognitive rather than an affective activity even though affective elements are recognised.

Largely as a result of these perceived differences empathy is being included in curriculum and syllabus statements as either an aim/or an objective to be
achieved. Empathy is being described as a medium for introducing specific objectives such as knowledge, reconstruction and attitude or social skills. Syllabus designers have generally accepted empathy as an important part of the curriculum but have appeared uncertain in determining how to embrace these differences and even more so in attempting to account for their eventual placement within curriculum statements. Closer attention is needed to a central rationale which can effectively explain and envelop the multitude of terms and descriptions associated with empathy. That a problem of definition exists is largely dependent upon an even more fundamental problem of conflicting and confusing rationales. The uncertainty of a central rationale for empathy is not only creating problems of definition but highlights also the sparsity of elements of procedure or the lack of a consistent description of empathy as a communication process.

A further major problem with empathy treatments to date is that there are still relatively few, if any, identifiable sub-skills attributed to it. Teachers attempting to teach for empathetic understanding in history are still very much 'in the dark' as to the methods and procedures involved. The classroom teacher is presented with a confusing array of suggestions for empathy studies and offered a correspondingly limited set of suggestions as to how to teach children to empathise.
What is still required for practising teachers is a description of what empathy does and what is involved in empathising as well as what empathy is or is not. In recent years cognitive based theories have tended to dominate empathy research. The clarity that Boddington has called for has been gained to a degree by the isolation of levels of empathetic achievement and the formulation of a framework for the progression of skills. As yet, however, these have failed to produce readily identifiable methods as to how these skills are applied. Methodological advances have been forfeited for the sake of clarity of description of empathy. At present there is little common ground on how skills are applied. This also points to the necessity of a model of empathy which explains more effectively how empathy can be used as a process to communicate history. Although empathy has been seen as a process by some a dependence upon cognitive based theories of explanation has seen little eventuate which may describe methodological steps in that process. There is a distinct danger that empathy pursuits in history, having failed to live up to their original promise will stagnate without a clearer methodology.

The uncertainty of a central rationale points to other areas of conjecture. Due to this uncertainty a confusion exists as to which age groups are best suited to an empathetic approach and whether all students receive the
same emphases in instruction. An uncertainty remains over the classification of affective aspects of empathy as opposed to the more amply described cognitive aspects. The adequacy of a dependence on cognitive based theory is in question particularly in view of the fact that psychological constructs of empathy have received little attention to date.

The central problem of a more consistent rationale for empathy raises two fundamental philosophical questions - what is history? and what is history for? Chapter 3 looks at these questions in relation to Collingwood's (1946) propositions to explain further this problem of rationale and to point out philosophical discrepancies which are possibly hindering methodological advances. Chapter 3 also examines criteria for establishing procedural elements for empathy. Assumptions are made concerning the clarification of rationale which, in turn, will affect how empathy is defined and how it can be more successfully applied to the practice of history teaching. Later chapters will consider practical applications towards a model based on these assumptions.
CHAPTER THREE

COLLINGWOOD: A PHILOSOPHICAL BASE FOR EMPATHY
CHAPTER THREE.

3.1 INTRODUCTION.

Chapter 3 develops the assumptions introduced in Chapter 2 about the need for a central rationale for empathy in history teaching. To create this rationale empathy is analysed as a form of the communication process in such a way as to expand the notion of empathy to include the affective as well as the cognitive domain of human behaviour. It is proposed that empathy, in its affective sense, is better able to illustrate human aspects of history. In respect of history as a human activity it is essential that empathy be seen as a process employed as a means of historical enquiry. Empathy is an interactive communication process which must involve the individual in the free expression of cognitive and affective behaviour. Thus, to restrict historical study to behaviour requiring emphasis on cognitive learning is tantamount to destroying the 'historical experience' and hence to denying the learner the benefit of empathetic method.

Specifically, Chapter 3 is organised as follows: First, Collingwood's philosophy of history is used to show how (a) empathy is more applicable to the affective domain of human behaviour than the cognitive domain.

(b) a number of contemporary and influential treatments of empathy are actually misreading his theory. (3.2 -3.6)
(c) there is a need for a broad psychological treatment of empathy as distinct from a narrow cognitive approach. Secondly, to facilitate the treatment of Chapter 3 the method adopted is to trace the chronology of the empathy debate from its conceptual origins in the work of Collingwood through the more contemporary British history movement and finally to the Australian attempts to explain empathy represented by Stockley and Cowling.

3.2.1 RETURN TO COLLINGWOOD: WHAT IS HISTORY? WHAT IS HISTORY FOR??

Aspects of Collingwood's view of history have been referred to in order to clarify much of the 'new history' movement. Collingwood's philosophical basis is re-examined in this chapter in terms of Debbins' (1976) interpretation of Collingwood's assessment of the two questions - what is History? and what is History for? The interpretation by Debbins is favoured to carry out this re-examination because of the emphasis that he gives to explaining why thoughts and feelings from the affective domain of human behaviour are important in gaining self-knowledge considered by Collingwood as an answer to this second question.

In respect of the examples reviewed in Chapter 2 Little (1983) has referred to Collingwood's "structural imagination"; Shemilt (1984: 41) has outlined what he terms "three competing portraits of Collingwood's empathising
historian"; Rogers (1972), Boddington (1980) and Stockley (1981) have all, in turn, examined some aspects of Collingwood's explanation; and the British Schools Council materials (1976) also show a strong link with Collingwood. Collingwood's view of history has been the subject of much debate, sections of it have been openly criticised in terms of being too idealistic, too simplistic or not fully worked out. Rogers (1972) for example, states that Collingwood's explanation is "highly dubious" and that his "carefully selected examples...give it an apparent authority". (Rogers 1972:111) Yet Collingwood's view of history remains valuable as a philosophical basis for historical enquiry. Debbins (1976) suggests the analysis of three basic questions to explain this view.

3.2.ii THREE BASIC QUESTIONS - COLLINGWOOD (1946).

Debbins (1976) reports that the question 'What is History?' is best assessed according to Collingwood if it is considered in the light of attempts to answer three further basic questions.

(a) How can we know what happened in the past?
(b) How can we know why it happened?
(c) Of what value is it for us to know what happened and why it happened?
(Debbins 1976:xvi)

Debbins states that Collingwood answers these accordingly in terms of the following propositions:

1. by showing that history is the imaginative
reconstruction of past events, ie. through the use of historical imagination it is possible to reconstruct the past to know what happened.

2. by showing that history is the 're-enactment of past thoughts', ie. by the re-enactment of the thought of the agent - the thought expressed in the logical pattern of his actions, it is possible to know why it happened.

3. by showing that the value of history is self-knowledge, ie. human self-knowledge. The value of history is that it teaches us what man has done and thus what man is. (Debbins 1976: xxviii–xxix)

Of course, Debbins provides only one interpretation of Collingwood's theory; there are others which conflict with it. The New South Wales Draft Junior History Syllabus (1986–7) for example, demonstrates a departure from Debbins in explaining as one of the Assessment Objectives for Pupil Progress in Historical Skills", the objective of 'Asking Historical Questions'. As Stage 1 of this objective students are to begin to become aware of basic historical questions such as:

"What happened and when?"
"Why did it happen?"
"How do we know?"
(NSW Junior History Syllabus [Draft] 1986–7: 11, 16)

In comparison with Collingwood's three basic questions this New South Wales document appears to concentrate on the first two questions with a different emphasis to "knowing"; for example, "how can we know what happened and when" gives a far greater stress to the methodology
involved than "what happened and when". Collingwood's third question suggesting the value of "knowing what happened and why it happened" has not been considered in this New South Wales syllabus. Deviations from Collingwood's explanation of a philosophy of history such as the above indicate a misapplication of Collingwood's intentions, which is confusing. In terms of Debbins' interpretation of Collingwood's work a closer look at what Collingwood suggested originally is seen as a means of demonstrating how researchers have deviated from Collingwood's original philosophy. This thesis contends that a rigorous treatment of Collingwood's philosophy of history is warranted in order to establish a conceptual basis for the inclusion of empathy in historical enquiry. Such a treatment is provided throughout the present chapter.

3.2.iii PROPOSITION 1: HISTORY AS RECONSTRUCTION.

Although it is debated by some (e.g., Rogers 1972:110) as not the only way to know 'what' happened, Collingwood's first proposition that it is possible to reconstruct the past for this purpose is the least likely of the three propositions to raise objection. Fundamentally there is agreement that this is so, just as a brief check through historiography (particularly British) will confirm that reconstruction has a long record of being seen as basically important to history. (Hale 1967:41,45)
Stockley's (1981) interpretation of empathy is predominantly centred around reconstruction. Thompson's (1983) emphasis on role play and re-creating the past are examples of turning to Collingwood's first proposition to find out what happened in the past. Shemilt's (1984) classification of methods shows that in both the enactive and reactive components of descriptive empathy, reconstruction predominates. (Shemilt 1984: 4)

3.2.iv PROPOSITION 2: HISTORY AS RE-ENACTMENT OF PAST THOUGHTS.

While extensive attempts are being made to know why history happened (as Collingwood's second proposition suggests) these attempts seem to evidence a reluctance to apply Collingwood's rationale of re-enactment of past thoughts. Little (1983) does stress the importance of past thoughts and feelings and comes closest to including this as a necessary feature of what she calls empathy. Little states:

Thus the historian uses empathy... in order to make sense of the past. He must take account of past feelings as well as past thoughts because human activity is motivated at least as often by feeling as by thought, normally by a mixture of both.

(Little 1983: 31)

However Collingwood's enthusiastic use of his second proposition for finding out why history happened, is matched substantially by Little's reservations on the extent of this method.
Little explains:

But the historian does not normally use empathy affectively only rarely can he 'feel' his way into the shoes of another. He does not think past thoughts or feel past feelings, he imagines them. (Little 1983:31)

Thompson (1983) does not explain specifically whether thoughts themselves are re-enacted, certainly they are not stressed or clearly offered as explanations of empathy. For example, Thompson refers to the fact that at times the impact of great events could be looked at through the eyes of ordinary people saying and doing the everyday things of life. [and also] in spontaneous drama the children become what they think and feel about (my emphasis) the characters. (Thompson 1983:24)

Lee (1984) is emphatic that in some passages of history a necessity to share feelings that correspond with the belief would render the historian's task, in principle, impossible. Lee bases this reservation on the fact that emotions and feelings have a cognitive basis and puts forward the example of not being able to share the triumph and hope of a politician immediately after an election if it is known that his assessment of the significance of his victory for the future was wildly wrong. (Lee 1984:98)

However, Plummer (1984) in analysing the importance of pictures to empathy gives examples of where a small girl's drawings are "not about things and places" but "about thoughts and feelings" and also by using pictures as
evidence "they can help us to understand what the people were thinking or feeling at a particular time". Plummer goes on to say that "Historians call this kind of understanding empathy". (Plummer 1984:4) Despite Plummer's view present trends, nonetheless, would suggest that Collingwood is too suspect in understanding history through thoughts and feelings and that if we are to know why history happened this knowledge must be gained by some other explanation. A substantial reason, presumably, is that this was "incompletely worked out by Collingwood", as Debbins reveals.

It would seem that much of the effort at reconstruction (Rogers 1972) and empathetic reconstruction (British Schools Council materials 1976; Stockley 1981) looks toward the first proposition to explain why history happened as well as what happened. Irrespective of the motive the fact remains that this explanation is a major departure from Debbins' interpretation of Collingwood. The issue to be looked at here is that such departures may be the underlying reason why empathy research to date has failed to come to terms with the "something more" suggested originally by Coltham and Fines (1971:7).

The association of thoughts and feelings with empathy and their explanation by methods showing why history happened as well as what happened identifies the essential attributes of the process of empathetic communication. It is part of the purpose of this thesis to employ
interpretations such as those of the British Schools Council (1976) and Stockley (1981) to illustrate how contemporary treatments of empathy are open to question by not appreciating these essential attributes of the empathetic process.

3.2.v PROPOSITION 3: HISTORY AS SELF-KNOWLEDGE.

To an even greater degree Collingwood's third proposition showing that the value of history is self-knowledge is considered even less to explain empathy. In investigating the rationales for including empathy in historical studies introduced in Chapter 2 (Boddington 1980, Stockley 1981, British Schools Council 1976) there is no distinct emphasis on self-knowledge in regard to aims and objectives for empathy. Thompson's (1983) broader rationale however does show evidence of knowledge of others and being socially aware but seems not to stress this knowledge as acquired through knowledge of self.

If the values of knowing what happened and why it happened are being included in the bounds of reconstruction (in line with Collingwood's first proposition) the burden on reconstruction to satisfy all three propositions is even greater. If these values are not being considered at all it could be that this is what is fundamentally incomplete in much of the research on empathy and much of the selective borrowing from Collingwood.
As highlighted by Debbins the majority of attempts to date, to include empathy in history treatments have been centred predominantly on the first of Collingwood's propositions, ie. to conform with 'what is history' to the detriment or exclusion of the second and third propositions. If it were to be established that a re-enactment of past thoughts (as Little [1983] is suggesting) or that self-knowledge were important to the understanding and application of empathy, the need for a re-examination of Collingwood from the viewpoint of having his three propositions misinterpreted originally would be required. This thesis develops a model of empathy which the author believes will provide a framework for carrying out this re-examination. To illustrate the point more clearly the study next deals with an example from a South Australian Education Department curriculum study.

3.2. vi SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CURRICULUM EXAMPLES.

The South Australian departmental curriculum document (1983) 'Planning the History Curriculum 8-12' offers an interesting comparison with Collingwood's emphasis on the value of history being "self-knowledge" or "human self-knowledge". Under the section titled 'Skills' a sub-section of 'Skills for Social Living' is broken down further into five separate areas:

(1) identifying personal and social characteristics;
(2) empathising with other people;
(3) valuing;
(4) interacting;
(5) organising and co-operating.

The programme explains in the first of these areas the skill of "studying people in other times and places to highlight characteristics of self". (South Australian Curriculum 1983:25) Although this particular skill is not included under the second area of "empathising with other people" there is a close association between highlighting characteristics of self and empathy as fellow skills for social living in this programme. From the number of curriculum guidelines examined in this thesis this breakdown of skills for social living in the South Australian programme comes closest to linking Collingwood's third proposition with empathy studies. The South Australian rationale whilst not seeing characteristics of 'self' as a necessary component of empathising with other people, nevertheless, closely attunes the two.

Lee (1984) in determining laws, lessons and generalisations for learning history is alluding to the importance of self-knowledge when he states

a man with a knowledge of history will be better placed, not than any other man who lacked that knowledge, but than he
himself would be without it. (Lee1984:11)

Explanations of self-knowledge as a more substantial aspect of empathy will be considered in Chapter 4 in light of the discussions related to the influence of elements of social psychology. It is necessary first to consider a British example to highlight the current problems of representing self-knowledge in empathy.

3.3. BRITISH SCHOOLS COUNCIL APPLICATIONS - AN INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF EMPATHY?

Analysis of the British Schools Council History13-16 Project (1976-77) in terms of Collingwood's three propositions and the treatment of empathy in that project reveals a strong emphasis on the "need to increase pupils' self-knowledge and awareness of what it means to be human". (Boddington[ed.]1980:6) To this writer this is a direct application of Collingwood's third proposition. Several points of confusion arise, however, from this application. The first of these is evidenced in the exposition of a series of depth studies (British Schools Council 1977) in the 14-16 Syllabus centred on three specific periods (Elizabethan England 1558-1603; Britain 1815-1851; the American West 1840-1890). The Project (1977) links "self-knowledge and awareness of what it means to be human" with empathy by explaining the depth studies as "the study of aspects of a period in the past involving an empathetic approach" (Boddington[ed.]1980:7) and also by
stating

the depth study is designed to increase pupils' self-knowledge and awareness of what it means to be human by concentrating attention upon the ideas and beliefs, values and attitudes of people of a different time and place. (Boddington[ed.] 1980:6)

Previously in this chapter it was argued that for empathy to be more effective in school programmes it may be better to be applied more in line with Collingwood's second and third propositions. At first glance this inclusion of 'self-knowledge and awareness of what it means to be human' as an objective in the depth study design would appear to be a clear application of Collingwood's third proposition, at least. However the British Schools Council materials have revealed that although this has been stated clearly it has been less easy to detect in programme applications or, more simply, the theory has not been matched in the practice. (British Schools Council Teachers' Guide 1977:10-11)

Sylvester (1978:20) notes in reviewing the findings of the project that three approaches were identified by the team, and that the one specifically related to imaginative approaches (presumed by this writer to include empathy) was "the use of simulation games and role-playing". Examples from the Teachers' Guide to Elizabethan England (British Schools Council 1977) - the first depth study topic, indicates this quite clearly. Under the title 'Examples of work involving imaginative reconstruction/empathy' the
following suggestions are made

(a) A class debate could be a useful way of helping pupils to compare and contrast attitudes to crime and punishment in the reigns of Elizabeth I and Elizabeth II.

(b) Imagine that you are one of Elizabeth's Privy Councillors. Describe the discussions you would have had in the Council on a variety of topics and the problems you would have faced in giving Elizabeth advice. (British Schools Council Teachers' Guide 1977:10-11)

In terms of Collingwood's three propositions this British Schools Council application is based on his third proposition in that empathy is to be achieved with the purpose of "self-knowledge and awareness of what it means to be human" and states that this can be achieved by reconstructions involving role play and simulation which is best applicable to Collingwood's first proposition. Put another way the project is saying that empathy can be assessed from the standpoint of the value it has as a means of knowing what happened and why it happened and is seeking to explain this value from reconstructions which concentrate solely on the first of these, of knowing what happened.

The project (1977) thus emphasises, in the depth study approach to empathy, attention upon "ideas and beliefs, values and attitudes of people of a different time and place" and sees role play and simulation as a means of describing these ideas, beliefs, values and attitudes more clearly. A further point of confusion is that this is a
somewhat 'watered down' approach in comparison with the re-enactment of past thoughts associated with Collingwood's second proposition.

Also, the adequacy of relying on reconstructions and simulations to explain fully self-knowledge, as well as cater for that important aspect of self-knowledge; i.e. the seeking of reasons **why**, is questionable. This lack of treatment of Collingwood's second proposition highlights the inadequacy of rationalising the third by means of the first. These above reservations point to a lack of emphasis on methodology associated with determining how we can know what happened in the past and why it occurred. Reasons for this may well be, as Sylvester (1978: 20) points out in reviewing the findings of the project "as the project had limited time and resources, it (could not) ... investigate everything" and consequently the treatment of empathy was one of these. The widely accepted opinion of this departure, as claimed by Rogers (1972) in reference to reconstruction, for example, would suggest that this is the dubious area of Collingwood and that because he is wrong in these propositions the project has had no option but to carefully negotiate this area. If Collingwood's propositions are found to have some validity in the assessment and application of empathy this opinion may be in need of some modification.

Alternately, the inadequacy of the project explanation may have stemmed from the admission by Sylvester (1978: 21)
that "the project failed to isolate an adequate methodological structure for history" and also that the project in declining to develop a taxonomy of objectives regarding empathy foundered somewhat when "uses of the past for adolescents" proved to be not enough. Sylvester (1978) refers specifically to this when he states that after considering structuring the history on a taxonomy of educational objectives it is concluded that though this has relevance for the teaching of history it is inappropriate as a basis for a syllabus framework [and...] In the end the Project decided to construct a syllabus which was not controlled by chronology or concepts or objectives, but which was based on the uses of the past for adolescents. (Sylvester 1978:21)

Whereas a syllabus based on the uses of the past for adolescents may be quite applicable for other aspects of teaching, such a syllabus would appear to be incomplete in describing empathy as an aspect of history teaching because of its inability to feature the processes involved in the acquisition of self-knowledge and its inadequacy in explaining motive in history by the re-enactment of past thoughts. The general trend towards constructing syllabi controlled by concepts and objectives in evidence since the implementation of the Project materials (as explained in Chapter 2; by Shemilt [1984] for example) would tend to support the view of the inadequacy of a syllabus such as the above, which is not controlled by concepts or objectives, to explain empathy.

An additional point is the emphasis which such a
syllabus framework, centred on answering pupil needs, gives to the character of self-knowledge. By emphasising self-knowledge of the present pupils as explained by Sylvester (1978:30) as "the need to find their personal identity by widening their experience in the study of people of a different time and place" the Project stresses self-knowledge of the pupils themselves with the objective, presumably, of being better able to live with others. Thompson (1983), of course, takes this rationale much further but interestingly also explains its application in terms of role play and simulation.

Empathy is used here, above, in a sociological sense. However a question to be asked is whether this is the only aspect of self-knowledge that is important to empathy and also whether it is an adequate description of what Collingwood calls 'human self-knowledge' or not? It is to this issue that the following section is addressed.

3.4. NEED FOR A BROADER PSYCHOLOGICAL DIRECTION IN EMPATHY.

In terms of empathising with the past there is a broader psychological sense to human self-knowledge which is not being catered for in this British Schools Council Project. Debbins (1976:xxx) points out that
debatable as this distinction [between different psychological emphases] may seem to some, recognition of it is essential for a proper understanding of the importance which Collingwood
attached to history.

Debbins further qualifies this distinction by stating it may be thought that it is the task of psychology to tell us what man is, that psychology, not history, is the science of human nature. Collingwood, however, was concerned with distinguishing between psychology as the science of man as a mere object in nature, and history as the science of man as a rational being. Only the non rational elements in human nature are, he thought, the proper subject matter of psychology—'sensation as distinct from thought, feelings as distinct from conceptions, appetite as distinct from will.' Man as a rational being, man as mind, is revealed in history.

(Debbins 1976:xxix)

There is growing evidence of closer attention being called for in interpreting history in this psychological sense. Lee (1984) states "work based on general psychological evidence is important" but has reservations on the scope of this evidence because it is largely perceptual and history includes "much more than the visibility of physical objects". (Lee 1984:107) Lee's analysis of the research of Flavell (1974) concerning children's inference-making ability leads him to conclude that "there seems a prima facie case for thinking that the task in history will be harder, but this cannot simply be assumed without research evidence". (Lee 1984:108) Lee also refers to Donaldson's (1978) notions of "disembedded thinking" and "human sense" as useful although "crude tools for teachers and researchers concerned with historical imagination and understanding". (Lee 1984:111)
Lee appears to be more concerned with such psychological reference being able to dispel some of the "neo-Piagetian gloom cast over school history" in determining children's rationality and concludes that there is an absence of "decisive evidence from psychologists". (Lee 1984:111)

Ennals (1984) in assessing the advances being made in Artificial Intelligence research using computers in history refers to the uncertainty among historians in the New History movement in emphasising processes as espoused by educational psychologists such as Gagné. Ennals suggests "a way forward" where both "historians and researchers in Artificial Intelligence are turning to common sources in the Philosophy of History and Social Sciences". (Ennals 1984:25) Ennals claims this commonality is supported by Doyle (1980) who states:

Collingwood (1946) suggested that the aim of history is not just to record annals, but to discover psychological explanations of the actions of men. This involves not only discovering the facts of a situation, but also the ways the participants viewed the situation and the possible actions available to them. (Ennals 1984:25)

Ennals also cites Davidson (1976) with reference to structures of belief:

When we attribute a belief, a desire, a goal, an intention, or a meaning to an agent, we necessarily operate within a system of concepts in part determined by the structure of beliefs and desires of the agent himself. (Ennals 1984:25)

This psychological emphasis is in need of closer inspection in relation to how it can be used to teach and
assess empathy in history. Elliott (1982:55) in assessing objectivity in education draws attention to an important point concerning psychological judgements when he claims that "a judgement which is psychologically subjective may have the same form, content and truth value as a judgement which is psychologically objective". If accepted, this proximity of the psychological subjective with the objective offers an interesting means of validating the subjective elements of empathy.

A psychological perspective in history is best applied to motives, relationships and conflicts explaining why an incident occurred which can then be applied to ask what happened in the incident in order to gain self-knowledge from the humans involved. This knowledge then can be applied to answering pupil needs and to assist them in finding their identity. The pupil needs are, in this way, stressed as an off-shoot of human self-knowledge, the empathising being with the characters themselves rather than with the objective itself. An approach which re-enacts past thoughts to examine motives by psychological insight develops students' awareness of self by empathising with the characters themselves in the past rather than by empathising according to how others in the present may react to the past. Any sociological priority can best be described at this stage, as a substantial departure from Collingwood's propositions because it does not take into account the
gaining of human self-knowledge by the re-enactment of past thoughts.

The influential nature of the British Schools Council rationale has greatly determined how empathy has been taught to date. There are doubts (at least in terms of Debbins' assessment of Collingwood) as to whether this approach to empathy is a completely adequate one. One discrepancy would seem to be that the role playing, simulation examples appear insufficiently and, at times, only remotely linked with the notion of self-knowledge.

3.5. ROGERS - AN INDIRECT INFLUENCE.

Just as the influence of the Schools Council Project has been noted on the development of empathy so too has been the influence of those who question the reliability and validity of the term to reconstructing history. Rogers (1972), particularly, represents this viewpoint and, in fact, makes no mention of the term. Rogers (1984:167), however, states that "empathy is, of course, a very important aspect of reconstruction". This appears to indicate a change in attitude by Rogers on this point. It is interesting to note that this 1984 assessment of empathy's importance is made following Rogers' explanation of careful reconstruction by using ikonic representation to translate information into a visual form and to conclude inferences drawn overwhelmingly from visual sources. This represents a significant and
far-reaching departure from his earlier work (1972) on 
reconstruction and will be discussed later in Chapter 5 in 
reference to Lee's (1984) reservations concerning aspects 
of psychological evidence in teaching 'for imagination'.

It can be argued that because of a failure to mention 
empathy the earlier work of Rogers (1972) need play little 
part in any serious discussions on empathy. However, in 
defence of Rogers' inclusion it is submitted that his 
view of 'imaginative reconstruction' has had significant 
impact on how empathy is treated. Because of his belief 
in the contrived nature of much of the subjective 
assessment by Collingwood, and others who espouse similar 
descriptions of history, Rogers has stressed the need for 
any inferences made regarding history to be closely 
monitored by evidence. He offers examples of what he 
terms "genuine imaginative reconstruction" as a result of 
this belief. (Rogers 1972:132) This approach by Rogers has 
been taken up by a number of researchers on empathy 
demanding that evidence be used as the controlling factor 
which counters such aspects as intuition, emotion and 
feelings. Stockley (1981) is representative of this group 
and, interestingly, it is he who suggests that what Rogers 
(1972) really means in his 'adductive' application of 
evidence is "very close to the idea of an empathetic 
reconstruction". (Stockley 1981:10)

Four relevant observations emerge from this Rogers (1972) 
example which is referred to by Stockley (1981). Firstly,
Stockley's (1981) reference is to a reconstruction disposed to re-creating conditions as they may have existed, to determine what conditions were. This is representative of Collingwood's first proposition. Secondly, and predictably, because Rogers (1972) doubts the credibility of the other propositions, there is no reference to past feelings or thoughts nor any reference as to why the exercise is used, apart from the obvious motive of showing what happened. Thirdly, the exercise shows no reference to the characters who would have been involved in the particular period of history, except in an oblique, impersonal way. Fourthly, the exercise relies heavily on materials designed to produce information which is more readily understandable from a sociological analysis of today rather than the natural actions of the inhabitants at the time. Pupils are asked to draw up "shopping lists" in terms of "family income" and a scale ground plan which is even further removed from the time because it is "simplified" to be better understood, presumably, by the pupils. (Rogers 1972:132) Attempts to estimate reliability of witnesses are also referred to. The procedural method employed in the exercise is significantly that of a simulation of conditions and role playing and is similar to other examples (notably the Schools Council depth studies) which attempt to reconstruct according to Collingwood's first proposition.

That this approach, to Rogers, has nothing to do with
empathy is acknowledged. It is not feasible to him to imagine that the inhabitants even had 'shopping lists', it is just a method to highlight a set of conditions. Real insight is inferred from what could be described as contrived evidence. The important point to grasp from this form of analysis by Rogers is that, whilst it may not be seen as an 'empathy' exercise to him, to others such as Stockley (1981), Boddington (1980) and Gard & Lee (1978) [who suggest that evidence determines the value of an empathetic response] it is this exercise type which is being used and described as able to best generate that empathetic response. Whereas Rogers (1972) may not recognise such activities as being empathy, others do. Boddington (1980:18), for example, appears to recognise empathy as such when he presents his 'narrower' view of empathy by stating that "in so far as imagination is needed for the success of this enterprise, it will be based upon experience, and is likely to be used by the student in moderating evidence". This type of example cited by Rogers (1972) needs to be examined from the point of view of whether the methods used are sufficient to describe empathy. The use of evidence is not in question but rather the adequacy of methods dependent upon that usage to fully explain empathy. Little (1983) for instance, has stated that "unless the dimension of feeling is attended to, understanding in the fullest sense will not be attained". (Little 1983:31) This is clear support for
the central importance of the affective domain in empathy studies. Plummer(1984) also appears to recognise this point when she states:

Pictures can be useful as evidence about people in the past. It's as if they give us a window through which we can look into people's minds. By doing so, they can help us understand what the people were thinking or feeling at a particular time. (Plummer1984:4)

Cowie(1985) draws attention to the point that "historical knowledge... goes beyond the explanation of thoughts, and the motives and deterrents operative in those thoughts". (Cowie1985:47)

In terms of describing empathetic procedures according to the criteria established by Rogers(1972) to explain reconstruction it is these criteria, because of their inability to incorporate thoughts and feelings in those procedures, which would appear to be inadequate.

3.6.i STOCKLEY AND EMPATHETIC RECONSTRUCTION.

In Chapter 2 reference was made to the observation by Coltham and Fines(1971) that historical imagination requires "something more" and by Fines(1981) that a "bridge" is needed "between empathetic and hypothetico-deductive modes" and that "supposition" may well be the best means of supplying that bridge. Stockley's(1981) descriptions of empathy and empathetic reconstruction are examples of taking what Rogers(1972) has stated concerning imagination and adjusting it to include empathy. Examples
of supposition are also used. In light of Collingwood's philosophy of history doubts are raised as to the adequacy of Stockley's description of empathetic reconstruction and the part he designates to supposition in these descriptions.

Stockley (1981:15) says that children will learn a critical historical skill in a structured and systematic way, with a minimum of fuss and with no complex and unsupportable suggestions that the children somehow are taking the part of historical characters.

Stockley goes on to suggest ways in which material can be structured and presented to overcome difficulties of "identifying with many problematic situations". (Stockley 1981:15) He advocates the structured interview in an example where children are being encouraged to empathise with villagers caught up in the plague in Britain by firstly asking "a villager" questions to do with age, occupation and so on in order to establish the context whilst taking care to be "historically accurate". He then asks the questions - "Did any of your family catch the plague? Did you try to do anything to avoid the plague?" and so on. The suggestion is made that "a typical family could also be invented for this purpose, keeping once again in the canons of historical accuracy". (Stockley 1981:16)

Stockley offers another "possibility", to do with the notion of supposing as an important element in empathetic reconstruction, which forces children to see things 'from
"Supposing all of the villagers were killed in the plague, how might we know whether they even lived and what sort of lives they led?" (Stockley 1981:16)

Additionally Stockley suggests that a natural extension of the above is the use of simulation games and role playing as more concrete and immediate representations of "supposing that" questions and structured dilemmas.

It would be an easy matter to construct a board and dice game about The Black Death and its effects on one village - a game which is of interest to the children, yet remains historically accurate. (Stockley 1981:16)

These examples would appear to be looking to the use of supposition suggested by Gard & Lee (1978) and referred to by Fines (1981) as a possible answer to offering the "something more" to historical imagination and to bridging the empathetic and hypothetico-deductive modes of historical enquiry. Stockley (1981) has spoken of a germane worry concerned with 'imagine that' exercises providing sufficient guidance and direction for the student and sees a solution to this in the structuring of 'imagine that' responses by advocating 'supposing that' exercises to develop a 'feel' for an historical period. Stockley also supports the view that Collingwood's 'commonness of humanity' is crucial for any concept of empathetic reconstruction and sees this as reflected in the Schools Council History 13-16 Project's belief in the
need to "increase pupils' self-knowledge and awareness of what it means to be human". (Stockley 1981:14) Although these factors are presumably covered by Stockley in these structured 'supposing that' exercises the procedures turned to in order to develop these exercises are dependent upon role play and simulation. This thesis is arguing first, that role play and simulation are insufficient processes to explain the critical attribute of empathy and secondly, that because of the inability of these processes to re-enact past thoughts as a means of explaining why the history happened they fail to develop an awareness of self by knowing what it is to be human.

3.6.ii PITFALLS IN THE USE OF SUPPOSITION - DEPENDENCE ON ROLE PLAY AND SIMULATION.

In terms of Collingwood's propositions outlined earlier in this chapter Stockley has avoided the use of procedures applicable to the second and third propositions and relied upon procedures more attuned to the first proposition. Identical procedures are used to explain 'imagine that' and 'supposing that' examples. In this way it may be inferred that 'supposing that' examples are still 'imagine that' in form. This explanation is similar to the fundamental departures from Collingwood outlined in the Schools Council depth studies (1977) and is, in fact, no different to Rogers' "genuine" historical reconstruction. Even though Stockley purports to
'increase pupils' self-knowledge and awareness of what it means to be human' this is limited seriously by the rigid use of role play and simulation as the process to bring it about. As stated earlier, in terms of Collingwood's propositions this process at best justifies the second and third propositions by means of the first. If this is so, the 'something more' asked for by Fines (1981) has not been catered for and the use of supposition examples such as these has not adequately supplied a bridge area as Fines had hoped. The same observations outlined previously in reference to Rogers' (1972) imaginative reconstruction example may be applied to the examples by Stockley - examples which he terms 'empathetic reconstruction'.

Lee (1984:89) has stated that empathy is part of (and a necessary condition of) historical understanding and that imagination as supposal is criterial for that same understanding. He claims:

The historian must entertain sets of beliefs and goals not necessarily his own, and with them a conception of what is normal or reasonable and bring all this to bear on his description. And, in so doing, he re-describes it. This is imagination as supposal.

Lee makes the point that

the task of imagination as supposal is to change our point of view, then everything looks different and we can begin to understand. (Lee 1984:97)

This later view of supposal as criterial to empathy
continues the previous priorities of supposing as a means of explaining empathy and even though Lee claims empathy is a process he admits "there is no mechanical way to do this" but points out that supposing does not make this way to empathise "a matter of free flight of imagination, of mere subjectivity". (Lee 1984:96) Lee claims that by using imagination as supposal, historical imagination itself is not "free floating and viciously subjective". (Lee 1984:97) In this way Lee's (1984) use of imagination as supposal is devoid of ways of identifying empathetic processes and shows little advance on the examples supplied by Stockley (1981).

The dependence on role play and simulation and the confusion it generates in explaining empathy is a problem of some long standing in definitions of empathy in psychological fields. In Chapter 4 it is proposed to examine these difficulties, specifically in the field of social psychology, to shed some light on this dilemma.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPORTANCE OF ROLE TAKING TO AN HOLISTIC TREATMENT OF EMPATHY
CHAPTER FOUR.

