2007

Sensationalism or nationalism?: Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports on East Timor crisis in 1999

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SENSATIONALISM OR NATIONALISM?
AUSTRALIAN AND INDONESIAN NEWSPAPERS REPORTS ON
EAST TIMOR CRISIS IN 1999

*A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the
requirements for the award of the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

From

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

By

ARI SANTOSO WIDODO POESPODIHARDJO, MA
(SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM AND CREATIVE WRITING)

2007
ABSTRACT

Following the tradition of Max Weber, this thesis is exploring the role of social interaction as an important part of a society. As social interactions encompass a very wide range, the focus is on the role of news in printed media (newspapers) as the part of the social construction of reality where what is defined as reality is in fact a subjective definition upon some event or matter whose Value is inherent within the society. In the definition of Peter Berger, what we know as reality is actually socially reconstructed.

News, as a reconstruction of reality presents its readers, viewers or listeners with a fractured definition of certain events. As it is a fractured representation of reality, news can only present a limited interpretation of reality. This thesis examines how Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented the crisis in East Timor during and after the referendum in August 1999. The event that follows has without doubt affected the relationships between Australia and Indonesia and has had a long term impact in the region.

But what is most important is the event has deconstructed the perceptions within Australian and Indonesian societies towards each other. By using various research methods and most importantly grounding the findings within its social contexts, this
thesis has found that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers have perceived the East Timor crisis in 1999 as a major issue and did a significant coverage accordingly. But beyond the obvious differences in the amount of coverage both Australian and Indonesian media have represented the crisis from different points of view- views that after a series of in-depth analyses, have turned out to be a reflection of how Australian and Indonesian societies perceived the issue.

This thesis found that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers reflect deeply upon their own societies in how they are representing the event. It found that Australian and Indonesian societies in turn reflect towards their own history, culture and values in viewing the East Timor crisis. The result is different perceptions are made regarding similar events in which both societies believe that what they perceived is correct.

This proved that media is an important part of the social process within a society but most importantly the power of the media actually lies within its capability in understanding its own society with its audience functioning as a mirror. What is significant is that this mirror is not a passive object but an active participant within the complex social processes where news media helps to create a socially constructed reality while at the same time being influenced by the society itself.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis is a reflection of being an Indonesian journalist for more than a decade. It finally came into its final shape with the help and support of many people. First I would like to express my deepest thanks to both of my supervisors: Dr. David Blackall and Professor Phillip Kitley whose support and belief in me has got me through the most intellectually challenging time of my life.

Then I would like to thank my mother, Anggani Hartiwi Kasran Soedono and my sister Dede Shinta Saraswati Soedono. Without their love, trust, inspiration and support, I would never have finished this thesis. Also my dearest friends and colleagues: Endang Kamajaya, Deskartes Iskandar, Wisnu Wardhana, Jo Coghlan, Joakim Eidenfalk, Georgia Lysaght, Susan Engels, Margaret Hanlon, Berto Wedhatama, Melvin Singh, Yohannes Suladji, Laurel Snelson, Leanne Robinson, Lenore Lyons, Kerry Lyon, Bob Mahoney, Andrea Poeloengan, I thank you all from the bottom of my heart. For those that I couldn't name here, you know who you are and I thank you too.

Special thanks are dedicated to my friend Kevin Adistambha, with whom many hours have been spent and whose support really helped me in dark hours. Also to Susan Walton and Richard Watson who offered their help all the way from England.

Finally I dedicate this thesis for three people: My (late) father Soedono Poespodihardjo; my (late) father in law: Suherman and my beloved wife: Indrati Kurniana Widodo Poespodihardjo, I wouldn't make it without your support. God bless you all.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction.

By the end of Twentieth century, the world's news media had thoroughly saturated the realm of daily life. The media's presence was everywhere, from the remotest part of Africa to the highest mountain in the world.

In 1992, a group of scientists and journalists from The National Geographic Society discovered an area in the Congo, Central Africa, which had never felt the presence of a human being.\(^1\) The team recorded an amazing finding – the animals on location reacted to the human presence like they had never seen one before. Accordingly the event was reported in depth in *The National Geographic* magazine.\(^2\) The modern media had finally touched one of the remotest places on earth, Ciaran Mc Cullagh described this reality:

> At the level of everyday life it has become routine and normal to encounter the media. Just as offering a cup of tea or coffee is a method of making people feel at ease, the provision of some form of media is rapidly becoming complementary to it. We accept without question the availability of newspapers in dentists' waiting rooms, bank managers' offices, the waiting rooms for job interviews, and in aeroplanes. We live in a media-saturated world, and for the most part are no longer surprised by it.\(^3\)
The news media is an inescapable reality in today’s life, particularly in a well established society such as Australia or even a diverse and developing society like that of Indonesia. Indonesia as a developing society, it seems, cannot have enough of the media. Since the fall of the New Order regime in Indonesia in May 1998, which under the Suharto regime 1964 – 1998 had imposed strict censorship on all media, by June 2000, the number of registered media (print, radio and television) had increased from 292 to 1,687 registered (print, radio and television). Though the numbers of the media surviving that period may be significantly less than registered, the issue here is that for Indonesia, the media is seen as an attractive commercial venture.

The news media, in particular their product - the news - is more than simply providing information to society. News is part of creating a sense of reality for people, providing a mirror on society. This thesis will be focusing on that concept in respect to newspaper reporting from Indonesia and Australia over a distinct period in the 1999 East Timor crisis. Before a discussion of news as realities for societies, and before analysis and comparison, there will be a scene setting discussion of the context of the role of the media in the society.

The tradition of the relationship between the news media and society is rooted in a concept in sociology; that news media, as an integral part of society, plays a functional role within that society. Media scholar Dennis McQuail stated that the relationship between the media and society has both a political and a normative or socio-cultural aspect and he defined this as:

The media constitute a separate ‘social institution’ within society, with its own rules and practices, but subject to definition and limitation by the wider society. Thus the media are ultimately dependent on society, although they have some scope for independent influence.
and they may be gaining in autonomy as their range of activity, economic significance and informal power grows. This is a potentially spiralling and self-fulfilling process, driven by ever increasing estimation of their significance by political and cultural actors.

The bottom line is the same; the news media are about sending a message to an audience and this can be very complicated and usually driven by commercial and political imperatives. The message itself has to be found, created or re-created. Then it has to pass through a complicated process within the mass media organization until it is transmitted to the audience. When the audience receives the message they will process it accordingly to fit prior knowledge. Consequently more action may take place in the form of a change in behaviour once the new information is processed in terms of the prior knowledge. This classic description by Klapper, sums up the idea of ‘active reception’:

Media do not operate on susceptible audiences. Audiences have prior social connections, prior social attitudes and prior opinions and it is through these that the material from the media was filtered and against which the validity and relevance of its content was assessed.

This media and society relationship is a complex and evolving process and as societies are inherently different, different societies and sections within society will react differently to information or ‘news’ of the same events. This thesis will focus on this aspect of the print news media – the societal relations through an extended analysis of an event that had special significance for both Australia and Indonesia: the 1999 crisis in East Timor.

This study will focus on Australian and Indonesian newspaper accounts regarding the East Timor crisis, thus the textual base of the study is all newspaper reports including ‘opinion pieces’ within the Australian and Indonesian newspapers within the period of the crisis from 1 August to 1 October 1999.
The East Timor crisis itself is defined as the time where the escalating tension due to the referendum in East Timor, which created a socio-political and security crisis in East Timor, thus affecting forever - Indonesia, Australia and the world.

This study will explore the different perspectives presented by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers. The different perspectives will be analysed within a broader context of the Australian and Indonesian societies’ perception of the crisis, as represented in the Australian and Indonesian newspaper accounts.

A hybrid research method based upon quantitative and qualitative research methods was applied to examine these news accounts. Further, the method of Grounded Theory\textsuperscript{10} will be applied to contextualise the various news accounts.

Grounded theory is a research methodology devised initially by Glaser and Strauss.\textsuperscript{11} As a research method, grounded theory has an ability to develop a theory from a series of 'normal' occurrences. Unlike traditional theoretical method, grounded theory does not present a hypothesis in the beginning, rather it builds the hypothesis along the research process, during which the hypothesis is constantly being tested until a new theory emerges. As it is a very powerful and versatile method, grounded theory will be used as the foundation methodology in analysis. Grounded theory will be described later in greater detail within the methodology section of this chapter.
1.2. Why the 1999 East Timor crisis?

The choice of the East Timor crisis in 1999, as the event for analysis through news reports from Australian and Indonesian newspapers, was due to several factors:

- The East Timor crisis in 1999 was one of the pivotal points of history in Australian Indonesian relations. The crisis brought the two nation's relations to a serious diplomatic and security crisis (Tiffen, 2001, AKSARA, 2000, Siahaan et al., 2001, Greenless and Garran, 2002).

- An important aspect of the East Timor crisis was played out through the actual reports of the news media, in particular the print news media.12

- The East Timor crisis turned out to have a long lasting impact in relevance to Australian and Indonesian societal relations. Fresh evidence of East Timor’s longevity may be seen most recently in the way East Timor is a frequent reference point. The most recent issue was when the Indonesian government expressed their disappointment over the Australian government decision on 42 refugees from Papua.13 Further, the recent 2006 intervention in East Timor by Australian troops has put the troubled spot back into the spotlight, so reinforcing the importance of the analysis as contained in this PhD.

The East Timor crisis reached beyond Australia and Indonesia. It involved the United Nations and many countries in the South East Asian region. But in this thesis, the focus will be on Australia and Indonesia and in particular, the selected newspaper reports on the crisis itself. The selected newspapers are chosen as representative of each country’s print media.
Earlier content analysis research conducted by the a non-profit AKSARA Foundation, a Jakarta-based think tank, were a foundation to the methods used in this PhD, where:

1. Selected Indonesian, Australian, British and American newspapers, and magazines, which published articles regarding East Timor within the research period, were cited.

2. The analysis was conducted by categorising the articles from each media outlet into different categories within the frame of a particular issue; that is, whether the articles were negative, positive or neutral in reporting from an Indonesian perspective.

3. The findings were tabulated and presented in tables, showing any trends.

The AKSARA Foundation research did not go beyond a simple quantitative analysis of the data. The research conducted by Hotman Siahaan followed similar steps except the newspapers analysed were all from East Java.

This thesis will take this type of analysis further by drawing on international theories regarding journalism, as well as a focus on the accepted methods of practice of Australian journalism and of Indonesian journalism. The theories emanating from this and the related research methods will be described in greater detail in the methodology section in this chapter as well as in Chapter 2. In what follows, I shall analyse the 1999 crisis in East Timor as general political context of this thesis.
1.3. Research context.

In December 1998, the Indonesian President BJ Habibie announced that he would offer two options to the East Timorese people: to remain part of Indonesia with a special autonomy, or if the people declined that offer, East Timor would cease to be part of Indonesia.

Under a special agreement with The United Nations and Portugal, it was decided that a referendum would be held under UN supervision. A special body was created – UNAMET (United Nations Missions for East Timor) and it was decided that the referendum would be held on August 30 1999.

Dennis McQuail has asserted that although there are wide ranging differences in media practice throughout the world, one common ideal is that the press should be neutral.\(^\text{18}\) It is also the case, however, that during an international incident that involves conflict, the media often seem to find it difficult to be neutral. As the American Senator Hiram Johnson said in 1917: “The first casualty when war comes, is truth”.\(^\text{19}\)

In East Timor as the preparations for the referendum were being readied, all sides (the Indonesian, the local East Timorese, the FALINTIL, the political wing of FRETILIN, the supporters of the integration and the supporters of the pro-independence movement and the press) were gearing up for their campaign to serve their own interests.\(^\text{20}\)
The political struggle for information control was not limited to the parties involved on the ground in East Timor, but reached beyond national boundaries. The AKSARA Foundation has shown that during the peak of the crisis, the international media were highly attuned to getting the right spin on the news stories (2000). For the Indonesian and Australian news media the spin and compliance with government agendas developed into a war of statements. Both media tried their best to present the view from their point of view while accusing the other of being biased.21

One example of the way partisan sentiment took over was when The Sydney Morning Herald journalist’s Lindsay Murdoch published the headline: “Stacks of bodies went up to the roof” which later was found to be unverified.22 He felt it was justified at that time claiming it was understandable journalistic practice.23

The entire place was going up in flames. We didn’t know the extent of the killings. We still don’t. When an eyewitness says she saw bodies stacked to the ceiling, I’ve just come out to the place and seen it burning, the streets are empty and anybody who goes on that street gets killed. What do you expect us to do? Not publish it? There isn’t a journalist in the world who wouldn’t publish that.24

Another extreme example is when The ABC Raphael Epstein, filing from Darwin, after fleeing East Timor with everyone else, reported falsely of severed heads on stakes, some with word ‘independence’ carved on their forehead. This ‘incident’ was also found to be false but in Australia the news itself already took effect in creating an impression of chaos, lawlessness and desperation in East Timor. This ‘impression’ contributed to the idea of an emergency situation which Australia should do something about it.
For Indonesia the situation was perceived differently. Officially, the government and its military spokesmen insisted that they had done everything they could to prevent violence. And indeed the violence was mainly conducted by pro-integration militias, many of whom were hardened fighters embedded with the military (TNI) against the rebels (who subsequently and naturally, became strong pro-independence supporters). In subsequent Indonesian inquiries the military was found to have no direct connection with the violence, though many would argue otherwise.

The Indonesian media were active in reporting events which threatened the unity of the nation. Reports of violence were published, especially in the mainstream newspapers such as Kompas or The Jakarta Post. Unlike their Australian counterparts, the Indonesian media took a different stand, which was one that appears closer to journalistic neutrality. At least this was the case until the involvement of the foreign military (in form of INTERFET).

All the factions, including the Indonesian and Australian governments, were quick to utilise the news media for their own ends. This thesis will show how the news media in both Australia and Indonesia were involved in this web of self-interest and in what could only be described as subjective reporting.

My research complements a study by the AKSARA Foundation (2000) which shows that both the Australian and Indonesian media were far from neutral in reporting the
East Timor crisis. The media (newspapers) in both countries were compromised to the extent that they were caught in the political impasse between the two countries.\textsuperscript{28}

Undoubtedly many foreign journalists were not pleased with the conduct of Indonesian government officials and members of TNI during the referendum. The Indonesian government (and its military) was widely viewed as having failed in meeting its commitments under the UN mandate.\textsuperscript{29}

The political wrangle between Indonesia and Australia erupted when Australia took the initiative on behalf of the UN in sending in a peacekeeping force to East Timor.

1.4. Historical context.

Australia has historical connections with East Timor, especially with respect to the ties created during World War 2.\textsuperscript{30} For the Australian media, East Timor was both a tragic and open-ended story. In December 1975, advancing Indonesian forces in Balibo killed five journalists who were working for the Australian media.\textsuperscript{31} This established a longstanding sense of injustice, or moral breach in the Australian media and so in the Australian public eye. Respective Australian governments from both sides of politics have exploited this moral breach in their various forms of manipulation of the Australian public. The concept of ‘moral breach’ is used deliberately here as it is understood as a key element in determining newsworthiness, in prioritising stories and in shaping the actual news story content and will be explored in detail in the analysis of news texts in Chapters four and five.\textsuperscript{32}

The Indonesian army (TNI) insisted that the journalists were killed in cross fire during a gun battle when they were taking refugees in a house.\textsuperscript{33} Many elements
within the Australian media, and the public, strongly believe the journalists were deliberately killed by the Indonesian forces (Ball & McDonald: 2000).34

The issue of the death Malcolm Rennie (Nine News Network), Tony Stewart (Channel Seven), Gary Cunningham (Channel Seven), Brian Peters (Nine News Network) and Greg Shackleton (Channel Seven) in Balibo remains a thorn to some elements within the Australian media and this structures their subsequent view towards Indonesia {McDonald, 2000 #50; Pembaruan, 1999 #20; Conboy, 2003 #8; Subroto, 1997 #41}.35 During the East Timor crisis, the issue was often in the background to stories, a shadowy reminder for the Australian public about the unresolved issue, the moral breach underlying Australian perceptions of East Timor’s relations with Indonesia.

There are other issues in respect to analysis and describing what kind of agendas are being proposed or created by the media, which in turn affect public opinion. The Chomsky theory is that the media will invariably convey certain views by using certain facts, while omitting others, and that this is often the view of those who control the media or their associates (Chomsky and Herman, 1994).

In line with Chomsky’s theory, the findings in Chapters four, five, six and seven show that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers did present certain views, or to be exact certain ways in viewing the East Timor crisis. What the newspapers did that is measurable in analysis, was to present information from certain sources while omitting or minimizing other sources. Inevitably this leaves journalism as being
likely to be seen as promoting certain issues that may emphasize certain views of society or worse, a particular a section of society who may benefit from the presentation of news in this way. As my findings show, the promotion of certain ways on viewing or comprehending the East Timor crisis in 1999 can be categorized as setting certain agendas for the public.

As stated by White\textsuperscript{36} these ‘agenda setting’ actions often were embedded within the body of news texts. Being embedded, readers are then likely to be influenced by those perceptions without realising.

In this study I employ a number of research methods, including discourse analysis within case study research. This enables me to explore the differences evident in the newspaper texts. I am questioning how these texts might reflect certain interests, and specifically, to what extent that control of the news texts impacted on the content and tone of media reports surrounding the East Timor crisis in 1999.

1.5. The Indonesian perspective.

The Indonesian media in 1999 was in transition. After decades of systematic repression by the Indonesian government, the press finally had a reprieve and their freedoms were dramatically increased. This was due to a sequence of circumstances that would eventually play out in the East Timor Crisis in the following year of 1999.
In mid-1997, a massive economic crisis hit Asia and Indonesia was not exempt. The result was millions of people suddenly lost their jobs. The national average income was slashed to almost nothing so that poverty skyrocketed. Before long, people were restless and demanding real action from government.

The Indonesian government’s reaction in dealing with people in revolt is by the use force. On May 12, 1998, a peaceful demonstration at a private University in Jakarta ended in a bloodbath. Five students were killed by unknown gunmen. This incident triggered a massive revolt, which ended in riots, lootings and lawlessness.

Faced with the mounting threat of mutiny from all ranks in the government, President Soeharto declared his resignation, passing the power to his vice-President, BJ Habibie on May 21, 1999 in line with the Indonesian constitution.

President Habibie was unique. Formally he had no real power base, except in his hometown in South Sulawesi. He came from the GOLKAR party, which was the ruling party, but he had a poor relationship with the military – the main sponsor of GOLKAR.

Habibie had spent half of his life in West Germany, studying, and later working for a leading aircraft company, *Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm*. One of the first things that Habibie did as President was to allow greater press freedom, although it wasn’t until early 1999 that he officially declared all previous press laws no longer valid,
confirming the freedom immediately by increasing the number of press licenses issued.\textsuperscript{40}

This higher degree of freedom meant the beginning of a new era for the Indonesian press and so it was bound to be contested. Since independence in 1945, the Indonesian press was systemically re-modelled into what can be defined as a developmental press model.\textsuperscript{41}

McQuail has argued that one of the main characteristics of developmental press is that it is subordinate to the efforts of developing nationhood and society.\textsuperscript{42} As the task of developing society and nation is the task of the government, then this renders the press sub-ordinate to the government.\textsuperscript{43} President Soeharto himself saw the role of the press thus:

\begin{quote}
Since it occupies such an important position, the press has an enormous impact in all sectors such as politics, the economy, the social-cultural environment whether it does or does not fulfil its role and responsibilities. A successful press will accelerate efforts to achieve national targets while a press which does not fulfil its role will no doubt delay the attainment of identified targets. It is precisely this realisation on the part of the press that has caused it to urge us to support the slogan: ‘positive interaction between the press, the government and the people’, as stated in the Main Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN – Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara).\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

By 1999, the Indonesian press was still in the process of finding its new form, re-writing the rules of the game and re-educating its members about the new role and responsibilities. This task continues today.\textsuperscript{45} During the 1999 East Timor crisis, the dilemma faced by the Indonesian press was very apparent. On the one hand there were signs that the members wanted the industry to become fully independent, while on the other hand, it cannot be denied that Indonesian pride was embedded in the status quo, the integrity and unity of the nation were at stake.
On those occasions when the Indonesian press chose to side with the Indonesian government regarding the integrity and unity of Indonesia, it meant that the press was inevitably supporting the interests of the Indonesian military. This was troubling, because over the decades the Indonesian military had been one of the main oppressors of the press.

On the other hand, choosing to side with the internationally popular view of East Timor separating from Indonesia was to be seen as in direct conflict with most Indonesian views about the integrity and unity of Indonesia as a whole. Toeti Adhitama of Media Indonesia explained:

In the case of East Timor, there indeed was a dilemma. We feel annoyed that the East Timorese want to separate from us – after we had considered them one of us for so long. But it's still hard to sit idle when we see East Timorese trembling with fear, made to squat with their hands on their head and guarded by large Australians who enthusiastically point the muzzles of their weapons at those helpless people.46

The case of the Indonesian dignity being at stake became more evident when the international pressure for intervention increased with the escalating level of violence after the referendum. Australia, and in particular the Australian media, was noted by Indonesians for its obvious highlighting of Indonesian mishaps and moral breaches. The Indonesian Ambassador for Australia at that time noted:

[I am] Simply amazed at the enthusiasm and glee in reporting our shortcomings and misfortunes.... [A lot of sensible people] are wondering, is Australia a friendly country, a neighbour, or what? .....Australians have become too intrusive, too arrogant, too boastful.47

For Indonesia, especially the general public, the reaction from Australia towards the situation in East Timor was very surprising. As explained by Ambassador Wiryono
above, such strong reaction led to a perception of cheering on Indonesia’s misfortune which was totally unexpected from Australia. It was as if Australia had turned from a close friend and ally to a total stranger who was now pointing a gun at you.

1.6. The Australian perspective.

The Australian media viewed the whole situation with a totally different view. There was a greater tendency for the Australian media to view Indonesia through what it found to criticise. This does not necessarily mean that there was a direct and conspiratorial campaign against Indonesia; rather the view was historical in respect to the Balibo five and perhaps a spin of cultural superiority in newspaper texts that were encouraged by the Howard government.

The Australian media can be defined by what Dennis McQuail stated as ‘a free press system’. Within the free press system, the media are basically free to present their view in any way within the law that is afforded all citizens. It is held that the media also should be free from any form of censorship and oppression.

The culture of the Australian media places much emphasis on ‘being straightforward’ and giving direct criticism. As Alan Knight stated:

Australian journalists learn industry practices and priorities within a Western professional culture that tolerates if not encourages criticism of governments, corporations and prominent personalities. They usually endorse the first article of the code of professional conduct for the International Federation of Journalists, which states that ‘Respect for the truth and for the right of the public to the truth is the first duty of the journalists’.
Coming from such a background, Australian journalists are often at odds in particular with local officials and governments in Asia. Asian journalists, officials and government (including Indonesia) have different backgrounds, culture and professional expectations as described earlier.

Foreign correspondents quickly discovered, furthermore, that it is frequently impossible to ring an organisation’s press spokesperson for instant comments and analysis on the topic issue of the day, as they would expect in their home countries (Kakialatu 1994:71).

Press secretaries often feel insecure about making frank on-the-spot statements to journalists, tending 'to be ignorant of decisions and issues or deliberately evasive' (Beutler 1982:28).

Foreign correspondents find that they gain information from such departments (such as the Indonesian Armed Forces) on 'an hoc basis' with the success of their interactions largely dependent on their personal relations with individuals in the institutions (Schwarz 1995).

Barry Lowe (2000) found that the negative reporting of Indonesia has been apparent for decades. He asserts that the Australian media often emphasise conflict, human rights abuses and poverty rather than providing a positive outlook of a country.

Even more troubling was the tendency for the Australian press to describe the Indonesian press as biased, tied in with the TNI and only representing certain kinds of news.

But their construction of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines is weighted heavily on the downside of life in the life of those countries. It describes these countries as appearing to falter in their quest for modernity, prosperity and brutality, danger and disappointment. The negative news focus may be partly been result of habit. Insurgency, disasters, repressive politicians and sleaze have been loud themes in International news media coverage of South East Asia for decades. It seems difficult for media gate keepers to refocus on other issues. The innate conservatism of news production practice determines that they keep doing things the traditional way, until they are confronted with compelling reasons to look for a new issue.

From that constructed and conservative public view, it seems that the Australian media stood to be relatively easily influenced by government, despite the idea that it was supposedly of a developed and free nature.
During WW 2, for the first time, Australia was directly threatened militarily and the threat came from Asia (Japan). In 1960 the rising waves of Communism brought new fears and so Australia was thrown into the Vietnam War, which ended when Communist forces took over the Republic of South Vietnam.

The significance of these two conflicts was that they reinforced the fear that Australia is always under threat from Asia. This was underlined by the view that Australia was a European bastion in the middle of a vast mass of Asian cultures and this was at odds with the predominant culture within Australia.\(^{56}\)

The result of this is long lasting and even today, there are heated debates about Australia’s position in the world and in the region in particular. While there are major differences between Asia and Australia in culture, values and politics, there will always be a level of distrust and fear, in particular from the Australian side in respect to the issues of location, a long way from its historical, constitutional and cultural origins in England.

To some extent the mass media content represents dominant social values and framing of events \{Chomsky, 1994 \#1; Damien Kingsbury, 2000 \#28; Lichtenberg, 1990 \#39; McCullagh, 2002 \#31; McQuail, 2001 \#9\}. News discourse that frames Australia’s position in the region as being vulnerable to terrorists and as ‘dangerous’ for Australians abroad, reinforces ideas that Australia is isolated from its origins and is alone or even ‘constantly under threat’. Therefore, in analysing media performance and discourse in this PhD, care has been taken to read Australian news discourse
against a historical tendency for Australians and Australia to perceive themselves as ‘the other’ in the Asian region.\textsuperscript{57}

1.7. Research questions.

There are two questions to be examined in detail within this thesis. First, how have the Indonesian and Australian press represented the East Timor conflict? The second research question is can we understand the representations as symbolic constructs of different perceptions of the political realities, reflecting and serving different political, economic and ideological interests?

Referring again to the research model by Arie Soesilo (Soesilo and Washburn, 1994) and based on the findings of my previous research, I am formulating several hypothesis as for examination in this thesis:

- Despite being part of a supportive Developmental Press, the Indonesian press demonstrated a tendency to hold an unspecific view on the East Timor Crisis.
- The Australian media on the other hand, known to be part of a Free Press System, appeared to be working in ways unlike a Free Press System. It worked instead, in close response to carefully designed media releases, leaks and spin from sources like the office of the Prime Minister, John Howard, and his ministers.\textsuperscript{58}
- The Indonesian media as part of a supportive Developmental Press, during the East Timor Crisis of 1999, showed a tendency to be relatively independent of the government.\textsuperscript{59}
- The reports on the East Timor Crisis within the Australian media tended to serve the political, economic and ideological interests of the power elite within Australian society.\textsuperscript{60}

- As if it was acting on behalf of the US in the region,\textsuperscript{61} Australia’s relations with Indonesia throughout the crisis presented a difficult case for journalism and diplomacy.

1.8. Rationale and theoretical framework

For this study, it was necessary to present a wide range of methodologies and significant writers in the field. As argued before, this thesis will cover a wide range of issues as it will analyse newspapers from two different countries; Australia and Indonesia – very much of two different countries with different cultures, histories and values. The analysis, therefore, will have to take into account the two different societies with everything that comes with it.

Due to the complexity outlined above and before, it was concluded that a single tool of analysis would not be ideal as the wide range of areas being analysed requires a more advanced approach. As the aim of the thesis is to understand the different accounts produced by Australian and Indonesian newspapers over the same issue – the East Timor crisis, then it is an imperative that the methodology applied here is flexible and able to cover wide range of issues and type of data.
The problem of known and traditional methodologies is that they tend to be strict in one singular point of view in the task of viewing specific events. This is in particular true to an extent with a positivist approach. Nevertheless, the positivist approach does have a strong point in its ability to replicate, thus fulfilling the requirements of exact science in determining what constitutes known facts. Facts can be defined in a simple manner as something that existed, can be measured and in term of scientific findings must be able to be replicated within the specific research parameters in which it was designed.

The problem in examining social occurrences is that often, social occurrence is not something that can be measured or replicated in specific terms or conditions. This issue has been a long standing argument within the discipline of sociology which is considered to be the foundation of social sciences, even until today. It is not an irony that August Comte, the founder of the term – sociology - believed that sociology should rigidly follow the exact sciences’ basic rules of what is constituted as ‘fact’. But over the time and during the development of sociology, it is accepted that not all social occurrences are measurable in an exact manner, nor can they be replicated in specific ways by using specific method.

The issue for this thesis is that it should not be a debate about the usage or which methodology, but about understanding the issue – why the Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented the East Timor crisis in 1999 in very different ways. The representations are so obviously different that even in using a quantitative method, as
the case for the AKSARA Foundation, the research was able to present the stark differences without difficulty. This leads to the questioning of the respective journalistic practices in both Australia and Indonesia, and to what extent they differ and how and why they differ and what is the purpose or reasons for such differences.

It is the position of this thesis then to define a methodology that can best examine the issue in great detail and understand the great complexity within the issue. The details to be examined here are the texts of news reports regarding East Timor crisis within the set period of August 1 – October 1, 1999. Even by limiting the scope of the study to the time frame above it still resulted in more than a thousand articles. To analyse those articles in full to minute detail was impossible within the limited time and space of this thesis. Thus a further method was needed and so it was decided that a method of sampling would be used.

The sampling method most appropriate in this case is purposive sampling. It was done by choosing purposively certain news reports as samples of the issue being analysed. Further discussion about the methodology and in particular this sampling method will be explained in the methodology section. But the aim of purposive sampling is to find valid and representative sample of the Australian and Indonesian newspapers regarding the East Timor crisis.

Once the samples were finally selected, then came the task of analysing them. As mentioned above finding an appropriate methodology is very difficult as there are many methodologies that will proclaim themselves as the most appropriate method of
This was not helped by the tendency within the scientific community to prove oneself as right by way of proving the other as wrong.

Exacting methods used by the AKSARA Foundation have clearly presented the issue by using a quantitative method, thus following the positivist approach, but that analysis is yet to explain further, in depth, rather than imply showing the trend of the news.

Analysing the whole text of articles published within the research period, thus using a qualitative approach such as textual or content analysis is prohibited by time and scope of the articles (more than 1000 articles). Thus it was decided that the appropriate methodology best be deployed here should be one that is able to analyse the issue in a very clear manner and yet manage to capture the complexity within the issue itself.

A possible approach as a research method is by using discourse analysis. Discourse analysis itself is defined in general as a general term for a number of approaches in analysing written, spoken or signed language use. The Discourse analysis is a useful method for this study. It can show interactions between various actors or elements within the process of news making. It can also show the relations between media (including the journalists that write the news stories) with their respondents and their audiences. This method is also able to show the relationships between the media and the society where they are exist. The combination of events, skill of the journalists to
present the news events and the social-political condition/context of the society that received the news can be a very powerful formula for analysing high impact news.

High impact news is defined here as news stories, which ideally should be based upon actual news events, that due to their nature, their ‘newsworthiness’, their timeliness and possibly subject matter, can create a strong impact upon a particular society.

A more recent example is the TIME magazine reports on the alleged massacre in Haditha, Iraq by a group of US Marines. The incident happened November 2005, was reported in January by the TIME magazine. Later TIME magazine brought their findings (as reported by them) to the attention of the US military.

The initial response from the US military was contradicting the TIME magazine reports, but finally in February 2006, the US military announced that they were conducting an investigation over the incident. The news itself by June 2006 was a major headline in the US mainstream media and in particular brought on a strongly negative perception of the US military and the Marines in particular.

The discourse analysis itself is still a very general concept. It encompass various methods of analysis covering various issues such as: Text grammar (or 'discourse grammar'), Rhetoric, Stylistics (linguistics), Interactional sociolinguistics, Ethnography of communication, Pragmatics, particularly speech act theory, Conversation analysis, Variation analysis and Applied linguistics. Understanding that
discourse analysis is still a very general concept, a new and more specific method was needed.

Discourse analysis has been promoted by many prominent scholars such as Michael Foucault, Alessandro Duranti, Teun van Dijk and Norman Fairclough. The latter two are among those often associated with the method. Both like other discourse analysis scholars, share the same basis that is linguistic, but in term of the focus of the study they have different focus.

For this research, I am not going to use the methods from either Van Dijk or Fairclough. Indeed this research will focus on the contextual analysis between written news and its social - cultural context, which is similar with the focus of Van Dijk and Fairclough. Nevertheless without diminishing the importance of the two scholars, I am going to employ methods proposed by Robert Entman, Peter White and Gadi Wolfsfeld.

My reason is because I believe that the three scholars above have more suitable and appropriate method of analysis to study the differences and contexts between Australian and Indonesian newspapers reporting on East Timor crisis in 1999. Robert Entman method was designed to analyze frame within the print media reports. His method was deemed to be one of the most systematic while still being inductive like other discourse analysis methods.
Peter White’s method is based on understanding the power behind the news. White proposed a comprehensive understanding from what makes the news to the power within the grammar of the news. Being a linguist like Van Dijk, White proposed a method that is much based on the linguistic of the news while connecting it with a broader social context (like other discourse analysis methods). Discussion regarding Peter White’s model of analysis will be available in Chapter 2.

Gadi Wolfsfeld proposed a rather different method. Instead of focusing mainly into the language of the news, Wolfsfeld method is focusing more into the context of the news. Wolfsfeld believes that news is part of a much bigger process such as political conflicts. During political conflicts, news and news media play a very important role that presenting to the public the views of the warring parties. The aim of the parties is to attract as much as possible public attention and support, from which they generated their political power. A more detailed explanation of White’s model is available on Chapter 2.

1.9. Methodology.

The methodology section in this chapter is acting as an introductory section to the overall methodology used in this thesis. A further and more thorough discussion over the theoretical foundations and methodologies will be found in Chapter 2.
Two main methods of study were ultimately chosen within a generally applied technique of discourse analysis. The main assumption is that systemic cultural practices, though hidden to casual observation, are confirmed through various kinds of discourse found in documents of a formal nature. They might be legal, administrative or mass media generated discourses; but they reflect many of the ideologies and ethical positions of those in power and those who produced them.

The particular focus of this PhD study period relates to the Australian context and the Indonesian context. Specific definition of the research methodologies applied here is best described as a blend of the following:

1. Case study research - applied to a select number of examples where the subsequent "logging" of the issues being examined were recorded in the form of Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports (as the primary sources) as well as reflective journal entries after obtaining primary documents, sometimes of a privileged nature.

2. Action research and participatory action research - two educational research methodologies that allow me, as educator (who was educated in Australia in the Journalism discipline) and journalist practitioner (photojournalist and writer), to set up a project around research questions on journalistic practice, to keep records of the progress, and reflect upon and respond to, those findings and any theories evolving from them over the period of study.
1.10. Case study research.

Case study research involves the use of analytical induction. Applied on its own, it has been shown to be a defective research method. When cases like print based news and news features are selected for discourse analysis and used in conjunction with other methods, then case study research has value. The method employs an exhaustive examination of cases to draw universal causal generalizations within the systems being studied. After an appropriate number of cases are observed and have been found to satisfy the hypothesis formulated before the study, then a universal causal relationship can be established.

This case study research, then, is supported by dual methodologies (i) participant observation, discourse analysis of media reports, conferences and case documents in public domains and (ii) interviews with experts and key personnel and stakeholders.

1.11. Action research.

The action research method was used in this PhD to develop theoretical principles and guidelines. In simple terms, action research is a collection of research methodologies, which are most suited to this particular study. The research
methodologies simultaneously pursue action (or modification and response) and research (or conception). In most of its forms, a recurring process is used that interchanges between action and critical reflection enacts this process.

In line with Grounded Theory methodologies, this method is ideal for me as a journalism lecturer/practitioner in researching and analysing events that were closely related to me as a professional while also relating to me through personal experience. In this thesis I was looking for a research method that allows me to analyse a process that was interacting between action and critical reflection.

In later stages, while continuously refining methods, data and interpretation (which is what Grounded theory is all about), new understanding and knowledge is developed from the outcome of the earlier stages.

Media reports from both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers regarding East Timor in 1999 are essentially part of a long process of reporting about East Timor, which goes back a long way prior to the time of the Indonesian invasion in 1975. As a continuing process, action research builds a better understanding through the creation of a new theory that emerges through the continuous process of analytical stages regarding the issue. In the majority of the cases, action research is qualitative and participative, where the researcher is involved. The research method used here then is an extended version of action research – and is categorically known as ‘participatory action research’.
1.12. Participatory action research.

Participatory action research, like action research, is a broad collection of scholarly activities involving community, solidarity and commitment: “all are necessary to carry the arguments to confront the psychologizing and socializing of research and method and their engagement in social life”.

As it covers such a broad spectrum of analysis, this method is best deemed to be suitable for my research here in understanding the Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports regarding the East Timor crisis in 1999.

In this thesis, I believe that participatory action research (PAR) is more suitable than action research as PAR can provide recognition that all research methodologies are political in character. This is appropriate to journalism and particularly to the media reporting of the East Timor crisis in 1999.

Journalists starting their work believing that they are doing ‘objective’ reporting will rarely acknowledge the power of differences within the reports they produce. A sample in this context would be the reports from Lindsay Murdoch with the headlines: ‘Stacks of bodies went to the roof’. The story turned out to be false, but Lindsay Murdoch vehemently defended his action by saying that there will be no editor in the world who would not publish such stories (even if it later turned out to be false).

Writer David Hamilton says that there are at least three democratic propositions that have been adopted by the participatory action research movement. The first is that the
twenty first century democracies should empower all citizens, not only those of the already privileged elite. Secondly, he says that research of any kind in the humanities, arts and the liberal social sciences, is never morally or politically disinterested, political positions always present themselves. And thirdly, he argues that maintaining a separation and a distance between research and practice "is psychologically, socially, and economically inefficient".81

The view above is in line with the classic theory from C. Wright Mills, that social research and theory is always influenced by the imaginations of certain political ethics.82 This theory is rooted in the theory of Max Weber, a prominent sociologist, where Weber asserted that there is a big difference between 'objective' facts with 'subjective' interpretation by humans (including social researchers) as members of their society.83

In agreement with the egalitarianism inherent in participatory action research as well as the support from Max Weber's theory above, suggests the case for adopting this particular method in analysing the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports on the East Timor crisis in 1999. Mc Taggart reinforces the argument:

What counts as research is not merely a matter of elegant argument about methodology; social research is also about the politics of having arguments heard, a precursor to being understood and accepted. Because participatory action researchers sought to redefine the often privileged relation of the researcher to the researched, the vindication of participatory action research required more than the validity of arguments to achieve acceptance by the research establishments it confronted and by the people it claimed to support.84

Within participatory action research, a thorough and multi dimensional ethical discourse allows discussion, argument and resolution through a non-confrontational dialogue. The multi dimensional ethical discourse should recognise that pre-exiting
legitimacy of people, epistemology, legal philosophy, cultures, values and international and civil and human rights. Participatory research is a systematic and yet a collaborative approach ideal in collecting evidence in these ways and generally, arriving at a theory of action.

This process is ideal for industrial reflection, dialogue, decision and outcome analysis, the results of which can be deployed back into the next stage.

Participatory action research is not simply problem solving. It involves problem posing, not just problem solving. It does not start from a view of ‘problems’ as pathologies. It sees values and plans problematized by work in the real world and by the study of the culture and nature of work by people themselves. It is motivated by a quest to improve and understand the world by changing it and learning how to improve it from the effects of the changes made.85

One important thing to note is that somebody else outside the system does not conduct participatory action research. Rather, my position as a working (Indonesian) journalist during the East Timor crisis in 1999 means the participatory research method can be applied to the daily practices (in a professional line of work) in order to improve that professional practice. As such, participatory action research reduces the perception held by some that they must take positions they feel they need to defend.

1.13. Developing theory.

One basic rule learned as a student of sociology studying sociological theories is all the theories of sociology are created reflecting the various factors that influenced the person that created theory itself. Thus one was taught to understand sociological theories as a reflection upon the social, political and economical conditions (among
other factors) of the day when the theory was created. The theory of Marx for instance was 'framed' for us as a reflection of the life and times of Karl Marx, a brilliant thinker who lived and died in poverty. This social condition reflected in his thought was therefore mainly about the struggle of the lower classes against the 'bourgeois' class.

As presented earlier, the issue of Australian and Indonesian newspapers reporting of the East Timor crisis in 1999 represents a complex issue. First it involves two different countries with different cultures, values and norms. Second, it involves press organizations bound by different press systems. Third, except for the book by Damien Kingsbury et al and few others, not much comparative discussion is available in regard to how the Australian press compared with their Indonesian counterparts. Fourth, both Australian and Indonesian newspapers and their journalists believed that they did the best they could in providing the public (or the society) with the best possible news reports according to their standard (of the day).

Bearing in mind the issues above, as stated previously, it was decided that the best possible way in formulating theory on the workings of the Australian and Indonesian newspaper reporting and how they might be improved, was to use methodologies based upon Grounded Theory. As stated earlier, this was a methodology capable in analysing and theorizing the issue, which could cover both the empirical aspects and the subjective aspects simultaneously.
The reality in East Timor during those fateful months of August to October 1999 was essentially empirical. It was simply a fact that it happened at that time. The issue now was how was the event being interpreted by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers, which in reality were a collection of people working to a specific goal, which was often driven by political and always commercial imperatives.

Grounded theory was founded by Glaser and Strauss87 and it became clear that it was the only methodology that was able to give a theoretical foundation to create an understanding of such complex and multi dimensional issues. Grounded Theory also provided a solid theoretical foundation for a more applicable research action as used in this thesis - namely participatory action research.

The process of developing a theory in journalism practice should cover as many factors as possible including the personal experiences of individual journalists. In reality, journalism today still relies very much on an individual journalist’s capabilities that were developed through the course of time, in other words, through experience.

This argument is supported with the fact that most of the news media professionals (journalists) do not have a formal or tertiary educated journalism background. Thus it was an imperative that the professional conduct of the modern news media, such as Australian and Indonesian newspapers, should be understood from the perspective of individual people who were involved with the process of reporting.
My experience as a working journalist during and after the East Timor crisis will become one of the analytical factors from a particular perspective. My professional experience as well as my personal experience, both as journalistic educator and a journalism student in Australia prior to the crisis in 1999, plays strongly in the process. Indeed a question that might arise is about objectivity, but as argued earlier the position of this thesis is not about finding an ‘objective judgement’ but rather trying to find a subjective understanding.

It is the aim of this thesis that the emerging theory is of one that will be able to take into account the social factors such as cultures, values and history that often were not present in conventional journalistic analysis. To achieve this goal, participatory action research as applied throughout this thesis was then to be extended to an appropriate process for the development of theory through grounded theory.

Newspaper reporting is essentially a process with a context in both production and management, and as an educator I needed to consider these and other conceptual issues. Consequently I decided to follow an approach based upon ‘grounded theory’. This method seemed able to allow the combination of all the contexts – allowing my professional print journalist experience, my years as a journalistic educator and my exposure to Australian journalism education, conventions and culture, to allow me in developing a theory on comparative journalism practice between the Australian and Indonesian newspapers.

Grounded theory (GT) is a general research method (most often associated with qualitative research) for social sciences developed by the sociologists Barney Glaser (b. 1930) and Anselm Strauss (1916-1996). Grounded theory is unique as it can be deployed in various situations from hospital management to classroom research, The strong point of grounded theory is its ability to build a new understanding (resulting in a creation of a theory) from a collection of cases that do not seem to be related at first scrutiny. As such, grounded theory is most suitable for this thesis where a new understanding was being developed from the analysis of Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports on the East Timor crisis in 1999. To avoid repetition, a comprehensive discussion regarding Grounded Theory will be presented in the Chapter 2.

1.15. Research as subjective interpretations.

Johannes Muller described in the introduction of Peter Berger’s book Pyramid of Human Sacrifice that there is an eternal conflict with the social sciences regarding what can be constituted as ‘facts’. Some social scientists have insisted upon the usage of an exact scientific (empirical) method and standard as the benchmark, thus often referred to as the ‘positivist school. On the other hand, there are those who believed that social events are by their nature a subjective event. The event itself is an objective fact but how the society interprets the ‘objective’ fact itself that made the process is subjective. Both lines of thought have their supporters with the positivists
school led by scholars like August Comte. In the other camp, Max Weber is considered as a leading figure.

What becomes the issue of this thesis and in line with the above discussion is how the Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented the East Timor crisis in 1999, in such a different manner. The different manner of representation is actually a reflection of the different perception of the crisis and the underlying culture and politics. Thus the issue here is about the politics of perception, how two different societies perceived and then represented similar issues and event through their news media, finally arriving at completely different accounts.

As described earlier, this thesis will rely heavily upon my own experience as a working journalist in Indonesia during the East Timor crisis (1999). This consequently gives rise the question about objectivity, as the researcher here becomes a central point of references in analysis. Such a position of research would not be possible if I was following the positivist line of thought. Within the positivist point of view, the researcher should limit their involvement to a minimum. Any breaches should be considered as being un-ethical and unscientific, thus contaminating the finding(s).

But my position as researcher here is clear as I see the researcher as an inseparable part of the analysis. As the researcher I am central to the research and so the subsequent thesis. Such a stance best serves the aim of this thesis, to develop an understanding of the journalism around the East Timor crisis in 1999. Max Weber, C
Wright Mills and Peter Berger are in keeping with the position presented in this thesis - that there should be a clear, transparent definition and delineation between the objective action and facts and the subjective interpretation. Within this line of thought, a social researcher will never be able to be truly objective as everyone is a product of their own society and language and thus they will always perceive events according to their subjective perception.

The key issue then is not about the ‘objectivity’ of the perception in absolute terms, rather the social researcher should admit when they are being subjective. When the social researcher is able to do so, they should create more ‘objective’ observation and data collection and in doing so, clearly define where their subjectivity lies.

As a working journalist in Jakarta at the time of the East Timor crisis (1999), I had a first hand experience on how the Indonesian newspaper worked and so I reacted accordingly during the time. I will therefore apply my ‘subjective’ experience in explaining and deconstructing the Indonesian newspaper reports on the East Timor crisis. On the other hand, between July 1997 and July 1998, I was educated in Australia in the journalism field in journalistic method and practice, theory, ethics and the law from the Australian, and perhaps, ‘western’ perspective. That enabled me to experience and learn about Australian media and culture.

Being an active participant, my subjective perception will be visible throughout the thesis. Galen Rowell, a photographer described the power of participatory action research: humans are always reflecting upon things that we see as visual stimulus to
what we already know.93 What happens later is a passive response to the stimuli presented by our surroundings. Instead of actively questioning what we saw in front of us, we often passively accept as something that we already see or know and so process accordingly.94 My position as social researcher is to transform the common news reports into something that is sociologically and journalistically meaningful. This kind of participatory action research expanded upon through grounded theory is a method I believe that will be able to put journalistic events into a new perspective on the East Timor crisis of 1999.

1.16. Overview of the structure of this thesis.

This chapter has explained that the significance of the East Timor crisis in 1999 in comprehending print journalism practice in Australia and Indonesia is of critical importance – especially as foreign peacekeepers, predominantly from Australia are again serving in East Timor in this year of 2006. For the crisis in 1999 Australian and Indonesian newspapers depicted the enfolding events in a markedly different manner of presentation with different emphasis on certain aspects. These differences in reporting ranged from the political standing of both the Australian and Indonesian governments to the direct accounts of the unfolding violence. This leads to the imperative to question why the news media of Australia and Indonesia, who claimed to be professional news organizations, were so diverse in their accounts of the same events.
In the next chapters these issues will be examined in more detail. The analysis will be undertaken through using both quantitative and qualitative techniques with emphasis on a framing methodology. Chapter two will continue to detail relevant theories. Chapter three will provide a general overview regarding the Australian and Indonesian print press and how they stand differently. Chapter four and five will centre on the framing analysis of selected incidents. Chapter six and seven provide further analysis using quantitative analysis and content analysis. Chapter eight will sum up and serve as the conclusion to the thesis.
CHAPTER 2
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

2.1. Theoretical perspective – key constructs.

This chapter is divided into two sections and outlines the theory and methodology used in this research. The methodology section leads off from the brief comments on methodology mentioned in the first chapter and describes and discusses the approach, concepts and methods to be applied in more detail than was provided in Chapter 1.

The theory section contains a literature review regarding the theory used and the theory itself. The event in East Timor in 1999 that defined the East Timor crisis as such was a social event. It was an event happening in one society, East Timor, but quickly engulfed the nearest countries and the world. How can one explain a simple choice of accepting or rejecting an offer of autonomy that turned into something totally different where violence was the norm and hundreds of thousands people were forced to leave their homes and livelihood.

Max Weber argues that events that happen in society follow certain rules but nothing about it is exact. He links this to the basic nature of humans of being inquisitive and strongly independent in choosing their actions but also at the same time dependent
upon their society to provide them with their basic needs such as identity and means to survive. The role of the social scientist is to observe the events that unfold in daily life. Harste and Mortensen described Weber's position in this way:

The social reality is real and the person the researcher must stand in an observing position. As a normal “everyday” person and as part of scientific institutions, he participates in changing and developing the social reality. But research is subject to reality perspective. Researchers must take cognisance of society instead of trying to change it.

Thus as described in Chapter 1, the position of the researcher in this thesis is of an observer looking back to the events that have unfolded in East Timor in 1999 and the impact the events had on both Australian and Indonesian societies and in particular, their media. As the researcher, I am applying the concept from Max Weber described above combined with the theory from Peter Berger (to be explained more below), of a participatory, or grounded observer.

The position I took here is based on the fact that I am part of Indonesian society, in particular the press corp. I was actively working as journalist during the East Timor crisis. But I was also in a unique position to earn my formal journalism education in Australia, from 1997 – 1998. Therefore, I was a witness in both societies, experiencing first hand the way both societies evolved and functioned. Indeed, my basic upbringing in Indonesia will allow me to understand more about Indonesian society, but I believe my experience of living and studying in Australia (back in 1997, as well as between 2001 and 2006) will help understand more about Australian society and in particular its press.

The theory that I will show and later use is to reflect on my position outlined above; I will refer back to Max Weber's theory regarding society and the theories from Berger
regarding the society and what constitutes ‘reality’. Critics have often declared that the problem with social science is that it is too unpredictable. Indeed, sociology was first developed by August Comte as a replica of ‘exact’ science in understanding society. The debate still continues today. I remember the time I was a sociology student in the University of Indonesia (1988 – 1996), and the emphasis of my school was to present our arguments with strong empirical evidence, and to do this, we were strongly advised to use quantitative methods such as statistical analysis.

In the case of East Timor crisis however, I felt that much of the explanation should reflect the understanding of differences between Australian and Indonesian societies. The case studies in Chapter 4, regarding the death of Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes has shown us that the issue is far from an exact perspective. Instead we have two different societies arguing strongly about the issue. As the foundations of the perspectives are inherently different, it should not be surprising that the findings are different too.

Taking off from the basic premise that we are dealing with two different societies that tried to understand the same issue, the methodology selected and applied that seemed most appropriate was case study research and participatory action research supported by the Grounded Theory method. The initial discussion can be read in the methodology section in Chapter 1. With that in mind, I begin with these positions:

- The Australian and Indonesian society are two different societies with different histories, cultures and values;
• In order to understand the different perspectives presented by their newspapers regarding East Timor crisis, we have to understand the context of the perspectives from both the Australian and Indonesian sides;

• The process of understanding includes understanding the history of the two countries: the history of their press and how the relationship between Australia and Indonesia has evolved, with particular relation to the press;

• As we are dealing with delicate social symbols here, it is best to use methodologies that allow the issues to be analysed within their contexts. It is essential that the method should not force the data to fit into any particular theory or concept;

• The researcher, as mentioned in Chapter 1 and in line with the theory by Weber and Berger below, has a central role in analysing and explaining the data and the findings. The researcher here will play an active participatory role – acting as a guide in taking the readers through the journey to understand the East Timor crisis from both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers’ points of view.

The argument of this thesis is that the news reports from Australian and Indonesian newspapers do not simply report news. The news reports create a sense of realism to what was happening in East Timor within the context of Australian and Indonesian societies. This is evident from the mood within Indonesia immediately after the announcement of the referendum in East Timor.
I remember that I was awoken by the phone call from my editor in Singapore at 6AM (Jakarta time) on September 4th, 1999. He said that the East Timorese had decided to reject the Indonesian offer to be part of the Indonesian nation but with special autonomy. This meant that East Timor would cease to be part of Indonesia. My editor wanted to have an article to be published that day about what Indonesians felt about the result of the referendum. Immediately, I called a few people. Every single Indonesian that I spoke to expressed their surprise, including those who used to serve in the Indonesian military. But one thing was quite apparent: there were mixed feelings of relief that a burden had been removed, and a hope that the East Timorese people would have made the best choice for their future.103

But the East Timor problem was a problem that did not want to go away. Almost immediately we saw and read news reports about how East Timor had descended into chaos. It was sad indeed, but the whole of Indonesia was also in chaos at that time. Food rationing was common and even in some areas in Jakarta, people had to line up to get basic needs like rice. Simple food ingredients such as chillies were becoming very expensive, creating a sudden urge by some of my friends to start businesses selling chillies. Suddenly, there were these reports about the riots and people running amok in East Timor. Frankly it was not a big deal for most Indonesians at that time. Riots and lawlessness were the norm of the day even in Jakarta.104

The turning point as far I remember was the day I saw the picture of Australian troops with their tanks on the front page of Kompas daily, sometime in September.105 The caption declared the readiness of the Australian troops to enter East Timor to 'save
the East Timorese'. As I came to my office at *The Indonesian Observer*, the Indonesian staff were very evidently upset, and the question on everyone's minds was: is Australia is going to invade East Timor?\textsuperscript{106}

From then on, East Timor was no distant reality. Suddenly everybody started to talk about how Indonesia has provided so much, in particular infrastructure in East Timor for more than twenty years. Stories of how thousands of Indonesian soldiers were killed in East Timor fighting the rebel group FRETILIN were revived.

The big issue then was the news about how the international world, drummed up by Australia, was pressuring Indonesia. In our perspective at that time, as bad as it was, we thought Indonesia should be given time and chance to solve the problem. We had no other choice than to accept our leader's statements as they were the leaders. But one thing that was seriously misrepresented at that time was Indonesia's determination to solve the situation.

1998 was probably the darkest time of Indonesia's history in my living memory. I remember walking around in a burned out mall in Jakarta. Walking inside, was the fresh smell of charcoal just like in a camping ground but this was no camping ground. This used to be a busy mall selling electronics.\textsuperscript{107} I remember talking with fellow Jakarta residents about how in May 1998 there was almost no law in the streets.\textsuperscript{108} Everyone was in fear and almost all males had to stay out all night armed with whatever they had to protect their homes from rioters' attacks. The feared security
But gradually things changed for the better. I also remember how I cherished so much reading the news that a car robber on the Jakarta – Bogor highway was shot dead by patrolling Marines. Finally, I thought, law and order would prevail. Indeed it took us some time, but gradually, the troops and police started to take over the streets in Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia. Life began to return to normal again and I could travel between cities without much fear of being caught up in riots. But it took time. This then was the reality of living in Jakarta during a time when the government was in the process of turbulent change, and the effects of the economic crisis were oppressive. This, and these social, political and cultural realities coloured Indonesian citizens’ outlook in 1998 leading up to 1999, but these realities were very far from the experience of Australians at the same time.

2.2. The social construction of reality.

The concept of the social construction of reality has its roots with the sociological theorist Herbert Blumer. Blumer argues that society is structured by interconnected interactions between the members of the society. During the interaction, a series of symbols are exchanged. Indeed the process of exchanging socially defined symbols becomes the essence of the process of interactions and led to his theory, symbolic
interactionism. Harste and Mortenson described the importance of Blumer theory as follows:\textsuperscript{110}

Blumer repeatedly takes exception to the view that social interaction simply expresses or represents the participating actor's inner condition and motives or an external cultural or structural order. In other words Blumer sees social interaction as fundamental formative process.\textsuperscript{111}

For Blumer the process of social interaction represents the bigger social order that surrounds and controls the members of the societies in their actions. Each member of the society's behaviour is constantly based upon the interpretation of the action by other members of the society and this process happens continuously.\textsuperscript{112} Thus what one does is based upon how others might interpret one's actions. By way of example, let us consider why an act of vandalism such as graffiti almost always happens in public areas. Based on Blumer's theory the reason is because the perpetrator or the actor realises that their action will be looked down on by other members of society. But part of the reason for the act in first place is its role as a symbol of defiance, a public statement or a protest against common norms. Understood in this way it makes perfect sense that the act of graffiti occupies public space.

Blumer's theory was later expanded into two well known theories by two leading sociologists: the theory of self by Erving Goffmann\textsuperscript{113} and the theory of the social construction of reality by Peter Berger.\textsuperscript{114} These two theories were representations of the world at that particular time, the 1960's, when the Vietnam War was raging and the Cold War was at its height. The world was facing enormous challenges to change, with the new generation born after World War II challenging the world hegemony.
For this generation, the perception that conflict should end in war was no longer the default position.

Erving Goffmann’s theory focused on the concept of self, an entity within every person but shaped by their surroundings and life experiences. Self is the identity of the person, on one hand being shaped by the society where they are but on the other hand, also shaped by the personal experiences of the individual. The centre of the theory is the concept that everybody is presenting their identity in a conscious and deliberate manner. A key concept for Goffman was ‘impression management’, that is, managing the impression we hope others will get of us. It’s like a theatre where we see what the directors and actors wanted us to see through the props, make-up and acting (Goffman, 1969, Goffman, 1997, Goffman, 2002, Harste and Mortensen, 2000).

The theory of social construction of reality was published by Thomas Luckmann and Peter L. Berger in 1966. Like Goffman’s theory, it is based on the theory of symbolic interactionism of Herbert Blumer. But the focus of the theory is different from Goffman. Luckmann and Berger focus on the concept of knowledge and the impact of what we know to be ‘fact’ or ‘knowledge’. Goffman instead was focusing on the process of interaction in relation to the concept of ‘self’.

Luckmann and Berger argue that what the society accepts as ‘knowledge’ or ‘reality’ is in fact what is defined by society as ‘reality’. So reality here is referring to
something abstract and subjective in the sense of being socially or intersubjectively constructed. Put another way, reality is not simply 'there:

It follows from this that what is perceived as reality in one society may not be considered as reality in other society. Berger and Luckmann suggest further that to understand the relativity of the realities here it is necessary to understand the context of how different ideas and practices are understood in different social settings. One simple example is that in Australia, in answering a question it is considered acceptable to put up the left hand instead of the right hand. This gesture is considered to be impolite and even rude in Indonesia as left hand is associated with activities that are considered improper to be shown in public.¹²¹

Thus as part of global industry, news is not merely a passing of information but something more significant. News is now a product of global industry¹²² and even at local level, news is still considered to be a promising business. A good illustration of the currency of news comes from Indonesia where immediately after the fall of the New Order regime, hundreds of news corporations in the form of radio stations, publications and (in much smaller numbers) television stations emerged. In 1999, press licenses jumped from 292 licences for press corporations to 1,687. Of that number, according to the data from the Indonesian Ministry of Information, 812 were licenses for new publications.¹²³

A study by Vhang, Wang and Chen argues that news play an important role in defining the 'reality' within a society.¹²⁴ Vhang et al argues that what is known as
'reality' especially in a remote setting is never given and generally comes from news media. Furthermore, they argue that 'social reality' is product of interaction between the society’s objective reality and a society’s owns pragmatic and social needs.

What constitutes the reality of a society, especially in a remote setting, is never given and generally comes from the news media (Lippmann, 1922). Social reality is a product of the interaction between the objective reality and a society's own pragmatic and social needs (Cohen, Adoni, & Bantz, 1990). The end result—verbal rituals and other crude forms of record in primitive societies and news in modern societies—is, in Boulding's words, "the transcript of society" (1956, p. 65). Within the boundaries and operational logic of the recording medium, this transcript takes note of events, issues, values, ideas, images, personalities, institutions, and experiences in and about a society, the totality of which becomes social knowledge that is relevant and useful to its members (e.g., Bernstein, 1976). In other words, the content and validity of social knowledge are ultimately tied to the general interests and common experience in society.

Within that context, news is not only presenting the society with specific information but also the frame of how the news fits in within the knowledge or perspectives of the society. Vhang et al further described that news has been long recognized as the source of knowledge. News, they argue, shape the communal consciousness of the society.

News as a form of knowledge has been recognized to be socially constructed and distributed. Park (1955) said that news is "one of the earliest and most elementary forms of knowledge," a way of seeing and thinking about the social world (p. 84). The organization and circulation of that knowledge help to shape "the individual and collective consciousness" of a society about its everyday life and the more remote context of their lives (McQuail, 1972, p. 13). To paraphrase Barnes (1988), how a society acts, whether nationally or internationally, depends upon what it knows before it makes a move. To function effectively and efficiently, a society needs to make sense of its current practices and potential action.

The works of Tuchman actually is expanding the initial works of Berger and Luckmann by adding the aspect of news as definer of social reality. Vhang et al argues that although Berger and Luckmann did not discuss news as social reality, the concept and methodology is applicable. Vhang et al describes:

Although Berger and Luckmann (1966) did not discuss how news may become part of the foundations of knowledge in everyday life, the essence of their treatise—the social construction of reality—can be applied, both theoretically and methodologically, to the field of news (e.g.,
With a close link between the media and a ruling elite comes the risk that the interests of the ruling elite can influence the way the media reports the news. In this context, the social construction of reality produced by the media represents the reality that the ruling elite wanted to promote. This issue can be more complicated if the press system within a particular society allows collusion between media and government, such as in a developmental press system. But even if the press system is advocating for an independent media, the political situation may influence the orientation of the media in particular when general consensus among the society, government and media is similar. When the general consensus is high, there is a high possibility that the media will closely follow the government’s lines.

Returning to the discussion regarding news and social construction of reality, we can see now that news is part of socially defined reality. The reality is defined subjectively by each society and presented as such. But as we have also discussed, there is much complexity surrounding this concept. In the next section we are going to try to understand the relations between the media as an institution with the creation and representation of socially defined realities.

2. 3. Media and the social construction of reality.
In today’s world the mass media, in particular television, has become what Castells called “The Cultural Epicenter” of our world. Such is the saturation of the mass media that our daily life is surrounded with the presence of mass media. Ciaran McCullagh described how the media is now very much embedded in our life:

We accept without question the availability of newspapers in dentists’ waiting rooms, bank managers’ offices, the waiting rooms for job interviews, and in aeroplanes. We live in a media-saturated world, and for the most part are no longer surprised by it.

The impact of such media saturation within our daily life is that news, as media products in whatever form it takes, has become part of our daily life. In Indonesia for instance, it is a common thing as an ‘icebreaker’ for people who have just met, to talk to each other about the hottest issue in the media – mostly about economy or politics or recently regarding the various disasters that have struck Indonesia.

News in my opinion is the essence of the media today, including during the time of the East Timor crisis in 1999. News is particularly important when general members of the society do not have direct access to the event {McCullagh, 2002 #31; Cottle, c2003 #18}. In a situation such as East Timor 1999, news fulfills the society’s need for information. However, news is giving the society more than just information. It also constructs a sense of reality which is why we need to understand the dynamics of the social construction of reality in relation to news.

As part of the ‘social construction of reality’ process, news is part of an on-going process within a society. Jaap Van Ginneken argues that society always had certain types of professional people engaged in producing what was considered as the ‘true knowledge’ about the real world. These ‘professional’ people such as clergymen,
politicians or community leaders have now been usurped to an extent, by a professional and commercial/industrial institution – the mass media. But whatever the form or institution that had the role of dispersing information, one thing remains similar: the information passed is not simply information but a part of the sense of reality for society.

From a sociological point of view, the media is the information provider for the society. Media circulates information critical to proper social functioning. A classic case would be how the media gives detailed information about major politicians before a general election. Such information is deemed necessary in order for the people to make an ‘informed’ choice during the election. But as much as the media is doing a noble job here, there are limitations. Media have been known to perceive themselves as a ‘window of the world’ – clean and undistorted.¹⁴⁸

There are two views on this. The first is that of journalists and the media generally. This characterises the media as the ‘window on the world’. Its job is to provide us with a window through which we can see out into the world. Like the glass in the window it should be clear and must not distort or refract what we are looking at; it must allow us to see the world as the world really is.¹⁴⁹

In reality, the media has a very limited capacity and capability in providing information. Therefore a process of selection will be inevitable. The question is which information will be circulated and which will be left out? How does the media decide which information should be published?

Media sociologists examining this issue came to the conclusion that media effectively acts as a ‘gatekeeper’. Editors constantly check and review which information is to be passed on and which should be withheld. By acting as a gatekeeper, the media
effectively becomes the controller of the knowledge and understanding that the people have (McCullagh, 2002).

2. 4. Further theoretical considerations

2. 4. 1. The Lasswell communication model.

The traditional communication model coming from this perspective focused on the process of who said what, through what and to whom. Ciaran McCullagh explains:

The Mass Media are simply the means through which content, whether fact or fiction is produced by organizations and transmitted to and received by an audience. As such the process of mass communication involves the three fundamental factors: content, organisation and audience.  

Within this tradition, the mass media is perceived to be an objective and neutral participant within the communication process. As a neutral participant, the press does not involve itself in whatever consequences that may arise from its reports. Nevertheless the press is subject to ‘influences’ from their surroundings - in particular the social and political system of the society in which it operates.

The pioneer of this model is Harold Lasswell (Lasswell, 1948). Lasswell was the first person who clearly defined the role of communication in society which he saw as essential for the maintenance of the society. In Lasswell’s theory it is clear that communication has an essential role of maintaining the society (Lasswell, 1948). Diagram 1 shows the main relationships in Lasswell’s model.
This model perceived the media as a simple message carrier that carries the message from the message creator (sources) to its recipients (receiver). Yet experts have argued that this is overly simplistic. \(^{156}\)

One example of how experts criticized the model may be found in the work of John Thompson. \(^{157}\) Although Thompson is basically a follower of the communication model above he argues that in order to analyze the media, three dimensions need to be analyzed: the content of media messages, the production and transmission of messages, and the reception of media messages. In the first dimension, Thompson argues that, being part of the society, it needs to be seen whether or not messages passed by the media reflect the society itself. In this context what needs to be analyzed is how the stories (media content) are put together, selected and framed.
In the second dimension, Thompson argues that being part of large and complex commercial bureaucracies, the structure and the environment of the media (wherever they operate) needs to be critically analysed. Factors such as structure and environment may have significant impact on the way the media operates. The third dimension, reception of media messages by the audiences, refers to how members of the society as the audience accept, absorb and later react towards media contents. In John Thompson’s terms, we are concerned with how audiences “… make sense of media messages and incorporate them into their daily lives”.

Thompson’s theory illustrates how the original linear approach of the Lasswell model may have missed the complexity of the media and its environment. This theory shows that an alternative model is needed if a more thorough understanding is desired.

2. 4. 2. An alternative communication model.

After looking at the ‘basic’ communication model above, we are confronted with a fact that the linear sender-receiver concept is too simplistic. This thesis aims to answer the following question: how can we understand the different perspectives of Australian and Indonesian newspapers, and how did these different perspectives shape reporting on East Timor crisis in 1999? Following the communication model above literally will make it very difficult to answer these research questions. John Thompson has given a clear illustration that in reality there are various factors that need to be addressed. In other words, it is actually a very complex affair to understand the media’s function and role in society.
Dennis McQuail has stated that the media are subject to control from outside the media itself. The media has its own goals, values and norms.

The simple picture of a 'two-step' (or multiple) process of mediated contact with reality is complicated by the fact that mass media are not completely free agents in relation to the rest of the society. They are subject to formal and informal control by the very institutions that have an interest of their own in shaping public perceptions of reality. The media are themselves an institution with their own goals, rules, conventions and mechanisms of control. Their objectives do not necessarily coincide with the primary goals of the society, nor even with the aim of relaying some objective 'truth' about reality.\footnote{158}

This view is also supported by McCullagh who argues that social reality is very much shaped by what the media deliver to the society (McCullagh, 2002). The ability to 'selectively select' and circulate information to the society is where the real power of the media lies:

This argument contends that our images and knowledge of social reality are formed and shaped by the images and information that the media deliver to us. If these images and information are selective and partial, then our images and information will also be selective and partial. Thus the power of the media is the power to define our sense of social reality of the society and the world we live in; they achieve this through control over the information that they present to us.\footnote{159}

Westley and Maclean\footnote{160}, Thompson\footnote{161}, McCullagh\footnote{162} and McQuail\footnote{163} have argued that the previous model is too simple and does not reflect the complexity of reality. In order to reflect the condition of the society better, a new communication model needs to be drawn. Here a model based on the developed version of Lasswell's model is adopted.

This communication model, though largely based on Lasswell's model, incorporates the criticisms and refinements made over the years regarding the original model. The new model will have to acknowledge the complexity of the society and the media environment - something that was largely neglected in Lasswell's original model. In
regards to the earlier communication model, the model used in this research can be described by reference to the diagram below:

Diagram 2.
The Alternative model.

In the diagram above, all aspects of the communication process: sources, media and receivers are interconnected. Another significant point is that each player is trying to influence the others. This links to McQuail’s view above (McQuail, 2001) where McQuail argues that media is part of the society and yet it may actively pursue a goal of its own and reinforce a different values than of the society itself.

Before Dennis McQuail, the theory of ‘information mediation’ or ‘mediation of reality’ has been described by Westley and MacLean. While Westley and MacLean essentially follow the linear communication model created by Lasswell they refined
the model. The refinement here is in terms of acknowledging the complexity the
society in which the media operates. Westley asserted that messages are started from
events or ‘voices’ within the society which then go through channels or
communicators - in this case the media. The mediated message is then received by the
audience.

Diagram 2 (above) shows a simplified model of Westley and MacLean’s model. In
the diagram, it is clear that although it follows the linear model of Lasswell, it
acknowledges that the whole process is not unidirectional. In the new model, it is
acknowledged that each party is trying to influence the other. The result of such a
process is that the message received will not be the result of single source. Instead it
maybe a compilation of various sources which includes the media itself.

Dennis McQuail argues that media constitutes a separate ‘social institution’ within
society, with its own rules and practices, but subject to definition and limitation by
the wider society.165

Thus the media are ultimately dependent on the society, although they have some scope for
independent influence and may be gaining in autonomy as their range of activity, economic
significance and informal power grows. This is a potentially spiralling and self fulfilling
process, driven by ever-increasing estimation of their significance by political and cultural
actors.166

2. 4. 3. The Gatekeeper and Primary definer theory

The Gate Keeper model is a metaphor where the journalist as the ‘gatekeeper’ simply
decides which pieces of prefabricated news will allowed through the gate.170
'Although this term has been around for some time, it is still valid and provides a handy if not altogether appropriate metaphor for the relation of news organisations to news product'.

The history of the term of 'Gatekeeper' goes back in 1950 when studies were conducted in American news organisations on how the news organisations produce news products. The term ‘gatekeeper’ was coined by social psychologist Kurt Lewin. The term was later applied by several social scientists into journalism. Joseph Straubhaar and Robert LaRose described the concept by reference to Wilbur Schramm’s work as follows:

In Wilbur Schramm's heyday, from the late 1940s to the early 1980s, mass media were produced by large, multilayered media corporations, where an elite corps of authoritative media commentators and professional producers acted as gatekeepers, deciding what the audience should receive and thereby serving an agenda-setting function. The editors and publishers, recognising their own power, were aware of themselves as shapers of public opinion and popular taste.

The main criticism about the 'gatekeeper' metaphor is that it simplifies the role of journalists and editors to a mechanical process of choosing what and which information is fit to be publicised. Though still relevant today, the metaphor does not critically analyse the kind of materials it actually passes. Thus, the critics are suggesting that the 'gatekeeper' model/metaphor oversimplifies the process of news production to a bureaucratic routine, production goals and impersonal relations within the newsroom.

But there is more to the role of journalists/editors in the 'gatekeeper' model. The journalists/editor role involves more than simply choosing which news is fit to print –
it involves decisions about what kind messages that the society can receive. In a way the journalists/editor becomes the ‘handler’ of the society.

Another weakness of the ‘Gatekeeper’ theory is the fact that the theory has been around for a long time. Since inception, many experts have argues against it (as it was perceived to be outdated, or tried to create a more advanced model based from it. Others tried to seek a different understanding how media and society interacts among those are Stuart Hall and Ciaran McCullagh.

Stuart Hall argues that media and society are interacting in such a way that from these interactions, the society perceived the meaning of the information presented by media. Hall believes that the media audiences do not simply accept what was being presented to them, instead the audiences are actively engaged in a decoding process. Within this process, the audiences are creating a subjective meaning of the information they received based on their experience, culture or believes.

Although the audience plays an important role in this communication process, a more pivotal role is played by the media itself. What the media do is actually giving the stimulus to which the society can react to. Without the stimulus from the media, there is nothing to give meaning to. As such media are actually acting as the definer of the meaning by directing the society towards specific points where meanings were derived.
Being a definer of meaning which translated here as the socially constructed reality, the media acted as primary definer of reality. Again, indeed the society will deconstruct the meaning of the information within the media based on the culture but it is the media who bring up which information that is considered to worthy to be deconstruct by the society. Within this context, media professionals such as journalists or the editors, are constantly redefine the knowledge of the society.

Journalists and their editors are constantly figuring, searching and presenting information that they see fit for their society. Such action results in the constant production of meaning, based upon the information presented. As the journalists and their editors are the major producers of information within the media, they become the primary definer of reality for the society. Just like what Galen Rowell refers previously that photographer captures and presented the visual image that we see based on their perception. Thus what we see in a photograph apart from our perception is the perception presented by the photographer.

Ciaran McCullagh supports Hall’s theory above in her book: Media Power. McCullagh took Hall’s concept further by stating media today, is without doubt the primary definers of reality for the society. There is almost no society today that is not influenced by the media. Media according to McCullagh, has become the major source of information and as such provides the society with the media’s interpretations of what is happening. There is simply, no escape in today’s society from media influences.
Referring back to the Westley and MacLean model\textsuperscript{186}, the media also actively select whose views they circulate:\textsuperscript{187}

Rather they relay to a potential environment, or they give access to the views and voices of some of those (such as advocates of opinions, advertisers, performers and writers) who want to reach a wider public.\textsuperscript{188}

This is where this thesis stands: the media is not a stand alone entity. It is part of the society and everything in it. It is part of an ongoing process within the society. In discussing the gatekeeper concept, it is worth to looking at an almost similar concept: ‘agenda setting’.

