

1-1-2006

The new age Hydra: India's experiences with terrorism and counter terrorism

Swati Parashar

University of Wollongong, sparasha@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: <https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers>



Part of the [Arts and Humanities Commons](#), and the [Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Parashar, Swati, The new age Hydra: India's experiences with terrorism and counter terrorism 2006, 55-63.
<https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/1974>

THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM: GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Edited by Věra Řiháčková

EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	7
Editor's note	7
Introduction	9
Keynote speeches	
Gijs de Vries	13
Cameron Munter	21
Questions / Comments and Answers	27
Transatlantic Public Opinion and Terrorism	
John K. Glenn	33
Terrorism as a Challenge for Transatlantic relations – EU and US Response to Terrorism	
Daniel Keohane	37
Threat Assessment and Response to Terrorism in the Transatlantic Community	
Karl-Heinz Kamp	43
Questions / Comments and Answers (Panel I)	49
The New Age Hydra – India's Experiences with Terrorism and Counterterrorism	
Swati Parashar	55
Experiences with Terrorism and Counterterrorism Policy in Turkey	
Doğu Ergil	65
Find the Needle in the Haystack: Profiling Risky Communities and Groups of Citizens Highlights of Lessons from Israeli Counterterrorism and Profiling of Potential Security Threats	
Reuven Paz	73
Questions / Comments and Answers (Panel II)	83

Acknowledgments

The initial versions of nearly all contributions to this publication saw the light of the day during the international conference “The Fight Against Terrorism – Global Challenge of the 21st Century?”, organised by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in co-operation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the British Embassy, the American Information Center, and held under the patronage of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic in September 2006 in Prague. The editor would like to thank all institutions involved in organising the conference once again for their generous support, as well as to express its gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic for the additional financial assistance which made this publication possible. A special vote of thanks goes to all conference speakers for their publication inputs and valuable time. Our sincere thanks also go to the proof readers who contributed significantly to the final outcome of the publication.

Editor’s note

This publication includes all conference contributions. They appear here in a number of different forms; keynote speeches are almost verbatim transcripts of what was said at the conference, some speakers made minimal follow-up changes to their contributions before publication, and others chose to turn them into articles (complete with references in footnotes). The structure of the publication follows the conference programme and after each section there are highlights from the relevant Q&A session. It was decided to retain references to events upcoming at the time of the conference (22 September 2006), such as the NATO summit in Riga or the U.S. midterm elections.

INTRODUCTION

The changing nature of the threat posed by global terrorism presents us with a “new circumstances”, consequently, necessitating “new measures” to deal with them. The growing complexity of the issue calls for reflection on the phenomenon itself, as well as on the counter measures taken at national, international and supranational levels. In Central Europe, the public debate on global terrorism is often characterised by the portrayal of “the enemy” in terms of the ‘clash of civilizations’. The counter measures debate does not go beyond the external dimension of national security policies, which are largely viewed through the positive lens of international cooperation with the Western allies. This publication is an outcome of an international conference, *“The Fight Against Terrorism – Global Challenge of the 21st Century?”*, which aimed at emphasizing the complex nature of the issue both in terms of geography and substance, and sought to bring the experiences of terrorism and counterterrorism beyond the EU and U.S. to the fore.

The first part of the conference looked mainly at the challenges global terrorism poses for the transatlantic partnership. It focused on the “counterterrorism discourse” (the interpretation of the different concepts and preferences in the implementation of counterterrorism strategies), on differences in threat assessment, on the issues of human rights and civil liberties, on public opinion, on EU-NATO relations and also on the role of the UN and international cooperation. The second part engaged with the specific experiences of countries that have had a long history of struggle against terrorism, namely India, Israel and Turkey. It clearly emerged that current terrorism is not limited to the conflict between Western democracies and Islam. On the contrary, it actually poses a greater threat to the Muslim world itself. It is a complex issue that has both local and global specificities and has much to do with the different ways in which local communities are constituted. Concerns were raised about increasing Al Qaeda influence on local Islamic Jihadi terrorism in non-Arab countries, in connection to a forthcoming Al Jazeera broadcasting service in English, as well as about the growing use of the Internet as the main recruiting ground, with terrorists exploiting the medium in a number of different ways.

Originally, the aim of the conference was also to involve speakers from Central European countries. However, in the end, the panel on the Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovak experiences of terrorism and counterterrorism policies could not be incorporated, due to time and budgetary constraints. There is a prevailing perception in Brussels that the EU efforts in the area of counterterrorism are being driven by the “old” member states and the Central European governments are acting negligently on the issue, namely due to a lack of experience, expertise and resources as well as a low level of threat perception and an generally uninvolved public. In the absence of a panel on Central Europe we would like to take the opportunity afforded by this publication to making some observations specific to the region here.

Counterterrorism policy-making in Central Europe is subject to several parallel dynamics; it is to a large extent driven by foreign templates and the pressure to comply with measures and regimes agreed internationally. Domestically driven counterterrorism policy-making needs a sense of political urgency and a strong impetus from the ruling elite. Generally, it is argued that political involvement mirrors the level of security threat perception; experts have repeatedly stated that unless there is an imminent crisis situation caused by an act of terrorism, this tendency is unlike to change in Central European countries. Given the sensitivity of the issues, the present political engagement of the ruling elites in the region quite often leads to unhealthy over-politicization of selected issues and unsystematic solutions.

As far as the assumption of the uninvolved of public opinion is concerned, the polls show that the threat perception is low and that the Central European public does not think that terrorism is the main challenge their countries have to face in the near future. However, this should not lead to the assumption that the public is disengaged from terrorism and counterterrorism measures. There are public concerns about the capacities and preparedness of state institutions to deal with the terrorist challenge. Unlike in Western Europe, where the percentages are high not only for the threat perception posed by terrorism but also for confidence in the effectiveness of the response by the states, the public in Central Europe does not think their countries are well prepared. There is high public support for sharing more competencies in the fight against terrorism with supranational institutions, namely with the EU. However, it is difficult to assess whether there is a clear conception of the nature of cooperation and future policy priorities. According to available data, it is also difficult to assess to what extent the public is interested in actively pursuing counterterrorism policies within their states, and which policy moves might be sensitive. In this sense, it is interesting to note that Central European public opinion does not seem to be particularly concerned about human rights and civil liberties violations in connection with counterterrorism measures, despite the paradoxical suggestion that they should instead show even greater sensitivity to such issues, as a result of their historical experience of living with communist “big brother” regimes.

Despite the historical experiences with terrorism of different kinds, none of the Central European countries concerned has so far had to face the consequences of acts of global Islamist terrorism; no large scale terrorist attack has ever occurred on their territories, nor have their citizens suffered from terrorist attacks abroad in the way that, for example, Australian citizens did in Bali. This said, such experiences do not seem to be the only trigger for efficient implementation of counterterrorism measures and the development of policy priorities. The Netherlands which had long resisted the bolstering of existing counterterrorism measures, refusing for example to apply the EU list of terrorist organizations and individuals, faced a catalyzing event in the murder of the film director Theo van Gogh, which triggered major changes in counterterrorism policy. Denmark offers another example. However, the experiences of global Islamist terrorism in the Central European countries does not go beyond the threat assessment, preventive monitoring of suspicious individuals and protection of critical points and infrastructure. In addition, the experiences of countering organized crime are worth noting – terrorism financing and money laundering are interconnected phenomenon, although the record of the Central European countries is rather mixed in this field.

The absence of experience and expertise calls for the use of templates and best practice in some areas of counterterrorism policy-making in Central Europe. Pressure from the EU and other international institutions to ensure compliance with adopted regimes and standards is also needed in order to further develop counterterrorism policies and legislative frameworks. With regard to the EU counterterrorism agenda, the Central European countries are promoting, for example, their timely accession to Schengen, on the pretext of modernizing the Schengen Information System, linked to establishing European borders management. Generally, there is also broad support for the EU framework for countering radicalization, critical infrastructure protection, countering cyber crime and the use of the Internet to spread the ideology of radical Islam and the promotion of terrorist techniques, including the provisions allowing for removing the illegal content from websites.

With regard to the lack of expertise and knowledge, as well as the unfinished reform of their security sectors, a willingness to enhance cooperation should be prevalent among the Central European member states. However, this is not always the case. The lack of adequate finance is one factor which plays a role. Another issue is the consistency of the proposed measures with existing legal frameworks. The Central European countries are largely willing to support proposals for amending the existing laws which do not cause problems in terms of deadlines and the implementation burden, which is always greater when the measure represents a marked departure from existing provisions. The other tendency, observable particularly in case of Poland, is for internal security to remain the prerogative of the member states; sometimes used by the politicians in order to safeguard and reinforce their sovereignty. Consequently, there is almost no support for establishing internal security institutions of the EU or extending the competence of bodies which already exist, such as Europol or Eurojust.

The Central European countries do not see the EU as the place for developing a coherent counterterrorism policy template; rather they feel that it should continue to provide a space for the exchange of experiences and allow for the creation of expertise in the fields in which the Central European countries lack it. That is all right; but the political culture in Central Europe in general suffers from the short-sighted approach of its politicians. Unless a very concrete and urgent threat suddenly arises in relation to Central Europe, EU policy in this area will continue to lack the immediate pay off which is needed to make long-term consideration of counterterrorism issues possible.

The Editor

KEYNOTE SPEECHES

Gijs de Vries

Short profile:

Gijs de Vries received his M.A. in Political Science from the University of Leiden, where he afterwards lectured in International Relations. In 1984, he became a Member of the European Parliament where he served as Chairman of The European Parliament's Delegation for Relations with Canada and became the leader of the Liberal and Democratic Group in the European Parliament (in 1994). He served as Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Netherlands between 1998 and 2002; later on, he became representative at the Convention on the Future of Europe, responsible for drafting the Constitutional Treaty. On March 25, 2004, only two weeks after the terrorist attacks in Madrid, Mr. de Vries was appointed the first EU Counterterrorism Coordinator by SG/HR Javier Solana.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Terrorists have hit many countries on several continents and they've hit people of different religions, including many Muslims. In the fight against terrorism each of our countries has a dual responsibility. First, of course, to protect its own citizens but secondly, to make sure that its territory cannot be used in any way for assisting an attack elsewhere.

This summer, as Europeans, we have had three lucky escapes; a major attack was prevented on transatlantic airlines, in Germany two bombs failed to explode on passenger trains and in Denmark what appears to have been a significant plot has been disrupted. The fight against terrorism must be first and foremost waged by national institutions, by national police forces, national intelligence services and national judicial authorities but the European Union increasingly has a role to play: that of helping our national agencies to cooperate across borders and to work with our partners elsewhere in the world within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

We are developing this role in reaction to what is arguably a changing threat of terrorism. The nature of the threat has been changing fairly rapidly over the past number of years. If we go back for a moment to 9/11, these attacks were new in several respects. They were new in terms of the scope of the acts that hit America: we in Europe were fairly familiar with terrorists attacking within specific countries, such as the IRA or ETA. Here for the first time we clearly had an international dimension, a trans-border dimension. The intensity of the attacks was also different from what we were used to in Europe. We were familiar with attacks that aimed to produce limited casualties: 9/11 was an attack where the perpetrators tried to kill as many civilians as they could. The threat was also different because, whereas in the past in Europe the terrorists tried to escape after having perpetrated the attack, here we saw a massive use of suicide attackers.

Since 9/11 we have seen the threat changing again. Al-Qaeda, because its physical base in Afghanistan has been destroyed, is no longer the centrally-directed organization it perhaps once was. That threat has been replaced by one of a much more decentralized type which incidentally is even more difficult to fight. We have seen the rise of home-grown terrorism in several of our countries. We've seen the rise of the Internet as a major terrorist tool not only in terms of spreading the technology to make bombs, but also in terms of radicalization and extremist propaganda; and we have seen the effect of the war in Iraq on some individuals from third countries who have travelled to Iraq to join the insurgency, including some from Europe. Of course we don't know how many of them may return but we must take the risk seriously that, when some of them return to their countries of origin, they will have picked up the kind of urban warfare skills that might be very dangerous for us.

Against that background, what is the role of the European Union and how can we help to tackle this changing threat? As I have said, our first line of defence is not Brussels; it is and must remain our national institutions, governments and agencies. The EU adds value by enabling these agencies to combine forces, to exchange information and best practices and to work together in foreign affairs. In December 2005, the EU adopted its first medium term counter-terrorism strategy. That was a document proposed by the then British presidency and by myself and it reflects the experience gained in several of our member states in combating terrorism. We have four main key terms that reflect the themes that have been used in the United Kingdom but of course we adapted these concepts to the specific role of the European Union.

The first objective is to help prevent people turning to terrorism. It is an issue I would like to return to in a little while and it has to do with winning the battle for hearts and minds, particularly among mainstream Muslims in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Our second objective is to protect Europe's borders and infrastructure. One way in which we do this is by improving security standards of member states, for example, passport security. As I am sure many of you know, criminals fairly regularly use false identities and false passports to carry on their business. Terrorists also make frequent use of them, so it is natural step for the EU to adopt stringent high standards. It has decided to include two biometric features into passports; the USA has so far only opted for one, even though it's considering going further. All this is done in the EU on the basis of common international standards, working closely with our American partners. Turning to the protection of infrastructure, every country needs to ensure the safety of its domestic infrastructure. Infrastructure is vulnerable. Most notably, we have seen terrorists targeting the transport infrastructure – airlines, trains, subways. In Turkey not long ago an attack was disrupted on a cruise ship. In countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, we have also experienced attacks on the energy infrastructure, including oil pipelines. A major attack in Yemen was prevented only last week on the oil industry. So we must protect these vital industries at home but we must also make sure that the trans-border dimension is properly covered and the European Commission will shortly issue proposals to this end.

Our third objective is to pursue terrorists across borders and to bring them to justice. That means that we need to exchange information among our police forces, intelligence services, judicial authorities and indeed, our border guards. We do that through four main channels. The police work together in Europol and Europol is now involved in around 20 investigations into terrorism. A very recent example of how this works is the name given by the British authorities to Europol, which they were able to check against their database and clearly demonstrate links with suspect individuals in at least two other EU member states. This is an example of how cross border cooperation through Europol is working. We have also had a case in Ireland of a terrorist who was sentenced to six years on the basis of information gathered by the Irish, French and Dutch police as well as Europol. Eurojust brings together our investigating judges and public prosecutors to make sure that when

we prosecute terrorists we do so in the country best equipped to deal effectively with the matter, in view of the nature of the case. Eurojust is now involved in about twenty cross-border investigations, as well. The border guards work together through Frontex, the agency based in Warsaw. Frontex is now in the frontline of the fight against illegal migration but it also has an important role in comparing best practice in border protection against terrorism. The fourth channel is the Situation Centre (SitCen) which brings together analysts from our security and intelligence services. This is a novel development. The EU used to have analytical capacity to look at the threats outside its borders; we have added to that the internal dimension so that now, for the first time, our interior and justice ministers and our foreign ministers have a “helicopter view” not only of the nature of the terrorist threat as it affects their country, but also as it affects neighbouring member states and the countries outside the European Union.

Of course we need to do more than this; we need to bring the terrorists to justice. One tool in this respect is the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Often the countries are looking for a suspect whose whereabouts are unknown. The EAW is a powerful tool to bring these people to justice. Since 2004, there have been about 2,000 cases of serious criminals being extradited across borders to be put to trial in the countries which had requested them. These 2,000 cases include a number which were terrorism-related. In April of this year, France and Italy jointly arrested twelve suspects, six in Italy and six in France, all on the basis of an EAW.

Our fourth objective is to help our member states respond to a terrorist attack, should they require cross-border assistance. Some attacks can be so massive that the national emergency services are overwhelmed. In such cases we need to offer cross-border assistance. I have just attended a major cross-border European exercise in Denmark and Sweden where eight member states brought their emergency services together to train for such an eventuality. It is important that we know what assistance countries can offer, it is also important for countries to train in and exercise how to receive aid. In practice, when you are not only swamped by an emergency but also swamped by offers of help, it is important to be properly prepared.

Now all of this calls for coordination among the ministers and coordination among the services at European level. But one important point has to be made – European coordination cannot be stronger than the coordination on the level of the nation states. The first step is to improve coordination between the domestic agencies in the fight against terrorism. Each member state of EU has to make sure that its police services, security and intelligence services, judiciary, custom services and others are joined up and share all necessary information. Coordinating mechanisms are essential in this respect. The European Union has carried out a peer review into the domestic coordinating mechanism of the member states. There is a confidential version of the document, which of course I am unable to discuss in detail, but there is also a public version of the document which can be found on the EU Council website. The bottom line is that we need to improve the domestic coordination,

and simultaneously we need to install mechanisms of democratic accountability. We need to do this because in our societies, where the rule of law is paramount, it is essential that secret services continue to work firmly on the basis of and within boundaries of the rule of law. Democratic accountability and a strong role of parliament are essential here.

What do we expect on the agenda of the EU for the remainder of this year and early next year? A priority will be to further improve information exchange, and one proposal on the table is to allow our national law enforcement authorities better access to the databases at the European Union level and in other member states, be it a DNA databases or databases on stolen cars or the like. However, if we do that we must simultaneously strengthen data protection; if you exchange more data you must also protect data more, the two have to go together – there has to be a balance between liberty and security in the fight against terrorism. The second main priority has already been mentioned – the infrastructure protection. Here the EU has already adopted major pieces of legislation – for example, directly after 9/11 the legislation to protect the European airports. We recently added to that the legislation to protect the maritime ports of Europe, but more is in the pipeline. The third important challenge remains to help prevent chemical, biological or radiological material falling into the hands of terrorists. That has an internal, intra-EU component but it also means combating the proliferation outside the EU and, for example, the EU is engaged with Russia in programmes to help Russia dispense of its surplus stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons. Finally, a very important priority for the EU will remain strengthening global cooperation in the fight against terrorism, because there are three levels at which we must work – domestic, the EU and the wider international framework.

