Gigantic shipbuilders under the IMO mandate of GHG emissions: with special references to China, Japan and Korea

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Abstract
To address greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping, the International Maritime Organization has adopted technical and operational measures, and discussed the possibility of adopting market-based measures. China, Japan and South Korea are major shipbuilding nations in the world, and have differing responses towards the IMO's regulatory initiatives. This paper conducts a comparative assessment of these three countries' positions on regulatory principles of the greenhouse gas issue, and concludes that their differentiated perspectives on this matter reflect their different regulatory interests. It is significant to take their differentiated interests into account in the developing regulatory regime to avoid disproportionate burdens being placed on certain countries, in particular developing countries.

Keywords
Japan, Korea, under, IMO, mandate, gigantic, GHG, shipbuilders, emissions, special, references, China

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Keywords
Greenhouse Gas, International Shipping, CBDR Principle, China, Japan, South Korea

I. Introduction

Climate change is one of the most significant challenges to the mankind of the 21st century. This new phenomenon requires “substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions” (“GHGs”).1 Climate change is also related to international shipping, the backbone of global trade and a driving force of the economic globalisation.2 Although often recognised...
as a relatively environmental sound method of transportation, international shipping has been reported to have significant and growing influence on climate change. Given the urgency of emissions reduction and the global nature of the shipping industry, the international community has responded to this imperative and begun to develop a regulatory framework.

The international regulatory efforts in regulating GHG emissions from international shipping can be traced back to the year 1995 when the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC")'s Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice ("SBSTA") and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation ("SBI") were requested to examine the allocation and control of emissions from international bunker fuels. In 1996, SBSTA identified five options from the eight options provided by the UNFCCC Secretariat as the basis for future work on the allocation of emissions from aviation and marine bunker fuels. In order to include GHG emissions from international shipping into a State-based convention, the emissions have to be allocated to different countries. However, this approach failed in reaching consensus among States. As a consequence, Article 2(2) of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC authorised the International Maritime Organization ("IMO") to regulate the GHG emissions from international shipping. Since then, two parallel regimes have been contributing to the


4 In 2007, CO₂ emissions from international shipping reached 870 million tonnes, which covers 2.7% of the global emissions of CO₂. If left unchecked, CO₂ emissions from international shipping may grow by 150-250% by 2050 compared with 2007 due to projected growth in demand for maritime transport service. Buhaug et al, supra note 2, at 1.


7 These five options are: (1) no allocation; (2) allocation to the country where the bunker fuel is sold; (3) allocation to the country of the transporting company, the country of registration of registration of the aircraft/vessel, or the country of the operator; (4) allocation to the country of departure or destination of the aircraft/vessel; and (5) allocation to the country of departure or destination of the passenger/cargo. See S. Oberthür, Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol, 3 Climate Pol’y 191-205, 193 (2003).

8 Id.

9 Article 2(2) of the Kyoto protocol provides that: “The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.” Kyoto Protocol, art 2(2), Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, reported in 37 I.L.M.
international regulatory process of this GHG issue.

The first regime is based on the global climate change where SBSTA worked on marine bunker fuels in 1996, which afterwards has been collaborated with the IMO. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (“AWG-LCA”) under UNFCCC had been working on the issue of international bunker fuels before 2012. Without substantial outcomes on GHG emissions issue, the AWG-LCA finalized its work in 2012 Doha Climate Change Conference as mandated. Currently the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (“ADP”) is working on negotiating a global climate change agreement that will be adopted by 2015 and will enter into force from 2020. Nevertheless, whether or to what extent that the 2015 climate change agreement will involve GHG emissions from international shipping remains unclear.

The second regime is related to the IMO GHG emissions where the IMO has adopted relevant conventions, codes, resolutions and guidelines to regulate GHG emissions issue. Of these various regulative initiatives, Resolution 8\(^\text{11}\) and Resolution A.963 (23)\(^\text{12}\) were adopted by the IMO in 1997 and 2003, respectively, which have underpinned the subsequent actions of the IMO. To date, three categories of measures have been discussed within the Organization in order to address GHG emissions from ships, namely technical measures, operational measures, and market-based measures (“MBMs”).\(^\text{13}\) After lengthy deadlock of negotiations on shipping GHG emissions within the IMO, shipping GHG emissions were partially regulated by technical and operational measures on July 15, 2011. This regulation takes the form of amended Annex VI to the International Convention for the Prevention of

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22. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol only listed six types of GHGs, namely CO\(_2\), CH\(_4\), N\(_2\)O, HFCs, PFCs and SF\(_6\), but a seventh type of GHG, NF\(_3\) was added to the category in the Durban Climate Change Conference in 2011. The GHG emissions from international shipping mainly constitute CO\(_2\), CH\(_4\), N\(_2\)O and HFC. See Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its Sixteenth Session, Decision 1/CMP.7, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Seventh Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf (last visited on Oct. 10, 2014).