\textbf{2. 4. 4. The agenda setting theory.}

In the agenda setting theory, the media directly or indirectly direct the attention and meaning of the information that is passed on by emphasising a specific angle or aspect. Thus the agenda setting theory can be understood as related to ‘framing’ theory and methodology which is important for this thesis.

Gatekeeper theory differs with agenda setting theory in terms of what is emphasized. Gatekeeper theory begins with the assumption that the media actively selects what should be passed on. Agenda setting, although also acknowledging the selective nature of the media, emphasizes the way the media direct what people should think about.
Dennis McQuail describes agenda setting in this way:

[The] Process by which the relative attention given to items or issues in news coverage influences the rank order of public awareness of issues and attribution of significance. As an extension, effects on public policy may occur.¹⁹³

Various experts argue that with such power to create ‘reality’ in this way, the media can easily manipulate public opinion (McQuail, 2001, McCullagh, 2002, McCombs and Shaw, 1972, Edelman, 1988, Entman, 1991, Chomsky and Herman, 1994, Knightley, 2003, Davis, 1990). The argument is that the media has almost direct access in creating ‘social reality’. Therefore media can be used to manipulate the public by creating a specific representation of ‘social reality’ that conforms to the interest of a specific groups or elements within the society.

From the agenda setting theory point of view, news as the product of mass media is not a neutral object. News actively directs people’s attention, creating a specific impression of ‘reality’. Therefore to understand why media from two different countries such as Australia and Indonesia can present the same story differently, we have look into how they present their news and what news they present.

2. 4. 5. Framing.

In Chapter 1, the issue of framing was noted briefly. Framing is a key concept in this thesis and will be described in detail in the coming methodology section.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless it is important to address the issue of framing here in relation to the theoretical context.
This thesis aims to explain why Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the East Timor crisis differently. Part of the explanation may be related to differences in the press systems within the two countries. Nevertheless it is also argued that the difference is also caused by the nature of media itself which systematically selects the information to be passed on (gate keeper) and actively promotes a specific angle/point of view (agenda setting).

Framing is closely linked to the agenda setting theory. Framing can systematically analyze the context of certain issues and explain in detail how different presentations can actually represent different perspectives even when based on the same facts.

'Frames' are basically the perspective of how a specific issue is being presented. Various experts have defined 'frames' and its method, 'framing,' in different ways but the basic idea is still same. It is about how a single issue may be presented in a specific manner within a specific background (Entman, 1991, Entman, 1993, Gitlin, 1980, Edelman, 1988, Mander, 1999, Rachlin, 1988, Bennet and Paletz, 1994, Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Soesilo and Washburn, 1994).

They are the persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual (Gitlin, 1980). They enable audiences to locate, perceive, identify and label the information that is coming at them about the nature of the social world (Goffman, 1974).

Through framing, the hidden meaning within specific stories can be analyzed. Meaning, or to be specific, the 'hidden meaning' can be understood as part of the 'social construction of reality'. We may not realize it but the (framed) meaning is
there, creating a view of the world as the media sees fit. We as the audience tend not to see that the media has carefully embedded the frame within the text. This thesis aims to examine carefully the salient meaning of the frames existing within Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports regarding East Timor crisis in 1999.

Media frames as suggested before, are not clearly visible. Frames are often hidden behind the narrative forms of the news reports (White, 2004, White, 1997, Entman, 1991, Entman, 1993, Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Goffman, 1974). To analyse the frames is to go behind the narrative forms and outline the hidden meanings and ideology within news reports. This can be done by carefully analysing the way the text was written, presented and the bigger context of the news itself. As Wolfsfeld notes, in political contests such as in the East Timor crisis, the contest is part of a larger context.\(^{199}\)

The notion of context is important: it serves to remind us that the transactions between the news media and political antagonists never take place within a political vacuum.\(^{200}\)

The real power of frames lies in their ability to relate meaning/s to the public. Though the term 'public' is universal, it is not so within the concept of frames.\(^{201}\) Frames become meaningful only if they can be understood by their recipients. For frames to be understood by the recipients, the creator of the frames (media, political power etc) has to base the frames within specific cultural values or norms. In other words, frames only work if they can be understood by the society. Not just any society but the specific society in which or for which the frames are developed.\(^{202}\)

2. 4. 6. The Press and the Construction of Meaning.
Before we discuss how to analyze news from Australia and Indonesia regarding East Timor's crisis in 1999, we have to look into what actually is the reality presented by the media. Gadi Wolfsfeld\textsuperscript{203} argues that the definition by Davis\textsuperscript{204} is the best description:

Social construction of reality theory is grounded on the premise that we live in a fundamentally ambiguous social world - a world which persons, objects and actions have no inherent or essential meaning. If meaning is not inherent, then it must be created - imposed on action, events or things through human action. But action is necessarily situated in a specific place and time. The meaning imposed is limited by and relative to the context in which meaning is generated. Moreover because action in situations is inevitably structured by groups that dominate those situations, those groups enjoy an inherent advantage in determining the meaning derived from action in situations.\textsuperscript{205}

Davis' concept above is the central idea of this thesis, that the media create a sense of 'reality' for the society. The ‘reality’ here is based upon the ‘meaning’ of signs being communicated. The signs or content of the communication itself are not autonomous nor value free objects.

Framing derives from the argument that the media is not simply reporting events (news) as they are.\textsuperscript{206} Within each media report, there is also a specific perspective that is being passed on. Media is presenting more than just facts, they are actually presenting their own interpretation of the facts.\textsuperscript{207} The media interpretation of whatever is being reported is often elusive and disguised within the reports. The main point is that the ‘frame’ or the interpretation is there. As Davis stated, frames come as an interpretation as the meaning of what is being presented is not inherent.\textsuperscript{208} It is up to the presenter and the reader to create the interpretation. Nevertheless, the presenter here enjoys a relative freedom and advantages in determining the meaning of the action.\textsuperscript{209}
Gitlin described frames as; ‘persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation and presentation of selection, emphasis and exclusion by which symbol-handlers routinely organize, discourse whether verbal or visual’. This concept again, reinforced the idea here that frames are part of an interactive process. The creator of the frames did not create the frames based out of nothing at all. Instead frames were created from what the creator believes will be well understood by the readers.

Erving Goffman argues that frames enable audiences to; ‘locate, perceive, identify and label the information that is coming at them about the nature of the social world’. Basically frames should help us understand better what is being reported. But in reality, as Davis said, frames are used within the political process where certain ideas are being promoted as the meaning of the specific actions. In this process, certain parties are given more advantages as they have more freedom and power to define the attributed meaning of specific actions or events.

A simple example is the way Indonesian flag is being perceived. When I grew up in the 1980’s, I remember that the convention in schools and everywhere in Indonesia was that the red and white the colours of the Indonesian flag – based on the colour; must not touch the ground. Our flag is sacred as it symbolizes the death of thousands possibly hundred of thousands of Indonesian freedom fighters. It also symbolizes our determination and pride in being able to take and defend our independence through war. In this context, it was the Indonesian government at the time (New Order regime) who reinforced the Indonesian flag as a sacred symbol. Being the ruling elite,
the New Order regime was able to frame the flag in a special way for the Indonesian people.

Going back to Davis’ concept, frames here function as a ‘construction of reality’. What the society understands (from the media reports) is actually a kind of ‘reality’ that the media wants the society to see. But the media here is only one part of a very complex issue. Indeed media can create and promote frames, but the media may promote frames that come from outside the media organisation itself. Chapter 6 and 7 of this thesis will show how media can be influenced by its sources in promoting specific frames.

In order for a frame or a particular construction of events to work effectively, it has to be well understood by the audiences. Therefore, effective frame creators (media) thrive on the skills of presenting their frames in ways that the meaning will be understood by the audience. Frames will not work if they are based upon things (such as values) alien to the society itself. This is due to the basic nature of the frame itself – it is part of social interaction. Interaction here requires that the other party understands what is being exchanged in a communicative sense. If the interaction or communicative exchange does not happen, then the frame itself will be useless.

Understanding the nature of how the media works, it is understandable that each media will do whatever they see as fit to connect to their audiences. In Chapter 1 and later in Chapter 4, the case of Sanders Thoenes has clearly illustrated how media portrayed one single event from different perspectives. The media from Australia and
Indonesia gave their own interpretation regarding the incident. For Australian newspapers, the issue was about history, culture and emergency situations. For Indonesian newspapers, the incident was about a criminal incident.

The impact of different perspectives is a continuation of what Davis described. Different framing will create a different interpretation of the 'reality. In the Thoenes case, Australian and Indonesian newspapers perceived his death differently. The perception here is derived from the reports, thus it is about what we interpret of what was reported in the newspapers. But we have to remember that there are two societies involved here: Australia and Indonesia. Therefore we have to look at what happened when two societies interpreted the same event differently.

2.4.7. The press and the cross cultural struggle over meaning.

The press is an integral part of society (McCullagh, 2002, McQuail, 2001). Social constructionists believe that the press helps to create an image of reality for the society members {Van Ginneken, 1998 #29; Berkowitz, 1997 #72; Wolfsfeld, 1997 #86; Goffman, 1974 #91; Gieber, 1964 #76; Cottle, c2003 #18; Schudson, 1997 #73; McCullagh, 2002 #31}. In social constructionist theory, news can be meaningful if the message it conveys can be understood by its audience. Wolfsfeld argues that as events have no inherent meaning, then the meaning should constructed through social process. Journalists fit the events to the already available frames. The press, Wolfsfeld argues, is always looking for something fit to preconceived images and not the other way around.
Events are a stimulus to the entire social constructing process. Journalists understand very well that people react differently to different stimuli. Therefore, the process of narrative is a cultural one in which journalists place the events of the day within a meaningful context.\textsuperscript{216}

In reaching its audiences, the press is bound to what it knows – its own society, its own audiences. Every media is trying to reach specific audiences within a specific society.

Within a political conflict where there are two or more parties involved, each is trying to influence the public more than their competitors. The main means to reach that goal is through the media.\textsuperscript{217} Media is the arena where the warring parties compete for a political victory. In a political conflict involving two different nations such as in the East Timor crisis, it is inevitable that each contender will have to look for support within their domestic base. Drawing on Wolfsfeld, I will show that the political contenders have to look for different frames in order to win political support for their cause.

Different frames used by the contenders are essential in their effort to communicate with their audiences. In this case, the Australian and Indonesian governments and press tried vigorously to present their views to Australian and Indonesian audiences. Each side tried to paint its side positively in order to gain support.
But gaining support in this situation is not a straightforward matter. McQuail\textsuperscript{218} has described earlier that Australia and Indonesia have two different political and press systems. Each society has a different history and they have different social and cultural systems. The challenge for both the Australian and Indonesian press then is to frame the political conflict using frames that may be understood by their own audiences. It is the aim of this research to look what perspectives were used during the East Timor crisis.

2. 5. Methodology.

As described earlier, this research aims to understand the different perspectives within Australian and Indonesian newspapers which shaped their East Timor Crisis reporting in 1999. The basis of the analysis in this thesis will be newspaper reports on East Timor during the crisis. There are four newspapers from Indonesia and two newspapers from Australia that will be analysed. All were chosen as they are deemed representative of different aspect/groups within their society as well as their standing in their country’s media market.

The time frame of the ‘Crisis’ here is defined from August 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1999 until October 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1999. It begins with the official preparation of the referendum until the time INTERFET formally took over control of East Timor from the Indonesian military. But that time frame yields more than 2000 articles representing various frames and each frame will required significant amount of time and space in order to thoroughly
analyse them. So, as stated in Chapter 1, the analysis will be conducted upon a sample of articles.

The sample articles will then be analysed with emphasis upon the written text in order to analyse the salient frames embedded within those articles. The rationale to analyse the text is as what has been stated earlier, namely that frames are embedded within the way the news reports were presented – the written report. Thus to analyse the frame is to analyse the written text.

The sample articles are chosen using purposive method, meaning the articles are chosen deliberately as they fulfilled certain criteria. The criteria relied on here are:

- They represent a specific issue that was reported widely (at least by three Indonesian newspapers and by all Australian newspapers);
- The issue appeared to be constructed differently by Australian and Indonesian newspapers.

Based on these criteria, two issues have been short listed for close analysis: the death of Sanders Thoenes and the issue of possible border crossings by INTERFET troops. Sander Thoenes’s death was selected because as shown in Chapter 1, the case was able to show the distinction between Australian and Indonesian perspectives as it was evident within the news reports. The issue of border crossing by INTERFET was chosen not just because it reveals different perspectives but it also resonates with deeper issues within the East Timor crisis.
The method of analysing the texts of the sample articles will be based on the approach by Entman\textsuperscript{219}, Peter White\textsuperscript{220} and Wolfsfeld\textsuperscript{221}. The rationale is that in order to create a thorough understanding of the frames promoted within the context of a political contest between Australia and Indonesia, no single method is deemed suitable. The issue of the East Timor crisis in 1999 is a very complex issue, related to but not limited to: the history of East Timor; the political history and situation of Australia and Indonesia from 1975 to 1999\textsuperscript{222}; the social condition of Australia and Indonesia prior and during East Timor crisis in 1999; and the political hegemony surrounding the East Timor crisis in 1999.

I deemed the three methods chosen above as most suitable for analysing the text as they provide ways of analysing different aspects of frames. Used in conjunction with each other, the three methods can complement each other instead of overlapping or negating each other.

As stated before, each method is going to focus on different aspects of frame analysis. The Entman method is used here as it has the most definite or systematic method in analysing frames. Entman's method is also the most quantitative method compared to the other methods. Other methods such as Peter White's media discourse analysis\textsuperscript{223} will be used as cross methods. Peter White is regarded as the leading expert in language analysis in analysing frames in news reports. In fact, White is also the founder of the newsworthiness rating system that is currently being taught in the University of Wollongong. White's method is geared towards systematic analysis of the salient meaning within the language used in the text of news reports. Wolfsfeld is
used to give this research more ‘depth’ in analysis as Wolfsfeld is geared towards ‘contextual’ analysis of the news reports. Wolfsfeld’s method is not specifically analysing the text or languages but instead giving the reports context within the societies related.

Apart from the three analyses above, as stated in Chapter 1, this thesis will also employ grounded theory analysis as a global method. This means that I will use grounded theory analysis as the general way to reflect on, explain and analyse the studies as a foundation to the other methods employed here. Thus grounded theory will be used constantly over the course of the analysis.

The rationale of the usage of grounded theory is that grounded theory is the method I deemed most suitable to weave all different kind methods of analysis together in the context of this research. Grounded theory is able to allow the data to speak for itself without forcing it to fit into specific theory, unlike other methods of analysis. I shall explain the grounded theory method later in this chapter. Below is the description of each method.

2.5.1. Robert Entman approach.

Entman stated that critical textual choices in frame stories can be revealed by comparing media narratives. Unless narratives are compared, frames are difficult to detect fully and reliably. This due to the fact that many of the framing devices can be appear ‘natural’ choice of wordings.
Entman described his methodology for analyzing frames through a series of aspects.\textsuperscript{227} The aspects, five in all, do not necessarily have to feature in each article. Also it is not necessary that for the aspects to be equally important.

The aspects are:\textsuperscript{228}

1. Size judgements. In this thesis it will be referred to as the relative importance of news. It refers to the size of the related articles in term of words.

2. Agency. The usage by the media of certain words and images to suggest how and where responsibility of an event being reported should be placed.

3. Identification. The usage by the media of certain words and images that encourage or discourage identification with those most directly involved in the media story.

4. Categorisation. The different way in which media label events or issues.

5. Generalisation. The degree to which the media generalise.

2.5.2. The Peter White approach.

Peter White uses a similar but different approach than Entman. White advocates analysis of the language of the news. In particular White argues that emphasis on certain aspect of the reports and the way language or words are used can create a specific message. White asserted that using his method, hidden meanings within the messages can be deciphered, thus presenting the reader (for newspaper readers) with a new understanding of what the news actually talks about.
The main premise of White’s method is that within ‘hard news’ or daily news that we see in newspapers, magazines or any other media, lie hidden ideological objectives.

White argues that most of the time the public perceives hard news or other common news as simply a collection of facts related to a specific events. Hard news in particular is perceived to be impartial, objective and apolitical. In reality news reports can be seen as a way to construct a model of social order. The model of social order presented, White argues, is not a specific one. Like in the society itself, values, norms and cultures are changing all the time. To understand the social order promoted within specific news is to understand the social order of the day. A key concept of White’s method is that society is always in a balance or at least always trying to be in one. Any possible issue or event that is perceived to be creating imbalance or disorder within the society will always attract the attention of the media.

The media’s attention to anything that may be breaking the balance of the society is part of the social order itself. The media acknowledges that change is part of society, but disorder is a threat to society. Therefore any possible disorder within society is worth reporting.

Peter White’s methodology is based on using the text in understanding the hidden ideology within news reports. White argues that there are two main ways in analyzing the text: first is to analyze the newsworthiness and subject matter of the news. Second is to analyze the way journalists position themselves within the reports. Newsworthiness is the concept of how events are being ‘valued’ in term of how the
society will be able to relate or react to it. The bigger the possibility the society will react to certain events, the more newsworthy the event is for the media.

White's argues that there are three variables that can show how newsworthy an event. The first one is aberrant damage. If within an event, the larger the damage done (due to natural disaster, conflicts or any other causes), then the more important the news will be. This is more important if the damage is mounting to incredible levels beyond normality.

The second variable is what is called power relations. Any disruptions (such as scandals) or anything not usual within the world of politics is worthy to be reported. The more unusual it is or the more disruption it creates, the better the news will be.

The third variable is normative breach. This involves events or state-of-affairs construed as departing from either established morality or custom. News items that include breaches of morality such as crimes are always attracting public attention. The more hideous the crime or any morality breach, the more likely it will attract more attention.

Besides newsworthiness, White also proposed another variable to be analysed: the positioning of the reporter within the news itself. News, in particular hard news, always carries the notion of 'objective' and impersonal reporting. In reality, reporters often inscribe their own views even in hard news reporting. When reporters involve their own personal views within news reporting they run the risk that the news will
not be ‘objective’. Therefore, in analyzing news reports, it is important to see how the
reporters position themselves within the story.

As described above, Peter White argues that there are several points that can be used
in analyzing hard news reports:\(^2\text{32}\)

1. Ideational orientation: Newsworthiness and the subject matter of ‘hard news’.
4. An informational pulse: repeating ‘the point of impact’.

2. 5. 3. The Gadi Wolfsfeld approach – The political contest model.

Wolfsfeld argues that news media have become a modern day arena where various
parties are continuously trying to win the contest of public attention.\(^2\text{33}\) Wolfsfeld
argues that public attention is actually the key to public approval. Public approval in
modern day democratic systems is the source of political power. Thus, the struggle
for media control is actually the struggle for political power.\(^2\text{34}\)

Within this theory, political struggles are always fought between two sides. The fight
is never fair as one side will have more advantages over the other parties. Wolfsfeld
called the stronger party as ‘the Authority’ and the weaker one ‘the Challenger’. The
authority here can be anything that holds more power or advantages over the other
such as governments, political power institutions or large corporations. The
Challenger may have less advantages but they may have some surprises of their own.
Often challengers can beat more powerful authorities providing they know how to use the opportunities they are presented.

The model Wolfsfeld suggests is based on five basic premises:

1. The political process is more likely to have an influence on the news media than the news media has on the political process.
2. The authorities' level of control over the political environment is one of the key variables that determines the role of the news media in political conflicts.
3. The role of the news media in political conflicts varies over time and circumstance.
4. To understand the role of the news media is to look at the competition among antagonists along two dimensions: structural and cultural.
5. Though authorities have tremendous advantages over challengers in the quantity and quality of media coverage they receive, many challengers can overcome these obstacles and use the news media as a tool for political influence.

Wolfsfeld argues that there is no singular theory that can explain the interaction between media and politics in reports on political conflicts. What gets reported in the media is not due to political pressure but is due more to the fact that the news fits into the preconceived frames within the media itself. Politics also plays a significant role in what is reported in the media. As mentioned earlier, the struggle here is played on the structural and cultural level on which politics is also based. In any society, the media will reflect first on the society they are based upon, including the political
dynamics of the society. As politics is one of the main powers that shape the society, it will also reflect on the media itself.

Nevertheless Wolfsfeld argues that politics is not the single most powerful reason or cause. Media can also influence the politics.

They (the media) help set the political agenda. They accelerate and magnify political success and failure. They can serve as an independent advocate for victims of oppression. They can mobilize third parties into a conflict and they are central agents in the construction of social frames about politics. The press serves as a powerful catalyst for political processes and it is therefore essential to understand better how this catalyst operates. This cycle of influence, however, usually begins with the world of politics.236

Another important point to remember is that although the authorities can influence the media, it does not mean that the media will bend willingly. The media has in its arsenal anti-authority sentiments that they can use at will when the situation allows.237

There are two frames that often found among journalists in regards to their views in political conflicts. First is that power inherently tends to corrupt. Any news about corrupt power, dictatorships or anything similar will attract attention. Better still is that most readers will be able to relate to this issue easily. The second frame involves innocent victims. Human victims in any kind of political conflict are the major news attraction. Victims evoke a universal sense of morality and humanity. In building frames, the construct of a victim is an important thing to attract and create perceptions:

Victims (and potential victims) are a major ingredients of news especially news about conflict. Victims provide human interest, good visuals and drama as well as important moral lessons about the evils of violence. News about victims is not restricted to the coverage of political conflicts: they are also a central part of stories about crime, natural disasters, accidents and social problems.238
These two basic frames are often found among journalists around the world. Almost anywhere violence and politics (especially a corrupt system) will attract and occupy media headlines at any one time. As much as journalists do not like to admit it, the old saying of: “Bad news is good news” is still valid even today. Wolfsfeld elaborates more:

Those who can latch on to this frame are provided with an extremely powerful conveyor belt for bringing their messages to the public. Images of victims are an especially important factor in building such frames. Pictures of protesters being beaten, of bodies being thrown out of planes by terrorists, of children dying due to the cruelties of war resonates powerfully in the news media. The fact that Rodney King’s beating was filmed made all the difference in the world.259

The power of utilising the victims of political conflict is visible in many cases strengthening the idea that such frames have a universal appeal. The cases that studied by Entman shows how victims can be used as frames to emphasize a certain frame, for example the shooting of KAL 007 by Russian fighters was framed as cold blooded murder in the American press. Interestingly the shooting of an Iranian Airliner by US Navy ship was framed as accident that happened in a high tension area, thus just being seen as a mere accident but as a crime by the Iranians.

The two cases show that despite the number of victims high in both cases as both airlines were fall, the frames representing the cases are different. One was of cold blooded murder (a deliberate action). The other was a pure accident. In the first case, the victims were treated like martyrs in a struggle for freedom. The second case the victims are just accidental victims like a daily traffic accidents; tragic yes, but nothing more.
Wolfsfeld closed his arguments in his books by underlining that the frame of ‘innocent victims of political conflict’ is a very powerful frames but it is not the sole factor that will determine whether an antagonist will win in a political conflict.\textsuperscript{240} Political conflict, Wolfsfeld argues, is a very complex process and to understand it requires an understanding over many factors involved.\textsuperscript{241}

2.5.4. Wolfsfeld’s methodology.

Central to Wolfsfeld theory is the concept of a continuous struggle over political power. Mass media today has become the central arena for the struggle as media provides a powerful medium to political power. The media occupies a central role here as it owns a powerful tool – frames. The frames provide an interpretation to the public of what is going on. Within the social construction of reality tradition, the interpretation becomes the source of ‘reality’ as perceived by the readers.

The media serve as public interpreters of events and as symbolic arenas for ideological struggle between antagonists. News stories about political conflicts are a form of social construction, in which some frames are more likely than others to serve as the underlying theme of news stories.\textsuperscript{242}

In order to analyze the frames of news stories (especially those regarding political conflict), Wolfsfeld suggests researchers ask three different questions. These questions will be the guide in order to analyze how journalists construct media frames for news stories and how they attempt to find a narrative fit between incoming information and existing frames.\textsuperscript{243} These research questions will help us to understand two things: first to think like the journalists who are attempting to build a news story. Second is to allow us to understand better the influence of the events and the professional and political inclinations of those who must cover them.\textsuperscript{244}
The research questions are:

- How did we (the media) cover this conflict in the past?
- What is the most newsworthy part of the conflict?
- Who are the good guys?

Each of the questions serves a different purpose. The first question aims to understand the context of a news story. The second question aims to understand the newsworthiness of the event which is the most important professional consideration facing journalists. The third question is to understand the political influences as journalists find themselves allocating blame. In this research, as in previous methodologies, all cases selected for analysis will be subjected to the three questions. The aim is to generate an understanding of what kind of frames were used in reports of East Timor crisis.

2.5.5. The Grounded Theory Method.

Grounded theory is used in this thesis as I felt it was needed as a synthesising strategy. This research ventures into some known and unknown territory of research. Grounded theory is also most relevant with the qualitative method here. Qualitative method places a strong emphasis on the exploration of new ideas. Grounded theory is actually fulfilling that role by combining scientific findings with already present discourse. Barney Glaser explained the strength of the grounded theory in a way which shows its relevance to this thesis.
Grounded theory allows the relevant social organization and social psychological organization of the people studied to be discovered, to emerge – in their perspective! Grounded theory does justice to the data. The methods in Basics of Qualitative research will always produce research products, but not the aforementioned ones of emergence in the perspective of the substantive area participant. 

Grounded theory is deemed to most suitable to this research as this research is aimed to understand why Indonesian and Australian newspapers presented the East Timor crisis in 1999, differently. A quantitative oriented research such as the AKSARA Foundation’s research shows the differences in quantitative manner, but as Glaser said, it offers little in understanding the greater issue.

Grounded theory in the context of this thesis was able to cover and connect various factors and issues that were extremely complex. Grounded theory was able to seek a more thorough understanding. For instance, it was able to analyse the impact of Australian culture that was often described as ‘egalitarian’ to the way the Australian newspapers reported the East Timor crisis in 1999. This method was also able to dwell upon my professional experience as working journalist, educator and student in Australia and so work at understanding the way the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the crisis.

Grounded theory is a very simple procedure yet it can cover wide range of issues, making it a versatile research method. Grounded theory, as first developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967), works towards best practice and best management for the people working within the system under scrutiny. The grounded theory building process is suited to this study in that it employs, as the central aspect, theoretical sensitivity with rapid response provided to the subjects in a study. The
descriptive function and heuristic role of grounded theory thus becomes a part of the interactive and continual development of the theory as the data is obtained. This model is ideal for education, health sciences and business where more truth is needed to engage in the problems of important dependent variables. Because of this, the model was ideal for developing a responsive theory for journalism practices of Australian and Indonesian newspapers when they were reporting East Timor crisis in 1999.

Data in this thesis arose from the collection of news reports from two Australian newspapers and four Indonesian newspapers, which I constantly analysed, while reflecting back to my personal professional experience as a working journalist and relating this to other materials from the public domain. Grounded theory provided the context for the case study research as presented in Chapters four to seven.

Potential theoretical sensitivity is lost when the sociologist commits himself [sic] exclusively to one specific preconceived theory’ (1967: 48). The notion of sensitivity here refers to openness on the part of the researcher to different ideas, to a process of interrelating theoretical insights and data.232

Quoted above, Norman Denzin further developed grounded theory in respect to his notion of sensitizing concepts. He defined sensitizing concepts as “concepts that are not transformed immediately into operational definitions through an attitude scale or checklist”.253 The process involves key players, like journalists I interviewed, who give meaning in their own right to the concept being investigated. The process of developing grounded theory is deliberately loose and open ended. When a researcher participates in, encodes and analyses data in the continuous process of grounded theory, decisions are made progressively.254 Glaser and Strauss defined this theoretical sampling as the “process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his [sic] data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges”.255

The data for the initial case studies in this thesis development were selected based upon certain criteria: the news reports should be reported by accepted mainstream
newspapers (two Australian newspapers and at least three of the Indonesian newspapers). My initial research found that there were very few specific events that were reported simultaneously by all the Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Therefore, my developing grounded theory was beginning to suggest that if such an occurrence happened, then it should be considered highly significant.

In Chapters four and five, the chosen case studies were found to be of high significance for both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers. The articles were then compared to personal notes of people involved and interviewed combined with a linguistic analysis in decoding the message within the articles themselves. From this process a new finding of how Australian and Indonesian newspapers perceived similar events was drawn. The findings then were continuously analyzed through comparison with other sources including my own notes taken during the same period.

The events covered by Australian and Indonesian newspapers are theoretically 'factual' events. However it is significant that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers often presented these facts with different points of view, leading to different meanings and interpretations of the same event. These different points of view were the reflection of both countries' newspapers' cultures or even perhaps hidden agendas, in perceiving the event. Thus, a so called factual or 'objective' event can be perceived differently as humans tend to perceive things through their subjective judgments, just as Weber, Wright-Mills and Berger have asserted. What grounded theory does then is to put these 'interpretations' within a context, thus
giving the researcher a clearer perspective of what they might finally mean once stripped of their cultural bias.

Besides my notes as a working journalist at the time of East Timor crisis, I consulted various interviewees, in particular people who were involved in reporting the East Timor crisis. The veracity of the content from these interviews, was cross checked and supported, or otherwise, by documents or articles available in the public domain. Through this continuous consultative process a new understanding was developed in keeping with the research methods of participatory action research and grounded theory. In spite of this cross checking, I still felt that these methods may not be sufficiently convincing for a final argument and therefore, I decided to utilize a more advanced method of analysis.

In Chapters six and seven this other method is particularly visible. In those chapters, a new period of study was selected and all articles regarding East Timor's crisis that were published at that time were analyzed. The focus of this analysis was upon the sources of the news in a quantitative way, rather than the qualitative approach taken in the earlier research. The selected period was chosen as it was possibly the most difficult period for accurate journalism during the East Timor crisis in 1999: the period when all foreign journalists were forced to leave the country. The inability to report directly from East Timor presented a major challenge for the foreign media, in particular the Australian newspapers. Yet the data shows that during that period, the Australian newspaper reporting was significantly higher (in quantity) than all the Indonesian newspapers (that were being analyzed here) combined.
This reflects a significant importance in East Timor as perceived by Australian newspapers. But the question arising is how the newspapers managed to get their stories? The term 'sources', means they are the suppliers informing the writing of the stories. Journalists throughout the world are always trained that all news stories should have reliable, and if possible, multiple sources unless the journalist witnesses the event himself or herself. Again as in previous chapters, the analysis was conducted by comparing notes, interviews and other materials with the actual published articles. In this context however, I have placed emphasis quantitatively upon the type of sources used.

Sources in news reports here were found to be more than simply the impartial source of the news. Rather as the research progressed, they were emerging as active participants in providing the information and it was beginning to be noticed that by providing the information, there was likely to be a benefit to the interests of the information provider. Thus, without a clear and careful scrutiny by the journalist, sources could in fact manipulate the outcome of the news reports, to the extent that the journalist and their newspaper were being used by the source. This is something that I have learnt in the context of my education in Australia through a Master of Journalism and in my professional practice in Indonesia; that a story’s veracity is substantially improved if it was informed by as many reliable sources as possible. Indeed this is accepted universally as standard journalism practice and yet repeatedly the stories examined in this period were overwhelmingly written from information
provided by one source – often the Australian government. Again, grounded theory is pivotal here in giving the sources a context where their role can be seen and analyzed.

It is clear now that while grounded theory is more than important for the later chapters, it is the central concept or method within the overall thesis. Grounded theory can provide a context within which the case studies can be analyzed. Without this context, the case studies risk appearing as ‘normal’ events without showing any significance.

Grounded theory came in as the analysis method for the data collected. The data compiled will show a certain trend within the Australian and Indonesian newspapers – in this case the choice of sources. What the data shows is just the trend, it does not give interpretation nor meaning unless it is put into a bigger perspective such as: the social conditions of both society, the political situation (at the time), historical background, values, culture and beliefs.

The main point is that data, though it may be empirical, needs to grounded – connected to the bigger and more complex background in order to understand it better. As detailed before, news is part of social construction of reality (Gieber, 1999, McCullagh, 2002, Berger and Luckmann, 1966, Cottle, c2003). The essence of news is information which means knowledge. The question now in this chapter is where did this knowledge come from? Does the choice of sources affect the knowledge created?
The application of grounded theory is done by integrating into the findings in Chapters 4 to 7 to a personal account of the crisis. The personal account is acting here as the representation of the participatory research where the researcher is becoming an active part in analysing and explaining the findings. The personal account is also acting as connection between the findings and their context in Australian and Indonesian societies.

The personal account will be much derived from the first hand experience of the researcher, in particular reflecting back to his own experience during the East Timor crisis. Nevertheless, the accounts will be supplemented with other personal accounts from other journalists or researchers who were involved with the issue. I have also drawn on personal accounts from other media practitioners that have been published within the public domains such as newspaper articles or other media accounts.

In conclusion grounded theory is used in this thesis as the global methodology, meaning it is used throughout the thesis in order to give context to the findings derived from other methodologies used here. Grounded theory will be used in the form of participatory research analysis by the researcher by presenting personal accounts to give the findings their larger or most significant context. By giving the findings context, we can derive a new understanding regarding the Australian and Indonesian newspapers accounts about East Timor crisis in 1999.
CHAPTER 3
AUSTRALIAN AND INDONESIAN PRESS:
A GENERAL OVERVIEW

3.1 Introduction

This thesis is aimed to answer the question: why do Australian and Indonesian newspapers present different perspectives in reporting the East Timor (1999) crisis. In previous chapters I have explored the main theory about the press and have argued that the press is intricately affecting the society in which it is located. In this chapter I will be discussing how and why Australian and Indonesian press cultures and their production outcomes differ.

Australian and Indonesian journalists in 1999 had long been embedded within the global news media world. Traditional boundaries such as national borders could no longer stem the flow of news. Technological innovations such as the satellite endowed the world with television, telephone, facsimile, and later the Internet. These technologies mediate the way we receive and process news. Alan Knight described the impact of this new realism:
Journalists can no longer hide behind national boundaries, ignoring the impact of their reporting on neighbouring countries. Satellite television, interactive news services, improved telephone and fax services and the internet do not acknowledge the border checkpoints, challenging politicians' attempts to censor or direct news. But these new technologies, spread by rising affluence, also allow wrong or insensitive reports to bounce rapidly around the region's media, encouraging disharmony and discrimination.

Reports of a racist politician receiving support in Australia can be transmitted instantly to audiences across ASEAN nations, threatening negotiated trade and diplomatic arrangements. Asian governments, which may not themselves espouse media freedoms, can choose to interpret such reports as evidence to support caricatures of Australians as ignorant, ill-educated white supremacists. Australian reporters, meanwhile, can be characterised as dishonest by Asian politicians seeking to bolster sagging domestic political support. Reports detailing ruling family corruption in Jakarta during the Suharto period were likewise regarded as a direct insult to the national interest and international diplomacy. 

The main argument in Australian and Indonesian relations especially between the press and the nations, is very complex. The relationship reflects the history, the culture and the perception between the two nations. My point of argument here is that what is being reported in the press is merely reflecting the way the two nations (or in this thesis the term is societies) perceived each other.

My argument above is based upon my previous arguments in Chapter 1 and 2 that news is a social construction of reality. Social construction of reality itself is a multi-faceted concept. The media presents a concept of reality but this very reality is packaged and presented using symbols already known to society. What the Australian and Indonesian newspapers report is part of how both societies perceived each other and as such, pre-existing symbols, values and knowledge profoundly colour the presentation of news in Australia and Indonesia.

This is the main context in analysis in answering the question as to why Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports differed. Immediately below, for context, that I
provide an overview of the social, political and historical flows that have rendered
Australian and Indonesian societies as distinctly different to each other. This will be
followed by a more detailed sociological analysis of Australian and Indonesian press
in the context of representation of their society’s social, political and historical
factors.

3.2. Regional context.

Australian and Indonesian societies couldn’t be more different. Australia started as a
British penal colony more than 200 years ago. Gradually, the new migrants not just
from Great Britain but also from Europe started to come and settle in Australia. These
migrants brought in more than people. They also brought in the values, cultures and
beliefs that were rooted back in Europe. This helped create the title of Australia as the
bastion of Europe in Asia and until early in the 20th century, Australia was officially a
British colony. On the first of January 1901, the Federation of Australia was created.
We shall further discuss the position and development of Australian society in
relation to their respective press, East Timor and Indonesia, in the latter part of this
chapter.

What is now known as Republic of Indonesia was a collection of small kingdoms at
the time the Dutch arrived in the 16th Century, trying to find the source of the
legend of the ‘spice islands’ that Columbus was looking for. The pre-Republic of
Indonesia had been known to by Portuguese and Spanish sailors, almost at the same
time. By the 17th century, the Dutch had prevailed against other European
competitors, to become the dominant European power in the immediate region, opening up the wealth of economic reserves that Indonesia has to offer. The Portuguese were only able to regain and retain control of the Eastern part of Timor Island as well as the small enclave in the central North West of Timor Island, called Oecussi.

During World War 2, Japan replaced the Dutch as ruling foreign power when the latter surrendered in 1942. Months before the end of World War 2, Japanese imperial forces promised Indonesia, its independence. Before Japan was able to fulfil that promise, Japan surrendered to the US and British led coalition force in August 1945. In the same month, nationalist leaders such as Soekarno declared independence. Within weeks, the Dutch manoeuvred to regain their control over Indonesia, meeting strong resistance from the nationalist camp. After two Dutch “police actions” – their term – in 1946/1948, seen as wars by the Indonesian nationalists who formed effective guerilla armies, the Dutch succumbed to international pressure principally from America and reluctantly acknowledged Indonesia’s independence on December 19th, 1949.

Next I will show the development and relations between Australian and Indonesian society and how this relates to their respective press perceived the East Timor crisis in 1999. Firstly I will give an overview of the history of both the Australian and Indonesian; provide a short history of the Australian and Indonesian press; and the relationship between Australia and Indonesia in particular their press. It is also the position of this thesis that understanding the dynamic between Australia and
Indonesia, in particular in respect to their press is pivotal in understanding the way Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented East Timor crisis in 1999.

This chapter then will be divided into three parts. The first is about the development of the Indonesian press, starting with the overview of modern Indonesian history and its relations with the birth of the Indonesian press; the issue of cultural identity within the Indonesian press system; and the general perception of the Indonesian press regarding the East Timor crisis. The second part will focus on the history and development of the Australian press; the subsequent press system that was adopted by the Australian press; and finally, the general perception of the Australian press regarding East Timor crisis. The last part of this chapter will focus on the history of the interaction between Australia, Indonesia and their respective presses, especially in the years prior to East Timor crisis.

3.3. A brief Indonesian history and the development of the Indonesian Press.

The history of modern Indonesia, in particular the period leading up to independence in 1945 is very important for the development of the Indonesian press. My argument here, which I expand upon below, is that the birth of the Indonesian press is deeply enmeshed with the emergence of social movements in the early 1900’s that have gave rise to the specific identity the Indonesian press comes from. This identity, in a developed form in 1999, shaped the way the Indonesian press perceived the East Timor crisis.

The historical context will show how since the beginning, the Indonesian press have been involved keenly with the development of Indonesian society. The Indonesian
press also turned out to be a breeding ground for independence movement leaders.

The Indonesian press started as a colonial press, under Dutch control. The Dutch colonial government created the first newspaper – *Bataviasche Nouvelles* in 1744 – and in 1746 it was closed. 

Later, a new newspaper was born: *Bataviasche Kolonial Courant*. When the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia's name under Dutch colonial power), was taken over by British Empire, the name was changed into: *Java Government Gazette*. After the colony returned to Dutch the name was changed again into: *Javasche Courant*. Being part of the colonial press, the contents of the early newspapers were either conveying the messages from the colonial government or politically neutral articles. The Dutch colonial government explicitly forbade mass media, including newspapers, to publish anything that undermined Dutch colonial power.

In the beginning of their rule the Dutch Colonial government did not allow any private publication to exist even if it belonged to a Dutch citizen. When W. Bruining, a Dutch national, brought the first printing machine to Indonesia, the Dutch colonial government immediately moved to prohibit him from using the machine. Indeed he was offered a bribe to return immediately to Holland. Only in 1851, Bruining was successful in publishing in Indonesia (known as the Dutch’s East Indies at that time).

Entering the 20th century, increasing criticism from within Dutch society about the nature of Dutch rules in the colonies saw greater hostility from the nascent press
towards the Dutch Colonial government. The movement, known as ‘ethical policy’ demanded that the Dutch Government erase its repressive policies in the colonies, drawing on an argument of common humanity. This movement not only existed in Holland, but also in Dutch colonies and in particular throughout Indonesia. In retaliation, the Dutch Colonial government created *Haatzaai Artikelen*, or the ‘hate articles law’ that prohibited the spread of ‘lies and hatred’ towards the colonial state.

The *Haatzaai Artikelen* was introduced first in *Wetboek van Strafrecht van Ned-Ind* (1935) and was set to become the foundation for limiting press freedom in Indonesia for almost a century later under Soeharto’s New Order. The essence of the hate articles legislation was the prohibition of any acts that might be considered as working against the government. This law shied away from legally defining what might constitute an act of ‘hate’, giving the government ample leeway to anticipate threats to its rule. During the New Order regime for instance, the law was used to close down theatre plays – such as some of the plays by *Teater Koma* (KOMA Theater): *Opera Kecoak* (The cockroach Opera).

Under the New Order, the ‘hate law’ became one of the infamous laws, as what was known as ‘the subversive law’. The subversive law drew its essence from the *Haatzai Artikelen* in which the any activities that might be constituted as being against the ‘legal government’ were outlawed. The activities included among other things; any kind of activities that can be considered to be offending the government and its officials. The subversive law also carried an extreme penalty: death for offenders.
During the New Order regime, the subversive law became the most famous and most hated laws in Indonesia. The law was used repeatedly by the security apparatus to stop any kind of activities that they considered to be 'against the legal government'. Again as the law was specifically not well defined. Activities encompassed anything from street demonstration to theatre plays. The victims of the law ranged from political activists, to artists. This law was a law designed to not to have boundaries.

Indonesian independence movements burgeoned from the very arrival of Dutch power in the 16th century. All movements were relying on armed struggle and all failed. There were a few independence movements that cost the Dutch colonial government dearly, such as the one in Aceh and the rebellion by Prince Diponegoro in central Java. Both movements took a heavy toll on the colonial army but eventually both were put to rest, kneecapped by the arrest of movements prime leaders.

But the beginning of the 20th century, the independence movements came equipped with a fresh strategy for freedom. The new approach was with weapons, education and a higher level of political activity. Within Dutch society, elements started to question the colonial hard line policy of the Dutch central government, particularly its action towards the people in various colonies including the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) – these movements were called Ethical Policy. Among the people questioning Dutch government policy was E.F.E. Douwess Dekker, who came from the Dutch middle class. Douwes Dekker became interested in life in the Dutch colony, particularly Indonesia. He went to work and live in Indonesia to the extent
that the experience made him realize colonial policies had created a life of enormous hardship for the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{272}

Douwes Dekker proposed that the Dutch government should review their colonial policy. He brought his ideas to the Dutch parliament, which not surprisingly gained very little support. He was not to give up his ideas.

In 1907, Douwes Dekker took up the post of editor at the *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*. Consumed by a hostility towards the Dutch Government in general, Dekker was very critical of anything related to official power. Dekker’s struggle was not confined solely to media. In 1912, with Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Suwardi Surjaningrat (or often known as Ki Hajar Dewantara), he created *The Indische Partij* – the first Indonesian political party that aimed to gain independence for Indonesia.\textsuperscript{273}

Douwes Dekker was not the only pro-Independence movement leader that used the media (newspapers) as his base. H.O.S. Cokroaminoto - the founder of *Syarikat Islam* and Haji Agus Salim – founder of *Taman Siswa* were among a few editors and writers who were active in the newspaper community.

Pre-republic press can be categorized primary by ownership:\textsuperscript{274}

- Newspapers owned by Dutch nationals. This included those owned by individuals who had Dutch and Indonesian parents – they were still considered Dutch nationals, though in reality this may not have been the case.
• Newspapers owned by Chinese people. This also included those that were owned by Chinese people who had mixed parents.

• Newspapers owned by Indonesian nationals.

Ethnic divisions in ownership lent each paper an individual style. Dutch owned newspapers serviced the primarily the Dutch expatriate communities mostly residing in urban areas throughout Indonesia. In terms of content, news stories met the needs the interests of Dutch communities and the Dutch colonial government (directly or indirectly in terms of being a sort of ‘official media’). Some newspapers took a critical stance towards the Dutch colonial government.

Chinese immigrants arrived around the 11th Century as there were many Chinese traders that came to trade in South East Asia including Indonesia. However only later, in the 20th Century, were there dedicated schools for the Chinese community. Chinese newspapers were originally created to serve the interests of Chinese communities. As the majority of Chinese living in Indonesia at that time were originally from China, it was understandable that the orientation of the newspapers focused heavily on the Chinese mainland.

The lack of dedicated schools had a visible impact. Until the 20th Century, there were very few educated Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. The birth of the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan organization was soon to rectify the situation. Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan was an organization aimed to improving the living conditions in all aspects for Chinese, though its focus was mainly on education.
In 1910, the conditions were conducive to create the first Chinese newspapers in the Dutch East Indies.\textsuperscript{278} The first Chinese newspaper was Li Po which sought to preserve Chinese culture and the connection with mainland China.\textsuperscript{279} Despite their concern to maintain Chinese culture, the fact that the newspapers were written in *Bahasa Malagu* gave them a significant role in inspiring a pan-Dutch Indies nationalism. The use of the *Malay* language was not simply coincidental. The Indonesian born constituency of the papers frequently could not speak the language of the Chinese mainland.

Ethnic Chinese Indonesians adopted *Bahasa Malagu* due to it being the major language spoken by the majority of local Indonesian people at that time, paving the way for a common link between different ethnic groups that lived throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The Chinese press played a very important part in developing the Indonesian press. One important step was the use of the *Malay* language. Moreover, the initial indigenous Indonesian press pioneers used the Chinese-Malay press as a model for their own press.

### 3.4. The Indonesian Press.

One of the main features of the Indonesian press, ever since its inception, is that it is pluralistic. The press have retained a strong sense of independence while also being nationalistic\textsuperscript{280}. 

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\textsuperscript{278} Source: [Sumber](#).

\textsuperscript{279} Source: [Sumber](#).

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In the early part of the 20th century, the Dutch colonial government realized that a new kind of independence struggle was emerging. Keen to protect its interests the Dutch colonial government did its best to suppress the emerging and inevitable threat.

Local Chinese, realizing they had little in common with Dutch society and a limited link with their ancestral land of China, choose to be associated with the local Indonesian people. Through this association the Chinese Indonesian press was set to become the foundation of the Indonesian press - partly because most Chinese Indonesian newspapers employed at least one Indonesian editor reporter. This provided Indonesian editors and reporters experience and expertise in journalism.

Douwes Dekker documented that between 1861 and 1907 there were 33 newspapers using the Malay language. Out of that number, 14 were Indonesian newspapers, almost 50% of the whole Malay language newspapers at that time.281 Being a part of the Indonesian independence movement, Douwes Dekker was biased towards the Indonesian side. According to Dekker, Malay language newspapers created by Indonesians had a higher standing in the community compared to the others, in particular those created by the Dutch colonial government.

The Indonesian independence movements soon attracted the attention of the local media. Boedi Oetomo – Indonesia’s first indigenous organization aimed at voicing the needs of the indigenous Indonesians – while Dutch language newspapers such as De Locomotief, Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad and Jong Indie regularly published mainstream news. This situation was soon to be realized by the Dutch Colonial government,
which responded by counteracting, creating pro-government Malay language newspapers and giving support to newspapers that were considered moderate in order to counteract the growing independence movement.

In 1911, another major indigenous organization was established – Syarikat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association) by Tirtoadisurjo, a leading press publisher/editor with Haji Samanhudi and H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto. A year later the organization name was changed into Syarikat Islam (Islamic Union - SI)."282

Tirtoadisurjo was considered as the pioneer of the Indonesian press. He was a government employee who decided to leave the job to become a journalist. By 1903 he established the first newspaper (in Malay language) to be set up and run by indigenous Indonesians. Some of his newspapers are Soenda Berita (Sunda News) and Medan Prijaji (Royals of Medan)."283

Within a decade the Syarikat Islam had become a leading indigenous organization with a claimed membership of 2 million in 1919. It also created several newspapers, the significant one being Oetoesan Hindia (Representatives of Indies), founded in 1913. Unfortunately due to lack of advertising income, the newspaper was closed in 1923.284

"Oetoesan Hindia became a medium for local Indonesian leaders to reach out to the local population. Some of the writers for Oetoesan Hindia included: Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, Abdul Muis, Haji Agus Salim and Surjopranoto. In 1920, the Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI – Indonesian Communist Party) was born. Within five years, PKI became a prominent power within Indonesian society. Part of the PKI appeal was to the lower classes and particularly the Javanese abangan (lower class people who weren’t part of a particular religious belief and who mostly practiced a mixture of religious and traditional beliefs).285

The influence of the PKI also reached the press industry. By the end of 1926, it was recorded that around 20 newspapers were owned or affiliated to the PKI. These were impressive figures as there hadn’t been any indigenous Indonesian political power that achieved that level of saturation.286 The PKI revolution of 1926 brought a halt to their burgeoning media empire. Little has been mentioned about the PKI publication after the rebellion and what fate was brought to the people that run them like the journalists.

The nationalist movement was marked by the creation of the Indonesia Merdeka magazine in 1924. Indonesian students living in the Netherlands created Indonesia Merdeka in secrecy. Through this magazine, for the first time, the word Indonesia was used in public.

Indonesia Merdeka was published by a new political power – Perhimpunan Indonesia. Perhimpunan Indonesia like the Indische Partij, sought to move towards an independent Indonesia. Indeed, the leader of Perhimpunan Indonesia was Mohammad Hatta – who later with Soekarno proclaimed Indonesia’s independence in
1945. Hatta also became Indonesia’s first prime minister as well as serving as vice president.

In the early part of the 20th century, the leading political party fighting for Indonesian independence was *Indische Partij*. Being a clear opponent of the Dutch colonial government, *Indische Partij* was soon disbanded and leaders of the party were sent to exile in the Netherlands. Despite this, leaders of *Indische Partij* were still able to promote and distribute their ideas through mass media publications such as *Hindia Poetra* and *DeIndier*.

Little has been recorded about the relationship between the Indonesian Independence movements and the Indonesian press, except that between 1928 and 1940 there were 33 newspapers and 11 of them were under a political party: PARINDRA – *Partai Indonesia Raya* (Greater Indonesian Library)\(^{287}\).

PARINDRA was created in 1935 by a fusion of former *Boedi Oetomo* and other Javanese activists with Dr Sutomo and Muhammad Husni Thamrin as the leaders. PARINDRA’s aims from the outset were the eventual independence of Indonesia from Dutch colonial rule.

Early in World War 2, a Japanese delegation came to Indonesia. Their aim was to garner support for the Japanese Imperial power (Japan hadn’t formally entered World War II at that time). By June 1940, Japanese leaders were openly talking about liberating Indonesia from the Dutch – a move hailed by Indonesian leaders.\(^{288}\)
In September 1940 a Japanese delegation came and met Indonesian leaders as well as the Indonesian press. For the Indonesian press, the arrival of these guests was significant as they also provided financial support to the Indonesian press by placing advertisements in the Indonesian press. When the Japanese Imperial forces arrived and defeated the Dutch, an important chapter in Indonesian history began.

Japanese Imperial forces combined strategies to gain support from Indonesians whilst maintaining control over the conquered areas. The Japanese strategy can be outlined as:

- The erasure of all Western influence in Indonesian society. This was achieved by prohibiting the use of the Dutch language.
- Utilizing support from local administrators as well as local leaders.
- Mobilizing Indonesian people for the war effort. This ranged from creating trained militias to concerted efforts to exploit using Indonesian natural resources.

For the Indonesian press, the Japanese occupation brought mixed results. On one side, the Japanese Imperial force controlled all aspects of life in Indonesia, including the press. Such tight control meant that press freedom was scant flexibility for the local press in heavily tenured terms.

On the other side, the Japanese occupation had positive affects. First was that Japanese rule allowed greater opportunity and even training for local Indonesians in
running and managing press operations. This was non-existent during the Dutch colonial regime.

A second positive aspect under Japanese occupation was that the usage of Dutch language was totally prohibited. The restriction in turn allowed for the Malay language to flourish as a national common language.

During the Japanese occupation, only eight Indonesian language newspapers and five Japanese newspapers were recorded in Indonesia. This was a big reduction from 33 Indonesian newspapers in 1940. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that it was during the Japanese occupation that many Indonesian press workers had received training in the opportunity to run newspapers. This was to have a long lasting effect on the Indonesian press.

3.5. Historical impact of contemporary Indonesian newspapers.

Almost all the Indonesian independence movement leaders were involved with the press, to name a few: Soekarno, Suwardi Suryaningrat, Haji Agus Salim, H.O.S Cokroaminoto and Ki Hajar Dewantara.

There are several important points to be noted here with respect to the early history of the Indonesian press. First the rising and persistent sentiment of Indonesian nationalism. Second, the growing importance of the role of the middle classes with
academic backgrounds in Indonesian society. Third, the use of Malay or Malay language as the common language (Lingua Franca).

Today the notion of a nationalistic Indonesian print media has never been wholly eradicated. News media like Media Indonesia and Republika very obviously defend the nationalistic ideas particularly on a united Indonesian country despite having different kind of audiences (young, educated and urban for Media Indonesia. Religious, lower-middle class and educated for Republika). But the issue of nationalism within the Indonesian press is related to more than just a sentiment towards history. As the case of many former colonies like Indonesia, history is something that is not merely learned as knowledge but is also embedded in the culture and belief.

For Indonesian schools and particularly public schools, it is compulsory for students to attend the flag raising ceremony once in a week. The ceremony was designed to closely imitate the ceremony on August 17th, 1945 when Indonesia proclaimed its independence. During the original proclamation ceremony, the proclamation was followed by a flag raising ceremony. This is replayed weekly in Indonesian schools.

It is interesting to note how today after almost a century, the idea of a print media promoting nationalism is still strong. There are several possibilities to explain this: firstly, the way the news media has developed. Secondly the way Indonesian society was developed within the idea of ‘gaining independence’. Thirdly, the fact that there
have always been perceived possible external threats to Indonesia creating the need for nationalism.²⁹³

The first point described earlier was how the Indonesian media, in particular print media was born and developed as a means of struggle for independence. This was also based on Indonesian society, which upheld the idea of earning independence through armed struggle.

The media itself tended towards the self perception that they were agents of freedom, voicing notions of freedom to the people. During the regime of the New Order, this role was heavily oppressed yet the regime failed to fully destroy the idea. Angela Romano described that during the New Order regime, the major motivation for the Indonesian citizens to join the press ranks was to make a difference in the struggle:²⁹⁴

All respondents were asked how and why they had become journalists; an innocuous question revealed what they thought the field of journalism could offer them and what they could offer to journalism and society. The most commonly nominated reasons for becoming a journalist was a sense of duty to help society by aiding the suffering, redressing social inequities and building democracy.²⁹⁵

The argument above is in line with the general description in Chapter 1 and 2 regarding the press in Indonesia as supporters of the development process. Some critics have said that this is part of a propaganda process of which the developing countries’ government is trying to reassert its grip on power by using the issue of the development as the main excuse. Within this context, development is a sacred ideology that must be defended at all cost.²⁹⁶ A classic example is what former President Soeharto said regarding the role of the press:

Since it occupies such an important position, the press has an enormous impact in all sectors such as politics, the economy, the socia-cultural environment whether it does or does not fulfil its role and responsibilities. A successful press will accelerate efforts to achieve national
targets while a press which does not fulfill its role will no doubt delay the attainment of identified targets. It is precisely this realization on the part of the press that has caused it to urge us to support the slogan: ‘positive interaction between the press, the government and the people’ as stated in the Main Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN).²⁹⁷

For developing countries such as Indonesia, the issue of development is a central issue – between giving prosperity to the people versus some aspects of the human rights. Peter Berger described this as an issue between achieving prosperity and the price that has to be paid for that prosperity. Berger argues that no matter what kind of system or ideology is used, the price in achieving prosperity will be significant.²⁹⁸

Even prominent Indonesian journalist and media tycoon, Jacob Oetama agrees that within the Indonesian context, the press is part of the bigger process of national development.²⁹⁹

But Jacob Oetama also stated that besides promoting development, the Indonesian press should act as a promoter of democracy. Thus, economic development in terms of economy must also be followed by the development in the political area. This democratic and economic development must be promoted equally and at the same time in order to create a balanced society.³⁰⁰

Similar to the time under examination in this thesis, Indonesia’s society in 1999 was in turmoil. In June 1999, for the first time since 1955 Indonesia had a fully open and democratic election. In a year before that, through a bloody conflict the New Order regime was pushed to an end after 32 years. Soon after the fall of the New Order, the new Indonesian government quickly asserted that the role of the press was pivotal to the advancement of Indonesian society. The result was a series of changes from
deregulation of press law to a final end to the Information ministry in 1999, as it was deemed to be ‘irrelevant’ by the government of the day.\textsuperscript{301}

On the other hand, the Indonesian press in 1999 contributed to furthering the chaos in society at the time. The press was often involved with (allegedly) misreporting news, having poor reporting quality and generally poor levels of professionalism. They were even accused of writing positive news articles for officials and politicians.\textsuperscript{302}

During the East Timor crisis, in parallel with the escalating tensions, the external condemnation of Indonesia escalated. The condemnation came in different forms. Some came from diplomatic sources stating the exact editorial never reached the public and those that did, usually came out as a mere summary by the press.

The most damaging kind of condemnation was public outrage towards Indonesia, conducted by foreign nationals in their own countries. Images (both still pictures and television footage) showed aggressive protest banners and were often followed by the burning of effigies or the Indonesian flag, and these were quick in grabbing the Indonesian public’s attention.

These actions were widely publicized by the Indonesian news media. The impact of such a publication was a growing anger towards what was regarded as foreigners’ involvement in Indonesia’s internal problems. This hit the trigger for strong nationalistic sentiments within the Indonesian public – in particular there was reaction to the burning of flags.\textsuperscript{303} All these pressures, publicized by the Indonesian media
were seen not just as a pressure upon the Indonesian government but the general public. This created a perception that Indonesia was being ‘attacked by foreign countries’.

Some editors openly expressed their disappointment over the foreign pressures towards Indonesia. Toeti Adhitama, Assistant editor at *Media Indonesia* explained.

> In the case of East Timor. There indeed was a dilemma. We feel annoyed that the East Timorese want to separate from us – after we had considered them one of us for so long. But it’s still hard to sit idle when we see East Timorese, trembling with fear, made to squat with their hands on their head and guarded by large Australians who enthusiastically point the muzzles of their weapons at those helpless people.\(^{304}\)

Research undertaken by the AKSARA Foundation has shows how the Indonesian print media generally were experiencing these serious dilemmas (AKSARA, 2000). Some newspapers deliberately presented views that strongly favoured Indonesia, even if that meant promoting the official Indonesian government (as well the military) line about what actually happened in East Timor.

3.6. Indonesian Press Summary.

The Indonesian press have a unique position within Indonesian society. Not only has it evolved with and reflected the social structure of Indonesia but it also plays a significant part in Indonesian history.

Since its conception, the Indonesian press has played a significant role in Indonesian independence movements. It has nurtured and sheltered almost all Indonesia’s early
leaders, such as Tjokroaminoto, Ki Hajar Dewantara and Soekarno. Some members of the early Indonesian press were a medium through which these leaders would ignite the independence movements in various areas throughout Indonesia.

These efforts were evident in the response from the Dutch colonial government, which sought to ban and arrest members of the press considered to be 'anti-Dutch government'. Product of such repressive a regime - *Haatzai artikelen* continue to exist in modern Indonesia.

*Haatzai Artikelen* or the 'hate article/law' was used by the Indonesian government up to 1998 to control and even ban elements of the Indonesian press\(^{305}\). Only during the government under President B.J.Habibie (May 1998 - August 1999) and President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999 - 2001), was the law was abolished.

To some extent, the Indonesian press also reflects the Indonesian society. It prides itself as part of the independence movement, reinforcing the notion of Indonesian nationalism. Like many other examples of the press in developing countries it also has problems: high levels of competition with increasing media entering the sector\(^{306}\); low quality management\(^{307}\) and increasing challenges in reporting from within a dynamic Indonesia while maintaining the quality of reporting\(^{308}\).

Angela Romano also described the general condition of Indonesian journalists, in particular during the New Order regime (1966 – 1998) as lowly paid, with a low bargaining power (due to the lack of workers unions), unclear minimum professional
requirements and lack of work protection. In 1999, the situation was not much different with the economic crisis forcing many publications to stop production, some before they were able to circulate a first edition. I remember at the time my first month in the *Indonesian Observer* (August 1998). I had no desk and no basic equipment, such as tape recorder or a film. And this was a major development compared to the conditions I was used to during my time with the SWA magazine (1994 – 1997).

Some media groups such as *Kompas* or *TEMPO* were able to give their employees more job security and financial rewards. *Kompas*, as part of the GRAMEDIA publication group, was able to give scholarships for the children of employees. This was described by a graduate from University of Mercu Buana – Berto Wedhatama:

> My father’s employer (*Kompas*) is paying my tuition fees, from primary school to university. Even as I’m about to graduate (from university) now, I am still under their support.

Unfortunately such conditions remain the exception within the Indonesian media. Smaller media instances were not able to pay their staff a proper salary, thus rendering reporters vulnerable to bribery. These are a small sample of the challenges that the Indonesian media (including their newspapers) faced during 1999. These conditions inevitably affected the reporting of the East Timor crisis in 1999.

**3.7. The Australian Press.**
In this section relating to the Australian press, I will not deal with press history, rather I will focus on the issues that shaped the Australian press in its culture of perception, in particular the way it perceived Indonesia and East Timor.

The Australian press started as part of the colonial press. The British colonial government established the first publication, a newspaper in Sydney. Soon, private publications were flourishing in line with the expansion of European colonies in Australia (Lloyd, 1999). But unlike the Indonesian press, there was a clear effort to distinguish between the private and independent press and the one created by the British colonial government. The Australian press of the day aimed to serve a single homogenous society based in the colonial outposts throughout Australia.

A study of relevant literature shows that there is a significant amount of scholarly analysis of the Australian press in relation in the context of the Australian and Indonesian relationship (Kingsbury, 2000, Romano, 2000, Tiffen, 2000, Knight, 2000).

All of these newswriters have sought to approach the Australian-Indonesian press relationship giving an overview of Australian and Indonesian press and political systems, and the general complexities due to the social and political differences between Australia and Indonesia.

In this context I shall use the description by Rodney Tiffen to explain the major traits of the Australian press. The Tiffen description offers the most concise and yet at the
same time, a comprehensive explanation and description of what constitutes the Australia press. Another important issue is that Tiffen originally wrote his description of the Australian press while he was comparing it to the Indonesian press.

In Chapter 1 and 2, I have sought to explain that the Australian press is part of the free or liberal press. But that description was just an ideal, it does not provide the intricacies requiring more explanation as to why such a system follows certain indicators. So from this point to the end of this chapter, I will try to explain how the Australian press and the press system it adopted can have a different perspective to the Indonesian press in looking at the East Timor crisis in 1999.

The Australian press evolved from the early colonial press into the modern press that it is today while mirroring the thoughts and traditions of Australian society. As Australia is a follower and a strong proponent of western liberal democracy, the Australian press mirrors that aspect.

The modern Australian press has significantly different traits to that of the Indonesian press. The differences are wide ranging from those of a cultural nature to those peculiar to the functions of each press system. In some discourse on the subject, there is evidence that the Indonesian press are actually behaving and striving for a much better standard of journalism than its Australian counterpart. By doing so, the Indonesian press is significantly ‘punching above its weight’ and emulating a modern and complex system with a journalism standard higher than what the Indonesian press is usually attributed.
Rodney Tiffen argues that the Australian and Indonesian press have their respective differences within the actual press system and practice rather in cultural aspects.\textsuperscript{316} Tiffen argues that there is not enough evidence to say that culture is the source of difference between Australian and Indonesian presses:\textsuperscript{317}

Culture offers a seductively embracing means of explaining anything. In politics, it figures as the most prolific residual explanation: “The fatal attractiveness of the political culture approach is that may be made to explain too much”. So before proceeding further, the limits and difficulties surrounding a cultural explanation of the conflict between the New Order regime and the Australian media need to be established. Two qualifications are fundamental:

- There is not one embracing, consensual contemporary Indonesian culture.
- The roots of conflict were more political than cultural.

Before we continue, we need to understand that most of the literature on this area was written in the context of the time when the ‘New Order’ regime was still in power throughout Indonesia. Indonesia in 1999, during the East Timor crisis, was a different Indonesia than the time of the New Order regime. The Indonesian press in particular, had finally earned its long sought freedom, with Habibie putting press freedom as his first priorities. These changes were set to be further strengthened with the new press law: Law No. 2/1999.

Tiffen argues that Indonesia in the late 1990’s was significantly different than what traditional cultural followers and commentators would have foreseen for Indonesia.\textsuperscript{318} This was particularly true if one was to employ pre-World War 2 ethnographic descriptions from Margaret Mead or Indonesia’s Clifford Geertz\textsuperscript{319}. Clifford Geertz was able to map the social demographics of Javanese society and his work remains true for many foreigners today.
Tiffen was correct to warn that the cultural aspect was very complex and should not
be used in a simplistic manner to explain the current condition of Indonesia (in 1999
in particular). However I disagree with his point regarding Geertz in that much of
what Geertz said about traditional Javanese culture and society is very relevant in
analysing Indonesian society, even during the East Timor crisis in 1999.

The differences between the New Order regime’s definition of a press system and that
of the Australian press system can be described in the following points:

- Strong authoritative political centre versus an adversarial orientation;
- An ethic of restraint and caution versus an ethic of disclosure and
  assertiveness;
- Maintaining public facades versus penetrating private realities;
- Tolerance for patrimonial prerogatives versus an emphasis on due process
  checks and balances;
- Nationalist sensitivities versus assertion of universal ethics.

Within Australian society, power over that society lies in an ability to share and
spread power evenly to create a sense of balance.\textsuperscript{320} The Western liberalism system
such as the one in Australia is based on the notion that power should not be
centralised upon single party lines.\textsuperscript{321} The central thought is that pluralism and
diversity of power will instil a balance of power and will result in a balanced strength.

The concept of balance through the process of checks and balances is important, as
when it’s unaccounted for, power will corrupt.\textsuperscript{322} Therefore, the foundation of the
Western press is a self-preserving image that they are serving the interests of society. In order to best serve the society, the press should promote disclosure and discussion.

Judith Lichtenberg argues over which one is more important: freedom of the press or freedom of speech. Western press, as Tiffen argues, is construed under the noble role of preserving basic human rights – and one of these rights is the freedom of speech. But Judith Lichtenberg argues that such a view is actually misleading, in that the basic human right is not about the freedom of speech but about freedom of expression. To be able to express oneself freely without fear of persecution, as long as the expression itself does not violate another’s rights, is a core value. Freedom of speech as championed by the press as simply a part of freedom of expression.

Lichtenberg argues that problems will arise if we were protecting the freedom of speech rather than the freedom of expression. In freedom of expression the rights of the individual are protected, as long they do not violate the rights of others. Freedom of speech, or in the form of freedom of press, basically guarantees that anyone can say anything they want. Problems will arise in reality as mass media, bounded by their obligations to their employers and profit, the available space, and their own political interests may not be able to present all expressions or in this case opinions from disputing parties. Thus protecting the freedom of speech or the freedom of the press instead will limit freedom of expression.
Within such a concept, the thinking that the Australian press is engaging in a noble act in presenting an adversarial orientation, may in fact lead to a promotion of one view only. A recent example is the question I had from an Australian journalist covering Indonesia in 1999.\textsuperscript{325} He said that when questioning Indonesian officials accusing them of corruption, the Indonesian official merely smiles and is not seen as shaking with fear as might be expected to happen in the west. This Australian journalist argues that if such things happened in Australia, the official would be trembling or reacting with fear. My answer was that in Indonesia, one has to deal with a litany of accusations including those on corruption, if they were holding an important position. Furthermore I explained that at that time, public officials only answer to their superiors not to the public. The Indonesian press often reports such allegations against public officials, but unless there is a political willingness from the official’s superior, then it would not lead to much further action\textsuperscript{326}.

In my opinion, such an adversarial orientation, as noble as it may be, could turn into problem of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. The news media is right to be a watchdog, but this situation could turn against the media itself as without sufficient safeguards, the media could become a promoter or proxy for certain political interests, including its own.

Under the Australian system, political balance makes under the auspices of openness. The public in the Australian system have the ability to replace any unwanted politicians and rulers and this is the most basic means of downward accountability.\textsuperscript{327} Thus, political responsibility as well as the public’s attention will be focused on the
leaders. Personal attack is not only allowed but is also the norm of the political circus.\textsuperscript{328}

Not only is blame personalised, but personal denigration becomes the common currency of political rhetoric, reaching far beyond the debating of policy differences. Personal vitriol has long been the common discourse. We are not shocked that during the 1980 election Deputy Prime Minister Anthony called Opposition Leader Hayden a ‘sissy’, that in 1984 Opposition Leader Peacock called Prime Minister Hawke a ‘cheap little crook’, or that in 1987 Treasurer Keating called Opposition Leader Howard a ‘wimp’. Indirectness is hardly in evidence.

With both the political opposition and the media there is a strong adversarial attitude, which some have claimed extends into a ‘tall poppy’ syndrome, which takes delight in cutting the leaders down to size. The methodology is one of gathering reactions and balancing viewpoints, highlighting the extent of contention. Sometimes, especially when a leader is succeeding politically, there is deference and ready acceptance of official viewpoints, but more often the tone is of impartial detachment verging into judgemental moral superiority.\textsuperscript{329}

The last sentence highlighted the point here that with such strong conviction of the role of the press in Australian society, the Australian press can fall into the trap of assuming the role of a superior moral judge.

Orientalism is worth examining in this context - a concept derived by Edward Said in his renowned book: “Orientalism”\textsuperscript{330} - where Said argued that the Orient (the society outside the western world – referred to here as Islamic and Asian societies) and Occident (the western world) worked as oppositional terms, so that the "Orient" was constructed as a negative inversion of Western culture.\textsuperscript{331}

The Orient, according to Said, is perceived as inferior to the West and this is reinforced with cultural perceptions within the Western society (Said, 2003). Of course such a perception stirs controversy especially within Western societies but it is worth noting that in Indonesia, the term: ‘Orientalists’ has been used to describe a person who perceives Islam negatively.\textsuperscript{332} I shall visit Said’s theory again in the later part of this thesis.
A second point that Rodney Tiffen makes about the main traits that the Australian press differentiates from the Indonesian press is the ethic of disclosure and assertiveness. In contrast with the press in South East Asian countries, the Australian press puts emphasis upon a culture of confidence, in the belief that openness, whatever its short-term consequences will ultimately be beneficial. The result is a press that can be perceived to be assertive but in a different context, may be viewed as arrogant. Tiffen explains:

In most normal circumstances, Western journalism displays a culture of confidence, an ethic of disclosure, in the belief that openness, whatever its short-term consequences, will be ultimately beneficial. This produces not only an impatience with secrecy and a reluctance to acquiesce to others’ desire to suppress information, but develops into an assertiveness of the prerogatives and a directness-cum-sensationalism in presentation.

The core of this value comes from the belief that it is the role of the press to present truthful facts to readers. The Western media believes that their actions are based upon their institutional purity. But this is exactly where critics, especially from a complex society such as Indonesia, perceive the Western press as driven by a sensationalistic goal; that the Western press is often irresponsible over the way and the consequences of the news they report; and as former Indonesian Ambassador Wiryono said: the western press is arrogant and boastful.

As Tiffen argued, this aspect leaves the Western press susceptible to a self-fulfilling prophecy driven by its own arrogant condition. The Western press thus becomes trapped in a self image of nobility. In reality, it not only runs the risk of being perceived as ‘arrogant’ but as Chomsky argues - the Western press could be
manipulated by parties (such as the media owners themselves, government and related big business) that have the control over the press.

The third point that Tiffen made of the Australian press is its tendency to penetrate private realities. To some the trait of a liberal democracy as described before is a sense of assertiveness and openness, where everybody is perceived to be equal and the leaders are openly answerable to the public. In this sense, for the political actors, there will be a limited private sphere as they are now under public scrutiny as the 'public figure test' in the USA. The press in this context is acting on behalf of the public in watching and scrutinising the political actor’s actions, either in public or in private.

As described earlier, in Australia, the life of the politician is a relatively public one. For Australian politicians, their public and private life is in the same sphere where the press tend to report everything. One example was of the former Federal Opposition leader Mark Latham, where the press often reported on his private life, such as how Latham had hit someone in a brawl, many years before he became a top politician.337

This kind of ‘professional’ bravado was non-existent in Indonesia during the New Order regime. Not only does Indonesian culture generally look down on such behaviour defined locally as a ‘smear campaign’, but to do so to public officials is against the law and carries the maximum sentence of death. The fall of the New Order regime broke much of the cultural and institutional chains in the Indonesian press and
by 1999 some of the newspapers and tabloids were openly practising the sensationalistic journalism that we know so well in the west.\textsuperscript{338}

The fourth point that Tiffen made is an emphasis on due process, checks and balances. As described earlier, the Australian press deriving from the Western liberal culture believes that the fair and democratic foundations of society exists within the division of power. Power, should be distributed evenly and not be invested in a single institution or person. Part of the division of power is an emphasis on due process. It is the system that counts and not the individual.