Therefore, working with the international partners is the key to our strategy and, of course, our first partner is the United States. In June 2004, at Dromoland Castle in the Republic of Ireland, we agreed a Declaration on Combating Terrorism which remains the cornerstone of our cooperation and which has since been updated. There are four important agreements that the EU and the USA have established: one was to protect the security of our containers, in view of the crucial importance of transatlantic trade to international trade, of which maritime trade is the very backbone; protecting containers traffic is essential to protecting our economies. A second agreement is on protecting airline passengers – the Passenger Name Records Agreement (PNR). We have two important further agreements one on Extradition and another on Mutual Legal Assistance, path-breaking and innovative agreements each of them. In addition, we have set up a high-level dialogue to discuss border and transport security. I have established good contacts in the past with Secretary Tom Ridge of Homeland Security, and with Attorney-General John Ashcroft and we work closely with their two successors. There is also solid cooperation on intelligence. Intelligence sharing remains central to transatlantic cooperation. I very much hope that our current difficulties on PNR and on America's visa waiver can be overcome. Our strategies to combat terrorism may differ occasionally, but transatlantic cooperation continues to reflect the interests of both sides and our achievements in this area are significant.

Our second priority on the international level is to strengthen the role of the United Nations. It is much to be welcomed that the UN has now agreed the counterterrorism strategy for which the EU has campaigned hard. However, we still need to have a comprehensive global convention against terrorism. The key to that is to outlaw once and for all the practice of terrorism. We need to end the ambiguity and hypocrisy, which lead some to suggest that blowing up men, women and children is acceptable as long as it is done in a framework of a liberation struggle. Blowing up men, women and children is never allowed. Non-combatants should not be targeted, not in war and not in peace time. Meanwhile we need to implement the thirteen existing UN conventions and I very much welcome that the Czech Republic has completed the ratification of twelve of them. We need to develop further the international consensus against terrorism by supporting the UN Counterterrorism Committee. One way of doing that is to help developing countries to strengthen their defences and that is why the EU has now embarked on capacity-building initiatives to work with a number of key countries outside our borders. We are working to join up what our member states deliver in terms of assistance and what the European Commission delivers in countries such as Algeria, Morocco, the Philippines and Indonesia. Synergies in capacity building can be improved further. Through NATO, many EU member states are also involved in Afghanistan, which remains a critical country in the fight against terrorism and indeed the EU itself is a major financial contributor to the rebuilding of that country, which we should not allow to slip off our respective agendas. The security of Europe does not stop at our borders.

There is a final point I would like to make. I am concerned, and I know that I am not alone in this, about the process of radicalization of Muslims that we see in parts of Europe, in Southeast Asia and in the Arab world. We need to work together across religious divides to counter this process. We must do so on the basis of the common principles of human rights as contained in the global frameworks. These also deal with the rights of prisoners, and we must apply them in full. Should Western countries not respect the rights of Muslim detainees, that would alienate mainstream Muslims further; and this is the background to the statement of the EU foreign ministers agreed on 15 September 2006, in which they expressed the hope that the USA would ban secret prisons. That statement reflects the depth of concern in Europe both in public opinion and in parliaments over this issue. Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and CIA renditions have diminished America's standing in the eyes of the world and they have made it more difficult to win the hearts and minds of Muslims, in Europe and elsewhere. It is of critical importance that we stop the next generation of terrorists from being recruited; this means we must win the hearts and minds of those Muslims on whose support terrorists depend. I am confident that we can do that on the basis of our common values; ultimately these values are our best defence. Human rights and the *respect* for human rights is the foundation on which the EU is built, and on which the UN has been built. Working to fight terrorism within the boundaries of human rights is the most effective way of addressing long-term threats; and the threat,

let us not be mistaken, is likely to be long-term. We have had some successes but open societies will remain vulnerable for a number of years to come. The level of the threat remains high in Europe and elsewhere. I have already mentioned the failed or prevented attacks of this summer.

If Europe is to combat this threat effectively, it should also reflect on the way it reaches decisions in this area. When the EU ministers have been able to take majority votes on important pieces of legislation, we have been successful. The legislation to protect our ports, our airports, our passports was based on majority votes, as was the important agreement to allow our intelligence, security and police agencies to access information concerning details of the telephone conversations that some suspects had had. All of that was based on majority voting. Where the EU has more difficulty is in reaching decisions when unanimity is required. Not too long ago the new director of Europol had to be appointed. It took interior ministers more than a year to reach the necessary unanimity to appoint this civil servant. I would suggest that is not good enough. We must enable our ministers to reach the necessary decisions quickly in the interest of the security of our citizens. Of course there are different ideas and it will be for ministers to decide about the future of the draft Constitutional treaty. I will not comment on that treaty as it stands, but I do believe that from the narrow vantage point of the fight against terrorism, it is essential that we look again at the way we reach decisions. If the EU is given a job, it should also be given the tools to do that job quickly and effectively. If not, it would perhaps be better for us not to give the EU that job in the first place. Giving the EU a job and not giving it the tools to do it is a recipe for public disappointment and a lack of effectiveness in areas where it is urgently needed.

Three changes, it seems to me, are necessary. Firstly, majority voting needs to be introduced in the Council for measures dealing with the most serious issues of cross-border crime, secondly, national parliaments and the EP should be involved more and thirdly, there should be stronger judicial control, including access by the European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights. Judicial and parliamentary control is important for keeping the balance between liberty and security.

Ladies and gentlemen, I hope to have given you some impression of what the EU does and does not do in the area of the fight against terrorism. Its role is to support our member states and not to replace them, as it is to work closely with our partners, from the USA to the United Nations, as well as from like-minded partners to partners that need persuasion. I very much believe that conferences such as these are essential to make the public understand what we are trying to achieve and I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss this with you today.

KEYNOTE SPEECHES

Cameron Munter

Short profile:

Dr. Cameron Munter attended Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, and the universities of Freiburg and Marburg in Germany; he received his PhD in Modern European History from the Johns Hopkins University in 1983. He taught European History at the University of California in Los Angeles (1982–1984) and directed European Studies at the Twentieth Century Fund in New York (1984–1985) before joining the Foreign Service. He has served overseas in Warsaw (1986–1988), Prague (1992–1995), and Bonn (1995–1997). He was Country Director for Czechoslovakia at the Department of State in Washington (1989–1991), and Dean Rusk Fellow at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy in 1991. In Washington, he served as a Director for Central, Eastern, and Northern Europe at the National Security Council (1999–2001), Executive Assistant to the Counsellor of the Department of State (1998–1999), Director of the Northern European Initiative (1998) and Chief of Staff at the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office (1997–1998). He became Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Prague in 2005, after serving in a similar capacity in Warsaw from 2002–2005. He recently returned from a six-month stay in Mosul.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I would like to express my deep thanks for the opportunity to speak on this relevant issue, especially because I am not an expert on counterterrorism as my colleague Mr. de Vries is. I am very impressed in hearing what he has told us about the systematic and effective efforts the EU has taken to take on the terrorist threat in the wake of 9/11. I would like to target a more conceptual level concerning the kinds of issues that we face in the United States, how those issues, especially the issue of democratic accountability raised by Mr. de Vries, complement the efforts of the institutions like European Union and the United Nations, and how in a long run we remain optimistic that we can be effective and that we can be true to our values. I think it echoes what Mr. de Vries has said and what he stands for and it certainly echoes that what historically the United States had stood for in the past.

Departing from my prepared notes, I would like to begin by making a comment about part of my experience in Iraq recently. I was the senior American civilian representative in the Northern part of Iraq and I was part of the team that did the final inspections of the Abu Ghraib prison when it was closed. I was charged with overseeing the largest prison once Abu Ghraib closed; this is Badush in Mosul. After Abu Ghraib we made sure we looked through both the civilian and the military files and experience so that there would be no repeat of what happened there. When we set up our oversight under the human rights group under my authority in Northern Iraq, we made sure that a close watch would be kept on the way both the military and the civilians, the Americans and the Iraqis oversaw the largest facility in Iraq. Does this mean that we had somehow been able to wash away our horror at what we have seen at Abu Ghraib? It certainly does not; it doesn't mean that we were able to look back and say somehow this was acceptable, that we had overcome this experience and could wipe it from our memory – quite the opposite. I submit to you that one of the things that you as our friends and we as a country hold dear is that we are able to learn from our mistakes. That is to say that what we have achieved in Badush, certainly during the time when I was in Iraq and I hope under my successors, makes it very unlikely that the kind of excesses that were carried out in the fight against terrorism would be repeated. My point is that thorough the battles that we are fighting in the coming years, what we will see is attempts by those people to be effective whether they go astray; that we have a kind of corrective mechanism within our societies and can correct those mistakes, those abuses. I am certainly very mindful of the context in the history of Europe, of the legacy of the world wars that have been fought across the continent, and the fact that the existence of terrorism after the calm that came out of it was something that was a low level but ever present threat for you. This was something that, as you may know, in our

country was something we forgot. We believed somehow that we were immune to these kinds of issues and behind our European friends both in our perceptions of how we dealt with terrorism and how we perceived it. It is unfortunate that we were awakened in the 1990's and the first years of this century in a rather sudden way, to which our democratic system has responded as best as it can but in a way that has been with fits and starts and in a way that to the outside eye has sometimes seen as contradiction or at least inconsistent with what we stand for.

I believe, however, that what we have done recently – our work with the EU, with the individual nations of Europe, our work with the countries outside of Europe and around the globe – has been something that has been very successful and which has addressed the initial threats posed by terrorism. For us it is a very important issue not to forget that terrorism is more than a criminal act, that it is an ideologically-based assault, one that deliberately targets civilians on a massive scale, one that is against tolerance and the way we live our national lives as Western democracies. Given the attacks that we face, there are many times when military means are the appropriate response. Otherwise, we are going to lose more of our people. I don't think it is a question of there being a difference between us and our European friends, but I recognise that it is something we need to explore more carefully when, not if, military force is most appropriate.

Another personal note, I was raised a Quaker. It is a religion of pacifists and while I very much respect the tenets of those who believe the violence is never right, I strongly believe personally that there are times when force is necessary. It is this issue of deciding when, with whom and how force is necessary that I believe we have the greatest work ahead at the conceptual level with our European friends. This has been part of the reasons why we had so many misunderstandings in the years since 9/11; where we had started with such an outpouring of support from our European allies, which has slipped away over the last years. I believe this misunderstanding or at least the lack of common position on the use of force is something we have to explore – why is it, why so many people in Europe are against the use of force at all, why is it that many people in Europe are sceptical about the way the Americans utilize force. We need to talk about it at this conceptual level as well as at the very real levels of counterterrorism Mr. de Vries has mentioned.

Part of my motivation for going to Iraq was because I believe there is a need to use force, there are people that will do violence to us and we need to resist them by the force. The question once again is, how do we do that? We have witnessed much in the last few years; we are filled with the images of Afghanistan and Iraq, of Madrid and London, Guantanamo and car bombs and coffins being lowered as flags are folded. In the transatlantic relationships during this time and during the level of great fear and uncertainty and of course with the differences over our policies in Iraq, there has nonetheless been an extremely fruitful set of goals that have been achieved through our common efforts and I am pleased that at the working level we have done very well. What it has done to us however is that it has brought changes to the United States; we've spent last five years simultaneously fighting

terrorism but also evolving into a nation that has become more familiar with the domestic threat of terrorism. And we have not finished this process; we hope this process will be a process that we share with you, our friends, we hope you will contribute to our process as you have done so much in the last 200 years. I think it is a remarkable process to me at least how after 9/11 we have built the kinds of structures where we can make those kind of agreements as we made in 2004 in Ireland with the EU and how we have developed the personal links with the people in Europe and in the world to fight terrorism.

In the post 9/11 world, these difficulties in transatlantic relations have led to differing perspectives and, in fact, many times they have been rhetorical, causing difficulties in both of our domestic situations. The policy differences do exist and there are legitimate concerns between friends, but overall, I believe that very clear cooperation exists today between the United States and our European allies. The most striking differences are in the public perception of the U.S. policy. Whereas the United States sees its efforts in the world as inextricably linked to the support of freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights and security, Europeans often view U.S. policies with suspicion. This comes, in part, from kind of choices we have had to make. We in the U.S. believe we have been compelled to act. Mr. de Vries mentioned in his comments those structural impediments to more effective European response that he very honestly presented to you and on which he has offered his suggestions. We, too, have impediments to how we respond to terrorism but I submit that our response perhaps goes in the other direction. We are sometimes very quick to act and perhaps sometimes too slow to reflect. I believe that these kinds of differences in our responses to the terrorist challenge have built up to misunderstandings; and I think that over the next few years we will be able to work on those things together. However, we do believe that we must be forthright and effective in protecting both our citizens, the citizens of our allies and the citizens of our friends against those who plan the attacks, whether they plan them in Hamburg, in Mosul or whether they even plan them in the United States.

We are charged with ensuring the safety of our citizens and we have often had to decide on what is and what is not an acceptable practice to prevent killings. The people of our countries are themselves the governments' most sacred charge and in making our decisions, in protecting our people, we struggle to be both effective and just. Therefore, human rights are crucial as the principles of international law, and there will never be peace and security without them. Our critics repeatedly raise the inconsistencies and difficulties in our policies but we in the United States are aware of the tensions between liberty and security and we do not take our decisions lightly. We are giving birth to a new paradigm, if you will, of ensuring international security whilst at the same time fighting to protect ourselves with all the tools, military and legal, that have been left to us from an earlier age. The internal U.S. debate on how to go about this is not simply another manifestation of partisanship in U.S. domestic politics. We are, therefore, in America working hard to try to deal with these issues straightforwardly and in a non-political way. The internal debate in the United States is a manifestation of the democratic process itself as we adapt to the

domestic terrorist threat. If we jeopardize that which defines our concept of ourselves, we would have lost something special, something that has allowed us to be a beacon for many others in the dark times of the past. I don't believe we are at that point. Such concepts as justice, liberty and objective truth are not going to be discarded as a result of the struggle with terrorists; these concepts underpin American consciousness and we will, with your help, find the equilibrium in our approach to terrorism as it matures over the years and because the fight against terrorism is global, it is not the only fight we have.

We must never confine ourselves to looking to the future only through the lens of the fight against terrorism, somehow leaving the rest of our work, whether it is to fight AIDS, to fight hunger or injustice. We have to work through these issues of poverty, instability, health and environmental challenges through the world. Without progress on these issues, we will never solve the questions related to terrorism; so as we face the future together dealing with terrorism in the 21st century, we will depend largely on who we are and what we do together in all aspects of the international society. We are friends and allies, not afraid to speak openly about the differences, committed to finding the way forward. As long as we have this dynamic relationship, I believe we can address terrorism and any other challenge we face. It is, in fact, our greatest tool in this fight.

QUESTIONS / COMMENTS AND ANSWERS

- *Is the **threat of terrorism** real?*
 - *One of the key priorities is to win the “**hearts and minds**” of the mainstream Muslims in Europe, specification of how to achieve this and the importance of “hearts and minds” of the EU citizens.*
 - ***Use of force** as a key problem in the transatlantic relations?*
 - *Only a descriptive approach to terrorism; why the **roots of terrorism** are not being explored? What will the “**changing**” **United States** do in order to despatch the root causes of terrorism?*
 - *Preventing recruitment, what **community development** the EU employs, efforts to engage Muslim community.*
 - *Slow **extradition** procedures between Asian and European countries.*
 - *Developments in **Iraq** and the implications for Jihadi terrorism elsewhere.*
 - *U.S. short-sighted counterterrorism strategy in dealing with **India and Pakistan** – rather tactical alliances.*
 - *Would EU be more effective in counterterrorism if it turned to **federal model**?*
-

Gijs de Vries:

I do remember the article in the Foreign Affairs which suggests that the **threat of terrorism** is exaggerated but if we look at the number of victims, the number of countries hit and at the threats which disrupted Europe over the summer, the threat is real; there is no question about that. Also the stated intentions of those who claim to be inspired by Osama bin Laden and his followers leave absolutely no doubt about their determination to continue. The threat is real; however, it is not a threat that we need to face by compromising the values on which our societies are based. Let us not forget that the human rights treaties, which were drafted right after the WWII, were drafted precisely with atrocities of that war in mind and they were drafted to provide guidance to policymakers in rough times. Human rights treaties are not fair-weather documents; they are documents to be used in difficult times; including the ones we are living now.

Are we losing? I think that would much too facile a judgement. Many plots have been disrupted, many terrorists have been arrested. Al Qaeda's physical base in Afghanistan has been destroyed by the use of force on the basis of a UN mandate and with the support of the international community, including European countries. There have been real successes. But it is clear that we are witnessing a **process of radicalization**, which is multidimensional and which differs from place to place and over time. We need to counter the rhetoric of the extremists and those who seek to recruit people into terrorism. The best way to do that is to insist on the fundamental principles on which civilized societies are based. Violence is unacceptable in a democracy; democracies are the antithesis of violence. People have to respect that, whether they are Christians, Jews, atheists, Muslims or whoever. This is also my response to the question on winning **the hearts and minds** of non-Muslims; we have to stick to the essence of our civilization and that is the rule of law, individual liberty and the responsibility to respect laws. If laws are broken, whether by Muslims or non-Muslims, then the perpetrators should feel the full force of law. People who engage in violence should be brought to trial, judged, and, if found guilty, convicted. If we do that, if we apply our principles and stick by them, we will prevail. Look at what happened in Madrid and in London after the attacks: It is always the strategy of terrorists to provoke an overreaction so that Western governments compromise on the values their societies are based on. But this did not happen: the British and Spanish people reacted with great dignity and calm to the terrible events that had befallen them. It shows that Western democracy is much stronger than the terrorists think; and not just Western democracy. In the countries like Indonesia, which has been hit several times by terrorist attacks the local terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah has campaigned actively to have the Indonesians adopt an Islamic kind of state. Indonesians have looked at that demand and they have

rejected it overwhelmingly. The biggest Muslim nation on this planet has participated in democratic elections for the presidency and parliament, rejecting the Islamist thesis and showing that there is compatibility between democracy and Islam. So these values are strong and we must build on them.

The question about the **roots of terrorism** – shouldn't we be targeting the roots rather than talking about the definition? I think we should be careful when talking about the roots of terrorism. First of all, there are different kinds of terrorism and we must not lump everything together. Secondly, too often to my taste, discussing the roots amounts to justifying or somehow minimizing the importance of terrorism: terrorism is wrong, for whatever reason, whatever its roots and we should build on that principle. That does not mean to say that we should not be addressing some of the grievances which are being expressed, including the search for justice in the world, including the search for democratic and accountable government in Muslim countries, including the complaints about how the European countries treat their minorities. These concerns are real and we must take them into account.