13 IMO, supra note 11, at ¶50.
Pollution from Ships (hereinafter MARPOL 73/78). By adding a new Chapter 4 to Annex VI on the regulation on energy efficiency for ships, this amendment makes mandatory the Energy Efficiency Design Index ("EEDI") for new ships, and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan ("SEEMP") for all ships. As this regulation was adopted by a majority vote rather than consensus, it is predicted that the future enforcement of this regulation will face certain challenges and uncertainties. To date seven types of MBM proposals, which aim to complement the technical and operational measures in reducing shipping GHG emissions, have been submitted to the IMO for discussions.

China, Japan, and South Korea are main flag States and shipping nations of the world. In particular, the shares of the global shipbuilding order book (in Gross Tonnage) by these three countries accounted for 88.49% in 2012. Therefore, the responses of these three

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15 As the main technical measure, the EEDI provides a specific figure representing a minimum energy efficiency level or technological threshold for certain ship types and size segments. Ship designers and shipbuilders are free to choose the most cost-efficient technological solutions for the ship once the minimum energy efficiency level required by the EEDI is achieved. IMO, supra note 11, at ¶57.

16 The SEEMP is an operational measure. As a ship-specific energy management plan, the SEEMP provides a flexible mechanism for shipowners and ship operators to monitor ship and fleet efficiency performance over time in a cost-effective manner. The Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI) is often utilized as a monitoring tool and to establish benchmarks related to ships’ energy efficiency. Id. at 59.


18 These seven types of MBM proposals are International GHG Fund, port State levy, Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS), Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT), Global Emissions Trading System (ETS) for international shipping, Penalty on Trade and Development, and Rebate Mechanism (RM). Among them, the SECT and Penalty on Trade and Development have been modified to be strengthened technical and operational measures. However, as options for possible MBMs, these two MBM proposals are still on the table. See Further Details on the US Proposal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, submitted by the United States, MEPC 61/4 Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.24 (Jul 23, 2010); How Technical and Operational Measures are the Only Direct and Effective Means to Deliver Cuts in CO2 Emissions, submitted by the Bahamas, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 2, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/2 (Dec. 22, 2010).

19 Recent research indicates that to achieve absolute emissions reduction using the EEDI and SEEMP alone is not possible due to the projected growth in international seaborne trade. See Z. Bazari & T. Longva, Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping,8 IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.2, annex( Oct. 31, 2011).

countries to the IMO’s regulatory initiatives, in particular the applicable regulatory principles, to a significant extent determine whether these measures could be effectively enforced by global shipping industries, and are thus worthy of an assessment. Different from China and Japan who are widely accepted as a developing and a developed country respectively, the status of South Korea is a bit ambiguous; she has been regarded as a developed country by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) and other international organisations. However, South Korea is also a UNFCCC non-Annex I State; it means she has been identified as a developing country under the global climate change regime. For these reasons the views of Korean Government, as well as its shipping industry, on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships are different from those of Japan. In this sense, China, Japan, and South Korea represent a major developing country, a typical developed country, and a developed but treated as a developing country respectively. A comparative assessment of these three countries’ perspectives on GHG emissions from ships can reflect the positions of many other developing countries and developed countries.

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine and compare the perspectives of China, Japan, and South Korea on regulatory principles of GHG emissions from international shipping. These countries’ positions on the IMO’s mandate and competence to regulate GHG emissions from ships are also analyzed for their relevance with applicable principles of this GHG issue. This article is divided into four parts including Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will investigate the shipping industries of China, Japan and Korea. Part three will compare the perspectives of those three countries on regulatory principles of GHG Emissions from international shipping.

II. The Shipping Industries in China, Japan and South Korea

A. China

Although China’s first international shipping company was established in 1961, the benign development of China’s international shipping sector, as well as its shipbuilding sector, only started in 1978 when its reform and opening up policy was adopted. China’s shipping

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22 Gao Weijie, Development Strategy of Chinese Shipping Company under the Multilateral Framework of WTO
industry has achieved rapid development after three decades’ development. As of January 1, 2013, China ranked ninth in the world among the flags of registration with the largest registered deadweight tonnage.\(^23\) In the same year, China owned the third largest fleet in the world with 190,078,835 deadweight tonnages, which covered 11.78% of the world fleet.\(^24\) However, 64.79% of these Chinese owned fleets (in terms of deadweight tonnage) sailed under the flags of foreign States. In 2010, China’s shipbuilding sector ranked first in the world in three categories, namely, its accomplished shipbuilding output, volume of new ship orders, and holding orders, which covered 43%, 54%, and 41% of the world market, respectively.\(^25\)