As such, the Australian press puts an emphasis upon the open description of events, in which the propriety of processes easily becomes a more pronounced point of reference than the substance of policy, except insofar as substance is reflected in the unfolding controversies surrounding official actions.\textsuperscript{339} But again, without a proper safeguard, the press can be all at once the police, the judge and the jury - therefore the Australian press puts much emphasis upon their own code of ethics.

The fifth point that Tiffen made regarding the Australian press is the assertion of universal ethics. The Western press, including the Australian press, are strong believers in open borders and especially in the universal application of human rights.\textsuperscript{340} For the Australian press, stories of human rights abuses or the plight of humanity always attract wide attention from within the Australian public. One example is of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989:

In Australia, for example (although not always consistently) a strong emotional response to humanitarian issues beyond our borders. The outrage and the sorrow that were widely
expressed in so many ways following the Beijing massacres in 1989 were a dramatic illustration of a tendency that no doubt complicates the lives of our diplomat.

A similar issue as above was when there were Australian lives involved in the story, suddenly the issue of human rights is projected beyond Australian soil. The classic example is when the Sari club and Padi pub were bombed in 2002 in Bali. Immediately the Australian media picked up the story as the media knew that Bali at that time was the top destination of Australian tourists and the two targets were well known to Australian tourists. So there was a big chance that there would be Australian victims. The media was not to be disappointed.

I was watching television that night, taking a break from doing my research. Just around 1.30AM (Sydney time) I send a couple SMS to my wife who was working at that time in Bali. She replied back to me accordingly, it was around 11.30 in Bali. Suddenly there was an announcement in the television that there was a bombing in Bali. The announcer only said that they expected to many casualties as the target were club and pub full with people.

Soon after that, a friend of mine called me saying the same news. Immediately I contact my wife again and she confirmed that she felt a massive blast even where she lived on the other side of Bali. For a week all the Australian media from television, radio and print media were full of headlines of what is known now as the first Bali bombing.

After the shock subsided, the media immediately picked up the frames that Australia is now a target of terrorist sleeper cells and that the Bali bombing was a direct attack on Australia. All sorts of theories emerged, such as a small nuclear bomb blew up the club and pub, as at that time the response from Indonesian security officials was very slow and with sketchy details. It took months for the officials to be able to publicly confirm that there were several bombs that blew up that night and it took several years to admit that there was more than one suicide bomber at that time.

The Australian media was almost unanimous in agreeing that the terrorist attack in Bali was aimed at Australia and Australians. It seems that the Australian media
refused to accept the confession of the Bali Bombers, such as the leader – Imam
Samudra, that the terrorists’ main target was American and British tourists. Imam
Samudra himself admitted that he couldn’t tell the difference between an American
and an Australian.

When the terrorists were finally arrested, one by one, the Australian media were not
shy in airing opinions from the public insisting that the terrorists be sentenced to
death. When Bali’s court finally sentenced most of the terrorists to death, the media
shows the emotional response of support from the Australian people particularly
those who lost their relatives or friends in the bombing.

Ironically, in 2004 a young female beautician named Schapelle Corby was arrested in
Bali airport. The customs officials in Bali airport found four kilograms of cannabis in
her surf bag. The same media circus started again but with a different twist. This time,
as the main perpetrator was an Australian, the frames was absolutely different so the
medias stance during the Bali bombing. From the emotional support for Schapelle
Corby’s innocence (when asked why people believed in her story, many including my
friend said that Schapelle Corby has innocent eyes); theory that she was framed by an
international narcotics mafia working in Australian airports; to the story that even if
she did bring in the cannabis it is not a big crime.

The irony was that the Indonesian police in Bali and at the Bali court, hailed as heroes
during the previous terrorists trials, were now the target of the mockery and
vengeance of the Australian press and public. One radio talkback personality in
Sydney made a mockery of Indonesia President’s skin colour as the colour of monkey. These examples are important to show how Australian press sometimes follows their own prejudice, as described by Tiffen and Said above. This begs the question as to whether the Australian press is upholding the idealism they aspire to to or has that very nobility, blinded them to their own prejudice – justified as they believe they represent a higher moral ground.

3.8. Media ownership and reporting preference

As discussed earlier, modern Indonesian media have a totally different history compared to their Australian counterpart. This caused significant differences in how the media perceived an event as the history of the media and its society construct different perception on similar issue. The major reason, as described earlier in Chapter 1 is human always react and perceived events that happen in front of them in relation of their previous experience.

Another probable factor is media ownership. As described in Chapter 1, Australian and Indonesia media came from two different press systems. Australian press with their liberal press system and Indonesian press with their developing press system. The difference in the press system will significantly affects the way the media operates and the outcome of their reports.
Within Indonesian press system, in particular during the New Order era, control is done through proxies rather than direct control. Direct control does happened occasionally but normally it only happened in extreme cases. Below is a greater explanation in how the Indonesian government control the media (during the New Order) and in comparison with Australian media.

During the New Order, Indonesian government imposed a strict control to the media using several methods. First is the supply of the papers. Papers for the press industry was still imported and the importation was strictly controlled by the government. Second was through the establishment of Indonesia Newspapers Publishers Association (SPSI). This association was controlled by placing several government officials as part of the top leadership.

The third method is by requiring journalists to become members of journalists association (PWI) that again was controlled by the government. All media leaders are required to be a member and without one they can not hold any top position in the media. Again the government controlled the association by placing their own people as the leader. The clearest example is the status of ANTARA which is a state new agency. ANTARA journalists when traveling on assignment may use government official passport (nick named as ‘blue passport’ due to the colour of the cover). Putting the ANTARA journalists in similar position as government official.

The most feared method of control is by revoking the press license. All media in Indonesia during New Order regime are required to have a press license. In fact this
applies mostly to print media as private broadcast media are not allowed to make their own news reports. If a media is considered to have breached the ‘code of conduct’, the government then can revoke the press license effectively eliminating the media.

Most damaging part of this method is the fact of losing the license also means the loss of income for the employee of the media itself. This include non editorial staff as well as the editorial team, meaning they are out of work. Unfortunately for most Indonesians, being out of work is one of the worst reality of life that they would prefer to avoid as far as they can.\textsuperscript{345}

The last press licenses revocation was in June 1994 when the Minister of Information announced that it has revoked the licenses of TEMPO, DeTik and EDITOR. At that time, the press industry fought hard that the decision can be overturned by going through the court. In the end, Indonesian court decided not to overturned the Minister’s decision. The government itself defended their decision by saying that they are allowing journalists and staff from the three media to open a new ones. TEMPO ‘successor’ named GATRA was then heavily criticized for often representing government statements without checking its credibility.\textsuperscript{346}

This does not means that the government did not tried to control the media through media ownership. Several newspapers with close connections with the government did exist such as ANGKATAN BERSENJATA and PELITA. ANGKATAN BERSENJATA was a newspaper closely affiliated with the armed forces while PELITA was the official newspaper from GOLKAR. As such, within the press
The virtue of controlling by proxy is the cost effectiveness. The government did not have spend money in acquiring any media yet they can control the media thoroughly. If there is an event that is deemed to be too sensitive to be reported, government officials can called all media and announced that the event is too sensitive to be reported. This often came at the last minute before deadline time for the media and in the form of telephone call. As such, the journalists then called it: “Telephone culture”. Failure to heed such ‘warning’ will result in warnings and the most serious warning came from the Ministry of Information as it carries the risk of license revocation.

In the case of the news media being analyzed here, all four have no direct ownerships by the government. One newspaper, \textit{SUARA PEMBARUAN} was actually banned before by the Indonesian government. Nevertheless one, \textit{REPUBLICA} does have a close relationship with the government. We shall look into it below.

\textit{KOMPAS}, \textit{SUARA PEMBARUAN} and \textit{MEDIA INDONESIA} are all privately owned and funded newspapers. \textit{KOMPAS}, the largest and most prestigious newspaper in Indonesia today was founded by two former teachers: Jacob Oetama and P.K. Ojong. They both have a vision of bringing quality information for the Indonesian people. As such one of the credo of \textit{KOMPAS} is to educate the people, something that they still hold true till today.
SUARA PEMBARUAN is the only afternoon newspaper from all newspapers examined. Initially founded under the name of SNAR HARAPAN, it later changed name into SUARA PEMBARUAN after it was banned by the government in mid 1980’s. In Jakarta, SUARA PEMBARUAN was number one afternoon newspaper with almost no close competitor. It is privately owned.

MEDIA INDONESIA was the brainchild of businessman Soerya Paloh. It came out first the form of PRIORITAS which was very popular during its short life in the mid 1980’s. The popularity of PRIORITAS was the result of the differences in format and contents compared to other newspapers. It was using bold headlines supported by often dramatic colour photographs. But what is most interesting is their content which is often very critical politically towards the government. As expected, PRIORITAS did not last for long as the government quickly revoked its license.

In 1988, PRIORITAS came back in the form of MEDIA INDONESIA. It uses the same format as PRIORITAS and in the beginning similar bold content as PRIORITAS was. This style of content did not last for long as MEDIA INDONESIA quickly revised its content to become somewhat ‘tame’. Nevertheless it was very popular among university students partly due to its low price. This unfortunately did not last for long either.

REPUBLIKA was founded in 1992 by Yayasan Abdi Bangsa (Abdi Bangsa Foundation) which was supported by the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesian (Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association – ICMI). ICMI itself was created allegedly
to give some sort of religious support for the government in the form of collective support from Muslim scholars in Indonesia.

In reality many of the ‘scholars’ are technocrats or advisers working for the government. This made ICMI are closely associated with the government although it is also closer to loose membership organization rather than a political organization with clear goal like GOLKAR. Nevertheless, the idealistic vision of the society perceived by ICMI is a modern Indonesian society that incorporate religion but not a religious country. In other words a nationalistic Indonesia just as described in the state ideology of Pancasila.

Despite such proximity with the government, none of the media examined here are owned either partially or wholly by the government. As argued above the government instead opted to control the media by using proxies which in turn are a very elaborate and complex scheme in itself. That way, the Indonesian government could effectively control the media without spending funds to owned the media itself.

After the fall of New Order regime in 1998, the media mapping totally changed. Started with President Habibie’s policy to abolished press revocation 1999 and opening the door wide open for new media. It was known that within 100 days of taking the presidential seat, President Habibie signed approximately 150 new press licenses. President Habibie is effectively allowing Indonesian press to have a taste of liberal system.
Australian press came from a totally different history compared to the Indonesian press. Historically, Australian press did not start as part of an independence movement like its counterpart in Indonesia. Instead it was part of the growing British colony that eventually opted to be an independent country while maintaining its historical link to United Kingdom.

Both Australian newspapers examined here, THE AUSTRALIAN and THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD are privately funded and owned. As such the press system adopted by Australia does not see that press is something that should be controlled by the government. The press under the free press or liberal system is an independent entity, ruled by law but not by the government.

As such it safe to conclude that media ownership plays little in how reportage of East Timor crisis in 1999. None of the media examined here are owned by their government therefore eliminating the possibility of they are reporting their government views due to the ownership. In the coming chapters this issue will be examined more closely.

3.9. Conclusion.

In conclusion, Australian and Indonesian press are representing two different societies. Australia and Indonesia have distinctly different histories, which have helped shape each society differently. Australia and Indonesia also have different
cultures, political systems and values, which in turn are affecting the respective press systems.

It is not the intention of this thesis to judge which society has a more valid perception or which has the superior press. Rather this thesis is simply aiming to create a better understanding about the way the press works in Australia and Indonesia.

The position of this thesis is to accept social relativism and understand that each society is unique and each has its own complexities. The only way to understand each society and its respective press is to understand the context and this should be focused on specific events. Therefore, the next chapters (4 and 5) will be dedicated to understanding some of the case studies regarding the Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports on the East Timor crisis in 1999.
CHAPTER 4

REPRESENTATION OF THE JOURNALIST AT RISK:

THE MURDER OF SANDER THOENES

4.1. Introduction

Sander Thoenes, a Dutch journalist was the only foreigner killed during the East Timor Crisis in 1999 making his death very significant. His death, has parallels with the tragic case of six foreign journalists (all working for Australian media at the time) who were killed during the Indonesian invasion in 1975. The two tragedies have similarities in that in both cases, the identity of the perpetrators remains unknown and exactly how the journalists died is still a mystery. Thoenes was not the only journalist who was killed in the line of duty in the East Timor crisis. Agus Mulyawan, an Indonesian journalist was also killed but unlike Thoenes his death did not attract much attention in his own country, let alone abroad.

The representation of Sander Thoenes’s death has been selected for examination because he was the only foreigner killed during the crisis, because of the historical resonances of his death, and thirdly because of the wide coverage his death received in the Indonesian and foreign media. What is of interest here, however, is the often
stark contrasts between reporting of the events in the Indonesian and foreign (Australian) newspapers.

Sander Thoenes was a 30 year old Dutch born journalist. At the time of his death, he was working for the London based *Financial Times* and assigned to Indonesia as their correspondent. He was reported to have a broad understanding of Indonesian social and political affairs as well as being fluent in the Indonesian national language.

Thoenes arrived in East Timor with other INTERFET’s accredited journalist and according to fellow journalists was an unexceptional member of the press corps.354 His death, was regarded very seriously and received wide publications everywhere except Indonesia:

Foreign journalists working in Indonesia before Sander Thoenes’s death often worked under the assumption that they were invincible. I often saw during demonstrations in Jakarta in 1998 that foreign journalists liked to put themselves right between the demonstrators and the security forces. Sometimes these journalists were right in the very front line. When I asked a fellow journalist from *Media Indonesia* about this, his answer was: ‘Those [foreign] journalists know that if they were to be beaten in public by Indonesian security forces, they can make a big case out of it’.355

According to reports, Thoenes was last known riding pillion on a rented motorcycle taxi (ojek) towards the Becora district in Dili. He and his driver then came to a road block manned by several men. Some reports said that those men were wearing Indonesian military uniforms. Confronted by the road block, the driver panicked and turned the motorcycle away. While doing this, there were shouts from the men and shots were fired. Both the driver and Thoenes fell to the ground. The driver managed to run away but Thoenes did not. The ojek driver notified INTERFET which organized a search party. Thoenes body was found the next day, more or less in the
spot where the driver left him. According to reports he had been shot and hacked to death.\textsuperscript{356}

According to Melvin Singh, a Singaporean journalist, he was supposed to go to Becora district that very morning. Except the ‘o\textit{jek}’ driver that promised to take him had already gone, taking Sander Thoenes (which he learnt later). After the shooting, the driver Araujo tried to seek help but was dismissed by INTERFET troops as Araujo could not speak English. Later, Araujo told Melvin Singh about the incident and INTERFET were duly notified. Then INTERFET arranged a rescue mission which unfortunately was too late.\textsuperscript{357}

The saga continues though with the question still lingering about who and what killed him. There were reports that he was shot and there reports that he was not shot. An Indonesian police officer who saw the body confirmed that he was shot in the butt but said that it was his observation that Thoenes was hacked to death.\textsuperscript{358}

The drama surrounding Sander Thoenes's death is the main focus of the analysis that follows. The analysis will show more than just differences in culture or news values account for the difference in representation of these events. The analysis, refracted through three different approaches will lead to a new understanding of how Australian and Indonesian newspapers operate. Due to space limitation, the articles analysed are not presented in full here. The full versions of the articles are available in appendix B.

4.2. Analysis

4.2.1. Robert Entman model of analysis.

American professor of communication Robert Entman has developed an analytic approach that provides a way of discovering below the surface messages and perspectives in news reports.\textsuperscript{359} The method Entman proposes focuses on five aspects of press articles which he argues give readers an understanding about how the story can be ‘framed’. The aspects of a frame are.\textsuperscript{360}
1. Size judgements. The amount of space and the degree of prominence given to the stories by the media. The importance of a story is signalled by its placement on the front page of a newspaper or as the lead item in a news bulletin. A decisive statement of the media’s belief in the ‘irrelevance’ of an event is its omission.

2. Agency. The usage by the media of certain words and images to suggest how and where responsibility of an event being reported should be placed.

3. Identification. The usage by the media of certain words and images that encourage or discourage identification with those most directly involved in the media story.

4. Categorisation. The different ways in which media label events or issues. Different categorisations encourage us to look at events in very different ways.

5. Generalisation. The degree to which the media generalise from an incident or issue in which the event occurred or in which the issue arose.

4.2.1.1. Size and placements.

All Indonesian newspapers placed the story of Sander Thoenes on their front page.

All of their headlines are about Sander Thoenes’s tragic fate. This shows how important the new reports were for Indonesian newspapers. Indeed this was probably the first foreign journalists killed while doing assignment in Indonesia.

As far I can remember during my journalism career (since 1990), I have never heard that any foreign journalist was ever intentionally hurt in Indonesia during their line of duty. It was common knowledge that Indonesian security, who never hesitate to beat up any journalists who fall into their hands, never did the same with any foreign journalist. This created a ‘myth’ of invincibility for foreign journalists. During the ‘demonstration season’ in 1998, I heard
many stories how these tall, white journalists stood between the security forces and the student demonstrators. Sometimes the foreign journalist even mocked the security officers knowing that they would not be harmed.361

The Thoenes stories in the Indonesian newspapers are quite long. Suara Pembaruan’s story was 894 words, Media Indonesia’s was 628 words and Republika’s was 900 words. Clearly a significant effort was made to produce the story – these were not just some byline stories put in to fill the paper.

In Australian newspapers, although Sander’s death hit the headlines, none of the stories got to the front page. Instead they were relegated to the ‘special reports’ section within the newspapers. This gives an impression that though it was important, the incident was not regarded as critically important for Australian readers.

In term of length of the articles, The Australian was 335 words and The Sydney Morning Herald stories were 446 and 707 words long. In comparison with Indonesian newspapers, the Australian articles were quite short.

Kompas, Indonesia’s largest newspaper was the only newspaper that did not publish the story of Sander Thoenes’s death. This is in contrast when compared with other newspapers. Kompas did not even mentione Thoenes’s death until a much later date after his death. For a clearer comparison of the articles length, we can see Table 1.
Table 1. shows the length of articles published regarding Thoenes’s death. This is an indication of the relative importance of the Sander Thoenes’ death within Australian and Indonesian newspapers. As noted above, Sander Thoenes’s tragic death was featured more prominently (in term of allocations) within Indonesian newspapers compared to Australian newspapers.

East Timor is always an enigma for journalists. According to Dayat Gautama, a former photojournalist from TEMPO magazine, East Timor under Indonesian rule was closed to most journalists. Only a handful of journalists were allowed to enter the area; Dayat was one of them. For him, the area was associated with constant danger where everyone had to be extremely careful with anyone they were dealing with. In his own words, Dayat described East Timor for journalists: “Who says it [East Timor] is a tourist area?”

Prior to the referendum the attacks on journalists were known to intensify and at the same time the numbers of international journalists present was increasing. Two Indonesian journalists, one working for Reuters and another for Kompas were shot and seriously injured. The photojournalist from Reuters, Bea Wiharta, was known within the (Indonesian) journalists as a serious and careful photojournalist. The fact that he was attacked and injured really brought up the sense of danger in East Timor.

The sense of danger in reporting in East Timor was very real – at least for Indonesian journalists. East Timor was described above was a ‘closed’ territory for years meaning no outsiders let alone journalist can enter the area without permission from
the military. Only a handful of journalists were allowed and they were carefully
selected by the military. But this didn’t dampen the interest of the Indonesian public
on East Timor. The death of Sander Thoenes was a tragedy. But for Indonesian
journalists who used to cover the area, it was part of the risk of reporting in East
Timor. The fact that it happened merely confirmed the realisation that East Timor was
a very dangerous area.

4.2.1.2. Agency.

Agency reports refer to the issue of who may be considered responsible in a particular
event. Indonesian newspaper articles stated that Sander was last seen alive when
being chased by ‘men in uniform’.\textsuperscript{363} The implication is that it was Indonesian
soldiers (TNI) that chased and killed Sander Thoenes. Nevertheless TNI officials
strongly rejected the accusation that TNI was involved in Thoenes’ killing. Some
Indonesian officials even said that INTERFET should be considered responsible as
INTERFET was de-facto responsible for the security in the territory.\textsuperscript{364}

In general, however, Indonesian newspapers took the view that Sander Thoenes’s
death was due to the risk of working in a conflict area. This was highlighted by a
statement from INTERFET commander – Major General Peter Cosgrove. Cosgrove
was quoted by \textit{Republika}\textsuperscript{365} and \textit{Suara Pembaruan}\textsuperscript{366} on September 22 and 23, saying
that East Timor is still a dangerous area despite the arrival of INTERFET.
Republika in its headline and article strongly asserted that INTERFET was responsible for the death. In its article Republika quoted Ja'far Assegaff, a former member of the Indonesian Press Council, who said that as INTERFET was the party holding the mandate for maintaining security in East Timor, it was responsible for Thoenes's death.\(^{367}\)

Besides Assegaff, Republika also cited other Indonesian press officials who attributed responsibility to INTERFET.\(^{368}\) One the officials quoted is Parni Hadi, Republika's own chief of editor. Nevertheless, Republika did not mention Parni Hadi as its own Chief of Editor in the article. Republika also mentioned the last accounts of Thoenes's death, quoting from the ojek driver that Thoenes used. The driver stated that Sander Thoenes's killers were people wearing Indonesian Police uniforms. Republika was the only newspaper that claimed the people who stopped and shot at Sander Thoenes were wearing Indonesian Police uniforms.\(^{369}\)

Suara Pembaruan in its headline stated that a foreign journalist was killed by slash wounds.\(^{370}\) The killers were identified as 'Men in military uniforms', again based upon the statement by the Ojek driver – Mr Araujo.

Among Indonesian journalists covering the chaotic period of 1998 – 1999, life on the street was always high with risk. A peaceful demonstration could lead into serious trouble. A student of mine who was doing an internship with The Indonesian Observer went to cover a demonstration in the Proclamation Monument in Central Jakarta. Soon he felt that his presence was not welcome by some of the demonstrators. The student was also aware that many of the demonstrators were carrying sharp weapons like spears and machetes in public, and that's when he decided that he should leave.

As he was leaving, suddenly he felt he should stop. He stopped for a second and as he was about to start moving again, he saw a spear land right in the spot where he would be if he had not stopped before. Had he kept walking, he would have been seriously injured or even dead.\(^{371}\)
Australian newspapers squarely blamed Indonesian military for the incident. Their reports were that Sander’s killer suspect/s were wearing Indonesian military uniforms (Murdoch, 1999a, Williams, 1999, Greenlees, 1999). Some article even portrayed this incident as part of a systematic campaign to intimidate journalists and the Indonesian public as a way of maintaining power for the ruling elite in Indonesia. Though their articles implicated the Indonesian military, Australian newspapers did not mention any comments from Indonesian military. Australian newspapers did not quote any statements from INTERFET regarding Sander death.

Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Placement of responsibility (Perpetrators)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kompas (No articles mentioned Thoenes death)</td>
<td>Six men in military uniforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suara Pembaruan (September 22)</td>
<td>Unknown parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Indonesia (September 23)</td>
<td>Men in Indonesian Police uniforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika (September 23)</td>
<td>Killers dressed in Indonesian military uniforms (TNI?). Although militias sometimes wear bits of uniform, Mr Araujo has no doubt these were Indonesian troops (TNI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sydney Morning Herald (September 23 and 25)</td>
<td>Killers dressed in Indonesian military uniforms (TNI?). Although militias sometimes wear bits of uniform, Mr Araujo has no doubt these were Indonesian troops (TNI).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. shows the agency using the agency report in general, almost all (except Republika) agreed with the allegation that Sander Thoenes was killed by men in uniform, most likely Indonesian army uniforms. These statements attribute the
responsibility directly towards Indonesian military (TNI), which was flatly rejected by the TNI.375

The death of Sander Thoenes brought public attention to the working conditions for journalists in East Timor. The emphasis on the dangers that Sander Thoenes faced as a foreign journalist (eventually leading to his death) was disproportionate compared to the dangers Indonesian journalists faced.

During the East Timor crisis, Indonesian military (TNI) and Indonesian Police (POLRI) were clearly being blamed for the chaos before and after the referendum. Before the involvement of Australia and INTERFET, I think most Indonesian will agree that TNI and POLRI had been responsible for many bloody incidents like the Tanjung Priok incident in 1985 where armed troops opened fire to a mass of demonstrators at the port of Tanjung Priok.

For the foreign journalists in East Timor, perhaps for the first time in Indonesia they were ever threatened by armed mobs and at the same time the military and police failed to protect them as they should. I can understand how frustrated the foreign journalists were about that experience. But such experiences were a common thing for Indonesian journalists working in the field. Prior to the referendum, two Indonesians journalist (one, Bea Wiharta, was working with Reuters) were shot and seriously wounded. Their plight was not even mentioned in any of foreign reports at that time.376

For Indonesian journalists working in Indonesia, risk was part of the reality. Unlike their foreign counterparts, there was very little they could do if they ever fell victim to the volatile situtation (i.e. got beaten by the mob or by the security forces). Since 1998, the security forces have tried to improve their standard procedures in dealing with demonstrators and journalists, but back then the situation was dangerous for anyone.

4.2.1.3. Identification.

In Australian newspaper reports, Sander Thoenes was humanized in the way he was represented. For Australian journalists, Sander Thoenes was part of a 'family' of
foreign journalists doing their job in a foreign land. An example is from the article written by Don Greenless:

He was a tall, strapping Dutchman, with a thick shock of blond hair, seated astride a motorcycle speeding along Dili’s seafront.

Only hours before Sander Thoenes died, he appeared to brim with the thrill of journalistic adventure.

It came to an end on the dusty verge of a road in Becora, one of Dili’s many bloodstained neighbourhoods.

When the Australian army found his body yesterday, Sander wasn’t easy to recognise.

This handsome 30-year-old, whose pink cheeks made him look years younger, had a bullet through his head and an ear severed by a knife -- a gruesome memento for the killers.

All Australian newspapers reports here are characterised by using first person approach and deliberate use a very personal point of view. Such an approach is valid as the newspapers perceived that their audiences wanted to know what happened in the field as if they were there themselves. This is explained by Rodney Tiffen:

In saturation media coverage, every fresh development is reported breathlessly in an overheated and competitive tendency to exaggerate the significance of the most immediate happenings. The huge human stakes brought great emotional swing with each new development.

The death of Sander Thoenes is perhaps like a sword with two edges. On one hand it provides the western media (including Australia) with a dramatic actualisation of just how dangerous were the conditions in East Timor. This dangerous reality fits in really well with the frame of urgent humanitarian crisis that was heavily promoted by western media including Australia. So it fuels an already explosive situation for the journalists that were covering East Timor, and competition for a more dramatic news angle. On the other hand, the death of Sander Thoenes, was a sharp reminder of how dangerous and real was the danger there. It was a tragedy that such a promising young journalist had to die in such conditions:

The death of Sander Thoenes was to bring long lasting effect. My close friend, Melvin Singh who was working for The New Paper – Singapore told me that because he knew the details of
In contrast to Australian newspapers, the death of Sander Thoenes was portrayed by Indonesian newspapers in a formal, detached and impersonal manner. The description was of a very close associate, a close friend, a well liked colleague. There was no personal description of Sander Thoenes in any of Indonesian newspapers. The only description was of how his body looked when it was found. It was an impersonal description of the kind that marked regular criminal reporting within down-market newspapers in Jakarta.

Such descriptions (of what and where the wounds were) are not unusual for Indonesian newspapers. Crime stories are very popular with the Indonesian public. In fact one of the most popular newspapers in Jakarta is *Pos Kota* whose front page is practically filled with crime stories – every day.

*Pos Kota* used to be an anomaly among newspapers published in Jakarta. *Pos Kota*’s front page is full of various criminal stories that happened in Jakarta. Usually, the most gruesome and horrific case is used as a headline such as when a family was butchered or seven criminals were killed by police. It was also cheap, just around one fifth the price of *Kompas* – the leading newspaper. Nevertheless, *Pos Kota*’s popularity is without doubt, it was more popular in Jakarta than *Kompas*. Surprisingly, though they might not admit it, many of Jakarta’s middle class society buy and read *Pos Kota* regularly.

Crime stories for Indonesian public, though very popular, were often presented in subdued form. There are certain ethical principles that dictate how a crime story can be presented. The victim of a sex crime, for example, must not be identified. There should be no clear picture of gruesome murder victims and the like. In reality the application of the ethical principles depends on the media itself. As a guideline,
Tempo magazine, the leading news magazine in Indonesia, believes that any bad news should not be amplified by bad presentation.\textsuperscript{383}

By describing Sander Thoenes’s lifeless body, Indonesian newspapers seemed to portray him as just another victim of violent crime. Violence is nothing new for Indonesian public. Ever since the former President Soeharto stepped down in 1998, Indonesia has been marred with violence – from criminal violence to daily confrontations between protestors and the authorities.

I know this seems absurd for a foreign journalist, but death is a daily fact that is also a hard news currency in Indonesia. I remember that TEMPO, the leading news magazine, in 1990’s required their trainee journalist to familiarise themselves with the city morgue. A female friend of mine from the university told me a story how she was called close to midnight by her editor in TEMPO and asked to report on an expat who had just committed suicide. As she was not carrying a camera at that time, she was told to explain in details how the corpse looked using the public phone in the morgue.\textsuperscript{384}

In the end, Sander Thoenes was represented as just another casualty of the conflict. The fact that he was a foreigner was the most significant aspect. This fact was highlighted in all Indonesian articles – using the term ‘Wartawan asing’ which means foreign journalist. The term ‘Asing’ here means ‘foreign’ but it also means ‘outsider’. By using such a description, the Indonesian newspapers highlighted the fact that Sander Thoenes, like the rest of foreign journalists was an ‘outsider’. The (informal) attributive meaning here is these people (foreign journalists) are outsiders involving themselves with Indonesian affairs. Combined with the description how Sander Thoenes’s body looked, the Indonesian articles conveyed a message that this ‘outsider’ died as an outcome of his involvement in Indonesian affairs. As violence has become a fact of life in Indonesia, Sander’s death was represented as the logical consequence of the risks that he took.
4.2.1.4. Categorisation.

Australian newspapers tend to portray Sander’s death as tragic and explicitly put the blame onto the Indonesian military (TNI). One article even goes further, arguing that Sander’s death was part of an ongoing intimidation campaign. The implication was that this criminal act shouldn’t go unpunished.385

Both *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* highlighted the gruesome details Sander Thoenes’s death such as the ‘cutting of his ears as souvenirs’.386 The meaning from the articles is that this was a very violent and sadistic killing. Here is a sample article from Don Greenless of *The Australian*:

> When the Australian army found his body yesterday, Sander wasn’t easy to recognise. This handsome 30-year-old, whose pink cheeks made him look years younger, had a bullet through his head and an ear severed by a knife -- a gruesome memento for the killers.387

Indonesian newspapers framed Sander’s death as a tragic incident but inevitable, as the situation on the ground was really dangerous for everybody. All newspapers repeatedly quoted Indonesian and INTERFET officials stating that East Timor is still a very dangerous area. Therefore anyone there, including journalists, were taking a big risk, and that risk might include falling victim to violence.

Indonesian newspapers also framed Sander Thoenes’s death and the risk of working in East Timor with reports that Indonesian journalists had received death threats allegedly from pro-Independence supporters. Such threats were deemed serious enough to warrant the evacuation of all Indonesian journalists.388
Framing East Timor stories in this way creates the impression that East Timor was a very dangerous place, especially for journalists. Being there meant taking a huge risk upon oneself.

A friend (Indonesian) who worked for the Associated Press in Jakarta loved to teased Dayat (former photojournalist from TEMPO). 'He (Dayat) is so morbid, he always carried two dog tags – one around his neck and another in his ankle, whenever we went to East Timor,' said my friend. Such is the reality that journalists took when reporting in East Timor.389

Every year, many journalists in Indonesia became victims of violence. Often it happened during assignments where they were simply at the wrong place at the wrong time, ending being beaten up by mobs or by security officials. Various press organisations (including the media themselves) tried to raise the issue but many Indonesian journalists still fallen victims.390 Interestingly, the risk of doing journalistic work in Indonesia was dismissed by Australian academic’s Angela Romano as she noted in her book:391

Complaints about press freedom were connected with a twofold cord of dissatisfaction that the news industry was weak against the institutions of power and there were few avenues of protection for journalists against physical threats. Many engaged in melancholy reflections on the small but real possibility of bashing, torture or other persecution. They saw the 1996 murder of Yogyakarta journalist, Fuad Muhammad Syarifuddin - apparently in relation to his investigation of bribery that was linked to the first family - as symbolic of the dangers that they and their colleagues might encounter.392

Given such realities, it is understandable that Indonesian newspapers represented the death of Sander Thoenes, a fellow journalist, simply as a victim of a generally chaotic situation. In other words, as gruesome Sander Thoenes killing may be, his death simply was a tragic outcome of working in an environment such as East Timor.

For Australian newspapers, in particular the journalists who are like Thoenes, foreigners assigned to foreign lands, the representation was of a fatal tragedy. For
these journalists, the loss is of a friend and a fellow journalist, and the factor of friendship may have affected their perception and representation of Sander’s death.

4.2.1.5. Generalisation.

Australian newspaper accounts of Sander Thones’s death generalize in a way that they link his death to other factors tied to the political situation at that time. First, the Indonesian military and the pro-Integration militias are portrayed as the culprits of the violence in East Timor. Second, Sander’s killing is represented as not an isolated incident but part of a power struggle scheme in Indonesia.

The Australian media and Government apparently believed that violence in East Timor after the referendum was conducted by pro-Integration supporters as presented by Murdoch\textsuperscript{393}; Murdoch\textsuperscript{394}; Hewett\textsuperscript{395}; Crouch\textsuperscript{396}; Lagan; Collins and Reed\textsuperscript{397}. Pro-Integration supporters including the militias, were allegedly created, trained, armed and controlled by the Indonesian military. This leads to the assumption that the Indonesian military allegedly is technically and morally responsible for the violence. As we have noted, Sander Thoenes was last seen being chased and shot at by a group of men, supposedly wearing Indonesian military uniforms. This information, vague as it was, helped to frame what the Australian media and government believed about who was responsible for all the violence.

*The Sydney Morning Herald* published a story portraying Sander Thoenes’s death as part of an ongoing campaign of intimidation. It connected Sander Thoenes’s killing
with violence in other areas such as Irian Jaya and Aceh. The article also connected the killing to the continuing demonstrations outside Australian embassies and consulates.

Such descriptions gave the impression that there is an ongoing ‘campaign of intimidation’ in different areas in Indonesia. The aim of such campaigns, which were conducted mostly by the military, was to maintain the status quo. The status quo was created when former President Soeharto left power in 1998. Since then a power struggle was continuously fought by various factions within Indonesia. The article argued that in these circumstances it was in the interest of the military to keep its interests covered. The article also pointed out that ‘human cost’ is nothing in this power struggle.398

His death, some believe, was part of the bigger picture he had been talking about with friends: the use of terror, intimidation and the provocation of violence to promote the political interests of the Indonesian military and to maintain the status quo.

What killing Sander, one of the most qualified and insightful members of the Jakarta-based foreign press corps, achieved was to frighten other journalists seeking the truth about the Indonesian military and the militia’s brutal role in East Timor over the past weeks.

But his death was just part of an ongoing fear campaign to demonstrate that despite the democratic face of the post-Soeharto Indonesian Government, the authoritarian forces of the military still hold the real power and they have no intention of letting it go.399

Indonesian newspapers took a different view which may be represented in this way: first, INTERFET should be held responsible for Sander’s death as INTERFET was responsible for security in East Timor.400 Second, as tragic it may seem, Sander’s death was the result of the risks of being in conflict area such as East Timor.401
The Indonesian military (TNI) also rejected the allegations that they were involved with Sander Thoenes's killing. TNI spokesman, Major General Sudradjat stated that TNI was not involved with the killing. In the end, an impression of 'TNI versus the world' could not be avoided.

Following the discussion and analysis above, there are several tentative conclusions that can be drawn from analysis using Robert Entman's model. The conclusions are:

- The Robert Entman model does provide a systematic approach in analysing frames. Though the emphasis may be in quantifying the data, this model has allowed for a more systematic model of analysis.
- From this model, a new picture regarding Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports on East Timor (in this case focused on Sander Thoenes's death) has emerged.
- Australian and Indonesian newspapers seem to present their reports based upon their different understanding and representation of the situation. The understandings are derived mainly from the experiences of the members of the press (the journalists) as members of their own society (Australian or Indonesian).
- The reports were framed close to the frame that was thought to be best understood by each society. As the two societies are inherently different, the reports and frames were different as well.

Robert Entman's model, although systematic, is, however, not considered adequate enough to generate a thorough understanding of Australian and Indonesian media
practices during East Timor crisis in 1999. Thus, it is deemed necessary that further analysis is conducted using a more comprehensive approach. As such, the next analysis is based upon the model from Peter White, which relies on a completely different approach in analysing the news.

4.2.2. Peter White’s model of analysis.

Peter White’s analytical model depends on linking semantic elements of newsworthiness in news reports. He argues that within the narrative of news reports lies a hidden message.

According to White, newspaper reports on the East Timor crisis fall into the ‘hard news’ category. White defined ‘hard news’ as reports that are typically associated with eruptive violence, reversals of fortune and socially significant breaches of the moral order. White argues that by analysing the generic structure, a mode of textual organisation unique to mass media which gives ‘hard news’ its textual distinctiveness, the hidden meaning can be uncovered. Thus in White’s opinion ‘hard news’ is no longer an ‘objective, neutral and impersonal’ mode of meaning making. Instead, ‘hard news’ reports acts to construct and naturalise a model of political stability, morality and normalcy.

There are two points to be analysed here based on White’s method: newsworthiness and the voice of the ‘hard news’ reporter. Newsworthiness is based upon how much the story shows a breach of normalcy, morality and social order. The second element
for analysis is what White refers to as 'the voice of the 'hard news' reporter'. White argues that the myth of 'hard news' reports being always identical with 'objectivity' and neutrality is not true. News reports are human artefacts. Historically situated reporters are very much influenced by various factors such as their culture, political values and morality.

Therefore even when the reporters are writing the hard news as it unravels, the reporters whether knowingly or unknowingly are influenced by many factors 'beyond the simple facts' of the event if we put it that way. Thus, news reports, even if they are 'hard news' reports, will be based on how the reporters perceived the situation. In other words, the reporters will always reports news as they 'see it'.

4.2.2.1. Newsworthiness.

According to White, breaches of normalcy or social order can be classified into three categories: aberrant damage, power relations and normative breach. Aberrant damage relates to physical damages such as the tsunami disaster of 2004. The more physical damage the more newsworthy the event. Power relations are linked to anything that is 'unusual' in the world of politics, and political scandals are a ready source of interest. Again the more unusual the event, the more news worthy the event. The last category is a normative breach which relates with any breach with established norms, values or culture (White, 1997). White demonstrates in his paper that the three categories are not mutually exclusive. There
are many events that may contain the elements of two or more categories. An example is the reports on Tsunami disaster in Aceh on December 26, 2004, where the enormity of the physical damage caused by the tsunami led over time to political scandals associated with the misuse of aid funds and scandals associated with paedophile gangs preying on displaced children.

Furthermore, the Aceh tsunami disaster news items can easily be categorized as aberrant damage due to the level of destruction that was caused. But as the events unfolded, there are stories about the Free Aceh Movement continuing rebellion in the same area. The rebellion stories lent the disaster a political side and even a normative breach as stories of the ongoing conflict came out. Therefore in this thesis, White’s categorisation will be used as a directive rather than mutually exclusive categorisation.

During East Timor crisis in 1999, both Indonesian and Australian print press treated the issue as a very important issue. In total, Indonesian newspapers published 917 articles within the time frame of this study. This is compared to 763 articles published by Australian newspapers during the same period. Arguably the number of articles published shows the relative importance of the crisis to both sides. On average, Indonesian newspapers studied, published around four articles per-day, and Australian newspapers published around six articles daily. The numbers may look relatively small especially for Indonesian newspapers. Nevertheless it is important to remember the context here. We can re-state the average as an article every day over a two month period. The point here is that the numbers show a continuing pattern of interest by the newspapers regarding a specific issue.
The issue itself had significance beyond Australia and Indonesia. The East Timor crisis is a crisis beyond the boundary of East Timor itself. The crisis brought in various countries as the UN was officially involved. In summary, the general issue of East Timor in the context of Indonesia’s interest and Indonesia’s relations with other countries are newsworthy enough. In this analysis, however, drawing on Peter White’s theory, the focus of newsworthiness is not linked to generalities. What this research will focus on is the newsworthiness of specific issues raised by certain articles. In the topic of Sander Thoenes’s death, the issue here is why Thoenes’s death was considered newsworthy enough to be covered in the manner outlined above.

White argues that how the press choose certain issues is not a random process, but is related to how society works. White argues that there is a persistent general norm of how and why certain issues will be valued more ‘newsworthy’ than other issues. As a general guide, White emphasises that the factor that may raise the value of the story is related to how much the story shows a breach of normalcy, morality and social order. It is important to note here that White, like Entman, believes that news is part of the social construction of reality. His method provides a way of getting below the skin of ‘ordinary’ news reports to show how the reports can be analysed as part of a process of creating social reality.

To return to the case under consideration here, each article will be analysed in terms of what it was that made the issue newsworthy within that article. The main rationale is that although each newspaper may have a different standard of newsworthiness, the
fact that they choose this issue shows a similar interest. But paradoxically, the similarity of interest is probably no indicator of overlap between the papers. This analysis aims to show just what aspect of Thoenes’s death it was that really raised the interest of all newspapers.

4.2.2.1. The Australian Articles.

At a glance The Australian reports seem to focus on the core of the tragedy – the death of Sander Thoenes. Thoenes’s death was described as ‘tragic’. The reporter portrayed the ‘tragedy’ in a wealth of personal detail, drawing attention to the journalist’s youth and bodily presence.413

He was a tall, strapping Dutchman, with a thick shock of blond hair, seated astride a motorcycle speeding along Dili's seafront.

Only hours before Sander Thoenes died, he appeared to brim with the thrill of journalistic adventure.

It came to an end on the dusty verge of a road in Becora, one of Dili’s many bloodstained neighbourhoods.

When the Australian army found his body yesterday, Sander wasn’t easy to recognise.

This handsome 30-year-old, whose pink cheeks made him look years younger, had a bullet through his head and an ear severed by a knife -- a gruesome memento for the killers.414

The details serve to portray the tragedy as how the reporters see it. Most readers probably never heard of Sander Thoenes before. Now the reporter here tried his best to describe Thoenes in detail. The reporter gives attention to the contrast between Sander’s vitality before his death, and his cruelly mutilated body when he died.

White argues that newsworthiness is related to the social order.415 If the issue reported is related to breaches or normalcy, social order or law – then the more newsworthy the story will be. In this story Thoenes was described by the reporter as a young,
bright and Caucasian journalist who died in the line of duty. The emphasis on the
details was not without its cultural associations or reasons. The focus on the before
and after reminds us of the broken column monuments in many Australian towns
which signify young men ‘cut down’ before their time in war.

The article above presents a breach of the first type: Thoenes was a Caucasian
journalist. Being a foreigner, physically and mentally he stood out and his sheer
presence fits with White concept of a breach of normalcy. How can a European man,
a foreign journalist and someone who has no direct interest with the chaotic situation,
become a victim of this conflict? The description was presented in the first sentence:

He was a tall, strapping Dutchman, with a thick shock of blond hair, seated astride a
motorcycle speeding along Dili's seafront.

A second breach is related to the assumption that he was murdered – someone
deliberately killed him. A murder, any kind of murder is a fundamental breach of law.
Even then, Thoenes’s death is represented as a kind of double tragedy as Thoenes was
cut down doing what he was professionally engaged to do:

Only hours before Sander Thoenes died, he appeared to brim with the thrill of journalistic
adventure.

The sentence above emphasises that he was a journalist killed while doing his work.
A professional journalist killed in the line of duty; a young and enthusiastic journalist
who died while doing his job. The article continues to highlight this aspect.

It came to an end on the dusty verge of a road in Becora, one of Dili’s many bloodstained
neighbourhoods.
When the Australian army found his body yesterday, Sander wasn’t easy to recognise.
This handsome 30-year-old, whose pink cheeks made him look years younger, had a bullet
through his head and an ear severed by a knife -- a gruesome memento for the killers.
The paragraphs above describe how Thoenes looked when his body was found – shot and mutilated. When a person is killed, it is a clear breach of law and social order or normalcy. In Indonesian law (recall that East Timor at the time was still under Indonesian rules), a murder is a breach of criminal law and carries the death penalty if proven. A murder which involves severe actions such as mutilation is considered as something vile. The article did not state whether Thoenes died because of shooting (it was said that there was a bullet wound) or due to mutilation. The emphasis on mutilation is to show how violent Thoenes’s death was. The death of Sander Thoenes here was described in detail in a way which emphasised violent death, death caused by very violent actions done deliberately. This is not a death caused by an accidents, which is already a tragedy but this is caused by people who intended to inflict violence to another person. This analysis reveals that the report emphasises that a Caucasian journalist was killed while doing his job. His death was not a regular death but a violent one, a very violent one in fact. Thus the death of Sander Thoenes is beyond normal expectations. It was a tragedy caused by very violent act.

Beyond the words, there are other points to be made. The emphasis on Sander’s looks which could be simply read as a general description of him as a lively person, could also be interpreted as marking a distinction - Sander as foreigner, a European with the local populations. The details in the description strongly describe him as a Caucasian, a European; tall and blonde. In comparison indigenous East Timorese are smaller, have dark skin and dark eyes as do most Indonesians.
The physical distinction here serves as a reminder that Sander Thoenes is a Caucasian and a European, a foreigner in East Timor. But such reminders bring back the memory that Sander is part of the same race that used to colonise East Timor and Indonesia, the Caucasian European. Presenting such details can be seen as an act of orientalism, reminding that Europeans used to rule this area and now one of them has fallen victim to their former subordinates.

Edward Said argues that the term and description of ‘Orient’ or the east and eastern societies, is the opposite term of ‘Occident’ which refers to the Western society. In this context, the description of Sander’ physical traits and his origins was highlighting the facts that Sander came from a different society and race, a race that less than a century ago used to colonise the very same area. Now this man from the former colonizer country was found brutally murdered, re-emphasises prejudices about the barbarism that is still apparently part of the former colony.

This interpretation of the article is based upon the idea from White that a news story often reflects the society’s perception of normalcy. For the news media, the bigger the breach of the normalcy, the better it will be as news. Applying that concept here, the description of Sander as a tall, white, blonde European reflects more than physical traits, and goes beyond describing how the body looked after it was found. It can be read as a constructed message saying that a person coming from high standard of civilisation was cut down by a brutal and barbaric act.
Read this way, the report seems to suggest that Sander Thoenes did not deserve the brutal end partly because he was part of the European race. The article was not meant to be racist by any means, but the implied meaning derived from the emphasis on the physical presence of Sander reflects heavily on the concept of orientalism. Again, in orientalism as Edward Said asserted, the Western perception of Eastern society and culture derived from its own fallacy of a superior society and culture.

Being a fellow journalist, I feel sad with the tragic death of Sander Thoenes. First time I heard about it was when I was monitoring the news agencies (while working for The Indonesian Observer). For Indonesian journalists, a fellow journalist in the field a mix between competitor and brothers in arms. So hearing about the death of one of us, is a big tragedy for us.

Nevertheless, I still can not understand even today, why the death of Sander Thoenes can be so important, while other Indonesian journalists who had similar tragic fate in East Timor such as Agus Mulyawan, did not received similar attention in the media. Reading how the Australian media described Sander as a fellow Caucasian made me wonder if the old beliefs in Indonesia about westerner being always more important than an average Indonesian is still true or not.418

4.2.2.2. The Sydney Morning Herald Article

The Sydney Morning Herald described Sander Thoenes’s death as tragic but as part of greater conspiracy done by militias and Indonesian military. Indeed The Sydney Morning Herald story was more direct in naming Thoenes killers.

Several days before he was killed in East Timor, Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes discussed concerns he had about the black operations being conducted behind the public face of the Indonesian Government and military. He was concerned about the violence and death that a power struggle among the Indonesian elite would bring to East Timor.

His own life ended tragically on the outskirts of the East Timorese capital, Dili, his killers dressed in Indonesian military uniforms, his young body mutilated by his killers.

His death, some believe, was part of the bigger picture he had been talking about with friends: the use of terror, intimidation and the provocation of violence to promote the political interests of the Indonesian military and to maintain the status quo.

What killing Sander, one of the most qualified and insightful members of the Jakarta-based foreign press corps, achieved was to frighten other journalists seeking the truth about the Indonesian military and the militia’s brutal role in East Timor over the past weeks.
But his death was just part of an ongoing fear campaign to demonstrate that despite the
democratic face of the post-Soeharto Indonesian Government, the authoritarian forces of the
military still hold the real power and they have no intention of letting it go.

What East Timor represents to the Indonesian military is an unacceptable international
humiliation. To that end public opinion in Indonesia is being manipulated to criticise
Australia's role in the peacekeeping force and sow fear among Australians in Jakarta and other
parts of Indonesia.

The attackers, allegedly Indonesian soldiers, who murdered Sander Thoenes cut his ear and
took it away as some sort of bizarre souvenir.

The 30-year-old Dutch journalist thought it was safe enough to take a ride late on Tuesday on
the back of a motorbike through the Dili suburb of Becora, a one-time independence
stronghold that is now a wasteland.

We all had a false sense of security, after seeing hundreds of heavily armed Australian troops
arriving in the devastated capital of East Timor, and hearing from INTERFET commander
Major-General Peter Cosgrove about the co-operation of the Indonesian military, or TNI.

The Sydney Morning Herald did not portray Sander Thoenes as a Caucasian journalist
as prominently as The Australian, but only identified Thoenes as a Dutch Journalist.

In this article he was portrayed as a journalist killed in his line of duty as a result of
some sinister political conspiracy.

What is considered as newsworthy here first is Thoenes's death. The Sydney Morning
Herald article clearly saw his death as a tragedy, but there is more to Sander's death
than this because it was a violent, deliberate act of murder. The second newsworthy
aspect is Thoenes's death is allegedly caused by a political conspiracy. Thoenes
was killed because certain people wanted to keep their interests in East Timor. From
this point of view, Thoenes's death breached all aspects described by White:
normalcy, social order and political ethics.

Several days before he was killed in East Timor, Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes discussed
concerns he had about the black operations being conducted behind the public face of the
Indonesian Government and military. He was concerned about the violence and death that a
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The Sydney Morning Herald report, like the The Australian article, emphasised Sander’s violent death, and confirmed the kinds of wounds found on his body.421.

4.2.2.3. Media Indonesia article

Media Indonesia presents Thoenes’s death in a more complicated manner. Thoenes’s death, though mentioned in the headline, was not elaborated clearly in the body of the article.

(Situation in Dili is tense – ‘The Financial Times’ journalist killed)

In anticipation of such situation all journalists that were working in Dili were evacuated to KOREM headquarters, especially after there was threat to the dozens of Indonesians journalists still in Dili that they will be killed following the death of foreign journalist, Sandler Toenes (sic), 30 from the The Financial Times. After being threatened, all Indonesian journalists that worked in Dili will be lifted out to Jakarta via Kupang.

From Jakarta, the reaction of the death of the foreign journalist immediately received various comments from different sides. Miniter of Defence/TNI Commander General Wiranto said that he had not received the formal reports of death of a foreign journalist in East Timor.

“Ive heard about the news and I shall check who is involved, why and how it happened. Of course we have to wait for reports,” he said before attending a limited cabinet meeting at Bina Graha, Jakarta, on Wednesday.

Meanwhile the head of TNI information center, Major General Sudrajat said that the allegation of the involvement of TNI personnel in the murder case of the journalist – Sander Thoenes in East Timor, is an unfair allegation, tendentious, had no foundation and was a provocative action.
"Armed Forces's spokesman Major General Sudradjat said that the accusation about TNI personnel's involvement in the death of Sander Toenes in East Timor is an unfair, tendentious accusation, has no foundation and is a provocative act," said the TNI spokesperson to reporters at the TNI headquarters in Jalan Merdeka Barat, Wednesday evening.

Then who is responsible for the death of the journalist in East Timor, is it TNI or INTERFET? A few senior journalists in Jakarta that were contacted by ANTARA on Wednesday said the international troops for East Timor (INTERFET) are responsible for the security of all journalists that are doing their journalistic work in East Timor. This is because the UN sanctioned troops are in control now of the security in the area,

"As an international force, INTERFET should have protected the journalists in area of armed conflict," said Dja'far Assegaf, Chief of Editors at the Media Indonesia daily.

A similar opinion was voiced by Parni Hardi, General Manager of ANTARA news agency and the Republika daily. The former secretary general of PWI asserted that INTERFET should give maximum protection so all journalists regardless of their nationalities, can do their journalistic work safely.

Professor Loebby Luqman, a criminal law expert who is close with journalists also made a similar comment. Loebby asserted that INTERFET should be responsible for the security situation including giving protection to journalists who are doing their duty in the armed conflict areas. This is because the control of East Timor is now fully under the Australian led international force.

Meanwhile, the Head of the National Human Rights commission, Marzuki Drusman, hoped that the stabilisation actions that now are being conducted by the international force should have created justice and equality to all Indonesian citizens in East Timor. 422

The Media Indonesia article did not mention how Sander Thoenes was killed – unlike the Australian newspapers. Instead, Media Indonesia put more emphasis on the political discourse regarding who was responsible for Thoenes’s death.

Within White’s theory, the questioning of who is responsible still comes within the concept of normalcy or social order breach. Nevertheless, the emphasis in the article is not on who is directly responsible but more on who is ‘politically’ responsible.

The article quoted several Indonesian press officials who stated that the responsibility for Thoenes’s death lies with INTERFET. This contradicts the Australian newspaper
articles that put the blame on the perpetrators who were (allegedly) men in Indonesian military uniforms.

An important note as part of newsworthiness is the term used in the headline: ‘Wartawan Asing’. ‘Wartawan asing’ means ‘foreign journalist’ in Indonesian language. But it is significant that this term was used in headlines and yet was not elaborated in the article. The point here is that the article simply wanted to state a foreign journalist was killed. This is the significant part of the article – the newsworthy part. The fact that the article did not elaborate more in the body of the article indicates that the main message was simply that a foreign journalist was killed in East Timor.

4.2.2.3. Republika article.

The Republika daily perceived the newsworthiness of Thoenes’s death again as the death of foreign journalist but also placed the responsibility for the death on INTERFET. Within the article, Republika published details of the wounds found on his body.

The pressure is on for the INTERFET to take responsibility for the death of British newspaper – The Financial Times’ journalist, Sandler Thoenes (sic). The 30 year old Dutch Journalist who has been assigned in Jakarta for two years, was found dead in Becora village, Dili. Declared missing since Tuesday (21/9), Thoenes’s body was found yesterday in bad condition with slash wounds in the heads and other parts of his body.

The death of Thoenes has sparked acts of revenge from the pro-independence group. Yesterday, around 10 Indonesian journalists had reportedly being threatened to be killed by the pro-independence group.

The death of Thoenes was confirmed by the Financial Times’s Public Relation manager, Anoushka Healy. She expressed their deep condolences for the tragedy that killed their correspondent. “We feel very surprised and shocked. Especially after we heard the statement from the witnesses that said that Thoenes was deliberately shot to death”.

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Anouska admitted that she can not comment more about this incident. "We", she said, "are still gathering further information on how Thoenes was killed. After that, we will make the decision on what are we going to do. Are we going to send condemnation to Indonesian government or take other steps".

Within the headline, *Republika* use the term ‘wartawan asing’ in referring to Thoenes. When a foreigner is killed during a conflict in Indonesia, obviously it becomes something beyond normalcy or social order.

4.2.2.4. *Suara Pembaruan* article.

*Suara Pembaruan*, like the other newspapers perceived Thoenes’s tragic death to be the main issue. The headline stated directly that a *Financial Times* journalist was killed with slash wounds. The headline, like the headline of other Indonesian newspaper reports, clearly shows that the newsworthy issue here is the death of this journalist. Nevertheless, unlike the other two newspapers (*Republika* and *Media Indonesia*), *Suara Pembaruan* did not use the term “Wartawan Asing” in the headline.

Headlines which included the phrase ‘Wartawan Asing’ made the foreignness of the journalist the key point. The term foreigner is deliberately used to show that the person killed – the victim, is not a local – not an Indonesian (the East Timorese at that time were often considered as ‘Indonesian’ by general public). By emphasizing the ‘foreign’ aspect in the article, the other Indonesian newspapers created the impression of the involvement of outside parties. In Sociology the term use is: ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. ‘Us’ refers to anyone considered as part one ‘our group’ – part of one’s society.
Them refers to those who are outside ‘our group’ – anyone who does not belong to our group.

Suara Pembaruan’s usage of the unqualified term ‘Wartawan’ in its article shows a different perception compared to other Indonesian newspapers. Without emphasizing the word ‘Asing’, Suara Pembaruan placed more emphasis onto who is this person that was killed in Dili – by implication signifying that it was just another ‘wartawan’ or journalist.

The Commander of the Military Emergency area in East Timor, Major General Kiki Syahnakri when asked by journalists acknowledged the killing of that journalist, said “It is correct that there was one journalist who was killed on Tuesday night. That journalist was killed by slash wounds”.

Indeed the Suara Pembaruan clearly identified who Thoenes was. The name and the nationality of Sander Thoenes clearly shows that he was not a local (Indonesian). So it was clear that he was a foreigner and yet Suara Pembaruan did not choose to highlight that in its headline.

4.2.2.5. The ‘voice’ of the reporter.

The second variable in White’s model is the ‘voice’ of the reporter. Inevitably during the writing of the news report, the ‘voice’ of the reporter will be ‘heard’ or will be visible in reports. This ‘voice’ is actually the ‘subjective’ perception of the reporter which is inscribed and transferred into the news reports. The thinking behind this concept is that news reporting is not about an objective perception. Instead it is ultimately the subjective perception of the reporters that are later transferred into news reports.
In this section the analysis will be focused on the ‘voice’ of the reporter itself in presenting the news of Sander Thoenes’s death. The aim is to see how the reporters position themselves within the news reports that they produced. Thus, we hopefully can see how the reporter is reflected in reports of the incident.

The reports of the Indonesian journalists were significantly detailed and thorough although the specific details of the incident were not as detailed as in the Australian newspapers articles. The immediate perception, as we discovered using Robert Entman’s model of analysis, is of a tragic incident but nothing more than a common criminal incident. In their reports the Indonesian newspapers researched in this study presented Sander’s death through the commentaries of Indonesian public officials. The articles are reproduced here again for convenience with the officials identified in bold.

The Commander of the Military Emergency area in East Timor, Major General Kiki Syahnakri when asked by journalists acknowledged the killing of that journalist, said “It is correct that there was one journalist who was killed on Tuesday night. That journalist was killed by slash wounds”. Suara Pembaruan.

The commander of military emergency in East Timor Major General Kiki Syahnakri confirmed the death of The Financial Times journalist. But he could not explain the caused of the death. Kiki rejects the foreign press reports that Thoenes died after armed contact between TNI and armed gangs. – Republika.

Armed Forces’s spokesman Major General Sudradjat said that the accusation about TNI personnel were involved in the death of Sander Toenes in East Timor is an unfair, tendentious accusation, has no foundation and a provocative act.

From Jakarta, the reaction of the death of the foreign journalist immediately received various comments from different sides. Minister of Defence/TNI Commander General Wiranto said that he has not received the formal reports of death of a foreign journalist in East Timor. – Media Indonesia.

In the Indonesian newspapers, the ‘voice’ of the reporters was considerably ‘detached’ or impersonal. As shown in the Entman analysis, there was no personal
identification by Indonesian reporters towards Thoenes. Indeed, Thoenes was identified as a fellow journalist but there was no emotional sign from Indonesian reporters in reporting Sander Thoenes’s death. As it was described earlier, Sander Thoenes’s death was represented as a criminal case which might be expected in a conflict area such as East Timor in 1999.

Australian newspapers perceived Sander Thoenes’s death in a different way from the Indonesian newspapers. Australian newspapers, both *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald*, presented the loss of Sander Thoenes as a personal loss. Both newspapers, fondly described him in intimate detail, revealing a level of closeness that might exist among friends.\(^{425}\)

*The Australian* article details Sander Thoenes’s physical characteristics which were later contrasted with the description of his lifeless body. Even more moving is the impression created that the reporters from *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* knew Sander Thoenes personally as they were all stationed in Indonesia.

In such a context, it is understandable that the dominant tone of *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* articles was sadness, tragedy and anger. Sander Thoenes was a friend and colleague of these Australian journalists. His death was very sudden and violent which motivates the strong sense of sympathy among his friends and colleagues.

In early in the year 2000, my faculty had a guest from Russia. A professor in communication was visiting Indonesia in cooperation with an NGO – INTERNEWS. After the public lecture, the professor was having a chat with the faculty staff including me. His first question was about Sander Thoenes.
Apparently this Professor knew Thoenes personally back in Moscow when Sander was assigned there. Now in Jakarta, this professor made it his personal mission to ask around whether anyone knew why and how Sander Thoenes was killed. At that time, I didn’t tell him that my close friend, Melvin Singh had known Sander Thoenes and knew a bit about the circumstances of his death.426

Sander Thoenes was young journalists with apparently many friends. His death was a great loss. But the way his death was presented brought out the differences between Australian and Indonesian representation of events. For the Australian newspaper journalists, Sander Thoenes was a close friend and a colleague.427 His death was a personal loss for the journalists and it was presented as such. Along with the loss, comes the anger and that may be what provided the background to why the Australian papers tended to immediately accuse the Indonesian military as being the responsible party for Sander Thoenes’s death.

For the Indonesian newspaper journalists the issue was different. The situation in East Timor in 1999 was of a conflict area where the risk to one’s life was real, and that also applied to journalists. While many foreign journalists were threatened or even beaten by the pro-integration supporters, many Indonesian journalists were also seriously injured in shooting incidents. Indonesian journalist Agus Mulayawan was killed approximately at the same time of Sander Thoenes’s death. Nevertheless, Agus’ death was not reported in any Australian newspaper.

Sander Thoenes death for Indonesian journalists was a tragic incident but understood as part of the risk in reporting in East Timor during such volatile conditions. The voice of the Indonesian reporter was an impersonal, official report of a murder. The tone employed was very similar to plain murder reports in Indonesian newspapers.
The only thing that made Thoenes’ death significant was the fact he was a foreigner, a foreign journalist.

At the end of the day, both Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented their own perception of Sander Thoenes’s death. Both country’s newspapers represented the events in ways that reflected their knowledge, personal relations, involvement or distance from Thoenes. But in the end, the reporters’ voices represented reality in ways that reveal differences between Australian and Indonesian reporters’ culture, values and standards.

4.2.3. Gadi Wolfsfeld’s analytic model.

As described earlier in this chapter, the analysis here will be conducted relying on the model devised by Gadi Wolfsfeld. Wolfsfeld, like Entman and White relies on the concept of ‘framing’ in news reports. The main difference is the context of the frame itself in which the frame is being analysed.

In Wolfsfeld’s model of analysis, news is part of the bigger context of political conflict. Wolfsfeld argues that during political conflict, where two parties are fighting over influence over the general public, the news media functions as the main arena. What Wolfsfeld means is that news media become center stage, the main venue where conflicting parties attack and counter attack each other in order to win political power over the public.
During the East Timor crisis in 1999 as researched in this thesis, what happened was exactly what Wolfsfeld described: two parties (Australia and Indonesia) were fighting over political influence through the news media. In the context of this thesis, Australian and Indonesian newspapers can be understood as the main arena where conflicting parties from Australia and Indonesia continue to fight for political dominance. This part of the analysis is to examine how and who benefits from the political conflict played out in the media, with particular reference to reporting of Sander Thoenes’s death.

In Chapter 2, it was suggested that Wolfsfeld’s model is marked by two basic questions: who are the good guys and how were similar issues covered in the past? The two questions are basic guides against which the frames can be analysed. That is what this part of the analysis is going to do. But unlike the previous part, there will be no singular analysis of each newspaper; instead the analysis will be conducted in unison.

Answering the first question: who are the good guys, we need to refer back the content of the articles. For both Indonesian and Australian newspapers, at a glance, the good guy is similar: Sander Thoenes. Sander Thoenes is hailed as a victim of a bloody conflict, something perhaps surprisingly, on which both Australian and Indonesian newspapers agree. But there the similarity stopped.

Australian newspapers, as shown during the previous analysis, tend to portray Sander Thoenes as a martyr, a hero among foreign journalists. Sander Thoenes was perceived
as a close friend and valuable colleague, and his death was a major loss. Sander’s death was also portrayed as the cynical evidence of a cruel covert campaign by Indonesian military in East Timor.

Indonesian newspapers perceived Sander Thoenes’s death as a tragedy but, represented it as part of the risk of reporting in a conflict area. Sander’s death was understood as similar to other numerous reported deaths during the time – mostly East Timorese. Sander’s death was regrettably, nothing more than one more criminal act that happened in East Timor at the time. Thus it was reported as it is – a criminal act.

Speaking with foreign journalists like Ben Bohane and Melvin Singh, I never ceased to be amazed on how these people have challenged death in some of their assignments. But as a journalist, when you are on assignment, we often ceased to think about anything else but our task at hand. The late Mark Worth, during one of his reports about the conflict in Bougainville, PNG – was shot at. He had the shooting, including the sound of the bullet passing through very near his head, in his footage which he ended up using in his documentary. It really adds to the reality of working on the field.

But for most Indonesian journalists, we know that we were badly covered by our employees, if we were covered at all. My newspaper, The Indonesian Observer, did not cover me for doing field reporting. Meaning if something happened to me, it will be fully my own risk while the risk is very real. A colleague of mine, Sayuti of Media Indonesia was shot in the stomach during riots in 1998. He managed to drive himself to the nearest hospital only to collapse right in front of the emergency unit. Hidayat (former Tempo) told me that after the shooting, Sayuti was quite traumatised.

Covering conflict areas in Indonesia is always difficult. Unlike other areas in the world, conflicts in Indonesia are often horizontal conflict, meaning conflict between different local groups. Also, these horizontal conflicts are often very bloody. For most Indonesian journalists, working under such conditions and without proper legal and financial protection are the conditions they have to endure almost everyday. The presence of numerous media observers after the fall of New Order regime highlighted those hazardous conditions, but violence towards Indonesian journalists continues.
In defining the good guys, both Australian and Indonesian newspapers agreed that Sander Thoenes was the good guy. But in terms of how the good guy was represented, the similarity stopped. There are two contradicting general frames promoted here. Australian newspapers presented a frame of tragedy. Sander Thoenes’s death is a tragic result of a sinister conspiracy. On the other hand, Indonesian newspapers were promoting a frame of emergency condition: the situation in East Timor had escalated beyond control and now a foreign journalist was killed. So for the Australian newspapers, Sander’s death was due to deliberate action. For Indonesian newspapers, Thoenes was simply at the wrong place and at the wrong time.

Now we will try to answer the second question of the Wolfsfeld model; how was this story presented in the past? For Australian newspapers, the closest event to Sander Thoenes’s death involved five journalists working for the Australian media who were killed in East Timor in December 1975. During Indonesia’s invasion, the five journalists were killed when they were trying to cover the invasion in the town called Balibo. Like Sander Thoenes, the details of these journalists’ death were sketchy and the perpetrators were never fully known.433

Indonesian newspapers did not make any reference to any previous incident in their reporting. This does not necessarily mean that violence against Indonesian journalists had never happened before. Hendro Subroto, a journalist for Indonesia’s state television, TVRI, was seriously wounded from gun shots during the Indonesian
invasion in 1975. In 1999, prior to the referendum, two Indonesians working for different news media were shot and seriously injured. But again, Indonesian journalists may perceive the situation differently.

Australian journalist, Ben Bohane told me that for independent journalists like him, covering conflict areas is full of risk. The key issue is how to minimize the risk while maintaining their independence. During the East Timor crisis in 1999, Ben deliberately entered East Timor without organising credentials with the INTERFET. For him, working independently which means living among the locals, gave him more security than embedding himself with INTERFET.

Nevertheless, Ben conceded that the mainstream Australian news media needed the protection and support of the INTERFET. For instance the television journalists may need access to electricity and satellite links provided by INTERFET. Independent journalists like Ben were required to send their stories according to a much less demanding schedule which in turn allowed them to be more independent.45

From Wolfsfeld model, we can see that Australian and Indonesian newspapers promoted different frames. The frame promoted by Australian newspapers was in line with the general frame promoted by Australian newspapers: an emergency situation existed in East Timor due to Indonesian military campaign, and required Australia to come and rescue the East Timorese. Thus Australian newspaper reports about Sander Thoenes’s death were consistent with the general perception and representation of Australian newspapers regarding East Timor crisis in 1999. For the general frame and more in depth analysis regarding it, please see Chapter 6 and 7.

Indonesian newspapers promoted a different frame; simply tragedy. This is also consistent with the general frame on the East Timor crisis in 1999 as promoted by Indonesian newspapers: the chaos and destruction is regrettable but such is the reality of this conflict. This frame is similar to the frame promoted by the Indonesian government that the East Timor crisis is simply a tragedy and all the destruction was due to a horizontal conflict between factions and groups in East Timor.
The frames promoted by Australian and Indonesian newspapers regarding Sander Thoenes’s death are thus consistent with the general frames promoted by Australian and Indonesian governments about the conflict in East Timor. This means that the newspapers from both countries were actually in line with official frames promoted by both governments. Sander Thoenes’s death was, in the end, just a means to reinforce a version of events which was in line with official framing of the conflict.

Nevertheless, this does not conclusively mean that Australian and Indonesian newspapers were acting simply as the mouthpiece for their own governments. The deeper frames contained within the reports may suggest something else. For instance, the Australian media were often accused by the Indonesian government of taking a partisan or adversarial position towards them. The Australian media on the other hand, perceived the Indonesian government as uncooperative and very closed. On top of that the general tendency of news media to focus on negative aspects of events (being newsworthy) amplified the animosity between the Indonesian government and the Australian media in general. Barry Lowe writes about what he described as ‘the Australian media’s construction’.

But [the Australian media’s] construction of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines is weighted heavily on the downside of life in the life of those countries. It describes these countries as appearing to falter in their quest for modernity, prosperity and brutality, danger and disappointment. The negative news focus may be partly the result of habit. Insurgency, disasters, repressive politicians and sleaze have been loud themes in International news media coverage of South East Asia for decades. It seems difficult for media gate keepers to refocus on other issues. The innate conservatism of news production practice determines that they keep doing things the traditional way, until they are confronted with compelling reasons to look for new issues.

Thus in the end, what the Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented in their reports may have reflected the deeper perception of both countries of each other. It
was what we might call the PR or framing agility of both governments that made their official perception of the East Timor crisis in 1999 influence newspapers perceptions of events.

5. Conclusion.

The death of Sander Thoenes was a tragedy and this view is shared by both Australian and Indonesian newspapers covering his death. But that is as far as the similarities go. Australian and Indonesian newspapers contextualised or framed Sander Thoenes’s death in different ways. Australian newspapers perceived Thoenes’s death as tragic and part of a covert military campaign. On the other hand, Indonesian newspapers perceived Sander’s death as tragic but part of the risk of working in conflict area. Subsequently these two different perceptions resulted in different frames being promoted by Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Surprisingly the frames promoted were in line with official frames promoted by Australian and Indonesian government about the crisis in East Timor.

In the next chapter, we shall delve more deeply into the frames analysis and what was being promoted by Australian and Indonesian newspapers during East Timor crisis. It is felt that the analysis in this chapter based on a single but significant case alone is not solid enough to make a thorough conclusion. Therefore further deliberation is needed.
5.1. Introduction.

The issue of possible border crossings between Indonesia and East Timor during the East Timor crisis is one of the most sensitive issues during the crisis. Sovereignty is always a very sensitive issue for most Indonesians especially for those who lived through the war of independence between 1945 to 1949. Most Indonesian who experienced the war had witnessed a very bloody conflict that had resulted in their country’s Independence.

After independence, sovereignty was still an important issue. Almost immediately, Indonesia had to face a number of rebellions in various areas such as PRRI in Sumatera, PERMESTA in Sulawesi and RMS in Maluku. The response for it was swift military actions though at the same period Indonesia was still having serious political and economic problems. A former army general, Santoso said:

We (Indonesia) had so many rebellions at that time (between 1945 and 1960’s), we (the army) dealt with every one of them. We (the army) did not even tell the President. Gatot Subroto (the chief of the armed forces at the time) took the initiatives (in swiftly dealing with the rebellions).
Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno was a strong proponent of protecting Indonesia’s sovereignty. Soekarno dubbed as the “Mad Doctor”438 in Western Countries, did not hesitate to do whatever he deemed necessary to defend Indonesian sovereignty. In January 1965 he pulled Indonesia out of the United Nations439, declared a confrontation with Malaysia in 1963440 and challenged the last Dutch bastion in Western Papua in 1961.441 The sentiment for Indonesian sovereignty does not solely belongs to Soekarno.

My father, a retired army officer who have fought the independence war, always proudly remembered how he fought the war. For instance once he took me to a river in the middle of the city of Surabaya, in East Java and showed me the spot where he exchanged fire with British and Dutch troops in November 1945 across the river. Then he took me to the small alleys where he was chased by British and Dutch troops later and how bullets were passing through near him. I remember seeing the fire in his eyes when he told me the story. 442

After the fall of Soekarno in 1965, the idea of sovereignty continued. The new president, Soeharto, though much more cautious than Soekarno, kept the idea of sovereignty alive. During his rule, a systematic ideological system was implemented and fiercely promoted – based upon the nation’s ideology: PANCASILA. The central concept of this ideology is that the idea of united Indonesia is a fact that cannot and will not be changed at all cost. Soeharto even directed a more elaborate effort to ‘promote’ the PANCASILA as state ideology.