A brief comment on wise and constructive intervention by Mr. Munter – I am not quite sure that the key issue that the European and Americans should be discussing is the **use of force** because I believe there is a role for use of force in the fight against terrorism. The use of force can be a major tool and Afghanistan is there to show it; yesterday and today we must use force to fight the Taliban who are trying to claw back power in Afghanistan. There is no other way, we must do it and we are doing it. I do believe we have to talk about the interpretation of the common principles that we established after WWII. Let's apply these principles because they are a source of strength.

I must confess (this may surprise you) that I am a little sceptical about the **federal model**. The EU is a very diverse phenomenon. Probably the best way to combat terrorism in such a diverse unit is to do it bottom up and not top down; to do it through the existing organizations that know their country best and by allowing those organizations to work together, rather than by creating a federal structure. To be quite specific, I am not so sure whether a European FBI or CIA, should we have the legal basis to create them, would be that much more effective.

As to **community development**, I am not an expert in the field but I believe it can play a role. I visited the Philippines not long ago and in Mindanao there is a very interesting project going on between Christian and Muslim farmers who combine forces in order to have better lives. That is the kind of practical work that is enormously important, it is not abstract and it works. It is not of course a cure but it can be part of the solution. We have to look at what is happening in our societies in Europe; there is certainly a search in many of our member states for the best way to build a society which would accommodate all minorities. It can be done but we have to invest a lot of effort in it.

As to **extradition**, I do not know enough about the specific case of the 8-year long extradition procedure between India and Portugal which was mentioned. Within the EU,

the process has speeded up significantly; it used to take a year between the member states, now it is down to little over a month. One of the suspects of the aborted second bombing effort in London in July was caught in Italy and he was extradited to the UK in 40 days. As far as third countries are concerned, it very much depends in practice on the factual information provided by third countries to the EU member state concerned. I know of several cases where judges in the EU member states have felt that a third country requesting extradition simply had not made out its case.

Iraq very briefly, there is no question that the war in Iraq has complicated the fight against terrorism but we cannot stop at saying that. There is equally no question that the fight against terrorism would be complicated even further if we would not do our utmost to help the Iraqis find peace with themselves and to find the peace with their neighbours. We need to help Iraq to build a stable environment. That will be a long term effort; it will require a great deal of investment and patience. There will be setbacks; it is going to be a rough and difficult process but I can see no alternative but to continue doing that work. The EU is trying to contribute modestly to that effort, for example by the training of about 600 judges and prosecutors so that the instruments of a functioning state in Iraq can be built.

Cameron Munter:

I think we can look at this morning's newspapers, in which the debate in the United States over the Geneva conventions has taken a very constructive turn. It is happening in the United States, within a democratic country, where there is criticism of those who are in power and where there is a debate going on between those who are in power and those who oppose them, not necessarily only on partisan grounds but on such questions like the rules of war. You will find that a compromise is being hammered out about the approach to Geneva protocols. It is an exact illustration of what Mr. de Vries is talking about; the discussion of those concepts which we have developed, not only since WW II, but indeed since the WW I, since the beginning of global institutions trying to cope with our common problems, we must maintain these principles in their current ways whilst adapting them to the challenges we face.

It is also worth thinking about the question of justice. In American rhetoric great value is placed on freedom to that extent that it sometimes trumps other elements of what we think of as the ingredients for a successful democratic society such as equality and justice. Sometimes justice is simply not heard as loudly as freedom. I think many of our friends in the Arab world will raise the question of justice, asking whether the way the world works is

just. That kind of question, is a very good exercise for us, because it gets us back once again to Mr. de Vries's question – how do we explain the existence of popular grievances? Is it that we are perhaps using a rhetoric that is sterile to those who hold such grievances, and they in turn are using one that is sterile to us? Looking at the word justice or the concept behind the word justice, I hope that we can make some progress.

Now the question about whether terrorism is a myth. Two journals were mentioned – Foreign Affairs and National Interest, please do not make the mistake of looking at the U.S. as a monolithic country; of course there is creative dissent in the United States, of course there are people who will be as honest as possible about their disagreement with the way that our government has worked. That is one of our greatest strengths. So yes, we have people who are claiming (and they have every right to claim), that a threat has been misunderstood, used or, twisted. I can only say for my part, that I entirely agree with Mr. de Vries, that **the threat is real** that those people who work on counterterrorism thorough the world, not only in America or Europe but also in Asia and elsewhere know that there is a very real threat.

As to the **use of force**, I did not want to give the impression this is the main question that separates Europeans and Americans. It is simply one that has a tendency to divide Americans from the very deeply-held beliefs of Europeans; and if one pays attention to what happened in the last century, it would be astonishing if European beliefs were different from what they are. Finding a common ground on when and how it is appropriate to use force is one of our biggest tasks; that was the point I was making. I don't want to caricature all Europeans as people who hope the bad things will just go away all on their own and all the Americans as policemen, protecting the Europeans; that is a false image. We simply have to talk about the ways we apply force and how they are consistent with what we want to achieve.

About the **process of change** and how we can achieve results in the U.S. One example is our government's attempts to deal with the issue of secret prisons. How internees shall be treated is part of the debate and the way we think about interrogations is being reassessed by the government. We are not going to stop questioning people who are legitimate suspects in the war on terror, because we want the public to be safe. However, from our Supreme Court decisions and from our new legislation in the U.S., I believe we are going to see changes in the way we do this; not to compromise our effectiveness but to improve our image in the world.

On **Iraq** I would add that the kinds of efforts mentioned by Mr. de Vries are perhaps lost in the reports about the car bombs and the ethnic violence. There are international efforts, not only involving the EU or U.S. but also the Japanese or Koreans, to have judges and police trained not only in keeping order but in representing citizenship, to have people working in economic fields and so on; that is not only to cope with the many years of dictatorship but to cope with Iraq as a battleground. I agree that it is difficult, but in fact, it did not begin with Iraq and it is not likely to end with Iraq either.

Addressing the question of Pakistan, I am not an expert in the region but the American lack of attention and the tendency seen by the rest of the world in tactics sometimes overlaps with the fact that we are a global country, dealing with global issues; that is we do not tend to look at regional issues, we tend to see issues that themselves might be regional, such as the borders between **India and Pakistan**, as they fit globally. Whether we have made the right choice or not is open to argument, but what we welcome is that many of our colleagues from India, Pakistan or Europe are choosing to see the issues in the global context, too. It may not be the same global context that we see, but at least the debate about the broad terms of what we do has begun. When somebody criticizes our support of Jihadists in Afghanistan in the 1980s, we can begin to talk about that over a longer period of time. Up until the end of the Cold War, only very few nations chose to see these questions in a global context. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there are more countries looking at these kinds of problems and the links between terrorists who are on certain borders of central Asia and those who are in the United States. One of the unexpected benefits of the war on terror is that we all are trying to see things globally in a more strategic way.

TRANSATLANTIC PUBLIC OPINION AND TERRORISM

John K. Glenn

Short profile:

*Dr. John K. Glenn is Director of Foreign Policy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, DC. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in sociology from Harvard University and a B.A. from Oberlin College. He has been a Junior Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna and Jean Monnet Post-doctoral Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence. He previously worked as the Executive Director of the Council for European Studies, based at Columbia University, from 1999–2004. He also held an appointment as a visiting scholar and adjunct professor in European Union studies at New York University from 2000 to 2004. His publications include: **Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe** (Stanford University Press, 2001) and **The Power and Limits of NGOs: A critical look at building democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia** (Columbia University Press, 2002). He is also the principal author of the annual GMF Transatlantic Trends survey.*

I would like to begin by referring to a recent public opinion survey released by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends*. It is an annual survey of public opinion in the United States and twelve European countries which addresses foreign policy issues facing the U.S. and Europe today. This year's survey findings relate to today's topic of counterterrorism strategies in the context of U.S.–Europe relations. The main finding this year was that, although Europeans have not changed their critical views of the Bush administration, the views of Europeans and Americans toward global threats and challenges are much closer than one would believe if one simply read the newspapers that tend to focus on the transatlantic divide.

Five years after 9/11, we found that the most important and most pressing threat on the both sides of the Atlantic was international terrorism. This is surprising in several regards. Firstly, we might have thought more Americans than Europeans would feel threatened by terrorism. There are also those who said that the threat of terrorism would fade after 9/11. There were those in Germany, who argued, the international terrorism was really an Anglo–American problem, related to the war in Iraq. This appears not to be the case in the minds of the publics. After the thwarted bomb attacks on regional trains in Germany this past summer, a very important change occurred in the German discussion about the nature of the threat posed by international terrorism. In addition, it is striking that the largest change from the last years, both in the United States and Europe, was on the threat of the so-called Islamic fundamentalism; it was up 13 points in the U.S. and up 11 points in Europe. It suggests that Americans and Europeans are seeing these issues similarly in some ways. Further, both Europeans and Americans saw the threat of a nuclear Iran as more pressing than the threat of violence and instability in Iraq.

The survey contains a couple of questions that go beyond threat perception. Americans and Europeans might see the world similarly, but would they agree on what to do about it? We asked questions about civil liberties and again, if you read the newspapers you might think that Americans feel so threatened by the prospect of another attack that they are willing to surrender their civil liberties; Europeans, on the other hand, are said to be more used to terrorism and more cautious. We asked: "Would you support greater governmental authority in the effort to prevent terrorism to install cameras in public places, monitor the internet, monitor citizens' phone calls, and monitor banking transactions?" We chose those four items because we thought they would be broadly applicable; in the U.S. for instance, there is a great debate on public library records, but this would not have the same connotations in Europe.

On these four policies, we found a surprising amount of agreement on where to draw the line on civil liberties. Americans and Europeans overwhelmingly agree that the government should have greater authority to install surveillance cameras in public places. They also agree, although by a lesser margin, that the government should have greater authority to monitor internet communications. They also agree that the government should *not* have the authority to monitor phone calls and they differ somewhat on whether the government

should have the authority to monitor banking transactions, with more Europeans in favour than Americans. The results are more similar than many would expect. I was struck reading the comment by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in which she said: "For us, it is about finding the balance between surveillance cameras, which I am completely in favour of, data protection and basic human rights, which we must be very cautious about." The survey did not focus exclusively on the issue but in some ways it gives us confidence that there is a room for us to talk beyond the elites, specialists and experts; that the U.S. and in European publics are perhaps not so far apart.

The second issue I would like to turn to is the debate on terrorism in the U.S., which should be understood as a debate about the power of the executive branch of government. What is happening within the United States is a debate about the authority of the President to make decisions related to terrorism and counterterrorism activities. I don't know how much of this debate makes it off our shores, so let me emphasise that there have been a series of cases in the judicial branch of government, the Supreme Court, which have slowly made their way forward. The most recent one is the Hamdi versus Rumsfeld case. To simplify, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the United States had to respect the Geneva conventions in dealing with prisoners; that the President has no "blank check" to do as he wishes in the war on terror. A compromise about U.S. legislation concerning the treatment of terrorism suspects was already mentioned by Mr. Munter in his presentation. You are probably aware, although it is easy to personalize the U.S. in its President, that he or she does not have legislative authority in the way many prime ministers have in European systems. The debate in the Congress is an extremely important one. After the Supreme Court decision, the President called for Congress to write legislation that would codify what is permitted and what is forbidden in the war on terror, as he sees it. He made some very strong claims about what should be permitted and what has been striking is that, although the Republicans currently control both Houses of Congress, his party had a debate within the Senate led by three prominent Senators – John McCain, John Warner and Lindsay Graham – which challenged the President on the issue. They refused to support legislation that followed the President's directive as given because of concerns about the way it would weaken U.S. morale and legitimacy and, in their own words, put our own soldiers at risk. I would urge you to follow this legislation because the debate within the United States very much concerns the extent and the powers of the different branches of government. The debate on wiretapping in the United States is really a debate about the need for judicial oversight; it is not a debate on whether or not wiretapping is permissible but about the extent of the power of the President to engage in wiretapping.

We are having "midterm" congressional elections in November, and one could ask whether terrorism is a partisan issue in this election. In the *Transatlantic Trends* survey, we can break down the public by party affiliation and, in fact, among the general public, there is no difference between Republicans and Democrats on the perception of the threat of terrorism. The question is whether it would make a difference if the Democrats were to

take a majority in one of the houses of Congress. We are having a discussion about this at the moment because we know from other public opinion polls that it is only on terrorism that the Bush administration currently receives above 50% approval; on all other issues it is below 50%. We are seeing this issue coming into to the public eye at a time when they are arguing very hard about the congressional elections and prospects for Republican candidates. There is often a lot of anguish over the lack of dramatic new ideas from the Democrats, and terrorism is one of those difficult issues in a way because most of the people don't disagree about whether terrorism is important. Disagreements tend to be about something less glamorous, such as differences about how to deal with terrorism. Arguments in both parties tend not to be about whether we deal with terrorism, but whether we can deal with it better, perhaps in a way that respects our values or international treaties more. The results of these elections reflect tensions between the different branches of the government, such as the ability of Congress to limit or empower the President in this field. In many ways, this will be the domain in which we will see America moving forward in one direction or another.

TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS – EU AND US RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Daniel Keohane

Short profile:

*Daniel Keohane is the senior research fellow for Security & Defence Policy at the Centre for European Reform in London (CER). He holds an M.A. in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a B.A. in History from Trinity College, Dublin. He has been a Visiting Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris; and a Research Associate at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University in Washington DC. He also worked at the Aspen Institute in Berlin. The short list of his publications include **Europe's New Defence Agency** (CER, 2004), **The EU and counter-terrorism** (CER, 2005) or **EU Defence 2020** (CER, 2006).*

Before tackling the EU approach to counterterrorism, EU–NATO relations, cooperation between the U.S. and European governments and public opinion, a couple of general comments, important for understanding the subject, should be made. The first problem with counterterrorism is that it is not a policy area in itself, it is truly a horizontal policy; it covers police and judicial cooperation, foreign and defence policy and it can even involve environmental ministries. It is truly cross–departmental, already difficult to organize at the national level and some governments do better at it than others; so it is obvious how difficult it is to get 25 EU governments to join up their services and cooperate at the EU level. Secondly, if you look at the EU and its approach to counterterrorism, most of it (perhaps over 95%) is done nationally. Even when it involves cross–border cooperation, the basis is mostly bilateral and there is a long history of this in Europe. Examples of this are the cooperation of the British and Irish governments dealing with terrorists in Northern Ireland or the French and Spanish governments, who have established a centre in Pyrenees, partly to keep an eye on ETA. On the other hand, we should not forget that the EU is still important because the threat we face today is very different from the threat we faced from the IRA, ETA or the Red Brigades; it is truly international, it moves in and out of Europe, it involves home–grown terrorists, foreigners and non–Europeans; this is why we need European, transatlantic and global cooperation.

As to the EU's response to terrorism, Mr. de Vries has listed everything that the EU is doing and indeed, on paper, it is a very impressive list. There is a long Action Plan of about 175 different measures; it covers absolutely everything from infrastructure protection to foreign policy, internal coordination, intelligence sharing or police and judicial cooperation. The problem is that most of these measures have not been implemented; only about 35 of the 175 measures have actually been carried out. Some of those measures are of course more important than the others.

The concrete measures that have been useful are things like European Arrest Warrant or the European Evidence Warrant – the concrete police and judicial issues. Frontex, the border agency, is trying to strengthen cross border cooperation as well as intelligence sharing. The Situation Centre (SitCen) is very important not only because it is trying to bring together the internal and external intelligence assessments. One must bear in mind that SitCen does not deal with the raw intelligence; it is about creating a strategic overview, but bringing together the internal and external in order to address the threat we face, is also absolutely crucial. It is also interesting that SitCen is developing a role in monitoring websites of Islamists; it is fairly uncontroversial but this is the first time SitCen has been given a more operational role and is not just depending on information from member states. It is extremely useful because the internet is one of the main tools the Islamists use to disseminate information, training and so on and that is the area where the EU can be very useful.

The EU strategy, which is remarkably similar to the UK strategy of four P's, is a very good step because before December 2005 we had a very long list of measures but no real overview of how we were approaching these issues. The problem is that the list of measures remains very long, containing all the world's problems that we have to solve before we can cope with

terrorism; and that is impossible. To give one example – radicalization, of course, it is a crucial issue but I do not see what the EU can do about it, particularly given the large Muslim populations in Europe and the focus on the home–grown Islamist terrorism. It is up to the British, French or Dutch governments to think about integration in their own countries. It is not for the EU to start commenting on social integration and how to work with communities.

There is one aspect that has been largely ignored in the debate and that is the role of EU foreign policy. We tend to focus on the internal threat in the EU; there is much less debate about what the EU can do outside Europe to help to cope with the international terrorism, in particular, working with the non–European governments, be they Egyptian or Pakistani. Capacity building, for example, sending out trainers, judges or policemen, is important. The EU can do a lot more of this. Pilot schemes with the Philippines, Indonesia and Pakistan have been started by the European Commission, which is sending money to help support their intelligence services and emergency response. The problem is that the European Commission is not sure where that money is going. There is not enough capacity within the Commission to assess the capacity building projects, which are being carried out outside Europe. There is also a problem of priority of goals. In Algeria, for example, the EU runs a judicial capacity building operation, but the Algerian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, recently jailed some independent-minded judges, whom he did not like. This raises the question whether it is right for the EU to continue to work with the judiciary in Algeria, promoting more judicial independence, whilst constrained to work with a government capable of undermining it in this way. This is an open question and it really is a difficult issue. The U.S. has made clear that spreading democracy and promoting human rights is the best way to win the so-called “war on terror” and the EU appears to agree, although it is a lot more timid in its statements. It does not talk about it very much but the promotion of democracy throughout the broader Middle East means you have to be prepared to talk to Islamists, especially when they get elected like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Hamas and Hezbollah elsewhere. We may not like that but it is the reality.