B. Japan

Japan is a traditional maritime power in the world as well as important flag State. As of January 1, 2013, Japan ranked 14\(^{th}\) in the world among the flags of registration with the largest registered deadweight tonnage.\(^26\) Meanwhile, Japan owned the second largest fleet in the world with 223,815,008 deadweight tonnage, which accounted for 13.87% of the world fleet.\(^27\) Of these Japanese owned fleets, 92.31% of them (in terms of deadweight tonnage) flew the flags of foreign States.\(^28\) Japan is one of the most advanced UNFCCC Annex I States and has pioneered most energy-efficient shipping technologies. Consequently, although Japan’s share of world shipbuilding output has fallen from around 34% in 1999 to 18% in 2011, due to worsening global economic conditions,\(^29\) Japan is still receiving many international orders for building larger and more complicated vessels with more added values. Japan’s shipping industry is competitive in the international high-level or energy efficient shipbuilding market.\(^30\)

\(^{23}\) UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 56.

\(^{24}\) Id. at 41.


\(^{26}\) UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 56.

\(^{27}\) Id. at 43.

\(^{28}\) Id.

\(^{29}\) During this period, China and South Korea both increased their shares of world shipbuilding output and reached 39% and 31% respectively. Council Working Party on Shipbuilding, supra note 20, at 23.

\(^{30}\) Id. at 30.
C. South Korea

The South Korean shipbuilding sector only began its development in the early 1970s. Nevertheless, to date, South Korea has become one of the main shipping nations of the world. As of January 1, 2013, South Korea controlled the fifth largest owned fleets (dwt) in the world with 764 vessels registered under Korean flags and 812 registered in other flag States.\(^{31}\) The deadweight tonnage it owned in that year accounted for 4.65% of the world total.\(^{32}\) The South Korean shipbuilding sector has ranked first among South Korean exports since 2008,\(^ {33}\) and is now home to seven of the world’s ten largest shipbuilding companies. Among the seven top shipbuilders, Hyundai Heavy Industries (“HHI”), Samsung Heavy Industries (“SHI”) and Daewoo Shipbuilding (“DSB”), also called the ‘Big 3’, are believed to have dominated the global market in terms of output.\(^ {34}\)

D. Assessment

Given that China, Japan and South Korea are all important players of international shipping trade, these three countries are also competitors in global shipping market, in particular in shipbuilding market. With its booming shipbuilding capability, South Korea overtook Japan to be the world’s largest shipbuilding nation in 2000, after Japan surpassed its European counterparts in 1956. This title was taken over by China in 2010 due to China’s better performance in exports of ships, but in 2011 South Korea regained the top spot as global shipowners ordered more complex high-technological vessels, in the production of which currently South Korea has absolute advantages over China.\(^ {35}\) Against this backdrop, China, Japan and South Korea have made differentiated responses to the IMO’s regulatory initiatives.

III. China, Japan and South Korea’s Perspectives on Regulatory Principles of GHG Emissions from International Shipping

It is generally accepted that the varying interpretations of Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol

\(^{31}\) UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 43.

\(^{32}\) Id.


\(^{34}\) Id.

by various countries has been the core obstacle in the regulation of shipping GHG emissions by the IMO. In other words, it is still open to debate whether the IMO has a mandate from the Kyoto Protocol to regulate the GHG issue.\textsuperscript{36} This discussion is significant in the sense that the generally-accepted origin of the IMO’s GHG mandate determines what kind of regulatory principles and measures apply to the regulation of this GHG issue.\textsuperscript{37} Generally speaking, if an international treaty gives the IMO a mandate, the principles incorporated into the treaty should also apply to the IMO’s regulation of the GHG issue.\textsuperscript{38} Therefore, if the IMO gets its mandate to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping from the Kyoto Protocol, the Common but Differentiated Responsibility (“CBDR”) principle\textsuperscript{39} which runs through the Kyoto Protocol\textsuperscript{40} should apply to GHG emissions reductions from ships. Similarly, if the Convention on the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter IMO Convention) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)\textsuperscript{41} give the IMO this GHG mandate, the No More Favourable Treatment (“NMFT”) principle,\textsuperscript{42} which has been consistently incorporated by all IMO agreements, should apply to this issue. Meanwhile, once the origin of the IMO’s GHG mandate is agreed, the measures beyond the IMO’s competence should not be adopted by the IMO to regulate this GHG issue.


\textsuperscript{39} The CBDR principle requires both developed and developing States to contribute to addressing environmental problems, but imposes the primary responsibility on developed States due to their different historical contribution to the problems and the differentiated capability of developed and developing States. This principle was first explicitly formulated in Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and has been widely accepted and endorsed in many conventions and treaties, including the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. See Philippe Sands, \textit{Principles of International Environmental Law} 287 (Cambridge University Press, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed, 2003).