4.1 INTRODUCTION.

The affective component has been recognised in a variety of methodological literature dealing with empathy but that recognition has so far failed to be translated into a suitable model of empathetic learning related to historical study. This failure is in part due to a great deal of confusion and disagreement as to the psychological nature and experience of the empathetic process. To redress these errors and disagreements it is the intention of this thesis to construct a model of the empathetic experience by emphasising a number of earlier ideas drawn from established social psychological theories concerned with models of empathy — in particular, the role taking model; and to indicate how the model might be translated into methods of learning history in school.

In particular Chapter 4 deals with four issues. First, it is shown that it is a confusion between role taking and role playing first detected by Coutu (1951) which when applied to empathy treatments in history is a cause of the misrepresentation of empathetic methodology raised in Chapter 3.

Secondly, it is argued that because of the proximity between psychological subjective and psychological objective determinants of human behaviour the treatment of psychological constructs will provide a means by which affective elements such as the assessment of thoughts and
feelings may be validated within empathy treatments.

Thirdly, this chapter is concerned with showing how psychological treatments of the affective elements of empathy can not only be catered for by looking to a role taking model but also by finding support from the directions in which present research is headed. Support can be found from the current climate in

(a) the investigation of historical imagination;
(b) historians' treatments of the subjective in history;
and (c) the call for more social psychology applications in history.

Fourthly, the suggestion is made that an holistic treatment of empathy is required and that for psychological treatments to be accepted and effective in historical studies a decrease in sociological emphasis is needed.

The chapter concludes that in light of the importance of Coutu's role taking theory the way is opened for Chapter 5 to examine social psychological theories of empathy from which can be obtained the components for the model sought in this study.

4.2 EMPATHY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

A number of the terms being associated with empathy in historical enquiry have a long history of application in other fields, notably social psychology and sociology.
Included among these are role playing, simulation, intuition, inference and, of course, empathy itself. Interestingly, in these fields, there has also been much confusion over the usage of many of these terms.

4.2.1 ROLE TAKING NOT ROLE PLAYING.

A central part of this thesis is that role taking and not role playing should be applied to teaching empathy in history. The concept of role taking will be employed in designing a model in Chapter 6 to show how empathy can be developed as a communication process.

Coutu (1951:180) notes a confusion between role playing and role taking in an article in which he sees "two great concepts in imminent danger of being lost". While Coutu is concerned with correcting misinterpretations of the applications of a number of terms in certain psychological quarters his clarifications offer an interesting and important avenue for assessment of the usage of similar terms and their definition in history's association with empathy. Coutu (1951:180) argues that "the sociological concept of role playing has been dangerously confused with the psychological concept of role taking" by some authors. Coutu makes the following observations by specifying the 'traditional' meanings of the terms involved. Role is defined as

a socially prescribed way of behaving in particular situations for any person occupying a given social position or
status. A role represents what a person is supposed to do in a given situation by virtue of the social position he holds. (Coutu 1951:180)

Role playing refers to performing the above functions and thus refers to behaviour or conduct which is overt activity. Role taking, to Coutu (1951:180), has "nothing whatever to do with playing a role" as described above.

The term (popularised by Mead 1956) is seen as a strictly mental or empathic activity, not overt behaviour or conduct. Role taking refers to that phase of the symbolic process by which a person momentarily pretends to himself that he is another person, projects himself into the perceptual field of the other person, imaginatively 'puts himself in the other's place', in order that he may get an insight into the other person's probable behaviour in a given situation. The purpose of this is to enable him to get the other person's 'point of view' so that he can anticipate the other's behaviour and then act accordingly. Mead's concept means 'taking over' into oneself the other's attitude, point of view or perceptual field. (Coutu 1951:181)

Coutu (1951:181) also makes the distinction between role playing, role taking and playing at a role. This latter term represents a concept involving two processes –

(a) role taking on an elementary level and,
(b) playing at, or pretending to play, some well known role.

'Playing at' involves both the 'playing' and 'taking' concepts in a make-believe form.
4.2.ii. SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS OF EMPATHY - COUTU'S SUMMARY.

Coutu(1951:181-182) sees this classification of separating role taking from role playing as far more than "quibbling about words" and makes the following points, all of which will be brought to bear upon the development of the model of empathy provided in Chapter 6.

1. Role playing is a strictly sociological concept with a long history.

2. Role taking is a strictly psychological concept, also with a long history.

3. Role playing is a sociological concept referring to a social function.

4. Role taking enables one to pretend momentarily that he is another person. While one is being that person one gets an insight into how that person probably views a given situation. With this new knowledge he can now sympathise with, feel with and as, the other person and can thus anticipate what the other person will probably think and do. This is a psychological mental process.

5. Playing at a role involves an elementary form of role taking. Here the child both imaginatively and overtly pretends he is another person, not necessarily a particular other person, but often a stereotype.

6. Role taking is significantly and necessarily related to social distance, whereas role playing is not. Too efficient role taking, for example, might prevent a soldier from bayoneting an enemy.

7. Role taking is primarily a communicating mechanism, whereas role playing is only indirectly so.

8. Role taking involves thinking and feeling as one believes the other person thinks.
and feels - a form of empathy.

9. Role taking is thus clearly related to sympathy whilst role playing bears no necessary relation to sympathy.

10. Clearly role playing and role taking have very different constructs. (Coutu1951:181-182)

4.2.iii A DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUE.

An important point referred to by Coutu is that in the theory of social psychology the child cannot perform the sociological process of role playing until he is capable of performing the psychological process of role taking to some degree. (Coutu1951:184)

A further issue on procedure is also clarified in that, in the theory of social psychology, the child can move from simple role taking to a generalised role taking. However even though this simple role taking may be necessary to develop role playing, the (more advanced) generalised role taking cannot be applied to role playing. From Coutu's psychological perspective generalised role playing is an impossible conception. (Coutu1951:186)

One particular observation of Coutu's analysis in terms of procedure is that stereotypes are often associated quite closely with playing at a role. Similarly in this description supposing is associated with role playing. Role playing is seen as performing what a person is supposed to do in a given situation. (Coutu1951:180) Issues such as these highlighted by Coutu are important
to the model advanced in this thesis. What is proposed in the model is that empathy be seen as a communication process. An important attribute of the process is the capacity to develop generalised role taking from specific role taking tasks. This development of role taking clarified by Coutu also offers an explanation of the limitations of empathetic treatments, which rely on role playing, imagination as supposal and 'stereotyped' empathy, in being able to develop procedural sub-skills of empathy.

4.2.iv APPROPRIATENESS OF COUTU'S WORK TO EMPATHY IN HISTORY.

In many descriptions applied to history (e.g. Thompson 1983) role playing by its greater acceptance, wider usage and close association with simulation has rightly or wrongly come to mean one and the same with playing at a role. Despite this difference in meaning to the 'traditional' descriptions of the terms given by Coutu the validity of the fundamental importance of establishing clarification between role taking and role playing addressed by him remains, as does the validity of much of the explanation offered by him for these differences.

Recent examples supplied by the Southern Regional Examinations Board of Great Britain (SREB 1986) demonstrate the strong dependence on role play to explain empathy. In a sample (SREB 1986:24-25) where students play the parts
of monks and nuns in a monastery it is stated that role play "can also aid the development of empathetic understanding". (SREB 1986:22) Although Shemilt (1984:66) has shown some reservations in the use of imaginative reconstructions particularly as an approach to explaining empathy there is still a heavy emphasis on games, simulations and experimental re-enactments in his explanation of approaches to teaching and assessing empathy and little differentiation from role play. No reference has been made to role taking.

Because many of these terms have found their way into the description of history, as a discipline, in recent years there is ample justification for a closer analysis of their historical meanings in terms of these psychological antecedents.

4.2.v EMPATHY AND ROLE TAKING.

What emerges from Coutu's assessment is the suggestion that empathy is associated with the psychological notion of role taking. Coutu also sees role taking as principally a mechanism of communication which suggests that it is far superior to role playing as a means of communicating. If empathy is to be utilised more effectively in history its application as a means of communicating history and being a part of a communicating process is in need of clarification. In the light of Coutu's explanation a major finding of this study is that
it would be more beneficial to examine and to seek to explain empathy from the point of view of **role taking** rather than **role playing**, as is currently operational and demonstrated in this chapter's previous examples.

4.2.vi A REVISED CRITIQUE OF EARLIER THEORISTS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS MAJOR FINDING.

Even though some reservations have been expressed by Shemilt (1984:69) regarding on-site re-enactments where students "succeeded in empathetically (re)constructing the situation of people in the past but not their perspective" and on imaginative (re)constructions which "appear to have little to recommend them" the emphasis on the use of role play in the SREB examples (1986) shows that empathy is still being explained from this role playing perspective.

Coutu (1951) also sees role taking to be significantly related to maintaining a 'social distance' which is equally significantly important in establishing a correct perspective on sympathy in history whereas role playing is not.

Coutu's explanation is useful in reinforcing a number of observations made previously in terms of how Collingwood's philosophy has been applied to empathy. In Chapter 3 it has been suggested that for empathy to be more clearly identified it should be interpreted in terms of Collingwood's second and third propositions, at least
in addition to his first proposition. Also Passmore (1957: 307), for example, points out that Collingwood (1946) sees the teaching of history as "a process" yet Coutu's (1951) explanation shows the unsuitability of a role playing model to describe a process. Applications of the British Schools Council depth studies (1977) and those of Stockley (1981) have been demonstrated to show that, in respect of the uses of Collingwood's propositions, empathy is being applied to emphasise what history is at the expense of his second and third propositions. The British Schools Council depth study on Elizabethan England (1977: 11) gives an example of work involving imaginative reconstruction/empathy as writing an account comparing what Elizabeth I has done "in the government of the country" with what part is "played by Elizabeth II today". Stockley (1981: 16) stresses factual conditions in encouraging students to empathise with villagers in the plague in Britain by determining age and occupation and asking "what sort of lives they led?" Further it has been suggested in these two studies that the method employed has to rely exclusively on sociological role playing and simulation exercises.

Coutu's clear distinctions between role playing, role taking and even, playing at a role and their subsequent clarification as either sociological, psychological or a combination of both psychological and sociological concepts would seem to indicate that, in both these
examples (British Schools Council 1977 and Stockley 1981), there has been a confusion in the application of these concepts in the empathetic process.

Role playing, according to Stockley (1981), has been used as a method to develop a 'feel' for an historical period and to 'increase pupils' self-knowledge'. Coutu's definition suggests that this is clearly in the domain of role taking and indicates that to attempt to examine feelings, thoughts and attitudes by role playing instead of role taking is an impossibility because role taking is primarily a communicating mechanism whereas role playing is only indirectly so. Role taking is a psychological process concerned with communicating another's role and with thinking and feeling like someone else. If role taking were to be seen as a means of communicating empathy in history, as the social psychologists suggest, it would appear to best fit those areas associated with thinking and feeling elaborated by Collingwood.

Whereas assessment of approaches to empathy from the perspective of Collingwood's propositions offers a means of examining the rationale for such approaches, the interpretation in light of Coutu's explanation accentuates the need to establish suitable procedures to apply that rationale. In conjunction, Coutu and Collingwood offer an explanation of present applications of empathy and an explanation as to why these applications may be inadequate. By applying this
explanation to the various problems outlined in Chapter 2 (i.e., problems attributed to a confusion of definition and a lack of a consistent rationale for empathy such as; determining the degree to which empathy is a cognitive or an affective activity; confusing empathy with sympathy; inadequacy of methodology concerning the processes of empathy) it can be argued that differences of interpretation are due to a lack of emphasis placed on knowing why the history happened and the importance that this has to historical understanding and to empathetic understanding. It can also be argued that dependence upon the sociological concept of role playing offers an explanation as to why there is confusion over such terms as 'identification' and 'sympathy'. Role playing is not the most appropriate means of developing empathy to communicate history and yet it is being asked to do just that. An interpretation of empathy according to its obvious psychological component can clarify these problems appreciably.

Coutu's classification, if valid, when applied to empathetic approaches in history, offers an explanation for the suggested problems in Chapter 2 of confusing terms such as 'inference', 'intuition' and 'assessing thoughts and feelings' as well as the problem of the inadequate description of processes of empathy. The 'something more' required in this area by Coltham and Fines (1971) is not achieved because the methods being used to identify this
'something more' are confined to sociological role playing rather than the psychologically oriented role taking methods. This, in turn, explains why terms such as 'sympathy', 'inference', 'intuition', 'identification', 'assessing thoughts and feelings', 'using a second record' and 'sharing a common humanity' are often tentatively explained or avoided altogether in descriptions of empathy. The process which is being used to explain these (according to Coutu) is inappropriate and foreign to many of these terms and, consequently, descriptions do not rest easily with them. Coutu's clarification also shows why the New South Wales group of teachers led by Cowling (1983) finds it difficult to identify components of empathy because the process being suggested is one not readily identifiable with empathy. In fact, Coutu offers an explanation as to why no process is readily identifiable in present attempts to establish empathy because role playing which describes a social function is being used rather than role taking which is itself a communicative mental process.

Likewise Coutu's analysis helps to explain why the method used by Rogers (1972) and extended by Stockley (1981), fails to give an adequate description of empathy because the 'indirect' communicating mechanism of role playing is being relied upon to furnish this description.

Coutu's final point concerning the impossibility of 'generalising' role playing offers an explanation to
demonstrate why difficulties have been experienced in adequately developing empathy as a process objective because, either generalising from role playing is being attempted or, insufficient importance is being placed on the progression to role taking with the result that the limited form of playing at a role is being implemented. A limitation can be identified in the role playing and simulations described by Thompson (1983:22) where children are asked to 'play at' being Alcock and Brown encouraged by tape recordings of suitable environmental and motivational accompaniments. Restrictions can also be seen in applications of what Shemilt (1984:52) has termed his Stage II description of how pupils explain actions according to stereotypes. Actions explained by stereotypes have been taken up and described by the SREB (1986:12) as the second of three important stages of empathy development, known as 'stereotyped historical empathy' and yet Coutu's description shows that stereotypes are associated with playing at a role which is seen as a limited form of role playing.

4.3.i VALIDITY OF SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS.

If Coutu's (1951) description of role taking is found to be of some importance in explaining historical applications of empathy an obvious retort may well be to suggest that the problem is really only one of confusing the terms role playing and role taking, that this is
merely quibbling over words and that role taking has really been implied and used anyway. This view however, could only be accepted if all aspects of the psychological concept of role taking were catered for. These aspects, which represent the major defining attributes in building a new model of empathy in Chapter 6, include the close association with 'sympathy', the concern with 'thinking' and 'feeling', the relation to 'social distance' and the anticipation of 'thoughts and actions'.

To substitute one name for the other to amend an incomplete definition, in terms of the previous examples, would seem to be in all cases inadequate as a means of overcoming that problem of defining empathy. Little's (1983) description, by calling for 'thinking and feeling' in empathy comes closest to including these psychological aspects but appears to stop short somewhat in their application. These aspects are indicative of a process of empathetic communication.

The inevitable questions to be asked concern the validity and reliability of this particular aspect of Collingwood's philosophy of history and the appropriateness of a definition from social psychology to explain applications of empathy in history. The validity of the use of the term role taking must ultimately rest on the respective meanings associated with the terms role playing and playing at a role as well as role taking itself, as transferred to history. The reasons for the
apparent rejection of those aspects associated with Collingwood's second and third propositions whilst accepting the first, of course, are fundamental to assessing the validity of these propositions. Although Shemilt (1984) has demonstrated limitations to describing empathy by role play alone the need to explain role playing procedures as a means of achieving empathetic understanding still predominates present applications.

4.3.ii INTUITION IN EMPATHY - SOME QUALIFICATIONS.

Rogers (1972:111) takes up this above point of validity when he accepts that

the intuitionist explanation works very well in some cases, [but suggests that] really this is due to the fact that the explanation of some events or actions are rather obvious [and that] intuition seems to work well in proportion as the explanation required is more and more obvious.

Given that Rogers (1972), at this stage, was intent on establishing the importance of reconstruction to best explain a colligation method as applied to Bruner's spiral model, perhaps the 'intuitionist explanation' is overlooked not because it is unworkable in some instances but more because it is seen as neither essential nor appropriate to an explanation of colligation as a suitable method to explain history.

Debbins (1976) makes one point concerning intuition which Rogers (1972) has elected to accentuate in
Collingwood's philosophy. Debbins states:

Notions such as 'intuition' and 'telepathic communication with past thoughts' prevent intelligible interpretation of Collingwood's explicit statements on the nature of thought, the nature of historical events and the relation between them... 'intuition' and 'telepathic communication with past thoughts' are not applicable to Collingwood's theory of historical explanation at all because he does not consider the act of thought to be an agent's private property. (Debbins 1976: xxviii)

Rogers' (1972) interpretation of Collingwood and the assumption of the usage of the term intuition demands a closer analysis of thought not being an agent's private property particularly in view of Debbins' (1976) point that Collingwood does not mean intuition when he speaks of the nature of historical thought. This analysis leads to the realisation of the merits or otherwise of the 'commonness of humanity' principle as opposed to the physically impossible thinking of the exact same thoughts of an agent.

4.3.iii THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS AND EMPATHY.

Carson (1980: 31), in assessing the point (attributed to Mounce) that the social scientist is unable to predict human behaviour because we cannot get inside the head of the subject at the time he acts to see what his motives are raises an interesting parallel to Rogers' (1972) interpretation of Collingwood. Carson (1980: 31) disagrees with Mounce because
empathy is simply not the only way of understanding and explaining human action [and that] to put oneself in the subject's shoes may be an effective technique to a full understanding... empathy might help to describe and explain, but the end product is not to be empathy[for this] would confuse a description and explanation with what is being described and explained.(Carson 1980:31)

In light of Carson's qualification of Mounce's point it can be argued that Rogers (1972) is applying a similar 'blanket' approach to empathy on the same grounds as Mounce that because empathy is not possible in all cases it must be rejected. This would seem to be the same reasoning which is being applied to Collingwood's statement as well that "all history is the history of thought". (Collingwood 1962:248) Because of this extreme view Collingwood has often been overlooked whereas if Carson's point is accepted it would indicate that although there is an argument to support the view that all history may not be the history of thought a necessary part of it is concerned with thoughts and feelings and that empathy is a most appropriate way of describing this aspect of history.

Little's (1983:31) suggestion that empathy is a "useful heuristic device to be discarded later" does not disagree with Carson's description and would seem not to be at odds with the view that Collingwood's explanation has merit, particularly when explaining thoughts and feelings as applied to history.
Some support also for the validity of Collingwood's propositions and Coutu's explanation of psychological terms in explaining empathy would appear to be found in points made by both Fines(1981) and Little(1983). Both refer to the importance of thoughts and feelings and inference. Fines(1981:8)even suggests that Gard & Lee (1978)have shown a "predisposition to the promotion of empathetic approaches and the use of primary sources" and in so doing have not overruled the need for "inferential reasoning".

There is evidence in this line of research that aspects of Collingwood's second and third propositions and role taking attributed by Coutu may be appropriate as an explanation of the various understandings of empathy. These aspects are indicative of emerging attributes of a model which characterises an holistic view of empathetic understanding. The need for this holistic view and its description is considered later in this chapter.(see 4.6.i -4.6.ii)

4.4.i RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL HISTORY.

Perhaps the most promising avenue for the inclusion of the theories and analyses of Collingwood and Coutu,as outlined,has come from recent developments in social history. Briggs(1978:164)speaks of the vitality of the last ten years[and explains that]much of this vitality has come from the fact that not all history has been
conventional in character [and consequently] extremely interesting work is being done by literary scholars on aspects of changing historical experience and how they were perceived. (Briggs 1978:164)

It is now time to turn to an analysis of how this vitality can be identified in explanations of imagination in history.

4.4.ii IMAGINATION IN HISTORY.

The work of a group of historians and in some cases, philosophers of history, has generated substantial interest in the treatment of subjectivity in history and the examination of the use of 'imaginativeness' in explaining history. Both Fines (1977) and Little (1983) are attracted to the diagnosis of Warnock (1976) to explain imagination in history. Fines (1977:24) explains the point of Mrs. Warnock's book (Imagination—Faber 1976) to historians is that she leads us to understand that if we will allow of a vaguer and more complex description of imagination it can help us to understand the process of mind...imagination is something more than a simple perception but 'thought-imbued', making a special meaning of a much larger world than one could have first thought on seeing the source of the perception.

Lee (1984:114), however, is less attracted to what he describes as Warnock's attempt at an account of "successful imagining" in terms of "images and feelings". Lee (1984:114) states that such an account fails in history because images (even in the very wide sense she
employs) are not central in history in the required way, and more importantly because private feelings cannot normally be criterial for successful imagining.

Successful imagination to Lee becomes an achievement whereby imagination as supposal enables both historian and audience to 'cash' what they already know by following out its implications and taking another point of view. Lee (1984: 101, 115) states that

if we know [past people] well enough and can cash that knowledge we know 'what they are going to say next' [and that] this will enable us to do things differently, moreover, whatever our feelings, we may just be mistaken in thinking our imagining has been successful.

Lee's assessment of images and feelings appears to be governed far more by the effect of hindsight and the desire to see its control by the use of cognitive restrained evidence than Warnock's (1976) account is suggesting.

As early as 1951 Butterfield, in discussing the place of imagination in historical construction, distinguishes the difference between "the imagination which invents things" and "the one which enables us to visualise them concretely". (Butterfield, 1951: 248) The identification of perception beyond 'seeing pictures in the mind' in using imagination in history has been recognised increasingly in recent years. Little (1983: 30) acknowledges the "important contribution of romanticism to understanding the 'sense of the past' with full intellectual sympathy"
in Wedgwood's (1957) account. Wedgwood's example (quoted by Little to show where a failure of empathy blinded one historian [Gibbon] to a particular insight) demonstrates an application of a more perceptive form of imagination. This example explained by Little (1983:30) provides an instance where

a failure of empathy blinded Gibbon to an insight about the behaviour of Sulplicianus. Had he imagined himself surrounded as was Sulplicianus, by the Praetorian Guard, out for blood, he would have realised that plain fear [my emphasis] rather than uncharacteristic ambition induced him to seize the imperial throne.

Despite some reservations as to the best method to employ in historical enquiry Little does stress the dimension of feeling as "essential to understanding in the fullest sense" as a consequence of this type of imaginativeness. (Little 1983:31)

Fines (1977:25) interprets Warnock's (1976) description of imagination in terms of "three rather dissimilar historians..to show different facets of the historian's imagination at work" and to highlight methods which build on this perception.

Cobb (1976) in his analyses of the French Revolution is reviewed by Fines (1977:25) as follows:

The detail builds up slowly, sometimes in pieces, sometimes in chunks, until the characters are here, back again somehow and we see their bonhomie and crazy thoughtlessness, their problems of movement and their simple pleasures as attached to real people.
Secondly, Fines (1977:25) sees in E.P. Thompson's (1975) work "a peep into the past that is the entire privilege of the historian". Fines (1977:26) states that the movement in Thompson's book has been from a teasing problem that has touched his curiosity through a stage of burrowing around to try to get a view from below, to a conclusion that not only modifies the history of the period, but also reveals the significance of a larger topic in a new light. He has first imagined the Waltham Blacks (basing his imagining on secure documentary evidence, of course) but he has moved on from that to imagining a new set of propositions about law, thus commenting on the discipline and its role in society as much as the subject of his study.

Thirdly, in Davis' The Norman Myth (1976) Fines (1977:26) assesses that Davis has re-imagined a subject that has grown dead with acceptance of conventional interpretations. He has seen Normans out of their mail and without their kite-shaped shields that imprison them from our imagination because of common use.

4.4.iii DEVELOPMENT OF SEQUENTIAL MEANING.

Fines deduces from these above applications that historical imagination in use seems to have a developing sequence of stages towards that analogous understanding of which Mrs. Warnock speaks; the first... the ability to see meaning in common things... the second... the belief in the reality of the material studied... the third... to see human meaning (the explanation of the thing itself) and the significance of that meaning on a grander scale of universals. (Fines 1977:26)

Fines (1977:26) advocates for seeing imagination as an
activity which

if we could see more clearly might help us to train up more imaginative historians, engaging them in the imaginative activity rather than being urged to see pictures in their minds.

Shemilt (1984) has applied a sequential development to empathy by suggesting levels of pre-empathetic and empathetic understanding. This development has been interpreted by curriculum workers (SREB1986, eg.) as everyday, stereotyped and historical empathy. Shemilt's sequential development is describing empathy as opposed to describing imagination and is based on much more specific guidelines than those deduced by Fines (1977) in his analysis of the part ascribed to imagination in the above historians' work. This difference is presumably due to the fact that Shemilt is concerned with pointing out that empathy is not merely imagination. The statement by Lee (1984:89) that "empathy is part of historical understanding and imagination as supposal is criterial for that same understanding" is an indication of the close association between empathy and imagination. Shemilt's cognitive restraints are a means of differentiating between the two and, understandably, because of these cognitive guidelines would seem to be based on the importance to empathy's description of shedding misconceptions and pre-conceptions. Shemilt's sequential development is clearly giving less significance to the type of sequential development.
advanced by Fines. Even though Lee (1984) considers Warnock's images (on which Fines bases this description) are treated in "too wide" a sense and are not "central in history" (Lee 1984:114) a closer look at Fines' interpretation of imagination may be required to describe empathy in a wider sense from a more holistic viewpoint (see 4.6.i and 4.6.ii) in order to give more consideration to the affective elements of empathy as proposed in this chapter. Such a description would be one possible means of taking into account an "awareness of the potency of affective elements in decisions of the past" which Cowie (1985:46) describes as "an indispensible component of historical knowledge". Such a description indicates that a closer examination of the link between imagination and empathy is required.

4.4.iv THE LINK BETWEEN IMAGINATION AND EMPATHY.

What may be deduced from the assessment by Fines (1977), whose penchant for the empathetic mode of enquiry is never far from the surface, is that this type of imaginative perception (much of which Little [1983:28] would call "structural imagination") can offer an exciting way to empathise in history. What these historians described by Fines are all concerned with is the explanation of history by exacting and demanding realistic research into the people of the past, making them 're-live' through their motives, aspirations and relationships.
These methods themselves offer substantial possibilities for their interpretation according to both Collingwood and Coutu to show that what they are doing, so successfully, can be related to empathy. The use of evidence which is so stringently adhered to in these examples offers the possibility of interpreting the characters in the history from their personalities and emotions which emerge from within the evidence with such consistent acceptance that they leave the reader convinced of their credibility. Examples of a wider acceptance of the importance of motives and relationships in the assessment of personalities are apparent in the work of Booth (1983) and in the materials of the SREB (1986) in Britain. In addition Coltham (1983) states:

Since history is essentially about mankind, it is a study which can help learners to understand more about humanity and the human condition. In the belief that where descriptions of people and their activities appear, greater empathy is evoked where this description is particular and detailed.  
(Coltham 1983:38)

Cowie (1985:47) endorses the emphasis that structures of the affective in history are more identifiable with people and their motives, relationships and personalities in claiming that:

Historical knowledge thus goes beyond the explanation of events to the explanation of thoughts, and the motives and deterrents operative in those thoughts.

What has emerged from the above analysis of the explanations of historical imagination is the major
finding that these explanations may also be applied to explain sequential meaning in empathy and may be used to describe a possible methodology for empathy treatments. All this analysis leads to the notion that history is ultimately about people.

4.4.4 HISTORY IS ABOUT PEOPLE.

This previous analysis of historical imagination redresses Butterfield's (1951) criticism that one of the surprising things in...historical discussions is the thinness and crudeness of some people's ideas about human motive, and the shallow academic character of their views on personality...[and supports his view that]...always we return to the fact that it is human beings who make history...[and that]...all the historian can depend on is a general feeling for human nature, based ultimately on self-analysis, but further enlarged in a general experience of life. (Butterfield 1951:92,93,116)

Included in a group of "unconventional historians" referred to by Briggs (1978:164) is Zeldin, whose volumes of contemporary French history have received considerable acclaim. Fulton (1979:21) describes his second volume as "one of the most important historical works to appear in recent times".

Zeldin (1973) claims:

My emphasis has been on understanding values, ambitions, human relationships and the forces which influence thinking[and adds] historical study is a personal experience and the subjective elements in it deserve to be valued. (Zeldin 1973:7)
Zeldin's work is an example of studying a period of history through the inter-relationships of groups, which evokes an atmosphere and a 'feel' for the history. Zeldin states that:

> History is a subject which requires historians to use all the resources of their individuality, imagination and sympathy in the appreciation of characters and events. (Zeldin 1973:6)

Cobb (1969:17), one of the historians cited by Fines (1977), speaks in similar terms when he states "I have never understood history other than in terms of human relationships". In assessing the importance to history of both Cobb and Zeldin, Hooper (1974:28, 29) states:

> the works of Richard Cobb and Theodore Zeldin illustrate the ways in which history can still be written without falling into the trap of micro-history, or without becoming so general that the particular is submerged for all time... both Cobb and Zeldin create a personal vision of the past which is deeply subjective and committed to actual experience.

4.4.vi PROUST AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE.

Hooper's (1974) identification of the differences and similarities between the works of both Zeldin (1973) and Cobb (1969, 1972) with that of Proust (1970) reveals, interestingly, that all converge to the explanation of self and cites Proust's point that

> in reality every reader is, while he is reading, the reader of his own self. The writer's work is merely a kind of optical instrument which he offers to
the reader to enable him to discern what, without his book, he would perhaps never have perceived in himself. (Proust in Hooper 1974:28)

This assessment appears to be particularly relevant in terms of Collingwood's third proposition which emphasises the importance of self-knowledge to historical understanding.

4.4.vii A GENERIC SENSE OF EMPATHY.

Other points emerging from the works of Zeldin and Cobb are that their imaginative approaches, emotional and subjective as they are, are applauded by Hooper for maintaining a 'general feel' for a period, an aspect Hooper considers is being lost in the work of many historians. This aspect also affords a very good example of a much more generic sense of empathy which can be established by more perceptive imagination. (Fines[1977:26] may call this deeper generic sense a meaning "on a grander scale of universals".)

The ways in which these above historians treat relationships and personalities subjectively in their accounts, and their reasons for doing so, are seen as important avenues for explaining how levels of understanding can be achieved affectively in history.

These methods form an important consideration in the development of the model of empathy advanced in Chapter 6.
Zeldin's work is an example of studying a period of history through the inter-relationships of groups, which evokes an atmosphere and a 'feel' for the history. Zeldin states that:

> History is a subject which requires historians to use all the resources of their individuality, imagination and sympathy in the appreciation of characters and events. (Zeldin 1973:6)

Cobb (1969:17), one of the historians cited by Fines (1977), speaks in similar terms when he states "I have never understood history other than in terms of human relationships". In assessing the importance to history of both Cobb and Zeldin, Hooper (1974:28, 29) states the works of Richard Cobb and Theodore Zeldin illustrate the ways in which history can still be written without falling into the trap of micro-history, or without becoming so general that the particular is submerged for all time... both Cobb and Zeldin create a personal vision of the past which is deeply subjective and committed to actual experience.

4.4.vi PROUST AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE.

Hooper's (1974) identification of the differences and similarities between the works of both Zeldin (1973) and Cobb (1969, 1972) with that of Proust (1970) reveals, interestingly, that all converge to the explanation of self and cites Proust's point that in reality every reader is, while he is reading, the reader of his own self. The writer's work is merely a kind of optical instrument which he offers to
the reader to enable him to discern what, without his book, he would perhaps never have perceived in himself.

(Proust in Hooper 1974:28)

This assessment appears to be particularly relevant in terms of Collingwood's third proposition which emphasises the importance of self-knowledge to historical understanding.

4.4.vii A GENERIC SENSE OF EMPATHY.

Other points emerging from the works of Zeldin and Cobb are that their imaginative approaches, emotional and subjective as they are, are applauded by Hooper for maintaining a 'general feel' for a period, an aspect Hooper considers is being lost in the work of many historians. This aspect also affords a very good example of a much more generic sense of empathy which can be established by more perceptive imagination. (Fines[1977:26] may call this deeper generic sense a meaning "on a grander scale of universals".)

The ways in which these above historians treat relationships and personalities subjectively in their accounts, and their reasons for doing so, are seen as important avenues for explaining how levels of understanding can be achieved affectively in history.

These methods form an important consideration in the development of the model of empathy advanced in Chapter 6.
4.4.viii HISTORIANS' TREATMENTS OF PERSONALITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

Zeldin's (1973) comment that historical study is a personal experience and one of personal interpretation can be applied to the Australian historian Manning Clark, particularly in the examination of motives, conflicts and relationships of individuals. Here, Manning Clark (1962, 1981) examines personalities through feelings as well as values. Even the most hardened of Manning Clark's critics, Mansfield (1979:10), accepts that he is "at his best on the fate of Burke and Wills". This is largely because of the imaginative mastery of the personalities, their emotions and feelings which Manning Clark evokes. In many instances Manning Clark's descriptions, if at least confined to the personalities of the individuals concerned, offer a multitude of opportunities for empathetic treatments in schools where the vivid story he tells is so necessary and welcome.

No historian offers better evidence for the treatment of history from the subjective than Woodham-Smith (1953) who carefully builds, imaginatively, the personalities of those involved in the infamous 'Charge of the Light Brigade' with perception and emotional intensity, yet always working 'within the evidence' to give a particularly forceful and convincing account of the event and the feelings of the individuals concerned. His account not only establishes the conditions and
relationships of the major combatants (specifically Lords Lucan, Cardigan and Raglan) but also as E.P. Thompson (1975) does, is able to move to a new set of propositions about the reasons for the disaster and the elements present in British society at the time, which were responsible for it. This account, in comparison to Zeldin (1973) is similar in that it caters for a 'general' side of history and develops what could be termed a 'generalised empathetic response'. This development, in turn, demonstrates a close affinity with Coutu’s (1951) assessment of generalising from role taking, which offers a practical method of assessing this approach.

Evidence from research such as this indicates that there is considerable support for the inclusion in history of an assessment of personalities and people in history in a compassionate and more intimate way. This above body of opinion, characterised by enthusiastic receptions for its methods, is evidence of a place for history based on insight into personalities and exploration of relationships. Recognition is being given to explaining personalities and relationships in some research examples in Britain. Dickinson & Lee (1978: 99-107), in the Battle of Jutland pilot study, to some extent examine the personality of Jellicoe and why he acted as he did. Relationships are explored in an example on nineteenth century child labour in SREB (1986: 55-60) materials on empathy. Attitudes of a character, Elizabeth
Whiting are analysed from the point of view of the decisions she may have had to make in sending her daughter to work. As a consequence of the above research and similar applications there is also healthy evidence offered of the applicability of methods such as those prescribed by Coutu and Collingwood which can best cater for, and hopefully describe, this type of psychological assessment.

A major methodological conclusion of this thesis is that, in such a climate, the call for the psychological empathetic component of Coutu and the emphasis of history through thoughts, feelings and related to self-knowledge, as stated by Collingwood, would seem not only relevant but overdue in the classroom.