A final point on EU cooperation: apart from what is happening in Brussels and the debates on the Action Plan, there is a lot of interesting cooperation going on in the various groups of governments; there is the G–6 group, consisting of the six biggest countries in Europe – Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland, which is trying to share intelligence more closely. Frankly, they don't want to share with everybody else, they do not trust all the governments in the EU since not all governments have the same kind of intelligence procedures. I am in favour of this; close cooperation in some form is better than none at all, and I am confident that eventually more countries will become involved. A lot of EU initiatives have started this way, as in the case of Schengen, but some of the smaller EU member states are not happy about this development. Another example is the Treaty of Prüm, which was signed by seven member states last year to intensify their police and judicial cooperation. The signatories declared that the other EU member states are welcomed to join in 2008 and there is a lot of speculation that it might become an EU wide measure by the end of decade.

Turning to EU and NATO relations; in the debates about counterterrorism NATO is not discussed as much as it used to be; it is true that in Europe the EU is very much a focus of cooperation, mainly because there are no interior ministers in NATO, and it does not have an aid policy. It is a military alliance focusing on defence policy and, for Europeans, defence policy is part of counterterrorism, but it is relatively insignificant compared with police and judicial. There are real problems in EU–NATO relationship at the moment but it is not about counterterrorism; it has to do with the dispute between Cyprus and Turkey and with the deeper issues between France and the U.S. about the future of NATO. However, it means that they do not talk to each other about counterterrorism, only issues like Bosnia, because it is a joint EU–NATO operation and capabilities (since everybody agrees there is a need of more capabilities) are being discussed. There is no discussion about Afghanistan where NATO could use a lot more EU help on the civilian side, neither is there any discussion on practical counterterrorism. This could be particularly beneficial, for example, on infrastructure protection or emergency response, especially given the NATO expertise with the nuclear, chemical, and biological threats. At the moment, both NATO and the EU have their own separate programmes; the assets in these areas could be shared. Turning to the emergency response, I took part in a seminar on the emergency response held in Brussels couple of months ago; representatives of both the Commission and the Council were present. I asked a simple question; when an emergency arises, particularly a cross-border attack where presumably the EU might have a role in coordinating the response, who speaks for the EU – is it Gijs de Vries, Franco Frattini or Javier Solana? The Commission representative told me she did not care who spoke for the EU, she only cared for who spoke for the Commission and that would be Franco Frattini. The Council representative responded it would probably be Javier Solana. Why can't there be one person? Ordinary citizens may not be interested in whether it is an EU Commissioner or a Council representative who speaks, but I was, and it emerged for a single person to speak, a Treaty change is needed. Do we really need Treaty change in order to have a spokesperson so that the EU can send a single message to the citizens after an attack?

Returning to my EU–NATO point, what is truly worrying is the slow build up of institutional rivalry. Obviously, the EU assumes it is important for counterterrorism, NATO assumes it is more important since it has more capacities. Part of the explanation resides also in the interagency politics in Washington; the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and the FBI are quite happy to work with the EU, but not everyone in the State Department and in the Pentagon are so happy to work with the EU. And the reason is not necessarily because of what is practical but it has rather more to do with a broader problem in the EU–NATO relationships, more particularly between Paris and Washington. I have heard proposals from Jose Maria Aznar, former Spanish PM, suggesting that we need to bring the interior ministers into NATO, in another words duplicating what the EU is doing but to do that in NATO, a new Atlantic Treaty is needed and it would probably take at least five to ten years to agree on it. Instead of reinventing the wheel, it would make more sense to focus on EU–US cooperation,

which is precisely what the U.S. Homeland Security Department and U.S. Department of Justice are doing. This is a worrying debate because the institutional disputes tend to shed more heat than light and will not help us in the fight against terrorism.

On the cooperation between the EU governments and the U.S. it has to be said that it is very good. For example, there is an American–French intelligence centre outside Paris, where intelligence on Islamists groups, in particular, is discussed. U.S. judges and FBI agents have been allowed to work under German jurisdiction in Germany. The problem in this case is rather on the public level. The rendition story for instance is very embarrassing for the European governments; there are many European politicians being very critical of the U.S. policy, disagreeing on the war on terror and then they are caught working so closely on one particular issue which is illegal in number of European countries. The investigations are going on but we have not seen any good evidence yet; the report for the Council of Europe was based on press reports and that is not evidence; it is up to the governments concerned to have their own internal investigations but the impact on the public opinion, if more revelations about secret prisons in Europe are found out, would be worrying.

There is also an interesting question about the perceptions of counterterrorism laws and how tough they are in the U.S. and Europe. Just because the Europeans do not talk about the war on terror, it does not mean they don't have tough antiterrorism laws. If you look at what Tony Blair was proposing last year, and he had difficulties with some aspects, parts of the proposals are tougher than the provisions of the Patriot Act; and it is not only in the United Kingdom. Take glorification, which is a big problem debated vigorously in the UK, as an example; there are already very tough anti–glorification laws in Germany based on historical experience but, for example, the groups like Hiz–bu–Tahrir, one of the main Islamist thinking groups in Europe and around the world, is banned in Germany whilst it is active in the UK. Another example of tough laws is detention. Detention has been an extremely controversial issue in the British debate; the final compromise is 28 days at the moment. I asked one of the top counterterrorism judges in France, Jean–Louis Bruguière who is famous for catching Carlos the Jackal, what he made of this British detention debate and he just started laughing. He said: "Honestly, if I want to keep somebody locked up for two years that is not a problem, you guys listen to your Parliament too much and that is the problem." Take another example; in France, wiretap evidence can easily be used in cases, in the UK it can't. The debate on the war on terror was very much focused on foreign policy, defence policy and the use of force; looking at the legislation, the view that the Europeans are quite soft and the Americans quite hard in counterterrorism, is reversed.

As to the public opinion, John Glenn has already mentioned the Transatlantic Trends survey and the strong agreement across the Atlantic on the nature of the threat and its importance in general. However, within Europe, there are big differences and the split runs clearly between East and West. In Western Europe, the average percentage of those who think terrorism is the most important security issue varies between 20–40%; in the Eastern Europe and further East you go, it starts falling rapidly, in Slovenia and Slovakia is less than 1%. This feeds into

a perception generally shared in Brussels that Central and Eastern European governments don't feel as if they are in the line of fire the way the Western European governments are. That perception may be unfair, partly caused by the fact there are no large Muslim populations in these countries but it is a perception and it is something that should bother us. A far more worrying are the polls of European Muslims; over the last year since the July 7 (2005) bombings, I have looked at a number of polls of the Muslim community and on average, roughly 20% tend to have some sympathy with the London bombers; that is worrying because of comparisons with the situation in the Northern Ireland, where one of the main reasons why the IRA lasted as long as it did, was its consistent 30% of national population support. Terrorists need support, not just logistics or money, it is what given them sustenance. Again, the EU is probably not the place to discuss formulating a policy on it; rather it can act like a think-tank for experience exchange.

My final point is about the language of counterterrorism. It is fair to say that there are not many people in Europe who like the phrase "war on terror"; Europeans keep talking about the "fight against terrorism". If the Europeans hear the phrase, they think it is militaristic, short-term and that it legitimizes terrorists because it implies that they are warriors, not criminals; the Europeans also don't think such a phrase is going to win hearts and minds and ultimately for Europeans, you have to win hearts and minds. However, this criticism is not entirely fair; the U.S. approach to the "war on terror" is much more sophisticated than it is given credit for, looking at what the U.S. is trying to do in terms of democracy promotion, for instance. Indeed, the Pentagon generals wanted the phrase changed but the President Bush had to keep it because the Republicans in Congress did not want to abandon it. The Pentagon and the State Department are not thinking in these terms, but it is the part of the American debate; it is like the "war on drugs" or the "war on poverty"; it is full of action – proclaiming that we *are* doing something about it. To European ears, however, it sounds very dangerous and there are good reasons for this; it is partly because there are large Muslim populations in Western Europe and there are worries about home-grown terrorism; it is also partly because of the European experience of counterterrorism, which has taught European countries that ultimately, terrorism must be treated as a crime using the police and judiciary. Also President Bush is not a very popular man in most of Europe and nearly anything he says will be disregarded, and that is a shame.

Looking at transatlantic cooperation, it needs to be borne in mind that when Europeans think about terrorism, they see it as an internal threat; when Americans think about terrorism, they see it as an external threat – 9/11 was caused by people who came from somewhere else – going to the root of that problem, to the Middle East, is the solution. For Europeans, thinking about London, the perpetrators came from the North of England, from Yorkshire, not from Islamabad or Yemen and that is something we have to discuss and be more honest with each other about.

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE TO TERRORISM IN THE TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Karl-Heinz Kamp

Short profile:

*Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp studied History and Political Science at the Friedrich Wilhelms University in Bonn. In 1985, he completed his MA thesis on the role of conventional forces in NATO; he also holds a Ph.D. from the University of the German Armed Forces in Hamburg (Bundeswehruniversität). In 1988 he became a research fellow at the Centre for Science and International Affairs of Harvard University. 1989 he joined the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn. Between 1997 and 1998 he worked in the Planning Staff of the German foreign ministry. In 2000 he was appointed Head of the International Planning Staff of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. He is currently the Security Policy Coordinator of the Foundation in Berlin. His publications include: **Deutschland, Europa und die transatlantischen Sicherheitsbeziehungen**, (Reinhard Meier-Walser (Ed.), *Gemeinsam sicher? Visionen und Realität europäischer Sicherheitspolitik*, Neuried 2004, pp. 249 – 260), **Die NATO braucht eine neue Strategie**, (Focus, 2004), **Preemptive Strikes – a New Reality in Security Policy** (Atlantisch Perspektief, 2004)*

I will make three main points, which have already been tackled in part. First, I propose to reassess our threat perception, secondly, to list what has been achieved – the good news so to say and thirdly, to list the bad news – what is still lacking and what still needs to be done in the transatlantic realm.

To start with the risk assessment, I would particularly question parts of the U.S. government threat assessment. If you go five years back in your mind and ask what the first reaction to 9/11 was, usually the first visceral response was that, from now on, this kind of attack was going to happen again because, apparently, it is so simple to attack highly-developed states like the U.S. For example, something like stealing a plane and attacking the Reichstag in Berlin appeared to be comparably easy. All catastrophic scenarios ranging from radiological attack, the release of biological agents and contamination of the water supply of the major cities seemed possible; in such an atmosphere, a mere few grams of white powder could cause anthrax hype in the U.S. as well as in Europe and lead to the general perception of Jihadi terrorism as an overarching threat, dominating all aspects of security policy and risk assessment. In the U.S., in the decision making part of the government, such a perception has survived for five years and even in Europe some still believe in the overarching threat of terrorism. The Bush administration has gone as far as to equate the threat of Islamist violence with the danger hitherto posed by the former Soviet Union. Only recently the argument was that the fight against terrorism is a new Cold War – long and dark – and that all energy needs to be focused on securing victory in it. However, such a world view is no longer convincing today, because five years after the 9/11 two simple facts have to be taken into account. First, whether or not the campaign against terrorism is a war, and it is truly arguable, it is certainly not comparable to the Cold War simply because, had the Cold War become a hot one, the consequences would have been dramatically different. If a Soviet nuclear missile launch had been detected, the U.S. National Security Advisor would have had only about three minutes to verify the threat and on reaching the President afterwards, the President would have basically had about four minutes to decide on the response. Assuming that the president had decided to respond in kind, launching the U.S. nuclear missiles; the result would have been 160 million people dead within the next six hours. It is quite clear that even a massive terrorist attack today could cause only a very small proportion of these casualties. Such a body count may appear cynical but these facts have to be taken into account, not at least for the sake of future transatlantic coherence. The second point is very simple; there has been no repeat of 9/11 in the last five years. We experienced the Madrid and London bombings, certainly tragic events but not comparable by far to the catastrophes in New York and Washington D.C.; neither when looked at symbolically, nor in respect of the number of casualties or global repercussions of 9/11.

However, optimistic predictions may not be in order, it is quite possible that at this very minute somebody is planning another 9/11 – we simply don't know. Still, we have

to concede that the predicted nightmare scenarios just did not happen, certainly due the fact that our preemptive and protective means have been increasingly successful but perhaps also because our initial threat perception rather overblown and pessimistic. Please do not get me wrong: I am not playing down the problem of international terrorism; Islamic violence will remain a long term key challenge for our societies, particularly since the attacks in London and other events have shown that our societies are apparently breeding their own new generations of Muslim zealots. The threat is a real one. However, my point is that Jihadi terrorism is not an existential threat for the transatlantic community and we should not inflate it into a clash of cultures, which will threaten our civilizations.

The exaggeration contains two pitfalls. Firstly, it contributes to the transatlantic divergence over threat perceptions, which in turn has detrimental consequences to consensual approach; much of the European-U.S. disputes we have had so far merely stem from the fact that our threat assessments have been different. Secondly, focusing too much on combating terrorism, there is a danger that other security threats might be neglected. Wars between the major states do not belong to the past as some may assume; security policy is more than dealing primarily with the non-state actors. The basic feeling today, particularly in Western Europe, is that since we cannot be attacked, the non-state actors remain as the only problem. This is not the case; if the energy crisis becomes as grave as the present forecasts indicate, it is hard to imagine that oil and gas competition among the major players will always be resolved in a consensual way. Moreover, given the situation in Iran and North Korea, the significant increase in the number of nuclear states is likely to lead to significant regional power structure changes. The countries which now have or are likely to have the WMD are those which will be affected most by the global warming and rising sea levels in the future. A British analyst stated recently that we might regard the year 2006 as the golden age of the century in 50 or 100 years time from now. If we focus exclusively on counterterrorism, taking previous crises as the models for the future, there is a very real danger that we might be completely surprised again and the negative impact of such a miscalculation on the transatlantic relations is quite clear.

Taking a more optimistic view of the challenges, whilst not underestimating the threat of terrorism, leads to a rather different assessment of the good news and the bad news. Five years after 9/11, the balance sheet does not actually look that bad. The good news is that transatlantic cooperation on combating terrorism has improved significantly. This holds true not only for the multinational organizations like NATO, G8 or the EU but also for the "bilateral" EU-U.S. level. NATO, for example, whilst certainly not having a "silver bullet" that would lay terrorism to rest once and for all, has agreed several NATO summit communiqués on terrorism, which, regardless their actual effect, are strong evidence of this. Very importantly, NATO also agreed not to exclude the preemptive use of military force against terrorism; a document has been signed by all NATO countries, confirming

this. Whether or not NATO will be able to put this statement into effect, the important point is that something which was so controversial in the transatlantic debate, did not actually prevent NATO from reaching a consensus; all NATO members signed, even the German and French governments, showing that it is possible to find consensus on controversial solutions if they relate to issues like terrorism.

The G8 has become the key institution in implementing data and biometrical information exchange; the EU has also developed some measures, which have already been mentioned. As a result, we are currently doing much better in antiterrorism operations than five years ago, both on the national level as well as in respect of the transatlantic dimension. British success only a couple of weeks ago in disrupting a major terrorist plot was no accident. It is also worth noting that the trade-off between providing security from terrorism on the one hand and restricting civil liberties on the other seems to be more a problem of elites, which does not have such an impact on average people. In relation to the Transatlantic Trends survey which has just been mentioned, if 70% or 80% of Germans and Americans have no problem with wiretapping, then that becomes essentially a problem for the elites who are complaining about it.

However, one has to remain realistic concerning what can be achieved in the EU and on the transatlantic level. We should not be over-ambitious; the EU approach is still a national one, the EU-wide approach is still not operational for the variety of reasons, not least because the EU is going through a bad period at the moment. There are some limits: transatlantic cooperation has its natural limits due to the different legal traditions, history or positions on very concrete issues, such as the use of the death penalty. It is clear that we have different strategic cultures on the both sides of the Atlantic, and that this imposes limits on cooperation. The same holds true for intelligence sharing: intelligence sharing has its limits primarily because intelligence services do not want to share. Furthermore, the readiness of some countries, particularly in the EU, to accept the transatlantic cooperation is limited; EU-NATO cooperation does not work because some NATO countries do not want it to function. France, for example, does not want close cooperation between NATO and EU for a variety of reasons, with the result that France blocks everything whether the other members like it or not. So it is important to be careful not to raise unrealistic expectations on the level of transatlantic or EU cooperation.

Finally, there is the bad news; after five years, the report card on terrorism contains, in my view at least, four points, which qualifies as a D grade. Firstly, we have not fully recovered yet from the severe transatlantic crisis over Iraq. Significant political improvements have certainly taken place; at last some in Washington have understood that the fight against terrorism and unilateralism are mutually exclusive. It has become quite clear that even a country like the U.S., enjoying unique military power and political might, needs allies and international support for the various aspects of its anti-terrorist actions. Europe has realized the need for transatlantic cooperation as well; we are

currently experiencing a surprising consensus on Iran, for instance. Furthermore; there were some political developments like the partial regime change in Germany, which has made the things easier, too. At the same time, the international image of the U.S. has deteriorated significantly; Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have severely damaged America's morale authority and leadership skills. The Iraq disaster has improperly blurred the lines between anti-terrorism and proliferation and has established some confusing terms like "state-terrorism". I say this as personally someone who supported the military action against Saddam Hussein and I am perhaps one of the few who still recall doing so.

Secondly, some European countries are still inward looking when it comes to the international dimension of anti-terrorist operations. I found it interesting that the Transatlantic Trends poll indicated a high level of transatlantic risk awareness; the figures of 79% of the Americans and 66% of Europeans who regard the threat posed by terrorism as extremely important were quoted. Perhaps the situation in Germany is particularly different but there is a poll done by the Institute for Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces saying that two-thirds of Germans feel more threatened by the cuts in social expenditure than by terrorism. It is something which fluctuates, for example, under the influence of major sporting events such as the soccer world championship. However, but by and large, many Europeans societies are quite inward looking, and that poses a problem.