When I entered the University as an undergraduate student in 1988, it was compulsory to all new students to go through a month long indoctrination process called: P4 (Pedoman Pengamalan dan Penghayatan Pancasila – Guides to implement and understand the Pancasila). This process went from Monday to Saturday, from 8 AM I till 5 PM. Any one who missed a class should have a strong excuse (i.e. seriously ill) otherwise they would be failed and they can not enter their university classes. The P4 classes itself was not too bad as we managed to have fun as young students do but the message of the P4 is clear: Pancasila and the unity of Indonesia is a fixed price that one can not defied.443
Like his predecessor, Soeharto was a proponent of using swift military action in relinquishing any signs of rebellions. The actions were often very swift and often caused the military to be accused of human rights violations. The military defended their action by saying that they’re simply protecting Indonesian sovereignty. As in the military term: Either you are a friend or you are an enemy. It is a fact of the history that the almost all armed rebellion leaders were killed. Muso, Kahar Muzakar, Kartosuwiryo, Aidit to Imron (leader of *Laskar Jihad* that accused of terrorism and hijacking in 1980-1981) were killed or executed. Indonesian government do not tolerate any separatist movement in any form.

The issue of East Timor as discussed in earlier chapters is a very complex issue. For common Indonesians, many never understood why East Timor became part of Indonesia. For those who were born in the 1970’s, all they knew was that East Timor was always part of Indonesia. For the military, the cost, in particular the human cost made it imperative that East Timor should always remains a part of Indonesia.  

Within the Indonesian society, perhaps the military is the main party that have the largest interest with East Timor. Thousands of Indonesian soldiers have died in invading East Timor and the continuing conflict that lasted for another 24 years. Some officers have married with local women and some have business interest there, such as coffee plantations. Former TVRI journalist, Hendro Subroto who followed Indonesian military invasion back in 1975 described his trip back to East Timor, 19 years later almost in a romantic tone almost in Hemingway style:

> After I had breakfast at the turismo hotel, I went for a stroll exploring the Avenida Marchal Carmona which lay parallel to the beach, stretching all the way from the eastern side to the Avenidad Amaral on the extreme western side of the city of Dili. Along this road, one could
Hendro Subroto’s position is unique as he was among the few Indonesian journalists allowed to follow the Indonesian military movements during the invasion in 1975. Hendro was even allowed to document (though not published at that time) the details of Indonesian military infiltration to East Timor prior to the invasion in December 1975. His account, published in his book: "Eyewitness to Integration of East Timor" was dubbed as the best account by Indonesian civilians regarding the invasion. But his closeness to Indonesian military made him perceived as betraying his role as journalist. Hendro even described how during a fire fight with FRETILIN in 1975, he picked up an AK-47 rifle and almost used it to shoot back at the FRETILIN but he decided not to in the end. Still, he admitted that he helped Indonesian soldiers by re-filling rifle magazines.

The Indonesian military despite all the accusations of corruption and human rights violations never forgot their role: to protect the integrity of Republic of Indonesia. This role was a role they played well especially after the fall of New Order regime in 1998. Indonesian military since then have become more proficient in showing their ‘role’ as guardian of Indonesia but sometimes it was played with a political background. A sample of how Indonesian military used their original role to strengthen their image happened during an armed show off between Malaysia and Indonesia in 2005.

In February 2005, a legal disputes with Malaysia over border demarcation in Kalimantan leads to deployment at least seven major warships, a battalion of Marines
and a flight of F-16 fighters to the disputed area. Such deployment was the most serious border issue that Indonesia had since the East Timor crisis. But unlike what happened in East Timor, the Indonesian military were in a totally different stature: they were protecting what they declared as a legal border of Indonesia against claims made by Malaysia. Indonesian media in this 'crisis' shows a more assertive position, supporting the Indonesian military. An article read as below:

Besides preparing warships and F-16 fighters, Indonesia is also sending marines to Tarakan, East Kalimantan following the increased of tension in the sea border of East Kalimantan and Malaysia.

Kompas's sources said that C-130 heavy air lifters from 31st Squadron based in Halim Perdanakusuma Airbase, on Saturday night (5/3) have lifted a company of 1st Marine Infantry brigade from Surabaya.

According to the source, the marines will be deployed in the front line of Indonesian - Malaysian border, such at Nunukan, Tanaj Mera, Tara and Tarakan.

During the East Timor crisis in 1999, the dimension of sovereignty did not only exist, it became a strong issue – at least from the Indonesian side. Never since the independence war had fully armed foreign troops come into an area where Indonesia still claim as its territory.

As in previous chapters, the analysis of the issue here is based upon three approaches. The approaches or models are from Robert Entman, Peter White and Gadi Wolfsfeld as described in Chapter 2 and put into practice in Chapter 4 and 5. All are based upon framing approaches though each presents a different angle of view. On top of the three models of analysis, grounded theory is used throughout to give the findings the necessary depth beyond the obvious findings. For more details and explanations of the methods used, please refer back to Chapter 1 and 2. All articles analysed are available in full version in Appendix C.
5.2. Analysis.

The first analysis uses Robert Entman's model. Entman stated that critical textual choices that framed the story can be revealed by comparing media narratives. Unless narratives are compared, frames are difficult to detect fully and reliably. This is due to the fact that many of the framing devices can appear as ‘natural’ choices of wordings.

The usage of language in reporting the event is like a vessel carrying the message but in this case, some messages were designed specifically to convey a more subtle but still a very important message. The choice of different wordings used in different articles were consistently chosen to depict similar phenomenon. Thus, the choices of words were actually reinforcing the particular frame.

Entman described his methodology that frames can be analysed using a series of aspects. The aspects – five of them do not necessarily have to feature in each article. Also it is not necessary that for the aspects to be equally important. The aspects are:

1. Size judgements. In this thesis it will referred as relative importance of news. It refers to the size of the related articles in term of words.

2. Agency. The usage by the media of certain words and images to suggest how and where responsibility of an event being reported should be placed.
3. Identification. The usage by the media of certain words and images that encourage or discourage identification with those most directly involved in the media story.

4. Categorisation. The different way in which the media label events or issues.

5. Generalisation. The degree to which the media generalise.

5.2.1. Analysis using Entman model.

5.2.1.1. Relative importance of the news.

The relative importance of news here is what Entman said was the size and placements of the story. Newspapers placements are not similarly equal. Each newspaper has their own standard of placements often related to the importance of the news itself.

*The Australian*’s story is 419 words long. *The Sydney Morning Herald*’s story is 446 words long. *Republika*’s story is 593 words long. *Suara Pembaruan*’s story is 381 words long. *Media Indonesia*’s story is 377 words long. In the table 1 below, we can see the length of the articles that covered the border crossing issue within Australian and Indonesian newspapers.456
Table 3.
Relative importance of the issue – in term of article size (in words).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers title</th>
<th>Article length (excluding headers)</th>
<th>Length of reference to actual statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sydney Morning Herald</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suara Pembaruan</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Indonesia</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the table above, *Republika* published the largest article compared to other newspapers. *The Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Australian* ranks second and third. *Suara Pembaruan* is forth and *Media Indonesia* published the smallest article.

In Entman’s frameworks, the size of the article reflects the importance of the story. *Republika* with the largest article seems to portray the issue as more important than other newspapers. Yet, *Republika* seems to be on its own here. Three others Indonesian newspapers did not publish the story as ‘big’ as *Republika*. *Kompas* as the largest newspaper in Indonesia did not even publish the story at all.
On the contrary, referring at the size of their articles, both Australian newspapers *The Sydney Morning Herald & The Australian* put the issue in the relatively similar importance.

The analysis above is regarding the general size of the articles excluding the headlines. It can be argued that the size of the articles can show the importance of the story. Nevertheless, in order to get a more substantial meaning of the frame, a more in-depth analysis is needed.

Using Entman’s concept of size, then it would necessary to see how the media portray the actual issue – John Moore’s statement. Entman believes that the subtle meaning often lies beneath the mass of words. Removing the masses will reveal the actual message of the frames.

In reference to the actual issue – John Moore’s statement, there are variations between media.

### 5.2.1.2. Agency.

Entman refers to agency as the usage by the media of certain words and images to suggest how and where responsibility of an event being reported should be placed. This is often the attribute of the headlines as the role of the headline is to present a short description of the news articles. Headlines also function as a means to attract the audience or in this case the readers into reading the article. In the Table 2 below we
shall see about the headlines of the related articles regarding the border crossing issue.

The main frame of this issue is the statement made by Australian Defence Minister, John Moore. On September 29th, John Moore made the statement that: ‘Australian-led peace force might cross the East Timor border in “hot pursuit” of militia’.

From the Table 4, the headlines in the newspapers depicted agency reports in ways bolstering the respective frames. Four newspapers: The Australian, Republika, Suara Pembaruan and Media Indonesia specifically mentioned the possibility of INTERFET troop entering Indonesian territory (the Western side of Timor Island). The Sydney Morning Herald headline just mentioned pursuing the militias without any elaboration.
The view propounded by the frames was that INTERFET troop have the legality and ability to enter Indonesian territory. Such an action is permitted by United Nations mandate and this is being pointed out by the Australian Defence Minister.

Under the mandate, UN sanctioned troops may enter another country’s territory if they caught up in a firefight near the border and consequently pursued the enemy. Australia as the leader of INTERFET is showing their resolution in following UN mandate.

From table 2, The Australian Headlines clearly define the agent as the Australian Defence Minister. The Defence Minister warned of the possibility of (INTERFET) troops crossing the Indonesian border. The statement was acknowledged to have an effect to Indonesia. It raised the tensions between Australia and Indonesia immediately.

The Sydney Morning Herald report was not conclusive. It started with a resolution in pursuing the militias. Only when the first paragraph is read, it is clear that the agency is ‘The Australian led force’. In this case the force may cross Indonesian border in order to pursue the militias.

Republika’s headline again implies that the agency – INTERFET, will face Indonesian troop if it crosses the border. Nevertheless the headline can be said to have two agencies: INTERFET and TNI. As in the Australian newspapers,
INTERFET is the party that will cross the border. TNI is the party that will be opposing the INTERFET if the latter actually crosses the border.

*Republika*’s headline is an active sentence. It was stated in the first person form. It also carries an ultimatum message. There is little doubt coming from it: If the INTERFET cross the border, then TNI will face them. The implication is that there will be armed confrontation.

*Suara Pembaruan* headline carries a different message. Here PM Howard was quoted stating his assurance that INTERFET will not cross the border into Indonesian territory. In the *Republika* headline the agency is again the INTERFET, presented in the active voice – direct quotation style, thus leaving little doubt regarding the message.

From a glance the messages of *Republika*’s headline seems to be contradicting the previous articles. Nevertheless it actually reinforced the notion that at some point there was a possibility that INTERFET would cross Indonesian border.

*Media Indonesia* presented its headline in a question form. This way it seems that the possibility of INTERFET entering Indonesian territory is a simple rhetorical question defined here as a question sentence that is asking for the sake of asking and not implying anything concrete. Like the other articles, the agency from the *Media Indonesia* headline is the INTERFET. The narrative is very clear about the possibility of INTERFET entering Indonesian territory.
Now we have concluded that from five newspapers, four have INTERFET as the agency in their headlines. INTERFET was attributed for raising the tensions by declaring its rights to enter Indonesia territory under certain circumstances. *The Sydney Morning Herald* was the only newspaper that did not clearly stipulate any agency in its headlines. Nevertheless, the first sentence in the article clearly defined “Australian led force” or another term of INTERFET as the agency.

The attribution of the source in this case that INTERFET will cross the border came from the Australian government. *The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, Republika* and *Media Indonesia* identify the source to be Australian Defence Minister – John Moore. John Moore in his statement date 29/9 declared that INTERFET has the right to pursue any attackers beyond the border – if they are attacked.

*Suara Pembaruan* did not attribute John Moore as the source of the debate. Instead it named PM Howard as the source of its article.

5.2.1.3. The Identification.

From the newspapers reports, the identity of the possible perpetrator, INTERFET was often mixed with Australian troops. The Australian military as a whole was portrayed as being identical with INTERFET, thus eclipsing the facts that INTERFET had personnel from different countries.
In *The Australian*, the headline and the article clearly refers to John Moore in his capacity of Australian Defence Minister. Another attribution is what is called: “Australian-led peace force”.459 There was no single mention of INTERFET. All references of tension and conflict directly refer to tension or conflict between Australia and Indonesia.

*The Sydney Morning Herald* also identifies INTERFET again as an “Australian-led peace force”. It also attributes the source as John Moore. The term ‘peace force’ is to underline the goal of the deployment of the troops – maintaining peace and order in East Timor. But the term also presented as a deliberate emphasis that what the international troops do, led by Australian troops is for a noble cause that is to create peace.

Such emphasis upon the nobility of the troop’s goal is very apparent only within Australian newspapers. The term also emphasis another thing: ‘Australian led’. This emphasis strongly upon the fact that international troops (INTERFET) are led by Australia. Indeed Australia provided almost 40% of the 11,000 troops sent to East Timor, the largest contingent. INTERFET itself was also lead by an Australian General, Peter Cosgrove.

The facts presented above show that the Australian newspapers were underlining the facts that bring strong positive sentiments to Australia. The sentiments created here are obviously very high, a showcase of another achievement by Australia. The issue that arises was like simple physics. If something increases something else will
decrease. In this situation the high sentiment of Australia’s achievement was considered to be created at Indonesia’s expense bringing more negative attention to Indonesia’s failure in East Timor. The repetition of Australian claim of achievements in particular within the Australian media, became like a loud booing for the losing party in a competition. As an Indonesian and journalist the effect was visible for me as I remember the mood due to the news reports simply widened the cultural gap between Australia and Indonesia.

In *The Indonesian Observer* there were several foreigners working as copy editors. Almost all had their opinions towards what was going on in East Timor, but none was so outspoken in expressing their opinion than a male editor from Australia. One night, out of the blue he brought out a map of East Timor and started slugging Indonesia about its role in East Timor. It happened in the news room and no Indonesian staff were happy about the way he expressed his opinion which was very direct and rude by Indonesian standards. Finally a senior editor answered his remarks by saying: “At least we didn’t do what you did. What do Australians really know about East Timor, actually?”

Almost all Indonesian that I spoke to about East Timor were genuinely surprised that the East Timorese decided to be separate from Indonesia. What made things worst was that it happened when Indonesia was at its lowest point since 1965. Common Indonesians suddenly lost their sense of hope. People were living from day to day, simply to survive. On the other hand, we are not happy with the way Indonesian military treated Indonesian people. Simply look at what happened with the Trisakti students in May 1998 and the aftermath to see that most Indonesians do not like the way the military behave. But when Australia loudly expressed its views and later supported the independence of East Timor (through the media), for me this is a vindication that Australia has a latent interest with the independence of East Timor.

Thus the identification of the articles regarding the Border crossing issue, simply reinforced popular beliefs within Australian and Indonesian societies. For the Australian society as described above, the military mission to East Timor is of a very noble cause — maintaining peace, saving the innocent East Timorese from Indonesian oppression and making sure that East Timor got the independence they have fought for. Unfortunately, such emphasis brings a different perception within Indonesian society. Instead Australia was perceived as a loud and nosy neighbour (at least) or actually having a role with the separation of East Timor from Indonesia.
In chapter 6 and 7, I shall dwell more on this issue by analysing who did the Australian and Indonesian newspapers use as sources. The aim was to see if newspapers from Australia and Indonesia were actually reinforcing the popular beliefs of their own society rather than fully focusing upon the issue.

One thing that struck to this day was how different Australian and Indonesian perceived the events of East Timor crisis in 1999. Some of my Australian friends believed that most Indonesian were deceived by Indonesian military and we (Indonesians) could not see that what Australia do was the right thing. On the other hand, most of my Indonesian friends said they knew what the military did in East Timor as they can see what the Indonesian military did in the other areas. But they said they can not accept Australian involvement at that time which they think as intrusive.

As a journalist, reading the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports on East Timor crisis in 1999 gave me a strong headache initially. During the peak of the crisis, I read too many reports from news wires (in The Indonesian Observer news room) from abroad that blatantly blamed Indonesia for the crisis. One article from Reuters for instance claimed that Indonesian military must have dumped thousands bodies of victims of the conflict to the sea based upon two things: the sea is near and the journalists could not found what the rumour said that the streets in East Timor were littered with dead bodies. My thought as a journalist trained in Australia was: where did the professionalism, accuracy and balanced reporting goes?

For fairness, Indonesian news media in particular ANTARA was often reserved as last resort news sources as often their reports are not in good qualities, to say the least. Often we basically have to re-write the news from ANTARA which was not to be the case with foreign news services (not just translating it from the Indonesian). Sometimes we think that ANTARA was quoting the Indonesian officials too much that we ran the risk of running propaganda if we published the news.462

As expected, Indonesian newspapers presented an opposite view compared to Australian newspapers. Republika identifies two agencies in its articles: INTERFET and TNI. Republika attributes the main topic of the story to TNI. To be exact TNI was warning the INTERFET not to cross the Indonesian border. This means that Republika is more inclined to support the position of the TNI in this issue. Indeed Republika was often dubbed as leaning towards the Indonesian government along with Media Indonesia in their reporting.463
Suara Pembaruan identifies its article to the statement of PM Howard. In his statement PM Howard is backtracking his Defence Minister's statement that INTERFET may cross Indonesian border. PM Howard declared that INTERFET will not cross Indonesian border. In this case, Suara Pembaruan did not appear to be presenting the view wholly from the Indonesian side. Instead it tried to bring the focus to the fact that John Howard as Prime Minister of Australia, has backtracked his minister's statement.

One thing that was very apparent of the news reporting of East Timor is how imbalanced it is between Indonesian media and foreign media. Indonesian media has very limited sources, my own newspaper could not even insure me beyond the standard work insurance which means you are covered when you actually in the office. So if something happened to you in the field, you are all by yourself. My colleague from Singapore told me that their newspapers insured them for thousands of dollars on their life insurance just in case something bad happened. But insurance only benefit the benefactor and so the farewell message among the journalists at that time was: 'Don’t be a hero'. It was not a joke, hero here mean to have the word hero carved on your tombstone.

But insurance does not guarantee that a journalist can do their job properly. Indonesian journalists were as eager to report on East Timor as their foreign counterpart. Unfortunately very few news media in Indonesia can afford financially to send their journalists travelling even within Indonesia. When I was working at the SWA magazine, we rely on plane ticket that the magazine received as barter to advertising space.

On top of that there is an issue of public interest. Sure many people were interested in the East Timor issue. In fact The Indonesian Observer was able to maintain a close contact with senior East Timor officials as proof that Indonesian media have strong interest on East Timor, not just copying what the government of military said. Nevertheless, the interest was initially buried within myriad of news reports regarding local politics or the economic crisis. Indonesian interest was unfortunately cranked up with the increased involvement of Australia. From the identification of the news reports we can see that newspapers can merely reflect that mood of their society. This is apparently more evident within Australian newspapers which both identify themselves with Australian officials. An important note is that Australian newspapers may not simply amplify their government’s official position but the fact that what the government does is closely connected with the mood of the Australian people.
The event of East Timor crisis in the end has shown how a government political decision's maybe influenced by the mood of its people. This is understandable as the basis of democracy is power is within the people, it's not hard to guess that when the pressure from the public became so strong the government will eventually give in to it. As example Australian government admitted that in the end they have to succumb to the pressure form its people to mobilize troops to restore law and order in East Timor. This is clear in John Howard statement on September 18:

All Australians have been distressed at recent events in East Timor. Scenes of violence and death, and the fear that a small, vulnerable community might be deprived of the freedom it deserves, have provoked a properly sympathetic reaction.

It is not only right that Australia join other nations in supporting the United Nations in East Timor, it is also in our national interest to do so. Continued instability in a territory so close to Australia could have harmful consequences for us in the longer run.

The role of the multinational force, which Australia will lead, is to restore peace and stability in East Timor, to support the United Nations mission and to facilitate humanitarian assistance. This will be Australia's largest commitment of military force abroad for more than 30 years.

We warmly welcome the participation of the forces of other nations. We know they will work professionally with the Australian soldiers. As in all operations of this kind, there is a risk of casualties. However, the rules of engagement will be such that our forces will have complete authority to not only defend themselves but to use appropriate levels of force to fulfil the mandate given by the UN.

As Australian troops go into East Timor, they go with the hopes and prayers of the entire nation and they go in the knowledge that they have the support of not only the Australian Government but the Australian people. Our thoughts will not only be with them, but also their families and other loved ones.

We wish them Godspeed and a safe return home.

The first two paragraph above clearly indicates that Australian Government has finally agreed to send troops to East Timor largely to the pressure from Australian society. The Australian society itself pressured the government after witnessing the atrocities and lawlessness as reported by the media. In the end, like in good democracy Australian government succumbs to the real holder of the power – the people.
5.2.1.4. Categorization.

In this incident regarding the possibility of INTERFET/Australian troops entering Indonesian territory, the newspapers highlighted the legal rights of the troop to do so. The newspapers also tend to have a blurry distinction between INTERFET and Australian troop.

Australian newspapers tend to point out the mandate of the United Nations which gave authority for the troop to do so. The Australian Defence Minister, John Moore was repeatedly quoted in stating what the UN mandate authorized.

On the other hand, Australian newspapers tended to portray Interfet as identical with Australian troop. In all articles, the reference of ‘troop’ goes to ‘Australian troop’. This is interesting as John Moore himself pointed out, that the UN mandate is for Interfet. Interfet itself consisted of more than half-of dozen countries. This style of journalism can be found in all countries as every media will always want to bring the proximity of the news as close as possible to their readers. For Australian newspapers the fact that Australian troops were heavily involved with this operation should be pronounced expressively.

The tendency for a ‘chest beating’ or ‘self congratulating’ reporting existed in all media from different countries. At home I was not able to stand more than five minutes listening to Fox News that my mother listened to so attentively. For me, Fox News is no more than the ultra nationalistic public relations of the Bush Administration. In Indonesia, the reporting of Hendro Subroto as illustrated earlier shows how the closeness between journalist and the military can cause serious issues about the quality of the journalism mostly in term of the independence of the journalist itself.
In a more serious issue, soon after the closing of TEMPO magazine in 1994, the government’s sanctioned magazine GATRA released a story how allegedly a well known Catholic priest from Yogyakarta was suspected in a radical movement. A colleague from SWA called the magazine and complained about the reporting. I remember how my colleague said to GATRA that as news magazine GATRA should be independent instead of becoming a mouthpiece for the Indonesian intel.

Indonesian newspapers perceived the issue differently. The focus instead is on the implication if INTERFET or Australian troops ever crossed Indonesian border. As much as the UN mandate authorized it, any armed foreign troops entering Indonesian territory is a violation of Indonesian territorial integrity. Such action can be perceived as a declaration of conflict. Therefore it was rightly so for the Indonesian military to give a stern warning for any border intrusion.

In October, an Australian patrol by mistake went to the Indonesian territory of Motain. A few Indonesian mobile brigade Police (Brimob) who were guarding the area gave warning shots into the air. Thinking that they were being shot at, Australian troops shot back to the Indonesian police, killing one and wounding another. This incident was quickly investigated and it turned out that Australian troop had used a different map than the Indonesian troops used.

Though the media and the diplomatic community quickly brought this issue to a halt, there was a story related to me years later. The story said that Indonesian military wanted to take revenge to the INTERFET and send some guerrillas into East Timor. The guerrillas ran into a New Zealand patrol and a fight ensued. In the end a private from New Zealand was killed and few others were wounded. Even today, I still meet with people from military or police background who are still bitter about the Motain incident.

In 2005, an open conflict almost erupted between Indonesia and Malaysia over a disputed area in East Kalimantan. Indonesian newspapers were quick to release reports that the TNI had sent some of its best assets such as the F-16 fighters and marines to the area while Malaysia sent some of its warships. This is the first border dispute that went to this level of animosity since East Timor crisis is 1999.

Putting this two situations in perspectives, it is apparent that Indonesian military has shown its willingness to be involved in an armed stand off if Indonesian sovereignty is being threatened. Back in 1999, some of the Australian newspapers reports instead
were presenting a view that Indonesian military in East Timor though dangerous is no match to the Australian troops. One Australian commentator thought otherwise.

The appalling events in East Timor have evoked an almost equally appalling response from many in Australia. Sanity seems to have deserted them, with calls even for unilateral armed intervention in the crisis by our defence forces, as if Australia could, in effect, declare war on a country so much our numerical superior in armed forces and population. We might perhaps be able to send in a few thousand troops to confront the 15,000 to 20,000 Indonesian troops already there, not to mention the thousands of militia.

Some of the loonier would even like to send in the F-111s to bomb somebody or other. The enormous hypocrisy of these human rights lawyers is once again apparent, as they attempt to tailor their doctrines according to their political preferences. If we can send in troops to protect human rights in Timor, why not in Cuba or Vietnam? Or, closer to home, in Fiji or Papua New Guinea?

Even if we had the overwhelming force and resources of the United States this would be a dicey business; for us alone it would be suicidal. The Government realises this perfectly well. But you would not think there was any sense in the Government’s position watching or listening to most of the petty sabre-rattlers of the media, the academy or the churches.

Such views are not shared by other Australians. Soon after publishing this article above, the author of the article released another article describing how he was described and even accused of being ‘unpatriotic’ or a traitor by other Australians. The important note here is not about the message but about the fact that when a society believes upon something, anything contrary will be perceived as breaking the norm and will result in social control. In this case, the Australian society generally believes upon what they think happened in East Timor and the position of their government. When Paddy McGuinnes presented his opinion, he was perceived as somebody that was against the society.

In Indonesian newspapers as stated earlier, the position was different. Indonesian newspapers tend to see the border breach as the final declaration of war between Australia and Indonesia. This was preceded by Australia’s involvement in East Timor
which climaxing in Australian troops being sent to East Timor. But the bottom issue is clear for Indonesian newspapers: is Australia going to risk an open conflict with Indonesia?

*Republika* was probably the strongest proponent of armed conflict. Citing TNI spokesman Major General Sudradjat declared his stern warning that any intrusion will be repelled by TNI.⁴⁷¹ This statement is very blunt and cannot be more clearer about Indonesia’s intention. International law outlined a clear process of handling border issues. But if a sovereign country’s border is being breached intentionally by armed troops from a foreign country, that means an invasion. Repelling an invasion will usually mean an armed conflict where casualties are very likely to occur.

Other Indonesian newspapers, *Media Indonesia* and *Suara Pembaruan* instead published the statement from PH John Howard declaring that Interfet will not enter Indonesian territory. PM Howard statement seemed to be contradicted with the statement of his Defence Minister.

What appear in *Suara Pembaruan* and *Media Indonesia* is a different focus, to the local Australian politics instead to the possible border breach issue. Australian officials were often accused by Indonesian officials of playing local politics at the expense of Indonesia.⁴⁷² This is publicly admitted in Australia that Indonesia will always be an easy subject to be used to attack the Australian government by its own people.

JOHN Howard has acknowledged on several occasions recently that the relationship between Australia and Indonesia is very difficult. It sure is. That’s why it is important to keep the association out of domestic Australian politics, insofar as this is possible. In opposition before
March 1996, the Coalition used Indonesia as a tactic to discredit the Keating Labor government. Since then, Labor has attempted to use much the same stratagem against the Howard Government.

Obviously, there are longstanding cultural differences. Yet Indonesia is Australia’s most important neighbour. It is also the most populous Muslim nation in the world and has recently become a fledgling democracy. The importance of the Australian-Indonesian relationship is acknowledged by both sides of mainstream Australian politics, even if the principle is more likely to be embraced in office than in opposition.473

What Gerard Henderson stated above is the confirmation that Indonesia is the hottest currency within Australian politics. This resulted in Indonesia being used as a ‘ping-pong ball’ among Australian politicians. For Australia who uses liberal democracy, such practice is a common one. Politicians in Australia often attack each other as part of the way to gain political power. But for Indonesia, who has different culture and democracy system, such way of doing things is very alien and considered very offensive.474

But such views about Indonesia can also be perceived as evidence that Australia is still perceiving Indonesia by using orientalism perspectives. Orientalism, that was defined by Edward Said, basically believes that many nations and societies in Western world still believe that they have a more superior culture and values compared to the developing societies/nations.475 This bias came from the long history of colonialism which led to master – object relations, where the Western societies as the colonials perceived their colonies as objects that should follow their perceptions.

Interestingly, the issue of orientalism was not evidently discussed within the discourse in the Australian newspapers during the East Timor crisis. What was evident was that Australian society was so focused in their belief about their noble
intention that anything else, especially those that will undermine them is not relevant.

A fine example can be seen below.

PEACEKEEPING troops heading to East Timor will be part of Australia’s great military tradition, Prime Minister John Howard will tell the nation tonight. In a special address to be carried on the ABC and all commercial television stations, Mr Howard will argue that Australia has no option but to send its soldiers to protect East Timorese people.\textsuperscript{476}

For general Australians, such conviction is considered to be a positive thing. Being a tough character in public is often perceived to be part of Australian general characters.\textsuperscript{477} Which is a contradiction compared to Indonesian culture. But such conviction was the very fuel that was used by critics within the Indonesian newspapers to attack Australia’s involvement in East Timor. Ironically the term ‘orientalism’ was not used by Indonesian critics towards Australia but the idea that Australia was acting a neo-colonialist bullying Indonesia was there.

5.2.1.5. Generalisation.

The possibility of INTERFET entering Indonesian territory was perceived as a direct threat to Indonesian integrity.

Indonesia took a strong pride in the fact that it gained and defended its independence through war. Such a fact was internalized with historical lessons taught in schools which often included visits to monuments in the National Hero’s cemetery. Every week, state school students have to have a flag raising ceremony. On August 17, the National Independence day, the whole nation watches the time Indonesia proclaimed its independence.
When I was at high school which was a public school, it was ridiculous. Every week at least once we would have to have a flag ceremony copying the same ceremony conducted at August 17, 1945. If you’re in classes in the morning, then you’ll have the ceremony at 7AM and if your class is in the afternoon, then it’ll be around 4 pm. These ceremonies took about an hour at a minimum but some went half an hour extra. Why I called it ridiculous was at my school we had to do it in such perfection that one of the senior students was actually selected to lead a ceremony of Pancasila commemoration where President Soeharto and all state officials were present.

At that time, attending the ceremony was an absolute necessity. You could skip classes and the teacher would not care much. But if you missed a ceremony, you ran a risk to be expelled. We did this ceremony since elementary school and by the time we reached University, we could memorise almost all the content of the original 1945 constitution. We also had to do the ceremonies at the heat of the day or even light rains.

Such efforts were designed to remind Indonesian people about their own history. Nevertheless, it is also fact that such integrated nationalistic teaching has a hidden message that is to legitimize the (current) regime in particular The New Order regime.

Now there was a definite threat to Indonesian integrity in the form of foreign forces going into Indonesian territory. Inevitably this brought up a nationalistic sentiment within Indonesia. While for Australia, the possibility was downplayed as a technical possibility – merely stating what its troops can do legally.

5.2.2. Peter White approach.

In Chapter 2 and 4, Peter White’s methodology has been described clearly. White’s is proposing a research method based upon a linguistic approach in order to analyse the salient meanings within ordinary news reports. White argues that within ordinary everyday news reports, often there are salient or hidden messages in it (White, 1997, White, 2004).
The salient meanings described by White are not a random occurrences. White argues that as news reports are created by humans, it is inevitable that the reports will reflect the person who created it. What is reflected can be the values, norms or beliefs but it can also contains certain messages that are deliberately created (White, 2004, White, 1997).

Two factors are to be analysed here – according to White’s method. The first one is newsworthiness and the second is the ‘voice of the reporter’. The first factor: Newsworthiness refers to on how much the story shows a breach of normalcy, morality and social order. What is to be analysed here is how the breach of normalcy, morality and social order is being presented within the reports.

Within the factor of newsworthiness, there are several sub-factors. According to White, a breach of normalcy or social order (which constitutes the basis of why an event is considered to be newsworthy) can be classified into three categories: aberrant damage, power relations and normative breach. Aberrant damage relates into physical damages (i.e. tsunami disasters). The more physical the damage, the more newsworthy the event.

The second aspect to be analysed is ‘the voice of the ‘hard news’ reporter’. White argues that the myth of ‘hard news’ reports being always identical with ‘objectivity’ and neutrality is not true. News reports are made by humans. Humans are very much influenced by various factors such as their culture, political values and morality.
Within White’s theory, news report are not a random occurrence. Instead news reports are part of a social process, a process where information passed is being carefully selected and framed to convey specific messages whether it is immediately visible or a salient message.

5.2.2.1. The Australian article.

Starting from the title: “Blunder escalates tensions – Defence Minister warns troops may cross Timor border”, there is a suggestion of a breach of normalcy by implying that there were ‘blunders’ which leads to tension. Furthermore, the statement was to clarify with another statement that troops (possibly referring to foreign troops) will go across the border of East Timor.

The sentence; ‘blunder escalates tension’, implied a gross mistake had been made which led to escalating tension. There are two negative words in the same sentence; blunder and tension. Blunder actually means: gross mistakes or to move or act blindly. Tension means: an act of stretching or straining. Blunder as stated above shows that a mistakes has been made. The mistake here resulted in an escalation of tensions.

The second part of the headline clarifies the what and why the first part of the headline is stating a gross mistakes has been made. The second part declares that a defence minister has stated that (probably) his troops will go across the (East) Timor border. East Timor has borders with two countries: Australia and Indonesia. So the
statement here refers to a possibility of some troops to enter either Australian or Indonesian territory.

Never since the Dutch colonial troops officially left Indonesia in 1949, has a foreign army entered Indonesia’s territory fully armed and ready for war. Indeed the legality of East Timor as Indonesia’s territory is always a sensitive and questionable issue. That is probably why President Habibie’s proposal for East Timor referendum, though shocking was initially not contested seriously in the Indonesian public sphere.

But with the increased involvement of Australia in the crisis, the Indonesian public’s animosity toward Australia also sharply rose. The climax was when several shots were aimed at the building. In year 2000, when applying for student visa, I saw that the bullet holes still existed in the wall. Never had such animosity happened to any embassies in Indonesia before, not even to the US embassy.

In the streets it was even more dangerous to be Australian. I met this reporter from Asia Week who was told me a story of how earlier in the afternoon he was chased by a mob right in Jalan Jenderal Sudirman. He was covering this demonstration when someone wanted to steal his wallet. He caught the culprit but the person recognised his accent. As soon as he was identified as Australian, he ran away chased by the mob that just minutes before were demonstrating. Later that evening when we had dinner with colleagues from Singapore, to the inquisitive restaurant staff, we said that he is Swedish, of course he didn’t say a word when someone else is around.483

To enter another country’s territory is a serious breach. The breach here is about another country’s sovereignty. When foreign troops enter another country’s territory without permission, the security and sovereignty of another country is being breached.

On the whole, the headlines suggest that another country’s sovereignty is about to be breached, either it is Australia or Indonesia. This is a very serious situation as it will definitely raise tension. This is exactly what made this reports newsworthy.

Within the body of reports, the possibilities of serious breaches were further highlighted. The first paragraph stated that tension with Indonesia is rising after the Australian Defence Minister stated that Australian led INTERFET troops may cross the Indonesian border. The statement suggests two things: INTERFET troops
(including Australian troops) may go across another country’s border and Indonesia’s border may be breached.

The second paragraph shows another breach; Indonesia has warned (Australia?) that a breach of its territory may lead to serious consequences. To have another country warning another country is a serious matter that goes beyond normalcy. Countries are supposed to respect each other sovereignty including their territory. Thus, this is the newsworthy aspect of the story – foreign troops may cross Indonesian border.

The (possible) breach of Indonesian borders is the main issue of this article. Nevertheless the issue itself is complicated. The Australia Defence Minister – John Moore stated that his statement showed what INTERFET troops can do within the mandate that they have. The mandate for the INTERFET came from United Nations and within the mandate is the ability to pursue the enemies even into another country’s territory.

Theoretically, no one even in Indonesia will deny UN’s authority in sending peacekeeping troops to East Timor. East Timor was a mess before and especially after the referendum. Two Indonesian journalists (one working for Reuters and the other was with Kompas) was shot and seriously wounded prior to the referendum. Later another Indonesian journalist was killed. It was clear that the area was almost lawless. But what I felt that the outside world miss to understand is we do not appreciate to be bullied through the media and later seeing our own flags or people were targeted especially in Australia.

The whole of Indonesia itself at that time was also in a mess. In Jakarta, we were too scared to travel alone after dusk. One day my sister was flying back from Australia and there were four people that went to picked her up with one guy carrying a golok-(machete) just in case. So why just East Timor got the attention as if Indonesia was able to do anything? I searched endlessly but found no reference of the trouble in Indonesia at the time of East Timor crisis. It was as if East Timor is the world’s little red riding hood and Indonesia is the big bad wolf. Everybody loves to be the hero and no one wanted to be the villains.

Now on top of that, when we lost hope and day to day is a survival, suddenly the news came that Australian or INTERFET troops may invade Indonesian territory. Within days, various organisations declared that if they were allowed, they will send volunteers to fight Australian troops. Interestingly, such animosity was dismissed almost entirely by Australian media.
The article also quoted the statement from US Defence Minister – William Cohen that warned the Indonesian government to comply with the UN mandate. This also shows another breach that is a warning by an official of a country to another country’s government.

The US warning here shows a pressure by a major power country on another country. Cohen also supported the Australian troop stance by claiming “The peace force needed to act in very aggressive manner to confront militia elements threatening violence”. This shows a controversy where a ‘peace force’ has to act ‘in a very aggressive manner’.

The statement from the Australian Defence Minister has created a strong controversy. This was shown by a warning by the Indonesian Ambassador for Australia, Wiryono. Wiryono warned that ‘tension is climbing like a ladder and had reached the top step’. The implied message was the tension has reached the top possible levels which are very dangerous.

The statement published by The Australian is a statement of challenge by Indonesian standards. To say that a foreigner is going into your house to kill someone you know in the house is like a direct challenge for Indonesian. One thing Indonesians do not like nor stay away from is a direct challenge. In the countless flag ceremonies I had as school kid was that Indonesia loves peace but we love our freedom. We were also taught that our freedom is worthy of our own life too. That’s why we have so many ceremonies – to remind us that we should always protect our freedom at all cost. Ironically, the Indonesians already said this long before George W. Bush used the same concept for his war against terror.

Tension between Australia and Indonesia has been present for a long time. In the 1960’s Australian troops was involved in campaign against Indonesian troops during the ‘confrontation’ era. During that time, Indonesia under President Soekarno was
threatening to attack Malaysia – which was under British control at the time. Another important factor was Indonesia between 1955 – 1966 was strongly influenced by communism something that was feared by Australia (Ricklefs, 2001).

The rise of the Soeharto regime which was strongly anti communist changed the perspective of Indonesia becoming a communist stronghold. This was marked by US military support to the Indonesian military in the early 1970’s in form of military training and equipment. But deeper down the fear of Indonesia growing into a military power never subsides.

In 2004, the arrival of modern Sukhoi Fighters from Russia has raised some alarms that it will become a threat to Australia. This alarm sounds so laughable to me as Indonesia only purchased four unarmed aircraft, something that were widely reported in Indonesian media. Given that Australian media monitored Indonesian media constantly, this made me curious why they did not publish those facts. The bottom line is there is still inherent perception of threat from Indonesia within Australian society.

The Australian article on one side may show the resolution of the Australian government of giving its troops in East Timor full ability to do their task. On the other hand it also illustrates the distrusts between INTERFET (including Australia and US) with Indonesia. Some Indonesian newspapers articles (also analysed in this chapter) shows Indonesia’s opposition of this possibility of foreign troops coming to Indonesian territory.

The issue of sovereignty is a very sensitive one for Indonesia. Being among few countries in the world that gained and defended their independence through war (1945-1950), Indonesia is very sensitive to the issue of sovereignty. In March-April 2005, a border issue with Malaysia has seen Indonesia sending 9 warships, three F-16
fighters and a battalion of Marines to a small area in Ambalat, North West of Kalimantan (KOMPAS, 2005d, KOMPAS, 2005a, KOMPAS, 2005c).

5.2.2.2. The Sydney Morning Herald Article.

The Sydney Morning Herald article begins with the heading: We’ll Hunt Down Militias. The heading carries an implied message of something (Militias) that will be hunted down.

In White’s model, the breach is shown within the word We and Hunt Down. The word We here is referring to INTERFET troops. Nevertheless, as the source of the statement is Australian Defence Minister, John Moore, the message could also be read as Australian troops will be hunting the militias. This is categorically a breach as the implied message is foreign troops (either INTERFET or Australian troops) will hunt the militias.

The term ‘hunting down’ refers to the act of hunting. In the act of hunting, targets (usually animals) are being tracked, chase and killed. The aim of the whole process is kill the target. In hunting, it is inconceivable to only hurt the animal. If the hunter by any chance failed to kill the target, the hunter has to find the target and kill the wounded target (animal).

From the discussion above, the headline implies that INTERFET or Australian troops are going to hunt down the militias. While the term ‘hunt’ sometimes means to
'track', the sentence 'hunt down' means to track and kill the target. So there is little doubt here that when INTERFET and/or Australian troops are out to hunt the militias, it meant to kill the militias.

The headline carried a strong meaning as normally what’s being hunted are animals. Even so, it’s not just every animal. Now within the headline, there is an implied message that what is going be hunted are people – the militias. This is the newsworthy part of the event.

The term 'hunt' here really unsettled me. In Indonesia until the arrival of tabloid newspapers like Suara Merdeka, we found it taboo to use such direct expression. The only exception is for criminal news which usually means the police are chasing the criminals but often as well the criminals will end up being shot for 'resisting arrests' or running away. Sometimes it was a fatal ending for the criminal. But the mainstream news media will never use it in the direct way that Australian media did.

My uncle who was an army officer and a proficient hunter, always said to me that when you are hunting you must never stop until you kill your target. There is no other outcome from hunting other than: fail to find the target or success in killing your target. But the target in hunting I know is animals and not humans.489

Within the first paragraph, came another contradiction which according to White is part of what make the news newsworthy. The paragraph described that Australian led force (INTERFET) may attack the militias within Indonesian territory if Indonesia did not prevent them from attacking (into East Timor).

The Australian – led force in East Timor might cross Indonesia’s border in “hot pursuit” if Indonesia allowed Timorese militias to launch attacks from its territory, the Defence Minister, Mr Moore warned yesterday.

The implied message can be seen from several words. The first one is the words are: ‘cross Indonesia’s border’. This clearly means that the ‘force’ – a fully armed force are going to cross another country’s border. This is will be a breach of a country’s sovereignty and may be seen as a declaration of war.
The second word is: ‘warned’. Warned which came from the word warning has a very serious connotations (Delbridge and Bernard, 2000). The word warning is synonym with an ultimatum – a threat that will be taken if the other party failed to follow what the others wanted. Therefore, the message is clear: Australian troops will attack the militias in Indonesian territory. The same message was presented again within the second paragraph.

Expressing concern at a build-up of militias in Indonesian West Timor, Mr Moore said the mandate given to the international force Interfet under Article 7 of the United Nations charter authorised such interventions. This allows raiders to be chased to their hideouts across the border.

The second paragraph shows a ‘tone down’ or a softer version of the previous paragraph. The usage of words such as: concern and authorized carries the same meaning but in more ‘softer’ tone. The word concern shows a level of seriousness but more into the level of thinking but not action. It merely shows that somebody is seriously thinking about something.

The other word showing a different tone is the word: authorized. Authorized as a word means: to be given some level of authority or legality to conduct something out⁴⁹⁰. For example, the police as law enforcers are given authority to enforce the law which includes arresting anyone found to be breaching the law.

Another example of the usage of the term; authority is for the term ‘armed forces’. This means a force that was authorized to carry weapons (thus they are armed). The key concept here is that authorize is synonymous with the term ‘legal’. Thus the usage of word ‘authorized’ in the second paragraph implies that the Australia-led (INTERFET) force has the legal power to cross the Indonesian border.
There is another important point within the article. In the Entman analysis, the article has identified Australia. The term: ‘Australian-led force’ could mean a force that was led by an Australian (which in fact it was) but could also being seen as a force led by Australia (as a country). Within either term, the central point is the word: ‘Australia’.

The salient meaning from the term: ‘Australian-led’ can be defined as bringing Australia as the central player – or in Gadi Wolfsfeld’s term: ‘the good guys’. The connotative meaning or salient meaning thus can be expanded into: ‘A force led by Australia (the good guys) is going to hunt down the militias (the bad people)’.

From the description above, anyone who is familiar with Western culture personification may remember the scenes in old Western movies where the American cavalry are chasing either bandits or Indians. Within such movies, the American cavalry was often portrayed as the ‘ultimate’ good guys’ who are defending the ‘helpless’ civilians (often immigrant farmers) against the villains – i.e. Indians or bandits491.

The last sentence of the second paragraph shows the final perception: ‘...raiders to be chased to their hideouts’. Raiders here carry the connotation of the bandits or Indians in the Western movies. In those movies the ‘bad guys’ often have their camps in mountains (bandits) or a bigger camp in a remote area (Indians). The cavalry (the good guys) then have to ‘raid’ those camps to destroy the ‘bad guys’.
The last sentence can also be interpreted with a different meaning. In the first paragraph and in the headlines, the key term is ‘hunt’ from hunting. In the second paragraph another word is used: ‘hideouts’. Hideouts normally refers to animals’ ‘homes’ but as animals do not have ‘homes’; instead they have their ‘hideouts’.

From White’s perspectives this is a breach. When humans are being deliberately portrayed as close to animals, it is a breach of humanity. How can humans, despite their shortcomings be described as ‘hunted animals?’ In retrospect, the salient message is: ‘The Australian led force (INTERFFET) is going to hunt their target – the militias in their hide outs’’. This can be re-interpreted as: “The good guys are going hunt and kill the bad guys – like a hunter kills its prey (animals). This is a fully legal action condoned by the United Nations”.

The rest of the article brought more reinforcement for the idea of ‘good guys’. The rest of the story described the ‘strong support’ from US towards Australia. The support here comes in two different aspects; political and military. In terms of political support, US is supporting Australia in pressuring Indonesia to stop the militias’ attack.

5.2.2.3. Indonesian newspapers articles

Within the Indonesian newspapers the issue of border crossing and national pride is the most visible issue. All three newspapers presented an almost uniform view; if
INTERFET cross the Indonesian border, Indonesian integrity will be breached. For
Indonesians such breach is a very serious threat to Indonesian integrity.

In line with Peter White’s model, the Indonesian newspapers articles are focusing on
what they believe to be a breach. The breach perceived here is the breach of
Indonesian territory by a foreign force (INTERFET).

As described in earlier, the issue of nationalism is a very sensitive issue for Indonesia.
A senior Indonesian journalist, Kornelius Purba described nationalism as Indonesia’s
primary commodity. Purba also argues former President Habibie decision to give
East Timor choice to be part of Indonesia or not is actually a very nationalistic
action.

"Narrow-minded nationalists may condemn his decision to end the country's occupation of
East Timor by allowing a referendum there a few months before his term ended. But he
perfectly carried out the 1945 Constitution's mandate that Indonesia should help other nations
liberate themselves from imperialism and colonialism."494.

Nationalism or nationalistic pride as described above is a very important factor in
analysing Indonesian society. Angela Romano argues that the very foundation of the
Indonesian political system is created upon a belief that the state should be central.
The Indonesian founding father – Professor Soepomo argues - took his inspiration
from the Hegel concept of organic/integralistic system.

He (Soepomo) found the organic system appropriate to ‘authentic’ Indonesian consciousness,
community spirit and social institutions.

This organic conceptualization specifically rejects individualism and the idea of ‘social
contract’ as the basis of protecting individuals. Soepomo went so far as to argue – admittedly
with limited success – that the Constitution should not contain safeguards of human rights and
civil liberties.
Soepomo’s view was later reinforced by the Indonesian struggle for its independence and freedom from foreign interventions. From 1945 until 1949, Indonesia was physically fighting foreign military intervention from the allied troops to former colonial power- the Dutch. Through the bloody struggle, the sense of nationalism was hardened.

5.2.2.4. The headlines.

*REPUBLIKA* presented a clear of normalcy within its headline. The title of the headline was: *Kapuspen: TNI akan Hadapi Interfet Bila Masuk Timor Barat* – (TNI will face Interfet if it enters West Timor: TNI Spokesman).

From the headline there are two breaches presented. The first one is the breach of the Indonesian border. West Timor is a de-facto an Indonesian territory. If foreign forces such as INTERFET are going to cross the border without permission that means a breach to Indonesian territorial integrity.

The second breach presented in the *REPUBLIKA* headline is that TNI is going to face INTERFET. A normalcy for any countries in the world is to have peace. When armed forces declared they are going to face an outsider (armed) force that could mean armed conflict. Conflict is the opposite of peace thus the statement of TNI spokesman is definitely a breach of normalcy.
The third breach is the tone of headline statement itself. The words: akan hadapi (will face) carries a very serious meaning. Within the Indonesian language, such formal words spoken by an authoritative person means a threat. The statement by the TNI spokesman is a strong warning at least and at worst it is a threat. The threat here is directly towards INTERFET; enter Indonesian territory and they will have to face the TNI.499

In its headline, SUARA PEMBARUAN presented a similar issue with REPUBLIKA. The headline said: PM Howard: Pasukan Multinasional Tidak Akan ke Timor Barat (Multi national force is not going into the West Timor: PM Howard).

SUARA PEMBARUAN headline implies a few breaches just like REPUBLIKA. The first breach is Australian PM, John Howard giving a statement about the multinational troops entering another country’s territory. This is a breach of normalcy as the head of a country normally only speaks of things under their jurisdiction. Multinational troops (INTERFET) are UN sanctioned and logically will be under the coordination of the UN. By saying he is speaking on the behalf INTERFET, Howard suggests that INTERFET as a whole is part of Australian armed forces which is legally under PM Howard.

The second breach within the SUARA PEMBARUAN headline is; a multi national force is going to enter Indonesian territory (West Timor). Similarly with REPUBLIKA headline, any sovereign country in the world is entitled to sovereignty of its own territory. When a foreign (armed) force is going to enter another country’s territory, it is a breach of normalcy.
The *MEDIA INDONESIA* headline also presents a breach. The headline says: Akankah Tentara Interfet Masuk Wilayah Indonesia (Are INTERFET troops going to enter Indonesian territory)? The breach is clear; INTERFET is presumably going to enter Indonesian territory. Being a foreign force mandated only to East Timor, by entering the Indonesian territory, INTERFET is committing a breach.

The summary from the headlines is all Indonesian newspaper articles are presenting breaches within their headlines. Of all issues presented, a single issue is presented by all newspapers; the possibility of INTERFET going into Indonesian territory. For the Indonesian newspapers, this is a breach for their country’s territorial integrity. It is also a breach that incites strongly Indonesia’s nationalistic pride.

5.2.2.6. The body of the articles

*REPUBLIKA* opened its article with a statement from the TNI Spokesman, Major General Sudradjat. General Sudradjat stated clearly that if INTERFET is going to enter Indonesian territory without permission, INTERFET will face the TNI. The first two paragraphs described General Sudradjat statement:

> Indonesian armed forces (TNI) will take stern actions if they face the INTERFET. According to TNI Spokesman Major General Sudradjat, if the Australian-led multination troops entered Indonesian territory in West Timor without permission, TNI will react.

> “We are not going to let the INTERFET enter Indonesian territory without permission and if that happen, they are going to face the TNI because they have breached Indonesian sovereignty,” said Sudradjat yesterday in Jakarta.

*Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) bersikap tegas menghadapi Interfet. Menurut Kapuspen Hankam/TNI Mayjen TNI Sudradjat, bila pasukan multinasional yang dipimpin Australia itu memasuki wilayah territorial RI di Timor Barat tanpa izin, TNI akan menghadapinya.*

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In the first paragraph, the breach was clearly described by General Sudradjat as a possible breach of Indonesian territory by the INTERFET. For TNI, their main role was to protect Indonesia from all threats including threat to its territorial integrity. To have any foreign armed force to enter Indonesian territory without permission is a threat to Indonesia – it’s a duty for the TNI to act against the threat.

**SUARA PEMBARUAN** started its article referring to the possible breach of the Indonesian territory. It quoted PM Howard’s statement acknowledging the possibility of INTERFET entering Indonesian territory but also downplaying the actual possibility of that actually happening.  

In order to reduce the tension with Indonesia, Australia’s PM John Howard on Friday tried to reduce the reports regarding multinational force action that will pursue the militias to West Timor.

To calm Jakarta, Howard to 3AW radio stated: “I don’t think that will happen, because we are focusing our attention in East Timor and not going to insult Indonesia’s dignity”.

*Dalam usaha meredakan ketegangan dengan Indonesia, PM Australia, John Howard, hari Jumat (1/10) berupaya meredam pemberitaan mengenai tindakan pasukan multinasional yang akan mengejar milisi hingga ke Timor Barat.

Guna menenangkan Jakarta, Howard kepada Radio 3AW mengungkapkan, “Saya kira hal itu tidak akan terjadi, karena kita memusatkan perhatian di Timtim dan tidak akan menghina martabat Indonesia”.

**SUARA PEMBARUAN**’s opening paragraph shows the perceived breach; Multi national troops (INTERFET) are going to pursue the militias to Indonesian territory. Nevertheless, what is important to note is the tone of language in how the breach is being reported.
REPUBLIKA opens its reports with a direct quotation from TNI spokesman – giving direct warning/threat to INTERFET not to breach Indonesian territory. SUARA PEMBARUAN is the opposite. SUARA PEMBARUAN opens its report with a quotation from John Howard softening his tone about the possible pursuit. Even more, SUARA PEMBARUAN is emphasizing the words: “reducing tensions”.

The words above are an important indicator on what the emphasis is of the SUARA PEMBARUAN article. The word ‘reduce’ is deliberately used to propose efforts to defuse the increasing tensions between Indonesia and Australia. It is also important because within Indonesian culture, humility is highly appreciated. Therefore, a sign that Australia is willing to lower its tone is an important gesture.

In the REPUBLIKA report, the main idea is clear; it is about a threat from external force and TNI is responding by giving another threat. SUARA PEMBARUAN placed the emphasis on the peaceful aspect of this incident. SUARA PEMBARUAN deliberately avoids focusing on the breach up front. Instead it tried to show efforts to avoid the breach.

Media Indonesia also adopted a similar position with Suara Pembaruan. Within the first two paragraphs, Media Indonesia reports the same breach – a possible breach of Indonesian territory, but within a more ‘softer’ tone.

Will the International force for East Timor led by Australia cross to East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) in order to chase the East Timor pro integration militias? It seems that the possibility is still open.
Australian Defence Minister, John Moore yesterday did not rule out the possibility that INTERFET will run missions to chase and destroy East Timor’s militias that are hiding in NTT or West Timor according to Western term. But he assured that such actions will be very limited.

Media used a question form in presenting their frame which compared with the report from Republika is much less ‘threatening’. In an Indonesian daily context, a direct challenging tone usually means a direct challenge thus it is usually a format that is to be avoided in reporting. But this convention changed with the fall of New Order regime in 1998. Many political publications, especially those taking the tabloid format are openly using the challenging tone. This is in line with the new paradigm within these type of publication that they are now can act openly as the opposition of the ruling elite.

By presenting its main frame in a less direct form, Media Indonesia seems to try to present such a sensitive issue in a more subtle way; something that is surprising knowing that during the East Timor crisis, Media Indonesia was often perceived to be promoting more nationalistic frames compared to the other Indonesian newspapers except for Republika.

The softer tone of Media Indonesia is not just visible within the first paragraph but also evident in the following paragraph:
Australian Defence Minister, John Moore yesterday did not rule out the possibility that INTERFET will run missions to chase and destroy East Timor’s militias that are hiding in NTT or West Timor according to Western term. But he assured that such actions will be very limited.

*Media Indonesia* is clearly presenting the possibility of the breach of Indonesian borders by INTERFET troops as stated by Australian Defence Minister, John Moore. But the way *Media Indonesia* presented the frame in this paragraph is similar to the first paragraph; it is of a threat from Australia which is still just an argument – not yet a direct threat. Unfortunately as subtle as it is, for most of Indonesians, the issue of Indonesia’s integrity and freedom is something almost sacred. Such arguments of a possible threat, especially spoken by a senior defence official that comes from a country that was seen as ‘unfriendly’ to Indonesia at the time is something to be taken very seriously.

In my personal experience, as for many Indonesians, our concern the during East Timor crisis was of how far this crisis will go. Being a journalist and educator at that time, I know from personal knowledge that Indonesian rule in East Timor caused much sufferings and pain to both the East Timorese citizens and the personnel of the armed forces stationed there. In fact the news for the service personnel was not good news. I kept hearing stories of how thousands of soldiers had been killed and often they were not just killed, they were butchered.

So my feelings towards the crisis was a mixed one. I remember that on the September 4th, I was woken at 6AM (Jakarta time) by my editor in Singapore. My editor wanted me to write an article about what Indonesian public felt about East Timor choosing to reject the Indonesian offer of special autonomy. I ended up writing a story that quotes a former Indonesian army general that basically said that we, Indonesians, are sad that the East Timorese rejected our offer but we can understand their reasons. That story was illustrated by a friend of mine who made a similar cartoon.

What most Indonesian felt at that time was surprise but also relief that hopefully this would end perceptions of Indonesia trying to hold East Timor at all costs. The mood on the fateful Saturday morning was very depressing but there was no anger, yet. The same sentiment also presented by Mrs Toeti Adhitama, an editor in *Media Indonesia*:

> In the case of East Timor, there indeed was a dilemma. We feel annoyed that East Timorese want to separate from us - after we had considered them one of us for so long. But it's still
hard to sit idle when we see East Timorese trembling with fear, made to squat with the hands of their head and guarded by large Australians who enthusiastically point the muzzles of their weapons at those helpless people.509

The sentiment from Mrs Adhitama above in many ways represents the feelings shared by many Indonesians at that time. Many Indonesians, remembered well that Indonesia, just about 50 years earlier was at war against its former master – the Dutch. For those who had not lived in these times by themselves, there were abundant Indonesian war movies that almost presented the same story: how the Indonesian freedom fighters fought against the more powerful, stronger, taller and brutal enemies. The problems in these movies are that the victims are always dark skinned, peasant looking Asians and the enemies are the tall and bulky white soldiers. Often the enemies were represented as ruthless and sadistic. So the frames of ‘fight against oppressions from westerners’ were abundant even before the East Timor crisis in 1999. When the INTERFET arrived in East Timor, such frames against the image of foreign white soldiers, were readily available.

What many Indonesian realised but somehow was not fully represented in the analysis here is that we also knew that East Timorese were suffering as badly as ourselves (at least) in the hand of New Order regime. I remember one story that I often heard from various people, from a fellow lecturer in my office to a security guard at the Indovision building510, was how for every single Indonesian soldier killed in East Timor, it was common to have a whole village destroyed – I never asked what happened to the villagers.

During a conversation with an Australian journalist, Ben Bohane, I came to an understanding how for an Australian journalist, East Timor was just another game. It was just an assignment but possibly one that will boost one’s career. So every journalist that went there was in a race to find ‘gold mine’. But soon it was apparent that not much was left to report other than the trail of destructions. On top of that, the parent organisation in Australia requires news stories
daily regardless of whether there was actually any news worthy events at all. So the pressure was very high.\textsuperscript{511}

But one thing was available: violence – or what was left of it. Melvin Singh, a journalist from Singapore showed a photograph of a well. He asked me how many bodies could I see? I said I saw just one. He said it is correct. But soon after Melvin took the picture, a group of foreign journalists came and they started to count how deep the well was and how many bodies should be there. Their count was thirty bodies. Later jokingly Melvin said when the news arrived at Reuters office in London, the number was a hundred. I was laughing until I saw the news report in Reuters mentioning the numbers above.

Back in Australia I was taught that it was better to be careful than sorry for publishing a wrong story. But listening and seeing such things happen like that, made me wonder about the accuracy and objectivity of modern news media. The man in the well was later identified as a pro-Indonesian militiaman instead of pro-independence that was alleged by foreign media merely due to the fact that the well was in Bishop Belo’s house – a well known independence activist.\textsuperscript{512}

At the same time that East Timor was ravaged by violence, an almost similar situation happened in Indonesia. Particularly in Jakarta, the situation was very explosive since May 1998. As Jakarta residents, we lived in deep fear but also knew that the only way to came out of this fear is to move on with our daily lives.

We kept listening to the radio all the time. Radio was the best source of news within a very unstable place like Jakarta. Mostly we listened to where (if any) riots were happening. But we also waited, if there was any significant news about the politics as well. Most important was to know which road was not safe to travel to. You don't want to be caught in the middle of riots on the road or worse massive robberies on the road which was almost the norm of the day at that time\textsuperscript{513}.

The Indonesian security apparatus was often overwhelmed at that time. There was almost no security guarantee. The only guarantee was to leave Indonesia, like many people did in the early days of riots in 1998\textsuperscript{514}. I remember one day in October 1998 just a few hundred metres from the heavily guarded state parliament complex, hundreds of people blocked the main road and demanded passers-by to give their valuables.

Even when the security apparatus were available, their behaviour was unpredictable. In squashing the demonstrators, the troops and police officers often simply squashed
anyone in their sight. Hundreds of people, either students demonstrating, people who
just joined for the fight or innocent bystanders were often victims, being beaten badly
or worse, being shot at. A description of how bad it was when the security apparatus
was squashing the demonstrations can be described here from the accounts of my
students:

(i) Everything was in chaos. People were running away and screaming. Shots were fired
everywhere. I saw someone hit by bullet in front of me. I was about to charge and help that
man when I heard: ‘Zzzzing’ sound passed near my head. It was a bullet. Immediately I
stopped my intention and instead hid behind a tree. When I looked behind, I saw a Red Cross
team which was also pinned down by the shootings.515

(ii) I was taking pictures when the troops and police attacked the demonstrators. Everybody
ran away in all directions. I found myself hiding under a police truck. It was a bad place to be
as I could hear the police and troops taking people to the truck and beating them really badly.
I have no doubt what my fate would be if I got caught.516

(iii) We were buying foods from the street vendors. Everybody including the troops seemed to
be calm. Even the troops were sitting enjoying their meals. Suddenly there were military
trucks passing by, and we heard shots. Instinctively I ran away; that was when I saw this boy,
about ten years old lying in the street. His body was covered with blood and rice. He looked
scruffy, maybe a street kid. Without thinking I just pulled him up and took him to the nearest
hospital – we were practically just in front of it. But before I got to the hospital, the boy
moaned and then he died. My shirt and jeans were covered by his blood.517

The accounts show how the Indonesian security apparatus was often accused of
heavy handedness in dealing with the security situation. But in all fairness, the
security situation was also in chaos. Indonesia faced a dilemma; on one hand we
wanted security to be rectified but on the other hand, the cost of maintaining security
is very high.

Returning to the Media Indonesia frame of the possible breach of the Indonesian
border by INTERFET troops, we can see the complexity from the Indonesian side.
On the one hand, many Indonesians were surprised that East Timorese wanted to
become independent after years of being supported by Indonesia. But the reports of
violence in East Timor were simply repeating the same news from all over Indonesia
at that time. Now, suddenly a senior defence official from a neighbouring country said that his troops, though under UN mandate, can and will breach the Indonesian border in order to destroy pro-integration militias.

For a media whose reports regarding East Timor crisis has been largely negative towards Australia, \textit{Media Indonesia} reports on the border crossing issue is surprisingly one of restraint. Unlike \textit{Republika}, \textit{Media Indonesia} did not deliberately show a reaction of defiance. Instead, \textit{Media Indonesia} presented the issue in impersonal and a ‘matter of fact’ format. In general, this report is a sharp contrast to the frame of confidence and can almost be described as ‘chest beating’ reports by Australian newspapers.

In conclusion, the textual analysis based upon Peter White’s method shows how the Australian and Indonesian press not only perceived the East Timor crisis differently but also presented a different perception of reality to their audiences. Both Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented the issue by using languages and terms available at their disposal. In the end, the frame created and the way it was presented, was basically aimed to present what the newspapers perceived to their own audiences.

\textbf{5.2.3. Gadi Wolfsfeld approach}

The third methodology used in this thesis is the one devised by Gadi Wolfsfeld. Wolfsfeld argues that media is playing the role of the arena in the modern day
competition among political adversaries. The adversaries are political power in all forms in particular governments (Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Wolfsfeld, 2003b).

The Media, is more than just a passive spectator. In previous chapters it has been discussed how the media actually created the social construction of reality. This reality is a subjective view of the world shaped by current knowledge and culture.

In Wolfsfeld’s theory, the central issue is about how various parties (or what he defined as ‘antagonists) are competing in defining the reality. Wolfsfeld argues that the media act as a generator of reality, that any parties with political interest will try their best to influence the media. The goal is to control the perception of reality.

The significance of controlling the perception of reality is the ability to steer people’s minds because people have a limited capability of gathering information regarding the world surrounding them. They rely on secondary sources – in which the media play a very significant role. The information gathered is needed to help people make an informed decision regarding various issues most importantly – their life.

In democratic societies, theoretically the power lies with the people. But there is an important condition, that is that the people should have full access to information in order for them to make a correct decision such as choosing a political leader or the future of their society. This as what Alvin Toffler said: “Those who control the information can control the society”. Anyone who can control the media can
influence the mind of the society. Davis gave a definition of social construction of reality.\textsuperscript{520}

Social construction of reality theory is grounded on the premise that we live in a fundamentally ambiguous social world – a world in which persons, objects and actions have no inherent or essential meaning. If meaning is not inherent, then it must be created – imposed is limited by and relative to the context in which meaning is generated. Moreover, because action in situations is inevitably structured by groups that dominate those situations, those groups enjoy an inherent advantage in determining the meaning derived from action in situations.\textsuperscript{521}

Ciaran McCullagh argues that sociologically, there is nothing wrong with how ‘reality’ is being constructed by media reports. The main issue is whether the information being passed is free from any distortion or refraction. The ‘window’ (or the media in his term) should allow the society to view the world as it is.\textsuperscript{522}

Wolfsfeld theory argues that the ‘window’ is not a static entity. The ‘window’ is like a living form, it follows the changes in its environment. The main idea is that media can only be effective if they can adapt themselves with the society in which they are based. Media, are successful if they can connect with their culture, values and political frames within their own society.\textsuperscript{523}

Media is not an independent entity. Within the political conflict discourse (as Wolfsfeld argues), media present its stories always within the boundary of cultural, structural and political symbols known at that time.\textsuperscript{524} Media also plays a pivotal role in defining the way the conflict\textsuperscript{525} can help the outcome by gaining supports for the contestants. The winner, according Wolfsfeld is the party that most successful in gaining political support (Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Wolfsfeld, 2002, Wolfsfeld, 2003b, Wolfsfeld, 2003a). Wolfsfeld made his model based upon years of research in the way
media presented the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, in which Wolfsfeld argues that Palestinian has the upper hands in term of media supports. 526

Back to the media over East Timor crisis, from the analysis based on Entman’s and White’s method we can see how both Australian and Indonesian newspapers were trying hard to promote their own perspectives over the issue. Australian newspapers were trying to present frames of a tough stance, resilience and determination in providing security in East Timor even though it may cause conflict with Indonesia. Indonesian newspapers, at that time already in defensive position due to pressures and condemnations from the world on Indonesia, are presenting frames of defiance.

*The Sydney Morning Herald* presented a frame of a blunder – a mistake. The mistake here is of the statement from Australian Defence Chief, John Moore of the possibility of INTERFET troops crossing the Indonesian border in order to destroy the pro-integration militias. *The Sydney Morning Herald* perceived that such a statement was simply increasing the already high tension between Australia and Indonesia. Australia’s image in Indonesia, according to *The Sydney Morning Herald* had already suffered setbacks due to Australia’s pressure to Indonesia over East Timor issue and in particular the fact that Australia led the UN’s sanctioned force – The INTERFET, to East Timor.

Nevertheless, *The Sydney Morning Herald* also acknowledged that the Australian government believed very deeply in the ‘justness’ of the INTERFET mission – including the possibility of a force crossing the Indonesian border. In *The Sydney
Morning Herald position, such a statement will draw serious consequences from Indonesia.

The Australian presented a different frame compared to The Sydney Morning Herald. The Australian presented a frame of confidence that as the previous analysis shows an almost ‘chest beating’ kind of confidence. The Australian not only perceived the statement by John Moore as justifiable but also believed that such action was necessary. In White’s method of analysis, we have seen how the choices of words presented a very strong view and opinion. In particular the words: ‘hunt down’ – is from the term ‘hunting down’. The problem with such a term used here is the term used for animals being hunted. Yet, in this context the intended targets were pro-integration militias, which are humans.

Thus the frame from The Australian is of confidence that Australian troops as part of INTERFET will hunt down the pro-integration militias as a hunter hunting down animals. Such a frame is very strong. It shows resolution, a strong will and a clear warning from a very authoritative source. As described earlier, there cannot be any other meaning than that it was a direct threat.

Going back to concept of framing by Wolfsfeld, frame is just a way of communicating during a political contest. Frame is a means of a political war where contestants try as hard as they can to win the right to give meaning to specific situations. The aim is to gain the public support of as many contestants as possible.
But nothing is constant in this contest. Every contestant has to be on their toes all the time. A winner can become a loser if they are not careful.

The statements by *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* are statements representing the interests of certain political players within the East Timor crisis. In order to analyse and understand them, Wolfsfeld has devised two options: who are the good guys and how was this issue covered in the past?

For the first question, the answer is for Australian newspapers, the good guys are the Australian troops though it was publicly announced as INTERFET. As shown in Entman’s method, the identification and generalisation is clear. Australian troops are INTERFET and INTERFET is Australian armed force, at least in Australian newspapers. The impact is the Australian public were given an impression of the power and might of the Australian force. Australia is full with resolution and ready to go to war with Indonesia if it’s necessary.

Such a strong frame is serving a limited contestant: Australian politicians. Sending the troops to East Timor was a huge gamble by the Australian PM for his political career. If the mission failed, then his political career could be in danger. But he knew if he succeeded he would be able to reap a popular support from Australian people. But at that very moment, the animosity of Australian people towards what happened in East Timor was so high (as reflected in the number of articles) that it was doubtful that Australian government would do anything otherwise.
Sending the troops was a positive step, politically for Australian government. But still fresh in the mind of the western society was the US failure in Vietnam War. As a US ally in the War, Australia was fully aware of the power of public opinion, so it was imperative that Australian government should create a strong message to the Australian people. This is exactly what Gerard Henderson said of how Indonesia was easiest and hottest commodities within Australian politics.528

Answering the second question, there was no reference of conflict between Australia and Indonesia except during the time of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. But during the East Timor crisis, very little reference was made about the previous conflict. This is interesting as the armed forces of Indonesia and Australia were at conflict just over thirty years ago but no reference was made here.

In general the Australian media relationship with Indonesia was often difficult. Stories by David Jenkins regarding Soeharto’s wealth were enough to make the Indonesian government bar any Australian journalists coming to Indonesia.529 In fairness the term: ‘bad news is good news’ is reflecting the relations. For Australian journalists, unfortunately the news that would be of interest for Australian media is about bad things that happened in Indonesia. But as Damien Kingsbury described, the Australian media perceived Indonesia through a one way mirror.530 What interests them is based upon the criteria of Australian media. The perspective presented is the perspective of Australian media.
So without any reference to the past, what was presented was about the present situation in East Timor after the referendum. This is not about how bloody the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia was back in 1963 – 1966. What is important and the focus of the story is just anything to solidify Australian perceptions of what is happening in East Timor. Thus the presented statements, frames and languages is merely presenting a reality, a social construction of reality to the Australian public about what is happening in East Timor and why Australia should be involved.

Indonesian newspapers also follow a similar path with the Australian newspapers. No reference was made to the confrontation period or events within Indonesian newspapers reports. Indeed there were abundant opinions and statements that presented Australia as an ‘enemy’ to the Indonesian public. Several graphics and most obviously statements from Indonesian officials were constantly published to reinforce the official standing of Indonesia. But those statements as presented earlier are not random occurrences. Everything was carefully constructed to follow a specific frame that will be able to be understood well by Indonesian public.

The Indonesian public in 1999 was a society that was full with rage, frustration and anger. After thirty years under repressive rules, suddenly everything changed almost overnight in 1998. Suddenly Indonesia faced an economic, political and social crisis it has not seen since 1960’s. Therefore what would be the best frame to present the issue of possible border crossing by Australian troops than to described it as an act aggression by a foreign country.
Whether moderate or subtle the presentation of the issue in the Indonesian newspapers gave a similar meaning: is Australia going to invade Indonesia? Based on Wolfsfeld's concept above, the good guys here are Indonesian. Indonesia is presented as independent and free and will protect its sovereignty at all costs. Australia is a foreign country that not just meddles into Indonesia's domestic affairs but also dares to make a statement that it will send its troops over the border to chase the militias.

In this concept, Indonesia is almost an innocent party, a victim of a big western bully who has forced its way into Indonesia's affairs. Fortunately in this incident the statement came first from Australia, making it more convenient for Indonesia to present itself as passive victim rather than a willing participant whose action may have triggered the threat from Australia. The winner here is the Indonesian elite, in particular the Indonesian military which after a disastrous referendum found itself being blamed solely for orchestrating the rampages. Now the Indonesian military was finding itself in a very comfortable position as the defender of Indonesia. Should the threat from Australia materialize, TNI will find itself as the hero for the Indonesian people.

It was not a secret that Australia always perceived Indonesia as a possible threat. A significant proportion and assets of Australian Defence Force (ADF) was directed towards Indonesia. Indonesian media did not fail in presenting Australia as a neighbour that although seemed to be friendly is always constantly suspicious of Indonesia.
When I started to read newspapers (early 1980’s), I remember reading many articles saying that ADF’s White Book or strategic plan always envisaged that the threat for Australia is always coming from the north. Indeed the threat always came from the north, such as in World War 2. But the end of World War 2 only reinforced the perceived threat from the north. Even as far as 2003, I was told that the most popular foreign language taught in ADF academy is Bahasa Indonesia.

During the East Timor crisis, Australian involvement was described as intrusive to say the least. But others have gone as far as describing Australia as an ‘enemy’. Indeed several incidents did happen such as when Indonesian jet fighters were scrambled to intercept Australian fighters above Rote Island.

Such constant representation of Australia as a possible enemy is something that was rarely encountered in the news media until recently. The issue of border crossing was simply another event that solidified the Indonesian public perception of Australia as a hidden enemy as voiced by the Indonesian newspapers.

5.3. Conclusion.

What this chapter shows is that Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented different frames to their own audiences. The frames were carefully constructed by using texts that were based upon icons or concepts that were not only understood by each society but also relate to a deeper meaning that again connects to values, cultures and history of the Australian and Indonesian societies.