4.4.ix PSYCHOHISTORY.

Encouragement for the inclusion of the areas outlined in theories and definitions by both Collingwood and Coutu comes from the existence of psychological history or psychohistory. Briggs (1978:164) describes this as a "major field" which apparently has gained credibility in its own right by the suggestion by Briggs that "the hyphen went out during the 1960's". (Briggs 1978:164)

Langer is cited as suggesting as long ago as 1957 that the use of psychology by historians is "the next assignment". (quoted in Briggs 1978:164) Doubts still exist concerning valid explanation because of the nature
of psychoanalytic procedures (as for example, Erikson's *Young Man Luther* [1962] wherein Luther's behaviour is analysed according to psychological motives such as the effect on him of his earliest relationships with his father). However the field of social psychology (Briggs' [1978:164] "neglected subject") offers considerably more scope from a psychological viewpoint if the aspects of relationships, emotions and subjectivity put forward by those historians referred to above continue to be accepted with the present level of enthusiasm.

In terms of Coutu's assessment the psychological concept of role taking would be a suitable means of demonstrating these particular aspects of social psychology to greater effect.

4.5.1 REDRESSING THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMBALANCE.

Briggs (1978:163) admits to a certain reservation concerning the overemphasis of a sociological treatment of history by stating that

> the influence of anthropology on English historians has on the whole made them less pretentious than historians influenced by sociology.

Butterfield (1951:92) has spoken of "a bloodless kind of sociologist's jargon" presumably, also referring to a degree of pretension. Passmore (1968:10) has defended the 'traditional' approach to history saying that

> the historian's work ought to be estimated by the thoroughness of what he does, not by
its incompleteness from a sociological point of view.

Passmore indicates that some historians would wish to go further by claiming

historical study, they would say, is the only way of understanding human society, since human actions are unique; they are hopelessly distorted in consequence, by an attempt to confine them within the bounds of an abstract generalising science. (Passmore 1968:10)

A retort to this claim by Passmore may be that psychology is also an abstract, generalising science so that if this criticism is valid as regards sociology it must be valid for psychology. In defence of social psychology as expressed in this regard some important distinctions need to be made. Firstly, methods employed by Cobb (1972), Zeldin (1973), E.P. Thompson (1975) and Davis (1976), for example, demonstrate a thoroughness of research which is recognised. Thoroughness of research is exhibited in the constant desire to 'burrow out' the truth using imaginative responses from within the evidence and to the evidence itself. Such research contrasts with the manufacturing of conditions or simulation of events associated with sociological treatments. Much of what has been described as contextual evidence in such examples as the Elizabeth Whiting exercise (SREB 1986:55-60) would be one indication of an attempt to gain insight from 'within the evidence'. Shemilt has explained everyday empathy as being able to interpret 'from the inside' but has seen a limitation in this form of
interpretation, however, of becoming locked into a twentieth century world view. (Shemilt 1984:76)

Secondly, history from a socio-psychological viewpoint centres upon human actions and their uniqueness, and of understanding individuals. It can be suggested that the difference between a sociological treatment and a treatment from the field of social psychology is that the latter, because of its thoroughness and its careful building of evidence offers an approach which gives history far more 'integrity' as a subject than the former which chooses to develop overall sociological laws and consequently, structures or simulates the history to best fit these requirements. In many cases this can be seen to have a 'de-humanising' effect. Programmes, such as the British Schools Council depth studies (1976), with the specified objective of demonstrating 'what it means to be human' appear not to have taken into account this 'de-humanising' effect in their sociologically oriented treatments.

4.5.ii A PARADOX? A DEGREE OF OBJECTIVITY IN SUBJECTIVE 'INTEGRITY'.

An irony here is that imagination, for so long considered to be too suspect as an historical approach, is being seen by many as maintaining a discipline of history and is holding its own alongside other more objective methods. Collingwood (1961) in fact states
the act of thought in becoming subjective does not cease to be objective [and explains this point by claiming]. . . it is the object of a self-knowledge which differs from mere consciousness in being self-consciousness or awareness, and differs from being mere self-consciousness in being self-knowledge; the critical study of one's own thought, not the mere awareness of that thought as one's own. (Collingwood in Tomlin, 1961:292)

The point made by Elliot (1982) concerning the inability to differentiate between psychological subjective and psychological objective judgements would help to explain why this is so. Coutu's assessment, in this regard, offers an explanation as to why these reservations concerning imagination are felt, in that the sociological concepts being applied do not lend themselves to communicating history as a study of thought.

One assumption which can be made is that, from this concern by Briggs (1978), Passmore (1968) and Butterfield (1951), for example, there is a certain dissatisfaction in some quarters as to the pretentiousness of some sociological treatments of history. From this, it can be further suggested that some aspects of historical research are not suited to a full, sociological treatment and, in fact, by their nature are more suited to other approaches. Empathy, a traditionally, but not necessarily, psychologically based concept may be better treated with less emphasis on sociological aspects and more on psychological ones.

These reservations do not imply that sociology has no
place in history but more that social psychology has more of a place than is being granted, specifically in the area of empathy. These reservations also can be seen to give more (and not less) weight to the use of Coutu's assessment of psychological and sociological terms as applied to history teaching.

4.6.i COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE ELEMENTS OF EMPATHY - TOWARDS AN HOLISTIC VIEW.

One area in need of clarification in empathy studies is that concerning the description of cognitive and affective elements. A cognitive-oriented trend is identifiable which has its roots in the original criticisms of the Coltham & Fines taxonomy (1971) by Dickinson & Lee (1978). Affective elements are treated with some skepticism by Shemilt (1984:79) who recognises their presence but not their usefulness in saying "affective empathy cannot be taught without degenerating into indoctrination". Lee (1984:98) has also attempted to accommodate the affective side of empathy by stating "emotions and feelings have a cognitive basis".

A different emphasis is readily identified in the work of Booth (1983:158) who advocates an inductive approach to thinking which involves "the heart as well as the head". Booth's concern is that not enough attention is being given to the affective area due to a preoccupation with a particular mode of thinking which does not take into
account inductive cognitive skills and this often reveals an inappropriate model of cognition. (Booth 1983:158)

Thompson (1984:173) has accentuated the importance of both the cognitive and affective domains in seeking "new ways" to teach history. He points out that

many important aspects of cognitive and affective development can be encouraged including the important areas of historical imagination and empathy.

(Thompson 1984:172)

Cowie (1985) has called for the use of the "second record" and for an emphasis on the affective aspects in treating history by applying "a sensitivity for the affective elements in human decision-making". (Cowie 1985:46)

This trend indicates a major finding of this thesis that in the treatment of empathy affective elements have been largely neglected. One reason for this may be found in the attempts to separate cognitive and affective elements of empathy. Piaget (1981) has stated that affective and cognitive behaviours are inseparable and claims that "affective states that have no cognitive elements are never seen, nor any behaviours found that are wholly cognitive". (Piaget 1981:5) Piaget's view is supported by Griffiths (1984:230) who states "this splitting in terms of the cognitive and affective is unhelpful". As a consequence of this statement Griffiths observes that "the old hard and fast line between emotions and motives is now softening". (Griffiths 1984:242) Rogers (1984:161) also claims that "affective and cognitive
aspects of learning are closely connected".

The main problem associated with the treatment of cognitive and affective elements of empathy has been the difficulty found in assessing the affective elements in particular as explained by Giles & Neal (1983:175). These authors state

> the difficulties in the way of assessing the affective sector are self-evident. Although specialised techniques such as the assessment of attitudes are known, their availability is limited, and in practice it would be useful to identify and study any existing tests which claim to assess the affective domain in history in an accurate and reliable manner...difficulty in assessing interest could debar the less intellectually able pupils from achieving recognition of quality in the affective sphere (as distinct from the currently tested cognitive domain).

Important areas to counter this difficulty exposed here by Giles & Neal can be turned to in the work on affective behaviour by such researchers as Flavell (1975) and Donaldson (1978) and to the encouragement given to the possibilities of affective behaviour by Griffiths (1984) and also Rogers (1984). These contributors will be turned to in later chapters to assist in articulating more clearly the model of empathetic communication suggested in this thesis.

4.6.ii A PLACE FOR A MORE HOLISTIC THEORY OF EMPATHY.

The above statements on affective elements tend to suggest the need for a shift in emphasis so that a more
holistic treatment as implied by Davidson (1976:103) is applied to empathy studies. Davidson calls for a "common-sense scheme for describing and explaining actions" by claiming that:

Any effort at increasing the accuracy and power of a theory of behaviour forces us to bring more and more of the whole system of the agent's beliefs and motives into account.

(Davidson 1976:103)

The de-emphasis on explaining cognitive and affective behaviour separately is required to make way for a treatment which gives equal credence to cognitive and affective elements as espoused by the perhaps lesser advertised theories of Piaget (1954). [Cowan (1981:ix) gives as a reason for less circulation of these theories that although Piaget was vitally interested in affective or emotional development the text of his lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in 1954 on this topic was never translated into English when other aspects of his writings were receiving much publicity in the 1960's.]

The treatment of empathy from a less reductionist and more holistic stance is an important direction advocated throughout this present work particularly in reference to the theories of Collingwood and Coutu. In order to clarify the expression "the whole is more than the sum of its parts" Weiss (1969:11) explains what is meant by reductionism and holism. He states that the "more" does not mean more content, mass or volume.
it refers solely to the necessity for the observer to supplement the sum of statements that can be made about the separate parts by any such additional statements as will be needed to describe the collective behaviour of the parts when in an organised group. (Weiss 1969:11)

Weiss (1969:11) describes this as "an upgrading process" which does no more than "restore information content" that has been "lost on the way down in the progressive analysis of the unitary universe into abstracted elements". Processes of reductionist and holistic theory are explained by Weiss (1969:11) as

the reductionist likes to move from the top down, gaining precision of information about fragments as he descends, but losing information content about the larger orders he leaves behind. The other holistic theorist proceeds in the opposite direction from below, trying to retrieve the lost information content by reconstruction.

The difference between the two processes is summed up by Weiss as "not unlike that between two individuals looking at the same object through a telescope from opposite ends". (Weiss 1969:11)

What this analysis by Weiss means to the processes involved in treating empathy is fundamental in explaining present applications. Elements of reductionism are apparent in theories of empathy which do not take into account all aspects of empathetic understanding. An emphasis on cognitive based theory is reductionist in character in the sense that insufficient concern is given to affective treatments and their important processes.
Similarly a theory which attempts to explain empathy as an heuristic device is reductionist in the sense that it does not consider the full implications of empathetic methodology. By referring to the need for a wider treatment in interpreting empathy it is suggested in this thesis that a more holistic theory be adopted for empathetic treatments which will allow for reconstruction from below as Weiss is claiming. This will address a deficiency of reductionist theory indicated by Weiss (1969:12) in that

> although reductionism may gain in precision of information in one sense this gain is made at the expense of information or content in a different larger or wider sense.

An holistic theory may also allow for a much better understanding of the use of inference in history by helping to clarify contextual evidence and what it actually means. Incorporated within this approach is a call for a psychological direction which caters for a personal as well as a technical side to empathy which covers emotions more adequately and "which takes into account the heart as well as the head" as Booth (1983:158) has suggested.

4.7. CONCLUSION.

From the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 there emerges firm support for the treatment of empathy in line with Collingwood's three propositions and Coutu's
clarification of terms. This is particularly evident in the directions being taken in investigating historical imagination and by historians' treatments of the subjective in history. The call for a psychological perspective in treating empathy affectively has emphasised the importance of the psychosocial process of role taking to explain empathetic methodology. Coutu's description has revealed that necessary components of the psychological process of role taking are an involvement with thoughts and feelings, the use of insight and, because of a need for social distance, the employment of sympathy. Coutu's clarification also shows that part of the function of the role taking process is to develop a generalised role taking from simple and specific role taking tasks. A close correlation has been revealed between this above process and the development of sequential meaning towards a meaning on "a grander scale of universals" (as proposed by Fines[1977]) and to the development of a general feel for a period in history (in the works of Cobb[1969] and Zeldin[1973]) by the treatment of specific personalities. In order to clarify the role taking process by identifying components such as these Chapter5 is concerned with examining more closely the place of role taking in social psychological theories of empathy.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONSIDERATIONS OF PSYCHOSOCIAL THEORIES
OF EMPATHY
CHAPTER FIVE.

5.1. INTRODUCTION.

The existence of two quite divergent and established theories of empathy, one based on role taking and the other on inference, indicate a ready reference in social psychological theory to the procedural components of empathy highlighted in Chapter 4. The purpose of Chapter 5 is twofold. First, by an examination of psychosocial theories of empathy, and particularly the literature surrounding role taking as a process, the conceptual components of a procedural outline for the empathy model proposed in Chapter 6 are isolated. Secondly, as a result of the clarification of the empathetic communication process on a specific/general continuum this thesis advances a typology of three distinct representations of empathy. These representational stages of empathy are seen to be attained along the continuum and are categorised as general empathy, specific empathy and specific/general (advanced general) empathy. The typology represents a clarification of the problems of definition pointed out in Chapter 2. The defined representations of empathy are considered as applicable to and to be developed by the model explained in Chapter 6.

The conceptual framework clarified in this chapter is influenced by the link between Mead's (1934) role taking theory of empathy and Collingwood's (1946) philosophy of history. Because of recognised weaknesses and limitations
of both Mead and Collingwood to adequately explain methodology and of the inadequacy of inference theory as suggested by Asch (1952) to explain empathy, the process defined for the model in Chapter 6 is an integrative one which allows for the inclusion of the more recent work of Berlo (1960), Turner (1963) and Flavell (1975) on role taking. This integrative approach is seen as a means of extending methodologically the theories of both Mead and Collingwood by taking up where they left off. Chapter 5 considers also the limitations and advantages to historical applications of the components of role taking from psychosocial theory.

5.2.1 Inference Theory of Empathy.

This theory, popularised by Asch (1952) is psychologically oriented and is related to developing self-awareness. An inference theory of empathy maintains that in relating to a feeling experienced as a consequence of certain aspects of one's behaviour a similar feeling will be accredited to similar behaviour observed in somebody else. Asch (1952:145) states:

*We make inferences from observations of ourselves. When subsequently we observe these changes in another person, we infer that he is experiencing a similar emotion. We are able to make an inference to the extent that it agrees with our previous experience.*

Because man is able to observe his own physical behaviour directly and can relate his behaviour symbolically to his own feelings, thoughts and emotions Berlo (1960:122)
describes this as

man developing a concept of self, by himself, [and thus] on the basis of his prior interpretations of himself he makes inferences about the internal states of others.

Asch (1952:146-7, 148) claims that inference theory of empathy is based on a number of assumptions. These are

1. that the qualities which we assert to be present in others are actually present in us alone.

2. that we translate the observed actions of others in terms of ourselves, investing them with a psychological content.

3. that we have first-hand knowledge of ourselves and second-hand knowledge of others.

4. that actions of persons are psychologically characterless and can acquire a psychological content only indirectly.

Asch (1952) voices some reservations regarding these assumptions because they imply that we observe events in ourselves in the same way as we observe events in others which he concludes is "often not true". (Asch 1952:148) He questions also the validity in all cases of concluding about a psychological condition in someone else unless we have first experienced it in ourselves. Asch believes that although it may be argued that we share certain possibilities of feeling with all men an inference theory of empathy does not explain satisfactorily how we "come to grasp a character different from ourselves or an emotion strange to us". (Asch 1952:148)
These reservations by Asch undermine seriously the adequacy of inference theory to explain empathy. The process of gauging attitudes and feelings of others against one's own however is fundamental to empathetic procedure. Berlo (1960:124) accepts that while there is "some merit in the arguments" inference theory does not seem to explain empathy in terms that are "completely satisfying".

5.2.ii ROLE TAKING THEORY OF EMPATHY.

This theory constituted by Mead (1934) is based on the observations of childhood imitative behaviour wherein Mead identifies various stages in the development of the concept of self. Role taking theory argues that the concept of self does not precede communication, as is the case in inference theory, but is developed through communication. In explaining the concept of self as a central feature of his theory Mead (1934:138,140) states:

The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only in so far as he first becomes an object to himself by taking the attitudes of the other individuals toward himself [thus]... responding to one's self as another responds to it.

The role taking process proceeds on two inter-connected levels: on the intrapersonal (I-Me) and on the interpersonal (self-other) level. In the first stage of role taking the
infant actually plays other people's roles without interpretation. He imitates the behaviour of others and as Mead points out "there is no basic organisation gained ..he passes from one role to another just as a whim takes him". (Mead1934:151)

The second stage comes about as a result of increased role taking behaviour, i.e. the child acts more and more towards himself in the same way that other people act towards him. He learns to associate significant symbols (language) with the behaviour and begins to understand how other people behave towards him and to put himself in other people's shoes - to look at himself as other people do. This second stage of role taking involves the playing of other people's roles, with understanding. Mead (1934:151) explains this as

a set of responses of such others so organised that the attitude of one calls out the appropriate attitude of the other.

In order to achieve this the child has to take all the roles of the others.

The third stage occurs because of the increasing complexity of role taking and the physical impossibility of playing all these roles. "The child begins to put himself in other people's shoes symbolically instead of physically". (Berlo1960:126) At this stage of Mead's model role playing gives way to role taking. As the child continues to participate in group activity he takes the
roles of many other people. Gradually he begins to 'generalise' the roles of others. He starts to get a general concept of how other people behave, how they interpret and how they act toward him. This action Mead (1934:154) calls the developing of the concept of the "generalised other". The 'generalised other' is an abstract role that is a synthesis of what an individual learns that is common or general to the individual roles of all others in his group. This is explained by Mead (1934:154-5) as:

It is not sufficient for him [the child] merely to take the attitudes of other human individuals toward himself and toward one another within the human social process, and to bring that social process as a whole into his individual experience merely in these terms: he must also... take their attitudes toward the various phases or aspects of the common social activity or set of social undertakings in which, as members of an organized society or social group, they are all engaged.

Mead argues that this is what we mean by our concept of self, that each of us develops a concept of the generalised other which clarifies the set of expectations that we have as to how we should behave in a given situation. Mead (1934:155) states:

This getting of the broad activities of any given social whole... is... the essential basis and prerequisite of the fullest development of that individual's self.

The assessment by Berlo (1960:127) is that this self-concept is developed through communication, through taking the roles of others, through acting towards ourselves as
an object of communication and through the development of a 'generalised other'.

Mead's role taking has been described by Baumann (1975: 69) as a "sequential and self-correcting" process of communication. Scheff (1970: 352) explains the process in role taking as one of projecting one's experience...onto the other, of hypothesising what...would correspond with this experience...of reformulating the hypothesized experience and so on indefinitely in a cycle of hypothesis-checking, which allows for the successive approximation of the other's experience.

Both inference theory and role taking theory place great emphasis on the nature of language as significant symbols in the process of empathy and the development of a concept of self. Both are similar in their acceptance of empathy being a communication process based on observable physical behaviours. The differences between the two theories are summed up as follows by Berlo (1960: 127):

Inference theory assumes a concept of self, and suggests that we empathise by using the self-concept to make inferences about the internal states of other people. Inference theory suggests that the self-concept determines how we empathise. Role taking theory argues the other way around. It suggests that the concept of self does not determine empathy. Rather, communication produces the concept of self and role taking allows for empathy.

5.2.iii AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY - BERLO.

Berlo (1960) offers an alternative to these two theories
which is a combination of the two, arguing that the initial step taken in empathising is role taking followed by inference. The process is described as follows.

Each of us takes roles of other people. Each of us develops a concept of the generalised other. As we develop and mature, we construct a concept of self. Then we operate on it. We now begin to make inferences about people, based on our concept of self, we lessen our use of role taking and increase our use of inferences. We make the assumption that other people are like us, and that their behaviours reflect the same internal states that our behaviour reflects. (Berlo1960:128)

This process is carried out only so far as it is rewarding and when it ceases to be so two alternatives are offered.

1. we distort the behaviour of others that we are perceiving and make them correspond to our expectations or,

2. we take another look at our images of ourselves; i.e. we re-define self, we return to role taking. (Berlo1960:128)

Role playing is suggested as a way of revising role taking and re-defining self concepts. Berlo suggests that this process of role taking, inference, role taking, inference is a continuous one largely because of the difficulty experienced in making inferences only from self-knowledge. He states "we need to be able to take other people's roles to re-define ourselves". (Berlo1960:129) Berlo combines these two theories largely because although he recognises the importance of inference theory, he is also aware of its shortcomings to act alone as a
comprehensive theory of empathy. These shortcomings are expressed by Berlo (1960) in reference to the assumption surrounding inference theory that all people express the same purposes by the same behaviours. He claims in support of Asch (1952) that "we often fail to 'know' the initial workings of others when we assume they are the same as ours". (Berlo 1960:123) Berlo concludes that many breakdowns in communication stem from this belief. Similarly, a further assumption of inference theory "that we cannot understand internal states which we have not experienced ourselves" is questioned by Berlo, who deduces that whilst experience may increase our understanding "it does not seem to be essential to understanding". (Berlo 1960:124)

Empathy is identified in the above analysis as a process of communication in which the importance of both inference and role taking is accentuated. A major conclusion of Chapter 4 is that for empathy treatments to be most effective in history they should be based on role taking. The following section looks at the work of others who have examined the role taking process in some detail.

5.3.1 PERSPECTIVES ON ROLE TAKING THEORY.

The concepts introduced by Mead to explain role taking have been difficult to categorise in systematic theory and research methods. Cottrell (1950) has described them
as "neglected problems in social psychology". (Cottrell in Baumann 1975:64) Baumann (1975) has pointed to a number of reasons for this. He explains that the concepts are "inter-related and interconnected in many ways and on many levels" and that they have suffered from "a lack of a relatively explicit, clear and suitably consistent conception and theory of motivation" (Baumann 1975:64). Their neglect has also been partly explained by Cottrell (1950) by the fact that for so long "empathetic responses" have been considered as part of "our taken-for granted experience". (Cottrell in Baumann 1975:64)

To Mead the human being is considered as 'social' not just with others but also with himself. The concept of self-interaction emphasising the interplay between subject and object in constructing the self is basic to Mead's social psychological theory. It is from this self theory that Mead's concept of role taking is derived. Mead stressed that in order to study humans successfully it was important to be concerned with subjective meanings. Baumann (1975:63) describes Mead's role taking as "a tentative, exploratory, subjective experimental process, and a dynamic and creative interaction process".

Turner (1963) has attempted to clarify this complex process by firstly identifying two types of role taking which he considers "undoubtedly call upon somewhat different skills". (Turner 1963:221) Turner's (1963) classification of types of role taking is
as follows:

Role taking may be a matter of first observing some behaviour of the other and then inferring the total role of which that behaviour is assumed to be a part. [or]

Role taking may take place without any visible behaviour on the part of the other, the role being inferred from a knowledge of the situation, from the supposed status or value.

(Turner1963:221)

Turner is concerned with explaining the way these types are distinguished. He claims that:

The manner in which the role of the other is inferred must be distinguished from the manner in which the inferred other-role shapes the enactment of the self-role. (Turner1963:221)

In order to make this distinction Turner identifies three distinct stages of role taking determined by what he calls the 'standpoint' taken. These further types of role taking are considered by Turner to be importantly interrelated in the behaviour of any individual in two ways - (a) hierarchically and

(b) as alternative orientations to the other. (Turner1963:226)

The three types of role taking according to the standpoint adopted by the role taker are categorised hierarchically by Turner according to whether they are reflexive or non reflexive. Mead(1934) refers to the term reflexive as "the characteristic of the self as an object to itself", indicating that "which can be both subject and object". (Mead1934:136) Turner(1963:224)
explains reflexive role taking as

when the role of the other is employed as a mirror, reflecting the expectations or evaluations of the self as seen in the other-role.

Role taking which is non reflexive is explained by Turner (1963:224) as "probably the simplest and earliest form". This occurs when one adopts the standpoint of the other and simply and automatically acts from the standpoint of the role. As the individual becomes concerned with multiple others he engages in role taking as a third party in order to determine how he ought to act toward the other. This third party standpoint according to Turner (1963:223) "may be recognised as that of a specific person or group or it may be depersonalised into a norm (stereotype)".

The final type of role taking is reflexive and occurs when the individual must shape his own role behaviour according to what he judges to be the probable effect of interaction between his own role and the inferred role of the other. (Turner 1963:223)

What is different about this third type is that it is more than attending to multiple other roles it is concerned with the way in which the individual relates his own role to the others in terms of their interactive effect rather than merely accepting their direction. Turner has made the following observations in light of this categorisation which are relevant to this thesis.

(a) The process of role taking is not
inherently different when the inference is accurate from when it is inaccurate. (Turner 1963:221)

(b) Although hierarchical relationship is important the important relationship among types of role taking lies in the fact that they are alternative relationships. (Turner 1963:227)

(c) Prior learning of the skills of role taking are required before the role taking can be detached from the adoption of the role standpoint. (Turner 1963:226)

(d) The tendency to empathise is at least as important a variable as the ability to empathise. (Turner 1963:228)

(e) Empathy is more accurate with respect to reflexive than non-reflexive aspects of the other role. (Turner 1963:229)

In addition to Turner the following interpretations serve to demonstrate selectively a number of perspectives of the role taking process and empathy.

Shibutani (1961:48) describes role taking as "making inferences about the other person's inner experiences" and as a capacity which develops in a cumulative process of "constructing personifications and imputing motives to them".

Stein (1964) considers the most important role of empathy is how it affects our own person not only by making ourselves into objects but also by discovering what is "sleeping" within us and developing this through empathy with "related natures". The process to Stein involves
both "self-knowledge and self-evaluation". (Stein 1964:105, 106)

Maucorps and Bassoul (1962) see the process of empathy as one of participation, comprehension and anticipation involving both cognitive intention, participating will and imaginative effort. They make the distinction between two types of empathy, elementary 'auto-empathy' and 'allo-empathy'—taking the place of the other.

Laing (1964) deduces a process of complex interpersonal communication in a role taking situation describing the process as:

How[the person]perceives and acts toward the others, how they perceive and act toward him, how he perceives them as perceiving him, how they perceive him as perceiving them, are all aspects of the 'situation'. They are all pertinent to understanding one person's participation in it. (Laing 1964:66)

In (5.5) these interpretations, along with the previous theories of empathy and Turner's analysis and observations of role taking will be used to elicit the components of role taking to be employed in this thesis.

It is first necessary to the purpose of this study to consider the predominance of Mead's own purpose of self interaction and to show how the concept forms a natural comparison with Collingwood's attention to self.

5.4. MEAD AND COLLINGWOOD.

Baumann (1975) draws parallels between Mead's concept of
role taking and Collingwood's 're-enactment of past experience'. These parallels are more apparent when assessed in the light of Mead's (1936) view of history. Baumann (1975:119) goes so far as to say that Mead's personal view of history, steeped in the German tradition of Romanticism is "not just an application of his self theory to the history of ideas" but rather "the starting point of his conception of the social self", i.e., how we see ourselves in society. Whether Baumann's assessment is accurate or not Mead's view of history serves to demonstrate that his perception of the importance of self-awareness and role taking in history is one and the same with Collingwood's re-enactment of past experiences.

To Mead (1936) the basic historical problem is:

> How are we to get the universality involved [i.e., the general statement] which must go with any interpretation of the world, and still make use of the differences which belong to the individual as an individual?  
(Mead 1936:406)

This is the methodological problem of accounting for both the specific and the general in historical treatments (raised by Hooper; see Chapter 4). Significantly, it is Mead's way of treating this problem in history by reconstructing the world from our own standpoint, by taking the roles of others in a process of self-conscious interaction and presentation which so closely resembles Collingwood's rationale for 'what it is to be human' and awareness of self. (Collingwood 1976:10) Mead (1936) sees
the Romantic period as not simply a past, but a past as the point of view from which to come back at the self. One has to grow into the attitude of the other, come back to the self, to realize the self. (Mead 1936:64)

For Baumann (1975:118) aspects of Mead's view are interpreted as "when the self has assumed new roles by playing the part of others, it is not only in a position to criticize the self whose role it has taken, but also in the position to criticize itself". Baumann (1975:126) demonstrates the closeness of Mead's position to that of Collingwood by drawing attention to the fact that:

According to Collingwood a historian must have not only the experience of historical thinking (in Mead's terms taking the attitude or the role of the person investigated) but also should have reflected upon that experience.

This similarity of position between Mead and Collingwood is summed up by Baumann (1975:127) as "to Mead the self is both subject and object of his experience" whilst "to Collingwood a person who performs an act of knowing can also know that he is performing or has performed that act".

Shortcomings in both works of Mead and Collingwood become apparent when viewed in terms of the actual components of the process involved. The purpose of this thesis is to build upon these shortcomings. Baumann (1975:63) aptly describes Mead's theory as formulated in a "loose manner" and that Collingwood's mistake is that:

Maintaining that one has to penetrate behind the phenomena and to put oneself
Mead explains a process of self-conscious interaction taking place inside of the interaction with other persons. This process when viewed in terms of a broader human group continues as an interaction between human beings although that group may not be physically present. The shortcomings of using 're-enactment' to explain this type of process by Collingwood have been amply demonstrated in Chapter 3 with reference to role playing and indicate an unexplained area of Collingwood's work. Nonetheless both Mead and Collingwood offer a considerable framework and both help to clarify the boundaries within which such role taking procedural components may be found. Section 5.5 below summarises these components.

5.5. A SUMMARY OF ROLE TAKING COMPONENTS.

This study takes the position that

1. Role taking is a psychosocial process involving personal interaction with self and others. Thus role taking is considered to be both 'subjective' and 'social'.

2. The concept of self is central to role taking, which involves the development of self by the processes of self-knowledge and self-evaluation through communication.

3. Role taking as described by Turner is identified by three hierarchic stages
thus suggesting it is a developmental process. Each role taking stage may also be viewed in three independent stages as admitted by Turner.

4. Role taking is a cumulative process.

5. Role taking as a process proceeds on two inter-connected levels (a) Intrapersonal (I-me) and (b) Interpersonal (self-other).

6. Role taking is dependent on prior learning of skills and as a consequence can be taught.

7. Role taking as a process proceeds from simple interaction, both interpersonal and intrapersonal, to complex intrapersonal interaction.

8. Role taking as a process proceeds from treatment of the individual (that which is specific) to treatment of the group (that which is general).

9. Role taking as a process proceeds from non-reflexive to reflexive stages.

10. Role taking as a process involves inference.

11. The process of empathy is dependent upon the process of role taking.

From all of these components the following skills of role taking can be deduced. These skills represent the teachable components of role taking and will be seen in Chapter 6 to form a number of the components of the model of empathy and the learning content of empathetic method in history.
Role taking skills are interpersonal and intrapersonal. These include:

- an ability to question introspectively,
- an ability to take another point of view,
- an ability to assess the effect of thoughts both interpersonally and intrapersonally,
- an ability to assess motive,
- an ability to assess the effect of motive,
- an ability to assess persuasiveness, authenticity and ambiguity of communication by interpersonal/intrapersonal evaluation,
- an ability to impute reasoning and to discriminate unrelated meaning transference,
- an ability to discriminate thoughts and feelings to develop a combined image from related or unrelated events.

These above components are applicable to the actual ability of role taking itself, however as Turner (1963:229) points out "the tendency and ability in role taking must be seen in combination" and, more importantly for this study, "the tendency to empathise...is at least as important a variable as the ability to empathise". (Turner 1963:228) This indicates the need to include other elements in the role taking process which cater for both the tendency to empathise and the maintenance of that tendency. Flavell (1975) has outlined a developmental-descriptive framework which takes these elements into account in describing the process of role taking.
5.6. FLAVELL - A DEVELOPMENTAL DESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ROLE TAKING.

Flavell(1975) has isolated a number of possibilities for 'role taking and communicative development'. He has advocated that these can be determined by a causal-analytic approach or a developmental-descriptive treatment. Both offer possibilities for role taking development and the work of Fry (in Flavell 1975:201-206), in particular, suggests possible applications of role taking skills to the understanding of important principles in history. The developmental-descriptive framework which Flavell identifies is, in itself, a valuable pointer to role taking development and offers key suggested areas for development of skills.

5.6.i A LEADING QUESTION.

Flavell(1975:208) asks the question "What sorts of things does the individual have to know or know how to do, in order to achieve any role-taking-mediated end?" Flavell(1975:208-9) identifies five major components the individual has to know.

1. **Existence** - "that there is such a thing as 'perspective' " (Flavell 1975:208); i.e. that the other and self may apprehend the same objects or events differently.

2. **Need** - "that the analysis of the other's perspective is called for in a particular situation". (Flavell 1975: 208) The Need constituent refers to a "growing awareness
that certain situations which do not explicitly call for role taking activity do so implicitly" and "certain situations constitute a signal to engage and utilise one's role taking capabilities". (Flavell 1975:209)

3. **Prediction** - that is "how actually to carry out this analysis" or the "possession of the abilities needed to discriminate with accuracy whatever the relevant role attributes are". (Flavell 1975:208)

Flavell (1975:209) explains that:

Assuming the child knows all the foregoing [existence, need], he still faces the considerable problem of actually carrying out the intended analysis of the other person's role attributes. Role taking activity usually takes the form of an inferential process, a process of making guesses about what the pertinent role attributes are in a given situation on the basis of our general knowledge of human behaviour, together with whatever specific information we can extract from the immediate situation. The nature and quality of the child's role taking activity will change with age.

4. **Maintenance** - "how to maintain in awareness the cognitions yielded by this analysis, assuming them to be in active competition with those which define one's own point of view, during the time... they are... applied to... goal behaviour". (Flavell 1975:208)

Flavell (1975:210) points out that these cognitive sequences involving role taking activity are likely to have some of the features of a system in 'dynamic equilibrium'; that is, one's own point of view may function, intermittently or continuously, as an active, spontaneous force which opposes a role taking analysis.
and which must somehow be neutralised.

The ability to counter this force to establish and maintain the necessary barriers between one's own and the other's point of view is seen as another developmental acquisition in this area.

5. Application — "how to actually apply these cognitions to the end at hand, eg. how to translate what one knows about the other's role attributes into an effective message". (Flavell 1975:208) This is seen by Flavell (1975:210) as "the task of 'behaving appropriately' in terms of the representation of the other's role attributes".

5.6.ii SUCCESSIVE HURDLES CHARACTERISTIC.

Flavell (1975) asserts that there is a 'successive hurdles' character to these activities. The number and nature of the hurdles depend upon the specific task. Flavell (1975:211) states that if a child produces a poor solution to some problem it may be because he is unaware of perspective differences as one of life's possibilities, or unaware that the present task has an implicit role taking requirement, or unable to achieve or maintain an adequate representation of the other's perspective or unable to use the information contained in his representation, or some combination of these.

Flavell has identified changes in these categories at different stages of a child's development. For instance, the child may have some understanding of perspective
variation on entering school or, the need category may change greatly in middle childhood and adolescence.