The third shortcoming, closely intertwined with the trend to inwardness, is the lack of explanations and coherent justifications of political decisions to the public, particularly where controversial actions are contemplated against terrorism such as military action. This holds true for the transatlantic level; the U.S. failed to explain coherently to its allies why it was necessary to act militarily against Saddam Hussein; it is simply not enough to make statements about an axis of evil and hope that this is self-justifying. This also holds true for the European national level, where many national governments have so far failed to explain the necessity of international engagements, particularly if they involve casualties. For instance, what is at stake in Afghanistan has not been explained properly – it is still unclear to many whether it is about combating terrorism, reconstruction, stabilization or whether it is an anti-drug operation. The more body bags start returning, the more public support for Afghanistan is certain to decline further.

This leads to the fourth shortcoming, and this is the inadequate allocation of the resources, notable on the European side. Much has not taken place on the European level simply because resources have not been allocated in an appropriate way. I am not talking primarily about the defence budget; the defence budget certainly is important – particularly when the NATO Secretary General has to go begging for a couple of helicopters to get things done in Afghanistan, something which I personally feel is a great shame – however, my point is rather different. In Germany in 1990, 21.5% of the total federal budget was spent on foreign policy expenditure, which includes the budget

of three foreign-policy ministries – the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Development Aid. In 2005, the figure has almost halved to 12 %. At a time when the international weight of Germany, as well as of many other European countries, has increased significantly and when terrorism is one of the key challenges facing us, our foreign policy expenditure has halved; and this includes not only money for military actions but for international activities in general. I understand the political difficulties connected with shifting the priority from domestic, and especially social spending, to foreign policy expenditure; however, if we don't find a politically acceptable way of doing this, we might end up learning our lessons the hard way.

To conclude on a positive note, there is ample room for improvement on the both sides of the Atlantic, but it is fair to say that the transatlantic alliance is certainly healthier than it was five years ago. There is no reason for complacency but there is also no reason for alarming assessments, which in the end I would argue tend to do more harm than good.

QUESTIONS / COMMENTS AND ANSWERS PANEL I

- **NATO and its summit in Riga** (November 2006) – designing new agenda? Elaboration of NATO duplicating the efforts of the EU; is NATO a framework for the military aspect of counterterrorism?
- **Threat perception** –not only the importance of the threat but also its likelihood; the impact of the thwarted attacks on the **threat perception in Germany**.
- **Is democracy a panacea to all major problems, including terrorism; can democracy be promoted from the outside?** Both democracies and non-democracies are breeding terror and are targets of it.
- **State terrorism** – a definition
- **International norms** and rules have to be observed, that is definition of a civilized international society, the U.S. administration violates not only the law but also the principles of the UN charter;
- **International law versus legitimacy**, international law has problems of being out of date, it is necessary to differentiate between legal and legitimate operations.
- **Intervention by Mr. Reuven Paz:** When we talk about Jihadi terrorism, we are talking mainly about the Arab threat because all the new ideology, interpretations and doctrines of modern Jihad which originated in the Arab world and have been exported. We have to understand that there is a lot in its roots that in fact does not concern Europe, the U.S. or any other country in the world besides the Arab governments and societies. This is not a clash of civilizations; first and foremost, it is a clash within the Arab world and, secondly, within the Islamic world. We are also talking about groups that have experienced great success with the use of internet; the internet allows the creation of a new platform for nationalism, based on the solidarity between the entire Muslim world – such a solidarity can be created by intensive indoctrination accessible in seconds to the millions. The main issue is also that the populations of Muslim countries are not sitting and waiting for **democracy**, they are not looking for **parliamentary elections**. There was a success in

1990 in Algeria with the first democratic elections ever held in the Arab world and what happened? – they were impeached and arrested with the support of France and the U.S. It almost happened in Jordan in 1993, it could have happened in Egypt in December 2005, it happened in Palestinian Authority in January 2006. The Shias in Iraq were not waiting for democracy brought to them by the U.S.; they wanted to become the majority through the elections. The democracy imported by the U.S. to Iraq fuelled the ethnical, national and religious fight between Shias and Sunnis; that is the clash between communities. The form of Western democracy is premature for the Arabs and for many parts of the Muslim world and perhaps the U.S. and Europe should look for another form of how to encourage local groups to have for example more freedom of speech but not necessarily to bring the whole concept of democracy. Also in the past year or two, there has been a growing sense, even an apocalyptic sense within the **Muslim communities in Europe** that they are moving inexorably towards a clash with the majority society – the riots in France, the cartoons in Denmark, the statement by Pope – this has added to the sense of the inevitability of such a clash. In this context, we are witnessing not only **home-grown terrorism** in Europe but also what I would call the “Jihad seekers”; people who are actively going either to join terrorist groups or looking for a way how to carry out terrorism, inspired by global Jihadi strategy, but organised by themselves. Besides the sense of apocalypse, it is also a result of growing alienation from the societies they are living in. By the way, we are not seeing the same phenomenon among the 7 millions Muslims in the United States. Europe is gradually becoming the unique arena for the coming clash.

Daniel Keohane:

The main role of **NATO** as a military alliance is to try to coordinate some of the defence elements of counterterrorism. It is already working hard on how armed forces can work together in the emergency response field; it is already active with some maritime surveillance operations of the East of Africa; that is ongoing. There are lots of complementarities between what the EU and NATO do but there is no recognition of that because they do not talk to each other. For example on the emergency response, I spoke with an official from the EU Situation Centre (SitCen) and I asked whether they talk to NATO about the emergency response and whether they discuss any coordination; and he replied they did not. It did not even occur to them. This is the problem you have in Brussels at the moment; the two organizations are not even talking to each other.

Afghanistan is also crucial in all of this; it will cast a fairly long shadow over the **Riga summit**. If you look at the agenda for Riga, most of it is already ongoing; it is about military transformation, emergency response or enlargement but nobody really want to discuss the

controversial issues. I expect it to be a boring summit. Indeed, the best the governments have declared is that we need a new strategic concept but we don't want to talk about it right now, we can perhaps start the process by bringing in some wise men; it sounds as if, when in doubt, set up a committee. We need a bit more honest debate on it across the Atlantic.

Another comment on the evolving strategic agenda; **NATO** has gone through a huge process of change over the last fifteen years. It has gone global, it is not out of business; and in fact, it has never been busier. Look at Afghanistan, at the emergency response in Pakistan, at training Iraqi forces, at helping EU in Bosnia and at its presence in Kosovo – there are all sorts of things NATO is doing and there is a discussion on how NATO can work better with the non-NATO countries like Australia or Japan. The problem is that counterterrorism does not fit very neatly in that strategic agenda because it is still very military-focused. Even counterterrorism operations (let's say for example trying to find warlords in Somalia) are not going to be done though NATO; Pentagon and the key European governments are doing it with each other; like the small operation in Djibouti – there are French, British, American and German soldiers but it is not a NATO operation. That is really the problem.

The European experience of counterterrorism, particularly with ETA and the IRA teaches us that standing up for **democracy**, human rights and rule of law and trying to encourage that space is the right way forward. It does not mean that the Irish and Spanish models will work everywhere; it does not work for example with the Red Brigades because that is not what they are looking for and it certainly would not work with Al Qaeda; but that is the general approach. When we talk about Islamist terrorism, there are many different types and groups, some are local some are home grown, some are Al Qaeda linked, and others are not. When we talk about Hamas and Hezbollah, there is a case for trying to **promote democracy** and rule of law. When we talk about Iraq, it is entirely different question. The problem is not about promoting democracy but how to do it, and it obviously cannot be done with the military force. It raises a set of other issues but perhaps more important point is that even if democracy promotion helps with countering terrorism, it is actually not the reason why it should be done. Democracy promotion is frankly a good idea; the question is how to encourage it from within – be it in Iran, standing up for independent judiciary in Algeria, be it encouraging more democracy in Syria. That is something we should be aware of; a lot of counterterrorism experts loose sight of that and they are guilty of seeing democracy as a panacea.

Couple of comments on the very interesting intervention made by Mr. Paz; let me just clarify what I understand to be the threat from Islamist terrorism. We basically face three circles of threat; obviously there is Al Qaeda, which many analysts argue is practically dismantled, although it is open for debate whether there is effectively a post-Al Qaeda phase. There are local groups like Hamas, some of whom have or had links with Al Qaeda, some of them don't; the question is, can we ensure these local groups don't go global? A third group, which are the most dangerous to the Europeans, are the Al Qaeda inspired,

particularly **home-grown terrorists**. It is right to point out the origins of Islamist terrorism and we in the West should not forget that most of the terrorist attacks are carried out in the Muslim countries. This suggests most of the grievances are local. The problem is whether there is a chance of glue that might unite all these groups or not; because a number of Westerners and indeed the Western politicians tend to lump all these groups together, whether they be Sunni or Shia. I refer to some of the comments that came out of the U.S. administration during the summer over the developments in Lebanon; the failure of our analysis in the West is that we tend to lump the nationalists groups together.

Final minor point, it is right to focus on Arab terrorism on one level, the problem is that for Europeans it has moved beyond that; it is about Bosnia, Chechnya; it is also about the links with countries like Pakistan. That is while it is useful to look at the source; but we also have to look beyond it.

Karl-Heinz Kamp:

On the subject of the **NATO summit**, not only will it be boring but also rather short; Tony Blair is only staying shortly, Ms. Merkel has to rush quickly back to a party convention. The reasons for this are basically twofold; first, the summit was scheduled before the agenda was set. Secondly, two summits were scheduled at the same time – one in 2006 and the other in 2008, and when you are presented with the choice between a task and two deadlines, which one would you take? It should be a transformation summit but it will be rather a postponement summit.

In relation to the **threat perception**; it is indeed going to change in **Germany** but very slowly. There was a double illusion in Germany for many years. First, Germany has no international interests, that is something characteristic to the U.S. but Germany is basically a national entity and it does not have anything to do with what is going on abroad. It is patently wrong; we have the same interests in the international developments as other countries. The second illusion was that Germany, as long as it remains more or less inactive, rather an observer of the international politics, will be safe, because only those who get engaged become a target. That view was slightly scratched when the first target of a terrorist attack in Iraq was the UN headquarters in Baghdad, but with the Spanish and the UK bombings, the targets, which were directly involved in Iraq, the former view was rather confirmed. This is going to change again in relation to the plot which was discovered couple of weeks ago. Actually, the soccer championship also changed a lot because some of the people caught in the plot said they originally planned to detonate the bombs, when the soccer championship was taking place; people realized they could have been hit. It takes long time to get an adequate threat assessment through to the public and it

gets another long way to translate the threat assessment into preparedness and devoting resources. To be able and to be willing to change priorities is a long process and apparently, the societies are partially doomed to follow a process of learning through their mistakes and the suffering which is occasioned in the process.

Concerning the two points on **state terrorism** and **violations of the international law**; of course certain forms of totalitarianism or dictatorship can be described as **state terrorism**, however, it does not help that much since no clear criteria are set. There is still the problem that for one group of states someone is a terrorist and for others they are a freedom fighter. Secondly, if you say that a country is not only a dictatorship but practises state terrorism, what difference does it make to your dealings with it? Are you legally permitted to do more in relation to such a state and who is there to defining it; we had the same problem with the term “rogue state”, which was not clearly defined.

The second point is on the **U.S. violating international law** and the question of agreeing that no violation of international law and norms should occur. The question was asked rhetorically and I shall answer rhetorically too – no, I do not agree; my reason for this is because NATO violated international norms in 1999 when it launched its campaign against Serbia, and it was right to do so, with the support of the German, Czech and other governments. It is patently too easy to say we should abide by international law and everything is fine, it is not. The UN Charter was written 60 years ago and some of the problems we face today are not covered by the document; there is not a word on terrorism or non-state actors. We have to adapt international law to new conditions, however, what do you do in the meantime? And that was the situation in which NATO found itself in the case of Kosovo. Nobody seriously doubted that a humanitarian catastrophe was looming in Kosovo but for a variety of reasons, China and Russia would not accept the Security Council Resolution. Should the Kosovars seriously have been told to wait another five years until the international law could have adapted to deal with the situation they found themselves in? – No, and NATO violated written international law, and rightly so. Some of our old recipes do not work anymore and to stick to the old system simply does not help much.

Finally, I would like to make a point on **legitimate versus legal**; just who is going to define what is legitimate? Iraq is a highly controversial issue but my reason for being in favour of military action was not the question of nuclear material, my point was that Saddam Hussein violated sixteen UN Security Council resolutions. The frequent counterargument is but how many resolutions were violated by Israel? The answer is: not a single one if it comes to the Chapter 7 resolutions (UN Charter Chapter 7 – Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, ed.) you are confronted with a situation where someone does not care at all about UN resolutions, what should you do – should you add some more resolutions? From that perspective you can argue for military action; you don't have to, it is controversial but it is very difficult to inject new terms like legitimacy when it is difficult to set who is going to define it and what happens, if something is not regarded as legitimate.

John K. Glenn:

As to the questions on **democracy and democratization**, there has been a great deal of simplistic thinking, which has come from the current administration at times and which is very easy to criticise and vulnerable to criticism. The assertions that either “terrorism is caused by anti-democratic countries” or that “democracy alone will solve the problem of terrorism” are obviously not true. I feel that, when you ask the question: Can democracy be promoted from the outside? You have to separate the idea that you can somehow “cause” democracy from the idea that you can encourage or promote it. I do not want to get too deep into the semantics here, separating out the differences between definitions of words too much, but, in my research on Central Europe, the question is, what role did the external world play? It must be said that, on the one hand, there were important roles played by the changes in the Soviet Union and the United States and, on the other, that the realities of what happened here, as well as in the other countries of the region, were always the results of the efforts by local actors. So there is a positive encouraging role for the outsiders, particularly in a situation when the local circumstances are resource-poor. There is a long tradition of different actors like the foundations of political parties in Germany seeking to encourage “reform” rather than “democracy” because democracy is such a big word and concept.

As to the issue of **Muslim communities in Europe** versus the United States; it is easy to speak simplistically about this, but the question usually has to do with differences in views of integration in Europe and in the U.S., where we often say that Muslims can be Americans. The challenge in Europe is that it is still a leap to be made in many cases.

The last is the issue of **elections and democracy** and the potential for elections to make violence worse in multi-ethnic societies. The role that elections can play at certain moments to legitimize ethnic divisions should come as no surprise to anyone here, given the proximity of the Balkans. Without going to the greater detail, one of the greatest arguments for democracy globally is that democracies don't go to war with each other and this is true; the problem is that we also know that the countries that are democratizing are more prone to violence. It is the question of managing democratization as a process rather than seeing a democracy as an outcome. The timing, when you have a situation that is ripe for elections, is obviously paramount and we saw that issue in Bosnia time and time again, the fear that early elections would merely legitimize the break up of the state. The discussion on Iraq is another case in which you have historical grievances, a majority population that has been ruled by a minority, so that any simple demographic representation through elections would exacerbate grievances of another sort. This is one of the fundamental challenges of managing transitions.

THE NEW AGE HYDRA - INDIA'S EXPERIENCES WITH TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Swati Parashar

Short profile:

*Swati Parashar has been a research scholar at the University of Lancaster (UK) since October 2006. Prior to this, she was a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore. Before joining IDSS she was an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, where she coordinated the International Terrorism Watch Programme (2003–2005). She was a Fulbright Fellow at the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, San Diego in 2006. She holds an M.A. in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and a B.A. (Honours) in History from Lady Shri Ram College, University of Delhi. Her publications include: **Terrorism in South East Asia—Implications for South Asia** (co-edited with Wilson John, Pearson Education, New Delhi, 2005), **The US and South Asia: From Tactical Security Relationship towards a Strategic Partnership**, (<http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1924.html>) or **Bangladesh: The Quagmire of Conflicting Nationalisms**, IDSS Commentary (<http://www.ntu.edu.sg/IDSS/publications/Perspective/IDSS0302006.pdf>)*

Introduction

India's experiences with terrorism, insurgency and violence date back to 1947, when the nation as a distinct political, national and geographic entity was realized. Ironically, after being home to a non-violent resistance against the British colonial rule, the new nation woke up to its 'tryst with destiny'¹ amidst unprecedented violence and terror resulting out of the partition of the country on religious grounds. Worse still, Mahatma Gandhi, the greatest apostle of peace and non-violence who had led the Indian struggle for freedom, was a victim of brutal political assassination carried out by a religious fanatic! Terror as strategy to settle political scores and achieve religious and political ends is therefore, not new in the Indian context.

The Post 9/11 emphasis on terrorism and the various counter measures and responses has done considerable damage to the debate on issues of human security that had started to emerge in the third world. State centric security discourse has regained prominence and non-state actors have been reduced to undesirable elements like criminals and terrorist groups whose aim is to destroy the peace in the world. This worldview has had an impact on India as well. Attempts to understand the root causes and the logic of terrorism and insurgency have been pushed into the background.

However, at the larger policy level, India recognizes that the 'global war on terror' is not universal in terms of content, issues and responses. This implies that India's problems of terrorism have local and regional root causes and the responses would have to be through national resources and mostly through bilateral cooperation. This explains India's attempts to work closely with governments in South Asia and most recently even with Pakistan to deal with the menace of terrorism and political violence. There is also an understanding that terrorism is just a strategy or even tactics at times employed by groups seeking an advantage or claim over the state. The 'ism' attached to terror is a misnomer because terrorism is not an end in itself nor a set of ideas or belief system on its own. It is in most cases a means to an end, which can range from political ideology, to anarchism, nihilism and religious fanaticism.

South Asia

India's experiences with terrorism and counter terrorism would have to be located within an understanding of South Asia as a powerful regional entity. South Asia is strategically located as a buffer region between West and Southeast Asia, which in turn are very volatile regions of terror. The presence of two rival nuclear powers in this region enhances the threat that terrorism could lead to armed intervention and a nuclear war. This region

1) On the eve of independence in 1947, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made the famous speech about India's 'tryst with destiny', which he said was realized as India achieved freedom from colonial rule.

is plagued mainly by Islamist terrorism and left-wing extremism. Ethnic violence in Sri Lanka perpetrated by the LTTE is also a major concern for those studying to understand terrorism in the world today. About 28% of the world population of Muslims resides in the region that includes some of the largest Muslim countries. Interestingly, both radical (Deobandi) and benign (Sufi) Islam have coexisted in this region. In a diverse region such as this therefore, it is important to note that domestic and not foreign policy drives both intra and inter-state terrorism.