The news reports, in this case the texts of the reports, show that it was not a random product. In fact, the analysis of the texts shows a deliberate effort to present what the media perceived as the reality at that particular time over a specific issue. On the issue of possible border crossings by INTERFET troops, Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented frames of mistakes (The Sydney Morning Herald), nationalistic
confidence (*The Australian*) and defiance (Indonesian newspapers). Nevertheless, in general Australian newspapers also presented the Australian government line of the justness of the action (of border crossing) and confidence that Australian troops (as part of INTERFET) could do so successfully.

The frame of defiance presented by Indonesian newspapers is not because it was the stance of Indonesia government. Instead, the stance of defiance is reflecting the pride of Indonesia as a nation that earned its independence through war – among a handful of countries in the world. The frame of defiance was at that time the political consensus within Indonesian society – Indonesia is under ‘attack’ by foreign power including Australia. Wolfsfeld argues that during the time of political contest such as during East Timor crisis, the overall political consensus within the political elite and the general society can determine the behaviour of the media during the conflict. Wolfsfeld argues that the bigger the overall political consensus, the more the media will follow the government line.

The textual analysis conducted using methods from Robert Entman, Peter White and Gadi Wolfsfeld in the frames presented by Australian and Indonesian newspapers regarding the issue of possible border crossing, produces some significant findings. The findings are:

- Australian and Indonesian newspapers were presenting views from sources that came from their own government (officials) and these views are apparent in the frames presented by Australian and Indonesian newspapers.
• The frames from Australian newspapers are of a blunder (*The Sydney Morning Herald*), confidence (*The Australian*) and general defiance (Indonesian newspapers).

• The frames above are generally in line with both governments’ line and that represents the frame of the ruling elite for both nations. This was the result of overall political consensus within the Australian and Indonesian societies.

• The frames themselves also represent some deeper beliefs rooted in culture and history within the Australian and Indonesian societies.

What the finding of this chapter show is the challenge of reporting under difficult situation such under the condition of war. Under such circumstances, often the situation is problematic by its nature where journalists may not get the full access to cover all sides. Often the only access they have is to the side where they gets protection from. A classic example is what happened during the Gulf War 1 and 2.

During the first Gulf War, both Iraqi and Coalition force did not know how to utilize the media and media were often seen with suspicions. Coalition forces (mainly the US military) allows the journalists to be among them within certain extent but in general the journalists were put under strict restrictions on their movements and to what they can reports.

During the second Gulf War, the situation was different where both sides are keen to promote their frames through the media. As such, media was almost a welcome addition to troops (US Military only) or as a witness to the destruction on the ground.
(Iraqi side). This way, journalists are not a passive observer but became an active participant in war of information.

In East Timor crisis, indeed at some stage, most journalists were expelled from the ground. Initially it was the foreign press who was forced to leave when the UN pulled out most of their staff out. But during that time, Indonesian journalists are still present despite great difficulties. The arrival of the INTERFET changes the situation where after the murder of Sanders Thoenes, almost all Indonesian journalists had to leave East Timor as the threat against them are mounting.

What happened here is a chaotic situation where sources are hard to come by and let alone independent cross checking of the information. Both sides then naturally resides to whatever sources available at hand, such as the incoming refugees to Australia. These refugees after leaving East Timor under extreme danger and stress will understandably may not able to give a neutral comment which in the end may support the frames of the Australian government at that time of a situation totally out of control.

But what is really interesting is the fact that both Australian and Indonesian media continuous to based their reports on sources close to them. Meanwhile they seems to ignore the other parties reports that sometimes contradicts their reports. This seems contradictory with a credo of journalism that to do a fair reporting. Limitations on getting reliable sources is the reality but refusal or ignoring other sources available
simply because they are ‘from the other side’ seems to compromise the basic idea of journalism itself.

The points of this chapter’s findings, were significant. It shows that news media accounts created socially constructed realities that were projected back to the both societies. But I still believe that it is not proven yet, that media were presenting a social construction of realities and most important is how such social construction of reality were created beyond the usages of languages.

The study of languages in this chapter and Chapter 4 show that a social construction of reality was created through the use of languages. But language here is just the means to present the social construction of realities. It is like a truck or plane that transports the product but it did not advance our understanding of how the social construction of reality was created. My belief is that as Entman and Wolfsfeld methods in this chapter show, there is a strong connection between the official sources and the message that were presented.

Thus in the next chapter the focus of analysis is going to be regarding the sources of the news reports. But to analyse all the articles published during the East Timor crisis will be to cover too many articles which is beyond the means of this research. What I proposed then is to focus on a specific period of time where a significant event happened. The event I proposed is the period of time when almost all foreign journalists were forced to leave East Timor during which the reporting continue to flow by the foreign media including Australian newspapers.
The aim for this next step is to refine the research while expanding the focus of the study into something different. By understanding how the media operates under extremely difficult circumstances, I hope we can have a much more comprehensive understanding of why Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented different perspectives during East Timor crisis in 1999.
CHAPTER 6
NEWSPAPERS AND THEIR SOURCES

6.1. Introduction.

In previous chapters, samples of the Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports in East Timor were analysed. The analysis aimed to show the various frames embedded in the news reports and also to show that the frame is actually related to a deeper meaning. The deeper meaning is used to ‘relate’ the news events to a contextual understanding within the societies of Australia and Indonesia.

Gadi Wolfsfeld argues that behind a frame there is usually a hidden deeper frame.336 This hidden and deeper frame is often something most fundamental to the related society.337 Based on this concept, this chapter will try to look beyond the surface frame and understand the deeper frame. This process is important in order to understand the respective realities created by the Australian and Indonesian media in reporting the East Timor crisis in 1999. Wolfsfeld describes his concept:

Cultures’ frames exist at a variety of levels and as a rule one would expect that deeper frames would be less contested and thus more resilient to change.

The depth of a given frame can be judged by considering its level of specificity and its age: while the deepest cultural frames about conflict may go back thousands of years. Those with less depth may be as recent as yesterday’s news. The power of the deepest frames comes from the fact that they are rarely examined and usually taken for granted.338
The existence of the deeper frame is the main focus of this thesis. I believe, as shown in the analysis of Chapters 4 and 5, that there are deeper messages or meanings within the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports. The messages or meanings were constructed upon the cultures, values and social conditions within Australian and Indonesian societies. In other words, the deeper frames were designed to relate to something fundamental within Australian and Indonesian society.

Besides frames, sources also played an important role in creating the media construction of reality (Zelizer, 1989, Clayman, 1990, Kurpius, 2002, McCullagh, 2002). David Kurpius stated that if journalism is a reflection of a society then the quality of this reflected reality is to some extent dependent upon sources used.539

Wolfsfeld argues that one of the keys to understanding a political conflict is by understanding the concept that the political process will have more influence on media reports than the media will on the political process.540 The role of political actors as main players is central within this process but it has to be understood in a broader context. One of the roles that political actors played is by acting as sources.541 The role of political actors as sources is very important as political actors provides a significant amount of information regarding the political conflict.542

A good deal of the information about political conflicts used by the news media comes from outputs generated by political actors. Outputs refer to all actions, information and interpretive frames produced by political antagonists.

The success of antagonists in promoting their frames to the news media will depend on their ability to ensure that the coming information and events offer a good narrative fit with their preferred media frames.543
In this chapter the main focus will be on the role news sources played in the East Timor's crisis reports in 1999. It is my belief that by identifying, classifying and analyzing the role of the source, we will come to a more thorough understanding of the issue.

6.2. The rule of three sources.

It is the aim of journalism to provide fair and balanced reporting. But how to achieve such an outcome is the never ending question. How can a report be classified as 'balanced' and 'fair'? How about the issue of 'objectivity'?

An extensive literature has discussed the issue of objectivity, fairness and balance in media reporting yet none has been able to fully define what is the ultimate objectivity, fairness and balanced report (Wright, 1986b, Said, 1980, Lichtenberg, 1991, Berger and Luckmann, 1966, Hackett, 1984, Reeb Jr, 1999). The core problem is that all those issues are all relative meaning that they will always relative to many factors, in particular to a specific society, where the media operates. It is in this context that objectivity, fairness and balance need to be judged.

Peter L. Berger said that the social scientist as a person is a product of their society, thus he or she will have and be affected with his/her own beliefs, values and experience, a view that I hold myself. Nevertheless when they do their role, social scientists should strive as best they can to be value free. This striving is to
maintain the highest level of research quality which will be impossible if the social
scientist failed to strive to be value free.546

The definition of fair reporting for me as a journalist was shaped by two major
experience. First was my training in Australia, in the Graduate School of
Journalism.547 There it was emphasized that what’s most important quality for
journalist is to be fair instead of being objective.548 The second most important
experience was my own working experience with SWA magazine and The Indonesian
Observer newspaper. During my time with both media, I considered myself to be
very lucky to have excellent experiences.

SWA magazine was the leading business magazine in Indonesia. It was part of
TEMPO magazine group until 1994, from which SWA got its high quality reporting.
The high quality reporting here was defined (loosely) by these standards: Always
look for the most credible sources (the more credible the better); Always have at least
two comparative sources (a single comparative source is used only when there is no
other option); More credible sources are better (for main coverage, it is better too
have at least four sources); Last but not least is always verify any information given
by the sources.549

During my tenure in The Indonesian Observer, I was often did my work besides
Mandiri Online editors.550 Mandiri Online have a very strict guidelines that any
stories will only be published after the journalist can verify their story with at least
two sources. Thus combined with the role of journalist as the eyewitness, the two
other sources rule made into three sources rule. I believe this practice to be a good standard of a fair reporting – by basing the report to as many credible sources as possible.

Sources are an important process of news gathering and news reporting. Sources give a report its credibility which is the main strength of news reports. But this comes at a price that the source has the ability to influence what is being reported. Ericsson et al give their arguments regarding sources:

News also constitutes an authoritative vision of social order through what sources are cited as saying. Sources are used to cite the facts of the matter without further investigation (Tuchman, 1978; Ericson et al, 1987), and to give credibility to what reporter visualizes.

In the reality of daily news reporting in Indonesia, often journalists were put into difficult position when they had to protect the identity of their sources while at the same time presenting to the public with the information. This is very delicate issue where the public’s right to know is contradicted by the need to protect the person(s) who had divulged the information from possible harm because of their action. These sources then were generally categorized as un-attributed sources or sources without any clear identity.

Un-attributed sources in my experience as a journalist were not encouraged at all. Such sources are difficult to be verified and especially during the New Order regime, can lead to the allegation of spreading rumors or even slandering. Slandering or spreading rumors was a highly dangerous issue during the New Order regime as often part of the Indonesian elite may do whatever it takes to ‘punish’ any media that they considered to be spreading wrongful information about them. Thus, unless it was
absolutely necessary, Indonesian media tended not to publish any un-attributed sources. Unfortunately this trend change after the fall of the New Order regime.\textsuperscript{556}

During the New Order regime, un-attributed sources were mostly found in criminal articles involving minors or sexual crimes. Under Indonesian press ethics, victims of crimes particularly if they were minors or victims of sexual crimes must not be identified clearly. It is permissible to state the gender or age but not their true identity. After the fall of New Order regime such practices spread into political reports, which can be found in even the most respectable media.\textsuperscript{557} Though according to Indonesian law such practice is permissible it also brought serious issues about accuracy of the information and the honesty of the sources.\textsuperscript{558}

The point of bringing this issue up is that the issue of un-attributed source is going to be part of the issue analyzed. Before we embark into analyzing this contested issue, we need to clarify the position about the un-attributed source. Un-attributed sources are permissible in both Australian and Indonesian newspapers but in particular for Indonesian newspapers such source is not the norm. It means as far as I know, in Indonesian press practices such practices can only be done if there is no other way to present the information and protect the source at the same time.

Under normal circumstances, when reporting conflicting ideas or parties, a journalist should strive for accuracy and fairness. This means all sides should be reported in a fair manner; if one side was quoted then the other side should be reported as well.
During my journalism training in Australia, there was an informal rule of three sources that address the issue of the fair and balanced sources.

The three sources rule here was supposed to give a fair coverage to all parties; one for each of the warring parties and one for a neutral source. Theoretically, these three sources will give a fair, balanced and neutral report. No parties were overly represented and there is a third source acting as a neutral source. During my association with The Indonesian Observer, this rule was applied in slightly different manner.

In The Indonesian Observer I often worked next to the Mandiri Online, our sister publication that became the second fully dedicated online newspapers in Jakarta at that time. One thing that impressed me most with Mandiri Online was of their professionalism. It was run and controlled by three editors, all former ANTARA news agency editors. They took turn to collect and process the raw reports from their field reporters.

Every time a reporter called the office to report the news, these editors never failed to ask back to their reporters: have they verified their news or not? Any news that was not verified yet, was processed but not published. Usually the editors would be satisfied until the news was verified with at least another source but normally they would prefer a third source to verify the story. Within months of their move to become fully based in the internet in February 1999, Mandiri Online became one of the most accessed Indonesian web based newspapers besides Detik.com.559

Indeed in reality, it is very hard to get three different sources within very short time.

For daily newspapers, where the deadlines are always tight the pressure is even higher. This is as true for Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Thus, often newspapers have to make do with whatever comes without much ability to fully verify them.

Australian journalist Ben Bohane who went to East Timor after the arrival of INTERFET, said that the conditions in East Timor (when he arrived) were very difficult. Electricity and communications were damaged and in many areas were not available at all. The journalists who were accredited (or in current terms: embedded) with INTERFET, were saved from those difficulties as INTERFET provided them with electricity and communication lines.

Nevertheless, Ben admitted, the pressure for those journalists embedded with INTERFET were very high too. For the Australian journalists (either print or broadcast journalists), their editors constantly demanded for new reports. At least once a day those journalists had to
report something to their offices. To report a proper news report under such circumstances is very difficult. Being an independent journalist who has more forgiving schedules, Ben Bohane did not have such difficulties with schedules.\textsuperscript{560}

As described above, the condition in East Timor during the crisis in 1999 was very difficult and dangerous. This situation led to some journalists to ‘relax’ their standard and ends up publishing stories that later were found to be wrong. A famous case was the story from Lindsay Murdoch where he reported that there was a houseful of bodies in the pro-Indonesian militia’s headquarters.\textsuperscript{561} The journalist later simply claimed that he was not able to check and verified the story, let alone comply with the ‘three sources rule’.\textsuperscript{562}

East Timor during the crisis in 1999 was not an ordinary place. The on-going conflict since 1975, have made East Timor a very hostile place. The risk for any journalist working in East Timor was very real and this was even so during the 1999 crisis where at least two journalists were shot at. One was killed and numerous others had their lives threatened. Nevertheless, the basic journalistic standard and practices should be followed otherwise the work will be meaningless. It is the focus of the study in this chapter and the following one, to understand how the journalists were able to works under very difficult situations.

\textbf{6.3. Focus of study.}

In this chapter the focus of the study is about how media operate within the constraint of the situation and what was the outcome. Issue of violence, soon escalated into the issue of emergency (within Australian media reports). For Indonesian newspapers, it
is about one issue within a wave of problems faced by Indonesia at that time. Indeed the outcome as presented in previous chapters is significantly different.

The focus of this chapter is the media reports between the time referendum result announcement until the arrival of INTERFET (September 4th – September 20th). The significance of the dates are: 1. It was considered the ‘peak’ of the crisis time. 2. Most significant was the absence of foreign journalists from East Timor around that time.

As a background, In September 4th the result of the referendum was announced by the UNAMET as the coordinator of the referendum. Within hours, pro-integration supporters went on a rampage, attacking any alleged supporters of the pro-independence. The pro-integration supporters (often described as militias or pro-Jakarta militias) attacked not only East Timorese but also anyone they considered to be the supporters of the pro-independence. These included church officials, UN staff, foreign aid workers and foreign journalists.

Within days the violence had pushed most of the foreigners out from East Timor. By September 10th, the only place considered to be ‘safe’ was the UN headquarters in Dili. Within the compound, were hundreds of East Timorese refugees and what was left of UN staff and foreign journalists. Finally at the 10th of September, with heavy security provided by Indonesian forces (Police and TNI), almost all the staff, journalists and refugees left Dili by air, leaving only a handful of UN staff that volunteered to stay behind. With this departure, all foreign journalists had left East
Timor (there were already just a handful as the majority have left as soon as the violence escalated).

For the Indonesian press, the situation was different. *Kompas* and *Suara Pembaruan* had reporters/correspondents in East Timor until the evacuation of most of Indonesian journalists on September 22nd. Nevertheless Indonesian journalists were able to maintain their presence until October 1st, when Indonesian forces officially were pulled out from East Timor. Some newspapers like *Republika* were not able to maintain a continuous presence of their own reporter in East Timor and had to base their reports mostly to *ANTARA* news agency.563

The data collected from the period of September 4th – September 20th 1999, shows a different pattern between Australian and Indonesian newspapers in term of sources used. The first discrepancy is the number of articles published. Australian newspapers published significantly more articles regarding East Timor compared to the Indonesian Newspapers. For the full list of articles selected to be analysed, please refer to Appendix A.
Table 5
Articles published period September 4th - 20th, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Articles published</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Sydney Morning Herald</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suara Pembaruan</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Indonesia</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the same period Australian newspapers on average published almost four times the number of articles regarding East Timor compared to the Indonesian newspapers. The articles analysed are all articles relating or regarding East Timor excluding public response (such as letters to the editors). Personal commentaries in the format of articles are included.564

The Table 1 shows how prominent East Timor issue is for Australian media. Within a 17 days period, on average each Australian newspaper published around 16 articles each day. On the contrary, Indonesian newspapers only published between two to three articles each day. So on average, Australian newspapers published seven times more articles compared to the Indonesian newspapers.
6.4. Research method.

In the previous chapter, we have used various models including the model from Peter White in order to analyse the frames within news reports. While very versatile, White's model is very specific upon the use of languages in presenting specific messages. Thus, that is White's model's main strength – to bring up and analyse specific parts of the news reports and to consider its salient meaning.

The other research model, Gadi Wolfsfeld's, has its strength in the contextual approach – understanding the specific events within the context of the specific society. Wolfsfeld's model strength also lies with the fact that it can seek understanding within a greater time span – some of today's events maybe understood by analyzing events in the past. Thus Wolfsfeld's true strength is the ability to analyse events through its context.

The position of this thesis is that beyond simply understanding the issue of the role of the media in political conflict (East Timor crisis is a political conflict), there should be a greater understanding of the role of the media. Media today no longer can claim itself as a passive observer. Media in reality has become an active agent of change for the society.

The analysis in this chapter is based upon grounded theory in conjunction with content analysis method. The findings from the content analysis are constantly being analysed using various theories and commentaries and content analysis method which
is part of the grounded theory. Commentaries in the grounded theory method, in order to maintain credibility, are based upon commentaries already available in the public domain (media reports etc). In certain cases, specific commentaries by knowledgeable sources may also be use.

Grounded theory is used in this thesis as it is considered to be the best approach here. A more thorough explanation regarding the usage of Grounded Theory and about the Grounded Theory itself can be found in Chapter 1 & 2. Barney Glaser explained the strength of the grounded theory in which he made it relevant to this thesis.\textsuperscript{566}

Grounded theory allows the relevant social organization and social psychological organization of the people studied to be discovered, to emerge – in their perspective! Grounded theory does justice to the data. The methods in Basics of Qualitative research will always produce research products, but not the aforementioned ones of emergence in the perspective of the substantive area participant.\textsuperscript{567}

Grounded theory is deemed to be most suitable to this research as this research is aimed to understand why Indonesian and Australian newspapers presented the East Timor crisis in 1999, differently. A quantitative oriented research such as the AKSARA Foundation’s\textsuperscript{568} research shows the differences in quantitative manner, but as Glaser said\textsuperscript{569}, it offers little in understanding the greater issue. Nevertheless in order to gain a solid data to be analysed using grounded theory another method – content analysis, is to be used here.

The content analysis method is used here to analyse the data by identifying, classifying and finally analyzing the data collected. The main focus of this chapter, as detailed earlier, is about the source of news during the time frame of this analysis
Content analysis is a research technique for the systematic classification and description of communication content according to certain usually predetermined categories. It may involve quantitative or qualitative analysis, or both. Technical objectivity requires that the categories of classification and analysis be clearly and operationally defined so that other researchers can follow them reliably. It is important to remember, however that content analysis itself provides no direct data about the nature of the communicator, audience or effects. Therefore, great caution must be exercised whenever this technique is used for any purpose other than the classification, description and analysis of the manifest content of the communication.

Berger described content analysis as best applied with a historical and comparative approach. This is exactly the method employed in this chapter in order to analyse the role played by news sources within East Timor's Crisis reports. This makes content analysis as the most suitable method in this chapter in conjunction with the grounded theory. Content analysis can provide a solid identification and classification of the raw data, while grounded theory will complete the analysis by allowing the collected data to present the researcher with perspectives based upon the data itself.

By using the combined method of content analysis and grounded theory, I believe that as Glaser said, the data collected will be able to speak for itself. The aim is that grounded theory will in the end shed the light or give greater understanding about the issue. At the same time, all of this is done by allowing the data to 'speak for itself' and by not forcing the data to fit into particular point of view.

An important note here is that content analysis in this thesis is used within a bigger context of qualitative research method, as outlined in Chapters 1 & 2. Some experts such as Neuendorf believes that content analysis is only suitable with quantitative
analysis. Others believe that content analysis is applicable for both quantitative and qualitative research method.\textsuperscript{575}

The research method employed in this chapter is conducted through several steps but is using two different methods. The first method is to use the content analysis method to identify and categorize the data, in this case news sources in Australian and Indonesian newspapers. After the data has been categorized, grounded theory method is used to explain the data by putting them into a greater perspective.

The research method employed in this chapter is conducted through several steps. Initially it is to use the content analysis method to help identify and classify the data. The first step is to identify all sources used in the articles within the period. Second is to tabulate how many times a similar source was used in comparison to the total numbers of articles published by each newspapers. Third is to make an analysis from the total tabulation.

Grounded theory came in as the analysis method for the data was collected. The data compiled will show a certain trend within the Australian and Indonesian newspapers – in this case the choice of sources. What the data shows is just the trend. It does not give interpretation nor meaning unless it was put in the bigger perspectives such as: the social condition of both societies, political situation (at the time), historical background, values, culture and beliefs.
The main point is that data, though it may be grounded at an empirical level needs to be connected to the bigger and more complex background in order to understand it better. As detailed before, news is part of a social construction of reality. The essence of news is information which means knowledge. The question now in this chapter is where does this knowledge come from? Does the choice of sources affecting knowledge create the outcome?

The news sources in this chapter are defined as all persons/institutions to which the news is attributed to; this means all persons quoted or whose comments are based upon. It also includes all institutions mainly press institutions of which the news may be based upon. The sources usually can be identified by the reference form such as ‘said’, ‘said by’ and ‘according to’.

To create the categorization of the sources, an initial research has been conducted by analyzing all newspapers reports within the time frame; September 4th – 20th. All reports were analysed in terms of who and what sources did they use in the reports. Based on that, a summary was created.

The categorization on the newspaper reports put sources into these categorizations:

- Australian officials – all personnel who were under official employment by the Australian government or person/s who are a member or part of any Australian legislative/judicative/executive body and were quoted on their official capacity.
• UN Officials. All personnel who were under the employment of the UN and quoted as sources, based on their official capacity.

• Indonesian Officials. Any person/s who were under official employment by Indonesian government or person/s who are member or part of any Indonesian legislative/judicative/executive body and were quoted on their official capacity.

• Pro-Independence. Any East Timorese who were identified or identified themselves as part of or the supporter of the Independence movements (i.e. FALINTIL, FRETILIN etc).

• Pro-Integration. Any East Timorese who were identified or identified themselves as part of or the supporter of the Integration groups (AITARAK, PPI etc).

• Refugees. Any East Timorese who were not identified nor identified themselves as part of any groups above (pro-independence or pro-integration).

• Australian people. Any Australian citizen (identified or claimed to be) that was not a member or affiliated with Australian government.

• Indonesian people. Any Indonesian citizen (identified or claimed to be) that was not a member or affiliated with Indonesian government.

• Australian press. Any members of Australian press (i.e. journalists, editors or photojournalists) or the institution itself (i.e. ...based on reports in THE AUSTRALIAN newspaper...).

• Indonesian press. Any members of Indonesian press (i.e. journalists, editors or photojournalists) or the institution itself (i.e. ...based on reports in KOMPAS newspaper...).
• Foreign press. Any members of non Australian or Indonesian press (i.e. journalists, editors or photojournalists) or the institution itself (i.e. based in reports on THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper).

• Unnamed or un-attributed sources. Any sources that were quoted but not identified (i.e. based on a source at the defence department).

• No sources used. To identify any articles that used no sources other than the writer itself (i.e. opinion piece).

• Other sources. For any other sources that cannot be categorized as above (i.e. President of the United States).

The sources categorization above is based on the aim of this research; to understand the different view of the East Timor crisis by Australian and Indonesian newspapers (through their reports). Thus it was oriented to look for the interaction between the alleged main players: Australia, Indonesia, the UN and East Timorese. But the categorization is not based on random examples, Table 6 below will show that all that were considered ‘major’ players were indeed used significantly as news sources either by Australian or Indonesian newspapers (or both).

The categorization above is also in line in particular with grounded theory concept regarding categorization. The categorization based upon patterns which were provided by the raw data – the articles themselves. After finding such a pattern, a tabulation based on the pattern follows. The result is presented in Table 6 but the full list of the articles analysed is available on Appendix A.
An important note about the data presented in Table 6 findings for each newspaper is presented as a percentage to the total of the articles published by each newspaper. The aim of a grounded research theory is to create an understanding\textsuperscript{578}, in this case how each newspaper presented their views on the East Timor crisis. Each newspaper is perceived to have a unique perception about the crisis and in the end it helps create a social construction of reality of the crisis for their readers. With such an approach, the aim is to allow each newspaper to be understood as they presented their views.

It is worth mentioning again about the social construction of reality. The social construction of reality is based upon the theory by Peter Berger.\textsuperscript{579} Berger believes that what is constituted as \textit{knowledge} is not an independent event nor occurrence.\textsuperscript{580} In fact it is a socially constructed event in which the knowledge is a relative concept, depending upon the interpretation of the society towards a specific event or issue.\textsuperscript{581} News is a social construction of reality and source as part of the news is an important part of how the reality is being defined.\textsuperscript{582} So understanding the role of source is important in understanding the \textit{knowledge} created by the news.

A significant portion of the grounded theory analysis will be conducted in Chapter 7, as the scope of analysis that can be covered by Grounded Theory is very wide. This chapter will deal mainly with the categorization and classification of sources as the data. Analysis of this chapter will deal mainly with the data compiled but again the aim is to allow the data to speak for themselves just as what grounded theory is aiming at.\textsuperscript{583}
The timeline for the research is set between September 4th and September 20th 1999. The rationale is September 4th is the starting date when foreign press were leaving East Timor due to increasing violence. The foreign press only returned later on September 20th with the arrival of INTERFET.

6.5. Research findings.

The significance from the numbers of articles published in relevance to Robert Entman’s concept. Entman argues that the importance of an issue can be seen from the relative size of articles (words). My argument here is not only the number of words is important but also the relative amount of attention in the form of articles published. Both aspects shows an amount of attention given to a specific issue.

Regarding the number of articles published, the numbers can also be deceiving. Australian newspapers have more pages on average (around 40 pages daily more on the weekends) compared to Indonesian newspapers (12 pages daily). What Australian newspapers can do in their much bigger space, Indonesian newspapers have to make do in a much less available space. The issue is important but the space is limited and does not permit extensive reporting. So in this context East Timor issue is still a very important issue for Indonesian newspapers.

But furthermore there is no strong evidence to tell whether the relative importance of the East Timor crisis is directly reflective on the numbers of news item created or the pages available. Every newspaper has at their own discretion, pages plans or page lay
outs in newspapers terms. For example the lay out for pages of *The Sunday Observer* (The Sunday edition of *The Indonesian Observer* newspaper) is listed below:

- Page 1: Headline news. The latest news. Made at the very last hour before printing. The aim is to present the very latest news.
- Page 2: News but not the necessarily the latest news. Often it is general news that still current but deemed not fit for first page.
- Page 3: Features. Normally about the hottest topic of the week. These can be about foreign or domestic issues.
- Page 5: Science and Technology news.
- Page 6: Arts news.
- Page 7: Arts or Fashion news.
- Page 8: Entertainment news.
- Page 9: Entertainment news.
- Page 10: Living – recipes, tips and other household interests.
- Page 11: Travel.
- Page 12: Photo galleries.

The description above shows the lay out plan for the newspaper. Under normal circumstances, this plan is followed rather strictly. It means no news about foods can go to page 2 unless it is about some Indonesian winning a prestigious cooking award for example. But there are exceptions such as for page 11 which was nicknamed as *Halaman KKN* (pages for collusion, corruption and nepotism) mainly due to the fact
that it is the page where various ‘news’ from sponsors, business relations and public relation materials were placed.\textsuperscript{587}

The pages plan above is not absolute. From time to time if there is breaking news that was deemed extremely important, then the whole page 1 can be filled with just a single story. Then page 2 may carry more about the story in page 1. Page 3 then can be filled with regular news that usually goes into page 1 & 2. Normally such decision lies with the board of editors but the editor in charge has the ultimate veto regarding the layout of the pages.\textsuperscript{588}

The illustration above is to show that in particular Indonesian newspapers, numbers of articles published though related with number of pages available may not necessarily reflect the perception of importance by the newspaper. News selection is often described as a process based upon intuition and logic rather than scientific art.\textsuperscript{589}

In the opinion of the author, the data from Table 1 is best understood by counting on average how many articles were published within such a short period (17 days). For instance \textit{Suara Pembaruan} published the least numbers of articles; just 40 articles within that period. This means on average just two to three articles everyday. But does this mean the issue of the East Timor crisis is not an important issue for them? The Chief of editor of \textit{Suara Pembaruan}, Atmadji Sumarkidjo stated that it was not the case at all.\textsuperscript{590}
Instead other factors may have played in such as access and maintaining it. The *Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* are representing two of the largest media companies in Australia: *News Limited* and *Fairfax Corporation*. Both of these companies are international level media players, backed by strong financial resources. Their journalists are often equipped and supported by state of the arts technologies and they can sustain overseas assignments in difficult areas such as East Timor much easier than their Indonesian counterparts.\(^{591}\)

Besides technologies, the ability to send and sustain difficult assignments is an important advantage that Australian newspapers have. Both *Republika* and *Suara Pembaruan* admit that they could not afford to send nor maintain a journalist in East Timor continuously.\(^{592}\) *Republika* admits that on many occasion, they have to send their journalists with officials contingents visiting East Timor.\(^{593}\) Such practices made access to different parties very difficult.\(^{594}\)

Before the 1997 crisis, very few print media in Indonesia could afford to sent their journalists traveling around Indonesia to cover news stories. The main reason was usually financial. To send a reporter and a photojournalist is very expensive especially if the travel requires traveling by air. In the end, many media relies heavily on ‘invitations’ as usually it contained the traveling arrangement and the accommodation for the journalists.

Within the two print media that I used to work, such arrangements were normally the case. The air ticket often came from special arrangements with the airlines where they barter plane tickets with advertising space. When in *SWA*, normally the accommodation was covered by *SWA*, unless it was provided by the host. For assignments in difficult areas such as areas not covered by regular flights, the media relies on official visits (or *kunjungan dinas*) by the officials where they can tag along. More often than not, these visits were the initiatives of the officials instead of the media itself.\(^{595}\)

So in the end the argument here is that regarding the number of articles published within the researched period, it is best understood that all newspapers researched here perceived East Timor to be an important issue to cover. The gap between numbers of articles published by each newspaper may not necessarily state the level of perceived
importance but also affected by many other factors such as the newspapers policies, access to sources and ability to send their own journalists.

6.6. Media reports and the News sources.

Between September 4th and September 20th, news reporting was particularly difficult in East Timor. Immediately after referendum result was announced, pro-autonomy militias went on rampages. Their target were pro-independence supporters, UN staff and foreign journalist; parties that they deemed responsible for the result of the referendum.

As the violence escalated, many foreign journalists decided to leave East Timor. Within days, almost all UN staff and foreign journalists left East Timor. What was left was just a skeletal number of UN staff. It is believed that the last foreign journalists left East Timor on September 9th, together with the refugees in the UN compound in Dili.

The question that arises then how is the news media, in particular Australian newspapers going to get their stories? How about the Indonesian newspapers? Theoretically, Indonesian newspapers should be better off as the perpetrator of the violence – pro autonomy militias are not targeting Indonesian journalists. Does that means Indonesian newspapers would have a much better representation (in terms of sources) than Australian newspapers at the same period? Also whose frame is likely to be pushed in the media under such circumstances?
The data analysed shows that during the same period, Australian and Indonesian newspapers were doing the best they could under the circumstances. The numbers of articles published in Australian newspapers shows that their intensity were not diminished under difficult circumstances. Indonesian newspapers on the other hand seemed to be unable to match the level of intensity shown by the Australian newspapers.

Melvin Singh from *The New Paper* – Singapore told me that the East Timor crisis in 1999 was a very important issue. Logically it is a very big issue. Never since the Balkan crisis, was the UN were involved in deciding the fate of a nation, East Timor.

For the majority of Indonesians at the time, the issue was important as it raised the issue whether Indonesia was still a united republic or not. Various areas in Indonesia such as Aceh and Irian Jaya have called for cessation from Indonesia. We, Indonesians, always feared that once an area ceased to be part of Indonesia, it will set a precedent for the others.

But when speaking with my Australian friends the issue was very different. For the majority of Australians, the issue was about human rights, about the fate of people that have been oppressed for a long time. Of course, most Indonesians agree that what the Indonesian military did in East Timor or anywhere (the human rights abuses) else was wrong. But most Indonesian will find it really hard to accept that the unity and the future of Indonesia, that has been fought for since 1945 to the death of the students in 1998 was about to be undermined with the support of foreign countries.

The different views and perception of the East Timor crisis above influenced the saturation and intensity of Australian and Indonesian newspapers. For Australian newspapers, the issue is in East Timor. What is going to happen there? Now Australia has committed its military again for the first time since the Vietnam War, it is in the interest of the Australian public to know how the mission goes and hopefully for a successful outcome. Apart from that, Australian newspapers never ceased to promote the historical link between Australia and East Timor in World War 2.

Indonesian newspapers perceived the East Timor crisis as the biggest gamble that the Indonesian government took since the fall of New Order regime in 1998. With this
crisis, lies the future of Indonesia. As stated above, many feared that if one area ceased to be part of Indonesia, it will set a precedent that will be followed by other areas such as Aceh and Irian Jaya (now called Papua). Thus the issue is very important but at the same time, the bigger issue lies within Indonesia itself with the economic and political crisis still going. The main issue is how the Indonesian government is going to deal with the issue of East Timor, not just what is going on in East Timor alone.

Data also shows that there is a strong tendency that news reports tend to reflect the views of parties closely related or affiliated with the particular news organization. In other words, Indonesian newspapers tend to quote more of their own people or those close to Indonesian people/government. The situation is vice versa with the Australian newspapers.

The Table 2 shows categories of sources used by Australian newspapers in the period of September 4th – 20th. The numbers in the tables shows how many articles are using a specific kind of source. This table is not showing how many times a specific sources is being used. The aim here is to show how many articles are basing their reports into a specific kind of sources.

Various references have argued that media sources are more than just the source of the news (Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Bennet, 1983, Center, 2000c, Entman, 1989, Gans, 1999, Shoemaker and Reese, 1991, Wolfsfeld, 2003b, McCullagh, 2002). Sources are the reference point for a news report. Sources can influence how an event is being told
through news report. Sources also help in creating credibility. Most importantly, source can shape the frame within a news report.\textsuperscript{597}

The issue of sources was a very difficult issue for the journalists working in East Timor during the 1999 crisis. Melvin Singh, describes that it was a juggling act for him to maintain good rapport with all parties, including the Indonesian military when he was in East Timor. Coming from a relatively neutral country like Singapore does help a lot as he was perceived to be a neutral party.

For Melvin it is about maintaining balance, trying to get as many sources as possible. Having a deep knowledge about Indonesia and speaking fluent Bahasa Indonesia, allows Melvin to have a very wide range of contacts from the INTERFET, Indonesian officials to the pro-integration militias. These sources, were later used in his reports.

Australian journalists may have difficulties in covering different sources. Melvin stated that most that came to East Timor could not speak Bahasa, an important language in East Timor. Ben Bohane admits that after the arrival of INTERFET it was difficult to get access to the Indonesian officials or the pro-integration militias. Australian journalists at that time, according to Ben, were naturally more acquainted with INTERFET officials, UN officials and the pro-independence supporters.\textsuperscript{598}

Sources used, according to the Melvin Singh and Ben Bohane also depends upon the available access. Ben Bohane said that he would love to interview the pro-integration militia leaders but there were none left after the arrival of the INTERFET, while Indonesia would not allow him to enter Indonesia. This situation is in fact played well with any parties wanting to win political influence, just as Wolfsfeld asserted. The arena is not even; some parties have the arena only for themselves with little opposition from the other party. Thus it would not be surprising if the result is overwhelming one sided reporting.

Table 6 presents the findings after sources in all newspapers reports were classified and categorized. The presentation is in percentage terms to the total number of articles published by each newspapers. So for instance, \textit{Kompas} published 50 articles within the researched period and 38\% of the articles were quoting Indonesian
officials. Another example is *The Sydney Morning Herald* which published 264 articles and quoted Australian officials in 25% of the total articles published by them.

Again as mentioned earlier, such methods of presentation are based upon the grounded theory approach – allowing the data to speak for itself. Content analysis method is used to classify and categorize but not to analyse. In grounded theory, the data will show its meaning when it is put within perspectives of different theories, opinions or perspectives\(^{599}\).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources category</th>
<th>Kompas (50 articles)</th>
<th>Republika (49 articles)</th>
<th>Suara Pembaruan (40 articles)</th>
<th>Media Indonesia (54 articles)</th>
<th>The Australian (269 articles)</th>
<th>The Sydney Morning Herald (264 articles)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Australian Officials</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.24</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>UN Officials</td>
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<td>6.12</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>17.84</td>
<td>17.8</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>40.74</td>
<td>13.75</td>
<td>10.6</td>
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<td>Pro-Independence</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>7.95</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
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<td>East Timorese refugees</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>5.68</td>
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<td>Indonesian people</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28.57</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>3.334</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian people</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.72</td>
<td>25.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Press</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Press</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Agencies – Foreign Press</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-attributed sources</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>16.35</td>
<td>18.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No sources used</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34.69</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>16.66</td>
<td>26.39</td>
<td>24.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sources (than above)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>13.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data in Table 6 shows the sources used by Australian and Indonesian newspapers in the period of September 4th till September 20th. In this period most foreign journalists – in particular Australian journalists had to leave East Timor due to escalating violence.

But the data presented in Table 6 may not present the full story nor a better understanding of how the media operates under extremely difficult situation. The data from Table 6 needs to be put within their perspectives, in this case to be viewed as representative of the newspapers views about the crisis – at the particular time. Each newspaper has their own perception over the crisis and this is reflected over their choice of sources.

Table 6 shows what sources were used by Australian and Indonesian newspapers during the height of crisis where almost all foreign journalists, and the presence of Indonesian journalists was at the minimum. The question asked here is how the Australian and Indonesian newspapers continue doing their work at that difficult time? Who will be their sources? What sources will they use? Are Australian and Indonesian newspapers going to behave differently with their choices of source or not?
### Table 7

Sources ranks – Australian & Indonesian Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>The Sydney Morning Herald</th>
<th>The Australian</th>
<th>KOMPAS</th>
<th>SUARA PEMBARUAN</th>
<th>REPUBLIKA</th>
<th>MEDIA INDONESIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Australian people</td>
<td>No source used (opinion)</td>
<td>- Indonesian officials - Indonesian people</td>
<td>Indonesian officials</td>
<td>Indonesian officials</td>
<td>Indonesian officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Australian officials</td>
<td>Australian officials</td>
<td>Other sources</td>
<td>- No sources (opinion) - News agencies/foreign press</td>
<td>No source used</td>
<td>Indonesian people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>No source used (opinion)</td>
<td>UN officials</td>
<td>News agencies/foreign press</td>
<td>- Australian officials - UN officials</td>
<td>Indonesian people</td>
<td>No source used (opinion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Un-attributed source</td>
<td>Australian people</td>
<td>UN officials</td>
<td>Pro-Independence</td>
<td>Pro-autonomy</td>
<td>Pro-autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>UN officials</td>
<td>Un-attributed source</td>
<td>No sources (opinion)</td>
<td>Other sources</td>
<td>Australian officials</td>
<td>- News agencies/foreign press - UN officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Other sources</td>
<td>Other sources</td>
<td>Australian officials</td>
<td>- Un-attributed source - Pro-autonomy</td>
<td>Indonesian press</td>
<td>Australian officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Indonesian officials</td>
<td>Indonesian officials</td>
<td>- Pro-Independence - East Timorese refugees</td>
<td>Indonesian people</td>
<td>UN Officials</td>
<td>- East Timorese refugees - Other source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>East Timorese refugees</td>
<td>Australian press</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Indonesian people</td>
<td>- East Timorese refugees - Australian press</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>- Indonesian press - News agencies/foreign press</td>
<td>Indonesian people</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Pro-Autonomy</td>
<td>Pro-Autonomy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7, shows the finding from Table 6 in different perspectives. In Table 7, the sources used by each newspaper were rank based upon their proportion to the total articles published by each newspaper. From the table 3, it is clear now that Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented a totally different view during the particular period based upon the sources they used.

Selection of sources show a cultural, political and sociological orientation to create a social construction of reality by the newspaper {Wolfsfeld, 1997 #86;McCullagh, 2002 #31;Cottle, c2003 #18}. This analysis will based upon the social construction of reality. The social construction of reality is a concept based upon the condition of a particular society. In this research the related society will be Australian and Indonesian society, as they are the based on the newspapers that are being analysed.

6.7. Top sources and its implication of the perspective created.

At the top of sources featured in The Sydney Morning Herald are the Australian people (25.75% of the total articles published by The Sydney Morning Herald) followed by Australian officials in the second place (25% of the total articles published by The Sydney Morning Herald). In the third place are opinion piece (24.62% of the total articles published by The Sydney Morning Herald).

For The Australian the view is rather different, but not by much. The top sources used are actually no sources used (opinion pieces) which consisted of 26.39% of the total
articles published by *The Australian*. In second spot are the Australian officials as sources for 22.3% of the total articles published by *The Australian*. It is followed in third place by UN officials as sources in 17.84% of the total articles.

From the top three sources used by Australian newspapers, Australian officials rank as the most often used sources. Australian people also ranked among the highest (as Australian people in *The Sydney Morning Herald*). In *The Australian* the opinion piece is written by Australian people (in different capacities or backgrounds) thus it is safe to assume that the opinion piece is actually reflecting the Australian people to an extent.

The general perception of the Australian newspapers was of an emergency situation in East Timor. This view was generally supported by Australian government in particular after the decision to send troops to East Timor. But behind the scenes, a different perception was being played out.

Started by Captain Andrew Plunkett, an army intelligence officer during East Timor crisis, there were allegations that behind the scene, the Australian government was trying to minimize the impact of its involvement in East Timor. Captain Plunkett and later Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins have accused the Australian government of sabotaging its own military operation during East Timor crisis.

Both former officers alleged that the Australian government had known the hidden campaign by Indonesian military in East Timor long before it was known by the public. Those former officers also alleged that when Australian troops found more damning evidence against Indonesia, the Australian government had deliberately hid or sabotaged the evidence. The goal of such efforts was allegedly to cover Australia's deep knowledge regarding the Indonesian military's covert campaign in East Timor and to protect Indonesia, to an extent, from further fall out in the international community.

The accusations and evidences brought up by the two former officers, seriously challenged the frames promoted by Australian government as well as the Australian media. The official frames of the Australian government were always of surprise and later a position of assertiveness towards Indonesia (by sending the troops). But the accusations from the two former army officers have challenged those frames. Instead the
Australian government was accused of trying to cover up its knowledge of the Indonesian military covert campaign in East Timor.

In June 2006, a new development in East Timor brought new challenges towards the frames promoted by Australian government in 1999. In April 2006, a domestic quarrel between East Timor’s Government under Prime Minister Marie Alkatiri against a group of Army officers ended with the dismissals of around 600 officers and soldiers. The soldiers instead decided to run away with all their weapons and equipments.

Within weeks, in May and June 2006, the situation worsened with security conditions deteriorating. Clashes between various armed factions erupted and the conflict had escalated towards civil war. Chaos again engulfed East Timor, almost a repetition of the violence in 1999, except now there are no pro-integration militias as the obvious culprit.

What this situation challenges was the frame promoted back 1999 that the chaos and mayhem prior and after the referendum was purely due to Indonesian military’s covert campaign. The Australian government in 1999, publicly rejected Indonesian perception that the chaos and violence is due to the disappointment of the pro-integration groups towards the result of the referendum.

Australian perception that horizontal conflict in East Timor is due to Indonesia’s campaign was severely challenged in May – July 2006. The quarrels and the subsequent riots between various factions in East Timor is a proof how volatile the relationships between factions and groups in East Timor. Indonesian military itself has acknowledged this condition and used to their own advantages in the past. The Australian government and media flatly rejected that such seeds of horizontal conflict existed. The frame from Australian government was that the chaos and violence were due to Indonesian military’s covert campaign.
In May – July 2006, suddenly Australian government were faced with a repetition of similar violence in 1999. The difference is the violence was triggered by a domestic quarrel and yet the outcome is similar violence and riots like 1999 crisis. Ironically, Australia had to assemble an almost similar contingent with INTERFET (the majority of new troops were Australian and Malaysian troops – similar to INTERFET) to stopped the violence. Unlike 1999, the international troops were not greeted as heroes by the locals.

The irony of the mayhem in 2006 is that history is repeating itself. Similar chaos and violence as in 1999, was again repeated in East Timor. Again, Australia had to send its troops back to East Timor to prevent the whole country collapsing. But this time, the frame of horizontal conflict due to Indonesia's involvement was not applicable. The conflict proved that the seed of horizontal conflict is very strong within East Timor society.

In the Indonesian newspapers, the situation is totally different than in the Australian newspapers. In all Indonesian newspapers (except with Kompas that also put Indonesian people as their top sources), Indonesian officials were the top source used. In all Indonesian newspapers, the Indonesian officials as sources were used significantly. Kompas quoted Indonesian officials and Indonesian people in 38% of their published articles while Suara Pembaruan, Republika and Media Indonesia were 40%, 40.81% and 40.74% respectively. With an average of 40% of the total articles published, Indonesian officials as sources are significantly more often quoted (in percentage to total articles published by each newspaper) in comparison to Australian officials quoted by Australian newspapers.

As described earlier, the issue of East Timor in 1999 is a complex issue for the majority of Indonesians. In general, Indonesians sympathize strongly with the sufferings of the East Timorese under the military rule. In reality, the whole of Indonesia suffers from the same fate. But for Indonesians, the issue of separatism is a very sensitive issue.
In 1999, while Indonesia was having a very critical economic, social and political crisis, suddenly East Timor was given the choice to remain with Indonesia or to be a free country. Such options were a nightmare for Indonesia as it might lead other areas to demand for similar options. When East Timor decided to be free, it took Indonesia by surprise and later turned into anger as it was alleged that Australia was pressing Indonesia too much in the matter.606

For Indonesians, the issue of East Timor lies within how the Indonesian government is going to prevent other areas demanding similar treatment? Now the precedent has been set, all it takes is just enough international pressure and a referendum can be held. As the issue is more about the Indonesian government (its actions and reactions), it should not come as a surprise as the main sources for the Indonesian newspapers were Indonesian officials.

As sources, Indonesian officials give Indonesian newspapers an easy access of information though it may not be the case every time. Indonesian officials were also well known to not give useful information to the media in order to give them power over the media reports.607 Therefore it was imperative for a good media and their journalists to be very careful with what the officials said and try to verify the information with as many sources as possible.

Angela Romano’s book regarding the way Indonesian press worked during the Soeharto regime is an excellent inside of the work Indonesian press. Nevertheless, a lot more aspects of Indonesian press were not covered in it. For instance, during my tenure with SWA magazine, I often found that sources asked for our scripts before it was published. This bad practice of public relations by the source, was often exacerbated with the practices of bribery. SWA prides itself as an honorable media and anyone caught accepting bribery or giving away scripts to the sources, ran a risk of being fired.

But sometimes, some sources has some ingenious ways like having their own tape recorder during the interviews. This way, we did not have to argue about sending the script, there was no need to. If there was any dispute about the content of the interview, the source has its own solid evidence. Unfortunately not many sources used this practice. With public officials things were even more difficult as they tended to dictate what was to be published. Often we had to be more careful than usual if we are going to use public officials as sources.608
Public officials are a very important source of news. Their position made them a very strong source as only they can give official statements regarding official issues. But in the case of Indonesian officials, often it was better to carefully use them as sources.

Second most often quoted sources in Indonesian newspapers were in general opinion pieces in the majority by Indonesian people. The only exception is *Kompas* whose second most often quoted sources were other sources. An interesting finding is with *Suara Pembaruan*, where news agencies or foreign press also rank the second most often quoted sources. This was followed at the third rank by news agencies/foreign press (*Kompas* – 20% of its total articles); Australian and UN officials (*Suara Pembaruan* – 12.5% of its total articles); Indonesian people (*Republika* - 28.57%) and opinion piece (*Media Indonesia* – 16.66% of its total articles).

An immediate lesson that I learned when I became a journalist was to understand who the audiences are. With the three media I worked for, *SWA, The Indonesian Observer* and *The New Paper* each has their own particular audiences and each required me to learned how to address the audiences properly.

It was like having a conversation regarding issues that were familiar with the audiences. Indonesian media naturally would prefer to have Indonesian sources as they can address the Indonesian public much easily. When I was working for *The New Paper*, I had to imagine what would be interesting for the Singaporean audiences. Often, for *The New Paper* issues that were important for them were the stories of Singaporeans in Indonesia.

Having local sources (for instance Indonesian sources for Indonesian media) is more than just a convenience. Often the local audience can relate more easily with local sources. But there is also the issue for access here. During the time of the study, very few Indonesian newspapers had direct access to East Timor except with Indonesian officials, either military or civilians. But another issue is that East Timor becomes a conflict perception, where Indonesia’s perception of the East Timor crisis was in conflict with the
Australian perception of East Timor crisis. In this context, logically the Indonesian media seems to prefer presenting Indonesia’s perception as the main issue.

For the third rank of the most often used sources by Indonesian newspapers are news agencies, Australian officials, Indonesian people and opinion pieces (no source used). *Kompas* quoted news agencies/foreign press at the third place (20% of its total articles). *Suara Pembaruan* quoted Australian officials and UN officials evenly (12.5% of its total articles published). *Republika* quoted Indonesian people (28.57% of its total articles).

*Media Indonesia* quoted opinion/no source used in 16.66% of its total articles.

News agencies often were the lifeline of the newspapers. In *The Indonesian Observer*, approximately 50% of our contents came from news agencies. For the Sunday edition that I worked for, the contents from news agencies can reach 70%. The reason is technical; we simply did not have the access, manpower and time to cover all possible news by ourselves.610

The pattern emerging from the top three sources used by Australian and Indonesian newspapers shows a different but at the same time similar pattern. In the top three sources, all newspapers from Australia and Indonesia show a tendency to quote sources close or within their own society, in this case Australian or Indonesian officials and Australian or Indonesian people. As East Timor during the period is de facto a hostile place for both Australian and Indonesian press, thus this pattern shows that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers decided to refers back to their own society members to report about something outside their own society. The distinct pattern is more visible when the analysis is expanded to the top five sources used.
Table 8.

Five most often used sources – Australian newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>The Sydney Morning Herald</th>
<th>The Australian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Australian people</td>
<td>Opinions (No source used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Australian officials</td>
<td>Australian officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Opinions (no source used)</td>
<td>UN Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Un-attributed source</td>
<td>Australian people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>UN Officials</td>
<td>Un-attributed source</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Table 8, the top five sources used by Australian newspapers were listed. As described above, the top five sources are similar between *The Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Australian*. Both newspapers basically are using the same type of sources. The difference is just the rank.

Another finding similar with the earlier description is the sources listed are all closely related with Australian society. In fact except for UN officials, most of the sources are part of Australian society. This raised a serious question of why during a difficult situation for the Australian press to work on East Timor, instead they were relying on sources within their own society? Also how about the Indonesian press at the same period?
Table 9.

Five most often used sources – Indonesian newspapers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Kompas</th>
<th>Suara Pembaruan</th>
<th>Republika</th>
<th>Media Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>- Indonesian officials - Indonesian people</td>
<td>- Indonesian officials</td>
<td>- Indonesian official</td>
<td>- Indonesian officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>- Other sources</td>
<td>- Opinion (no sources used) - News agencies/foreign press</td>
<td>- Opinion (no source used)</td>
<td>- Indonesian people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>- News agencies/foreign press</td>
<td>- Australian officials - UN officials</td>
<td>- Indonesian people</td>
<td>- Opinion (No source used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>- UN Officials</td>
<td>- Pro-independence</td>
<td>- Pro-autonomy</td>
<td>- Pro-autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>- Opinion (No source used)</td>
<td>- Other source</td>
<td>- Australian officials</td>
<td>- News agencies/Foreign press - UN officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 outline the top five sources used by Indonesian newspapers. The finding in table 5 shows a more diverse choice of sources within Indonesian newspapers compared to Australian newspapers (Table 4). There is a similarity of the type of sources used by Australian and Indonesian newspapers; both were using sources close to their own society.
The most often source used in Indonesia are their own officials. Then it was followed by Indonesian people and opinion from (mostly) Indonesian people. So up to this point, Indonesian people (officials and citizens) were quoted significantly just like Australian newspapers did (Table 3), but then the similarities dissipate. Indonesian newspapers then quoted a much more diverse choice of sources including pro-autonomy supporters, news agencies/foreign press and even Australian officials. Such diversity did not exist at this level in the Australian newspapers which for example rank Indonesian officials in seventh place.

6.8. Significance of source choices.

In Chapter 4 and 5, in discussions regarding frames, it was found that Australian and Indonesian newspapers are promoting a different set of frames. The frames are by nature different for each report as each report will most likely be presenting a different issue. Nevertheless by analyzing certain topics or subject and how they were framed in the news reports we can see the differences in general in how Australian and Indonesian newspapers framed their reports.

Different frames mean a different way of seeing things. In sociology a frame is part of social construction of reality. News media created a perception of a ‘reality’ but the reality in social term is a relative term depending upon how the reality was defined. In this chapter the focus is on the creation of ‘reality’ based upon the usage of the sources.
Findings in Table 2 show that one difference was the selection of sources by Australian and Indonesian newspapers. The significance of the source selection is even more visible in the Table 3 and 4. In Table 3 and 4 the sources can be described as those that the media can identify with best (at that time) to describe the issue. The findings show that those sources that the media thought they can identify themselves with are sources that originated or are closely associated with the society where the particular media came from.

Table 7 shows that the Australian media identify themselves best with their own country’s officials, their own people, UN officials and surprisingly unknown sources. Indonesian newspapers identify themselves best with Indonesian officials and people. So the significance is very clear here.

In the concept of framing, this can be described that newspapers from both Australia and Indonesia are actually presenting the views and perceptions of their own society. In the end the views and perceptions are almost totally different. Again this should not come to as a surprise as these are two distinctly different societies.

Society is not a singular entity; it is constituted with various factions that may have different interests, views or views (to say the least). Nevertheless, in this research such possibilities were accommodated with using various newspapers from both Australia and Indonesia as research subjects. As described in Chapter 1 and 2 that by focusing with
different newspapers, it was hoped to have as wide as technically possible, the different views and perceptions.

In Table 6, 6.3 and 6.4, we see that the usage of sources is very close to Australian society; Australian people and officials are among the most significant. UN officials are the most significant sources used from outside Australia. Also significant are the opinion pieces written by the Australian public. Indonesian officials are the least significant sources used.

The data from Table 7 presented another picture; the East Timor crisis from the perception of the Australian society. Almost all of the major sources are coming from within Australian society. The only exceptions are the UN officials as sources and the Indonesian officials as sources.

For Indonesian newspapers, the situation is very much similar. All the major sources are in fact part of the Indonesian society but there is a significant difference with Australian newspapers. There is also a less uniform tendency in the choices of the news sources. In Indonesian newspapers, the selections of sources tend to follow the general stance taken by the newspapers itself, such as in Republika or Media Indonesia.

One of the main distinctions between Australian and Indonesian newspapers is perhaps the tendency of the newspapers to perhaps disguise or balance their sources. Table 6 and 6.3 show how within Australian newspapers the selection of sources is spread rather
evenly. As significant the numbers may be, it is still less obvious than Indonesian newspapers, such as in using their own country’s officials as sources. The bottom line is Indonesian newspapers tend to portray their position (through the usage of sources) than their Australian counterpart.

Just like what Toeti Adhitama of *Media Indonesia* or Atmadji Soemarkidjo of *Suara Pembaruan* said, the issue of East Timor in 1999 was a very difficult issue for majority of Indonesians. Generally the Indonesian public sympatise deeply with the sufferings of the East Timorese but the decision to break away from Indonesia plus the notion that foreign countries allegedly supported such moves excites the Indonesians as it comes at the worse possible moment.

At the same time, Indonesia was facing the most serious social, economic and political crisis since 1966. The future of Indonesia itself was on the very edge with many areas wanting to separate itself from Indonesia. The general feeling then was Indonesia is a pariah country and being compared to repressive regime such as the former republic of Yugoslavia. The continuing brutal criticism from outside Indonesia, towards Indonesia that did not distinguish between Indonesian people, government and the military really stirred nationalistic feelings in most Indonesians.

Nevertheless, not all Indonesians would prefer to demonstrate in the street against Australia as they have more pressing issues, such as daily survivals. Despite that, I believe most Indonesian were not happy with the ‘blind’ criticism towards Indonesia due to the crisis in East Timor. The Indonesian newspapers knew about this deep sentiment and they successfully exploited it in many of their reports. The term of ‘enemies’ towards Australia was more than once used in some articles, reflecting the deep seated animosity towards international pressures.

In the end, it was not just about the message that is important but also who gives/presents the message in the first place. The data above shows that while there were options to different sources (or political actors as Wolfsfeld said), Australian and Indonesian media tended to quote or base their reports to their own people.

Another significant finding is the relative importance of un-attributed sources especially in Australian newspapers reports. Basically sources are the standard where news reliability and credibility are measured (Gans, 1999). Having a significant amount of un-attributed sources in news reports will damage the news credibility. But whether such an
issue happened in the case of East Timor crisis's reports is something to discuss in later chapter.

In Chapter 7, there will be a more lengthy and in-depth discussion regarding the significance of such action. What this chapter has aimed at was to show the pattern within the selection of the news sources in relation with 'created image of reality' by the newspapers.

6.9. The deeper frame analysis.

Wolfsfeld (Wolfsfeld, 1997b) described about the presence of deeper frame beyond the 'normal' frames that can be immediately seen. Wolfsfeld argues that the deep frame is actually the connecting the news as the product of media organization with the society that existed (Wolfsfeld, 1997b). Deep frame is like the foundation upon which the frame is constructed and connected to the particular society (Wolfsfeld, 1997b).

It is also the position of this thesis to take the view that news is part of the social construction of reality. The essence of news is information – information for the society. Information is the essence of knowledge, which is socially constructed. So to understand the news regarding the East Timor crisis in the context of Australia – Indonesia – East Timor in a social and political frame, is to see the news as the socially constructed product aimed at specific societies (in this case Australian and Indonesian societies).
To understand the media role during East Timor crisis, we can look at the case of Indonesia. Access to East Timor was generally very limited for Indonesian general public. Only in the late 1980’s was East Timor declared an ‘open’ area. Even then, not many Indonesian, could travel there unless they were officials, journalists or the new influx of traders/migrants.

Prior to the referendum many of the migrants from other areas of Indonesia, had left East Timor due to escalating violence. This left the sources of news to Indonesian officials, journalists and of course the foreign journalists. This meant, the majority of Indonesia learned of what’s happening in East Timor through the media, either local Indonesian or foreign media. Frankly, at that time the difference of the Indonesian and foreign media position on East Timor crisis was getting wider and wider by the day.

The question then is which side is the Indonesian wanting to take sides with? The local Indonesian media including the newspapers knew that they would get the positive attention of the Indonesian public by tapping into the general sentiment of the Indonesian people. The same thing is happening with Australian newspapers too. The press is the only sources of information out of East Timor, so they have the full capability to shape the public opinion. They did use this capability.  

Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 have show that during the most difficult period of reportage in East Timor (September 4th – 20th), Australian and Indonesian newspapers reacted in distinctly similar but at the same time different manners. The Australian press as part of the foreign press had to leave East Timor during that period due to escalating violence. The result was the loss of capability to report directly from East Timor. As expected, when direct reporting is not possible, Australian journalists continue their reporting by using other means.

The first finding in the Australian and Indonesian newspapers choice of sources is the tendency to quote significantly their own officials and citizens. In Australian newspapers this is apparent with the fact that four of five most often quoted sources are Australians (as officials or as citizens). Indonesian newspapers also quoted Indonesians significantly (as officials and as citizens) but Table 9 shows that Indonesian newspapers also have more diverse sources.
In understanding this we can start by understanding the way Australian and Indonesian newspapers operate. We also need to put into consideration the social, political and historical context in understanding the way both countries' newspapers operates. The analysis will be put in context as below:

6.10.1. Press systems.

Australian and Indonesian newspapers are representing two different press systems. Australian newspapers come from a liberal press system where it is marked by the relative independence of the press from the institution of power (the state) (McQuail, 1986, McQuail, 2001). Indonesian newspapers come from a developmental press system where the emphasis is strongly put in assisting development programs of the society (McQuail, 1986 #9; McQuail, 1986 #201; Oetama, 2001 #55). More discussions regarding this issue is in Chapter 1 and 2.

The impact of the different system is huge as it affects the way the press perceived issues such as the East Timor crisis. As the data in Table 2 till 5 shows the perception is already different. Part of the explanation is within the inherent divide between the two press systems.

It is publicly acknowledged that the Australian press often perceived Indonesia in general with disdain but this is rarely admitted. Damien Kingsbury argues that the issue between
the Australian press and Indonesia has existed for almost 30 years now.\textsuperscript{615} What is worrying is that trend is still continuing today. Below is his general observation:

In broad terms, the Australian news media have, according to regional leaders behaved with insensitivity, ignorance and an overriding sense of cultural chauvinism in their reporting of Australia's near neighbours. The have, according to this view, offended cultural sensibilities, interfered in domestic affairs, imposed a set of values that are not only alien to the region but which have imperialist or neo-imperialist overtones and are, implicitly, racist. By extension, this perspective presents Australia as a remnant of the colonial past, an imperial outpost clinging to an unfounded sense of superiority and cast adrift in a rising sea of post-colonial states\textsuperscript{616}.

The description above is generally still valid until today and though almost all Australian people will reject the idea of racism, the issue is well and alive in the media context. The big media circus relating the reports of convicted drug trafficker, Schapelle Corby in 2005 shows exactly that.\textsuperscript{617} But what Schapelle Corby’s case show is how sensitive is Australian media towards Indonesia, in particular with issues related with human rights. The case itself was perceived totally different by Indonesian media and public.\textsuperscript{618}

The choices of the top five sources show that no sources from Indonesia were quoted. Australian newspapers did quote sources from Indonesia but they were not ranked very highly. On the contrary, Indonesian newspapers (\textit{Republika} & \textit{Suara Pembaruan}) quoted Australian officials as one of its top five sources. This is interesting as \textit{Republika} is one of Indonesian newspaper that tend to show a greater sign of nationalism\textsuperscript{619}. This shows a general pre-occupation with Australian society or what considered to be close with Australian society (the UN).\textsuperscript{620}
The finding above is significant as the Australian press, as described earlier, came from a much developed and freer press than the Indonesian press. Being part of a liberal or developed press, the Australian press took pride with the quality and the standard of journalism. This means the choice sources as shown in Table 2, 3, and 4 means it was an act of free choice. The Indonesian press on the other hand came from different press systems and as it will described later, may not have the same level of press freedom as the Australian press has.

In comparison with Indonesian newspapers (Table 9), it seems that the Australian press is pretty much occupied with their own society or their own society's perception over the East Timor crisis. The Indonesian press on the other hand seems to try to present a more diverse view of the issue. This is interesting that theoretically the Australian press have the same access to much of the sources that were used by Indonesian newspapers, except perhaps the pro-autonomy supporters. But why did the Australian press behaved differently?

A possible explanation as mentioned earlier is the animosity between the Australian press and in particular the Indonesian government. In particular during the New Order regime, the Indonesian government have made a negative impression towards the Australian press (Kingsbury, 2000, Tiffen, 2000, AKSARA, 2000). But what really set the animosity between the Australian press and the Indonesian government in general is
the different political system and situation between the two countries (Kingsbury, 2000, Tiffen, 2000).

The Australian press in 1970’s until today is representing a modern, liberal and democratic Australia. The press in Australia is acting as a counter-balance to the government (Tiffen, 2000, Kingsbury, 2000). The New Order regime in particular is a right wing, almost dictatorial kind of regime (Romano, 2000, Kingsbury, 2000). This is a contradiction to the perception of democratic government in western democracy including Australia. In Australia, it is not uncommon to have a press that is very critical to a level of almost being the adversary to the government. Such a situation is almost impossible during the New Order regime.

Melvin Singh said to me that Australian press could have done a much better job in covering the East Timor crisis. In his opinions, Australian journalists were too occupied in following their own perception of the crisis, just as promoted by their own government. But Ben Bohane said that it is easy to understand why Australian journalists view Indonesia negatively. The destruction and the sufferings of the East Timorese were very visible and the main culprit was the pro-integration militia which in turn were created and supported by the Indonesian military.

But Melvin Singh believes that there are other ways to view this crisis. For him, the destruction and sufferings is there and real but he also wanted to understand why the pro-integration supporters did what they did. He said that for the pro-integration supporters the result of the referendum means they will lose the privilege they have now (i.e. gambling). It means a loss of livelihood for them. Melvin also described how the pro-independence supporters immediately created new businesses as soon as they took power. It’s all about a struggle of livelihood.

In the East Timor crisis, Australian press and foreign press were caught in the political conflict just as Wolfsfeld said. Even the UN body, UNAMET admitted that they were not 100% neutral as they felt that they had to ‘level the field’ by giving more access and support to the pro-independence supporters. Their excuse was that Indonesian influence
and power in East Timor was so great that the only way to balance things up is by giving more supports to the pro-independence supporters.625

Other aspects that create a divide between Australian press and Indonesian press is the way the Indonesian government maintain their control over the press. During the New Order, the press is tightly controlled under the notion of being a ‘partner’ of the government.626 This situation was maintained by various means such as: tight regulations; tight control over what the press can publish and up to the ‘advice’ given to press by various government institutions.627 Of course such actions or situations are not known in Australia.

On the other hand, there are other cultural aspects or practices that were hard to understand by the Australian press, simply due to the different culture and values between Australia and Indonesia. For instance maintaining honour is almost absolute especially in public space. Public humiliation by the media is non existent in Indonesia as such action will effect severely to both the victim and perpetrator. Even if someone is known to have done something wrong, in the public space, all efforts are taken to avoid humiliating the person. Again such a thing is not a taboo in Australia with a great example from the ‘seven o’clock’ programs such as “A Current Affair”.628 The list of differences can go on but the main idea is that Australian and Indonesian culture and political system are inherently different. Such differences create a friction when one
society has to contend with the way the other society’s press reports something that maybe sensitive for the first one or vice versa.

The core of the issue here is that the Australian media believes that they are working for the Australian public; bound by Australian law; regulated by the Australian press system and reporting for the Australian public (Kingsbury et al., 2000, Tiffen, 2000). In effect it creates a position of conflict (in some cases) with the position of Indonesian government, people or Indonesia in general. But what is this inherent disdain or issue between Australia and Indonesia related with the findings in this thesis? The answer lies with the history of relations between Australian press and Indonesia.

As described above, the Australian press believes it should report news as they know best how to – based on Australian journalism standard of practices. The standard of practices is not an empirical method but instead a complex set of values, ethics and beliefs. It is rooted within the quest in journalism for objective reporting, something which even today is still being sought by the media. But an important issue to remember here is that ‘objectivity’ is a relative term and it is heavily based upon the standard imposed upon the society where the media is located.

For decades, the Australian press have worked in Indonesia but the past 40 years as described by Kingsbury (Kingsbury et al., 2000) have been the most difficult era for both Australian press and Indonesia. Papers by Kingsbury and Rodney Tiffen described
that often the way Australian press perceived and reports news about Indonesia have put them at odds with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{633} Often, the reporting by Australian newspapers have come between the relationship between Australia and Indonesia such as the reporting by David Jenkins on the then Indonesian president Soeharto.\textsuperscript{634} The best defence on Australian press behaviour was outlined by Damien Kingsbury below:

Australian journalists are, on the whole, better educated, more articulate and more socially engaged than their forebears often were. They are broadly less inclined to the boozy stereotypes that characterized the ‘old school’ and once a blokes ‘club’ for long lunches and drunken nights, is more these days a meritocracy. This more thoughtful journalism is reflected in their approach in reporting regional affairs. In the region, rather than simply reporting bad facts, Australian journalists are more inclined to look at the context of those facts, to understand their history and to consider their local implications. The problem is not so much that Australian journalists are not sufficiently professional, rather it is that they are simply journalists just doing the job of journalism, and perhaps they are doing it better. The term ‘professional’ therefore means this regional context, a willingness to bow to desires of politicians. As a matter of principle, Australian journalists tend not to do this.

So if there is a distinction between the political landscape of Australia and some of its neighbouring states and, on balance, the standards of Australian journalism have not declined, perhaps the real issues lies in other than the rhetoric of offence taken by neighbouring governments. It could be suggested that the sensitivity on the part of Australia’s neighbours reflects more the direction of their own developments.\textsuperscript{635}

So within this context, we can see that the tendency for Australian newspapers to quote their own people (as their top sources) is part of the press system of which, Australian journalists saw themselves as doing a proper and professional journalism job. The criticism that come follows, in particular by Indonesian (as government and people) can easily be dismissed as irrelevant. Don Greenless from \textit{The Australian} commented on the working condition he had to worked with:

So whatever you do, don’t assume that we sit down in a cool, complex way and think we are going to run our stories in particular tendentious way, because we believed East Timor should be independent or if you are an Indonesian journalist, you think it should be integrated with Indonesia and so sit down and coolly make this things up. We were on the ground working under tight deadlines, under pressure, concerned for our safety and trying to do the best job we could on the day. That’s true for Indonesian journalists and that’s true for foreign journalists.\textsuperscript{636}
The comment from Don Greenless above shows how difficult it is for foreign journalists (in particular) to report under the difficult situation in East Timor. It reinforced the perception above though that Australian journalists do believe that they were doing what they thought as good journalism.

The questions that arises now is how about the Indonesian press system? Does it have any impact towards the selection of sources? But the most important issue is whether the selection of sources (at least the top five) are acceptable by journalistic standard; and what does it tell us?

The Indonesian press system as described earlier is very much part of the developmental press (Soesilo and Washburn, 1994, McQuail, 1986, McQuail, 2001, Oetama, 2001, Kingsbury, 2000). Part of the trait of the developmental press is a strong commitment to the developmental effort in particular by the government (Soesilo and Washburn, 1994, McQuail, 1986, McQuail, 2001). This can have consequences that the Indonesian press can be susceptible to propaganda efforts by the Indonesian government in the name of promoting development (Kingsbury, 2000, Oetama, 2001, Siahaan et al., 2001, AKSARA, 2000).

In 1999, during the East Timor crisis, such practices were still rampant though the Indonesian press has finally already won their press freedom. One regular excuse as to why Indonesian journalists allow themselves to be ‘bullied occasionally in East Timor is
simply because in East Timor in 1999 (and even before that), their safety was guaranteed by their ‘good’ relations with Indonesian military. One example was given a former journalists who was assigned to East Timor:

As soon as I arrived there, I got continous mysterious phone calls in my hotel room. Finally, I thought I had enough and I called the local military office asking for the intelligence commander. After a meeting with the commander, I was able to do my job without any problem. But who says East Timor is a tourist area.

A similar comment was voiced by Suara Pembarua Chief of editor’s Atmadji Soemarkidjo. Mr Soemarkidjo voiced the difficulties found in reporting in East Timor. The problem, he said, is not just from people who are traditionally hostile towards Indonesians (such as the pro-integration supporters) but also from within the rank of Indonesian officials in East Timor.

There was a feeling of suspicion on the pro-independence side as well. ‘What are the reporters from Jakarta up to?’ Be that as it may, in the field our reporters were viewed with more suspicion by the pro-integration members. They were seen as traitors, selling out their own country. So it was truly difficult on all sides. With TNI as well: ‘Come on. Don’t report that. You’re an Indonesian right? Defend Indonesia. This is Red and White (Indonesian flag) we’re talking about’. But that era has passed.

The comment above shows how, though that theoretically the Indonesian press has finally earned its freedom, real challenges are still present. The enactment of the No 4/1999 press law does not mean that the Indonesian press will enjoy the institutionalized press freedom that were enjoyed by their Australian counterpart. In fact, reality in the field requires great care simply to survive. Just as one Indonesian journalist who was assigned many times to East Timor (during Indonesian occupation time) put it to me;

Working in East Timor (during Indonesian rules) is not something like strolling around in a tourist area. During one of the assignments there, as soon as I arrived I was terrorized by anonymous phone calls in my hotel. Finally I felt enough is enough so I called the local authorities and asked them not to hassle me anymore. A meeting later with an intelligence officer solved the problem but you are always on your toes there.
Within this context, it maybe understandable how all Indonesian newspapers chose Indonesian officials as their number one source and in significant numbers as well. But still the fact is that Indonesian newspapers used nine different type of sources in their top five of sources used during that period. This shows not just diversity but a significant effort to present different views in their reports. What is more significant is the fact that those sources came from different backgrounds. Some even came from Australia.