Other points of interest from Flavell's research are the recognition of role taking skills already in the curriculum (Flavell 1975:218), the development of cognitive chains or a 'wheels within wheels' character (Flavell 1975:224), the use of persuasion strategies in terms of their predicted effectiveness to develop the child's ability to think 'on his feet' (Flavell 1975:226) and, the teacher's ability as a requirement to make sure that children obtain formative experiences rather than to put them into a situation in which they might obtain formative information. (Flavell 1975:206)

In relation to the above developmental descriptive framework proposed by Flavell the role taking components outlined earlier in this chapter [5.5] are applicable to his Prediction stage and offer an alternative to the guesswork suggested by him. (Flavell 1975:209) In this way greater clarification is afforded to both the description and the implementation of the role taking process. Flavell's developmental descriptive framework forms the basis for the empathy model devised in Chapter 6. Section (5.7) deals with the appropriateness of this framework in the context of teaching empathy in history.
5.7. SIGNIFICANCE OF PSYCHOSOCIAL ROLE TAKING TO HISTORY.

The significance of the processes of role taking highlighted in this chapter is that they offer a means of interpreting history according to the philosophy of Collingwood outlined in Chapter 3 and confirm the suitability of role taking to explain empathy in history. The emphasis on development of self, interpersonally and intrapersonally, conforms with Collingwood's basic rationale that the value of studying history is self-knowledge. The emphasis on thoughts and feelings involved in the psychological process of interaction confirms Collingwood's belief that history is the 're-enactment of past thoughts' and subsequently offers a possible means of explaining why history happened. The analysis of role taking processes reveals a number of interaction skills which offer a methodology for the 're-enactment of past thoughts', an area not treated by Collingwood.

Of major significance to history is the manner in which the role taking process develops and proceeds, particularly from the individual to the group - from the specific to the general. What is central to the study of history is that which is particular or specific is only significant when viewed in the context of the general. Baumann (1975:119) offers an example to explain this point that "one can state what is unique about the French Revolution only after having compared it with other
revolutions". The process of role taking with its specific/general orientation aligns itself with this fundamental feature of historical methodology. A major finding of this study is that role taking processes are critical to the study of history because of their capacity to develop the significance of the particular in the context of the general. This capacity answers Hooper's call (in Chapter 4) for the maintenance of a general 'feel' in historical analysis. As a consequence of this finding three representations of empathy are recognizable along a specific-general continuum. The three representations are referred to as general, specific and specific-general empathy. Each representation will be seen in Chapter 6 to assist in making the model of empathy explicit.

5.7.1 THREE REPRESENTATIONS OF EMPATHY.

These representations of empathy closely follow the role taking process and are based on the educational belief that a grasp of the particular enables one to suggest a deeper comprehension of the general. The representations also cater for the three propositions explaining Collingwood's philosophy of history (Chapter 3) and although a rough approximation may be made to equate each representation hierarchically with Collingwood's propositions to do so gives a false impression of methodological development to both the representations.
and the propositions. Methodologically the description of the representations of empathy gains significance if viewed in the light of Turner's point that role taking types can also be interrelated as "alternative orientations to the other". (Turner 1963:226) However, in terms of role taking processes these three representations of empathy are described developmentally following the progression to Mead's 'generalised other'. The three representations are presented below.

1. EMPATHY AS A GENERAL REPRESENTATION.

The first representation is seen as developing a general understanding of past events or characters by students. This representation is associated with a broad understanding of past events and with developing and creating an atmosphere or a 'feel' for a particular time and/or place. It is this 'feel' which is experienced to some degree with any inquiry into an historical topic. The student, receiving information, takes it in and in the process alters his perceptions of that time or place accordingly. A feature of this first representation is that it is non reflexive. The student simply adopts the role of the other where required. This may be done in some cases by simulation and role play. General impressions of what it was like on the goldfields, during the Depression or in Victorian England are examples of this representation.
2. EMPATHY AS A SPECIFIC REPRESENTATION.

The second representation is seen as developing a sense of the specific in a particular time and place or in understanding the actions of a specific character or characters. The student is asked to consider the points of view of past characters in a specified time or place from within the characters themselves. In order to do this specific events are pieced together from the viewpoints of the characters. This understanding of viewpoints involves the taking of multiple roles. When these roles taken adopt a stereotype they are non reflexive, when they involve the assessment of thoughts and feelings a degree of reflexiveness is demanded of the student. Significantly the student's perceptions are limited to the specific so that a general understanding is not sought. This representation lends itself particularly to the treatment of possible motives and conflicts of past characters, and to an assessment of their relationships.

Examples of this representation include (a) the understanding of how Bligh feels about Christian in a given situation or, (b) why Cook acts as he does in another or, (c) what Elizabeth experiences in the Tower.

3. EMPATHY AS A SPECIFIC-GENERAL REPRESENTATION.

The third representation is seen as developing a sense of the specific which in turn generates a general understanding of past events or characters. It is a
reflexive sensitizing approach involving degrees of interpersonal and intrapersonal role taking. What Mead terms the 'generalised other' is equated with this representation and central to it is that the understanding of the particular enables a suggestion of the general. Consequently this representation of empathetic understanding is not seen as being operative in the reverse, i.e., the general suggesting the specific.

Examples of this third representation include (a) when Cook reprimands Banks over the 'careless' loss of life of two negroes on a naturalist walkabout at Tierra del Fuego, this leads to a general impression being formed of the responsibilities of those on board the Endeavour and their different aspirations, or, (b) when Ned Kelly, son of 'Red' Kelly from Tipperary in Ireland on 26 October 1878 shoots Sergeant Michael Kennedy from Westmeath in Ireland, Constable Thomas Lonigan from Sligo in Ireland and Constable Michael Scanlon from Kerry in Ireland a general understanding of an Irish dimension to Kelly's clashes with the law is suggested beyond simple lawlessness or hatred of police in general.

Implicit in the third representation is the assumption that understanding generated by the specific treatment will replace or at least, add to, a conception of a general understanding already formed. For example, the understanding of Kelly as being violently opposed to the police is somehow widened by the 'Irish' dimension.
Previously this understanding may have been that Kelly hated the police because of problems in the colony, because he had a rebellious nature, or because his mother had been imprisoned. This wider sense of the generic, with Irish ironically pitted against Irish, helps to establish an understanding for the period through the characters and offers a perspective which can be said to be more empathetic than the prior understanding. This is not only one empathetic experience of Kelly's viewpoint but is also an insight into the motives of his pursuers which may not have been previously apparent.

It may be concluded then that the third representation of empathy emerging from this study provides greater explanatory power of empathy than the first two representations and hence is considered as a more advanced means of communicating empathy. Also, the two representations of empathy which claim to be concerned with the same result (i.e., the development within students of an ability to generally feel or experience the atmosphere of 'what it must have been like' in a particular time) are seen to be quite different in the understanding they develop because of the presence or absence of the second representation mentioned, the specific.

5.7.ii HOOPER - ILLUSTRATION FROM WORK OF MAINSTREAM HISTORIANS.
Hooper (1974:27), in assessing the "very different works"
of Zeldin and Cobb as illustrations of "the survival value of History as a significant study of the past" relies heavily on the importance placed on this specific-general development in their work. Hooper praises this development (which seems so suited to empathetic understanding) in the works of Zeldin and Cobb who are said to write History "without falling into the trap of micro-History, or being so general that the particular is submerged for all time". (Hooper 1974:28)

This observation by Hooper would appear to have no greater relevance than in this classification of the representations of empathy. It can be argued that what often separates the worth of one historian over another is the ability of that historian to convey this sense of both the specific and generic.

5.7.iii A CRITIQUE OF SHEMILT IN LIGHT OF PRESENT FINDINGS.

The SREB Working Party (1986:42-43) make reference to the distinction between "general empathetic understanding" which is "unrelated to specific events" and "everyday empathy" which suggests "how people at a particular time felt about a specific event". This SREB (1986) reference to the importance of specific events to improve upon general empathetic understanding demonstrates a recognition of specific-general development in empathy treatments. Although the importance of general and
specific understanding appears to be recognised by the SREB in determining levels of empathetic development there is little emphasis given beyond this recognition to explain how reference to specific events improves general empathetic understanding. Such recognition demonstrates a significant difference to the way general and specific understanding are used to explain empathy development in this thesis. The SREB Working Party refer to 'specific' and 'general' to explain how a hierarchy of assessment may be implemented to gauge levels of empathetic responses according to the classification of empathy into successive stages by Shemilt(1984). This emphasis on assessment of student responses to gauge empathetic development contrasts with the emphasis given to determining how empathy itself develops as a process through general and specific understanding as proposed in this thesis model. The difference between the two approaches is that one method considers reactions to understanding whereas the other looks at ways of developing or creating understanding. The lack of emphasis given to explaining empathy development in treatments such as those proposed by the SREB(1986) clearly demonstrates that empathy is not being seen as a developmental process. Types of empathy are recognised only from how students may react empathetically if this SREB(1986) direction is followed as opposed to this thesis model which offers ways to teach empathy directly. The
understanding and application of these above representations of empathy is considered as important to and synonymous with the integrative role taking model of empathy proposed in the next chapter. The issue of specific-general development is looked at more closely in Chapter 7 when the thesis model is tested against contemporary treatments.

5.8. CONCLUSION.

The analyses in Chapter 5 lead to the conclusion that role taking processes must be taken into account if the process of empathy is to be more completely understood than is presently the case. This understanding has been advanced by suggesting three representations of empathy, the culminating one, namely specific-general generating the greatest explanatory power. The conceptual framework thus presented in Chapter 5 can now be employed as a conceptual basis for the model of empathy to be presented in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER SIX

A MODEL OF EMPATHETIC COMMUNICATION
CHAPTER SIX.

6.1 INTRODUCTION.

This chapter presents a model for teaching empathy according to the development of role taking tasks. First, an overall developmental-descriptive process consisting of a series of five developmental tasks as devised by Flavell (1975) is outlined. Secondly, embodied within this first outline is a detailed extension of the third of these tasks as applied to history teaching, i.e., the methods used in analysing and predicting outcomes of a role taking perspective as a means of communicating empathy. Suggestions are put forward concerning the roles of both teacher and student in the application of this communication process.

6.2 DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE TAKING TASKS RELEVANT TO AN EMPATHETIC APPROACH IN HISTORY TEACHING.

6.2.i RECOGNITION OF EMPATHETIC PERSPECTIVE.

The first step in empathising in history is to be aware of a perspective based on the knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others and to recognise that these may not be similar to one’s own. It is important that students be encouraged to realise that this perspective is a viable alternative to other methods or processes used and to be fully aware that such a perspective exists and further that understanding can be achieved by analysing thoughts and feelings. Traditional
interpretations of history may tend to make this view quite foreign to both students and teachers alike. Flavell (1975:5) points out that "the child is continually a prisoner of his own point of view". In this case, sometimes it may not occur to students of history to, firstly, recognise this empathetic perspective and secondly, to consider using it as a method of analysis.

6.2.ii APPROPRIATE SELECTION AND APPLICATION OF AN EMPATHETIC PERSPECTIVE.

Students are required to identify a need for an empathetic perspective; i.e. to be able to interpret when this perspective is appropriate to use in analysing history and when it is not. Flavell (1975:21) states there is a growing awareness that "certain situations which do not explicitly call for role taking do so implicitly". He suggests that certain situations constitute a signal to engage and utilise one's role taking capabilities. What are these signals as applied to history?

Generally students will be drawn to this perspective if they are seeking motives for historical actions and want to know why these actions occurred. There may be a desire to get closer to the truth. Following identification of a political motive or an economic one a human motive related to feelings may become obvious. There may be an inadequate explanation offered by other perspectives. The type of material may suggest this
approach, eg. conversations, letters, a conflict of interests between characters or character behaviour. Generally students will be drawn to this perspective if they wish to consider a human aspect, particularly if they are made well aware that this perspective exists and know what to look for. This perspective may be signalled because another point of view is necessary to counter bias detected in a particular exercise. An empathetic perspective may be suggested by a student's dissatisfaction with the truth of an account or by an attempt to understand it more fully and personally.

Need will be determined by the degree of empathy sought: either a general picture (how did a certain people live?) or a specific relationship motive (why did a particular character act as he did?) These signals will depend upon the material being treated but will be more apparent if students and teachers are aware of the possibility of analysing by this perspective and are aware as to why they may wish to apply it. Because of a need to be aware of what to look for an empathetic situation points to encouraging in students the development of a philosophy of history and, in teachers, the development of a philosophy of teaching, for empathetic understanding to be more effective. Such developments have long been advocated as a necessity in some quarters (see Phillips 1980). The approach of this model suggests at least one possible avenue of their
achievement.

Analysis in previous chapters of this thesis has demonstrated that by viewing empathy as a communication process role taking skills can be developed thus allowing for the situation where empathy can be taught to students. The following stage in the overall developmental descriptive framework is concerned with the enunciation of these skills and their application and explains the central methodological component of the thesis model. The model extends Flavell's assumptional base by explaining empathy skills according to the components of role taking isolated in Chapter 5 and illustrates how the three representations of empathy developed in this thesis can be employed in teaching history. Eleven methods are clarified as emerging from the role taking components identified in Chapter 5 to provide the working model of empathy which forms the central purpose of this study.

6.2.iii METHODS OF ANALYSING AND PREDICTING OUTCOMES OF AN EMPATHETIC PERSPECTIVE.

Following the recognition of an empathetic perspective and the need to empathise in a given situation the next stage is concerned with actually carrying out the intended analysis of the other person's role attributes, i.e., taking the roles of historical characters. It involves inferences being made about what these attributes are in a given situation on the basis of general understanding.
and any specific information which may be supplied.

The effectiveness of these methods will ultimately ensure the difference between 'guesses' and 'controlled inferences', monitored by the humanness of the response and how it fits the situation as much as by the specific evidence supplied. As a consequence this step may vary considerably according to the general knowledge and information component of individual students as well as the individual abilities of these students. Age, according to Flavell (1975:54) has been found to be a significant factor in this ability range. However, Donaldson (1978:25) claims that "motives and intentions of characters are entirely comprehensible to a child of three because to him it makes human sense". In view of Donaldson's (1978) findings the manner of presentation may have more to do with successful application of this step than recognised student abilities and even age.

This thesis model identifies the following eleven abilities to be considered in history teaching in directing students towards how to infer or in offering possible avenues to encourage a more disciplined line of inferential role taking. All these abilities imply that empathy is described as a subjective psychosocial process and are specific examples of the teachable components of role taking skills developed in Chapter 5. These abilities all reflect to some degree the characteristics of the role taking process namely, the development from
simple interpersonal to complex intrapersonal interaction, the progression from non reflexive to reflexive stages and the cumulative nature of role taking. The degree to which these abilities reflect the components determines the extent to which they can be categorised as skills to describe the representations of empathy developed in Chapter 5. Also reflected are experiments by Flavell (1975).

1. Ability to Develop Self-Directing Questioning.

Students may be encouraged to develop an ability of questioning from within themselves; i.e. to look at emotions and fears and their possible bearing on events. In this way questioning will be less outwardly directed and more self-directing, e.g. in assessing the emotions, attitudes and feelings of Captain Bligh to Fletcher Christian the student may be more likely to be successful at this assessment by following a more introspective analysis. The 'Bluey' question in a Soldier Settlements unit (Cowling 1983: 48) which asks "What reasons can you suggest for Bluey's action in burning his house down?" is an example of applying this step. This ability is an expression of the reflexive nature of role taking indicating an analysis of specific character intention and interaction and is an example of the development of a specific representation of empathy as outlined in Chapter 5. This role taking ability is dependent upon the consideration of empathy as being a subjective social process involving the development and evaluation of self
by interpersonal and intrapersonal communication.

2. Ability to Determine Points of View Within An Historical Situation.

Students may be encouraged to re-tell a specific event or action in history from the point of view of each actor in that event; ie. to see the event from each actor's (or character's) perspective. Often in history exercises students are encouraged to determine different interpretations of history from different opinions given of it. This particular ability to be developed is concerned with determining points of view within the situation itself and how the characters react to them.

Manning Clark (1962) in describing the last days of Burke and Wills offers an example to which this method is readily applied. He explains the history from the various points of view of the characters. (Manning Clark 1962:157-158)

For their part the blacks were delighted to show white men how to find the seed of the nardoo plant, how to grind it into flour and cook it.

...Mr. Burke had knocked the fishnets out of the hands of the blacks fearing that if they were too friendly the blacks would be always hanging around.

Wills writes to his father:

We are on the point of starvation, not so much from the want of food, but from the want of nutriment in what we can get and I can only look out like Mr. Micawber for something to turn up.

The above selection from Manning Clark (1962) demonstrates
how this ability can lead to the development of a specific-general representation of empathy. By assessing the specific points of view of characters in an incident a general understanding is developed which takes each of these points of view into account. A general understanding of what it was like for these historical characters has been arrived at through an analysis of how each point of view is reconciled within the situation and how the characters relate to each other according to the humanness of their responses. This ability relies on the important components of the thesis model which describe role taking as a cumulative process proceeding from simple interaction to complex intrapersonal interaction.

Shemilt (1984:67) is using this method in what he terms the 'spot' biography to assess the position of Mary Queen of Scots, Elizabeth and Walsingham to determine who was responsible for the execution of Mary. The value of using specific information about characters leads to a general understanding which has been enhanced by the specific information. The process, although clearly in evidence in Shemilt's example has not been accentuated as it is in the thesis model from the point of generating a deeper general understanding and feeling for a period by taking the roles of the characters in preference to problem solving however this is, no doubt, implied to some degree by Shemilt.
3. Ability to Develop a Recursive Picture.

Students may be encouraged to develop an understanding of a 'recursive picture'; i.e. that one person's thoughts can become another person's thoughts or the same person's thoughts can become the object of another person's thoughts. By looking for examples of this process in primary source materials students may develop more relevance in inferring because they can detect these nuances of personality.

Woodham-Smith (1953:26), in describing the last moments before the fateful decision to order the charge of the Light Brigade shows how the thoughts and anxieties of the three central characters, Nolan, Lord Lucan and Lord Raglan become the object of each other's thoughts and demonstrates subsequently how they misinterpret them.

The process involved in assessing thoughts of characters in a given situation and of assessing how these thoughts may be interpreted by other characters and hence how they may be reflected in their actions is an example of how inference forms a significant part of role taking. This in turn shows how the process of empathy is dependent upon role taking. In terms of the model of this thesis the representation of empathy in the example by Woodham-Smith (1953) is specific in that it assesses the level of personal interaction of particular characters and draws conclusions on the two interconnected levels of interpersonal and intrapersonal communication to explain
character action.

4. Ability to Assess Different Aspects of Human Motivation.

As well as being encouraged to develop a more 'self-directing' approach to questioning students may be encouraged to examine a situation from different motivational aspects of human nature; i.e. greed, jealousy, anger, frustration, loyalty, pity and despair.

The transcript of the statement of evidence by Mrs. Waldron at the Sydney trial of two female convicts for the murder of her husband, Charles, at Wollongong in 1833 gives students an opportunity to examine this evidence from different motivational aspects. (see Appendix A) The motives for the various actions of the participants in this 'instance of domestic violence' when examined in terms of frustration, jealousy, anger, pity, despair or loyalty shed interesting light on the events allowing the students a glimpse into the private lives of these people. This exercise allows for a recursive picture of the characters and a re-telling of the events according to how the respective characters appear to see them and also deliberately weighs up character interaction against common inherent human responses such as jealousy, anger or frustration. Does frustration explain the rather bizarre act of undressing by the convict girl? If so, frustration with whom or with what? Are there examples of loyalty expressed in this extract? If so, by whom? to whom? why?
This ability which relies on an assessment of subjective personal interaction by interpreting the thoughts and feelings of specific characters fosters a specific representation of empathy according to the typology introduced in Chapter 5.

The role taking involved in this exercise may also allow for a 'wider view' of life in Wollongong in 1833, wider than the four characters involved, leading to a greater understanding of the lives and living conditions and the relationships between convicts and settlers in the community. The development of a specific-general representation of empathy is catered for by this ability in proceeding from the treatment of the individual to the treatment of the group and relies on the cumulative nature of role taking. Motivational questions applicable to this thesis model are to be seen to be different to descriptive or analytical ones such as - who killed Captain Waldron? or speculative ones such as - do you think Sarah washed the floor? They concern themselves with seeking to explain why the actions occurred by relating to the actions in human terms or according to the 'commonness of humanity'.

5. Ability to Assess the Effect of Motive to Most Logical Perspective.

Students may be encouraged to differentiate between, for example, two or three messages (or statements) concerning the same content from the perspectives of the
intended receivers of those messages (or statements) and to determine the differences in terms of the usage to which pertinent information is put; i.e., how they appear to affect each other. In doing this, students may be encouraged further to find the logical product and the logical sum of such sets of information which each message (or statement) possesses; i.e., to develop an ability to reduce evidence to best suit all three (or whatever) perspectives. This ability reflects the importance of intrapersonal interaction in empathising and will encourage students to estimate the extent of motivational and attitudinal systems within the messages (or statements) which may determine whether the role taking will be particular or generalised. For example, a day in the life of Governor Philip may be described and analysed more fully from convict sickness reports, crime reports, work details and stock lists by being reduced to the most logical explanation of his actions on that day in terms of what he may have had to think about and what he may have had to think about most.

A number of variations to this method can also be adopted which depend upon the nature of the material presented and the timing of its presentation. The Governor Philip example here is based on analysis of sets of materials in no fixed order simultaneously, where students are to come up with the most logical possibilities to explain what Governor Philip may have
done and consequently, by adductive thinking and cues from within the source material, what life may have been like at that time in the colony. This example reflects the importance of empathy as a cumulative process and is a means of generating a specific-general representation of empathy. Sets of information may be presented at different points in a lesson to foster the process of moving from a general understanding of an event to a more empathetic general understanding by the introduction of new, more specific material. An example of this development designed by this author for a Wollongong Year 9 class occurs when students are supplied with a very general account of life on the goldfields containing such statements as "Diggers lived in primitive tents and bark huts" and an illustration showing miners 'puddling' for gold. (see Appendix B) The students are asked to describe what life was like. This description conforms with a general representation of empathy. Following this brief exercise and discussion students are supplied with specific information concerning deaths at a particular town (Lambing Flat) over an eight month period and causes of death as listed in the newspapers at the time. Specific questions such as "How many children died in this period? How were they killed? When did Le Deu Sook die? (see Appendix C) are directed towards issues such as attitudes to children, town organisation, social life and why people may have died. This supplying of
information allows for the development of a specific representation of empathy. After further discussion and reading of answers the students are asked to re-read their initial statements and explain how their perceptions of those statements have altered and to explain what understanding the second exercise has revealed that the first has not. The supplying of the specific information, the ensuing discussion and re-reading of the earlier material allows for a specific-general representation of empathy to be developed.

A similar exercise is given by Shemilt (1984:70) on Custer's decision making at Little Bighorn concerned with assessing a number of decision points within a narrative. The exercise allows for the development of a specific representation of empathy by supplying particular information on characters and their motivations. The withholding of information in the disconfirmation exercise involving the harsh punishment of John Stubbs (Shemilt1984:73) also shows elements of this empathetic process.

6. Ability to Differentiate Students' Own Perspective Measurement.

In an exercise such as the above (see 4) students may also be asked to consider differentiating between the various levels of persuasiveness in terms of the degrees of predicted effectiveness to themselves. This may
involve rating sets of alternative persuasive arguments according to the above steps; i.e. their own ability to encourage self-directing questions or their understanding of a recursive picture from a relationship viewpoint. The Waldron case may involve rating a 'jealousy' motive against a 'loyalty' motive to explain a character's actions. This process is described here as the development of the means of coming to terms with one's 'second record' or by learning to rely on the use of one's 'second record' in a certain way, from a human orientation. Whereas (5) is concerned with the perspective of characters in history and how they may affect each other this ability considers the students' own perspective measurement. This ability is dependent upon the development of self by the process of self-knowledge and self-evaluation through both interpersonal and intrapersonal communication. This ability also gives an indication of the importance attached to the prior learning of empathetic skills for students to be able to make this type of assessment.

7. Ability to Recognise Ambiguity and Naiveté of Characters' Perceptions.

Students may be encouraged to recognise an ambiguous quality in material and/or, in so doing, be able to determine that the naive other's view is different from their own, or that the particular characters may have naive or simple perceptions of an event which may
influence its interpretation. An example devised by this author for a Year 9 class involves an examination of the various logs and diaries recorded on board the Endeavour during Cook's voyage up the east coast of Australia in 1770 and reveals a number of significant differences in the accounts. Students may recognise that some are privy to information that others have not or that some accounts have identical mistakes and that others have a naive view of the events. This naivété not only may influence the students' interpretation of the events but may alter their perceptions of those on board in seeing them more clearly through their motives, naive or otherwise. They may even be able to be seen by the students as they may not have visualised themselves. This point is touched on by Fines (1981:25) in reference to Thompson's descriptions of the reading of Waterson's private memorandum book.

The important point concerning this exercise on log variations is that it is not initially directed towards determining whether one log account may be more authentic than another but rather to determining why these accounts may be different. The ambiguities and inconsistencies are compared 'in period' rather than from the vantage point of hindsight. In this way the log variations suggest inferences that can be made as to why and how certain logs may be exact copies of Cook's log whilst others are not. This direction involves the examination of specific relationships on board and their effect on
each other and allows for the development of a specific-general representation of empathy as outlined in Chapter 5. The specific-general representation may then possibly offer a clearer understanding of the authenticity of the accounts.

An exercise such as this one on log variations is an example of 'getting the period right' and relies on pupils arriving at this perception through analysis of the particular source material by taking the roles of those responsible for the various accounts and being able to appreciate the naivety or otherwise of their accounts in terms of the pupils' own perspectives. Limited background knowledge is required for this exercise which amply demonstrates that although empathetic exercises should be concerned with 'getting the period right' (and most exercises are) this concern is just one objective among a number of others to be attained in order to gauge an empathetic response.

8. Ability to Impute Complicated Reasoning.

Students may be encouraged to develop an ability to impute complicated reasoning to others. They may also be encouraged to recognise degrees of predictive reasoning or complicated reasoning and when it is being applied. Although similar to point (3) this is seen as an 'advanced' extension of the diagnosis of thoughts and feelings and is characteristic of the development of a "wheels within wheels" dimension described by Flavell (1975:223) as a
"cognitive chain" which may be recognised by students. Flavell suggests that there are at least three levels in this cognitive chain. An example of Level 1 is listed as "I know how you feel"; Level 2 as "I'm sure you know what I think about Bill"; Level 3 as "I think you must feel that I can't understand your attitude about Bill". (Flavell 1975:51) This ability features the reflexive nature of role taking and relies on being able to empathise specifically on both interpersonal and intrapersonal levels. Variations of cognitive chains are found in Carr's (1963) description of the meaning of historical documents which includes "what he wanted others to think he thought, what he himself thought he thought" (Carr 1963:16), and in Laing's description of interpersonal communication. (see Chapter 5)

An example of this development in an historical context would seem to occur in the period of extreme friction in the colony of New South Wales in 1809 when Bligh has been removed from office by Paterson and yet was claiming to be still in command. The flurry of correspondence between Paterson, Foveaux, Johnston, Bligh and Captain Porteus (captain of the Porpoise) over from whom Porteus should take orders reveals an example of correspondence influenced, at least in some part, by this development. This method would seem to be particularly suited to conflicts between characters in history and the inherent misunderstandings in their relationships.
9. Ability to Discriminate Role Transference.

Students may be encouraged to discriminate how meaning from one task can be transferred to give meaning to an unrelated task and consequently how meaning from one role taken can give insight into and can be transferred to the role taken by someone else. This process of transference would appear to be similar to what Sansom (1987:127) has described as "an important mechanism of learning which takes place by an interplay of skills, experience and material which modifies the concept structure of the pupil".

A simple example of this is that posed by Reid & Pickhaver (1984:4) in a War Memorial document where the sergeant's role in filling thermos flasks in turn affects the perception of the role taken by the rear gunner on a bombing raid. Similarly, students may be encouraged to recognise how the absorption of meaning (in terms of motive) from an exercise may assist meaning in an unexpected quarter. An example of this in a classroom exercise devised by this author for a Year 9 class proved to be that in attempting to find out why cattle were wandering in the early days of the colony in New South Wales it was discovered by students that it was the convicts themselves who were guilty of wandering to visit the French ships in Botany Bay. This example demonstrates the use of problem solving from the point of posing a dilemma as Shemilt (1984) and others such as
Macintosh (1981) have advocated as essential to teaching empathy. The importance of this wandering cattle example is that the problem is not the most important aspect of the treatment. Because of the open-endedness of the enquiry the empathetic response comes more from the divergent thinking involved in the role taking and in creating a broader general picture. The specific information introduced in this model example allows for the development of a specific-general representation of empathy to be achieved by transferring the problem to a wider perspective. Emphasis has been placed not on the problem to be solved but on the processes of human action involved in the exercise and how the children relate to them. This is one example of demonstrating the importance of problem solving but also of going beyond it to establish empathy. Schafer (1959) in describing 'generative empathy' offers an explanation as to why empathy is more than just problem solving. He claims (1959:345) that "empathetic comprehension is understood to refer to a process with equally important cognitive and affective aspects". Schafer (1959:346) disassociates empathy from both "naive psychological explanations in which generalisations substitute for concrete reference, imagery and affective tone" and from "pure secondary process and ordered inductive and deductive problem solving".
10. Ability to Form a Combined Image from Unrelated Events.

Students may be encouraged to develop an ability to form a combined image from seemingly unrelated events and also that this combined image is gained by discriminating thoughts and feelings rather than by describing incidents. This situation can often be best explained as seeing the history 'from below'. Cobb, in particular, is described by Fines (1981) as building this image which is akin to 'painting' a picture. This can also be an image formed by describing speech. Cobb's descriptions point to the fact that much can be gained in understanding people in the past from the way they spoke. The transcript of the Waldron trial is an example of how the way the conversations are recalled can assist in building this image of how people in the past lived. The ability to form a combined image encourages the development of a specific-general representation of empathy by drawing that which is general from specific unrelated events and speech patterns.

11. Ability to Discriminate Thoughts and Feelings from Visual Sources.

The ability to form a combined image can also be used effectively in describing visual images, particularly photographs, to give a general impression of what it was like at a particular time. The process of discriminating thoughts and feelings from photographs does not involve
merely viewing the picture and giving impressions but is dependent upon questioning directed to answer what the characters in the picture may be thinking or feeling. An example of this method designed by this author for a Year 9 Wollongong class centred round a photograph of an early settler's family with questions such as "What duties does this mother have? What are the dangers for this woman and her children? How are they dressed? Why? Who took the photograph? How do you know this? and What are their entertainments?" A question directed even more to feelings asks "How warm is this home?" This ability demonstrates that students can be taught to empathise by personal subjective interaction from purely visual sources. Where the characters are not known a general representation of empathy is most likely however visual sources when supported by knowledge of characters and additional source material may produce a specific-general representation of empathy as described in Chapter 5.

If the above abilities or skills may be considered to have one emphasis in particular it is that of developing powers of discrimination rather than merely powers of description. Although the need will inevitably arise as to when to introduce these stages an absolute definitive order, according to levels of difficulty, may not need to be established. Turner (1963) makes the important distinction that although hierarchical relationship is important "the important relationship among types of role
taking lies in the fact that they are alternative relationships". (Turner 1963:227) With this view by Turner (1963) in mind this thesis model adopts the position that these tasks or abilities are not seen so much as developmental one to the other but more as being used to assist a general, specific or advanced general empathetic understanding. Obviously some are more elementary in their approach and may, because of this, be considered as preliminary to others. However the overriding factors deciding when these tasks are introduced may be determined by the opportunities perceived within the material presented and the possibility of maintaining an empathetic approach (as discussed in the following section). Nonetheless a non-mandatory order may be determined prior to a particular unit of study.

6.2.iv MAINTAINING AN EMPATHETIC PERSPECTIVE.

Flavell (1975:216) has stated in reference to developing role taking tasks that "it is simply a fact that children are not masochistic enough to be forever aiming at targets which their intellectual weaponry cannot reach". If this is so, when this student attitude is coupled with the other suggested 'natural' phenomenon of a child being "continually a prisoner of his own point of view" (Flavell 1975:5) the solution to the problem of maintaining a perspective on empathetic understanding within these parameters is a decisive one.
Lee (1984) in referring to Flavell's observation on maintaining another's point of view has speculated that the task is more complicated in history because of the suspension of emotional loadings of beliefs and values required to do so, but appears to accept in light of research being found to the contrary that this may not be the case. (Lee 1984:108)

Flavell (1975) suggests that the student has to be seen as possessing some of the features of a system in "dynamic equilibrium" and states that

one's own point of view may function, intermittently or continuously, as an active, spontaneous force which opposes a role taking analysis and which somehow must be neutralised.

(Flavell 1975:210)

An ability to counter this force and to establish and maintain the necessary barriers between one's own and the other's point of view is important to developing role taking skills. Two abilities, particularly, are seen to be important to and to be developed within this maintenance stage.

(a) The ability to 'keep alive' the representation of the sort of individual whose role is being taken.

(b) The ability to maintain consistency in the face of change.

Part of this latter ability will be the additional abilities to identify possible disruptive influences and to determine how to reduce them. The consistency
referred to here is in respect of portraying a set of feelings, thoughts or perceptions which are in faith with the character involved. This ability to maintain consistency in the face of change may be measured by explaining and weighing up motives of individuals or by developing an ability to account for apparent inconsistencies of actions.

As these above methods (6.2.iii) are being asked to be identified and developed in student performance a legitimate task of the teacher may well be to set up evidence to establish pathways to empathetic learning. Booth (1987:37-38) has stressed the importance of materials and methods which "will allow the teacher to set up situations in which pupils can operate in a variety of ways, unconstrained by notions of levels of thinking or formal operations". Such an emphasis would allow teachers greater scope in teaching for empathy by establishing pathways to learning.

A representation of an individual may be maintained also, in some cases, by a greater emphasis on role taking activity as opposed to role taking accuracy (as outlined as a component in Chapter 5); ie. to look for what might have happened or what a possible explanation may have been rather than determining certainties. This comes closest to what has been described as 'supposition' (cf. Stockley 1983). The important difference to be taken into account is that whereas this may be a useful device to
use on occasions in maintaining a perspective of empathy it is not empathy as such. The distinction needs to be made in order to demonstrate how it may be necessary to establish pathways to empathetic understanding in one learning situation so that they may be established in other future learning situations without it. In this way the means justify the end in that the method of empathising is that which is learned. Once these have been established and 'trained for' it is envisaged that it would not be necessary to continue structuring evidence depending on the retention rates of the students in question. Once again this may be determined by the capacity of those in the learning situation to maintain an empathetic approach. Ashby & Lee (1987:86), for example, have pointed to the value of allowing students to argue out a problem often giving wrong answers in "reaching a higher level of understanding". The use of what Little (1983) identifies as Collingwood's "structural imagination" may be, for example, deliberately used to establish such a pathway. Such a view supports Turner's (1963) claim that "the process of role taking is not inherently different when the inference is accurate from when it is inaccurate". (Turner 1963:221)

The maintenance stage demands development of a system which constantly checks the level of perception. This checking may embody an ability to detect levels of drift or regression, of impulse control, of conceptual
differentiation, of maintenance of attention and of assessing the gap between what Flavell (1975) calls the 'target' and the 'weaponry'. If empathetic understanding is not being achieved it may mean that new and better 'weaponry' may be created; i.e., it may be teacher selected rather than self selected. The maintenance stage is one which is dependent, to a large extent, upon the teacher possessing these checking abilities, although ultimately the student when understanding empathetically and having familiarised himself with this process will possess and apply these abilities by his own fruition.