\textsuperscript{40} Kyoto Protocol art 10.


\textsuperscript{42} The NMFT principle refers to ‘port States enforcing applicable standards in a uniform manner to all ships in their ports, regardless of flag’. Buhaug et al, \textit{supra} note 2, at 20. See also MARPOL 73/78 art 5(4).
Alternatively, the IMO may collaborate with other competent international organisations in adopting these measures.\textsuperscript{43} China, Japan and South Korea have expressed their positions and provided theoretical analysis to underpin their arguments due to the significance of the IMO’s mandate issue.

A. China’s Perspective

China has expressed its views on this GHG issue by submitting a number of proposals and statements to the IMO since the 52\textsuperscript{nd} Marine Environment Protection Committee (“MEPC”) meeting in 2004.\textsuperscript{44} Through submitting these documents, China has attempted to address three concerns such as: (1) what is the scope of the IMO’s mandate and competence in regulating the GHG issue?; (2) why the CBDR principle should be applied to the GHG issue?; and (3) how the CBDR principle could be applied to this issue?\textsuperscript{45}

China took the view that the scope of the IMO’s competence in regulating the GHG issue should be limited to technology or methodology related matters,\textsuperscript{46} and the proposed MBMs under discussion are beyond the competence of the IMO.\textsuperscript{47} Supporting the IMO to regulate technical issues, however, China thus asserted that MBMs should be decided by the UNFCCC if they are to be regulated in the future.\textsuperscript{48} Although this view has been supported by a number of developing countries,\textsuperscript{49} China did not provide legal basis for its assertion in its submitted documents. Indeed, the IMO Convention provides the

\textsuperscript{43} Shi, supra note 37.

\textsuperscript{44} The MEPC is responsible for the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping. \textit{IMO Convention} arts 11, 38; \textit{IMO Resolution A.963(23)} art 1.


\textsuperscript{47} Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, annex 4, p 2, MEPC 60\textsuperscript{th} Session, Agenda Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 60/22 (Apr. 12, 2010).

\textsuperscript{48} Id.

\textsuperscript{49} For example, this view was also held by Brazil, Venezuela and Malaysia. See Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, annex 3, pp 5-7, MEPC 61\textsuperscript{st} Session, Agenda Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (Oct. 6, 2010).
Organization with economic purpose. However, in practice the purposes of the IMO have been limited to technical aspects only, and its economic mandate has never been allowed to be exercised. Meanwhile, China and its shipping industry are opposed to any unilateral actions, in particular, the proposed inclusion of GHG emissions from international shipping into a European Union Emission Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”).

China has put forward five reasons to underpin the application of the CBDR principle to GHG emissions from international shipping. First, the IMO received its mandate to regulate the GHG issue from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol; this is also the only mandate in regulating the GHG issue. Therefore, the fundamental principles that UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have set for regulating climate change, including the CBDR principle, should also apply to the IMO in addressing GHG emissions from international shipping.

Second, the CBDR principle is not just the principle drawn from UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol; it rather represents the fundamental consensus of the international community in tackling climate change. Thus, all relevant international organizations should give due respect to the CBDR principle when they contribute to addressing climate change. The IMO is no exception.

Third, the IMO Assembly rejected a recommendation that Resolution A.963 (23) on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships “should be based on a common policy applicable to all ships rather than based on the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol” in 2003. China is opined that the above assertion by MEPC was proved ‘wrong.’ The IMO’s Legal Division interpreted that its GHG mandate was not from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol, but from the UNCLOS and the IMO Convention. However, China argued that Article 2(2) shall only

50 IMO Convention art 1(b)(c).
53 Shi, supra note 37, at 112.
57 Id.
59 IMO, supra note 11, at para 121.
be interpreted by the Conference of the Parties (“COP”) and the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (“CMP”), which are the competent bodies of the Protocol rather than any other body.\textsuperscript{60} China agreed that Articles 1 and 64 of the IMO Convention give the IMO competence in regulating the GHG issue, but underscored that the Kyoto Protocol is still “the most direct and authoritative” for such authorization.\textsuperscript{61} From the perspective of international law, China’s rebuttal on the interpretation of Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol by the Legal Division of the IMO is persuasive in the sense that the IMO is not the competent organization for such interpretation.\textsuperscript{62} However, China’s argument on the relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and the IMO Convention in authorizing the IMO this regulatory work is lack of sufficient legal basis. This is because the Kyoto Protocol and the IMO Convention are two parallel treaties; it is thus unlikely to tell which treaty should prevail when there is a conflict between them.\textsuperscript{63} For this reason, it is not persuasive for China to claim that the Kyoto Protocol is the “most direct and authoritative” for the IMO’s work in regulating this GHG issue.\textsuperscript{64}

Fourth, to apply the NMFT principle and exclude the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue would be unfair for developing countries. The largest share of GHG emissions from international shipping is attributed to the historical development of the shipping industry in developed countries,\textsuperscript{65} currently controlling the majority of the world deadweight tonnage.\textsuperscript{66} That is why the application of the NMFT principle would place the technologically disadvantaged developing countries in a worse position for development due to their lack of “survival emissions”.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{60} Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, annex 9, p 2, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (Oct. 16, 2008).