The significance of the finding of sources used and the press systems is that press system theory may explain some but not all. The fact that the Indonesian press quoted Indonesian officials and people significantly may reinforce the developmental press theory. Nevertheless at the same time, the Indonesian press shows a great effort in presenting different views from different sources. The Australian press on the other hand shows a tendency to quote their own society (officials and people) at the same level.

As part of a liberal or developed press system, the Australian press took a pride in working based on a strong standard in journalism. The Australian press also has an almost ideal press freedom, something that the Indonesian press does not have. But if the balanced reporting by presenting different views from different sources is the hallmark of good journalism, it may seems that from the press systems points of view, the Indonesian press may come equal or better than their Australian counterpart.
The final argument here is that the Australian and Indonesian press came from two different press systems. Within the two systems was a long animosity that lasted for more than two decades. In relation of how the Australian and Indonesian press reported the East Timor crisis, in particular during the difficult period of September 4th – 20th, the different systems may offer some explanations but that may not be all. More analysis from different points of view are needed.

6.10.2. News as social product – a social construction of reality.

Sources choice is not a random occurrence as news gathering and reporting is a systematic process that follows a set of procedures and standards {Cottle, c2003 #18;McCullagh, 2002 #31}. The decision by Australian newspapers to use sources that are close with them (Australian society) is not a random occurrence. The choice of sources during the difficult period reflects the frame of mind within the Australian newspapers. But the point is news is a product of journalism in order to reflect upon a reality faced by them and presenting it in a format that best understood by their readers/audiences {Gieber, 1999; McCullagh, 2002; Cottle, c2003}. Walter Gieber described it below:

To a sensitive, thoughtful newspaperman, writing the news story is a singularly personal experience. For despite what 'professional' or 'ethical' control he enforces upon himself, or for that matter, the bureaucratic controls that are thrust upon him, the news story is – should be – a product of his disciplined perception and his evaluation of the environment, of the social arena from which the story and its characters come, and of the bureaucratic climate in which it is written.642

Gieber argues that newspapers are in reality acting like gatekeepers, screening which information they can pass on to the society.643 Within this concept, news is a product of a
deliberate, systematic and rational process of the media organisation. But as the heart of any organization is the people, the organization involved needs to be understood within the social context where they existed where the society acted both as the target audience for the particular media.

McCullagh also argues the same line as Gieber; news is a social process. The production of news according to McCullagh follows the view that audience is central in the news production. The audience, she said, is the main issue as it becomes the target and context of which the news was created for. She explained it below:

The notion that the audience is important in influencing the production of media messages comes from two sources: the first is that media organizations need to attract an audience and to do this they must cater to its need; the second (and more complex) source is in the nature of social communication. Successful communication requires us to have some idea about the people with whom we are communicating. To be sure that they will understand us we must adapt our style of communication to fit the mental image we have of them.

So the use of sources close to Australian and Indonesian societies is basically an effort to better communicate the message – situation in East Timor, to their own respective society. Within this context it is understandable why the top sources are all close with the Australian and Indonesian society (in particular Australian society). Nevertheless, it still do not explain why Indonesian newspapers used much more diverse sources compared to Australian newspapers. To answer that we need to analyse the role of sources within the context of news as social construction of reality.

The finding in Table 2, 3 and 4 show that during a difficult time in doing 'proper' reporting from the field, Australian and Indonesian newspapers show a tendency to
'reflect' back their own society perception of the East Timor crisis. The question that arises now is what is the impact of such action? Each country’s newspapers provided their best defence as it was the best that they could do just as Don Greenless said earlier or to what Mr Hamami from *Republika* or Mr Soemarkidjo from *Suara Pembaruan* stated. Also above we have seen the argument that such actions were understandable due to the different press systems existing in Australia and Indonesia. But it is still does not answer the question what actually is the impact of referring back to their own society while reporting something physically and socially external of their society?

When the situation becomes difficult to report directly from East Timor, especially for Australian newspapers they need to find substitute sources. As the finding in table 2, 3 and 4 show, the substitute sources are Australian officials, Australian people and UN officials. Indonesian newspapers also have difficulties as well in reporting from East Timor but were able to maintain their presence in East Timor. Nevertheless the finding also shows that they also follow the trend to quote more on Indonesian society. But let's examine the finding above; major similarities between Australian and Indonesian newspapers are that they quoted more on their own officials and people.

Research often shows that the press tends to quote the powerful more often than those who do not have power. McCullagh describe that government officials, and institutional sources – such as professional organizations, pressure groups, business associations and ‘experts’ – predominate the as the sources of media stories. In
contrast, ordinary citizens very seldom appear as news sources except in some cases – mostly to put human faces into a tragedy.\footnote{653}

Furthermore McCullagh describe the relationship between the press and powerful sources as a paradox of contradiction (McCullagh, 2002). The press are inherently worried about being used in particular by powerful sources such as the government as their propaganda machine (Oetama, 2001, Siahaan et al., 2001). The Indonesian press community right after the fall of the New Order regime were particularly wary about such issues and they were right as the during New Order the press was strongly used and controlled by the Indonesian government and the ruling elite (Romano, 2003, Oetama, 2001, Siahaan et al., 2001, Romano, 2000, Center, 2000c, Center, 2000a, Center, 2000d, Simaremare, 2001).

But in reality, the press during the difficult time of reporting from East Timor has shown a tendency to quote significantly from officials sources (Table 2). This happened in both the Australian and Indonesian press, simultaneously. The possible explanation was what Murphy described that officials as sources are giving the media a shortcut while maintaining an image of strong credibility.\footnote{654} This is described by McCullagh:

\footnote{Such source (officials) solve a number of production and newsgathering problems; most notably, they solve the problem of verification because stories were originating with official sources are by definition ‘reliable’. If a news editor challenges a journalist on a story, the fact that the source is a powerful individual or organization in society establishes it as legitimate and as newsworthy. The information that such sources provide is also by definition ‘significant’ because it comes from the significant and important individuals and institutions.\footnote{655}}

Within this frame, it is now clear why Australian and Indonesian press tend to quote their own officials as their top sources during the difficult times of reporting from East Timor.
it’s a reliable (for their own society); it’s politically acceptable (for their own society again) and it is convenient. In other word as Don Greenless stated earlier – East Timor is just another assignment, albeit a difficult ones. From Greenless point of view, the goal is to report about the crisis as best as they could. Where the sources come from or what kind of sources is a secondary issue. At the end of the day, the main issue is that the newspapers have something to publish to their audiences. How the stories and where the stories came from is not important as long they are legally valid. It’s just another day in the business of selling news.

6.10.3. Issue of Orientalism.

In Chapter Seven, a more in depth analysis regarding the content of the articles within the period will be conducted. Within the in depth analysis, a significant portion will be related to the way Australia perceives Indonesia and vice versa. It is believed that such an aspect, influences very much the way Australian and Indonesian newspapers reporting the East Timor crisis.

As described earlier, Australia and Indonesia have two distinctly different press systems, cultures, political systems and beliefs. Such differences have arguably shaped the way Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the East Timor crisis in particular under extremely difficult circumstances.
The possibility of the orientalism issue in particular within the way Australian press perceived Indonesia was raised initially by Damien Kingsbury.\textsuperscript{656} But Kingsbury himself refused to accept that criticism over Australian press reporting approach in the South East can be described as ‘orientalism’.\textsuperscript{657} He described it below:

In trying to defend Australia more generally from some the more scurrilous attacks upon it by regional leaders, it would be very easy to here to slip into what Edward Said has referred as the ‘politics of congratulation’ (Said, 1981). This paper is not intended to be ‘self congratulatory’, although it would disingenuous to deny that it is polemical. Rather, it is intended to point out the basic distinction between Australia and its political culture and that of some neighbouring governments that from time to time express disapproval of Australia.\textsuperscript{658}

Kingbury’s argument above raised another important finding related very much to the issue of orientalism and the deeper frame in Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports. The issue is the perception that certain South East Asian governments tend to be hostile towards Australia and in particular the Australian press – thus they needed to be treated as such. This perception is not just belonging to Kingsbury alone but is also shared by other critics about South East Asian governments view towards Australia (Kingsbury, 2000, Tiffen, 2000, Romano, 2000).

In my perception such a view is an over simplification over the complex issue in representing South East Asian societies (in particular Indonesia and Malaysia). The perception shared by Australian academics above is simply stating that the problem is within the government – i.e. the Indonesian government. The Indonesian government (under the New Order regime), being a representation of a corrupt, closed, and dictatorial regime will find that the Australian press is a challenge (Tiffen, 2000, Kingsbury, 2000, Romano, 2000). This is because the Australian press are representing a free, democratic
and liberal society, something that is at odds with the Indonesian government during New Order regime.

As described earlier in this chapter as well as in Chapters 4, 5 and 7, the conflict in representing East Timor crisis in 1999 within Australian and Indonesian newspapers is about differences above. The Australian press is often perceived to be unable to clearly define the differences between the Indonesian people, the Indonesian government (after the fall of New Order regime) and the Indonesian military. This is also supported by reports from AKSARA Foundation. Reports about East Timor and Indonesia often are mixing the barriers between the behavior of the Indonesian military in East Timor; the Indonesian government reactions; and the actual perception of the Indonesian public regarding East Timor issue (AKSARA, 2000, Siahaan et al., 2001).

In August 1999, there was just over a year from the fall of New Order regime in Indonesia. Within Indonesia, the whole country was engulfed by massive political, social, economic and security crises. During my study in Australia until July 1998, the Australian media I remembered reported meticulously about the political and security upheavals in Indonesia, almost in great detail. But in my living memory, not very much was reported about the daily hardships for Indonesian in surviving those difficult times. In mid-1999, it seems that the Australian media again was focusing very much into the violence and hardships in East Timor, while in the process blaming Indonesia (in general) for letting such things happened in East Timor.
The refusal of Australian newspapers in perceiving the situation other than in their own society’s perspective is visible from the choices sources (Tables 3 and 4). The top five sources used by Australian newspapers are from Australian society or the UN which politically and socially considered to be part of Australian psyche as well, at that time. This, in my opinion is sign of orientalism.

As the scope of the discussion of this chapter is very wide and deep, more in-depth discussion will be conducted in the Chapter 7.
CHAPTER 7
AUSTRALIAN AND INDONESIAN NEWSPAPERS STANDARD AND PRACTICES DURING EAST TIMOR CRISIS IN 1999

7.1. Introduction.

Discussion in Chapters 1 to 6 has revealed a new general understanding of the different perspectives within Australian and Indonesian newspapers regarding reporting on East Timor’s crisis in September 1999. It is clear that media reports are part of society’s perception of the events. We have referred to and understood the different national perspectives as ‘frames’. But the discussion in previous chapters shows that there is more than just interpretation. The media frames are often part of an ongoing process, an interactive process within the society itself. This interactive process is actually an essential process within society that allows the society to develop.

The study of newspaper reports of the 1999 East Timor crisis in Australian and Indonesian newspapers has shown that the two societies perceived the same crisis differently. Both Australian and Indonesian societies, through their media (newspapers in this study), saw the same issue through totally different point of views. Australian society
perceived the event as a humanitarian crisis that warranted serious military intervention by national and international forces. This perception was perhaps not free from prejudice, reflecting some unresolved issues within the history of Australia – Indonesia relationship which were amplified by recent events.

Discussing Australian and Indonesian relationship is like a never ending story. At the end of the day it really depends on where you want to see it and when do you want to stop the discussion. Some Indonesians were intrigued why for a country that supported Indonesian independence struggle back in 1945 – 1949, Australia could act differently with the East Timor issue in 1999 and later the Papuan refugees in 2006.

For Australia, the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005 have changed their perception of Bali (and Indonesia in general) as ‘paradise’. Bali for Australians has become synonymous with danger. Either terrorism or being caught for using/smuggling drugs from and to Bali, it’s a fact that many Australians do not feel comfortable to go Bali or Indonesia anymore. With over a hundred Australians killed or injured in the bombings, plus those who were sentenced to death or life by Indonesian courts (mostly for drugs charges), it understandable why Australians have such views.

On the other hand, Australians were among the most generous donors for Indonesia in early 2005 after the tsunami disaster. I remember listening and seeing on television how Australians from all walks of life, gave their money to help the tsunami victims, particularly in the Aceh area. The most memorable moment was when I heard some school children were donating their milk money for the fellow children in Aceh.

Beyond politics, Australia and Indonesia are like two neighbours who love to hate each other but always come to the rescue when needed. Unfortunately in Australia, except for a few academics, students, military officials and intelligence officials, there is very little interest in serious study about Indonesia. In Indonesia, there is even less interest in studying about Australia. So the ignorance, misconception and misunderstanding continue even until today.

For Indonesian society, the issue of crisis is of a matter of perception differences. At the time the world was pressuring Indonesia, Indonesia was also facing a crisis of their own; the future of the country itself. The sudden collapse of the New Order regime due to the massive economic crisis in 1998 brought a sudden power vacuum. This condition led to the most serious economic and security crisis since the 1960’s.

Riots were the norm of the day; massive unemployment and sudden rise of poverty the reality. Politically, the transition towards democracy was marred by a trial and error
process of rewriting the political rules of the game including the constitution. On top of that, many provinces that were oppressed during New Order regime were declaring their intention to break free from Indonesia. All these problems needed urgent solutions but Indonesia was rapidly losing the means.\textsuperscript{668}

There is nothing that Indonesia fears more than breakaway provinces. Since independence in 1945, Indonesia has been plagued with rebellions. Most of the rebellions were fueled by same reason: dissatisfaction with Indonesia’s central government. Unfortunately, until recently successive Indonesian governments have always seen military solutions as the only solution for rebellions.

The referendum of East Timor was truly a nightmare come to life for Indonesia. It was such a traumatic experience that when the Indonesian government declared war against Aceh’s rebellion in 2002, the majority of Indonesia did not object to new bloodshed. This is an irony that just a few years earlier, the findings of human rights abuses in Aceh (particularly by the Indonesian military) brought serious trouble for the Indonesian military. After East Timor, it seemed that majority of Indonesians were silently willing to sacrifice peace and human rights for the integrity of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{669}

Thus for Indonesia, the East Timor crisis was just another crisis for an already unstable country. East Timor’s population of 800,000 is nothing compared to 210 million in the whole of Indonesia. East Timor was heavily supported by the Indonesian economy. It was logically unsurprising that some Indonesians (including President Habibie) thought that East Timor was just a burden of history. For them, East Timor was a mistake from the past and like a cancer that needed to be taken away.

When I first heard about the options (referendum) for East Timor, my thought was: this is a really serious gamble for Habibie and Indonesia. Most Indonesians including me did not want East Timor to be engulfed into chaos such as what happened before and after the referendum. But learning from what happened in Jakarta in May 1998, such things were not surprising for us.

Many of us thought, that this is really the most damaging thing that President Habibie could do to Indonesia. Others rather believed a ‘conspiracy theory’ that President Habibie was listening only to his private advisers instead of his ministers and the advisers had advised a quick solution for East Timor. But in the end, seeing how the General Assembly (MPR) rejected President Habibie’s explanation on East Timor during the General Assembly’s meeting in 1999, I knew that would be the end of Habibie’s political career in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{570}
Unfortunately the reality was not that simple. The sudden decision to conduct a referendum for East Timor by President Habibie infuriated elements within Indonesian society including the military. Being the de-facto ruler of East Timor, the Indonesian military was not very keen to release East Timor overnight. Events that took place later were a matter of history. President Habibie invited the UN to oversee the referendum.

I remember that among the first group that demonstrated against the referendum for East Timor were the children of East Timor’s veterans and soldiers that were killed there since 1975. I remember it because I remember publishing the story in *The Indonesian Observer*. It reminds me of the stories told by my father and uncles who were in the Army about how the Indonesian military lost thousands of its soldiers in East Timor since 1975. For these former officers and soldiers, the loss of East Timor was like betraying the sacrifices given by those soldiers slain in East Timor since 1975. The issue was really something deep and very personal for them.671

When the UN arrived, a hidden campaign was allegedly already underway in East Timor to undermine the referendum. When the results showed that majority wanted to be an independent nation, elements within East Timor society went on a rampage. These elements were armed militias created, trained and armed by the Indonesian military as support for their efforts to quell the rebellion by FRETILIN. In September, these militias went on a rampage as they felt disappointed by their losses.

The real reason why the militias went on rampage is still being debated, even today. But what is undisputed is that due to the escalating violence, the UN had to be pulled out from East Timor. This crisis led to the creation of a peace keeping force – INTERFET under the leadership of Australia.

Singaporean journalist Melvin Singh, believed that there are more issues about East Timor than what appears to be most obvious. As a start he believed that there are seeds for horizontal conflicts within the East Timor society itself. As an illustration he described how the main leaders of FRETILIN and CNRT are Portuguese descendants, while the pro-Integration militias mostly were indigenous or what Melvin described as ‘black people’. He said that in the social structure of East Timor, descendants of the Portuguese were often seen as a higher rank (the highest among the indigenous but still below the Portuguese) among the society. The indigenous people were
often the neglected part of the society. They are often poor, uneducated and sometimes looked
down upon by the higher rank groups. This is a seed for social jealousy and conflict.

Secondly, Melvin believed economic factors were ‘trigger factors’. The pro-integration militias
benefited significantly from the presence of the Indonesian military in East Timor. The militias
were not just involved in fighting the FRETILIN but also in illegal gambling and other businesses.
When the referendum result was announced, the pro-integration militia suddenly lost their income
as they lost their privileges due to their proximity to Indonesian officials. According to Melvin,
one thing that a pro-independence leader did immediately after the referendum was create a hotel.
So for Melvin there are other issues than politics at play in East Timor such as ethnic and historic
rivalries and economic factors.  

The point of this argument is that there are many aspects of East Timor society that were
not known by outsiders. In the past, East Timor was badly divided by internal conflict
that often put brother against brother. Such divisions were not just known but also
heavily utilized by both Portuguese and Indonesia as rulers of East Timor. When the
East Timor crisis escalated in 1999, the Australian public and press were merely pointing
out that the Indonesian military was using the crisis for their own ends.

In the media arena, media from both Australia and Indonesia were busy presenting the
crisis to their own audiences. What this chapter will do is extend the analysis to create
the final theory regarding this issue – how Australian and Indonesian media presented
East Timor crisis in 1999. All quoted articles in this chapter are available in Appendix D.

7.2. Theoretical background.

When presenting certain news events, the media does not just give a neutral report of
events but inscribes its own interpretation of the event. As weak or as minimal the
interpretation may be, it is still an interpretation. Those interpretations, often called
frames, are common process within media reports. Jaap van Ginneken gives a more detailed description of the concept of 'frame':

The news media bring some features of 'reality' to our attention, placing them in the light, whereas most of the rest is kept in the dark. It is mostly the same features which are brought to our attention time and time again. But even then, the illumination is intermittent at best: it is rather like the beam of a lighthouse, the stroboscopic lights in a disco, or the flash of a camera lighting up the night every now and then. It permits us to develop only a very partial and slanted view of our environment.

Framing is seen by some scholars as the way media connect to their society. Basically a news event is a social event – something that the society wants to know or what the media wanted the society to know. In order to have that event best understood or received, the media then packages the reports in a way that will be (hopefully) understood best by the society. Thus the study of frames becomes important.

My research about the studies of frames shows, however, that there is nothing exact when trying to understand frames. Many theories of frames offer understanding but not a systematic way to understand frames let alone understand the hidden message within the greater context of the particular society. It was this uncertainty that led me to develop a new approach.

7.3. A New Theory of Media and East Timor Crisis.

The method used here is to use several layers of analysis in order to create a new understanding and later a theory regarding media reports and the East Timor crisis in 1999. The rationale for using multiple layers of analysis is because the nature of the object of research – frame, is an elusive object. Frame as a focus of study has been
discussed numerous times by both media practitioners and academics but few are able to fully describe a thorough method to analyse frames. Some scholars such as Robert Entman, Peter White and Gadi Wolfsfeld have created methods to analyse frames but each uses a different point of view and thus creates a different method of analysis. Thus, it is deemed necessary in this thesis to utilize more than one method of analysis in order to analyse frames in the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reporting on East Timor crisis in 1999.

The use of different methods of analysis is necessary to create a strong argument in the conclusion and also because the topic covers a very complex issue. The methodology here is based on qualitative method in general but also based on grounded theory in particular. The rationale for drawing on both of these is that the issue is a very complex in its nature. Various variables need to be put under consideration such as history, culture, values and historical events in both Australia and Indonesia. Being a research method that is specifically suited to analyse complex events, a qualitative methodology is deemed the most suitable method as the basic approach in this Thesis. Grounded theory, as founded by Glaser and Strauss\textsuperscript{680}, is a research method that created a theory by analyzing data by continuously challenging the findings until a new theory emerges. I have relied upon grounded theory throughout this thesis to analyse and re-interpret the data.
The analysis of the news articles in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 has shown the different perceptions about East Timor crisis within Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Chapter 4 and 5 deal specifically with how to foreground the different perceptions.

In Chapters 4 and 5, several cases were studied thoroughly using not just one method but three different methods drawn from Robert Entman, Peter White and Gadi Wolfsfeld. It was deemed necessary to use the three different methods for several reasons:

- To gain maximum understanding of the frames and how frames were constructed within those news reports.
- To minimize possibilities of basing the interpretation solely on single factors. The issue is not about avoiding bias but instead giving a fair and more thorough understanding.
- Each method offers different aspect of analysis – creating a much bigger picture.
- Each method allows a meticulous analysis to be applied to particular aspects of the news reports. Taken together, the analysis develops a more holistic approach.

In this chapter, the new theory will be formulated in the final section of the chapter. The early part of this chapter will continue what was discussed in Chapter 6, namely understanding the use of sources in the news reports. As in previous chapters, the analysis is limited to the time frame described in Chapter 6; September 1st – 20th, 1999. This is arguably the most critical period of the East Timor crisis. It started with the announcement of the referendum result; the escalation of violence; the withdrawal of UN
and foreign press from East Timor and finally the arrival of UN sanctioned troops – INTERFET in East Timor.

The withdrawal of almost all foreign press from East Timor during that period created a void of access. The question asked in Chapter 6 was how both the Australian and Indonesian press reacted to such a situation. The result was both the Australian and Indonesian press reacted by looking for sources within their own society. Also, even though the access to direct sources in East Timor was difficult, there was still access to the East Timorese people (Pro-integration, Pro-independence or refugees/civilians). Yet, the study shows that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers generally considered the East Timorese as less important sources compared to other sources such as Australian and Indonesian officials.

7.4. The East Timor Crisis from the Media Point of View.

Each society, represented by their news media, was trying to comprehend the emerging and complex issue of East Timor as a new nation. What this chapter will try to do is to apply the grounded theory approach in a more comprehensive manner to the data collected in Chapter 6. The aim of using grounded theory here is to create a new understanding – formulated into a new theory about media, society and crisis. Grounded theory provides the best possible method as it allows the data to ‘speak for itself’\(^{681}\), thus allowing a new theory to be created from the raw data by continuously challenging the new findings until a new concept or theory emerges. The data in Chapter 6 has shown
how Australian and Indonesian news media represented the East Timor crisis, in particular during the peak of the crisis. The findings show that both country’s newspapers present the issue using sources that are close to their own society. If this is so, then it is a possibility that each country’s news reports were merely reflecting the perception within their own society.

The process of news reporting as written language in newspapers can be likened to the process of photojournalism. In Chapter 1, a nature photographer Galen Rowell described how humans perceive visual stimuli (in this case photography) by comparing it to already present knowledge within the human itself. The knowledge here is a product of a lifetime experience of each individual, and unique to the individual. As the knowledge (or experience) of each individual is different, every person will perceive the photograph differently.

The same situation exists for written news. Readers respond to the information given to them by the newspapers. The information which is packaged within the news frame, is designed to convey specific information to the readers. This is the major difference between photographs and written news. A photojournalist can only present (in his or her photograph) what was present. Any form of manipulation such as adding or deliberately deleting some element within the photograph can result in the photograph being described as ‘manipulated’, and thus the photograph will lose its news value. Written news theoretically should be based upon the actual facts but in reality it is a manufactured product.
Written news is created by words carefully selected by the journalist and refined by the editors which means it is a created product. This carefully constructed effort aims to present the audience with the best possible description of the news events or the facts. This presented information may reflect the conception and perception by the journalists themselves which later is being presented to the audience. A photograph can only present what was present (and recorded) in front of its lens. Even so, the photograph itself may only represent a distortion of reality.

The point here is that if a photograph, sometimes considered to the most truthful journalistic medium, may not represent the full reality, what about written news where everything is created by the journalist? The most common answer is because the audience believed that the journalists were presenting them with facts as known by the journalist, the written is accepted by the readers as ‘reality’. But the question that still lingers is how about the subjective perception of ‘facts’ here especially with the fact that presented ‘reality’ is actually a reconstruction of facts as perceived and comprehended by the journalist themselves?

Journalists as human beings will react to their surroundings using knowledge that they already have. Thus for example a conflict situation like East Timor in 1999 may be perceived differently by different journalists as each journalist has different sets of knowledge (including values, norm and cultures). The journalists themselves knew or
thought they knew that their conception of the situation they face will be the base of perception for their audience.

During the Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky affair in 1998 – 1999, I remember reading significant number of reports from US print media (through the news wire services) that were greatly divided. The US media basically was divided about the issue whether President Clinton affair can be constitute a ‘violation’ of his mandate or not (as it was ‘just’ a private affair). But what was interesting was the reaction around the world with some reports said that majority of the global audience were more interested with the details of the ‘affairs’ itself. I remember one comment from a man in a middle east country who said that he couldn’t understand why American people made a big fuss about the affair. He said, in his society a man like President Clinton can have more than one wife so an affair like that should not be a big issue.

In the end, as explained in Chapter 1 and 2, the core of this research is not about whether Australian and Indonesia presented truthful reports or not regarding the East Timor crisis in 1999. The core of this research is about how the Australian and Indonesian newspapers perceived and represented the East Timor crisis in 1999 in particular to their home audiences. The differences found in the presentation of the issue, is evidence that Australian and Indonesian newspapers and societies perceived the issue differently.

7.5. The data analysis.

The analysis in this chapter will be divided into several parts to reflect the findings in Chapter 6. Each section will contain a more in-depth analysis regarding the findings. The method of analysis relies on identifying and quantifying sources used in news reports. The data discussed in previous chapters is re-categorized here and divided into five categories on the basis of sources accessed:

- Australian and Indonesian officials as sources.
- Australian and Indonesian citizens as sources.
7.5.1. Australian and Indonesian officials as sources.

In Chapter 6, officials from Australia and Indonesia were defined as those representing either country in their official capacity. In this thesis, that would mean public/government officials and members of state governing bodies such as the house of representatives. This definition includes all persons, either civilian or military, regardless of their rank, as long as they were quoted in their capacity as 'officials'. If the person were quoted as a private citizen, then they would be categorized as 'citizen'.

The data in Chapter 6 shows that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers relied extensively on their own country’s officials as sources. In Chapter 6, a possible explanation for the (over)reliance on officials was linked to the nature of their position. As representatives of the state, officials are traditionally ranked very high (in terms of credibility) as sources. This explanation will probably explain why officials rank almost uniformly in both Australian and Indonesian newspapers as the top sources used. Nevertheless the findings in Chapters 6 did not provide an in depth view of the complexity of using officials as sources.
Officials understand well that in their official capacity they will be seen as the representatives of their country, at least politically. When they are quoted, in particular government officials, the understanding is that they are representing the views of the ruling power. So it needs be understood here that officials are representing just one element within a very complex society – the elite, ruling element.

For Indonesian journalists, officials are the most common sources of news. This was particularly true during the New Order regime as the government was the center of the society. During the New Order regime, public officials were part of the central structure of the state, they were the state, depending upon their position. Further away from the central power of Jakarta, local officials were often known as the ‘local Tsar’. Therefore major news organizations assigned certain journalists to cover specific government departments. The more important the department (eg The State Palace), the more likely a journalist will be stationed there full time so they can monitor and report any news from the officials as early as possible.

The main argument here is that officials (especially government officials) represent one element of the particular society – the ruling element. Their position as officials makes them very visible and important in term of their value as sources. But again, they are simply representing one element within complex societies such as Australia and Indonesia.

From Tables 2, 3 and 4, the relative importance of officials as sources is clear. Both Australian and Indonesian newspapers put a relatively high importance on officials as sources. This is understandable from several points of view:

- East Timor in 1999 was an official issue. It started back in 1974-1975 with the crisis within East Timor itself which ended when the Indonesian military invaded East Timor in December 1975. The invasion which led to East Timor’s integration to Indonesia was an international issue, debated in the UN for
decades. It was always an issue between the Indonesian government and other governments.

- The agencies involved within the East Timor crisis in 1999 were official agencies including the UN, Portugal, Indonesia (the signatories of the tripartite agreement), and later Australia and other international forces. In addition non governmental organizations (NGOs) played important roles even if the main players were official agencies.

Within the reports itself, the frames promoted (in relation to the officials as sources) are continuously shifting. This is probably the most important issue in connection to understanding officials as sources – they reflect the changing (official) perceptions of the situation in East Timor.

In the early September 1999, the Australian government was shocked by the escalating violence in East Timor. This shock immediately turned into political pressure on Indonesia, as Indonesia was responsible for the security based upon the tripartite agreement. A sample report from early September appears below. In this report, Australia signals its interest in keeping at arm’s length from the events:

Canberra ruled out yesterday the possibility of Australia participating in any non-United Nations military force in East Timor.

The Minister for Defence, Mr Moore, said Australia was prepared to meet any need for evacuation from East Timor, but added: "Troops from Australia will not go in unless it's at the invitation of the United Nations with the sanction of Indonesia."

A spokesman for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Downer, said last night that he had been surprised by Mr McKinnon's reported comments and had sought clarification. "Mr McKinnon's office re-assured us that non-UN intervention in East Timor is not an option that is being promulgated by New Zealand because of the self-evident complications associated with it," he said.
"For those who have still not got the message, Australia will not be invading Indonesia."  

The report above from *The Sydney Morning Herald*, dated 2\(^\text{nd}\) of September, shows some uncertainty within the Australian government in deciding its official stance. Within days, as the violence escalated rapidly, the perception of the government changed accordingly. By the 7\(^\text{th}\) of September the tone of the Australian government had changed dramatically.  

Prime Minister John Howard last night called an emergency meeting of the Cabinet's national security committee to consider Australia's response to the deteriorating relationship and to the East Timor crisis.  

Mr Howard earlier yesterday said there was "no doubt in the world that at the moment Indonesia is not fulfilling its obligations to maintain law and order".  

Government sources said all aspects of the relationship, including defence links and aid, would be on the table if Indonesia did not live up to its promises to ensure peace.  

It is understood Defence Minister John Moore has failed in his efforts in recent days to speak to Indonesian armed forces commander General Wiranto, now widely believed to have sanctioned the growing violence in East Timor.  

"The situation has really got much worse in the last 48 hours," Mr Howard said. Australia has mounted a major diplomatic effort to try and shame Indonesia into restoring peace in East Timor, and to win support for an early deployment of peacekeepers.  

The two articles above show how the frames presented in this case by Australian officials were changing. The basis of the changes was the increase in violence in East Timor after the referendum. In the first article, the frame was that the Australian government would not enter East Timor without Indonesian permission. In the second article, the frame has shifted to put pressure on Indonesia to give the permission for armed peacekeepers in East Timor. This happened in less than a week.  

One thing that has never been clearly understood by most of the Indonesian people was why Australia changed its mind dramatically during the East Timor crisis in 1999. In the beginning, Australia was publicly supporting Indonesian efforts for making the referendum a success. But when the pressure from the Australian public becomes too strong, the Australian government position changed dramatically. This is the point where many Indonesians even those who may not be government supporters feel that Australia has changed its position towards Indonesia. The
declaration' of the 'Howard Doctrine' really fuels the assumption that Australia wanted to become a 'local bully with a super power ally' in South East Asia.

Long after the 1999 crisis passed, I still met people from different ethnic or social groups that think Australian involvement in East Timor crisis (1999) was way out of line. But when probed deeper, it seems that much of the angst came from the bombastic political campaign by Australian officials regarding the crisis. The problem in my opinion is that though such methods of harvesting of public support is common in Australia, such a thing was long abandoned in Indonesia. I think the last time Indonesian officials used such methods was when President Soekarno declared the armed conflicts back in 1960's. I believe most Indonesians have seen that the result of such campaign was bloody conflict and more victims of conflict.695

Later, as the INTERFET arrived in full strength in East Timor, the tone of Australian reports changed again. Before the arrival the frame promoted was concern about possible casualties amongst Australian troops. When INTERFET had been fully deployed in East Timor, the frame changed again into self gratification:

The other thing that stirs the emotion of the Indonesian public towards Australia was the publicized comments by Australian media. The Indonesian public also watched with horror the way the pro-integration militias behaved during and after the referendum. But unfortunately, some Indonesian media in particular newspapers have successfully exploited reports about the arrogant behaviour of the UN staff and Foreign (in particular Western) journalists.

One thing that Indonesians do not like is arrogant behaviour. So it was easy to stir up the emotion by playing on perceived arrogance. But when the Australian media returned to East Timor after being expelled by the pro-integration militias, the impression was that the Australian wanted to came back for revenge. This time, the Australian media brought their own protector - INTERFET and it was easy to see how the Australian media were taking sides with INTERFET in their reporting that almost sounds like hyperbolic boasting.696

The strong support for INTERFET from Australian newspapers may have come from a combination of public demand, political support from the government and not to be under estimated, were the previous demands by Australian journalists for an Australian intervention in East Timor. All parties in Australia seem to be in a winning position: the government gained political support, the public felt their demands were being met and the media felt that their campaign was successful. The loser unfortunately was Indonesia which suffered from strong condemnation by the international community and relentless negative reporting about Indonesia.
The frames promoted by the Indonesian government were different from the frames above. In the beginning of September, it was a surprise that the majority of East Timorese decided to decline the offer of full autonomy, and this led to the independence process. As soon as reports of escalating violence emerged, the frame was of surprise and confidence that the Indonesian security apparatus would be able to handle the situation. When it was obvious that things were out of control, a whole new set of frames were promoted.697

Furthermore General Wiranto said that it is clear that the deployment of security forces to East Timor is not going to make the situation more explosive. This is because the security forces were there to secure the situation. If there are no security forces, the situation will be more explosive. It's due to the ability to act brutally, attacking one another without any interference.698

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in his press conference said that the result of the referendum will be followed up by the Indonesian government with meetings with the UN, Portugal and other parties. These meetings will be concerned with many aspects including assets, security and transfer of authority, before the formal process of transfer to the UN later.699

Indonesia will keep on trying to find the best solutions in there (East Timor) and still rejects the presence of foreign troops until the third stage said Minister of Cabinet Secretary; Muladi to reporters. The third stage is the period after the result of the referendum is accepted by the General Assembly (MPR) at the next General Assembly meeting.700

The frame promoted was confidence that Indonesian security forces will be able to manage the security, and that business will go on as usual as according to the tripartite agreement between Portugal, Indonesia and the UN. The Indonesian government presented a frame of confidence and at the same time a subtle defiance. President Habibie as Indonesia’s president at the time claimed that he would bear all responsibility for everything that happened in East Timor. In the same statement he also stated that he declared that Indonesia had successfully conducted a peaceful and transparent referendum.701
What is happening in East Timor at present is one thing. The other fact is that we have successfully conducted a referendum process that was peaceful and transparent. *Apa yang terjadi di Timtim saat ini adalah satu hal. Fakta lainnya, kita telah melaksanakan proses jajak pendapat yang transparan dan damai (Republika, September 7)*.

The frames in the government ranks were more or less stable. Governments as major political players always try to hold a consistent line as far as possible (Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Wolfsfeld, 2003b). Smaller political players, however, who do not possess the same level of power and importance often have to change their message in order to maintain their importance.

The point here is the stronger the player is in terms of political influence, the more able they are to maintain a consistent frame. Nevertheless a consistent frame is neither positive nor negative. By their nature, governments need to preserve a sense of stability to maintain order. This warrants a consistent frame and ‘everything is in order’ position by the government.

Even during the peak of the crisis – when the UN forces were about to arrive in East Timor, both governments still maintained the ‘everything is in order’ frame. But there is more to that issue than is apparent on the surface. For the Indonesian government, to maintain such a stance was seen more as a ‘facing saving’ effort. The Indonesian government had finally lost in its effort to maintain its status as a credible security provider in East Timor – thus failing its commitments to the tripartite agreement. This constitutes the ultimate humiliation after the majority of East Timorese rejected the Indonesian autonomy offers.
That morning when my editor from Singapore called me, telling me that the East Timorese had rejected the Indonesian offer of autonomy, I was really shocked. Never before as an Indonesian, did I think I would see such a thing happen. Indonesia was still in financial, social and political crisis, a few other provinces have been nagging for independence and now East Timor ceased to be part of Indonesia.

Humiliation for Indonesia was not in Indonesians' minds at that time. It was more like a shock. But when the situation deteriorated very quickly and it was obvious that the Indonesian military and police could do very little – to be precise too little, too late; that's when we felt so ashamed. Most Indonesians know how efficient and brutal the military and police are when dealing with such riots and yet they failed. The well published international pressure only heightened our feeling of being cornered.

After the decision to send UN sanctioned troops was made by the UN, the Indonesian government's frame was to accept the UN decision and to welcome the UN troops. Hostile frames from the Indonesian government ceased when the UN decision was accepted.

For Australia the frame can be understood as an attempt to contain the anxiety within Australian society. For weeks, the Australian press had been pressuring the government to send troops to East Timor. The Australian press, members of Australian society and East Timor’s independence activists presented a unanimous view that Australia should send troops to East Timor. This concerted effort was successful.

I remember the most shocking news about East Timor was not the burning or refugees, for after the 1998 crisis we were used to that. The most shocking news was that suddenly Australia was preparing its troops in Darwin to go to East Timor, way before the UN resolution. For us Indonesians, regardless whether or not we agreed with what the military did or not, such an act from Australia was like a statement of war, just like before the Dutch colonialists wanted to re-occupy Indonesia after World War 2.

For Indonesians, since the end of the War of Independence in 1949, we had never seen foreign troops going to Indonesia for a conflict. Conflict is part of Indonesian history. The Javanese, are proud to carry their weapons (The Keris). But the Keris is always carried in the back and anyone carrying weapons up front (except for the military and police) is considered very rude and will attract negative attention – in most places in Indonesia.

Now the image of Australian soldiers, fully armed with their armored vehicles saying they are ready to go to East Timor was filling the front pages of Indonesian newspapers. Such a thing is like reminding us of the rude and arrogant Dutch colonialists 1946-1948. In the end it's just fueling the long held fear and prejudice about western societies’ attitudes towards Indonesia. Just today, a
Having made the commitment to send troops in East Timor, the Australian government faced the grim reality of casualties in East Timor. There was also an alarming possibility that sending troops might incite conflict with Indonesia. In the end the frames produced by the Australian government were a mix between warning of the worst possible case (of casualties but not conflict with Indonesia) and drumming up support for the troops.

In 2004, the frames produced by Australian and Indonesian governments were challenged by a new comer. Some news articles were mentioning that the Indonesian military were not just supporting but also coordinating and arming the pro-integration militias. The fact that pro-integration militias were created and trained by the Indonesian military is not a new story. In fact it goes along way to the early days to the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia (Subroto, 1997, Conboy, 2003).

The significance of the new reports was that the Australian government was very aware about what had been going on in East Timor including the intentions of pro-integration militias. The report made by Captain Andrew Plunkett also stated that the Australian government was very aware about the plan to destroy East Timor should the people reject the autonomy offer. Captain Plunkett claimed that he knew these facts as he was the senior Australian army intelligence officer assigned to INTERFET.
Captain Plunkett’s report was later reinforced another report by another former Australian Army officer. Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins was the officer assigned to head the intelligence section within INTERFET. He claimed that not only was the Australian government very aware of Indonesian military plans but that the Australian government was also deliberately trying to cover up such knowledge (Davis, 2004, Daley, 2004, Lyons, 2004a). Lieutenant Colonel Collins claimed that the cover up was due to the strong influence of powerful ‘pro-Indonesian’ lobby group within Australia (Lyons, 2004a, Lyons, 2004b, Daley, 2004, Davis, 2004).

Lieutenant Colonel Collins argued that the ‘pro-Indonesian’ lobby group saw that the relationship with Indonesia was very important for Australia. The ‘pro-Indonesian’ lobby group itself is a loose association of academics, government officials (either still serving or retired) and business people. In this group’s view, a fall-out between Australia and Indonesia over East Timor should be avoided but if that were not possible, it should be contained as far as possible. Captain Martin Toohey, the officer in charge for investigating Lieutenant Colonel Collins’ allegations of a cover up stated:

He describes the Jakarta lobby, as “a cabal of both uniformed and civilian personnel within DIO and Defence who take everything emanating from the TNI [Indonesian military] at face value. This so-called ‘intelligence’ is written with the object of distancing the TNI from atrocities committed by the Kopassus [read ‘terrorist’] arm of the TNI... two basic premises of the Jakarta lobby are firstly to deny atrocities committed by the TNI, followed by publicly attributing those outrages including those human rights violations in East Timor [pre-Interfet] to ‘rogue elements’ of the TNI and not the TNI per se.”

The presence of the pro-Indonesian lobby group or ‘Jakarta lobby’ was one of the main issues in the case of Lieutenant Colonel Collins and Captain Plunkett. Various reports by
the Australian media highlighted the presence of the ‘Jakarta lobby’ as a scandal within the Australian federal government. Paul Daley from *The Bulletin* reports:

Talk about the so-called Jakarta lobby - those Australian political, military and diplomatic elites are said to be pursuing an entrenched policy of appeasement with successive Indonesian administrations ahead of human rights - was rife. The arguments varied in sophistication. Some analysts were willing to entwine stories about the Jakarta lobby with conspiracies about alleged cover-ups of paedophile activity in the foreign service. The more sophisticated, however, saw the Jakarta lobby more prosaically as an alignment of decision-makers who pragmatically considered strong relations with Indonesia, and the ensuing security and trade benefits, to be the necessary bedrock of the bilateral relationship, ahead of human rights.

Captain Plunkett and Lieutenant Collins’s reports challenged the previous frames presented by the Australian and Indonesian governments during the crisis in 1999. The reports also challenged the foundations of both governments’ frames at that time. For the Indonesian government this new construction represented their officials (especially the senior military officers like General Wiranto) as having questions of credibility. Indonesian officials (especially the military officials) had always denied the claim that there was a plan to destroy East Timor should the autonomy offer being rejected. For the Australian government the report presented a different meaning.

Captain Plunkett and Lieutenant Colonel Collins’ reports shows a possibility of a new, deeper frame within the Australian government’s frames during the East Timor crisis. The hidden frame can be understood as pleasing the Australian public while at the same time managing the crisis with Indonesia. One of the damning facts presented by Captain Plunkett was the finding of an alleged mass grave containing victims of the conflict in East Timor. Not only that, Captain Plunkett also alleged that Kim Beazley, the head of Australian Labor Party was compromised due to his close association with Indonesia.
By mid-2001, Captain Andrew Plunkett, an intelligence officer with outer-Sydney Holsworthy-based parachute regiment the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment, had written a report asserting that Beazley's past friendship with a prominent Indonesian had brought him to the attention of Indonesian intelligence agencies.

Plunkett alleged that Beazley, a former defence minister, had been compromised by Indonesian intelligence because of the friendship and was therefore a risk to Australia's national security. Plunkett says he first verbally detailed his claims to the commanding officer of the 1st Intelligence Battalion at Sydney's Victoria Barracks. Plunkett says he then emailed a written report to the same superior officer before giving a copy to the office of then-defence minister Peter Reith.710

The mass grave found by Captain Plunkett would have pushed the UN to create an international tribunal in East Timor, something that Indonesia strongly resisted. Almost immediately, Captain Plunkett was ordered to close the investigation of possible atrocities in East Timor. Closing down the investigation meant that it was difficult for the UN to have reasons to create an international tribunal.

We may now return to the media frames presented by government officials. It is clear that both governments presented frames that supported the political stand of the Australian and Indonesian governments. But within those frames, lie hidden frames. For the Indonesian government, the hidden frame was concerned with maintaining the integrity of Indonesia in the domestic and international communities. For the Australian government, the hidden frame was concerned with acknowledging the pressure from the Australian public while at the same time trying to minimize the fall out with Indonesia.

In 2006, this hidden frame was fully publicized in a report by the East Timor's truth and reconciliation commission.711 The report was made about the time Indonesia took over East Timor from Portugal in 1975 until the referendum in 1999. Within the report, there
were allegations that Australia strongly preferred East Timor to remain a part of Indonesia despite reports of thousands of victims of violence in East Timor.

AUSTRALIA wanted East Timor to remain an Indonesian province and the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, lobbied Jakarta to delay a vote for independence, a report to the United Nations has found.

The report says Australia "contributed significantly to denying the people of Timor-Leste their right to self-determination before and during the Indonesian occupation".

In order to maintain a good relationship with Indonesia, Australia violated its obligations under international law and backed the bigger neighbour's push to take over East Timor in 1975. It also was influenced by a desire to get the most it could out of maritime boundary negotiations affecting oil and gas reserves.

Australia also gave Indonesia economic and military assistance throughout the 24-year occupation and advocated on its behalf in the international community, the commission said.

It also makes special mention of the more recent role of Mr Downer before the vote for independence in 1999. It says he lobbied Indonesia to delay the poll because it was in Australia's interests for East Timor to remain part of the archipelago.712

Regardless of the evidence of the deep frame within Australian government frames, it still does not answer why there were changes of frames promoted by the Australian government. The first answer may lie in what Wolfsfeld said that political antagonists always do their best to promote frames that best suit their interests according to the situation.713

A second answer is that the Australian government at that point of time was in a difficult position. On one hand it was clear that the Australian government wanted to keep East Timor as part of Indonesia for various reasons. On the other hand, the continuous reports of violence especially after the referendum had triggered a very strong emotional response within Australian society. The pressure from the Australian public reached a point that was impossible to be ignored by the Australian government. The description
by Richard Woolcott, former Australian ambassador to Indonesia, is probably the best description:⁷¹⁴

I have been sickened by many of the scenes from East Timor. Nobody can condone the savagery of the anti-independence militias and any support they have received from the Indonesian armed forces (TNI). Many Indonesians will also be shocked by these acts.

The situation of the East Timorese -- those we sought to help -- is horrific; much worse than it was at the beginning of this year. We now face a devastated East Timor with an unknown number of casualties, many of whom might otherwise still be alive.

How did we allow all this to happen? The first error was to assume that President B.J.Habibie, an erratic and transitional figure whose legitimacy, hold on power and support from the armed forces was always in question in Indonesia, could deliver without strong opposition on his undertakings to John Howard.

The second was to overlook the likelihood of a violent backlash to the expected vote against autonomy on August 30. Many Indonesians, including East Timorese, warned of this.

The third mistake was the Government's response to domestic pressure groups demanding immediate independence for East Timor, with which it virtually joined hands. While community feelings were very strong, it overreacted to the East Timor lobby, a sometimes hysterical and committed media, the more radical elements in the Catholic Church and a handful of ex-servicemen who feel Australia has a debt to the East Timorese who helped them after Australia had invaded the Portuguese colony in 1942.⁷¹⁵

In the end, the point of the argument is that Australian newspapers with the complicity of Australian officials promoted frames that suit the interests of political players in Australia – the government. The frames were not visibly known until members of Australian Defence Force, Captain Plunkett and Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins broke the silence and declared that the Australian government knew more than what they claimed during East Timor crisis in 1999. The revelations also suggested that the Australian government was deliberately trying to minimize the impact of their action (to Indonesia) in order to preserve their interests with Indonesia.

On the other hand, the Indonesian press also arguably fell in line with the Indonesian government's position regarding the East Timor crisis in 1999. Nevertheless, the
positions of the Indonesian newspapers were due to rising nationalistic sentiment caused by international pressure towards Indonesia. The Indonesian government at the time was also structurally weak unlike the New Order regime. Nevertheless, the combination of a lack of resources and the systematic control of information by the Indonesian military made it difficult for Indonesian newspapers to fully cover the East Timor crisis.

Seven years after the East Timor crisis in 1999, another crisis came to East Timor, opening the old wounds again. In April – May 2006 tension was rising in East Timor due to differences within the East Timor Defence Force and East Timor’s government under Prime Minister Marie Alkatiri. The tension climaxed with the sacking of around 500 soldiers. Immediately the soldiers ran away to the jungle carrying all their equipment and weapons, creating the most serious crisis since 1999.

Apparently the main issue was concerned with the unfair treatment towards soldiers that came from the western side of East Timor. These soldiers were thought to be associated with the pro-integration militias in 1999. Soon after the soldiers were dismissed, armed conflicts erupted in many areas. East Timor became engulfed with violence as bad as 1999 crisis. Nevertheless this time, the crisis was a major blow for Australia.

After promoting the frame that the Indonesian military was solely responsible for the crisis in 1999, Australia now faced a crisis that was fueled and sparked from within East Timor society itself. The frame of horizontal conflict - that there were roots of conflict
within East Timor society that were dismissed in 1999, now suddenly came out in the open.717 Suddenly Australia had to backtrack on its frame as ‘local super power’ as the condition of East Timor were clearly beyond control.718

For Australian newspapers, such a situation was like a reversal of the 1999 crisis. Instead of being perceived as hero and liberator719, Australia now had to act as a forced mediator to restore law and order.720 As in 1999, Australia now saw no other option than to send their troops but the situation was now completely different. A description is given by Paul Kelly:

AUSTRALIA’S necessary military intervention in East Timor is now hostage to the political divisions and constitutional deadlock that have been played out during the past week. This should end the romantic and unrealistic view of East Timor that has shaped Australia’s public debate since the 1975 Indonesian invasion, driven relentlessly by Australia’s media. The ministries in Jakarta will be rocking with laughter this week. In seven short years East Timor has ceased to be Indonesia’s problem and has become Australia’s problem. 721

Seven years since Australian newspapers and officials promoted the frames of historical links, the emergency situation and regional security, the frame is now being put under scrutiny. This time the ‘romantic and unrealistic view of East Timor’ as Paul Kelly described has disappeared. Instead Australia now faced a long commitment of a country riven with horizontal conflict that could turn violent any time. Unlike before, Australia, including the press and government, did not have Indonesia as the main scapegoat to demonize – the cause and root of the problem now appeared to lie within East Timor itself - something that was rejected by the frames promoted in 1999.

7.5.2. East Timorese as sources.
The crisis in East Timor in 1999 was allegedly about the East Timorese. In December 1998, the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, wrote to the Indonesia’s President BJ Habibie to find a solution for East Timor. PM Howard claimed that his letter was merely asking for Indonesia to be ‘more lenient’ towards East Timor. President Habibie instead replied by suddenly announcing that he was willing to grant East Timorese special autonomy within Indonesia. Refusal of the autonomy offer would result, however, in a managed transition to independence.

In term of the frame, the offer of autonomy suggested by President Habibie was to the people of East Timor. As the referendum was essentially a survey of popular opinion, the main focus was on the people of East Timor. Later as the media picked up the stories of the referendum, the issue of the East Timorese became more prominent in the Australian and Indonesian media. Nevertheless in both Australia and Indonesia, the focus on East Timor and its people was different.

For Australian newspapers, out of the issues concerning East Timorese, the process of referendum, violence and forced displacement, the latter took the priority. For Indonesian newspapers, the referendum process had a higher priority as well as the stories on the efforts to bring peace and conflict resolution. For the latter, again Australian newspapers did not perceive that as an important issue.

The East Timor crisis in 1999 fitted in perfectly to the Australian media format. Over the time I was studying journalism in Australia I found there was almost an obsession within the Australian media (and the people too) with human interest stories especially with anything that closely related with Australian society. The newspapers often carries headlines such as “Wollongong man injured in an accident” which turned out to be a story of a man involved in a common traffic
accident in Indonesia. But what makes it different is because there is an Australian involved with it.

Six years after East Timor crisis I witnessed another kind of 'hysteria' fueled by the Australian media. Soon after the December 26th 2004 tsunami, the world including Australia learned that Aceh, a province of Indonesia was the hardest hit area with the number of victim rising by thousands every day. Although there were no Australians in Aceh at the time, the emotion stirred from seeing the footage of the tragedy was so great that Australian public end up donating millions of dollars. In a concert for charity Australians, from school children to celebrities donated anything from milk money to thousands of dollars.

Being Indonesian the tsunami tragedy struck me hard. When I went to Jakarta in January 2005, I saw massive reportage in the Indonesian media about the tsunami. Then I realized how differently the story was represented. For Australian society, it was clear that what connected them to the tsunami tragedy were the reports from the Australian Defence Forces, Red Cross and volunteers—all Australians, who went to Aceh and gave dramatic impression of the tragedy. For Indonesian, the tragedy was presented as a tragedy in the family where all family members came together and quietly helped each other out. For the Australian media what was important was the role of individual Australians in Aceh. For Indonesian, what important was how the community could be mobilized to help more.

Peter White has noted that society perceives what is considered important by measuring the event against the values of the society itself. The values of the society are a reflection of the society itself and some values are more fundamental than others. This will be reflected in what is transcribed by the society in the daily interaction. That events in East Timor are reflected differently by Australian and Indonesian newspapers is not surprising as the two societies are two distinctly different societies.

In this context, when we examine East Timorese as sources, the deep frame is not about just what was said in the newspapers at that particular time. Instead, I believe that the number of East Timorese used as sources in comparison to the total articles published will show the deep frame. To be able to look what is the deep frame, we need to look to the data collected and presented in Chapter 6.
In Table 2, the data shows that the average East Timorese quoted as sources is quite low, less than 10 per cent. The exceptions were Republika and Media Indonesia. These papers quoted pro-integration supporters to a significant degree. This tendency, which might regarded as biased towards certain groups, was readily admitted by the newspapers.729

Both newspapers admitted that the connection with Indonesia that was shown by the pro-integration groups was a factor underpinning the support given by those newspapers.730

The argument here is that in the terms of East Timorese as sources, there was a tendency to downplay the importance of the East Timorese. Both Australian and Indonesian newspapers (except for Republika and Media Indonesia) showed little interest in drawing on the East Timorese as sources.

In a classic movie – The Seven Samurai by Akira Kurosawa, many people thought that the central role and the winners in the movie were the Samurai that were hired by the villagers. I remember seeing the movie with a hall full of people who cherished the moment when the Samurai finally defeated the bandits that were attacking the villages. Instead, the real reality was put in context when the head of the Samurai said: “It’s not the samurai that wins. It’s the peasants, the villagers that hired them that win”.

For me East Timor is like the movie. Various parties and nations claimed that they were helping the East Timorese. Even the Indonesian used the same reason in 1975 when they invaded East Timor. But in the end the reality was that the East Timorese were just pawns in a bigger political game.731

This finding contradicts the frames promoted (officially) by both the Australian and Indonesian governments. Both governments always insisted that the main issue was not about East Timor as land but about the people. PM Howard’s letter to President Habibie in December 1998 was allegedly urging Indonesia to treat the East Timorese people better. During the campaign and preparation for the referendum, the issue often promoted was the future of the East Timorese. Then when the UN and Australia became involved
militarily, the frame promoted was to save the East Timorese from the rampaging pro-
Indonesian militias.

At the height of tension between Australia and Indonesia over East Timor, most Indonesians did
not believe that Australia's motivation to 'save' East Timor was just a humanitarian issue. Many
commentators in the Indonesian newspapers were accusing Australia of wanting to reap benefits
from East Timor's gas and oil. Other commentators claimed that Australia wanted to build
military bases in East Timor to be used as defensive 'forts' in case of Indonesian invasion.

The point here is that between Australian and Indonesian society, apparently very little
understanding existed despite the long contacts between the two societies. What seems to be
flourishing well is the prejudice and wariness that one country might invade the other. In the
present day the issue has changed into terrorism where Indonesia being accused to be harboring
anti-Australian terror groups simply because the majority of Indonesian people are Muslims. A
ridiculous perception in my opinion but that was the reality. The result is the same: there is little
trust or understanding within the two societies and that has made it easy to spark a possible
conflict between Australia and Indonesia.772

Figures presented in Chapter 6 show that the East Timorese had relatively little
importance as sources. Even when they were quoted, there were also tendencies to quote
more from groups that were perceived to more 'accessible' or 'friendlier' to specific
media (such as pro-integration towards Indonesian journalists and the pro-independence
towards western journalists). So there was an imbalance between promoted frames and
the reality.

The reality here is that within that time frame, when the media have a significant amount
of energy and space focused on a single issue, the East Timorese have little direct
representation. Even when there was direct representation (as sources), there were
tendencies to favour certain groups. The papers which demonstrated this tendency most
clearly were Republika and Media Indonesia.
We might conclude then, first, that there is little direct representation of East Timorese (as sources). This brings up the question of whether the frames promoted by both the Australian and Indonesian governments and media represent the actual concern regarding the people of East Timor. Second there is a tendency within Australian and Indonesian newspapers of bias towards certain groups. The bias was more visible in certain Indonesian newspapers. Third, the low numbers of East Timorese used as sources also raises the question of what kind of social construction of reality being created here. In comparison, sources coming from both Australian and Indonesian societies were more significant than the numbers of East Timorese used as sources. This aspect will be discussed in detail later.

7.5.3. Australian and Indonesian citizens as sources.

Data from Chapter 6 shows that Australian and Indonesian citizens were used significantly as sources during the East Timor crisis. In fact, both Australian and Indonesian newspapers quoted their own citizens much more frequently than they quoted the East Timorese. As explained above, this raises the question of what kind of social construction of reality is being created here?

Sources play an important role in news and the ‘reality’ that is created (O'Connor, 2000, Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Wolfsfeld, 2003b, Bennet, 1983, Gans, 1999, Goodhart, 2004, Said, 1980). By emphasizing sources within their own society, while the main story is
regarding a different society, there is a danger that the focus may not be grounded in what the papers claim to be their news focus.

The finding in Chapter 6 has clearly challenged the frame that East Timorese were the focus of the news. In Table 2, it was clear that there were more Indonesian or Australian people used as sources than the East Timorese. The media claimed that their focus is the plight of the East Timorese, but they were clearly presenting their stories based upon the information coming from their own citizens.

On the surface the frames from Australian and Indonesian sources were different but not by much. Australian newspapers put much emphasis on the escalating violence and efforts to save the East Timorese. As a consequence of these frames, increasingly negative perceptions developed towards Indonesia and there were demands to send Australian troops in order to resurrect the law and order in East Timor. Indonesian newspapers also put emphasis on the escalating violence especially after the announcement of the referendum result on September 1st. But this frame later was sidelined with the frame of increasingly hostile international pressure towards Indonesia. When the INTERFET was formed, the frame was dominantly about the role of Australia in the process of creating the INTERFET and the subsequent deployment of INTERFET.

In my opinion the East Timor crisis in 1999 is a good example of how little Australia and Indonesia know and understand each other as societies. During the six years I lived in Australia, I found Australian society to be generally caring and even passionate towards human rights issues. On the other hand, the history and the belief in Indonesia in human rights lies with the communal life, and is contradictory with the individual human rights as understood in Australia.

Unfortunately instead of prompting a search for greater understanding the political powers both in Australia and Indonesia seem to use this deep seated animosity and mistrust for their own advantage. After the East Timor crisis in 1999, there have been more cases that amplified the
animosity such as the Schapelle Corby case, The Bali bombing and the case of nine young Australians convicted of drug smugglings in Bali (dubbed as ‘Bali Nine). In these cases, politicians have been quick to use it to amplify fear and ignorance and unfortunately, the media seems to be more than happy to assist.733

The deeper frame presented by Australian and Indonesian citizens is perhaps the key to understand the different perceptions within the two societies. For Australian people, the deeper frame is of panic watching helplessly a crisis unravel at the doorstep of Australia. This feeling of panic was more pronounced with the continuing reminder of ‘the debt to the East Timor people in World War 2’ and (to a limited scale) the death of five journalists working for Australian media in 1975.

For Indonesian people, the deeper frame is perhaps disbelief at the way things were unravelling in East Timor, and the consequences for Indonesia. This deep frame was later replaced by sense of nationalism triggered by the increasing pressure from international community including Australia.734 To make matters worse there is a strong bias and prejudice that existed within Australian press in their perception of Indonesia.735 Lowe understands the problem in this way:

But their construction of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines is weighted heavily on the downside of life in the life of those countries. It describes these countries as appearing to falter in their quest for modernity, prosperity and brutality, danger and disappointment. The negative news focus may be partly been result of habit. Insurgency, disasters, repressive politicians and sleaze have been loud themes in International news media coverage of South East Asia for decades. It seems difficult for media gate keepers to refocus on other issues. The innate conservatism of news production practice determines that they keep doing things the traditional way, until they are confronted with compelling reasons to look for new issues.736

Thus the deeper frames or the social construction of reality within Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports about the East Timor crisis present something quite profound. The social reality constructed here represents something fundamental within
the societies in their relations with the media. This will be the core concept to be presented by this thesis.

7.5.4. Press as sources.

As sources, the press played a limited role during the East Timor crisis but this does not mean that it played an insignificant role. Findings in Chapter 6 show that as an openly attributed sources the press was less often quoted than other sources. Nevertheless, two Indonesian newspapers *Kompas* and *Suara Pembaruan* quoted other press institutions (news agencies) quite significantly. It is also interesting to note that both newspapers have been perceived to be the most neutral in their reporting about East Timor crisis.\textsuperscript{737}

Though the findings in Chapter 6 may show that the press as source was not as significant a source compared to other sources, there are still important findings. First, two Indonesian newspapers (*Kompas* & *Suara Pembaruan*) relied significantly on and quoted other press institutions. Second, it is possible that newspapers analysed here based their reports upon other press but did not mention their sources clearly in their articles.

Regarding the first finding, the only explanation is that both *Kompas* and *Suara Pembaruan* probably took the view that they should present the issue of the East Timor crisis from various angles, and news agency reports provided a way of doing this. The other two Indonesian newspapers, *Media Indonesia* and *Republika*, openly stated that
they perceived information sourced from non-Indonesian sources was biased and so they avoid using them as sources.\textsuperscript{738}

For the Australian press, the sentiment also involved media ego. Both The Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian had journalists on the ground in East Timor (until they were pulled out due to escalating violence). Having their own journalists on the ground in East Timor provided both newspapers with fresh reports from the front line and made it unnecessary to have to rely on secondary sources, unlike the Indonesian newspapers.

Having a journalist in the ground of East Timor may not mean that the issue of media ego was resolved. Foreign journalists often worked under the principle that their job was to report what’s happening as they saw it. On one hand this is a well established function of journalism. But on the other hand, did the journalist present the issue in a ‘fair’ manner – which means giving enough depth of coverage to all sides reported. During the East Timor crisis, one of the major criticism from the Indonesian side was that foreign press (including Australian press) downplayed or even omitted the fact that Indonesia had been supporting and working hard in East Timor to improve the standard of living.

The reports of AKSARA Foundation highlighted the issue:

> In accusations against international press coverage of Indonesia, a common complaint was the lack of attention given to the development which had occurred in East Timor during its tenure as Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province. Many members of the Indonesian community felt that the international press excessively dwelt on the people killed during Indonesia’s initial annexation of the territory while ignoring the roads, schools and churches built by the Indonesian government.

> When asked about this lack of attention, several members of the international press stated, “Well that isn’t news. We were reporting on what was occurring, as it was occurring.” They also felt that the violence that occurred during the Indonesia’s annexation of the province and the years of
intimidation suffered at the hands of the Indonesian military were far more relevant in explaining why the Timorese voted for independence than Indonesia’s development of the province. For Indonesian newspapers, even before the violence escalated (after the referendum result announcements), they already had difficulties in fielding and maintaining their own journalists in East Timor. The difficulty is basically operational: the Indonesian media often lack the financial power to send their own journalists over an extended time even within Indonesia. For instance, when SWA business magazines (the leading business magazine in Indonesia) sent their journalists to other areas, they often had to rely on airline tickets provided by airline companies as barter with advertisement space. Other arrangements were dependent on ‘fully covered’ invitations.

The economic crisis in 1997 made this situation even worse. When the East Timor crisis broke out in 1999, many Indonesian newspapers had to rely on the Indonesian news agency ANTARA as the source of news. Otherwise, Indonesian newspapers had to rely on ‘official visits’ to East Timor by Indonesian officials. These circumstances made the position of Indonesian journalists very difficult at times. It is best illustrated by reference to the situation faced by Republika.

Nurul Hamami, Republika’s editor responsible for East Timor, confirmed the difficulty of access to East Timorese sources. Republika sent reporters to East Timor on three occasions to cover the referendum and on two of these occasions, the reporter were part of an official TNI delegation, staying at the military headquarters. Arriving with TNI made it very difficult for them to get access to the pro-independence side, he stated. He also admitted that Republika has the reputation of being closely affiliated with the Indonesian government at the time and as such, was viewed with suspicion by the pro-independence movement.

Press sources played a more limited role during the East Timor crisis, in particular when the violence barred most journalists (especially foreign journalists) from reporting.
directly from East Timor. But the issue is far more complex than that. Some Indonesian newspapers felt that they had to deliberately avoid using foreign press agencies as sources as they perceived these agencies to be biased against Indonesia.743 At the same time, some other Indonesian newspapers seemed not to have the same difficulty.744

Nevertheless behind the biased or nationalistic rhetoric, for practical reasons Indonesian papers must have used other press as sources. Republika admitted openly that they could send journalists only three times into the field and they were not stationed East Timor745. The lack of financial resources meant it would be difficult for Indonesian media to maintain a continuous presence in East Timor, unlike their foreign counterparts. So in order to maintain the news flow in particular during the peak of the crisis (after the referendum result announcement), the Indonesian press must have used press services as sources.

It is possible that the agency or service they relied on was the Indonesian news agency – ANTARA. Established in 1937 to counter the Dutch Colonial Press Agency, ANTARA is the government sanctioned news agency.746 Even today, ANTARA is still maintained (though not reporting to) by the secretary of state office.747 Its journalists are technically state employees. ANTARA is the largest media institution in Indonesia and naturally it was able to maintain its presence in East Timor during the crisis.

During the East Timor crisis, naturally ANTARA was one of the major news sources for Indonesian newspapers.748 Unfortunately, during the crisis, ANTARA was also accused
for often being biased towards Indonesia (particularly the frame promoted by Indonesian officials). This led to the perception of Indonesian newspaper reports being low in quality and accuracy.749

For the Australian press, the East Timor crisis is a major issue for various reasons. First it’s about history: about how the East Timorese helped defend Australia in World War 2 and then how five journalists working for the Australian media were killed there in 1975. Second is the issue of politics: Australia was the major supporter for Indonesia in annexing East Timor in 1975. Third, the East Timor Crisis presented a major humanitarian crisis right at the doorstep of Australia.

Given these reasons, it is easy to see why the East Timor crisis was a big issue for the Australian press. The Australian media sent as many journalists as they could to cover the issue (either from print or broadcast media). With correspondents on the ground, the Australian media did not need to rely on secondary sources in the way the Indonesian papers did.

The huge amount of attention given to the East Timor crisis also brought out the issue of media bias. The Indonesian people and media have often accused the Australian media of bias towards the idea of independence (of East Timor) and the supporters of the idea (including FALINTIL and FRETILIN). The bias is particularly visible in terms of the amount of coverage given to the pro-independence supporters and their positive representation of the pro-independence forces.750 The positive perception (seen as
outward support) by the Australian media towards East Timor's independence was alleged to be the deep frame within Australian media reports of East Timor's crisis. In other words, the Indonesian press and society had the perception that the Australian press were supporting the independence of East Timor all along instead of acting as neutral observers.

7.5.5. The issue of un-attributed sources.

The Watergate scandal was probably the best example of the usage of un-attributed source (at that time). Two Washington Post journalists followed up a story that there was a possibility that the Republican Party was spying on Democrat Party. Part of the story concerned a break in at a Democrat Party office in Washington which led to the accusation of spying. The investigation later led to a serious allegation that the spying was directed by the most senior level of the Republican Party. When the story was published it created a scandal that led eventually to President Nixon's resignation. The issue here is that the two journalists who broke the story based their story by information coming from a un-attributed source, nicknamed 'Deep Throat'.

The case cited above show that usage of un-attributed sources can be a very serious issue. It turned out the information the journalists published was correct. Nevertheless the impact was far reaching creating huge fame for the media and journalists that broke the
story. For journalists sometimes, the hunger for the fame which also creates publicity for
their publication, encourages the attention on ‘breaking stories’.

An un-attributed source may be used when there was no other means available, and the
story has an overwhelming significance that such means are necessary to tell the news.
Again the classic example is the Woodward and Bernstein famous source – ‘The Deep
Throat’. Woodward and Bernstein agreed never to disclose the identity of this source
unless the source itself did – something which happened 30 years later. In this classic
case, Woodward and Bernstein were able to use such arrangements partly due their
strong evidence (which was also attributed to this ‘un-attributed’ source). Their action
was vindicated and they gained fame and recognition for themselves and their
newspaper. But then the question that arises is what if the information from the source
was wrong?

Ideally, any journalists should never take information given to them at face value.\textsuperscript{752}
Standard journalism practice is to verify all information with other sources or means
before publicizing it.\textsuperscript{753} Unfortunately even the most well known newspapers or
magazines in the world may not be free from publishing wrong information.\textsuperscript{754}

In Table 2, within Australian newspapers there are a significant number of reports that
utilize un-attributed sources. Ethically and legally, this is not a serious issue as in
Australia, as long as the reports are correct in content. It is not compulsory to name the
sources. A similar position regarding this issue was the case in Indonesia. Nevertheless the practice has serious implications for media credibility.

As explained and illustrated above, un-attributed sources may pose serious problems as well as presenting the possibility of publishing important information without endangering the source. But in the East Timor crisis, at its peak, it was apparent that un-attributed sources played a significant role in Australian newspapers reports (Table 2). On the other hand, Indonesian newspapers used un-attributed sources significantly less.


As I have argued and described in this and previous chapters, the media are an instrument of the society that creates a particular ‘construction of reality’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, McCullagh, 2002). But it is important to understand that media does not dominate as a source of ‘social construction of reality’. Nevertheless media is an important source especially due to its function and ability to create and convey news.

The social construction of reality is an important part of the society as it is the part that defines what counts as knowledge for the society. During the East Timor crisis in 1999, both Australian and Indonesian newspapers were presenting different social constructions of reality. This should not come as a surprise as both societies are inherently different. Both Australian and Indonesian society perceived the situation
differently according to their own history, and the social and political situation at that time.

What makes understanding the social construction of reality important here is the fact that it was created by the media - in this case newspapers. The media here have successfully created and circulated their social construction of reality to their own societies. The evidence for this lies in the increasing attention given by the media to the crisis, and the range of opinions within the newspapers as the crisis unfolded. It shows how both Australian and Indonesian societies perceived the media to be a valid channel to present their views. In the end, even the political actors (Australian and Indonesian governments) had no other option than to listen to increasing voice of concern presented by the media.

As described earlier as well, Gadi Wolfsfeld has argued that each political conflict is unique. In the case of the East Timor crisis, the conflict is mainly about meaning – how the conflict was to be understood at the cultural level. The newspapers from both Australia and Indonesia did their best to define the crisis according to the cultural language available and meaningful for them.

In the end, the result of this political conflict amounts to a culturally subjective interpretation of the crisis. I argue that what was represented as a conflict over the fate of East Timor and its people, ended up as a conflict over subjective meaning within Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Thus the issue of East Timor, though still central,
was in fact sidelined in favour of the issue of how Australia and Indonesia perceived each other in this conflict. The theoretical principles I draw out of this examination are as follows:

- The frames found within Australian and Indonesian newspapers during the East Timor crisis in 1999 were a reflection of how Australian and Indonesian societies perceived the conflict and not just means by the newspapers to 'reach out' to their readers.
- The representation of particular realities created by Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports are distortions of reality. The representations or construction of events mirrored both society’s perceptions over the issues and were informed by the history, social, political and cultural situation at that time.
- The reason why such contradictory perceptions over the East Timor crisis exist is because the promoted frames or the social construction of realities created were able to connect with the deep meaning or beliefs existing within Australian and Indonesian society.
- The existence of this deeper level of meaning or belief made the issue become strongly contested as it is based upon something deeply believed in both societies.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

Starting in Chapter 1, a quest was started to understand the different perspectives about the East Timor crisis as presented within Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports from August 1 - October 1, 1999. The quest is about to come an end, with many significant findings and new understandings revealed about the Australian and Indonesian media during and about the East Timor crisis. However, before we arrive at the final conclusion, we are going to review the quest briefly.

8.1. Theoretical review.

Susan Sontag, an American essayist, in her book On Photography, said that photography is a distortion of reality. A picture, she said, only captured a fraction of a second of what was going on in front of the camera. A picture may present only the best the moment can provide such as a smiling family where everything looks ‘happy’ and ‘normal’. However, the picture may not be able tell of the quarrel between brothers and sisters just prior the picture, or of the disharmony between father and mother. The picture, she claimed, deceived us as it only presented what we wanted to see from the point of view of the creator.
News, like photography, presents us with a description of a fraction of the moment deemed important enough by the journalists to pass on to their readers/viewers. In fact, news presented through the medium of photography now has its own title - photojournalism. Still, the essence of news is telling or informing the readers/viewers of what happened within a specific moment at a specific time and place. What Susan Sontag said regarding photography as a distortion of reality even applies to news.

As a distortion of reality, news just presents us with a fraction of the information. It is through understanding the greater context that we can de-construct the reality to give us a better understanding of the reality being presented. In order to do so with news reports about the East Timor crisis, the framing method was applied as the research method of this thesis. The framing approach is based upon the concept that the media functions like a gateway, selecting the information to be passed on to the audience, or in the context of this thesis, to society.

By selecting the information to be passed on, often defined as ‘gate keeping’, the media are conducting a process that re-constructs reality into something more in-line with the media’s perception. In order to do so, the media are not just selecting but also presenting the information they select in a certain manner so that it will be understood in the way the media would like. The process of presenting information in a specific manner in order to create a new understanding is the basic concept of ‘framing’.
In this thesis, framing is the basic method used in order to understand the studies that were conducted on the Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports of the East Timor crisis in 1999. Framing is deemed the most suitable method for analysis as it is designed to give a greater understanding about the meaning of the message presented in the reports. Framing does that by placing the reports within a certain context, thus grounding the message from a conceptual and abstract level to a level from which the event can be understood as it is and not as it was projected.