The tasks of both teacher and student are summarised briefly following description of the next stage (seen as a natural extension to maintenance in role taking) which is referred to by Flavell (1975) as the application stage. In the historical context this may be described as the interpretation of the perspective in terms of its effect on the history studied.

6.2.v INTERPRETATION OF AN EMPATHETIC PERSPECTIVE.

This stage is concerned with knowing how to make the appropriate empathetic response. It may be dependent upon an ability to recognise that this perspective will alter an overall historical perspective and also upon an ability to explain how (in written or spoken form) it will do so. The development of some powers of persuasion (in some instances akin to what the legal profession calls
'talking on one's feet') may be a necessary ability. One exercise in persuasiveness may be to analyse what is wrong with less capable interpretations. The bulk of assessment material from student responses such as that compiled by research (British Schools Council 1976; Shemilt 1984; Ashby & Lee 1987) in Britain, where both teachers and students can analyse responses of others may be an important resource in developing this perspective.

A further ability of interpretation may be to draw generalisations from these above appropriate empathetic responses. This may entail the recognition that the specific understanding leads to a more general interpretation or that the recognition of a specific understanding only is more appropriate to a situation. To do this effectively, of course, students must know that they are empathising in the first place. The ability to draw generalisations as applied to interpreting empathy has an interesting parallel in the example cited by Fines (1981) on the use of imagination in history in describing the "movement" in Thompson's book "from a teasing problem ...to a conclusion that not only modifies the history of the period, but also reveals the significance of a larger topic in a new light". (Fines 1981:26) An empathetic example of this is where Woodham-Smith (1953), in describing specific decisions made by participants in the charge of the Light Brigade leads to generalisations being drawn about the reasons for these decisions being deeply
embedded in the British military system, particularly that of officer recruitment. The recognition of the 'Irish' dimension in the Kelly exercise (6.2.iii) is another example of this.

6.3 THE TEACHER'S TASK.

Although the maintenance stage of an empathetic perspective (such as fostering 'dynamic equilibrium') is an obviously important stage, the task of the teacher is equally important throughout the process. The teacher must be aware of the various stages of identification and recognition, application and analysis, maintenance and interpretation and the possibilities of aspects of each stage in respect of individual student development.

The teacher, in recognising a poor empathetic response, must be a 'troubleshooter' who can cross check for explanations of this poor response. The teacher may find that a student is unaware of perspective differences or, is unaware that the task calls for 'implicit' role taking or, is unable to achieve or maintain an adequate representation of the other's perspective or, is unable to use information contained in this representation to draw significant historical conclusions.

The teacher, in doing this, must also be able to recognise those role taking skills which are already operational in a curriculum and make use of them. He must also be able to identify cognitive chains in
historical instances and discern that certain instances may be appropriate for this 'wheels within wheels' character analysis. The teacher must be able to identify persuasion strategies and to rank sets of alternative persuasive arguments. He must also possess the ability to make sure students are in the best position to obtain formative experiences rather than just put them in a situation in which they might obtain meaningful information. Dangers of rote learning may be kept to a minimum if, by allowing for open-ended responses, process is taught and the teacher is still able to guide rather than direct. For a better balance between guidance and direction this approach needs to be examined in comparison with Shemilt's (1984) exercises, which tend to take their cue from student thinking rather than teacher direction.

The teacher must be able to point out to the student where role play is being undertaken for a definite purpose and subsequently to correlate this purpose with role taking. Finally the teacher must also accept that his own empathetic understanding is never complete and hence be open to change.

6.4 THE STUDENT'S TASK.

Until a student has developed an ability to empathetically understand more fully his awareness of tasks must necessarily be less far-reaching than that of
the teacher. Nonetheless, the possibility must always be taken into account that a student or students may be more perceptive than the teacher. A student's task, primarily, is to develop an empathetic understanding with characters in the past. To do this he has to become familiar with the developmental process and be able to recognise its various stages. As he develops empathetic understanding he may be able to analyse his own performance as well as interpret more readily situations which call for an empathetic treatment.

The student's task has a constant self-monitoring component as well as a component which regulates the empathetic responses in other past characters' actions.

The student may also need to develop a greater awareness of the teacher's task in relation to his own in terms of his own expectations of that teacher's task. Confirmation that the teacher does not know everything is a good starting point. It follows that the degree to which both teacher and student are aware of their respective tasks will greatly determine the degree of empathetic understanding.

6.5 RECONCILING THE TWO PROCEDURAL OUTLINES.

Two procedures have been introduced in this thesis model which are considered to be relevant to developing empathetic understanding. The first; a general description of a developmental process, the second; a more
specific description of the part played by role taking in that developmental process. The following diagrams illustrate how these may be reconciled.

Figure 6.1. DEVELOPMENTAL EMPATHETIC PROCESS IN HISTORY.

In Figure 6.1. The developmental role taking tasks will apply only to the points on the continuum where role taking is occurring. The level of application of the role taking tasks will be determined by the degree of perception involved in each representation. Points (f), (g), (h) describe periods of possible inference, role play and role taking. (f) indicates increase of inference.
(g) demonstrates corresponding decrease in probability of role play. (h) indicates the likely situations where role taking will be occurring; i.e., after inference but containing the possibility of role taking at any point after initial inference.

**Figure 6.2. DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE TAKING TASKS RELEVANT TO AN EMPATHETIC APPROACH IN HISTORY.**

- **Recognition of Empathetic Perspective,** e.g., awareness of possibility of; etc.
- **Appropriate Selection & Application of this Perspective,** e.g., signals of inadequate explanation etc.
- **Methods of Analysing and Predicting Outcomes of this Perspective,** e.g., questioning from within oneself etc.
- **Interpretation of Empathetic Perspective,** e.g., ability to draw generalisations etc.
- **Maintaining An Empathetic Perspective,** e.g., maintaining consistency in the face of change etc.

In Figure 6.2. The maintenance tasks will apply concurrently with all others. A first representational application of empathy will involve no role taking tasks until some form of inference is made from role play. If no inference is made there may be some form of empathy
experienced by individual students, however this will be haphazard and difficult to ascertain because inference will be covert. The role taking tasks will be determined by the desire to empathise in a general, specific or specific-general perspective. Methods of analysis corresponding to the level of empathy sought will vary considerably between these three; eg. recognition of complicated reasoning will, most likely, not apply to a general empathetic response whereas a specific-general response may make use of all methods suggested. Role taking tasks will be applicable mostly to second and third representations of empathy. Although there is the possibility of role play at the end of the process the advantage of being able to play a role or act in a dramatic sequence after gaining high levels of empathetic understanding is less important for the empathetic process than it is for improved dramatic performance. However role play at this end of the continuum cannot be overlooked as a possible means to promote further role taking should it arise and also as a means of assessment.

One aspect of these outlines is the consideration of where various current empathetic approaches would apply best to this continuum; eg. Thompson's (1983) role playing exercise on Alcock and Brown's flight because of the lack of inference (overt) would be more applicable to the first representation stage of empathy. Much of present application centred on role play and simulation would be
described best as confined to this first representation stage of empathy.

6.6. CONCLUSION.

Chapter 5 demonstrated the importance of recognising empathy as a role taking experience and identified role taking components which needed to be considered in proposing an empathetic methodology. In order to clarify degrees of empathetic understanding a typology of representations was developed to describe this methodology as a process. The representations form a hierarchy in which the final stage is seen to be able to generate the most explanatory power. Chapter 6 uses this conceptual base to outline a model of empathy which applies directly to history education. The thesis model has the intention of providing teachers and pupils with the means of experiencing history as perhaps a major form of human experience. The model is concerned with confronting the problem of how the history curriculum can be implemented as authentic human experience by empathetic method. A conclusion of this thesis is that the implementation of the history curriculum as authentic human experience has not been successfully carried out in contemporary treatments. Chapter 7 demonstrates why this conclusion is reached by assessing contemporary treatments of empathy in terms of the thesis model components outlined in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER SEVEN

EVALUATION OF CONTEMPORARY EMPATHETIC TREATMENTS IN LIGHT OF THE MODEL
CHAPTER SEVEN.

7.1. INTRODUCTION.

What emerges from the continuing empathetic literature as significant to this thesis is the admission almost a decade after Boddington's (1980) call for clarity by Ashby & Lee (1987:62) that

although empathy has firmly established itself as something which has an important place in history... and has on the face of it achieved the status of a technical term in history... it is surprisingly difficult to pin down its meaning, or to get any agreement among teachers or examiners as to how it should be taught, or what sort of test might validly assess it.

Assessment of contemporary treatments and associated literature against the thesis model of Chapter 6 gives a clearer picture as to why this difficulty persists. The assessment reveals the lack of an adequate model to describe empathy treatments and no reference being made to the psychosocial components of the thesis model. The reader is referred to the various appendices (Shemilt - Appendix D, Thompson - Appendix E, Stockley - Appendix F, SREB - Appendix G) for more detailed extracts taken from works of those authorities more prominent in the empathetic debate which are selected to represent contemporary treatments of empathy.

Critical analysis in 7.2 - 7.6 is based on the application of the types of representations (Chapter 5), the model of empathy (Chapter 6) and the empathetic skills
Chapter 7 examines contemporary empathetic treatments in terms of five key issues.

1. The adequacy of empathetic methodology.
2. The influence of reductionist theory.
3. Empathy as a 'taken for granted' experience.
4. Specific/general development in empathy.
5. The use of source materials and questioning in empathy.

The following conclusions about these treatments are made as a result of the above analysis.

(i) Empathy is not being considered as seriously as it should be.

(ii) Little encouragement is being given to psychological assessment.

(iii) Role taking is not being considered to develop empathy.

(iv) Empathy is being developed by an incomplete and inadequate methodology.

(v) Empathy treatments are not being handled particularly well because of their acceptance as reductionist cognitive activities.

(vi) Empathy is being seen as a taken for granted experience.

(vii) A shift is required away from assessing empathy to teaching empathy more directly.

(viii) Contemporary treatments show no effective attention to specific/general development to explain empathy.

(ix) The way source material is used and the type of questioning employed is all important in generating an effective empathetic response.

(x) Contemporary treatments reflect a lack of
preparation for empathetic situations.

The above conclusions indicate that contemporary treatments are falling short of the requirements of the thesis model. Contemporary treatments are catering for the type of empathy described by the first representation in Chapter 5. The holistic nature of the thesis model demonstrates that cognitive-oriented treatments are reductionist in character by concentrating on the development of general empathy and not allowing for the types of empathetic understanding which can be developed by attention to affective elements. In this way, by describing empathy as a process to be developed and by the identification of an overall conceptual framework with empathetic skills to be attained, the thesis model is considering empathy as more important as a means of historical understanding and is offering a much more comprehensive application than selected contemporary treatments. Section 7.7 looks at how trends in recent empathetic literature confirm the directions advanced in the thesis model of Chapter 6.

7.2. AN INADEQUATE METHODOLOGY FOR EMPATHY.

The type of empathy being developed most in contemporary treatments is a general first representation empathy as outlined by the typology in Chapter 5. The development of a general feel for a period which is characteristic of this earliest stage of empathetic
understanding does not depend on reflexive character interaction but more on non-reflexive role play and simulation.

Stockley (1981) offers a structured interview of the survivors of the Plague which illustrates non-reflexive role play and simulation. Stockley (1981:15) suggests that examples such as this have "particular force and merit" in empathetic reconstruction. In the interview the children ask 'a villager' questions to do with age and occupation to establish the context (all termed by Stockley to be historically accurate) and then they ask such questions as - Did any of your family catch the plague? Did you try to do anything to avoid the plague? Were strangers allowed to enter the village? What do you think caused the plague? The children are asked in this exercise to 'invent' a typical family (again historically accurate) and to describe how the plague could have affected that family.

A board and dice game about the effects of 'the Black Death' on one village is suggested as an extension to this above exercise by Stockley (1981:16) to give students "more concrete and immediate representations" of earlier exercises. Examples of questions for this board game include - What is the probability of survival? Were there miracle cures? How long did the plague last in the village?

A final teaching suggestion (Stockley 1981:16) is offered.
The children are asked to focus on a problem or decision to be faced by the villagers. Questions relating to this choice of decision are:

Could the villagers simply have fled to somewhere more isolated when the plague appeared? Would this have helped? What might be the disadvantages of this decision?

Stockley (1981:16) states that the choice of decision

should reflect understanding of the period and situation as perceived by the villagers and hence constitutes the heart of empathetic reconstruction.

The method of projection which Stockley uses in these above examples is one based on simulation and role play. The roles played are not of specific characters but those of simulated villagers manufactured to conform with evidence presented. Stockley's assessment that problem solving exercises such as the final example constitute the 'heart of empathetic reconstruction' is not questioned in terms of reconstruction. It is important to remember that reconstruction according to Collingwood (1946) tells us what history is and not why history happened. Because of the methods of simulation and role play used which are suited to developing a general feel for a period exercises such as these are important in generating a first representation type of empathy as advanced in Chapter 5. The 'heart' of empathy, however, is more than reconstruction. In comparison to the thesis model applications which use reconstruction by
sociological role play are confined to a first representation of general empathy because of their inability to develop psychosocial skills of interaction through role taking. The assessment of thoughts and feelings by allowing for students to take the roles of actual characters identified from within source materials enables students to develop skills of interaction necessary to explain the specific elements of empathetic understanding as proposed in the thesis model. Because of the dependence on role play to elicit an empathetic response in these examples the overall emphasis is one of applying sociological analysis from the perspective of a dilemma to be solved. Sociological activities such as role play and simulation have been analysed by Coutu (Chapter3) as poor communicating mechanisms. Turner (Chapter5) has diagnosed role playing as limited in its application because of its non-reflexive capabilities.

An example of an exercise with a strong sociological emphasis is supplied by Stockley and Foster(1982) in a section on 'Australians, Schooling and Education'. The questions related to a series of photographs (pages 116 - 121) taken of various school activities from 1900 to the 1950's are to encourage empathetic understanding. Questions offered by Stockley and Foster(1982:122) are:

What are the children doing in each of the photographs? For example, are they moving around the classroom? What changes in schooling can you see when you compare the earliest and latest
photographs? In other words, what historical changes have taken place? E.g. how have seating arrangements changed and what could these seating arrangements tell us about the sort of role children have had in the classroom at different times?

Questions such as these rely strongly on a sociological emphasis involving role analysis and comparisons with modern sociological perspectives. In explaining the 'skills of the historian' and the 'skills of the sociologist' in special categories Stockley and Foster (1982:8-11) stress this sociological emphasis and point out that "History and sociology have quite different skills and concerns. However both benefit enormously from working together[and that]perhaps one could say that the historian should also be a sociologist and vice-versa".

What is limited in sociological examples such as these is that there is no reference to the motives of specific characters and no possibility of developing anything other than a general first representation type of empathy. The thesis model in Chapter 6 demonstrates that much can be done to develop empathy beyond this first representation. The treatment by Stockley and Foster (1982) shows the inadequacy of a sociological emphasis in empathy particularly in comparison with psychological elements which are much more suited to an empathetic approach. The type of questions demanded of the thesis model are concerned with examining motives of specific characters by developing such specific student abilities.
as determining points of view within a situation or to developing self directing questioning. The emphasis on development of psychosocial skills is not evident in this application by Stockley and Foster (1982) and this falls far short of the requirements of the thesis model. The apparent acceptance of examples such as these as a full expression of empathy is evidence of the reductionist tendency to treat empathy as a purely sociological phenomenon.

Thompson (1983) advises teachers that empathy can be developed as a skill specifically by drama, role play, research, experiential opportunity and music (Thompson 1983: 23-26). The dramatisation of the Atlantic flight of Alcock and Brown is explained by Thompson (1983: 22) as for a few minutes two small boys have relived the experience of two brave men. They have been able to project themselves into the cockpit of the converted Vimy bomber, and enabled us to share with them the battle against the North Atlantic storms.

A further example of using drama to develop empathy is supplied by Thompson (1983) in the re-enactment of an incident from the diaries of Mungo Park. (see Appendix H)

Role play is seen by Thompson (1983: 24) as "more exploratory" than drama. He divides role play into role play as the "consideration of past events" and role play as the "consideration of impending events". Thompson (1983: 24) suggests the use of commercially produced role
play exercises such as "The Star River Project" and "Siting a Steel Works" to develop empathy.

Thompson’s exercises are directed towards the establishment of a general empathetic understanding according to the first representation of the typology outlined in Chapter 5. What drama, role play, music and visits to museums, for example, do in establishing empathy is develop an atmosphere and a general feel for a period which is largely controlled by the individual abilities of the teacher. The teacher, in determining procedures for empathy and developing empathetic skills, is offered guidelines which may be useful in some cases and not in others. The diaries of Mungo Park, for example, provide an excellent opportunity to take the roles of characters and assess their thoughts and feelings by directly teaching such abilities as developing a recursive picture or assessing aspects of human motivation. This type of assessment which is proposed by the thesis model is not attempted by Thompson in the above treatment and demonstrates a limited application of empathetic development in comparison to that proposed by the model. The emphasis on total involvement required in drama exercises does not necessarily produce similar empathetic responses from students. For example, the child playing the rear end of a horse may be expected to empathise to a different degree to the child selected to be Mungo Park. This emphasis on involvement encourages interest and
development of pupil awareness, but in terms of empathy, does not guarantee in any definitive form that empathetic understanding has been attained. An emphasis on 'acting' the history may encourage acting abilities and no empathetic understanding. This situation closely resembles what Coutu (1951) classifies as 'playing at a role' which has been demonstrated in Chapter 5 to be, at best, a limited communicating mechanism for empathetic understanding. The reliance on individual differences in appreciation of music does not guarantee an empathetic response. This situation may be ideal for one student, completely ignored or misrepresented by the next.

Empathy, in this instance, is dependent not merely on a teacher's ability to point out the aesthetic nature of the music and make the connection as in the use of 'Lara's theme' (Thompson 1983: 26) for example, but relies upon a largely unstructured response which is difficult to measure and control.

In all of Thompson's (1983) examples, even where specific empathetic responses could be encouraged, the emphasis is turned towards what it was like for historical participants with no apparent emphasis on why certain actions have taken place or why the student is studying these actions. This situation confirms Collingwood's (1946) belief that reconstruction tells only what happened in history. It also exposes by approximating the event or manufacturing the conditions in contrived sequences one
of the difficulties of developing understanding according to a rationale which is directed towards student participation with characters. Such an application avoids the specific representation of empathy and the development of empathetic skills as outlined in the thesis model and is restricted as a result to developing empathy in a very general sense. The thesis model by comparison has demonstrated that a number of psychosocial empathetic abilities directed specifically to asking why characters may have acted as they did can be developed thus allowing for a fuller empathetic response than that suggested by Thompson. Thompson's (1983) treatment falls far short of establishing the type of empathetic understanding required by the thesis model.

Shemilt (1984:67) has diagnosed a limitation in drama exercises as the danger involved in pupils' becoming oversympathetic to characters and inserting a subjective impediment between these characters and a dispassionate understanding. Shemilt's (1984) view on the use of drama to explain empathy in history contrasts significantly with Thompson's proposals. This thesis, however, draws attention to the inability of such drama exercises to develop psychosocial skills and to account for a specific/general development in the process of empathetic communication. Further limitations by Shemilt (1984) on other activities
such as projective exercises, on-site re-enactments and imaginative reconstructions are also made on subjective grounds or because of the difficulty associated with establishing the history in period rather than by the inadequacy of methodology as outlined above by this author in this thesis.

Shemilt (1984:73) favours the empathetic dilemma as "more suited to teaching empathy than anything else". The dilemma posed as an example is based on "a 13th century manuscript showing King Edward the Confessor treating scrofula, a skin disease, by touching it with his hand". (Shemilt 1984:74) The problem asks "When people... were not cured they often followed the King around, being touched over and over again. Why did people living in the Middle Ages still believe in 'cures' like these even if they did not work?" (Shemilt 1984:74)

In terms of the representations of empathy being put forward to explain this thesis model Shemilt's approach develops a general first representation type of empathy. Shemilt is concerned with 'getting the period right' and in developing a 'feel' for a period which takes into account the fact that people in the past were subject to different influences from those of today. Because Shemilt considers that an empathetic understanding of history cannot be taught directly no consideration is given by him to the type of psychosocial components outlined in the thesis model. In recognising that games
and simulations may be useful for empathetic construction if they are used to solve a problem and if 'imagine if' questions are avoided Shemilt(1984:69) has not appeared to recognise that the same sociological role playing activity is in operation when 'imagine if' exercises and games and simulations are employed. It is significant that problem solving is suggested by Shemilt(1984) as being the most appropriate approach to teaching empathy. Findings of this thesis argue that such a conclusion arises because there are limited empathetic processes associated with role play. The procedure resorted to in order to compensate for this inadequacy is one of applying a series of possible problems to determine what might have happened in a past situation. The description of empathy as a role taking activity as proposed in the thesis model demonstrates how such treatments by Shemilt reduce the capacity to develop a full empathetic understanding by a lack of attention to the psychosocial capabilities of affective empathy. The development of empathetic psychosocial skills indicates how treatments can go beyond problem solving to explain empathy. Such a direction is advocated by Booth(1987) who points to the advantages associated with gaining greater historical understanding by not posing problems to be solved. Booth's (1987) research is discussed more fully in 7.7. Although problem solving is a valuable medium to encourage an empathetic response the fact that it is relied upon
almost exclusively by Shemilt (1984) to promote higher levels of empathetic understanding reduces the overall effectiveness of empathy. Shemilt's problem solving, given its present cognitive guidelines, undervalues empathy's importance and diminishes the possibility of an adequate place for empathetic treatments in history.

In a role play exercise (SREB, 1986), where pupils play the parts of monks or nuns, the Working Party stresses the importance of building a bridge between fact and fantasy to allow the imagination to flourish. The predominance of dramatic activities and role play in such questions as "What did you feel like when the Commissioners came?" (SREB, 1986: 28), although gained from copious background evidence and dealing with the feelings of characters, still reveals the innate weakness of a method removed from the actual experiences of the past and with an unmistakable manufactured air. A vague general first representation empathetic understanding of what it may have been like in a monastery is the result of a method which involves extensive preparation yet depends on an inadequate communicating mechanism, in the first place, to convey empathy. Although feelings of characters are treated they are approached through developing role playing activities rather than role taking tasks as proposed in this thesis model and consequently are not related sufficiently to the characters to give a full meaning to empathy.
An approach similar to that of the SREB is outlined by Cowling (1983) where a unit of work 'Understanding People and the Problems of Evidence' is presented as a draft examination paper for a simulated school, Australia Bay High School. Question 5 advises the teacher of testing "the ability to interpret conflicting evidence and to empathise with people in the past". (Cowling 1983:86) It is assumed by this writer that each of the questions is to assist in some general way with assessing empathy, however two questions, applying to Source 10 (see Appendix I), are more directly related to empathy. The two questions asked on this source are as follows (Cowling 1983:86-89):

(1) In Source 10, assume the husband's comment is correct. Now give a sensible explanation based on your knowledge of the Depression to explain why Jim's father might think the way he does.

(2) What similarities and differences do you see between the problems of the unemployed in the 1930's and the unemployed in the 1980's?

Question 1 takes simulation to an extreme. To have a simulated examination paper in a simulated school is acceptable in setting out instructions for teachers. However a certain amount of credibility is lost when simulated conversations concerning events are produced as source material. Although this question is concerned with character interaction and assesses the thoughts of a character it relies on non-reflexive role playing to do
so. To suggest that empathy is established as a result of simulated role play and attained by stretching the credibility between the simulation source and the actual history even further by "assuming the husband's comment is correct" (Cowling 1983:89) is asking too much of role play's limited ability to communicate history. The second question relies on comparisons with modern sociological observations which, as argued in this thesis, are inadequate as a means of developing the type of empathetic understanding proposed by the thesis model.

The examples examined above demonstrate how contemporary treatments are falling back on non-reflexive projection, simulation and role play to describe empathy. These examples are confined to developing a general understanding for a past period. The absence of any reference to how characters may interact, although attempted, is unconvincing because of the absence of the psychological components identified in this thesis model.

The effect of inadequate methodology in contemporary treatments can be seen if the thesis model is superimposed over them. Thompson's (1983) treatment corresponds with the earliest stage of empathy development explained by the general representation type. The failure to recognise empathy as a process is evident in Thompson's approach by the use of such strategies as non-reflexive role play, simulation and drama. Thompson's treatment whilst catering for general empathetic
understanding gives a much simplified view of empathy categorised within the first somewhat elementary phase of the thesis model. Even though Shemilt (1984) has classified the three stages of empathetic development as everyday, stereotyped and undifferentiated historical empathy the majority of these stages fall also within the early non-reflexive phase of the thesis model described as the general representation of empathy. This is because role play, simulations and re-enactments are being used to develop empathy. Stereotypes are also associated with the first general representation of empathy. There are instances where the type of undifferentiated historical empathy attributed to Shemilt can be explained as the development of more specific types of empathy by interaction such as the assessment of Custer's motives at Little Bighorn (Shemilt 1984:70). However the emphasis being placed on problem solving, at the expense of developing procedures, assures a sketchy application of the more advanced stages of the thesis model.

The following section considers how cognitive-oriented theory has come to dominate contemporary treatments of empathy.

7.3. INFLUENCE OF COGNITIVE – ORIENTED THEORY.

Contemporary treatments of empathy reflect the continuing influence of cognitive-oriented theory. (Gard &
Leel978;Shemilt1978;Littlel1983) Limits established by
Shemilt(1984) have reinforced that influence particularly
the following three desiderata listed by him.(Shemilt1984:
78-79)

(1) that adolescents cannot be taught to
empathise authentically;

(2) that empathetic construction should
be taught and assessed as a cognitive
not an affective activity;

(3) that teaching and assessment should
seek to mesh aims excogitated from
analysis of the nature of the subject
with the ideas adolescents hold at
given stages of conceptual(i.e.
ideational not operational)development.

The influence that such desiderata have is to stress the
importance of assessing student abilities to empathise
through cognitive stages of development(as in[3]).
Empathy has become an aid to teaching history because of
the belief that it cannot be taught(as in [1]) and
affective elements have been largely overlooked(as in[2]).

A consequence of the cognitive-oriented influence in
terms of this thesis model is that the most powerful
means of generating empathy(i.e.effectively)is being
devalued and often ignored. A further consequence is
that because the central components of empathy are not
being considered the inadequate method(discussed in 7.2)
is being employed. The method used has been governed as
much by the limitations imposed by cognitive theory as by
the desire to control imaginative subjective responses.

Although Shemilt(1984:66)has suggested that "to teach
and assess empathy certain approaches may be instantiated in written work, class discussion and computer assisted learning packages" actual teaching procedures have not been clearly identified. Lee(1984:89)argues that "although empathy may be regarded as a process...it is easy to drift into thinking that empathy is a special means of finding out". Lee(1984:90)rejects this type of process claiming that "in our efforts to empathise unless we can produce some public evidence we cannot expect anyone to take much notice of them". Even though Lee recognises that there is a link between the affective domain and empathising, a reliance on affective elements to explain the commonness of humanity principle is being given little credence in statements such as the above. The model in Chapter6 argues that 'public evidence' is afforded by the close attention to psychological processes of interaction drawn contextually from historical sources.

The influence of purely cognitive guidelines to empathy development has been substantial and yet in dealing with character motives, relationships and conflicts it has not been as convincing. By classifying biography (even though he recognises the 'spot' biography can still consider characters and motives) as a descriptive method rather than a valuable explanatory method, Shemilt(1984:66) has given somewhat scant treatment to a method which can generate higher levels of specific empathy. Shemilt(1984:
67) offers as a reason for this treatment of biography that "for the generality of candidates, the necessity to relate the particular to the general... while simultaneously organising and interpreting relatively large numbers of data, remains unfulfilled". The thesis model in Chapter 6 proposes that the relation of the particular to the general is a key element in the process of empathising and that (as explained more fully in 7.6) this relationship depends on how the data is used and not on the quantity of material.

Evidence of a reluctance to capitalise on developing empathetic understanding through specific historical characters can be found in two case studies given as examples in the British Schools Council material (1977: 16, 21). The two case studies featuring Elizabeth and Mary, Queen of Scots and the Earl of Essex's rebellion offer considerable scope for empathetic treatments by dealing with, for instance, the important relationship of Mary with Elizabeth. Although there is an opportunity to empathise more specifically with individuals such as Elizabeth or Mary or a Privy Councillor, by assessing subjective interaction, this opportunity is nullified by the suggestion that empathy be established by simulations and role play. The thesis model in Chapter 6 is suggesting that such treatments can generate empathy by developing the listed psychosocial abilities of students. In the case study examples the specific interpretation of
empathy is put forward and almost tantalisingly allowed to fall back upon a more general empathetic response because of an emphasis on role play.

The issue of applying sympathy effectively to empathy studies has not been clearly understood in contemporary approaches which see little value in an affective form of empathy. For example, Lee (1984:97) has explained that "sympathy is often more a matter of recognising that the feelings are appropriate, given the way the person concerned sees the circumstances" and that because he recognises the appropriateness of his subjects' emotions "the historian is more likely to be able to entertain their views in a consistent manner, to have insight into their consequences, and to pass all this on to his audience". What Lee (1984) does not explain well is how the recognition of the appropriateness of subjects' emotions can be achieved without being sympathetic. The reason for the restriction of the use of sympathy by cognitive-oriented theorists to describe empathy seems to be because this would make students dangerously over-sympathetic to characters and hence bias their interpretation. Sympathy's major purpose in a role taking model of empathy is to supply specific elements of empathetic understanding. Coutu (1951) has pointed out that sympathy is closely associated with the process of role taking and to be able to sympathise is a necessary part of that process. Macintosh (1981:29) has advocated
avoiding sympathy until a "balanced view" of a past event has been presented. However if introduced after a balanced view it appears very late in the teaching process and would seem to be placing a different emphasis on the use of sympathy to that hinted at by Cowling (1983: 39) who states "sympathy is a necessary first step to empathy". The place of sympathy in this thesis model is that it constitutes a vital empathetic step in building up an understanding which can then be a part of the formative side of a balanced view if required. Contemporary applications of empathy are accentuating the importance of background evidence (e.g. the British Schools Council depth studies [1977]) to overcome a fear of indiscipline thus by ensuring that if evidence is objective empathy will be more likely to be objective too. Such an approach is turned round in this thesis model to show that it is the approach taken to empathy which gives its objectivity first and not the evidence. Thus, the approach taken to empathy in this thesis is clearly seen as a process which emphasises gaining a clearer perspective of what man has done and hence what man is. The treatment of 'sympathy' is used objectively in this thesis model and is not involved with intimating what man should do. Consequently a fundamental difference of opinion to that of Gard & Lee (1978) is assumed in this thesis model when they ask, for example, "should children be encouraged to think like Hitler?" It is argued in
this study that a role taking model of empathy can be considered as successful if children can be encouraged to 'think like Hitler' in order to better understand his actions and to assess his motives through 'sympathy' (if confined to the above objectivity) because it increases their awareness of human action. This proposition employed in the educational environment is more likely to teach the lessons of the Hitler era. An empathetic approach alternatively would be considered to have failed if children are encouraged to act 'like Hitler' or be told what they should do about him. The danger of sympathy lies not in its application but in its interpretation and its intention.

A fear of imagination running riot in subjective treatments has developed the situation which sees empathy as not affective and therefore obviously cognitive. The effect of this reductionist problem has been to limit greatly the application of possible subjective empathetic components, which are being suggested in the thesis model, to generate, holistically, a full empathetic response. The effect of cognitive-oriented theory to explain empathy in contemporary treatments is a serious limitation to empathy's description as a process and explains why contemporary treatments when compared with the thesis model fall within a limited early stage of empathetic development as described by the model. One major result of the reductionist cognitive theory has been that,
because no empathetic skills have been developed and because emphasis has been placed on analysis of student acquisition of empathy, contemporary treatments have become predominantly assessment exercises. The effect of this situation is looked at in the following section.

7.4. A TAKEN FOR GRANTED EXPERIENCE.

Empathy has not been accepted as a communication process as outlined in this thesis model and yet a procedure to teach empathy is evident in contemporary treatments. Paradoxically, contemporary treatments reflect the methodological dilemma arising from the view that one can teach empathy while maintaining that it does not contain teachable elements. In a teaching model of 'classroom practice in teaching empathy' the SREB(1986:14) Working Party state "the teaching of an empathetic response..does not necessarily mean that the ability to empathise is being taught". Shemilt(1984:66) has listed approaches to teaching and assessing empathy while claiming that "adolescents cannot be taught to empathise authentically"(Shemilt1984:78). The SREB(1986:9) Working Party although referring to the teaching of empathy state that "it is not really a separate skill". As a result of this dilemma contemporary treatments demonstrate that empathy is not being seen as an on-going creative teaching process with skills to be taught but as an aid to developing understanding after it has been
attained by students. Such an emphasis on teaching for empathy rather than teaching empathy highlights an absence of procedure. The result of this lack of teaching procedure is that the attainment of empathetic understanding will almost certainly be subject to chance rather than the consequence of deliberate implementation. The SREB(1986:14)Working Party explain that their reservation with teaching empathy directly is that pupils by merely regurgitating what the teacher has said will not be able to empathise. The assumption for such a reservation is that the only way to teach empathy directly is for the pupils to learn the appropriate empathetic response and reproduce it. The thesis model in Chapter6 demonstrates how abilities such as 'ability to develop a recursive picture' or 'ability to discriminate role transference' are separate methodological skills to be applied in empathetic situations and are in no way dependent on the regurgitation of a teacher's stated knowledge of a topic.

Plummer(1984:4)affords an example of the implementation of empathy as a 'taken for granted' experience when she states "In this book we shall see[my emphasis]how pictures have helped us to understand the ideas,values and beliefs of ..groups of people in history". A series of photographs and illustrations are supplied - but with no other directions - from which the astute reader may or may not be able to develop empathetic understanding.

A lack of procedure has been justified apparently by
the fact that empathy is a very elusive and often
difficult concept. Subsequently all that one can do is
to set up the situation, control the evidence to conform
with a feel for the period, or reconstruct some aspect to
encourage what it would have been like, and then allow for
empathetic understanding to take place.

The classification of various cognitive stages of
development gained from analysis of student attempts to
empathise also has become a means of justifying the level
of empathy attained. It is noted that Shemilt (1984:55)
states, for example, "At Stage V pupils begin to question
what empathetic construction means and how it may be
accomplished" and also for some pupils "the teacher must
accept the pre-empathetic stage II and the empathetic, but
non-historical, stage III as worthwhile goals". Instructions on the teaching of how a student may attain
such stages are not articulated.