India is the largest country in South Asia and a rising global power. The Bush Administration realized the importance of the fast growing economic and political status of India and signed the nuclear deal for civilian nuclear cooperation in July 2005. While the "global war on terror" is targeted against Islamist terrorism, India's major threat is from the left-wing political extremists called the Naxalites² and nearly 15 out of the 29 federal states are affected by the Naxalite insurgency. It is therefore pertinent to understand the similarities and differences between Naxalite or left-wing extremism and Islamist Jihadi terrorism in Kashmir and other parts of India.

Certain similarities are obvious between the religious terrorists and the Left-wing extremists:

- Both are based on strong perceptions of "victimhood", exploitation and persecution. If Al Qaeda is waging a war against American hegemony and Western imperialist forces and against the forces of globalisation, so is the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and People War (PW) in India, and other radical left groups. Anti-western, anti-imperialist rhetoric is a part of both religious and left-wing terrorism.
- In both cases the existing state structures are the vanguard of imperialist forces and must be done away with. They should be replaced by new structures. Al Qaeda thinks that governments in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen and other Islamic countries have failed to protect the interests of the people and failed to serve the cause of Islam and must be overthrown by violent structures. The MCC and the PWG in India and the CPN (M) have also identified the state as their primary enemy.
- Both these kinds of terrorism need charismatic leaders for their mass appeal.
- Both are waging individual wars in different countries but in the hope and belief that it is a part of the larger religious struggle (pan-Islamism) or world proletarian revolution. Negotiations for immediate political solutions may suffer a setback because of the larger global aims and objectives of the terrorists.
- Both have very strict codes of conduct and promise a better life to individuals for attracting people in large numbers. Both types of terrorism are also backed by strong economic and business interests.

2) Derived from Naxalbari, a village in West Bengal, India, where this movement began in the 1960's.

- Both believe that violence is the only way to bring in the new socio-political, economic and religious order. And both are waging an unconventional form of armed conflict unlike between large standing armies.
- Both types of terrorism can become state terrorism if the state adopts these ideologies.
- Both types of terrorism privilege the group over the individual.
- Both types of terrorism can be linked to other transnational crimes if one examines the political economy of terror. Narco-trafficking, money laundering and small weapons trafficking are a part of both left-wing and religious terrorism.

However, with all these similarities there are glaring differences between the two types of violent ideologies which the states must take into account while formulating anti-terrorism policies.

- One derives legitimacy from religion while the other derives legitimacy from a political ideology that is averse to religion.
- Left-wing ideological terrorism is a class war between the privileged and those who feel deprived. Religious terrorism, on the other hand, has a very broad constituency of followers and believers. It includes the proletariat who participate in the religious struggle for a better life and the bourgeoisie who provide the material resources to fight this ideological battle. Islam for instance has appealed to all classes and protects their interests. It promises a better life to the poor masses and on the other hand protects the interests of the capitalist class by acting as a bulwark against a revolution from the oppressed classes. Religion creates a homogeneous category that papers over all other kinds of class differences.³
- In the case of left-wing violence, the enemy or the 'other' is the state and therefore the constituency of attack is much smaller. In the case of religious terrorism, the constituency is much wider because the 'other' or the enemy is all other religions and people.
- Far removed from ideas of religious rebirth and divine justice in heaven and hell, the Maoists and Naxals promise better life in this birth, through better political, economic and social conditions. The religious terrorists on the other hand rely extensively on promises of a better life after death. This is obvious in the indoctrination of Islamic suicide bombers who are promised a better life in the "jannat" (heaven) and 72 virgins. Suicide bombing for Islamic radicals is an end in itself due to the religious glory attached to it. It is the ultimate form of service to the brethren and submission to the divine power. The cult of martyrdom therefore is much stronger in religious terrorism.
- In the case of religious terrorism there is a complete ideological domination which does not allow for any other political space. All other movements and kinds of power struggle are completely dominated by the ideological control. For example, women's

3) Chris Harman has discussed this aspect of class relations in religious terrorism in his article "*The prophet and the Proletariat – Islam, Religion and Ideology*". This is available at: <http://www.marxists.de/religion/harman/>. In this article Harman mentions Islam's relations with the capitalist countries like Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan and Iran and its appeal to the masses.

- rights or other kinds of group rights do not find their rightful space and voice. Left-wing ideological terrorism, on the other hand, is based on socio-political and economic aspirations of the people. Some of the left-wing terrorist groups have taken up issues of exploitation of women and other under privileged sections of the society.
- There are more easily identifiable "root causes" in the case of left-wing violence. In the case of religious terrorism the material causes are far less defined.
- In case of religious terrorism use of violence is often indiscriminate and to call attention. The purpose is to modify the behaviour of those who are not the immediate victims of the attack.⁴ By bombing Jews in a Synagogue or Muslims in a Mosque or foreigners in embassies the idea is to get the message across to the governments and the world at large. In case of left-wing terrorists the targets are often police personnel or government officials who are directly identified with the exploitative and oppressive regimes. Even though there are ample examples of massacres of civilians to teach a lesson to the state.
- The two types of terrorism also differ in their violent tactics. The religious terrorists use indiscriminate violence with the help of modern weapons and technology. They attack unarmed civilians and not armed opponents for the shock value. Some of them even aspire to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The left-wing terrorists organise themselves into guerrilla fighters with bases in inaccessible locations. Geography therefore plays a very important role in left-wing violence which is difficult to control in inhospitable terrains. They conduct small scale hit and run operations against vulnerable outposts of state authority such as local government buildings or small police or military detachments and subsequently retreat in the wake of the counter-attacks from the state.
- Liberating territories from government control and in the process forming alternative source of political authority is an important part of the Maoist strategy. Territory is not a major concern for the religious terrorists. The boundaries are not well defined even by radical Islamists who proclaim the creation of a worldwide Islamic State. In fact some political conflicts over land resources and territory are also appropriated by religious terrorists if the dominant groups belong to distinct religious identities. The Israel-Palestine conflict started as a conflict for territory and illegal occupation considering that the Muslims and Jews have had relatively more peaceful relations in history till the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The conflict today has been hijacked by religious forces on both sides who have now constructed the "other" on the basis of religion. The Jews and the Arabs have developed a very strong hatred for each other which goes beyond the political origins of the conflict. The same is also true of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. Certain Islamic and right wing Hindu groups project it a religious conflict which actually has political issues involved.

4) (Weinberg, Leonard, Davis, Paul, *Political Terrorism*, McGraw Hill Publishing Company, US, 1989)

Terrorism and Political Violence in India

Sikh Terrorism

Sikhs living in the state of Punjab in India as well as in the UK, former West Germany, Canada and the US sought the means of terror emulating the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in order to pressurise the Government of India to concede their demand for an independent State for the Sikhs to be called Khalistan. This movement for Khalistan started in the early 1980's. The Khalistani terrorist organisations were largely funded by some members of the Sikh diaspora abroad and by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. They were trained and armed by the ISI in camps in Pakistani territory.

According to terrorism expert B. Raman, the Khalistani terrorists used four modus operandi; first, use of hand-held weapons against selected leaders, officials and others perceived as enemies of the Sikh religion; second, hijacking of planes of the Indian Airlines; they hijacked five planes between 1981 and 1984; third, blowing up planes of Air India in mid-air, they blew up off the Irish coast a plane originating from Toronto in June, 1985, killing over 200 passengers and unsuccessfully tried to blow up another plane originating from Tokyo the same day; and four, indiscriminate planting of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in public places killing a large number of innocent civilians.⁵

The Indian state extensively applied a military and police approach along with efforts by the Media and the society and the Sikh community in particular to counter terrorism. The leadership in the counter terrorism community was also derived from the Sikh community, a strategic move by the state to gain support and legitimacy for its efforts among the people.⁶ The inherent nature of the Khalistan Movement prevented its ideology gaining ground; the "other" was not a strong category; recruitment was affected and the degeneration of the movement into petty crime hastened its demise by the late 1980's.

Naxalites

The Indian Prime Minister had in early 2005, stated that Naxalites are the biggest threat to India's national security in the present context. His statement came before the Mumbai train blasts of July 2006, carried out by Islamist elements, but the Naxalite insurgency still poses a serious challenge to the state. From 55 districts in nine states, the Naxalite or the Maoist rebels have spread their network to about 200 districts in 15 states.

5) Refer to *Evolution of India's Counter-Terrorism Capabilities*, International Terrorism Monitor paper no. 55 by B. Raman, <http://www.saaq.org/%5Cpapers18%5Cpaper1793.html>

6) The Punjab anti-terrorism campaign was led by a Sikh officer, the Director General of Police, Mr. KPS Gill.

Extortions, kidnapping and loot are their usual means of generating revenue for their activities. CPML-PW and MCC-I⁷, the two Maoist rebel parties merged into a single entity called Communist Party of India-Maoist in 2004. Since then violence has been on the rise.

A breathing space for Naxal violence has been created because of the preoccupation with religious terrorism since 9/11. However, unless the extent of the Naxal menace is recognised and proportionate responses are articulated and implemented, this problem is far from being rooted out.

Jihadi Terrorism: Kashmir and Beyond

Islamist terrorism emerged in the late 1980's in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The terrorist groups sought to emulate the perceived "success" of the Afghan mujahideen and several veterans of the Afghan war returned to operate in the Kashmir valley. The Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan and the Pakistani state provided logistical and monetary support to groups like Lashkar e Toiba (LeT), Harkat ul Mujahideen (HuM), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Harkat ul Jihad al Islami (HuJI) and the Jaish e Mohammed (JeM).

Early information about the Jihadi operations in Jammu and Kashmir came from the Najibullah Government in Afghanistan and even from Israel. However, the Indian state in the later part of the 1980's was busy with the LTTE issue in Sri Lanka and ignored these early warnings. By the 1990's the Kashmiri based Jihadi groups had begun a ruthless campaign against the Indian civilians and the state.

Post 9/11, these groups are now taking jihad to other parts of India – and the "other" has become an amorphous category. There have been attacks carried out by Islamist groups in all the major cities of India and on soft targets. The "fidayeen", or deadly variant of the suicide bomber in India's context, emerged in the late 1990's esp. after the Kargil war between India and Pakistan. They prefer fighting till the end over instant explosion – and consider suicide bombings unislamic. However, in recent times, even suicide bombings have been reported from the Kashmir valley.

Pakistan has done enough at the Western Frontier to capture Taliban and Al Qaeda elements but the Eastern Frontier with India remains ignored. Terrorist training camps still exist and their logistical infrastructure is still intact. Bangladesh has also emerged as the new hub of Jihadi terrorism in South Asia. In recent times terrorist groups have entered India from the eastern border using Bangladesh as their base.

Local grievances of the Indian Muslim youth are continuously being exploited by Jihadi groups like LeT, JeM and HuM. However, Al Qaeda is still a far cry for Indian Muslims and no Al Qaeda presence in the Indian territories has been reported till date. There is still no trace of "Arabization" of terror, and madrasahs are not the sources of radicalization in India.

7) CPIML-PW : Communist Party of India, Marxist Leninist – Peoples War, MCC-I : Maoist Communist Centre – India

Islamist terrorism will continue to pose a serious challenge to the state and threaten the secular values of the country. Communal passions if ignited due to intensified Jihadi campaign will cause great damage to social harmony and also lead to riots and loss of lives and property.

Counterterrorism Experience

Terrorism in India is due to local causes and influences and is aided by cross border sanctuaries in the neighbourhood. The counterterrorism strategies aim at survival of the Indian state in a very unstable region and at preserving the territorial integrity, sovereignty and the secular ethos of the nation.

India's counterterrorism strategy deploys national resources through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Counter insurgency has been important aspect of internal security management since 1947 due to the tribal and communist insurgency that hit parts of independent India. Counterterrorism, as a policy consideration emerged only with the advent of Sikh terrorism in the early 1980's and aviation, personal and anti explosives security were introduced. 1989 onwards, Islamist terrorism, "fidayeen" attacks and Jihadi ideology started gaining ground. Maoist or naxalite violence also reached threatening forms since the late 1990's.

Indian responses to terrorism and Maoist violence have included a multi pronged approach – both military and non-military through economic, social, psychological, media, and diplomatic initiatives. According to B. Raman, counterterrorism has four aspects:⁸

- Preventive through timely intelligence
- Physical security to counter attacks if intelligence fails
- Crisis management post attacks
- Deterrence through legal procedures

India lacks in comprehensive legislation against terrorism. Legal acts like TADA⁹ and POTA¹⁰ were repealed after opposition from different groups. Even as this paper is written judicial drama over the 1993 Mumbai blasts unfolds in India with piecemeal judgments being accorded.¹¹ The conviction rate is extremely low in terrorist related cases in India and criminals and terrorists are first to declare their faith in the Indian judiciary. The judicial system has to

8) Refer to *Evolution of India's Counter-Terrorism Capabilities*, International Terrorism Monitor paper no.55 by B. Raman, <http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers18%5Cpaper1793.html>

9) TADA: Terrorist and Disruptive Activities act, repealed in 1995, allowed Indian forces to round up and detain citizens for up to one year without formal charges, due process of law or formal trial. When and if court hearings were held, they were held in secret. Victims did not allowed to confront their accusers, and „witnesses“ kept their identities secret.

10) POTA: Prevention of Terrorist Activities act was an anti-terrorism legislation enacted by the Parliament of India in 2002. The legislation was introduced by the governing NDA coalition dominated by the Bharatiya Janata Party. The legislation followed, and is largely identical in its provisions to, the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) promulgated by the same government in 2001. The act was repealed in 2004 by the UPA coalition.

11) The 1993 Mumbai blasts verdict is being announced by the special TADA court in different parts. Most people argue, "Justice delayed is justice denied" in the case of the 93 blasts. The 1993 bomb blasts took 13 long years for judgment, before the ones responsible have been brought to task and worse still the real culprits are still at large.

be made accountable and the importance of witness protection and circumstantial evidence needs to emphasize in cases related to terrorism.

Even though India records the largest number of terrorist strikes and deaths due to terrorism in the world every year, air power or the artillery or other heavy weapons have not been used against the terrorists in any part of India. Disproportionate use of force and collateral damage will only serve to alienate the common people and antagonize them against the state.

India has had a long history of counterterrorism cooperation with other countries, particularly with the UK, Canada and the US. This cooperation has expanded further after 9/11. Most recently has been the idea of an Indo-Pakistan joint anti-terrorism mechanism agreed to by the Indian Prime Minister and President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan during their meeting on the margins of the Non-Aligned Summit at Havana in September 2006. The joint statement issued at Havana said: "The two leaders met in the aftermath of the Mumbai blasts. They strongly condemned all acts of terrorism and agreed that terrorism is a scourge that needs to be effectively dealt with. They decided to put in place an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations." This is a positive initiative and if implied seriously will strengthen the peace process between the two countries.

Conclusion

Islamist terrorism remains a major threat in India along with Naxalism. Home grown and "copy cat" terrorism have emerged as the new trend within Islamist terrorism since 2001, and jihad has reached other parts of India. Islamists targeted Ayodhya, Varanasi, Bangalore, Delhi and Mumbai in the last couple of years. New tactics employed by terrorists include hostage taking, attack on places of worship, mass killings and attacks on soft targets like shopping malls and commuter trains. Communal tensions and violence in India have a long history and have to be understood to study both the root cause and consequences of terrorism.

Politically motivated terrorism, where political power and territorial control are the objectives can be addressed through political engagement with terrorist groups – Punjab and North East have been successes as far as the Indian experiences are concerned. The Naxals have also shown an interest in negotiations with the state at different times and efforts are on to bring back the Maoist rebels to the political mainstream.

However, religious and more specifically Islamist terrorism will continue to threaten India's interests. How India will respond to this "New Age Hydra" – bilaterally and multilaterally, will also determine India's role in the region and in the international system. The resilient Indian democracy and the Indian society with a rich heritage of tolerance and a history of adapting to the changing times will have to work together to counter terrorism, from ideological and recruitment levels to crisis management after an act of terror. Terrorism is not merely a law and order problem in India, and both the state and society will have to work together to respond to this menace.

EXPERIENCES WITH TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN TURKEY

Doğu Ergil

Short profile:

*Dr. Doğu Ergil graduated from Ankara University with honours, holding B.A. degree in Sociology and Psychology. He has an M.A. in Sociology from Oklahoma University and a Ph. D. in Development Studies from the State University of New York. In 1975, he joined the Department of Political Behaviour of the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University. In the following years he became an Associate Professor of Political Science (1980) and a Professor of Social Science (1989) at the Ankara University. He also worked as an advisor to the former Ministers of Internal and External Affairs on matters of political reconciliation, minorities, and terrorism and ethnic relations as well as to the private sector, too. He is one of the founders and the President of Centre for the Research of Societal Problems–TOSAM, which promotes democracy, pluralism and rule of law in Turkey. His publications include **Social and Cultural Roots of Violence and Terror** (Turan, 1980), **Secularism in Turkey** (Centre for International Affairs, 1988), **Democratic Culture and Effective Citizenship** (Turan, 2005)*

In terms of organizations or movements, there are two sources of terrorism in Turkey; the first is ethnic and for ease of reference can be labelled "Kurdish". The visible actor of the Kurdish terrorism is the PKK (Workers' Party of Kurdistan). It is an armed organisation that has been staging terrorist acts especially in South East Turkey (the traditional homeland of the majority of the Kurds) and recently in urban centres, especially in the tourist resorts, in order to involve foreign governments in the conflict. According to recent intelligence reports, there are about 700 PKK militia within Turkey and about 2.400 in the camps in North Iraq; using the porous, mountainous, border region between Iraq and Turkey, they move in for offensive operations and move out in order to retreat to a safe haven.

The other source of terrorism is religious; in this respect, there are two main organizations. The first is Turkish Hezbollah, which has nothing to do with the Hezbollah in Lebanon and is not a Shiite organisation. After the military defeat of the PKK in 1999, Hezbollah turned into a mafia type of organisation, kidnapping people, practising extortion and so on; it moved to the urban centres, especially to Istanbul and became a menace for public safety. It did not take long for the government to crack down on this organization and now Hezbollah is reduced to a minor organisation trying to reorganise once again. It is a Kurdish organization, it was born in the small towns of South East Turkey and as it moved to the West, the system started perceiving it as a "near and present" threat and moved to demolish those structures which were visible at that time.