By grounding the information presented, the distortion that was part of the news can be minimized and a better understanding of the actual event can be uncovered. In this thesis, the grounding process focused exclusively on the text of the newspaper reports. The reason for this is that the news text itself is the message that needs to be grounded and de-constructed in order to free it from distortion and to be able understand the greater meaning of the message.

8.2. Focus of Study & Research Methodologies.

The difficulty in conducting the research as outlined by the theory above is that the East Timor crisis represents a very complex issue. It relates to a history of 24 years of conflict if the time frame starts at the Indonesian invasion in December 1975. It could also relate to the history of East Timor under the occupation of Portugal for 400 years, which gives East Timor a distinct identity compared to the rest of the region colonized by the Dutch or British. However, it could also relate to the political hegemony of the past 30 years.
with the Cold War as the bigger context. It also could be understood through the perceptions Australia and Indonesia have of their positions in the region, their own histories and the way the two societies looked upon themselves and each other. All of the possibilities mentioned are just examples and in no way represent all the issues related to East Timor.

To analyze the East Timor crisis in 1999 by looking at all possible issues would be an extensive and complex task. Thus, it was decided to put the analysis in the context of the societies of Australia and Indonesia and in the way the societies perceived the East Timor crisis. As this thesis is about journalism, the focus of the study is limited to the Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports of the crisis written between August 1st – October 1st, 1999.

The rationale for the selection of this time frame is because August 1st marked the start of the campaign for the referendum, and October 1st marked the time when the INTERFET took over control in East Timor. Thus, October 1st is significant as it effectively denoted the end of Indonesia’s control over East Timor. Nevertheless, this time frame still yielded almost 2000 articles and covered a very wide range of issues. Therefore it was not feasible to cover everything within the scope of this thesis. Therefore, further re-focusing was necessary to narrow down the study without sacrificing the quality.

The re-focusing of the study was conducted in several steps. The first one focused the research onto the text of the newspapers. As suggested by the framing approach, it is
completely possible to understand the underlying messages by putting the reports within more global parameters such as article size and placement as advised by Robert Entman. Because of this, Entman’s approach is used in this research, but only to a limited extent.

Due to limited resources on the researcher’s side, Australian newspaper articles had to be obtained using electronic means. As such, it was not possible to analyze them using the full method advised by Entman. This condition also prevented the full analysis of Indonesian newspaper articles using Entman’s method as it would not provide equal comparisons with the Australian newspaper analyses. However, the Entman approach gave a significant advantage in that it was able to give a much clearer methodology for analyzing frames as demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5.

Robert Entman’s frame analysis method is considered to be the most systematic in analysing frames (McCullagh, 2002) but in this thesis, it was deemed insufficient to rely only on the Entman method of analysis. In this thesis, frames are perceived as a part of a very complex process of social interactions within a society and as such, require further analysis in order to be fully understood.

In order to meet the requirements of a more thorough analysis, a further two methods for frame analysis were employed, each focusing on different aspects within the frames. The first method other than Entman’s was from Peter White. White has done extensive research upon the usage of English grammar in conveying specific messages, or frames.
within news reports. White argues that, in the English language, the news process from selection to presentation is not a random occurrence, but part of a complex social order. White then devised methods that allow researchers to analyse the content and see the representation of social order in news reports. As White’s method is based upon language, in this case English, his method is focused very much upon language usage.

In the context of this thesis, there are two different languages within the news reports being analysed: Indonesian and English. Although White’s method was devised for the English language, its main focus is on the content of the language reflected in the structure of the news reports. As such, it is deemed suitable to analyse news reports in languages other than English, in this case Indonesian, as the researcher here can understand both languages as required by White’s method.

The other method of analysis used to analyse frames in this thesis was the method devised by Gadi Wolfsfeld. Wolfsfeld is a professor from Israel who has done major studies regarding the representation of conflicts in the Middle East in the news media. Like White and Entman, Wolfsfeld found that the news reports represent a certain kind of social order but unlike the other two, Wolfsfeld focused his studies on the political context of the frames that he analysed. As his studies were conducted on news media reports about conflicts, Wolfsfeld came to the conclusion that conflicting news media reports during conflict actually represent a latent political conflict, which became the focus of his analysis.
The three methods of analysing frames as outlined above are used in this thesis as it was
decided that no single method of analysis would be able to give comprehensive
understandings of frames. All three complemented each other as each focused on
different aspects of frames not analysed by the other methods. The usage and results of
these methods were presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

Frame analysis methods, such as the one created by Robert Entman, were indeed very
versatile, very systematic analytical methods771, but as it was noted in Chapters 1 and 2,
it was not possible to utilize the Entman method fully due to the limitation of materials.
Nevertheless, the Entman method also has a significant drawback as it is possible to fall
into the trap of quantifying a very abstract concept such as frames, thus eliminating the
possibility of understanding the frames better in a holistic approach.

By quantifying the data, for instance by separating based on the size of the articles, I was
afraid that the data would be forced to fit into a specific category instead of being
allowed to release all its salient information. Thus, it was deemed necessary to employ
another research method that complemented the framing methods of analysis. The
method chosen was Grounded Theory as first formulated by Glaser and Strauss.772

The other frame analysis methods used from Wolfsfeld773 and White774 placed emphasis
in understanding the salient or hidden message of the news stories by understanding them
through the context or the structure of the language. As such, these methods are actually
very much in line with the concept of grounded theory because they ground the news stories by placing them in their contexts as their means of analysis.

The second step in re-focusing this study was to direct the research to concentrate on specific events. As described earlier, to explain or analyze every single report regarding East Timor would be impractical in the limited space of this thesis, due to the number of the articles and the wide range of topics covered. Instead, several events will be selected as case studies to exemplify the way Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the East Timor crisis. The criteria for the case studies were that the event must have been considered significantly important to have been reported by the majority of the newspapers analyzed here from both countries. After much deliberation, two topics were selected: the death of the Dutch journalist, Sanders Thoenes, and the issue of the border crossing by INTERFET troops.

The death of Sanders Thoenes was significant due to several factors. First, it was reported widely in both Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Second, it involved the death of a foreign journalist, the only civilian foreigner casualty during the East Timor crisis. Thoenes’ status as both a foreigner and a journalist were of interest here. Third, as shown in Chapter 1, this case showed the significantly different perceptions and representations within Australian and Indonesian newspapers over the East Timor crisis.

The issue of a border crossing by INTERFET troops was also considered significant enough to be analysed here due several factors. First, the issue was widely reported in
both Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Second, the crossing of any border of any sovereign country in the world by armed foreign troops without the permission of the country whose border is being breached, represents a possible trigger for war. Third, the statement about the possible border crossing was made by a very high ranking Australian official, Australian Defence Force chief General Michael Moore. This issue caused confusion over the mandate of the INTERFET as well as the intentions of Australia towards Indonesia. Fourth, this case provided a good sample of the controversy surrounding the East Timor crisis that was well reported within both Australian and Indonesian newspapers.

The third step in re-focusing the research was to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports regarding the issues. As explained earlier, the methodology that was used here was based on the framing approach. The framing approach stated that media reports do not merely present us with information based on facts, but they also present us with the packaging through which the information ought to be understood (Mander, 1999, Galtung and Ruge, 1965, Gamson, 1989, Gamson et al., 1992, Gamson, 1992, Goffman, 1974, Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Edelman, 1988, McCullagh, 2002). In other words, media reports do not simply tell us the stories, but they also tell us how to understand them.\textsuperscript{775} To use all the framing methods available was not possible, but realising that the East Timor crisis was unique, I decided to use not a combination of the framing methods of White, Entman and Wolfsfeld.
8.3. Research Findings.

Earlier, the East Timor crisis was explained as a very complex issue. In order to understand the complexity of the issue and to be able to create a thorough understanding, the issue needed to be analysed from various points of view. Each framing method tried to understand a specific event/issue from a particular point of view. For instance, the strength of Robert Entman’s method is its systematic nature and ability to quantify abstract data. Peter White’s method is based in textual analysis. White’s method is able to reflect the state of the mind of the writer of the news reports and the salient meanings within the written texts. Gadi Wolfsfeld’s method is particularly suitable for analysing frames within political and cultural contexts. These three framing analysis methods were the methods I used in analysing the two case studies chosen.

Because this research is in journalism practices and standards, the focus was mainly on the end product of journalism - news reports. As mentioned earlier, the main focus was the text of the news articles within Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports about the East Timor crisis. Accordingly, the selected methods above were applied in understanding the news reports.

In order to analyse the case studies, the methods chosen were used in stages. Each stage used a single method to explain the frames within the news reports by focusing on a different aspect or point of view in reviewing the frames. Each stage also reviewed the frame on different levels, the latter stages related to deeper levels of analysis. I started
with the most obvious approach: analysing the size of the articles, their placements and acknowledgements according to Entman's methods. I then moved to a deeper, much more abstract level which I analysed using White's and Wolfsfeld's methods. As described earlier in Chapters 1, 2, 4 and 5, the reason why such an approach was used here was because it is evident that there is not a single approach that could explain the issue. Also, as I described above, the different approaches actually work in conjunction. As a continuous process, it was necessary to begin from the most obvious level, such as placement, and then move to more abstract or conceptual levels such as cultures as in the Wolfsfeld method.

The first method applied was Robert Entman's. As explained before, Entman's method is deemed to be significant as it was among the first methods that were able to analyse frames in a more systematic, but albeit a more quantitative way. Such a method was very important as it was able to clearly show the frames within the news reports.

Nevertheless, as explained earlier, Entman's method could not be fully applied here because of the limitations within the data collected. The second factor was that Entman's method is based on a quantitative approach which in itself is vulnerable to forced explanation as the data will have to conform to pre-selected theories. Any data that failed to conform would then be considered unusable. This contradicted the principle of this research which was to allow the data to speak for itself in line with the general method employed in this thesis, grounded theory.
The second method applied was the textual analysis method by Peter White. Peter White suggested that within daily news reports there were salient meanings that came out as the writers or journalists wrote their stories. The reason was that journalists are not detached human beings when they write their stories. Journalists are part of a more complex structure called society, for which the stories were written. The concept of journalists being part of society was further discussed, but basically evolves from the concept that news, and in particular frames, are part of a systematic process of creating a sense of ‘reality’ for society. This concept is based on the theory by Max Weber and later evolved into the concept mentioned particularly through the works of Erving Goffman and Peter Berger.

Peter White’s method is in many aspects more meticulous and requires a significant understanding of the usage of language. Understanding the usage of language in order to understand the salient meaning within the news story requires a significant understanding of the way the language is used. This method is significantly more complex than the method proposed by Entman but in my opinion, can also act as a compliment rather than an anti-argument. White suggests that to analyse the frame, we should look at two aspects, the newsworthiness and the voice of the writer within the news reports.

Newsworthiness for White is a significant issue as it defines why such an event is deemed important enough to be known by the general member of society. In other words, with millions of things happening in a single day, it is important to figure out why a specific event warrants the attention and the efforts of both the media and the society.
Central to White's idea is the idea that newsworthiness is actually a reflection of society. Something is deemed newsworthy, White says, when it actually breaches the line of what is considered to be normal by society. Thus, news selection is actually a part of the social process where symbols are created and used to represent a form or reality which is communicated back to that society. This is just like what Max Weber described when he said that society is based upon the understanding of the interactions of social symbols.

Newsworthiness here is perceived as how the society perceived the unfolding events from their point of view. As such, different society will perceived the same event differently as each society has their own particular point of view as shaped by but not limited to their culture, values, law and history. A simple example is when an Australian got into a traffic accident in Bali the newspaper in his/her town will ran a story about him/her. Meanwhile such event may not be perceived as newsworthy by Indonesian media even in Bali where such accidents often happened.

So in this case, newsworthiness is a reflection of each society. What is considered to be newsworthy in Australia may not be perceived as newsworthy. This is a simple case of cultural relativism where things are being perceived differently within different culture. Newsworthy as a parameter based on the perception of the society itself will reflect such differences.
As thorough as Peter White’s method can be in explaining the process of news selection and writings in relation to the salient meanings within the news reports, also known as the frames, it was still deemed insufficient. White’s method is significantly more detailed and deeper in analysis compared to Entman’s method, but still there are some limitations that make the understanding less than complete. The limitations are first, that White’s method relies heavily upon language. Language indeed is a deliberate process where the selection of the words can reflect the mood, intention and intended messages. Nevertheless, understanding the language itself may not be enough to understand the bigger context of the news reports. The language may suggest some meanings, but understanding the bigger context requires a method that was designed to analyse the news as the product of the social process in a broader term.

The second limitation of White’s method is that by relying on written language too much, it may lead to a trap of ‘cultural tolerance’, thus negating the possibility of further analysis as the researcher is already satisfied with their own understanding. An example of this was seen, in Chapter 5, regarding the issue of a border crossing by INTERFET troops. The word, ‘hunt down’ was used in Australian newspapers. Some English-speaking researchers may not see anything wrong with the usage of these words or expressions. Nevertheless, that expression relates to the salient meaning of hunting down prey, normally an animal.

What makes the usage of the term ‘hunt down’ very alarming is that the ‘prey’ in the articles, consisted of pro-integration militias composed of humans. Thus, although such
an expression is in fact very strong, someone from an English speaking background may see the usage of the expression, though not regular, as something not unusual in daily situations.

Further deliberation in Chapter 5 showed that the usage of term ‘hunt down’ was deliberate in the sense that it was chosen consciously by the writer. In fact, as White’s method revealed, the usage of the term actually reflected the mood at that time, particularly within the Australian press, that viewed the pro-integration militias as dangerous people who wanted to harm them.

It was also found that prior to the arrival of INTERFET troops, the pro-integration militias had often threatened journalists, particularly foreign journalists, in a very violent manner. There were many accounts in Australian newspapers where the militias directly threatened journalists. As such, it created an atmosphere of fear so that when the situation was turned for the benefit of the Australian press, such euphoria was clearly conveyed in the reports. In this context, the usage of the term, ‘hunt down’ can be seen as an expression of vengeance towards the militias.

This leads us to the final method used in analysing the study cases, the political contest model from Gadi Wolfsfeld. Wolfsfeld argues that in a political contest between two parties or countries, the media plays a major role. The media, Wolfsfeld argues, can influence the way the world views the conflict, but its most important function is to
convince the societies involved of the justness of both the conflict and the position that they have taken.

The East Timor crisis in 1999 was a political conflict that involved many parties: Indonesia as the de facto ruler; Portugal as the ruler prior to 1975; the United Nations as the mediating party between Indonesia and Portugal; the organizations in East Timor that fought for independence; Australia as a neighbour of Indonesia and the forward base of UN operations in East Timor in 1999. Although many parties were involved, this research focused mainly upon the political conflict between Australia and Indonesia that occurred during the East Timor crisis in 1999.

The political conflict between Australia and Indonesia over East Timor was what Wolfsfeld described as a conflict over meaning. In the beginning, Australia was not a major player in the East Timor issue, though it was PM John Howard’s letter to President Habibie in December 1998 that led to Habibie’s decision to grant East Timor a referendum to choose whether or not they wanted to part of Indonesia with special autonomy. If the first option had been rejected, the UN would have taken over East Timor to prepare it to become an independent country. Even when Indonesia signed the agreement regarding the referendum, it was between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN. Australia was not formally involved except that it was used as a staging base for UN operations in East Timor. This lasted until East Timor ceased to be part of Indonesia.
Australia became involved with the East Timor crisis after most foreign journalists and UN staff were expelled from East Timor following the announcement of the referendum's results on September 4th, 1999. The reason for this was that the pro-integration supporters went on rampages that became out of control, endangering the safety of the UN staff and foreign journalists. The news of the crisis shocked the world, but it was in Australia where the news was received with very strong reactions.

Australia, as a nation, believes that it esteems the noble value of humanity as in the UN charter. Such beliefs were evident in many cases when looking at the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. In 1997-8, when an economic crisis hit Indonesia, Australia quickly lent $1 billion of aid. In December 2004, when tsunami waves destroyed the Indonesian province of Aceh, Australia became one of the first foreign nations to send help and became the largest donor with at least $1 billion raised from the Australian government and public. However, in 1999 the reports of the suffering of the East Timorese civilians re-opened the claim that Australia owed East Timor their independence. During World War II in 1942 – 1945, East Timor played a major role in protecting Australia from the invasion of Japanese imperial forces. Thousands of East Timorese fought alongside the Australian forces and later, when Japanese forces overtook East Timor, thousands became victims because of their role in defying the invaders.

This sentiment, combined with the news reports of frightened East Timorese civilians, touched deep emotions in the Australian public. However, the news reports themselves
were not the sole reason for the strong reaction from Australian society. In 1975, five journalists working for the Australian media were killed in East Timor, allegedly by Indonesian forces that were invading East Timor at that time (Ball and McDonald, 2000, Subroto, 1997, Conboy, 2003). Their deaths were never fully investigated which created a conspiracy theory alleging that the Australian and Indonesian governments covered up the truth. In 1999, ironically, the former Indonesian officer accused of being directly involved with the death of the five journalists, General Yunus Yosfiah, was the Indonesian minister for information.

Besides the sentiment of the World War II 'debt' and the death of journalists working for the Australia media, Australia was also the base for many East Timorese independence movements. Many of East Timor’s independence activists, like Jose Ramos Horta, took asylum in Australia after the Indonesian invasion in 1975. Though the Australian government officially supported Indonesian annexation of East Timor, many Australian citizens became supporters of East Timor’s right to independence.

When the violence escalated in East Timor after the announcement of the referendum on September 4th, the Australian media immediately seized it as a valuable commodity. As a news event, East Timor was priceless. Here, the media had a situation that could be easily presented in a good-versus-evil context where a long oppressed society suddenly found their chance for freedom. At the same time, this freedom was being held hostage by brutal hoodlums working for the oppressor. It was almost like scene from a classic
movie where the good guys finally, with the help of heroes from the outside, overcame the evil oppressor.

For the Australian media, the perception was almost as simple or even as naïve as that. In general, the Australian media genuinely believed that they were working for a noble cause – helping the poor and long oppressed East Timorese to become an independent nation. On the other hand, for the Indonesian media, as explained in previous chapters, the situation was the opposite and much more complex.

Indonesia, by 1999, had just experienced a very traumatic transfer of power, a bloody revolution. In 1998, a severe economic crisis crippled the Indonesian economy. Within months, thing went from bad to worse, culminating in May riots in Jakarta. Then, because of the combination of pressure from the public, students and public officials, President Soeharto stepped down on May 21, 1998. This effectively ended the New Order regime but it came with heavy price as thousands of people were killed during the process, mostly in the riots.

For the Indonesian media, the end of the New Order was the start of a new era. The subsequent government starting from President Habibie declared and kept their promise to give freedom of speech and freedom of press. Unfortunately, as in any rapid change, this new-found freedom was not yet supported by the available infrastructure, man power or culture of the press. Therefore, while theoretically the Indonesian press had become a
free press with the end of the New Order, it still would take some time until the Indonesian press could fully utilise their new-found freedom and power.

While changes were taking place in the social, political and cultural fronts in Indonesia, the East Timor crisis added a new twist to these historical events. The subsequent escalating violence, which was well recorded by the foreign media including Australia, brought international pressure onto Indonesia. Suddenly, Indonesia found itself in the position of a pariah state, something they had never experienced before.

The Indonesian media were then forced into a difficult position. As a free press, they could see how the crisis in East Timor evolved from the very beginning into a major international crisis. The Indonesian media was also well aware of the major political struggle that lay hidden behind the East Timor crisis. Unfortunately, the strong international pressure on Indonesia put the Indonesian media in a dilemma between protecting the facts and defending Indonesia's pride against the onslaught of international condemnation and pressure, seen by some Indonesians as incited by the foreign press.

Finally, after describing the events that preceded and proceeded the East Timor crisis, as well as the salient social and political context behind the events, we finally arrive at the conclusions. The conclusions, presented here in the same structure as the research questions outlined in Chapter 1, are these:
1. The Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports regarding the East Timor crisis, defined here within the time frame of August 1st until October 1st 1999, to an extent represented the Australian and Indonesian societal perceptions of the crisis.

A sample report published during the crisis of the story of Sanders Thoenes described in Chapter 4, showed the differing views of the East Timor crisis. The death of Thoenes, a member of the foreign press, with which the Australian press identified strongly, was described by them in dramatic detail, with a tone of tragedy and accompanied by visible anger towards the pro-integration militias and Indonesia. The Indonesian press, on the contrary, presented the death of Thoenes in detail, but in the way a daily crime was reported- without emotion, with an emphasis on gory details and in an impersonal tone.

In some sense, the story about Sanders Thoenes represented strong emotions, namely a strong sense of justice and an attachment to history as Sanders Thoenes was European and Australians still see themselves as descendants of European people. For Australian newspapers, the reports represented the sentiments of the Australian people at the time: feelings of anger at seeing seemingly helpless East Timorese being terrorized by pro-integration supporters while Indonesian security forces, who were supposed to maintain law and order, stood by and did almost nothing. At the same time, Indonesia was actually bound by an agreement with the UN and Portugal, but the UN was obviously helpless to stop the carnage.
Such strong emotion was also not without contexts; In December 1975, five journalists working for the Australian media were killed during the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. History then recorded that Australia was in fact directly and indirectly involved with the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in that same year. Australia also then became the first country who acknowledged the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. However, at the same time, many East Timorese independence supporters or activists moved to Australia and used Australia as a base to launch their campaigns for the independence of East Timor.

A much stronger context was the frame promoted by some Australian World War II veterans that Australia actually owed its freedom from Japanese occupation to the East Timorese. Another context was how, during the Balkan conflict, especially in Bosnia (1994 – 1996), the UN and Europe were forced to watch the destruction caused by the conflict in agony. In the Balkan conflict, the press strongly reported the massacres conducted right in front of the Western world while they were helpless to come to the aid of the innocent civilian victims.

When Sanders Thoenes was killed, his death became an illustration of the penalty paid for standing by silently and earned him an almost martyr-like fame as he was representing what Australia, as part of the western world, wanted to prevent from happening again.
From the Indonesian newspapers' point of view, Sanders Thoenes' death was just like any other news story. It was as tragic as the death of Agus Mulyawan, an Indonesian journalist killed in East Timor almost at the same time. The irony was that the death of Agus Mulyawan was barely mentioned in Australian newspaper reports. As detailed in Chapter 4, there was more reported about Sanders Thoenes’ death, such as the 'recklessness' of the ojek driver that took him to the fateful area that day, the alleged refusal of the INTERFET to accept the initial report from the ojek driver regarding the fate of Sanders Thoenes, and finally the ongoing quarrel over what actually killed Sanders Thoenes. Was Sanders was shot or hacked to death?

These conflicting views illustrated but failed to completely represent the bigger context of the different perspectives presented by Indonesian and Australian reporters. As much as it was painful for the Australian public to watch the escalating violence in East Timor before and after the referendum, it was more painful for the Indonesian public. For much of the Indonesian public, the terror, the helplessness and the loss of hope was not just happening in East Timor, it was happening all over Indonesia during the same period and even possibly over a longer time frame.

The loss of Sanders Thoenes was tragic, but what about the shooting of two Indonesian journalists prior to the referendum in East Timor? Bea Wiharta from Reuters and another journalist from Kompas were assaulted and shot while they were doing their job. Agus Mulyawan was killed while doing his job. Bea Wiharta was working for a foreign news agency but physically, he looked like any other Indonesian because he was Indonesian.
From my personal experiences, Indonesian journalists were often deliberately targeted – something that rarely happened with foreign-looking journalists. Other reports about the assault of foreign journalists rarely ended in such tragic circumstances.\(^7^9^8\)

In 1998, a colleague of mine who I often met during assignments, Sayuti, from *Media Indonesia*, was shot while covering riots in Jakarta. An *ANTARA* photo journalist was assaulted by the police during a demonstration in August 1998 and was seriously injured and was lucky to be able to continue to work at a later stage. More Indonesian journalists have been assaulted and beaten, often becoming seriously injured while doing their jobs in Indonesia and East Timor. But their plight was rarely described in Australian newspaper reports. Suddenly, the death of a tall, blue-eyed journalist from the Netherlands was very important.

The point here is that newspapers from both Australia and Indonesia defended their reporting vigorously by saying that their reporting was aimed solely at their audiences, comprised of their own society, their own people. Such a one-sided representation of the news event was permissible as it was deemed to be the most appropriate facts that should have been reported back to the Australian or Indonesian society, even though the actual points reported differed markedly between the two countries.
2. Australian and Indonesian newspapers reacted in line with the alleged press systems they subscribed to, but only to an extent.

In Chapter 1, it was noted that the Australian and Indonesian presses represent two different press systems. The different press systems here predicted the totally different behaviour from the Australian and Indonesian press. Indeed, the behaviour of the two countries' newspapers was different, but at the same time, they did not fully comply with what their press systems predicted.

The Australian press system categorically falls into the category of free press which, in theory, has traits such as: independent reporting, as opposed to government control or censorship, orientation towards facts rather than the news itself and freedom in publishing anything deemed newsworthy (McQuail, 1986, McQuail, 2001). Instead, this research found different realities. Australian newspapers relied significantly on their own government and people as sources, presenting almost exclusively views that closely represented the Australian views of the East Timor crisis.

Indonesian newspapers also reacted and behaved along similar lines. A significant portion of their sources were Indonesian officials, creating criticism that the Indonesian press strongly represented government views on the East Timor crisis. However, the Indonesian press represented the developmental press, which is almost totally the opposite of the free press. The developmental press generally has traits such as: supporting the government in the context of promoting development, limited freedom of
press and strong control by the government over the press (McQuail, 1986, Soesilo and Washburn, 1994).

As found in this research, it was not just the choice of both countries’ officials as sources, but also the selection of frames that showed the deviation of Australian newspapers from their political system. As shown in the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 the newspapers promoted frames based on the Australian government’s stance at that time. In Chapter 7, a closer look at the frames promoted by Australian and Indonesian newspapers also discovered that Australian newspapers presented frames based on or closely representing the Australian government’s and people’s views of the East Timor crisis at that time. What was significant in the promotion of such frames and the lack of diversity in the choice of main news sources, was the lack of critical analysis about the government’s position as would be expected to happen under ‘normal’ circumstances.

The frames promoted by Australian newspapers were shown to strongly present views of anger, fear and distress felt by the Australian people, including members of the press, over things that happened in East Timor at that time. But again, such views were considered to overwhelm other views, as reports that critically challenged those views were often sidelined or even ridiculed. In the end, the view that Australia’s involvement in East Timor was justified and proper, could be best illustrated by John Howard’s words that, “it was right, but because it was in our national interest to do so”.

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Such un-critical promotion of government stances contradicted the description of the Australian press as a free press system according to the description by Rodney Tiffen. The free press system, to which the Australian press belongs, warrants independent reporting. But the term independent here is within the context that such reporting is conducted in a fair and balanced manner. The research showed that during the period of time where it was difficult for foreign journalists to report from East Timor (September 4th – 20th), the Australian newspapers fell back on their own government and people as their main source of news as even the UN was considered part of the Australian sphere at that time. The result was reporting that was heavily biased towards the Australian viewpoint.

What this research shows to some extent is journalism is an issue of relativity. Under ‘normal’ circumstances, the press are always being put under scrutiny for the ethics and standards. But when the situation changed, the expectation of the press also changed. As an example in the beginning of US invasion to Iraq in 2003, FOX Television clearly supports to US government views was not strongly opposed by the American society. This is an example how during a conflict, often press may ‘take sides’ and this is totally acceptable to the particular society.

But what is in question is here is the application of journalistic standard and practices to which journalism earn their honourable place in the society. If such things are acceptable with the excuse of a condition during a war or conflict, then there should be a different journalistic standard and practices for such situations. One aspect of journalism values
accepted globally is journalism should not take sides even during conflict. Acceptance to a different standard during conflict will mean that such universal values is no longer applicable.

Moving back to the Indonesian press, the period of the East Timor crisis was a difficult period for both Indonesia and the Indonesian press. Being a journalist in Indonesia at that time, my recollection was of a chaotic period, where we, the Indonesian people, were living from day to day, not knowing what tomorrow would bring. A journey to the office for instance, often meant having to pass through several areas where riots or demonstrations were still rampaging. Nevertheless, I remember well that almost no one in my office, The Indonesian Observer, excused themselves from coming to work even when the situation was very difficult. As Don Greenless said, we worked as best as we could under extremely difficult circumstances to produce the best reporting we could for that day.

As this research showed, the result of the Indonesian newspaper reports on East Timor during the same period of September 4th – 20th was quite different to Australian newspapers. Indeed, true to the press system it subscribed to, the developmental press, the Indonesian press put much attention and emphasis on Indonesian government stances regarding the East Timor crisis at that particular time. At the same time, the Indonesian press showed a significant effort to do more. This research showed for instance, that in term of sources, Indonesian newspapers used a more diverse selection compared to their Australian counterparts.
In terms of reporting style, as shown in the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5, Indonesian newspapers also seemed to present more impersonal and un-emotional reporting. Indonesian reporting also was shown to be based upon the facts known at the time, unlike some Australian newspaper reports that further reinforced some conspiracy theory allegations. While Australian newspapers prided themselves as part of a more advanced and developed press system, the Indonesian press showed evidence that despite their limitations, they tried to maintain a high quality of reporting.

In conclusion, Australian newspapers may come from a more developed press system and enjoy more freedom when compared to Indonesian newspapers. Nevertheless, during the period of September 4th – 20th, when it was difficult to get reports from East Timor, study cases and in depth analysis showed that the behaviour and performance of the Australian and Indonesian newspapers did not seem to represent the press system they belonged to.

3. The media reporting in Australian and Indonesian news reports served certain political interests.

Gadi Wolfsfeld argues that in a political conflict, the media act as facilitators and are sometimes subservient to certain political parties or interests. This was arguably the case during the East Timor crisis in 1999 as Australia and Indonesia were caught in a
political war. The warring parties here were Indonesia as the de facto ruler of East Timor at that time, and Australia as the representation of the international community, particularly, the UN. The war was over who was to determine what happened in East Timor. Australia perceived it as a humanitarian crisis where military intervention was inevitable while Indonesia perceived it as a domestic crisis where its own apparatus should have been able to control the situation.

Over the period of September 4th - 20th, foreign media were expelled from East Timor. That situation effectively prevented the foreign media, including Australia, from reporting directly from East Timor. What happened then was, instead of diminishing the number of reports about East Timor, Australian newspapers kept reporting about East Timor. The problem was that instead of reporting based on actual observation, Australian newspapers were relying significantly on official statements from the Australian government, accounts by members of Australian society and un-attributed sources. Thus, the reports that came from Australian newspapers represented Australia’s perception of the crisis.

Within the same period, Indonesian newspapers also presented Indonesian perspectives by significantly quoting Indonesian officials and Indonesian people. Thus, they created a political conflict described by Wolfsfeld as a ‘conflict over meaning’. Australian and Indonesian newspapers were competing over the interpretation of what was happening in East Timor at that time. The arena was the newspaper reports and the spectators were the people from both Australia and Indonesia.
The significant problem found by this research was regarding an imbalance in the representation of views. In Indonesian newspapers, different views from different sources, even Australian sources, were represented. Although quantitatively it may not have been as significant compared to the number of Indonesian sources, still the perspective from Australia was significantly represented. On the other hand, the perspective from Indonesia was barely represented in Australian newspapers. For me, this was like watching a group boxing match where one side was represented by overwhelming numbers while the boxers from the other side were nowhere to be seen.

This finding was rather alarming as what was explained before as one of the basics of journalism is fair and balanced reporting (White, 1991, Granato, 1991). What this research found is that both Australia and Indonesia did not represent balanced reporting as they did not represent the other side in balanced numbers in terms of sources. However, what was more significant was that Indonesian newspapers tended to try to present a more balanced representation of views. Another significant finding was that this unbalanced reporting from both sides was excused by both sides because that was how their own audiences wanted to see the East Timor crisis.

The conclusion here is that during the East Timor crisis, in particular during the period where reporting directly from East Timor was difficult, both Australian and Indonesian newspapers waged an almost one-sided war of meanings. However, this one-sided representation was more apparent within Australian newspaper reports rather than within
Indonesian newspaper reports. This led to my next point that this war of meaning was about the cultural understanding of the crisis rather than just a simple matter of journalistic standards and practices.

4. **Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports on the East Timor crisis were about the social understanding of the crisis.**

A basic but often forgotten fact in understanding the differences of Australian and Indonesian reports on the East Timor crisis is that Australia and Indonesia are two different societies. Australia and Indonesia have been neighbours since their inception but come from different backgrounds. Australia evolved from the settlement of British convicts which later expanded with new immigrants. It was originally a British colony that later was expanded with the arrival of European immigrants. This shaped the perception that Australia is 'part of Europe located in Asia'.

Indonesia, before being colonised by the Dutch in the 16th century, was a collection of smaller kingdoms often at war amongst themselves. In fact, Indonesia acknowledged that the Dutch colonialisation actually helped shape Indonesia's sense of identity. In 1945, Indonesia declared its independence but it took four years of war to finally earn recognition from the Dutch in 1949. This led to a strong sense of nationalism in Indonesia, in particular against any perceived 'foreign interference'. While their histories and backgrounds differ markedly, culturally the two societies are even more significantly different.
During the East Timor crisis such different backgrounds shaped the perceptions of each country. Australia was proudly a part of the Western community: founders of the UN, members of coalition forces in World Wars I and II, allies of the US during the Vietnam War, part of British forces fighting rebels in Malaysia in the 1950’s, forces fighting against Indonesia during the confrontation period (1963 – 1966) and last but not least, boasting its cultural view of human right that believes Australia has a strong sense of humanity. In the East Timor crisis, Australia, in line with such a background, believed that they were socially and historically compelled to help the East Timorese who had voted for independence and were being attacked by pro-integration supporters.

Australia argued that their sense of humanity prevented them from not doing anything while the media continuously presented the news about the situation in East Timor. Historically, Australia also claimed that they owed a debt to the East Timorese who helped them defend Australia from Japanese invasion during World War II.

For Indonesia, East Timor represented a paradox and a huge dilemma. I remember learning about East Timor during high school in the 1980’s and learning that it was the 27th province in Indonesia. Later in university, I learnt more from rumours and government propaganda, the best one being the creation of an East Timorese pavilion in the Miniature of Indonesia’s Park (TMII) in Jakarta. One thing I learnt as a fact was that the integration of East Timor into Indonesia was a very bloody process and until the late

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1980’s, being in a military family, we still heard horror stories about soldiers killed in East Timor.

Closer to the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, the issue of East Timor was more often raised in different ways. In the late 1980’s, the Indonesian government declared East Timor an ‘open’ province, meaning that anyone could visit. Previously, only military personnel were allowed to enter East Timor. As a journalist, I later learnt too that only military-approved journalists were allowed to enter East Timor. This was true up to the mid-1990’s.

In the 1990’s, East Timor was gradually given more positive coverage in Indonesia, mostly through government controlled channels such as the TVRI, the state television. It also gradually became apparent, through reports coming out of the mainstream media, how bloody was the conflict in East Timor. One of the best accounts was from TVRI’s reporter Hendro Subroto.

The horror of the fierce battle in Dili can be witnessed by the large number of casualties on both sides. Thirty-five members of the 18th Airborne Infantry Brigade were killed in action (KIA), 16 Para Commandos killed and six men listed as missing in action (MIA). On the Fretillins side, 122 were killed, 65 captured and an excess of 300 or so surrendered.

Being Indonesian and growing up in the 1970’s and 1980’s, I can’t help but see East Timor as part of Indonesia. Nevertheless, hearing the horror stories from both sides meant I could understand the plight of the East Timorese.

Stories that were very commonly heard were about how, in the early days of the Indonesian invasion, thousands of Indonesian soldiers were killed. Of course, we never heard about the actual numbers, but what was more important were the stories telling that for every Indonesian soldier killed, it was common to have a whole village destroyed.
Another fact that I learnt myself was when I visited the Indonesian Army central hospital, RSPAD Gatot Subroto in Jakarta in 1987. In the psychiatric wing, there was a chart on the wall recording the names of the patients. During the 1980's, the section recording armed forces patients went off the chart. When I asked why that was, the psychiatrist there said, 'those are the ones who just came back from East Timor'\(^{807}\).

Thus, hearing of the option of a referendum for East Timor in 1999 was a huge surprise for almost all Indonesians. We were in really difficult times during that period. Just a year before, President Soeharto had suddenly resigned. We were still under massive political, social, security and economic crises. Food was getting more expensive and often some basic foods, such as salt and sugar, were missing from the market. Then, suddenly President Habibie wanted to perform his own political stunt\(^{808}\). It wasn’t that we did not want East Timor to have a better condition, but we were all in a difficult situation at that time so hearing that East Timor could be an independent country was beyond belief for almost all Indonesians\(^{809}\).

When the process of the referendum was rolling in, it was only more bad news that Indonesians heard. I remember how some media often reported the behaviour of UN observers or staff as ‘arrogant’. Also, there was no shortage of stories about how the Indonesian military for years had fought FRETILIN, which was often portrayed as a barbaric rebel group\(^{810}\). However, as we got closer to the referendum date, different stories started to emerge.

It was not just the foreign media that sent their journalists to East Timor, but also the Indonesian media. In 1999, the Indonesian media prided itself on being finally free from
government control. As such, the Indonesian media's reporting of East Timor changed accordingly. The continuous visits by various Indonesian community leaders to FRETILIN leader Xanana Gusmao were frequently reported. Often, it reached the front page, meaning it was considered to be important news.

In January 2007, I was assigned to cover a press conference of Timor Leste, the Indonesian truth and friendship commission. This commission had a task similar to the truth and reconciliation commission in South Africa to find closure, in particular for the victims of conflict by finding the truth of what had happened. The Timor Leste – Indonesia commission is in fact assigned to seek the truth of what exactly happened during the referendum in East Timor in 1999.

As I had the pleasure to interview Dionisio Babo Soares, co-chairman of the commission from Timor Leste (the official name of East Timor now), I was able to ask what the truth really means for the people of East Timor. His answer summarizes the importance of this thesis, that finding and understanding the facts of what really happened during those fateful months in 1999 is very important for the victims of the conflict and may bring a closure for a very violent and traumatic episode within Indonesian and East Timorese history.

Indeed, he said that many of the facts are open for interpretation, but by trying to use several different methods based on internationally accepted standards, the new
understanding can be built. It is a complex issue Mr Soares admits, but it is a very important process for the future of both Indonesia and Timor Leste.

What is really interesting was that during the press conference all parties analysed in thesis were present: Indonesian officials, East Timor officials (as they are now an independent country), Indonesian press and Australian press. Most important is the fact that during the conference, reporters from the Australian media persisted in asking about whether there will be prosecutions of any Indonesian officials found guilty by the commission. Meanwhile, the Indonesian press is interested in whether the commission will be able to provide a satisfactory finding despite the obvious challenges of getting persons of interests (mostly Indonesian officials) to give their testimony to the commission.

The different emphasis on the issue echoes the similar views back in 1999 where the Australian press was pressing for justice to be done in East Timor. On the other hand, the Indonesian press, aware of the complexity of the issue, are very pragmatic regarding the issue of justice. However, different perceptions were not just found within the press but also within the officials that were present.

Indonesian officials in the commission clearly stated that the commission is not going to persecute anyone as that is not within their authority. On the other hand, the East Timorese officials on the commission insisted that the victims of violence, particularly the East Timorese, should find a sense of justice through the works of the commission.
Nevertheless, both Timor Leste's and Indonesia's officials are united in the view that the outcome of this commission process is to find reconciliation. This reflects the intricate relationship between East Timor and Indonesia today as two independent countries that shared more than just similar borders where contemporary economic and regional political interests may have a more significant role.

In the end, the press conference was like a live dramatisation of the events that happened in 1999. Most important was that even though the political circumstances are different, the different perceptions and political interests regarding the event in 1999 are still clearly visible. This highlights the findings of this thesis that different perceptions caused by values, cultures, socio-economic factors, history and political factors had shrouded the crisis in East Timor in 1999, creating different and often conflicting perceptions of the event. This thesis instead has shown that understanding the event through the factors above will bring a new understanding of not just how the print media works in extremely difficult circumstances, but also the impact of social processes within Australian and Indonesian societies on their own media.

This thesis is, I believe, part of new beginning where the process of media reporting, particularly in difficult circumstances, can be seen as part of the social processes of a society. As such, hopefully there will be more research in the future to be based or inspired by this thesis and a better understanding of media and society particularly from journalistic point of view, can be developed. Furthermore, because most of the media theories at present have been based upon modern societies in the USA or Western
Europe, this thesis hopefully can help in the creation of new media and society theories based in developing countries.

What this thesis provides is a stepping stone from which a more comprehensive theory could be created. The finding of this thesis indeed have found that press indeed may act as both mirror and facilitator for the society. As mirror, it may reflects what the society see but how the society perceived that reflection, is a matter of subjective process by the society itself. Understanding this process will help social and media researchers in understanding the differences in how media are functioning within different societies. The bottom line is media in different society reflects on particular issues differently than in other societies as the media is influenced and influencing the society at the same time.

What often happens is researcher reflects upon the process and reflections within media from other societies, by using their own values. This is causing an issue as the mirror which it was based is different than the one being used by other society. As such, it is feared that the conclusion generated by the research process may in fact reflects the perception of the researchers themselves rather than the perception of the society analyzed.

Finally this thesis is closed by quoting the Prophet Muhammad that learning is something that has no end even when the end of one’s life is very close, there is still a lot to learn from the societies that exist today. The press conference turned out to be my last official assignment as a newspaper reporter, bringing closure to this research journey.
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1 To read more on this article check: Chadwick, D. H. (1995) In *National Geographic*, pp. 2-45.

2 Ibid.


5 We shall discuss the issue of media and society later in this chapter as well as in Chapter 3 – Media in Australian and Indonesian societies.


7 Ibid. p 5.


20 According to UN brokered deal in May 5, 1999 it was agreed that Indonesia will be supervising the security while UN staff will prepare for the referendum.

21 {Republika, 1999 #49;Soedirman, 1999 #66}

22 According to UN brokered deal in May 5, 1999 it was agreed that Indonesia will be supervising the security while UN staff will prepare for the referendum.

23 Ibid. Page 30.

24 Ibid. Page 30.


26 This stances was the officially stated over and over again by various Indonesian officials including military officials. Nevertheless it also shows the Indonesian government and military reluctances to control the militias with whom the military has a strong emotional link.

27 This was based upon the study by AKSARA foundation in 2000. The study is use in this research as the basis of the data. The study by AKSARA foundation analyzed various print media in Indonesia, Australia and other countries.


AKSARA Foundation is a Non Governmental Organization based in Jakarta who aim according to its official website, AKSARA Foundation activity is focused in literature and spreading literature in Indonesia (www.aksara.or.id).


30 It is generally believed that during World War 2, East Timorese people helped Australian commandos fight off the Japanese Imperial forces in Timor island. When the Australian commandos were forced to retreat back, the East Timorese fell into the hands often ruthless Japanese force. This was used to create a strong excuse for Australia's involvement as Australia was actually indebted the East Timor people. However, there was another side to the historical narrative. Most of Australian commandos were betrayed by the local East Timor people to the Japanese force. In fact the local population were so hostile that eventually all allied operations were suspended by it. It will take a close scrutiny of historical facts to decide which version is the actual one. This thesis is not and will not attempting to do so. What is important in this thesis is the fact that majority of Austialian media tend to believe the first version.


33 Ibid. Page 230.

34 This version of the incident is the most popular version particularly within Australian public and media. Given this history, it shouldn't be too surprising that Australian media tend to have negative views towards Indonesia.

35 There are various version of what happened in December 1975 in Balibo regarding how the five Australian newsmen were killed. Indonesian version as quoted by Ken Conboy was that the journalists were killed during a fighting between Indonesian forces (which includes militias and regular army soldiers) and FRETILIN forces. Hamish McDonald presented another version that journalists were executed as the Indonesian forces were taking over Balibo.

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It is important to note here though the referendum was supervise by the UN, East Timor at that time was still under Indonesia. Indonesia was the responsible to provide security for the whole referendum process as well as for the security of East Timor.

Such a stance is shown in the themes of newspaper reports (table 7 appendixes). The Australian media put more emphasis on violence and international pressure for Indonesia rather than for example efforts of peace conflict resolutions.

In the topics (such as news about Indonesia, source of news, news on pro-integration and news on pro-independence) where Indonesian media are ‘supposed’ to be more positive towards the ‘official’ Indonesian stand, there is evidence that they instead prefer to be neutral. Refer to table 2, table 4, table 5 & table 6 in the appendixes.

At the peak of the crisis (after the ballot announcements), the Australian government were facing various dilemmas: in the home front, news about the violence in East Timor was creating a strong demand for the government to take immediate action, while in the regional front Australia was facing a massive criticism.

Such a stance is shown in the themes of newspaper reports (table 7 appendixes). The Australian media put more emphasis on violence and international pressure for Indonesia rather than for example efforts of peace conflict resolutions.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
101 Author's note.
102 Author's note.


Ibid. Pg 179.

Ibid.


For Indonesian in general, the usage of left hand is often associated with activities in toilets in which left hand is the hand to be used to clean oneself. This concept is actually come from Islamic tradition.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See more about the discussion regarding developmental press in Chapter 1.


Author's note.


Ibid. Pg 14-15.

Ibid. Pg 5-6.
207 Ibid. Pg 25.
209 Ibid.
213 Author's note.
215 Ibid. Page 35.
216 Ibid. Page 36.
217 Ibid.
222 1975 was the year when Indonesia annexed East Timor with political support from Australia. 1999 is the year when East Timor crisis broke down.
228 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
234 Ibid. Page 2.
235 Ibid. Page 3-5.
236 Ibid. Page 3-4.
238 Ibid. Page 38.
242 Ibid. Page 54.
243 Ibid. Page 49.
244 Ibid. Page 49.
245 Ibid. Page 49.
247 Ibid., pp. 5.
Until early 20th Century, the Dutch colonial power in what is now known as Indonesia was held by the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC). Created in 1602 to handle the affairs of Dutch colonies in the far east, VOC became a de facto ruler of Indonesia as well as a representation of the Kingdom of Netherlands in Indonesia.

Haatzaai Artikelen was used as basis of press law even after Indonesia gained its independence. Within the current Indonesian criminal law (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana - KUHP) it is an offence to insult any public servants or government officials with lies or rumors. During New Order regime, it was even interpreted even more wider by assuming that such actions could undermine the stability of the nation. Such crime is punishable by death.

Douwes Dekker perhaps is the most famous Dutch nationals that were recorded in Indonesian history. His most famous works was his book: “Saijah and Adinda”, which he wrote under a pseudonym MULTATULI. Later on Douwes Dekker changed his name into an Indonesian name: Dr. Danudirdja Setiabudi.


Swantoro. *Lok Cit.* p. 218

Swantoro. *Lok Cit.* p. 89.

Swantoro. Ibid. p 98 – 100.


Swantoro. Ibid. p 97.


Author’s note.

Ibid.

The external threat here is the perceived threat that international community (through UN) will be involved militarily into East Timor. This situation will also open a possibility that the conflict could spread to other Indonesian area as well. In the end this will create an open conflict between Indonesia and international community.


Ibid. Page 55.


Ibid.

The decision to scrap the ministry of Information was declared by President Abdurrahman Wahid as he announced his cabinet in 1999. It was surprise decision that took everybody by surprise in particular the Information ministry staff.

President Wahid at that time asserted that ‘regulating the press’ is no longer a function of the government, so the ministry is no longer needed. President Wahid declared that from then, it was the society that will judge and declare which press is good and which one is not.

This decision is the climax of a series of changes for Indonesian press done by the government. Wahid predecessor, B.J. Habibie initiated the changes by abolishing various law that restricted the Press, announcing a much greater freedom of press and unleashing the society to create press publications as they wish. One of the most visible improvement was the number of press license granted were multiplied within days after Habibie announced his decision.

The word ‘allegedly’ is use here due to the fact that little has been done to clarify the allegedly misreporting and other allegations by members of public.

One of the prominent case of press receiving and doing paid services for politicians and public officials was when several private television stations ran an interview with formei Defense minister — Wiranto. Wiranto was at that time accused of being responsible for the crisis in East Timor after August 1999, referendum.

During the interview (which was conducted jointly by the television stations), Wiranto strongly denied the allegations and at the same ‘explaining’ his views about situations in Indonesia. What made this interview controversial, was it was admitted later that Wiranto actually paid the television stations time slots for the interview.
All television stations involved denied any wrong doing. Citing that the interview was not classified as ‘news’ and didn’t run as news either.

The second case was when Setiawan Djody, local businessman that was close with Soeharto’s family, bought time slots from local television stations. Like Wiranto, Djody used an ‘interview’ like setting to send out his message but the difference was Djody also used it to aired a concert of his band; “Kantata Revolvere”.

New Order strongly inducted a sense of nationalism into Indonesian society. This is translated into clear actions of what you can and cannot do. The Indonesian flag (Bendera Merah Putih) was always referred as the ultimate symbol of Indonesia’s independence and pride. School children were taught from early days for instance songs about the flag and the ethics in handling the national flag. The flag was supposed to never touched the ground at all times. A raised flags must be taken down when rains and when being raised up or down must never touch the ground.

The images of foreigners burning symbol of Indonesia’s pride was probably an ultimate insult. As most the flag burnings happened in Australia, part of public anger were fixated towards Australia.


The actual law used by Indonesian government to banned the press is not the Dutch law but essentially the content of the law is the same.


In SWA, every reporter were required to bring their own tape recorder. Nevertheless, every reporter have their own desk and computer. We also can ask anytime for office utilities such as pen, notebooks or batteries. As I was working in the photo department, SWA provided us with the required films and batteries.

We also have equipments for special assignments such as full lighting sets, backgrounds, cameras and lenses. All are available for whenever the need arise. For transportation, there is one van on standby for out of city assignment. Otherwise, we can claim for our transportation which was based upon taxi fares.

Clifford Geertz is an American sociologist who was able to map the social demographic map of Javanese society. Geertz did his study in a small town called Modjokuto, an alias for Pare, a small town in East Jave who happened to be my home town as well.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Author’s note.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Author's note.


Ibid.

Ibid. Page 46.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Author's note.

Author's note. In Indonesia, often a single working person have to support financially not just hims/herself but also other people. Often these people are their closest relatives like their parents or their siblings. But it is also not unusual that they have to support their extended family as well. This obviously put a lot of pressure on the working person.

Author's note.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Author's note.

Ibid.

According to Dutch people, Sander Thoenes name is Sander Thoenes which is popular name in Netherlands. Sander is more often popular as last name. But coherence with the media reports, then the spelling used here is Sander Thoenes.


Author's note.


Interview with Melvin Singh.

Author's note. In 2006, I met several Indonesian police officers who were assigned in East Timor during the referendum in 1999. One of the police officer gave his account about what he saw as he was in the crime scene. He agrees to have his comments quoted on a condition that his identity is not to be revealed.

Author's note.

Ibid.


Republika (1999b) In RepublikaJakarta, pp. 1.


Republika (1999b) In RepublikaJakarta, pp. 1.

See appendix B.

{Pembaruan, 1999 #20}

Author's note based upon the description given by Berto Wedhatama.


At the time of Sander Thoenes' death, the INTERFET had arrived in East Timor. As INTERFET was made by various armed forces, there were various kind of uniforms that were present in East Timor at that time.

Republika (1999b) In RepublikaJakarta, pp. 1.

Author's note.

For the full article, please refer to appendix B.


Author's note.

The best selling newspaper in Jakarta actually was not Kompas, it was a cheap morning newspaper named Pos Kota (City Post). Pos Kota is well marked by its trademark: a front page full of the most gruesome criminal news, the worse the better. Though the Indonesian Elite view Pos Kota as a ‘cheap newspaper’, their reporting is very accurate and quick. Not even Kompas could match Pos Kota popularity in Jakarta.

Author's note.


Ibid.


Author's note.


Hewett, J. Ibid., pp. 17.

Crouch, H. Ibid.


Ibid.


See Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


See appendix B.


Ibid.


Author's note.

I am using the term allegedly here is because at the time of article was published there was no strong evidence that link Thoenes murder to the conspiracy theory.


Republika (1999b) In Republika Jakarta, pp. 1.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Author's note.


Interview with Ben Bohane.


In general, Australian people perceived themselves as open, happy, communal and independent people. In the term of independent, I found that a lot of Australians took this as being physically independent, which means able to survive in harsh nature of Australia. Indeed a lot of Australians still took this view very highly by trying to maintain their ‘bush skills’, living in the bush or simply going to the bush every once or a while. Others perceived that independent got to do more with the blue collar kind of independence. Which may resonate more as a lot of Australian still believes that they are classless society that derived from working class (from their history as convict colony).

Author’s note.
Ironically even today much of American expeditionary force (part of the armed forces that are design to be constantly ready for deployment to anywhere in the world) still uses the same concept – cavalry. The most famous perhaps is the 81st Division (Airborne) which nick named as ‘Air cavalry’.

Such movies made famous by actor like John Wayne was very influential in defining who are the good guys in American history. Indeed it is a controversial issue as many historians will challenged such perceptions. Nevertheless, the image of fully armed, marching cavalry gives term of: ‘John Wayne’ movies.

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I was working as correspondent for a Singaporean newspapers: The New Paper.

Interview with Ben Bohane.

Account from "E", a university student who asked his identity not to be disclosed. The account was about the incident on November 13th, 1998. What was later known was 'the first Semanggi tragedy'.

Account from "B", a university student who was working as freelance photo journalist. He was covering the same incident as above.


Ibid. Pg 32.


Ibid.

In July 1997 until July 1998, I was enrolled in Master of Arts (Journalism) program in Graduate School of Journalism. Faculty of Creative Arts. University of Wollongong.

The issue of objectivity is definitely a contested issue. The emphasize given in the Graduate School of Journalism was that objectivity is an elusive term. Objectivity is actually a very subjective issue as everyone will have their own standard of objectivity and each society will have their own standard as well. Thus the emphasize at the Graduate School of Journalism is to strive for balanced reporting. Balanced reporting is loosely defined to cover all sides of the stories and to give equal treatment to all sides.

Author's note.

At The Indonesian Observer we are basically sharing the office space (wholly) with our sister media—Mandiri Online. Mandiri Online was probably the third Indonesian web based media after TEMPO Interaktif and Detik.com. During my time, Mandiri Online pride themselves as one of the best web based media in Indonesia especially in the quality of their reporting. Their key was with their editors that majority were former seasoned editors in ANTARA news agency. Author's note.

In her book, Angela Romano described the threat to Indonesian journalists as serious issue for Indonesian journalists but rarely founded (Romano, A. (2003) Politics and The Press in Indonesia: Understanding an evolving political drama., RoutledgeCurzon, London.). Though the rate of death casualties among Indonesian journalists are relatively small, it is a threat that cannot be taken lightly. Numerous Indonesian journalists have fallen victims to repressive actions, mostly by Indonesian law enforcer (police and the military). This is a serious concern as almost all Indonesian journalists were not properly covered for anything wrong happened during their duties. Thus any risk in the field are truly to be bear by the journalists themselves.

After the New Order regime fell in May 1998, the number of media soared but the quality plummeted down. This was marked by sharp increased of tabloids focusing into politics and entertainments. A full list of the articles is available in Appendix A.

Author's note.

Interview with Ben Bohane.


Ibid.


{Glaser, 1992 #194}


{Glaser, 1992 #2}


{Glaser, 1992 #2}


{Glaser, 1992 #3}


Ibid.

Ibid.


As of November 1999. Author’s note.

Often The Sunday Observer get stories from people who have business dealings with The Indonesian Observer or its parent company. The unwritten rules are that The Sunday Observer will print the stories as refusal to do so will have negative impact to company’s standing – which at serious financial problem after the financial crisis in 1997. The only way to print such ‘masked advertisement’ or public relation effort is disguise them as ‘back pages news’ – news that were considered as the filling of pages. Author’s note.

Author’s note.


The technological gap between international media organization and Indonesian journalists are often very wide. For instance in The Indonesian Observer, only one photo journalist was properly equipped with all lenses and equipments (one wide angle lens, one long zoom lens both have to have diaphragm of 2.8 or bigger and a set of flash. Camera must the best of day: either Canon EOS-1 or Nikon F-5) out of three photo journalists. Foreign journalists often carry more than two camera bodies of the top range and more lenses.

In reporting the news, Indonesian journalists at best only have mobile phones which are naturally restricted in their coverage. Foreign journalists often can afford to have and use satellite phones. Author’s note.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Author’s note.

Interview with Melvin Singh and Ben Bohane.


Interview with Melvin Singh and Ben Bohane.


Author’s note.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Author’s note.


Author’s note.


Ibid. Page 17.

In 2005, a young, female Australian named Schapelle Corby was convicted over possession and trafficking four kilograms of marijuana by Denpasar court, Bali. The court process was closely followed by Australian media and the day she was convicted, there was a huge debate and emotional response from Australian media and public. Such public outcry is almost similar to what happened in 1999 during the East Timor crisis.


Australia identify itself strongly with the UN. Before, during and after the crisis Australia is the staging point for UN operation in East Timor. During the crisis, all foreign links goes to East Timor through Darwin and this links persists until the arrival of INTERFET.


Australian press theoretically has the same access to sources as to Indonesian press. Australian press have and maintain offices in Indonesia. The UN is using Australia as staging post since the beginning of the referendum process. Pro-independence movement groups have offices and sympathizers in Australia. Major news agencies also have offices in Australia and Australian newspapers have access to their news reports.
The increasing use of media for political purposes in the war against terror have highlighted the need to analyse the new role of media as a ‘willing propaganda’ cannon for governments. The practices of ‘embedded journalists’ are putting journalist within the ‘shoes’ of the government troops, is example how governments have successfully rallied the media to their cause. Presenting an almost one sided view of the issue.

In all fairness, there is little evidence to say that ‘embedded journalists’ will fail to report news objectively. But on the other hand, it raise a serious issue of balance reports.

This report by David Jenkins which ran The Sydney Morning Herald was the greatest example how Australian press comes in between the relations of Australia and Indonesia. In my personal opinion, this example was made famous due to the nature of the story – a direct attack on what’s the most powerful person Indonesia at that time. Actually an arguably more important issue which still lingers on today is the death of five journalists working for Australian media in East Timor in December 1975. Within Australian media community, this issue is far from forgotten and during East Timor crisis in 1999, it came out again logically.
In fairness, the views presented above was written in late 1990’s when Indonesia was still under the New Order regime. Nevertheless, it was part of a book that was published in 2000, two years after the fall of New Order regime in Indonesia – Author’s note.


In 1998, food rationing by Indonesian government suddenly existed. Almost in every market there were long lines of people waiting to get *Sembako* (*Sembilan bahan pokok* - the nine basic food products) such as rice, sugar and salt. Last time Indonesia had such situation was back in 1966 – 1968, an era that was considered to be the hardest era of Independent Indonesia. Such sight of people lining up was a very depressing sight especially just a few years back, Indonesia was boasting to be a very high economic growth. Author’s note.

Author’s note.


Ibid.

Author’s note.


{Dortch, 2001 #187}

Author’s note.

Ibid.

Interview with Melvin Singh.
674 Ibid.
676 Ibid.
679 Ibid.
683 Ibid.
685 Author's note.
688 For the full article, please refer to Appendix D.
690 Full article is available in Appendix D.
692 Author's note.
693 Author's note.
694 Full versions of the articles are available in Appendix D. Author's note
698 Republika (1999a) In *Republika* Jakarta.
699 Ibid.
700 Author's note.
701 Ibid.
703 Ibid.
706 Daley, P. Ibid.
707 Ibid.
709 Ibid.
711 See Appendix D for the full version of this article.

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{Satrohandoyo, 2000 #46} Pg 7.

{Satrohandoyo, 2000 #46}

{Satrohandoyo, 2000 #46}

Author's note.


{Satrohandoyo, 2000 #46}

Author's note.


Ibid. Pg 129.


Ibid. Page 17.


Author's note. In the case SWA magazine it was true as far 1997, the year the author left the magazine. But the practices of relying with 'fully covered' invitation also happened when the author's worked with *The Indonesian Observer* in 1998-1999.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


ANTARA is a unique press entity within Indonesian press. As a news agency it is actually owned by the state but it theoretically is an independent entity. As part of state's establishment, ANTARA is funded by the State's Secretariat. ANTARA also during The New Order regime were occasionally associated with the State's Intelligence body or BAKIN. Nevertheless, as stated earlier ANTARA is theoretically independent and it doesn't report to both State's Secretariat or BAKIN.

As a joke among Indonesian journalists, ANTARA's reporters were often dubbed as 'the officials' as ANTARA reporter when traveling abroad are entitled and used official passports that identify them as government officials.


Ibid.

Ibid.

{Putra, 2000 #189}


Ibid.

Ibid.


Center, M. W. a. C. (2000c) *Jurnal Media Watch, 1*, 23-26. According this article, the main reason of withholding source's identity is to protect them from the implication of being the sources.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


The articles from Australian newspapers were in digital forms thus negating the possibility of analysing it some of the way Entman wanted them to be – to analyse the placements.

The basic general method of analysis of the frames in this thesis is also based upon the grounded theory. Grounded theory believe that the data should be allowed to 'speak' for itself and to avoid forcing the explanation. For more on the grounded theory, please see Glaser, B. G. (1992) *Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis*, Sociology Press, Mill Valley.


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791 Ibid.


798 Except for Sanders Thoenes, there was no public record of any foreign journalist seriously injured or killed in East Timor in 1999. Author's note


804 Ibid.


806 Ibid. Page 166-167.

807 Author's note.

808 Ibid.

809 Ibid.

810 Ibid.
Appendix A
Chapter Six – List of articles analysed

Period of September 4 – 20, 1999

The Sydney Morning Herald articles


2. Thugs And Fear. September 4, 1999 Saturday.


5. Cowardly, But Militias Are Not A Force To Be Ignored. September 4, 1999 Saturday.

6. Kosovo Option 'is UN's Only Chance'. September 4, 1999 Saturday.


15. No Invitation, No Intervention: Howard. September 6, 1999 Monday.


22. Church Pleads For UN Help As Armed Mobs Take Control. September 6, 1999 Monday.


25. A Television Turn-off, With Or Without Dick And His Esky. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.


27. There's No Defence For Our Tainted Ties With Butchers In Uniform. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.


32. UN To Consider Force In Territory. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.

34. Union Fires First Shot In National Blockade. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.


38. What Must Be Done In Timor. September 8, 1999 Wednesday

39. Dancing With The Dictators. September 8, 1999 Wednesday

40. Indonesia Needs To Hear Some Frank Talk. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.

41. If We Go In, We Will Have To Pay A Price. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.

42. Visas For 100 Timorese, No More. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.


44. Military Chief Is Out Of Minister's Reach. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.

45. 48-hour Deadline To Stop The Killing. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.


47. Protests Start With Ships. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.


49. As The UN Dwindles, Dili Burns. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.

50. 'Vote Again Or We Burn Everything'. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.


52. Gaumao Vows To Fight For Peace. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.


55. After 24 Years, It Seemed Optimism Had A Chance. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
56. Crisis Robs Australian Consul Of Celebration. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.


58. Freedom In Flames. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.


60. APEC And East Timor. September 9, 1999 Thursday.

61. Back Then, We Didn't Wait To Ask. September 9, 1999 Thursday.


64. What Of Those Left Behind? September 9, 1999 Thursday.


69. Plan To Cut All Aid Goes Before Congress. September 9, 1999 Thursday.

70. 'Scorched Earth' Plan Officially Backed. September 9, 1999 Thursday.


79. 'Cleansing' Rears Ugly Head Again. *September* 9, 1999 Thursday.


82. A People Oppressed Take Their Bishop And His Church To Heart. *September* 9, 1999 Thursday.


84. US Ponders Over Which Trouble Spot To Focus Its 'super Powers' On This Week. *September* 9, 1999 Thursday.


87. 24 Hours To Action Stations For Peacekeeping Force. *September* 9, 1999 Thursday.


90. Officialdom Seals Own Fate As Balibo Ghosts Ignored. *September* 9, 1999 Thursday.


95. NT Opens Its Doors To 1,000. *September* 9, 1999 Thursday.


100. We're No Force To Be Reckoned With. September 10, 1999 Friday.

101. PM Cool As Emotions Flare. September 10, 1999 Friday.

102. With A Great Friend Like Australia . . . September 10, 1999 Friday.


104. A Night Of Torment For Kofi Annan. September 10, 1999 Friday.

105. Media Critics Have Administration 'bastards' On The Defensive. September 10, 1999 Friday.

106. UN Gives Habibie One More Day. September 10, 1999 Friday.


110. Time To Pray, And Run The Militia Gauntlet. September 10, 1999 Friday.


113. AWU Will Blockade Outgoing Air Cargo And Mail. September 10, 1999 Friday.

114. Nun Prays For Her 'gentle And Compassionate' Colleagues. September 10, 1999 Friday.


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118. 250 Reported Slaughtered In Suai. September 10, 1999 Friday.

119. UN Team To Tour Dili Ghost Town. September 10, 1999 Friday.

120. Nervous About Mr Nice Guy. September 10, 1999 Friday.

121. Reality Still Has To Rule, OK? September 10, 1999 Friday.

122. 'Stacks Of Bodies Went Up To The Roof'. September 10, 1999 Friday.

123. Fix It Or Else, Warns Clinton. September 11, 1999 Saturday.


126. Church Anger At Attacks On Its Flock. September 11, 1999 Saturday.

127. We Don't Need Your Approval For Peace Force: UN. September 11, 1999 Saturday.


130. Protesters Storm Sydney Airport, Block Passengers. September 11, 1999 Saturday.


134. Again An Exit Amid Tears And Rage. September 11, 1999 Saturday.

137. Descent To Chaos. September 11, 1999 Saturday.
139. The ABC Of Warmongering. September 11, 1999 Saturday.
142. Tourists Give Bali A Miss. September 12, 1999 Sunday.
144. Dili Too Risky For UN Human Rights Woman. September 12, 1999 Sunday.
146. 15,000 Marchers Say Send Troops. September 12, 1999 Sunday.
148. Timor Terror Squad Trained In Australia. September 12, 1999 Sunday.
149. Line Of Defence Get Ting Thinner. September 12, 1999 Sunday.
155. 'We Seem To Be Continually Deserting Them'. September 13, 1999 Monday.
156. Rape Used Over And Over As A Systematic Torture. **September** 13, 1999 Monday.

157. RAAF Flew Out Refugees With UN Staff. **September** 13, 1999 Monday.

158. Republican Lobby Ponders Reaction To The Timor Factor. **September** 13, 1999 Monday.


160. 'Blood Of Victims Seeped Out Of Church'. **September** 13, 1999 Monday.

161. PM's Pressure For UN Military Mission Vindicated. **September** 13, 1999 Monday.


164. East Timor Breakthrough. **September** 14, 1999 Tuesday.

165. Summit Breathes New Life Into APEC. **September** 14, 1999 Tuesday.

166. Troops Waiting And At The Ready. **September** 14, 1999 Tuesday.

167. Wimhurst Outspoken On Failure Of Indonesia To Pursue Killers. **September** 14, 1999 Tuesday.

168. Marry Early, Cancel Trip - Anything To Keep The Peace. **September** 14, 1999 Tuesday.

169. Refugees Shot At As They Starve. **September** 14, 1999 Tuesday.

170. We Must Move Quickly To Stop The Destruction. **September** 14, 1999 Tuesday.
171. A Week On The Diplomatic Edge. September 14, 1999 Tuesday.


173. Don't Rush To Write Off Our Indonesian Links. September 14, 1999 Tuesday.

174. Bodies Burn, Refugees Starve Amid Fears Of 'final Solution'. September 14, 1999 Tuesday.

175. How PM's Triumph Comes At A Cost. September 14, 1999 Tuesday.

176. Role For Australia Provokes Protests And Calls To Stay Out. September 14, 1999 Tuesday.

177. Wiranto May Be Ready To Dump Tainted Generals. September 14, 1999 Tuesday.

178. Force Must Be Led By Us, Says Downer. September 14, 1999 Tuesday.

179. Scorched Earth. September 14, 1999 Tuesday.


182. Free East Timor Spurs Faria To Fame. September 15, 1999 Wednesday.

183. Crisis Exposes Hole In Our Defences. September 15, 1999 Wednesday.


188. Lawyers Join Forces To Gather Evidence Of Atrocities. September 15,
189. Commander Earmarked For Joint Force. **September 15, 1999 Wednesday.**

190. Last Line Of Defiance. **September 15, 1999 Wednesday.**

191. Security Fears Delay Aid Drops To The Starving. **September 15, 1999 Wednesday.**

192. All Necessary Measures. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

193. Seeking Our Pacific Identity. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

194. Indonesians Hold Key To Force's Success. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

195. Australia Accused Over Failure To Act. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

196. They Wanted To See Dad Off, But Just Couldn't Swing It. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

197. Jakarta Tells Peacekeepers: Heed Danger Warnings. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

198. Militias Now Fear Indonesian Troops. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

199. Smarting Over A Blow To Pride. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

200. Advance Guard Of 2,000 Troops Ready For Action. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

201. Pilot's Plea: I Will Fly In Now. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

202. Two Militiamen Among Refugees Flown To Darwin. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

203. UN Force In For The Long Haul. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

204. Air Drops Start In 24 Hours. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**

205. Diggers In First Wave. **September 16, 1999 Thursday.**
206. Time To Take On Defence. September 17, 1999 Friday.

207. Deadlock Blocks Food For Starving. September 17, 1999 Friday.

208. Belo's Aide Implicates Top General. September 17, 1999 Friday.


210. Disarming Militias 'a Concern'. September 17, 1999 Friday.

211. Martial Law Will Stay In Meantime. September 17, 1999 Friday.

212. Surrender Your Weapons Now, Says Commander. September 17, 1999 Friday.

213. In The City Of The Damned, A Faint Heartbeat. September 17, 1999 Friday.

214. Mole Leak Seen As Bid To Stir Emotions. September 17, 1999 Friday.

215. Torn-up Treaty A Turn For The Worse. September 17, 1999 Friday.

216. Defence Signals Easily Misread. September 17, 1999 Friday.

217. Rescue Countdown. September 17, 1999 Friday.

218. Gusmao Seeks Talks With Rivals. September 17, 1999 Friday.

219. A Proud Mother Bids Her Son Farewell And Waits. September 18, 1999 Saturday.

220. John Winston Howard Shows His Mettle. September 18, 1999 Saturday.

221. So Much Hindsight, So Little Foresight. September 18, 1999 Saturday.

222. Army's Games Role Disrupted. September 18, 1999 Saturday.

223. First Food Flown To Starving Refugees. September 18, 1999 Saturday.


225. PM Denies Strategy Was Flawed. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
226. Insurer Sets Deadline For Troops. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
228. A Word In Your Ear, PM . . . Look After My Boy. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
230. 'God Be With You . . . Please Come Home Safely'. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
231. Squabble Over Deputy's Role. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
233. UN Force Has A Mandate To Shoot. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
235. Small Joys In Tent City. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
236. The End Of An Agreement. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
239. Bishop Fears Another Wave Of Murder. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
244. We Neglected Timor Says Judge. September 19, 1999 Sunday.
245. Messages Pour In For 'our Boys'. September 19, 1999 Sunday.
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247. 'So Many People Will Die'. September 19, 1999 Sunday.
248. Twist Of Fate Puts Future In Our Hands. September 19, 1999 Sunday.
250. Going To War To Keep The Peace. September 19, 1999 Sunday.
251. Keating Homes In On Wrong Target. September 19, 1999 Sunday.
256. Timor Talks Set Stage For Mission. September 20, 1999 Monday.
258. Warning For Australian Residents. September 20, 1999 Monday.
The Australian articles.

7. 55,000 flee militia violence. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
10. We can help if Jakarta let us. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
15. Timor faith should be betrayed. September 6, 1999, Monday.
18. The blood is in Wiranto’s hands. September 6, 1999, Monday.

25. Call for force to back people's will. September 6, 1999, Monday.


30. From joy to terror in a week. September 6, 1999, Monday.


32. The regime in Jakarta is up to its dirty tricks again. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.


34. The people's voice must be heard. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.

35. Thugs left to murder and maim in peace. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.


41. Outrage as ambassador is shot at. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.

42. Militia links stretch all the way to Wiranto. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.


44. Warm relationship put on very thin ice. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.

45. Portugal: UN efforts 'fall short'. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.

47. I shall return, says a retreating crusader. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.


50. Howard's choice: to go to war or the UN. September 8, 1999, Wednesday.

51. It would do no good to barge in. September 8, 1999, Wednesday.

52. We must repay debt of honour. September 8, 1999, Wednesday.


56. ASEAN looks the other way. September 8, 1999, Wednesday.


59. Born into a world under fire. September 8, 1999, Wednesday.

60. Nun haunted by her ordeal. September 8, 1999, Wednesday.


63. Refugees herded into exile. September 8, 1999, Wednesday.

64. New Order reborn in bloodshed. September 8, 1999, Wednesday.


68. UN abandons last post. September 9, 1999, Thursday.

69. They came, they saw, then left. September 9, 1999, Thursday.


73. Martial law fails to stop the killing. September 9, 1999, Thursday.


81. The awful truth: we'll do nothing to stop the carnage. September 10, 1999, Friday.

82. Generals plotted terror. September 10, 1999, Friday.


84. TEARS FOR THE SLAUGHTERED. September 11, 1999, Saturday.


86. PM's heart says yes, but his lips say no. September 11, 1999, Saturday.

87. At war with ourselves. September 11, 1999, Saturday.


89. Rage, rage against the sitting on hands. September 11, 1999, Saturday.


91. Timor tragedy shows where we stand. September 11, 1999, Saturday.

92. US under fire for 'timidity'. September 11, 1999, Saturday.


95. The tide of protests swell. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
96. UN misjudges again. **September** 11, 1999, Saturday.

97. Right man for the job. **September** 11, 1999, Saturday.

98. Impotence exposed to the world. **September** 11, 1999, Saturday.

99. Last bastion hold on to battered belief. **September** 11, 1999, Saturday.

100. Trauma of those exiting 'dead' city. **September** 11, 1999, Saturday.


102. Countdown to chaos. **September** 11, 1999, Saturday.

103. Tears for the slaughtered. **September** 11, 1999, Saturday.

104. 'Utmost in a very complex situation'. **September** 11, 1999, Saturday.