No evidence has been identified by this writer where
contemporary treatments deem that it is necessary to
teach students how to empathise directly. This thesis
has been developed in order to provide the direct means
by which students may be taught empathy. Examples of
teachable components such as 'an ability to form a
combined image from unrelated events', 'an ability to
develop self-directing questioning' and 'an ability to
discriminate thoughts and feelings from visual sources'
as outlined in Chapter 6 have not been taken seriously
into account in contemporary empathetic treatments. If these teachable components were taken into account, contemporary treatments would not be solely dependent on describing empathy by applying post analytical empathetic assessment; a strategy which at best produces only inferential (ie. not direct) evidence that empathy has been employed.

A further illustration of the deficiency in contemporary treatments of empathy is available in the British Schools Council material (1976). Macintosh (1981:29) reiterates that "you are asked to bring about what it was like to be a Roman soldier sentenced to serving at World's End (the Roman wall in Northern Britain)". No specific instructions are given as to how this may come about. Macintosh (1981:29) states that "you must teach empathy in a factual perspective" and also, in relation to the use of 'imagine' questions that "if empathy is not taught as a high priority 'imagine' questions will not be done well by the able and will be disastrously done by the less able". It may be an inopportune choice of words to use 'teach' and 'taught' in this context because very little is offered by Macintosh which could be called an actual procedure to be followed. He falls back on the posing of problematical situations or dilemma exercises leaving the method of making the leap from factual material to understanding in the hands of the teacher with guidelines to follow such as the recommended usage
of 'reconstruct' instead of 'imagine', the usage of factual materials to develop a strong understanding of the society of the time beforehand, the danger of sympathising, the avoidance of making a moral judgement and the need to present a balanced view. (Macintosh 1981:29) Macintosh offers guidelines for the teacher to introduce empathy without detailing actual teaching procedures. The reference to 'reconstruct' and the general nature of the question asking 'what it was like' to be a Roman soldier indicate the possibility of generating a first representation type of empathy. The overall emphasis of the exercise has been to assess the degree of empathetic understanding attained as a result of a discussion guided to avoid a number of pitfalls. Again it is clear that the impact of the British Schools Council history unit described by Macintosh falls short of direct empathetic experience.

An example of an empathetic question from a Victorian Year 12 Australian History course (1987) is based entirely on the degree to which empathetic understanding has been attained beforehand. The question asks "How might a successful pastoralist in the 1880's looking back over the previous 30 years, have justified his/her attitude and actions towards Aborigines over that period?" (in Carrodus 1988:35) No further instructions or materials are given to the student for this question. This type of rigorous testing of the attainment of empathetic
understanding does not ensure that the response will be empathetic only the degree to which empathy has been attained. A major problem with contemporary treatments then is that such questioning appears to be substituting for the actual teaching of empathy rather than merely serving as an assessment device.

A further emphasis in contemporary treatments is that of avoiding doctrinaire approaches to student responses. The duty of teachers has been seen as one of enticing responses from students involving exercises geared to establishing the atmosphere of a period. Thus Thompson (1983:25) argues that children be encouraged to "handle things like hoes farmers used". Shemilt (1984:72) cites the simple example of students attempting to "construct a perfect circle of equally spaced stones" to demonstrate to them the concept of a "shared humanity" and that by a form of controlled experimental re-enactment they become aware that they have similar "capacity for thought and feeling" as stone age people. Such approaches rely heavily on the importance of inference to develop empathy. The direction adopted in this thesis model has been that inference is an important aspect of the communicating process but is most beneficial when used as a means of assisting and developing psychosocial role taking abilities. The use of inference occurs, for example, in encouraging an ability to develop a recursive picture where the thoughts of particular characters in history
are interpreted through their actions. Inferences are made concerning the effect that the thoughts of one character may have had on the thoughts and actions of another in history. Inferences are made on why characters may have misunderstood or misinterpreted the intentions of others as in the charge of the Light Brigade example or the scene of domestic violence surrounding the death of Captain Waldron (in Chapter 6).

The assessment of contemporary treatments in this chapter indicates that empathy is still regarded as an intractable psychosocial process in so far as teaching this process is concerned. From the examples cited either empathy is assumed to have occurred in the learning process or its assessment, post analytically, is carried out to verify this. What is clearly needed is the use of such concepts as the specific-general representation of empathy (see Chapter 5) and the application of this concept together with contextual evidence. If this were done, stronger evidence that empathy is occurring during the teaching/learning phase could be made available. Section 7.5 looks at this important issue.

7.5. SPECIFIC/GENERAL EMPATHETIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE USE OF CONTEXTUAL EVIDENCE.

Awareness of problems associated with post analysis of empathy as outlined above (7.4) are confirmed by the SREB
(1986:40) Working Party who state it may be necessary to use different types of question if one's concern is the development of pupils' empathetic understanding rather than assessing that understanding itself.

Assessment of contemporary treatments of empathy reveals that, although there is extensive attention being given to establishing atmosphere and a 'feel' for periods thus achieving a general empathetic understanding, there is little evidence of the development of specific types of empathy. Specific empathetic situations involving the assessment of subjective character interaction are receiving limited consideration for the way in which they may be used to generate a wider general empathetic understanding. The thesis model advocates that a full and meaningful empathetic understanding is dependent upon the employment of specific/general development. The development of role taking components of empathy is in turn dependent upon the way source materials are used to allow for the generation of specific and specific-general types of empathy.

Mention is made of specific and general development in the SREB(1986) materials which suggest that the stage of 'everyday' empathy is attained by analysing a specific event as opposed to what is termed "the first glimmering of empathy"[prior to the first stage which is considered] ... "unlikely to often be used in assessment since it is general and unrelated to specific events". (SREB1986:42)
Although description is not clear beyond this reference there are signs in this statement of recognition of a developmental process. The question "What do you think Elizabeth Whiting would have felt about sending her daughter, aged 10, to work in a brickyard, like the one pictured in Source A?" (SREB1986:56) is assessed according to the different levels of response. This usage of specific evidence enables an empathetic response from within the evidence presented. There is evidence in this example of the generation of an empathetic response and, more importantly, of generalising from a specific response.

The use of primary source material is the most important and suitable medium for supplying the specific elements to empathy. Primary source materials such as letters, diaries and photographs not only allow for the reflexive process of psychosocial interaction between characters and between characters and students but they also effectively allow children a close identification with the history in a way more attuned to how they think themselves, in much more human terms. Primary source material is often much more subjective than secondary source material because of the expressed thoughts and feelings of participants. Although secondary source material may be valuable for developing empathy (i.e. in terms of analysing reactions between individuals, their motives, their conflicts of personality as seen by others), primary source material allows for a closer perception of
and association with the writer/character at the time the event in history was taking place. The awareness of being close to the situation as it may have been and the effect that this awareness has on students taking the roles of past characters is also an important advantage in using primary source materials.

Primary source materials allow for as clear an understanding as possible of the reasons for various participants acting as they did. Evidence in this way is not being used as a constraint or a yardstick against which empathy is measured because empathy comes from within the person, the source material serving more as a stimulus to the experience of empathy itself not measured against it. This is what 'contextual' means as applied to evidence and seeing contextual evidence in this way is a means of avoiding the situation where history is too far removed from the experiences of children or too simulated to be believable. The empathetic possibilities of the model of this thesis are dependent upon the interpretation of psychological interaction between characters and of characters in situations in order to allow for the generation of a deeper understanding of both the characters and the situations. The types of questions related to source material need to be examining interaction to be effective. Contemporary treatments demonstrate a lack of attention to these types of questions. Concern with seeking motives for actions
which will convey an explanation of why historical characters may have acted in a certain way is important but equally important is that the answers to questions must be retrievable from the source material itself. An example of where source material is too limited and where it is impossible to extract the answer to the question from within the source is supplied by Cowling (1983:80) who offers the following information:

When the Depression hit Australia many government leaders and economists disagreed on what was to be done about it. [the question then asks] Why was there such disagreement at the time?

Any form of empathetic response to a question such as this is dependent upon the supply of further information or the reliance upon background knowledge to supply the information. By contrast, Coupe and Andrews (1984:55) offer a clear use of contextual evidence in an exercise where the instruction is given on a picture of children working in a mine to "work out [from the picture] why mine owners used young children to do the 'hurrying' in the mines". The height of the mine tunnel in the picture is a relatively simple observation to be made from within the source material.

In recent years history education in Australia and the United Kingdom has seen the development of source based questions as a successful means of assessing history. A conclusion drawn from analysis of contemporary treatments is that a first necessary step in testing empathy is to
provide the source material as part of the assessment so that empathy can be developed during the assessment task rather than relying on total recall from background knowledge.

Contemporary treatments reveal that often too much source material is being used to establish the period under study and, often in seeking an empathetic response, too much is left to prior knowledge or to the ability to recall from an overabundance of material, instead of more simply, from within the actual material presented. The example by Coupe and Andrews (see above) shows how an empathetic perspective involving development of an ability to discriminate thoughts and feelings from a visual source (as outlined in Chapter 6) may be gained without copious background material. The role taking involved in such an exercise is made according to the commonness to all of the human activity represented. It has been stated by British Schools Council programmers (1976–77) that empathy is difficult and thus empathetic pursuits are more suited to advanced students. One can speculate on how much this difficulty may be due to the perception of the need for sifting through quantities of detailed evidence, (a task assumed only to be within the competency of advanced students) and the concentration so required, rather than recognising that empathy is a human capacity capable of being employed by all. The SREB (1986) Working Party suggest that absorption of background
material be kept to a minimum. This is an indication of a growing awareness that background information, if not curtailed, can often get in the way of empathising. Attention to background knowledge may be given more beneficially after an empathetic response rather than as a determinant of that response. Portal (1987:96) also refers to the importance of not "imposing" a "background" course through set texts but to edit materials so that "they should also prove a stimulus to empathy".

There are beginnings of an awareness that more subjective analysis of thoughts and feelings and the assessment of relationships as suggested in this thesis model are being incorporated into contemporary treatments. As yet, however, steps being taken are tentative indicating that although more subjective treatments of empathy are being sought they are still not being adequately found by a whole range of contemporary authorities. The superiority of the thesis model over contemporary treatments is evident by the manner with which subjective analysis is incorporated within teaching strategies and by the clearer methodological explanation for the inclusion of such analysis. The following examples support the view that contemporary empathetic treatments are turning to more subjective analysis and are further indications of the need for the application of this thesis model.

The SREB (1986:56) example on Margaret Whiting referred
to above demonstrates significant advances in interpreting motivation empathetically by making pupils "look at the intentions of an historical figure within a given situation in order to explain the outcome in terms of their understanding of the feelings and motivation of that figure". (SREB1986:44-45) There is evidence in this exercise that, in practice, the SREB materials are going beyond their stated cognitive theoretical limits in catering for a more subjective assessment.

Reid and Pickhaver (1984) afford numerous possibilities for subjective empathetic treatments by tracing the career of John Worley who served in Lancasters of No. 460 Squadron in World War II. Instructions to students (Reid and Pickhaver 1984:4-5) are:

Look at this picture from the Australian War Memorial's photographic collection. It shows part of the preparation for a Lancaster bombing raid [air force sergeant filling over 100 thermos flasks with tea]. What has it got to do with George's crew? (G for George)

Rogers (1984:158-159) in explaining examples of reconstruction carried out through the use of sources as an ikonic translation of terrain and logistics in the Nine Years War would seem to be using subjective analysis to develop empathy.

Cowling (1983:48) provides an excellent example which sets out to test specifically for "empathy for an historical person". The question which asks "What reasons can you suggest for Bluey's action in burning his
house down?" can be answered from supplied source material. Bluey's dilemma is personal and specific. Students are able to associate with an historical, identifiable person. The question puts the students in Bluey's shoes. This question loses some of its value because much of the specific nature of the question is not capitalised upon in later questions to generate an improved response. Such examples as those by Reid and Pickhaver (1984), Coupe and Andrews (1984), Cowling (1983) and Rogers (1984) when compared with the thesis model demonstrate how some treatments are going beyond the predominant first general representation of empathy found in the sample of contemporary treatments. In these examples there is evidence of the development of the specific psychosocial role taking abilities of the thesis model but because of a lack of procedure and instructions to teachers and a confusion with role play this direction is tentative. The above examples are strong evidence of the need to develop the thesis model in order to incorporate such directions.

The extent to which empathetic exercises are not being capitalised upon is reflected also in the way contemporary treatments are presented to the classroom teacher. Although there is no lack of enthusiasm for empathy in contemporary treatments a lack of preparation for empathising is evident. The following section deals with this issue.
7.6. DEVELOPMENT OF AN EMPATHETIC PERSPECTIVE.

Further indications that the model developed in this thesis has achieved much that is being sought after in contemporary treatments is available from Flavell (1975). In assessing the work of Fry, who examines the possibility of putting role taking skill into the curriculum Flavell (1975:218) comments that "we are here speculating about the extent to which it is already there in disguise, and about how its diagnosis could be turned to educational profit". The War Memorial document (Reid and Pickhaver 1984) encourages students to take the role of John Worley and demonstrates also a method of introducing items of specific evidence which build upon each other to create a fuller empathetic response. Reid and Pickhaver's (1984) exercise reinforces Flavell's remark in that within its structure there are already operational elements, which encourage role taking and lend themselves to an improved empathetic approach, albeit unspecified. If, for example, the thesis model were to be employed in the Reid and Pickhaver exercise the following benefits would be available. The students would be aware that the exercise contained possibilities for developing an empathetic perspective and subsequently the possibility of generating a fuller empathetic understanding in place of merely hinting at the association between the exercise and developing empathy would be apparent. Both teachers and students would be directed towards attaining a whole
range of empathetic abilities such as discrimination of role transference, assessment of different aspects of human motivation, development of self-directing questioning, determining points of view within an historical situation and forming a combined image from unrelated events.

Sansom (1987) isolates a problem of failing to recognise and utilise process elements adequately which is closely attuned to Flavell's observation. Sansom (1987:137-138) notes that "many of the newer text books" fail to utilise fully elements which "develop ideas about cause, motivation or change". Sansom (1987:138) refers to the fact that even in a well thought out series such as 'History in the Making' [Macmillan] there are opportunities missed in prompting the teacher to use books in a process-led way.

Sansom argues that there is no attempt to point pupils towards questions that will cause them "to discuss avidly" and "give them a fine example of the interlocking of causative factors with human personality and motivation in historical change" (Sansom 1987:138). This same failure to identify empathetic processes and to isolate suitable questions is evident in the War Memorial document by Reid and Pickhaver in the form of a number of similar 'missed opportunities'. Sansom (1987:138) suggests that such treatments can be turned to our advantage if the
'process' aspect of the syllabus is the controlling factor in guiding pupils' work rather than the content of individual textbooks.

It is a contention of this thesis that the 'process' aspect of the syllabus may be best attained by developing clearer questioning and procedures by attention to role taking as a communicating mechanism. Process aspects would be greatly enhanced if the process sought were to be to develop the abilities of this model such as, for example, the assessment of character interaction in determining points of view within a situation. The questions offered by Sansom, though not explaining the procedures as examples of role taking as such, clearly indicate a closer inspection of relationships. Such a tendency is evident when Sansom (1987:138) suggests that Jones (1979) has omitted questions which could explore relationships more fully as in the topic on Luther where a question could have asked "What was the influence of William of Anhalt...on Luther?" This method of explaining relationships more fully is precisely equivalent to the assessment of subjective interaction of characters as proposed in the thesis model.

As well as the recognition that exercises may maintain within them the capabilities to foster greater empathetic understanding contemporary treatments reveal that little consideration is being given to how to interpret empathetic exercises. The lack of process identified in
contemporary treatments is largely responsible for this predicament. It is this writer's view that the development/descriptive stages of Need, Recognition and Maintenance as proposed by the thesis model (Chapter 6) are, at best, poorly developed in contemporary treatments. Instructions for an example by Cowling (1983) demonstrate that guidelines indicating what to avoid in empathetic exercises are well documented. Cowling (1983: 39) states that:

Any assessment of empathy must therefore consider:
- the use of accurate and relevant facts.
- an effective use of a range of details based on the evidence.
- a logical synthesis of facts.
- an historical viewpoint without inconsistencies.
- an understanding of varying viewpoints.

However guidelines of what to look for (i.e., how to explore relationships, how to assess viewpoints and motives) are conspicuously absent. Contemporary exercises such as the above, after claiming that their major concern is with empathy offer no further advice to the teacher. The thesis model advocates a positive approach be taken to directing both teachers and students by outlining major considerations in the role taking process. A major conclusion of this chapter is that much of the confusion surrounding empathy may be removed by closer attention to explaining the parts played by teachers and students in fostering the empathetic process. At present, examples
such as those offered by the British Schools Council (1977) case studies, which could be explaining procedures for teachers more fully, are allowing for a very general type of empathy to be developed and only then if the individual teacher takes up the challenge to develop types of questions by his own initiative. No close attention is being given to the actual objectives of these questions and how empathetic skills can be attained. The notion of empathy as an heuristic in contemporary treatments is accentuated by the emphasis being placed on helping to solve problems and dilemmas which has detracted from the building of process elements into empathetic treatments. Sansom (1987) has called for more 'process' in empathy studies. There is evidence (e.g., Portal 1987) from current literature on empathy that both the model of empathy and the empathetic skills (Chapters 5, 6) provide the unfilled needs that are becoming more and more evident in the field of contemporary history education. Indeed this thesis has been written in an attempt to meet these needs and thus to provide a set of guidelines for practice which at present seem unavailable. The implications of the continuing empathetic literature in relation to the stated direction of this thesis model are discussed briefly in the following section.

7.7. CALLS FOR A WIDER APPLICATION.

A feature of current research is a desire to broaden
empathy's base. Portal (1987:89) makes a point of stressing the need for greater emphasis in history teaching to achieve "a dialectical relationship between imagination and cognition" and suggests that "empathy as a skill must comprise the evocation of a personality from clues...in the sources and[must]refine this evocation into a consistent character in an authentic context". (Portal 1987:93) The emphasis in this study on balancing cognitive and affective elements of empathy and examining personality is consistent with Portal's ideas and provides a procedural strategy for the direct teaching of empathy. Portal's preference is for empathy to be seen as an heuristic (after Little [1983]) wherein the "products of empathy can be recognised among other elements in the historical reconstruction". (Portal 1987:93) Portal indicates that the greatest advantage gained from this recognition is empathy being seen as "a characteristic dimension of each of the other historical skills" and thus advocates against "having empathy exercises as such". (Portal 1987:94)

Portal's emphasis accentuates the dilemma that to be able to empathise is a skill but that the skill is not capable of being separable from other skills. Portal (1987:94,98) claims that by diffusing empathy among other skills a great deal [would be done] to underline the human quality of history as a subject concerned primarily with the intentions and actions of human beings and the ways in which these purposes interact and
influence each other. Portal's sentiments reflect those of this author particularly in elevating empathy's position and in being concerned with intentions and actions of characters. His view, however, falls short of the requirements of this thesis model in developing empathetic method in its own right.

Booth (1987) offers an encouraging prospect for identifying subjective empathetic procedures by arguing that:

Piaget's framework of cognition is far too limited and restricting an instrument to use for analysing the complex strands which go to make up pupils' thinking and understanding in history. (Booth, 1987:27)

Booth (1987:27) calls for a "more open-ended analysis based on an understanding of history's particular structure or knowledge form" and demonstrates from Egan's work that "hunches or intuition, sheer chance and vivid imagination are often resorted to rather than deductive thinking". (Booth, 1987:26) Booth makes the important point that in response to visual sources the essence of a genuine historical response appears to have been "not based on the key word of the quotation but rather on inferred qualities or ideas" which allows for the "picture or quotation" to be seen "not from the outside but from the inside". (Booth, 1987:29-30) Booth's point confirms the belief advanced in the thesis model that in terms of developing empathetic processes the ability to infer from
source materials is at the heart of using evidence contextually and offers an important way forward to asking the "different types of questions" sought by the SREB(1986:40) Working Party. Booth makes the important observation that such use of source material is one of the basic ingredients which will allow the teacher to set up situations in which pupils can operate in a variety of ways, unconstrained by notions of levels of thinking or formal operations. (Booth 1987:38)

Booth deduces from his research that "logical structures and hypothetico-deductive thinking have only a very limited connection with the imaginative and inferential thinking". (Booth 1987:31) Booth also suggests that "children considered not only how things arose, but how we can know...and that...teaching for particular skills and understandings can...make a difference". (Booth 1987:33)

Again, Booth's work is entirely consistent with the model developed in this thesis and is taken, together with the work of Portal, by this writer to be strong supporting evidence for the importance of developing the present model.

Sansom (1987) who has been much influenced by the stages of development derived by Shemilt, calls for the building of 'process' into the syllabus in which the teacher is a "provider of tools for thinking with". (Sansom 1987:138) Although the elements of processes of empathy are extended considerably in Sansom's examples it is
interesting to note that, similarly to Shemilt, he sees the "trend in empathy exercises is thus away from imagination towards explanation". (Sansom 1987:137)

The importance of Sansom's call for process-led work units is encouraging but in terms of the holistic theory of empathetic understanding advocated in this thesis it does not offer procedural examples beyond the cognitive-oriented, problem solving examples of Shemilt. This is insufficient to account for all empathetic learning, particularly in light of Booth's criticisms of cognitive theory to adequately explain imaginative and empathetic elements of history.

Booth's (1987) emphasis on a wider, 'open-ended' notion of analysis to include inferential elements, the need to consider more than cognitive-oriented structures, the way primary source material is treated and the movement away from problem solving are all indicative of the trend towards the development of the more affective aspects of empathy and the application of the type of holistic approach advocated in this thesis.

Despite Shemilt's reluctance to view empathy as an affective activity his contribution has been appreciable in clarifying how the components of the model proposed in this thesis may be incorporated into empathy treatments. Shemilt (1984:67) has highlighted the use of 'spot' biographies and the closer analysis of individual characters which is important in supplying the specific
element required by the thesis model. The use of a series of decision points (Shemilt 1984: 70) located within a story to adductively assess alternatives in decision making (as in the examination of Custer's options at Little Bighorn) points to the development of evaluating thoughts and feelings as a means of establishing an empathetic response. The use of disconfirmation exercises (Shemilt 1984: 72–73) shows a degree of analysis of feelings and intentions of characters which is a central consideration in the model proposed in this thesis. The supplying of further information as in the Stubbs example (Shemilt 1984: 81) and the reflection required by students to do so indicates attention is being given to a development of empathy as a psychosocial process. In the wake of Shemilt's (1984: 76) classification of various empathetic stages in history advances have been made in 'empathy exercises' which have moved towards isolating sub-skills of empathy. An emphasis on developing separate empathetic skills is evident in the two recent syllabus documents (NSW Junior Syllabus [draft] 1986–87 and the British Department of Education and Science 1985) although they offer little explanation of the processes involved.

The NSW Junior History Syllabus [draft] (1986–87: 13–14) offers, for example, suggestions that

1) students can explore some of the feelings participants may have had at the time.
2) students can show understanding of a person's viewpoint within a given
historical situation.

(3) students can identify the extent of choice available to a person in a given situation in the past.

These suggestions demonstrate that the Syllabus Committee (NSW) is moving towards more affective assessment and much of the impetus for this has been apparently due to Shemilt's work on stage development. If these syllabus suggestions are examined for the type of methodology required for their implementation they point directly to the type of interaction skills developed in the model of this thesis.

An encouraging avenue for the application of subjective, more imaginative stages of development is alluded to in the assessment by Fines (1970, 1977) of the work of Cobb, E. Thompson and Davis respectively (see Chapter 4). It is interesting to note that Fines who has been closely associated with the introduction of the concept of empathy into the history curriculum in Britain may have been closer to the mark than at first thought.

7.8. CONCLUSION.

This chapter has compared chosen contemporary treatments with the following three main thesis developments:

(1) The model of empathy.
(2) The typology of modes of representation.
(3) The list of derived empathetic skills.

The analysis reveals that the thesis model, because of its
holistic outlook, proposes a more comprehensive treatment of empathy and caters for the development of a wider empathetic understanding than is the case with contemporary treatments. The thesis model offers a concrete approach to teaching empathy and describes a set of teachable skills and abilities. The model also develops a general procedure to be followed in recognising and maintaining an empathetic approach in history. Such an approach, based on developing empathy as a process to be adopted in historical treatments, contrasts with the lack both of teaching procedures and the use of empathy as an aid to understanding in contemporary treatments. The thesis model affords empathy the opportunity of a higher status as an historical method because of the development of the above methodology in contrast to contemporary treatments which consider that empathy is a taken for granted experience to be assessed and not taught. The thesis model describes empathy according to three distinct representation types based on specific and general understanding. Contemporary treatments (Shemilt 1984, SREB 1986, NSW Junior Syllabus 1986-7) although represented by a description of empathy types have been found to be consistent with the first general representation of the thesis model typology.

Finally the thesis model offers a means of incorporating the present directions noted in current empathetic literature. These directions call for a closer
attention to the use of evidence (Sansom, 1987), greater attention to inferential and imaginative treatments, a need to develop empathy beyond problem solving (Booth, 1987), an elevation in the importance of empathy as an historical procedure, a need to balance cognitive and affective elements (Portal, 1987) and the need to place more emphasis on process in historical treatment (Sansom, 1987). The holistic model proposed in this study demonstrates how these concerns may be overcome and exposes the inability of cognitive-oriented treatments to do so.

In Chapter 8, the findings of the present study are reviewed and implications of the study for future research are proposed.
CHAPTER EIGHT

SYNOPSIS OF THE MODEL: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
CHAPTER EIGHT.

8.1. GENERAL SUMMARY.

The thesis model proposes a methodology for the development of empathetic understanding. The underlying premise of the study, which has led the writer to establish the model outlined in Chapter 6, is that empathy is a psychosocial process of communication in which the individual is involved as a whole in all his or her capacities for subjective/objective and affective/cognitive experience.

Two main consequences of the model are:

(1) The model provides those working in curriculum generally with a comprehensive account of a whole new range of strategies identified as a psychosocial model of the empathetic communication process. Such a consequence places strong emphasis on the development of curriculum theory wherein the model of empathy is perceived as a general communication process which may be learned and applied by both teachers and pupils over the range of curriculum subject matters. Thus a conceptual model of what is involved in the total communication process is presented to assist in reassessing existing curriculum theory and to offer a different perspective on empathetic communication which may be seen as a step towards establishing a general theory of empathy.

(2) The model demonstrates how widespread the
application of empathy is to the teaching of history. The thesis is so framed to explain how the application of the empathy model, as a psychosocial process of communication, removes much of the uncertainty associated with contemporary treatments of empathy in history.

The model was developed from an initial examination of role taking and inference theories of empathy from which the assumption was made that empathy is a communication process involving both role taking and inference. References to contributions by theorists explaining empathy from the field of social psychology point to the need to develop an integrative model which takes these theories into account.

A first stage in developing the model was to determine a focus of interest from which components of empathy as a communication process could be identified. The focus of interest was directed towards categorising communication channels, describing patterns of development in empathetic communication and isolating features of that communication. This focus revealed that existing role taking literature provided the means of isolating a number of components which described empathy as a communication process. These components are:

(a) that the empathetic process is dependent upon the process of role taking,

(b) that the empathetic process is a subjective psychosocial process,
(c) that the empathetic process is developmental.

(d) that the empathetic process proceeds on two inter-connected levels of interaction, interpersonal (self-other) and intrapersonal (I-me).

(e) that the empathetic process proceeds from the treatment of the individual (that which is specific) to the treatment of the group (that which is general).

(f) that the empathetic process proceeds from non-reflexive to reflexive stages of communication,

(g) that the concept of self is central to role taking and the empathetic process involves the capacity for self-knowledge and self-evaluation through communication,

(h) that the empathetic process develops understanding cumulatively.

The above process components indicate that the following features underline the empathy model.

(i) Within the total communication process empathy employs the central mechanism of interaction as opposed to merely actions and reactions.

(ii) Empathy assesses affective responses.

(iii) Empathy is dependent upon prior learning and can be taught.

(iv) Empathy can be explained in hierarchic stages with the interpersonal level of interaction (self-other) being more elementary than the intrapersonal level
From the above process components the identification of specific/general development was selected as the central process to which the other components seek reference. The selection of specific/general development as the central referent in the empathetic process allows for the categorisation of separate hierarchic stages of empathy and the identification of three representational types of empathy identified as (a) general (b) specific and (c) specific-general (advanced general) empathy.

The central referent of specific/general development also allows for stages of empathetic understanding to be categorised according to the degrees of reflexive and non-reflexive behaviour associated with that understanding.

The description of the communication process of empathetic understanding by specific/general development identifies the important methodological associations of role play and simulation with simple interpersonal communication and role taking with the more complex intrapersonal and interpersonal communication.

Summarising the model to this point;

(a) Eight role taking components have been identified within the empathetic process.

(b) Five underlying features shape the identification of specific/general development as the central process which allows for

(c) The categorisation of three representations of
types of empathy.

A second stage of development of the model resulted in the refinement of identifiable teachable skills from within the eight role taking components. The following eleven separate empathetic skills or abilities emerged as listed in Chapter 6:

1. an ability to develop self-directing questioning,
2. an ability to determine points of view within a situation,
3. an ability to develop a recursive picture,
4. an ability to assess different aspects of human motivation,
5. an ability to assess the effect of motive to the most logical perspective,
6. an ability to differentiate one's own perspective measurement,
7. an ability to recognise ambiguity and naiveté of others' perceptions,
8. an ability to impute complicated reasoning,
9. an ability to discriminate role transference,
10. an ability to form a combined image from unrelated events,
11. an ability to discriminate thoughts and feelings from visual sources.

The identification of the above teachable skills demonstrates how empathetic understanding is thus seen to
be able to be developed as an holistic expression of the individual's capacity for subjective (as well as objective) and affective (as well as cognitive) experience.

A third stage of development of the model recognises the importance of placing these skills within an overall developmental/descriptive conceptualisation of the empathetic process. The model describes the complete empathetic process according to the 5 stages of Recognition, Need, Analysis/Prediction, Maintenance and Interpretation (after Flavell 1975). Stage 2 of the model to this point having corresponded with the third of these - that of Analysis/Prediction.

The model isolates from the remaining stages of the total communication process the following 10 associated skills necessary to recognise, maintain and interpret an empathetic perspective; (after Flavell 1975)

1. an ability to recognise an empathetic perspective different to one's own,
2. an ability to consider using an empathetic perspective as a method of analysis,
3. an ability to interpret appropriateness of an empathetic perspective as a method of analysis,
4. an ability to maintain another's point of view by neutralising one's own point of view,
5. an ability to 'keep alive' the representation of the sort of individual whose role is being taken,
6. an ability to maintain consistency in the face of change,

7. an ability to establish pathways to empathetic learning,

8. an ability to check levels of empathetic perception by detecting levels of drift or regression, of impulse control, of conceptual differentiation, of maintenance of attention and of assessing the distance between an empathetic response and the procedure being used to develop that response,

9. an ability to 'talk on one's feet' to make an appropriate persuasive empathetic response,

10. an ability to determine the degree to which empathetic interpretations are less capable by drawing generalisations.

The second and third stages of the model in summary have identified 11 separate teachable role taking skills necessary to analyse and predict empathetic understanding and 10 associated skills necessary to recognise, maintain and interpret an empathetic response.

The impetus for the development of the thesis model has been because of the need to explain inadequacies of empathetic methodology in contemporary treatments of history. A conclusion of this writer emerging from that explanation is that the effectiveness of the model as a communication process in explaining these inadequacies offers substantial support for its greater applicability.
in curriculum development beyond the limitations of this particular study.

Earlier chapters of this thesis have pointed to the absence of a suitable methodology to apply to empathy treatments in history. Chapter 3 demonstrates how Collingwood's (1946) philosophical base which has been used to explain contemporary empathetic treatments is being misinterpreted. Sociological emphasis on role play is serving as empathetic methodology in contemporary treatments, which has been found by this study to be an inadequate means of coming to terms with both the affective nature of empathy and the important philosophical direction in history teaching of developing self-awareness by the explanation of motive and character intent. As a result the study has directed attention to the importance of viewing empathy as a role taking process of communication. The following table demonstrates how this study arrives at the implementation of the thesis model to explain empathy in history.

Figure 8.1. Table of Underlying Assumptions For An Empathetic Approach in History.

(i) Why study History? ...To know what happened. To know why it happened etc.–Collingwood.

(ii) Why is it important to know why? ...SELF-KNOWLEDGE.

(iii) How to know why? ...By re-enacting past thoughts. By understanding based on self-knowledge.
(iv) How is self-knowledge best shown?

...Best shown from empathetic perspective. Best demonstrated by human perspective, yet maintaining integrity of subject.

(v) How can this be done?

...By treating empathy as a process, and assuming that empathy can be taught. By seeing empathy more holistically as both general and specific understanding. By development of psychosocial skills of interaction.

(vi) What method is used?

...Empathy as a psychological concept - best shown by psychosocial process of role taking.

(vii) What features of this method need to be considered?

...Empathy is an on-going process, empathetic perceptions will change. Different to some other approaches in that develops a discipline in itself. Includes sympathy. Use of primary sources to govern boundaries of subjectivity.

(viii) What should be avoided?

...A narrow view of empathy. Seeing empathy only as an heuristic. Seeing empathy merely as problem solving. Seeing empathy only as a 'second record'. Confusing psychological aspects with psychoanalytical treatments eg. Erikson. Fear of poor inadequate response. Preoccupation with 'getting the period right'. Cluttering empathetic process with background evidence.

(ix) What 'outside' influences can be considered?

8.2. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF MODEL IN LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY TREATMENTS.

A fundamental philosophical difference between the thesis model approach and contemporary treatments of empathy in history is revealed by the analysis in Chapter 7. This difference concerns the way thoughts and feelings are seen to be incorporated into historical treatments and the means by which thoughts and feelings may be validated as empathetic understanding. Thought as envisaged by this study is that which Collingwood (1970: 303) describes as having "a significance valid for all men at all times". Such a description implies the universality of thought. This study takes the view that empathy is validated by its meaningfulness in terms of the universality of thought. Two important criteria derived from assessment by Dray (1957) and Rotenstreich (1957) are necessary for such validation.

(1) Dray (1957:431) has indicated that what makes thought universal is not some sort of "esoteric encounter" between historian or student and past character but the "rational force of the argument".

(2) Rotenstreich (1957:415) has explained Collingwood's description by claiming that a thought is universal not because it is "valid beyond its circumstances" but because it is "meaningful beyond the occasion".