\textsuperscript{61} Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, annex 4, p 2, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 60/22 (Apr. 12, 2010).

\textsuperscript{62} Under international law, competent organizations to interpret a treaty include the treaty Parties, an ad hoc tribunal or the International Court conferred by the treaty, and the organs of the competent international organisation. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 630 (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2008).

\textsuperscript{63} Shi, supra note 37, at 85.

\textsuperscript{64} However, it can be argued that the mandate that the IMO gets from the Kyoto Protocol is more specific than it gets from the IMO Convention. See id.


\textsuperscript{66} Id. at para 5.

\textsuperscript{67} Id. at para 4. In this context, the “survival emissions” refer to the heavy reliance of many developing countries on necessary emissions associated with their shipping industry. See also Mark J. Mwandosya, Survival Emissions: A Perspective from the South on Global Climate Change Negotiations (2000).
Fifth, as a response to a criticism that the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue would possibly make most ships exempt from the global reduction regulations due to the existence of Flag of Convenience (“FOC”), China asserted that this concern could be addressed. In China's view, the beneficially-owned tonnage could be targeted in a way that was utilized by the Review of Maritime Transport by the UNCTAD, based on the data supplied by Lloyd's Register-Fairplay. China suggested that the nationality of ships (flag State) be defined as the nationality of shipowners for the purpose of applying the CBDR principle in the context of GHG emissions from international shipping. In this way, the application of the CBDR principle would not seemingly make the ships, which are owned by the nationals of developed States but are flying the flags of developing States, be exempt from compulsory reduction commitments. However, shipowners may be companies or other business entities in law. It is thus possible that the nationals of developed States register their companies in developing States investing in ships so as to avoid the stringent regulations. China maintained that the CBDR principle should be applied to all three routes of reduction measures such as technical, operational measures and MBMs. In a broad sense the ‘differentiated responsibility’ element of the CBDR principle consists of the following three categories: (1) differentiated central obligations; (2) differentiated implementation arrangements; and (3) the granting of assistance including financial and technological assistance. China suggested all these three scenarios to the energy efficiency measures being discussed within the IMO, although two of these proposals have not got positive responses by other IMO member States. At the 61st MEPC meeting, China proposed that EEDI “should be mandatory to developed countries and voluntary to developing countries.” This proposal reflects China's interpretation on applying the CBDR principle to this GHG issue. That is to impose differentiated central obligations on various States. At the 62nd MEPC meeting, China proposed a phased-in approach for developing countries in

70 Id. at para 7.
71 Id.
implementing EEDI and SEEMP. This approach belongs to the “differentiated implementation arrangement” element of the CBDR principle. However, neither of them was accepted by most countries. Under these circumstances, after the adoption of the revised MARPOL Annex VI, China turned to the last opportunity of partially incorporating the CBDR principle to the energy efficiency measures. The recognition of the CBDR principle was eventually written into the MEPC resolution on technical cooperation and transfer of technology. As a result, China was getting more enthusiastic to participating in related discussions under the guidance of the CBDR principle. Considering that many developed countries reserved their positions on this provision, however, whether the CBDR principle can be reflected in the implementation of this resolution is still doubted.

China has been a persistent opponent of MBMs to be applied to this GHG issue. However, China has suggested that, if a MBM is to be adopted, the CBDR principle should apply in a manner that “no extra financial responsibility” will be brought to developing countries. She proposed two principles to achieve this goal. First, the basic principles and key elements of MBMs should be determined by UNFCCC. Second, any funds generated from any MBM should be only provided to the shipping sector in developing countries. If comparing China’s claims with the current MBM proposals, it would not be straightforward to meet China’s proposal.