105. The brawl now firmly in Wiranto's court. **September** 11, 1999, Saturday.


108. 'Please do not leave us here we will die'. **September** 13, 1999, Monday.


111. Diggers face blood, sweat and militia. **September** 13, 1999, Monday.

112. Praise for 'courageous step'. **September** 13, 1999, Monday.

113. Climbdown may spell downfalls. **September** 13, 1999, Monday.

114. PM builds force to be reckoned with? **September** 13, 1999, Monday.

115. Peacekeepers to go in - Habibie bows to world pressure. **September** 13, 1999, Monday.

116. No refuge, even for the sisterhood. **September** 13, 1999, Monday.
117. War crime names on 'long chain'. September 13, 1999, Monday.


119. Sole refuge is to head for the hills. September 13, 1999, Monday.

120. Refugee's plea for help hits UN nerve. September 13, 1999, Monday.

121. Howard builds force; is it one to be reckoned with? September 13, 1999, Monday.

122. Ordinary people demand to be heard. September 13, 1999, Monday.

123. PM gains Clinton's pledge on peace plan. September 13, 1999, Monday.


127. Food drops offer lifeline to thousands. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

128. Families live in fear of things that go 'ring' in the night. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.


130. Asian may lead the UN outfit. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

131. Aid airlift to starving. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

132. Cards tell diggers when to shoot. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

133. Bank Indonesia says there's plenty in the till. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

134. Don't forget we're on our own. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

135. Pared-down military barks, but can it bite? September 14, 1999, Tuesday.


Support for peacekeepers. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Starvation feared in hill retreats. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Terror tracks refugees to Checkpoint Charnel. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Canberra role stirs regional dilemma. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Enforcers warned: stick to your guns. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Vietnam vets tipped to lead peace force. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Defence spending up, review tipped. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

To reckon with. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Peacekeepers' mandate key to success. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Outrage, relief amid strained ties. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Don't sack Uncle Sam, it's a case of Yankee Dili dandy. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Restoring peace in East Timor. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.

Belo's promise: I will go home. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.


Quiet achiever of UN debate. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.

Peace force may suffer casualties. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.


From the lips of prime ministers. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.

When it pays to hear voices in the wilderness. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.


166. What countries will contribute to the peacekeeping force. **September** 15, 1999, Wednesday.


170. Lisbon, Canberra to give the most. **September** 15, 1999, Wednesday.


174. Cry from the heart on flights out of hell. **September** 15, 1999, Wednesday.

175. Drafts diluted to suit Jakarta. **September** 16, 1999, Thursday.

176. Devotion to duty. **September** 16, 1999, Thursday.


178. Man in the line of fire. **September** 16, 1999, Thursday.


183. For baby Unamet, the name says it all. September 16, 1999, Thursday.

184. Fears that food airdrops will kill more than they save. September 16, 1999, Thursday.


188. Presence needed for up to five years. September 16, 1999, Thursday.


190. Cost of military operation could reach $700m a year. September 16, 1999, Thursday.


192. UN gives the command. September 16, 1999, Thursday.

193. All dressed up, only one place to go. September 16, 1999, Thursday.


196. Hefty price to pay for meddling. September 17, 1999, Friday.

197. This burden is here to stay. September 17, 1999, Friday.

198. Refugees trapped behind wall of silence. September 17, 1999, Friday.
199. Jakarta's 'final solution' exposed. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

200. Miners pull out expat staff. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

201. Soldiers in bid to clean up their act. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

202. Aceh calls for vote on autonomy. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

203. A people guided by hand of faith. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

204. Belo aide cites crime suspects. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

205. Worries at bay on home front. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

206. Are we ready for death? **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

207. The humane side of tragedy. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

208. Top brass talk tough on job to be done. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

209. It's a blow to lose the pact we had to have. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

210. A deal struck by yesterday's men. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

211. Jakarta 'spy' inquiry call. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

212. Foreign mine staff evacuated. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

213. Jakarta severs security ties with Canberra. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

214. US fury at our 'failing'. **September 17, 1999, Friday.**

215. Habibie sets Howard his toughest test. **September 18, 1999, Saturday.**

216. Bitter pillory to swallow. **September 18, 1999, Saturday.**

217. Juggle for a new Jakarta. **September 18, 1999, Saturday.**

218. DRESSED TO KILL. **September 18, 1999, Saturday.**

219. Troops will need uncommon virtue. **September 18, 1999, Saturday.**

220. Best of help for soldiers' families. **September 18, 1999, Saturday.**

221. Tempers fraying in city on front line. **September 18, 1999, Saturday.**

222. Militia threat of war in Australia. **September 18, 1999, Saturday.**

223. West just as wild for 150,000 'hostages'. **September 18, 1999, Saturday.**
224. UN desperate for a little peace of history. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
226. Thais take up Asia's colours. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
229. We're marching a fine line. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
239. Don't stretch troops all the way to the border, says Burke. September 20, 1999, Monday.
Kompas articles.

5. Timtim "Merdeka", Usaha Jalan Terus.... September 5.
25. PAN Terima Sepenuh Hati Hasil Penentuan Pendapat. September 11.
32. Timtim dan Reorientasi Strategi TNI. September 13.
35. Pro-Integrasi tak Rela. September 16.
36. RI Bahas Masuknya Pasukan Perdamaian. September 12.
38. Indonesia Undang Pasukan PBB. September 13.
42. Sebaiknya tak Dipimpin Australia September 14.
43. Yudhoyono dan Frederick Mengko Dampingi Menlu ke PBB. September 14.
44. Thailand Siap Beri Bantuan Kemanusiaan. September 15.
45. Pasukan PBB Tiba Akhir Pekan Ini. September 15.
46. PBB Harus Hati-hati Tentukan Komposisi Pasukan. September 15.
47. Cerita Somalia. September 15.
48. Australia Pimpin Pasukan PBB. September 16.
49. Megawati Ingatkan PBB. September 16.


52. Thailand Dampingi Australia. September 17.


57. Tentara Indonesia dan PBB. September 19.

3. Timor Timur bukan Bagian dari Nasionalisme Indonesia September 6.
5. Pukulan dari Timor Timur September 6.
17. PBB belum Putuskan Kirim Pasukan Perdamaian ke Timtim September 8.
19. RI Tetap tidak Terima Pasukan PBB September 10.
29. RI Terima Pasukan Perdamaian PBB. September 13.
33. Politisasi Timtim. September 15.
34. Mempertimbangkan Empati Untuk Timor Timur. September 15.
35. Pasukan PBB bleh Bertindak Apa saja. September 16.
36. TNI dan CNRT Sepakat Tutup Lembaran Sejarah Masa Lalu. September 16.
37. Revitalisasi Nasionalisme setelah Referendum di Timtim. September 17.
41. DPR Memahami Keputusan Presiden. September 14.
42. Pasukan Ini Biasanya Dipersiapkan untuk Perang. September 16.
43. PBB Harus Hindari Subjektivitas yang bisa Merugikan Indonesia. September 15.
44. Australia Pimpin Pasukan PBB. September 15.
45. Milisi Timtim Versus Australia. September 19.
47. 2.500 Pasukan Interfet Tiba di Dili Pagi ini. September 20.
Media Indonesia articles


2. Timor Timur Tidak Langsung Merdeka. September 5.


30. DPR Sesalkan Australia Pimpin Pasukan PBB. September 16.
34. Diusulkan Provinsi Ke-27 baru. September
38. Australia Bernafsu Pimpin Pasukan PBB. September 14.
40. Timtim Diselesaikan Secara Terbuka. September 15.
41. Kemenangan Bagi Australia. September 17.
42. Thailand Setuju Menjadi Wakil Komandan. September 17.
44. Cina Kirim Insinyur Bertugas di Timtim
46. AS Kerahkan 200 Orang Tentara. September 18.
47. TNI Gagal, PBB Masuk. September 19.

51. 2.000 Tentara Siap ke Timtim. September 20.


22. Indonesia Setujui Kerja Sama Keamanan Dengan PBB Di Timtim. September
28. Prajurit Indonesia Dan Milisi Timtim Dituduh Jarah barang UNAMET. September 15.
33. Awasi Resolusi DK-PBB
34. Pasukan Multinasional Tiba Sabtu. September 17.
35. Tak Akan Bentrok. September 17.
Appendix B

Chapters 4 – Transcripts of articles analysed

(Quoted articles on Sanders Thoenes)

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Thrill of adventure dies in the dust
Don Greenless – The Australian.
September 23 – 1999

HE was a tall, strapping Dutchman, with a thick shock of blond hair, seated astride a motorcycle speeding along Dili’s seafront.

Only hours before Sander Thoenes died, he appeared to brim with the thrill of journalistic adventure.

It came to an end on the dusty verge of a road in Becora, one of Dili’s many bloodstained neighbourhoods.

When the Australian army found his body yesterday, Sander wasn’t easy to recognise.

This handsome 30-year-old, whose pink cheeks made him look years younger, had a bullet through his head and an ear severed by a knife -- a gruesome memento for the killers.

Sander had ridden on the back of Floriado Da Conceicao Araujo’s motorbike into Becora about 4.30 on Tuesday afternoon.

They hadn’t gone far before they ran into six men in Indonesian military uniforms.

They were ordered to stop, but a familiar fear of Indonesian authority took over. Floriado turned his bike around and tried to speed away. Sander crouched lower, tightly hugging his waist.

"I could hear them shooting ... they shot the motorcycle and we fell," Floriado said.

He escaped into the trees beside the road with an injured leg. Sander lay in the dust, not moving. The assailants came closer, still shooting.

Floriado had only a glimpse before disappearing. "He couldn’t run, so he was certainly shot," Floriado said.

Sander worked for the Financial Times of London and the Boston-based Christian Science Monitor. He had been in Jakarta for nearly two years. He was an easygoing, intelligent journalist.

He was the last person any one of us would have expected to die in Dili. The Financial Times, he said, did not have the same intense interest as other papers,
so he usually only stopped a couple of days before heading back to Jakarta.

Last Thursday, as the peace enforcers appeared to be on their way, Sander, a member of the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club board, was busy organising flights for journalists in, and out of, Dili.

Sander won’t be on one.

Military Tramples Decency and Hope
By Louise Williams – The Sydney Morning Herald.

September 25, 1999

Several days before he was killed in East Timor, Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes discussed concerns he had about the black operations being conducted behind the public face of the Indonesian Government and military. He was concerned about the violence and death that a power struggle among the Indonesian elite would bring to East Timor.

His own life ended tragically on the outskirts of the East Timorese capital, Dili, his killers dressed in Indonesian military uniforms, his young body mutilated by his killers.

His death, some believe, was part of the bigger picture he had been talking about with friends: the use of terror, intimidation and the provocation of violence to promote the political interests of the Indonesian military and to maintain the status quo.

What killing Sander, one of the most qualified and insightful members of the Jakarta-based foreign press corps, achieved was to frighten other journalists seeking the truth about the Indonesian military and the militia’s brutal role in East Timor over the past weeks.

But his death was just part of an ongoing fear campaign to demonstrate that despite the democratic face of the post-Soeharto Indonesian Government, the authoritarian forces of the military still hold the real power and they have no intention of letting it go.

What East Timor represents to the Indonesian military is an unacceptable international humiliation. To that end public opinion in Indonesia is being manipulated to criticise Australia’s role in the peacekeeping force and sow fear among Australians in Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia.

It is not surprising that snipers this week fired, mysteriously, into the Australian Embassy despite the presence of Indonesian military guards, that demonstrators tore down the Australian flag inside the consulate in Balikpapan and raised the

Indonesian flag instead, that mobs burnt Australian flags in Jakarta, and that Australia businesses were the targets of death threats.

The demonstrators, however, are not ordinary Indonesians, but "rent-a-crowd" members of right-wing groups with links to the military.

Indonesian politicians routinely talk about "provocateurs" stoking violence for political ends, playing one religion off against another, one culture off against another along the numerous fracture lines that run through Indonesian society. It is important to remember that in May last year massive riots which devastated Jakarta were provoked by one faction within the Indonesian military seeking to discredit the Commander in Chief and promote the ambitions of their own commander. At least 1,300 ordinary Indonesians died.

"The political and military elite are so accustomed to power that thousands of lives are not too much to achieve their ends," said one Asian diplomat recently.

It is important to point out that there is little that is genuine about this "rising wave of anti-Australian sentiment". Ordinary Indonesians, struggling under the weight of the worst economic crisis since World War II, are not afforded the luxury of misplaced national pride and have had little interest in the Timor issue.

But, it is perhaps even more important to point out that within Indonesia this week there were far larger, and more passionate, demonstrations by Indonesians against their own armed forces and the political elite which is willing to maintain its power.

There were unconfirmed reports that five students died and scores were injured in clashes with police on Thursday night as thousands protested outside the Indonesian Parliament building over new legislation which would further enhance the powers of the security apparatus.

That legislation mocks the "democratic" victory of tens of thousands of student demonstrators who last year forced President Soeharto to step down, raising hopes of an end to military abuses and the evolution of an accountable, democratic system.

And the East Timor carnage is a tragic warning to other regions that the military will continue to act with impunity.

For Australia the ongoing power struggle in Jakarta is crucial for our own efforts to reshape our tattered foreign policy to reflect the realities Timor has exposed. It appears that right now the Indonesian military is not able to be effectively checked.

But it would also be foolish to discount the strength of the democratic movement in Indonesia and the deep resentment of the armed forces among the people of other regions, such as Aceh and Irian Jaya, who have suffered so much.
The attackers, allegedly Indonesian soldiers, who murdered Sander Thoenes cut his ear and took it away as some sort of bizarre souvenir.

The 30-year-old Dutch journalist thought it was safe enough to take a ride late on Tuesday on the back of a motorbike through the Dili suburb of Becora, a one-time independence stronghold that is now a wasteland.

We all had a false sense of security, after seeing hundreds of heavily armed Australian troops arriving in the devastated capital of East Timor, and hearing from Interfet commander Major-General Peter Cosgrove about the co-operation of the Indonesian military, or TNI.

But they had only secured the airport, wharf and United Nations compound. The rest of Dili remains a dangerous no-man's land.

Motorbike rider Florindo Araujo knew he and Thoenes were in trouble when he saw six men dressed and equipped as Indonesian soldiers on the road about 200 metres ahead shortly before dusk. Although militias sometimes wear bits of uniform, Mr Araujo has no doubt these were Indonesian troops.

"I saw them lift their automatic rifles towards us and motioned us to stop. I tried to turn around but they started shooting, maybe 10 or 20 times. There were bullets all around. My motorbike was damaged and we went down. The journalist looked asleep. It looked like they were going to continue shooting so I ran away."

Shortly after dawn the body of Thoenes, who works for London's Financial Times and the Dutch weekly Vrij Nederland, was found by friends face down in Becora, his body battered and apparently mutilated.

American photographer Chip Hires and British journalist Jon Swain were not greatly worried when they saw a convoy of Indonesian soldiers on the edge of Dili about the same time as Thoenes was killed. But the soldiers, East Timorese from one of the two locally-raised TNI battalions, stopped their taxi.

"For me it was sort of the year of living dangerously all over again," said Hires. "They started hammering our driver - then his eye came out. He was beaten very badly. They put him on the back of a truck and were still beating him."

One of the soldiers then pulled out a pistol and shot out the taxi's tyres.

Hires said he and Swain, a veteran Asian journalist who survived Pol Pot's occupation of Phnom Penh in 1975, were then told to go away. "We took cover in a small village and called our office in London on a mobile telephone."

The call mobilised more than 100 Australian soldiers, armoured personnel carriers and Black Hawk helicopters. The men were rescued early yesterday morning.* Sander Thoenes's body will be flown to Darwin in the next few days.

Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office yesterday demanded that those responsible for the "appalling" killing be brought to justice.
Dili (Media): Memasuki hari ketiga kehadiran Interfet di Timor Timur, situasi di Bumi Loro Sae itu semakin tegang. Aksi pembakaran dan penjarahan mulai terjadi lagi, bahkan belasan wartawan Indonesia mendapat ancaman pembunuhan.

(Entering the third day of INTERFET presence in East Timor, the situation in the Loro Sae land is becoming more tense. Acts of arsons and riotings has started again and dozens of Indonesian journalists were threatened with murder).

Sepanjang hari Rabu, kemarin asap terlihat di sejumlah tempat. Kelompok pro-kemerdekaan yang marah karena mengetahui rumah mereka dibakar milisi sebelum pasukan PBB mendarat di Timtim melakukan pembalasan dengan membakar rumah-rumah yang masih utuh.

(All day long on Wednesday, smoke was seen in several areas. The pro-independence groups that were angry upon learning that their houses have been burned by the militias prior to the arrival of UN troops, were having their revenge by burning houses that were still intact).


(In the middle of the uncertain security and political situation, Media’s journalists, Edi Hidayat and Gino F. Hadi reported that residents that had run to the jungles had started to return to the towns since morning. The residents had looted the Dolog and Makore warehouses, as well as scratching houses that were burned. Men, women and children were all running around trying to find goods that can be taken home).

Sementara itu sepuluh helicopter Interfet melakukan patroli udara, berputar-putar di atas Kota Dili. Sedangkan di darat, 3,000 personel melakukan patroli kota hingga menyusur ke daerah perkampungan seperti Decora, Timore, Audian dan Aebesi. Para personel Interfet itu melakukan sweeping kepada setiap warga masyarakat yang ingin masuk kota. Sampai kemin Interfet sudah menangkap puluhan anggota milisi, baik yang membawa senjata api maupun senjata tajam.

(Meanwhile, ten INTERFET choppers started air patrols, flying above the City of Dili. On the land, 3,000 personnel conducted urban patrols in the residential,
areas such as Decora, Timor, Audian and Aebesi. INTERFET personnel searched all people who wanted to enter the town. Up until yesterday, INTERFET has arrested tens militias members that were carrying sharp weapons or firearms).


(In anticipation of such a situation all journalists that were working in Dili were evacuated to KOREM headquaters specially after there was a threat to the dozens of Indonesian journalists still in Dili that they would be killed following the death of foreign journalist, Sandler Toenes, 30, from the The Financial Times. After being threatened, all Indonesian journalists who worked in Dili would be lifted out to Jakarta via Kupang).

Sedangkan dua wartawan asing yang dikabarkan hilang, kemarin sudah ditemukan patroli gabungan TNI - Interfet di Desa Decora pada pukul 24.00 Wita, Selasa.

(Meanwhile two foreign journalists that were reported missing were found yesterday by joint TNI- INTERFET patrol in the Decora village at 24.00 Central Indonesian Time (WITA) on Tuesday).

Menurut Panglima Penguasa Darurat Militer Timtim, Mayjen Kiki Syahnakri, kedua wartawan itu pada pukul 17.30 Wita berada di jembatan Decora pada saat iring-iringan Batalyon 475 melintas dari Dili ke Atambua, kedua wartawan itu berusaha membuat dokumentasi.

(According to the Commander of Military emergency area East Timor, Major General Kiki Syahnakri, the two journalists were at Decora bridge at 17.30 local time when the convoy of Batallion 475 were crossing from Dili to Atambua. The two journalist were trying to make a documentary).  

Berbagai reaksi  
Various reactions

Dari Jakarta, reaksi atas kematian wartawan asing itu segera mendapat tanggapan dari berbagai kalangan. Menhankan/Panglima TNI Jenderal Wiranto mengatakan belum secara resmi menerima laporan adanya wartawan asing yang tewas di Timor Timur.

(From Jakarta, reactions to the foreign journalist's death immediately arrived from various sections. Minister of Defence/TNI Commander General Wiranto said that he had not received a formal report regarding a foreign journalist killed in East Timor).

("I have received the news and I shall check who, why and how it happened. Of course I have to wait for reports," he said before attending the limited Cabinet on economic and industry meeting at Bina Graha, Jakarta, Wednesday).

Sedangkan Kapuspen Hankam/TNI Mayjen Sudrajat mengatakan, tuduhan yang menyebutkan personel TNI terlibat dalam kasus terbunuhnya wartawan Sander Toenes di Timtim adalah suatu tuduhan yang tidak adil, tendensius, tidak punya dasar dan suatu tindakan provokatif.

(armed Forces, spokesmen Major General Sudradjat said that the accusation about TNI personnel were involved in the death of Sander Toenes in East Timor is an unfair, tendentious statement which has no foundation and is a provocative act).

"TNI sudah berulang kali mendapatkan tuduhan yang tendensius. Saya tegaskan, tuduhan itu adalah tidak etis dan tidak punya dasar," kata Kapuspen menanggapi pertanyaan wartawan di Mabes TNI JI Merdeka Barat, Rabu malam.

("TNI has repeatedly received tendentious accusations. I asserted that such an accusation is unethical and has no foundation," said TNI spokesman answering questions from journalists at the TNI Headquarters in Jalan Merdeka Barat, Wednesday night).

Lalu siapa yang bertanggung jawab atas kematian wartawan di Timor Timur, TNI atau Interfet? Beberapa wartawan senior di Jakarta yang didatangi Antara Rabu menyebutkan, Pasukan Internasional untuk Timor Timur (Interfet)-lah yang bertanggung jawab terhadap keamanan semua wartawan yang menjalankan tugas jurnalistik di Timtim, karena pasukan bentukan PBB itu kini mengendalikan situasi di wilayah tersebut.

(Then who is going to be responsible for the death of a journalist in East Timor, is it TNI or INTERFET? Several senior journalists in Jakarta that were contacted by ANTARA, on Wednesday said that the INTERFET is the one responsible for the security to all journalists that were conducting their journalism work in East Timor because UN troops are now controlling the area).


(As an international force, INTERFET has to protect journalists in the area of armed conflict," said Dja'far Assegaf Chief Editor of Media Indonesia daily).
Pendapat serupa dilontarkan Parni Hadi, Pemimpin Umum LKBN Antara dan Harian Republika. Mantan Sekjen PW1 Pusat itu menegaskan, Interfet seyoginya memberikan perlindungan maksimal agar semua wartawan apapun kebangsaan mereka, dapat menjalankan tugas jurnalistik secara aman dan lancar.

(Similar opinions were expressed by Parni Hadi, General Manager of ANTARA news agency and REPUBLIKA. The former secretary general of Indonesian Journalist Association asserted that INTERFET should give maximum protection to all journalists regardless of their nationalities so they can conduct their journalistic duties safely).

Demikian juga pakar hukum pidana yang dekat dengan dunia kewartawanan, Prof Loebby Luqman. Loebby menekankan bahwa Interfet harus bertanggung jawab atas situasi keamanan, termasuk memberikan perlindungan kepada wartawan yang tengah menjalankan tugas di wilayah konflik bersenjata, karena saat ini seluruh kendali sudah di tangan pasukan internasional yang dipimpin Australia itu.

(Professor Loebby Luqman, a legal practitioner who was known to be close to the journalist community, asserted that INTERFET should be responsible for the security situation, including giving protection for journalists who were doing their works in the armed conflict areas. As for now the Australian led international force has full control).

Sedangkan Ketua Komnas HAM, Marzuki Darusman, mengharapkan tindakan stabilisasi keamanan yang kini ditangani pasukan internasional hendaknya bisa menciptakan keadilan dan persamaan terhadap semua warga Indonesia di Timor Timur.

(Head of National Commission of Human Rights, Marzuki Darusman is hoping the security stabilization efforts that are now conducted by the international force should be able to create justice and equality to all Indonesian citizens in East Timor).
Wartawan Asing Tewas Dibunuh – ‘Interfet Harus Bertanggung Jawab’

Foreign Journalist murdered – ‘Interfet must bear the responsibility’


Dili – Pasukan multinasional untuk Timor Timur (Interfet) harus bertanggung jawab atas keamanan semua wartawan yang menjalankan tugas jurnalistik di Timtim. Pasalnya, menurut sejumlah wartawan senior Indonesia, pasukan bentukan PBB itulah yang kini mengendalikan situasi Timtim.

("As multinational force, INTERFET should protect journalists in conflict area," said Dja’far Assegaf, former head of Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI).


(Thoenes death had sparked revenge from the pro-independence group. Yesterday, around ten Indonesian journalist reported that their lives had been threatened by the pro-independence group.)

(Thoenes death was acknowledged by FT Public Relation manager, Anoushka Healy. She stated their deep regrets for the tragedy that killed their correspondent. "We are very surprised and sad, specially after we heard statement from eye witness who said that Thoenes was deliberately shot until killed.

Anoushka mengaku masih belum bisa berkomentar banyak akan peristiwa itu. Kami katanya, masih mengumpulkan informasi lebih lanjut tentang bagaimana Thoenes tewas. "Baru setelah itu kami akan mengambil keputusan tentang apa yang akan kami lakukan, apakah kami akan melayangkan kecaman kepada Pemerintah Indonesia atau langkah lain."

(Anoushka admitted that she cannot give comments regarding the incident. They are still collecting further information regarding how Thoenes died. "After that we will make the decision of what we will do, whether we are going to condemn the Indonesian government or take other steps."

Florindo Araujo, seorang warga Timtim dalam wawancaranya di BBC, mengaku telah mengantarkan Thoenes ke kawasan pinggiran Dili, Becora, Selasa silam. Di tengah jalan ujarnya, ia dan Thoenes melihat penghadang jalan yang dijaga oleh enam pria bersenjata yang mengenakan seragam polisi RI.

(Florindo Araujo, an East Timorese in an interview with BBC, admitted that he had taken Thoenes to the suburb of Dili, Becora, last Tuesday. On the way, he and Thoenes saw road block that was manned by six armed men who wore Indonesian police uniforms.)

Dalam kesempatan itu, Araujo mengaku membalikkan motornya dan bukannya berhenti. Namun ujarnya, orang-orang bersenjata yang sebelumnya berjaga-jaga di dekat penghalang jalan itu langsung mengejar mereka dengan mobil dan kemudian menembaki bagian roda depan sepeda motornya.

(On that occasion, Araujo admitted that he turned his motorcycle instead of stopping. But he said that the armed men that were previously just standing in the road block immediately chased them with cars and shot his motorcycle's front wheels.)


("My motorcycle then fell and we were dragged for approximately 100 meters.

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The journalist fell to the street. They kept shooting and I ran to the jungle, " said Araujo to the BBC. According to Araujo, he last saw Thoenes lying in the street before finally receiving the news that he was found dead.

Bawah Interfet harus bertanggung jawab atas keselamatan wartawan juga dibenarkan Parni Hadi, Pemimpin Umum LKBN ANTARA dan PU Republika. Mantan Sekjen PWI Pusat itu menegaskan Interfet seyogyanya memberikan perlindungan maksimal agar semua wartawan, apapun kebangsaan mereka dapat menjalankan tugas jurnalistik dengan aman dan lancar. Ia mengingatkan perlindungan terhadap wartawan itu sesuai dengan Konvensi Palang Merah Internasional.

(The perception that INTERFET should bear the responsibility for the safety of the journalists was supported Parni Hadi, ANTARA News Agency Chief of Editor and REPUBLIKA's Chief of Editor. Former secretary general for PWI central stated that INTERFET should give maximum protection to all journalists regardless of their nationalities so they can conduct their journalistic works. He reminded us that the protection for journalists is according to the International Red Cross Convention.)

Sejak pasukan Interfet yang dipimpin Australia masuk Dili awal pekan ini, keamanan para wartawan yang meliput situasi di daerah bergolak itu kurang terjamin.

(Since the arrival of the Australian led INTERFET in Dili early this week, the safety of the journalists that were covering in the conflict area is not well protected.)

Pakar hukum pidana yang dekat dengan dunia kewartawanan Prof Loebby Loqman, menekankan pula bahwa Interfet harus bertanggung-jawab atas situasi keamanan Dili. Itu termasuk memberikan perlindungan kepada wartawan yang tengah menjalankan tugas di wilayah konflik bersenjata. Pasalnya saat ini seluruh kendali sudah di tangan pasukan multinasional itu.

(A criminal law expert who is close to the journalists community Prof Loebby Loqman, also stated that INTERFET should be responsible for the security situation in Dili. It includes giving protection to journalists who are conducting their duties in the armed conflict areas as at present all control is in the hands of the multinational troops.)

"Kendali keamanan yang sebelumnya dipegang TNI telah diambil alih Interfet sejak lembaga tersebut mendapatkan mandat dari Dewan Keamanan PBB untuk memulihkan keamanan di Timtim," katanya.

("The control for security that was previously handled by TNI has been taken by the INTERFET since it got the mandate from the UN Security Council to restore security in East Timor," he said.)

Tentang sikap pasukan Interfet, Loebby menilai mereka sudah bertindak di luar
batas kewajaran, padahal mereka tahu TNI juga melaksanakan tugas di Timtim.
"Mereka itu melakukan operasi tanpa basa-basi, seperti melakukan razia dengan
brutal dan tindakan melampaui batas dan tidak memiliki sopan-santun sedikit
pun," kata guru besar UI itu.

(Regarding the INTERFET's attitude, Loebby believes that they have acted
beyond normalcy, though they know that TNI is also doing their job in East
Timor. "They did the operation without any regard to local customs. They
carried out brutal raids, going beyond the limits of good manners," said the
professor from University of Indonesia.)

Panglima Darurat Militer Mayjen TNI Kiki Syahnakri membenarkan tewasnya
wartawan FT. Namun ia belum dapat menjelaskan sebab-sebab kematian itu.
Kiki membantah pemberitaan pers asing bahwa Thoenes tewas setelah terjadi
kontak senjata antara TNI dan gerombolan.

(The commander of military emergency Major General Kiki Syahnakri
confirmed the death of The Financial Times journalist. But he could not explain
the caused of the death. Kiki rejects the foreign press reports that Thoenes died
after armed contact between TNI and armed gangs).

Dari Jakarta, Menhankam/Panglima TNI Jenderal Wiranto mengatakan ia belum
secara resmi menerima laporan adanya wartawan asing yang tewas di Timor
Timur. "Saya dengar berita itu dan saya akan mengecek siapa, kenapa bisa
begitu. Tentunya harus menunggu laporan-laporan," katanya sebelum mengikuti
Sidang Kabinet Terbatas bidang Ekuin di Bina Graha, kemarin.

(In Jakarta, the Minister of Defense/Armed forces commander General Wiranto
said that he has not officially received reports regarding the death of foreign
journalist in East Timor. "I heard the news and I will check who has been killed,
and how it happened. Of course I have to wait for reports," he said prior to the
limited cabinet meeting on finance and economic sector at Bina Graha,
yesterday.)

Lebih lanjut Wiranto mengatakan ia tidak mau berspekulasi tentang tewasnya
wartawan asing itu. "Jadi laporan-laporan yang diterima sumber-sumbernya
barangkali belum bisa kita pastikan, kemungkinan bisa terjadi masalah-masalah
baru," katanya.

(Furthermore, Wiranto said that he did not want to speculate regarding the
death of a foreign journalist. "We haven’t been able to verify the sources of the
reports that we received, probably there will be some new developments," he
said.)

Tentang tewasnya Thoenes, Panglima Pasukan Interfet, Mayjen Cosgrove di
Dili, kemarin mengatakan pihaknya sedang melakukan penyelidikan di tempat
kejadian itu. "Saya mendapatkan laporan tentang kematian itu. Tim pasukan
Interfet dikirim ke tempat kejadian dan memastikan bahwa korban adalah
seorang jurnalis," katanya.
(Regarding the death of Thoenes, INTERFET commander Major General Cosgrove in Dili yesterday said that his side is doing an investigation at the crime site. “I have received reports regarding the murder. The INTERFET team were sent to the site and it was verified that the victim was a journalist,” he said).

Dia berharap para wartawan yang sedang melakukan peliputan di Timtim lebih berhati-hati dan memberikan laporan yang bijaksana dengan memperhatikan keselamatan diri.

(He hopes that all journalists who are covering East Timor will be more careful and gives proper reports while maintaining personal safety).

Di Canberra, Australia, Pemerintah Australia memahami pernyataan Presiden BJ Habibie yang menilai reaksi Negara Kanguru itu berlebihan mengenai masalah Timtim. “Australia yakin hubungan kedua Negara yang kini merosot suatu ketika dapat dibangun kembali,” kata Howard sebagaimana dikutip Dubes RI untuk Australia Wiryono Sastrohandoyo di Canberra, Rabu, usai keduanya bertemu.

(In Canberra, Australia, Australian Government stated that they can understand the strong statement by President BJ Habibie who thinks that Australia’s reaction regarding East Timor is beyond its proportion. “Australia believes that the relationship between the two countries that now is at the lowest level, one day can be rebuilt again,” said Howard as quoted by the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia Wiryono Sastrohandoyo in Canberra, Wednesday, after the two of them met).


(Ambassador Wiryono came to PM John Howard’s office to bid farewell as his duty as Indonesian Ambassador to Australia will end on September 30. The meeting was also used to discuss the current relationship between the two countries).

Dalam kesempatan itu, Howard mengaku terus mengikuti pidato Presiden Habibie di depan anggota DPR/MPR. Selasa kemarin melalui jaringan Televisi CNN, Howard menilai persepsi rakyat Indonesia yang menilai sikap Pemerintah Australia angkuh dan berlebihan tidak terlepas dari peran media yang cenderung memanas-manasi.

(On that occasion, Howard said that he always follows President Habibie’s speech in front of the parliament members. On Tuesday, through CNN, Howard said the Indonesian people’s perception that thinks the Australian Government attitude as arrogant and beyond proportion is related to the role of the media
Kepada Howard, Dubes Wiryono menyatakan sepakat bahwa kedua pemerintah perlu melihat memburuknya hubungan tersebut dengan lebih jernih dan tidak larut dengan emosi dan kemerahan. Wiryono juga mengemukakan bahwa Kedutaan Besar RI (KBRI) kini telah dapat berfungsi kembali setelah selama dua pekan ia dan seluruh staf tidak bisa berkantor di KBRI.

(To Howard, Ambassador Wiryono said he agrees that the two governments need to see the worsening of the relationship with more clarity and not be taken by emotion and anger. Wiryono also stated that the Indonesian embassy (KBRI) is now functioning again after two weeks he and his staff could not work in the embassy).
Wartawan "Financial Times" Tewas Dibacok Di Timtim

"Financial Times" journalist died after being slashed in East Timor.


Pada perkembangan lain, ribuan penduduk Dili yang kelaparan Rabu (22/9) menjarah gudang milik Dolog untuk memperoleh bahan makanan. Mereka mengambil berkarung-karung beras terigu dan minyak goreng. Meski situasi keamanan di Dili berangsur pulih, penduduk yang kelaparan mulai menjadi persoalan serius.

In a recent development, on Wednesday thousands of hungry Dili residents rampaged through the warehouses that belongs to DOLOG to get food. They took sacks of rice, flour and cooking oil. Though the security condition in Dili is slowly becoming normal, the hungry residents are becoming a serious problem.

Pada Selasa malam, juga sempat hilang dua wartawan yaitu Jon Swain dari AS dan Chip Hires dari Inggris. Begitu mendapat laporan tentang hilangnya dua wartawan tersebut, maka komandan Sektor Dili Kolonel Inf Gerhan Lantara memerintahkan untuk mencari kedua wartawan tersebut. Dengan patroli gabungan dari TNI dan Pasukan Interfet, kedua wartawan itu berhasil ditemukan pada pukul 24.00 Wita.

On Tuesday evening, two journalists were also reported missing. They were Jon Swain from USA and Chip Hires from UK. As soon as the report came in about the missing journalists, Commander of Dili Sector Colonel Gerhan Lantara gave orders to find them. The combined patrols of TNI and INTERFET, found the two journalists at midnight Indonesian central time.

Demikian dilaporkan wartawan Pembaruan Marcellus Widiarto dan Tinnes Sanger dari Dili, Rabu (22/9) siang.

This is as reported by Pembaruan journalists Marcellus Widiarto and Tinnes Sanger from Dili, Wednesday afternoon.

Panglima Penguasa Darurat Militer di Timtim, Mayjen Kiki Syahnakri yang dicegat wartawan Rabu siang itu membenarkan terbunuhnya wartawan tersebut.

Commander of Military emergency in East Timor, Major General Kiki Syahnakri confirmed, the murder of the journalist.

"Betul ada satu wartawan yang meninggal terbunuh pada Selasa malam. Wartawan itu meninggal akibat luka bacok," kata Mayjen Kiki.
"Indeed there is a journalist that was murdered on Tuesday evening. That journalist is dead because of slash wounds," said Major General Kiki.

Sementara itu Panglima Interfet Mayjen Peter Cosgrove mengatakan, sepertinya milisi di Timtimit telah mencoba untuk meningkatkan kegiatan mereka untuk menunjukkan bahwa tidak semua wilayah di Timtimit itu aman.

Meanwhile Commander of the INTERFET Major General Peter Cosgrove said that it seemed the militias in East Timor had tried to increase their activities to show that not all areas in East Timor were safe.


"I agree, we shall increase the security control to become more strict in several areas," said Cosgrove on Wednesday afternoon to journalists in Dili.

Peter Cosgrove mengatakan tampaknya para milisi meningkatkan aksi mereka sebagai reaksi atas pulangnya para pengungsi ke Dili yang kini tinggal puing-pu ing.

Peter Cosgrove said that it seems the increase of the militias' activities is as a reaction to the return of the refugees to Dili which is now in ruins.

"Situasi masih berbahaya 24 jam," kata Cosgrove. Dia memperkirakan perlu waktu beberapa minggu untuk memulihkan keamanan di provinsi ini.

"The situation is still dangerous for the next 24 hours," said Cosgrove. He figured that it will take several weeks to establish the security in this province.

"Ada indikasi para milisi teragitasi oleh kembalinya para penduduk Dili yang sempat tercerai berai. Konsekuensinya tampaknya para milisi berusaha meningkatkan kegiatan mereka terlihat dari belum pulihnya keamanan".

"There is indication that the militias were agitated by the return of Dili residents who were previously running scared. As a consequence the militias now tried to increase their activity which can be seen from the security condition that is not safe yet.

Sempat hilang.
Dua wartawan asing yang dinyatakan hilang pada hari Selasa (21/9) setelah diserang para milisi ditemukan selamat.

(The two journalists that were reported missing on Tuesday (21/9) after being attacked by the militias have been found safe.

Wartawan Sunday Times Jon Swain, fotografer AS Chip Hines dan pengemudi mereka bersama seorang penerjemah harus bermalam di bawah perlindungan
Menurut Brigadir David Richards, anggota Interfet asal Inggris, kepada BBC, Swain dan Hires mengendarai mobil ke luar kota Dili ketika diserang. Dia menuturkan keduanya lari ke semak-semak dan diselamatkan oleh pasukan yang oleh pasukan yang berada di helicopter dan kendaraan lapis baja.

According to Brigadier David Richards, an INTERFET member from the UK to BBC, Swain and Hires were driving to the outskirts of Dili when they were attacked. He said the two ran to the bushes and were saved by troops that arrived using helicopters and armored personnel carrier (APC).

Sedangkan wartawan Financial Times, Sander Thoenes asal Belanda, dilaporkan hilang di Dili setelah meninggalkan hotelnya hari selasa.

(Meanwhile Financial Times journalist, Sander Thoenes from Holland, was reported missing in Dili after leaving his hotel on Tuesday.)

Seorang tukang ojek menuturkan dia dan seorang wartawan asing diserang sejumlah pria berseragam militer hari selasa.

(A motorbike rental driver said that he and a foreign journalist were attacked by several men wearing military uniform on Tuesday).


("There were a group of men wearing military uniform. They stopped us," said Florindo de Araujo. "But when I turned they shot us.")


(Araujo said that the six men then chased them on motorcycles while shooting, When his motorcycle was shot, both of them ran from the bike. "I ran to the forest but they kept shooting at me").

Masih berbahaya.
Melihat perkembangan yang terjadi saat ini, kata Cosgrove, jelas sekali dalam perkembangan kejadian belakangan ini beberapa tempat di Timtim saat ini masih berbahaya. Untuk itu kepada wartawan yang meliput di kota Dili supaya lebih berhati-hati.
Considering the recent development, Cosgrove said that certain areas are still dangerous. He then asked all journalists to be more careful.

"Kepada para wartawan dari media yang meliput di Dili, saya minta kepada kalian untuk menggunakan akal sehat yang terbaik dalam perjalanan kalian dan menjaga keselamatan kalian di Dili," katanya.

(To all journalists who cover Dili, I ask all of you to use your common sense in your travels and to be vigilant for your safety in Dili," he said.)

Melihat perkembangan kejadian terakhir di Dili, aparat keamanan meminta kepada para wartawan yang akan melakukan kegiatan jurnalistiknya di kota Dili, khususnya di beberapa daerah yang dianggap berbahaya, untuk pergi secara berkelompok dan sebelum berangkat memberi informasi kemana tujuannya dan untuk apa.

(Considering the latest development in Dili, the security apparatus asked all journalists in Dili especially those who wants to go to volatile areas, to travel in groups and to give information about the destination and purpose of their visit prior to the departure.)

Suasana Dili pada Rabu siang sudah hidup dan sudah banyak masyarakat yang ada di jalanan kota Dili. Mereka bergerombol berjalan kesana kemari dan melihat aparat keamanan dari pasukan Multinasional yang nampak berjaga-jaga di sepanjang jalan kota Dili.

(Dili's conditions during Wednesday afternoon have become lively again and many residents thronged the streets in Dili. They traveled in groups and viewed multinational troops that were seen standing along the streets of Dili.)

Ketika Batalyon 745 yang sudah dilikuidasi dan sebagian sudah berangkat dengan kapal laut namun karena kapal tidak mampu memuat, maka sebanyak 11 kendaraan besar dan 2 kendaraan kecil harus berangkat lewat darat dengan dikawal 50 orang. Waktu lewat di Lalea itu mereka dihadang oleh kelompok tertentu yang belum jelas identitasnya dan sempat terjadi kontak tembak menembak. Kejadian itu hanya berlangsung sebentar dan tidak ada korban jauh, kata Mayjen Kiki.

(When the transports ship was unable to carry the rest of 745 battalion that had been evacuated, about 11 large and two small vehicles had to go by land and were protected by 50 personnel. When passing Lalea, they were ambushed by an unknown group and shooting ensued. The incident was brief, and there was no casualties said Major General Kiki.)

Menjarah
Ribuan penduduk Dili yang kelaparan hari Rabu menjarah gudang Dolog di timur Dili. Mereka mengambil berkargung-kargung beras, terigu dan minyak goreng.

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Thousands of hungry Dili residents looted Dolog warehouses on the East of Dili, on Wednesday. They took sacks of rice, flour, and cooking oil.

Meski pasukan Interfet mulai mengembalikan situasi keamanan, penduduk yang kelaparan mulai menjadi persoalan. Penduduk yang kembali dari kawasan perbukitan mendapati kota mereka tidak dapat lagi didiami dan makanan menjadi persoalan utama. Sulit mendapatkan air dan listrik di kota yang 80 persen hancur.

(Though Interfet troops started to restore order, hungry residents started to become a serious issue. Residents who were coming back from the hills found their towns to be uninhabitable and food became, major issue. Electricity and water is hard to find in the city that was 80% destroyed.)

Rasa frustasi ini memaksa ribuan penduduk mengepung gudang Dolog itu, mendobrak gerbangnya dan mulai menjarah apa saja. Sejumlah prajurit TNI yang menjaga kompleks itu tak bisa berbuat apa-apa karena banyaknya massa yang menyerbu.

(Frustrated, thousands of residents encircled the Dolog warehouse, broke down the gate and looted everything there. The few TNI soldiers guarding the complex could not do much due the large number of invading masses.)

Beberapa menit kemudian sekitar 30 prajurit Australia tiba dan mengusir penduduk, memblokir pintu masuk

(Several minutes later around 30 Australian soldiers arrived, disperse the people and blocked the entrance gate.)


(We need rice. We are hungry," said a man who carried a sack of rice on his back. After the incident, fully armed Australian soldiers were guarding the gate. Thousands of refugees are still lingering in the complex.)

Pasukan Interfet hari Rabu ini telah mulai bergerak kea rah Timor Barat dalam upaya membuka koridor untuk memasok bantuan bagi para pengungsi yang kelaparan. Sedangkan pengiriman bahan makanan yang terhenti sejak hari Minggu, karena semua pesawat digunakan untuk mengangkut pasukan Interfet telah dimulai kembali.

(This Wednesday, Interfet troops started to deploy towards West Timor in an effort to open the corridors to supply the hungry refugees. Meanwhile, food supplies that were halted since Sunday, because all planes were used to carry INTERFET troops, have resumed their operations.)
"Kami berharap dapat mencapai sebagian besar penduduk yang rawan yang menghindari pertempuran sejak pecah krisis, sehingga hitungan hari untuk menyelamatan jiwa," kata Abbi Spring dari Program Pangan Dunia (WFP).

(We hope we can reach the majority of the critical population who were trying to avoid clashes after the crisis broke out. It is a matter of days to save life," said Abbi Spring from the World Food Program.)

WFP telah mencarter sebuah pesawat khusus jenis C-130 Hercules dari Afrika Selatan bernama Snowdropper yang dirancang khusus untuk menyalurkan bahan makanan dari udara.

(WFP has chartered a C-130 Hercules from South Africa named Snowdropper that is specially designed to drop foods from air.)
Appendix C

Chapter 5 – Quoted articles on The Border crossing issues

Blunder escalates tensions – Defence Minister warns troop may cross Timor border.

Patrick Walters, Robert Garran – The Australian.

Friday, October 1, 1999.

Tensions with Indonesia worsened yesterday after John Moore declared that an Australian-led peace force might cross the East Timor border in “hot pursuit” of militia.

His statement prompted warnings from Jakarta of “adverse consequences” and forced the commander of the force, Major-General, to clarify his role and insist that it was limited to East Timor.

The Defence Minister’s comment on the laws of “hot pursuit”, allowing troops to cross borders to pursue attackers, risk escalating the deepest crisis in Australia-Indonesia relations in three decades.

Yesterday, Mr Moore sought to clarify his comments that the East Timor peace force had the “ability, under Chapter Seven, of hot pursuit” to deal with militia threats from West Timor.

Senior Indonesian military sources said that last night they were concerned about Mr Moore’s comments which would have “adverse consequences” and they would seek explanation and clarification.

And US Defence Secretary William Cohen said last night: “I think we ought not to speculate at this point what the reaction of the UN force would be.”

The row came as the Pentagon chief warned President B.J. Habibie and other senior government figures that Indonesia would suffer “severe damage” if the army failed to disarm the Timor militia.

His warning was one of the harshest made by a visiting envoy. It was spurred by intelligence reports of intense militia activity in West Timor and fears of militia raids across the border, and followed US threats that vital International Monetary Fund credits to Indonesia could be withheld.
Mr Cohen defended Australian troop behaviour, saying that the peace force needed to act in a “very aggressive manner” to confront militia elements threatening violence.

But Australia’s role in Indonesia has accused increased friction, coming under attack yesterday from Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and provoking a warning last night from the departing Indonesian ambassador, S. Wiryonono, that tensions were climbing “like a ladder and had reached the top step”.

Mr Moore’s comments on “hot pursuit” added to the diplomatic heat.

He yesterday elaborated on his Wednesday comments, during a press conference with Mr Cohen, on the hot pursuit of militia.

“To have our troops there unable to defend themselves against hostilities wouldn’t make sense to the Australian public,” he said.

“If they are engaged under those circumstances and they happen to be near the border...then they may cross the border”.

John Howard said early yesterday the peace force “has no authority to go into West Timor, none whatsoever” but later explained his comments did not apply to “hot pursuit”...
We’ll Hunt Down Militias

September 30, 1999

The Australian-led force in East Timor might cross Indonesia’s border in “hot pursuit” if Indonesia allowed Timorese militias to launch attacks from its territory, the Defence Minister, Mr Moore warned yesterday.

Expressing concern at a build-up of militias in Indonesian West Timor, Mr Moore said the mandate given to the international force Interfet under Article 7 of the United Nations charter authorised such interventions. This allows raiders to be chased to their hideouts across the border.

The United States stepped up its contribution to Interfet yesterday, with the visiting US Defence Secretary, Mr William Cohen, announcing that an amphibious landing ship equipped with four heavy-lift helicopters would go to East Timor.

After talks with Mr Moore in Darwin, Mr Cohen said the US had apprehensions about a militia build-up that would attack East Timor. He foreshadowed tough words for Indonesia’s President B.J. Habibie in a meeting in Jakarta today. He would insist that Indonesia’s military in West Timor ensured the militias did not attack across the border, that deported people to be allowed to return home, and that Indonesia hold an inquiry into atrocities in East Timor.

The extra US contribution to Interfet meets an Australian request to supply four heavy-lift helicopters that will operate from a US amphibious vessel off East Timor and to position military vehicles and other equipments. The US will also add a 130-strong army communications team which will set up a satellite based communications system for the force, and more military planners and intelligence specialists. About 260 Americans are already with Interfet in non-combat positions.

Mr Cohen said the new US contributions would greatly add to Interfet’s capabilities.

Australia had made no formal request for the US to place ground troops in East Timor, but the US stood with Australia in supporting “the Indonesian people in their quest and struggle for democratic reform, including a civilian-controlled military”.

The Prime Minister insisted yesterday that he and Mr Moore had canvassed the issue of an American contribution of ground troops with President Clinton and Mr Cohen.

However, the Government had not made a formal request, he said, because the Americans had made it clear they felt unable to provide combat troops. “The reality is that…you formally request what you know will actually get. You don
not formally request something you know from earlier conversations...is simply not going to be available”.

Mr Howard said he had told Mr Clinton on September 6 that Australia expected a US involvement, but Mr Clinton had said there were already 14,000 US troops in Kosovo, and Congress was unsympathetic. There had been similar exchanges later between him and Mr Clinton, and between Mr Moore and Mr Cohen.
Kapuspen: TNI akan Hadapi Interfet Bila Masuk Timor Barat.

TNI will faced INTERFET if entered West Timor: Spokes person.

Republika.

Friday – October 1st, 1999.

Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) bersikap tegas menghadapi Interfet. Menurut Kapuspen Hankam/TNI Mayjen TNI Sudradjat, bila pasukan multinasional yang dipimpin Australia itu memasuki wilayah territorial RI di Timor Barat tanpa izin, TNI akan menghadapinya.

"Kita tidak akan membiarkan bila Interfet benar-benar memasuki wilayah Timor Barat tanpa izin dan apabila itu terjadi, mereka akan berhadapan dengan TNI karena telah melanggar kedaulatan RI," kata Sudrajat kemarin di Jakarta.

Penegasan tersebut dikemukakan Kapuspen Hankam/TNI Mayjen TNI Sudrajat, sehubungan dengan pernyataan Menhan Australia John Moore bahwa Interfet mempunyai wewenang untuk melintasi perbatasan Timor Barat bila terlibat pertempuran dengan milisi pro-integrasi. Bahkan, Interfet wajib melakukan pengejaran (hot pursuit).

Menurut Sudrajat, ketentuan hot pursuit dalam Konvensi Jenewa hanya berlaku di perairan. Berkaitan dengan it, Sudrajat mengimbau Interfet menghormati Konvensi Jenewa sekaligus wilayah kedaulatan RI. Ini demi mencegah terjadi bentrokan di perbatasan territorial RI.

Meski demikian, menurut Sudrajat, Indonesia membuka kemungkinan Interfet masuk ke Timor Barat bila meminta izin terlebih dulu kepada Pemerintah RI. "TNI akan mendukung Interfet bila mereka memenuhi prosedur-prosedur yang..."
berlaku," katanya.

(Even so, Indonesia opens the possibility for INTERFET to enter the West Timor if it asked permission to Indonesian government. "TNI will support INTERFET if they follow the procedures that apply," he said.)


(Furthermore, Sudrajat stated that TNI does not want West Timor to become a new base for pro-integration militias. He asked the militias to think for reconciliation efforts. "The Indonesian government will not allow Kupang, Atambua or other areas to be used as bases for pro-integration militias," said Sudrajat.)


(Speculation among the Australian politicians and Government regarding the issue whether INTERFET can chase the militias into West Timor (NTT) started from a press conference between Australian Defence Minister and New Zealand Defence Minister, Max Bradford in Canberra, on Thursday morning. Moore claimed that INTERFET is permitted to pursue the pro-integration militias that were located in West Timor. The statement was further strengthened by Australian Prime Minister John Howard who said; "As long there is a security assurance from Indonesian side for the INTERFET personnel."


(The controversy arose after US intelligence gained information regarding the action of several militias. The report stated that there is an indication that there are 2000 to 4000 militias preparing guerilla war against the Australian troops. "We have intelligence information regarding several militias in West Timor and we have prepared ourselves against all possibilities," said Moore.

Namun Komandan Interfet Mayjen Peter Cosgrove menepiskan pernyataan
Moore. Menurutnya pasukannya hanya mendapat mandat beroperasi di Timtim sesuai dengan resolusi DK PBB. Penegasan Cosgrove itu untuk menepiskan spekulasi dikalangan politisi dan Pemerintah Australia tentang boleh-tidaknya Interfet memasuki Timor Barat, NTT.

(But the INTERFET commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove sidelined the statement from Moore. According to Cosgrove, his troops only have mandate to operate in East Timor according to the UN Security Council resolution. Cosgrove's statement refuted speculation among Australian politicians and Government about the legality of INTERFET entering West Timor, NTT.)


(Meanwhile, various factions continued to highlight the presence of Australian led multinational forces in the land of Lorosae. Malaysia for instance believed that Australian troops behaviour had gone beyond limits. "Is it necessary to point guns at clearly un-armed people? That is too much," said Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad in a press conference at UN Headquarters in New York, Wednesday.)


(He also asked the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to decrease the Australian troops number in East Timor. At present the number of Australian troops are 3.377 out of planned number of 4.500 personnel which is going to be pulled out on March 2000. Overall the total number of INTERFET troops in East Timor is 5000.)


(In relation with the worsening relationship between Indonesia and Australia, a number of ambassadors from ASEAN countries showed their sympathies during the farewell ceremony for the Indonesian ambassador to Australia Wiryono Sastrohadoyo. In the emotional farewell, all ASEAN ambassadors were present except for Myanmar and Cambodia. They showed they solidarity and sympathy.)
Wiryno mengakui banyak mengalami perlakuan tidak menyenangkan dari media Australia mengenai masalah Timtim. Perlakuan itu berupa kritikan, pertanyaan tajam, bahkan dalam beberapa kasus seperti diinterogasi.

(Wiryno admitted that he had received much unpleasant treatment from Australian media regarding East Timor issue. The treatment, in form of criticism, sharp questions and in several cases it felt like being interrogated.)

"Terus terang saya tidak begitu menghormati cara-cara media Australia yang cenderung berorientasi kebencian kepada Indonesia demi menaikkan tirasnya ketimbang memberikan informasi yang konstruktif kepada publik," katanya.

("To be quite honest I do not respect the way the Australian media that tends to orientate hatred against Indonesia in order to raise their circulation rather than giving constructive information to the public," he said.)

Ia mengakui tidak semua pers Australia yang melakukan tindakan yang tak terpuji. Bahkan, sebenarnya, cukup banyak surat maupun telepon simpati yang berasal dari warga Australia.

(He admitted that not all the Australian press had done unpleasant actions. In fact there are many letters or incoming telephone messages expressing sympathy that came from the Australian public.)
PM Howard: Pasukan Multinasional Tidak Akan ke Timor Barat.

Multi national force is not going to West Timor: PM Howard


Dalam usaha meredakan ketegangan dengan Indonesia, PM Australia, John Howard, hari Jumat (1/10) berupaya meredam pemberitaan mengenai tindakan pasukan multinasional yang akan mengejar milisi hingga ke Timor Barat.

(In an effort to reduce tension with Indonesia, Australian PM, John Howard tried on Friday to downplay reports about the multi national force that is going to pursue the militias to West Timor).

Guna menenangkan Jakarta, Howard kepada Radio 3AW mengungkapkan, “Saya kira hal itu tidak akan terjadi, karena kita memusatkan perhatian di Timtim dan tidak akan menghina martabat Indonesia”.

(To calm Jakarta, Howard said to 3AW radio: “I think that will not happen as we focus our attention in East Timor and will not breach Indonesia’s integrity).

Sumber Intelijen AS dan Australia telah memberi sinyal waspada atas penyusunan kekuatan milisi pro Jakarta di Timor Barat. Washington dan Canberra khawatir bahwa milisi, dukungan TNI tersebut akan melancarkan serangan gerilya ke Timor Timur.

(US and Australian intelligence sources have given warning signs for the pro-Jakarta militias build up in West Timor. Washington and Canberra are concerned that the militias, with the support of TNI will launch guerrilla attacks in East Timor.)

Pemerintah Australia hari Kamis mengungkapkan pasukan multinasional di Timtim memiliki hak hak untuk melintasi perbatasan Timor Barat bila melakukan pengejaran terhadap pemberontak.

(The Australian government on Thursday stated that the Multinational force in East Timor has the rights to cross the West Timor border, when pursuing the rebels).

Pernyataan tersebut membangkitkan kegeraman publik di Jakarta yang menganggap keberadaan pasukan Internasional di Timor Barat sebagai ancaman terhadap kedaulatan Indonesia.

(The statement has caused public anger in Jakarta that considered the presence of the international force in West Timor as a threat to Indonesian integrity).
ASEAN Bantu

Sementara itu, seorang pejabat tinggi ASEAN dalam pertemuan menteri ekonomi organisasi regional tersebut di Singapura, berusaha meredakan ketegangan yang terjadi antara Australia dan Indonesia, Kamis (30/9)

"Untuk saat ini kita belum bisa melihat perkembangan dari usaha tersebut sebab kami sedang berusaha menghubungi pihak Australia," ungkap Sekjen ASEAN Rodolfo Severino.

Pertemuan ke-31 Menteri Ekonomi ASEAN tetap dilangsungkan meski dikhawatirkan ketegangan antara Jakarta - Sydney dapat mengganggu terciptanya perdagangan bebas dan Investasi di kawasan tersebut.

"The 31st ASEAN Economic Ministers meeting was held although there were concerns that the tensions between Jakarta and Sydney could hinder the creation of free trade and investments in the region.

Dalam pidato pembukaannya PM Singapura Goh Cok Tong memperingatkan para investor akan mencermati perkembangan situasi yang terjadi di Indonesia. Sementara Menteri Perdagangan Indonesia, Rahardi Ramelan mengungkapkan tidak ada boikot resmi terhadap produk Australia di Indonesia setelah Jakarta mengumumkan akan membantu pengusaha setempat mencari pemasok baru. Hal itu dilakukan guna membantu pengusaha Indonesia mencari alternatif lain di luar Australia dalam mengimpor produk pertanian.

"In his opening speech, Singapore’s PM Goh Cok Tong warned that the investors will watch the development in Indonesia. Meanwhile Indonesia’s trade minister Rahardi Ramelan said there is no official boycott of Australian products in Indonesia after Jakarta announced that it will help local businesses to look for new suppliers. This is done in order to help the Indonesian business community to find new alternative besides Australia in importing agricultural products.

Rahardi Ramelan melanjutkan, dirinya telah menerima tawaran dari beberapa negara yang ingin menjual gandum ke Indonesia, namun dia tidak memberi penjelasan mengenai negara mana saja yang telah melakukan penawaran tersebut. Ramelan menambahkan dia belum tahu apakah bias bertemu secara khusus dengan Menteri Perdagangan Australia Mark Valle yang menyatakan keinginannya berbicara dengan dirinya Valle berharap dapat menemui Menteri Perdagangan Indonesia dalam kesempatan pertemuan di Singapura itu, guna meredakan ketegangan kedua negara.
(Rahardi Ramelan said that he already received offers from several countries that wanted to sell wheat to Indonesia, but he did not elaborate which countries have given their offers. Ramelan also adds that he doesn’t know if he can meet Australian trade minister, Mark Valle who has stated his intention to meet with him. Valle said he wanted to meet his Indonesian counterpart during the meeting to reduce the tensions between the two countries.)

Ramelan sebelumnya diberitakan menolak rencana pertemuan tersebut, karena saat Valle tiba di Singapura Kamis (30/9) sore, dirinya segera kembali ke Jakarta, hari Jumat (1/10). Ramelan bersama rekan-rekan dari ASEAN sebetulnya dijadwalkan bertemu dengan Valle dan sejawatnya asal Jepang, serta Selandia Baru, hari Jumat (1/10).

(Ramelan was reported previously that he refused the meeting because when Valle arrived in Singapore Thursday afternoon, Ramelan would return to Jakarta on Friday. Ramelan and his colleagues from ASEAN were scheduled to meet with Valle and other colleagues from Japan and New Zealand on Friday.)
Akankah Tentara Interfet Masuk Wilayah Indonesia?
Is Interfet troops are going to enter Indonesian territory?

Media Indonesia – Friday, October 1, 1999

Akankah Pasukan Internasional untuk Timor Timur (INTERFET) pimpinan Australia menyeberang ke Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) untuk mengejar milisi Timtim prointegrasi? Sepertinya tidak tertutup kemungkinan kearah sana.

(Will the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) led by Australian cross the border to East Nusa Tenggar (NTT) in order to chase the East Timorese pro-integration’s militias? It seems that the possibility is high).

Menteri Pertahanan Australia, John Moore, kemarin tidak mengesampingkan Interfet akan menyelenggarakan misi mengejar dan menghancurkan milisi Timtim yangsembunyi di NTT atau Timor Barat menurut istilah Barat. Tapi ia memastikan aksi-aksi yang berkaitan dengan itu akan sangat terbatas.

(Australian Defence Minister John Moore, yesterday refused the possibility that the INTERFET will conduct search and destroy missions to eliminate East Timorese militias that were hiding in East Nusa Tenggara or West Timor according to Western terms. He also stated that such actions will very limited).

“Itu adalah soal penilaian dan itu adalah sesuatu yang kita (Australia) tidak antisipasi akan banyak melihatnya,” kata Moore dalam wawancaranya dengan jaringan radio ABC.

(It’s about judgement and it is something that we (Australia) are not anticipating to happen frequently,” said Moore in an interview with ABC Radio network).

“Menurut Pasal Tujuh Mandat (Dewan Keamanan PBB kepada Interfet), bila tentara Australia dan PBB dipaksa terlibat dalam tembakan bermusuhan, maka adalah kemampuan pasukan PBB mengejar mereka yang melakukan agresi terhadap mereka,” sambung Moore.

(According to the Chapter Seven of the UN Security Council’s mandate to INTERFET, if Australian and UN troops were involved in hostile fire, the UN troops had the capability to pursue those who were aggressive towards them,” adds Moore).

“Bila itu sampai terjadi, maka pergi menyeberang ke Timor Barat (NTT) dan bila kemudian terjadi kontak aktif maka itu dizinkan, namun mereka tidak bias pergi jauh dan pada beberapa tingkatan kontak ini, mereka harus segera
("If there is an active contact it is permissible to cross the border into West Timor but the action must be limited and the troops must return immediately once it is over," he adds).


The United States has declared their disapproval of the increase of military presence in the border between NTT and East Timor. Moore also expressed his concern about the possibilities of increasing violence there. "We (Australia) have intelligence data that shows there are numbers of militias there in NTT. We don't know what, they are up to but we are ready for any eventualities," he said.

Sampai sejauh ini, lanjut Moore, belum ada tindakan seperti itu di Timtim. Jadi segala pembicaraan tentang hal itu masih bersifat spekulasi. "Mereka (Interfet) punya kekuatan penuh sesuai Pasal Tujuh dan itu memberi mereka semua hak untuk mempertahankan diri".

(So far, Moore adds, there is no such incident in East Timor. So all discussion regarding the action is still a speculation. "They (The INTERFET) have full capability according to the Chapter Seven and it gives them all rights to defend themselves").

Di tengah-tengah spekulasi tentang kemungkinan Interfet masuk ke Indonesia, tentara Falintil mulai masik ke Dili dan menawarkan kerja sama dengan Interfet.

(In the middle of the speculation of whether INTERFET will enter, Indonesia, FALINTIL troops started to enter, Dili and offered their cooperation with INTERFET).

Pasukan yang saat memasuki Dili dipimpin Cornelio Gama, juga menyerahkan senjata yang menurut mereka direbut dari tentara Indonesia. Tapi mereka tidak mau menyerahkan senjata milik mereka sendiri. "Kami tidak menawarkan untuk menyerahkan senjata kami, tapi kami ingin bekerja sama dengan Interfet untuk membuat Dili lebih aman," kata Matu Rusto, juru bicara Gama.

(The troops that entered Dili was commanded by Cornelio Gama, also surrendered weapons which according to them were taken from Indonesian troops. But they did not want to surrender their own weapons. "We did not offer to surrender our weapons but we wanted to cooperate with the INTERFET to make Dili much safer.

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Interfet belum menanggapi keinginan Falintil mempertahankan senjata mereka, padahal Interfet sedang melucuti senjata milik milisi prointegrasi. Siapa saja yang dicurigai anggota milisi akan digeledah habis-habisan, bahkan tak jarang sampai tengkurap di tanah.

(INTERFET had not replied FALINTIL’s aspiration to surrender their weapons, while INTERFET is disarming the weapons belong to the pro-integration militias. Whoever was suspected as militia will be fully frisked and often they have to lie on the ground).

Gama dan beberapa orang-orangnya sempat diundang ke Hotel Torismo oleh Kolonel Bab Harnes, perwira paling tinggi Australia di hotel tersebut.

(Gama with some of his men were also invited to Hotel Torismo by Colonel Bob Harnes, the most senior Australian officer in the hotel).
Canberra ruled out yesterday the possibility of Australia participating in any non-United Nations military force in East Timor.

The Minister for Defence, Mr Moore, said Australia was prepared to meet any need for evacuation from East Timor, but added: "Troops from Australia will not go in unless it's at the invitation of the United Nations with the sanction of Indonesia."

But New Zealand's Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Don McKinnon, said non-UN intervention in East Timor was possible if violence escalated in the troubled territory.

"The worst that could happen is absolute chaos by the end of the week," Mr McKinnon said, adding that the chances of getting a UN mandate for intervention were very low.

He said a group of "like-minded" countries could decide to intervene if the situation deteriorated. "We can't go on hearing about this bloodshed the way it is now and not engage in some sort of a support base," he said, listing Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United States and possibly members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as potential participants.

A spokesman for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Downer, said last night that he had been surprised by Mr McKinnon's reported comments and had sought clarification.
"Mr McKinnon's office re-assured us that non-UN intervention in East Timor is not an option that is being promulgated by New Zealand because of the self-evident complications associated with it," he said.

"For those who have still not got the message, Australia will not be invading Indonesia."

Australia has consistently said armed involvement of its military could only happen with Indonesian Government agreement. Unlike Australia, New Zealand never formally recognised Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor after the 1975 invasion and there have been tensions between Canberra and Wellington on the policy divergence.

ASEAN, which also recognised Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, would not intervene in East Timor without Jakarta's approval.

Mr Moore will fly to Tindall RAAF base in the Northern Territory this evening to be briefed and to speak to troops involved. The minister said he saw no reason why normal military exercises with the Indonesian military should not continue, because they were in Australia's interests.

Labor's foreign affairs spokesman, Mr Laurie Brereton, said the international community, led by the UN, should intervene if Monday's vote went in favour of independence. * A report headed "Mass turnout a triumph for the people" in the Herald on August 31 referred to an "anti-Indonesian militia group". It should have read "anti-independence".


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SHOTS were yesterday fired at Australia's ambassador to Indonesia and the consulate in East Timor, escalating the conflict into a diplomatic crisis with Australia's most important neighbour.

Australia's relations with Indonesia are at their worst since Indonesia launched its "confrontation" with Malaysia in 1965.

The Australian Government reacted with outrage to the shootings, saying they were completely unacceptable.

Ambassador John McCarthy was driving through Dili when his car was hit by gunfire, a failure of Indonesia's promise to protect foreign diplomats and a clear snub to Australia. Mr McCarthy was not hurt and was last night scheduled to fly back to Jakarta.

Prime Minister John Howard last night called an emergency meeting of the Cabinet's national security committee to consider Australia's response to the deteriorating relationship and to the East Timor crisis.

Mr Howard earlier yesterday said there was "no doubt in the world that at the moment Indonesia is not fulfilling its obligations to maintain law and order".

Government sources said all aspects of the relationship, including defence links and aid, would be on the table if Indonesia did not live up to its promises to ensure peace.

It is understood Defence Minister John Moore has failed in his efforts in recent days to speak to Indonesian armed forces commander General Wiranto, now widely believed to have sanctioned the growing violence in East Timor.

"The situation has really got much worse in the last 48 hours," Mr Howard said.

Australia has mounted a major diplomatic effort to try and shame Indonesia into restoring peace in East Timor, and to win support for an early deployment of peacekeepers.
But Mr Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said yesterday Indonesia was adamant it would not accept international peacekeepers before the vote of its people's assembly (MPR), in late October or early November.

Mr Downer said: "The Indonesian Government of course is now under intense pressure, not just from Australia, but from the international community, for its clear failure to maintain security in East Timor."

Opposition foreign affairs spokesman Laurie Brereton said: "East Timor's descent into a maelstrom of murder and mayhem must be stopped, and stopped now."

Indonesia's ambassador to Australia, S. Wiryono, meanwhile, stormed out of an interview with A Current Affair presenter Mike Munro when questioned on the "slaughter" of civilians in East Timor.

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'For our ambassador to be shot at is completely unacceptable and is a matter we are pursuing with the Indonesian Government'  
Australian Foreign Minister ALEXANDER DOWNER  
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'Where is the dignity of the members of the Security Council? How many more people killed do you want (before you) start acting?'  
Portugal's special envoy to Jakarta, ANA GOMES  
*

'We are determined to implement what measures are necessary to uphold law and order and to ensure security '  
Indonesian Foreign Minister ALI ALATAS  
*

'The Indonesian Government must not only give assurances or be willing to comply with the terms of the May agreement but the assurances must be seen on the ground '  
UN special envoy on East Timor, JAMSHEED MARKER
The road to hell is often paved with good intentions

I HAVE been sickened by many of the scenes from East Timor. Nobody can condone the savagery of the anti-independence militias and any support they have received from the Indonesian armed forces (TNI). Many Indonesians will also be shocked by these acts.

As an Australian who has devoted much of his working life to strengthening Australia's necessary engagement with East Asia and its relationship with Indonesia, I am saddened by the situation in which we now find ourselves.

Foreign and trade policy needs to be aimed at securing predictable and achievable outcomes which would be in Australia's national and regional interests. The Government's intentions were no doubt good. It saw an opportunity to resolve the East Timor situation which had been an irritant in our relations with Indonesia for 25 years.

But it is time to consider objectively and unemotionally the grim realities. What are the main outcomes of our recent policies? There are six.

The situation of the East Timorese -- those we sought to help -- is horrific; much worse than it was at the beginning of this year. We now face a devastated East Timor with an unknown number of casualties, many of whom might otherwise still be alive.

Our relationship with Indonesia -- which the Howard Government noted in its first ever White Paper on foreign and trade policy in 1997 would "always be fundamentally important" and one of our three or four most important relationships -- has been set back perhaps for a generation. The Australian community is now alienated towards Indonesia and the Indonesian community now alienated towards Australia. Despite warnings from a number of quarters, the Government has allowed its policy towards Indonesia and the region to become a hostage to its policy towards East Timor.

Our wider engagement with East Asia has also been damaged. Countries have been surprised by the rush to press for early independence for East Timor; a rush which Australia led largely as a combination of domestic pressures and a naive assumption that we could secure a great diplomatic success. That both Xanana Gusmao and Bishop
Carlos Belo believed that for independence to work there would need to be a preparatory period of five to 10 years of autonomy seems to have been overlooked.

The efforts we have made over many years to come to terms with the geopolitical realities of our place in the world and to be seen as a partner in the East Asian region -- and not as an Anglo-American outpost in the southern hemisphere -- have also been set back. Association of South-East Asian Nations members agreed to join a peace force because they wanted to assist Indonesia; not because Australia pressed them to do so.

The domestic situation in Indonesia is also likely to affect adversely our interests. The new government in Jakarta, which will be formed early in November, will probably now be nationalist and antagonistic to Australia.

Another outcome of the situation is a huge humanitarian and refugee problem in West Timor with which Australia will also have an obligation to assist.

We now face maintaining a peacemaking and later a peacekeeping force in East Timor, possibly for a decade, which is likely to sustain casualties in the early stages, as well as an obligation to support with substantial aid a broken-back independent mini-State within the Indonesia archipelago. The combined cost is likely to be at least $500 million a year for the foreseeable future.

How did we allow all this to happen? The first error was to assume that President B.J.Habibie, an erratic and transitional figure whose legitimacy, hold on power and support from the armed forces was always in question in Indonesia, could deliver without strong opposition on his undertakings to John Howard.

The second was to overlook the likelihood of a violent backlash to the expected vote against autonomy on August 30. Many Indonesians, including East Timorese, warned of this.

The third mistake was the Government's response to domestic pressure groups demanding immediate independence for East Timor, with which it virtually joined hands. While community feelings were very strong, it overreacted to the East Timor lobby, a sometimes hysterical and committed media, the more radical elements in the Catholic Church and a handful of ex-servicemen who feel Australia has a debt to the East Timorese who helped them after Australia had invaded the Portuguese colony in 1942.

But the fourth and, in my view, major misjudgment in terms of the additional tragedy which has befallen the East Timorese was to press for an early United Nations Mission to East Timor presence and referendum. It would clearly have been preferable from the outset to seek to defer the process until mid-November when there would have been a constitutionally elected president and vice-president, whose writ would have been much more likely to run including with the armed forces.

Finally, there is an important matter of diplomatic style. We may be doing what we believe to be right in defending democracy; but in the wrong way. We chose to lead the pack and issue ultimatums. We would have been more effective and generated less animosity if our diplomacy had been more persuasive and less demanding.

The unpalatable fact which Australia needs to face is that to Asian countries including Japan, China and India, as well as the US, the paramount issue is the successful transition of 210 million Indonesians to representative government and the recovery of the Indonesian economy. Despite justifiable moral outrage in the
community and the almost total preoccupation with East Timor here, it remains a secondary issue to other countries compared with the future stability of Indonesia.

Richard Woolcott is a former secretary for Foreign Affairs and Trade, and a former ambassador to Indonesia and to the UN.