The thesis model has been developed on the premise that
the assessment of thoughts and feelings as explained by Collingwood (1946) is fundamental to empathetic understanding. The establishment of the above criteria of analysis of thought for its universal meaning according to the rational force of the argument presented and whether it has meaning beyond the occasion allows for empathetic understanding from the affective domain to be validated. As long as these criteria are met the distinction between affective and cognitive elements of empathy does not arise. The emphasis in contemporary treatments has been to identify meaningfulness with validity beyond its circumstances and consequently validity with verifiability. The thesis model demonstrates how empathy can be validated in terms of universal meaning beyond the occasion contextually or in the context of supplied evidence. A major difference then, between the thesis model and contemporary treatments, is in the way evidence is used to validate an empathetic response. Contemporary treatments follow the view that before any form of authentic empathetic experience can be validated and verified as worthwhile to history the closest possible approximation to how certain characters felt at the time must be established first. Otherwise any empathetic response beyond the circumstances of the evidence will be invalid. Consequently the establishment of the period by building a background of knowledge has been predominant in contemporary treatments. The thesis
model adopts the view that as long as an empathetic response comes across as authentic beyond the occasion or beyond the evidence supplied it is valid. The difference lies in that as empathy is generated by the process of role taking, as in the thesis model, it is constantly changing as a result of changed empathetic perceptions as the occasion is extended or as new evidence is supplied. The establishment of a feel for a period is gained during or at the end of a process which allows for changing perceptions of empathy by students. Empathy then, in the thesis model, is generated by the process and is seen as being improved upon and becoming more authentic as historical experience by the readjustment and reassessment of prior understandings which have been found to be no longer valid beyond the occasion. This view is in contrast to contemporary treatments which attempt to establish authenticity and validity beyond the circumstances as a necessary prerequisite to empathetic development. (see Appendix F)

The repercussions of this fundamental philosophical difference are that the thesis model by validating empathy in this fashion allows for the important description of affective elements of empathy contrasting with contemporary treatments which restrict empathy to the cognitive domain. The thesis model as a consequence is seen to be holistic in character whereas contemporary treatments adhering to strict cognitive guidelines are in
comparison reductionist in outlook.

This study, by incorporating empathy as an affective activity, has systematically demonstrated in the thesis model how (a) a whole range of suitable teachable skills for the development of empathetic understanding can be drawn from psychosocial components of role taking and, (b) how these teachable skills are dependent upon the development of a number of associated skills to form a process of empathetic communication. Because empathy is seen as a cognitive activity it is being viewed in contemporary treatments as an aid to teaching history and not as a teaching process so that subsequently no skills have been identified. Symptomatic of contemporary treatments is the inability to categorise empathy procedures and the belief that empathy is a taken for granted experience as well as the desire to validate thought objectively beyond the circumstances rather than the occasion by the misplaced use of source material to establish a general 'feel' for a period.

The thesis model in describing empathy as a process of communication incorporates contemporary treatments predominantly into an elementary stage in that process because of the lack of attention to actual teaching procedures. Contemporary treatments and the continuing empathetic literature do reflect however, a desire to go beyond this cognitive-oriented stage. The effect of Shemilt's (1984) classification is very much in evidence on
teaching programmes in Great Britain and New South Wales in particular. Latest research by Booth (1987) would seem to be going towards the direction advocated by Fines (1971).

8.3. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.

This study has demonstrated the importance of role taking in providing a model of communication which integrates elements of social psychological empathetic theory. The model is different from existing ones in that;

(a) it provides a new perspective on empathetic understanding by allowing for subjective/objective and affective/cognitive experience.

(b) it offers a more comprehensive treatment than existing models for the development of empathy as a communication process.

Skilbeck (1979:5) claims that "the awareness of self and the achievement of a sense of personal identity and value entails a sense of history" and also that a more human treatment of history requires "the distinctive character of human judgements and their place in personal experience and relationships among people". (Skilbeck 1979:3)

These important historical features have been demonstrated by the thesis model as fundamental empathetic procedures. Existing models of empathy have not provided an adequate structure to date which develops these procedures. This study has established a broad
developmental descriptive framework for empathetic communication which allows for the elevation of empathy's status as a central historical method. The model also articulates along a continuum of specific/general understanding representations of types of empathy which highlight awareness of self with a more subjective treatment of history.

Through this study it is now possible to view empathy as more than merely a cognitive-oriented experience by altering the empathetic perspective to include a more human orientation as an holistic expression of both affective and cognitive behaviour. More specifically it is now possible to clarify the problems raised in Chapter 2 within this all embracing rationale. The model offers clear directions to teachers concerning empathetic skills and procedures to be developed. Within the thesis model a place is found for such terms as 'projection', 'sympathy', 'inference' and the processes of 'reconstruction', 'supposing', developing a 'feel' for history and using 'thoughts' and 'feelings'. The explanation of empathy as a process gives direction to previously unexplained empathy (good or bad, weak or strong) and to 'taken for granted' experience. The model has demonstrated a consistency with the direction of continuing empathetic research particularly in extending empathy's description beyond visual examples and problem solving.

It becomes possible through this study to consider
psychological aspects of history by the assessment of character interaction thus closing the gap between the hypothetico/deductive and affective modes of enquiry called for by Fines(1977).

The thesis model offers clarification of a possible theory of empathy as a communication process in education curriculum. A recommendation for future research arising from this study is to identify the degree to which a form of empathetic learning as such may be isolated and to what extent this type of learning may influence methods of instruction across a wide range of curriculum matters.

A recommendation in light of this study is the need to consider adjustments to the fundamental teaching approach in history from that of one which reacts to and guides student responses to one which is required to direct and guide students towards identifying how and why they may give these responses. The new emphasis projected in this study in directing students more positively towards attaining empathetic skills highlights the need for adjustment of teacher training programmes to incorporate or identify in teachers' preparation the sharpening of capabilities before embarking on empathetic instruction.

The isolation of sub-skills in this model affords a possible avenue of research into their applicability for history computer programming(see Ennals1984)and the extent to which both adductive thinking and divergent
processes based on the humanness of responses may be incorporated into computer strategies.

Further exploration of the learning processes involved in the thesis model would offer the possibility for a wider application and an earlier introduction for empathy treatments in school programmes. The preparedness of both pupils and teachers to empathise has been suggested in this study to be not entirely a matter of attaining levels of development nor strictly a matter of intelligence. Booth (1987) makes an important point which, if accepted, not only has significant ramifications in encouraging the type of approach advocated in this thesis but also in determining when such an approach may be introduced to students. Booth (1987:33) claims that work he has done with students suggests that it is often through the imaginative and empathetic approaches that pupils first become involved in history and so are enabled to develop high level conceptual understanding.

This statement is particularly relevant when viewed alongside the findings of Donaldson (1978) who has deduced from research by Hughes (Donaldson 1978:59) that the young child "first makes sense of situations (and perhaps those involving human intention) and then uses this kind of understanding to help him to make sense of what is said to him". Donaldson further suggests that "motives and intentions of characters are entirely comprehensible to a child of three because to him it makes human sense". (Donaldson 1978:59)
To be able to do this the child has an ability to "decentre" which requires the understanding of another point of view but not "with what another person sees from a given standpoint but with what he is feeling and planning to do". Donaldson (1978:25) is suggesting that this is a "very fundamental human skill".

The important link between the findings by Donaldson (1978) and Booth (1987) [both of which are consistent with earlier work by Bruner (1960) and his colleagues and Rogers (1984)] is not merely that both question Piagetian concepts, although this is significant. Rather it is that if empathetic approaches in history are concerned with motives and intentions and interpreting thoughts and feelings affectively, as proposed in this study, and that this is what often leads students to become involved in history as Booth (1987) suggests, it may be because at a very early age the child has a well developed fundamental human skill which is essentially the skill of empathy. This fundamental empathetic skill allows him to make sense of what is said to him after he has understood motives and intentions of the speaker. Donaldson's findings help to explain why students at all ages (as Booth has proposed) may be attracted to history through an empathetic approach. If a procedural mechanism is already in place to interpret history by means of making sense of motives and intentions through empathetic activities it seems to be a natural extension that this
avenue to understanding be exploited in teaching history. What this may mean is that not only can very young students have the capacity to consider the feelings of others (a fundamental condition of empathy) as basic 'human sense' but also that empathy if used in this fashion may be much more central to developing human understanding and the acceleration of personal development.

The implications of developing empathy in history through early childhood abilities to make 'human sense' if at all valid may demand some revision of when and how empathy can be introduced into a school curriculum. The possibility may exist for the development of empathetic procedures much earlier in primary school education than is envisaged at present. By "sloughing off" from the "constraints of the Piagetian framework" one of the first "releases" that Booth (1987:38) calls for may be in offering empathy studies and procedures to a much wider cross-section of the school community, both primary and secondary. If empathy is to be encouraged at an earlier age there is no reason why a standard treatment should not be applied throughout a student's schooling which does not rely on age and the passage of time to develop.

This study has been concerned, from the outset, in clarifying empathy procedures so that the classroom teacher may feel more comfortable in using empathy as a valuable means of developing greater levels of historical awareness and understanding. The study questions
assumptions on theoretical development and introduces a concept of empathetic learning by using psychosocial elements and procedures in history. It is hoped that this research will act as a catalyst in addressing the need to apply affective treatments more fully to history and to elevate the importance of affective elements in determining how human decisions are made.
TRANSCRIPT OF SYDNEY TRIAL (1834) OF TWO FEMALE CONVICTS FOR THE MURDER OF CAPTAIN CHARLES WALDRON.

(Sydney Gazette, February 25, 1834).

[Mrs. Waldron's statement] - "I said to her 'Sarah, the verandah has not been washed this morning'; she answered, 'it has'; my husband overhearing what passed, called out, 'Jemima, don't let them persuade you it has been done, as I will make my oath water has not been on it'; he then called Mary Maloney into the verandah, and said, 'look at the ashes which I knocked out of my pipe last night and the carpet upon which I placed my feet'; she replied 'those are not the ashes of your pipe but of mine, as I was washing the place'; she then commenced the most horrid imprecations, and calling Capt. W. 'a b—— old soldier', said 'may h—— and d——— b——— you all in the house' ... by this time Sarah McGregor had got up from the parlour fire, and I smelt spirits upon her; I asked her respecting it and she denied having drank any... (my husband) said 'Mary you will go to the Beach', meaning the Police Office as it usually is called; her language was at the same time a continuation of the most horrid cursing; Sarah said, 'if Mary goes I will go too; we came together'; Capt. W. replied, 'Sarah you have done nothing to induce me to send you, and you shall not go'; she said, 'I will, and you shall see that I will give you reason to send me'; she then ran at my husband and struck him with great violence on the right side of the neck..."
[The Captain fell from the height of the verandah, 14 inches, with great force, and both women struck him in the face and neck until they were stopped.]

"...I then said to Mary Maloney, 'you vile and wretched woman, what have you done to my husband'; she replied, 'you call me a wretch, do you know what a wretch is?' and immediately turning round, she exposed her person to my view, that of my husband, our family and servants; I said 'my dear, I shall never be able to look up again in presence of the men on the farm..' the prisoners called out 'we will leave our clothes'... and I, in order to pacify their rage ordered their clothes to be given them."
LIFE AND DEATH AT THE DIGGINGS.


Exercise 1.

Read the following general account of life at the diggings. What was life like? Describe general conditions and social life on the goldfields.

"Diggers lived in primitive tents and bark huts. Some tents were just calico cloth stretched between poles to shelter diggers from wind and rain. Tables and beds were made from bark nailed to four posts. Diggers could buy sheets of bark from the Aborigines at Ophir. Some diggers put mattresses of straw or leaves over the bark."
Pickle cases were often used for chairs. The diggers usually slept in their daily clothes.

The gold-fields were unhealthy places. Diseases spread quickly because of polluted water, flies and very poor sanitation. Some diggers suffered from rheumatism from working in water and sleeping in wet clothes or on damp ground. Others had heart attacks from the hard work. The healthy had to take care not to fall in holes after dark or to let the sides of a deep hole fall on them.

On Sundays, mining stopped. There were church services for those who wanted to attend. Sunday was also a day for washing, cleaning up the tent and getting firewood. Other free time was spent by horse-racing, foot-racing, fighting, singing and playing musical instruments such as the fiddle, flute, cornet and concertina. When the hard-working diggers went to town they often went on a spree. Diggers were seen lighting cigars with bank notes and treating strangers to champagne". 
Deaths at Lambing Flat - 1861.

(as reported in the newspapers)

10.2.61 HENRY BUTT, in his tent at Stoney Creek, of "apoplexy of the lungs, resulting from intemperance".

6.3.61 JOHN FREDERICK ESBACH, aged 8 years, run over by bullock dray at the main crossing place, Burrangong Creek.

10.3.61 JAMES BAINES, broke neck when fell under a dray.

18.3.61 JOHN HOLDHAM, miner, broke neck when mine fell in on him at Stoney Creek.

18.3.61 BENJAMIN VINE (or FINE), miner, when dirt bank fell on him at Lower Wombat.

8.4.61 ELLEN HEFFERNAN, daughter of Michael Heffernan of Chance Gully, when thrown from a horse.

10.4.61 FRANK ALDWELL, shot in a shanty between Demondville and Wombat.

last week in April: GEORGE GRAHAM, a German, found dead in the bush near Stoney Creek.

27.4.61 ADOLPHUS DUPREE, aged 4 yrs. 3 mths., when trampled by a bullock, at Allandale.

c.18.5.61 Mr SEGERS0N (or SICKERSON), miner, when hit on head by a bucket falling down shaft, at Tipperary Gully.

24.5.61 CATHERINE HULL, aged about 24, dropped dead (prob. from intemperance).

c.24.5.61 DOMINIC FARRY, fell 32 feet (10 metres) down a mine shaft, near Golden Point, Spring Creek.

4.6.61 WILLIAM GAY (or GUY), aged 30, murdered by John McMahon, at Spring Creek.
5.6.61 WILLIAM ARCHER, found dead, drowned in a waterhole at Spring Creek.

c.5.6.61 Woman, name unknown, found dead in a tent at Tipperary Gully, from exposure and intemperance.

c.8.7.61 EDWARD McCANN, at Allandale, from intemperance and exposure.

c.15.8.61 ADAM SMIDTH, a German, suicided at Tipperary Gully.

31.8.61 An old man in the employ of Mr. Fitzsimons, butcher, Chance Gully, dropped dead while killing and dressing pigs.

5or7.9.61 LE DEU SOOK, Chinese miner, when his claim fell in on him, at Back Creek.

c.29.9.61 RICHARD LANE, of Lower Spring Creek, aged 46 fell down a 24 feet (7 metre) deep mine shaft in the dark.

10.10.61 Mr. HUMPHREYS, miner, aged 50, of natural causes.

c.15.10.61 HANNIBAL PEARSON, a Swede, at Young, of natural causes.

c.15.10.61 A man, name unknown, at Back Creek, of dysentery.

c.21.10.61 THOMAS DAVIS, infant, at Chance Gully, of natural causes.

late Oct.'61 Man, name unknown, found dead in the main creek, probably from the effects of drink. (prob. identical with the following.)

c.31.10.61 ROBERT CUNNINGHAM, of Chance Gully, from injuring spine when fell into the main creek.

Questions:

1. How many children died in this period? How were they killed?

2. What period of time do these recorded deaths cover?

3. How many unknown deaths were recorded?

4. What is similar in the recordings of the deaths of Segerson and Humphreys?
5. What is similar in the recordings of the deaths of Segerson, Gay and Vine?

6. What does the small 'c' indicate in front of the dates?

7. How did the women die?

8. When did Le Deu Sook die?

9. How many people died of natural causes?

10. What does this list of deaths tell us about the following:
    (a) town administration.
    (b) reporting of deaths.
    (c) social life.
    (d) life for women in Lambing Flat.
    (e) attitude to children.

11. What does this list of deaths at Lambing Flat tell us about life at the diggings during the Gold Rush?

Re-read the initial statement made in Exercise 1 (Appendix B) and your own paragraph answer to that question. How have the above questions in Exercise 2 altered your perceptions of life at the diggings? What has the second exercise explained that the first exercise has not?
The empathetic dilemma

Disconfirming pupils' expectations and, thereby, making them aware of logical intransitivities within their ideas, is a teaching technique applicable to concepts other than empathy and subjects other than history. Approaches based upon the identification and reduction of apparently incongruous data are, in contrast, more suited to teaching empathy than anything else. Such approaches are also useful for assessment purposes. The basic technique involves presenting pupils with information about what people did or believed that simply does not make sense from a contemporary perspective. The challenge is to use background knowledge of the period in order to make sense of it. The example in Figure 3.4 is taken from a 16+ Trials Paper for Schools Council Project History 13-16.

A selection of responses to the question in Figure 3.4 (grammar and spelling corrected to render comparison of 'empathetic' contents easier) illustrates both the virtues of this type of exercise and the difficulties of assessing empathetic understanding:
A thirteenth-century manuscript showing King Edward the Confessor treating scrofula, a skin disease, by touching it with his hand.

When people like those shown in Source G were not cured they often followed the King around, being touched over and over again. Why did people living in the Middle Ages still believe in "cures" like these even if they did not work? 

Figure 3.4

(a) They wouldn't think the 'cure' hadn't worked only that it hadn't happened yet. Being touched by the King wasn't a scientific cure it was something that God did, so it isn't like something not staying in orbit proving the theory of gravity wrong, it's more like me saying I'm going to take you to a football match this season and you ask every match and I say no but may say yes next time. Only it's more complicated because of the need to have faith. If you start worrying about miracles and wondering if they happen after all, they won't work. So they've got you both ways. Either you believe even when it doesn't work or you stop it working. And if you take this bit away you might find everything else you believe
in falls down as well. You can't believe in the King and God without believing in miracles and the kings are put there generally to rule over you. It was called the divine right of kings by Louis XIV a few hundred years later.

(b) Some people who touched the King would get better if they waited long enough and courtiers and priests would then say 'It's a miracle' to flatter the King and get rewards. Faith sometimes works as well, especially for hypochondriacs who only think they're sick. Doctors give you anti-biotics for colds even though they don't work. It keeps the patients happy and believing in doctors.

(c) They believed in these things because they were superstitious and religious. Religion is a main factor in medical development through time. It started with the Egyptians and then potions and ended with the Salvarsan trial when religious people opposed cures for syphilis. It's always been the same, religion has only helped medicine a little bit and held it back a lot.

(d) They carried on being touched because they thought the King was supernatural. The Middle Ages were primitive and backward and people weren't as good at thinking things out.

How should these responses be assessed? For many teachers, the absence of any affective element, the paucity of emotional commitment and imaginative flair is commensurate with a lack of empathy. Evaluated by reference to 'a warm glow around the heart' or 'cold chill in the bowels', these four answers are uniformly deficient. But they are clearly different and, equally clearly, reflect different conceptions of what should count as an historical answer to the question posed. May they be assessed according to the historical accuracy, or felicity, of the (re)construction offered - that is, for the degree of authentic empathy that each may be thought to contain?
But this is to demand the impossible and could only encourage rote instruction of the least desirable kind. Imagine an art teacher attempting to teach the principles of composition and colour theory to average 15-year-olds. If successful, he may be able to detect an understanding and appraise the application of these principles, but he cannot expect the resultant paintings to qualify as more than worthless daubs. Nor can he expect understanding of the principles taught to be co-extensive with artistic talent or skill with a brush. The 'best' paintings will not necessarily be produced by pupils who demonstrate effective learning of what was taught. The history teacher is in the same position – he must be able to evaluate teaching in terms of its manifest impact upon pupil performance, but he cannot expect pupils to produce work of historical value. Of course, this does not follow if 'motive' and 'sense of period' are taught as though they were dates or lists of bills and battles; but such teaching is comparable to learning art by tracing Durer drawings.

An alternative approach to the appraisal of these responses is to regard them not as pieces of historical writing but as evidence of pupils' historical thinking, of the assumptions they bring to the subject, of the way they make sense of what they are taught. A criteria-related mark scheme incorporating four levels of empathetic and pre-empathetic understanding and conforming to the developmental models described in section II may be advanced:

Level 1: No valid application of historical knowledge or empathetic understanding. At best, truistic common-sense and historicism. -'They believed these things because they were thick/stupid/a bunch of dimmos.' -'...not advanced like us.' -'...backward and superstitious; lived in primitive times.' Explanations either tautological, biological, historicist.
Level 2: Valid historical analysis but 'from the outside'. No evidence of empathetic understanding.  
-'Believed in supernatural cures because lived in a religious age; pre-Renaissance.' Conditional explanation substituted for empathetic.

Level 3: Explanation 'from the inside', but only everyday empathy. Genuine attempt to show how the Royal Touch could have seemed reasonable to people at the time, but reconstruction remains locked in twentieth-century world-view - no attempt to recreate an alien form of life and way of thinking. -'Faith cures occasionally effective (placebos; spontaneous remissions)' -'Effective religious and royal propaganda - people would always hear about miraculous cures; nothing to counteract this.' -'People desperate and had nothing to lose because no alternative recourse.'

Level 4: Genuine historical empathy. Attempt to show how belief in the Royal Touch was reasonable to the medieval mind. Genuine attempt to shed twentieth-century preconceptions and to recreate alien world-view. Reward any answer that clearly attempts this even when less than completely successful. -'Disease wages of sin; cure signals forgiveness; forgiveness must be merited; following the King around may be construed as a penance.' -'King merely the instrument of God's purpose; this instrument must be "clean" and in a state of grace.'

Structured contrasts between past and present

Along with the empathetic dilemma, this type of exercise may be recommended as a standard, routine approach to the teaching and assessing of historical empathy. Adolescents experience difficulty in making the leap from everyday to historical empathy, being generally disposed to impose contemporary values and ideas upon the past. The necessity to think, or to try to think, in period must be learned and repeatedly reinforced, and exercises embodying
a contrast between past and present are useful inasmuch as they signal to pupils that past behaviour and attitudes are incongruous when viewed from the perspective of the present. The following example is taken from a CSE examination paper:

' "What can be more ridiculous than the idea of trains travelling twice as fast as stage coaches! We should as soon expect people to let themselves be fired off upon one of Congreve's ricochet rockets as to trust themselves to the mercy of such a machine going at such a speed." (Quarterly Review, March 1825.)

We treat as normal the fact that Concorde flies at more than twice the speed of existing airliners. Why, then, did people find it "ridiculous" for railway trains to travel "twice as fast as stage coaches"?'

Although more appropriate to O level candidates, this question worked reasonably well at CSE. An annotated version of the mark-scheme is given below:

Level 1: Recreation of a particular set of circumstances

Candidates argue to the effect that circumstances in which railways were introduced were in no way comparable to those obtaining during the launch of Concorde: the suggested parallel is false because circumstances were different.

Many arguments rather elliptical with no mention of Concorde at all; for example:

Lots of silly stories were told to frighten people of railways by the canal and turnpike men. Great Dukes and MPs did not want to sell their land and of a dirty noisy train spoil hunting and told lies about it killing all the cows and passengers could not breath when they went fast...[explanation of support for railways omitted] The public were not very sophistickold they only read cheap broodsheets and ballards even tho there was no page 3 in them days.
they believed lots of the lies they wrote in the ballards...

The implication here is that, unlike Concorde, railways suffered a barrage of hostile and mendacious propaganda. This is true as far as it goes, but the candidate construes all fears and theories, for instance about the physiological effects of high-speed travel, as lies and propaganda. There is no attempt to explain how it was possible for people at the time to believe these ideas.

Level 2: Empathetic reconstruction of situation
Candidates attempt to reconstruct what it was like to ride as a passenger in an early train. Again most contrasts with Concorde are implicit; for example:

they tried to jump on and off trains to fetch their hats because they were used to doing this on stagecoaches. It was dangerous to go twice as fast as a stagecoach if you kept the same habits and forgot where you were....A famous actress had a ride in 1830 and got burnt by the red hot cinders. They set their clothes on fire and had to be put out all the time. She enjoyed it but other people were scared of burning to death. The cinders got worse the faster the train sped along.

Other responses mentioned problems with tunnels, the high accident rate, the decapitation of people riding on top of carriages stage-coach style, etc.

Level 3: Empathetic analysis of perspective
Candidates recreate and explain the point of view of people in the past: There is an attempt to see things through the eyes of the average man in 1825, given his society and, interestingly enough, given his history; for example:

Concorde goes twice as fast as a jumbo jet, but this goes twice as fast as propeller-driven airplanes. Airplanes go twice as fast as cars and some cars go faster than locomotives. Today people get used to
going faster and faster but they had not in 1825. For thousands of years NOTHING went faster than a horse could ride or wind could blow a ship. Then railways were invented and went a lot faster and people worried about what would happen. If a spaceship was pulled faster than light by a Black Hole the astronaut would worry a bit.

This response is short on fact but long on sense of history. In the unsuccessful 'astronaut' reference, the candidate is attempting to find a contemporary parallel for the steam locomotive.

Level 4: Empathetic reconstruction of period

One or two candidates attempted to locate railways on the wider canvas of early nineteenth-century life and thought. As might be expected, no more than a few hints of anything approaching a 'sense of period' were recorded; for example:

'looked at great iron monster clanking their pistons, hissing steam and smoke and fire. 'How different from our sleek pony's', they thought. 'What iron and fire can do Nature cannot', they wondered....They all know Nature and what nature could do, so they wondered if a horse was as fast as Nature was meant to go. Perhaps Nature could not stand going faster and should not try.

Despite the literary extravagance and lack of factual precision, this response does capture something of the impact of steam upon the nineteenth-century imagination. Whether or not there is sufficient evidence of a sense of period, of the intrusion of iron and fire and steam into a world of muscle and sinew and elemental forces, for this to qualify as a Level 4 response remains open to debate, however.
In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary empathy is defined as 'the power of projecting one's personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation'. Put more simply it means close identification with another person, identification so close that the child who empathizes steps into the clogs of the millworker and experiences the hard existence of factory life in Victorian times.

The 'Place, Time and Society Project 8-13' identifies empathy as a social skill to be developed in the course of a curriculum designed with an objectives base. However, it goes further and indicates that empathy is a free standing aim that is to be achieved by a curriculum design that embodies the intellectual skills of using resources, communicating information and interpreting information supported by attitudes and values that foster discernment and curiosity. At a time when there is a need to include a multicultural dimension within the school curriculum empathy must be encouraged, developed and exercised through the media of subject disciplines such as History and Geography where the prime concerns are with people in their world today, yesterday and in the future.

Developing An Ability To Empathise In Young Children.

Let us consider an example in a primary classroom where some ten year olds have been looking at 'Transport' as a topic. The work is in its final stage, and groups of children are presenting their work. One group talks knowledgeably about railways, showing pictures of trains, old and new; another group has modelled an impressive road system, and another offers 'Ships through the Ages'. The
fourth group are going to dramatise something, and quickly a space is cleared. Some desks are moved into a T shape, and at the junction, two chairs are placed on top. Two boys climb on to the chairs, and an 'announcer' tells us that we are witnessing the start of Alcock and Brown's flight across the Atlantic. The two pilots go through the starting procedures, they wave to the American mechanics, and they are airborne. There is a wild roaring from a tape recorder, operated by a girl, and the two pilots shout above it. Hours pass, we are told, then comes a great violent storm. The aircraft is rocked from side to side, there is noise, flashing light, rolling thunder (from metal sheets) and the two pilots shout as they battle against the elements:

'Down, we are going down'
'I cannot hold her, the airspeed is dropping, the wind is too strong'
'Hold me while I lean out and catch that flapping strut'
'Got it - it could have stuck in the prop on that side'
'Down still more and slower still - look there are the waves, so high, so fierce, we have no chance there'
'She is easier now, look, the speed is rising slowly, I can hold her at this'
'Time for a cup of tea - my hands are like ice, I cannot feel even the warmth of the cup and my feet are frozen'

There is a drumming and a rattling as the plane is beaten by the driving rain, the pilots sway in their seats, leaning back as they climb slowly to a safer height. For a few minutes, two small boys have relived the experience of two brave men. They had been able to project themselves into the cockpit of the converted Vimy bomber, and enabled us to share with them the battle against the North Atlantic storms.

Here is another example from a Middle school where each class in turn presents a week of assemblies to the rest
of the school and a class of ten year olds had been studying Scott of the Antarctic. The stories of Scott and his companions were adopted by the children as the theme for their assemblies. The children selected readings from Scott's diaries, sequences were dramatised to show the laborious journeys across the ice and snow, and a tape recorder played music from 'Peer Gynt' that helped to create a feeling for the cruel wild environment of the stormy Antarctic weather. All who participated identified with Scott and his companions; through reading, music, movement and drama they transported their audience from the warm school hall to the elemental wastes of an ice bound world. For all the experience was most moving, sad and yet inspiring in its sorrow, as there was empathy in identifying with men who went to the limits of devotion and human endeavour.

Sympathy and Empathy.
So far in defining empathy no consideration has been given to sympathy. A definition of sympathy reads: 'tenderly to draw another person's emotion, condition or sensation of compassion'.
There is always a danger in considering empathy that it will be confused with sympathy, for there is some degree of similarity between them. When we consider say, a performance of 'King Lear', the portrayal of the King gives rise to compassion for his condition. However, when we look at the Knights of Alcock and Brown, it is admiration rather than compassion that is awakened in us. We become, temporarily, the whole person involved in the situation. We are not observers, but participants, we suffer the storms, the discomforts, and we enjoy the successes.

Empathy: An Aim and A Skill.
If empathy is to be both an aim and a skill to be acquired, how can it be achieved in school? For empathy to be an aim in schools it must be accepted as a fundamental part of school policy for to see it merely as one of several
expressed aims in certain subject disciplines completely disregards the place of empathy in the whole school curriculum. While empathy can be illustrated and explored in the context of History and Geography it is also something that needs to be appreciated in every day life. It is apparent in any experience that children will have with multi-racial relationships; for example, many children are still unaware of what life is like for someone in a minority group. Closer identification with the lives and experiences of ethnic minorities can lead to better understanding and appreciation of them and this cannot be taught in isolation. The experience will come in school assemblies, in newstime, in class discussion; it will emerge in the 'hidden curriculum' as peer group relationships are developed. It will be seen in the way infant children play in the Home Corner and in the books that children read in the Junior School. Hence if empathy is accepted as an aim it must be embodied into a whole school policy, something that has been explored, discussed and finally agreed by the staff as being the basic philosophy that determines the function and purpose of the school. Ideally then, empathy is accepted as an integral part of a school's philosophy; how can it be developed as a skill? Drama, role play, research, experiential opportunity and music are means to this end. *Ordinary People.*

History is about people and it is not always necessary, nor even desirable to go into the courts, palaces and parliaments of the past. Let us think too of the cottages of rural England, the slums of nineteenth-century Liverpool, the stews of Dickensian London, and the cluttered streets of medieval York. In all of those there are people, the ordinary people who represent the fabric of the back cloth of History against which the key figures are embroidered in bright colours. There have been many
productions of 'Oliver', many schools have dressed children in the button up boots and stove pipe hats of Victoriana and others have turned back time to schools as they were in the first years of free primary education. All too often though these are examples of pageantry rather than the purposeful identification of children with people of other times. We should think, for example, of a family in history, using drama to identify a Roman family, a Saxon family under the Normans, a medieval family engaged perhaps in a miracle play, a family thrust into the Roundhead and Cavalier conflict, a family whose sons explore with Raleigh and fight with Drake, a family who fight Napoleon, a family growing up in Victorian England aware for the first time of the value of anaesthetics, and a family forced by the Depression of the 1930's to live on survival rations. It is not suggested that every History lesson becomes a dramatic experience but that at times the impact of great events could be looked at through the eyes of ordinary people saying and doing the everyday things of life. If one can turn to contemporary literature, for example, the writings of R.F. Delderfield particularly in 'The Dreaming Suburb' and 'The Avenue goes to War' give many cameos of family life in the 30's and 40's as ordinary people live first in the uneasy peace of the rise of Hitler's Germany and then through the years of the Second World War.

**Controlled and Spontaneous Situations.**

Drama in the classroom takes various forms. Controlled, directed, spontaneous can all be applied to current forms and each is vital. Often in spontaneous drama the children become what they think and feel about the characters. I recall a religious dramatisation in which Jesus was preaching to the 5,000 – one small boy, a 'walk on extra', came in and said 'Hello Jesus, what are you doing?' Perfectly natural, everyday conversation, exactly
what someone would say and yet so far removed from the cold precision of the Authorised Version from which the story came.

Place, Time and Society 8-13 has indicated in relation to the teaching of History in the 'Clues' Unit the vital role of pre-disciplinary activities and the control of variables by the teacher. The example quoted gives the freedom of expression that a loose situation required. For a more tightly defined situation, such as say the events leading to the murder of Thomas a Becket, the teacher would require the actual words used by the participants as these are recorded in the records of the time. It is essential therefore to give children practical experiences of talking and moving in pre-disciplinary situations such as freely adapted stories or contrived sequences before moving them into the drama of historical situations developed from well-researched resources.

**Role Play.**

Drama has a spontaneity and a cavalcade that is lost to some extent in role play. Role play is purposive in that it is more exploratory than the illustrative appeal of drama. Drama highlights human beings in situations where human actions and reactions are known through the records of past events, through the eyes of contemporary diarists and reporters who write from memory and often with their own interpretation of meaning. F.S. Trueman, that flamboyant Yorkshire fast bowler, has frequently been misquoted and misinterpreted by observers and reporters who have sought to enhance that flamboyance. We read of Sir Francis Drake finishing his game of bowls before sailing to tackle the Armada. It is a brave story but in practical terms he was probably waiting for the tide before setting sail. The interpretation however is that of supreme indifference and inspiring bravery. In role play the situations are different for role play can divide
into two broad divisions: Role play in the consideration of past events, and role play in the consideration of present or impending events. Role play in the consideration of past events has been used successfully in, for example, a consideration of the impact of enclosures upon a rural community and in the effects upon rural people of the coming of the railways.

Role play in respect of contemporary or impending activities has been used by at least one teacher who introduced her class to local government activity by giving them roles to play as local councillors in a Council meeting. Later the children went to the Council chamber to experience the real thing. There are many good commercially produced role play exercises, the most compulsive being 'The Star River Project' which is adult in its audience participation but adaptable to a class situation. Simpler examples such as 'Siting a Steel Works' and 'Motorway Construction' come more readily applicable to the classroom.

In each of the divisions certain requirements emerge:

1. CHARACTERS have to be identified and adopted.

2. SCRIPTS have to be studied.

3. CONTENT has to be considered from each side so that point and counter point can be reviewed.

4. Familiarity with DOCUMENTATION must be assured.

5. The SETTING must be arranged - council table or 'public meeting' as dictated by the situation under review.

All of this requires time and all too frequently this is insufficient. Yet, if role players are to identify then it is an essential requirement that there be a process of absorption of detail, character and background. Admittedly the following example is at adult level and it
described a role play situation at management level. A group of headteachers on a management course were told that they would be required to participate in a staff meeting. A 'model' school was created, staffed with a group of teachers who were by character belligerent, uncooperative or obsequious and bedevilled with a variety of problems posed by recalcitrant children and obtrusive parents. The brief was a lengthy document and the head teachers were given time to read it and time to work up their own roles. A full morning was given to the actual 'staff meeting' and tempers frayed in royal battle as the role-playing heads handled not only staff but the problems created in the brief. At the end one teacher came to the organisers and said 'That was just like my staff - now I think I can handle them'. The lesson for the classroom is that time is required for briefing, for identification, for living the parts and for research into background. Possibly some spontaneity might be lost in the process but a greater depth of understanding will emerge.