While thinking that the worst was behind it, Turkey was shaken by two consecutive bomb explosions in Istanbul that took place in October 2003. All of a sudden we discovered that there was a new group; a Jihadi formation that was loosely associated with Al Qaeda but did not come from the abroad – although the indoctrination and ideology came from the abroad the perpetrators were home grown. They were the products of the kind of alternative religious training and socialization that have become affective in Turkey especially in the past two decades. This group sees itself as part of the global Jihadi network. This network has two major enemies; one is the "near enemy" and the other the "distant enemy". The "near enemy" is made up of the Islamic societies and secular governments which do not share the same values and ideology with the group. The "distant enemy" consists of both the United States, which is associated with the idea of a modern crusade and Israel, termed the "Zionist infidel". Both are considered the sworn enemies of Islam.

Sixty-nine people were detained after the bombings in Istanbul, suspected of being perpetrators or affiliated supporters, when the documents from their interrogations were made accessible, I went through all the statements and found an unfamiliar picture. They were not people who had hard lives with a grievance against a system which had excluded and oppressed them. Most of them were high school graduates; about one-third of them had a university degree. Some of them were small businessmen. However, they were converted to an alternative creed to mainstream Islam which was wrathful and vengeful in comparison to it. Through an alternative, non-traditional socialization into religion inspired by Wahhabism and financed by Saudi Arabia, a Salafi Jihadi movement has grown up in

Turkey, as well as other parts of the Islamic world suffering from underdevelopment and an authoritarianism which suppresses individualism. These people have become alienated from the world they were raised in, and they already feel they belonged to another world that is neither national, nor home grown any more.

As regards the information yielded by the Turkish case in dealing with terrorism, most of my points highlight ambiguities and what not to do. Consequently, I leave it to readers to draw their own conclusions on the methods of counterterrorism. Here are the basic problem areas:

1. Definition of the phenomenon of terrorism. Terrorism must not be defined through the perspective of an ideology. The grievances and demands of some of the groups resorting to terrorism may be quite reasonable and legitimate. What is not legitimate is the method they use to air their grievances and carry their demands to the attention of the public: namely violence. Violence reduces human life to a bloody political message and sees human beings as expendable in a game whose stakes are much greater than the lives of victims and terrorists alike. In this regard there is no problem in Turkey, the Turkish population and also the government view terrorism as an act of terror, regardless of the rational behind it, which, as I have already said might in some circumstances be quite reasonable. In the mind of radical groups, ends (that are sanctified) justify means. Thus they bypass moral problems and shift the blame to their victims. Even if the ideology or rationale of the terrorist organisation coincides with that of the state or the ruling group, they must never be allowed to get away with this disappearing through a kind of moral "trap door", thereby escaping the full moral consequences of their actions. We must always be aware that behind many of the violent acts, there is a social conflict, which the government fails to understand or to identify and the sources of the grievances are often overlooked.

2. There is a danger of the men with the weapons being lumped together with the wider groups of supporters and sympathizers. These may be made up of hundred or thousand or even millions of people. They extend out from the terrorists like ripples from a stone thrown in water, arranging themselves into ever wider circles of support. These are the target groups which need to be won over by the authorities. When central authorities lump them all together, they risk alienating and losing the very people they so desperately need to win over, finding themselves in direct confrontation with them in the fight against terrorists by non-terrorist means. In order to stage a comprehensive struggle against terrorism, the central authority and ruling elite have to understand the wider picture; meet the needs of the sympathizers and defuse the grievances of the supporters. Then the armed militia will appear as mere terrorists rather than as representatives of an excluded and oppressed wider group.

3. Important as it may be, intelligence gathering may ignore the full social, cultural and economic background of a given conflict and concentrate on the security angle

of the phenomenon. "Human intelligence" comprising attitudes and sentiments; fears and expectation may be left out of the equation. When what should on the whole be a civilian endeavour or a scientific effort is reduced to a one-dimensional information gathering the full extent of the conflict or insurgency may not be understood, as was the case in Iraq. The American military and intelligence communities never understood the human aspects of the "Iraqi problem" and lost. In the end, the analyses made are usually reduced merely to a body count and territory held. This is a completely spurious kind of success. Penetrating terrorist organizations is hard. For example, PKK terrorists live in caves and barely accessible camps and it is very hard to infiltrate such groups. Radical religious organisations are even harder to penetrate because they recruit their members from the Koranic schools when they are still tiny children. Later they become members of different orders, still later become organised politically and finally receive military training in distant camps where they are further radicalised. Without understanding their cultural and psychological qualities, these organisations cannot be understood and eliminated. It requires different approaches than classical intelligence techniques; otherwise there is a danger of "killing the mosquitoes without drying up the swamp". That is why counterterrorism efforts should not be limited to merely military or police methods. Otherwise, we may never grasp the larger picture – the social, economic and cultural background. A national security agency should be created with responsibility for surveying attitudes, analysing scientific and factual data from different sources, intelligence reports etc., it must also coordinate and integrate various counter terrorism activities carried out by different government agencies.

4. Terrorist militia must be differentiated from the population which actively and passively supports them, which ought to be the real target audience. For, it is the supporters that confer a degree of legitimacy on the terrorists by responding positively to their hopes, demands and goals especially when they go as far as the ultimate sacrifice of loosing their lives for the common "cause". This legitimacy affords a "representative" status to the terrorist group, if the central authority does not allow for the emergence of legal representatives and alternative leadership with a negotiable peaceful agenda. Hence denying terrorists popular support goes beyond mere counter-violence or anti-terrorist tactics. Public denigration or replacement of the community leaders may work against the culture that is based on respect for the elder and loyalty and submission to local community leaders. By insulting the leaders, whole communities can be lost. During imprisonment, if such people are tortured and insulted for belonging to a particular group, the whole cultural group can be lost, not only because they are cruelly treated but also because they are discriminated against. The balance sheet has to be reviewed periodically to assess the efficiency of the policies employed as well as the damage caused when the wrong policies/implementations are used. If the latter are not changed, enforcement may cause more damage than improvement.

5. Another lesson to be learnt is that an armed extremist group should never be used to eliminate another extreme group. In Turkey, Hezbollah was born out of the frustration of the merchants and craftsmen of small towns in the South East. The increasing number and volume of extortions by the PKK in the name of 'revolutionary tax' devastated their businesses. Out of this frustration, an alternative Kurdish group emerged to fight back and forced the PKK out of these towns in several years (late 1980s). The officials seized the opportunity. It is one of the best known secrets of Turkish politics, that the state organs supported this equally terrorist organisation. However, in time Hezbollah proved to be more cruel and lethal since there were no limitations to their crimes and no moral boundaries. They had legitimised their lethal actions with religion and divine call. The dictum that "my enemy's enemy is my friend" is totally wrong and spurious; "my enemy's enemy is its enemy and might be my future enemy as well", and Turkey is not the only example of this lesson to be learnt.

6. Marshalling international legal norms in counterterrorism and stigmatizing terrorism as an infringement of human rights, pushes terrorist tactics towards the margins of legitimacy. Yet, some governments that apply brute force without the support of soft power that involves economic, cultural and social inputs often overlook this phenomenon. These stringent measures may be accompanied by what may be called "extraordinary laws" such as martial law and other legal tools that may fall short of the principle of rule of law during implementation. Thus, what is officially labelled as "terrorism" is bracketed under the heading of 'violence-and-counter terrorism' is not allowed to be anything other than terrorism. It is in this context that we see a legitimate organization such as the state reverting to illegitimate means and seeking the assistance of irresponsible secret organizations. The existence and excesses of such clandestine illegal organisations further alienate people and weakens their trust in the state as a non-partisan and just power that can solve problems. In short the state (with all of its organizations) must be part of the solution not the problem. Failure in this respect may further extend and expand the conflict.

7. Law enforcement agencies must be provided with a strategy to deal with terrorism. Members, at least the leading members, of such agencies must be equipped with the power of innovative analysis flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances. The analytical capabilities of law enforcement agencies must be constantly improved, staffed by agents capable of independent analysis who have access to necessary information and intelligence. It is often the case that the police, military, gendarmerie and central or national intelligence services work by themselves, withholding critical information from each other. Institutional 'exclusiveness' often blurs the whole picture or prevents the full understanding of a complex phenomenon as terrorism. If this is the case, governments that fight with terrorism may never see the connections between smuggling, border violations

and other criminal activities, and terrorism. Also the link between terrorism financing and racketeering enterprise can not be thoroughly investigated and established. The Finance Minister should create a unit to deal with foreign asset control, which would be dedicated to the issue of terrorist fundraising.

8. Another explanation of the only limited success achieved in law enforcement is due to concerns of incrimination of officials and official institutions. The duties, responsibilities, powers and authorities of each agent and institution in the enforcement sector must be clearly defined and bound by law so that the extent of their legal competence is clearly known not only to them, but also to the wider public, which will therefore be aware when they are acting in breach of the law.

9. We are faced with a different kind of terrorism in the world today that defies the existing world order which it denounces as unjust, discriminatory and exclusively Western. The perpetrators are so committed they are prepared to sacrifice themselves to help bring about the birth of a new order that will rise from the debris of the existing one. They recognise no limits and boundaries in their actions, because they only represent a retaliation against cruelty, humiliation and destruction brought upon them by the West. They differ in mentality from other terrorist groups and harbour different values, which are incomprehensible with the positivist point of view we are used to. In the realm of religious terrorism, there are two leads to follow: deviance from the existing religious training. In the Turkish case, traditional religious training is carried out and supervised by the official Administration of Religious Affairs. It is fashioned after the Sunni (Hanefi School) interpretation of Islam, aiming to create individuals who are pious, conservative and obedient to the existing worldly authority. However, in the past two decades a different, unofficial religious training has penetrated Turkey, emanating from and financed by Saudi Arabia and fashioned on the Wahhabi Salafi tradition which advocates Jihadism (holy war in the name of religion). Its adherents see all parts of the world and all communities other than their own or which they fail to control as the “house of war”. This alternative training produced or converted approximately 350 young people who received training in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and fought in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Kashmir and now in Iraq. This religious training is totally political and wants to transform the world into a Muslim caliphate. The converted believe that the community of believers is surrounded by “near” and “distant” enemies. The near enemies are the oppressive governments of Muslim countries that are corrupt and insensitive to the needs of their peoples. The distant enemy is the USA and Israel. A global system that sustains the control of the distant enemy, as the masters of the world must be got rid of. This is a life-and-death matter and they stake all they have on this struggle. The “jihadi” agents, training sites, publications, and financial transactions must be monitored at all times throughout the world. This requires international cooperation and brings us to the last point or lesson.

10. International cooperation is a must in counterterrorism because most often terrorists and their deeds transcend national boundaries. However, international cooperation is very much wanting in this area. This is true even in the case of cooperation between the U.S. and Europe and among European countries. The case is even worse between the Middle Eastern countries where adversaries are more abundant than allies. Countries that have unsettled scores with their neighbours often support terrorists or treated them leniently which facilitates the transmission of terrorism across national boundaries. Yet terrorism is like a sword without the handle; at the end it cuts the hands of its holder. The radical Kurdish organization, PKK has been supported by Iran, Iraq, Syria and Greece against Turkey. Now with the exception of the last of those named, all three have problems with their own Kurds. Needless to say, today they need Turkey’s support in surmounting this problem. Without such cooperation, it is very hard to deal with terrorism at the international level.

FIND THE NEEDLE IN THE HAYSTACK: PROFILING RISKY COMMUNITIES AND GROUPS OF CITIZENS

*Highlights of Lessons from Israeli Counterterrorism
and Profiling of Potential Security Threats*

Reuven Paz

Short profile:

*Dr. Reuven Paz holds Ph.D. in History of the Middle East from Haifa University. He worked for Israeli General Security Service as Head of the Research Division. He was also a lecturer at Haifa University at the Department of Middle Eastern History and served as Academic Director of The International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT). He is currently involved in the activities of the GLORIA Center in Herzliya, especially in the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM), of which he is the founder and director. PRISM was founded in 2002, in order to combine academic and field research of new developments of radical Islam and Islamist movements. His publications include **The Anti-Judaism of Radical Islamic Movements** (to be published), **Tangled Web: International Islamist Networking** (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002) and a series of PRISM papers.*

Identifying the enemy

The problem of identifying the enemy in democratic societies through profiling entire publics, societies, and communities, or sections of them, is becoming the primary challenge for Europe in the field of counterterrorism. Until recent years, there were only two major terrorist groups in Europe, which were part of ethnic-national separatism – the Irish *IRA* and the Basque *ETA*, which were focused on attacking local targets in their own countries. Until the 1980's, other national groups included mainly various factions of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), which used Europe as an arena for attacking Israeli and Jewish targets, and the Kurdish-Turkish PKK emerged. There is also an issue of non-European targets, which can be attacked on European soil, too; the embassies and officials of the United States and Israel as well as the dissidents from Arab and Muslim countries, for instance. Global Jihad poses a new kind of threat; it appeals to large segments of younger generations of Muslim communities.

All the above-mentioned elements create a problem where there are certain “foreign” communities, which might potentially serve as a recruiting ground for terrorism; yet, the majority of them are not at all involved in any phase of terrorism or political violence. However, terrorist groups emerge from within communities that serve as a hothouse for contingent risk. This hothouse is also encouraging public support for alienation and some violent forms of protest and sympathy or at least understanding of the roots of violence.

The processes of European integration might develop a growing tension between nationalism of the various countries and pan-European nationalism in the future. Against this background, there are signs of growing solidarity and sense of brotherhood among the entire Muslim population in Europe, and of a “clash of unifying processes”.

There are several elements that make this issue crucial, especially while countering Jihadi-Salafi terrorism:

- Home grown terrorists, second and even third generations of emigrants with identity crises, social alienation, cultural and social difficulties coping with modernization, crises of local community leaderships, the influence of local Islamist leaders and clerics, the role of mosques and Islamic social and welfare infrastructure, culture clash, the “shield” of familiar Arab culture, and new young groups of Jihad-seekers.
- Links to the Arab or Muslim homelands and the influence of internal affairs in the various Arab countries or the entire Arab world – opposition to secular governments, the failure of Arab nationalism, leadership crises in the Arab world, the occupation of and insurgency in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fundamental anti-Americanism that is shared by parts of European societies, and oppressive Arab governments.
- European liberalism, the encouragement of immigration, the fear of “clash of religions” between Christianity and Islam, the differentiation of worldviews and perceptions regarding the separation of state and religion, the role and responsibility of religious

institutions in society, the potential conflict between state law (man-made) and the Islamic law (divine), fears of racial trends in Europe, the former history of oppression of religions and ethnic groups, the former “demons” in Europe, the existing ethnic conflicts in Eastern and Western Europe, some open (former Yugoslavia, the Basques, Irish in Northern-Ireland) and some hidden (Belgium, Scottish or Catalan separatism).

- Currently emerging Jihadi terrorism has the global nature of transnational terrorism and networking. Global Jihadi strategy is to develop a new kind of transnational religio-political nationalism of the *Ummah* – the global Islamic nation. Within this sphere, Muslims view themselves as facing a global attack; the whole world becomes an arena for retaliation. Moreover, the global Jihad creates a sense of strong solidarity; any problem, conflict, or threat to a Muslim community is viewed as a threat for the entire Muslim world. Therefore, Jihadi terrorism in Europe can be motivated by many reasons, not only the European ones – Iraq, Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or by perceived attacks against religion (the Van Gogh murder). Interestingly, the Muslim or Islamic campaigns which were directly connected to Europe, like the Danish cartoons, French veil law or the social-ethnic riots in France and Belgium, did not actually lead to acts of terrorism.
- In democratic and liberal societies it is not easy to create laws containing measures on profiling communities, religions, charities, or other risky groupings and activities. In Europe in the post-Cold War era, it is even difficult to define the field of political subversion and hence, to counter it.
- There are certain Islamic organizations, neighbourhoods or public groupings that might pose a threat and in democratic societies; they can also easily create other institutions which act as a cover for their activities – for example, mosques, student institutions, charities, certain types of NGOs, bookstores, social and welfare institutions, circles of clerics, etc. The virtual influence through the Internet can be added to it nowadays, originating both in Europe and mainly in the Arab and Muslim homelands. The majority of the Internet activities and groupings aim at promoting both the ideology of globalizing Jihad and the global solidarity but countering the dangerous use of the Internet is problematic in a democratic society.
- The Jihadi phenomenon is still unfamiliar to the West in general and in Europe in particular; disseminated mainly in Arabic, containing a different mindset and values, it resonates among a large segment of second and third generations of emigrants who prefer to prevent themselves developing close ties to the majority societies.

The Israeli parallel to the Muslim communities in Europe – the Israeli-Arab citizens

There are about 950,000 Israeli-Arab citizens out of 6.5 million Israeli citizens; that is 14.6%, and about 250,000 Arab residents in East Jerusalem who are not citizens of Israel; all together they represent 18.4% of the total population of Israel. About 82% of them are

Muslims, the rest are Druze and members of various Christian churches or communities who do not pose any greater potential threat than, say, dissident Jews. Despite the discrimination claims, justified or not, the Israeli-Arab citizens enjoy full rights of citizenship; i.e. representation in the elected Israeli institutions, independent municipalities, educational system, and an independent civil society. They concentrate on the three main regions creating a majority in certain parts of them, and therefore enjoy a sense of cultural and social autonomy.

On the other hand, they are an integral part of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, which is in a state of violent conflict with Israel, which is their country of residence and citizenship. This is a very difficult situation with no promise of change in the near future. The Israeli-Arab citizens enjoy freedom of political activity, speech, and institutions, and at the same time they are exposed to the doctrines, policy, communication and messages of the Arab world and the Palestinians, including the anti-Israeli one. There is quite a large Israeli-Islamic movement, which is politically, socially, religiously and culturally a sister movement to Hamas. The movement is integral part of the Israeli democratic political process; it has three representatives (out of 120) in the Israeli parliament, and dozens in municipality councils.