B. Japan’s Perspective

In comparison with these large developing countries like China and India which frequently reiterated their positions on the CBDR principle by lodging their statements to the IMO, Japan formally expressed its views on the regulatory principles for addressing GHG emissions from international shipping at the 58th and 59th MEPC meetings. First, Japan supported the role of the IMO in regulating the GHG issue asserting that there should be

75 For details, see Draft MEPC Resolution on Promotion of Technical Cooperation and Technology Transfer Relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships, annex, submitted by Angola, Argentina, China, India, Jamaica, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa and Venezuela, MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 64/4/30 (Jul. 27, 2012).
78 Id.
79 Id.
adherence to the NMFT principle.\textsuperscript{80} It supported the nine fundamental principles agreed at the 57\textsuperscript{th} MEPC meeting.\textsuperscript{81} In view of strong opposition from many countries on the second principle (hereinafter NMFT principle), however, Japan, together with some other States, suggested an improved expression of this principle in order to reach consensus. It proposed that the future IMO framework should be “binding and equally applicable to all ships” rather than “binding and equally applicable to all flag States.”\textsuperscript{82} However, this proposal was not accepted by those delegations not supporting the second principle.\textsuperscript{83} It was probably because this proposal still applied the NMFT principle, and thus was opposed by major developing countries, particularly major shipbuilding developing countries. Although these developing countries can flag their ships with FOC States, various regional Memoranda of Understanding (“MOUs”) on port State control will make it very difficult to operate and trade with substandard ships.\textsuperscript{84}

Second, Japan supported the US view that “the IMO’s mandate on GHG emissions from shipping predates, and does not derive from the Kyoto Protocol.”\textsuperscript{85} Indeed, if this assertion is generally agreed, the CBDR principle will “[have] no place in the IMO.”\textsuperscript{86} However, this view has been supported by many developed countries, such as Norway, New Zealand, and Denmark.\textsuperscript{87}

Third, Japan respects the CBDR principle applied in UNFCCC; she argued that the CBDR principle could be reflected in other ways including through technical cooperation in

\textsuperscript{80} Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58\textsuperscript{th} Session, annex 9, p 19, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (Oct. 16, 2008).

\textsuperscript{81} At the 57\textsuperscript{th} MEPC meeting, the nine fundamental principles were agreed by “an overwhelming majority” but the second principle was opposed by some States. See Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, para 4.77, MEPC 57\textsuperscript{th} Session, Agenda Item 21, IMO Doc MEPC 57/21 (Apr. 7, 2008).

\textsuperscript{82} See Identifying Consensus on IMO Principles on Addressing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, MEPC 58\textsuperscript{th} Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/16 (Aug. 1, 2008).

\textsuperscript{83} Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, para 4.76, MEPC 57\textsuperscript{th} Session, Agenda Item 21, IMO Doc MEPC 57/21 (Apr. 7, 2008).

\textsuperscript{84} The MOUs on port State control have become a dominant means of facilitating effective port State control at the regional level. Currently there are nine MOUs. The reasons why regional MOUs have achieved rapid development include: the elimination of “port shopping”; improving inspection efficiency by means of harmonization between port States; and the reduction of the foreign ship’s burden of repetitive inspections. Ho-Sam Bang, Is Port State Control an Effective Means to Combat Vessel-Source Pollution? An Empirical Survey of the Practical Exercise by Port States of their Powers of Control, 23 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 726 (2008).

\textsuperscript{85} Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58\textsuperscript{th} Session, annex 9, pp 11, 19, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (Oct. 16, 2008).

\textsuperscript{86} Id. at 10.

\textsuperscript{87} Id.
the regulation of the GHG issue. Compared to many other developed countries' positions, Japan’s view reveals its willingness of cooperation and compromise. As already discussed, based on a broad interpretation of the CBDR principle, an effective technical cooperation including the transfer of technology, in addition to financial assistance from developed countries to developing countries, could constitute a type of “differentiated responsibility” of the CBDR principle. In May 2013, however, the IMO adopted a resolution on Promotion of Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships, which in the preamble recognised both the CBDR and NMFT principles. Although the expressions utilize the words “being cognizant” to replace the proposed “acknowledging” by other countries, it was encouraging for most developing countries to expect more beneficial measures in facilitating the transfer of technologies as regulated in the amended Annex VI to the MARPOL. As a response to this adoption, Japan, together with Australia and the US, lodged a statement to the meeting report, which clarified that the CBDR principle applies in UNFCCC while the NMFT principle applies in the IMO and under the MARPOL. This statement indicates that Japan did not welcome the application of the CBDR principle to this issue from any perspective, although it asserted earlier at the 58th MEPC meeting that this principle could be reflected in certain ways.

C. South Korea’s Perspective

South Korea is a highly-developed shipbuilding country and has actively participated in the discussions on proposed technical, operational measures and MBMs within the IMO. At the 61st MEPC meeting in 2011, South Korea asserted that the IMO is “the appropriate body to develop and enact regulations for emissions from international shipping.”

Unlike its Chinese counterparts, the South Korean shipbuilding sector, in particular its

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89 See, e.g., the US asserted that the CBDR principle ‘has no place in the IMO’ and is inconsistent with the actions taken by the IMO. Id. at p 10.