Empathy begins in the early years in school. One very successful topic in a primary school in a London Borough took the suggestion offered in 'Clues, Clues, Clues' of Cavemen. In the middle infants class the children explored 'caves' with their teacher and then went on to consider what life was like for cavemen. The children had been shown much - many pictures of caves, cave paintings, cave dwellers; evocative music was played, stories were read and personal experiences recounted. At the end the children wrote about cavemen and many identified closely. One small girl said 'I would not have any toys. I would have a doll made from a piece of bone covered with fur'. From this early beginning in what is largely a pre-disciplinary experience children can move on to consider other people in History and Geography. All the time the process is developmental in that children are learning
more about resources and more about communicating ideas; as they grow older they practise interpretation, looking at information more critically so that they can do as one boy in a Junior Class did when looking at two different illustrated books of life in Tudor England. He commented that the people in the pictures wore clothes that showed great differences although the period in History was the same. He was learning to be critical and to be perceptive; these skills sub tend from empathy, making it a skill that opens out the development of many other intellectual skills.

People Make History.

History is all about people. How often this is said and how often it is ignored! Whether the History is somewhat narrowly that of Tudor England or on the broader canvas of Worldwide Discovery it is people that make History and in the evidence they leave behind, children can begin to explore attitudes and beliefs. What simpler place is there to begin than the Portuguese Court and what must have been the passionate belief of Christopher Columbus from the world of today — known to be a globe, identified as such by men standing on the moon. What would have been the attitudes and beliefs of the earliest space explorers, what are the current attitudes and beliefs in this field of exploration? Empathy identifies attitudes and beliefs and it makes them come alive; that these change is all too apparent in History for one has only to think say, of New England and the witch hunts to be identifying with the harsh, cruel rigour of the Puritan. We can show that the attitudes still linger in Bedford and Salem but the punishments have gone.

In a multi-cultural society the greatest need is for an understanding of people, their diversity, their attitudes and their beliefs. All of this is the substance of History; in History we see the changes that have occurred
as waves of migrants have sailed across the world. England has a long history of migration; so have other nations like Nigeria and Ghana. The canvas of History must be spread wider to enlarge children's experience and show them that other people have attitudes and beliefs, that people have always had these and that they have changed for so many reasons. Encouraging empathy which is identifying with past peoples, exploring change in attitudes and beliefs, knowing why people were as they were and why they changed is fundamental not only to the reasons why we teach History but indeed to why we teach at all.
Empathy in Historical Explanation and Understanding.

An important and enduring theme within discussion of the nature of historical explanation and understanding has been a stress on the distinctive interpretative and empathetic nature of history as a discipline and as a particular mode of thought. The crux of this latter mode is an emphasis on the understanding part of 'historical understanding' and a concomitant emphasis on the importance of the subject/the historian. To defend the significance of this position (a peculiar form of historical understanding) is not to deny that the method of verstehen requires systematic knowledge for its completion. That is, one needs to know 'the facts of the situation' and not to rely on some sort of transcendental intuitionism between historian and historical agent. Put thus, the method becomes, in Weber's terms '...a way of generating causal hypotheses about human behaviour; those hypotheses can then be tested.' (9) This is a far cry from the earlier claims in the verstehen tradition, in which:

The sociologist's or historian's understanding of the people he studies was variously conceived as following unproblematically from what they had in common as human beings, or as involving some imaginative act such as the 'reliving' of their experiences; (10)

The Weberian stress on the necessity for intersubjectivity understanding and on the fact that understanding of a single personality requires systematic knowledge for its completion, moves very close to Popper's
notion of 'situational analysis', even though the two positions may seem to commence from virtual polar opposites. Popper puts it thus:

The historian's task is, therefore, so to reconstruct the problem situation as it appeared to the agent, that the actions of the agent become adequate to the situation. This is very similar to Collingwood's method, but it eliminates from the theory of understanding and from the historical method precisely the subjective... element which for Collingwood and most other theorists of understanding (hermeneuticists) is its salient point. (11)

To take a particular case: viz. that 'history typically involves human action'. (12) Historical explanation frequently is about an agent's motives and intentions, but explication of this will rely on public evidence — Popper's 'situational analysis', the 'facts of the situation' or Collingwood's 'absolute presuppositions of a period', and not on intuition or subjective notions of empathy.

Collingwood's dictum that 'all history is the history of thought' and his related claim that once we know what happened we know why it happened, seems on the face of it to be based on the untenable assumption that imaginative understanding is to be used to penetrate the mind of the historical agent, thereby acquiring direct knowledge of his/her intentions and of the acts which are a consequence of those intentions. Certainly, in practice, historians sometimes claim (or at least silently believe) that they have 're-lived' a period. But this is 'poetic licence', not idealism. Nor does the historian's unavoidable use of 'hunches', 'insights' or 'extrapolation from personal experience' (the historian's invaluable 'second record'), crucial though these are, match the force of Collingwood's position. His point is that the external manifestations of past thought are beyond recall, since
history has no recourse to laboratory experimentation and replication, but that one can penetrate the internal past because thought is a universal phenomenon which makes others intelligible to the self. Rejecting crude empiricism, Collingwood makes no attempt to deny the role of the individual historian, the subjective element, in writing history:

Each historian sees history from his own centre, at an angle of his own: and therefore sees some problems which no other sees, and sees every problem from a point of view, and therefore under an aspect peculiar to himself. (13)

In one sense, there is nothing profound in this statement. It is simply stating that every historian has a personal perspective - both a bias and a 'second record' of experience. Equally, however, there is the critical point that this interpretation is tempered by having to operate within a public tradition of criteria of truth and acceptability.

Collingwood frequently has been dismissed as an idealist and intuitionist who claimed quite an unwarranted mystical role for the historian and for the superiority of historical knowledge, largely because of his claim that historians could have direct access to other people's minds and hence re-live those people's motives, thoughts and actions. Collingwood's claims for empathy may well be inflated, but he does make a number of particularly important points about the role of the historian and the nature of historical explanation and understanding. For example, Collingwood's arguments do assume a 'commonness of humanity' in the historian's interpretation of past actions and events. This is crucial for any concept of empathetic reconstruction, whether for the historian or for the history teacher, and is reflected in the Schools Council History 13-16 Project's belief in the need to 'increase pupils' self-knowledge and awareness of what it means to be human'.

The rather poetic metaphors which Collingwood uses to describe the historian's work, are put in their true perspective by the statement that 'there seems no reason to suppose that historical or sociological understanding is essentially different from everyday understanding'.(14) Good historians may well be more imaginative or have a greater feeling or ability to empathise, but that is not to agree with Collingwood's apparent claim for the historian's direct access to other minds. The latter notion is both an empirical and a logical impossibility. Moreover, there is no real need to postulate such a mystifying process — a process, indeed, which is in grave danger of ignoring the material factors in the world completely. An acceptance of human commonality allows us access to other minds, motives, and actions. Necessarily, operations at that level will remain highly subjective. The dilemma is partly overcome by the insistence on a referral to publicly acceptable criteria of evidence and so forth. Outhwaite suggests that we can strengthen this verstehen position even further and make more rigorous our attempts at empathetic reconstruction by the use of Weber's concept of an 'ideal type'. Weber's 'ideal type':

...must mediate this transition from the subjective to the objective if anything can. When we construct an ideal type, whether purely of a person's character or a course of action, we are not thinking of the particular experience or characteristics of the individual in question, but rather of giving an interpretation in terms of typical patterns of events which could occur 'again and again' in the lives of different individuals.(15)

Analysis along these lines builds a bridge between the historian's need to generalise and the indisputable point that the historian usually is dealing with the irregular, non-repeatable and apparently isolated and unconnected phenomena of the past. There must be regularity — at least, there must be an assumption of it, for how is the
historian to explain the completely unique? So we have a solid entry into this debate. Finally it gives us a point of entry into the similar problem of how the historian is to explain a particular action or a particular situation. In turn, we then can link the advantages of the Weberian 'ideal type' with the Popperian concept of 'situational logic'(16) and pull that closer to a peculiarly historical mode of explanation by salvaging from the verstehen perspective those elements referred to above. 'History typically involves human action'(17) and therefore historical explanation frequently is about an agent's motives or intentions. It is here that one is particularly concerned with notions of empathetic reconstruction, but with the qualification that it will rely upon public evidence - the facts of the situation or the 'absolute presuppositions' of a period. This brief discussion of a large and complex area can be summarised by reference to von Wright's notion of 'practical inference'. In von Wright's words:

It is only when action is already there and a practical argument is constructed to explain or justify it that we have a logically conclusive argument. The necessity of a practical inference schema is, one could say, a necessity conceived ex post actu.(18)

This meets Hempel's 'covering-law theory' criteria. It also meets the 'soft' verstehen requirements for rational explanation of the actions of an historical actor, since we have a form of explanation 'proceeding by means of the construction of a practical inference for that agent'.(19) This is not a full-blown claim for rational explanation. Rather:

The point is that it is possible to construct a practical inference (or 'rationale') for an action, and to construct it on the basis of public evidence. ...so practical inference schemas provide the logical basis for explaining human actions, even though any particular reconstruction may prove to be false. (20)
To conclude this section, we can say that the concepts of 'ideal type' and 'situational logic' are at the heart of historical explanation, with the notions of 'practical inference' and a 'rationale' explanation, bringing out most clearly that which is distinctive in the nature of historical explanation and understanding. There is a related strong verstehen element in historical explanation, but this is not some mystical or spontaneous process which takes place in the historian's mind. Empathetic reconstruction may well be an imaginative act, but it is also an analytical one and one that must be prepared for and not be dependent upon some sort of mystical spontaneity. To argue that empathetic reconstruction is solely an imaginative act would, in any event, be an extremely crude and naive way of viewing the imaginative process. This view of empathetic reconstruction lays more stress on 'understanding' than on vague notions of 'feeling like other people'.


(10) Ibid., p. 12.


(15) Ibid., pp. 91–2.


(20) Ibid., p. 76.
EMPATHY IN HISTORY - FROM DEFINITION TO ASSESSMENT.

(Extract from booklet produced by a working party convened by the Southern Regional Examinations Board (SREB) at the Cambridge Department of Education, 1986, pp. 7-14, 19-21, 41-46).

Developing Empathy

Although we may agree on the importance of empathy, it is easy to allow it to be overshadowed in the classroom by other skills which have harder edges. It is important for teachers to recognise and support those aspects of empathy which have more in common with understanding art or literature than with the conscious reasoning process. Two such aspects are the spontaneous formation of pictures and impressions in the mind and the projection of one's own attitudes into the historical situation. The first demands a suitable topic, rich in concrete detail, with personal continuity and action of the kind likely to appeal to the pupils. First hand accounts, physical and visual sources and the introduction of art and music as acceptable working media may also be important. Projection will depend very much upon the degree of social interaction in the classroom; approaches likely to stimulate empathy would include various forms of drama and role-play and the use of small groups for discussion and assignments.

However, historical empathy differs from fiction and drama in that it must be about real people of a specific time and place and it must obey the rules of evidence. In order to think empathetically, an historian needs to have in mind the information available to the historical character, information about the modes of thought common in that situation and also knowledge of the individual character's experience and cast of mind. Good historical empathy is difficult to achieve. Secondary school pupils are likely to have only limited information about an
historical topic; in the same way, they will have only limited knowledge of human nature. On the other hand, they have a good deal of experience of empathetic projection in drama, in fiction and in everyday life. It seems reasonable to suppose that we can help them to move towards the disciplined and well-informed empathy that is characteristic of good history. In a world full of conflicting groups with long-established differences of outlook, nothing could be more useful.

Teachers and examiners in history need to agree how to recognise empathy and how to distinguish between its more and less effective uses. It is difficult to measure since it is not really a separate skill, but a key part of the historian's mode of thinking used always in combination with other skills. This pamphlet tries to suggest how empathy can be encouraged, outlines some stages in its development, and describes some attempts to assess levels of its achievement.

The Teaching of Empathy

From definition to classroom practice

Too many teachers shy away from 'signposting' for their students the conceptual objectives of particular lessons. Yet as R S Peters argued many years ago, it is debatable that learning has taken place unless the accomplishment of objectives are recognised by both teacher and pupil. No mathematician would accept that the conceptual vocabulary of the subject eg subtraction, multiplication should be denied to the student. Indeed, many would argue that no mathematical learning can take place without a grasp of such concepts. Many young historians, however, are considered to be unable to grapple with abstract terms. The Schools Council History Project 13-16 has done much to break down such prejudice, but the recognition of what is historical empathy and the use of the term by pupils is still rare. There seems, for instance, to be only one textbook (Pictures and People, Aileen Plummer, History 11-13,
Holmes McDougall, 1984) which actually attempts a definition of the term for pupils and provides a detailed discussion of it. At all levels of empathy the use of imagination is crucial to the student of history. But, imaginative reconstruction and empathy are not the same thing. Empathy requires a disciplined use of imagination. Pupils may imagine that people in the past would have felt just the same as they themselves do nowadays; but historical empathy often depends on the ability to imagine exactly the opposite: to expect past societies to have held different values and attitudes, and to understand that individuals within these societies would have held as many different points of view as we do today.

How do pupils begin to empathise with people in history? A knowledge of the physical realities of past societies, their details and a description of their unique phenomena are often well taught, but such teaching is no substitute for genuine attempts to lead pupils to analyse, understand and explain the motives, beliefs and values of historical figures or groups. For example, knowing what life was like in the trenches and being able to describe conditions is not the same as empathising with the soldiers who experienced trench warfare, because a description can often involve no attempt to understand how the soldiers felt about their experience.

Everyday empathy

It is not difficult to show pupils this distinction. But as soon as they begin to understand the feelings of people of the past, they easily make the sort of mistake which Bertie Wooster made about Archimedes [page 4]. There remains the problem of helping pupils to perceive the difference between what may be called everyday empathy and historical empathy. Many pupils will apply their own twentieth century motives, attitudes, feelings and values to the behaviour of previous societies. What might be termed
the "Flintstones" syndrome needs to be exposed to pupils for their own critical self-assessment. They need to recognise the limitations of ascribing to past peoples their 1980s' notions of right and wrong, wealth and poverty, pleasure and pain etc. Such recognition then needs to be compared to genuine attempts to recreate the world views of previous peoples which are often quite distinct from those of modern society.

1 The Flintstones are a set of cartoon characters who supposedly lived in the stone age but do so in 20th century fashion with stone televisions, dinosaur barbecues, etc.

Stereotype historical empathy
The examination candidate's answer on page 5 about ancient medicine is an example of what might be called stereotype historical empathy in that it assumes that medical ideas were held in exactly the same way by everybody. For most pupils it will be difficult to go beyond the stage of stereotype empathy where, for example, they would assume that there was one Victorian world view or an Elizabethan world view. Pupils ought to be challenged to adopt various standpoints in respect of people in the past, not led to imagine that the different feelings of past peoples were no more than one and the same for each individual. Research findings suggest that the residual stereotype is often the most lasting of all the impressions formed by pupils who have studied history at school. Propositions such as "all Germans are arrogant" and "all workhouses were intolerable" are often the outcome of a genuine attempt to show the pupils the differences in feelings and values of past societies, but of an attempt constrained by superficial and usually misleading generalisations.

Differentiated historical empathy
The next step therefore is to present pupils with opportunities which demand analysis of differing modes of behaviour and responses to problems within past societies. A teaching strategy might be to employ the "dilemma" question or the conditional hypothesis. For example, "if the workhouses were so intolerable why didn't everybody condemn them?", or "why was it that a guardian of a particular workhouse might hold views quite opposite to, but equally as sincere as, those of Charles Dickens?". Pupils can thus be brought to a heightened conceptual awareness - which might be termed "differentiated historical empathy". Within this level of thought lies the need to impose a major aspect of the historian's art on the assignment posed to pupils: that is, to justify empathetic judgement by use of specific historical evidence. In short, we must demand that pupils can justify their conclusions or explanations of, not only why people thought and felt differently from those living today, but also sometimes differently from some of their own contemporaries.

It is possible to display a teaching model on the basis of what has been said so far. The model and the examples of practice which follow depend on the notion that there is a progression in the ideas which need to be offered to pupils, and that these levels of thinking can be recognised in the responses by pupils to assignments and questions where the required response has not been taught in advance.

**Classroom practice in teaching empathy**

**Stages**

1. Information gathering; knowledge
2. Everyday empathy - problems of transferred value systems (i.e. 20th century motive, feelings and attitudes), anachronism
3. Stereotype historical empathy - substantiated or unsubstantiated
Differentiated historical empathy - substantiated or unsubstantiated

5 Ability to assimilate stereotype and in particular to distinguish the different general characteristics of the various world-views of past societies. For example, although there may not be one Elizabethan world view (stereotype), historians will speak of 'the Elizabethan world' which exhibits a universality, albeit a subtle abstraction beyond the grasp of most school students.

Notes

Sophistication within the stages

- The provisional nature of historical evidence can mean that stage (1) within the model is to be applied at all other stages - a cyclical process of reappraisal.
- The use of the historian's imagination is found within the operation of every stage.
- The teaching of an empathetic response at stages (2), (3), (4) does not necessarily mean that the ability to empathise is being taught. Teachers must guard against telling pupils how people in the past thought or felt, and then assuming that pupils who can regurgitate what the teacher has said are able to empathise.

The Bloodfeud

The questions posed in the exercise which follows on the Bloodfeud reinforce the need to expect attitudes and feelings to be different in past societies. It is a legitimate device to widen discussion by speculating on why attitudes and feelings change, and this leads succinctly into consideration of stereotype empathy eg that there is a typical and unchanging Anglo-Saxon world view. A supplementary exercise on the role of the individual can be used here.

The Bloodfeud

The tie of kinship was very important to the Anglo Saxons because it meant protection for individuals. If a free
man were killed his kin were supposed to avenge his death or force the killer and his kin to pay a wergild (man price). The wergild was the value placed on a man because of his importance eg a cniht (knight) was valued more highly than a ceorl. All kinsmen were supposed to help pay the wergild or instead join in the feud with the kinsmen of the dead man. The bloodfeud existed throughout the Saxon times, even after Viking invasions, and there are documents which still show wergild being paid in the twelfth century. Sometimes bloodfeuds led to large scale fights between families with friends joining in.

Source 1

The gang was furious. Johnson and his friends from town had hidden in the underpass and set upon Smith on his way home. The gang was going to get revenge. After the boys had laid their plans, they dashed across the street to the youth club where the others liked to meet. When they arrived Johnson and his friends weren't there. The only person in the building was Sunnar. "He'll do", said Harris, the leader of the group. "Let's get him, after all they got Smithy".

When some of the youth club members came in they were horrified to see Sunnar who was lying in a corner groaning, his eyes already swelling and his nose bleeding. They ran to fetch Mr. Lewis. When the warden heard and saw what had happened he was very angry. "I'll soon sort this out", he said.

(Reminiscences of a youth-leader, 1984)

Source 2

"It is an evil custom which has long existed in this land that, when a man has slain, his kinsmen will attack whichever of the slayer's kin is considered the finest man (even though the killing may have been done without his knowledge or wish, and without his sharing in the deed), and they will not take vengeance on the slayer, even though
Empathy means the ability to understand the different feelings, motives, beliefs and customs of past peoples and the understanding that they "ticked" quite differently to us. In the two sources we saw first how a modern conflict was carried on and settled and, in Source 2, how Anglo-Saxons and Norsemen settled a dispute by the custom of bloodfeud.

1. You would probably agree that the reaction of the rest of the youth club members in Source 1 was quite usual nowadays. Why didn't the Saxons turn to someone like a warden, or King, or other figure in authority to settle their feud?

2. If we asked a modern person to advise people how to settle legal disputes whom might they suggest?

3. Why do you think in Saxon times that families preferred to settle disputes between themselves by bloodfeud?

4. Consider your answer to question 3. The Saxons eventually gave up bloodfeud. Can you think of any reasons why this might be so? Look for clues in the sources.

5. From the list which follows choose the statement which you think best explains why peoples' attitudes, feelings and customs change.
   - Someone shows them a better way of doing things.
   - They become more civilised.
   - People travel and copy better ideas.

Can you think of other reasons to explain this change? What would you say historians need to bear in mind if they are to empathise with people in the past?
Role play can also aid the development of empathetic understanding.

The preparation of pupils and their role play enables reinforcement of the complete model (see pages 13-15).

- They gather evidence to support their role
- They highlight the differences between their role and themselves (i.e., they guard against the misapplication of everyday empathy)
- They act a stereotype
- There are sufficient stereotypes to consider the need of the historian to differentiate between different attitudes/feelings before attempting any generalisation.

Many teachers have found that active participation by pupils through improvised drama or role play can be a highly effective way of giving a real understanding of the intentions and activities of people of time past, as well as providing motivation and an opportunity for children to use language creatively.

There are a number of points which teachers should bear in mind when planning such activity.

1. The objectives of the exercise must be clear. If the hallmark of historical empathy is the understanding of the role, the drama must focus sharply on events which allow such intention and attitudes to be explored. Time and again it has been found that this has been achieved when the activity has centred round a problem. (For example, first year pupils had to consider what their actions as Anglo-Saxons might be after the battle of Edington [878]; second years as sixteenth-century monks and nuns in specific houses in East Anglia had to prepare for the fateful visit of Thomas Cromwell's Commissioners; older students grouped into family units in twentieth century Germany had to react in role to a series of national events between 1914 and 1939. Empathy was generated by getting pupils to respond to a problem or series of problems within the context of a specific period. This
approach can be contrasted with one that merely attempts to recreate the feel or atmosphere of a particular event. For example, a particularly disastrous drama lesson with first year pupils attempted to recreate the crossing of the Red Sea by the Israelites; less chaotic, but equally pointless was the re-enactment of the execution of Mary Queen of Scots. The failure of both these exercises lay in concentrating on the theatre rather than on the history.

2. Usually pupils should not be cast in the roles of major historical characters. Whenever possible they should take on minor or fictional, though possible, roles so that they are not constrained by the actuality of the person. Thus, for example, in the role play about Germany 1914-1939 one group was called Liepmann, a Jewish family, with the father a general practitioner working in Berlin, another was given the name Schmidt, a steel-working family from the Ruhr, a third were Prussian junkers from East Pomerania, the Von Stellenbergs - and so on.

3. The role play itself must be meticulously planned. The time should be divided up into a series of specific, limited tasks.

4. Pupils need to be carefully prepared before undertaking a role-play exercise. Empathy is often defined as if it were concerned with constructing a bridge between past and present. This is a fair definition and to do so is obviously an exercise of imagination. But we should stress that there is another bridge to be built - between fact and fantasy. Often this bridge is not made. Lessons can be too deep-rooted in factual details for the imagination to flourish or have insufficient factual understanding for the empathy-drama to be convincing. Preparation will consist therefore of a nicely focussed lesson in which enough data is presented which will both stimulate and nourish the imagination.
5. Teachers and pupils must be clear what the empathy product is to be. Is it the dramatic performance? Is it the group preparation? Or is a more intangible matter - the thought processes which go on in the pupils' minds before, during and after the drama? Role play can also be used to expose the problems of empathetic reconstruction. Information and evidence are likely to sustain the role or empathy to a given point but these then require further research by the pupils.

The Assessment of Empathy

A suggested hierarchy for the assessment of empathy

It has been suggested earlier that empathy is an essential part of reconstructing and explaining the past; without the ability to see the events of the past from the point of view of those who were there at the time, we can only, at best, give a narrative account of them. If this is accepted, then the whole question of the assessment of the extent of the pupils' ability to focus empathetically on the past is raised in a vital and critical way. A model for explaining and defining empathy has been suggested on pages 13-15. In the light of this model, it is possible to define levels of empathetic response for assessment purposes, bearing in mind, however, that not everything which is part of the teaching situation can be carried out in external assessment. A hierarchy for assessment, which reflects in positive terms that which the candidate understands, is essential if the idea is to be avoided that empathetic understanding is absolute. As with any other concept which can be assessed, empathy can be accepted as valid at many levels. Pupils may be encouraged to find their own level of expression of their reactions and their understanding, without any pressure to operate at a level which is not natural to them. The whole point of empathetic understanding, is that at any level it should involve genuine understanding and not a
mere 'parroted' repetition of apparently high level thinking. Consequently, it is crucial to bear in mind the different stages of development of empathetic thinking through which pupils may go, and to consider the idea that these should represent stages on the line of differentiation between candidates in an examination or internal assessment question which has empathetic understanding as its target.

1. The first glimmering of empathy can perhaps be taken as the realisation that people at the time in question did have feelings in a run-of-the-mill way. In other words, they were not cardboard cut-outs or mere two dimensional figures in a History book or in an illustration. It is unlikely, however, that this level would often be used in assessment since it is general, and, by its very nature, unrelated to specific events.

2. The first rewardable level of assessment (everyday empathy) may be when pupils are able to suggest how people at a particular time felt about a specific event. At this level, however, they ascribe their own reactions, without realising the different outlook of people at that time.

3. Beyond this, it may be possible for pupils to show their realisation that people had an attitude characteristic of their time towards a given situation (stereotype empathy). At this level, though, they would tend to think that all people had the same feelings and ideas within the perspective of the time in question.

4. Perhaps the highest realistic level for the 16+ age group is the understanding that, though it is possible to describe a collective attitude towards the given situation, there might, nevertheless, be individual variations which arise from the personality, or even from the shared humanity experienced by people from all ages, despite differences of time and culture: 'differentiated empathy'.
Types of Question

This model requires that pupils be given, or encouraged to remember, enough background detail to enable the empathetic response to be placed firmly in context. What is also necessary is for the pupil to be given the right sort of lead into an empathetic response, avoiding, if possible, questions which lead to 'bad' empathy. For example, questions of the 'Imagine you are...' variety have an unhappy record in assessing empathy in examinations. One possible approach is to face pupils with a situation which, though in a familiar context, they have possibly not met before in quite that way. This could have the effect of reducing to a minimum the production of a learned response, of encouraging pupils to think on their feet, and so to show an empathetic response which is genuine.

A refinement of this approach is to give the pupil a problem, the solution to which is the unravelling of the paradox which is the difference between the modern and an historical perspective. This can, of course, be done within an external examination or in course work; in either case, the best empathy results from a greater knowledge of the person or people concerned, bearing in mind the point discussed in Chapter II, that knowledge alone is not a sufficient condition for empathy.

One way of presenting pupils with enough contextual detail to push them in the direction of an informed empathetic response is to provide source material as part of the question. This will clearly be done in assessment of course work assignments, but it is also possible in an external examination. This type of approach can combine within it both the giving of background detail and the presentation of an unfamiliar situation in the way suggested above. An example of this type of question, presented in the form of a paradox, is given below.

So far, empathy has been seen as the understanding of the difference between the outlook and reactions of the modern
and the historical perspective. Another interpretation of empathy can also be suggested. It is possible to look for an empathetic approach to motivation, whereby pupils are asked to show their understanding of actions taken by people in the past by demonstrating how far they appreciate the reactions of a person to any given situation. An example of this can be found in a question set in the Elizabethan England section of the 1983 SCHP GCE Paper 1. This presents a paradox inasmuch as it invited the candidate to perceive the difference between the apparent of what seems and the reality of what is.

Philip of Spain proposed marriage to Elizabeth I. He also sent the Armada to invade England. How is it possible for both these events to have happened during Elizabeth's reign?

The likely responses to this question would not fit into the pattern suggested above. This is because the point of the question is to make pupils look at the intentions of an historical figure within a given situation in order to explain the outcome in terms of their understanding of the feelings and motivation of that figure. Thus, motivation is approached by means of empathy; this would support the view of empathy which sees it as a vehicle for historical understanding rather than an aim and a target in itself.

Constructing Coursework Assignments

The conclusions about the nature of empathy discussed above have considerable implications for the construction of coursework exercises. This section attempts to describe these implications and to illustrate them by looking at the construction and marking of such an exercise.

The choice of topic on which to set the exercise is important. While empathetic exercises can be set on any topic, there are some topics which may help candidates to perform as well as possible. These topics are those where
the difference between a modern perspective and that of a chosen period is considerable. Empathetic material could be taught, rote learnt, and regurgitation tested in just the same way as the causes of the First World War or the Elder Pitt's foreign policy; but this would not be a worthwhile exercise. It is more interesting when pupils are asked to fit an unknown situation within a known context, the work being largely extrapolation and inference from an existing body of data. Successful empathetic exercises of this type will most likely come from areas where the relevant information can be kept to a minimum. All pupils, and especially those of lower academic ability, will thus be able to think about the problem for themselves, rather than concentrating on mastering a body of information. The two criteria, then, against which a topic should be assessed are the distinctiveness of the historical perspective, and the ability to appreciate that perspective from a manageable, closely focussed information base.

Conclusion
The National Criteria require all history teachers of GCSE examination courses to teach their pupils to think empathetically: thus, the ability to look at events and issues from the perspective of people of the past is now an assessment objective. In this pamphlet, however, it has been argued that the development of empathetic understanding should be a key objective for the history curriculum of all pupils and that the concept of empathy is one of the principal factors which not only marks history as a distinct discipline but helps to justify its place in the core curriculum. The importance of empathy is twofold. First, it addresses the problem of the strangeness of much of the past and attempts to get to grips with it; secondly, it helps to create a habit of mind in which 'strangeness' or 'difference' is not immediately
dismissed as stupid or silly but is approached with openness and with a desire to collect evidence and improve understanding: qualities of which we are now perhaps more in need than ever before.
DRAMA EXERCISE BASED ON THE DIARIES OF MUNGO PARK.

(Extract from 'Empathy: an aim and a skill to be developed'.)

"History is about people. Inevitably the key figures will dominate, the great kings and queens, the politicians, the explorers and the discoverers but these are only key figures because they had status that distinguished them from the other figures of their times. Key figures in drama can only move in relation to their contemporaries, supported and frequently illuminated by them. Hence it follows that in a class of children there is a potential cast from which all the extras as well as the key figures can be drawn. Let us see how one teacher developed this.

A class of African children was studying the exploration of Africa and they had been introduced to Mungo Park's diaries. At one stage of his journey he is captured by 'Arabs', tied up and left for the night on the edge of the Arab camp. His horse is hobbled, his captors sit around the dying fire until they fall asleep. During the night a sandstorm blows up and in the whirling dust Mungo Park escapes.

A 'Mungo Park' was nominated, an 'Arab' Chief and his followers, also two boys who, wrapped in a sheet became the front and back of a horse. Mungo Park was attacked, bound up and dragged away to a camp where other children stood in groups representing trees. As the night deepened the trees came to life, swaying and shaking ever more violently as the storm grew in fury. Noise too, the howling of the wind, the rustling of sand and the shouts of the confused 'Arabs' all created the scene for Mungo Park to slip his bonds, untether his horse and steal quickly away."
"ASSESSING STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN HISTORY IN YEAR 10."


Source 10.

Conversation Overheard, 1982.

**Wife:** "Jim, I can't understand your Dad. I think he's going a bit funny in his retirement. He reckons things are getting bad again and he wants to take his money out of the bank and keep it at home. I suggested that, if he is going to get it out of the bank, he may as well spend it on himself and then live on the old-age pension, but he's not even keen on that!"

**Husband (Jim):** "I wonder if his attitude has anything to do with his experiences during the Depression."


Asprey, D., 1982, "What really happened at Stringybark Creek?", *Newsletter* (History Teachers' Association of New South Wales) No. 3, pp. 52-57.


Board of senior school studies (NSW), 1986, modern history syllabus.


Carson, A.S., 1980, "Two problems of educational theory", *British journal of educational studies,*


Clark, C.M.H., 1979, "Teaching Australian history", *New challenges in senior history* (HTA conference papers), April, pp. 7-17.


Coltham, J.B., 1971, "The development of thinking and the learning of history", *Historical association* TH34.


Cooper, K., 1976, Evaluation, assessment and record keeping in History, Geography and Social Science, Glasgow: Collins.


Coupe, S. & Andrews, M., 1984, Their ghosts may be heard, Australia to 1900, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.


Cranfield, C.A., 1977, "New texts for teaching the new history", Newsletter (History Teachers' Association of NSW), No. 3, pp. 24-34.
Crook, D.P., 1972, Questioning the past, St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.


Doyle, J., 1980, A model for deliberation, action and introspection, Al-TR-80 May, Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, MIT.


Dutton, P., 1984, "Drama based on actual events—accuracy and distortion", Agora (History Teachers' Association of Victoria), April, p. 16.


Fabian, S., 1983, "Year 10 historical re-enactment at Richmond High School in 1982", Agora (History Teachers' Association of Victoria), August, pp. 35-36.


Fines, J., 1981, "Educational objectives for History - ten years on", Teaching history (The Historical Association), June, pp. 8-10.


Flora, R., 1984, "What happens when a sceptical teacher uses a simulation of doubtful value?", Agora (History Teachers’ Association of Victoria), April, pp. 17-18.


Larsson, Y., 1977, "Historic concept formation in primary and secondary schools", Coping with change (History Teachers' Association of NSW), pp. 50-56.


Little, V., 1983, "What is historical imagination?", *Teaching history* (The Historical Association), No. 36, June, pp. 27-32.


Maucorps, P. H. & Bassoul, R., 1962, "Jeux de miroir et sociologie de la connaissance d'autrui", in *Cahiers intern. de sociol*.


New South Wales junior history syllabus, 1986-87, (draft circulation).

Noad, B., 1975, "The use of simulation games in the social sciences", *Social science bulletin* (for teachers in New South Wales secondary schools), No. 18, pp. 58-60.


Raban, S., 1983, "The Schools Council History project - 0 level after 1984", *Teaching history* (The Historical Association), No. 36, June, p. 36.

Reid, R. & Pickhaver, E., 1984, "He wants to be a pilot", Canberra: Canberra war memorial publications.


Rogers, P.J., 1977, "Play, enactive representation and learning", *Teaching history* (The Historical Association), No. 19, October, pp. 18-21.


Sawyer, R., 1980, *The way we were*, Adelaide: Rigby.

Secondary Schools Board NSW, 1981, "Syllabus in History years 7-10".


South Australian history curriculum committee, 1984, "History pre-testing in history years 7-10 - a rationale and model" (draft circulation).

Southern regional examinations board (Booth chairman), 1986, Empathy in history: from definition to assessment, Cambridge: Cambridge dept. of Education.


Taylor, L., 1977, "Observations arising from the conference and possible practical applications of research in historical concept formation", *Coping with change* (History Teachers' Association of NSW), pp. 41-42.

Tench, W., 1979 [facsimile], *Sydney's first four years*, Sydney: Library of Australian history.


Thompson, F., 1982, "Place, time and society 8-13. The project's view of the meaning of history today", *Teaching history* (The Historical Association), February.

Thompson, F., 1983, "Empathy: an aim and a skill to be developed", *Teaching history* (The Historical Association), No. 37, October, pp. 22-26.


Walker, W., 1977, [facsimile], *Reminiscences (personal, social and political)*, Sydney: Library of Australian History.