The Arab Muslim community in Israel is one of the youngest in the world with an average age of 18.5 years, compared to the average of 31.5 years among the Israeli Jews. In some communities, namely among the Bedouins of South Israel who are completely Muslims, the average age is only as high as 13 years¹; the young alienated population is always a source of security threat. The demographic process clearly favours the Israeli-Arab population and looking at Palestine in its entirety, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, it is permanently in favour of the Palestinians. At present, there are about 5.5 millions Jews and about 3.5 millions Arabs in the whole of Palestine, in about 20 years, the number might be roughly equal. The Israeli-Arab citizens often have family members or relatives among the Palestinian Diaspora and they are exposed to values of "tribal loyalties", which are stronger than the loyalty to the nation-state in general, and Israel in particular. The rate of Arab criminal activity in Israel is about 24%, in case of juvenile criminal activity reaches about 28.5%. Given the percentage of Israeli-Arab population, it is another significant sign of alienation from the majority society, from the state and possible breeding ground for political violence and terrorism. There can be also separatist tendencies among the Arab-Israeli citizens as well as the growing sense of autonomy and demand for political self-organization.

The other security risks related to terrorism include Arab, primarily Syrian, state sponsored terrorism, the attacks against target of a "soft belly" nature, i.e. Israeli tourists, diplomats, embassies and primarily Jewish targets and around the world, i.e. synagogues, community centres, clerics, individuals, cemeteries, and Palestinian Islamist or national terrorism originating in the PA territories.

1) Identical to Gaza

Arab-Israeli involvement in terrorism

Despite the facts mentioned, the direct and indirect risk of involvement of the Israeli-Arab citizens in Jihadi or nationalist terrorism is relatively low. In the period 1948-1965², there was no act of terrorism carried out by Israeli-Arab citizens at all. There were few cases of logistic support by Bedouins in the South to Palestinian Fidayeens who carried out the terrorist attacks through the borders with Egypt, Jordan, and Egyptian-controlled Gaza. There were many cases in the Galilee³ of espionage for the Syrian intelligence, largely undertaken by smuggling through the borders and using family connections. This involvement was mostly caused by money or family ties, not by ideology; and the espionage was not only quite primitive but also harmless, since the Israeli-Arab citizens were totally excluded from any work in the Israeli security infrastructure. Furthermore, until 1966, the Israeli-Arab citizens were controlled by the military and limited in their movements.

In the period 1965-1987⁴ and especially after June 1967, Israel experienced a growing involvement of Israeli-Arab citizens in terrorism, sponsored and carried out by the various factions of the PLO. In 1968-1973, about 450 Israeli-Arabs were prosecuted and imprisoned for terrorism; only 40 of them acted on their own initiative, the others were part of some 70 groups or cells detected. All the groups were initiated, sponsored or organized as part of the PLO factions. The period between 1973 and 1978 was marked by a significant decline of their involvement in Palestinian terrorism, as a result of the internal factors, which will be explained below and a change of PLO attitudes, and those of its largest fraction Fatah, towards the Israeli-Arabs. The PLO found the political struggle within the Israeli society (promoting the support for Palestinian independent state) to be more fruitful; another new PLO policy was to organize the Israeli-Arabs into an autonomous community at the socio-political level.

The period 1978-1980 is a turning point, marked by the self-organization of large Islamist Jihadi group of Israeli-Muslims⁵, influenced by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world. The first pilgrimage of Israeli-Muslims to Mecca took place in 1978 and Israeli-Muslims went to study in the Islamic colleges in the West-Bank for the first time. Also the organized movement and infrastructure of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza and the West Bank emerged at that period; however, unlike the PLO, the then Muslim Brotherhood was not at all involved in any form of terrorism⁶.

Since the outbreak of the first Intifada in December 1987, there have been on average 60-70 Israeli-Arabs arrested a year, despite a significant population growth in real terms and the high proportion of youngsters. Also in the past three years, the number of Muslims

2) On 1 January 1965, the first terrorist operation by Fatah was carried out.

3) Northern Israel

4) The first Intifada started in December 1987.

5) The group included about 75 people, divided into three branches.

6) Also their socio-political infrastructure was approved and legalized by Israel.

arrested on charges of terrorism has declined. During this period, the main involvement of Israeli-Muslims in terrorism has been in logistical support, such as driving the Palestinian suicide bombers, smuggling weapons from the PA territories, hosting terrorists in the safe-houses, or providing information for terrorist operations. There are only two cases of Israeli-Muslims carrying out direct attacks – in 1990 by a group of members of the Israeli-Islamic movement against IDF soldiers, and an individual suicide bomber, 44-year-old married member of the Islamic movement⁷.

In general, the number of Israeli-Arabs involved in terrorism is rather small, and since 1973 they have only been Muslim. It is quite surprising given their number, involvement in the Israeli society, free movement, good knowledge of the language and culture, and the intensity of Palestinian terrorism against Israel. Yet, two elements should be noted. First, even though the number is very small, it is still very difficult to find small groups, or individuals among quite a large segment of the Israeli society. Profiling them as Arabs or Muslims is relatively useful, but in a democratic open society it is very problematic. Secondly, the background remains – the complete exposure of the Israeli-Muslims to the anti-Israeli propaganda and incitement, the family ties, the violent clashes with the Israeli authorities, such as in October 2000⁸ and a constant feeling of discrimination, justified or not.

On this background, two observations should be made, which might be use as a lesson for Europe, too:

- The delicate and fragile boundary between individual or organized crime and terrorism; and criminal activity as a reflection of socio-political alienation from the state and from the majority society; and socio-economic conditions that encourage criminal activity.
- The delicate and fragile boundary between political subversion and terrorism. Political subversion works in the “grey zone” and is difficult to be defined on the legal level. In the Islamist case, subversion is not only public or open incitement through speeches, sermons, writings, or web sites. It is also the entire or part of **Da’wah** activity – welfare charities, mosques, religious study circles, and other forms of organizations and institutions.

Internal factors affecting involvement of Israeli-Arabs in terrorism

- The Israeli Communist Party, which served as a block against terrorism, as a result of the policy of the Soviet Union, which kept the orthodox Communist parties out of illegal activity. During the period 1949-1990, the Party became the main political power among the Israeli-Arabs, even though it has always been a Jewish-Arab party, and until

7) Also an Israeli-Muslim girl planned a suicide attack after she fell in love with a Palestinian Fatah operative, but was imprisoned prior to the operation.

8) 12 Israeli citizens and one Palestinian were killed by police.

the mid-1970’s its leadership was mainly composed of Jews and Arab Greek-Orthodoxes. It was responsible for three main processes among the Israeli-Arab citizens:

1. The legitimacy of the Israeli Jewish state as part of Soviet public policy.
 2. The focus on the political struggle only, including within the framework of Israeli law.
 3. The exploitation of the Israeli democracy in order to encourage Arab integration within Israel and not separatist tendencies, and the focus on a socio-political struggle for equal rights for Arabs and Jews. Hence, the party focused from 1949 on integration and participation in all the possible elections—parliamentary, municipal, labour unions, and all the other institutions of the Israeli civil society, in order to promote their status in Israel.
- Until 1967, Israeli-Arab citizens were regarded by the rest of the Arab world as traitors since they remained in the “Jewish State”, did not resist, preferred the socio-political struggle of the Communist party, and were totally disconnected from the rest of the Arab world and most of the Palestinian Diasporas, except for the border with Lebanon and the Palestinian refugee camps there.
 - Since the mid-1970’s, the PLO started establishing official and unofficial connections with Israeli-Arab and Jewish groups. The first official meeting was held in Prague in 1976 between the representative of the PLO and the leadership of the Israeli Communist party, which opened political and later on financial support by the PLO for several Arab-Israeli organizations in order to take advantage of their position in Israel to exert political pressure and secure achievements. From then on, the Palestinian factions in general, led by the leadership of the PLO/Fatah kept a non-violent role for the Israeli-Arabs, unlike their brothers in the territories.
 - In 1966, the military rule over the Arabs in Israel was removed, which started a relatively speedy process of better integration in most fields of civil society. It gradually led to a new self-perception on the part of the primarily Muslim Israeli-Arabs, namely that they had a lot to lose if they entered a violent clash with the Israeli authorities. Further and better integration into Israeli society in the 1990’s, in addition to the decline in their relative percentage-weight in Israel as a result of the immigration of over one-million Jews from the former Soviet Union, has strengthened the notion that they should focus on the struggle for equality within Israel and within the limits set by the existing law. The situation of the Arab citizens in Israel is far from being satisfactory for both sides, either on the level of societies or the relations with the authorities. Mutual suspicion exists and will be on-going for several decades.

Relevant factors in Israeli security policy

- **Intelligence** – One of the most significant elements of public security in profiling the most dangerous groups within a certain minority group or community is the efficiency of the intelligence and information gathered by the security service. Already in the

early 1950's Israel established a very efficient system for collecting information through profiling priorities and degrees of the risky groups out of the entire "suspected" population. It does not only concern the planned terrorist attacks but also delivers a thorough knowledge of the entire Israeli-Arab population with a focus on political subversion as the main field leading to terrorism. Following the thin line between terrorism and criminal activity, the cooperation, coordination, and sharing of information between all the security and law-enforcement agencies is crucial.

- **Education and Public Awareness** – Following a long experience of intensive terrorism, the Israeli public, certainly in the case of the Jewish population and mostly in the case of the Arab, is very much aware of possible terrorist attacks. The public is aware of suspected objects or prepared for intensive security checks in public places. In many cases, the Jewish public is alerted by the presence of people of Arab appearance, or the use of the Arabic language. The majority of the Israeli-Jewish public cannot differ between an Israeli-Arab and a Palestinian from the PA. In many cases Israeli Jews of Middle Eastern origin have been suspected, too. The public awareness and many physical security facilities deter terrorists from carrying out operations. Another important element to note here is compulsory military service for all Jews and the permission to carry weapons quite freely, which has already proved to be useful in many cases, when citizens managed to thwart terrorism or even to arrest or injure terrorists before or after their operation.
- **Identification** – For many reasons, not just security, religion is registered in the Israeli IDs, which eases the security checks.
- Israeli-Arabs are in most cases excluded from any job which is directly or indirectly connected to security or sensitive matters. There has been a gradual change in this field since 1948 as a result of a significant increase of the number of Israeli-Arabs with higher education, and the consistently small number of Arab citizens who have taken part in hostile activities.
- **Social influence** – The mid-1970's were a turning point both in the relations between the Israeli-Arab citizens and the Israeli state, and Israeli-Arab citizens and Jewish society. Above all it marked a start of socio-economic progress as a result of meeting with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. On the political level, it was a period in which identification with Palestinian nationalism and the involvement in Israeli politics within the Arab national parties deepened, and many NGOs emerged. Yet, all these activities led mostly to further political subversion and protests within the Israeli law. On the socio-economic level, their struggle for equality as Israeli-Arab/Palestinian citizens within Israel strengthened and the differences between them and the Palestinians in the territories grew. During the 1980's and later on, especially after the Oslo accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, it became clear that any political solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not include them. The Israeli authorities and Jewish society also "allowed" them to maintain a socio-political struggle within

the Israeli political "rules of the game." Economically, and in some ways even culturally, the differences between Israeli-Arabs and the Palestinians kept growing, too, resulting into a notion that "they have a lot to lose" by acting against the state through political violence or terrorism.

Conclusion

The relative success of the Israeli counter-terrorism policy, especially regarding Israeli-Arab citizens, is the result not only of the deployment of efficient means and a good intelligence infrastructure, but also of the integration of the Israeli-Arabs into the Israeli society; at least as far as the aspects affecting recruitment for terrorism are concerned. Three fundamental points should be noted as a reminder of what might happen in the future in Europe: the first is the importance of profiling individuals or groups with the most secrecy and sensitivity. The European case is more difficult than the Israeli one, since these groups or individuals do not face any military hostilities from their mother countries. European countries cannot impose certain limitations against their citizens; yet, the proportion of illegal immigrants, primarily Muslims, in Western Europe may enable European governments to take such steps in the future. Secondly, socio-political integration is a key element in decreasing the risk of home grown terrorism. Thirdly and finally, public awareness is a highly significant element of counterterrorism policies.

QUESTIONS / COMMENTS AND ANSWERS PANEL II

- *How did the Indian government manage to counter **Sikh terrorism** by focusing on community **leadership**? One of the big problems in Europe is the lack of leadership in the Muslim communities.*
 - *Would a solution to the **Israeli-Arab conflict** put an end to Islamist terrorism?*
 - *International cooperation and state-sponsored activities against **Turkey** by Iraq, Iran, Syria and Greece over the last 20 years – is it possible that this phenomenon could occur in Eastern Europe?*
 - *It was argued that terrorism is not a goal in itself, but as far as global terrorism is concerned, there are no specific **goals** declared. It is hard to imagine that Jihadi terrorists could achieve their goals and then settle down to live in peace.*
-

Swati Parashar:

The government used a lot of **Sikh** symbols during the anti-terror campaign and the police **leadership** came from the Sikh community. The anti-terror campaign in Punjab was led by a Sikh Director General of Police, Mr. K.P.S. Gill. Even during communal riots in India, there is a tendency on the part of the government to use symbols from the communities engaged in the conflict in order to build confidence among the people and calm passions. After the Mumbai train blasts in July 2006, the Muslim leadership responded well in terms of crisis management. The seven trains blasts were followed by another blast in a mosque and graveyard at Malegaon, near Mumbai, in which 13 Muslims died and it was interesting that the police patrolled the area with the local Imam. Together they appealed to the people to refrain from any sort of communal backlash. In view of the general complaints that the police in India have lost the trust of people, it was a strategic thing to do. The police in India need to restore the confidence of the people by engaging the communities directly.

Regarding the concept of terrorism as a means to an end, and not an end in itself; if one studies global terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, one finds that they also started with particular **goals** like attacking the Saudi monarchy. However, they keep shifting their goals, a feature which is very typical of Jihadi organisations today. Any word with the suffix *-ism*, like communism, fascism, capitalism, refers to a structure and a set of ideas and to a belief system. One cannot imagine an end product like a terrorist state ruled by complete anarchy. Al Qaeda is also aiming at the particular goal of an Islamic religious caliphate. Thus, terrorism is a strategy and even a tactic within the larger strategy. It is not an end in itself. I wanted to make the distinction between ends and means because of the debate on the freedom and independence movements, which use terrorism as tactics. When these movements use terrorism, with one act of terror they violate every ideal for which they claim to be struggling. The tough task today is to delegitimise terror as tactics and yet not take away from the legitimacy of some of the movements which are against foreign occupation and against state oppression.

Reuven Paz:

Firstly, it is obvious that the **Israeli–Arab conflict** is used by Al Qaeda or by the other radical Islamic movements, to recruit more support and to justify part of their acts. What is the solution of the Israeli–Arab conflict? The solution, which is accepted in the rest of the democratic world, is two states and a democratic Palestinian state; not a state controlled by Osama bin Laden or other Islamic groups but a state controlled either by Fatah or even by Hamas, which is moving more towards a nationalist movement than an Islamist one. In any case, Hamas is far from being similar to global jihadi movements. The best evidence is the attitude of Al Qaeda itself or the scholars who represent the global jihad, towards Hamas; they have been criticizing Hamas now for several years past, for different reasons starting with “selling Palestine to the Jews”. They claim that there cannot be a compromise on Palestine; you want to either establish a true Islamic state all over Palestine, or stop fighting. Secondly, they claim that Jihad waged by Hamas is no longer a Jihad for Allah but a Jihad of a nationalist nature. Thirdly, during the second intifada, for example, when in some periods Hamas was supporting Yasir Arafat, the global Jihadists were very angry. Yasir Arafat, is for Al Qaeda, a symbol of despotism, dictatorship and of the oppression of Muslims, just like Hosni Mubarak or Saddam Hussein. The resolution of the Israeli–Arab conflict by creating two modern states would not solve the problem of Jihadi terrorism; on the contrary, it might even increase it. It could add Palestine to the list of targets. We have to remember that the vast majority of Jihadi terrorism is targeting *Muslims*, not Christians, Jews or Westerners. Algeria, Iraq and Afghanistan are examples which prove this point.

One of the problems with the Jihadi groups is the fluid definition of their enemy. The enemy is not just the West, the so-called “crusaders”, or Jews but also the Shias and others. A poor Egyptian worker, who went to Iraq to look for work and incidentally found it in an American company, is nowadays automatically an infidel. As an infidel, he is not only to be executed but also beheaded. So the enemy is “everybody who does not think like them”.

I am not sure that we really understand what the **goals** of Al Qaeda are; at least of the traditional hard core. For them, cases like Chechnya or Bosnia provide an opportunity to take advantage of local conflicts in order to create more solidarity or bringing in more volunteers. The dream of bin Laden is perhaps that of using terrorism in, for example, Saudi Arabia, in order to destabilise it and provoke U.S. intervention. The occupation of Saudi Arabia would then create another wave of solidarity and recruitment, in order to fight for the liberation of the heart of Islam. The global Jihadists lack a political vision of what a Muslim state in modern times should look like.

Doğu Ergil:

Iran, Iraq, Syria and Greece had scores to settle with **Turkey**. Iran thinks Turkey is a strategic opponent in theatres like the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Syria wanted more headwaters of the trans-boundary waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. Greece has always felt threaten by Turkey because of various reasons, historical and otherwise. These countries committed the age-old mistake of befriending the enemies of their enemy. But now, Iran is dealing with the unruliness of its own Kurds. Iraq is hopelessly trying to deal with the demands for Kurdish independence while Syria is next in line. Only Greece has no Kurdish minority but she played the Kurdish card to deter Turkey from a possible belligerent act. Fortunately the political elite of this country realized in time that this was both dangerous and unethical and stopped its support of the PKK after this organization's fugitive leader was detected in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi and arrested in 1999. It is after this date that Greece chose to support Turkey's EU membership as the proper strategy for the resolution of its larger security concerns.

However such a development is unlikely to happen between some of the countries in Eastern Europe. Although most of the countries in the region are or are becoming EU members, some others seem to be left out due to lack of shared principles or political alliances. This situation is pregnant with political problems for the near future, as those who are left out may seek to take their place in an illiberal alliance headed by Russia that appears to be increasingly in competition with the West. I feel there is a serious possibility of problems; how they will arise, and when, I cannot say.