91 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI reg. 23.2.


large-sized shipbuilding companies, welcomes the planned unilateral actions by the EU to strengthening environmental regulations.\(^9^4\) South Korea’s large shipbuilders believe that they can gain more orders for constructing high-efficiency, eco-friendly ships once various EU technical, operational and market-based measures are in place.\(^9^5\) In contrast to the positive attitudes to reducing GHG emissions from ships by Korean shipping associations and large-sized shipbuilding companies, small and medium-sized shipping companies, however, are not so supportive of this kind of regulation. A survey in 2011 revealed that Korea’s small and medium-sized shipping firms were concerned that stricter environmental regulations on ships might further increase their manufacturing costs and weaken their price competitiveness, while their Chinese counterparts might not be influenced in this way.\(^9^6\) Due to the existence of such a gap between different shipping firms, many small and medium-sized companies have not started their preparation for incorporating EEDI and SEEMP measures,\(^9^7\) while large size companies have responded quickly to meet new requirements. E.g., HHI has been keen to develop its environmentally friendly high-value vessels, including drillships, liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) carriers, mega containerships, and those using LNG as a fuel.\(^9^8\) With this strategy, HHI has achieved remarkable success in getting new orders.

With regard to the CBDR principle, South Korea acknowledged it as a significant political matter which needs “deep consideration”; she pointed out that the matter would be addressed by ‘various options’.\(^9^9\) Additionally, South Korea limited these ‘various options’ to “financial arrangement for technical cooperation and capacity building for less developed countries.”\(^1^0^0\) These expressions indicate that South Korea supported the application of the CBDR principle to GHG emissions issue based on its broad interpretation on the CBDR principle; it means that this principle could be applied to this GHG issue by the granting of


\(^{95}\) Id.


\(^{97}\) Id.

\(^{98}\) Lee, supra note 35.


\(^{100}\) Id.
financial assistance and technical cooperation to developing countries. At the 61st MEPC meeting, South Korea asserted that the IMO is the appropriate body to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping “with harmonization” between the CBDR principle and the NMFT principle.\footnote{Comments on the Use of Credits of the Clean Development Mechanism in Market-based Measures for International Shipping, para 2, submitted by the Republic of Korea, MEPC 61\textsuperscript{st} Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/28 (Aug. 6, 2010).} It can be inferred that South Korea supported the application of both the CBDR and NMFT principles to the GHG issue, although her interpretation on the CBDR principle is different from that of China. South Korea has not explicitly expressed its views on the origin of the IMO’s mandate. However, it supported the nine fundamental principles adopted by the 57\textsuperscript{th} MEPC meeting.\footnote{See, e.g., Report of the Third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, para 3.4.3, note by the Secretariat, MEPC 62\textsuperscript{nd} Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (Apr. 8, 2011).} The incorporation of the NMFT principle into the second principle reveals South Korea’s support for applying the NMFT principle to GHG emissions from ships. This position makes South Korea distinct from many other UNFCCC non-Annex I States, such as Brazil, South Africa and India.

D. A Comparative Assessment

China, Japan and South Korea all support the leading role of the IMO in regulating technical and operational measures to reduce shipping GHG emissions. They all agree the role of the CBDR principle in the global climate change regime, i.e., a regime under UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. However, their views towards the IMO’s role in regulating MBMs and the application of the CBDR principle to GHG emissions issue are divergent.

While China doubted the IMO’s competence in regulating MBMs and asserted that this work should be determined by UNFCCC, both Japan and South Korea supported the IMO’s role in regulating MBMs. The NMFT principle is the real ground behind the different positions of these countries. Since it is open to debate whether the Kyoto Protocol is the sole mandate that the IMO has received so far in regulating GHG emissions issue, it becomes reasonable for countries to interpret Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol to meet their regulatory interests. If Chinese argument on the IMO’s competence is accepted by most IMO member States, the NMFT principle will not be applied to the proposed MBMs in further regulating this GHG issue. Considering their comparative advantages in energy efficient technologies, nevertheless, the shipping industries in Japan and South Korea would be less negatively affected by the increased transportation cost due to possible adoption of MBMs
than that in China.\textsuperscript{103} Table 1 provides the divergent views of China, Japan, South Korea and their shipping industries on the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping.

Table 1. Positions of China, Japan, South Korea and their shipping industries on the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>IMO competence in regulating technical &amp; operational measures</th>
<th>IMO competence in regulating MBMs</th>
<th>Application of the CBDR principle</th>
<th>Application of the NMFT principle</th>
<th>Unilateral actions by the EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese shipping industry</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese shipping industry</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>“conditional” recognition</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korean shipping industry</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author.

The shipping industries in China and South Korea have opposite views on possible unilateral actions by the EU. The EU generally launches its unilateral actions when the regulatory process of competent international organizations is slow, and these unilateral actions are usually more stringent than the proposals being discussed within the international organization.\textsuperscript{104} For this reason, these different views from Chinese and South Korean shipping industries probably reveal that under proposed IMO regulations the technologically-advantaged Korean shipping industry would be more competitive when compared to its Chinese competitors. Although Japan’s shipping industry has pioneered most energy efficient shipping technologies, it remains unclear whether she supports possible unilateral actions by the EU.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{103} Council Working Party on Shipbuilding, \textit{supra} note 20, at 29.

\textsuperscript{104} For example, in January 2012 the EU included the emissions from international aviation into the EU Emission Trading Scheme due to slow progress within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). This unilateral action significantly increased the cost of many airlines and was thus opposed by many countries. Consequently this policy suspended in December 2012. In October 2013, an EU proposal on its unilateral ETS was rejected by the 38\textsuperscript{th} ICAO Assembly since the ICAO adopted its own MBM agreement based on which a proposal for a global MBM scheme would be agreed in 2016 and be implemented by 2020. See Information Relevant to Emissions from Fuel Used for International Aviation and Maritime Transport, Executive Summary, 3, UNFCCC SBSTA 39\textsuperscript{th} Session, Warsaw, Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2013/MISC.20 (Nov. 10, 2013).

\textsuperscript{105} For details, see Anuradha, R.V., “Unilateral Measures and Climate Change” (Centre for WTO Studies, IIFT Bhawan, May 25, 2012), 11, \textit{available at} http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/Books/Anuradha%20Unilateral%20measures.pdf (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014);
China has continuously supported the application of the CBDR principle to GHG emissions from ships. Although China interpreted this principle as differentiated central obligations between developed countries and developing countries, China also attempted to apply other options to partially adopt the principle. They are differentiated implementation arrangement and the granting of financial assistance and transfer of technology. Compared with China, Japan opposed the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue from any perspective. Actually, this comparison reflects the conflict between major developing and developed countries as to approaches of appropriately balancing equity and fairness in combating climate change; today there is a trend of weakening the CBDR principle in global climate change negotiations.\(^{106}\)

While China supported the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue rather than the NMFT principle, South Korea welcomed the application of both principles in this regard. In addition to their different views towards the NMFT principle, the divergence of China and South Korea also lies in their differing interpretation of the CBDR principle. To some extent, the CBDR principle that South Korea interpreted is not the same one that China understood. This indicates that there are differing regulatory interests between States which are not listed under Annex I to UNFCCC. Aside from large developing countries which are also main importing countries, main FOC States, least developed countries and small-island developing States all have differentiated regulatory interests.\(^{107}\) Such difference determines that these UNFCCC non-Annex I States take differentiated positions on this CBDR issue.

In comparison to Japan’s opposition to the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue, South Korea adopted a “conditional” recognition of this principle. Although both Japan and South Korea are the members of OECD, their different legal affiliations under the Kyoto Protocol may lead to the differentiated regulatory interests and responses.

IV. Conclusion

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The international community has a goal of limiting an increase of two degrees Celsius in the
global average temperature by 2100 in tackling climate change.\textsuperscript{108} However, a recent report
by the Asian Development Bank reveals that an increase of two degrees Celsius by 2050 is
“almost unavoidable”\textsuperscript{109} Compared with the average of 1961-1990, mean temperatures will be
1.9-2.6 degrees Celsius higher across the East Asian region in 2050 and 3.8-5.2 degrees
Celsius higher in 2090.\textsuperscript{110} Owing to the significant contributions of China, Japan and South
Korea to global climate change,\textsuperscript{111} it is vital for these three countries to ensure the compliance
of their ships with the adopted energy efficiency measures. Nevertheless, EEDI has had and
will continue to have more negative impacts on Chinese shipbuilding industry than on the
shipping industries in Japan and South Korea; the Index may even “trigger another migration
of shipbuilding industry in the future.”\textsuperscript{112} It will thus be more important for China to secure
the incorporation of the CBDR principle in certain ways as to future improvement of the
EEDI and SEEMP, as well as future adoption of MBMs.

As discussed throughout this paper, the differentiated perspectives of these three
countries on the regulation of GHG emissions issue generally reflect their differing
regulatory interests. Therefore, it is significant to take their differentiated interests into
account in the developing regulatory regime to avoid disproportionate burdens being placed
on certain countries, in particular developing countries.

\textsuperscript{108} Lavanya Rajamani, \textit{The Cancun Climate Change Agreements: Reading the Text, Subtext and Tea Leaves},
\textsuperscript{109} Michael Westphal, Gordon Hughes and Jorn Brommelhorster (eds), \textit{Economics of Climate Change in East
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Id}.
Pol’y & Manage. 495-510, 495 (2013).